LANGUAGE AS A MEANS OF SOCIAL CONTROL AND RESISTANCE:
DISCOURSE ANALYSIS IN A PRISON SETTING

by

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SUMMARY

This study is concerned with the linguistic analysis of a cognitive training programme for offenders which was run at Prison X in 1996.

Several Cognitive Skills classes run by prison officers and attended by groups of five to eight prisoners were videotaped and analysed to investigate the discourse practices used in these sessions. I also explored the written discourse of the Cognitive Skills Handbook used by the officers as a reference-text for running the classes.

In my research, I have borrowed insights from Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), particularly Fairclough's three-dimensional model of discourse, as it forms a framework for studying language in its relation to power and ideology. I have attempted to show through this case study that the discursive practices investigated are ideological in that they produce and reproduce unequal power relations in the way they represent and classify offenders. Following the Hallidayan tradition, I have taken a systemic functional approach as my point of departure for the analysis and interpretation of texts.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 A social theory of discourse

Recent social theory has produced important insights into the social nature of language. Of the major theories of society and social interaction, which may be divided into those of an idealist and materialist type, it has been the idealist theories such as Symbolic Interactionism, a brand of social psychology, which have accorded language a dominant role in shaping human behaviour. Sociological interest in language use was stimulated by Ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1967; Cicourel, 1968, 1973) with its concern to enquire into the common-sense world of everyday life and to show how social realities are experienced and constructed by interacting subjects. A branch of Ethnomethodology, Conversation Analysis (Sacks et al., 1974; Atkinson and Heritage, 1984; Sacks, 1992), has focused on conversation, as it plays an important part in the construction of social identities and interpersonal relations and thus lends itself particularly well to ethnomethodological enquiry. This interpretive, phenomenological sociology was also advocated by Goffman, whose later writings (1974; 1981) focused on the examination of verbal interaction. Thanks to this linguistic turn in social science, the value of discourse analysis in social-scientific research is no longer overlooked.

Important insights into the relationship between language, power and ideology have come from Althusser (1971), Foucault (1977), Habermas (1984), among others. These have been assimilated to varying degrees by linguists who attempt a synthesis between these and text-analytical traditions within language studies. These linguists do not see language as transparent, and focus on the social and ideological functions of language in producing, reproducing or

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1 The materialist theories, including Sociobiology, Behaviourism, Utilitarianism, and Marxism, have little to say about language, with the exception of the Marxian concept of false consciousness.
changing social structures, relations and identities. Critical Discourse Analysis (henceforth CDA) in particular claims that ideological power is of particular significance because it is exercised in discourse: authority and power are manifested and perpetuated by the ways language is used. The study of ideology and language has not been the sole province of CDA, of course. The question of their relationship has been debated since Plato and Aristotle, and has been the subject of constructivist theories of language. Within sociology, there is a broad tradition of work on the social construction of reality (e.g. Berger and Luckmann, 1966). Critical research on language has also been a concern of Voloshinov whose Marxist theory of language dates from the 1920s. Theoretically, the antecedents of critical linguistics and CDA are both rooted in linguistics - predominantly Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) (Halliday, 1978, 1985), as well as the important influence of the work of Bernstein on codes (Bernstein, 1968, 1990), and from sociological, political and philosophical theories.

In what follows, I shall analyse the main concepts of discourse that have served as a context and basis for the elaboration of my own approach. The following outline of various approaches to discourse analysis is thus a selective one. I am largely drawing on the concept of discourse provided by CDA, in particular Fairclough’s (1992) three-dimensional framework for discourse analysis. The resulting approach does, I believe, provide a rich framework for the textual analysis of my own data. I shall begin by focusing on definitions of discourse that are important for the particular linguistic analysis presented in this study.

1.2 The concept of discourse

‘Discourse’ is a difficult and fuzzy concept as it is used by social theorists (e.g. Foucault, 1972), linguists (e.g. van Dijk, 1985), social psychologists (e.g.
Wetherell and Potter, 1992; Wilkinson and Kitzinger, 1995), critical linguists
(Fowler et al., 1979; Kress and Hodge, 1979) and finally, critical discourse
analysts (Fairclough, 1989, 1992, 1995), all of whom define discourse slightly
differently and from their various theoretical and disciplinary standpoints.

Discourse is often defined in two different ways that make different
assumptions about the nature of language and the goals of linguistics: the
formalist paradigm views discourse as ‘language above the sentence or above
the clause’ (Stubbs, 1983: 1); whereas the functionalist paradigm regards
discourse as ‘language in use’ (Brown and Yule, 1983: 1). Van Dijk (1990:
164) points to yet another important aspect, that discourse should be understood
as action, as a specific form of language use, and a specific form of social
interaction, interpreted as a complete communicative event in a social situation’.
Schiffrin (1994: 31) has proposed a third definition that is at the intersection of
structure and function - discourse as utterance - which suggests it is a collection
of ‘inherently contextualized units of language use’. According to the
functionalist paradigm, the analysis of language cannot be divorced from the
analysis of the purpose and functions of language in human life. Halliday
(1973: 35) claims that ‘the investigation of language as social behaviour is not
only relevant to the understanding of social structure; it is also relevant to the
understanding of language’. This functionalist view sees discourse as a
culturally and socially organized way of speaking. The view of language as
action and social behaviour is also emphasized by CDA, which sees discourse -
the use of language in speech and writing - as a form of social practice. This
view implies ‘a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and

\[^2\text{This view of discourse was also taken by Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953). Wittgenstein rejected theories (including his own earlier work) which portray language as a medium which merely reflects or describes the world and emphasized the importance of language use. Wittgenstein held that we should consider language as a series of tools which acquire their purpose and function from the social and cultural environments in which they are used.}\]
the situation, institution and social structure that frame it: the discursive event is shaped by them, but it also shapes them' (Fairclough, 1992: 62). It is this definition of discourse that provides a useful framework for my analysis of institutional discourse within a prison. I shall come back to institutional discourse below.

The term 'discourse' is also used by some linguists to refer to different types of language usage or to describe texts which occur within a particular setting, for example 'newspaper discourse', 'classroom discourse', 'advertising discourse'. Here, the context of the production of the text seems to be what defines a discourse, and the term can be interchanged with words like 'genre'. Foucault has been a major influence in the development of discourse analysis as a social analysis: discourse as a social construction of reality, a form of knowledge. Fairclough combines Foucault's more social-theoretical sense of discourse with the 'text-and-interaction' sense in linguistically oriented discourse analysis. (Note, for instance, Fairclough's (1992) use of discourse as a countable noun, 'a discourse', 'discourses', 'the discourse of biology' in the socio-theoretical sense for a particular class of discourse types or conventions.) Unlike Foucault's social analysis of discourse, CDA anchors its analytical claims about discourse in the close linguistic analysis of texts. Fairclough has introduced a three-dimensional framework for discourse analysis - analysis of discourse as text, as discourse practice, and as social practice - in order to emphasize that text analysis should not be done in isolation. Any discursive 'event' (i.e. any instance of discourse) is simultaneously a piece of text, an instance of discursive practice, and an instance of social practice. The 'text' dimension is the language analysis of texts. The 'discursive practice' dimension, like 'interaction' in the 'text-and-interaction' view of discourse, specifies the nature of the processes of text production and interpretation, for

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3 This should not be confused with Foucault's definition of genre, which is not limited to the context of production or the subject matter of a group of utterances (Mills, 1997).
example which types of discourse are drawn upon and how they are combined. The 'social practice' dimension deals with issues important for social analysis such as the institutional circumstances of the discursive event (i.e. any instance of discourse) and how that shapes the nature of the discursive practice and the constitutive effects of discourse (Fairclough, 1992).

Chouliaraki and Fairclough's (1999) understanding of texts is that they are created in 'mediated' interaction, in the sense that a technical medium is used to increase 'time-space distantiation', but not in face-to-face interaction. This understanding of text is different from Halliday's concept which refers to both written texts and transcripts of spoken interaction: 'any passage (of language) spoken or written, of whatever length, that does form a unified whole' (Halliday and Hasan, 1976:1). I shall use the term 'text' in Halliday's meaning and the term 'discourse' with the meaning introduced by Fairclough, in order to capture the dimensions of the particular situations studied here.

I have referred several times to Foucault and the appropriation of his notion of discourse by Fairclough and other linguists. Since some of his concepts are pervasive in both linguistic literature and penal sociology, it is necessary to discuss Foucault in more detail.

1.3 Foucault and the analysis of discourse

Foucault’s approach to discourse analysis merits attention for the following reason: his model is widely used by social scientists and he has made an important contribution to a social theory of discourse with regard to the relationship between discourse and power and the functioning of discourse in social change.4 I will briefly outline below what I take to be the most important characteristics of Foucault’s work with regard to the present study and include

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4 Another reason to focus on Foucault is given by the criminologist Stanley Cohen (1985), who claims that talking about crime and punishment without Foucault would be like talking about the unconscious without
below some of the criticisms levelled at him by some both in penal sociology and linguistics.

While Foucault's emphasis in his earlier 'archaeological' work (1972) was on types of discourse as 'rules for constituting areas of knowledge', he turned his attention in his later 'genealogical' studies (1977) to the relationship between knowledge and power and explicitly linked the concept of discourse with power and control.5 'In every society' says Foucault (1972: 216), 'the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organized and redistributed according to a certain number of procedures'. These procedures include external controls, internal rules and the regulation of access to knowledge. Foucault does not think of discourse as a stretch of text, but as 'practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak' (1972: 49). In other words, a discourse produces an utterance or a concept rather than something which exists in and of itself and which can be analysed in isolation.

If we want to think about discourse as having effects, we have to consider truth, power and knowledge, because it is because of these that discourse has effects.

In Foucault's (1979: 46) view,

Each society has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth: that is, the types of discourse it harbours and causes to function as true: the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true from false statements, the way in which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures which are valorised for obtaining truth: the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true.

Truth is therefore something which societies have to produce. Foucault is concerned with how certain forms of knowledge are excluded from being considered as true. To give an example from criminology, theories that experts

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5 Foucault uses 'genealogy' in the Nietzschean sense to describe his method of writing a 'history of the present'. His history highlights a contemporary issue or institution by investigating the historical conditions that brought it about. Foucault's genealogy uses history to problematize and destabilize the present (Garland, 1990: 136).
develop to explain deviant behaviour often tend to negate the legitimacy of meanings offenders ascribe to their acts. ‘Real reasons’ such as personality disorder or lack of social control are given instead (see Young, 1970). Foucault is especially interested in the ways in which one discourse becomes the dominant discourse, which is then supported by the institutions of the State and by the population at large. For Foucault (1980a: 47), discourses like criminology were only called into existence to justify the imposition of punishment. They serve as a pretext for those working within the system to operate with an impression of humanitarianism and good conscience. He asks:

Have you ever read any criminological texts? They are staggering ... One has the impression that it [the discourse of criminology] is of such utility, is needed so urgently and rendered so vital for the working of the system, that it does not even need to seek a theoretical justification for itself, or even simply a coherent framework. It is entirely utilitarian.

Foucault alleges that behind the language of penal reform there lies the ‘will to power’ a conception which reveals his Nietzschean legacy. Power is, therefore, crucial in the analysis of discourse. While Foucault’s (1970, 1972) theory of discursive practices had been tied up with a very negative view of power, stressing coercion and prohibition, he offered a different view in Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (1977:194):

We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it “excludes” it “represses”, it “censors”, it “abstracts”, it “masks”, it “conceals”. In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production.

Foucault analyses imprisonment in terms of a symbiotic relationship between power and knowledge, which in turn is not an ‘objective’ truth separable from power relations: ‘Power and knowledge directly imply each other ... there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor
any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations' (Foucault, 1977: 27). Thus the disciplinary surveillance of the prison created a new kind of ‘knowledge’ of the prisoner’s body which created a new kind of power.

Many of Foucault’s themes are already well developed in the work of Nietzsche, Weber and Durkheim. But whereas for Durkheim punishment represented an example of ‘collective conscience’ and a matter of social solidarity of the citizens against criminals, for Foucault it is a system of power imposed on the population. What Foucault means by power is the idea of controlling behaviour through the disciplinary training of offenders. Everything that occurs in penal institutions is geared to the advancement of control and regulatory power. Discipline was the new feature of the Benthamite prison, whereby the inmate was ‘normalized’ or forced to conform by constant surveillance and the imposition of forced labour. ‘Normalization’ is a method of sanctioning, which is corrective rather than punitive and is aimed at achieving conformity. One of the stated aims of imprisonment is the transformation of the individual – and education and work play an essential part in this transformation. Foucault investigates the shift from corporal to carceral punishment between the late eighteenth and mid-nineteenth centuries. His explanation for the coming of the prison is that this was ‘the moment when it became understood that it was more efficient and profitable in terms of the economy of power to place people under surveillance than to subject them to some exemplary penalty’ (Foucault, 1980: 38). The new industrial social order required new techniques of power and new institutions to control the subordinate classes. The prison does not control the criminal so much as control the working class by creating the criminal, and, for Foucault, this is the ultimate rationale for its persistence. Although this is not a policy which is ever declared publicly, Foucault insists that it does amount to a deliberate strategy (see Garland, 1990).
I shall now discuss Foucault's model of power in more detail and consider its usefulness for the present study.

1.3.1 Foucault's model of productive power

Power, Foucault says, is located in strategies which work at every level: they cannot be reduced to the power of the state or of a ruling class. Power is productive (and in particular productive of knowledge). Thus power does not just work negatively by forcefully dominating those who are subject to it; rather, it incorporates them and is 'productive' in the sense that it shapes them to fit in with its needs. He talks about the 'microphysics of power', power disseminated throughout the whole of society, and contends that if power were really merely repressive, power relations would be much more unstable than they are. Therefore, power has the capacity to do something other than repress, just as the prison has the capacity to do something other than fail to prevent crime and has thus been able to survive.

Rather than assuming that the powerful person in an institutional setting is in fact all-powerful, Foucault argues that power is more a form of action or relation between people which is negotiated in interaction and is never fixed or stable. To give an example, those who are not in economically powerful positions, such as secretaries, nevertheless manage to negotiate for themselves fairly powerful positions in the hierarchy. Ultimately, secretaries cannot refuse what they are asked to do, but they can make it clear that some requests will have to be made in polite language (see Mills, 1996). I observed the same phenomenon in parts of my own analysis of the interactions between prison officers and prisoners in the Cognitive Skills classes. In the case of some of the data, there was no clear-cut distinction to be made between powerful talk on the one hand and powerless talk on the other. One of the two officers in particular was careful about how to negotiate the enactment of his power by, for instance,
displaying tentativeness (seemingly a classic sign of powerlessness) to the inmates, whereas the inmates would resist (at least verbally) his suggestions. This is not to suggest that in these interactions the inmates hold a position of power; rather it indicates how people in a fairly powerless position negotiate within that position and accrue power (or at least the appearance thereof) by using seemingly powerful styles of language (see also Holmes 1995).

Foucault’s (1980) theory of productive power has helped disseminate a different understanding of power, where power is not cruelly oppressive but ubiquitous and not possessed by any particular social class or group, that it is ‘never localised here or there, never in anybody’s hands, never appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth’ (Foucault, 1980: 98). It is not difficult to realize that power relations obtain in practically all spheres of life. But from this it does not follow that power is not repressive, nor that one should not pay attention to the intentions and interests of actors when studying it. Therefore Foucault’s model of productive power should be complemented by a model of power as - in part at least - domination. The fact that the Course participants use (linguistic) strategies to dispute and resist the roles assigned to them and assert their position can be seen as an indication that power between interactants is negotiated through conversation and that power may be more than a property given to individuals by society or by an institution. Ultimately, however, the prison is a social institution with a clearly defined hierarchical structure, in which the power to discipline those of lower rank is a property invested in holders of higher rank. This power, however, is not absolute. I shall now elaborate this point in the following section.

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6 One criticism levelled at Foucault in *Discipline and Punish* was that he fails to investigate the objectives of power and to describe its agents. Critics have also remarked on Foucault’s use of the vague pronoun ‘on’ and passive constructions, whereby he avoids attributing social processes to people, yet does not rule it out completely (see, for example, Merquior, 1985).
1.3.2 Power as domination

Defining the concepts of 'power' and 'dominance', within both social theory and linguistics, is problematic, and has been the subject of many studies. It is safe to say that practically all social relations and institutions in some way involve power. But although power is pervasive in social systems, its conceptualization has remained a matter of disagreement (see Lukes, 1974)\(^7\).

Traditionally, there have been two major views of power, the conflict and the consensus models. Power in the first sense is a relational concept, 'power over', and entails domination by individuals or collectives. One of the most famous formulations of this view comes from Weber (1978: 53). He defines power as

\[
\text{the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests.}
\]

Given the assumption that when power implies resistance it also implies conflict, Weber's definition has been understood to hold that conflict is essential in power relations. In his definition of power he distinguishes 'power' and 'resistance' as distinct but interrelated phenomena within the power relation. Importantly, he gives an irreducible role to resistance in the analysis of power. The second view, the consensus model, sees power as a 'capacity to get things done' (Parsons, 1952). Power in this sense may be positive as well as repressive, and is a capacity possessed in some degree by any actor, dominant or dominated. It is more a resource for action than a constraint on it.

\(^7\) Steven Lukes's (1974) account describes three different forms of power: a one-dimensional view which focuses on decisions over which there is some observable conflict of interest; a two-dimensional view which focuses on mechanisms which prevent decisions from being reached on issues where conflicts of interest are apparent; and a three-dimensional view which is concerned with ways in which issues are kept out of politics altogether and where conflicts of interest are latent rather than actual
The conflict model emphasizes the nature of power as a relationship of domination and subjugation. Out of all social organizations, it would be the prison that emerges as the perfect example of complete domination. And yet, even within a prison, the power of the custodial staff is not absolute, as some commentators on the prison as a social system have observed. As Sykes (1958) says, prisons are unstable and can only guarantee conformity to rules in the most short-term and minimal of ways. It is only by tolerating infractions of minor rules that the prison officer can ensure compliance from the inmates in the overall running of the prison. Sykes (1958: 61) points to the ‘built-in’ weaknesses of the prison as a ‘total system of power’:

The lack of a sense of duty among those who are held captive, the obvious fallacies of coercion, the pathetic collection of rewards and punishments to induce compliance, the strong pressures toward the corruption of the guard in the form of friendship, reciprocity, and the transfer of duties into the hands of trusted inmates - all are structural defects in the prison’s system of power rather than individual inadequacies.

Sykes thus argues that the dominant position of the prison officer is more fiction than reality if one sees domination as something more than the outward forms and symbols of power. If power is viewed as the probability that orders will be obeyed by a given group of individuals, as Weber has suggested, then the prison, says Sykes (1958: 45), is ‘more notable for the doubtfulness of obedience than its certainty’. The power of the custodians is not based on authority, as power based on authority in its pure form would entail the moral compulsion to obey by those who are to be controlled (Weber, 1947). According to Sykes (1958: 47), it is precisely this sense of duty which is absent from the general inmate population, because these commands and regulations ‘must jump a gap that separates the captors from the captives’. Therefore, if prisoners are to be brought to conformity, they have to be cajoled rather than coerced into it by a system of rewards and punishments. Power is thus not a purely negative force:
there are natural limits to its exercise. ‘Total systems of power’ are thus an illusion.

Foucault has been criticized by some in the field of penal sociology on both theoretical and historical grounds (e.g. Ignatieff, 1981; Garland, 1985, 1990, Adler and Longhurst, 1994), and by linguists for the one-sidedness of some of his views. They have also questioned the validity of his conclusions about ‘discursive practices’ (Foucault, 1972), since he never followed them up with an analysis of texts (e.g. Macdonell, 1986; Fairclough, 1992). Commentators on Foucault (e.g. Rose, 1984; Merquior, 1985; Paglia, 1992) expose what they perceive to be his elementary errors and circular reasoning.8 I shall now discuss some of these criticisms in turn.

One of the weaknesses identified in Foucault’s work is the assertion that power is ubiquitous and that people are often helplessly exposed to and manipulated by it (Merquior, 1985). In Discipline and Punish (Foucault, 1977), which at times reads like a conspiracy theory of history, the reader is told that ‘the power of normalization’ is not exercised by the prison alone, but also by schools, hospitals and factories, which are extensions of the prison and that our lives are ‘normalized’ from beginning to end. However, these sweeping statements were never followed by an analysis.

Not only can one criticize Foucault for exaggerating the extent to which people are manipulated by power; one can also charge him with not paying enough attention to the possibility that dominated groups may oppose dominant discursive and non-discursive systems. So although he insists that power is exercised not only as a mode of domination, but also an act of resistance, he

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8 Take, for example, J.G. Merquior’s following criticism of Foucault: ‘Now Foucault ... says that we should stop wondering at the actual failure of prison to deter crime and correct criminals and realize that the actual purpose of prisons is precisely to maintain and produce delinquency, by implicitly encouraging recidivism and converting the occasional offender into a habitual criminal. Although Foucault’s rhetorical style leaves the consequence-explanation suggested rather than asserted, his reasoning entails the presumption that a cui boni question - what are prisons useful for? - is not just a heuristic guide among others, but a privileged path for reaching the true raison d’etre of prisons. The point is, teleological explanations of this kind do not, of course, qualify as genuine causal analysis; they just assume causes without demonstrating any causal mechanism; hence the circularity and the question-begging’ (Merquior, 1985: 107; emphasis in the original).
gives the impression that resistance is generally contained by power and poses no threat (Macdonell, 1986; Fairclough, 1992a): ‘where there is power’, Foucault (1994: 165) says, ‘there is resistance ... These points of resistance are present everywhere in the power network. Hence there is no single locus of great Refusal, no soul of revolt, source of all rebellions, or pure law of the revolutionary. Instead there is a plurality of resistances’. The exercise of power over others draws on social resources which are not available to subordinates. However, through resistance, they can limit power and influence the outcome of power relations to a certain degree. One form of resistance is the oppositional discourse people set up and use as a conscious alternative to the dominant or established discourse type in the form of an ‘anti-language’ (Halliday, 1978). Examples of anti-languages would be a ‘non-standard’ social dialect of a working-class community in a large city or the language of the criminal underworld and prison lingo (Mayr, 1994). Because power is always met with resistance, the emergence of what commentators of prison life have called the inmate subculture and its anti-language can be seen as an example of what Foucault has called power creating new possibilities. Some work within CDA (van Dijk, 1993; Fairclough, 1995; Wodak, 1989, 1996) has focused on these strategies of resistance in discourse. I shall consider these in more detail below (Chapter 5), where I present my analysis of the oppositional discourse prisoners use to state their resistance to some of the roles assigned to them in the Cognitive Skills Course.

To sum up, I believe that Foucault’s move away from a top-down model of power is useful in the sense that it tells us something about the complexities of power and helps us to see power as a relation rather than a simple imposition. The view that power is dispersed throughout social relations and produces

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9 However, Barry Smart (1983) notes that although resistance is not a central topic of Foucault’s analyses, he does acknowledge that the exercise of power is accompanied by resistance. For example, the prison riots which have occurred since the late 1960s in several countries throughout the world are seen by Foucault to have been not so much about the relative adequacy of prison conditions, as about the very materiality, the prison as an ‘instrument and vector of power’ over the body (in Garland and Young: 1983: 68).
possible forms of behaviour (e.g. an inmate subculture) as well as restricting it, has also been found useful by some critical discourse analysts (e.g. Fairclough, 1992; Wodak, 1996) when thinking about discourse. The idea of power as enacted within power relationships and thus as something which can be contested at every moment and in every interaction has some validity with regard to the officer-prisoner classroom interactions analysed in the present study. However, in a prison context, it can only be a complement to power in terms of domination. With regard to the Cognitive Skills Course, Gramsci’s concept of hegemony is particularly helpful in analysing relations of power as domination. Hegemony sees domination based upon consent rather than coercion, entailing the naturalization of (linguistic) practices and their social relations as a matter of ‘common sense’. The concept of hegemony therefore emphasizes the significance of ideology in achieving and maintaining relations of domination. I shall return to hegemony in section 1.5 below, where I discuss it in connection with CDA.

1.4 Relevant approaches to analysing the Cognitive Skills discourse

Since the conceptual framework for my analysis of discourse is in large part derived from Fairclough (1989, 1992a), and also draws on insights from Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis (Sacks et al., 1974), Pragmatics (Brown and Levinson, 1978), The Birmingham School (Sinclair and Coulthard, 1975), and Systemic Functional Linguistics (Halliday, 1978, 1985) in particular, I will review these approaches first. I find this rather rich theoretical base essential in dealing with the complexities of my own data.

The discussion will begin with a consideration of Ethnomethodology and the role of Conversation Analysis within it.
1.4.1 Sociological Perspectives: Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis

The approach of Sacks, Scheglof and Jefferson (1974) was strongly influenced by the sociologist Harold Garfinkel’s (1967) Ethnomethodology - a phenomenologically oriented brand of sociology associated with Schütz and Husserl. Rather than analysing social order in itself, Conversation Analysis (and Ethnomethodology) seeks to discover the methods by which members of a society produce a sense of social order. This approach is then specifically applied to conversation, which is a source of much of members’ sense of social order. Conversation also has its own kind of order and structure. In order to account for the sequential organization of communication, Sacks et al. developed the turn-taking model, which has been influential in defining turn-taking in conversation as collaboratively managed by participants. It is essentially a descriptive approach to discourse analysis. The main formula of this model is that one speaker speaks at a time, and that turns are exchanged either through selection by the current speaker or through self-selection of the other speakers by starting to produce a turn. If that does not happen, the current speaker may continue. According to Sacks, Scheglof and Jefferson these options are equally available to all participants. The notion of people being capable of contributing equally in talk is also what Grice (1975) had in mind when he formulated the ‘Cooperative Principle’, according to which conversations can only occur because two or more participants tacitly agree to cooperate in talk. But for people to be able to contribute on an equal basis, they must have equal status. Having equal status means having equal discoursal and pragmatic rights and obligations, such as, for instance, the same turn-taking rights and the same obligations to avoid silences and interruptions, the same rights to make requests and ask questions, and the same obligations to respond to them, and also what for interactional purposes counts as relevance. However,
the nature of the turn-taking system depends on (and is part of) power relationships between participants and it is only in conversation among equals that turn-taking is negotiated between the participants according to the above rules. As we shall see, in conversation among unequals, the turn-taking system can be very different from the rules for informal conversation. Part of the picture that emerged from the linguistic analysis of some Cognitive Skills classroom discourse was that turn-taking rights were often unequal, in that the inmates mostly took turns only when the officer directed a question to the whole class or an individual inmate. And not only was the taking of turns constrained for them, so also was what they said in the turns they took: they were essentially limited to giving ‘relevant’ answers to the officer. It is generally agreed in Pragmatics (discussed below) that utterances are relevant or irrelevant only in context (Brockway 1981: 67). However, the dominant person in an interaction can more or less define the context and determine what is ‘discoursally relevant’ (Thomas, 1986a, b). One might argue that usually every first speaker in an interaction has the right to define the context. But in ‘unequal encounters’ the dominant person may use devices to keep the other interactants to the topic he or she has selected and restrict their options through ‘discourse control acts’ (Thomas, 1988), which I shall discuss at greater length in Chapter 4.

There are many ways in which dominant participants can dismiss contributions which they consider irrelevant. A common device is to interrupt speakers or ignore them altogether by not taking up their points. An example of this occurs in the following extract taken from a ‘Values Enhancement’ session, called ‘The Robbery’, which I shall analyse in more detail in Chapter 5. R, one of the Course participants, attempts to explain to the officer (O1) why he would not call the police if he caught a burglar in his house who turns out to be his neighbour:

R: I It’s oanly pretty obvious what we wud dae but, really.
O1: 2 How?
R: 3 Right, in your eyes[
J: 4 [(?)
O1: 5 [ Ye got children
J: 6 With your eyes
R: 7 Aye, but in my eyes, right[
O1: 8 [Right, ye’ve goat children, ye get up in
the middle of the night and ye find somebody wi’ a mask oan in the
middle of yer house.

Turn-taking rights and topic control are certainly not equal here. In turn 3, R
first tries to elaborate the position from a middle-class point of view (Right, in
your eyes), but is interrupted in turn 5 by the officer who attempts to put him in
the position of the man whose house was broken into (Ye’ve got children). In
turn 7, R tries once more to present his own point of view, but is again
interrupted by the officer who insists on R putting himself in the other person’s
shoes. R’s point is not taken up, obviously because the officer does not consider
it relevant. After all, taking up R’s point would hardly be in keeping with one of
the aims of the ‘Values Enhancement’ sessions, which is to make inmates
‘consider the points of view of other people’ and to challenge their ‘pro-criminal
and anti-social talk’.

Another criticism that has been levelled at the turn-taking model comes
from Murray (1985) and Diamond (1996) who argue that it is too observer-
oriented. In his study of how speakers felt about overlapping speech, Murray
found that speakers are more concerned about being interrupted before making
any point at all than being interrupted before saying all they had to say. The
problem with examining the interactional quality of a group of people by
looking at the way turns are managed is that not all overlapping speech is turn-
competitive. Nor is it always an interruption. Interruptions have been defined
by some as displays of dominance and sometimes as male ‘violation’ of female speakers rights (e.g. Zimmermann and West, 1975). More recent research, however, has suggested that there are occasions when interruptions can evidence co-operation rather than power-dominance, and are not perceived by interruptor or interrupted as violating the latter’s rights. Murray (1987: 104) points to the positive functions of interruption, arguing that it is possible to conceive it as ‘restoration of order (turn-sharing) rather than as conversational deviance’. For example, when interlocutors feel that a turn has been used up, they may consider it their right to interrupt. Such interruption ‘upholds the moral economy of speech in response to one kind of conversational deviance, talking too long’ (ibid.). With regard to this, Goffman (1981), Gumperz (1971, 1981) and Hymes (1974), among others, have suggested that all speech devices are pluri-functional. As Goffman (1981: 65) states: ‘A speech form having a standard significance as a speech act can be employed in a still further way [than the usual one] to convey something not ordinarily conveyed by it.’ Thus, in some instances, interruption may be egalitarian and indicate solidarity. I focus on overlap and interruption here because it is quite a common feature of some of the data and it is quite difficult to establish whether it is turn-competitive or not. Certainly it cannot be automatically equated with dominance. Edelsky (1981), for instance, has observed that overlaps may be the norm in small groups of people. Let us look at the following example from my data:

In this extract the officer (O2) implies that if a reporter revealed the name of a source, who is also a drug addict, ‘they’ (the police, the judge) might be able to help the man to overcome his addiction, thereby doing him a favour. J and T, two Course participants, disagree.

O2: 1 In a way they are daein’ him a favour, wouldn’t they?
J: 2 Ah wudnae fuckin’ speak tae [them!
T: 3 [Nah they wudnae, they wud get ‘im
Although T and J speak at the same time, this example of an overlap is hardly an attempt to dominate. Rather, they support each other with their respective arguments and in so doing indicate solidarity with each other. Nor do they seem to feel interrupted by each other. It is worth mentioning here that the two men’s arguments are based on one tenet of the inmate code, which is never to inform on anybody.

The problem with interpreting overlapping speech is that no matter whether we describe it as a back-channel response, as interruptive, turn-supportive or turn-competitive, these are all ‘observer’s interpretations’ (Diamond 1996; emphasis original). Diamond’s argument that the turn-taking model of conversation is too observer-oriented leads her to call for a more participant-oriented approach, which takes speakers’ own perceptions into consideration:

Thus the foundation of the structural model, that of economy of speech, is shaken: speakers are more related to the quality of contribution than the quantity. This suggests that topic and idea, i.e. what people say, might be a better tool of analysis of speakers’ interaction than turn length and number (1996: 91; emphasis original).

Thus, complementing the turn-taking model of conversational structure with a participant-oriented model takes into account what speakers say and their relationship to what they say. Regrettably, owing to prison routine, I was not able to put this very useful suggestion into practice. There was never time for the Course participants to help me go over the video-tapes to check even the contents, let alone discuss the meanings of turns and overlaps. All the way through my transcription and analysis of the tapes I was therefore left with the feeling that I might misinterpret what was going on in the Cognitive Skills
classroom sessions. However, I was an observer and participant in the interactions myself, which was very helpful in my analysis.

Following Diamond (1996), I have decided to look at longer stretches of discourse and take the entire speech event, including participants and situation, into consideration. Topics cannot tell us much in isolation, as they are developed over the course of a conversation by one or several speakers. We only know whether a topic is successfully introduced and developed by looking at the subsequent activities of the interactants. As we shall see in Chapters 4 and 5, topic is often controlled by the prison officer in that he determines the nature and purpose of the interaction and restrains contributions which in his view are not valid. On the other hand, the inmates do employ linguistic strategies of resistance and manage to achieve at least some control over the interaction as it evolves and develops.

Although Conversation Analysis is still flourishing (e.g. Boden and Zimmerman, 1991; Drew and Heritage, 1992) and its contributions to discourse analysis remain undisputed, it has also been criticized for its lack of systematic analytical categories, which makes a quantitative analysis of conversation impossible, its focus on small excerpts of talk and limited ability to deal with longer conversations, and its mechanistic interpretation of conversation, which interprets it as dynamic interactive achievement but fails to account for what kind of achievement it is. Conversation Analysis does not explain adequately what interactants use conversation for, nor how it relates to macro-social structures (see Eggins and Slade, 1997). Rather than regarding conversation as a form of social interaction that is verbal, the Systemic approach sees conversation as a linguistic interaction that is fundamentally social. I shall discuss Systemics in some detail in section 1.4.4 below.

Ethnomethodology has also been applied to the study of deviance. The ethnomethodological approach to the study of deviance uses linguistic and norm-breaking behaviour to reveal the shared understandings that make social
interaction possible (e.g. Wieder, 1974). Like other micro-sociological approaches to deviance, such as Symbolic Interactionism and Social Phenomenology (e.g. Toch, 1975), Ethnomethodology focuses on small groups and roles rather than large organizations and mass categories of people, and on reality as experienced by the subjects of the study instead of as based on the researcher’s concepts. The methodology is participant observation, interviews and intellectual analysis rather than questionnaires and statistics, and the researcher is not concerned with hypothesis testing and theory development. The ethnomethodological approach not only disregards any causal or etiological approach to deviance but also raises the question of how subjective understanding or verstehen (Weber) of human social action is scientifically possible. Man is seen as producing and constructing social structure. For Weber, social science has to delve into how people view, define and conceive the world. Any investigation, empirical or otherwise, must be able to enter the subjective world of actors. Schütz’s (1967) advance on this position was to investigate why and through what process actors come to share common meanings. He insisted that the social world is interpreted in experience as meaningful and comprehensible by human actors.

One example of the contribution Ethnomethodology has made to the study of deviance is Cicourel’s (1968) work. His study of social control agencies has examined the way that talk socially constructs definitions of deviance and how the everyday existence of these agencies actually produces given rates of deviance. The actual indices of crime are produced as a result of the everyday workings of the police, courts, social workers, etc., which probably do not reflect actual amounts of deviance, but are merely indices of the deviance which is processed or handled by the social control agencies themselves. Intervention may make things worse: individuals who are labelled or stigmatized as deviant may be more likely to take on a self-identity as deviant and become more, rather than less, deviant than if they had not been so labelled (Becker,
1963; Goffman, 1963). Some of these more qualitatively based sociological analyses in the ethnomethodological tradition are an important corrective to the many pro-administrative studies of prison life that are normally more concerned with managing prisoners than understanding them (e.g. Irwin, 1970; Manocchio and Dunn, 1970; Toch, 1971; Cohen and Taylor, 1972; Carroll, 1974; Cardozo-Freeman, 1984).

Since ethnomethodologists tend to avoid discussion and use of the concepts of class, power or ideology which are of focal concern to mainstream sociology, they have been criticized for failing to develop causal theories or explanatory models and for studying only one plane of social reality, individual consciousness. They thereby reduce all meaning to the meanings held by individual actors (see Taylor, Walton, and Young, 1973).

Having reviewed the sociological perspectives of Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis I shall now turn to those linguistic approaches to analysing discourse which are most relevant to the present study.

1.4.2 Linguistic Perspectives: Pragmatics

Further insights can be drawn from Gricean Pragmatics (Grice, 1975) which focuses more on the interpretation than the production of speech and formulates conversation in terms of general ‘principles’ rather than rules.

The purpose of politeness can be said to be to minimize the risk of confrontation and conflict in discourse - both the possibility of confrontation occurring at all, and the possibility that a confrontation might be perceived as threatening.

Politeness has been studied over the past thirty years or so within linguistics and related disciplines (cf. Lakoff, 1973, 1975; Leech, 1983; Brown and Levinson, 1978, 1987). The theories and descriptions of politeness have

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10 The ethnomethodological critique of sociology, and especially the sociology of deviance, is that concepts such as class and deviance are either meaningless, or if they do have a meaning, are no more meaningful than the generalizations made by members (Taylor, Walton and Young, 1973).
focused on its use in ordinary, usually dyadic conversation. Brown and Levinson (1978), in their model of politeness, build on Goffman’s (1967: 5) notion of face, ‘an image of self delineated in terms of approved social attributes’, but differentiate between ‘positive face’ - the need to present oneself positively, be liked or admired, or to be seen as an equal - and ‘negative face’ - the want not to impose or be imposed upon by others. They maintain that people have the need to satisfy their positive or negative face wants and see politeness as a number of strategies used by discourse participants to tone down the force of utterances which may be threatening to their own ‘face’ or that of a participant (see also Leech, 1983).

The reason for including politeness phenomena here is that pragmatic theory shares with CDA its concern with language as a social practice. However, what is missing in Pragmatics, according to Fairclough (1992: 162), is ‘a sense of the variability of politeness practices across different discourse types within a culture, of links between variable politeness practices and variable social relations, or of producers being constrained by politeness practices’. The problem with the pragmatic approach is that it implies that conversations occur co-operatively, between equals. Drawing on Bourdieus’s (1977) view of politeness concessions always being political concessions, Fairclough concludes that particular politeness conventions embody particular social and power relations. Eggins and Slade (1997: 43) also point to the fact that in most conversations power is not equally distributed but is ‘constantly under contestation’. Thus Grice’s view of conversation as homogeneous, co-operative and equal amounts to an idealization of it. Following Sarangi and Slembrouck (1996), I take the view that the issues developed in Pragmatics, such as cooperation/confrontation in institutional encounters, should be combined with a critical linguistic approach and be reassessed by it. Since pragmatic analysis is concerned with the way in which participants interpret the moves in an exchange and with the assessment of the meaning of a particular move, it shares with
CDA an emphasis on interpretation. Thus investigating the politeness conventions of a given discourse type is one way of gaining insight into the social relations within the institutions with which it is associated. Explaining indirectness and (pragmatic) ambivalence is one of the concerns of Pragmatics, whereas discourse analysts (e.g. Sinclair and Coulthard) have largely ignored them. Conversation analysts (e.g. Atkinson, Heritage, Jefferson), while recognizing these phenomena, do not seek explanations that go beyond the exchange system itself and thus cannot account for how participants cope with these uncertainties. Linguists who have discussed indirectness and ambivalence in terms of politeness phenomena have stated that for reasons of politeness it is often in the interest of speaker and hearer to leave the meaning of an utterance unclear and ambiguous. Leech (1983: 23-24) states that ‘S may leave H the opportunity to choose between one force or another, and thus leaves part of the responsibility of the meaning to H. For instance, “If I were you, I would leave town straight away” can be interpreted according to context as a piece of advice, a warning, or a threat.’ The speaker however, will always be able to claim that it was a friendly piece of advice. A high degree of ambivalence and indirectness can be expected in situations where social distance is felt to be present between speakers and the interaction is face-threatening to one or both parties. But one can also find extremely face-threatening interactions involving socially distant participants (e.g. teacher/child, judge/defendant) where one participant tries quite obviously to reduce ambivalence. My data show examples of extremely face-threatening acts, and they are, as we shall see, not always limited to the officers. The examination of politeness has been extended to discourse types in which conflict is an intrinsic element. Robin Lakoff (1989), for example, in her discussion of therapeutic and courtroom discourse, has argued that in these contexts, non-polite behaviour can be systematic and normal. Verbal confrontation plays an important part in the Cognitive Skills classroom sessions, notably the ‘Values Enhancement’ sessions, in which the officer’s task is to
challenge the inmates’ ‘anti-social talk’, and the line between direct and forceful confrontation is sometimes crossed.

1.4.3 Analysis of exchange structure: The Birmingham School

Since I shall be concerned with the linguistic aspects of classroom interaction, I turn to Sinclair and Coulthard’s (1975) work on classroom discourse for further insights into the linguistic structure of conversational exchanges. While these authors aimed at developing a model for the analysis of all discourse, they focused primarily on the classroom as it offered a discourse practice which was more structured and more likely to have clear rules. The model of analysis developed by them is essentially descriptive in that it provides a comprehensive means of classifying the elements of the discourse. Classroom exchanges are made up of what the authors have called ‘moves’. Much of their work on classroom interaction has focused on the exchange structure in the classroom - a tripartite structure, where an ‘initiating move’ by the teacher is followed by a ‘responding move’ by the pupil, which is followed in turn by a ‘feedback’ or ‘follow-up move’ on part of the teacher to tell the pupils whether their answer is right or wrong. Sinclair and Coulthard occasionally allude to power and domination, but their tendency to displace content by structure does not allow us to draw firm conclusions, as relations of power cannot be fully disclosed by the operation of the exchange structure. They have not paid enough attention to developing a social orientation to discourse and interpretation of discourse practices; rather they present classroom discourse practices to be simply there for description and not helping to sustain particular relations of power. Pedagogic exchanges differ from conversational exchanges in two different ways (Eggins and Slade, 1997: 45):
(i) at the exchange level pedagogic exchanges typically consist of three ‘slots’ in a sequence motivated by movement towards completion, while casual conversation contexts reveal far more open-ended exchange types. 
(ii) In casual conversation interactants rarely ask questions to which they already know the answers. The types of moves that occur in initiating slots of conversation include ‘real’ questions, statements of opinions, commands, offers, etc. The slots which occur after the Responding slot do not generally consist of evaluating moves but are either recycling types of moves (queries, challenges) or additional ‘afterthoughts’ of various kinds.

In the Cognitive Skills classroom sessions the differences between these two exchange types were sometimes blurred, with some of them alternating between the two types and some discourse passages resembling casual conversation. This happened when the officer relaxed his control and let the Course participants initiate and develop their own topics.

In Chapter 5, where I will be concerned with exchanges in pedagogic spoken discourse, I will take up insights from the Birmingham School and integrate them with insights from Systemic Functional Linguistics, which I have chosen as my framework for the analysis of spoken and written discourse in the present study.

1.4.4. Systemic functional linguistics (SFL) - a multifunctional view of discourse

Systemic Functional Linguistics is based on the model of ‘language as social semiotic’ developed by Halliday (e.g. 1973, 1975, 1978, 1985; Halliday and Hasan, 1985). This semiotic approach is described by Halliday (1978: 2) in his view of the relationship between the micro- and macro-social worlds:
By their everyday acts of meaning, people act out the social structure, affirming their own statuses and roles, and establishing and transmitting the shared systems of value and of knowledge.

This shows Halliday's concern with the (re)production of social structures in discourse, which is also the concern of the present study. Halliday has theorized that there are three general functions which language fulfils at a time: it communicates about events and objects in the world ('ideational function'), it establishes and maintains social relations ('interpersonal function'), and it constructs links with itself and with features of the situation in which it is used ('textual function'). The 'textual' function concerns how bits of information are foregrounded or backgrounded, taken as given or presented as new, chosen as 'topic' or 'theme', and how a part of a text is linked to preceding and following parts of the text, and to the social situation 'outside' the text. According to Halliday these three functions are the basis of the grammatical structure of a language, since grammar provides the means whereby these functions can be turned into communication.

The systemic approach offers two major advantages to analysing discourse:

i) it offers a comprehensive and systematic model of language which allows discourse patterns to be described (and quantified) at different levels

ii) it theorizes the links between language and social life so that discourse can be seen as social practice.

These two benefits of systemic linguistics make it useful for its application in CDA. The systemic model can be described as a functional-semantic model. It is functional in that it sees conversation (spoken interactive discourse) as meaningful behaviour and it is semantic in that it interprets conversation as a process of making meanings: 'it is not only the text (what people mean) but also
the semantic system (what they can mean) that embodies the ambiguity, antagonism, imperfection, inequality and change that characterize the social system and the social structure' (Halliday, 1978: 114). The benefit of Halliday’s view that ‘language is as it is because of its functions in social structure, and the organization of behavioural meanings should give some insight into its social foundations’ (Halliday, 1973: 65) to the present study is that it makes it easier to connect the analysis of language with social analysis.

As the systemic view of language emphasizes that the grammar of a language is a system of ‘options’ from which speakers choose according to social circumstances, and that the choice of certain linguistic forms always has a meaning, it is not only a powerful basis for analysing what is in texts, but also for what is absent or omitted from them. This view of text has been applied by ‘critical linguistics’ (e.g. Kress and Hodge, 1979; Fowler et al., 1979; Trew, 1979a, 1979b). Beginning from Halliday’s critique of generative grammar, these authors have been concerned with a political analysis of text and influenced by Marxist linguistics and political theory and by Foucault, whose definition of discourse they have integrated with a linguistic framework of analysis. An early example of work in this area was Trew (in Fowler et al., 1979), who attempted to demonstrate how the choice of certain linguistic devices in newspaper headlines (e.g. choosing the passive rather than the active voice) affected the meaning and force of the text as a whole, thus exposing the potential ideological significance of using agentless passive constructions rather than opting for other constructions in which agents are explicitly stated.

The early critical linguists have been criticized for their use of the concepts of ‘ideology’ and ‘power’, without really explaining and discussing them and their tendency to see texts as products and to give scant attention to the processes of producing and interpreting texts (see Thompson, 1984; Fairclough, 1992). Criticism also came from within their own ranks (Fowler, 1987; Hodge and Kress, 1993). An important limitation of critical linguistics, according to
Fairclough, is that it places too much emphasis on the effects of discourse in the social reproduction of existing social relations and structures, and neglects discourse as a domain in which social struggles take place, and change in discourse as a dimension of wider social and cultural change. Finally, the interconnectedness between language and ideology has been too narrowly conceived in critical linguistics. Not only may grammar and vocabulary be of ideological significance, but also the whole argumentative and narrative structure of a text. Critical linguists have tended to take an 'exclusively top-down view of power and ideology' (Fairclough, 1992: 29) which puts an emphasis 'on social stasis rather than change, social structures rather than social action, and social reproduction rather than social transformation'.

According to Fairclough (1995: 82), it is one characteristic of ideology to 'naturalize' itself, to appear as 'common sense' and the lexicon. CDA is about 'denaturalizing' everyday discourse, to expose the often hidden ideologies that are reflected, reinforced and constructed in discourse. To achieve this, a multifunctional view of language is called for as it 'incorporates an orientation to mapping relations between language (texts) and social structures and relations' (Fairclough, 1995: 6). Halliday's claim that social function precedes linguistic form foregrounds the social, potentially ideological bases of semantics and lexico-grammatical structures. While systemic linguistics in this way offers frameworks for establishing a link between ideology and language and has developed sophisticated tools for analysing language patterns, it has not so much critically interpreted the results of its descriptions. Its theory of society is essentially structural-functionalist and stops short of a discussion of class conflict and power. The task of connecting ideology with language and joining macro-social theory with textual analysis of spoken and written texts has been taken up by critical linguists and critical discourse analysts, in particular. It is their approach I shall be concerned with in the following section. I shall
elaborate on those aspects of CDA which I draw upon in my own analysis of discourse.

1.4.5 Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA): a complement to Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL)

Like other approaches to discourse analysis, CDA analyses stretches of social interaction which take a linguistic form. What distinguishes the critical approach from other forms of discourse analysis is its view of discourse - language use in speech and writing - as a form of 'social practice'. Describing discourse as social practice implies dealing with issues that are important for social analysis such as the institutional circumstance of the discursive event and how that shapes the nature of the discursive practices and the constitutive effects of discourse (Fairclough, 1992). In other words, discourse is both socially constitutive and socially shaped. It is constitutive in that it helps to maintain and reproduce the social status quo, and in that it helps to transform it. Unlike 'non-critical' linguistics, critical discourse analysis is not content with description alone, but also attempts to show 'how discourse is shaped by relations of power and ideologies, and the constructive effects discourse has upon social identities, social relations and systems of knowledge and belief, neither of which is normally apparent to discourse participants' (Fairclough 1992: 12).

The theoretical origins of critical discourse analysis go back to Western Marxism. Unlike other forms of Marxism, Western Marxism has focused on cultural dimensions of society, arguing that capitalist social relations are established and maintained to a large extent in culture and ideology, not just economically. Western Marxism includes key figures in twentieth century social and political thought: Gramsci, the Frankfurt School (especially Habermas) and Althusser. From a different perspective, the same critical approach also informs much of the work in German and Austrian socio-
linguistics (Dittmar and Schlobinski, 1988; Wodak, 1985, 1989), some of which takes the critical sociolinguistic paradigm of Bernstein (1971-5) as its point of departure.

Fairclough (1995: 132-3), whose work has its intellectual antecedents in the writings of the above theorists, offers the following definition of CDA:

By 'critical' discourse analysis I mean analysis which aims to systematically explore often opaque relationships of causality and determination between (a) discourse practices, events and texts, and (b) wider social and cultural structures, relations and processes; to investigate how such practices, events and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of power and struggles over power; and to explore how the opacity of these relationships between discourse and society is itself a factor securing power and hegemony.

CDA is thus concerned with showing how discourse produces and maintains relations of power and domination/inequality which are often obscured and not readily apparent to speakers (see, for example, Mumby, 1987). Importantly, critical discourse analysts pay more attention to 'top-down' relations of dominance than to 'bottom-up' relations of resistance. However, they do not see power and dominance merely as imposed from above on others, but maintain that, in many situations, power is 'jointly produced' in social interaction, communication and discourse, for example when subordinate groups are led to believe that dominance is legitimate in some way or other. Power may even be consensual, as is the case when groups elect leaders and give them special power. Although an analysis of strategies of resistance is important for an understanding of power relations in society, the critical approach tends to focus on dominant groups and their discursive strategies to maintain and reproduce relations of domination. CDA is thus concerned with social power and ignores personal power, unless enacted by individuals as group members. CDA defines
social power as power belonging to people who have privileged access to social resources such as wealth, education, and knowledge.

Powerful groups may not only limit the freedom or action of others, but also influence their minds. The most effective form of power is exercised when those in power have managed to persuade those who have less power to see the world from the formers’ point of view. Power is thus exercised through consent. This is why some critical discourse analysts (e.g. van Dijk, 1993; 1998a, b) argue that ‘modern’ power is mostly cognitive, and enacted by strategic ways, such as persuasion and manipulation, to change the minds of others in their own interests. Managing the minds of others is basically a function of discourse. Hence the interest of critical discourse analysts in discourse strategies that legitimate control, especially those which are not overtly manipulative, but seem natural, are enacted and reproduced in every day forms of discourse and ‘naturalize’ (a term adopted from Marx) the social order (Fairclough, 1989; 1992). Fairclough points to the role which the lexicon plays in this process, citing as an example Cicourel’s (1968) ethnomethodological case study (already referred to in section 1.4.1 above), which focused on the unwritten and unspoken conventions for the use of particular expressions with particular behaviours, which are taken for granted in the production and interpretation of written records in the juvenile judicial process. Items such as incorrigible, defiance, lack of responsibility, and delinquency are part of a particular lexicalization of young people who do not fit into society. But it is easy to create an ‘anti-language’ (Halliday, 1978) to this part of the lexicon: Fairclough suggests irrepressible for incorrigible, debunking for defiance, refusal to be sucked in by society for lack of responsibility toward society, and spirit for delinquency. Alternative lexicalizations are thus created from divergent ideological positions. A lexicalization may become ‘naturalized’, i.e. become dominant and finally be accepted as commonsensical and normal, as ‘the lexicon’. For example, the use of certain expressions in the Cognitive Skills
Handbook for Teachers to describe the behaviour and thinking of offenders is passed off as mere common sense, while they are, as I shall attempt to show in Chapter 3, ideologically loaded.

The relationship between common sense and ideology was explored by Gramsci in his theory of hegemony. Since the present study is concerned with ideological common sense and hegemony is a key concept in CDA for investigating discourse as social practice, it is worth drawing attention to here.

1.5 Hegemony and discourse

When critical discourse analysts argue that texts are ideologically shaped by power relations they use the term ideology in a ‘critical sense’: drawing on Gramsci’s (1971)11 concept of hegemony, Fairclough understands ideologies to be ‘significations/constructions of reality (the physical world, social relations, social identities) which are built into various dimensions of the forms/meanings of discursive practices, and which contribute to the production, reproduction or transformation of relations of domination’.

The concept of hegemony dates back to Lenin, but has been elaborated by Gramsci in his analysis of Western capitalism and revolutionary strategy in Western Europe. Like the Marxists, Gramsci, too, understood cultural and ideological practices in terms of their functioning within the antagonistic relations between the bourgeoisie and the working class as the two fundamental classes of capitalist society. Where Gramsci departed from the earlier Marxist tradition was in arguing that the cultural and ideological relations between ruling and subordinate classes consisted less in the domination of the latter by the former than in the struggle for hegemony - that is, for moral, cultural, intellectual and, thereby, political leadership over the whole of society - between the ruling

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11 Antonio Gramsci’s (1891-1931) contribution to Marxist theory marked an important step away from the one-sided economic determinism of writers such as Rusche and Kirchheimer (1939), and was written while he was imprisoned by the Italian fascists for his communist activities.
class and, as the principal subordinate class, the working class (see Bennett, 1998). Hegemony means that one class has persuaded the other classes to accept its own moral, political and cultural values. It is about integrating rather than simply dominating subordinate classes by winning their consent through concessions or ideological means. Power is therefore not exercised coercively, but subtly and routinely. This domination, however, is only ever achieved partially and temporarily, as an unstable equilibrium. Hegemonic struggle takes place on a political level, which includes the institutions of civil society (the family, schools, courts of law, etc.). Equally important is the ideological factor of consent: subordinate classes ‘consent’ to the existing social order because it is effectively represented by the state as being universally beneficial and commonsensical. A case in point is Education, where dominant groups appear to exercise power through forming alliances, winning the consent of subordinate groups and doing so in part through discourse. One major function of dominant discourse is precisely to manufacture such consent, acceptance and legitimacy of dominance (see Herman and Chomsky, 1988). It is important that Gramsci did not believe that consent was the result of a ruling class conspiracy to deceive the working class. Rather, he thought that ideologies were produced by material realities within which people live and work.

The value of Gramsci’s theory of hegemony is that it represents a convergence of Marxism and linguistics, as it emphasizes a close connection between the language question and social organization, a connection marked by the ideological clash and temporary consent of values or hegemonic meanings. It thus provides a useful framework for analysing discourse as socio-cultural practice. I shall argue that the discourse practices (‘orders of discourse’) investigated in this study represent one domain of hegemony. The ideological dimensions of hegemonic struggles can be conceptualized and analysed in terms of the three-dimensional view of discourse Fairclough has introduced. According to Fairclough (1995: 77), an order of discourse is the
discoursal/ideological facet of a contradictory and unstable equilibrium (hegemony): ‘Discoursal practice is part of the struggle which contributes to the reproduction or transformation of the existing order of discourse, and through that of existing social and power relations’. For instance, the different forms of discourse employed in certain Scottish Prison Service policy documents, which were analysed by Adler and Longhurst (1994), can be interpreted as a mix of the existing order of penal discourse (normalization, control, and rehabilitation discourse) and ‘enterprise discourse’, a form of managerial discourse. Fairclough’s view of an order of discourse as complex, heterogeneous and contradictory is borne out by Adler and Longhurst’s conclusion that the Scottish Prison Service is a site of power struggles which are reflected in the production of different, often competing discourses. I shall come back to Managerialism in the Scottish Prison Service in Chapter 2.

Fairclough (1995) has identified changes in discoursal practices which may be linked to wider hegemonic struggles. One is the ‘conversationalization’ and apparent ‘democratization’ of discourse’, which simulates meanings and forms that belong to the discourse of social relationships and have interpersonal functions in Halliday’s (1978) terminology. It involves the reduction of overt markers of power asymmetry between people of unequal institutional power, for example, teachers and pupils, employers and workers, doctors and patients, or counsellors and ‘clients’. ‘Client’ is now also the preferred term within the crime-control system to refer to prisoners taking part in treatment programmes. This democratization of discourse is a tendency which is apparent in a great many institutions and can be generally interpreted not as the elimination of power asymmetries, but their transformation into more covert forms. The Cognitive Skills Course run at Prison X is a case in point. It can be seen as an attempt to blur the power relations obtaining between officers and prisoners. This may not even be a deliberate strategy on part of the officers who run the Course and may have the effect of helping to reduce the tensions existing
between the two sides. Relations between the two sides can improve when officers talk with prisoners conversationally on a roughly (at least apparently) equal footing rather than merely subjecting them to (shouted) orders. In one of the Cognitive Skills Courses I observed, the relations between the officer and the inmates were indeed quite friendly, if only for the duration of the Course. All six inmates maintained that the Course had changed some of their negative perceptions about prison officers. However, the discoursal practices employed by the officers can also be interpreted in hegemonic terms. The officer, who during the Course is also a teacher, exercises control (in discourse) less through direct orders and overt constraints, the way he normally does, but through indirect requests and suggestions, a less authoritarian way of reacting and responding to what the inmates say or do, thus integrating rather than dominating the group and attempting to win their consent for the programme. My data demonstrates that this attempt at hegemonic ideological control partly fails, as it is resisted by the prisoners. Some of them reject the roles assigned to them in the Course and they refuse to interiorize its conceptions.

The interrelation between language, knowledge and power has been made apparent in the structure of speech acts (Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969). Explicit commands are used when the power differential between the speaker and hearer is large and can be openly acknowledged, as in the case of prison officer and prisoner. Otherwise the command may be given in an indirect way, for example by means of an interrogative. But a request, despite its interrogative form, may well be functioning as a command (Hodge and Kress, 1993). Complicity with the speech-acts of others, recognizing them as questions which are worthy of answers or as offers which are worthy of responses, may already imply an affirmation of relations of power. The spoken discourse analysed in the present study can be seen as a contradictory mixture of discourses of (apparent) equality and power. Even when some Cognitive Skills sessions turned into 'casual' conversation, a genre which, according to Kress (1985: 25), is that with the
'least or no power difference' because the participants speak 'on their own behalf', the power differences between the officer and the group were at best less pronounced. Eggins and Slade (1997) go as far as saying that even casual conversation always involves a struggle over power, which is only concealed by the apparent equality of the casual context.

To sum up this section, CDA argues that 'modern' power is mostly enacted by persuasion and manipulation. Such 'mind management' (van Dijk, 1998b) is not always overtly manipulative, but may be enacted by subtle, everyday forms of text and talk that appear 'natural'. This is why the concept of hegemony with its associated concept of consent and the management of the mind lends itself so well to CDA's focus on discourse strategies that legitimate control, or otherwise 'naturalize' the social order and especially relations of inequality (see Fairclough, 1985).

Van Dijk (1998b) names two major ways in which discourse is involved in the (re)production of dominance and inequality: namely through the enactment of dominance in text and talk in specific contexts, and more indirectly through the influence of discourse on the minds of others. In the first case, dominant speakers may effectively limit the 'communicative rights' of others, e.g. by restricting participants, topics, style or speech acts. We will see in my analysis of some of the spoken classroom discourse in Chapter 4 that the teacher has more communicative rights than the students and the students have more communicative obligations. In the second case, dominant speakers control the access to public discourse and are thus able to manage the minds of people indirectly. They do so by using linguistic structures and strategies that manipulate people in such a way that they develop attitudes, values and norms that ultimately serve the interests of the dominant groups. Dominance is defined as the exercise of social power by elites, institutions or groups, that results in social inequality, including political, cultural class, ethnic, racial and gender inequality.
Power and dominance are usually organized and institutionalized to enhance their effectiveness. CDA regards discourse as constitutive of institutions and therefore focuses its attention on institutions and on discourse which is clearly associable with particular institutions. In the following section I shall investigate the relationship between discourse and institutions in more detail.

