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Abstract/Summary

The impact of Irish nationalism on central Scotland, 1898 – 1939

The years 1898 to 1939 were momentous ones for both Irish and Scottish history. The rise of Sinn Fein, the impact of the First World War and the Easter Rising, followed by the formation of the Irish Free State in 1921 and Eire in 1937 all occurred within these forty or so years. This thesis explores the nature and extent of the impact that Irish nationalism had on Scotland in this period.

This thesis divides these years into four segments: from 1898 when Irish nationalists began to renew their activities in Scotland in earnest, to the Easter Rising in 1916 (i); from the suppression of the Easter Rising until the establishment of the Irish Free State in 1922 (ii); from 1922 until the 1931 census when anti-Irish prejudice was widespread again in Scotland, coming in particular from the Church of Scotland and associated institutions (iii); from the Depression to the coming of the Second World War in 1939, when these institutions altered their campaigns to become anti-Catholic in general and the IRA once again looked to Scotland for assistance.

There can be little doubt that Irish nationalism had a profound effect on Scotland and had its many different aspects: the organisation of IRA supply and training activity; the military and intelligence responses by the British government; the reaction of the Protestant churches, and the anti-Irish or anti-Catholic campaigns of the Church of Scotland in particular; the influence on the movement for Scottish Home Rule and the founding of a nationalist political party with the NPS in 1928; the electoral benefits enjoyed by the Labour Party from an already politicised ‘Irish’ vote; and the conflict between constitutional and militant Irish nationalist politics. This mixture of both positive and negative effects demonstrates the deep impact made on Scotland during a transitional period of economic adjustment amid continuing urbanisation. It was in the industrial towns and cities of central Scotland that this impact was most keenly felt, on both sides of the religious divide, and this presents itself as an underlying cause of the continuing religious bigotry felt in central Scotland to this day.
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Julian M Agnew

21 June 2009
Buion dar slua thar toinn do thainig chugainn

Faoi mhoid bheithe saor…

(Amhran na bhFiann)
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A Note on Terminology

This thesis often uses the term ‘Catholic’ throughout, instead of the technically correct ‘Roman Catholic’ to refer to people in Ireland or Scotland of this religion.

The term ‘Irish-Scots’ is used in Chapter II to describe the immigrant Catholic community in Scotland. Thereafter, for reasons explained in the Introduction, the term ‘Scots-Irish’ is used instead.

Between 1911 and 1964 the Conservative Party was known as the Unionist Party as it had merged with many former Liberal Unionists. This thesis uses ‘Conservatives’ until 1911 and thereafter uses ‘Unionist’ to describe the same group, unless it appears in lower-case which means a reference to any institution which supported the Union itself.

All other errors in this thesis are my own…
Chapter I: Introduction

The years between 1898 and 1939 were momentous ones for Irish history. The rise of Sinn Fein, the First World War, and the Easter Rising, the formation of the Irish Free State in 1921 and then Eire in 1937 all occurred within these forty or so years. In this chapter the historical background to the events of this period will be examined along with the political legacies at work. All these events had an impact on Scotland, but it will be shown that the cultural connections between Ireland and Scotland caused a varied, and in some respects, an unexpected impact on the Scottish people.

The period between the beginning of the twentieth century and the coming of the Second World War represented years of culmination during which Irish nationalism arguably achieved most of what it had sought in the rebellion of 1798 and since the Union of 1801. The activity of Irish nationalists throughout the nineteenth century – mostly peaceful but occasionally violent – will be discussed below; but this activity should be seen as a gradual movement towards the fulfilment of the Irish nationalist agenda which was arguably realised in 1921.

The position of Scotland in relation to Ireland and Irish politics is a particularly interesting one. Irish immigration and Irish nationalist activity affected the whole of Britain, but Scotland received proportionately more Irish immigrants than anywhere else in Britain and there was also an exceptional religious dimension at work which caused greater tension in Scotland throughout the period than in the rest of Britain. This made Scots more palpably aware of Irish issues, as they were always brought sharply into focus by this peculiar politico-religious dimension.
It is possible to divide the years between 1898 and 1939 into four distinct segments of varying lengths. Firstly, from 1898 when Irish nationalists began to renew their activities in earnest to the Easter Rising in 1916; secondly, from the suppression of the Easter Rising until the establishment of the Irish Free State in 1922; thirdly, from 1922 until the census of 1931 when anti-Irish prejudice was widespread in central Scotland, coming in particular from the Presbyterian churches and other unionist institutions; and finally from the Depression to the coming of the Second World War in 1939, when these institutions altered their campaigns to become anti-Catholic in general and the IRA looked to Scotland once again for assistance.

These divisions will aid analysis and should help to produce a clearer picture of the impact of Irish nationalism on Scotland, showing it to be more complex than previously thought. This thesis proposes that there were, in fact, four separate and distinctive stages of reaction to Irish nationalism in Scotland between 1898 and 1939. There is also the important issue of distinguishing between different types of impact to consider, as well as the issue of how impact can actually be measured. The impact of Irish nationalism on Scotland ranges from the direct impact on government agencies like the intelligence services who monitored the evolution of Irish nationalism (and particularly Irish republican activity), and were aiming to minimise its effect on the internal security of the United Kingdom. Another direct impact was on the immigrant Irish community in Scotland. Support for Irish nationalism from the Irish-Scots peaked in the years before the First World War and began to recede thereafter, mainly due to the conflict between constitutional and militant methods after the renaissance of republicanism. Wider public opinion in Scotland was also greatly affected by the Irish Home Rule debate before 1914, and by the perceived threat of Irish republicanism in the 1920s. The
impact of ‘republicanism imagined’ is perhaps the most interesting strand to be analysed as it coincided with the growing confidence and visibility of the Catholic community in central Scotland between the wars as well as a period of severe economic malaise. Militant Irish nationalism arguably succeeded in shifting the focus of political debate in Scotland at key points in this study: 1916, 1921, 1931, 1933 and 1939; and the impact on key elements of Scottish society, like the Church of Scotland for example, cannot be taken for granted.

All the principal public records for the study of the effects of Irish nationalism on Scotland have been consulted in Dublin, Edinburgh, Glasgow and London. Various newspapers and other contemporary publications have also been consulted and their quality and value will be discussed throughout the text. Although there has been a fair amount of research into the Irish in Scotland, what is surprising is the lack of historical study on the specific impact of Irish nationalism, both constitutional and militant, on Scotland – until now – in this particular period of the early twentieth century. This thesis aims to contribute to this debate and I have included my historiographical comments throughout the text.

Peter Hart, for example, has recently challenged the view of early twentieth century events in Ireland as a series of events, preferring to describe the period between 1916 and 1923 in particular as a ‘revolution’. He discusses the traditional conflict between nationalist and anti-nationalist versions of events that have dominated historical debate between the 1970s and the 1990s and advances a revised approach, “a new revolutionary history”¹, freed from political agenda to use comparative, sociological methods based on extensive empirical research. He notes that revolutionary violence in Ireland had three overlapping conflicts: anti-British, communal and intranationalist; and correctly argues that we should not focus on the anti-
British conflict to the detriment of the other two dynamics. The inner battles within the revolutionary movement were too significant a factor between the Easter Rising and the Civil War to neglect. He also warns against too narrow a geographical focus as historians working on southern Ireland have often ignored the north and vice versa. Moreover, a comparison with the United Kingdom as a whole for IRA activities and revolutionary identity would be useful he thinks. This thesis explores the relationship between Scottish and Irish republican motivation and methods to that end.

Although Hart’s recent work is compelling and rigorous, this approach has its origins in the 1970s with Charles Townshend’s *The British Campaign in Ireland* which used fresh sources to explore the response of the British authorities to the growth of Irish republicanism between 1916 and 1921. He innovatively used structures of bureaucracy and political decision-making as the focus for his systematic investigation. In a similar vein, Eunan O’Halpin’s book on the Irish administration also examines the problems of government organisation. David Fitzpatrick and Tom Garvin have both used quantitative analysis of Irish nationalist activity and, in the case of Garvin, also attempted to place the events of 1912 to 1939 in an extended comparative context. These historians and others have used the vast range of sources now available and combined this data with comparative and theoretical methods to encourage a broader debate. Peter Hart describes Ireland as “one of the best historical laboratories in which to study revolution”. This thesis proposes that Scotland is one of the best historical laboratories in which to study reaction.
A study of any form of nationalism, militant or otherwise, requires an examination of the origins of that nationalism. Modern Irish nationalism really began in the late eighteenth century, distilling influences from the American and French revolutions as well as other, older, historical influences.

In 1798 with assistance from the French, the United Irishmen, a clandestine republican organisation, attempted a revolution of their own in Ireland. Although Ireland supposedly had its own legislative independence, the rising precipitated full parliamentary union with the British state. Catholic Ireland had retained close ties with France for well over a century, and was thus particularly sensitive to events occurring there. When the revolution in France brought almost spontaneous emancipation, it is not really surprising that the Irish people began to clamour for it too. However, although the French Revolution brought social reform to the French peasantry by abolishing tithes, among other measures, what could not be understood in Ireland was the distinct anti-clerical nature the revolution quickly adopted. The Catholic Irish peasantry were essentially a socially conservative group and could not comprehend this attack on the Catholic Church, which for generations had represented an enduringly popular symbol of their identity. This can be broadly contrasted with the reaction of Protestant Ireland to the treatment of the Catholic Church in France. Although the Penal Laws had been repealed by the early 1780s, attacks by Protestants on Catholics and their property were still commonplace in late eighteenth century Ireland, especially in rural areas. These attacks eventually led to the creation of the Defenders, a secret society established to protect Catholics from Protestant violence such as the Peep o’Day Boys, for example. Although many Irish Protestants were deeply suspicious of the Catholic Church and its motives, it would not be true to say that this was universal; several of the founding members of the United Irishmen,
such as Wolfe Tone, were Protestants who viewed collective action as the solution to Irish problems and regarded sectarian conflict with dismay. Moreover, the United Irishmen eventually merged with the Defenders to plan and then carry out the unsuccessful rebellion of 1798 which ultimately led to the imposed Act of Union between Britain and Ireland in 1801.

However, the reasons for the revolution in France were never disputed in Ireland. What has been described as the ‘deadlock’ in French society, applied even more so to Ireland and “made nonsense of the nominal legislative independence won in 1782”\(^7\). The United Irishmen, therefore, had an onerous task to combine seemingly incompatible ideals: discontent with English manipulation of Irish affairs and lack of popular participation in the political process, along with socially conservative notions of respect for the Catholic Church and the monarchy. As a political organisation the United Irishmen had some success in inculcating a comprehensive and popular Irish nationalism which drew on the bitterness still felt among the Catholic Irish because of the Penal Laws, and also the patriotic principles held by both the Protestant gentry and middle-class\(^9\). This new and, most importantly, equitable patriotism did much to counter the reservations many Irishmen had over some of the principles behind the revolution in France:

“In the present era of reform when unjust governments are falling in every quarter of Europe...we think it our duty to come forward and state what we feel to be our heavy grievance, and what we believe to be its effectual remedy. We have no National Government. We are ruled by Englishmen and the servants of Englishmen whose object is the interest of another country, whose instrument is corruption, whose strength is the weakness of Ireland, and these men have the whole power and patronage of the country as means to subdue the honesty and the spirit of her representatives in the legislature.”\(^10\)
This declaration, adopted at the inaugural meeting of the Dublin Society of United Irishmen on the 9th of November 1791, contains nothing overly contentious for the time, but the subtle radicalism of the language implies that more extreme measures could be invoked if deemed necessary. The aims of the society were a union of all Irishmen, regardless of religion, to reverse the English influence in Ireland and to obtain both social and political reform. These aims were almost universally popular at the time and it was these aims which ordinary Irish people related to, and not the implied radicalism of the leaders; Wolfe Tone, Napper Tandy, Samuel Neilson et al.

It is possible that if the revolution in France had not taken such a radical direction, that a similar transition could have been made in Ireland. However, the excesses and the radical republicanism of the French Revolution shocked the majority of people in Ireland and in Scotland, thus making it very difficult for the radicals in the United Irishmen and therefore the United Scotsmen to make any significant popular progress. The failure of the rebellion in 1798 and the subsequent repression in Ireland further distanced the ordinary Irish people from the ideals of republicanism. Although the United Irishmen introduced a more democratic and inclusive form of nationalism, their attempted rebellion failed because the Irish people just did not respond to their republican nationalism in any meaningful way.

The events of 1798 precipitated a parliamentary union with Britain, and left Ireland with the status of a region, not a nation. Support for the Union in Ireland did not correspond clearly to any party political positions. The most vociferous opponents of the Union were, paradoxically, the Orangemen who feared a real threat to their dominance of Irish society. Nonetheless, the Union came into being on the 1st of January 1801 after the British government had secured its passage through parliament with
patronage and bribery. It must be understood that the threat of invasion from France was still very real up to about 1805, and the British government did not want a volatile neighbour across the Irish Sea while most of her military forces were occupied fighting in continental Europe.

Yet the real threat was perhaps not from the United Irishmen, who had largely been suppressed by 1799, but from the biggest problem within Irish society. This was the system of land ownership which prevailed in most of the country. The British government’s land reforms, which would ultimately contribute to the rapid expansion of owner-occupancy, had little impact on agricultural efficiency or economic prosperity. The key features of larger farm sizes, the erosion of landed influence, specialised cultivation and a declining rural population could also equally apply to Scotland. Yet Ireland was unique in the sense that there was no concurrent industrial development in urban areas to smooth the difficulties of this transition or absorb the surplus rural population. This explains why Irish nationalism was mainly an urban movement supported by relatively prosperous middle-class individuals, and those who aspired to such social status, until the 1870s. Only with the Land War after 1879 was there any real attempt to bring the rural and urban movements together. The orthodox view that Irish development was held back by the oppression of an exploitative landowning elite has been largely discredited by recent research which tends to concentrate instead on the influence of the famine on the development of Irish nationalism.

When the experience of parliamentary union with England in Ireland is compared to the experience in Scotland, it appears that the Scots have had by far the better deal. Scots have participated fully in the British Empire, with many economic successes. Although by no means popular when it was initially established in 1707 it has been generally accepted, until recently, that Scotland made the best out of the Union in sometimes
difficult circumstances\textsuperscript{13}. The Church of Scotland, the Scottish legal system and the Scottish education system were all preserved within the Union to ensure a lasting sense of Scottishness in ‘Northern Britain’. This was not the case with Ireland. For the 120 years of its existence, the direct union with Britain was characterised by undiluted control from Westminster. This contrast between the respective experiences of Scotland and Ireland in their union with England raises many questions. Yet it is perhaps the question of religion which will shed most light on the present study. After the Reformation of the sixteenth century, Scotland shifted its allegiance from France to England and has been influenced by its southern neighbour ever since. Catholic Ireland, as has been described above, retained close links with France up to and including the rebellion of 1798. As Scotland was a Protestant country which kept its own institutions to temper English influence, it had a much more beneficial experience of union with England than Catholic Ireland did. The fundamental social and economic problems of Ireland were not seriously considered until the late nineteenth century, with the Union always seen as the root cause of all these problems\textsuperscript{14}.

The new movement which had as its main aim the national improvement of life for the ordinary Irish people was led by Daniel O’Connell and had various names, but has become known as the movement for Catholic Emancipation. This was essentially a social movement, but came to represent a type of popular nationalism for the majority of the Irish people. Irish republicanism had become a minority political movement, and the success of the Catholic Emancipation movement clearly awakened the dormant power of the ordinary Irish people; after generations of suffering, this movement began to champion the cause of the majority of the population – Catholic Ireland. O’Connell rejected separatism and wanted legislative independence within the British Empire. This is perhaps why his policy was also attractive to many southern Irish Protestants; for
O'Connell, like the United Irishmen before him, Ireland did not just mean Catholic Ireland\textsuperscript{15}. O'Connell also abhorred bloodshed and terror so advocated legal demonstrations, organisation and discipline. It was these last two qualities in particular which eventually wrought concessions from the British government with the introduction of the Catholic Emancipation Bill in April 1829. O'Connell had succeeded in holding back the forces of agrarian violence, though he always hinted in his speeches that this control was conditional. His election in County Clare in 1828 was a challenge to the political establishment, and they had no real alternative but to introduce the Bill in face of the monumental backlash which would follow in Ireland if they did not do so\textsuperscript{16}.

However, it was O'Connell’s campaign for repeal of the Union, with its ‘monster meetings’, which consolidated in Ireland a popular and powerful national consciousness which became political, but not republican. It proved difficult to sustain the momentum of public opinion generated by the Catholic Emancipation movement of the 1820s, but O'Connell was aided in his Repeal campaign by a group of young middle-class men, some Catholic, some Protestant, who were to become known as ‘Young Ireland’\textsuperscript{17}. Through their newspaper, *The Nation*, which first appeared in October 1842, they attempted to construct a new and dynamic Irish nationalism which demanded repeal of the Union and an Irish Parliament:

\begin{quote}
"The work that should today be wrought

defer not till tomorrow;

the help that should within be sought

scorn from without to borrow.

Old maxims these – yet stout and true –
\end{quote}
they speak in trumpet tone,
to do at once what is to do
and trust OURSELVES ALONE.”

The association between O’Connell and the Young Irelanders was not always a happy one, as O’Connell continually played on the deep emotional respect the ordinary Irish people had for the monarchy. This did not go down well with the Young Irelanders, for they were supporters of a federal solution to the Union dilemma and were not ardent monarchists. They believed that a British Federation was all that could reasonable be hoped for out of their situation. This was a similar hope to that of Irish nationalists in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries who pushed for Home Rule. Throughout the 1840s, unionists in Ireland and in Scotland believed that any concession to Irish nationalism would have been “the thin end of the wedge of separation”\(^\text{19}\). O’Connell was eventually to back down from his campaign of ‘monster meetings’ when the British government banned a proposed gathering at Clontarf in September 1843. This sign of weakness at a time when forcefulness was required to see through the repeal campaign disillusioned many in Ireland and exasperated the Young Irelanders. The years between 1843 and 1846 were years of political deadlock, and the strain of between the empirical and constitutional approach of O’Connell and the more dynamic outlook of the Young Irelanders became increasingly apparent. When the split finally came in the summer of 1846 the only real result was the satisfaction of the British government, and the strengthening of the Union. At any rate, the political situation was thrown into turmoil by the potato famine in Ireland which began in the autumn of 1845.
Emigration from Ireland did not begin after the potato famine, as is widely believed; it actually developed gradually from about the beginning of the nineteenth century. It did reach its peak in the period between 1845 and 1852, due to the exceptional devastation caused by the potato famine which was only exacerbated by the over-reliance on agriculture in the Irish economy. Many went to North America, many settled in London and north-west England, and many took the northern route, from Connaught and Ulster, to Scotland. The main area of concentration for the Irish immigrants to Scotland was the west of central Scotland.

Being concentrated so heavily in one part of the country, this population movement seemed more overwhelming than it was in reality. Even in the 1840s, Irish immigration never accounted for more than a third of total population increases. When the fact that the number of immigrants was roughly balanced by those going abroad is also taken into account, the reaction of many indigenous Scots is put into perspective. However, at the peak of Irish immigration between 1845 and 1852 there was concurrently a growing awareness of urban decay and its problems. This cruel coincidence made the Irish immigrants in the cities of mainland Britain convenient targets for condemnation. The Irish were denounced as ‘aliens’ by the establishment, and the fears of the Scottish people were played on in this way for political ends from the 1840s right up until the 1930s. Although Scotland received a fair amount of Irish immigrants, more in fact than England in proportion to national population, this population movement was never the flood it was made out to be at the time. The Irish were just easy targets and suffered severe hostility and discrimination, causing them to feel alienated from their host society. This alienation bred a lack of confidence in themselves, which hampered any attempts at serious political organisation within immigrant communities for some considerable time. The potato famine of 1845 was without doubt the most
terrible disaster in recorded Irish history; it is thus all the more galling that those who survived to come to Scotland experienced yet more hardship.

The Young Irelanders had planned a confrontation with the forces of the British government in theory for late 1848. What has been called the ‘rising of 1848’ in Ireland did not really measure up to any practical notions of revolt. There was such a lack of organisation and no clear strategy that the British government never looked in serious danger. Events dictated the whole affair, rather than the other way around. The bloodless revolution in Paris in February 1848 encouraged the new Irish League to press ahead with its policy of pressurising the British government for repeal22. However, the mere act of repealing the Union would not end the suffering of the Irish people at a stroke. In this sense the Irish League was out of touch with the views of the ordinary Irish people. The second revolution in Paris in June, which was very violent and socialistic, shocked the middle-class supporters of the Irish League and made the clergy in Ireland distance themselves from the Irish nationalist movement. The Irish League wanted to put on a show of strength to force some concessions from the British government, but the government took the initiative and made the possession of arms illegal as well as suspending the Habeus Corpus Act. Warrants were issued for the leaders of the Irish League, notably Smith O’Brien who had not really wanted a direct armed confrontation with the British government in the first place. Alarmed by what was occurring on the continent, the clergy set about persuading their congregations to take no part in the rising. Without the crucial support of the Irish people, any attempt at a rising was doomed to failure. Coupled with the organisational mistakes and the tendency to be reactive instead of proactive, the attempted rising of 1848 in Ireland, apart from a few minor incidents, was a non-event.
The pointlessness of debating the finer points of Irish nationalist politics when thousands of Irish people were dying due to the potato blight was apparent by 1848. Irish nationalist politics had to be brought closer to the people if they were to have any real substance or chance of success, so the 1850s marked a slight change of direction in Irish politics. There was a distinct shift towards constitutionalism and an independent Irish Party was established at Westminster to this end. However, the Irish Party was initially unsuccessful due to its small numbers and an inability to exploit parliamentary procedures. In 1864 a National League was founded to try and achieve an Irish parliament through constitutional means but, like the many organisations with the same purpose founded before it, its efforts came to nothing and support for it ebbed away.

At about the same time, a new secret society was being established in the south-west of Ireland. Secret societies had been active in Ireland for well over a century, but had never been as intentionally political as this new society, which also attracted greater numbers of middle-class members. This secret society did not really have a name as such until 1858 when it grew into the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB), and later became the organisational nucleus of Sinn Fein. The directing influence behind this society was James Stephens, an Irishman who had travelled widely in Europe and had first-hand knowledge of the revolutionary socialist theories active on the continent. He was also an able organiser and the IRB skilfully exploited the Irish communities in North America and in Scotland for funds and supplies. This was the first time that the large reservoir of tacit support for the Irish nationalist cause had been seriously tapped in this way. Stephens had learnt the value of secrecy and effective organisation and control abroad, and the early years of the 1860s were spent moulding the IRB into a militantly republican secret society. Although an independent republic was their ultimate goal, the IRB also
had the reform of the land system at the head of their agenda. They realised the importance of gaining the support of the ordinary Irish people in any future armed uprising, and through the influence of their Irish-American division, the society came to be known as the Fenians, and they established their organisational base in London in early 1867.

A rising was planned for the 11th of February of 1867 but it failed because, as so often before, the ordinary Irish people did not actively support it in large enough numbers. The British government, through the use of spies and informers, had learned of the rising and took swift action to snuff it out. Once the Fenian leaders had realised this they attempted to postpone the rising, but could not communicate quickly enough with all sections of the organisation. Their proclamation appeared in The Times newspaper on the 8th of March 1867, calling for an Irish Republic, the reform of the iniquitous land system, and the complete separation of Church and State. What was different about this attempted rising was the fact that the leaders of this republican movement were so heavily influenced by revolutionary socialist theory.

This examination of Irish nationalism reveals something of the complexity of its origins. The historical background from which Irish nationalism emerged gives us the political vocabulary of the Irish immigrants to Scotland. Their political ‘Irishness’ gradually grew into a sort of dualistic patriotism, an expression of a double identity: being Scottish but at the same time acknowledging the social and cultural ties to Ireland. Glasgow Celtic Football and Athletic Company (later just Celtic Football Club) is perhaps one of the best examples of this concept of a dual social identity. As Gerry Finn has written:

“the Irish-Scots of the 1880s were a proud community, despite the range of prejudices aimed at them...The formation of Celtic symbolised the aspirations of this outward-
looking community, and these high expectations were soon fulfilled by the footballing success of the team…Celtic represented a community which was Irish-Scots, and Celtic, above all other symbols, has reflected the desire of the Irish-Scots and their descendants to…take pride in their Irish ancestry.”

Although this pride referred to by Finn above would come to cause problems with the Protestant majority in Scotland, it encouraged the Irish immigrants to organise themselves effectively, and the years between 1867 and 1890 arguably represented the pinnacle of popular Irish political organisation in Scotland. During these years the energies of all Irish communities across Britain were directed towards gaining support for Gladstone and the Liberal Party or Parnell and the Irish Party. The defeat of the Home Rule for Ireland Bill in 1886 only served to intensify the political activity of the Irish-Scots at that time. The Home Government Association, founded in Scotland in 1871, directed the efforts of the Irish across mainland Britain. The Glasgow branch of the Association, led by John Ferguson, was arguably the best organised and most vigorous of all the British branches. However, after the second Home Rule Bill was rejected by the House of Lords in 1893, the Irish-Scots began to grow disillusioned with parliamentary politics. They had made almost superhuman efforts – twice – to try and win Home Rule for Ireland but had failed each time. Gladstone had always ensured that any Irish drift into ethnic-based politics had been cut short but, after 1893, and a second successive parliamentary failure to deliver, he could no longer exercise control over the Irish vote which collapsed, demoralised, in some areas or switched allegiance to the labour movement, as socialist candidates began to appear in election after 1888.

The Irish-Scots split into warring faction after 1890, but unity was slowly restored by about the beginning of the twentieth century. Many, though,
had lost their zeal for Irish nationalist politics and were actively looking for
an alternative. The United Irish League (UIL) was established in 1898 to
redirect Irish nationalist political activity, taking over from the moribund
Home Government Association. New life was quickly injected into the
political activity of Irish-Scots, but the UIL could not have claimed the sole
credit for this; the Labour Party was beginning to win over many working-
class voters but, more significantly for this study, Sinn Fein began its Irish
nationalist propaganda amongst the Irish-Scots communities at the same
time. This only confused many of the Irish-Scots; on the one hand they
were definitely open to new political ideas and methods after the failure of
the second Home Rule Bill in 1893 but, on the other hand, the Irish-Scots
were being courted by the Labour Party and thus absorption into
mainstream politics which caused them to question their previously held
convictions.

The emergence in Ireland of the National Literary Society and the Gaelic
League in 1892 and 1893 respectively, put the issue of Irish nationalism
very simply: Ireland had to be de-Anglicised. They rejected the influence
of English culture on Irish tastes and outlook, and declined the label of
‘West Britons’. Although these two groups were essentially a minority
movement, their creed of cultural self-respect gradually became
incorporated within the Irish national ethos, and thus eventually into the
general outlook of the Irish-Scots. This growth of a national consciousness
in the 1890s would eventually benefit Sinn Fein, as it provided the
necessary and inevitable manifestation of the inherent cultural pride of the
Irish people.

The terminology used when examining the immigrant Irish communities in
Scotland needs to be clarified. Some writers have used the term ‘the Irish
in Scotland’. Finn uses the term ‘Irish-Scots’, which is useful when you
are describing members of immigrant communities not born in Scotland.
The present study will use this term as defined above, but it best describes those who were actually born in Ireland. This thesis is directly concerned with the period between 1898 and 1939 however, and during this time immigration from Ireland had slowed to a steady trickle. Therefore, most members of immigrant communities would have been born in Scotland, thus making the term ‘Scots-Irish’ more accurate, particularly after the First World War.

A useful description of Irish nationalism in the nineteenth century would be that of a see-saw; a movement continually oscillating between constitutional agitation and more radical republicanism. The last example being the Fenian Rising which provoked a shift to another constitutionalist phase which contained two unsuccessful Home Rule Bills. It has been argued that, if Home Rule had been achieved in the late nineteenth century, it would have kept Ireland in the Union and avoided the bloodshed and bitterness seen in the twentieth century. An alternative view is that the achievement of Home Rule for Ireland in the late nineteenth century would not have halted the movement for an Irish republic; it would only have accelerated it.

Tom Garvin describes the parliamentary leaders of Irish nationalism as “prisoners” of an aged and violent tradition and, to compete with violence, “constitutionalism had often to wrap itself in a very green flag indeed”\(^{30}\). Alvin Jackson and Matthew Kelly have described what they see as the “Redmondite-Fenian nexus” of the 1890s\(^{31}\). After the Home Rule movement split into Parnellite and anti-Parnellite factions, the Redmondites (after John Redmond, the leader of the Parnellites) drew closer to the IRB as seen in the campaign for the amnesty of Irish political prisoners, for example. By 1900, however, Redmond had severed the Parnellites’ links with the IRB to achieve the reunification of the Irish Party. The cultural mobilisation of the romantic nationalism of the 1890s and the
1798 centenary activities demonstrated to the new generation of Irish republicans the possibilities of a “dynamic separatism” in sharp contrast to constitutional nationalism. There is also the view that the Irish Party at Westminster only publicly revered Fenianism to manipulate the popular myth of the bold and noble Fenian men. This deliberate strategy was not patriotic or separatist but an attempt to convince the electorate that constitutional nationalism was not only close to success, but actually the legitimate culmination of all previous Irish nationalist activity. This strategy continued to 1914 when the need for more militant action became clear once again.

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The evolution of Irish nationalism and the relationship of militant to constitutional nationalism is one of the most interesting aspects of this study. Ireland was not unique in Europe in seeking to separate from the political control of a foreign government, nor was it even the first to try to do so. Nationalism grew throughout Europe from about the middle of the nineteenth century onwards. The Irish movement for Home Rule was not exceptional within the British Empire either: Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa all obtained dominion status by the early twentieth century. What was unique about the struggle for Irish Home Rule was the inflexible resistance of unionists Protestants in Britain and particularly in Ulster. This resistance led to many setbacks and by the early twentieth century more militant methods were considered by more and more Irish nationalists as a necessity rather than a choice.
Militant Irish nationalism or republicanism has its origins in the ‘Atlantic Revolution’ of the late eighteenth century. Social Contract theorists like Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau influenced the American colonials and French revolutionaries in their desire for good government. At its most fundamental level, republicanism implies the absence of a monarchy in a country’s system of government, which was a very radical proposal in the late eighteenth century. The main reason for the republican spark igniting the British colony in America and then the French to revolution was relatively straightforward: powerful groups in each society had very real grievances with their respective systems of government. The American colonials rejected the inequality of being heavily taxed without fair political representation in return and, similarly, the bourgeoisie directed the revolution in France in order to redress the power imbalance against them in French society. Although each context has its own peculiarities, both groups were enraged by patriarchal arrogance and political mismanagement; and both groups felt socially slighted so both movements aimed to reform their respective governments for the greater good.

Moreover, the focal point in each case was the monarchy. There can also be detected in each movement a developing sense of national consciousness which sought national renewal in a very positive way. All modern European nationalism has been influenced in some way by the Atlantic Revolution of the late eighteenth century.

Irish republicanism during the period of the present study was also about renewing a national consciousness, but it also contained a feeling of collective grievance against the British government and a sense of political impotence that only separation would satisfy. This was expressed as a fierce Celtic or Gaelic pride which manifested itself in militant and often violent acts of protest. There is also the great myth of noble failure and sacrifice which has been absorbed into the identity of militant Irish
nationalism. The Fenians emphasised the republican continuity from the United Irishmen in 1798, through 1803 and 1848 to 1867, for example. Moreover, militant Irish nationalism or republicanism was also influenced by revolutionary socialist thinking from continental Europe from 1848.

