THE CONCEPT OF AIDOS IN GREEK LITERATURE
FROM HOMER TO 404 B.C.

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PREFACE.
The scope of the thesis, as given in the title, requires some explanation: 404 B.C. is largely a nominal cut-off point, since, although authors whose entire oeuvre falls after that date are excluded, except for incidental references, it seemed better to consider the whole of Aristophanes, even though his last two plays take us well into the fourth century; in the case, too, of the fragments of Demokritos, much of the material considered may be of fourth century date, but the corpus as a whole is included for the sake of the light which the fragments shed on fifth century controversies.

I should like to thank my supervisors, Professor D.M. MacDowell and Mr. A.F. Garvie, especially for their generosity and support during the period of my research, but also more generally for the excellent education I received at their (and their colleagues') hands as an undergraduate. The debts which one owes to one's teachers, perhaps, may never be repaid, but I should like to go some way towards that end by mentioning also two most inspirational schoolmasters, A.C. Jones and A.H. Murray, without whose example I should probably never have considered pursuing the study of classics. Thanks must also go to my wife, who endured my unsociability and read many parts of my work in the (fruitful) search for errors. I dedicate this work to my mother and to the memory of my father.
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SUMMARY

The introduction deals briefly with the question of the classification of societies as shame or guilt-cultures, and the position taken that, firstly, such a distinction has no real basis in human psychology and, secondly, that its application to the differences between ancient Greek culture and our own is largely superficial. The challenge to the shame-culture/guilt culture antithesis continues in the chapter on Homer, of which one of the central topics is the extent to which Homeric man possesses an internal conscience. The fundamental association of aidos with popular opinion is noted, and the terms which describe both the kind of situation or conduct which merits censure and the censure itself are studied, with a particular view to their relevance to competitive and co-operative standards. It is concluded that there is no basis for a subordination of the co-operative to the competitive in the vocabulary of the poems, although it is certainly the case that many characters are more concerned with failure in the latter sphere. This, however, is in no way part of the moral ideology of either the poet or his characters.

The main areas of operation of aidos are identified: its rôle in battle and as fear of disgrace in general, its relevance to the co-operative standard of philia, its concern with positive regard for others, especially suppliants and guests, and the particular form which the concept takes with regard to sex, especially in women. These are broadly the categories which also obtain in subsequent chapters.

Instances of the relevant terms in the poetry from Hesiod to Pindar are largely heterogeneous, but particularly worthy of note are Hesiod's remarks on the ambivalence of aidos (a notion also present in Homer), Solon's application of the verb, aideomai, to his lack of concern for the misguided opinions of others, and the association of qualities like aidos and loyalty to one's friends, itself promoted by aidos, with arete, both moral and social, in Theognis.
In the Tragedians, attention is paid first of all to the rôle of *aidos* etc. in the motivation of characters, then to its importance in the thematic structure of the plays, and only then, and with some caution, to the possibility that the usage of the tragedians may reflect changes in the society outside the plays. In Aeschylus, the operation of the concept in the above-mentioned categories is, briefly, surveyed, but the bulk of the chapter is concerned with its rôle in the psychology of characters faced with an acutely difficult choice: here the inhibitory force of *aidos* is apparent, as it frequently provokes crises of indecision. Such indecision, moreover, is often an important sign that all is not well.

The psychological insight of Aeschylus, it is argued, is very far from elementary, but, of the three tragedians, it is Sophokles who makes most use of *aidos* in the psychology and motivation of his characters. In all but two of the extant tragedies *aidos* etc. have a central thematic importance: the possibility of conflicting ideas of *aidos*, a topic perhaps suggested by sophistic relativist theory, is frequently explored, and one demand of traditional *aidos* is often set against another. Sophistic discussions of the nature of *aidos* are particularly in evidence in two plays, the *Ajax* and the *Philoktetes*, which both reveal the operation of the concept as an internal form of conscience which can work without reference to the "other people" whose judgement is often mentioned in the context of the *aidos*-reaction. This appreciation of the internal aspect of *aidos* corresponds with Demokritos' view of its operation in the conscience of the individual.

Sophistic ideas are even more readily apparent in Euripides, although they are much less closely integrated into the psychology of individual characters than they are in Sophokles. Relativism is also important in the younger poet, and a particular feature of his work is the exploration of the extent to which the character of a given act may vary according to circumstance: *aidos* is relevant in this context, since it frequently appears that *aidos* is now appropriate,
now inappropriate. This is the burden of Phaidra's famous doubts about the subject in Hipp., and the importance attached to the kairos in that passage might be taken as an indication of the dramatist's interest in relativism of this kind. The abundance of instances of our terms in Euripides recalls their frequency in Homer, and the tragedian's work affords us an opportunity, comparable to that offered by the Odyssey, to observe the working of aidos over a wide range of everyday applications. Euripides, like Sophokles, is aware of the internal aspect of aidos, and an important topic in this chapter is the large number of retrospective uses of the verbs, aideomai and aischunomai, and the extent to which these circumscribe the concepts of guilt and remorse. The element of the retrospective, "bad" conscience in several such uses is accepted, but more often, it is argued, there is a natural combination of motives, of both conscience of wrong done and prospective fear of criticism on that account; neither of these cancels the other. Particular notice is taken of the importance of aidos in Euripides' work, and of its frequent association with education, something which again reflects sophistic interest in the origins of society, the nature of political communities, the reasons why people do wrong and the respective roles of heredity and environment in the development of skills and character.

In Herodotos, the historian's view of the operation of standards of honour and shame in historical causation, largely in the context of individual resentment of wrongs and the desire for vengeance, is noted, as is his belief that the victory of the Greeks against the Persians has its roots in Greek laws, customs and social organization, since aidos, as the impulse to conform to the standards of one's own society, is of great importance in this connexion. Aidos occurs only once in Thucydides, but this fact belies the importance of the concept in his work, both where it occurs as aischune or Τὸ αἰσχύνειν and in passages in which no such term occurs. Honour is a frequent motive at both the individual and the international level, and particular attention is paid to the ways in which standards of honour and shame operate both competi-
tively, in the conflict between states, and co-operatively, as part of the obligation owed by one state to another.

Many uses of the relevant terms in Aristophanes are of only minor interest, but the bulk of the chapter is taken up with an investigation of the opportunities for anaideia afforded by the festivals at which the plays were performed and the rôle of this comic licence in both the celebration of the freedom of the restraints of society enjoyed by the comic hero and the exposure of breaches of conventional morality by those figures who are the comedian's targets. A certain familiarity with concepts of conscience, expressed as aischune and as syneidesis, is noted.

The final chapter is largely taken up with the rôle of aidos in the thought of Protagoras, Antiphon and Demokritos, and the central topic is the dialectic which seems to take place between a view which takes aidos and the impulse to obey the law (perhaps to be related to aidos and dike in the myth of Plato's Protagoras) as simple responses to external sanctions like legal punishment or public humiliation (this view appears to be represented by Antiphon) and another (represen-ted by Demokritos) which sees aidos as an internal corrective mechanism which can operate without reference to the fear of detection by others. Demokritos' view, it is argued, is the more sophisticated. Demokritos' ideas of conscience are also examined (as are, earlier in the chapter, the instances of syneidesis which occur in Antiphon "the Orator"), and related to his view of aidos. Two short appendices, on the speech of Kallikles in Plato's Gorgias and the Dissoi Logoi, are added to conclude the survey.
INTRODUCTION

Aidos is notoriously one of the most difficult of Greek words to translate; there is no English equivalent, and indeed many renderings are positively misleading. Von Erffa\(^1\) is right to point out that aidos is "eine eigene Kraft, für die uns das Wort fehlt," yet in his account he is constantly concerned to identify separate meanings; the deficiencies of this approach are well set out by Scott\(^2\) and, at greater length, by Adkins\(^3\). Accordingly, no single universal definition will be offered here, although every effort will be made to discover the essence of the concept itself. Aidos and its direct derivatives, however, are not the only Greek words we shall have to consider: the group of terms centred on aischron, aischune, etc. will also be important, as will those words which refer directly to popular disapproval, such as nemesis (in Homer), oneidos etc. In addition, there exists a number of other terms which can, on occasion, operate within the same field of usage as aidos; these, too, must be taken into account, and points of similarity or difference noted. It has not, however, been my intention to conduct an entirely lexicographical study, and accordingly, certain passages in which none of the relevant terms occur, but which seem to shed light on our theme, or to reveal the operation of standards of behaviour other than aidos, will also be considered.

The most common translation of aidos is "shame", and to a considerable degree it is with shame as a psychological and cultural entity that we shall be concerned. As is already suggested by the observation that no translation can cover the entire range of the word aidos, the possibility that our idea of shame and that of the ancient Greeks may not be co-extensive is a real one; nevertheless, it should be taken as read that, in general, aidos does relate to the feeling we describe as shame; we find that characters in Greek literature often refer their aidos explicitly to "what other people will say", and that, surely, is
an important manifestation of at least one kind of shame. The anxiety of aidedos, moreover, can be accompanied by physiological symptoms, such as blushing, or by instinctive behaviour patterns, such as lowering of the eyes or the desire to hide oneself from view; these are typical concomitants of the shame reaction and further suggest the relationship between shame and "other people". A psychological definition of shame, however, is almost as elusive as an adequate translation of aidedos. Piers summarizes the definitions of his psychoanalytical predecessors and rejects most of them as too narrow; explaining (p. 18) that shame can be thought of as an affect, an emotion like fear, rage, hope etc., or as a neurotic symptom, such as shyness or self-effacingness, or as a character trait, like modesty, he goes on (23-4) to offer his own definition, naming four criteria which differentiate shame from guilt.

These criteria, however, operate largely at the level of the unconscious, and, in consequence, do not take us very far. For example, in dealing with the ways in which ancient authors portray or describe the conscious anxiety of aidedos, it will be no great advantage to know that, "the unconscious, irrational threat implied in shame anxiety is abandonment, and not mutilation (castration) as in guilt." Piers' distinction, however, between guilt as a product of tension between the ego and the superego, and shame as a product of similar tension between the ego and the ego ideal (p. 24) does have its value, provided we accept the distinction between superego (an internal source of reference based on the interdictions of punitive parents) and the ego ideal (the idea of one's social rôle based on identification with the ideals of loving parents and of the sibling and peer groups). This distinction has the following consequence, which forms one of the criteria for the differentiation of shame and guilt:

"Whereas guilt is generated whenever a boundary (set by the superego) is touched or transgressed, shame occurs when
a goal (presented by the ego ideal) is not being reached. It thus indicates a real shortcoming. Guilt anxiety accompanies transgression, shame, failure.\textsuperscript{10}

Perhaps this definition is useful for preserving a proper distinction between the psychological states of shame and guilt, but as a guide to the linguistic behaviour of real individuals it has its limitations. Anyone, for example, might regard a transgression as a failure, or may see the requirement not to fail as an injunction to be obeyed, a limit not to be transgressed. A given action, then, may be accompanied by either guilt or shame, depending on the individual. Furthermore, as Piers himself points out (p.29), parental punishment may take the form of humiliation: thus the creation of a sense of guilt may encompass the creation of a sense of shame, and it is possible that the same action may be attended by both senses. The closeness of shame and guilt is further demonstrated by Piers' discussion (31-9,44) of the ways in which guilt can conceal shame (and vice versa) or in which the one can lead to the other. The association of shame with failure and guilt with transgression, then, fails to provide an adequate criterion for a distinction. This, it seems to me, is partly because Piers is thinking mainly of guilt and shame felt with regard to one's own actions: when an individual experiences a sense of shame retrospectively at his own conduct, while he may simply be reacting to the prospect of others' disapproval of that conduct, he may equally be accepting responsibility for what he has done, and the shame reaction may encompass a degree of remorse or repentance. In such a context, then, the distinction between shame and guilt would be very hard to pin down. But a more empirical and workable distinction may be found in the fact that shame does not always relate to one's own conduct, and need not, unlike guilt, presuppose some sense of responsibility. One may, for example, feel shame at something someone else does, at something which happens to oneself, or at being thought to have done something which, in fact, one has not. In short, shame need not encompass a sense of one's own responsibility, while guilt, even irrational
guilt usually does. (Even here, however, the distinction should not be too rigidly applied: we often hear, for example, of the guilt experienced by whole nations at the transgressions of previous generations, and certain religions believe in a kind of guilt which adheres to the human race as a whole and which one inherits at birth.)

It should be noted, however, that Piers' discussion presupposes that both guilt and shame are internal states of conscience: both operate in the context of the internalized prescriptions and ideals of the individual and both are acquired early in the process of socialization. This, in turn, brings us to the often quoted distinction between "shame-culture" and "guilt-culture". Piers' collaborator, M.B. Singer, investigates the conventional justifications for this distinction at some length, and comes to the conclusion that, as a means of characterizing whole cultures, it is scarcely tenable. Important here is the classification of cultures into two categories: those whose morality is enforced by so-called "external sanctions", i.e. punishments, including disgrace or humiliation, and those which rely on the "internal sanction" of individual conscience, the sense of guilt. Yet, as we have seen, the sense of shame may also be internalized, and indeed is likely to be so sooner than guilt, given that children will identify positively with their parents and others in their environment before they begin to internalize parental prohibitions. Margaret Mead, quoted by Singer (p.65), is aware that shame may refer to an internal standard, but attempts to preserve the distinction between external and internal sanctions by claiming that shame requires a (real) audience to be effective. But if the shame felt by the individual really does stem from a discrepancy between the act contemplated or committed and his own internalized ideals or goals, then clearly no audience is required. It may be a characteristic of shame that it is often expressed with reference to other people, but the audience thus implied may be present only in fantasy, or may not be present at all, if the ideal being challenged is one which has been internalized completely. The "other people" may simply be the
expression of the internalized standard, a "generalized" or "eidetic" other.\textsuperscript{16}

If, then, there is no possibility of an absolute distinction between shame and guilt in terms of internal and external sanctions, it follows that the distinction between shame-culture and guilt-culture cannot be maintained in the form in which it was first conceived. In particular, since shame and guilt can be so close, the possibility arises that the criteria for differentiating the two senses may differ from one researcher to another. On pp. 71-83 of his study Singer discusses the results of comparative "moral ideology" tests carried out among groups of American Indian children and white Protestant children from the conservative Midwest. Several of the criteria employed by the researchers\textsuperscript{17} to distinguish shame from guilt must surely seem questionable to the reader familiar with the application of the shame-culture/guilt-culture antithesis in the ancient Greek context. In particular, one reads that guilt/conscience is to be regarded as a feeling of unworthiness, of falling below the ideals set by parents.\textsuperscript{18} In Greek culture, however, the idea that one should be unworthy of one's parents, especially one's father, is regarded as occasion for \textit{aidos}.\textsuperscript{19} Again, we are told that, "The midwestern children definitely show a greater expressed concern about personal achievement and about personal failure than most of the Indian children."\textsuperscript{20} This is intended to concede that the shame-culture of the Indians does differ from the guilt-culture of the midwesterners in important respects; but it is well known, especially from the writings of A.W.H. Adkins, that classical Greeks were also distinguished by an acute concern for personal achievement and personal failure, and this is one of the features of their society which is commonly believed to mark it out as a shame-culture; we remember, too, Piers' definition,\textsuperscript{21} that, "Guilt anxiety accompanies transgression, shame, failure."

Is this feature, then, of the midwestern children's response a guilt feature or a shame feature?

The shame-culture/guilt-culture antithesis, then, is fraught
with difficulties, and it may be, as Dover says,\textsuperscript{22} that the essential difference lies in the way people talk rather than in the way they feel. This difference, however, is no trivial one: the way people talk is part of the way they think, and the way they think is part of the way they are. Clearly, the way our ancient Greek subjects talk marks them out as different from us, and it is therefore unsafe to assume that, whatever they say, they mean exactly the same as we should in the same circumstances. In dealing with \textit{aidos}, it is necessary to realize that the power of popular disapproval was greater for them than it is for us, and we should also be ready to admit the prudential aspect of their morality; at the same time, we should be prepared to allow them, as human beings like ourselves, their internal awareness of the standards of their society; a middle way between total alienation and an excessive attitude of familiarity must be forged.\textsuperscript{23}

\textbf{NOTES TO INTRODUCTION.}

(For full details of works cited by author's name and short title see bibliography.)

1. p.9.
4. See Piers in Piers and Singer, \textit{Shame and Guilt}, p.19. Aristotle (\textit{EN} 1128b) recognizes the psychological nature of \textit{aidos} and its physiological effects when he describes it as a \textit{pathos} rather than a \textit{hexis} (and so not an \textit{arete}) and relates it to the sensation of blushing: see also Wilamowitz, \textit{Glaube} I, p.348.
5. op.cit., 18-21.
6. We shall meet \textit{aidos} in all these capacities.
8. Piers discusses this distinction on pages 25-30.
10. Lloyd-Jones, \textit{JZ}, p.25, quotes a similar definition from J.K.Campbell, but points out, correctly, that Campbell's idea
of transgression as transgression of the laws of God alone does not adequately account for all forms of guilt.

11. Piers argues for the internal sense of shame at pp. 28 and 39.

12. On these terms, see Singer in Piers and Singer, Part Two. For their use in classical Greek contexts, see Dodds, GI, c. 2, 28-63; Adkins, MR, 48-9, 154-6, 170n. 10, 132n. 5, 353n. 12; Lloyd-Jones, JZ, 2, 15, 24-7, 55-6, 171n. 102.

13. See Singer, 63-70.

14. See Piers, p. 46.

15. That this is true of aidos in Homer is the position of Scott, Acta Classica 1980, p. 15: "(aidos) needs other people to impose it."


17. Kluckhohn and Leighton.

18. Singer, p. 76.

19. See below, p. 28 etc.

20. Singer, p. 79.

21. See below, p. 28 etc.

22. GPM, p. 220n. 3; cf. O. Seel, "Zur Vorgeschichte des Gewissens Begriffs", p. 297. On this subject, one general observation suggests itself. Members of a shame-culture are supposed to have no objective moral standards, but simply to adjust to their environment (see Singer, p. 75); but if this was the case in classical Greece (and see here Lloyd-Jones, JZ, p. 26, "Greek culture continued to be a shame-culture until well after the fifth century"), why did the dissemination of the notion that all nomoi were conventional, man-made, cause such a stir? The reaction of ordinary people, the kind of people for whom Aristophanes wrote Clouds, to the nomos/physis controversy suggests that the Greek saw his standards of law and morality as objective rules to be obeyed. A large amount of the objectivity of those values must have resulted from the fact that, from Homer onwards, the gods share and underwrite human standards.

23. See Seel, 293-8, 319 on this (against the approach of Snell and others).
1. AIDOS IN HOMER

In Homer the range over which *aidos* is employed is at its widest, and to a great extent, the subsequent history of the concept is one of refinement of its uses and diminution of its power. Syntactically, however, the usage of the verb *aideomai* is at its simplest in Homeric epic: it takes only two constructions, either governing a direct object in the accusative (and this object is always personal in Homer, and thus never refers to an action; hence there is no possibility that *aideomai* could mean, "I am ashamed of x," i.e. of having done x: *aideomai* is always used prospectively in Homer) or being followed by a prolative infinitive.

As a preliminary to a detailed examination of the concept in the poems, let us first get some idea of the nature of *aidos* by looking briefly at a few characteristic passages. In I.11.7.93 the reaction of the Greeks to Hektor's challenge to single combat is as follows:

\[ \text{Aidos is thus clearly a check of some kind; it modifies the conduct of those affected.} \]

Its restrictive nature is recognized in those few passages where its abandonment is advised. In Od.3.14, Athene, urging outspokenness on the youthful Telemachos tells him he has "not the slightest need of *aidos*"; later, at line 96 of the same book (=4.326) it is
recognized that *aidos* may cause one to keep back information in order to spare another's feelings;\(^3\) at *Od*. 17. 347 Telemachos' instructions for the beggar Odysseus include the observation,

\[
\text{αἰδὼς διόν ἀγαθὴ κεχερήσθην ἀνδρὶ παρεῖναι.}
\]

Finally, at *Il*. 10. 237-8 Agamemnon urges Diomedes to ignore any feeling of *aidos* which may cause him to choose his accomplice on the spying mission on grounds of status rather than of merit. In circumstances, then, in which an absence of restraint is desirable, *aidos* is specifically excluded.\(^4\)

That the restraint provided by *aidos* is an emotional one is suggested by its situation in the *thumos* at *Il*. 15. 561 and 661.\(^5\) If *aidos* is an emotion, we need not be surprised if it is not effective on each and every occasion.\(^6\) As an emotion, it is often coupled with pity or fear.\(^7\) In these cases the very fact that *aidos* and pity or fear are named together shows that they are not identical, yet the combination does suggest that *aidos* does work on the emotional plane. Where *aidos* does occur together with one of these emotions, it is generally true that pity accompanies *aidos* for the helpless or less fortunate, while fear accompanies *aidos* for one's superiors.\(^8\)

Simple instances of *aidos* with a direct, personal object (the type of passage in which it is generally rendered as "respect") tell us virtually nothing about the essence of the concept. Often, however, the reference to the personal object is amplified by a clause giving the grounds for the character's *aidos*. For example, at *Il*. 22. 105-6 Hektor explains,

\[
\text{αἰδέρναις Τεῦχος καὶ Τεμάδας ἐλκευπέτους, μὴ ποτὲ τις εἰπῇς κακῶτερος ἄλλος ἐμείν. Ἐκτῆς κτλ.}
\]

The *μὴ*-clause further suggests the relationship of *aidos* to fear; the warrior's *aidos* here takes the form of apprehension at the prospect of what other people, even inferior people may say. At *Il*. 6. 442-3 he expresses a similar concern, but this time the reference to "what other people
Nevertheless, it is certain that his primary concern is that the Trojans should not see him acting in the way that he shuns, and it is clear that it is their disapproval that he fears. There is a definite link, then, between *aidos* and popular opinion, a link which we shall now explore in more systematic fashion.

**SANCTIONS**

Popular opinion in Homer is most clearly expressed by δήμου φάτις or φήμις. At Il. 9.459-61 δήμου φάτις and ὀνείδεσι Καὶ ἄνθρωποι ἀνθρώπων occur together, and the context is clearly one in which *aidos* might be present: Phoinix explains that he was restrained from killing his father by ἀθρόι καὶ ὀνείδεσι, ἔνθα μὴ παθενόμενος μετ’ Ἀχαλοίων καλέσμενον. Phoinix is concerned about his reputation, and envisages popular disapproval: this looking forward to "what people will say" parallels exactly the reaction of Hektor in the passages quoted above, and it seems likely that δήμου φάτις and ὀνείδεσι are a periphrasis for *aidos* here. At Od. 16. 75 (=19.527)δήμου φήμις occurs as the object of the participle καὶ ἀθρόιμενον, while at 21.323 φάτις ἀνθρώπων ὃδε γυναῖκι ἐκ τοῦ ὀνείδεσιν is the object of *οἰδομένος*, which must be synonymous with *οἰδομένον* here.

The most important expression of popular disapproval for our purposes, however, is *nemesis*. The relationship between *aidos* and *nemesis* is so close that many instances of the latter will be considered individually in the main discussion below; at this point a few remarks on the nature of that relationship and on the operation of *nemesis* will suffice.
One indication of the closeness of aidos and nemesis is the fact that they frequently occur together; see, for example, Il.13.121-2.

\[ \text{ἀλλ' ἐν φρειὶ θέσθε ἐκαστὸς} \]

and Od.2.64-6.

\[ \text{νεμεσιῇθε καὶ αὐτῷ,} \]

\[ \text{ἀλλος ῥ' αἰσθήθητε περίκτωνς ἀνθρώπους,} \]

The nature of the relationship becomes clearer when we examine Il.17.91-5:

\[ \text{ώ μοι ἔγνω, εἰ μὲν κε λύτω κατὰ τεῦχες καλὰ Πάτροκλον θ', ὡς κεῖτοι ἥμυς ἐνεκ', ἔνθαδε τιμᾶς,} \]

\[ \text{μὴ πᾶς μοι δακαίων νεμέσιῃτες, ὡς κεν ἓστατ.} \]

\[ \text{εἰ δὲ κεν ἑκτορί μοῦνον ἐὼν καὶ Τεῳ μᾶχωμεν αἰσθήθησι, μὴ πᾶς με περίστημι ἐνα Πολλοῖ.} \]

The alternatives which Menelaos considers are as follows: either he can leave behind the arms and body of Patroklos and risk the nemesis of his fellows, or he can give in to the aidos which the thought of their disapproval arouses in him and remain where he is, in spite of the danger. Aidos, then, foresees and, if it is not ignored, forestalls nemesis. We should notice also the connexion between aidos and being seen by others (ὡς κεν ἓστατ.

A similar example of the interaction of aidos and nemesis is given by von Erffa. At Od.20.343 Telemachos explains his reluctance to send his mother away in terms of aidos (κιδέμεθι δ' ἂκουσκιν ἀπὸ μερῷο διέθακε), while at 2.136-7 he refers to nemesis as his reason for not doing so (νέμεσις δὲ μοι ἐσ ἀνθρώπων ἑστεκε).

In the passage from Iliad 17 the object of nemesis was an action which could have been viewed as cowardice, as it was in the other passage quoted above from Iliad 13. The term has a similar reference in Il.6.351, 13.117-9, 292-3, 10.129-30. We shall also encounter passages in which warriors are urged to feel nemesis lest the body or arms of a fallen colleague be captured by the enemy. But nemesis does not
operate entirely within the "competitive" sphere. In the lines cited from Od. 2 it was imagined as directed at a breach of the loyalty expected in a son towards his mother, while in the previous passage quoted from the same book it was invoked against the excessive behaviour of the suitors. There is also a link between nemesis and loyalty in those places where Penelope's sensitivity to nemesis is given as a reason for her desire to finish Laertes' shroud before choosing one of the suitors as her husband.

In fact, the range of usage of nemesis is very wide: it is frequently employed in condemnation of violence or excess, and also in a number of minor, social contexts, where it censures infringements of decorum. In some cases, moreover, it seems to signify little more than anger, although, as Redfield points out, it always connotes anger in which the subject feels himself justified, that is, it is always directed at some transgression or deficiency on the part of someone else. There is always the possibility, then, that nemesis may refer to a breach of aidos, even when the latter is not mentioned, and in cases in which it does not obviously refer to one of the particular contexts in which aidos normally occurs. Hence von Erffa's list of passages in which nemesis is not the correlate of aidos seems rather over-inclusive.

In a number of passages nemesis is explicitly denied or disclaimed (in the form οὐ νέμεσις or οὐ νέμεσις ἢ μὲν etc.): the action thus freed from nemesis is therefore regarded as justified or understandable. In a similar manner, when a character urges μὴ νέμεσις (etc.) he is effectively apologizing beforehand for annoying behaviour which he nevertheless feels is demanded on the particular occasion.

The neuter adjective nemesseton occurs seven times in the poems in the sense "occasioning popular disapproval." In Il. 9.523 (=Od. 22.59) the expression is οὐ νέμεσις ἢ μὲν, which corresponds to the usage of οὐ νέμεσις just mentioned; in the other passages there is an obvious reference to "how
things look." to appropriateness; in Il. 3.410 and 14.336, for example, the term is applied to the performance of the sexual act at a time or place which is felt to be inappropriate.\textsuperscript{26} At Il. 19.182 and 24.463 the question of the correct conduct for individuals of a certain status is foremost: in the former passage Agamemnon is informed that it will not be nemesseton for him to make amends with Achilles since it was he who began the quarrel; apparently the nemesis which is here denied is to be imagined as directed at a king who would show himself weak by giving in to his inferiors even when they are in the wrong;\textsuperscript{27} in the latter, Hermes refuses to accompany Priam into Achilles' presence, on the grounds that to do so would be nemesseton, i.e. not fitting for a god like himself. Finally, at Od. 22. 489 Eurykleia tells Odysseus that it would be nemesseton for him to remain in his beggar's rags: again the idea of physical appearance and the status of the person concerned is stressed. This idea of appropriateness and of appearances in the adjective, together with its connexion with popular disapproval reveals it as clearly comparable with those terms which express more explicitly the notion of "how things look", namely aischron and aeikes.\textsuperscript{28}

The use of nemesetos in the masculine at Il. 11.648 is unparalleled: coupled with aidoios and predicated of Achilles it appears to mean "liable to feel nemesis" but this is not certain; given that the verbs aideomai and nemesizomai/nemessaomai can approach each other in meaning,\textsuperscript{29} it could be a synonym of aidoios here; the tautology would not necessarily rule this out. Whatever the meaning, the passage is evidence of a certain fluidity and polyvalence in the use of these terms.

The connexion between popular disapproval and appearances is also evident in the usage of the terms aischos, aischros etc.. The root meaning of the noun is "ugliness", and this connotation is present throughout the range of its uses. At Od. 11.433 aischos is the legacy left by Klytaimestra to the rest of her sex, and the context is clearly one of
disgrace or infamy. Aischos also has an obvious reference to popular disapproval at Od. 18.225, where Penelope tells Telemachos that he will suffer aischos and lobe among men for allowing a guest under his protection to be ἀσκειεδημένοι. Again, appearances are stressed in the use of all three of these terms. Lobe is roughly a synonym of aischos and, its root meaning apparently "disfigurement" (see LSJ s.v.), it clearly bears a similar relationship to physical appearances. The two terms also occur together at Il. 13.622, where Menelaos, exulting over his defeated opponent, Peisandros, claims that the Trojans have no lack of aischos and lobe.

The context is one of condemnation of Paris' breach of guest-friendship, yet the two terms quoted do not refer to the Trojans in this instance, for Menelaos goes on to say that the lobe which the Trojans do not lack is the lobe they inflicted on him (ὦ ἐμὲ λυφήσασθε). Although Menelaos is condemning Paris' conduct, then, and promising divine punishment, he decides in this instance to stress the discreditable nature of that conduct for himself, the patient, rather than for the agent. 30

In the examples just quoted aischos was both the state which might arouse popular disapproval and the state resulting from it. In the plural, aischea can refer both to the state considered disgraceful and to the reaction of others to that state. The two usages, however, should not be sharply distinguished, since "ugliness" is the dominant connotation of both and because it is perfectly natural that a condition deemed ugly by popular opinion should be designated by the same term as the words, ugly in themselves, used to comment on it. At Od. 1.229 it is to acts liable to arouse disapproval that aischea refers: the disguised Athene says to Telemachos, with reference to the excessive behaviour of the suitors (note 227 ὑπερφιέσατο ὑπερφιέλως): Νεμέεσσακάτο κεν ἄνη κεῖταν ταῖς πόλλ' ὀρών, ὅσ τις πίνυτος γε μετέλθω. A sensible man, then, would feel nemesis at κεῖταν ταῖς πόλλ' ὀρών. Adkins 31 believes that these aischea are disgraceful for Telemachos alone, but this can hardly be the case when
Athene has been referring to the *hybris* of the suitors, when she is masquerading as a guest in Telemachos' house (and, as we shall see, strict conventions demand courtesy between guest and host - it is surely incredible that a guest should draw attention to a host's disgrace) and when Telemachos obviously takes her words not as criticism but as sympathy. The possibility of *nemesis* at the *aischea* of the suitors here suggests that their "uglinesses" and their *hybris* may also entail breaches of *aidos*, and we should remember that they are characterized as without *aidos* throughout the poem.

At *Od.* 19.373 the reference of *aischea* (together with *lobe*) is to the insults which cause disgrace, that is to the reaction of other people, rather than to the object of that reaction. The same is true of *Il.* 3.242, where the term *oneidos* also occurs, *Od.* 6.351, where it is coupled with *nemesis*, and 6.524.

At *Il.* 18.24, 27, 180 and 24.418 the verb *aischuno* occurs in the sense, "make ugly", "disfigure", while at 22.75 it governs (subject *κόντες*) *κάρη, γένσων* and *καίδι*; the literal sense of the first two terms suggests that *aidos* is also physical here, in the sense/*aieodía*. The meaning is the same at 23.571, but the usage, because of the abstract object, is more figurative (Menelaos complains to Antilochos, *γιχύνως ... ἐμὴν ἀτείνη*). At 6.209 Glaukos reports the injunction of his father, *μηδὲ γένως πατέρων αἰξχυνήσ*, where we might legitimately translate "disgrace", "shame", provided the root meaning is kept in mind. Similar is *Od.* 2.85-6, where Antinoos reacts to Telemachos' criticism: *πῶλον ἔειπές* *ημένως καὶ ἡγυνων, ἑθέλες ἄτε γε μήνων ὁνάσα*. The suitors deny (87) that they are responsible for the dissipation of Telemachos' patrimony, yet Antinoos clearly believes that his criticism could "disfigure" them. This relates to our remarks on *aischea* at *Od.* 1.229; there *aischea* referred to the suitors' behaviour, and it seems here that criticism of that behaviour may implicate them in *aischos*, since, it seems difficult to deny, that is the
result when one allows another to *aischunein* one. Even if one takes aischunos simply as "abusing" here the fact remains that Antinoos envisages harm to his reputation as the result of Telemachos' criticism of the suitors' excess, and that it seems possible to use the verb *aischuno* in a context of censure of co-operative failure. 36

The adjective *aischros* remains to be considered. At Il. 2.216 the superlative is used to describe Thersites, "the ugliest man at Troy". This is the only instance of the adjective in a personal application in Homer. In several passages (Il.3.38,6.325,13.768)37 the combination aischros epeiein occurs, and in each case the ugliness of the words reflects particularly on their recipient, and not on the speaker: to address someone with ugly words, then, is equivalent to "disfiguring" (*aischunein*) them. Similarly, the adverb aischew, on its only two appearances in the poems refers to the act of abusing or reproaching someone (Il.23.473, Od.18.321). In both cases the speaker wishes to censure or humiliate the person addressed, and any disgrace accruing would doubtless fall on the addressee, but equally it is the words themselves which are felt to be "ugly", and there is a case for saying that the adjective primarily describes the "appearance" of the words and only incidentally their effect on the addressee. In the latter passage in particular, the words are directed by Melantho, the unfaithful maidservant, at Odysseus, and while they are primarily disgraceful for the latter, since he should be able to prevent others' abuse, the possibility remains that the audience are expected to disapprove of the former's conduct, since ill-treatment of guests and abuse of one's master (even if he is *incognito*) is not the kind of behaviour commended in the *Odyssey*. Perhaps circumstances and the justice of the rebuke dictate whether to address another aischw is discreditable for the agent or not.

The neuter singular, *aischon*, occurs only three times in the poems, all three instances in the *Iliad*. All three also refer to exactly the same situation, that of return
from a military enterprise with nothing to show for it. II. 2.298 is the most succinct of the three:

νίσχων τοι δημον τε μένειν κεντον τε νέεσθαι

Similarly, lines 119-22 of the same book stress the effects on the warriors’ reputations and the disgrace of giving up before victory is achieved:

νίσχων γάρ τάδε ν’ ἔστι καὶ ἐγγεμένοις πυθέσθαι,

And the third passage is II.21.436-8, where Poseidon says to Apollo:

ὦ οἶκεν ἄχθηνων ἐτέρων· τὸ μὲν νίσχειν, αἰὲ κ’ ἄμαχτι

Again, appearances constitute the main incentive (οὐδὲ ἐοίκεν), and the context is again one of returning home without a fight.38

It will readily be seen that aischron is a word of very infrequent occurrence in Homer. It thus seems a little unwise to build as much on it as does Adkins at MR pp. 30 (“aischron ... is the most powerful word used to denigrate a man’s actions”) and 33. Admittedly, Adkins is correct in saying that aischron is confined to the competitive sphere in Homer, but, as we have just seen, the same is not true of aischos and aischuno; nor is there any reason to assume that the co-operative uses of the latter two terms are any less powerful than their competitive cousins. The adjective aischros refers to appearances, whether those of a man, an action, a situation or whatever; it does not occur in Hesiod, but in Theognis, for example, we see it used of a situation in which drunken men and sober men find themselves in each other’s company (Thgn. 627-8), or (in the negative) of a request that a favour be returned (1329-30), and neither of these uses is competitive. Non-competitive uses, then, occur early in post-Homeric poetry, and the usage of other terms from the same root in Homer himself tends to suggest that it is simply a matter of chance that aischron is exclusively competitive in the few passages in which it occurs. There
are, moreover, other terms which Adkins ignores or depreciates which have a similar application to that of aischros: we have already looked at nemessetos, now we shall consider aeikēs, by far the most frequent term expressing both unseemliness and unfittingness in Homer. 39

In the overwhelming majority of passages in which it occurs it is the primary, physical sense of the adjective which dominates. When qualifying πότμος or λοιγος, for example, it refers primarily to the unpleasant nature of death by violence. 40 Similarly the blinding of the Cyclops is aeikelios at Od. 9.503, and Odysseus would have suffered an ἄληκαλλος ἄλγος had he been devoured by Eumaios' dogs (Od. 14.32). In several passages the groan of warriors slain in battle is also described as aeikēs, and here the reference of the adjective is clearly to the unpleasantness of the sound. At Il. 24.19 the noun aeikeie refers to the physical disfigurement against which Apollo protects Hektor's body. At Od. 20.308 the term is used more figuratively, of the behaviour of the suitors in Telemachos' house, but again it comments on the visual aspect of the situation, and it scarcely seems possible to tell whether the situation is dishonourable for the suitors, for Telemachos, or for both.

In a number of passages aeikēs and aeikelios seem to convey the ideas of meanness and low status. Often, for example, the disguised Odysseus' clothes and accessories are so designated, and the reference here seems to be to the humble status of the items and their unsuitability for a man of Odysseus' position. 41 Something of the flavour of "mean" or "contemptible" seems present in the use of aeikēs with νόος at Od. 20.366 and aeikelios of the kind of army Odysseus feels Agamemnon is better suited to lead at Il. 14.84. The idea of low status is also present at Od. 6.242 and 13.402, where aeikelios is used firstly of the previous impression the Phaeacians had of Odysseus and secondly of the appearance lent him by Athene as part of his beggar's disguise. In both passages the idea that people of low status are also of unpleasant appearance may influence the choice of
vocabulary. The notion of lowliness or meanness is also present in Odysseus' description of the bed on which he spent many sleepless nights as aeikelios at Od. 19.341.

The concrete meaning "disfigure" is also the primary one of the verbs aeikizo and aeikizomai, which are often used of the physical maltreatment of dead bodies in the Iliad. 42 There is only one instance of the verb in which the sense could be considered figurative. This comes at Od. 18.222, where Penelope chides Telemachos for allowing the beggar to be δεικτεθμένας. Odysseus has suffered no physical disfigurement, but he has been struck by Antinoos and was involved in a scuffle with Iros.

The adjective aeikes is most relevant to our discussion when it occurs in the neuter, whether alone as a substantive or qualifying ergon or erga. Here again, however, we should consider the adjective first of all as descriptive of the erga themselves, before assuming that an ergon aeikes reflects on either its agent or its patient. In three passages in the Iliad 43 the combination οὐκ ἀείκες describes a situation that is both natural and fitting. The idea of honour is most prominent in the second of these (15.496), where Hektor claims that death in battle is not dishonourable (aeikes) when one is fighting on behalf of one's native land. In these passages the main point is that other people, in viewing the particular situation, will not feel that it merits their disapproval. The neuter aeikes, then, has a similar application to that of both nemessaton and aischron in that it comments on the outward aspect of a situation and categorizes it as one of which people are liable to disapprove.

Adkins claims that, "In all cases where ergon aeikes refers to a defeat, military or social, it is the person who 'performed' the ergon aeikes who is discredited," 44 and goes on to suggest that this is true of all passages in which these words occur. There is no need, however, to be so categorical. At Od. 17.216, for example, aeikes describes
the insulting and excessive manner in which the goatherd, Melantheus, addresses Odysseus and Eumaios. The agent's behaviour is undoubtedly condemned, yet Odysseus is provoked to anger, and it can hardly be that it would not be considered unfitting for him to be insulted by a goatherd. But aeikes does not mean "discreditable": its primary reference is to the goatherd's words themselves, and it will depend on the circumstances whether an unseemly act damages the reputation of the agent, the patient or both.

In some passages, however, particularly those in which there is no patient, and where only the status of the agent is involved, actions which are aeikea do reflect primarily on the latter. In others, where there is a patient, it often seems clear that, in designating an act aeikes, the speaker intends to condemn the agent. This need not mean, however, that the honour of the patient does not also suffer, for in a society which cares as deeply about honour as that portrayed in the Homeric poems, it is surely dishonourable (to some degree at least) to allow oneself to suffer the aeikea erga of others. Adkins says as much in connexion with aischea and aeikelios, and there is no good reason to assume that an insult designated aischea is any more insulting or dishonourable for the patient than one described as aeikes. Since, as we saw (14-15 above), aischea can discredit both agents and patients, it seems entirely arbitrary to deny aeikes the same possibility.

Particularly relevant here are those passages which refer to the murder of Agamemnon. In these, the deeds of both Klytaimestra and Aigisthos are described as aeikea, and the condemnation which the description entails is obviously directed at them; the same is true of aischos at Od.11.433. Yet Agamemnon describes his death as most pitiable at Od.11.412, and it is hard to imagine that a great warrior king such as he would not regard such a death as beneath his dignity. Disinterested members of society would presumably condemn Klytaimestra's crime before Agamemnon's failure, but the fact remains that Agamemnon suffered an ignoble death,
and it is quite possible that someone not well-disposed to Agamemnon could comment adversely on, for example, the ignoble manner of his death, or his failure to retain the loyalty of his wife, and this would certainly have a detrimental effect on his posthumous fame. This being the case, it seems possible both that a person might be deterred from the commission of *erga aeikea* by *aidos* at society's disapproval and that *aidos* at what *some* people might say could be present in one who had suffered, or feared the prospect of suffering, such treatment at others' hands.

The inconsistency of Adkins' insistence that *aischea* and *aekielios* reflect only upon the patient while *aekes* reflects only upon the agent is clearly demonstrated by two passages from the *Odyssey*, the second largely a repetition of the first. At 16.106-9 (cf. 20.316-9, where Telemachos is the speaker) Odysseus says,

> βουλομον κ' εν εμοια κατακταμενος μεγαρους Τεθναμεν ο ταδε γ' αιεν αεικες εχθ' ορακησαν, εινου τε ουθελεσμενος διωκες τε γυναικας έστασοντας αεικελιος κατα δουματα καλα ...

Now, according to Adkins' schema *aeikea erga* in 107 refers to the suitors, and it is they alone who are thereby condemned, while *aekielios* in 109 reflects badly on Odysseus and Telemachos, in the sense that it is disgraceful that the head of the house should be unable to protect his dependants. There is, however, no basis for this distinction in the text, which speaks only of unseemly acts of which the unseemly treatment of the serving maids is one. The sense of both *aeikea* and *aekielios* is that the acts to which these terms apply are of a kind of which other people might disapprove; it is the appearance of these acts which is thus described and there is no necessity to conclude that the terms employed must always apply to either the agent or the patient in any mutually exclusive way. In the particular example quoted Odysseus obviously regards the conduct of the suitors as insupportable, and it is a reasonable inference to imagine that he sees their actions as undermining his status and reputation, but equally, if the suitors are
performing actions which may legitimately be described as unseemly, and if society at large condemns excess and unseemliness, then the suitors will also be discredited. This is an important point for the study of *aidos*, because it establishes the link between the suitors' conduct and their often mentioned lack of *aidos*, and suggests that *aidos* may be a motivating factor for Odysseus and Telemachos too.\(^{53}\)

Of the terms so far discussed, then, *nemesseton, aischos, aischea, aischron* and *aeikes/aeikelios* refer to the external aspect of actions or situations which are liable to excite adverse comment, while *nemesis, aischea* and *oneidos* can be used of the reaction of others to those actions or situations: there is a strong presumption that *aidos* is the reaction to the idea of popular disapproval represented by these terms. There remains just one more group of terms to be discussed before we move on to examine the operation of *aidos* itself, that centred on the nouns *elenchos* and *elencheie*.

The plural of the noun *elenchos*, which appears to mean something like "showing up"\(^ {54}\) can be used concretely of people who are exposed to the disapproval of others; in two passages (I.5.787 and 8.228) those so described are urged to show *aidos*, and part of the object of that *aidos* is the implication of unworthiness or cowardice contained in the reproachful description, *elenchea*. To describe someone in these terms, then, is to excite their *aidos* at the slur on their reputation.\(^ {55}\) The plural of the adjective, *elenches*, works in the same way (I.4.242, 24.239). The singular *elenchos* occurs at I.11.314-5, where Odysseus tells Diomedes that *elenchos* would be the result were Hektor to reach the Greek ships. Similar is the use of *elenchea* at Od. 21.329, where Eurymachos foresees the taunts of *Τίς ΚΚΚΧΕΪΤΑΙ* if the beggar Odysseus should succeed where the suitors have failed in drawing the bow. The connexion between *elenchos* and "what people say" is thus explicitly made, and inasmuch as *aidos* is the typical reaction to
popular disapproval, it would seem that the speaker is subject to that emotion here. Penelope reinforces the idea of popular opinion at 331-3, in claiming that the suitors have forfeited their claim to eukleia by reason of their actions in the house of Odysseus. Adkins (MR p.39) calls Penelope's implicit identification of elenchea with the suitors' co-operative failures a "persuasive definition", and it is indeed clear that she has a different view of the application of the term from that of the suitors, but it is not at all clear that she is using it in a way that society in general would find novel or impossible. We have already seen that the suitors' actions could be designated aischrea and that it was possible for one who criticized these actions to be seen as aischunon the suitors, and obviously elenchos is a word used in similar contexts to these. Penelope may, in fact, be right in terming the suitors' misdeeds elenchea, since characters in the poem do condemn them and since the poem was obviously composed for an audience which would share their condemnation. The fact that the suitors are insensitive to criticism in most places does not mean that the criticism is not in keeping with the values of society.

One has to concede, however, that in the majority of its usages the root elench- does refer to competitive failure. The noun elencheie occurs four times in the context of the result of failure in battle or in some other competitive exploit. At Od.14.38, however, Eumaios says that it would have been a source of elencheie for him had he failed to prevent his dogs attacking the beggar Odysseus, a visitor to his home. Thus the word does refer to failure here, but the failure is in according another the protection he deserves, and this is a co-operative not a competitive failure. The same is true of the usages of the superlative adjective elenchistos: in three out of the four passages in which it occurs it does refer to the disgrace resulting from failure on the field of battle, but in the fourth it has no such reference. At Od.10.72 Aiolos calls Odysseus ἐλέγχηστι τῶν ἀνδρῶν, and the reason for his being elenchistos, open to
popular reproach, in this case is the fact that he appears to Aiolos to be hated by the gods, and while the latter's evidence for the gods' hatred comes from his failure to reach Ithaka in spite of the gift of the bag of winds, this it not obviously a failure in competition. To be *elenchistos*, then, to be open to *elenchos* or *elencheie* is to be in a position in which one is liable to be criticized or mocked, and there is nothing inherent in the words themselves which would exclude their use in non-competitive contexts.\(^{62}\)

All the terms discussed in this section are connected with "how things look" and with "what people say": these are the words which indicate the grounds for *aidos* and the consequences of ignoring it. The range of their collective usage is wide, and there is no real reason to believe that some refer exclusively to any one circumstance or that some are more powerful than others. Nor is there any reason to conclude that words which span both the co-operative and the competitive spheres necessarily lose their power in the former. Adkins makes much of the idea of the "effectiveness" of popular disapproval in the competitive and co-operative spheres,\(^ {63}\) and it is perhaps true that the characters of the Homeric poems, or some of them at least, are more concerned at criticism of their competitive failures than at criticism of their co-operative failures. This, however, is a matter not of theory, but of practice, not of the power of the terms employed but of the realities of the particular situation. A strong individual in any society is able to ignore others' censure of his breaches of the "quiet" moral virtues; he will, however, have to take notice of any accusation of weakness or inferiority, because even if the person making the accusation is an inferior, the charge may encourage an enemy or a competitor to attempt a trial of strength. It is not the power of words decrying competitive failure which is more compelling than that of words decrying moral deficiencies, but the likely results of ignoring criticism in either sphere. No word, no matter how "powerful" constitutes effective restraint;\(^ {64}\) the only effective restraint is physical force,\(^ {65}\) and that is the ultimate
sanction feared by the hero who is sensitive about his reputation as a warrior and head of his community. Criticism of competitive failure is taken seriously because a challenge from a rival is the likely outcome if it is not so taken. As students of Greek society we ought to take note of this, as it constitutes part of the reality of Homeric society, but equally, if we wish to gain an accurate insight into Greek values, into the "moral ideology" of the Greeks, we must consider theory as well as practice, and the theory in Homer is that competitive and co-operative failures are condemned in similar, sometimes identical terms.

AIDOS IN BATTLE

We have already seen that nemesis, aischos, aischron, aeikês and elenchos, together with their relatives, can decry cowardice or shirking in battle. Two passages already referred to show how aidos operates in the thick of battle to promote courageous behaviour; at Il.5.787 (= 8.228; cf. p.22 above) we find the exhortation,

"αἶδος, Ἀγείδοι, κάκ' ἐλέγχεα, εἶδος ἁγντοί.

The warriors are elenchea, as we should say, "a disgrace". The implication is that they are acting in such a way as to bring the disapproval of others upon themselves, and they are urged to feel aidos at this prospect. Other passages are even more to the point, in that they employ the exhortation aidos own as a means of rousing the army to greater activity.66

The major function, then, of aidos in battle is to ensure that the soldiers in the field do not give in to the impulse to save themselves regardless of the outcome of the conflict. In the very thick of things it often acts to prevent flight, as in Il.16.422, or at 5, where Agamemnon, alarmed at the lack of vigour in his men,

"κ' ὀμιλον ἐποίητα πολλ' κελεύων.

Heili d' aνέεσ έστε και α' ἀλκημον ἱτος ἐλέεδε,

ἀλλήλους τ' αἴδειεθε κατ' κατεγας ὤμεννας.

αἰδολέων ἄνδεων πλέονες σοοι ἰ' τε ἐφεκται.

φευγόντων δ' οὔτ', ἀ' κέλεις ὀρνυτε ὀὔτε τις ἀλκή."
Important here are the practical justification of *aidos* (those who show it retain their *kleos* and can win more, and *aidos* is more likely to ensure the safety of the majority) and the emphasis on the interdependence of the members of one contingent (*ἀλληλος*).

The situation is similar at 15.655-8: Hektor has driven the Greeks back to the very prows of their ships, and is wreaking havoc amongst the army. The poet goes on:

> Ἄρεισοι δὲ γεὼν μίν ἐχώρησαν καὶ ἀνάγκη τῶν πρωτέων, αὐτὸν δὲ πάρα κληγίσασιν ἐμεῖς ἀθεόν οὔδε ἱκέσθην καὶ ναῖ στρατόν. ἴσχε γὰρ αἰδῶς καὶ δέος. ἀγηξὲς γὰρ ὀμόκλεον ἀλληλοῦσι.

By necessity the Greeks have given some ground, yet they do not break ranks and scatter — *ίσχε γὰρ αἰδῶς καὶ δέος*. *Aidos* thus maintains discipline among the troops, and this is the case, we are told, because, "they kept reproaching each other." One's fellow soldiers, then, are the guarantors of one's bravery in battle, in that they have an interest in ensuring that no one lets the side down, for, as we have already learned,

> αἰδόμενων ἄνδρων πλέονες ἡς ἢ πέφανται.

It is the certain knowledge that one's comrades will witness one's actions and one's reluctance to acquire a reputation for cowardice in their eyes that arouses *aidos* at the prospect of acting in the way of which they disapprove: this does not mean that, if an individual felt he could get away with it, he would necessarily take the opportunity to act like a coward, simply that in the normal situation in the field he has no opportunity to act like a coward, because the presence and the exhortations of his fellows make such conduct unthinkable.

There is, however, a very considerable calculative element in such passages, and this is well illustrated here by the presence of *deos*. The fear which prevents the host scattering can hardly be fear of Hektor, for that would be more likely to produce the opposite response; we must take *deos* closely with *aidos* here; it denotes the fear of the
consequences of not heeding *aidos* 68 the fear of being considered a coward and being singled out for reproach, and, perhaps, the fear of one such as Nestor, who alludes to the disgrace which will result if they do not stand their ground in lines 661-6:

> ὧν φίλοι, ἄνερες ἔστε, καὶ αἶδὸς θείᾳ ἐνι θυμῶν ἀλλων ἄνθρωπων, ἐπὶ δὲ μνήσασθε ἐκαστὸς ἐπὶ σαυστῶν ὑμῶν καὶ δρόχινων καὶ κτήσισος ἐδέ τοι ἑτὲρ, ἕμεν ὦ ταῖς ἐνώσει καὶ ἦ ἐκαταστενυκαί. Τῶν ὑπὲρ ὑπόθαλ' ἐνι γίνονται οὐ περιεντιῶν ἐσταμέναι κρατεώς, μηδ' ἐπὶ τεσσάρες φόβονδε.

The phrase *αἴδῳ ἄλλων ἄνθρωποι* has caused some difficulty; for von Erffa these words are "leer" and "nichtssagend", and thus must be interpolated; 69 Verdenius rightly rejects this approach, 70 and sees *aidos* here as the reaction to the criticism of others. The only parallel for the use of the noun with a dependent genitive (Od. 14.505) is certainly different (since the person designated by the genitive in that place is not the third party who will vent his disapproval, but the recipient of the feeling of *aidos*), but this does not rule out Verdenius' interpretation, since the verb *aideisthai* can take an accusative of the person whose criticism is feared of by the person towards whom one feels *aidos* (this is the usage which is often rendered by 'respect' in English), and since the use of a noun with an objective genitive is analogous to that of a verb governing the accusative. Nevertheless, Verdenius may not be right. Whether he is or not depends on whether one regards the sentence beginning ἐπὶ δὲ in 662 as a continuation of the previous one or the addition of a further point. If the latter, ἄλλων ἄνθρωπων will refer in a general manner to anyone who may criticize or ridicule the Greeks for retreating; if, however, the former is the case, ἄλλων ἄνθρωπων must in some way refer to those who are mentioned in 663.

It seems to me far more likely that the two sentences bear some relationship each to the other than none at all; at the very least, the second must be prompted by the first. If there is some connexion in thought, αἴδῳ ἄλλων ἄνθρωπων
will be open to one of two interpretations; either the "other people" will be those named in 663 or they will be those who will disapprove if those named in 663 are let down (in this case *aidos* would still be a reaction to the criticism of a generalised group of "other people", but not quite the same people as envisaged by Verdenius). In view of the parallel from the *Odyssey* and of the emphasis placed on the emotional appeal in 662-6, the former seems the more likely; *κλαμών ἄνθρωπον* will then refer to the direct recipients of the combatants' *aidos*, their children, wives and parents, and the sense of Nestor's words will be that they should feel *aidos* for their dependants, both because they will be without protection if the warriors are killed and because any disgrace affecting the warrior affects his dependants as well. The very fact that those whose parents are dead are also urged to feel *aidos* shows that Nestor is not simply thinking of the material consequences of defeat. 71

The idea of a community of honour, then, seems to underlie this passage, together with the notion that one has a responsibility to protect one's dependants. 72 Other passages reinforce the idea that others have an interest in the honour or disgrace of the individual; family honour, for example, is in the keeping of the warrior, hence the injunction of Glaukos' father, *μηδὲ γένος Πατέρων αἰχμήνευ* 73. The converse, that the father rejoices in the fame of his son, is also found. 74 At 11.6.350-1 Helen expresses the wish that she might be the wife of a better man, one who knew (i.e. took notice of) the *nemesis* and *aischea* of men. The context is one of Paris' slacking in battle, and Helen clearly feels that her husband's disgrace reflects upon her. Hektor, too, is perturbed by others' criticism of his brother. 75 Other characters, however, are less concerned with the honour of their relatives than with their safety, and the attitude of Helen towards Paris in book six is in sharp contrast to that of Andromache to Hektor in the same book; 76 similarly, at 22.82-9 Hekabe would rather her son avoided Achilles entirely than bow to the demands of honour and face him. 77 At 22.482-507, it is the other
element in Nestor's appeal, the complete dependence of the the hero's wife and family on their protector, and his duty to protect, to which Andromache refers in painting a pitiable picture of the lot of herself and her son after Hektor's death. Even then, the responsibility of the protector to protect is not divorced from the claims of honour, in that the pitiful situation of the dead hero's dependants presumably diminishes the status of his family. Nestor's appeal to *aídos* on behalf of the hero's dependants, then, is an appropriate one, since one's personal honour is closely bound up with that of other members of one's household and family.

We saw in the section on sanctions that defeat in battle and cowardice were consistently described in terms which condemn them as unseemly and subject to popular disapproval; in each of the two passages in which the word occurs *aischron* refers to the disgrace of failure in the martial context. The implication in those passages seems to be that the empty-handed return of the warriors will be proof of their failure, and it would seem that such failure is disgraceful regardless of any circumstances which may be adduced in mitigation. This attitude also seems to prevail at II.17. 336-7, where Aineias points out,

> αἶδως μὲν νῦν ἡδὲ γ' ἀρχηγίλων ὑπ' Ἀχαίων
> ἔλιον εἰσαναβηναι ἀναλκεληγε δημέντας.

Von Erffa (p.6) sees *aídos* as a virtual synonym of *aischron* here, and takes the words as meaning, "This is a disgrace...", but Verdenius rightly observes that such a use would be without parallel, and suggests that this passage, like the others we have discussed, is an exhortation to *aídos*; the sense will then be, "This is occasion for *aídos*," or "let *aídos* be present." Part of Aineias' strategy in attempting to arouse his comrades' *aídos* is his suggestion that to return to the city at this point will be taken as a sign of cowardice (κακὴν κελεύων). No doubt many Trojans fought well enough, but this is not envisaged as an adequate excuse.

At II.8.139-44 Nestor advises Diomedes that, since Zeus is
manifestly favouring Hektor, a prudent withdrawal would be the best policy. Diomedes recognizes the validity of the old man’s advice (146), yet cannot bring himself to act upon it (147-50):

"Ακκα ὁδ’ αἰνὸν ἄχος κεραίην καὶ θυμὸν ἐκάνει·
ἐκτῶς γάρ ποτὲ φησίν ἐγί περεβοσ’ ἀγορεύων·
τυδείσθης ὑπ’ ἐμεσ’ φοβεύμενός ἐκεῖν νήμασ.
ὡς ποτ’ ἑπελήσει. Τότε μοι χάνοι ἐυείκει Χθών.

Nestor’s answer to this is to claim that no one would believe Hektor were he to impugn Diomedes’ honour in the way he fears (152-6). As Adkins points out,80 Diomedes does not simply rely on his own opinion of himself, nor does Nestor advise him to do so. On the other hand, Nestor, the older and wiser of the two, clearly does believe that Diomedes’ aidos here (for that is surely what his anxiety is) is misplaced; Diomedes may, then, be rather more concerned for the opinion of other people than is thought normal. Nevertheless, his concern for what other people, even his enemies say, is obviously acute, and this suggests that the power of popular disapproval is very considerable. I doubt, however, whether this passage shows us that the Homeric hero’s self “only has the value which other people put on it;”81 Diomedes’ concern for what others might say presupposes a high personal image of the self; he has an idea of his own worth which he fervently hopes other people will share, and the prospect of this not being the case causes him great anxiety. The fact that popular opinion is of the utmost importance in Homeric society and that one’s self-image often requires the validation of others does not mean that the hero has no idea of his own worth.

Diomedes’ reaction is interesting in other ways, too; it is significant, for example, that a hero can be concerned about the opinions of his enemies as well as his peers;82 and his wish that the ground would open up (and swallow him) is an example of the classic shame-reaction, the desire to hide oneself from view.83 Both of these aspects of his response are paralleled. At 11.4.171 Agamemnon addresses Menelaos, telling him that he, Agamemnon, would be
elenchistos on his return to Argos, were he to return without his brother. At 175 we find the familiar distaste for leaving an enterprise unfinished (ατελεωσων ἐπὶ ἔργῳ), while at 176-81 Agamemnon imagines the taunts of "one of the Trojans" as he jumps on Menelaos' grave.

At this prospect, he reacts as did Diomedes: Τότε μακ Χένων εὐρικχ Χθών. Agamemnon, then, is concerned for his brother, but this is not a matter of mere affection; the honour of the two is closely bound, and the death of Menelaos would be a disgrace for Agamemnon, not simply because others would charge him with failing to protect his brother, or because his death would give their enemies a chance to dishonour them both, but also because it would negate the whole purpose of his mission, which was to recover Menelaos' wife and to restore his honour.

Again, it appears that the negative judgement feared, whether that of one's own side or that of one's enemies, is based on results rather than intentions, and Adkins is therefore right to stress the importance of results in Homeric society. There may be a number of reasons for this; first of all, one's enemies are hardly likely to consider anything other than results, since any action upon which they can place a discreditable interpretation is good for their moral and bad for one's own; the position, however, with regard to the judgements of one's colleagues and friends is not quite as clear cut, and requires rather more consideration.

There does, in fact, exist a number of passages in which characters do attempt to persuade others to consider intentions rather than results; only those which refer to success or failure in battle, however, need concern us here. Perhaps the most striking of these is Il.14.80-1, where Agamemnon offers the opinion,

ɒὐ γὰρ τὶς νέμεις φυγέων κακόν, οὔδ’ ἀνὰ νῦκτικ. βέλτερον ὅς φεύγων προφυγῇ κακόν ἦτε ἁλὼν.

This is a clear reversal of the view found in those passages we have discussed so far, which is that retreat is discreditable no matter what the circumstances, and it should be
noted that Agamemnon is urging a consideration of circumstances (greater advantage) rather than of results. But his attempt to convince his audience has no chance of success, as indeed one might expect from the far greater number of passages in which retreat is said to be disgraceful tout court. Immediately Agamemnon has spoken the lines quoted, Odysseus reacts with great vehemence (83ff.), and expresses the opinion that he is unworthy of his kingship better suited instead to command of "some aeikelios army."(84)

Other passages are similar; a character claims that there is no cause for criticism in the particular situation, but is proved wrong by events. At Il.13.222 Idomeneus asserts that none of the Achaeans is responsible for the current reversals, which must be the will of Zeus (226), but, as Poseidon points out (232-4), and as Idomeneus himself is, in any case, very well aware (228-30), this does not excuse wilful withdrawal from battle. The tone of 17.91-105 is somewhat different. There, as we have already seen, Menelaos debates whether he should obey aidos by attempting to defend Patroklos' body or risk the nemesis of his fellows by saving himself. At 98-101, however, Menelaos seems to change his mind, and he expresses the view that it would be unjustified of his comrades to feel nemesis against him, since Hektor is obviously fighting with the aid of the gods. Nonetheless, he does not follow the implications of this view, and withdraw entirely; another thought occurs to him, and he decides to pursue another method of rescuing the body, with the help of Ajax (102-5). In spite of his expressed belief, then, that no one could find fault with one who fled in the face of divine intervention, he decides not to do so, and follows, with a slight modification, the course dictated by aidos.

On the other hand, the passages just quoted, in which the reference to circumstances and intentions is proved misguided or not acted upon, do at least indicate that there could be a degree of doubt or of difference of opinion as to whether or not intentions were relevant, and this suggests that some individuals did not feel themselves
absolutely constrained by maxims such as "it is disgraceful to retreat," but it general it does seem that for most the power of popular opinion, which could never be counted on to share one's own interpretation of one's actions, or even to be aware of it, was too strong. The major exception to this, the main area in which popular opinion does seem to have been willing to consider circumstances and intentions, is that of death in battle, which may be aeikês to the eye, and which is indisputably a failure, but which may, nevertheless, be glorious, depending on how the victim fought.

In this context, that of the power of popular opinion and the relative weakness of the individual's ability to content himself with his own interpretation of his actions, one figure, Paris, seems rather out of step with the others, and this is particularly true in book six of the Iliad, where his character emerges in sharp contrast to that of his brother, Hektor. On three occasions Hektor addresses Paris, abusing him for his slackness in battle. The second of these episodes begins at 6.325, where Hektor, having hastened to Paris' house, commences his rebuke; he assumes that Paris has kept himself away from the field out of χόλος, and points out that such wrath is inappropriate, when people are dying on his behalf; Paris himself would fight with another whom he saw slacking; a fortiori he, the cause of the conflict, should not hang back. This, like other passages we have discussed, is clearly intended to arouse aídos by the implication of cowardice.

In his reply, however, Paris shows no aídos whatever, and, while he does say that he has been thinking of returning to battle (337-9), he says merely that to do so "seemed better", and adds, philosophically, that victory attains now one man, now the other. He acknowledges the validity of what Hektor has said (333), but gives no indication that he is moved either by Hector's reference to those to whom he bears a responsibility, or by the threat of popular disapproval implicit in ὃ ὅ δ' ἄν μαχέσαιο καὶ ἄλλῳ.
Paris, then, does not seem concerned that his reputation might be diminished by his absence from the field of battle, nor does he seem particularly upset at his brother's reproach. This might suggest that his susceptibility to aidos is low. This impression is confirmed by the words of Helen, who continues the attack against Paris when Hektor disdains to address him: at 350-1 she wishes that she had been the wife of a better man, who took heed of other's nemesis and aischea. Paris, then, is insensitive to others' disapproval, and therefore not susceptible to aidos, even in a situation where his reputation as a warrior is at stake.

Later in the same book Paris and Hektor meet up again, and here the latter is more reflective on the subject of his brother's shirking:

Here Hektor concedes Paris his bravery, and claims that anyone who was ἐναίγμος would share his appreciation of it; this suggests both that one's reputation for valour is not entirely vulnerable to the attacks and reproaches of others, and that there are some people who are prepared to judge one's bravery in battle by taking more than simply one's immediate conduct into account. The ἐναίγμος in this passage is in sharp contrast to the frequently mentioned Τις Κακότερος (II.22.106, Od.6.275, 21.324), who judges on results alone and who takes delight in criticizing the efforts of his betters, even if their qualities are well known. In this case, however, the implication seems to be that those who are uttering aischea against Paris are justified in doing so, since Paris is the cause of their troubles and is thus expected to pull his weight. It is significant that the aischea of others worry Hektor; he does seem concerned that they might affect the standing of his brother and perhaps of himself, but equally he expects that ἐναίγμος people, like himself, will retain a positive
appreciation of his brother's fighting ability in spite of his previous shirking and inactivity. This passage shows us how and why intentions are less important than results in the poems; neutrals and those well-disposed to the subject may be prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt; for them, one who appears to be acting like a coward may still be an essentially brave man; but war is a serious, competitive business, and those involved in it will often not be prepared to accept excuses when a loss has been incurred or to spare one whose conduct has led to defeat and disgrace, however brave he has been in the past. In the same way, the individual hero will know quite well that those who might be expected to support him should he seek to excuse a retreat or some other failure will be few, and accordingly his own estimation of his own bravery and value will not be sufficient to allay his fears regarding the disapproval of the majority. The feeling of shame, moreover, seems in general to have less to do with intentions than results, and not only in "shame-cultures". We are all very well aware that other people make judgements about us based solely on appearances, and it is not uncommon for us to be concerned at their judgements, even if we know them to be false: one who, as a result, say, of some problem of balance, is forced to walk with a pronounced stagger, may be acutely concerned lest other people, as they will, think him inebriated, even though he is perfectly aware that his gait is the result of circumstances entirely out with his control.

Book six of the Iliad is almost entirely taken up by the contrast of Paris and Hektor, and clearly Paris emerges as the less admirable figure; the contrast is particularly evident in the susceptibility of the two to aidos, and if Hektor is the more admirable character, there is a strong presumption that we are intended to see his attitude to aidos as more proper than that of his brother. In her speech at 6.407-39 Andromache begs Hektor to pity herself and her son, and to carry out the future defence of Troy from within the fortifications. Hektor replies as follows (441-6):
It is *aidos*, then, which drives Hektor to fight in open battle, in spite of the pity he feels for his wife and child. It is clearly unbearable for him that others should consider him to be acting like a coward. But this is not his only reason for rejecting Andromache's appeal: he knows that there is something else which impels him to risk his life, something within himself not dependent on his fear of what the Trojans might say, and it is to this factor that he refers when he says that his *thymos* produces the same result as his *aidos*. In referring to his *thymos* Hektor is effectively telling us that it is his own subjective wish to face the Greek heroes in battle. He has no word for "will", but this is the concept to which he appeals. His *thymos* bids him fight because he has learned to be brave and always fight among the first of the Trojans; we should do well not to divorce his "education" from the *aidos* which he has just expressed; in the society envisaged by the *Iliad* any education will be in the values and expectations of the group, and the sensitivity to custom thus produced must approximate to *aidos*, a quality which will later figure prominently in Greek educational theory. Hektor's education, then, will have taught him how society expects him to behave, and thus contributes to the formation of his social rôle; inasmuch as it is his *thymos*, as well as his *aidos*, which leads him to pursue this rôle, however, Hektor has obviously internalized the expectations of society, so that they have become his own idea of his status and his duty.

Hektor is faced with a similar situation in book 22, when it is his parents who attempt to dissuade him from going into battle. Again he is not persuaded (91), and again he sees his choice to remain in the field in terms of *aidos*. This time, however, his *aidos* is not directed at the implication...
of behaving like a coward, but at the charge that he has failed in his duty to protect Troy and its people. He cannot return to the city, he claims, because Polydamas will be the first to set up *elenchei* for him (100); Polydamas had urged him to lead the host back to the city when Achilles had made his initial return to the fray, and Hektor had disregarded his advice. The result was disaster, and now Hektor is afraid to return to the city:

> νῦν δ' ἔπει ὡς εἰκά τὸ κρίσις ἁμάρτησιν ἐμῆσιν, ἀιδέομαι Τηῦας καὶ Τεῦας ἐλκειτέπλους, ἐνί ποτέ τις ἔπιει κακωτέρος ἄλλος ἐμένοι. ἔκτις ὅφι βιχφι Πεθῆσας ὡλετε λαὸν. (22.104-7)

Two points are important here: the first is that Hektor regards it as normal that he should be condemned for failing in his duty to others; as the punishment for such failure is personal disgrace, it seems legitimate to conclude that the requirement to protect is regarded as a demand of personal honour. The second point is that Hektor is clearly aware that he has done something which is reprehensible. This does not mean that his *aidos* is retrospective, as von Erffa points out; it is still the reproach of other people which he fears, and his apprehension is still prospective. Nevertheless, in giving the reason for his *aidos* in 104 he expresses more clearly than does any other Homeric character his awareness of his own culpability, and awareness of one's misdeed is a prerequisite of conscience, a word which, in its Latin and Greek forms, *syneidesis* and *conscientia*, refers explicitly to the idea of "awareness". Hektor knows he is culpable, and he knows this because he is familiar with the standards by which others will judge him; although he articulates his "conscience" of his past mistake in terms of prospective apprehension, the reproach of the Trojans is still hypothetical; Hektor's awareness of his mistake is thus subjective, and it troubles him now; he does not have to await the actual disapproval of the Trojans. The explicit reference to "other people" is perhaps not what we would associate with conscience, but it would be wrong to say that the germ of conscience is not present in this passage, or that Hektor, within the limitations of his language and his
culture, is not experiencing something very like that which we experience in situations which we explain in terms of conscience or remorse.⁹⁹

We saw in the last passage how it seemed to be expected of Hektor that he should not endanger his men; failure to meet this requirement could bring elencheie, which suggests that the standard might be enforced and upheld by the aidos of the individual. In both of the passages quoted from book six in which Paris was criticized by Hektor reference was made to the former's responsibility to those who were fighting on his behalf (6.327-30, 525). We also noticed how hortatory appeals to aidos in the midst of battle were intended to have the effect of ensuring discipline in the host and promoting the security of all; to the passages on pp. 25-7 above add Il. 15.502-3:

\[
\text{κόσμος, άρεσεις, οὐδὲν ἄρειν ὑπὸ ἀπολέσθαι ἢ ἔσαυρήν καὶ ἀπώθασθαι κακὰ νηών.}
\]

In such appeals, then, co-operation among the troops is achieved through the appeal to the individual's concern for his own reputation, while in the other passages it seems that the charge of failing one's comrades-at-arms was seen as one which might bring disgrace on the subject and arouse his aidos. Thus the proper modes of conduct towards one's fellows are allied to the requirements of personal honour; the individual's sensitivity regarding his own honour causes him to remain at his place in battle and to strive to see that his fellows do the same, while failure to protect one's comrades constitutes grounds for reproach.

The idea of personal honour, then, has its part to play in co-operation as well as in competition; since, however, our subject is not the responsibility of the heroes to each other, but aidos and its relatives, we shall be restricted to discussion of those passages which have a direct bearing on our subject.¹⁰⁰ Here we shall be concerned mostly with the responsibility of the heroes to their fallen comrades, for it is in this context that nemesis in particular has a considerable rôle to play.
Glaukos' words after the death of Sarpedon are both typical and instructive: the first point in his speech (Il.16.538-40) refers directly to Hektor's responsibility to his allies:

"Εκτες, νῦν δ' ἡ πάγχυ λελαμένος εἰς ἑπτακόην, οἱ σέθεν εἶνεκα τήλε φίλων καὶ πατείδος αἵς θυμὸν ἀποφθινύθουσιν. οὐ δ' οὖν ἐθέλεις ἐπανύνειν.

In the next line Glaukos informs Hektor and the Trojans of Sarpedon's fate; clearly he feels that Hektor should have taken steps to prevent it. Now that Sarpedon has fallen, however, Glaukos turns to the more pressing question of the rescue of his body, addressing the general company of Trojans and their allies (544-6):

The Trojan side, Glaukos' philoi, is asked to feel nemesis lest Sarpedon be stripped of his arms and his body suffer disfigurement. The Lycian leader would be a considerable prize for Patroklos and the Myrmidons, and his armour would be concrete proof of their success. It is therefore a matter of honour, both collective and personal, that his comrades should take steps to retrieve his body and avoid disgrace. The passive form of the verb is important here: if nemesis is always anger in which one feels oneself justified, then there must be an object of the Trojans' nemesis here; but obviously the correlation between one's own nemesis and another's breach of aídos is not relevant, for in a society in which warfare was a way of life it is scarcely credible that one should be expected to refrain from killing one's opponent out of aídos, or that it was considered occasion for resentment when an enemy killed a friend; Glaukos surely cannot be asking the Trojans to feel nemesis towards Patroklos for killing Sarpedon.

The passive, νεμεσιήθηκε is the clue, for although not a true passive, it does differ slightly in meaning from the middle; the nemesis of Sarpedon's fellow-soldiers is directed not at Patroklos but at themselves; the breach of aídos is their own, or would be. There are two sides to the reaction of
shame at the prospect of disgrace; one is the inhibitory
side, when the agent suppresses the action which might lead
to ignominy; the other is the angry, resentful side, which
comes into play when the reprehensible action is abandoned and
positive steps are taken to wipe out any suggestion of an
insult; this emotion can be covered by *aidos* (in hortatory
appeals especially), but here it is expressed by *nemesis*.

In *Iliad* 17 the question of duty to one's fallen comrades
arises for both sides, the Greeks striving to rescue the
body of Patroklos and the Trojan side still involved in
recriminations regarding the body of Sarpedon. We have
already seen (pp. 11 and 32 above) how Menelaos, at *Il.* 17,
91-105, debates whether he should attempt to rescue
Patroklos' body, giving in to *aidos*, or consult his own
safety, thus risking the *nemesis* of his fellows. The question
of Menelaos' obligation to Patroklos arises in line 92,
where he mentions that Patroklos has been killed fighting
for his (Menelaos') *time*. The idea must be that Patroklos
has done something for Menelaos, and now Menelaos finds it
difficult to escape doing something for Patroklos. Later in
the same episode, after calling on the leaders of the Argives
as his *philoi* in 248, he appeals to their *nemesis* much as
Glaukos did in the previous book:

\[\begin{align*}
\text{άλλα} & \; \tauι \; \alphaυτοσ \; \iotaω, \; \nuεμεσιζέθηθα \; \delta' \; \epsilonι \; \thetaυμω
\text{Πατροκλον} & \; \tauεσθι \; \kυσιν \; \muέλπυθηκα \; \γενείδισ(254-5).
\end{align*}\]

At line 95 Menelaos saw his responsibility to Patroklos as
prompted by *aidos*, now it is *nemesis* which he imagines will
motivate the others to intervene; the force of *nemesis* here
seems to rely on a vivid imagining of the discreditable
event: the hero is urged to regard the disgrace of losing a
comrade's body as a real and present possibility; the
reaction of *nemesis* will then occur as a response to the
failure, the breach of *aidos* thus envisaged. It will be seen
that the heroes' concern for their own, personal honour is
invoked to encourage an attitude of responsibility towards
the other members of their contingent; the honour of each,
in fact, is closely bound up with that of the others, and
thus brings about co-operation rather than competition.
The appeal to personal honour which is implicated in the collective honour of the group is not, however, the only means of encouraging the heroes to act in the interests of their fellows, for each hero bears certain obligations towards the others which are not directly connected with the fact that the loss of a comrade's body reflects badly on the whole company. We have just seen that appeals to nemesis in this particular context are frequently addressed to the general body of the army addressed collectively as philoi;\(^{102}\) we remember, too, that Menelaos mentioned the service Patroklos had rendered him in the context of his explanation of his reluctance towards leaving his body behind (17.92); so too Paris is reminded by Hektor that the Trojans and their allies are fighting on his behalf (6.327-30,525; 33-4 above), and Hektor feels himself responsible for the deaths of many of those whom he was supposed to protect (22.104-7, p.37 above).

The implications of these passages are brought out more clearly in another passage of Iliad 17, and again the point at issue is Hektor's responsibility to the dead Sarpedon. At 142-7 Glaukos threatens Hektor with the withdrawal of the entire Lycian contingent, on the grounds (147-8) that they receive no charis for their efforts in the field. Hektor's lack of charis, Glaukos claims, is manifested in his failure to rescue the body of Sarpedon, his xeinos and hetairos (150). The fact that Hektor has failed to save Sarpedon, it is suggested, will discourage others from fighting on his behalf, since they can scarcely expect him to act in their interests when he has failed to act in those of one to whom he was bound by such strong ties of guest-friendship, comradeship and gratitude. The value of Sarpedon's services, then, as well as the specific ties between him and Hektor, put Hektor under an obligation to help him where possible, and to rescue him from ill-treatment and dishonour when dead.\(^{103}\) Sarpedon enjoys special status as a result of his pre-eminence as a warrior and because he is Hektor's xeinos, but it is clear from Glaukos' words that the other Lycians also expect charis from Hektor, and the
evidence suggests both that it was seen as a duty of hetairoi to come to each other's aid in battle\textsuperscript{104} and that each member of either of the two sides, Greek or Trojan, could be considered the hetairos of the others.\textsuperscript{105} Thus any member of one's own side might be covered by the obligations which existed between hetairoi.\textsuperscript{106}

We shall discuss the matter of supplication below, but here it will be sufficient to comment that there does not seem to have been much room for aidos towards one's opponents in the Iliad: Hektor at 22.123-4 claims that he can expect no mercy or aidos from Achilles even if he does lay down his arms as his mother requests. Yet Achilles has become particularly savage by that point, and perhaps it was thought worthwhile to plead for pity or aidos from less ferocious opponents; otherwise, if no quarter was ever given (and, as we shall see, this is not the case), why should the question even arise?

**AIDOS AS A SOCIAL VIRTUE**

Frequently in the poems we find people described as aidoios; those who deserve this designation, people before whom one feels aidos, fall into three broad categories; those before whom one feels inferior, who fill one with a sense of awe; those with whom one has a tie of philotes; and those who are helpless or who throw themselves on one's mercy. In the feminine, however, the adjective is used formulaically of any respectable woman, and its usage tells us relatively little.

Where aidoios is the only adjective employed it most often refers to those in the third of these categories; in other contexts, however, it is frequently combined with other adjectives which help define the precise grounds on which the person so described is aidoios. One of these is deinos. At Od.14.234, as part of his yarn designed to deceive Eumaios, Odysseus tells how, after his oikos ἀφέλλητο, he became deinos and aidoios among the Cretans. At Il.18. 394 Hephaistos describes Thetis as a δεινήτε καὶ αἰδοῖς θέος,
and goes on to describe a debt of gratitude which he owes her. The two examples appear quite dissimilar, but the common factor seems to lie in the special status of the person described; Thetis is deino for Hephaistos because he owes her a favour, and this constitutes a tie between them, while Odysseus' Cretan is deinos because of his wealth and power; in combination deinos and aidoios seem to describe a sense of awe or inhibition which one feels towards one's superiors or those one respects for some other reason.

The relationship between aidoios and deinos thus works in much the same way as that between aidos and fear, and one feature of both combinations is their use in portraying the attitude of inferior towards superior. The two heralds at Il.1.331, for example, feel both dread and aidos for Achilles, both because he is their superior and because he is particularly fearful in his present mood. Similarly, Eumaios experiences both aidos and fear with respect to his masters, Odysseus and Telemachos. At Od.14.145-6 he tells his disguised master of his feelings towards Odysseus:

\[ \text{His aidos here clearly approximates to a very considerable respect for his master; his reluctance to name him } \]

strikes us as an indication of fear, yet he gives as his reason for this reluctance not Odysseus' severity but his kindness; like Hephaistos for Thetis, then, he feels some kind of awe for one who has treated him well. At 17.188-9 the swineherd tells the disguised Odysseus that he will carry out Telemachos' instructions, even though he would rather not, explaining:

\[ \text{This passage shows that the object of one's aidos in situations like these is the immediate recipient of one's actions; in experiencing fear and aidos towards Telemachos it is Telemachos' own disapproval that Eumaios fears, not that of other people in general.} \]
The analogy of the combination, aidoios and deinos, seems to help explain the use of the adjective nemesetos in an unparalleled personal sense at Il.11.649. Here Achilles is described as aidoios and nemesetos in the context of Patroklos' unwillingness to incur his anger, and it is significant that deinos in 654 covers the same notion as the two previous epithets; on balance the active meaning of nemesetos, liable to feel nemesis, seems more likely, but a passive meaning, expressing the idea that Patroklos would feel nemesis towards himself were he to go against Achilles' instructions, seems just possible.

In addition to finding aidoios and deinos as a pair, we also meet them in combination with a third adjective, philos, as at Il.3.172, where Helen addresses Priam, who has just shown kindness towards her: Κιδοῖς τέ μοι ἐρεί, ἡλε ἐκυψί, δεῖνος τέ. There may be any number of reasons why Priam should be deinos to Helen; he is a great king, and a reverend old man, and in both of these senses may be considered her superior. He is also manifestly her philos, as the father of her new husband.

At Od.8.21-2 Athene covers Odysseus with charis and makes him mightier in aspect, with a view to making him philos, deinos and aidoios in the eyes of the Phaeacians. Being taller and stouter in appearance Odysseus could obviously expect to appear deinos to the Phaeacians, and the other two epithets take their force from this fact; looking like a man of wealth and power, Odysseus would be more likely to find people who will entertain him, since, philotes being the reciprocal relation that it is, one who looks as if he can repay one's hospitality is a better prospect than one who does not. And if he is both deinos and philos it is only natural that he should also be aidoios, since men feel aidos towards those whose presence they find imposing and towards those who are their philoi. The implication that it is only on these grounds that Odysseus can expect aidos from his prospective hosts should, however, be rejected; as we shall see, even those who are neither deinos nor the philoi of
those they encounter are still entitled to be met with *aidos*; it would appear, however, that one could be more confident about receiving hospitality if one could create the impression that any kindness done would be rewarded; hence Odysseus' statement at Od.11.360 that he would be *aìdòi'kètêcôs kai fí'kterôs ìndê'pìv* were he to return to Ithaka πλεοτέ'pên sìn kêpî.

There appears to be a certain degree of interchangeability in the way in which *deinos* and *philos* accompany *aidois*; we might compare, for example, the last passage quoted with 14.234 (p.42 above); in the former Odysseus expects to become *aìdòi'kètêcôs kai fí'kterôs* as a result of increased wealth, while in the latter he becomes *dèinôs t' aìdòi'côs te* by the same process. One wishes, it would seem, to become the *philos* of the *deinoi*. In 11.18 the question of the relationship between *philos* and *deinos* arises in connexion with the gratitude one owes one who has done one a kindness. At 386 and 425 Thetis is described as *aìdòi'kèn te fî'kèn te,* while at 394, at the beginning of a passage which gives powerful grounds for Hephaistos' *philotes* with her, she becomes *dèinîc te kai aìdòi'kèn.* Thetis has done Hephaistos a great service, and this appears to be the reason for her designation as *deine* and *aidoie.* At 14.210, however, Hera explains to Zeus that she believes that she will be called *phile* and *aidoie* by Okeanos and Tethys if she succeeds in bringing about a reconciliation between them. Apparently, one to whom one owes a debt of gratitude may be both *philos* and *deinos*; *deinos* is obviously far removed from the idea of fear here; it seems that both *deinos* and *philos* refer to one who has a special status in another's eyes, and it is this special status which makes one *aidois*.

*Philotes* is a frequent ground for *aidos* in Homer; in addition to the passages already quoted and others in which *philos* and *aidois* are combined, there also exists a number of passages in which the operation of *aidos* in *philotes* relationships may be observed. At Od.20.343-4 Telemachos says that he feels *aidos* at the thought of expelling his mother from the house against her will; at 2.134-7 he gives
elaborate reasons for his compunction; his father would
punish him were he to do as the suitors request, his mother
herself would set "hateful Erinyes" against him, and people
in general would feel nemesis towards him. Clearly, then,
the requirement that one should show aidos towards one's
mother is backed up by the strongest of sanctions; but
Telemachos is not simply constrained by fear of punishment
or opprobrium, for at line 131 he stresses the debt of
gratitude which he owes his mother in referring to the fact
that it was she who gave him life and nurture. This debt was
also felt to be a factor in producing aidos towards one's
mother; at Il.22.82-4 Hekabe bares her breast to her son and
bids him show aidos on account of the nurture she gave him:

"Εκτος, Τέκνων ἵμων, Τάξε τ' αἶδον καὶ μ' ἐλέγουν
αὐτήν, εἰ ποτὲ τοι ἀκθικηθέκ μάζον ἐπέτέχον.
Τῷ ἰμῷ μνήμαι, φίλε Τέκνω..."

Strife is to be avoided among members of the same family,
even if the family is divine; at Od.6.329-30 Athene is
deterred by aidos from provoking a confrontation with her
uncle Poseidon, while at Il.21.468 avuncular philotes again
gives rise to the aidos which prevents a quarrel between
Apollo and the sea-god. In both cases the divine sphere
reflects the norm in human family relationships.

The tie of philotes, however, was not simply one between
members of the same family, but existed in relationships in
which no blood tie was involved. As might be expected,
aidos is also a feature of this type of philotes. At Il.24.
110-11 Zeus informs Thetis that his wish in assigning
Achilles kudos is to preserve the aidos and philotes which
bind Thetis to him; a philotes relationship already exists
between the two, but this further favour strengthens it and
secures Thetis' aidos for the future.

We saw above (38-42) that the heroes of the Iliad were each
other's philoi and that they had certain obligations to each
other which it was a matter of honour to uphold; while it
is true to say that the cohesion of the warriors in battle
is produced to a great extent by their individual concern
for their own reputations, we also sensed that there was more to their mutual obligations than that; it now seems opportune to suggest that, as a group of philoi, they felt themselves obliged to accord each other aidos. The sanction against neglect of this aidos will still be popular disapproval, since the belief that aidos is appropriate among philoi will be shared by society in general, and because aidos is itself a sensitivity to the opinions of others, but there will also be a direct tie between the philoi and each will be concerned not only with the reactions of a wider public, but also with the reactions of the other party to the relationship.

The issue of the hero's obligations to his philoi arises most conspicuously in Iliad 9, where the ambassadors attempt to persuade Achilles to return to the fighting. Not much is made of aidos or philotes in this context, but what is said is significant, and indeed the whole purpose of the mission is to persuade Achilles to consider the interests of the rest of the army rather than his own injured time. The appeal to eleos (302) is also important, in that eleos appears to be expected among philoi and can lead the warrior to subordinate his interests to those of his friends. Aidos makes its first appearance in this episode at 508, but here the context is not one of Achilles' responsibility to his comrades, but of the god-given benefits of giving in to entreaty. Ajax, however, who speaks after Achilles has rejected the appeals of the others and whose words have the greatest effect, does refer explicitly to that responsibility, and to aidos and philotes. At 630-2 Ajax charges Achilles with neglect of the philotes he enjoys with the rest of the army, and reminds him of its reciprocal nature; the other Achaeans honour (étiômen) Achilles with their philotes, and it is implied that he should return their friendship. In concluding his speech, Ajax asks Achilles, καὶ οἱ φίλοι μοι εὔπαρκαι and points out that he and his colleagues are guests under his roof; this appears to be a reference to the institution of xenia, but need not be narrowly interpreted; Ajax is appealing to the ties of
friendship which exist between them, and although the envoys are currently enjoying Achilles' hospitality, we should not see Ajax' words as an appeal to xenia separate from that to philotes; similar conduct is required in both relationships, and, in practice, once the initial bond between host and guest is forged, xeinoi are treated as philoi. We should also notice that Ajax concludes his speech, and his appeal to aidos, by claiming that he and his fellows are Achilles' closest friends (κυριατός ε' έμενε καὶ Φίλατατοι, 642). Ajax and his colleagues, then, consider it worthwhile to attempt to persuade Achilles by referring to their friendship as members of the same army; they do not, it is true, suggest openly that his refusal to be persuaded is unseemly or discreditable, or name any sanctions which may be brought to bear as a result of his neglect of his philoi, but then their purpose is not threatening, but cajoling. And there are indications enough that they regard his obstinacy as unusual and excessive; line 523, for example, πείν δ' οὖν η νεμέσιτον Κεχολλόθακ should be read with emphasis on the πείν, while the remarks of Phoinix that even the gods are open to persuasion (497) suggest that Achilles' concern for his time, exceeding even that of the gods, is abnormal. So, too, Ajax, in pointing out that even one whose brother or son had been murdered would accept compensation (632-3), implies that Achilles is going too far in his anger. Clearly, then, it was regarded as desirable that one should listen to one's philoi, consult their interests, and accord them aidos, but, as in any society, it was difficult to coerce those who put their own interests first.

The avoidance of strife in the peer group appears to have been an ideal, but so too was the pursuit of honour, and although the opposing forces at Troy may be considered as two groups of philoi, each individual within the group also cherished his own claim to honour; and where honour exists as an acknowledged factor in the motivation of men, there also exists a hierarchy of honour, for if everyone has equal honour, then no one has any; by the same token, honour is regarded as a commodity, of which there is a finite amount
within the community; one man's acquisition of honour is another man's loss. Thus a situation could arise in which acute concern for one's own honour might be combined with a wariness of one's rivals and a determination that they should not increase their honour at the expense of one's own. In this type of situation the individual might be subject to competing claims, and *aidos* might enter into these claims in more than one sense, in that concern for one's own honour and reputation, which may take in *aidos* at the prospect of any loss of status in the eyes of others, may conflict with the honour of the group, which *aidos* helps defend, or with the requirement that one's superiors and one's *philoi* be accorded *aidos*.

Although the forces at Troy may be seen as groups of *philoi*, some enjoyed greater status than others; we have already seen that *aidos* is a proper response with regard to one's superiors, and in straightforward situations there is no problem about this; the heralds at Iliad 1.331 are quite obviously Achilles' inferiors, and the *aidos* they show him recognizes that fact unambiguously. In other situations, however, the position may be more complicated, particularly when two or more of the most prominent heroes are involved, for in such situations the matter of superiority is not always clear, and one party may decide to push his own claim, either to superiority or to parity; *time* is important in this, for while one hero may have more than another, in dealing with his fellow heroes he is never dealing with one who has a negligible claim to *time* of his own.

An episode in Iliad 4 shows how problems might arise; at 370-400 Agamemnon, who is pursuing the task of urging the army on to greater effort with no little enthusiasm, abuses Diomedes, accusing him of slacking and comparing him unfavourably with his father. Diomedes himself does not immediately respond, but his companion, Sthenelos, the son of Kapaneus and so, like Diomedes, one of the *epigonoi*, the sons of the Seven against Thebes, reacts angrily to the suggestion that his generation is inferior to
that of his father. Significantly, he sees the matter in terms of *time*, arguing that his generation was successful where their fathers failed, and that they should therefore enjoy greater *time* (410). Sthenelos, then, takes Agamemnon's words as an affront to his honour, and we can see how a dispute might arise on that basis. Diomedes' response, on the other hand is totally different; at 401-2 he refrains from making any reply at all, *κισεθείς βασιλεύς ἐνιππήν κισόλοιο*. As supreme commander and *basileus* Agamemnon is of paramount status, and Diomedes acknowledges this with *aidos*. After Sthenelos has spoken, he explains why he has taken no offence; he realizes (412-18) that Agamemnon is attempting to encourage the troops to greater effort, and accepts his right to do so, for, as he points out, both the glory of success and the sorrow of failure rest with him. Diomedes, then, does not resent (*οὐ νεμέω* 413) remarks which another has taken as an affront because he can understand why the remarks were made; he makes allowance both for Agamemnon's status and for the pressures and responsibilities that that status entails.  

Sthenelos and Diomedes, then, exemplify opposite responses, both of which are envisaged by the values of society; Sthenelos' is the individual response, conscious of personal *time*, while that of Diomedes takes loyalty to the peer group and respect for one's superiors into account. We see the latter attitude again at IL.10.237-9, where Agamemnon excuses Diomedes from the need to take *aidos* for one of superior birth and rank in choosing an accomplice for the mission behind enemy lines:

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μὴ δὲ γάρ κισόμενος εὐθεὶς ὑπὲρ τὸν μὲν ἄρειν καλλιτείτεν, ὑπὲρ ἄρεῑον ὀπάσσας κισօν ἐίκων, ἐς γενεᾶν ἄροιν, μηδὲ εἰ βασιλεύτερος ἐστιν.
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Agamemnon is being disingenuous (trying to ensure that Diomedes does not select Menelaos, 240), but even so his argument must be plausible; *aidos* for one's superiors, then, must have been a powerful force, in some individuals at least. On the other hand, a response like that of Sthenelos may also be envisaged as normal, as at 10.129-30, where Nestor's
denial that anyone will feel nemesis at Menelaos' commands in the present instance implies that such a response might be likely in other instances (cf. 114-5, where Nestor foresees nemesis on the part of Agamemnon should he charge Menelaos with dereliction of duty). Where aidos intervenes, then, it helps subdue the nemesis which is occasioned by an affront to one's time; the fact that nemesis is the term employed suggests that the affront, the failure to recognize another's time, may be regarded as a breach of aidos.

It is suggested by Scott that the fact that Diomedes' aidos in 4.402 is not shared by Sthenelos and others in the same situation reveals the weakness of the restraint which the concept provides. If the fact that some feel aidos in a given situation while others do not means that aidos is weak, then we shall have to accept this argument. To me, however, this does not imply that aidos is weak, but simply that it is an emotion to which some are more sensitive than others, or which certain individuals, as a result of their upbringing and disposition, are more likely to experience in some situations than in others. We should not consider fear to be weak simply because some are more prone to it than others, nor pity, nor love; rather we judge the power of these emotions by their power in individual human beings; and we have already seen that in some individuals aidos can be powerful to the point of being undesirably so. It should be no surprise that it is not powerful in every individual.

At Il.23.473ff. a quarrel breaks out between Ajax, son of Oileus, and Idomeneus; after a quick burst of invective from both sides (in which the former addresses the latter aiχεύει, cf. p.16 above), Achilles quickly interposes (492-4):

It may be true that Ajax' address is only aischron for its recipient, but Achilles reprimands the conduct of both as "unseemly" and occasion for nemesis, terms which appeal to the same
ideas of appropriateness and disapproval as does aischron. This is clearly a minor quarrel, and perhaps that is why it is considered inappropriate, but where time is at stake, the importance of the cause of the dispute may be irrelevant, and so it is important that a dispute can arouse nemesis, which suggests that aidos has been ignored, and that the standard by which it does arouse nemesis can be seen as universal (καὶ δ' ἀλλ' ἁμέσωτα).

We have seen that aidos can override resentment at an affront, and that nemesis is the reaction of one who feels himself affronted; aidos, then, in an ideal situation, should work both ways, preventing both the insult and an excessive reaction to it, relying in both cases on an appreciation of the other's time. But ideal situations are few in any society, and disputes do arise. At this point we can hardly help but be reminded of the quarrel which stands at the centre of the plot of the Iliad. When Achilles is insulted by Agamemnon, his reaction is to complain of his opponent's anaideie, and his grounds for this accusation clearly lie in the slight he has suffered upon his time. Adkins, in connexion with this and other passages, points out that there is a natural tendency to set a higher value on co-operative values in others when one has oneself been wronged, and there is plainly a great deal of truth in this, but aidos and time are associated, and Achilles' charge of anaideie does seem to coincide with the judgement of others; certainly all those who express an opinion feel that Achilles was the wronged party; at 19.86 Agamemnon is abused for provoking Achilles, while at 9.523 (above, p.48) Phoinix says that, up to that point, Achilles' anger has not been nemessetont. Even Agamemnon himself admits as early as book two (377) that it was he who started the quarrel. Most importantly, however, Nestor, the first to attempt to calm the two, sees the matter in terms of their time, pointing out that Agamemnon should not deprive Achilles of a prize allotted him by the other Achaeans (visible proof of the time he has won in battle), and that Achilles, although of divine birth and the greater warrior, should bow before the
greater *time* of a king who rules from Zeus (1.275-84).\(^{129}\)

Agamemnon, then, is certainly *anaides* in disregarding Achilles' *time*,\(^{130}\) while Achilles himself is reproached for being without the kind of *aidos* shown by Diomedes at 4.402.

The implications of this aspect of the quarrel for the wider question of the nature of Homeric values are manifold; we see, for example, that although Achilles does not act as did Diomedes, or as Nestor urges him to, nevertheless he is not regarded as in the wrong; while the reflective response, the response with which *aidos* is associated, may be the ideal, it appears that retaliation for a wrong suffered is felt to be legitimate. Two kinds of response are thus envisaged, one of self-control and one of self-assertion, one of regard for the *time* of others, one of regard for one's own. *Aidos*, moreover, may be part of both responses, *aidos* for one's philoi and superiors on the one hand, and *aidos* at the prospect of humiliation resulting from failure to avenge the affront on the other; it seems to me that Achilles is clearly subject to the latter at 1.293-4, where he claims that he would be called *deilos* and *outidanos* were he to yield to Agamemnon in every matter. Obviously the two responses conflict, and where they do, the conflict will be between loyalty to the group and loyalty to oneself.\(^{131}\)

The conflict is also one between co-operative and competitive standards, between the avoidance of strife and the pursuit of one's own interests. Adkins is therefore right to point out that Agamemnon, in ignoring Achilles' *time* is undoubtedly *anaides*, and that his *aidos* is weak.\(^{132}\) Indeed, his *aidos* in this instance is non-existent; Adkins might also have pointed out that Achilles, too, follows competitive *aidos* rather than co-operative, even if he is justified in doing so. This, as we have said before, is a question of what is at stake, rather than of the structure of Homeric values;\(^{133}\) both Achilles and Agamemnon are concerned at the prospect of being thought weak; this worries them more than the prospect of being considered *anaides*, because the charge, "You are weak," challenges their rights, privileges and status in a way that
the charge, "You are anaides," does not. This is not, however, a question of the relative power of the two charges, but of the material consequences of ignoring them; popular disapproval is not effective in itself, whether in the co-operative or the competitive sphere. The fact, then, that Agamemnon feels able to ignore criticism of his conduct in depriving Achilles of Briseis, feels able, in fact, to be anaides, and that his peers are unable to prevent his doing so by means of their disapproval, is a question not of values but of practicality; it is not part of the structure of Homeric values that breaches of co-operative virtue on the part of the powerful are condoned by society; as we have seen, Agamemnon's behaviour is not condoned. Therefore it is not true to say that Agamemnon has a claim to deprive Achilles of his prize, but it is certainly true to point out that he feels able to do so without undermining his position in any way.

Adkins also claims that, while Agamemnon may be anaides in refusing to acknowledge Achilles' time, it is not aischron for him to do so. The context, however, gives us no clue on this question, and the paucity of evidence for the usage of aischron in Homer scarcely equips us to decide one way or the other. Yet we do know that aischron refers to the appearance of actions or situations, and that it implies that the situation thus described will be such as to occasion popular disapproval, and we have seen both that Agamemnon ignores popular disapproval and that quarrels can be condemned on the grounds of their unseemliness; I should hesitate, therefore, to say that it is impossible that Agamemnon's behaviour be described as aischron. We remember that the suitors do perpetrate aischea which reflect badly upon themselves, and throughout the Odyssey they are characterized as anaideis. It is interesting, therefore, to find that on two separate occasions they are condemned because

\[ \text{Où πιναχλος πέτασσαι ἐπὶ τοιχον ἀνθρώπων,} \]
\[ \text{οὐ κακῶν οὐδὲ μὲν ἐσθητον, οὕτι δὲ καὶ ἐπαθεῖς εἰς ἀνθρώπον:} \]
\[ \text{Od. 22.414-5, 23.65-6} \]

The suitors, then, are anaideis, commit aischea and do
not accord others the *time* they deserve; they are *agathoi* but are condemned throughout the poem, and their *arete* is largely irrelevant to those who condemn them; nor does the poem as a whole give the impression that it was composed for a society which would countenance breaches of the co-operative virtues provided *arete* was maintained. The fact that *arete* is unaffected by such behaviour does not mean that it is condoned; *arete* encompasses so many aspects, such as birth and wealth, which could never be affected by anyone's disapproval, that it is difficult to imagine it being affected by anything but the severest material disaster. The significance of the extracts examined for our purposes, then, lies in their demonstration that it was considered discreditable to deprive others of the *time* they deserve, and that *aidos* was felt to be the factor which led one to acknowledge the status of others.

Turning more firmly now to the *Odyssey*, we find that much is made of *aidos* in the context of the youthful Telemachos' dealings with those he meets on his travels to gather news about his father. At 3.24 he experiences *aidos* at the thought of addressing the aged Nestor, even though Athene, disguised as Mentor, has assured him that he has not the slightest need to feel that way (14). Telemachos' instinctive *aidos*, then, which is regarded as normal in one of his age, is active even when he has been assured that it is not necessary; this amounts to an assurance that no one will think the worse of him for abandoning his *aidos* and so shows that the emotional reaction represented by *aidos* does not amount to a simple calculation of the responses of others. Rather Telemachos' *aidos* is deeply rooted in his temperament, which is portrayed as characteristic of one making the transition from boyhood to manhood.

Telemachos is showing similar reticence at 4.158-60, where, describing his behaviour towards Menelaos, Peisistratos explains:

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άλλα οὖν ἡ τὸν ἔστι, οὐκ ἐφηται ὅτι ἐνι θυμῷ
ὡς ἔχοντι τὸ Πεισίστρατος ἐπερχόμενον
άντικελέα, τοῦ νῦν θεοῖ ως τερπόμεθ' κυβή.
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As we have already noted, \textit{νεμεσίς} comes very close to the sense of \textit{αιδέω} here; both verbs refer to possible breaches of the decorum expected by society. It is therefore interesting to note the association of \textit{aidos/nemesis} and \textit{saophrosyne}, a concept which will later express some of the notions of self-control and self-inhibition present in \textit{aidos}. \textit{Sophrosyne}, however, has no overt reference to the censure of other people, except inasmuch as popular disapproval is an unpleasant consequence which one who practises \textit{saophrosyne} will wish to avoid, but this restraint is of an intellectual nature and differs from the instinctive, emotional force of \textit{aidos}. In Homer, \textit{saophron} works much as do other words which connote "good sense", and the interaction of these with \textit{aidos} will be discussed below.

Telémmachos' \textit{aidos}, as we have just seen, could go too far, and interfere with the purpose of his journey; but just as he feels \textit{aidos} towards his hosts, so he expects that they will feel it towards him, and he realizes that this, too, may conflict with his purpose, which is to find out the truth about his father. Hence at 3.96 and 4.326 he entreats Nestor and Menelaoz (respectively),

\begin{quote}
\textquote{Μηδε τι μ' κιδόμενος μειλλίσσεο μηδ' ἐλεκίσσων.}
\end{quote}

Telémmachos imagines that \textit{aidos}, concern for his feelings, may lead his hosts to withhold unpleasant details regarding his father's fate. \textit{Aidos} here clearly denotes concern for the recipient of one's actions, and while one could claim that such \textit{aidos} contains the notion of fear of that person's disapproval, it seems pedantic to deny that its primary reference is to an altruistic concern for another's feelings.

\textit{Aidos}, then, is a powerful influence over the conduct of Homeric man \textit{vis-à-vis} his fellows; it is a desirable quality and helps enforce the norms of society. So far, however, we have only seen it in action with regard to those who have some claim to it arising from their special relationship to the subject, be they his superiors, his family or his colleagues. Other categories of people, however, who cannot demand \textit{aidos} on the grounds of their power or their \textit{philotes},
are nevertheless felt to be entitled to it; this group of *aidoioi* consists of those who enter a community from outside, and who are largely at the mercy of those they encounter, namely strangers, suppliants and beggars, all of whom may, to some extent, be subsumed under the heading of *xeinoi*. Unlike those groups discussed so far, however, one's *philoi* or one's superiors, these people do not rely on their own time to attract the *aidos* of others, but on that lent them by Zeus, their protector and *epitimetor* (Od. 9.270).

Obviously, though, society will only impart this special status to those who enter a community from outside because it regards it as desirable that they should be protected; the impulse to protect strangers thus arises from within society, and should only be regarded as divinely imposed by those who believe in the Olympian religion.

To disguise Odysseus as a beggar on his return to Ithaka was a masterstroke on the part of the poet of the *Odyssey*, for it is only when the suitors are confronted by the beggar that the full extent of their *anaideia* (as well as their *hybris* and *atasthalie*), for which they are criticized throughout the poem, becomes apparent. In Od. 17 the beggar Odysseus goes to town, and is encouraged by Telemachos to make the rounds of the suitors begging for alms; he is also told that, as a beggar, he is exempt from the need to feel *aidos* (347-352):

\[\text{αἰδός δ’ οὐκ ἄγαθός κεκηρυμένω κλέπτειν.}\]

Antinoos, however, when the beggar comes to ask him for alms, shows himself to be unaware of this exemption, exclaiming,

\[\text{ὅσ τις θαρραλέος καὶ ἄνειδος ἐστὶν προεκτιθ.}\]

This discrepancy in attitude between Antinoos and Telemachos clearly reflects badly on the former; Antinoos, however, goes further in contempt for proper conduct, hurling a stool at Odysseus' back, arousing the censure of several in the company, most immediately from the victim himself. The crux of Odysseus' speech is that his assailant will be punished:

\[\text{αὖθις εἰ ποιοὶ πτωχῶν ἐστὶν θεός καὶ ἐγκύως εἰδένω.}\]

\[\text{'Ἀντίνων τῷ γάμμων τέλος θανάτοις κέρδει.}\]

The beggar's divine protectors will intervene to exact the
vengeance most beggars are unable to take themselves; in the mouth of Odysseus, however, these words hint darkly at his own intentions. Antinoos is contemptuous of the beggar's complaint (he is impious as well as *anaides*), but his contempt merely excites the disapproval of the others:  

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οἱ δὲ ἄρα πάντες ὑπερφιλίας νεμέτησαν (481).
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The standard that even beggars should be treated with *aidos*, then, is so widely acknowledged that even Antinoos' fellow suitors disapprove of its breach.

What follows is interesting, for, through *τις νέων ὑπερφιλεόντων*, we are given nothing less than an empirical and materialistic justification of the advisability of treating beggars with *aidos*. Beginning with the assertion that it was *οὐ καλὰ* for Antinoos to strike the beggar, 152 the spokesman goes on to affirm that he is, indeed, doomed, if there is a god in heaven (484), and continues (485-7),

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καὶ τε θεός ἐνίοτον ἐοικότες ἀλλοδαπῶν, πάντοιοι τελεθοῦντες, ἐπιστρεφὼν πόλεις, ἀνθρώπων ύβρεῖν τε καὶ εὐνομίαν ἐφορεῖται.
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In harming a stranger, then, one may be harming a god, and so caution is required when dealing with strangers; if this belief, based on the common folk-motif of theoxeny, was at all widely held it is evidence for the uncertainty with which strangers were regarded; 153 we may be confident, however, that the doctrine that one should receive outsiders kindly is older than the justification. That such a justification is offered, however, does illustrate a characteristic feature of Greek moral thought, the attempt to identify behaviour in accordance with traditional morality with individual self-interest.

Now, beggars are only a species of the genus *xeinoi*; their profession demands that they wander from town to town; other *xeinoi* may have any number of reasons for leaving the security of their own communities, but, like the beggar, they are *xeinoi* by virtue of their being outsiders and unprotected, except by the gods. At *Od*. 14.386-9 Eumaios gives his reasons for affording the beggar Odysseus protection:
We should notice that fear of Zeus xenios and pity for the beggar himself are presented as Eumaios's reasons for showing *aidos*: showing *aidos* is not the same as showing fear or pity, although both help define *aidos* here. There are clearly two strands to the *aidos* reaction in the context of guest-friendship, and these, the prudential and the altruistic, are expressed by Eumaios' fear of divine punishment and his pity for one less fortunate than himself; both these aspects can be expressed by the verb *aideisthai*, which may have either the god or gods who underwrite the standard or the stranger himself as its object. It is difficult precisely to establish the sense of *εἴδεσθαι* here; the association with the verb *philein*, which refers here to the concrete acts Eumaios will perform in the entertainment of his guest, suggests that it, too, may refer more to Eumaios' conduct than to his disposition. Perhaps, though, the two should not be separated, in that the swineherd's attitude of respect towards his guest, based on the special status invested in all guests by Zeus and on pity, will be manifested in those acts which are proper to the relationship of xenia. It is, however, important to realize that, from this passage, it appears that the verb *aideisthai* is as descriptive and characteristic of the action of receiving a guest as is *philein*.

Eumaios, then, explains his *aidos* for his guest in terms of his obedience to divine law (and fear of divine punishment) and his own capacity for pity. There is, however, another sanction against the ill-treatment of guests, one both more immediate than the wrath of Zeus and more compelling than the individual's instinct for pity. It is to this that Eumaios refers when the beggar Odysseus first stumbles towards his hut, forcing the swineherd to save him from the attack of his dogs. The dogs safely driven away, Eumaios
Failure to protect a guest, if it became known, might lead to *elencheie*, "showing up", and thus another kind of *aidos*, different from that one accords the recipient of one's hospitality, but still related, enters into the sphere of guest-friendship. We have seen that proper treatment of strangers is an imperative which is widely adhered to; this being the case, popular disapproval will inevitably be the consequence of any breach of the standard; and so *aidos*, by now familiar as the fear of popular disapproval, can work in two ways in the attitude of the host, firstly as a concern for the stranger himself, a fear of his reaction and a withdrawal from the prospect of doing him harm, and secondly as concern for the opinion of others, who are presumed to take a dim view of any breach of a standard to which they themselves subscribe. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that these motives, the altruistic, the fear of punishment and the fear of opprobrium, co-exist, even within the same individual, and therefore should not be considered in isolation; it would be wrong to say that Eumaios' concern for Odysseus is entirely altruistic, but neither is it entirely self-regarding.  

That the honour of the host is diminished by his failure to protect a guest emerges from a number of passages, some of which we have looked at already. Telemachos, for example, is concerned that he is unable to welcome a guest properly because of the suitors' behaviour, and feels *nemesis* at himself on that account (Od.1.119-20); if his own *nemesis* is aroused then so, one would imagine, would be that of others. The *nemesis* of Penelope at her son's failure to protect his guest is certainly aroused at 18.220-5:

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οὐκέτι τοι φίλεις εἰσίν ἐναίσχοις οὐδὲ νόημα,
οὐν δὴ τέσσερα ἐγών ἐν μαραθείνοις ἐτύχη,
ὅς τοῦ δείνων ἐκατατηρηθεκέλευς οὕτως.
Πῶς νῦν, εἰ τι δείνως ἐν ἡτέρους δομινίν
μένος ὢδε πάθος ἐνστατικός ἐγκέφαινης:
ὅτι κ' αἰὲχος λύμη τε μετ' ἄνθρωποις τέλοιο.
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Penelope, then, sees Telemachos' failure as an intellectual one, and implies that the impulse to protect one's guests arises from one's intellect; Telemachos agrees (227-30) that one's intellect, if it is sound, does lead one to act as custom demands, but points out that he is prevented from acting as his intellect urges him by the suitors, whose "bad sense" (232) is opposed to his own good sense. Clearly, then, there is a link between what one knows and acting in accordance with propriety, and that link will be explored below. For our immediate purpose it will suffice to record that aischos and lobe were felt to accrue from any inability to protect a guest, and that the impulse to avoid the disapproval represented by these terms was seen as an intellectual one. Thus proper conduct could be both an object of knowledge and a goal of education.

Words of seemliness and appearances abound in the last passage quoted, and we noted in our discussion of those terms how the unseemliness of the situation could reflect on either the doer or the sufferer of the action described as unseemly; we have just seen how Telemachos is affected by the actions of the suitors, but in other passages, as we saw, their conduct seems to reflect as badly on themselves as on Telemachos, if not more so. Accordingly, it seems that abuse of another's hospitality can be regarded as disgraceful, even if those who act in this way are not always concerned at disapproval on that account. Certainly both abuse of hospitality and failure to protect a guest are described as inappropriate and unseemly.

The courtesy demanded of both parties in the relationship of xenia is also governed by aidos. In the fifteenth book of the Odyssey Telemachos is anxious to take his leave of Menelaos, but has no wish to cause his host offence. Menelaos, however, brushes his anxiety (which is perhaps itself akin to aidos, and is certainly further evidence that concern for others' feelings formed part of Homeric etiquette) aside, saying (15.69-71),
This form of expression, in which the speaker rejects a course of action by referring to the nemesis he would feel at such conduct in another, suggests, as we have seen before, both the universality of the standard and the speaker's agreement with it. Excess is to be the object of Menelaos' nemesis here, and the fact that excess can attract nemesis suggests that aidsos might cause one to reject excessive behaviour. A desire not to overstep the bounds of good manners in the host-guest relationship seems also to underlie Odysseus' aidsos at Od. 8.85-6, where, moved by the bard's song, he hides his face in order that his hosts should not see him weep. Elsewhere in the poems even the greatest heroes do not experience aidsos at shedding tears, and at Od. 4. 195-6 Peisistratos, who had joined the others in a lament over the fate of those who did not return from Troy, explains that he feels no nemesis at those who weep for the dead; it is unlikely, then, that Odysseus feels aidsos at weeping per se; more probably he regards it as a discourtesy to his hosts to show anything less than complete satisfaction with their hospitality. The idea that one should not burden one's hosts with one's troubles certainly occurs at Od. 19.118-21, where Odysseus expresses reluctance to bewail his own misfortunes in another's house, lest one of the household or his hostess herself feel nemesis. A similar idea seems to occur at Il. 24.90-1, where Thetis' unwillingness to join the other gods seems to be based on reluctance to inflict her troubles on them (although it is also possible that she simply feels inferior to the Olympian deities).

Besides the negative justification of the custom that one should behave kindly towards strangers (the theoxeny idea, p. 58 above) and the negative sanction of ill-repute for those who fail to do so, we also find a positive, but nonetheless materialistic, justification at Od. 19.333-4, where Penelope says that the fame of good men (men who are ἀρετέοι) is spread by xeinoi. Thus a good reputation is the reward
of proper conduct, just as ill-repute is the lot of those who treat guests badly. Yet Penelope does not simply say that *xeinoi* report on the behaviour of their hosts *qua* hosts, but that they carry the fame of anyone who is ἴμύρων and who "knows ἴμύρων" to all men; conversely, she remarks (329-31) that "all mortals" curse those who are ἄπτηνες and who "know ἄπτηνες"; although she begins her speech from the context of xenia, she seems to believe that society in general shares her abhorrence of moral wickedness and appreciation of moral goodness, and, accordingly, she sees popular disapproval as the consequence of the one and popular commendation as that of the other. And indeed, given the plot of the *Odyssey*, with its emphasis on poetic justice and its undoubted didactic purpose, particularly where proper behaviour towards guests is concerned, there must be a strong presumption that the poem was composed for a society whose ideals, if not necessarily the everyday conduct of its members, matched those of Penelope in this passage. Certainly much is made of the theme of xenia in the poem, and in particular the society of those who practise it is sharply contrasted with that of the Cyclopes, who are distinguished from civilized peoples by their lack of cohesion and ignorance of themis (9.188-9); when Odysseus first sets out to ascertain the disposition of those who inhabit the Cyclops' island he refers to two alternative types (9.175-6):


Thus the values which promote the observance of the laws of hospitality are precisely those which characterize a community as civilized, and we can see how Penelope's remarks on the conduct of men in general can spring from contemplation of their attitude towards guests in particular; the attitude of men to those who enter their communities from outside is indicative of their sensitivity to justice and propriety in general, and one who maltreats a guest is likely to be unjust in other ways. This being the case, *aidos*, which is so central to the institution of guest-friendship, obviously has a rôle of considerable importance in the society of the *Odyssey*.
Protection of strangers was, then, a Homeric ideal; we should not, however, be blind to the possibility that practice may have fallen short of that ideal; we have seen that materialistic justifications were often felt necessary. Materialism also affects the institution in the form of the exchange of gifts which was the norm among xeinoi: Odysseus is constantly concerned to amass booty for his return to Ithaka (his fictitious description of himself doing just that at 19.272-4 is quite in character), and even asks the Cyclops for a gift outright (9.268). In addition, we have seen that at 11.360 he believes that he will be kódotatos and píxteos to all men if he can return to his home with a substantial amount of wealth. He is aidoios no matter how much he posseses, but his own experiences as a beggar tend to confirm that while aidos towards all strangers is the theory, ill-treatment of those of them without means could all too often be the practice.

The institution of guest-friendship is very closely linked, especially in the Odyssey, to another code of behaviour, that of supplication, and, indeed, the boundary between suppliant and stranger is difficult to define. A suppliant is a "comer", and often we find strangers, who come unprotected to an alien community, and who might also be regarded as xeinoi, either describing themselves as suppliants or resorting to supplication. Odysseus' supplication of the local river god on his arrival in the land of the Phaeacians is a good example, in that he himself refers to the etymology of hiketes in identifying himself as a suppliant (Od5.447-50):

The general "immortal gods" of this passage is particularized in the Zeus xeinios of Od.9.269-71, another indication of the closeness of xenia and hiketeia.
Zeus, then, in his guise as *xeinos* was felt to be the protector of both strangers and suppliants; at *Od.* 13.213 we find him described by another cult title, *hiketesios*, which is obviously derived from his function as protector of suppliants, but which is used in that passage in a context of his punishment of human crimes in general.

Since one who is a *xeinos* might also decide to style himself a suppliant (although suppliants do not behave exactly as do other *xeinoi*172) much of what was said about *xenia* also holds good for *hiketeia*. In a number of contexts, however, the connexion between supplication and *xenia* is not prominent, in that those involved are not stranger and prospective host; in these situations supplication is employed to further a specific request. Like the *xeinos*, the *hiketes* appeals to *aidos*, his claim to which seems to rest on his special status as a *protegē* of the gods and on the ritual self-abasement173 to which he subjects himself; he thus claims *aidos* both as one enjoying *time* (invested in him by the gods) and as one without *time*.

Since an appeal to *aidos* is an appeal to an emotion which may or may not be present in the individual supplicated, such appeals are often unsuccessful. In "full" or literal supplication, however, the supplicant's physical contact with the supplicated, or with an altar, means that outright rejection of the appeal will entail the breaking of contact by force,174 and the use of force in such a context, where popular opinion believed the gods took an interest, which in turn reveals that society in general believed that protection of suppliants was desirable, would be discreditable. Whereas, then, at first sight it may seem that the distinction between full and figurative supplication should have no effect on the individual's *aidos*, it may be that the prospect of using force against a suppliant could lead to *aidos* at the thought of the disapproval, divine and human, which would result, in a way that the simple rejection of the appeal, or the avoidance of full supplication, would not. These considerations, however, are relevant only to a later
period, for although *aidos* is mentioned in the appeals of suppliants, and while one could, if one had the time and space, make a case for the presence of *aidos* in those who accept the supplication of others, there is no passage in the Homeric poems in which a character states explicitly that he has been moved by *aidos* to accept another's supplication, whether literal or figurative.

In the first book of the *Iliad* the supplication of the priest, Chryses, who comes bearing the suppliant's *στέμματα* (1.14) shows both that *aidos* is the proper reaction and that failure to react with *aidos* is reprehensible; all the other Greeks, we are told (22-3) wanted to *aideisthai* the priest, but Agamemnon, to whom (with Menelaos) the supplication was principally addressed (16), sent him away, as the poet says, *κακῶς* There is also the question of ransom in this case, however, and it seems that the rejection of appropriate compensation was frowned upon as much as was the disregarding of the suppliant's pleas, for Ajax complains bitterly of Achilles' refusal to accept the gifts offered him by Agamemnon at *Il*.9.636-7, and from then on, until he accepts the supplication of Priam in book 24, Achilles is clearly in the wrong. Achilles also rejects the supplication of his comrades in the same book, in spite of Phoinix' personification of their entreaties as the "daughters of Zeus" (508).

In times of war and conflict attitudes to suppliants seem to have varied according to the circumstances of each case, while in peacetime contexts the dominant impression given is that it is right that their pleas be heeded; certainly in the *Odyssey* it would have been regarded as occasion for the strongest disapproval if Odysseus as a suppliant at the court of Alkinoos had been harmed; similarly, Polyphemos' rejection not only of Odysseus' pleas (quoted on p.64 above) but even of the power of Zeus himself (*Od*.9.273-8) is intended to be shocking, and, as we saw, Agamemnon's dismissal of Chryses was roundly condemned. But a commonsense attitude seems to have prevailed in those cases where the suppliant is an enemy
begging for his life. We saw (p.42 above) that Hektor expected no aídos from Achilles, and in those scenes of supplication which are acted out before us in the Iliad no suppliant is spared. In the passion for revenge which often motivates those who kill suppliants there seems to be little room even for the distinction between real and figurative supplication. At Od. 22.310 the priest, Leodes, takes hold of Odysseus' knees, and in 312 utters the suppliant's appeal:

\[ γυνευματι μ' ἄδειον· σὺ δὲ μ' αἴσθενε καὶ μ' ἐξέρχον.\]

The appeal to aídos, however, and the ritual clasping of the knees make little impact on Odysseus, who instead treats Leodes' case on its merits: the priest claims that he never said or did anything atasthalon, but rather attempted to restrain the suitors from their deeds of atasthalia; Odysseus, however, considers him implicated in the suitors' crimes and kills him, and although he kills a suppliant in the very act of supplication, no condemnation is forthcoming, nor does he express any misgivings. Later in the same book, both the bard Phemios, who utters a plea for aídos at 344, having already clasped Odysseus' knees, and the herald, Medon, who supplicates Telemachos (365-70), are spared, not because Odysseus is noticeably moved by their appeals, or because he cannot bring himself to break ritual contact, or because he fears the wrath of Zeus, but simply because he has been persuaded, largely through the intercession of Telemachos, that they are innocent of the crimes of the rest of their company.

The case of Lykaon in Iliad 21 is interesting; Lykaon was spared by Achilles on a previous occasion, and it may be that a successful supplic 'ation had something to do with this. At 71 he clasps Achilles' knees, and at 74 he appeals for aídos and pity, adding (75),

\[ Ὅντι τῷ εἰμί ἐκείνῳ, διοτέκεσ, αἴδοιοι.\]

Now, Lykaon has effected the full ritual contact of the suppliant, and yet he claims only to be "in the place of a suppliant," "a sort of suppliant"; this may be significant, in the sense that, while supplication of a foe in battle
might have been an expedient which was worth the attempt, it could be that rejection of such supplication on the part of one who only moments before had been attempting to kill the recipient of his appeal was regarded as understandable, if not normal. Achilles, of course, has become an extremely savage human being by this time, but still there is no indication that his rejection of Lykaon's appeal, or even of his claim to philotes, which, though technically justified, is nevertheless unquestionably tenuous, is an act which society would find abhorrent; Lykaon himself has little hope that his plea will be successful (92-3), and it may be that his description of himself as "a sort of supplicant" expresses a similar lack of confidence. Lykaon, as Gould points out, does abandon his supplication by relaxing his grip on Achilles' spear and stretching out his hands, and this does show that he has accepted that Achilles' desire for revenge will mean his death, but there can scarcely be any doubt but that Achilles would have killed him in any case, and neither the ritual contact nor the appeal to aidos and pity has any effect on him. The tone of both the passages, indeed, in which Odysseus and Achilles kill their suppliants suggests that the desire for revenge will inevitably override any sense of aidos or compunction. There is no indication in the text that their reaction is justifiable, but the implication must surely be that it is.

The position of those who undertake supplication in situations of conflict, then, appears weak; if there is little at stake in the encounter, or if a ransom is offered which pleases the supplicated, as seems to have been the case on Lykaon's first meeting with Achilles, the supplication may be accepted, but in practice it seems that supplication in such contexts was felt to be resistable and to have little chance of success. In other contexts, however, where the supplicant is genuinely a "comer" in that he is unknown to the recipient of his appeal, and where supplication and guest-friendship almost coincide, his position seems rather stronger, and the killing of a supplicant would surely meet with the same kind of condemnation as is incurred by Herakles, who is described
as schetlios for killing his host and failing to show aidos for the anger of the gods or for the relationship that existed between them (Od. 21.28). This example relates to the relationship of xenia, but the reaction to such conduct in the context of peace-time supplication would surely be similar, because the essential difference between the acts of supplication which succeed in the Odyssey and those which fail in the Iliad is not to be ascribed to the greater moralism or the greater concern with divine justice of the former (for Odysseus kills Leodes with impunity), but to the fact that one supplicated by a stranger, as in the Odyssey, has no legitimate grounds for treating his suppliant with violence (Polyphemos' rejection of Odysseus' supplication is an indication of his monstrosity), whereas in the context of war or similar conflict it is one's goal to kill one's opponents and revenge is an important and legitimate motive. Although the ritual of supplication does not differ in these contexts, the situation does, and Homeric values, as would ours, make allowances for that difference.

Priam's supplication of Achilles in Iliad 24 provides a good indication of the precariousness of the suppliant's position in cases where there is a great deal at stake. Achilles has been told that it is the will of Zeus that he should heed the old man's plea (24.128-37), and it is almost unthinkable that he should ignore such a direct command, yet the supplication must still take place, and, when it does, it creates a formidable amount of tension. At 503 Priam bids Achilles ἀρξομενίθεον υπότασσω, and since Priam is aware of the will of the gods in this matter, this may be a general usage, "respect the gods (on account of their power)"; such a usage would have no parallel, however, since in Homer the gods are accorded aidos only as protectors of guests and suppliants, and so it is probably better to take the words in that sense here. The main point of Priam's appeal, however, is not that, as a suppliant, he is under divine protection, but that he deserves pity, as an old man in a situation analogous to that of Achilles' own father. This is the point which frames his appeal (486-501, 503-6), and it occurs already at
22.418-22, where Priam announces it as his intention to employ precisely this form of appeal. And it is the appeal to pity and the reference to Peleus which has the greatest effect on Achilles, and the analogy with Hektor and Priam places himself and his father in the same tragic situation; Achilles knows that Hektor's fate will be his, and that he will never see his father again. Achilles, then, does feel pity, and he is also aware of the need to obey Zeus' instructions and to avoid harming a suppliant, although when he does refer to these points, it is in the context of the danger of his ignoring them (560-70). He does not, however, say that he feels *aidos*, although his acceptance of the supplication itself may be construed as "showing *aidos*"; an indication of how *aidos* might arise in such a situation, however, is afforded by the description of Achilles' reaction on first seeing Priam at 480-4; he feels *θυγβας* at his appearance and at his immediate performance of the ritual gestures of supplication, and this reaction is compared to that of those who receive a homicide into their presence. Both the homicide in the simile and Priam himself are suppliants, and dread or awe is the reaction they arouse; this is not uniquely a reaction to the shedding of blood, for although the suppliant in the simile has shed blood, Priam has not, and it seems that it is the supplication itself, or perhaps the appearance of one who intends to supplicate in a particularly tense situation, which arouses such an emotion. It does not seem too far-fetched to suggest that this feeling of awe, of uncertainty, towards a suppliant of somewhat ambivalent status might be related at least to one aspect of the *aidos* which is appropriate to the situation.