1.6 Institutional discourse

In recent years there has been a significant growth in the studies of power in organizations which have been concerned with understanding the relationship between discourse, ideology and power (e.g. Mumby 1987; van Dijk 1993; Wodak, 1996; Mumby and Clair, 1997). Rather than regarding organizations and institutions as social collectives, where shared meaning is produced, critical discourse studies see them as 'sites of struggle where different groups compete to shape the social reality of organizations in ways that serve their own interests' (Mumby and Clair, 1997: 182). The concept of organizations as cultures with an emphasis on the interconnectedness of power and discourse lends itself very well to my linguistic analysis of institutional discourse within a prison, where this is particularly evident. An institution which in many respects is built on repression is also structured and maintained by discursive relations and interactions. This is because many of these relations of domination are structured and reproduced through the mobilization of particular attitudes and beliefs (see Adler and Longhurst, 1994).

Not only is a dominant ideology important in securing the coherence of dominant groups, but it is also relevant in incorporating the dominated. Fairclough, extending Foucault's analysis of the technologies of power to discourse, refers to a 'technologization' of discourse (Fairclough, 1992), which he sees as a striking feature of contemporary society. As capitalist societies are
increasingly moving from manufacturing to service industries, workers are redefined as being in need of 'communication skills'. Examples of discourse technologies would be interviewing, teaching, counselling, and advertising. Habermas (1984) has made an important distinction in this respect between 'communicative' use of language - aimed at producing understanding -, and 'strategic' uses of language - oriented to success and to making people do things - and has pointed to the displacement of the former by the latter. He sees this development as a sign of the colonization of people's lives by the systems of the economy and the state. 12 This interventionist orientation to language is reflected in the conceptualization of language in terms of skills and techniques (such as interviewing and counselling) which are designed and redesigned for particular purposes, and can be applied in various domains and institutions more or less independent of context: discourse technologies in modern society have taken on the character of 'transcontextual techniques, which are seen as resources or toolkits that can be used to pursue a wide variety of strategies in many diverse contexts. Discourse technologies are coming increasingly to be handled in specific institutional locations by designated social agents' (Fairclough, 1992: 215). 13 Those who are to be taught discourse technologies tend to be teachers, 'gate-keepers', 'power-holders' and, in this particular case, prison officers, whereas discourse technologies are generally designed to have a particular effect on 'clients' who have no training in them. Social skills training has been widely implemented in institutional contexts for training social workers, counsellors or public officials. The instruction of prison staff in the Scottish Prison Service also includes the teaching of inter-personal skills, judging others, non-verbal communication, and listening, although the

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12 A prime example of strategic discourse is advertising discourse. According to Fairclough (1989, 1992), Education is one of the domains which has been colonized by the advertising genre, turning it into a 'commodified' educational discourse, which is dominated by a vocabulary of skills.

13 In university social studies departments, a well-established example is research and training in 'social skills' carried out by social psychologists (e.g. Argyle, 1978).
overwhelming focus remains on regulation and control. The prisoners who take part in the Cognitive Skills Course are considered to be lacking in social and cognitive skills and are therefore the ‘clients’. The Course is based on the assumption that prisoners’ inadequacies in social practice can be overcome by teaching them to draw on these skills.

There has been a tendency in recent years for institutional discourse to be more informal and more empathetic (e.g. doctor-patient talk; interviews of various kinds). Whether these changes in communication, as, for example, between doctors and patients (see Wodak, 1996), are indeed emancipatory or merely obfuscate power relations, as Fairclough (1992) suggests, is difficult to assess. Looking at the interactions between the officer and the inmates in the Cognitive Skills Course, this is true to a certain extent, but not entirely. If, for example, prison officers are more polite, then prisoners may be more willing to accept what the officer attempts to teach them in the Course. On the other hand, they may also find it easier to question the conceptions of the Course or to reject them outright, as my analysis in Chapter 5 of the linguistic strategies of resistance employed by the prisoners demonstrates.

I started from the assumption that this form of control can be associated with ideology and hegemony. I will take this type of discursive and ideological control as an example of the kind of power relation that has become prevalent in modern societies, in which ‘discourse technologies’ (Fairclough, 1992) have had an influence on many institutional locations, including prisons.

It was stated above that it is in the nature of ideology to ‘naturalize’ itself and to appear as ‘common sense’. One of the tasks of CDA is to expose the

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14 The training has been criticized by Ken Murray, the former Chief Nursing Officer at the Barlinnie Special Unit: "interpersonal relations" might be the new rhetoric in training but the primary relationship is on rules and regulations taught top-down by established prison officers. Interpersonal relations says treat the person as an ordinary human being... but what's an ordinary human being? The prison system is largely unprofessional in terms of dealing with the real complexity of human problems. People off the street are taken on the basis of being able to read or write, then after 8 weeks they are expected to deal with the most complex set of people you are ever likely to meet." (Ken Murray, personal interview, 1989; quoted in Phil Scraton et. al. Prisons under Protest, 1991: 34).
ideologies expressed and therefore the interests served in everyday and institutional discourse. In the section below, I shall take a closer look at the concept of ideology itself.

1.7 Language and ideology

Of all controversial concepts in the social sciences and the humanities, the concept of ideology, like the concepts of discourse and power, is probably the one that most defies precise definition. Broadly, the term refers to systems of ideas, beliefs, practices, and representations which work in the interests of a social class or cultural group. Common usages generally fall into two categories: a critical definition allied with Marxist theory and a relativist definition used in liberal social theory and popular discourse. According to Williams (1976: 126), the word ‘ideology’ first appeared in English in 1796, as a direct translation of the new French word idéologie which had been proposed by the rationalist philosopher Destutt de Tracy to denote the ‘science of ideas, in order to distinguish it from the ancient metaphysics’. In addition to this scientific meaning a more derogatory meaning of the term was derived from the so-called ‘idéologues’ of post-revolutionary France and quickly acquired a negative meaning, as Napoleon accused the ‘idéologues’ and their doctrines of being responsible for the decline of the country (see Thompson, 1990). This negative connotation of the term was preserved in the writings of Marx and Engels (1845-46), who saw the ruling ideas as ‘nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships’. Failure to realize this produced ideology as an upside-down version of reality. This is reflected in the notion of ideology as ‘false consciousness’, which implies that under the influence of ruling class domination (hegemony), the working class may have misguided beliefs about the material conditions of its existence. Dominant ideologies in that case are an instrument of the ruling class to conceal its power
and the real socio-economic conditions of the working class. Because the ruling class, no matter how defined, controls the means of production, including the (re)production of ideas (in particular those of politics, the media, education), they also have the ability to make the ruled more or less accept their ideologies as the undisputed truth. There is also a more neutral meaning of ideology in Marx’ writings, namely a ‘set of ideas which arise from a given set of material interests’ (Williams, 1976: 129). Later thinkers in the Marxist tradition, however, have stressed the implicit and unconscious materialization of ideologies in practice. Gramsci (1971: 328) defines ideology as a ‘conception of the world that is implicitly manifest in art, in law, in economic activity and in the manifestations of individual and collective life’. For Gramsci, ideology is ‘tied to action, and ideologies are judged in terms of their social effects rather than their truth values’ (Fairclough, 1995: 76).

The term ‘ideology’ has been taken up by sociologists, anthropologists, political analysts, and increasingly linguists who want to explore the relations between linguistic and non-linguistic activity. One can distinguish two fundamentally different ways of how the term ‘ideology’ is used. In the writings of some contemporary social theorists (e.g. Seliger, 1976; Gouldner, 1976; Hirst, 1979), it is a purely descriptive term, denoting ‘systems of thought’ or ‘systems of belief’ which belong to social action or political practice. According to this ‘neutral conception’ of ideology (Thompson, 1984), ideology has no intrinsic connection to the problem of domination. The other, ‘critical conception’ of ideology links it to the process of sustaining asymmetrical relations of power - that is to the process of maintaining domination. Unlike neutral conceptions, critical conceptions imply that the phenomena which are characterized as ideological are misleading, illusory or one-sided and susceptible to criticism (Marx). It is this critical conception of ideology which I shall adopt as a framework to explore the relation between language and ideology by means of critical discourse analysis. The analysis of ideology is, in a fundamental
respect, concerned with language, as language is an important medium of the meaning which serves to sustain relations of domination. Following Thompson (1984, 1990), I wish to argue that to study ideology is to study the ways in which meaning serves to sustain relations of domination. This is similar to Fairclough’s (1992: 87) position that ideologies are ‘significations/ constructions of reality (the physical world, social relations, social identities), which are built into various dimensions of the forms/meanings of discursive practices, and which contribute to the production, reproduction or transformation of relations of domination’.

Thompson (1984) outlines three general modes through which ideology can operate: legitimation, dissimulation and reification. Relations of domination may thus be maintained by being presented as legitimate. According to Weber (1978) every system of domination attempts to maintain a belief in its legitimacy, by appealing to rational grounds (appealing to the legality of rules), traditional grounds (appealing to the sanctity of traditions) and charismatic grounds (appealing to the magnetic personality of an individual with authority). Such an appeal is generally expressed in symbolic forms by means of language. Legitimating discourse is usually employed in institutional contexts: institutions legitimate themselves with regard to citizens and the population at large. It is discourse that justifies official action of an institution or the institution itself. At the same time, legitimation implies that opposing groups will be delegitimated (see van Dijk, 1998b). For example, the essentially negative news coverage by some Scottish papers about the 1986 siege at Peterhead prison, which portrayed the prisoners involved in the protest as violent, unstable and irrational ‘hard men’, was an essential mechanism in legitimating the official response that behind all prison protest stood a minority whose aim it was to disrupt the regime, intimidate other prisoners and injure prison officers, and delegitimating
prisoners' concerns. 15 Most Scottish newspapers took for granted the official statements from the Scottish Office, which undermined the prisoners' grievances by affording them only little space and legitimacy in the newspaper coverage (Scraton et al., 1991). Where prisoners were allowed to speak, the reader was left in no doubt that they were not necessarily to be believed. 16

Strategies of delegitimation are generally based on norms, values and ideologies which are claimed to be widely accepted by society. Dominant groups will in this case not cite their own interests, but use arguments that claim that their norms are good for the dominated groups themselves. This can be observed in the delegitimation of prisoners' values or the meaning they attribute to their actions. It is therefore not surprising that in the Cognitive Skills literature (Ross, Fabiano and Ewles, 1989: 3) prisoners are described as people whose thinking is 'impulsive', 'egocentric', 'illogical' and 'rigid'. By thus portraying prisoners as irrational and describing their behaviour as a form of personal disorder that justifies professional intervention, the ideology of the Cognitive Skills literature becomes legitimate.

Dissimulation means that relations of power which are in the interest of some at the expense of others may be concealed or denied. A strategy which facilitates dissimulation is the use of euphemisms, whereby actions, institutions and social relations are described in terms which have positive connotations

15 A similar observation was made by Teun van Dijk (1991) in his work on racism and the press. Van Dijk found that minority representatives are seldom allowed to speak as the only source about ethnic events and that opponent discourse may be delegitimated in the press by citing out of context, emphasizing the violation of common values or through negative speaker representation ('militant', 'fundamentalist'). Not only were accusations of racism on the part of minorities presented as fundamentally doubtful, and hence between quotes, but also did they not go unchallenged by the (white) authorities (van Dijk, 1991, 1998b).

16 The following introductory paragraph taken from an article in the Sunday Mail, which describes the experiences of one prisoner, provides an example of how delegitimation can work: 'Steve is no angel. He's a not-so-old lag with a violent record. His last sentence was 6 years for robbery ... ' 'He makes allegations that would be denied by prison authorities. But it shows the state of mind that led to the violence.' (Sunday Mail, 16 November 1986; quoted in Phil Scraton et al. 1991: 121).
(such as ‘client’ and ‘inmate’ to describe prisoners or ‘establishments’ to describe prisons) and metaphors. The effectiveness of metaphors in dissimulating social relations, individuals or groups by representing them in a particular way and providing them with a positive or negative sense has been pointed out, among others, by Lakoff and Johnson (1980), Koch and Deetz, (1980), Deetz and Mumby (1985) and Chilton (1988). Lakoff and Johnson discuss the metaphorical use of argument as war (reflected, for example, in statements such as ‘his criticisms were right on target’ and ‘I demolished his argument’). They stress that many arguments are structured by the concept of war and that this is not a superficial process but basic to language and thinking. Chilton (1988) refers to the ‘militarization of discourse’ as a militarization of thought and social practice, just as Fairclough (1992) refers to the ‘marketization of discourse’ to other spheres such as Education as a ‘marketization of thought and practice’.

The third way through which ideology may operate, reification, works by representing a transitory, historical state of affairs as if it were constant and natural. Processes are portrayed as things or events in such a way that their social or historical character is obscured or concealed. This mode may be expressed in symbolic forms by the strategy of naturalization, whereby a state of affairs which is a social and historical creation may be presented as a natural event or as the inevitable outcome of natural characteristics. For example, the socially created division of labour between men and women may be portrayed as a result of physiological and biological differences between the sexes. Ideologies which are embedded in discourse are most effective when they become naturalized and achieve the status of ‘common sense’ (Fairclough, 1992). Thus metaphors may be so completely naturalized within a particular culture that people are not even aware of them. Reification may also be expressed by means of nominalization and passivization, which delete actors and agency and tend to represent processes as things or events that take place
without the subject that produces them (Kress and Hodge, 1979; Fowler et al., 1979; Hodge and Kress 1988). Nominalization is, as we shall see in Chapter 3, a prominent feature of the Cognitive Skills Handbook texts.

These three modes by which ideology can operate are by no means the only ones, nor are they mutually exclusive. Rather, they overlap and complement each other. By concentrating on certain modes of operation of ideology and indicating ways in which they may be connected, in particular circumstances, with 'strategies of symbolic construction' (Thompson, 1990), my aim here is to exemplify how meaning may serve to establish and sustain relations of power. The meaning I am concerned with is the meaning of 'symbolic forms', that is, linguistic utterances and structures which are produced by subjects and are embedded in social contexts. An important qualification I have to make in analysing some typical strategies of symbolic construction is that I do not want to claim that these structures are ideological per se. That depends on how they are used and understood in certain circumstances and whether they serve to create, sustain, or undermine relations of domination. It is also true that relations of domination are sustained in many different ways, such as the exercise of force and violence, or apathy and indifference on the part of dominated individuals and groups, and that language pales into insignificance compared to these. To name just one example, Clegg (1975, 1987), in his study of power relations between workers and management on a construction site, has questioned the access to the reality of power in organizations through the analysis of language, arguing that questions of power are tied up with systems of wage relations and the social relations of production and that one need not necessarily make reference to language in a circumlocutive way to discover who exercises power over whom. In other words, power is not primarily a discursive phenomenon. A similar objection can, of course, be made with regard to relations of power and domination in the prison. However, the mobilization of meaning to support relations of domination is a social phenomenon and one
possible way through which these relations are sustained. This in itself makes discourse an important domain in the study of ideology.

The greatest difficulties in analysing ideology are telling whether particular language forms are indeed establishing and sustaining relations of power and how we can find out what they mean to individuals and if there is any relation at all between the meaning and the social situations of these individuals. There can be no clear-cut response to these problems. But it is probably right to assume that symbolic forms do have certain meanings for people and that although it is very difficult to determine these, they are not indeterminate. What I attempt to do in this study then, is to shed light on the meanings that language forms may have for individuals by analysing the characteristics of these forms using principally the tools of CDA with an emphasis on Halliday’s functional grammar.

The interpretation of ideology does raise specific problems in so far as this involves defining phenomena which are already understood in some sense by those who produce and receive them and which are linked to the interests and opportunities of these individuals. One claim made by critical linguists was that ideologies reside in texts. While it is true that the forms and content of texts show traces of ideological structures, critical discourse analysts take the view that is not possible to ‘read off’ ideologies from texts. This is because meanings are produced through interpretations of texts, and texts may be interpreted in different ways and because ideological processes appertain to discourses as whole social events (Fairclough, 1992). Any attempt to link ideology with language should therefore be tempered with Voloshinov’s (1973) and Pêcheux’s (1982) insight that linguistic theorizing itself is not outside ideology.

As I pointed out above, discourse analysts have increasingly paid attention to the ways in which language is used in specific contexts and thereby serves as a medium of power and control. This sociological turn has turned discourse analysis into an important tool for studying ideology. Especially
Fowler, Hodge, Kress and Trew have sought to develop a 'critical linguistics' which focuses on the ways in which language reflects and reproduces the social organization of power. I have pointed out their contributions and main limitations above and I shall not pursue this matter any further here. Suffice it to say that these authors have tended to emphasize form and structure of discourse at the expense of content and that they assumed that meaning can be 'read off' from syntax. What an expression 'means' is not fixed and invariant, but fluctuating, and is determined as much by context as by its syntactic features. Another problem is that although discourse analysts have sought to explore the relations between language, power and ideology, their accounts have remained limited, as their definitions of these key concepts are very vague and not situated within a systematic social theory. For example, Hodge and Kress (1993: 6) have defined ideology as a 'systematic body of ideas, organized from a particular point of view'; Fowler et al. (1979: 81) have understood ideologies as 'sets of ideas involved in the ordering of experience, making sense of the world'. This conception of ideology is too general and fails to establish a link between ideology and domination. But despite these shortcomings in their work, Fowler et al. have been right to call attention to syntactic devices which play an important role in discourse, such as nominalization, passivization, the use of pronouns and the structure of tense. For representing processes as things, deleting actors and presenting time as an extension of the present tense are all examples of reification within language. Thompson (1984) made an important observation by stating that the meaning of an expression is not fixed and always open to change:

What may have seemed like a sphere of effective consensus must in many cases be seen as a realm of actual or potential conflict. Hence the meaning of what is said - what is asserted in spoken or written discourse as well as that about which one speaks or writes - is infused with forms of power; different individuals or groups have a different capacity to make a meaning stick. It is the infusion of
meaning with power that lends language so freely to the operations of ideology... Relations of domination are sustained by a 
*mobilization of meaning* which legitimates, dissimulates or reifies an existing state of affairs; and meaning can be mobilized because it is an essentially open, shifting, indeterminate phenomenon (Thompson, 1984: 132; emphasis in the original).

When an ideology is the ideology of a powerful social group, it is said to be dominant. Thus, dominant ideologies are mediated through powerful political and social institutions such as the government and the law. This theoretical account of social reproduction may exaggerate the extent to which particular values and beliefs are shared and accepted by individuals in modern industrial societies. I shall deal with this issue in the following section.

1.7.1 Dominant ideologies

The concept of ideology and analysis of ideological forms and their role in social and political life have been criticized from various perspectives and it has been debated whether such dominant ideologies exist in the first place. For example, Abercrombie, Hill and Turner (1980, 1990) have questioned the ‘dominant ideology thesis’, according to which adherence to social order is largely secured through the presence of a dominant ideology which is so pervasive that it manages to win the consent and acquiescence of the majority. They argue that people often resist dominant ideologies and that various non-ideological (e.g. economical) mechanisms are also influential in attaining a (limited) level of cohesion. Another fundamental attack comes from Thompson (1990) who criticizes the dominant ideology thesis for its presumption that ideology works like a kind of ‘social cement’, binding individuals to a social order which oppresses them. He questions to what extent dominant values and
beliefs are shared by members of subordinate groups (see Willis, 1977). The dominant ideology also fails to explain what it seeks to explain, namely, why members of subordinate groups act in ways which do not undermine the social order.

A substantial body of research shows that the ideologies that are diffused by the media are to a large extent those of the economically and politically powerful groups and not those of subordinate groups (Dreier, 1982; Golding and Murdock, 1979; Lichter et al., 1990). Other research suggests that the general ideological influence of the media is pervasive (Hall, 1980a, b; 1982; Herman and Chomsky, 1988). Finally, there are studies which emphasize that even where such ideological control takes place, people are quite capable of rejecting it or adapt such ideologies to their own needs (Bryant and Zillman, 1986; Graber, 1988; Neumann et al. 1992). Obviously, such ideological strategies are not always successful and resistance and opposition may challenge them (Hall and Jefferson, 1976; Luke, 1989; Miller et al., 1989; Mullard, 1985; Scott, 1986). For example, although the British government’s ‘tough on crime’-stance may command widespread support among the population, liberal market ideology that promotes a dismantling of the welfare state, is much less accepted, specially in the lower classes. In this case, the dominant ideology may be invalid. On the other hand, Thatcherism and its conservative rhetoric of popular capitalism was quite successful in preventing solidarity among subordinate groups/classes by suggesting that everybody ‘can make it’ (Hall, 1988).

This is not to suggest that certain symbolic forms are not capable of establishing and reproducing relations of domination, nor is it to maintain that the concept of ideology is not useful in the analysis of social and political life.

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17 In his study of a group of working-class boys, Paul E. Willis (1977) provides an example of how the reproduction of the social system can be an unintentional result of the rejection of the values and norms emphasized by the educational system. Willis argues that the reproduction of manual labour is not the outcome of a seamless fit between the values and beliefs of individuals and a set of values that is provided by the educational system; on the contrary, it is precisely because these boys refuse to interiorize the values and beliefs propagated by the educational system that they accept manual labour.
But rather than assuming that a particular set of beliefs and values binds all strata to the social order, a more satisfactory approach to ideology must examine the ways in which ‘individuals differentially situated in the social order respond to and make sense of particular symbolic forms, and how these symbolic forms, when analysed in relation to the contexts in which they are produced, received and understood, serve (or do not serve) to establish and sustain relations of domination’ (Thompson, 1990: 91-92). The main objections that can be raised to the dominant ideology thesis are, first, that it adopts a class-reductionist approach to the modern state, according to which the main function of the state is class exploitation carried out in part by the propagation of a dominant ideology through the ‘ideological state apparatuses’ (Althusser, 1971), which include the schools, the family, the legal system, and the media. Second, the dominant ideology thesis also tends to adopt a class-reductionist approach to ideology. Although relations of domination between classes are very important for the analysis of ideology, some argue that it would be quite misleading to maintain that class relations are the only or primary factors which should be referred to in an analysis of ideology (see Thompson, 1984; van Dijk, 1998b). On the other hand, while it may be true that the importance of class in the analysis of ideology has been over-valued within the Marxist tradition and that the role of ideology in securing domination in gender relations and in relations between ethnic groups is as worthy of consideration, it should not be overlooked that we are analysing social relations of domination within a social order that is capitalist, and dominated by, although not reducible to, class relations.

In this section I have discussed the concept of ideology and its various definitions and I have presented my own understanding of the term. Having stated that language use and communication is often crucial in the expression and (re)production of ideology it is now time to relate the macro-notion of ideology to the typical micro-notions of discourse and social situations and state what features of discourse may be ideologically invested. In what
follows, I will present a brief discussion of discourse structures which may be typically involved in the expression or formation of ideology and relate it to the present study.

1.7.2 Ideological discourse structures

Although ideology is differently defined by both social theorists and critical linguists, there is widespread agreement that discourse and social interaction are relevant to the study of ideology. For example, Thompson (1984: 3) suggests that the study of language is important within the theory of ideology: ‘to study ideology is, in some part and in some way, to study language in the social world’. An important question about ideology is what features of language and discourse may be ideologically invested. Linguistic analyses of ideological language have illustrated that ideologies are expressed not only at the lexical-semantic and the grammatical-syntactic level (e.g. Hodge and Kress, 1993; Eggins and Slade, 1997), but can also be detected at pragmatic levels. Harris (1994), for example, showed that ideological processes in court operate on both the propositional level (propositional content, choices of mood and modality, choices of lexical items) and pragmatic levels (interactive rules with regard to speaker rights, use of particular speech rights). Often, the content of a text and its lexical meanings are regarded as potentially ideological, but so are metaphors, grammar, presuppositions, implicatures and coherence, the turn-taking system, politeness conventions, and style.

1.7.2.1 Lexicalization and grammatical structure

The most obvious and most thoroughly studied form of ideological expression may be found in the words people choose to express a concept. An example of an ideologically based lexicalization would be the choice of ‘riot’ rather than
'prisoner protest', as was the case in the news coverage following the 1986 prisoner protests at various Scottish prisons. By defining prisoner protest as 'riot', prisoners' actions are given a meaning that practically criminalizes their actions, thus negating the possibility that 'riots' could in fact be an expression of reason or resistance and a means for prisoners to voice their grievances. This is an example of how a lexical item can be invested with a particular kind of meaning from a particular ideological standpoint. Other meanings are denied.

Lexical items and grammatical structure are some of the most obvious means speakers employ to express their ideological opinions about people and events. Syntactic structures may also have ideological implications. Sentences may be expressed in a passive rather than active voice, so that actors and patients are made less prominent or left implicit, as in the case of nominalizations (Fowler, 1991; Fowler et al., 1979; van Dijk, 1991). Word order, clause structure or clause relations may put information in more or less prominent position, thus subtly affecting their meaning.

1.7.2.2 Style

Lexicalization may vary as a function of opinion, and if such takes place systematically throughout the discourse, one can speak of a 'lexical style' (van Dijk, 1998b). Lexical and grammatical style then may indicate in many ways relationships of power. A speaker's powerful social position may not only be expressed by the words or syntax he or she chooses, but also be enacted and reproduced by it. This may manifest itself in the stylistic differences between judges and defendants, professors and students, or police officers and suspects. Style can be said to define positions of participants. Those who control the style of text and talk in the literature on cognitive training for prisoners thus define their position. Chapter 3 will be concerned with the ideological significance of all aspects of meaning and of the 'styles' of written texts. The ideology of the
Handbook for Teaching Cognitive Skills, for example, is in part stylistic in that it is full of categorical and unmitigated statements about offenders. Take the following statement as an example: ‘offenders tend to be undersocialized - they lack the values, attitudes, reasoning and social skills which are required for pro-social adjustment’ (Handbook, p. 3). There is a moral preoccupation with the behaviour of the individual offender, which legitimates and justifies intervention.

1.7.2.3 Interactional strategies

If the basic aim of ideological communication is to influence recipients in such a way that they eventually accept preferred opinions, several forms of ‘interactional control mechanisms’ will play a part in this form of social mind control. In the same way as speakers may control topic or style, they may also control turn-taking and turn allocation, thus limiting the conversational freedom of others. Conversation Analysis, although it initially ignored notions of power and inequality, has shown how such forms of social inequality may be enacted in every-day and institutional talk (e.g. Coulthard, 1992; Drew and Heritage, 1992; West, 1984; Holmes, 1995). In Chapter 4 I will focus on the linguistic strategies employed by the officers to secure compliance with the course contents (e.g. how they use questions and reformulations as a means of controlling the topic).

1.8 Conclusion

In this chapter I have reviewed sociological and linguistic approaches to discourse analysis with special reference to SFL and CDA. These approaches serve as a framework for my own analysis of written texts from the Cognitive
Skills Handbook in Chapter 3 and spoken discourse from the Cognitive Skills training sessions run at Prison X in Chapters 4 and 5.

I have also focused on Foucault because he ascribes a central role to discourse in the development of specifically modern forms of power and because his emphasis on the role of discourse in the constitution of social subjects is important to linguistics. I have argued that his model of productive power is insufficient to explain power relations in a prison context and also with regard to the Cognitive Skills spoken and written discourse. I find a view of power as domination using the concept of hegemony more useful, particularly because it stresses the importance of discussing ideology in securing domination.

In the following chapter I shall present an overview of the history of the Scottish prison system and more recent changes within the Scottish Prison Service (SPS) to account for present approaches to imprisonment. This will be followed by an account of my research methods and data collection.
CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH CONTEXT, METHODS, AND DATA COLLECTION

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I shall first provide a brief account of the historical development of the Scottish prison system. This will be followed by a description of the use of imprisonment in Scotland, the most important and powerful groups within the prison system today and their associated discourses. These discourses are expressed in a number of policy documents the Scottish Prison Service (SPS) produced in the wake of the crisis it faced in the mid- and late eighties, which gave rise to its new corporate philosophy. By drawing attention to these documents, I attempt to put my own discussion of the functions of discourse, ideology and power within the deviancy control system into a wider context. Also, I believe that developments in the present must be understood in terms of the system’s historical developments. I shall then briefly describe Prison X and my involvement in the Cognitive Skills Course run at this particular prison. In the final section I will focus on my methods of data collection.

2.2 The institutional history of the Scottish Prison Service\(^1\)

The institutional history of the Scottish Prison Service (SPS) can be seen as characterized by two themes: centralization and the replacement of the legal profession by the civil service as the major source of influence over the service. The origins of the system of imprisonment which exist in Scotland today are to be found in the nineteenth century. Loss of freedom as a punishment for crime is a fairly recent idea in Scotland, and prisons were rarely used as places of punishment before that time.

\(^1\) The following account is largely taken from Michael Adler and Brian Longhurst (1994).
Compared with England, Scotland seems to have had a relatively liberal penal tradition (Coyle, 1991). However, the general conditions in prisons in the early nineteenth century were very bad, which led the Government to take responsibility for prisons away from the local authorities and move towards centralization. By 1877, all responsibility for prisons had been transferred to the Secretary of State for Scotland. At the same time, prison staff became civil servants. Much of the 1877 Act was re-enacted in the Prisons (Scotland) Act 1952, which remained in force until it was replaced by the 1989 Act. Under this Act the Secretary of State has the overall responsibility for all aspects of penal policy and administration.

The system which was operating in Scotland during the nineteenth century was determined by two forms of penal discourse: deterrence and reform. These, however, co-existed with a powerful control discourse. While this control discourse remained constant, the discourses of deterrence and reform were gradually transformed in the course of the twentieth century into a discourse of rehabilitation. And although rehabilitation, along with control, had become one of the two dominant forms of penal discourse in the twentieth century, the former has been gradually displaced by a new discourse of normalization since the early seventies, when confidence in rehabilitation discourses started to diminish (see Martinson, 1974). For example, some prison governors in Scotland have argued for a normalization strategy which emphasizes the improvement of the relations between prison officer and prisoner (e.g. Coyle, 1986 and 1991). Training prison officers to become Cognitive Skills tutors can be seen as one example to achieve the goal of normalization in the relations between the two sides. I shall deal with the issue of relations between officers and prisoners in the section below.
2.2.1 Staff-inmate relationships

All the major accounts of prison life have made assumptions about the possibilities of interaction between staff and inmates. Sykes (1958), for example, observed that both sides are drawn from the same culture, hold many of the same values and share a common language. In their study of Pentonville prison, Morris and Morris (1963) also noted similarities in behaviour and attitudes with regard to language, women, sex, and the colour question. Cohen and Taylor (1974), on the other hand, found that although prisoners in a maximum security wing at Durham prison had the same socio-economic origins, they shared very little in culture or language, but felt culturally distinct. Dobash and Dobash’s (1986: 190) study of Cornton Vale, Scotland’s only prison for women, likewise found very little evidence for the barriers between staff and inmates being broken down, claiming that suspicion was the hallmark of relationships between adult prisoners and prison officers: ‘While the ideology of modern women’s prison suggests that the officer is the prisoner’s friend and therapist (leaving out the possible conflict between these roles), the actual operation of the prison through the prison rules underlined by the officers’ training promotes an authoritarian mode’. Likewise, Manocchio and Dunn’s (1970) study points to the overwhelming difference in perspectives between staff and prisoner by presenting a prisoner’s view, in his own words, contrasted with the same events as seen by a prison counsellor (Dunn and Manocchio, respectively). In the view of the authors, both parties are so involved in their own worlds that they cannot reach out to understand each other. A valuable insight comes from Goffman (1961) in his book *Asylums* ², where he points to the fact that there is a constant tension in staff relations with inmates between a

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² Though mostly an account about life in mental hospitals, *Asylums* relates mental hospitals to prisons, concentration camps, monasteries, orphanages, and many other organizations. According to Goffman, total institutions like these are institutions in which all elements of human life occur in the same place and under the same authority. All activities are rationally organized in the service of the institution’s goals.
The caste model of social relations and normal human interaction. The caste model demands staff withdrawal from inmates with reciprocal negative stereotypes. In contrast staff feel a pull towards normalizing their interaction with at least a few of the more appealing inmates. According to Goffman, they react to conflict by cycling between contact and withdrawal. As contact increases, the staff member becomes increasingly sympathetic towards an inmate. Eventually, he gets involved too much, gets 'burnt', and withdraws into the safety of the caste model of staff-inmate relations.

A more positive account has been given by Wheeler (1961b: 230), who focused on differences in norms and perceptions between prisoners and staff, and noted a mutual misperception between the two. The staff saw prisoners as being more anti-social than they were by their own reports. Likewise, in tests on staff expectation, prisoners saw them as more anti-prisoner than they actually were. Wheeler claimed that 'the results suggest that there is less conflict between inmates and staff on a private attitudinal level than is usually reported on the basis of observational accounts'. And Morris and Morris (1963: 254) remark that 'it would be quite erroneous to accept at face value the statements of prisoners that “all screws are bastards” and of the staff that “all prisoners are liars and not to be trusted”'. For if these stereotypes were held consistently and expressed in overt behaviour, prisons would be constantly verging on crisis: ‘whatever staff and prisoners may say about each other, the fact remains that neutrality is more characteristic of most relationships than hostility and that in some instances relationships between staff and prisoners may be characterized by considerable warmth’. The configuration of inmate-staff hostility was not among the phenomena I studied, so all I have to offer is anecdotal evidence. While I found no evidence for the latter part of the above statement at Prison X, relationships between officers and inmates were not always as hostile as they made them out to be. The Second Prison Survey (Wozniak et al., 1994: 28) likewise found that ‘for many prisoners, the stereotypical portrayal of hatred and
opposition between prisoners and staff was not a particularly accurate portrayal of the general quality of relationships which existed in Scottish prisons at that time’. Although a few prisoners said that the officers would just ‘put up a front’ for a female researcher, they also remarked at the end of the Cognitive Skills Course that their attitude towards officers had somewhat changed and that they no longer saw them all as contemptible screws. It appears that where prisoners and officers spend time together in small groups, as in the Cognitive Skills Course, they are forced to regard each other as individuals and at least to reassess their attitudes about each other.

2.3 Actors in the Scottish prison system

The significant actors within the Scottish prison system are: civil servants based in the Headquarters of the Scottish Prison Service in Edinburgh; prison governors, prison officers; several groups of prison professionals, most of whom work in prisons; and the prisoners themselves.

Different groups of staff exercise power in different ways. With regard to daily activities in prisons, the two most important groups are prison officers and prisoners, and what goes on in prison can, in the first instance, be understood as a power struggle between these two groups. Although most administrative decisions concerning prison careers and the quality of life of prisoners are made by prison governors and Headquarters personnel, particularly those in the casework branches, prison officers and some professional groups influence decisions as well. However, their recommendations and opinions about prisoners are very often ‘translated’ by the more powerful ‘governor grades’. Although adult, male, long-term prisoners can now state which of the three ‘prisons of classification’ (Glenochil, Perth and Shotts) they prefer and may ask for a change of work party, they have few legally enforceable rights and must depend on someone in authority to support their wish.
In addition to the inner core the prison system also comprises three institutions which, although outside the Scottish Prison Service, do have an influence in its workings. The first is the Parole Board which is appointed by and accountable to the Secretary of State. Prisoners serving more than eighteen months may get parole after twelve months, provided they have served one-third of their sentence. The second institution is the Prisons Inspectorate. The Chief Inspector, who comes from outside the prison system and is also appointed by and accountable to the Secretary of State, visits each prison on a regular basis and is mainly concerned with the physical conditions of the prisoners, the facilities available to them and the morale of staff. The third group are the Visiting Committees, which are appointed by the local authorities in the prison area. They have the right to enter the prisons whenever they want, but their overall influence in decisions regarding prisoners and in general is not very high. Finally, there are also a number of pressure groups and voluntary organizations which claim to represent the interests of prisoners and their families. Among them are the Scottish Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders (SACRO), the Scottish Council for Civil Liberties (SCCL), the Howard League for Penal Reform (Scotland), the Gateway Exchange and Families Outside.

2.4 Imprisonment in Scotland today

At any one time, Scotland has proportionally more people in prison than just about any other Western European country. In 1996, Scotland’s average daily prison population represented 110 people per 100,000 of population. Only

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3 Scotland has its own Parole Board, whose members include judges, psychiatrists, criminologists, social workers and lay members. It is appointed by the Secretary of State for Scotland (Adler and Longhurst, 1994).
Portugal, with 140 prisoners per 100,000, had a worse record and Scotland’s current figures are known to show an increase (Mega, 1997). 4

The prison population is a product of the number of receptions into prison and the mean period of detention in prison. Scotland has also made proportionally much greater use of short sentences. Among convicted prisoners, almost half (47.2 per cent of receptions in 1988) were imprisoned for not paying a fine. At the same time, the imposition of longer sentences for drug-related crimes and the reduced availability of parole for certain long-term prisoners were particularly marked in recent years. 5

The increase in the number of long-term (eighteen months or more in Scotland) and very long-term (three years or more) prisoners and the attempt to accommodate them within the existing prisons caused serious problems and contributed to the crisis faced by the Scottish prison system in the late 1980s. In 1986 and 1987 there was an unprecedented series of instances of prisoner unrest in which prison officers were taken hostage and substantial damage was done to several prisons. Partly as a result of these pressures the Secretary of State for Scotland announced plans for a new corporate philosophy for the Scottish Prison Service in 1988, the final outcome of which were a number of policy documents: Custody and Care (C&C) (Scottish Prison Service, 1988a), Assessment and Control (A&C) (Scottish Prison Service, 1988b), Opportunity and Responsibility (O&R) (Scottish Prison Service, 1990a), A Shared Enterprise (ASE) (Scottish Prison Service, 1990b) and Organising for Excellence (OFE) (Scottish Prison Service, 1990c). These documents were an attempt to recast the running of the adult, male, long-term prison system. The last two documents, in

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4 Recently published Home Office figures on the female population of UK prisons have shown that the numbers of women have also soared. In 1992, there were 1,577 women in prison, whereas in 1998 there were 3,053 - the highest figure for over 90 years. (Roberts, 1998).

5 In 1984, the Secretary of State for Scotland announced that prisoners convicted of murder in the course of armed robbery, murder of a police or prison officer, and sexual or sadistic murders of young children should serve a minimum of twenty years. This restrictive policy brought Scotland in line with England and Wales (Adler and Longhurst, 1994).
particular, reflect a move within the SPS towards the construction of itself as an enterprise Prison Service and a new emphasis on Managerialism. I shall come back to Managerialism below and argue that the managerial approach to imprisonment and its associated discourses are part of a wider trend in which discourses originating from economic practices have encroached on many institutional settings (e.g. Education). This has implications for the present study in the sense that I consider the Cognitive Skills Course as one aspect of the managerial approach to the problem of crime: managing offenders’ minds and behaviour. The following sections will give a more detailed outline of these developments in Scottish penal policy.

2.5 Power, discourse and developments in Scottish penal policy

Social institutions can be seen as sites of diverse ‘ideological-discursive formations’ (Fairclough, 1995) associated with different groups within the institution. They sustain contrasting and often competing discursive practices (‘discourses’, in the terminology of many social analysts). According to Fairclough, there is usually one ideological-discursive formation which is clearly dominant. The Scottish prison system seems to be a case in point. During its crisis in the late eighties the Scottish Prison Service was a site of power struggles between those who wanted to preserve the status quo and those who wanted to implement change. These were expressed in different forms of discourse. The outcome of this struggle was a reformulation of discourses about imprisonment, which I shall discuss briefly below.

In their study of imprisonment and the Scottish prison system, Adler and Longhurst (1994) have analysed the above mentioned policy documents in terms of power and discourse. Their focus was on the roles of dominant groups within the Scottish prison system and on the importance of ideology in securing the coherence of dominant groups. Drawing on Mannheim’s (1952) work on the
sociology of knowledge, they maintain that groups in particular settings produce discourses that reflect their interests.6 These discourses, which they define as ‘relatively coherent sets of ideas and symbols’ are created in part from the beliefs, responses and actions of those involved in struggles within the system. In their analysis of the Scottish Prison Service documents the authors identify ‘ends discourses’, concerned with what prisons are for, and ‘means discourses’, dealing with how prisons should be run. They further distinguish between three competing types of ends discourses: rehabilitation, normalization, and control discourse. These three types can be seen as forms of ‘strategic discourse’ (Fairclough, 1989), that is, discourse oriented to instrumental goals and results. They are relevant to the present study in that they highlight the institutional and discursive changes within the SPS in the late eighties. I shall briefly discuss each type in turn.

Rehabilitation discourse is concerned with the rehabilitation of the offender back into society through actions of the state, and tends to be an ‘individuating discourse’ (Abercrombie et al., 1986). The focus is on the ‘deviant individual’. Any idea of a parallel need for a wider social change tends to be left out.

Normalization discourse contrasts with rehabilitation discourse in that it does not attempt the rehabilitation of the offender, although it seeks to prevent some of the negative effects of prison by making sure that opportunities for change are available, hoping that the individual will not become ‘worse’ while in prison. Prisoners are sent to prison as punishment rather than for punishment. The publication of Custody and Care seemed to represent a move in the direction of normalization. Examples of normalization discourse in this document were the commitment of the Scottish Prison Service ‘to provide for

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6 Karl Mannheim (1952) stresses that the competitive nature of human life is characterized by established and relatively stable patterns of domination. However, this domination is resisted by those who are subjected to it. Thus, Mannheim is particularly concerned with the nature of social struggles for power. He also points to the discursive nature of social domination. He believes that the use and development of certain forms of belief relate to positions in social hierarchies and patterns of domination. As in the later work of Foucault, power and knowledge are interconnected.
prisoners as full a life as is consistent with the facts of custody’ and ‘to enable prisoners to retain links with family and community’.

Control discourse is not concerned with either rehabilitation, reform or normalization, but with the control of disruption and the smooth running of the prisons and the prison system. It maintains that the individual should conform to the measures which are considered to be necessary for the maintenance of order and discipline in prison. Order and discipline are deemed to be under threat by the ‘disruptive’ prisoner who is at the centre of the discourse. As such, it is particularly concerned with the protection of prison staff, in particular prison officers. The short complete ‘lockdown’ of all prisoners in Scotland following prisoner unrest in 1986 and 1987 showed how control discourse had come to dominate over other forms of discourse. Many of the proposals in Assessment and Control advocate control strategies and are permeated by control discourse. Adler and Longhurst (1994: 223) cite the following excerpt from the document:

The priority is prevention and this means that judgements have to be taken which anticipate possible or intended trouble. The test of preventive measures cannot be ‘proof beyond a reasonable doubt’ because the only such proof would be the actual occurrence of events which it is hoped to prevent. Necessary intervention in advance of anticipated trouble, therefore, will always be open to objections that it is unfair or unreasonable (A&C, para. 4.9.2).

Taken together, both Custody and Care and Assessment and Control proclaimed greater emphasis on control within the prison system. A&C was received very negatively and it was in this context that Opportunity and Responsibility (O&R) was created. The philosophy of Opportunity and Responsibility not only contained normalization (as set out in Custody and Care) and control (as developed in Assessment and Control), but also a third element, opportunity, an updated form of rehabilitation. It takes the view that
we should regard the offender as a person who is responsible, despite the fact that he or she may have acted irresponsibly many times over in the past, and that we should try to relate to the prisoner in ways which would encourage him or her to accept the responsibility for their actions by providing him or her with opportunities for responsible choice, personal development and self-improvement (O&R, para. 5.5; quoted in Adler and Longhurst, 1994: 226).

*Opportunity and Responsibility* emphasized prisoners' responsibilities and the need for prisoners to face the consequences of their decisions, but had little to say about their rights, and its failure to accommodate legal discourse has been considered a matter of concern by some of its critics (e.g. Adler and Longhurst, 1991). Although the document admitted that some of the policies adopted by the Scottish Prison Service contributed to its crisis and made proposals for a number of significant policies, such as sentence planning for prisoners, it made few references to prisoners' rights and the means by which they can be enforced. This can mean that, without reference to prisoners' rights, prisoners may still face repercussions if they behave 'irresponsibly'. Its description of the relationship between officers and prisoners as one of mutual interdependence and the role of the prison officer as a kind of 'social worker' in the Halls is problematic, as it ignores the issue of power which characterizes the relationship between prisoners and all those in prison who have authority over them.

Like *Opportunity and Responsibility*, *A Shared Enterprise* places 'high value on encouraging the prisoner to accept responsibility for his action while in prison' and sees the role of the Scottish Prison Service as 'facilitating the personal development of the prisoner throughout his sentence' (para. 8.17). The document advocates normalization for the prisoner 'through greater access to his family and by retaining his self-respect' (para. 8.14.) and professionalism for staff 'which will allow them to carry out their roles competently, effectively and with a caring compassion' (para. 8.17). Again, this was not accompanied by a discussion of prisoners' rights nor of procedures for ensuring the achievement of professional standards.
As in A Shared Enterprise, rights in Organising for Excellence always entail responsibilities, particularly when it comes to so-called ‘irresponsible’ prisoners. Responsibility can be a loaded term, and it is the Scottish Prison Service that defines what responsible behaviour is and what not. The documents are mostly concerned with how prisons should be run and are therefore to be seen as examples of means discourse rather than ends discourse. They avoid any direct reference to power, although their proposal of a fusion of powerholders (that is, abolishing the distinction between civil servants and prison governors as both become managers of the ‘shared enterprise’) is seen by Adler and Longhurst as a strategy for the mobilization of power and to concentrate power in such a way as to increase social control. Equally important, the two documents stress that prison officers and prisoners also share in the operation of the system. Apart from the afore-mentioned differences between these two groups, it is arguable to what extent this decentralization of power is substantive or merely cosmetic. In order for this strategy to be at all successful a very strong rhetoric is necessary which is provided by the ‘discourse of enterprise’. Enterprise discourse is a form of managerial discourse which is heavily influenced by the ‘enterprise culture’ (Keat and Abercrombie, 1991). It provided the rhetoric under which the proposed reorganization of the SPS took place. Enterprise discourse can be detected in many areas of social life. It is an example of ‘strategic discourse’ (Fairclough, 1989) and has been transported from political discourse into the media; the training of management in industry, the health services and education. In the case of the Scottish Prison Service, such a discourse places a particular emphasis on the unification of the service and indeed on the creation of a ‘common culture’ (Pollitt, 1990: 23) which all share. Organising for Excellence (Para. 3006) argues that ‘[t]here is a need to develop a more integrated service perspective, which will produce benefits by improving co-operation between Headquarters and prisons and encourage career movement between Headquarters and establishments’ (Adler
and Longhurst, 1994: 236). Thus, a unified workforce is to be the basis for a common culture. Adler and Longhurst's (1994: 238) conclusion about the final two documents *A Shared Enterprise* and *Organising for Excellence* is that the silence of institutional actors on power relations disguises an attempt to mobilize power for particular ends and that 'the integration between the existing power-holders which they propose and the managerial discourse which they espouse can only lead to the centralisation of power and to more wide-ranging and more effective forms of social control'.

The managerial approach to imprisonment can thus be said to combine a quest for greater cost-efficiency and an increasingly overt political quest for more effective forms of social regulation.

*2.5.1 The Scottish Prison Service: the move towards enterprising Managerialism*

Since the law and order rhetoric of the Government was toned down after the mid-1980s, the more pragmatic approach of Managerialism has been adopted by the Home Office. Managerialism rests upon the assumption that modern managerial techniques, such as the ones used in private sector businesses, can be successfully applied to the problems of crime and punishment (see Bottoms and Stevenson, 1992; Cavadino, 1994). Its influence can be observed in the changes the Scottish Prison Service has undergone in recent years: one is a shift in the philosophical approach to imprisonment as demonstrated in the policy documents discussed above; the other is management-focused and concerned with the application of strategic planning to the management of all Scottish prisons. Strategic planning is a 'business system designed to provide better and more effective organisational management' and aims at 'the delivery of a quality service through a more directed and focused management system' (Wozniak, 1994: 147). It is a system that makes no explicit attempt to understand the use
and purpose of imprisonment in society. The two most important groups to be involved in this process of change are prisoners and staff. Wozniak (1994) has argued for a 'customer-focused' prison service, with prisoners and prison officers being the customers and the SPS providing the service. This thinking is particularly exemplified in *A Shared Enterprise* (Scottish Prison Service, 1990b). The document is an 'outline corporate strategy' defining the strategic priorities for the SPS, which are 'to improve the quality of service to prisoners, so as to provide them with as full, active and constructive a life as possible' and 'to develop the appropriate organisational structure and management style to deliver the service as efficiently, effectively and economically as possible' (para. 7.2).

The managerialist approach is a revival of the reformative approach and rejects the pessimistic notion that 'nothing works' to reform offenders (associated with the criminologist Martinson, 1974), holding instead that 'something works'. Its proponents believe that systematic experimentation, research and monitoring can identify methods of penal training which will 'work' to reform offenders and thereby make expenditure within the penal system more cost-effective (Pitts, 1992). More recent claims about the effectiveness of reform can be found in the literature on cognitive and reasoning skills programmes (for example, Gendreau and Ross, 1987; Ross et al., 1988; McGuire, 1995; Ross and Ross, 1995). These programmes attempt to improve the cognitive and reasoning skills of offenders, often by confronting them with the consequences and social unacceptability of their actions, in the hope that they will accept responsibility for them, think of alternative actions and change their attitudes towards breaking the law. Importantly, this approach appeals to the offender's free will. The Cognitive Skills Course (*The Reasoning and Rehabilitation Program*) run at Low Moss is based on Ross and Fabiano (1985),

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7 Apparently, Robert Martinson (1974) never actually said 'nothing works'. He later (1979) revised his former views and acknowledged that some treatment programmes do make offenders less prone to recidivism.
whose approach to offender rehabilitation I shall outline in the following section.

2.6 Offender rehabilitation: a cognitive model

In the 1970s, the widely accepted attitude that ‘nothing works’ in the treatment of offenders and reduction of re-offending prevailed. The reviews of the criminological literature conducted on both sides of the Atlantic, most notably by Martinson (1974) in the United States and Brody (1976) in the United Kingdom from which the conclusion emerged, remained more or less unchallenged until critics started reporting positive findings in the treatment of offenders (Blackburn, 1980; Ross and Gendreau, 1980; Gendreau and Ross, 1987; Thornton, 1987; McGuire and Priestley, 1992). Martinson (1979) finally withdrew his conclusion about the futility of correctional programmes as invalid and unjustified. There are now quite a few research studies that report positive findings (e.g. Ross et al., 1988; Lipsey, 1990). These studies produced encouraging results from the use of social-skills training and similar methods.

The cognitive approach assumes that the development of cognitive skills is lacking or delayed in many offenders and that these skills can be taught (Goldstein, 1988). If offenders acquire some of the skills taught, it is likely that they develop the ability for ‘interpersonal problem-solving and moral reasoning’. As a result, it is assumed that the cognitive skills acquired will help to reduce or avoid further criminal involvement (Yochelson and Samenov, 1976). To give just a few examples, in the UK, Chandler (1973) used role-reversal exercises with young offenders, which apparently improved their ‘perspective-taking skills in interpersonal situations’; in addition, their recidivism rate after 18 months was significantly lower than that of a matched control group. Social skills training has also been used to make offenders less prone to aggressive behaviour (Hollin, 1990; Lipsey, 1990) and cognitive-
behavioural training has apparently helped individuals control certain types of behaviour 'linked to offensiveness'. More recent positive evaluation studies of cognitive skills programmes in the USA have been conducted by Bahr and Klein (1996) who evaluated a course emphasizing the benefits of offenders developing cognitive skills for repairing and maintaining family relationships, and Henning and Frueh (1996) who evaluated a programme based on the cognitive distortion model of offending by Yochelson and Samenov (1976, 1977), according to which specific 'cognitive distortions' can be observed in offenders' thinking which lead to and maintain their criminal behaviour.

In contrast to the model developed by Yochelson and Samenov, Ross and Fabiano (1985: 9) developed the Cognitive Skills Deficit model. According to this model, many offenders never have acquired critical thinking skills and they evidence a host of thinking errors. The most common of these is externalizing the blame for their actions onto other people or circumstances beyond their control ... Although they may be able to rationalize their anti-social behaviour ..., the reasoning they use in doing so is often simplistic and illogical. Their thinking is often exceptionally shallow and narrow - they construe their world in absolute terms and fail to appreciate the subtleties and complexities of social interactions. They tend to adopt simple solutions to complex problems. Many fail to think through problem solutions and uncritically accept those conclusions which immediately occur to them. Then they cling to these conclusions stubbornly and rigidly. Consequently, their thinking is often inflexible and maladaptive.

Although the authors do not suggest that 'cognitive inadequacies' are a cause of crime, they do believe that these may be a strong contributing factor. By concentrating on the individual offender and his 'cognitive defects', the Cognitive Skills approach to offender rehabilitation leaves out any discussion of a possible need for social change.

Having outlined the cognitive model of offender rehabilitation, I shall now move on to the description of my research methodology.
2.7 Background: how the project started

I became involved in prison fieldwork when I conducted a small linguistic study of prison slang at Prison Y as part of my MPhil dissertation for the English Language Department at Glasgow University (Mayr, 1994). My fieldwork for this project consisted of interviewing 20 prisoners on a one-to-one basis about their knowledge and use of prison slang terms, which I had collected with the help of a former prisoner.

After deciding to embark on a PhD thesis on the same topic I contacted the Scottish Prison Service (SPS), and was finally granted access to Prison X and invited to take part in the recently established cognitive training programme as a participant observer. The suggestion to do this came from the Prison Service, and the Cognitive Skills Course soon turned out to be a useful and highly interesting framework within which to conduct my study.

The Reasoning and Rehabilitation programme, as the cognitive training programme is called, was first implemented in Scotland in 1992. It assumes that many offenders have deficits in a number of social skills and that training in cognitive skills is an essential component of effective correctional programmes (Ross and Fabiano, 1985). The first programme of this kind to run in Scotland was held at Prison X, a short-term prison with a capacity for 400 male offenders sentenced to up to 12 months for mainly drug-related offences. The programme has now been conducted in various Scottish prison and community settings with both juvenile and adult offenders and in several prevention projects.

After the inmates expressed their interest in taking part in the Cognitive Skills Course at Prison X, their cognitive functioning was assessed in a semi-structured interview by the officer teaching the Course. Using a scale, the officer rated the offenders' ability to recognize the existence of personal problems, their ability to solve these, think of alternatives and set and achieve goals, their awareness of the consequences of their behaviour, their
‘egocentricity’ and ‘impulsivity’, their ‘cognitive style’, their motivation to change and, finally, their motivation to participate in the course. He did so by reading out certain problem situations to the interviewees and writing down their answers verbatim in the space provided in the questionnaire.

2.8 Data collection and transcription

All the data used in this study were recorded between March and September 1996 at Prison X, where Cognitive Skills Courses for prisoners were run. The Courses normally lasted for eight weeks and were run on four days a week, in the morning and afternoon. A maximum of eight participants was allowed to take part in the sessions.

2.8.1 Recording procedures

Many Cognitive Skills sessions were videotaped several times per week over a six to eight week period, to be used either as a form of feedback for the participants after they performed role plays or as part of the tutors’ teaching assessment by the founders of the programme in Canada. More often than not attention was therefore focused more on the officer than on the inmates, the result being that some of the six to eight participants were not visible on tape. However, they could still be heard. What is more, a relatively detailed view of non-verbal behaviour of at least some participants, including the officer, was obtained. After being present in the recorded sessions as a mere observer for the first few weeks, I got permission from both the officers and the inmates to videotape the lessons which I considered relevant for my research. Since my data collection focused on the verbal behaviour of the prisoners and the officer, all sessions involving group discussions and role-plays (the ‘Values Enhancement’ and ‘Anger Management’, and ‘Social and Negotiation Skills’
sessions) were of interest. In videotaping the sessions, the camera was placed in a corner of the room in an attempt to aim at both the tutor and the inmates. However, the room was too small for the camera to videotape all participants and the tutor. When I was present, videotaping had previously occurred, so the men were used to being videotaped. Once the video camera was set up, it normally operated on its own. During some discussions and role-plays, either one of the inmates or I directed the camera, following participants as they moved around the classroom during role-playing. Most of the videotaping occurred in the room provided for the duration of the Course. Only once, on a particularly warm summer day, did one group manage to persuade the officer to run the class outside. This produced a very relaxed atmosphere, but the recording was of poor technical quality since the microphone picked up all the background noise caused by a lawnmower and cars passing by on the nearby road.

Verbal interactions between the officers and inmates did not appear to change a great deal during recording: the Course participants continued to behave much in the same way as before videotaping. The arguing that sometimes developed during the group discussions did not help to produce recordings of good technical quality, but it suggests that the speech style was quite relaxed. In some instances, the profuse swearing and shouting during discussions and role-plays were acts of ‘linguistic bravado’ (Cheshire, 1982), caused by the presence of the video camera and possibly my presence. The loudest members of the group enjoyed displaying their verbal prowess while being recorded. Parts of the recorded material were of no use for analysis because of arguments or background noise, or simply because too many people were talking at the same time. Some of the recorded conversations were extremely lively and noisy, others, particularly in Group 1, were quieter and more restrained. The participants in Group 1 were less forthcoming than the ones in Group 2 and I had the feeling that the presence of a female researcher
did not exactly help either. Also, the two officers, who taught one group each, had different teaching styles altogether, one demanding discipline from the participants at all times, while the other one did so less.

The recordings also contain a few narrative accounts that occurred spontaneously during the course of the classroom discussions. A total of seventeen hours of speech was obtained which could be used as the basis for analysis. All in all I took part in three Cognitive Skills Courses, which were run alternately by the two prison officers trained to be Cognitive Skills tutors. The first Course had been running for about five weeks when I began to sit in the classes as a mere observer. After agreeing to my presence, the inmates signed release forms, which assured them of confidentiality. When first present I explained that I was a research student from Glasgow University undertaking a study of the language used in the Cognitive Skills sessions and indicated that I might use some of the audio-and video-taped sessions for linguistic research. Although the inmates in all three Courses never quite understood why anyone would be interested in linguistic research in a prison, they never objected to my presence and allowed me use the tapes.

My place of research was a small classroom next to the visiting area which accommodated eight participants, an overhead projector, two boards and video equipment. Conditions were less than ideal due to lack of space, but there was sufficient room to enable two participants to role-play in full view of the video camera and the other participants. The six inmates sat at school desks which were arranged in horseshoe shape. I was seated on a chair in one corner of the room, merely observing at first and taking notes. I was not actively involved in any of the class activities during the first Course, but gradually moved from being a mere observer to a more actively involved participant.
2.8.2 Participant observation

Research that involves the active collaboration of the researcher in the field has been called ‘participant-observation’ and it has been frequently employed in the study of deviance. The sociological study of ‘deviant’ subcultures has been ‘deviant’ itself with regard to mainstream sociology, whose tradition has been positivistic. Positivistic methods of enquiry, such as the reliance on quantification, the use of the analytic method and the adoption of an a-historical viewpoint, are part of a quest for a particular kind of certainty. The idea that societies are structurally functioning ‘wholes’ based on a central value system with a single social and moral order lies at the heart of positivism. The study of deviance has, therefore, been associated with a sociological tradition and perspective, which in some ways has been closer to the methods of ethnographic anthropology. In America, where the great bulk of the studies on subcultures have been conducted, the perspective adopted has been called Naturalism (Matza, 1969). Naturalism was pioneered by the Chicago School in the 1920’s and 30’s, when a group of sociologists and criminologists (e.g. Thrasher, 1927; Whyte, 1943) began studying juvenile street gangs and deviant groups (professional criminals, bootleggers, hustlers, etc.). It was less common in the 1940’s and early 50’s when the field was dominated by Parsons and Merton, but was revived in the later 1950s and the 1960s with special reference to the areas of deviance, crime and delinquency.