Irish republicanism integrated much of the theoretical legacy of the Atlantic Revolution of the late eighteenth century, but also contained many singular elements which seem to have more of a bearing on Scotland. It essentially became a militant separatist movement with a distinctive national identity, driven by the IRB’s interpretation of revolutionary socialism. Yet the period between 1898 and 1939 was not the first episode of Irish republicanism to deeply affect Scotland. The reaction to Fenianism in the 1860s has been well documented and Elaine McFarland, for example, explains it as a ‘moral panic’ in the classic sociological sense. Scotland was particularly susceptible to the fear of Fenianism in the 1860s due to deep economic and religious insecurities. Problems in India and fear of French invasion made the Empire look weak and vulnerable, and apprehension over the papacy’s intervention in the unification of Italy raised questions about the loyalty of the Catholic minority within Scotland. Industrial uncertainty, urban overcrowding and poverty, and Irish immigration only heightened this anxiety as McFarland has noted. She also traces the ‘pedigree’ of Irish underground organisation in Scotland, from refugee United Irishmen after the rebellion of 1798, through Ribbon societies in the 1820s and 1830s, Young Irelanders in the 1840s and 1850s, to the Fenians or IRB in the 1860s and beyond. She views the Fenians in Scotland as a reflection of the Irish community’s desire for “collective advancement and individual self-fulfilment”, and correctly sees continuity between IRB activities in Scotland in the 1860s and again in the 1920s. Iain Patterson has also noted the evolution of Irish nationalist politics in Ireland being mirrored within the Irish community in Scotland as well as
the parallels between the 1860s and 1920s for IRB activity. The Fenian panic of 1865 to 1868 remained in the collective memory and should be viewed as an underlying influence on attitudes towards Irish republican activity in Scotland in the 1920s and 1930s.

The nineteenth century in Scotland was generally one of progress and reform. The Scottish people were mostly content with the benefits from the Union with England, largely brought about through successful economic integration and Empire-building. Unlike in Ireland, in Scotland there existed a fairly diverse industrial base as well as an agricultural sector. Moreover, Presbyterianism was the dominant religion throughout the country and so there was much less social instability present to foster discontent on a similar scale to Ireland where Catholicism was the dominant religion but did not have a similar social status. However, by the end of the nineteenth century old political certainties were beginning to disappear. Attitudes towards Irish Home Rule began to polarise after 1885 as urban Scotland struggled with the continuing expansion of its industrial base. Support for some devolution of power from the Imperial Parliament in London to Scotland as well as Ireland grew, but minorities like unionists in Ulster feared the consequences of any change to the status quo. Poverty and cultural alienation in Ireland consistently undermined any attempts to fully integrate Ireland into the Union. It should also be stressed again that Scotland’s experience of the Union was in marked contrast with that of Ireland. The much more sympathetic treatment of Highland crofters in the 1880s compared to the treatment of Catholic Irish tenant farmers is a good example of contrasting attitudes and experiences.

In Scotland there was also a growing concern over the dilution of Scottish national identity. Anglicisation began after 1603 and was consolidated after 1707. The attacks on Highland culture after 1745 further undermined any traditionally Scottish cultural identity. Emigration, mainly to North
America, renewed a sense of the importance of the past to any form of national consciousness. This renewed nationalistic vigour manifested itself in different ways: the Gaelic revival of the 1860s to the 1880s being a cultural reaction, and the establishment of the National Association for the Vindication of Scottish Rights in 1853 being one of the first political reactions. Scots disliked English indifference but were generally pragmatic. They understood and enjoyed the benefits from the Union, but had been uneasy about the treatment of Scottish culture since 1745. The monarchy had widespread, but not total, support and was regarded as a symbol of unity. Republicans had been active in Scotland as well as Ireland since the French Revolution, but any serious attempts at popular political organisation were always thwarted by the British government. However, the increase in Catholic Irish immigration after 1845 caused alarm and tension, especially in the west of central Scotland. The issue of Irish Home Rule also led directly to the formation of the Scottish Home Rule Association in 1886, for example, and illustrates the sensitivity of many Scots to the events associated with the evolution of Irish nationalism.

The complexity of party alignments is also an essential concern. The work of Alvin Jackson and David Miller provides much insight here. It is clear that the 1885 General Election ended Conservative and Liberal representation in the three southern provinces of Ireland, and the Irish Party dominated each subsequent election until 1918. Both Jackson and Miller see the period immediately after 1885 polarising attitudes within and to Irish Home Rule. Unionists in Ulster increasingly feared persecution, humiliation and dispossession; fears that bemused Irish nationalists who could not fathom why northern Protestants did not see Home Rule as a victory for all Irishmen instead of a potential disaster. The fact that the 86 Irish nationalist MPs held the balance of power at Westminster led Gladstone to introduce the first Home Rule for Ireland
Bill, the immediate consequence of which was to split his own party and return the Conservatives to government supported by a group of unionist Liberal defectors. Preparations for armed resistance to Irish Home Rule began in Ulster, and it even became socially acceptable for wealthy Presbyterians to join the Orange Order\textsuperscript{44}. In Scotland, as Elaine McFarland has noted, the Orange Order enthusiastically supported the Conservative/Liberal unionist pact, becoming an “autonomous pressure group within the Unionist Camp”\textsuperscript{45}. There was no Protestant unanimity on Irish Home Rule, however. Scottish supporters of Gladstone and Home Rule were mostly Protestant and, even within Liberal Unionism, there was a desire for devolution within the United Kingdom so that Scotland would continue to benefit from the imperial connection but have a degree of control over its internal affairs\textsuperscript{46}.

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Before assessing the extent of any impact which Irish nationalism had on Scotland, we must be clear on how this impact can be measured. ‘Impact’ here generally means how far the ideas, methods and propaganda of Irish nationalism influenced or affected the people of Scotland. Exactly who was affected and why is also important. The scope of this study will therefore be as wide as possible, taking into account not just the immigrant Irish community and indigenous Scots and interaction between the two, but also the Scottish institutions that were affected like the Protestant churches and the various political parties, for example. There is also the direct impact on the British government and its agencies like the intelligence services who monitored the evolution of Irish nationalism, and in particular Irish
republicanism, and were aiming to minimise its effect on the internal security of the United Kingdom.

The extent of any influence can be determined through careful examination of public opinion. Contemporary newspapers have been particularly useful in this regard, with the Glasgow Observer providing valuable insight into the Irish immigrant community since it was their primary organ. The views in the Glasgow Observer are balanced with a study of unionist newspapers like the Glasgow Herald for the alternative perspective. The Scotsman and Daily Record archives have also been consulted as well as any available local newspapers. Reference has also been made to the archives and publications of the political organisations active at the time like An Poblacht, Forward and Protestant Action election literature from Edinburgh Central Library.

In any piece of analytical research there will be problems of interpretation for the historian. Any study of relevant contemporary sources, no matter how complete, will always leave gaps for hypothesis and subjectivity, especially in an area so close to the present. This study has undoubtedly benefitted from access to many official sources in the National Archives of Scotland (formerly the SRO) which were released to the public for the first time in the late 1990s. To a lesser extent, fresh sources were examined in the Public Record Office in London and in the National Archives of Ireland in Dublin. Several other repositories have been used and the sources referenced throughout the text and detailed in the bibliography to encourage further research on this part of Scotland’s recent past.

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The following chapters will continue an examination of Irish nationalism and its impact on Scotland in detail. The next four chapters divide the period into the four segments put forward above; 1898 to 1916 (Chapter II), 1916 to 1922 (Chapter III), 1922 to 1931 (Chapter IV), and 1932 to 1939 (Chapter V). Each chapter represents a discrete study of the influence of Irish nationalism on Scotland in that particular era, but together chart the evolution of Irish nationalism and its overall impact on the Scotland. The final chapter discusses the conclusions reached from the research undertaken.

This study aims to stick closely to the aims and objectives outlined in the original thesis proposal and explained at length in this Introduction. As well as looking in as much detail as possible at the available evidence in order to assess the impact of Irish nationalism on Scotland between 1898 and 1939, this study also attempts to take other recent research into account before drawing any necessary conclusions.
Chapter I: Notes


2) See TOWNSHEND, ‘The British Campaign in Ireland, 1919-1921’.

3) See O’HALPIN, ‘The Decline of the Union, 1892-1920’.


5) HART, op. cit., p.29.

6) See GARVIN, op. cit.


8) ibid.

9) The Penal Laws excluded Roman Catholics from all public life and most social activity. These laws (early 18th century) made it illegal for Catholics to buy land or make a decent profit from renting it out. Moreover, if a Catholic converted to Protestantism, they immediately gained social and economic advantages. These laws were designed to make Catholics feel inferior, and in practice they created deep divisions between both religions. Some excesses were alleviated by the Catholic Relief Act of 1793, but it was not until the Emancipation
movement of the 1820s, led by O’Connell, that Irish Catholics received substantial redress from this discrimination.

10) From the Declaration of the Dublin Society of United Irishmen at their inaugural meeting (Report of the Committee of Secrecy to the House of Commons, London, 1797, Appendix II)

11) KEE, op. cit., pp.149-160.


14) Refer to the works cited in note 12 above, for example.

15) GIRVIN, ‘From Union to Union’, p.7.

16) Due to the oath an MP had to take on entering the House of Commons, which asserted allegiance to the crown and Protestant supremacy and accused the ‘Church of Rome’ of using superstitious and idolatrous practices. See MITCHELL, ‘The Irish in the west of Scotland, 1797-1848’ for an examination of the effects of O’Connell’s campaigns on Scotland, and also McCAFFREY, ‘Irish Immigrants and Radical Movements in the west of Scotland in the early nineteenth century’, IR39, 1988.

17) After Mazzini’s ‘Young Italy’.

18) The Nation, 3 December 1842.
19) KEE, op. cit., p.207 explains this in some detail.

20) 400,000 Irish immigrants came to Scotland between 1845 and 1852 according to census figures. See HANDLEY, ‘The Irish in Modern Scotland’, pp.44-5.

21) A survey of contemporary Scottish newspapers reveals this. See the Glasgow Herald of the 1840s especially. See also HANDLEY, op. cit. and GALLAGHER, ‘Glasgow: the uneasy peace’, especially chapter 1.

22) A reunion of the Young Irelanders’ ‘Irish Confederation’ with the old Repeal Association.

23) Taken from the legendary elite warrior legion of Fiona MacCumhail, the Fianna.

24) For most Irish-born immigrants living in Scotland this would have been similar – identification with the motherland of Ireland, but wanting to contribute fully to Scottish society at the same time.


26) See McFARLAND, ‘John Ferguson, 1836-1906’ for a discussion of this.

27) The parallels with Scotland being viewed as ‘North Britain’ are clear. Although Scotland and Wales were also united with England to form Britain, British influences were still seen in Ireland as ‘English’.

28) HANDLEY, among others.

29) FINN, op. cit., pp.22-93.
30) GARVIN, op. cit., p.186.


32) KELLY, op. cit., p.231.


37) ibid, p.205. See also her ‘Ireland and Scotland in the Age of Revolution’.

38) ibid, p.220.


41) See JACKSON, op. cit. and MILLER, ‘Queen’s Rebels’ in particular.

42) With the exception of the two Dublin University seats.

44) ibid.


46) ibid, pp.40-2.
Chapter II: 1898 – 1916; “all changed, changed utterly”

The beginning of this period was marked by the aftershocks of the unsuccessful Gladstonian Home Rule Bills of 1886 and 1893. The ‘Irish Question’ was still apparent in political debate, but had diminished in perceived relevance by the time of Gladstone’s death in May 1898, and this was for three main reasons. Firstly, the Conservatives had by then replaced the Liberals as the party of government\(^1\), and were committed to a policy of ‘equality’ for Ireland – treatment comparable to the other members of the United Kingdom\(^2\) – but were absolutely opposed to any form of Home Rule. Secondly, the Liberals, now out of office and with Gladstone dead, effectively shelved Home Rule as an identifiably Liberal Party policy. This was because there were many Liberal MPs who were unionist in sentiment, and the party managers realised that a divided Opposition would not return swiftly to power. Lastly, there was a severe and apparently irretrievable split amongst the Irish Nationalists or Irish Party. This can largely be explained as the reaction to the failure of the Second Home Rule Bill of 1893. The Irish Party had pinned their hopes on Home Rule being delivered at this second time of asking, and were palpably affected by its defeat. As after any political setback, searching questions were asked of the Irish nationalist parliamentary leadership; when they could not agree on the way forward, especially concerning their relationship with the Liberal Party, a split occurred. Serious tension had in fact been ongoing since the Parnell split during 1891, which was the underlying reason for all the internecine conflict within Irish nationalist politics until well into the twentieth century. This in-fighting between Parnellite and anti-Parnellite factions killed any real hope of Home Rule success for a generation of Irish nationalists. There was, not unusually for
the time, no clear manifestation of this split as far as parliamentary party organisation went, but Irish nationalist MPs could have been separated on which ‘leader’ they supported. Broadly speaking, the larger half of the parliamentary party was keen to lick its wounds and press for systematic legislation to remove specific Irish grievances. This section was led by John Redmond and John Dillon, but these two did not always agree. The rest of the party, led loosely by Michael Davitt, William O’Brien and T. M. Healy, called for more militant action against the oppression of the ‘English’ parliament (sic) at Westminster.

The Irish nationalists at this time can be divided into moral or physical force advocates therefore. The moral force advocates hoped to persuade the British public that Ireland’s needs were not properly addressed or satisfied with the status quo, and only a devolved Irish assembly would effectively solve this problem. The physical force advocates within the Irish nationalist movement were the guardians of republicanism. They regarded the continuation of Irish inclusion within the United Kingdom as an insult, a deliberate neglect of the wishes of the majority of the Irish people. They too desired an Irish parliament, but an independent parliament not subject to the Imperial parliament at Westminster. They believed that Irish national pride was being damaged by pleading for something which, in their opinion, Ireland had always been justly entitled to.

The use of force was justified in claiming separation from the Union because the Union had not served Ireland well; the Irish people had been coerced into it in the first place and, most importantly, all other methods seemed to have failed. By 1898 two separate Home Rule Bills had been defeated and persuasion, even with moral force, had proved unsuccessful. The physical force Irish nationalists saw themselves as the protectors of Irish nationhood, and the law could and must be broken because the laws
from Westminster were unjust. It must be stressed that the physical force Irish nationalists at this time probably envisaged a campaign of civil disobedience to begin with, as most Irish nationalist meetings of any expected size were banned by the authorities. However, the gradualist nature of their approach to the use of violence must also be stressed. The republican heritage of Ireland was always on their minds, and that heritage implied violence, armed resistance and ultimately rebellion. Parnell, in his later speeches, often gave sinister coded endorsements of violence, and the parallels are clear.

1898 was an important year for Irish republicans – it represented the centenary of the first Irish republican rising in 1798. The failure of that rising led directly to the union with Britain in 1801, and the beginning of the prejudice and oppression so often cited by Irish republicans as the genesis of their struggle. In Ireland itself the centenary celebrations were overshadowed by yet another potato famine which resulted in many destitute Irish migrating to mainland Britain, but particularly to Scotland.

At any rate, the newspapers of the day dismissed the Irish Party of 1898 as harmless. The *Glasgow Herald* is a good example of a typical unionist newspaper of the time. Dismissing the disunited Irish Party, the issue of the 13th April 1898 turns its focus to the general political situation in the country, stating that “Ireland has been quiet for some time”. The credit for this tranquillity was wholly due to the Tory policy of ‘equality’ it argued, albeit with an “insignificant” ’98 revival. The Conservative government’s policy of ‘equality’ actually meant ‘killing Home Rule with kindness’ which, when taken with unionist press ridicule of all Irish nationalist political endeavour, amounted to an effective propaganda machine. The Scottish public were led to believe that Ireland’s grievances were being addressed, that the Irish people would want to stay in the Union if the increasing benefits were made clear to them, and that physical force
advocates were isolated, out-of-touch and few in number. In other words, the British government was in control and resistance was unjustified but, at any rate, harmless. This is best illustrated with an example from the newspaper itself. In the same issue as cited above, a whole column is devoted to the report of a speech by a parish priest from rural Ireland; the important factor being the priest was advocating civil disobedience or physical force to achieve Home Rule. The newspaper labelled the speech as “extraordinary” and argued, reasonably enough, that clergymen should stay out of politics.

However, this speech was also used as the excuse for a systematic attack on the Roman Catholic Church as a whole. This can be contrasted with the Glasgow Observer from a similar date, which reported on the Home Rule movement optimistically, stating: “the only real remedy for Irish ills is the overthrow of English rule”. Anti-Catholic prejudice such as the demand for the inspection of convents appeared throughout the month of April 1898 in the Glasgow Herald. It is perhaps shocking by modern standards, but the important thing to remember about these attacks is that they had a purpose. The Irish people had long been ridiculed in the Scottish and British press, but only really with resentment in regard to Irish immigration and competition for employment. In reality, the Irish were picked on because they had a different religion to the majority of the Protestant population of the United Kingdom. For the Glasgow Herald to argue that religion and politics do not mix, and then do the same itself albeit indirectly, may seem hypocritical but anti-Catholic prejudice was more or less institutionalised in Scotland at this time. It would have been too vulgar to openly attack militant Irish nationalism within the confines of a traditional newspaper, yet the implication was that every loyal (and therefore Protestant) Scotsman believed that all Irish nationalists were Catholic, and many Scots saw Irish nationalist activity as merely a cover for
the agenda of the Roman Catholic Church. It is not really an exaggeration to say that Catholicism and therefore every Catholic was suspect and suspicious. This explains why second, third or even fourth generation immigrant families from Ireland were still labelled ‘Irish’, even though they had all been born in Scotland. Catholicism was still regarded as alien or foreign, so no true Scotsman could be a Catholic. Catholicism in Scotland was synonymous with ‘Irishness’ and Irishmen were stereotyped as lazy, ignorant, untrustworthy and disloyal to the Crown and Empire. It would be a mistake, however, to portray Protestantism in Scotland as monolithic and entirely reactionary. A sizeable minority participated in anti-Catholic agitation certainly, but many Scottish Protestants were very wary of the connections between Ulster and the Conservative Party and had priorities other than Irish issues. Perhaps it is because the anti-Catholic prejudice and religious bigotry was so vociferous that many contemporary observers, and modern historians, have tended to overestimate its influence. In reality, the 1890s were a time of cautious liberalisation in most of the Scottish Protestant churches, with reforms to the more doctrinally stern and socially conservative elements of evangelical faith which would pave the way for many Scottish Protestants to play leading roles within the growing labour movement – a key dynamic of the twentieth century urban Scottish experience.

A study of contemporary newspapers reveals that the Glasgow Observer and the Glasgow Herald are the best sources for the study of the Irish-Scots, as between them they had the most coverage. They also provide a good contrast, the Glasgow Herald taking a unionist perspective and the Glasgow Observer taking an Irish nationalist perspective. However, it must be stressed that the Glasgow Observer was not a ‘quality’ newspaper in the way that the Glasgow Herald was. The main attraction of the Glasgow Observer was its links to the Glasgow Celtic Football and Athletic Coy (later just
Celtic Football Club), something which guaranteed it a good circulation amongst the Irish-Scots community. Although it served its owner, Charles Diamond, as his mouthpiece, it is still the most valuable source of material for investigating the political activities of the community it served. This is because it reported on every meeting held by prominent Irish politicians in Scotland (which were often ignored by more mainstream newspapers). Moreover, all political groups submitted reports of their local meetings which, despite being dominated by social events, often contained political references. There is a distinct lack of coverage for the Irish-Scots community in newspapers like *The Scotsman* or *Daily Record*, and even the *Glasgow Herald* only usually made comment during particularly heightened circumstances. Local newspapers with sizeable Irish-Scots communities follow a similar pattern; the *Motherwell Times*, the *Greenock Telegraph*, the *Partick and Maryhill Press* and the *Govan Press* are all good examples.

For about a year after these attacks on Catholicism and the Irish nationalist movement, there was no real mention of Irish affairs in Scottish newspapers. This was because the split in the Irish Party had deepened, and the Conservative government’s concessionary policy towards Ireland – ‘killing Home Rule with kindness’ – was having moderate success. The Irish Party was slowly recuperating and healing its wounds, so much so that the *Glasgow Herald* reported that “the fervour of Irish nationalism has departed” in May 1899\(^{11}\). This lasted until a new Irish nationalist organisation was established the same month under the direction of Michael Davitt, the United Irish League (UIL). “It is to be feared that this new Irish League means mischief” claimed the *Glasgow Herald*\(^{12}\), and made much of Davitt’s Fenian background and “methods”, but the newspaper did not have any real discussion of Irish political affairs throughout the rest of 1899\(^{13}\).
The Boer War interrupted events at the turn of the century, and was used by the unionist press to good advantage against Irish nationalists. The war was also used by the Irish Party, who seized the political opportunity. They were accused of being unpatriotic by the unionist press for continuing their demand for Home Rule when the country was at war. Irish nationalists in Glasgow were singled out as “disloyal” for still holding meetings and pressing for Home Rule\textsuperscript{14}. This sort of activity only served to reinforce the stereotype of ‘Irishness’ that Scots were being fed through newspapers like the \textit{Glasgow Herald}. The turn of the century also saw the Irish Party pressing the Boer case in Parliament and demanding peace. Although an unpopular move with the general public at the time (it would come back to haunt the Irish Party frequently), it succeeded in its aim of highlighting the need for reform at home as well as in South Africa. The Boers wanted separation, the Irish wanted separation, but this policy of the Irish Party was dismissed as “arrogance” by the unionist press, which emphasised the necessity of a truly United Kingdom in times of national crisis\textsuperscript{15}. Irish nationalists pulled ranks, however, and issued a manifesto calling for Home Rule under the auspices of a new and united party for Ireland\textsuperscript{16}. There had been disunity since the failure of the second Home Rule Bill in 1893, but now Irish nationalists came together under the nominal leadership of John Redmond, a moderate moral force nationalist\textsuperscript{17}. The Conservatives behaved arrogantly too, stating that Irish MPs and Liberal sympathisers should “make the best of a political connection which will never be severed”\textsuperscript{18}. Yet the ‘Union is working’ argument already sounded false to many ears. The country was preoccupied with the war, but it was going too far to say that “the Irish people are content but Irish politicians are not”\textsuperscript{19}.

The close examination of the Union that the Irish Home Rule issue brought to Scotland resulted in a growing demand for some form of Scottish self-
government. As a consequence, the Scottish Home Rule Association (SHRA) was re-established demanding devolution on the 1st of August 1900. Scotland had benefitted much more from the Union than Ireland ever had, as has been explained above, yet the fact that the Imperial Parliament tended towards centralisation and regional neglect made for a persuasive argument against the status quo. Modern Scottish nationalism has its origins in this period, but was always something of an equivocal fellow-traveller to Irish nationalism. It is, though, an indication of the influence of Irish nationalism on Scotland that such an organisation was even formed at this time. The opinion of the bulk of the Scottish press towards demands for Scottish Home Rule was to good-naturedly dismiss them as nonsense and remind readers of the benefits the Union had given Scotland. It must also be stressed that the good-natured dismissal of claims for Scottish Home Rule was in stark contrast with the tone of dismissal reserved for the Irish Home Rule movement. This tone was unionist, anti-Irish, imperialist, jingoist and decidedly Protestant in character.

Throughout 1900 in the unionist newspapers of the period, the patriotic impulses the war generated were used to attack Irish nationalists for their “disloyal” rejection of the war. The truth is that the Conservatives were wary of the renewed vigour within the movement for Irish nationalism; “the most thoroughly organised effort on the part of the Irish nationalists since the fall of Parnell”, and sought to destabilise this restored unity using their propaganda machine. The Irish Party was quite entitled as an Opposition group to criticise the government’s handling of the war, but they were not spared for it. All through 1901 Irish nationalist MPs gave anti-British speeches over the Boer War and as a result Irish affairs slowly gained more coverage. It was beneficial to Irish nationalism that the death of Queen Victoria and the Glasgow International Exhibition (as well as continuing coverage of the Boer War) dominated most newspapers in 1901.
Otherwise the anti-Home Rule campaign being waged by the
Conservatives would have been more successful. Irish nationalist MPs
were accused of obstructing the business of the House of Commons and of
being unpatriotic, even traitorous – a strategy designed to distance public
opinion from Irish Home Rule arguments. Some might say that they need
not have tried very hard to win over public opinion, but these reactionary
views did confuse and alienate many readers of the popular press.

The Liberal Party abandoned Home Rule for Ireland as an official policy in
1902, with the behaviour of the Irish Party throughout the Boer war given
as the explanation. The Liberals seemed anxious to begin the new century
with a clean slate and showed some movement towards the Conservative
position of ‘equality’ for Ireland. Instead of direct rule, Ireland would be
given local government and therefore be on the same footing as England
and Scotland. The Liberal Party wrangled and partially fragmented over
Irish Home Rule, but one thing was certain: the Gladstonian ideal of Home
Rule as set out in the Home Rule Bills of 1886 and 1893 seemed to be well
and truly dead by 1902. This Liberal wrangling caused Irish affairs to be
put back on the political agenda again, but the renewed impetus in Irish
nationalist circles was met with contempt and derision by the
Conservatives. The issue of Irish land redistribution or the ‘Land Question’
as it was known, reasserted itself and a conference of tenants and
landowners proved quite fruitful. The Liberals wanted to see minor Irish
grievances resolved, hence the movement on the Land Question, but were
also anxious to be politically independent of the ‘Irish vote’. The unity and
strength of the Irish Party and UIL at this time can be compared and
contrasted with the Liberal disunity, and the feeling at the time was that
something was going to happen over Ireland. The federal notion of
‘Home Rule All Round’ was also given close examination in Scottish
newspapers in 1902, to further take the sting out of the Irish Home Rule tail\textsuperscript{26}.

The UIL demanded “the right to administer their own laws in their own country” and was kept under close surveillance in Glasgow after 1899. Files from Dublin Castle on the UIL are very meticulous and thorough from this time, which suggests that Irish nationalism was being taken more seriously than ever\textsuperscript{27}. The direct impact on the intelligence services of the British government is perhaps one of the most interesting elements to this study, mainly because of the significant amount of evidence now available. All the contemporary files from Dublin Castle show that they kept tabs on every Irish nationalist organisation in both Ireland and Scotland, and prove that considerable resources were employed by the British government to counteract the perceived threat of militant Irish nationalist activities. However, as a great deal of this information on Irish nationalism would have been gained from paid informants, questions arise about the validity of this evidence. Many informants would have told the agents of Dublin Castle what they wanted to hear, perhaps for continued financial gain or perhaps to deliberately misinform. It is also important to highlight the ‘siege mentality’ within Dublin Castle at the time; throughout the nineteenth century it was the clearing-house for all intelligence gathered on Irish nationalist activity, and previous episodes of physical force militancy in the 1840s and 1860s would have been kept in mind by those intelligence officers undertaking surveillance duties. ‘Prevention is better than cure’ seems to have been the prevailing attitude towards the examination of any Irish nationalist agitation and Dublin Castle saw itself as the state’s bulwark. Their reports tend to throw suspicion on all Irish nationalist groups, and are only valuable in the sense that they provide the historian with an insight into the inner workings and mindset within Dublin Castle.
at the turn of the century and beyond, but need to be studied with caution and corroborated with a variety of other sources.

Further evidence of the religious animosity referred to earlier can be found in a report from the Liberal Party into the political situation vis-à-vis Home Rule in early 1903. Although Irish affairs were not prominent in the first half of 1903, the report stressed the difficulty and passion the Irish Home Rule issue aroused and caused. It stated that there existed an “unfortunate racial antipathy between Scotchmen and Irishmen”\(^{28}\). The report did not just mean Protestant Scotland and Catholic Ireland in general, but also Protestant Scots and Catholic Irish including Irish-Scots and their descendants living throughout central Scotland in particular. Even the Liberal Party reinforced the contemporary ‘racial’ stereotype of the ‘Irish’ in Scotland. Either consciously or unconsciously, those who endorsed this negative image of the Irish-Scots community were contributing to a process of unjust victimisation. It has always been easy to apportion blame to a distinct or separate group in society, and the ‘Irish’ were seen as the problem, the Home Rule Question was the ‘Irish problem’, and the ‘Irish’ just could not or would not make the best of things. This religious animosity was a major factor in preventing the host community of Protestant Scots from ever making concerted attempts to successfully integrate Irish immigrants or their descendants until after the ‘Irish Question’ was partially answered in 1921.

A royal visit to Ireland in the second half of 1903 discouraged dissent and proved that many ordinary Irish people still felt something of a connection to the monarchy. Irish demonstrations at this time that were reported in Scotland were more moderate in tone so seem to bear this out. At an Irish nationalist demonstration in Glasgow in August 1903, for example, the speakers stressed the need for ‘constitutionalism’ in securing Home Rule for Ireland – in other words moral force advocacy. 1904 also seems to have
been a poor year for Irish affairs. The Russo-Japanese War dominated most of the headlines, and another royal visit to Ireland in May reinforces the impression that the cracks were being smoothed over. This was also true for the Liberal Party, the natural ally of the Irish nationalists in parliament, since for the best part of the year they were still sorting themselves out and jockeying for position with an election looming. The Union seemed very strong as both major parties now favoured some extension of local government, instead of Home Rule, to bring an element of democratic control closer to the Irish people. This move was greeted with cautious optimism in Scotland, especially in Conservative circles. England was seen as the dominant partner in the Union, and most Scots were content with the benefits from the relationship. The Conservatives hoped to lessen Irish nationalist credibility further with the Irish Local Government Bill, and they certainly seemed in a strong position to do so, the Glasgow Herald distinguishing between the British “lion” and the Irish “lamb”\textsuperscript{29}. The truth was, of course, that Irish nationalist activity was still very much feared, and the UIL and other smaller organisations were increasing their protests and were also beginning to receive Irish-American donations to their cause. Some form of Home Rule for Ireland was becoming a reasonable demand again.

The vital question in 1905 was not what the Conservatives intended to do about Ireland, but what the Liberals were prepared to do. The Irish Local Government Act of 1905 changed the situation. In Scotland, Irish nationalists felt it was long overdue and that it brought Home Rule a step closer. The Conservatives began to see that their policy of ‘killing Home Rule with kindness’ would not guarantee the longevity of the Union after all. The Liberals preferred the status quo; good government of Ireland directly from London, but no Home Rule. However, there were many Liberal MPs who were not unionist in sentiment, and thus outbreaks of
‘disloyalty’ were common. There was a growing belief that the Irish Question had persisted for so long that it could not be ignored indefinitely. This was a reaction to the Local Government Act eventually giving Ireland some control over her own affairs; but also, and perhaps more importantly, to the activity of Irish nationalist in Scotland and in Ireland. Outside of Ireland, the main centre for Irish nationalist activity was Glasgow. An IRB ‘Centre’ was appointed in 1905 to visit various towns in Scotland and retained close links with the IRB in Ireland. By the end of the year, organisations like the Ancient Order of Hibernians were condemning what they called “constitutional agitation”. Scottish unionists, either Conservative or Liberal, remained firmly opposed to Home Rule. The Liberal leaders began to accept that some form of Home Rule was inevitable but, uncertain of their exact policy, did not really want to cooperate with the Irish Party. Irish affairs had been brought back to the boil, and the Local Government elections in Ireland in early 1906 brought the tension further on. Most interest and activity centred on Ulster, where Home Rule was the sole focus of the elections; candidates declared themselves either for or against, plain and simple.