AIDOS AND WOMEN: SEXUAL AIDOS

A number of passages exist in which *aidos* occurs in a broadly sexual context, whether in relationships between the sexes, where it affects women particularly, or with reference to an individual's own sexuality or to sexuality in general; in the former category, *aidos* is concerned with the social rôle of men and women, while in the latter it relates to a coyness regarding sex, sexual organs and bodily functions.
take the first category first, we might begin by suggesting how the *aidos* of women might differ from that of men. We have noticed some instances of women being described as *aidoie* in connexion with some specific relationship; usually *aidoie* is accompanied by *deine* or *phile* in these contexts, and the adjective commends exactly the same qualities as it would when used of a man. 188 Frequently, however, *aidoie* is the only adjective employed, 189 and it may describe a queen of the highest birth 190 or a relatively humble household servant. 191 Rarely are the reasons for the use of the adjective apparent in any specific activity of the woman so qualified. The explanation of the apparently indiscriminate application of the adjective, however, lies in the rôle of women in society and the nature of women’s honour. Society sets different standards for women from those it sets for men, 192 and the main virtue required of women is faithfulness; men’s honour is vulnerable through women, and men have an interest in ensuring that the women under their control remain faithful and sexually pure. 193 Although women, by virtue of their upbringing in society, may subscribe to the standards imposed on them without question, and be critical of the deficiencies of other women, ultimately the standards to which they adhere are laid down by men. 194 It is in adhering to these standards and in being above any slight on her honour that a woman merits the title *aidoie*.

It is, as we might expect, a woman’s *aidos* which helps her remain within the guidelines laid down by society, and such *aidos* frequently manifests itself as a coyness about dealings with the opposite sex. Nausikaa, for example, has been promised a husband by prophecy and is anxious to meet him, but she obtains leave from her father to go out by offering to take the linen down to the river for washing. The poet gives her reason for the artifice (Od. 6.66-7):

\begin{verbatim}
\textit{aiōdeis ἀνὴρ ταξεύον τεμένω εὐονυμῆκε
πατέρι φίλω.}
\end{verbatim}

Once Nausikaa has met Odysseus, she wishes him to return with her to her father’s palace, but there are standards to be observed; she cannot be seen in the company of a man without
having gained her father's permission, and she knows that there are people, ἕπερφίκαλοι and the familiar τις κακώτερος who will comment adversely on her conduct. This she explains to Odysseus, and concludes (6.285-8):

NES ἑρέωσιν, ἕμωι δέ κ' ὀνείσκεκ ταῦτα γένοιτο.
καὶ σ' ἀλλὰς νεμέω, ητὶς τολμᾶτα γε ἐξέλοι,
η τ' ἀσχοτί αἰγών πατέως καὶ μητρώος εὐόνων
κυρεῖς μεγητικ' Πέιν ή ἁρπάζων ήλθείν.

Nausikaa was led by ἀίδος to conceal her desire to meet her prophesied husband, and now she explains that oneidea and nemesis are to be expected at a girl who consorts with men before her marriage. Her words in 286 on her own feelings, should she see another woman acting in the way she shuns, endorse the standard she is herself in the course of breaking: 195 inspite of her assertion that only the ἕπερφίκαλοι and τις κακώτερος would reproach her, Nausikaa admits that she would act as they do towards another woman. This is clearly one of the passages in which the calculative aspect of ἀίδος dominates; Nausikaa is aware that her present conduct is unacceptable, but she overcomes any ἀίδος she might have felt at the thought of mixing with Odysseus at all by means of her own preference and the knowledge that she is, so far, unobserved; it is not the transgression which troubles her, but the danger that it will be found out. The calculative aspect of the girl's behaviour might be mitigated, however, if we imagined that she is afraid that others will place an interpretation on her actions which is unjustified and pejorative, and that she regards her current behaviour not as reprehensible, but as entirely innocent.

The modesty with regard to the opposite sex shown by Nausikaa is not confined to unmarried women. On two occasions we find married women expressing reluctance with regard to sex even with their husbands, and doing so on the grounds that others will disapprove. At 11.3.410 Helen refuses to go to her husband's bed - νεμεστϊτον δε τε κεν ειγ' - and she goes on to explain that it is the censure of the Trojan women that she fears (411-12). It is simply not the right time; she is clearly troubled by Paris' showing in the duel with Menelaos,
and no doubt the sight of them both together has caused her to reflect on her conduct in leaving Sparta. We remember that Helen saw Paris' unseemly conduct in battle as a reflection on herself, and her reference to the blame of the women might be related to a fear that they will criticize her for leaving a good husband for an inferior one, and regard it as inappropriate of her to behave as a wife to the latter immediately after his inferiority has been revealed. Inappropriateness of place is Hera's alleged reason for refusing sex with Zeus at Il. 14.330-40, where, attempting to deceive her husband, she claims that it would be nemessetôn for her to return to Olympos having slept with Zeus in the open on Mt. Ida; she is, then, feigning aídos at being seen in the act of love and at facing those who might have seen her.

Just as a sensitivity about sex is common to married and unmarried women, so shyness of the other sex persists after marriage. At Od. 18.184 Penelope decides to call two female attendants before facing the suitors, explaining,

οἳ ὃν οὖκ εἶνετε μετ' ἀνέρκης, αἰδέομεν γὰς.

Shyness of sex itself and of the company of men combine at Od. 8.324, for while the male gods meet to see Ares and Aphrodite in bed,

θηλύτερκα δὲ θελὴ μένοι αἰδοὶ οἶκοι ἐκάτη.

A certain amount of coyness regarding sexual matters does seem to have been common to both sexes; the usage aidoi = genitals occurs only once (Il. 13.568), but is implied by Odysseus' statement that Thersites' clothes "cover his aídos" (Il. 2.262). Obviously there is a certain flexibility in both these usages; the aidoi are not aidois in the same way as a suppliant is, but still they are cause for aídos, and Thersites' aídos is not a reaction on his part, but part of his anatomy; aídos is here used of that which arouses aídos, much as aischos (disgrace) can arouse aischos (reproach).

Propriety in a sexual context might also be the issue at Od. 6.221-2, where Odysseus declares that he will not allow
himself to be washed by Nausikaa's attendants:

γυμνούσθαι κούρηιν ἐὐπλοκάμως μετελθὼν.

Some commentators point out that men are more than once bathed by women, both slave and free, in the Odyssey and suggest that Odysseus' aidos here is really motivated by the fact, mentioned in 220, that it has been a long time since his last wash; von Erffa, however, refers to lines 135-6, where the natural implication of the text is that, in normal circumstances, one should not appear naked before young women; in the other passages in which men are washed by women the context is one of xenia and the guest is washed in the house of his host; this is not the case here, and it may be that it was not considered proper for a man to be seen naked by women except in certain well-defined situations.

Aidos with regard to nakedness and sex, then, is not confined to women, but sexual aidos is nonetheless stronger in women in that scrupulous avoidance of any implication of sexual impurity or unfaithfulness constitutes a major part of a woman's virtue. In general, a woman's duty is to her husband or father and to the family group of which he is the head. Penelope's loyalty to Odysseus, for example, also entails loyalty to his father, and on three occasions she expresses the conviction that other women will feel nemesis against her should she allow Laertes to go to his grave without a shroud (Od.2.101,19.146,24.136). Her primary loyalty, however, is to her husband, and twice we find this duty described as

Penelope, then, feels aidos for her husband's bed as the symbol of the marital relationship, and for popular opinion as the agency which helps enforce her duty to her husband and which will condemn any neglect of that duty; it might be significant that the participle has these two objects; Penelope's aidos for her husband and their marriage bed suggests a more personal and internal obligation than does aidos at what other people might say; obviously it is popular opinion which establishes that it is a woman's obligation to remain loyal to her husband, but the fact that Penelope
venerates the relationship itself suggests that, for her, the standard laid down by society has become a personal moral imperative.

Along with Helen and, to a lesser extent, Aphrodite, Klytaimestra is a prime example of a wife who felt no *aidos* for her husband's bed, and it is she who is contrasted with the faithful Penelope in *Od*. 11; at 432-4 of that book the former's aggrieved husband describes how her act has damaged her reputation:

> ή δ' εξοχε λυγκ ἱδοῖξν
> οἱ τε καὶ κίες ἔχενε καὶ ἐγκομένην ὁπεσανθητέρησε γυναῖξε, καὶ ἦ κ' εὔεργος ἐγεν.

A vigorous exaggeration from a biased party, no doubt, but we should at least accept Agamemnon's assertion that his wife's deed brought *aischos* on herself; it is *aischos* of this kind that Penelope's *aidos* forestalls. Klytaimestra's act implies a lack of *aidos* and it is to this idea of shamelessness that Agamemnon gives expression when he calls her *κυνώτης* at 424. Agamemnon also draws the contrast between his wife and Odysseus'; of the latter he says (445-6),

> λήγε γὰρ Πίνακα τε καὶ εὖ ἔγνοι χαρὰς οἴδε
> κούρει ἱκαβοῖ τε περίφερον Πηνέλοπεικ.

The passage fairly bristles with terms relating to Penelope's intellect, and we should notice that her intellect is seen as producing the same response as her *aidos*, namely loyalty to her husband; the relationship between *aidos* and the intellect, particularly in the *Odyssey*, will be explored immediately below.

The requirement to be loyal to the head of the household, however, extends beyond the kinship group to the other members of the *oikos*; at *Od*. 22.424 it is said that 12 of Odysseus' maidservants άναδειχθα ἐπέβησαν by consorting with the suitors, and these are marked out for punishment. Their chief offence is obviously their disloyalty to their master, but it is also significant that Eurykleia follows up her statement about their *anaideia* with the amplification,
disloyalty, then, also encompasses a failure to accord others the time they deserve, and this is an offence which they share with the suitors themselves. By their conduct they are also said to dishonour Odysseus himself (418) and to have "poured oneidea on" Telemachos and Penelope (463-4); their disloyalty is an insult in itself, entailing as it does disregard for the instructions of one's superiors, and, although as anaideie the maids' conduct is discreditable for themselves, it also discredits the ruling members of the oikos, in that failure to secure the loyalty of one's inferiors may be taken by others as an indication of weakness; the notion of a community of honour is thus also relevant within the household, in that, while its members enjoy the prestige of its head, the honour of the latter is also vulnerable through its less important members.

AIDOS, INTELLIGENCE AND EXCESS

We have already noted some ways in which the moral thought of the Odyssey differs from that of the Iliad; most readily recognizable of these is the greater expressed concern for the co-operative virtues, but here the difference is one of degree; the Iliad is not blind to the desirability of such qualities, but there is obviously less scope for them in a society at war than in one at peace, and, indeed, the distinction between wartime and peacetime may go a long way towards explaining many of the apparent differences of outlook. A more profound difference, perhaps, lies in the greater degree to which the gods of the Odyssey have an interest in the justice men show in their dealings with each other, and this will be considered towards the end of this section. First of all, however, let us deal with the matter of intelligence; we noticed how Agamemnon's commendation of the loyalty of Penelope (Od.11.445-6) stressed her intellect, and saw that her intellectual qualities led her to pursue the same course of action as her aidos. There should, then, be some link between aidos and "good sense", and the Odyssey provides us with ample opportunity to explore that link. The association, however, of terms denoting intelligence and
aidos or the conduct suggested by aidos is not unique to that poem. At I1.15.128-9, for example, Ares, on the point of entering battle to avenge the death of his son and so disobeying the orders of Zeus, is restrained by Athene as follows:

\[ \text{μανδόμενε, } \phi\epsilon\nu\epsilon\varsigma \varsigma \acute{\nu} \lambda\acute{e}, \delta\epsilon\acute{\epsilon}\theta\omicron\omicron\varsigma, \ \hat{v} \nu \tau\iota \alpha\upupsilon\upsigma\nu \ \acute{\omicron} \acute{\kappa} \acute{o} \nu \acute{\epsilon} \omicron \acute{\mu} \acute{e} \nu \ \acute{e} \omicron \upsilon \tau \acute{\iota} \upsilon \text{ νόος } \delta' \alpha\pi\omicron\lambda\omicron\iota\nu\epsilon \kappa\alpha i \alpha i o \delta\omicron\upsilon\iota\varsigma. \]

In the Odyssey, however, the association is much more apparent, and this is particularly so in the cases of Penelope, as we have seen, and Telemachos, who in the early books of the poem is a virtual type of aidos, personifying the modesty and inhibitions of youth; accordingly he is frequently described as pinutos, pepnumenos etc.. Od.4.158-60 is a good example, where Peisistratos explains his companion's reticence to their host, Menelaos:

\[ \text{άλλω τα } \varsigma \acute{a} \delta\epsilon\omicron\omicron \varsigma \ \acute{e} \omicron \tau \iota \upsilon \varsigma \ \nu \acute{e} \nu \rho\iota \mu\sigma\upsilon \to \ \pi \acute{e} \upsilon \acute{\omicron} \upsilon \ \epsilon \pi \upsilon \sigma \upsilon \upsilon \upsilon \epsilon \nu \ \acute{a} \nu \kappa\alpha \lambda\upsilon\epsilon \nu \ \acute{e} \omicron \delta\epsilon \tau \iota \upsilon \varsigma, \ \tau\omicron \nu \ \nu \nu \iota \ \theta\epsilon\omicron\omicron \ \acute{e} \nu \ \pi \upsilon \sigma \epsilon \omicron \omicron \epsilon \omicron \omicron \delta \omicron \omicron \upsilon\omicron \epsilon \upsilon \rus. \]

Telemachos' saophrosyne and nemesis (here directed at himself)\(^{206}\) are clearly seen as virtues, and as Helen North points out,\(^{207}\) not only is the former associated with aidos here (through nemesis) but it is also close to it in sense, in that the designation saophron signifies the control of the impulse to outspokenness. But saophron takes on this connotation largely through its association with nemesis, and in other Homeric passages does not imply much more than do other terms which commend "good sense".

Lack of intelligence may also be seen as lack of aidos, as we saw, in fact, in the example from I1.15 above. Similar is Od.17.454; Antinoos has shown a flagrant lack of aidos in his words to the beggar, and Odysseus charges him with lack of phrenes:

\[ \text{ώ } \pi\omicron\omega\omicron\varsigma, \ \omicron\kappa \ \acute{\alpha} \epsilon \kappa \ \varsigma \acute{\omicron} \gamma' \ \epsilon \omicron \pi \iota \ \epsilon \acute{\iota} \delta\epsilon \epsilon i \ \kappa a i \ \phi\epsilon\nu\epsilon\varsigma \varsigma \hat{n}\acute{a} \nu. \]

By convention, those of Antinoos' status are assumed to be of fine appearance, and Odysseus' claim that Antinoos' wits do not match his appearance recalls the reproach uttered at I1. 5.787 and 8.228,
The thought is the same; those censured have acted without aidos and are criticized for the possession of an appearance which belies their true nature; it is assumed that the man of admirable appearance will possess aidos and act accordingly.

Just as Antinoos is condemned for his lack of sense in his treatment of the beggar, so the herdsman, Philoitios, whose reaction is a true manifestation of aidos, is commended for his intelligence (Od.20.227-8):

A man who does not treat strangers well is thus not only aphron but also kakos. We might well compare 18.383, where Odysseus charges Eurymachos, who has just acted without aidos, indeed (381) with hybris, with consorting with παύειν καὶ οὐκ ἀγαθῶσιν, namely the other suitors. We are thus confronted with usages of agathos and kakos which, based as they are on the possession of co-operative moral virtues, differ sharply from those stressed by Adkins, undoubtedly the majority, which commend ability in warfare, wealth, noble birth and decry their opposites. We could conceivably regard the "quiet" usages as "persuasive definitions", but the problem with that expedient would be that we should have no way of knowing whether the society for which the poem was composed would agree with such descriptions or not; if anything, the general tone of the Odyssey, which assumes that its audience will condemn the suitors, conventional arete and all, suggests that it might. It seems we must simply reckon with two usages, one, the competitive, both descriptive and evaluative, and the other purely evaluative. A good parallel from English usage would be the adjective "noble"; one might never be noble in the sense of coming from a distinguished family, but it is not beyond the powers of ordinary speech to describe one as noble by virtue of some action, heroic or altruistic, say, which people find commendable; and just as the suitors remain agathoi in spite of others' disapproval, in spite, even, of being called "not agathoi", so a nobleman
in our culture may continue to be so described regardless of whether his conduct is noble in any morally evaluative sense.

We have already looked at Penelope's statement (Od. 18.215-25, pp. 60-61 above) that Telemachos' failure to protect his guest revealed his lack of sense and would implicate him in aischos and lobe; Telemachos accepts his mother's criticism, but wishes to defend himself against her attack on his phrenes and his noema; hence (228-32):

αὐτής ἐγὼ θυμῶ νοεώ καὶ οἴδα ἐκείστα,
ἐσθάλα τε καὶ τὰ ἁρέμακα. Πάρος δ’ έτε νυπτοσύη,
ἀλλά τοι οὐ δύναμιν περιυμένη πάντα νοήται.
ἔκ γὰρ με πλησιουγε παρθένοι ἀλλοθεν ἀλλο
οἶδε κακά φεινέντες, ἐμοὶ δ’ οὐκ εἰσίν άρεσοι.

Telemachos, then, also sees the impulse to protect a guest in terms of good sense, and since to protect a guest and to be aware of the consequences for one's reputation of not protecting a guest are both reactions with which aidos is concerned, there is clearly a link between acting in accordance with aidos and good sense; similarly, the suitors, whose insensitivity to aidos is their chief characteristic, and whose presence prevents Telemachos' acting in accordance with his principles, are described as κακὰ φεινέντες (232).

Now, Adkins points out that neuter usages of agathos and kakos do not affect his thesis on arete as the most admired quality because, "to say of an action 'it is agathon (kakon) to do x' is simply to say that it is beneficial to do x, without passing any moral judgement on the rightness or wrongness of x." This may be true of the formulation which Adkins quotes, but here the wording is both different and more general: Telemachos "knows agathia and ta chereia" and the suitors "think kaka". The implication of the latter may be, as, for example, in Il. 6.161-2 and Od. 1.42, that the suitors' current "thoughts" will prove harmful for themselves, that their present conduct is imprudent, but even this idea is not clearly brought out. Clearly there is an element of prudential morality in both cases, that of Telemachos as well as that of the suitors, for it is certainly imprudent of Telemachos to leave himself open to aischos and lobe, but
it would be to misrepresent the tone of the passage to suggest that Penelope is simply urging Telemachos to consult his own interest and that he replies by pointing out that he knows what is good for him. Telemachos knows what he should do in order to act in the manner expected of him, and it is in that sense that one course of action is esthlon and another kakon: he is not simply considering his own interest, because the direct beneficiary in the event of his being able to act as his phrenes bid him would not be himself but his guest. In criticizing her son's intellectual capacity Penelope is urging him to react both to the fact that he has failed in his duty to his guest and to the possibility that other people will see this as grounds for reproach, while in pointing out that he knows esthla and ta chereia Telemachos wishes to impress upon his mother his awareness that it is not esthlon that a guest should be treated as the beggar has been, neither in general, because it violates a norm which is portrayed as universal, nor in particular, because it is not fitting that one of his status should be unable to protect a guest; Telemachos is saying that he knows what the standards of society are and how they affect him.

There is a link, then, between awareness of the values of society and individual self-interest, and this link is something we have seen before in all those passages in which proper conduct is justified in terms of expediency; it is, indeed, an underlying message of the Odyssey that self-interest and behaviour in accordance with propriety will coincide. It is possible to view this phenomenon in two ways; either one can stress the materialism of the Greeks, pointing out that they are rarely content with a simple injunction such as "do it because it is right", or one can point out that the identification of morality with self-interest places the code of morality on a very stable basis and suggests that a society which subscribed to the belief that it is in one's own interest to observe the norms of that society would have a strong belief in the validity and universality of its own values. The tendency to link morality and self-interest is a characteristic of Greek society in
all the stages of its development with which we shall deal, and as well as being responsible for a strong streak of materialism it also gives rise to the elevated moral thought of Protagoras, Demokritos and Sokrates.\textsuperscript{212}

"Good" conduct, then, is that which promotes one's own good by means of the observance of the standards of society, and it is one's intelligence (loosely defined) which enables one to recognize and act upon the requirements of society. That having been said, it will be apparent that \textit{aidos} and the intellect lead to the same ends. This does not, however, mean that \textit{aidos} is an intellectual quality, nor does it imply that Homeric man adopted an intellectualist approach to ethics; for the words which belong loosely to the category we should describe as intellectual cover a much wider range of usage in Greek. One's \textit{noos} and that which one "knows" describe not one's knowledge but one's character,\textsuperscript{213} in the sense that if one "knows lawless things", like Polyphemos (Od. 9.189,428), one will act consistently in a lawless way, will be, in fact, a lawless person. Furthermore, if there is no real distinction between knowledge and character, neither is there any between knowledge and ability; "knowing how" is not distinguished from "knowing that".\textsuperscript{214} It is in this sense that one's "intellect" enables one to act in accordance with propriety, for knowing what society expects is combined with knowing how to act upon that knowledge, and both are regarded as ingrained features of one's character; and this is where \textit{aidos} is relevant, for, since one's awareness of the standards of society is, in the ideal situation, profound and acute, any failure to act as required will entail the knowledge that one is not living up to expectation and that popular disapproval will be the likely result; and the reaction to that prospect will be \textit{aidos}.

We saw in our section on sanctions that the terms which place conduct in the category of that which is liable to arouse popular disapproval refer fundamentally to appearances. Society thus condemns conduct on the basis of "how it looks", and one consequence of this is that excessive behaviour is
regarded as unacceptable and moderation is approved. Thus *aídos* has a great deal to do with avoidance of excess and it is in this way that it is operative over a whole range of situations which do not belong to any of the categories to which it is particularly relevant.\(^{215}\) At Od.1.227-9, a passage which is by now very familiar, we see how excess, appropriateness and intelligence interact with the complex of values centred on *aídos*; we have already dealt with the suitors' "uglinesses" (*aischea* 229, 14-5 above), now we should notice how their conduct is condemned as excessive (*ὑβρίσονες ὑπερβλέπω* , 227) and contrasted with that which an intelligent man (*πινοτός*, 229) would expect; the possibility of *nemesis* (228), moreover, suggests that in other individuals such excess might be inhibited by *aídos*.

The suitors, it need hardly be said, are cast as *anaideis* throughout the poem, and many people express their *nemesis* at their actions. Apart from their *anaideie* they are condemned for two other major vices in the poem, their *hybris* and their *atasthalie*, both of which refer to excess.\(^{216}\) At 20.169-71 the behaviour of the suitors is described in terms of all three:

> αἱ γαρ δῆ, Ἐνυμείς, θεοὶ τισάκατο λύσιν, ἢν οὔδε ὑβρίσονες ὑπερβλέπω καθέλακα μηχανώντας οἴκῳ ἐν κλήτορε, οὔδ' ἀίδοσις μορφὲν ἔχουσίν.

A lack of *aídos*, then, may lead to or be accompanied by acts of *hybris* and *atasthalie*, and indeed there is a strong case for saying that these two vices operate as rough antonyms of *aídos*.\(^{217}\) Thus the benefits of possessing and showing *aídos* are central to the theme of the poem; certainly the dangers of the opposite course are stressed in very prominent passages which occur at its beginning and at its end (1.32-5, cf. Dodds, *GI*, p.32, and 24.454-60).

Abhorrence of excess, however, is not a quality peculiar to the *Odyssey*, although it is perhaps more prominent there than in the *Iliad* (war gives more scope for excess than does peace); we do, in fact, find similar notions in the *Iliad* and, indeed, a case could be made for the proposition that
moderation and avoidance of excess are as central to that poem as they are to the Odyssey. In particular, much is made of the excessive conduct of Achilles himself from the point at which he rejects the appeals of his comrades until he accepts the supplication of Priam. Ajax appeals to his aidos (9.640), an appeal which he rejects, Phoinix hints at the possibility of nemesis (9.523) and Priam and others refer to the violence of his nature (see especially 22.418, where Priam describes him as ἀνάθεμα ὑμᾶς ὀφειλομένον). By the time his excess has taken the form of dragging Hektor's body daily round the walls of Troy even the gods are beginning to worry about his conduct. Apollo is the first to voice their concern, and in terms which are familiar by now (24.39-45,52-4):

There are several important points here, of which the main ones for our purposes are the criticism of Achilles' lack of sense and the stress laid upon his excessive violence, violence which is so excessive, in fact, that he is compared to a wild beast; hence von Erffa's statement, with reference to this passage, "aidos unterscheidet die Menschen auch von den Tieren." It is indeed a lack of aidos which has led Achilles to his present condition, and Apollo's threat of nemesis makes this doubly clear. Most important of all, however, we see from this passage that similar standards obtain in both the Iliad and the Odyssey.

It is also significant that Apollo envisages the nemesis of the gods as a direct result of Achilles' conduct; elsewhere in the Iliad (e.g.4.507,8.198) any nemesis the gods feel
towards mortals is based on slights they feel themselves to have suffered; here, however, it seems that their reaction is directed simply at the excessiveness and inappropriateness of Achilles' behaviour; this reaction, then, does not differ from the **nemesis** a mortal might feel at similar conduct, but it is significant in itself that the gods are seen to be taking a similar interest in human propriety to that which might be shown by a man. With this we might compare Od. 14. 284, where Zeus xeinios is said to feel nemesis at kaka erga; in his capacity as protector of guests Zeus already has an interest in human conduct, but only in so far as maltreatment of guests is felt to infringe his prerogative; here, however, the natural implication is that he dislikes kaka erga in general. **Nemesis** in these passages therefore stands midway in its development from purely human disapproval to an exclusively divine reaction, a development which seems to take place because the gods were first felt to share human standards, then to impose them.

The feeling that the gods share mortals' disapproval at excess is widespread in the *Odyssey*; at 14.83-4 Eumaios expresses his belief that the gods "dislike" schetlia erga and prefer dike and moderation (aisima erga). From this there follows a general assumption that the gods will have a hand in the punishment of the suitors; in two such passages reference is made to their failure to accord others their proper share of time (see 22.413-5, 23.63-7, and cf. pp. 54 and 76 above), something which, we decided, was indicative of a lack of aidos, while the second of these states that the suitors have been punished for their atasthalie, which might also imply lack of aidos. Breaches of aidos, then, may be reasons for divine punishment.

This point emerges more clearly from Telemachos' appeal to the Ithakesians at 2.64-7:

> ἀλλοι τ' αἰδέοντες περικτόνοις Ἀνθρώπους ὦ Πελικλήσισι ἔμεν, δ' ὑποδέεσσε μὴν ὁ μή τι μετακτέσθων ἐγκεκρίμενοι κακὰ ἔγικα.
Telemachos asks the people to feel nemesis at the destruction of his inheritance, most probably directed at themselves for allowing it to happen, but possibly also at the suitors who are responsible for it. They are also urged to show aidos with regard to other communities, which suggests that the members of the community had an interest in the collective honour of their group and in the status of their leaders, and that communities as a whole might vie with each other for prestige. Telemachos' third point, however, is a new one; he does not suggest that the people of Ithaka will themselves be punished by the gods for their failure to expel the suitors, but that the punishment of the real wrongdoers may implicate the entire community. The thought seems similar to Hesiod, WD.240-1, and may be based on an idea that the gods punish by means of natural disasters which overtake all. In carrying out such punishment, the gods' chief target would be the suitors and their anaideie, but Telemachos' point is that failure to show aidos and nemesis on the part of the ordinary people may involve them in the fate of the guilty.

It also emerges from this passage, as from 14.284 (previous page), that the gods dislike kaka erga in general; in the latter case it was Zeus xenics who took an interest in such deeds, and it could be that the deeds in question could be seen as infringements of his prerogative in his capacity as protector of guests; at 2.64-7, however, the connexion with guest-friendship is more tenuous, and it seems unlikely that the gods regard the suitors' conduct as an offence against themselves. The same is true of 22.38-40, where Odysseus charges the suitors:

\[ \text{αὔτῷ τὴ ἕλπντος ὑπεμνήκεθε γυναῖκα} \]
\[ \text{οὔτε θέους δείκνυτε, οἵ οὐρκνῶν ἐμφύλω ἔχουσιν,} \]
\[ \text{οὔτε τῶν ἀνθρώπων νεμέων κατοκίσθην ἐγερθαί.} \]

Wooing another man's woman while he is still alive is not one of the particular offences against aidos we discussed above, nor are the gods specifically protectors of the marital relationship in the same way as they are of guests and suppliants, yet Odysseus states it as a fact that both the wrath of the gods and the nemesis of men would result
from the suitors' illicit wooing of Penelope. If the suitors had no regard for the nemesis of men then they were anaideis, and the act of wooing another man's wife is presumably felt to be occasion for nemesis because it transgresses the normal order of things and is "inappropriate"; anything of which others disapprove, then, may arouse aidos in those who are sensitive to that emotion, and thus aidos can cover a range of situations much wider than consideration of those with which it is chiefly concerned would suggest. It is also assumed in this passage that the gods share men's disapproval, and so, in theory at least, any breach of aidos may excite divine anger and lead to divine punishment. The gods might therefore enter into any situation in which aidos is relevant, yet it is not true to say that aidos is a religious scruple, for only in a few well defined situations (those of guest-friendship and supplication) does one αἰδος ἔχει. In other cases, although divine and human disapproval may result from the same breach of aidos, it is with the disapproval of other human beings that aidos is concerned, while the disapproval of the gods is seen more as occasion for fear than for aidos (aidos might perhaps accompany this fear, since to be hated by the gods might leave one open to the disapproval of one's fellows, as in the case of Odysseus at Od. 10.72, pp.23-4 above, but it is still true to say that, outwith the special circumstances we have considered, aidos is not primarily concerned with the gods).

To sum up, then, aidos in Homer is an unwillingness to act contrary to one's own perception of the standards of society as a whole or of a particular peer group; it is associated with the individual's concern for his own reputation, but also, because one's relationships with others affect both parties to the relationship, with the status and reputation of others, and the proper reaction to the same. It is an important concept in both poems, and is regarded as desirable in most circumstances, although it is recognized that in some situations the restraint provided by aidos will be undesirable; Adkins, in explaining the weakness of aidos and other quiet virtues, writes, "Naturally, to say that this
distaste, this *aidos*, is weaker when the quiet virtues are in question is not to say that it does not exist; and it must be such *aidos* which holds Homeric society together, in so far as it is held together, for a society of *agathoi* with no quiet virtues at all would simply destroy itself." I have no quibble with the substance of this statement; we have already seen that there are sound practical reasons why the characters of the poems are more concerned about criticism of their competitive failures than about their co-operative ones; but Adkins' emphasis seems strange; we know that Homeric society is held together, that it did not, at least as far as the poems tell us, destroy itself; if, then, *aidos* is responsible for this, if *aidos* does hold society together, this would appear to be a reason for stressing, not minimizing, its importance, even if it is not present in some individuals or ineffective in some critical situations, whether by virtue of its own nature as an emotion or as a result of practical considerations.

Aidos is also important thematically in both poems; Agamemnon's initial offence against Achilles is seen as *anaideie*, but Achilles himself lacks *aidos* in his persistence in his anger, and becomes virtually a savage without it, until Priam's appeal to *aidos* restores him to normal human society. In the *Odyssey* the suitors' chief characteristic is their *anaideie*, and the appearance of Odysseus as an *aidoios par excellence* both throws their lack of *aidos* into higher relief and demonstrates the desirability and utility of the concept in the society of the poem. If the didactic purpose of both poems is accepted, as it was by generations of ancient Greeks, then surely the benefits of *aidos* form one of the major lessons to be learned.

From what has been said about *aidos* as a fear of popular disapproval and from its association with a group of terms connoting intellect, one might suppose that it simply amounted to a calculation of the effects of courting society's disapproval, and we have certainly seen passages where an element of this is present. But even where *aidos* is
combined with a calculation of the consequences of one's actions it is not synonymous with the calculation, but rather the prospect of a given set of consequences produces the emotional inhibition which aídos represents. A calculative aspect, indeed, will be inherent in the application of any prospective check, since, if one's aídos or one's moral conscience is to inhibit a course of action, the consequences of that action must be clear in one's mind. Nor is aídos always calculative; Telemachos is told (Od. 3.14) that no one will think ill of him for seeking to ascertain his father's fate, yet (24) his aídos is still as strong; aídos is an internal emotion and is governed by instinct rather than reason. Nor would it be true to say that aídos is always self-regarding; even though it is a characteristic of the Greeks to expect a return for their favours and material justifications of the desirability of according others aídos are found, it is not necessary to suppose that the hope of reciprocity or the justifications of co-operative relationships constitute the sole reasons for showing aídos to another human being; the aídos which Telemachos imagines his hosts may show him out of concern for his feelings (Od. 3.96 = 4.326) can hardly be self-regarding, and it would be churlish to suggest that Eumaios, who saves a portion of his income in order to help aidoi (Od. 15.373), does so for reasons of self-interest.

In what way, then, if any, does aídos approximate to an internal form of conscience? Redfield writes that aídos is "nothing like conscience," yet goes on, "Aídos is a vulnerability to the expressed ideal norm of the society; the ideal norm is directly experienced within the self, as a man internalizes the anticipated judgements of others on himself." Aídos is therefore an internal form of consciousness according to this definition, but not a form of conscience. This view is at least an advance on those scholars, mainly those writing in the German tradition of Geistesgeschichte, who claim that Homeric man possesses no internal standard, is incapable of decisions and simply adjusts his conduct to suit the external standards of society; it is in this
sense that *aidos* is sometimes called an external form of conscience. An external conscience, however, is little more than an absurdity; even to recognize that a given action or occurrence will damage one's status in the eyes of others will demand both a subjective idea of one's own worth and an awareness of the standards of society, and it is difficult to see how either of these could be external. Those who propound the sort of theory which suggests that Homeric man adjusts his conduct to his environment and has no capacity for rational decision also tend to point out that the reactions and choices of the type of individual they describe, given the power of convention and the pressure to conform, are automatic, instinctive and unquestioning; this suggests, however, not that the standards being observed are external, but that they are deeply internalized, since surely observance of external standards would entail reflection and deliberation rather than automatic response. The observation that for Homeric man morality is not distinguished from conformity does not mean that he has no internal moral conscience; it may mean that he has no concept of personal morality as distinguished from adherence to the standards of society, but this should not surprise us, since the development of personal codes of morality is a relatively sophisticated one, and one which only occurs at an age which is both much later than that of the Homeric poems and much less certain of its inherited system of values. Neither is conformity uniquely a feature of "shame-cultures"; values based explicitly on guilt may also produce conformity, and when dealing with popular morality in any sort of culture, one will have to consider those values to which the culture as a whole conforms or would like to conform, rather than principles which are unique to a number of different, usually educated, individuals.

*Aidos* is, then, an internal state of conscience which is based on an internalized awareness of the values of society; this awareness will have become internalized precisely because of the uniformity of those values and of the power of popular opinion to enforce them, and it will have become
internalized through education at an early age. It is, however, based firmly on the values of society rather than personal principles, and although characters express some disagreement with the values of society by ignoring popular disapproval or, as does Agamemnon at Il.14.80-1, pp.31-2 above, by denying its applicability in situations in which it generally is applicable, there is no case where a character experiences \( \text{aidos} \) at the prospect of the breach of a standard which is not one generally accepted by his peers; where \( \text{aidos} \) is deprecated it is so because it is seen as natural in the circumstances, but unhelpful.

\( \text{Aidos} \) is also exclusively \( \text{prospectiva} \) in usage in Homer, and as such cannot express the ideas, "I am ashamed of myself" or "I am ashamed of what I have done," that is to say, if it does encompass conscience in the sense of awareness of the standards of society, it does not approximate to our notion of the retrospective "bad" or guilty conscience. There is a case for saying, however, that prospective \( \text{aidos} \) can be based on a retrospective awareness that one has done something discreditable, and the feeling of anxiety occasioned by this awareness, which the Greek articulates in terms of \( \text{aidos} \) (because for him the disapproval of his fellows is a more pressing sanction than his own disapproval of himself), may be similar to the anxiety which we call "a bad conscience." Explicitly, however, \( \text{aidos} \) is always connected with the future disapproval of others in Homer, and for most of the period covered by this study we shall find that the Greeks have the greatest of difficulty in trying explicitly to express the idea of guilt or remorse. This is not to say that the characters of the poems do not experience that which we should call guilt or remorse, simply that they have no words with which to articulate the emotion in a form which would designate it unambiguously as the feeling which we describe in those terms. While \( \text{aidos} \) is internal, then, it is nevertheless to be distinguished from our concept of conscience in that it does not fully coincide with all the applications of that concept in terms of its usage.
OTHER TERMS

On pages 23-7 of his work von Erffa considers other concepts which approximate to *aids* in some of their usages; these, in the main, are terms which express an idea of inhibition together with a notion of respect for another's status; in most cases they are, as *aids* is not, operative in the sphere of man's response to the divine. Most examples of the verb *hazomai*, for example, are concerned with the proper reaction to the gods or their representatives. In this sense it does resemble *aideomai* in that it is an inhibitory reaction to the special status of its object, and it inhibits disregard for, and maltreatment of, that object. Its inhibitory force and its connexion with the numinous is shown at *II.6.266*-7, where Hektor explains:

\[
\chiρων δ' ἀνέπτυσεν Δεί λείβειν αἰθοπα δίνον ἀφοίνει.
\]

Here the verb clearly operates in a similar way to *aideomai*, but the exclusive reference to religious scruple, rather than to "other people", sets it apart. It can, however, be used in a context where *aideomai* might also occur, provided that context is one of those in which *aids* is specifically linked to the divine sphere: hence Odysseus' warning to the Cyclops (*Od.9.478*-9):

\[
\deltaάκτυλι', ἄπει ἑσίνως οὐκ ἄγεο ὁ ἐν νοικί

εἰθέμενει. Τῶν τε Ζεὺς Τίτατο καὶ θεό ᾿Αἰλλὸς.
\]

The *opis* of the gods, originally their all-seeing eye, comes to denote their anger. If a connotation of "seeing" or "being seen" is retained in the term, then it is highly appropriate that one can *aideisthai* the *opis* of the gods (*Od.21.28*, in the context of guest-friendship). As with *hazomai*, however, it is with fear of divine anger, not of popular disapproval, that *opis* is concerned, and the verb, *opizomai*, works much as does *hazomai*. Thus it may approximate to *aideomai* in those religious contexts in which *aids* normally occurs: fearing the wrath of Zeus *xeinios* at *Od.14.283*-4 might amount to feeling *aids* towards the god and his protegés. *Opizomai* is used with a human object at *II.22.332*, but seems to connote "fear" rather than "respect".
Closest to *aídos* of all those terms considered by von Erffa is *sebas*, and this is a concept which we shall have to consider at all stages of our study. Like *aídos*, *sebas* is a reaction which can acknowledge the status of other people and which can inhibit action; in Homer the noun seems always to be used of the subjective reaction to some special aspect of another person, of material objects or of a situation, although in later works it may also denote the quality in the other person etc. which arouses the reaction in others. In the formulaic expression ἑσπάς μ᾽ ἔχεις εἰροφόντα (Od.3.123.4.75,142 {with feminine participle}),6.161,8.384) *sebas* seems to be a feeling of wonder or astonishment which acknowledges something special or unusual in its object, and to have little to do with *aídos*, but at Il.18.178-80 it appears virtually as a synonym: *Iris* is urging Achilles to react to the possible mutilation of Patroklos' body:

Πάτροκλον ἔκεις κωνία μὲλπίτρα γενέκθηκεν
οἱ λύβη, αὖ κέν τι νέκυς ἐγχυμενος ἔλθη.

The prospect for Achilles should his friend's body be disfigured is lobe, and *sebas* is to be his reaction to that prospect; if *sebas*, then, can be a feeling aroused by the prospect of disgrace, it must be very close to *aídos*; as well as being a feeling of wonder it must also be a form of anxiety with reference to the individual's own status. The usage of the verbs, *sebazomai* and *sebomai*, confirm the closeness of the concept to that of *aídos*; twice in Il.6 (167,416-7) the former expresses, as might *aideomai*, inhibition at doing harm to another of a particular status; in the former passage Proitos refrains from killing Bellerophontes, and in the latter Achilles' *sebas* causes him to refrain from stripping his victim, Eetion, of his arms. At Il.4.242, however, it is *sebomai* which comes closest to the meaning of *aideomai* when it is used in an exhortation to greater effort in battle:

"Αργείοι ἵμαρσας, ἐλέγχετε, οὐ νῦν σέβεσθε;"

The implication of cowardice contained in *elenchees* clearly marks this exhortation to *sebas* as very similar to those we looked at in which *aídos* was urged, and the conclusion that the feeling of *sebas* can express the idea of concern for
one's own reputation is inescapable. Sebas in general seems to be a kind of shudder, which produces a momentary withdrawal, and as such can cover a whole range of reactions from awe and astonishment to respect and fear; there is very little to go on, but it does seem that sebas, although it does undoubtedly relate to concern for one's reputation and for the status of others, is less explicitly tied to the idea of the disapproval of others than is aids.

I have left consideration of the three usages of aischunomai till last, in order to tackle the question of the degree to which that verb may be seen as synonymous with aideomai. In two of the three passages of the Odyssey in which it occurs it seems to me that there is no practical difference between it and aideomai. Both verbs, in fact, refer fundamentally to the same idea; aideomai is cognate with aischos and aischros and works as a reaction to the commission of deeds which may be described as aischron, aischea or which may involve one in aischos (disgrace) or invite the aischea (insults) of others; aischunomai, on the other hand, is clearly a derivative of aischos or aischros and is probably a later formation than aideomai; nevertheless it refers to the same reaction to the prospect of disgrace or humiliation which would be expressed in terms of aischos or aischron. At Od.7.305-6 Odysseus explains why he did not accompany Nausikaa to town; gallantly he represents the decision as his rather than the girl's:

Here the familiar connexion with fear and the reference to Alkinoos' disapproval (έπικυρώσατο) mark aischunomenos out as synonymous with aidoumenos, and the fear of popular criticism to which Odysseus refers (307) is exactly that which Nausikaa articulated earlier (6.273-88) in terms which were clear indication of her aids.242

At 21.323-9 aischunomai is even more obviously a synonym of aideomai; the participle governs ένδομεν τις γυναικῶν as its object, and the familiar fear of what τις κρίκτερος
may say is expressed, and summarised by elenchea in 329. At 18.12, however, the situation seems less clear; Iros tells the beggar Odysseus that he is being urged to drag him away, and goes on ἐκ ἁίστρομαί ἐπίτης. Now, if aischunomai were to be equivalent to aideomai here, we should expect the meaning to be that Iros is reluctant to treat a beggar with violence, and, indeed, there is nothing in the text to indicate that this is not the meaning, but if Iros really is taunting Odysseus (VēlKēlwv, 9) then such compunction seems out of place, although it might be suggested that his scruple is feigned. Von Erffa, on the other hand, believes that Iros means that he considers it aischron for himself to become involved with so menial a task, and thus insults Odysseus by claiming that it is beneath his dignity to expel him;243 this seems to fit very well, but it is a matter of subjectivity which interpretation is preferred. Even if aischunomai does diverge from aideomai here, this does not mean that there is a fundamental difference in the usage of the two verbs; we shall meet such slight differences again, but generally we shall find that the two verbs are interchangeable in most contexts, and that even usages which at first seem unique to one or other of them tend to become attracted to the other by a process of cross-fertilization.
NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE

1. Iliad 21.468-9, Odyssey 146-7 are similar.
2. Obviously, then, it operates negatively, it inhibits; see Verdenius, Mnem. 1944-5, 47-8, 49n. 2, 51. Von Erffa's insistence (5, 40) that aidos is positive arises from a confusion of its effects, usually beneficial, and its operation.
3. Aidōs of this kind is clearly altruistic; see Scott, 1980, p. 25, and cf. pp. 56 and 88 below.
4. On this topic and these passages, see Pearson, Popular Ethics 42-3; for a parallel from a modern Greek community, see J.K. Campbell in Peristiany (ed.) Honour and Shame, p. 150.
6. See Murray, Rise of the Greek Epic, 83 and 89.

For aidōs and words connoting fear, see Iliad 1.331, 3.172, 15.652-3, 18.394, 24.435, Odyssey 8.22, 17.188, and cf. below, pp. 42-4, on aidōs in combination with deinos.
8. Pity - e.g. Iliad 21.74, fear - e.g. Iliad 1.331, Odyssey 17.188
9. 458-61 were athetized by Aristarchos, but Plutarch (see OCT app. crit.) may be right to assume that this was on account of their shocking content; the lines certainly seem to belong here. On their substance, see von Erffa, p. 5.
10. See below, pp. 74-5.
11. See below, pp. 93-4. Other instances of the phrase (Odyssey 15. 468, 14. 239) are less important.
14. These would be a valuable trophy for the Trojans, and proof of their success. On the importance of trophies and other means of concrete proof, see Finley, WQ, 132-7.
17. See below, pp.38-40.
18. The terminology is that of Adkins, MR, c.3 passim.
20. It is frequently directed at the suitors, for example; see Od.1.228-9,2.64,17.481,21.146-7 etc.; the gods in the Iliad feel nemesis when one of their number becomes involved in human strife - Il.5.757-9.872; correspondingly, a god who acts in the manner condemned by nemesis is said to be without aídos - Il.15.115,129; see von Erffa, p.33.
21. e.g. Od.4.158,22.489.
23. p.35.
26. See below, 72-3.
27. For an alternative explanation (which seems to me less probable), see Scott, 1980, p.29.
29. See below, pp.38-40.
30. See Adkins, MR, p.42; this does not mean, however, that Paris' conduct is only discreditable for its recipient, Menelaos; see Long, JHS 1970, p.133 on Il.3.46-51. Lobé also occurs at Il. 3.42,9.387,11.14 (where it is qualified by aeikés),19.208, Od.18.347,19.373 (note aischea),20.169,285, 24.326,433. Verbal forms ("disgrace", "insult") occur at Il.1.232,2.242,13.623, Od.23.15,26. One whose situation is disgraceful may be described as a lobeter, as at Il.2.275, 11.385,24.531 (note elenchees) or lobetos, as at Il.24.531.
31. MR, p.42.
32. See below, pp.61-2.
34. Oneidea also occurs at Il.1.291,2.222,251,3.438,9.460
(p. 10 above), 20.246, Od. 6.285, 17.461, 22.463; oneidos at Il. 16.498, 17.556; at Od. 6.285 oneidea behaves like aischia in referring to the situation which leads to reproach, rather than the reproaches themselves.

35. Aidos therefore denotes that which attracts aidos in this usage; cf. Il. 2.262. In later literature aidos also appears as that in one's character which attracts the aidos of others; see below, p. 126 on h. Hom. Cer. 214; in Homer aidos comes nearest to being a character trait at Od. 8.172, where it is a quality of the man whose morphe a god has crowned with eloquence. Characters are said to have no aidos at Il. 15.129, 24.44, Od. 21.171, and this is obviously a reference to a quality which they do not possess, but in each case the speaker has a specific act of misconduct in mind; see von Erffa, 38-9.

36. This is the interpretation of Long, JHS 1970, p. 131.

37. The formula \( \lambda \epsilon \nu \rho \delta \varepsilon \rho \lambda \zeta \sigma \iota \epsilon \nu \zeta \varepsilon \) is comparable, and slightly more common; see Il. 1.519, 2.277, 16.628, 21.480, Od. 18.326 and cf. Il. 22.497, where either \( \lambda \nu \pi \varepsilon \sigma \varepsilon \rho \alpha \iota \) is a neuter substantive or \( \iota \pi \varepsilon \varepsilon \rho \alpha \iota \) is to be "understood". The combination \( \lambda \nu \pi \varepsilon \sigma \varepsilon \rho \alpha \iota \lambda \nu \theta \varepsilon \) (internal accusative) also occurs; Il. 21.393, 471.

38. It is significant that Apollo strongly resists the invitation to fight; his aidos for his uncle (468-9) outweighs the aidos at failure which Poseidon's aischion in 437 seeks to arouse. It is also interesting that Apollo implies that his conduct in refusing to fight is "sensible" (saophron, 462); cf. Long, JHS 1970, p. 132n. 37.


40. See Il. 1.341, 398, 456, 4.396, 9.495, 16.32, Od. 2.250, 4.339, 340, 17.130, 131, 19.550, 22.317, 416. The notion of 'dishonourable' in this use of the adjective is, it seems to me, only secondary, although obviously in many circumstances to die violently will be seen as proof of inferiority. Death in battle is not always dishonourable, however (contrary to the implication of Adkins, MR, p. 42): see, for example, Il. 15.495-6, 22.110, 24.214, and cf. 13.275-91, where Idomeneus implies that one's arete is not diminished by wounding or death.
provided one's wounds are honourably received (on this passage, see D.B. Claus, TAPA 1974, p.16). See further Long, p.136, Griffin, Life and Death, p.96.

41. Od.14.199,24.250 (his clothes), 13.437,17.197,357,18.108 (his πέρα), and 20.259,24.228 (other items).

42. Il.16.545,559,19.26,22.204,24.22,54. At 22.256 the sense of the fut. ἀείκεια is clearly physical (pace LSJ s.v.); Hektor says that, if he defeats Achilles, he will strip him of his arms, but will not maltreat his body, returning it to the Achaeans instead.

43. Il.9.70,15.496,19.124.

44. MR, p.43.

45. e.g. Il.14,13,19.133,24.733.

46. Od.15.236,23.222,4.694,20.394,22.432.

47. MR, 41-2.

48. Od.3.265,4.533,11.429.


50. οἰκτρός. M. Scott examines the usage of oiktros etc. in Homer in Acta Classica 1979, 6-8, and shows that oiktros is only once used of the death of a warrior in Homer. On p.7 she concludes, "It is as if the feeling involved in oiktros is aroused only by people placed in a position of peculiar humiliation, of especially shameful failure under Homeric arete standards." If this is accepted, it would imply that Agamemnon's death was also aeikes for himself.

51. Adkins (MR, p.41) says Telemachos alone, but this is because he assumes that Telemachos is the speaker here, as he is in the repetition.


53. The position of the aeikea erga which Achilles committed against Hektor is similar (Il.22.395,23.24). Achilles is condemned for committing them, even by the gods, and yet his intention is clearly to dishonour his vanquished opponent, and indeed Hektor's body would have suffered mutilation had not Apollo prevented this by supernatural means. The acts themselves, described as unseemly or excessive, may reflect on both agent and patient, but the agent is more immediately condemned, while the danger for the honour of the patient lies in what an enemy or rival may make of his sufferings.
On Achilles' *erga* see also Griffin, *Life and Death*, p. 85n.9.

54. The idea of "showing up", "making obvious" is the common link between the two separate meanings given by LSJ s.v.. As a result of this idea of "exposure" *elenchos* will be important long after the Homeric notion of "disgrace" has been forgotten. At all periods, exposure to the public gaze may arouse *aidos*.


56. Note: *συγκυνόμενοι ἵκτῳ ἄνθρωπον οὐκ ἐγκατάσχειν* 323, and cf. p. 10 above and 93-4 below.

57. Cf. Long, p. 134. Adkins' reply (*JHS* 1971, 6-7) does not seem to me to answer this point.

58. But not all: see *Od.* 2.85-6 (15-6 above).

59. *Il.* 22.100, where Hektor foresees Polydamas' criticism of his leadership, 23.342.408, where *elencheie* is envisaged should Antilochos lose the chariot race, and *Od.* 21.255, where it is the result of Eurymachos' failure to draw the bow.

60. On this passage, see Adkins, *MR*, p. 33, Long, p. 125, Adkins, *JHS* 1971, p. 8. Adkins' reply to Long's objections to his remarks in *MR* is to point out that Eumaios' failure is described in the same terms as failure in battle. This, however, proves nothing; if a word is used in a given context this does not mean that it is tied to that context.

61. *Il.* 2.285, where Agamemnon would be *elenchistos* if he left Troy without defeating his opponents, i.e. if he were to act in the manner described as *aischron* at 298 (cf. Adkins, *MR*, p. 33), 4.171, where Agamemnon is concerned at the prospect of criticism of his failure to protect Menelaos (and to win the war) - see below, 30-1 - and 17.26, where Menelaos is called *ἐλεγχεστός καθαρής*.

62. In addition to the forms discussed, the verb *elencho* occurs twice in the sense, "expose (to ridicule)". At *Il.* 9.522 Phoinix urges Achilles not to *elenchein* the mission of the ambassadors; presumably they would be embarrassed to return without success. At *Od.* 21.424 Odysseus, having drawn the bow, tells Telemachos that his beggar guest does not *ἐλέγχεσ* him; the bond between host and guest creates a tie of collective honour, a tie which is most often evident in passages in which the host's honour is said to be committed by failure
to protect his guest (see below, 59-61), but apparently the failure of the guest could also implicate the host.

64. See Havelock, Justice, p.22.
66. See Il.13.95,15.502,16.422.
67. The exhortation is repeated at 15.561-4, αἰσχῶ θέει τ' ἐνὶ θύμιν replacing ἀλκυμόν ὑποῖς ἔλεεθε.
69. p.6.
70. Mnem. 1944-5, p.53.
71. This is the interpretation favoured by Redfield, Nature and Culture, 120-1.
72. On the community of honour in modern Mediterranean societies, see Peristiany (ed.) Honour and Shame, 35,52,89, 119,179,245,249-50. Dover, GPM,237-8 shows that the notion is widespread and natural, applicable to our society and not confined to "shame-cultures".
75. Il.6.523-5.
77. Farron, p.26
78. Above, 16-7; the comparative aischion also occurs (21.437-8).
79. Verdenius, p.55.
80. MR, 48-9 (Many, 31-2). Dover (JHS 1983, p.40) criticizes Adkins here, but his criticism is of his expression ("Nestor cannot say, 'Don't worry, it isn't true'") not his meaning, which is that the Homeric warrior does not feel himself able to ignore popular opinion.
82. Verdenius, p.53.
83. See above, p.2.
84. Cf. also Il.17.415-9.
88. p.11 above.
89. See Claus, TAPA 1974, 16 and 20.
90. See n.40.
91. Il.3,38ff.,6.325ff.,13.768ff.. Hektor's words are only really insulting, however, in the first of these passages.
92. The phrase ὅδε ἀν μεθέκησο καὶ ἀλλώ seems to be a variant of (e.g.) καὶ ἀλλώ νεμεσάμεν, ὅτις τολμήσο μείν (23.494). Such expressions suggest that the standard being breached is universal and that the speaker is justified in his complaint; see Hohendahl-Zoetelief, Manners, 11-13, and cf. Od.6.286 and 15.69, where the first person of the verb is used, implying the subject's own agreement with the standards of society.
93. Cf. p.28 above.
95. Cf. also Dover, GPM, p.238.
96. See below, pp.363-5,551-4,562-3.
97. It is interesting that elencheie may be the result of refusing to retreat, since other passages stress the idea that retreat itself is disgraceful. Hektor seems to have been caught in an impossible situation; his aidos would prevent him retreating, but retreat would have prevented the elencheie he now faces.
98. p.8.
99. See also the discussion of this passage by Verdenius, p.59, and cf. 88-90 below.
100. The notion of the individual's responsibility to his fellows is an important one in the Iliad, but it is only rarely expressed in the terms of our enquiry; for a discussion, see Roisman, Loyalty, passim, esp. 6,9-11,17-32, and Kakridis, Amitié, cc.1-3.
101. The verbs nemesaomai and aideomai thus refer to the same type of reaction here, namely the rejection and avoidance of discreditable conduct; see von Erffa, p.33. Verdenius agrees with the general interpretation of this usage, but points out that aidos differs from nemesis in the manner of its operation (49-50, esp.49n.2). At Od.4.158-9, however, the present νεμεσάμεν comes extremely close to αἴδεται in sense (von Erffa, p.54, contrast Verdenius, p.49n.2); there is,
however, an important difference; the participle ἔλθεντα shows that the reference of νεμέεις is to the present, and the sense is that Telemachos has already embarked upon a course of action which he regards as a breach of ἀidos in himself; αἰδεῖται ἐπερεολίκης ἂνθρακίως would mean that he had yet to act, and that his ἀidos was preventing his doing so. At Od.2.64 νεμέεις ὦτα is probably best taken as reflexive, and so a reproach from Telemachos to the Ithakesians (Verdenius, p.50, Redfield *Nature and Culture*, p.116) although an injunction to them to feel nemesis towards the suitors (passive for middle or active) would be equally possible; it seems less likely that the words are addressed to the suitors as an appeal to their nemesis with regard to their own conduct (the last two interpretations are also considered by Long, p.131n.36). At Od.1.263 νεμέεις Ἰθαγένης clearly means "he feared the anger of the gods", and thus, as a prospective fear of disapproval, the verb comes close to aideisthai in that context; αἰδεῖσθαι Ἰθαγένης, however, is only found in contexts of supplication and guest-friendship in Homer. 102. Cf. Kakridis, *Amitié*, p.8 (further examples). 103. See Kakridis, *Amitié*, p.96, Long, p.124, Roisman, *Loyalty*, p.17. 104. Kakridis, 65-70 (on hetairos in general, see 47-77, Roisman, *Loyalty*, p.6). 105. Kakridis, 56-8; hetairoi might also be members of one's own clan (52-5) or simply the heads of clans among themselves. One's hetairoi may also be one's philoi; 61,64 etc.. 106. Thus Adkins' statement (CQ 1963, p.32, cf. JHS 1971 p.4) that "Diomedes is far more closely bound to a Lycian who is his philos than to a Greek who is not, even during the Trojan War," deserves the qualification that, if all the Greeks at Troy are Diomedes' hetairoi, they are presumably his philoi too. Admittedly, disputes can arise, but when they do they are regarded as disputes between philoi, and are condemned as such; see below, 51-2. 107. Von Erffa (p.19) is perplexed at the use of καὶ οὐ περεύτηκε here; Scott (1980, p.47n.33) suggests two explanations; Eumaeos is avoiding the pain of naming his long-lost master, or he is influenced by the superstition that if one divulges
a name, the enemies of its owner gain some kind of magic control over him. Aidos, however, is never used of the avoidance of pain per se in Homer, only of avoiding the pain of humiliation caused by others' disapproval, while the second explanation can hardly be correct, since Eumaios pronounces the name at 144! To me, the lines appear as nothing more than an exaggerated expression of Eumaios' respect for his master; he is saying, somewhat rhetorically, that he still feels aidos for him despite his absence.

108. Cf. Il.24.435-6, where Hermes is posing as Achilles' therapon.


110. A king is obviously one's superior; cf. Il.4.402, where θεραπός is qualified by aidoios and Od.18.314, where aidoie is used of a queen. That one feels aidos for the old on the grounds of their superiority is the assertion of von Erffa, p.11, on Il.22.419-20, where, he believes, old age attracts aidos because of its authority and pity because of its disabilities. This distinction may well be valid. The most explicit statement of the claim of the old to aidos comes at Od.3.24, αίδης δ' αὖ νέον ἄνδρα γερμίτεεν ἐσειτερακεῖται.

111. This is not to suggest that philos is merely a kinship term here; clearly the adjective also has an affective meaning, as is allowed by Kakridis (who discusses philos on pp.1-46 of her work) and Adkins (CQ 1963); see especially Kakridis, 5-8,15-17, Adkins, p.33.

112. Od.5.88,10.114,19.254; cf. von Erffa, p.11.

113. In urging Hektor τάδε αἰδώς, Hekabe is using the emotive aspect of the mother-child relationship (her breast) metonymically for the real object of the aidos she wishes to arouse, namely herself. Similarly, in other passages some feature of the particular relationship in which aidos is felt appropriate is used as the object of the verb in place of a personal object; cf. Il.9.640, Od.16.75,19.527,21.27-8 (see Scott, 1980, p.22).

114. The extension of the term philos to those outside the kinship-group is not a primitive feature; cf. Finley, WQ. p.116. (Yet Finley still feels able to say (28-9) that the hero's only responsibility was to his family.)
115. For a full discussion of this episode, see Roism, Loyalty, 5-22.
116. ibid. 5-6.
117. Scott, 1979, 1-14, distinguishes eleos (a positive feeling of sympathy, often associated with aidos [p.11] and appropriate among philoi (11-2)) and oiktos (pity combined with revulsion, felt towards the humiliated, etc. (cf.n.50 above)); Roism, 12-3, shows that, while philoi were not explicitly obliged to accord each other eleos, they do so on a recurrent basis, and concludes that eleos constituted part of the duty one owes one's philoi.
119. Philotes thus refers not to a condition in 630, but to an action, the act of philein.
120. See Adkins, BICS 1960, p.31 on this point (and the rest of his article on honour/time in general) and cf. Pitt-Rivers in Peristiany (ed.) Honour and Shame, p.24, Dover, GPM, p.231.
121. On the connexion between time and reputation, see Adkins, BICS 1960, p.30, and cf. Pearson, Popular Ethics, 48-50, on reputation, time and arete. Aidos and time are associated as the recognition accorded a bard at Od.8.479-80; von Erffa, p.12, Adkins, BICS, p.24.
122. Thus, where honour is at stake, circumstances and intentions can be very important; this is mainly true of one-to-one situations, however, in which the status and intentions of the person delivering the affront will help determine whether or not the recipient of the affront decides to commit his honour; the individual will have to consider, for example, whether the other person meant to diminish his honour, as well as whether it would be a proper decision to regard the affront as a matter of honour (whether, that is, other people will consider him dishonoured should he fail to take action). On this, see Pitt-Rivers in Peristiany (ed.), Honour and Shame, 25-8,33-4. Outside the one-to-one situation, where a generalized "other people" is making judgements on the conduct of individuals, intentions, as we have seen, often do not matter; cf. Pitt-Rivers, p.64.
123. Nemesis is the normal reaction of heroes to rebukes which they regard as unjustified or insulting; see Hohendahl-
125. Scott, 1980, p. 17. Adkins also frequently claims that *aidos* is weak because it is not effective in every individual on every occasion; see *MR*, 45-6, *BICS* p. 31, *JHS* 1971, p. 9 etc.
126. This is the view of Murray, *Rise of the Greek Epic*, 88-9, and he seems to me to get it exactly right.
127. *Il.* 1.149, 158; cf. 9.372-3, where Achilles again refers to Agamemnon's *anaideie* and claims that, *κυνέος* (= *anaides*) as he is, he will not dare look him (Achilles) in the face. Achilles thus seems to be saying that even one as shameless as Agamemnon would experience *aidos* when faced with one he has wronged; the ability to look others straight in the face is a sign of *anaideie*, at least when one has some reason for *aidos*, and the dog seems to be particularly associated with shamelessness: *Il.* 1.225 (note *δίμαρξ - *aidos and *anaideie* are commonly manifested in the eyes - cf. 1.159 *κυνέοι* and see below, p. 75 and n. 202), 3.180, 6.344, 8.423, 21.481, *Od.* 4.145, 8.319, 11.424, 19.91; other passages in which a human being is called "dog" may be relevant, but the context does not always make it clear whether the insult is levelled on the grounds of shamelessness. In connexion with Agamemnon's *anaideie* we should notice that Achilles also charges him with *hybris* (1.203, 214, 9.368; cf. von Erffa, p. 19); *hybris* and *anaideie* are also combined in the suitors (below, p. 82).
130. See Adkins, *BICS* 1960, p. 31 (= *JHS* 1971, p. 9) and Scott, 1980, p. 16.
133. 24-5 above.
137. 14-5 above.
138. In the *Odyssey* both Eumaios (17.322-3) and Penelope (19.124-6) lose some *arete*. Eumaios because he loses the status of a free man and Penelope because her husband, in
whose arete she shares and on whom her arete depends, has gone; see Pearson, Popular Ethics, p.49. Penelope, moreover, exaggerates, since her very resistance to the suitors is a manifestation of her arete.

139. Cf. n.110 above.

140. Telemachos eventually overcomes his aidos in this episode, and he does so by means of tharsos (76, cf. Od.2.324 ibid.). The opposition of boldness and aidos is one we shall meet again, most notably at Hesiod, WD 319 (below, pp.117-119). In addition, part of the pseudo-platonic definition of aidos (Def.412c) runs τολμηταις ὑποχωρητικον εκουσα δικαιως ... (cf. von Erffa, p.41).

141. Above, n.101.

142. On aidos as a forerunner of classical sophrosyne, see North, Sophrosyne, 6-7, and cf. Greene, Moira, p.20.

143. North, 3-5.

144. 76-81.

145. Cf. above, p.9 and n.3.


147. See Adkins, BICS 1960, p.25, who interprets epitimetor as "he who imparts time".

148. Cf. Scott, 1980, 19-20. Verdenius (p.52) believes that strangers are accorded aidos not because of their weakness as outsiders, but because they are unusual and mysterious; there may be something in this, and the aidos which one feels for them might arise from an uncertainty about their origins, status, intentions or character which could lead to inhibition of any impulse to harm them. Cf. Finley, WQ, 111-2,134-5,137 on the ambivalence of the stranger.

149. Cf. Havelock, Justice, 161ff; on the importance of the theme of guest-friendship in the p.oem as a whole, see Thornton, People and Themes, 38-46 etc..

150. Cf. 578, where Penelope asks Eumaios whether it is aidos which causes the beggar's reluctance to enter the house, and opines κακος δ' αιδοιος αλητης. The active usage of aidoios here is unique in Homer, and is evidence of a certain flexibility of usage. On the analogy of this passage von Erffa
(p.13) believes that the adverb in Od.19.243 (the disguised Odysseus claims that he sent his guest, the fictitious Odysseus of his tale, on his way αἰδοίως) is also active in sense (meaning that the host showed αίδος towards his guest); but the sense could just as well be passive or proleptic, on the analogy of the far greater number of passive instances of the adjective. The sense would then be, "I sent him away in such a condition that he would be αίδοιος to other people." Cf. Scott, 1980, p.33n.4.

151. Again, "daring" (θερευκέλος, here coupled with αναίδες) is seen as an antonym of αίδος; cf. n.140 above.

152. 17.483: one might expect οὐ καλής to be equivalent to αίσχρον, but Adkins (MR,43-5) denies that this is ever the case in Homer, claiming that καλόν does not commend success as αίσχρον condemns failure; this begs a very large question, since αίσχρον is rare and, in any case, has no intrinsic reference to failure. For other passages in which οὐ καλής (etc.) may be equivalent to αίσχρον (including Od.21.312-3, also in the context of Antinoos' maltreatment of the beggar) see Long, p.128.


154. 1) object Zeus or the gods - Od.9.269 (in the context of both xenia and hiketeia) and II.24.503 (context of supplication). 2) personal object - the present passage (14.388), and (context of supplication) Od.22.312,344, II.21.74. At Od.21.28-9 the οψις of the gods (see below, p.91) and the table of his host are the objects Herakles failed to αἰδείσθαι in killing his host; cf. II.9.640, κατασφέρω δέ μίαθεν, and n.113 above, on the verb governing some central, emotive feature of the αίδος relationship; for the table as the central feature of the relationship of xenia cf. Od.14.158-9, 17.155-6,19.303-4,20.231-2 (and Gould, JHS 1973, p.97).

155. See Kakridis, 41-3, Adkins, CO 1963, p.34.

156. Cf. p.23 above.

157. Cf. in general Pearson, Popular Ethics, 62-3, and on 14.386-9 and Eumaios' altruism, Havelock, Justice, p.164. In that passage Eumaios' active desire to help is important, as it is at 15.373, where he describes how he reckons part of his income as available to help αίδοιοι; cf. 14.56-8, where
he states his obligation to help \textit{xeinoi} and beggars as a simple moral imperative (\textit{themis}); cf. Havelock, p.163, Hohendahl-Zoetelief, \textit{Manners}, p.117.

159. pp.76-81.
160. See 14-16,21-3 above.
161. We saw that it was \textit{ou καλακεία} for Antinoos to strike the beggar (Od.17.483, p.58 above) similarly at 20.294-5 (= 21.312-3) it is \textit{ου καλών} to abuse another's guests. Cf. n.152 above.
162. Cf. n.92 above.
164. Von Erffa (p.19) regards 86, \textit{αἰσχρο γὰρ ἀθίκης... δέκαμε χεῖσαι}, as the only instance of \textit{aideomai} with a ptc. in Homer, but, in fact, \textit{αἰσχρο} governs the accusative \textit{ἀθίκης} as in many other passages, while \textit{χεῖσαι} is used causally; see Verdenius, p.48n.1.
165. Cf. Od.17.415-8, where the beggar Odysseus promises to spread Antinoos' fame.
167. Cf. von Erffa, p.36, Long, p.139, Havelock, \textit{Justice}, 159-60; Pearson, \textit{Popular Ethics}, 43-4, shows both that \textit{themis} and \textit{dike} represent custom, "how things are done" in the \textit{Odyssey} (cf. Havelock, 179-84), and that Cyclopean society emphasizes the importance of these by contrast. The poet or poets of the \textit{Odyssey} clearly believed that their society was a civilized one by virtue of its possession of \textit{themis} and \textit{dike}, with which \textit{aidos} is intimately connected as the force which dictates their observance.
170. Odysseus' supplication is "figurative" here, in that he does not make the ritual contact with the supplicated which is felt necessary to the act in its fullest form; on "full" and "figurative" supplication, see Gould, 76-7 etc.; cf. Kopperschmidt, 20-1.
171. Cf. Od. 7.165.
172. See Gould, 93-4; not all strangers, it should be added, employ the language and gestures of supplication.
175. Cf. Lloyd-Jones, JZ, p. 17.
177. Cf. above, pp. 47-8, on their appeals to philotes.
178. On the importance of this passage, see Thornton, Homer's Iliad, 114-121 (cf. Lloyd-Jones, JZ, p. 16); Thornton makes a convincing case against the rejection of these lines (as favoured by Dodds, GI, p. 6, Page, History and the Homeric Iliad, 302-3; see Thornton, p. 116n. 17 and cf. Lloyd-Jones, JZ, p. 6) and shows that they are, in fact, central to the poem in the form in which we have it. On the importance of the theme of supplication in the Iliad and its four stages see Thornton, 121-4.
179. See Griffin, Life and Death, p. 91; on the other hand, we do hear of suppliants being spared; see below (p. 67) on Lykaon in II. 21, and cf. Gould, p. 80n. 38.
180. II. 21.35-44, 77-80; Gould, ibid..
181. Why does Lykaon say he is "like a supplicant"? Leaf, ad loc., believes that he is referring to his claim to philotes with Achilles; he is only "like a supplicant" because Achilles does not recognize him as a philos. But being a quasi-philos does not make one a quasi-hiketes; one does not have to be the philos of the person addressed in order to supplicate him, although reference to any tie of philotes or charis which may exist will always be a useful argument in making an appeal. Leaf obviously takes Lykaon's ἀυτῷ in 76 as explanation of his use of ἐν χείρι, but it seems more natural to regard it as introducing the grounds on which he hopes Achilles will accept his appeal, namely the fact that they have broken bread on a previous occasion (see Gould, p. 79
and n.36, p.81, Scott, 1979, p.11, 1980, 18-9); Achilles acknowledges this claim contemptuously at 106; it does not necessarily follow from this, however, that Lykaon would not be entitled to see himself as a suppliant in the full sense of the word. Either his use of ἄντρι is insignificant or it implies some doubt as to whether one in his position may legitimately be regarded as a suppliant; it seems more likely that this doubt should arise from the fact that he has been Achilles' adversary until the commencement of his appeal than from the ambivalence of his claim to philotes (see Scott, 1980, p.18). (I now see that Parker, Miasma, p.182 and n.207, holds that Lykaon has no real claim to full 183. Cf. n.154 above. It suppl., and that his use of ἄντρι acknowledges this.)

185. The simile thus inverts the roles of the parties in the real situation; Gould, p.96.

186. This would certainly square with Verdenius' assertion (n.148 above) that strangers of whatever kind arouse ἀδοις as a result of "das Ungewöhnliche in ihrer Erscheinung." Gould, p.96n.111, suggests that the thambos of the spectators in the simile might imply a horror of pollution; Parker, Miasma, 134-5, believes that the supplication of a prospective protector by a homicide might be an appeal for a minimal sort of purification, but (p.135n.124) is sceptical about the argument that thambos is a reaction to pollution. Supplication as described in the simile may also be relevant to Ajax' assertion (Il.9.632-3) that the relatives of the victim accept ransom from his killer; for a parallel from N. Africa see Zeid in Peristany (ed.), 254-5.

187. On the Greeks' attitude to sex in more general terms see Dover, GPM, 205-13, Parker, Miasma, 74-103; cf., more briefly, Henderson, Maculate Muse, 3-5.

188. See above, 42-5.


190. Il.22.451, Od.18.314.

191. κιδοίν Ττιό - Od.1.139,7.175,15.138,17.94,259.

192. This is true of many more cultures than the ancient Greek; see Pitt-Rivers in Peristiany (ed.), p.42. On this
phenomenon in Homer, see Adkins, MR, 36-7.
196. I1.6.349-51, above, p.34.
197. Cf. I1.22.75 for this physical sense of aidos (p.15 above).
199. p.18.
200. Cf. nn.113 and 154 above.
204. Cf. p.54 above.
206. See n.101 and pp.55-6 above.
207. Sophrosyne, p.5.
208. Cf. Long, 126n.16 and 154.
210. MR, p.31.
211. See Long, p.123.
212. The foreshadowing of Sokrates' identification of morality and self-interest in Homer has often been noted; see Dodds, GI, p.17, Gould, Development Plato's Ethics, p.7. For an explicit Homeric statement that wrong conduct is imprudent conduct, see Od.22.372-4.
213. See Dodds, ibid., Pearson, Popular Ethics, p60 (also 52-60 in general).
216. See Greene, Moira, 18-23.
218. See Thornton, Homer's Iliad, p.142.
219. p.36, cf. Redfield, Nature and Culture, p.211; the lack
of the peculiarly human quality of *aidos* by reason of their inanimacy is the only explanation I can think of for the designation of boulders and rocks as *anaides* (Il. 4. 521, 13. 139, Od. 11. 598).

220. Apollo also comments (45) on the ambivalence of *aidos*; this line is certainly much more appropriate in the other context in which it occurs (Hes. WD 318), but the question of "interpolation" in Homer is a vexed one, and we can hardly be sure that the Hesiod passage has influenced that under discussion or that line 45 did not stand in its present place when the Iliad was given the form in which we have it.


222. ὅ resultMap, a unique usage of the verb in Homer; see Kakridis, *Amitiä*, p. 40.

223. Cf. 24. 351-2, where Laertes is of the opinion that the suitors have suffered the reward of their ἀταθήθηκεν ὕππρίσ.

224. Cf. n. 101 above.

225. MR, p. 46.

226. See esp. 71-2 above, on Od. 6. 285-8.


228. Pearson, *Popular Ethics*, p. 223n. 18, also states that Homeric man possessed a personal, internal standard of conduct, but does not explicitly relate this to *aidos*.


231. To be sensitive about one's honour entails a claim to honour, which is subjective; see Pitt-Rivers in Peristiany (ed.), 21-2, 72, and cf. p. 30 above.

232. Singer, *Shame and Guilt*, p. 64, points out that once standards or sanctions are internalized, they operate auto-


235. The best example is that of Hektor at *Il.*22.104-7, pp. 37-8 above.


237. Seel, *Zur Vorgeschichte ...,* 302-9 gives examples of the ways in which Homeric characters express ideas close to that which we should call conscience and reasons as to why Homeric language cannot fully express a concept of conscience. He shows, convincingly, I believe, that our concept of conscience is not totally absent from the poems; it is, however, only a concept for us, and not for the Homeric characters; there is a difference between "the concept of conscience is not absent from the poems" and "the characters of the poems do have a concept of conscience." The relationship between words and concepts is such an intimate one that it would be wrong to imagine that a society could have a concept of something which it could not express in words.


241. *Iliad.*

242. See p. 72 above.

2. FROM HESIOD TO THE FIFTH CENTURY.

HESIOD.

In comparison with Homer, Hesiod provides us with little opportunity to observe the workings of *aidos*, and many of the passages in which our terms do occur are either insignificant or uninformative.¹ The adjective *aidoios*, for example, frequently occurs as a simple honorific epithet; at Th. 44 the children of Ouranos and Gaia are a γένος αἴδοιον, and Aphrodite is an αἴδοιη καλὴ ὥρα at line 194 of the same poem.² Kings are *aidoioi* at Th. 80, fr. 43a 89 and fr. 361; as in Homer *aidoie* is a favourite epithet of women.³ The concrete usage of *aidoia* occurs at WD. 733-4, in the form of the injunction:

μηδ' αἴδοια γαν' ἡπειραμένος ἔνδοθι οἶκου ἵστην ἐκπέλκων παρκαφάνεμεν, ἀλλ' ἀλέκοθει.

This sexual tabu is found in that part of the poem which deals in general with proper conduct towards one's neighbours and the avoidance of conduct which may be unseemly or unpropitious (707-64); the major sanction against breaches of these standards is outlined at 760-4, lines which reveal Hesiod's appreciation of the importance of popular opinion in his society and which suggest a corresponding importance for *aidos*:

Defeat or failure is disgraceful in Hesiod as in Homer (WD. 210-11) and presumably *aidos* would be the reaction to such a prospect:

Moving to more important instances of the relevant terms, we might begin with Th. 80-93, a passage which affords interesting parallels with Od. 8.169-73.⁴ Both passages involve an individual who is favoured by the gods, and both deal with
aidos, but the Hesiodic is longer and more specific. The eloquent man of the Odyssean passage has the following characteristics (171-3):

\[ \delta \delta \' \alpha \rho \kappa \alpha \kappa \varepsilon \omega s \ \alpha \gamma o \rho o \varepsilon \]
\[ \alpha \iota \delta o \iota \ \mu e l i \chi i \gamma i \mu \]
\[ \mu e t \kappa \varepsilon \ \pi \rho e \tau \iota \iota \varepsilon \mu \rho \mu e n \alpha \iota \nu \]
\[ \varepsilon \chi \omicron \mu \varepsilon n \iota \varepsilon \ \alpha \kappa \varepsilon \ \kappa \sigma \tau \iota \ \theta e \iota \nu \iota \ w s \ \varepsilon \iota \sigma o \omega \varepsilon \iota \nu . \]

The Hesiodic version has all these elements but employs them in a different form and in a different context, and the subject is not one who is good at speaking, but a king. The king, like Homer's ἀλλος μὲν, delivers his speech ἀργαλέως (86), but with μαλακοτέρον ἐπερήν (90) rather than αἴδοις μελλίχης. Aidos in the Hesiodic version is not the property of the speaker but of his audience (91-2):

\[ \varepsilon \chi \omicron \mu \varepsilon n \iota \varepsilon \ \delta \iota \iota \varepsilon \ \kappa \nu \gamma \nu \kappa \ \theta e \delta \iota \iota \iota \ w s \ \i \lambda \alpha \kappa o \kappa i \alpha \iota \delta o \iota \ \mu e l i \chi i \gamma i \mu \]

In both passages the subject enjoys the favour of the gods and the respect of other mortals, but only in the Hesiodic is that respect explicitly described as aidos; the aidos the king receives recognizes his status and authority, and corresponds to the designation of the king as aidoios in its normal sense of "deserving aidos" at line 80. In the passage from the Odyssey the possibility that the reaction of the spectators, which is so similar to that of their Hesiodic counterparts, might also be classifiable as aidos should not be ruled out, but aidos is only mentioned in that place as a quality of the speech itself; the words of the Homeric character reflect the aidos he accords other people, and if the reaction of others to that quality of his speech is also aidos then it seems that aidos as a quality can attract aidos as a response. The usage of aidos in the lines from the Theogony is certainly the more orthodox of the two, but the speaker's aidos in the Odyssean example is also readily explicable as an oblique reference to the absence of the same quality in the words Euryalos has just directed towards Odysseus, and it seems illegitimate to conclude that the former must be the model for the latter simply because aidos is used in a more traditional sense in the one than in the other.
The best known instance of *aidos* in Hesiod is that at *WD. 317-9*, a passage whose interpretation has been much discussed.\(^7\)

\[\text{The text reproduced here is that of West, and I fully agree with him that *koi}βις* is to be preferred to *koi}βεν* in 317. The point of the passage is the inefficacy of *aidos* in certain circumstances (see pp. 8-9 above) and this requires the infinitive, in order that *καρηθῇ* may have its dominant sense of "good at";\(^8\) with the reading *κοί}βεν* the line loses its traditional and proverbial basis, a basis it shares with those passages of *Od. 17* on the inappropriateness of *aidos* for a man in need (347, 352, 578); *κίν\(\omicron\) ... *κοί}βεν*, moreover, is an awkward expression, and some violence must be done to it in order to obtain an acceptable meaning. \(\text{MacKay}^9\) argues that *κοί}βεν* must have been the reading known to Euripides, who, as Cook shows,\(^10\) had these lines in mind at *Hipp. 383-7* and *Erecth. fr. 365N*\(^2\), but the tragic poet's *οὐκ ἀγαθῇ* and *κακῷ* may be verbal reminiscences of Hesiod's *οὐκ ἀγαθῇ*, and need not imply that *οὐκ ἀγαθῇ* is attributive in our passage. All these passages deal with the ambivalence of *aidos* and its harmful effects in certain circumstances, and both these aspects are clear enough in our passage without the reading *κοί}βεν*.\(^11\)

Having dispensed with the notion of "bad (or false) shame"\(^12\) in 317 we may agree with \(\text{MacKay}^13\) against Hoekstra,\(^14\) that *aidos* means the same in 317 as in 319, and construe: "Aidos is not good at looking after a needy man; it can do both harm and good; the poor have their *aidos*, the rich their *tharsos*."\(^15\)

The three lines are somewhat disjointed, and it seems highly probable that all three are proverbial maxims that Hesiod has adapted to his own purpose.\(^16\) The original sense of 317 was most likely similar to that of the Odyssean examples cited above, referring to the necessity of initiative and boldness in the poor in spite of the *aidos* which might affect one who imagined that he was showing an excess of self-confidence for one of low status and who therefore feared the reproach
of others; 318 will have been an expression of the traditional ambivalence of *aidos* such as we noted in Homer, and 319, as McKay plausibly suggests,⁷ may have been a proverb by which the poor consoled themselves with their own (positive) *aidos* in contrast to their betters' (reprehensible) *tharsos*.

Hesiod, however, has adapted his material to the situation on which his immediate concern is focused, and the *aidos* of 317 is not that of one who is forced to ignore his inhibition in asking others for help or charity, but a reference to Perses' preference for wealth without effort; it must be Perses to whom the observation that work is not an *oneidos* (311) is addressed, and he is presumably to be thought of as regarding work as an *oneidos* because he considers work to be beneath his dignity (hence his *aidos*).⁸ Similarly *aidos* retains its negative aspect, and it is seen as regrettable that the poor cling to their *aidos*; this reflection must be general and not specifically related to the situation of Perses, since Perses does not show either the positive *aidos* of the putative model of this maxim, or any kind of *aidos* which might be seen as appropriate to the poor, but, in Hesiod’s view, regrettably so. No doubt the gnomic nature of the previous verses has led the poet to more general reflections. Equally the reference to *tharsos* is only indirectly relevant to Perses; he is being asked to show a positive kind of *tharsos* in buckling down to hard toil, but the line also has the general application that the poor as a class would do better to imitate the quality which they resent in their social superiors. The general and the particular thus mingle in this passage, as indeed one might expect in a poem which is intended both for its named addressee and for a wider audience, and this may contribute to its undoubted difficulty.

Hesiod is thus being deliberately controversial in arguing for a beneficial form of *tharsos* and against a negative form of *aidos*; the positive connotation of *tharsos* is supported by *Od.* 3.76 (p. 55 above, with note 140) where it is also opposed to inappropriate *aidos*, but the word is also frequently negative in character,⁹ as indeed it is in the
proverb which Hesiod adapts, and the poet shows his awareness of this negative aspect by adding an injunction against carrying tharsos too far at 320 - $\chi\nu\mu\upsilon\alpha\tau\kappa\alpha\tau\kappa\alpha\tau\kappa\alpha\tau\kappa\alpha\tau\kappa\alpha\tau$.

This excessive tharsos the poet equates with violence (321; note $\chi\xi$ and cf. 191-2) and with a desire for kerdos which leads one's noos astray, and all of these are subsumed in the generic anaideie of 324 which drives away aidos. The connexion between negative tharsos and anaideie and its opposition to aidos are thus apparent, and it would appear that it is aidos which leads one to refrain from theft and the pursuit of wealth by dishonest means. Anaideie here will be either lack of regard for the status and disapproval of the victim of dishonesty or failure to take into account society's disapproval of theft and dishonesty in general.

Further examples of anaideie are given at 327-32, and these are a mixture of the familiar and unfamiliar; the harming of guests and suppliants (327) is certainly familiar to us as a form of anaideie from the Odyssey, and the seducing of a brother's wife would be a grave breach of philotes and as such also a breach of aidos in terms of the values of the Homeric poems. Equally the last example of the series (331-2), maltreatment of an aged parent, would also involve neglect of the aidos proper among philoi and, more specifically, that owed by children to their parents; the harming of orphans in 330, however, does not appear as a specific breach of aidos in Homer, and indeed at II.22.484-506 it is assumed that a fatherless child will be harmed; perhaps Hesiod is thinking of the obligation to protect the orphaned children of a member of one's own family, or perhaps it was simply seen as excessive and discreditable to maltreat the helpless.

Since we are in a context of anaideie we should also notice the use of the twin criteria of good sense ($\delta\nu\chi\upsilon\lambda\eta\xi\nu\varsigma$, 330) and appropriateness ($\pi\lambda\kappa\kappa\iota\varphi\iota\kappa\alpha\varsigma$, 329) so familiar from such contexts in Homer; Hesiod also goes on to say that Zeus himself punishes the offences outlined in 327-32, and this reflects the interest taken by the gods in human propriety in general in the Odyssey.
These offences which Zeus punishes are, however, not only instances of anaideia, for in 334 they are described as ἑγκ ἀδικκα. This suggests that there is a link between aidos and dike, the concept which has dominated the first part of the poem, and this is confirmed by an examination of the poet’s description of the collapse of moral standards in the current, iron age of human civilization. The iron age men, he tells us, will be ungrateful to their parents, οὐδὲ θεῶν ὅπιν εἴστε (185-8), and goes on (189-93):

Χειροδίκαι, ἔτερος δ’ ἐτέρου πολίν ἐξελατάμεθεν,
οὐδὲ τῆς εὐόρκου ἱερᾶς ἑποταλ οὐδὲ δίκαιον
οὔτ’ ἀγαθῶν μάλλον δεὶ κκκῶν ἐκκτήσα καὶ ἐξίν ἀνέκτη τιμήσαι. δίκη δ’ ἐν ἱερς καὶ καίδως ἑγετάκη.

To observe the aidos proper between parents and children is also to observe the ὀπις of the gods; the idea of concern for divine anger thus coincides with aidos once more, and this is because the gods are felt to share the standards of men. Lack of aidos and failure to consider divine anger will lead to the breakdown of civilized procedures for the settlement of disputes (χειροδίκα, 189) and in the ensuing reversal of civilized values the hybristic will be honoured in place of the just and dike and aidos will be overcome by violence. More unnatural disruptions follow, leading to the climax (197-201):

καὶ τότε δὴ πρὸς ὅλουτον ἀπὸ χθόνωσ εὐρυσκιν
λευκοῖν δάφεσι καλυφμένως χρόκ καλῶν
καθαρτῶν μετὰ θυλών ἔτοι προσποτυ ἀνθρώπους
αἰδῶς καὶ Νεμέις. τὰ δὲ τῇ ἁρματεί ἁγεκ λυγρὰ
θυμοῖς ἀνθρωποῖς, κακοῦ δ’ οὐκ ἑγετάκη ἀλκη.

Aidos (with its correlate Nemesis) is thus explicitly linked with dike and its departure from the world is seen as the final stage of a moral collapse in which the abandonment of dike is also prominent. Now, in an authoritative study of dike in WD Gagarin points out that the word refers primarily to a process in the poem, the process employed in the peaceful settlement of disputes,22 and thus explains the close link between dike and the questions of property and the proper acquisition of wealth which prevail in the contexts
in which the term is employed; we have already seen that *aidos*, too, is involved in this economic sphere in 320-4. Perhaps, then, *aidos* is the impulse which leads one to be susceptible to and to observe the process of *dike*; if, however, *dike* is to be restricted to the narrow, "Iliadic" sense of "arbitration", "settlement", and to have nothing to do with the wider, "Odyssean" sense, "proper behaviour", then we must also suppose that where *aidos* does interact with it, it is in the context of readiness to observe the adjudications arising from a *dike* or of determination to avoid the sort of conduct which would involve one in a *dike*. I do not believe, however, that *dike* can be so narrowly interpreted in the *WD*; in 327-34, as we have seen, various offences against propriety are placed under the heading of *δική*, and if it is *δίκη* to maltreat guests etc. it must be *δίκαιον* to behave properly towards them; this passage renders Gagarin's assertion (p. 91) that, "... no violator of the rights of a suppliant or a guest, no doer of any wrong except that connected with litigation is ever spoken of as violating *δίκη*..." totally invalid; *dike* is still a process in Hesiod, but it is the process of acting properly towards others as well as that of litigation; it is thus not separable from popular morality, as Gagarin would have us believe. The close relationship between *aidos* and *dike* is now that much easier to understand; since *dike* does have a reference to proper behaviour, *aidos* can play its normal role as the force which renders one sensitive to the values of society and which inhibits departure from those values.

A clear indication that *dike* refers to more than the settlement of disputes is given at 276-80, where the poet claims that *dike* separates man from beast; as Claus points out, the beasts are not differentiated from man simply because they do not possess a system for the settlement of disputes, but because they do not have the civilized qualities of the *dikaios* man, qualities which, in the *Odyssey*, served to characterize civilized communities as different from barbarous races like the Cyclopes. Admittedly, Hesiod does argue from the general sense of *dike* possessed by humans
to its concrete application in legal disputes (280-5), but this does not restrict its reference to litigation in 276-80. Von Erffa notes the function of dike as the major civilizing quality in these lines and contrasts this with Il. 24.40-5, where it is aidos which separates man from beast; this does not mean, however, as von Erffa seems to imply, that aidos has a different or less important rôle in Hesiod, or that society has "developed" into one in which justice is more important; Hesiod has particular reasons for stressing the part played by dike and, in any case, dike describes the behaviour of men in a civilized society; it is not primarily the awareness of the standards of society which produces civilized behaviour. That function is performed by aidos, in Hesiod as in Homer, and the absence of dike in the fifth age of men entails also the absence of the aidos which encourages its observance; we should not, moreover, overlook the climax in lines 197-201; the departure of Aidos and Nemesis from the world is seen as the ultimate in moral collapse; without aidos there is no defence against evil (201). And if we need any confirmation that aidos in Hesiod "still" separates man from beast, we need only look at Th. 312 and 833, where anaides is the adjective applied to Kerberos, the "raw-eater" (311), and to the thymos of a lion.

A word on nemesis in Hesiod; at Th. 223 the idea is personified as the daughter of night and a manifestation of divine anger, but the other personification at WD. 200 is not the same; there the notion personified is that of popular disapproval, the correlate of aidos, and nemesis is not a divine element; its absence, we are told, will lead to woes and unmitigated κακία for mortals, and if it were divine anger it would be its presence which would have such effects. Elsewhere in Hesiod nemesis generally has the same significance as it does in Homer; at WD. 756 the verb does refer to divine anger, but it is anger at an offence against the gods themselves (the profanation of the mysteries) rather than divine anger at human wrongdoing in general. At 303-4 of the same poem the nemesis of men at one who does not work is shared by the gods, but this does not place the term firmly in the divine sphere;
it still refers fundamentally to popular disapproval, as the recapitulation, κεργύ θείτ' ὀνείδος (311) shows. At fr. 197.8 the sons of Amphiaraos incur the nemesis of men, while at fr. 70.27 we find the similar ἐθνοτὲς ἡμὲς ἄρνητυν τ' ἀνθρώπῳ. Fr. 204.814 deals with the oaths imposed on the suitors of Helen by Tyndareus, and shows how aídos and nemesis work within a group on a basis of mutual security:

ος δὲ κεν ἀνδρῶν
ἀυτός ἐλοιπό βέν, νέμεσιν τ' ἀτοθείτο καὶ αἰδώ, τὸν μετὰ πάντας ἄνωγεν κολλάεις ὅμοιοιν τελεμένους.

By imposing this oath Tyndareus makes each of the suitors the guardian of the others; all have committed their honour by swearing it, and to break it or allow it to be broken would be to fail in an obligation to the others: aídos should prevent perjury, because perjury in a case like this would entail the manifest contradiction of a statement on which one had staked one's honour; nemesis here might refer to the reaction of a defaulter to his own transgression, or to the nemesis he would feel if another were to act in the way he himself is contemplating, but the simplest way to take "rejecting nemesis and aídos" is to regard nemesis as referring to the prospect of others' nemesis at any breach of the terms of the oath; the perjurer rejects the thought of nemesis.

**THE HOMERIC HYMNS**

Most of the instances of the terms with which we are concerned which are found in the so-called Homeric Hymns are unremarkable usages of the adjective aídoios which need no comment; such, in fact, are all the passages in the minor hymns with which we might otherwise be concerned; detailed comment is only required in the case of a few passages from the hymns to Demeter and Hermes, both of which, we may be fairly confident, were composed within the period covered by this chapter. To begin with the hymn to Hermes, then, we find that deity addressed as ἀναίδειν ἐπελεμένει by his mother at line 156, the same phrase as is used of Agamemnon by Achilles at ll.1.149. Hermes has stolen Apollo's cattle, and his anaideie is presumably to be related to that fact; theft was described in the same terms at WD.324 (p.119 above):
but although Hermes' *anaideia* is undoubtedly to be referred to his crime and to his rascality in general\textsuperscript{34} it must also relate to his disregard of the consequences of being found out, which would be a source of discredit, and to his failure to show *aidos* for the status of his victim. It is this proper regard for a deity of superior status that he feigns at 381-2, denying the charge of theft (a further example of his *anaideia*, the denial of responsibility which, if exposed as false, will reveal his disregard for the opinions of others):

\[ \text{Ἡέχειον δὲ μὲν καὶ κόσμος καὶ δεῖγμας ἀλλοις, καὶ ἐφιλῆ καὶ τούτων ὀπίσθομαι.} \]

He claims that *aidos* for the Sun and the other gods would have prevented his committing the theft, and implies the same of his *philotes* of Zeus and his fear of Apollo's anger:

\[ \text{οἴσομαι} \] used of Apollo shows that the proper relationship between that god and Hermes should be based on the latter's respect for the former's greater power. It is, however, Hermes' intention to test that power and to assert his own time, with the ultimate view that it be acknowledged by the other gods.\textsuperscript{36} In pursuing this aim he is *anaides* in many respects, considering neither the rights of the direct recipient of his actions nor the possible disapproval of others.

At *h.Cer.* 64-5 Demeter asks Helios for help in finding her daughter:

\[ \text{Ἡέλιος κιέσσατι με θεόν θεός, ἐπεὶ ἐπεὶ ἐρημὸς κραδίην καὶ θημὸν ἔγειρα.} \]

For Helios to accede to the goddess' request would be to accord her *aidos*, and Demeter asks for *aidos* on the basis of the return of past kindnesses; in such examples, it seems, *aidos* is to be felt for the special status of the individual (and we remember that one who has done one a favour may be *deinos*, *philos* and *aidios* - cf. p.45 above) and at the prospect of ignoring that person's request; society in general believes that it is proper to return favours and discreditable not to, while it is also easy to imagine that the prospect of disappointing one who does have a special status in one's eyes might produce *aidos*. Von Erffa\textsuperscript{37} points
out that the sun god's reaction to Demeter's appeal to *aídos* is expressed as *'jômai* and *'lêkèw* at line 76, but this does not suggest that either of these verbs is synonymous with *aideomai*; Helios can *hazesthai* Demeter because she is a goddess, but she herself only asks for *aídos* on the basis of her past services; equally Helios may pity her, but she does not ask for pity, but for the return of a favour.

At line 190 of the same hymn the effect of Demeter's appearance on Metaneira is described:

_Tên δ' αίδως τε σέβας τε ἢδε Χλεών δέος κιλεν._

Metaneira can see that Demeter is a being of unusual status, but she does not yet know that she is a goddess; accordingly the words used of her reaction describe the response of an inferior to a superior; we met the combination of *aídos* and *deos* frequently in such contexts in Homer, and saw also how *sebas* could describe a similar reaction. As in all the passages in which the word occurs in Homer, *sebas* is subjective here; it describes a response to some quality in another which inspires awe; probably the first instance of the word in its objective sense (that which arouses awe) comes in the eighth of the epigrams preserved in the pseudo-Herodotean life of Homer (Ep.8.3-4), where the *sebas* of Zeus *xeinios* attracts *aídos* and his *opis* is the sanction brought to bear upon those who disregard it. At *h.Cer.10-11 sebas* describes the response of gods and men to the narcissus which is to entrap Persephone, but there the term has a slightly extended sense, "occasion for, cause of *sebas*," as in the case of *aídos* at *II.17.336-7* and *Od.3.24*; in each of these examples *sebas* and *aídos* designate the situation as one in which these reactions are appropriate; the terms enjoy considerable flexibility of usage, and it is this which allows *sebas* (and occasionally *aídos*) to be used both subjectively and objectively; we might compare the twin usages of *aischos* and *aischea*, and the active and passive senses of *aidoios*. That which arouses *sebas* may be described as *semnos*, as at *h.Cer. 1* and *478* (note *sebas* in 479 and cf. *h.Merc.552*) and Demeter and her daughter are described as both *semnai* and *aidolai* at *h.Cer.485-6*; clearly, since both
sebas and aidos can denote similar reactions to another's power, aidoios and semnos are very close in meaning, but at this stage it seems that semnos is more readily used of divine majesty than is aidoios.

Metaneira's first impressions of the goddess lead her, at 213-5, to address her as follows:

Χηιε γάναι, ἐπεὶ δ' ὅθ' ἀκακῶν ἀπ' ἐκλίπω τούτων,
ἔμμεναι ἀλλ' ἀρχων· ἐπί τοι πρέπει ὄμματιν πίσος
καὶ χάρις, ὡς εἰ πέμπῃ τε θεομάτων βασιλέων.

Aidos is manifest in the eyes because the feeling of shame or inhibition naturally causes one to avert one's gaze, and it is therefore not remarkable that the situation of aidos in the eyes should become proverbial. The association between aidos and charis is important, recalling Od.8.18-23, where, as a result of Athene's pouring charis on his head and shoulders, Odysseus becomes philos, deinos and aidoios, and 169-77 of the same book, where possession of aidos is contrasted with lack of charis; here Demeter must show by her demeanour, perhaps by her downcast eyes, that she is capable of showing aidos, but her aidos is not related to any specific action and appears to be much more a quality, like charis, a quality which likens her to ὀμματικῶν βασιλέων; kings are described as aidoioi in three passages of Hesiod, and, as we have just seen, aidos was part of Metaneira's reaction to the appearance of the goddess at 190; the aidos which is apparent in one of a certain status, then, arouses a corresponding feeling of aidos in those they encounter. It is significant, too, that Metaneira equates aidos so readily with noble birth; this identification is one we shall meet again in Theognis and the tragedians.

Before leaving hexameter poetry we might first consider a few passages in the Homeric epigrams which deal with aidos in the context of guest-friendship. We have already looked at Ep.8, which mentioned the rôle of Zeus as protector of guests, and Ep.1 is an unremarkable plea for aidos for a needy stranger; in 2.2 and 6.6 the poet hopes to meet men who are aidoioi with respect to strangers, and since the context in
both places is one of the proper way of receiving strangers, it would seem that aidoios is to be construed in the active sense, "showing aidos", for which the only Homeric parallel is Od.17.578; again, evidence of considerable flexibility in the usage of these terms. Two further passages in the epigrams are worthy of brief comment; at 4.2 a mother is described as aidoie, suggesting the obligation to accord one's parents aidos, and at 14. (= [Hes.] fr.302) 7 anaideie refers to failure to keep a promise, in this case the promise to pay the bard for his services.

LYRIC, ELEGIAC AND IAMBIC POETS.

Here it seems most appropriate to deal first with the early elegists, Tyrtaios and Kallinos, both of whom transport us back to the martial atmosphere of the Iliad, giving us further opportunity to observe the rôle of aidos on the field of battle. Kallinos fr.1 (West) 48 begins thus (1-4):

This kind of hortatory appeal to aidos is familiar from the Iliad: the poet, imagining himself on the field, accuses his colleagues of slacking, and seeks to arouse their aidos, urging them to consider "what other people will say". There is no essential difference in the way aidos works in this passage from its operation in various passages in Homer, yet von Erffa contrasts Kallinos' expression with that of Il.5.529-30, and finds significance in the fact that, whereas the Homeric warriors are urged to aideisthai each other, Kallinos' fellow citizens are asked to show aidos for the opinions of members of other communities, i.e. other city states; in the one case the warriors are urged to show concern for their own reputations and in the other for that of their community. This, indeed, is true, and the argument does differ in the two passages, but this is not necessarily because Homer's warriors live in scattered oikoi while those of Kallinos dwell in a city state; the situation of the participants is undoubtedly different; the heroes of the Iliad do not live
in the same kind of society as does Kallinos (although the poet who gave the epic its written form might have), but even in the Iliad the idea of a community of honour in which all the members of one contingent were involved is of considerable importance, and we do find an appeal to aidos with regard to the reputation of one's own community vis-à-vis other communities at Od. 2.65-6, and such appeals must always have been possible. It would also be erroneous to imagine that Kallinos' warriors are not concerned about their individual reputations in the same way as the Homeric; in fact, personal honour and collective honour go hand in hand.

Tyrtaios 10.15-8 offers a similar kind of battle-speech:

Flight is "ugly" and brings disgrace; Tyrtaios, even in fragmentary form, is much freer with the use of the adjective aischros than is Homer, but, broadly speaking, it is used in similar contexts to those in which it is found in the Iliad and Odyssey. Its primary reference is still to physical appearances; at 10.21ff. it is aischrom that an older man should be killed fighting in the front ranks before the younger warriors, and while this situation obviously reflects badly on the young, it is its external appearance which is primarily described as "ugly". The relationship between ugliness and disgrace is apparent at line 26; the wounds of the older man (to his aidoia) are

Here the stress on physical appearances is reinforced by the scene is ugly to the eye, and, because an older man should not have to fight in the front ranks while there are young men who could take up that position, occasion for disapproval (nemeseton): nemeseton refers explicitly to disapproval, aischra etc. only secondarily, in that people disapprove of that which is ugly; perhaps aischron is so much rarer than nemeseton in Homer precisely because it is more firmly in the sphere of appearances than in that of
popular disapproval.

The extant poetry of Tyrtaios makes much of the idea that it is a duty of the ἀνὴρ ἐγκράτους to be brave in battle and to avoid flight; flight, we have seen, is aischros, and, as such, will be liable to arouse the aídos of any who consider it. On this topic, von Erffa writes,

"Bei Tyrtaios sehen wir zuerst einen Zusammenhang der aídos mit der arete. Die alte homerische aídos = das Standhalten im Kampf ist für Tyrtaios eine Forderung der arete."

I find this hard to understand; the Homeric warrior is also fighting to preserve his arete and it is the mark of a kakos to show cowardice in battle; disgrace is to be avoided, in Homer as in Tyrtaios, and disgrace can affect reputation, which is crucial to arete. It is, however, true that Tyrtaios does equate bravery in battle with arete much more explicitly than do the Homeric poems, but Tyrtaios' poetry is also much more explicitly didactic, and the same lessons are furnished in Homer by indirection.

If aídos has a negative rôle to play in the preservation of arete by means of the avoidance of disgrace, it also has a positive rôle in its recognition. In fr.12, having expressed the view that martial arete is the most important, Tyrtaios goes on to describe the rewards attendant on those who manifest this arete. The warrior who has died for his city brings fame to it, its people and his own family (23-4), and the entire city mourns and honours him, and his family after him (27-30); his fame survives (31) and, though dead, he becomes immortal (32). The warrior who is fortunate enough to fight bravely and escape death is also honoured by the entire community, and for the rest of his life (37-42):

πάντες μιν τιμῶν, δ' ὡμὸς νέοι ὑδε παλαιοὶ,
πολλὰ δὲ τετραπὸν παθὼν ἐκέται ἐς Αἰδήν,
ηθὲ κεκων δ' ἀστοχει μεταπρέτει, ὡδε τις αὐτῶν
βητητεν ὧτ' αἴδους ὧτε δίκης ἔθελε,
πάντες δ' ἐν θώκαισιν ὡμὸς νέοι ὧτε κατ' αὐτῶν
δίκους' ἐκ χώρῃς ὧτε τε παλαίστεροι.
Again we see a relationship between time and aidos; both are here used of the community’s recognition of the arete of a brave soldier, as, too, is dike; as a result of the respect in which he is held, it seems, the hero does not suffer the same fate as Hesiod, being cheated of a fair settlement in a dispute. 56 Lines 41-2 appear to describe one way in which the aidos of the people for the warrior and the time they accord him are manifested; giving up one’s seat to another is an obvious mark of respect and one which is equated with aidos at Ar. Clouds 993. 57

The fate of one who does not display sufficient arete in battle, however, is very different, as we can see from 11.14-6: 58

Here aischra refers to cowardice in battle, and the result of “learning aischra” is loss of arete. 10.1-12 enlarges on the lot of one who has lost his arete:

It appears that the woes of the beggar here have something to do with failure to act as described in 1-2; either he has shown himself a coward and been forced to leave his own community or he and his family are survivors of a community which has been utterly defeated, something which might also be taken as an indication of his failure to fight to the best of his ability. 59 It is also clear that the beggar is
to be seen as one who has fallen from previous respectability. The whole of this fragment is intended to promote bravery in battle at all costs, and it seems to be the purpose of this section to depict the disgrace of cowardice or defeat in vivid terms, to depict, in fact, the kaka that befall one who has lost his arete. Knowledge of the disgraceful consequences of defeat, it need hardly be said, is likely to arouse the aidos of those who are faced with defeat as a real possibility, and aidos would certainly be the reaction of Tyrtaios' audience to the prospect of suffering in the way he describes. It is significant, then, that the coward/failure of the poem is placed in the position of having acted in a way which aidos should prevent, and of being unable to act as his aidos might urge him. He has, for example, shamed his family (9), in breach of one of the warrior's fundamental commands; he has exchanged prosperity for poverty and is now unable to fulfil his obligations to his parents, his wife and his children; even his appearance suffers. In addition, having failed to act as aidos demands and to be an ἐνθεός, he has no claim to the kind of rights possessed by his more fortunate counterpart in 12.35-42; he receives no time and no aidos.

It need not surprise us that a beggar is described as being without the aidos of others; just as the Odyssean idea that beggars deserve aidos was idealistic and, even in that poem, often ignored in practice, so Tyrtaios stresses the ignominy of the beggar's life in order to reinforce his warning. Tyrtaios' beggar, however, does seem to belong more to the real world than to that of Homeric fantasy, and perhaps it is a feature of the world he portrays that utter defeat and total loss of arete seems a more present possibility than it does to the heroes of epic; no doubt utter defeat is also possible in Homer, and no doubt a severe loss of reputation could, in theory, lead to total loss of arete, but these are not eventualities which the heroes themselves stress, and although the Homeric characters are acutely concerned for their reputations, none of them ever looks like losing all his arete in the way described by Tyrtaios; this is not to
say that the values of Tyrtaean and Homeric society are essentially different, simply that the fragments of Tyrtaios seem to reflect a real world in a way that the Homeric poems do not.

It is not only in Sparta and Ephesos, however, that values of this kind prevail, and we find Athens' earliest known poet expressing similar ideas when he says (Solon fr. 3)

To be inferior in war involves one in aischos, for Solon as for Homer. Although much of the surviving poetry of Solon deals with more or less moral topics, there are few instances of aidos etc., and not much that is relevant to our discussion. One fragment, however, (fr. 32) is of particular interest:

The use of aideomai in this fragment is best explained by taking the phrase μάνας καὶ κατασχύσες κλέας as referring to the kind of judgement made by Solon's contemporaries with regard to his decision not to become an absolute ruler, rather than explaining it as his own view of the consequences of setting up a tyranny; I should paraphrase, then, "If I defiled and disgraced my reputation by not seizing absolute power," as opposed to "If I did not defile and disgrace my reputation by seizing absolute power." Under the first of these interpretations Solon is admitting, rhetorically, that he has diminished his kleos, but denying that this causes him aidos, while, if the second were adopted, he would be saying that he has done nothing shameful, therefore he is not ashamed; the latter, however, would be a strange sort of sentiment to express in a conditional sentence.

Von Erffa regards this passage as the first retrospective
usage of aideomai, but, although Solon's aidos (or rather the lack of it) is undeniably related to an event in the past, the position is not essentially different from that in Il. 22.104-7, where Hektor's aidos at future abuse is based on his awareness that he has done something which others will consider reprehensible. Similarly here Solon is momentarily accepting the charges of his opponents (whose taunts are quoted in fr.33, which may be part of the same poem and may, indeed, have stood before the present passage) that he has damaged his fame, and it is primarily at these criticisms that he feels no aidos; this is not, however, to disagree with von Erffa that οὐδὲν αἰδέομαι also expresses the poet's lack of regret over his past conduct, but simply to point out that aidos is still explicitly related to the judgement of others while nevertheless encompassing an internal awareness of the character of one's conduct.

The real importance of this fragment, however, lies in another direction; Solon is faced with a relatively widely-held belief that he has acted in a way that brings him no credit; people are saying unpleasant things about him, yet he feels no aidos about this, and relies instead on his own evaluation of the situation (note line 4 ἄρκτω), and this is something which Adkins claims no one does before Sokrates. The crucial point here is that Solon does not even consider the effects the taunts of others may have upon his reputation and his status; it is not in itself new that aidos can be inactive in the face of certain reproaches; numerous characters in Homer feel no aidos when reproached, the most notable example being that of the suitors; but the suitors in most cases simply ignore reproaches which they know can not seriously damage their position or even their reputation, because they are powerful and admired in other respects; they do not disagree with those who say that their conduct is dishonourable, they ignore them; in cases where the reproaches of others are likely to gain wide currency and to have a serious effect on an aspect of their object's reputation about which he is sensitive, and, by affecting his reputation, also to affect his material position, Homeric man does not
feel himself able to ignore popular opinion (the classic example is that of Diomedes in Il.8). Solon, however, does not care who believes the taunts of others, or how they might affect his reputation, and instead is content with his own conception of the truth; he believes not only that his action was not dishonourable, but that it was positively honourable, and will be proved so in the long term.

Archilochos is another archaic poet who is not subject to the power of Hesiod's δειλή φήμη (p.115 above); fr.14 reads thus:

Archilochos is another archaic poet who is not subject to the power of Hesiod's δειλή φήμη (p.115 above); fr.14 reads thus:

\[
\text{Αρχιλόχος, διήνυσον ἐπί τὴν μελέτην ὑπὲρ σος οὐδεὶς ἂν μάλλ' ἐμποδεύεται Πέθαν.}
\]

We remember, too, that Archilochos admits throwing away his shield in order to save his life (fr.5), contrasting only the value of his shield, which, though a good one, is not irreplaceable, with that of his life, and saying absolutely nothing about the fact that such an action is universally considered disgraceful. His contempt for popular opinion, however, differs from that of Solon, for he simply ignores the disapproval of others, whereas Solon ventures to dispute its relevance; Archilochos, then, is simply anaides; he does not say that it is not disgraceful to throw away one's shield, he just ignores those who say that it is. It is, however, significant that one who lives by the spear (fr.2) can afford to admit that he has acted in a way commonly viewed as cowardly; obviously he feels that the disapproval of others, even of a failure in terms of competitive values, will not significantly affect his material position or his ability to get on with his job, and this attitude provides an important contrast with that of the Homeric warrior, who puts his reputation for valour above all; perhaps this is another respect in which the values of the Homeric poems are idealized.

Archilochos' iconoclasm and disregard for convention are also in evidence in fr.133, where he ventures to dispute the conventional opinion, as found in Tyrtaios 12.23-34, that those who die bravely in battle are honoured after death.
In fr.124b.4 he ventures to accuse a friend who has burst into a symposium uninvited (thus showing no regard for the disapproval of those already and legitimately present) of anaideia, but it is his own anaideia which is remembered by posterity (Kritias B44DK), and the chief example of this for Kritias is the loss of his shield; contemptuous of both time as the reward for success and popular disapproval as the punishment for failure, Archilochos is an important exception to the mainstream.

In the collection of poems which has come down to us under the name of Theognis we have an opportunity to witness aidos and the other relevant terms in action in a wide range of contexts, and aidos itself enjoys an importance in the corpus which is comparable with that accorded it in the Homeric poems. One of the most important areas in which the term occurs in the corpus is that of friendship; we saw in Homer that aidos was a proper reaction towards one's philoi, and, although aidos does not occur in that connexion in Hesiod, the concept of philotes and the proper modes of conduct towards one's philoi remain the same in all essential aspects in that author; in Hesiod as in Homer philotes is a reciprocal relationship (WD.353-6), but it is not necessarily a calculating or materialistic one; there may be an intrinsic pleasure in giving (357-8), and forgiveness and constancy are also stressed (707-16). Nevertheless, reciprocation of friendship is regarded as fundamental, although reciprocity is obviously not everything there is to the relationship, and it is frequently with the obligation to return a favour that aidos is concerned, particularly in Theognis.

The complaint that friendship has not been returned is a frequent one in Theognis, and this is seen as a breach of aidos; typical is 253-4, where the poet complains that, despite his having presented Kyrnos with the gift of immortality through song, he receives little aidos in return:
Two passages illustrating the consequences of failing to return a favour show clearly that to do so is to ignore aidos; at 1272 a greedy boy is said to have become an aischune to the friends of both parties to the relationship, while at 1297-8 a boy for whom (presumably unrequited) philotes threatens to lead the author to Hades is urged to behave properly towards one's philoi, then, can implicate one in aischune and lead to the disapproval of both gods and men. The aidos which is owed to one's philoi is explicitly associated with arete at 399, where is said to be a basic duty of the agathos; we find no such explicit statement in Homer, but the impression created by the stress on aidos in the context of philotes in epic is that the same also holds good in the Iliad and Odyssey. The idea of reciprocity and gratitude is also combined with aidos at 1329-34, a passage which seems to sum up all that we have said on the subject so far:

To return a favour, then, is kalon and it is not aischron to recall a favour one is owed; to give charis, moreover, is equated with showing aidos. This obligation is common to all kinds of philia, not only to erotic relationships between boys and older men (we have seen the truth of this from Homer, especially at Il.18.394, where Thetis is described as aidoë, deserving aidos, on account of a favour she once did Hephaistos, and from passages like h.Cer.6480), and von
Erffa is therefore wrong to say (p.71) that the *aidos* demanded at 253,1266 and 1331 is derived from the respect one owes one's elders; the stress in these passages is wholly on the failure of the addressee to return a favour.

We also saw in Homer how *aidos* was frequently combined with terms denoting intelligence, that one of these was the adjective *saophron*, and that, in general, *aidos* was opposed to similar ideas of excess and self-assertion as is classical *sophrosyne*. In Theognis *aidos* and *sophrosyne* meet to an extent not hitherto encountered. An explicit connexion is to be found at 479-83:

\[\deltaς \delta' α\'ν ὑπεβέβλητος πῶλος μετέρων, οὐκέτι κέννος τῆς αὐτοῦ γλώσσης κατέργοι οὐδὲ νόσου, μυθεῖται δ' ἀπεξέλανα, τὰ νῦν ἐνέρχεται κίνησι, αἰδεῖται δ' ἐράων οὐδὲν ὅταν μεθύη, τὸ πρὶν εἰναι συγκεκριμένον, τὸτε νῦττος.\]

The notion of excess is important in this passage (479), and to go beyond the *metron* is to discard *aidos* and *sophrosyne*; one also loses control of oneself (480), and thus *sophrosyne* begins to take on positive connotations of "self-control", but, as the antithesis with *νυττος* shows, the dominant sense of the adjective is still "sensible" or "prudent", and, as in Homer, good sense or prudence is the ally of *aidos*. Again we see the relationship between *aidos* and that which is *aischron*; the drunkard's conduct appears ugly to others, and arouses their disapproval, but the prospect of their disapproval does not worry its object, because, in his drunken state, he "λιθητικὶ δ' ἐράων αὐθένταν." A similar idea is to be found at 627-8, where we are told that it is *aischron* that a drunken man should be in the company of sober people and that a sober man should remain in the company of inebriates; clearly the experience in both cases would be unpleasant for the odd one out, and it is the unpleasantness of the situation itself which is denoted by the word *aischron*; such a scene simply does not look right.

The alliance between *sophrosyne* and *aidos* is most apparent in passages in which moral decline and social conflict are
the main topics. At 41, 379 and 1082a sophrosyne emerges as the antithesis of hybris, and hybris, along with bie (835), atasthalie (749) and hyperbasie refers to the notion of excess which is opposed by both aidos and sophrosyne, both of which, it is claimed, are absent from a world in which these vices flourish. At 83-6 we learn that there is not one shipload of men alive who have aidos on their tongues and eyes, while at 289-92 the topsy-turvy state of contemporary society is blamed on a lack of aidos and a preponderance of anaideie and hybris:

Similarly at 635-6 we learn that of the "good men" who are attended by gnome (= sophrosyne) and aidos there are now few examples, while at 647-8 the sentiment of 291-2 is reiterated: The departure of aidos, then, means a lack of agathoi, no dike and a surfeit of hybris and anaideie, almost exactly the situation envisaged by Hesiod as the culmination of the iron age (above, p. 120); but when the poet of 1135-50 chooses to depict moral decline in thoroughly Hesiodic terms, it is sophrosyne, not aidos, that he decides to personify (1135-8):

It is also significant that, in the sequel to this statement, the state of affairs which has just been attributed to the departure of sophrosyne is seen as a result of man's failure to respect the gods, and a number of those terms which refer specifically to the human response to the divine make their appearance (hazomai, we noted, refers almost exclusively to the divine sphere, but sebo/sebizo etc. could work in the area of human relationships in Homer; here, however, eusebes seems primarily religious. From this passage it seems
that *sophrosyne*, a term not primarily associated with fear of the gods, can nevertheless refer to similar conduct to that implied by those terms which do; the same was true of *aidos* in the *Odyssey*.

At 399 (p. 136 above) we saw that it was a duty of the *agathos* to *καθεδυτή* *νικαυς*, while 289-92 (p. 138) the decline of the *agathoi* and the ascendency of the *kakoi* coincide with the destruction of *aidos* and the hegemony of *hybris* and *anaideia*; similarly at 635-6 (ibid.) *aidos* is said to be a property of the *agathoi*. We find similar thoughts at 409-10, a passage which refers to the importance of instilling *aidos* in the young and which once more associates it with *arete*:

> οὔδένα ὁσιάσκον παίσειν κατακήρυκ αμέλειν
> αἴσθος, ή τ' ἀγαθοῖς ἀνδρικὸς κύριν ἕπεται.  

The crucial question here, however, centres on the reasons for the designation of those who possess *aidos* in these passages as *agathoi*; are they morally good, or are they simply *agathoi* by virtue of their birth and rank? In some places it seems that social change, in which one class gains the ascendancy over another, can in itself render the *agathos* *kakos* and vice versa (55-8, 1109-13), and there *agathos* etc. must be socially descriptive rather than morally evaluative. In other places, however, it seems that it is moral qualities that render one *agathos* or *kakos* (most notably 145-8). Some passages simply do not allow us to decide, while some seem to combine the descriptive with the evaluative; a case in point is 53ff.; in 57-8 *agathos*, *ἐσθλός* and *δείλος* refer to social class, but in 59-68 the former *deiloí*, now *agathoi* are chiefly characterized by their moral failings, cheating, faithlessness and unreliability as friends, all of which could be seen as breaches of *aidos*. Another problem regarding *arete* in Theognis is that it sometimes appears that *agathos* is a title conferred by success (165-6, 797-8), while elsewhere success or wealth are irrelevant (315-8). Where *arete* is not tied to success it may be moral, but in view of the confusion of social and moral *arete* in 53-68 it is hardly safe to assume this; it seems, in fact, most likely that either the poets who composed the relevant portions of the *corpus*...
genuinely believed that the nobility were, as a class, also morally good and their inferiors morally bad, or they sought deliberately to imply that this is the case. Certainly the identification of *aides* as an aristocratic virtue is one we have met before, and the idea that a given social class should have a monopoly on moral goodness is not one that is unfamiliar to us.

The Theognid corpus does not offer many instances of *nemesis*; at 279-80 the *kakos* is said to be unable properly to discern τη δίκη, and not to fear (hazesthai) the *nemesis* to come; we are not told whether this *nemesis* is of man or god, but the use of ἀγορέων might suggest the latter, without ruling out the former as a possibility. *Nemesis* is divine at 660, but only in the sense of the gods’ anger at an abuse of their own prerogative (the gods, ἄγαν ἐπέτει τέλος feel resentment if one swears μητηπότε προχμα το φάσθει). At 1179-82 the appearance of *aides* and *nemesis* in close proximity might suggest that the lines form a complete excerpt (hence Young (Teubner) prints them as such); in the first couplet Kyrnos is urged θεούς αἰδοῦ καὶ δεόντας and informed that such *aides* prevents *asebeia* in word or deed; we have met *aides* for the gods before, but only in the contexts of supplication or guest-friendship, although we saw in connexion with the *Odyssey* how the interest taken by the gods in those aspects of human affairs could become more general. As a result, it seems, of that process, it is now possible to use *aides* in a more general way, and to regard the conduct which *aides* prevents not simply as that which is discreditable for oneself but as that which exhibits disregard for the gods as upholders of morality (*asebes*). The adjective *asebes* seems in this passage to have a special reference to the divine sphere, but in Homer *sebas* itself has no such exclusive reference, although in later literature the religious usage is the dominant one; here the two groups of terms meet because *aides* itself has now moved into the religious sphere, and it seems that *aideomai* refers to the same idea of awe at the superior power of the gods as would *sebo* etc. in a similar context. Again we see the combination of *aides* and fear in
1179, and again the combination itself tells us that the two ideas are not synonymous, while nonetheless placing this usage of *aidos* in the category of "respect for those of greater power".

The first couplet, then, expresses the idea that *aidos* for, and fear of, the gods prevents *asebeia*; the second (1181-2) maintains that the *nemesis* of the gods is not aroused by the overthrow of a δημοκράτικος πολιτικός, no matter how this is achieved; the clear implication is that violence is justified against a political enemy who can also be seen as an enemy of the people as a whole. The *nemesis* of the gods might therefore seem to link up with the idea of *aidos* in 1179, and, if taken together, the lines would have to mean: "*Aidos* for the gods prevents *asebeia* (and avoids divine *nemesis*), but it is not *asebes* to dispose of one who is consuming the wealth of the city." The injunction to *aidos* will then be the rule to which the following is the exception, and the main point of the stanza will be the legitimacy of any method which will get rid of the tyrant, but the connexion does seem abrupt, and 1179-80 do have the air of a genuine moralist’s precept, and so it might be better to see the lines as two separate distichs, as does West. No matter how the lines are divided, however, the main point of both couplets for our purposes is the attraction of both *aidos* and *nemesis* into the divine sphere; *aidos* will only operate in that area on relatively few occasions, while *nemesis* very quickly becomes an exclusively religious concept.

In a body of poetry in which *aidos* is constantly seen as necessary and desirable one passage stands out in sharp contrast; lines 1063-8 exalt the pleasures of love and the symposium, with the conclusion (1067-8):

> τέ μοι πλούτης τε καὶ κόσμος;

> Τέσσαρλήν νύκτα πάντοπε σον εὐφροσύνη.

Wealth is probably seen as unnecessary here because one’s enjoyment of revelry and love-making stands in no relation to one’s riches; these are simple pleasures to which wealth is irrelevant. *Aidos*, on the other hand, must be that which
would conflict with enjoyment of these pleasures, the *aidos*, perhaps, of one who did not wish to behave in a way which might arouse the disapproval of others, or who thought such revelry "unseemly" or "inappropriate". Once again we see *aidos* as an inhibition feeling which is felt to be more a hindrance than a help in certain circumstances.

We have already discussed some of the more important usages of the adjective *aischros* in Theognis, mostly in passages in which *aidos* etc. also occur; even where the two do not occur together, however, there will still be a connexion, because any act or experience which could be described as *aischros* will also be of such a kind as to occasion *aidos* in a prospective agent or patient. In the Theognid corpus, as in the *Iliad*, it is *aischros* to return from a battle with nothing to show for it, or, worse still, without even having taken part (889-90):

*ἐλλʼ αἰσχρὸν παρεόντα καὶ μὴ κτιτόδων ἐπιβρὰντα ἡμῶν μὴ πόλεμον δακρύσαντ' ἐνίδειν.*

Most of the instances of *aischros* etc. in the corpus, however, have nothing to do with the martial context; at 1177-8 the avoidance of *ἐξέκαστα* either as agent or patient, is related, in a general way, to *arete*, and this bears comparison with those passages in which *aidos*, the force which leads one to avoid *aischra*, is also seen as part of *arete*. Elsewhere *aischros* etc. are often used in two particular contexts, that of poverty and that of dishonesty. At 373ff. the poet takes Zeus to task for allowing the just and the unjust to live in τοιχωμένη μοίρῃ; many who are just, he goes on (383-7), are forced to live in poverty, and some are led into wrongdoing under its compulsion; the poor man, we are told, endures against his will καί ἰχθὲς τολμᾷ (388), and learns many *kaka*, lies and deceit and strife (389-90). Aischea here seems to refer first of all to the indignities which one for whom *kakon* is unseemly (391) is forced to suffer, and secondly to the discreditable action which many who are constrained by poverty are forced to take; although the crimes of deceit and dishonesty are described as *kaka* rather than *aischra*, the
context seems to imply that the kaka which the poor man is forced to commit form part of the aischea which he is forced to endure; to be in a position in which one is tempted to act dishonestly is in itself aischron. The poet, however, does not believe that poverty necessarily leads to dishonesty, since he goes on to claim that it is in poverty that the moral character of the individual is revealed (393-4); even in time of need the good man will not turn to injustice.99

Another passage on the same theme reveals similar ideas at work (649-52):

The deprivations of poverty disfigure a man’s appearance and his intelligence; the inclusion of noos, which normally refers to the moral intelligence required to act prudently and in accordance with convention, suggests that aischra and esthla refer to improper and proper conduct respectively, although it is also possible that ethlak ... kai kal' epistameinon signifies knowledge of a more prosperous and dignified way of life; perhaps, as in the previous example, both ideas are present. For the idea that it is aischron in itself to be poor we might compare Tyrtaios 10.1-12 (pp.130-1 above), where the beggar suffers total atimie and kakotes and receives no aidos from others. It appears from Hes. WD.717-8 that poverty could in itself be considered grounds for reproach, although Hesiod himself holds that one should refrain from such reproach;101 his injunction, however, seems to have gone unheeded by many.