In the naturalistic perspective, research becomes not an objective study but an interchange through a shared language (Blumer, 1956) between the observer and the people with whom he participates. It is based on a Symbolic Interactionist social psychology, derived primarily from Mead (1934). It understands action as always informed by the giving and taking of meaning. Action is not behaviour, but ‘meaningful action’, a meaning-loaded exchange between actors.
Participant observation changes the focus from objectivity and quantification to 'empathetic understanding', that is, understanding from the inside, taking the perspective of the native, and qualitative work. In practice, however, participant observation is very often not a single method, and many participant observers back up their observation with somewhat more 'objective' techniques, including survey techniques and statistics (Roberts, 1975). Despite its capacity for producing interesting accounts of subculture, the method also has a number of significant flaws. Hebdige (1979), for example, notes that the lack of any analytical or explanatory framework has assigned it a marginal status in the predominantly positivist tradition of mainstream sociology. More importantly, while participant observation provides a great deal of descriptive detail, the significance of class and power relations is neglected or at least underestimated. Subcultures are often presented to be functioning outside the larger social, political and economic realities, which can result in an incomplete account of it. According to Roberts (1975), Naturalism has been better at exploring the social worlds of particular outgroups than at defining what happens when worlds with different resources and power connect and collide.

Since deviance, crime and delinquency were the favourite themes of Naturalism, it also dealt with the question of social control. This was originally studied only in terms of what appeared to be a powerless world of reciprocal interactions (for example, between the delinquent and the social worker). The key turning point came about when Naturalists started to look at the relation between the poor and the powerful in structural as well as (or rather than) interactional terms (see the Becker (1967) - Gouldner (1968) exchange). This resulted in some important modifications in the field of Naturalism (for example, the shift from an interactional to a transactional approach). The importance that has been placed on the kind of social interaction which is

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8 The debate started with an important article by Howard S. Becker "Whose side are we on?", in which Becker clearly took the side of the underdog, severely criticizing prison officers, administrators and bureaucrats. Al Gouldner’s detracting critique was that the unintended consequences of defeating these groups would be more power at the top.
involved in the exercise of social control reintroduced the dimension of power. Deviance and delinquency were now no longer seen as arising naturally from the world of the ‘outsider’, but as part of an ascribed social identity, arising in the interaction between groups which are unequal in the distribution of power. The ‘deviance’ of a group was now not natural but the result of a specific kind of social construction: and one of the key mechanisms of this process is the power to define situations for others, and the power to label others - and make those labels stick. Among others, the work of Becker (1963; ed. 1964), Goffman (1961), Erikson (1962), Kitsuse (1962) and Lemert (1967) belong to this ‘transactional’ phase in the evolution of Naturalism.

These developments in the American practice of Naturalism have been reflected in Britain, above all in the work of the National Deviance Conference (see Cohen, 1971; Taylor and Taylor, eds. 1973; Rock and Mcintosh, eds. 1974). Their main practitioners attempted to develop Naturalism theoretically, to work out a critique of positivistic sociology and to apply empirically participant observation and transactionalism to British cases.

The activities of my six months of participant observation at Prison X included meeting with administrators and prison officers, a tour of the prison and the dormitories, informal talks with the Course participants and their teachers during breaks, in between or after the Cognitive Skills sessions, informal talks with other inmates in the Education Unit of the prison and with officers during meals in the officers’ canteen, and finally, my collection of data in the Cognitive Skills sessions. The data reported in Chapters 4 and 5 are drawn from this fieldwork.

In addition, I was a part-time teacher in the Education Unit for two months, teaching ‘European Studies’, a course which covered European history, culture, and life-style. More often than not topics addressed in this course would result in small group discussions with the inmates about their lives and experiences. Many prisoners found conversation in the Education Unit or
around the prison yard a pleasant break from the routine and boredom of prison life. Thus my involvement in prison teaching gave me an additional opportunity to gain an insight into the world of this prison and the beliefs and views of some of its inmates and officers. I had access to a great deal of information and yet had taken only a small step into the prison world. Although I taught and worked there, I gained only a small knowledge of the entire life inside Prison X.

I shall now turn to the conventional problems associated with participant observation and discuss how I attended to these problems in my work. Whereas, as stated above, positive methods distance researchers from their subjects and thus neutralize their impact on the field, participant observation exploits the interchange between researchers and the field. Observers must not only get familiar enough to be able to reconstruct the field as the 'natives' see and experience it: they must to some degree experience it themselves. The strength of participant observation lies in the quality of knowledge observers are able to attain through their involvement with the field. They become sensitized to the experiences of its members and learn to appreciate the validity of lives and experiences other than their own. However, there is always the danger that they might be seduced into a romantic attachment to a culture which is so completely different from their own.

More importantly, despite its advantages, closeness can also be a problem for the researcher. As a person who sees a social world from the inside like a member yet who also stands apart and analyses it in an 'objective' way, the researcher is supposed to be both an insider and an outsider, a state which is probably unattainable. Brian Roberts (1975: 245) summed it up perfectly when he said:

Participant observation lays a heavy burden of tact and tactics on the researcher: empathy without identification, understanding without 'being taken for a ride', rapport without compromise.
Thus, the participant observer also has problems with ‘neutrality’, although they are different from the problem the positivist has with ‘scientific neutrality’. The participant observer is ‘in but not entirely of the culture’ (Wolff, 1964: 127). I realized that the ‘objective’ observer who is detached from his subjects and does not allow his values to influence his observations is a myth. Max Weber emphasised that sociology must be value-neutral if it is to be truly scientific. Ned Polsky ([1969] 1997: 229) interprets this to mean that ‘social scientist[s have] no business attempting to ‘adjust’ people to the moral norms of [their] society or any other’. That is, if researchers exclude value judgements to an extent that they even produce findings which go against their personal values, they come close to Weber’s ideal. Polsky finds the key to value neutrality in Nietzsche’s (1878) *Genealogy of Morals*:

> It is no small discipline and preparation of the intellect on its road to final ‘objectivity’ to see things for once through the wrong end of the telescope; and ‘objectivity’ is not meant here to stand for ‘disinterested contemplation’ (which is a rank absurdity) but for the ability to have the pros and cons in one’s power and to switch them on and off, so as to get to know how to use, for the advancement of knowledge, the *difference* in the perspectives and psychological interpretations. ... All seeing is essentially perspective, and so is all knowing. The more emotions we allow to speak on a given matter, the more different eyes we train on the same thing, the more complete will be our conception of it, the greater our ‘objectivity’ (quoted in Polsky, [1969] 1997: 228).

Another problem, which is particularly relevant here, concerns the impact the researcher’s presence has on the behaviour (including the linguistic behaviour) of the people he or she works with. I became aware, as all participant-observer researchers must, that my presence in some significant ways helped shape the data. As Vidich (1955) says, the researcher, by joining a social situation, disturbs a scene which he or she would like to hold constant. Whatever the role the researcher is assigned, it will affect the social interaction he or she has with the respondents. I differed as a middle-class female, as a student and teacher collecting data from people who live inside what Goffman (1961) calls a ‘total
Before starting to observe my first Cognitive Skills Course I was warned by the officer that the inmates might 'play up to me' because of my status as a female. However, in the first few sessions the whole group remained quite reticent precisely because I was a researcher and a female. This is presumably the point L. Milroy (1987) is making when she remarks that a female fieldworker will not have access to some of the characteristically male speech events recorded by Labov et al. in 1968. This is true up to a point. However, as the inmates became more familiar with me this problem receded, especially after my observational work became more and more interspersed with active participation in the Cognitive Skills Course.

Yet another difficulty touched on in the previous paragraph concerns the social role of the fieldworker. Linguists have commented on problems fieldworkers might encounter on the basis of their age, sex, and social class. While Nessa Wolfson (1976) implies that the generally low esteem in which women are held may lead to problems for a young female fieldworker, Lesley Milroy (1987) notes about her language study of working class Belfast communities that many communities find males, particularly young ones, threatening. She also found Nordberg's (1980) proposition to use an 'insider' to conduct the linguistic fieldwork, that is, one socially matching the subjects, not necessarily the best solution. The role of 'outsider' can be of advantage because people may be willing to share important information precisely because one is an outsider. Some researchers (e.g. Trice, 1970; Plate, 1975) have claimed that people may be more willing to open up to neutral outsiders. Edwards (1986), who in her study of the language of a British Black community used inside and outside fieldworkers (as was the case in Labov's et al. 1968 study), has expressed reservations about the ability of even inside fieldworkers to consistently elicit vernacular speech, as the status of insider has to be earned.

Although these are valid concerns, I never found them to be major stumbling blocks in my fieldwork. On the contrary, my acceptance by the
prisoners and officers was dependent in a way on my novelty value as an outsider and a woman conducting linguistic research in this particular prison. Jenny Cheshire’s (1982) language study of Reading working-class adolescents likewise was successful despite her status of an outsider, and also because of the sympathetic interest she showed towards them as individuals. Finally, a more recent participant-observation prison study conducted by Elaine Genders and Elaine Player (1995) confirms my view that some inmates find it easier to talk to a woman than to a man, because they feel less need ‘to construct and maintain their defences’ when talking to a woman.

Let us now turn to the problems associated with participant observation in prisons. Gresham Sykes (1958) and Rose Giallombardo (1966a, b), who both conducted their studies in maximum security prisons in the USA, warn about ‘role corruption’, and argue that the researcher should keep contacts with prison officers to a minimum. During my first few days at prison X when I was acquainted with the setting, I was invited to have lunch with some officers in the officers’ canteen. At first, I was anxious when inmates saw me in the company of officers and I thought that it might be better to keep contacts with officers to a minimum. I was soon told by one of the Course participants that I would never find out the ‘truth’ by sitting with the ‘jannies’. On a different occasion, while having a break after a Cognitive Skills session, a prison officer turned up, asked me about the object of my study and then launched into a monologue on the British prisoner (‘the sleaziest prisoner in the world’) to which I listened in amazement. I was told that prisoners’ language was ‘scum language, because they demean everything’, that they would only ‘wind me up’ and that while programmes such as the Cognitive Skills Course might work in Scandinavia, they would be a mere waste of time and money in Britain. Situations like these, where one side made detracting comments about the other, were not uncommon. I found it very interesting and revealing to take in the arguments of both sides and very often I had to conclude that both had a point. Fortunately, my concerns
about being interested in both sides turned out to be largely unfounded. First, it was precisely in the interest of my research to maintain good relations not only with the inmates but also with the two officers who ran the Cognitive Skills Course. Second, after the inmates learned who I was and what I was doing, they were less suspicious when they saw me in the company of prison officers. In this respect, Burton (1978: 168) warns of the problem that the researcher, by ‘going native’, develops ‘interests and acquaintances which effectively exclude his acceptance with other respondents’. Not less problematic, though, he says, is the attempt to ‘be a marginal man, with a foot in all the different social worlds of the milieu he is studying’, because there is the danger of becoming a ‘social eunuch’ who is afraid of voicing views and opinions lest he alienate his respondents. I think I was able to strike a happy medium between these two extremes.

Much has been said about the ethical problems surrounding participant observation. For the fieldworker, participant observation is extremely demanding not only in tact, but also in emotional involvement. Throughout the research I faced the constant dilemma of being concerned with the prisoners’ personal situation while pursuing interests vital to the research. Strong relationships with individuals are sometimes built up over a period of even a few weeks. Because of this involvement, I found it often quite difficult to persevere with tape-recording and questionnaires. On one occasion, after one group had completed their Course, I was going to evaluate the inmates’ opinion of the Course and suddenly felt it was not appropriate to do so, as some had started to talk about some particularly sad events in their lives. There were times when I could not help wondering if I was actually exploiting the inmates’ situation with my research. I therefore tried to reciprocate by carrying out small favours, ranging from bringing in a video-casette of ‘A Bronx Tale’, a film which was used for discussion about values in one of the Cognitive Skills sessions with Group 1, lending them books they showed an interest in, signing them in for a
course in the Education Unit to buying a cake after they completed the Course. The difficulty implicit in such favours is in setting limits. Once I was asked by two Course participants whether I would smuggle them whisky and cigarettes, because I would 'not be searched anyway'. I explained that I did not want to risk being expelled from the setting, which they understood. While such behaviour may be a deviation from the alleged ideal of the participant observer's strict neutrality, I believe the field researcher has a moral debt to those who made the research possible. This, of course, includes prison officers and administrators as well.

Finally, the method is very time-consuming and somewhat wasteful. I had taped more hours of speech than I could ultimately analyse. Only when I started the frightfully difficult task of transcribing and analysing my data, did I realize that sessions other than the ones I had recorded would have been more useful for my study. Some parts of the recorded data were simply unanalysable, as the technical quality of participation observation data is often poor (Labov, 1981). Some of the Cognitive Skills sessions turned into complete mayhem, with some of the participants talking and shouting at the same time. And while it was highly interesting to take part in these sessions and to observe what was going on, the transcription and actual analysis of parts of the tapes turned out to be intensely frustrating, if not virtually impossible.

Yet another problem concerns the question of whether one should enter the setting using a methodology of some sort or develop one as one goes along. I grew into, rather than systematically planned, the study. I had, for example, difficulty knowing what to record and, initially, what to make of the recordings. Becker (1958: 653; emphasis original) states that fieldworkers 'assume they do not know enough about [an area] a priori to identify relevant problems and hypotheses and that they must discover these in the course of the research'. Polsky (1969: 124-5) goes even further and suggests that entering the field with

9 In her Belfast study, L. Milroy (1980) offered favours such as the use of her van in return for the opportunity to spend time in people's homes recording their conversation.
a prepared methodology is an obstacle: 'the problem for many a sociologist today - the result of curricula containing as much scientism as science - is that [human] capacities, far from being trained in him, have been trained out of him'. Thus, if understanding comes from exploring society, it cannot be created by carefully prepared schemes and hypotheses.

For W. Foote Whyte (1943: 510-11) it is in the immediate response to the world that solutions arise:

"Probably most of our learning in [the] field is not on a conscious level. We often have flashes of insight that come to us when we are not consciously thinking about a research problem at all. These insights are more likely to come to the man who is absorbed in the field situation than to the one who is always going in and coming out in order to maintain his perspective."

For linguists, the main advantage of participant observation is its capacity to countervail the 'observer's paradox' (Labov) to a certain degree. In order to gain access to the vernacular several linguists (e.g. Labov, 1972; Blom and Gumperz, 1972; L. Milroy, 1980; Cheshire, 1982) have opted for a participant observation method, not least because of its efficacy in making people less aware of the long-term presence of the researcher. This is certainly true. The more I became actively involved in the Cognitive Skills group discussions and the assignments, the less I stuck out and the less the inmates attempted to control their speech patterns. Also, the prisoners I met liked engaging in extended conversation about their lives; hence participant observation was a viable method for learning about their lives as well as their speech patterns. The objective of my study was not so much to gain access to their lingo; rather, this was a kind of 'side-effect', as my focus was mainly on the structure and contents of the Cognitive Skills classroom discourse.

My justification for qualitative methods, however, runs deeper than this 'simply because the opportunity arose' approach. I found participant
observation appropriate because it is a method which is particularly conducive to analysing a social world (see, for example, Heath, 1983). Participant observation entails the more or less active collaboration of the researcher. I believe that one can have no appreciation of how people act by exclusively relying on survey methods or formal interviews. Neither can one grasp the environment as its members do. On conducting fieldwork in a mental hospital where he wanted to obtain ethnographic detail regarding selected aspects of patient social life Goffman (1961: 7) said: 'It was then and still is my belief that any group of persons - prisoners, primitives, pilots, or patients - develop a life of their own that becomes meaningful, reasonable, and normal once you get close to it, and that a good way to learn about any of these worlds is to submit oneself in the company of the members to the daily round of petty contingencies to which they are subject'. This is not to suggest that by immersing oneself in a group's environment one can ever fully grasp it. Although one becomes so close to the participants that one can empathize with them, one is never really one of them. However, through participant observation one gets at least a chance to gain an insight into a social world, and in my case, into life behind the walls. Of course, pure naturalism is an illusion:

What the researcher sees and understands is a product of who he is, what assumptions he brings to his study, what bits he selects as important enough to describe, how he enters the field, what happens to him in his 'first days', whether he is lucky enough to meet a particularly sensitive and acute respondent or not, etc, etc. (Roberts, 1975: 247).

I have already mentioned the ethical problems inherent in the technique. To sum up, although I sometimes questioned whether this type of research should be done at all, I do believe that such research should be continued. Not only is the prison an important and highly interesting place in which to study individual and group behaviour, but the presence of outside observers also serves to show that prisons are open to people who are eager to witness what happens within.
More importantly perhaps, participant observation among prisoners is particularly appropriate for gaining information about aspects of social reality that tend to be comparatively unknown or neglected because they are incompatible with conceptions of reality held by society in general.

2.8.3 Transcription system

'If talk is a social act, then so is transcription' (Roberts, 1997: 167). As one transcribes data, one relies on one's own social evaluations of speech in deciding how to write it. In other words, all transcription is representation and cannot be neutral. However, transcribers should use or develop a system that can best represent the interactions they have recorded, and this means finding a balance between accuracy, readability, and what Mehan (1993) calls the 'politics of representation'. New systems that make transcriptions increasingly accurate and readable have been developed (Du Bois 1991; Edwards 1992; Edwards and Lampert 1993), but the categories worked out do not tackle the ideological issues of representation. How can the voices of informants be heard in the way they wish them to be heard? How can informants convey their identity through the filter of transcription? The representation of linguistic varieties has been discussed by sociolinguists and ethnographers (Preston 1982, 1985; Tedlock 1983; Atkinson 1992). These authors have been particularly concerned with the stigmatization - the social evaluation the reader makes of the informant - when non-standard orthography is used to represent certain linguistic varieties, and they argue that it should best be avoided.

Different discourse types and research purposes call for different transcription conventions. Edwards (1992: 368-70) suggests that words should be transcribed in standard orthography, sometimes supplemented by phonetic description. Yet another method used by conversation analysts trained in sociology, known as eye-dialect (writing a non-standard variety to read as it
sounds), has been criticized for being uninformative, inconsistent, ambiguous and difficult to read, especially for non-native speakers of English (Atkinson and Heritage, 1984). More importantly, it is argued that eye-dialect, despite its perceived ability to convey the flavour of the dialect, does 'more to mar the transcript or representation than make it come alive' since 'writing cannot hope to capture the quality of speech' (Preston 1982: 320). What is more, eye-dialect is also said to make speakers of non-standard dialects appear lower-class, unintelligent or 'gangsterish' (Preston 1985). Preston points out that although one could argue that linguists are resistant to status-lowering responses to respellings, there is no proof this is actually the case. In his study on reader attitudes towards non-standard transcripts of spoken language Preston (1985) showed that non-linguists do stigmatize speakers whose utterances have been respelled with allegro forms (e.g. gonna, snice 'it's nice'). It was the spellings themselves and not the pronunciations represented which caused negative responses, such as demotion of the social status of the speakers, among the readers. Preston also makes an interesting statement when he claims that the non-standard constructions would not be denigrated in the same way if they were heard rather than seen as allegro respellings. Roberts (1997), too, is against using eye-dialect, but raises the question about how researchers can transcribe the 'whole social person' (Bourdieu 1991), in order to convey the informant's identity.

On the other hand, Ochs (1979), who was perhaps the first researcher to tackle the politics of representation, maintains that strictly standard orthography should be avoided, arguing that a modified orthography, such as that adopted by Sacks et al. (1974) should be employed, as it captures the way in which a word is pronounced versus the way it is written. Modified orthography includes items such as gonna, wanna, yah see, and the like. Bearing the objections against non-standard written representations of spoken discourse in mind, I would nevertheless agree with Ochs and opt for a 'moderate' system of non-standard
orthography. Macaulay (1997) has also written approvingly about non-standard spellings\textsuperscript{10}, but warns that in transcribing actual spoken language it is important not to make it look like written prose while at the same time it is essential not to give the impression of illiteracy. The approach he has taken is to use only conventional spellings for Scottish forms and to avoid indicating the elisions and assimilations that are part of normal speech.

For the sake of readability I shall follow the same practice as in Macafee (1983, 1989): Standard English spellings are used for common core words. The 'common-core' is the area of overlap between Scots and Standard English, and includes items such as name, see, young, is, he, they (see Aitken, 1979, 1984b). Spellings are used which show non-lexical incidence, e.g. job, gaunny 'gonna', but for the sake of a fluent transcription I shall make no attempt to represent peculiarities other than the ones just mentioned.

The orthographic representation of utterances of course varies according to the goals of the research undertaken. Since this study wants to show that the inmates' way of speaking is valid in its own right, representing their speech in standard orthography would to a degree defy the purpose. To me this would look like speech 'bowdlerized' to make it acceptable to (middle-class) readers of the transcripts. However, even Labov (1969) carried out his analysis of non-standard Negro English (NNE)\textsuperscript{11} in Standard English. He gives the following reason:

The fundamental reason is, of course, one of firmly fixed social conventions. All communities agree that standard English is the 'proper' medium for formal writing and public communication. Furthermore, it seems likely that standard English has an advantage over NNE in explicit analysis of surface forms, which is what we are doing here (quoted in Keddie, ed. 1973: 39)

\textsuperscript{10} Macaulay supports his argument by noting that the use of taboo language combined with urban dialect, as for example, in Irvine Welsh's best-selling Trainspotting or James Kelman's award-winning novel How late it was, how late is no barrier to wider acceptance.

\textsuperscript{11} Later, Labov (1972a) changed the term to Black English Vernacular (BEV), as he considered the former potentially offensive to some people.
The fact that Labov felt he needed to make these changes illustrates the dilemma linguists are faced with when they want to make non-standard speakers 'acceptable', but also want to do so on their terms. But what are non-standard speakers' terms? I can only guess my informants' opinion of their own variety. Owing to prison routine there was never time to discuss the inmates' attitudes to their speech patterns. Labov (1966a) suggests that users of stigmatized varieties often better recognize such usage in others and also evaluate it more harshly. When I asked a former participant in a Cognitive Skills Course, which had been run in a different prison, how he would wish his speech to be represented, he said: 'Well, if Ah came across as a right idiot, Ah wud want ye tae put it intae Standard English'. However, another one assured me that representing prisoners' speech patterns the way they are spoken is important, because otherwise 'it wud simply no' be me'. The notion that speakers of non-dominant varieties display feelings of 'linguistic insecurity' and 'linguistic self-hatred' (Labov, 1966a) is questioned by Macaulay (1997: 26). He notes that many respondents in Macaulay and Trevelyan's (1973) Glasgow study were aware that Glasgow speech enjoyed a rather 'negative prestige' but did not see any reason to modify their form of speech radically. Although the Glasgow survey did provide extensive examples of linguistic insecurity, the investigators nevertheless felt it would be misleading to see this as a wholesale rejection of their speech, concluding that the local form of speech, Glaswegian, is considered to be 'more appropriate than the Englishman's way of speaking for members of the community' and that broad Glaswegian is 'less highly valued within the community, though not "out of place" there' (Macaulay, 1997: 51).

To sum up, in dealing with transcription, the researcher is confronted with ethical issues as well as accuracy and consistency. The challenge for me as the transcriber to best represent the inmates' interactions and identities through transcription was all the more an ethical question as I was working with them
and thus implicated in aspects of their lives. Expressive as it is, my informants’ language would lose much of its character if presented in standard orthography. Most transcription work in applied linguistics has been concerned with the technical features of languages and not with how people convey messages about their lives and identities. In the present study, content is just as important as structure. Therefore, although I am aware of the possible dangers of non-standard orthographic representations, I believe that transcribing the informants’ talk in Standard English would amount to denying their ‘whole social person’. A Standard English transcription would also make an ideological statement about its superiority and the deficiency of non-standard (working-class) speech. My point is that we should reconsider the notion of non-standard speech as unable to express abstract thought and rather treat it as a dialectal variation of Standard English or a valid alternative to it within a particular community.

2.9 Conclusion

In this chapter I have given an outline of the nature of particular penological discourses within the Scottish prison system as presented by Adler and Longhurst (1994). This outline is relevant for the present study in several respects: they draw attention to the interconnectedness of power and discourse and show the ways in which these discourses are used to secure the coherence of dominant groups within the prison system, such as administrators and governors. I believe they are necessary for an understanding of more recent developments within the Scottish Prison Service which have culminated in a new philosophy embracing enterprising Managerialism. I also believe that a historical dimension has to be included when we analyse specific discourses, as discourses are marked by intertextuality (Fairclough/Wodak, 1997), that is, they are always related to other discourses synchronically and diachronically.
The present study analyses ‘social-control discourse’ within the deviancy control system and its ability to present what is essentially a power relationship as a helping one, citing the texts of the *Handbook for Teaching Cognitive Skills* and the dynamics and structure of the Cognitive Skills classroom discourse as a case in point. In the following chapter I will be concerned with the linguistic analysis of a range of texts taken from this Handbook and show how these construct meanings about offenders.
CHAPTER 3: CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS AND THE LANGUAGE OF SOCIAL CONTROL

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter I shall explore the theme of ideology and its relationship to discourse. I shall investigate how ideology is embedded in features of discourse which are taken for granted as matters of common sense and contribute to sustaining existing power relations. To this end, I shall discuss the type of ‘social-control discourse’ which can be found in Reasoning and Rehabilitation: A Handbook for Teaching Cognitive Skills (Ross, Fabiano and Ewles, 1989). This Handbook is used by the Cognitive Skills trainers (two prison officers) as a reference for the training sessions. The sections I have chosen for discussion include the ‘Objectives of Training’, ‘The Management of Emotions’, ‘Problem Solving’, ‘Assertive Communication’, ‘Values Enhancement’, and ‘Negotiation Skills’. By concentrating on these sections I want to give a representative overview of the Cognitive Skills texts, most of which relate to the spoken classroom discourse transcripts I shall explore in the following chapter. The Handbook texts also put these training sessions into context.

I shall focus upon the ideational, interpersonal and textual functions of language, i.e. its functions in representing and signifying the world (Halliday, 1978) in ‘constructing social reality’; the enactment and negotiation of social relations and identities; and the construction of text. I shall analyse the texts for the following systems used in Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL): Transitivity, Mood and Theme (lexico-grammatical analysis), and lexical cohesion (discourse-semantic analysis). I shall also explore the role of evaluation (termed appraisal by Martin, 2000) in the construction of ideology in the Cognitive Skills Handbook texts. The analysis of these aspects of grammar,
syntax and lexis highlights some of the ways in which meaning is constructed in discourse and how they may do ideological work in a text.

One of the tasks of my analysis is therefore to draw attention to ('denaturalize' in the words of Fairclough) some of the linguistic means by which certain (ideological) assumptions about the nature and behaviour of offenders are presented as common-sense, non-negotiable facts. I do, however, recognize that my own position is that of a 'reader' of the texts I shall be presenting. As Fairclough (1995: 9; emphasis in the original) has put it:

The interpretation of texts is a dialectal process resulting from the interface of the variable interpretative resources people bring to bear on the text, and properties of the text itself.

Different people may interpret the same text differently, depending on their socio-cultural positioning. Martin (2000:161) warns that, when analysing Appraisal, linguists need to declare their reading position since the evaluation one makes of evocations depends on the institutional position one is reading from. He says:

Socialization into a discipline involves both the alignment with the institutional practices involved and an affinity with the attitudes one is expected to have towards those practices.

The analysis and interpretation of the Cognitive Skills Handbook texts presented in this chapter and the spoken discourse samples analysed in Chapters 4 and 5 below, is therefore influenced by my own socio-cultural discursive practices.

Before the actual linguistic analysis of social-control discourse, a brief overview of the concept of social control and its various uses in the social
scientist is necessary. I shall review these and then define how I intend to use the term.

3.2 The concept of social control

In sociology, 'social control' is used as a generic term to describe the processes and methods which help produce and maintain orderly social life. These include socialization, education, public opinion, as well as state powers such as the police and the law. The concept was first defined by E.A. Ross (1901) who defined control as a purposive, intended form of social action designed to subject individuals to social roles they did not themselves make. Importantly, Ross did not define the concept in terms of coercion (external social control) only, but considered motivation 'internal' to the individual (internal social control) to be its most effective form.

In criminology, the term usually has a narrower meaning, referring to the administration of deviance by criminal justice, social welfare and mental health agencies. In the 1950s, Parsons (1952: 297) defined the theory of social control as 'the analysis of those practices in the social system which tend to counteract ... deviant tendencies'. This narrower usage of the term in criminology has produced a large literature analysing the effects, especially the unintended ones, caused by the actions of 'agents of social control', such as the police, prisons, psychiatrists, social workers, etc. In the 1960s, Becker (1963) and Lemert (1967) transformed the field by redirecting attention away from the focus on the individual criminal and arguing instead that social control can lead to deviance (the 'labelling perspective of social deviance'). They stimulated research on the ways in which the 'labelling' and stigmatizing' of offenders by officials may actually reinforce and amplify deviant identities and behaviour.
In the 1970s, this critical attitude towards the practices of social control found its expression in Marxist theories of the state and a new social history which saw the emergence of modern institutions such as the prison, the asylum, and the social welfare system not as benevolent and progressive reforms but instead as a deliberate strategy to subordinate and control the lower classes (e.g. Donajgrodzki, 1977; Foucault, 1979). In the 1980s a new specialized field developed, the sociology of social control, which focused on the ‘control apparatus’ (Cohen and Scull, 1983; Cohen, 1985). Cohen’s (1985: 14) influential thesis asserts that since the 1960s there has been an ‘increasing expansion, widening, dispersal, and invisibility’ of the social-control apparatus’. The assumption underlying his thesis is that modern society is increasingly governed by reference to expert knowledge, classification systems, and professional specialists in the administration of deviance. I shall understand social control in his sense to refer to ‘all organised responses to crime, delinquency and allied forms of deviance - whether sponsored directly by the state or by institutions such as social work and psychiatry, and whether designated as treatment, prevention, punishment or whatever’ (Cohen, 1983: 102). This conception of social control is both narrower and more specific than the standard sociological definition. Here I shall be concerned with the working ideologies in the control of crime and delinquency in general and the ideological assumptions made by the Cognitive Skills Handbook about offenders in particular.

In the following section I shall give an overview of correctional changes and social-control ideologies in western industrial societies, as current developments in penal policy and the crime-control talk that accompanies them are better understood in terms of the system’s original foundations.

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1 The sociologist David Garland (1990: 10) avoids this usage, as ‘social control’ usually refers to a wider range
3.2.1 Correctional changes and social-control ideologies

According to Cohen (1983) two main correctional changes in western industrialized societies can be detected. The first, which took place at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries, formed the basis of all subsequent deviancy control systems. The second, which has been happening over the past few decades, can be seen as an attempt to question and reverse that earlier transformation.

The original change was marked by the following key elements: (1) Public punishments involving the infliction of pain declined and the mind started to replace the body as the object of punishment; (2) a centralized state apparatus for the control of crime and the care or cure of other types of deviance emerged; (3) these groups became increasingly separated into different types, each with its own experts and professionals; (4) deviants became increasingly segregated into closed institutions and the prison emerged as the favoured form of punishment and behaviour modification.

Historians who have written about this transformation all agree that these changes have actually occurred (e.g. Rothman, 1971; Foucault, 1977; Ignatieff, 1978). Where they disagree is why they have occurred. There is also some disagreement about the second correctional change as to what has been happening over the past thirty years and what the causes are. Some commentators (Scull, 1977; Cohen, 1979, 1983, 1985; Mathiesen, 1983) believe there is an increasing extension, widening and invisibility of the social-control apparatus. For example, both Cohen and Mathiesen cite more individualistic forms of control, such as the community service order, as proof of their argument that punishment has begun to penetrate into the informal networks of society, a process that they depict as an extension of discipline. Moreover,
according to Cohen (1983), these changes have been in almost diametrical opposition to the ideological justifications - the words - from which they are supposed to be derived. Others, such as Bottoms (1983) and Garland (1995), have questioned the validity of this so-called ‘dispersal of discipline’ thesis (see Cavadino and Dignan, 1997). Garland, for instance, argues that surveillance, as an essential part of social control, can be benevolent as well as repressive. Bottom’s criticism of the thesis is that many of the new community control measures that are described by Cohen and Mathiesen are not disciplinary - at least not in Foucault’s sense² (Bottoms also criticizes their neglect of the increasing use of the fine, which has come to displace imprisonment most significantly since the war and is definitely not a disciplinarian measure in Foucault’s sense.) Others (e.g. F. M. Thompson, 1981; van Krieken, 1991) object to the view that social controls are imposed on the subordinate classes, rather than negotiated or invited by the groups concerned.

Cohen (1983: 105-9) lists three contrasting models of correctional change that emerge from the historical debate: the first one, ‘uneven progress’, presents all change as a record of progress. Although the system is seen as practically and morally flawed, it is not the system’s aims that are wrong, but their imperfect realization. This vision is a modern version of Enlightenment belief in progress and represents the mainstream of penal reform rhetoric. The second position, ‘benevolence gone wrong’, implies that there is a huge, but unintended gap between rhetoric and reality. Its most important exponent, Rothman (1971), saw a discrepancy between ‘conscience’ and ‘convenience’ in the attempts of penal reformers. Finally, the third and most radical model is ‘mystification’, according to which words are mere camouflage, which conceal another plan. Drawing upon Marxist theories of history and ideology, this model appears in a number of somewhat different versions: according to Ignatieff (1978), penal

² Foucault’s concept of discipline contains the two key elements of ‘surveillance’ and the ‘mechanics of training’
reformers acted out of political self-interest, but also because they believed the wealthy had some responsibility for crime. The changes are seen as the result of economic and material interests. A second version of this model stresses the irrelevance of stated intention and claims that the control system has served to perpetuate capitalist social order. The theory of change is materialistic: knowledge, theory and ideology are created to serve ruling-class interests (e.g. Rusche and Kirchheimer, 1939; Scull 1977). In a third version (Foucault, 1977, 1980), power and knowledge are held to be intimately and inextricably linked. Humanism, professional knowledge and reform talk neither produce change in the idealist sense, nor are they the mere result of changes in the political economy in the materialist sense. They are entirely utilitarian and serve as ‘alibis’ for the exercise of power.

Both these idealist and materialist views about crime-control can help us to make sense of current crime-control talk. Cohen (1983) claims that the ‘distrust of benevolence’ model is particularly helpful in understanding correctional change as it demonstrates that custodial, pragmatic and managerial goals (‘convenience’) have undermined treatment, reform and rehabilitation (‘conscience’).

Cohen (1983) claims that today’s social-control talk is characterized by a reversal of the direction taken by the system in the late eighteenth century. The first of the original four changes, the move from body to mind, has not been reversed, but each of the other three has been subject to destructuring movements - movements accompanied by slogans such as ‘decentralization’, and ‘decriminalization’ seem to be an indication of an attempt to bypass state control; terms such as ‘decarceration’, ‘deinstitutionalization’ and ‘community control’ a move against the dominance of prisons and other closed institutions. These slogans, however, are completely at odds with the reality of

which aims to make the offender obedient by working on his ‘soul’ (Cavadino and Dignan, 1997: 238).
contemporary crime control and there is a gap between words and reality. Cohen (1983: 126) concludes:

An informed sociology of social-control talk can afford neither to be deceived by appearances nor to be obsessed by debunking. The notion of demystification is based on an inadequate understanding of the contexts, sources and functions of control talk. The point is that abstract ideologies only make sense when grounded in the day-to-day operating philosophies of control agencies. They constitute working or practice languages. For the most part, the workers and managers - who are simultaneously the apostles and architects of the new order - cannot explain very well what they are doing or what is happening. Therefore they improvise a vocabulary - drawing on those abstractions - which invests and dignifies their daily organisational imperatives and contingencies with the status of a theory.

What one might ask then is less whether these theories are correct, but how they relate to practice. Cohen’s argument is that from what we know about the origins and functions of social-control ideologies we should never expect a simple congruence between words and deeds. We can therefore assume that most of the time there will be incongruence and contradictions.

Cohen lists a number of theories that might explain this phenomenon. The sociologist Howard S. Becker (1967: 243) assumed that officials who run institutions such as prisons, schools, or hospitals, ‘must lie because things are seldom as they ought to be’. In other words, these places hardly ever perform the way they are supposed to. Gramsci’s theory of hegemony points to the conditions under which control-talk gains acceptability in a certain social order. I already referred to the concept of hegemony in Chapter I and its usefulness in providing a framework for analysing discourse as a social practice: hegemony means relations of domination based upon consent, involving the naturalization of practices and their social relations as matters of common sense. This is why
the concept of hegemony emphasizes the importance of ideology in achieving and maintaining relations of domination.

Another concept which might be helpful here has been put forward by Ben-Yehuda (1990), who argues that the so-called social control theories\(^3\) can be usefully linked to C. Wright Mills's (1940) concept of 'motivational accounting systems'. Mills claimed that statements of motivation have a basic social character because they enable people to be integrated into social groups and provide the actors with directions for subsequent actions. These motivations reflect morality, and as such, a vocabulary of motive serves as a prime internal source of social control. Vocabularies of motive are different from one group to another because they reflect moral standards. Importantly, Mills believed that vocabularies of motive are primarily rhetorical devices used for particular audiences and do not allow us to draw conclusions about actors' intentions.

On the one hand, control theories chart the macro motivational accounting systems, sanctioning, or encouraging, particular behaviour patterns. They define the boundaries of specific moral universes and provide control agents with the vocabularies of motive needed to justify their actions. On the other hand, control theories also chart the vocabulary of motive that deviants - on the micro level - use to justify their behaviour (see Sykes and Matza, 1957; Matza, 1964). Unlike Mills, Ben-Yehuda (1990: 23) does not confine the concept of motivational accounts to the micro level and argues that it is possible to conceptualize ideologies as 'generalized motivational accounts': institutional justifications can thus be conceptualized in terms of motivational accounting systems. Institutions and control agents develop specialized vocabularies of motive and use motivational accounting systems in much the same way

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\(^3\) Social control theories are strongly influenced by Durkheim (1951), who saw social disorganization and a weakened hold of society on the individual as the reason for the occurrence of deviance. Social control theories
individuals do. In this way, these macro societal organizations are involved in ‘reality construction’ and ‘in attempts to delineate and negotiate moral boundaries’.

Sociologists have been concerned with the problem of whether one can or should infer from accounts anything about the real intentions of actors. According to Ben-Yehuda (1990: 30), this question is only marginally important since accounting situations are ‘primarily bargaining situations and are therefore fluid, constantly changing and giving rise to emergent identities’. Values, power, status, ideology, and interest are crucial in accounting situations influencing the question of what type of motivational accounting system can be used in a particular situation. The ‘truth’ or validity of a motivational accounting system is limited and very specific to a culture, to a symbolic-moral universe. Thus the study of motivational accounting systems should not be separated from actual behaviour and from the context in which they are used, as they are the essence of symbolic interactions. This accords with Cohen’s (1983) above argument about the nature of social-control talk.

The concept of culture as a symbolic-moral universe goes back to Berger and Luckmann (1966: 113), who define symbolic universes as bodies of theoretical tradition that integrate different provinces of meaning and encompass the institutional order in a symbolic totality. Symbolic processes are processes of signification that refer to realities other than those of everyday experience [...] the symbolic sphere relates to the most comprehensive level of legitimation.

A symbolic universe thus provides its inhabitants with the necessary motivational accounting systems (based on particular vocabularies of motive) that can be used by them to explain and justify their actions. Which of the definitions of reality will be imposed will depend on the power of the symbolic

all share the assumption that deviance does not simply occur, but becomes possible due to an inability to prevent it.
universes in question: ‘power in society includes the power to determine
decisive socialization processes and, therefore, the power to produce reality’
(ibid.: 137; emphasis in original). This implies that those groups in society that
occupy positions of greatest power will also tend to have the greatest access to
the means of legitimation.

Berger and Luckmann (1966: 123) further suggest the concept of
‘universe maintenance’, claiming that ‘All legitimations, from the simplest pre-
theoretical legitimations of discrete institutionalized meanings to the cosmic
establishments of symbolic universes, may ... be described as machineries of
universe-maintenance’. One major occasion for the development of universe-
maintaining conceptualization arises when deviant versions of the symbolic
universe develop into a reality in their own right and become the bearer of an
alternative definition of reality. This poses not only a theoretical, but also a
practical threat to the institutional order legitimated by the symbolic universe in
question. Deviance, for instance, can be interpreted as a kind of alternative
worldview. The reasons for this hostility to an alternative worldview may lie in

the extremely significant function that the symbolic universe serves in
making social life possible ... [Human] life is by its nature disorderly and
the symbolic universe helps to create for us a kind of certainty and
anchorage. Anything that threatens to strip us of this protective cocoon
will inevitably be seen as evil. ... [The] deviant is a person whose
existence does threaten to inundate with chaos the symbolic system by
which order and meaning are given to human existence (Scott, 1972: 30-
31).

The important point is that in a negotiated social order the repression employed
against deviance by the protectors of the official definition of reality needs to be
legitimated by various conceptual machineries. Berger and Luckmann name
several types of these machineries - mythology, theology, philosophy and
science. A further application of universe maintaining machinery is therapy. In the words of Berger and Luckmann (1966: 131), therapy entails

the application of conceptual machinery to ensure that actual or potential deviants stay within the institutionalized definitions of reality and is a form of social control: ‘since therapy must concern itself with either deviations from the “official” definitions of reality, it must develop a conceptual machinery to account for such deviations and to maintain the realities thus challenged. This requires a body of knowledge that includes a theory of deviance, a diagnostic apparatus, and a concept system for the “cure of souls”.

The deviant’s conduct challenges the societal reality as such and its ‘taken-for-granted cognitive and normative operating procedures’. Such a conceptual machinery is then applied by the appropriate specialists and may be internalized by the deviant, who develops ‘insight’. Successful therapy re-socializes the deviant into the objective reality of the symbolic universe of the society.

From what has been said so far, it makes sense to argue that a generalized motivational accounting system must be invented in order to justify the use of power. Max Weber (1947: 324-92) differentiated three major types of power legitimation: charismatic, rational, and traditional. Ben-Yehuda goes beyond these types and suggests that the use of power is legitimated through the use of a complex set of symbols: morality (or ideology), which can be thought of as society’s generalized motivational accounting system on the macro level that provides actors with rules and legitimizes the use of power. It can also justify resistance to the powerful by developing a counter-morality.

Finally, Edelman (1964) has referred to crime-control discourse as one form of the symbolic language of politics. Its function is to attempt to convey rational decisions, change and progress. Even if there is no change and progress, social-control discourse has to give the impression that there are
actual innovations and breakthroughs in the war against crime. Professionals and researchers are engaged in developing new programmes and campaigns and inventing new names. All this is to try to show that social problems such as crime can be controlled to a certain extent. I shall come back to Edelman below in my section on lexicalization.

So far I have provided several sociological accounts that are useful in analysing social-control discourse: Cohen on the nature and functions of crime-control talk; Ben-Yehuda on motivational accounting systems and vocabularies of motive as a form of legitimation for control agents; Berger and Luckmann on the social construction of reality and universe-maintenance; and Edelman on the language of the helping professions. All of these accounts are of relevance to the present study in that they offer explanations for the functions of social-control talk. They all make essentially constructivist assumptions about language and tie in with Halliday’s (1973: 450) suggestion that in interpreting language in functional-semantic views we may find out ‘how it is that the most ordinary uses of language so effectively transmit the social structure, the values, the systems of knowledge, all the deepest and most pervasive patterns of the culture. With a functional perspective on language, we can appreciate how this is done.’ Rather than reading texts as natural, inevitable representations of reality we need a way of looking at language that is not just representing but also constructing our view of the world.

Before the actual analysis of sample texts from the *Handbook for Teaching Cognitive Skills*, I shall provide an overview of its organization.

3.3 The Cognitive Skills Handbook

The *Handbook for Teaching Cognitive Skills* (Ross, Fabiano and Ewles, 1989) provides the instructions and detailed lesson plans for training offenders in the
cognitive skills which it considers to be necessary for ‘adequate social adjustment’. It is based on a substantial body of research (Ross and Fabiano, 1985; Ross, 1991) which suggests that many offenders have deficits in a number of cognitive skills and that training in these skills is ‘an essential component of effective correctional programs’. Trainers are asked to develop a thorough understanding of the cognitive model and use it as a conceptual guide in their programmes. The Cognitive Training sessions which are presented in the manual are modified versions of a number of techniques which have been used in previous programmes and of a selection of other techniques which Ross and Fabiano believe to be particularly useful for offenders. Most of the techniques were field-tested in an experimental study with probationers in Ontario (Ross et al. 1986; 1988), and have been implemented in projects in various correctional settings in Canada, in institutions for offenders in Venezuela and Spain (Ross et al, 1989), in programmes in Britain, and in many community and institutional programmes in the USA.

3.3.1 Organization of the Handbook

The Cognitive Skills programme consists of nine inter-related modules: problem solving; social skills; negotiation skills; the management of emotions; creative thinking; values enhancement; critical reasoning; skills in review; cognitive exercises. Each module contains a number of sessions and each session encompasses one of the specific cognitive sub-skills which are dealt with in that module.

An Introduction for Trainers is presented at the beginning of each session. This introduction is designed to indicate the purpose of the session and to provide an overview of the training procedure to be followed in the session. In addition, detailed step-by-step instructions for the trainer and a suggested
script for his/her instructions, comments and questions to participants are also
given. I have included these in the presentation of the Cognitive Training
sessions I use for my linguistic analysis in Chapters 4 and 5.

The Handbook consists of three separate volumes. The first presents the
instructions for trainers I have referred to above, the second contains
Supplements for each session, and the third is a Participants' Workbook
containing handouts, exercises and worksheets for participants, which the
trainer has to photocopy for them. The supplementary material required for
each session is used when and as indicated in the instructions for trainers. The
exercises are structured opportunities for participants to learn and practise the
cognitive skills presented in a session.

Some exercises ask participants to apply the cognitive skills they learned
about in previous sessions, thus giving them an opportunity to review these and
practise them together with new skills. The exercises include group activities,
role-playing, thinking games, puzzles, and problem situations. Ross and
Fabiano have deliberately chosen exercises that may seem to have nothing to do
with the participants’ experiences, in order to ‘broaden their horizons, get them
to think about issues they seldom think about, give them opportunities to
practise skills in unfamiliar contexts, and make them feel they can deal with
matters they might think are beyond their competence’. They regard a wide
variety in the content as ‘essential, not only to avoid boredom, but also to
ensure that the skills can be generalized across situations’ (Handbook, p.6).
Group discussions are considered to be a ‘primary vehicle’ for exercising the
cognitive skills that are to be taught.

All the texts I shall analyse in the following sections are from the
Handbook for Teaching Cognitive Skills. Apart from Text 3.1, which describes
the ‘Training Objectives’ of the Course, all the other texts are the ‘Introduction
for Trainers’ sections to the various modules.
3.4 Analysis of the Cognitive Skills Handbook texts: applying Systemic Functional Linguistics

The discourse-semantic and lexico-grammatical analysis of the texts presented here will illustrate how the systemic functional approach to language can be used to make explicit what positions, biases, and interpretations are encoded in these texts and that certain ideological assumptions about the nature and behaviour of offenders are realized in linguistic choices. This analysis is presented in a compact form in the Appendix, accompanied by a key to the analysis.

Let us first recall the three contrasting positions about the nature of 'Controltalk: the language of punishing, treating and helping' (Cohen, 1985) described at the outset of this chapter: first, things are more or less going according to plan; second, there is an unintended gap between rhetoric and reality; third, the words used are merely masquerading as benevolent concepts, while concealing the real interests and motives behind the system. Let us also bear in mind Cohen's warning that seeing this language as 'mere ideological proclamations' or delusion misses the essence of social-control talk: it stands for what the system likes to think it is doing and justifying, rationalizing and legitimizing what it would like to do. Like the motivational accounts used by individuals to rationalize their behaviour, social-control talk can be said to be functioning as a motivational accounting system, trying to convey change, progress and rational decision making in crime control. By inventing new names and announcing new programmes and campaigns professionals and administrators are engaged in giving the impression that the crime problem is not totally out of control. Crime-control ideology is also significant in so far as it succeeds in presenting as natural, acceptable or even just and humane, a
system that is basically coercive. The study of ideology and social-control talk has therefore to be grounded ‘in terms of its actual working functions’ (Cohen, 1985: 29). With these important considerations in mind, I shall now analyse how meanings and ideologies are constructed in the discourse of six Cognitive Skills Handbook texts and how they function to maintain and transmit existing power relations. The texts are the introductions to the modules ‘Objectives of Training’; ‘Management of Emotions’; ‘Problem Solving’; ‘Values Enhancement’; and ‘Negotiation Skills’. I shall analyse these texts for Transitivity, Mood and Theme (lexico-grammatical analysis), Appraisal and lexical cohesion (discourse semantic analysis). The lexico-grammatical and discourse-semantic analyses of the following texts are based on the division of the texts into sentences, as numbered below. The following text is taken from the Handbook’s ‘Objectives of Training’.

Text 3.1: ‘Objectives of Training’:

1. The cognitive training sessions are designed to target the specific cognitive skills deficits which are discussed in detail in Time to Think: interpersonal cognitive problem-solving, consequential thinking, means-end reasoning, social perspective-taking, critical reasoning, abstract reasoning, creative thinking and values.
2. Deficits in these skills constitute a serious personal handicap which puts the individual at risk of developing an anti-social lifestyle. 3. Cognitive training focuses on modifying the impulsive, egocentric, illogical and rigid thinking of offenders and on teaching them to stop and think before acting, consider the consequences of their behaviour, conceptualize alternative ways of responding to interpersonal problems and consider the impact of their behaviour on other people (including their victims).
4. Rather than viewing the offender’s anti-social behaviour as a reflection of some presumed underlying psychopathology, cognitive training is based on two premises: offenders tend to be under-socialized - they lack the values, attitudes, reasoning and
social skills which are required for pro-social adjustment; such skills can be taught.

5. The purpose of the cognitive training sessions is to foster the offenders' cognitive development and to teach them specific cognitive skills. 6. It is not designed to effect basic personality change (an exceedingly ambitious undertaking). 7. It is not psychotherapy. 8. Cognitive training has been found to be therapeutic in that it fosters improved interpersonal and social adjustment. 9. However, cognitive training is not therapy that deals directly with the offender's personal emotional problems. 10. On the contrary, cognitive training is designed to equip the offender with skills which will enable him to deal with his problems himself; skills which will also help him to avoid such problems in the first place. 11. It is a fundamental premise of the cognitive model that the best approach to treatment for offenders is an educational one - directly and systematically training them in the skills needed to live more effectively (Handbook, p. 3; sentence numbers added).

In what follows, I shall analyse six texts from the Handbook for Teaching Cognitive Skills to shed light on how these texts construe basically ideological opinions about offenders and their behaviour. It is particularly through the choice of lexical items that these become apparent, but also through syntactic and grammatical levels. I have tabulated the results to highlight different patterns in the texts. These tables are presented in my discussion of the results of the analysis (summary).

3.4.1 Lexico-grammatical analysis of text 3.1

3.4.1.1 Transitivity in text 3.1

Carrying out a transitivity analysis means determining the types of process which are encoded in clauses and the types of participants (elements in clauses) involved in them. The main process types are material (processes of doing), mental (processes which encode meanings of thinking and feeling), behavioural
(processes which share some of the characteristics of material, and some of mental), and relational (processes covering the many ways in which ‘being’ can be expressed in English clauses).

Transitivity has been a focus of attention in Critical linguistics (Fowler et al., 1979; Kress and Hodge, 1979; Kress, 1988; Hodge and Kress, 1988) and CDA (Fairclough, 1992a). The idea behind analysing Transitivity is to explore what social, cultural, ideological, and political factors determine what process type is chosen in a particular type of discourse. For example, in media reports of important events, it can be significant whether agency and responsibility are made clear or left vague. Thus, the choice of process type may depend on the political and ideological position of the newspaper and its presentation of wars, political demonstrations, or unemployment as events that just happen or as actions with responsible agents (compare ‘the police shot the suspect’ and ‘the suspect died’). By examining conservative, liberal and radical readings of newspaper reports Trew (1979) showed how lexicogrammar was used to construct and modify a range of interpretations. Similarly, the question of what Process type is chosen in the Handbook texts, whether offenders are represented as Actors or Goals (the objects of the action) and Beneficiaries (the Participants who benefit from the Process) of actions performed by cognitive training has a possible political and ideological significance.

Starting the analysis from the experiential meanings, one striking feature of the first paragraph, given that the topic is cognitive training of offenders, is the scarcity of reference to people: it is the objective, quasi-scientific side of cognitive training that is being presented here. The only overt reference to people is in the form of an impersonal noun, the individual. This text sets out to reduce interaction to a minimum, at least at the overt level. Human agency is

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4 However, not all agentless passives are used insidiously. They may carry ideological significance, but they may also be a requirement of a particular register, such as the writing of scientific texts, or they may simply be a
removed by the use of nominalizations (interpersonal cognitive problem-solving, consequential thinking, means-end reasoning, social perspective-taking, critical/abstract reasoning, creative thinking and pro-social adjustment) and passive clauses ('Cognitive training has been found to be therapeutic', 'reasoning and social skills which are required for pro-social adjustment', 'such skills can be taught', 'training them in the skills needed to live more effectively').

The 'stylistic' effects of persistent nominalization are well known: it attenuates the feeling of activity in language. It makes for 'impersonality' in style; this is an effect of the deletion of the participants, often the actor or the affected, which are possible with nominalization. The passive transformation has similar consequences to those of nominalizations, i.e. deletion of participants ('Cognitive training has been found to be therapeutic ...'), and lexicalization ('presumed underlying psycho-pathology', 'improved interpersonal and social adjustment'). Two other important functions of nominalization are 'encapsulation' and 'meaning condensation' (Thompson, 1996: 170). In formal discursive text it is quite common to bring in meaning encapsulated in a nominalization rather than a full clause. Since they condense a clause down to a word or group, nominalizations are clearly economical. They also allow a process to become a participant in a further process (e.g. Cognitive training focuses on modifying the impulsive, egocentric, illogical and

variation from the use of active constructions in a text. A specific grammatical form is thus open to various interpretations.

In their functional linguistic analysis of the sociolect of ex-criminals rehabilitated in Jewish religious academies Uri Timor and Rachel Landau (1998: 375) interpreted the use of nominalizations and passives by former inmates along similar lines: nominalizations such as 'There were some binges with drugs, but slowly, gradually, I saw how phony that was' were interpreted in the interpersonal dimension as a way for the inmates to lessen personal responsibility for past crimes and blaming external factors instead (a 'technique of neutralization' (Sykes and Matza, 1957); the use of the passive voice, as, for example, in 'There was violence and people were hurt' was interpreted in the ideational dimension as a world-view which includes deterministic elements and in the interpersonal dimension as another attempt to lessen responsibility and to dismiss the need to account for past deeds. This functional linguistic analysis explored the verbal means some criminals employ to present themselves in a more positive light. They may feel the need to do so in order to counteract the stigma of being criminals (see Goffman, 1959; Scott and Lyman, 1968).
rigid thinking of offenders). One reason why nominalization is in harmony with the ideology of science, and of formal writing in general, is that it allows processes to be objectified. Since nominalized processes, unlike clauses that contain a process verb, are non-finite, they are not tied to any specific time in relation to the time of speaking. Thus a nominalized process is detached from the here-and-now in a way that is not normally possible for a process expressed by a verb. Nominalization is one form of reification, one of the modes by which ideology can operate (Thompson, 1984), which represents a transitory state of affairs as if it were constant and natural. Meaning can thus be presented as though it has some external objective reality. It is therefore inherently generalized, which is again in harmony with the aim of science to establish general truths not tied to the specific conditions of time or observer. The writers can treat meaning as existing, as a kind of abstract thing, which facilitates the expression of general ‘common-sense’ truths or claims about the nature and the behaviour of offenders. It also means that the writers have a wide choice of elements for Theme position in the clause. Not only can a process become the starting point of a clause, but agents or further processes may be left to the end of the clause (in Rheme position) where they ‘carry more communicative dynamism’ (Bloor and Bloor, 1995: 223-24). This ‘objectification’ (Fowler and Kress, 1979) in turn affects lexicalization, the provision of words and phrases to code new concepts or consolidate existing ones: interpersonal cognitive problem-solving, means-end reasoning, social perspective-taking, problem-solving effort. New wordings create new lexical items (Halliday, 1966). Wording which involves nominalization makes this process particularly clear: ‘This will determine how successful they (i.e. offenders) will be in attempting to solve their problems becomes The manner ... will determine the success of their problem-solving effort (see text 3.4, sentence
1. Thus, the wording of (1) has been turned into problem-solving effort in (2), which is treated like a new lexical item.

Another significant function of nominalization is that it provides a noun to which a judgmental adjective can be added, as in serious personal handicap, anti-social lifestyle, pro-social adjustment, impulsive/ egocentric/ illogical thinking. The authors of the Cognitive Skills texts make extensive use of this possibility, and it again serves the goal of turning a process with an adverb of manner (they think in an impulsive, egocentric, illogical way) into a term with a fixed, non-negotiable meaning.

If we look at Transitivity, most of the processes in text 3.1 are material, reflecting one purpose of the text, which is to give the impression that something can be done about offenders' deficits in cognitive skills. This is part and parcel of the crime-control talk used by the workers, managers and ideologues of the system 'as they explain what they think they are doing and announce what they would like to do' (Cohen, 1985: 115). The Transitivity system focuses the reader's attention on what the Cognitive Skills Course can achieve. Offenders are rarely referred to as agents and occur only twice in the informationally-important part of the sentence, as its Theme. They typically occur as Goals or Beneficiaries in action clauses, as in 'Cognitive training focuses on...teaching them to stop and think...' or 'cognitive training is designed to equip the offender with skills which will enable him to deal with his problems himself'; 'skills which will help him to avoid such problems in the first place'. Their actions, stop and think before acting, respond to inter-personal problems, deal with his problems, avoid such problems, are embedded in main clauses that represent them as beneficiaries of actions performed by the cognitive training process. The text thus depicts offenders as acted upon, with the Cognitive Skills Course as actor. The same is true for the four mental processes that follow in sentence 3: 'teach them to ... think before acting, consider the
consequences of their behaviour’, conceptualize alternative ways of responding to interpersonal problems and consider the impact of their behavior on other people’. This, combined with the modalization of this sentence with ‘will’, which gives a meaning of categorical prediction, presents the offender as the participant at whom an invariant process is directed. Otherwise, offenders are Carriers in (negative) attributive relational processes (forms of ‘to be’ or ‘to have’): ‘Offenders tend to be under-socialized’, or (non)-Possessors: ‘they lack the values, attitudes, reasoning or social skills …’) which characterize them as lacking and having some deficit.

Both attributive and identifying relational processes are used several times in this text. Attributive relationals ascribe some descriptive attributes to an entity: … social skills which are required (At) for pro-social adjustment. Identifying relationals give the entity in question a definite identity. For the identifying type, the relevant Participants are the Token and the Value: that which is being identified, and that which gives the ‘Value’ or identification. In the following sentences the Values identify the Tokens: Deficits in these skills (T) constitute a serious personal handicap (V); The purpose of the cognitive training sessions (T) is to foster the offender’s cognitive development (V1) and to teach them specific cognitive skills (V2); It (T) is not psychotherapy (V); It (T) is not therapy (V); It is a fundamental premise of the cognitive model (V) that the best approach to treatment for offenders is an educational one (T). Both the attributive and relational processes are used to define and describe the Cognitive Skills Course in terms of its positive qualities, which shows that the text has a persuasive role and is almost a form of advertising.