The issue of Home Rule also dominated the General Election of 1906. Voters in Scotland were urged by the UIL to support pro-Home Rule candidates, either Labour or Liberal. The Conservatives maintained that they would not have Home Rule; they believed a subordinate Irish parliament would only lead to an independent Ireland eventually. The Conservatives’ real fear was for Ulster; they feared the trade advantages enjoyed in Ulster would vanish if Home Rule was realised, indeed they feared a Catholic majority would persecute their Presbyterian stronghold in the north-east of the country. This fear was so real and persistent because Unionists in Ulster knew they had been historically favoured over the rest of Ireland and, as Protestants, had participated zealously in
discrimination against Catholics, and hence there was this abiding fear of revenge from Irish nationalists. In reality, however, defiance and not regret was what manifested itself in the political language of Ulster. Letters in the *Glasgow Herald* do well to illustrate the difference in political opinion over Ireland that existed in Scotland at this time. One writer argues that Irish Home Rule will only ever cause disunity and would surely lead to civil war\(^33\). Several days later, a rebuttal appears, arguing that Home Rule for Ireland is “logical” and only the “bigoted obstinacy” of Protestant Ulster prevented it\(^34\). Brian Girvin has argued that Irish Protestants were effectively, but unwittingly, excluded from the national community by what he describes as “Catholic Nationalism”, and this is what made a united Ireland so difficult to achieve. Protestant unionists rejected Irish nationalism in the same way that Catholic nationalists rejected Anglicisation. The ‘bigoted obstinacy’ charge referenced above is typical of what Girvin sees as the “base motives” attributed to Protestant unionists by Irish (Catholic) nationalists who failed to comprehend their complex sense of identity\(^35\). A Protestant unionist in Ireland would have seen himself as both British and Irish; in much the same way as a Protestant unionist in Scotland would have seen himself as both British and Scottish. However, in Ireland the Union was a symbol of oppression for Catholic nationalists and it was this dilemma that compromised Irish unity. Only if Irish nationalism had developed in a more inclusive manner would there have been any real chance for Home Rule after 1906.

It is clear that Irish Home Rule as a policy divided the Liberal Party into feuding sections. Patricia Jalland has noted the importance of Home Rule in the ultimate decline of the Liberals\(^36\). She highlights the internal feuds after Gladstone’s retirement between Lord Rosebery (former Liberal PM), John Morley and Sir William Harcourt amidst the shifting attitudes towards Irish Home Rule. Partly as a result of these feuds, and partly as a
response to unionist electoral success in 1895, the Liberals adopted a more gradualist approach to the Irish Question between 1895 and 1905. Their commitment to Ireland did not disappear, but this ‘step-by-step’ policy did repair party unity to the extent that victory was secured in the General Election of 1906.

The new devolution scheme was supported by Redmond and Dillon and most of the Irish Party. Sinn Fein, active since 1900, completely rejected the scheme as a sellout. The Liberal government under Asquith firmly committed itself to introducing an Irish legislative devolution scheme sometime in 1907. The Irish Council Bill of 1907 did not prove to be acceptable to Irish nationalists, even devolutionists, as both groups felt that it did not go far enough in any direction. The Conservatives responded to the Bill by setting up the Union Defence League with its headquarters in London, but later it had offices in Glasgow. The Glasgow Herald announced that “Scotland and England are as hostile today to Home Rule as they were in 1886.” This was part of the impact of Irish nationalism on Scotland; for unionist Scots, whichever party they supported, Home Rule for Ireland still implied the eventuality of an Irish republic. Home Rule was seen by them as a stepping-stone, a halfway house; and they believed that all Irish nationalist activity was geared towards this – Irish nationalism and republicanism were, to them, tantamount to the same thing. It therefore did not matter what Irish nationalist said or did, unionists only heard the same message. Unionist Scots rejected Home Rule with a variety of arguments: they argued that the Liberals’ proposals for devolution were really Home Rule by the back door, the Liberals had no electoral mandate for introducing such a measure, and finally that loyal Ulster would be handed over to the Irish nationalists. On the other side, the UIL was not impressed with the Bill and, sensing a struggle was on the cards, initiated a strong membership drive in Glasgow. After the Bill was introduced to
the Commons in May there were repeated demonstrations and disturbances from both sides, and both sides sought to make political capital out of the others apparent lawlessness. When the Irish Council Bill folded due to being starved of parliamentary time, Home Rule activity intensified dramatically; letters flooded in to newspapers urging the public to recognise the disaffection of the Irish\textsuperscript{43}, while others stated that Scotland would have indeed supported Home Rule, and not the contrary, as had been continually predicted by the Conservatives\textsuperscript{44}.

Irish nationalist activity was beginning to have an impact again. Sinn Fein activists seized the opportunity to highlight the differences between themselves and the moderate Irish nationalists: complete separation versus subordinate devolution. Sinn Fein accused the ‘Westminster Nationalists’ of being ineffective, and called for a boycott of English manufacturers. They argued in their manifesto that only extreme nationalism could deliver Irish independence\textsuperscript{45}. The dynamism of Sinn Fein provoked unrest in Ulster along strictly religious lines\textsuperscript{46}, and also caused disquiet in Scotland. Special Branch of the RIC had a man, Sergeant Maguire, permanently stationed in Glasgow from 1906 to observe Sinn Fein activity in and around the city. He reported that the Sinn Fein policy slowly gained popular support; regular meetings and organising tours by activists denounced purely parliamentary agitation\textsuperscript{47}. Discussion within the Irish Party at Westminster also occurred, as many recognised the growing influence of Sinn Fein. Faced with this growing strength, and the fact that the UIL was then also demanding complete autonomy for Ireland, public opinion began to modify its position to accept some form of Home Rule but by constitutional means only\textsuperscript{48}. In other words, the spectre of violence brought the reality of the situation into sharp focus; better half a loaf than no bread at all. The strenuous activity of Sinn Fein and the UIL in Scotland
had played its part in moving many people to accept the case for a measure of Irish Home Rule – the Union bubble seemed about to burst.

Tom Garvin has skilfully analysed the historical development of Irish nationalism. He notes that there is only a “partial continuity” between the Sinn Fein of pre-1914 and the republican Sinn Fein of 1917 and onwards. Arthur Griffith’s original social and political programme was monarchist, as he initially accepted the sovereignty of the British crown in Ireland. He viewed the Union of 1801 as unconstitutional and called for the Irish MPs elected to Westminster to withdraw from London and meet in Dublin instead as an Irish Parliament. It was only after the Easter Rising of 1916 that Sinn Fein became the basis of a new and republican mass movement for Irish nationalism.

1908 saw Sinn Fein making good its foothold in Scotland. Arthur Griffith, the Sinn Fein President, spoke in Glasgow in March to reaffirm the commitment of the organisation to complete independence. After a motion in favour of Irish Home Rule was passed by Parliament in the same month, the Conservatives began to panic. The Glasgow Herald gave a platform to the Conservatives in Scotland who maintained that the Scots supported Ulster. However, attacks on the Union began to come from much closer to home. The Liberals, after repeated questioning in the Commons, stated that they saw Home Rule for Scotland as “desirable.” In this spirit, they commenced the moving of local government and some government department functions to Edinburgh. The federalist idea of ‘Home Rule All Round’ to defuse the complex political situation was reintroduced to political debate. The renewed demands for Scottish Home Rule had much to do with the perceived success of the Irish Home Rule movement, but many in Scotland looked on federalism as the sugar on the pill of Irish Home Rule. Throughout this period, and up until the 1920s, the movement for Scottish Home Rule ran along on the coat-tails of Irish
Home Rule; there was a legitimate and growing demand for Scottish Home Rule, but it only seemed to hold sway in periods of successful Irish Home Rule activity, and this seems to bear out the impact of Irish nationalism on Scotland. As a consequence, Scots of a unionist persuasion always looked on Scottish Home Rule as just a decoy for Irish Home Rule. At the close of 1908 the Conservatives were in more determined mood, pressing the Liberal government for a definitive statement on Irish Home Rule.

The Conservatives had realised that they had plenty to lose by 1909, and thus went on the offensive. They ridiculed the ‘decoy’ of federalism, attacked the Liberals as being unfit for government, and labelled Sinn Fein as an “audacious sect”\(^54\). Some 50,000 members of the Orange Order assembled at Pollokshaws in Glasgow on the 12\(^{th}\) of July, where various anti-Home Rule speeches were delivered. Asquith, the Liberal leader, had promised “self-government for Ireland”, but unionist Liberals accused him of seeking only to retain his parliamentary majority by doing deals with Irish Party MPs\(^55\). Once again, unionist Liberal MPs had to face a loyalty dilemma: Archibald Cameron Corbett, MP for Glasgow Tradeston (who had returned to the Liberal Party after joining the Conservatives in 1886), is a good example of a Glasgow MP who struggled with his conscience. Another General Election looked imminent by the end of the year, and voters were urged in the press to realise their “special responsibility”\(^56\). The tenor of the Conservative argument is best encapsulated (as ever) by the *Glasgow Herald*: “the Irish peril...[republicanism]...must be averted at all costs”\(^57\).

The new Parliament of 1910 was finely balanced. The Liberal Party just retained control with the support of the Irish Party and the Labour Party. The Irish Party had split into two ‘parties’ during the election: the followers of Redmond against the followers of O’Brien. The *Glasgow Herald* took the opportunity to ridicule Irish nationalist politics by remarking that “this
four-horse coach will take careful driving”\textsuperscript{58}. The Conservatives were bitterly disappointed that they had failed to take power, but the fact that the majority of MPs elected were in favour of some form of Irish Home Rule seems to have made no difference to them. The Duke of Abercorn, a senior Conservative, wrote in a letter to the press: “Ulster will stay loyal at all costs...Do not be ignorant of or underestimate our resolve”\textsuperscript{59}. In other words, once Home Rule looked likely the Conservatives began to make veiled threats of violence in Ulster; anything, in fact, to prevent the checking of the “Protestant ascendancy”\textsuperscript{60}, and this led directly to the creation of paramilitary groups in Ulster at first but then across the rest of Ireland. Throughout the course of 1910, a series of articles on Devolution, Federalism and Scottish Home Rule ran in the \textit{Glasgow Herald}\textsuperscript{61}. All of these articles were fairly objective, sometimes even favourable to Scottish Home Rule, and this shows the movement for Irish nationalism had enough of an impact for the unionist \textit{Glasgow Herald} to begin to examine the different methods of separation seriously. These articles would certainly have had a considerable effect on the newspaper’s readership and advanced, to a certain extent, the prospects of Irish nationalism.

The idea that Irish Home Rule would have been part of a federal settlement had gained much more credibility by 1911, during a year that was characterised by strained political wrangling over Ireland. Both Scottish and Welsh Liberal MPs stated that they had no quarrel with Ireland and they regarded Irish Home Rule as the first step towards complete federal devolution\textsuperscript{62}. The concept of federalism was also given serious examination at Westminster. The main thrust of the Conservative defence of the status quo was constitutional; they argued that the Liberals had no mandate to introduce Irish Home Rule as it had not been an important campaign issue during the General Election (not altogether true), and that Ireland was unfairly over-represented in Parliament whereas England was
under-represented which created an artificial majority for Home Rule. There was some truth in this, but the Conservatives had not given high priority in the past to constitutional or electoral reform, laying them open to charges of expediency now that Irish Home Rule looked like being secured. All through 1911 there were large Protestant demonstrations against Home Rule in Ulster and, led ably by Sir Edward Carson, the Ulster Unionists began to fight Home Rule in earnest. Huge support for Ulster came from Scottish Protestants, so much so that “the problem of Ulster” began to merit widespread attention in the Scottish press. Once the Ulster Unionists realised in 1911 that some form of Irish Home Rule was probably inevitable they initially pressed for their own “loyal” government in Belfast, but when this was dismissed out of hand they adopted an exclusionist stance which became a very effective political strategy.

Ulster Unionists at first argued that it would be impossible to consider Irish Home Rule without the consent of Ulster, but they became increasingly defiant and belligerent from 1911 onwards. It would be fair to say that the Liberal government initially underestimated the resolve of the Ulster Unionists. Public opinion in mainland Britain, and especially in Scotland, looked on the political situation in Ireland with a mixture of curiosity and anxiety, and it is testimony to the skill of the Ulster Unionists that their propaganda was as effective as it was.

Ireland consists of four provinces: Leinster, Munster, Ulster and Connaught. Of these four provinces, only Ulster was really against Home Rule and only in six out of the nine counties of Ulster were there majorities against Home Rule. Needless to say, Protestants were by far the largest social group in these six Ulster counties. Irish nationalists looked upon the situation as allowing six Irish counties to dictate the country’s future to the other twenty-six, and it depends how much value is placed on the rights of minorities in a society. Brian Girvin has argued that partition was
effectively in place in Ireland well before it was institutionalised in the 1920s. Since Protestant unionists in Ulster were as determined to exist outwith a state dominated by Catholic nationalism as Catholic nationalists were determined to exist outwith a state dominated by Protestants, there were in reality two nations occupying one island. The British state had consistently rejected the Irish nationalism’s claim for self-determination because the majority of citizens in the British state did not support it. Although Protestant unionists were a minority within the Irish nation, they were in the majority within the British state as a whole. The fact that Catholic nationalists failed to appreciate the legitimacy of this position effectively divided Ireland and made civil war a real possibility. As a result, Irish nationalists were fighting a losing battle to keep Ireland as a nation intact. Andrew Bonar-Law, the new Conservative leader, stated in November 1911 that “Ireland is divided into two nations”, further entrenching the idea that the two sides in Ireland were irreconcilable, an idea that had been consistently asserted by the Ulster Unionists and their supporters in Scotland.

The passing of the Parliament Act in 1911, which removed the power of veto from the House of Lords, was the catalyst that made Irish Home Rule by constitutional means a probability. As Patricia Jalland has noted, there was a “unique opportunity” for the Liberal Party to enact an Irish Home Rule Bill in 1912 before Sinn Fein developed into a republican mass movement. However, the fact that Asquith’s government failed to understand the significance of the Ulster issue left them woefully ill-equipped to combat the Unionist assault. A peaceful solution to the issue of Ulster therefore became very unlikely. The pacifist views of many Liberal MPs made them as reluctant to coerce Ulster as they were to enter the First World War. Jalland suggests that Redmond may have agreed to ‘Home Rule within Home Rule’, or even exclusion for Ulster in 1912 but,
because Irish nationalists were offered their ultimate goal first (which was then withdrawn incrementally) they lost faith with the Liberals and did not trust them to fulfil their ‘obligation’ to Ireland.

The issue of Ulster is crucial to understanding the events between 1910 and 1912. The imminent prospect of Irish Home Rule led directly to a coalition of what David Miller has called “counter-revolutionary forces”, which produced Ulster’s Solemn League and Covenant in September 1912. This document committed its signatories to defying an act of Parliament, by force if necessary, as soon as it was made law. Ulster Protestants felt that their civil and religious liberties were under attack and Home Rule would be ‘destructive of our citizenship’, so they were morally if not legally justified in disobeying what they saw as no ordinary law. There was simply no trust between Unionists and Irish nationalists in Ulster, they both suspected the other of seeking to dominate. Moreover, Ulster Unionists looked on Ireland as two nations or no nation at all, and if one of these two had a right to self-determination then the other had it equally. This does raise the question of how much of a real bond of national feeling there was between Ulster Protestants and the rest of the population of Britain. As David Miller has shown, the answer is not a straightforward one; “they had quasi-national feelings of attachment to Ireland, to ‘Ulster’ and to a Britain which was less the real Great Britain than a vague concept of a Greater Britain which somehow the Empire might come to embody…they thought not in terms of nationality, but in terms of a treaty or contract.” In a constitutional democracy, no rights can reach beyond the length of each new parliament; no binding promises can be given because the next parliament always has the right of repeal. Therefore, Ulster Protestants became bound by the wishes of the whole British people which created a loyalty dilemma as they saw themselves as a special case for consideration.
Alvin Jackson has explored similar themes and noted that after 1911 Loyalism (as it came to be known) in Ulster was “more embattled and self-reliant”, mainly because of an increasing recognition of the failing relationship with unionism in the rest of Britain. He describes the process of replacing constitutional or parliamentary resistance with local strength as “Ulsterisation” and, like Miller, sees this as a direct consequence of Ulster Loyalists’ disenchantment with British politics. Graham Walker has also highlighted the complex question of ethnic identity in Ulster. Throughout the Home Rule era the “myth of the Ulster-Scots” as a distinctive ethnic group was developed and popularised. They were seen as “a pioneering people with a history of civilising achievement”, and Walker notes the amount of published works on this theme which mainly sought to distinguish the ‘Ulster-Scots’ from Catholic Irish ‘natives’ for propaganda purposes. He also notes that these attempts to encourage stronger bonds of British solidarity by Ulster Loyalists had most success in urban west-central Scotland among Liberal unionist economic elites and the Orange Order-influenced working class. Indeed, when the Conservatives and Liberal unionists in Scotland merged into a Scottish Unionist Party in 1911, the West of Scotland Liberal Unionist Association minuted this message of support to the ‘Ulster-Scots’: “closely united to us by ties of race and religion…we in the West of Scotland, of all in the British Isles, should hold out a strong hand to them in their hour of distress.”

The plight of Unionist Protestants in Ulster did not, however, make much of an impact on many Scottish Presbyterians who could not bring themselves to align with the Conservatives because of their traditionally Liberal and, in some cases, radical politics. Issues of Scottish identity, land ownership, patronage and even disestablishment meant much more to them.
Yet it could be argued that, by 1912, it was probably too late to reconcile Ulster with the rest of Ireland. The British government did not, understandably, want to send troops to Ulster to enforce Home Rule and thus provoke a civil war, but the situation should not have been allowed to deteriorate so damagingly in the first place. The Liberal government could have done more to counteract the propaganda of the Ulster Unionists, and the Irish Party could have put aside what differences they had temporarily to take on the common enemy. More could have been done by previous governments to redress legitimate Irish grievances like the Land Issue sooner; more could have been made of the Irish Council Bill of 1906-7 and the concept of federal devolution for the whole United Kingdom could have been explored more seriously. The Imperial Parliament at Westminster had too much business to cope with at the time, and some devolved powers to every member nation would have checked the intransigence of Ulster Unionists, especially if Ireland had been granted an assembly in Belfast as well as in Dublin. A federal solution did receive some examination, but the exclusiveness of Irish nationalism and the self-interest of Ulster Unionists prevented it from becoming a reality; certainly after 1912 each side was so deeply entrenched that there seemed no possibility of any constructive political dialogue or an all-Ireland solution.

The belief that the Irish Home Rule issue was too difficult to resolve was advanced on two fronts by the Unionists from 1912. On the one hand they argued that recent history, particularly the unsuccessful Home Rule Bills of 1886 and 1893, proved that Irish Home Rule was not popular with the electorate and so should be dropped altogether. On the other hand they argued that whatever form of Home rule was adopted, some groups would not be happy as it was just impossible to please everybody - Ulster, especially, deserved special treatment. Certainly, the case for Ulster was beginning to have increasing success at Westminster. The Liberals outlined
a “Federal Trail” to Home Rule in February, for example\textsuperscript{83}. Unfortunately, while doing so, Asquith acknowledged that “in Ireland there is an acute racial difference” to the dismay of Irish nationalists. The Unionist smelled blood, and began again to turn the argument along sectarian lines.

Every unionist institution in Scotland was involved in this propaganda campaign. In Scotland, the Glasgow Presbytery of the Church of Scotland passed a motion in sympathy with Ulster Protestants, and the enduring embers of anti-Catholic prejudice began to flicker once more\textsuperscript{84}. In April 1912 the Unionist Party released a pamphlet entitled \textit{Against Home Rule}, which was given widespread and usually favourable press in Scottish newspapers\textsuperscript{85}. The pamphlet argued that “…[Home Rule would be]…subjecting Protestant Ulster to the uncontrolled domination of Roman Catholic Leinster, Munster and Connaught”\textsuperscript{86}. Anti-Catholic prejudice ran right through the pamphlet, renewing traditional fears in Scotland, and demonising Irish nationalism which, as has been explained above, was synonymous with republicanism in the eyes of many Protestant Scots. By the middle of 1912 the case for exemption for Ulster from any forthcoming Home Rule Bill had great support in Scotland. Sizeable demonstrations against Irish Home Rule were organised in July 1912 by the Orange Order and took place throughout Lanarkshire\textsuperscript{87}. The solidarity felt for Ulster in Scotland prompted the \textit{Glasgow Herald}, for example, to remind its readers that Ulster was still “a Scottish colony”\textsuperscript{88}. The gloves were well and truly off; many Protestants in Scotland as well as in Ulster were prepared to fight if necessary. Even reasonable suggestions like a federal solution were met with indignation in this volatile political climate, and the Unionist Party described federalism as “a thinly veiled apology for Home Rule”\textsuperscript{89}.

The need to defuse the situation seems to have been lost on Irish nationalists in Scotland. All this time they had been working for Home Rule and were, with some justification, shocked by the tactics of unionists.
Sinn Fein, which had been organising in Scotland since 1900, was growing in strength and support and regarded Irish Home Rule as a platform upon which to build. When Unionists in Glasgow brought Sir Edward Carson to speak in the city against Home Rule in October 1912, Irish nationalists responded by bringing the Lord Mayor of Dublin to the city to speak in favour of it the same month – and both meetings were well-attended.

When the third Home Rule for Ireland Bill entered the Report stage in Parliament in December of 1912, the debate between both sides used unambiguously warlike language and imagery.

Iain Patterson has noted that it is very difficult to judge the numerical strength of Sinn Fein within the ‘Irish’ community in Scotland between 1912 and 1914. A study of the Glasgow Observer suggests that there was only one active Sinn Fein cumann in Glasgow before the First World War, but there were 200 paying members of the IRB in Scotland in 1912, and as there is some evidence of overlapping memberships in Glasgow between Sinn Fein and the IRB, this is a useful baseline. Bulmer Hobson addressed “about 500” at a Sinn Fein rally in Glasgow in 1912, for example. By way of comparison, an estimated 50,000 heard Joseph Devlin in Kilmarnock the following year, which does suggest the Irish Party was still dominant until at least the outbreak of war. There is also some evidence to suggest that both Sinn Fein and the IRB in Scotland were much more socialist in outlook than their parent organisations in Ireland. Tomas O’Ban (Tom White) and Charles Corrigan were both members of the IRB, Sinn Fein and the Catholic Socialist Society organised by John Wheatley, for example. The Glasgow branch of Sinn Fein also criticised Arthur Griffith for not supporting the Dublin transport strike in 1913. There is even evidence that the Irish Citizen Army (formed as a result of this strike by James Connolly) received a consignment of smuggled arms from Glasgow in 1914. Patterson estimates around 100 Sinn Feiners in Glasgow prior to the
Easter Rising, but this does not take into account the probable difference between a paying membership and an active membership, as has been previously discussed above\textsuperscript{100}. Other sources indicate about 70 Irish Volunteers in the city at the same time\textsuperscript{101}. Yet for most Irish-Scots, political activity before the war still centred on the UIL and Irish Party politics. However, the postponed implementation of the Home Rule for Ireland Act, the issue of recruitment and then the Easter Rising would soon combine to fragment Irish nationalist politics forever.

The fact that events were unquestionably on a war footing was emphasised by several cases of illegal rifles being seized in Belfast in June 1913 – they had all come from Scotland. The IRB in Glasgow had resolved to supply the Irish Volunteers with arms at a meeting in November 1913\textsuperscript{102}. Sir Edward Carson spoke again in Glasgow during the same month and issued “a call to arms” to defend Ulster\textsuperscript{103}. The General Assembly of the Irish Presbyterian Church passed a motion against Home Rule, also in June, and repeated the Unionist Party argument that Ireland was “a special case...religion and politics in Ireland cannot be separated”\textsuperscript{104}. Unfortunately for the unity of Ireland this had indeed become the case; antagonism and intolerance had ensured that there would be no inclusive settlement, despite assurances from Irish nationalist leaders like T. M. Healy that civil and religious liberty would be guaranteed within a self-governed Ireland\textsuperscript{105}. There was simply too much animosity, too much socio-political baggage on both sides for reason to prevail. Preventing Home Rule had become a narrow religious crusade for some, just as achieving Home Rule had become a similar obsession for Catholic nationalism; both sides were even prepared to risk civil war with mass bloodshed. Irish nationalism had endured far too many setbacks to accept anything less than Home Rule, and since Ulster Unionists had never had
their own identity or status recognised by Irish nationalists they would not be coerced. It was a long way from ‘killing Home Rule with kindness’.

What both of these intractable stances achieved was the conviction of the Liberal government that they were not, in fact, bluffing. The unionist movement continued to threaten civil war and by 1914 the exclusion of Ulster from the Home Rule Bill looked certain but was not to be regarded as a permanent solution. The Liberals were even said to be contemplating “Home Rule within Home Rule” for Ulster106. The eventual exclusion scheme unveiled by the government involved plebiscites for all Ulster counties on Home Rule, with a time-limit for the period of exclusion set at six years. This was as far as the Liberals were prepared to go, and the Irish Party at Westminster was not happy with any compromise at all.

Moreover, support for Sinn Fein grew when it became clear that Ulster had gained a deal of this kind. The Liberals offered this concession to the unionist movement because they had come to believe that Ulster was not bluffing but they also wished to avoid a General Election until at least 1915, as they had other major pieces of legislation they wanted to secure107. Needless to say, the Ulster Unionists rejected the time-limit on exclusion, determinedly trying to evoke their Covenanting heritage. Rallying to the cause, the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland passed a motion in sympathy with their Irish Presbyterian brethren, and sent a deputation to ascertain the “true facts” of the situation108. Unionists in Ulster had been very successful in mobilising support for exclusion amongst a largely sympathetic Protestant community in Scotland. The RIC then stationed more men in Glasgow to liaise more closely with the Scottish police109, no doubt worried about further consignments of illegal arms being shipped across to Ulster.

The third Home Rule for Ireland Bill was passed by the House of Commons and sent to the House of Lords on the 27th May 1914. The
Glasgow Herald was typical of most unionist newspapers by calling for a General Election to settle the Irish crisis, as the Liberal government were merely “spectators” in their opinion\textsuperscript{110}. It was a bitterly ironic coincidence that the First World War intervened in August 1914 and began to split the Irish nationalist movement in Scotland. The UIL quickly came out in support of this ‘anti-German war’, realising the dangers of being branded as disloyal. However, Sinn Fein rejected the war as an English affair and encouraged all its supporters to resist recruitment in Scotland as well as in Ireland. The Volunteer Corps of each side, fully trained for the event of civil war, were faced with difficult decisions. The Ulster Unionists did not want to leave Ulster totally defenceless, and large sections of the Irish Volunteers totally refused to get involved in a war they dubbed as imperialist. Special branch of the RIC reported in October 1915 that “there are about 70 Irish Volunteers in Glasgow, and that about 35 of them meet for drill, without arms, on Sundays at their Hall”\textsuperscript{111}.

The war signalled the eclipse of constitutional or parliamentary Irish nationalism in Ireland and in Scotland. Sinn Fein began to take control of the Irish nationalist agenda, and behind Sinn Fein was the IRB – the nucleus of republican activity at the time. To a certain extent then, the fears of the unionist movement in Scotland had been realised. Stories of Germany trying to provoke revolt in Ireland began in 1914 and appeared periodically until 1916\textsuperscript{112}. Irish nationalist newspapers like Sinn Fein, The Irish Volunteer, Irish Freedom and The Irish Worker were accused of sedition or having German backing and the Unionists urged the Liberal government to take immediate action. Special Branch of the RIC reported that German arms would be supplied to Ireland “if paid for”\textsuperscript{113}. The Liberals did not seem keen to act, no doubt conscious of the disappointment within Irish nationalist circles that Home Rule had been achieved but not implemented because of the war. Sean McDermott, the
editor of *Irish Freedom* was arrested, but no action was taken against the other newspapers or indeed the Irish Volunteers, as recruitment was not pursued in Ireland\(^\text{114}\). Many eligible Irish-Scots took advantage of this arrangement by leaving their Scottish homes for Ireland\(^\text{115}\). This obviously laid the Irish-Scots open once again to charges of disloyalty, and reinforced the stereotypes held by many Protestants Scots that the Catholic Irish-Scots were all republicans and hence would not fight for King and country. The dilemma for the Irish-Scots was their dual national identity; their community was increasingly Scottish by birth but had a strong cultural bond with Ireland and were thus reluctant to be identified as British\(^\text{116}\). However, many Irish-Scots did join the army\(^\text{117}\), but these recruits would have been Liberal or perhaps Labour voters, and would have supported Home Rule probably through the UIL if they were even involved in the Irish nationalist movement at all; they certainly would not have been Sinn Fein supporters\(^\text{118}\). Those that did not or would not enlist were attacked by the unionist movement repeatedly from 1914 to 1916, the Glasgow Herald advising its readers to “drop the ‘Sinn’ and call them ‘Feigners’”, for example\(^\text{119}\). Despite this, Sinn Fein in Scotland organised an anti-recruitment campaign, centred on Glasgow and Lanarkshire, using mainly postcards and leaflets\(^\text{120}\).

Tom Garvin has noted that, in Ireland, the authorities were concerned about the reluctance of rural youths to volunteer for the army\(^\text{121}\). Catholic Irishmen volunteered less than Protestants, and rural Catholics least of all\(^\text{122}\). Elaine McFarland has explained the difficulty in expressing Irish recruitment figures as a reliable percentage of adult males of military age (the 1911 census does not specify religious denomination for those of Irish birth) but, based on statistics from the UIL, Glasgow provided 8,000, Edinburgh 1,648, and Dundee and Clydebank 2,000 enlistments each\(^\text{123}\). Moreover, she points out the hitherto ‘forgotten’ nature of the Irish-Scots’
contribution to the First World War. Enlistment was one way to escape economic hardship, and “ambivalence rather than alienation” explains their attitude to defending the British Empire\textsuperscript{124}. Both the Irish Party and the Catholic Church stressed the concept of duty, and hoped for enhanced roles in post-war society\textsuperscript{125}. Although it must be emphasised that it would have been very difficult to disengage from such a huge national mobilisation, the contribution of Irish-Scots to the war effort shows a community keen to participate as fully as possible in the society they had chosen to settle in.

When the Easter Rising occurred in April of 1916 it took several days before concrete details appeared in Scottish newspapers. This was no doubt because of war censorship, and once the situation was contained the government allowed some publicity, hoping to boost the war effort with patriotic outrage. The Irish Party at Westminster reacted similarly, fearing that Home Rule and Irish liberty were in jeopardy. The Easter Rising was generally labelled as insignificant, nothing more than “foolish local disturbances”\textsuperscript{126}, but these observers were ignorant of the significance of the myth of sacrifice in Irish republican heritage\textsuperscript{127}. The Easter Rising of 1916 brought Irish republicanism fully into the mainstream of not just Irish nationalism but of British politics as a whole.