There appeared to be a suggestion in both these passages that the discreditable condition of poverty could lead one to discreditable conduct; in other passages aischron etc. are frequently used of the offences of theft, deceit and dishonesty, and the distaste for the pursuit of wealth by improper means is redolent of the attitude of Hesiod in the Works and Days. Lines 27-30 are a good example of this, in which Theognis
implicitly equates the avoidance of injustice and \( \alpha' \text{ischron} \) with \textit{arete} (27-8) and explicitly relates it to good
sense (29):

\[
\text{soi \ 'e\'w \ ed \ phron\'ewn \ upoth\'ogram\'e, \ oitt\'ete \ au\'tos \ K\'\nu\nu, \ at\'o \ t\'wn \ akath\'wn \ pai\'s \ e\'wv \ el\'ibon.}
\]

\[
\text{Pepnu\'o, \ \eta\' \ a\'ischro\'ewn \ et\' \ \'er\'umai \ \eta\' \ adikai\'wn}
\]

\[
\text{ti\'a \ \eta\' \ \'a\'re\'tas \ \'el\'keo \ \eta\' \ \'a\'fenos.}
\]

465-6 and 1147-50 are similar:

\[
\text{\'e\'m\'i \ \'a\'re\'t\'i \ te\'ibou, \ kai \ t\'o \ \'a \ \dikaia \ \'il\'e\'stw,}
\]

\[
\text{\'eta \ de \ \'e \ \niki\'a\'t\'w \ \'e\'d\'os \ \'e \ \'a\'ischro\'in \ \'e\'g.}
\]

From the first of these it appears that it is a requirement of \textit{arete} to pursue justice and avoid \textit{aischron kerdos} \textsuperscript{102}, while in the second the conduct which is \textit{aischron} consists of a proclivity towards theft or at least the acquisition of another's goods by deception; in both cases that which is \textit{dikaion} or not \textit{adikon} is related to that which is \textit{aischron}. Pursuit of the wrong sort of \textit{kerdos} is, as we saw, \textsuperscript{103} a major vice in Hesiod, and at WD.323-4 it is equated with \textit{anaideie} and opposed to \textit{aidos}; similarly at Theognis, 83-6, the possession of \textit{aidos} \textsuperscript{104} as that which would prevent one being led by \textit{kerdos} into conduct which is \textit{aischron}; at 1148, however, it is failure to heed the anger of the gods which leads one to commit \textit{aischra} and \textit{adika}, and thus we see once again how, from the \textit{Odyssey} onwards, the observance of human propriety may be equated with fear of divine punishment. The idea of \textit{aischron kerdos} also occurs in 607-10, where profit made from lying is said to be \textit{aischron}, \textit{kakon} and not \textit{kalon}; there is little indication in the \textit{Odyssey} that lying is discreditable in itself (as it appears to be in 607), and Odysseus in particular often tells lies to further his own aims, but a certain distaste for deceit does emerge from Il.9.312-3, where Achilles says that he hates a man who thinks one thing and says another. The notion that it is \textit{aischron} to tell lies, however, does become common in fifth century literature.
At 197-208 it is Zeus' way of punishing those who acquire wealth unjustly (those whose conduct is described in 199-202) which is described; the gods do not punish wrongdoers immediately: some are punished, while some, it seems, die before their punishment; the punishment envisaged, then, must be something like ruin or loss of prosperity while one is still alive. The important point to note for our purposes, however, is the designation of death as *anaides* in 207; clearly the adjective in this case refers to ruthlessness rather than to insensitivity to popular opinion; death is *anaides* because there is no possibility of its being averted by entreaty or being persuaded to feel *aidos*; in this application the adjective, as we have seen, is also used of inanimate objects\(^1\) and wild beasts.\(^2\)

Many of the lyric, elegiac and iambic poets refer to *aidos* only in passing, and uninformative instances of *aidoios* etc. are common. Of those passages not so far discussed in which the relevant terms occur the following are the most interesting. A sepulchral epigram, attributed by some to Simonides (fr. 136D) but probably later, reveals the persistence of *aidos* as that which prevents cowardice in battle:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{αίðως καὶ κλέσθητιν ἔτη προποτεὶς θεικιών} \\
\text{ἀνέλευ} \text{οὐ στολοντ'} \text{η' ἔχα} \text{εν εἰς γάντον} \\
\text{θερμέων κύριοντα κλέαν ὑλον; πάτος δὲ κλετόνον} \\
\text{ἀνέφιλον αἰχμητός υἱὸς ἑθηκ' ὀνομα.}
\end{align*}
\]

Sappho 137LP shows how *aidos* inhibits utterances which are not *kalon*:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{θέλω τί τ' εἴπην, ἀλλὰ μὲ κωλύει} \\
\text{αἴδως .................} \\
\text{αἱ δ' ἱχεσ ἐγκλων ἐμερον ὡ κάλων} \\
\text{καὶ μὴ τί ' εἴπην γλώσσῃ ἐκείνα κάκοιν,} \\
\text{αἴδως τ' κέν γε οὐκ ἤχεν διὰ παρα-} \\
\text{τ' ἀλλ' εἴχεσ τ' ἑκείνῃ δικαιών.}
\end{align*}
\]

The surviving poems of Bacchylides offer remarkably little of relevance; the only passage worthy of comment is 5.104-7 (Snell-Maehler), where the Kalydonian boar is described as *ἀνδρεμωκρός* presumably because, like death at Thgn. 207 (above), it cannot be persuaded to show quarter.
The concept of *aidos* is not crucial to the ethical views to be found in the extant poetry of Pindar, but the term does occur and over a wide range of usage. There are three immediately identifiable areas in which the concept is often found: firstly, since the epinikian odes are written for specific athletic champions, the *aidos* of others towards the victor is important; secondly, the *aidos* proper among *philoi* also occurs; and, thirdly, we also find the term in the familiar context of sex and sexuality.

In two passages the adjective *aidoios* is used in connexion with the attitude of others to the victor; at Q. 7.89-90 Zeus is requested to grant Diagoras

\[
\text{καὶ ποτ' ἀστιὼν καὶ ποτὶ σεκε}-
\]

*Charis* is the quality possessed by one towards whom others feel *aidos*, and the adjective is thus used in its normal, passive significance. A similar idea occurs at 1.2.37, where Xeinokrates is described as *aidoios ... ἀστιώς ὀμπεῖν*: primarily, these words may be taken as referring to others' recognition of the victor's success, but an active notion seems to coexist with the passive in the adjective, for the poet immediately goes on to praise Xeinokrates for his hospitality.

Two passages from P. 4 illustrate the operation of *aidos* among philoi; at 145-6 the text, as printed by Snell-Maehler, reads:

\[
\text{Μοῖραι δ' ἀφίσκειν, κι' τις ἐχθέκ \ ζέλει}
\]

\[
\text{δρομοῦνοις αἰδώ \ καλύψει.}
\]

In the Loeb edition, however, a comma is printed after *δρομοῦνοις*, and commentators are divided as to whether *αἰδώ* *καλύψει* is final after *Μοῖραι δ' ἀφίσκειν* or consecutive after *ἐχθέκ* *ζέλει*. Greene points out that the Moirai are associated with the family through Eleithulia and their attendance at childbirth (Q. 6.42, Ν. 7.1), and this might explain their *aidos*, but on either interpretation the Moirai withdraw, and so their association with the family does not prove that it is they
who experience the *aidos* of 146. Yet because the Fates are associated with the family, von Erffa's reason for rejecting the interpretation favoured by Greene, namely that there is nothing to connect the goddesses with family strife, is rendered invalid, and the translation, "The Fates withdraw ... to hide their *aidos*" thus makes good sense. So too, however, does the rival interpretation, "The Fates withdraw, ... if strife among kin conceals *aidos*," and, in the end, it is only the word-order which makes the latter the more likely. For our purposes, however, it is the link between *aidos* and *philia* which is important, and this is present under either interpretation.

At line 218 of the same poem a much more straightforward form of *aidos* is mentioned, the *aidos* of Medea for her parents which the charms taught Jason by Aphrodite were intended to overcome. On the debt of *aidos* which one owes one's parents we might compare Il.22.82,Od.20.343-4 and Hes. WD.331-2.

In P. 9 *aidos* makes an appearance in the context of sexual relationships; at line 12 we learn how Aphrodite cast *aidos* on the γυναικεία *evnai* of Apollo and the mortal girl, Kyrana (Cyrene). The union of the pair is idealized, and the presence of *aidos*, a form of restraint and respect for decorum in sexual contexts, illustrates this. Such delicacy is, however, general, according to the centaur, Cheiron, who informs Apollo (40-1):

```
καὶ ἔν τῇ θεοῖς τῷ τῷ κανθρώποις ὄμως
αἰδέων ἀλκανθών ἀκέδως
τοιχείαν τὸ πρῶτον ἐναὶ.
```

This may refer to a general distaste for open lovemaking (cf. Il.14.330-40, p.73 above), but if the inclusion of τῷ *πρῶτον* is to have any significance, there must be a reference to shyness at taking the crucial first step towards a sexual relationship.

Other instances of *aidos* in Pindar seem to be linked by an association with foresight and good sense; a difficult
passage of Ω.7 relates *aidos* and foresight explicitly (43-7):

ε'βρικεν καὶ χάρματ' ἀνθρωποις Περιμεθέος αἰδῶς.

επὶ μὰν βεβήλετ τι καὶ λάθος ἀτέκμασταν νέφος,

καὶ παρέλκει περιμεθεῖν ὦρθον ὦδόν

Ε'ξω δ' ἀγεῖν.

The meaning of these lines, if we take *aidos* as the subject and not χάρματα, as Wilamowitz suggests, is reasonably clear; *aidos*, something to do with forethought (or forethinking), brings men *arete* and χάρμα, but forgetfulness can lead them astray (thus on the particular occasion they forgot to light fires to Athene). Περιμεθέος αἰδῶς, however, is difficult; Jebb would print Περιμεθέος but such a genealogy is unparalleled and, moreover, difficult without the article or something like θυγατής: von Erffa suggests that Περιμεθέος is the genitive of the masculine adjective and translates, "the *aidos* of a forethinking man ...", but this is surely far too specific for the context; equally, it seems impossible to take Περιμεθέος as the genitive of the neuter, for here, too, the article seems necessary in order to give the sense "foresight" or "forethought", and, in any case, "*aidos* towards foresight" seems to make little sense. It seems, then, that the best option of those considered is the interpretation of Jebb, since it is the only one which gets us close enough to the required sense, "*aidos*, which is related to foresight", in spite of the absence of the article or θυγατής (an absence which Gildersleeve's alleged parallel, Π.5.27 τὶν ἔπεμψεος...

οὐνόμα θυγατέκ τοῖς, only makes more obvious.

The importance of this passage, however, lies in the association of *aidos* with piety (*aidos* is seen as that which prevents neglect of one's obligations to the gods, just as it does in the case of one's obligations to one's fellows) and with foresight, and these associations are present no matter how the text is interpreted. The link between *aidos* and foresight presumably relates to the prospective force of the term; if *aidos* is to inhibit action in the future, foresight will be required in order to envisage the possible consequences of different courses of action; if one such
course seems likely to bring discredit on the agent, or to be unacceptable to the set of values to which he subscribes, then *aidos* will intervene. At *N.* 11.45-6 lack of *aidos* is also associated with lack of *προσθέσις*, and it seems that the intelligence which enables one to foresee the consequences of one's actions is indispensable to *aidos* in its prospective, inhibitory sense.118

Aidos is again linked with good sense at *N.* 5.14-18, but here the tone of the passage differs considerably from that of those just discussed:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{κύδωνος} & \text{ μέγις εἶπειν} \\
\text{ἐν δίκαι τῷ μῷ κεκυκλωμένῳ,} \\
\text{πῶς ὁ} & \text{ λίκτων εὐκλέων νῦν}, \\
\text{καὶ τῆς} & \text{ ἄνδρες ἐλκύμωσαν} \\
\text{δαίμων} & \text{ ἀπ’ οἰνώνες ἔλατεν,} \\
\text{στάρμαχι} & \text{ οὐ τῷ ἐπίπτει κεφαλῶν} \\
\text{φαῖνονος} & \text{ πρὸς ὁμοίων ἀλάθει ἀτέρκεας.} \\
\text{kαὶ τῷ} & \text{ συγκή πολλάκις ἐστι σοφῷ-} \\
\text{τατον} & \text{ ἄνθρωπῳ νοήσει.}
\end{align*}
\]

The deed which Pindar wishes to conceal is the murder of Phokos, the son of Aiakos, by his two half-brothers, Telamon and Peleus, and thus the poet represents himself as feeling *aidos* at the prospect of relating the discreditable actions of others, and his *aidos* might perhaps be seen as distaste for the unpleasantness of the story; yet he explains his *aidos* by καὶ τῷ συγκή πολλάκις ἐστι σοφῷ; is, then, the poet's scruple based on a fear of unpleasant consequences should he tell the story? This can hardly be the case, since the allusion to the event is quite clear, and, in fact, the poet reveals that which he claims to conceal.119 In reality, the passage is nothing more than elegant and witty praise of the victor; Pindar pretends to expel any disreputable elements from his victory-ode, and τῷ συγκή, which conceals ignoble deeds, is contrasted with the poet's craft, which makes noble deeds immortal; but he need not have mentioned the episode at all, and so he must have some reason for making the allusion, and it is most probable that his reason was a literary one, involving the clever and courteous "suppression"
of unsavoury detail and a sly literary joke, to the effect that the poet must show prudence in his selection of material, lest his patrons refuse to pay him. The *aidos* of this passage, then, is manifestly not genuine.

We have already had occasion to mention the contrast between *anaideia* and foresight in n.11.45-6; the whole passage, from 43-8, reads as follows:

\[
\text{τὸ δ' ἐκ Διὸς ἀνθρώποις σκῆς οὐχ ἔπεται}
\text{τέκμαρ ἄλλ' ἐμπέχε μεγαλοσκοίς ἐμβαίνομεν,}
\text{ἐργ' ἐς πολλὰ μενολούντες. ἔστεκε γὰρ ἀναίδει}
\text{ἐκτίθε γνίκ, πολυθεόρες δ' ἀπόκενταξ ἐσκλ.}
\text{κερδεν ἐξ Χεῖ μετέω μεταύμεν.}
\text{ἐπροσικτικὴ δ' ἐρωτήν ὀφλέται μανικι.}
\]

This is one of the many passages in Pindar in which moderation, particularly in the enjoyment of prosperity, is stressed, and one of the few in which *aids* has a role to play, as it did in Hesiod and Theognis, in the restraint which is urged with regard to the acquisition of wealth. The striving for wealth, it appears, can be harmful when it becomes excessive, and when, having no regard for the *metron* or the possible consequences, it leads one to *anaideia*; the danger of *kerdos* is familiar from Hesiod and Theognis, as is the association of the unrestrained pursuit of *kerdos* with *anaideia*. While the desirability of moderation and the dangers of excess were apparent in Homer. Pindar differs from Homer, however, in stressing the idea of divine resentment of human prosperity, an idea of which only the germ is present in epic. The tendency of humans to get above themselves, thereby presuming upon the prerogative of the gods (see p.3.59-62, Ι.5.14-5) is most often encapsulated in *hybris*, which with the *megaloskei* and *anaideia* έλπίς of n.11.44-6 approximate.

Apart from its appearance in the passage just considered, *aids* only enters into the poet's insistence on moderation and the dangers of *kerdos* in two other places; in conclusion to ο.13 (line 115) we find the following prayer:

\[
\text{Zeū τέλει', αἰδὼν σεβολ καὶ τύχαν τεσσαρών ἀλυκέων.}
\]

Aidos could refer here to the *aids* the victor is to receive
from his contemporaries, but it is more likely, given that
the rest of the line refers to his attitude to his prosperity,
that it is the victor's own *aidos* with regard to others and
particularly with regard to the disposal and pursuit of wealth
that is meant; it accords well with beliefs such as those we
have already looked at to imagine that enjoyment of prosperity
is to be seen as possible only if *aidos* is present.¹²²

A similar notion is also to be found in Ἁ,9.33-4, again in
the context of a prayer to Zeus; the god is reminded that
the people of Aitna are uncorrupted by possessions (32-3),
but the poet concedes (33) that this may be hard to believe,
explaining,

```
καίδοσς γὰρ ὑπὸ κρύπτες κεφελεὶ κλεπτεταὶ,
καὶ δέετε δοξαν.
```

Again, *aidos* brings about resistance to *kerdos*, and, as
concern for one's reputation, it keeps one's *doxa* intact and
allows it to grow. From the renown of the Aetnaeans, however,
the poet moves on to that of his patron, Chromios, and lines
34-7 describe how *aidos*, personified as a goddess in 36,
enabled him to stand his ground in battle; *aidos*, then, is
still the force which promotes courage in the martial context,
as, indeed, might also be concluded from an earlier passage
of the same ode (24-7), where it is said that Amphiaraoos,
having taken to flight in the battle for Thebes, was saved
from the disgrace (*κισχυμάτων, 27*) of being wounded in the
back¹²³ by the intervention of Zeus.¹²³a The relationship
between *aidos* and courage is also apparent at Ῥ,4.174, where
the sons of Poseidon join the crew of the *Argo κισεβαίτος
ἀλκυνία*; it would hardly be in keeping with the tone of the
passage for this to mean, "ashamed lest their cowardice should
be exposed", and so it seems that the warriors' *ἁλκυνία* is
treated as a semi-personification, and they accord it *aidos*
as they would a person of greater status and power.¹²⁴

Two instances of the adjective *anaides* seem worthy of brief
comment: at fr.140a.59 ἐφ' ἀναίδεια refers to deeds which
manifest the *anaideia* of their agent, in this case with regard
to an abuse of hospitality, while at Ḍ,10.105 death is
described as *anaides*, as at Thgn. 207 (p.145 above). Nemesis occurs only twice in Pindar, and in both places it is far removed from its epic sense of popular disapproval; at *O.8.86*,

\[\text{εὐχαριστοῖ τῷ καλῶν μαίρειν νέμεσιν διχόβουλον μὴ θέλειν,}\]

it is clearly seen as a divine reaction to human over-prosperity, while at *P.10.42-4* the Hyperboreans are said to be free from toil and battle and thus to escape ὑπερεύθικος Νέμεσις, where nemesis seems to be divine punishment for human injustice.\(^{125}\) The verb *nemesao* occurs in the sense "be angry" at *I.1.3*.

**NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO.**

1. It is not automatically assumed that Homer is earlier than Hesiod, although much or even most of the traditional material incorporated in our *Iliad* and *Odyssey* will predate the composition of the Hesiodic poems; nevertheless, there remains the possibility that the latter were in existence before the former were given the form in which we have them; with this in mind West (*Theogony*, 46-7) argues for the priority of Hesiod, Havelock (*Justice*, 214-5) for that of Homer; probably the *Odyssey*, Hesiod, the earliest elegists and Archilochos are all roughly contemporary, belonging to the century or so following the reintroduction of literacy; cf. Seel, "Zur Vorgeschichte ...", p.310, Thornton, *Homer's Iliad*, p.23.

2. Cf. *WD.257* (Dike), 300-1 (Demeter).


4. See above, p.97n.35.

5. Odysseus is thus contrasting the *aidos* shown by his exemplar towards others with Euryalos’ lack of *aidos* towards a guest (*Od.8.159-64*); cf. von Erffa, p.47.

6. Such is the view of the first group of scholars cited by West, ad loc., and opposed by von Erffa, p.47, and Havelock, p.215. West himself argues against direct dependence, pointing out that both passages may be derived from a traditional stock of ideas, but also that the application of the language is more traditional in the Hesiodic passage.

7. See in particular A.B. Cook, *CR* 1901, 341, T.A. Sinclair,
153


9. op. cit., p.17.

10. loc. cit..

11. It might be claimed that the two eides at WD.11ff., expressing the idea of the ambivalence of eides, lend support to "bad aidos" in 317 (cf. Verdenius, comm. on 317 ἄγκθη, 318 σκότως); but the idea of two kinds of aidos does not emerge from 317 even with the reading κομισέω and anattributive sense of οὐκ ἄγκθη; certainly 318 does not say that there are two kinds of aidos, but that aidos is now harmful, now helpful; if pressed to keep κομισέω in 317, rather than, "bad aidos looks after a needy man," I should translate, "the aidos which looks after a needy man is not good," i.e. in the particular circumstance (certainly not, "the aidos that is bad for a poor man (also) fosters him," Claus, TAPA 1977, p.83 - an obvious attempt to mitigate the oxymoron, οὐκ ἄγκθη/κομισέω): the meaning of the passage would still be that aidos is inefficacious in some circumstances, but this is a meaning which is much clearer with the reading κομισέων.


14. 102,106.


17. loc. cit..

18. This interpretation might be supported by E. fr.285N.2 14, where aidos leads a poor nobleman to reject physical work. In general, however, manual labour was not felt to be degrading in itself; see G. Nussbaum, CO 1960, 213-20, esp. 217, where the Hesiodic attitude is contrasted with the later, classical outlook which may lie behind the Euripidean passage. Perses, however, clearly does reject work, and prefers to live the life of his social superiors; his attitude may not have been typical, but this does not mean that such a view
could not have been held.


20a. On αἰδος and ἀναίδεια in the context of taking by force, see also WD. 359, fr. 204.82 (p. 123 below).

21. So Verdenius on 330 ἡθος.

22. CP 1973, 81-94.

23. So Fränkel, Early Greek Poetry and Philosophy, p. 121.

24. On the "Odyssean" and "Iliadic" sense of δίκη see Gagarin, 82-6; cf. Havelock, Justice, cc. 7-10.

25. Gagarin concentrates too closely on interpretation of the substantive, δίκη, itself at the expense of the adjectives δικαιός and ἀδίκος which have a wider reference and which thus give δίκη a wider reference (see Claus, 1977, p. 77). Gagarin does discuss Claus' example (270-3, δικαιός) and mine (327-34, ἀδίκος) on p. 93 of his article, but claims that these usages, which he admits relate to proper behaviour, have nothing to do with δίκη; but how can conduct which can be described as δικαιός or ἀδίκος have nothing to do with δίκη? Gagarin contends that these passages demonstrate the separation of proper behaviour and lawful behaviour; on the contrary, they show their close interaction.

26. See Havelock, Justice, 216-7, where he also recognizes the moral aspect of δίκη, and notes that Hesiod's personifications of the concept foreshadow, in a limited way, the development of justice as a principle of human conduct; cf. Claus, 1977, p. 78.

27. 77-8.

28. See Pearson, Popular Ethics, p. 82 and cf. p. 63 above (with notes and ref. to Od. 9.175-6).

29. 52-3.

30. p. 83 above.

31. So Wilamowitz, Glaube 1, p. 350n. 1, Verdenius ad loc.

32. See Richardson's ed. of h. Cer., p. 3.

33. Cf. p. 52 above (with n. 127).

34. On the h. Merc. as a celebration of clever wickedness and crafty ἀναίδεια, see Whitman, Aristophanes and the Comic Hero, 31-4.
35. On opizomai cf. p. 91 above; it is beyond the scope of this enquiry to treat such terms, which only bear an occasional relationship to aídos, systematically; henceforward they will only be taken into account when, as here, an obvious connexion with the terms of our enquiry does exist.

36. Cf. 172-3:

καὶ ης ὄρνης ἐπηρημομεν ἦσ πέρ Ἀπόλλων.

36a. θεός (Peerlkamp; see Richardson's app. crit.) as against Ludwich's θεός τού περ (OCT); Allen refers us to 116 as a parallel for Ludwich's emendation, but the inclusion of ως in that line makes all the difference.

37. p. 23.

38. Cf. pp. 9, 42-4 above.

39. 92-3 above.

40. Schmid-Stählin, I. i. 224, regard the epigrams as genuine archaic poetry.


42. Cf. p. 44 above.


44. See p. 115 above, and cf. p. 103n. 110. See also h. Cer. 343 and 374 (Demeter and Persephone aidoiai).

45. Cf. Richardson, ad loc., and p. 116 above.

46. Cf. p. 125 and n. 40 above.

47. Cf. n. 150 (pp. 107-8) above.

48. All iambic and elegiac poets cited from West, unless indicated otherwise.

49. 61-2.

50. Cf. above, 84-5.

51. For the physical sense of aischros cf. 11. 19.


54. p. 61.

55. In stating his preference for martial arete over all other kinds (cf. Xenophanes' preference for a different kind of arete, 2.1-12) Tyrtaios is not redefining arete, nor does his notion of martial arete differ essentially from that of the Iliad (although even there arete does not solely consist of bravery in battle); different kinds of arete are, as in
this passage, also envisaged in several places in the Odyssey (4.725-6, 8.244-9, 13.45-6); on arete in Tyrtaios; cf. Pearson, Popular Ethics, 48, 75, 231n.8, Adkins, MR, 70-3. On the rôle of aidos in maintaining arete in battle, cf. Timotheos, PMG 789 (last quarter C5th):

σέβετρα αἰδώς συνεγέρειν κέρτας δοξιμάξον.

56. 12.37-40 also occur at Thgn. 935-8; on dike in this passage, see Gagarin, CP 1974, 190 and 197.
57. See below, p. 508.
58. The lines immediately before these resemble II.5.531 in that they commend endurance and cohesion in battle (explicitly the results of aidos in the Homeric passage) with reference to the fact that more are saved than die when the host as a whole exhibits these qualities; cf. von Erffa, p. 60 and pp. 25-6 above.
59. Tyrtaios is, of course, a Spartan, and the Spartans were renowned for their severity towards those whom they regarded as cowards; on descriptions of the fate of cowards at Sparta in Hdt., see below, pp. 420-3.
60. Cf. p. 28 above (with n. 73).
61. Eumaios does lose half his arete on losing his freedom (Od. 17.322-3, n. 138, pp. 106-7 above), and loss of liberty is exactly the kind of material disaster which can destroy arete; in Homer disapproval alone is not sufficient to do this. In the world of Tyrtaios, however, it might be possible to regard one who is subject to universal opprobrium as without arete, provided it was accepted (as it presumably was not by many sectors of society) that bravery in battle is the only important arete; obviously one's reputation for bravery can be affected by the taunts of other people in a way that, for example, one's wealth or nobility of birth cannot.
62. The latter is the view of von Erffa, 62-3.
63. We should note in passing that αἰδώς εἰ has not been encountered before.
64. ibid..
66. MR, p. 155 and n. (d).
67. See pp. 15-6 above and p. 99n. 58; the suitors are not totally insensitive to criticism of their conduct.
68. Cf. pp.29-30 above.
68a. Solon fr.13.5-6 deserves a mention for the way in which he exploits the epic collocation of the adjectives aidoios and deinos, which are complementary in Homer, for a different purpose; Solon wants to be aidoios to his friends and deinos to his enemies.
70. Cf. below, p.573n.49.
71. Cf. Whitman, *Aristophanes and the Comic Hero*, 37-9. We know, too, that Alkaios (fr.428LP) lost his shield, but the citation gives us no clue as to his feelings on losing it.
72. If the Theognidean corpus does preserve a selection of early elegiac poetry (West, *Studies*, p.59), and if most of the excerpts are at least no later than fifth century in date (West, *Studies*, p.77, Gagarin, *CP* 1974, p.193), then questions of authorship and relative dating do not greatly concern us, since most (all?) of the passages considered will be legitimate evidence for the period under discussion.
76. Pearson, p.245n.2, Fraisse, loc.cit..
78. This is the first instance of the noun aischune we have encountered (cf. von Erffa, p.73); here it appears in its regular sense, "disgrace" ("ugliness", cf. aischos), although later it will be used, like aidos, of the reaction to disgrace. On the figurative description of a person as an aischune, cf. the Homeric usage of alenchea (above, p.22) and Thuc. 8. 73.3 (on Hyperbolos, p.489 below); also Ar. *Ach*.855 (*oneidos*, cf. p.512 below).
79. Επετροφή is used here of a reaction to human disapproval, and so comes close in sense to aideomai; but the verb properly refers to divine anger, which is the factor which dictates its use here, and only governs βάσει τ' ανθρώπων by a kind of zeugma.
81. Above, pp. 76-82.
82. Above, pp. 56 and 77.
83. Above, p. 56.
84. See North, Sophrosyne, p. 18.
85. ibid.; cf. 431, 453-6, 497-8, 665-6.
86. This is the first example we have met of aideomai followed by a ptc. where the verb does not also govern a direct object (as in Od. 8.86 [p. 109n. 164 above] and Kallinos 1.2-3 [p. 127 above]). We have now encountered aideomai + acc., + inf. and + ptc., as well as κὶςκὸμεν ὅτι (Sol. fr. 32, p. 132 above); from these usages it will be clear that one can feel aidos (a) concerning future conduct (often); (b) concerning present conduct (those passages cited in which a pres. ptc. gives the grounds for aidos); and (c) concerning past conduct (Il. 22. 104-7, Sol. fr. 32).
86a. Cf. 502; excessive drinking can κατατρυχάζει one previously ροξοί; his conduct becomes aischron and both he and it "look ugly".
88. On aidos in the eyes, cf. p. 126 and n. 41 above; on aidos and one's γνώμαι or one's voice in general, cf. below, pp. 516 + 518 on Ar. Knights, 276-7, 637-8.
89. Cf. above, p. 91.
90. Cf. above, pp. 92-3.
91. Cf. 105-12, where the ingratitude of deiloi and kakoi is contrasted with the charis of agathoi.
91a. In 1161-2, where the language is similar, aidos is still associated with education, but is not a quality of agathoi, rather a reaction to those who are agathoi; if, however, one does possess the aidos appropriate to agathoi one will presumably follow convention and accord other agathoi their due.
95. Above, 83-6.
96. Cf. pp.92-3 above.
97. Cf. p.137 above, where the passages quoted seem to suggest that *aidos* might be a proper response to the excesses of the drinking party.
98. Cf. p.139 above.
99. In line 393, then, ὁ δειλός and ὁ πολλὸν ἄμεινων are so described because of their moral qualities, and wealth and success do not affect the application of the adjectives; cf. p.139 above.
100. Cf. Tyrtaios, fr.10.9 (pp.130-1 above).
101. Hesiod bases his advice on the fact that wealth or poverty is in the gift of the gods, and so one should not criticize another for something that is beyond his control; he is thus urging his audience to consider circumstances and intentions rather than simply results; cf. pp.29-35 above.
102. From this and other passages Gagarin (CP 1974, p.193) concludes that *dike* in Theognis is, as he claims it is in Hesiod, mainly concerned with the proper pursuit of wealth; in the similar passage at 27-30, however, pursuit of prestige and status by dishonest means is also seen as *aischron* and unjust. Generally, though, Gagarin is right to maintain that *dike* refers mostly to economic behaviour in the corpus; other forms of dishonesty, such as that between *philoi*, for example, are not described in terms of *dike*, as they are in later literature (cf. Pearson, *Popular Ethics*, 86-7).
103. pp.119-21 above.
104. See below, pp.185,248-62,352,443.
105. pp.112-3n.219 above.
106. p.122 above.
107. See p.126 above; in *Od*.8.169-77, however, the man who (implicitly) possesses *charis* does not (explicitly) attract *aidos*, but rather shows it towards others; cf. p.97n.35, p.116 above; *charis* is also qualified as *aidoia* at *Q*.6.76-7, again as a quality of the victor which attracts the admiration (envy) of others.
109. So Burton, *Pythian Odes*, p.159, who also refers to the Fates' association with the family, but takes ἀλλήλην as
consecutive.

110. And by Gildersleeve, ad loc. (with further reff.).
111. Von Erffa, p.75.
112. pp.45-6 above.
113. p.119 above; cf. WD.185-8 (p.120).
115. JHS 1882, p.155; Jebb's interpretation is followed by Gildersleeve, ad loc..
116. p.78.
117. This is the interpretation of Boeckh, Pindari opera (Leipzig 1821), 171,178, quoted by von Erffa, ibid..
118. Pearson, Popular Ethics, p.85 (on Thgn. 1135-46) believes that sophrosyne is, above all, the ability to recognize the consequences of one's actions; if this is accepted, it goes some way to explaining the frequent association of aidos and sophrosyne (as well as that of aidos and other terms signifying intellectual qualities); for a further association of aidos with good sense, cf. fr.52b.50-1 (aidos and euboulia).
119. Cf. Q.1.52-3.
120. Greene, Moira, p.20 suggests the following as indications of the concept of divine resentment in a minimal form: Il.5. 440-2, Od.4.78-81,22.287-9; another example might be Il.7. 446ff. (cf. Adkins, Many, p.36).
121. See, for example, Q.13.9-10, P.2.28-9.
122. So Gildersleeve, ad loc..
123. For the disgrace accruing from a wound of this type, cf. Il.15.495-6 (p.97n.40), Tyrtaios, fr.11.19-20 (p.155n.51).
123a. aischuno also occurs in its primary, physical sense at P.4.264. The comparative αἱχιοτευ also occurs at I.7.22, where the victor's arete is said to be "not uglier" than his appearance.
125. On ὑπεξοδίκευ, see von Erffa, p.82.
Moving from archaic poetry to drama necessitates a considerable difference of approach; while the nature of tragic speech and song, especially in Aeschylus, often requires detailed elucidation of individual passages, as in Pindar, in the most important instances of *aidos* etc. in tragedy the focus of our attention will be the motivation of the characters involved and the rôle of their *aidos* in the meaning of the piece as a whole; in each of the three major tragedians *aidos* is often crucial in these respects, but their approaches to the concept differ greatly; in Aeschylus the concept is frequently important in the creation of tension and in the motivation of those characters who find themselves in a tense and difficult situation.

Before considering the major instances of *aidos* etc., however, we must carry out a brief survey of some uses which, while less crucial to the interpretation of the plays in which they occur, are nevertheless valuable evidence for the usage of the relevant terms in the period under discussion. At *Pers.* 800-42 the ghost of Dareios speaks of the *hybris* of the Persian force in Greece (808,821) and of the punishment that awaits them at Plataia; the description of their crimes includes the following (809-10):

*Oî γῆν μακόντες Ἐλλῆσ τού θεῶν βρέτη
gonvto suxxw oude τιμητέκνει νεώς.*

*Aidos* should have prevented this sacrilege, it appears; in that such conduct will presumably arouse the condemnation of men as well as the anger of the gods *aidos* might still be related to sensitivity to damage to one’s self-image and reputation through discreditable behaviour, but the stress in the text is on the lack of scruple which led to the commission of sacrilege rather than on the sanctions, human and divine, which await it. *Aidos* should have prevented these crimes simply because the perpetrators should have known that such conduct is "wrong", that it is offensive to men and to the gods who, by now, lay down the standards by which men should live; *aidos* is the reaction to this "wrong" conduct, whether the force which dictates that it is so is popular
opinion, the gods or one's own personal moral conscience. Also apparent in Dareios' speech are the ideas of hybris, excess (825,827-8,831) and boldness or daring (831); failure to show aidos, then, as we have seen many times before, may lead to, or be equated with, conduct which may be described in those terms.² Fragment 530M presents a general antithesis between aidos and excess; the goddess Dike speaks of a son of Zeus and Hera, a Παιδικὸς μόρος(31), a

θυμολέσεις τέκνον,
δυσκμητος, αἰβός δ' Ὀνκ ένην προνήματι.
πολλαὶς δ' αύθυκτα των ὀδοτερεών ρέκν
ἐφείς άναλωσις κτλ.

(32-5).³

Also in Persae we find the adverb aischros in the context of the honour of the warrior in battle and its diminution in death: the Messenger prefaces his account of the massacre of Psyttaleia with the following (441-4):

Περσικος ἐν πτετες ἧσαν ἀκμαῖος φύσιν,
ψυχήν τ' ἀκριτοι κευγέναικον ἐκπρεπεῖς;
αὑτῷ τ' ἀνκκτα πτυτιν ἐν περιτος ἀξί,
τεθνάσων αἰσχρος δυσκληστᾶίς μόρος.

The contrast is made between the previous valour, strength and loyalty and their subsequent slaughter in circumstances which gave them no opportunity to show their qualities or to die nobly; the very unpleasantness of their deaths reflects badly on themselves, precisely because it was not mitigated by any noble deeds on their part.⁴

In the Redepaare scene of the Septem Melanippos, the adversary of Tydeus, is said to honour the throne of Aischyne and to hate proud words (409-10), and this, in turn, is explained by his freedom from aischra and his reluctance to be kakos (411); Winnington-Ingram⁴a seems to assume that all these terms refer to his concern for his personal honour as a warrior, and he relates this to Eteokles' desire to avoid aischyne at 683-5;⁵ the primary reference here, however, is surely to the moral superiority of the defenders to their Argive opponents (with the exception of Amphiaraos); the lines (especially 411) may well explain the bravery of
Melanippos, but his worship of *Aischune* clearly differentiates him from Tydeus, and we have no reason to believe that Tydeus does not also wish to avoid the disgrace of cowardice; the difference, then, must lie in Melanippos’s rejection of his opponent’s overweening pride, impiety and excess.  

It should be noted that 409-10, τὸν Ἀἰσχύνης θεῶν τηλικα, implies the use of *aischune* not as “disgrace” but as a synonym of *aidos*, a usage we have not met before but which must already have been known, and which quickly becomes common.

The motive of honour, both personal and collective (familial), is frequently adduced in connexion with the need for vengeance in the *Oresteia*; at *Eum.* 95-8 Klytaimestra complains to the sleeping Erinyes:

εὐνῷ δ’ ὄφ’ ὑμῶν ὑδ’, ἀπητυμασμένη
καλοὶς ἐν ἔρευσιν, γὰρ μὲν ἐκτάνων
ὅνεδος ἐν θολωτεῖν ὦκ ἐκλείπτεται
ἀἰσχρῷ δ’ ἀληθείᾳ.

Vengeance, then, should restore the time of the victim, but without vengeance the victim is dishonoured; here Klytaimestra’s ghost speaks of the reproach and disgrace she has to suffer among the dead, and, had she a living, human avenger, such dishonour, given the strong bonds of collective honour within the family, might conceivably be a source of *aidos* for him. Certainly in *Cho*. Orestes and Elektra dwell on the dishonourable manner of their father’s death; he was killed *aischrōs*, by deceit (494), he did not receive the burial due a king (430-6), and his death was unfitting for one of his status (479). Agamemnon is also dishonoured by the adultery of his wife and Aigisthos; at *Cho*.990 the latter is described as an *aischunter*, whom it is lawful to kill, and a similar term, *kataaischunteres*, is used of both Aigisthos and Klytaimestra at *Ag*.1363; similarly, the chorus reproach Aigisthos for shaming (*aischunon*) another man’s bed at *Ag*.1626. As the last of these passages shows, and as is implied in the others, it was felt to be discreditable to dishonour a man by seducing his wife, even though the primary reference of the terms employed (*aischuno* etc.) is to the disgrace suffered by the cuckold. Revenge for an affront done to Menelaos’ honour was
presumably the motive for the expedition against Troy, for at Ag. 399-401 the chorus state that Paris was punished by Zeus xenios (362-6) for shaming (ὑπέρτυν) the table of his host.

Of all the plays the Supplices is the richest in instances of aidos, and this is so because of the importance placed on the supplication of the Danaids at Argos: we shall consider how aidos affects Pelasgos below, but here we may usefully examine the role of aidos in the chorus' supplication both before and after the crucial decision. The Danaids adopt the part of suppliants immediately on entering the orchestra, even though they do not take up position at the altar until 207ff. and despite the absence of any representative of the Argives; in the opening lines of the play, then, their supplication is directed towards the gods, to Zeus in particular, and at 27-9 they pray:

This is clearly an appeal to aidos, and, this being the case, aidoios must be active in sense in 28; the πνεύματι χώρας does not attract aidos, it manifests it. The active usage of the adjective has hitherto been rare, but in this play, as we shall see, it frequently coexists beside the passive. The chorus are reminded of the importance of aidos in their supplication by their father, who, in his exhortation to them to climb upon the altar, urges (191-6):

Both instances of aidoios in these lines are invested with the fullest significance; it is always possible that αἰδοίου Διός means "reverend Zeus", but there is no reason to reject an additional active significance for the adjective, and,
indeed, the parallel with line 1, *aphiktor*, shows that it is quite likely that a term normally applicable to the suppliant could be applied to his protecting deity. 14 Like *aidoios*, *semnos*, derived from *sebomai*, is normally passive, and so the adverb in 193 is most naturally taken in the sense, "in such a way as to arouse the *sebas* of others;" Friis Johansen and Whittle (ad loc.), however, in translating "in a reverent manner," clearly feel that an active connotation is also present beside the passive (of which they are also aware), and this does not seem impossible. Holding the suppliant branches *semnos*, the Danaids are to utter κίσσω ... ἢτη, and again the use of the adjective is ambivalent; as supplicants, the maidens will speak in such a way as to arouse the *aidos* of others, but in the following lines Danaos speaks not of others' reaction to his daughters, but of their behaviour towards those they will encounter; they are to speak as befits newcomers (195), avoid boldness (197), appear composed in countenance (198-9), be neither forward nor reluctant in speech (200-1) and, above all, they are to yield to their prospective hosts (202); all this suggests that they are to manifest *aidos* as well as attract it, and, in particular, mention of τὸ μὴ θερεύν and ὁματός τὰς ἡρύχου, given that *aidos* is frequently opposed to boldness and manifested in the eyes, makes it very likely that the Danaids' words are to be both actively and passively *aidoia*.

According to Danaos' precepts, then, both suppliant and supplicated are expected to show *aidos* in a reciprocal manner and thus, in connexion with supplication at an altar, it may be correct to say that, "*aidos* is common to both parties in the encounter, or ... is characteristic of the encounter itself." 15 On the other hand, in Homer it was only the *aidos* which is owed to the suppliant by the supplicated which was mentioned explicitly, and in other places, too, *aidos* is much more regularly the reaction of the supplicated. 16 In personal supplication, moreover, while the suppliant might perhaps feel *aidos* for his protector after his plea has been accepted, in making his plea he must, in fact, disclaim or overcome any *aidos* he may feel, in order that the self-
abasement which is essential to personal supplication\textsuperscript{17} can take place; one kind of \textit{aidos}, at any rate, namely concern for one's own reputation and status, would actually exclude the possibility of this kind of supplication, as, indeed, it threatens to at \textit{E.Hel}.\textsuperscript{947-9}.\textsuperscript{18} While, then, it is unnecessary to deny that \textit{aidos} is also required in those who carry out supplication at an altar dedicated to the gods of a city, especially when the suppliants are women (the supplicated will be better disposed to accede to the pleas of those who behave properly), it does seem to be an exaggeration to suggest that \textit{aidos} might always exist as a reciprocal element common to both parties in the supplication relationship in any schematic way; it seems far more likely that the ambivalence of \textit{aidoios} in the passages discussed is a feature of Aeschylus' pregnant style, and that his reasons for raising the question, "how will the Danaids behave?" are thematic, connected with the future action of the trilogy.

After they have been granted the protection of the king and his subjects the Danaids sing in praise of Argos, and acknowledge the citizens' \textit{aidos} at 641; a reference to the \textit{aidos} they have been shown by Pelasgos must also exist at 490-1, but the text in that place does not allow us to be sure of the precise sense; Porson's \textit{ei}ϕεθ\textit{εντα} (adopted by Page) is convincingly rejected by Friis Johansen and Whittle ad loc.; if the general sense can be assumed to be a reference to Pelasgos as the Danaids' \textit{κίδωις πρόχεινος then} \textit{aidoios} is presumably best taken as active, referring to the \textit{aidos} the king showed in his speech immediately preceding these lines, although an honorific application ("deserving \textit{aidos}") might also be possible, and the two senses may even coexist.\textsuperscript{19}

In \textit{Eumenides} \textit{aidos} occurs three times as the proper response towards an oath (483-4, 680, 710); an oath is sworn publicly and commits the honour of the swearer to its observance; it is also sworn by the gods, and thus partakes of their power; and society in general must have believed that it was discreditable to commit perjury; for all these reasons, then, the phrase \textit{κιδωιθεν των ορχον} seems highly appropriate.\textsuperscript{20}
Aidos is also operative in the familiar sphere of sexual relationships and encounters between male and female in Aeschylus. It is particularly characteristic of feminine modesty; at PV 133-4 \(^{21}\) the chorus explain their presence thus:

\[
\text{κτύπου ἐκ ἀκροθι ἀκροθι}
\]

\[
χώ χάλυβος δειπνευ ἀν-
\]

\[
τεύν θυμόν, ἐκ δ' ἐκπληθε μου
\]

\[
τὰν θ' ἐμερεύσιν αἰδῶ.
\]

The most natural way to take these lines is as an explanation of the abandonment by the chorus of their natural feminine reticence in their desire to discover the origin of the commotion. \(^{22}\) θ' ἐμερεύσις is a rare word (elsewhere only at Emp. B122.2DK) but Hesychios glosses ἐμερεύει by ἐπερεύει, ἐπενοεί, εὐπαθεία: the Oceanids' composure, then, a product of their aidos and manifested in their eyes or facial expression, has been shattered by the noise of Hephaistos' hammer and their subsequent eagerness to discover the source of the commotion; again the connexion between aidos and the eyes is apparent, and we might compare Supp. 198-9 (p. 165 above) where the aidos of the Danaids was also to be manifested in the composure of their countenances. The appropriateness of aidos for young women is asserted at fr. 355M. 23-4, and again we should notice ὁμορρίων and ὀμορράτος in the two previous lines.

At Ag.1203-4 (transposed by Hermann and subsequent editors) the chorus enquire about Cassandra's sexual relationship with Apollo and she, admitting that the nature of their relationship was sexual, explains that aidos had previously prevented her speaking of it; her aidos is thus occasioned by an event in the past, but directed at future reproach for conduct which is universally seen as discreditable: the chorus immediately interpret her aidos as "delicacy" (ἐπενευτάλ), appropriate to the prosperous but not to one in the prophetess' pitiful condition. \(^{22a}\)

At Supp.991-1009 Danaos effectively urges aidos on his daughters, although the term is not employed; warning them about the tendency of people to speak ill of outsiders (994-5),
he urges them not to shame him (Katērkínwēn 996) by succumbing to sexual temptation; at 1008-9 he recapitulates:


\[\text{μης' κήρος ήμιν, ήδονήν δ' ἐξθροῖς ἐμοῖς πρέσβευμεν.}\]

Danaos, then, is concerned about popular opinion and about his own reputation, and is afraid of the mockery of others; this suggests that he himself is sensitive to *айд vont* and reveals once again that the honour of men is vulnerable through the women under their control; we might compare those passages in *Ag.* in which Klytaimestra's adultery with Aigisthos is said to shame Agamemnon. It seems remarkable, however, that Danaos feels it necessary to make his speech at all; his daughters, certainly, have given no indication that they are liable to behave in the manner which he deprecates; it is commonly assumed that his advice shows that he, at least, did not believe that his daughters had conceived an aversion to all men, but other passages in the play suggest that they although this might not be the ultimate explanation of their character; it may, however, be possible that Danaos is wrong about his daughters in this passage; even if they do not hate all men, neither do they need such detailed advice on this subject, and it may be that the passage characterizes Danaos rather than his daughters (although we cannot be sure for what purpose).

*Aidos* also occurs as a feature of encounters between men and women at *Cho.* 663-7, where Orestes, knocking on the door of the palace, says:

\[\text{εἶπεξέω τις ομπάτων τελεφόρος γυνῇ τόππεχος, ἄνδρα δ' εὐπρεπεστευτον.} \]

\[\text{αίδως γάρ ἐν λείχασεν οὔσιν ὑπερεύνους λογίους τίθηνιν. Εἴπε θερήσεις ἄκην ἐπός ἄνδρα κατήμυνιν ἐμφανές τέκμας.}\]

We have already seen that *айд vont* tends to be present when the sexes meet, and that it can be a hindrance when plain speaking is required. Once more boldness (*θερήσ* is seen as opposed to *айд vont*, and a particularly close parallel would be *Od.* 3.14,24 and 76, where Telemachos is first advised not to pay any attention to *айд vont* in order that he
may speak freely, then expresses his *aidos* which prevents self-assertion, and finally overcomes his inhibition by means of *tharsos*; as in that passage, *tharsos* is desirable here.

At *Supp.* 579 the chorus sing of Io's release from her torment; transformed by the touch of Zeus, she "shed her sorrowful *aidos* of tears" (δακρύαν δ’ ἀποστάξει πένθω παισώ); the most natural interpretation of these words is to assume not that Io loses her *aidos* by weeping, but that her tears are an expression of her *aidos*. Her *aidos*, then, is not shyness with regard to her more or less sexual union with Zeus, as Friis Johansen and Whittle suggest (for, as they acknowledge, it would be inappropriate for a woman to lose (their translation of ἀποστάξει) such *aidos* at the moment of conception), but it may encompass embarrassment at her present condition (the other possibility suggested by FJW); there is, however, no need to reject an application to her past experiences; having regained human form, Io is at last able to weep, and her self-consciousness and embarrassment, both at her past indignities and at her present condition, which is itself a product of her past experiences and virtually inseparable from them (she is embarrassed for the present and future because of her previous sufferings), burst out in a flood of tears; this is not only plausible, it is an acute and remarkable piece of psychological observation.

A different kind of *aidos*, though still with sexual overtones, is found in fr. 228M, where Achilles reproaches the dead Patroklos as follows:

εἶπε ἃς ἀγὼν ἁγνὸν οὐκ ἐπὸδέων, ἀλλὰ ἡμέρεστε τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἔλεγμένον.  

Male homosexual love is a branch of *philia*, and *charis* is important in that context; Achilles' grief leads him to regard his friend's death as a failure to show the *aidos* and accord the *charis* which are appropriate among *philoi*, and his complaint is similar to those addressed to the *teunyemeros* at *Thgn.* 253-4 and 1263-6. It is interesting that *sebas* can be the object of *aidos*, and we shall have to discuss the relationship between these two terms in some detail later in this chapter.
In a number of crucial passages in the plays, passages in which the character involved often has to make a difficult choice or is more generally in a stressful situation, *aidos* is absolutely central to the motivation of the character and to the interpretation of the play: we see *aidos* at work deep in the conscience of the individual, and often the emotion works in more than one direction, producing psychological turmoil and crises of indecision. 38 One might imagine that *Septem* would be unlikely to provide much evidence for *aidos* of this type, particularly in view of von Erffa's comment: 39

"Für Eteokles spielt bei der Erwägung, ob er seinem Brüder kämpfen soll, *aidos* keine Rolle. Er ist vielmehr fest überzeugt, daß Polyneikes mit seinem Angriff auf die Vaterstadt *dike* verletzt hat und daß sie auf seiner eigenen Seite steht."

Both the assumption that Eteokles deliberates and the assertion that *aidos* has no role in his resolve to fight his brother are questionable; Eteokles does not deliberate; he both wants to fight his brother and sees it as inevitable that he should do so; 40 but he is also motivated by *aidos* to the same act, as is shown by 683-5:

εἰτε κακὸν φέος τις, κινχύνης ἐίτε ἐστώ. μόνον γὰρ κέρδος ἐν τεθνήκουν, κακὼν δέ κέφωξιν οὕτω, εὐχλείαν ἐρεῖς.

Eteokles, then, is motivated by concern for his honour as a warrior; 41 he wishes to avoid *aischune* and *aischra*, the disgrace of cowardice, and to preserve his reputation; we have met this concern often enough to recognize it as *aidos*. 42 This motive is a personal one, as is his desire to shed his brother's blood, and these must be seen as somehow combined with the curse; either they exist independently, in which case Eteokles is still responsible for his own desires, no matter how the curse may affect him, 43 or the curse may be the cause of his desire and concern for his honour, 44 and, if this notion that the gods work through personal human motives is accepted, it presumably holds good in every case (although, lacking poetic omniscience, ordinary men do not normally recognize it), with the result that the individual
is still liable for the consequences of his own actions in terms of everyday values; for nowhere in Aeschylus is it suggested that liability on the human level is cancelled out by the belief that all motives come from the gods.\textsuperscript{45}

Eteokles' concern for his honour, then, his \textit{aidos}, is an important element in his motivation; in claiming that he gave no indication of \textit{aidos} in declaring his resolve to face his brother, however, von Erffa may have been thinking of the \textit{aidos} which is proper among members of the same family, and it is certainly true that this \textit{aidos} is totally disregarded by him; when the chorus refer to the horror of the shedding of kindred blood (677-82,718) Eteokles replies firstly in terms of personal honour, secondly in terms of the curse. We do not know the rights and wrongs of the quarrel between the brothers, but Eteokles' disregard of familial \textit{aidos} must surely be seen as discreditable, as, indeed, the reaction of the chorus suggests; the mere existence of the quarrel would probably be regarded as discreditable, and at 831 both brothers are condemned for their murderous intentions (\textit{μὴ κοιτήσῃ δικαίως}).

We have already seen\textsuperscript{46} something of the importance of \textit{aidos} in \textit{Supp.}, and in the play's central decision scene this importance is even greater; the Danaids, as suppliants, appeal constantly to the king's sense of \textit{aidos}, but his \textit{aidos} does not lead him immediately to give in to their requests. From Pelasgos' entry until 332 the origin of the Danaids, both immediate and ancestral, is the central issue; in 333-4, however, the theme of supplication is reintroduced, and is to dominate until 491; in this passage of stichomythia (-347) the question of the rights and wrongs of the quarrel with the Aigyptioi is only raised allusively, and the Danaids' evasiveness in 337 is characteristic of their responses in this connexion.\textsuperscript{47} At 340 Pelasgos' question indicates his desire to behave properly towards the suppliants, but he soon recognizes that to do so to their satisfaction will involve conflict with their opponents; the theme of war, which will concern the city of Argos as a whole, is already
introduced, and it is a prospect which the king does not relish. Against his reluctance to go to war on their behalf the Danaids set an appeal to *aidos* (345):

\begin{align*}
aídos \; εὐ \; πεύκειν \; πόλεως \; μὴ \; ἐστεμμένην.
\end{align*}

Pelasgos acknowledges the force of this appeal by his reference to the shudder he experienced on seeing the altar (346), and either the chorus-leader or he himself\(^\text{48}\) explains this shudder in terms of the power of the wrath of Zeus, the protector of suppliants (347). Pelasgos' shudder is important; it suggests an instinctive reaction to the act of supplication and may thus be akin to the inhibitory reaction of *aidos*; no less important is the clear statement of the consequences of the king's decision; he can choose to accept the supplication, and thereby involve the city in a war, or he can risk the anger of Zeus by allowing suppliants to be maltreated; crucial in this respect is the obvious parallelism between the two alternatives; both are *βαθύ* (342, 347).

These ideas are developed in the ensuing epirrhetic section (348-437); the chorus stress their supplicant status (348-53), and Pelasgos accepts this, but returns to the prospect of war; *τὴν γὰρ οὕτω δεῖξαι πόλις* (358). The Danaids then reiterate their appeal to *aidos* (359-64, esp. 362 *αἰδοπέμενος*), but once more Pelasgos refers to his responsibility to the city (365-9), but now his mind is not so much on the consequences of accepting the supplication (war) as on those of its rejection (*mium* 366); the Danaids' supplication takes place before the altar of the city's gods, and since the city will be affected by any pollution resulting from the supplication, the citizens must have their say.\(^\text{49}\) From the general "wrath of Zeus", then, the consequence of ignoring the girls' plea has crystallized into the more definite idea of pollution; pollution or war are now the alternatives, and the people will be involved in both. The chorus reject the king's claim that he must consult the people (370-5), but they pick up his mention of pollution, and warn him of the dangers of inviting it (375 *Κύος ὑλασσώ*).

In answer Pelasgos restates the difficulty of his choice
(376-80), and declares himself unable to decide; once again his choice appears as a balanced antithesis between two evils. The Danaids then remind him of the anger of Zeus (381-6), but Pelasgos is not yet willing to decide in their favour; instead he attempts to evade the decision entirely, hoping that the chorus may be persuaded to pursue their claims in accordance with the nomoi of Egypt (387-91); he would clearly rather not decide, and probably he is hoping that they will be persuaded to leave the altar, thus freeing him from the anger of Zeus and the danger of pollution. The Danaids, however, are not impressed (392-6).

To the difficulty of the choice the king adds the idea of the importance of the views of the people (397-401), and it is here that we see how complete is the balance in his mind for and against acceptance of the supplication, and how exact the parallelism between his impulses to accept or reject and between the consequences of either:

Here Pelasgos explains exactly why he must consult the demos; it is not that he is obliged to consult them, simply that he does not wish to take sole responsibility for a decision which will affect the whole city upon himself; he fears the censure of the people in the event of disaster, and imagines their reproaches; his position, then, is analogous to that of Hektor at Il.22.104-7; Hektor recognizes his responsibility for the ruin of his city, Pelasgos does not wish to be uniquely responsible for the ruin of his, and both fear what their fellow-citizens may say; Hektor expresses his concern in terms of aidos, and Pelasgos' concern is identical. His choice, then, is not between giving in to aidos or rejecting it, but between the demands of two sorts of aidos; aidos for the suppliants and for the wrath of Zeus inhibits rejection of the appeal, and aidos at the prospect of the greatest popular disapproval inhibits its acceptance; we have
already seen how *aidos* may be undesirable when initiative is called for, and that it can lead to indecision or diffidence; here it inhibits both of a pair of alternatives, and leads to complete *amechania*.

From 402-54 the position remains unchanged; the Danaids remind Pelasgos of the other side of the coin, of Zeus (402-6) and of the consequences of ignoring their supplication (418-37), and he stresses the importance of deliberation and the gravity of the consequences, no matter what he decides (407-17, 438-54); he would rather not choose, and, though he hopes for the best, he does not expect it (453-4).

The Danaids now realize that something must be done to secure the king's support - they threaten to hang themselves on the altar and Pelasgos gives in. The Danaids preface their threat with the injunction (455),

πολλῶν ἀκοουσίν Τέματ' αἰδοίων λόγων

and once more the adjective *aidos* bears the fullest significance:54 the epithet has been ambivalent earlier in the play (cf. especially *κίνων* ἐπη in 194), and so it is here; the threat is an end of *αἰδοίων λόγων* in the sense that the chorus abandon their formal appeals to the *aidos* which is the right of suppliants, but, more pertinently, it is so because they no longer show the *aidos* urged on them by their father, they no longer speak ὡς ἐπηλύκας πρέπει (195).

Paradoxically, however, the Danaids' abandonment of *αἰδοίων λόγων* allows the king's *aidos* for the wrath of Zeus, protector of suppliants, to prevail over his *aidos* for the opinions of the *demos*; he still stesses the terrible consequences of heeding the appeal (468-71, 474-7), but now realizes that there is no escaping *miasma* if he does not heed it (472-3), and concludes (478-9, picking up the words of the chorus in 347, 385, 427):

όμως δ' ἀνάγκη Ζηνὸς αἰδοίων κατον ἱκτῆσοι. ὑψίστοις γὰρ ἐν βέβοτοις ἰδοιος.

Aidos is thus central to Pelasgos' decision; it is a decision in the full sense of the word, for it results from
consideration of two alternatives, and from an estimation of the consequences of those alternatives, and of the responsibility the individual will bear for his decision.\textsuperscript{55} Admittedly, the decision does not immediately spring from the recognition of the consequences,\textsuperscript{56} but this is because the king's \textit{aidos}, which is produced by an evaluation of the consequences of both courses of action, leads him to \textit{impasse}; it is precisely because he can decide that he finds it so difficult to do so, even to the extent of trying to evade the decision entirely; it is also true that the Danaids' threat tips the scales in their favour,\textsuperscript{57} and that, as a result of the threat, he speaks of the necessity of heeding the wrath of Zeus,\textsuperscript{58} but the threat is not something entirely new; it makes the prospect of \textit{miasma} (473) inevitable, but this prospect has always been envisaged as a consequence of disregarding the plea (366, 375, 429-33) and \textit{ananke} in 478 refers not to some form of external compulsion,\textsuperscript{59} but to the virtual compulsion that is imposed upon a man of ordinary sensibilities by the recognition that the consequences of alternative (a) are really much more serious than those of alternative (b). Pelasgos' decision has been elaborately prepared for by his twin concerns, to avoid pollution and the anger of the gods and to avoid a war which will harm his people and leave him open to censure; he does not forget these concerns, rather they coalesce, when he realizes that the prospect of inconceivable pollution which, because it defiles the city's altar, will defile the whole city, is now imminent. The compulsion is not absolute, but arises from the king's own appraisal of the situation.

This is not to say that the decision is taken in absolute freedom; since the play presents a recognizable human being acting in a plausible situation with a full awareness of the difficulty of his choice (a difficulty which is also described as \textit{ananke} in 439-40), it would be impossible for his choice to be absolutely free, to exist, as it were, independently of the conflicting claims on either side and of the king's own character; decisions in real life also do not happen like that. Let it also be noted that the king's prog-
ress towards a decision has been portrayed with great psychological realism; he would rather not choose, because recognition of the alternatives produces *aidos*, which leads to *amechania*; this *aidos*, this uncertainty and desire to avoid bringing any unpleasant consequences upon oneself, is the mark not of one who cannot decide, but of one who knows that he can, of one, one might almost say, who is subject to the existentialist's fear of freedom.

This psychological realism is not confined to *Supp.*; the so-called "carpet-scene" of the *Agamemnon* has been much discussed, and its importance variously estimated; here, too, we find that the workings of *aidos* give us important clues as to the meaning of the scene. Klytaimestra's invitation to tread purple begins at 905, but we should notice in the foregoing line θένος ἀπέτευξα for *phthonos* is to be a key word in what follows, and, referring as it does to both human and divine disapproval (and there is frequently an ambiguity in this scene as to which of these is meant), it will be relevant to our discussion of *aidos*; Klytaimestra expresses the wish that her praise of Agamemnon will not attract *phthonos*, but her plan in the scene to come is precisely that; to attract *phthonos* to her husband.

The invitation follows, from 905-13, and ends with deliberate ambiguity between the meaning Klytaimestra's words have for herself alone and that which they have for Agamemnon; the latter's refusal comes at 914-30, and almost immediately he raises questions of appropriateness and propriety (916-7), going on vehemently to reject oriental luxury and effeminacy (918-20) before coming to the idea of *phthonos* (921-4):

_mηδ' εἰμαί στρέως, ἐπὶφθείον πόρον τίθηι. Θεοῦ τις τοις τιμαλθὲν χλων, ἐν πολλοῖς δὲ θυμὸν ὀντα καλλεῖν βαίνειν ἐμὸι μὲν ὁδόμως ἄνευ δόμου.

To tread the strewn purple, then, would be to attract *phthonos*, and, since the contrast between Agamenon's mortality and the honours proper for the gods is emphatically drawn, there can be no doubt that it is divine resentment which the king has
in mind; as a result of this conviction he recognizes the danger of doing as his wife asks, and is afraid. But although he does not wish to be honoured as a god he does wish to be honoured (925), and this concern that his success be acknowledged is also evident in the following two lines, of which the sense must surely be, "Fame shouts aloud, without foot-wipers and embroideries" (Denniston and Page, ad loc.), rather than, "Different is the ring of the words 'footmats' and 'embroideries'" (Fraenkel ad loc., following Blass); it is this concern for his own reputation which Klytaimestra will go on to exploit.

Stichomythia now begins, and Klytaimestra resorts to an argument which prefigures one form of sophistic relativism, the idea that the character of an act varies according to circumstance and agent; 63 in, for example, the Dissoi Logoi such arguments are used to prove that the same act can be both aischron and kalon etc. or that aischron and kalon are "the same"; here Klytaimestra exploits not the variable character of the act, but the variability of the agent and the situation; at 933-4 she gets Agamemnon to agree that it would not be discreditable to tread purple if one had vowed to the gods to do so, 64 and at 935-6 he admits that Priam would readily do what he fears to do; it is for Agamemnon to point out that his situation differs from that in 933 and that he is not Priam and this he fails to do; nor does he remember his rejection of oriental pomp only lines before; 65 to the audience, however, the relativity of the act to both agent and situation will be only too clear, and they will recognize that what may be acceptable in other circumstances or for other people is not acceptable for Agamemnon.

At 937-8 aidos enters the picture; Agamemnon has shown his reluctance to walk on the purple vestments, and has expressed his reluctance in terms of phobos and concern for phthonos, yet his concern for his honour has also been revealed, and in these lines Klytaimestra manages to reduce the former concern by appealing to the latter:
The earlier references to phthonos have been general enough to allow one who wished to to regard them as concerned only with human envy, and this is what Klytaimestra chooses to do here; she interprets Agamemnon's reluctance as _aidos_, and relates this _aidos_ exclusively to popular disapproval; her husband indicates by his reply that he is concerned at the prospect of others' disapproval, but Klytaimestra's _άνθρωπελον_ is pointed, and Agamemnon, having drawn a proper distinction between honours appropriate for men and gods in 922-5, might have pointed out that it is not only human disapproval which he fears. He makes no direct reply to Klytaimestra's observation that one whose success is not resented is also not to be envied, and it is clearly by this argument that his scruples are finally allayed; his desire to attract positive envy as proof of his success outweighs his fear of critical resentment; he has been persuaded that the _aidos_ which arose instinctively with the thought that it would not be quite right for him to walk on the vestments is merely fear of the reproach of other, inferior mortals, and he has been encouraged to imagine that one of his pre-eminence can afford to ignore such _aidos_.

Agamemnon gives in at 944, but although his fear of others' disapproval has been dispelled, traces of _aidos_ remain; he takes off his shoes (944-7), lest his treading on the vestments of the gods (θεῶν 946) attract _phthonos_; again the word is used without qualification, and it is possible to regard it as referring to a residual fear of human criticism or to an instinctive concern for divine resentment; at any rate, his undoing of his shoes as a means of avoiding _phthonos_ is explained in terms of _aidos_ (948-9):

_πολλὴ γὰρ αἰώνι _ _δυσμοθεότεροι_ _πολιτικά _ _πλούτων ἰσχυρώτεροι_ _θ' ύπας._

Agamemnon thus shows his awareness that what he is about to do is inappropriate; although, then, he now wants to walk on the vestments and he believes that popular disapproval can
be overcome, his *aidos* nevertheless persists, because it is not equivalent to the calculation, can I get away with it? Rather it is a sense that all is not well, that what he is about to do is dangerous in terms of the values and religious beliefs of his society; he hopes to mitigate his offence by taking off his shoes, but the effect of this concession to *aidos* is to reveal that he is doing wrong. 69

Agamemnon's *aidos* is therefore important in the scheme of the play; as a sign that something is wrong it takes its place at the beginning of a crescendo of apprehension which builds from this point on and culminates in the paroxysms of Kassandra. It has been maintained 70 that, had Agamemnon committed any real offence in this scene, the chorus would surely comment upon it; it is true that the chorus do not criticize the king openly, but immediately Klytaimestra has finished speaking the lines which accompany Agamemnon's entry into the palace they pick up the apprehension which the latter has expressed by means of *aidos*, and sing of the prophetic fear which now vexes their hearts (975-87). In this connexion de Romilly 71 writes:

"En un sens, on peut dire que, par définition, toute peur est annonce d'un malheur, prédiction d'un malheur; mais ce qui rend 'prophétique' la crainte des vieillards, c'est qu'avant d'être cette prédiction, elle est la donnée première sur laquelle celle-ci s'appuie. Et, si ce trouble même du corps est du à quelque sentiment de l'âme, il faut bien alors qu'il soit assez peu conscient et assez peu raisonné pour n'être d'abord sensible que sous cette forme indirecte."

She goes on to show that prophetic fear may be taken as a sign that the order of the universe is upset, 72 and to demonstrate how the chorus' fear prefigures Kassandra's hysteria. 73 One could go further, however, and place Agamemnon's *aidos* at the beginning of this chain, and we should notice that the apprehension which the king describes at 923-4 as *phobos* is similar to that described in 948 as *aidos*; the contribution of *aidos* to the creation of tension is therefore considerable, as it was in *Supp*.
Agamemnon's concern for his reputation, which leads him into error in the "carpet-scene" is also evident in the chorus' description of his decision to sacrifice Iphigeneia in the parodos. His choice in this matter is clearly set out; either he can do what would, in normal circumstances, be unthinkable and sacrifice his daughter, or he can give up his leadership of the alliance and, as he puts it, desert (206-13). It is noticeable that Agamemnon sees the choice in terms similar to those in which Pelasgos sees his; both alternatives are βαγεύ (206-8, cf. Supp. 342, 347) and both will have serious consequences (211, cf. Supp. 442); Agamemnon's amechania, then, is not presented as vividly or as painfully as is Pelasgos' (simply because we do not see its effects before our eyes), but both characters are in similar positions; and just as Pelasgos comes to favour one alternative over the other as a result of the Danaids' threat, so for Agamemnon the scales are tipped by his concern for his reputation. Fraenkel may be right to call the rhetorical question in 212-3 - "impossible;" - but it is only impossible for Agamemnon; the possibility of desertion is rejected by him, not by Aeschylus, and its rejection is simply part of the motivation of the character. It is Agamemnon, moreover, who chooses the pejorative term λιπόναυς, "by which", as Lesky well points out, "he envisages the disgrace and shame he would incur by deserting his post"; he thus chooses to put his own honour before his loyalty to the family, and, while this concern for his honour, this aidos (for despite the absence of the word itself, the self-conscious fear of disgrace can hardly be anything else) may be entirely understandable in one of his position, may, indeed, have been viewed sympathetically by the audience, it nevertheless leads him to commit a great crime against his own family. We saw that the king in Supp., while still unable to decide, was subject to two kinds of aidos; so, perhaps, is Agamemnon, for aidos for his daughter, aidos at a breach of philia, may well have balanced aidos at the prospect of disgrace, until the latter eventually prevailed. This impression is confirmed by the chorus' designation of
delusion (παρακείμενος, 223) as αἰσχρότης (222); Agamemnon will have known as well as they do that it is aischron to kill a member of one's own family, and that knowledge would presumably lead to aídos when he was faced with the prospect.

In the next play of the trilogy a similar form of aídos affects Orestes when he too is faced with the prospect of killing one whom he should not kill (cf. 930). At 896-8 Klytaimestra bares her breast and appeals to her son's aídos for this emotive feature of the mother-child relationship, as does Hekabe at Il.22.82-4, aídos which is both of the general variety, owed to all members of one's family, especially one's parents, and that which is related to the requirement to show gratitude, appropriate among all philoi. This appeal destroys Orestes' resolve, and he asks (899):

\[\text{Tukhē, tē deēnē; mētē e bēstw kouvenī;}\]

This question is all the more striking for being absolutely unthinkable in any normal context, as was Agamemnon's intention to kill Iphigeneia. Unlike Agamemnon, however, Orestes is not really involved in deliberation between two alternatives, rather a decision already made is in danger of being undone in the face of his recognition of the full horror of its consequences. There are two deliberative subjunctives in line 899, and Orestes is thus clearly faced with a choice; he is free to spare his mother, although, reminded by Pylades of the danger of making enemies of the gods, he does not do so. Yet as in all the other passages we have considered in this connexion, particularly the "carpet-scene" of Ag., the ignoring of aídos is not intended to go without notice; some believe that the hesitation represented by aídos mitigates Orestes' guilt, but it is more likely that the converse is true, that his aídos is a sure sign that what he is about to do is wrong in terms of the most deeply held traditional beliefs, and it is certainly true that it is never claimed in Eum. that Orestes' hesitation is a sign of his moral innocence; neither Orestes nor Apollo pleads for mitigating circumstances in the third play, instead insisting on the justice of his case; in the present instance, however, aídos shows that Orestes' deed,
regardless of its dike, is at variance with traditional values. It is Orestes' awareness of these values, which produces his aidos, and his aidos is a clear, instinctive sign that all is not well.

We have seen that the rejection of aidos may sometimes be a danger sign; now we shall consider more passages in which it is explicitly rejected, although with a certain difference of emphasis. Snell, Scenes from Greek Drama, 1-22, uses fr. 225M as a basis for the delineation of a particular feature of Aeschylean tragedy, which he also regards as a new element in the development of Greek society. The beginning of each line in the papyrus is lost, but the general sense is clear enough for our purposes; as printed by Mette, the fragment (lines 9-14) reads:

According to Snell, means, "I do not care what you think. I shall stand by what I have done, by my convictions, and shall carry it through against your resistance."

He thus sees the fragment as the first indication of a tendency towards subjective evaluation of one's own conduct without reference to the universal standards of society, as, in fact, an indication of the development of a personal moral conscience. He recognizes that it is not in itself new that someone should reject aidos (referring to Archilochos' insouciance over the loss of his shield) and he might also have mentioned any of a number of characters in Homer who are, for whatever reason, insensitive to aidos; these characters, however, do not say "I am not ashamed", and therein lies something of a difference: people who say "I am not ashamed" are usually either trying to conceal the effect the criticisms of others are having on them, or seeking to
oppose their evaluation of an act or a situation to that of other people, and clearly in the latter instance the possibility of subjective judgement of one's own actions does arise. Here Achilles is clearly setting his own estimation of himself and his prowess against the loyalty to the army as a whole which is demanded by others; this, however, was also his position in the Iliad, where his refusal to act as aidos for his comrades demands is equally apparent. The emphasis in the fragment, it must be admitted, is somewhat different; in the Iliad Achilles wishes his own opinion of himself to be validated by the other Achaeans; here he seems to exult in his own knowledge of his worth without reference to the opinions of others; we cannot be sure, however, that his desire for recognition of his prowess was not stressed elsewhere in the play, and should notice that he manifests a similar awareness of his own value to the army at 11.9.348-55. The aidos which he rejects in this fragment may relate to either or both of two factors; Achilles has uttered a great boast, and we can tell from the descriptions of the Argives in the Redepaare scene in Septem that such boasting is seen as discreditable; he has also declared himself superior to all the other leaders of the Achaeans, and thus he is without that aidos which one owes one's peers or one's superiors. It may be that the wider purpose of this passage was to reveal the extent of Achilles' anaideia; the situation is certainly somewhat different from that of the Iliad, where, until his rejection of appropriate compensation, Achilles' anger was regarded as understandable; here it appears (line 1) that the other Achaeans have already threatened that he should be stoned for his treason or his desertion, and he is thus remaining firm in his position in the face of the strongest disapproval from his fellows; while, then, we should be aware that this passage may characterize his attitude as reprehensible, we should also admit that Snell's position does carry a great deal of weight; Achilles is certainly standing up for his own principles in the face of popular disapproval.

Snell is also right in identifying other Aeschylean passages
which are similar in tone, but wrong to assert that Aeschylus is the first author to compose passages with such a tone; for Solon 32W, which we have already discussed, in which the verdict of popular opinion is disputed and opposed to Solon's own conviction that he has behaved creditably, is, if anything, a clearer example of the phenomenon Snell discusses than 225M. Bearing in mind, then, that Aeschylus is not the first to present the subjective evaluation of one's own conduct at variance with popular opinion, we may go on to examine other, similar passages in his work.

Snell cites the following from Ag., in all of which Klytaimestra is the speaker:

613-4 -

- Τοιούτῳ δ' κόμπος, τῆς ἀληθείας γέμων,
- οὐκ ἴσχεσι ἤς γυναικείς γενναίης λακέων.

855-8 -

- ἄνδρες πολίτες, πρέσβεις Ἀθηνῶν τόδε,
- οὐκ ἴσχυναύτης τοὺς χιλιάρχους τρίτους
- λέγας, πρὸς ὅπειροι - ἐν χρόνῳ δ' ἀποφθέινει
- το Τάρσος ἄνθρωποιν.

and 1372-6 -

- Πολλῶν πάροικων κατείχενς εἰρήμενων
- τὰν κατά, εἴποιν οὐκ ἐπιστηχυνθημεν.
- τῶς γὰρ τις ἐκεῖνος ἐκεῖ ἔρχετο παροικών, βίοις
- δοκούντις εἶναι, πηγανίς ἀκούειν 'ἀν
- φάσθημεν ὅποιος κρίετον ἐκτεθήμενος;

The first of these passages is superficially similar to 225M, in that lack of inhibition regarding a boast is the subject; but Klytaimestra has been feigning loyalty to her husband, and loyalty is precisely the virtue expected of a noble woman and a good wife; while there may be some suggestion that modesty normally prevents one speaking of one's own virtues, the underlying meaning of Klytaimestra's words is that her boast, assuming it to be true, as she says it is, does her credit, because it reveals that she has fulfilled society's expectations of a dutiful wife.

In the second passage she prefaces a speech explaining her longing for her husband during his absence with an assertion
that she will not be ashamed to speak of her love for her husband, because time has blunted her inhibition with regard to such private matters. In both these passages the *aidos* which Klytaimestra claims to ignore is, on the surface at least, of an insignificant kind, but the point of these lines for the meaning of the play is that they are lies; it was probably well established at this time that deceit is *aischron*, and the audience will realize that Klytaimestra's denials of *aidos* conceal her more significant lack of *aidos* with regard to her deceit. It is this, the essence of her *anaideia*, which emerges in the third passage; here she does attempt to justify conduct which *aidos* might have prevented with reference to the right of retaliation, the need to fight duplicity with duplicity, and so the passage may be considered as an instance of the individual's subjective appraisal of the situation overcoming convention, but still her lack of *aidos* with regard to telling lies, which in turn suggests her lack of *aidos* for her husband and for the limitations imposed on her as a woman, is evident; the effect of all three passages is cumulative; Klytaimestra is entirely without *aidos*, which, for a woman, is possibly more reprehensible than it is for a man.

The conviction that one is right, then, may actually reveal that one is wrong, at least in terms of traditional values, but we must bear in mind that, even if the insistence of Achilles and Klytaimestra on their own rights is morally reprehensible and an indication of their *anaideia*, the language that they use clearly implies that the argument that one's own evaluation of one's conduct is more important than "what people say" was far from unknown in Aeschylus' time. Two other passages reveal a similar outlook, but neither may safely be used as evidence for the practices of Aeschylus; Snell presumably omits *Septem* 1029-30 from his account because of the doubts about the authenticity of the end of the play, but he includes *Py* 266, to which similar reservations apply. In the former Antigone argues much as she does in Sophokles' play, that she is not ashamed to disobey the order that Polyneikes should not be buried, while in the latter Prometheus'
proud admission that he willingly did wrong (Ὑπερέφανος) reveals that he is not concerned that others should mock him for his ἀμετάκλητος; in choosing the term which his enemies might more readily apply to his deed he resembles Solon in fr. 32: in both these cases a subjective idea of right is opposed to the judgement of others, and even if both are later than Aeschylus, they show that the phenomenon first observed in Solon, though perhaps not entirely without trace in Homer and Archilochos, becomes common in fifth century literature.

We have now covered most of the instances of ἀιδος etc. in Aeschylus; comment on some passages, however, has been reserved until now, in order that we may observe how σέβας and its cognates, which, as we have already seen, often occur in similar contexts to those in which our terms are regularly found, have, to a large extent, taken over many of the functions of ἀιδος in Aeschylus; the takeover is not complete, however, and the considerable degree of overlap which exists allows us to discover what the terms have in common.

The most obvious point of contact is to be found at Pers. 694-704:

Χο. δένομαι μὲν προσιδίσθεκι,
δένομαι δ' ἄντικα λέγει
σέβην ἀρχαῖων περὶ τάμβηλ.

Δα. ἀλλὰ ἐπεὶ κατωθεὶν ἦλθον ὡς γόος πεπειρνέος,
μή τι μακελείης μοθὸν ἄλλῳ σύντομον λόγῳ
ἐπεὶ καὶ πέρκινε πάντως τὴν ἐμὴν κίνω μεθεύς.

Χο. δένομαι μὲν χαρίσκομαι
δένομαι δ' ἄντικα πάσθει
λέγεις δύσλευκτοι φιλοσειν.

Δα. ἀλλὰ ἐπεὶ δεός παρλικὸν σοι φευγών ἀνθίστησαι,
τῶν ἐμῶν κτλ.

The chorus first describe their inhibition as σέβας, which arises from their "ancient dread" of their former king, but Dareios himself paraphrases it as ἀιδος, before the chorus go on to reiterate their reserve in terms of fear, which the king describes as δεός. The connexion with fear places these usages in the category, "respect for one of superior status"
in which *aidos* is often found in Homer, while the chorus' reluctance to look Dareios' ghost in the face (694), indicates that this characteristic shame-reaction, which is often found in contexts which we should describe in terms of modesty, embarrassment or simply shame, also occurs in contexts which seem to us to involve respect; the similarity of the manifestations of inhibition across the range of these usages is presumably one reason why the Greek can apply one term to all. Most important for our purposes here, however, are the inhibitory force of *sebas*, its closeness to *aidos* and the association of both with fear.

In other passages we find that *aidos* and *sebas* are used almost interchangeably in contexts which are, to all intents and purposes, identical. We might compare, for example, *Supp.* 222–3, with line 345 of the same play,

*αίδος εὑρίσκειν πόλεος ὑδ᾽ ἔστημεν.*

Similarly, *aidos* is the response to the suppliant at 641, but *sebas* describes the same response at 815 (cf. *Eum.* 151). One's reaction to the god of suppliants may be *aidos* (*Supp.* 478–9) or *sebas* (671–2).

We are familiar enough with *aidos* as a reaction to another's power; such seems to be the *aidos* of the chorus at *Ag.* 362–4:

*Δίκ τοι βέλιον μέχριν καίδομαι τὸν τάδε πραθεμένον, ἔτ' Ἀλεξάνδρω τείνοντα πᾶλιν τὸ σοφ, ... .*

Here *aidos* is not general reverence for a deity but awe at his power, power which has been manifested in the punishment of Paris. In Aeschylus, however, *sebas* is much more common than *aidos* in such applications; in *Supp.* 755–6, for example, the collocation of *sebas* and fear found in the *Persae* passage recurs in *Th.* 680–8, *while at Cho.* 912 – *οὐ δὲν σεβίζῃ γενεσθίους αἰώνισ τεκνον* – it is clear that Orestes' *sebas* is to be akin to fear and to be directed at the power of a mother's curse.
Two passages in Ag. show how sebizo works as did aideomai in Homer in describing the response of inferior to (mortal) superior; at 258-60 the chorus address Klytaimestra as follows:

ηὴ ἡδὲς ὑπὸ, Κλυταίμνητα, κράτος. δείκῃ τιν ἐστὶ φύτος ἀρετὴν ἔτειν γυναῖκι, ἐρεμοῦντος ἐργῶν θεοῦν.

Similar are the terms in which they greet Agamemnon at 785-7:

πῶς σε προσφιές; πῶς σε ἡδὲς μὴ ὑπεράκης μὴ ὑποκάμψας

The presence of τις in 259 is instructive; we decided that, in Homer, aidos could be a reaction to another's time, be he an equal or a superior, and a similar idea of "honouring" seems to exist in sebas.

Both aideomai and the verbs based on sebas, in fact, occur frequently in contexts where ideas of "honouring", "choosing" or "favouring" are present, and their sense in such contexts seems to approximate to τις or πτοκήνων. At Cho.106-8, for example, the chorus-leader explains that she honours (κιδούμη) Agamemnon's tomb as if it were an altar, and Elektra accepts her aidos. At Eum.760 Orestes claims that Zeus became his saviour, πατέρον ἁδεθὲς μένοι, which Verrall translates, "In pity of my father's fate," and Gagarin paraphrases, "... a sense of respect and shame at his father's death," but the point is that Zeus has preferred, i.e. considered more important, the death of Agamemnon to that of Klytaimestra; similarly, Athene says (at 739-40),

οὖν γυναῖκις οὐ προτυπήτων μένοι

and the chorus recapitulate the argument of Apollo at 640 with the words πατέρος πτοκήνων ζεὺς μένοι while the similarity in sense between aideomai and πτοκήνω is confirmed by the use of πτοκήνω (governing τοκέων τέκνων, equivalent to αἴδομενος τόκεος) and αἴδομενος together at 545-9. Eum.760, then, means "putting my father's fate first", or, if μένοι may mean not "death", but "portion", "honouring the paternal portion". In all these passages, it seems, the idea of "honouring" regularly present in aideomai when it governs a personal
object, transfers the verb somewhat from its normal usage; sebe is used in a similar sense at Eum. 715 and 749. Containing the idea of "honouring", then, sebas is frequently the reaction to one of superior power; it appears from Cho. 55-7, however, that it does not simply respond to naked power, for the new régime of Klytaimestra and Aigisthos, although not lacking in power, is said to have lost the sebas which once belonged to the royal house, and thus to have lost the respect of the people. Sebas, then, is not simply fear of the powerful, but rather a reaction which encompasses positive admiration for legitimate authority. Similarly, at Ag. 1612 the chorus, despite the fact that he has already assumed the place of ruler, refuse to show any sebas for Aigisthos. At PV 937 Prometheus urges the chorus,

\[ \text{σέβοι, προσεύχου, θώπτε τὸν κρατοῦντι τ' κ' εί.} \]

and, although he clearly sees τὸ σέβοι as the reaction of the weak to the strong, regardless of the character of the latter's power, the connexion with flattery shows that it must also entail an active expression of one's admiration for its object.

Aidos, as we have seen on numerous occasions, is particularly common in relationships with one's parents, family, friends and in those which involve strangers and guests; in Aeschylus, sebas, too, is found in these contexts. At Supp. 707-9 it is one of the "ordinances of Dike" that parents should receive the sebas of their children, and at Eum. 269-72 lack of sebas for the gods, a guest or one's parents are the offences which are rewarded by τὴς δίκης ἐπέφε. and all may easily be regarded as examples of anaideia. Likewise, we have already seen 116 that Eteokles and Polyneikes were said to have perished ἄρ φελοι δικνοῖτε, and this must refer fundamentally to their lack of familial aidos.

As a reaction to those of special status, sebas, as we have seen, is very often directed towards the gods; although aidos now also occurs with greater frequency in this connexion, it appears from Aeschylus and other fifth century literature,
both poetry and prose, that sebas is the more typical term used to designate man's attitude to god; see Septem 529-30, Supp. 222-3, 921-2, Cho. 960, Eum. 12-3 and 897. Py 541-2 also reveals, paradoxically, that the gods are entitled to sebas; Prometheus, a god, feels too much sebas for mortals, and it is implied that this is an inversion of the normal pattern. Mortals, however, can attract a proper amount of sebas (see, e.g., Ag. 925), and it should certainly not be inferred that sebas is an exclusively religious concept, particularly since, on its first appearances in Homer, it bears no such exclusive reference. As a result of the frequent association with the gods, however, the adjectives eusebes, asebes, dussebes and the corresponding nouns most often occur in religious contexts, although they can refer to general right and wrongdoing, (particularly because the gods now have such an interest in human conduct) and hence they can also describe proper or improper behaviour in contexts in which the gods have a particular interest.

So far we have used sebas and aidos as shorthand for the complexes of terms related to these concepts; in Aeschylus, however, there is frequently a difference of usage between the two; whereas in Homer sebas denoted the individual's reaction to another person or some object which aroused his awe, in Aeschylus it most often refers to that quality which occasions such a reaction in others; Eum. 92 is an obvious example - εἶνει τῷ Ζεύς τῷ ἐκνύμων εὐβασις; ἀδελφεῖ θεῶν λέγεται. In this sense, sebas is often spoken of as the possession of the gods - Py 1091, Supp. 396, Cho. 644; similarly, at Ag. 515, Hermes is described as the sebas of heralds, i.e. that which heralds sebein. Elsewhere sebas can designate anything which one εἶνει - the virginity of Europa at fr. 145M. 5 and the homosexual relationship between Achilles and Patroklos in 228M; from the latter we see both that sebas is, like aidos, relevant to relationships of philia, and that sebas, in its objective sense, can attract aidos (εὐβασις ... ἀδελφεις). Sometimes there is no need to decide whether sebas is the objective quality or the subjective reaction; at Eum. 885, for example, ὁ δὲ θεὸς εὐβασις, the genitive
may be either possessive ("the majesty of Persuasion") or objective ("the respect which Persuasion commands") and in Supp. 83-5 the altar which is a δαίμων ἐσήμα may be an object of respect to the δαίμονες, mortals or both; similarly at 755 of the same play θεοίν ἐμηρίδια may be the things which the gods ἐςημά or the things, belonging to the gods, which men ἐςημά, since the subjective sense appears to be the older, it appears that, from the meaning "awe", the term develops to mean, "that which occasions awe", a process we see beginning in h. Hom. Cer. 10-1. In many cases, such as these last, the distinction will not be clearly made, if it was felt at all, and the clearest example of this is Cho. 55-7 (p. 189), where sebas must be both the quality in the royal house which arouses the respect of the people and that respect itself, which now "stands aside". A distinction must, however, be made at Cho. 243, in order that the text be properly understood; Elektra has recognized her brother and exclaims:

πιστὸς δ' ἀδελφός ἡθ' ἔμι ἐςημά ἠμιρέων.

It is important to see that these words imply nothing about Orestes' attitude to Elektra; pistos means not "loyal" but "reliable", its most normal sense in Aeschylus, and ἐςημά ἠμιρέων means "bringing me something to sebein", not "bringing me your respect." Elektra means that she has relied upon Orestes and felt sebas for him all these years, and she now realizes that he has, by his appearance, shown himself worthy of this regard (it seems most likely that ηθ' ἡθα is equivalent to κε' ἡθα (on which see Goodwin, Moods and Tenses, §39)).

In other passages the active sense, "respect" is unambiguously what is required; ἄκτων ἐςημά at Supp. 707 must surely mean "respect for one's parents", while the sebas of the townspeople at Eum. 690 is clearly their reaction to the power of the Areiopagos (equivalent to τοὶ μὴ ἄδειν ἐςημάτες in 749). In conclusion, then, the usage of the substantives sebas and aídos differs, in that the duality of sebas is much more regular than the duality of aídos; nor is there complete correspondence in the usage of other terms belonging
to the same groups; while the usage of the verbs may overlap, the same is not true of, for example, *aidoios* and *eusebes*, the former being normally passive in sense 129 and the latter normally active; *asebeia* or *dussebeia*, however, may refer to similar kinds of conduct to *anaideia*, provided the latter has only a general sense; for *sebas* and its cognates have no explicit reference in Aeschylus to popular disapproval or concern for one's own reputation. In general in Aeschylus, and in the other tragedians, *sebas* and *aidos* only overlap where both take a personal or quasi-personal object, that is, in situations where both may be rendered as "respect"; in Homer, as we saw, 130 *sebomai* etc. could be followed by an infinitive, and thus behave like *aidomai*, but in Aeschylus we find this happening only at Pers. 694-6 (p. 186 above), and there the chorus' inhibitory *sebas* is based on their *sebas* (= respect) for their former king; the two groups of terms are obviously very close, and, even in Homer, there may already be some contamination from one to the other, but if *aidos* is to be distinguished from *sebas* at all, it will surely be in its concern with the image of the self (the "ego ideal" 131) and with the prospect of action which is in conflict with that image that the distinction is to be found.

*Sebas* etc. are certainly more common in Aeschylus than *aidos* and its cognates, and instances of the former are most numerous in two plays, *Supp.* and *Eum.*; in the former *sebas* works closely with *aidos*, which is not surprising since the plot centres on an act of supplication and since, while *aidos* is commonly linked with the reaction of the supplicated, *sebas* is particularly associated with the gods, whose concern for suppliants is central to the ritual. In *Eum.* *sebas* is concerned mainly with crime and deterrence, and, on occasion, *aidos* also intervenes. There are some 20 instances of *sebas* etc. in the play; many of these have already been discussed, and most of the rest occur in two passages of the trial scene at Athens. At 482-8 Athene explains that the new process of justice which she is about to lay down will involve evidence and witnesses, and the *thesmos* of oaths for which the jurors will feel *aidos* (483-4). 132 The chorus,
however, are concerned that the new method of punishment may
not have the deterrent effect of the old, and in their song
(490-565) they worry that, if their power is destroyed,
kindred murder will go unavenged, and there will be nothing
to prevent the murder of mothers and fathers (490-516). The
example of the punishment of the guilty, then, is necessary
to deter others, and it is on this point that they enlarge
at 517-25:

The utility of fear (τὸ δεινὸν) is thus explained: fear
of punishment causes one to check impulses to transgress,
and to see σεβαίνειν: σεβάς is thus associated with fear once
more, but, as we saw in connexion with Cho.55-7, the two
are not exactly synonymous, as the chorus go on immediately
to suggest at 526-30:

Fear of punishment, then, is not to be carried to the extent
of despotic coercion; there are rewards as well as punish-
ments (534-7).

In the next stanza (538-49) the thought of τίς ... ἐτέκεν σέβας
Δίκα (522-5) is taken up by βιοιν αἰσθέμενον Δίκας (539), and
the two concepts are again linked at 545-9:

Here σέβας τοῦ προτίμου and αἰσθάνεσθαι are virtually synonyms.
and the specific virtues commended are those which *aidos* traditionally upholds, but which Aeschylus can also describe as maintained by *sebas*. Respect for one's parents and for *xenoi* are among the most canonical of Greek virtues, and it would appear that the chorus believe that these are kept in force by their kind of *dike*, by that fear of punishment which is maintained by example; the *aidos* which they would like to see is, in fact, related to punishments in 541-3; to disregard *aidos* is to be distracted by *kerdos*, and for this punishment awaits; *aidos*, then, seems no less closely related to fear of punishment than *sebas*, but both are also used of the reverence accorded properly constituted power, and thus both imply more than simple fear; it is noticeable, however, that the frequent connexion of *aidos* with the consequences of popular disapproval is not mentioned; the Furies are uniquely concerned with respect for authority.

The Furies' song concludes with two stanzas on the rewards for justice and the punishments for its opposites, and a debate on the merits of Orestes' case follows, until, at 681ff., Athene puts the matter to the judges and explains to them their duties; she now describes the *thesmos* (681) which she had promised to institute at 483-4, and, in effect, she attempts to allay the chorus' fears point by point; at 690-1 the necessity of fear and *sebas* as a means of promoting just behaviour is affirmed, and, at 696-9, the views of the chorus find an exact echo; the citizens are to *sebein* το θυμι α'ναρχον μήτε σεβασμόναν (cf.526-7), the efficacy of το δείνων is stated (cf. 517-9), and it is assumed that it is only fear which makes mortals just (cf. 520-5). Athene, then, institutionalizes fear and *sebas* and gives them utility in the state, but it is also shown that these qualities have always been instrumental in the maintenance of justice; their new utility seems to lie in their new objectivity, their lack of partiality in the context of a court of law, for it is made clear that the new system of justice is to be superior to old (700-6):

`Τοιόντω σε *ταραφοῦντες ένδικως σεβάς, εδρυμέ τε *χωρίς καί πόλεως σωτηρίων εξολόθ’ αν οίνον οὔτις ἀνθρώπων ἐξέλι,`
Here *sebas* refers to the new system itself; it is to be an object of awe to the citizens, of which they will be afraid, but which will also be *aidoion*, and this suggests that we are not to imagine a state ruled by mere coercion; the Areiopagos will be incorruptible, and will deserve the respect of the people.

Fear of punishment, then, produces *sebas* for the agencies which have the power to enforce it, be they the avenging Furies or a homicide court, and, in view of 539 and 705, in which *aidos* also enters the picture, it seems that that feeling, too, is aroused by the forces of punishment and deterrence; the stress, however, is on *sebas*, and this accords with the far greater frequency of that term in the sense "respect for those of special status". The association of *aidos* with fear is traditional, and is found in contexts in which the fear is fear of disgrace and in those in which it is fear of the power of another person; if *aidos* is to differ from *sebas* at all (and in many cases, as we have seen, there is no practical difference in application), a provisional distinction might be found in the contrast between the ultimate reference to oneself contained in *aidos* (though it must be admitted that such a reference is rarely expressed in contexts in which *aideomai* takes a personal object, in the sense "respect") and the other-directed reference of *sebas*; *sebas*, it seems, is an enlightened form of fear, based on the acknowledgement of superior power, yet contingent upon the nature of that power and one's reaction to it; if it is concerned with consequences for oneself it is with the consequences of concrete sanctions that it is concerned, rather than with the effect punishments will have on one's own status and reputation, which is the ultimate reference of *aidos*. 
The utility of fear in the state is, as de Romilly points out, recognized by later writers, particularly Plato, and *aidos* (and *aischune*) have their part to play in the Platonic "good fear"; for Plato, however, *aidos* in this context is not simply the respect which the institutions of the state command, but the traditional fear of disgrace which prevents transgression, and, while this may lie behind the *aidos* which occurs in *Eum.*, it is not explicitly mentioned.

De Romilly also shows that the fear inspired by the Areiopagos is the healthy counterpart of the terror which affects the characters earlier in the trilogy, and with which, as we saw, Agamemnon's *aidos* has a certain amount to do; this sequence of distortion in *Ag.* and *Cho.* and resolution in *Eum.* has been shown to occur in several of the image-patterns of the trilogy. The various disruptions reflected in the imagery of the trilogy also reflect the disturbance in the world order, a disturbance which results fundamentally from crime; the *aidos* of Agamemnon and the fear of the chorus which we have already looked at represent the instinctive awareness of human beings that there is some disturbance, that something is not quite right. In his presentation of the fear which torments the guilty (e.g. at *Ag.* 179-80) Aeschylus anticipates Demokritos' and Antiphon's descriptions of the psychological disturbance which affects those who have, as we should say, a bad conscience, and in his use of *aidos* as an instinctive sense that a contemplated act conflicts with one's internal awareness of moral standards, whether these are described as one's own or those of society, he certainly shows his recognition of the phenomena of conscience, but, as we have seen, this awareness that all is not well is not restricted to the agent, but is diffused among those who merely look on, and is ultimately regarded as inspired by the gods; Aeschylus, then, does not present conscience unambiguously as such, but he has recognized the phenomenon and presented it in a way which is psychologically convincing; we should notice in particular how his representation of *aidos* as an instinctive form of conscience which often leads to indecision and uncertainty is central to his use of psychological realism.
NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE.

1. I do not use the word "wrong" in any exclusively moral sense; *aidos* is also the reaction to conduct which is wrong in the sense that it is inappropriate.

2. Dareios applies *hybris* etc. only to the conduct of the army (although Ἔρως in 831 refers to Xerxes), and it is therefore probably unwise to see his remarks as explaining the actions of its commander (Gagarin, *Aeschylean Drama*, 47-8), although many critics (Dodds, *GI*, p.39, Winnington-Ingram, *Studies*, c.1, Lesky, *Greek Tragic Poetry*, p.54) do see Dareios' comments as an inspired revelation of the nature of the conduct of both Xerxes and the army, of which the play's other characters have only a partial grasp.

3. On this fragment, see Lloyd-Jones, *JHS* 1956, 59-60, and in Loeb Aeschylus (ed. H.W. Smyth, II²) appendix 576-81; on the identity of this child of Zeus and Hera (probably Ares), see the latter discussion.

4. On the text of 444, see Broadhead ad loc. The idea of dying *aischros* also occurs at frr. 225M.21 (Snell's restoration; the sense is not clear, but perhaps Achilles means to reproach Patroklos for deserting him (cf.228,229M) or, more likely, he is speaking of the death (by stoning) which the army has in mind for him) and 309M (where the disgrace arises from the fact that the deceased has been cheated of his property).


5. See below, pp.170-1.


7. ibid..


9. Cf. Dover, *GPM*, p.210; in the *Od* the actions of Klytaimnestra and Aigisthos are described as *aeikea* (cf. pp.20-1 and n.48, p.98 above), and at *Od*.1.35 Zeus describes Aigisthos' seduction of Klytaimnestra as Ἰτε μῆνων, while at 37-43 we learn that he was directly warned by the gods about his conduct; clear signs, surely, that adultery is to be regarded as discreditable for the adulterer.
13. Cf. *Od*. 17.578 (pp. 107-8 n. 150, and note also the adverb in *Od*. 19.243) and [Homer] *Ep*. 2.2.6.6 (pp. 126-7 above); on the coexistence of both senses, cf. p. 146 above on *P. I*. 2.37.  
14. See Friis Johansen and Whittle on both 1 and 192, and cf. von Erffa, p. 87, who suggests that an active sense for aidoios in 192 might be supported by 815, ἄρρητον δ' ἱκτῷς ἵπτεν (addressed to Zeus).  
16. Homer; see 64-70 above; Sophokles, pp. 217-8 below; Euripides, 363-84 below.  
17. On the two types of supplication, see Kopperschmidt, 46-53, Burian, *Suppliant Drama*, 1.4-5, Gould, 75-8; on self-abasement in personal supplication, see Gould, 79, 94-5.  
18. See below, 301-2; Menelaos does supplicate Theonoe, but he attempts to avoid self-humiliation - he feels that it would diminish his reputation as the captor of Troy to clasp her knees or to weep, and he expresses this inhibition as aischune (= aidos).  
19. Aidoios also occurs as a simple, honorific epithet at *Ag*. 600 (used of Agamemnon by his wife).  
20. On aidos and oaths, cf. p. 123 above and 210-1 below. Von Erffa, p. 95, suggests that αἴσχρησθη τὸν ἐρχώ may have been an Attic legal formula, but there appears to be no evidence for this.  
21. It seems sensible to treat the few relevant passages in *PV* in this chapter simply because of the traditional association with Aeschylus, although it is probably not by him (see Griffith, *The Authenticity of the Prometheus Bound*); it seems most likely, however, that it is fifth century in date (Griffith, p. 253), and so legitimate evidence for the general usage of the period, though not for any generalizations about Aeschylus.  
22. So Griffith, comm. ad loc.; von Erffa interprets the Oceanids' aidos as a feeling or condition which is disturbed
by the noise of Prometheus' binding (91-2), but fails to say what kind of feeling or condition it might be.

22a. Cf. Cho. 917, where Orestes is drawing on traditional shyness regarding sexuality when he claims that he is ashamed (aischumomai) to speak of his mother's liaison with Aigisthos; speak of it he does, however, and Klytaimestra knows exactly what he means; see Garvie, ad loc..

23. If Danaos does have any specific Τ' χρεία in mind at 1008, it is not clear who they are; probably not Aegyptos and his sons, although it just might be possible that they could take a perverse pleasure in Danaos' disgrace, even though it would entail that of their prospective daughters-in-law and wives; see further Friis Johansen and Whittle III, p.290.

24. p.163 above (cf. in general p.71 and n.193).


28. For the text and interpretation, see Garvie, ad loc. (his preference for τύπτειξαν over τύπτειξαν in 664 does not affect the passage for our purposes).

29. Cf. Od.18.184, p.73 above (also pp.71-4); see also Garvie, ad loc. Gould, *JHS* 1973, p.87n.65 (also *JHS* 1980, p.56).


32. pp.8 and 55 above.

33. So Friis Johansen and Whittle, ad loc..

34. Von Erffa, p.90.

35. The interpretation of the scholiast, followed by some edd. and rejected by Friis Johansen and Whittle, ad loc.; their objection, that aidos is not found of retrospective shame (in the basic sense of shame occasioned by an event in the past), is invalid; Io's aidos could be the same as that of Kassandra at Ag.1203-4 (p.167 above); for aideomai used of an event in the past, cf. pp.37,132-3 above; simply because Io's aidos may arise from her past sufferings does not mean that it must be tantamount to guilt.
37. Below, pp.186-96; note that the εὐφύς ... μὴ γίνω of 228M is expressed as μὴ γίνω τῷ τῶν εὐφύς ὁμιλεῖ in 229M.
38. If this approach assumes that Aeschylus had an interest in individual characterization and psychology, so be it. Psychology and character are integral to plot, action and the creation of tension in Aeschylus, although, it need hardly be said, he did not indulge in characterization for its own sake; on this topic in general, see Jones, On Aristotle and Greek Tragedy, 30-3,37-8 (on ethos in Arist. Poetics) and 77-81 (against characterization in A.), and contrast P.E. Easterling, GR 1973, 3-19, Winnington-Ingram, Studies, p.141, Dover, JHS 1973, 58-69, esp. 69; the approach of Hutchinson, Septem, xxxiv-v, is less tentative and has much to commend it.
39. p.96.
40. For his desire to fight Polyneikes, see 692,718-9 (where it is combined with a belief in the inevitability of the conflict); for the belief that the confrontation is determined by the curse, 653-9,695-7. Eteokles never considers the possibility that he might not face his brother, even though the chorus urge him to do so (698); the question of free will and compulsion, then, often brought in here (see Winnington-Ingram, Studies, 16-7n.3 for reff.), does not really arise, for, however the curse may work (and we must assume that it does have objective existence), it does not conflict with his desire; the question of choice versus compulsion would be more relevant had Eteokles wished to resist the force of the curse; prima facie it is not impossible for him to refuse to face his brother (see Hutchinson on 653-719 [p.149] and contrast Lloyd-Jones, CQ 1959, p.86, who says that he had "no choice"); the effect of the Redepaare scene, with its mixture of tenses, is to suggest that, despite the curse, Eteokles could choose to position himself at another gate (see Lesky, WS 1961, 8-10 [also JHS 1966, 83-4, Greek Tragic Poetry, 58,60], R.D. Dawe, PCPS 1963, 33-7 [esp.37], Winnington-Ingram, Studies, p.24; Hutchinson [on 369-652, pp.104-5] does not believe either that Aeschylus did not intend to make it clear whether or not all the postings had been made [Lesky,
Dawe) or that some have been made, some not (Winnington-Ingram), but nevertheless holds that "the audience must not think that the seventh gate has already been allotted").


42. So Hutchinson on 653-719 (p.149), comparing Il.6.441-3, where aiodos does occur; Snell, Aischylos, p.83 has the same comparison, but, wrongly, believes that Eteokles fears not the disgrace of imputed cowardice, but that of injustice; Eteokles' concern for military success and glory, however, resurfaces at 716-7.

43. Class, Gewissensregungen, p.33 argues for coincidence of human and divine motives, and rightly rules out the possibility of a Gewissensentscheidung in the passage; he seems to imply, however, that the curse is more important than the personal motives, and this is brought out more fully by Stebler, Entstehung und Entwicklung, p.35, who recognizes the combination of motives, but remarks, "Wo magische Notwendigkeit wirkt, gibt es keine Möglichkeit des Entrinnens."

44. So Winnington-Ingram, Studies, 36-40.

45. See the discussion of Gagarin, Aeschylean Drama, 6-11, 17-8,20 etc..

46. pp.164-6 above.

47. Cf. Lesky, Greek Tragic Poetry, p.64.

48. See Friis Johansen and Whittle, ad loc.

49. This is probably a legitimate distinction; see Gould, JHS 1973, p.89; on miasma as the result should any harm come to those who supplicate at an altar, see Parker, Miasma, 182-6, esp. 185.

50. On his amechania here, see Snell, Aischylos, p.60, Kopperschmidt, p.62, Lesky, Greek Tragic Poetry, 64-5.

51. See Gould, JHS 1973, p.82 for this tactic.

52. οὐδὲ πετὶ κατὰν (399) is most naturally taken as concessive rather than conditional; Pelasgos has the power to decide for himself, but such is the gravity of the matter and of the implications of his decision for the city that he does not want to; see Friis Johansen and Whittle ad loc., and cf. their notes on 365-9,368-9,484-5. Pelasgos is thus not constrained by a democratic constitution, although his
statements of his power at 250ff. are certainly tempered somewhat by his subsequent stress on the rôle of the demos; see Burian, *Suppliant Drama*, 53-7.

53. The comparison is also made by Friis Johansen and Whittle, on 401.


58. Lesky, 79-80.

59. So Rivier, p. 18 and Stebler, p. 94, who seems to imagine that the gods somehow force Pelasgos to accept the supplication.

60. See the important remarks of Lesky, *JHS* 1966, p. 80.


62. For two contrasting views, see Fraenkel on 948 (on the importance of the scene), Dawe, *PCPS* 1963, p. 48n. 2 (on the unimportance of the scene); see also Easterling, *GR* 1973, 10-1.

63. This is "non-sceptical" relativism; see below, pp. 568-70.

64. On the correct interpretation of these lines, see Fraenkel, *ad loc.*, and cf. Winnington-Ingram, *Studies*, p. 92.


67. See Page on 931ff.


69. Cf. von Erffa, p. 94; unfortunately he persists in regarding *aidos* in such phrases (where the noun is followed by an infinitive, cf. *Il. 17.336 and Od. 3.24* [p. 29 above]) as equivalent to *ιπρός τό εὐθεία*; although to say, "there is *aidos* to do *x*" (i.e. the prospect arouses the *aidos* of those faced with it) may come to the same thing as "it is *aischron* to do *x*, *aidos* does not mean "disgrace" in this context.

70. By Dawe, *PCPS* 1963, p. 48n. 2; contrast Easterling, 10-12.


72. p. 78.

73. p. 75.

74. The chorus describe Agamemnon's consideration of two alternatives, and his eventual preference for one over the
other, and so it can hardly be maintained that he does not have a choice; ananke in 218 probably refers to the necessary consequences of the decision (Snell, *Aischylos*, p. 143), but even if it does not, Dover (JHS 1973, p. 65) is right to point out that, "Many ἀνάγκαι are resistible in principle" - ananke may encompass motive and circumstance, and does not necessarily imply absolute compulsion. Those who claim that Agamemnon has no choice include Page (introd. to the ed. of Denniston and Page, xxiii-ix) and Lloyd-Jones, *CQ* 1962, 187-99, esp. 191-2; Rivier, *REG* 1968, 9-10, recognizes that he does have a choice, but stresses his lack of freedom (cf. Stebler, p. 53); one might, however, do the same in the case of anyone faced with a difficult choice. Hammond, JHS 1965, p. 47, sensibly points out that those who say that Agamemnon has no choice can only mean "no real choice". We are hardly justified, however, in treating his choice from an austerely philosophical perspective; Agamemnon is liable for the sacrifice of Iphigeneia no matter how far his freedom of choice is restricted, and his act calls forth Klytaimestra's retribution whatever the nature of his decision; see Gagarin, *Aeschylean Drama*, p. 197n. 17 (but notice that Gagarin also [n. 18] rejects the idea that Agamemnon is absolutely compelled to act as he does).

75. Gagarin, p. 92.
76. P. 172 above.
77. See Lesky, JHS 1966, p. 81.
78. As Page believes (introd. p. xxvii).
79. JHS 1966, p. 81.
80. See Gagarin, p. 92 and cf. Stebler, p. 53.
81. See Dover, JHS 1973, p. 66.
82. The meaning of this line for Orestes is probably that, although he recognizes that it is wrong in any normal circumstance to kill one's mother, his own deed is justified as retribution for Klytaimestra's, which, for him, is the initial wrong; for the audience, however, the words will be a sign that Orestes' vengeance is thematically and morally parallel with that of his his mother; see Garvie, ad loc., and, for the view that Orestes here expresses his realization that what he is about to do is wrong, see Pearson, *Popular*
Ethics, p.20 (cf. Snell, Aischylos, p.120).

83. Or, probably, the actor playing her makes some equivalent gesture (Garvie, ad loc.).

84. See p.46 (with n.113) above.


86. Orestes' "decision" precedes the play's beginning (Rivier, 28-9, Stebler, p.31), but his resolve is strengthened at several points, notably in the kommos; for the view that Orestes fully realizes what his decision involves only at 899, cf. Garvie, ad loc..

87. Snell (Aischylos, 133-4) is thus correct in stressing Orestes' choice, but wrong to see it as a struggle in his heart between divine forces (cf. Class, p.44); Klytaimestra's Erinyes have not yet entered the equation, and Agamemnon's Erinyes desire the same end as Apollo; cf. Garvie, Cho., introd. p.xxxii. Rivier, 25,28-9 (cf. Stebler, p.91) maintains that Orestes has no choice, but see the remarks of Garvie on 899; the very mention of the punishments laid down by Apollo should Orestes disobey his command (271-96) shows that disobedience is not impossible (Garvie, p.xxxi).

88. e.g. W. Arrowsmith, Tulane Drama Review, 3.3 (1959) p.49.

89. On dikē as retributive justice in A., see Gagarin, 25-6, 76-80, 83-4, 146-7, etc..

90. Orestes' act is thus in conflict with his internalized awareness of the standards of his society, and his aidōs arises instinctively from this awareness, which must be seen as a form of conscience (Snell, Aischylus, 131,133, Stebler, p.91); Stebler stresses Orestes' Gewissens-Not, yet maintains that his personal conscience is overcome by divine compulsion; but Apollo does not compel, at least not absolutely. Earlier in her work (p.14) she quotes C.G. Jung's distinction between "ethical conscience", involving reflexion and conscious deliberation, and "moral conscience", which is activated instinctively; I do not know that the terms used to make the distinction are helpful, but the distinction in itself is valid; Orestes' aidōs clearly belongs to the latter category. One could make a case for the argument that aidōs always, even when explicitly related to "other people", implies this form of conscience; this might, perhaps, avoid the confusion which arises from the assumption that, when
"conscience" is mentioned with regard to Homer or classical Greek literature, a private, personal, reflective or "ethical" conscience is meant.

91. The authenticity of the fragment has been disputed (see Page, Sel. Pap. III, 136-41, Lloyd-Jones, Aeschylus [ed. Smyth] II 2, 590-3), but Page's literary/dramatic arguments against are hardly conclusive; the balance of probability is still that the fragment is by A.; see Lesky, Greek Tragic Poetry, p.101; certainly Snell's argument, and the analogies he draws with other, Aeschylean passages, deserve to be discussed.

92. Snell (Scenes, p.8) restores κυνήγησις, which would make Achilles' (for he is assumed to be the speaker) lack of αἰδος the more striking, but his argument would still apply even if he read ἐξιθρήσκεια; oὐκ ἐθέρμησα, with a question mark at the end of the line (attributed by Lloyd-Jones to Schadewaldt) might be a better restoration.

93. P.8, cf. Stebler, p.69, who, like Snell, also cites Ag. 1373, and, unlike him, Sept. 1029-30.

94. Scenes, p.8.

95. As in the child's cry, "Sticks and stones ...."

96. Cf. 47-8,53 above.

97. P.53 above.

98. See Scenes, p.9.


100. See pp.142-4 on deceit in Thgn.; cf. PV 685 (which is doubtless later in date than the passages under discussion); also Adkins, MR, p.181.

101. αἰρεῖν νοῦν in 856 expresses exactly the same sense as would αἴδοειναι, and, indeed, in every case where αἰσχύνομαι occurs in A. (Ag. 1373, Cho. 917 [n.22a above], Sept. 1029) aideomai might also be used.

102. The audience may also have gasped on hearing οὐκ ... λέγει in 856-7, thinking first of Klytaimestra's adultery with Aigisthos (cf. Snell, Aischylos, p.122; Fraenkel, on 856, denies the double meaning, but there is no good reason to do so).

103. Cf. Fraenkel on 1373 (which he rejects to 856).

104. As Snell recognizes, Scenes, 10-11.

105. On this topic, see Hutchinson on 1005-78, Lesky, Greek
Tragic Poetry, 61-2; for an argument for authenticity, see Lloyd-Jones, CQ 1959, 80-115; further lit. in all three.

106. See below, pp. 113-4.

107. Paris in particular is scarcely perturbed that others accuse him of slacking and cowardice (pp. 33-4 above), and it should be noted that he defends his own skills (the gifts of Aphrodite, Il. 3.64-6) in the face of Hektor's criticism; we may be intended, however, to see Paris as a bad example.

108. See pp. 134-5 above.

109. On διόμαι see Broadhead on 200-2; Wilamowitz' suggestion that διόμαι (for MSS διόμαι) is a form arising from δέδικα seems more likely to be right than do either the assumption that it is the middle of δίως, and means "fear" on the analogy of φοβέω/φοβέμαι, or Hermann's suggestion διόμαι ("I speed" = "I flee"??); the connexion with fear is, in any case, guaranteed by τέτοιος in 703; this is the only certain instance of τέτοιος in A. - see Italie, Index, s.v. and cf. de Romilly, La Crainte, 59 and 111 n. 1.


111. pp. 48-55.

112. Aeschylean Drama, p. 78.

113. Von Erffa, p. 92, interprets the line correctly, dismissing Wilamowitz' translation, which is the same as Verrall's; Italie (s.v.) gives only mors as the meaning of πότις, but here and at 640 it could mean "portion", although "death" is more likely at 739.

114. For sebo etc. meaning "honour" in a more straightforward sense, cf. Supp. 1024-5, Ag. 274, 779-80, 833, 1612 and Cho. 637.

115. Such is clearly the sense of sebas ... νῦν ἑξισταθηκέναι; the point would be yet more emphatically made if φοβεῖται σέτις (58-9) were intended to draw the contrast between the sebas attracted by the rule of Agamemnon and the fear which is the people's response to the new tyranny, but this makes the connexion with the words immediately following difficult, and, on balance, it is more likely that it is Klytaimestra's fear (perhaps both cause and effect of the people's withdrawal of respect) to which the chorus refer; see Garvie on 58-60.

116. p. 171 above.

117. p. 177.
117a. pp. 92-3 above.

118. e.g. Ag. 338,372, Cho. 122, Eum. 910.


121. i.e. like aidos; see p. 92, and cf. 125-6.

122. Cf. the similar vocative (of the dead Agamemnon) at Cho. 157-8.

123. Cf. p. 169 above.

124. See p. 125 above.

125. Cf. Garvie, ad loc.

126. See Roisman, Loyalty, p. 107 and contrast Garvie, ad loc.

127. Roisman, p. 112.

127a. In Eum. 545 (τοκέων σέβας καὶ πτοτέων) may mean "honouring the majesty of parents" or "placing due importance on the respect which parents deserve."

128. Although aidos = that which one αἰδοῖται is found - pp. 97n. 35,116,120 above - but not in A.

129. But see pp. 164-6 above.

130. pp. 92-3 above.

131. See p. 2 above.


132a. The idea of fear is what is wanted in 522 (cf. 699); εὐδοξίω seems the most likely emendation.

133. Cf. de Romilly, La Crainte, p. 111.

134. Cf. p. 189 above.

135. Cf. p. 188 above.


137. Cf. pp. 119-21,144,150-1 above.

138. Von Erffa, p. 104, claims that aidos and sebas are to be distinguished by the latter's association with fear of punishment, an association which aidos is supposed not to share; neither, however, is equivalent to fear of punishment, and it appears from this passage that punishment awaits both those who show no sebas and those who show no aidos; both aidos and sebas respond to power, and the ability to punish demonstrates power.


140. La Crainte, 112-3.
141. See Pl. Laws 647a, 699c (aidos), 647b, 671d (aischune).
143. Cf. p.179 above.
145. See Class, Gewissensregungen, 35-41 on these lines.
146. See below, pp.546-7, 561-2.
147. See, for example, Ag.948, Cho.889 (pp.178-9,181 above).
149. With regard to other terms which are close to aideomai etc., we should not leave hazomai entirely out of account; if aideomai and sebo etc. are frequently identical in sense, so hazomai expresses similar ideas of fear, respect and honour as do sebo etc.; see Pers.589 (abs., of obeisance to royal power), Supp.652 (pers. obj., = "respect", "stand in awe of"), 884 (quasi-pers. obj., = "respect"), Eum.389 (abs. with fear, cf. von Erffa, p.102), 1002 (pers. obj. = "honour", "respect", "venerate").
4. Sophokles

Although Sophokles does use *aidos* and its relatives differently from Aeschylus, our approach to the younger poet need not differ substantially from that employed in the previous chapter; we might agree with von Erffa that *aidos* has not the same connexion with moral responsibility in Sophokles as in Aeschylus\(^1\) (although we might also feel that, under the influence of Snell, he has exaggerated the importance of that concept in the latter); we should not, however, go along with his contention that we have no opportunity, as we had in Aeschylus' *Supplices*, to observe the operation of *aidos* over the course of an entire play;\(^2\) as in Aeschylus, we shall be concerned first of all with the meaning of the relevant terms in individual passages, then with the rôle of the concepts they represent in the motivation of characters, and thirdly with the implications of our findings for the interpretation of the plays as a whole; and in all of the extant plays, with the possible exception of the OT, the complex of values based on *aidos* can make a significant, sometimes a crucial, contribution to our understanding of the drama.

The extant plays of Sophokles belong to an age in which the idea that there are two sides to every story became a commonplace, and problems based on sophistic relativism - that people may differ over the meanings of words, may have subjective ideas of what is right and what is true, that people find it difficult, sometimes impossible to communicate - loom large in his work. Sophokles understands partiality, aware that people often hold views or attitudes that are contradictory and that they interpret events and situations to suit themselves; accordingly, one kind of *aidos* is frequently set against another in his work, and his characters often have only a partial grasp of what *aidos* is, and of what course of action it dictates; if the tragic element in the plays of Aeschylus often (to us at least) depends on the interplay of freedom and necessity, much of the tragic force in Sophokles, it seems to me, centres on an essential conflict of values.
Our terms occur with relative frequency in *Oedipus Tyrannus*, but the passages concerned are largely heterogeneous, and are not central to the meaning of the drama. At 354-5 Oedipus accuses Teiresias of *anaideia* -

οὔτως ἀναίδως ἐξεκίνησε τοῖς
tο ἑγέρσι;

and his outrage seems to stem from a belief that the seer is failing to accord him the respect his status demands and, perhaps, from a conviction that his accusations will soon be proved false; Teiresias' *anaideia* would then lie in his disregard of the consequences (disgrace) of making accusations against a superior which may easily be refuted. At 635-6 Iokaste, finding Oedipus and Kreon in dispute, delivers the following reproach, based on their neglect of the ills of the city:

οὔτως νοσοῦσθαι ὦ βίοι κλοὺντες κακά;

Her words refer to the duty of the leaders of the community to work in its interests in time of trouble, and seem to imply the right of its members to criticize their betters when they fail to do so; the lines thus recall passages like *Il. 13.292-3*, where Idomeneus foresees *nemesis* as the reaction of those who might see himself and Meriones engaged in conversation rather than in battle.3 Iokaste's *ἐπαίρχυνεσθέ*, then, indicates that it is discreditable (*aischron*) to put personal differences before the good of the community, and suggests that the competitive concern for personal honour evidenced in the quarrel should be subordinated to a concern for the charge of failure in co-operation.

We have noted a connexion between *aídos* and oaths already, particularly in the phrase *καίδεῖσθαι τῶν ὀρκω* in the *Eumenides*. The same phrase is found at *OT. 647*, where Oedipus is asked to "respect" an oath sworn not by himself, as in the Aeschylean passages, but by Kreon; here the power of the oath itself is to be the object of his *aídos*, and this power seems analogous to that of the gods who are its guarantors (note τῶν ὀρκω *καίδεϑι* theology). In 648 Iokaste gives Oedipus other grounds on which to *aideisthai*, asking for *aídos* for
herself (presumably on the grounds of their marital philia) and for the chorus (who, as bystanders, might judge his present, excessive conduct adversely). The chorus themselves then (652-3) take up the appeal, and ask that Oedipus should feel aidos for Kreon, both because he has proved his worth in the past and because he is now "big in oath". Again aidos is operative in connexion with oaths, but now it is the swearer of the oath, not the oath itself, which commands aidos. In this case the aidos felt for the individual seems broadly similar to that accorded suppliants; in both the swearing of an oath and supplication the sanction of divine punishment is invoked, albeit slightly differently in each case; the suppliant is protected by the gods from harm while the swearer of an oath invokes divine destruction on himself in the event of his perjury; nevertheless, the divine element signifies a powerful situation, and aidos may be the reaction to that power. In addition, both supplication and the swearing of an oath create tension by placing structures of honour in a position of stress; the suppliant abandons his claim to honour, while the swearer of an oath commits his honour on the question of its veracity and its fulfilment; to refuse to believe one who has sworn an oath is to challenge his honour or to consider it worthless; to do the opposite is to recognize his honour, and to recognize another person's honour, or time, may be expressed as aidos.

At 1078-9 Oedipus, having learned of his status as a foundling but not yet of his true origin, imagines that Iokaste's hurried departure is to be attributed to shame at his low birth:

\[ \text{αὐὴρ δὴ ἑώς, ἐκεῖν ἃς ἦσσι γυνὴ μεγά,} \\
\text{γὰρ ἰδεῖν τὴν ἐμὴν αἰρχύνετε.} \]

Oedipus himself is not troubled that he might be the child of a slave rather than the king's son he believed himself to be, but he imagines that women may be more sensitive about such things. It seems to me, although the opinion is based on nothing more than Sprachgefühl, that this is one passage in aischunomai is not interchangeable with aideomai; one could perhaps aideisthail one's own dusgeneia, but the most
natural interpretation of τὴν ὑπερήφανην τὴν ἐμὴν αἰδεῖται would surely be "she respects my low birth."

The normal identity of meaning of the two verbs is, however, brought out at 1424-8, where Kreon appeals, presumably to a group of attendants, as follows:

There is quite clearly no effective distinction between the two verbs here; true, καταίγχυνεσθ' is used with a human object and αἰδεῖσθε with a divine, but the roles could easily have been reversed. The disgrace and the pollution with reference to which the attendants are expected to feel ἀιδος (or aischuné) are not their own, yet it is they who are responsible for the fact that Oedipus may be seen by men and by the Sun, and so they are felt to share any reproach or revulsion which the exposure of his pollution may arouse. If ἀιδος is to be the reaction of those whose duty it is to keep Oedipus out of sight, then we might expect that Oedipus himself would be all the more liable to feel ἀιδος; in fact, no word of ἀιδος ever crosses his lips.

Oedipus' ills, however, are quite manifestly also grounds for reproach. Kreon prefaces the remarks quoted above with a denial that he has come to mock or to reproach (ὑπερήφανην 1423) his misfortunes, while Oedipus himself at 1486-1502 (see especially 1494, ὅψεται, and 1500, ὅψεται) recognizes that his daughters will be taunted with the deeds of their father for the rest of their lives. He also, at 1407-8, laments the fact that he has committed "all the acts which are aischista among men," and goes on to say that, since he has done that which it is not kallon either to speak of or to do, he should be concealed or put to death, in order that he may never be seen again (1409-12). Oedipus is thus quite aware of his own disgrace, and in wishing to be removed from sight he is exhibiting both a classic shame reaction and the
kind of *aidos* which Kreon urges on the attendants at 1424-8. Much more importantly, however, his self-blinding is also related to his desire for concealment, and therefore to his shame. Conceptually, unseeing and unseen are very close, and by depriving himself of sight Oedipus expresses the same impulse which later drives him to seek concealment. At the same time, in motivating his self-blinding, he claims that he was driven to that act by his inability to face the prospect of looking upon his father and mother in Hades (as well as that of having to look upon his children and the entire city of Thebes) (1371-83), and inability to face others is also a classic shame reaction; we have also seen repeatedly that shame is in general closely related to ideas of seeing and visibility, and particularly associated with the eyes. Oedipus also, however, wishes to be shown to the people of Thebes (so says the ἑβέργελος at 1287-9); this may be regarded as a sign of the complexity of his psychology (of his desire to punish himself by exposing himself to revulsion) or as a consequence of Sophokles' need to motivate his entrance; or perhaps it is both.

It is not, however, simply the prospect of others' reproach which troubles Oedipus; his words in the *exodos* often take the form of the strongest self-reproach (e.g. 1337-46) and he is clearly horrified by what he has done (1357-61, 1398-1408); he also wishes to be punished (1409-15), and even expresses remorse over his wrongful accusation of Kreon (1419-21); his pain, which is so vividly presented, lies not so much in fear of disgrace but in his knowledge of what he has done, in his μνήμη κακῶς (1318); he is "wretched both in his fate and in his knowledge of it," say the chorus at 1347. If Oedipus' reaction, then, is one of shame, his shame is clearly based on an internal awareness of the horror of what he has done; this being so, his reaction is also compatible with the emotion which we should call guilt. We remember, too, that he is unable to face his parents; is this because he has failed to live up to their ideals or because he fears them as agents of punishment? In the psychoanalytical definitions of shame and guilt we looked at earlier punitive
parents were said to be the focus of guilt, loving parents (and the example they provide) of shame feelings. It is quite clear, however, that Oedipus' crimes are both transgressions of the most profoundly felt traditional imperatives and a failure to conform to the ideals set by other people, and so once again the distinction between guilt (the internalized interdictions of punitive parents) and shame (based on the idea of one's social role formed by identification with parents and others) as the concomitants of transgression and failure respectively is of little help to us. Where one's internal awareness of the character of one's own actions is concerned there will be virtually no effective difference between anxiety described as shame and that described as guilt, and it would be entirely arbitrary to state categorically that Oedipus is suffering from the one rather than the other.

The Trachiniae does have its share of instances of the terms with which we are concerned, but most of these, as in OT, are of comparatively minor importance. At 65-6 Deianeira, recasting the advice of the Nurse (that it is "fitting" - εἰκός, 56 - that Hyllos should go in search of his father) in rather stronger terms, declares that it is a source of aischune that Hyllos has failed to ascertain his father's whereabouts. The disgrace here clearly lies in the son's failure to fulfil his duty towards his father, and thus arises from a neglect of the imperatives of family loyalty. At 448 we find a general usage of τὸ καίρικον in Deianeira's assertion that she regards Iole as "jointly responsible for that which is not at all of a shameful kind and that which does me no harm." This is a very odd way to put it, and the use of μετακινεῖα suggests that Deianeira does hold Iole jointly responsible in some sense, although she may well be sincere in saying that she does not regard that for which she bears joint responsibility as aischron. The adjective is used in the most general of senses here; Deianeira means simply to suggest that Iole has done nothing with which she can find fault; it is unlikely that there is any reference to Athenian law regarding concubinage.
adjective aischra is used of the situation as it stands at
the end of the play, and this, principally the death of
Herakles, is said (by Hyllos) to be discreditable for the
gods. The disgrace to which the gods are liable in Hyllos'
eyes seems to lie in their indifference to human suffering,
and perhaps specifically in the fact that, as he sees it,
Zeus has failed to protect his son, has failed to live up to
the expectation that he would protect him created by (e.g.)
the chorus' rhetorical question at 139-40 -

Τέκνους μεν Ζηνικόβουλον ἐς ἔσεν;

The most important instances of aischron and aischune in the
play occur in connexion with the nature of Deianeira's
stratagem to win back Herakles' love. At 596-7 she affirms
her resolve to go ahead with her secret plan, explaining:

καὶ αἰσχρὰ πέσσεσθαι, οὐποτ' αἰσχύνῃ τεσσάρα.