A Token analysis can guide us towards the broader concerns of the text producers. Essentially, the Values reveal what values the writers (and ultimately the culture they are part of) use to measure the Tokens that they deal with. These values suggest wider ideological beliefs, e.g. that offenders may be
less likely to re-offend if they learn to practise cognitive skills. Halliday (1994: 126) mentions particularly scientific, commercial, political and bureaucratic discourse as areas where an analysis of the experiential values used in identifying clauses is useful for investigating ideological values as ‘the meanings that are being construed are inherently symbolic ones’.

Finally, it should be noted that of the most frequent clause types in text 3.1, material, mental and identifying relational, it is the material ones that are distributed more or less evenly throughout the text. There is a small cluster of mental processes in sentences 3 and 4, where the text talks about modifying the thinking of offenders. All six identifying relationals are concentrated in the second part of the text, which describes the purpose and functions of the Course. There does thus seem to be a clear pattern of movement from one process to the next.

3.4.1.2 Theme in text 3.1

As a textual dimension of the grammar of the clause, Theme is concerned with the ways in which clause elements are positioned according to their informational prominence. The definition given by Halliday (1994: 38) is that it is the element which serves as ‘the starting-point for the message’ or ‘the ground from which the clause is taking off’. All Themes but one in the above text are unmarked Subject Themes, beginning with The cognitive training sessions, which sets up the main topic. Most other unmarked Themes are Cognitive training. This is an important feature of thematic patterning in the text, as this foregrounding of cognitive training enables an evaluation of the Course, emphasizing its positive aspects. Offenders are mostly in Rheme position, which is where what is called ‘New’ information occurs. The position of offenders in the ‘news’ position highlights their role: all activity is focused
on them. *Offenders* become Theme only twice in the text (sentence 4), when the text talks about their alleged defects ("*Offenders* tend to be under-socialized – *they* lack the values …").

The dependent clause as Theme *Rather than viewing the offender’s anti-social behaviour as a reflection of some presumed underlying psychopathology* allows the writer to use a rhetorical strategy to indicate ‘that something in the context requires an a-typical meaning to be made’ (Eggins, 1994: 296). In sentence 11, the extraposition *It is a fundamental premise of the cognitive model that the best approach ...* (rather than ‘A fundamental premise of the cognitive model is ...’) has implications for Theme-Rheme position and Given-New assignment. Instead of being placed in the unmarked position for Subject, the rankshifted clause *that the best treatment for offenders is an educational one* is placed at the end, with ‘it’ functioning as ‘dummy’ subject until the real information appears. This makes the information given sound ‘heavier’ and more authoritative.

One significant contribution that Theme makes to cohesion and coherence of a text has to do with thematic progression, with how thematic elements succeed one another. In text 3.1 there is mainly a pattern of Theme reiteration, a very effective way to provide the text with a clear focus and to create cohesion: *cognitive training* manages to occur thematically in most of the Themes of the text, as if to advertise itself. This kind of thematic pattern is interrupted for a short period, when *offenders* are made Theme twice and when *The purpose of the cognitive training sessions* is made Theme. There is a ‘zig-zag pattern’ (Eggins, 1994: 303) of thematic progression at the beginning of the text, that is, an element which is introduced in the Rheme in one clause, is chosen to become the Theme of the next clause: *The specific cognitive skills deficits*, which is introduced in the Rheme in sentence 1, is made Theme in the next: *Deficits in these skills*, which is treated as ‘given’, not new, information.
that is expressed evaluatively. Hoey (2000) points out that evaluative words or nominal groups that occur as given information are difficult to challenge, as the reader is not positioned to make a decision as to whether or not agree with these evaluations.

The Thematic element Rather than viewing the offender's anti-social behaviour as a reflection of some underlying psychopathology builds on all the Themes and Rhemes of the preceding clauses, e.g. the noun ‘anti-social behaviour’ sends us back to the Rheme ‘anti-social lifestyle’. The thematic foregrounding of cognitive training is a very important part of the orientation of text 3.1, serving as a starting point of positive evaluation of the Cognitive Skills Course. This also makes it sound rather ‘impersonal’ and authoritative. The absence of any interpersonal Themes adds to this.

3.4.1.3 Mood in text 3.1

Turning to the interpersonal meanings, we can see that in text 3.1 the writers use only a limited range of modalizing resources: e.g. ‘such skills can be taught’. After being informed about the ‘specific cognitive skills deficits’ of offenders, this sentence sounds very reassuring for the reader, as it suggests that something can be done about offenders’ behaviour. Here one function of social-control talk becomes evident: to maintain and increase the self-confidence of those who work in the system and to suggest that things are not beyond control. Otherwise we see mostly declarative clauses making strong assertions about the quality of the Course and about offenders. The systemic approach stresses that tense is another feature of modality. The present tense realizes categorical modality: ‘deficits in these skills constitute a serious personal handicap which puts the individual at risk ... they lack the values to ... ’). The text makes unmitigated statements about the behaviour of
offenders, presenting it as a straight fact. This certainty is not unusual for textbooks. Unlike research article writers, who are expected to hedge claims which could be seen as 'Face Threatening Acts' (Brown and Levinson, 1987), textbook writers normally treat their topic as fully understood and unproblematic. Myers (1989: 14) has interpreted most of the features that are considered conventional in scientific texts, such as hedging, impersonal constructions, or the assertion of general rules, as negative politeness devices. In text 3.1, however, there is no hedging by 'personal attribution', because 'any implication that belief is personal weakens it'. Myers also suggests that one might find a bald-on-record strategy where demands of efficiency overrule demands of politeness. The authors of the Handbook are able to make their statements baldly because they were claimed and accepted by other researchers (see section 3.3 above on Cognitive Skills Handbook).

Several sentences in the text are modalized with 'will' ('...skills which will enable him to deal with his problems himself; 'skills which will also help him to avoid such problems ...'). This gives a meaning of categorical prediction and suggests that the text producers are writing from a position of insider knowledge, which is another way to make their assertions sound more authoritative.

3.4.2 Discourse-semantic analysis of text 3.1

3.4.2.1 Appraisal in text 3.1

Within Systemic Functional Linguistics, exploring interpersonal discourse semantics has generally been grammatical, using the interpersonal systems of Mood and Modality as a point of departure for the development of discourse models (Halliday, 1984; Ventola, 1987). However, apart from Mood and
Modality, another significant aspect of interpersonal meaning is the attitude expressed in a text and the encoding of judgements through lexical choices, for example, describing offenders’ thinking as ‘egocentric’ versus, for instance, ‘individualistic’. This attitudinal lexis expresses the speaker’s or writer’s opinion on a broadly good/bad parameter and has been variously described as ‘affective meaning’ (Leech, 1974), ‘stance’ (Conrad and Biber, 1988) and ‘appraisal’ (Martin, 2000). Working within a systemic functional framework, I shall adopt Martin’s term to analyse the lexical items in the Cognitive Skills texts, but also use it interchangeably with the more general term ‘evaluation’.

Appraisal can turn up in verbs, nouns, adjectives and adverbs and can be positively or negatively loaded, depending on context. Some lexical items are very clearly evaluative in the sense that evaluation is their main function (e.g. ‘splendid’, ‘terrible’). As well as obviously attitudinal, they can also appear neutral on the surface. Appraisal has three sub-systems, Affect, Judgement and Appreciation. According to Martin (2000: 145), Affect is the resource used for construing emotional responses (‘happiness, sadness, fear, loathing’); Judgement is deployed for construing moral evaluations of behaviour (‘ethical, deceptive, brave’, etc.); and Appreciation construes the ‘aesthetic’ quality of text (‘remarkable, desirable, elegant’, etc.). Some texts foreground one or another of these three systems. As we shall see below, the Cognitive Skills texts foreground Judgement. This is because it is concerned with changing the thinking and behaviour of offenders it regards as negative. Judgement can be thought of as the ‘institutionalization of feeling’ (Martin, 2000) in the context of

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6 Appraisal is one of three major systems, alongside Negotiation and Involvement (as outlined by Martin, 1992, 2000). Negotiation is concerned with speech function and exchange structure (Ventola, 1987); Involvement deals with resources for including or excluding interactants through specialized lexis, taboo words and slang (including anti-languages; see Halliday, 1978). These three systems construe the register variable tenor, which is concerned with the ongoing construction of relations of power (equal/unequal) and solidarity (near/distant) among interlocutors (Martin, 1992). I shall take up Negotiation and Involvement in Chapter 5 for my analysis of some of the spoken interactions between the Cognitive Skills tutors and the inmates.
proposals (norms about how people should or shouldn’t behave). Martin further distinguishes between inscribed and evoked appraisal. Inscribed appraisal is explicitly expressed in a text (a bright/vicious child), whereas with evocative appraisal, an evaluative response is projected by reference to events which are conventionally considered to be either positive or negative (a child who reads a lot/ a child who tears the wings off butterflies).

Iedema (1987) suggests dividing judgements into two major categories, social esteem and social sanction. Judgements of esteem have to do with normality (how unusual someone is), capacity (how capable they are), and tenacity (how resolute they are); judgements of sanction are about veracity (how truthful someone is) and propriety (how ethical someone is). Social esteem involves admiration and criticism, typically without legal implications. Social sanction also involves a positive and negative dimension, praise and condemnation, but often with legal implications.

It should be pointed out that not all evaluation is of good and bad, but also of certainty or importance and relevance. These two parameters play a less important role in the Cognitive Skills texts, but they do occur, as we shall see below.

Taking a look at text 3.1, one can see that Judgement stands out. There are clusters of appraisal, beginning with the evaluation of the lack of cognitive skills as ‘deficits’. Most of the significant appraisal occurs around the description of offenders’ thinking and the description of the Cognitive Skills Course.

The symbols + and – denote positive and negative Judgement (Martin, 2000):

- **deficit** (social esteem; –capacity)
- **serious personal handicap** (social esteem; –capacity)
- **anti-social life-style** (social sanction; –propriety)
impulsive/egocentric thinking (social sanction; –propriety)
illogical/rigid thinking (social esteem; –capacity)
psychopathology (social esteem; –normality)
under-socialized (social sanction; –propriety)
lack the values (evoked judgement, social sanction; –propriety)
therapeutic (social esteem; +capacity)
pro-social adjustment (social esteem; +capacity)
enables him to deal with (social esteem; +capacity)
helps him to avoid (social esteem; +capacity)
fosters (social esteem; +capacity)
improved inter-personal and social adjustment (social esteem; +capacity)
the best approach to treatment (appreciation; positive valuation)

This analysis shows that judgements of social sanction and esteem about offenders are overwhelmingly negative, mainly in terms of propriety and capacity. Not surprisingly, judgements made about the Cognitive Skills Course are all positive in capacity. As already indicated in the section on Theme in text 3.1 above, the placing of the noun group *deficits in these skills* as ‘given’ information makes it more likely that the reader will accept it as a valid evaluation. Once it is accepted, the subsequent argument constitutes a serious personal handicap is more likely to be accepted also. The reader is thus positioned to respond to something according to the label it is given.

In impulsive/egocentric/illogical/rigid thinking the negatively judged adjectives modify a general noun. In improved inter-personal and social adjustment, the positively judged adjective ‘improved’ further modifies the already positively evaluated noun ‘adjustment’. This shows how effective nominalizations coupled with judgemental adjectives are in expressing fixed, non-negotiable and evaluative meanings.
3.4.2.2 Lexical cohesion in text 3.1

I have already pointed out in the section on Theme that text 3.1 makes extensive use of Theme reiteration, the overall effect of which is tight lexical cohesion. The lexical explicitness of text 3.1 is apparent not only in the use of lexical repetition but also in reference items such as pronouns and demonstratives. All four kinds of endophoric reference (anaphoric, cataphoric, esphoric, and comparative) occur: ‘the specific cognitive skills which are discussed in detail in ...’ (esphoric); ‘Deficits in these skills’, i.e. cognitive skills (anaphoric); they (anaphoric) lack the values, which are required for pro-social adjustment (esphoric), ‘such skills can be taught’ (comparative); cognitive training is designed to equip the offender with skills which will help him (anaphoric) to deal with his problems himself (anaphoric); skills which will also help him (anaphoric) to avoid such problems in the first place’ (comparative). The main participant, cognitive training, is always referred to by full nominal groups and is repeated four times; to foster (the offender’s cognitive development and improved inter-personal and social adjustment) is repeated twice. All these instances are examples of ‘reiteration’ (Halliday, 1976) and they have in common that one lexical item refers back to another, to which it is related by having a common referent. The one with the strongest cohesive force is obviously repetition, although reiteration includes not only the repetition of the same lexical item but also the occurrence of a related item, which may be either a synonym or near-synonym of the original, a superordinate, or a general word: for example, anti-social behaviour refers back to anti-social lifestyle, of which it is a synonym. Other synonyms or near-synonyms are pro-social adjustment/social adjustment; to target/to focus on; to think/
consider/conceptualize; interpersonal problems/personal emotional problems; to help/foster. All these examples of reiteration serve to intensify meaning.

Text 3.1 makes relatively little use of grammatical resources for explicitly signalling conjunctive cohesion. Cohesive definite deixis does occur (e.g. ‘The cognitive training sessions’, ‘The purpose of the cognitive training sessions’), but the other examples of repetition (‘Cognitive training’) have no cohesive deixis and are treated as if they were a new start each time. Even in the last paragraph, there is no explicit signal that the term ‘cognitive training’ has occurred earlier. This lexical explicitness suggests that the writers rely very little on co-operation from the reader in constructing meaning by supplementing the information in one sentence with information carried over from another; but they do expect the reader to understand how the information fits together - there is, for instance, except for the final paragraph, only one conjunctive adjunct (‘rather than’) to signal a connection between the sentences. Not all conjunctive relations, however, have to be expressed explicitly. They can also be expressed implicitly, through the simple juxtaposition of sentences.

In the clause complexes, the dominant relationship is extension expressing variation (one sentence changes the meanings of another by contrast or by qualification). All conjunctive relations (rather than, however, on the contrary) are of the adversative type: ‘however’ is adversative/contrastive (‘as against’) and emphatic; ‘rather than’ and ‘on the contrary’ are replacive in that they express correction of meaning in the sense of ‘contrary to expectation’ or ‘as against what has just been said’. Recently, Thompson and Zhou (2000) have argued that coherence and cohesion depend not only on the logical connections but also on evaluation - what the writer thinks about what he is writing. This would mean that clause relations represent a kind of dialogue, or interaction between the writer and reader as Winter (1968) has suggested: one function of a conjunct such as ‘however’ or ‘but’ may be to tell the readers that
what follows is not what they expect to find. In this case, a logical-connection word, 'however', has an interpersonal function.

To sum up, text 3.1 can be said to use many attitudinally loaded lexical items (e.g. egocentric thinking, anti-social lifestyle). There is human agency, but it is removed from thematic position by nominalizing the processes. The result is a text in which people, i.e. offenders act, but do not become Theme when they do so. The role of Actor is taken by the Cognitive Skills Course, the topical Themes focus mostly on abstracted processes or things and are institutional, rather than personal. The text contains no interpersonal Themes at all, which is another way in which it creates its authority and distance.

Text 3.2: ‘Management of Emotions’

The ‘Management of Emotions’ module recommends strategies for successful verbal communication for the offender in ‘the emotionally charged conditions he is likely to encounter outside the sessions’ (Handbook, p. 156). The training is intended for both aggressive and passive trainees and is designed to help them ‘take action to avoid or effectively deal with circumstances that might create anger or anxiety’. The following extract is from the Introduction to the module:

1. There is convincing evidence that offenders who have acquired the social cognitive skills taught in this program learn to apply these skills in social situations outside of the group and thereby improve their ability to solve many of the interpersonal conflicts which previously would have led to anti-social or deviant behavior. 2. Moreover, they learn to avoid such situations before they develop. 3. However, an offender cannot avoid all conflict. 4. There will be times when the problems he encounters will make him highly aroused both emotionally and physiologically. 5. Emotions, of course, are a crucial aspect of thinking. 6. There are few thoughts without emotion; few emotions without
thoughts. 7. The emotion is often stronger than and overrides the thought. 8. It is imperative that offenders learn to use cognitive techniques to manage their emotions so that they no longer are simply controlled by them. 9. A moderate level of arousal in conflict situations is both natural and essential since it energizes and can serve to motivate problem-solving activity. 10. Very strong feelings and high levels of arousal, however, may interfere with the individual’s application of cognitive skills which he has no difficulty using when he is calm. 11. In large measure, the offender’s success in social situations will depend on his ability to:

- 12. respond to interpersonal conflict in a manner which effectively prevents him from becoming emotionally aroused. 13. This ability can be achieved in most situations by application of the various skills taught in this program.
- 14. maintain or reduce his level of arousal to a moderate level in emotionally provoking situations. 15. That is one focus of training in this unit.
- 16 persist in applying his cognitive skills even when his arousal is high. 17. This ability can be developed in two ways:
  a.) by practicing his cognitive skills so frequently that they become habitual, automatic responses to interpersonal stress.
  b.) by practicing these skills under emotionally arousing conditions. 18. That is why we suggest that in training sessions you encourage highly intense provocative discussion.
19. We want the offenders to practice the application of the skills you are teaching under conditions which correspond as closely as possible to the emotionally charged conflicts he is likely to encounter outside of the sessions (Handbook, p. 155-6; emphasis in the original; sentence numbers added).

3.4.3 Lexico-grammatical analysis of text 3.2

3.4.3.1 Transitivity in text 3.2

We can see that in text 3.2 again most processes are material, spread throughout the text, with offenders being the active participants most of the time, albeit in
dependent clauses. There are three existential processes in this text (*There is convincing evidence ...*, *There will be times ...*, *There are few thoughts ...*).

Existential processes are typically used to bring in a new participant in the text. The message that comes across from *There is convincing evidence*... together with the present tense is one of scientific authority, but also reassurance. The effect of nominalization here is very much like in text 3.1: it makes it sound authoritative.

Apart from material clauses, the most frequent clause types are behavioural and attributive relational (e.g. ‘The emotion *is* often stronger than ...’; ‘A moderate level of arousal in conflict situations *is* both natural and essential ....’) to describe what still comes within the parameters of ‘normal behaviour’. These are more or less interspersed at regular intervals in between the material clauses, although there is a pattern of movement from material to attributive relational and existential processes in the first half of the text (sentences 4-7). There are only two identifying relational processes: ‘That is one focus of the program’ (teach offenders to control their emotions) and ‘Emotions, of course, are a crucial aspect of thinking’.

The relatively high number of behavioural processes (e.g. *solve* interpersonal conflicts; *avoid* such situations/all conflict; *respond* to interpersonal conflict) shows the text’s concern about offenders learning to manage their emotions. The Cognitive Skills Course offers the possibility of adopting certain forms of behaviour, which can be achieved by ‘the application of the various skills taught in this program’. It is thus concerned not so much with the internal states of the offender but his external observable behaviour. In other words, as long as offenders ‘behave’, there is no need to change their circumstances. This is what makes the Course such an ideal tool for exercising social control.
3.4.3.2 Theme in text 3.2

With the exception of one marked Theme (*In large measure*), all Themes are unmarked subject Themes, most of which are impersonal (e.g. *the emotion*) except for *offenders* at the beginning of the text and *we* at the end. If we look at Theme development, we observe less Theme re-iteration but thematic shifting instead, with the new Themes coming from inside the text, that is cohesively (thematic progression). In the first part of the text, *offender(s)* is repeated twice by *they/he*. Then it is the zig-zag pattern which allows *the problems he encounters*, introduced in the Rheme of the previous clause as a near-synonym (*conflict*), to become Theme. The same is true of *emotion(s)*, introduced in the Rheme as Circumstance of Manner (‘highly aroused both *emotionally*...’) which becomes Theme twice. The thematized comment *It is imperative that* ... allows the writers to thematize their own comment on the value or validity of what they are going to say. Like the text before, this text also uses lexical repetition for cohesion: *emotion* is repeated four times, which suggests that the authors are preoccupied with the supposedly impulsive nature of offenders as one reason for their ‘anti-social behaviour’.

3.4.3.3 Mood in text 3.2

Text 3.2 again uses the present tense to express categorical modality (‘There *is* convincing evidence that offenders ... *learn* to apply these skills .... and *improve* their ability to ....’), but also a more tentative tone (‘Very strong feelings ... *may* interfere with the individual’s application of cognitive skills ...’). This text makes a slightly greater use of modality: as with text 3.1, it modalizes several sentences with ‘*will*’, thus categorically predicting events (‘There *will* be times ... when the problems he encounters *will* make him highly...’).
aroused …; the offender’s success will depend on his ability to …). It uses modalization to express lack of ability on part of the offender once (‘An offender cannot avoid all conflict’) and ability on part of the Cognitive Skills Course to do something about it (‘This ability can be achieved …; this ability can be developed …’). There is one epistemic modal expression, it is imperative that …, expressing objective modality (Perkins, 1983: 67-8), ‘the objectivity being a function of the fact that the modality itself is actually asserted.’

3.4.4 Discourse-semantic analysis of text 3.2

3.4.4.1 Appraisal in text 3.2

convincing evidence (appreciation; positive valuation)
anti-social/deviant behavior (social sanction; –propriety)
it is imperative that (importance)
manage their emotions (social esteem; +capacity)
effectively (social esteem; +capacity)
simply controlled by their emotions (social esteem; –capacity)
highly aroused both emotionally and physiologically (social sanction; –propriety)
highly intense provocative discussion (appreciation; positive valuation)
emotionally charged conflicts (social esteem; –normality)
likely to encounter (certainty)

Again there is a foregrounding of negative judgement of social sanction and esteem when it comes to offenders’ ability to control their emotions. There are two forms of evaluation in the emotionally charged conflicts he is likely to encounter. The first one is of negative judgement, the second one is of how
certain the writers are of these conflicts happening. Both serve to evaluate offenders negatively by implying that they are *simply controlled* by their emotions. The negative evaluation of offenders is also signalled by the adverb 'simply', indicating that offenders are at the mercy of their emotions.

### 3.4.4.2 Lexical cohesion in text 3.2

Lexical cohesion in this text is again achieved by the choice of words that are in the broadest sense synonymous: *conflict/problems, social cognitive skills/cognitive techniques; such situations* refers back to *interpersonal conflicts*, offenders must learn to *manage* their emotions, so that they are no longer simply *controlled* by them; and by contrast: *thoughts/emotions*. The ‘presuming’ reference items (Eggins, 1994: 95) in the text are the definite article, demonstratives and pronouns, most of which are used anaphorically. There is one example of esphoric reference (‘the interpersonal skills which previously would have led to anti-social behaviour’), where we find out which interpersonal skills by the immediately following part of the nominal group *which would have led to ...* and one example of comparative reference (‘Moreover, they learn to avoid *such situations*’), where the identity of the presumed item is retrieved because an item with which it is being compared has been mentioned (‘many of the interpersonal conflicts which previously would have led to anti-social or deviant behaviour’). There are two examples of extension in the first two paragraphs. The first one, ‘*Moreover, they learn to avoid ...*’, expresses a complex additive relation, which is emphatic, the second one expresses an adversative relation: ‘*However, an offender cannot avoid all conflict*’. ‘*Emotions, of course, are a crucial aspect of thinking*’ suggests that something should have been obvious, but was overlooked (Halliday, 1976:
Here, the writers probably want to show that they do acknowledge a role for emotions in people's thinking.

**Text 3.3: 'Problem Solving'**

The third text is the Introduction to the 'Problem Solving' module in the Handbook, one of the largest modules (together with 'Values Enhancement'). It includes a session called 'Assertive Communication' (text 3.4, analysed below).

1. Many anti-social individuals have deficits in interpersonal problem-solving – the thinking skills which are required for solving problems which we all encounter in interacting with other people (Spivak, Platt & Shure, 1976).

2. In their interpersonal relations, offenders often fail to recognize that an interpersonal problem exists or is about to occur; if they do recognize it, they fail to understand it. 3. They do not or cannot consider alternative solutions to such problems, but keep responding in their same old, ineffective way. 4. They cannot calculate the consequences of their behaviour on other people. 5. It is not just that they do not; they can not. 6. They cannot determine the best way to get what they want in their interactions with other people. 7. They do not understand the cause and effect relationship between their behaviour and people's reaction to them. 8. Problem-solving training is a component of many programs for offenders. 9. In our program, problem-solving training is not limited to offering individuals specific solutions to specific problems, but aims to teach cognitive and behavioural skills which will enable the individual to develop a general approach to problems (Handbook, p. 17; emphasis in the original; sentence numbers added).
3.4.5 Lexico-grammatical analysis of text 3.3

3.4.5.1 Transitivity in text 3.3

The most frequently used process types in text 3.3 are material and mental processes, with the number of mental processes being slightly higher. All the mental process are concerned with offenders’ presumed inability ‘to recognize that a problem exists, to fail to understand it, to consider alternative solutions and to calculate the consequences of their behavior’. In this text, there is a clear move from mental to material processes, most of which are concentrated in the last part of the text, with Problem-solving (not surprisingly) as the Actor ‘offering individual specific solutions to specific problems’.

3.4.5.2 Theme in text 3.3

There are two marked Themes in the text (in their interpersonal relations; in our program), putting special emphasis on the interpersonal relations of offenders and drawing attention to the fact that this programme is different to other correctional programmes in that it offers both cognitive and behavioural kills. Otherwise the text uses mainly personal topical Themes, using Theme iteration as a strategy: many anti-social individuals, offender(s), they and he, referring to offender(s). Here we can observe the same phenomenon as in xt 3.1: the Theme position of these evaluative nouns and their personal onouns makes it difficult for the reader to challenge them.

5.3 Mood in text 3.3

5.3 uses declarative sentences to make categorical statements about
offenders, although the softener ‘often’ is used once (offenders often fail to recognize that a problem exists), and to outline its approach to problem solving. The rest of the text uses modality to express lack of ability on part of the offender (e.g. ‘they cannot consider alternative solutions’ ... ‘they cannot calculate the consequences of their behavior’; ‘it is not just that they do not, they cannot) and one categorical prediction (... skills which will enable the individual to develop a general approach).

3.4.6 Discourse-semantic analysis of text 3.3

3.4.6.1 Appraisal in text 3.3

anti-social (social sanction; –propriety)
deficits (social esteem; –capacity)
required for (importance)
fail (social esteem; –capacity)
in their same old, ineffective way (social esteem; –capacity)
offer (appreciation; positive valuation)
enable (social esteem; +capacity)
teach (appreciation; positive valuation)

Since this text is mainly concerned with offenders’ lack of thinking skills which are required (evaluation of importance) for solving their personal problems, all appraisals express negative judgement of social sanction and esteem, mainly in terms of capacity and propriety. Towards the end of the text we learn that the Cognitive Skills Course offers, enables and teaches, all positive evaluations.
3.4.6.2 Lexical cohesion in text 3.3

Lexical cohesion is again achieved through repetition: 'interpersonal problem-solving; interpersonal relations; interpersonal problem'; 'offenders often fail to recognize that a problem exists ...'; 'if they do recognize it, they fail to understand it'; 'Problem-solving training is a component of many programs for offenders', but 'In our program, problem-solving training is not limited to offering specific solutions to specific problems'; and through contrast: 'aims to teach cognitive and behavioural skills ...'.

Let us now consider the 'Assertive Communication' text. The session focuses on techniques for turning a confrontational conversation into an assertive, collaborative one. With its emphasis on the rational and pragmatic (attempting to change offenders’ dysfunctional behaviour rather than looking for its deeper causes), ‘Assertive Communication’ is similar to other assertiveness training (AT) programmes that have been widely implemented to train those who are considered to be ‘socially inadequate'. They form an integral part of programmes designed to combat social problems such as drug-taking and crime, in which assertiveness is taught as it is supposed to ‘enable’ people to resist peer pressure or, as in the Cognitive Skills Course, to ‘enable offenders to interact positively with peers, teachers, parents, employers or other authority figures (including correctional officers)' (Handbook, p. 107). In its ‘Instructions for Trainers’, the Handbook claims that the use of assertive conversational skills can help the offender to avoid unpleasant conflicts:

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8 Well-known examples of AT in anti-drugs programmes are the Heroin-Screws-You-Up campaign launched by the Conservative Government during the 1980s and the Just-Say-No crusade in the USA. More recently, the Scotland Against Drugs (SAD) campaign initiated in 1996 by the then Secretary of State, Michael Forsyth, turned out to be an unequivocal Just-Say-No initiative allied to a law enforcement crackdown. The underlying causes of Scotland’s drug problems, whatever they are, were not discussed.
Text 3.4: ‘Assertive Communication’

1. You will be teaching them that the manner in which they attempt to implement a solution will determine the success of their problem-solving effort; that some ways of implementing a possible solution will be effective, some ineffective and some may magnify the problem. 2. Your goal will be to have each client understand that he must communicate his proposed solutions precisely and accurately and in such a manner that people clearly understand how he feels and he must do so without antagonizing others or violating their rights. 3. In effect, he must learn to express his feelings, his views and his suggestions in an assertive manner. 4. Many offenders tend to avoid expressing their views, whereas many others express them aggressively; neither approach is likely to achieve the goal of making others understand or appreciate their suggestions. 5. You will teach them to understand why avoidance or aggressive approaches are ineffective because of their effect on other people - and you will help them to learn and practise assertive responses - communicating their views clearly without antagonizing people (Handbook p. 92; emphasis in the original; sentence numbers added).

3.4.7 Lexico-grammatical analysis of text 3.4

3.4.7.1 Transitivity in text 3.4

In this text, material processes again dominate, although the number of verbal and mental processes is also quite high. The focus is on making offenders (‘clients’) understand that they to express himself assertively, so that ‘people’ understand them.

3.4.7.2 Theme in text 3.4

In this text, the personal pronoun you, addressing the trainer, is made the topical Theme at the beginning and at the end of the text (Theme reiteration). Once, the topical Theme is a brief nominal group (your goal), also referring to the
Cognitive skills trainer. Then there is a short pattern of thematic shifting: *he*, referring back to the *client* (i.e. the offender), introduced in the Rheme, manages to become Theme twice, then *many offenders*, followed by *many others* is the Theme. *Neither approach* (the only impersonal Theme) is made Theme once, after being introduced in the Rheme of the previous clause complex (*Many offenders tend to avoid expressing their views, whereas many others express them aggressively*). This again contrasts with text 3.1, where the topical Themes are mostly nominalizations. The patterns of topical Theme choice in the texts analysed here relate to the Mode variation between them. In factual writing, the Mode demands the Thematization of abstractions. Text 3.4, however, reveals through some of its topical Themes one of the strategies it uses to meet the competing demands of being a written text that is supposed to have the accessibility of speech. This text is more interactive than the texts before in that the reader /Cognitive Skills tutor is directly addressed.

### 3.4.7.3 Mood in text 3.4

Most sentences in text 3.4 are modalized with ‘will’ (e.g. ‘You *will* be teaching them that the manner in which they attempt to implement a solution *will* determine the success of …’) again giving a meaning of categorical prediction. This is coupled with a strong obligation being placed on the offender: ‘Your goal *will* be to have each client understand that he *must* communicate his proposed solutions precisely … and he *must* do so without antagonizing others …’).
3.4.8 Discourse-semantic analysis of text 3.4

3.4.8.1 Appraisal in text 3.4

*success* (social esteem; +capacity)
*effective* (social esteem; +capacity)
*ineffective* (social esteem; −capacity)
*magnify the problem* (social esteem; −capacity)
*antagonize/violate* (social sanction; −propriety)
*in an assertive manner* (social esteem; +capacity)
*aggressively* (social esteem; −capacity)
*understand/appreciate* (social esteem; +capacity)

neither approach is *likely* to *achieve the goal* (certainty; social esteem; +capacity)
*avoidance* (social esteem; −tenacity/capacity)

We can see that text 3.4 displays the same Appraisal patterns as the rest of the texts so far: negative judgements of social esteem and social sanctions to evaluate offenders’ ways of communicating their views; positive evaluation of assertiveness. What is ignored here is that different contexts may call for different speech styles and that while assertiveness may work in one context, it may not work in another.

To account for the value-laden nature of evaluation Hunston (1985) suggests that ‘what is good’ and ‘what is bad’ can be defined in terms of goal-achievement: ‘your goal will be to have each client understand that …’; ‘neither approach is likely to *achieve the goal* of making others understand …’. So what is good helps to achieve this goal, whereas what is bad prevents or hinders the achievement of the goal. This ties in with Fairclough’s (1992) notion of
‘strategic discourse’, discourse oriented to instrumental goals and success, which is supposed to have an effect on ‘clients’, i.e. the Course participants.

3.4.8.2 Lexical cohesion in text 3.4

As in the other texts, there is extensive use of lexical repetition here, which contributes significantly to the text’s cohesion: ‘to implement a (possible) solution (2x); ineffective (2x); solution(s) (4x); understand (2x); antagonize (2x); express (2x); communicate (2x); avoid/avoidance). Cohesion is also achieved through contrast or antonymy (effective/ineffective; aggressive approaches/assertive responses), synonymy (precisely/accurately; antagonize/violate; feelings/views; understand/appreciate).

The presuming reference items in the text are again the definite article and pronouns (he, they, them, his), most of which refer to offender(s)/client and are used anaphorically. There are two examples where the definite article is used esphorically (‘the manner in which they attempt to … ’; ‘neither approach is likely to achieve the goal of making others understand … ’). Anaphoric cohesion in the text is also achieved by ellipsis (‘some ways of implementing a possible solution will be effective, some ineffective and some may magnify the problem’) and substitution by verbal ‘do’ (‘he must communicate his proposed solutions precisely and accurately and he must do so without antagonizing … ’) and by nominal ‘others’ (‘Many offenders … Many others … ’). In effect is clarifying and verifactive elaboration, that is, the elaborated element is made more precise for the purpose of making it absolutely clear that offenders have to express themselves in an assertive, rather than aggressive, way. Biber and Finegan (1989) note that ‘in effect’ is a certainty adverb, the main use of which is persuasion. The reader therefore seems to be positioned to agree with the text’s propositions.
The Values Enhancement module is one of the larger modules and encompasses nine training sessions (group discussions), two of which, 'The Robbery' and 'The Confidence Game', I shall analyse in the next two chapters.

Ross and Fabiano (1985) argue that it is not possible to teach cognition without teaching values and that the two should be combined. Much of the teaching of values is therefore implicit in all the modules of the Course. The authors nevertheless dedicate an entire module to improving offenders' values. The text below is from the Introduction to the module:

1. Throughout the program you must frequently **reinforce your participants' pro-social talk and actions.** 2. That is, you must take as many opportunities as possible to support and encourage (by word or gesture) the behavior and verbalizations of your participants which reflect anti-criminal and pro-social attitudes. 3. Moreover, you must also respond to participants' pro-criminal or anti-social talk by **questioning** the participants about the personal and social implications, and consequences of such positions.

4. The approach we recommend to values enhancement is **not** character education or indoctrination. 5. We reject any attempt to inculcate values by preaching, moralizing or sermonizing. 6. We do so primarily because we do not believe such approaches will be effective with offenders. 7. For the same reason, we do not recommend advice-giving or telling offenders what the "correct" values are. 8. Rather than telling offenders what values they should or must adopt (they are likely to reject your advice), we recommend challenging the offenders to examine their beliefs, raising questions which stimulate them to consider their views, and suggesting alternative perspectives. 9. We agree with those who argue that in our complex society there is no universally accepted system of values. 10. There is considerable disagreement even about fundamental principles or morality and ethics. 11. Values which are "correct" for one group may be repudiated by other groups. 12. Values are, indeed, relative to subgroups and even to individuals within subgroups. 13. Values are also relative to place and circumstances and
change frequently in a rapidly changing world. 14. However, we do believe that there is one universal value which all individuals should adopt: **concern for the feelings of other people**. 15. It is this value which we believe must be taught to offenders; it is this value which is the focus of all our program and the primary target of our values enhancement module.

16. Our general approach to teaching empathy is to continually challenge the offender’s egocentric thinking and to stimulate him into considering the views, wishes, attitudes and feelings of other people. 17. The values enhancement sessions have been designed to ensure that the offenders are continually engaged in activities which require that they think about the feelings of others. 18. This is done by exposing them to social and cognitive conflict - by creating situations in which they find that they are in conflict about what they believe and in which their ideas are in conflict with those of others. 19. In these situations the participants come to seriously question and examine their ideas about many important matters of morality and, more important, they are impelled to consider the points of view of other people (Handbook, p. 192; emphasis in the original; sentence numbers added).

One of the sociological accounts reviewed above (section 3.2.1) suggested that social-control language legitimizes what the crime-control system would like to do. So in order to legitimate action, the authors of the Handbook may need to show that their basic principles and values are ‘universal’ and therefore should be adhered to by everyone. Legitimation is also one of the main social functions of ideology and legitimating discourse is usually employed in institutional contexts (Thompson, 1984, 1990; van Dijk, 1998b).

3.4.9 Lexico-grammatical analysis of text 3.5

3.4.9.1 Transitivity in text 3.5

Again, most of the processes in text 3.5 are material, although the relatively high and roughly equal number of mental and verbal processes shows that the
text is also concerned with the cognition of offenders. The agents of the material and verbal processes are the tutors (‘You must take as many opportunities as possible to support and encourage (by word or gesture) the behavior and verbalizations of your participants … ‘you must also respond to participants’ pro-criminal or anti-social talk by questioning the participants about the personal and social implications …’). The mental process believe occurs three times to express the beliefs of the Handbook authors. Most mental processes are embedded in clauses with material processes directed at offenders (‘we recommend challenging the offenders to examine their beliefs, raising questions which stimulate them to consider their views’ …; ‘stimulate him into considering the views, wishes, attitudes and feelings of other people’; ‘ensure that the offenders are continually engaged in activities which require that they think about the feelings of others’; … ‘by creating situations in which they find that they are in conflict about what they believe.’ ‘In these situations, the offenders come to seriously question and examine their ideas … they are impelled to consider the points of view of other people’.). We can see that offenders again occur as Goals in action and verbal clauses (‘Rather than telling offenders what values they should or must adopt … we recommend challenging the offenders to examine their beliefs …’)) with the Cognitive Skills tutor being the actor.

3.4.9.2 Theme in text 3.5

There are three marked Themes in this text, two circumstantial elements (throughout the program, in these situations) and one causal element (for the same reason), drawing attention to the special status of these clauses. There is also one dependent clause as Theme (Rather than telling offenders what values they should or must adopt, …). If we look at thematic progression, there is a
pattern of Theme reiteration for short spells at various points in the texts, in this case two simple personal pronouns: you (meaning the Cognitive Skills tutor) is made Theme twice, followed by we (the Handbook authors) and values which both become Theme three times in a row. The rest of the text reveals extensive thematic shifts, mainly a zig-zag pattern of Theme progression, that is, elements which are introduced in the Rheme in one clause are promoted to become the Theme of the following clause. For example, the Rheme in clause 6, ... because we do not believe such approaches will be effective, becomes marked Theme For the same reason in the following clause with the Rheme ... we do not recommend advice-giving or telling offenders ... , which in turn becomes the following dependent clause as Theme: Rather than telling offenders what values they should or must adopt. We crops up as Theme throughout the text from time to time, keeping the text focused on the Handbook authors and their approach to teaching offenders values. Because of the thematic foregrounding of we the text has a much more personalized nature than texts 3.1 and 3.2. This text is the only text to use interpersonal Themes: ‘Values are, indeed, relative to subgroups’ in clause 12 is an emphatic indication that the authors do acknowledge that values are relative; and ‘more important, they are impelled to consider the points of view of other people’ in clause 19 serves to direct the reader to the main point of the text. Both interpersonal Themes suggest a more involved, even conversational style and are a means for the writer to enter into a dialogue with the reader.

3.4.9.3 Mood in text 3.5

We again see a mixture of indicative (declarative clauses encoding strong assertions about offenders) and modalized expressions, which indicate a strong degree of obligation being placed on the reader/Cognitive Skills tutor (‘You
must frequently reinforce your participants’ pro-social talk and actions”; ‘you must also respond to participants’ pro-criminal or anti-social talk”; ‘we do believe there is one universal value which all individuals should adopt’; ‘It is this value which we believe must be taught to offenders’. The authors use strong epistemic modality to express their commitment: ‘we do not believe such approaches will be effective’; ‘we do believe that there is one universal value which all individuals should adopt ...’ ‘It is this value which we believe must be taught to offenders’. They may be seen as ‘hedgings by personal attribution’ (Myers, 1989), through which the authors are using a politeness device to mitigate the ‘Face Threatening Act’ of their claims, saying what they believe but at the same time allowing the readers to judge for themselves. One sentence is modalized with ‘will’ (‘We do not believe that such approaches will be effective with offenders’), a categorical prediction. The rest of the text is in present tense, realizing categorical modality.

3.4.10 Discourse-semantic analysis of text 3.5

3.4.10.1 Appraisal in text 3.5

reinforce, support and encourage (social esteem; +capacity/tenacity)
anti-criminal/pro-social (social sanction; +propriety)
pro-criminal/anti-social (social sanction; -propriety)
character education/indoctrination (social esteem; -normality)
inculcate (social esteem; -normality)
p有很大概率是 preaching/moralizing/sermonizing (social esteem; -normality)
effective (social esteem; +capacity)
concern (social sanction; +propriety)
empathy (social sanction; +propriety)
challenge the offender's egocentric thinking (social esteem; +tenacity; social sanction; -propriety)
stimulate him into considering (social esteem; +tenacity)
expose to social and moral conflict (social sanction; +propriety)
important matters of morality (evaluation of relevance)
impelled to consider (social esteem; +tenacity)

The Cognitive Skills tutor’s task in this text is to reinforce, support and encourage, to stimulate, to challenge, and to expose. Whereas the first three verbs would usually be classed as positive, challenge and expose could have negative connotations on their own, but the context makes it clear that the authors evaluate them positively. In this text, the authors distance themselves from various approaches to teaching offenders values by judging these negatively (character indoctrination; inculcate values by preaching, moralizing or sermonizing). Putting correct into inverted commas twice indicates their awareness that values are relative, except for concern and empathy, which they judge positively in terms of propriety.

3.4.10.2 Lexical cohesion in text 3.5

Lexical cohesion is achieved by the choice of words which are synonyms and near-synonyms: support/encourage; anti-criminal/pro-social attitudes; pro-criminal/anti-social talk; implications/consequences; reject/do not recommend; character education/indoctrination; preaching/moralizing/sermonizing; to question/examine their beliefs/ideas/consider the views, wishes, attitudes and feelings of other people; concern for the feelings of other people/empathy; the focus of our program/the primary target of our values
Text 3.6: ‘Negotiation Skills’

1. Many offenders, when faced with interpersonal conflict, rebel in an anti-social manner which may alienate or antagonize other people. 2. Their rebelling may magnify the problem, and lead to difficulties with the law. 3. Many other offenders, unwilling or unable to deal appropriately with the conflict, retreat. 4. They fail to deal with the conflict in a direct manner, but, instead, engage in various manipulative behaviours which often are highly deviant. 5. Retreat for others involves avoiding the issue altogether by escaping into alcohol or drugs. 6. Still other offenders avoid the conflict by conforming - they accept the other person’s demands without objection. 7. Retreating and rebelling both represent maladaptive responses which are likely to create problems, rather than solve them; they also may lead to illegal behaviour. 8. Conforming, although not a deviant response, requires that the offender relinquish his position and forfeit his needs. 9. Accordingly, conforming may not resolve the conflict; it may simply delay it. 10. You will teach participants an alternative response to conflict: negotiation. 11. Negotiation usually involves compromise or concession - yielding somewhat in one’s demands in order to make the other party willing to accept at least part of one’s wishes. 12. Compromise, of course, is anathema to many offenders, who may view it as a weakness. 13. Accordingly, it is essential that you impress upon participants that rebelling and retreating are for “losers”; they are “no win” strategies - they usually fail to get the offender what he wants and may get him what he doesn’t want: a court referral! 14. Negotiation, on the other hand, is a “no-lose” strategy - both parties are able to satisfy their needs in a way which is mutually satisfactory. 15. It is also essential that you counter the view that negotiation is what weak or inadequate individuals do. 16. You must impress on them that negotiation is an activity that requires both strength and skill - strength to directly face the conflict and interpersonal skills which enable the offender to negotiate successfully (Handbook, pp. 131-2; sentence numbers added).
3.4.11 Lexico-grammatical analysis of text 3.6

3.4.11.1 Transitivity in text 3.6

As in the texts before, the proportion of material processes to other process types is quite high, although the relatively high number of behavioural processes shows that this text focuses on the (negative) behaviour of offenders: they rebel, retreat, engage in various manipulative behaviors, escape into alcohol or drugs and conform. The number of identifying relational processes (e.g. Retreat and rebelling (T) both represent maladaptive responses (V); Compromise (T), of course, is anathema to many offenders (V); Negotiation (T), on the other hand, is a no-lose strategy (V)) is three times as high as the attributive relationals, which indicates that the text is concerned more with identifying than describing participants.

3.4.11.2 Theme in text 3.6

In contrast to text 3.5, there are no marked or interpersonal Themes here. Again, we find a mixture of personal and impersonal Themes. Offenders is the Theme most of the time in the first part of the text (Theme reiteration), which again uses a zig-zag strategy to achieve cohesion by building on newly introduced information. ‘Many offenders, …, rebel …’ is taken up as Theme in the following clause: Their rebelling. ‘Many other offenders, …, retreat’ turns into the Theme Retreat and ‘Still other offenders avoid the conflict by conforming’ is made Theme not in the following clause, which takes up Retreating and rebelling as Theme, but in the next clause. Then there is a brief break in the pattern, with You (the Cognitive Skills tutor) being made Theme
and *negotiation* as Rheme, which shifts the focus of attention to the Cognitive Skills tutor and his role in the classroom.

**3.4.11.3 Mood in text 3.6**

In this text, the writers make quite extensive use of modalizing resources, using a more tentative tone (e.g. Their rebelling *may* magnify the problem ...; retreating and rebelling *may* lead to illegal behavior). This prominence of modalization in the text is an indication of the amount of interactive work that the writers feel needs to be done. Strong obligation is placed on the reader/cognitive skills tutor: it is *essential* that you impress upon participants ...; It is also *essential* that you counter the view ... You *must* impress on them that ...).

**3.4.12 Discourse-semantic analysis of text 3.6**

**3.4.12.1 Appraisal in text 3.6**

*rebel in an anti-social manner* (social sanction; -propriety)
*alienate/antagonize* (social sanction; -propriety)
*magnify the problem* (social esteem; -capacity)
*retreat* (social esteem; -capacity)
*manipulative behaviors* (social sanction; -propriety)
*highly deviant* (social sanction; -propriety)
*avoid the issue* (social esteem; -capacity)
*escape into alcohol or drugs* (social sanction; -propriety)
*conforming* (social esteem; -capacity)
*maladaptive responses* (social esteem; -capacity)
in text 3.6, we notice that the behaviour of offenders and their approaches to
deal with conflicts are again negatively evaluated. Rebel could be judged
positively in certain contexts, but its negative evaluation becomes clear here by
adding in an anti-social manner. Conforming is evaluated negatively, too.
Again there are basic distinctions into good and bad, right and wrong; concepts
which reduce what may be very complex issues to 'no-win' and 'no-lose’
strategies designed to help offenders negotiate successfully.

3.4.12.2 Lexical cohesion in text 3.6

As in all other texts, lexical cohesion is achieved by the use of (near) synonyms:
to alienate / antagonize other people; to magnify the problem/to lead to
difficulties with the law; maladaptive response/deviant response; to fail to deal
appropriately with the conflict/to fail to deal with the conflict in a direct
manner; to relinquish his position/to forfeit his needs; and contrast create
problems/solve them.
The use of 'of course' ('Compromise, of course, is anathema to many
offenders’) is another certainty adverb, which again functions to persuade the
reader to agree with a point that might be controversial.
In the following sections, I shall summarize the results of the analyses of texts 3.1 to 3.6, beginning with the lexico-grammatical analysis.

3.5 Summary of the lexico-grammatical analysis of the texts

3.5.1 Mood analysis

All the texts use only full and occasionally elliptical declaratives, a pattern which is not surprising in the written mode, where a dialogue between reader and writer, in the strict meaning of the word, is not possible. This dominance of full declaratives in all six texts indicates that they share a common focus on giving information. Texts 3.1 and 3.2 use little modality overall, whereas text 3.3 uses a relatively high number of capability modalizations (e.g. ‘They cannot calculate the consequences of their behavior’), where the text producers make expert assertions about possibilities or (lack of) ability in offenders; and text 3.4 of modalization and modulation (You will be teaching them’, ‘Your goal will be ...’, ‘You will help them to learn ...’) for their short length. Where modalization is used in texts 3.3 and 3.4, it is used to express median probability objectively, and modulation is used to express high obligation (on the part of the offenders) objectively through finite modal operators (Halliday: 1985: 86-7).

The modalization of sentences with ‘will’: ‘skills which will enable him ...; skills which will help him ...’ (text 3.1); ‘There will be times when the problems he encounters will make him highly aroused both emotionally and physiologically’ (text 3.2), suggests that the text producers are writing from a position of insider knowledge. It also gives a meaning of categorical prediction and certainty about the actions to be performed by the Cognitive Skills tutor. The higher use of modality in some texts (e.g. parts of texts 3.5 and 3.6) can be
seen as part of the way the writers create a less authoritative, more tentative
tenor, although this is counterbalanced by the repeated use of ‘will’ as
categorical prediction and the use of moderate or strong obligation being placed
on the offender (‘He must communicate’, ‘He must do so without antagonizing
others’, ‘He must learn to express his feelings ... in an assertive manner’; text
3.4) or the tutor (‘you must frequently reinforce your participants’ pro-social
talk or actions’; text 3.5). There are four epistemic modality expressions
throughout the texts, e.g. ‘It is imperative/essential that ...’ expressing objective
modality and thus deflecting arguability from what the text producers consider
relevant for changing offenders’ thinking.

3.5.2 Transitivity analysis

The process types and participant configurations of each clause (both ranking
and embedded) are shown in the Appendix. Table 3.1 presents the total number
of each process type in the texts.

Table 3.1 Transitivity in the Cognitive Skills texts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process type</th>
<th>3.1</th>
<th>3.2</th>
<th>3.3</th>
<th>3.4</th>
<th>3.5</th>
<th>3.6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>material</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mental</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>verbal</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>behavioural</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>existential</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>relational: attribut.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>relational: identif.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>relational: poss.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>causative</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As this table shows, material processes dominate in all texts except text 3.3 ('Problem Solving') where the number of mental processes is slightly higher. This indicates that the texts are concerned with physical actions and events, and the participants who/which are the doers. The use of a small number of existential processes in texts 3.2, 3.3 and 3.5 suggests that these actions take place against the background of something that exists or happens. Text 3.2 ('Management of Emotions') uses only one mental process, whereas texts 3.1 ('Objectives of Training') and 3.3 use seven and eight respectively, suggesting that the text is in parts concerned with the offenders’ thinking rather than their actions. Actions are usually performed by the Cognitive Skills Course or by the reader, i.e. the Cognitive Skills tutor; offenders behave. Texts 3.2 and 3.6 ('Negotiation Skills') use a significant number of behavioural processes, as their aim is to suggest alternative ways ('strategies') for offenders to cope with their problems. Despite this, the number of material processes in these two texts is at least three times as high as the behavioural ones. Change in the thinking and behaviour of offenders is presented as dependent on the actions taken by the Course. The highest number of verbal processes occurs in text 3.4 ('Assertive Communication'), indicating how important it is for offenders to express themselves assertively, and text 3.5 ('Values Enhancement'), which is concerned with the tutor verbally supporting or challenging offenders’ ‘pro-/anti-social’ views.

Texts 3.2 and 3.5 contain the highest number of attributive relational processes. This indicates that they are more descriptive than the rest of the texts. Texts 3.1 and 3.6, on the other hand, use a relatively high number of identifying processes. Both the attributive and identifying relationals are used to define and describe the Cognitive Skills Course in terms of its positive
features and the advantages of negotiation as an interactional and behavioural strategy as opposed to rebelling, retreating and conforming.

3.5.3 Theme analysis

The analysis of Theme is presented in the Appendix. Table 3.2 summarizes the findings of the Theme analysis.

Table 3.2 Theme in the Cognitive Skills texts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>3.1</th>
<th>3.2</th>
<th>3.3</th>
<th>3.4</th>
<th>3.5</th>
<th>3.6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marked</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>interpersonal</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dependent clause as Theme</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If we look at what kinds of Themes get used we can see that there is a certain variation in the texts. This variation has to do with their Mode values. If we compare the Mode dimensions, we can describe all three texts as written to be read, and we saw that they all contain a high degree of nominalization, although texts 3.3, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 fall somewhere between 3.1 and 3.2, as they are the most interactive of the six texts, with fewer nominalizations as Themes in 3.3. Texts 3.4 and 3.5 are particularly interactive in that they directly address the reader. Text 3.6 contains a mixture of personal and impersonal Themes.

Only text 3.5 contains two interpersonal Themes. Although meanings of modality and modulation are made in the texts, they are not given Thematic status, but are realized through non-Thematic modal finites (e.g. can, must, will), and the Mood adjunct ‘often’ and objective expressions of probability, ‘likely’. The only Mood structure used is declarative. This non-Thematization
of modality and non-use of mood classes which invite interaction is one way in which the texts create their authority and distance. If we look at combinations of topical and textual Themes, we find that topical Themes are sometimes preceded by conjunctive textual Themes (‘rather than’, ‘however’, ‘on the contrary’, ‘moreover’, ‘in effect’).

In text 3.3 we find the majority of topical Themes are personal pronouns (you, he, they). Some topical Themes are class names (‘offenders’, ‘people’, ‘client’). By contrast, the topical Themes found in text 3.1 are often nominalizations and there is one example of a dependent clause as topical Theme to the entire sentence (‘Rather than viewing...’). Where simple nominals are used, the thematized nouns again refer to classes of people, not to individuals (offenders, people). What the authors choose as Themes represents what or who they focus on for describing. What is chosen as Theme reveals their ways of seeing the event.

The lexico-grammatical description of the texts allows us to see their similarities and differences and the effect of the different patterns I observed. I shall now complement the result so far of this analysis by considering the discourse-semantic patterns in the texts.

3.8 Summary of discourse-semantic analysis

Identifying what the authors of the Handbook think tells us more than just their ideas. Every evaluation expresses a value system and contributes to building it. This value system in turn is part of the ideology that lies behind the Cognitive Skills texts. We have seen that Judgement of social sanction and social esteem is an important category in all the texts to evaluate offenders’ thinking and behaviour negatively and the Cognitive Skills Course positively. Importance plays a less important role, but does occur regularly throughout the texts.
I have suggested that evaluation is used to build a relationship between the writer and reader, in particular by assuming shared attitudes, values, and reactions which can be difficult for the reader, as the ‘subordinate’ in this relationship, to dispute. This is especially true when an evaluative term is defined as a problem and put in Theme position. This relationship does not exist only in terms of the information in the text, however, but in terms of the text itself, in its organization. For example, evaluation along the importance parameter appears to play a key role in the organization of texts, as indications of relevance are found especially at the beginning and end of paragraphs (see, for example, Swales, 1990). Examples of this occur in texts 3.2 (‘It is imperative that offenders learn to use cognitive techniques …’; sentence 8) and 3.6 (it is essential that you impress on them …’ sentences 12 and 14).

The discourse-semantic analysis has shown that ideology can be expressed at the semantic level through lexical selections in that the choice of one word rather than another expresses personal attitudes and beliefs of the authors of the Handbook. It also expresses their judgements of the normality or abnormality of offenders’ behaviour. Van Dijk (1995) has pointed out that the selection of word meaning through lexicalization is the major dimension of discourse meaning controlled by ideologies. Domains of meaning may be ‘lexicalized’ or worded in different ways, and different ways of ‘lexicalizing’ may involve ideologically different systems of classification, the linguistic ordering of the world. A point of interest is how areas of experience may come to be ‘relexicalized’. Fowler et al. (1979: 210) define ‘relexicalization’ (Halliday, 1978) as ‘relabelling, the provision of a new set of terms, either for the whole language or for a significant area of the language’, which ‘promotes a new perspective for speakers, often in specialized areas which are distinct from those of the larger social group’. Relexicalization can also mean generating new wordings as alternatives to, and in opposition to, existing ones. In Chapter
I mentioned Cicourel's (1968) study, which dealt with the expressions typically used and taken for granted in the written records in the juvenile judicial process. Items such as 'incorrigible', 'defiance', 'lack of responsibility', and 'delinquency' are part of a particular lexicalization of young people who do not fit into society. But it is easy to create an 'antilanguage' (Halliday, 1978), as noted in Chapter 1. If we take some of the expressions from the 'Objectives of Training' text analysed above, 'impulsive' could be replaced by spontaneous, 'egocentric' by individualistic, 'illogical' by intuitive, and 'rigid' by committed. The point is that alternative lexicalizations are created from divergent ideological positions. Each side labels accordingly. Some lexicalizations become 'naturalized' (Fairclough, 1989), i.e. become dominant and are finally accepted as commonsensical and normal and part of the lexicon. Which discourse types become naturalized depends on the power of the social groupings that exercise power and domination in a society or a social institution. Let us recall Gramsci's concept of ideology as an implicit, taken-for-granted philosophy embedded in the activities of social life, which links it to common sense. 'Common sense', then, can be ideological. Fairclough (1989: 84) understands ideological common sense as 'common sense in the service of sustaining unequal relations of power'. Thus, commonsense assumptions may to some degree contribute to sustaining unequal power relations. What makes the Handbook's texts ideological in their implicit assumptions is that they provide a commonsensical framework for treating what is essentially (though by no means exclusively) a social problem in an individual way. By employing a 'language of individual pathology' (Edelman, 1977) these texts direct attention away from a conceptualization which could lead to power relations being questioned and challenged - that there are social roots and social remedies for the problem of crime. This is what Fairclough means by 'common sense sustaining unequal relations of power'.
In addition to ‘relexicalization’, Halliday (1978) distinguishes ‘overlexicalization’ for the dense wording of a domain. Overlexicalization is a sign of ‘intense preoccupation in the experience and values of the group which generates it’, pointing to ‘peculiarities in the ideology of that group’ (Fowler et al. 1979: 211-12). It is therefore useful to compare the wording of particular domains in terms of the number of wordings that are created, many of which will be more or less synonymous with each other. This phenomenon is noticeable in all the Cognitive Skills texts analysed here, in their use of repetition as a strategy to create cohesion. Another example from the Cognitive Skills Handbook is the wording of ‘thinking errors’ attributed to offenders. Such wordings include: ‘cognitive inflexibility’, ‘basic cognitive deficit’, ‘cognitive rigidity’, ‘difficulties in forming alternative conceptualizations’, ‘inability to develop alternative views and to conceptualize alternative ways of solving problems’ (Handbook, p. 175). This overlexicalization can be interpreted as an (ideological) preoccupation in the Handbook with the inadequacy of the individual offender as an explanation of his (re)offending.