Iain Patterson estimates that about 50 Irish Volunteers from Glasgow took part in the Easter Rising\textsuperscript{128}. Once taken prisoner they were eventually transferred to camps in mainland Britain before being released by the end of 1916. As Tom Garvin has pithily commented: “before 1916, everybody in radical politics knew everybody else, and after 1916, thanks to the camps, they knew each other rather better”\textsuperscript{129}. Patrick Pearse had counted on the British reaction to the Easter Rising being ruthless and extreme, knowing that this would allow the republicans of 1916 to take their place in the pantheon and renew this part of the Irish nationalist mythology for at
least another generational cycle. John Wheatley succinctly explained his (and most Irish-Scots) reaction to the British response: “it appeared as if in the most miraculous manner the Irish heart had been completely captured by the British Empire. I firmly believe that had the Government at that moment treated the Irish rebels as they did the Boers, then the Irish problem was solved forever. But no, they insisted on their pound of flesh”\textsuperscript{130}. Whether the thousand or so Irish Volunteers who joined Pearse on Easter Monday in 1916 were genuinely seeking martyrdom as well as him is an issue that has been raised by Peter Hart\textsuperscript{131}. He does not see them all as members of “a mystical republican cult”, but as an “intelligent and dedicated” group of people fighting for each other and an Irish republic. They had nothing but contempt for the compromises of the Irish Party and saw themselves as upholding their national honour\textsuperscript{132}. The Irish Volunteers certainly saw themselves as part of the republican continuum though, as their Easter Proclamation attests. What we should perhaps see is a merging of IRB thinking with a more populist Irish Volunteer ideology.

It would seem therefore that the impact of Irish nationalism on Scotland between 1898 and 1916 was gradual and varied. The main impact was felt by Protestant unionists who feared the republican agenda in particular. They felt solidarity with the Protestants of Ulster, but were also deeply suspicious of the Irish-Scots in their midst. As most Irish-Scots families were Roman Catholic, this suspicion grew into anti-Catholic prejudice. Coupled with the stereotyping of the Irish-Scots as disloyal and republican, this religious prejudice and bigotry reinforced the conspiracy myth common to many Scottish Protestants: the Irish were all republicans, and all Catholics were looking to overthrow the Protestant faith and monarchy. Public opinion was skilfully manipulated by Protestant unionists against Home Rule and the legitimate grievances of Catholic Ireland. Both propaganda and bigotry filled the unionist newspapers of the time, and the
amount of coverage and its tone proves that there was a substantial impact on the sensibilities of unionists. This propaganda also affected Scottish institutions as well as members of the general public; the Church of Scotland, in particular, participated fully in the anti-Irish nationalist campaign. The latter focus on Ulster and the demand for it to be excluded from the Home Rule Bill by 1914 showed the unionist movement reacting to the inevitability of Home Rule by advocating the disintegration of Ireland as a complete nation. This was perhaps inevitable anyway as the fatal mistake of Irish nationalism was to develop in an exclusive way that denied the complex sense of identity that Irish Protestants in Ulster possessed, making Irish nationalism really just Catholic nationalism. The antagonism and intolerance within the debate on the Irish crisis before 1916 also shows that the fear of Irish republicanism was very real, even if the republicans themselves were not really that strong in Scotland yet.

The movement for Scottish Home Rule also owes much to the struggle for Irish Home Rule. As a fellow-traveller on the coat-tails of Irish Home Rule, moves for Scottish Home Rule were proposed several times and several organisations were also established to this end during this period\textsuperscript{133}. The largely sympathetic hearing that Federalism received throughout this period is also testimony to the influence of Irish nationalism on Scotland. A federal solution to the Home Rule crises may well have been the most practical conclusion, but politics and religion were never separated or reconciled long enough for any lasting scheme to be realised.
Chapter II: Notes

1) The Conservatives replaced the Liberals as the part of government in 1895. The Liberals returned to power in 1905 and remained in government (albeit in coalition from 1915) until 1922, but would never win another election.

2) General taxation and the issues of land redistribution and a Catholic University were the main bones of contention.

3) Irish nationalists always made this distinction – see discussion of this in Chapter I.

4) Admittedly, this does not apply to Ulster, but this argument will be discussed later in this thesis.

5) This is textbook Thoreau.

6) Irish migration to Scotland began to increase again from 1898 (1,142 in 1898, 1,508 in 1899, 1,968 in 1900, 2,207 in 1901 compared to 642 in 1896 and 877 in 1897; see HANDLEY, ‘The Irish in Modern Scotland’). See also the Crime Branch Specials 16160/S and 16827/S in the National Archives of Ireland, Dublin.

7) GH, 13 April 1898, 6c. See also GH, 18 March 1898, 6f.

8) GH, 13 April 1898, 7h.

9) GO, 19 February 1898, pp.10-14.

11) WOOD, ‘Irish Immigrants and Scottish Radicalism’, SLHSJ, 9, 1975. See also GH, 19 May 1899, 6e.

12) ibid.

13) The vast majority of letters to the Glasgow Herald in these months support the Conservative government, but that is only to be expected in a unionist newspaper.

14) See McFARLAND, ‘John Ferguson, 1836 – 1906’. See also GH, 24 November 1899, 6g.

15) GH, 1 February 1900, leader.

16) GH, 12 February 1900, 6d.

17) There still remained a Dillon faction, a Healy faction as well as a Redmond faction.

18) GH, 22 February 1900, 4d.

19) GH, 26 May 1900, 6c. See also WOOD, op. cit.

20) FINLAY, ‘A Partnership for good?’, esp. Chapter 3. See also GH, 1 August 1900, leader.

21) See Chapter I. See also FINLAY, op. cit.

22) See GH, 13 November 1900, for example.

23) GH, 4 January 1901, leader.

24) See the letters pages of GH, February to November, 1901.


27) PRO, CO903/8, Irish Crime Records on UIL, 1898 – 1901.

28) GH, 6 February 1903, 8e.

29) GH, 17 May 1904, 6e.

30) In 1903 there was less of a notion of collective responsibility outside of actual government ministers. Backbenchers frequently argued against their own Party’s official position on issues like Irish Home Rule. See BOYCE, op. cit.


32) GH, 1 January 1906, 10d.

33) GH, 12 January 1906, 9g.

34) GH, 19 January 1906, 13d.

35) GIRVIN, ‘From Union to Union’, p.27.

36) See JALLAND, ‘The Liberals and Ireland’.

37) ibid, pp.22-4.

38) See Chapter I for an examination of Sinn Fein origins. See also KEE, ‘The Green Flag’, vol.III, part 2, Chapters 8 and 9.
39) Interestingly, taking into account the widespread tension of the time, the Peace Preservation Act of 1881 was repealed at the end of 1906; this Act had been intended to quell political risings and forbade the possessions of firearms in Ireland – a curious move at a volatile time.

40) GH, 19 January 1907, 6d.

41) Generally speaking, the majority of Protestant Scots supported the Union, as at its head was a monarch who was sworn to defend their faith. In Scotland, most Protestants were Presbyterian and many had a particular antipathy towards Catholics and Catholicism, making it easier to believe that Irish nationalist activity was just a thinly veiled cover for a republican movement. It would also not be going too far to say that the Irish-Scots were therefore suspected of being the vanguard of this movement.

42) GH, 23 May 1907, 9d. See also HANDLEY, op. cit.

43) GH, 31 May 1907, 10h.

44) GH, 3 June 1907, 4g.

45) GH, 24 June 1907, 9d and GH, 28 June 1907, 10c. See also KEE, op. cit.

46) GH, 6 July 197, 9a.

47) PRO, CO904/117/2, II, III, VI, XI, Special Branch of RIC, 1905 – 1907.

48) GH, 6 September 1907, 6c.

49) GARVIN, op. cit.
50) ibid, pp.105-6.

51) GH, 16 March 1908, 12b.

52) GH, 14 April 1908, 8f et seq.

53) GH, 7 May 1908, 9c. See also MITCHELL, ‘Strategies for Self-Government’.

54) GH, 5 February 1909, 8d; 19 April 1909, 8d; 15 June 1909, 6f.

55) GH, 13 December 1909, 8d.

56) GH, 20 December 1909, 8d.

57) GH, 30 December 1909, 6e, but my addition.

58) GH, 2 February 1910, 6e.

59) GH, 11 November 1910, 3e.

60) See BRUCE, ‘No Pope of Rome’. See also GH, 12 January 1910, 12h.

61) GH, 25 October 1910, 6d; 26 October 1910, 8d; 29 October 1910, 8d.

62) See KENDLE, ‘Federal Britain: a History’ and ‘Ireland and the Federal Solution, 1870-1920’ as both works give a thorough examination of the problem. See also GH, 14 April 1911, 10b.

63) GH, 5 October 1911, 8d. The new leader of the Conservative Party, Andrew Bonar-Law, was particularly supportive.

64) See essays in WOOD, ‘Scotland and Ulster’. See also GH, 26 September 1911, 7f.

66) GIRVIN, op. cit., p.17.

67) See MITCHELL, ‘Conservatives and the Union’. See also GH, 1 November 1911, 8e.


70) ibid, pp.262-3.

71) MILLER, op. cit., pp.94-5.

72) ibid, pp.96-8.

73) ibid, pp.120-1.

74) JACKSON, op. cit., Chapter 7.

75) ibid, pp.322-6.

76) WALKER/OFFICER, ‘Scottish Unionism and the Ulster Question’ in MacDONALD, op. cit.

77) ibid, and also HARRISON, LATIMER, HERON, HANNA and WOODBURN, for example.

78) ibid.

79) NLS, SCUA MSS, Acc. 10424/22, 5 December 1912.
80) See WALKER, op. cit.

81) See GH, 23 October 1911, 8f; 1 February 1912, 8d; 12 February 1912, 8d. Too often the federal argument was judged on colonial terms – see KENDLE, op. cit.

82) See GH, 1 February 1912, 8d; 6 February 1912, 9a.

83) ibid. See also KENDLE, op. cit.

84) GH, 29 February 1912, 12b.

85) GH, 11 April 1912, 7c.

86) GH, 24 April 1912, 8d.

87) See BRUCE, op. cit. See also GH, 8 July 1912, 11d, for example.

88) GH, 15 June 1912, 8d.

89) See MITCHELL, op. cit. See also GH, 6 September 1912, 8c.


91) GH, 2 October 1912, 8c; 21 October 1912, 12e.


93) NLI, McGarrity Papers, MS17, 705.

94) PATTERSON, op. cit., p.151.
95) GO, 16 March 1912.

96) GO, 6 September 1913.

97) GO, 16 March 1912; FORWARD, 9 October 1915 & 20 May 1916 & 14 October 1916.

98) GO, 1 November 1913.


100) PATTERSON, op. cit., p.67.

101) NLI, McGarrity Papers, as before.

102) PRO, CO904/119, I, Special Branch of RIC, 1913.

103) GH, 13 June 1913, 11e.

104) See WALKER, ‘Intimate Strangers’. See also GH, 7 June 1913, 8d.

105) GH, 16 August 1913, 8e.

106) See GH, 4 March 1914, 8d, for example. Rumours of this sort were rife and were designed to undermine public confidence in the Liberal government.

107) Reform of the House of Lords was the main priority. The veto by the Lords on previous Home Rule Bills and other Liberal legislation had not endeared the Lords to the Liberal Party. At any rate, other events were to intervene in 1914 to upset the Liberal programme.

108) GH, 25 May 1914, 11a; 29 May 1914, 11a.
109) PRO, CO903/19/I, RIC Intelligence, 1914 – 1919.

110) GH, 17 June 1914, 8d; 27 June 1914, 8c.

111) PRO, CO904/120, Special Branch of RIC, 1915.

112) GH, 22 September 1914, 7h, for example.

113) PRO, CO904/24/I, Special Branch of RIC on Sinn Fein.

114) GH, 18 May 1915, 10h, for a description.

115) GH, 1 March 1916, 8d. Far more eligible men residing in Scotland of Irish birth also made the journey back to Ireland to avoid being called up.

116) See Chapter I for an explanation of this.

117) See GH, 17 September 1914, 9d; 11 November 1914, 5h.

118) GH, 9 November 1914, 11c.

119) GH, 4 April 1916, 8g.

120) PRO, CO904/162, files on IRA Propaganda.

121) See GARVIN, op. cit.

122) ibid.

124) ibid, p.266.

125) GO, 3 October 1914.

126) GH, 28 April 1916, 8h.

127) See Chapter I for an explanation of this.

128) PATTERSON, op. cit., pp.159-60.

129) GARVIN, op. cit., p.115.

130) FORWARD, 20 May 1916.


132) ibid.

133) In 1900, 1902, 1906, 1907, 1908, 1909, 1910, 1911, 1912, 1913 and 1914 to be precise.
Chapter III: 1916 – 1922; “and shake the blossom from the bud”

The Easter Rising of 1916 served to precipitate events in Ireland considerably. Dismissed as “foolish local disturbances” by the British government, the Unionists, the Irish Party and the UIL, the Rising reminded everyone that the ‘Irish Question’ was far from resolution\(^1\). It can be argued that the rebels of Easter 1916 achieved their secondary purpose\(^2\). Their primary goal was to establish and hopefully defend an Irish republic but, at the very least, their ‘blood sacrifice’ was intended to gain attention and provoke debate\(^3\). When the Republican proclamation eventually appeared in the press in May 1916, it was described as “remarkable”\(^4\). The Rising was widely denounced, and the Unionists gained useful ammunition in their campaign to brand the southern Irish as disloyal and unpatriotic. The following extracts, from the *Glasgow Observer* and the *Glasgow Star and Examiner* which advocated constitutional agitation, and *The Scotsman* which was cautiously in favour of Home Rule, support this:

“"The vast and overwhelming majority of Irishmen everywhere have accepted and approved the international bond of peace between Great Britain and Ireland embodied in the Home Rule Act...Individual Irishmen here and there may stand apart – they are entitled to do that. There are British republicans...whose whimsicalities nobody troubles to interfere with so long as peculiarities are confined to mere harmless verbosity or the writing of anonymous letters...But, if the Irish counterparts of such oddities should attempt to make their treason operative, they cannot count on either the tolerance or sympathy of sensible Irishmen who have made an honourable pact with Britain and mean to honourably keep it."\(^5\).

“"Dublin antics should bring no discredit nor prejudice to the constitutional Irish movement...The Irish people in Great Britain...will not manifest the slightest sympathy or approval with the madly criminal action of the pro-German plotters who resorted to..."
insurrection in Dublin…and flung themselves into armed conflict with the forces of the Crown.”

“Sinn Fein has made the fatal mistake of putting out its head too far; and at a time and in a manner that make it impossible to mistake its true character and intentions…We may feel confident that the great majority of the Irish people, by whatever party name they may call themselves, will abide this ordeal, and will make haste to disavow and condemn Sinn Fein and all its works.”

However, although this campaign was relatively successful in Scotland, the imposition of martial law, mass arrests and the summary executions of rebel leaders created a backlash of public abhorrence in Ireland, no doubt influenced by the horrors of the western front. As the pro-Labour journal Forward put it, “if Great Britain had had the good sense to adopt Home Rule in 1886 or 1893, the events of the past three weeks would not have happened”⁸. The Nationalists, still led by Redmond, pressed for an inquiry into the executions and also urged action on the Home Rule Bill. Delay, it was stressed, caused confusion. The Liberal government responded favourably by announcing in July that, with the exclusion of Ulster, the Government of Ireland Bill would be introduced as soon as possible. Furthermore, there would be a conference at the end of the war to decide the “permanent settlement of Ireland”⁹. Thus the impression was created in 1916 that any scheme introduced then was only temporary; even the exclusion of Ulster would be re-examined at the end of the war.

These announcements created optimism within the Irish nationalist movement. Sinn Fein was becoming the dominant political group in Irish politics, due to its association with the Easter Rising. Admittedly, at the time of the Rising, the majority of the Irish people and the Irish community in Scotland did not subscribe to the republican ideal. It was principally the repressive counteractive measures employed by the British military regime in Ireland that would earn Sinn Fein the support of both communities.
Anti-British propaganda by Sinn Fein asserted the right of the Irish people to self-determination and blamed Irish problems on English (sic) oppression. The treatment meted out to Sinn Fein after the Easter Rising only served to bear out these arguments and consolidate support for them in Ireland and in Scotland. It was mostly the young who flocked to join Sinn Fein and involve themselves in its activities. This new generation of Irish nationalists had not directly experienced the trauma of the Gladstonian Home Rule debacles; they had, though, witnessed years of political wrangling and compromise at the centre of which presided the Irish Party at Westminster. Charles Townshend’s view of 1916 is that it was perhaps incidental in the process of Irish national mobilisation that occurred in 1918. He acknowledges that the rebellion did “shift the horizons of possibility”, but the creation of the Irish Free State in 1921 owed more to the popular mandate of 1918 than the “unmandated violence” of 1916. His revisionist account, typical of recent histories, is compelling and it is right to view Sinn Fein after 1917 as a truly mass movement primed to take advantage of the conscription crisis and what followed. Constitutional nationalism was beginning to seem redundant and ineffectual to this new generation of Irish nationalists, and Sinn Fein offered a dynamic and romantic alternative to the previous mainstream of Irish politics.

The growth of support for Sinn Fein in Scotland was less rapid than in Ireland. Iain Patterson attributes this to an “abeyance” of regular lines of communication between communities in Scotland and Ireland as a result of wartime restrictions. This may be true to a certain extent, but by the end of 1917, there were five active Sinn Fein clubs in west central Scotland: two in Glasgow, one in Govan, one in Motherwell and one in Clydebank. Considering that there was only one Sinn Fein club in Glasgow before the war (named after James Connolly), this represents significant growth and
also highlights the impact of the Easter Rising on the Irish communities in Scotland. Reaction to the treatment of the rebels in Ireland goes a long way to explaining this switch of allegiance from the Irish Party to Sinn Fein.

The increasing lawlessness in Ireland from 1917 onwards was the result of the political impasse; some ‘proposals’ for Ireland were being discussed, but no details were being published. Nationalists threatened the war effort over the perceived Ulster veto on Home Rule, and the first anniversary of the Easter Rising saw republican flags fly prominently throughout Ireland (including in Ulster). Sinn Fein was the new Irish nationalist movement; strong and now decidedly republican in character. The fact that Ireland was then in a state of emergency caused alarm in Unionist circles in Scotland. This is best illustrated by the reaction to the Scottish Gaelic Society’s call for the compulsory teaching of Gaelic in Scotland – perhaps in itself a reaction to the regeneration of Irish culture by and through Sinn Fein. The Glasgow Herald of 18 April 1918 bemoaned “…[we should have]…nothing to do with schemes where sentiment is more prominent than reason, and in which lurk the seeds of mischief”\(^{13}\). The ‘we’ referred to were presumably loyal unionist Protestants. This newspaper went on to leave its readers in no doubt of the origin of the proposal: Sinn Fein. The Glasgow Herald dubbed the Gaelic Society in Scotland a “similar movement” to Sinn Fein\(^{14}\), which was “avowedly divisive and separatist”\(^{15}\). This anti-cultural movement had disparate roots but only one real purpose: to rekindle anti-Irish prejudice in Scotland and extol the benefits of the Union. Many pro-Union Scots, perhaps even most Scots in the establishment, felt that the disintegration of Scottish culture (particularly Highland Scottish culture) was a small price to pay for the perceived benefits of the Union with England\(^{16}\). However, there were still many Scots who supported some measure of Home Rule for Scotland and who strove to maintain some degree of Scottish culture beyond just kailyard and
tartanry. Yet the First World War had, to an appreciable extent, galvanised the Union as only the unifying experience of a major war can do. This galvanising effect on the attitude of the Scots towards the Union was not as great as that of the Second World War, but that is perhaps because the Second World War was far more concerned with democracy than the more imperialistic First World War. Furthermore, there was no enduring ‘Irish Question’ waiting to be resolved during or after the Second World War\textsuperscript{17}. Charles Townshend has also argued that the most damaging legacy of the First World War period was not political violence but the “finalisation of partition”\textsuperscript{18}. Most constitutional Irish nationalists hoped in 1914 that the common cause of war would be a unifying influence throughout Ireland but, in actual fact, they were slow to realise that the issue of Ulster could not be so easily resolved. Although the Rising in 1916 made the imposition of conscription unlikely it was arguably the war itself, leading to the popular mandate of 1918, that cemented partition in Ireland. In Scotland, the effects of the war led to economic upheaval and political reconstruction. Elections in 1918 and 1922 confirmed the rise of the Labour Party (with the Catholic vote in central Scotland particularly significant here) as well as the decline of the Liberals. The priority of Scottish society became social regeneration with improved housing, for example, as an immediate concern.

Michael Rosie skilfully highlights the various factors which explain the anti-Irish prejudice being rekindled in the interwar period: religious acrimony, dislocating political flux, economic crises and fears over Scotland’s future identity\textsuperscript{19}. He argues against the orthodoxy that interwar Scotland was a sectarian society. He sees religious separatism, even religious bigotry, but not sectarianism\textsuperscript{20}. He is persuasive when he argues that we do not currently use the term ‘sectarianism’ with care as a concept. He defines sectarianism as “systematic discrimination which affects the
quality of life of an entire religious group”\textsuperscript{21}. There is still an ongoing
debate about sectarianism in Scottish society, and perhaps what is usually
referred to as ‘sectarianism’ would be better described as bigotry or even
prejudice\textsuperscript{22}. Rosie rightly emphasises that national identities are not fixed
or constant, and the debate on ‘sectarianism’ must be seen as part of the
broader debate on the identity of the Scots\textsuperscript{23}. Many Catholic Scots in
central Scotland today would argue that the descriptions ‘Irish’ and
‘Scottish’ are not in fact mutually exclusive and it is possible to have a dual
identity or hold a variety of identities simultaneously. Every Scot is also
British and a European as well, and other ethnic identities could also be
thrown into the mix: in northern Ireland many would have recognised the
term ‘Ulster-Scots’, for example, just as the term ‘Irish-Scots’ has been
coined to refer to the Irish immigrant community in Scotland. Events in
Ireland certainly caused both Catholics and Protestants in Scotland to re-
examine their identities during the interwar years. Protestant reaction to
the Easter Rising in 1916 was perhaps the origin for the rekindling of anti-
Catholic hostility in Scotland as the Irish-Scots were viewed as disloyal and
unreliable, and the War of Independence which followed only confirmed
this opinion. Irish immigration to Scotland had fallen considerably in the
twentieth century and the vast majority of ‘Irish-Scots’ had been born in
Scotland by the end of the First World War, so the term ‘Scots-Irish’ is
perhaps more appropriate. Their immigrant ancestors certainly
experienced the ‘systematic discrimination’ referred to by Rosie in the
nineteenth century, but the Catholic community in central Scotland was
conflicted by 1918. Technically, they were more Scottish than Irish, but
many if not most still had strong emotional or familial ties to Ireland, so a
dual identity persisted that brought them, and their religion, into conflict
with the rest of Protestant Scotland. Many Scots-Irish had volunteered to
fight in the British army during the First World War, for example, but
many others would not do so\textsuperscript{24}. This was also an extremely politicised community that had participated fully in the Irish nationalist movement for Home Rule since the 1840s. They were organised and determined, and only when the Education Act of 1918 was passed did this community perhaps begin to feel accepted as more Scottish and less Irish.

Throughout May 1918, the Church of Scotland General Assembly, with invited delegates from Ulster, discussed the “Irish problem” in some detail, reacting to events in Ireland and the increase in support for Sinn Fein in Scotland\textsuperscript{25}. The strength of Sinn Fein in Glasgow in June 1918 was given as seven clubs with a large membership “ostensibly of a literary and educational character” but “inner circles”, it was alleged, met in secret and this referred to the IRB\textsuperscript{26}. This was an accurate reckoning, as Sinn Fein had been growing in Scotland since 1900, drawing on the support of the Scots-Irish community (particularly in the west) of central Scotland, with an increasing supply of new recruits from Ireland. Indeed, in July 1918, eight Glaswegians, four men and four women, were arrested at Ardrossan attempting to smuggle some explosives from Scotland to Ireland\textsuperscript{27}. In the subsequent trial in September, Michael Callaghan, one of the accused, informed the court that he was a member of the IRA and had no regrets over his actions. This was the first of many trials for similar offences in Scotland between 1918 and 1922. By the middle of 1918, the Glasgow Observer was mentioning Sinn Fein clubs in Coatbridge and Greenock (in addition to the five already extant), and was giving lukewarm support to republicanism in its articles\textsuperscript{28}. Irish republicanism needed the support of the press most likely to be read by the Scots-Irish for more substantial growth to take place.

In the General Election that followed the end of the war in 1918, Lloyd George promised Home Rule for Ireland excepting Ulster, and a measure of Scottish Home Rule also. Sir Edward Carson, the Ulster Unionist leader,
wanted reforms that would allow Ulster to go its own way. However, Irish issues did not really dominate the election campaign as most minds were optimistically focused on the successful conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany. Yet the demand and movement for Irish independence did not let up; in fact there were signs that support for an Irish republic was growing. The TUC at Glasgow in September 1919 called for “Irish self-determination”, and Sinn Fein pressed for the Irish case to be heard at Versailles with some sympathy, but no success\textsuperscript{29}. The Irish Self-Determination League (ISDL), which was based in Scotland, also called for an Irish republic at this time\textsuperscript{30}. There was a general feeling that Ireland had been made to wait for too long for a settlement which made republicans and Nationalists alike indignant, and Unionists nervous: “though it is first and foremost an Irish problem, [Home Rule]…is also an English, Welsh and Scottish problem”\textsuperscript{31}. This paralysis of public opinion in late 1919 motivated the British government to establish a Speaker’s Conference on Devolution, a body of inquiry to assess the overall situation. The Conference reported in May 1920 and proposed two schemes: subordinate legislatures for all parts of the United Kingdom (harking back to 1911) or ‘Grand Councils’ instead. It is interesting to note that both of these proposals have a decidedly federal character to them; as has been stated above, a federal solution to the Home Rule crises would probably have been the most effective.

Unfortunately, there was a lack of political will behind any of these proposals, and all parties bickered over the faults and merits of each scheme. Sinn Fein, by 1920 the undisputed main player in nationalist Irish politics, demanded full independence and nothing less. When it became increasingly clear that this was not likely to be granted, physical force methods were increasingly utilised. Accounts of shootings, ambushes, railway blockades, republican courts and general disturbances in Ireland
filled Scottish newspapers in the latter part of 1920. These disturbances eventually developed into a major conflict, and the impact of this direct conflict in Ireland was significant on Scotland. For example, the police were ordered to secure all detonators in circulation in October 1920. There are also accounts of battle manoeuvres being conducted by Irish Volunteers outside Glasgow, as well as the regular ‘molestation’ of pedestrians by Sinn Feiners. Other organisations, like the Glasgow Federation of the Independent Labour Party in particular, campaigned throughout 1920 on Irish affairs holding demonstrations and meetings regularly, as well as collecting for the relief of distress in Ireland caused by the reprisals of British government troops.

From 1921 ‘weekly crime statistics’ appear in the Glasgow Herald, but not just of “outrages” like the ambush of British soldiers in Ireland by the IRA, but of Irish republican activity within Scotland also. Most of this activity was focused on the central belt of Scotland, but particularly in the west around Glasgow. What is clear from the evidence available is that there was an Irish republican conspiracy in Scotland at this time to organise and assist their republican comrades in Ireland; usually with weapons, ammunition and explosives being smuggled from Scotland to Ireland. Once wartime restrictions ended by 1919, the movement of agents and supplies was facilitated greatly. During 1920, the Clyde Valley Electrical Power Company was concerned about security at its power stations in Motherwell and Yoker, warning that “a large number of employees at these works are either Irish or of Irish extraction”. In response, the Chief Constable of Lanarkshire, H. J. Despard, advocated armed response units to the Scottish Office, but this idea was met with a cool response. The Chief Constable of Renfrewshire was less belligerent; “…[if Yoker]…or police stations were invaded by armed Sinn Feiners the occupants would nearly be powerless against them”. The suggestion of a military guard for
the power stations was also made, but in the end ‘trustworthy’ workers were enrolled as Special Constables. This shows that there was a real fear of republican activity in Scotland at this time. The authorities took what they saw as the republican menace very seriously indeed, stepping up their intelligence networks throughout 1920. Illegal drilling also caused particular alarm during the summer of 1920 when large groups of about 100 Sinn Fein men at a time were observed regularly travelling from Glasgow and around to Lennoxtown by train, camped in the Campsie Glen and conducted illegal drilling. Correspondence between the Lord Advocate and the Secretary of State for Scotland confirmed that a statute existed for two years penal servitude if caught drilling illegally. Even allowing for the difference between perception and reality, there are enough accounts in the public records to be sure that illegal drilling did take place quite often outside Glasgow, and the authorities considered it to be worthy of further investigation.

Skirmishes between rival factions did happen occasionally. Sinn Feiners and Orangemen battled one another at a meeting in Motherwell being addressed by John MacLean in 1920. Iain Patterson has suggested that Irish politics was the excuse rather than the reason for such violence, and there is perhaps some truth in this. There is evidence that the culprits on both sides were immigrants from Ireland, as this intelligence report suggests: “conflicts between the two factions of Irishmen are on the increase, and another of the weekly Saturday night brawls took place in Greenock on 26th June [1920]. Two policemen and several civilians were severely injured by stones and bottles and 13 persons, mostly young Irishmen, were arrested.” More work needs to be undertaken on the Protestant Irish immigrant community in Scotland in this period, and this thesis agrees with Michael Rosie who bemoans the “invisibility” of the Protestant Irish experience.
The strength of Sinn Fein in Scotland also caused considerable anxiety. Scotland Yard reported that over 6,000 attended a Sinn Fein meeting in the St. Andrew’s Halls in Glasgow in September 1920, coming from Lanarkshire, Ayrshire and Renfrewshire as well as Glasgow to hear Sean McFergus and Sean Milroy deliver speeches which were “frankly republican” according to the Procurator Fiscal of Glasgow. Moreover, Glasgow CID reported on a Sinn Fein meeting in Greenock the following month at which 37 clubs were represented. This report states that there were 30,000 Sinn Fein volunteers in the west of Scotland, 20,000 revolvers, 2,000 rifles and plenty of ammunition, not to mention that they had also acquired plans of Maryhill and Hamilton barracks. Finally, “delegates were instructed to inform their several battalions that an order might be received at any time to mobilise, and to be ready to act either in Ireland or in Scotland as might be required.” The authorities clearly feared the spread of violence from Ireland to Scotland, especially at a time of concurrent industrial unrest, but nonetheless these reports seem exaggerated and alarmist. An offer from the Ulster Volunteers in Scotland to aid the police in September 1920 was sensibly declined. Yet this bears out the fact that the authorities had their resources fully stretched and simply did not have the manpower to guard every potential IRA target. Public buildings were feared likely targets and police activity intensified throughout 1920. As a result, Sinn Fein in Glasgow and Dundee ceased organised drilling by the end of the year. There almost seems to have been a tacit acceptance of Scotland as a supply and training centre for the IRA as long as violence did not occur.

Information and intelligence reports were regarded as the vital key to keeping the republican threat in check. Documents were seized in Paisley in early 1921 which showed definite plans for carrying out ‘outrages’ in Scotland. Special Branch of New Scotland Yard were also successful in
curtailing some smuggling of detonators to Ireland throughout 1921, but many more would have got through successfully\textsuperscript{50}. Such information resulted in the capture of two men (Henry Coyle and Charles McGinn) who were caught driving a car which contained an array of explosives, guns and ammunition\textsuperscript{51}. They identified themselves as Sinn Feiners and admitted the load was for Ireland. Deportation or internment of Sinn Fein and IRA activists was suggested by the legal community as early as December 1920 for the following reasons: “it is beyond all question that Republican troops are in this city with the avowed object of taking part in hostile operations, both in Ireland and here...They...are levying war against this country, and against the Executive Council of Ireland. They are instigating disorder in Ireland, supporting the IRA with money, arms and ammunition, and I apprehend even supplying them with men”\textsuperscript{52}. This was the argument put to the Lord Advocate by the Procurator Fiscal of Glasgow, and backed up by the Chief Constable of Lanarkshire: “very active propaganda is being carried on in this county and...there is a large number of disaffected persons engaged in this work...the arrest of the leading Sinn Feiners in Scotland...would put a stop to the whole movement in Scotland”\textsuperscript{53}. It took until 1923 for deportations to occur, but these extracts show conclusively that Irish republicanism was seen as a problem worth spending time and resources on by the Scottish authorities.