There is just a slight hint of a paradox in these words, in
the idea that one can do aischra and not be implicated in
aischune, and there seems to be something of a tension bet-
 tween the idea of aischra which are objectively so, whether
the deeds so described are public knowledge or not, and that
of aischra which only become so when others know of them.
Behind this passage seems to lie a particular contemporary
controversy, the problem of "doing wrong in secret" and how
to prevent it. There was certainly a school of thought which
held that only punishments and the thought of popular disap-
proval could deter people from wrongdoing, and that acts
which were illegal or regarded as discreditable could be
perpetrated with equanimity provided they remained
undetected, and it is this sort of argument which Deianeira
employs here. Perhaps many in the audience held similar views,
and probably these sentiments did not sound particularly
shocking at the stage of the action at which they were
uttered, but they are put to the test in the rest of the
drama, and Deianeira is proved wrong.

Her mistake is emphasised at 721-2, where, having seen the
effect of the poison on the tuft of wool used to smear the robe and fearing the worst, she resolves to die rather than endure life with her reputation destroyed. She thus recognizes that her deceit will involve her in *aischune* and that her conviction that she could avoid disgrace provided her deceit remained secret was ill-founded. One qualification of the idea that one can do as one likes provided one's deeds remain secret thus seems to be that human beings can never be sure of the consequences of their actions. The immoralist position is thus shown to be flawed even in its own prudential terms. Deianeira's deceit, then, has disastrous consequences, and she cannot live with the disgrace which will result; thematically, her earlier misgivings, expressed in the request that her plan be kept secret in order that, if it be *aischon*, she should not be involved in disgrace, serve as an indication of the dubiety of what she was about to do; her concern there that she should not fall in *aischune* must be related to *aidos* with regard to the execution of the plan *per se*, and this *aidos* she ignores, but she cannot ignore the same impulse a second time when her mistake is about to become known.

In the face of Hyllos' accusations Deianeira departs in silence, and Class is probably right to see this silence as an indication of her conscience of her own shame and guilt. The chorus are also aware that her silence will be taken as a sign of her culpability, and protest (813-4):

\[ \text{τί σίγη ἀφέπεις; ἄ κάτωθι ὅθ θεύνεκα} \]
\[ \text{δυνάσθοι σιγώκ τῷ κατηγὼς;} \]
If Deianeira's silence is the result of *aidos* then the sentiment accords well with that of fragment 928 (Radt):

\[ \text{αἰδώς γὰς ἐν κακῶιν αὐθέν ὠθελεί;} \]
\[ \text{ἡ γὰς ἐλπὶν τῷ καλοῦτι σύμμαχος.} \]

With this von Erffa well compares frag. adesp. 528N -

\[ \text{κακὸν γὰς αἰδώς, ἐνθὰ τὰ ναῦσὲς κρατεῖ.} \]

In both these cases the type of *aidos* condemned is that which prevents outspokenness on one's own behalf, and, in general, this is the usual ground for the deprecation of the need for *aidos*. In the *Trach* passage, it is clear from the chorus-
leader's words that she believes that there is a plea which Deianeira could make in her own defence, and obviously this
defence would be based on a proper distinction between acts
perpetrated in ignorance and those committed intentionally, a
distinction made by the chorus at 841-8 and by Hyllos at
1122-3. Deianeira's shame, however, considers results rather
than intentions, and in this she is every bit as hard on
herself as is Herakles, to whom the argument that she acted
in ignorance is meaningless (1124-5, and in the stichomythia from 1126-37). In representing Deianeira as more
concerned with results than with the knowledge, which she
must have possessed, that she did not intend to kill Herakles,
Sophokles is, however, not revealing his own origins in an
Adkinsian "results culture", but rather portraying a woman
acting as real people often do. 21 Before concluding our
discussion of this play, we should note in passing that
Herakles himself seems to be motivated by something very
like aidos in his desire to be removed from the sight of men
and from the scene of his triumph at 799-802, 22 and when he
expresses his resentment that he should be brought low by a
mere woman, be reduced, in fact, to the status of a woman
himself (1062-3, 1071-5).

The Oedipus Coloneus is a suppliant drama, and since the
process of supplication provides the play with its dramatic
impetus, we do find, as we might expect, given the close
association of aidos with that process, much that is relevant
to our enquiry. The standard motifs of suppliant drama, how-
ever, are employed in complex and unusual ways, 23 and the
role of aidos is accordingly not as straightforward as one
might expect.

Oedipus himself does not refer to aidos in any of his appeals
to the stranger, to the chorus and to Theseus; already in
this respect he is an atypical suppliant. It is, in fact,
left to Antigone to employ a more typical suppliant appeal
at the point at which her father is in danger of being
expelled from the country. 24 Her plea, at 237-53, is essen-
tially an appeal for pity and for aidos; the chorus are apo-
strophiized as *aidophrones* and their *aidos* for Oedipus is requested at 247, while Antigone pleads for pity for herself at 242, and the wretched state of both suppliants is stressed (241, 244-5, 246, 248). The chorus do feel pity (255), but their doubts about Oedipus have not been dispelled, and this is why the latter now makes his famous speech of self-vindication. 26 The result of the combination of these two, very different appeals is that the chorus abandon their intention to expel Oedipus and instead await the arrival of their king (294-5).

The expectation that the suppliants would have to repeat their plea for protection before Theseus, however, is disappointed; 27 the king enters at 551, recognizes Oedipus and expresses his pity (556), basing his sympathy on a recognition of common humanity (567-9); it is impossible to be sure, but it is at least possible that Theseus is subject to a particularly altruistic form of aidos. 28 However that may be, more readily recognizable forms of aidos have their parts to play in his acceptance of Oedipus as supplicant; at 636 he says that he will allow Oedipus to remain out of sebas (ςφυρανταί) for his status as a supplicant and divine protegé and for the tie of xenia which exists between them, and we saw in connexion with Aeschylus' Supplices that aidos and sebas are virtually interchangeable as responses to suppliants. 29 Aidos is also in evidence in lines 902-3, where Theseus, despatching his attendants to free Antigone and Ismene, speaks of the danger of ridicule should he fail to protect those whom he has taken into his care; concern for one's reputation as a strong protector is very often an important motive in ensuring that the supplicated continues actively to protect the supplicant. 30

In the scene of confrontation between Oedipus and Kreon the only detail which need concern us is the latter's anaideia, with which he is twice charged, first at 863, where the basis for the charge lies in his attempt to lay hands on Oedipus, and for the second time at 960, where Oedipus is reacting to his speech in denunciation of his parricide and
incest. Both these passages reveal the traditional association of \textit{anaideia} with \textit{hybris}; in the former, Kreon's threat to seize another person, treating him as tantamount to a slave, is clearly hybristic, and in the latter the two ideas are explicitly related; Oedipus accuses Kreon of \textit{anaideia} and \textit{hybris}, but suggests that his insults harm himself rather than their intended target:

\begin{quote}
\begin{center}
\textit{ω̄ λημ' κακίδες, τω̄ καθυστέρειν δοκεῖς, Π τότε ἐμοὶ γέροντος, η σκυτω, τόδε;}
\end{center}
\end{quote}

Although the speaker of these lines is hardly unbiased, their wording does suggest that, in certain circumstances, the attempt to dishonour (καθυστέρειν) someone else can rebound to the discredit of the person making the affront. Kreon's \textit{anaideia} is revealed in one further passage, at 978-80, where Oedipus asks:

\begin{quote}
\begin{center}
\textit{μῆτεις ἰδέ, λημαν, οὕκ ἐπαυχώμεν ἱέμων οὐνός ὁμαίμων, οὐς μ' ἀναγκασών κεῖν ὁιόν ἐρώ ταχ.'}
\end{center}
\end{quote}

Firstly, Kreon might have felt \textit{aidos} at speaking of that which should not be spoken of, of that which is \textit{anosion} (981), but, as Oedipus points out, Iokaste was his sister, and (both) out of family loyalty and a sense of family shame he should refrain from mentioning her disgrace; that he does so reveals his disregard for propriety, his \textit{anaideia}.\footnote{After Kreon (who plays the part of the enemy herald)\footnote{has been seen off, the pattern of the suppliant drama is complete, but it is at this point that a second suppliant appears, Oedipus' son, Polyneikes. Oedipus is at first determined not to see him, but eventually gives in on two grounds, having noted Theseus' remark on the sanctity of Polyneikes' place of supplication and on the possibility of divine displeasure (1179-80), and out of deference to his daughter's plea (1189-91):}

\begin{quote}
\begin{center}
\textit{ἐφυγέω αὐτόν; ῥέτε μυθὲ δεμένη σε τκ. τω̄ν κακίστων δυσεβέστατω; \μ πετες, θέμω σε τ' εἶναι κεῖνον ἀτιθέκαν κακῶς.}
\end{center}
\end{quote}

As she does in the drama which bears her name, Antigone subjects retributive justice to a higher standard, the
themis of the familial relationship; since she is appealing to a sense of loyalty to one's philoi, it would seem that aidos, though not mentioned, is relevant, for it is aidos which dictates the avoidance of strife and promotes loyalty within the family; aidos will thus be the response which Antigone seeks to arouse in her father (the reponse to the imperative, the themis she mentions), while the actions of Polyneikes (τι ... δυσεβεστάτη) will also be breaches of the same kind of aidos.

It is therefore interesting to note that Polyneikes, having left the altar of Poseidon, appeals to similar standards as does his sister. While it is obviously in his interests, as a suppliant seeking help and forgiveness from his father, to set a high value on such standards, the fact that he is not disinterested need not lead us to suppose that he is insincere or that he is being presented unsympathetically; his sympathy for his father and his sister is quite spontaneous and he is candid in admitting his own faults (1254-66), and there is no sign that he is dissimulating. In the face of his previous ill-treatment of Oedipus, he asks for aidos at 1267-9:

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ἀλλ’ ἐστι γὰρ καὶ Ζηνὶ σύνθακος θεόνων,
Αἰσθεῖ ἐπὶ τρόφις πάσι, καὶ τίς σε, πιέει,
Παρασταθέντω.
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Aidos is here urged with a view to obtaining forgiveness and is opposed to resentment for a wrong done which would encourage retaliation rather than compassion; it is also invested with a considerable importance, "sharing the throne of Zeus in all things." These sentiments are clearly extremely idealistic, but they are not totally subjective or without foundation in traditional thought; aidos is the response usually demanded by suppliants and it is the norm among members of the same family and, indeed, among all philoi; its importance in human affairs in general is also recognized. The problem in this particular case is that Polyneikes has already wronged his father, and so the aidos-standard conflicts with another, the need for retaliation to preserve one's time, for dike, and the confrontation...
of these two traditional sets of imperatives produces the
dilemma which exists in all those tragedies in which retal-
iation is pursued or contemplated within the family.

Oedipus himself makes this opposition of aidos and dike
quite explicit in his speech at 1375-82:

Just as Antigone and Polyneikes had stressed the importance
of aidos over that of dike, so Oedipus does the opposite. He
does not, however, depreciate aidos, but rather insists that
his sons were the first to neglect it; they failed to show a parent the aidos he deserves. 38
In failing to sebein (or aideisthai) they have deprived him
of time (1378), 39 and dike (Zeus' χυνεγεὺς in a pointed
rejoinder to 1267-8) demands that he treat them as they
treated him. In referring to dike Oedipus obviously appeals
to a principle which the audience will have understood as a
traditional and powerful one, and they will also have identi-
fied τούς τυπευόμενους σέβειν as one of the canons of tradit-
onal values, yet it is by no means certain that Oedipus' harshness, not to mention his curse, is to be commended. 40
His wrath, for example, conflicts with the idealism not only
of Polyneikes, who is biased, but also of Antigone, who
behaves impartially towards both her father and her brother,
and his rejection of supplication, "the only such formal
suppliant appeal rejected in all of Greek tragedy," 41 con-
trasts sharply with the humanity of Theseus, surely an admirable character. Oedipus, then, if we wish to evaluate his
character in terms of moral virtue, comes off badly in com-
parison with these two figures; significantly, though,
before the play is over a distinct parallelism emerges be-
 tween him and Polyneikes.
At 1399-1413 Polyneikes declares his intention to face his brother and begs Antigone to see to his funeral should their father's curse be fulfilled; now Antigone becomes, figuratively, the suppliant (ἰκτισμῶν ὀτ, 1414), but once again her plea that conflict within the family should be avoided is ignored; Polyneikes claims it would be impossible to lead his army back "having once trembled" (1418-9) and goes on (1422-3):

αἰχεὶν τὸ ἑυγένει, καὶ τὸ προσβείουντ' ἐμὲ
οὖν γελαίθαι τοῖς κακιγνὴται πάσιν.

These words reveal that Polyneikes is certainly subject to a familiar kind of ἀιδος, but it is of a very different nature to that which he urged on his father at 1267-9 - not the ἀιδος for another human being which would lead one to abandon retribution but that which envisages one's own humiliation and which demands retribution as vindication of one's own honour. Some hold that the contrast between these two attitudes reveals Polyneikes' essential hypocrisy and selfishness, yet his reaction, though tragic, is a traditional and an understandable one. The fact remains, however, that he appeals to familial and other-regarding ἀιδος when attempting to dissuade his father from pursuit of δίκη and consideration of his own injured time, yet disregards it when his own desire for revenge and his concern for his own honour intervene; his partiality, then, overcomes his idealism, and there is an obvious, Sophoclean irony in the way in which this comes about, not the least part of which is the eventual similarity which emerges between father and son.

If there is any lesson in this it is that self-regarding motives tend, in the way of things, to outweigh other-regarding impulses. As a symbol that this is simply "the way things are" Oedipus, who embodies the principles of retaliatory justice, of "helping one's friends and harming one's enemies", is elevated to the status of a hero, becomes part of the universal order which seems to make it likely that men will act as he did towards Polyneikes. And yet, even though this may be the way the world works, and even though it may be unalterable, there are other examples to follow:
those of Antigone and Theseus.

There is only one reference to *aidos* in the *Antigone*, but it is one which illustrates very well the temperament of the heroine and the degree to which it is impossible for her to communicate with her adversary, Kreon. At line 508 stichomythia begins between Kreon and Antigone, the issue the degree of support which the latter's defiance enjoys among the chorus and the people of Thebes. Kreon maintains that Antigone is alone in thinking that her deed is glorious, that it is pleasing to the old men of the chorus, and that he is simply taking advantage of the prerogative of the absolute ruler to do and say what he will; at 509 Antigone replies with a reiteration of her belief that the chorus side with her, but Kreon prefers to ignore this, and to insist that their opposition to her conduct is an acknowledged fact (510):

\[ \text{εὖ δ' ὥσκ ἐπαίδη, τῶν δὲ καὶ} \text{ μὴ ἔι} \text{ φέρεσί;} \]

To this, however, Antigone's answer is unexpected (511):

\[ \text{οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐμεῖν} \text{ τοὺς ὀμοσπονδάχχους} \text{ ἕβειν.} \]

Kreon's question insinuates that Antigone is out of step with popular opinion, and that she should feel *aidos* on that account; he reproaches her, in effect, with failure to conform, failure to react as did Ismene, who affirmed the inability of women to oppose men or to act *aischron* to honour one's kin (61-2, 78-9). The *aidos* to which Kreon refers, then, would, if Antigone were susceptible to it, be based simply on the knowledge that others disapproved of one's, regardless of one's evaluation of it, and this is, of course, a recognizable and traditional form of *aidos*. Antigone explains her lack of *aidos*, however, with reference to quite different standards. In effect, the question she answers is not, "Do you not feel shame if you think differently from these men?" but, "Do you not feel shame at what you have done?" For her, any *aidos* she might feel would depend on her own interpretation of her action, not on that of other people, and even though her statement in line 511 is quite in keeping with traditional values (all things being equal, most people would have agreed that it is not *aischron* to honour one's kin), the
fact remains that she clearly feels able to decide for herself what is and is not *aischron*.\textsuperscript{51} For Antigone, then, it is her own personal conscience rather than convention which determines the character of her actions; Kreon exemplifies an entirely contrary attitude, and the chance of their communicating is slim.\textsuperscript{52}

Similar problems of communication and partiality are to be found in the drama in which *aidos* plays its greatest Sophoklean rôle, the *Ajax*. Much has been written about the Homeric atmosphere of this play,\textsuperscript{53} about similarities between Ajax and the Homeric Achilles,\textsuperscript{54} and between the Sophoklean and the Homeric Ajax;\textsuperscript{55} and it is certainly true that the values exhibited in martial contexts in the *Iliad* form the moral background to the play, and that the play does contain "the one conspicuous and extensive reproduction by Sophocles of a specific Homeric passage"\textsuperscript{56} (*Aj*.430-595, recalling *Il*.6.390-502). Yet the Ajax in Sophokles' play is much more extreme in his pursuit of *time* than anyone in Homer,\textsuperscript{57} and, as has been pointed out,\textsuperscript{58} Homeric motifs are employed for contrast as well as for comparison; and there is the figure of Odysseus, whose conduct must be judged on the basis of different, though still related standards.

One of the essential attitudes which the play explores is expressed by Athena in line 79; Odysseus begs her not to call Ajax out of his tent, on the grounds of their enmity, and she replies:

\begin{quote}
οὐκο ὑέλιος ἡλετός εἰς ἔξωθος γέλην;
\end{quote}

The supposition that pleasure is to be found in the disgrace of one's enemies, as we shall see, is shared by all but one of the characters of the play; it assumes a strict polarity of friends and enemies and notions of the importance of "what people say" which are quite traditional. That Ajax himself shares these attitudes is shown by his first appearance on stage; he is pleased with his "success" and wishes to boast of it (96), and in one sense, this is a traditional or "Homeric" attitude, for Ajax believes he has defeated his enemies and expects that his strength and prowess in doing
so will be recognized; yet the echthroi he believes he has attacked are his fellow warriors, those who should be his philoi, and the Homeric ideal in disputes between philoi is compromise. For Ajax, however, his own time is paramount (98) and he clearly does not believe that it could be diminished by breaches of the social aspects of the heroic code.

With the entrance of the chorus we see how Ajax' disgrace affects his philoi; they are disturbed at the duskleia of what they have heard (141-3) and they are reluctant to believe the reports of those who would rejoice in their leader's misfortune (150-7), regarding the account as fabricated by Odysseus and simply as a sign of the envy which the great of heart inevitably attract; if true, however, Ajax' disgrace reflects badly on them, and, considering an alternative explanation (that Artemis may have driven him to slaughter the beasts), they refer to the goddess as μήτες αἰνξύνης ὅμοι (174). An important word in this context is hbris, for it is in terms of hbris that the chorus describe the reaction of Ajax' enemies to his misfortune (151-3):

\[ \text{τοῦ λέξαινος καὶ εἰς μᾶλλον} \]
\[ \tau\delta\varsigma \sigmaοις ἀκενιν καθηδρεύσῃ. \]

Now, hbris is a pejorative term, and so the chorus clearly see the exultation of others in Ajax' ills as discreditable, but it is also clear that they are using the word in a polemical sense; the hbris of Ajax' enemies is not of the same kind as his own, for clearly a violent and insane attack on defenceless beasts, or the attempt to slaughter one's fellow warriors, might be regarded as hbris by a majority of people, even those who are disinterested, while the grounds for the accusation of hbris by the chorus seems to lie in the simple fact that those at whom the charge is levelled are drawing attention to Ajax' disgrace (for τοῦς τοῖς ἀκένιν καθηδρεύσῃ seems to imply that at least those who hear the story believe it, rather than that they are simply going along with a tale which they know to be an invention); thus it is the mockery of one's enemies which they regard as hbris, and while there are some indications in earlier
literature that such mockery or exultation is not to be pur-
sued, it is generally accepted that one's enemies will mock, and certainly Ajax himself had plans to humiliate his enemy, Odysseus, when he had him in his power (105-17). While, then, the chorus might, if pressed to express the matter in general terms, be able to come up with some form-
ulation such as "it is not kallon to exult in another's mis-
fortune," they obviously regard such exultation as natural, and in calling it hybris they are only succumbing to the temptation to regard as discreditable in others what one might oneself do in identical circumstances. This, of course, is an entirely natural tendency, but it is one which marks out the use of hybris by Ajax' partisans as different from its use in Homer, where, even if those who levelled charges of hybris were not impartial, the actions so designated were of a type which would be generally recognized as such; in this play the possibility that hybris may be partial is a real one.

The question of Ajax' aidos is first raised at 344-5, where the chorus-leader asks Tekmessa to open the door to Ajax' hut and expresses the hope that he will be seized by aidos when he catches sight of his followers. Given the chorus' concern for Ajax, this aidos can hardly be of the kind which would cause him any pain; it cannot therefore be aidos at what he has done or aidos at mockery arising from what he has done. It seems, then, that this aidos is related to keeping up appearances, to pulling oneself together; the hope is that Ajax will compose himself on this basis, ashamed to be seen raging or grieving before his inferiors. When Ajax does appear, however, he gives every impression of being troubled by another kind of aidos; he contrasts his present atimia with his past greatness (364-5,418-27) and imagines the mockery of his enemies (367,382); significantly, he also believes he has been treated with hum bris (367); he does not reflect on the fact that this hybris (presumably perpetrated by Athena) only served to deflect him from the murder of his fellows. It is entirely, then, with the pros-
ppect of humiliation that he is concerned, and the moral
character of his actions is no consideration for him at all.63

With the end of the epirrhematic scene which heralded Ajax' second appearance on stage he begins to speak in iambics, at first going over much of the same ground again (430-80), but eventually being drawn into that dialogue with Tekmessa which is so clearly based on the farewell of Hektor and Andromache in Iliad 6. The subject of his first speech is still his atimia (440), which he contrasts with the eukleia of his father (434-6), and this leads him to thoughts of the original slight, the judgement of the arms (441-4), of the Atreidai who should now be dead but who will instead be able to mock him (445-56) and of the further disgrace of the slaughter of the animals (453). So much for the past; now (456-80) he contemplates the future, and in doing so picks up several of the points raised in the first part of the speech. Chiefly, his thoughts return to his father, who, it would appear, is the very focus of his aidos:64 for he is unable to contemplate facing his father without some proof of his success at Troy (and inability to look at others is a sign of aidos)65 and he is determined to show him that he is not unworthy of his birth or his inherited nature (470-2). All this leads him on to thoughts of death, for it would be aischron to live on when one is beset by troubles (473-6);66 he ends with a statement, similar to that made by Deianeira,67 of his devotion to his own eugeneia:

\[
\text{καλάς τῆς θεοῦ θυσίας}
\]


(479-80)

After the choral comment that Ajax' speech was entirely like him, but that he should still give in to the advice of his philoi (481-4) it is the turn of Tekmessa to speak. As Kirkwood says, "She presents a concept of values and duty significantly opposed to that of Ajax,"68 but she does so not because the suppositions on which she bases her argument are entirely different from those on which Ajax bases his, but because, to a large extent, she exploits contradictory aspects of the complex of values to which he himself subscribes.69
Tekmessa begins with fate (485-6), particularly her own (487-90), which was to become Ajax' concubine; as such she appeals to him on the basis of their sexual relationship, her own feelings for him, and the power of Zeus, guardian of the hearth and home (490-3), but her appeal is couched in terms which he should be liable to understand; for it is to his concern for his time that she appeals, and thus to a kind of aidos which does not differ greatly from that which he has already manifested (494-5):

The aidos to which she appeals, then, may promote co-operation, but should Ajax decide to co-operate he would be doing so on a basis of self-interest. Tekemessa then continues in her attempt to deflect Ajax' self-regarding aidos away from the disgrace which he is presently experiencing to thoughts of the disgrace which would result were he to expose his dependants to humiliation, and pictures herself and her child as slaves, reminding Ajax of what people will say and of the consequences of this for his honour (500-5):

Line 505 is transitional; from the implicit notion of aidos at the prospect of the taunts of others Tekmessa now turns to the aidos which one owes one's philoi, particularly one's parents (506-510), and to pity, which she invokes in the name of their son. There is a change of emphasis here, but it is not a particularly great one, for the other-regarding aidos to which she now appeals is only the other side of the coin in relation to the self-regarding aidos she sought to arouse in the earlier part of her speech, since aidos for one's parents may be based both on respect for their special status and on the idea that respect for one's parents is a duty which it is discreditable to neglect; Ajax' concern for
his reputation may therefore be activated by the thought that he has left himself open to reproach by abandoning his parents. Similarly, although in appealing to pity for Eury-sakes Tekmessa is appealing to an emotion which is normally regarded as altruistic, she also stresses both the boy's ignoble status as an orphan and Ajax' responsibility for it (510-13), and it is surely discreditable in itself that a hero's son should be in such a pitiful condition; Tekmessa's appeals to self-regarding and other-regarding impulses, then, are closely related. Likewise, when she comes to speak, in language recalling that of Andromache at Il.6.413-30, of the pitiful nature of her own condition (514-9), it is not to pity itself which she appeals, but to charis, the obligation to show gratitude (520-2), which she represents as a duty of the eugenes (523-4), and while to return a kindness is to benefit another person, the impulse to do so may be based on the knowledge that reciprocity is an imperative which it is discreditable to ignore; and in suggesting that Ajax will not be regarded as a eugenes if he fails to return the charis of their relationship Tekmessa is clearly attempting to arouse his aidos at the prospect of conduct which would be unfitting for one of his status.

The definition of eugeneia, the idea with which both Ajax and Tekmessa end their speeches, is one aspect of the conflict of values between the two, and related to this is their difference over that which the eugenes should find disgraceful, over aidos and its proper object. As Reinhardt says,

"Ajax' thoughts of his father, his home, his son, respect and shame (aidos) are to him reasons for committing suicide; but precisely the same ideas appear to Tecmessa as reasons for not committing suicide ... ." 73

They do, then, place quite different interpretations on the same material, and in the sequel Ajax is not persuaded; effectively, they do "speak different languages." 74 But the breakdown in communication is not total, and so Reinhardt is wrong to say: 75

"... they speak without communicating, ... for each speaks his own language to which the other does not
listen. The words of the wife die away without a syllable having reached her husband's ears, and vice versa ... neither speech refers to the other, they do not touch or lead to any argument for or against ... ."

This is quite simply not true; Tekmessa's whole speech takes its argument from that of Ajax, and it is expressed in terms which are likely to strike a chord in him; and strike a chord they do, for although Ajax does not reply directly to Tekmessa, in his speech to his son (550-77) he does answer her on precisely those points on which she attempted to arouse his aidos; he declares that the boy will not suffer nybris or lobe (560-1) because Teukros and his fellow Salaminians (the chorus) will protect him (562-6), and is confident that his son will be able to perform the function of providing for his parents (567-70). It is not, then, that he denies that the eventualities set out by Tekmessa would harm his posthumous honour, simply that he does not believe that they will come about. Only for Tekmessa's appeal to charis has he no answer (although he does express his pity for her and the child at 652-3), and this suggests that he is not susceptible to her claim that to fail to show charis would be to impair his eugeneia.

Ajax concludes his general reflections in the Trugrede with remarks on the mutability of friendship and enmity (678-83), and in the remainder of the play it is the theme of friends and enemies which is to dominate. Following Ajax' death it is not simply his loss which disturbs his friends, but also the thought of the mockery of his enemies; they seem to take over from the hero his concern for his reputation. At 954-5 Tekmessa describes her woe as Odysseus' joy, and the chorus take up this idea, lamenting the mockery and hybris of Odysseus and the Atreidai which they regardas inevitable (955-60); once more the equation of the mockery of one's enemies with hybris, already noted, is apparent. It is fully expected that others will mock; Teukros echoes the sentiments of Athena at 79 when he says (988-9):

\[ \text{\textit{τοῖς ἤθωνεί τοι}} \]
\[ \text{\textit{φιλοῦσε πάντες κεφαλῶν ἐπεγγελὼν.}} \]
and when the chorus-leader sees Menelaos approaching he immediately assumes that mockery is his intention (1042-3):

There are clearly two strands of thought in such passages, that it is discreditable to mock a dead enemy (and some support for this idea may be found in the Iliad, at least to the extent that it appears to be discreditable there to mutilate a dead enemy; exultation over a dead foe, however, is common and passes without censure) and that it is natural to do so (an idea arising from the notion that it is right to harm one's enemies and that their humiliation is one's own glory). 77

The chorus and Teukros, then, are concerned at the prospect of the mockery of others, and while there may be something of a general concern that Ajax should receive his due honour in this concern, they must also be alarmed at the prospect that they will, because of their relationship with the dead hero, be implicated in such mockery; this concern for their collective honour will presumably also be *aidos*. Interestingly enough, this *aidos*, which is perhaps a typical male warrior's attitude, is not shared by the woman, Tekmessa, who takes the attitude that the mockery of the Atreidai can be ignored, and finds comfort in the fact that they will feel the lack of Ajax in battle (961-5); she accepts that they will mock, but maintains that their mockery will not harm its target (966-70), and that Odysseus' *hybris* will thus be in vain (971); this is roughly the attitude of Apollo at fl. 24.54, 78 and clearly it was one which it was possible to hold; clearly too, however, it requires a certain amount of detachment from ideals of honour and *time* (such as may be found in women and gods?) which the other characters are unable to share. 79

When Menelaos does appear we learn that he does, in fact, intend to dishonour Ajax (by depriving him of a tomb, 1062-6) and that his motivation in doing so is one of retaliation for the dishonour which Ajax attempted to inflict on him and his fellows; had "one of the gods" not intervened they would
have perished αἰσχύνη μόρις (1057-9).

Menelaos also has important remarks to make on the nature of Ajax' error; his attack on the cattle was ὑβρις (1061), and so was his attempt on the lives of his comrades and his superiors; at 1071-86 Menelaos sets Ajax' disobedience in a wider, civic context:

In its stress on the utility of (the traditionally related ideas of) fear and ἀίδος in the state this speech is particularly reminiscent of similar arguments in Aeschylus' Eumenides, and probably makes use of ideas which are both traditional and part of contemporary discussion of the nature of civic life and the need for justice in the community; the traditional element may be seen in the importance accorded ἀίδος (here synonymous with αἰσχύνη) and in the presence of ὑβρις as the consequence of its absence, while the idea that it is fear, of both punishment and disgrace, which makes one amenable to state or military authority seems to reflect the fifth century preoccupation with the question, "why should one be moral?" Also worthy of note is the, by now familiar, association of ἀίδος and σοφροσύνη (1075-6); in the Tragrede Ajax, feigning his conversion to σοφροσύνη, hinted at his rejection of it; here
the lack of sophrosyne is associated with lack of aidos, and
this confirms our suggestion that Ajax was without any aidos for the representatives of authority; and this is clearly Menelaos' belief, too.

In general, Menelaos' remarks seem to be justified as an analysis of Ajax' conduct; there is certainly nothing "diss-tasteful" in his observations on the need for fear and aidos in promoting ordered behaviour, and Pearson is probably correct to see his remarks as an "orthodox exposition of the civic virtues;" the chorus-leader calls them γνώμενοι σοφαί at 1091. Seen in their wider context, however, these gnomai emerge in a different light, for Menelaos uses Ajax' hybris and lack of aidos as justification for his own retaliation (1067-70,1085-90); he thus manifests a similar concern to that which motivated his enemy, and sets up a parallelism between them which emerges quite explicitly at 1087-8:

In spite of his commendable remarks on aidos and deos, then, Menelaos sees hybris not as a bad thing which one should not perpetrate at all, but as a legitimate weapon against one's enemies; he thus lives up to the expectation created by 1042-3, and merits the chorus-leader's comment (1091-2):

The partiality of hybris, then, already very prominent, is maintained.

The exchanges which follow between Teukros and the Atreidai are nothing more than invective, and no purpose is achieved; accusations of hybris (1151,1258) and lack of sophrosyne (1259) fly, and Agamemnon and Teukros attempt to bring aischune on each other by mutual accusations of barbarian origins (1259-63,1291-8), the latter adding, for good measure, some unsavoury details from the history of the Pelopidai. It is Teukros, however, who finally comes back to the issue at hand, suggesting that the occasion for shame (κινήσωμεν 1305) is not his own birth, but Agamemnon's conduct in denying
burial to Ajax (ἐπερχύνθη 1307); each has attempted to excite the other's shame over facts which were entirely outwith his control, but eventually Teukros raises the question of shame over one's own actions, the assumption, as ever, that it is discreditable to insult the dead. The possibility of different interpretations of what is aischron is also raised in the earlier exchange, where both Menelaos and Teukros maintain that it would be aischron for them to continue the argument, the former claiming that it would be aischron for him if people learned that he was wasting words in the attempt to control one who could be controlled by force (1159-60), and the latter retorting that it is aischiston for him to listen to one who is talking rubbish (1161-2); but this is mere invective.

At 1316 Odysseus enters; we have been encouraged to believe that he, too, will exult in Ajax' misfortunes (953-4, 955-60, 971), yet the chorus-leader hopes that he can break up the quarrel (1316-7); the audience, perhaps, having seen the prologue, will be even more confident that he will not take sides. And this, in fact, he immediately refuses to do (1320-4), forcing Agamemnon to admit that he has not only received, but also dealt ἄρχεόν τοις ἱρον. In his speech at 1332-45 he states his opposition to the prohibition of burial, gives his reasons, and restates Ajax' time. At 1336-41 he declares that his enmity will not lead him to deny that Ajax was aristos at Troy, after Achilles, to deny him, that is, the time he deserves; he thus distances his personal bias, his hatred, from his estimation of Ajax' worth, and this is something Agamemnon and Menelaos have signally failed to do. Odysseus bases his impulses on dike: to leave Ajax unburied is to give in to the temptations of force and to trample on dike (1332-5); Ajax' arete means that it is not just that he be dishonoured by Agamemnon (1342 - ἤντι τ' ὑπ' ἐνδυκώς γ' ἀτλακραφοῦσιν cf. 1363); to dishonour Ajax is not to destroy him, but the laws of the gods (1343-4); and it is not dikaion to harm the esthlos in death, even out of hatred (1344-5). Odysseus thus clearly subscribes to the belief, which has been reiterated throughout the play, that
it is wrong to exult in others' misfortunes, and particularly
that it is wrong to insult the dead, and his idea of dike
thus happens to coincide with that of Teukros at 1125,92 but
his appeal to these standards enjoys greater validity by
reason of its impartiality.

But what precisely are Odysseus' principles in opposing the
dishonouring and non-burial of Ajax? He responds to his
enemy's arete and is reluctant to deprive him of time, and,
to a large extent, the belief that it is proper to accord
others the time they deserve is a Homeric one.93 To do so in
Homer could be seen as aidos, and so it is here; in answer
to Agamemnon's question, ἐξθέων ἐδ' αἴδην ῥέκυν (1356) Odys-
seus replies (1357):

καλεῖ γὰρ ἐτέσι με τὴν ἐξθέσιν πολύ.

So Odysseus experiences a positive feeling of respect for
Ajax' arete; but this is also allied to a general feeling
that it is not right to deprive others of such respect, and
this feeling is expressed in terms of dike. Winnington-
Ingram is thus right to say that dike "is presented in terms
of time."94 But the term is not defined at all,95 and seems
to answer to little more than Odysseus' subjective conviction
that there are limits which should not be transgressed.96
This vague idea of limit is also a traditional one,97 and it
is one which Odysseus develops in the ensuing exchange with
Agamemnon. At 1347 he refers to a standard which is related
to his idea of dike, that of τὸ καλὸν, when he says ἐνίκων ὥ,
ἡνίκ', ἦν μυρίων καλῶν, and he follows up the implication
that it is not kalon to hate the dead by urging Agamemnon

μὴ χαιρε', Ἀγαμημόνα, κέρδεσιν τούς μὴ κάλουσ(1349).

These, too, are traditional ideas, related to the vague
"standard of appropriateness" which was so prominent in
Homer,98 and to the notion that one can go too far in the
pursuit of gain found in Hesiod and Theognis.99

So Odysseus is following certain traditional, if vaguely
articulated, beliefs; but the most striking aspect of his
response to the situation is that it is unexpected and
shared by none of the other characters.100 In particular,
Agamemnon gives in not because he believes or even understands what Odysseus says (he continues to think in terms of friendship and enmity [1356, 1360] and of his own reputation [1362]), but out of deference to their friendship (1370-1), while Teukros, in refusing to allow Odysseus to participate in Ajax' burial (in spite of his desire to do so), reaffirms the polarity of friends and enemies at the play's close (1393-1401). Odysseus, then, is isolated, and his ideas of τὰ καλὰ and dike depend on his own sensitivity, his own interpretation of right and wrong, his own personal moral conscience. His response also, I feel sure, depends on ἀδοσ; he describes his response to Ajax' arete as ἀδοσ at 1357, and ἀδοσ is traditionally the reaction to the ideas of excess and inappropriateness which he rejects. It should, then, be clear that this ἀδοσ is not simply an impulse to conform, not simply a fear of being out of step with convention, because it is based on principles which are subjective and activated instinctively; Odysseus could clearly "get away with" maltreating Ajax' body, and so popular disapproval is not a consideration with him; and yet his ἀδοσ is based on ideas which are quite traditional. Behind his response to the body of Ajax and its burial, then, lies a realization, which may or may not be "new", that to behave in accordance with traditional ideals depends on the sensitivity of the individual rather than on fear of punishment or disgrace.

Like the Ajax, the Electra is a play of retaliation, of reciprocity and of non-communication, and this emerges with greatest relevance to our theme in the agon between Elektra and Klytaimestra which stands at its heart. It soon emerges, however, that the agon is itself representative of a recurrent process, a process of retaliation and mutual recrimination. The background to this is one of atimia, and concern for time, both Agamemnon's and her own, is Elektra's chief motivating force; she alone, she says (100-2), has pity for her father's ignoble death, and she will persevere with her lamentation until vengeance is achieved (103-20). She resents Aigisthos' usurpation of her father's prerogatives (266-74, cf. Chrysothemis at 419-21), and describes (442-6) how Agamemnon's atimia is reinforced by
the mutilation of his body (cf. the chorus at 486-7). She believes, too, that she herself will win fame by restoring her father's honour (975-83), while at 1153, believing Orestes dead and contemplating her own ruin as well as that of her father, she imagines the mockery of her enemies (γελώσει δ' ἐχόντοι). Her own atimia is also recognized by Orestes at 1181 and 1427.

Out of this background of atimia grows the process which we shall see at work in the agon. We first see Elektra consumed by grief; later we learn that her grief is her only means of retaliation against her father's murderers (352-6):

Her grief and her miserable condition, then, are to her a means of restoring Agamemnon's time, and her persistence in grief is thus a deliberate act of retaliation for wrong done; as Whitman says, it is "the one proof that she is still a princess." Her concern for her time, however, which presumably involves aidos at her disgrace, has a particularly masculine tinge, which emerges in her assertion (in line 351) that the course suggested by Chrysothemis (moderation and compliance towards authority, the "normal" woman's reaction) is tantamount to cowardice (deilia).

Elektra, then, lives and acts as she does in order to annoy her enemies, and it is not, therefore, surprising that she regards their conduct as motivated by a similar concern; indeed, she regards the conduct of Klytaimestra and Aigisthos as specifically designed to undermine her status. At 271-4 she describes the sexual union of her father's murderers as "the ultimate hybris", while at 278-93 she describes the kind of thing her mother says when she reproaches her (ἐγγονεύει 288) and insults her (ἐυτροφεῖ 293) in the face of her troubles; of her mother's part in the process of recrimination, then, she is clearly aware. She returns to
the theme of the sexual relationship between her mother and Aigisthos at 586, where she calls it αἰνχιστα πτώειν ἐγκε, which recalls τὴν τελευταίαν ὑβέιν in 271; possibly this refers to the disgrace of Klytaimnestra's adultery, possibly to the distaste Elektra feels for the acts themselves, but it is certainly clear that she resents these erga, and she may feel that their "ugliness" diminishes the honour of her father and herself. Something of the atmosphere of the Ajax is recalled when, at 790 and 794, Elektra, believing Orestes dead, assumes that her mother will react with hybris to his death.

It is in this atmosphere of insult and enmity that the agon takes place, and it is in the agon that the true nature of the relationship between Elektra and Klytaimnestra is revealed. Klytaimnestra enters at 516, and refers first of all to her daughter's unmaidenly conduct; Elektra is "on the loose" as a result of the absence of Aigisthos, and is thus able to remain out of doors, "shaming her philoi (516-8)." This argument is clearly based on traditional ideas of the rôle of women which we have met before, and presumably also on the seclusion of respectable women in contemporary Athens. Klytaimnestra's point here is that such conduct, because the disgrace of one member of the family affects the others, reflects badly upon her, but in order to do that it must also reflect badly on Elektra herself; Elektra thus undertakes action which is discreditable to herself in order to bring shame on her mother (for there can hardly be any doubt but that αἱρχών τίκεισι is Elektra's intention).

Klytaimnestra's next words are very important; Elektra is afraid of Aigisthos, she says, but has no regard for her, and she continues (520-524):

Καίτων πολλὰς πρὸς πολλοὺς με διὰ

εὖθυνες μὲς θερεταί καὶ πέρα δίκυς

αἶξιώ, καθωβελείνοντα καὶ τὰ σα.

ἔγὼ δὲ ὑβειν μὲν οὐκ ἐχώ, κακῶς δὲ εἴ

λέγω κακῶς κλονουσκι προσ εἴθεν ἁμάλ.

We have already seen the truth of this; Elektra does denounce
Klytaiemesta often and in front of many, does regard her rule as unjust, and does see her mother's actions as *hybris* against herself. Klytaiemesta's awareness of the charges Elektra makes against her corresponds to a converse awareness on the part of Elektra (278-93, p.237 above), and also reveals her awareness of the process in which she is involved, and it is to this that she refers in 523-4, *κακωτέλω...* The reciprocal and retaliatory nature of the process is thus apparent; Klytaiemesta justifies her conduct in terms of retaliation for the insults of the other, and Elektra does the same. We should also be prepared to see the importance of shame in all this, for shame (the subjective reaction) and disgrace (the objective state) are the result of *κακωτέλω* and the aim of *κακωτέλω*.

Klytaiemesta now proceeds to a justification of the murder of Agamemnon with reference to the murder of Iphigeneia, and Elektra duly responds with a statement of her interpretation of the same events (525-609). Thus they debate the *dike* of Klytaiemesta's deed, but there is no real attempt to persuade, and it is clear enough that this passage is but another round in a recurring pattern of mutual recrimination. Both, for example, refer to previous arguments of the same type in the lines between the two speeches, Elektra at 552-3 - "You cannot say I started it this time (νῦν γέ")- and Klytaiemesta at 556-7 - "If this were the way you always spoke to me ...." Klytaiemesta's argument is simple; she killed Agamemnon justly because he sacrificed her daughter. Elektra's is less simple (558-60):

These words belong properly to the recurrent exchange of insults between the two rather than to the debate about *dike*, for Elektra, having dismissed the question of *dike* in 560, immediately goes on to argue that her mother's action was not *dikaion* in 561-76. Elektra is at pains to designate
Klytaimestra's conduct *aischron*, of course because she believes is was, but also because to implicate her in disgrace is part of her strategy.

Adkins, however, sees more in the passage: 110

"To say an action is *aischron* is to play the ace of trumps: to justify performing it, one cannot press the claim that it is *dikaion*, for that is of less importance, but must maintain that it is in fact not *aischron* after all."

We can dismiss the curious assumption that, in any real context, a word may be an "ace of trumps," 111 for it is not central to Adkins' argument, which is, presumably, that if one accepts that one's conduct is *aischron* one cannot go on to justify it on other grounds, even those of *dike*. But this is also an artificial argument: if one did believe that one's conduct was *dikaion*, the judgement that it is also *aischron* would be unlikely to come from oneself. And yet there does exist a number of passages in which people do admit that they have acted or may act in a way commonly regarded as *aischron*, yet justify this in terms of the necessity of achieving some more important objective. Such, for example, is fr.352 (Radt):

> Κάλον μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἐστὶ τῇ θευδῇ λέγειν ὅτι ὅλθεν δεινὸν ἀληθείαν, ὅτι εὐγγνωστὸν ἐπεὶ ἐστὶ καὶ τῷ μὴ καλὸν.

Any of those passages, moreover, of which there is a great number, in which someone is advised or decides to abandon *aidos*, which is the instinct which prevents one doing something *aischron*, would also show that recognition that a given course of action is *aischron* does not mean that its performance cannot be justified. 113 Perhaps the most apposite parallel is that of Aeschylus' Orestes, 114 whose *aidos* at Cho.899 shows his awareness that it is normally *aischron* to kill one's mother, but who proceeds to do so on the basis of *dike* and the divine command, a basis on which he defends his action in *Eumenides*. And then there is the Elektra of this very play, who, as we shall see, recognizes that her own conduct is, in some respects at least, *aischron*, yet justi-
fies it in terms of the need for retaliation, for *dike*.\textsuperscript{115} Characters can, then, justify conduct which they recognize as *aischra* in other terms; the fact that Elektra herself does so while denying her mother the same possibility is presumably part of the point of this passage.\textsuperscript{116}

The passage quoted above, however, is not Adkins' last word on the subject. Some pages further on,\textsuperscript{117} he goes on to claim that Elektra's words in 558-60 constitute Sophokles' "solution ... to the problem set by the crime within the family," that is to say that Sophokles intends us to believe, with Elektra, that although it might have been just for Klytaimestra to kill Agamemnon, she should not have done so, since to do so was *aischra*. This, indeed, is Elektra's position, but we can hardly be sure that it is Sophokles'. On the other hand, Elektra does have a certain amount of authority behind her statement here, in that the murder of a husband by a wife is *traditionally* *aischra* (Klytaimestra's deed is *aischra* even at \textit{Od}.11.432-4),\textsuperscript{118} being both a fundamental breach of the tie of *philia* and against all the imperatives of loyalty to one's husband inherent in woman's *arete*. But if Elektra is "right" here she is, by the same token, wrong elsewhere in the play, and particularly at its conclusion, where, out of absolute commitment to retaliatory justice and other imperatives such as *eusebeia* towards her father, she takes part in the murder of her mother, another horrifying breach of *philia* and also traditionally *aischra*. Rather than solving the problem in 558-60, however, Sophokles represents it in its most fundamental aspect: injustice, wrong or insult calls forth retribution (*dike*), and the requirement to pursue *dike* is a powerful one, but to pursue it within one's family must inevitably involve an act which is *aischra*.\textsuperscript{119}

Elektra is thus able to state the problem which bedevils the history of her family,\textsuperscript{120} yet is ignorant of the application of her words to herself. This becomes particularly apparent at 577-83, where she recognizes that Klytaimestra's case rests on the legitimacy of retaliation, a life for a life,
and suggests that rigid application of these principles would lead to her mother's own death: she would be first to die, she says, if she were to meet with dike (583). She thus recognizes, but depreciates, Klytaimestra's claim to dike, yet she herself acts on the same principle and will, as we who have seen Orestes know, realize the hypothesis of line 583. Electra's position, then, with regard to dike and aischune is very similar to that which she criticizes in her mother.

At 584-94 Elektra argues that it was not, in fact, dike which drove her mother to kill her father, but sex: thus she returns to the idea of the shamefulness of Klytaimestra's conduct: Klytaimestra commits aixketa taivtw iux (586) with Aigisthos, and it would be aischron (593) for her to say that this was retaliation for the death of Iphigeneia; for it is not kallon to marry enemies for the sake of one's daughter. The essence of this accusation is Klytaimestra's breach of women's arete in her disloyalty to her husband; her adultery is aischron in itself, and even more so in that the adulterer is an enemy of the lawful husband (a sign of still more flagrant disloyalty). It is thus clear that these charges have some foundation in terms of traditional values, but it is equally apparent that Elektra raises them because the deeds she criticizes are a particular source of annoyance to her, and because it is her particular purpose to shame her mother.

In the final section of her speech, however, as her own temper rises, it is the possibility of the shamefulness of her own conduct which comes to the fore. At 595 she abandons her argument on the nature of her mother's conduct, and recognizes that she will never convince her that she is right, because her only concern is a daughter's abuse of a mother (596-7); this, of course, is exactly Klytaimestra's complaint at 523-4, and Elektra thus reveals, once more, her awareness of the process in which she is involved; and since abuse of one's mother is a breach of aidos and so presumably aischron, she also makes it clear that the accusations her
mother makes against her are similar to her own against her mother. This emerges even more clearly in the final words of her speech, as the exchange degenerates into the exchange of insults which we are to regard as the normal pattern of communication between the two (605-9):

In urging her mother to call her anaides Elektra is presumably referring to the charge that she is deficient in the aidos which is properly due a mother, a charge to which she is certainly open and which Klytaimestra will make at 612-5 and 622, but in urging her mother to denounce her at all she is also affecting indifference with regard to her own reputation, and this suggests another kind of anaides. It is also important that she acknowledges, albeit ironically, the legitimacy of the charges her mother makes against her, and it is extremely significant that she suggests the possibility of a similarity in nature between them; in saying that she does not kataischunein her mother’s physis she is both offering a perversion of the traditional ideal, normally appropriate to men rather than to women, that one should live up to the reputation of one’s parents and affecting irony, because it is clear that she is trying to shame her mother by imputing to her the negative qualities of 606-7, but the real irony is that the similarity in physis between the two women is a real one.

Klytaimestra immediately takes up the challenge, accusing her daughter of hybris (613) and anaides (κατασχυνεῖν, 615). This is not the first time that one character has, in effect, predicted what the other will say, and it is difficult not to regard the interminable process of conflict in which they are involved as responsible for this obvious familiarity with the arguments of the other side. Elektra has just claimed that she was indifferent to any charge of anaides her mother might make and to any damage
such a charge might do her reputation; her reaction to Klytaimestra's words in 612-5 is, therefore, surprising (616-21):

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{εἰ} & \text{ ἕπιτω} \text{ τῶν} & \text{ μ' αἰσχύνην ἔχειν}, \\
\text{kai} & \text{ μὴ} & \text{ δοκεῖ} \text{ ὑπ'} & \text{ κυνθένω δ' οὖν κεκρίσθη} \\
\text{ἐξωκε} & \text{ πρᾶσω} & \text{ κων} & \text{ ἐμοὶ προσελκότα}, \\
\text{αλλ' ἦ} & \text{ γα} & \text{ ἐκ} & \text{ συμφέρειν καὶ τὰ ἐκ} \\
\text{ἐγγε} & \text{ ἕναν καθαύνει μὲ} & \text{ ταύτα} & \text{ δεῖ} \text{ βεβ.} \\
\text{αἰσχροι} & \text{ γας} & \text{ αἰσχρα} & \text{ πρέπον} \text{ ἔκδηλοκότα.}
\end{align*}
\]

The complexity of Elektra's psychology and the depth of her insight into her own condition are at their most apparent here, but even so she is unaware of the full implications of her words. It might be possible to regard the sentence μενθεὶν ... προσελκότα as referring only to Elektra's failure to act in accordance with her status and thus to relatively minor breaches of decorum, such as being seen out of doors, or simply to the excessive nature of her grief, were it not for the fact that she says τῶν & μ' αἰσχύνην ἔχειν. for τῶν & must refer to Klytaimestra's accusations of ὑβρις and lack of aischune (= aidos), specifically lack of aischune for her mother. Elektra therefore does experience an instinctive feeling that her lack of regard for her mother is reprehensible, and she is aware that, in the ideal situation, she should feel aidos for her mother. She then goes on to justify her unseasonable and unseemly conduct with regard to the need to retaliate (as, in effect, did Klytaimestra at 523-4): shameful deeds are taught by shameful deeds; is this not the justification of conduct which is aischron in terms of dike? Such justification is thus (pace Adkins) clearly possible: the significance is that, while Elektra exploits this line of argument herself, she refuses to allow Klytaimestra to do the same.

In 605-9 Elektra suggested that if she was full of anaideia, this was due to the physis she inherited from her mother; in 616-21 she accepts the charge of anaideia, but explains it in terms of the education she has received at her mother's hands (ἐκδηλωθεὶς); in terms of both heredity or antecedent capacity (physis) and education (nomos) Elektra's character is the counterpart of her mother's.
The argument between the two is about to end, but before it does the positions of the participants are reiterated. At 622-3 Klytaimestra explodes:

\[ \omega \; \theta \varepsilon \varepsilon \rho \varepsilon \; \alpha \nu \alpha \nu \delta \varepsilon \; \eta \; \varepsilon \; \varepsilon \nu \; \chi \varepsilon \; \varepsilon \nu \; \tau \alpha \mu \; \varepsilon \tau \eta \eta \; \kappa \alpha i \; \tau \alpha \varepsilon \chi \alpha \; \tau \alpha \mu \; \pi \nu \lambda \; \alpha \gamma \nu \; \lambda \varepsilon \gamma \varepsilon \nu \; \tau \theta \varepsilon \nu . \]

The exclamation, \( \omega \; \theta \varepsilon \varepsilon \rho \varepsilon \; \alpha \nu \alpha \nu \delta \varepsilon \) (again fulfilling the expectation created in 607) gets to what is, for Klytaimestra, the heart of the matter: Elektra is her child, yet she has no aïdos for her mother. Yet Elektra has just shown signs that she is aware of this, and that it troubles her, but Klytaimestra hears only one more reference to her \( \alpha \nu i \chi \varepsilon \nu \pi \varepsilon \varepsilon \eta \) aìp. Elektra had just all but admitted that there was wrong on both sides, but her mother cannot accept this: she wishes to be all right, and Elektra’s complaint \( \alpha \nu i \; \varepsilon \pi \varepsilon \varepsilon \zeta \kappa \lambda \varepsilon \varepsilon \nu \) (629) is justified. On the other hand, Elektra’s moment of weakness was short, and, stung to anger once more by the accusation of anaideia, she again tries to justify her conduct with reference to her mother’s actions (624-5):

\[ \gamma \; \tau \iota \iota \; \lambda \varepsilon \gamma \zeta \nu \nu \; \nu \varepsilon \nu \; \chi \varepsilon \; \varepsilon \nu \; \tau \theta \varepsilon \chi \alpha \; \tau \alpha \mu \; \tau \nu \varepsilon \gamma \omega \nu . \tau \varepsilon \; \delta \; \varepsilon \gamma \chi \; \tau \varsigma \nu \lambda \varepsilon \gamma \varepsilon \nu \; \varepsilon \nu \varepsilon \delta \varepsilon \varepsilon \nu \nu \kappa \varepsilon \kappa \varepsilon \kappa \varepsilon . \]

Klytaimestra’s deeds provoke Elektra’s words, to the extent that the words themselves are Klytaimestra’s: the process of retaliation is again emphasized, and the point that words are Elektra’s weapons is forcefully made. Yet Elektra also describes her retaliation, which so far consists solely of words, as erga at 608, and as pragmata which she is compelled to "do" at 620-1, so her implication that Klytaimestra is wrong and she right because words are less important than deeds should be rejected; for the purposes of retaliation they are equivalent, and the audience also knows that Elektra’s turn to act will come.

In the agon, then, the theme of shame keeps before our eyes a parallelism between Elektra and Klytaimestra and a balance of contradictions in Elektra’s own conduct. There is also, however, a passage at an earlier point in the play’s action which contributes to the same effect. The kommos which doubles as the parodos of the play comes to an end with five lines in which aïdos appears in a traditional guise (245-50):
The theme of the departure of *aidos* from a corrupt and troubled world is a common one, while the notion that punishment of the guilty will reinforce traditional values recalls the arguments of the Furies in *Eumenides*. In this passage both *aidos* and *eusebeia* may be the impulses which prevent one committing murder, especially within the family, but there may also be a subsidiary notion in both that both these qualities, and perhaps especially *eusebeia*, are required in those who avenge the murder of their kin. It is interesting that Elektra, like Aeschylus’ Furies and Menelaos in *Ajax*, in stressing the rôle of deterrence, imagines that *aidos* will be the effect of the example of other’s punishment; this need not mean, however, that *aidos* is simply fear of punishment; it may, for example, be the impulse which inhibits the specific sort of crime which is envisaged in each case, or it may be respect for the agents of punishment or for the corpus of beliefs which demands punishment.

Elektra, then, believes that her conduct holds out some hope that *aidos* will be maintained; in her very next utterance, however, the theme of *aidos* resurfaces in rather a different light; already at lines 254-60 she expresses sentiments which are very close to those of 616-21, admitting that her own conduct is discreditable but justifying it in terms of the need to retaliate:

Particularly noticeable are the words of compulsion in both
places (256, cf. 620). Although Elektra's aischune here is less significant than in the later passage (here it is merely embarrassment regarding conduct which is unfitting for a woman of her status, while at 616 it also implies disquiet with regard to her lack of aidos for her mother), there are strong verbal echoes, and it is important that Elektra recognizes something of the ambivalence of her conduct; her aischune indicates that she is not behaving as a noble woman should in normal circumstances, yet she justifies her conduct in terms of loyalty to her own eugeneia; while the "compulsion" which makes her act in this way is only absolute given her own values and outlook, it is part of her tragedy that she does feel herself compelled to act in ways which she perceives (with more or less clarity) to be discreditable. At 989 she tells her sister, ἐὰν αἰσχῶν αἰσχῶς τὰς καλὰς πείδικας, yet her own eugeneia compels her to ἐὰν αἰσχῶν (and she admits [608] that by nature [πείδικα] she might be full of anaideia).

So Elektra's statement that she is acting to safeguard aidos is immediately qualified by a statement that this very conduct causes her to act in ways which aidos (or aischune) should normally preclude; her lack of aidos in this respect, moreover, is dictated by her aidos for one of her parents, and this suggests a corresponding lack of aidos for the other parent, a hint which is taken up later in the play. There was also mention of eusebeia in 250, and just as her statement of the need for aidos was immediately balanced by the opening lines of her speech at 254-60, so her remark about eusebeia is qualified by the words with which she concludes the same speech at 307-9; unless her father's murderers pay the penalty, she claimed, eusebeia would depart from the earth; she thus sets herself up as champion of eusebeia, a position she maintains throughout the play; it is therefore surprising that she ends the speech, in which she justifies her retaliation in terms of the insults she has suffered at her mother's hands, with the words:

ἐν ὁμν ταυτος ὑπερωνείν, φίλαθλος
οὐτ' εὔσεμεν παρεστίν. ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς κακοῖς
πολλῷ ἐτ' ἀνάγκη κατηγοροῦν κακά.
The pursuit of eusebeia, then, necessitates its negation, and once more compulsion is stressed. No doubt the meaning of both these lines and those at 254-60 for Elektra herself is that propriety (for the reference of sophronein and eusebein in 307-8, as of aischunomai in 254, is to behaviour which is proper for an unmarried noblewoman) must be sacrificed to higher imperatives such as loyalty to one's father, but the effect of these two passages, coming at the beginning and the end of her speech, is to highlight the problematic nature of her conduct and to reveal that she is not without qualms in that respect; indeed, the very parallelism between Elektra and her mother which emerges in the agon is fore-shadowed - "in the midst of evil it is necessary to practise evil." Both justify conduct which is aischron in terms of dike.

Before leaving the Electra there is one more passage which might be considered, both because the concept of aidos goes some way to explaining it and because it relates thematically to those already discussed. We have already seen that it is, at least by the fifth century, aischron to tell lies; this emerges particularly in the Philoctetes, but is also assumed in other Sophoklean passages, such as frr.352 and 79 (Radt). The same idea also helps explain El.59-66, where Orestes experiences some discomfort at the thought of practising deceit, but dismisses his scruple by imagining the kleos he will win. His hesitation, slight though it is, is presumably based on an awareness that lies are generally thought discreditable, and might thus be regarded as aidos. He too, then, like his sister and his mother, pursues an aim he considers justified by discreditable means, and in his deceit sets up a parallelism between himself and his father's murderers, whose action is frequently described as deceitful. Segal writes, "Treachery and deceit ... seldom come off well in Sophocles;" neither, I feel, does the disregarding of a feeling of aidos, and not only in Sophokles; Orestes' hesitation at 59-66 is almost as clear a sign of the ambivalent nature of what he plans to do as is the aidos of his Aeschylean counterpart at Cho.899.
Discussion of attitudes to deceit brings us to the Philoctetes, a play in which there is no instance of the word aidos but which nevertheless provides us with a perceptive and convincing account of the operation of the concept in circumstances in which the ethical suppositions on which it rests are put to the test. Once again, we shall be concerned with the opposition of conflicting aspects of a complex of traditional attitudes and with the notion that the interpretation of key terms can differ from individual to individual.

Odysseus first alludes to the deception of Philoktetes in lines 50-3, in which he prepares Neoptolemos for the hearing of something kainon (52), in the execution of which the boy must prove himself gennaios (51); much of the remainder of the play will concern itself with the question of whether one who is truly gennaios can bring himself to carry out such a plan. The plan is then unveiled (54-69); Neoptolemos is to claim that he left Troy in anger at being denied the arms of his father; this is a "heroic" response, and an extreme one at that, for although Achilles contemplates sailing away from Troy in the Iliad, he never does so. At 64-7, on the other hand, Odysseus' own unheroic nature is revealed; Neoptolemos may say anything he likes against him in the course of his tale; nothing, no matter how bad, will cause him pain. This Odysseus, then, does not care what people say about him - he is anaides.

The subject of anaideia is raised explicitly in the lines with which Odysseus concludes his speech, where he returns to the idea of the foreignness of deceit to the son of Achilles (79-85):

δ' οὖν, παί, φύτευς ο λίη πεφυκότα
τολάματα διώνειν μηδε τεχνάνθεκα κακάν.
ἀλλ' οὗ δ' ακάλυπτα τῆς νίκης λαβεῖν,
τόπῳ δικαιοίς καὶ άλλης ἐκφάνομεθάκη.
καί ἤ' εἰς ἄναιδες ἦμερας μέκες βίοκε.
δος μοι σέμουν, κατὰ τῶν λυτῶν θεῶν
κέκλυσο πάντων εὐξεβέστατος βροτῶν.
To practise deceit, then, requires anaideia and may be described as "contriving kaka". Odysseus, then, is not ignorant of the orthodox attitude to deceive, and does recognize that deceit is usually condemned in these terms; that he uses the pejorative terms at all is a sign of the discreditable nature of his plan. He is also aware of the kind of language used to commend those who avoid deceit (dikaios and eusebes), and realizes that other people, though not himself, may value their reputations for the possession of the qualities of dikaiosyne and eusebeia. It is with the desire to forestall such a concern for reputation that he stresses that one's reputation for these qualities is not irretrievably lost through one discreditable act; more than this, however, he also implies that success (nike) in itself can secure a reputation for dikaiosyne and eusebeia; thus, as with his use of gennaios in 51, he retains the prescriptive sense of these words (he does not deny that a reputation for eusebeia is a good thing to have) but distorts the descriptive (implying that one can act in a way normally considered adikon or dussebes and yet still be called dikaios and eusebes).

As both his use of anaides and his stress that deceit will not damage Neoptolemos' reputation make clear, it is the latter's aidos that he is trying to forestall. He assumes, therefore, and not unreasonably given the traditional connexion between aidos and "what people say", that he will be able to do so if he allays any fears that he might have that his reputation will suffer. Yet he himself also makes pointed reference to Neoptolemos' physis (79-80), and this suggests something more than a mere concern for reputation; if it is against one's physis to act in a certain way, will the intellectual realization that one can act in that way without suffering any harm to one's reputation be enough to enable one to carry out the action without qualms? This question is already foreshadowed by the reference to Neoptolemos' physis, but it is one of which Odysseus at this point seems unaware; for him the end justifies the means and it is his belief that any doubts about the moral character of a given course
of action can be dispelled by the knowledge that it can be carried out with no ill effects.

Neoptolemos' reply (86-95) seems at first to rule out the prospect of his acquiescence in Odysseus' scheme, for he both paraphrases the *aidos* which the plan arouses in him (ἀλγυ κλών, 86, πρέπειν στυγ, 87) and refers to the incompatibility of such conduct with his *physis*. His reaction, then, is instinctive, as we might expect from one whose *physis* it is to reject deceit. Yet although Neoptolemos may be subject to *aidos* in his reaction to the prospect of deceit, another sort of *aidos* is at work on him in rather a different way: he would rather capture Philoktetes by force (90-2), but this does not mean he is ready to abandon the enterprise entirely; he has been sent as Odysseus' assistant by the army, and he is reluctant to be called a traitor (δικαίος πεισόμεθα καλείσθαι, 93-4). One kind of concern for his reputation, different even from that envisaged by Odysseus, thus makes him susceptible to Odysseus' arguments; but he is still not ready to give in; he would rather behave honourably and fail (καλής δέων ἐκμαρτήσει, 94-5) than succeed basely (νικαν κακῶς, 95).

Neoptolemos thus uses *καλῶς* and *κακῶς* in a co-operative sense, and values means and intentions over ends and results. Yet neither *kalos* nor *kakos* is confined to the co-operative sphere, and the ambiguity inherent in the terms will facilitate his persuasion, for in the passage of stichomythia which follows he is forced to choose between competitive and co-operative standards. At first, however, he remains true to his principles (100):

> Τί σοι μ’ ἀνώνυμος καλὸ πλήν ψευδὴ λέγειν;

The possibility of persuasion is then explored, but Odysseus rules this out. The stichomythia continues (108-11):

> Νε. σοι αἰρεῖσθαι ἵνα δῷ τὰ ψευδὴ λέγειν;  
>  Οδ. σοὶ, εἰ τὸ σωμάτια γέ τὸ ψευδὸς λέγειν  
> Νε. πῶς σοι βλέπων τὸ ταύτα τὸν ἱερὸν λάκειν;  
>  Οδ. δῴαν τι σεῖς ὡς κέριος, σοι ὁκνίσαντες. 

The two clearly differ fundamentally over the definition of
what is *aischron*, and Neoptolemos is not impressed by yet another subordination of end to means; his question, \( \pi\tilde{\nu}\; \delta\nu\; \beta\lambda\epsilon\sigma\omega\nu\; \pi\tau\zeta \ldots \) alludes to the common manifestation of *aïdos* in the eyes, and to the fact that *aïdos* makes it difficult to look upon one who regards one's conduct as discreditable.\(^{148}\) Odysseus' sophistic arguments, then, do not convince the youth, yet in 112 he asks after the nature of the *kerdos* to which reference was made in 111, and, on learning that he cannot become the sacker of Troy without Philoktetes' arrows, agrees to the deception (120):

\[ \acute{\iota}\nu\cdot\; \pi\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omega\nu\; \Pi\alpha\gamma\omega\; \alpha\iota\iota\chi\omega\nu\nu\; \acute{\iota}\epsiloni. \]

Odysseus does hold out other inducements, to the effect that Neoptolemos' reputation will not suffer through the deceit (he will be called both *sophos* and *agathos*, 119), but it is by the possibility that he may lose the glory of being the sacker of Troy that he is convinced, not by these. The position of neither has changed: Odysseus still promotes end over means and Neoptolemos still holds that lies are *aischron*: it is simply that he is willing to abandon his *aischune* in order to win fame as a warrior, and at this point he believes that to do so will be as easy as Odysseus says it is. He is plainly portrayed as naive (he is eager to do the right thing, to do his duty and behave honourably [93-5], and his idealistic incredulity that Odysseus should expect him to deceive [100,108,110] is probably intended to reveal his extreme innocence), and his swift abandonment of his untested principles may have struck many in the original audience as the inevitable compromising of youthful idealism in a harsh world.

At the same time, however, although Odysseus is very much the cynical relativist, he has been made to give several indications that he is making the worse cause appear the better; he uses the pejorative terms *kaka* (80) and *kerdos* (111) of his scheme, and his redefinitions of *gennaios*, *dikaios*, *eusebes* and *aischron*, all of which, for him, are applicable or otherwise depending on whether a success has been gained, only imply that these words do have a meaning on which most people are agreed. The audience will also,
then, have been well aware of the reprehensible nature of
the plan and will have realised that, in ignoring a feeling
of *aídos* or *aischune*, Neoptolemos is doing something which
rarely comes off well in tragedy. It will not, needless to
say, have appeared inevitable at this point that he will
undergo a change of heart, yet the foundations on which this
change will be based have already been laid; there is the
question of his *physis* and his concern for his reputation,
and it is only when he is faced with the loss of reputation
in the eyes of another person that the demands of his *physis*
will reassert themselves.

Neoptolemos' decision to abandon his *aischune* is very soon
put to the test by his association with Philoktetes. First
of all, the plan requires that Neoptolemos win the confidence
of his prey, and accordingly a form of *philia*, though based
on deceit, is created between the two. Even this false
friendship, however, brings him into contact with a human
being whose ethical suppositions seem close to his own, as
he expressed them in the prologue. Then there is the
possibility of pity, which is raised, in all sincerity, it
seems, by the chorus at 169-90. Neoptolemos is also
placed in a position of stress by Philoktetes' supplication,
which takes place at 468-506, after the former had made as
if to depart at 461, and although the irony of this passage
is that Philoktetes entreats Neoptolemos to do exactly that
which it is his intention to do (to take him on board ship),
part of the effect of the appeal is also to reveal to Neop-
tolemos that the arguments used by Odysseus in the prologue
may also be used to quite different ends and that there are
alternatives to his definitions of important terms.

From 485 (*προκήρυξ στὸ γόνατο*) it appears that Philoktetes
does make the ritual contact of "full" supplication, and in
doing so thus creates a situation of tension in which *aídos*
is felt to be appropriate; we have seen that Neoptolemos is
susceptible to *aídos* and it can hardly be that the supplic-
ation has no effect on him, especially when he is faced with
the appeal to pity (501) of a lame and helpless individual
groveling at his feet. Most important of all, though, Philoktetes also employs the regular supplicant appeal that the reputation of the supplicated will suffer if he does not grant protection: he thus uses the same argument from reputation as did Odysseus, and, to complete the parallel, employs many of the same terms (473-9):

To Odysseus' perverse definition of gennaios in 51 Philoktetes now opposes a general formulation with which few would disagree and offers Neoptolemos eukleia if he helps him and an óúéidos oú kalón if he does not. The chief point of these suppositions is that they agree with those of Neoptolemos in the prologue; if he still holds the same views about what is and is not aischron as he did there, and if he accepts that the gennaios does hate the aischron, then he would, at least if he thought logically about it, to concede that he is not behaving as a gennaios should; this prospect might cause him some discomfort, and he might consider that Odysseus' implication that he could practise deceit and remain gennaios was a false one.

Rose claims that Philoktetes' idea of gennaios, "boldness" (475 and 481) 154 and eukleia 155 "worlds away" from "traditional heroic virtues" and implies that he is adapting these terms to an application which is not their traditional one. This, however, is not the case; we saw in Theognis how any number of co-operative moral virtues could be seen as requirements of those designated by essentially aristocratic terms like gennaios, and should remember that for an audience watching a play in 409 B.C. it is not only the harshest elements of the morality of the Iliad which are "traditional". Similarly, there are instances enough in the Odyssey of good reputation being acquired by helping others.
of particular relevance in the case of those who help suppliants. The idea, moreover, that the *gennaios* (or *agathos*) should pursue τὸ χαίρετην and reject τὸ αἰσχρό is fundamental, and we have already noted that it seems, by the time of this play, to be firmly established that lying is *aischron*. I feel sure, then, that both Neoptolemos and the audience will recognize Philoktetes' use of these terms as the more normal and traditional, and the effect of the passage is that Neoptolemos is reminded of standards of behaviour to which he himself seemed to subscribe and of all the imperatives of loyalty to one's *physis* and one's noble birth which the proper use of the term *gennaios* entails.

Neoptolemos accepts the supplication, but, as far as we can tell, only because it advances the plan of Odysseus; there is as yet no sign of any genuine *aidos* on his part, either at his own conduct or for Philoktetes. At 524-5, however, he does feign one sort of *aidos*: the chorus (507-18) and their leader (522-3), as part of the deceit, have affirmed their pity for Philoktetes and their willingness to convey him homewards, and Neoptolemos affects embarrassment that he should show less initiative in helping a *xenos* than his inferiors:

\[ ἀλλ' αἰσχρὰ μενὶς τῷ γέ μ' ἐνδεέτετον \]
\[ ἕνω θανάτω πέρος τῷ καίρον πονεῖν \]

There is a note of aristocratic politeness about this, and it may be that he is simulating the gentlemanly qualities which Philoktetes expects of the *gennaios*; it is certainly true that his use of *aischra* in the context of failure to help another echoes the latter's words at 475-9. The words are, however, a simulation, and we have no way of knowing if they conceal any real *aidos* of Neoptolemos' part.

The deceit continues through the Merchant-scene, but the attempt to get Philoktetes on board ship must be abandoned when he succumbs to an attack of his illness; Neoptolemos' resolution in the pursuit of deception is now put to another test, confronted with the pain of a suffering human being. When Philoktetes, exhausted, falls asleep, the chorus urge
Neoetolemos to take the bow and leave the man (827-38). This is impossible, he replies, for the prophecy demanded both (841); he goes on (842):

κομπελείν ὅ' ἐς ι' ἀτελήν σὺν ψεύδειν αἰγχέαν ὀνείδος.

As Winnington-Ingram notes,160 in this sentence Neoptolemos combines the twin considerations between which he had to decide in the prologue, the idea that it is disgraceful to fail and the idea that it is disgraceful to lie; to say that one has achieved what one has not is both to fail and to lie about it. It is, however, the competitive aspect which is the stronger, and the disgrace which is explicitly referred to is that of leaving an enterprise unfinished, and this is the context in which the word aischron makes its first appearances in Greek literature.161

It is extremely difficult to know how to interpret these words: on the one hand, he does not simply carry out Odysseus' original plan, the aim of which seemed to be the acquisition of the bow and arrows (77-8, 113-5); on the other, it does not seem that his statement that the prophecy mentioned both Philoktetes and his weapons is a mere excuse; even Odysseus (at 101) said that he must capture Philoktetes, and the Merchant, too, seems in no doubt but that both the bow and the man are required (591-7); we should assume, then, that Neoptolemos does believe what he says about the prophecy.162 At the same time, he also echoes both Philoktetes' terminology at 476-7 and his own of the prologue, and it can hardly be that thoughts of the moral character of deceit and the contradiction this poses to his desire for a good reputation do not enter his head when he uses these terms; in this connexion it may be relevant to mention that this is not the first time that he has prevaricated (cf. 639-40), and it is thus possible that his expression of a conventional kind of aidos (his words in 842 are virtually a gnome) conceals a growing uncertainty about how he should behave.

However this may be, when Philoktetes awakes it is not long before Neoptolemos expresses the pain which the deception...
causes him, and when he does so he indicates that his discomfort is not something new, but something which has been vexing him πάλαι (906, 913). At 874-6 Philoktetes congratulates Neoptolemos on the "ease" (ἐν ἐυχέσει) with which he bore the sight and sound of his sufferings, and attributes this to his physis, which is ἐυγενής ... καὶ ἐυγενῶν, but Neoptolemos' position is far from easy - he has reached the point at which he can go on no longer. He first gives expression to his aporia at 897: Philoktetes asks if the "difficulty" (συχέσεις) of the disease has persuaded him not to take him on board ship (900-1), but in fact the συχέσεις of the disease has persuaded him in quite another direction, and produced in him a different sort of συχέσεις:

Philoktetes' own pain, then, has induced an analogous pain in Neoptolemos, the pain of conscience, Gewissensnot. His feeling is clearly instinctive, it arises in spite of the efforts he must have made already to ignore it, but it is also reflective, based on an appreciation of his own physis and on a prolonged confrontation of a dilemma, a choice between two possible courses of action. That this feeling may also be described as aidos is suggested by τα μὴ προσκόπτω, since it is aidos which prevents unfitting or unseemly conduct, and confirmed by 906:

Fear of appearing "base" and concern for "how things look" quite clearly indicate aidos, and this aidos is based on the fact that he has "hidden what he should not and spoken the most aischron of words" (908-9). It is thus clear that this aidos has a retrospective aspect: it is based on action in the past. It is also, however, articulated with the familiar reference to the future disapproval of others (φανοῦμαι); but this does not mean that Neoptolemos is simply afraid of the judgement of others. Despite his concern for the outward aspect of his conduct he has no very clear idea of exactly whose disapproval he might incur, unless that of Philoktetes.
There is also the question of his physis: to do what is not fitting is to abandon one's physis (903-4). Neoptolemos thus believes that he has acted contrary to his essential nature, and it is this, the thought that he has not been true to himself, which causes him pain. He does not simply acknowledge that other people find deceit disgraceful; he states, tout court, that deceit is wrong (μὴ ἄτεχνη, 909), and it is part of his very being to believe that this is so. Stebler claims that Neoptolemos' physis cannot be seen as "seine eigentliche Ich-Natur", his own idea of his self, because it also contains imperatives based on loyalty to aristocratic virtue, represented by the accumulation of terms like gennaios and eugenes, and to his father (cf. 904-5, also 89); but Neoptolemos is of noble birth, and his background must be an essential part of himself; in living up to aristocratic standards he is also being true to himself. His concern to live up to the image of his father is also an important point, and particularly relevant to our discussion in that the paternal model is a frequent focus of aidos, but reference to this model does not indicate observance of external standards, given that a human being's most deeply internalized moral standards are likely to be based on precisely this source of reference. We have mentioned the difficulty of deciding whether fear of falling short of parental standards can be regarded as exclusively a shame or a guilt reaction before; in this case, too, it would be possible to describe Neoptolemos' aidos in terms of both, but wrong to claim that either could exclude the other.

Neoptolemos, then, is subject to aidos, and his psychology in doing so is skilfully and realistically presented; thus the combination of the reaction, "what will others think of me," and the reference to personal standards is entirely natural. Philoktetes' response to his discomfort also lays stress on the fact that his conduct so far is occasion for aidos. The victim's denunciation of the deceit at 927-9 is vehement, and at 929-30 he asks: οὐδ' ἐπαινεῖτεν μ' ὄρνι τὸν πειστέσθαν οἱ μὲν ἐκτάλην, ἦς ἐκτάλην;
If Neoptolemos’ discomfort has not already shown him that this question should be answered in the affirmative, then his own observations at 934-5 do; Neoptolemos, he notices, no longer speaks to him but turns his head away, not because he is deaf to his appeals for the return of the bow, but because he is ashamed. At 967-8, still pleading for the return of the bow, Philoktetes once more reminds Neoptolemos of the discreditable nature of deceit, and urges him not to set up an oneidos for himself in the eyes of men. Thereby he is clearly trying to arouse aidos at the thought of others’ disapproval, but, as we have already seen, Neoptolemos’ aidos is not solely concerned with the opinions of others.

Philoktetes’ appeal can only have increased Neoptolemos’ difficulty, and the latter’s direct response to the mention of an oneidos is an expression of despair (969-70). The arrival of Odysseus precludes any decision for the moment, and he remains silent during the exchange between the two old enemies; even in his silence, however, he apparently gives signs of his discomfort, and Philoktetes regards his pain as provoked by both remorse and pity (1011-2). Neoptolemos has, then, recovered his principles of the prologue, and both Philoktetes and Odysseus recognize this, the former attributing his conduct to an education in aischra at the hands of bad men in lines 971-2, and the latter acknowledging that his gennaiotes could lead him to jeopardize their mission (1068, μὴ προέλθεις, γενναῖος περὶ θη). This recognition of Neoptolemos’ qualities of decency and nobility on the part of Odysseus is not new (cf. 79-80), but his use of gennaios here contrasts with that at line 51, and reveals that he is aware of the ordinary significance of the word; there he maintained the prescriptive force of the term while distorting its descriptive meaning; here he does virtually the opposite, applying the word to the impulse to feel pity and to help others, but denying that this impulse is desirable. This use of gennaios thus agrees with that of Philoktetes at 475-6 (he repeats it in the same sense at 1402), and there can be little doubt but that we are supposed to
regard this as the proper application of the word. 175

Philoktetes referred to Neoptolemos' **hamartia** at 1012, and in the prologue Neoptolemos himself declared that he would rather καλὸν ἑλόν ἐγκατατέθην than νοκόν κακὰ (94-5): it is once more with Neoptolemos' **hamartia** that we are concerned when he and Odysseus return to the stage at 1222. At 1224 Neoptolemos says that he intends to undo his previous **hamartia**, and at 1228 he defines this as consisting in his ἱππάτας αἰσχρός in the attempt to capture Philoktetes; 176 at 1234 he explains his desire to give back the bow, and bases this on the recognition that he acquired it αἰσχρός and without δίκη, and again, this must refer to deceit. Odysseus then replies with a threat that the Achaean army will prevent him giving back the bow (1241-3) and with a blatantly specious argument that he has, in any case, no right to give it back since it was his, Odysseus', plan which secured its capture in the first place (1247-8)! In reply to this Neoptolemos simply restates his desire to remedy his ἀμεία αἰσχρός (1248-9). 177

Neoptolemos, then, recognizes that he has done wrong in committing his **hamartia**, and takes full responsibility upon himself; 178 he feels that his conduct has been αἰσχρός and this suggests that his reaction to it is one of αἰδος. In this scene, moreover, his shame is entirely directed at his past actions, and there is not the slightest hint that he is concerned at the prospect of future damage to his reputation. He is concerned, however, to make good his error, and this indicates the presence of the emotion we should describe as remorse. It is clear, then, that in this passage we are confronted with an individual who acts according to the dictates of his own conscience, who, like Odysseus in Ajax or the Antigone of the play which bears her name, 179 has his own ideas of right and wrong, καλὸν and αἰσχρός, and is prepared to defy the group in order to carry his convictions through (1250-1). 180 His terminology, however, is still that of αἰδος, and it is therefore of the greatest importance for us that these terms, particularly αἰσχρός, which seems to
have an intrinsic reference to the external aspect of an action or situation (to "how things look"), can be used in the context of an individual's retrospective evaluation of his own conduct, his internal moral conscience. Sophokles, it appears, has recognized that when a human being experiences *aidos*, he is not simply reacting to the prospect of the disapproval of others, but responding on the basis of moral standards which have become part of his internal conscience. Any feeling of *aidos*, of course, even when it is explicitly related to "other people", will indicate the activation of an internal source of reference based on the standards of society, but the importance of this passage, and, to an only slightly lesser extent, of Neoptolemos' earlier manifestations of *aidos* at 895-975, lies in their presentation of the working of the internalized standard as such. We have met passages in which a subjective evaluation of one's own conduct is used as an explanation for the absence of any pang of *aidos*, but it is only in the *Philoctetes* and the *Ajax* that we have so far encountered a clear representation of *aidos* operating as the individual's subjective awareness that a certain course of action is against his own principles. The realization, then, that *aidos* can work in this way will presumably be a phenomenon of the later fifth century, and we shall meet it again in the fragments of Demokritos.

There is a certain paradox in all this; Neoptolemos' *aidos* is based on interpretations of key terms like *aischroI* and *gennaios* which must roughly correspond to the orthodox fifth century senses of these words, yet in responding to conventional standards he is forced to use his own subjective judgement and to defy the rest of his society; the subjective aspect of his *aidos* is thrown into relief by the fact that it entails a corresponding neglect of *aidos* with regard to the criticisms of others, and thus the roots of Neoptolemos' *aidos* in his conscience are highlighted in a way in which they would not be in one whose ethical assumptions were shared by the rest of his society. Philoktetes, however, does subscribe to the same ethical standards as Neoptolemos.
eventually does, and the bond created between them, in
effect, creates a society outwith that represented by Odys-
seus, and it is the values of this society that Neoptolemos
responds. An even deeper paradox than this, however, con-
fronts the audience of the play: the relationship between
Philoktetes and Neoptolemos and the commendable conduct of
the latter surely demonstrate the fundamental lack of
respectability of the argument that the end justifies the
means; and yet in this case the end must be achieved, and it
is the will of the gods that it should be so. There is thus
no comfortable solution in which the spectator may bask, but
rather each member of the audience, each reader of the play
is compelled closely to examine his own values in the face
of this fundamental paradox.

The relative paucity of instances of *aidos* in Sophokles'
work belies the great importance of the concept itself; the
poet's use of different kinds of *aidos* and his creation of
tension between them form an important part of his technique,
and the influence of contemporary thought is clearly shown
in the partiality with which his characters often approach
the terms with which we are concerned. As regards usage, we
find that *aidos*, having already given way in many areas to
*sebas*, is now less frequent than *aischune*; *aischunomai* etc.
occur ten times, *aideomai* etc. six times in Sophokles, and
both are increasingly used not of apprehension for the future
but of concern over an action in the present. Neither is
used with an infinitive, but both occur with
present participles (*aischunomai* etc. *Ai.*1307,*Ant.*540,*OT.*635,
*Phil.*929,1383; *aideomai* *Ai.*506-7), and two instances with ε
(*Ant.*510 (*epaideomai*), *El.*254 (*aischunomai*)) reinforce this
connexion with present action. This is obviously a sign of a
certain shift in usage, and it is certainly significant that
these verbs are now used more frequently of an action which
is already begun than to inhibit one which is merely contem-
plated, and perhaps this concern with the character of one's
present actions does facilitate a move towards a subjective
interpretation of one's own conduct, but no very sweeping
conclusion should be drawn about changes in values or
society; it is obvious, for example, that *aidos* with regard to one's present conduct may still be related to others' future disapproval (e.g. *Ant.* 510). In the remaining instances the two verbs take a direct object.

**Other terms.**

*Sebas* etc. occur with great frequency in Sophokles, but the pattern of usage is very similar to that noted in the last chapter, and it would be to overburden an already prolix discussion to attempt any systematic treatment of these terms. Worthy of note, however, is the increasing number of very general uses of *eusebes*, *asebes* etc. to commend or denigrate conduct; this does affect *aidos* to a certain extent, because, as von Erffa points out, an action which could be described as *aischron* might now also be termed *dussebes*.

The present participle of *hazomai* occurs at *OT*.155 in a context of religious fear. *ἀφίκης* seems to make good sense at *OC*.134 (its force being equivalent to *ὑπονομέα*) but the active occurs nowhere else.

*Nemesis* etc. are found five times (*El*. 792, 1466-7, *Phil*. 518, 601-2, *OC*. 1753) in the sense of divine anger, only once as popular disapproval (*Phil*. 1193).

**NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR.**

2. ibid.
3. The famous speech of Sarpedon to Glaukos at *Il*. 12.310-28 similarly implies that heroes have a duty to protect their communities and that the protected have a right to demand protection.
6. The explanation is presumably intended to forestall any objection that O. "should" have guessed the truth from the manner of Iok.'s departure; it is not tremendously plausible,
but it does have the effect of stressing the extent of O.'s delusion. Burian, *Suppliant Drama*, p.291n.37, suggests that there may be irony in the lines, to the effect that Iok.
really is ashamed of O.'s "misbegetting".
7. On the Sun as the god who sees all and so most resents pollution, see Parker, *Miasma*, 293,310,316-7.
8. Because people shun and express revulsion for that which is polluted, the consequences of pollution and disgrace converge; see Parker, *Miasma*, 94,205,313-8.
10. On O.'s guilt feelings, see Class, *Gewissensregungen*, 84-8, Stebler, *Entstehung und Entwicklung*, 82,95-8; I should not dispute the general import of their observations, but both, it seems to me, place too much emphasis on O.'s repeated references to his kaka. Stebler, p.97, claims that in the *exodos* is "doppelsinnig ... als Unglück und Leid, Schlechtes und Böses;" there is, however, no instance of the word in which the primary sense is not "misfortunes" rather than "misdeeds" (see esp. 1330 κακα ... παθέωκ). O., as Class (p.87) points out, bears no Schuld in the subjective sense, he is not "morally responsible" for what he has done, yet he still experiences a Schuldgefühl which is extremely natural ("Oidipus wäre kein Mensch, wenn die Stimme des Gewissens bei ihm ausbliebe," Class, ibid.); this distinction, however, does not rest on the interpretation of his kaka as "misdeeds".
11. Cf. above, 2-4. In addition, if there is any truth in Devereux' assertion (*JHS* 1973, 36-49) that O.'s self-blinding is a symbolic form of castration, we might relate this (as a sign of guilt) to Piers' dictum (p.2 above) that the unconscious threat implied in guilt anxiety is mutilation (castration).
12. understanding *τὸ* with both phrases (so Easterling and Jebb, ad loc.).
13. From 444 and 462-3 it appears that she believes that Iole is in love with H., not only that he is in love with her.
15. Hyllos himself raised the question of *τὴ* μεθέλεια at 1270, and although he cannot foresee it, the audience must
be intended to think of the sequel, the apotheosis, and to recognize that Zeus is not aboulos where Herakles is concerned. See Easterling ad loc. and her introd., 10-1. On the idea that the gods can be implicated in disgrace at all contrast fr.276R (von Erffa, 122-3,125).

16. On the problem of \(\lambda^\phi\theta\epsilon\iota\kappa\varepsilon\iota\kappa\tau\alpha\nu\omega\nu\iota\) and sophistic approaches to it, see below, pp.541-65.


18. p.76.


21. Cf. above, p.35. "Results" and "intentions" are, however, part of the dialectic of the play; Dei. makes allowances for the influence of Eros on both H. and Iole, and does not consider her husband responsible for betraying her (436-69), and, as we saw, both the chorus-leader and Hyllos recognize her moral innocence. H., on the other hand, considers only results, both in the case of Dei. and in that of Lichas, who is put to death despite his ignorance of the nature of the gifts he brought (772-80, esp.773 - \(\tau\iota\nu\\ ο\delta\eta\\ η\iota\iota\iota\iota\)). H.'s values thus differ from those of the other characters (cf. in general Segal, YCS 1977, 119-23), but Dei., as we noted, adopts his, results-based approach in her resolve to die. This is only one aspect of the parallelism between the two in the self-chosen manner of their deaths.

22. Yet he wishes to show his body to all at 1078-80.


24. O. has already been persuaded to leave the sacred precinct and to relinquish contact with it; his supplication, and Antigone's plea, is thereafter "figurative" (Gould's terminology, JHS 1973, p.77) and it might therefore be easier for the chorus to have him expelled from Attica (a reaction they exhibit on learning of his identity [229-36]).

25. Aidophron first occurs at E.Alc.659, and was presumably coined in order to convey the sense "showing aids" which can only ambiguously be expressed by aidoios.

26. As Adkins points out (MR, p.105) Oedipus' language in expressing his moral innocence (that he suffered rather than
did, 266-7, cf. 538-9) is novel, and clearly akin to the kind of argument found in the tetralogies of Antiphon (esp. Tetr. 3.d.3-6), but we should not follow Burian (Suppliant Drama, p.222n.26, Phoenix 1974, p.414) in assuming from this that the passages present a "distinction between objective guilt (pollution) and moral responsibility" which is also novel; this distinction is already present in Athenian homicide law, which was very far from "new" when OC was written (see Gagarin, Drakon and Early Athenian Homicide Law, p.1 etc.), and which distinguished between intentional, unintentional and justified homicide, regardless of pollution (cf. MacDowell, Athenian Homicide Law, 47, 58-81). Thus in OC O.'s pollution is still relevant, even though he maintains his essential innocence (see, e.g., 1132-4); pollution still adheres to him even though he is νομίμως καθαρός (548: he is so, it seems, because he acted in self-defence and in ignorance, 270-2.547-8), and this pollution is presumably indelible because of the intrinsic horror of the crimes of parricide and incest (cf. Parker, Miasma, p.124). Lesky, Greek Tragic Poetry, p.177, claims that the "distinction between subject-ive and objective guilt" is "completely foreign to the earlier Oidipous play." This is not entirely true, since the exangelos at 1230 distinguishes between the suicide of Iokaste and the blinding of Oedipus, which are hekonta, and other kaka, presumably the parricide and incest, which are akonta; this distinction is, of course, meaningless to O. himself in the Tyrannus, but not because it was not understood by the Athenians when the play was produced.

On the subject of lines 258-91, we should note the presence of the argument from the reputation of the supplicated at 258-62,282-3; essentially, this is an appeal to αιδος, but of a more self-regarding kind than the simple appeal for αιδος qua suppliant. Perhaps, too, the whole argument on O.'s moral innocence is a variation of another common suppliant appeal, the argument that the suppliant's position is dikaion (cf. A.Supp.343,384,395,406,419,430).

28. Cf. the sentiments of Odysseus at Ai.121-6 and n.102
below.
31. I should print a question mark (Dawe) rather than a colon (Pearson) after Τάξια.
32. This is how O. describes his crimes at OT. 1409 (p. 212 above).
38. aideisthai could easily replace sebein in this context.
39. The connexion between aidosis, sebas and time is apparent in this passage; see above, pp. 188-9.
43. It is, for example, the reaction of the other brother at A. Sept. 683-5 (p. 170 above); we might also note how both Pol. in OC and Et. in Sept. act in fulfilment of the curse out of concern for their honour and the desire to do battle; in OC. 1424-5 Antigone makes explicit comment on this:

Burian, Suppliant Drama, p. 253n. 73 writes,

"There are few more poignant illustrations of the Greek conception of prophecy as determining the future not by itself, but only in conjunction with human will."
44. See Winnington-Ingram, Sophocles, 276-7.
45. Cf. in general Winnington-Ingram, 277-9, 325-9.
46. There are, however, several minor uses of related terms: the concept of aischrokrdeia (the pursuit of wealth or advantage by dishonest means) is mentioned by Teiresias at 1056 as a particular failing of monarchy, and Kreon uses the adjective aischros with a similar reference to base gain
at 299.313 and 1047 (cf. Haimon at 747); at 710-1 Haimon declares that open-mindedness and flexibility are not *aischron* for one who is *sophos*, i.e. that they will not be taken as a sign of weakness. Self-regarding *aidos* is also a prominent motive in both main characters: at line 5 the statement of Antigone that there is nothing *aischron* or *atimon* which is not part of the ills of her family is but one indication of the concern for her own reputation and for the honour of her family which is one of her chief motivating forces throughout the play (cf. Gellie, Sophocles, 30-1). Kreon, too, is motivated by concern for his own status: it is a matter of honour to him that he should not be worsted by a woman (484-5, 525, 677-80) or by his son, a mere boy (726-7), himself the slave of a woman (746, 756).

47. Kreon thus "makes the fact of Antigone's deviation a reproach against her" (Jones, Aristotle, p. 199).

48. The phrase *πρό τοι έκθέτων* recurs at 907 in Antigone's speech to the chorus which draws its argument from Hdt. 3.119. While I tend to agree with those who reject this passage, I do not believe that the repetition of this phrase influences the argument one way or the other.

49. Cf. (e.g.) 29-35 above.

50. The idea of τοὺς ἱματικούς *seβελ* raises the possibility, *sebein* and *aideisthai* being so close in this type of context, that Antigone feels *aidos* for her brother. This *aidos* would be the kind which one owes all one's *philoi*, especially one's family, and clearly it would be possible for her response towards Polyneikes to be so designated, but Sophokles achieves a significant effect by describing it in terms of *sebas* and by exploiting the varying senses and applications of *sebein*, *eusebeia* etc. (on which see Adkins, MR, 132-8). *Sebas* is not originally or exclusively a religious term (see pp. 92-3 above), but with its relatives it is commonly used of the response to the divine, and it is this application of the words, together with that centred on loyalty within the family, that Sophokles assigns to Antigone (511, 922-4, 943; on *eusebeia* as her *Beweggrund*, see Stebler, p. 108). Haimon also supports her form of *eusebeia* at 745, and Kreon recognizes its religious nature (777-80),
but expresses contempt for it. For him, to sebein is to be a patriot, to obey those in authority, and, in the final analysis, to bow to his own power (166,301,514,516,730,744).

The sense of respect for authority or for those of greater power or status, we recall, might also be covered by aidos, although, as we saw in Aeschylus (pp.186-96 above), sebas is now much more common in such contexts.

The chorus also have pronouncements to make on the nature of eusebeia: at 872-5 they recognize that both Antigone's and Kreon's kinds of eusebeia are entitled to be so called, and point out the former's failure to recognize the totality of the concept (cf. the second antistrophe of the "Ode on Man", 365-75, where both respect for the law and reverence for the gods are seen as desirable). In the end, however, it is Antigone's eusebeia which is seen as more important and Kreon's failure to grasp this which is condemned: ἔρημον ὁ ἐρήμωτα, 1349-50 (on the two choral comments, cf. Kirkwood, Study, p.126).

Kreon and Antigone, then, differ in their conceptions of aidos and eusebeia, as well as on the meanings of a number of common words (cf. Goheen, Imagery, p.17, Kirkwood, Study, p.125, Knox, Heroic Temper, p.90).

51. See von Erffa, 108-9, Stebler, p.69; Adkins (MR,p.184) misses the point, which is that Kreon does not ask Antigone "whether she is not ashamed of having tried to bury Polyneikes in defiance of his orders."

52. See n.50. On Antigone's "conscience", see Stebler, 107-11. As Stebler points out (p.107, cf. Gellie, Sophocles, 29 and 32) Antigone has a number of motives, but one of them is certainly her independent recognition of an absolute moral imperative.


54. Winnington-Ingram, p.17, cf. Whitman, Sophocles, p.64.


57. Winnington-Ingram, 16-9.
59. On his concern for his time and atimia, see Knox, Heroic Temper, p.29, Winnington-Ingram, p.27; on his disregard for his social context, Winnington-Ingram, p.24.
60. Ajax' conduct is described as hybris at 1061 (cf.1088) by the far from impartial Menelaos, but surely this estimation of the indiscriminate slaughter of animals might be shared by anyone. Hybris on Ajax' part is also implied by Athena at 132-3 and by the Messenger's report of Kalchas' explanation of the goddess' wrath at 758-70.
61. See, for example, Odysseus' words to Eurykleia at Od.22. 411-2.
63. See Winnington-Ingram, p.27, Stebler, p.67, Class, p.72; the latter, however, also writes:
   "Hier kommt mit zwingender Eindringlichkeit einem Menschen zum klaren, vollen Bewußtsein, daß er etwas vollbracht hat, wofür er ganz verantwortlich ist und das sich nicht mehr rückgängig machen läßt."
And:
   "Von der θύρος der Aias ... läßt sich eine Linie ziehen zur θύρος des euripideischen Orestes, der unter dem schlechten Gewissen leidet, nämlich dem Bewußtsein, Furchtbares getan zu haben."
Ajax does realize what he has done, and that his action will have its consequences, but he attributes its initiation not to himself as a responsible agent, but to Athena (367,401-2); and the fact that he is not troubled by the rightness or wrongness of what he has done, but only by the ignominy in which it involves him, is part of his extreme concern with his honour, part of his character, and is in no way attributable to the play's early date; the difference between Ajax and E.'s Orestes need not be seen in terms of development towards a greater understanding of "conscience".
64. Ajax' concentration on his father here reveals the strength of his attachment to the heroic warrior ideal; in the Iliad it is the father's hope that his son will be a better warrior than he is (Hektor at 6.479, recalled by Ajax
at Ai.550-1) and the father shares in the son's glory (6.446, 8.285); the converse is also true, and both Glaukos in the Iliad (6.209) and Telemachos in the Odyssey (24.508) are reminded by their fathers of the need to preserve family honour (on all these, cf. p.28 above). To let one's father down, then, is clearly occasion for aidos; perhaps we should remember, however, how Kluckhohn and Leighton saw the feeling that one is unworthy of one's parents as guilt or conscience (p.5 above); it may simply depend on the choice of vocabulary whether such a feeling is shame or guilt, even in terms of Piers' distinction between failure and transgression (p.3 above), since to let one's parents or one's father down is both to fail to live up to an ideal and to transgress injunctions like μη δὲ γένεστε πατέρων αἰσχύνεμεν (cf. pp.213-4 above).

65. 462-5, καὶ Τοίον ἴματα συλλέων καθι; notice also that Ajax imagines that his father will be unable to look upon him; on such behaviour as a sign of aidos cf. pp.2,6n.4,106n.127,126, 213 above; as a sign of aidos the inability to look others in the face may simply be an indication of embarrassment or a sign that one shares the negative judgement of one's own conduct which one expects in others, and thus a sign of conscience (a Gewissensregung, Class, 74-5).

66. Hence the truth of Whitman's remark on the symbolism of Kalchas' pronouncement that Athena's anger is destined to end with the present day (756-7): "if Ajax can be induced to endure one day of disgrace ... he will live on for any number of days" (Sophocles, p.70). This is, in effect, what Ajax says at 475-6.

67. Cf. pp.215-6 above; devotion to their own standards of eugeneia is a characteristic of the heroes; see Knox, Heroic Temper, p.28, and cf. in general H.Diller, WS 1956, 70-85.

68. Study, p.105.

69. See Winnington-Ingram, 18-9,29-31.

70. Cf. pp.28-9,38-42 above; Andromache's appeal at Il.6.432 is similar, and Hektor reveals that he is affected by it at 454-65.


72. Winnington-Ingram (p.29) refers to Tekmessa's use of
eugenēs as "a 'persuasive' redefinition" of Ajax', but the idea that the man of good birth should return favours is certainly not foreign to the traditionalist outlook of (e.g.) the Theognid corpus (cf. above, pp.135-7). Winnington-Ingram may be right, however, to suggest (p.30) that more obviously self-regarding concerns may override such sentiments, and, in particular, that the claims of a concubine to charis may not be particularly strong; the fact remains, however, that Tekmessa bases her argument on aspects of the heroic code.


75. loc.cit. (n.73).

76. In the *Trugrede*, the content of which concerns us only to the extent that mention of sebas for the Atreidai by virtue of their status as leaders (667-8) and of "yielding", raises the possibility of the aidos which one owes one's superiors. Since I believe that Ajax is dissimulating in this speech, it follows that I should regard him as without this kind of aidos (cf. Winnington-Ingram, p.49, contrast [e.g.] M.Sicherl, *YCS* 1977, p.82); furthermore, I do not believe that he accepts any recognizable kind of sophrosyne in this speech, in spite of his reference to that concept in 677 (cf. Winnington-Ingram, 50-6, Segal, *Tragedy and Civilisation*, 119 and 150, contrast Sicherl, 82-8, Whitman, *Sophocles*, p.77); the general approach to the *Trugrede* of Winnington-Ingram (47-56) and Lesky (Greek Tragic Poetry, p.127) is the one I should myself follow. On "yielding" in Sophokles in general, see Diller, *WS* 1956, 75-8. As to his pity for Tekmessa and Eurysakes, there is no certain indication as to whether this is genuine or feigned, although, to me, both his ironical use of the pejorative ἔθηκυνθιν in 651 and his brusque dismissal of pity in 580 suggest the latter.


78. Where he says that Achilles ἁκερία not Hektor but "dumb earth".

79. Thus at ΙΙ.24.406-9 Priam is concerned lest Achilles may
have mutilated his son's body, and, at 411-23, Hermes is at pains to reassure him.

80. Cf. p. 225 and n. 60 above.
82. Cf. the Theognidean passages on pp. 137-8 above.
83. Cf. below, pp. 549-65; the argument given by Menelaos seems essentially to correspond with the Protagorean position, as far as we can tell (below, pp. 550-6).

P.W. Rose, HSCP 1976, p. 53 identifies soteria as a sophistic Stichwort, the aim of the pre-social struggle for survival which is analogous to the state of man before the acquisition of aidos and dike in Plato's Prot. myth (Prot. 322a-b); here, however, as, indeed, in the Phil. (see Rose, p. 79 on Phil. 1396) soteria is the product of aischune and deos (so at Prot. 322b.6 in trying and failing to found cities they were seeking τὸ ῥῆματος; this, however, they only achieve with the acquisition of πολιτική τέχνη through dike and aidos).

84. Cf. pp. 56 and 137-8 above.
85. In n. 76 above.
86. That his remarks are distasteful is stated by Whitman, Sophocles, p. 78. Whitman also writes of Menelaos' "Spartanism" (cf. Jebb, ad loc.); this description is tenable, in view of the similarity of the remarks of Archidamos at Thuc. 1.84.3 (pp. 454-7 below).
87. Popular Ethics, p. 194.
89. In using commendable arguments for discreditable ends Menelaos thus bears comparison with the Kreon of the Ant.; cf. Winnington-Ingram, 62-3. The position of Odysseus in Phil. is in some ways the converse of this; his aims are desirable but his methods discreditable.
90. One wonders, however, whether, with the prohibition of burial, the hybris of Ajax' enemies does not take on a more objective character; denial of burial is certainly seen as an infringement of divine law in the Ant., and in this play it is opposed by the morally scrupulous Odysseus; for the idea that it was Sophokles' own belief that denial of burial was always wrong (even though it was carried out with some frequency in real-life Athens) see G. Cerri, Legislazione orale e tragedia greca, 17-50. It is certainly worth remark-
ing that the partiality of choral comments decreases somewhat from that point on; see the leader's criticism of Teukros' abuse of Menelaos at 1119-20, implying that, ἔν θρησκείᾳ, dignity and moderation should be shown by all (and cf. 1264-5).

91. Another breakdown of communication; see Segal, Tragedy and Civilisation, p.135.
93. Cf. above, pp.48-55.
94. p.66.
95. See Pearson, Popular Ethics, p.195.
96. Although the laws of the gods are also relevant here (1343-4). The two points are, however, separate: Odysseus believes that it is not dikaion to deprive Ajax of time and that it is not dikaion to transgress the laws of the gods (cf. Winnington-Ingram, p.67).
97. Cf. above, pp.81-4 etc..
98. Cf. above, pp.10-25,82-4 etc..
100. On its unexpectedness, see 1382. Of course, Teukros and the chorus would not dispute what Odysseus says, but their concern for Ajax and his body is partial where his is not.
100a. Odysseus is thus denied the opportunity to act as did Achilles in Il.24, where he prepared his enemy's body for burial (571-90, cf. 6.418-9, where Achilles personally sees to the burial of Eetion, for whom he felt sebas).
101. This is, in effect, denied by Stebler, p.71, who, while recognizing that Odysseus acts out of concern for dike, nevertheless writes:

"Im Blickpunkt steht noch nicht das eigene Selbst, das eine Verletzung der göttlichen νομός nicht mit sich vereinbaren kann, aus tiefst-innerer, wesensmässiger Gefolgschaft, sondern die δίκη, die νομός, die zu wahren sind, damit der Mensch weiter in ungetrübter Beziehung zu den Göttern stehen kann ... ."

The idea of "das eigene Selbst ..." she finds in Ant. (pp. 106-16 of her work), but I see no difference between Odysseus' conviction that one should not break divine law and
Antigone's; both dike and the laws of the gods in Ai. are interpreted in line with Odysseus' own moral principles, and so, just like Antigone, he is opposing his own moral conscience to the will of other people; in that he is disinterested where Antigone is not he is, in fact, a clearer example of the phenomenon.

102. On the relevance of this to Demokritos B264 etc. see below, pp.559-65. Odysseus does, of course, motivate his conduct in several different ways: there is the aspect which most concerns us, his sense of what is dikaion and kalon; then there is his belief that divine law forbids the exposure of a corpse; and there is his characteristic (in this play) humanity, his ability to see his own fate in that of another, which is expressed at both the begining (121-6) and the end (1365-7) of the play (cf. Theseus at OC.567-9, p.218 above). At both points he points out that his pity for Ajax as a human being is based on consideration of his own interests as well as those of his enemy, and Jones, Aristotle, 184-8, is at pains to explain this element of self-interest to "the reader educated in a morality of altruism" (p.186). I do not think, however, that his sentiments will have placed any strain on those familiar with the phrase (often repeated in justification of Christian altruism), "There but for the grace of God go I."

105. Sophocles, p.165.
107. θευστικ in 521 also suggests hybris (Jebb compares Pl. Laws 630b) and lack of aidos.
110. MR, p.156.
111. See Dover, JHS 1983, p.41.
112. Adkins denies that οὐκαλῶν is the equivalent of aischron in Homer (MR, 43-4), which is in itself unlikely, but there is no equivalent denial with regard to later poetry.
113. In addition to those passages already considered (pp.8-
9,117-9,134-5,185,216 above), cf. E.IA.1341-4, Thuc. 1.83.1, 84.1,5.101,111.3-4,8.27.2-3 (below, pp.331,452-3,467-9).
114. See pp.181-2 above.
115. That the position of the Orestes of this play is similar is argued below, p.248.
117. p.185.
118. Cf. p.75 above.
119. For the aischron-dikaion antithesis in the same context cf. E. El.1050-1, Or.194 (below, pp.359-60).
120. Notice how at 515 the chorus term the family history one of aikeia right back to the death of Myrtilos.
122. Cf. p.238 above.
123. Just as Klytaimestra recognizes that her arguments will not persuade Elektra (547,550-1, cf. Winnington-Ingram, p.221).
124. Cf. above, p.227 and n.64 (etc.).
126. The offence which, as she recognized (522-4), Elektra most often attributed to her (cf. 271,790,794).
128. See Whitman, p.165, Lesky, Greek Tragic Poetry, p.167, and on the self-awareness of Sophokles' charcters in general, Diller, WS 1956, 70-85. Stebler, p.87, sees Elektra's aischune here as "eine bestimmte Form des Gewissens."
129. On the question of whether aidos exists νυμ ή δυνη, see below, pp.551-4.
133. Eum.490-516, p.193 above.
134. Cf. n.67 above.
135. See 589-90, 968-9, and cf., the chorus at 1058-97; Elektra claims eusebeia for herself no less than does Antigone (n. 50 above); cf. Lesky, Greek Tragic Poetry, 163-4.

136. Cf. Winnington-Ingram, p. 225. The sentiment contrasts with that of the Aeschylean Elektra, who wanted to be συμφέστειρα και συμβεβαιοτείρα than her mother (Cho. 140-1); J. T. Sheppard (CR 1918, p. 137) suggests that the sophrosyne and eusebeia of Elektra may have become proverbial, and (CO 1918, 84-5) develops the idea that Sophokles' treatment of these themes reveals the essential contradiction in Elektra's conduct which constitutes her tragedy; on the contrast between E1.307-9 and Cho. 140-1, cf. also Segal, TAPA 1966, p. 500 and Lesky, Greek Tragic Poetry, p. 163.

137. 308-9 clearly bear comparison with 621; cf. Winnington-Ingram, 223-4. We might also consider in this connexion 1382-3, where Elektra prays to Apollo, "Reveal to men the ways in which the gods reward dussebeia;" as Segal (TAPA 1966, p. 525) points out, this is an ominous prayer for one who cannot eusebein.

138. Cf. p. 185 and n. 100 (p. 205) above.

139. Cf. p. 240 above.

140. ἀνήσθην ἐν περίτους ἀνδρὸς εὐσεβείας.


142. See 114, 125, 197, 279, 638 etc.; Segal, TAPA 1966, p. 511, Tragedy and Civilisation, p. 254.

143. TAPA 1966, p. 475.

144. Ἰ. 9. 356-63.


146. Webster's explanation (ad loc.) of the syntax of 83 seems to me to be most likely to be right; he explains εἰς ἄναμβεις as adverbial, comparing εἰς καλώς, ΟΤ. 78, and μέζος βεβεκύ as acc. of duration; von Erffa, p. 117, also rejects
Jebb's idea that ἄναλεξις and βελτίων could both qualify μέτοχος, but his explanation (that εἰς ἄναλεξις = "for the purpose of a shameless act") seems to require τὸ just as much as the other interpretation which he, like Jebb, rejects (that εἰς ἄναλεξις could = εἰς ἄναλεξως) would require the article.

147. N.'s awareness of his own physis will prove important; see Diller, WS 1956, p.71.

148. Cf. n.65 above, Class, p.74, Stebler, p.103; N.'s use of τελευτής also hints at anaideia, which is commonly felt to require "boldness" or "daring".

149. Aside from Odysseus' obvious promotion of τὸ συμφέσων over τὸ δίκαιον the influence of sophistic thought may also be seen in his use of τὸ σωτήριον in 109; soteria is an important idea in the play and, as Rose, HSCP 1976, p.53 points out, possibly a term borrowed from sophistic Kulturentstehungs-theorien (cf. n.83 above).

150. See Rose, HSCP 1976, 64-80, on the development of ties of friendship between the two men which eventually become genuine; Rose relates this to sophistic "social contract" theories, the idea that morals and values arise from a recognition that it is in the interests of all to live together in political communities without harming each other. On real points of contact between the two even before Neoptolemos confesses his deceit, see Rose, p.67, on 411-60, where there does seem to be a genuine agreement between them on which of the heroes at Troy were chrestoi and which kakoi; cf. Alt, Hermes 1961, p.151, Kirkwood, Study, p.146.

151. Rose, p.66 and n.42.

152. Cf. OC.258-62,282-3 (n.27 above) and 902-3 (p.218 and n.30 above).

153. p.68.

154. Cf. Odysseus' injunction, τὸ θάνατο, at 82.

155. Above, pp.139-40.

156. Cf. in general pp.60-3,109n.165.

157. Cf Adkins, MR, p.189 (on aischron and agathos in the prologue of this play).

158. Above p.248 (with nn. ad loc.).

159. Cf. Rose, p.69 (who, however, claims that Neoptolemos imitates Philoktetes' "untraditionally humane ethics.").
160. p. 288.
161. Cf. pp.16-7 above.
162. On the progressive revelation of the prophecy, see Winnington-Ingram, p.292; as he points out, there can scarcely be any doubt but that the final version, given by Neoptolemos at 1324-36, is the authoritative one, for it is endorsed by Herakles; it is pointless to ask, in connexion with that passage or with this, how N. knows and why he does not say what he knows sooner; see further Alt, Hermes 1961, 141-74 and (with some criticism of her approach) Lesky, Greek Tragic Poetry, 175-6 (with further reff.).
162a. Cf. 966 and, on the significance of περίκλη in these lines, Lesky, p.172, Winnington-Ingram, p.284.
163. His aporia is the dominant note of this scene; cf. 895, 908,969,974; Alt, 159,163, Stebler, 104-5, Lesky, p.172.
164. See Rose, p.73 and cf. Segal, Tragedy and Civilisation, p.336.
165. Cf. Stebler, p.104. For words indicating N.'s pain, see 806,906,913,1011.
167. Applied to a person aischros usually bears a physical sense ("ugly"); for this transferred use cf. 1284.
168. Neoptolemos' moral standards and his aidos thus seem to be part of his physis, but this hardly allows us to attribute to Sophokles the view that aidos can exist (on this question see below, 551-4 ), first of all because the poet is not writing a systematic discourse on nomos and physis and secondly because it is not necessary to suppose that, because a certain kind of aidos is part of one's physis as a young adult, it is inherited and innate. From the play itself it emerges that both innate capacity and education (the education Neoptolemos receives at the hands of Philoktetes) are necessary for the development of a sound character (see Rose, 85-9); this is the Protagorean/Demokritic position (below, pp.551-2,562-3) and it is therefore possible that Sophokles was aware of ideas such as that found in Demok. B33DK, to the effect that education can create a new physis.
169. p.104.
170. On N.'s aristocratic *physis* see Diller, *WS* 1956, p.71, Lesky, *Greek Tragic Poetry*, p.175 (191-2 on *physis* in S. in general); the aristocratic aspect of the references to *physis* should not be exaggerated, however, to the extent of claiming that, in N., S. dramatises the "Pindaric" notion of inherited virtue; N.'s essential "nobility" and his *physis* must meet with the proper education to become effective (see Rose, p.87) and, as Winnington-Ingram (p.310) suggests, terms originally denoting aristocratic virtues may have long since become "simply those of traditional morality."

171. Cf. p.227 and nn.64 and 65 above.

172. Cf. pp.5,213-4 (with n.11) and n.64 (pp.270-1) above.

173. See Class, p.73 and cf. 110 (p.252 and n.148 above).

174. Cf. his words at 477.

175. Rose, p.90, recognizes that Odysseus' redefinition of *gennaios* at 51 is specious, and that in 1368 the word is used in a popularly acceptable sense, but as we saw (p.254 and n.153 above), refuses to allow that Philoktetes' also uses the term in a sense which is recognizably conventional at 475-6; on the various interpretations of this word, see also Alt, p.147, and H.C.Avery, *Hermes* 1965, p.289.

176. Cf. Philoktetes at 1136.

177. On *hamartia aischra* in this passage Adkins (MR, p.183) writes: "Under traditional values, a *hamartia aischra* is a mistake that has led to a failure." At no period, however, is there any intrinsic reference to failure in the adjective *aischros* (cf. pp.13-8 above), except in so far as to do something *aischros* is to fail to match some standard of propriety; the standard in question, however, could be any one of a large number of traditional imperatives, and need not simply be the requirement to succeed *per se*. Correspondingly, the rest of Adkins' remarks on this passage are invalid. He goes on:

"To be able to use such a phrase as *hamartia aischra* in a situation where a success has been gained, indicates a firmly rooted change in values ... . The new usage is sufficiently rooted to be understood without explanation, but only a minor assault might be needed to overset it."

Since he finds it "significant" (ibid.) that this phrase
occurs in a late play of Sophokles, Adkins presumably regards the "change in values" as a phenomenon of the latter half of the fifth century; yet in Hesiod success was not to be pursued at all costs, and similar ideas are expressed in Theognis; to steal is to gain a success of sorts, but in Theognis theft (the pursuit of kerdos by improper means) is aischron (cf. p.144 above, and note that in Thgn. 607-10 it is profit made from deceit which is aischron). One could even claim that the "firmly rooted change" goes back to the beginning of Greek literature, for although the evidence for the usage of aischron in Homer is scant, the suitors of the Odyssey could, despite their manifest success, be implicated in aischos by others' criticisms (see pp.14-6,58 and 108n. 152 above).

178. Stebler, p.106, notes the absence of any attempt to excuse himself.


180. Cf. Rose, p.76, who notes that this passage "does mark a particularly self-conscious internalization of the heroic 'shame' ethic; terms which normally derive their validity from the approval or disapproval of the group are here held up as a basis for defying the group's opinion." Rose also relates this to sophistic thought, and hints at Demokritos, but does not mention the passages which would best illustrate the phenomenon, namely Demok. B84,244,264.

181. Cf. (e.g.) pp.3-4,87-90 above.

182. Cf. 132-4,182-6 above.

183. On Neoptolemos' conscience Stebler (p.106) writes: "Neoptolemos' kurze Angaben von 1234 ... und 1246 ... zeigen weiter, daß er mit der Vorstellung seines Gewissens-Inhalts den inneren ναύγα des spontanen Rechts-Empfindens umgreift, noch nicht aber sein Ich als zentrale Instanz (noch nicht: 'Ich habe getan, was mir nicht entspricht.') - In Antigone werden wir auch dieser Stufe von Ich- und Gewissens-Bewußtsein begegnen."

This is quite arbitrary: Neoptolemos says, "Ich habe getan, was mir nicht entspricht" at 902-3; Stebler is aware that this might seem to contradict her remarks here, but claims (n.255, p.151) that in spite of the stress on physis and τά
in those lines, the presence of other motives (concern for noble birth, status, shame, cf. p.258 above) renders the meaning quite different from Ant.523 (Ant.'s famous statement about her loving physis). But Neoptolemos' physis drives him just as much as Antigone's drives her, and the latter, too, is subject to motives other than loyalty to her physis. Neither do I see why a phenomenon which can be present in Ant. should be seen as "not yet" present in Phil.. From her note 256 (p.151) it seems that Stebler regards Antigone's positive commitment to do what is right as more important than Neoptolemos' retrospective, "bad" conscience, but this, again, appears to me a quite arbitrary preference.

184. See below, pp.559-65.
186. p.125.
5. EURIPIDES

In Euripides, while *aídos* etc. are not generally of the same importance for the overall interpretation of individual plays as we found them to be in Aeschylus and Sophokles (the *Hippolytus* is an obvious exception), the frequency of the words with which we are concerned is greatly increased, and this, combined with the comparatively wealth of our knowledge of Euripides as against the other two major tragedians, allows us to examine the usage of the relevant terms over a range whose width can only be paralleled by that afforded by the Homeric poems. Euripides is often named as the poet who brought realism to the Athenian stage, and while judgements of this kind must be subject to careful qualification, it is certainly true that there is often a greater domesticity in the background of his plays, and it is this relative domesticity which enables us to gain something of the insight provided by the *Odyssey* into the workings of *aídos* in everyday contexts.

Euripides, like Homer, provides us with a number of instances of *aídos* in the martial context: at *Hec. 813*-6 the Messenger describes the cowardice of Eurystheus in the face of a challenge from his opponents:

> ὅ δ' οὔτε τοὺς κλώντας αἴδεσθείς λόγων
> οὔτε αὐτὸς αὐτῶν δειλινοὶ στρατηγοὶ μὴν
> ἔλθειν, ἐτολμήσῃ ἐγγὺς ἀλκίμων δορος,
> ἀλλ' ἂν κακιτος.

As in the *Iliad*, *aídos*, here inoperative, is felt to prevent cowardice; *τοὺς κλώντας αἴδεσθείς* expresses exactly the Homeric reaction - one is concerned for the opinion of those who might witness one's cowardice.¹ There is, however, a zeugma of two senses of the verb here, for while line 813 conveys the sense of (e.g.) *αἴδεσθείς...* *τείχες*..., the phrase *αἴδεσθείς...* *δειλιν* is very far from Homeric,² since, if *aideomai* took a direct object in Homer, that object was always personal, and referred either to those who might witness one's actions or to the direct recipient of one's actions; the use of the impersonal object here suggests not
"I feel shame before", but "I am ashamed of", and the phrase, στενός ὄν, probably concessive in force, seems to add to the criticism of Eurystheus' failure to reject cowardice out of aídos. The Messenger's suggestion, then, seems to be that Eurystheus showed no regard either for the opinions of others or for his own status as a general, and it thus seems to be expected that one will refrain from discreditable conduct both because it will damage one's reputation in the eyes of others and because one considers it unworthy of oneself, regardless of what others may say. We have already noted that any feeling of aídos, any fear of loss of reputation presupposes a claim to honour, a subjective idea of one's own worth, but the novelty of this passage is that this subjective or "internal" aspect is explicitly referred to beside the external source of reference, the judgement of other people. The thought behind the passage is still the traditional one, that cowardice is aischron, but it is recognized that when one rejects a course of action as aischron one is not simply responding to the prospect of others' disapproval. A notion of "self-respect" has entered the picture, and with it a possible relationship to Demokritos' ἐνυφον ἁίδοιθαι. This passage is also important in that it is the first in which we have met aideisthai governing an impersonal object in the sense "I am ashamed of x." In this particular case it is not absolutely necessary to regard the force of aideisthai as retrospective (aideisthai ... δεικνύω might simply paraphrase aideisthai δεικνύω γένευθαι) but it will be clear that this sense of the verb does facilitate the retrospective usage, and we shall indeed consider instances of aideisthai in the sense of shame over one's own past actions. Obvious some development in the usage of the verb has taken place, since in Homer aídos was uniquely prospective and took only a personal or quasi-personal object, and this development should presumably be related to the frequency of instances of aideomai and aischunomai with a present participle in Sophokles: aídos and aischune, it seems, come increasingly to be concerned with one's reactions to one's own present or
past conduct, rather than with the inhibition of action in
the future. Barrett, in his note on Hipp. 244, notes this
development, but his explanation of it, in terms of contam-
ination of aideisthai from aischunesthai, is highly question-
able. In Homer, the usage of both verbs is parallel, and in
the one passage in which aischunomai governs a direct
object it does so in exactly the same way as aideomai.
There is, moreover, no instance of aischunomai with an
accusative of the wrong done which is earlier than this
present passage, and while aischunomai is much more common
with the participial construction in Sophokles than aideomai,
this reflects only the obsolescence of the latter, not a
particular association of the former with shame over one's
own conduct. We have, in fact, met only one passage in which
either verb might legitimately be translated "I am ashamed
of x", and this was in the context not of shame over one's
own actions, but of shame over another person's low birth
(OT. 1079); I expressed some hesitation as to whether
aischunomai in that passage could be replaced by aideomai
without a change of meaning, but the fact remains that τῆ
συργένεσιν ... αἰχύνωντοι clearly means "she is ashamed of my
low birth," not "she respects my low birth." OT and Hcld.
are probably roughly contemporary (if anything, the latter
is likely to be the older), but even if the OT were
unquestionably the older, one previous instance of aischun-
omai + acc. in the sense "I am ashamed of x" would hardly be
enough to prove that passages like the present one, in which
aideomai has that sense, arise from contamination from the
one verb to the other; since instances of both verbs in this
application appear at roughly the same time, it is most
likely that both, as synonyms, develop this particular
meaning in a parallel fashion.

Later in the same speech (839-40) the Messenger reports the
exhortations to bravery which arose as battle was joined:

će  Αθηναίος  τῶν  Ἀρείων  τόστοιες  οὐκ  ἀγαθήτης  αἰχύνων  πόλει;

These lines clearly recall similar appeals in the Iliad, the only slight difference being the reference to the col-
lective honour of the polis rather than the personal honour of the individual warrior or his collective honour vis-à-vis his comrades, family or dependants. Eurystheus, the Messenger reports (828-9), employs a similar appeal to aidos when he urges his men not to disgrace (kataischunai) their homeland in the forthcoming battle, while at 700-1 Iolaos expresses the traditional idea that cowardice and staying at home are aischron in affirming his determination to fight. Iolaos is again the speaker at 541-2 where, responding to Makaria's decision to offer herself in sacrifice, he says:

οὐδ' αἰσχύνωμεν τοὺς σοις λόγους, τῇ τύχῃ δ' ἀγγύνωμεν.

If οὐδ' αἰσχύνωμεν is not a litotes for "I am very proud", then the aischune which Iolaos disclaims may be explained as the reluctance of a warrior to be outdone in heroism by a woman (the chorus-leader has just described Makaria's proposal as the ultimate in heroism).

That victory is kalon, defeat aischron is stated quite plainly by Theseus at Supp. 529-30, while the idea that it is aischron to flee underlies Helen's appeal to Menelaos to abandon his aidos at Hel. 805. At Tro. 1190-1 Hekabe claims that the report that grown warriors killed the child, Astyanax, out of fear will bring disgrace to the Greeks; at Hcld. 1000-8 and IF. 155-70 the killing of an enemy's children is represented as a prudent means of securing one's own position and avoiding vengeance, but in both these passages the speaker is far from impartial, and clearly such an extension of enmity is of the type which some, like the Odysseus of Sophokles' Ajax, might regard as distasteful. In the Troades passage it is clearly Hekabe's intention, in the absence of any more effective means of retaliation, to implicate the Greeks in disgrace, but her evaluation of their conduct need not be rejected on that account. Also in Tro. we find an exception to the rule that defeat is aischron, in a passage which urges consideration not just of the outcome of the conflict, but of the way in which the participants fought (401-2):

καλῶς οἶδες τὸς ἕλθον, στέφανος οὐκ ἁίδρος πολέμων καλῶς ὀλέσθαι, μὴ καλῶς δὲ συκκλέεις.
This appears to be an extension by analogy of the Homeric idea that to die bravely in battle is not *aischron*, but the analogy may break down in that, whereas an individual who is killed in battle can be honoured by his fellows or his community, which has an interest in promoting the idea that death in battle can be glorious, a city which is destroyed will be unable to confer honours on itself, and, unless it belongs to an alliance of some kind, might be less likely to find praise for its noble stand in the wider world. Thus, in the immediate context, the chorus-leader (406-7) takes no comfort from Kassandra's words; clearly, though, her remarks do represent the kind of sentiments to which the defeated might turn in self-consolation.

We have already seen in Aeschylus' *Septem* and Sophokles' *OC* how the sons of Oedipus are presented as driven by mutual destruction and fulfilment of the father's curse by their concern for their honour. In *Phoenissae* Eteokles is subject to exactly the same motivation, and the similarity of his justification of his action in terms of the insult to his time to that of his namesake in Aeschylus and his brother in Sophokles suggests that this aspect of the brothers' motivation had become a *topos*. The relevant lines are 509-14:

\[
\text{άνωσία γὰρ, τὸ πλέον ὀίτις ἀπολέεις} \\
\text{τοῦ χάρρου ἐλάβε. Πεῖς ἐς τοῦτο αἰγκύνομαι,} \\
\text{ἐλθὼν ἐν ὑπάλληλοις τὸν καὶ προθύμητα γὰρ} \\
\text{τυχέιν ἐχεῖς. Ταῖς γὰρ ἀν ὑφήσις τῶς} \\
\text{γένοιτ' ὀνείδος, εἰ μυκηναὶ δόρος} \\
\text{φόρω περείην ἐκπέτηκ τῷ τῶς ἐχειν.}
\]

Eteokles represents himself as concerned both for his own reputation and for that of his city, but his justification is couched in terms which reveal it as pure selfishness; to say that it is *anandria* to give up the greater share in exchange for the smaller is surely to confuse greed with manliness, while the concern lest Thebes should incur an *oneidos* by giving in to a foreign force barely conceals a preoccupation with Eteokles' own honour (*εἰ ... περεῖην ἐκπέτηκ τῷ τῶς ἐχείν*). What were understandable motives in Aeschylus and Sophokles have become base and mean in Euripides, and Eteok-
les' selfishness is further highlighted by contrast with the fairness of his brother and through the criticism of his mother. This is the first time we have met aischunomai with a noun clause: von Erffa suggests that the verb has its "root meaning" ("I consider it aischron), but aideomai must also virtually mean "I consider it aischron", and, in fact, occurs with a comparable noun clause at Hcld.43-4.