Expressions such as ‘under-socialized’, ‘psychopathology’, ‘at risk’ (text 3.1) become authoritative scientific explanations which call for intervention. Edelman, in his analysis of the political functions of the language of the helping professions, has called these words ‘mythic cognitive structures’. He argues that it is through metaphor, metonymy, and syntax that linguistic references evoke these mythic cognitive structures in people’s minds. ‘Cognitive training’ for offenders is a metonymic evocation of a larger structure of beliefs: that cognitive training is useful in solving the crime problem, that prisoners (re)offend because they lack the necessary cognitive skills to stay out of trouble, and that prisoners trained in these skills will be less likely to re-offend. Each of these interrelated beliefs is debatable, but people who are anxious to fight crime
and believe that problems can be solved without some degree of social change will find them very reassuring.⁹

Because crime-control theorists and the helping professions define other people's status, the terms which they use to categorize their 'clients' and justify regulating or restricting them are particularly revealing of the political functions of language and the multiple realities it helps to create: 'just as any single numerical evokes the whole number scheme in our minds, so a professional term, a syntactic form, or a metaphor with scientific connotations can justify a hierarchy of power for the person who uses it and for the groups that respond to it' (Edelman, 1977: 59). 'Client', a term used for a person to whom service or help is offered, is now the preferred term within the crime-control system (see text 3.3). Like the use of the term 'inmate' instead of 'prisoner', it might be an indication of 'kind thoughts behind the kind words' (Christie, 1981). Prisoners may feel better if they are not constantly reminded of their status. Alternatively, however, these words can be regarded as an attempt to hide the basic character of punishment, serving the ulterior motive of blurring the power relations obtaining between officer and prisoner. I will take up the issue of these power relations in greater detail in Chapters 4 and 5, where I analyse the officers' interactional control devices and the inmates' linguistic strategies of resistance.

The 'pains of imprisonment' (Sykes, 1958)¹⁰, argues Christie, have vanished from today's applied labels. Christie (1981: 19) has coined the term 'pain delivery' for what has become a 'clean and hygienic operation' in crime control:

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⁹ 'Job-getting skills', which are offered to unemployed people, are another example. There seems to be the widespread belief that if more unemployed people are trained in securing jobs, there will be more jobs, or that their failure to get jobs is a reflection on their inadequacies, rather than those of the social system.

¹⁰ According to Gresham Sykes (1958), these include loss of liberty, the lack of goods and services, the deprivation of heterosexual relationships and the loss of both autonomy and security.
Pain delivery is the concept for what in our time has developed into a calm, efficient, hygienic operation. Seen from the perspective of those delivering the service, it is not first and foremost drama, tragedy, intense sufferings. Infliction of pain is in dissonance with some major ideals, but can be carried out in an innocent, somnambulistic insulation from the value conflict. The pains of punishments are left to the receivers. Through the choice of words, working routines, division of labour and repetition, the whole thing has become the delivery of a commodity.

Through these words -the vocabularies of helping and treating- used by crime control agents to define, categorize and justify restricting their ‘clients’ are revealed the political functions of this language. By defining interventive practices as help or treatment (as is the case with the Cognitive Skills texts), value conflicts and concern about coercion can be resolved and resistance can be neutralized. Both the definers and the defined can act out their role without thinking in political terms. The potential of this language lies in its ability to marshal public support covertsly, by portraying a power relationship as a helping one. The language employed implies that the professional knows how to render the dangerous harmless and to rehabilitate the inadequate (e.g. ‘Cognitive training is designed to equip the offender with skills which will enable him to deal with his problems himself’; text 3.1). The terms employed to categorize offenders in the Handbook texts analysed above carry all these connotations. When there is an allegation of delinquency (‘at risk of developing an anti-social life-style’) or intellectual incapacity (‘specific cognitive skills deficits’, ‘illogical and rigid thinking’), its legitimacy is linguistically created and reinforced. What is more, the lay public by and large adopts the professional perspective, for it wants to believe that others are able to handle these problems, which are potentially threatening to them. This is what Howard S. Becker (1967) has termed ‘the hierarchy of credibility’ - the likelihood that professionals who offer definitions and opinions about controversial topics will have their definitions accepted, because they are understood to have access to a
more accurate picture than the majority of the population. This public reaction is the politically crucial one, as it confers power on the professionals. The public reaction, in turn, is a response to the language of the professionals and to the social environment which gives that language its authoritative meaning. The criminologist Jock Young (1970: 39) claims that in dealing with offenders, the experts share the same prejudices as the public. Although their notions may be ‘more conceptually sophisticated’, he argues that ‘within the glove of therapy and treatment is concealed the same iron fist of punishment’. Young concedes that these experts are not cynical, but ‘seek to treat’ and ‘not to punish’, but considers the ideology of treatment to be ‘immensely more insidious’, allowing ‘dimensions of coercion and punishment which even the most unenlightened and vindictive supporter of the moral order would never have the tenacity to pursue’ (ibid.: 42; emphasis original).  

The potency of social-control language lies furthermore in its ‘symbolic evocation’ (Edelman, 1977). It is this that distinguishes it from simple deception. As Cohen (1985) puts it, it is naive to believe that terms such as ‘psychopathology’ or ‘anti-social behaviour’ have fixed meanings and stand for particular objects and behaviour. Rather, they are symbols and as such evoke a particular structuring of beliefs and emotions, depending on people’s social situations. In the symbolic worlds evoked by the language used by the people working in the helping professions speculation and verified fact merge with each other. Many of the terms used by them involve a high degree of

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1 Although the modern institutions of today deny their association with cruelty, Friedrich Nietzsche (1878: 200) insists that underneath this hypocrisy, pleasure in cruelty only underwent a certain sublimation: it has to be ‘translated into imaginative and psychological terms in order to pass muster even before the tenderest hypocritical conscience’. The criminologist David Garland (1990: 235) makes a similar point when claiming that the civilizing process in punishment which has taken place in the period between 1700 and the present, is also apparent in the ‘sanitization’ of penal practice and penal language: ‘the aggression and hostility implicit in punishment are concealed and denied by the administrative routines of dispassionate professionals, who see themselves as “running institutions” rather than delivering pain and suffering. Similarly, the language of punishment has been stripped of its plain brutality of meaning and reformulated in euphemistic terms, so that prisons become “correctional facilities”, guards become “officers”, and prisoners become “inmates” or even...
unreliability in the prescription of the right treatment, coupled with
unambiguous constraints upon clients. These constraints, Edelman points out,
are converted into liberating and benevolent acts by defining them as education,
therapy, or rehabilitation. Moreover, the professional interpretation also serves
the political function of extending authority over those not yet subjected to it
and of shaping public perceptions so as to divert attention from economic and
social institutions. According to the Cognitive Skills Handbook, ‘cognitive
programs can also be provided for delinquency prevention in schools with “pre-
delinquents” or with students with behavior problems’ (p. 3). ‘Pre-delinquent’
is another favourite term of social work and criminological literature. On the
face of it, this term implies that it refers to all who have not yet become
delinquent and gives the professional the ‘right’ to assert authority over
anybody who has not yet committed a crime. But in practice this term has a
narrower denotation, for social workers, teachers and law enforcement officials
largely apply it to the poor. More importantly, the term focuses the mind of its
users and their audience ‘on the utility of preventive surveillance and control
and divert attention from the link between poverty and delinquency’ (Edelman,
1977: 70). The term also evokes confidence in the professional’s ability to
distinguish those who will misbehave in the future from those who will not.
This is another example of the ‘power of an unobtrusive symbol to evoke a
structured world and to direct perception and norms accordingly’ (ibid.: 1977:
70).

The motivations underlying cognitive training are problematic in several
respects. For instance, the basic assumption of the ‘Management of Emotions’
module is that it is for prisoners’ own benefit when they are taught
‘communicating their views clearly without antagonizing people’ (Handbook, p.
92), that is, prison officers and people in positions of authority. But is it? After

residents”, all of which tends to sublimate a rather distasteful activity and render it more tolerable to public and

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all, the training is very much in the interest of the prison system, too, in that it
aims at making prisoners more compliant with the prison regime and may
marginalize prisoners’ grievances by reducing them to problems that are
supposedly due to their personal defects. The basic rationale of the Course that
if prisoners learn ‘how to think’ and communicate ‘better’ they may be less
prone to recidivism, suffer less personal misery and less social disadvantage, is
debatable.

The module ‘Assertive Communication’ is similar to Assertiveness
Training (AT) in the workplace. As it may be taught so as to make staff happier
and therefore more productive, teaching offenders the communicative norms of
being assertive but not aggressive ultimately serves the goal of running prisons
smoothly. What Cameron (1995: 218) says about AT for women also holds true
for the assumptions the Cognitive Skills Course is based upon:

[T]he norms of ‘assertive’ or ‘effective’ communication [...] all function
(among other things) to tidy up messy or troublesome realities. The rules
affirm basic distinctions like true/false, good/bad, correct/incorrect, and
they insist that those distinctions are categorical absolutes, not matters of
opinion or arbitrary convention, and not contingent judgements that could
vary with the context.

What the Cognitive Skills Course ignores is that different contexts may call
for different speech styles. It ignores the significance of the interpersonal as
opposed to the informational function of language, which in most face-to-face
encounters is just as important. The Course is based on the assumption that
social and cognitive skills can be isolated and described, and that inadequacies
in these skills can be overcome by training offenders to use them. This skills-
based view of (language) education has been defined by Fairclough (1992) as
‘commodification’: the process whereby institutions come to ‘sell’ educational
commodities to their ‘clients’. To take just one example from the Handbook, the skills which the *Reasoning and Rehabilitation* programme considers to be very important for offenders include: asking for help; expressing a complaint; persuading others; responding to the feelings of others; responding to persuasion; responding to failure and responding to complaints. After the officer has explained to the group why it is important to learn a particular skill he makes up a scenario (usually one involving situations which they are likely to find themselves in) and demonstrates to the group in a role play with a selected group member how an ‘unskilled person’ would behave in various situations - that is, showing how it should not be done. In so doing his behaviour in role play should ‘approximate the inappropriate and ineffective behaviours’ that many of the group members ‘might typically evidence in such situations’. Then the participants themselves are asked to role-play certain situations (which they either make up or select from a list provided by the officer) first in an ‘unskilled’ manner and then as a ‘socially skilled’ person would do, following a list of steps written by the officer on the flip chart. After role-playing each participant is asked to assess whether he followed the steps. The authors argue that breaking the behaviour down into steps aids the learning process as it helps offenders realize that they need to ‘think about the thoughts and feelings of other people, consider the alternative actions they might take and the effects of these actions on others, and communicate their position clearly, while acknowledging the needs of others’. According to the Handbook, the steps provide ‘not only the behavioral responses’, but also ‘reflect the cognitive processes which underlie the social skills’ (p. 110).

Despite this assertion the Cognitive Skills Course could be an example of what Cohen (1985: 150) has called the new Behaviourism in crime control: a

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12 For example, the steps to be followed in the skill ‘Responding to Complaints’ were: a) Listen carefully to the complaint; b) Ask for more information; c) Decide if the complaint is justified; d) Decide if you should accept or
behaviourist shift in the criminal justice system, a move from mind to body, from the internal state to the external behaviour, from cases to consequences, from individuals to categories. The pure rehabilitative model, which emerged in the eighteenth century (the move from body to mind), and which first came under attack in the sixties and seventies, had to be modified, because its goal of changing attitudes, or even the whole person, was too ambitious: no longer change through internal insight, but through external compliance. This move made both managerial and ideological sense. Behaviour modification is suited to prison settings, where you can observe behaviour in a way you cannot observe insights. Cohen offers four reasons for why the new Behaviourism is so ideologically perfect: it is uninterested in causes for crime; it is compatible with management, control and surveillance; it offers the possibility of changing behaviour sequences rather than people; it works at the ‘realistic’ level of situations or physical environments rather than institutions which touch the social order. As long as offenders behave, using the social skills they have been taught, something has been achieved. It is thus the behaviour patterns of offenders and not their thoughts that are changed by teaching them social skills through traditional behaviourist techniques, accompanied by the rhetoric of cognition. The Cognitive Skills Course stresses that it is concerned with changing the thinking of offenders and that ‘it is not designed to effect basic personality change (an exceedingly ambitious undertaking; text 3.1; emphasis added)’. Thus the ideology that informs the Cognitive Skills Course is rather modest: the offender is not asked to change, but to show an ability to maintain the overt demands of a conforming life. The focus is on retraining and providing skills. Although the Course claims to focus on modifying the thinking of offenders the training of social and cognitive skills remains behaviourist.
Inherent in the Cognitive Skills Course is the assumption that delinquency can be explained in terms of individual skills deficits, but there is little proof for this claim. Such a view is at odds with criminological theories that suggest that crime is a function of the interaction between the individual and their environment (e.g. Hollin, 1989, 1990). From this it would follow that attempts to change offenders' thinking and behaviour patterns must also be concerned with changes to their environment. Therefore the Course's aim to reduce re-offending is open to criticism.

This is not, however, to dismiss the Cognitive Skills Course. Nor is it to suggest that prisoners derive no benefit from Cognitive Skills training. There is some evidence to suggest that some offenders are lacking in cognitive skills. Asked by me what they thought about the Course, the participants generally said that they had found it interesting and useful, even if they sometimes could not see the point of the techniques while they were being taught them and found some of them unhelpful or patronizing at first. But what the inmates found positive was probably not what the authors believe to be its most important factor, that is, the acquisition of a number of cognitive, social and communicative skills. It was less the techniques they were taught they found useful but more the social benefits of having the chance to 'get out of the sheds' and experience something that would relieve them from prison routine for a while. Another positive element of the Course was that the agenda of a training session sometimes turned into an occasion for discussing prison-related problems, such as relations between officers and inmates. Both sides had thus the opportunity to reassess their opinions and attitudes about each other. Some inmates maintained that the Course had somewhat altered their perception of prison officers. In this sense, the Cognitive Skills Course may be a way towards
improving staff-inmate relationships, which is one of the stated aims of the Scottish Prison Service.

3.8 Conclusion

This chapter has presented the analysis of six texts from the Handbook for Teaching Cognitive Skills in order to demonstrate that a detailed lexico-grammatical and discourse-semantic analysis can shed light on how texts can make meanings and some of the possible implications these may have: how social-control language can function to disguise its political elements (status, authority and power of the helping professions) and how various professional terms, syntactic and grammatical forms justify a hierarchy of power. I have also examined the role of evaluation (appraisal) in the construction of ideology in the texts and applied Martin’s framework to account for the evaluative meanings made in them. The examples of the lexical items I presented are an illustration of how a particular ideology can become set into the form of language, and what might appear to be standard, common-sense, even objective, form is in fact coloured by opinions and attitudes. I have suggested that the reader is positioned to respond to entities in the text according to the labels they are given (individualistic versus egocentric). A form of behaviour labelled as ‘anti-social’ or a person labelled as an ‘anti-social individual’ is open to being given negative value.

Overall, the main features that have emerged from the texts, particularly texts 3.1 and 3.2, are depersonalization and a focus on information: we can see this in the often unrelieved use of declaratives and an avoidance of direct address and overt interaction. The writers use a range of devices to make the texts sound as authoritative and objective as possible, such as objectifying what is essentially opinion through nominalization. I have shown that
nominalizations can be a useful tool when writers wish to avoid negotiation and make it more difficult for the reader to disagree with them. In the choice of a highly nominalized mode in the texts the ideological implication could be that there is a need to present the topic to officers who have trained to become Cognitive Skills tutors in the formal written mode of abstractions and generalizations. This form of writing is teaching how to see offenders as representatives of a whole group rather than individuals with different life histories. The reason to do so is that the writers are communicating with readers whose interest in the topic is rather professional than personal and who are also interested in an efficient transfer of information.

The Cognitive Skills texts construe offenders as acting and behaving irrationally due to a lack of cognitive skills (e.g. ‘Many offenders behave in an anti-social manner because they lack the skills to behave in a pro-social manner’; Handbook, p. 107) and cognitive training (or its trainers) as acting by taking concrete steps. The texts thus encode an ideology of discounting offenders' behaviour as meaningful, of doing something effective about it and, in a wider sense, of combating crime. When offenders do act, their actions are defined as problematical. Here we can see an ideology of non-coping which justifies professional intervention in order to prevent offenders from re-offending and 'help' them acquire cognitive skills.

One might argue that the texts I have analysed here are a slim basis to draw general conclusions from. But the important point is that the functional approach to language analysis enables us to use individual lexicogrammatical and discourse semantic choices in context to tell us something about how text producers construe the world, even from a small number of texts. I thus attempted to show how lexical choices and grammar picture reality in certain ways that at the same time reflect people's attitudes and influence their perception of the world. By looking at choices made from the systems of Mood
and Modality and from the interpersonal systems of Appraisal much can be learned about what attitudes are conveyed and how these resources are used as an integral part of the negotiations of meanings that goes on. The texts show that attention is given towards the individual offender rather than social structures. These are neglected in favour of a preoccupation with the conduct of the individual offender. The linguistic analysis of the Handbook texts contributes to illustrating this point.
Chapter 4: CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS AND THE STUDY OF OFFICER-INMATE INTERACTION: SOCIAL CONTROL IN ACTION

4.1 Introduction

While Chapter 3 focused on the written discourse of the Cognitive Skills Handbook, Chapter 4 deals with the spoken discourse of the Cognitive Skills classes. Of the three types of functions of language identified by Halliday - ideational, interpersonal, and textual - I shall focus in this chapter on the interpersonal meanings made by interactants in the Cognitive Skills sessions and explore the grammar of conversation as a means for realizing these interpersonal meanings through the clause system of Mood. My sources of data in this chapter are two ‘Values Enhancement’ sessions run by two prison officers. I used my impressions as participant-observer and participant in these sessions together with the perspective of an outside reader of the transcripts to give functions and meanings to the interactions.

The goal of this chapter is two-fold. My first aim is to describe the turn-taking system and a range of interactional control devices identified in CDA which are used by the ‘powerful’ participant - in this case the officer - in order to restrict the discoursal options of the ‘subordinate’ participants. I shall focus on the differences in teaching style between the two officers and argue that social control in an educational context can be exercised by various linguistic strategies, such as an overtly authoritarian teaching style, but also by ceding control and allowing the participants more linguistic space.

1 I put ‘powerful’ and ‘powerless/subordinate’ in quotation marks here because one should not assume a priori that the prison officer’s position is always and automatically one of absolute power (see, for example, Gresham Sykes, 1958). In these particular classroom settings under consideration, the relations between the officer and the inmates in terms of power are not always clear-cut. It has to be pointed out though that while the course participants may not always be the ‘powerless’ ones in that particular setting, they are ultimately so because of their status as prisoners.
to express their opinions. The pragmatic notions of face and politeness will also be considered.

My second aim is to show how the analysis of Mood choices, that is, the types of clause structures chosen by the interactants in the Cognitive Skills sessions, can reveal that they construct relations of power through talk. One way in which a Mood analysis can reveal dimensions of Tenor (roles and role relationships) is to consider who is doing the talking in a situation and for how long. The relationship of unequal power that is set up in a typical classroom situation is realized linguistically by the teacher's dominance of the speaker role. In the transcripts I present below, the officer frequently uses interrogative clauses, while the inmates use far fewer, producing mostly (elliptical) statements (usually to answer the officer’s questions). So we can see how in this particular context, the social role officer and teacher accords linguistic privileges to the officer (the right to ask questions to which he already knows the answer, rather than the obligation to answer questions asked by the inmates). However, we shall also see that the distribution of clause types is not always clear-cut and that the inmates resist the roles assigned to them in the Course sessions. Power is not only exercised, but also fought over in discourse.

Before the actual linguistic analysis of the Cognitive Skills spoken discourse, I shall briefly explain the Values Enhancement module.

4.2 Outline of the Values Enhancement module

The Cognitive Skills session which I shall discuss and compare here is called 'The Confidence Game' and is part of the 'Values Enhancement' module. The Values Enhancement module comprises group discussions about moral dilemmas and is designed to 'improve the values of offenders' (Ross and Ross, 1995) by creating situations which stimulate participants into
questioning their values. Let us recall Ross and Ross’s recommendation for Values Enhancement, which is

*not* character education or indoctrination. We reject any attempt to inculcate values by preaching, moralizing or sermonizing ... Rather than telling offenders what values they should or must adopt (they are likely to ignore your advice), we recommend challenging the offenders to examine their beliefs ... and suggest alternative perspectives (Ross and Ross, 1995: 108; emphasis original).

The authors’ reason for rejecting indoctrination is that they do not believe that such an approach would work with offenders. They also acknowledge that in our ‘complex society there is no longer any universally accepted system of values and what is “correct” for one group may be repudiated by other groups’. However, they argue that concern for the feelings of other people is ‘universally endorsed’ and it is this value which they believe ‘must be acquired by offenders’ (Handbook, p. 108). In the following passage the authors present their view of how the Values Enhancement sessions should be run:

Our general approach to teaching empathy is to continually challenge the offender’s egocentric thinking and to stimulate him into considering the views, wishes, attitudes and feelings of other people. The values enhancement sessions have been designed to ensure that the offenders are continually engaged in activities which require that they think about the feelings of others. This is done by exposing them to social and cognitive conflict - by creating situations in which they find that they are in conflict about what they believe and in which their ideas are in conflict with those of others. In these situations the participants come to seriously question and examine their ideas about many important matters of morality and, more important, they are impelled to consider the points of view of other people (Handbook, p. 192).
The question is whether concern or empathy for other people can be taught, especially in a prison setting. Relationship therapies designed to foster close ties between offenders and their therapists have not been found to be particularly effective (e.g. Gendreau and Ross, 1987). Ross and Ross, however, believe the reasons for the apparent failure of relationship therapies is that many offenders ‘simply lack the cognitive skills which would enable them to understand or appreciate such relationships’. The Cognitive Skills tutors (i.e. the officers) are given the following advice for handling the Values Enhancement sessions:

Throughout the program you must frequently reinforce your participants’ pro-social talk and actions. That is, you must take as many opportunities as possible to support and encourage (by word or gesture) the behavior and verbalizations of your participants which reflect anti-criminal or pro-social attitudes. Moreover, you must also respond to participants’ pro-criminal or anti-social talk by questioning the participants about the personal and social implications, and consequences of such positions (Handbook, p. 192; emphasis in the original).

Below I will compare the linguistic devices two officers use to put these suggestions into practice. I will look at two ‘Confidence Game’ sessions attended by two different groups of inmates. In order to demonstrate how the interactions unfold and develop, I have decided to present rather long stretches of text.

Each group, consisting of six participants, was presented with the following dilemma situation for discussion:

The Confidence Game

Tom Heatherington, a reporter for the Gazette was the first reporter to break the story about the way organized crime had taken control of the Seaway Grain Company and was using the company’s transportation system to ship illegal drugs from coast to coast. Tom was given the information in complete confidence by his long-term
friend, Jamieson Petrie who made him promise he would never reveal who gave him the information. Tom wrote and published the article the next day and won the admiration of journalists across the country. He made no mention of his sources. The same day the article appeared in the newspapers, Tom was taken to court by the police and the judge demanded that he reveal his source of information. Should Tom break his promise and tell the court that Jamieson was his informant?

If the group agrees not to reveal the source (which is what all participants did at the beginning of the discussion), the officer can suggest the following alternative dilemmas: Jamieson has made enormous profits and has become an addict himself; Tom paid Jamieson 1500 dollars for the information; if Tom does not give away his source there won’t be a stop to drug trafficking. Tom has kids. People from the Seaway Grain Company have been seen hanging around his children’s school.

In this particular group, one inmate said that even after revealing the source the reporter still might be imprisoned and suggested that giving a wrong name while still protecting the source would be a way out of the dilemma. Another argued that a promise should be kept by all means and if one had any ethics, one would not reveal the source. After discussing the problem with the participants for about half an hour, the officer divided them in two groups of three, asking one to find three reasons for, and the other group three reasons against revealing the name of the source. The two groups therefore had to argue against each other. During the group discussion some of the men relented saying that they would rather reveal a source than face up to five years in prison only to reiterate their original view at the end of it.

I shall now start my analysis of the ‘Confidence Game’ session by focusing on what Fairclough (1992) has called ‘interactional control features’.
4.3 Analysis of interactional control features in text 4.1

Interactional control features are devices that ensure that the interaction is well organized: that turns at talking are distributed in an orderly way, questions are answered and that topics are selected and changed by the more powerful speaker. The investigation of interactional control is therefore a means of explicating ‘the concrete enactment and negotiation of social relations in social practice’ (Fairclough, 1992: 152).

Text 4.1: ‘The Confidence Game’

1, 2, 3 refer to speaker turns. The text (turns 1-130) has been divided into smaller parts to facilitate analysis. NV indicates non-verbal behaviour. Interruptions and overlaps are marked by square brackets; utterances in round brackets are unclear speech. Underlined words mean emphatic stress. An asterisk marks incomplete clauses. The full transcription key appears in Appendix II.

O1: Officer 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speaker</th>
<th>Turn</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>O1:</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>G:</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
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<td>O1:</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>O1:</td>
<td>7</td>
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</tbody>
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jeopardize yer own career, yer own family, the support that ye have fae them... in order... tae protect ... a source.

W: 8 Aye
J: 9 Aye
O1: 10 Something in this nature, in these cases you could be jailed for a long long time, ye’re not talking aboot contempt three month, ye’re talking aboot not helping the [law.
B: 11 [What does the judge want tae find that oot for?
O1: 12 What tae find out for? For what? What dae ye [think?
B: 13 [Tae jail him, is it?
O1: 14 Tae jail who?
J: 15 His source=
?: 16 =He’s innocent
O1: 17 Naw, maybe he just wants tae find oot so as he can maybe get more detail intae it.
B: * 18 Naw, cos’ then [...
O1: 19 [How come, if the police canny get this type ay information, where dae ye get it then? The judge might want to know for what reason.
B: * 20 Cos’ [
O1: 21 [Is this true or is it not true?
B: 22 Not a loat of people like the polis.
O1: 23 Not a loat of people like the police.
B: 24 Aye=
O1: 25 =I think the judge is alright with the police, eh?
B: 26 Aye, sticks by them, don’t he.
Okay: in cases like this ye’re talking aboot going tae court, not going tae jail for three months, ye’re talking aboot from five years onwards for contempt in cases like this. ... So ye’d go tae jail for five year, away fae yer family, yer children, lose yer job, lose every form ay income that ye had, jis’ so as you could protect a source.

Aye.

(Or jis’ so as ye wudnae.) ... Right, ye’re protecting a source, okay. The rest ay you the [same?

[If he does give away his source, his joab would be finished probably anyway, [O1: why?] cos’ no other source wud want tae go near him=

=Where does it say up there that once he tells the judge ... where does it say up there that once he tells the judge that the judge is gaunny use the information? ..The oanly thing the judge has asked for is his source. (?

All judges use information. They don’t jis’ collect it and don’t use it. All judges dae.

What’s he asked him for?

The source=

=The source.

demanded that he reveal his source of information. Why?

‘Cos he wants tae know who he’s gettin’ it fae.

He wants tae know who he is gettin’ it from, G, aye, exactly. For what reason?
D: 39 Tae see where the source is gettin’ it fae?
J: 40 ‘Cos the polis don’t know any’hin aboot it.
O1: 41 Nobody else knows nothing about it. And this
journalist comes up with this [information
B: 42 [The journalist doesn’t want anybody else tae know.
O1: 43 But the judge is now demanding that he tells him.
B: 44 Fuck the judge=
J: 45 =Aye, but he tells the judge and then the polis find
out and then the polis [(go and find the source).
O1: 46 [Okay, ye say fuck the judge.
B: 47 Aye.
O1: 48 If you fuck the judge and you’re goin’ tae jail for five
years for [contempt.
J: 49 [Fuck ‘im
P: 50 (If ye want tae tell the judge, coast tae coast they find
oot the source’s name.
B: 51 Where does it say that if he does reveal the source,
he’ll no’ go tae jail?
O1: 52 Sorry?
B: *53 Where does it say that if he does [ 
O1: 54 [What happens with contempt of court? If you’re found guilty of contempt
of court ... 
G: 55 Ye’re telling the truth.
O1: 56 Sorry?
All : NV [hhh]
G: 57 Tell the truth.
B: * 58 Naw! But wha’ [
What happens tae ye if ye’re found out contempt of court?

Jailed=

Right. The judge has demanded that he answers his question. If he refuses tae answer his questions, he’s deemed tae be in contempt of court.

Right, so what will happen tae him if he does dae it?

Nothing will happen tae him.

If he does dae it, nothing will happen tae him. What?

(Try tae ring it), get somebody else, gie somebody else’s name.

So he’s given his source, he’s lyin’ tae the judge as far as the judge is concerned then. So ye’re sayin’ ye wud give a name but no’ the right name?

Aye (?) try tae ring it.

But ye jis’ said a couple of minutes ago ye wudnae give [anybody’s name.

[Ah’ve changed ma mind noo. Ah wudnae gie the right source’s name.

See umm okay

{taps his pencil on desk} Give me three ... concrete valid reasons why ye shouldn’t give up this guy’s name tae the judge. Three.

We’re the grasses for the day! ha ha

You three. Give me three valid reasons why ye
should give the judge the information he requires. Three.
P: 74 Ye write it.
O1: 75 Okay?

The above text may be seen as an example of an ‘unequal encounter’, a face-to-face discourse where participants are unequal. Jenny Thomas (1988: 33) gives the following definition of unequal encounters: they are ‘interactions which take place within social institutions with a clearly-defined hierarchical structure (such as schools, the police, the law courts, etc.) in which the power to discipline or punish those of lower rank is invested in holders of high rank (head teachers, inspectors, judges, etc.).’ The officer by the very nature of his occupation is in a position of power. Prison officers are involved in decision-making regarding prisoners, in that they write reports and make recommendations on a range of issues, for example, on prisoners’ suitability for a change of work party, an upgrading of security category, or a move to a semi-open or open prison (Adler and Longhurst, 1994). Power in discourse may be characterized in terms of the more powerful participant constraining the contributions of the less powerful participants. Fairclough (1989) mentions four devices for doing this: interruption, enforcing explicitness, controlling topic, and formulation. These textual features are significant for critical analysis in that they provide an insight into possible power asymmetries. Therefore, my analysis concentrates on these four categories, among others.

If we assume that the prison officer is the more powerful participant, then, as we shall see, he certainly did use all of these devices. As can be seen from text 4.1, the officer is controlling the turn-taking system most of the time. He has the right to give orders and ask questions, whereas the participants have the obligation to comply and answer, in accordance with
the subordinate relation of inmate to officer. I shall now take a closer look at the turn-taking system.

4.3.1 Turn-Taking

In many respects, the turn-taking system of text 4.1 is typical of systems one finds in institutions where ‘gatekeepers’ interact with ‘clients’ (see Thomas, 1985, 1988). It is also an example of the exchange structure often found in classroom discourse: an ‘initiation-response-feedback’ structure suggested by Sinclair and Coulthard (1975). One important aspect of the interaction between the officer and the inmates is that the officer evaluates their utterances. This ‘initiation-response-feedback’ exchange structure incorporates this evaluation element in the feedback. The nature of the exchange system is important for turn-taking, but also for what people say. In initiating an exchange (for example, by reading out the dilemma text to the inmates), the officer (like the teacher) gives the inmates information, asks them questions, sets out the agenda for the class, thus directing and controlling the inmates’ linguistic behaviour. The inmates, on the other hand, are more constrained in what they can say or do. At least at the beginning of the class, they mainly answer questions within limits of what is judged relevant by the officer.

I will include here Schegloff and Sack’s (1974) notion of ‘adjacency pairs’ (where A is the first part of the pair and B a contingent and related pair part, as, for example, in question-answer, complaint-apology, request-accept/turn down or greeting-greeting). Thomas (1988) has suggested that some illocutions are more obligating than others. Greetings, direct questions and direct requests are highly obligating, since it is more difficult for the addressee to pretend not to have understood, whereas assertions or phatic talk would be less so. She notes that in ‘unequal encounters’ powerful
interactants tend to ignore ‘obligating illocutions’ directed at them by their subordinates. An example of this is B’s question in turn 53 (*Where does it say...*), which the officer ignores. Conversely, the frequency with which an interactant responds to ‘non-obligating’ illocutions might also be seen as an indication of unequal power relationships (this is not shown in my data). At the beginning (turns 2 to 9) the inmates only take turns when asked a question by the officer as he was trying to set up the class. According to McHoul (1978), only teachers select the next speaker: either themselves or a student. In the interactions discussed here, the inmates do occasionally self-select: for example, in turn 11, B self-selects by directing a question at the officer, and in turn 50 P self-selects by making a statement. The officer, however, does not answer B’s question, but immediately directs it back at him. This can be seen as an attempt to regain interactional control, although the officer’s motivation here is difficult to assess, for he may also want to prompt critical thinking in the inmate. To ask a question in response to a question is an act of counter-control and is either a sign of a true differential in social power where the speaker has more real authority, or that there is equality between the speakers (Mishler, 1975). B attempts to get a point across, but is interrupted twice by O1 (turns 18 and 20) who cuts him short. The reason for this basic organization has to do with ‘topic control’, which is the interactional control feature I shall be looking at next.

4.3.2 Topic Control

Harvey Sack’s (1968) definition of ‘talking topically’, according to which the way other participants will develop one’s topic is unpredictable, hardly applies to our classroom situation. In our interaction, topics are introduced and changed mainly by the officer according to a pre-set agenda. The selective way in which the officer takes up the answers of two inmates to his
questions is another aspect of his topic control. Turn 31 is an example of this. The officer tries to convince P that all the judge wants to know is the source. P’s reply that *Judges don’t jis’ collect information and then don’t use it* is a valid point, which the officer chooses to ignore. Its absence of any modality also makes it a clear contradiction to what the officer has said. Instead, the officer asks another two questions (turns 33 and 36) and acknowledges G’s answer by repeating it, thus backchanelling it. The officer is shifting and constraining topic because of the pre-set agenda of the Course, which the participants are not being allowed to disturb. This is, of course, what most teachers would do in the classroom.

4.3.3 Classroom questions and steering of discourse

Another aspect of the officer’s control is the nature of the questions he asks. The use of questions in classroom settings is a commonly studied phenomenon (e.g. Mehan, 1979; Reynolds, 1990). Turns 33-41 show how questions are used as a means of controlling the topic and are designed to steer the inmates to the required answers: incorporating what has been said and indicating by further questions that further information is needed. The officer’s questions are not open (as for example ‘Tell me what you think’ is), but rather closed questions, for instance, *Is this true or is it not true?* (turn 21), attempting to force acquiescence with what he said before (*The judge might want tae know for what reason*, turn 19). One has to concede, though, that many questions in a traditional classroom setting are ‘closed’, requiring a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ and minimal comments. Note also that B thwarts the officer’s attempt at interactional control by giving an evasive answer (*Not a loat of people like the polis*).

B offers turn 51 by asking a question. Note that he uses the same ploy as the officer in turn 31, referring to the information given in the Values
Enhancement text on the overhead projector (*Where does it say up there...?*).

Unlike the officer, who manages to get his question across, B is not successful as he is cut short by the officer, who asks another question in turn 54 (*What happens with contempt of court?*). The turn-taking system is asymmetrical because the officer does not feel obliged to answer B’s question and also because he interrupts the inmate when the latter is ‘irrelevant’ according to the criteria of relevance imposed by the officer. However, although an interruption, in this case worded as a question, may be the prerogative of dominant speakers, that does not mean they always manage to achieve their interactional goals. The officer’s attempt to force a ‘correct’ answer to his question misfires, as G offers his own sarcastic interpretation of what it means to be found guilty of contempt of court (*Ye’re tellin’ the truth*, turn 55).

I will discuss the functions of questions more fully in my analysis of mood choices below.

4.3.4 Interruption

Of the four clear instances of interruption on part of the officer (turns 19, 21, 54 and 59) all are successful because the officer manages to take the floor and the participants immediately give way and stop speaking:

O1: 17 Naw, maybe he just wants tae find oot so as he can maybe get more detail intae it.

B: * 18 Naw, cos’ then[...]

O1: 19 [How come, if the police canny get this type ay information, where dae ye get it then? The judge might want to know for what reason.

B: * 20 Cos’ [
[Is this true or is it not true?]

B: Not a lot of people like the polis.

Where does it say that if he does [What happens with contempt of court? If you’re found guilty of contempt of court...]

G: Ye’re telling the truth.

O1: Sorry?

Tell the truth.

B: Naw! But wha’ [What happens tae ye if ye’re found out contempt of court?]

B: Jailed=

=Right. The judge has demanded that he answers his question. If he refuses tae answer his questions, he’s deemed tae be in contempt of court.

B: Right, so what will happen tae him if he does dae it? [pause 3 secs]

O1: Nothing will happen tae him.

B’s question is interrupted by the officer (turn 53). He attempts to ask the same question in turn 58, but is again cut short by the officer who repeats his earlier question (What happens when ye’re found out contempt of court?). This time he gets a satisfactory answer from B (Jailed). Then the officer elaborates on his answer, repeating what will happen if the journalist remains uncooperative with the judge. In turn 62, B finally manages to ask his question without being interrupted, and this time the officer responds to it.
What we have seen so far is that when the officer initiates conversation with a question, he retains control over its course by successive questioning (turns 33-38). When the inmates ask a question he also retains control by responding with a counter-question (turns 12-14). This suggests the dominance of the officer and that ‘the degree to which one interactant feels free to trespass on the discoursal space created by another is at least partly a function of the power relationship obtaining between them’ (Thomas, 1988: 8). However, the extent to which an interruption is interpreted as negative is a matter of degree. Rather than categorically regarding interruptions as displays of dominance by the more powerful speaker, one must also bear in mind that the requirements of the pedagogic role of the officer/teacher may also lead to more interruptions by him than by the inmates.

The instances of overlapping speech initiated by the inmates cannot be interpreted as attempted interruptions (turns 11, 13, and 30), as they all occur at ‘turn relevant places’ (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson, 1974), points in an utterance where the second speaker may reasonably assume that the first speaker has finished speaking:

O1: 10 Something in this nature, in these cases you could be jailed for a long long time, ye’re not talking about contempt three month, ye’re talking about not helping the [law.

B: 11 [What does the judge want tae find that oot for?

O1: 12 What tae find out for? For what? What dae ye [think?

B: 13 [Tae jail him, is it?
There is only one successful interruption of the officer by B in turn 42, because the officer clearly has not finished his sentence yet:

O1: 41 Nobody else knows nothing about it. And this journalist comes up with this [information
B: 42 [The journalist doesn’t want anybody else tae know.

4.3.5 Formulation

A further way in which power is made manifest in discourse is in the ability of the more powerful speaker to define the situation for the other participants. The way in which this is done has been defined by Fairclough (1989: 136) as formulation, which is ‘either a rewording of what has been said, by oneself or other, in one turn or a series of turns or indeed a whole episode; or it is a wording of what may be assumed to follow from what has been said, what is implied by what has been said’. As such, formulations serve to check understanding or reaching an agreement of what has transpired in an interaction. But they are also control devices, a way of making participants accept one’s own version of what has transpired, and thus limiting their options for further contributions. Examples of formulation occur in turns 7, 27, 67, 78, 92, and 115 (see Appendix II). In the following continuation of text 4.1, the officer has divided the Course participants into two opposing groups. One group has to produce three reasons for revealing the source, the other one three reasons against doing so. The officer asks the second group (consisting of G and B) what their reasons for revealing the source are. Note that while all six participants were unanimous in not revealing the source at the beginning, G and B now have to argue why they
would give the source's name away. The officer demonstrates his power by formulating what the inmates say, that is, he shapes the meanings they are trying to make into the forms that he wants (turns 78, 92, 115).

**Text 4.1 (Continuation)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speaker</th>
<th>Turn</th>
<th>Text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>O1:</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>What's yer second reason?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G:</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>Ye could stoap illegal drugs shipments from being made.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O1:</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>Right. By doin' that and givin' the information the police could get hold of more information aboot this network that's goin' aboot and stoap the stuff being shipped aboot all over the place ... And if it's a big company like what they are suggestin' in that bulletin and there's hundreds and hundreds of thousands and thousands of pounds goin' aboot ... and youse are quite willin' tae allow that tae continue...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D:</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>Right.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O1:</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>Aw for the sake ay yer promise ... Aye?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P:</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>Aye, because his promise is as soon as he started the baw rollin' so from then oan they should take (over), ye don't need the source.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O1:</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>Oh Ah see, ye want them tae take over but wi oanly half the information. Ye want them to stoap, but without yer help noo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P:</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>Aye, but he's gied them as much help as he can gie them=</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O1:</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>=No he's [no'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B:</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>[no he's no'=</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
P: 86 =He can as much as he wants tae gie=
O1: 87 =Ah, there’s a difference.
G: 88 Aye, as much as he wants.
? 89  (?)
P: 90 He’s made a promise, ain’t he?
D: 91 That’s aw he’s giein’ them, know what Ah mean.
? 92  
O1: 92 So this stuff is bein’ shipped aboot, and it’s goin’ intae aw the areas that youse live in, it goes tae aw the schools yer kids go tae and ye’re quite happy tae allow it tae continue...
B: 93 How dae ye feel ... if yer..[G: The wean?] weans fuckin’... goat aw this (soil)
D: 94 No’ goat any weans[O1: Yeah] and never will.
B: 95 That’s what Ah says. (?)
O1: 96 So dae ye want yer children, if ye decide tae have any, tae grow up in a drug culture or a drug-free society?
D: 97 Ye can’t beat drugs all over the world anyway ... know what Ah mean?
O1: 98 So is that right we don’t dae anything tae stoap it=
D: 99 =no really no.
J: 100 One man doesnae make the law ye know=
B: 101 Wha’?= 
O1: 102 =Sorry?
J: 103 One man doesnae make the law for the drugs.
O1: 104 One man doesnae make the law for the drugs? Ah don’t know what ye mean, J.
J: 105 Well, the way ye’re puttin’ it, right?
O1: 106 mhm
J: 107 (?) there's been drugs everywhere for centuries.
O1: 108 Unless what?
G: 109 Unless ye staun up and try and stoap it.
J: 110 But they never done it.
O1: 111 [Why?
B: 112 [Ye can dae it the noo.
O1: 113 Because of promises?
G: 114 (?)

In the above text O1 organizes the discourse by assessing and elaborating G's reply, making assumptions about the consequences of giving the name of the source away. While this can be taken as an implication of what has been said, turn 78 taken by the officer looks more like an example of formulation and its strategic use in discourse. Especially when the officer addresses P, J and D, who argue against revealing the source, (and youse are quite willin' tae allow that tae continue) he attempts to make them give up their view by implying strategically that they have not considered the consequences of their view. Turn 80 is an example of another interactional controlling device: 'forced feedback' (Thomas, 1988). When no verbal acquiescence is offered by the subordinate participant, the dominant participant may force it by the repeated use of tag questions or 'right' or 'okay', or in our case aye with questioning intonation. This is also noticeable in turn 3 (yeah?). In turn 82, the officer formulates P's response to his statement ('Oh Ah see...') - he 'offers' P the conclusion from what the latter said. P acknowledges it, but offers another reason why the reporter can be of no further help to the police (Aye, but he's gied them as much help as he can gie them).

Another thing merits attention here. First, note the use of the personal pronoun we by the officer in turn 98 (So is that right we don't do anything tae stoap it). This 'inclusive' we implicates the addressee in the content of
the discourse and is therefore more intimate and solidary, according to Fowler and Kress (1979). It makes an even stronger assumption if used by a superior speaker in an interaction, because it ‘unquestioningly and unchallengeably’ includes the other, inferior speakers, as, for example, in interactions between doctor and patient (‘How are we feeling this morning?’) or teacher and students (‘What I want us to do today is...’). The collective ‘we’ addresses the group, ostensibly from inside the group, coercively eliminating any potential antagonism between speaker and addressee’ (ibid.: 204). ‘You’, on the other hand, addresses someone, in this case a group, who are different from the speaker. Here, the addressees are being told something. The officer uses ‘you’ in this sense in turn 92 (...and it’s goin’ intae aw the areas youse live in ... and ye’re quite happy tae allow it tae continue) in an attempt to distance himself from the group, as he would not allow his area to be infiltrated by drugs. Turn 92 is also another example of formulation on part of the officer. D’s use of ‘you’ in turn 97 (Ye can’t beat drugs all over the world anyway ...) is again different. Using general second person singular not only enables the speaker to distance himself from responsibility (Fowler et al., 1979: 92), it also involves the addressee, in this case the prison officer, in the situation, thus implying that he would behave similarly, that is, he would not try to do anything against the drug trade.

4.3.6 Enforcing explicitness

As we have seen so far, a less powerful participant may use ambiguity or ambivalence to deal with those in power; but a more powerful participant may enforce explicitness by asking participants to make their utterances less ambiguous or force them out of silence by, for example, asking questions like ‘Are you saying that...?’, ‘What is your opinion?, ‘do you understand?’, or, Is that what ye’re sayin’ tae me? or Ah’m asking you! (turns 122 and 124
What the dominant speaker may demand is what Thomas (1988: 29) has called ‘discoursal disambiguation’. Part of the reason why dominant speakers force feedback from other participants even when some form of contribution has been given already has to do with the notion that discourse is essentially ambivalent and displays multiple functions. Just as a dominant speaker may thus force a subordinate to ‘go on record with the intended pragmatic force of an utterance’, he may also force him ‘to disambiguate discoursally ambivalent utterances and oblige him to indicate that he acknowledges the accuracy of a fact or shows acquiescence with what the dominant speaker is saying’. In other words, the subordinate is required to show co-operation with the dominant speaker’s discoursal and social goals. The following extract (a continuation of text 4.1) is another example of how the officer attempts to force explicitness:

**Text 4.1 (Continuation)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speaker</th>
<th>Turn</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>O1:</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J:</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O1:</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J:</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O1:</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J:</td>
<td>* 120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B:</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
can help by givin’ the source ay information which might stoap it [J: Naw] at once ...... So ye want tae stoap it but ye don’t want tae help stoap it, is that what ye’re are sayin’ tae me ?

J:  * 123 Ah’m jis’ puttin’ myself [in

O1:  124 [Naw! Ah’m asking you a

question. Ye want it stoapped=

J:  125 =Naw

O1:  126 but ye’re not willing tae help.

P:  127 Ah’m no’.

J:  128 Ah’m no’ prepared tae help [

O1:  129 [Ah see. So ye want it
stoapped, but ye’re not prepared tae help.

J:  130 mhm.

In the above text, J resists the officer’s attempt to enforce explicitness : the officer interrupts J’s contribution, dismissing it as irrelevant (Ah’m no’ askin’ if..., turn 117). A long pause follows, which could be taken as an example of J using silence as a weapon. But J is genuinely at a loss for words, because the officer has put him into a moral dilemma. It seems as if the officer wants to give J some space to come up with an answer. Only after he tells him to go on, does J continue, but he still remains vague (Naw, no really, but ...). In turn 122, O1 attempts to force explicitness (So ye want tae stoap it but ye don’t want tae help stoap it, is that what ye’re sayin’ tae me?), but J is still vague (turn 123) and finally states explicitly that he is not willing to help in the war against drugs (turns 125 and 128).

In the following brief passage from text 4.1, which shows another example of the officer enforcing explicitness, the inmates are still split in two
groups. P, who is in one group with J, names his reason for not revealing the source. G is in the opposing group:

**Speaker**  **Turn**

P: 1 A promise between two people shouldn’t be broken.
O1: 2 A promise between two people shouldn’t be broken.
Even if that promise being broken means you’re gaunny lose yer livelihood, yer freedom, yer family.

P: 3 Ah say it again. A promise between two people shouldn’t be [broken

O1: 4 [Ah’m asking you! Even [even if

P: 5 [Aye, shouldn’t be broken.

O1: 6 Even if it means going tae jail?

P: 7 Aye

O1: 8 Yes?

J: 9 mhm

O1: 10 So ye feel that strongly aboot a promise.

J: 11 [Aye.

G: 12 [No danger.

The officer repeats P’s turn: a turn repeat is often a sign of repair initiation. It shows that the officer does not agree with P’s proposition. P remains adamant despite the repair introduced by the officer in turn 2. He then demands explicitness in a quite powerful manner (*Ah’m asking you!*). P cuts him short by restating his opinion, but the officer keeps probing by repeating his question (*Even if it means going to jail?*).
4.3.7 Politeness

Speakers use politeness in language, according to Brown and Levinson, in order to repair, redress or avoid situations in which an individual’s face is potentially threatened. ‘Face-threatening acts’ (FTAs: Brown and Levinson, 1987: 60) result from a speaker wanting something that would impinge on the addressee (e.g. a question, request, suggestion or advice) in that it puts pressure on him to act in a certain way. For example, a request may be made ‘baldly’, without ‘redressive action’, that is, no attempt to mitigate it (most obviously when the officer says *You three: Give me three valid reasons why*... in turn 73); with ‘positive politeness’, which means redressing it by showing sympathy or, it can be made with ‘negative politeness’, which means mitigating it by showing consideration for the addressee’s wish not to be imposed upon (‘Sorry to bother you but could you ...’). This is an indirect way of making a request, which does not occur in the texts at all. A face-threatening act could also be any act that ‘runs contrary to the addressee’s face wants’, such as an insult, criticism or sometimes the blunt truth.

According to Brown and Levinson, people are generally concerned with lessening the severity of FTAs. These strategies of redressive action become apparent in conversation, for example, when speakers hedge or modify their opinions.

As we can see from text 4.1, O1 is neither negatively nor positively polite. Questioning can also be threatening to the addressee’s positive face, for example, when it is possibly demeaning. Let us look at the following example:

O1: 1 So ye’re willin’ tae keep a promise because it might save somebody’s joab, but it might not.
[pause 5 secs.]
P: 2 Ah don’t work with might-nots, but Ah just work with mights.

O1: 3 [Ye work with mights, Ah see, so ye want one hauf of it, ye don’t like reflections?

P: 4 Ah wudnae tell ye ma source.

The officer first formulates P statement that one should always keep a promise and questions the rationality of it. For P, his statement is an expression of his principles, for the officer it is a sign of uncritical thinking, which he criticizes. Although P’s answer is evasive, he still commits a face-threatening act by refusing to give the officer the desired answer.

Having looked at the interactional control devices employed by the officer I shall now turn to my analysis of the classroom discussions by describing what goes on in the individual speaker turns. As we shall see below, through their grammatical choices, the interactants take up roles in the conversation, constructing relations of power through talk.

4.4 Analysing for Mood and Modality: grammatical patterns in conversation

I explored grammatical patterns by studying the types of clause structures found in the Cognitive Skills sessions. At the clause level, the major patterns which enact roles and role relations are those of Mood, with its subsystems of modality and polarity. One area of Mood choice in which Tenor dimensions are realized is seen by investigating what speakers do when they get the speaker role, that is, who makes a demand, who makes an offer and are these rights reciprocal? A lack of reciprocity suggests different status relations. There is thus a clear relationship between the social roles people play in situations and the choices they make in the Mood system. Thus, in studying the grammar of the clause as exchange we are actually studying
how interpersonal meanings are made. By looking closely at the choices the interactants make for Mood and Modality in the sessions, I attempted to uncover the interpersonal relationships that are being expressed in the texts. Below I present those aspects of Mood analysis which I need for the critical interpretation of the Cognitive Skills conversations.

A quantitative exploration of the speech patterns observed during the Cognitive Skills sessions makes it possible to compare sections of different classroom sessions with each other. In this way I am also able to corroborate the claims I have made about these patterns in the last two chapters.

1) **Number of clauses** One can see a clear difference in the amount of speech produced by the officer as opposed to the inmates. Because the officer has the role of teacher and therefore has to set up the class first, this is to be expected.

2) **Number of incomplete clauses** There are 6 incomplete clauses, which are produced by B (turns 18, 20, 53 and 58) and J (turns 120 and 123) as a result of being interrupted by the officer.

3) **Declaratives** As can be seen from the texts, full declarative clauses are normally used to initiate exchanges by putting forward information for negotiation. They construct the speaker as taking on an active initiatory role in conversation. Declaratives can express factual information or attitudinal opinion (e.g. B’s turn 22, *Not a lot of people like the police*; D’s turn 8, *Ye can’t beat drugs all over the world anyway*; and J’s turn 103, *One man doesnae make the law for the drugs*). They are also used to question prior talk, to challenge (e.g. B’s turn 42, *The journalist doesn’t want anybody else tae know*) and to counter-challenge (O1’s turn 43, *But the judge is now demanding that he tells ‘im*).

The officer produces 69 declarative clauses, P 19, J 13, B 10, G 8, and D 2. Although the officer produces significantly more declaratives than the
inmates combined, which suggests that he, in keeping with his role as teacher, initiates exchanges by giving information more often than the inmates do, it is significant that the inmates take on an initiatory and challenging role at various points in the interaction (B in turns 22, 42, 44, 51; P in turns 30, 32, 45 and 49; D in turn 22; J in turns 100, 103, 110 and 116).

4) Tagged declaratives The officer does not use this mood choice at all, whereas B produces two tags and P one. The ambiguous functions and meanings of tag questions have been discussed quite extensively. Lakoff’s (1975) very restrictive view of tag questions as markers of tentativeness has been challenged, among others, by Holmes (1984), who in turn has been criticized by Cameron et al. (1988). Holmes distinguishes between ‘modal tags’ and ‘affective tags’. Modal tags are ‘speaker-oriented’, requesting information or confirmation of information the speaker is not sure about (e.g. ‘You were out last night, weren’t you?’). ‘Affective tags’, on the other hand, are ‘addressee-oriented’, that is, they indicate concern for the addressee, which can take two forms. They may exemplify ‘negative politeness’ and function as a ‘softener’, thus reducing the face-threat of the utterance to the addressee. Another problem of Holmes’s framework is that tags cannot unambiguously be classed as either modal or affective and may be both speaker and addressee-oriented, as Cameron et al. (1988) have found. Tag questions, like other linguistic forms, simply underline that utterances in discourse are multifunctional and diverse in meaning. The problem is further compounded in asymmetrical discourse and ‘unequal encounters’. Whereas in sex-difference research tag-questions have been seen as a marker of tentative speech, powerful/powerless studies have found them to be markers of power and control in speech. Harris (1984), Philips (1984) and Woodbury (1984), who have worked on court discourse, regard them as attempts by the more powerful speaker to control the discourse and to constrain the responses of the addressee. Harris has shown that tags, which she found very
often used by magistrates, can be a highly conducive form of questions. Cameron et al. (1988) have also suggested that tags, rather than being softeners, can be the opposite, that is, they may be perceived as increasing the addressee’s humiliation. Their hypothesis is that, in unequal encounters, tag questions are an interactional resource of the powerful rather than the powerless. This is not borne out by my data.\(^2\)

Consider the following exchanges from text 4.1:

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>O1: 12</td>
<td>What tae find out for? What dae ye [think?</td>
<td>B: 13 [Tae jail him, \textit{is it}?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O1: 25</td>
<td>I think the judge is alright with the police, eh?</td>
<td>B: 26 Aye, sticks by them, \textit{don’t he}?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P: 90</td>
<td>He’s made a promise, \textit{ain’t he}?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^2\) Support for this hypothesis, however, can be found in the following extract taken from the BBC 2 documentary \textit{Jailbirds} (1999). The following exchange is a disciplinary interview between a prison governor and a female prisoner:

\begin{center}

\textbf{Gov.: 1} You will have to get sorted out at some point you know ... \textit{aren’t you}? Instead of that you’re getting more aggressive each time you come. Whether you are doing it or not, you shouldn’t be doing it, you know that\textasciitilde  \\
\textbf{Pris.: 2} Yes Sir.  \\
\textbf{Gov.: 3} And that’s what we are dealing with here, \textit{isn’t it}? Is there anything you’d like to say in mitigation?\textasciitilde  \\
\textbf{Pris.: 4} =Nothing  \\
\textbf{Gov.: 5} Nothing. Nothing at all [Pris.: Nothing] Not even I’m sorry?
\end{center}

The Governor’s first tag could be interpreted as a request for confirmation or an explanation from the prisoner, who merely agrees with his proposition. But by the end of turn 3 it becomes clear that she is not being asked to clarify anything, but merely to verbalize her guilt and submission. She attempts to keep her dignity by refusing to do so.
Since tags tend to be a conducive form of questions, the use of the tags by the inmates here could represent an attempt to elicit agreement from the officer with the proposition made in the declarative part of the utterance.

5) Polar Interrogatives The officer produces 6 polar interrogatives, whereas the inmates do not produce any:

O1: 21 Is this true or is it not true?
B: 22 Not a loat of people like the police.
O1: 29 The rest ay you the same? (elliptical)
(no answer)

O1: 96 So dae ye want yer children, if ye decide tae have any, tae grow up in a drug-culture or a drug-free society
D: 97 Ye can’t beat drugs all over the world anyway.
O1: 98 So is that right we don’t dae anything tae stoap it=
J: 99 =No’ really no

O1: 117 ... Ah’m asking is it right for them tae get away wi’ it?
J: 118 Eh=
O1: 119 Go oan!

O1: 122 ...is that what ye’re sayin’ tae me?
J: 123 Ah’m jis’ puttin’myself [in
O1: 124 [Naw! Ah’m asking you a question.
Since polar interrogatives require a minimal response only, they become a powerful means of controlling the inmates’ contributions. Most of the officer’s questions contain a complete proposition, which the participants are asked to confirm or deny and which makes it difficult for them to introduce new topics. They also reveal much about the nature of the officer’s control over what is talked about. What is more, to challenge a completed proposition requires more interactive work than to support it (e.g. Harris, 1984). Coulthard (1981: 22) points out in that respect that ‘all apparently and formally neutral questions are in fact marked as expecting a positive polarity answer’. However, if we look at the exchanges, we can see that the officer’s attempts at controlling the inmates’ contributions does not always work. In turn 97, D refuses to answer the officer’s question and comes up with a new proposition altogether, and in turns 118, 120 and 123 of text 4.1 J resists, too, if only by being vague.

6) Wh-interrogatives The officer produces 15 wh-interrogatives (6 of which are full wh-interrogatives, 8 elliptical, and 1 abandoned). B produces 8 (two of which are interrupted by the officer, and one of which is elliptical), whereas the other participants do not produce any. The officer’s relatively high use of full wh-interrogatives (involving ‘what’, ‘how’, ‘where’, ‘why’) is one way in which he engages the inmates in talk while retaining the status as initiator and controlling the interaction. Although less restricting, a glance at the texts shows that they still can be and are answered minimally. Although ‘how’ (officer’s turn 19) and ‘why’ (officer’s turns 31, 36 and 111) allow for a less restricted response, the inmates’ explanations remain rather brief.

7) Imperatives As is to be expected, it is the officer who uses imperatives, although overall he uses merely two imperatives. The imperative is the most direct (‘congruent’) type of command realization, or what Brown and
Levinson (1988: 94) have called ‘bald’. It is a realization of the officer’s power: he can give a command because of his authority.

8) Modalities

The two main types of modality, modalization and modulation (Halliday, 1985), allow speakers to temper their conversational contributions, expressing degrees of either probability/usuality or obligation/inclination. Modalization is a way of tempering the categorical nature of the information people exchange, while modulation is a way of tempering the directness with which they want to act upon each other. In other words, modalization is the expression of the speaker’s attitude to what he or she is saying. We can recognize degrees of modalization: high (must, certainly, always), median (may, probably, usually) or low (might, possibly, sometimes). It always expresses the implicit judgement of the speaker, although it can also be explicit. Speakers can make it quite clear that it is their judgement that is being expressed (‘I reckon’ ‘I think’, ‘I’m sure’). There are three types of modulation: obligation, inclination, and capability.

**Modalizations in text 4.1**

There are four examples of probability modalizations in text 4.1, all by the officer. The first example involves 2 modalities which are median probability; objective, implicit:

O1: 17  Naw, maybe he jis’ wants to find oot so he can maybe get more detail into it.

Probability here is signalled by a combination of two interpersonal adjuncts: ‘maybe’ and ‘jis’, which tone down the intensity of what is being said.
The second is median probability; subjective, explicit:

O1: 25 I think the judge is alright with the police, eh?

The third modalization is low probability; subjective, implicit:

O1: 19 The judge might want to know for what reason.

*Modulations in text 4.1*

There are two examples of obligation modulation, both by P. They are median obligation, subjective, implicit, one is negative:

P: 81 Aye, because his promise is as soon as he started the baw rollin’ so from then oan they should take (over),

(brief excerpt, page 180)

P: 1 A promise between two people shouldn’t be broken.