Attempts to establish a similarly strong grassroots Irish republican movement in the east of Scotland were much less successful. The Chief Constable of Edinburgh stated; “one or two...who have a distinct tendency towards Sinn Fein have...come under my notice, but generally speaking, the movement does not seem to be deep-rooted here. Several public meetings have been held in this city of late with a view to securing support, but these...have been attended with very little success”\textsuperscript{54}. This was for two simple reasons. The west of Scotland was home to the overwhelming
majority of Irish immigrants and their descendants, and the east of Scotland did not have the same geographical proximity and thus the opportunity to deliver aid in a similar manner. It would not be true to say, however, that all Irish republican activity occurred in the west of central Scotland, but it would be true to say that Irish republican activity in central Scotland was concentrated in the west, particularly in and around Glasgow.

Peter Hart has recently argued for more historical attention on the IRA’s activities in Britain between 1920 and 1923, and this thesis accepts that these activities were “much more extensive and effective than is usually assumed”755. He has traced the development of active IRA units established in Britain between 1919 and 1921, and argues: “Man for man, and operation for operation, the Liverpool, Manchester, Tyneside, and London IRA outperformed many Irish brigades56. The number of men in these units is difficult to pinpoint, due to their varied composition and constant changes. Hart estimates an average of 100 men in Liverpool and London in this period, for example, and around 1,000 men available in the crucial year between July 1920 and July 192157. It is interesting to note that about half of that figure come from Scottish units who could muster a potential force of 600 men by August 192058. The business of most units consisted of meetings, collecting dues, drill sessions and occasional parades. Active duty would require involvement in operations to steal weapons, ammunition or explosives from collieries in Lanarkshire, for example, and then transport these items to Ireland. Some weapons were held back for training purposes and would have also been used in acts of violence or sabotage in mainland Britain. These figures have been arrived at after examining both official records and personal records of those who served in the IRA. Most of the latter were not placed in public repositories until after the Second World War, so even taking into account inclinations to
round-up membership or exaggerate strength of numbers to impress IRA HQ, a force of around 500 to 600 IRA men in Scotland in the early 1920s seems a reasonably accurate figure to base judgement on.

The Irish Republican Brotherhood was the secret organisational centre within the IRA just as it had been within the Volunteers. Although all IRB members would also be members of the IRA, it does not necessarily follow that all IRA men would also be members of the IRB. Immigrant Irishmen were an extremely mobile group and so; “as a result of the migratory nature of work of the Irish in Scotland, it was very difficult to keep [IRB] circles together. A circle might disappear in just a few months”59. England as a whole reported 117 paying IRB members, whereas Scotland reported 250 (the Irish figure was 1660) at this time60. Peter Hart has shown that, for the first six months of 1921, IRA-related incidents were occurring twice a day across Britain, concentrated in and around London, Liverpool, Manchester and Newcastle. These operations were usually carried out by IRA men living near the targets, operating from their own homes61. Probably the most spectacular English operation was the destruction of nineteen warehouses near Liverpool docks on the night of 28 November 1920, which caused widespread panic and shock as the authorities had been aware of such plans62. Hart also points out that local police forces did not attempt to infiltrate IRA units in Britain or to gather intelligence through systematic surveillance. Instead, they tended to focus on apprehending those responsible for specific crimes and not on defeating the IRA as an organisation as a whole63. This should have helped the IRA immensely, but they could not really take advantage of this because their campaign was really small-scale guerrilla warfare and not modern terrorism as we understand it today.

If caught, however, Sinn Fein and IRA agents faced heavy penalties, illustrating the extent of establishment concern over the conflict in Ireland.
spreading and thus having considerable impact. The trial of sixteen people from Glasgow and Alloa at the High Court in Edinburgh in March 1921 for explosives charges resulted in heavy terms of penal servitude for the ringleaders, even though there existed only circumstantial evidence linking most of the accused to the materials discovered. The Lord Justice quite openly led the jury, stating that “reasonable men...[could]...make the inference” – so much for the burden of proof and reasonable doubt. By the middle of 1921 the situation in Ireland was grave. Reprisals by the Black and Tans and other government forces were by then common and indiscriminate. Debate on reprisals was stifled in the House of Commons on several occasions, and the curfew in Dublin was brought forward to 9pm, a tacit admission that the government troops were not in control of the situation. Sinn Fein and the IRA were in a very strong position: they were fighting a guerrilla war on their own territory amid a largely supportive Irish population. Added to this, they had good intelligence and skilful leadership from Michael Collins, allied to the political commitment of the IRB. They could also rely on support and supplies from mainland Britain as well.

In Scotland Sinn Fein was very healthy, its headquarters at 171 Renfield Street, Glasgow. From these offices, the Scottish branch of Sinn Fein was organised by Sean O’Sheehan, and a newspaper, Dark Rosaleen, was also published. “Our people in Scotland are confined in a closer area, and the expense and time required for travel is not so great as it is [in England]”. New clubs were being established frequently, there being about 78 Sinn Fein clubs in total in Scotland by 1922 – all of them in the central belt; “clubs are holding meetings regularly almost every Sunday except in a few of the outlying districts where halls are not so easily obtained”. Membership of a Sinn Fein club did not necessarily imply membership of an IRA unit as well. Sinn Fein clubs had members of both sexes, some not
working, most working as clerks, bakers, labourers and such like. Most members were part of the Scots-Irish community, although some were migrant Irish workers based in Scotland temporarily. All were Roman Catholic, and meetings generally took place on Sunday afternoons after attendance at Mass.

As far as IRA numbers are concerned, estimates vary considerably. Iain Patterson cites the total strength of the Scottish Brigade at between 2,000 and 2,500 men by 1921. He goes on to argue that this figure is much smaller than contemporary estimates which went as high as 4,000 in Glasgow alone in 1920. Although this estimate has been routinely used by historians from Handley to Gallagher, it now seems clear that they were deliberately inflated by contemporary sources. The figure cited earlier in this thesis would seem to be the most reliable: about 600 IRA men in Scotland in 1920. A fair assessment would be no more than 1,000 active IRA men in Scotland by 1921, and perhaps the figures of 2,000 or even 4,000 or more highlight the difference between membership and active membership, and this has already been discussed above and elsewhere.

The most dramatic act by Irish republicans in Scotland was undoubtedly the attempted rescue of one of their own from a prison van in the High Street of Glasgow in May 1921. Eighteen arrests were made, including one priest, after the abortive ambush resulted in the death of one police inspector and the injury of another. With tensions running high and the police unable to control the anger of the Scots-Irish community, the army had to be eventually brought in to calm the situation and restore order. Twenty-seven men finally appeared in court accused of being connected with the ambush, and the police were still pursuing further suspects as the case went to trial. As one of their own had been killed by the IRA, the police were especially diligent in their efforts; so much so that the Scots-Irish community accused them of harassment. A taxi driver named
McKechnie, who witnessed the attempted rescue but was reluctant to testify, feared “the callous punishment they [the IRA] inflict”, so harassment obviously worked both ways. It was perhaps the failure of this operation that convinced the IRA in Scotland to concentrate on alternative types of activity. Violent acts perpetrated by Scottish units were actually quite rare, but operations to acquire weapons, ammunition and explosives were by far more successful and more commonplace in the 1920s.

At any rate, much anti-republican feeling was generated by this incident but the Scottish public seemed tired of the Irish Question by 1921 and wanted to see a resolution. Alexander MacCallum Scott, the Liberal MP for Glasgow Bridgeton, urged a speedy conclusion to Home Rule for Ireland, excluding Ulster, and he was just one of many similar voices in favour of this. The fact that the Ulster Parliament (created by the 1914 legislation) had been elected, in May 1921, with a large Unionist majority allayed most fears in Scotland over the autonomy of Ulster. Thus any anti-republican sentiment generated was less vehement than it might have been. In this climate, collaboration between republicans in Ireland and Scotland intensified. “Isn’t it a pity that their end of it was not more advanced at this juncture, but of course it is no use regretting” wrote Michael Collins, hoping that a simultaneous movement for independence in Scotland would stretch the resources of the British government to breaking point, and thus precipitate a favourable settlement. The organisation with which cooperation was planned was the Scottish National League (SNL). Dialogue had taken place since early 1920 through Art O’Brien, the leader of the ISDL (and the IRA’s man in London at the time), who was responsible for intelligence throughout Britain. Meetings were held to gain support but were usually poorly attended. This is part of a typical resolution: “this meeting…rejoices to hear of the awakening to national
consciousness of the people of Scotland – an independent nation”79. Ruaridh Erskine of Marr was the driving force behind the pan-Celticism of the SNL, but his organisational skills did not rival those within Sinn Fein or the IRA; “I agree it does not look too hopeful. I am afraid they were too sanguine. They have the same hard fight to go through as we went through, but their material is not so good or so prepared”80.

However, it seems that the SNL were over optimistic about their chances of immediate success. According to Michael Collins, “it seems to me that they do not appreciate the particular difficulties they are up against. It will take a very long time, and I don’t think they have the same actual strength as we had at the very worst period of our history, say 1904 to 1908…it would be better to go on working as a handful, than to make an effort which would be founded only on false hopes. Failure in this manner would mean much more even to this small group than years of tireless labour and non-recognition”81. Here Collins has not only highlighted the differences between the struggles in Ireland and Scotland, he has also shown how the IRA learned the lessons of the 1916 Easter Rising. He clearly saw the war with the British government around 1920 as a culmination of republican activity dating back to the nineteenth century. Scotland had no such tradition, and he was warning the SNL off any premature attempts at insurrection. Yet it would seem that the SNL pressed on with a plan to stage a diversionary conflict in Scotland with the forces of the British government; “Erskine of Marr...does not wish to exaggerate the position, but he thinks they [SNL] are now well on the way to getting their people organised. He thinks that within six months, they will be able to give us some effective help – this, provided their plans work out satisfactorily”82. However, the Anglo-Irish negotiations and treaty intervened towards the end of 1921, and the promised ‘effective help’ from the SNL failed to really materialise. Yet it is significant that the republican movement in Ireland
had such an effect on sympathetic Scots, albeit only a small group of about a few hundred people.

There was certainly a feeling within the British government that the rest of Ireland should have some form of settlement quickly. “An offer to be publicly made to the people of Ireland of self-government on the analogy of a Dominion under the Crown” was how the Home Secretary put it. There was indeed a feeling of inevitability about it; however, they wanted to secure a settlement on the best possible terms, and this was in the mind of Lloyd George when he made a ‘peace offer’ to Eamonn de Valera, the Sinn Fein President, in May 1921. Talks about talks began in July 1921 at Downing Street amid a tenuous IRA ceasefire. Lloyd George proposed an Anglo-Irish conference to settle the issue, but asked that Sinn Fein give up the claim to self-determination. The Ulster parliament rejected keeping its separate status in an All-Ireland constitution and it became increasingly clear that an Irish republic would not be granted. A great deal of Sinn Fein activity in Scotland complemented these initial discussions. A large rally in the City Halls of Glasgow in November 1921 was almost not allowed to take place; there were also large Sinn Fein meetings at Paisley and Motherwell in late November 1921, all calling for an Irish republic: “Ireland is fit to be an independent nation”; “We are in favour of the Irish republic. We are in favour of an undivided Ireland”; are good examples of resolutions passed at such meetings.

Glasgow’s Chief Constable warned that the war in Ireland could spread easily to Scotland, as his officers had uncovered lots of evidence of Irish republicanism in Scotland. The police had orders to watch, search and arrest suspects, and in raids throughout Scotland in 1920-1 found evidence of Sinn Fein drilling members in military fashion, much republican literature, explosives, munitions and weapons mainly in country districts, documents that gave Scotland as a division of the IRB,
and evidence of an IRA ‘flying squad’ in the Lothians. All this collected evidence suggests the police were taking the republican threat seriously, and had devoted some considerable time to investigating it. Moreover, the authorities gave careful consideration to the impact their actions would have elsewhere: “any action to be taken by the authorities in Scotland might therefore have to be considered in the light of its effects in England and, of course, with due regard to its bearing on the situation in Ireland”. As well as clearly showing the official mind, this illustrates the bilateral impact of Irish republicanism.

In fact, the IRA through Sinn Fein had been reorganising and renewing supplies from Scotland since early 1919 when Joseph Vize was sent to Glasgow to be responsible for the essential overhaul: “The present state of affairs is lamentable. I found only two companies of volunteers known as A and B Companies; A which claims to be HQ is composed of a good number of undesirables and mixed citizen army and volunteers trying to run the whole movement here, but making no progress beyond their own company…However…there are quite a number of willing men here to help in…[the]…work”. Vize met with some initial intransigence, but moved quickly to adopt a new system; “Volunteer movement in Glasgow to be controlled by Dublin HQ, who will issue all orders for management of same”. After this, Vize went to work in earnest, establishing or affiliating companies in Townhead, Govan, Motherwell, Paisley, Greenock and Clydebank. Vize was so successful in drumming up numbers that IRA HQ in Dublin officially endorsed his recruitment drive: “your recruiting movement has the sanction of HQ staff who fully realise the necessity for making provision in countries outside Ireland”. The report on Sinn Fein and IRA activities in Great Britain from the Director of Intelligence at the Home Office gives the following information for early 1921: “the estimated number of Sinn Feiners in the Glasgow district at this date was 90,000 and
the membership of the Irish Volunteers just over 10,000; of these 1,233 were armed. In this area the Irish have considerable hold on trade unions, especially in the unskilled trades”. Government intelligence reports from this time clearly saw Glasgow and west-central Scotland as one of the main danger areas for Irish republican activity\textsuperscript{97}.

As has previously been stated, local police forces simply failed to come to grips with IRA activity in Britain. Peter Hart has suggested that they were just poorly served by the agencies above them who were trying in earnest to combat Irish republicanism\textsuperscript{98}. Both Scotland Yard and Scotland House included the IRA within their post-war fight against what they deemed as subversive and revolutionary activities. Fear of communism and increasing urban unrest led to the creation of counter-revolutionary strategies and organisations. Basil Thomson, a colourful character, developed Special Branch and established the new Directorate of Intelligence. The DOI included the IRA and ISDL in Britain on their list of ‘revolutionary organisations’ to be kept under surveillance\textsuperscript{99}. The data compiled by the DOI was sent to the Cabinet in weekly reports, always delivered in a lively, almost sensationalist manner. Many of these Cabinet reports are cited in the bibliography of this thesis because they underline how seriously the British government and its security agencies took the threat of the IRA between 1920 and 1922. Even if these reports are to a certain extent alarmist, the fact that IRA activities in Scotland were discussed every week at Cabinet level demonstrates the impact Irish republicanism was having quite convincingly.

Supplying the movement in Ireland was as crucial as providing manpower. Vize adopted the following supply route in early 1920: Motherwell to Liverpool by train; Liverpool to Waterford by boat; Waterford to Dublin (presumably by road as no details are given)\textsuperscript{100}. The indirect nature of the route emphasises the close attention the police in Scotland paid to the
regular ports. Vize seems to have appropriated most of his supplies of guns and ammunition from military barracks usually, it seems, by bribing sentries. He wrote to Michael Collins: “our new channels are Maryhill, Hamilton and Stirling barracks…Dunfermline is also…newly opened to us”\(^{101}\). The police were never far away, however: “you will be sorry to hear I’m on the run again, four of them called at my old digs…looking for me, they are getting very busy now, but I don’t think you may be alarmed about it, whatever they know it must be from information received”\(^{102}\). This suggests that whoever informed the police was either unreliable or even, perhaps, a double agent. In Dublin, Collins was contented rather than alarmed; “Yes, the goods are coming along quite safely and promptly”\(^{103}\). Indeed, Vize was so successful in his activities that he was eventually sent help in the form of Sean Milroy, who was to continue reorganising the Sinn Fein clubs while Vize concentrated on supplying HQ in Dublin\(^{104}\). The newspapers of the time pored over the details of republican activities and arrests, but more out of curiosity rather than contempt\(^{105}\). Interestingly, a clear distinction was made between Sinn Fein and the IRA as separate, but linked, organisations from about June 1921. This is most easily seen in the Secret and Confidential Police Circulars of the time, which gave orders to deal with agents provocateurs, to encourage the report of lost or stolen forearms, and to safeguard all explosives from Sinn Fein or the IRA\(^{106}\).

Peter Hart has described the operations of the IRA in Scotland as ‘minimal’, but what he is really alluding to is acts of violence to persons or property\(^{107}\). He calculates that Scottish operations only amounted to 9% of the total amount of all IRA operations in Britain between 1920 and 1921\(^{108}\). Statistics, however, can be interpreted in different ways. This Scottish 9% is as much as the combined efforts of Teesside, Lancashire, Yorkshire and Birmingham units of the IRA in the same period. Moreover, if acts of
violence are separated from acts of robbery to acquire arms and explosives, Scottish IRA units outperformed all other British units put together: 21 out of 25 acts of robbery were carried out in Scotland or, in other words, 84% of the total\textsuperscript{109}. This thesis accepts that violent acts by Scottish IRA units were rare and even inconsequential; but in the supply of arms, men and the provision of a safe refuge, the Scottish IRA excelled despite many internal problems. Acts of violence more or less ceased after the abortive prison van rescue attempt in May 1921, and the Scottish IRA concentrated on operations of supply thereafter. The work of Joseph Vize should also be highlighted, as he turned a disorganised group of republican sympathisers into a disciplined network of IRA units across the central belt of Scotland. There is no doubt that Scottish IRA units were very good at what they decided to specialise in, and their success is all the more remarkable because of the intense scrutiny they were under after 1919.

Iain Patterson describes arms, munitions and explosives being purchased as well as stolen (which would not be included in Hart’s figures), and similar merchandise being smuggled by boat from Germany to Scotland\textsuperscript{110}. Michael Collins himself had to intervene to prevent the Scottish IRA establishing an arms network between New York and Glasgow, which only underlines their enterprising nature further\textsuperscript{111}. Transporting these acquired arms, munitions and explosives from Scotland to Liverpool (route explained above) was probably the main problem faced by Joseph Vize. Liverpool served as the marshalling station and base for all weaponry acquired throughout Britain to be transported to Ireland and, as such, its importance as an IRA centre of activity has been perhaps exaggerated by Patterson and Hart. The authorities’ attention on the west of Scotland, due to its large concentration of Scots-Irish, allowed Liverpool to continue with its work relatively undisturbed. All ports on the west coast of Scotland were very closely watched, as has been explained above, so taking the
‘merchandise’, as Collins described it, south was the only realistic option for Vize, and this led to the establishment of the main supply route via Liverpool. The success of Vize’s efforts also led to the Scottish IRA reporting directly to Dublin instead of London HQ, so there can really be no doubt over the fact that the Scottish IRA punched well above its weight in a British context. However, it is also clear that the difficulties involved in transporting the ‘merchandise’ down to Liverpool was one of the factors that ultimately led to the decline of IRA activity in Scotland after 1922.

An Anglo-Irish treaty was eventually thrashed out towards the end of 1921. Unlike the initial discussions, the conference delegation was led by Michael Collins. De Valera, zealously committed to the republican ideal, sensed the futility of continued debate with the British government. The treaty offered Dominion status (similar to that of Canada) with the option for Ulster to join an All-Ireland Parliament with the rest of Ireland. A new oath of allegiance – to Ireland first and the Crown second – was delicately proposed as a sop to republican sentiment. Lloyd George presented the treaty as a last offer, with veiled threats of the consequences of rejection. In case the peace negotiations broke down, a plan was established to counter fears that the IRA in Scotland were preparing to attack targets like Scottish prisons, especially Barlinnie and Peterhead. Prison wardens were issued with rifles in readiness. No such action was deemed necessary in England as the prisons there had no Irish republican inmates at that time.

It is a common misconception that Collins agreed to the treaty in London, but this was not the case; he did not have the power to do so. He only agreed to take the treaty back to Ireland for ratification by Dail Eireann. Collins was in favour of the treaty in principle, and his support for it eventually cost him his life soon after, but he acted in what he believed were the best interests of Ireland at the time. It was unlikely that a
continued war with Britain would ever be completely successful and Collins, as commander-in-chief of the IRA, was best placed to assess this. He did not achieve an Irish republic because he could not have achieved one in 1921. Too much time had passed since the opportunity of 1914, and the Ulster Unionists had grown too used to their achieved position, and were by 1921 well entrenched. What Collins achieved was the possibility of a future republic; he saw the Irish Free State as something to build on, a necessary stepping-stone to full Irish independence. He was, though, quite naïve to believe that Ulster Unionists would one day willingly unite with the rest of Ireland to form an independent republic. Ulster was fatally allowed to take a separate path after the suspension of the Irish Home Rule Act in 1914. The First World War gave Ulster time to consolidate its position so, by 1921, any All-Ireland solution was dangerously impractical. Only perhaps an imposed federal solution before the First World War could have avoided the acrimony and bloodshed, both of which Scotland participated in. Peter Hart sees the introduction of paramilitary organisation into Irish politics in 1913 as “one of the crucial dynamics of the revolution”\textsuperscript{116}. He suggests that a fully democratic outcome to the Irish Question was just not possible after this, and the events of 1916 to 1921 only confirm this assessment\textsuperscript{117}.

On the 6\textsuperscript{th} of December 1921 in Dail Eireann, by a slender majority of seven, the Irish Peace Treaty was ratified but this just created yet more conflict. The republican movement split into the ‘Free Staters’ who had voted for ratification and those against them who regarded the Treaty as a sell-out and wanted a republic or nothing at all. Many Glasgow republicans were disappointed with the Treaty and came out in support of de Valera and the anti-Treaty side, who were soon dubbed as ‘rebels’ after refusing to accept the result of the elections held in Ireland on the Treaty\textsuperscript{118}. Candidates presented themselves as either for or against in June 1922, and there was an
overwhelming result in favour of the Treaty\footnote{119}. Needless to say, the civil war in Ireland that began in July 1922 was not welcomed by the vast majority of the Irish population or the Scots-Irish communities in Scotland who feared it spreading: “the Irish people living under foreign misrule had every justification for resistance…we have taken and to take a very different view of happenings in…Scotland, where Irishmen have been concerned in the perpetration of deeds which clearly involved them in the criminal law…Acts of violence, either against property or persons perpetrated in Great Britain in the interests of Ireland, have no moral justification”\footnote{120}. The authorities were not best pleased either, introducing permits for the control of passenger traffic between Scotland and Ireland\footnote{121}. After allegations in early 1922 that Irish gunmen were disembarking early at Greenock instead of completing the journey to Glasgow\footnote{122}, baggage was routinely searched and passengers carefully scrutinised yet young Irishwomen still occasionally carried explosives back to Ireland from Glasgow successfully\footnote{123}. Although the direct route was rarely used for supply, the authorities did not relax these arrangements until 1924, which again underlines how seriously they regarded the problem\footnote{124}.

The rebels or Irregulars had ignored the wishes of the Irish people, and believed themselves to be the guardians of the republican ideal. They saw themselves in the same position as the men of Easter 1916, but their actions did not evoke a similar response. After being handed a real opportunity through the Treaty, the last thing the Irish people wanted was more conflict and bloodshed. Nevertheless, a faction of Sinn Fein in Scotland was determined to continue their “persistent quest” for arms and explosives for Ireland\footnote{125}. The death of Michael Collins in August 1922 earned a sympathetic obituary from Scottish newspapers, as had that of Arthur Griffiths the previous month, illustrating the change in attitude towards Irish leaders and Sinn Fein\footnote{126}. In Scotland, there still remained some rebel
represents them as the National Convention of the Irish in Scotland, who met at 114 Trongate, Glasgow, but were relatively small in number. Moreover, Special Branch of New Scotland Yard estimated that 85% of Scots-Irish residents were in favour of the Treaty, and only “the less responsible members of the Irish Colony” were supporting de Valera. Most Scottish republicans still belonged to a Sinn Fein club, and a conference of Sinn Fein clubs was held in Coatbridge on the 17th December 1922, at which they pledged their congratulations and loyalty to the Irish Free State government, and renamed themselves the Irish Exiles League of Great Britain, “in the name of the great majority of the Irish people in Scotland.” By the end of 1922 then, Free Staters and Republicans had drifted apart, with the Free Staters forming the Irish Exiles League mentioned above. Special Branch of New Scotland Yard scornfully described the minority who rejected the Treaty and the Free State, clinging to republican ideals: “it may safely be said that more than 90% of the Irish in Scotland are in favour of the Free State, and the remaining small minority are not among those who count socially, politically or in the commercial world. They are mainly young men and women led by fanatics and intrigues. A few may be dangerous but the majority have neither pluck nor intelligence.” The authorities seemed content. In truth, the IRA had been compromised by in-fighting and factionalism since 1916. In particular the Glasgow IRB within the IRA and Sinn Fein clubs identified with socialism much more than republicans in Ireland did, and this isolated them within mainstream Irish nationalism in Scotland. It is therefore quite ironic that, once the Irish Question was settled to the satisfaction of most of the Scots-Irish, they began to turn to the Labour Party and looked to participate in mainstream Scottish politics, eschewing the path of revolutionary socialism that had been considered by the IRB in Scotland since the early 1900s.
In conclusion, the period between 1916 and 1922 was a period of transition for Ireland and Irish nationalism. After the Easter Rising of 1916, Sinn Fein gradually but surely replaced the mainstream Irish Party as the main Irish nationalist movement. Active in Scotland since around 1900, in this period Sinn Fein became the focus of the new generation of Irish nationalists. The First World War brought the language of self-determination to the Irish Question, and made republicanism more attractive and acceptable to nationalist communities in Ireland and in Scotland, and the Easter Rising just consolidated its position. The fact that the promised Home Rule Act of 1914 failed to be implemented for the whole of Ireland further boosted the position of Sinn Fein and republicanism. Ulster was allowed to take a separate path, and this allayed most of the fears of unionist Scottish Protestants, allowing Sinn Fein to increase its activities, cultural influence and support in Scotland. However, the authorities took care to be aware of these activities and made many arrests and prosecutions. Indeed, weekly reports on Sinn Fein and IRA activity in Scotland were discussed regularly at Cabinet level. The conflict in Ireland between the IRA and British forces made the Scottish people amenable to a settlement which did not include Ulster. The Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 was regarded as fair and sensible in Scotland, and the ‘Free Staters’ were given support in their stance against the anti-Treaty rebels. In short, Irish republican activity in Ireland and in Scotland created a climate within which Irish separation could be reasonably put forward and discussed; in other words, Irish republicanism actually strengthened the Union between Scotland and England, making a rational evaluation of the ‘Irish Question’ possible. The First World War had consolidated the Ulster veto and, once this fact was realised, many Scots accepted the status if not the claims of Sinn Fein. The bloodshed and reprisals from both sides caused a paralysis of public opinion which only a negotiated settlement could ever have cut through.
Therefore, the years between 1916 and 1922 were almost years of drift in Scottish opinion over Ireland. Irish nationalist activity intensified, public opinion weakened. Many things occurred in this short period of time, but it is best regarded as a phase of reconciliation: some settlement of the ‘Irish Question’ became inevitable as a result of the sustained activity of Irish republicans in Scotland as well as Ireland.
Chapter III: Notes

1) GH, 1 May 1916, 8f.

2) See KEE, op. cit. vol. III, pp.4-15.

3) See Chapter I.

4) GH, 1 May 1916, 8f.

5) GO, 29 April 1916.

6) GSE, 28 April 1916.

7) SM, 26 April 1916.

8) FORWARD, 13 May 1916.

9) GH, 28 July 1916, 6d.


11) PATTERSON, op. cit., p.356.

12) NATIONALITY, 23 June 1917, 21 July 1917, 16 Nov 1917, 17 Nov 1917 & 22 Dec 1917
13) GH, 18 April 1918, 4e.

14) ibid, 4f.

15) ibid, 4g.


18) TOWNSEND, op. cit., p.358.


20) ibid.

21) ibid, p.3.

22) DEVINE, ‘Scotland’s Shame?’, for example.

23) ROSIE, op. cit., p.7.


25) WALKER, ‘Intimate Strangers’. See also GH, 23 May 1918, 5g.

26) GH, 13 June 1918, 3f.

27) See GH, 15 July 1918, 6c; 11 September 1918, 7d.
28) GO, 13 June 1918.

29) GH, 15 September 1919, 5c.

30) GH, 20 October 1919, 11d.

31) GUL/SC, MacCallum Scott Papers, MS GEN 1465/81, November 1918.

32) NAS, HH/52/5, Secret and confidential police circulars, 1910-1920, no.1643.

33) PRO, CAB24/114/CP2089/8, Director of Intelligence/Home Office, 11 November 1920.

34) MLG/RBM, ILP Glasgow Federation minutes, 1919-1922, SR281 TOG. The Executive Council minute book is especially illuminating. All the activities organised seem to have been successful.


36) This is partly due to the geographical proximity of the west of Scotland to Ireland, but mainly because this area of Scotland was the destination of most Irish immigrants looking for work and hence had the greatest concentration of ‘sympathetic’ Irish-Scots and Scots-Irish.

37) NAS, HH/55/62 (I).

38) ibid.

39) ibid, (IV).

40) ibid.
41) McSHANE, ‘No Mean Fighter’, p.117.

42) PATTERSON, op. cit., p.337.

43) PRO, CP1564, CAB24/108, 1 July 1920.

44) ROSIE, op. cit., p.8.

45) NAS, HH/55/62(IV), 12 September 1920.

46) ibid, 16-17 October 1920.

47) ibid, 12 September 1920.

48) PRO, CAB24/116/CP2273/84, Director of Intelligence/Home Office, 8 December 1920.

49) PRO, CAB24/125/CP3055/110, Director of Intelligence/Home Office, 16 June 1921.

50) PRO, CAB24/131/CP3538/134, Special Branch/New Scotland Yard, 8 December 1921.

51) ibid, 4 December 1920.

52) NAS, HH/55/69, 30 November 1920.

53) NAS, HH/55/62 (III), 9 December 1920.

54) NAS, HH/55/69, 22 November 1920.

55) HART, op. cit., p.142.
56) ibid, p.141.

57) ibid, p.144.

58) NLI, O’Mahoney Papers, MS24/474, John Carney to C/S, 22 February 1922.

59) ibid, MS15/337, statement by Patrick McCormick.

60) HART, op. cit., p.145.

61) ibid, pp.164-6.


63) HART, op. cit., p.170.

64) GH, 21 March 1921, 11e. See also PATTERSON, op. cit.


66) See GH, 29 April 1921, for example.

67) See KEE, op. cit. vol. III, pp.47-8, 73-4, and 77. See also COOGAN, ‘Michael Collins’.

68) GH, 30 April 1921, 5b.

69) NAI, 1094/2/1, memo to Director of Intelligence from S. Duggan, 20 December 1921?

70) ibid, 19 December 1921.
71) ibid.

72) PATTERSON, op. cit., p.166.

73) Daily Record, 20 July 1921.

74) HART, op. cit., Chapter 6.

75) GH, 5 May 1921, 7c.