There is another character in Pho. who acts to preserve his reputation and avoid the charge of cowardice, but the motives of Menoikeus, who, according to Teiresias (913-4), must be sacrificed to secure the safety of Thebes, are presented in a much more favourable light. Kreon, the boy's father, conceives a plan to convey his son out of the city and save his life, but Menoikeus, having first assured his father that he is ready to leave the city, soon reveals his resolve to take his own life. Important in this decision is his belief that to flee would be to implicate himself in cowardice (994), but Menoikeus' concern for his reputation is combined with a strong sense of duty and responsibility to others; at 995-6 he says that there is no excuse for his betrayal of the land that bore him, and thus combines the idea of the opinion of other people (συνήνωμι) with loyalty to his country, a duty which is related to the requirement to show loyalty to one's parents (μετέργασα (996) makes plain the quasi-familial relationship) and other philoi. Self-regarding (or "competitive") and other-regarding ("co-operative") motives are further entwined at 999-1005:

He is concerned, then, at the charge of cowardice, about how he will compare with others who face death in battle and about how he might appear to others, but he also considers his responsibility to others, and it is on the co-operative
note that he ends his speech (1015-8):

εἰ γὰς ἠκαίνων ἐκαίνως ἐπὶ δύνατό τις
χειρότην διέλθοι τοῦτο καὶ κολύν φέροι
πατείδι, κακῶν ἃν οἱ πόλεις ἐλασσόνων
πεσόμεναι το ἀντίν εὐτυχίσειν ἂν.

The combination of self- and other-regarding impulses in the motivation of this character is indissoluble. This will, I take it, partly be a result of the fact that it is traditionally reprehensible, and so bad for oneself, to fail in one's duty to others, but it might also be related to contemporary debate with regard to how far other-regarding behaviour is compatible with self-interest. In Menoikeus there is a perfect coincidence of the two, and he undertakes the ultimate subjection of self to community out of concern for his own reputation. That other-regarding behaviour is often motivated in this way is a particular Euripidean theme which we shall meet again; another recurrent technique is the way in which a given action or attitude is shown to be harmful or reprehensible in one situation or individual, helpful or commendable in another. This, too, may be related to contemporary thought, in particular to the idea that the character of a particular entity or course of action is not fixed but dependent on circumstances, and there may be something of this behind the contrast between Eteokles and Menoikeus; to be concerned about one's reputation is, it seems, not always bad, but sometimes bad, sometimes good.

It is almost certain both that the Rhesus is not by Euripides and that its date places it outwith the period with which we are concerned. Without, however, drawing any conclusions about the practice of Euripides, we might note in passing that the play does contain several passages which, not surprisingly given the thoroughly "Iliadic" background, refer to the traditional idea that cowardice and defeat are aischron (see 82,102-4,489-91,589-90,756-7,808-10). The disgraceful nature of Rhesos' death, aischron at 756-7 because he was killed in bed, is contrasted with the glory of a brave death in battle at 758-61.
It is not only in the context of battle, however, that we find characters expressing concern for their reputations; such concern is explicitly related to _aidos_ at Alc. 725-8, where Admetos is involved in recrimination with his father: 

\begin{align*}
\text{Ad. } & \text{θανυ}\text{π }\gamma\text{ε }\&\text{ε }\text{μενοι }\text{δυσκληεις, }\text{γε }\text{θανυς.} \\
\text{Φε. } & \text{κακις }\text{ακαειν }\text{ου }\text{μελει }\text{θανοντι }\text{μι.} \\
\text{Ad. } & \text{ϕευ }\text{φευ}. \text{Το }\text{γεις }\text{ου }\text{αναιδειας }\text{πλευν.} \\
\text{Φε. } & \text{η}^\text{ς} \text{οικ }\text{αναιδεις }\text{- }\text{τινω }\text{εφυτες }\text{αφευν.}
\end{align*}

To be unconcerned about what people say is, as we have seen before, _anaideia_. Pheres, however, picks up the idea of _anaideia_ and uses it in a different sense; he may be _anaides_, but Alkestis was not, in that she gave up her life for her husband. The _aidos_ which Pheres admits he lacks, then, which is concern for what others may say of oneself, differs from that exemplified by Alkestis, which is respect for one's _philoi_; the distinction answers to the double use of _aideomai_ with a direct object in Homer, on the one hand expressing awareness of the criticisms of those who witness one's actions, on the other signifying concern for the direct recipients of one's actions. Both senses may, however, come together, in that society in general may disapprove of a failure to show _aidos_ towards one who deserves it, and so _aidos_ for the recipients of one's actions may easily encompass _aidos_ at "what people say", and this is very much what happens in this _agon_ between Admetos and Pheres, as each accuses the other both of failure to show respect for others and of acting in a way which people will regard as discreditable.

Admetos charges his father, in effect, with a breach of two different kinds of _aidos_: his major accusation is that it was cowardly of the old man to refuse to die in his son's place (642, 717, 721, 723), but it is also part of his case that his father failed to return an obligation of _charis_: Admetos did not dishonour his father, but was _aidophron_ towards him (658-9), yet, he implies (660-1), his _aidos_ was not returned. Pheres' own accusations against his son are exactly parallel: Admetos reproaches others with cowardice, yet he has been outdone in bravery by a woman and is a
coward himself (696-8,701-2), while his determination to avoid death has convicted him of anaideia (694-6):

σὺ γὰρ ἄναιδός διεμάχω τῷ μὴ θανεῖν
καὶ ἐγὼς παρελθὼν τὴν πεπεραμένην τύχην,
Ταύτην κατακτεῖς.

Each, then, accuses the other of anaideia and seeks to implicate his opponent in disgrace; that this is a common tactic in such exchanges of invective is suggested by the similar exchange of insults in Sophokles' Electra.24 Here Admetos' anaideia seems to lie in his neglect of accepted limits of human conduct, his disregard for the opinions of other people in seeking someone to die in his stead and, perhaps, his lack of aidos for his wife.25

Pheres, as we have seen, virtually admits the validity of his son's accusation of anaideia: similarly Admetos, in a quieter moment, reveals that he is sensitive to exactly the charges made by his father, when, in the Homeric manner, he imagines "what someone will say" (954-7):

Perhaps the idea that Admetos has failed in his obligations to his wife lies somewhere behind this passage, but much more prominent is his concern for his own reputation for manliness, which he expresses in language which clearly reveals that he is subject to aidos. Such aidos is also part of the motivation of Alkestis at 315-6, where she expresses a concern lest some future stepmother spoil her daughter's hopes of a good marriage by spreading an "ugly rumour" (ἀισχῶν προβλαβών κληρών): not only would this harm the child and her reputation, it would also reflect badly on the mother.

Concern for time and the need to restore honour through vengeance is a common theme in the surviving plays which deal with the fortunes of the House of Atreus: at El.274 it seems that Electra considers even the slightest hint that her
brother will not restore the honour of the family disgraceful, for in answer to the question, what will Orestes do, if he returns to Argos? she replies:

[Text in Greek]

As in the other tragedians, the desire to forestall the mockery of others often plays a considerable rôle in the motivation of Euripides' characters. Such a desire, for example, determines Medea's resolve to kill Jason's new bride by poisoning rather than by any other means (381-5):

[Text in Greek]

A similar concern is in evidence at 404-6, where she imagines the mockery which she will incur as a result of Jason's abandoning her, daughter of a noble father and descendant of the Sun, in favour of a member of the "Sisyphean" royal house of Corinth. Like many another tragic heroine, Medea's concern for her status, a concern borrowed, perhaps, from traditional male ideas of honour, is acute.

Another woman deeply influenced by the fear of disgrace is Megara in HF. At 282-3 she expresses her belief that it is inevitable that she and her fellow-suppliants will be put to death; Lykos has already (238-46) threatened to burn them at the altar if they refuse to leave its sanctuary. For Megara, however, such a death is intolerable, since to afford one's enemies an opportunity to mock is a fate worse than death (284-6); the house to which the suppliants belong is glorious, and they must not betray it (287); to do so would be to impair Amphitryon's fame as a warrior (288-9), and while Herakles' own fame is secure (290), he would not wish to be associated with the kind of disgrace which would accrue to his family as a result of such a passive death (291-3); for noble parents are afflicted by their children's disgrace. Again, such concern for honour and fame is of a kind which is more appropriate for men than for women,
and Megara acknowledges this by referring to her μίμησ' ἄνδρος at 294.

The idea of the gelos of others, particularly one's enemies, recurs at IT.502, where Orestes explains his reluctance to divulge his name - ἀνώνυμοι θανόντες οὗ γελωμένη ἄν. At Ba.828 Pentheus' aidos at dressing up in women's clothing (cf.836) is clearly based on a fear of ridicule, but his aidos is dispelled by the assurance that this would be the only means of avoiding detection by the Maenads on whom he wishes to spy (837) and that he will be led through deserted streets (841); of this plan he approves, as a means of avoiding the mockery of his opponents (842). That Pentheus should be mocked, however, is exactly the intention of his tormentor, who wishes to enhance his victory by public humiliation of his victim (854-6).

At Or.1102 Orestes declares Menelaos, properly his philos, to be an echthros and vows vengeance. Then follow the seizure of Hermione and "murder" of Helen. At 1554 Menelaos rushes in, aware that his daughter is prisoner and believing that his wife is dead (1558-9); the only concern to which he gives voice, however, is his concern for his reputation and his fear of the mockery of his enemy (1559-60): ἀλλὰ τοῦ μητρικόνων τεχνάματι ἡ στι τά ἡ ταύτα καὶ πείλυς γέλως.

Fear of the mockery of others, especially of one's enemies, is thus a major consideration with many Euripidean characters, and no doubt such a concern was a common feature of the everyday experience of real-life Athenians, but it is worth noticing that such motivation often emerges in an unfavourable light; Medea's fear of mockery, for example, leads to murder, and not only of her enemies, while Menelaos, at IA. 371-2, uses his resentment of the mockery of the Trojans in justification of the sacrifice of Iphigeneia; similarly Megara's fear of mockery is based on an outlook of despair which turns out to be ill-founded. Perhaps, then, the poet sometimes suggests that such concerns can be harmful.
At Hec. 567-71 Demophon, in rejecting a course of action which he considers _aischron_, thus suggests that he may be motivated by _aidos_, _aidos_ which seems to be based on his obligations to Makaria, who has requested that her sacrifice be attended only by women:

\[
\text{εἰτικι τάς, ὥς Τάλκινα Πυρθένων, ἐπεὶ καμὲν ἥν' ἀἰσχρόν, μὴ ὥσ κορμελθαμί καλῶς, πολλῶν ἐκάτι, τῆς τε ἕστε ἑψύχεις καὶ τῶν δικαίων, ἡμεῖς τῆς ἔπεισον.}
\]

Makaria's request, and Demophon's recognition that it is a request to be _κορμελθαμί καλῶς_, relate to ideas of the impropriety of young women mixing with men, but Demophon's assertion that it would be _aischron_ for him to deny her request is based on the girl's bravery and on _τὸ δίκαιον_.

Makaria's bravery, then, seems to give her a right to have her request granted, and this is presumably because it is felt to be correct to give honour where honour is due. Something of this sense may be covered by _τὸ δίκαιον_, but it is possible that this also refers to the fact that Demophon feels himself bound by a debt of gratitude, in that Makaria's self-sacrifice, which she herself has already justified with reference to the _charis_ which she and her kin owe the Athenians (503-6), frees Demophon from the dilemma of being forced either to acquire a reputation for abandoning supplicants (461-3) or to enter a battle which he knows he cannot win (since it has been prophesied that the sacrifice of a virgin is required in order to defeat the Argives). 32

Distaste at leaving an enterprise unfinished was one of the senses covered by the term _aischron_ in the _Iliad_, 33 and it is a sentiment which finds expression again at Hec. 1240-2, where Agamemnon explains why he feels himself obliged to arbitrate in the dispute between Hekabe and Polymestor:

\[
\text{ἀχθείνα μὲν μιὰ τῆλετελεί Κίνειν κακέ, ὅμως ὁ ἕναχρη. καὶ ἔλα, αἰχήνης φέρει πρὸς ἀγές ἄρες θανόν, ἀπωσαθ' ἄσε.}
\]

Agamemnon may be dissimulating here (he has already given indications that he is concerned lest others think that he
has taken Hekabe's side for the sake of his concubine, Kassandra (850-6), and it may be that he is attempting to conceal the fact that he is not disinterested), but his explanation of his intervention in terms of aischune, must at least be plausible, or its efficacy as an excuse would be minimal.

The idea that it is aischron for one of a certain status to undertake work more suitable for his inferiors seems to underlie Adrastos' reaction to the Messenger's report that Theseus himself took part in the laying out of the Argive dead at Supp. 767:

δενόν μὲν ἢν βάσταγμα καθεκύνην ἔχειν.

To this the Messenger replies (768):

τί δ' αἰσχρόν ἐνθεύματα Τάλληλην κακῆς;

The claim that such action is not aischron thus rests on the principle of the common humanity of the king and the dead, and takes no account either of the menial nature of the task or of the possibility that it may involve Theseus in pollution (an idea which might be alluded to in δενόν, if not also in καθεκύνην ἔχειν). It is easy to see how the handling of dead bodies might be considered distasteful on both these grounds, and thus it is likely that Adrastos' is a possible "ordinary man's" reaction; it is certainly one which is based on a feeling that other people will share his distaste for the task which Theseus has performed. The Messenger, however, uses the word aischron in a way which takes no account of what other people may say, but only of his own interpretation of the situation, which he obviously feels is shared by Theseus himself. The Messenger thus represents the increasing tendency, which we first noticed in Solon, to decide on the basis of one's personal principles what is and is not aischron. Doubtless this contrast between ordinary and enlightened opinion is deliberately contrived by Euripides and, expressed in this way, a product of the age, sceptical of traditional values, to which he belonged; but while the contrast between different views of what is aischron may be "new", the humanity which the Messenger attributes to Theseus is not: twice in the Iliad Achilles
takes part in the burial of enemies he has killed himself, and there is no suggestion that it was at all aischron for him to do this.

In Aeschylus' Agamemnon Agamemnon wished to walk on the garments strewn by his wife, yet experienced aidos at the prospect of doing so; in Choephoroi Orestes' aidos led him to hesitate as he was about to gain the revenge he sought; and in Sophokles' Electra, while Orestes and his sister experienced no misgivings when committing murder, both did show signs of aidos. Orestes with regard to his deceit, Elektra in connexion with her excessive and unfilial conduct. All these characters, then, experienced aidos even in the execution of an action which they desired to perform, and their disregard of this aidos, an anxiety created by their instinctive awareness that their conduct was not compatible with values to which they themselves subscribed, was an important indication of the questionable moral character of what they were about to do. The fact that Euripides employs this motif in his Electra suggests that it may have become a topos in plays with the Oresteian theme. Elektra's aidos (though aischunomai is the verb which is used) surfaces at El.900-4:

Several features of this passage particularly recall the "Carpet scene" of the Ag. (cf. 902 μή μέ τις θέων βάλη with Ag.947, μή γιά... βάλοι θέων, 904 with Ag.937-8), and this adds strength to the supposition that Elektra's hesitation has a similar effect to that of Agamemnon, that it is a sign that she knows she is doing something discreditable. Both she and Orestes relate her aidos to fear of popular disapproval (phthonos in 902 seems to cover the sense of the Homeric nemesis), but it is significant that, whereas the latter regards it as sufficient simply to assure his sister that she has no reason to fear disapproval, her misgivings are not entirely dispelled (904): her expressed concern for
"what people say", then, conceals a vestige of a moral scruple which knows that ῥεχέουσ ὑπεξέγειν is wrong in principle. 42

In the Ion, Ion's concern for his reputation manifests itself in two ways: firstly he is apprehensive lest he incur the resentment of the Athenians in taking up a position of importance in the city despite being, as he believes, the incomer son of an incomer king. The Athenians, he is aware, are autochthonoi and resent incomers (589-90), and he is afraid that he will incur their disapproval no matter how he acts: if he keeps quiet out of fear of the reproach of being an outsider, they will call him a nobody (593-4), and if he is at once active in the state, his inferiors will hate him and the upper classes, who remain aloof from politics, will mock him and call him a fool for courting popular disapproval (595-601). Ion's aidos, as seems to be the norm among young men, 43 is obviously acute (he reiterates it at 631-2), but it is also understandable, since the chorus of Athenian women give expression to their city's hatred of foreigners at 719-22 and 1074-5. 45

The other aspect of Ion's aidos is his fear that he may turn out to be of low or servile birth. This is expressed at 1382-3, where he opines that it would be better never to discover his mother than to find that she was a slave, and at 1526, where he describes the possibility that Kreousa bore him as the result of an illicit relationship as τοῦμον ηλευθέρων. 46 The opinion that slavery is discreditable in itself is, as one might expect, not shared by slaves; the outlook of Kreousa's old retainer at 854-6 differs sharply from that of Ion:

ἐν γας τι τοῖς δουλοις ηλευθέρων τοῦμον τὰ ἐξ χάκοι παίνετ οἱ ἐλευθέρους ὁδοὺς κακίων δούλους, ὠστὶς ἐσθλον ἤ.

In claiming that only the name of slavery brings disgrace and that a slave who is esthlos is no more kakos than a free man the speaker applies these terms exclusively to moral qualities, 47 and thus ignores both their traditional use as
terms of rank and the tendency to assume that those who are socially "good" are also morally "good". Perhaps, then, these sentiments would be unlikely to find widespread acceptance, but they do at least reveal both that those of low status might still be protective of their honour and that the equation of birth with moral worth was beginning to be challenged.

Loss of status is a frequent ground for shame in Hec.; at 551-2 Talthybios reports Polyxena's words as she begged to be allowed to die without constraint:

ĕν νεκρὸς Υὰς

δούλη κεκληθηλ βασιλικὸς οὔτε αἰσχύνομαι.

Hekabe bemoans her own fate in a similar vein at 822:

αὐτῇ δ' ἐπ' αἰσχραὶς αἰχμάλωτος σίχομαι.

Here her distress is genuine, but it is feigned at 968-73, where she expands on the theme of her loss of status as a ruse to mislead Polymestor. It is perhaps true, as she says, that she is unable to look him in the eye, but this is more likely to be because she is plotting vengeance against him than because she is ashamed of her present condition:

αἰσχύνομαι κατ' ἑπιθέλεσεν ἑναντίον, Πολυμεθυσταῖο, ἐν τούτῳ δε κελέμῃ κακοῖς.

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The inability to look another person in the face, the concern at being seen and the downcast eyes are all typical concomitants of aídos (which is here treated as synonymous with aischune). The deception is thus convincing, and Polymestor regards the reaction which Hekabe feigns as quite natural (976).

The eponymous heroine of the Electra is another character whose loss of status disturbs her. She dwells on it with much exaggeration at 300-13, ending (312-3) with an expression of her shame that she, whose hand was once sought by Kastor, now a god, should now be married to a
peasant. Her obsession with her reduced circumstances resurfaces at 404-5, where she berates her husband for inviting guests "greater than himself" to his humble abode, while at 658 her conviction that Klytaimestra will come to her on hearing of her childbirth is explained in terms of the desire she imagines her mother will conceive to bemoan the wretched circumstances of the birth. Elektra's preoccupation with her status is only one aspect of the theme of social class in the play. Elektra's marriage to the Farmer allows the poet, in fact, to explore the legitimacy of traditional class attitudes.

The Farmer, it turns out, is no less conscious of his status than Elektra, and, just like her, he experiences aischune at the divergence in their rank. He is proud of the fact that he comes from a noble family (οὐ δὴ τοῦτῷ ἐξελέγχομεν, 36), but the wealth and nobility of his line has declined, and so his present low status makes him inhibited with regard to the rich. He feels that he would aischunein Elektra if he were to sleep with her (43-4), and goes on (45-6):

αἰρχώμενας ἀλβίνων ἄνδρῶν τέκνα λαβίν ὑβείκειν, οὐ κατὰ ἔλεος γενῶς.

At 261 it is suggested that the Farmer is also afraid of the punishment of Orestes, and so does not attempt to take Elektra by force for that reason, but even there it is recognized that he is sophron by nature, and it appears from the present passage that a feeling of his own unworthiness is just as important a consideration with him as the prudential fear of punishment. His awareness of his low status, then, leads him to show regard for others, while Elektra's causes her to think only of herself. The Farmer's consideration for other people is also revealed at 47-9, where he expresses his sympathy for Orestes on account of Elektra's "unhappy marriage" and assumed at 364-5, where Orestes believes that the Farmer is motivated by an unwillingness to destroy his (Orestes') reputation. The two siblings are thoroughly appreciative of the Farmer's awareness of his own place in society, and express their approbation in terms of his eusebeia (253-4) and his sophrosyne (261). Paradoxically, how-
ever, they also express it by means of words which refer in their origin to noble birth: he is *gennaios* at 253 and 262, and it is recognition of the poor man's essential "nobility" which leads Orestes to his disquisition on the proper application of terms like *euandria, gennaios, kakos, agathos* and *eugenes* at 367-90. The wider paradox behind this speculation is that, while it is the Farmer's awareness and acceptance of class distinctions which lead him to act as he does, his conduct leads to conclusions which undermine these very distinctions. In all this, *aidos* is of some importance, because it is, in effect, the Farmer's *aidos* with regard to his own status *vis-à-vis* others and the *aidos* which makes it impossible for him to consider dishonouring another person which earn him these terms of praise and which allow him to emerge favourably in the comparison with the the two representatives of the noble house of Atreus whose *aidos*, such as it is, is entirely self-regarding.

In the *Helen* much is made of the discrepancy between Mene-laos' fame as a warrior and his present sorry condition as the victim of a shipwreck. At 414-7 he expresses his discomfort in terms of both *aischune* and *aidos*: At 790-1 it is Helen who is affected by her husband's sudden drop in status, when she expresses her horror that he has been forced to beg for food at the door of a *barbaros*, while his own *aidos* resurfaces at 845-6, where he explains his "decision" to die in Egypt with Helen in terms of his desire not to spoil the fame he won at Troy:

To *τὰ Τρεικόν γὰρ οὔ κατακεχύμων κλέος
οῦτ' ἔλθων λέγωμεν πεινών θρόνων, ... .

His concerns are the same at 947-9, where he explains his refusal to supplicate Theonoë:
Clearly Menelaos carries his concern for his kleos to extremes, and he cuts a rather ridiculous figure in doing so, but this is to be attributed to the comic/melodramatic nature of the play rather than to the supposition that such concern is inherently ridiculous or pompous (though neither is it always entirely without overtones of pomposity). Likewise, Menelaos' assertion that to undertake supplication is to become a coward may be an exaggeration, but it is nonetheless true that supplication does involve the self-abasement of the suppliant and the abdication on his part of his claim to parity with the supplicated; the aidos which he is then felt to command is thus based on his abandonment of his claim to time, although in another sense the aidos of the supplicated is a response to the time which is invested in the suppliant by the gods. Clearly, whether one decides to undergo this ritual humiliation will depend on the strength of the regard (the aidos) one has for one's own status and on what is at stake.

Menelaos is clearly not one to admit inferiority to anyone, but the aidos which inhibits supplication is also to be found in a more serious context at Pho.1622-4, where Oedipus tells Kreon:

\[
\text{οὐ μὴν ἐλίξεσθαι ὑμᾶς σὺν κακῷ φανόμενα. ἂν γὰρ ἐμὸν ποτὲ εὑρέθη ἀιδὸς ἀν ἀνεδοκήν, οὐδὲ περὶ πράξεων κακῶς.}
\]

The aidos experienced by Menelaos and Oedipus is explicitly disclaimed by Klytaimestra at Id.900-2:

\[
\text{οὐκ ἐπιδεισθήσομαι ἐφ' ἐπιστεπτέον τὸ σὺν γόνῳ, θυμὸς ἐκ θέας κεφαλή. ἂν γὰρ ἐγὼ σεμνύνομαι, ἢ τίνος σπουδαστών μελ λαλλοὺ ἢ τεκνὸν πέτα.}
\]

For Klytaimestra, then, the benefit she hopes to gain by supplication outweighs her concern for her status, although it is doubtless concern for her status which prompts this justification of its temporary abandonment. She clearly feels that aidos on her part would be a hindrance in the circumstances, and that is why she rephrases ἐπιδεισθήσομαι as σεμνύνομαι: semnos comes from the same root as sebein, and, as we have seen, aideisthai and sebein are virtually
interchangeable when they describe the response of supplicated to suppliant, but *semnos* itself has a particular pejorative overtone when applied to a mortal, and in using the verb *semnos* here Klytaimestra expresses her belief that, in the present circumstances, *aidos* would be something akin to "pomposity".

In Makaria's speech at *HclO* 500-34 concern for the status of herself and her family is combined with fear of mockery, the obligation to show gratitude and other, practical considerations. Having stated her intention to offer herself in sacrifice, she goes on to explain why she believes it is both necessary and honourable that she should do so. Her first point, at 503-6, resembles that made by Menoikeus at *Pho* 999-1002 - where others are prepared to be brave, it is discreditable not to follow their example; but whereas Menoikeus was referring to the example of his fellow citizens, Makaria refers to that of the foreign state which has decided to aid the suppliants in whose number she belongs. The Athenians' act of kindness demands the repayment of the *charis*, and it not be fitting for the Herakleidai to appear inferior to them in their sense of honour. The Athenians' bravery, then, demands a *charis* of bravery from the suppliants, and to fail to live up to their example would be seen as cowardice, would invite the mockery of others, and imply that Herakles' children were unworthy of him; how can this be fitting for *chrestoi* (507-10)? Better (and more fitting, *καλλινοῦ*, 511) to be killed at the hands of one's enemies than to show such cowardice.

One alternative to her self-sacrifice, that the Herakleidai should allow the Athenians to fight on their behalf and be defeated, is thus rejected as dishonourable; Makaria now goes on to reject another, that she and her fellow suppliants should leave Attica, on the same grounds, for in following this course she would be forced to become a beggar, which is dishonourable in itself, and would be subject to the taunts of others (515-9):
This future conditional expresses exactly the sense of the Homeric, κισέσμα ... μὴ ποτέ τις εἰπήτο, 65 and the imaginary reproaches of τις are still a major consideration. It is particularly noticeable in this passage how quickly Makaria’s thoughts turn from the loss of status involved in wandering from place to place to the more masculine and militaristic notion of cowardice. In the following lines, however, it is to her own material position in the event of her not committing suicide that she returns; if she were bereft of her brothers (here she seems to imagine another eventuality), she would be alone in a position of anaxia, and no one would wish to marry her, and this is not a situation which one as episemos as she could endure (520-7). This fear of loss of status, however, which might be appropriate in a woman of noble birth, she prefaces with a remark drawn from notions of honour which are more normally associated with the male (to the effect that it would be a betrayal of her brothers if she were to survive them, 520-2), and she concludes her speech with an affirmation which is the converse of all that she has said before: whereas it would be disgraceful for her to seek to avoid death, actively to pursue it would bring her the renown of having saved her brothers and of refusing to φιλοφυχάτει (530-4). Like Menoikeus in Phq., then, Makaria undertakes the ultimate subjection of her own interests to those of others precisely out of concern for her own status, and effects a perfect combination of self- and other-regarding behaviour. That she does so is clearly intended to be seen as commendable, and it is perhaps all the more so in that she is a woman: no less than that of Megara in HF her conduct is a μένυμα ἀνδρος.
fear of loss of face. Some, admittedly, do carry these concerns too far, while in others a preoccupation with personal honour leads to terrible consequences, but this is not true in every case, and so it seems most probable that the frequency with which these anxieties are expressed reflects the extent to which regard for one's own status in the eyes of others was part of the motivation and outlook of ordinary Athenians.

Such concerns, specifically expressed as *aidos*, are prominent in Herakles' reaction on awakening to the enormity of his crime in *HF*, but Herakles' *aidos* deserves particular discussion because of the questions it raises about the relationship between *aidos*, guilt and pollution. Herakles learns of what he has done at 1135-9, and his first connected utterance thereafter begins at 1146, where he immediately conceives his wish to kill himself. As his thoughts turn to methods of suicide his language becomes increasingly metaphorical, and he conceives an image of himself as dikastes of his own crime (1150), before considering the possibility that he might burn from his flesh the duskleia which awaits him (1151-52). As well as by grief, then, he is motivated by a desire to punish himself and fear of disgrace. It is not only, therefore, that he feels he will incur reproach, although this concern will weigh heavily with him; the idea that he has done wrong and must be punished is also present, and this implies remorse and the feeling which we should call guilt. There is also a hint of one further strand: lines 1151-2 are a metaphor from the ritual of purification by fire, but the object of purification here is not miasma but duskleia, and this is only the first of several combinations of the two ideas in this part of the play.

Herakles thus alludes to the disgrace which he imagines will result from what he has done before Theseus arrives, but it is certainly true, as Parker points out, that the former's shame increases noticeably with the arrival of the latter, a witness and a philos whom Herakles respects (1154). At 1155-6 he exclaims,
The arrival of another person, then, leads to fear of being seen, a typical *aidos* reaction. Together with this fear, however, there is also a fear that Theseus will be affected by Herakles' pollution. Both these considerations lead Herakles to remove himself from Theseus' sight, as he explains at 1159-62:

Veiling of one's head is another typical *aidos* reaction, a consequence of the fear of being seen and of the general association of *aidos* with seeing and the eyes, but if pollution can be transmitted by sight, the veiling of one's head is an obvious means of avoiding affecting others. Herakles' concern lest he transmit his pollution to Theseus, moreover, is only a particular aspect of the desire not to involve outsiders in one's troubles which is expressed by means of the verb *aischunomai* at *Or*. 281-2 and *IA*. 981-2. In more ways than one, then, Herakles' *aidos* and his awareness of his pollution are inextricably linked. This is entirely natural, for as Parker shows, the immediate danger of pollution for the polluted party lies not in the pollution itself but in the reaction of others to it, and the reaction of others (horror, revulsion, reproach) will have much the same effect on its recipient as would a similar reaction aroused for any other reason; there is thus "a convergence of the consequences of pollution and disgrace", since it is a source of reproach to be polluted. Conversely, it is also worth noting that the reaction of other people to conduct which is considered shameful may be expressed in the language of pollution simply as a means of expressing the utmost moral revulsion. When one also considers the fact that pollution is infectious and that *aidos* seems to make one reluctant to cause unpleasantness to others, the closeness of the association of *aidos* with pollution becomes apparent.

This association is more or less present in several other
Euripidean passages in which the head is veiled in shame: at Hipp. 243-6. Phaidra asks the Nurse to cover her head, since she feels *aidos* at what she has said and has already made her *aischune* (here of the subjective reaction rather than of objective disgrace) plain by the lowering of her eyes. Clearly *aidos* at one's own conduct and shyness of being seen by others are more prominent here than any thought of pollution, but the ultimate object of Phaidra's *aidos*, her illicit love for Hippolytos, is the kind of sexual transgression which might, at least figuratively, be described in terms of pollution, and, in fact, Hippolytos reacts to the Nurse's report of Phaidra's passion as if her very words brought contagion (653-5). The title of the first Hippolytos (Καυστόμενος) in itself informs us that the eponymous character veiled his head at some point, and since that reaction was presumably prompted by *aidos* it may have been accompanied by the following exclamation (fr. 436N):

\[ w \pi\acute{a} tv\i\ 'a\i\dot{w}\i\acute{s}, e\i\acute{t}e t\acute{a}j\i\pi\acute{k}in b\eta\i\acute{t}\i\acute{s} \\
\sigma\nu\nu\i\dot{o}\i\acute{t}a \t\acute{a}v\acute{a}v\i\dot{k}a\i\dot{t}\i\acute{w} \acute{e}\i\dot{g}\i\dot{e} \i\dot{w} \phi\i\acute{e}n\i\dot{w}. \]

The shameful proposals of the Phaidra of that play are a sign of her lack of *aidos/aischune*, and this induces *aidos* in Hippolytos, and leads to the veiling of his head, again as if he might somehow be contaminated by contact with the shameful. On HF. 1159 Wilamowitz compares Or. 459-61, a very close parallel in that both Herakles and Orestes are polluted, both feel shame at what they have done (cf. HF. 1160 with Or. 461) and both are reluctant to be seen by one who is bound to them by a tie of *philia*. 

Emphasis on the contagious aspect of pollution decreases after Theseus convinces Herakles, in his speech at 1214-28 and in the stichomythia at 1229-54, that he will not be deterred from helping a friend by considerations of pollution, but Herakles is still afraid of reproach in the future, and part of his fear, at least, must be based on the awareness that those less enlightened than Theseus will shun him as polluted. Accordingly, at 1286-90 he imagines the reproaches of those he will encounter should he leave Thebes, and his shame persists to the end of the play, where, at
1423-4, he refers to the disgrace in which he has spent the house and the fact that he will henceforth be a wretched burden on Theseus.

He has, however, by that point given up his intention to commit suicide, and 

*aidos* has its part to play in undoing his resolve: Herakles, in fact, is won over by the argument that failed to convince Sophokles' Ajax, that there is more occasion for *aidos* in choosing to kill oneself than in facing the tribulations of life, even a life beset by disgrace. 82

The thought that suicide is the coward's way out, however, is not overtly prompted by his interlocutor, but arises within himself (1347-51): 83

\[
\text{Εἴκεψε κατεστείλαμεν δὲ καὶ παραβάς ἐν κακοῖς ὑμῖν μὴ δειλινίως ὑφίστως τιν' ἐκλίπτων βάρος.}
\]

\[
\text{Τῶς συμφοραῖς γὰρ ὀτις ὑİK ὑφίσταις οὕτως ἀνδρεὺς ὑπὸ κακίων ὑποστημένοι βέλος.}
\]

\[
\text{ἐγκατεστείλαι βίων.}
\]

In the same speech, at 1378-85, he wonders whether he will be able to carry his weapons, with which he killed his wife and children, in the future. So strongly does he feel that the weapons will be a reminder of his crimes that he sees them, metaphorically, as witnesses who will reproach him in future (1379-81); he is still deeply troubled, then, by remorse, and the fact that he personifies his weapons and imagines their reproach suggests that he is also still subject to *aidos*. Again, however, his concern for his past glory as a warrior and fear of future disgrace at the hands of his enemies lead him to persevere, to continue to be the Herakles he was (1382-5):

\[
\text{οὐκ ἔμειναι ἀλλὰ θαμνοῦσιν ὅτι ὑπὲρ ἔξω ἔστιν ἠλλὰ ἐν ἐκλήσει ἐκπεπεκτῆς ἐν 'Ελλάδε τὸ ἐκθέοι ἐμενοῦ ὑποπολείων αἰτήσεως θάνατον;}
\]

\[
\text{οὐ χειπτῶν τὰς, ἀθάνατος δὲ σωτῆραν.}
\]

*Aidos* is thus clearly of great importance in the play, and it works on Herakles in different ways: it both suggests the idea of suicide and encourages Herakles to stay alive. It also has two distinct aspects, one which is particularly
concerned with the judgement of others, another which is based on Herakles' own reaction to what he has done.\textsuperscript{84} We have seen, for example, that Herakles wishes to remove himself from Theseus' sight and that he retains a concern for what other people will say of him in the future (1155-62, 1286-90). Similarly, his decision to endure is grounded in his reluctance to be called a coward or to fall prey to his enemies (1347-8, 1382-5). At the same time, however, his resolve to live also draws its strength from a renewed confidence in his own worth which enables him to face the prospect of future opprobrium, and we saw that his very first utterance on discovery of the murders contained not only a reference to his duskleia, but also a desire that he should receive his just punishment (1146-52). One passage not so far discussed reveals how these "inner" and "outer" aspects are combined. At 1199-1201 Amphitryon explains to Theseus why Herakles hides his head:

\begin{center}
\text{
κατά λέον ὁ ζήν ἀμάκ
κατὰ δικαίως ὁμοίων
[assemblyed text]

The zeugma of different applications of aideisthai recalls Hcld.813-4 (pp.283-4 above), and here, as there, the zeugma unites inhibitory and retrospective senses:\textsuperscript{85} according to his father, Herakles feels inhibition at being seen by Theseus, respect for Theseus as his philos,\textsuperscript{86} and shame at what he has done. There are, then, effectively three senses of the verb here, inhibition before a witness, concern for a philos (the Homeric usage of aideisthai with a direct object as respect for the recipient of one's actions), and retrospective shame (the new usage of the verb with a direct object). There should be no doubt that Amphitryon is correct in attributing these motives to Herakles, for all he does, in fact, is rephrase the concerns expressed by Herakles himself at 1153-62 when he first saw Theseus approaching, namely fear of being seen, concern at implicating a philos in his troubles, and shame based on what he has done. In the present passage the most interesting aspect is Herakles' retrospective shame, which raises the possibility that his...
here corresponds to guilt.

The conclusion that this is the case, in fact, is inescapable, because in giving the three objects of Herakles' αἰδος, Amphitryon is clearly not simply saying the same thing three times over; if αἰδόμενος τὸ σὸν ὀμίκα is to differ from αἰδόμενος αἷμα παιδευόμενο, the difference must lie in the reference of the former to the judgement of others and of the latter to the character of one's own actions and one's responsibility for them. It is significant, however, that it is Amphitryon who makes the distinction, rather than Herakles: when Herakles speaks on the subject, he speaks simply of αἰδος, αἰσχυνε, δύσκλεια etc.; it is clear from what he says that his αἰδος has different aspects, but to him these are all part of the one overwhelming feeling. Accordingly, when he speaks of his shame inhibitory and retrospective aspects are inseparable. Line 1160 is a good example: Herakles explains his veiling of his head in the words, αἰρομενα γὰρ τοῖς δεξαμενοις κακοῖς,
and it is clear that he regrets what he has done and that his horror of it instills in him a profound sense of shame; he knows that what he has done is reprehensible and feels responsible for it, yet this knowledge still produces inhibition and the desire to avoid the (possibly critical) gaze of others. The dative τοῖς δεξαμενοῖς κακοῖ, moreover, is not the object of his shame but the reason for it - it is a causal dative, and the possibility thus arises that αἰρομενα refers as much to prospective inhibition as to the recognition that one has done something disgraceful. In the same way, Herakles' feeling that his weapons will be a constant source of reproach to him as they hang by his side (1378-81) is simply a projection of his inner shame at what he has done and of the fear that the memory of his crime will be hard to live with, but the fact that he projects these feelings to an external source of reference at all shows how the idea of guilt or remorse and the awareness that the object of his guilt may also be the object of others' reproach are combined within him. Let it be clear, however, that neither of these aspects cancels the other.
It is important not to go to extremes in one's eagerness to discover what is new about the usage of *aídos* in the tragedians; we saw in connexion with Homer that even prospective uses of *aídos* could entail an internal awareness that a given action was generally considered wrong in terms of traditional standards, standards which will have been deeply internalized because of their very uniformity, and so even uses which refer explicitly to "other people" do not necessarily imply simple adjustment to external standards. This internal aspect, the element of "conscience", is present, then, even in prospective uses, and is not a concomitant of the retrospective sense alone, but obviously the ability to use *aideisthai* and *aischunesthai* retrospectively increases the possibility that we will recognize in the retrospective application a subjective evaluation of the moral character of one's own actions, and this is clearly what we find in passages like HF.1199-1201, *kúrónos ... λίμα*, and Hcl. 813-4, *aístes ... δείλιν*. In other passages, however, the retrospective and subjective aspect is combined with an inhibitory aspect which relates to the prospect of future reproach, and much as we had to emphasize the internal element of traditional, prospective *aídos*, so we must not underestimate the external element which often accompanies *aídos* based on one's past actions. Greek "realism", as Dover calls it, is able to encompass both these elements.

Thus passages, like HF.1160, in which *aischunomai* is used with a causal dative need to be treated with some caution: it is important that the speaker is aware that his own conduct is disgraceful, but equally the thought that others will criticize him because of it may also be present. That this should be the case is shown by Hcl.541-2:

\[ \text{τὰς τοὺς λόγους, τὴν Τύχης ἦλθυνομένη} \]

Here the dative is causal, as it is in HF.1160, but the question of retrospective shame does not arise, because Demophon's *aischune* is occasioned not by his own words, but by those of Makaria; he is not, therefore, judging himself, but responding to the prospect that it may harm his reputat-
ion to be seen as inferior to a woman (responding, in this case, negatively). This is, naturally, based on his own idea of his own status and worth, but it does still take account of the opinions of others. This also seems to be the case in the other example of aischunomai with the dative at Or. 460-1:

\[\text{av tr' (sc. Tyndareus) aifwsý`'icc GSÖ M/n D-f' EknG --, / -r& LdCEFLe pC f/IA VLS.}\]

Here Orestes is clearly troubled by the enormity of what he has done,\(^9\) but he is also afraid of adverse judgement at the hands of Tyndareus, and goes on to give specific grounds for his fear of disapproval from that quarter in particular. (He refers to the his own failure to repay his grandfather for his upbringing, and while his anxiety here will arise from an awareness that it is wrong to betray one's philoi, it nonetheless causes him to be afraid to face the one he has wronged.) The situation in passages like this, then, is not dissimilar to that in \(\text{Il.22.104-7,}^9\) where Hektor is aware that he has caused the destruction of the host, something which he knows is "wrong", but combines his awareness of his misdeed with a prospective fear of popular disapproval. Similar are Apollo's aidos with regard to his past prophecies at \(\text{Il.713}\) (this leads him to drive Orestes, whose presence in Greece would be a constant reminder of the disreputable oracle and a possible source of reproach, as far away as possible),\(^9\) and Menelaos' aidos at his tyche at Hel.417, both of which find a place in von Erffa's list of instances of retrospective aidos.\(^9\) The latter, in fact, is barely relevant at all in this connexion, since it deals not with shame over a misdeed regarded by society as reprehensible, but with simple embarrassment at Menelaos' present condition.

The idea that discreditable action in the past should occasion inhibition in the present occurs at Tro.1025-8, where Hekabe expresses her revulsion towards Helen,
Perhaps there is also a suggestion in this passage that retrospective shame on Helen's part should have led her to punish herself, but the *anaideia* referred to specifically relates to the failure to show proper inhibition towards others on account of past transgressions. There is, then, both a retrospective aspect, Helen should recognize her faults and, as we should say, feel guilty about them, and a prospective, inhibitory aspect, in that she is expected to modify her conduct *vis-à-vis* other people.99 Helen reacts almost as Hekabe would like at Or. 97-105, where she attempts to persuade Elektra to make an offering for her at Klytai mestra's tomb:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Hl. } & \text{οὖν ἔσθη ἑπταμενός πέρας φίλων στείρων τάφος;} \\
\text{El. } & \text{δειγμα γὰρ ἀγαθώσιν ὑμῖν} \quad \text{αιχυνμαι.} \\
\text{Hl. } & \text{ὄψε ὑπ' ἀγνωσίας εὖ, τότε ἐπάνω} \quad \text{αιχυνμαίσ ὁμοι.} \\
\text{El. } & \text{δειγμα εἴης, οὐ φίλους ὅμως} \quad \text{χέρες.} \\
\text{Hl. } & \text{αἰσθήσεις} \quad \text{ότι} \quad \text{ἐκ} \quad \text{τοῖς} \quad \text{μνήμης} \quad \text{έχεις;} \\
\text{El. } & \text{οὐκ διὰ} \quad \text{τά} \quad \text{τώ} \quad \text{τῶν} \quad \text{ἀλλα} \quad \text{νησίων}. \\
\text{Hl. } & \text{δειγμα γὰρ, ἀγαθώ τ' ἀναβεβίω} \quad \text{μετὰ} \quad \text{φάταν} \quad \text{τοῖς} \\
\text{El. } & \text{οὐ} \quad \text{καὶ} \quad \text{διὰ} \quad \text{φανερωμένω} \quad \text{μητέρως} \quad \text{ἐγκλαμει} \quad \text{τάφος.}
\end{align*}
\]

Von Erffa100 is right to say of Helen in this passage that, "Der Grund für das αἰχυνμαίσ liegt in der Vergangenheit," but it is misleading of him to regard this as an instance of retrospective shame because line 98, *δειγμα ... αἰχυνμαίσ*, is a straightforward example of the traditional, prospective use of *aischunomai* with an infinitive. It would be more correct to say that Helen's prospective *aidos* (for so does Elektra interpret her *aischune*) is based on the knowledge that she has done something discreditable; in fact, though, it emerges that it is not the moral character of her past actions which concerns her as much as her fear of unpleasantness from those whose sons she led to their deaths. The association of *aidos* with fear of unpleasant consequences is traditional, but this can be more or less combined with a recognition that others' reproaches are justified: there is not much of this in Helen's *aidos* here, and in this respect she contrasts with Elektra, whose inability to look upon her mother's tomb is probably an indication of a kind of *aidos*.
which is based exclusively on her recognition of the enormity of what she and Orestes have done. 101

Other passages deserve to be distinguished from those which deal with shame based on a knowledge that one has done wrong for the simple reason that, although the grounds for shame lie in the past, the action was not committed by the person who feels aidos but by someone else: with Hcld. 541-2 (pp. 310-1 above) compare Ion 341, IA. 848. One's own actions are, however, at issue at Ion 367 and Hipp. 244. In the former Ion advises Kreato not to question the god about the child he fathered because he kíríývetai to péleýma, and although Ion believes that the god is concerned to avoid exposure (ή γελέγχα νιε), his use of kíríývetai clearly refers to shame over a discreditable action in the past. In the Hipp. passage Phaidra’s kídí actions γι' τη λελεγμένα μου indicates her shame at her madness and possibly also at the indications she has given of her love for Hippolytos, but the inhibitory aspect is also clearly present in her desire for concealment and her reference to her ómy turning to aischune, which presumably means that she has lowered her eyes out of shame at what she has done; both terms here, then, aideomai and aischune, have both a retrospective and an inhibitory aspect. 102

Given the traditional prospective force of aidos it is entirely natural that the inhibitory aspect should exist beside the retrospective in passages in which aidos is occasioned by one's own past conduct, and thus the element of the retrospective, "bad" conscience in such passages must be seen as accompanying, not supplanting the sense that one is under the scrutiny of other people: both these elements can coexist. They coexist, for example, in the character of Orestes in the play of that name, whose conduct towards Tyndareus, mentioned above (pp. 311), reveals how his awareness that he has done wrong leads to unwillingness to face the reproaches of others. His awareness that he has done wrong, however, emerges unambiguously as such in the famous line 396, where he describes his nosos as

\[ \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \gamma \; \γ
This line is universally seen as the first reference to the phenomenon of conscience as such in tragedy, and it clearly relates to other passages in late fifth century literature in which the phenomenon is described by means of the verb ἐνειδέω. Here the emphasis is on Orestes' intellectual apprehension of his crime, an apprehension which has, however, emotional and psychological consequences, and thus there is no mention of ἀδός, which, although a result of the awareness of the character of one's actions, is not equivalent to it. Euripides thus separates the element of retrospective conscience from its effects and manifestations here, and identifies the rational element behind the emotional reaction. Elsewhere, however, it is clear that ἀδός is one of many aspects of Orestes' response to his crime: he hides his body, says Elektra at line 43, feels ἀδός at the approach of Tyndareus at 459-69, expresses a fear that he will cause the latter pain at 544-5, and claims he feels ἀδός at referring to Klytaimestra as his mother (557). From the wider action of the drama, then, it appears that Orestes' awareness of the enormity of what he has done does lead to ἀδός.

In And. 804-15 the ideas of conscience, concern for reputation and fear of unpleasant consequences are combined in a particularly ironic manner: the Nurse reports Hermione's remorse at her attempt to have Andromache and her child put to death:

δείτε ταύτα γαρ κατ' οἴκον, Ἐρμοίδην λέγω, γιάτί ἔχειν ἔργα ταῦτα, συννείν ἄμα. Οὗ τὸν δέρματον ἑργον ἄνθρωπον καθέν, ἐν τῇ κυρία τῇ, κατὰ λοίπον τὴν ὅλην σκότους, ἄντι τῶν δεδεμένων. Ἐκ τοῦ κατατάξους συμμετέχω ἀποκηρύξας. Μιᾶς τοῦ νεώτερου ἐπαναλαμβάνει σπουδαίας ὁμήρους ἀπὸ τοῦ δικτυτήρου. Θεατρίτης πάσος ἐξ ἐνδυναμοῦ. Οὔτω μεταλαμάτι καὶ τά τέρα περιπέφηλα ὡς ἐξυπόθεσε τα ἀμαλκαί, οὐ καθώς.
The language of conscience (συννοϊ, 805, 

μεταχειρίσεως, 814) is certainly used here, and the Nurse's interpretation of Hermione's horror at what she has tried to do and her representation of it as συννοϊ, repentance and a subjective recognition that she has acted καλώς reveal a familiarity with the experiences of guilt and remorse. At the same time, however, the Nurse also makes it clear that Hermione fears punishment at the hand of Neoptolemos and the dishonour (ἀργυρός, 809) which punishment would bring. It may be that we are to see all these motives as combined in Hermione, as indeed they might be in any individual, but Hermione has already revealed herself as an ignoble character and the moral sensibility which the Nurse attributes to her emerges only when she is bereft of her father's support and faced with the prospect of punishment; when she reappears on stage, moreover, although her distress is acute, she is concerned with her conduct towards Andromache only in so far as it makes her own position vulnerable. The element of conscience in this passage, then, the element which measures one's own conduct in terms of one's internal standards of right and wrong, may not be the slightest part of Hermione's response, but rather the attempt of her partisan, the Nurse, to place the best construction on her mistress' behaviour by suggesting that her distress is caused by a genuine recognition of her own moral error rather than panic at the thought of punishment. A similar attempt to place a good construction on ignoble behaviour is to be found at line 918 of the same play, where Andromache claims that Menelaos gave way to Peleus out of aidos; there was, however, no sign of aidos on his part in the scene between the two, and it seems that Andromache's implication of such sensitivity to her father is simply an attempt to disarm Orestes' surprise that Menelaos should be defeated by a weak old man. Both these passages show how partiality can lead one to place a favourable interpretation on the actions of another which is not consonant with that person's true motives.

We have seen that men often experience aidos at the prospect of acquiring a reputation for weakness or cowardice, and this concern can sometimes be shared by women. In normal
circumstances, however, the behaviour expected of women is
different to that expected of men, and the chief elements of
a woman's arete are loyalty to her husband and freedom from
any imputation of sexual impropriety. Most regularly, then,
women's aidos is concerned with breaches of these standards.
In several of Euripides' plays the conduct of the woman who
is traditionally the most conspicuously lacking in such
aidos is discussed and criticized. 117 It is a premiss of the
plot of the Helen that the vilification directed at the
heroine is undeserved, and so the Helen of that play does
experience a proper degree of aidos at sexual contact with a
man other than her husband: at 66-7 she explains her supp-
llication at the tomb of Proteus, which she carries out

\[ \text{At 696-7 she denies that she left Sparta (cf. Or. 99), and at 932 she hopes that, on learning the truth, people will restore her to τι σωφρόνι;} \]

At Hec. 443, Tro. 773, 1041, 1114, Or. 118-9, 1154, 1361-2. To avoid
any imputation of impropriety it is generally felt better
that the respectable woman should remain indoors and apart
from men as much as possible, since men are only too ready
to charge the innocent with the faults of the guilty
(fr.493N²).

At Hecld. 41-4 we see how aidos on the part of those who are
in charge of young women leads them to keep their protegees
in seclusion:

\[ \text{More normally, however, aidos is the reaction of the woman} \]
herself, and it must be such aidos which leads Makaria to explain, at lines 474-7 of the same play, her entrance among a group of strange men:

Thrasos is a typical antonym of aidos, and in employing this word Makaria is signalling her awareness that aidos should normally prevent young women from mixing with men; in τὸ σωφρονίν we see another link between aidos and sophrosyne in this particular context.120

In the Andromache the conduct of women is a theme of some importance. To be jealous if one's husband decides to take another woman, Andromache tells Hermione at 212-21, is a sign of ἀπληστία λέξους in a woman; to succumb to this is ἀἰσχρόν, not only for Hermione but for all women, for men will use the example of the individual to confirm their prejudices about women in general; and yet men's charges are justified, for women are more subject to ἀπληστία λέξους than men; Hermione, Andromache implies, is letting the cause of all women down by undoing the value of all their efforts to overcome their sexual appetites.121 An agon then develops between the two women, and at 234-5 Hermione recognizes that her opponent is trying to claim the high moral ground:

The attitude that a woman should not take an excessive interest in sex Hermione identifies as sophrosyne, but suggests that for Andromache to claim sophrosyne for herself is mere pretentiousness; once again122 we see how the attitude prompted by aidos can be seen, when viewed in a negative light, as semnotes. Andromache is not deterred, however, since Hermione's sexual jealousy is her main weapon in this agon, and at 238 she goes on to criticize her adversary for speaking of ἀἰσχρα, things which women with a proper sense of aidos should not mention. All women, Andromache concedes
once more (242) are preoccupied with sex, but a proper attitude to the subject is all important, and this is as true among the Trojans as among the Greeks (244):  

\[\text{Kάκει τά γ' άλοξε ο Κάλυθεώς αίχυνην έχει.}\]

From 364-5 it appears that \textit{sophrosyne} should prevent women taking the initiative in conversation with men:  

\[\text{άγαν ἐλέεσε ὡς γυνὴ πεῖς ἀφενομάς} \]

\[\text{καὶ σου τὸ σύμμετρα ἐφετύγχετον ἡλιοῦ.}\]

Here \textit{τὸ σύμμετρα} functions as that which opposes excess, just as did other terms connoting good sense did in Homer, and, presumably, the same behaviour could be described as \textit{aidos}, just as it could be in Homer. Later in the play it is the \textit{sophrosyne} of the women of Sparta, Menelaos' city, which is at issue: Menelaos has no right to speak amongst men, Peleus claims (590-5), because he could not even control his woman. Helen was not \textit{sophron} (594), and this Peleus attributes to the general lack of \textit{sophrosyne} among Spartan women, a result, as he sees it, of their athletic training (595-601). Men's honour is vulnerable through women, and this is the route Peleus chooses to launch his attack on Menelaos. At 876-7 the Nurse, of whose concern for Hermione we have already seen evidence, urges her mistress to avoid being seen outside the house:  

\[\text{ἄλλα εἴριχε εἶνας μηδὲ φαντάζον δόμων} \]

\[\text{πέρασε τύνδε, μη τίν' αίχυνην λάβυς.}\]

\textit{Hec.} 974-5 refers to the \textit{nomos} that men and women should not meet face to face, and thus adds another reason for Hekabe's \textit{aidos} towards Polymestor. Diggle deletes these lines, but, as we have already seen, they may be genuine and a product of Hekabe's search for excuses.  

Even if the lines are interpolated, however, their interpolation shows that a Greek-speaking person regarded this \textit{nomos} as adequate explanation of a woman's \textit{aidos}.

The \textit{nomos} is repeated by Elektra's peasant husband at \textit{El.} 343-4, where he explains his annoyance at seeing his wife in conversation with two strangers:
The Farmer, as we have already seen, is concerned for Elektra’s reputation, and Elektra both appreciates his concern and recognizes that her conduct would in ordinary circumstances be discreditable, but justifies it in terms of the importance of the strangers’ news (345-8). The concern shown here for a relatively minor breach of domestic decorum perhaps contrasts with the enormity of the crime which Elektra longs to perpetrate: such a contrast is certainly present at 945-6, where, in the speech which she describes in advance as \(\nu\varepsilon\rho\varepsilon\sigma\upsilon\upsilon\sigma\upsilon\varepsilon\sigma\varepsilon\upsilon\omega\upsilon\sigma\nu\) (902), she experiences the bashfulness which is normal in such circumstances when she comes to criticize Aigisthos’ adultery:

\[
\text{αδὸς ἐσ' γυναικὸς (παρέθεν γὰρ, ὥσ' καλὸν λέγειν) οἰ, ωπτὼ, γυναίκας δ' αἰνιζομαι.}
\]

That \textit{aidos} is a young woman’s reaction to sex and marriage in general is shown by \textit{IT}.372-6, where Iphigeneia describes her last glimpse of the infant Orestes at Aulis:

\[
\text{ἐὼν δὲ λεπτῷν ὄμηκα διὰ καλυμμάτων ἕλκων ἀμοφεόν οὔτ' ἀνελόμην χέρον, ὅς νῦν ἔλωλεν ὧς καταγνησίῃ στεκεν συναίνῃ, ὅτ' αἰδοῦς, ὥσ' ὀνεῦς ἐς πηλῶς ἐμέλαθε.}
\]

The girl’s \textit{aidos} with regard to her imminent marriage (note its manifestation in her modest glance through the veil) is apparently so inhibitory that she cannot embrace her brother; perhaps she sees him as a reminder both of the childhood she is leaving behind and of the quite different stage of life upon which she is entering. At \textit{Oe}.1047-8 the rôles are reversed, and it is the male, Orestes, who experiences \textit{aidos} at embracing the female, Elektra:

\[
\text{ἐκ τοῖς μετῆφεις καὶ ἐ' ἀμπηθαείς θέλω ὕλοτῷ τι χειλών. ἔτ' ἀιδοῦμαι τάξας;}
\]

Here Orestes’ \textit{aidos} (which he overcomes in 1049-50) seems to stem from his desire to avoid an outward show of affection which may be regarded as unseemly or womanish.
Since it is the most basic element of the plot of the Ion that a woman has been raped it is to be expected that women's aidos is important in the play. Kreousa's first reference to the rape is an oblique one: at 288 she explains why she reacted with such vehemence (see 286) to Ion's mention of the Long Cliffs - she is "aware of something disgraceful" in the caves: 129 συναντημεν Αίγλην αἰδοῦσαν τινά At 334 Kreousa tells Ion that she has a μαντεύμα κρυπτόν to ask of Apollo, and, at 336, is about to reveal its substance, until aidos intervenes:

"άκονος δε ταύτην μυθον: άλλη αἰδούσανα." On one level Kreousa's inhibition will be caused by the nature of the story which she is about to tell, but her aidos has even more point when we remember that it is of the loss of her own virginity that she is about to speak. In line 337 Ion recognizes the inhibitory nature of aidos and hints at its traditional inefficacy when action is required:

"οὐ̄ τἀκε περὶδες οδηγός ἀργός ἦ θεός." Kreousa, however, overcomes her aidos and proceeds with the story of her "friend". Ion is shocked, and moved to exonerate the god: Kreousa's friend's tale must be an attempt to conceal a crime committed by a man (341):

"οὐ̄ εἶτιν: ἄνδρος ἀδίκων αἰχμαλωτή." This is another example of the use of aischunomai in the context of retrospective shame. The shame here, however, is directed not at something one has done but at something one has suffered; although a man who commits rape ἀδίκως, it is expected that the woman will be ashamed of the experience. That a woman should be ashamed of being raped, however, is not something which should surprise the modern reader.

The suggestion that rape is disgraceful only for the victim, however, should, on the evidence of line 367, be resisted: there aischunomai is again used retrospectively, but this time it is the god's shame at his own wrongdoing which is at issue (365-7):

"λίγαντες δ' θεοὺς δ' λαθεῖν λαβέται μαντεύτω τίνα; Κρ. εἶτιν καθένα τε τετεισθη κοινὸν οἷον ἔλθασος. Ιων οἰνοκινήτω το τεράμα μὴ ἐξελεῖξέ νυν."
As we noted already, Apollo's aischune here envisaged by Ion encompasses both a retrospective awareness of the discreditable nature of his actions and a prospective fear of exposure, and we really have no way of telling which of these aspects is the stronger; it is simply assumed, quite naturally, that the god knows he has done something wrong and that it will distress him to be reminded of the fact. That Ion is correct in his explanation of the god's motives is shown by 1557-8, where Athena explains that she has been sent by Apollo,

*ος εσ ρίν εφίν μολέν εύκ ήβεν,

μή τών πέμαθε μένψις εσ μέρον μόλη,...

There is presumably an element of ironic Götterkritik in this emphasis on the god's commission of human aischra and his human reaction to it; we might compare Hel.884-6, where Theonoe tells Helen that Aphrodite is trying to prevent her return to Greece lest she be shown up (μη σελεγχθη and exposed as having bribed Paris to declare her the most beautiful with only a semblance of a marriage, and IT.713, where Orestes tells how Apollo drove him, a constant reminder to people of the oracle ordaining matricide, as far away from Greece as possible out of aidos at his past prophecies. Behind passages like these presumably lies the objection, articulated long before by Xenophanes, that men should not attribute their own faults and motives to the gods, a view which finds succinct expression in the well known line from the lost Bellerophon (fr.292.7N²):

*ει θεοί τί δε θελεν αισχέν, αυκ εισιν θεοί.*

At 392-400 Kreousa urges Ion not to reveal anything of what she has told him to Xouthos; her motive is presumably aidos lest her husband should ever find out about her own disgrace, but it is interesting that she feels herself able to explain her request in terms of aidos at the prospect of incurring reproach for having spoken about sex at all: say nothing, she says (395-6), μή τιν' αιράλλην άρης/διακοδικα λείπη. She ends with a gnome on the lot of women (398-400):

*Τι γαλ γυναικών συγχεί πέρος άρενας,
καν. ταίς κακαίοις άγαθοί μεμοκλοκέναι
μισούμενοι. ούτω δυτυχείς περίκεκλεν.*
We have seen that both the victim and the perpetrator are expected to be ashamed of rape, and while it is regrettable in our eyes that this should be so in the case of the former, we can nonetheless understand such a feeling. From this passage, however, in which Kreousa must be referring to male attitudes which Ion might be expected to understand, it emerges that Kreousa's "friend" would be considered a κακὴ γυνὴ simply because she had once been raped, and that one who spoke to such a woman might be criticized by men simply for associating with her. In this respect the Greek attitude seems to differ, if not from our own, at least from that which we should like to be "our own", and, seen in this context, the intensity of Kreousa's άιδος at her past experiences, which is, as Conacher points out, the chief obstacle to a speedy resolution of the complications of the play, becomes entirely understandable.

Kreousa' άιδος resurfaces every time she has to talk about her disgrace:

\[
\text{α' εχύνομαι μέν ρ', \ Ύ' ήερι, κέξω δ' ὤμως} \quad (934)
\]

At 1471 she is forced to tell Ion that, although she is his mother, Xouthos is not his father, and at this prospect her άιδος reappears, in the form οὖν οὖν κακὴν γυναῖκα. Kreousa has clearly experienced this άιδος since the day of the rape. The actions of the god on that day, on the other hand, were characterized by αναίδεια, which must consist in his lack of respect for another's person, for the honour of the man who was in charge of the victim and for public opinion, which clearly decries such behaviour.

In the Phoenissae Antigone is characterized as a young girl brought up in a proper degree of seclusion from the outside world. As such it is her duty to remain innocent of men and be seen in public as little as possible. At 88-95 we learn from the Paidagogos that she has obtained special permission
from her mother in order to be able to watch the Argive army from a distance. Nonetheless, he feels it necessary to ensure that she comes into contact with none of the citizens (92-3), lest she and the Paidagogos himself incur ἀφογόνος among the people. At 193-201 Antigone is urged to go back indoors, since the Paidagogos is concerned for her reputation: there is a crowd of women (the chorus) approaching, and women love to seize the slightest opportunity to criticize each other. At 1275-9 Antigone shows the results of her upbringing: when her mother tells her to follow her to the field of battle she is shocked:

Antigone’s ἀδος at being seen among crowds of men is her instinctive response, which, however, she abandons on learning what is at stake, thus disregarding convention and public opinion in favour of family loyalty: their characters are very different, but in this respect she resembles the Antigone of Sophokles’ play, and probably the motif of Antigone’s exclusive concern with her φίλοι had been proverbial since the production of that piece.

Antigone rejects ἀδος again at 1485-90, this time describing the symptoms of the embarrassment which, because of her troubles, she no longer feels:

The third affirmation of Antigone’s commitment to her family which directly concerns us comes at 1691-2, where she has offered to share the ills of Oedipus’ exile:

Oedipus suggests that it would be unfitting for his daughter
to accompany him, a blind and polluted beggar who is bound, by his low status, his mean appearance and the horror of his crimes, to attract the revulsion of others; in this revulsion Antigone would share, both by simple association and because the life of a beggar is beneath the dignity of a well brought up young woman. Antigone, however, refers to different standards, and urges "an attention to facts rather than appearances." She does not, however, simply ignore convention or discount the possibility of disapproval, but rather sees the situation in terms which are conditioned by her upbringing, as it is portrayed in the earlier part of the play. The only aischron she can imagine for one in her position is that of immodest behaviour: thus she maintains that, on inspection, her behaviour will be found to be perfectly sophron, and indeed, when it is found that she is exhibiting loyalty to her father, her conduct will appear gennaion. Clearly, then, she is urging attention to facts rather than appearances, but this does not mean that her reply is "not envisaged at all by traditional values," since the virtues which she feels will be recognized, modest behaviour and loyalty to one's father, are precisely those which are traditionally demanded of an unmarried girl. If there is any novelty at all in this passage, then, it is to be found in Antigone's confidence that others will share her own interpretation of her actions; but surely such optimism must always have been possible?

The Bacchae furnishes two minor examples of aischron used of the adultery of married women. At 487-8 Dionysos rephrases Pentheus' ἀλεξιόν and ἀθρόιν, used of nocturnal infidelity, as aischron, while at 1062 the Messenger reports the latter's desire to witness the aischrourgia of the Maenads.

The IA is richest of all the plays in examples of polite aidedos towards the opposite sex. The chorus are first to give expression to this kind of aidedos when they sing (at 185-91) of how they overcame their inhibitions and ventured to look upon the massed army of the Greeks:
For the symptoms we might compare the passage just discussed, Pho.1485-90, while for the overall sense of the passage there is a particularly close parallel in (A.) PV.132-5, for there, as here, women, who constitute the chorus of the play, explain their appearance and hence their abandonment of their customary *aidos* (*aischune* in the present passage is synonymous with *aidos*) in terms of their desire to see something unusual. In this passage *(τοῦ θεάτα* (188) demonstrates the particular association of this type of *aidos* with youth.

The chorus return to the theme of *aidos* at 558-72, a passage which is of great importance for its association of *aidos*, education and *arete*. In respect of these things the stanza has a general application, but it is prompted by reflections on the importance for women of moderation in love (543-57), and it thus ranges from particular reference to women’s *arete* to a wider reference to *arete* and its development through education in general. The sequence of thought is as follows: a good education leads to *arete* (561-2), because τι *κίνητο* is *sophia* (563), and enables one to discern, with the aid of intelligence, one’s duty (564-6); good reputation is the result, and this leads to a fame which grows not old (566-7). Education thus instills *aidos* and *aidos* promotes *arete*, but there are different kinds of *arete*: for a woman it consists in shunning secret lovers, but for a man its forms are countless and it can make a city great (568-72). Women’s *arete* thus has a more negative aspect than that of men. Just as the *arete* of men and women differs so will their education, and the *aidos* which education instills in a woman will presumably be based on the imperatives of staying indoors and keeping away from men (such has obviously been Antigone’s education in Pho.). Yet
although the education of men and women may differ, and
although the virtue thus acquired by either/sex may not be com-
parable in scope or in detail, the process is the same in
either case: education teaches the proper object of aídos
and the practice of proper aídos will be recognized by soc-
ociety as virtue and appropriately rewarded (by doxa and
kleos).

Agamemnon, custodian of the honour of his wife and daughter,
reminds both of the need to avoid contact with the world of
men. At 678-9 he tells Iphigeneia to go indoors, explaining
 artículo kóra y piveí, while at 735 he claims concern for
Klytaimestra’s honour as his reason for wishing to give his
daughter away himself:

οὐ κακόν ἐν ὀξύμω εἰς ἐξομαλυκθαί στρεκτώ.

The belief that women should not be seen in public and its
consequences take on a comic tinge in the confrontation bet-
ween Klytaimestra and Achilles, in which first the latter,
then the former becomes acutely embarrassed.

Klytaimestra addresses Achilles out of the blue at 819-20,
and he is clearly startled (821-2):

Ἀκμάεις, ἄρετος παθέρα: ηὑριστατε χέννω τοι
γυναῖκα, μορφὴν εὔπρεπῆ κεκτημένην;
Achilles’ exclamation recalls that of Hippolytos in the
first version of the play that bears his name, and if
the echo is deliberate, those who caught it might have
reflected on the contrast between the situation in which
Hippolytos invokes aídos (when confronted with the incestuous
love of his stepmother) and that in which Achilles does so
(when confronted with a woman of distinguished appearance).
Achilles’ youthful aídos is obviously acute, activated as it
is by the very sight of an unaccompanied woman. Klytaimestra
approves of his aídos and interprets it as sophrosyne (824):

αἰνῶ δ’ ὀτι σέσυν το σοφροσύνη. At 829 Achilles praises
Klytaimestra’s brevity in disclosing her identity and takes
his leave -

αἰγχεῖν δὲ μεί γυναῖκι συμβέλλειν λόγους (830).

She, however, offers him her hand, as a prelude to their
becoming related by marriage: Achilles, again, is horrified, and again expresses his horror in terms of *aídos*; this time, however, his *aídos* has more than a slight prudential element: 

\[ Tē ðexi; èrmoun dēsclēv; kímov·èv `Aγaμmēnov, èi spuvyn·mèn mē µēn èmēs (833-4). \]

Achilles does not say that, out of respect for Agamemnon, he will refrain from touching his wife, but that he *would* respect him if he were to touch his wife, and this can only mean that in such circumstances he would be afraid of such action as Agamemnon might take. Achilles, however, does firmly believe that it is wrong (*mē èmēs*) to lay hands on another man's wife.

Klytaimestra continues to speak on the subject of the wedding, and regards Achilles' incredulity as another kind of *aídos*, bashfulness (839-40):

\[ Pāñν ναν ναταν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν ναν να
of a practical joke (849-50); he thus recognizes that Klytaimestra's *aidos* is based on a feeling that she has been made to act in a way which is unworthy of her and liable to attract the mockery of others. Despite his words of consolation, Klytaimestra's *aidos* persists, manifested in her downcast eyes as she makes to quit the scene (851-2):

\[ \chi αίλ' \ ο \ υ' κα' ωθηθ' ὁμομενιν \ ε' ετ' εἴρομεν, \]

\[ \psiευδής γενομένη καὶ πεθοῦν' ἀνάξει. \]

Lombard is right to say that there is a particular effect of parallelism and contrast in the way in which Achilles' *aidos*, which impels him to leave the scene, is balanced by that of Klytaimestra, which impels her to the same end, but I see no evidence in this passage for his assertion that the poet is employing "a technique of juxtaposition and contrast" which is intended "to highlight the difference between traditional notions, motivated by external sanctions, and more advanced concepts, grounded in inner ethical attitudes." The contrast, to me, appears to be between two recognizably traditional forms of *aidos*: Achilles' shyness at mixing with a woman is both an inner ethical attitude, in that it operates in him instinctively and is part of his upbringing and social rôle, and a response to the external standard of convention; he both feels it is wrong to associate with another man's woman and worries about what people will say should they witness his doing so. There is, on the other hand, scarcely any sign of an inner ethical attitude in Klytaimestra's response, for she is not judging her own actions, but only responding to the effect the actions of another have on her; no doubt she deprecates the deception which has been perpetrated against her, but this attitude is not equivalent to her *aidos*, which relates to the fact that she has been treated in a way which she sees as undermining her status (πέτοντα λείνη, 847, παθοῦν' ἀνάξει, 852). Her embarrassment, then, has nothing to do with "a subjective feeling of inner shame for having actually told a lie": (852) does not refer to a belief that lies are *aischron* as such, but to the fact that Klytaimestra has been shown to have been talking about a marriage which did not exist; she
is standing face to face with one who knows that she has been
talking virtual nonsense and who realizes that she, a woman
of her status, has been the victim of a hoax; accordingly,
her reaction is not "inner shame", but straightforward
embarrassment, which may be a profoundly "inner" experience,
but is nonetheless produced by no "inner ethical attitude." 146

One thing Klytaimestra has learned from this exchange is
that Achilles has a young man's susceptibility towards
aidos, and she will go on to exploit this susceptibility in
the subsequent scene in which she pleads with him for help:
we shall discuss this scene, however, when we come to the
topic of supplication. 147 Once the supplication is concluded,
though, Achilles shows the same regard for Klytaimestra's
womanly virtue as he did when first he saw her (1028-32):

This notion, based on the community of honour within the
family, that a woman's father may suffer disgrace as a
result of his daughter's conduct, gets to the heart of the
basis of the prohibition on women being seen abroad in the
structure of male honour: men's honour is vulnerable through
women.

Iphigeneia herself in this play is one of those young women,
like Makaria in Hcld. and Antigone in Pho., who are presented
initially as inexperienced and full of the modest aidos
which is particularly appropriate in those of their sex and
age, but who eventually reject the maiden's rôle out of
devotion to some higher cause. 148 We first hear of her aidos
at second hand, when, at 992-7, Klytaimestra asks Achilles:

βούλη νῦν ἵκτων σὺν περιπτύκει γύνη;
απειδέοντα μὴν τᾶδ', εἰ δ' ἐν δοκέει,
ἡσεῖ, δ' ἀρετοῖς ὁμα, ἱχνος, ἐλευθερον.
εἰ δ' ὀφ παρουσίας τυφτα τεύχομεν σῶθεν,
μὴν πῶτερ κατ' οἴκωμι 'σεμνὰ γαρ σεμνωτέρα.
ὁμώς δ' ὦν με δυνατὸν αἰδεοῦσιν ἱχνων.
This is a difficult passage, but the general sense is clear: if Iphigeneia were to come, she would conduct herself with aidos. This must mean that Iphigeneia would not entirely abandon her aidos at undertaking the "unmaidenly" action of supplication: supplication is "unmaidenly" because it requires ritual self-abasement, and a maiden's aidos should normally prevent such behaviour. Klytaimestra, however, asserts that her daughter will be able to perform supplication while retaining her aidos, thus enjoying the best of both worlds; she will supplicate, but she will not humiliate herself totally, and the aidos for her own status which she retains will somehow be manifested in the look of her eye. When manifested in the eyes aidos indicates that the gaze is averted downwards, and although ἐχουθεῖτο does not immediately suggest "downcast", this must also be the case here: Iphigeneia's gaze will be downcast, but still ἐχουθεῖτο. On the whole, however, it would be better, Klytaimestra goes on, if the girl stayed at home, since her modest regard for her virginity is acute. This seems to be the force of σεμνά γάρ σεμνύσασθαι: σεμνύσασθαι is middle, and governs the accusative σεμνά; a clumsy rendering might be, "that of which she considers σεμνόν really is σεμνόν". From here, however, I part company with von Erffa, who claims that ὅμως δ'... ἄθετες Χρεῶ means not, "Nevertheless one must show aidos as far as is possible," but "Nevertheless one must show aidos only as far as is possible." I doubt if the Greek can mean this, and would suggest as an alternative the explanation that line 997 is a slight correction of the impression Klytaimestra feels she may have given in 996: σεμνύσασθαι has the same overtone of "pretentiousness" as did the same verb at 901 and the noun σεμνοτες at 1344; while, then, σεμνά γάρ σεμνύσασθαι does mean that Iphigeneia's modesty is justified, the use of the pejorative word leads Klytaimestra to correct any impression that her daughter's modesty is mere semnotes, and thus she adds that a proper sense of aidos is a good thing. There may be a suggestion in this that there does come a time when it is no longer possible to aideisthai, but the primary significance of 997 is that Iphigeneia would be right to cling to her
as long as it is not absolutely necessary, as it would be if Achilles insisted on her undertaking personal supplication, that she should abandon it. 153a

At 1341-4 Iphigeneia voices her own *aidos*, but this time it is her mother's opinion that she should abandon it. At 1338 the girl sees a crowd of men approaching, and on learning that her "bridegroom", Achilles, is among them, her *aidos* becomes so acute that she wishes to hide herself (1340). The passage continues:

By simple *variatio* Iphigeneia refers to her embarrassment, occasioned first of all by the approach of men *per se*, then by the thought of facing Achilles, whom she had thought she was to marry, 154 as both *aischune* and *aidos*. Klytaimestra, however, in paraphrasing the girl's *aidos* as *habrotes* and *semnotes*, is not simply recasting her daughter's words, but placing a negative construction on her conduct. The inefficacy of *aidos* in certain circumstances is proverbial, but recognition that the same feeling can be both harmful and beneficial depending on circumstance may also owe something to the relativist thought of some of the sophists. 155 In this passage, Klytaimestra dismisses *aidos* as unhelpful in the present circumstances in a way which is quite familiar, but it is perhaps significant that she has recourse to two other, pejorative terms in speaking of unhelpful *aidos*; this perhaps relates to contemporary interest in the proper definitions of words, and the topic for debate, as it were, might be, is *aidos* always *aidos*, even in circumstances in which it is unhelpful? This is a question which seems also to exercise Phaidra in the *Hippolytus*, where the notion that a concept which changes its prescriptive force (whether it is "good" or "bad") according to context might better be given a different name is also important. 156

The *Rhesus* offers one example of women's *aidos*. At 926-8 the
Muse addresses her dead son, Rhesos:

κατεὶ σε τίκτω, συγγένους αἴδουμέν
καὶ Πάρθενεκν, ἥκ' ἐς εὐόμον πάτερς
δὲνας.

This is exactly the reaction of Kreousa in Ion. Superficially, the zeugma, συγγένους αἴδουμέν καὶ Πάρθενεκν' appears similar to (e.g.) οὔτε τοὺς κλώντις αἰσθηθεῖς λόγων οὔτ' αὐτὸς
ποτέ δεξίων (Hgld. 813-4), but whereas there the impersonal object designates the conduct of which the agent should be ashamed, here it is the positive quality which aidos seeks to protect, the object, that is, of the agent's respect. The expression here, then, does not differ from that at Od. 16.75=19.527, εἰὼντ' αἴδουμέν πόλεως ὀμοίῳ το θῆμιν.

In the Hippolytus aidos plays its most prominent Euripidean rôle, and it is a considerable motivating force in both the central characters. The concept does work in different ways in the play, but its overall prominence is surely to be attributed to the playwright's focusing on the theme of the power of sex and the effects of resistance to it.

Aidos is one of the qualities which Hippolytus claims as exclusively his own: lines 73-81 show how it fits into his private world:

Hippolytos brings Artemis a garland from a sacred meadow, pure and untouched like himself; the personified Aidos herself is the gardener, and the flowers are to be plucked only by those whose sophrosyne is innate. Hippolytos' insistence, then, is on purity and its exclusivity, and on physis rather than nomos as the chief determinant of both character and worth. With his very first utterances in the play he
affirms his devotion to Artemis, and to the head of that
devotion he subsumes the qualities which he regards as par-
ticularly his own: *aidos*, *sophrosyne*¹⁶¹ and, in 83 (*ὑπερβοῦς
Αήτο*), *eusebeia*.¹⁶² Most important for our purposes here is
the association of *aidos* and *sophrosyne*: the association is
one we have met many times before, and it goes back to the
*Odyssey*: Telemachos' youthful modesty and shyness, for
example, could be described as both *aidos* and *sophrosyne*,¹⁶³
and the same youthful qualities are combined in the Achilles
of *IA*,¹⁶⁴ in whom the connexion of *aidos* and *sophrosyne* with
proper behaviour towards the opposite sex offers probably
the closest parallel with the present instance. The combina-
tion of the two concepts in a sexual context, however, is, in
the work of Euripides at least, much more common in pass-
ages dealing with the conduct of women than with regard to
that of men,¹⁶⁵ and it thus seems a reasonable inference
that Hippolytos' devotion to chastity represents the coalit-
ion of an exaggerated form of that *aidos* which is felt
normal in young men and a perversion of ideals of *aidos* and
*sophrosyne* which, when tied to the sexual sphere, are more
appropriate to young women than to young men.¹⁶⁶

The partiality and one-sidedness of Hippolytos' virtues is
apparent even from the prologue of the play: his *aidos* and
his *sophrosyne* must be seen, as he himself sees them, in the
light of his devotion to Artemis, which he regards as *euseb-
eia*: yet devotion to Artemis entails rejection of Aphrodite,
and this is neither *eusebeia* nor *sophrosyne*. So, too, his
association of *aidos* with the latter indicates his partial
grasp of the concept: *Aidos* gardens for those whose *sophro-
syne* is innate, and presumably this implies that *aidos* is
also innate in such people; yet it is scarcely possible that
*aidos* should be innate, given its traditional association
with observance of the conventional values of society, since
no one is born knowing what society expects of them. Nor is
there much support in contemporary thought for the idea that
*aidos* does exist by nature: elsewhere in Euripides *aidos* is
explicitly associated with education,¹⁶⁷ and this corresponds
with the position as stated in Plato's *Protagoras* myth.¹⁶⁸
Hippolytos' rejection of education, then, and his belief that *aídos* can exist without it, afford a further indication of his one-sided and elitist view of the world. At 993-1001 Hippolytos refers to *aídos* once more, and although the *aídos* itself is of a rather different kind from that in 78, it is nonetheless still rooted in his particular lifestyle and related to the companion virtues of *sophrosyne* and *eusebeia*:

Once again we see the youth's conviction of his own rectitude and his pre-eminence in *sophrosyne*, and again his tendency is to regard the virtues which he feels are particularly his as interchangeable, since it certainly seems that his statement that he knows how to reverence the gods and to associate with those who possess *aídos* is intended to demonstrate his *sophrosyne*; it is therefore significant that he goes on to imply (in 1002-7) that the lifestyle to which he refers in these lines has been such that it is impossible that anyone should regard him as having been tainted by sex; there may thus be an assumption in these lines that *sophrosyne*, *aídos* and *eusebeia* inevitably promote sexual chastity. On the surface, however, the *aídos* which he mentions is of a familiar kind, that which ensures loyalty among *philoi*, and this reference to the impeccable conduct of his hunting companions must strike Theseus as particularly irrelevant, but mention of loyalty to one's *philoi* has a specific point, since the crimes which Hippolytos claims his *philoi* avoid are precisely those of Phaidra: she was disloyal to Theseus in his absence (unlike Hippolytos, 1001-2), and it was she who treated another *philos*, Hippolytos himself, in
the manner described in 997-9. Theseus is also unlikely to understand the reference to Hippolytos' *eusebeia* for the gods (996) in anything but the most general sense, but it is likely that the point of this line lies in its allusion to Hippolytos' eventual decision, after initial reluctance in the notorious line 612, to keep the oath not to reveal to anyone the subject of his conversation with the Nurse. It is this compunction which Hippolytos calls το *eusebēs* in 656, and it is perhaps ironic that in the present passage the virtue to which he alludes is exactly that which prevents Theseus understanding the allusion. We remember that the keeping of an oath is frequently regarded as a demand of *aidos*; Hippolytos, however, refers only to his *eusebeia*, and while it may simply be that the two terms are virtually interchangeable in this context (since *aidos* for one's oath also entails *aidos* for the gods who are its guarantors, and because *eusebeia* might simply imply the kind of proper behaviour which is promoted by *aidos*), he does use the term in a specific rather than a general way: for him the *aidos* which is normally felt as a result of the public nature of the oath is less important than reverence for its divine guarantors, and the opinions of those before whom the oath was sworn (in this case, the Nurse alone) do not enter his calculation.

Hippolytos, of course, remains true to his principles to the end of the play: the *eusebeia* he feels with regard to his oath, then, is a powerful force. He also conspicuously maintains his particular brand of *sophrosyne*, with which *aidos* is very closely connected, and so he remains true to his own conception of his *physis* as he articulates it at 79-81: this is not to say that he is correct in regarding these qualities as innate, merely that his own principles are sufficiently deeply-rooted to stand the severest test. At 997-1001 he implies that Phaidra was without *aidos*: this is far from true, but there is nonetheless a difference in the attitudes of the two principals to the concept: Hippolytos is quite sure what *aidos* is and sees it as an element of his inherited nature, while his very unconventionality indicates
that he has little time for the *aidos* of ordinary people which simply promotes conformity to traditional standards; ultimately he chooses to keep his oath rather than to clear his good name. Phaidra, on the other hand, does care what people say about her and does show concern for conventional standards; she does have her own standards of right and wrong, but finds it difficult to live up to them; she even has her doubts about what *aidos* is.

Phaidra's *aidos* develops and changes as the play progresses, but its basis is to be found in the fundamental demands of women's *arete* - Phaidra struggles to be faithful to her husband and to shun secret lovers, just as the chorus recommend at *IA*.568-70. The basic supposition is that adultery is *aischron*, both for the woman and for the deceived husband. Theseus describes the crime he attributes to his son as *aischron* for himself at 944-5,1165 and 1171-2; at 1040 he claims that it involves him in *atimia* and at 1050 he sees it as *dussebeia*. Phaidra, in turn, reveals her awareness that it would be *aischron* for her to give in to her passion at 331,408,411,499 and 503-6. The Nurse, on the other hand, after her initial shock which tends to confirm the validity of traditional standards, becomes openly contemptuous of them, and so at 462-6 she suggests that in practice *τέμεν καλά* are often ignored, while at 500-1 she argues from expediency that *aischra* are better for Phaidra than *kala*. These are clearly shocking sentiments, and the Nurse is obviously drawing on contemporary ideas of the superiority of self-interest to morality; she does not, however, emerge with any credit for doing so.

It also seems certain that Hippolytos'/adultery is *aischron* for himself: at 944-5, while Theseus does say that his own *λείτρα* have been disgraced by his son, he also claims that Hippolytos stands revealed (ιδιλικά τερματικά) as flagrantly *κακάστος*, and at 946 he expresses his revulsion by regarding his son as polluted. The crime imputed to Hippolytos, of course, is not simple adultery, but involves both incest and the destruction of a *philia* relationship, yet it still seems...
likely that adultery could be considered *aischron* for the male adulterer: in the *Odyssey* Aigisthos' adultery is seen as discreditable to himself as well as to Agamemnon,\textsuperscript{177} and the suitors' disregard for Odysseus' honour by seeking the hand of his wife is roundly condemned. Adultery entails an assault on the honour of the woman's legitimate guardian, and for that reason, as Dover points out,\textsuperscript{179} is seen as *aischron* for the adulterer at *Dissoi Logoi* 2.5. One wonders, however, how the adultery of one who seduced an enemy's wife or daughter might be viewed: at *Dissoi Logoi* 2.7 it is said to be *kalon* to harm one's enemy.

When we first see Phaidra it is not long before she gives voice to her *aidos*: indeed *aidos* is the dominant aspect of her reaction on recovering her senses (239-49):

\begin{verbatim}
δύναμος ἐφὶ, τι ποι᾽ εἰργαζόμην;
ποι᾽ περὶ πλάγχθην γυνὴς ἀγκῆς;
ἐμάνην, ἐπεεν σαιμονος ἀτη.
φεῦ φεῦ πλήμν.
μάϊα, πάλιν μοι κρύφον κεφαλίν;
αἴδομέθα γαρ τὰ λειψάμενα μοι.
κρυπτέ και Κατ' ὅσων δάκρυ μού βαίνει
καὶ ἐπ᾽ αἰχμήν ἱμμα τοποτετα.
τὸ γαρ ἐθεούθαλ γύνην άδων,
τὸ δὲ μενομένον κακόν· ἀλλά κατὰ
μὴ γίγνοσκοντ’ ἀπολέσθαι.
\end{verbatim}

The realization that she has suffered an attack of temporary insanity and the very fact of coming to her senses cause her pain,\textsuperscript{180} and allied to her pain is a feeling of embarrassment at her uninhibited ravings. It is probable, however, that *aidos* is a wider aspect of Phaidra's condition than simply embarrassment at her unseemly conduct while mad: behind her *aidos* at her madness there is surely *aidos* at the nature of the desires which have driven her mad (the desires which she describes as a *miasma* at 317),\textsuperscript{181} and possibly also *aidos* at the indications she feels she may already have given of her love for Hippolytos.

When she next mentions her *aidos*, however, it appears in a
different guise. At 325-6 the Nurse, seeking to discover the reason behind her mistress' desire for death undertakes supplication by clasping her hand and her knees, refusing to let go. Immediately the supplication begins the idea of revealing her secret seems to become more attractive to Phaidra (329-35):

Phaidra thus gives in, explicitly at least, out of *aidos* for the Nurse's supplication. At 329, however, the idea that her struggle against her passion brings her credit also crosses her mind, and it is after the Nurse's suggestion that she will enjoy greater *time* by divulging her secret that she gives in. There are thus two strands to her decision to give in: she believes that her resistance to her desires will win the approval of others and she is unable to resist the Nurse's supplication. Both these motives are important: it is certainly true that her concern for her *time* reveals a desire to share her knowledge of her passion and her struggle against it, but the Nurse's supplication also creates the situation in which she can give in to this desire, and breaks a deadlock which might otherwise never have been broken; had Phaidra not given in she would have been obliged to attempt to break the Nurse's hold by force, something which it is unlikely that she would do in her present weak condition and which would entail a flagrant disregard for the sanctity of the suppliant gesture and all that it implies. Phaidra, then, wants to give in, but she does so in a situation in which the pressure on her to give in is intense.

From this passage it emerges that Phaidra's concern for her reputation is working in two ways: her very concealment of her love for Hippolytus is motivated by the knowledge that her passion is discreditable and harmful to her good name,
yet she also believes that she is being virtuous in resisting her love and that her reputation might be positively enhanced if her resistance became known. There is an obvious incompatibility in these two positions, since, in order to enjoy time for her resistance, Phaidra must reveal its object, a passion which is disgraceful, a miasma which might attract the revulsion of others; she is, then, clearly confused, and it is this confusion, I believe, which lies behind the notoriously problematic lines 375-87, in which Phaidra expresses her views on the ambivalence of aidos.

Interpretations of these lines are as many as there are interpreters: some are frankly outlandish, some merely vague, while many, despite their merits, fail to satisfy the requirements of the text at every point. The passage in question runs as follows:

Phaidra thus concludes this part of her speech with remarks about the traditional ambivalence of aidos, and it seems particularly likely that the poet had one of the best known expositions of this ambivalence, Hesiod, Works and Days 317-9, in mind when he composed these lines. There are, however, many other passages in which the negative side of aidos is stressed: in Euripides himself we may compare Ion 336-7, IA. 1341-4 and fr. 365N2 (from Erichthonius):
This fragment is closest to the present passage in its explicit identification of good and bad *aïdos*, but in that it presumably refers to the need to overcome *aïdos* to achieve a desired purpose it belongs to the same category as other passages we have seen. The ambivalence of Phaidra's *aïdos*, however, is different, and the difference emerges clearly in comparison with the Erechtheus fragment. If, as seems likely, the bad *aïdos* of the fragment is that which Erechtheus himself experiences on learning that he must sacrifice his daughter, then it must refer to a form of *aïdos* which in normal circumstances would be commendable and understandable but in the present causes the agent distress and inhibits an action which must be carried out; this is the normal ambivalence of *aïdos*, desirable in most circumstances but harmful when an absence of restraint is required. Phaidra's bad *aïdos* is obviously similar, but differs in that it inhibits not simply the effort which is required to achieve a necessary or desirable end, but the impulse to do what is morally right; Erechtheus' *aïdos* recognizes that the action which it inhibits is normally seen as aischron, whereas in Phaidra the instinct which normally discerns τὸ μὴ ἀεί εὖ prevents her carrying out τὸ ἀκαλόμ. Thus a knowledge of the traditional ambivalence of *aïdos* does not adequately account for the particular ambivalence of the concept in the present passage.

It has been suggested that Phaidra's remarks in the lines quoted have no very definite application to her own situation, that she is simply speaking generally. Well, her observations are certainly couched in general terms, but since she goes on to apply her conclusions on the nature of gnome and its rôle in preventing wrongdoing to her own situation at 391ff. it can hardly be that her words at 375-87 have no reference to herself; her own struggle against eros must have provoked her general reflections, and her general reflections must then relate to her own experience. It is also prima facie unlikely that her mention of *aïdos* is not intended to be referred to the part which *aïdos* has played in the action so far.
We, like the audience in the theatre, have considered the part played by *aides* so far, and so we should be in a position to discover what *aides* means in the present passage. First of all, we should establish the nature of τ ἀνοίγω in Phaidra's particular case: this can only be one of two things, either absolute resistance to any feeling of love for Hippolytus from the outset, or the resolution to overcome her passion once and for all by killing herself. It is difficult to see how *aides* could prevent the execution of τ ἀνοίγω in the first case: if Phaidra had simply shown the resolution required to banish any thought of love from her mind, what would the object of her *aides* have been? If, however, τ ἀνοίγω relates to suicide, we can refer the *aides* which stands in its way to Phaidra's conduct earlier in the play. At 239-49 Phaidra experiences *aides* at her condition and declares that it would be better to die than to return to her senses; her *aides* at this point leads her to conceal both herself and her love, and suggests the idea of death as a means of escape. This, as Dodds points out, will presumably be the "not bad" *aides* of 385. The only other passage in which Phaidra refers to *aides* prior to her discussion at 373ff. is 335, where she feels *aides* for the Nurse's supplication: Dodds relates this to the bad *aides* of 386. This is certainly on the right track, but it is not simply the *aides* towards the suppliant which is to be seen as put before τ ἀνοίγω, although it is certainly true that in responding to the supplication Phaidra does place *aides* before her resolve to keep her love concealed. The clue lies in lines 329 and 331, where Phaidra also refers obliquely to her *aides*, saying that the concealment of her love, which is prompted by *aides* because her love is *aischron*, brings her credit and represents the creation of *esthla* out of *aischra*.

This positive desire for her virtue to be recognized was, as we saw, one of Phaidra's motives in revealing the truth about her passion. We should notice, then, how her concern for her time springs from her *aides* and how this relates specifically to the negative aspect of *aides* in 386: for Phaidra the knowledge that it is *kalon* to follow the dictates
of her *aidos* is not enough; she feels a certain pride that she is resisting her passion and wishes others to know about it; it is actually part of her *aidos*, the good *aidos*, which rejects adultery, that she takes a certain pleasure in it and wishes others to know of her struggle. This is the sense in which *aidos* is included in the list of pleasures at 382-5.\(^{198}\) The pleasurable aspect of her resistance to her love for Hippolytus, then, causes her to disclose the reasons for her distress, but this, together with the *aidos* she felt for the Nurse as a suppliant, is immediately seen as a mistake: the Nurse immediately reacts with horror (352, 353–61) and, significantly, Phaidra's own initial reaction is to pretend that she has not, in fact, revealed the object of her passion (352). At the point at which she delivers her speech on the ambivalence of *aidos*, then, Phaidra feels that the correct course would have been to die without revealing her love: this is why she feels that the *aidos* she accorded the Nurse's supplication and the pleasure which she took in her good *aidos* were not "in place": the *kairos* was not clear (386) and the pleasurable aspect of *aidos*, gratified by showing *aidos* towards the Nurse, proved harmful.\(^{199}\) *Aidos* thus has different aspects, and varies in character according to circumstance.\(^{200}\) All that remains is to explain how it may be seen as a "burden on the house." Firstly, there is no need to refer this to the ultimate consequences of the actions of the Nurse on learning Phaidra's secret:\(^{201}\) if is to be taken literally it may be referred to the fear, which Phaidra articulates at 419-25, that exposure of her passion may involve her husband and her children in disgrace; the idea of the *oikos* is particularly relevant in that, at 424-5, she foresees real and practical disabilities for her sons in their civic life as a result of her *kaka*, and, in as much as this disgrace would have to result from her revelation to the Nurse of her love, the *aidos* which occasioned that revelation may legitimately be seen as an \(\ddelta \chi \theta \sigma \varsigma \delta \iota \kappa \omega \nu\). Alternatively, \(\ddelta \chi \theta \sigma \varsigma \delta \iota \kappa \omega \nu\) may mean no more than that Phaidra regards *aidos* as a burden on herself, perhaps because her misplaced and mistaken *aidos* has led to exposure of her passion, perhaps because, since even the good *aidos* causes her
pain (244-9), she feels that the pleasurable *aidos* which caused her to vacillate has given way to a painful feeling of guilt and self-disgust. Taken as a whole, this difficult passage shows that *aidos* is, as Winnington-Ingram says, "playing a dubious part in the action," and this is the case in a number of different and complex ways; there is certainly more to its elucidation than the simple identification of one instance of good *aidos* and one of bad, but it is nonetheless true that Phaidra's previous references to the concept do reinforce the impression of the ambivalence of *aidos* and thus should be referred to her doubts about it at 385-7.

The twin aspects of Phaidra's *aidos*, the shame with regard to conduct which she firmly believes is wrong and the awareness that in following this *aidos* she is acting in accordance with convention and therefore commendably, are probably extremely close, but Segal is certainly right to identify "internal" and "external" strands to her *aidos*. Had her private shame at her illicit passion been activated on its own there would be no play, but as it is that aspect of her *aidos* which relates to "other people" leads her first of all to reveal her secret and then, in the subsequent action of the play, to take steps to ensure that her reputation is not diminished after her death. Immediately after her speech on the nature of wrongdoing we see how she is affected both by a genuine awareness of her moral duty and a concern for what people will say of her.

At 392ff. she explains the forms which her resistance to her passion has taken: first she attempted to conceal her "sickness", then to overcome it by *sophrosyne*, and finally she decided to be rid of it by means of suicide (393-402); this last she describes as the "best of counsels" (402), and it should, therefore, be clear that this course is the one which she regards as *τελευταίον* and which is promoted by her *aidos* in its helpful aspect. The benefit of such a course, she goes on to explain (403-4), would have been that it would have ensured that her disgraceful passion remained concealed. She knows that her love is *aischron* (thus she
expresses her subjective awareness of the moral character of her own actions), yet she is also concerned that no one should find out about it. Thus her aidos encompasses both a consciousness of right and wrong and a fear of disapproval. This is the normal pattern, and in ordinary circumstances implies no real dichotomy of motivation. In Phaidra, however, the inner and outer aspects of her reaction to her love create a conflict, and the essence of this conflict is present in the lines under discussion, for in 403-4 - 

- she refers to the two elements in her motivation, recognition of the discreditable nature of her love which dictates concealment, and the desire for praise when acting commendably, which conflict in her confrontation with the Nurse and which ultimately prove her undoing. The duality of her motivation continues to assert itself in the rest of her speech (to 430): at 405-14 she expresses her revulsion for the idea of adultery and for those who practise it, and at 413-4 indicates that for her a mere semblance of sophrosyne is not enough; a woman, she believes, must be truly loyal to her husband.

At 415-8 she describes in greater detail the conduct of the kind of woman she despises, and indicates that she could never behave as they do:

- Aidos is not mentioned here, but is certainly relevant: Phaidra is amazed that adulterous women are able to look their husbands in the face and to look upon the darkness which is their accomplice or the rooms in which they have committed their crimes. Thus she expresses her view that a consciousness of wrongdoing should produce inhibition when faced either with those who are the victims or with that which is a reminder of the crimes, and this clearly suggests aidos. She thus indicates her own view that a knowledge of one's own misdeed would be insupportable, but she also
exhibits a tendency (and this is a traditional component of the feeling of aidos) to project the subjective awareness of the character of one's own conduct onto the judgement of other people; thus the darkness and the rooms of the house are treated as witnesses to the crime who might bring about its exposure. Again, this subjective sense of guilt and the fear of reproach will be present to varying degrees in any feeling of aidos which relates to one's own past actions, but in Phaidra's case it is part of the particular purpose of the poet to explore how far the two strands may conflict.

The two aspects of Phaidra's aidos continue to be reflected in the remainder of her speech. From her remarks at 415-8 on what Barrett rightly describes as "the consciousness of a secret guilt", she moves to the effects that any disgrace on her part would have on the reputation of her husband and especially on that of her children (419-25). The transition is effected effortlessly, and Phaidra refers to the idea of conscience on the one hand and that of the harm caused by popular disapproval on the other as two sides of the same coin (as, indeed, they are in most traditional applications of aidos etc.), but in her own case her concern for her reputation has already had the effect of revealing that which her conscience told her should be concealed, and the indications that she gives in the present passage that she is acutely concerned that her sons should be able to hold their heads high rather than be inhibited by their knowledge of their mother's disgrace constitute the first hint of the action which she will later take against Hippolytus out of her concern for her reputation.

Phaidra concludes her speech with a remark on the importance of gnome which is surely fairly conclusive proof that the whole section from 391-430, which begins and ends with gnome and in which the concept of aidos is so prominent, is to be referred to her general remarks at 373-87. Phaidra thus believes that her gnome will stand her in good stead, and goes on to express a wish that she may never be seen among those whom time shows up as kakoi (428-30): all this, we
should remember, is in explanation of her resolve to escape her disgraceful condition in death; she is confident, then, that her intellectual recognition of her moral duty will enable her to carry out the course of action which her aidos and her conscience demand. She has, however, already recognized that people place obstacles before τι καλίν, and that one of these is a burdensome form of aidos; in speaking, in effect, of her aidos in 392-430 she had, as it were, recombined its twin aspects, which shows that she did not fully understand what the two aspects were, but in spite of this uneasy coalition of that which was separated at 385-7 there are indications enough that aidos is still working upon her in different ways. Phaidra, then, believes that she is now about to act in accordance with the good aidos, but that aidos which she has already called bad is still present.

The chorus, like Phaidra in the latter part of her speech, see no conflict between doing what is right and preserving one's reputation, hence their comment on Phaidra's speech (431-2):

\[ \text{δεν δεν τι ρωσων και παντυχων καλίν και δούκαν εινθην εν βετας κατηρετυει.} \]

The Nurse, on the other hand, once she has decided to attempt to minimize the influence of traditional morality on her mistress, goes on to describe the good aidos as bad, for when Phaidra reaffirms her determination not to allow pleasure to deflect her from τι καλίν (486-9 particularly recalls 382-4), she describes the aidos which lies behind the reference to ευκλεία as mere semnotes (τι σεμνομουθεις; 490). As in Phaidra's own disquisition on aidos the sophistic concern for the proper definition of words and the idea that the same response might be described in different terms is relevant here. For the present, however, Phaidra sticks to her resolve, concentrating (in 499, 503 and 505) on that which is really aischron rather than the Nurse's insistence that aischra are better for her than kala.

Soon, however, Phaidra vacillates again, her aidos assuaged, and allows the Nurse to approach Hippolytus. Her illicit
passion is thus revealed to an even wider audience, and, just as the Nurse's initial horror on hearing her secret caused Phaidra to be ashamed and embarrassed, so Hippolytos' particularly vehement reaction produces the same response, and Phaidra once again experiences shame at her love (685-6):

\[ \text{οὐ κἀπων, οὐ ἐκ τῆς προσωπικῆς φρενός,} \]
\[ \text{εἶδν ἐφ' ὀσὶ νῦν ἐγὼ κακώσης;} \]

The verb kakunomai is usually seen as analogous to aischunomai, but if it may bear some sense like "I feel myself kake" it might be regarded as indicative of the kind of self-disgust which Phaidra expressed when she called her love a miasma at 317. At any rate, Phaidra's aidos at the nature of her passion is once more expressed, and once more it causes her pain. Immediately, however, she turns from shame at the impulses which she finds reprehensible in herself to the idea of her reputation: she imagines that Hippolytos will tell others what the Nurse told him, and imagines the harm this will do to her honour (687-92). Her concern for her own reputation and for that of her family leads her to thoughts of death (715-21):

As at 386 she is concerned for her oikos (δομος, 719), and her inability to face Theseus both testifies to her aidos and recalls her prediction that she would be unable to do so at 416; most importantly, however, she is concerned to preserve her own reputation and that of her sons, and this recalls both 421-5 and the very desire for a good reputation which caused her to reveal her secret to the Nurse in the first place. This, in turn, leads her to formulate her plan to denounce Hippolytos and teach him sophrosyne (728-31): once again, then, she puts aidos, fear of disgrace, before τὸ καλὸν and for the pleasure of revenge undertakes unjustly to dest-
roy another human being. 216 Ironically, too, since Hippolytus
had no intention of breaking his oath, the truth is revealed
at the end of the play only because of the action Phaidra
took to avoid exposure. Disaster comes upon her because she
is unsure about aidos: she does the right thing in reacting
with aidos to her passion, but this aidos causes her pain;
at the same time her awareness that she is doing the right
thing causes her to take a certain pleasure in her aidos,
although she knows (486-9) that true eukleia is better than
superficial pleasure and (382-5) that it is harmful to take
pleasure in aidos. Her aidos, then, is truly "double": the
aidos which she experiences at impulses which she knows are
wrong makes her the sympathetic figure that she is, the
"good" Phaidra of this play as opposed to the "bad" Phaidra
of the first Hippolytus, but the aidos which she relates to
the judgement of others ultimately leads to the exposure of
her desires and the deceitful and vindictive destruction of
another person. The separation of aspects of aidos which are
traditionally part of the whole is doubtless artificial, but
it certainly allows the poet to explore the traditional
ambivalence of the concept in a new and searching way. The
chorus are unaware of the implications of all that is brought
out about the twofold nature of aidos, but at 770-5, in
their summing up of Phaidra's motivation, they unwittingly
give expression to its twin aspects: Phaidra was ashamed of
her lot, 217 and concerned to preserve her reputation: 218

It is worth pointing out that Hippolytus' moral principles
do not have this duality: the eusebeia which causes him to
keep even an oath which was improperly extracted from him 219
remains with him till the end; he, too, is faced with the
ruin of his reputation, yet this does not lead him to break
his oath. 220 His eusebeia, then, like his aidos and his
sophrosyne, is not influenced by other people, yet this is
precisely the cause of his own undoing. Much is made in the
play of the concept of sophrosyne, which in Phaidra's case is linked to her aídos and in Hippolytos' to both aídos and eusebeia, yet it is the particular form which these qualities take in them which proves disastrous in both their cases. Neither's sophrosyne, then, can be true sophrosyne, if "safe thinking" produces disaster: the kairos, the play seems to tell us, is all important - there are no absolutes.

Women, we have noticed, form a category in which the sense of aídos is expected to be strong: conversely, the old form a category which is felt particularly to attract the aídos of others. Thus at And.917-8 the aídos which is normally felt towards the old allows Hermione to place a favourable interpretation on her father's inability to impose his will on the ancient Peleus:

Ως κατεῖπτ τῶν γέρανων ἀκεφολή χείλις;
Εγώ αἴδοι γένε μ' ἐγέμνων οὐκέτα χείλιν.

Similarly, at Ανδ.263-5 the chorus-leader accuses Pentheus not only of impiety and failure to show aídos for the gods, but also of a lack of aídos for his grandfather, whose worship of Dionysos he has ridiculed; failing in all these respects, Pentheus, it is claimed, is a disgrace to his house. From lines 204-9 and 365 of the same play, however, it emerges that the old, venerable as they are, are expected to conduct themselves with certain amount of decorum: in the former passage Teiresias mentions the possiblity that others will regard his participation in the orgiastic rites of the new god as evidence of a lack of aischune (= aídos in the traditional sense of "respect") for his old age, while in the latter he informs us that it would be aischron were he and Kadmos to fall.

We have already seen from the HF that aídos can make one reluctant to involve others in one's own misfortunes: the aídos involved here will be a form of that which one feels for the direct recipients of one's actions, and will be based both on a fear of the other's disapproval and on one's recognition of his status. Such aídos is also in evidence in the following passages:
In both these passages the speaker experiences aischune at involving another in his/her problems, and it does not seem to matter whether those involved are philoi or not, for while in the former Orestes is speaking to his sister, Elektra, and exhibiting a certain concern for her reputation as a respectable woman, in the latter Klytaimestra and Achilles have only just met.

The idea that one's business is one's own and no one else's also lies behind IA.327-31, where Agamemnon, having discovered that Menelaos has intercepted his letter to Klytaimestra, vents his fury on his brother:

Ἀγ. τὸν δὲ καλαβές νῦν; ἢ Θεοί, ὅτι ἀναισχύντων δεος. Με. πρεσβοκών οὐν παίς ὅπ' ἀγγεύς, οὐ οἰκέτευμι ἐδετεῖ. Ἀγ. τὸν δὲ σε ταῦτα διὰ φυλάξεις; οὐκ ἀναισχύντων τοῦτο; Με. ὅτε τὸ βοῦλεθάλα μ' ἐκνεφί: ὅππος δὲ δούλος οὐκ ἔσων. Ἀγ. οὕκι δεσνά; τὸν ἐμδι οἰκέων οἰκον οὐκ ἔόρομι.

Agamemnon, then, regards it as anaischuntia, a synonym of anaideia, that Menelaos has interfered in his affairs, thus showing the disregard for another's rights and status which is regularly seen as a breach of aidos. Menelaos, however, experienced no aidos at the time and is unrepentant in the present, simply because he feels he can ignore his brother's disapproval.

Agamemnon's anger persists at least as far as 378-80, where he prefaces his criticisms with the following:

βοῶμει τ' εἴποιν κακὺς εὖ, βεβηκὼς, μὴ κέιν ἐνν, ἐβέθηκεν περὶ τῶν ἀναιδῶν ἀγανων, ἀλλὰ ὑμων ἡσαυροῦσιν; ὡς ὡσεῖν ὅντι. ἀνήρ γὰρ χρησίμος αἰδείτηκεν ἄγιος.

So he wishes to abuse Menelaos, but from a position of moral superiority. Sophrosyne and anaideia are here opposed, suggesting once again the closeness of the former to aidos.
anaideia is seen as manifested in an unflinching gaze, just as aidos commonly is in downcast eyes, and the fact that Menelaos is Agamemnon's brother seems to have some influence on the latter's aidos: one does not abuse one's philoi. It will be seen, then, that aidos and sophrosyne here are concerned with general ideas of appropriateness and moderation, just as aidos and terms denoting "good sense" often were in the Odyssey.

Agamemnon's recriminations against Menelaos are interrupted by the arrival of the messenger who is the escort of Klytemnestra, Iphigeneia and Orestes. Such is the king's aporia at this eventuality that he feels himself liable to weep, and even when faced with the choice, to weep or not to weep, he vacillates (451-3):

That a man should experience aidos at the thought of weeping is natural: that Agamemnon should feel it at not shedding a tear, however, is remarkable; it seems that he is the sort of person who weeps when he feels he should. Details like this obviously help to make up the characterization of Agamemnon as ineffectual and slightly pompous, and the lines which precede the remarks quoted confirm this: at 446-9 he envies those of low birth their ability to say what they like and to weep when they feel like it, and contrasts this boon with the poverty of the nobleman's nature in that respect; people like himself must protect themselves with their own self-importance (δυνάμεις, 450) and are slaves to popular opinion (449-50). It is thus apparent that Agamemnon has an acute concern for his "image" and that he bases his conduct upon what other people will say; in effect, he denounces his own pomposity out of his own mouth. In the character of this figure, then, the traditional nobleman's concern for his reputation, elsewhere seen as quite normal, is held up as something faintly ridiculous, and this is, in fact, a theme of the play as a whole: for just as Agamemnon's identification of aidos as a virtue of those of noble birth (380,446-53)
reveals his essential pomposity and is equated with ἀγαθός, so do other characters, notably Klytaimestra, express the idea that, in certain circumstances, a too profound regard for one's own status may be not ἀιδός, but mere semiotes or habrotes. Similarly the one other character whose concern for his image surpasses even that of Agamemnon (namely Achilles) also emerges in a faintly ridiculous light. This play, then, like the Hippolytos, explores the idea of burdensome ἀιδός, but in a rather more satirical vein.

We have already seen many times that it is aischron to tell lies. At And. 435-8 Andromache charges Menelaos with deceit, and is astounded when he does not deny the charge, but glories in it: thus at 451-2 she terms his pursuit of his aims by saying one thing and doing another aischrokerdeia. At I.A. 1144-5, however, Agamemnon declines to follow a similar path: he knows that Klytaimestra knows the truth, and recognizes that to claim that he did not intend to sacrifice Iphigeneia would be a brazen disregard for Klytaimestra's knowledge to the contrary; to persist in claiming that an untruth is true even when others know that it is not is therefore anaideia (or anaischuntia): We have already had occasion to note that in Euripides, as elsewhere, one's philoi have a special right to ἀιδός. In some plays the motif of philia is of particular importance, and among these is the Alcestis: Alkestis herself is preeminently loyal to her husband, and as such a model of feminine arete, while the mutual responsibility expected in both her and Admetos as philoi is repeatedly mentioned. At 277-9 Admetos tells his wife:

This is answered by Alkestis at 282-4:
sebein and presbein are parallel terms, which describe the reciprocal respect owed by both parties to a relationship of philia. The reciprocal nature of the relationship is shown by Admetos' words at 433-4:

Aidos enters the picture at 728, where Pheres, accused of anaideia by his son, points out that such a charge could not be levelled against Alkestis, and the idea that Admetos himself may have manifested anaideia in asking his wife to die for him may be present at 954-7, for although the lack of husband's aidos in that passage is specifically referred to his cowardice in refusing to face death, the fact that he persuaded his wife to die in his stead is also mentioned in a way that suggests that this, too, is discreditable (and Admetos does mention his debt of gratitude to Alkestis in 950-3). The idea that Admetos does owe his wife a debt of gratitude which it would be discreditable of him to ignore is brought out more fully at 1057-61, where he explains his inability to accept the woman Herakles has brought him in terms of fear of reproach from both people in general and his dead wife in particular:

Although Admetos does express himself in terms of the reproach of others, it is clear that he feels himself under an obligation which his own principles lead him to honour: the reproach of his fellow-citizens may be a real possibility, but criticism on the part of Alkestis is surely a less pressing sanction; even if he does believe that she could reproach him from beyond the grave, his fear still reveals a personal awareness that it would not be right to betray his wife. It is worth noticing that the positive force of this obligation, to respect one's benefactor, is consistently, as here, designated by sebein, sebesthai, timan, presbeuein etc. and not by aideisthai, although aidos is the negative
inhibition which prevents breaches of the standard. In Homer both senses could be covered by aideisthai, and the Euripidean practice in this play shows how far sebein etc. have taken over from that verb in the sense "respect", "honour".

**Philia**, and breaches thereof, also play an important rôle in **Medea**. Throughout the play Jason is condemned for his betrayal of his wife: the Nurse is unwilling to speak ill of her master, yet is firmly of the opinion that he has been revealed as kakos with regard to his philoi (84). The Paidagogos is cynical about this and replies (85-6):

\[
\text{At 439-40 the chorus draw the moral from Jason's conduct towards Medea:} \\
\begin{align*}
\beta\epsilon\beta\alpha\kappa\epsilon\delta' \'\omicron\kappa\alpha\nu\chi\acute{e}i\varsigma, & \quad \omicron\delta' \epsilon't\ \kappa\iota\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma \\
\epsilon\kappa\lambda\lambda\epsilon\iota \tau\acute{e} \ \mu\acute{e}g\acute{a}l\epsilon \ \mu\acute{e}n\nu, & \quad \kappa\iota\theta\epsilon\epsilon\iota\kappa \ \delta' \ \alpha\nu\acute{e}p\tau\alpha.
\end{align*}
\]

In abandoning Medea, then, Jason has destroyed the obligation to treat her properly, an obligation sanctified by oath, and suggested that there is no longer any place for aidsos, the impulse to keep such obligations, in the world. Medea is given the chance to vent her fury on Jason himself at 465ff... She equates his betrayal of her with cowardice (465-6) and maintains that he is now her enemy (467): further insinuating cowardice, she goes on (469-72):

\[
\text{It is, of course, implied that it is discreditable to betray one's philoi, but Jason's anaideia, as Medea sees it here, consists not in the betrayal itself but in his having the nerve to face the one he has betrayed; his consciousness of his misdeed, she suggests, should have caused him to be unable to look his victim in the face. At 499 Medea ironically pretends to treat him once more as her philos, yet asks herself the question:} \\
\begin{align*}
\delta\upsilon\kappa\omicron\omicron\epsilon\nuk, & \quad \mu\acute{e}n \ \tau'i \ \pi\acute{e}e\varsigma \ \gamma' \ \phi\omicron\omicron \ \tau'\omicron\acute{e} \ \kappa\alpha\lambda\varsigma, \\
o'\mu\varsigma\varsigma & \quad \epsilon\rho\omicron\theta\upsilon\theta\omicron\epsilon\varsigma\varsigma \ \gamma' \ \alpha'i\zeta\chi\epsilon\iota\nu \ \delta' \ \kappa\nu\acute{u}.
\end{align*}
\]
The enormity of Jason's betrayal, she believes, will become apparent when he is unable to answer the question (502), where am I now to turn? That Jason should be shown up in this way is clearly Medea's intention, and such is often the motivation behind such agonès.

Medea, herself, however, has already committed grave crimes against philia, and will do so again. At 166-7 she herself confesses that the murder of her brother was aischron (airχwυ ... κτείνακα κάριν), while at 1286-7 the chorus, thinking of the murder which is taking place as they sing, sing of Ino's ἕνων τόκων δυσερέει. At 1328 Jason calls her deed δυσερέεπαι, and at 1346 addresses her as airdοςοπολέ: as often, the same action may be regarded as dussebes or as aischron. Medea herself admits that the murder was dussebes at 1383.

The closeness of sebas and aidos in the context of philia is further demonstrated by Hcld. 6-9, where Iolaos explains his participation in the labours of Herakles:

εἵμεν γὰρ αἰδοὶ καὶ τὸ συγγενῆς γένος,
εἵμεν καὶ ἀγάπας ἑτέρων, τὸν οἶκον
περιπετείων μετέχειν εἰς ἅν τε Ἡρακλεῖ,
οί τέρατα ἡμῶν.

Here both αἰδοὶ and τὸ συγγενῆς γένος express the idea of positive respect for one's kin, and the equivalence demonstrates that, while sebein etc. are now more common in this application, aidos can still bear this sense. As a result of his philia with Herakles Iolaos now protects his friend's children (10-11), and at 26-30 we see how aidos motivates him in this, too:

εἵμεν δὲ εὖν ἰηένους συμφέειν τόκων
καὶ εὖν κακῶς πράγματε συμπεράνεις κακῶς,
δίκυνη προδονάλλει, μή τις ἤδ' εἶπε βετένν.
"I δέσθ', ἐπεδήπορος παῖσιν οὐκ ἐπείνα πατηρς,
ἵ τὸν θάνατον οὐκ ἡμῶν συγκένας γέγον ἡμεῖς.

Here δίκυνη προδονάλλει conveys exactly the sense of αἰδούμενος προδονάλλει, and the the reason for Iolaos' concern, what people will say, confirms that he is subject to aidos. Other people, then, in Euripides as in Homer, disapprove of
failure to help one's philoi in time of trouble.

In the Hippolytus the most important breach of philia is that supposed to have occurred between Hippolytos and his father: we have already noted how Theseus accused his son of honouring himself more than his father. At 1257-60 Theseus describes how his initial pleasure at Hippolytos' destruction turned to regret:

Theseus feels aidos for his son on account of their kinship, and the co-operative feeling of concern for a philos, especially a blood-relation, overcomes the competitive desire for vengeance. Theseus' aidos for the gods must relate to this, so it seems that he regards the gods as guarantors of the proper relationship between philoi. There is, however, a slight difference of meaning between ἀϊδωμένος θεοῦς and ἀϊδωμένος ἐκεῖνον: aidos before the gods signifies respect for the gods as upholders of moral standards and implies the sanction of their disapproval, while Theseus' aidos for Hippolytos can scarcely encompass any concern for the latter's opinions, but is rather a positive regard for a member of one's own family qua philos. This standard may ultimately be related to popular disapproval, but that aspect is not mentioned here, so it seems that Theseus' aidos for his son is an example of the concept in its most altruistic and other-regarding aspect.

At 1286-9 Artemis upbraids Theseus for his treatment of his son and says that he is, as a result of his conduct towards him, disgraced and should hide himself away (1290-1): Theseus' disgrace stems partly from his mistake, but ultimately from his wrongful destruction of a philos: the idea that he should remove himself from sight acknowledges this impulse as a common feature of the reaction of shame.
1287 the goddess also says that Theseus killed his son \( \text{οὐχ ὀδὼς} \), and this reasserts the connexion with the divine sphere which we noticed at 1258-9. At 1294-5 she goes on to claim that Theseus' crime leaves him no share in the life of \( \text{ἀγαθὸς ἄνδρος} \), and thus suggests that a crime against \textit{philia} of such enormity entails the destruction of the perpetrator's \textit{arete}: Artemis, however, is far from impartial in all this, and perhaps others may be inclined to see Theseus' ignorance of what he was doing as a mitigating circumstance. At 1331-4 it is Artemis herself who is implicated in disgrace, and again the grounds for this lie in the betrayal of a \textit{philos} in this case Artemis' failure to protect her devotee, Hippolytos:

\[
\text{έπεί, καθ' ἵνα, Ζήνα μὴ φοβομένη, σύν καὶ ποισὶ ἥλθον ἐς τὸ δ' αἰρόμενα ἐξ ἑως, ἱνδεκ πώς των χέλτατον βεοτων ἐμοὶ θανεῖν ἐσκελ.}
\]

Again, there may be an element of irony in this attribution of human motivation to the divine.\(^{252}\)

\textit{Philia} also has an important part to play in the scene between Hekabe and Odysseus in the \textit{Hecuba}. Hekabe once allowed Odysseus, who had entered Troy in disguise, to escape unharmed, and he admits (248) that he owes his life to her. As a result of this debt of \textit{charis} Hekabe asks Odysseus to intercede on behalf of Polyxena, who is to be offered as a sacrifice to Achilles, and claims that he should be ashamed to appear before his benefactress to demand the sacrifice of her daughter (251-3):\(^{253}\)

\[
\text{οὐκὼν κακὴν τοῖς τοῖς βουλεύμασιν, ὁς ἐσ ἐμοὶ μὴν ἐπιθέσεως ἐπὶ Ἰησοῦς παρθῶν, δὲς δ' οὐδεν ἡμᾶς ὦ, κακὴς δ' ὤγον σύνης;}
\]

Odysseus, she goes on to say, manifests no \textit{charis} (254) because he is a politician, and therefore a slave to the whims of his constituency, \( \text{ὁ πολέμος} \) (257): in the course of this argument (256) she implies that she is his \textit{phile}, whom it is not right for him to betray.

To Hekabe's argument from \textit{charis} Odysseus opposes another:
Achilles himself requested the sacrifice (304-5) and he, because of the energy he devoted to the capture of Troy, deserves to be honoured in the way in which he would wish (309-10): if the brave are denied time cities will decline (306-7), and no one will be willing to fight if the dead are not honoured (313-6); Achilles is also the philos of the Greeks, and it is aischron to treat a person as a philos while he lives only to abandon him in death (310-1). Odysseus thus resists Hekabe's argument, in essence, by agreeing with it: he agrees that it is aischron to betray a philos, but represents the obligation to show gratitude as more cogent in the case of the dead Achilles than in that of Hekabe.

Adkins believes that, in terms of traditional values, Odysseus is right. Yet while the arguments he employs may be compelling in any ordinary situation they do not adequately meet the purpose to which Odysseus uses them: it is true that Achilles has a much more powerful claim to philia with Odysseus than does Hekabe, and all that Odysseus says about the need to reward bravery and prowess is perfectly commendable: in the present circumstance, however, his arguments are being used to justify human sacrifice, which, as Pearson points out, "is no different from murder", and which is one of the very few practices to meet with outright and unambiguous condemnation in the Iliad. Odysseus, then, is using justifiable arguments to unjustified ends, and it would be very easy for the request of Achilles to be condemned as excessive or unseemly in line with traditional, if vague, standards of appropriateness. Nor should the obligation which is placed on him by the fact that Hekabe once accepted his supplication be minimized: supplication does create a bond between the two parties and the successful supplicant is under a debt of gratitude to his protector. It is doubtful whether Odysseus' granting of a favour which Hekabe does not want (301-2) satisfies this obligation.

At Supp. Aithra asks Theseus whether she should say something kalon for both the city and himself, but at 295 refers to her reluctance to speak her mind, a reluctance which she
goes on to paraphrase (299-300) as a fear that it is useless for women to speak well. Aithra, then, seems to experience a form of *aidos*, or fear of criticism, which arises from her consciousness of her place as a woman (and we should notice that this fear of criticism almost prevents her revealing that which she believes to be *kalon* - 293,300). Theseus, however, suggests, in effect, that it is not with regard to speaking that she should feel *aidos*, but at remaining silent, and relates this opinion to the demands of loyalty between *philoi* (296):

\[ \text{αίσχρων γὰρ ἐλέεσα, ἄρηστ' ἐπὶ καταπτερνος φίλους.} \]

We saw in connexion with Sophokles' *Elektra*261 how, in the context of the crime within the family, the conduct demanded by *dike* might conflict with that demanded by *aidos*; we find the same opposition in Euripides, expressed in strikingly similar terms. At El.1051-3 the chorus-leader comments on Klytaimestra's argument that it was *dike* which drove her to kill Agamemnon:

\[ \text{δίκαιη ἔλεεσα, ἢ δόξη δ' αἰρεσάω ἔχει.} \]

The chorus-leader's point, then, is the same as that made by Elektra in Sophokles' play:262 regardless of the legitimacy of retaliation, Klytaimestra's murder of her husband involved fundamental offences against both women's *areta*, for women must be loyal to their husbands, and *philia*, since it is clearly a crime against *philia* to murder one's husband. The argument is similar at Or.194, although here it is the murder of Klytaimestra by Orestes and Elektra which is at issue: the chorus sing that this deed was performed with *dike*, but Elektra goes on, *καλῶς δ' ὦ*. These statements, however, must be seen against a background in which it is *traditionally aischron* either to be disloyal to one's husband or to promote strife within the family: this is not a new aspect given the situation by Sophokles and Euripides, and certainly not an attempt at a solution "to the problem set by the crime within the family."264 It would, however, be true to say that to designate an action *aischron* is to present a sound argument
against its performance, but this, as we saw very clearly in our discussion of Sophokles' play, does not necessarily mean that one who accepts that a given course of action is aischron will be deterred from carrying it out; it is also true that in the Orestes especially the claims of justice are, in the early part of the play, frequently subordinated to the demands of family loyalty, but if this is a sign that Euripides believed that the latter always outweighed the former, then it will be a sign that he is placing more emphasis on one of two traditional aspects of the situation, rather than suggesting a solution to the problem based on supposedly new, "quiet moral" uses of aischron etc.: Homer's Klytaimestra, brought up to subscribe to the same standards as Penelope, will have known as well as her Sophoklean or Euripidean counterpart that it is aischron to be disloyal to one's husband, and the "problem set by the crime within the family" is scarcely one which required a solution in fifth century Athens.

At one point in the IT Orestes and Pylades are on the verge of separation, and this prospect arouses feelings of aidos in both. At 605-8 Orestes explains why he feels unable to abandon his friend:

Tά τών γέλων

καίχετον ὀρτύς καταβαλέως ἐς γυμνάριας

αὐτός σέσωταλ. Τυχάναν δ' ὅδ' ὥν φίλος,

διὸν σύδεν ἱππεὶν ἐν ἀρρήν ὀρέγην θέλω.

On this account, he gives up the opportunity of a safe return to Greece. Pylades, however, feels no less strongly (674-86):
Orestes immediately points out that he is affected by similar considerations (689-91):

"ο γάρ ἐσθ' ἁπαξείν θανάτως διελθεὶν ἔργας,
ταύτ' ἐστὶν ἡμῖν, εἰ ἐστὶ κηρυκθοῦντ' ἐμὲ
κτενώ ἡμῖν."

Both, then, are subject to *aidos*, in that both believe that it is *aischrun* to abandon a friend and both are afraid that they would incur the censure of others should they do so. Pylades, in particular, conceives an elaborate image of the unjustified charges of those who see base motives in everything: it is clear that these charges would cause him great distress, in spite of his own knowledge of the facts, but this is an entirely understandable human reaction in the circumstances. Nor should it be inferred that Pylades' preoccupation with the judgement of others reveals that the Greek's loyalty to his friends rests only on fear of opprobrium: Pylades' very fears show that he is acutely concerned about his own reputation for loyalty as such (by subsuming it disloyalty to the head of cowardice he relates/to that area of male values about which a young nobleman in his position might be most concerned),\(^{267}\) and this reveals that his own personal belief that it is wrong to betray a friend is a strong one. In line 686, moreover, he gives two reasons for his desire to be sacrificed along with Orestes, friendship *tout court* and fear of reproach, and neither motive should be minimized; and if Pylades does show a strong prudential regard for his own position, we may contrast this with the initial pronouncement of Orestes (605-8), that it is *aischrun* to abandon a friend and that he himself is as concerned for the life of his friend as he is for his own.\(^{268}\) Once again, Greek values are shown to embrace prudential and altruistic aspects.