There are eight modalities of capability (three by the officer), and one of possibility (also by the officer).

O1: 10 Something in this nature, in these cases you could be jailed for a long long time ...

O1: 17 Naw, maybe he jis’ wants to find oot so can maybe get some detail into it.

G: 77 Ye cud stoap illegal drugs shipments from being
Right. By doin’ that and givin’ the information the police could get hold of information about this network.

Aye, but he’s gied them as much help as he can gie them.

Ye can’t beat drugs all over the world anyway... know what Ah mean?

What can ye dae? Ye can [Ye can help by givin’ the source ay information which might stop it...]

While the number of modalities in these texts is too low to warrant strong claims, we can nevertheless see some differences in the interactants’ use of them. All modalizations are by the officer, who modalizes for probability. The inmates do not produce any. The officer’s concern is very much with convincing the inmates that it is morally questionable to withhold information from the judge by not revealing the name of the source. This is in fundamental contrast with one value prisoners commonly adhere to, at least verbally: not to inform (‘grass’) on anybody. So the officer knows he is up against a difficult task here and that is why he is trying to tell the inmates in modulated form that all the judge wants is more information. Thus the use of modality here perhaps reflects the fact that the officer finds it more appropriate to direct by persuasion and suggestion. All the inmates’ modalities are modulations of obligation and capability, reflecting what they claim to be their moral values (*A promise between two people shouldn’t be broken*) and their belief that nothing can be done against the drug trade.
Clues to the different social roles among the interactants can be found in the linguistic choices they make. There is an obvious difference between the officer and the inmates, which is also suggested by the way they use language. The inmates use more colloquial language and swear words, although the number of swear words (e.g. Fuck the judge) in text 4.1 is low. This may in part have been due to my presence in the session. Asked by the officer in the first session I was present why they did not use any swear words, one inmate said that he would not do so in the presence of a women. The officer uses colloquial language, too, but also more standard and restrained forms (e.g. police instead of polis). The way he teases the inmates (There’s a statement, eh) is another indication of his position of power (the inmates do not tease him). The most striking pattern enacted in text 4.1 is that the officer has more linguistic privileges, while the participants have more linguistic responsibilities. The officer gets the greatest number of turns and the longest turns and he asks the greatest number of questions. Again, this is hardly surprising given the classroom context, but it is a significant sign of the unevenness in the interaction. The officer asserts his own position, empowered both personally (as knower) and institutionally (as officer and teacher) to decide what topic will be talked about and quick to rebuff (sometimes quite bluntly) what he regards as irrelevant and as a challenge to his authority. However, what he does is essentially what he is asked to do by the Handbook: to challenge what its authors perceive to be ‘anti-social’ and ‘pro-criminal’ talk.

In the texts analysed so far, we can see that the officer (01) uses a number of strategies for displaying power and dominance in discourse: topic control, that is, defining what is talked about and questioning the relevance of some questions asked by the inmates by ignoring these; formulation to shape the meanings the inmates are trying to make into the forms that he wants; and demanding explicitness, thereby attempting to get the inmates to
disambiguate their utterances. The officer’s questions are designed to steer the inmates to the desired answer by incorporating what has been said and at the same time indicating by further questions that more or different information is needed. He elaborates considerably on the inmates’ rather brief answers, and his meaning is the one that is last heard.

Having listed the main discourse strategies employed by Officer 1 in the classroom, I shall now turn to the second, videotaped ‘Confidence Game’ session, which was run by a different prison officer (O2) with a different group of six inmates. We will see that Officer 2 uses some of the interactional control devices used by Officer 1, but not all. He also uses them differently. The Cognitive Skills class I shall look at below was conducted as an ‘outdoors’ session. It was a particularly warm day in spring and one of the inmates had managed to persuade the officer to run it on the prison premises. The seating arrangements outside were more ‘relaxed’: the inmates were sitting on ‘easy chairs’ taken from the visiting area around a low, round table, some with their feet propped up against it. The officer was standing most of the time, but sat down with the rest of the group towards the end of the discussion. I took turns with an inmate to videotape the session. The quality of the recording suffered due to the background noise coming from the near-by road and a very lively discussion.

I shall begin by discussing the interactional control features O2 employed in this class and then analyse the interactions for Mood and Modality. Text 4.2 (turns 1-175) has again been divided into smaller parts.
4.5 Analysis of interactional control features in text 4.2

4.5.1 Classroom questions and steering of discourse

The following interactions show that O2, like O1, uses questions to control and steer the discourse. In the following extract, O2 uses mainly polar interrogatives, two of which are negatively worded, anticipating agreement (turns 9 and 29). They are both contested by two inmates, the first one using a counter-question (turn 10) and a negative answer and the second one by using a command and counter-question (turn 30). The officer also uses one leading negative tag (turn 14, but is contested again by two negative answers (turns 15 and 16). The officer directs the conversation by introducing the alternative dilemmas (turns 7, 9, 27, 38, 40), which he is advised to do by the Handbook, if the Course participants all argue against revealing the source’s name. Although he manages to steer the discussion in the direction he intends, all the propositions he puts forward are contested by the inmates through questions (turns 8, 10, 30), counter-propositions (turns 10, 39, 41) and negative answers (turns 9 and 29).

Text 4.2: ‘The Confidence Game’

O2: Officer 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speaker</th>
<th>Turn</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>O2:</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A:</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O2:</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| J:      | NV1  | haha \{talks to H and now turns to officer\}  

No fuckin’ danger!
H: 6   Naw

O2: 7   Naebdy? Naebdy reveal his source? But what aboot this: (wee Tom, that guy told him that Jamieson Petrie is his long-time friend) He’s made a loat of profits fae ... the drug business. But the thing is he’s become an addict hisself.

T: 8   Then what?

O2: 9   Well, dae ye no’ think if he told them, they might be able tae get him aff the drugs?

T: 10  What? And get him tae fuckin’ jail?

A: 11  That wud be cuttin’ his supplies aff.

N: 12  (?)

A: 13  That wud be cutting his supplies aff and he’s an addict hisself, won’t he.

O2: 14  In a way they wud be daein’ him a favour, wouldn’t they?

J: 15  Ah wudnae fuckin’ speak tae [them!]

T: 16  [Naw they wudnae, they wud get him tae jail=]

A: 17  =Newspapers are confident. [T: (?)] They are not supposed tae break yer confidence. Ye sign a contract.

O2: 18  Naw

A: 19  What dae ye mean naw?

O2: 20  No, no’ the journalist. [He’s (?) confidentiality, ye know?] [H!]

J: 21 {talks to 2 inmates} [no’ the journalist.]

Listen, all Ah’m sayin’ is,
right, if anybody sways in this group that means they are a grass!

O2: 22  Naw it doesnae.

J: 23  Aye it fuckin’ does!

O2: 24  Naw it doesn’t!

J: 25  It does tae me!

T: 26  (all grasses then!)

O2: 27  Tom had paid the guy 2000 [pounds

J: 28  [Doesnae matter what he paid ‘im!

O2: 29  But dae you no’ feel he doesnae owe him any loyalty, now he’s paid him a lot of [money?

J: 30  [Hector look you listen tae me

here! Are ye [listenin’? {points at officer with both hands}

T:  NV2  [hhh]

O2: 31  No!

J: 32  Anybody who’s supposed tae grass, is a fuckin’ grass. End ay story!

O2: 33  It’s for the nation’s good! The well-being of the nation=

T: 34  =Fuck the nation! =

J: 35  =For fuck’s sake Mr [ ], get it taegether!

O2:  * 36  If he doesnae tell the court how that drugs these drugs are gettin’ transported, right [pause 4 secs]

J:  * 37  If he does tell them

O2: 38  Right, Tom hisself he’s goat two young teenage sons,
right [T: wha’?] he’s concerned.

T: 39 He can move then!

O2: 40 And a young teenage daughter [J: (?)] right, people from that same transport company have been seen hangin’ aboot the [school

T: 41 [Doesnae matter he can move
[to another school.

J: 42 \{jumps up\} [Ah’ve had enough man, Ah’ve had enough.

4.5.2 Interruption

One striking feature in the class run by O2 is that he hardly ever interrupts the inmates, whereas the inmates do so on numerous occasions. Only a few of the overlapping utterances made by the inmates occur at turn-relevant places; the rest can thus be identified as intentional interruptions. This interpretation is strengthened by the fact that this particular topic would create some tension between the officer and the inmates. Most interruptions therefore tend to cluster where the discussion becomes ‘heated’, that is when the officer tries to convey that the reporter is under no moral obligation to keep his promise, because he paid his informant a considerable sum of money. The following text (a continuation of text 4.2) is a good example of this.

Text 4.2 (Continuation)

Speaker Turn.

T: 43 He canny stick ‘im in [O2: eh?] no matter what.
O2: 44 He’s no gaunny stick ‘im in? =
T: 45 =They fuckin’ dae him [(?)
J: 46 [Dae ye mind if Ah slip ma
shorts oan by the way? \{unbuttons his jeans and
shows his shorts\}
O2: 47 Naw! We don’t want tae see yer spindly legs! \{to
T\} Eh? Ye’re no’ gaunny grass?
T: 48 (?)
O2: 49 Eh? No wait a minute!
T: 50 Look! Ah’ve told ye. Ah hate them. No, Ah’m not
talkin’ aboot it!
J: 51 Look, listen Hector!
T: 52 Ye’re supportin’ grassing bastards!
O2: 53 It’s no’ [grassin’!]
J: 54 [It is grassin!
O2: * 55 [The thing was done in confidence, the guy
paid ‘im money, so therefore, what right, is he no’
entitled [\A: 56 [That’s even worse.\]
O2: 57 Wha’?
A: 58 In that case it’s even [worse.
J: 59 [He’s a fuckin’ dirty wrongie!
O2: 60 Is he no’ entitled tae [A: (?)] feel that he can
breach this [confidence
J: 61 [He’s a wrongie Mr [ ], we’re no’
[int’ristit
O2: 62 [because he’s gied them money. * What right [\J: 63 [He’s a
dirty fuckin’ wrongie!

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O2: 64 Well what aboot the wee deals that are done at the polis stations behind closed doors?

T: 65 What wee fuckin’ deals?

O2: 66 Eh?

J: 67 *points at N* Ye must have made one anyway! (?)

O2: *68 All the wee deals [ (?)

J: 69 [ (?)

T: 70 The wee cunt got done for a bag snatch, sticks me in and oanly got done wi’ attempt theft. That’s a wee deal for ye and Ah got seven months through the dirty wee grass!

O2: 71 But Inspector Flint [T: (?)] says, T if you let me know who did this, we’ll go easy oan ye.

T: 72 Where dae ye come fae man?=

O2: 73 =Does tha’ no happen?= 

T: 74 =Not tae fuckin’ [me! 

O2: 75 [Dae ye tell me this doesn’t happen? 

T: 76 Aye it does happen. Ah know how it happens, ‘cos Ah fuckin’ got tae jail for the wee prick who done it, aye it [happens.

O2: 77 [Have ye not been put in that position [T: Aye for fuck] T? A wee bit? * Look wee man, we fuckin’ [ 

T: NV3 haha 

J: 78 [Mr [ ] ye’re rippin’ the ass oot it!= 

T: 79 =Aye ye’re at it= 

J: 80 =Ye’re right rippin’ the ass oot it. 

O2: *81 Ah’m tellin’ ye [
Ah tell ye right now. They (the police) wouldn't even embarrass theirsel askin' me for that anymerr.

The coppers up my way wudnae embarrass theirsel askin' me for that.

But it does go oan J, ye know. Sorry, ye will be here soon. No danger!

It does go oan, 'cos that's how we're in the jail through [them.

[But when ye're in behind here, a wee deal instead of going for a big yin, ye get a wee yin {a small sentence}]

(A wee deal, six months)

Ye've goat tae go tae court, no matter who ye stick in an' aw.

Naw ye don't.

Ye don't have tae go tae court, ye give a statement.

Ye're no' gaunny tell me if you were down for five years or five months ... a wee slip of the tongue, a wee slip of the tongue, a wee hint here or [there (?)]

Ah'm gonna tell you something. Ah was sixteen year old, first offence, two assault and robberies. Ah got asked tae turn Queen’s evidence and Ah was walking out ay
court [O2: mhm] and Ah took a three and a half year sentence for it.

O2: 97 Is that wise?
T: 98 Aye, it’s [wise.
J: 99 [Aye it’s wise.
O2: 100 Is it?
T: 101 Aye, for one he can walk aboot and keep his heid held up [high

O2: 102 [Walk aboot where? (?) In the prison?
T 103 (?)
O2: 104 Ah’d rather walk aboot outside.

Whether the officer interprets the inmates’ interruption as intentional resistance is not clear, but at no point does he attempt to complete his utterance by, for example, raising his voice and continuing to speak. Once, he repeats his questions (turns 55-50) after being cut short by two participants, only to be interrupted again (turn 61). The inmates’ interruptions are successful because the officer stops speaking and is temporarily no longer in control of the discourse. The officer might have refrained from interrupting because he wanted to encourage the inmates to talk. For him one of the benefits of the Course was that it helped the inmates to ‘get out of their shells’, which would suggest that he did not perceive their interruptions as a threat to his authority.

If we consider the inmates’ interruptions, we have to bear in mind that interruption in conversation is affected by a number of social and personality variables. Rim (1977), for example, found that extroverts interrupted, and spoke simultaneously, more often than introverts. Natale et al. (1979) pointed out that the frequency of interruption was positively related to speaker confidence and also that people with a high need for social approval
tend to interrupt more often. Interruption may also signal heightened involvement rather than dominance (Long, 1972). Some of the values the Course espouses are in fundamental opposition to the inmates' value system, which they may feel they have to defend. Finally, status and status acquisition within the group is also a significant factor and may account for the fact that some of the inmates interrupted the officer quite frequently. Interruption is thus affected by many variables, and only some are related to variables which reflect dominance on the part of the more powerful speaker (Ferguson, 1977; Beattie, 1981). It is not quite clear here who the more powerful speaker is. The way the inmates interrupt the officer suggests that they consider themselves to be his conversational equals.

4.5.3 Formulation and enforcing explicitness

Officer 2 used formulation very sparingly and never enforced explicitness from the inmates. In the text below, it is actually an inmate who uses this device.

Text 4.2 (Continuation)

Speaker Turn

J: 105 So what you’re saying, ye’re a grass?
T: 106 Aye, [he’s a fuckin’ grass!
O2: * 107 [Ah’m not sayin’ Ah’m a grass, all Ah’m [sayin’
J: 108 [So what ye’re sayin’ is Ah should’ve stuck him in?
O2: 109 Ah didnae say that, all Ah wud say is Ah wud rather walk, know what Ah’m sayin’, walk aboot outside [
J:  110  [Mr [ ] Ah took my chances through the trial.
T:   111    (?)
O2:  112    Eh?
J:  113    Ah took ma chances through the trial.
O2:  114    Mhm. So you’re sayin’... there’s people who wudnae
    grass then?
T:  115    There is people who don’t grass, plenty ay [them.
J:  116    [There was
    six of us in court that day and not one ay us grassed.
T:  117    dae ye think most criminals are grasses?
O2:  118    Eh?
T:  119    dae ye think most criminals are grasses? [O2: T!]
    Ah must be one of the elite then, ‘cos Ah never stuck
    anybody in in ma life.
O2:  120    T!
T:  121    don’t fuckin’ T me! Ah know Ah’m no fuckin’
    grass!
O2:  122    T! It get’s done all the time.
T:  123    Aye, it gets done all the [time.
O2:  124    *  [The wee deals [ 
    well aye! ‘Cos Ah got done for two grasses who went
    oan protection. (He goat put on report on a bogus
    letter found, ‘cos they cudnae prove it).
J:  125    [Well aye.
O2:  126    But it does get done.
T:  127    We’re no’ denyin’ that there’s grassin’. (There’s
    plenty ay them.
O2 demands explicitness only in turn 114 (So ye’re sayin’... there’s people who wudnae grass then?). J, on the other hand, demands explicitness from the officer twice (So what ye’re saying, ye’re a grass? in turns 105 and So what ye’re sayin’ is that Ah should’ve stuck him in? in turn 108), which suggests that the roles of teacher/learner are being reversed and that the inmate considers himself to be the conversational equal of the officer.

4.5.4 Topic Control

As we have seen from the interactions in O2’s class, some participants frequently interrupt the officer to get their points across. Control over the introduction and change of topic which in Group 1 was exercised mainly by the officer is here sometimes exercised by a prisoner. Examples of how the inmates introduce topics occur in the following continuation of text 4.2:

**Text 4.2 (Continuation)**

| Speaker | Turn | 
|---------|------|---|
| O2:     | 128  | This whole jail what about 400 people, wud say Ah’d batter a grass, Ah’d kill a grass, [T: (grasses in here)] but cud ye still say Ah’ve never grassed, Ah’ve never did a deal? |
| T:      | 129  | Ah cud say that. |
| O2:     | 130  | [Eh? |
| J:      | 131  | [Ah cud! |
| A;      | 132  | What about [ ] what about [ ], the deals he’s daein’ the noo? |
| O2:     | 133  | Who? |
| A:      | 134  | [ ] |
H: 135  (?)
O2: 136  He's oanly tryin'... he's only after his ain self.
A: 137  (?)
H: 138  (?)
J: 139  Ah cud. All Ah'm sayin' is Ah've never stuck anybody in in my whole life.
O2: 140  That's fair enough J. But Ah'm sayin', what Ah'm sayin, Ah'm no' sayin' Ah've never done or ever done it, either or, what Ah'm sayin' it gets done J and the very people who dae it, are the very people who condemn grasses.
J: 141  Exactly.
T: 142  We're no' denyin' that, [O2: Eh?] we're sayin’ it does happen.
O2: 143  Right= 
T: 144  =Fuck's sake ... See, right, Ah was stuck in, right see the boy who stuck me in, he's done 13 sentences.
H: 145  Who is it?
T: 146  [. [H: Is it?] done 13 sentences and stuck me in because he was junked oan tabs. That was his excuse. No excuse where Ah come fae. But that’s what he said, know what Ah [mean.
J: 147  [Nae excuse for grasses= 
T: 148  =This boy’s done 13 sentences. Never been known as a grass. And yet he stuck me in tae get away for a bag snatch. That’s the truth, aye.
O2: 149  What if a good friend ay yours right [T: Six
months] a good friend ay yours, a member of yer family was badly beaten up and he’s desperate tae find out who it was and (?) ye knew who it was.

T: 150 (?)  

H: 151 Ah’d fuckin’ dae and shoot the bastard, dae a favour for them. Ah’d shoot ‘im, but no’ grass him in. Ah’d dae them a favour. Ah’ve done it afore. Ah’ve no’ shot any cunt, but Ah slashed, stabbed a few cunts but and attacked ma next-door neighbour.  

(?) {Everybody talks at the same time}

O2: 152 Ye must admit that it gets done.  

H: 153 (?)  

N: 154 It gets done, but not by anybody here.  

J: 155 Aye ma brother got done. And it came back tae me who it was. And the guy says tae me listen blah blah blah. Anyway, he telt me who it was and that’s how Ah’m here the noo. But aye it gets done.

O1: 156 And how dae ye think the polis capture a lot of people?  

T: 157 Because of grasses!  

J: 158 If the polis had never information (?)  

H: 159 The biggest gangsters stick each other in.  

J: 160 Aye, ye better believe it.

In this text the topic is ‘grassing’. O2 is trying to make the point that it happens far more often among inmates than they are willing to admit. The participants finally concede that this is true, but insist that nobody in the group has ever done it. T then offers his story about how he ended up in prison because of a ‘grass’. O2 does not comment on T’s comment but J
evaluates it positively (*Nae excuse for grasses*). Then O2 introduces a new topic (turn 149), hoping that the group might be tempted to involve the police if a member of their family or a close friend was beaten up. H, however, only offers to ‘do’ the perpetrator, that is, take justice into his own hands, and tells the group that he has done it before. H’s comment would be regarded as ‘anti-social’ and ‘pro-criminal’ talk, but the officer’s challenge is very mild. He simply reiterates his argument that ‘grassing’ does happen. J agrees and takes the opportunity to tell the group that the reason he is in prison is because he beat up the person who informed on his brother.

In the following text, the ‘Confidence Game’- discussion is coming to an end. The officer sums up what has been said:

**Text 4.2 (Continuation)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speaker</th>
<th>Turn</th>
<th>Dialogue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>O2:</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>So we’re no’ gaunny change oor mind here?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All:</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>Naw!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O2:</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>No’ even for a moment?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T:</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>The polis werenae wide enough tae catch me theirsle, so they goat a grass tae dae it for them. How can I condemn grasses when Ah’m here because of them?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J:</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>Aye, Ah tell ye, aye, Ah let my wife get away wi’ it. My wife stuck me in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O2:</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>Stuck ye in?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J:</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>Aye</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T:</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>That’s the oanly person in the world who can stick ye in at the polis and (?) because she’s yer wife.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| J:      | 169  | She’s fuckin’ done it. Ah fuckin’ tell ye: see wummin, wummin, see wummin love tae spill their
fuckin' guts. [O2: Aye] Ah tell ye there's nothing better for a woman tae go in there and get it aff her chest. [O2: Aye] Ah'm staun in the dock like tha’ aye dirty cow {folds arms across his chest} did ye need tae tell them that? [O2: That's right]. She's telt them all sorts.

O2: 170 There's another wee inference how they {women} make when the're talkin' about us. They are masters at it. We're no' masters at it.

H: 171 It comes natural tae them=

O2: 172 =It comes natural tae them.

J: 173 It's fuckin' oan top for you Andrea ye female ye! It's fuckin' oan top for ye!

O2: 174 This is murder this. Ye never gaunny change?

? 175 Ah wudnae even think aboot it.

T and J are 'talking topically' without sticking to a single topic, but covering a series of interconnected topics: J's first offence which resulted in a prison sentence (turn 96), his wife giving evidence against him in court (turn 169); T's account of why he ended up in jail (turns 70 and 146). J slips into a narrative of personal experience (Aye, Ah tell ye, aye). The narrative expressions are started at the initiative of the inmates, which is a sign of them introducing a new topic. In so doing, the inmates are talking about things which are quite relevant in conversation but probably not immediately relevant from the perspective of the Course. The officer's attentive reaction (There's another wee inference; turn 170) implies that he accepts this conversational development of the topic. In turn 172, he repeats H's turn, not because he intends a turn repair, but because he acknowledges (backchannels) his opinion.
4.5.6 *Turn-taking*

Whereas in text 4.1 it is the officer (O1) who mostly controls turn-taking, selecting the next speaker, either himself or an inmate, in text 4.2 the control over speakership is less dominated by the officer (O2), with the inmates frequently self-selecting, usually themselves.

Compared with text 4.1, text 4.2 strikes one as less focused on O2. Talk also seems to be more evenly distributed between the officer and some of the more vociferous inmates who are very explicit in their views. Although O2, like O1, specifies the nature and the topic of the conversation at the beginning of the Course, the participants' contributions do not seem to be as restricted as in Group 1. O2 has a different teaching style. The interaction is more informal, whereas O1 kept it more directly under his control. The participants in the above text were able to use the relatively unconstrained atmosphere to chip in far more often and even dominate the talk at times. Although running this particular session outside the prison classroom certainly contributed to it being relaxed, the classes run by O2 were generally more informal. The seating arrangement in the classroom was different, too. Whereas in O1's classes the tables were arranged in U-form, so that he was able to approach each participant, in O2's classes the tables were normally put together into one big table, with the men sitting at this table and the officer standing at the front. Once, when O2 split the group in two, one participant moved to a corner in the room and lay down on a spare table, making his contributions from there. This would have been unthinkable in O1's classes. The most striking difference between the two groups in terms of interactional control features is that the interaction in Group 2 reminds one at times more of informal conversation between equals in that turn-taking is 'negotiated', rather than being systematically controlled by the officer.
4.5.7 Politeness

In text 4.2, the politeness conventions seem to be reversed: it is the officer who shows both negative and positive politeness to the prisoners, whereas the prisoners do not mitigate their utterances, showing no negative politeness. Hardly ever do any of the participants ‘soften the blow’ of their statements and interruptions. In fact, they baldly interrupt the officer many times. Maybe these differences are due to a different mixture of discourse types which are being drawn upon (classroom discourse and discourse which is sometimes reminiscent of ‘disciplinary interviews’ in Group 1; a mixture of classroom and casual conversational discourse in Group 2) and different social relations obtaining between officers 1 and 2 and their respective groups. The relationship between O1 and his group is more like the one traditionally associated with prison officers and prisoners or teachers and pupils, where positive politeness is less common. He feels he has to challenge the inmates’ ‘anti-social talk’: this also justifies an absence of negative politeness on his part which, however, could also be interpreted as disregard for the inmates’ views and values. At the end of the session O1 did acknowledge the inmates’ values (keeping a promise by not revealing the source’s name to the police), although he also made it clear that they were wrong as it would get them in conflict with the law.

In Group 2, social relations are less formal, O2 simulates symmetry, which makes negative politeness on part of the inmates unnecessary. In fact, in Group 2 it is the Course participants who are neither negatively nor positively polite.
4.5.8 Summary of interactional control features in text 4.2

Although interactional control exercised by O2 in the above texts appears to be more relaxed, I would not suggest that he is giving it up altogether. Fairclough (1992) notes that even if the initiative to yield control comes invariably from the dominant participant they still exercise control at some level, even in the paradoxical form of ceding control. There are, of course, control features in text 4.2: the fact that O2 sets the agenda for the class, asks the questions which are relevant for achieving the goals of the Course and comes up with the alternative dilemma situations (the source has made profits from the drugs and become an addict himself; the reporter paid the source to get the information; drug trafficking can be stopped by giving away the source) once the participants agree not to reveal the source. He does so, however, in a manner different from O1. He hardly ever offers an assessment of what the inmates are saying the way O1 does. He does not use formulation and demands explicitness only once (So ye’re sayin’... there’s people who wudnae grass then? in turn 114). Inmate J, on the other hand, demands explicitness from the officer twice (So what ye’re saying, ye’re a grass? in turns 105 and So what ye’re sayin’ is Ah should’ve stuck him in? in turn 108). What I am suggesting is that in the class run by O2 there is a convergence of several discourse types: classroom discourse, more open-ended conversational discourse and discourse reminiscent of counselling. The interactional control features of classroom discourse are still maintained, but expressed in a less direct and mitigated way under the influence of the latter two. Counselling gives ‘clients’ the space to talk, it involves showing empathy for them and being non-directive. The classroom discourse converges with ‘Troubles Telling’ (Jefferson and Lee, 1981) and ‘Therapy Talk’ (ten Have, 1989). Jefferson (1984) has shown that Troubles Telling in ordinary conversation evolves gradually and that the transition to other topics
occurs step by step. Although this seems hard to reproduce within the confines of a course it does happen with Group 2.

Text 4.2 points to some interesting discourse differences among the inmates. We can see that they produce very different amounts of talk. In terms of volume, J and T are the most prolific and the most dominant speakers. A and H produce far fewer utterances. Thus, the linguistic evidence suggests that the participants are differentially involved in the discussion. Those who produce the most clauses/turns, also produce the highest proportion of declarative clauses which means that they give information more often than the other speakers. These findings suggest a complex and confusing picture of the roles and social relations being enacted in this discussion.

4.6 Analysing for mood and modality in text 4.2

1) Number of clauses In the above text, the exact number of clauses cannot be ascertained due to the poor quality of the recording. The numbers below are therefore calculated on the basis of discernible utterances.

2) Number of incomplete clauses Interestingly, it is the officer who produces most of the incomplete clauses (7), 6 of which are caused by interruptions from the inmates (turns 55, 62, 68, 77, 107, 124). Turn 36 is another incomplete clause, an abandoned clause. J follows suit (turn 37), doing the same thing. This could suggest that neither feels they have to compete for the floor and both are quite confident that they will be allowed to remain speaker.

3) Declaratives The number of declaratives is more equally distributed and the officer produces slightly fewer declarative clauses than two of the inmates. O2 produces 43 declaratives, T 49, J 51, H 12, A 5 and N 2. This suggests that talk is more evenly distributed among the speakers.
4) Tagged declaratives Text 4.2 contains only two examples of tagged declaratives: one is produced by A and one by the officer in the following exchange:

A: 13 That wud be cuttin’ his supplies aff and he’s an addict hisself, won’t he?
O2: 14 In a way they wud be daein’ him a favour, wouldn’t they?

The officer’s tag could indicate insecurity, as Lakoff (1975) has suggested with regard to women’s speech. As Lakoff notes, ‘hedges do have their uses when one really has legitimate need for protection, or for deference (if we are afraid that by making a certain statement we are overstepping our rights) …’ (1975: 54). In the above example, the officer’s hedge could be due to the fact that he is aware of the threat he poses to the inmates’ negative face. He knows that making a statement like In a way they wud be daein’ him a favour, wouldn’t they does not go down well with the inmates, for whom revealing a source is tantamount to ‘grassing’. It could also be seen as an elicitation on part of the officer – an invitation for the inmates to embrace the values propagated by the Course. Whatever it is, the officer mitigates the force of his utterance by using a tag.

5) Polar Interrogatives O2 produces 18 polar interrogatives, 12 of which have negative polarity and 3 of which are elliptical. J (turns 30 and 46) and T (turns 117 and 119) produce 2 full polar interrogatives each. T (turn 10) and H (turn 146) produce 1 elliptical polar interrogative each.

Some questions are more constraining than others. O2 uses negatively worded polar interrogatives (turns 7 (2x), 9, 29; turns 44, 47, 55, 60, 73, 75, 77, 161, 163) as an interactional control device. They can be seen as ‘conducive’ questions, which, if they contain a completed proposition, are
more difficult to challenge than other questions. The officer’s question *Well, dae ye no’ think if he told them, they might be able tae get him aff the drugs?* is a conducive question, as it anticipates the inmates’ agreement with the officer’s assessment of the dilemma situation. However, it does not result in the desired agreement, as it is contested by T (*What? And get him tae fuckin’ jail?*). In fact, only one of the negatively worded questions asked by the officer produces the desired acknowledgement from T:

O2: 75 dae ye tell me this doesn’t happen?
T: 76 Aye it happens. Ah know how it happens, ‘cos Ah fuckin’ got tae jail for the wee prick who done it...

The remaining polar interrogatives are all contested by the inmates. I have selected the following exchanges from text 4.2:

O2: 29 But dae ye no’ feel he doesnae owe him any loyalty, now he’s paid them a lot of [money?
J: 30 [Hector look listen tae me here!

O2: 73 Does that no’ happen?= 
T: 74 =Not tae fuckin’ me!

6) Wh-interrogatives O2 produces 7 wh-interrogatives (turns 7, 57, 64, 102, 133, 149, 156) T 4 (turns 8, 10, 65, 72), A (turns 19, 132), J (turns 105 and 108) and H (turns 93 and 145) produce 2 each. Not all wh-interrogatives asked by the officer are aimed at controlling the interaction: turns 7 (*Wha’?) and 133 (*Who’?) are questions asking for
information from the inmates.

In the following exchanges the questions are interactional control devices. In turns 64 and 156 O2 attempts to get the inmates to admit that informing on fellow criminals is common, but only the one results in the desired response. In turn 159, O2 hopes that the inmates will consider reporting a crime to the police if their families are affected by it. The inmate’s reply however, shows he would rather resort to taking the law into his own hands.

O2: 64 Well what aboot the wee deals that are done at the polis stations behind closed doors?
T: 65 What wee fuckin’ deals?

O2: 149 What if a good friend ay yours right ... a member of the family was beaten up ...?
T: 150 (?) 
H: 151 Ah’d fuckin’ dae and shoot the bastard ...

O2: 156 And how dae ye think the polis capture a lot of people?
T: 157 Because of grasses!

All of T’s questions are counter-questions to the officer’s questions, whereby he expresses his resistance. H’s questions are directed at at another inmate and are information-seeking questions. A’s first wh-interrogative challenges the officer’s statement, but the second actually is asked in support of the officer’s argument that there are a lot of informants among criminals.

7) Imperatives There are more imperatives in text 4.2 than there are in text 4.1. Interestingly the officer uses only 1 imperative (turn 49), whereas J
produces 4 to address the officer (turns 21, 30, 51), and T 1 (turn 50). Imperatives usually function as commands, as for example when J addresses the officer twice *Look listen Hector*. Imperatives set up expectations of a compliant response which may also be non-verbal, e.g. when the addressee turns his eyes to pay attention.

O2: 49 Eh? No, *wait a minute*!
T: 50 *Look*! Ah’ve told ye. Ah hate them. No Ah’m not talkin’ aboot it!

By using imperatives, J and T manage to attract the officer’s attention. Eggins and Slade (1997: 89) note that in casual conversation imperatives are often used to negotiate action indirectly, that is they function to encode advice. In turn 35 J’s imperative encodes his advice/opinion:

O2: 33 It’s for the nation’s good, the well-being of the nation.
T: 34 Fuck the nation!=
J: 35 =For fuck’s sake Mr [ ] *get it taegether*!

In this use the imperative positions the speaker as having some power over the addressee as one can only advise someone if one assumes a dominant position. J is implying that the officer does not know what he is talking about. He challenges the teacher’s role of expert; it is the teacher’s knowledge that is being evaluated here; teacher and learner roles are reversed.
7) Modalities

Modalizations in text 4.2

There are three examples of modalization, one by the officer, one by J and T each: they are probability, subjective, implicit:

O2: 9 Well dae ye no’ think they might be able tae get ‘im aff the drugs?
J: 67 You must have made one anyway.
T: 119 Ah must be one of the elite then, ‘cos Ah never stuck anybody in in ma whole life.

Modulations in text 4.2

There are six examples of obligation modulations: high obligation: directive; subjective, implicit.

H: 91 Ye’ve got tae go tae court, no matter who ye stick in an’ aw.
J: 94 Ye don’t have tae go tae court, ye give a statement.
O2: 152 Ye must admit that it gets done.

median obligation: advice; objective, implicit, one is negative.

O2: 3 Should he reveal his source?
A: 17 Newspapers are confident. They are not supposed tae break yer confidence.
low obligation: permission, subjective, implicit, negative.

T: 43 He *canny* stick ‘im in [O2: Eh?] no matter what.

Permission can be seen as the lowest degree of pressure, opening the possibility for the other person to do the action, but leaving the decision to them.

There are seven expressions of capability, two of which are produced by the officer:

T: 39 He *can* move then.  
T: 41 Doesnae matter he *can* move to another school.  
T: 107 Aye for one he *can* walk aboot and keep his heid held up high.  
O2: 128 But *cud* ye still say Ah’ve never grassed?  
T: 129 Ah *cud* say that.  
O2: 130 Eh?  
J: 131 Ah *cud*.  
J: 139 Ah *cud*.

In text 4.2, the officer sometimes tempers his statements with modalization and modulation, thereby displaying tentativeness and deference to the inmates. He knows that he is up against people ‘who live by values which fundamentally, and not without justification, distrust authority within the criminal justice process’ (Scraton et al., 1991: 75). Hence maybe his use of tentative language. The inmates, on the other hand, quite freely contradict the officer in no uncertain terms, that is, without any modalization. This seems to indicate that they consider themselves to be on a more or less equal
footing with the officer, at least for the duration of the session. By employing ‘powerful’ styles, the inmates negotiate power in the interactions.

If we compare the two analyses of Mood and Modality, we notice certain differences in the way the two officers run their classes, but also in the linguistic behaviour of the inmates. Taking into account that text 4.1 is slightly shorter than text 4.2 (130 versus 175 turns), we can see that O1 produced 69 declaratives as opposed to 19 by one inmate, whereas O2 produced 43 as opposed to 51 by one inmate in his group. This suggests that O1 kept the interaction more under his control, formulating inmates’ contributions, putting forward propositions most of the time, while O2 allowed more space for the inmates’ contributions. O1 produces 6 polar interrogatives, whereas the inmates in his group do not produce any. O2 produces 18 polar interrogatives, 12 of which are negatively worded, while the inmates produces only 2. While this low number could be a sign of the officer controlling the interaction by asking questions throughout, a close look at the texts reveals that the inmates were simply not concerned with asking questions, but contradicting the officer’s questions by putting forward propositions of their own. Questioning is thus one way through which both officers attempt to exert control over the inmates and their contributions. While O1, through the act of questioning, defines the way in which the inmates are to continue with the conversation, O2 does less so or manages less to do so, because of the frequent interruptions and challenges from the inmates. Whether this is due to the differences in the two officers’ teaching styles or the personalities of the inmates is difficult to assess. It is probably safe to assume that it is a combination of the two factors.

Another striking contrast is the use of imperatives. O1 uses one imperative as a request for action (group work), whereas in O2’s class it is an inmate who produces 4 imperatives to address the officer. This was probably due to the fact that in this particular group the barriers between the officer
and the inmates were considerably lowered, if not broken down (at least for the duration of the Course).

4.7 Conclusion

In this chapter I have compared two ‘Values Enhancement’ sessions (‘The Confidence Game’) run by two officers by analysing them in terms of the interactional control features identified by Fairclough and Thomas as typical of ‘unequal encounters’. I have also analysed the grammatical tools interactants can employ to make interpersonal meanings in conversation. I have shown how this kind of grammatical analysis is a starting point for revealing the linguistic behaviours which are associated with certain social roles constructed and negotiated by participants in conversation. I have suggested that the social roles (prisoner, prison officer) give access to a different range of grammatical choices, which has implications for the power relations between the interactants. I have also attempted to show that grammatical patterns of mood choice are a means of enacting and constructing status differences. Reciprocal mood choice indicates functional equality of roles, whereas non-reciprocal mood choice indicates the linguistic acting out of status differences.

From the interactions analysed here it has transpired that attempts at social control may also create resistance. Subordinate participants are not always compliant and do challenge institutional norms and values. The accounts of the two Values Enhancement sessions in this chapter have focused on control over the interactions by the officer, although I have hinted at resistance. A complete separation of the officers’ control strategies from the inmates’ resistance strategies would have been artificial. However, an analysis of ‘social-control talk’ without a consideration of ‘resistance talk’
would limit our understanding of it. The following chapter will therefore be concerned with the issue of the inmates’ linguistic strategies of resistance.
5.1 Introduction

In the previous Chapter my analysis of two Values Enhancement sessions ('The Confidence Game') was concerned with various discourse practices employed by the Cognitive Skills tutors to secure the Course participants' compliance with the preferred values of the Course. However, these practices are open to challenge from below and are indeed resisted by the inmates. I believe that an analysis of strategies of resistance is crucial for an understanding of power relations between interactants. I suggested in Chapter 1 that resistance, or at least the capacity for resistance, is imminent in the exercise of power, including the exercise of power in discourse. This Chapter is therefore devoted to the examination of specific discourse practices the inmates employ as modes of resistance.

5.2 Constructing resistance and solidarity

Whenever the exercise of power in discourse meets with resistance, this may take a variety of forms, some of which are more active than others. Although resistance in discourse is more likely to occur, and more likely to take active forms, in institutional locations where the domination of one group over others is partial and contested (such as management and shop floor, doctor and patient, etc.), some of the data do show that the inmates can and do contest (discursive) power overtly and compete for leadership roles in the interactions. Among the resistance practices the inmates employ are not only counter-questions and interruptions, (text 4.1), but also the attitudes
they express towards the officer and the Cognitive Skills Course. These attitudes are expressed at the semantic level mainly through lexical selections. Using Martin's (1994) theoretical framework for the analysis of evaluative meanings in talk, the two semantic systems of Appraisal and Involvement, I will be suggesting that the attitudes the inmates express are an important linguistic means for constructing and indicating resistance to the values propagated by the officers in the Course and for expressing ingroup values and solidarity. What I will be looking at then is the attitudinal vocabulary with which the inmates appraise and evaluate the Cognitive Skills Course, and the slang, anti-language and swearing they use to indicate group cohesion and resistance. Consider the following exchange between Officer 2 (O2) and two inmates from text 4.2 (‘the Confidence Game’) which can be interpreted in terms of resistance:

O2:  29  But dae ye no’ feel he doesnae owe him any loyalty, now he’s paid him a lot of [money?
J:  30  [Hector, look, listen tae me here! Are ye [listenin’?
O2:  31  [No!
T:  NV [hhh]
J:  32  Anybody who’s supposed tae grass, is a fuckin’ grass. End ay story!
O2:  33  It’s for the nation’s good! The well-being of the nation.
T:  34  Fuck the nation!=
J:  35  =For fuck’s sake Mr [ ], get it taegether!

J and T offer resistance in the following ways: J challenges O2’s question rather than answering it (turn 30). Then both T and J question the validity of O2’s argument (turns 34 and 35). Thus both maintain an ‘orientation’
(Sinclair and Coulthard, 1975) that is different from the officer’s. Participants can maintain a consistent orientation towards each other throughout an interaction or they can converge on or diverge from each other. A lot of echoing of the teacher’s orientation is a sign of convergence, and a different vocabulary indicates an unwillingness to enter a ‘common universe of discourse’ (Sinclair and Coulthard, 1975: 132). In our sample this is evidenced by J’s use of the lexis of his fellow inmates (grass) and both inmates’ use of swear words. As Fairclough (1995) says, alternative lexicalizations are created from divergent ideological positions. The inmates’ opposition to the values propagated by the Course has its roots in widely differing perspectives of social reality. Some of the participants in text 4.2 (O2), in particular, do not constrain their contributions to the interactions in accordance with institutional norms. They use strategies to dispute and resist the roles assigned to them and assert their position. A pervasive form of resistance used by them is not conforming with the rights and obligations imposed by dominant discourse practices (such as asking questions) and drawing upon other practices, such as swearing or digressing by telling stories. There are also instances of resistance with Officer 1 (O1), but they are less outspoken. I want to show that linguistic resistance is potentially possible even where the less powerful participant is continually placed in the position of respondent rather than initiator through successive discourse acts. Analysing another ‘Values Enhancement’ class with O1, I will therefore explore the exchange of speech functions (speech acts) by applying Halliday’s (1984) account of discourse structure, as it provides a model for investigating linguistic resistance and acquiescence. I will attempt to illustrate that the patterns of confrontation and support expressed through conversational structure enable the officer and the inmates to negotiate their differences and the inmates to express resistance or acquiescence.
First, I shall highlight the role of semantic patterns in expressing attitudes and resistance among the inmates by considering the texts 4.1 and 4.2 presented in Chapter 4 as well as the text presented in this chapter. I start with Appraisal meanings, followed by an account of Involvement.

5.3 Appraisal

Appraisal analysis looks at the attitudinal meanings of words used in conversation. Recently, Martin (2000) has developed a theoretical framework for the analysis of evaluative meanings in texts, building on Labov's (1972a) work on the role of interpersonal meanings in narratives and Biber and Finegan's (1989) studies of 'stance' (the lexical and grammatical expression of attitudes about the propositional content of a message). Martin (1994) recognizes four main categories of appraisal: Appreciation (speakers' reaction to and evaluation of reality); Affect (speakers' expression of positive and negative emotional states); Judgement (speakers' evaluations about the morality and social values of other people); and Amplification (speakers' ways of maximizing or minimizing the intensity of the reality they are negotiating). Of these three variables, only Judgement and Amplification are used with some regularity by the inmates.

I shall consider all the categories used by the inmates in the Cognitive Skills interactions and investigate inmates' judgements about the ethics, morality, and social values the officers expose them to. In attempting a lexical analysis one has to bear in mind that lexical meanings are far more fluid than grammatical structures, where categories are clearly differentiated and more fixed. This has to do with the fact that the meanings of lexical items are continually negotiated and changed and differently understood by different people. The interpretation of the meaning of lexical terms is thus
not only dependent on the conversational context but also the socio-cultural background of the interactants.

5.3.1 Affect: expressing feelings and emotions

Speakers can express attitudes that indicate their emotional states and feelings, rather than their thinking. Affective appraisals are usually lexical and have a positive and negative dimension. This category includes mental processes of affection, that is, verbs of liking and hating, although realizations are usually adjectival. For example, in text 4.2, T expresses his feelings about 'grasses':

T: 50 Look! Ah've told ye. Ah hate them!

Affect is scarcely used in the Cognitive Skills interactions. This could be an indication that expressing their feelings in this way is not an important appraisal category for the Course participants.

5.3.2 Judgement: expressing judgements about behaviour

As stated in Chapter 3, the Appraisal category of Judgement expresses the social values of people's behaviour, usually through lexical terms, although it can also be signalled grammatically. Both forms of judgement, social sanction and social esteem (Iedema et al., 1994), occur in the data. Social sanction is about 'right and wrong'. In the first form, a person's morality is evaluated as conforming with or deviating from the speaker's worldview (through lexical items such as 'good, moral, ethical' or 'bad, immoral, evil'). In the following examples of judgement by social sanction from text 4.2, J
and T are questioning the ethical morality of the officer’s suggestions (that reporting the name of the source to the judge may help fight the drug trade):

J: 21 Listen, all Ah’m sayin’ is, right, if anybody sways in this group that means they are a grass.

T: 52 [to officer] Ye’re supporting grassin’ bastards!

J: 59 He’s [the informer] a fuckin’ dirty wrongie!

T: 70 The wee cunt got done for a bag snatch ... Ah got seven months through the dirty wee grass.

T: 76 Ah fuckin’ got tae jail for the wee prick.

T: 116 Dae ye think most criminals are grasses? Ah must be one of the elite then ‘cos Ah never stuck anybody in in ma whole life.

T: 127 We’re no’ denyin’ there’s grassing.

In text 4.2, examples of Judgement by social sanction are numerous. Most of these revolve around ‘grassing’ - the betrayal of a fellow criminal or inmate to the officials, which, according to the inmate code, is a very serious offence. The effect of these judgements is to clarify the social values of the inmates, which have group cohesion and inmate solidarity as their basic theme. ¹

¹ It should be noted that observance of the inmate code cannot be taken for granted, although its maxims are usually asserted with great vehemence by the inmate population, and their violation call forth sanctions ranging from ostracism to physical violence. Commentators on the prison as a social system (e.g. Sykes and Messinger, 1960) have pointed to a discrepancy between words and actual behaviour, suggesting that prisoners are apt to pay mere lip service to codes of conduct (see also King and Elliot, 1977). Precisely those inmates who are most vociferous in their verbal allegiance to the maxims often deviate from them. In this respect, the inmate social system is no different from any other social system. Sykes and Messinger suggested that much of the answer to this phenomenon was to be found in the fact that almost all inmates have an interest in maintaining cohesive behaviour on the part of others, regardless of the role they play themselves, and vehement vocal support of the inmate code is a potent means to this end.
5.3.3 Amplification: resources for grading

Amplification involves the lexical resources speakers can use to grade their attitudes towards people and things. Amplifications differ from the systems of Appreciation, Affect and Judgement in that they do not occur as positives and negatives and that there are no congruent realizations. Many amplifications are adverbs, but they can also be nouns and verbs. The system is organized around three variables - enrichment, augmenting and mitigating, of which the latter two occur in my data.

i) Augmenting involves amplifying attitudinal meaning. It means intensifying the force of evaluation. Speakers can intensify

a) through prosodic features by adding stress to the lexical item which may or may not already carry attitudinal meaning:

O2: 27  Tom had paid the guy 200 pounds [
J: 28  [Doesnae matter what
         he paid ‘im!

J: 35  For fuck’s sake Mr [] get it taegether!

O2: 53  It’s no grassin’.
J: 54  It is grassin’!

J’s emphatic stress expresses the negative evaluation he is making of the propositions put forward by the officer.
b) through repetition, which may be used to give attitudinal meaning to lexical items. The following is one example from text 4.5:

J: 9 She’s fuckin’ done it. Ah fuckin’ tell ye: see wummin, wummin, see wummin love tae spill their fuckin’ guts.

Here the neutral expression ‘wummin’ is turned into an attitudinal coloured one by repetition. J thereby expresses his annoyance at ‘wummin’ in general not being capable of keeping incriminating evidence to themselves in court.

c) Grading words such as swearing can be used to amplify an evaluative lexical term:

J: 32 Anybody who’s supposed tae grass is a fuckin’ grass.
J: 59 He’s a fuckin’ dirty wrongie!
J: 63 He’s a dirty fuckin’ wrongie!

Here an already negatively evaluated term is further intensified by a swear word.

Swearing that is incorporated within the nominal group can also function as amplification:

T: 10 What? And get him tae fuckin’ jail?
T: 65 What wee fuckin’ deals?

Here T’s use of fuckin’ intensifies ‘jail’ and ‘deals’, in themselves neutral lexical items, to indicate his negative attitude about informers. The following examples of amplification are all incorporated within verbs:
These integrated swear words all indicate the negative attitude the inmates express towards the officer’s suggestions. Autonomous expressions of swearing (e.g. *Fuck’s sake*) are considered to be resources of involvement (see section below).

d) Amplification can also be achieved by using lexis which quantifies the degree of amplification being encoded:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Text</th>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Expression</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>O2:</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>He’s made a lot of profits ... fae the drugs business.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T:</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>There’s people who don’t grass plenty ay them.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ii) Mitigation: As well as intensifying attitudinal meaning speakers also mitigate their expressions. Adverbs such as ‘just’ and ‘only’ play down the effect of surrounding appraisals. The inmates in text 4.2 (Officer 2) do not play down the force of their evaluations at all. The inmates in text 5.1 (Officer 1), however, use many examples of mitigating ‘just’, as we shall see below.

Having outlined the main categories of appraising lexis, I shall now interpret patterns in text 4.
5.3.4 Summary and interpretation of Appraisal items

Reading through text 4.2 one can see that T and J produce a great number of Appraisal terms, which reinforces the results that emerged from the Mood analysis in Chapter 4: these two participants are the most dominant and outspoken speakers, whereas the rest of the group, consisting of A, H and N, are very little involved in the interaction. Looking at the types of Appraisal vocabulary used by the speaker, it turns out that J and T’s appraisals are of Amplification and Judgement; T uses Affect only once (Ah hate them!; turn 50). Both are thus concerned to comment on the social sanction of others and both frequently augment their attitudinal expressions, which indicates how assertively, if not to say aggressively, they are putting their opinions forward. By expressing judgements of social sanction mainly in terms of propriety they judge others in terms of falling short of standards of social behaviour they consider desirable. Their judgements are also directed at the officer whom they call a ‘grass’ at one stage (So what you’re sayin’ ye’re a grass? – Aye he’s a fuckin’ grass!; turns 105 and 106). Their amplifications are associated with these judgements. H is hardly involved in the discussion, but when he does offer to make a comment he also amplifies and judges: Ah’d fuckin’ dae and shoot the bastard. A is the only participant who does not draw on Amplification resources at all, which suggest that he is least interpersonally involved. He uses Judgement of social sanction once (‘That’s even worse’; turn 56) to express his disapproval of the officer’s suggestion to tell the judge the source’s name.

The Appraisal systems of interpersonal semantics provide us with an insight into how some of the Course participants construct their resistance to the Cognitive Skills Course and some of the values and issues of morality it stands for. If we compare the above Appraisal patterns from text 4.2 (Officer 2) with Appraisal patterns in text 4.1 (Officer 1), a different picture
emerges: the inmates neither use Appraisal nor do they resort to Amplification resources. It is the officer who uses Amplification (Augmenting) through prosodic features (adding stress) and repetition, thereby negatively evaluating the inmates’ views.

O1: 7 All of you would be quite willing tae go tae jail, jeopardize yer own career, yer own family, the support that ye have fae them …

O1: 78 …and there’s hundreds and hundreds of thousands and thousands of pounds goin’ aboot and you’re quite willin’ tae allow that tae continue.

It is difficult to assess why the inmates in text 4.1 did not use Appraisal and/or Amplification. It might have been due to their personalities, the rather controlling teaching style of the officer, or even my presence. The officer’s motivation to amplify seems rather straightforward: he is engaged in challenging the inmates’ refusal to co-operate with the police and the authorities, as a result of which they would face imprisonment and also allow the selling of drugs to continue. He uses Judgement of negative social sanction (drug culture) and positive social esteem (drug-free society), thereby presenting the drug issue in terms of good versus evil. He thereby draws upon a representation of the issue in the media and among certain politicians where the war against drug dealers is a dominant features of the discourse. D, however, contradicts him (ye can’t beat drugs all over the world anyway; turn 97, text 4.1).
5.4 Involvement

Involvement is the name for a range of semantic systems which allow speakers to realize, construct and vary the level of intimacy of an interaction. It refers to how interpersonal worlds are shared by interactants. Involvement includes lexical systems, such as the use of technical or specialized lexis, the use of vocatives, which indicate who focuses on whom, slang or anti-language, and swearing. Of these four categories identified by Martin (1994), the latter three occur with some frequency in the texts analysed here and therefore deserve closer scrutiny.

5.4.1 Swearing

Unlike text 4.1, text 4.2 is replete with swear words and expletives. According to Eggins and Slade (1997) there are two important dimensions of their use:

i) the degree of integration or autonomy of the expression: i.e. whether the swear word is inserted within a clause (as an adjective, verb or noun) or is used as a separate expletive. Swear words which are inserted within clauses are usually amplifiers (already referred to above), whereas autonomous expressions of swearing, for example, *Fuck's sake*, are considered resources of involvement.

ii) the level of explicitness of the item.

The frequency of swearing in discourse gives some indication of how casual or formal the talk is. What, however, is more important than the frequency with which swear words occur, is whether their use is reciprocal. An even cursory glance at the Cognitive Skills Course interactions shows that this is not the case. Most of the swear words are produced by the inmates, although the officers occasionally use integrated swear words, too. It is J who
produces most of the swear words, followed by T. All of these swear words are explicit and express assertiveness, and especially J is as explicit with the officer as he is in conversations with his peers. Through their swearing, the Course participants express their dis-identification with the officer (the officer hardly ever swears) and the Cognitive Skills Course or at least some aspects of it. Most examples of swearing are integrated, with *fuckin' being most frequently used as an intensifier.

Eggins and Slade (1997) suggest that there is some association between swearing and group membership and that the use of swearing among men contributes to their construction of themselves as macho and aggressive, something that is borne out by my data as well. Swearing is a common feature in prison, and both staff and inmates resort to it. As a prison officer remarked in Morris and Morris' (1963: 257) study of Pentonville Prison, 'swearing is inevitable in any large community of one sex ... factory, forces, prisons. It's partly because it's the only way men can express their true feelings, and partly because it's the only language a prisoner understands. If you give him an order without reinforcing it with swear words he doesn't take you seriously'. Another explanation for why prisoners use swear words when talking to officers comes from Cardozo-Freeman (1984: 26): 'Hurling abusive language at guards is the only thing a man has left to protect his sense of manhood. If he does not defend it, he will despise himself. Psychologically, it is very important for the prisoner.' O2 must have realized this, for he never appeared to be offended by the inmates' choice of words and considered it as a way for them to 'get out of their shells'.

5.4.2 Vocatives

The possible functions of vocatives are to attract attention and to target an utterance. They are thus attempts to control the turn-taking system: the
current speaker indicates who he would prefer to have as the next speaker. They are an important device to examine here, as they tell us something about the attempts of the speakers in text 4.2 to control or manipulate the other interactants. Of particular interest is again the frequency with which the interactants use vocatives towards each other, and whether his usage is reciprocated or not. Repeated use of vocatives between one pair in a multi-party interaction will tend to create a special relationship between them, as they form a dialogic unit within the larger multi-party context. Eggins and Slade (1997) distinguish between targeting and redundant vocative in multi-party talk. A targeting vocative is used by the current speaker to indicate who they want to be their next speaker in situations where other contextual clues do not make that person the most likely next speaker. The officer, for example, uses targeting vocatives at the beginning of text 4.2, when he asks the whole group if they would reveal the source and then addresses each participant by their names. Another example of a targeting vocative is J’s way of addressing the officer in turn 29:

O2: 29 But dae ye no’ feel he doesnae owe him any loyalty, now he’s paid them a lot of [money?
J: 30 Hector, look you, listen tae me here! Are ye [listening?
O2: [No!

Here the officer asks J and the rest of the group a question, but rather than answering it, J challenges it and selects the officer as the next preferred speaker. He uses the vocative Hector, a derogatory term to address the officer, to put him ‘on the spot’.

T: 119 Dae ye think most criminals are grasses? [O2: T]
Ah must be one of the elite then, ‘cos Ah never stuck anybody in my life.

O2: 120 T!

T: 121 Don’t fuckin’ T me! Ah know Ah’m no grass.

O2: 122 T! It gets done all the time.

A redundant vocative is used when there is already sufficient contextual information available for the nominated person to be assumed next speaker. The nominative is not really necessary, as the person concerned will know that he is meant to speak next. An example of a redundant vocative by the officer can be found in the following exchange from text 4.2:

J: 139 All Ah’m sayin’ is Ah’ve never stuck anybody in ma whole life.

O2: 140 That’s fair enough J ... what Ah’m sayin’ is it gets done J and the very people who dae it, are the very people who condemn grasses.

This use of redundant vocatives by the officer here could indicate an attempt to establish a closer relationship with T and J, which in the case of T misfires (Don’t fuckin’ T me).

T: 76 Aye it happens. Ah know how it happens, ‘cos Ah fuckin’ got tae jail for the wee prick who done it, aye it [happens.

O2: 77 [Have you not been put in that position [T: Aye, for fuck] T? A wee bit? Look wee man we fuckin’[  

T: NV3 haha
The vocative used by the officer is redundant, because only T could be the addressee of the officer’s question. J uses as many as five redundant vocatives to address the officer:

O2: 33 It’s for the nation’s good. The well-being of the nation=
T: 34 =Fuck the nation!=
J: 35 =For fuck’s sake Mr[], get it taegether!

O2: 60 Is he no’ entitled tae feel that he can breach this confidence
J: 61 [He’s a wrongie Mr[], we’re no’ intristit
O2: 62 [because he’s gied them money.

O2: 95 Ye’re no’ gaunny tell me if you were down for five years or five months ... a wee slip of the tongue, a wee slip of the tongue, a wee hint here or [there
J: 96 [Mr[], Ah’ m gonna tell you something ...

O2: 109 Ah didnae say that, all Ah wud say is Ah wud rather walk, know what Ah’ m sayin’, walk aboot outside [
J: 110 [Mr[], Ah took ma chances through the trial.
The officer uses vocatives several times to address one particular inmate, but of particular interest is the frequency with which J uses vocatives towards the officer. The usage is reciprocal. J’s use of vocatives to the officer shows how he attempts to control who will be the next speaker, i.e. the officer. He switches between forms of vocatives as a term of abuse (*Hector*), depending on whether he wants to tease the officer, and as a formal way of addressing him (*Mr /[ ]*), thus acknowledging the status of the officer. It is interesting to note that although both officers addressed the Course participants by their first names, the latter never did so. One inmate said that he could not bring himself to address an officer by his first name. This would obviously mean breaking down a barrier which some inmates may wish to uphold.

Inmate J is the one who articulates his values (which he takes to be the values of the whole group) and his resistance to the Course most explicitly and consistently. His use of vocatives and swearing makes him the one who dominates the group discussions most of the time.

5.4.3 Slang or ‘anti-language’: sharing an alternative reality

The term ‘anti-language’ goes back to Halliday’s (1978: 164-82) analysis of those ways of speaking which are developed by ‘anti-societies’, such as the anti-language of prisoners and the criminal underworld. ‘An antisociety’, says Halliday, ‘is a society that is set up within another society as a conscious alternative to it. It is a mode of resistance, resistance which may take the form either of passive symbiosis or of active hostility and even destruction’ (1978: 165). Anti-societies generate anti-languages, which define an ‘alternative social reality’:

An antilanguage ... brings into sharp relief the role of language as a realization of the power structures of society. The antilanguages of prison and criminal countercultures are the most clearly defined because they have specific reference to alternative social structures, as
well as the additional attributes of secret languages and professional jargons; and hence they are full of overt markers of their antilanguage status. The obliqueness of meaning and form that makes them so effective as bearers of an alternative reality also makes them inherently comic - so reflecting another aspect of the same reality, as seen by its speakers (Halliday, 1978: 181-2).