76) NAS, HH/55/63 (I), 4 May 1921.

77) GUL/SC, MacCallum Scott Papers, MS GEN/1465/105, not dated, 1921?

78) NAI, DE/2/435, Michael Collins to Art O’Brien, 8 April 1921.

79) ibid, 28 February 1921.


81) ibid, Michael Collins to Art O’Brien, 21 March 1921.

82) ibid, Art O’Brien to Michael Collins, 31 August 1921.

83) NLS, Haldane Papers, MS5918ff, 129-30, 25 June 1919.
84) What these days are called ‘proximity talks’.

85) GH, 17 November 1921, 3f.

86) FORWARD, 17 September 1921.

87) GSE, 20 August 1921.

88) GH, 17 November 1921, 3f.

89) PATTERSON, op. cit. See also GH, 28 June 1921, 5b.

90) ibid.

91) GH, 23 August 1921, 7g.

92) PRO, CAB24/112/CP1978, Scottish Secretary, 18 October 1920.

93) UCDA, Mulcahy MSS, P7/A/11, Joe Vize to Michael Collins, 5 February 1919.

94) ibid, Michael Collins to Joe Vize, 17 April 1919.

95) ibid, 28 May 1919, 6 June 1919, 27 September 1919.

96) ibid, HQ Adjutant to Joe Vize, 1 October 1920.

97) PRO, CAB24/118/CP2455, Director of Intelligence/Home Office, January 1921.

98) HART, op. cit., p.171.

100) UCDA, Mulcahy MSS, P7/A/11, Joe Vize to Michael Collins, 7 February 1920.

101) Ibid. There was also a plan to hijack government trains at Blantyre in February 1920.


105) See GH, 3 June 1921, 10d; 28 June 1921, 5b, as examples.

106) NAS, HH/52/12, nos. 1719, 1749, 1781 (April to October 1921).


110) Patterson, op. cit., 170-1.

111) UCDA, Mulcahy MSS, P7/A/11, Michael Collins to Joe Vize, 15 April 1920.

112) Patterson, op. cit., pp.172-4 for a discussion of these difficulties.

113) GH, 5 December 1921, 7e. See also Boyce, op. cit.
114) PRO, CAB24/128/CP3380, Director of Intelligence/Home Office, 6 October 1921. See also CAB24/129/CP3492 and CAB24/131/CP3509 for further details of the 1921 campaign.

115) NAS, HH/55/66, November 1921.

116) HART, op. cit., p.108.

117) ibid, pp.107-9.

118) PRO, CAB24/131/CP3579, Special Branch/New Scotland Yard, 22 November 1921.

119) GH, 20 June 1922, 9e. See also KEE, op. cit.

120) GO, 21 January 1922.

121) NAS, HH/55/67 (I).

122) ibid, (II and III).

123) NAS, HH/55/68.

124) NAS, HH/55/67 (IV).

125) PRO, CAB24/131/CP3600, Special Branch/New Scotland Yard, 5 January 1922. See also CAB24/136/CP39176, Special Branch/New Scotland Yard, 31 March 1922.

126) GH, 24 August 1922, leader.

127) See GH, 13 November 1922, 4f; 9 December 1922, 8a. See also PRO, CAB24/140/CP4302.
128) PRO, CAB24/132/CP3609, Special Branch/New Scotland Yard, 12 January 1922.

129) See GH, 19 December 1922, 11g.

130) PRO, CAB24/138/CP4144, Special Branch/New Scotland Yard, 3 August 1922.

131) PRO, CAB24/140/CP4353, Special Branch/New Scotland Yard, 2 December 1922.

132) NLI, O’Mahoney Papers, MS24/474, statement by John McGalloghy. See also PATTERSON, op. cit., pp.358-60.

133) It is no doubt significant that the original, pre-war, Sinn Fein club in Glasgow was named after James Connolly. The links between his ICA and the IRA in Glasgow have already been discussed above.
Chapter IV: 1922 – 1931; “To stir the boiling pot?”

The establishment of the Irish Free State in 1922 provoked an increase in Irish republican activity. Fighting between Irregulars and the forces of the Free State became a regular feature of Irish life at the beginning of this period. In Scotland, Irish republicans were in the minority amidst a majority of ‘Free Staters’. They lacked organisation and leadership, prompting Joseph Robinson to be given the job of restructuring: “I have ordered every soldier of the army to join the Sinn Fein club in their district...I am convinced my work will soon bear good fruit”¹. Robinson’s plan was to turn the Scots-Irish away from the Treaty and thus facilitate the continued use of Scotland as a supply and training centre for the IRA. However, the importance of the Scots-Irish community was not lost on the Free State government either, prompting the republican faction to step up their plans: “it is more important now than ever that the Chief [de Valera] should come for the Free Staters are making a big attempt to get the support of the Irish in Scotland. Milroy, Collins and others are coming in the near future”². Their plans for the visit of de Valera had to be cancelled though, as they were refused a permit for an open-air meeting and the police warned the proprietors of all suitable halls not to grant their use; “These few facts might be used to show any wavering Irishmen or women how much the British people desire to have us in ‘common citizenship’ with them. Their love for us is the same when giving us the ‘Treaty’ as it was when giving us the Black and Tans.”³. The inability to hold regular public meetings severely weakened the republican movement in Scotland, as it was intended to do.

The increase in republican activity in Ireland, tantamount to a civil war, was the rejection, by hardcore republicans, of the Free State itself. To them,
its existence was an aberration; if north and south were permanently partitioned, their republican cause was severely weakened. The British authorities wasted no time in taking advantage of the new arrangements, however. Midnight raids, mainly in Dundee and Glasgow in March 1923, resulted in wholesale arrests and deportations of suspected IRA activists back to the Free State⁴. The files that exist on internees show that quite a few seem to have been genuinely innocent, others only on the fringes of any political activity, and the rest probably guilty of active involvement in IRA gun-running, raids, organisation, etc.⁵. Deportation and internment were introduced with the Defence of the Realm Act, and the arrangements made permanent with the Emergency Powers Act in 1920. The Restoration of Order in Ireland Act targeted “any person who is suspected of acting or having acted or being about to act in a manner prejudicial to the restoration or maintenance of order in Ireland”⁶. It was controversial enough to use such sweeping powers in wartime or in Ireland up to 1921, but to use them against civilians in 1922 and 1923 when the situation was much calmer was, as Peter Hart has put it, “a profound extension of the powers of the state”⁷. These deportations are best seen as a knee-jerk reaction to the continuance of Irish republican activity in mainland Britain. In many cases, hard evidence simply did not exist, and the allegation of being an ‘active republican’ was enough to be used as a pretext for deportation⁸. Similar operations occurred simultaneously in Liverpool, Manchester and London. The reason given for the 38 Scottish arrests was that every person arrested belonged to the IRA, “that quasi-military organisation”⁹. The authorities feared that Clydeside, in particular, was in danger of becoming a refuge for republican activists from either the Free State or Ulster.

These deportations were looked upon with genuine curiosity and surprise in Scotland, and Scottish Labour MPs like James Maxton and David Kirkwood even tried to visit their deported constituents¹⁰. When their
requests to visit the deportees were declined, they still pressed for their
good treatment and legal claims. One group in Scottish society would have
particularly welcomed these deportations; the Church of Scotland chose
1923 as the year in which it launched an attack against the so-called ‘Irish
in Scotland’. Indeed, from 1923 to 1939, the Church of Scotland led the
other Presbyterian churches in a campaign of intolerance against those of
Irish birth or extraction in Scotland. This was no accident; they were
attempting to make the Scots-Irish their scapegoats for the economic
problems affecting Scotland at the time, calling them a “menace to the
peace of the realm” for their political activities and maintained, compared
with the Scots, that the Irish were “on a lower scale...intellectually, morally
and spiritually”\(^1\). As has been explained above, the unionist institutions in
Scotland had a tradition of victimising the Scots-Irish at times of Irish
political crisis or even when there occurred an increase in pro-Irish political
activity in Scotland\(^2\). This new campaign was just as aggressively
Protestant as previous campaigns, but had other specific objectives: to
assert Scottish ‘racial’ superiority, to limit Irish immigration into Scotland
and to try to weaken the growing strength of the Roman Catholic Church
in Scotland.

Their campaign also indirectly weakened the Irish republican movement in
Scotland: “the republican movement in Scotland has 94 Cumanns and 2
District Councils; at present there is an average of 50 members in each. All
are doing their best to help, but with many out of work, and fighting to
keep body and soul together. The fight is hard. With all against us, we
shall fight on to keep the movement alive and assist Ireland all we can”\(^3\).
It also did not take Joseph Browne long to assess his position: “it is
questionable if a full-time organiser could justify his existence here
meantime owing to apathy, unemployment and the effect of recent
deportations; it is very hard to raise funds...I would be better employed in
Ireland at the present time”\textsuperscript{14}. The combined effect of the split caused by the Treaty, the deportations and the new campaign of anti-Irish prejudice severely weakened the Irish republican movement in Scotland. Towards the end of 1923, there were only 32 Sinn Fein clubs left in Scotland and, apart from one in Dundee and one in Edinburgh, they were all situated in or around Glasgow\textsuperscript{15}. It was also stated that “only Glasgow D[istrict] C[ouncil] is functioning properly”\textsuperscript{16}.

The economic position did not help matters either, but it did help the Church of Scotland reinforce its objectives. All these objectives were openly debated at the Church of Scotland’s General Assembly in 1923. The majority of delegates agreed on the nature of the ‘problem’, despite the fact that no hard evidence was forthcoming, and the subsequent report entitled ‘THE MENACE OF THE IRISH RACE TO OUR SCOTTISH NATIONALITY’ was nothing more than bigoted pamphleteering\textsuperscript{17}. The General Assembly welcomed the report and called for a government inquiry to look into the regulation of Irish immigration. Needless to say, the constant reference to the ‘Irish menace’ caused widespread anger among Scots-Irish communities, and many Labour MPs (now the main recipients of Scots-Irish votes) called the report slanderous\textsuperscript{18}. There did, however, exist evidence to refute the claim of the Church of Scotland that Scotland was being swamped by undesirable Irish immigrants. Mr M A Reynard, the Inspector of the Poor and Clerk to the Parish Council of Glasgow stated in April 1923 that the rumours of a large influx of Irish immigrants to Scotland were “quite unfounded”\textsuperscript{19}. However, his and other reasonable voices went largely unheeded. Slowly but surely, enmity was again generated against the Scots-Irish and their way of life by a significant group within the Church of Scotland who were consciously prodding a raw nerve with the Scottish public who had abiding fears for the security of Scotland as well as Ulster.
This campaign, now widely known as the ‘Kirk’s Disgrace’, certainly dented the confidence of Scotland’s Catholics who turned defensively inward, and embraced the Labour Party even more wholeheartedly. Michael Rosie has commented on the fear within Presbyterianism in the 1920s that it was losing focus and influence\textsuperscript{20}. He also points out that the broad mass of clergy and laity were curiously silent throughout this campaign, agreeing with Steve Bruce’s contention that the Church of Scotland effectively sidelined the campaign into General Assembly subcommittee and it was thus not widely supported\textsuperscript{21}. Yet this campaign was led by ministers and other senior figures with great power and influence and, even if their views were not shared by the broader church, they condoned it by doing and saying nothing\textsuperscript{22}. Moreover, immigration from Ireland since the 1840s did not just mean the arrival of Roman Catholics to Scotland. About one third of all immigrants from Ireland were actually Protestant (a mixture of Presbyterians, Episcopalians and Methodists) and their influence needs to be taken into account\textsuperscript{23}. There was certainly a crisis of faith amongst Scottish Protestant churchmen over the efficacy of evangelical solutions to the growing social problems of the twentieth century. Individualist religious salvation was increasingly at odds with the ideology of collectivism which appealed to the working class so strongly. As Callum Brown has put it, religious individualism “was tarnished with the same brush as modern capitalism”\textsuperscript{24}. Poverty, poor health, overcrowding and unemployment on a mass scale could not be effectively tackled by the traditional Christian values of thrift and self-reliance. The campaign against Irish immigration in the 1920s known as the ‘Kirk’s Disgrace’ should be seen as an act of desperation against the challenge from a secular salvation in the form of state social welfare. The rise of Labour in central Scotland owes much to immigrant Irish Catholics (and their descendants), and the Protestant churches felt marginalised by
the 1920s as the social and political attitudes of the working class were adjusted to exclude their input. By the end of the 1920s the Church of Scotland had been effectively disestablished and also lost its influence over education and poor relief with the abolition of Parish Council and County Education authorities. Scottish Protestantism as a whole had “lost its image as the religious face of the Scottish civil establishment”\textsuperscript{25}. Although membership remained healthy until the 1950s, the Presbyterian, Episcopalian and evangelical churches were losing their social significance and did not seem to relish the prospect of coexisting peacefully with an increasingly confident Roman Catholic Church in Scotland.

The idea that Scotland was an equal partner with England within the British Empire was also seriously tested in the 1920s. “The impact of the Great War… ushered in a period of profound social, cultural, economic and political dislocation” as Richard J Finlay has put it\textsuperscript{26}. In particular, Scotland’s heavy industries were irretrievably damaged by the reluctance to modernise and compete. Unemployment, at previously unknown levels, exacerbated the existing severe social problems of health and housing. Politicians referred to the ‘End of Scotland’, the idea that Scotland as a nation was in terminal decline. This crisis of national identity had at its root the miserable state of the Scottish economy. The implications for nationalist endeavour were clear; Scotland desperately needed a fresh start and many looked to self-government to provide the catalyst for social, cultural, economic and political regeneration. Yet the Church of Scotland looked to accuse and blame, hoping to increase their social standing and improve generally falling church attendances. They aspired to provide the spiritual leadership they felt was lacking in Scotland, using the ‘Irish menace’ as a convenient scapegoat. Usually the Irish were labelled as a separate ‘race’ in this campaign, but the word did not have the same pejorative meaning in the 1920s that it has today. Those concerned with
the ‘End of Scotland’ were thinking of a separate religion and culture, not of different skin colours or other physical characteristics per se. At the heart of this campaign was a desperate desire to maintain the ‘purity’ of the Scottish ‘race’, and the ‘Irish’ as the largest immigrant group in Scotland at the time, became the obvious focus for this campaign.

The Irish Free State was trying to consolidate its position and exercise its authority throughout 1924 and the Labour Party, having its first experience of government, was trying to do much the same thing in Britain. The Free State was paying the price of self-government as high taxation exacerbated the political tension in Ireland. In Scotland, Sinn Fein and the Irish Self-Determination League called on all Scots-Irish voters to question Labour candidates in the October 1924 General Election on the issue of political prisoners, whereas Scottish Orangemen were instructed to vote anti-socialist. The IRA itself was undergoing changes at this time; the Scottish Brigade having to report to ‘HQ/Britain’ rather than to Dublin. This illustrates the desire of the IRA to carry out operations on the British mainland in continued protest against the Treaty. At this time, the IRA had more men in the Glasgow Brigade alone than they had in the whole of England, which emphasises the continuing influence of Irish republicanism on Scotland, even if only on the west of central Scotland. There was clearly still a desire to do something for Ireland long after most of the Scots-Irish had moved on politically. Yet indiscipline and feuding continued to undermine republican unity in Glasgow in the 1920s as Brian Hanley has noted. IRA strength in Scotland declined to just 100 men by 1926, when it had become primarily a social organisation. The geographical position of west central Scotland is perhaps the most significant factor here; long after IRA units had disappeared elsewhere in the United Kingdom, never mind the rest of Scotland, there was always an IRA presence in and around Glasgow. Numbers and activity had been steadily declining since 1922 but
not as sharply as elsewhere. This was mainly because of the continuing movement of the Scots-Irish between Ireland and this part of Scotland. As well as looking for employment (seasonal as well as permanent), there were regular visits back and forth to see family and friends as well. The present writer has heard testimony from a variety of individuals about the ‘Derry Boat’ linking the Clyde Coast with Donegal, for example, and this movement continued on a significant scale from the 1920s right up until the 1960s.

Since the end of the First World War and especially after the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921, the Labour Party increasingly represented Scots-Irish communities, as attention was then focused on social and economic problems. The Ancient Order of Hibernians named unemployment and housing as the two greatest problems facing the Scots-Irish in 1924. The other main problem for the Scots-Irish was the attitude of their fellow Scots towards them. The 1925 General Assemblies of the Presbyterian churches criticised the 1918 Education Act for the advantages gained by Roman Catholics from it. They objected to the State funding of Catholic schools on economic, religious and cultural grounds, arguing that the practice was socially divisive. In reality, denominational education had been a feature of the Scottish system since the introduction of public education in 1872 and not just since 1918. The negativity of the Presbyterian churches towards the Scots-Irish was sharply contrasted by the reports given on the Irish Free State on the fourth anniversary of the Anglo-Irish Treaty in the *Glasgow Herald*. The successes and failures of the Free State were appraised and, generally, the transition to self-government was regarded positively. The Scottish Office also concluded in 1925 that the facts and arguments of the Church of Scotland on Irish immigration were “erroneous”.

Indeed, their investigations showed that there were fewer Irish-born residents in Scotland in 1921 than in 1911, and the number of
‘Irish’ in receipt of poor relief had not grown actually or proportionately. There were more Irish immigrants entering Scotland than Scots emigrants leaving in 1924, but it was stated that the “Irish ‘danger’ was not appreciably increasing and does not justify any action by the British government”\textsuperscript{38}.

The Glasgow Herald and The Scotsman remained firmly unionist throughout the 1920s, and The Bulletin (from 1915) was also broadly a unionist newspaper. The Daily Record had supported the Liberal Party in the past, but new owners moved it into the Unionist camp. Only the Labour-supporting Daily Herald and the Liberal-supporting News Chronicle tried to break this Unionist deadlock of the 1920s, without much success. Both the Sunday Post and Sunday Mail had appeared in 1919, which only added two more unionist newspapers to the mix. This was the culmination of a process began as a consequence of the First World War. I. G. C. Hutchison describes the effect on the Liberal press as ‘annihilation’, and points out that the only two papers of quality still reliably Liberal at this time were the Greenock Telegraph and the Paisley Daily Express\textsuperscript{39}. This right-wing leaning of the vast bulk of the Scottish press only increased the Labour Party’s standing within Scots-Irish communities.

Towards the end of 1926, the Presbyterian churches intensified their campaign against the Scots-Irish. A deputation was received by Sir John Lamb, Under Secretary of State for Scotland, concerning Irish immigration. The church leaders claimed that over 700,000 Roman Catholic ‘Irish’ were then resident in Scotland and around 9,000 immigrant Irish were arriving every year, but could not or would not substantiate their figures for Irish immigration\textsuperscript{40}. Their point of view was considered carefully if not sympathetically at the Scottish Office, and it was decided to refer the matter to the Secretary of State for Scotland for a fuller examination. This resulted in the Scottish Secretary, Sir John Gilmour, receiving a deputation
consisting of representatives from the Church of Scotland, the United Free
Church and the Free Church of Scotland in November 1926. The churches’
deputation was not taken altogether seriously; their figures were disputed,
and it was also pointed out to them that it would be a very dangerous
precedent to regulate migration from one part of the United Kingdom to
another, especially since they had no objections to Protestant immigrants
from Ulster to Scotland.

It could be argued that this meeting at the end of 1926 should have meant
the end of the Presbyterian churches’ campaign\(^{41}\). Admittedly, the initially
cool official response to the churches’ deputations did limit the campaign’s
perceived success but, more importantly, the Presbyterian churches took
this rebuffal as the impetus to redouble their efforts. It should also be
stressed that this campaign to regulate Irish immigration to Scotland was
mainly based on anti-Catholic prejudice. Irish immigration to Scotland
was, in fact, negligible throughout this period\(^{42}\). What the Presbyterian
churches were really objecting to was the healthy growth of the Roman
Catholic community in Scotland. By the 1920s the Catholic population of
Scotland was largely Scottish. That is, most Catholics had been born in
Scotland; very few indeed had been born in Ireland\(^{43}\). It was the fact that
the majority of Scottish Catholics were of Irish extraction that so upset the
Presbyterian churches. They argued that, with a separate religion and
separate educational facilities, Scottish Catholics were a separate
community; and furthermore, because they were mostly ‘Irish’ (of Irish
extraction), they represented an alien presence, and an inferior presence at
that. Actually, the Scots and the Irish share much in terms of heritage and
racial origins, even though most Scottish Protestants would not have felt
able to recognise the similarities in the era of the 1920s\(^{44}\). The modern Irish
in Scotland had been encouraged over as cheap labour during the
industrialisation of the nineteenth century. By the 1920s they had served
their purpose and were regarded as an economic threat to ‘native’ Scots – despite the fact that most of the Scots-Irish were themselves native Scots by then. For example, a 1927 Ministry of Labour survey of public-funded construction schemes showed that only 33 out of over 7,000 workmen were Irish-born.

It was essentially a question of identity. As they were Roman Catholic, many Protestant Scots would not accept the Scots-Irish as truly Scottish. The Scots-Irish were solely blamed for being incompatible with the Scots ‘race’ because they kept themselves to themselves as separate communities; when in fact no real attempts had been made at social integration by any Scottish institutions. The Scots-Irish kept themselves to themselves because there was no practical alternative in the Scotland of the 1920s. As well as being blamed for “racial antagonism”, the Scots-Irish were accused of polluting the Scottish national character and motivating great numbers of young Scots to emigrate in search of a better standard of living.

Although this is clearly scapegoating, it is perhaps understandable. Presbyterian suspicion of the Scots-Irish and their religion was not entirely irrational or unreasonable. The 1920s were a time of unprecedented economic and emotional turmoil, and the presence of the Scots-Irish was a direct challenge to the fundamental nature of Protestant Scotland. Scottish society, particularly in urban areas, struggled to successfully integrate the Irish, Irish-Scots and Scots-Irish in that order. Although the reaction of Protestant Scotland was often hostile it was rarely violent, when this was not usually the case with immigrant or minority communities elsewhere in Europe between the wars. Examples of this scapegoating can be seen in the works of George Malcolm Thomson and Andrew Dewar Gibb who, albeit right-wing, were both still Scottish nationalists. In reality, unemployment, poor living standards and Scottish emigration levels had little to do with the Scots-Irish. As had previously occurred in the late
nineteenth century, at times of economic depression, the immigrant Irish were targeted and victimised. However, unlike in the nineteenth century, in the Scotland of the 1920s the Scots-Irish were relatively well-established and vigorous, aided by legislation like the Roman Catholic Relief Act of 1926. It proved much more difficult to make the mud really stick this time and this was no doubt because the ‘Irish Question’ seemed to be settled. Indeed, most of the Scots-Irish were beginning to see themselves at this time as primarily Scottish, and comparatively few still clung completely to a dual identity. The Irish Free State was consolidating its political position and Home Rule, albeit without Ulster, had been achieved. Politics for the Scots-Irish in the 1920s implied the Labour Party and Catholic organisations. Social welfare legislation became more important to Scots-Irish communities than Irish nationalism as they entered the political mainstream in the interwar years.

The developing two-party system in British politics meant the Scots-Irish had no other choice but to support Labour if they desired a voice in Scottish politics. This should be placed in the context of Scots-Irish communities seeking general advancement within Scottish society. Most historians, from Handley to Gallagher, see the end of the Irish Civil War as also the end of the influence of Irish politics on the Scots-Irish. While this thesis accepts that the 1920s saw the political integration of the Scots-Irish, they did not cease to be a distinct community altogether due mainly to the variety of their social institutions. The Catholic Church itself became more assertive in the 1920s at the same time as the Protestant churches were experiencing a crisis of confidence. Their reaction to this increasing integration goes a long way to explaining the ‘Kirk’s Disgrace’ and the activities of the PAS and SPL as Patterson, for one, has suggested. Moreover, Tom Gallagher has shown that the 1918 Education Act “breathed life” into the ‘No Popery’ movement. John McCaffrey has
argued that radicalism within the Labour Party had to diminish after 1918 because support from ‘Irish’ votes was conditional on Labour protection of Catholic interests and values, especially in education but also in housing and employment51. This radicalism included support for an Irish republic, and so this dilution would also have allowed many Protestant Scots to support Labour. Michael Rosie has highlighted the profound influence Presbyterianism had on the Labour Party in Scotland, emphasising that not all Presbyterians approved of the Kirk’s rightward drift in the 1920s and 1930s52. Many Protestants, including Orangemen, began to put the interests of their class above religious concerns, which assisted Labour’s advance in Scotland to a great extent. Rosie describes Labour as providing a “secular canopy” under which individuals or groups of all religions and none found their social and economic interests represented53.

However, the irrational fears of many Scottish Presbyterians still encompassed politics. The Reverend Duncan Cameron of Kilsyth, for example, speaking in December 1927 warned of the continuing Irish republican menace in Scotland, dubbing all of the ‘Irish’ working-class as left-wing and having a “revolutionary character”54. Although the IRA was still active in mainland Britain, it was effectively an underground and peripheral political movement since the establishment of the Irish Free State in 1922. However, what is important is the belief that Irish republicanism was dangerously active still persisted in Scotland, particularly among those with most to fear from it or with most to gain from that fear being perpetuated. Pressure from the Presbyterian churches brought about an Inter-Departmental Government Conference on Irish immigration in 192755. There are signs that it deliberately took its time to collate and analyse information, no doubt waiting for the 1931 census to settle the controversy finally.
The same Reverend Cameron delivered a lecture on the “influx of Irish Roman Catholics” under the auspices of the Scottish Protestant League in the Town Hall, Greenock, in February 1928\textsuperscript{56}. To aid the Presbyterian churches in their anti-Catholic campaigning two organisations, although not formally connected, were established in the late 1920s; the Scottish Protestant League in the west of Scotland, and Protestant Action in the east of Scotland, mainly around Edinburgh. These organisations were both militant and refused to accept the rejections of their arguments. Indeed, Sir John Gilmour, in reply to continued Commons questioning on Irish immigration, rejected calls for a Commission of Inquiry in the same month, February 1928\textsuperscript{57}. He quoted the 1921 census figures as showing 91\% of the Scottish population being Scottish-born and this had been more or less constant since 1861. Moreover, the percentage of the Scottish population who were Irish-born had in fact fallen from 6.7\% in 1911 to 3.3\% in 1921. These official figures clearly show that Irish immigration to Scotland was not in fact the problem the Presbyterian churches and militant Protestant political groups would have had the Scottish public believe. Nonetheless, another churches’ deputation was jointly received by the Home Secretary and the Scottish Secretary in July 1928\textsuperscript{58}. At this meeting, held in London, the Scottish Presbyterian churches were informed that the regulation of population movement within the British Isles was not desired or practical. Yet this highest-level dismissal could not dissuade this Protestant movement to falter, which illustrates the xenophobic nature of their claims and demands: “Government should not refuse those who demand that measures be taken to check the influx from Ireland”\textsuperscript{59}. Even a publication by the respected academic, Professor J W Gregory, entitled ‘SCOTLAND AND THE IRISH INVASION’ which dismissed the churches’ arguments did little to modify views already well entrenched\textsuperscript{60}. Michael Rosie has correctly argued that anti-Catholicism was just not strong enough to
sustain a party at local level in Glasgow, even in the economic situation of the 1930s\textsuperscript{61}. At its zenith, militant Protestantism attracted 23% of the vote in Glasgow (SPL) and 31% of the vote in Edinburgh (PAS), revealing what Rosie has described as a “cultural divide” between urban Catholics and Protestants within Scotland’s central belt\textsuperscript{62}. However, even though organised anti-Catholicism was short-lived, it did represent a significant minority and underlines the impact the healthy growth of Scots-Irish communities were causing. Shared class interest would eventually benefit the Labour Party, as has been discussed above, but this significant minority of Protestant voters still felt strongly enough to put religion before class.

Another significant organisation was established in Scotland in 1928: the National Party of Scotland. Directly after the Irish Free State was established in 1922, the Scottish Home Rule Association demanded Home Rule for Scotland as Irish Home Rule had finally been taken care of\textsuperscript{63}. Ever since its foundation in 1886, the SHRA had to live in the shadow of the Irish Home Rule movement. However, once the Irish Free State had been established, Scottish Home Rulers began to press their own claims for devolution more vigorously. In 1924, the Unionist government stated after a debate on Scottish Home Rule in the Commons that it would take no further action on the matter\textsuperscript{64}. This did not prevent a Scottish Home Rule Convention drafting a new Bill in the same year which only floundered because it was too closely linked to Welsh Home Rule. The idea of ‘Home Rule All Round’ or federalism, which first appeared in the 1830s and had received close examination in the 1880s and 1890s, still had support in some sections of the political mainstream. The reconstituted SHRA, which had strong links with the Labour Party, held many who felt the solution to the Home Rule argument was a federal United Kingdom\textsuperscript{65}. For so long the question of Irish Home Rule dominated the devolution debate, and once the Irish Free State had been established, the SHRA’s influence receded to
be replaced with the idea of a nationalist political party in Scotland. Yet the attitude of most Scots towards Scottish Home Rule was decidedly cool at this time. Anti-Home Rulers introduced difficulties such as the number of Scottish MPs to remain at Westminster in order to deliberately muddy the waters and thus postpone any serious examination. Unionist newspapers like the *Glasgow Herald* argued in 1927 that there was no desire for Scottish Home Rule; some administrative devolution perhaps, but not any degree of self-government. In the same year the socialist Scottish MPs introduced a Government of Scotland Bill which failed due to lack of parliamentary cooperation. This motivated the SHRA to protest against what it considered to be government interference. It is no great surprise that Scottish Home Rulers eventually realised that they would have to emulate their Irish predecessors by establishing a political party with the main policy of Scottish self-government.

There were also many different ideas on strategy within the Scottish nationalist movement throughout the 1920s. There was a demand for an independent national party as early as 1925 in the SHRA, but this was not the only alternative strategy being debated. Others advocated an independent Scotland separate entirely from the British Empire, some put the case for Dominion status within the Commonwealth and there were also those who argued for complementary self-government within the United Kingdom and Empire. A referendum, petitions, a Royal Commission and even civil disobedience were considered by the three main nationalist bodies: the SHRA and the more radical SNL and Scots National Movement (SNM). Disillusionment with lobbying and pressuring existing political parties provided the impetus for this reassessment, but the removal of the Irish dimension with the establishment of the Irish Free State had certainly helped to precipitate it. The transition occurred at the AGM of the SHRA in Glasgow in April 1928; a motion was presented to
the effect that all SHRA members should join the new National Party of Scotland. Interestingly, in its first manifesto, the NPS made no mention of the Scots-Irish community or the perceived ‘Irish invasion’. The manifesto had, in fact, distinctly republican undertones. This was because the NPS had to ensure its various factions could interpret it as they wished. Thus the more radical wing of the party (the old SNL) which was anglophobic and hostile to the British Empire expected more militant rhetoric and strategies. Both of these are well expressed in an early letter from the NPS to Dail Eireann asking TDs for their support: “Scotland must demand...[self-government]...and must be prepared if necessary to take it...The righteousness of our cause and the memory of your own great struggle is [the] only justification for [our] appeal to you.”

Richard J Finlay has shown that the Celt cists within the NPS held up Ireland as their model to imitate. He sees religion, despite the efforts of the Presbyterian churches, as “coincidental” to the issue of the Irish Question which was shaped by notions of ‘race’ instead. Nationalist bigots like Andrew Dewar Gibb and George Malcolm Thomson vilified the Irish example because they viewed the Irish as racially inferior to the Scots. Finlay is correct to state that “although...the nationalist movement in Scotland was largely free of racial chauvinism, it cannot be denied that racial concepts, both directly and indirectly, contributed to its political development and consumed a fair amount of its intellectual energy.”