In the *Ion* Kreousa is urged by her faithful slave to kill Xouthos. This, however, she refuses to do (977):

"αἰσθήμαθ' εὐνάς τὰς τοῦθ' ἴνικ' εἰθὸς ἑν."

Kreousa's *aidos* here is not related to any fear of disapproval on the grounds of disloyalty, but to a positive regard for the *philia* she and Xouthos have enjoyed: the fact that
Xouthos was once a good husband sets up, in Kreousa's view, an obligation which must be returned.

This idea of obligation, of charis, also occurs in a passage to which we have already referred in another context, 269 Or. 459-69. At the approach of his grandfather, Orestes is seized by aidos, which causes him to be reluctant to face the old man (460-1). As the causal dative, τῶν ἐξεγερμένων, shows, the grounds for Orestes' aidos lie in his murder of Klytaimestra, but they do so in a particular sense, as he goes on to explain (462-7):

Orestes' murder of his mother, then, occasions his aidos in that he regards it as a crime of ingratitude against his grandfather, who brought him up: thus he cannot face a philos he has wronged. Again, the unpleasant implications of the crime within the family are stressed, and this fits in with the general importance of the theme of philia in the whole play. 270 Later in the play this theme is also prominent in the prelude to the execution of the plot to kill Helen and kidnap Hermione, when, just as in IT, Orestes and Pylades pledge their friendship and vow never to abandon each other (801-2, 1075-81). 271

In one of its longest continuous fragments (fr. 22 and 60 Bond) the Hypsipyle contains several passages which are relevant in this connexion: at 15-7 Hypsipyle begs Amphiaraos not to be put to death under an αἰτία αἰχμή, and this seems to refer to her breach of trust and dereliction of duty in neglecting the infant, who was subsequently killed. At 20-1 she tells the seer,

Here it seems that aidos is the trust one places in one's
philoi, or the hope that they will stand by in time of need: thus the sense of *epaideomai* here seems very close to that which might be borne by *sebo* or even *timao*. At 25ff. Hypsipyle supplices Amphiaraos, but his reply at 39-42 is expressed in terms of the debt of *charis* which he owes her as a result of her earlier kindness towards him (to which she herself had already referred at 17, before her supplication began):

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That the seer feels it *aischpron* not to return Hypsipyle's favour indicates that he would feel *aidos* at the prospect of not doing so: this is the attitude which he describes as *τὸ εὔρεβεσ* in line 40, and again we see the closeness of *aidos* and *τὸ σέβεσ* *aischpron* and *dussebeia*.

Mention of supplication in the *Hypsipyle* brings us to discussion of the topic in its own right: *aidos* as we have seen before, is felt particularly appropriate in the context of supplication, and seems to be a reaction to the situation and the ritual gestures in themselves, but in Euripides, in particular, *aidos* is often present or appealed to, in the supplicated in other, less obvious ways.

At line 324 of the play which bears her name Medea seems to begin supplication (*πρὸς σὲ γυναῖν* [sc. ἱκτεύομαι]), but Kreon dismisses her pleas (325) and in answer to her question (326), confirms that he feels no *aidos* for them (327). At this point, as Gould shows, Medea's supplication is purely figurative - she has not made ritual contact. By 339, however, she has made contact, and (340-7) begs to be allowed to stay in Corinth one day longer. At this point Kreon does feel *aidos*, and gives in, although he is aware that he is making a mistake (348-51):

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<td>ήκιπ τούμν λήμ' ἐ' ἐν τυρκυκιῶν,</td>
<td>αι δυσμένοις δὲ παλλὰ δὴ διέθρυκ.</td>
<td>καὶ νόν ὅσον μὲν ἐξανακτῶν, γυναί,</td>
<td>ὅμως δὲ πεῦξε τοῦτο:</td>
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</table>
Ritual contact, then, does make a difference, and in this case it brings Kreon, not initially susceptible to *aidos*, to a point where he must either accept Medea's supplication, or carry out his threat (335) to use force against her; this, however, he cannot bring himself to do, because, as he seems to suggest, it is not in his nature to act in such ways. His *aidos*, then, leads him to reject a course of action which he feels instinctively to be wrong: this *aidos* is close to, but distinct from, that which one might feel as a spontaneous response to another's appeal for mercy or aid.\(^{275}\)

Medea's supplication was personal, conducted on a one-to-one basis with Kreon, the *echthros* whom she was attempting to turn into a *soter*.\(^{276}\) The *Heracleidae*, on the other hand, is a full-scale suppliant drama, in which supplication takes place before the altar of a city in which the suppliants are seeking protection. Since protection implies protection from an enemy, the appearance of the suppliants' *echthros* is a constant feature of plays of this type. In this play, the *echthros*, Eurystheus' herald, enters even before the suppliants have encountered their prospective *soter*,\(^{277}\) and this means that when the latter, Demophon (with his brother, who remains silent throughout the play), enters, he must decide quickly on whether or not to support the suppliants. In view of the violence threatened by the enemy herald,\(^ {278}\) there is really only one decision Demophon can make, but although he decides quickly and with scarcely any hesitation, his decision does not arise from one simple consideration, but rather reveals the complexity of the motives of the supplicated and something of the variety of appeal which the suppliant might employ.

Faced with the appearance of the enemy herald, Iolaos appeals to the citizens of Athens in general (69-72), referring both to the herald's threat of violence as violence against the city's gods and to the danger that failure to protect those who take refuge at its altars will damage the city's reputation (will be an *oneidos*, 72). This *oneidos* may cover a number of different ideas: Iolaos may imagine that Athens is
concerned for her reputation as protectress of the weak, or as a city of pious citizens, or he may be suggesting that it will be a sign of weakness on the Athenians' part if they allow those who take refuge in their territory to be maltreated.

In their rebuke to the herald at 101-4, however, it is to religious aspect alone that the chorus refer (cf.107-8), and it appears from this that the very act of supplication entitles the suppliants, in that they have invoked the protection of the gods, to *aidos*:

εἰκός θεῶν ἵκτης καὶ δικαίως, ἥνε,
καὶ μὴ βικίω Χελεὶ ἀκλ-
μῶν ἀπόλιτεν σφι ἔδη,
πότικα γὰρ Δίκης τὰς οὖ πείρατε.

The divine sanction, however, merits only the barest of allusions in the speech in which Iolaos seeks to persuade Demo-
phon to accord protection, but rather the old man employs three common suppliant appeals which are intended to supplement the basic argument that it is pious to protect those who already enjoy the protection of the gods. These *Bitt-
topoi* are in this case the argument from reputation, the argument from kinship, and the argument from *charis*, grati-
tude for past favours. 279

The first of these arguments is subtly worked into Iolaos' speech, for rather than simply suggesting that the reputation of Athens will suffer if he and his fellow-suppliants fall into the hands of the Argives, he prefers to indulge in extensive praise of the Athenian spirit, while introducing a number of hints to the effect that this spirit, and the consequent good reputation, must be maintained. Thus he in-
sinuates (191) that any decision to expel the suppliants would be regarded as motivated by fear of the Argives, and suggests (197-8) that in such an eventuality he would have his doubts about the city's independence. At 200-1 he links protection of the suppliants more explicitly to the values of the battlefield: the Athenians, he says, will be willing to die to protect their suppliants,
This is still praise of Athens, but it also suggests that the Athenians' reputation for bravery is now at stake.

Iolaos' next point is τις ῥυγμωνή, something upon which he himself sets a high value. Theseus and Herakles were related, and so Demophon is related to the suppliants (207-13); this places an additional obligation on Demophon himself (205-6). There was more to the philia of Theseus and Herakles, however, than simple kinship, for Herakles freed Theseus from Hades (214-9), and Iolaos, using the third of his arguments, now claims that charis back (220). His final words are essentially an appeal to pity, but he does allude to several of the topoi he has already mentioned, and begins by stressing the danger to the reputations of Athens as a whole and of Demophon in particular should the suppliants be dragged off by force (223-5): in pointing out that this would be aischron for the city and its king Iolaos essentially recapitulates, for all that he has said before has been based on the idea that it is aischron firstly to be shown up as weak or cowardly, secondly to betray one's kin, and thirdly to fail to return a favour; this being so, it should be clear that he is appealing to aidos on three different grounds, none of which answers to the simple argument that suppliants deserve aidos qua suppliants.

In his reply Demophon enumerates three considerations which compel him to accept the supplication: the divine sanction (238-9), το ῥυγμωνή and charis (240-1) and τις αἰχμηρόν (242), on which he adds (243-6):

εἰ γὰρ παραγόντες τήδε ἀνθρώπινη βία,
ὲγὼν πρὸς ἅνθρωπος βωμὸν, ὑπ' ἐκείνην ὁμοφωνοῦν ὧν ξένον ἔχων ὡς ὅμομον ἄνθρωπον, ἀρετίνθι δ' ὧν ξένων ἀκτένας προσβαλεῖν.

He has, therefore, recognized and accepted Iolaos' arguments, and his aidos has been successfully aroused on all counts. It will be seen that he accedes to the request both out of concern for principle and out of concern for his own and his
city's reputation, and *aidos* is relevant in both areas, as the instinct which responds to the wrong action of disregarding those who are under the protection of the gods, to that of the abandonment of one's kin and to that of failing to return a favour, and also as the reaction to the knowledge that all these things, in much the same way as is cowardice or weakness, are subject to the disapproval of other people.

Demophon expresses the idea that it is *aischron* for him to allow the suppliants to be dragged off again at 256, and his insistence that this is so will be based on a belief that it is discreditable to allow suppliants to be maltreated, but this belief itself may rest either on the idea that to fail to protect is a sign of lack of regard for others or on the thought that failure to protect indicates one's own weakness. Demophon's reply to the herald's suggestion that he should simply expel the suppliants from Attica in order that the Argives may take them once they have crossed the borders (257) at least shows that he is not solely concerned about the charge of weakness should they be seized by force. Demophon's statement, incidentally, that it is *aischron* for him to allow suppliants to be taken by force (256) is prompted by a question from the herald which reveals that it is also *aischron* to seize suppliants by force (255):

> οὐκών ἐμὴ τὸδ' μιχεῖν ἀλλ' οὐ σιβρᾶβος;

The same action, then, may be disgraceful for both the *echthros* and the *soter*, and the former's lack of *aidos* in this case is a clear sign of his *anaidela*. At 284-7 Demophon ends the scene with the herald by referring once more to the role of *τὸ μιχὲν* in securing his support for the Herakleidai, and this time he is certainly motivated by a concern for his own and his city's reputation for strength and independence:

> ἄθελον. τὸ ἀν γὰρ ἂγος οὐ δέδοικ' ἑρ'.
> ἐνθέντε σ' οὐκ ἐμελεῖς κακὺνάς εἰμή
> ἄψευς ἐκ τυρίδιον οὐ γὰρ ἄγελων πολίν
> ὑπηκόουν τὴν ο领导干部 ἀλλ' ἐκένθεσκαν ὀκὼ.

The supplication over, Iolaos urges his charges to express their gratitude towards the Athenians, who are ἀγαθοὶ ἐβὴν
This use of sebein, which is virtually interchangeable with aideisthai in this context, suggests that aidos is also the response of the successful suppliant to his protector. The situation changes, however, with the prophecy that the blood of a noble maiden must be shed if the Athenians are to defeat the Argives in battle. Demophon cannot command any of his citizens to make such a sacrifice, and the suppliants fear they will be abandoned. At 450 Iolaos expresses that it would be aischron for himself and his fellow-suppliants if they should be put to death at the hands of their enemy: it seems, then, that the taking of the suppliants by force would be aischron for all parties, for Demophon (242-6, 256, 284-7), for the herald (255) and for the suppliants themselves. As a result of Iolaos' fears, the Athenians of the chorus become worried about the reputation of their city (461-3):

The chorus-leader fears a reproach which he knows would be false: results are thus more important for him than intentions, but this is an entirely understandable reaction, and one which we should have no difficulty recognizing both at individual and at community level in our own society.

In the play of the same name, Andromache is driven, in fear of her life, to take refuge at the πατρεία of Thetis (42-6). Until the entrance of Peleus, however, much later in the play, she does not address her supplication to any human being. Her appeal to Peleus comes at 572-6:

As well as the divine sanction, then, she also appeals to the old man's aidos for the reputation of his family: both he and Neoptolemos will appear weak if she, the suppliant of the one and the concubine of the other, is seized by an out-
sider. Later in the play (647-67) Menelaos claims that the opposite is the case, that Peleus' protection of Andromache is \textit{aischron}, both for Peleus and for himself (648-50), on the grounds that she is a barbarian and an enemy, who is partly responsible for the death of Achilles. Menelaos thus ignores the power of the ritual of supplication entirely,\cite{281} but his argument fails because Peleus holds \textit{him} responsible for the war and considers \textit{him} his enemy (706-7), and because he is from his first appearance on stage prepared to take Andromache's side.

Hekabe's supplication of Agamemnon at \textit{Hec}. 786ff. deserves careful consideration, for there is more to the scene than first meets the eye. Hekabe throws herself at Agamemnon's knees at 787 and proceeds to supplicate him on the basis of the justice of her case: Polymestor has killed a \textit{xenos} and deserves punishment. At 806-7 she sums up this part of her appeal:

\begin{quote}
\textit{ταῦτ' ὅν ἐν αἰδεῖσθαι θέμενος ἀιδέτθητι με, οἴκτειν ἡμὲς, ...}.
\end{quote}

\textit{Aideisthai} seems to be used here as the verb which describes the reaction to supplication, and probably refers to the status which the suppliant enjoys as a \textit{protegeé} of the gods, although there may also be an element of pity for one who has abandoned all claim to time in the usage. \textit{ταῦτ' ... ἐν αἰδεῖσθαι θέμενος} refers to Hekabe's argument on the justice of her case: she is asking Agamemnon to consider the crimes of Polymestor \textit{aischron} (thus the term will have a similar application to the adjective \textit{anosios}, used of Polymestor at 790 and 792 [cf.788], referring to the breach of \textit{xenia}); she says nothing about Polymestor's conduct, or Agamemnon's failure to punish him, being \textit{aischron} for Agamemnon;\cite{282} thus she is not appealing to Agamemnon's own sense of \textit{aidos}, but to his sense of outrage at a breach of \textit{aidos} committed by someone else. This argument, however, fails to persuade him, for he withdraws and thus avoids the ritual contact of supplication (812);\cite{283} Hekabe then interprets this action as a refusal. At 850-3, however, Agamemnon accepts the supplication, and on the grounds of the justice of Hekabe's case at that:
What, then, has happened: has Agamemnon changed his mind, or was Hekabe wrong to imagine that he was not persuaded by her argument at 812? Only one argument has been tried in the meantime which could possibly have influenced his decision: at 824-40 Hekabe turns to the fact that her daughter, Kassandra, is now Agamemnon's concubine, and claims that a form of charis exists between herself (and her dead son, Polydoros) and Agamemnon on account of the philia he enjoys with Kassandra. This is not a compelling argument, but Agamemnon does not simply ignore it, for he qualifies his statement of his willingness to act in accordance with to dikaios as follows (854-6):

Now, it may be, as Adkins claims, that Agamemnon's decision to recognize the claims of justice and the institution of xenia is to be taken at face value, but, if so, why does he withdraw at 812, the very point at which Hekabe has said all that she is going to say about the justice of her case? And why is he so concerned to avoid the charge that he is acting for Kassandra's sake? Dalfen is in no doubt but that sex, the charis of his relationship with Kassandra, is Agamemnon's real motive, and concludes, "Als Bemäntelung für sein wahres Motiv ist ihm die Hikesie gut, als Appell war sie wirkungslos." Part of the point of the scene, then, will be that people often have personal, self-interested reasons for following the moral course, and this seems to me to be the best way to explain both the king's change of mind and the fear that he will be seen as acting out of regard for his concubine. It may seem slightly strange that Agamemnon should be subject to such a motive, but the very fact that he suggests that others will assume that this is his motive suggests that it would be regarded as natural, if discredit-
able, for him to act on that basis. 288

The Supplices, like the Heracleidae, is a suppliant drama, and naturally aidos is important. The main modification of the canonical pattern of suppliant drama in the play is the presentation of two parallel appeals and two replies, one negative and one positive. 289 Each of these is very different from the others, and as the appeals are based on different means of persuasion, so the replies are formulated as they are for different reasons.

The climate initially seems favourable to the suppliants, when, at 34-41, Aithra expresses her pity for these mothers who have lost their sons, reveals her respect for the institution of supplication (σέβομαι, 36) and announces that she has summoned her son in order that he may resolve the situation. Theseus duly arrives, and at 113-4 Adrastos begins his appeal, initially answering Theseus' questions in stichomythia, then resorting to a formal suppliant appeal (163-92). At 164-5 he prefaced his plea with a reference to the ritual humiliation which the suppliant must undergo:

ाνας Ἀθηνᾶς, ἐν μὲν αἰρχύως ἔχω πρὶν οὖσα ὑέννυ ἐν ἐμπίστευσεν χέε, ... ἐν αἰρχύως ἔχω seems to paraphrase aischunomai: 290 Adrastos is reluctant to abandon his claim to honour, yet (167) recognizes that he must do so. 291 The stichomythia had been concerned mainly with the advisability of the expedition against Thebes (answering to the topos of the justice of the suppliants case), but the rhesis which follows it is largely an appeal to pity and a general argument that it is right that Theseus and Athens should protect the weak: Adrastos adduces no other reason for acceptance, not even the divine sanction. By this point, however, Theseus is more interested in the justice of the initial expedition, which he condemns as imprudent (161), unjust (224, 228, 233) and impious (231), and on this basis he rejects the appeal.

He will, however, change his mind, but only after Aithra has interceded on the suppliants' behalf, employing many of the
topoi Adrastos failed to mention. After the rejection of the initial appeal the chorus renew supplication and beg for pity (263-85). At 284 they urge Theseus to look upon them in their pitiful condition, but it is Aithra who looks and, having looked, immediately covers her eyes (286-7). She is plainly moved, and her reaction; given that she hides her eyes, might be classifiable as aidos. Theseus, in turn, is moved by his mother’s distress, and attempts to divert her sympathy (286-90,291-2). Aithra, however, obtains leave to speak, and at 296 begins her appeal on the suppliants’ behalf.

Her first point is based on the religious imperative (301-2):

To urge someone not to dishonour the gods amounts to a request to piety. Next, with a passing reference to the time Theseus will win if he helps the Argives (306), she refers to the dangerous precedent which will be set if the Thebans are allowed to maltreat the dead with impunity (306-13). Following her remarks on the importance of pan-Hellenic nomos, however, she proceeds to her third point, which is an argument based on the reputation of the supplicated (314-27), and although she concludes this section with an implication that it is discreditable per se not to help those in need, most of her appeal here is based on the point that others will regard Theseus as a coward if he avoids conflict with the Thebans: people will say that he shirked a fight out of fear and anandria (314-6), and they will belittle his previous exploits if he is found to be a coward in this case (316-9); Aithra even goes so far as to suggest that she would disown him if he were to act in the way she describes (320). This is clearly a much more audacious form of appeal than could be employed by any suppliant, but Aithra has already obtained leave to speak on the grounds of her philia with Theseus, and their kinship gives her greater scope for plain speaking. In essence, however, though not in degree, this appeal to self-regarding aidos based on one’s status as a warrior is of the same kind as that employed by Iolaos in
Aithra appeals, then, to three sanctions, the gods, pan-Hellenic law and popular disapproval, but it is to the latter alone that Theseus' reply addresses itself (337-46):

It is the appeal to self-regarding *aidos* which has found its mark: in particular, the hint that Theseus must live up to his reputation as an Attic Herakles-figure (316-7) and the reference to Aithra's own disapproval are both taken up (340-1, 343-5): the mother clearly knows her son well.

It is important to see that Theseus' expressed motives for accepting the supplication are based entirely on consideration of his own status and reputation, for this is sometimes ignored by those who interpret the play. Kopperschmidt, for example, thinks that the reference in 301 to *tò tòn théôn* is the main point of Aithra's argument and sees Theseus' negative and positive responses as manifestations of a regard for *Polis-Recht* and *Götterrecht* respectively. He recognizes that Theseus gives in out of *aidos* but does not explain what this *aidos* is. Zuntz emphasizes Aithra's appeal to *nomos* and describes her argument as a successful attempt to subject *oiktos* to the test of reason: his paraphrase,

"You cannot avoid the risks involved in succouring the injured; such cowardice would destroy your honour and, at the same time, would be your proper ruin."

blurs the distinction between Aithra's arguments and ignores Theseus' response. Others stress the elements of divine and pan-Hellenic law in Aithra's appeal, but fail to notice that
Theseus himself does not refer to these points. On the other hand, there are those who positively emphasize the appeal to Theseus' fear of being called a coward and its obvious acceptance. Greenwood calls Aithra's remarks about the religious obligation "perfunctory" and writes of Theseus' "vanity". Similarly, Fitton mentions Aithra's appeal to her son's ego and recognizes that he is troubled by public opinion.

Burian attempts to find a middle way, and claims that "the question of Theseus' reputation is ... inseparable from the ethical and political considerations inherent in ... the appeal." This is true, to the extent that Aithra believes that her son will incur disapproval by failing to do that which she regards as pious and proper, but she does not say that it is on these grounds that he will be reproached, but for cowardice, and it is to this argument that he responds. Again, Burian is right to point out that the force of Aithra's religious and legal arguments remains, despite Theseus' lack of response to them and that Theseus actually uses the same arguments against the Theban herald (531-41, 558-9), and it is certainly true that Theseus' earlier dismissal of Adrastos' appeal failed to take account of this, the central aspect of the mothers' supplication. The argument from Pan-Hellenic law is valid, and it can hardly be that it is wrong of Theseus to act in support of this law, but it still remains a problem that he agrees to do so for entirely self-interested reasons.

In the end, we are probably left to rely on a subjective appreciation of the "tone" of Theseus' reply, but an important factor in any judgement of this tone should be the observation that it is in no way inherently discreditable for a hero like Theseus to be concerned for his reputation for valour. It is also worth mentioning that the reputation of which he is proud, based on exploits as chastiser of the kakoi, is likely to have struck the Athenians as an aspect of their national hero with which they had been fami-
liar since childhood. It is unlikely, then, that there is
any irony in the presentation of Theseus at this point, and
if the poet has any purpose in making his response to his
mother's appeal so self-regarding, it will presumably be
that self-interest and the demands of morality and religion
can combine to the same ends.\(^302\)

The early scenes of HF form a suppliant tableau of a super-
ficially familiar kind, Amphitryon, Megara and the children
taking refuge from Lykos at the altar, yet there is no sign
of Herakles, their soter,\(^303\) and they themselves, although
Amphitryon, at least, retains some hope, seem to have little
expectation that he will ever return. Eventually they decide
to abandon their supplication. Their position is also unusu-
al in that their supplication has no object: they take
refuge at an altar, but deliver no appeal, firstly because
their saviour is absent and would, in any case, scarcely
require to be persuaded to save his own family, and secondly
because Lykos is a committed enemy from whom they expect
nothing. No appeal, no plea for aidos: there is nothing in
the play which refers directly to aidos for the gods or for
their suppliants; instead we hear a great deal about Lykos' lack of aidos.

The futility of any appeal to Lykos' aidos is shown by his
own remarks at 165-9: he claims that he is not anaides, but
reveals that he is the sort of person who does not see his
conduct in these terms at all:

\[
\text{ε} \chi \text{ει δὲ τού μὴν οὐκ ἀναίδευτον, γὲνιν,} \\
\text{ἄλλον εὐλαβέων: οὐδὲ γὰρ κατακτῶνων} \\
\text{κρέοτάκ πατέρα τῷ δε καὶ θείοις ἔχων,} \\
\text{οὐκόν τε καθένων τῷ δε τιμωροῦσεν ἐμὶ} \\
\text{χρόνῳ λιπέσθαι, τῷ δεμακτῶν δῖκην.}
\]

These words, commentators point out,\(^304\) reveal Lykos as an
immoralist, a sophistic upholder of the right of the stron-
ger.\(^305\) He is not subject to the claims of morality at all,
but only to the demands of self-interest. In terms of tradi-
tional values, however, he manifestly is anaides, in that he
has no regard for the sanctity of supplication and because
he is able to face his victims and still deny his anaideia.

Megara refers obliquely to his lack of aidos at 299-301:

φεύγειν, οκαίν άνθε, εχθρων χρεών, σοφολεί δ' είκεν και θεαμώνος καλώς.
έκον γα' αίδου δ' υποβαλών φέκ' αν τεμοι.

There is nothing to be gained from submitting oneself to Lykos' aidos because he is stupid and badly brought up. The association of aidos with intelligence is a traditional one, going back to Homer, while its development in the process of education is a recurrent idea in Euripides in particular. With this passage we might compare Hcld. 458-60, again in the context of supplication: here Eurystheus is the skaios:

οκαίν γα' ανθέ. τοίς σοφίτσ τού εύκτον γοβό
εχθρών συνάπτεαν, μη διμεθα γενώται.
Πολλάς γα' αίδους καί δίκης τες αν τύχει.

Here the reference to education is missing, but otherwise the passages are remarkably similar. From both it emerges that the capacity for aidos is dependent on the character (or intelligence) and upbringing of the individual; the correct way to conduct oneself is an object of knowledge and in the process of learning one may acquire aidos, the instinct which distinguishes commendable from discreditable conduct. Since aidos in both passages is seen as something one receives from someone else, it clearly answers to that aidos which acknowledges the status and rights of other people, aidos for the direct recipients of one's actions. The fundamentally social nature of the concept is thus stressed, and it may be assumed that the education which produces aidos consists in the apprehension of the values of society: at the same time, it is clear that aidos has been instilled in those who are sophoi and properly brought up, and so it may also be seen as an integral part of an individual's character, rather than a simple awareness that action x is liable to have the unpleasant consequence of arousing popular disapproval.

The last word on Lykos' anaideia comes at 554-7:

Με. τε δ' ἐσκελπετ' οἶκον ἐστίκαντ' ἐμήν;
Με. βίογ, παθή μὲν ἐκπεσὼν στρεφτ' ἄγχαους.
To use force on others may in itself be *anaideia*, but Lykos' *anaideia* is compounded by his lack of regard for a venerable old man.

There is a supplication scene in *Helen* in which Helen and Menelaos (reluctantly) beg Theonoe to help them in their plan to escape. Their appeal is based on two main arguments, each closely linked to the other, for not only do they appeal to her sense of justice and piety, but they also remind her that the reputation for justice and piety of both herself and her father will be in danger if she ignores their pleas. Helen begins supplication at 894 and begs Theonoe not to tell her brother of the planned escape (-900). She then proceeds to an argument based on the prophetess' reputation - not, however, since she is a woman, and since there is, in any case, no question of her having to enter a situation of conflict in order to protect the suppliants, her reputation for strength, but her reputation for *eusebeia* (900-2):

Helen, then, is urging Theonoe to place moral principle, and her reputation for it, before loyalty to a member of her family. From 903-18 she is concerned with the justice of her case, and contrasts this with Theoklymenos' *bia* (903,908); at 910 she introduces the subject of Theonoe's father, Proteus, mainly in order to convince her that he would have accepted her suit, but also to suggest that the justice of her father sets a standard to which the daughter must aspire. She sums up this part of her argument at 919-23:
As the use of aischron in 922 shows, Helen is attempting to arouse Theonoe's aidos, but her argument, both here and at 900-2, is of a more subtle nature than a simple appeal to concern for one's reputation. There is, however, plainly an element of the latter, in particular in the references to Proteus, which recall the traditional imperative that one should not tarnish the reputation of one's parents, while even in the argument from Theonoe's own special status there may be some idea that to fail to live up to the demands imposed by such status will involve the disapproval of others. Yet there is also, in the appeal to the prophetess' inherited principles, her special relationship with the divine and her own past eusebeia, an unmistakable hint of "self-respect", the idea that, regardless of what others say, Theonoe will be letting herself down if she ignores the claims of justice in favour of those of family loyalty. The family, however, still excercises powerful claims, and it may be as much for the benefit of the audience as for that of Theonoe that Helen goes into such detail on the need to ignore family loyalty in the present instance.

The next section of Helen's speech is an appeal to pity (924-38) and to consideration for her efforts to remain virtuous (note ΤΟΙΔΗΦΟΝ in 932), but she concludes her speech with a final reference to ΤΟΙΔΙΚΑΙΟΝ in association with reputation (940-3):

δος την Χρυση την χηρον μοι τηνδε και μηνου ττοπους
πατρος δικαιον παιοι γαρ κλεος τοδε
κάλλιστον, δεδοι έκ πατρος χρηστον γεγονος
εως τατιν ηλθε τωι τεκονις τωι ττοπους.

Here the element of the appeal to justice for justice's sake is still present, but the appeal to reputation emerges much more clearly with the reference to kleos, and she thus reminds Theonoe directly of the need to live up to the reputation of one's father. Nonetheless, this is not the sole aspect of her remarks on justice and piety, and it is clear that she is also urging Theonoe to remain true to her own principles.
Menelaos' appeal, which is essentially a suppliant appeal even though he does eschew the performance of the ritual self-abasement,\textsuperscript{312} takes its cue from that of his wife, but is much less subtle, and where Helen had suggested that Theonoe had standards, both her own and of her father, to which she should aspire in order to enhance her reputation, Menelaos simply threatens opprobrium: if she thinks it right to save him and heed his just request, let her do so; otherwise she will be revealed as a γυνη ΚΑΚΗ (954-8). He then turns away from Theonoe and speaks directly to Proteus' tomb (959ff.), developing his remarks on the latter's reputation and its relation to that of Theonoe. He is confident (966-8) that she will not allow her father, previously ἐυκλεέστατος, to be badly spoken of (ΚΑΚΗ ΑΚΟΥΕΙ, 968). He returns to the idea of reputation at 973-4, this time urging Hades to "compel" Theonoe to "appear better than her pious father." As in 958, the use of the verb phainomai reveals that Menelaos' concern is exclusively for the outward appearance of morality, although it must be granted that he also believes that his appeal is just (955). Thereafter, he simply resorts to threats, firstly to fight Theoklymenos (975-9), secondly to pollute the tomb of Proteus by killing first Helen, then himself over it (980-7): this would be not only a miasma but a source of reproach to the honour of the tomb's inhabitant (987).\textsuperscript{313}

Theonoe's reply shows that she has taken the arguments of both husband and wife to heart (998-1004):

Here the ideas that it is part of the prophetess' nature to do what is right and that her reputation and that of her father will suffer if she does not are given equal weight. The sense of line 998 is clearly that Theonoe has a positive
desire to act in accordance with principles which have become deeply internalized in her nature: von Erffa\textsuperscript{314} is therefore right to compare Il.6.442-4,\textsuperscript{315} where Hektor explains that it is not simply the desire to conform which drives him to the field of battle, but an active desire rooted in his essential nature and developed by a process of education. Theonoe, however, has the terminology of the late fifth century at her disposal, and thus identifies her motives in a more analytical fashion than does Hektor: in essential details, however, the responses of the two characters do not differ widely.

Line 998 is one syntactical unit, the two finite verbs coordinated by τε and καί: the same structure is used in 999-1000, ἄριστον ... Μηλέμαν, but the question remains whether ἄριστον τ' ἠμαυτίῳ is to be taken in sense with the reaction based on internalized principles, as expressed in 998, or with the response to the possibility of loss of reputation in 999-1001.\textsuperscript{316} On the face of it, it seems equally possible that the phrase could refer either to self-respect in the sense of living up to one's own principles or to the wish to protect oneself against the taunts of others: one wonders, however, whether the two are really separable in this case; Theonoe is clearly concerned both to be true to herself and to avoid reproach, and it may be that her philautia does not refer exclusively to one or the other, but contains elements of both and is therefore transitional between ἄριστον ... βούλομαι and καί κλέος ... ἱκνήσωμεν. That said, the self-regarding impulse to love oneself is clearly a positive thing here,\textsuperscript{317} and thus Kannicht is manifestly right to relate it to Aristotle's discussion of proper philautia at EN 1168b.25ff., whether it does encompass concern for reputation or not. In that the expression ἄριστον τ' ἠμαυτίῳ probably does contain a reference to the desire to be true to one's own principles, and thus to the justification of one's conduct in terms of one's own personal conscience, von Erffa\textsuperscript{318} may be right to relate the passage to Demokritos B264 etc., but if philautia in this passage does contain an element of self-protection against the criticisms of others, and given that philein and
aideiathai differ in meaning, the possibility remains that
φιλον εαυτων should not be entirely equated with ριδεισθαι
εαυτων. 319

It must, however, still be the case that Theonoe is subject
to aidos in this passage: her concern for her own kleos and
for that of her father alone shows that, and since this con-
cern for reputation is virtually inseparable from her wish
to be true to her physis and to the temple of dike which is
there sited, 320 we should be prepared to find a rôle for
aidos in this part of her reaction, too. The reference to
the temple of dike in her physis is, in fact, of the greatest
importance, for, as Stebler says, 321 the expression is noth-
ing less than an acknowledgement of the location of the
individual's standard of justice in his own personal moral
conscience. In rejecting the course which conflicts with the
dictates of her conscience, then, it is likely that Theonoe
is subject to aidos, since aidos is the instinct which
rejects wrong conduct, whatever the arbiter of right and
wrong may be.

In the Orestes, Orestes and Elektra imagine that the coming
of Menelaos will be their salvation. When the former and
Menelaos meet face to face supplication takes place (begin-
nning 382-4), and Orestes refers in particular to the
charis Menelaos owed his father, and now owes him (453,646-
64), and to the philia which exists between them (665-9,674).
Failure to respond to either of these arguments might be
regarded as lack of aidos. Menelaos, in turn, indicates that
he is moved by the supplication (682-3):
'Ορέστ', εγώ τι τίν κατειδούμενι κάκη
cαι εμπονηθεί τοῖς Κακοῖς ψωλομεν.
The verb κατειδούμενι here seems simply to refer to the
proper response to the supplicant, the granting of the respect
he deserves. Menelaos goes on, however, to qualify his sup-
port for his nephew, and Orestes, unconvinced of his sincer-
ity, reacts angrily (717-24). As a result, there comes to be
a state of enmity between the two (1102), and Menelaos' rôle
changes from that of soter to that of echthros. 322
we saw already how in the IA Achilles, as a properly brought up young nobleman, was particularly susceptible to aidos. Klytaimestra, who praises his aidos as sophrosyne at 824, also recognizes this aspect of his character, and in the supplication scene between the two she attempts to exploit his sense of aidos in order to elicit his support for Iphigeneia against Agamemnon and the rest of the Greeks. At 897-9 Achilles is disturbed by the Old Man's report, feeling he has been abused by Agamemnon, and Klytaimestra encourages him in his sense of grievance:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Ach.} & \quad \text{εἴληνων οὔταν ἀθλήκων εἳ, τὸ δ' ἐμὸν ὡς φαύλως φέρω.} \\
\text{Kly.} & \quad \text{παῖδᾶ μεν κατακτῶν μοῖς δολῆσετε γάμης.
}
\end{align*}
\]

Achilles, then, is already worried about his position, while Klytaimestra encourages the identification of his troubles with those of Iphigeneia. At 900-2 she declares that she feels no aidos at supplicating Achilles (subtly reminding him of his superiority on the basis of his divine descent at 901), and begins her appeal at 903, combining a plea for pity with an argument that, on account of the bogus marriage which was mooted between Achilles and Iphigeneia, there now exists a kind of philia between them which means that it would be discreditable for him to abandon her (906-8):

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{ἐὰν δ' ὄνειδος ἐξεταὶ,} \\
\text{ἀρτις οὐκ ἁμαρτᾶς ὑμῖν γὰρ ὡς μὴ γέμων ἡμῖν ἐξουσίας,} \\
\text{ἀλλ' ἐκλήθης γοῦν τελαίνης παθέναις φίλος πόσις.
}
\end{align*}
\]

Klytaimestra, however, probably recognizes that this application of the topos of philia is somewhat tenuous, and so she tries other arguments. She mentions Achilles' onoma at 910, and claims that because his name has ruined her, he must now come to her aid. Again she claims that Achilles is under an obligation to her, and again her claim is tenuous. Thus the body of her appeal is a request for pity (903,911-6).

Achilles is not oblivious to the appeal for pity (932,942-3), but he says much more about his good name and its misuse by Agamemnon. He is, in fact, convinced by Klytaimestra's point that his onoma is partly to blame for Iphigeneia's plight (938-9,941,947), and he is deeply resentful that he has been
used: from 954 it seems that he believes the honour of his homeland is at stake if he does not resist such treatment at the hands of Agamemnon. At many points, however, he does show an appreciation of the issues involved: we have already noted his sympathy for Klytaimestra and her daughter, and at 928-9, where he says that he will obey the Atreidai if they "think ροάλον" but will not if they do not, it seems to be implied that the plan to sacrifice Iphigeneia is not kalon. Again, at 940-3 his statement that he would consider himself defiled should he be the unwilling agent of Iphigeneia's ruin seems to indicate a certain revulsion for the plan. At 959-69, however, he gives himself away: he has no desire for marriage with the girl, but resents the hybris Agamemnon has perpetrated against him (959-61); Agamemnon should have asked for permission to use his onoma (962), in which case he would gladly have participated in the deception of Klytaimestra and the sacrifice of Iphigeneia (963-7); as it is, however, his permission was not asked and so he feels that he has been treated as a nobody by his commanders (968-9). There are elements in Achilles' speech, like his discursive prooimion (919-31) and his aside that "myriad girls"seek him as their husband (959-60), which, though they seem to us to indicate pomposity and narcissism, we might play down out of deference to the rhetorical nature of Euripides' speeches and the millenia of cultural change which separate. Euripides' world from ours, but surely in lines 959-69 Achilles reveals that he is totally absorbed in himself and his fame, to the exclusion of any other external moral consideration?

This picture of Achilles, with his proclivity to resent any and every insult to his time is clearly based on the Homeric model, although the Achilles of the Iliad, unlike his counterpart here (964), would never resort to deceit (Iliad 9.312-3). Nevertheless, Achilles' resentment here is a recognizably traditional response, perhaps aidos, but more probably resentment (nemesis) at another's breach of aidos in failing to accord him the time he deserves. The heroic response, however, does emerge in a rather shabby light at this particular point of the play.
In his treatment of supplication in different plays Euripides explores a whole range of motivation: some characters are convinced by the moral and religious arguments, but more often an appeal to some other sanction is more effective; these appeals may take the form of a reference to some tie of kinship, friendship or charis which it is aischron for the supplicated to ignore, or they may be more directly addressed to the supplicated's concern for his or her reputation, whether it is the reputation for strength or the reputation for altruism. The question of the character of the self-regarding response is further complicated by the fact that some who respond to the reminder of others' disapproval seem to be presented favourably while others do not: as often in Euripides, there is little room for absolutes.

Like hiketeia, xenia is an institution by means of which outsiders are brought within the group and thus within the range of privileges to which philoi are normally entitled: accordingly, strangers and guests are felt particularly to deserve aidos. Since the Cyclops is based on the encounter of Odysseus with Polyphemos in Od. 9, it is no surprise that the prominence of xenia in the latter is reflected in the former. In both places Polyphemos' maltreatment of strangers is seen as an extreme of anaideia: the Cyclops' throat is anaides at Cyc. 592, and his cannibalism anaischuntos at 416. Contempt for the laws of xenia, however, is also contempt for the gods, and so Polyphemos and his activities are also described as dussebes or anosios (30-1, 289, 310-1).

In Alcestis, too, much of the action is motivated in terms of the relationship of xenia which exists between Admetos and Herakles (itself a doublet of the similar relationship between Admetos and Apollo which is the source of the peculiar situation from which the play proceeds). At line 542 Herakles seems to express his unwillingness to intrude on his host's grief in terms of aidos:

\[ \alpha i r x e \alpha i t \pi e r k \kappa l a i o w t o \theta o i v a t a \varepsilon \eta o u s . \]

Aischron here refers to Herakles' feeling that it would be inappropriate for him to be entertained in a house which is
in mourning. For hospitality to take its proper form, it seems, both parties must be committed to its enjoyment, while Herakles' aídos at putting one who has troubles of his own to further trouble seems to be the converse of that desire not to involve others in one's own problems which we noted at HF.1162 and 1200, Or.280-2 and IA.981-2. Aídos, it seems, can lead to respect for another's privacy, whether by leaving him to cope with his own grief or by refusing to implicate him in one's own problems. For the reference to inappropriateness in Herakles' use of aischron, we might compare the Theognidean passage (627-8) in which it is said to be aischron for the company of the sober to be infiltrated by a drunk (and vice-versa): there, as here, the reference is to the inequality of mood of the two parties and to the general idea that such inequality is offensive to good taste.

Admetos, however, refuses to let Herakles depart, and in this he, too, is influenced by ideas of appropriateness and good manners. Where, however, Herakles, from the position of one wishing to avoid hospitality, stressed the inappropriateness of the presence of a guest at a time of mourning, Admetos, wishing to fulfil the obligations of xenia, stresses the impropriety of troubling a guest with one's own grief (549-50):

\[ \text{ou } πρέπει θεωρομένος } \\
\text{κλέειν στεναγμών οὐδὲ λυπεῖσθαι γένος. } \\
\]

Both Herakles and Admetos, then, react in accordance with a system of politeness which prompts them to consider both the awkwardness of the situation and the position of the other person.

The chorus-leader, after Herakles has been led inside, agrees with his judgement that it is inappropriate for Admetos to think of entertaining a guest in his present condition (551-2):

\[ \text{τι σις; τυχαίης συμφορᾶς περικυμένης, } \\
\text{ Ἀδμητε, τιμῆς ξενοδοχείν; τι μύρος ἔε; } \\
\]

Admetos' reply makes clear what his use of \text{ou πρέπει in 549} suggested, that in insisting that Herakles remain he is
motivated by *aidos*. His grief would not have lessened had he turned his guest away, but he would have lost a friend (553-6), and to add to his other troubles he would have to suffer the ignominy of being considered inhospitable (557-8):

\[
\text{καὶ πρὸς κακοῖν ἀλλο τοῦτο ἀν ὑν κακῖν, δῷμος καλεῖθε τοὺς ἐμοὺς ἐθεοφένοις.}
\]

He believes, then, that the *kleos* of his house would suffer if he turned away a guest: a network of guest-friends, moreover, is a useful thing, while Herakles himself is *aristos*, and thus a tie of *xenia* with him reflects well upon Admetos (559-60). Admetos is thus clearly concerned with his reputation, but his response is not a simple calculation of the consequences of his actions for himself in terms of the judgement of others. Herakles, in fact, showed no sign that he would be offended if he were not accorded hospitality, but rather gave evidence of his sympathy for the position of his friend, and even said that he would be grateful if he were allowed to depart (544). Admetos, of course, could not be certain of what Herakles might say in the future, or of how other people, especially those with malicious intent, might react to his report, yet it nevertheless seems true that Admetos' concern for his reputation also embraces a commitment to do what he believes to be right, and is not a simple fear of criticism.

This emerges more clearly as the episode draws to a close: the chorus-leader accepts that Admetos is motivated by concern for Herakles as a *philos*, yet implies that since he is a *philos*, Admetos should not have deceived him (561-2). Admetos, however, sees the situation entirely differently: Herakles is a *philos*, and so he must deceive him to ensure that he does not leave (563-4). Herakles would not approve of his conduct, and would therefore not accept his hospitality (565-6). For Admetos, however, this would be unthinkable (566-7):

\[
\text{τὰ μὲν δ’ οὐκ ἔπισταται μέλαθεν ἀπωθεῖν οὐ δ’ ἀτριγέλεν ἔγονος.}
\]

For Admetos, then, the requirement to accord hospitality is one which must be obeyed no matter what the circumstances.
It is certainly clear that in doing that which he believes to be right he is also doing that which is generally thought commendable, but the two ideas are scarcely separable at all, and it would be wrong to claim that Admetos is simply trying to maximize his reputation.

Despite the initial criticisms of their spokesman, the chorus recognize that Admetos' attitude is essentially a noble one. They immediately sing a song on the theme of philoxenia, of which the final stanza is a direct appreciation of Admetos' conduct in the present situation (597-601):

Admetos' aidos, which motivated his reception of his guest, is thus a product of his eugeneia, whether this be moral or social: aidos is also, they go on, a mark of the agathos, who is commended for his sophia. These associations of aidos with good birth, arete and good sense are traditional, but in this case we have no way of knowing how far they might be influenced by sophistic consideration of the interaction between arete, knowledge and aidos.

At 821 Herakles discovers the truth about the death of Alkestis and is astonished that Admetos should have ventured to entertain him in spite of his grief. The Servant, however, explains Admetos' action in terms of aidos -

and, since aidos for a guest is generally a commendable response, Herakles sympathizes. More importantly, however, he is so impressed by the strength of Admetos' philoxenia that he feels himself under an obligation to return the favour (charis, 842). At 855 he explains his determination to return Alkestis to the man,
Admetos has honoured Herakles, and Herakles wishes to honour Admetos, and just as Admetos saw it as a matter of his own honour not to dishonour his guest, so Herakles is determined, as a matter of honour, to prove himself a worthy recipient of his host's aidos. Clearly, then, in a reciprocal relationship of this kind concern for one's own honour and regard for that of the recipient of one's actions go hand in hand.

One of the messages of Alcestis seems to be that xenia, and so aidos for one's xenoi, is a boon which brings rewards: thus Herakles' advice to his friend on departure (1147-8):

καὶ δίκαιος ἤν τὸ λοιπὸν, ἡμετέροις, εὔσεβεῖς περὶ δένους.

Admetos' aidos, then, also makes him dikaios and eusebes. Ultimately, his aidos for guests has been his salvation, but even here there is a note of ambivalence, for, just as Admetos' philoxenia towards Herakles led the latter to perform a act of charis which was most welcome, so his earlier entertainment of Apollo brought him a charis which proved to be no charis at all. Nonetheless, it remains true that his aidos for xenoi is positively valued, and this surely means that it is so in both its self-regarding aspect and in that element which is based on principle.

Xenia is also prominent in Hecuba, where Polymestor has killed a xenos, Hekabe's son, Polydoros, by deceit and for motives of greed. Thus in her supplication of Agamemnon Hekabe lays emphasis on the fact that Polymestor's crime is aischron (806). This judgement is shared by the chorus-leader at 1086, and by Agamemnon himself at 1247-8, where he tells Polymestor,

τάχ' οὖν περὶ υἱὸν Σιδῶν ζενοκτόνων.

As in the case of Herodotos, Agamemnon's acquaintance with comparative ethnography makes him aware that nomoi may be
relative to the peoples who profess them, and thus that standards of aischron may not be absolute, yet he still believes that each people's nomoi are valid for themselves. As an indication of the range of terms which might be employed to denote the proper attitude to xenia we might notice Hekabe's denunciation of Polymestor at 1234-5 as being neither eusebes, pistos, hosios nor dikaios. All these terms, then, may describe an attitude to which aidos is central.

At IT. 947-54 Orestes tells his sister how, when he first went to Athens for purification, no xenos would accept him on account of his pollution. He goes on, however, to explain how oj l' hovering (949) did eventually accord him hospitality, but although they admitted him to their houses, they would not allow him into their company. The aidos of these people, then, must have a strong altruistic aspect, since they presumably have no need to fear the disapproval of their fellows who refused to have anything to do with the matricide. Their aidos must, then, spring from their own beliefs of what is right and from the sympathy they feel for the unfortunate, if they endanger themselves by taking a polluted person under their roof: the idea of aidos thus seems close to that of pity here. Orestes himself seems subject to the aidos proper among xenoi when, at 955-6, he explains how, because he did not think it right (ov ((A)) to show up (Ito & ) his hosts, he endured his pain in silence and pretended not to notice that he was being kept away from everyone else.

At Ba. 441-2 Pentheus' servant, detailed to recapture the Stranger, describes his aidos at being forced to bind a man who offers no resistance and who is, besides, a xenos: 

\[ \text{kavy } di' aidos eitov. o) gev', oyx ekav } \]

The servant clearly does not want the stranger to think badly of him, and thus there will be an element of embarrassment to his aidos, but he would not feel such aidos at all if he did not feel that what he was doing was wrong.
At Rhesus 841-2 two breaches of guest-friendship are compared. The Charioteer, believing that Hektor has treacherously killed Rhesos, claims,

εὑρετέτεσθαιν Πάρις
ζευκόν κατῆχουν τ' ἐν συμμακάους κτανύν.

It may be true that the murder of an ally is more serious than the abduction of a host's wife, but the Charioteer is essentially the aggrieved party here, and we should not take his remarks as a literal indication of any real hierarchy of offences.

We have seen (for example in the passage from IT just cited) that in some cases the altruistic aspect of aidos, as simple concern for another human being, can come quite obviously to the fore, while in many other passages it may well co-exist with more self-regarding concerns. At this point I should like to consider a number of other passages in which, it seems to me, the altruistic aspect dominates. At Hec. 515 Hekabe asks Talthybios whether the Greeks sacrificed Polyxena αἰδοίμενοι, or whether she had to endure the indignity of being treated as an enemy in death (516-7). This question may contain a veiled reference to Polyxena's status as a virgin, and thus the aidos about which Hekabe enquires may contain an element of inhibition with regard to sex and female nakedness, but even so it must also refer fundamentally to respect for Polyxena's person, whether that respect is based on her virginity or simply on her pitiable condition.

The reaction envisaged in the last passage is more clearly evident in the Talthybios of Troades. At 717 he speaks of his uncertainty as to how he might best break the news of the decision to kill Polyxena to Hekabe, and she interprets his apprehension as aidos (718):

ἐπηγένεις καὶ ὁ, πλὴν ἐὰν λέγησ κακέ.

This aidos can hardly be anything but the desire to spare another's feelings, and it is to this kind of aidos that the herald himself refers at 786-9, where he laments his own unsuitability to be the bearer of such tidings:
To deliver news which will cause suffering to another person takes not only a lack of pity but a lack of *aidos*. There may be a number of reasons as to why *aidos* should be used in this context: firstly, it is a traditional use of the term to apply it to a positive regard for the recipient of one's actions; secondly, this kind of *aidos* may be related to the desire to avoid the disapproval of the recipient of one's actions (although this concern is scarcely evident here); thirdly, individuals may simply feel that it is not right to inflict suffering on others, and so experience *aidos* when forced to do so; and fourthly, popular usage may have given *aidos* overtones of "pity" or "compassion".

In this connexion Hcl’d. 1027 may be relevant: Eurystheus says that Athens experienced *aidos* at the prospect of putting him to death (*κατγεβόη κτενεῖν*), and while this may simply mean that the Athenians felt it inappropriate to kill him, the usage may also foreshadow the use of *aidesis* as a technical term in Athenian law for clemency.

It will readily be seen that *aidos* is an important concept in Euripides, and on occasion, indeed, this importance is acknowledged by certain of his characters: Medea calls anaideia "the greatest of all ills among men" at Med. 471-2, while in fr. 436N2, from the first *Hippolytus*, Hippolytos apostrophizes *aidos* and expresses a wish that its power were universal. Similarly, a lamentable lack of regard for conventional morality can, as it was in Hesiod and Theognis, be seen in terms of the departure of *aidos*: this, as we noticed already, is the case in Med. 439-40, and the same idea recurs at IΑ. 1089-97:
The chorus are commenting directly on Agamemnon’s desire to sacrifice his daughter, and thus the context is one of a breach of philia: aidos, as is common, is the impulse which leads one to observe one’s duty to one’s philoi, while so to do is seen as arete; from Homer on we have seen that the obligation to show loyalty to one’s philoi is a powerful one, but whereas this imperative is often linked to competitive virtue, such an explicit association of arete with aidos for one’s philoi is rare; arete in this passage, moreover, is quite clearly not competitive, but co-operative, since its absence leads to disregard for nomoi; this is not, then, a case of the promotion of co-operation with reference to competitive standards. Arete, then, consists of respect for one’s philoi and for law and custom, and is promoted by aidos, which is the instinct which makes one susceptible to the claims of law and custom. Both arete and aidos, moreover, are contrasted with τι ἄρεττον, and this suggests that aideisthai and sebein may still overlap to a large extent, particularly in cases in which asebeia etc. denote general wrongdoing. Here, however, while τι ἄρεττον obviously does, by virtue of its association with anomia, have a general application, mention of divine phthonos in 1097 also suggests the more particular sense of respect for the gods as guarantors of human standards. Mention of the gods, in turn, contributes to the traditional and conventional tone of the passage, and this suggests that the sentiments expressed would not be considered novel or unusual by the original audience.

Aidos is also associated with arete in an earlier ode in the same play: at 558-72 the chorus sing:

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διάφοροι δὲ φύτες βέοτών,
διάφοροι δὲ τέσσερ’ θέσις ἐσθόλων σκέφτες αἰτεῖ.
Τεσσαρ’ θ’, αἱ παλασφίαιναι
μεγά φέροντ’ ἐσ τὰν ἄρεταν.
Τὸ τὲ γὰρ αἰδεισθαί σοφία,
The similarity of this stanza to the argument of Protagoras in Plato's dialogue is striking, and it is very likely that both this passage and the parts of the dialogue in which Protagoras propounds his own views are based on the opinions of the historical Protagoras. Allowance is made for innate capacity (558-9, cf. Prot. 327b-c), but education is said to be the chief factor in the production of arete. The connexion in thought between lines 562-3 is rather elliptical, but the γαλ clearly implies that aidos is instilled through education and that it contributes to arete: aidos here has its traditional association with both intelligence and reputation, and the point is clearly made that the course dictated by duty is also that which brings good reputation; aidos which is felt at the prospect of the commission of an act which one's education has taught one to regard as wrong is, therefore, to be seen as complementary to that which fears loss of reputation; concern for what people say, then, is not incompatible with conscience.

This association of aidos with education is not new: it is apparent, for example, in Thgn. 409-10 (where there is also an association with arete) and in Il. 6.441-6, where Hektor explains that he is unable to remain within the walls of Troy both because he feels aidos at the prospect of reproach and because he has learned to be brave and so cannot bring himself to behave otherwise. Passages like these seem to recognize the truth that any sense of shame (or guilt) will be acquired in the process of socialization, as one learns what is expected of one by society, and naturally, as thinkers come to speculate on the origins of moral values and the nature of the impulse to be moral, we find that the
link between *aidos*, education and knowledge, a link which has a long history, begins to be explored in a more systematic manner. Thus there are several passages in Euripides in which the explicit association of *aidos* with education reveals the influence of sophistic, and perhaps particularly Protagorean, thought.

We have already looked at HF.299-301, where *aidos* is seen as a quality of those who are wise and well-brought up. There, as in the IA passage, *aidos* is seen as the impulse which promotes co-operative behaviour: at Supp.909-17, the conclusion to Adrastos' Funeral Speech, *aidos*, treated as synonymous with *aischune*, is related to competitive *arete*, and thus the education mentioned in this passage bears comparison with that of Hektor in the passage from Iliad 6:

\[
\text{έκ τωνδὲ μὴ θαύμαστε τῶν εἰσχρών, θητεύ, πρὸ πολέμου τωδὲ ταληκεῖ θαυμῖν.}
\]

\[
\text{Τὸ γὰρ τρέψαντα μὴ κακῶς ἄιδον φέρει: αἰνεχὺνετο δὲ τὰ γάθα: ἥκισσας ἄνθρωπον, κακὸς γενέθαι πῶς τις, ἢ δ' εκυπερέα δίδακτον, εἴπερ καὶ βέβηγος διδακτεῖται λέγων ἀκούειν θ' ἂν μάθηςν αὐτῷ ἄξοι. Αὐτῷ ἂν μάθη τις, ταύτα εἰσδέθη πιθήκ}\\ 
\]

Again, there are similarities with the "Great Speech" of the Protagoras (cf., for example, 914-5 with Prot.327e), and, while the passage deals only with *euandria*, a synonym for *arete* in its narrow, competitive sense, it is surely also implied that other *aretai*, or *arete* in general, are teachable, and this is Protagoras' essential position in Plato's dialogue. Similar ideas are expressed in similar language in fr.1027N, although the application in that passage is somewhat wider:

\[
\text{Τὰς ὡς ἑνὶ φυλάσσει περιγράμμων αἰσχρῶν ἄποι. ὡς ὑν ὑπαθής τις μὴ κακῶς, καίρουνεται ἄνθρωπος, ἱκονευοντας αἰσχρὰ δεῖν. νέος δ' ὀτκ ἐκχλα ἐγκρίνεται, τὴν ἀμαρτίαν ἐξελεῖ. εἰς ὑμέας αὐτῶν τῶν τροποίν ἐμφατών.}
\]

An interesting aspect of this passage is the statement that...
habits learned in youth can become part of the adult's physis, which implies that upbringing can develop, or even create one's physis. The question of nomos or physis, heredity or environment/upbringing is also raised at Hec. 599-602, where the statement that one who has been able to discern to kallion by means of the standard of to kallion implies that aidos, the instinct in one which responds to the prospect of to kallion, is instilled in the process of education. All the passages cited, then, suggest that aidos is developed in the course of one's upbringing or education, and this indicates a belief that aidos, the fully-developed ability to discriminate between right and wrong, aischron and kallon, is not present in the individual but exists: thus Hippolytos, who rejects education yet values aidos, is an isolated figure in Euripides in his belief that aidos and sophrosyne can be innate.

It seems fitting to conclude this chapter with a selection of passages which stress the importance of aidos, for in Euripides aidos has a degree of prominence it has not enjoyed since Homer. Aidos is still active in most of the areas in which we observed its function in Homer, although aischunomai is now more common than aideisthai, while in the sense of "respect for the recipient of one's actions" sebein etc. retain most of the ground they captured from aideisthai somewhere between Homer and Aeschylus. In most, if not all, contexts, however, aischunomai and aideisthai are synonymous, while there does still exist a degree of overlap between aideisthai and sebein.

NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE.
1. Since τούς κλήνους αίδεψεις is so clearly parallel to the Homeric reaction, I do not see why von Erffa (p.142) finds it necessary to claim that in this passage "the positive force of aidos is lost." Aidos is inhibitory, and so "negative" in Homer: see p.95n.2 above.
2. Cf. von Erffa, ibid.

5. The *aidos* which is lacking in Eurystheus' failure to *μισείν* *τιλέων*, based as it is on one's own awareness of the duty inherent in one's status, is thus similar to that experienced by Sophokles' Neoptolemos (above, pp.257-62), behind which there may also be a Demokritean influence.


7. Cf. p.262 above.

7a. It is, however, accepted by Kannicht on *Helen* 415-7, Solmsen, *Hermes* 1973, p.423 and Harder in her commentary on *Cres*. fr.457N² (p.149).


9. Noted by Barrett, ibid..


11. On its dating, see Lesky, *Greek Tragic Poetry*, p.256.

12. See pp.25-9,38 etc. above.

13. For von Erffa, however, "Der Zuruf *μισείς* ist positiv, die Mahnung *οὐκ ἀείκρινετ' αἰκονύνει* negativ" (p.142). See n.1.

14. For the idea that it is discreditable for women to take the initiative over men, cf. *El*.932-3, where Elektra claims that it is *aischiron* that a woman should be in charge of a house rather than a man: for the idea that it is *aischiron* for men physically to be worsted by women, cf. *Ba*.798-9.

15. Cf. pp.33 and 97-8 (n.40) above.


17. At 531-2 Iokaste asks Eteokles why he worships Philotimia, the "worst of divinities", while at 506 Eteokles himself claims that he holds *Tyrannis* the greatest of gods. To these two "deities" Iokaste opposes *Isotes* at 536 and 542: it is tempting to see an echo of the opposition of *Aidos* and *Dike* in *OC* (pp.220-1 above).

18. p.158.

18a. p.316 below.


20. This is "non-sceptical relativism": see Nill, p.29 and cf. *Dissoi Logoi* 2.2-8 (below, pp.568-70).

22. Cf. fr. 829N².
23. On aidophron, cf. p. 215 (with n. 25) above: in the present passage it is notable that Admetos associates aídos with the response to another's time; to be aidophron is not to atimazein the object of one's aídos; cf. above, pp. 48-55, on the association of aídos and time.
25. On the theme of the philia of Admetos and Alkestis, cf. below, pp. 352-4. Lombard, Acta Classica 1985, p. 11n. 34, correctly points out that, in 694-6, Admetos' anaideia properly consists in his attempt to avoid death, rather than in his "murder" of his wife (against von Erffa, p. 133): since, however, his attempt to avoid death culminated in his allowing his wife to die, it seems pedantic to deny that his anaideia might also cover lack of respect for a philia. The wider aspects of Lombard's discussion of this passage also merit some discussion. On p. 9 of his article he writes:

"Thus ἐνίμβη implies that the pleasure Admetos derived from life should have instilled in him ἀνίμη, i.e. an 'inhibition' preventing him from expecting others to die in his stead. Here at last we have a negative form of ἀνίμη censuring the absence of the inner restraint demanded by Democritus [in B264DK etc.] as the measure defining and limiting the action of man. ... the inner force of ἀνίμη is enhanced by the technique of juxtaposition and contrast ... [which] ... emphasizes the contrast between Admetos' pre-eminent observance of ἀνίμη in the context of social conventions and his ἀνειδεῖα on the existential level."

While I agree that the aídos whose absence is criticized in 694-6 should have prevented Admetos' expecting others to die in his stead, I cannot see why Lombard should relate this particular instance to Demokritos' ἐνευτῇ αἰδὲνθει or why he seems to imagine that negative aídos is rare. In using anaídos of Admetos' determination to avoid death Pheres is referring to his son's concern for himself to the exclusion of all others, and such disregard for the claims of other people is a recognizably traditional form of anaideia (cf.,
for example, pp. 52-4 above, and 349-51 below). I should not deny that this form of \textit{anaideia} involves an "absence of inner restraint", but would point out that inner restraint is also necessary in the "observance of \textit{aistros} in the context of social conventions". Lombard's attempt to relate this passage specifically to Demokritos is rather strained.

27. See Bond, ad loc., and Adkins, \textit{CQ} 1966, p. 211.
28. See Bond, ad loc..

29. Megara's argument here is, however, somewhat illogical: she says that Herakles would be unwilling to save his children once they had acquired a \textit{pòs} \textit{kakía}. On her own reasoning, however, such a \textit{doxa} is to result from the children's death, and it is difficult to see how H. could save them then. One wonders whether the audience is expected to notice this: is it, perhaps, a hint of an irrational aspect to her pessimism?

30. This maxim is obviously based on traditional ideas of the community of honour within the family: for instances of the disgrace of one member of the family affecting the others, cf. \textit{Hel.} 134-6, 200-2, 686-7, 720-1, \textit{El.} 47-9, 1154. Related is the idea that children should live up to the reputation of their parents, \textit{El.} 336-8, \textit{Ion} 735-7, \textit{Or.} 1169-71, \textit{Ba.} 265, \textit{IA.} 505.

31. In fr. 460N\textsuperscript{2} it is seen as inevitable that one's enemies will mock one's misfortunes.


33. Cf. p. 17 above (and p. 256 on \textit{S. Phil.} 842).

34. Collard (ad loc.) compares \textit{HF.} 1233-4; see also Stebler, p. 75.

35. Fr. 32W (pp. 132-4 above).


37. See Murray, \textit{Euripides and his Age}, p. 97.

38. Adkins, loc. cit..

39. 6.418-9, 24.571-90. So, too, the Odysseus of \textit{S. Ajax}, whose humanity is his chief characteristic, wishes to take part in the burial of his erstwhile enemy (above, p. 236).

40. On all these passages, see above, pp. 176-82, 244, 246-8.

41. Tyrwhitt's \textit{qoi} for \textit{qoi} in 902 would make the corres-
pondence closer (cf. also P.O.8.55) and may well be right, although the MS text can certainly stand.

42. As, indeed, is suggested by her choice of the pejorative term *hubrizein* in itself. For the idea that one should not insult the dead, cf. *Od*.22.412-3, *A.Ag*.1612, *S.Ai*. passim (pp.224-36 above) etc.. Elektra's scruple in this respect is evidently not shared by her brother, who in 896-9 contemplates with equanimity the mutilation of Aigisthos' body.

43. Cf. Telemachos in the *Odyssey* (pp.55-6 above) and Achilles in *IA* (pp.326-9,382-3 below). Hippolytros is also comparable, although his *aidos* is of a rather more individual kind (cf. pp.334-5 below).

44. 636-7 also deserves a mention: Ion says that it is "unbearable" to have to give way to one's inferiors in the street; to do this willingly would probably be a mark of respect (as is giving up one's seat to another at *Tyrt*.12.41-2W and *Ar.Clouds* 993 (p.130 above)) and a recognition of the other person's *time*. Ion's concern for his own *time*, however, is so intense that he is unwilling to allow himself to appear to be on a par with those he considers his inferiors. Devereux, *The Character of the Euripidean Hippolytros*, p.14, compares Ion's "narcissism" with that of other Euripidean characters.

45. 1074-5, ἁγνός τοῦ πολὺν θεὸν ... is explained by Wilamowitz (ad loc.) as the chorus' reaction to the thought of a non-Athenian taking part in the Eleusinian procession; they assume that the god (Iakchos, see Owen's n. ad loc.) shares their hostility.

46. With these passages cf. *S.OT*.1078-9, p.211 above.

47. For *esthlos* in 856 does not mean "good at being a slave".

48. Cf. above, 139-40.

49. Cf. *IA*.858 and Eumaios' concern for his honour at *Od*.14. 38 (pp.23 and 60 above).


51. She also refers (974-5) to the *nomos* that women should not look directly at men. Diggle would delete these lines, presumably because the commonplace seems somewhat extraneous here, but it could be that Hekabe simply adds one further
excuse to explain her inability to look her victim in the face.

52. See Grube, Drama, p.303.
53. Page's emendation, ιηξηνερα for ινεινερα, is quoted with approval by Denniston (ad loc.) and accepted by Diggle.
54. Sheppard, CR 1918, 137-41, shows how the motifs of eusebeia and sophrosyne, applied in Cho. and S.El. with reference to Elektra (cf.pp.246-8 above, with nn.), have been transferred in this play to the Farmer.
55. On this passage, see Adkins, MR, p.177; on the traditional equation of moral virtue and social standing, cf. Denniston on El.253.
56. There may even be a further twist, in that anyone in the audience who wishes to has the opportunity to regard the Farmer's moral eugeneia as a product of his atavistic social eugeneia. E. may well be teasing his audience, or a section of it, here.
57. Since της τυχης in 417 is presumably an objective genitive, the phrase will correspond to a retrospective usage of aideomai with an impersonal object, although not to an instance of aidos as shame over one's own conduct, since Menelaos is manifestly not ashamed at what he has done, but embarrassed at his sufferings; cf. von Erffa, p.159 and below, p.311); for aischune in a similar sense (although encompassing shame at one's own actions), cf. S.El.616 (p.244 above). Kannicht's note on Hel.415-7 accepts Barrett's explanation of the history of aideomai and aischunomai, and this leads him to claim that ιηξηνερα in this passage has "taken over" the "original" sense of aideomai, while εισεφοη represents the use of aideomai in the sense which originally belonged to aischunomai. This is mistaken: cf. p.285 above.
58. Cf. p.65 above.
60. Cf. p.187 above.
61. Cf. Grube, Drama, p.193 (on semnos etc. in Hipp.).
62. p.288 above.
63. For this competitive aspect of what is essentially a cooperative relationship, cf. S.Phil.524-5 (p.255 above).
64. 511-4: this idea of "death before dishonour" is common
in E. (as, indeed, it is in S.): cf. Hec. 373-4 (and Adkins, MR, p. 161), 497-8, Hel. 134-6, 200-2, 686-7, as well as the passages from Pho. on pp. 288-9 above and HF. on pp. 292-3 above, 304 below.

65. e.g. Il. 22.105-6.
66. This wish for death as a means of escaping disgrace is close, but not identical to the choice of death rather than future dishonour: for parallels, cf. Dover, GPM, p. 237 (Deianeira in S. Trach. etc.), Lesky, Greek Tragic Poetry, p. 279 (S. Ai.).
68. On which see Parker, Miasma, p. 227.
69. ibid., p. 318.
70. See Bond, ad loc., on the transmission of pollution through sight, and for parallels to this passage.
71. See Bond on 1160-2 (comparing S. Ai. 245 etc.), Class, 96-7 (with parallels).
72. Pheres' accusation of anaideia against Admetos at Alg. 694 (p. 291 above) may also censure an absence of this regard for others.
73. Miasma, 316-7 (also 94 and 205); cf. p. 212 above on Oedipus in OT.
74. Parker, p. 317.
75. See Parker, 313-4, on this phenomenon in Hipp.
76. On this passage, cf. below, pp. 313, 337.
77. Similarly, Theseus reacts to the story of his son's adultery with Phaidra by terming it a miasma at 946 (cf. Parker, p. 313, on both these passages).
78. Cf. von Erffa, p. 160; Webster, Tragedies, p. 68, suggests another location for the fragment.
79. On the importance of philia in this passage, cf. p. 362; the breach of philia is the major reason for Orestes' aidos here, but he is nonetheless a polluted person, and Tyndareus treats him as such at 479-81.
80. See esp. 1231-4: Herakles, Theseus claims, cannot pollute the gods (thus he seeks to remove Herakles' concern that he may pollute the Sun), and he himself, as Herakles' philos, fears no alastor (thus he combats the fear both of polluting a friend and of incurring reproach); cf. Chalk, JHS 1962,
p. 13:

"The grounds for suicide were δύσκλησις and μίση; but οὐδεὶς ὀλίβαρος τῶν ἐκείνη ἐκτιμῶν [θεοῦ], in Theseus' words (1234). Δύσκλησις is determined by moral judgement ... and it is the continued regard of an obviously noble Theseus which convinces Herakles that these grounds are illusory."

81. Even if he is purified, as Theseus (1323-5) promises he will be, he will still risk revulsion as one who has committed crimes which are felt to involve pollution, and presumably this revulsion will take little account of formal purification.

82. Cf. pp. 227-30 above, and, on the contrast, Lesky, Greek Tragic Poetry, p. 280.

83. See Chalk, JHS 1962, p. 13 on this passage. Adkins, CQ 1966, p. 218, is right to say, in modification of Chalk’s argument, that Herakles is still motivated by the need to avoid disgrace, and that this, although a demand of traditional arete, is not a "new" arete. Yet Herakles has changed his mind as to the nature of disgrace, and has, in effect, decided to live with that which would be disgraceful in terms of traditional values. Thus, while he does base his decision to live on an aspect of traditional arete, he also rejects one traditional "heroic" response, and while he may not make endurance (ὑποστηριχύρω) a "new" arete, he does subsume it to the head of arete.

84. See Zürcher, Darstellung des Menschen, 93-4, 96, Stebler, p. 98.

85. Cf. Bond, ad loc.

86. Wilamowitz refers ἡμέρισται to the chorus, but Theseus, son of Poseidon, is a kinsman of Herakles, son of Zeus (cf. 1154 and Bond’s n. on 1200), and referred to Theseus, the line picks up Herakles' reluctance to ἠθικὰ, the innocent, a reluctance which is probably to be seen as aídos (cf. p. 305 above) at 1161-2.

87. On the causal dative with aischunomai, see Goodwin’s Grammar, §1181 (citing Ar. Clouds 1355); Bond (ad loc.) calls the dative "instrumental", and one can see what he means, but this seems to require a quasi-passive sense of the verb
(although the distinction between causal and instrumental dative will not be very precise).

88. Also comparable in this respect is Herakles' statement at 1423 that he has spent the house in aischunai: obviously this entails self-reproach, remorse and recognition that he has done wrong, but he will also be aware that other people tend to criticize those whose actions, on their own admission, have been disgraceful.

89. Cf. Bond on 1287: "Such mockery or scorn was a natural concomitant of the guilt which the fifth-century Greek felt." This seems to imply that guilt and fear of mockery can coexist as manifestations of the one general reaction, and, if so, one should approve it. Bond goes on, however, "The Stoic-Christian notion of the mens sibi conscia recti which disregarded public opinion was still far away." Certainly Stoic-Christian notions are far away from fifth century Athens, and it is true that in Greek literature recognition of the reprehensible nature of one's own actions is very often accompanied by fear of mockery, but 1) the mens sibi conscia recti is an ideal to which few adhere on every occasion and 2) there are examples enough in Greek literature of those who disregard public opinion in clinging to their own idea of what is right (Archilochos and Solon, pp.132-5 above, Aeschylus' Achilles and Klytaimestra, 182-7 above, Sophokles' Antigone, pp.223-4 above, Demokritos, pp.560-4 below).

90. See pp.87-90 above.

91. Thus von Erffa's list of retrospective uses at pp.156-60 seems to me rather too uncritical in this respect; in particular, he goes too far in claiming that the awareness that one has done something discreditable is new (pp.157,160).

92. GPM, p.225.

93. Cf. p.286 above.

94. As Willink points out (ad loc.), 461 recalls the famous line 396 (below, pp.313-4).

95. pp.36-8,90 above: Solon 32W, which von Erffa sees as an example of retrospective aidos, is comparable (cf. pp.132-3 above).

96. Cf. Ion 1557-8 and Hel.884-6, where Apollo and Aphrodite (respectively) fear disapproval arising from the presence of
a mortal whom they have treated shabbily.

97. Cf. p. 300 above.

98. p. 159.


100. p. 158.

101. So Lombard, Acta Classica 1985, 7-8. In line 106 Helen goes on to express another, more trivial kind of aidos, to the effect that it is aischron that she should neglect her duty to her dead sister by allowing slaves to bear her offering.

102. See Barrett, ad loc. (but cf. above, p. 285, on the deficiencies of his distinction between aidos and aischune).

103. See Zucker; Syneidesis-Conscientia, 7-8, Seel, "Zur Vorgeschichte...", 298-9, Class, 102-7, Stebler, 118-9.

104. On τυγιδεῖν elsewhere in Elektra, see Zucker, p. 8n. 12, Class, loc. cit., Stebler, p. 120; on τυγινί, see Class, p. 106, Willink, ad loc.; on syneidesis etc. in other authors, cf. below, pp. 509-10, 542-8.

105. See Class, 106-7, Willink, ad loc.


107. This concern for the feelings of another person might well be the same as the aischune which Orestes expresses with regard to Elektra at line 280; cf. also pp. 305 and 308 above.

108. At this point Orestes has been representing himself to Tyndareus as troubled by what he has done (see 546 κορούς ἐξ ἔργσ μητέρας κτενελ), and so this aidos may be based on horror of the crime of matricide. On the other hand, it is possible, since Orestes has moved on to the subject of Klytaimestra's adultery, that his aidos is to be seen as reluctance to associate himself with a mother whose conduct he despises (for a similar reaction, see Ch. 917).


110. On τυγινίκ see (Pl.) Def. 415e (quoted by Willink on Or. 396).

111. See Class, 99-102, Stebler, p. 83.

112. Stebler, p. 84.
113. See 833-5, which, to me, indicates only distress that Neoptolemos will inevitably discover what Hermione has done (contrast Class, p. 101). Certainly at 919-20 Hermione openly acknowledges that she is motivated by fear of punishment, and no other motive is mentioned. Notice also the absence of any recognition of her own violation of Andromache's suppli- 

ant status in Hermione's τίνος κάλνα θεών ικές ορμήνδητ 859, which is surely an ironic touch. Hermione has no respect for the institution of supplication as such, but considers using it for her own protection. (The way in which some characters exloit such conventions for their own ends is one of the themes of J. Dalfen's article on aïdos in Festschrift J. Fink, 67-75.)

114. I do not mean to suggest here that these standards must be personal to oneself.

115. Cf. Dalfen, Festschrift Fink, p. 73.

116. These last passages are those in which references to conscience etc. most directly concern us: on conscience in E. in general, see Class, 91-107, Stebler, 47-9, 83-4, 88-9, 91-2, 98-102, 117-9.


118. pp. 311-2 above.

119. For the noun clause, cf. p. 288 above.

120. See North, Sophrosyne, 69, 71 and 74.

121. For similar reflections on the sexual appetite of women (the orthodox view), cf. frs. 401, 410, 493, 662N, 882a (in Snell's supp.).


123. In this line the argument, drawn from the ethnographical studies of the likes of Herodotos, that different peoples may vary in their conceptions of what is aischron is alluded to, but the point is made that, although conceptions of το τιχές differ, each people's conception is valid for itself, and this is very much the Herodotean position; cf. pp. 388-9 with n. 334 below.

124. Diggle, following Page, prints a lacuna between these two verses.

125. pp. 314-5 above.

126. Cf. n. 51 above.
127. pp. 299-300 above.
128. Cf. especially Orestes at Cho. 917.
129. ἔγνωρε presumably denotes awareness rather than conscience here, but there may be a slight ambiguity nonetheless; it turns out that Kreousa's memory of the rape does prey on her conscience, and since the audience is aware of the nature of the aischune, its members might mentally supply a reflexive pronoun in this line.
130. p. 313 above.
131. Cf. p. 311 above.
132. Cf. also HE. 1341-6, with Bond's n. ad loc. Von Erffa (p. 163) uses fr. 292. 7 to distinguish E.'s theology from that of Sophokles, as exemplified in fr. 276R (nothing that the gods do is aischron); there is, indeed, a contrast, but since both fragments will have formed part of speeches by characters in a play they represent at best only the kind of arguments which were "in the air" in the Athens of the late fifth century, rather than the considered opinions of the two poets. (The Sophoklean fragment, moreover, is flatly contradicted by the statement of Hyllos at Trach. 1271-2 [cf. p. 265n. 15 above]; Hyllos may be wrong, but we do not know that the speaker of the fragment was proved right.)
133. Euripidean Drama, p. 282.
135. Adkins, MR, p. 184; Dover's explanation (GPM, 240-1), that Antigone invites others to see her as a moral subject rather than a moral object, is similar.
136. As is claimed by Adkins, ibid.
137. Cf. p. 167 above.
139. Fr. 436N2, p. 306 above.
141. Cf. p. 319 above.
142. This is the familiar association of aids with the eyes; for a simple restatement of the proverb, see fr. 457N2

\[ \alpha'ξ\upsilon\omega\ \delta' \varphi\iota\theta\varepsilon\lambda\nu\theta\iota\sigma\gamma\nu\eta\tau\omega\nu\ ,\ \tau\varepsilon\kappa\nu\omega\nu\varepsilon \]  

For parallels and discussion, see Harder's commentary, pp. 118-20.
144. p.6.
146. Lombard's assertion, then, that E. consistently applies a technique of contrast between conventional and advanced uses of *aidos* must be considered not proven: he considers three passages in his article, the present one, *Aig. 600ff.* (on which see pp.290-1, with n.25) and *Ox. 97-105* (pp.312-3 and n.101 above), and only in the last is there any real contrast between superficial or conventional *aidos* and "inner shame".

149. Cf. above, p.301 (etc.).
151. ibid.
152. ibid.
153a. Iphigeneia, does, however, supplicate her father at 1245-8, using the infant Orestes as a lever and appealing to *aidos* and pity.
154. Her feelings of embarrassment at being made to look a fool here will thus be comparable to those of her mother at 847-8.
156. Cf. below, pp.339-43. For *habrotes* as a synonym of *aidos*, cf. *A.Ag*. 1203-5 (p.167 above), *E.IA*. 858 (where a character informs us that he does not *eksulabos* on account of his servile status).
158. pp.74-5 above.
159. On his purity and his exclusivism, see Segal, *Hermes* 1970, 278-83, Devereux, *Character*. 89-94.
161. Cf. 667,949 (Theseus, ironically), 995,1007,1013,1034-5, 1365,1402, North, p.70, Berns, passim.
162. Cf. 656,996,1061,1309,1364,1368,1419,1454.
163. Cf. pp.55-6 above.
164. Cf. p.326 above.
165. Cf. pp.311-2,316-8 above.
166. On Hippolytos' unusualness, cf. Barrett on 79-81, and on his quasi-feminine concern for sexual purity, see Segal, Hermes 1970, p.293, Devereux, Character, 19-32 (and cf. 1006, Πεθένων ἥλιος ἂν ἄρον ἔκλυεν).
167. Cf. above, pp.325-6, and below, pp.392-5.
168a. Hippolytos' insistence on ψυχή is recognizably aristocratic (see Barrett, p.173, on 79-81), and thus this passage may be compared to those in which άίδος is seen as an aristocratic virtue (H.Hom.Cer.213-5, p.126 above, Thgn.289-92,399,409-10, pp.139-40 above).
169. Cf. 1007.
170. See Barrett, ad loc.; it appears that Hippolytos regards Phaidra's behaviour towards him as a breach of φίλια; similarly, both the Nurse and Phaidra regard his implied threat to ignore his oath and denounce his stepmother as a betrayal of his φίλος (613,682).
171. Cf. pp.123,166,210-1 above.
174. This line is, however, deleted in Diggle's text.
175. At 408 and 420 the idea that she would also shame Theseus is also present.
176. Cf. frs.19,840 and 920N² (on which see Dodds, GI,187-8).
177. Cf. above, pp.20-1.
180. See Class, 97-8.
182. That she calls the suppliant's gesture a σέβας (that which one εἴπεται), but describes her reaction to it as άίδος reveals once more the closeness of aideomai and sebo (etc.) in the context of supplication (see above, p.187 etc.).
183. See Barrett on 333-5, Winnington-Ingram, Fond. Hardt 6, 179,193.
185. Conacher, for example, Euripidean Drama, 35,54-5,
believes "that 'the bad 助' here regarded as a pleasure refers to the distracting enjoyment of 'taboo' subjects which, when not treated with reverence, lead to shame." This, however, answers to sense of aidos which I can identify.

186. The commentaries of Wecklein and Barthold, for example, speak of Phaidra's "weakness".


189. Cf. p.110 above.


192. Thus, it seems to me, Barrett (on 385-6) explains traditionally ambivalent aidos, but not, or not entirely, the passage under discussion.


194. Without wishing to go into any detail, I should perhaps declare that I am convinced by those who claim that there is an objection to the Sokratic doctrine that no one willingly does wrong in these lines: see Barthold on 380, Snell, *Philologus* 1948, 125-34, *Scenes from Greek Drama*, 59-67, Dodds, *GI*, 186-7; contrast Barrett, p.229 on 377-81.


196. See previous note.

197. What follows is similar, but not identical, to the views of Dodds, loc.cit., and Segal, 284-8.

198. Thus there is no need to deny, with von Erffa, p.166, and Barrett on 381-5, that aidos is seen as a pleasure in 385; cf. Segal, 285-6n.4.

199. Cf. Dodds, p.103, Segal, 286-7; on the kairos, see also Barrett on 396-7.

200. This idea, that the character of an action or attitude varies according to situation, occurs time and again in E.: see pp.289 and 331 above. Dalfen, *Festschrift Fink*, 70-2, shows how the Nurse's misuse of the ritual of supplication and Phaidra's misplaced respect for the ritual gesture ulti-
mately prove harmful, and relates this to Hippolytos' respect for the oath which the Nurse, again exploiting the religious sanction for her own ends, extracts from him; this, too, might be related to the idea that context determines the usefulness or otherwise of such conventions (non-sceptical relativism again, cf. n. 20 above); cf. Ion 1275-81,1313-9, with the comments of Segal, Hermes 1970, p.284.


202. Winnington-Ingram, Fond. Hardt, 193-4, believes that Phaidra's *aídos* with regard to her illicit passion proves harmful because it leads to repression.


206. Cf. Barrett, ad loc..

207. Cf. Herakles' doubts as to whether he will be able to endure the silent reproaches of his own weapons at HE. 1379-85 (pp. 307-8 above).

208. *συνέδεσις* in 425 refers to awareness of a discreditable element in one's family history which causes inhibition, regardless of the fact that those who experience the inhibition bear no responsibility for the past action: it has, therefore, no connexion with *synéidesis* as "conscience", but does, interestingly enough, describe the awareness which leads to *aídos*.

209. On the closeness of τι *συνέδεσις* here to *aídos*, see North, p.74.

210. In 489 *ενίκλης* still refers to Phaidra's determination to preserve her reputation by committing suicide.


212. See Grube, Drama, p.183, Parker, Miasma, p.313.


214. See Barthold, Barrett, ad loc..

215. Cf. 239-49.

216. Cf. 1310-2, where Artemis explains Phaidra's denunciation of Hippoloytus in terms of her fear of exposure (*elen-choj*).
217. Another use of the verb + acc. in the sense "be ashamed of ...".


219. See 656.


221. At 667 Hippolytos hopes that women, especially Phaidra, may learn sophrosyne, at 731 Phaidra expresses the wish that he may learn the same lesson, and at 1034 Hippolytos again passes judgement on Phaidra's sophrosyne and contrasts it with his own.

222. Menelaos showed no signs of aidos in the actual exchange with Peleus, and there can be little doubt but that we are supposed to see the cowardice with which the latter charges him (590-1,616-8,765) as the real reason for his departure; cf. Dalfen, Festschrift Fink, p. 73 (p. 315 and n. 115 above).

223. This instance of ἀίδως θυσία is rare: it does not imply that aidos has a particular religious aspect, simply that the time of the gods should be recognized.


225. Cf. pp. 75, 106n. 127 and 112n. 202 above (etc.).

226. Aidos is explicitly used of the avoidance of excess in fr. 209N²: on aidos, sophrosyne and moderation, see North, p. 78n. 116 and the passages there cited.

227. Cf. S. Ai. 319-20, Trach. 1071-2 and (with reference to the display of emotion in general) Or. 1047-8; the position of Odysseus' aidos at Od. 8.86 is complicated by the fact that Homeric heroes frequently experience no aidos at shedding tears; cf. p. 62 above.

227a. Cf. the braggart Menelaos at Hel. 947-53: he feels it unmanly to weep, yet he has heard that it is kalon to do so εἰν Ἴτολοιοι.

228. On aidos as a mark of noble birth, cf. n. 168a above.


230. Cf. below, 382-3.


232. Cf. Amphiaraos at Hyps. fr. 22 and 60 (Bond), 58-9. Lying is also anaideia in the sense that it denies the truth to one who feels he deserves it, and so fails to recognize his
claim to honour.

233. On her arete, see 152,323-5,1000-1.
235. The same sense is conveyed by προτύμεξκ at 155 (cf. Dale, ad loc.).
236. Cf. p.290 above.
238. The syntax of these lines, as printed by Diggle, is odd. One would expect καὶ in 1060 to be co-ordinate with ἐκ in 1057, and ἐκ ὑπερ σημείων and καὶ τῆς θαυμάσιας to be dependent on μὲν, explaining its twofold nature, but this leaves 1061, πολλὴν πρyectos καὶ unconnected; one might assume ana-
ocolouthon (beginning with a καὶ to co-ordinate with ἐκ in
1057, Admetos then changes the syntax of his sentence), or
punctuate with a colon after θαυμάσιας and a comma after σημείων,
taking the following clause as asyndetic, or delete 1061-3,
following Wheeler (Diggle's app.crit.).
239. This, too, might be aidos - cf. Od.17.188-9.
240. Cf. fr.452N² (from Cresphontes):

By saying that he is not ashamed of loving himself,
because everybody does it, Polyphontes implicitly admits
that his ἁγαπᾷ is a bad thing, thus conforming him-
sely to the common view about ἁγαπᾷ. Only occasion-
ally we find it positively valued; cf. S.OC 309 ... and
E.Hel.998f."

On this fragment Harder (p.102) writes:

1080-1, where sebein seems to work in much the same way:
πολλὰς γε μᾶλλον σημείων ἦ τοὺς τριῶν ἄλλων ἐν δίκαιος ἔν.
Too much respect for oneself, then, appears to be discredit-
able.
241. On aidos in connexion with oaths, cf. pp.123,166,210-1,
335 above.
242. For the decline in contemporary morality seen as the
departure of aidos, cf. Hes.WD.197-201 (p.120 above), Thgn.
289-92,647-8 (p.138 above), S.El.245-50 (p.246 above); also
IA. 1089-94 (pp. 391-2 below).

243. For aischros in the non-physical sense when applied to a person, cf. S. Phil. 906 (p. 257 above).

244. Medea's opinion that the conduct of Jason has been aischron is shared by Aigeus at 695 (cf. 699, where he calls him kakos).

245. Cf. S. Phil. 93-4, p. 251 above.

246. Cf., for example, Hektor at Il. 22.104-7 (p. 37 above: cf. also 38-42, 46-56).

247. n. 240 above.

248. This might be interpreted as showing that he puts aidos for his philoi before retaliatory justice, and thus might be referred to the antithesis between aischron and dikaios in the context of the crime within the family (pp. 240-8 above, 359-60 below).

249. So Barrett, ad loc..

250. Euripides is fond of the zeugma of different senses of aideisthai: cf. Hcl. 813-6 (pp. 283-4 above), HE. 1199-1201 (p. 308 above).


254. CQ 1966, 196-9, where he criticizes the interpretation of Pearson, Popular Ethics, 144-6.

255. p. 146.

256. Il. 23.176.


258. Hekabe appeals to such a standard at 282:

οὐ τῶν κταντυρής χείρ κτανην ἕη γένων.


260. Cf. (e.g.) Hcl. 503-6, p. 302 above.

261. pp. 239-48 above.

262. pp. 239-40 above.

263. Strife between members of the same family is aischron also at Pho. 1219-20 and 1369.


265. See 288-93, 416-7, 505-6, 507-11.

266. Adkins, MR, p. 186.
267. For disloyalty as cowardice, see Med. 465-6, p. 354 above.
268. Since both Orestes and Pylades are prepared to die for each other, I do not see why Roisman (Loyalty, p. 173) says that in this play "only the chorus ... fulfills the requirements of loyalty."
270. Cf. p. 360 and n. 265 above, and see also 499, where Tyndareus calls the murder of Agamemnon an αἰσχύνον ἔγγειν (though, significantly, he denies that this justifies Orestes' retaliation).
271. Note ἱμαλάν ρήβων in 1079 and cf. Alc. 279 (pp. 352-3 above) and Hcl. 6 (p. 355 above).
272. Cf. below, n. 327.
273. On αἴδος for one's φίλοι, cf. also fr. 109N2 - εὐμενικὸν τοὺς παῖς χορεύεις ήδέων - and IA. 1187, where Klytaimestra says that Agamemnon would return home αἰσχύνον having sacrificed his daughter. Fr. 593N2 speaks of the "fetters of αἴδος", probably in the context of the friendship of Theseus and Peirithoos (von Erffa, p. 133, says Herakles and Peirithoos, but see Nauck's testimonia). On the attribution of the play from which this fragment comes to Kritias, see below, p. 549.
275. On Medea's supplication, see Dalfen, 67-70. Medea is another of those characters who misuses ritual for her own ends (see n. 200 above). In the second part of his study (72-5) Dalfen collects passages in which ritual is used legitimately (the subject thus being entitled to αἴδος) only to be ignored by those who see it as in their own interests to do so; these people, however, he points out, emerge with no credit in failing to respond to appeals for αἴδος. It seems, then, that E. is exploring both the way in which people view their self-interest and the extent to which the legitimacy of conventional and ritualized behaviour may vary according to context.
276. For the terminology and the two types of supplication, see Kopperschmidt, Die Hikesie, 46-53, and cf. Burian, Suppliant Drama, 1,4-5, and Gould, 75-8. Medea also undertakes supplication of Aigeus at 709ff., and the latter gives in 1) out of pity and 2) because he wants to, on the grounds
that Medea has already been of service to him. Aidos is not mentioned, but may, at least, lie behind the impulse to return a favour.

277. This is an atypical feature (Burian, p.96).
278. See 65,67-8,105-6,159-60 and Burian, 97-8.
279. See Kopperschmidt, p.150.
281. See Dalfen, p.72-3.
282. As claimed by Adkins, CQ 1966, p.201.
285. Pace Adkins, ibid..
286. ibid..
287. p.74.
288. Earlier in the play, Hekabe tells Polyxena to supplicate Odysseus, but he hides his right hand, avoiding ritual contact (339-45, see Gould, 84-5), and, in any case, the girl declines to follow her mother's advice. Hekabe's own supplication of Odysseus (ἰκτύων , 276) concerns us only as an appeal to aídos on the grounds of philia (pp.357-8 above).
289. See Kopperschmidt, 133-5, Burian, 137-8.
290. See Collard, ad loc..
291. On the reluctance to undertake supplication, see pp.300-2 above.
292. Cf. pp.365-6 above.
293. Die Hikesie, 135-6.
294. See p.138.
295. Political Plays, 7-8,10; cf. Lesky, p.266.
296. See, for example, Grube, Drama, p.233, Conacher, Euripidean Drama, p.102.
299. Suppliant Drama, p.159.
300. p.163n.34.
302. Cf. Burian, p.164. If there is no irony in the presentation of Theseus here, there may, nonetheless, be irony in the presentation of the subsequent events of the play, and it should be noted that the recovery of the bodies is the
first step in the rehabilitation of the Argives, whose expe-
dition Theseus originally criticized. The rehabilitation
continues with Adrastos' Funeral Speech, which praises for
private virtue men, like Kapanes, who were notorious as
types of impiety, and ultimately results in the renewal of
the conflict through the Epigoni. For this "ironical" inter-
pretation of the second part of the play, see Fitton, Hermes
1961, 438-41 (followed by Burian, 191-5); against, see Lesky,
303. See Kopperschmidt, 193,179-92,204 (on the late entry of
the soter: he compares And. in this respect).
304. See Bond on 165-6, Grube, p.247.
305. See Guthrie, HGP 3, 101-16, Adkins, MR, 238,249 etc..
306. Cf. above, pp.76-81.
307. Cf. above, pp.325-6, below, 392-5.
308. Cf. also Hyps. fr.60.116 (Bond).
309. Cf. OC.863, p.218 above, and note the depreciation of
the herald's bia at Hcld.64,79,97,102,112,127,225.
Ion 337 (p.320 above).
311. Cf. 300-1 above: despite his protestations, Menelaos
does address an appeal to Theonoe.
312. See previous n..
314. p.149.
315. p.36 above.
316. See Kannicht on 998-1001.
318. p.149.
319. See below, p.578n.109.
320. On the temple of dike, Kannicht (on 1002-4) compares
(D.)25.35, where all men are said to possess altars of dike,
eunomia and aidos in their hearts.
322. See Kopperschmidt, 197-9.
323. pp.326-9 above.
327. To the examples already cited add Hyps. 22 and 60, 30-1 (Bond).
328. This much emerges from passages like Od. 8.85-6, 15.69-71, 19.118-21; see pp. 61-2 above.
332. Cf. 1037-41 in this connexion.
335. Cf. And. 243-4 (p. 318 and n. 123 above), also von Erffa, p. 165.
336. The view that moral standards, and the gods who underwrite them, exist only by convention is expressed by Hekabe at 799-805; she, too, believes that nomoi should nonetheless be upheld. This corresponds with the Protagorean position, as far as we can tell: cf. Pl. Prot. 323c and see Heinemann, Nomos und Physis, 121-2.
337. He is also anosios at 790, and his crime anosion at 792.
338. This is the reaction he fears at El. 1195.
339. Cf. οἱ ἐμοὶ τῇ μαρτανόμενᾳ at Thuc. 2.51.5 (below, pp. 485-6).
340. This altruistic concern for another's feelings is not a new element in the reaction of aídos - cf. Od. 3.96 (= 4.326), pp. 8-9, 56 above.
341. Concern for which leads her to take pains to conceal her body from the eyes of men, as reported by Talthybios at 568-70.
342. Cf. von Erffa, p. 139.
343. Talthybios shows a similar sympathy for Hekabe and Polyxena at Hec. 518-20. On the universality of pity, see And. 421-2.
344. See below, p. 572n. 21.
345. See above, p. 354.
346. See above, p. 306.
347. Cf. n. 242 above.
348. p. 354 above.
349. Cf., for example, those passages in which failure to meet one's obligations to one's philoi is seen as cowardice
Aidos and arete are, however, associated in several passages of Theognis (pp. 136-9, 144 above), although this may conceal an attempt to reconcile moral and social arete. It may well be, however, that aidos for one's philoi would be seen quite generally as an aspect of arete: the two are certainly equated in an unambiguous and unselfconscious manner at Thuc.2.51.5 (n.339 above).

Cf. pp.325-6 above.

See below, pp.550-6.

In lines 363-6 I take τι τι καταλύεται as the subject of Ἐχεῖ — "For τι τι καταλύεται is wisdom, and has the excellent grace (of being able) to discern duty with the aid of intelligence." Von Erffa (161-2, following Weil) takes ἔρχεται το δὲ ἄνω as the subject of Ἐχεῖ, and seems to imagine that ἐξελλήκτυρον ("surpassing") must have a comparative sense. Thus he sees a contrast between instinct (aidos) and intelligence (ὑπὸ γνώμης ἔρχεται); but 1) aidos is already identified with sophia, 2) το ... το does not indicate any kind of a contrast (quite the opposite) and 3) ἐξελλήκτυρον need not be comparative. p.139 above.

p.36 above.

p.376 above.

Euandria, however, denotes virtue in a wider sense at El.367-70, a passage which also suggests that environment and upbringing, rather than heredity, are the important factors in the development of character.

Cf. Demokritos B33DK.

This passage is deleted by Sakorrhaphos, but even if it is not by E. it clearly reflects contemporary ideas.

Various examples of this may be found above, particularly in contexts of philia, supplication and xenia. In addition, see Or.37-8, where Elektra experiences aidos at naming her brother's tormentors, the Furies, and 410, where Orestes finds a similar reserve on the part of Menelaos understandable, in that the goddesses are semnai: that which causes one to sebein, then, may also cause one to aideisthai. Ion's aidos at harming the birds which live in the sacred
precinct at Ion 179-81 is another example of the use of aideisthai in a context in which sebein might also be appropriate (for aideisthai in the context of sacrilege, see A. Pers. 809-10, p. 161 above). Sebein is much more common as the response to the divine, although the simple αἴσχρω τοῦ θεοῦ does occur at Hipp. 1258, Ba. 263.
6. HERODOTOS.

Instances of *aidos* etc. are comparatively few in Herodotos, certainly in comparison with those of *aischune* and *aischunomai*. This undoubtedly reflects the growing obsolescence of the former group of terms, and perhaps a feeling that *aidos* is a more "poetic" word than its synonym. Nevertheless, there is still a great deal which is of relevance to us, provided we include under the heading of *aidos* both passages in which the ideas with which we are concerned seem present, although the words themselves are not used, and instances of obvious synonyms.

Still one of the most natural contexts in which our group of terms may be found is the martial one. The verb *aideisthai* occurs in connexion with cowardice and flight at 1.55.2, where the oracle advising Kroisos to flee and not to *kivetos* *kalas* *einei* when a mule becomes king of the Medes is quoted. The ideas are familiar, and we shall note further examples in the historian's work, but this passage is not in itself evidence for his usage, being a piece of hexameter verse which presumably dates from the previous century.

When Herodotos does speak of the shame of cowardice in his own voice the term he uses is *aischunesthai*, and the context is one of the attitude to cowardice of the Spartans, who are, in the Histories, the people who adhere most rigidly to traditional martial values. The Spartans, we are told at 1.82.8, have grown their hair ever since their conquest of Thyrea: the sole Spartan survivor of that campaign, one Qethryades,

*aiskunosin opoustetew vs epastew, twv oi eklochitewn diechrmnaw, autow mn en ti ne' Thvrgy kataxhmywai wmutw.*

Used prospectively with the infinitive, *aiskunosin* is clearly indistinguishable from *aideismenon* here.

The reception Qethryades could have expected from his fellow-citizens is suggested in 7.231-2, where the story of two Spartan survivors of Thermopylae, Aristodemos and Pantites, is related. The former chose to take no part in the battle,
having been excused from service as a result of an eye complaint. Unfortunately for him, Herodotos explains, a comrade, Eurytos, also excused because of illness, chose to fight, thus throwing into relief his colleague's lack of commitment. Aristodemos' return to Sparta is then described (231):

His fellows, then, demonstrate their disapproval by shunning him and calling him names, and he suffers a diminution of time.¹ The reaction of the citizenry to Pantites seems to have been similar, but in his case the opprobrium proved unendurable - 

We hear of Aristodemos again at 9.71.3, where we are told that, in spite of his bravery at Plataia, he was denied the honour accorded others who performed well, on the grounds that his disregard for his own safety in the battle was directly attributable to his desire to escape the disgrace incurred at Thermopylae through death. The anecdote demonstrates both the intensity of Aristodemos' concern for his time and the strength of the Spartans' disapproval of one who failed to live up to their standards: it also, interestingly enough, illustrates an instance in which intentions, even in the context of success and failure in battle, are more important than results;² for the Spartans, in this context at least, one's motives for bravery are more important than the mere outward appearance of one's actions.

In contrast to Aristodemos the kind of conduct valued most by the Spartans is exemplified by Leonidas, who adheres rigidly to the precept that it is not fitting for Spartiates to retreat (οὖκ ἔχειν ὑπετείτως ἐκλυπέιν τὴν Ταξίν, 7.220.1, ἀπείνα τῷ καλῷ ἔχειν, ibid. 2); as a result, he left great
kleos behind him. Aidos seems central to Spartan attitudes in this matter: at 7.104, however, Demaratos names quite another concept as the force which chiefly promotes the discipline for which the Spartans are renowned:

In the particular sense, this nomos, which makes the Spartans the bravest of the Greeks, is that people's belief that anything other than complete commitment to bravery and overall victory is unacceptable; whether or not the Spartans had a statutory law which forbade cowardice or prescribed punishments for it, the requirement to be brave is one which they also enforced by a considerable degree of social pressure, and any nomos (law) which the Spartans had formulated against cowardice or indiscipline would only be one aspect of the nomos (custom or belief) that cowardice is disgraceful. To this nomos, then, aidos might well be the response, and it is certainly clear from the passage quoted that the conduct dictated by nomos and that which might be said to be promoted by aidos are identical: nomos in this passage is to be referred in the first instance to the Spartans' martial code, to their system of values, and it is thus not surprising that the requirements of this system should be recognizably those which aidos traditionally helps maintain, given that aidos is intimately concerned with the observance of prevalent codes of conduct, of the nomoi of one's society.

Nomos has a wider significance here, however, in that it also refers to the general difference in political organization between Greeks, represented by the Spartans, and the Persians: the Greeks are free, and obey nomos, their own system of values, customs and laws, whereas the Persians obey their king (which is, in a somewhat different sense, their nomos). Study of the nomoi of different cultures is, of course, a major element in Herodotos' work: he recognizes that nomoi are relative to their country of origin, yet
stresses the pervasive influence of a people's nomoi upon its character. Thus in the present passage the Spartans' fear of a nomos which is a particular belief of their community is related to the nomos of the Greeks as a whole that they live in political communities and are subject only to compacts to which they subscribe as a community, rather than to the commands of the monarch. Demaratos' remarks about the Spartans' fear of nomos are proved correct in the sequel, to which most of the examples of the Spartan attitude to cowardice quoted above belong, and thus it seems that the historian is using the Spartans, and the basis of their bravery in their nomoi, as an illustration of how the bravery of the Greeks, rooted in their choice of political organization, proved superior to the Persians, whose deficiencies are likewise rooted in their political system, their nomoi. The nomoi of a culture thus determine how its people will behave, and so in Herodotos' ideas of causality nomos plays an important part.

All this may seem to take us far from aidos, but aidos is relevant to nomos in the sense that it is one's aidos which makes one susceptible to the values of one's society and to the judgement of one's fellows who subscribe to the same values. Aidos is also particularly relevant in a situation in which the particular standard is not a rule imposed on one by someone else but part of the agreed system of beliefs with which one grew up; thus aidos is important in the question of the extent to which a people's nomoi produce bravery in battle, since aidos is likely in a warrior who is aware that he is fighting on behalf of his community and that his community abhors cowardice, but rather less likely in one who feels that he is fighting simply to maintain the privileges of another.

Herodotos does, in fact, seem to contrive a contrast of this kind, for with the Spartans, who fight in fear of their collective nomos, he contrasts, in 7.104 and elsewhere, the Persians' simple fear of their king. Thus, at 8.86, the bravery of the Persians at Salamis is attributed not to fear
of disgrace but to a fear of Xerxes based on each individual's feeling that the king could see him. Similarly, at 7.107.1 we learn that when Boges of Eion, a valued subject, was being blockaded by the Athenians under Konon he refused terms. Boges may value his own status in the eyes of others, but the opinion he values most is that of Xerxes, and while he may experience some aidos at the idea of cowardice, it is likely that he is chiefly motivated by fear of Xerxes' wrath.

Thus even if it is only fear of unpleasant consequences which promotes bravery, the Greeks, in Herodotos' estimation, are likely to prove braver than their Asiatic counterparts, in that to the latter the calculation of whether they may act without the king's knowledge will be important, whereas the citizen warrior will constantly be under the eyes of his fellow-citizens. This argument, however, should not be pressed to the extent of claiming that the Greeks differ from the Persians in that the latter do not subscribe to the nomos that cowardice is disgraceful, for at 1.136.1 we are told that for the Persians, as for the Greeks, the chief manifestation of andragathie is "to be good at fighting." Presumably, then, the Persians consider those who are not good at fighting not to be agathos, and the latter will feel aidos, or its Persian equivalent, at such a judgement.

Thus while Herodotos obviously believes that the Greeks are braver than the Persians as a result of their nomoi, he shows an awareness that the latter might share the former's nomos with regard to cowardice. This awareness also emerges in passages like 8.16.2, where the resistance of the Persian fleet at Artemision to the impulse to yield is explained as follows: To be routed by a smaller number of ships would, it is felt, cast doubt upon the prowess and bravery of the fleet. Fear of the king's anger is not mentioned, but rather the sailors' own determination not to be shown inferior: this determination is articulated by the phrase, which seems analogous to the use of aischunomai.
and aideomai with a noun clause at E.Phoe.509-14 and Heliod.43-4 respectively. From 8.100.4 it further appears that Persians are concerned about their reputation for valour: Mardonios attempts to console Xerxes, maintaining that the non-Persian contingents of the army proved themselves kakoi, but that no stain of cowardice adhered to the Persians themselves. It appears, then, that he imagines the king would be disturbed by the imputation of cowardice to his men, and he implies that he, too, values the Persian reputation for bravery, in that he urges the king not to expose his own race to the mockery of the Greeks by abandoning the expedition. He thus appeals to ideas of honour and reputation with which we have become familiar. According to Herodotus, however, his concern conceals his true motives, which are entirely related to his own position, rather than the honour of the Persians: he fears punishment for having recommended the expedition and feels it better to persevere in the subjugation of the country or to die gloriously in the attempt (100.1). He is thus subject to a fear of his master which the historian regards as typical of the king's subjects. His remarks to Xerxes about the Persians' reputation, however, must have some validity in terms of Persian values (at least as Herodotus perceives them), or else their efficacy as an means of persuasion would be minimal, while in Mardonios' desire to end his life there may also be an element of concern for his own reputation. Concern for one's reputation, then, does not seem to be foreign to the Persians as the historian saw them.

The attitude that defeat, cowardice and indiscipline are disgraceful is, in fact, more or less universal in the historian's work: it is one he himself shares, as he reveals when he uses the adverb aischros of the collapse of the Median forces at 1.128.1 and of the poor showing of the Persians in battle at 6.45.2; at 9.17.4 the Phokian general, Harmokydes, reflects the same traditional attitude in urging his men not to give themselves up to be killed. The Skythians, too, do not differ fundamentally from the Greeks in their view of cowardice: at 4.66 their nomos that
every man who has killed his foe in battle be invited to
drink with the nomarch is recounted; those who have failed
to kill their opponent, however, are not allowed to taste
the wine, ἀλλὰ ἔτιμμενοι ἀποκατέστατο· οὐκεδός δὲ σφι ἔστι
μέγιστον τοῦτο. Failure in battle, then, entails diminution
of time and attracts disapproval, just as in the Greek con-
text. By contrast, the man who is able to provide concrete
proof of his pre-eminence by attaching the greatest number
of opponents' scalps to his bridle is considered aristos
(64.4). The Skythians' practices may differ from the Greek,
but the basic suppositions are the same.

Of the Greeks it is, as we have seen, the Spartans who
adhere most rigidly to traditional ideas of honour and shame
in battle. At 9.48 Mardonios attempts to exploit this trait
of theirs as a means of undermining the cohesion of the Greek
forces: addressing the Spartans directly, he refers to their
reputation for bravery and implies that it is now in danger,
construing the tactical manoeuvres of the Greek force as
cowardice and pointing out that the Spartans are now station-
ned opposite the Persians' subject peoples. It seems, then;
that he is aware of the intensity of the Spartans' sense of
aidos, for clearly it is that sense that he attempts to
arouse here. That this was an expedient which might have had
some success is demonstrated by a subsequent episode, still
in the context of the prelude to the battle of Plataia: at
9.53 Pausanias and the other commanders advocate a strategic
retreat, but Amompharetos, commander of a lochos, refuses to
obey—οὐκ ἐὰν τῶν βείνοις ἰδέεται οὐκ ἐκὼν ήνε
ἀιρχώμεν τῷ τῆς ἐπαρτην. Amompharetos' regard for his own
honour and for that of his city leads him to disobey an
order: this is clearly a demonstration of the inefficacy of
aidos in certain circumstances, and the situation only comes
about as a result of that sense of honour, that aidos, for
which the Spartans are renowned. Amompharetos' aidos, we
might say, leads him into anaideia, and the commanders'
reaction to this anaideia is one of anger and indignation,
conveyed in the phrase ἡκινόν μὲν ἐπαλευτὸ τὸ μὴ ἰδέεται
ἐκείνον ὑψῆ (53.3).
A nomos which we have met before is that which demands that one should not tarnish the reputation of one's forefathers. In Herodotos it is Xerxes who appeals to this principle, at 7.11.2:

μὴ γὰρ εἶην ἐκ Δαρείου τῷ Ὑστάπτεος τῷ Ἀγάμητος... τῷ Ἀχαμένιδος γεγονός, μὴ τιμῶσθαι καὶ θηρίω".

And at 7.53.1:

εὐθέως ἔγινεν Ὀδηγός καὶ μὴ κατακρίνων τῷ πρῶτῳ Ἠρακλήνα Ἰέρομη, εἰόντα μεγάλα τι καὶ πτελῶν ἄρχει, καὶ εἰς τῷ ἐκατός καὶ οἱ σύμπτατας προκυμίην ἐκων.

Something else we have met before is the idea that it is shameful for a man to be worsted by, or compared to a woman. At 1.207.5 Kroisos tells Kyros that it is aischron for one of his (Kyros') status to yield to a woman (in this case Tomyris, queen of the Massagetai), while in two passages of book 2 it is the comparison with women as a sign of unmanliness which is important. At 2.102.4 (cf. 106.2) we hear of the practice of the pharaoh Sesostris, who honoured vanquished opponents who fought bravely, but sought to humiliate those he considered to be cowards:

ὄτεων δὲ εἰμεχτὶ καὶ εὐπτεχέως παρέλαβε τὰς πόλεις, τοῖς δὲ δνέγρετε ἐν τῷ στῆλη ταυτά τι καὶ τοῖς ἀνδρικέστεροι τῶν ἐθνῶν γενομένωσι καὶ δὴ καὶ αὐδᾶς γενομένοις προενέγρετε, διότι βοηθιοῦσα τοιοῖσι ὡς εἶτεν ἐναλκίδες(102.5).

Since these aidoia appear to be the result of a misinterpretation of Egyptian hieroglyphs, it seems that either Herodotos himself is the source of the mistake (at 106.2 he says he has seen stelai inscribed with these aidoia in Palestine), having applied a rationalization which seemed probable to him to signs which otherwise were puzzling, or else he has heard a story about Sesostris' humiliation of his enemies from some or other of his sources.

Similarly, at 7.11.1 Xerxes, angry at Artabanos' opposition to the proposed campaign against Greece, threatens to humiliate his uncle by leaving him behind among the women, adding, as he says, atimie to his cowardice and lack of spirit:
At 8.93.2 it is the Athenians who are concerned lest they appear inferior to a woman. At Salamis, we are told, they were particularly anxious to capture Artemisia alive - δεινὸν γὰρ τι ἠττεντο γυναῖκα ἔπι τᾶς Ἀθηνᾶς στρατευσθαι. Once more the phrase δεινὸν ποιεῖθαι seems to place the occurrence designated deiron in the category of the shameful. At 9.107.1 it is to Persian values that we return: Masistes upbraids the general Artayntes for his conduct in an engagement with the Greeks, calling him, among other things, "worse than a woman"; this, we are told, is the greatest reproach (δέινος) possible among the Persians. Artayntes is far from pleased (107.2): ὅ δέ ἐπεὶ πολλὰ ἠκούε, δείνα ποιέμενοι σπάσας ἐπὶ τῖν Ἀρταύντην τὴν ἀκινάκην, ἐποκτείνηκε θέλεν. He thus clearly resents the slur on his honour, and this resentment is expressed as δείνα ποιεῖθαι. This phrase, then, seems to refer both to the recognition that a given occurrence may damage one's honour and to the resentment produced by this recognition; thus it appears to express ideas which Homer might have expressed through aídos and nemesis. In this passage Herodotos mentions only that the Persians consider it the greatest of insults to be compared unfavourably to a woman, but from the other passages quoted it emerges that several other races, including his own, are susceptible to concern for the damage such a comparison may do to their time.

Concern for time, or the desire to save face is also evident in two passages in book 9, in which a number of cities are represented as shamed into action by the example of others. At 9.85.3, on the subject of the burial mounds of those who died at Plataia, Herodotos expresses the opinion that many of these are not genuine:
Here we have an example of *aischunomai* with a causal dative similar to those found in Euripides, and again the reference is to fear of criticism in the future based on recognition of shortcomings in the past. 9.19.1 seems similar: there the Spartans advance to the Isthmus, and the other cities of the Peloponnese, some out of principle, others because they actually witnessed the Spartans' advance, *oúk ēidikōtōn leiptēthai tīs ἐξῆσθαι*. Since the historian goes to the trouble of mentioning that some cities were only motivated to do what he regards as their duty by the sight of the Spartan advance, it seems certain that we are to regard these cities as concerned to avoid unfavourable comparison with others. It is significant, however, that he does not regard this as the only possible reaction.

Elsewhere the desire to save face is described in terms of *semnotes*, which, as in Euripides, seems to come close to the sense of *aidos* while retaining a pejorative connotation which suggests that the desire to keep up appearances is slightly misplaced. At 1.95.1 the historian declares his intention to follow the accounts of those Persians who wish to tell the truth, rather than *εἴσην ἐπεί Κύθνον*, while at 3.16. 7 he rejects Egyptian stories that the body of Amasis escaped mutilation at the hands of Cambyses as mere *semnotes* -

> αὐτήν ἃν τούτῳ Ἀμαῖνος ἄντωε οὕτως αἶται αὐτῷ ἔστι τῆς ταύτης καί τῆς ἄνθρωπον ἔχουσαν οὕτως δεκέων ἁρχῆν γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ ο' κυτῆ Ἀἰγύπτων σεμνοῖν.

A good example of how an individual may experience *aidos* at the imputation of cowardice, regardless of his own knowledge of the facts, is provided by the complaint of Kroisos' son at 1.37.2-3, even though the word *aidos* does not actually occur. Kroisos, following a dream which warned that his son, Atys, would be killed by a spear, sought to protect him by removing all weapons from the house and keeping him indoors. The speech is informative, and worth quoting in full:

> Ἕλθε, τὰ καλλίστα περὶ τοῦτο καὶ γενναίοτάτα ἡμῖν ὕμνος τοῦ θεοῦ παρὰ τοῖς Πολεμιστικοῖς εὐδοκίμενοι, νῦν δὲ ἀνθυπνάμην μὲ τούτων ὀποκλήσεις...

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The youth's first worry is that he is being excluded from those activities through which a young nobleman may win esteem, and he claims that, although he is neither deilos nor athumos, he is being treated as though he were. Thus he is concerned lest others, observing his treatment, assume that it is deserved. Several aspects common in contexts in which aidsos is found reveal that Atys is experiencing that emotion here: words of seeming, mention of the eyes of others and concern for their opinions all indicate aidsos. His concern for the opinion his wife will have of him, moreover, indicates a fear that she, because of the community of honour within the family, will come to be ashamed of her husband, as happens in the case of Helen in Iliad 6.17

It is well known that Herodotos' partiality towards certain states and bias against others sometimes influence his judgement. At 1.143.2-3 he launches into a particularly scathing attack on the Ionians, claiming that they are so weak that the majority are actually ashamed of the name - ἀλλὰ καὶ νῦν δι' ὑπάντησιν μοι οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν ἐπιχύνομεν τῷ ὄντων. Entire cities, then, may experience aischune at the association with a name which is a byword for weakness.

We have already noted something of the relevance of the phrase deilos pollesthai to our enquiry. Its usage seems broadly to fall into two categories: firstly, as in 8.16.2 and 8.93.2 the words may refer to the prospect of disgrace or loss of face as a likely result of the action or situation which those involved seek to avoid or prevent. In this sense, as we noted, the phrase behaves as do aischunesthai and aideisthai when used with a noun clause.19 Thus to consider
a situation deion may be equivalent to considering it aischron. The other sense is closely related, but somewhat different nonetheless. At 9.53.3 and 107.2 the phrase describes a feeling of anger and resentment, in the one case at disobedience, in the other at insults: there is still a reference to the effect of the action considered deion on one’s own time, but this is combined with a sense that the other party involved should have taken account of that time, and thus in this application the phrase seems to cover the idea of justified indignation conveyed in Homer by nemesao etc. Thus it is possible that deion deion may describe the reaction to another’s anaideia.

In the second of these applications in particular deion deion etc. play an important rôle in a pattern of motivation which is central to the historian’s idea of causation, in that he frequently explains the motivation of his subjects in terms of their concern for their time, their resentment of insults, their desire to humiliate their enemies and their thirst for revenge. The idea of revenge, in fact, permeates the work and, as the greatest single factor of causation, has the effect of linking episodes and imposing form.

The connexion between deion deion and time is clearly shown at 5.42.2, where the reaction of Dorius to the accession to the Spartan throne of his half-brother, Kleomenes, is described:

Dorieus feels himself wronged and is angry, believing that he has been treated in a way which has undermined his status, and decides to have no more to do with those who have wronged him. In a similar context later in the same book it is Kleomenes who feels himself insulted, and, interpreting the insult as hybris, he decides to take revenge (74.1):

Thus it appears that, as in Homer, the aggrieved party, at any rate, may regard an insult to his time, which might other-
wise be seen as \textit{anaideia}, as \textit{hybris}.

At 7.9.2, where Mardonios tells Xerxes that it would be a \textit{δικεῖν προδίκης} if the Persians should fail to punish the Athenians for the wrongs they have inflicted upon them, \textit{deinon} seems to be used euphemistically for \textit{aischron}: for the king to fail to subdue a people who once attacked his kingdom, when he has enslaved nations who have done him no harm whatsoever, would, Mardonios suggests, be a sign of weakness. He is thus urging on his king both resentment of a wrong and fear of future humiliation, attempting, in short, to arouse his \textit{aidos}. Xerxes answers this point at 11.4, and reveals that for him, too, it is a matter of honour that the Athenians and the rest should be punished (it is \textit{kalon} to take revenge, he says, and he, too, stresses the inferiority of the Greeks). 26

At 9.33.5 the indignation of the Spartiates (\textit{δεινα ἐπιεικεῖν}) is their reaction to the attempt of an outsider (the seer, Teisamenos) to infringe on their prerogatives, by demanding the privilege of Spartan citizenship in return for his services. Again, concern for status is prominent in their reaction.

In several other passages in which the motive of revenge is paramount so, too, are the terms with which we are concerned. A good example is the story of Kandaules’ wife in book I. After the episode in the bedchamber, 27 the wife, aware that she has been seen by Gyges, is understandably upset:

\begin{quote}
\textit{μηθεῖσα δὲ τῷ υἱῷ ἕκτῳ ἀνδρὶς οὔτε ἀνέβας ἐκχυθέαν εἰς ἀνέβας κηρυχθεῖσα οὔτε ἐδοκεῖ μαθεῖν, ἐν νόῳ ἔχονα τείναθαι τὸν Κανδαύληκ (1.10.2).}
\end{quote}

To put the depth of the woman's shame into perspective, Herodotos adds (10.3): \textit{περὶ γὰρ τοὐσ ἅπαν ... καὶ ἄνδρα ὄφθηνα γυνῆς ἐς κηρυχθῆνα μεγάλην ἕρα}. The Lydians' shame with regard to nakedness, he suggests, is more intense than that of the Greeks, since they consider it disgraceful even for a man to be seen naked (\textit{a fortiori} a woman's shame in such a situation would be even more intense than in the
Greek context: this does not mean, however, that a Greek woman would experience no shame in similar circumstances. At this stage, however, it is not shame with regard to nakedness which concerns, but the way in which Kandaules' wife, having been disgraced, resolves to take revenge, a revenge which has a momentous influence on the history of the Lydian nation. 28

At 1.73.4-5 insult again calls forth retribution. Kyaxares casts aspersions on the hunting prowess of the Skythians who had arrived as suppliants at his court, and this implicates them in disgrace (aeikeie, 73.4). The Skythians, in turn, resent the assault on their honour (μὴν δ' αὐτοῖς ζήλην μὴν πεπονθῶς, 73.5) and plan a Thyestean banquet for their erstwhile protector.

The story of the discovery of Kyros' royalty in the same book is similar. Kyros, brought up as the son of a herdsman, beats the son of a nobleman while playing "kings"; the boy's father complains to the king, Astyages, who decides to punish Kyros. There are several important points here: firstly, the resentment of the son of Artembares is described in terms of status — μής γε δ' ἀνάφη προστάθως (1.114.4); next, Artembares regards Kyros' conduct as hybris (πειραμαθεία, 114.5), not only against his son, but also against himself; finally, Astyages is moved to grant Artembares' request that Kyros be punished out of regard for his subject's time (θέλων τιμωτῆς τῷ παιδὶ τιμῆς τῆς Ἀρτεμβαρέως εἰνεκα, 115.1).

Time is, then, central to the whole episode: Kyros, it is believed, has acted without proper regard for a superior's time, an affront suffered by the son reflects badly on the father, and it is seen as imperative that the aggrieved party be restored to his proper position. There is also a strong case for regarding Kyros' conduct as anaideia, at least from the point of view of Artembares and Astyages, given that aidos recognizes the status of another person, and that it is with failure to accord another the time he deserves that he is charged. In his interrogation of Kyros
Astyages continues to see the gravity of the offence as rooted in the gulf in status between the boys' fathers (115.2): Ὅτα δὲ ἐὰν τιθέν τεκνίτιν ἐστις παῖς ἐτόλμημα
tὸν τεῦθεν παιδὴν ἐστὶς πρῶτον παῖς ἀεικέλη τεῦθε τευτέων;
For the son of a herdsman to assault the son of the king’s most valued counsellor requires *tolma* (and daring is a frequent concomitant of *anaideia*) and involves the superior party in *aeikeie*. The situation is thus disgraceful for the patient of the affront, but there is also a strong implication that the commission of the affront is also disgraceful for its agent.

That it is correct to see *anaideia* in this last passage is suggested by a similar episode in which the term does actually occur. At 7.39 Pythios the Lydian, encouraged by Xerxes’ favourable treatment, ventures to request that his eldest son be excused military service. Xerxes is outraged, and exclaims (39.1):

οὐ ἀλλὰ ἤθεστε, ἐγὼ ἐτόλμημα ἤμεν ἐπεξετευμένον
ἐκὼν ἄνθρωπος ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα καὶ ἤμεθα παῖδας ἐμῶς καὶ
ἀδελφούς καὶ ἀδελφάδους καὶ φίλους ἐκεῖνοι περὶ
σὲο παιδὸς, ἐὰν ἐμὸς βῶλος, τὸν Ἡρών ταυτολή
ἀντὶ τὴν γυναίκα ἀνεπιθεῖ

Again, the “going too far” is described as *tolma*, and again the status of those involved is the main consideration. Xerxes goes on (39.2):

ὡς μὲν ὅσα χρησάτως περιήγει ἐστιν τυπικῶς ἐπὶ
ὑγείας, ἐξερεγιές μοι βασιλέα ὥσα καννήσει ὑπὲρ
βάλεσθαι. ὡς ἐπιτετελέσθη δὲ ἢ ἀναδείχθη ἐστὶν,
τὴν μὲν ἁγίην ὧν ἱάμφει, ἐκάθεν δὲ τῆς ἁγίης.

The king, then, regards a presumptuous request from an inferior as *anaideia* and sees punishment for the insult to his own honour which such *anaideia* implies as imperative: just as the king returned favours with greater kindnesses, so he will now, magnanimously, requite Pythios’ *anaideia* with less than it deserves. Behind this explanation of the conduct of the oriental despot, then, lie the familiar Greek notions of *charis* and “helping one’s friends and harming one’s enemies.”
It is, in fact, a fundamental part of Xerxes' attitude that others should be thinking of his status and his power. At 7.210.1, for example, he regards it as anaideia that the Spartans at Thermopylae do not retreat at the sight of his superior forces: ὡς οἷς ἀπεκλάσσωσα ἀλλὰ οἱ ἐφαίνομεν ἀναιδεῖα τῇ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ διαχείμενοι μὲν ἔναν. For Xerxes, it is anaideia for the weak to presume to oppose the strong, and evidently he expects aidos even from enemies in time of war.

The sequence insult-resentment-revenge is a pervasive one in Herodotos. Essentially a story-teller's technique, it provides a thread which can link several different narratives. The Kyros episode recounted above, for example, leads to the discovery of the boy's royal birth, which causes Astyages to punish Harpagos for disobedience, which Harpagos in turn sees as an insult and which ultimately leads him to avenge himself on Astyages by helping Kyros gain the throne. Similar patterns abound in the work, and all rely on the one essential notion that insults to one's time will be resented and lead to retaliation. This may well have been a feature of all the different societies in which Herodotos portrays its occurrence, but, more importantly, it articulates his history in terms of a motivation which the ordinary Greek would readily understand.

Several passages present the concern for one's own time in straightforward terms. At 3.65.5. Kambyses, son of Kyros, explains to the Persian nobles how he has suffered aischra at the hands of the two Magoi usurpers. He regards it as essential that he wipe out the insult: τὸν μὲν νῦν μᾶκα Χέριν ἐμοὶ αἰχμα πρὸς τῶν μόνων τιτονθέν τιμωρεῖν ἔμει ... . Two passages reveal the use of an appeal to aidos (based on concern for one's own status) as a means of persuasion. At 3.134 Atossa attempts to persuade Dareios to mount an expedition against Greece, appealing essentially to his aidos with regard to his reputation for manliness: (134.2): οὐκ οὗτος δέ ἐστι κόμη καὶ νέω καὶ χρυσᾶ μεγάλον δοκεῖν φέρεται τῷ πατρίκινυμον, ἵνα καὶ Πάρθου ἐκμέταλπεν ὅτι ἦπε ἁνδειος ἐχειτε.
In the thinly veiled threat that Dareios' subjects will consider him less than a man if he fails to carry out some daring exploit his wife is clearly seeking to arouse his *aidos*. The need to impress his subjects, then, might be one consideration which could provoke *aidos* in the oriental monarch.

At 5.49.2 Aristagoras of Miletos requests Spartan support for the revolt of the Ionians. His appeal takes the form of a figurative supplication (he does not attempt full ritual contact until 51.1, after Kleomenes has rejected his plea), and several common suppliant motifs occur, including the argument from the supplicated's own reputation, here expressed as follows:

\[ \text{Aristagoras states frankly that the situation of the Ionians is \textit{aischron} for themselves, and attempts to extend this idea to include the Spartans, on the grounds that they are the champions of Greece, and as such must act to defend those under their protection, both because it is felt to be right that Greek should help Greek, and because any failure to act might give rise to doubts about the Spartans' claim to pre-eminence.}^{33} \]

The passages discussed so far have dealt mainly with the values of males, and with their striving to avoid diminution of their status. Herodotos is also, however, particularly interested in the conduct of women in different cultures, and in the extent to which the sexual \textit{mores} of other societies coincide with or differ from those of the Greeks.\textsuperscript{34} The concept of *aidos* is important in this area, too, since *aidos* is a characteristic element in the Greek attitude to sex and sexuality on which the historian must inevitably base his study of the values of other peoples.