The antilanguage is a language of social conflict - of passive resistance or active opposition; but at the same time, like any other language, it is a means of expressing and maintaining the social structure - in this case the structure of the antisociety (Halliday, 1978: 185).

Such languages are generally relexicalized versions of the over-language, that is, they are characterized by the creation of a rich vocabulary which gives new names to things. In addition, the language is usually overlexicalized (1978: 165) in the significant domains of interest to the antisociety. Halliday (1978), for example, cites Mallik's (1972) account of the underworld language of Calcutta, where he found forty-one words for police. Prison slang or argot has long been an area of study by sociologists interested in the prison environment, starting with Clemmer, in his (1940) pioneering ethnographic study of an American prison, where he compiled a dictionary of 1,063 argot terms and analysed them to see what categories of human experience they referred to. Clemmer found that about a third of the argot terms he succeeded in collecting referred to circumstances in prison. Bondeson (1967, 1968a) found the same in a content analysis of the argot terms at a Swedish training school. Bondeson (1989) has also used prison argot as a measure of 'prisonization', a term used originally by Clemmer to denote a form of secondary socialization, in which the inmate learns to adapt to prison as a way of life. Bentley and Corbett (1992), two former prisoners at Arizona State prison, wrote a prison slang dictionary containing 25 words for prison officers, 37 for serving time, 37 for homosexuality, 64 for violence and 78 for drugs and alcohol. A recent dictionary of English prison
slang compiled by Devlin (1996) during her fieldwork in several English prisons lists 25 words and expressions for the police, 32 for prison officers, 22 for informers, 30 for sex offenders, and 36 words for male homosexuals. Drug terms seem to be very important, too: there are 39 expressions for LSD, 47 for ecstasy, 21 for heroin and 28 for marijuana. The number of argot terms can thus be assumed to reflect the importance of a given category of experience in prisoners’ lives. Violent imagery is also quite noticeable in prisoner language use and permeates some of the texts analysed here, as it permeates aspects of daily existence in prison from the most serious to the most mundane.

Slang is an interpersonal device because it enables the prisoners to identify with each other and an alternative reality, and at the same time to reject the dominant reality and the values it stands for:

In many ways, the inmate social system may be viewed as providing a way of life which enables the inmate to avoid the devastating psychological effects of internalizing and converting social rejection into self-rejection. In effect, it permits the inmate to reject the rejectors rather than himself (McCorkle and Korn, 1954: 88).

Some writers have claimed that the argot of criminals functions to maintain secrecy, and the theme of secrecy is a familiar one in ‘folk antilinguistics’ (Halliday, 1978) - in members’ and outsiders’ explanations of the use of prison slang. This explanation, however, is somewhat doubtful, given the fact that prison officers often not only know the meaning of slang terms but also use them to a degree. So while secrecy may be a necessary strategic

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1 In England and Wales there have been at least three relevant internal Prison Service documents. The first, a short Glossary of Terms and Slang Common in Penal Establishments, was produced for Boards of Visitors in 1978. In 1978 the Education Department at HMP Frankland produced another document, mainly for use by foreign national prisoners. The third document, Welcome to the Prison Service (Home Office, 1992), contains a glossary as part of a general introduction for new prison officers. Another list of prison terms was compiled by staff at HMP Hindley and is contained in the Prison Visits Training Pack produced by the Magistrates’ Association (see: Angela Devlin, 1996: 19).
property of prison argot, in particular of drug terms, as they allow drug
dealers and users to hide their activities from the authorities, it is unlikely to
be the major cause of its existence. Rather, it is ‘the acting out of a distinct
social structure; and this social structure is, in turn, the bearer of an
alternative social reality’ (Halliday, 1978: 167). Halliday (1978: 80 has
noted that anti-languages are ‘typically used for contest and display, with
consequent foregrounding of interpersonal elements of all kinds’. Since the
language of the inmates is an oppositional one, very different social
relationships are set up, challenging the organized and rule-bound social
world of the prison. Halliday cites Podgorecky’s (1973) discussion of the
‘second life’, a term used to describe the subculture of Polish prisons, which
shows that the antilanguage associated with it is a fundamental element of it,
not simply a device for verbal contest and display, while keeping it secret
from the prison authorities. Podgorecki explains this language in terms of a
need among the inmates to maintain inner solidarity under pressure. Similar
insights into the functions of prison argot were produced by Sykes (1958) in
his study of an American maximum security prison. Sykes (1958: 85) finds
the view of prison argot as an indicator of loyalty or allegiance secondary as
both ‘inmates and guards are aware that a language can be used without
necessarily signifying commitment to a group’s values’, arguing instead that
‘the more critical function of prison argot would appear to be its utility in
ordering and classifying experience within the walls in terms which deal
specifically with the major problems of prison life’. Wieder’s (1974)
ethnographic study in a half-way hostel found that the convict code in the
first instance operated as a ‘sense making device’.

Language has long been recognized as an important tool not only for
cultural transmission but also for constructing social reality (Sapir, 1949,
Berger and Luckmann, 1966). Through language, people learn and absorb
cultural values, reinforcing them by using certain words and phrases in their
cognitive and verbal functions. The words and phrases people choose to
express feelings and describe actions reflect their attitudes, goals and
commitments. What is true of language in general is also true of prison
slang and argot. Hence, for almost fifty years, sociologists and
criminologists have explored the role of argot among prison inmates in order
to understand their values and the behavioural expectations for its members,
as well as the probable behavioural consequences of its choices (Sykes,
1958; Stephenson and Scarpitti, 1968, Fleisher, 1972; Wieder, 1974; Little,
work on ‘argot roles’, slang labels for inmate roles played in response to
their imprisonment, was followed by the study of the role structure and
culture of inmate systems (Schrag, 1944; Cloward, 1960; Ward and
Kassebaum, 1965; Giallombardo 1966). The analysis of argot and argot
roles was a major concern in these studies as ‘such an analysis suggests that
in origin and function prison argot is essentially anti-administration and anti-
therapeutic ... it commonly identifies many attitudes and activities in conflict
with administrative objectives and inconsistent with a treatment oriented
program of correction’ (Stephenson and Scarpitti 1968: 385). Studies of
different types of prisons have indicated that argot use varies from one type
of prison to another, with the most hostile inmate codes found in prisons for
adult men.

Most examples of slang expressions occur in text 4.2, and they are
produced almost exclusively, and not surprisingly, by the inmates.
In text 4.1, B says twice that he would try to ring it\(^3\) (turns 66 and 68), that
is, that he would attempt to fool the judge by giving a wrong name. In text
4.2, the inmates’ discussion revolves around ‘grassing’: a grass (J in turn 21,
O2 in turn 13) to grass (J in turn 32, O2 in turn 47), to grass sb. in (H in turn
\(^3\) to ring: to manipulate; change illicitly: from ca. 1785; ex sense 1 to cheat (also ring it): late C19-20 (Eric
Partridge 1984, *A Dictionary of Slang and Unconventional English*)
The rest of the slang terms they employ include *hector* (J in turn 30); *to do sb.* (T in turn 45); *wrongie* (J in turns 59, 61, 63), *polis* (O2 in turn 64); *cunt* (T in turn 70), *prick* (T in turn 76); *to rip the ass oot it* (J in turns 78 and 80); *coppers* (J in turn 86); *to be down (for five years)* (O2 in turn 95); *to get done* (J in turn 155); *stick sb. in, junked on tabs* (T in turn 146), *to do sb.* (H in turn 151), *to spill one’s guts* (J in turn 169).

The use of slang terms by the inmates is an expression of both their solidarity as a group and of resistance in that they refuse to use other mainstream ways of talking. What is relevant about slang use is the extent to which interactants have access to it: as well as being used to create and signal solidarity it can also signal unequal power relations and exclusion. In this way, oppositional discourse can be used by groups who do not have access to hegemonic power as a moderate form of counter-power.

In these sections I have looked at the semantic resources the inmates draw upon to make interpersonal meanings. In the following section, I will go beyond these semantic resources the interactants deploy and focus on the exchange of speech functions (speech acts) in yet another ‘Values Enhancement’ text below.

5.5 Speech function analysis

So far I have attempted to show that the interactants construct relationships by drawing on the grammatical and semantic resources of language: the systems of mood in the previous Chapter, Appraisal and Involvement in this Chapter. I have suggested that these choices express degrees of authority and directness between the interactants and the inmates’ evaluations of the Course. In the following sections, I shall focus on speech functions, whereby each ‘move’ in conversation means taking on a speech role and positioning other interactants into predicted speech roles, too. By relating
speech functions to mood choices I intend to present a fuller picture of how interpersonal relationships are negotiated through talk. To account for how the inmates construct resistance, I shall go beyond the topics that they discuss and the grammatical and semantic resources they deploy to do so. An analysis of mood choices tells us primarily about the linguistic rights and obligations of social roles; an analysis of speech functions contributes to an understanding of how participants negotiate their interpersonal differences while enacting these social roles. A combination of the two therefore enables us to see how power is constantly negotiated through talk. By applying functional labels to the linguistic strategies interactants employ, such as ‘questioning’, ‘challenging’, ‘supporting’, ‘stating opinions’ we have a useful tool for exploring discursive strategies of resistance and acquiescence. As I pointed out in Chapter 1, approaches for dealing with discourse interactivity have been developed in Conversation Analysis and its account of turn-taking; Speech Act Theory, which has identified the different illocutionary forces of utterances; Pragmatics, which interprets the meanings of utterances in context; and the Birmingham School. All these approaches are useful in explaining discourse structure. However, for my analysis of speech functions I shall draw on the functional-semantic account of dialogue as proposed by Halliday (1984) and extended by Eggins and Slade (1997). I use this approach because the account of discourse structure in systemics provides a model for investigating linguistic resistance and acquiescence by offering a comprehensive description of the meanings of moves in conversation. Importantly, this model is placed within a contextual model of language, thus providing a way of linking patterns of move choices to the interpersonal context of interaction. Through the register variable of tenor, patterns in discourse interactivity can be related to contextual variables such as status, power and affective involvement. Therefore this semiotic perspective allows us to explore the relationship between micro-
interactional patterns and macro-social structures in a way Conversation Analysis and Speech Act Theory do not. And although the Birmingham School’s models of conversational sequences are useful for the description of interactive structures in pragmatic interactions, the functional-semantic account of dialogue offers a more detailed description of meanings of moves in talk. Whereas Sinclair and Coulthard (1975) use a more collaborative-consensus model of description, which does not deal exhaustively with the notions of ‘power’ and ‘control’, Eggins and Slades’ (1997) model makes it possible to explain the relation between the linguistic and the social order.

In the following section, I give a brief summary of Halliday’s interpretation of dialogue, before presenting the analysis of the speech functions in text 5.1.

5.6 Halliday’s functional-semantic model of dialogue

Halliday’s (1994: 68-71) model explains interaction in functional-semantic terms, thus interpreting dialogic structure as the expression of interpersonal meanings. It suggests that dialogue involves a ‘process of exchange’ consisting of two factors: a commodity to be exchanged: either information or goods and services; and roles associated with exchange relations: either giving or demanding. These two factors define the four basic types of moves (speech functions) interactants can make to initiate a dialogue: statement, question, offer and command.

Halliday’s (1984: 12) notion of speech roles implies that every time a speaker initiates an interaction, s/he puts the listener into a role of responding, and that the responding moves are constrained by the initiating move a speaker has made. This corresponds to CA’s notion of sequential implicativeness, according to which conversational turns make sense because they are interpreted in context. He pairs each of the four basic
initiating speech functions with a desired response, which may or may not be produced. Because interactants may produce a response other than the expected one, there are what he calls ‘discretionary alternatives’ (the dispreferred responses of Conversation Analysis). These are broadly divided into supporting and confronting. For example, answering a question or acknowledging what a speaker says implies consensus and is thus a supporting response; answering a question with a counter-question, or disclaiming the authority of what somebody says are confronting responses, which imply some degree of negotiation, confrontation and resistance.

Halliday’s account of dialogue goes beyond interpretations of conversational structure made by Conversation Analysis and Speech Act theory, as it links this conversational structure to both context and grammar (the clause system of mood). The link between speech functions and context is that the social roles of interactants will constrain the speech functions they have access to when speaking with others. In the Cognitive Skills Course, the combined role of prison officer/teacher allows the officer the full range of initiating speech functions, while the social role of prisoner/student often (but by no means all the time) constrains the frequency and types of initiations that they can make to the officer. Halliday suggests that each speech function is associated with a mood structure and differentiates between congruent realizations of speech functions (when a speech function is realized by the predicted mood type, such as question - declarative) and incongruent ones (when a speech function is not realized by the predicted mood type). For example, in turn 7 of text 5.1, the officer probes using a declarative structure with a rising, interrogative intonation (a ‘queclarative’; Eggins and Slade, 1997), Ye gonna tell yer neighbours?: Here the declarative structure contrasts with the congruent realization of his probe through an interrogative: Are ye gonna tell yer neighbours?
Although turns are very important units in talk, they cannot be used to analyse speech function because one turn can realize several speech functions. Consider the following excerpt from text 5.1:

O: command M: 52a (i) Think of the lowest form ay life in yer area J
O: statement: fact 52b (ii) ye caught ‘im in yer hoose
P: question: closed: 53b (iii) wud ye stick ‘im in?
opinion (iv) wud ye murder ‘im?

Here we see that within a single turn, inmate M actually achieves three different discourse tasks. This example demonstrates that although turns are important in the analysis of conversation, they are not necessarily equivalent with discourse functions. As we saw in Chapter 4, the grammatical patterns of mood are expressed through clauses. Halliday suggests that the discourse patterns of speech functions are expressed through moves. The relationship between the two is that moves are discourse units, which are expressed in language through clauses, which are grammatical units.

Before identifying moves and analysing speech functions in text 5.1, I will give an overview of speech function classes. The speech function network presented here is an adaption of the networks found in Martin (1992) and Eggins and Slade (1997). Although Eggins and Slade have developed their approach as a starting point for the description of mainly casual talk, I feel it can be usefully applied to the analysis of my ‘classroom’ data.
5.7 Speech function classes in conversation

The following section describes the meanings of the different speech functions. Once they have been presented, they will be used to analyse text 5.1 (‘The Robbery’).

Figure 5.1 presents an overview of the entire network, showing the major subcategories of speech function classes which will be presented.

5.7.1 Opening speech functions

As the name indicates, opening moves function to initiate talk around a proposition. Because a speaker here proposes terms for the interaction, they are generally assertive, indicating a degree of control over the interaction on the part of the speaker. While opening moves are not elliptically dependent on prior moves, they are usually cohesive through lexical, or referential cohesion. Thus in J’s opening move, Ah wudnae hand ‘im in tae the coppers ‘him’ is referentially cohesive, referring back to the name of the burglar. Eggins and Slade (1997) differentiate between fact and opinion information, both for statements and questions. For example, J’s statement above is opinion. The difference between facts and opinion is usually expressed through modality or appraisal lexis and is an important thing to look out for.
in the following text, as it shows the degree of affective involvement the interactants express in the Value Enhancement discussions. Eggins and Slade also differentiate between open questions, which try to elicit completion of a proposition, and closed questions, which present a complete proposition for the support or confrontation of the addressee. Open questions are congruently realized through wh-interrogatives, whereas closed questions are realized by polar interrogatives.

5.7.2 Sustaining moves: continuing speech functions

Sustaining moves keep negotiating the same proposition. Sustaining moves may be made either by the speaker who has just been talking (continuing speech functions), or by other speakers taking a turn (reacting speech functions). The continuing status of a move will become clear from its elliptical status in relation to a prior move. A continuing speaker has three options: monitoring, prolonging and appending. Figure 5.2 displays the speech function network for the first group of sustaining moves, the continuing moves.

![Figure 5.2 Sustaining: continuing speech functions in casual conversation (Eggins and Slade (1997:195)](image-url)
5.7.2.1 Monitoring moves
Monitoring moves imply that a speaker is ready to hand over a turn, they are moves by which the speaker attempts to include other speakers, or seeks support for their own position (e.g. ‘you know?’ at the end of a proposition).

5.7.2.2 Prolonging moves
Prolonging moves are moves where a continuing speaker adds to their contribution by giving further information. To describe the prolonging options, Eggins and Slade (1997) draw on Halliday’s (1994: 324-6) three types of expansion: elaboration, extension and enhancement. Prolonging moves are assertive moves in that they enable a speaker to keep a turn, although they may also be used to forestall possible challenges, in which case they would be used defensively.

5.7.2.3 Appending moves
Speakers make appending moves when they lose their turn, because another speaker has intervened. As soon as they regain the turn, they produce a move which is a logical expansion of their immediately prior move.

5.7.3 Reacting speech functions: responding

Eggins and Slade differentiate two types of reacting moves: responses and rejoinders. Responses are reactions which move the exchange towards completion, whereas rejoinders prolong the exchange. In a responding reaction speakers negotiate propositions on the terms set up by previous speakers, that is, they accept being positioned as a respondent. Thus, any responding moves are potentially or actually elliptic. Although responding moves are geared towards exchange completion, they still can express resistance and may be either supporting or confronting. Supporting moves
are the preferred responses of Conversation Analysis or Halliday’s predicted responses, while confronting moves are dispreferred or discretionary alternatives, although Eggins and Slade classify some dispreferred options as rejoinders (see below).

There are four main categories of supporting moves: developing, engaging, registering, and replying. They differ in the degree and type of negotiation they enter into.

Figure 5.3 displays the responding group of Reacting options in the speech function network.

![Diagram of speech function network](image)

Figure 5.3 Sustaining: responding speech functions in casual conversation (Eggins and Slade, 1997: 202)

5.7.3.1 Developing moves

Developing moves indicate a very high level of acceptance of what the previous speaker has said, as they build on it, by expanding it experientially through elaboration, extension and enhancement. The speaker indicates interpersonal support for the prior speaker, while offering further ideational content for negotiation.
5.7.3.2 Engaging moves
Engaging moves agree to the negotiations going ahead. They are realized by minor clauses, often duplicating the lexical items of the opening salutation (e.g. hello – hello).

5.7.3.3 Registering moves
Registering moves are reactions that encourage the other speaker to take another turn. They do not introduce any new material for negotiation. Into this category come feedback and backchannelling moves, as well as more evaluative reactions such as ‘oh’, ‘really’ with an intonation expressing surprise (not doubt, because then they could be taken as challenges).

5.7.3.4 Replying moves
Replies are the most negotiatory of the responding reactions, although they negotiate the proposition given by a prior speaker. They are subclassified as either supporting or confronting. Because with supporting replies, speakers indicate their willingness to accept what the previous speaker has said, they are non-assertive. Confronting replies, while indicating a dependency between two speakers, do not imply the deference of supporting replies. They are a mild form of expressing non-compliance. Like supporting replies, they close the exchange off and avoid overt negotiation of differences of opinion.

5.7.4 Reacting: rejoinder moves

While the responding reacting moves comply with the expectation of exchange closure, rejoinders tend to prepare sequences of talk that interrupt, postpone or suspend the initial speech function sequence. Rejoinders either query propositions or proposals by demanding further details, or reject them
by offering alternative explanations. There are two main subclasses of rejoinders: tracking moves and challenging moves.

Figure 5.4 presents the rejoinder subclasses.

5.7.4.1 Tracking moves

Tracking moves are moves which check, confirm, clarify or probe the content of prior moves. They are supporting in the sense that they merely delay the completion of an exchange, without disagreeing with it. Checking moves check on content which has been missed or may not have been understood. Confirming moves attempt to verify what the speaker indicates they have heard. For example:


R: track: confirm  O1:  40 (i) Naw?

Clarifying moves seek additional information in order to understand a prior move. Probing moves offer further details or propose implications for
confirmation by the initial speaker. They thus introduce new propositional material, but have a logico-semantic relation with the prior move. A probing moves offers for confirmation an elaboration, extension, or enhancement of a prior move. For example:

R: track: probe O1: 63b (ii) So how wud ye dae that?
R: track: clarify J: 64 (i) How dae ye mean?

Here the officer wants further explanation of how J intends to have the burglar arrested without him personally getting involved in it. J then seeks clarification for what he has not understood (or pretends not to have understood; see below in transcript). Confronting responses to tracking moves generally come under the challenging moves category outlined below.

5.7.4.2. Challenging moves
Speakers using this type of rejoinder move confront prior speakers by actively rejecting negotiation or by questioning the speaker’s contribution. Eggins and Slade name three types: detaching, rebounding and countering. Detaching moves attempt to terminate the interaction, to avoid any further discussion. Rebounding moves send the interaction back to the first speaker, by questioning the relevance or legitimacy of another speaker’s move. Countering moves express confrontation by offering an alternative position or interpretation of a prior speaker’s turn.

Having provided an overview of all the speech classes that I will be using, I shall now present and analyse the following transcript. It has been divided into moves so that the speech function system as outlined by Halliday can be used to code the talk and show the distribution of initiating to responding and their (non)-reciprocity. The text is called ‘the Robbery’,
and is another Values Enhancement session run by Officer 1 with a different group of inmates.

The Robbery

Last night Mr. and Mrs. Johnson retired to bed at 11:00. At approximately 1:00 a.m. Mr. Johnson heard footsteps downstairs. He was very concerned as several homes in the neighborhood had been burglarized in the last month. There was no phone upstairs to call the police and Mr. Johnson was concerned for the safety of his children sleeping on the first floor. He decided to go quietly downstairs and attempt to nab the intruder. Upon entering the dining room, Mr. Johnson and the intruder came face to face. The intruder was wearing a mask and attempted to push Mr. Johnson aside in order to get away. In the ensuing struggle, the intruder's mask came off, and there, much to Mr. Johnson's surprise, stood Rick Jones, the boy from across the street. Rick admitted that he had been the perpetrator of the other neighborhood burglaries, but explained that the money was needed to help pay the medical bills his father had incurred as a result of being treated for cancer. All the stolen articles from the other homes had been fenced. Should Mr. Johnson turn Rick over to the police?

Six inmates took part in the discussion. When asked by the officer at the beginning of the session what they would do in the same situation as presented above, five said that they would turn Rick Jones in to the police. One of these five, however, claimed that he personally would let him go, but since it was against the law he wanted to be included in the group. The other two participants argued that they would not turn Rick in because they knew him, one of them saying they would rather beat him up than report him to the police. This time the officer did not mention the alternative dilemmas (Rick Jones' father had lent Mr. Johnson $2000 a year before when he was in a better financial situation - if the group decides to hand him in to the police; Rick had a criminal record for similar offences - if the group decides against it). He spent most time convincing the two inmates who were
reluctant to turn the burglar over to the police of the wrongfulness of their ‘anti-social’ values.

Key:

O = Opening move
R = Reacting move
D = Developing move
P = Prolonging move
A = Appending move
s = supporting
c = confronting

Speech function choices are written on the transcript. The transcript has been divided into moves, according to the criteria suggested by Eggins and Slade (1997: 186-89). Moves are numbered within turns using the a, b notation. The analysis also deals with incomplete moves, that is, where a move is abandoned before completion, and non-verbal realizations of moves. Although speech function analysis focuses on moves, it is still important to note clauses, as it will be related to mood analysis to show patterns of congruence and incongruence, and choices in modality. This transcript starts with J restating his opinion, after each member of the group has explained their point of view.

**Conversational Structure**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S</th>
<th>T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>O:</td>
<td>give opinion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J:</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i)</td>
<td>Ah wudnae hand him in tae the coppers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R:</td>
<td>track: clarify</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O1:</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i)</td>
<td>Why not?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R:</td>
<td>c: withhold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J:</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i)</td>
<td>Jis’ wudnae.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R:</td>
<td>D: enhance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R:</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i)</td>
<td>‘Cos that’s his values.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
R: register
O1: 5a  (i) Mhm.

R: challenge: rebound
5b  (i) Is it his values?

[pause 5 secs]

R: D: enhance
G: 6  (i) ’Cos if ye stuck him in tae the coppers, (ii) ye get a bad name, (iii) because ye live in that street.

R: challenge: rebound
O1: 7a  (i) Get a bad name? [R: s: resolve  G: Aye].

P: extend
7b  (ii) But yer streets is all law-abiding people. (iii) These guys have all done nothin’ wrong. (iv) He’s robbed all their hooses, (v) you now know he’s robbed yer neighbours’ hooses,

R: track: probe
7c  (vi) ye no’ gonna dae nothin’ aboot it? (vii) Ye gonna tell yer neighbours?

R: s: resolve
G: 8  (i) Aye, (ii) Ah ‘hink Ah’d tell his neighbours.

J: 9  [ ( )]

R: track: probe
O1: 10  (i) [Ye maybe tell yer neighbours?]

R: c: disavow
G: 11  (i) Ah’d no’ fire him in though.

R: D: enhance
O1: 12a  (i) So Nicholas next door, ye have known him for years (ii) and ye know that this Rick Jones who has robbed his hoose

R: track: probe
12b  (iii) and ye’re not gaunny tell him who’s done it?

R: s: comply
J: 13  (i) Aye, (ii) Ah’d tell ‘im who’d done it.

R: s: comply
G: 14  (i) Ah’d tell the neighbours, aye.

R: A: extend
J: 15  (i) And it’ll be up tae them (ii) tae hand him in tae the coppers.
See! (i) So once ye’ve told the police, (iii) the police are gaunny come and say the reason we got this information was (v) because ye caught him robbin’ yer house?

(i) Aye.

(i) Umm.

So we like a statement from you as well now, Sir.

(i) Ah’d jis’ refuse ye the statement.

(i) Ye’d refuse to give a statement. (ii) Okay.

(iii) Unfortunately he was caught in your house (iv) and that’s how it came about we found out he robbed the other houses. (v) When it comes to court (vi) we actually are gonna call you as a witness. (vii) Put you up in the stand.

(viii) So ye’re gonna perjure yerself?

(i) Ah’d jis’ say Ah found the guy outside the hoose.

(i) Ye caught him outside the house.

(ii) So what ye’re sayin’ ye beat this man up in public?

(i) Aye.

(i) See!

(ii) Sir, so we now arrest you for assault.

(i) Fair do’s.
R: register  O1: 26 (i) Right.
R: c: contradict  J: 27 (i) Ah still wudnae stick the guy in.
R: D: enhance  O1: 28 (i) So ye gaunny go tae court yerself. (ii)
This guy has broken into yer hoose [R:s: acknowl.: J: Ah know] (iii) he’s robbin’ you,
(iv) he’s robbed yer neighbours, (v) right,
(vi) ye’ve done him in (vii) and now ye are
in court for assault (viii) and he’s walkin’
away scot-free?
R: c: contradict  J: 29 (i) Isn’t necessarily walkin’ away scot-free, is he?
R: c: contradict  O1: 30a (i) Aye he is. (ii) Scot-free.
P: extend  30b (iii) But ye’re gettin’ doon for six month for
assault.
R: l: opinion  J: 31 (i) That’s jis’ the way it goes.
R: D: enhance  O1: 32 (i) All because he broke into yer hoose and
yer neighbours’ hooses, (ii) ye gaunny dae
time for ‘im?
R: c: challenge  C: 34 (i) Ye’re wrong boy, (ii) ye’re wrong.
R: c: contradict  J: 35 (i) Ah certainly wudnae stick the guy in.
R: D: extend  M: 36 (i) Aye, (ii) but ye’re a law-abidin’ citizen,
(iii) yer mind doesnae work the same way it
is workin’ now.
O: question: open: fact  O1: 37 (i) How long are ye [gaunny dae time for?
R: c: disavow  J: 38 (i) [Ah wudnae know about
that, haha
O: statement: opinion  G: 39 (i) Ah wudnae hand him in, (ii) Ah jis’ wud
talk tae ‘im.
R: track: confirm
O1: 40  (i) Naw?

R: s: resolve
G: 41  *(i) Ah’rn jis’ gaunny tell []

R: s: resolve
P: elaborate
O1: 42a  (i) [What aboot that
mad bastard who lives across the road, [ ]

(ii) he’s fuckin’ bonkers, (iii) he’s got a bad
temper, (iv) he’s gonna leather the fuckin’
boy, (v) ‘cos ye’re gonna tell the rest of the
neighbours (vi) as you said.

R: track: probe
O1: 44  (i) Ye might, (ii) oh ye might noo?

R: c: disavow
G: 45a  (i) Ah didnae say Ah wud tell, (ii) Ah say
Ah might tell them.

G: 45b  (iii) It all depends on the circumstances.

* (iv) If Ah knew him well []

R: challenge: refute
O1: 46  (i) [The
circumstances are what the circumstances
are {points to the board}

R: D: elaborate
G: 47  (i) If Ah knew ‘im well []

R: challenge: refute
O1: 48  (i) [He’s robbed
umpteen other hooses in the street.

R: register
G: 49a  (i) Right.

P: elaborate
*49b  (ii) If Ah knew him well but, (iii) If Ah
grew up wi’ him=

R: challenge: refute
O1: 50  (i) =He’s the boy who lives across the road.

R: s: acknowledge
G: 51  (i) Aye.

O: command
M: 52a  (i) Think of the lowest form ay life in yer
area, G,

O: statement: fact
52b  (ii) ye caught him in yer hoose [R: s: acknowl.:
G: Ah know but],

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P: question: closed: (iii) wud ye stick ‘im in? (iv) Wud ye murder him?

R: s: resolve J: (i) Ah’d murder them, (ii) but Ah wudnae stick ‘im in

O: l: give fact M: (i) Ye’re doon for a life sentence ...

P: elaborate 55b (ii) ye don’t want tae jail for the rest of yer life (iii) jis’ for murderin’ a low-lifer.

R: c: disavow J: (i) Ah wudnae murder ‘im [but.

R: D: enhance O1: (i) [So yer wife and yer kids are gonna lose you for at least two months for assault, (ii) all because you don’t want him tae go tae jail?

R: c: disavow J: (i) Ah never said Ah didnae want ‘im tae go tae jail.

R: register O1: (i) Oh Ah see,

R: track: clarify 59b (ii) ye don’t want him...(iii) ye dae want tae go tae jail? (iv) ye don’t want him tae go tae jail by yer hand?=

R: s: resolve J: (i)=It wudnae matter. (ii) Some other (?)

R: nv M: NV2 [hhh]

R: register O1: (i) Oh Ah see.

R: track: probe 61b (ii) So what ye’re sayin’ (ii) it’s awright for him (iii) tae get stuck in (iv) as long as it is no’ you that’s daein’ it?

R: s: resolve J: (i) Aye.

R: register O1: (i) Awright...

R: track: probe 63b (ii) So how wud ye dae that?

R: track: clarify J: (i) How dae ye mean?

R: nv NV3 [hhh]
(i) How wud ye dae it?

(i) How wud Ah dae what?

(i) How wud ye stick ‘im in (ii) without ye daein’ it? (iii) How wud ye get him nicked?

(i) Blame some other cunt.

(i) Ah see.

(i) As Ah says (ii) Ah’d tell somebody else, another neighbour=

(ii) by the way Ah caught Rick Jones robbin’ in ma hoose last night, (iii) he’s admitted daein’ all yer hooses as well. - (iv) Oh, is that right, (v) Ah’m jis’ gaunny phone the polis (vi) and we gaunny get ‘im done (vii) for burglarizin’ all the hooses then.

(i) Right.

(i) Okay, Ah’m back tae bein’ this police officer.

(ii) Ah’m at yer door, (iii) Ah want a statement.

(i) Ah still wudnae gie you a statement.

(i) Ye’re refusing to give me a statement, (ii) it’s a fact (iii) that you caught this man in yer house then, Sir [

(i) [So how [ (i) [How Does Mr Inglis know [R: c: contradict: Jim: Ah wudnae
have the coppers in ma hoose] you caught 'im in the house then?

R: s: resolve J: 78 (i) He's picked me up wrang.
R: register O1: 79a (i) Oh he's picked you up wrong.
R: track: clarify 79b (ii) So how dae ye know he's robbed Mr Inglis' house?

R: s: resolve J: 80 (i) 'Cos he telt me.
R: register O1: 81a (i) He told ye.
R: track: clarify 81b (ii) And why did he tell you this, Sir?
R: s: resolve J: 82 (i) 'Cos Ah leathered 'im.
R: register O1: 83 (i) 'Cos ye leathered 'im.
R: nv J: NV4 haha
R: track: probe O1: 84 (i) So you assaulted this man?
R: track: clarify O1: 86 (i) So where did this assault take place?
R: s: resolve J: 87a (i) Jis' ootside the door. [R: register: O1: Outside the door]

P: elaborate 87b (ii) He was taperin' wi' the door, (iii) so Ah assaulted him.
O1: 88a (i) Ah'm afraid we have to charge you wi' assault.(ii) You've just made a statement you've assaulted somebody simply (iii) for taperin' wi' yer door.

P: track: clarify 88b (iv) How do you know the boy wasnae in the wrong house, (vi) tryin' tae get into his own house?

P: elaborate 88c (vii) I mean he does live just across the street, (viii) the houses are all very [similar.

R: s: resolve S: 89 (i) [He had a
balaclava oan.

[pause - 4secs]

R: register
O1: 90 (i) He had a balaclava oan.

R: c: disavow
J: 91 (i) Naw, Ah never said he had a balaclava oan, ha. (ii) It was him, next-door neighbour.

[pause - 5 secs]

O: 1: opinion
R: 92 (i) It’s oanly pretty obvious (ii)what we wud dae but really.

R: track: clarify
O1: 93 (i) How?

R: s: resolve
R: *94 (i) Right, in yer eyes [

O: quest.: open: opinion
J: 95 (i) [What if Ah wud have leathered ‘im

R: challenge: counter
O1: 96 (i) [Ye’ve got children

J: *97 (i) With yer eyes

R: A: extend
R: *98 (i) Aye, (ii) but in my eyes, right [

R: challenge: counter
O1: 99 (i) [Right, ye’ve got children, (ii) ye get up in the middle of the night (iii) and ye find somebody wi’ a mask on in the middle of yer house.

A: extend
R: 100 (i) Ah’d jis’ stab fuck oot ay ‘im throw ‘im in the bin [R: register O1: umm] (ii) and put ‘im in a black bag, bury ‘im (iii) and that wud be it.

R: track: check
O1: 102 (i) Yeah?

A: elaborate
R: 103 (i) Ah wudnae grass oan him but really, (ii) oanly fae a middle-class, fae an upper-class, the way ye were sayin’ upper-class area, (iii)
they wud jail ye,(iv) but the likes ay oor class, the areas where we stay[

R: track: probe
O1: 104 (i) [In the jail?

R: s: resolve
R: 105 (i) Aye in the jail=

R: s: resolve
J: 106 (i) =Probably aye

A: elaborate
R: *107 (i) But oor class, oor [

O1: 108 (i) [Mr Jones...(ii) Sorry is the light still oan in that? {checks whether tape is still running}

A: elaborate
R: 109 (i) Were we are stayin’ (ii) we wudnae jail ‘im. (iii) We wud rather...gie ‘im a right one.

O: statement: fact
O1: 110 (i) Mr Jones is dyin’ wi’ cancer, (ii) ev’rybody in the street knows that *(iii) and this boy has told ye that the reason [

R: c: contradict
R: 111a (i) [But that’s no’ the point.

P: elaborate
111b (ii) He cud have went tae some other area and tanned another hoose, can’t he.

R: register
O1: 112 (i) See!

A: elaborate
R: 113 (i) A masochist, (i) tannin’ neighbours’ hooses.

From this transcript we can see that the interactants are differentially involved in the conversation, that is, of the six interactants including the officer present, only the officer, and two inmates (J and G) are responsible for most of the talking. The reason is that both J and G make propositions the officer has to challenge as they also continue to give confronting replies
to the officer’s statements of fact and opinion and his questions. The other
group members are more incidental speakers. R, for example, takes the floor
only towards the end of the discussion, attempting and finally managing to
elaborate what people from ‘where he comes from’ would do with a burglar
who ransacked his house. M does not offer any resistance to what the
officer is saying throughout, but changes his position in the end at the end of
the discussion (not shown in text).

5.8 Appraisal in text 5.1

If we look at semantics first, we can see that for both O1 and some of the
inmates Judgement lexis is again an important Appraisal category. Each
side is judging the other, censoring deviance from behavioural norms and
distancing itself from the individuals it appraises. J and G, for example, use
negative Judgement of social sanction by referring to policemen as coppers
(turns 1, 6, 15, 77). The officer, too, uses both Judgement of positive social
sanction (law-abiding people) and of negative social esteem (that mad
bastard) to refer to one inmate, albeit in a jocular manner. Interestingly, M
picks up the term law-abiding from the officer in turn 36, and in turns 52
and 55 uses lowest form ay life and low-lifer to refer to the burglar. He
thereby also question the rationality of J’s statement according to which the
latter would rather kill the burglar than hand him over to the police. Thus
M’s choice of lexis seems to be a sign of convergence with the officer’s
orientation, although in the end he changes his mind saying that extenuating
circumstances should be taken into account by the judge as Rick Jones, by
fencing the stolen goods, also wanted to pay his father’s medical bills. In
turn 42, it is the officer who uses swearing as an Amplification resource:
What about that mad bastard [ ], he’s fuckin’ bonkers, he’s gonna leather
the fuckin’ boy. Here the first fuckin’ amplifies the affectual Appraisal
*bonkers* and the second one intensifies the noun *boy*, i.e. Rick Jones the burglar. The officer thus indicates his negative attitude both to the burglar and to one of the inmates present in the session by actually picking his name for the argument he is trying to make. He amplifies again in turn 48 (*He’s robbed umpteen other houses*) by quantifying with a term of amount to show his disapproval of the burglar. R uses Amplification (*Ah’d stab fuck oot ay ‘im*) and Judgement of social sanction and social esteem (*Ah wudnae grass oan ‘im; A masochist, tannin’ neighbours’ hooses*). Whereas the officer makes his statements with little or no modal softening, the inmates use the adverbs ‘just’ and ‘only’ to mitigate the effect of their statements. Most of the examples of mitigating ‘just’ in the above text are produced by the inmates. All the following turns contain mitigating ‘just’:

```
J: 19  Ah’d *jis*’ refuse ye the statement.
J: 21  Ah’d *jis*’ say Ah found the guy outside the hoose.
J: 31  That’s *jis*’ the way it goes.
G: 39  Ah wudnae hand ‘im in, Ah *jis*’ wud talk tae ‘im.
G: 41  Ah’m *jis*’ gaunny tell [M: 55 ye don’t want tae jail for the rest of yer life *jis*’ for murderin’ a low-lifer.
O1: 71  Ah’m *jis*’ gaunny phone the polis and we gaunny get ‘im done for burglarizin’ all the hooses then.
O1: 86  So where did this assault take place?
J: 87  *Jis*’ outside the door.
R: 92  It’s *oanly* pretty obvious what we wud dae but really.
R: 100 Ah’d *jis*’ stab fuck oot ay ‘im ...
```
Fowler et al. (1979: 68) have suggested that 'just, 'only' and 'probably' are used by speakers not only when they are uncertain, but also to cover over the embarrassment of the powerless challenging the powerful.

The interactants in the above text employ the following slang terms: *copper* (turns 1, 6, 15, 77), *to fire sb. in* (turn 11), *fair do's* (turn 25), *low-lifer* (turn 55), *to grass on sb.* (turn 103), *to tan sb's house* (turn 113). The officer, too, uses slang terms: *to get doon for six month* (turn 30); *bonkers*; *to leather the fuckin' boy* (turn 42), *stick 'im in, get 'im nicked* (turn 67), and *He's admitted daein' all yer hooses; polis* (turn 71) to mimic two inmates talking. As I already pointed out above, the inmates use slang terms to construct their solidarity as a group and to differentiate themselves from other mainstream ways of talking. The officer’s reason for employing slang terms is more difficult to assess. Does he want to construct himself as dominant by swearing, does he seek to demonstrate membership by imitating the inmates’ language or, quite the opposite, does he want to stand apart by making fun of the inmates’ way of talking?

5.9 Interpreting speech functions in text 5.1

Analysing interaction means that we have to look at what the interactants are doing in relation to each other. When J starts off by saying *Ah wudnae hand 'im in tae the coppers* (turn 1) he does not merely produce a modulated negative declarative clause, but also makes a conversational move, in this case an opinion. His move has implications for how the discussion unfolds and how the other interactants react. By stating this negative opinion, he positions himself in conflict with the officer. O2 reacts with a tracking move (*Why not?*; turn 2), which seeks additional information in order to understand the prior move. Clarifying moves typically delay the presentation of the speaker’s reaction because of inadequate information. J
then confronts O2 with a withholding response (Jis’ wudnae; turn 3) and gets support from R (‘Cos that’s his values; turn 4). R makes a developing move, that is, he expands on J’s contribution, producing an enhancement of J’s earlier move and offering an explanation for J’s opinion. He indicates interpersonal support for the initiator J and also offers further ideational content for negotiation. Thus, in the first four moves we see J making an initiating contribution, the officer’s tracking move is supporting in the sense that it delays exchange completion and is dependent on F’s in that it is elliptically tied to it. J’s next move, while still stating opposition, does so elliptically, indicating its dependence on the officer’s. All interactants play an essentially co-operative role, although J’s second move is a confronting reply; however, it is a relatively weak form of non-compliance as it avoids the overt negotiation of any differences. Confronting replies indicate a dependency between the initiator and respondent, although they do not imply the deference or alignment of supporting replies. By quantifying the discourse structure choices per speaker in all moves, overall patterns of choices, such as lack of reciprocity among the interactants, become apparent. The following table is a quantification of the discourse structure choices in all moves by all speakers in text 5.1:

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The analysis of speech functions reveals the following patterns:

The dominant speakers are O2 and J, and to a lesser extent, G. Inmates R and M play a more passive role throughout, although they both make an initiating move at some stage in the conversation (turns 52 and 92).

**Number of turns** There is a remarkable difference in the number of turns between the officer and the inmates, with J getting most of the turns.

**Number of moves** Again, the number of moves produced by the officer far exceeds the number of moves produced by the inmates. The officer (O1)
emerges as speech functionally dominant, that is, he gets more moves into his turns, while J’s number of moves is about the same as his turns. Only M produces more moves through fewer turns.

If we now look at categories of moves produced by the speakers, the above list shows the following patterns: although J opens once with a statement of opinion and gets most of the turns, his moves are mostly in reaction to the contributions made by the officer. O1 and M both use three opening moves, J opens twice, R once, whereas S and C do not use opening choices at all. When O2 opens, he uses 2 questions, one of fact and one of opinion, and a statement of fact, enacting his role as a teacher. J, G and R’s only openings are statements of opinions (turns 1, 39, 92). M’s two openings are statements of fact, in which he basically repeats what the officer has said in turn 7 (But yer streets is all law-abiding people). M is the only participant to use a command as an opening move (Think of the lowest form av life in yer area, G, turn 52). M is the one who acquiesces most in what the officer says.

J is the one who uses most confronting responses, although the number of his supporting responses is still slightly higher than his confronting moves. He does play a stronger confrontational role than the rest by disagreeing with the officer and sometimes withholding information. He uses 6 contradicting, 5 disavowing and 2 withholding moves. His supporting moves are mostly resolves to the officer’s persistent probing. He uses two continuing moves in which he extends (turn 15) and elaborates (turn 87). G uses 3 confronting moves, but again the number of his supporting moves is three times as high as his confronting moves. R, who remains quiet throughout the discussion, makes an opening move towards the end, giving his opinion (It’s oanly pretty obvious what we wud dae but really; turn 92). He then makes 6 appending moves, attempting to elaborate and extend on his first point. Although he is interrupted by the officer three times (turns
98, 104 and 107), and a turn transfer occurs once (turn 102), R’s moves do not appear to be a reaction to the officer’s moves, but rather a continuation of his own contributions. He also contradicts the officer once in turn 111 (But that’s no’ the point) and then elaborates on his position again.

The results for rejoinders are also revealing. The majority of rejoinders are produced by the officer. His rejoinders are tracking moves, most of which are probing. This indicates that he promotes the talk by demanding confirmation of the inmates’ propositions. The officer is also the only one to use challenging moves by countering and refuting the inmates’ arguments, apart from C’s only challenging move (Yer’re wrong boy, ye’re wrong; turn 34), which, however challenges J rather than the officer. The inmates’ rejoinders are mostly resolving moves: J resolves 11 times and G 5 times, all in response to the officer’s probing.

If we now take a look at mood choices, we can see that they confirm and extend on the picture which has emerged from the speech function analysis.

1) Number of clauses The officer produces 110 clauses, J 44, G 23, R 21, M 10, C 2, and S 1. One can see a striking difference in the amount of speech produced by the officer as opposed to the inmates, which shows his dominance of the interaction and the centrality of his contributions.

2) Number of incomplete clauses There are nine incomplete clauses, eight of which are produced by the inmates: J is interrupted once by O2 (turn 76), G four times (turns 41, 45, 47 and 49), and R, who talks very little, is also cut short three times by O2 (turns 94, 98, 107), but manages to interrupt him once (turn 110). This reinforces the impression that the interaction is tightly controlled by the officer and that the inmates have to compete for the floor, if they want to get their points across.

3) Declaratives The number of declaratives produced by O1 is significantly higher than the inmates’ (63 full and 18 elliptical declaratives). J 28/10; R
The inmates’ use of elliptical declaratives is some evidence of their more responding supportive role (this aspect of the conversation becomes clearer in the speech function analysis).

4) Polar interrogatives O2 produces two polar interrogatives (turns 5 and 7 (ellipt.)) and M produces another two, asking another inmate a question (both in turn 52).

5) Tagged declaratives There are only two examples of tagged declaratives, both of which are produced by inmates. I suggest that the inmates use them as a request for the officer’s sympathy or support.

J: 29 Isn’t necessarily walkin’ away scot-free, is he?
R: 111 He cud have went tae some other area and tanned another hoose, can’t he?

6) Wh-interrogatives O2 produces 13 wh-interrogatives (turns 2, 37, 42, 63, 65, 67 (2x), 77, 79, 81, 86, 88, 93 (ellipt.)). His high use of wh-interrogatives indicates his status as initiatator and controller. J produces three (turns 64, 66), two of which are counter-questions to the officer’s question So how would you do that? J’s counter-questioning is an example of stalling or hesitation (Fowler et al: 1979) and gives him time to think or change tactics. His third interrogative (turn 76) is interrupted by O2.

7) Modalities In the first exchange, the one produced by the inmate is median probability, subjective, implicit, and the one produced by O1 is also median probability, objective, implicit:

G: 8 Aye, Ah ‘hink Ah’d tell his neighbours.
J: 9 (?
O1: 10 [Ye maybe tell yer neighbours?
In the second exchange, the inmate produces a modality of median probability, objective, implicit, and the officer one of low probability, subjective, implicit: one is low probability, subjective, implicit. The inmate’s answer is low probability, subjective, implicit:

O1: 42 ... he’s gonna leather the fuckin’ boy, ‘cos ye’re gonna tell the rest of the neighbours as you said.

G: 43 Aye, maybe.

O1: 44 Ye might, oh ye might noo?

G: 45 Ah didnae say Ah wud tell, Ah say Ah might tell ‘em.

O1: 87 I mean he does live just across the street.

There is one modality of capability:

R: 111 He cud have went tae some other area and tanned another hoose, can’t he?

Congruence/Incongruence of speech functions By relating mood choices to speech functions one can see that the officer is the most incongruent speaker. He probes using declarative structures with an interrogative intonation (‘queclaratives’). The declarative structure here contrasts with the congruent realization of his probe through an interrogative. The function of his choice is to present his authoritative wording of what he thinks the inmates have told him and to request confirmation (moves 7c (one pos., one neg.), 10 (neg.), 12b (neg.), 16b, 20, 44, 57 (neg.), 59 (neg.) 61b, 84.

A detailed analysis of interactive patterns, combined with the analysis of grammatical and semantic patterns provides an insight into some of the ways the inmates resist the officer’s propositions.
Overall then, the speech function analysis in text 5.1 shows that, despite the rather controlling style of the officer, some of the inmates do use resistance strategies, although they are rather subdued. This becomes understandable if we take a look at the officer’s control strategies.

As we already saw in text 4.1, O1 again uses ‘formulation’ (Fairclough, 1992) on various occasions (turns 12, 16, 28 and 57) and enforcing explicitness (turns 20, 22, 44, 61 and 84 (e.g. So what ye’re sayin’ it’s awright for him tae get stuck in as long as it is no’ you that’s daein’ it?)). They are all ‘queclaratives’, which are difficult to challenge as they contain a completed proposition. For example, the officer’s turns 7 and 10 (Ye no’ gonna dae nothin’ aboot it? Ye gonna tell yer neighbours? Ye maybe tell yer neighbours) are both queclaratives (one negatively worded) requesting confirmation. They function like leading questions as they anticipate agreement from the addressee (see Harris, 1984). Although G makes a confronting move in turn 11 (Ah’d no’ fire him in though) he finally acquiesces with the officer’s proposition in turn 17 (Aye). What I am suggesting here is that by using these interactional controllers, the officer systematically ‘corners’ the Course participants, making them say things they might not necessarily have said, had the questions been more open-ended. In fact, it is the officer who first introduces the possibility of telling the neighbours about the burglaries (... ye know he’s robbed yer neighbours’ hooses, ye no’ gonna dae nothin’ aboot it? Ye gonna tell yer neighbours? in turn 7), which he subsequently dismisses as counterproductive. G’s answer (Aye, Ah ‘hink Ah’d tell his neighbours) softens his proposition. In turns 71 and 73, the officer assumes the role of a police officer questioning J. This looks like a mock ‘disciplinary interview’ (see Harris, 1985). J remains recalcitrant (Ah’d jis’ refuse tae gie ye the statement; turn 19), O1 follows with another leading question, demanding explicitness (So ye’re gonna perjure yersel’?), but J remains evasive and entangles himself in answers
that become increasingly non-sensical (*Ah'd jis say Ah found the guy outside the hoose*).

In turn 22, O1 enforces explicitness (*So what ye're sayin' ye beat this man up in public?*) by asking a highly conducive question, which J confirms. However, he still offers resistance in turn 27 (*Ah still wudnae stick the guy in*). M, who said he would turn Rick Jones over to the police, offers turn 36 (*Aye, but ye're a law-abidin' citizen, yer mind doesnae work the same way it is workin' now*). Here M is referring to the inmate code which forbids cooperation with the police. His use of the term ‘law-abiding’ signals convergence with the officer’s orientation (turn 7). G takes the floor in turn 39 (*Ah wudnae hand 'im in...*). When he attempts to elaborate his view he is interrupted by the officer in turn 42 (*What about that mad bastard [ ], he's fuckin' bonkers ...*), implying that C is irrational. Telling the neighbours about the burglaries, the officer argues, is making matters only worse, as Rick Jones will be subjected to ‘natural justice’. G then modalizes his prior statement (*Aye maybe*), mitigating the force of it. Rather than expressing uncertainty, this modalization expresses deference to the officer, who enforces explicitness (*Ye might, oh ye might noo?*). G attempts twice to get his point across, saying that it depends on circumstances what he would do (*If Ah knew 'im well ...*), but is cut short by the officer on both occasions, who points out that these circumstances are already included in the text on the board. G offers no further resistance (*Aye*). Turn 57 (*So yer wife and yer kids are gonna lose you*) is another example of formulation by O2, which J refuses to confirm (*Ah never said ...*). The officer again wants a clear statement from J and this time the latter acquiesces. J then responds to the officer’s question in turns 63 and 65 (*So how wud ye dae that?*) with another question (*How dae ye mean?*). Consider the entire exchange:
J's intention here is difficult to assess. His questions might be simply a request for clarification from the officer, but they could also be an example of stalling/hesitation. Although these forms differ in their precise meaning (see Fowler et al. 1979: 75-6), they have the function for the speaker of giving him time to think or change tactics. In this sense, J's moves might be interpreted as a moderate form of resistance. G, by using a resolving move, can be said to give a compliant response, but in so doing also supports J in his argumentation.

To sum up, the speech function analysis has revealed that the inmates in text 5.1 do resist the officer’s propositions, although they use more moderate forms of resistance, such as contradicting or withholding answers to the officer’s questions. Counter-questions, interruptions and story-telling, prominent features in text 4.1, do not occur here (O1 is interrupted only once by R in turn 111). However, I attempted to show that resistance is still possible with a rather controlling Cognitive Skills tutor.

5.10 Conclusion

The analysis of Appraisal/Involvement and speech functions in the interactions between officer and prisoners has shown that the Cognitive
Skills ‘classroom’ interactions are an interesting source of conflict and confrontation in that the inmates’ linguistic choices construct a form of resistance to what the Course stands for. The choice of one lexical item rather than another expresses the inmates’ attitudes to the Course and also their judgements of the acceptability of what the officers suggest. The analysis suggests that hegemonic positions such as the ones offered by the officers are contested and resisted by the inmates. We have seen that very often passive resistance may be the only form of resistance available to the inmates. Although this Chapter has focused on the inmates’ linguistic strategies of resistance, the control functions of Officer 1 in text 5.1 have also become apparent. As I pointed out in Chapter 4, a complete separation of the two is not possible, since power implies resistance.

In Chapters 3, 4, and 5 I have shown that ideology is expressed in complex ways, including choices of mood and modality and recurrent choices of particular lexical items. Interactively, differing rules with regard to speaker rights are enforced, along with sequencing constraints, but these are also challenged by the inmates. Ideology is also expressed by consistent choices involving particular interactional controlling devices. These serve not only to maintain the officers’ control in the immediate discourse context, but also to sustain an ideological construction of reality which is crucial to the perceived legitimacy of the crime-control system. The Cognitive Skills written texts and the officers put forward propositions which function to maintain the status quo: by leaving aside the issue of the inmates’ social situation, they thereby reinforce and reify existing relationships of power and domination.
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

6.1 Introduction

This study was concerned with the linguistic analysis of a Cognitive Skills Course run for prisoners at Prison X. The aim of this research was to show that certain spoken and written discourse practices that appear to be common sense are in fact ideologically invested in that they produce and reproduce unequal power relations. In so doing, I used Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) as my framework. I also attempted to join the textual analysis of spoken and written discourse with macro-social theory.

In this final chapter, I shall summarize the major issues presented in this study, review the analyses presented in the previous Chapters, outline the difficulties I was faced with in my data collection and linguistic analysis, and make suggestions for future research in this area.

6.2 Summary of Chapters

In Chapter I I reviewed the approaches to discourse analysis which I found to be most relevant to the analysis of my own data. While acknowledging insights from Conversation Analysis, Ethnomethodology, Pragmatics and the Birmingham School, I argued that SFL, in combination with CDA, was most useful for my concerns. CDA was useful for the present study because it focuses on the ways in which texts are used to realize power and ideology. It also brings critical social science and linguistics (specifically systemic functional linguistics) together within a theoretical and analytical framework. Because SFL is designed to look beyond linguistic choices to
the socio-cultural and ideological factors influencing their existence and use, it thus provides a linguistic model for uncovering the ideological processes of discourse. Halliday's three metafunctions (ideational, interpersonal, and textual) are useful in describing the complementary meanings of a text and relating them systematically to their social context. In SFL, social context is modelled as systems of register (field, mode, and tenor) and of genre. These social systems are seen as realized through language. When systemic functional linguists say that language realizes register and genre they mean that language constructs and is constructed by the social. From this it follows that power is not a fixed variable; it shifts around as texts unfold (Martin, 2000). I presented my understanding of social power and argued that Foucault's model of productive power can be useful in analysing discourse, as it allows for the idea of power being enacted within power relationships and thus as open to contestation. While it is true that power is exercised by the person of higher institutional rank in an interaction, I questioned the assumption that the position of the prison officer is exclusively one of power. In the interactions between prison officers and prisoners investigated here, some prisoners certainly did negotiate within their fairly powerless positions by drawing on seemingly powerful speech styles. Power is thus exercised not only as domination, but also as an act of resistance. It is fought over, and fought over in discourse. Despite its usefulness the productive power model should be complemented by a model of power as domination, particularly in a prison setting. I then presented my understanding of ideology, aligning myself with a critical conception, which links the term to sustaining unequal relations of power and to maintaining domination. I also stressed the importance of ideology in securing the coherence of powerful groups (such as the dominant groups within the Scottish Prison Service).
In Chapter 2 I provided a contextualization for my research by giving an account of the historical development of the Scottish Prison Service (SPS) and its most important and powerful actors today. I described the two changes the SPS has undergone over the past decade: one is a shift in the philosophical approach to imprisonment, stressing the role of the prisoner as a responsible individual and the relation between prison officer and prisoner as one of mutual interdependence, with the officer acting as a kind of 'social worker'; the second is a move within the SPS towards a managerial approach to imprisonment ('enterprising managerialism') which is based on the belief that managerial techniques can be applied to the problems of crime and punishment. This corporate strategy for the management of all Scottish prisons has the improvement of the quality of service to prisoners as one of its aims (a 'customer-focused' prison service). I have linked these developments within the SPS and its concomitant reformulation of discourse ('enterprise discourse') to a wider movement in contemporary society (late modernity, Giddens, 1990). Several theoretical accounts and analyses of the transformations of late modernity have emphasized that they are to a degree transformations in language and discourse (e.g. Habermas, 1984). I have suggested that the Cognitive Skills Course is part of this wider trend in which language has become a commodity and is subject to economically motivated processes of intervention, a process whereby institutions sell their educational commodities to their clients. Managerial discourses in education are discursive constructions which draw upon discourses from economic practices. The 'commodification' of language (Fairclough, 1992) in late modernity is a primary example of the 'instrumental' rationality which is predominant in the systems of the economy and the state (Habermas, 1987). Instrumental rationality means that everything is subsumed under maximising the effectivity of institutional systems, whether it is a matter of maximally effective ways of producing or selling
commodities, or maximally effective ways of organizing or educating people. With its focus on the so-called defects of individual offenders and its concern to 'manage' their minds, the Cognitive Skills Course makes both managerial and ideological sense.

In Chapter 3 I analysed a range of texts from the *Handbook for Teaching Cognitive Skills* in order to highlight some of the ways in which ideology is constructed in discourse. The analysis of the Handbook texts also provided a context for the analysis of some of the spoken data from the Cognitive Skills sessions. I first reviewed a range of sociological accounts about the functions of crime-control discourse and linked these to my analysis of the Cognitive Skills texts. I found the view of social-control ideologies as a form of 'motivational accounting system' (Mills, 1940; Ben-Yehuda, 1990) and a form of legitimation for control agents particularly helpful. Then, using SFL as my framework, I analysed six introductions to various Cognitive Skills modules for Transitivity, Mood and Theme (lexico-grammatical analysis) and lexical cohesion (discourse-semantic analysis). I also examined the evaluative lexis of the Handbook texts using Martin's model of Appraisal. The analysis of these aspects of grammar, syntax and lexis highlighted some of the ways in which ideological meanings are constructed in the texts. In particular, the analysis showed that the texts construe offenders as thinking and behaving irrationally as a result of their perceived cognitive deficits, thus discounting their behaviour as meaningful and linguistically creating and justifying intervention in order to help prevent re-offending.

In Chapters 4 and 5 I investigated the grammatical, semantic and discourse patterns in the Cognitive Skills discussions between prison officers and prisoners. Whereas Chapter 4 dealt with the linguistic strategies of control employed by the prison officers teaching the Cognitive Skills Course, Chapter 5 focused on the inmates' linguistic strategies of resistance.
In Chapter 4 I compared two Cognitive Skills ‘Values Enhancement’ sessions run by two different prison officers, focusing on their teaching styles and describing a number of interactional control devices identified in CDA (Fairclough, 1992). I further showed how the analysis of Mood choices are a means for enacting and constructing status differences between the officers and the inmates. I suggested that the Cognitive Skills discourse practices can be linked to what Fairclough has called a ‘technologization’ of discourse, in which speech communication training is one way of exercising social control.