“Every Irishman coming into Scotland means a Scotsman on the dole”; this remark was made by Lord Scone, President of the SPL, in a speech in the St. Andrew’s Halls in Glasgow in October 1928. As well as spuriously blaming the contemporary malaise on an imaginary influx of Irish immigrants, he called for a residency qualification of seven years before any privileges of Scottish citizenship were granted. Lord Scone and the other leaders of the anti-Catholic movement never really quoted actual
figures to back up what they said, nor did they acknowledge the wealth of census and other evidence which made their arguments look so false and reactionary. However, these organisations did reinforce the traditional myths and stereotypes many Protestants Scots believed about the Irish and Scots-Irish, and these people heard what they wanted to hear in rhetoric like the example quoted above. This was especially the case after the Irish Free State introduced its Public Safety Act in 1927 and there were fears that large numbers of undesirable deportees would arrive in the west of Scotland to increase the immigrant ‘Irish’ community. Some were motivated to direct action like the attack on the annual Ancient Order of Hibernians demonstration at Falkirk in August 1928 when stones and bottles were thrown.

The tide began to turn at the beginning of 1929 when the Glasgow Herald ran a series of five articles on ‘THE IRISH IN SCOTLAND’, in an attempt to get to the bottom of the ‘problem’. These articles were a genuine attempt at an examination of the situation in Scotland, but did not really tackle the issue of anti-Catholic prejudice. The articles did, however, acknowledge that Irish immigration had slowed to a ‘trickle’ and, according to the 1921 census, English and Welsh-born residents far outnumbered those who were born in Ireland. There were also, it was conceded, no Irish-born recipients of the dole registered at that time, although figures for Scottish-born descendants of original immigrants had proved regretfully hard to come by. The Roman Catholic church was berated for encouraging large families among its members, whereas the Protestant churches, by encouraging smaller families, were partly responsible for the Scots becoming “a dying people”. All this melodrama stemmed from the fact that many Protestant Scots were finding difficulty in coming to terms with life in a modern industrial nation in decline. This series of articles concluded by placing the onus solely on the Roman Catholic community.
(which, it was stressed, was 90% ‘Irish’) to stop ‘segregation’, otherwise the problem of disharmony could never be solved.

To continually label third, fourth or even fifth generation Scots-Irish as just ‘Irish’, to accuse them of being socially inferior, to openly attack their professed religion while at the same time blame them for their reluctance to integrate fully into mainstream Scottish society was hypocrisy writ large. The Scots-Irish had not wholly and successfully integrated into mainstream Scottish society because mainstream Scottish society did not want them to integrate wholly and successfully. Football clubs like Glasgow Celtic and Edinburgh Hibernian, for example, would never have come into existence if Roman Catholics had been simply welcomed into existing Scottish clubs. Needless to say, clubs like Glasgow Rangers deliberately obstructed social integration on the grounds of religious bigotry, specifically anti-Catholic prejudice, by refusing to sign Roman Catholic players and not discouraging the widespread singing of sectarian songs by their supporters. A vocal minority of militant Protestants perpetuated religious tension in interwar Scotland, but are we projecting our secularised values on them? Michael Rosie has argued that these localised conflicts were “epiphenomenal to the broader secular cleavage in Scottish society”, and the decline of Empire combined with fears of increasing Anglicisation was much more important than religious squabbles. It may be the case that the extent of religious tension has been hitherto exaggerated in comparison with tensions caused by class or gender, for example, but Rosie and others place too much emphasis on individual factors in isolation. This thesis contends that, certainly in central Scotland, religious tension and conflicts were as important as wider economic and cultural concerns. For the contemporary actors, these religious tensions and conflicts were legitimate cultural factors.
Leaders in the *Glasgow Herald* following the earlier series of articles argued that the large community of Roman Catholics of Irish extraction in Scotland did represent something of an ‘invasion’, but at the same time questioned the accuracy of the Presbyterian churches’ views, whose leaders were still pressing the government for immigration regulation and calling the Scots-Irish community “a persistent magnet”\(^84\). The beginning of 1930 saw the Presbyterian churches pressing the new National government on Irish immigration and the arrangements for the census of 1931\(^85\). They proposed a ‘religious denomination’ column be added to the 1931 census\(^86\). The National government also established a Commission of Inquiry into the administration of Scottish affairs with a view to introducing eventual legislation. Events in Ireland overshadowed everything else, however, as President Cosgrave resigned and Eamonn de Valera emerged as the strongest and ultimately successful candidate with a programme for full Irish independence. Republican malcontents had been a thorn in the side of the Irish Free State government since 1922. In Scotland too, throughout the 1920s, the authorities kept a careful eye on Irish republican activists by issuing orders to the police to safeguard firearms and explosives as well as compiling lists of places vulnerable to IRA attacks\(^87\). De Valera had been the natural leader of the anti-Treaty faction since 1921, but had slowly realised the possibilities of building on the status of the Free State through democratic participation in the government. The IRA had become marginalised, but was still the focus for those republican malcontents to try to continue the armed struggle. Although lawlessness broke out again in the Irish Free State during 1931, de Valera and his political allies were by then keen to attempt a democratic resolution and distanced themselves from such incidents\(^88\). Sinn Fein had more or less ceased to be a major political player, and was replaced by Cumann na nGaedheal (pro-Treaty, Fine Gael after 1933) and Fianna Fail (de Valera’s populist republicans).
The continuing unrest provoked the Free State government to introduce a further Public Safety Act which caused another scare in Glasgow as it was feared that ‘Irish gunmen’ would flee there from Ireland. Indeed, the authorities issued special orders to the police to report any Irish republican disturbances or propaganda amongst the Scots-Irish population. De Valera took the opportunity of restored calm to outline the new republican aims – no oath of allegiance to the British Crown and further dilution of any political links with the United Kingdom. However, de Valera did not propose ending the Free State’s membership of the Commonwealth because he hoped to use it as leverage to end partition. Only when the Republic of Ireland was declared in 1949 were all links to the United Kingdom finally severed.

Irish republicanism was therefore beginning to regenerate. The IRA had begun to exploit the effects of the Great Depression at the same time as politics began to radicalise again across Europe. Brian Hanley sees this phenomenon as explaining the growth of IRA recruitment and activities from 1930 onwards. He cites the establishment of the radical Saor Eire in September 1930 as an attempt to take advantage of the economic crisis through a dedicated political organisation. The IRA had also previously attempted to seize political control of the GAA immediately after the Civil War, without success. Increasing activity in the north of Ireland can also be detected from this time. Disputes between those in the IRA seeking military action and those who advocated a political solution would dominate the 1930s. The IRA was experiencing a period of operational stagnation between 1922 and 1931, but would survive to advance an alternative ideological identity to what John Regan has described as “the crisis of treatyite politics”.

Irish nationalism had a more direct influence on the Scottish nationalist movement in this period. After the Irish Free State was established,
Scottish nationalists looked on Scottish Home Rule as unfinished business, and several attempts and organisations failed to achieve any real success. The foundation of the NPS in 1928 was a realisation that, like Sinn Fein and Irish nationalism, Scottish nationalism also needed a party political focus if any tangible success was to be achieved. Moreover, the Labour Party gained most Scots-Irish voters after 1922 who had been politicised by the Irish Home Rule movement and were thereafter concerned mostly with social issues.

The main impact of Irish nationalism on Scotland in this period was, however, as an imaginary force. The Presbyterian churches waged a campaign of intolerance and anti-Catholic prejudice against the Scots-Irish communities in Scotland for two main reasons: from fear that the political beliefs of Irish immigrants (really their descendants) would take hold in Scotland, and from fear over the growing strength of the Roman Catholic Church in Scotland. When the Presbyterian churches labelled the ‘Irish’ as inferior and revolutionary, they were referring to a community which was largely born in Scotland by the 1920s and were, in fact, Scots-Irish. Their notions of race dictated that the Scots-Irish were not true Scots because they were not Protestants. Militant Protestant groups like the PAS and SPL gained some respectability from association with the ‘Kirk’s Disgrace’ that they would not otherwise have enjoyed. Although much of mainstream Protestantism was ambivalent or even opposed to these campaigns, many erstwhile Labour voters switched to militant Protestant parties in both Edinburgh and Glasgow, as Michael Rosie has shown. This had the double impact of increasing Labour activity and organisation in these areas, and fastening Scots-Irish Catholics more securely to this party. Rosie is correct to stress that, just because we find that religion and politics mixed much more in the past is not tantamount to finding widespread sectarianism; “rather it is to find that the past was more religious”.

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imaginary influx of Irish immigrants (who were always Catholic and republican) manufactured by the Presbyterian churches was an attempt to exert undue influence on the British government at a time of economic uncertainty. Many believed that Scotland really was a nation in decline and the imperial ideal was no longer secure. Many Protestant Scots were very susceptible to these images of the ‘Irish’ as an invading and hostile race, plotting to corrupt the purity of the Scottish race; and this also explains the support for militant Protestant groups like Protestant Action and the Scottish Protestant League.

In conclusion, the impact of Irish nationalism on Scotland in the period 1922 to 1931 was keenly felt and never absent. What matters when assessing this impact is not just how significant events seem with hindsight, but how significant people at the time perceived them to be. Irish nationalists in Scotland began to concentrate their efforts within the labour movement, and the Scots-Irish movement began to flourish. Examining the reaction to the anti-Catholic or anti-Irish campaign waged by the Presbyterian churches in Scotland it is clear that what mattered most, and hence what had the greatest impact, was anything that was perceived to threaten Scotland directly or could upset the hegemonic status quo of Protestant Unionism. If the past was more religious, it was also more political. Religion, identity and much more general concepts of race were all inextricably linked as political constants at this time. Whether those Scottish Presbyterians actually believed in their imaginary influx of Irish immigrants or not is irrelevant; what matters most is that this ideological device was very successful in modernising as well as intensifying anti-Catholic prejudice in Scotland.
**Chapter IV: Notes**

1) NAI, 1094/14/2, correspondence regarding organisation of Cumann na Poblachta and Sinn Fein, 1919-23. JR to HQ, 5 May 1922.

2) ibid, JR to HQ, 16 May 1922.

3) NAI, 1094/15/1, S Duggan to E Donnelly, 31 May 1922.

4) GH, 12 March 1923, 11e.

5) NAS, HH/55/71-2, including 9 page list of supposedly ‘active republicans’ in 1923.

6) The Times, 28 June 1921.

7) HART, op. cit., p.172.

8) NAS, HH/55/71-2, as before.

9) See GH, 13 March 1923, 9d-f.

10) See GH, 17 March 1923, 9f; 19 March 11a; 24 April, 9h.


12) See Chapter II. See also GALLAGHER, ‘Glasgow; the Uneasy Peace’.
13) NAI, 1094/16/4, Joseph Browne in Glasgow, nd, 1923?

14) ibid, 1094/16/5-6, 24 May 1923, 2 June 1923.

15) ibid, 1094/17/7, Cumann Poblacht na h-Eireann n-Albain, lists of clubs and members.

16) ibid, 1094/17/9.

17) 1923 Church of Scotland General Assembly Report, SRA (ML), TD 200 147g.

18) See GH, 15 May 1923, 3e; 30 May 1923, 6b; 31 May 1923, 7h; 15 June 1923, 10c.

19) GH, 24 April 1923, 8e.

20) ROSIE, op. cit., pp.100-6.

21) BRUCE, ‘No Pope of Rome’.

22) ROSIE, op. cit., p.105.

23) BROWN, C. G. in WALKER/GALLAGHER, p.76.

24) ibid, p.79.

25) ibid, p.81.


27) Some Irish nationalist internees had been in captivity for well over two years by this point.

See GH, 12 July 1924, 15d; 9 September 1924, 3b; 22 October 1924, 12h; 25 October 1924, 11d.
28) GH, 22 October 1924, 6b. See also BRUCE, ‘No Pope of Rome’.

29) UCDA, Twomey MSS, P69/37 and 120 (13). Glasgow Brigade had 224 men in March 1924 compared with 216 men for the whole of England.


31) UCDA, Twomey MSS, P69/181(91).

32) HANLEY, op. cit., Chapter 9 especially.

33) Information collected from casual conversations as well as informal interviews in public houses in and around Glasgow in the 1980s and 1990s (e.g. Heraghty’s, Pollokshaws Road; Queen’s Park Café, Victoria Road; Baird’s Bar, Gallowgate; The Dolphin, Partick; and also various social clubs in Clydebank and Coatbridge).

34) WOOD, ‘John Wheatley and the Irish’, IR31, 1980. See also GH, 1 September 1924, 7a.

35) NAS, HH/1/558. This file contains contemporary correspondence on the 1918 Education Act. See also BROWN, ‘Outside the Covenant’, IR42, 1991.

36) See GH, 22 October 1925, 8e; 16 December 1925, 10c; 29 December 1925, 6b.

37) NAS, HH/1/541.

38) ibid.

39) HUTCHISON, ‘Scottish Unionism between the Wars’ in MacDONALD, op. cit., p.81.

40) See GH, 25 September 1926, 11f.

42) See Appendix II.

43) ibid.


45) NAS, HH/1/544.

46) ibid.

47) GH, 8 December 1927, 3c.

48) See ‘Caledonia; or the future of the Scots’ (1927) and ‘Scotland in Eclipse’ (1930).

49) NAS, HH/1/775. This file contains correspondence from ‘concerned Protestants’ objecting to the Bill.

50) PATTERSON, op. cit., pp.360-1.

51) GALLAGHER, op. cit., Chapter 3.

52) McCAFFREY in DEVINE, ‘Irish Immigrants and Scottish Society’.

53) ROSIE, op. cit., p.95.

54) See GH, 8 December 1927, 3c.

55) NAS, HH/1/545. See also HH/55/596 for precise figures.
56) See GH, 18 February 1928, 10d.

57) See GH, 24 February 1928, 11c.

58) See BROWN, op. cit. See also GH, 20 July 1928, 11d.

59) NAS, HH/1/553. See also PRO, Cabinet CP262 (1928) and CP40 (1928).

60) See GH, 28 July 1928, 11c.

61) ROSIE, op. cit., pp.142-3.

62) ibid.

63) See FINLAY, ‘Independent and Free?’ See also GH, 21 November 1923, 5b.

64) See GH, 10 May 1924, 10a-g; 20 May 1924, 9a.


66) ibid.

67) The issue of how many MPs Scotland would have in an Imperial Parliament at Westminster if devolution was enacted, came to be known as the ‘West Lothian Question’ in the 1970s, thanks to Tam Dalyell MP.

68) See GH, 7 April 1927, 7c.

69) MITCHELL, op. cit., pp.176-79.
70) See GH, 23 April 1928, 11b (the SHRA eventually wound up in April 1929).

71) See FINLAY, op. cit. See also GH, 11 April 1929, 8e.


74) ibid.

75) ibid. See also GALLAGHER, op. cit., pp.168-72.

76) See BROWN, op. cit. See also GH, 18 October 1928, 12g.

77) See Appendix II.

78) NAS, HH/55/75. A split over strategy occurred between de Valera and the IRA in 1926 and this legislation sought to further marginalise the IRA.

79) See GH, 27 August 1928, 9d.

80) See GH, 20-25 March 1929, 11f-g; 11f-g; 13c-d; 8e-f; 13f-g respectively.

81) FINLAY, ‘National Identity in Crisis?’ History, 1994. See also GH, 23 March 1929, 8e.

82) MURRAY, ‘The Old Firm’, FINN, op. cit. and also GH, 26 March 1929 and 15 April 1929.

83) ROSIE, op. cit., p.144.

84) See GH, 15 April 1929, 13f; 26 April 1929, 14e.
85) BROWN, op. cit. See also GH, 10 May 1930, 11f.

86) NAS, HH/1/561.

87) NAS, HH/52/12, secret and confidential Police circulars 1921 – 1930, nos. 2081, 2106, 2108.

88) KEE, op. cit. See also GH, 17 August 1931, leader; 16 October 1931, leader; 23 October 1931, 5a.

89) NAS, HH/52/17, secret and confidential Police circulars, 1931 – 1939, nos. 2589, 2662.

90) KEE, op.cit. See also GH, 28 October 1931, 15d.


92) ibid.


94) ROSIE, op.cit., pp.130-4.

95) ibid, p.70.
The tenth anniversary of the Anglo-Irish Treaty in 1932 saw elections taking place in Ireland. De Valera’s Fianna Fail emerged as the largest party, and de Valera became undisputedly the political leader of the Irish Free State. This caused concern in Ulster, where rioting broke out later in the year, ostensibly as a reaction to the sharp rise in unemployment. Moreover, the Belfast Trades Council attempted to call a General Strike on the 12th October, but a few days later order had been restored by the authorities and the search for the communist agents who were suspected of agitating for the strike also began. The skilled working-class of Belfast were susceptible to such overtures at this time because they felt vulnerable; the economic depression had hit industrial areas particularly badly, and it also seemed as if the Free State was actively preparing an attempt to absorb unionist Ulster. The end of 1932 saw de Valera flexing his new political authority: within the Free State the split with the IRA became apparent after several confrontations between IRA marches and the police, baton charges often being used by the police; outwith the Free State de Valera precipitated stalemate over import duty negotiations with Britain. De Valera was testing the political climate with these acts of brinkmanship.

After convincingly retaining power in the Free State elections in January 1933, de Valera felt confident enough to introduce three separate constitutional Bills to the Dail in August of the same year. These Bills were designed to bring an Irish republic a step nearer, involving the severing of all links with the British Crown and a new constitution. Furthermore, de Valera expressed his desire for another election to approve the new constitutional arrangements. Needless to say, de Valera’s proposals met with a cool response from the British government, who issued a statement,
entitled “THE PROTECTION OF ULSTER” which advised against any constitutional changes. In Ulster itself, the proposals were met with deep anxiety and the authorities there responded by prohibiting the display of republican flags and emblems.

In Scotland, the influence of de Valera’s democratic republicanism was a factor in the foundation of the Scottish Republican Party in February 1933. The party had its headquarters in Inverkeithing in Fife, and its initial programme owed much to the original agenda of Sinn Fein in Ireland. As far as the broader movement for Scottish nationalism was concerned, the early 1930s held mixed fortunes. Success was achieved with the election of Compton Mackenzie as Rector of Glasgow University in October 1931, but the NPS itself had a poor showing in the General Election of the same year with the National Government being understandably re-elected with a large majority. A Scottish self-government conference in September 1932 was not altogether popular either; the Glasgow Herald in particular opposing the idea of self-government strongly, arguing that Scotland had had more advantages than disadvantages from the Union. After this mauling, Unionists in Scotland felt confident enough to declare in January 1933 that there was a “waning interest” in Scottish nationalism. It was more a case of nationalists in Scotland licking their wounds. Since the early 1930s the NPS had become progressively weakened by internal divisions. The so-called fundamentalists, who advocated an entirely independent Scotland free from imperial concerns, came more and more into conflict with the moderate wing of the party who believed this stance was seeing off potential votes. The moderates desired a more positive image which would improve relations with England. Both factions blamed the other for the party’s inability to achieve an electoral breakthrough, and the squabbling only served to disillusion ordinary party members.
Furthermore, the creation of the right-wing Scottish Party by establishment figures in the summer of 1932 heralded the inevitable split in the NPS which came at the party’s annual conference of 1933. The fundamentalist wing was expelled by the moderates to facilitate greater cooperation between the NPS and the Scottish Party which led eventually to the creation of the SNP in April 1934. The Scottish Republican Party mentioned above became the new focus for many of these expelled radicals. Others moved into the Scottish Defence Force, a radical militaristic organisation which desired complete separation from England and had links with the IRA. Strategy meetings were held in Glasgow during the summer of 1933 at which a number of ‘leading officials’ of the Irish republican movement in Scotland gave advice. Statements such as “we must be prepared to go out and do what Ireland has done; we must be prepared to make sacrifices” caused the authorities to monitor the organisation but it never seems to have been regarded very seriously. It seems clear that the newly formed SNP was trying to come to terms with the modern Scottish political landscape of the post-Depression era. Those who drifted into the Scottish Republican Party or Scottish Defence Force became marginalised, and any Irish influence on Scottish nationalism declined as a result. The SNP in the late 1930s and beyond looked instead to Westminster, and not to Ireland, in their campaign for Scottish self-government.

The IRA had regenerated itself as a focus for opposition to the Irish Free State and, at its peak between 1932 and 1934, it had around 10,000 members in total. Two successive General Army Conventions in 1933 and 1934 highlighted a figure of 12,000 members. However, de Valera’s populist republicanism began to satisfy most Irish republicans and the IRA began to split due to internal political turmoil. The 1930s had an increasingly conservative atmosphere in Ireland and the Catholic Church, now
reconciled to Fianna Fail, would not tolerate the IRA’s dangerous radicalism. Brian Hanley has noted that by 1936, as a consequence, “its increasingly desperate tactics had largely marginalised the IRA from broader republicanism”\textsuperscript{11}.

The leading industrialists, businessmen and landowners of Scotland, as Unionists, feared Scottish nationalism might capture widespread popular support during what they saw as a temporary economic crisis. As they had shown with their activity against Irish Home Rule, they were adept at negative campaigning and began to work in a similar manner once more. To a certain extent, the renewed debate on Scottish self-government and nationalism followed the anti-Irish immigration furore that was effectively concluded after the results of the 1931 census were published. These results showed that only 54,854 persons born in Ireland were then resident in Scotland, a further fall since 1921 and a total refutation of the main claims and arguments of the Presbyterian churches\textsuperscript{12}. However, and perhaps unsurprisingly, their anti-Catholic campaign staggered on until 1939. Certainly, the Scottish Office did continue to examine Irish immigration carefully, but not with any great enthusiasm after 1935\textsuperscript{13}.

With only around 1% of the Scottish population actually Irish-born by the 1930s, why did the anti-Irish campaign continue for so long? The answer is that the Presbyterian churches never really distinguished between those of Irish birth or those of Irish extraction in their campaign. Whether they would not or could not differentiate between the two is irrelevant; in their minds the Scots-Irish community was a foreign entity and they felt justified in their hostility towards it. Moreover, the powerful forces behind Unionism in Scotland were very good at mobilising and shaping Protestant opinion in campaigns like this as they had so much experience of doing so for several generations. Scots-Irish communities more or less ceased to be referred to incorrectly as ‘Irish’ and were referred to only as ‘Catholic’.
Needless to say, it was not so easy to maintain a campaign of open religious intolerance after it had become reasonably clear that the Presbyterian churches were guilty of bias and exaggeration. Most Protestant Scots supported the Union, and ‘Home Rule’ was something they were used to rejecting; it always had strong Irish associations and was therefore suspect and opposed. Michael Rosie has described the anti-Catholic campaigns of the 1920s and 1930s as “the final kick, rather than the peak of ‘Protestantism before Politics’ populism”\textsuperscript{14}. It is easy to stereotype the Protestant churches as a whole, but these campaigns, although officially sanctioned, had marginal national influence. The quest for a regenerated ethnic identity was something that most Protestants, who were not militant, eschewed in favour of a class-based identity and political participation through the labour movement. Scotland did not have the “major secular cleavages” that existed in Ulster, and Rosie is right to draw attention to the limitations of the militant Protestant vote\textsuperscript{15}, but the important point, surely, is that there was still such a thing as a Protestant vote in 1930s Scotland.

The IRA newspaper *An Poblacht* issued a call to arms at the beginning of 1934\textsuperscript{16}. It called on all true republicans to prepare themselves to sever the link with the British Crown. This provoked what few Irish loyalists there were in the Free State to begin to organise against the possibility of an Irish republic\textsuperscript{17}. Help was offered to them from Ulster and from Scotland. De Valera responded by declaring that Ireland was entitled to its freedom, and would not be willing to look on the question of trade and import agreements favourably unless Ireland’s case had a sympathetic hearing\textsuperscript{18}. Concurrently, the Scottish Home Rule Commission was visiting Ulster and the Free State on a fact-finding mission to establish the benefits of self-government and to learn how each system operated\textsuperscript{19}. The delegation actually met with de Valera who was anxious to promote Irish-Scottish
relations\textsuperscript{20}. No doubt de Valera was also happy to acknowledge the debt the Irish republican movement owed to Scotland.

All this must be placed within the context of the IRA split of 1934 that led to the emergence of the Republican Congress. Many historians have viewed the Republican Congress as a socialist organisation, similar in some ways to Saor Eire, but as Richard English and Brian Hanley have argued, the truth is a little more complex. In January 1934 the IRA published a pamphlet titled ‘Constitution and governmental programme for the Republic of Ireland’ stating that the document proposed its “ultimate aims and ideals”\textsuperscript{21}, which were a mixture of gaelicism, separatism, republican militarism and radical social ambitions. Richard English has demonstrated that the commitment to public ownership was tempered, as both personal and private property were unambiguously allowed\textsuperscript{22}. He notes also that there definitely existed a sincere commitment to communalism (as opposed to communism) within sections of the IRA which can be traced back as far as the writings of Patrick Pearse\textsuperscript{23}. The socialist aspects of the programme can be traced back to the writings of James Connolly, who saw the causes of Irish nationalism and Irish labour as inseparable\textsuperscript{24}. However, as English has rightly observed: “Republicanism was only a socialist faith if you were a socialist republican”\textsuperscript{25}. The Congress could not convert the IRA, so it split in September 1934 and thus divided the militant republican movement. The events of 1934 illustrate the discord between a socialist republicanism advocating class war, and a gaelicist, militaristic separatism which utilised the language of communalism. In the words of Richard English: “the majority of the IRA were shown to belong to the tribe of Pearse rather than the tribe of Connolly”\textsuperscript{26}.

It appears that the IRA ‘call to arms’ was being answered in Scotland at the beginning of 1935, as several cases of illegal possession of explosives were then prosecuted\textsuperscript{27}. In Ireland itself, increasing tension over the economic
climate motivated the proposal of a bridge or tunnel to be built between Scotland and Ireland to alleviate unemployment. The scheme met with a lukewarm response in Scotland, and even caused the issue of ‘cheap Irish labour’ to be resurrected with questions in the House of Commons. They all met with the same response: there were fewer Irish in Scotland in 1931 than there were in 1921, and the overall trend was declining. Easter Rising celebrations were again banned in Belfast but religious rivalry and friction caused many disturbances there between April and July. In Glasgow, Orange Order processions caused severe disturbances in the Gorbals, Gallowgate and Shettleston areas of the city, and seemed more than the usual ‘marching season’ hostilities. Serious anti-Catholic disturbances also occurred in Edinburgh in 1935 which were the work of the militant Protestant Action Society, and showed that there was still support for anti-Catholic campaigns. There is surprisingly little detail in *The Scotsman* on the sectarian riots, but they were referred to as “a public menace.” It is interesting to note, however, that the authorities regarded John Cormack as responsible for the riots and official documents stress something the newspapers did not report – Cormack served in the Black and Tans in Ireland until 1921.

By 1936 the possibility of another major European war seemed very real, and preparations for such an eventuality were well in hand. Maurice Twomey, the IRA Chief of Staff, called the League of Nations “a snare for smaller nations” and urged republicans to fight against England trying to ‘include’ Ireland in any forthcoming war. The IRA had been vying with Fianna Fail for the support of republicans ever since de Valera gained power in 1931, and had retained the support of only the most diehard physical force republicans in both Ireland and Scotland.

The Bills that de Valera had introduced to the Dail in 1933 eventually came to fruition in May of 1937. The constitutional relationship the Free State
had with the British Crown came more or less to an end. The new constitution of Eire made explicit what was implicit before: that de Valera had always envisaged the separate self-government of Ireland. The new state of Eire inevitably provoked political controversy. Opinion in Scotland was equivocal – most Protestant Scots regarded the transition as acceptable as long as Eire did not interfere with the status quo in Ulster. In Northern Ireland, the authorities there took great care in stressing that the south had no power over the north and that they were anxious to reaffirm their loyalty to the British Crown. No negotiations took place between Britain and the Irish Free State, and this provoked several questions in both Houses of Parliament over the relationship Britain now had, if any, with Eire. The status of Irish-born loyalists in Eire was again raised but quietly forgotten about. The most important and controversial issue was undoubtedly that the new constitution of Eire laid claim to all of Ireland, not just the territory previously known as the Irish Free State. In a broadcast speech in December 1937, de Valera emphatically declared that Eire was a reality, and robustly defended the right of the Irish people to their freedom. Eire was a stepping-stone in his long game, and de Valera knew that he could not declare a republic in 1937; he also knew that the British would take some time to get used to such a change, but at the same time was aware of the realisation in Britain that the south of Ireland had been going its own way since 1922. The Free State had taken most of Ireland out of the United Kingdom, with a status similar to that of Canada within the Commonwealth. The new constitution of Eire was something of a halfway-house between this status and an Irish republic.

Elections in Eire in January 1938 confirmed the constitutional changes as permanent and consolidated the dominant position of Fianna Fail in Irish politics. De Valera was seen as a “dictator” by the unionist press in Scotland; and he responded by calling for an end to the partition between
north and south in Ireland, prophetically stating that “a divided Ireland would be a permanent menace”\(^41\). This statement caused the authorities in Northern Ireland to increase their security measures; so much so that republican demonstrations in Belfast in May 1938 at the graves of IRA men and United Irishmen saw armoured cars and a heavily armed police presence ensuring that there were no incidents\(^42\). De Valera further exacerbated the political situation by announcing, in November 1938, that citizens of Eire were not eligible to be conscripted in any forthcoming war that Britain may be involved in. The impact of these statements was limited by the public preoccupation with events on the continent and, in this sense, de Valera had chosen his time carefully and intelligently.

1938 also saw the tenth anniversary of the National Party of Scotland (SNP since 1934) which held a conference at the McLellan Galleries in Glasgow, where members claimed responsibility for creating a “National Consciousness”\(^43\). Needless to say, this claim was only their interpretation of events. The SNP had developed the nationalist cause in Scotland by establishing an actual political party with Scottish self-government as their aim; but a Scottish ‘national consciousness’ of sorts had persisted since 1707. The vigour of the movement for Irish Home Rule which began in the nineteenth century encouraged nationalist Scots to ride the coat-tails of this movement and demand Home Rule for Scotland. Many attempts and disparate organisations had been unsuccessful in securing even a measure of devolution for Scotland because a significantly national demand for Home Rule did not exist. This is best explained as Scots feeling better off in the Union than out of it, as well as being concerned with other issues they saw as having greater priority. The SNP’s aims were stated just as vaguely as the NPS’s to avoid controversy. However, the issue of the imperial ideal dogged the party repeatedly until the Second World War. From about 1935, the SNP began to fragment into opposing factions. As collective
security deteriorated in Europe many nationalists saw imperialism as the cause, and were reluctant to be part of a war to maintain the British Empire. As Richard J Finlay has noted, the SNP’s anti-war campaign was “inextricably linked to a belief that somehow British imperialism was a major factor in creating international tension”\textsuperscript{44}. Many rejected the imperial ideal as outmoded and indefensible, and believed that Scotland had ultimately suffered from her connection with it. Similar to the experience of Sinn Fein in Ireland, these radical Scottish nationalists tried to forge a particular national identity in the hope of gaining popular support as more traditional methods were eclipsed. The SNP did create a party political focus for Scottish nationalists, but there were always other conduits: the Scottish Self-Government Federation, founded in May 1937; and the Labour Council for Scottish Self-Government, founded in April 1938 are good examples of more radical organisations\textsuperscript{45}.