At 1.5.2 the Phoenician version of the abduction of Io is given, an account which denies that she was abducted at all:
Io, then, fears exposure and the disapproval of her parents: the participle, κιδεμένη, perhaps combines the idea of concern for those who witness one's actions and that of respect for those who have a right to it, but both these senses are Homeric, and there is nothing new or unusual in this passage (pace von Erffa, 181-2).

Following the stories of the abduction of women with which the histories begin there comes the story of Kandaules' wife, to which we have already referred. Gyges is horrified by Kandaules' suggestion that he should contrive to see the queen naked (he calls it "unhealthy", 1.8.3, and "unlawful", 8.4), and explains his horror by means of a gnome (8.3): κ' με κόλιπον ιδουμένων ενεκπληκτα και την αίδου γυνή. The gnome, however, seems scarcely to fit well in this context. Taken in its most obvious sense it would refer to the attitude of the woman herself, namely that the removal of her clothes entails the removal of her sense of restraint and modesty. That this is the most obvious interpretation of the words is shown by the objection of Plutarch (coniua. praec. 139b): οὐκ ἐπεξεργασθεὶς Ἡρόδωτος ἐπίνει ὅτι ἡ γυνὴ ἁμα τῆς χιτώνος ἐκδύσαται καὶ τῆν αἰδίων τοῦτον γὰρ ἀντενδύεται τὴν αἰδίω. Plutarch, then, objects to the implication about the nature of women in the historian's gnome, and replaces Herodotos' assumption with a more optimistic one.

In their most natural sense, however, the words do not seem to bear any very precise reference to the particular situation: Kandaules' wife is to have no knowledge of Gyges' presence, and there is no reason to suppose that she will conduct herself immodestly once she has removed her clothes. In attempting to reconcile the gnome to its context, von Erffa holds that aidos is not the subjective sense of shame in this passage, but rather the quality in a person which commands the aidos of others ("die unbekleidete Frau ist nicht mehr aidoie"). There are some precedents for the use
of aidos in this sense, but, except when it is used as an equivalent of aidoia, aidos as a quality usually presupposes that the individual who possesses it is capable of manifesting aidos as a response to others, while the interpretation of the words by Plutarch shows that the sense demanded by von Erffa is not one which would occur immediately to a native speaker of Greek. The presence of the article, moreover, in ενεκδύσει καὶ την αἰδὸν suggests that the aidos in question is the woman's own, not her claim to that of others. To me, then, it seems most likely that Gyges' words have no precise reference to the conduct he expects of Kandaules' wife, but simply represent a general reason, based on the typical Greek view of the appetite of women for sex, and spoken "man to man", for his reluctance to see the woman naked: it is right, he implies, that women should manifest aidos, but his master's suggestion will force him to place himself in a position from which he will see his mistress without her customary sense of aidos.

Herodotos is generally extremely reluctant to pass adverse comment on non-Greek custom, even when it contrasts sharply with Greek attitudes, yet at 1.199.1 he describes the practice of ritual prostitution among the Babylonians as aischistos, even though other, and, in Greek eyes, equally reprehensible customs of both Babylonians and other peoples escape censure entirely. Aischistos here seems simply to express the historian's revulsion for a practice which he regards as unseemly and inappropriate.

No censure accompanies the story of the Pharaoh Mykerinos' rape of his own daughter at 2.131.1, but we might imagine that some feeling of shame must have provoked the girl's subsequent suicide. The extent of a Persian woman's sensitivity about sexuality is revealed at 3.133.1, where Dareios' wife, Atossa, conceals an abcess in her breast out of shame (κρύπτωσε καὶ λαξυνωμὴν ἔθησε οὐδενὶ), the reason for which would seem to lie simply in the fact that the part of the body affected is one normally concealed from others in accordance with proper behaviour as regards sex. This atti-
tude, that perfectly straightforward afflictions of certain parts of a woman's body are somehow shameful, persists even to this day. 41

That a woman acquires time and manifests arete in proportion to her devotion to her husband is a proposition which might be supported by any number of passages from Greek literature: if, however, a man were to have several wives the pursuit of feminine arete might take on a rather different form. This is the case among the Krestonaians, a Skythian tribe whose marital nomoi are described at 5.5. On the death of the husband his wives vie for the honour of being considered his favourite. Their arete, then, is competitive in a way which would not be possible for a woman in any monogamous society. In the case of this tribe formal competition actually takes place, and a winner (ἡ τις κατεύθυνε ἐκείνη καταλήσει ὑπὸ τοῦ ἄνδρος) is chosen. She is then honoured and praised (παρευθεὶς, ἐγκυμισθείς) as is appropriate for one judged ariste of a particular group, and killed over her husband's grave. The rest take their defeat badly - κεφαλαία συμφέρειν μεγάθεν πολεύτω ἄνδρος γιὰς ἐμ' τοῦτῳ μέγιστω γίνεται. Within the reduced scope of their existence, then, these women compete to win praise and avoid disgrace just as men do: the arbiter of success and failure is public opinion, manifested in the praise of the successful wife and in the oneidos which awaits those who fail.

The terms with which we are concerned frequently occur in contexts of philia, or where a debt of charis is owed between two parties. This is also the case in Herodotos, although instances are relatively scarce. Behind Kroisos' indignant questioning of the Delphic oracle lies the assumption that it is aischron to betray a benefactor. Kroisos instructs his messenger to ask the god εἰ ὄφε παρακάνεται τωι μνημόνιον ἑτερ Κροίων στρατεύσεις ἐπὶ Πέλεας ὥς καταπεσόντα τὴν Κύρην δύναμιν... (1.90.4). There may also be an implication here that it is discreditable to deceive per se, but deceit is more discreditable when it denies the truth to someone who deserves it on account of the oblig-
ation to show gratitude (Kroisos' sense of grievance is related to his dedications at Delphi at 90.3). The god's reply (91) denies deceit and points out that Kroisos' benefactions were, in fact, returned, which only serves to confirm that deceit and betrayal of a philos would constitute grounds for aischune.

The idea that a benefactor deserves aidos is given clear expression at 3.140.2, where Sylosos, a Greek who once lent Dareios his cloak, comes, on hearing of the latter's accession to the throne, to Susa to claim his reward. Dareios subscribes to the belief that benefactors deserve aidos, but is astonished that one should present himself so early in his reign - καὶ τῇ ἐστὶ Εὔχες τῆς ἐγὼ προαίδεσθι, νεκρὶ μὲν τῇ ἐχθῆν ἔχω. We have not met the compound proaideisthai before, and, indeed, it is only found here and in one other Herodotean passage. The significance of the prefix might lie in the use of the verb, here and at 1.61.3 (Peisistratos and his sons ἔχειν δυνάμει ἐκ τῶν πολίων κίνης εἰ τροκεδέκτο κοῦ τι) to denote the repayment of aidos for aidos shown in the past: in both these passages the verb might be translated, "owe a debt of gratitude", but its precise sense is difficult to pin down.

In Homer, not only those who were philoi, but also those who could be described as deinoi were felt to deserve aidos, and aideisthai could be used of the response to those of greater power and status than oneself. We have seen that in tragedy sebein etc. have become the more common verbs in this context, but in Herodotos the Homeric usage reasserts itself. At 3.72.3 the Persian conspirators against (as Herodotos presents it) the Magus who has seized the throne discuss the manner in which they should gain entry to the palace. Dareios claims that they will have no difficulty in marching straight in, explaining that the guards will not stand in their way, partly out of aidos (κατααυδείμεθα ἡμένα) and partly out of fear (δειμαίνων). Dareios, then, expects aidos and deos from the guards on the grounds of the status (ἐόντων τοῦνδ' ἐκ) of himself and his fellows. As in Homer, then, the association
of *aidos* with fear of one's superiors is made, and *deinotes* is re-established as a ground for *aidos*. Dareios, moreover, is proved correct, for at 77.1 the guards let the conspirators pass. 

Gaining access to the Persian king was, even in normal circumstances, no easy matter. That this should be the case was, according to Herodotos, the work of Deiokes, king of the Medes, who was the first to stipulate that no one should enter the king's presence, but that all business should instead be carried out by means of messengers, that the king should be seen by no one, and also that it should be *aischron* for anyone to laugh or spit in the king's presence (1.99.1). This obviously has the effect of increasing the mystery of the monarch, and, in increasing the gulf between the king and his subjects, may also make it more likely that the latter will regard the former with *aidos*. Given that one does feel *aidos* for one of such superior and awe-inspiring status, it is entirely likely that one will consider it *aischron* to laugh or spit in his presence, since to do so would incur the disapproval of the king and all those who held him in reverence and require a considerable degree of boldness in ignoring propriety. This is probably what Herodotos means here: no doubt by his own time it was considered *aischron* to behave indecorously in the king's presence, but no one man, regardless of his power, could make it so by his own *fiat*. Deiokes may have forbidden these acts, and they may gradually, or even quite quickly, have come to be considered *aischron*, but even Deiokes could not have said "x and y are *aischron*" with any hope of convincing anyone if a majority of those concerned did not already believe so.

Given that *aidos* is the response to the powerful in these passages, it seems important to notice that *sebein* etc. are not generally used of powerful mortals in the histories. We are told at 1.66.1 that the Spartans *rēbouμ* a temple of Lykourgos built after his death, but this in itself suggests only that they regard him as a god (the oracle quoted immediately before left the question of his divinity
open). Elsewhere sebein, eusebes etc. are used exclusively of mortal attitudes to the divine, although at 7.115.3 we do find that the Thracians φίλον μεγάλως the road built by Xerxes on his march to Greece; even here, however, there is a religious connotation, and it seems that the people concerned believe that Xerxes' prodigious feat of engineering is somehow divine.

Aidos is also present in its traditional guise as that which inhibits conduct which is generally felt excessive or inappropriate, and Hippokleides' unorthodox gesticulations during the banquet at the court of Kleisthenes of Sikyon are construed by the latter as anaideia at 6.129.4. The notion of aischrokerdeia also appeals fundamentally to the same regard for moderation and propriety, and at 1.187.5 the adjective aischrokerdes is used of one who would desecrate a grave in the pursuit of wealth.

There are also several instances of aischros in its root meaning, "ugly": 1.196.2, 4.144.2, 6.61.2. The outward appearance of actions felt to be distasteful is also the main point of the adjective at 2.35.3 (τὰ αἴχρεί of practices which should not be performed in public), 2.162.6 (αἴχρεός of the terrible mutilation of Patarbemis), 3.155.3 (Zopyros' self-mutilation an ἔγγον κίδηκτον) and 4.184.2 (πάντα τὰ αἴχρεί λοιδοφόροντα - probably of obscene language). Appearances and appropriateness are also important at 7.13.2, where Xerxes apologizes for his earlier outburst against his uncle, Artabanos: ἦ νεότης ἐπέσε, he explains, ὥσπερ ἀκιδέτερον ἀπονείπει ἐπεκ ἐς κίδεκ πρεβύτερον ἢ χρεώ. Ἀκιδέτερον here refers to a standard of appropriateness in the treatment of the old, a category of people commonly felt to deserve aidos. As represented by the historian, Xerxes reveals his awareness that this standard obtains in his society, and repents of his past conduct. This, too, may be aidos, and we should notice that Xerxes' repentance is based on his own sense of what is right (ἀκιδέτερα ... ἢ χρεὼν). Herodotos is thus able to use traditional language to express the ideas of the desire to do what is right, regardless of other people; and of
regret over one's own conduct in an unselfconscious manner which suggests that such ideas are commonplaces of everyday idiom.

The tragedians furnish ample evidence of the belief that it is aischron to tell lies, and Herodotos provides further examples, but in his case the data refer to barbarian, rather than Greek society. At 1.138.1 he informs us that lying is considered aischiston among the Persians, while owing money is almost as bad, especially in that it usually compels the debtor to tell a lie. At 1.117.2 Harpagos, on being questioned by Astyages, οὐ τείχεται ἐπὶ ἅπαν ὅπων, ἵνα μὴ ἐλεγχόμενος αἷληπται. Lying always risks elenchos, exposure, which is embarrassing and which reveals the agent's anaideia in saying something he knows to be untrue.

Herodotos' assertion that telling lies is aischiston among the Persians does, however, appear a little strange when one compares his statement at 136.1 that andragathie for that race consists firstly in being good at fighting and secondly in having a lot of sons. Either we are to believe that andragathie is not the most desired goal of the Persians, or, if it is, that that which is aischiston for them is not the opposite of that which is kalliston: perhaps Herodotos has got it wrong, or perhaps the values of a real society defy such systematic classification, but possibly the most important aspect of this section of the work for our purposes is the obvious fact that Herodotos does not automatically equate the kalon/aischron standard with the agathos/kakos standard: according to him the Persians' most desired goal is competitive success, but their greatest disgrace is a cooperative failure. If this answers at all closely to what the Persians actually believed or what they told Herodotos they believed, then it is a sign that real societies do not classify their own values in any systematic or exclusive way.

Supplication does occur in Herodotos (1.159,5.51), but only once is aideisthai used in that context: at 7.141.2 the Athenians, urged to approach the god as suppliants in order
to obtain a more favourable prophecy, beg Apollo, ἐν ψωθίσα, χρηστοῦ ἡμᾶς ἔμενιν περὶ τῆς πτέριδος, αἰδωθεῖς τὴς ἵκετήρις τάδε τῆς τοῦ Ἡκομέν φέρεσθαι.

There is, however, one further area in which ἀιδος is of considerable importance. For the Greek states who take part in the resistance to the Persian invasion it is καλὸν to resist, ἀισχρὸν to Medize, and ἀιδος has its rôle to play in promoting the first and preventing the second. At 7.152.3, for example, where the question of Argive medism is raised, co-operation with the Persians is described unequivocally by the historian himself as ἀισχιστα (οὐ' ἀγαναι ἀλήξεται πέτοιμαι). The fullest statement of this commitment to united Hellenic resistance in terms of honour, however, comes at 9.7a.2, where the Athenians explain why, in spite of betrayal by other Hellenes and the advantages of an agreement with the enemy, they remain determined to play a leading part in the defence of Greece:

The Athenians, then, are committed to a specific Hellenic ideal, and their commitment is expressed in terms of ἀιδος and their belief that it would be διὸν (once again δεινὸν πολέειθαι expresses the sense of aischunomai or aideisthai) to betray Greece. As Solmsen points out, 44 Xerxes is also influenced by τὸ καλὸν in deciding to attack the Greeks, but his concern in this direction is limited to the traditional regard for one's own status and the idea that one should live up to the reputation of one's forefathers. 45 Behind the Greek commitment to civic glory and freedom as represented by the Athenians, however, there lies a deeper commitment to a more abstract and altruistic ideal, an ideal represented by τὸ ἑλληνικὸν (racial and cultural unity, 8.144.2) and by the gods of Greece, who personify the abstract ideal and who are imagined as having an interest in its maintenance (see 8.144.2, καὶ θεῶν ἱδρύμακ τὸ κοινὸ καὶ θυεῖς ἐν τῷ ὅμοιτء.
We have seen that ideas which can be expressed in terms of *aidos* are more often conveyed in other ways and that the word *aidos* itself is not of frequent occurrence. This is first of all an aspect of Herodotos' style, but if it also reflects change, then the change will be linguistic rather than cultural, since traditional ideas are clearly still present even where terms like *aidos* are not applied. Two passages, however, offer clear examples of the trend towards subjective evaluation of one's own actions without reference to the opinions of other people. The novelty of this trend, however, should not be over-emphasized, since it is as old as Solon at least. At 5.75.1 we find that the Corinthians, having already set off to join an expedition against the Athenians, changed their minds and withdrew, ἐξ Ἀθηναίων δύνατον λέγειν ὡς εἷς ποιῶν τὰ δίκαια . Whatever the grounds for the opinion that the expedition was not just, we are left in no doubt but that it is the Corinthians' own interpretation of their action which was important, and that justice, in an abstract sense, was an important consideration with them. Had they, in fact, considered what other participants in the enterprise might say, they might have seen that commonplaces such as the need to avoid imputation of cowardice, the importance of being successful in completing what one has begun etc. would suggest quite the opposite course in anyone who had not their concern to do what is right. The Corinthians here act as their consciences dictate.

The remarks of Artabanos at 7.10d.2 might be compared: 

Τά γὰρ ἐν βουλεύσθαι κόρδος μέγιστον εὐρέσκει· ὡς ἤγαζεν.
This argument, attributed to an aged Persian nobleman, more plausibly reflects contemporary developments in Greece. Its novelty lies in its explicit and complete disregard of results, of success or failure, in favour of stress on the quality of the original plan, or intention. Popular opinion as the arbiter of success and failure, of kalon and aischron, is thus ignored, and the possibility of aidos at criticism of one's failure ruled out: what matters here is the knowledge that one has done one's best, one's own awareness that chance, not one's own shortcomings, led to failure.

The word nemesis occurs at 1.34.1, but referring exclusively now to divine anger, it has virtually no relevance to our theme: von Erffa (p.184) compares S.Phil.601-2, E.Or.1361-2.

NOTES TO CHAPTER SIX.
1. In that Herodotos goes on to describe Aristodemos' atimie as social ostracism, it seems most likely that this is all that the historian has in mind here. Atimia, however, might also denote legal disfranchisement, and the social sanctions could be prescribed by law. On the possibility that Spartan cowards were punished by legal as well as social atimia, see MacDowell, Spartan Law, 42-6. For our purposes, however, the precise sense of the word in this passage is scarcely relevant, for even if the Spartans did take legal action against those considered to be cowards, this will only have been one aspect of their disapproval, and thus only one manifestation of a reaction which might occasion aidos in one who had fallen, or was in danger of falling, short of his fellows' requirements.
2. On this question, cf. pp.31-5 above.
3. See again MacDowell, loc.cit..
4. On the senses of nomos in Hdt., see J.A.S.Evans, Athenaeum 1965, 142-53, Ostwald, Nomos, 20-54 passim, and Giraudeau,
Notions Juridiques, 120-33.

5. For this interpretation of the passage, see Heinimann, Nomos und Physik, 29-35, Gigante, Nomos Basileus, p. 115; n.b. 102.1 - nomos makes all the inhabitants of Greece brave. On obedience to the king as the Persians' nomos, see Heinimann, p. 34, n. 42, Gigante, p. 116, Evans, p. 149.

6. See Gigante, 111-2, Dihle in Kerferd (ed.), Sophists and their Legacy, 59-60, and Giraudieu, 164-5, 167-8. One clear indication of this attitude is the passage at 3.38.1, where the historian rebukes Kambyzes for ridiculing another nation's nomoi, and points out that each people considers its own nomoi to be best.

6a. See 104.4, κλέως σε άρετιν αύληων απέβαλον. On the social aspect of the Spartans' arete and the nomos which promotes it (and the relationship of these ideas to sophistic thought), see Dihle, Philologus 1962, 209-10.


8. pp. 288 and 316 above.

8a. There is no essential contradiction between the ideas that the Persians, like the Spartans, do have a code of honour in battle, and that the king's subjects fight only out of fear, provided we make a proper distinction between Persians proper and their subject races (as made by Mardonios at 9.48): Persians may fight out of regard for Persian honour, but subject peoples fight out of fear.


10. In Homer, cf. Ι.2.235, 7.96, 8.163, and see also pp. 268n. 46 and 286 above.

11. For aidoia in the meaning "genitals", cf. (besides these two passages) 1.108.1, 2.30.4, 36.3, 37.2, 48.2-3, 104.2-4, 3.103, 149. Most of the references are in book 2, and most of these deal with circumcision or other Egyptian ritual practices. On these, see Lloyd's commentary, ad locc..

12. See How and Wells, ad locc..


17. Cf. pp. 28 and 34 above.
19. See n.8 above.
20. Cf. 3.155.2, δεινῇ τι πυλώματος Ἀσσυρίως Περσην καταχείλω.
22. On the meaning of which, see pp.10-3 above.
23. The phrase δεινῇ πυλώματος also occurs, but appears to mean
"make a fuss" (so Powell, Lexicon, s.v.πυλώματα A.I.6). One
may, however, make a fuss about an insult to one's honour,
as at 2.121e.1 and 7.1.1, but the phrase does not seem to
have any fundamental reference to standards of honour.
24. See de Romilly, REG 1971, 314-37, Giraudeau, 80-6,
Waters, 105-6.
25. See above, p.106n.127.
26. On honour as Xerxes' motive for attacking Greece, see
also p.427 above.
27. On αίδωσ in this passage, see below, pp.437-8.
28. Not only does the woman's desire for revenge install a
new ruler, but Hdt. also reports an oracle which attributes
Kroisos' downfall to his ancestor's usurpation of his master's
prerogatives (1.91.1).
29. Cf. 7.158.1, Gelon's reply to the ambassadors from Greece.
30. The kind of αναίδεια manifested by Pythios is rejected
by Artabanos at 7.16.1, where he considers himself unworthy
to sit on the royal throne (οὐκ ἄξιος ἀναίδειας): Artabanos pays
due respect to the divergence in status between himself and
the king.
32. E.g. 3.48, the Corinthians' resentment of a θυβρίσμα:
3.120.3-4, where Oroites, insulted by Mitrobates, decides,
in his fury, to avenge himself on Polykrates (!); 6.67.2 -
Demaratos and Leotychides, humiliation of a personal enemy
as vengeance; 6.73.1, Kleomenes' resentment of a δεινῆς προτηθείσης
λακκιμύη; and 7.238 and 9.79.2, on the desire to humiliate
a dead opponent by maltreating his body (on which see de
Romilly, REG 1971, p.333; on the body as a prize in war, see
7.225,9.22 and 24).
33. Arguments of this kind are particularly common in Euripi-
dides (above, pp.363-84).
35. pp. 432-3 above.
37. Ibid.
38. See above, pp. 97n. 35 and 126.
39. The woman, in fact, reacts as Plutarch's ἐμφύτως γυνὴ would (see pp. 432-3 above) - she is shamed and, out of concern for her honour, seeks revenge. In 10.2 αἰτίωθε ἡμιαία is probably passive ("disgraced"), but to be disgraced implies that one will feel ἀίδος, and in this instance the woman's consciousness of her disgrace inhibits her impulse to cry out. It seems certain, then, that ἀίδος is part of her reaction.
41. There is an identical concealment of an identical condition in George Douglas Brown's, The House with the Green Shutters (London, 1901). Brown, a protegé of Gilbert Murray at Glasgow, would have known his Hdt., and may have taken the idea for Mrs. Gourlay's abscess from this passage.
42. See 1.86.2, 138.2, 2.141.6, 172.4, 5.7.
43. See pp. 185, 248 (and 249-62 passim), 352 above.
44. Two Crucial Decisions in Herodotus, 28-31.
45. See above, p. 427.
46. On the relationship of this passage to contemporary thought, see Dihle, Philologus 1962, p. 217.
47. η'γ' seems simply to be variatio for η'γ' here: cf. 8.144.1 and von Erffa, p. 183.
48. See also Giraudieu, p. 70 (and 71-2 on phthonos in Hdt.).
7. THUCYDIDES.
Thucydides uses the substantive *aidos* only once, at 1.84.3, and the verb *aideisthai* does not occur. The only other derivative of *aidos* to find its way into the work is the adjective *aidoios*, twice (1.6.5, 2.49.8) used in the neuter plural in the sense *pudenda*. In the passage in which *aidos* does occur, however, it is quite clear that it is regarded as a synonym of *aischune*: κιδως εσφευρηνον πλειστων μετέχει, *κισχυνγ* δε ευθυχικα, claims Archidamos. *Aischune* etc., on the other hand, are found quite often, as is τι *κισχρον* as a synonym of *aischune* in both its subjective and objective senses. Given that *aidos* and *aischune* are interchangeable at 1.84.3, and since this only reflects the intimate relationship between *aidos* and those terms derived from *aischros*/ *aischos*, it seems legitimate to continue to treat instances of the terms mentioned above as relevant to the study of *aidos*. At the same time, as in previous chapters various periphrases which seem to present ideas which deserve to be included in our enquiry and several passages in which none of our terms occurs will be considered, where it seems possible that the ideas with which we are concerned are present.

We have seen that the shift from *aidos* to *aischune* is a gradual one, effected over a long period in the works of several different authors. This development probably reflects a change in everyday usage. On the other hand, *aidos* does not die out after Thucydides, and other, later authors use it with greater frequency than he does. For this reason, some have sought to explain the virtual exclusion of the term with reference to the historian's method and outlook. Shorey, for example,\(^1\) believes that he prefers *aischune* and τι *κισχρον* to *aidos* because the latter is "more distinctly ethical", and thinks that the historian saw *aidos* as an obfuscation in the search for a rational explanation of events: if this were the case, it would be strange that the practically synonymous *aischune* is of such frequent occurrence as a motive for action, rational or not. Nor is there any real case for considering *aidos* to be "more ethical" than *aischune*. No substantial difference of either meaning or connotation
is unambiguously apparent in any passage we have considered so far, and while we may well agree that Thucydides has exaggerated a linguistic trend out of personal preference, the real reasons for his preferring aischune and ἀἰχύνη seem scarcely discoverable.

The sole instance of ἀῖδος in the work occurs in the middle of a debate in which ἀῖδος/aischune, aischron and kalon, as well as other terms, notably sophrosyne, are of the greatest importance. Sophrosyne is a key word in the work as a whole, but its importance is probably greatest in book one, where its centrality to the Spartan character is the major point, and where the efficacy of the Spartan approach, and the applicability of the term sophrosyne thereto, are disputed. Reference to Spartan sophrosyne is first made by the Corinthians at 1.68.1, where Spartan possession of the virtue with regard to their internal affairs is admitted, but contrasted with amathia in their dealings with outsiders. Here, as elsewhere, sophrosyne may denote little more than "good sense". In 1.69 the Corinthians go on to criticize their allies for their quietism and lack of initiative, and they end their speech (71.7) with a conventional appeal to the Spartan sense of honour, urging them to live up to the reputations of their forefathers.

It is to this view of the Spartan character that Archidamos, ἀνὴρ καὶ σωφρόν δοκῶν εἶναι καὶ σωφρόν (79.2), addresses himself. He immediately stresses the importance of deliberation and good counsel (80.1-2), and, in summing up this part of his speech, points to the danger of the more precipitate approach urged by the Corinthians (82.5):

εἰ γὰρ ὑπεράσκεψιν τοῖς τῶν γυμνίσων ἐφκλήσασθαι ἐπειδὴ ἔντετε τίμημαν κυτήν (sc. τὴν Ἀθηναίην), ὁρᾶτε ὅτι ἐπὶ σοφρόν καὶ ὑπερασκείν τῷ Πελοποννήσῳ πρόειμεν.

It is clear that σοφρόν here refers to the disgrace of defeat. The Spartans' concern for careful preparation, elsewhere seen as sophrosyne, thus also contains a desire to avoid disgrace, a desire which might be construed as ἀῖδος.
Archidamos’ next point develops the idea of disgrace: just as the Spartans should beware of defeat as a possible outcome of over-hasty action, so should they avoid being stung into action by their own aischune at others’ charges of cowardice:

\[\text{καὶ ἀκανθῶσα μηδεὶς πελώσαι μη \ τὸ \ πόλεμον μη \ ταχῦ \ ἐτελθὼν}
\[\text{δοκεῖν \ θετεί (1.83.1).}
\[\text{καὶ \ τὸ \ βέβαιο \ καὶ \ μέλλων, \ ἐ\ μερίων \ εἰς \ μέλλον \ ή \ μή}, \ μή \]
\[\text{αἰρόκνισθαι (1.84.1).}

Whereas at 82.2 Archidamos had attempted to arouse the aischune of his audience at the prospect of defeat, in these passages he moves to forestall the same feeling, lest the Spartans should be persuaded that their present inactivity is generally regarded as cowardice. This idea is implicit in the speech of the Corinthians, and it is one to which they return at 120.3: 
\[\text{καὶ \ ἵπποι \ γὰρ \ ἐν \ κρίσει \ μὲν \ ἐστιν, \ εἰ \ μὴ \ ἀδικάειτο,}
\[\text{ἡ \ κυκέσσω, \ ἄγκεθον \ δὲ \ ἀδικαμάνως \ εἰ \ μὲν \ ἐφρήσεις}
\[\text{πολεμῶν ...}. \ They \ then \ go \ on \ to \ enlarge \ upon \ the \ duty \ of \ the \ agathos \ to \ avoid \ disgrace (122.2-3). \]

The importance of their argument at this point lies in its appeal to the essentially heroic ideal that the agathos should resent insults and take steps to wipe them out, and the implication is that the Spartans, unless they act as the Corinthians wish them to, risk not being considered to be agathoi. This is the assumption which Archidamos attempts to counteract at 83.1 and 84.1. There is, then, something of a tension between the arete-based values of the Corinthians and sophrosyne: although Spartan sophrosyne, as represented by Archidamos, takes account of the fear of disgrace, it is seen as possible that others may regard the same attitude as indicative of anandria. Aidos (or aischune) can thus lead to both caution and haste, and Archidamos is driven both to excite aidos and to deny its applicability in certain circumstances, and thus the traditional ambivalence of the concept is apparent once more.

The idea of good counsel which Archidamos consistently recommends also exhibits a certain ambivalence, in that at 84.1 the conduct suggested by aischune is opposed to good sense, while at 82.5 aischune and good sense converge to the
same end. There is a very close echo of the former attitude at 8.27.2-3, where Phrynichos also speaks out against the danger of being forced into ill-considered action as a result of fear of disgrace:

This passage concentrates on facts and deprecates oversensitivity to popular opinion. It also hints at subjectivity in the evaluation of that which is *aischron*, in that the attitude which recognizes that others may criticize one for retreating, and that this is *aischron* regardless of the circumstances, is explicitly rejected as unhelpful: Phrynichos is able to decide for himself that it is not *aischron* to retreat *meta kairos*. This need not, however, be seen as novel, or necessarily dependent on the opinions of the sophists, first of all because Agamemnon finds it just as easy to deny that retreat, even by night, is *aischron* at ll.14.80-1, and secondly because Phrynichos immediately goes on to refer to the traditional idea that defeat is disgraceful in pointing to a greater and more concrete *aischron* which might come about as a result of a misplaced fear of criticism. Thus he is not simply urging the Athenians to ignore popular opinion, but rather attempting to channel their sense of shame to a more important object, just as Archidamos attempts to convince his Spartans that the disgrace of defeat caused by haste is a more pressing consideration than the prospect of criticism of their caution.

In the speeches of both men good sense and prudence are of the utmost importance. The Corinthians, however, seeking to overcome Spartan slowness, attempt to argue against this importance (1.120.5):
This passage is virtually the converse of that at Herodotos 7.10d.2, in that it uses similar vocabulary to limit the importance of good counsel, whereas Artabanos in Herodotos stresses its importance. Here, however, there is nothing remarkable either in the language or the content, for where Artabanos denied that success or failure have any effect on the essential worth or excellence of a plan (thus denying that success or failure determine what is aischron or kalon), the Corinthians use ἀνίχνευσι traditionally to refer to the plan's eventual issue.

At 1.84.2-3 Archidamos goes on to explain how the Spartans' caution, described as ἐνθέσθαι ἔμφθαι, maintains stability and equilibrium in their state, preventing excess in both the enjoyment of good fortune and the extent to which they yield to misfortunes: this caution, he goes on, means that the Spartans are not easily forced into action against their better judgement either by the praise or the censure of others. The king then proceeds to give this approach a theoretical basis in the organization of the state and in its system of education (84.3):

This is a complex and difficult passage, but the general line of thought is fairly clear. Archidamos has just explained that his people's caution leads to moderation, and he attributes that moderation to the discipline of the Spartan education (τὸ ἐὔκοσμον). This education, however, has two
parallel results: it renders the Spartans both warlike and prudent. The origin of both these qualities is then explained in the clauses, τὸ μὲν ... ἐξθαλάσσῃς ἦν, and while ἄιδος only occurs in the first of these, σοφροσύνη is found in both, and since ἄιδος is associated with σοφροσύνη in the first clause, it must be that it is also relevant to the second. Indeed, the whole passage is an explanation of Spartan σοφροσύνη, a concept with which ἄιδος has long been associated, and this association is expressed in a particularly direct manner here. Aidos, then, is closely relevant to Spartan σοφροσύνη.

The Spartans' overall characteristic, then, is σοφροσύνη, and ἄιδος (here equated with αἰσχύνη) is part of that σοφροσύνη. Sophrosyne thus seems to be the wider term, in that it covers the entire effect of Spartan discipline and education, whereas ἄιδος only occurs in relation to martial, rather than civic virtue. This perhaps reflects an association of ἄιδος with the poetic and the archaic, perhaps specifically with its importance in the martial context in Homer, while the use of σοφροσύνη to cover wider aspects of civic virtue probably reflects the more fashionable nature of the term and its greater suitability to political and theoretical contexts. Both the traditional links between ἄιδος and σοφροσύνη, however, and their particular closeness here mean that it is not only with Archidamos' remarks on his city's warlike qualities that we are concerned.

The promotion of bravery through ἄιδος, of course, is an idea which is as old as Greek literature itself. Here, however, martial virtue is placed in a civic and social context. Bravery, Archidamos says, has a share of ἄιδος/αἰσχύνη: this, however, does not appear simply to refer to fear of others' disapproval, or, at least, if it does, it refers not to the disapproval of outsiders but to that of one's fellow Spartiates, since the σοφρόν attitude, of which ἄιδος and bravery are constituents, specifically excludes excessive concern with the praise or blame of non-Spartans. The Spartans' martial ἄιδος presumably does contain an element of
fear of the disgrace of defeat or cowardice, but the moderation which their king commends means that it is not so intense as to be influenced by the taunts of others.

Much more importantly, *aidos* is related to the more general attitude of moderation which is developed by education and which promotes obedience to the laws. Education is thus seen as the major contributor to national character, and *aidos*, as part of *sophrosyne*, is seen as a product of that education. Spartan *sophrosyne*, then, is produced by an education in the values and statutes of Spartan society: it does not take an excessive account of the opinions of outsiders, but is based on obedience to the internal constraints of Spartan society; it involves rational deliberation, but not to the point of excess, and the *nomoi* are always superior to individual cleverness. In all this, *aidos*, as a part of *sophrosyne*, is important, and thus emerges as a product of one's upbringing in a social and political environment. Hussey's relation of this to Demokritos is very plausible, but perhaps it is not possible to be quite so specific: the passage certainly shows sophistic influence, but other thinkers, such as Protagoras and even Antiphon, may also have propounded similar ideas, and it is also possible that the sophistic influence on the passage is too general to be related to anything more concrete than the general climate of late fifth century thought.

At 2.11.4-5 Archidamos again urges caution, this time on an army in the field immediately prior to the first invasion of Attika, and certain of his remarks on this occasion recall those already quoted. This time, however, it is fear, rather than *aidos*, which is stressed as an important factor in ensuring success in battle:

> 'kO'CrAJ -a-x^H61ý3 c1e1J tv`J -rv vý -rrkE&Vic, S ccL: c Tt, Kxrc C6vvvvrocs PPToc? aIrKEvovs / IE Vt1 & u. " iý C vý ýE oc1 el cv ýý, ac-ývs 6re tvýc, ý rw CSýe ýw eft frr LC& c valýK`ýýi . The association of *aidos* with fear is traditional in the martial context, as is the opposition of *aidos* and "daring":

...
thus it seems quite possible that the fear which Archidamos urges on his men is akin to *aidos*. In particular, *aidos*, as well as being related to the fear of disgrace, may denote a reluctance or hesitancy when action is called for, based either on the simple fear of going too far (or "daring") or on a more precise fear of criticism, and it is in this aspect that *aidos* is often considered inefficacious in certain circumstances. Archidamos clearly believes that the fear he recommends will be salutory, but, together with his earlier remarks about caution, *aidos* and *sophrosyne* in book 1, this passage does indicate a considerable Spartan tendency towards hesitancy in the name of discipline and prudence, and, it has been plausibly suggested, in these qualities may reside something of the Spartans' weaknesses, as the historian saw them, as well as their strengths.

These speeches of Archidamos, taken collectively, recall the remarks of another Spartan king in a different context: at S. *Aj.*1071-86 Menelaos, like Archidamos in 1.84.3, also associates discipline in the city and discipline in the army, and the coincidence in the use of terms like *aidos*, fear and *sophrosyne* in the speeches of the literary and the historical kings is striking. Both Menelaos and Archidamos seem to reflect contemporary debate on the nature of political communities and on the forces which promote social cohesion, but it is also significant that both are Spartans, and the remarks on the fostering of obedience to authority, and so on fear, *aidos* and *sophrosyne*, seem to have a special relevance to conditions in Sparta, at least as Athenians perceived them.

We have already seen that the Corinthians take issue with Archidamos on the correct way to check the Athenians. At 1.86.2 one of the ephors, Sthenelaídás, taking up the Corinthian position expresses this difference of opinion as a difference regarding that course which is truly *sophron* - ἢν σωφρονίμως ... οὐδέ μελλότωμεν τιμησείν. Thus he denies that *τὸ μέλλειν*, which Archidamos called *ρυγόσυμη εἶναίν* is *sophrosyne* at all. Just as Archidamos, then, had to distin-
guish (at 84.1 and 84.3) between two kinds of aidos/aischune, so Sthenelaidas suggests that a course of action designated sophron by his king is really not sophron at all. The whole debate, it seems, reflects sophistic interest in accurate definitions of words,\textsuperscript{27} as well as a sense of the relativity of those terms both to the particular situation and to those who use them.

Throughout the debate in book 1, while it is sophrosyne which is given greatest prominence as the quality which the Peloponnnesians would most like to appropriate to themselves, the desire to maintain time and avoid disgrace is also important. Archidamos and those who support him seek to avoid the aischron which may be occasioned by ill-prepared action on their part, while the Corinthians and Sthenelaidas regard it as aischron that they should not punish the Athenians forthwith. It is thus important to both sides to maintain honour, although they disagree as to how this should be achieved.

The motivation of the Corinthians receives further expression at 1.122.2-3, where they explain:

\textit{...}

For the Corinthians, then, defeat will mean slavery for the defeated, and even to be in a position from which it is possible that one's fortunes could tend in this direction is aischron, since the cities of the Peloponnese are many and Athens only one. Concern for the opinion of other states is revealed in δοκιμαί: people will say either that, since the Peloponnnesians acquiesce in their humiliation and thus admit their inferiority, the Athenians must be justified in treating them badly, or that the Peloponnnesians fail to retaliate out of cowardice. The Corinthians, then, experience aidos
with regard to both their present condition and the deterioration which they see as inevitable if they do not take action at once. They then go on to refer to the familiar precept that one should not disgrace one's forefathers, and *aidos* is also relevant here. 28

The Corinthians thus express themselves in thoroughly traditional terms, and, indeed, they make this clear in their references to the past. Attempting to win the Spartans to their point of view, they profess to see the dilemma facing them as identical to that which faced their fathers 29—freedom or slavery, the liberty of the cities of Hellas, the dissolution of tyrannies, 30 all these points are intended to arouse Spartan *aidos* that they should appear worse than their fathers.

Resentment of wrongs or insults, as we saw in Herodotos, may be expressed as *δεινὸν ποιεῖθαι*, 31 and this phrase occurs with the same meaning at 1.102.4, where the Athenians are described as resentful at being sent away from Ithome, although their help in crushing the helot revolt had been requested—καὶ δεινὸν ποιήσαμεν καὶ ὡς ἀξιώματες ὑπὸ Λακτ-δαμανίων τῷτο παθένων... Again, ὡς ἀξιώματες makes clear the connexion between *δεινὸν ποιεῖθαι* and treatment felt to be unworthy of one's status.

Later in book 1 Perikles delivers a speech which is the Athenian counterpart of that of the Corinthians at 1.120-4, and it soon becomes apparent that he is motivated by many of the concerns which affected them. At 141.1, for example, he too sees the issue of peace or war in terms of freedom or slavery:

*τὸν γὰρ κύριον δοκίμων δικαιώσειν ἢ τὴν μεγίστην καὶ εὐχαρίστη
δικαιώσειν ὑπὸ τῶν ὀμίλων τὸ ἔνοχον τῆς πόλεως ἐπιτελείωσένη.*

For Athens to give in to Peloponnesian demands without recourse to arbitration would, he claims, imply her inferiority. Like the Corinthians, therefore, Perikles urges his audience to go to war at least partly to preserve their
honour in the face of enemy insults. Later in the same speech he refers to a positive inducement to war based on the same premiss, that defeat is aischron and victory kalon, and that one must defend one's time against the former and seek to increase it by means of the latter - ἐκ τε τῶν μεγίστων κινήσεων ὁτι καὶ πόλεις καὶ ἴδιατὰ μεγίστα τυμαί περιγύνεται (144.3). As was the case with the Corinthians, reflections like these lead him to one of the conventional inducements to valour, the importance of maintaining one's father’s reputation (144.4).

At 2.11.2 and 9 it is the turn of Archidamos to express precisely these two points, the need to live up to the reputation of one’s father and the glory to be won in victory:

δύκμων ὡσ ἡμᾶς μὴ τῶν πατέρων χείρας καίνεται μὴ τὴν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τῆς σοβῆς ἐνδεικτέος.

ὡς ὡσ ἤτοι πολεμῆν τέκνων στρατεύοντες καὶ μεγίστην σόβην οἰκομένη ταῖς τε περγήνως καὶ ἡμῖν αὐτῶς ὅτ' ἀμφοτέρῳ ἐκ τῶν ἀτερβάντων ἐπέθεο . . .

Unlike Perikles, however, Archidamos combines the reminder of the duty to the glory of previous generations, itself an appeal to aidos on the basis of one’s own reputation, with a more explicit reference to the requirement that the present generation should strive to preserve its own reputation. The Spartans' doxa, he suggests, is at stake, once and for all, for good or for bad, and this constitutes a very powerful appeal to aidos indeed. With Archidamos' linking of past and present we might perhaps compare 4.92.7, where the Theban, Pagondas, urges his countrymen not to αἰσχύνει τὰς προηγούμενα ἁταλίας, where the ἁταλία are προηγούμενα in that they have been handed down from previous generations (who are mentioned immediately before) to the present. 32

Also in book 2, Perikles' Funeral Speech has a great deal to say about honour and disgrace. At 42.4 we are told that those in whose honour the oration is delivered, by concentrating on warding off the enemy rather than on their own safety, τῇ ... αἰσχύνῃ τῶν λόγων ἐφυγεν. The dead, by the very fact of
their death, escape the charge of cowardice. By doing so they bring glory to the city, and in the next chapter Perikles urges his audience to remember that this glory is the result of the aischune, the desire to avoid disgrace, of men like those who have died (43.1):

(χείρ) καὶ ὄτιν ὑμῖν μετελη ὄβρα ἐιναι (sc. ἢ Τόλις), ἐν θυμομένοις ὅτι τελμῶντες καὶ γινώσκοντες τὴν δέοντα καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ αὐξιωμένην ἀνδρῶν κατὰ έκτίμαντο, καὶ ὅποτε καὶ πείτε τοις σφαλέιν, οὐκ ὀὖν καὶ τὴν τίλιν γε τῆς σφετέρος ἄρτος ἀσφλεύντως στερεόκεν, καλλίτευχον δὲ ἔρανον αὐτὴ προϊέμενοι.

Glory, then, is won by men who know their duty and who experience aischune (=aidos) when in action. These two points are probably to be taken closely together, since awareness of τὰ δεῖνα in battle will presumably occasion aidos/aischune at the prospect of dereliction of that duty, while aidos/aischune itself, and the discipline and cohesion thereby promoted, must also be considered part of a soldier’s duty. Mention of the arete which belongs to the city brings us back to the familiar idea of the community of honour within the group, and it is clear that, for Perikles, the polis has a powerful claim to the loyalty of its members, and he expects that the honour of the city as a whole will be as major a consideration as the honour of oneself and one’s family.

At 44.4 it is to the collective honour of the family that he refers in urging the older members of the community who have lost sons to be consoled by the eukleia the dead have won.

In chapter 46, which forms the conclusion to the speech, the civic inducements to bravery in battle, namely glory, a public burial and education at the state’s expense for the sons of the fallen, are described as the ἑθλικ ἔρτυς, and these, it is said, produce the best citizens - ἑθλικ γὰς ὃς κέιτι ἐρτυς μέγιστα τὸς δὲ καὶ ἀνδρὰς ἔρτυς πολιτῶνειν.

To be a good citizen is thus a competitive activity, but it is the good of the polis as a whole which Perikles stresses, not simply the glory to be won by individuals. At the same time, however, it seems that he does believe that competition
among the citizens for these athla can only be good for the community. The expression ἀθλα λέγεται recurs at 2.87.9, where it is the Spartan way of rewarding bravery and punishing cowardice which is under discussion:

καὶ εὐκ ἐνδώμονεν πριν εἰναι κακῶς γενέσθαι ἢν δὲ τὸ ἄρα καὶ βεβηλήθη, καλαθήσεται τῷ πρετεύον ἄνημα, οὐ δὲ ἁγαθεὶς τεμήσοντει τοῖς περικέκεναι ἀθλίστοις.

The Peloponnesian commanders are characteristically more ἀθετοῦν. reticent than the Athenian statesman, but, for all the differences between the two cities and their ideologies, both reward the brave and punish the cowardly. As in Athens, the Spartan or Peloponnesian athla may include material benefits, but the wider value of these is honorific, and the athla presumably also encompass other, less tangible rewards. As regards the punishments for cowardice mentioned here, the language used strongly suggests specific legal penalties, rather than simple disapproval, and we shall encounter an example of the statutory punishment of cowards below. 33

At 2.62.3 Perikles combines two appeals to ἀδος: one is the prospect of unfavourable comparison with previous generations, and the other is based on the idea that it is ἀισχρόν to admit weakness by giving in to others. His actual words are:

... τῶν τε πατέσων μὴ ἱερῶς κατ' ἄμφοτέρα φανερῶν, οἱ μὲν πάνω καὶ οἱ παῖς ἀκλίνω δεδόμεναι κατέχον τε καὶ προσέται διακάλλυται παρέσιμω ὡμοί αὐτὸ (κλίθην δὲ ἐκχειτε ἀκλίνως καὶ κτημένως ἀθυρῶς).

It is ἀισχρόν to be deprived of what one has, and even more so when one owes what one has to the efforts of one's forefathers, since to give up one's possessions in that case entails a betrayal of the reputation of one's predecessors. It is more ἀισχρόν, Perikles claims, to lose what one has than to fail to acquire more, because the former shows weakness and lack of initiative while the latter at least reveals a proper degree of ambition. Having made this point, Perikles then goes on to urge his fellow citizens to strive to win glory and avoid disgrace (64.6): ὡμοί δὲ ἐστε τὸ μέλλον καὶ πιγνότες ἐστε τὸ κατάκακα μὴ κλίθην τῷ ἱδη προεξόμενον ἁμφοτέρος κτήσακε...
States, then, act very much as do individuals, at least in the view of people like Perikles and the Corinthians spokesmen in book 1. The last two passages quoted, in particular, make it clear that a major motive for the maintenance of the Athenian empire, and thus for the Athenians' readiness to go to war, was the time that the city enjoyed as a result of her pre-eminence. This is a major theme of the history, and a point to which Athenian spokesmen refer often and explicitly. 34

Athenian success at Pylos in 425 B.C., their fortification of the place and blockade of the Spartiates on the island of Sphakteria, poses considerable problems for the Spartans, faced as they are with both the ignominy of defeat and the loss of a number of important citizens to the enemy, for whom they would constitute valuable proof of success and an important source of propaganda. Accordingly, their ambassadors sent to Athens to sue for peace make it clear that avoidance of disgrace is one of their chief objectives, and they point to the renown which the Athenians' success has brought them as an incentive for them to come to terms immediately (4.20.2):

εἰτ δ' ὄντων ὑπέτην καὶ ὑμῖν μὴν δοῖς καὶ ἡμετέρες βικίς προτιμήσατε, ὑμῖν δὲ πρὸ κιλκεῶν τινς συν- φορὲς μετέκαστε κατατιθέμενος δι' αὐτοῦ ὑμῖν.

The Athenians, however, are not persuaded. They go on to capture the island, and allow their prisoners to seek advice from their fellows on the mainland as to what they should do: they are told to make their own decision, provided they do nothing aischron (4.38.3). At 5.34.2 we learn that the captured Spartiates, having decided to surrender themselves and their arms to the Athenians, were later disfranchised, suffering legal atimia. Although the Spartans are credited with other motives for taking this action, there can hardly be any doubt but that these measures would have been justified to the Spartan people with reference to the fact that the prisoners had done something aischron in giving up their weapons. The prisoners' conduct, then, would have been construed as cowardice and punished by the appropriate penalty. 35
It is significant, however, that the very disfranchisement of these people is explained by a fear that, if they were allowed to retain their citizens' rights, they might attempt some kind of revolution out of a feeling that they were somehow disadvantaged by what had happened on the island, and it is probable that this explanation alludes to the social atimia which the former prisoners would suffer, and to the fear that their resentment of this might take an extreme form. 36

At 4.126.5 Brasidas is attempting to encourage his troops, who are about to face the barbarous Illyrians. He points out that their outlandish appearance and constant shouting conceal serious deficiencies in their way of fighting, and implicitly contrasts Spartan discipline, maintained by aischune, with their haphazard approach, maintained by their lack of aischune:

οὐτὲ γὰρ τὰς ἔκτις αἰχυνθέτειν ἂν λιτεῖν τίνα
χῷρην διασόμενα ἢ τὸ φυγὴ καὶ ὡ ἐφόδος αὐτῶν
γεγν ἔχων δοσὶν τῶν καλῶν ἀνεξέλεφτην καὶ τῷ
ἀνδρῶν ἔχει (αὐτοκρατικὸς δὲ μάχη μάλιστα ἃν καὶ
πρὸς τὰν τοῦ ἐγνώμον τινὶ περιτοίχως πεζίζει).

Brasidas' point is that the Illyrians will not prove resolute opponents because, unlike the Spartans and other Hellenes, they do not fight under the constraint of aischune (=aidos), that is, they have no regard for the opinion of their fellow-combatants and have not been taught that it is disgraceful to retreat: thus they are not afraid to save themselves rather than stand their ground. Brasidas represents this as inherent in their tactics: they do not fight in battle formation and thus have no way of determining each other's bravery, while their strategy of "every man for himself" affords the individual the opportunity to justify tactics for which he alone is responsible.

We need not take this too literally, however, since it is clear that Brasidas is saying exactly that which will most hearten his men: it suits him very well to represent the Illyrians' guerilla tactics as indiscipline and lack of
aischune and to contrast this with the superiority of hoplite warfare. We should not, therefore, simply accept that the tactics he describes necessarily mean that those who employ them have no sense of aischune: the Illyrians may feel no aischune at following the battle plan they feel to be most efficacious, but that is a different matter. Homeric battle, for example, is more or less ἄντικεφαλή, and yet ἀδος is of the greatest importance to its participants, while references in Herodotos to various barbarian peoples, like the Skythians, who also exhibit reluctance to engage the enemy in straight combat, suggest that their aischune could be just as intense as that of the Spartans. Even the Spartans themselves, moreover, will have known as well as anyone else that sometimes a well-disciplined army has to swallow its pride and withdraw, and so the fact that the Illyrians withdraw readily as part of their strategy proves very little about their sense of aischune. Brasidas' remarks, then, are more valuable for what they tell us about the Spartans than for what they tell us about the Illyrians. While it should probably not be implied that every Spartan experiences aischune at any withdrawal in any circumstance, it is clear that Brasidas believes that Spartan battle-formation ensures bravery and discipline, in that it renders each man a witness of his comrades' behaviour and allows no excuse for saving oneself at the expense of the group.

Brasidas' belief in the importance of τὸ ἁίσχυνθαι in battle is expressed again at 5.9.9, where he addresses first the Spartiates, then their allies:

This clearly echoes Archidamos' remark at 1.84.3 that εὐφυκία partook of aischune, but whereas Archidamos was addressing his fellow-Spartiates, here Brasidas seems to think that a simple reminder of the duty inherent in their status will suffice to motivate that section of his force. Archidamos
also assumed that aischune would promote discipline, while Brasidas treats that quality separately. Τὸ αἰσχῦνται itself is unexplained, but it must refer to the traditional function of aidos/aischune of promoting bravery through the fear of disgrace or the reluctance to become a coward. As von Erffa points out, one might expect τὸ ἐθέλειν to be a consequence of τὸ αἰσχῦνται, but aischune is a negative check, and by τὸ ἐθέλειν Brasidas probably envisages a positive desire to fight well. As if to reinforce his point about aischune Brasidas goes on to employ a classic appeal to aidos: if the allies fight bravely, they will enjoy the title "allies of the Spartans" (note κεκληθησαν, ibid.), but if they do not, they will risk universal condemnation as traitors to the cause of Greek freedom. The analogy with the situation of 480-79, then, continues to prove useful to the Peloponnesians.

The issue of freedom or slavery is also central to the Melian Dialogue, where Melian aidos/aischune at the prospect of being considered inferior is seen as a possible reason for their resistance, and thus its appropriateness is deprecated by the Athenians. At 5.100 the Melians clearly express the idea that their aidos prevents them giving in to Athenian demands:

Η πτω ήρα, εἰ τεῦτον γε όματι τε μὴ πιθήμεν άρχης καὶ οἱ διωκώμενοι ἢ ἀτυλλακησάντες τὶν παρεκκλησίαν πετοῦμεν, ἢ μὲν γε τῆς ἐπὶ ἐλευθερίας τολῆς καθάς καὶ δείλε μὴ τὰν τῶν διωκώμενως ἐπεισελθεῖν.

This is a traditional attitude, and one of which we have already seen evidence in Thucydides. To the Athenians, however, it is not a prudent attitude (101):

Οὐκέ, τίν γε συμφώνως διωκώμεθεν. οὐ γὰρ περὶ ἀνθρωπογινατικας ο χινων ἀπὶ τῶν Ἰων ὑπὸ, μη αἰσχυνησθεῖν δῆλειν, τετελεί καὶ συμφώνησαν καθὼς καὶ βουλή, τοῖς κέρδοσιν πολέως μὴ ἀνθισταθήμεν.

The Athenians, then, claim there is no room for andragathia or the concern to avoid disgrace when the weak are faced with the demands of the strong, and urge the Melians to act out of prudence (σωφρείως) and in their own interests.
Sophrosyne is thus opposed to aidos here, although Archidamos could combine the two at 1.84.3, but the Athenians' argument does not differ fundamentally from that offered by that speaker at 1.83.1 and 84.1 or that of Phrynichos at 8.27.2-3, since all these urge the dismissal of at least one kind of aischune in favour of a more realistic appraisal of the particular situation. As the catchword, soteria, suggests, there is obvious sophistic influence on the Athenian argument, and a fragment of Demokritos supports their position, inasmuch as it claims that it is not by giving in to the strong that the weak incur disgrace, but in attempting to oppose them: this, however, is an attitude which is much older than the sophistic movement, for it is expressed in strikingly similar terms at Hesiod, WD.210-1—he who opposes the stronger inevitably loses and adds aischea to his algea. The Athenians' position in 101, then, is based on traditional discretion, rather than the extreme immoralist's "might is right". At the same time, however, their argument is one the Melians are unlikely to accept: the attitude that it is aischron to be ruled by others is well-nigh universal among the Greek states as represented by Thucydides and Herodotos, and never is the determination to avoid the imputation of inferiority, or slavery, tempered by the realism of admitting the prospective ruler's superiority. Thus the Melians do not accept that their aidos is irrelevant simply because they are not the equals of the Athenians, because they do not accept that the contest of andragathia can only take place among equals.

The Athenians develop the points made in this passage in more detail at 111. Still urging the Melians to consult the interests of self-preservation and good sense, they go on to deliver a denunciation of aischune/aidos which draws heavily on traditional ideas of that quality's ambivalence (111.3-4):
The passage recalls those in which the ambivalence of \textit{aidos} is first encountered (I.24.45 = Hes. WD.318), as well as the passage we have already considered in which Phrynichos points to the possibility of a greater disgrace resulting from a misplaced sense of \textit{aischune}.\footnote{53} The argument here is, then, that \textit{aischune} at giving in to the Athenians without a fight could lead to utter defeat in a struggle with superior forces: thus, although the Athenians depreciate \textit{aidos}, they also seek to arouse it. They then go on to appeal, in essence, to a kind of ideal hierarchy of honour (4), in which those of equal status compete, while the weaker give in to the stronger and the stronger behave moderately towards the weak. Again, this has a traditional basis, since any society structured upon honour will be hierarchical and will expect its members to "know their place": it is for this reason that the status of a person delivering an insult will be important - insults from those who compete on a basis of equality or near equality must be taken seriously, while the strong can afford to ignore a challenge from the weak and the weak must simply endure the slights of their betters.\footnote{54} A system of this kind probably works well where differences of status are well acknowledged, but even then the application of the theory will not be hard and fast: in Herodotos, for example, Harpagos will have been only too conscious that he was the inferior of his master, Astyages, yet the resentment he feels at being insulted by him still leads him to take action which ultimately removes him from his position of pre-eminence.\footnote{55} In practice, then, no hierarchy of honour will be absolutely rigid, and inferiors may be intensely determined to protect their honour against even their acknowledged superiors. To these considerations we might add that the Melians might well point out that there is no acknowledged hierarchy of Greek poleis, that all are free and call no man their master. Thus the Athenians' argument, though based on traditional notions, will fail unless the Melians abandon...
their commitment to other, equally traditional notions.

In urging their partners in the dialogue, moreover, to abandon their aischune with regard to becoming the subjects of Athens, while counselling them to bear the disgrace of defeat in mind, the Athenians also seem to be attempting to have their cake and eat it, since it is unlikely that the Melians, having accepted that defeat is aischron, even when one is defeated by superior opponents, will then accept that giving up one's independence is not aischron, precisely because one's opponents are superior.

It should be clear from this discussion that the Melian Dialogue is not simply an abstract treatise on the nature of power: the Athenians recognize that the Melians' aischune, together with other, more or less moral notions, will be a hindrance to them, and so they attempt to eliminate it. Similarly, those who see the Dialogue as the illustration of the Athenians' drop to the very depths of immoralism are unlikely to be right, firstly because it is clear that they are simply using the arguments they feel to be necessary, some of which are traditional, some "sophistic", in order to bring about a convenient, and bloodless, resolution of the matter, and secondly because their arguments are strikingly similar to those of the Athenian spokesmen at 1.76.2-3, who also mention that it is natural that the strong should rule the weak: the spokesmen in book 1, it is often pointed out, claim that they themselves act with justice, though they need not, but so, too, in effect, do the ambassadors to Melos, who promise that the Melians will be treated moderately if they give in, and go so far as to claim that moderation towards one's inferiors is the best policy (111.4). The arguments of the Athenians at Melos, then, do not represent a decline in the moral standpoint of the city's spokesmen from the position at the beginning of the war.

It is not only the thought of these passages which is important for our purposes, however: in 111 in particular, the terms aischune and aischros are used with a remarkable degree
of fluidity. *Aischune*, for example, occurs in both its subjective and objective senses, as the sense of shame (= *aidos*) which does men most harm in the midst of "ugly dangers" (i.e. when there is a danger of utter, and disgraceful, ruin), and as the disgrace which is more disgraceful when caused by one's own stupidity. From the next sentence it appears that, in the usage of Thucydides, *aischune* is undergoing a similar development to that which is manifest in the two usages of *aischune*: for just as *aischune*, which first appeared as "disgrace", came to signify also "sense of shame", so in this passage *a, 4X(J, with its "attractive name", is not "the disgraceful", but "thought (or fear) of the disgraceful", i.e. the sense of honour, or *aidos*. There is also an interesting periphrasis for misplaced *aidos/aischune* in 111. 4, where the obstructive preoccupation with honour is described as *a, 4X(J, which suggests that the desire to avoid disgrace can be seen in terms of its converse, the appetite for success.

In two passages the idea that military defeat is *aischron* occurs in connexion with the position of the Peloponnesians at the time of the Peace of Nikias. At 6.10.2 Nikias himself expresses the belief that the truce was made at a time when the situation of the enemy was more *aischron* than that of the Athenians, i.e. the Peloponnesians had come off worse in the Archidamian war, while at 6.11.6 he urges the Athenians to be cautious, and to imagine that the Spartans are doing nothing but

\[ \text{δικαίως ὀφείλεται ὀπίσθεν ἔτι καὶ χορός, ἢν δύναται,} \]

\[ \text{ηὐλόγητες ἢμεῖς ἐν ἑτέρων ἀπερεπεῖς ἐνθεοῦσα, δῶς καὶ} \]

\[ \text{περιτείχαν καὶ διὰ περιτεῖχος δοθεῖσα βεβηλίας μελετῶν.} \]

Here again *aischune* seems to cover the ideas of both "disgrace" and "reaction to disgrace", while, as in 5.111.4, *aperpēs* is used as *variatio* for *aischron*. Nikias clearly believes that the Spartans' renowned sense of honour will prove stronger than any obligation they might feel to honour the treaty which he himself negotiated, and thus his appeal to realism rather than justice does recall something of the atmosphere of the Melian Dialogue, but Nikias' realism,
while it does recognize that the Spartans are more likely to act in their own interest than out of a concern for justice, also encompasses a recognition that considerations of national prestige are often as important as the evaluation of one's immediate material advantage, and this is a thought which his compatriots in the Melian Dialogue would rather play down.

In the same context (that of the debate over the expedition to Sicily) Nikias also finds it necessary to deny the appropriateness of aischune in certain circumstances, when he imagines that the older citizens may fear the charge of cowardice from the young and so be reluctant to vote against the enterprise (6.13.1): 62

The irrational impulse of aischune, Nikias recognizes, may overcome one's better judgement and lead one to conform as a result of the social pressure exerted by the more vociferous. The aischune which he attempts to forestall is thus based on appearance rather than facts, and on the judgement of others rather than one's own opinion of oneself. As it turns out, his attempt is unsuccessful, and the vote for the expedition is carried without conspicuous opposition because of the aischune of many in the assembly (6.24.4):

Thucydides ascribes the conformity of these people to fear, but since the fear in question is directed towards the adverse judgement of others, towards "how it will look if ...", it seems legitimate to conclude that the historian is describing the operation of the aischune which Nikias tried to forestall: but although the citizens opposed to the expedition are represented as keeping silent out of aischune, their embarrassment does not take exactly the form which Nikias feared it would: for whereas Nikias envisaged the fear of being called a coward, the fear of being considered
weak, the citizens in 6.24.4 keep silent out of a fear that they will be considered unpatriotic; Nikias thus imagines aischune at individual failure, while the historian himself presents a reluctance to be considered lacking in one's commitment to others, one's fellow citizens.

After the arrival of the expedition in Sicily, we find Alkibiades giving voice to the commonplace that it is aischron to return from an enterprise with nothing to show for it (6.48.1): ἄλκιβιάδης δὲ οὐκ εἴη σχῆμα πείσατο δυνάμει ἐπιλέβασας καὶ ἀπρεσάτης ἀπελθέντην. Among the Sicilians themselves the threat from the Athenians is frequently expressed in terms of freedom against slavery, kalon against aischron. At 6.80.5 Hermokrates urges the Syracusans μὴ αἰσχρόν δεῖ ταῦτα λαβέντωσιν, and at 7.56.2 that community is represented as considering the kalon to be achieved in the conflict with the Athenians. 64 This point is echoed by their ally, Gylippos, at 7.66.1, and it is he who goes on to remind them of the consequences of defeat - slavery, "unseemly" treatment of women and children and an aitikêmys for the whole city (7.68.2).

So far we have seen whole states or armies being urged collectively to pursue τὸ καλὸν and avoid τὸ αἰσχρὸν: in this way the concern for honour appears to work collectively on groups very much as it does on individuals, and, indeed, we do find that the prominent individuals of the history are also motivated by similar concerns, often to the extent that they promote certain policies or take certain decisions, the results of which will affect the entire state, out of concern for their own personal prestige. This is particularly true of Nikias and Alkibiades: at 5.16.1 Nikias is represented as contemplating his reputation in the eyes of posterity as he attempts to secure the peace which bears his name, 65 while Alkibiades, we are told, proceeds to wreck the peace at least partly because he regarded it as a slight to his honour that the Spartans had negotiated with Nikias and Laches rather than himself (5.43.2). 66 At 6.15.2 doxa forms part of his motivation in supporting the Sicilian expedition, while in
his speech in the following chapter he reminds the Athenians of his own time. His famous speech to the Spartans also reveals that his regard for his own status is paramount (6.89), and at 8.82.3 he is portrayed as wishing to appear to Tissaphernes. Nikias' concern for his reputation is revealed at 7.48.4, where part of his reluctance to return to Athens from Sicily stems from fear of punishment for his failure, part from the fear that such punishment would, because of the discreditable nature of the charge (ιπτ', αἰσχρά καί αἰρετά), ruin the good name which he was so keen to preserve at 5.16.1.

It is not only in the sphere of competitive values, however, that states and individuals are subject to the same, more or less personal motives: we also find that aischune, kalon and aischron are as relevant to the co-operative ties between states as they are to the obligations of personal philia, and, in particular, the requirement to return favours is mentioned just as often in the area of international diplomacy as it might be among personal philoi.

At book 1.32ff. Kerkyraian and Corinthian ambassadors address the Athenians, speaking for and against an alliance between Kerkyra and Athens. The former point out that they have no claim on Athenian services, since neither have they supported them in the past nor are they members of their alliance, and so they confine themselves to the advantages which an alliance between the two cities would bring (1.32.1). The Corinthians, on the other hand, employ an argument based on justice and honour, referring initially only to the supposed rights and wrongs of their dispute with Kerkyra: an important part of their attempt to convince the Athenians of their opponents' injustice is their portrayal of their anaischuntia, which, although the Corinthians' language is extremely vague, seems to consist in failure to observe proper standards in relations with other states.

The Corinthians' remarks on their opponents' anaischuntia occur in chapter 37. At 32.4 the Kerkyraians had referred to
their previous opinion, now abandoned, that their policy of
neutrality represented *sophrosyne*, in that it freed them
from the danger of being implicated in an ally's mistakes.
At 37.2 the Corinthians, since theirs is the moral argument,
interpret this statement with an exclusively moral emphasis,
and take the Kerkyraians' *sophrosyne* not as a claim to pru-
dence, but as a claim to quiet moral virtue: the Kerkyraians,
they say, avoided alliances not out of *arete*, the desire to
be morally right, but with a view to *kakourgia*,74 in order
that they might proceed with their *adikemata* without the
need to experience *aischune* at the opinion any witnesses to
their misdeeds might have of them. In their view, then, one
feels *aischune* when one's misdeeds are witnessed, and would
prefer that they remain undetected.75 This is one possible
view of the operation of shame as a check against wrongdoing,
the idea that shame requires witnesses to be effective, and,
as we have seen, it is a view shared by many, both in our
ancient sources76 and in the discussions of modern commenta-
tors:77 it is, however, for reasons outlined above, unlikely
to be absolutely right.78

The speeches of both sides at this point in the work are
clearly influenced by sophistic rhetorical theory: the Ker-
kyraians represent the argument from *τὸ ἱερόν*, while the
argument of the Corinthians is based on *τὰ κέκληματα* : the Corin-
thians, moreover, since their opponents expend no great
energy on putting forward the justice of their case, are
driven both to propose the kind of positive moral construc-
tion which might be placed upon the Kerkyraians' previous
conduct, and to demolish this impression by interpreting the
same conduct in a negative moral light. Since it is the
Corinthians' main aim to blacken their opponents by means of
rhetoric, they are led into a slight inconsis tency: they
claim that the Kerkyraians possess sufficient regard for
their reputation for quiet moral *arete* to attempt to conceal
their misdeeds from others, and, at 37.4, they develop this
point by alleging that their opponents devised *τὸ ἔβρυτον*
*μὴ καταπολέσων* as a cover for their immorality, rather than as a
way of avoiding being drawn into the immorality of others.79
At the same time, however, they go on to accuse them of *anaischuntia*, in that they persist in acting unjustly and have no concern for decency or justice provided they may make some gain (ibid.):

Thus the Corinthians seek thoroughly to blacken their opponents, yet they do so by claiming both that they devise fair-seeming arguments, themselves largely a product of the Corinthians' imagination, to conceal their misdeeds, and that they have no regard at all for propriety in pursuing their own advantage.

The Corinthians refer indirectly to the Kerkyraians' *anaischuntia* (anaideia) once more at 38.5: 

The Corinthians claim that they have a right to respect from their colonies (cf. 38.2, 38.3, 38.4), as superior does from inferior or parent from child, and, in implying that the Kerkyraians have been deficient in this respect, indirectly accuse them of lacking the *aidsos* which one owes one's superiors. As did those of the Athenians at 5.111.4, their arguments rest on the idea of a hierarchy of honour, in which the inferior must give in to the superior, but which also requires that the superior behave with moderation towards the inferior. It is perhaps possible that the Corinthians envisage a situation in which the Kerkyraians might be satisfied with their own knowledge that they had acted *καλῶς* by giving in, while the Corinthians had acted *ἀιχθύς* by using force, but more probably they regard international opinion as a powerful sanction against excessive behaviour on the part of individual states, and imagine that the Kerkyraians might draw some satisfaction from both the praise they would enjoy on account of their moderation and the censure incurred by the Corinthians' excessive violence. The view, however, that the community of Greek states is concerned with the injustice of
its members is an idealistic one: it clearly suits the Corinthians to propound it here, but the Athenians, although in other circumstances they might put forward similar views, are not susceptible to it in the present instance, and decide to support the Kerkyraians out of regard for their own interests (1.44.1-3). It is, in fact, fairly clear that the Corinthians’ pursuit of the moral argument rests entirely on their image of themselves as the wronged party, and thus, since the Athenians, who have no real interest in the quarrel over Epidamnos, decide on the basis of self-interest and the Corinthians only resort to the argument from principle because it suits them to do so, it appears from this episode that it is out of a desire to maximise their self-interest that states conduct themselves, regardless of ideas of propriety in international relations which undoubtedly exist.

Between states which are allies, as we have said, the standards which are felt to obtain are largely identical to those which apply to personal philia. This much emerges from Pericles’ words at 2.40.4:

The idealistic remarks on the relative merits of different kinds of obligation do not immediately concern us, but it is important that proper behaviour towards one’s philoi is seen as part of arete, and that this is felt to hold good for cities as well as for individuals. Given that it is part of arete to behave properly towards one’s philoi, the aidos/aischune one might experience at betraying a friend, and thus proving oneself kakos, should, in theory, be intense.

Like the Corinthians in 1.38.5, the Mytilenean ambassadors at Olympia in book 3 assume that breaches of obligation between states are frowned upon by the community of city-states, but, at the same time, and unlike the Corinthians, they also recognize that disapproval of the betrayal of one state by another
is not allowed to interfere with considerations of national self-interest - it is an established custom, they claim (3.9. 1), that states welcome the defection of their enemies' allies, yet remain suspicious of those who have broken faith: νομίσουσι δὲ εἶναι περὶ οὓν περὶ τὴν ἥλιν καὶ εἰς ἰταταὶ. The Mytileneans are thus realistic enough to recognize that no state is going to reject a potential ally who could prove useful, but at the same time their desire to convince the Peloponnesians that they did not, in fact, betray the Athenians reveals that a community might, nonetheless, be acutely concerned for its reputation for loyalty to its allies. It seems, then, that aidos over a breach of philia may affect an entire city.

In conclusion to their speech at 14.1 the Mytileneans appeal to a moral principle of a rather different kind as a means of eliciting Peloponnesian support, representing themselves, figuratively, as suppliants, and asking the Peloponnesians to grant their requests καὶ καλικικτηντες . . . τὰς τῶν ἑλλήνων ἐς ὑμᾶς ἐλπίδας καὶ Δίκα τῶν ὑσματων, ἐν εὐτω χερώ ἵκα καὶ ἱκανῆ ἴμαρ. This appeal recalls the Athenian statement of their commitment to the cause of Hellenic freedom at Herodotos 9.7a. and rests on similar assumptions regarding the specifically Hellenic ideal that the independence of individual city-states should be protected. The hopes of the Greeks, the Mytileneans claim, are invested in the Peloponnesians as liberators, and it is aischron to betray either these hopes or the god who underwrites the principle on which they are based.

The concept of philia is also of the greatest importance in the speeches delivered by the Plataians and the Thebans later in book 3. That friendship or enmity is a central issue of the debate on the fate of the Plataians is stated in simple terms by the Plataians themselves at 3.54.2, where they ask whether the Spartans consider them philoi or polemioi: if the former, then it is the Spartans who are in the wrong in attacking them without provocation. This, in turn, raises the question of justice, for if the Spartans consider the Plataians their enemies, then they cannot claim that they
have been wronged (ἀλώκατα) if the Plataians have not treated them as friends.

The justice of the Plataians' own position is the issue at 55.3 - εἰ δ' ἀφοτάνησθι 'Ἀθηναίων οὐκ ἐθέλησαν ὑμῶν κελευσθήναι, οἷς ἥκισθαν. This statement they explain with reference to Athenian help against the Thebans, and to the demands of honour in an alliance in which a bond of charis exists between two willing parties - καὶ προδομίων ἑαυτῶν οἰκετί ἕν καλόν. It is thus both dikaios and kalos to maintain one's obligations to one's philoi. At 56.4-5 the Plataians adduce the argument from philia and charis in yet another way, claiming that the Spartans are obliged to show gratitude for the Plataian contribution to the repulse of the Persians in 480-79.

The Plataians, then, are urging the Spartans to take the proper moral course, the course which might be dictated by aidos, and the appeal to aidos becomes more explicit in 57.1:

The Spartans are reminded, then, of their reputation for andragathia and of the fact that the eyes of the rest of the Greeks are fixed upon them, particularly since the present conflict involves parties of such renown. The community of city states, they claim, takes a dim view of injustice and ingratitude, and their disapproval can affect one's arete.

Having once introduced it, the Plataians proceed to develop the argument from the Spartans' reputation: they remind them of their former alliance and of the arete shown by their fathers in the cause of Hellas, and ask, as a favour which ought to be returned, that they should not kill οὕς μὴ ... Προτει, but rather συγκομά τα ἀντὶ ἀνωτέρως νυμήκεραν χάριν,
kai m' ëven ðontes ëkklês kakícov autoiês ântiklêbei. To kill former friends, then, would be aischron, the Plataians claim, and would expose the Spartans to a charge of kakia. The threat of loss of reputation is then put even more bluntly (58.2): ἄρα καὶ τὰ ἐμέτερα ἑώματα δικηθέρα, ἐπίτηδεν δὲ τὸν ὀσκίκλησιν κυτών ἐξήνεκεν. The Plataians then continue in this vein until the end of their speech, reminding the Spartans particularly of the need to preserve their own reputation, of the Plataians' past services, of the Spartan dead who lie in Plataian soil, the danger both of falling short of their standards and of dishonouring their graves, and adding, as a further consideration, the fact that the Plataians laid down their arms and came forward as suppliants (3.58-9). All these arguments are based on standards which aídos traditionally helps enforce, and so the conclusion that the Plataians' main purpose is to arouse the Spartans' sense of aídos is inescapable.

The Thebans (3.60) are worried lest the Spartans succumb to this kind of argumentation, and so request leave to argue against the Plataians. In opposing them, however, they nevertheless rely on similar standards of justice and propriety, and seek to prove that the present generation of Plataians deserves no special consideration. Thus, while much of their speech consists of self-defence against Plataian attacks on the conduct of the previous generation of Thebans, they also answer their opponents directly at several points. At 63.3-4, in particular, they attempt to refute the Plataian claim that it would have been aischron for them to betray their allies, the Athenians:

καὶ ἄρα ἐχέστε ὡς αἰχμηρῷ ὑπὲρθοντες τῶν ἐνοργίας. Πολὺ δὲ ὡς αἰχμηρῷ καὶ ἄδεκτησι τῶν τάσσει Ἑλλήνως κατὰ-προσόντα, ὡς ὑμνώμενο, ἢ Ἀθηναίους μένως, τῶν μὲν καταδεκτησιν τὴν, Ἑλλάδα, τῶν δὲ ἐλευθερώσας. καὶ ὡς ἀν λέγων τὴν ἀρκετὴν αὐτῷ αἰτίαν ἐπηλλαχθῆναι, ἄγες, μεν γὰρ ἁδεκτήσις αὐτῶς, ὡς τοις, ἑπερνεῖτε, τοῖς δὲ ἁδεκτησιν ἀθλεῖς ὑμεναῖοι κεφάλαια. κατὰ τῶν ἑμαῖρας ἄρεστα μὴ ἀντιδεδώκας αἰχμηρῆς μᾶλλον ὡς τῶν μετά ὁσκίκλησιν μὴ ἀπελεφθέον, ἐὰς ἀδεικτῶς ἀπὸ σοδιμάν δέ.
The Thebans, then, agree that it is *aischron* to betray one's allies, yet, turning the Plataians' references to the situation of 480-79 to their own advantage, regard the betrayal of the Plataians' former allies as more *aischron* than that of their alliance with the Athenians would have been. For the Thebans, as indeed for the Plataians (cf. 58.1), the manner in which ties of friendship are maintained is also important: by following the Athenians in their enslavement of Greece the Plataians have "given back unequal charis", turning a debt owed on a just basis into one repaid on a basis of injustice. The Thebans maintain, then, that an ally should consider justice rather than the obligations of alliance when these seem to demand co-operation in injustice, and this is the opposite of the implication of the words of the Corinthians at 1.37.4, which seem to assume that a state may be drawn into injustice out of loyalty to its allies. Clearly, however, this is a moral dilemma which each state would have to work out for itself, and probably neither of these two statements on the subject is a definitive solution to the problem, although it must be said that the position of the Thebans is in no way untenable.

At 66.2 the Thebans point out that the Plataians also killed men who stretched out their hands in supplication (namely the Thebans taken prisoner after the initial attack on Plataia), and thus dismiss their opponents' observations on the *nomos* that such people should not be killed (58.3), implying that the Plataians' initial *adikia* calls forth retribution and that they, too, have committed *aischra*. They attempt to shame the Plataians in a more direct manner at 67.2, turning their own arguments on their past *arete* against them: if the Plataians ever did show any *arete*, their present conduct is doubly *aischron* and deserves twice the punishment, since it represents a betrayal of their inherited excellence (*τί οὐκ ἐκ πρεσβέων ἐμφανέντειν*), and thus a betrayal of their forefathers. The Thebans do not necessarily want the Plataians to experience *aidos* here, but they are trying to annoy them by implicating them in disgrace.
All these speeches, those of the Plataians and Thebans, of the Mytileneans at Olympia, of the Corinthians at Athens, refer to justice, philia, τὸ καλόν and τὸ ἁγίον with great regularity, and are thus strikingly unlike the most celebrated of Thucydidean speeches, such as the Melian Dialogue or the debate over Mytilene, in which Athenian speakers, particularly, avoid references to these concepts and depreciate their worth. It seems most likely, to this reader at least, that it is the "philia/justice" speeches which represent the kind of argument actually employed in the course of international diplomacy, rather than the austere practical arguments in speeches of the other kind, and so we should be prepared to recognize that references to standards which are normally upheld by ἀδος were probably crucial to the language of the fifth century diplomatic exchange, but neither should we be in any doubt as to the historian's low opinion of the efficacy of such arguments. In the Plataian debate, in particular, nothing is more striking than the irrelevance of the arguments of both the Plataians and the Thebans on justice and τὸ καλόν to the Spartans' eventual decision, for, while the Spartans justify their decision to put the Plataians to death in terms of justice (claiming that the Plataians broke the treaty they had made with Pausanias and were first to harm the Spartans, 68.1), the historian makes it clear that he himself believed that they acted as they did to gratify the Thebans, whom they regarded as useful to them at that time (68.4). This, in fact, is the general pattern in such episodes. It seems probable, then, that the speeches in which self-interest alone is stressed represent the historian's own appreciation of the issues involved, while those in which justice and τὸ καλόν are prominent reflect more closely the type of arguments which might actually be employed.

This is not to say, however, that Thucydides necessarily approved of the concentration on expediency over justice in international affairs. His own ideas on the rôle of morality in international politics are hard to pin down, but it is perhaps significant that in the context of personal philia,
at least, he subscribes to the belief that it is part of arete to help one's friends. He might, then, agree with the Plataians that it is a sign of kakia for a city to fail to honour its obligations of charis (3.58.1), while appreciating that such considerations will not normally outweigh a state's calculation of its own advantage.

From 4.19.2-4 it appears that a cessation of hostilities can, but need not, create a state of philia between erstwhile enemies. The Spartans, at this point, are seeking to come to terms as a result of the setback they have suffered at Sphakteria, and claim that it is better to dissolve enmity by coming to a moderate and fair settlement than to attempt to force one's opponents to agree to one's own terms. When one makes an agreement προς τι ἐπιεικές καὶ ἄετη, as they claim they wish to do, ἄδμητες μὲν ἀρεύιν καὶ ἄμμαχωκαι καὶ ἀλην ὕεικαν τολλὴν καὶ ὀικείοτητα ἐς ἀλλήλους ὑπερέχειν, a debt of charis is created between the two signatories, with the result that ὁμέλην γὰρ ἡδη ἐναντίον μη ἀνταμίσθηκυ ὡς ἀντεπέθεσ, ἀλλ' ἀνταποδώκαι ἄετην, έτοιματες ἔς ἐστιν ἀλλήλαις ἐμμένειν ὡς ἰνόθετο. Again, the reciprocal relationship between philoi is described as arete, and aischune (in its subjective sense here, as a synonym of aidos) ensures that the agreement is observed. The Spartans thus represent the course commended by honour and moderation as that which is also most advantageous (making for fewer problems in the future), and it seems that the historian, to judge from his disapproval of his fellow-citizens' rejection of terms, agrees with their assessment, but it is also clear that the Spartans' desire for fairness and moderation stems largely from their position of inferiority at the present stage of the conflict, and we should not forget that Nikias' observations that the Spartans are more concerned with the preservation and enhancement of their doxa appear to be justified by events. While, then, it appears from the present passage that a moderate and honourable settlement involving an alliance for the future may have been the most advantageous course for both sides, the Athenians' rejection of the offer and the idea that the Spartans would not be constrained
by the obligations inherent in a peace treaty both suggest that in reality ambition and concern for national prestige tend to preclude the recognition that the course which is reasonable and honourable may also be the most expedient.

At 4.64.3 the Syracusan, Hermokrates, employs an argument based on philia in an attempt to unite the other Sicilians, at present split by differences among themselves, against the Athenians. With this in mind he claims that, by virtue of their sharing the same island and being called by a common name, the Sicilians are as much kin to each other as are Doriens to Doriens or Chalkidians to Chalkidians: as a result, the competitive standards which obtain among those bound by no tie of philia do not apply - οὐδέν γὰρ αἰθρίν σικεῖος oikeioi ἤτοι θύμα. The gnome is conventional enough, but the application of the term oikeioi to the disparate ethnic communities of Sicily is questionable.

In the Melian Dialogue, as we have seen, the Athenians attempt to exclude moral considerations from the discussion, while for the Melians questions of aischune etc. arise. As well as raising the subject of their own aischune, however, the Melians also refer to the possibility of Spartan aischune should they fail to help their allies. The Spartans will intervene to help their allies, the Melians claim, if for no other reason then at least τῆς γε συντενέσθη ἐννυχ καὶ αἰθρίν (5.104). The Athenians, however, are contemptuous of what they regard as the Melians' naïveté here (105.3), τῆς δὲ ἐσθ Ἀκιδεμονέων δόξης, ὡν δὲ ἐπὶ αἰθρίν δὴ βουβήθεν ύμῶν πιστεύετε αύτως, μακαρίτευτε ύμῶν τὸ ἀντειρόκοκκον εὑρημέντος ἦσθε μὲν τὸ κέφαλον, and go on to claim that the Spartans consider only their own interests in their dealings with other states: although they act in accordance with arete in respect of their own customs and institutions, towards others they consider only their own advantage, and τὰ μὲν ἴδεκ καλὰ νεμόσουσι, τὰ δὲ συμβέβηκα δίκαια. The truth of this has already been amply demonstrated in the Plataian episode. The Melians, however, have a good answer for the Athenians on this point, and remark (106) that it is in the Spartans' interest not to
acquire a reputation for betraying their allies, lest they alienate those well disposed to them and provide the enemy with valuable propaganda to use against them. In this enlightened view, then, justice and self-interest can coincide, and this is exactly the position which might be taken by Demokritos, Sokrates or Antiphon. The Melians, in essence, appeal to the idea of ultimate self-interest, which may differ from immediate self-interest, but this is a point which is lost on the Athenians of the dialogue, who, in 107, persist in regarding τὸ στομάτιον as that which is most convenient for the Spartans in the short term. The lessons imparted by the secession of Athens' allies on a large scale later in the war, however, perhaps suggest that the city's concentration on its immediate advantage had blinded it to the nature of its ultimate self-interest, and thus might go some way towards proving that the kind of argument employed by the Melians in 106 is a cogent one.

In the case of the Melians there is no evidence that the Spartans were influenced to intervene, whether for reasons of justice or for those of self-interest. Significantly, however, the Spartans' most articulate spokesman, Brasidas, is represented as referring to exactly those concerns raised by the Melians in 5.106, in that, in attempting to win the propaganda battle among the allies of the Athenians, he claims both that the Spartans are genuinely concerned to treat any states which might secede with justice, and that it is in the Spartans' interests to do so. Such is his argument in his speech to the people of Akanthos at 4.86.5-6:

χαίτετες γὰρ ἂν τὴς ἀκροβάτου ἀρχῆς εἰς, καὶ ἦμιν τοῖς Ἀκεδαμίωις οὐκ ἁπτεῖσθαι, ἕν ἑκεῖ ὑπνοῦ ἑκοθεᾶσθαι, ἀνὴρ ἑδονῆς καὶ δόξης ἀετὰς μᾶλλον. οὕς τε τῶν Ἀθηνῶν ἐφίλημαι κατακτησμένην, αὐτοὶ ἔν τε μάθειν έχθειον ἢ δὲ ὑποδείξασιν ἀρετὴν κατακτήσαν. ὡς τε γὰρ εὔπρεπως κυρίως τούτῳ ἔν τε μάθειν πλακωνίζεται ἢ βίον ἐμφανήν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ δικαίως, ἣν ἡ τύχη ἔδωκεν, ἐπέρεχεται, τὸ δὲ γνώμης ἀδελφών ἐπισκολή. Once again arete is identified with justice, equity and the honourable motive of freeing states from subjection to Athens,
and *time* and *doxa* are seen as the rewards which such *arete* brings. That which would be worse than rule by another state is Spartan intervention in the internal affairs of cities which secede from the Athenian alliance, and Brasidas claims that this would be the case because such Spartan intervention would be a betrayal of their previous claim to *arete*, and so *aischron*, even more *aischron* than the pursuit of profit by force. Brasidas' reassurance of his audience is thus very subtle, in that he suggests that the Spartans will remain true to their promises to act with justice simply because it is in their own interests to do so: for whoever would choose an *aitia* and the implication of a *γνώμην ἀδίκος* rather than *time* and *doxa*? It seems fairly certain, then, that Brasidas is convinced of the value of justice in dealing with other states, not least because he is aware that the argument from justice and *τὸ καλόν* can prove efficacious and offer the Athenians' allies an honourable motive for giving in to Spartan pressure. The pressure, however, is still there: Brasidas threatens to lay waste the Akanthians' land (87.3), and while the latter are impressed by his attractive arguments, their decision to give in is also motivated by fear for their crops (88.1).

There is a minor example of the operation of the *kalon*/ *aischron* standard in the context of proper behaviour among states at 8.45.4, where Alkibiades describes the Chians as *anaischuntoi* in requesting aid from Tissaphernes in order to revolt from Athens, and their *anaischuntia* seems to lie in their attempt to induce others to take trouble on their behalf when they have the resources to help themselves (πλην τῷ κτιτόν ὑπὲρ τῶν Ἑλλήνων), although it may also have involved their pleading poverty when their wealth was well known. 103

We have seen that *philia* between states operates in very much the same way as does personal *philia*. It is, as one might expect, in the sphere of international politics that *philia* is most prominent in the work, but references to personal *philia* do occur, and one in particular shows how identical standards obtain in both kinds. At 2.51.5 the identi-
fication of proper behaviour towards philoi with arete is made by the historian himself: oi ἐκεῖνοι τι μεταπονοήμενοι, he informs us, were most likely to die of plague as a result of contact with others, αἰσχύνη γὰρ ἔφειδον αὐτῶν ἐκείνως πατὰ τοὺς φίλους. This aischune, the impulse to act in accordance with arete, might perhaps be identified with a feeling that society expected one to care for one's philoi, but in anyone who would expose himself to a fatal disease as a result of such aischune the feeling must have become deeply internalized. This passage, in fact, is a good example of the way in which terms which often describe the self-regarding concern for one's own position may also be used of behaviour which benefits others much more than it benefits oneself.

Personal philia is also relevant in a much less significant way at 2.97.4, where we learn that the Odrysian Thracians, unlike the kings of Persia, believed that one should receive gifts rather than give them, and that it was aischron not to give a gift when asked than to ask for one and fail to receive it. Only the use of aischron in the context of the reciprocal process of philia need concern us here.

It only remains to comment on some passage which do not fit readily into any of the categories outlined above. At 1.5.1 we are told that, in days gone by, piracy did not involve its practitioners in disgrace (aischune), but rather brought them renown (doxa). It is the attitude of those who were not pirates which is important here, since presumably anyone who chose to be a pirate would be unlikely to spend his life feeling ashamed of his profession, and this is why Thucydides goes on refer to the question, found in "the older poets", as to whether those who put in to land were pirates: this question, he writes, assumes both that those questioned would find nothing reprehensible in the practice of piracy (οὐτὰ ... ἑπικατοντυ) and that those asking were unlikely to reproach them for it (οὐκ ὀνειδίζουσιν). Presumably, in the absence of any coercive state only those who were the victims of piracy would find anything wrong with it.
One passage in Perikles' Funeral Speech touches on the relationship between nomos and disgrace (aischune):

\[\text{\textit{νομος} \& \textit{αισχύνη}}\]

The problem of the precise meaning of "unwritten law", and whether the expression can always be related to an identifiable corpus of unwritten laws, is a vexed one, and this particular passage does not make a particularly decisive contribution to any possible resolution, but a few general points might still be made. First of all, since Perikles claims at 37.1 that Athens differs from other states in her nomoi, it would appear that the nomoi of 37.3 have a more or less Athenian character, and thus that the unwritten nomoi are not to be related to laws which are common to all men. This does not mean, however, that Perikles has a specific Athenian collection of unwritten laws in mind, since the reference to the "recognized disgrace" which results from breaches of these standards suggests not specific imperatives but Athenian belief in general; agraphos nomos in this passage most probably indicates the general body of moral attitudes which one could declare with some confidence to be held by most Athenians; anything which the Athenians considered aischron might be proscribed by an agraphos nomos. It is, however, with the use of aischune rather than the meaning of nomos that we are chiefly concerned, and so the main points to note are the association of fear of aischune and fear per se as the forces which ensure obedience to law and custom, and the application of the adjective \emph{μηδὲν} to \emph{αισχύνη}, which suggests both the possibility of disagreement over what is aischron and, more importantly, the idea that the members of a political community are (must be?) in general agreement over moral values. Both the identification of fear and fear of disgrace as the factors which ensure justice in the state and the mention of agreement suggest the influence of Protagorean political theory in this passage, and in our final chapter we shall return to this
theory and the opposition to it. 110

Perikles returns to the topic of aischune in a subsequent passage of his speech (2.40.1), where he claims Πλούσιων τε ἔχουν μὲν ἄλλων καιρῷ ἐκχώρισεν κυμάτω προς σφημήλα, καὶ τὸ πέντε-
θαν οίκοι ἐμελοχέοι πινὶ καθὼς, ἀλλὰ μὴ δικαιοῦντες ἔγινεν εἰκονεῖ. Here Perikles distances his city from the tendency to regard poverty as something of which one should be ashamed. 111 In Athens, he suggests, it is not poverty itself which is the disgrace, but failure to take active steps to escape it. Thus it is a person’s intentions which he values, rather than the outward impression created by his circumstances, and the absence of initiative is more disgraceful than poverty itself. It is notable that, while Perikles claims that it is not aischron to admit poverty, he nevertheless assumes that poverty is aischron, since, for it to be true that not to strive to escape poverty is aischron, it must also follow that the condition of poverty is discreditable in itself. 112

At 2.52.4 a connexion is to be found between nomoi, in the sense of social and religious imperatives, and anaishuntia in the description of the effects of the plague on traditional burial customs:

νόμιμο τε πιέζει συνταγμάτων οἷς ἔχουσα πρότερον περὶ
τῆς ταφῆς, ἡθοποιοὶ δὲ μὲν ἐκείνους ἐδικάσατο. καὶ πολλὶ ἐσ-
ἀναίδευτοι, θυσίας ἐκατέρωσαν ὀτανὶ τῶν ἐπικυρεῖν ἕκα
τὸ συνόν ὑδην προτεθείσαν ἕπειν. ἐπὶ πυρὸς γὰρ ᾧλο-
τέσας ἐθάνατος τοὺς νεκροὺς οἱ μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦν τῶν
ἐκτυνην νεκρῶν ὑπόπτως, οἱ δὲ καυματίων ἄλλου εἰπελόντες
κῦψαν οὐ κατελεγον ὑπόπτως.

The sentence ἐπὶ πυρὸς γὰρ ... explains the sense in which the methods of burial here referred to are anaishuntai: 113 cremating the body of one’s own relative on a pyre made for someone else or throwing it on a pyre which is already aflame indicates a lack of regard for established norms of behaviour and for the opinions or feelings of other people, especially those of the deceased person for whom the pyre was built. Von Erffa 114 does not explain ἀναίδευτοι, but his comparison of S.Α이.1306-7, 1356 and El.245ff., where aidsos, in a
general way, promotes proper burial, is apposite.

Immediately following the passage quoted, the historian describes other, wider manifestations of anomia caused by the effects of the plague on public morals. Central to these are failure to sebein the gods and disregard for human nomoi and the deterrence of legal sanctions (53.4).

The verb aischunomai occurs in the context of a similar breakdown of conventional morality at 3.82.7, where Thucydides comments sardonically on the type of reputation most sought after in times of stasis, when traditional senses of words become twisted. Speaking of a syndeomai he goes on: 

This passage has caused some difficulty, but its sense is fairly easily appreciated, provided we translate not as "are more readily called" (Gomme), but as "would rather be called." If we then supply with 

we have the perfectly acceptable notion that "the majority would rather be called clever rogues (lit: clever though rogues) than stupid but honest (stupid though honest): in the case of the latter they are ashamed, but in the former they exult." Cleverness, not arete, is now the most desired quality, and even a reputation for arete is of no consolation to one who would rather be called clever.

Several incidental passages may be dealt with briefly: at 3.42.2 aischron is used in a general sense of proper behaviour, at 3.59.3 the Plataians say they would rather perish by starvation, which is the most aischron method of death, than be handed over to the Thebans, and aischistos here seems both to describe the fundamentally unpleasant nature of such a death and to contrast it with a more fitting way of dying, perhaps specifically death in battle; at 8.73.3 we are told that Hyperbolos was ostracized because

It seems more likely that aischune should be objective here (Hyperbolos was a disgrace to, brought disgrace upon the city) but the subjective sense ("ostracized because
of the city's shame" at Hyperbolos' presence). In either case the point will be that the disgraceful conduct of one member of the community can affect his fellows. Two passages in book 7 suggest remorse or guilt: in both (7.75.5 and 7.77.1) the Athenians in Sicily are portrayed as blaming themselves for the failure of the expedition; perhaps this also suggests retrospective shame based on one's own interpretation of one's actions. The idea of remorse occasioned by the recognition that one has acted in contravention of one's own principles is also implicit in the misgivings experienced by the Athenians following their decision to put all adult male Mytileneans to death. 119

NOTES TO CHAPTER SEVEN.
1. TAPA 1893, p. 74.
2. See North, Sophrosyne, 100-1.
6. See North, p. 109 (comparing Sophokles). On p. 108 she refers to a similar tension in the passage on stasis at 3.82. At 1.84.2 Archidamos goes on to justify τι βρβευ και μέλλων as απειλώντας ένιατον: thus it appears, from 84.1, that he recognizes that sophrosyne may occasion shame or embarrassment.
7. Krüger wished to delete ονείδει, and certainly the passage would mean the same with τις ανεχειν alone, since τις ανεχειν is a common Thucydidean expression, meaning both "disgrace" and "fear of disgrace" (see von Erffa, p. 191n. 167). The addition of ονείδει does resolve any ambiguity between these two senses, and perhaps for that reason is more likely to be a gloss. For a different view, see Andrewes in Gomme, Andrewes, Dover, ad loc.
8. This might be related to passages like Demok. B48DK (on the agathos' disregard of popular disapproval), but the basic sentiment is as old as Archilochos (pp. 134-5 above). On possible links between Thuc. and Demok., see E. Hussey in Crux, 118-38.
9. See pp. 31-2 above.
12. ἐνάτωμα is added, according to the scholiast quoted by Gomme, ad loc., in order to stress that Spartan prudence is not merely instinctive.
13. For detailed exegesis of individual points, see Gomme, ad loc.
15. Cf. the way in which, in the Great Speech of Plato’s Prot., the ἀδος and δίκη of the myth are replaced by σοφροσύνη and δικαιοσύνη in the logos (below, p. 552).
16. This relationship of ἀδος, through σοφροσύνη, to respect for νόμοι bears comparison with the ἔσωτης νόμος passage in Hdt. (pp. 422-3 above, cf. also 487-8 below).
18. Cf. Xen. Lac. Pol. 2.2, where ἀδος is also seen as a result of Spartan παιδεία, and 3.4-5, where ἀδος and σοφροσύνη are said to be particularly strong in Spartan youths as a result of their upbringing. On ἀδος and education, see above, pp. 392-5.
20. Especially since the names of Antiphon and Thuc. are associated in the tradition, and since certain fragments of the former reveal ideas similar to those of Demok. (below, pp. 559 and 577n. 91).
21. Cf. 2.11.4, οὐράλε γὰρ τὰ τῶν πολέμων with τὴν προστεντίως τύχει ὑπὸ λογίων διαιρέται (1.84.3).
22. See above pp. 8-9, 26-7, 95n. 7 and 8 etc.
24. See pp. 232-3 above on the Ajax passage. The comparison is made by Finley, Three Essays on Thuc., p. 15.
25. Topics also raised in several passages of A. Eum. (see pp. 192-6 above).
26. There is probably no deliberate echo of Sophokles in the Thucydidean passages, but it is notable that the variatio of ἀischune for ἀδος occurs in both authors: see Gomme on 1.84.


28. The Corinthians also refer to this idea at 1.71.7, as does Archidamos at 1.85.1 and 2.11.2: cf. also 2.62.3, 3.67.2, 4.92.7 and 7.69.2.

29. Cf. 1.69.1, 69.5, 124.3.

30. Because of this conscious identification of present with past, the Corinthians' remarks recall the speeches made in the name of Hellenic unity in Hdt. (cf. pp.444-5 above).


32. For the expression κέσθη αἱρετικῶν, von Erffa compares Il.23.571, where the arete concerned is not προσφυγούς, but someone else's; cf. also S.Æ.1083 (ἐνκλήσειν αἱρετικῶν).


34. See de Romilly, Thucydides, 71-7, 79, 253-4, Woodhead, Thucydides on the Nature of Power, 14-5. Other states and many individuals are, naturally, also motivated by time (de Romilly, 79-80).

35. See 2.87.9, p.462 above, and cf. MacDowell, Spartan Law, 44-5.

36. Fear of atimia, whether disgrace or statutory punishment, is doubtless what drove the Spartan, Timokrates, to commit suicide following the loss of his ship (2.92.3).

37. See Hdt.4.66 (pp.425-6 above).

38. This much is suggested by Archidamos' insistence that one should not pay too much attention to the opinions of others, but rather do what one feels to be prudent (1.83.1, 84.1-2, pp.452-6 above), and, more directly, by the strategic withdrawal of the Spartans and other Greeks at Hdt.9.53 (p.426 above), although it must be admitted that the disobedience of Amompharetos, and his belief that retreat is aischron in any circumstances, reveal that the Spartan upbringing could instil a reluctance to withdraw even when it was prudent to do so.

39. Cf. περιειλθη here with καὶ οὐκ ἐνδυμασίν περιείλθην οὐδενὶ κακῷ γενέσθαι at 2.87.9 (p.462 above, in a speech delivered by Spartans).

40. See Gomme, ad loc.
41. It would appear, then, that he believes that those brought up as Spartiates have internalized the imperatives imparted by their education to the extent that they will now act properly out of a subjective regard for their own status and identity: for this idea, cf. E.Hel. 813-6, pp. 283-4 above.

42. p. 186.

43. The combination thus recalls Il. 6.442-4 (p. 36 above): cf. also E.Hel. 998 (pp. 379-80 above).

44. Cf. pp. 458-9 above.

45. Andragathia may just have a slightly sardonic ring here. Certainly Perikles is openly sarcastic about it at 2.63.2 (although the sense in that place, one must concede, is different).


47. See North, ibid.

48. See pp. 452-3 above.

49. B238DK.


51. See Adkins, MR, 224 and 241n. 8, and Andrewes in Gomme, Andrewes, Dover, ad loc.

52. It motivates Perikles, for example, at 1.141.1 (p. 459 above).

53. Many words, in fact - kîvówn, συναφές, κιγιγν, κιγιν, ἱππηθηθης - are common to both these passages: see above, pp. 452-3.

54. See Pitt-Rivers in Peristiany (ed.), Honour and Shame, p. 31.

55. See above, pp. 433-5.


57. The eventual slaughter of the Melians is not an issue in the dialogue: see Cogan, The Human Thing, p. 89.

58. E.g. de Romilly, Thucydides, 254-6.

59. The stress on expediency rather than morality, moreover, may be attributable to the historian's expressed concern for diagnosis and prognosis (1.22-3, 2.48.3), since the laying bare of true motives makes for clarity and the exposition of "natural law" in action suggests how its operation may be recognized in future: see E. Topitsch, WS 1943-7, p. 66.
60. Cf. Antiphon 6.1 for a similar idea. Such disgrace, it might be said, exhibits more clearly the subject's own shortcomings than does a setback which comes upon him by chance: see Andrewes' modification of Gomme's n. in Commentary on 111.3.


63. The prototype is II.2.298, p.17 above.


69. Cf. Westlake, p.251. Cf. also 8.12.2, where Alkibiades uses the inducement of τ' λα时间为 to persuade the ephor, Endios, to support his plans.


73. They do, however, relate this to Kerkyraian anticipation of just such an argument at 1.34, where the latter claim, though in far less detail than their opponents, that right was on their side in the original dispute.

74. For kakourgia (rather than kakia) as antonym of arete in a non-martial context, cf. 3.82.7, p.489 below.


76. Cf. S. Trach. 596-7, E. Hipp. 403-4 (pp.215,344 above) and Antiphon B44ADK (below, pp.556-8).

77. See above, p.4, p.6n.15.

78. Above, pp.3-4 etc..

79. It is a notable point that the Corinthians assume that obligation to its allies may cause a state to act unjustly.

80. p.468 above.


82. As, in fact, was suggested by 1.37.2 (p.474): cf. below, pp.482-6 and Pearson, *Popular Ethics*, p.235n.17 (on arete and personal philia at 2.51.5).
84. At 3.10.1 the Mytileneans continue their self-justification by setting forth their views on the fundamental conditions for philia, both personal and international: philoi must be alike in character and the relationship must be conducted with "conspicuous arete"; again, arete is seen as essential to philia.
85. pp.444-5 above.
86. Aischunesthai thus bears the Homeric sense of aideisthai as "respect" here, and, as in that usage, the idea of respect is combined with the notion that it is discreditable to fail to respect those who deserve it. On freedom versus slavery and the Peloponnesians as the liberators of Greece, cf. pp. 458-9, 466, 479-80, 484-5.
87. Andragathia here is thus equivalent to arete in 2.40.4 or 3.10.1 (p.476 and n.84 above), where the reference is to justice and equity, but not to arete in 3.56.7, 57.2 or 58.1, where it denotes bravery in battle (and possibly also commitment to the Hellenic ideal). On arete in Thuc., cf. Topitsch, WS 1943-7, p.65.
88. Since the opposite charis is described as sophron, it appears that, once more, the course recommended by sophrosyne and that promoted by aidos are the same.
89. We saw in Homer, however, that the supplication of those who, having surrendered in battle, plead for their lives was often disregarded. Cf. pp.66-9 above (with nn.).
90. Cf. p.474 and n.79 above.
91. On this motif (a classic means of arousing aidos), cf. pp.459 (with n.28), 460, 462, 478 above.
92. 2.51.5, below, pp.485-6.
93. Consider, for example, 3.82.7, where he laments the fact that a reputation for arete, among those engaged in stasis, is less highly prized than one for cleverness (below, p.489).
94. See 4.21-2, especially 21.2, τῶν δὲ πλέον υἱόφωτο
95. 6.11.6, pp.470-1 above.
96. Cf. pp.466-9 above.
97. Note that διότι χιρίχαν is used in the same sense as χιρίχυνθ in 104: cf. p.470 above.
98. This, again, shows a natural assumption that honouring one’s obligations to one’s philoi is part of arete.

99. The Athenians here seem to subscribe to a political theory which acknowledges justice and moral values within individual communities, but not in the international arena, since there is no constraint on the independent members of the community of states equivalent to that exerted on the individual citizen by the laws, customs and institutions of his city: cf. Hussey, Crux, p.126.

100. Cf. 90, where the Melians point out that it is in Athens' interests to act with the appearance of justice and moderation, for the sake of the impression this will make on others.


102. Cf., generally, Hussey, 127-8. H., however, fails to mention the Melians’ point in 106, even though it would add to his argument.

103. For the idea that it is discreditable (bad manners) to involve outsiders in troubles, see pp.305,308,349-50 above.

104. E.g. Od.3.69-74.

105. See Hirzel, Agraphos Nomos, Cerri, Legislazione orale (both passim), and cf. the remarks of Ostwald, Nomos, vii.

106. See Hirzel, p.21.

107. Such as the body of unwritten law whose interpretation was entrusted to the Eumolpidai ([Lys.] 6.10): see Cerri, 67-8, against Hirzel, p.21.

108. Cf. Archidamos’ stress on the same qualities, pp.454-7 above. Archidamos, however, emphasizes obedience and self-control to a greater extent than does Perikles. Von Erffa, p.190, points out that aischune helps define deos in the present passage, and explains the latter as not simply fear, but rather fear (presumably of legal sanctions) and fear of disgrace, comparing 1.49.4.


110. See below, pp.549-65.

111. On the disgrace of poverty, see pp.142-3 above (on Thgn.). The idea, implicit in Perikles' remarks, that the poor should not be reproached simply for their poverty is not new – cf. Hes. WD.717-8.

112. This much is suggested, in fact, by the comparative,
aischion, which implies the sequence, "poverty may be 
aischran, but not to strive to escape it is aischion."
113. A mild instance of enallage.
114. 191-2.
115. The only instance of sebein in Thuc., though we do find 
Τὴν ἡμερήσιαν ἡμέραν at 1.126.11, asebein of denial of burial at 
4.98.7, asebein and asebema in connexion with sacrilege and 
the mutilation of the Herms at 6.53.1 and 27.2, and eusebeia 
in a general sense at 3.82.8.
116. In the passage which concerns us it is the prescriptive, 
rather than the descriptive force of the terms which is 
changed.
117. See Gomme, ad loc., referring to the criticisms of 
Dionysios of Halikarnassos.
118. So Shorey, TAPA 1893, p.75, who explains the phrase 
under the analogy of ἐν ἡμέραν at 8.89.
8. ARISTOPHANES.

Aidos and its direct derivatives (with the exception of anaideia) are not common in Aristophanes, and aischune etc. are much more frequently used. Instances of the relevant terms are, for the most part, heterogeneous, many being merely incidental references, but these are nonetheless valuable as indications of everyday usage. On the other hand, there are special considerations peculiar to comedy which the student of ethics must bear in mind, and caution is thus required when using evidence obtained from that source to hypothesize about trends in society in general.

It seems best to begin with a survey of the miscellaneous instances of aidos, aischune etc. before proceeding to investigate the more particular characteristics of their function in comedy. Comic characters, like their tragic counterparts, are often represented as concerned at the prospect of mockery or damage to their reputations. One such is Lamachos at Ach.1195-7, exaggerating his wound and expressing his fear of mockery in mock-heroic terms:

```
τυδόμην οὗτος άλακτίν άν γένοτοι,
δικαιόπολις οίμ' ἑδι τεσσαμένων
κατ' εὐχαρεί ταῖς ἐμεῖσ τυχκείων.
```

The readiness of others to mock one's misfortunes (specifically one's demotai), is mentioned by Demosthenes at Knights 319-20, where he describes how he was cheated by the Paphlagonian tanner and thus provided his demesmen with a great source of amusement (Katáφελιν τάς τύχες). In contrast, Strepsiades, at Clouds 1206-11, imagines the admiration and envy his proposed victory over his creditors will arouse in his demotai. At Lys.271-2 the Old Men are vehement in their conviction that they will not be mocked by their female opponents:

```
oυ γὰρ μα τῆν Δήμητρε' ἐλευ σῖντες ἐγκανιώτει.
```

It is, of course, a matter of honour that men should not appear ridiculous to women. Later in the same play the hemichorus of women, wishing to effect a reconciliation, refer twice to to the ridiculousness of their opponents' appearance: at 1020 their intention in doing so is to undermine the men's
continued bellicosity, while at 1024 they attempt to restore their self-esteem by claiming that, fully dressed, they are real men and no longer καταγχοιται. At Wasps 150-1 Bdelykleon expresses his concern for his own reputation, when he claims that he is athlīos because people will call him "son of Smoky", a reference, prompted by his father's attempt to escape through the chimney, to the comic poet Ekphantides, nicknamed Kapnios because of the obscurity of his writing. Bdelykleon has no wish to associated with an inferior poet like him.\(^5\) The desire to avoid mockery is also apparent in Thes.939-42, where Mnesilochos, about to be handed over to the Prytanis, asks that he might at least be allowed to be bound naked, without his women's clothing, to the plank, *ένω μη' ην κερκυτοὶς καὶ μιτραίς γέρων ἀνή
γέλωτα παρέχω τυίς κέραζεν ἑστίων.* Public humiliation, however, is to be part of his punishment: the Prytanis wishes him to be δῆλος to the passers-by (944).

At Knights 1274ff. the chorus proceed to the abuse of one Ariphrades, abuse which they justify as follows (1274-7):

\[
κλεφτημεν των Τανηγους υποθεν ειτ' ἐπτεβθονοι,
'αλλα τυμη τοις χρησις ἢσις εü λεγεσται.
ει μεν ουν ανθρωπος, ον δει παλλ' ἀκοιμη και κακα,
αιτος μην ένδηθος, ουκ δει άνδρος ἐπηνεήθην φίλου.
\]

In 1274 ἐπτεβθονοι contains the idea of public disapproval, and it is thus implied that unjustified abuse might be ἐπτεβθων (or aischron). To abuse one who deserves it, however, brings time, if done well. The desirability, in turn, that the poneros should be exposed excuses the reference to his brother, who might be expected also to be affected if a member of his family were to be subjected to public humiliation. Thus the poet, in effect, apologizes for any embarrassment he may cause the innocent brother. The idea that one should feel no scruple at ridiculing one who deserves it is also to be found in fr.200K (= 207KA), a quotation from the poet's Banqueters:

\[
ουκ αἱλοιμονεϊ τιν τάειχον τιντοιν
πλυνων ύπανων δει ενυλων αιτω κακα.
\]

Abuse of this kind, directed at specific living individuals,
appears from the Knights passage to be regarded as part of the comedian's duty, and indeed may have been a part of the rituals from which comedy developed. The aim, presumably, is to shame the victim.

Ariphrades in particular is ridiculed because he takes delight in \( \alpha\i\s\c\h\s\c\r\o\s \ (1284) \), in which expression aischros seems to bear the sense of "disgusting" or "obscene": this fits with the term's intrinsic reference to "how things look" as well as with its secondary connotation of "liable to excite disapproval". The adjective, in fact, most commonly has a general reference to appearances in Aristophanes. It has its basic, physical sense, for example, at Knights 1321, Clouds 920, Thea.168 (the ugly poet, Philokles, writes ugly plays) and Eccles.618,619,625,629. Semnos appears to be used of physical attractiveness at Eccles.617, while Kratinos 208.3K (=223.3KA) provides another example of aischros meaning "ugly". Fr.322 (364KA) of the same poet - \( \tau\i\n\k\i\c\n\w \ (1284) \) - printed thus, should translate, "It is the mark of ugly men to be poneros while rendering a favour to their friends". \( \tau\i\n\k\i\c\n\w \), however, seems awkward with the singular ponoi kai oun eivai, and Kassel and Austin believe these words to belong to the author making the citation. Meineke reconstructs Kratinos' verse beginning aiº14 de - and this general, moral sense of aischron, rather than the physical one of \( \tau\i\n\k\i\c\n\w \), is what is required.

At Lys.923 (Myrrhine's assertion that it is aischron to make love on the bare bed-boards) aischron may mean as little as "not nice" or as much as "unseemly", while at Frogs 693-4, the sense is not simply that it is aischron that slaves should be made citizens after one sea-battle (the poet approves of this at 696), but that it is aischron that those who benefitted the city on one occasion should be so treated while others who have served her on numerous occasions remain atimoi as a result of their "mistakes" (689) in 411. Again, the meaning of aischron is general, but its application can be explained with reference to the traditional idea that one
should treat one's benefactors or friends according to both their deserts and their time: it is inconsistent of the city, the poet claims, to accord one group great honour in return for one service while others are without honour, and disfranchised (692), in spite of their many services; this inconsistency, in turn, is discreditable and unfitting.

Fr. 600K (616KA) refers equally to "how things look" - it is aischron for a young woman to have an old husband, both because such a match simply does not look right, and because it brings the woman herself, who might have found a better husband, no credit. The use of aischron in fr. adesp. 518K-αἰσχρόν ὤ ἴθι κλέων τὰ καλὰ τῷ πολλῶν ψόφῳ - is also general, but the implication, that society in general is not a fit arbiter of τῷ καλῷ, is important.

At Eccl. 560, 565-7 the aischra enumerated are all offences of general dishonesty, and the use of τὴν ἁρπαγμὴν in 560 indicates the tendency to link words of daring with conduct which is aischron, which requires anaideia. Fr. dub. 1203K, 5-6 shows that aischros can be used of ugliness of sound as well as of appearance:

υἱός ὁ αἰσχρός κλέων πέρος καλῶν δέκινθ
do Phoibos ou περισσώς

Kock suggests ὑπερβός for ὑπέρθος, presumably because it does seem unlikely that Apollo should sing out of tune, but "Phoibos" here may be used ironically of some other character, or may be a slave's name used literally for comic effect.

The phrase αἰσχρὰ δρᾶν τινα occurs in the passage of Eccl. just discussed (560), and is paralleled in the sense, "do harm or wrong to"9 by αἰσχρά γαρ τις μὴ γέγαγατο at Wasps 787 and by the passive formation, αἰσχρὰ γ' ἐπάθυμεν, at Lys. 1096.10 No doubt aischra in these phrases implies the humiliation of the sufferer, but criticism of the agent may also be implied. Aristomenes 3K - μὴν ε' ἵτι θέγης μου θείη - seems similar, but the article in θείη is difficult and the verse may be corrupt.

The concept of aischrokerdeia occurs at Peace 623-5, where
Hermes finds the origin of the war in the desire for gain:

As usual, aischrokradeia consists in the pursuit of gain regardless of the rights of other people. In τὴν ὁ (sc. Εἰρήνην) ἀπορρέοντες καὶ ἀφορμώντες τὴν πόλειν αὐτῆς πρὸς τὰ κείμενα τό κέρδη τῶν ἔνεργως ἢν κακά.

It is considered discreditable, then, to concentrate on the acquisition of wealth to the extent that one cannot enjoy it, an idea which becomes a commonplace in New Comedy.

Several passages refer to the fundamental belief that cowardice is aischron, and to the related idea that one should not bring disgrace on one's ancestors. At Peace 1298 the son of the (according to Aristophanes) notorious coward, Kleonymos, begins to sing Archilochos' song about the loss of his shield, and at 1301 Trygaios interrupts the third line, ὅτε ἐκείνη with κατ' ἐνυς δε μακαρ. As Whitman points out,
the coward's son is still invited to the feast, but at Eccl. 678-80 it is Praxagora's hope that cowards will be shamed into departing from the feast she proposes to hold:

καὶ ἐκεῖνος ἔσται τεις παραδείγματιν
τοῖς ἀνόρφοις εἰν τῷ πολέμῳ καὶ τοῖς δεῖλοις ἡγέονταί,
ἐνα μὴ δείπνῳ αἰχμαλώτων.

Any coward s present, it is, jokingly, assumed, will, on simply hearing of the bravery of others, be so conscious of their own cowardice and of the knowledge others have of it that they will leave the feast in shame.

Cowardice is also the issues at Birds 768. In the topsy-turvy world of the birds cowardice is not aischron:16

To ἂν παρ' ἵππην οὐδ' ἀκρον ἐστὶν ἐπτερικικαί.

This clearly implies that in the real world cowardice is aischron, and in fact line 768 is prefaced by two lines whose intention is to humiliate a real Athenian as a coward.

At Clouds 1220-1 Strepsiades' first creditor declares,

ἀνα κελεύει ἔν την πατέρα ἐκακλαμώθη

The comic exaggeration that the creditor's failure to recover his money would shame his fatherland may be based on the general thought that the whole of Attika would be implicated if he were to manifest such weakness, or on satire of Athenian litigiousness, the idea being that he is reluctant to be the one to cause a break with national tradition.18 A similar sort of joke occurs at Birds 1451-2, where, in an inversion of normal attitudes, the Sycophant declares that it would shame his forefathers if he were to take up a more reputable profession:

τὸ γένος οὗ κατακλαμώθη

With regard to the general attitude towards cowardice expressed in the plays, Ehrenberg19 writes of "a decline of the soldierly spirit", evident especially in passages which refer to the desire to shirk military service.20 He also21 mentions the references to astrateutoi who are set up for
public humiliation, and claims that these indicate a move away from traditional ideas of a citizen army. There must, indeed, be some basis to these opinions, but comedy may exaggerate, and, in particular, the comic hero's proclivity towards cowardice should not be taken too seriously, since his antics are more likely to be indicative of the way most Athenians did not behave. It is, however, significant that cowards are ridiculed, and even that cowardice is a trait of those characters who enjoy freedom from the restraints of social pressure, for this indicates a general climate in which cowardice is deplored and in which *aidos* with regard to cowardice will, for that reason, be common: comic ridicule of cowards, moreover, is an important manifestation of society's disapproval, and it may well be that such ridicule is a recognized social and traditional function of the genre.22

One individual who is abused for his cowardice is Amynias (or Ameinias), who, is, in effect, compared to a woman at *Clouds* 691-2:23

Σω. ὅρησ; γυναῖκα τὴν Ἀμυνίαν καλεῖς.
Στρ. δεικνύεις ἕτερον οὐσίως κατευθύνει.

Related to the comparison of cowards with women is the idea that men should never be worsted by women, which is, naturally enough, given the centrality of the battle of the sexes to the plot, prominent in *Lysistrata*. The dictum is stated as such at 450-1 -

αὐτὰ ὅπως γυναικῶν οὐδὲντες ἐπὶ θυτήτες ἡμῶν.

and implied at 485,

ὡς 

where the idea that it is *aischron* for men to be defeated by women is combined with the fundamental notion that it is *aischron* to abandon what one has begun.24 Honour is also at stake for the women in this conflict: it is not, it need hardly be said, traditional that women should not give in to men,25 but the women of *Lysistrata* deny the woman's role and present a claim to parity, and thus subscribe to male, competitive values. Thus, at 713, *Lysistrata's* parody of *Euripides,*26 ἄλλως 

refers to the
fact that the women are weakening in their resolve, while at 779-80 she claims that it would be aischron for her comrades to betray the oracle which, it is believed, promised them victory.

In the later plays women enjoy considerable freedom to do and say what they please, and thus they are given the opportunity to share the licence allowed other comic characters to transcend the restrictions imposed upon them by society. As a consequence, the familiar aidos which so constrains women in other genres is scarcely in evidence. The chorus of Thesmophoriazusae, however, although a pretty unrestrained lot themselves, do refer to the normal feminine attitude in the parabasis of that play. Their first point is that the male opinion, that women are a kakon, is absurd. The very care men take in keeping their women in seclusion, they claim (789-94), reveals the inconsistency of this assumption, for why should they take such trouble to look after that which they find kakon? At 797-9 they go on:

κὰ
κὸ
εὖ
γενέσθαι
τὰ
κυνῆ
τὰ
διὰ
τὸ
κοινὸν
παθοῦναι
καὶ
αἰσχον
ἠξιοθέντα
καὶ
καὶ
γενέσθαι
ἀνδρῶν
αἰχον
ἀνέφηκα
καὶ
καὶ
πλὴν
αἰγόνθετας
καὶ
τῶν
σως
βελθεοφότοις.

Here, where the real values of contemporary Athens are the object of the humour, the normal position of women obtains: they are kept indoors and experience aischune if seen by strangers.

At Frogs 1049 Euripides asks Aeschylus to explain in what way his plays dealing with adulterous women have been harmful, and the latter replies (1050-1):

ὦ
γενέσθαι
καὶ
γενείων
ἀνδρῶν
ἀλέχος
ἀνέπηκα
καὶ
καὶ
πλὴν
αἰγόνθετας
καὶ
τῶν
σως
βελθεοφότοις.

These women, it seems, are to be imagined as feeling themselves implicated in the disgrace of Euripides' characters and ashamed of what are presented in comedy as slurs on the honour of womankind. Exaggerations of this type are not new: similar is Agamemnon's claim (at Od. 11.433-4) that his wife has poured aischos upon herself and all women yet to be born, even the good ones. Dover points out that Aeschylus also
presented wicked women, like Klytaimestra, and that it seems illogical that the shame of stage adulteresses should corrupt contemporary females while that of stage murderesses should not. It is, however, a peculiarity even of our own culture that sexual matters, treated realistically, are more shameful and dangerous than "ordinary" crimes. An actor who played a homosexual in a recent West-end production was asked on television if he had no misgivings about such a role: he pointed out that the question would not have been asked had he been playing the most heinous of murderers.

At Eccl.484-5 the chorus of women express their concern lest their plan to cause the assembly to vote for a gynaecocracy should be discovered by the men:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{η} \mu \text{ίν} \delta' \alpha\nu \text{ω} \gamma \chi \nu \eta \nu \delta' \text{έ} \nu\ \\
\text{πάρει} \pi \epsilon \kappa \tau \text{ο} \iota \text{ς} \text{α} \nu \delta \gamma \eta \epsilon \nu \tau \text{μ} \text{α} \nu \text{τ} \text{ω} \text{υ} \text{τ} \text{ε} \text{λ} \text{η} \chi \text{β} \varepsilon \text{n}.
\end{align*}
\]

Aischune is objective disgrace here, and the reasons for it in this case seem to lie in the women's disloyalty, although it might also be the case that simply to be caught in the act of something one wishes to conceal may bring aischune. Again we see the connexion between shame and elenchos, "showing up".

The sensitivity of women and their susceptibility to aidos may lie behind Health 701-2, where Karion's female companion, Iaso, is embarrassed at his breaking wind in the temple of Asklepios: she blushes (υπηρυβίκει), and blushing is a common concomitant of aidos. The Just Argument in Clouds represents himself as a staunch champion of aidos, and one of his recommendations is (992):

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{καὶ} \tau \text{o} \iota \text{ς} \text{α} \iota \chi \eta \text{o} \iota \text{ς} \text{αι} \gamma \chi ν \text{ε} \τ \text{η} \alpha \text{λ}, \kappa \text{αν} \text{ο} \kappa \text{o} \mu \text{η} \tau \text{ι} \zeta \tau \text{ε} \zeta \text{ε} \text{λ} \gamma \text{ε} \text{θ} \text{ε} \text{λ} \text{αλ}.
\end{align*}
\]

In the context, then, of aischune and aidos (in 995) the Just Argument recommends blushing when one is mocked. In contrast to these passages we may set the following, in which failure to blush seems to indicate a lack of aidos. At Clouds 1215-6 Strepsiades' first creditor declares it better to ὑπερυβίκει when first asked for a loan than to have trouble recovering one's money later. Thus it seems that one would normally be expected to blush at the prospect of refusing an acquaintance
credit, presumably because to do so implies distrust of the other person and a lack of concern that this should be communicated to him, although general ideas of the conduct proper among philoi may also be relevant. At *Knights* 397-9 the chorus, commenting on Paphlagon’s *anaideia*, associate it with the ability to avoid blushing:

\[\text{ὅστις τὸν ἀρώματος τῆς περιπετείας,}\]

Paphlagon (or Kleon, since this is one of the passages in which the literal characterization is subordinated to the allegorical) has just admitted that he relies on the gullibility of the *demos* in order to sustain his power. Such a discreditable admission indicates *anaideia*, and the chorus point to his failure to blush as further evidence for this.

We saw in Homer that *aideisthai* could govern a direct, personal object in the sense usually translated as "respect". In Aristophanes, however, it is *aischunesthai* which conveys this sense, and it does so on several occasions. At *Wealth* 981 the Old Woman explains that her young lover did not ask her for many favours—καὶ γὰς ἐκνομός, μὴ ἁπάσωμεν. The young man’s requests, however, turn out to have been extensive, and Chremylos is being sarcastic when he says (988), ἃλλα ἑλπίζει χρὴ ἔχειστο ἡ τοῦ ἀδυνατίσματος. The aischune involved here is clearly identical to the *aidos* which one traditionally owes one’s philoi. The precise context, however, is one of reluctance to ask openly for money, and this is an idea which occurs earlier in the play, at 158-9: Chremylos claims (155-6) that "good" boys do not ask their lovers for money, but for a horse or dogs (157); Karion then replies:

\[\text{αἰσχυρωμένων γὰς ἐκ γνώμης μεθ' ἑαυτῆς ἔνομαν περιπετείον τὴν μηχανής.}\]

The idea that one should be ashamed to ask openly for money seems to be related to the notions of *aischrokerdeia* expressed elsewhere in the play, and the idea seems to be that it is discreditable to be more concerned for material things than about true friendship (cf.153-4): this may also explain the idea that one might blush when refusing another a loan, above, but there also seems, especially in *Wealth*, to be a
growing feeling that there is something inherently distaste-
ful about money and profit.

Aischunesthai is used of respect for the direct recipient of one's actions in one other passage in Wealth, where the Old Woman's young lover claims that it is out of respect for Chremylos' years (οἰκείωσθαι τὴν ἡλέκτην τὴν οἷν, 1077) that he is willing to give up his aged mistress to him without a fight. Respect for the old as a requirement of traditional values is alluded to at Clouds 993-4, where, in a passage which has aidos and the avoidance of τὰ κίθραυά as its theme, the Just Argument urges the young to give up their seats to the old and to refrain from insulting their parents. He ends his speech (998-9) with an injunction not to talk back to one's father or to tease him about his age. Aidos for one's father seems also to be implied at 1468, καταβατῇς πικρῶν δίκαια: Dover suggests (ad loc.) that this phrase, probably paratragic, could be interpreted to mean, "Show aidos for Zeus, whose province is the relationship between fathers and their children." The point would then be that Strepsiades wishes his son to accord him aidos, in the manner recommended by the Just Argument.

At Wasps 446-7 the chorus-leader comments on the treatment Philokleon receives at the hands of the slaves who were formerly his:

οὐδὲν ἐν ἐφθαμάσαιν μιᾶς τῶν πικρῶν ἐμφαξένι. 35

This seems to combine three forms of aidos, that which one owes those who have benefitted one in the past (Philokleon's benefactions are recounted at 443-6), that which one owes one's superiors (τῶν πικρῶν ἰδιατέρως, 442) and that which one owes the old (see 441).

In the three passages of Wealth just discussed we noted that aischunesthai was used of respect for the direct recipient of one's actions. In other passages the same verb bears the related sense of shame before those who will witness one's actions. At Eccl.381-237 Chremes explains that he arrived too
late to get his payment of three obols for attending the assembly: as a conscientious citizen, he is ashamed of this (aischunomai, 381), and is presumably about to elaborate on the object of his aischune when Blepyros interjects, μὴ Τὸν Δί᾽ ραδίου ἀκόντα ἕτερον τιν ἐμψυκτεν. The meaning now is that, according to Blepyros, Chremes is worried lest his shopping bag will reproach him for failing to obtain his dinner money.