In Chapter 5 I showed that this attempt at social control is met with resistance from the prisoners. Applying Halliday’s (1984) account of discourse structure as a model for investigating resistance and drawing on Eggins and Slade’s (1997) adapted model of it, I showed that the patterns of confrontation and support enable the inmates to construct resistance. Although the model was devised to analyse casual conversation, I found that it could be usefully applied to the analysis of my own more pedagogic interactions. I also used Martin’s (2000) model of Appraisal/Involvement for the analysis of the evaluative meanings the inmates and officers make in the interactions.

To sum up, my analysis of mood, appraisal, involvement, speech function has displayed systematically ways in which ideology can be constructed in written texts and interactions. I explored how the interactants draw on grammatical, semantic and discourse resources to enact and construct their social identities out of their socio-cultural differences, so that what they speak about is not just the interpersonal relations between the participants, but the values and beliefs of the culture they are part of.
6.3 Strengths and weaknesses of the study

6.3.1 Participant observation

Unless one commits an offence it is hardly possible to become a participant observer in a prison. However, one of the great advantages of participant observation in a prison is that one becomes sensitized to the experiences, points of view and values of both prisoners and prison officers and learns to appreciate the validity of the views of both sides. Being in close contact with both the inmates and the prison officers running the Course has proved to be an invaluable experience in that it allowed me to gain an insight into a social reality different from my own.

In a prison, there are many practical constraints on research design. For example, each individual visit to the prison normally has to be carefully arranged and timed. This problem was alleviated by me working as a part-time teacher in the Education Unit for a short time and becoming integrated in the Cognitive Skills Course as a participant. I could walk around prison quite unrestrained and engage in conversation with both staff and inmates whenever the opportunity arose. I therefore found the open-ended character of my field research congenial to exploring the issues I eventually focused on in my linguistic analysis. I still believe what Whyte (1943: 303) said about participant observation: ‘As I sat and listened, I learned the answers to questions that I would not even have had the sense to ask if I had been getting my information solely on an interview basis.’ In retrospect, however, I wonder whether I should have entered the field with a more definite conception of what I wanted to find out. While entering the field with a clear research methodology can be an obstacle to losing one’s preconceptions, working out a more detailed research plan might have been helpful in some respects. Although there was very little time to interview
the Course participants about the Cognitive Skills Course, a questionnaire might have been useful in backing up the (largely positive) anecdotal evidence I have about the inmates' attitudes towards the Course. Keeping a more detailed field diary might also have been useful, especially for writing down more mundane matters, such as the organization of the Course, as one tends to forget them so quickly.

More often than not prisoners would start talking about their lives. Jotting their remarks down verbatim immediately afterwards could have provided me with additional data. However, this richness of data one acquires by immersing oneself into the prison world can also turn out to be a mixed blessing. The actual transcription of the videotaped Cognitive Skills Course interactions was the least of my problems. Far more difficult was to decide which sessions should be transcribed. I ended up transcribing more data than I could actually use, which was very time-consuming.

Where prison is the focus of investigation, it is best to treat the institution as a small community in which members have differing and competing interests. Bearing this in mind on entering the prison, I was relieved to find out that my concern with what some commentators of prison research have referred to as 'role-corruption' (over-association with either prison officers or prisoners), turned out to be largely unfounded.

Finally, it should be noted that the researcher certainly changes the dynamics of the group he or she studies, but the effect can be minimized as participants become acquainted with and finally feel at ease with the researcher.

6.3.2 Linguistic analysis

In using systemic functional analysis as my framework, I often felt that I might be interpreting the meanings of aspects of grammar, syntax and lexis
incorrectly, especially in my analysis of Appraisal meanings in Chapters 3 and 5. The speech function analysis also posed problems in that I found it very difficult to code them. I was frequently confronted with uncertain and fuzzy cases where several analyses seemed possible and appropriate, especially in my analysis of Appraisal in the Cognitive Skills Handbook text and the speech function analysis. I have resigned myself to accepting this uncertainty as an inherent feature of language and attempted to build this into my linguistic description in an ordered and generalizable way.

Although systemics is said to be designed to look beyond linguistic choices to the socio-cultural and the ideological functions of language, its claims are very general and vague, and I felt I was groping in the dark for a long time. CDA, on the other hand, offers a somewhat bewildering array of concepts from the social sciences. It was only by studying the sociological and criminological literature and integrating it with SFL and CDA that I found my bearings. Halliday’s account of ‘anti-languages’, for example, usefully complements the criminological literature on the functions of prison argot.

CDA has come under sustained criticism (Pennycook, 1994; Widdowson, 1995, 1996; Hammersley, 1996; Stubbs, 1997). Widdowson, for example has termed CDA ‘essentially sociological or socio-political rather than linguistic’ (1995) and Stubbs (1997: 102-3) has argued that CDA is ‘unavoidably circular in certain respects’, taking issue with Fairclough’s (1995: 71) claim that ‘ideology cannot be read off texts, since there is no one-to-one correspondence between forms and functions’. He says that ‘if it is not possible to read ideology off the texts, then the analysts themselves are reading meanings into texts on the basis of their own unexplicated knowledge’ (Stubbs, 1997). I shall deal with these two criticisms in turn and explain how I addressed them.

Understanding and explanation are both part of interpretation. CDA does acknowledge that a text can be understood in different ways, although
it claims that there is a limit to what a text can mean: the way a text is understood results from a combination of the properties of the text itself and the social positioning and values of the person interpreting the text. Having said this, I was aware of the circularity problem throughout my study. I can only hope that I gave as balanced an account as possible after extensive readings of sociological accounts on the ideological functions of language and of crime-control discourse (Chapter 3, section 3.2.1) in particular, the essence of which is that this language should not be seen as mere mystification, concealing a sinister plan, but has to be understood within the context of the organizational contingencies of social-control agencies.

I do not believe that CDA’s social concerns deflect from careful linguistic analysis of texts, although textual analysis undertaken by various critical discourse analysts in the past could have been more detailed, thereby giving more leverage to its more theoretical claims. This study has certainly benefited from sociological accounts of prisoners’ argot and the functions of crime-control discourse. For example, the labelling perspective of social deviance (e.g. Becker, 1963, 1964) has shown that both the actor and the behaviour are labelled as deviant: the person who steals is labelled a thief. In this sense, behaviours such as theft or drug use are transformed into statuses that people may make part of their social statuses. Thus this focus on the role of stigmatizing labels in fostering the development of deviant behaviour is relevant to CDA: discussion of how people and events are labelled in texts of various kinds is after all central to the work of CDA (e.g. Fairclough, 1989; van Leeuwen, 1996). From this it would follow that analysis should be based on a substantial body of material which can be seen as representing a particular domain of practice (Wodak, 1996). I hope I have addressed this problem by presenting what I believe is a representative range of texts in this study. CDA has been criticized for not systematically analysing large representative texts, including the use of quantitative and
computational methods, which could provide a solid linguistic basis for its social claims about discourse (Stubbs, 1997; Toolan, 1997). I agree that CDA could be enhanced in these ways, although I see their value as supporting qualitative analyses of particular texts. There is thus a need to combine qualitative text analysis with quantitative analysis of large bodies of texts. This is why I used SFL as a framework to make quantitative claims about the discourse patterns in the present study. These could have been exploited even further by undertaking a corpus-based analysis of the evaluative lexis in the *Handbook for Teaching Cognitive Skills* and some of the literature on cognitive skills (e.g. Ross and Fabiano, 1985; Ross and Ross, 1995). This could have strengthened my claims about the ideological representations of offenders in these texts. However, because of constraints of time, funding and facilities, such work is beyond the scope of a single PhD thesis.

Finally, I believe that I should have focused more on inmates’ narratives as a mode of resistance, thereby exploiting the issue of resistance to a greater extent. However, constraints of time and funding precluded this. Apart from being modes of resistance, these narratives are also accounts of prisoners’ worldview. Prisoners’ versions of their past lives can be a source of rehabilitative discourse in that they are offenders’ attempts to come to terms with their own actions. An understanding of offenders’ acts may come about if we carefully analyse their discourse (see O'Connor, 1995. This might be an interesting avenue to pursue in a different project.

6.4 Suggestions for future research

I would like to suggest that CDA focuses more on the discourse of resistance. If power does imply resistance, as Weber and Foucault have suggested, then we should consider more carefully the discourses certain
people use to contest and challenge practices which disempower them. An analysis of linguistic strategies of resistance is important for an understanding of power relations in society and should be included in a theory of power, counter-power and resistance.

The analysis of evaluation could be removed from linguistic intuitions and based in systematic observation of lexical items. A corpus-based method makes possible an analysis and description of the evaluative function of lexical items in a systematic way. Without recourse to intuition, quantitative data show clear evidence of whether there is an evaluative meaning to an item. Research on such items could become a central focus for those interested in critical discourse analysis.

Following recent research on evaluative lexis (Hunston and Thompson, 2000) I suggested that evaluation in text scan be used to build a relationship between the writer and the reader, in particular by assuming shared attitudes and values, which can be difficult for the reader to dispute. It takes a conscious effort for the reader not to identify with the writer’s point of view. Evaluation is important to CDA for two reasons: it plays a vital role in structuring the ideological basis of a text, thereby locating writer and reader in an ideological space, and it plays a vital role in organizing a text. Because ideologies are essentially sets of values -what counts as good or bad or true or untrue - evaluation is an important linguistic concept. Its importance has only recently been recognized and its application to texts within a CDA/SFL approach could be extended.

To sum up, CDA and SFL have long been closely associated since the pioneering work of critical linguists (Fowler et al. 1979, Hodge and Kress 1993) and the version of CDA I have worked with has used SFL as its main resource for textual analysis. The greatest advantage of SFL in the context of CDA is its ability to combine concerns with power and ideology in the detailed analysis of texts as they unfold. It provides CDA with a technical
language for talking about language and to engage in quantitative analysis. That is why the two should be combined in future critical linguistic research.

I hope that my data have lent support to Berger and Luckman's (1966) claim that discourse (spoken and written) is critical in the social construction of reality and that reality maintenance and creation achieved through discourse is largely implicit, not explicit; this ties in with CDA's claim that the ideological functions of talk and text remain sometimes invisible to its participants/readers. It has been my aim to make these functions at least partly visible.

CDA contributes to critical social research systematic accounts of the discourse practices of contemporary social practices. To do so, CDA has to be firmly grounded in critical social research and in the theory and analysis of language. My hope is that the present study has made a contribution in these directions.
APPENDIX I

Each text below is analysed for Transitivity and Theme, according to the Keys given below (adapted from Eggins, 1994). The texts have been divided into sentences.

Key:
P=Process, Pm=material, Pme=mental, Pb=behavioural, Pv=verbal, Pp=possessive, Pe=existential, Pi=intensive, Pcc=circumstantial, Pc=causative
A=Actor, G=Goal, B=Beneficiary, R=Range
S=Senser, Ph=Phenomenon
Sy= Sayer, Rv=Receiver, Vb= Verbiage
Be= Behaver, Bh= Behaviour
X=Existent
T= Token, V= Value, Cr= Carrier, A= Attribute
Pr= possessor, Pd= possessed
C=Circumstance, Cl=location, Cx= extent, Cm=manner, Cc= cause, Ca=accompaniment
Ag= Agent
Theme is underlined
textual Theme: in italics
interpersonal Theme: in CAPITALS
topical Theme: in bold
dependent clause as Theme: whole clause in bold
Text 3.1: ‘Objectives of Training’

1. The cognitive training sessions (G) are designed (Pm) [[to target (Pm) the specific cognitive skills deficits (G) [[which (G) are discussed (Pv) in detail (Cm) in Time to Think (CI) : interpersonal cognitive problem-solving, consequential thinking, means-end reasoning, social perspective-taking, critical reasoning, abstract reasoning, creative thinking and values]] ]].

2. Deficits in these skills (T) constitute (Pi) a serious personal handicap (V) [[which (A) puts (Pm) the individual (B) at risk (At) [[of developing Pm) an anti-social lifestyle (R)]] ]].

3. Cognitive training (A) focuses on (Pm) modifying (Pm) the impulsive, egocentric, illogical and rigid thinking of offenders (G) and on teaching (Pm) them (B) [[to stop (Pm) and think (Pme) before acting (Pm), consider (Pme) the consequences of their behaviour (Ph), conceptualize (Pme) alternative ways (Ph) [[of responding to (Pb) interpersonal problems (R) and consider (Pme) the impact of their behaviour (Ph) on other people (including their victims) (CI)]] ]].

4. Rather than viewing (Pme) the offender’s anti-social behaviour (Ph) as a reflection of some presumed underlying psychopathology (Co), cognitive training (Cr) is (Pi) based (At) on two premises (CI): offenders (Cr) tend to be (Pi) under-socialized (At) - they (Pr) lack (Pp) the values, attitudes, reasoning and social skills (Pd) [[which (C) are (Pi) required (At) for pro-social adjustment (Cr); such skills (G) can be taught (Pm) ]].

5. The purpose of the cognitive training sessions (T) is (Pi) [[to foster (Pm) the offender’s cognitive development (G) (V1)) and [[to teach (Pm) them (B) specific cognitive skills (G)(V2)]] ]].

6. It (V) is not designed (Pm) [[to effect (Pm) basic personality change (R) (T)]] (an exceedingly ambitious undertaking) (At).
7. **It** (T) is (Pi) not psychotherapy (V).

8. **Cognitive training** (G) has been found (Pme) to be therapeutic (At) [[in that **it** (A) fosters (Pm) improved interpersonal and social adjustment (R)]].

9. **However, cognitive training** (T) is (Pi) not therapy (V) [[that (A) deals (Pm) directly (Cm) with the offender’s personal emotional problems (R)]].

10. **On the contrary, cognitive training** (G) is designed (Pm) [[to equip (Pm) the offender (B) with skills (R) [[**which** (A) will help (Pm) him (B) [[to deal with (Pme) his problems (R) himself; skills **which** (A) will also help (Pm) him (B) [[to avoid (Pm) such problems (R) in the first place (Cl)]]]]]]]]

11. **It** (At) is (Pi) a fundamental premise (V) of the cognitive model [[**that the best approach to treatment for offenders** is (Pi) an educational one -directly and systematically (Cm) training (Pm) them (B) in the skills (G) [[needed to live (Pm) more effectively (Cm)]] (Handbook, p. 3).]

**Text 3.2: ‘Management of Emotions’**

1. **There** is (Pe) [convincing evidence (X) [[**that offenders** (A) [[**who** have acquired (Pm) the social skills (R) [[taught (Pm) in this program (Cl)]]]] learn [[to apply (Pm) these skills (R) in social situations outside of the group (Cl) and thereby (Cc) improve (Pm) their ability (R) [[to solve (Pb) many of the interpersonal conflicts (Ph) [[**which** previously (Cl) would have led (Pm) to anti-social or deviant behavior (Cl)]]]]]]]]]]]]

2. **Moreover, they** (A) learn [[to avoid (Pb) such situations (Ph) [[**before they** (A) develop (Pm) (Cl)]]]].
3. **However, an offender** (A) cannot avoid (Pb) all conflict (Ph).

4. **There** will be (Pe) [times (X) **when** the problems [[the encounters]] (Pm) (Ag) will make (Pc) him (G) highly aroused (At) both emotionally and physiologically (Cm).]

5. **Emotions**, (T) of course, are (Pi) a crucial aspect of thinking (V).

6. **There** are (Pe) few thoughts (X) without emotion (Ca); few emotions (X) without thought (Ca).

7. **The emotion** (A) is (Pi) often stronger (At) than **and** overrides (Pm) the thought (G).

8. **It is** (Pi) imperative (V) [[that offenders (A) learn [[to use (Pm) cognitive techniques (G) to manage (Pm) their emotions (R) [[so that they (G) no longer (Cl) are simply (Cm) controlled (Pm) by them (A)]]]]]]

9. **A moderate level of arousal** (C) in conflict situations (Cl) is (Pi) both natural (At) and essential (At) **since** it energizes (Pm) **and** can serve [[to motivate (Pm) problem-solving activity (R)]].

10. **Very strong feelings and high levels of arousal**, (A) **however**, may interfere (Pm) with the individual’s application of cognitive skills (Cl) [[which he (Pr) has (Pi) no difficulty (Pd) [[using (Pm) [[**when** he (C) is (Pi) calm (At)]]]]]]

11. **In large measure (Cx)**, the offender’s success (A) in social situations (Cl) will depend on (Pm) his ability [[to:
12. respond to (Pb) interpersonal conflict (Ph) in a manner (Cm) [[ which effectively (Cm) prevents (Pm) him (G) from becoming (Pi) emotionally aroused (At)]]]]

13. **This ability** (G) can be achieved (Pm) in most situations (Cl) by application of the various skills [[taught (Pm) in this program]] (Cm).

14. [[- maintain (Pb) or reduce (Pb) his level of arousal (Ph) to a moderate level (Cl) in emotionally provoking situations (Cl)]].
15. **That** (T) is (Pi) one focus of training (V) in this unit (Cl).

16. [[- persist (Pm) in applying (Pm) his cognitive skills (G) *even when* his arousal (C) is (Pi) high (At)].]

17. **This ability** (G) can be developed (Pm) in two ways (Cm):
   a.) [[by practicing (Pm) his cognitive skills (G) so frequently [[*that they* (C) become (Pi) habitual, automatic responses to interpersonal stress (At)].]
   b.) [[by practicing (Pm) these skills (G) under emotionally arousing conditions (Cl).]

18. **That is why we** (A) suggest (Pv) [[*that* in training sessions (Cl) you (A) encourage (Pm) highly intense provocative discussion(G)]].

19. **We** (S) want (Pme) the offenders (Ph) [[to practice (Pm) the application of the skills (G) [[you (A) are teaching (Pm) under conditions (Cl) [[which correspond (Pi) as closely as possible (Cx) to the emotionally charged conflicts (Cl) [[he is likely to encounter (Pm) outside of the sessions (Cl)]]]]]] (Handbook, p. 155-6).

**Text 3.3: ‘Problem Solving’**

1. **Many anti-social individuals** (Pr) have (Pi) deficits (Pd) in interpersonal problem-solving(Cl) - the *thinking* skills (Cl) [[*which* (C) are (Pi) required (At) [[for solving (Pb) problems (Ph) [[*which we* all (A) encounter (Pm) in interacting (Pv) with other people (Ca)]]]]]

2. **In their interpersonal relations** (Cl), offenders (A) often fail to recognize (Pme) [[*that an interpersonal problem* (C) exists (Pe) or is about to occur (Pe); if *they* (S) do recognize (Pme) it (Ph), *they* (S) fail to understand (Pme) it (Ph)].

3. **They** (S) do not or cannot consider (Pme) alternative solutions (Ph) to such problems, (Cl) *but* keep responding (Pb) in their same old,
ineffective way (Cm).

4. **They** (S) cannot calculate (Pme) the consequences of their behaviour (Ph) on other people (Cl).

5. **It** is (Pi) not just [[**that they** do (Pme) not; **they** can not (Pme)]].

6. **They** (S) cannot determine (Pme) the best way (Ph) [[to get (Pm) [[what **they** want (Pme) in their interactions (Cl) with other people (Ca)]]]]

7. **They** (S) do not understand (Pme) the cause and effect relationship between their behaviour and people’s reaction to them (Ph).

8. **Problem-solving training** (T) is (Pi) a component of many programs for offenders (V).

9. **In our program** (Cl), problem-solving training (C) is (Pi) not limited [[to offering (Pm) individuals (B) specific solutions (R) to specific problems (Cl), but aims [[to teach (Pm) cognitive and behavioural skills (R) [[**which** will enable (Pm) the individual (B) [[to develop (Pm) a **general** approach (R) to problems (Cl)]]]]]] (Handbook, p. 17).

Text 3.4: ‘Assertive Communication’

1. **You** (A) will be teaching (Pm) them (B) [[**that** the manner (A) [[in which **they** (A) attempt [[to implement (Pm) a solution (R) will determine (Pm) the success of their problem-solving effort (R); [[**that some ways (Cr) [[of implementing (Pm) a possible solution (R) will be (Pi) effective (At), [some (Cr) ineffective (A)] and some (A) may magnify (Pm) the problem (G)]]]]]]]]]]]]

2. **Your goal** (T) will be (Pi) [[to have (Pc) each client (S) understand (Pme) [[**that he** (Sy) must communicate (Pv) his personal solutions (Vb) precisely and accurately (Cm) and in such a manner (Cm) [[**that people** (S)]]]]]]
clearly (Cm) understand (Pme) how he (S) feels (Pme) (V) and he (A) must do so (Pv) [[without antagonizing (Pm) or violating (Pm) their rights (G)) (Cm)]]]]]

3. **In effect, he** (A) must learn [[to express (Pv) his feelings, his views and his suggestions (Vb) in an assertive manner (Cm) (R)]]

4. **Many offenders** (Sy) tend to avoid (Pm) expressing (Pv) their views (Vb), whereas **many others** (Sy) express (Pv) them (Vb) aggressively (Cm); **neither approach** (T) is likely [[to achieve (Pm) the goal (R) [of making (Pc) others (S) understand (Pme) or appreciate (Pme) their suggestions (Ph)] (V)]]]]

5. **You** (A) will teach (Pm) them (B) [[to understand (Pme) why avoidance or aggressive approaches (Cr) are (Pi) ineffective (At) (because of their effect on other people (Cc) ] (Ph)- and you (A) will help (Pm) them (B) [[to learn (Pm) and practice (Pm) assertive responses (G) - communicating (Pv) their views (Vb) clearly (Cm) (without antagonizing (Pm) people (G)) (Ca)]]]] (Handbook, p. 92).

**Text 3.5: ‘Values Enhancement’**

1. **Throughout the program** (Cl) you (A) must frequently (Cm) reinforce (Pm) your participant’s pro-social talk and actions (G).

2. **That is, you** (A) must take (Pm) as many opportunities as possible (R) [[to support (Pv) and encourage (Pv) (by word or gesture) (Cm) the behavior and verbalizations (Vb) of your participants [[which (C) reflect (Pi) anti-criminal and pro-social attitudes (At)]] ]].

3. **Moreover, you** (A) must also respond (Pv) to participants’ pro-criminal or anti-social talk (G) [[by questioning (Pv) the participants (G) about the personal and social implications, and consequences of such positions (Cm)]].
4. **The approach** we recommend to values enhancement (CI) (T) is (Pi) not character education or indoctrination (V).

5. **We** (A) reject (Pm) any attempt (G) [[to inculcate (Pm) values (R) [[by preaching (Pv), moralizing (Pv) or sermonizing (Pv) (Cm)]]]].

6. **We** (A) do so (Pm) primarily because **we** (S) do not believe (Pme) [[**such approaches** (C) will be (Pi) effective (At) with offenders (Ca)]].

7. **For the same reason** (C), we (A) do not recommend (Pv) advice-giving (G) or telling (Pv) offenders (Rv) [[**what** (V) the “correct” values (T) are (Pi) (Vb)]].

8. **Rather than telling** (Pv) offenders (Rv) [[**what values** (G) they should or must adopt (Pm) (they (A) are likely to reject (Pm) your advice (R))], we (A) recommend (Pv) challenging (Pm) the offenders (G) [[to examine (Pme) their beliefs (G), raising (Pm) questions (R) [[**which** (A) stimulate (Pm) them (G) [[to consider (Pme) their views (Ph), and suggesting (Pv) alternative perspectives (Vb)]]]]]]

9. **We** (S) agree (Pme) with those who (Sy) argue (Pv) [[**that** in our complex society (CI) **there** is (Pe) no universally accepted system of values (X)]]

10. **There** is (Pe) considerable disagreement (X) even about fundamental principles or morality and ethics (Cm).

11. [[**Values** (G) **which** (T) are (Pi) “correct” (At) for one group (V)] may be repudiated (Pm) by other groups (A).

12. **Values** (C) are (Pi), INDEED, relative (At) to subgroups (B) and even to individuals (B) within subgroups (CI).

13. **Values** (C) are (Pi) also relative (At) to place and circumstances (Cl) and change (Pm) frequently (Cm) in a rapidly changing world (CI).

14. **However, we** (S) do believe (Pme) [[**that there** is (Pe) one universal value (X) [[**which** (G) **all individuals** (A) should adopt (Pm): concern (G) for the feelings of other people (V)]]]].
15. It is (Pi) this value (T) [[which we (S) believe (Pme) must be taught (Pm) to offenders (B) (V); it is (Pi) this value (T) [[which is (Pi) the focus of all our program (V1) and the primary target of our values enhancement module (V2)]]]].

16. Our general approach to teaching (Pm) empathy (G) (T) is (Pi) [[to continually (Cm) challenge (Pm) the offender’s egocentric thinking (G) (V1) and [[to stimulate (Pm) him (G) into considering (Pme) the views, wishes, attitudes and feelings of other people (Ph) (V2)]]]].

17. The values enhancement sessions (G) have been designed (Pm) [[to ensure (Pm) [[that the offenders (G) are continually (Cm) engaged (Pm) in activities (CI) [[which (A) require (Pm) [[that they (S) think (Pme) about the feelings of others (Ph)]]]]]]].

18. This (G) is done (Pm) [[by exposing (Pm) them (G) to social and cognitive conflict (CI) - [[by creating (Pm) situations (R) [[in which they (S) find (Pme) [[that they (C) are (Pi) in conflict (At) about what they (S) believe (Pme) [[and in which their ideas (C) are (Pi) in conflict (At) with those of others (C)]]]]]]]].

19. In these situations (Cl) the participants (S) come to seriously (Cm) question (Pme) and examine (Pme) their ideas (Ph) about many important matters of morality (Cm) and, MORE IMPORTANT, they (G) are impelled (Pm) [[to consider (Pme) the points of view of other people (Ph)]] (Handbook, p. 192).

Text 3.6: ‘Negotiation Skills’

1. Many offenders (Be), when faced (Pm) with interpersonal conflict (Cl), rebel (Pb) in an anti-social manner (Cm) which (A) may alienate (Pm) or antagonize (Pm) other people (G).
2. Their rebellinl! (A) may magnify (Pm) the problem (G), and lead (Pm) to difficulties with the law (Cl).

3. [[Many other offenders, (S) unwilling (At) or unable (At) to deal (Pme) appropriately (Cm) with the conflict (Ph)]], retreat (Pb).

4. They (S) fail [[to deal (Pme) with the conflict (Ph) in a direct manner]] (Cm), but, instead, engage (Pb) in various manipulative behaviours (R) [[which (C) often are (Pi) highly deviant (At)]].

5. Retreat (C) for others (Cc) involves (Pi) avoiding (Pb) the issue (Ph) altogether (Cx) [[by escaping (Pb) into alcohol or drugs (Cl)]].

6. Still other offenders (Be) avoid (Pm) the conflict (R) [[by conforming (Pb) (Cm)]]- they (Be) accept (Pb) the other’s person demands (Ph) without objection (Cm).

7. Retreating and rebelling (T) both represent (Pi) maladaptive responses (V) [[which are likely [[to create (Pm) problems (G), rather than solve (Pb) them (Ph)]] ]]; they (A) also may lead (Pm) to illegal behaviour (Cl).

8. Conforming, (A) [[although not a deviant response (At)]], requires (Pm) [[that the offender (A) relinquish (Pm) his position (G) and forfeit (Pm) his needs (G)]]

9. Accordingly, conforming (A) may not resolve (Pb) the conflict (Ph); it (A) may simply (Cm) delay (Pm) it (G).

10. You (A) will teach (Pm) participants (G) an alternative response to conflict: negotiation (G).

11. Negotiation (T) usually involves (Pi) compromise or concession (V) yielding (Pm) somewhat (Cx) in one’s demands (Cl) in order to make (Pc) the other party (Cr) willing (At) to accept (Pm) at least part of one’s wishes (G).

12. Compromise (T), of course, is (Pi) anathema to many offenders (B) (V), [[who (S) may view (Pme) it as a weakness (Co)]].
13. **Accordingly, it** (Cr) is (Pi) essential (At) (V) [[**that you** (A) impress upon (Pm) participants (G) [[**that rebelling and retreating** (T) are (Pi) for “losers” (At) (V) ]] ]; **they** (T) are (Pi) “no win” strategies (V) - **they** (A) usually fail to get (Pm) the offender (B) [[**what** (Ph) **he** (S) wants (Pme)] and may get (Pm) him (B) [[**what** (Ph) **he** (S) doesn’t want (Pme): a court referral! (Ph)]]]]]

14. **Negotiation** (T), on the other hand, is (Pi) a “no-lose” strategy (V) – **both parties** (A) are able [[to satisfy (Pm) their needs (G) in a way (Cm) [[**which** (Cr) is (Pi) mutually satisfactory (At)]] ]].

15. **It** (Cr) is (Pi) also essential (At) (V) [[**that you** (A) counter (Pm) the view (G) [[**that negotiation** (Cr) is (Pi) [[**what** (G) **weak or inadequate individuals** (A) do (Pm)] (V)]] ]]]]

16. **You** (A) must impress (Pm) on them (G) [[**that negotiation** (T) is (Pi) an activity (V) [[**that** requires (Pm) both strength and skill (G) - strength (G) [[to directly (Cm) face (Pm) the conflict (R) and interpersonal skills **which** enable (Pm) the offender (B) [[to negotiate (Pv) successfully (Cm)]] ]] ]] ]] (Handbook, pp. 131-2).
### APPENDIX II

**Text 4.1: ‘The Confidence Game’, Chapter 4**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speaker</th>
<th>Turn</th>
<th>Turned On</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01:</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>You would quite openly defy the law and go tae jail tae back up yer ethics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G:</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Aye</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01:</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Yeah?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>?:</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Aye, mhm, aye</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01:</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Go tae jail for contempt of court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>?:</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Aye, mhm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01:</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>All of you would be quite willing tae go tae jail, jeopardize yer own career, yer own family, the support that ye have fae them ... in order... tae protect a source.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W:</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Aye</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J:</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Aye</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01:</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Something in this nature, in these cases you could be jailed for a long long time, ye’re not talking aboot contempt three month, ye’re talking aboot not helping the law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B:</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>[What does the judge want tae find that oot for?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01:</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>What tae find out for? For what? What dae ye [think?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B:</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>[Tae jail him, is it?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01:</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Tae jail who?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J:</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>His source=</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9.16 =He’s innocent

01: 17 Naw, maybe he just wants tae find oot so as he can
maybe get more detail intae it.

B: 18 Naw, cos’ then [...

01: 19 [How come, if the police canny get
this type ay information, where dae ye get it then? The
judge might want to know for what reason.

B: 20 Cos’ [

01: 21 [Is this true or is it not true?

B: 22 Not a loat of people like the polis.

O1: 23 Not a loat of people like the police.

B: 24 Aye=

01: 25 =I think the judge is alright with the police, eh?

B: 26 Aye, sticks by them, don’t he.

01: 27 Okay: in cases like this ye’re talking aboot going tae
co(urt), not going tae jail for three months, ye’re talking
aboot from five years onwards for contempt in cases like
this. ... So ye’d go tae jail for five year, away fae yer
family, yer children, lose yer job, lose every form ay
income that ye had, jis’ so as you could
protect a source.

J: 28 Aye.

O1: 29 (Or jis’ so as ye wudnae.) ... Right, ye’re protecting a
source, okay. The rest ay you the [same?

P: 30 [If he does give
away his source, his joab would be finished probably
anyway, cos’ no other source wud want tae go near him=

01: 31 =Why? Where does it say up there that once he tells
the judge ... where does it say up there that once he tells
the judge that the judge is gaunny use the information? ...
The oanly thing the judge has asked for is his source. (?)

P: 32 All judges use information. They don't jis' collect it
and don't use it. All judges dae.

O1: 33 What's he asked him for?
G: 34 The source=
J: 35 =The source.
[pause 3 secs]

O1: 36 Demanded that he reveal his source of information.
Why?

G: 37 'Cos he wants tae know who he's gettin' it fae.

O1: 38 He wants tae know who he is gettin' it from, Gary.
Aye, exactly. For what reason?

D: 39 Tae see where the source is gettin' it fae?

J: 40 'Cos the polis don't know any'hin aboot it.

O1: 41 Nobody else knows nothing about it. And this
journalist comes up with this [information
B: 42 [The journalist doesn't
want anybody else tae know.

O1: 43 But the judge is now demanding that he tells him.
B: 44 Fuck the judge=
J: 45 =Aye, but he tells the judge and then the polis find
out and then the polis (go and find the source).

O1: 46 Okay, ye say fuck the judge.
B: 47 Aye

O1: 48 If you fuck the judge and you're goin' tae jail for five
years for [contempt.
J: 49 [Fuck 'im
P: 50 (If ye want tae tell the judge, coast tae coast they find oot the source’s name.)

B: 51 Where does it say that if he does reveal the source, he’ll no’ go tae jail?

O1: 52 Sorry?

B: * 53 Where does it say that if he does [What happens with contempt of court? If you’re found guilty of contempt of court ...]

O1: 54 [What happens tae ye if ye’re found out contempt of court?]

G: 55 Ye’re telling the truth.

O1: 56 Sorry?

?: NV [hhh]

G: 57 Tell the truth.

B: * 58 Naw! But wha’ [What happens tae him if he does dae it?]

O1: 59 [What happens tae ‘im.]

B: 60 Jailed=

O1: 61 =Right. The judge has demanded that he answers his question. If he refuses tae answer his questions, he’s deemed tae be in contempt of court.

B: 62 Right, so what will happen tae him if he does dae it? [pause 3 secs]

O1: 63 Nothing will happen tae ‘im. [pause 4 secs]

B: 64 (?)

O1: 65 If he does dae it, nothing will happen tae ‘im. What?

B: 66 (Try tae ring it), get somebody else, gie somebody else’s name.

O1: 67 So he’s given his source, he’s lyin’ tae the judge as
far as the judge is concerned then. So ye’re sayin’ ye wud give a name but no’ the right name?

B: 68 Aye (?) try tae ring it.

O1: 69 But ye jis’ said a couple of minutes ago ye wudnae give [anybody’s name.

B: 70 [Ah’ve changed ma mind noo. Ah wudnae gie the right source’s name.

O1: 71 See umm okay

[pause 6 secs]

\{taps his pencil on desk\} Give me three ... concrete valid reasons why ye shouldn’t give up this guy’s name tae the judge. Three.

B: 72 We’re the grasses for the day! ha ha!

O1: 73 You three. Give me three valid reasons why ye should give the judge the information he requires. Three.

P: 74 Ye write it.

O1: 75 Okay?

(several turns omitted)

O1: 76 What’s yer second reason?

G: 77 Ye could stoap illegal drugs shipments from being made.

O1: 78 Right. By doin’ that and givin’ the information the police could get hold of more information aboot this network that’s goin’ aboot and stoap the stuff being shipped aboot all over the place ... And if it’s a big company like what they are suggesting’ in that bulletin and there’s hundreds and hundreds of thousands and thousands of pounds goin’ aboot ... and youse are quite willin’ tae allow that tae continue ...
D: 79  Right
O1: 80  Aw for the sake ay yer promise ... Aye?
P: 81  Aye, because his promise is as soon as he started the
baw rollin' so from then oan they should take (over),
ye don't need the source.
O1: 82  Oh Ah see, ye want them tae take over but wi oanly
half the information. Ye want them to stoap, but
without yer help noo.
P: 83  Aye, but he's gied them as much help as he can gie
them=
O1: 84  =No he's [no'
B: 85  [no he's no'=
P: 86  =He can as much as he wants tae gie=
O1: 87  =Ah, there's a difference.
G: 88  Aye, as much as he wants.
?: 89  (?)
P: 90  He's made a promise, ain't he?
D: 91  That's aw he's giein' them, know what Ah mean.
?: 92  NV [hhh]
O1: 93  So this stuff is bein' shipped aboot, and it's goin' intae
aw the areas that youse live in, it goes tae aw the
schools yer kids go tae and ye're quite happy tae allow it
tae continue...
B: 94  How dae ye feel ... if yer..[ G: The wean?] weans
fuckin'... goat aw this (soil)
D: 95  No' goat any weans [O1: Yeah] and never will.
B: 96  That's what Ah says. (?)
O1: 97  So dae ye want yer children, if ye decide tae have any,
tae grow up in a drug-culture or a drug-free society?
D: 97 Ye can’t beat drugs all over the world anyway ... know what Ah mean?

O1: 98 So is that right we don’t dae anything tae stoap it=
D: 99 =no really no.

J: 100 One man doesnae make the law ye know=

B: 101 Wha’?=

O1: 102 =Sorry?

J: 103 One man doesnae make the law for the drugs.

O1: 104 One man doesnae make the law for the drugs? Ah don’t know what ye mean, J.

J: 105 Well, the way ye’re puttin’ it, right?

O1: 106 mhm

J: 107 (?) there’s been drugs everywhere for centuries.

O1: 108 Unless what?

G: 109 Unless ye staun up and try and stoap it.

J: 110 But they never done it.

O1: 111 [Why?

B: 112 [Ye can dae it the noo.

O1: 113 Because of promises?

G: 114 (?)

O1: 115 So ye’re sayin’ then it’s quite awright for these people tae get away wi’... threatenin’ tactics, [intimidation

J: 116 *[But they have been daein’ it [for

O1: 117 [Ah’m no’ asking if they have been daein’ it for years, Ah’m asking is it right for them tae get away wi’ it. [pause 6 secs]

J: 118 Eh=
O1: 119 =Go oan!

J: * 120 Naw, no' really, but [  

B: 121 [What can ye dae? *Ye can [  

O1: 122 [Ye can help by givin’ the source ay information which might stoap it [J: Naw] at once ... So ye want tae stoap it but ye don’t want tae help stoap it, is that what ye’re are sayin’ tae me ?  

J: *123 Ah’m jis’ puttin’ myself [in  

O1: 124 [Naw! Ah’m asking you a question. Ye want it stoapped=  

J: 125 =Naw  

O1: 126 but ye’re not willing tae help.  

P: 127 Ah’m no’.  

J: 128 Ah’m no’ prepared tae help [  

O1: 129 [Ah see. So ye want it stoapped, but ye’re not prepared tae help.  

J: 130 mhm.

Text 4.2: ‘The Confidence Game’, Chapter 4

| Speaker | Turn |
|---------|------|---|
| O2:     | 1    | Would you reveal your source? |
| A:      | 2    | Naw                        |
| O2:     | 3    | J! Should he reveal his source? |
| J: NV1  | 4    | haha {talks to H and now turns to officer} |
|         | 5    | No fuckin’ danger!  |
| O2:     | 6    | J?                        |
H: 6  Naw
O2: 7  Naebdy? Naebdy reveal his source? But what aboot this: (wee Tom, that guy told him that Jamieson Petrie is his long-time friend) He’s made a loat of profits fae ... the drug business. But the thing is he’s become an addict hisself.
T: 8  Then what?
O2: 9  Well, dae ye no’ think if he told them, they might be able tae get him aff the drugs?
T: 10  What? And get him tae fuckin’ jail?
A: 11  That wud be cuttin’ his supplies aff.
N: 12  (?)
A: 13  That wud be cutting his supplies aff and he’s an addict hisself, won’t he.
O2: 14  In a way they wud be daein’ him a favour, wouldn’t they?
J: 15  Ah wudnae fuckin’ speak tae [them!
T: 16  [Naw they wudnae, they wud get him tae jail=
A: 17  =Newspapers are confident. [T: (??)] They are not supposed tae break yer confidence. Ye sign a contract.
O2: 18  Naw
A: 19  What dae ye mean naw?
O2: 20  No, no’ the journalist. [He’s (confidentiality, ye know) [H!
J: 21  {talks to H and S} [no’ the journalist. Listen, all Ah’m sayin’ is, right, if anybody sways in this group that means they are a grass!
O2: 22  Naw it doesnae.
J: 23 Aye it fuckin' does!

O2: 24 Naw it doesn't!

J: 25 It does tae me!

T: 26 (all grasses then!)

O2: 27 Tom had paid the guy 2000 [pounds]

J: 28 [Doesnae matter what he paid 'im!]

O2: 29 But dae you no' feel he doesnae owe him any loyalty, now he's paid him a lot of [money?]

J: 30 [Hector look you listen tae me here! Are ye [listenin’? {points at officer with both hands}]

T: NV2 [hhh]

O2: 31 No!

J: 32 Anybody who's supposed tae grass, is a fuckin' grass. End ay story!

O2: 33 It's for the nation's good! The well-being of the nation=

T: 34 =Fuck the nation! =

J: 35 =For fuck's sake Mr [ ], get it taegether!

O2: * 36 If he doesnae tell the court how that drugs these drugs are gettin' transported, right [pause 4 secs]

J: * 37 If he does tell them

O2: 38 Right, Tom hisself he's goat two young teenage sons, right [T: wha'?] he's concerned.

T: 39 He can move then!

O2: 40 And a young teenage daughter [J: (?)] right, people from that same transport company have been
seen hangin' aboot the school

T: 41 [Doesnae matter he can move
to another school.

J: 42 {jumps up} [Ah’ve had enough
man, Ah’ve had enough.

T: 43 He canny stick ‘im in [O2: eh?] no matter what.
O2: 44 He’s no gaunny stick ‘im in?=
T: 45 =They fuckin’ dae him [(?)

John: 46 [Dae ye mind if Ah slip ma
shorts oan by the way? {unbuttons his jeans and
shows his shorts}

O2: 47 Naw! We don’t want tae see yer spindly legs! {to
T} Eh? Ye’re no’ gaunny grass?
T: 48 (?)
O2: 49 Eh? No wait a minute!
T: 50 Look! Ah’ve told ye. Ah hate them. No, Ah’m not
talkin’ aboot it!

J: 51 Look, listen Hector!
T: 52 Ye’re supportin’ grassing bastards!
O2: 53 It’s no’ [grassin’!

J: 54 [It is grassin!
O2: 55 * The thing was done in confidence, the guy
paid ‘im money, so therefore, what right, is he no’
entitled [A: 56 [That’s even worse.

O2: 57 Wha’?
A: 58 In that case it’s even [worse.

J: 59 [He’s a fuckin’ dirty wrongie!

O2: 60 Is he no’ entitled tae {A: (?)} feel that he can breach
this [confidence

J: 61 [He’s a wrongie Mr [], we’re no’ [int’ristit
O2: 62 [because he’s
gied them money. * What right [
J: 63 [He’s a dirty fuckin’
wrongie!
O2: 64 Well what aboot the wee deals that are done at the
polis stations behind closed doors?
T: 65 What wee fuckin’ deals?
O2: 66 Eh?
J: 67 {points at N} Ye must have made one anyway! (?)
O2: * 68 All the wee deals [
J: 69 [(?)]
T: 70 The wee cunt got done for a bag snatch, sticks me in
and oanly got done wi’ attempt theft. That’s a wee
deal for ye and Ah got seven months through the dirty
wee grass!
O2: 71 But Inspector Flint [T: (?)] says, T if you let me
know who did this, we’ll go easy oan ye.
T: 72 Where dae ye come fae man?=
O2: 73 =Does tha’ no happen?=
T: 74 =Not tae fuckin’ [me!]
O2: 75 [Dae ye tell me this doesn’t happen?
T: 76 Aye it does happen. Ah know how it happens, ‘cos
Ah fuckin’ got tae jail for the wee prick who done it, aye
it [happens.
O2: 77 [Have ye not been put in that position [T: Aye
for fuck] T? A wee bit? * Look wee man,
we fuckin’ [
NV3: haha

J: [Mr [ ] ye’re rippin’ the ass oot it! =

T: =Aye ye’re at it=

J: =Ye’re right rippin’ the ass oot it.

O2: * 81 Ah’m tellin’ ye [

82 [(?) {everybody talks at the same time}]

J: 83 Ah tell ye right now. They {the police} wouldn’t even embarrass theirsel askin’ me for that anymerr.

O2: 84 J?

T: 85 (?)

J: 86 The coppers up my way wudnae embarrass theirsel askin’ me for that.

[pause 4 secs]

O2: 87 But it does go oan J, ye know. Sorry, ye will be here soon. No danger!

T: 88 It does go oan, ‘cos that’s how we’re in the jail through [them.

O2: 89 [But when ye’re in behind here, a wee deal instead of going for a big yin, ye get a wee yin{a small sentence}.]

T: 90 (A wee deal, six months)

H: 91 Ye’ve goat tae go tae court, no matter who ye stick in an’ aw.

J: 92 Naw ye don’t.

H: 93 Wha’?

J: 94 Ye don’t have tae go tae court, ye give a statement.

O2: 95 Ye’re no’ gaunny tell me if you were down for five years or five months ... a wee slip of the tongue, a wee slip of the tongue, a wee hint here or [there (?)]

J: 96 [Mr [ ] Ah’m
gonna tell you something. Ah was sixteen year old, first offence, two assault and robberies. Ah got asked tae turn Queen’s evidence and Ah was walking out ay court [O2: mhm] and Ah took a three and a half year sentence for it.

O2: 97 Is that wise?
T: 98 Aye, it’s [wise.
J: 99 [Aye it’s wise.

O2: 100 Is it?
T: 101 Aye, for one he can walk aboot and keep his heid held up [high

O2: 102 [Walk aboot where? (?). In the prison?
T 103 (?)

O2: 104 Ah’d rather walk aboot outside.
J: 105 So what you’re saying, ye’re a grass?

T: 106 Aye, [he’s a fuckin’ grass!

O2: *107 [Ah’m not sayin’ Ah’m a grass, all Ah’m [sayin’
J: 108 [So

what ye’re sayin’ is Ah should’ve stuck him in?

O2: 109 Ah didnae say that, all Ah wud say is Ah wud rather walk, know what Ah’m sayin’, walk aboot outside [.

J: 110 [Mr [ ] Ah took my chances through the trial.

T: 111 (?)

O2: 112 Eh?

J: 113 Ah took ma chances through the trial.

O2: 114 Mhm. So you’re sayin’ there’s people who wudnae grass then?

T: 115 There is people who don’t grass, plenty ay [them.

J: 116 [There was
six of us in court that day and not one ay us grassed.

T: 117 Dae ye think most criminals are grasses?

O2: 118 Eh?

T: 119 Dae ye think most criminals are grasses? [O2: T!]
   Ah must be one of the elite then, ‘cos Ah never stuck
   anybody in in ma life.

O2: 120 T!

T: 121 Don’t fuckin’ T me! Ah know Ah’m no fuckin’
   grass!

O2: 122 T! It get’s done all the time.

T: 123 Aye, it gets done all the [time.

O2: 124 [The wee deals [ 

J: 125 [Well aye,
   well aye! ‘Cos Ah got done for two grasses who went
   oan protection. (He goat put on report on a bogus
   letter found, ‘cos they cudnae prove it).

O2: 126 But it does get done.

T: 127 We’re no’ denyin’ that there’s grassin’. There’s plenty
   ay them=

O2: 128 =This whole jail what about 400 people, wud say
   Ah’d batter a grass, Ah’d kill a grass, [T: (grasses in
   here)] but cud ye still say Ah’ve never grassed, Ah’ve
   never did a deal.

T: 129 Ah cud say that.

O2: 130 [Eh?

J: 131 [Ah cud!

A: 132 What about [ ] what about [ ], the deals he’s daein’ the
   noo?

O2: 133 Who?
A: [ ]
H: (?)
O2: He's oanly tryin'... he's only after his ain self.
A: (?)
H: (?)
J: Ah cud. All Ah'm sayin' is Ah've never stuck anybody in my whole life.
O2: That's fair enough J. But Ah'm sayin', what Ah’m sayin, Ah’m no’ sayin’ Ah’ve never done or ever done it, either or, what Ah’m sayin’ it gets done J and the very people who dae it, are the very people who condemn grasses.
J: Exactly.
T: We’re no’ denyin' that, [O2: Eh?] we’re sayin’ it does happen.
O2: Right=
T: =Fuck’s sake ... See, right, Ah was stuck in, right see the boy who stuck me in, he’s done 13 sentences.
H: Who is it?
T: [ ]. [H: Is it?] Done 13 sentences and stuck me in because he was junked oan tabs. That was his excuse. No excuse where Ah come fae. But that’s what he said, know what Ah [mean.
J: [Nae excuse for grasses=]
T: =This boy’s done 13 sentences. Never been known as a grass. And yet he stuck me in tae get away for a bag snatch. That’s the truth, aye.
O2: What if a good friend ay yours right [T: Six
months] a good friend ay yours, a member of yer family was badly beaten up and he's desperate tae find out who it was and (?) ye knew who it was.

T: 150 (?)

H: 151 Ah'd fuckin' dae and shoot the bastard, dae a favour for them. Ah'd shoot 'im, but no' grass him in. Ah'd dae them a favour. Ah've done it afore. Ah've no' shot any cunt, but Ah slashed, stabbed a few cunts but and attacked ma next-door neighbour.

(?) {Everybody talks at the same time}

O2: 152 Ye must admit that it gets done

H: 153 (?)

N: 154 It gets done, but not by anybody here.

J: 155 Aye ma brother got done. And it came back tae me who it was. And the guy says tae me listen blah blah blah. Anyway, he telt me who it was and that's how Ah'm here the noo. But aye it gets done.

O1: 156 And how dae ye think the polis capture a lot of people?

T: 157 Because of grasses!

J: 158 If the polis had never information (?)

H: 159 The biggest gangsters stick each other in.

J: 160 Aye, ye better believe it.

O2: 161 So we're no' gaunny change oor mind here?

All: 162 Naw!

O2: 163 No' even for a moment?

T: 164 The polis werenae wide enough tae catch me theirsel, so they goat a grass tae dae it for them. How can I condemn grasses when Ah'm here because of them?
J: 165  Aye, Ah tell ye, aye, Ah let my wife get away wi’ it.
... My wife stuck me in.

O2: 166  Stuck ye in?

J: 167  Aye

T: 168  That’s the oanly person in the world who can stick ye
in at the polis and (?) because she’s yer wife.

J: 169  She’s fuckin’ done it. Ah fuckin’ tell ye: see
wummin, wummin, see wummin love tae spill their
fuckin’ guts. [O2: Aye] Ah tell ye there’s nothing better
for a woman tae go in there and get it aff her chest. [O2:
Aye] Ah’m staun in the dock like tha’ aye dirty cow
{folds arms across his chest} did ye need tae tell them
that? [O2: That’s right]. She’s telt them all sorts.

O2: 170  There’s another wee inference that they {women}
make when they’re talkin’ about us. They are masters
at it. We’re no’ masters at it.

H: 171  It comes natural tae them=

O2: 172  =It comes natural tae them.

J: 173  It’s fuckin’ oan top for you Andrea ye female ye! It’s
fuckin’ oan top for ye!

O2: 174  This is murder this. Ye never gaunny change?

? 175  Ah wudnae even think aboot it.
### Text 5.1: ‘The Robbery’, Chapter 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speaker</th>
<th>Turn</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>J:</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O1:</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J:</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>R:</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>O1:</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>G:</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>O1:</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>G:</td>
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<td>J:</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>O1:</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>G:</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O1:</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>J:</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G:</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J:</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| O1:     | 16   | See! So once ye’ve told the police, the police are gaunny come and say the reason we got this...
information was because ye caught him robbin' yer house?

G: 17 Aye.

O1: 18 Umm. So we'd like a statement from you as well now, Sir.

J: 19 Ah'd jis' refuse ye a statement.

O1: 20 Ye'd refuse to give a statement. Okay. Unfortunately he was caught in your house and that's how it came about that we found out he robbed the other houses. When it comes to court we're gonna actually call you as a witness. Put you up in the stand. So ye're gonna perjure yerself?

J: 21 Ah'd jis' say Ah found the guy outside the hoose.

O1: 22 Ye caught him outside yer house. So what ye're sayin' ye beat this man up in public?

J: 23 Aye.

O1: 24 See! Sir, so we now arrest you for assault.

NV1 [hhh]

J: 25 Fair do's.

O1: 26 Right.

J: 27 Ah still wudnae stick the guy in.

O1: 28 So ye gaunny go tae court yerself. This guy has broken into yer hoose [J: Ah know] he's robbin' you, he's robbed yer neighbours, right, ye've done him in and now ye are in court for assault and he's walkin' away scot-free?

J: 29 Isn't necessarily walkin' away scot-free, is he?

O1: 30 Aye he is. Scot-free. But ye're gettin' doon for six month for assault.
J: 31 That’s jis’ the way it goes.
O1: 32 All because he broke into yer hoose and yer neighbours’ hooses, ye gaunny go and dae time for ‘im?
J: 33 Probably, aye.
C: 34 Ye’re wrong boy, ye’re wrong.
J: 35 Ah certainly wudnae stick the guy in.
M: 36 Aye, but ye’re a law-abidin’ citizen, yer mind doesnae work the same way it is workin’ now.
O1: 37 How long are ye [gaunny dae time for?
J: 38 [Ah wudnae know about that, haha
G: 39 Ah wudnae hand him in, Ah jis’ wud talk tae ‘im.
O1: 40 Naw?
G: 41 Ah’m jis’ gaunny probably talk tae him [ O1: 42 [What aboot that mad bastard who lives across the road, that C Williams, he’s fuckin’ bonkers, he’s got a bad temper, he’s gonna leather the fuckin’ boy, ‘cos ye’re gonna tell the rest of the neighbours as you said.
G: 43 Aye, maybe.
O1: 44 Ye might, oh ye might noo?
G: 45 Ah didnae say Ah wud tell them, Ah say Ah might tell them. It all depends on the circumstances. If Ah knew him well [
O1: 46 [The circumstances are what the circumstances are {points towards the board}
G: 47 If Ah knew ‘im well [ O1: 48 [He’s robbed umpteen other hooses in the street.
G: 49 Right. If Ah knew him well but, If Ah grew up wi’
him=

O1:  50  =He’s the boy who lives across the road.
G:  51  Aye. [?]
M:  52  [Think of the lowest form ay life in yer area, G, ye caught him in yer hoose [G: Ah know but], wud ye stick him in? Wud ye murder him?
J:  53  Ah’d murder them, but Ah wudnae stick ‘im in.
M:  54  Ye’re doon for a life sentence ... ye don’t want tae jail for the rest of yer life jis’ for murderin’ a low-lifer.
J:  55  Ah wudnae murder ‘im [but.
O1:  56  [So yer wife and yer kids are gonna lose you for at least six months for assault, all because you don’t want him tae go tae jail?
J:  57  Ah never said Ah didnae want ‘im tae go tae jail
O1:  58  Oh Ah see, ye don’t want him... ye dae want tae go tae jail? Ye don’t want him tae go tae jail by yer hand?=
J:  59  =It wudnae matter. Some other (?)
M:  NV2 [hhh]
O1:  60  Oh Ah see. So what ye’re sayin’ it’s awright for him tae get stuck in as long as it is no’ you that’s daein’ it?
J:  61  Aye.
O1:  62  Awright... So how wud ye dae that?
J:  63  How dae ye mean?
NV3 [hh]
O1:  64  How wud ye dae it?
J:  65  How wud Ah dae what?
O1:  66  How wud ye stick ‘im in without ye daein’ it? How wud ye get him nicked?
G:  67  Blame some other cunt.
Ah see.

As Ah says Ah’d tell somebody else [O1: See!][79]

another neighbour=

=Right ... by the way Ah caught Rick Jones robbin’ in

ma hoose last night, he’s admitted daein’ all yer hooses as

well. - Oh, is that right, Ah’m jis’ gaunny phone the polis

and we gaunny get ‘im done for the burglaries of all the

hooses then.

Right.

Okay, Ah’m back tae bein’ this police officer. Ah’m

at yer door, Ah want a statement.

Ah still wudnae gie you a statement.

Ye’re refusing to give me a statement, it’s a fact that

you caught this man in yer house then,

Sir []

[So how []

[How Does Mr Inglis know [J: Ah

wudnae have the coppers in ma hoose] you caught ‘im

in the house then?]

He’s picked me up wrang.

Oh he’s picked you up wrong. So how dae ye know,

he’s robbed Mr Inglis’ house?

‘Cos he telt me.

He told ye. And why did he tell you this, Sir?

‘Cos Ah leathered ‘im.

Oh, ye leathered ‘im.

NV4 haha

So you assaulted this man?

Aye, Ah assaulted him.
O1: 85 So where did this assault take place Sir?

J: 86 Jis' ootside the door. [O1: Outside the door] He was tamperin' wi' the door, so Ah assaulted him.

O1: 87 Ah'm afraid we gonna charge you wi' assault. You've just made a statement you've assaulted somebody simply for tamperin' wi' yer door. How do you know the boy wasnae in the wrong house, tryin' tae get into his own house? I mean he does live just across the street, the houses are all very [similar.

S: 88 [He had a balaclava oan.

[Pause - 4 secs]

O1: 89 He had a balaclava oan.

J: 90 Naw, Ah never said he had a balaclava oan, ha. It was him, next-door neighbour.

[Pause - 5 secs]

R: 91 It's oanly pretty obvious we wud dae but really.

O1: 92 How?

R: 93 [Right, in yer eyes [J: 94 [What if Ah wud have leathered 'im

O1: 95 [Ye’ve got children

J: 96 With yer eyes

R: 97 Aye, but in my eyes, right [O1: 98 [Right, ye’ve got children, ye get up in the middle of the night and ye find somebody wi' a mask on in the middle of yer house.

R: 99 Ah’d jis’ stab fuck oot ay ‘im throw ‘im in the bin
[O1: umm] and put ‘im in a black bag, bury ‘im and that wud be it.

O1: 100 Yeah?

R: 101 Ah wudnae grass oan him but really, oanly fae a middle-class, fae an upper-class, the way ye were sayin’ upper-class area, they wud jail ye, but the likes ay oor class, the areas where we stay [

O1: 102 [In the jail?

R: 103 Aye in the jail=

J: 104 =Probably aye

R: 105 But oor class, oor [

O1: 106 [Mr Jones...Sorry is the light still oan in that? {checks whether tape is still running}

R: 107 Were we are stayin’ we wudnae jail ‘im. We w-ud rather gie ‘im a right one.

O1: 108 Mr Jones is dyin’ wi’ cancer, ev’rybody in the street knows that and this boy has told ye that the reason [

R: 109 [But that’s no’ the point, know what Ah mean. He cud have went tae some other area and tanned another hoose, can’t he.

O1: 110 See!

Rab: 111 A masochist, tannin’ neighbours’ hooses.
Summarized transcription key

The transcription symbols I used for the oral, conversational texts in this study are as follows (based on Jefferson, 1979; Tannen, 1984, 1989 and 1993; Schiffrin, 1987; Ribeiro, 1996; Eggins and Slade 1997):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[</td>
<td>overlapping utterances: two people talking at the same time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[]</td>
<td>turn is completely contained within another speaker’s turn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>=</td>
<td>latching</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[</td>
<td>a proper noun, such as the name of a prisoner or officer left out to assure confidentiality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(?)</td>
<td>question mark instead of words in round bracket indicates inaudible words (Jefferson, 1979)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(unsure)</td>
<td>words in round bracket are unsure transcriptions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>{non-verbal}</td>
<td>description of non-verbal behaviour (e.g. changes in posture) appear below the segment of talk in square brackets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[hh]</td>
<td>chuckle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[hhh]</td>
<td>laughter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>underline</strong></td>
<td>emphatic stress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td>three dots in transcripts indicate pauses of less than three seconds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[pause -4 secs]</td>
<td>indication of inter-turn pause length</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>=</td>
<td>When there is no interval between adjacent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
utterances, the second being latched immediately to the first (without overlapping it), the utterances are linked together with equal signs (Jefferson, 1979)

umm doubt
mhm agreement

Prisoners are referred to by their initials, the two officers are O1 and O2, respectively. I refer to myself as Andrea.
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