Although de Valera chose his time well to introduce constitutional changes in Eire he could never successfully control the IRA, which had gone underground in the mid-1920s. In Scotland, any reports to the police concerning IRA activity were still thoroughly investigated\textsuperscript{46}. Indeed, the IRA leadership had threatened in April 1939 to initiate a war on English soil\textsuperscript{47}. The following month, when the British government was organising the details of probable conscription, the IRA denounced the concept of conscription and called on all its units to be ready for action. In reality, the British government had purposely excluded the whole of Ireland from its Conscription Bill to try to avoid potential trouble, but still upset loyalists in Ulster\textsuperscript{48}. It was clear by 1939 that if war came, the civilian population would be affected much more than at any time before, and the British government just could not afford a similar anti-conscription campaign to that organised in Ireland by Sinn Fein during the First World War. This renewed vigour from the IRA resulted in the government of Eire banning
the organisation outright in June 1939. The IRA responded by declaring war on England and, in a statement published from New York, declared that “British air defences are at the mercy of Irishmen”. The British government slowly woke up to the danger the IRA posed to any future war effort, and began a “careful examination” of the IRA threat as an “urgent matter” in July 1939.

Smuggled IRA pamphlets were discovered by Scotland Yard which claimed responsibility for past unresolved bombings, and referred also to future action. This action was initiated in the IRA Army Order for Britain, issued in July 1939. The order gave the “opportunity to serve Ireland”, and motivated the British government to rush through the Prevention of Violence (Temporary Provisions) Act, which resulted in several deportations after its introduction at the end of July 1939. There were protestations about the legality of this Act, as there had been with the deportations in 1923, but the authorities emphasised the “new direction” of the IRA from 1926 onwards and stressed the importance of national security. An indication of IRA policy came from Sean Russell, the acknowledged IRA commander, speaking in the USA in August 1939: “The Civil War ended in Ireland in December 1938…the only enemy we have now is England”. The IRA began to concentrate their efforts on mainland Britain, at a time when they knew that the British government was vulnerable to their type of guerrilla activity. In Scotland, the police were ordered to “keep close watch on movements of Irishmen”, as well as reporting any suspect explosions, search for hidden IRA weapons dumps and keep lists of all IRA suspects. The English Commissioner of Police responded by asking all hotels and guest houses to report all suspicious Irish persons. When the Second World War broke out at the beginning of September 1939, the government of Eire quickly declared its neutrality and introduced extensive powers to detain known IRA men for the duration of
the war for “activities prejudicial to the state”\textsuperscript{60}. At any rate, the activities of the IRA throughout the war did not prove to be particularly significant. The police were instructed to continue watching Irishmen and search for hidden explosives well into 1940\textsuperscript{61}, but their only real success was in May 1939 with the discovery of some explosives in the offices of the Celtic Literary Society at 132 Trongate, Glasgow\textsuperscript{62}. This indicates that, despite dwindling support, the IRA in Scotland was still attempting to supply explosives for ‘the cause’ long after many historians have dismissed their input altogether. Yet this thesis has established that Scottish IRA units outperformed all other British units put together in the supply of arms, men and the provision of safe refuge since the early 1920s; and this evidence would suggest that this state of affairs continued until the Second World War, at least in ambition if not in execution.

In fact, Sean Russell had been trying to organise a bombing campaign in England since 1936 with the assistance of Clan na Gael funds from the USA\textsuperscript{63}. Russell represented ‘the tribe of Pearse’, and was arguably more extreme than most militant republicans. He thought in uncomplicated terms and saw undiluted militarism as a return to traditional IRA activities after a period of political experimentation with Saor Eire, the Republican Congress and Cumann Poblachta na-h-Eireann. In reality, the proposed introduction of conscription was just the catalyst which precipitated a series of explosions culminating in a bomb which killed five and injured many others in Coventry on the 25\textsuperscript{th} August 1939. In total, around 130 incidents related to the IRA were recorded by the end of 1939\textsuperscript{64}, and these incidents only generated much anti-republican sentiment throughout Britain. Richard English rightly draws attention to the “enormous gulf” between the IRA and Fianna Fail by 1939, and describes the “solipsistic quality of mind” within the IRA which failed to recognise that the populist republicanism of Fianna Fail had been embraced by public opinion\textsuperscript{65}. The
IRA, including their dwindling supporters in Scotland, were easily marginalised because their intransigence would not allow them to view any political alternatives as valid. As Richard English puts it: “for republican zealots in this period, self effectively became confused with nation; when describing the supposed qualities, ideals and aspirations of the Irish nation, they were in fact merely describing their own”66.

The period between 1932 and 1939 saw a change in the relationship between Britain and Ireland. Both the Irish Free State and the government of Northern Ireland attempted to consolidate their positions and, in the case of the Irish Free State, altered its constitutional status to become Eire in 1937. This transition to Eire was largely managed by Eamonn de Valera, President of the Irish Free State from 1930. He took the opportunity that Michael Collins had negotiated in 1921 to bring an Irish republic closer in 1937. These constitutional changes were regarded equivocally in Scotland; most Scots accepted the new status of the south of Ireland as long as the south did not attempt to interfere with the north of Ireland. The constitution of Eire did lay claim to all of Ireland, but this fact was overshadowed at the time by other events in Europe.

Internal divisions between fundamentalists and moderates within the NPS in the early 1930s eventually led to the creation of the SNP in 1934. The SNP did establish a party political focus for moderate Scottish nationalists, but the fundamentalists or radical Scottish nationalists, in a similar way to the origins of Sinn Fein in Ireland, forged their own particular national identity and did gain some popular support.

Although the 1931 census showed a further fall from 1921 in Irish-born residents in Scotland, the anti-Catholic campaign of the Scottish Presbyterian churches continued until 1939. Militant groups like Protestant Action in Edinburgh were keen to instigate anti-Catholic riots to perpetuate
hostility towards the Scots-Irish community in Scotland. Lawlessness in Ireland and the renewed campaigns of the IRA on the British mainland from around 1931 had impacts on Scotland, but these were limited due to economic and political uncertainty throughout Europe.

In conclusion, the impact of Irish nationalism on Scotland in the period between 1932 and 1939 was varied and complex. A crucial factor is the significance the contemporary actors attached to events at the time. Contrasting the reactions to the establishment of Eire, the continued anti-Catholic campaign and the renewed activities of the IRA, it is clear that anything perceived to have been threatening Scotland or Protestant Unionism directly had considerable psychological impact. This was a time of deep economic uncertainty, when many believed Scotland was a declining nation within an insecure imperial ideal. Anti-Catholic and anti-Irish prejudices had become constants in Scottish society at a time when racial and religious intolerance had dangerous parallels elsewhere in Europe. It must be stressed, though, that Scottish society did not stray too far down the fascist path. Political violence amid street politics was much more common in the 1930s than it is today, and the PAS and SPL never glorified violence in the same way that fascist movements of the period did elsewhere in Europe. As one historian has noted, militant Protestantism was really conservative, not revolutionary\textsuperscript{67}, but did flirt with fascism as did the IRA in the 1930s and beyond\textsuperscript{68}.
1) GH, 12 October 1932, 11f. See also WALKER, ‘Intimate Strangers’

2) GH, 12 November 1932, 11c; 14 November, 11d. See also COOGAN, ‘The IRA’, chapter 3.

3) See GH, 5 December 1932, 9f; 6 December 1933, 11d-f.

4) GH, 11 February 1933, 10g.

5) ibid. See also FINLAY, op. cit., (IR42, 1991)

6) See GH, 3 January 1933, leader; 11 January, 13e.


8) NAS, HH/1/798. File on Scottish Defence Force.

9) HANLEY, op. cit., p.16.

10) UCDA, Twomey Papers, P69/187 (95) for 1933 & MacEntee Papers, P69/525 for 1934 GAC.


12) See GH, 8 December 1933, 7b and Appendix II.
13) NAS, HH/1/574. There were slight increases in Irish immigration in 1935, 1936 and 1937, but the files get thinner and thinner on the subject. See also BROWN, op. cit.

14) ROSIE, op. cit., p.143.

15) ibid.

16) See GH, 13 January 1934, 9d. See also An Poblacht, 12 January 1934.

17) GH, 7 May 1934, 13a. See also WALKER, op. cit.

18) See GH, 26 May 1934, 11c; 28 May, 9c. See also COOGAN, op. cit.

19) See GH, 14 July 1934, 3e; 16 July, 11d.

20) GH, 17 July 1934, 11d.

21) UCDA, Coyle O’Donnell Papers, P61/11(1) has a copy in good condition.


23) ibid, p.52. See also PEARSE, ‘The Sovereign People’, 1916, pp.3-6.

24) See Worker’s Republic, 8 April 1916, for example.

25) ENGLISH, op. cit., p.57.

26) ibid, p.64.

27) GH, 21 January 1935, 9c, for example.
28) GH, 5 March 1935, 7e.

29) GH, 22 May 1935, 10a.


31) GH, 8 July 1935, 9c. See also MARSHALL, ‘The Billy Boys’.

32) SM, 26 June 1935.

33) NAS, HH/1/777. See also GALLAGHER, ‘Edinburgh Divided’.

34) GH, 13 April 1936, 9c. See also COOGAN, op. cit.

35) See GH, 1 May 1937, 11f, 12f and leader.

36) ibid. See also GALLAGHER & WALKER, ‘Sermons and Battle Hymns’.

37) GH, 7 May 1937, 8g.

38) GH, 9 August 1937, 10g. Interestingly, the Labour Party in Northern Ireland, at their annual conference in 1937, rejected calls for Irish unity.

39) See GH, 30 December 1937, 9a and leader. See also COOGAN, op. cit.

40) GH, 11 January 1938, leader, for example.

41) GH, 5 February 1938, 13d.

42) GH, 18 April 1938, 7d. See also COOGAN, op. cit.
43) GH, 7 April 1938, 3c.


45) See GH, 29 May 1937, 9a; 25 April 1938, 11a. See also MITCHELL, ‘Strategies for Self-Government’.

46) NAS, HH/55/76.

47) GH, 10 April 1939, 4f. See also COOGAN, op. cit.

48) GH, 5 May 1939, 6d, 13a and leader.

49) GH, 24 June 1939, 11c. See also COOGAN, op. cit.

50) See GH, 28 June 1939, 13a. The references to Britain as England is a distinction Irish republicans have always made. This has already been discussed in Chapter I.

51) GH, 7 July 1939, 6b. See also COOGAN, op. cit.

52) See GH, 10 July 1939, 6f; 17 July, 7c. See also COOGAN, op. cit.

53) ibid.

54) See GH, 29 July 1939, 9a. The forerunner of the current Prevention of Terrorism Acts.

55) NAS, HH/55/657. See also HANLEY, op. cit.

56) GH, 15 August 1939, 10f. See also COOGAN, op. cit.
57) NAS, HH/52/17, no.3469.

58) ibid, nos. 3465, 3533, 3656.

59) ibid and also GH, 30 August 1939, 11e.

60) See GH, 4 September 1939, 13b; 16 September, 2f, 8a. See also COOGAN, op. cit.

61) NAS, HH/55/751/

62) NAS, HH/55/660.

63) NLI, McGarrity Papers, MS17485.

64) HANSARD 5 (Commons), cccl, 1049-50 (1939).


66) ibid, p.438.

67) ROSIE, op. cit., p.137.

68) HANLEY, op. cit., pp.184-5 for IRA links to Nazi Germany during the Second World War.
Chapter VI: Conclusions

There can be little doubt that Irish nationalism had an impact on Scotland between 1898 and 1939. After the failure of the Home Rule Bills of 1886 and 1893, the influence of republicanism grew as the influence of the Irish and Liberal parties began to wane. In Scotland the movement for Scottish Home Rule began to intensify after 1900, and this was as a direct influence of Irish Home Rule agitation through the likes of the UIL. Fears for the future of Ulster motivated many Scottish Protestants to view moves for Scottish Home Rule as a mere decoy for Irish Home Rule which would inevitably lead to an Irish republic, and so had to be resisted. The likes of the Ancient Order of Hibernians, IRB and Sinn Fein became very publicly active in Scotland from around 1905 onwards, drawing steady support from the Scots-Irish communities, particularly in the west of central Scotland.

The problem of integrating an increasingly militant religious minority in the north with the rest of Ireland’s Home Rule aspirations came to a head in 1911 when large Protestant demonstrations against Home Rule took place in Ulster and Scotland, and ultimately led to the signing of ‘Ulster’s Solemn League and Covenant’ in September 1912, echoing the tradition of the Scottish League and Covenant from 1643. Sympathisers of both Ulster Unionists and Irish Republicans in Scotland became the most regular suppliers of arms, ammunition and explosives as well as men for ‘duty’ in Ireland.

The outbreak of the First World War in 1914 signalled the eclipse of mainstream or ‘Westminster’ Irish nationalism and the ascendancy of Sinn Fein and republicanism. A new generation had grown frustrated with
constitutionalism and moral force that failed in 1886 and again in 1893. Irish republicanism was treated with fear and suspicion by many Protestant Scots who directed these emotions at the Scots-Irish in their midst. As most Irish immigrant communities were Roman Catholic, anti-Catholic prejudice became even more widespread that it had been in the previous century. The immigrant Irish were stereotyped as disloyal and republican, always conspiring to overthrow the Protestant faith and monarchy. Unionist newspapers manipulated public opinion along these lines, and the Church of Scotland collaborated with particular zeal. Even though support for Irish republicanism was not yet that strong, the fear of it amongst many Protestant Scots was significantly palpable.

The Easter Rising of 1916 changed everything. The repressive counter-measures taken by the British government backfired and the constitutional path to Irish nationhood met a dead-end. Although the war itself initially strengthened ties to the union in Scotland, the supply of weapons and explosives to the IRA actually intensified into the 1920s. The British authorities redoubled their intelligence efforts but support for Sinn Fein grew steadily until there were more active members in Scotland than in the whole of England. So much so that weekly reports on Sinn Fein and IRA activity in Scotland were discussed regularly at Cabinet level. Such activity was concentrated in the central belt, but particularly in the west around Glasgow. This was mainly due to the size of the Scots-Irish community there and, of course, its close geographical proximity to Ireland which made it ideal as a supply and training centre for the IRA. Although the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 split the Scots-Irish community in Scotland, with the majority supporting the Free State position and rejecting further conflict, the IRA could always rely on some support from Scotland well into the 1930s. It is clear, however, that the bloody conflict in Ireland between the IRA and British forces made most Scots desire some sort of
lasting settlement. Even Protestant Scots were happy with the Free State as long as it excluded (most of) Ulster.

The continued IRA activity in Scotland after 1922, albeit less intense, led to the authorities deporting IRA suspects and sympathisers to the Free State in 1923, and surveillance of groups with Irish connections continued into the 1930s. The historiography of this period has tended to polarise on the issue of the strength of the IRA and the extent of its activities in Scotland. Historians like Handley and Gallagher have tended to exaggerate IRA membership in Scotland and the amount of assistance given to republicans in Ireland. Moreover, historians like Hart and Patterson have tended to minimise the strength of the IRA in Scotland and denigrate their activities. The truth is somewhere in the middle. This thesis accepts that, apart from a brief period between 1919 and 1921, support for Irish republicanism was minimal within most Scots-Irish communities in Scotland. It is also correct to state that violent acts perpetrated by the IRA in Scotland were rare. However, in ‘supply activity’ or acts of robbery to acquire arms, munitions and explosives, Scottish IRA units performed very well when compared to their English counterparts. Despite many incidents of feuding and factionalism, the Scottish contingent of the IRA still managed to play a significant role as a supply centre for Irish republicanism, and this should not be diminished or dismissed as it often has been in comparison to strength of numbers or acts of violence. There has been something of a republican pedigree in Scotland since 1798, and it was arguably the centenary of that rebellion that rekindled this phase of Irish republican activity on both sides of the Irish Sea.

To focus solely on the impact of Irish nationalism in relation to the Scots-Irish would be to miss the point entirely, however. There can be little doubt that the main impact was on those Scots who were not Catholic. Most Protestant Scots genuinely believed, to varying extents, that Irish
republicanism was a serious threat and danger to them in this period. They were fed this myth through the unionist-dominated press, and would have also been aware of the anti-Catholic campaigns of the Church of Scotland as well as the activities of the PAS and SPL. The economic problems caused by reconstruction at the end of the First World War hit Scotland particularly hard. Scotland depended too much on traditional or heavy industries which began to decline due to a combination of lack of investment, increasing foreign competition and poor labour relations. As many contemporary observers predicted the ‘end’ of Scotland and the Imperial ideal, the Presbyterian churches and the Church of Scotland in particular, began to focus on the ‘problem’ of Irish immigration to Scotland. They argued that there was a massive, unchecked and regular influx of Irish into Scotland which, if unchallenged, would result in Protestant Scots losing their jobs and the ultimate contamination of the pure Scots ‘race’. Although this seems like scapegoating nonsense today, it was taken very seriously indeed in the 1920s and 1930s. Influential figures within the Presbyterian churches saw themselves as a bulwark against the Irish ‘menace’, and campaigned viciously against the ‘Irish’ in Scotland. What they were really campaigning against was the healthy growth of the Roman Catholic community within Scotland. In reality, the vast majority of Catholics in Scotland by the 1920s had been born in Scotland and were therefore Scottish. It was more the fact that most were of Irish extraction and Roman Catholic that so enraged the Presbyterian churches. It is important to emphasise that the belief that Irish republicans were dangerously active within Scotland was still very real throughout the 1920s, amongst those with most to fear from it or with most to gain from perpetuating that fear. The result was that this racial antagonism and religious prejudice caused many Protestant Scots to regard the Scots-Irish as not truly Scottish; it fuelled religious violence and held back social
integration, the lasting effects of which are still felt today, and not just between Catholics and Protestants. There are lessons to be learned about integrating minority ethnic or religious groups from the interwar period that could inform relations between Christians and Muslims in British society today, for example.

The success of the Irish Free State was one of the main causes of the foundation of the National Party of Scotland in 1928. There was perhaps an opportunity for Scotland to emulate Ireland and achieve at least some form of devolution but popular support was curtailed by Unionist Party propaganda, a largely unionist media and the anti-Catholic campaigns of the Church of Scotland which did not allow any Scottish political or social unity to establish or endure. The new repository of Scots-Irish votes, however, was the Labour Party which actively sought the votes of these communities in the central belt of Scotland after the ‘Irish Question’ appeared to be settled in 1921. The growth of the Labour Party also led to the steady decline of the Liberal Party which would never form a government again without such support. These Scots-Irish voters had been politicised by the Irish nationalist struggle for Home Rule and therefore played a significant part in the development of the Labour Party in the 1920s and beyond; particularly in local government, as issues like housing, education and employment began to dominate their political agenda.

Perhaps another indicator of impact was the rightwards shift that characterised the Scottish press in the interwar period. The vast majority of daily newspapers became solidly Unionist in the 1920s, causing many Liberal papers to disappear altogether or merge with a Unionist stable. Ultimately this led to the increased participation of Scots-Irish communities in Labour politics as an alternative to political introversion. Reaction to this growing political and social advancement goes a long way to explaining the ‘Kirk’s Disgrace’ and the activities of the PAS and SPL. The
Labour Party had to check its initial radicalism towards Irish issues so that Catholic votes could be relied on, and this in turn led to Protestant voters trusting Labour with their social and economic interests. Green and Orange, to paraphrase Iain Patterson, combined to produce a pale shade of Red\(^1\). The 1920s and 1930s were much more polarised and impoverished than today, and perhaps we look back and see a sectarian society when in fact there was no ‘systematic discrimination’ of the Scots-Irish or Roman Catholics per se. Prejudice and bigotry were certainly present, and are best viewed as symptoms of the search for new identities in the interwar period. As Michael Rosie has put it: “...the universal franchise, the rise of Labour and radical street politics of left and right. The seemingly inexorable drift back to war; churches emptied by poverty; the unparalleled freedom and attraction of mass leisure: these were the defining features of the period”\(^2\).

The 1931 census proved that Irish immigration to Scotland was negligible and declining, but the Church of Scotland simply substituted ‘Catholic’ for ‘Irish’ and continued its campaign right up until 1939. This was in part due to the Depression causing even more economic upheaval in the 1930s. The creation of the SNP in 1934 shows that supporters of Scottish Home Rule wanted to enter the mainstream but without the radical tendencies and affiliations of groups like the Scottish Republican Party (1933) and the Scottish Defence Force (1934); both of which were committed to a Scottish republic and received advice from Irish republicans. Weapons and explosives began to be shipped between Scotland and Ireland again from around 1935, which shows that there were still enough IRA sympathisers in Scotland to offer at least some assistance. The new constitution of Eire, established in 1937, laid claim to the entire island of Ireland but passed without much comment in Scotland at the time because of the preoccupation with events elsewhere in Europe. Nonetheless, by 1939 the British government saw the IRA as a real threat again and began to step up
their surveillance and intelligence efforts to levels only previously seen in the early 1920s.

Many of the public records examined during research for this thesis were being made available for the first time, particularly so in the National Archives of Scotland. The bulk of these records, from the NAS and PRO especially, are either Special Branch intelligence reports or secret and confidential police circulars. These sources do show the official mind but many if not all of these were written from an alarmist point of view which compromises their value as historical evidence to a certain extent. However, after examining these sources in detail, there is no doubt that the British government took the threat from Ireland very seriously indeed, particularly in the 1920s, and their exaggerations should not lessen their indication of impact overall. All of the most interesting or valuable sources are detailed in the bibliography of this thesis to encourage further examination and debate on this topic.

In conclusion, the impact of Irish nationalism on Scotland had its many different aspects: the organisation of IRA supply and training activity; the military and intelligence responses from the British government; the reaction of the Protestant churches, and the anti-Irish or anti-Catholic campaigns of the Church of Scotland in particular; the influence on the movement for Scottish Home Rule and the founding of a nationalist political party with the NPS in 1928; and the electoral benefits enjoyed by the Labour Party from an already politicised ‘Irish’ vote. This mixture of both positive and negative effects demonstrates a deep impact made on Scotland during a transitional period of economic adjustment amid continuing urbanisation. It was in the industrial towns and cities of central Scotland that this impact was most keenly felt, on both sides of the religious divide, and thus presents itself as an underlying cause of the continuing religious bigotry felt, particularly in the west, of central
Scotland to this day. For the historian, the discrepancy between the popular image and the reality of the impact of Irish nationalism on Scotland suggests that new approaches are needed if we are to fully appreciate the true nature and development of our own Scottish national consciousness.
Chapter VI: Notes

1) PATTERSON, MPhil thesis, p.360.

2) ROSIE, op. cit., p.6.
Appendix I: List of abbreviations used in the text

AOH  Ancient Order of Hibernians
CSS  Catholic Socialist Society
DOI  Directorate of Intelligence
GAA  Gaelic Athletic Association
ICA  Irish Citizen Army
ILP  Independent Labour Party
IRA  Irish Republican Army
IRB  Irish Republican Brotherhood
ISDL Irish Self-Determination League
NPS  National Party of Scotland
PAS  Protestant Action Society
RIC  Royal Irish Constabulary
SHRA Scottish Home Rule Association
SDF  Scottish Defence Force
SPL  Scottish Protestant League
SNL  Scottish National League
SNM  Scots National Movement
UIL  United Irish League
UVF  Ulster Volunteer Force
Appendix II: Irish Immigration to Scotland, 1900 – 1920

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Immigrants</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
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<td>1919</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above table shows the number of immigrants from the Irish provinces of Leinster, Munster and Connaught to Scotland. The total figure comes to 3655.

From the province of Ulster in the same period the total is much higher: 17,327. This shows that the vast majority of Irish immigrants to Scotland were from Ulster [Official statistics of immigration shown in Handley, The Irish in Scotland, (1947), p.341]. By way of comparison, the total figure of Irish immigration to Scotland in 1876 was 8807 [ibid, p.339 (1876 was the first year of publication)].

The census of 1911 showed 174,715 Irish-born persons in Scotland, falling to 159,020 in the census of 1921 and 124,000 in the census of 1931 [ibid, p.340].
Appendix III: Chronology of modern Irish political history

1541: Henry VIII declares himself King of Ireland as well as England
1559-1560: Reformation overthrows papal authority and establishes Protestantism
1603: James I and VI unites the crowns of England and Scotland
1608-1610: The Plantation of predominantly Scottish Protestant settlers in Ulster
1641-1652: The Great Rebellion by the dispossessed Catholic Irish is brutally suppressed by the Parliamentary forces under Cromwell and Catholic share of the land is reduced from 67% to less than 25%
1660: The Restoration – Charles II allows a tolerant religious atmosphere
1685: James II succeeds Charles II and attempts to reverse the Protestant ascendancy
1688: The Catholic James II is replaced with the Protestant William I by revolution
1690-1691: Battles at the Boyne and Aughrim give victory to William of Orange
1703: The Williamite settlement reduces Catholic share of the land from 22% to 15%
1703-1723: Penal Laws introduced to exclude Catholics from all public life as well as forbidding them to buy land or inherit it normally
1750: The Penal Laws effectively reduce Catholic share of the land from 15% to just 7%
1760s: The Whiteboy movement emerges – an agrarian secret society which aimed to redress the grievances of the poor with rough and ready justice
1775: The Irish Catholic gentry express their loyalty to the crown at the outbreak of revolt in the American colonies
1778 and 1782: The Penal Laws preventing Catholics from owning, leasing and inheriting land are repealed
1782: Henry Grattan persuades the Irish Parliament to pass his Declaration of Independence from England
1783: The Renunciation Act specifically renounces any British claim to legislate for Ireland
1785: A new secret society, the Defenders, is established to protect Catholics from Protestant violence (the Peep o’Day Boys et al)
1789: The French Revolution begins on the 14th July
1791: The Society of United Irishmen is established as the first radical Irish republican organisation
1793: The Catholic Relief Act allows Catholics the same voting rights as Protestants/War breaks out between Britain and France – an Irish Militia is established
1796: The United Irishmen and the Defenders merge and secretly plan rebellion
1798: Brutal repression follows the failed rebellion by the United Irishmen
1801: Act of Union between Ireland and Britain – the Irish Parliament is abolished
1803: Robert Emmet is executed after his failed attempt to establish an Irish Republic
1815-1824: sporadic violence from agrarian secret societies across Ireland
1823: Daniel O’Connell founds the Catholic Association and begins his campaign for Catholic Emancipation
1828: O’Connell wins the election in County Clare with an overwhelming majority
1829: The Catholic Emancipation Act receives a pained and angry royal assent
1832: The First Reform Act extends the franchise considerably into the middle-class
1840: The Repeal Association is established under the control of O’Connell
1841-1843: O’Connell organises ‘monster meetings’ for Repeal of the Union
1844: The Irish National Society founded in London to encourage nationalism within Protestant gentry
1845-1848: widespread potato famine grips Ireland killing 1 in 8 people
1847: Irish Confederation established by Young Irishers
1848: Smith O’Brien’s Young Ireland Rising fails, Irish League founded to replace Irish Confederation and Repeal Association
1850s: appearance of modern and independent Irish Part at Westminster
1858: IRB founded in Dublin on St Patrick’s Day by James Stephens
1867: Fenian Rising fails due to lack of popular support
1869: The Church of Ireland is disestablished
1870: Irish Home Government Association formed by Protestants against Land Bill
1873: Irish Home Rule League founded by Isaac Butt with support of RC Church
1879: National Land League of Ireland founded by Parnell for tenant ownership
1882: Parnell establishes the Irish National League for Home Rule
1884: the GAA founded to reinvigorate Irish national consciousness and culture
1886: The First Irish Home Rule Bill is defeated by 341 votes to 311
1891: Parnell dies prematurely and so do hopes for Home Rule for 20 years
1893: The Second Irish Home Rule Bill passes the Commons but is rejected by the Lords/formation of Gaelic League
1898: Centenary celebrations of the Irish Rebellion of 1798
1900: Cumann na Gaedheal founded in Dublin

1904: Irish Reform Association (unionist) proposes ‘devolution’ instead of Home Rule

1905: Cumann na Gaedheal changes its name to Sinn Fein

1911: The Parliament Act removes the power of veto from the House of Lords

1912: The Third Irish Home Rule Bill is introduced by Asquith

1913: Ulster Unionists decide to raise the UVF from Orange Lodges/Irish National Volunteers founded in Dublin

1914: The Irish Home Rule Act passes but is suspended for the duration of the war/Irish (or Sinn Fein) Volunteers split from (Irish) National Volunteers

1915: Conscription Bill is introduced into the Commons

1916: Easter Rising – the 14 leaders are executed at Kilmainham Gaol

1917: Plunkett wins Roscommon, MacGuinness wins Longford, de Valera wins East Clare

1918: Landslide for Sinn Fein in the General Election – Irish Party reduced to just 6 seats

1919: Dail Eireann assembled at the Dublin Mansion House

1919-1921: Irish War of Independence

1921: Anglo-Irish Treaty creates an Irish Free State but excludes Ulster/Dail ratifies Treaty by 64 votes to 57

1922: Irish General Election which returns 94 out of 128 members for the Treaty

1922-1923: Irish Civil War

1923: August election gives the Free State Party a majority over the Republicans

1924: Boundary Commission promised by the Anglo-Irish Treaty established

1925: Irish Free State confirms its existing boundaries

1927: Eamon de Valera establishes Fianna Fail – Sinn Fein is reduced to just 7 seats

1932: Fianna Fail wins Irish General Election

1936: The IRA is declared illegal by de Valera

1937: A new constitution of Eire replaces the Anglo-Irish Treaty by referendum

1939: The IRA declares ‘war’ on Britain

1949: Eire is renamed the Republic of Ireland and leaves the Commonwealth
Appendix IV

The source of all the Chapter headings in this thesis is the collection of poetry entitled *Michael Robartes and the Dancer* by William Butler Yeats (1865 – 1939), published in 1920.

Chapter 2 “all changed, changed utterly” is taken from the poem *Easter, 1916*.

Chapter 3 “and shake the blossom from the bud” is taken from the poem *The Rose Tree*.

Chapter 4 “to stir the boiling pot” is taken from the poem *Sixteen Dead Men*.

Chapter 5 “vexed to nightmare by a rocking cradle” is taken from the poem *The Second Coming*.

Yeats was very close to the politics of Irish nationalism, but rarely engaged in direct political action. Instead he collected Irish folklore and was instrumental in creating a national theatre. His ‘imaginative nationalism’ was profoundly influential in the advancement of the Irish literary tradition. Like most Irishmen he tried to come to terms with the changing cultural and political landscape after 1916 and in these poems he explores his responses to the Proclamation of the Republic of Ireland in Dublin on 24 April 1916. Yeats refused a knighthood from the British government in 1915 and became a Senator in the Irish Free State in 1922.
Appendix V: List of abbreviations used in the Bibliography

GH  Glasgow Herald
GO  Glasgow Observer
GSE  Glasgow Star and Examiner
GUL  Glasgow University Library
IJHS  International Journal of the History of Sport
IJSH  International Journal of Social History
IHS  Irish Historical Studies
IR  Innes Review
MLG  Mitchell Library, Glasgow
NAI  National Archives of Ireland, Dublin
NAS  National Archives of Scotland, Edinburgh
NLI  National Library of Ireland, Dublin
NLS  National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh
PRO  Public Record Office, London
SHR  Scottish Historical Review
SLHSJ  Scottish Labour History Society Journal
SM  The Scotsman
UCDA  University College Archives, Dublin
UNL  University of North London
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