Similar is fr. 588K (604KA).

although, in our ignorance of the context, we cannot be certain of its exact significance. At Thes. 903 Mnesilochos expresses his embarrassment at being seen by Euripides while his beard, following its shaving earlier in the play, looks ridiculous. Again, the collocation αἰσχύνωμαι ἐστὶ indicates inhibition in the presence of the other person and concern for his opinion. Mnesilochos’ line (αἰσχύνωμαι κτλ.) is an explanation as to why he does not obey Euripides’ command, "look at me!" (902), and this implies the familiar notion that aidos/aischune prevents one looking directly at others.

The inability to look others in the face is also in evidence at Knights 1354-7, where it is an outward sign of Demos’ retrospective aischune. The passage reads as follows:

Δὴ. αἰσχύνωμαι τοι τῆς προτέρων ἐμπειρίας.
Αἰ. ἀκειμένως σὺ τῶν κακῶν μη δεινεῖς, ἄκρα οί πρὸς ταῦτα ἐγγυπτῶν.

Demos’ shame evidently causes him to bow his head and somehow to change his stance or position, and it seems that consciousness of his past mistakes leads to present inhibition in the presence of others. The suggestion of remorse, however, is clearly present, and it is notable that Demos accepts full responsibility for his actions until his concern in this direction is assuaged by the Sausage Seller. The notion of self-reproach is also present in Wasps 743-9, where the chorus imagine Philokleon’s recognition of his past mistakes and consider it possible that he is reproaching
himself (εὐφράστηκεν κύτιν ἐγὼ τε πράξμεν ἔγνω, 743). The chorus themselves seem to acquit Philokleon of responsibility, in that they claim that his errors were committed when he was "mad" (744) and hope that he will now "come to his senses" (σωφρονεῖ, 748), but the possibility remains that his self-reproach encompasses a subjective sense of guilt. Similar ideas recur at 999-1002, where Philokleon is horrified that he has acquitted a defendant:

Philokleon does, admittedly, say that he "didn't mean it", and that he does not know "what got into him", but his έμνυτό... συνείσημη, 43 must nevertheless refer to his own conscience as an internal source of reproach for what he has done: he thus retains a feeling of responsibility while aware that he acted akon, and while this may be philosophically inconsistent, it is a perfectly plausible reaction in terms of everyday language. Philokleon reveals an acquaintance with both the phenomenon and language of conscience such as any ordinary member of our society might possess, and it would be idle to expect a discourse on moral responsibility from one such as him.

At Frogs 1474 it is implied that consciousness of a wrong one has committed should lead to aidos, which is to be manifested by the inability to look the wronged party in the face. Euripides asks Dionysos, αἰσχίστον ἐγὼ προεβλήτην μὴ ἐγγυμένος; he thus suggests that Dionysos is being anaides in failing to avert his gaze. The deed which Euripides regards as aischiston is so because he sees it as a breach of promise and, more specifically, a breach of oath (469-70). Comically, Euripides' insistence that Dionysos should act in accordance with traditional morality allows the latter to retort with examples of moral relativism drawn from the tragedian's own plays, namely the notorious line, HIPP.612 at 1471, and a fragment of the Aeolus (fr.19N²) at 1475.
Very similar to the repentance of Demos in Knights is that of Ploutos at Wealth 774-81. The god experiences retrospective shame, but expresses it not as shame at what he has done but as shame at what he has suffered (774-5):

κίνησιμόμεν δὲ τὰς ἐμαντοὺς ουμφοράς,
οἴοις ὁ δὲ ἀνθρώπος συνὼν ἐξοκνιδὸν.

At the same time, however, he realizes that he has done wrong, and does not try to evade responsibility (778):

ὡς οὐκ' ἱκῖν' ἀ' οὐτ' ἱκῶν τούτ', ἐρθὼς ἐδεικνύν.

Once more, we see a highly plausible reaction, which seems to combine elements of remorse with elements of concern for other people. Ploutos does stress that he acted akon, without knowledge of what he was doing (775,777), but in his case this is an accurate assessment of the true position: he has been blind. It is therefore quite natural that it should be the thought of how other people will judge him which is uppermost in the mind of one whose eyes have just been opened to his past mistakes (Ploutos' concern for his reputation is especially evident in 780-1, where he speaks of showing people that he acted akon), but this, we should note, is not based on simple dislike of any criticism, regardless of its object, but on a personal moral sense which finds it unacceptable that others should consider one to be morally bad.

We have already had occasion to comment on several passages in which it is a sign of aidos/aischune to avert one's gaze (Knights 1354-7, Thes. 902, Frogs 1474), and this is the sense in which aidos is traditionally said to reside in the eyes (Wasps 447). Correspondingly, it is a sign of anaideia (or anaischuntia) to fail to avert one's gaze in circumstances in which aidos/aischune should be felt (Ach. 289-91):

ἀναισχυναί ΕΕ καὶ βεβελυκὼς

ὃς προσόκα τῆς πατρείδος, ἐκτὸς ἡμῶν λίμων

στειγάμενος εἰτ' δύνατ' πρὸς ἐμ' ἀποφλεῖτειν.

Dikaiopolis' knowledge, the chorus suggest, that he has acted in a way which will arouse others' disapproval should cause him to feel inhibited when confronted by their opposition. The opposite reaction is found at Wealth 367-8, where Blepsidemos, noting that Chremylos' gaze does not remain
fixed, concludes that he has something to hide:

\[ \text{καλλ' οὐδὲ τὸ βλέπειν αὐτὸ κατὰ χειρὶ ἑκεῖ,} \]

\[ \text{αὐτὴν ἐτέιν ἐπίσημον τὴν πεπαναγμένην.} \]

To avert one's eyes, then, is to indicate shame and inhibition, while to look another person in the face, though it might indicate a clear conscience, can be interpreted as anaideia. 45

Several incidental passages might merit a brief comment: at Ach. 855 the description of Lysistratos as \( Χολαμγένων ὁδικὸς \) reminds us that the disgrace of one member of a community may affect the rest; at Clouds 1374 aischra means "insults", which are presumably so called because of their ugliness of sound and because they seek to spread this ugliness to their recipient; at Wasps 1048 the chorus tell the audience that it was aischron of them not to recognize the brilliance of Clouds straightaway, and it seems that the poet imagines that it is possible to be ashamed of a lack of aesthetic sophistication. At Peace 1215 Trygaios uses aischunomai of his reluctance to make an offer for the Plumemaker's plume, but it is difficult to see exactly why he does so: perhaps he is (or pretends to be) embarrassed to name a price which the seller might consider too low. 46 At Thes. 848 Mnesilochos explains Euripides' failure to resume him in terms of the poet's reluctance to appear in public following his relative's parody of a scene from the "frigid" Palamedes: τὸ

\[ \text{Πελαμήδην Χῳδὲν ἴστι καὶ χάινως.} \]

The grounds for Euripides' aischune lie in the past, but it is clear that its main object is the present and future mockery of others. 47

Special Characteristics of Comedy: Comic anaideia.

On p. 175 of his work von Erffa reflects that the frequency of words like anaideia and anaischuntia is relatively high in Aristophanes, and attributes this, without further elaboration, to the nature of comedy. The reasons for the prominence of these terms, and the relationship of this to the fundamental character of Old Comedy, are well explained in several modern studies. The remarks of McLeish 48 express the
matter succinctly:

"Part of our delight in watching comedy is in seeing the comedian overstepping the normal bounds and conventions of our own everyday world. He is a kind of licensed buffoon, a scapegoat who confronts and overcomes our taboos. He is free from the complexity of everyday morality ... ."

This passage summarizes many of the conclusions of Whitman's chapter on "Comic Heroism", perhaps the fullest account of the licence accorded the comic genre in general and the comic hero in particular. Whitman stresses the "self-centred individualism" of the heroes, and points out that their unscrupulousness and disregard for convention exist as part of a by-tradition in Greek literature (evidenced by examples from epic, *h.Hom.Merc.* and Archilochos) in which the victory of one character's clever knavery is celebrated. D.F. Sutton gives the presentation of comic licence and the audience's enjoyment thereof a psychological basis, and relates it to the festivals of which comic performances formed part. In this context, both Whitman and Henderson refer several times to the championing of *physis* over *nomos* which is important in many of the plays, and, broadly speaking, it is in the disregard shown by the characters for *nomos* that the rôle of comic *anaideia* becomes apparent, for *aidos* is primarily a susceptibility to the values and norms of the society in which one grows up, and these values and norms, whether rules to be obeyed or general attitudes of society, are *nomoi*. *Aidos* thus respects *nomos*, and if the comic hero defies convention, it follows that he is, at least in some respects, *anaides*. It is, of course, not always only the hero who is *anaides*, but it is generally only with the hero's *anaideia* that the audience is intended to sympathize.

One particular aspect of comedy's victory over convention is the use of obscene language. *Aidos* should prevent open reference to sexual and bodily functions in normal society, but in comedy such references occur frequently and with gusto. Aristophanes, for example, much prefers explicit and obscene
words for the sexual organs to the normal euphemism, τὰ χιόνια. 56 The latter expression, in fact, occurs only twice, at Clouds 978, where it contributes to the characterization of the Just Argument and corresponds to his other remarks on the importance of ἀϊδος, 57 and at Wasps 578, where Philokleon refers to the joy of looking at the ἀιδεία of young boys undergoing their dokimasia.

There are several minor instances of anaideia etc. in Acharnians. We have already seen 58 that the chorus accuse Dikaiopolis of anaischuntia at 289-91, and the grounds for this charge seem to lie in his blatant disregard for the opinions of all the other citizens of Athens in concluding a peace treaty by himself. 490-3 is similar, where the chorus call Dikaiopolis anaischuntos and τολμάω because he is about to argue against the rest of the city. 59 In this passage, however, there is a note of admiration (Dikaiopolis has put his head on the block if he fails to convince his opponents, and yet he shows no fear), and this may be analogous to the reaction of the audience. The question of anaideia also arises in the parody of Euripides' Telephus, where the chorus repeatedly refer to the presumption of the beggar, Telephos/Dikaiopolis, in addressing them as τολμά (558, 563, 577-9). Words of daring, as we have seen, frequently paraphrase lack of ἀϊδος.

Comic anaideia has perhaps its greatest rôle in Knights. The Sausage Seller is anaides par excellence, and the contest between himself and Paphlagon is one in which the aim is to be superior in anaideia. 60 The qualities which mark the Sausage Seller out for leadership are first indicated at 180-1, where the slave, Demosthenes, explains:

δι' αὐτῷ γὰρ τοι γινέται μέγας, ὅτι πονηρὸς καὶ ἄγονες εἰ καὶ θερτός.

It is θερτόν which first suggests the possibility of anaideia, of which abundant evidence is provided in the subsequent action of the play: it suggests "going too far", and, in one of the Sausage Seller's status, "not knowing one's place". Beside his anaideia, it is the Sausage Seller's poneria that
is the dominant element in his character, and, in a sense, that poneros is defined for us here by ἐφῳδείς and τροπίζευσι: he is poneros in the moral sense by virtue of his "boldness", but equally he is socially poneros as a result of his origin in the agora. As Ehrenberg points out, poneros is virtually a term of rank as well as of moral censure in Aristophanes, and it refers in particular to those traders (kapeloi) with whom Athenians came most often into contact, namely those who ran their own businesses in the agora. The Sausage Seller's mean occupation places him squarely in this class, a class from which Comedy liked to believe all post-Periklean politicians came.

In spite of Demosthenes' assumption that the Sausage Seller is poneros and ὑπεκείς, however, it seems at first as if he is not quite so bold after all, for at 182 he objects that he feels himself unworthy for high office (οὐκ ὅσιον ἡγεμόνι καὶ ἄρκα, ἀλλ' ὡς οἰκονόμῳ ἔχων μέγα), and this suggests that he is subject to that aidos which is traditionally thought appropriate to the poor and of which boldness is the antonym. His objection, however, is soon dismissed, and in such a way that the complete inversion of normal values which will obtain until the Sausage Seller has won his victory is made clear. At 183-4 Demosthenes is dismayed at the unexpected expression of unworthiness, and wonders if the Sausage Seller has something good (καλον) on his conscience: he asks in horror, μὴν ἐκ κακῶν ἐκ καὶ κακῶν (185); The Sausage Seller vehemently objects, proud of the poneria of his ancestors (185-6). He is then congratulated on the appropriateness of such a background for one contemplating a life in politics, and the point is made that the present political situation (the starting point in the real world from which the fantasy takes off) demands people of low birth and low morals as its leading figures, and that the admired qualities which will bring success are poneria and anaideia.

Whitman comments on the inversion of the ordinary implications of poneros in Knights and relates this, quite correctly, to the frequent celebration of poneria in the character of
the comic hero. He then explains the significance of *poneria* in modern Greek (meaning roughly "cleverness" but with connotations of trickery and unscrupulousness), and thereafter in his book, when he refers to the *poneros* as a character type, it is this sense of the word, which he has explained quite adequately, that he has in mind. This is important, because there is a tendency in other modern discussions to use *poneros* as a technical term without reference to Whitman's explanation. *Ponerea* was not an admired quality at Athens, and although comedy may sometimes celebrate it, it also condemns it. In *Knights* the *poneria* and *anaideia* of the Sausage Seller are acceptable because we are made to sympathize with him, as comic hero, and with his aims, and because their very function is the exposure of the *poneria* and *anaideia* of Kleon, a real-life Athenian. This is paradoxical, but it is a paradox which exists in several of the plays and one which we must simply accept: although the hero may be immoral, or amoral, the plays themselves, despite their libertarian nature, often criticize or satirize the vices of contemporary society.

The first indication that a contest in *anaideia* is about to take place comes at 276-7: Paphlagon has boasted (275) that he will overcome his opponents by shouting, and the chorus-leader replies:

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κλαξ' εκν μέντοι γε νικε'ς τη' βοή, τήνελλος ει.
ην' δ' αναίδεικ πεζέλθη σι' ημετέρος ο πυρκμώς.
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It is assumed that shouting and *anaideia* can be equated, presumably because shouting is excessive and takes no account of others' opinions. As lines 285-7 show, the two participants in the quarrel begin shouting at each other almost immediately, and this signals the beginning of the contest. In the exchanges up to 303, after which the chorus formally open the *agon*, there are three conspicuous examples of *anaideia*. Firstly, at 292-3, Paphlagon's command, "Look at me without blinking," implies the *anaideia* of an unflinching gaze, while the Sausage Seller's reply, that he is well able to do so by virtue of his upbringing in the *agora*, relates *anaideia* of this kind to a specific class of people. Paph-
lagon himself advertises his own anaideia at 296, ὀμηλογῷ. κλέπτουν· ὡς δ' οὐχί: theft is condemned by society, and freely to admit it indicates both contempt for society's opinion and one's own lack of moral sense. The Sausage Seller, however, goes one better here: he swears by Hermes agoraios (the patron of thieves as well as of traders) that he does admit theft, and adds κατάφρονε γε θλετόντων (298). Just as the presence of other people can frequently induce aidos, so here it emphasizes the Sausage Seller's lack of aidos. The swearing of an oath always involves witnesses, and aidos is often seen as the impulse to remain true to an oath, but the Sausage Seller gives no thought either to anyone in his audience who might be aware of the truth or to the sanctity of oaths and the opinions of witnesses, human and divine. Also in this exchange (284-303) it is significant that the only obscenity (295) is given to the Sausage Seller. As Henderson points out, most of the obscenity in the play is his, and this is a clear sign of his anaideia.

At 315-8 there is a joke about Paphlagon's selling of sub-standard merchandise (Demosthenes weighs in with an illustration at 319-21), and the chorus make the following comment (324-5):

By ἀπ' ἀρχὴς they appear to mean "before you entered politics", and so they move from Paphlagon to Kleon, equating the two. The anaideia which they find in the Sausage Seller's description of Paphlagon's double dealing is probably firstly cheating in itself, and secondly offering for sale shoddy goods in the knowledge that they are shoddy, thus manifesting no aidos at deceit or the imminent prospect of the disapproval of the irate customer. This anaideia on the part of Kleon/Paphlagon is condemned, which might seem odd, given that he is engaged in a contest in which the aim is to prove one's anaideia, but this simply shows the way in which the anaideia of the play's hero is acceptable (the chorus enthusiastically express the hope that their champion will be victorious in Πνονεῦσέ τε καὶ Θεύσε καὶ κοβαλικεύσαντι at 331-2) where that
of its target, corresponding as it does to real-life anaideia, is not.

At 384-5 the chorus sing appreciatively of the Sausage Seller's anaideia:

\[ \text{ήν κ' ἔκ τυχός γ' ἐπερχ θερμότερ καὶ λόγων} \]
\[ \text{ἐν πολει των ἀναίδων ἀναίδεστερον.} \]

At 397-9, however, they are critical of the same quality in his opponent, in a comment on his words at 395-6. Paphlagon has stated defiantly that he will never fear his opponents, "as long as the council chamber exists and the face of the people in session gapes stupidly." This admission is inherently discreditable, and this is why the chorus comment on his utter anaideia, manifested by his failure to blush. At 409, Paphlagon goes further in exalting his own anaideia, boasting that he will never be outdone in that quality.

In lines 417-28 the Sausage Seller relates, entirely without aidos, a story of the kind of trick he used to play when he was young, and the Slave responds enthusiastically. As at 297-8 he compounds his theft by perjury, and this makes it clear that he is giving us an example of his anaideia (as is suggested by Paphlagon's εἰς ἐπὶ-τίμων τῶν θείων in 429). The trick of stealing an item while persuading its owner to look the other way will be repeated before the play is over.

At 637-8 the Sausage Seller describes how, in preparation for his speech to the boule, he prayed for thrasos, a γλῶττα ἐυτοῦσ and a ἀναίδες. Presumably his ἐμφάνισις is to be anaides simply in that its very loudness will enable him to shout down the opinions of others. Boldness and a ready tongue (ready to say anything, true or not) also indicate anaideia.

In the later stages of the conflict the motif of theft and taking the credit for another's work is prominent, and this is related both to the Sausage Seller's history of petty domestic theft (e.g. 417-28) and to the recent success of Kleon at Pylos. The topic of Pylos was first introduced at
54-7, and there, as later, the point of the reference is to belittle Kleon's contribution to Athenian success and to represent it as simply the stealing of the credit due Demosthenes. The same point is made at 742-5, where Paphlagon/Kleon presents his success at Pylos as an example of his services to the demos, while the Sausage Seller refers to the theft of a pot being boiled by someone else. The effect of the juxtaposition is to equate the two, and the suggestion is that, just as the Sausage Seller's admission of his dishonesty reveals his anaideia, so does Kleon's boasting of his achievement at Pylos, since (the poet would have us believe) everyone knows that the credit really belongs to Demosthenes. Further reference (in language which recalls the original joke at 54-7) is made to this at 778, where the Sausage Seller, maintaining that he will treat Demos at least as well as Paphlagon does, says that he will steal others' bread and serve it to him.

The contest in anaideia is finally won, in fact, by a combination of Kleon's stratagem at Pylos and the Sausage Seller's own trick as recounted at 417-20, and the cumulative effect of the use made of the motif of theft plus anaideia is the total demolition of the claim of Kleon's success at Pylos to be taken seriously. At 1193-4 the Sausage Seller realizes that he will have to devise some plan if Paphlagon's gift of a hare is not to win Demos over: he decides, therefore, to divert his rival's attention by pointing to the arrival of some (non-existent) ambassadors. He then steals the hare and presents it to Demos, and the connexion with Kleon's exploit at Pylos is made explicit at 1201. Paphlagon (or, more importantly, Kleon) has been defeated by his own tactics, and this is acknowledged at 1206, εἰμι κακοδιάμοι, ὑπερκακισκευάσμοι . In this line the stage Paphlagon admits the relationship between the anaideia of the Sausage Seller and that of the real-life Kleon, and while the former is triumphant, the latter is condemned by comparison.

Before giving up his position of pre-eminence, however, Paphlagon is determined to ensure that his rival really is
his destined successor, and the effect of the interrogation which ensues at 1235ff. is once more to reveal the Sausage Seller's complete anaideia and poneria. The former is most obvious at 1239, where he says that he learned κλέπτων ἐπικείν καὶ πλεύτων ἐνκυτίων: stealing and perjury involve anaideia in themselves, but this is compounded by the ability to look the victims in the eye. Anaideia may also be present in the Sausage Seller's nonchalance regarding his poor education and low origins (1236) and his mean occupation (1242,1247), and is almost certainly displayed by his admission that he was a catamite (1242): passive homosexuality is frequently ridiculed in Aristophanes, and seems to have been frowned upon by the Athenians in general. 77

In Clouds it is with the agon between the Just and the Unjust Arguments that we are chiefly concerned. This contest, unlike that in Knights, is not between anaideia and anaideia but between anaideia and aidos, the former being of the regular comic type and the latter being exposed as little more than prurient hypocrisy. In the play as a whole Strepsiades, to a certain extent, conforms to the type of the anaides hero: his chief desire, for example, is to cheat his creditors, and even when he is confronted by their legitimate complaints he defies them to attempt to recover their money. Significantly, however, he is not allowed to succeed, and in the end repents when he sees the unfortunate results of real anaideia. In this he differs from, say, the Sausage Seller or Philokleon. The scene in which he disposes of his creditors, however, shows him at his most anaides, and it is here alone that his anaideia is referred to by another character: at 1236 the first creditor's ἀπόλοιο τούν τε καὶ ἀναδείξῃ ἤτι is provoked by Strepsiades' levity over the swearing of an oath, and the anaideia may lie in his failure to take the creditor's demands seriously or in his sarcasm regarding the gods.

The agon tackles, in a comic way, the contemporary controversy over physis and nomos and their influence on individual development, 79 and these forces are patently represented by
(respectively) the Unjust and Just Arguments. The subject, however, is treated facetiously, and it is the question of sexual behaviour which dominates the debate.

Just speaks first, and both the chorus' katakeleusmos (ἀλλ' ἐν πολλὰς τοὺς περιστερῶς ήθεις χρηστῶς στεφανωσάς, 959) and his own opening remarks on ή χρήση παθήσεως reveal his sympathy with traditional values: he flourished, he tells us, in the days when συμφωνίαν νέομετο. Sophrosyne will be important in the ensuing debate and, as often, it will be associated with aidos. The theme of sophrosyne is elaborated in the lines that follow, in which its importance in self-control and the observance of good manners, together with its development through education, is stressed. Already Just's obsession with boys as sexual objects is apparent (966, 973-6), yet he advocates a form of education which promotes modesty and chastity in the young. He is thus a representative of the double standard which held that while it was legitimate for older men to pursue young boys it was discreditable for the latter to give in. In this connexion, it is notable that, at 977-8, he both reveals a considerable interest in young boys' genitals and uses the conventional euphemisms of polite conversation, the use of which will have been inculcated by the sophron education he describes, in order to refer to them:

The stress on sophrosyne and modesty in the young, especially with regard to sex, suggests aidos, and in the next section of his speech (991-90) it is on that quality that he concentrates:
This passage is virtually a list of the proper objects of a young man's aidos, concentrating as it does on two main areas, respect for one's elders and shyness with regard to sex. The physiological manifestation of aidos, blushing, is referred to at 992, and since the reference is to one's reaction to mockery, the passage is thus a good indication of the working of aidos as a self-conscious and involuntary response to the criticism of others. Aidos is personified in 995, as often in archaic poetry and tragedy, and perhaps Just's poetic language at this point, given that the line contains one of the only two instances of the word in extant Aristophanes, suggests that the original audience might have regarded aidos, as opposed to aischyne, as a poetic and somewhat outmoded term.

Perhaps most in the original audience, if pressed, would find Just's sentiments with regard to respect for the old commendable, but they might sense that there is an element of the killjoy in his approach which is at odds with the basic spirit of comedy. This is even more possible in the case of his strictures about lowlife sexual liaisons (996-7) and about the need for discretion and concern for one's reputation in sexual matters in general (973-83), because his stress on appearances and decency involves such an obvious suppression both of his own sexual desires and of the normal sexual licence of comedy. The effect of the characterization, then, is to portray aidos primarily as a superficial regard for convention which involves the inhibition of the very licence which the audience is there to enjoy.

Following this speech the Unjust Argument interjects with a suggestion that concern for one's own reputation to the degree recommended by his opponent would indicate stupidity and inability to think for oneself. He claims that if Pheidippides follows Just's advice people will call him a "mummy's boy" (μομμί-μνέα, 1001), and it should be noted that this in itself is an appeal to aidos: whereas Just suggests that boys should be concerned for their reputation for chastity, Unjust implies that they are now more concerned to possess a
reputation for cleverness, sophistication and being up to date.

In the concluding section of his speech (1002-23) Just returns to his praise of traditional education, and warns of the dangers of following the advice which, he anticipates, his opponent will give (1019-23):

\[ \text{καὶ ἐ’ ἀνατείσει} \]
\[ τὸ μὲν κίηχεν ὀπὶ καλὸν ἐγείρθην,} \]
\[ τὸ καλὸν δ’ αἰεχεῖν.} \]
\[ καὶ πρὸς τούτων τῆς Ἀντιμάχου Καταπυξομένης ἀνατλήτης.} \]

The Unjust Argument, then, will adopt a relativist approach and advocate a complete reversal of traditional values, of which the effect will be the abandonment of the aidos which, according to Just, should prevent boys becoming catamites. This prediction turns out to be fairly accurate.

The chorus (1024-35) praise Just's conventionality, and place the onus firmly on his opponent: Unjust will need δὲ ἱνα ἐνδείξαι to win the argument and risks humiliation if he loses (1032-5). In the comic agon, then, as in any agon, the motives of the avoidance of disgrace and the desire to humiliate one's adversary are important, and this explains the frequency of words like elenchos etc. in this context: in seeking to ensure that it is one's opponent rather than oneself that suffers humiliation one attempts to "show him up".

Unjust's exordium comes at 1036-45, and the most important element of this part of his speech for our purposes is his statement that he always opposes nomoi: Just is an upholder of conventional and traditional attitudes, but his opponent is to be an advocate of unrestrained physis. The inhibition of the self recommended by Just and identified by him with aidos is the subject addressed by Unjust at 1060ff., where the same attitude is expressed as τῷ ρυμίζοντι and compared unfavourably with the attractions of outright hedonism (see especially 1071-2). His words at 1075-82 reveal the common
ground between his championing of *physis* and normal comic *anaideia*:

The "necessities of nature" are, in keeping with the tone of Just's speech, exclusively sexual, and it is assumed that even those who think in the old way will be unable to resist these *anankai*, and will only differ from their more modern counterparts in that their conventional attitudes will render them unable to defend themselves when caught. Unjust, then, seems to subscribe to the view that *aidos* does not prevent the offence, but is simply aroused by the prospect of exposure. In such circumstances, therefore, where *aidos* is unhelpful, he recommends *anaideia*. The advice that the adulterer should deny all knowledge of his offence and show no sign of shame or guilt is, in effect, an injunction to behave as does the Sausage Seller in *Knights*, denying his thefts and committing perjury in front of witnesses. Such conduct was *anaideia* there, and so it is here: indeed, the advice *χειρισθείς, γέλα*, *νυμφή μηδεν αἰχμών* might be the credo of any comic hero, and the Unjust Argument is, in fact, addressed as would be a typical *anaides* at 890 (Θεοδώρος), 909 (Ἀναίργυρος), 915 (Θεοδώρος).

The Unjust Argument, then, is the true exponent of the spirit of comedy in *Clouds*, and his victory in the *agon* corresponds with that of the hero in other plays. He wins by demonstrating to his opponent that his conventional inhibitions, based on the opinions of the society in which he was raised, are out of date and no longer have a basis in popular consensus. The Just Argument is shown that not only does society now condone *εὐπρακτία*, but is actually dominated by *εὐσπερχωτά*; thus there is no need, in this atmosphere of com-
plete sexual freedom, for him to disguise his own tendencies, and he joins the εὐεργετικὰ (1083-1104). The αἴδος which he recommended thus emerges not as an impulse aroused by the prospect of the violation of any deeply held moral principle, but as that which prevents one acting in the way in which one dearly longs to act, and when the Just Argument is shown that εὐεργετικά no longer risks public disapproval because the values of society have changed, he immediately gives in to the "necessities of nature."

The Clouds differs from other plays, however, in that the victory of αναίδεια is followed by scenes in which αναίδεια, in practical application, is condemned. As a result of his education in the phrontisterion Pheidippides becomes as αναίδες as the Unjust Argument, and while his αναίδεια is still comic, it is revealed as undesirable in any real context.

One of the most fundamental imperatives of traditional values is that one should honour one's parents: therefore, when Pheidippides emerges (at 1321) as a father-beater, the audience, though amused, might feel that αναίδεια has gone too far. Pheidippides is not described as αναίδες at this point, but his αναίδεια is still apparent, and not only because he ignores the belief that it is aischron to beat one's father. Witness the following exchange (1325-9):

ΣΤ. ἦ μας τυφύς τοῦ πατέρα; ΦΕ. φήμῃ, ἦ πέτρε. 
ΣΤ. ἐρίθ' ἐμιλοχοῦνθ' ὅτι με τύφυ. ΦΕ. καί μελκ. 
ΣΤ. ἦ μικρεῖ καί πατερλοκει καί ταῖξιμοτοκε. 
ΦΕ. μηθίγε με ταῖτα ταῖτα καί πλεῖω λέγε. 
ἄρ' οἴθ' ὅτι χαῖρω τὸλλ' ἄκουν καί κακα; 

Strepsiades points to his son's admission that he beats his father as something to be condemned, and, as we have seen, the admission of a discreditable act indicates αναίδεια. Pheidippides, however, is so αναίδες that he actually enjoys being insulted and criticized, in which respect he is exactly like his tutor. 89

The chorus describe the youth's new character in terms of
At 1349, and, following his demonstration that he is right to beat his father, Strepsiades addresses him as οὐδὲν ἔχειν at 1380: his anaischuntia lies, as the context shows, in his ingratitude for the upbringing his father gave him. Pheidippides' shamelessness in this respect is identified with support for physis against nomos at 1420-2, where Strepsiades attempts to argue against his justification of father-beating by pointing to universal custom (1420, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἔχειν τοῦ πατέρα τοῦτο πάσχειν), and he replies: ὥσπερ ὅπ' Καβρί πάλιν ἔφη τετῶν ἑτερὸν πρωτόν καὶ λέγειν ἐπειδῆ τοὺς πατέρας;

Human law, in the absence of any divine law, is thus depreciated, and Pheidippides goes on to assert his right to make contradictory laws. This comic antinomianism, which denies all human authority and admits of no distinction between ad hoc decrees and traditional custom, is very close to that which enabled Unjust to win the ἀγόν, but here, as satire on the views of the post-Protagorean generation of sophists, it is the target of the poet's condemnation, and given this relation to the world outside the play, comic anaideia emerges as a real threat.

At 1444-6 Pheidippides goes too far, offering to prove that it is right to beat one's mother, and Strepsiades, deciding that enough is enough, burns the phrontisterion down: the character who sought to cheat his creditors by having his son educated in the anaideia necessary for the job thus recognizes the undesirability of anaideia. Clearly, then, anaideia is both exploited for its comic possibilities and condemned in so far as it relates to the behaviour of the targets of the comedian's satire: this is sometimes seen as a weakness in the construction of the Clouds, but, broadly speaking, this essential paradox underlies many of the plays, and the combination of attack on anaideia and celebration of the same quality is just as apparent in the plot of Knights as in that of Clouds.

There is no instance of the terms anaides etc. in Wasps, but the play follows a similar pattern to those already discussed.
Like Clouds it raises questions of education: Philokleon resists all attempts to make him civilized and his physis persists in asserting itself: indeed, his behaviour at the symposium, described at 1299-1323, and his attitude towards his opponents, 1388-1441, provide excellent illustration of the maxim, χειρος τῷ λόγῳ, εσκείτα, γελάκ, νομισμα μηδεν κινχίν. There is, therefore, much anaideia in Wasps: there is also the delight in theft and clever knavery prominent in other plays, and the tension between moral licence and moral purpose: Philokleon is the anaides hero and the ultimate victory is his, yet we are opposed to his desire to continue as a juror and side with Edelykleon on the issue of the law courts.

Similarly in Peace there are few concrete examples of anaideia designated as such, but much general shamelessness in the demeanour of the characters, choice of vocabulary etc. There is a general accusation of anaideia against the late politician, Kleon, at 48, and at 182-7 Trygaios' calm acceptance of and agreement with Hermes' insults (including 182, ἀναίδευτος τό ) is a clear sign of his anaideia. Again, in 182 shamelessness and boldness are combined, and the elements, ἐ βελυμένε καὶ πλήγυς κάναιευσίων occur in a rearranged order at Frogs 465.

In Birds a case could be made for the presence of comic anaideia at many points, but its real emergence comes in the parabasis, where the birds enlarge upon the nature of their resurgent kingdom, one which, it turns out, subscribes to values diametrically opposed to those of men (755-9):

This passage forms the culmination of the wish-fulfilment fantasy that has gone before: Peisetairos and Euelpides wished to be free of the restrictions placed upon them in Athens, and the society of the birds allows them to be so. This society does not quite represent physis against nomos.
although for all practical purposes it may seem so, but rather one set of nomoi against another, exploiting both comic antinomianism and popular awareness of comparative ethnography. In this passage the disruption of standards which the Athenians would perceive as normal is once again indicated by the example of father-beating, and perhaps the frequent references to the breach of this particular taboo hint at the feeling of exhilaration the audience might have experienced at being momentarily freed of it, relieving the tension created by observance of traditional imperatives in an atmosphere of conflict between the generations. In this passage the disruption of standards which the Athenians would perceive as normal is once again indicated by the example of father-beating, and perhaps the frequent references to the breach of this particular taboo hint at the feeling of exhilaration the audience might have experienced at being momentarily freed of it, relieving the tension created by observance of traditional imperatives in an atmosphere of conflict between the generations. Later in the same passage we learn that the nomoi of the birds countenance another fundamental breach of traditional Greek values: they find nothing reprehensible in cowardice (768). In Lysistrata anaideia etc. occur mainly as Schimpfwörter, but in a general sense the anaideia of the women, their disregard of the restrictions normally placed on them by convention, is central to the plot. In a sense, then, although the men use anaides as a term of abuse, their criticism is justified in terms of traditional attitudes. At 368-9, making precisely this charge, they exploit one of the many misogynistic lines of Euripides:

Their utterance at 1014-5 is similar:

Here anaideia is a property of the animal world, appropriately so, since aids is the civilizing virtue which separates man from beast. Wilamowitz is right to see anaides here not as "shameless", but as "ruthless, pitiless", but it is not certain that he is right to differentiate between anaideia and anaischuntia in this sense, particularly since aischune appears to mean "mercy" at Ant. 1.27.

At line 379, still in the exchange of insults of which 368-9 form part, the men describe their opponents' anaideia as thraesos - ή κουράς αὐτῆς τοῦ θρασσος; The women justify this
with reference to their status - ἐλεύθερον γάρ εἰμι. This justification is identical to that offered by Pheidippides in mitigation of his father-beating at Clouds 1414 - καὶ μὴν ἐξ ἐλευθερίας γὰρ καγώ. Probably the argument, "I am freeborn too, you know," was in current use as a means of suggesting that one's own time was at least equal to that of another, and, correspondingly, that one did not require to accord that person ἀιδὸς as an inferior: in comedy this is stretched to cover the justification of sheer impudence. We might notice that, at 399-400, that which at 368-9 is regarded as ἀναίδεια and at 379 as θράσος is seen as ἁυβρις: all these terms convey the idea of carrying self-assertion too far, to the extent of ignoring another's claim to honour. If the women of Lysistrata are to win, however, they need to overcome their respect for convention and their fear of criticism, hence Lysistrata's exhortation (460)οὐκ ἄνωρχυντησεν. The women are, then, like other characters ἀναίσχυντοι, but in a good cause.

In Thesmophoriazusae references to women's ἀναίδεια are more conventionally misogynistic, and their ἀναίδεια is brought out in a particularly comic way by the antics of the shameless buffoon, Mnesilochos. As in other plays, instances of ἀναίδεια etc. tend to cluster together in specific episodes: in Thes. this means that it is only in the first half of the play that the terms occur.

Mnesilochos is ἀναίδες from his first appearance onwards, and at 63 Agathon's servant supposes him to have been a ἁυβριστὴς in his youth. It is, however, in his scene with the women that accusations of ἀναίδεια really begin to fly. Mnesilochos' speech in defence of Euripides (466-519) essentially admits the validity of the tragic poet's supposed calumnies against women, and, disguised as a woman, he admits a whole catalogue of feminine vices. It is this outspokenness which provokes the chorus' response (520-7):

τοὺς μὲν τοὺς θεομάτος,
ὄπισθεν γυνέσθαι τοῦ χειμα,
χῦτις ἐφθείλεν χυζάκ,
τὴνδὲ τὴν θεκελινὴν οὖτω.
The complaint is that Mnesilochos has spoken openly about matters which should remain concealed: the chorus assume that he is a woman, and he is therefore anaides in that he speaks without reservation about things which reflect badly on their entire sex. Once again, the idea of anaideia is supported by words of boldness and daring (523, 527). As a woman, Mnesilochos is also anaides in that he is alone in his opinion of Euripides, but is not troubled by that fact (cf. 544-5, ἡ τις μόνη πείλακες ύπερ ἀνδρός ἐντελείως). The chorus of women, however, weaken their position somewhat when they admit (ἀφίσται), ἀλλ' οὔ γὰρ ἔτη τῶν ἀναφεύγετον ἔεις γυναικών οὔσεν κάκον ἐγκατα πλὴν ἡ εἰ ἐν γυναικεῖς (531-2).
The chorus, then, find the only explanation for Mnesilochos' anaideia in that of their own gender.

At 611 it seems to be Mnesilochos' (for a woman) unseemly reference to urination which makes him anaishuntus in the eyes of Kleisthenes, while at 638 ἀναίσκυντε seems to be nothing more than a general term of abuse. At 702 it is because they believe that he has stolen a child that the chorus describe him as τόλμησε μετὰ καναισχυντες, but Mnesilochos is unabashed by the theft, and for that reason the chorus accuse him of anaishuntia again at 708 and 744.

Frogs provides only one reference to anaishuntia, at 465 where Aiakos calls Dionysos anaishuntos because he believes him to be Herakles, on whose part it would be a sign of anaishuntia to return to the scene of his crimes (the theft of Kerberos). Later in the play Euripides' exclamation (1474), κἰνικτόν ἔργον προελθεσί μ' ἐφιθισμένος suggests, as we saw already, the anaideia of disloyalty or perjury.

In Ecclesiazusae, although there is the usual licence in the use of obscenity, in the conduct of women and in the sus-
tained sexual fantasy that is the plot, the nearest we come to explicit statements of anaideia are two instances of tolman. At 400 it is deina that Neokleides should venture to give advice to the assembly when he cannot even see properly, while at 560-1 –

οὐ γὰρ ἐτί τοὺς τολμῶντες κατην κακεὶ βεδν

ἐστι τὸ κοιτών . . .

it seems that it requires toInsult or humiliate another, and this suggests that κακεὶ βεδνικα can be seen as anaideia, lack of concern for another's status, and so be discreditable for the agent. 105

In Wealth, while Karion, on his way to becoming the clever slave of New Comedy, still retains many characteristics of the Old Comic anaides, there is no passage which demands our specific attention.

NOTES TO CHAPTER EIGHT.
3. On one's demotai as one's severest critics, see Neil, ad loc..
5. See MacDowell, ad loc.. There is a similar passage in Ekphantides himself (fr.2K), κακεὶ βεδν μεγαλικοὶ τοῖς.
8. The opinion offered would then coincide with that of the Thebans at Thuc.3.63.3-4, pp.479-80 above, that one should not do wrong out of obligation to a philos.
11. So Platnauer, ad loc..

14. The lines from Wealth are pro-poor, anti-rich, which is probably the sense of Hesiod's gnome in its original form (see pp.117-8 above).

15. Aristophanes and the Comic Hero, p.39.


17. On ἐκτεινόμενοι, see Merry, ad loc.

18. So Dover, ad loc.


20. E.g. Frogs 204.


22. Cf. n.6 above.

23. For this is a form of abuse, cf. p.427 (with n.10, p.447) above.

24. On ἀκμαίωτος, see Wilamowitz, ad loc.

25. Quite the opposite: see A.Ag.940, E.And.213-4 etc.

26. According to the scholiast.

27. καλοθείς in 798 seems to combine the ideas of "shamed" and "ashamed", as in Hdt.1.10.2 (p.449n.39 above).

28. Aristophanic Comedy, p.185.

29. See below, pp.521-2.

30. On which see below, pp.516-20.


34. Cf. von Erffa, p.173, and, in general, see Ehrenberg, People, 152-4.


36. And, as MacDowell points out (ad loc.), τῶν πυλητῶν ἐφέσων in 447 is περὶ προδομῶν for τῶν πυλητῶν διπτάνων. This usage of the noun + obj. gen. presupposes the use of the verb with a direct obj. in the sense, "respect", and this suggests that it is probably a simple accident of survival that it is aischunomai and not aideomai which bears this sense in extant Aristophanes.

37. Following Ussher's redistribution of the lines to speakers, which is much preferable to the allocation given in other edd.
38. See Ussher's introduction, xiv, xxxiv, xxxvi.
39. The line, however, may come from a lost tragedy: see van Leeuwen, ad loc.
40. The phrase, ὅτε τί κυάτεν; is also used of Mnesilochos at Thes. 930, as he is being handed over to the Prytanis.
41. This, as we saw in Euripides (pp. 309-10 above), is the general pattern in instances of aischunomai with a causal dative (for which cf. Clouds 992, p. 506 above).
44. See MacDowell's n. ad loc.
44a. Cf. οὔχι ηε χύρνα μενείν; in Knights 1354.
45. Cf. Knights 1239 (below, p. 520).
46. Von Erffa (p. 174) thinks he is ashamed because he has ruined the Plumemaker's business.
47. Also in Thes., at 1019 Seidler conjectured ἦ περὶ αἴσθου ὅτε τέν for R's meaningless περὶ αἴσθουσαν. Dobree's περὶ αἴσθουσα however, addressed to Echo, who did appear in E.'s Andromeda and whose presence in the original is the point of the scene at 1069-97, seems preferable.
49. In Aristophanes and the Comic Hero, 21-58.
51. 28-41: cf. Sutton, Self and Society, p. 49, and, on the influence of Archilochos and iambic poets, Henderson, Maculate Muse, 17-23.
52. Self and Society, 4-10.
53. Whitman, 132, 152, 186, Henderson, 76-7, 78-9, 84.
54. See Sutton, 49-52 and passim.
57. See below, p. 521.
58. p. 511 above.
59. Cf. S. Ant. 510 (p. 223 above), and von Erffa, p. 177.
60. Cf. Whitman, p. 89.
61. People, 73, 75, 87, 176 etc.
62. ibid., p. 91.

64. ἕνεκ' ἀληθῆ δικαίου εἰστὶν καλὸν. The comic inversion, kallon for kakon or aischro, shows an unselfconscious familiarity with the language of conscience in the layman's, if not the philosophical sense. See Seel, "Zur Vorgeschichte...", 300-1.


66. p. 29.

67. Particularly that of McLeish.

68. On this paradox, see Sutton, p. 10 (although it is not necessary to see it as a tension between libertarianism and conservatism, as S. does). On the irrelevance of moral criteria in determining our sympathies for or against given characters, cf. id., 29, 39, 48-52.

69. See Whitman, p. 90.

70. The Homeric Hymn to Hermes is one of those works cited by Whitman, 31-4, as demonstrating a traditional celebration of clever wickedness in Greek literature.

71. See above, p. 166.

72. p. 69.

73. On the personification of anaideia in this passage, see Neil, ad loc.

74. See p. 507 above. As the rest of the antistrophe (396-408) is addressed to Paphlagon, and since he has shown anaideia in 395-6, it is unlikely that 397-9 could be taken as praise of the Sausage Seller.

75. Rather than the chorus (codd.), who do not normally intervene in the spoken sections of the agon.


77. See the examples in Henderson, 215-9.

78. See Dover, Greek Homosexuality, 81-91.

79. See E. de Carli, Aristofane e la Sofistica, 5-25, Ehrenberg, 208-9.

80. See Dover, loc.cit. (n. 78).


82. Cf. p. 506 above.

83. The reading in 995 is uncertain (against OCT's άνίκτείθημι see Dover, ad loc.: probably the final word of the line should be obelized), but the sense is the basic one, that
doing *aischryon* is incompatible with *aidos*.


85. Unjust, in revaluing *οὐκ ἐστιν* here, is employing the relativist argument which accepts the descriptive meaning of a term but denies its prescriptive force.


89. Cf. especially 1330 with 910, Unjust's response to the charge of *anaischuntia*.


92. It is possible, too, that the representation of Kleon as a dog in the trial scene suggests *anaideia*, given the association of the dog with shamelessness (p. 106n. 127 above).

93. Cf *Knights* 185-6, p. 515 above.


95. Cf. Henderson, p. 84.

96. See Sutton, 77-8.

97. Cf. p. 503 above.

98. See Wilamowitz, ad loc.

99. Thus the Kalydonian boar is *anaides* at Bacchylides 5.104-7 (p. 145 above), and inanimate objects (stones) are so called in Homer (pp. 112-3n. 219 above).

100. Ad loc. followed by von Erffa, p. 177.

101. See below, pp. 539-40.


104. p. 510 above.

9. PRESOCRATICS, SOPHISTS, ANTIPHON AND ANDOKIDES.

In the fragments of the natural philosophers collected by Diels-Kranz aidos etc. occur only sporadically and incidentally. Herakleitos B15, a typically enigmatic pronouncement, declares that the celebrants of Dionysiac rites involving the use of aidoia would be acting anaidestata, but for the fact that Dionysos, in whose honour the ritual is performed, is "the same" as Hades. In fr.B82 of the same philosopher we find an example of aischros in its physical sense: πείρουν ὁ κάλλιτος αἰχέος ἀνθρώπων γένει συμβάλλειν. That this sentence formed part of an analogy is indicated by the fragment which follows it in the source: ἀνθρώπων ὁ σοφότατος πρὸς θεον πίθηκος φανεῖται καὶ εὐφίλι καὶ κάλλει καὶ τῶς ἀλλής πλεῖσιν (B83DK).

The fragments of Empedokles furnish only two passages of minor interest. B112, the proem of the Katharmoi, describes the citizens of Akragas (line 3) as Σείνων αἴδοioi λυμένες. Bergk proposed κάδων for αἴδοιοι, but this is unnecessary: as von Erffa points out, aidoios can bear an active as well as a passive sense, especially in contexts of guest-friendship and supplication. At B122.3, in a list of feminine deities personifying opposite qualities, we find the pair ἄκλλητα τῷ ἀρετῇ πε. In Philolaos B13 τῇ αἴδειοι is given as one of the essential parts of the rational being, but it seems most likely that the fragments fathered on this genuine fifth century figure come from forgeries based on Aristotle's accounts of Pythagoreanism.

The sayings of the Seven Sages incorporated in Diels-Kranz' collection may or may not go back to those regarded as their originators, but they do represent a body of traditional gnōmai which provide useful corroborative material for everyday Greek values. Recurrent in the collection is the injunction to respect one's father, parents or elders. Other sayings recommend loyalty to friends or warn of the dangers of aischrokerdeia. The idea that failure will lead one's enemies to mock, and the correlate that mockery of another is liable to create enmity, also occur, while Pittakos 5
furnishes a rare theological deterrent against mockery of the unfortunate: ἀπεκρύοντι μὴ ὀνειδίζει· ἐπὶ γὰρ τούτοις νέμεις θεῶν καθήται. In the saying preceding this one nemesis occurs in its Homeric sense of anger at another's conduct - ἃ νεμεῖς τῷ πληγίῳ, κατέσ μὴ ποίει. In Chilon 12 aischunesthai is used of respect for a person of authority, and it emerges quite clearly that this respect responds to more than simply superior power or status: τραχὺς ὃν ὡριζον σεαυτόν Πάσης, ὅτες ὅς κισχώναται μᾶλλον ἡ φοβάται. In Bias 2 a link is made between the literal and the figurative sense of kalos and aischros, but whereas he who is physically kalos should do kala, the ugly (aischros) man is urged to mend the deficiencies of his physis by means of kalokagathia. It is assumed, then, that a good physical appearance may be a sign of a physis which is capable of good conduct, but it is also stressed that proper education can overcome any lack of innate capacity.

In the fragments of Gorgias the complex of values with which we are concerned is given only incidental expression, and aischron etc. occur only in familiar, conventional usages. B11.7 refers to the (unjustified) opprobrium incurred by Helen's infidelity, while at §16 of the same piece (on how fear can overcome one's sense of honour in battle) it is interesting to note that the honour (τῇ καλῇ) which is due those who show courage in battle is described as δεὶ τήν νόμον κεινομένου. As in Hdt.7.104 nomos plays its part in promoting cohesion in battle, and, as in that passage, while nomos may include positive legislation, it seems unlikely that it excludes social control through popular opinion.

In the Defence of Palamedes (B11aDK) much is made of the atimia in which the charge involves the defendant and which would be reinforced by his condemnation. While to be accused of anything might be disgraceful, Palamedes' disgrace stems particularly from the fact that he is accused of treason - τῆς αἰσχύνης αἰτίας §1; cf. §25 - to betray Greece would be to perpetrate τί παρακαθήκω. In §20 he claims that consideration of the consequences of treasonable action could only
have dissuaded him from its undertaking: forced to live among barbarians, he would be bereft of the honour he enjoyed, living ἐν καὶ κλῆτι δυσκληκτικόν;¹³ his fate, he claims, would be the worse for the knowledge that he himself was its cause—καὶ ταῦτα δὲ ἐμαυτῶν ὑπὲρ καὶ κλῆτιν ἄνδρες, δυστυχέν δι᾽ αὐτῶν. The suggestion is, then, that failure, which entails disgrace, is harder to bear when one is aware that one is personally responsible for it than when it comes upon one by chance:¹⁴ in both cases it is disgraceful to fail, but in the former one is likely, presumably, to experience a greater feeling of personal inadequacy and to turn more strongly to self-reproach;¹⁵ this need not suggest guilt or remorse, but it does indicate that one’s own evaluation of one’s conduct can combine with that of other people in the shame which one feels with regard to failure, and this suggests that whereas others will consider only results, the fact that one has failed, one’s own judgement will take account of intentions, and of the degree to which one is personally responsible for the disgrace. It will be seen that in this passage Gorgias is employing an argument from probability based on ἀδος, for if the disgrace resulting from a given action is inevitably so terrible, then (the audience is invited to assume) any normal man’s ἀδος will prevent his pursuing it.

Palamedes attempts to stress his point that he is unlikely to have done that of which he is accused by referring to his previous good character (28-32): hence §30, τῶν ἀτεχνῶν καὶ τῶν κακῶν ἐγὼ ἄτεχμι. In §33 he turns to his judges and reminds them of their own reputations, and in 35-6 he warns them that the eyes of Greece are upon them and that an unjust verdict will not go unnoticed:

This is a blatant appeal to ἀδος, and clearly such an appeal might produce the hesitation necessary to dissuade a jury.
from a guilty verdict.  

Before the publication of J.S. Morrison's important article in 1961, it was generally assumed that Antiphon, the oligarch and author of the Tetralogies and homicide speeches, was to be distinguished from the sophist, author of works On Truth and On Concord and perhaps also an interpreter of dreams. Morrison showed, however, that the distinction was largely based on linguistic and stylistic criteria scarcely applicable to works differing so widely in genre, and his conclusions make any positive distinction impossible. In spite of this, however, it still seems preferable to separate the speeches and the fragments in DK generically, since the philosophical, and particularly the papyrus fragments are of immense importance for the understanding of the development of important fifth century controversies, while the speeches provide excellent evidence for the role of aidsos, anaideia etc. in rhetorical argument. The speeches, then, will be treated here, while the papyrus and other fragments will be discussed below.

The passages of Antiphon's speeches which most concern us fall broadly into three categories: in the first, the speaker claims that his opponents have manifested anaideia or have acted aischros; in the second, the idea that personal honour is at stake in a court case is predominant; and in the third ideas of guilt and conscience are exploited as part of the speaker's case.

In speech 1.26-7 the general thought is that, since the defendant, the speaker's stepmother, has acted aischros, she deserves no aidsos from the jury. The passage reads as follows:

πῶς οὖν ταῦτα ἔλεγεν ἐξίων ἐστιν ἢ κίδους τυργίνων παίς, ὑμῶν ἡ ἀλλοτρία τοῦ; ὡς καθ' ἀυτῷ ἡ μάχειν ἐλέγον τὸν ἐκτός ἀνέθρεκ, ἕλλ' ἀνεμώς καλ' αἰχρός οπλικεῖν (27) . . . 

καὶ ὅπερ ἔκεινον κότυ οὔτε θεοῖ οὔθ' ἰσχυρόν οὔτ' ἀνθρώπους κισχυρεῖκον οὐδ' ἄθλον οπλικεῖν, οὔτω καὶ κατ' υἱόν μέν, καὶ τὸν δικαιὸν ἀνέθρεκ, καὶ μη τυχοῦσ' μήτ' κίδους μητ' ἔλεον μήτ' κισχυρεῖκον μηθεῖμας παίς ὑμῶν, ὥς δικαιοτάτης ἐν τούτοις τιμῶσι.
Several traditional elements are employed here, notably the association of *aidos* and pity and that of *aidos* or *aischune* with fear: in §27 no doubt *kíρυνθέρα* refers to the concern for the opinions of those named (gods, heroes and men) and *δέκα* to fear of punishment at their hands. Also notable is the identity of *aidos* and *aischune* in this specific application: perhaps *aidos*, as the older term, might be more readily associated with mercy, but this passage shows that the normal equivalence of the two terms means that they can be interchangeable in specific, as well as general applications.

Another point to note is the use of *aischros* together with *anosiós* with reference to the conduct of the alleged murderess: as Dover points out, it is clear that the adverb, so employed, is intended to condemn the conduct of the agent rather than reflect on the patient. At the same time, however, there can be no doubt but that it is *aischros* to be murdered by one's wife (cf. §23, the speaker's father died *κλέως*), and thus it seems obvious that the same action can be discreditable for both agent and patient.

As in tragedy and comedy, the accusation that one's opponent is *anaides* is common, and this accusation is frequently coupled with one of *tolma*, of going too far. Speech 3.c.1 provides a simple example:

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κειττίκα εἰς εὐ τῇ ἡμεροθείν ἄνελθγ καὶ τολμηρὸς


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The speaker affects incredulity that his opponent dares to contradict what he has presented as the plain facts of the case, and implies that such a barefaced denial of the truth constitutes *anaideia*. This is his point again at c.5, *eἰς τοῦτο γὰρ τόλμης καὶ ἄνελθγς ψῆκε* ..., a phrase which is repeated at 4.c.6: accusations of shameless *tolma* occur at 1.28, 4.c.4, 5.15, 5.57, 6.51.

In 2.c.3 an argument from *aidos* is used in conjunction with one which seeks to establish that the accused alone possessed sufficient motive to commit the crime. Like Gorgias in the *Palamedes*, the speaker asserts that, in any normal circum-
stance, people are deterred from crime by fear of both punishment and disgrace, but maintains that fear of the consequences if the crime is not committed and hatred can lead the desperate to overcome their inhibitions:

Here aischune is the disgrace which will result from exposure as a murderer, but the calculation of kindunos and aischune must involve aischune in its other sense, as the equivalent of aidos. The prospect of disgrace here performs an inhibitory function - it checks the passions, unless the sense of resentment is too strong.

Accusations of anaideia such as we looked at above are clearly designed to "show up" or shame the speaker's opponent. A court case is an agon, and, as in any agon, the reputation of both parties is at stake: failure in a legal process, in a society like the Athenian, where one's actions are highly visible, may occasion shame even though the individual involved is aware (or represents himself as aware) that his case is wholly just; other people will not know the facts of the case and will draw their own conclusions from its result.

Thus the importance of honour in the legal context is stressed in several passages in Antiphon: at 2.b.9 the defendant says that if he is condemned to death he will inflict kindunos on his children, and in §12 he appeals,

We have already seen how the prosecutor in the second Tetralogy became indignant at the suggestion that his opponent was not responsible for his son's death: honour has its part to play in this, too, for at 3.d.4 the defendant explains that it is out of concern for the dead boy's reputation that his opponent, the boy's father, refuses to accept that his son's accidental death may have been his own fault:

25
It is accepted, then, that the charge that one's son had caused his own death by negligence might cause some distress, and we can see that this is the kind of information of which one's enemies might make use: perhaps the same stress on reputation might not be present in, say, one present at the inquest into the death of a relative in our society, but the same concern to apportion blame to others is often apparent in such contexts, and behind this may lie motives similar to those mentioned in this passage.

In the *Herodes* the defendant, Euxitheos, claims that the fact that he has been brought to trial by a method which he represents as quite unprecedented has brought disgrace on himself and his family (§18, ὁνειβεῖ τε αὐτῷ τε ἐμὴ Περιέθεσιν καὶ τοῖς ἐμὶς προσήκουσι ... The οἰνοίδας arises chiefly from his imprisonment). Honour is thus a considerable motive in those involved in litigation, and in this context it is perhaps relevant to note the frequency of terms like elenchos etc. in Antiphon, for while these terms might often refer to the exposure of "the truth", there is also a concern to expose one's opponent's wickedness, deceit or anaideia, and elenchos often has more to do with shaming one's opponent than with the presentation of proof or evidence.

It is in the third of our three categories (that of passages in which the notion of guilt or conscience is prominent) that something of Antiphon's individuality is apparent: none of his successors exploits the idea of conscience to anything like the same extent. In this he reveals his awareness of developments in contemporary thought, for the identification and designation of the concept of conscience as such is a phenomenon of the later fifth century, but clearly the idea of conscience can hardly have been completely novel, since a composer of speeches to be delivered before a popular jury would be unlikely to incorporate ideas which his audience
would find unusual or unnecessarily sophisticated. It seems most likely, then, that the identification of the concept of conscience and its designation in terms of synêidesis etc. was fairly readily accepted by the ordinary citizens of Athens.

Reflections on guilt and conscience, however, are not introduced arbitrarily or gratuitously into the speeches: all have their point, and in terms of purpose and application may be divided into two categories, firstly those passages which warn the jurors of the possibility that their consciences will trouble them should they reach an unjust verdict, and secondly those in which the main point is the clear conscience of the speaker himself. Those passages in the first category are mostly based on the idea of the jury's duty, which in a case of homicide is a religious one (a requirement of eusebeia) analogous to that of the prosecution in avenging the dead man.

Summing up his second speech for the defence, the speaker of 2. d. 12 appeals to the jury for eusebeia and aidos, and concludes by reminding the jurors that a hasty verdict will afford them ample opportunity for repentance:

It is significant that in this passage, as often in Aeschylus but only infrequently later, aideisthai and sebesthai overlap to a considerable extent, and both seem to bear the sense of "honouring" which is their closest point of contact. One can aibeibh... evsebhen, and this same idea is picked up by teit... gebrhmen. 3. b. 12 uses similar language: tην τι σεν...
As to the metanoia mentioned at the end of the first Tetralogy, it does seem at first sight as if the speaker is warning the jurors that their own (subsequent) recognition that they have reached an unjust verdict will cause them to feel remorse, but the picture is complicated by the obvious stress on the religious aspect. The remainder of the passage is concerned with pollution and ritual purity (for example, if the speaker is condemned the real murderer, a source of pollution, will go free), and thus the metanoia may equally be occasioned by the recognition that the jurors have been responsible for bringing pollution on themselves and the city. In other passages, both the condemnation of an innocent man and failure to condemn the true killer may bring the wrath of the victim down upon the jury. If, then, the jury's metanoia is to be caused by the sense that they are being pursued by some avenging spirit, then we are not, strictly speaking, dealing with remorse as such, but at the same time we should notice that in both 2.d.12 and 3.b.12 the jurors are asked to behave not only piously but also with regard for justice, and it is thus clearly possible that any repentance they might experience after the trial might also be occasioned by a feeling that they have failed to act in accordance with justice, and this might well indicate remorse. It is important to remember, moreover, that, unless we believe that fifth century Athenians were literally pursued by the avenging spirits of the dead or subject to the pollution caused by the shedding of blood, we are bound to see the phenomena which they describe in those terms as indications of normal human responses, and it is perfectly possible that the fear of pollution or of the vengeance of the dead man conceals an anxiety which we should describe in terms of conscience. Naturally, however, this does not mean that the phenomenon of conscience is referred to in these passages as such.

The jury is warned in similar terms at 5.89 and 91-2, and
although reservations based on the theological aspect of homicide still obtain, they do so to a far lesser extent in this, a genuine court speech, than in the Tetralogies. The last sentence of §88 informs the jury that it is a hamartia and an asebeia to convict an innocent man of murder, and the next sentence (§89) explains that it is more serious for a jury wrongfully to convict than for a prosecutor wrongfully to accuse. Section 89 closes with a warning that the consequences of a wrong verdict (whatever they may be) are inescapable.

In 91 Euxitheos proceeds to make a distinction within the category of hamartia, saying that to acquit is a mistake than to convict: the former is a mistake (άρετη), the latter an impiety (άσέβημα). In the case of a mistake which can be remedied (i.e. if the jury acquit a guilty man) a change of mind is always possible, but:

Similarly in 92 he goes on to emphasize the gravity of a decision to condemn: a conscious decision which turns out to have been wrong admits of no excuse.

Certainly there are religious elements in this passage (πρόβατα 88, ὁμώμης, ἄσφαλς 91) but the threat of pollution is not explicitly brought out. Parker, however, believes that the warning that the jurors cannot escape the responsibility for any hamartia means that "it would be pollution or spirits which the jurors could not evade." On the other hand, the sentence, ἐν δὲ τεῖς ἄνηκέστοις πλέον βλάβος τῷ μετανοέων καὶ γνώμης ἐξηματητήτος, does suggest that the very recognition that one has made a mistake (or done wrong) will prove painful: as Dover points out, it is impossible to decide whether the recognition is painful because it leads to fear of consequences or because the indivi-
dual blames himself for being wrong. Possibly the matter is deliberately left open, those on the jury who believe in pollution thus being allowed to consider the dangers of mistake in the light of that belief, while those for whom individual conscience is a real consideration are encouraged to take that into account.

That Antiphon is thinking of conscience in this passage might be suggested by the sequel (§93), in which relatively new uses of the vocabulary of conscience are exploited to suggest the innocence of the defendant. The passage is worth quoting in full:

\[\text{\vspace{1cm}}\]

The repetition of parts of \textit{ἀνάθεμα} here is most striking, and it is clear that we are dealing with an internal conscience which has important psychological effects: the \textit{psyche} of one with a clear conscience is strong, while that of one with a bad conscience is weak, and it seems that it is one's own awareness that one has done no wrong which is the most important consideration. As Dover points out,\textsuperscript{39} the representation of conscience in this passage strongly resembles similar descriptions in the fragments of Demokritos, to which, as we shall see,\textsuperscript{40} \textit{aidos} is closely relevant. On the other hand, Antiphon does seem rather to step back from a wholly Demokritean or psychological explanation of conscience: the \textit{psyche} of the man with a bad conscience is said to weaken because he feels that what is happening to him is a punishment for his \textit{asebemata}. It is possible that a fear of supernatural punishment enters the picture here, but it also remains true that the psychological disturbance is directly
caused by the recognition of a transgression. The passage thus clearly reveals fairly advanced notions of the nature of conscience, and this is particularly true in the awareness of the positive benefits of a good conscience rather than simply of the ills caused by guilt. In the fifth century context it is definitely comparable with the interest in describing and defining conscience shown by Demokritos and Euripides.

The passage, however, is not included in the speech for its own sake, but is an example of how the moral outlook of at least part of the jury may be exploited as an argument from probability: the speaker claims that a good conscience allows confidence, through the strength of the psyche, while a bad conscience leads to weakness of the psyche and despair. In effect (as indeed the last sentence of 93 shows), he is inviting the jury to conclude from his demeanour that he is innocent, because this is the impression created by his confidence. The converse of this argument, open to his opponents, would be that his confident exterior, in the face of compelling proof of his guilt, is a sure sign of anaideia.

The speech On the Chorister opens with a similar argument from conscience. If one must face danger, the speaker claims, the greatest of blessings is a clear conscience (6.1):

"κατ' έκτιμ' συναθέντι μηδέν ε'γ'ημακατηκότι, άλλ' έν' τις καί εμφαίλα θύγνετο, άϊν' κακότατος καί αἰσχύνης θύγνεθι, καί τυχ' μιλλ' ή θάλεια." Again the true determinant of the character of the situation is the individual's conscience, and it is claimed, in effect, that provided one's conscience is clear, no aischune can accrue, even though the situation is one normally considered disgraceful. This is not the traditional view, and contrary opinions are expressed in Antiphon himself, but, as we have seen, since its first occurrence in Solon, the explicit statement that one's own estimation of the character of one's actions is more important than that of other people has become increasingly common. In the passages so far discussed it is implied that the awareness that one has done no wrong
frees one from fear and inhibition: in other passages it is
the awareness that one has done wrong which leads one to
submit oneself to justice, even in the absence of compulsion.
One such is 6.4-5, where it is said that one who kills
another who is under his control and who thus has no one
to avenge him by prosecuting his killer nevertheless volun-
tarily seeks purification, out of respect for convention and
for the divine sanction (τὸ νομοσκολευμένον καὶ τὸ θεῖον δεδώκει). The reference to τὸ θεῖον clearly indicates fear of divine
punishment, but fear of τὸ νομοσκολευμένον suggests not fear,
but ἀίδος: nor does it seem that this ἀίδος is directed
primarily at others' reproaches, but rather it takes the
form of respect for the code of conduct prevalent in the
city; it appears to be assumed that the individual in ques-
tion agrees with conventional standards and is keen to behave
in accordance with them. In §5 this readiness to
submit to the prescriptions of law or custom is described in
terms of conscience: οὐτ' ἀδ συνειδῶς καυτὸς κατὰ ἤ' ἄριστον
ἐγκατέλειψαν τοὺς ἄνθρωπος μὴ σὺ χρησιμοποιήσας τὸ νόμον. It seems, then,
that there is in this passage a realistic awareness that
fear of punishment, conscience and a conscientious desire to
do what is considered right can combine to promote the same
course of action. Other similar passages include 5.33,41,49
and 6.23, in all of which a subjective evaluation of right
and wrong is more important than external compulsion.

Of the speeches of Andokides only the second falls within
the period of our enquiry, but it contains little that is
relevant. In §4 we are told that Andokides' real opponents
send others to accuse him, the sort of men ὁ οἰς ἐκθέμενος
τῇ ἀναισχυντῇ οὐδὲν διέξεσθαι περὶ τοῦτων διεπεῖν τῇ καὶ ἀκούσα τῇ
μεγίστῃ τῶν κακῶν. The identification of ἀναισχυντία with
the ability to say anything, true or not, and with disregard
for the opinions of other people is fundamental. Here these
ἀναισχυντοι are contrasted with Andokides' enemies, who σὺ
tούχωσιν... διεχύνεσθαι περὶ τούτων, φοβοῦμεν ἐλέγχον
δεδομένα: these people obviously do possess an element of
αισχυνή, at least with regard to exposure.
In the ethics of Protagoras, Antiphon (in the fragments of *Truth* and *Concord*) and Demokritos, as far as we can tell from the available evidence, the nature and efficacy of *aidos* played a major part. Before discussing these figures, however, space must be created for a brief examination of relevant passages in the fragments attributed to Kritias. Most of the instances of the relevant terms are of a commonplace nature, and only the celebrated *Sisyphus* fragment has any bearing on the mainstream of our discussion. The question of whether the satyr-play and the three tragedies (*Tennes*, *Rhadamanthys* and *Peirithous*) are to be attributed to Kritias or to Euripides is of no great importance here, since the passages with which we are concerned will be equally good evidence for fifth century ideas as long as it is merely assumed that they are of that period.

The *Sisyphus* fragment (B25) contains no instance of *aidos*, but is nonetheless important in that it provides important evidence that a problem we shall meet again in Antiphon and Demokritos was a prominent one in the age of the Sophists. The fragment is firmly in the tradition of sophistic *Kulturentstehungslehren* in its assumption of an original bestial state from which mankind emerged with the help of laws and other institutions of civilization. Laws, however, can only prevent open transgressions of which society will be aware (B25.9-10), and so men began to do wrong in secret (11). In order to deter them from this, *πυγνὸς τὸ καὶ ῥοθὸς γνῶμῃ ἄνθρωπος* (12) invented fear of the gods. The speaker is probably the irreligious Sisyphos himself, and the atheist sentiment may be the passage's main dramatic point: it would certainly not be legitimate to take it as the view of either Kritias or Euripides, even if we could discover which of the two was the author. For our purposes, however, it is the idea that human beings felt it necessary to devise a means of preventing wrongdoing in situations in which the sanctions of statutory punishment and popular disapproval, by reason of the deed's private status, were felt to be ineffective, which is important. Clearly *aidos* has a part to play in the prevention of misdeeds about which others may find out (and here it is not
necessary that they should find out in every case, merely
that the prospective agent should be concerned at the possi-
bility), but the speaker in the fragment is obviously of
the opinion that *aidos* is inactive when the likelihood of
detection appears slight. It is also clear that anyone who
can say that the gods were invented will have no belief in
divine authority, and so the opinion represented in the
fragment is one which holds out little hope of deterring men
from attempting to do wrong in secret. This opinion, widely
accepted, would clearly be a dangerous one, and it is there-
fore not surprising that various arguments were employed in
the attempt to refute it, and it is to some of these that we
shall now turn in our discussion of Protagoras, Antiphon and
Demokritos.

The *ipsissima verba* of Protagoras are scant, and any attempt
to reconstruct the broad outline of his teaching will inevi-
tably be driven to consider the accounts given of him by
Plato, both in the eponymous dialogue and in the *Theaetetus*,
and this raises the question of the reliability of Plato's
testimony. The *Theaetetus*, however, does not immediately
concern us, while in the *Protagoras* only those arguments used
in the so-called Great Speech (320c-328d) will be considered,
and there is a strong presumption that, where Protagoras is
portrayed as freely offering his own views, these are likely
to be consonant with opinions actually held by the historical
Protagoras: if Plato did wish to examine or refute Protagoras' 
doctrines he must have intended to state them somewhere, and
it is more likely that he did so in the Great Speech, which
is a voluntary statement of the sophist's opinions, than in
the rest of the dialogue, where he is pressed by Sokrates
and led into areas he may not have wished to explore. Certainly the advantages of attempting to discover the views of
the historical Protagoras distinctly outweigh the disadvan-
tages of the uncertainty of attribution, since the views ex-
pressed in the Great Speech are firmly in the older sophistic
mainstream, and since other writers, like Antiphon and Demo-
kritos, do seem to be aware of the strengths and inadequacies
of the doctrines there presented. That the Speech does treat
major topics which engaged other fifth century figures is a strong argument in favour of its reliability as evidence.

In the myth (320c-322d) which Protagoras relates in order to prove his contention that political arete can be taught, a two stage account of the origins of culture and human progress is given, the first stage being bestial and uncivilized, the second bringing civilization and πελτική τέχνη through the intervention of Zeus and his gift of ἀιδος and δίκη. There are two implications of this account which are important for our purposes: firstly, that men lived on earth for some time before acquiring the ability to live together amicably; and secondly, that ἀιδος and δίκη, and πελτική τέχνη, are prerequisites for the second, civilized stage of human existence. Thus ἀιδος appears once again as a civilizing force, as it does at Il.24.41-45 and in those passages in which its withdrawal is seen as a sign of the breakdown of moral order. At WD.276-80 it is δίκη which separates man from beast, but as in the present passage, ἀιδος and δίκη are linked elsewhere in the context.

The precise nature and rôle of ἀιδος and δίκη, however, are problematic: all men are to possess them (322d), and any unable to do so, in the myth, are to be put to death, but in the logos which follows the myth and which gives an account of how virtue actually is taught in contemporary Athens it is stated that the Athenians do not consider πελτική τέχνη to exist πριν, but to be developed by teaching and practice (323c). The problem is, how can everyone possess ἀιδος and δίκη and yet not possess πελτική τέχνη (or τέχνη) by nature, since πελτική τέχνη is said to have been brought about by the acquisition of ἀιδος and δίκη? The problem is largely a product of the allegorical divine apparatus of the myth, yet it is of great importance, in that its investigation will bring us closer to the ideas of one or more classical thinkers as to how ἀιδος actually worked.

Most commentators have assumed that the combination of myth and logos shows that both innate capacity and teaching are
required to bring out πολιτική αρετή and indeed there are indications enough of this in the text. In addition, one of the fragments of Protagoras' own works (B3DK) affirms exactly that position: ἡ λόγος καὶ ἡ γνώσης διαφέρουσιν ἀρεταῖ. Our problem, then, really is, do ἀδος and δίκη belong to φυσις or are they instilled by ἀσκεσις. Some have said that ἀδος and δίκη exist ἐπὶ ἰστι, on the grounds that, if all those who were unable to possess these qualities were put to death early in the history of mankind, surely all those now alive possess them by nature. This position is, however, open to two objections, the first that the execution of those unable to share in ἀδος and δίκη shows that Zeus is unable to alter man's essential nature: but both this, and the position it attacks, may entail a too literal interpretation of the logic of the myth. A more serious objection is that if ἀδος and δίκη exist by nature, they cannot be equivalent to πολιτική τέχνη or αρετή. That ἀδος and δίκη are equivalent to πολιτική τέχνη/ἀρετή is suggested by the fact that δικαιοσύνη and σοφροσύνη, which paraphrase ἀδος and δίκη at 323a (and thereafter), are equated with πολιτική τέχνη at 323a-b and with ἀνάγεις αρετή at 324e-325a. At the same time, however, we should note that, at 329c, Sokrates is not clear on whether ἀδος, δικαιοσύνη, σοφροσύνη and ἡσιότης, despite Protagoras' assertion that these "are" αρετή, are parts of a unity called αρετή or names given to the unity, αρετή. Protagoras replies that they are parts of a whole as are the parts of the face to the face itself (329d-e). Thus an absolute equivalence of ἀδος etc. and αρετή, in the manner suggested by Sokrates' second alternative, is denied, and the statement that ἀδος etc. (and perhaps any number of other qualities) are parts of αρετή may mean no more than that they contribute to it, and so the question of whether ἀδος and δίκη, unlike αρετή, exist ἐπὶ ἰστι is left open.

A better route towards the solution of the problem is afforded by an examination of the logos with a view to determining how ἀδος and δίκη, or σοφροσύνη and δικαιοσύνη, work in relation to αρετή: are they themselves taught or do they enable one to learn? In general in the logos it is argued
that society's attempts to correct the moral faults of its members by punishment (323d-324c, 325a, 325d, 326d) show that these faults are regarded as remediable, and thus that arete can be taught. Experience of punishment, then, and fear of its recurrence are thought to produce arete. These, however, are only the sanctions employed when the subject has failed to absorb the precepts imparted to him in the process of education: examination of Protagoras' conception of this process shows clearly that he regarded it as the instruction of each member of society from the earliest age in the standards and values of the community. At 325c-d we are told that a child's nurse, mother, paidagogos and father all strive to improve its arete, pointing out τι μὲν δικαίων, τι δὲ ἀδικον, καὶ τὸδε μὲν κακῶν, τὸδε δὲ ἀθητῶν, καὶ τὸδε μὴ ὀύς, τὸδε δὲ ἀνόητων, καὶ τὰ μὲν τοιαὶ, τὰ δὲ μὴ τοιαὶ. The child thus learns to subscribe to the same values as its teachers: 64 dikaion/adikon etc. correspond to the three parts of arete at 324e-325a, δικαίωσιν καὶ ἀθετῶσιν καὶ τὸ ὀψιλον καὶ χαῖ, and, inasmuch as the child does not know instinctively what is dikaion or adikon, it seems that the efforts of its teachers at this stage are designed to instil exactly these qualities, which are those which enable the child to recognize what is dikaion, what adikon etc.. It seems likely that Protagoras saw education, or "social control", 65 as producing the qualities dikaiosyne, sophrosyne and hosiotes, not as exploiting them. 66 The sophist himself avoids the word aidos outside the myth, but the learning of what is aischron and kalon, while it corresponds only to sophrosyne of the three parts of arete, strongly suggests the learning of aidos.

The other stages of education confirm this general impression. As well as instructing their charges in lyre-playing, the didaskalos also teaches eukosmia (325e): having learned this, the boys also learn to emulate the heroes of epic (325e-326a). When they continue their studies of music with the kitharistes they also practise sophrosyne (326a); in physical training (326b-c) they learn how to avoid ὀποδηλίνως διὰ τὴν τενηρίν τῶν σωμάτων καὶ ἐν τοῖς παλέμεσις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις πράξεσιν, and they are presumably reminded at this point that
it is aischron to be a coward. Finally (326c-d) the city's laws become teachers, and the young men learn by example: the nomoi clearly provide moral, as well as legal, imperatives, and to obey them can hardly be anything other than the exercise of aidos and dike. Protagorean theory thus coincides with that of modern psychologists, to the extent that both see the social virtues which promote conformity to the standards of society as imparted in the process of socialization. 67

The strongest indication, however, that aidos and dike do not form part of the nature of every man comes at 327c-d, and it is here that Protagoras' position is finally clarified. The essence of the argument is that, as all flute-players are flute-players per se as compared to non-flute-players, although within the category of flute-players there may be a wide range of talent and ability, so all citizens, although they vary widely in arete and justice, are still just when compared to those who do not enjoy a civilized life in a political community. Even the most unjust citizen, we are told, would appear an expert in justice compared with men who had no contact with the institutions of civilization (οἱ μὴ ταύτα ἐστίν μὴ ἄθροισται μὴ νόμι μὴ δικαιοσυνη ἁνέκπη μηδὲν διὰ πάντως ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπος ἐπιμετέχειν). If, then, men possess a minimal capacity for justice, they do so because of their membership of a civilized community, not because they are men. Protagoras, however, does not envisage any race of "wild men" like those of the comic poet, Pherekrates (327d), as actually existing, and so the implication of the myth, that all men possess a capacity for πελάτω τεχνή because they possess aidos and dike does not conflict with this statement. The process of civilized life is reciprocal: aidos and dike are required in order for cities to exist, and membership of a citizen body makes it inevitable that one will possess some degree of aidos and dike. 68

On the other hand, Protagoras does attach some importance to innate capability (remember fr.B3DK): in the analogy of the flute-players (327b-c) it is natural ability which allows
one musician to excel over his fellows: so, it is implied, do men differ in dikaiosyne according to their physis. Antecedent capacity, then, can determine how just one is (and, presumably, how much aidos one feels), but not whether or not one is just at all. Therefore, whatever this antecedent capacity is (and this is a considerable difficulty), it is probably not aidos or dike: it may simply be a greater ability to learn. The fact that Protagoras has allowed for innate ability, however, has created difficulties. Some have held that while aidos and dike do not exist by nature, the ability to acquire them does: but the ability to acquire aidos and dike is a simple consequence of being born into a social environment, and if one not brought up in a social environment can be said to be vastly more unjust than anyone who has been, then obviously natural ability has nothing to do with the acquisition of justice. Furthermore, to posit an innate capacity for aidos and dike divorced from the qualities themselves creates a problem of terminology, for how would a Greek differentiate between a capacity for aidos and aidos itself, and what would this capacity be called?

To sum up, then, Protagoras in the Great Speech holds that the moral qualities of aidos and dike (sophrosyne and dikaiosyne) are necessary for the existence of the social and political unit of the city, that the qualities are desirable as well as necessary (they benefit citizens mutually at 327b) and that they are not innate but acquired in the socializing process which every member of the community undergoes. As a means of promoting justice and virtue, this thesis is open to several objections, of which the chief for our purposes are the following: it is empirically false that everyone in a city must be just for the city to survive; in allowing that citizens vary in the degree of their observance of justice and in maintaining that, nevertheless, all are minimally just, Protagoras shows only that a minimum of just behaviour is necessary for everyone's good; citizens have grounds to obey the laws for the good of the city, but not for their own good in every circumstance. The historical Protagoras may have had perfectly adequate answers to these
objections, but if so, they are not to be found in our sources. In view of the concentration in the age of the sophists on the traditional tendency to identify just action and expedient action, the crucial objection which might be made is that Protagoras does not relate moral action specifically to the individual's own advantage, and it is exactly this point that is made by Antiphon in criticizing a theory of justice which might well be that of Protagoras. 76

In fr.B44A Antiphon offers the following definition of justice: δικαιοσύνη οὖν τὰ τῆς πόλεως νόμιμα, ἐν γὰρ πολιτεύηται γι', μη παρεβάζειν. This is not, however, a definition to which he himself subscribes, 77 since he immediately goes on to describe how one might treat justice most advantageously to oneself, and this entails not obedience to the laws of the city in which one lives (the requirement of justice), but simply obeying the laws in front of witnesses and obeying τὰ τῆς φύσεως when no witnesses are present. As he goes on to explain (col.1.22 - col.2.10), justice and law (nomos), in his view, have no power to compel other than that of the sanctions imposed by other members of the community when one's transgressions come to light:

Τὰ μὲν γὰρ τῶν νόμων ἐπίθεται, τὰ δὲ τῆς φύσεως ἄναγκαι, καὶ τὰ μὲν τῶν νόμων ὀμολογηθέντα (τα δὲ τῆς φύσεως) οὐχ ὀμολογηθέντα. Τὰ οὖν νόμιμα παραβιάζων εἰ ἄν λέου τῆς ὀμολογηθέντας καὶ καθήμενα ἀποτελάκτειν καὶ κὼιμηθαίναι καὶ ἀπαθάνειν εἶναι.

Antiphon, then, is criticizing a view of justice which holds that justice is obeying the nomima of one's own city, and which relies on a belief that laws and customs are products of agreement. 79 He is, of course criticizing the definition from his own point of view (and so we do have his own views here), but he is not putting forward positive doctrine of his own: there is no injunction to break the law in secret. 80 Several indications suggest that the view of justice criticized is that of Protagoras: the association of dikaiosyne and τὰ νόμιμα recalls Prot.327a, τῶν δικαίων καὶ τῶν νόμων, while the statement that laws are ἐπίθεται suggests a view of the origin of law similar to that implied by the Prot. myth.
Again, the citizens agree to uphold that which their city holds just, and this is precisely the arrangement suggested by Tht.167c.

In his criticism Antiphon singles out two consequences of law-breaking, aischune and zemia: it is probable that, in using these terms, he wishes to encompass the entire range of the term nomos, both codified and uncodified, for while aischune (disgrace) would follow conviction for a crime prescribed by law, it also naturally follows breach of conventional morality. Antiphon seems, in effect, to be suggesting that Protagoras' aidos (fear of reproach or disgrace, whether resulting from breach of convention or of positive law) and dike (sense of justice, "law-abidingness") are not sufficient to prevent injustice when the agent feels that he can avoid the attention of others: the process of legal punishment or social disapproval can be set in motion only when society is aware of the transgression, and this kind of sanction, when compared with the immediate and painful consequences of acting against nature (col.2.10-30), is, in Antiphon's view, inadequate to prevent injustice. We should notice that all the stress in this argument is on external sanctions, and it is assumed that it is only in fear of the sanctions of punishment or disgrace that an individual avoids wrongdoing: there is thus a disregard of any personal standard of right and wrong, of any subjective form of conscience.

Further drawbacks of nomos and its failure to correspond with physis are outlined: col.3-4 of 44A in particular discuss the ways in which nomoi hinder nature; col.5-7 show how various people who abide by nomos (both law and custom) and justice derive not benefit but harm from doing so. In col. 5-7 most of the examples concern legal justice, and how becoming involved in the process of justice can prove more harmful than beneficial for all parties, but in col.5.4-8 καὶ οὖτις ἐν τοῖς γενναμένοις καὶ κακοὺς έντυς ἐις αὐτῶς ἐν τολῆς is given as an example of action which is hostile to nature. Now, those who would treat well even parents who had treated them badly would not do so primarily out of
obedience to a written *nomos*, but to an unwritten one, such as the saying of Kleoboulos, πιέζει δὲν κισείθαλα. Antiphon, then, does take account of both custom and law, and implicitly suggests that *aides*, such as would lead one to honour a parent who had shown one no kindness, does not (always) contribute to one’s own advantage.

In fr. 44B col. 2 Antiphon actually mentions *aides*, again in criticism of the restraints placed on nature by convention:

In these difficult sentences the author seems to say that by honouring some and not others according to birth people impose an arbitrary distinction upon themselves, such as that between Greek and barbarian. He sees, then, distinctions of class and race as conventional, just as laws and justice are, and thus as something to be depreciated. It is hardly legitimate, however, to conclude from these observations, which may be simply practical and have no moral message at all, that Antiphon believed in the unity of mankind in any humanitarian sense. The combination ἐπικοινωνεῖ τὸ καὶ σεβόμεθα is poetic, both verbs being roughly equivalent, as often in Aeschylus, to a verb of "honouring", and it is perhaps significant that, while Herodotos and Thucydides avoid *sebomai* in secular contexts, the same closeness of *aideomai* and *sebomai* occurs in "Antiphon the orator." The other papyrus fragment (P. Oxy. 1797, fr. 44DK) does not specially concern us: essentially it makes points similar to those in 44A 5-7, showing that those who submit themselves out of respect for law to the processes of justice often receive not support or benefit from so doing, but harm. In addition, three definitions of justice (none of them Antiphon's), viz. "not to take the initiative in harming others," "obeying the law" and "neither to do nor to suffer harm" are shown to be incompatible. Antiphon shows, then,
that none of the conventional conceptions of justice which he considers can ensure the advantage of those who submit themselves to justice. As even the opening lines of 44A suggested, Antiphon's criterion is advantage, but, as has been amply demonstrated,\textsuperscript{90} this does not necessarily imply that he advocated uninhibited gratification of one's own desires: to pursue such a course of conduct would for most people entail more disadvantage than advantage. Although the papyrus fragments give us no indication of how Antiphon felt an individual might best pursue his own advantage and avoid pain, the quotations of later authors from his work, which DK assign to his πει ἐμνάσας, show that, in practice, the pursuit of advantage is not incompatible with traditional morality. These fragments, however, promote action approved by traditional morality because it is prudent, not because it is moral.\textsuperscript{91}

Demokritos,\textsuperscript{92} like Antiphon, is aware that fear of punishment and fear of disgrace are not sufficient to deter all wrong-doing, but rather lead some simply to attempt to conceal their vices. Unlike Antiphon, however, he maintains that it is in the interests of everyone to act justly and honourably, and ἀιδῶς is central to his attempt to prove that this is so. In outlook he often resembles both Protagoras and Antiphon, but unlike either he has an advanced conception of the individual conscience and an essentially internalized notion of what is good for individuals.

That Demokritos does recognize the inability of external moral sanctions to compel and deter in every eventuality is shown most clearly by B181:

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κρείσσων ἐπʼ ἀκριτὴν βασιλέα προτεστή χρώματος καὶ λόγω
πειθοὶ ἀπὸ μάλιστα ἀκριτῆ καὶ ἀνάγκη. λέθες μὲν ἄμερος ἐκπεμάτων
εἰκός τὸν εἰρμένων ἀδίκως ὔπε νῦν ὑπὸ νῦν, τῶν δὲ ἐστὶ δὲν
ἡμέρων πειθοὶ οὐκ εἰκός οὔτε λέθες οὔτε ἄμερος ἐκδει
tὶ πλημμέλεις. δεότε συνέκι τῷ καὶ ἐπιστήμην ἐκθετεγέρων
τὶς ἀνδρείου ἄρισ ταῖ καὶ ἐθερμωμένος γέγραπται.
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Here Demokritos replaces fear of punishment and disgrace by intelligence and understanding, brought about by persuasion,
the object of which is duty (τὸ δέον). He implies that, once the individual has been persuaded, he will recognize that it is not in his own interest to do wrong. Like Antiphon, then, he is aware that nomos alone is insufficient to prevent injustice, and, also like Antiphon, if the concord fragments mentioned above (n.91) are anything to go by, he suggested that, even in spite of the inadequacy of nomos, people would find it more advantageous to act with restraint. Unlike Antiphon, however, he stresses the individual's own appraisal of his conduct (implied in ἐπωτήσατο and ἐπιστήμη) and (as other fragments show) appreciates the very considerable benefits of nomos. Fr.B41 is comparable to 181: μὴ δειν ἐφεξώ, αὖλα διὰ τὸ δέον ἐπέκεικα ἐκμεταλλάζω, and, as B42 shows, τὸ δέον (οὐ δὲ) is an object of knowledge: this reinforces the ideas of ἐπωτήσατο and ἐπιστήμη in B181, and the importance of intelligence in human action is further stressed in B59,77,83 and 182 (τὰ καλὰ are achieved by μάθησις through πῶνα, τὰ αἰσχρὰ come automatically).

Intelligence, however, is not Demokritos' only answer to the problem of λήθες ἐκμεταλλάζων, for intelligence for him is primarily moral intelligence, productive of an awareness of right and wrong, an awareness which appears as ἀδόσ. Fr.B264 is the most important source here:

μὴ δὲν τι μᾶλλον τῶν ἀνθρώπων κίσειται ἐνυτῶν μηδὲ τί μᾶλλον ἐστι γεγένθαι καλῶν, εἰ μᾶλλος μηδὲς εἰσῆλθαν ἦν οἱ πάντες ἀνθρώποι· ἄλλο ἐνυτῶν μέλιστα κίσειται, καὶ τοῦτο νόμων τῷ φυσικῇ κκθετάναι, ὅτε μὴ δὲν ποιεῖν ἀνεπιτίθενοι.

B84 and 244 express the same idea (using aischunesthai rather than aideisthai):

ἐνυτῶν πείτων κισεύεσθαι χειρῶν τῶν κισεύες ἐξόντα.

φίλοκου, καὶ μόνος ἤς, μήτε λέβης μήτ' ἐργαζόμεθα, μήτ' ἐν πολὺ μᾶλλον σκυτῶν αἰσχύνεσθαι.

Demokritos, then, believes he has found a solution to the problem of λήθες ἐκμεταλλάζων: the individual has his own standard of right and wrong and values his own opinion more than that of other people. The expression ἐνυτῶν κίσειται
relies, as the contrast with τῶν ἀνθρώπων αἰδεῖθείς shows, on the use of aideisthai in the sense of fear of reproach, and so Demokritos shows himself to be aware of a concept of prospective aídos in which self-reproach, rather than fear of detection is paramount, and this in turn suggests a familiarity with the operation of a subjective sense of guilt or remorse. This internalized form of aídos, so expressed, is entirely different, as far as we can tell, from that envisaged by Protagoras and Antiphon, and it fulfils Antiphon’s implied criterion for an effective deterrent against injustice, in that it presupposes an awareness that a given action will as a matter of course lead to unpleasant consequences (self-reproach).

The basis for Demokritos’ concept of aídos is to be sought in his ideas of conscience and guilt, of which, in turn, the basis lies in his atomic theory and its influence on his ethics. The effects and manifestations of a guilty conscience are described in B174:

αὐτῶν. Τοῦτο πάντα τὰ τελευτήτα ὑπερτείρατο, ὅταν τὴν ἀναμνησθήτο, καὶ δεδοκι, καὶ ἐνεποτον κακίστει.

Acting in accordance with justice and popular morality (observing δίκαια καὶ νόμιμα) promotes well-being and contentment, while disregard of justice and failure to do τὰ ἔργα ἀντικαίρως (cf. τὰ δέον, B181, 41, ἀ δέον, B42) lead to absence of pleasure, fear and self-reproach. This self-reproach must be the object of ἐνεποτον αἰδεῖθείς. B215 is comparable: δίκης κοῦμος γνώμης θάνατος καὶ ἀθανασία, ἁδεστής βεγέτων ἀνίμων ἴσως πέμπῃ. Fear here may denote simple fear of punishment, but more probably (as the converse of tharsos and athambie) it refers generally to uncertainty and worry, the psychological disturbance which is the opposite of contentment. Conscience of wrongdoing leads to disturbance and fear also in B297, but those seem in this case to result from a mistaken belief in life after death and are not, therefore, the ineluctable consequences of doing wrong. In B262, however, illegal and
unjust action is said to have the inevitable consequence of an ἀνικάρδην 100 for the agent. This suggests that injustice always involves a loss of contentment. 101 In spite of this, however, recognition of one's misdeeds and the pain caused thereby can prove salutary, if it is allied to repentance:

εἰς ἰσχεῖν εἰςμακεν βίον σωτηγί (B43). 102

In some respects these passages on guilt and remorse are subject to the usual reservations that they may take external sanctions into account, but B174 does mention the possibility of self-criticism, and if the unpleasant psychological consequences of wrongdoing are related to the maxim ἐνυπίσταν ἀλβεῖθαι a definite interest in internal conscience does emerge. Unjust action, it seems, always leads to loss of pleasure, and naturally loss of pleasure can be manifested in a realization that another course of action would have been better in the first place: this may engender self-reproach, and one who is fully aware both of right and wrong and of the unpleasant consequences of doing wrong will forestall his self-reproach through ἀδος. The relationship of all this to Demokritean physics is suggested by B191, which outlines the basis of euthymia in the physical state of the soul: 103 euthymia consists in moderation of pleasure and a well-ordered life (βίον συμμετρί); excess or deficiency causes change and brings about great movements in the soul; souls which are moved over great intervals are neither stable nor contented (εὔθυμον); one must therefore limit one's desires to what is obtainable and avoid discontent and envy.

From the other passages we have discussed, it appears that wrongdoing causes the kind of instability in the soul described in this passage.

It seems likely that Demokritos believed that intelligence which has been fostered by education or persuasion led one to the position of being able to discern both the proper means of maximizing one's euthymia and the kind of action whose performance would be inhibited by ἀδος. 104 Certainly, like Protagoras, he links ἀδος and education: 105

† ἐξωτερικος † μη πωνεν παροις ανι óντες ουτε εὔθυμον ἀν
Like Protagoras, then, Demokritos sees *aidos* as a product of different forms of education, and sees a connexion between *aidos* and *arete*. Education and *aidos* also require *ponos*, as in B182: τὰ μὲν καθ' ἄρχεσθαι τοῖς πόνοις ἡ μάθησις ἐστὶ ἐργαζέται, τὰ δ' ἀνεγκαθ' ἄνευ πόνων ἀυτομάτη. This recalls the assertion of Protagoras that *arete* does not come ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀυτομάτου (*Prot.* 323c). Demokritos also shared with his fellow-citizen a conviction that both *physis* and education contributed to a man’s character (*Prot.* B3, cf. Demok. B33, 183, 208); if anything, it is Demokritos who lays the greater stress on education (B242, cf. Kritias B9).

The twin strands which contribute to the development of Demokritean man’s internal conscience are intellect and *aidos*, and in laying stress on these two factors he does not diverge far from the mainstream of Greek thought, nor even from Homer, in whose poems “good sense” and *aidos* are the marks of a properly educated *agathos*. Where Demokritos does differ from the mainstream is in his conscious internalization of *aidos* and his conception of the autonomous human being who determines the character of his own actions for himself. Thus he denies a rôle to popular opinion, traditionally the single most powerful force in Greek ethics. Several of the other fragments beyond those already discussed confirm this impression. In B48, for example, he claims, μημημομένων ἕλκυνυς οὐκ ἔργον οὖν ποιεῖτι λόγον. Homer’s heroes, often anxious about the criticisms of *τις κακώτερος*, would not agree. Other fragments stress intentions, rather than results or appearances, in a way which is quite novel in its explicitness. In B68, for example, good or bad reputation is said to result not only from deeds, but also from intentions: δόκησε ἐνή καὶ ἐδόκησε σοὶ ὅσον ἐστὶν πρὸς τὴν μόνην, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔστιν ἄνωθεν ἄνω. B62 has a similar emphasis: ἔχθεσιν οὐ τῷ μὴ ἔστω, ἀλλὰ τῷ μὴ ἔθελεν, ἀλλὰ δ’ ἐμπέμφεσιν, as does B89: ἔχθεσιν οὐχ ὁ ἄρσιν, ἄλλα δ’ ἐμπέμφεσιν.
Demokritos, then, envisages a world of moral subjects, who avoid wrongdoing not out of fear but out of conscience, who do not overrate public opinion and whose intentions are more important than the outward appearance of their actions. The question is, how far might his ideas have been accepted by society? Certainly his teachings would be unlikely to alter the attitudes and beliefs of the majority, but neither do they exist in a vacuum. We have already seen, in passages too numerous to mention, dating back as far as the archaic lyric and elegiac poets, that a more subjective standard of morality, less concerned with popular opinion, does begin to assert itself with increasing frequency. By the end of the fifth century, one of the effects of the adoption of such a subjective standard seems to have been the dissolution of consensus, the consensus to which, hitherto, *aidos* had been the response. Antiphan and Kritias would have us believe that one need only give in to such *aidos* as one might feel when there is a danger that the transgression envisaged will come to light, and this in itself suggests a society in which consensus has broken down, in which an individual may not have an implicit belief in the worth of the standards of his own society. Demokritos, however, attempts to combat this dissolution of consensus, and he does so by reasserting the importance of *aidos*.

The expression ἐνωτὸν ἀιδεῖθαι has both traditional and radical aspects. Most obviously, *aideisthai* is not normally a reflexive verb, and when it governs a direct object it normally manifests a relationship with the opinions of other people: the association, indeed, of *aidos* with "other people" is both frequent and traditional. Any feeling of *aidos*, however, will have its subjective and internal aspects, since even if an individual knows that society condemns a given action, it is still up to himself to characterize his own conduct as belonging to that category; as a psychological response, *aidos*, in order for it to differ, as it obviously does, from the simple calculation, can I get away with it, must be acquired early in the process of socialization, and from that point on, even when outwardly expressed in terms of the
fear of criticism, it will operate as an internal state of conscience. At the same time, however, awareness of the internal aspect of *aidos* is not always, or even often, present in those who declare themselves subject to that emotion, and so one can quite readily see how an Antiphon, like a whole generation of modern scholars, might assume that the traditional association of *aidos* with the judgements of others makes it nothing more than a simple reaction to the prospect of criticism. Demokritos, however, has a better understanding of both *aidos* and psychology, and recognizes that an individual’s standards of right and wrong, *kalon* and *aischron* are often personal ideals to which he is determined to adhere, and thus that the *aidos* which such an individual feels is occasioned by the prospect of the breach of this kind of internal standard. Many people will have experienced *ewv πεθήκατε* before Demokritos formulated the expression, and while Demokritos clearly does have views on the working of the personal moral conscience which are profoundly untraditional, in respect of his attitude to *aidos*, at least, much of the validity of his doctrine is drawn from its awareness of the fundamental nature of the concept, even in its traditional guise.\(^{110}\)

The corpus also contains a number of minor instances of *aidos* etc.. In frr.218-22 the concept of *aischrokerdeia* is paramount, although the word itself does not occur (in B218 dishonest wealth brings an *oneidos*, and *kerdos* is termed *kakon* in 220 and 221). B53a suggests that those who do act *aischron* are nevertheless subject to *aidos* (although not *aidos* of the kind recommended by B264): *πελλοὶ δέωντες τὰ κινητὰ λόγους ἁρίστους ἢ κακοῖς*. In B80 it is said to be *aischron* to disregard one’s own affairs while meddling in those of other people (cf.Kritias B41a) and in B111 the idea that men should be worsted by women (elsewhere *aischron*) is termed *hybris* (cf.B214). In B238 it is said that *kakodoxie* is inevitable for one who seeks to oppose one stronger than himself, presumably defeat and the imputation of imprudence can be the only outcome.
Appendix 1. Plato, Gorgias 482d-483c.

The issues of the compatibility of morality and self-interest and of nomos and physis in this part of the dialogue reveal its roots in fifth century controversies, and I wish to discuss the passage here primarily because of the importance invested in it by Adkins, who implies that beliefs such as those held by Kallikles here were widespread and influential and that they contributed to Athens' moral decline in the years of the Peloponnesian War. Earlier in the dialogue Polos has agreed with Socrates that it is more aischron to commit than to suffer injustice. This is not a traditional belief, though evidence suggests that it was a current one: in earlier literature, while it may be undoubtedly aischron to wrong others, it is nonetheless clear that for the average individual it is a more compelling source of disgrace to suffer wrong at another's hands or to fail in competition at all. This being the case, Kallikles does have the authority of traditional attitude on his side when he objects to the formulation (482d-e). He then goes on to offer his interpretation of the relative roles of nomos and physis, which he sees as mutually exclusive (482e): when Polos said that άδίκειν was αίρχειν than ἀδίκησθαι, he was speaking out of deference to nomos, but Kallikles goes on to explain (483a-b) that in nature it is that which is harmful which is αίρχειν and that it is αίρχειν νόμων to commit injustice (or inflict harm), but αίρχειν φύσιν to suffer it. The definition of τι αίρχειν according to nomos he sees as the attempt of the weak to defend themselves against the strong by imposing laws governing human conduct and by praising some actions and decrying others (483b-c).  

Kallikles' analysis does have its value: his opposition of physis to nomos in the question of justice does seem to answer to something fundamental in human nature, since it is surely an observable fact that human beings resent wrongs committed against themselves far more than they are ashamed of wrongs they have done others. Certainly this is the traditional attitude in Greek culture. Furthermore, as Kerferd points out, he does expose the way in which the
majority seek to constrain the selfishness of the pre-eminent for their own selfish reasons. On the other hand, the distinction between \(\text{ἀίσχρος} \) and \(\text{όμοιος} \) is not in any way traditional, nor is it a necessary consequence of the widening of the definition of \(\text{ainochron} \), as Adkins suggests.

Each society, and each age within a given society, will decide what is beneficial or harmful for its own survival. In the Greek context, that which is beneficial will be \(\text{ἀγαθός} \) or \(\text{kalon} \) and that which is harmful \(\text{kakon} \) or \(\text{ainochron} \). In Homer, failure in battle was considered disgraceful, and "considered" is the operative word, for it is popular opinion, not on the particular but on the general level, which determines what is \(\text{ainochron} \) or disgraceful, and it is popular opinion, embodied in the values of society, to which any individual who fears disgrace will respond. To say, then, that there is a category of \(\text{ainochra} \) which is not determined by popular opinion is not traditional at all, neither is it traditional implicitly to disregard popular opinion by designating all non-competitive \(\text{ainochra} \) as \(\text{ομοίος} \); all \(\text{ainochra} \) are \(\text{ομοίος} \).

Kallikles' distinction, then, is entirely arbitrary, and is unlikely to have influenced anyone who had to live in the real world, in which others may well criticize one's breaches of co-operative standards as +\(\text{ainochron} \), to free themselves of the fetters of \(\text{nomos} \). While it may be true that people are more concerned about being criticized for their failures than for their misdeeds, this fact is neither inherent in the Greek word \(\text{ainochros} \) nor made more likely by the \(\text{nomos-phyris} \) controversy, as Adkins suggests.

Adkins is also reluctant to admit that the distinction \(\text{ομοίος} \), \(\text{ομοίος} \) occurs only in this passage. Since this is the case, and since none of the other "immoralists" (Antiphon, Thrasymachos in Rep.) employ any similar argument, it is surely misleading to refer to the "great strength of this position" and to ascribe to it consider-
able influence on the rest of society. Kallikles' distinction is, in fact, irrelevant to the mainstream of sophistic thought, which holds in general that all moral standards are \( \nu \ \mu \ \alpha \ \nu \ \not \ \eta \ \tau \ \epsilon \ \nu \ \theta \ \varepsilon \ \mu \ \alpha \). 120 This is the position which is influential, and, unlike Kallikles', it does not distinguish between co-operative and competitive aischra.

It seems, then, that the distinction \( \nu \ \mu \ \alpha \ \nu \ \not \ \eta \ \tau \ \epsilon \ \nu \ \theta \ \varepsilon \ \mu \ \alpha \ \nu \ \mu \ \alpha \ \nu \ \not \ \eta \ \tau \ \epsilon \ \nu \ \theta \ \varepsilon \ \mu \ \alpha \ \nu \ \mu \ \alpha \ )\ is largely a red herring. It is perhaps idle to consider, but nonetheless interesting, whether Kallikles' statement of a category of aischra which exist \( \not \ \eta \ \tau \ \epsilon \ \nu \ \theta \ \varepsilon \ \mu \ \alpha \ \nu \ \mu \ \alpha \ \nu \ \not \ \eta \ \tau \ \epsilon \ \nu \ \theta \ \varepsilon \ \mu \ \alpha \ \nu \ \mu \ \alpha \ )\ also presupposes a form of aídos which also exists \( \not \ \eta \ \tau \ \epsilon \ \nu \ \theta \ \varepsilon \ \mu \ \alpha \ \nu \ \mu \ \alpha \ )\ . Perhaps he would not have been aware of this implication, but he might conceivably have argued that one feels aídos naturally at the exposure of one's own failings, but is schooled by an education in the values of society to feel it at breaches of co-operative virtues. This is possible, but the obvious objection would be that even the reaction to the humiliation of failure is a learned response.

Appendix 2: the Dissoi Logoi.
The second of the Dissoi Logoi, a collection of sophistical commonplaces arguing for and against the relativity of moral values, datable to around 400 B.C., 121 is headed \( \tau \ \epsilon \ \varepsilon \ \iota \ \kappa \ \alpha \ \lambda \ \omicron \ \nu \ \mu \ \alpha \ \nu \ \mu \ \alpha \ )\ . Two positions are maintained, that kalon and aischron are "the same" (2-20) and that they are "different" (21-8). The naïve and undeveloped terminology has the results firstly that the first section, in showing that the same action may be both aischron and kalon, assumes that this proves they are "the same", and secondly that the reply, showing that they are different, disregards the former stress on circumstance and exploits the absurdity that the same action can be both aischron and kalon at once and in the same circumstance. The argument that aischron and kalon are "the same", as a collection of sophistic arguments for the relativity of these values, concerns us more than its opposite. In this section two forms of relativity are illustrated: sections 2-8 demonstrate how the evaluation of an action can
vary according to circumstance; here, an action is kalon or aischron depending on where, how and by whom it is carried out. Sections 9-18 show how different peoples have different standards of aischron and kalon. Many of the examples here are from Herodotos, and show how the interest of the historian and others in comparative ethnography influenced ethical theory: the demonstration that customs differ widely from people to people contributes to the recognition of their relativity, and, incidentally, to theories of the origin of culture in which nomoi are introduced as an advance on nature. For Herodotos, variety in nomoi serves only to demonstrate their power in each culture, while for others, like our present author, it tends to undermine their force.

It will be seen that in the first of these categories a certain amount of objectivity for τὸ κινεῖται and τὸ καλοῦ can be assumed: it is implied that knowledge of the circumstances in which the action was performed will enable one to determine whether it was aischron or kalon. This is what Nill calls "non-sceptical" relativism. In the second category, it depends on the subjective evaluation of the individual community whether an action is aischron or kalon: a calls x aischron, but b calls it kalon. This is "sceptical relativism", and corresponds to Euripides' notorious, τι δ' αἰτία τελείωται, ἢ τὸ ταῖν χρηματίνα δοκῇ (fr.19N²); It is doubtful, however, whether the author of the passage is aware of the distinction, since he uses both kinds of argument to prove the one thesis, that kalon and aischron are the same: he is more interested in the form of his antilogies than in their content. In particular, the verses quoted in conclusion to the argument in favour of the proposition that kalon/aischron are the same suggests that the author believed that differences in the nomoi of different peoples were as much differences of circumstance as those outlined in §§52-8. Having pointed out that each people would choose its own kala if all kala were collected together (18, suggesting that τὸ καλοῦ becomes so by virtue of its being believed so), he quotes a passage (trag.fr.adesp. 26 = com.fr.adesp. 1209) which claims that it is the kairos which determines whether an action is kalon
or aischron.\textsuperscript{126} It seems that it is enough for the anonymous author to prove that kalon and aischron are not absolute.

Of the examples of what constitutes an aischron or a kalon action, none are new or surprising. Example 6 (that it is kalon for a woman to adorn herself, aischron for a man) re-appears as example 15, where the Persian custom that both men and women wear make up is contrasted with the Greek idea that this is aischron. Thus an action seen as non-sceptically relative becomes sceptically relative, but there is no suggestion that the author has worked out the implications of this. Significantly, perhaps, example 7 (it is kalon to εὕ τοι ἐνι one's friends, aischron to do so to one's enemies) is amplified at 3.2 (πετέλεις καὶ ἀδίκου) which suggests an overlap between kalon and dikaion. Indeed several of the examples of dikaion/adikon might equally be examples of kalon/aischron, especially those concerning proper treatment of parents and friends.

NOTES TO CHAPTER NINE.
2. Pl.\textit{Hipp.}, maj. 289a-b.
3. p.194.
4. See Pl.\textit{Phd.}, 61e.
5. See von Erffa, p.139n.169, and Kirk-Raven,\textsuperscript{1} 308-11 [in the second edition, however, Kirk and Schofield, under the influence of Burkert, now accept the genuineness of "the main metaphysical and cosmological texts", p.324].
7. Solon 16, Thales 2, Periandros 12.
11. This "Xenophontic" use of kalokagathia is probably an
indication of late date.

12. See pp. 422-3 above.

13. This application of the *cui bono* argument recalls that of Kreon in OT.583-615.

14. Cf. Thuc. 5.111 (p. 470 above, with n. 60, p. 494) and Ant. 6. 1 (p. 547 below).

15. It is, of course, perfectly possible to hold virtually the opposite view, that undeserved disgrace is harder to bear than that which is one's own fault (E.Hel. 270-2, cf. Dover, GPM, p. 239).

16. Von Erffa does not discuss these passages, but restricts his account of Gorgias to B6 (divine *nemesis*) and B16 (where *aischrós* seems equivalent to *kakós*, although "kennen wir leider den Zusammenhang nicht" [p. 196]). Equally, he ignores the papyrus fragments of Antiphon "the Sophist" and all of "the Orator".


19. See Guthrie, HGP III, 293-4, Kerferd, Sophistic Movement, p. 50, Rankin, Sophists, Socrates and Cynics, 64-5. Such objections as these scholars express to Morrison's thesis are largely "political", i.e. they retain some doubt that so-called "democratic" views in the "Sophist" can be reconciled with the "conservatism" of the Rhamnusian orator. S. Luria, Eos 53 (1963), 63-7 (also in Classen, Sophistik, 536-42), carries these arguments to extremes, claiming that the author of Antiphon B44B col. 2 (on the unnaturalness of class and racial distinctions) "cannot" be the right-wing orator, that the speeches of the orator reveal conservative attitudes which must have been held by their author and that Thucydides, who praises the oligarch, "could not" have agreed with the views of the author of the anarchistic papyrus fragments: but 1) we know nothing of the ideology of the oligarch (and it is dangerous to assume that fifth century right-wingers believed exactly the same as right-wingers today: the oligarchs at Athens were seeking to undermine, not uphold the status quo); 2) the conservative attitudes of the speeches would surely have been retained by their author on publica-
tion precisely because conservative attitudes are more likely to win over a jury: their appearance in the speeches shows merely that their author thought them efficacious; 3) the papyrus fragments are not necessarily anarchistic, and it is very far from certain that Thucydides would have disagreed with their content, even supposing that his praise of the oligarch in book 8 is contingent on agreement with detailed aspects of his policies and doctrines (see Moulton, TAPA 1972, 365-6). See now also H.C.Avery, Hermes 1982, 145-58.


21. Aidos is regularly used of clemency in legal contexts, and later, as aidesis, it becomes virtually a technical term (see von Erffa, p.106, and E.Heitsch, Aidesis im attischen Strafrecht). The prosecutor in an Areopagite homicide case was required to speak from the λίθος ἀναιδέας, which symbolized his duty to show no mercy (von Erffa, 105-6, Wilamowitz, E. Herakles, p.338n.1, Ar.Lys. n. on 1014f.. Cf. Ant.4.a.1).

22. GPM, p.242.

23. pp.537-8 above.

24. Promethia seems to encompass something of the sense of aidos here: cf. the association of these qualities in Pindar (pp.148-50 above).


26. See 2.a.1,2.a.10,2.d.10,4.c.6 (having been ἀνεϊδεσ ... ἐλευκέωνς it is anaides of the defendant to stick to his story), 5.19,6.7,6.14,6.19,6.22,6.24,6.31-2.

27. Most of Dover's passages on conscience (GPM, 220-2) come from Antiphon.

28. Compare the familiarity with syneidesis etc. in Aristophanes (p.510 above).

29. See 2.d.11,2.d.12,3.b.11,3.b.12,4.b.7,5.88,5.96,6.51.

30. See 6.7.

31. See Parker, Miasma, 105,110.

32. See 3.d.9,4.b.8,4.d.10.

33. See 2.b.9-11,3.b.11-2,4.a.3,4.b.8.

34. Cf. Parker, who remarks (p.126) "... there is a noticeable contrast between the Tetralogies, where the argument from pollution occurs with obsessive regularity, and its merely intermittent presence in the forensic speeches," and
"Arguments from the Tetralogies recur, but in the most muted of tones."

35. Parker, p.127.
36. ibid..
37. 5.89. The passage is repeated, almost verbatim, at 6.6.
38. GPM, p.221.
39. GPM, p.222.
40. Below, pp.560-5.
41. Snell, Gnomon 1930, p.27, claims that in the pre-Christian era, where a moral evaluation enters into the idea of conscience, it is always in the context of the "bad" or guilty conscience.
42. Cf. Parker, p.254.
44. Cf. 541-2 above.
45. pp.132-4 above.
46. Probably his Eide (see Parker, p.119).
47. All in Dover, GPM, 221-2.
48. There is also a minor use of the adjective aischros in §10, where Andokides explains that, at the time of his exile, his position was one of complete misfortune (kaka) and disgrace (aischra).
49. See B6.9-10 - alcohol leads to κινεῖται μύθοι, B15.7 - κινεῖται κέδυ, B20 - "the fetters of aidos," context of philia (cf. p.414n.273), B15a.26-7 - aischron to betray a philos, 30-4 - desire to avoid mockery, B44 - criticism of Archilochos' anaideia (cf. pp.134-5 above).
52. See Dover, GPM, p.223: "I cannot possibly be certain that a given act of mine will never be known."
53. The discovery and attempted solution of the problem of
In these three figures is one of the most important topics in M. Nill's *Morality and Self-Interest in Protagoras, Antiphon and Democritus*. For traces of the question in Sophokles and Euripides, see pp. 215-6, 344 above.

54. On the legitimacy of seeking the views of the historical Prot. in the Great Speech, see Heinemann, *Nomos und Physis*, p. 115 (and the older lit. cited in his n. 14); M. Gagarin, *TAPA* 1969, p. 134; Guthrie III, p. 186; and Nill, 5-6, 14-20. Nill amply refutes J. P. Maguire, *Phronesis* 22 (1977), 103-22, who sees the ambiguity between τελικῆς ἀξιωτί as 1) administrative skill and 2) the moral capacity to live in political communities (on which see Adkins, *JHS* 1973, 3-12) as an indication that Plato has manipulated the historical Protagoras' view (a strictly practical interpretation of τελικῆς ἀξιωτί into his own view of moral virtue at precisely the point which most concerns us (aidos and dike, 322c). This ambiguity may, however, be intended to be seen as due to Protagoras, as represented by Plato, or perhaps Plato represents it as not recognized by either Protagoras or Sokrates; or perhaps even Plato himself did not recognize it. Adkins thinks the ambiguity is due to the Protagoras of the dialogue.

55. Cf. pp. 83 and 112-3n. 219 above; also Ar. *Lys.* 1014-5 (p. 528 above).


61. See North, *Sophrosyne*, p. 87.


63. So Untersteiner, p. 62.
67. On the rôle of *aidos* in education, cf. pp.393-5 above. Demok. B179 is similar to the passages cited there and to the position of his compatriot in the *Prot*. Demok. also believes in the coalition of education and innate capacity (B33,182,183).
69. See Guthrie III, 67-8.
72. This must presuppose at least a minimal social contract theory: stripped of the divine apparatus, the myth suggests that men developed cities, laws and customs for their own protection and survival (the two-stage theory of progress alone suggests this). See C.H. Kahn in Kerferd (ed.), The Sophists and their Legacy, 92-108, especially p.98 with n.10, 99-100 (Kahn believes that the social contract is implicit in the dialogue, but not certain that the dialogue can be used as evidence for the historical *Prot*.); K. Döring, ibid. 109-15, especially 110-1; Guthrie III, p.137; Nill, p.8. Plato's Tht.167c ("what each city considers just is just for itself") also presupposes a contract of citizens abiding by the city's laws: see Döring, p.111; T.A. Sinclair in Classen (ed.) Sophistik, p.79; Nill, 6-7,26. Kerferd (Sophistic Movement, p.147) denies *Prot* such a theory, but does not consider the Tht. passage (cf. Simmons, Paed. Hist 1972, 524-6, who takes the myth literally). Antiphon, in criticizing a view of justice like that of *Prot*., assumes that society maintains its laws and customs by agreement.
73. See Nill, p.8.
74. Ibid., p.9.
SoC. 1977-8, p.219.
78. This supplement is surely necessary after τητεύ...: the papyrus itself, however, athetizes φιλολογία... 
79. He is thus aware of a social contract theory: see Kahn in Kerferd (ed.) Sophists, p.95 and n.3, Guthrie III, p.138. 
80. Kerferd, PCPS 1957-8, 27-9, shows that A. is not putting forward his own positive views. This is misunderstood by Nill (p.53 and n.12, p.104) as meaning that even his criticisms are not his own. Nill himself shows (54,66 etc.) that A. is criticizing a view of justice (Prot.'s): cf. D.J. Furley in Kerferd (ed.), Sophists, p.91 and Moulton, MH 1974, p.136. Adkins (Many, p.116) and Saunders (p.219) believe that A. does advocate breaking the law in secret. 
81. So Heinimann, p.139 (noting the parallel with Thuc. 2.37. 3, where breach of unwritten law brings an agreed aischune); Guthrie (III, p.138) and Moulton (TAPA 1972, p.333) think that A. is more interested in written law. 
83. See Kerferd, PCPS 1957-8, p.29 (Sophistic Movement, p.116), Sinclair (Sophistik), 97-8, Guthrie III, 111-2, Saunders, 224-5, Furley, 81,85,87,91, Nill, 62-5. 
84. See p.536 and n.6 above. 
85. Saunders (227-30) suggests that A. did believe in a category of laws which were natural, social and automatic in effect, and identifies this category with traditional onomai of unwritten laws: but "honour your father" is just such a law, and A. here rejects it. More probably he did not believe in any kind of "natural law" or "natural justice" (see Furley, 81-2, Kerferd, Sophistic Movement, p.117, Nill, 57-8). 
86. See Morrison in Classen (ed.), p.530. 
87. As does Bignone, ibid., 495-6,508-9. 
89. Some have held that the third definition, "neither to do nor to suffer harm", was A.'s ideal (Untersteiner, p.251, Moulton, TAPA 1972, p.348), but this is really only a variation of "not to take the initiative in harming others" (Guthrie III, p.112). 
90. See Bignone (in Sophistik), 493-5,505-6 (although he does
go rather too far in ascribing to A. the desire to create a natural basis for justice (p. 511); Adkins, Many, 115-6 (it is recognized that opportunities to pursue one's own advantage will be few, but Adkins goes on from this to claim that A. must be directing his "injunction to live according to phusis ... to the outstanding individual" (but cf. n. 80 above)). See also Untersteiner, p. 247, Guthrie III, 289-91, Moulton, MH 1974, p. 136, Nill, p. 69.

91. Nill, 69-72. The most relevant frs. are B58, 59, 60 and 61, all of which are distinctly Demokritean (see Moulton, MH 1974, passim, Adkins, Many, p. 115, Nill, 73-5). 58 and 59 urge sophrosyne (59 has an incidental use of τραχεία in a general sense), 60 exalts education, and 61 condemns anarchia.

92. On the question of the authenticity of the ethical frs., see the surveys of Guthrie II, 489-91, Nill, 110-1n. 4. Insofar as those frs. considered here handle topics current in Demokritos' lifetime, their inclusion is justified. The "Demokrates" frs. are often considered especially doubtful, but in many cases they corroborate ideas found in the rest of the corpus, and, when they do so, they should be considered legitimate evidence.

93. See Nill, 76.


95. Phobos is presumably fear of punishment here; Moulton, MH 1974, p. 135.

96. See Nill, p. 84.

97. These (euhyymia, B3, 174, 189, 191, 286; symmetria, B191; euesto, B257; eudaimonia, B170, 171; athambia, B215, 216) are Demokritos' ideals: see Nill, 76-90, for a discussion; cf. Guthrie II, 492-4.

98. See Nill, p. 89.

99. Hence συναίσθησις in the fr. connotes simple awareness, and tells us little about an internal conscience. Snell, Gnomon 1930, p. 23, regards this as the earliest instance of the word.

100. The word recalls enthymion in Ant. 2. c. 10, 3. a. 2, 3. d. 9 (see Stebler, 63-6), but the enthymion has a supernatural aspect which enkardion does not (see Stebler, p. 66, Parker,
Miasma 252-3).


104. Cf. p. 560 above, and Nill, p. 84.


106. Cf. E.IA.1089-97, 558-72, pp. 391-3 above.

107. Cf. von Erffa, p. 199. Von Erffa also shows that in B179 πονεῖν and ᾠνεῖνεσ are antithetical, and that Kranz' translation, "Wenn man die Knaben nicht zum Arbeiten frei läßt," is untenable. The sense must be, "When boys are free not to work ..." (so Diels).


109. Thus von Erffa, p. 198, looks in vain for parallels, finding only two linguistic similarities, examples of verbs not normally used reflexively being so used (S.OC.960-1, E. Hel.999), which are no real parallels at all. The line from Helen, however, is relevant in content, in that it deals with a positive form of philautia. This is noted by Stark, Aristotelesstudien, p. 119, who relates the passage to Aristotelian philautia, with which he also identifies D.'s ἐσεμένα ἀιδεῖζμα. One must concede that an element of "self-respect" is probably common to both "good" philautia and ἐσεμένα ἀιδεῖζμα, but the former seems to be more concerned with regard for one's own status and worth, and this may encompass an element of awareness of one's image in the eyes of the world, whereas ἐσεμένα ἀιδεῖζμα seems more closely related to the corrective mechanism of conscience, to an emotional disturbance resulting from the knowledge that a given action is "wrong".

110. The real parallels for ἐνυτελ ἀιδεῖζμα are to be found in tragedy, particularly in Sophokles' Ajax and Phil.
pp. 234-6, 249-62), in both of which traditional vocabulary and traditional responses are used against a background which, in highlighting the isolation of the relevant characters, reveals the subjective nature of their responses. It seems most likely, therefore, that, by the latter half of the fifth century at least, certain people had become aware of the subjective and internal aspects of *aidos*. In the matter of the possibility of a direct relationship between Demokritean theory and the *Ajax*, in particular, there is a problem of chronology, since it is unlikely that the conventional dating of the *Ajax* to the 440s is wrong, and since Demokritos is supposed to have been born around 460. While this date could be substantially wrong, it seems unlikely that Demokritos' birth could be pushed back to a date which would make him as old as Protagoras. Direct influence by Demokritos on Sophokles in the *Ajax* is, therefore, unlikely, even in spite of the similarity between some passages of that play and certain of the ethical fragments (cf., e.g., A1.121-6 with B107a and 293). Demokritos may have taken much from Protagoras and others, whose ideas would also be known to Sophokles, or perhaps ideas such as are represented in the corpus enjoyed fairly wide currency in the latter part of the century.

112. Like Antiphon, then, Kallikles assumes the origin of law and morality in a social contract: see Dodds on 483b4, Guthrie III, 140-1.

114. *Sophistic Movement*, p. 120.
113. Kallikles thus covers *nomos* as law and as custom: Dodds, ibid., Heinimann, p. 123.

115. It is doubtful, though, that he intended any criticism of selfishness (*pleonexia*) in showing this: he himself seems to regard *pleonexia* as natural and good (483c, cf. Guthrie III, p. 103).

117. *MR*, p. 188.
118. The distinction is referred to in *MR*, 187-8, but no source given. Only at p. 232 is the passage quoted.
120. See Archelaos A1DK, quoted by Dodds on *Gorg.* 482e5; the
same position is implied in the *Prot.* myth and by Demokritos
(see B9).
121. See 2.8 (the Peloponnesian war newly over). The collec-
tion is treated briefly here as an example of fifth century
thought, but not of the doctrines of any identifiable sophist.
The antilogic character suggests Protagorean influence, but
other candidates have been put forward. See W. Kranz in
Classen (ed.), *Sophistik,* 629-40, and Untersteiner, 304-8
(cf. 277). The work is translated by R. K. Sprague, *Mind,* April
122. See Dihle in Kerferd (ed.), *Sophists,* 54-63, and cf.
Heinimann, 29-41, 79-81, 120.
123. Hence the idea, in §18, that each people would prefer
124. p. 29.
125. Nill, 29-30; cf. Guthrie III, p. 166 for the same dis-
tinction.
126. Von Erffa (p. 197) compares *E.Hipp.* 386-7, but also,
inappositely, fr. 19.
CONCLUSION.
It seems especially fitting to end our survey with Demokritos B264 and the idea of a form of aidos which finds its point of reference in the individual's own conscience, for, essentially, there is very little more which needs to be said on the subject of aidos once this fragment is understood. Demokritos sees aidos as product of the process of education, as an instinctive and prospective form of moral conscience and as an ally of the intelligence which is required to discern one's moral duty, and thus he achieves a perceptive analysis of the fundamental nature of the concept. This nature, however, is not something new, but rather belongs to aidos even in the earliest periods and in the earliest authors which we have studied. We should thus be prepared to see that aidos can at all periods encompass the individual's subjective awareness of right and wrong, even if his standards of right and wrong happen to coincide with those of the rest of his society.

It is therefore untrue to say that aidos is nothing like conscience. Equally, however, it would be untrue to claim that aidos performs the rôle of conscience in all its applications: aidos is frequently more concerned with the judgement of others than with the moral character of one's own actions, but, again, it must be stressed that, simply because this is sometimes the case, there is no need to assume that it is always the case. Similarly, aidos is frequently not concerned with one's own actions at all: sometimes it connotes simple embarrassment at being caught in a humiliating situation, sometimes the reaction to the possibility that the actions or shortcomings of another will reflect badly on oneself. Aidos, moreover, is operative in a wide range of situations in which its operation is not primarily moral, but rather bound up with standards of politeness, manners and etiquette: but even though it is not always moral, there are no grounds for claiming that aidos is never moral - when a term enjoys a range of usage as wide as that of aidos it is especially important to avoid misleading generalizations.
Probably the application of *aidos* which takes us furthest from our own ideas of shame or embarrassment is that which is normally translated in terms of "respect", where, that is, *aidos* appears to connote not an inhibitory emotion but positive regard for another person who, for whatever reason, enjoys special status in the eyes of the *aidoumenos*. Presumably the fact that *aidos* is employed in such contexts indicates that the Greeks saw a similarity between the reaction to, say, the prospect of defeat in battle and that which one feels towards a guest, and if the connexion is recoverable by us, it must lie in the basic psychological and physiological sensation experienced in both these situations. One might, for example, blush at the prospect of humiliation and in the presence of a person of a certain status vis-à-vis oneself, and it is most probably the sense of inhibition, the feeling of self-consciousness or even simply of unease which unites both these, and indeed all other, applications of *aidos*. *Aidos*, then, seems to refer fundamentally to a psychological reaction and its attendant physical symptoms, but clearly the word comes to be used in a variety of different applications in which the context itself will define its precise meaning. *Aideisthai*, for example, comes to denote the proper response to a suppliant or the showing of mercy to a defendant in court, and doubtless there is a sense in which the verb is felt to have a special relationship to those contexts. Equally, it may take on a variety of connotations as a result of repetition in a range of particular applications, of "pity", for example, by virtue of its use in contexts of supplication and guest-friendship, or of "honouring" as a result of its use as a response to those of special status: neither of these conveys the particular meaning of *aidos* or *aideisthai*, but either might be an adequate translation in certain contexts. Ultimately, however, the use of the terms in these contexts will be based on an original recognition of a fundamental similarity in the psycho-physical response experienced in such situations.

We have considered a number of theories which argue for the
existence of fundamental and wide-ranging differences of psychology, culture and moral outlook between the Greeks and ourselves: in my opinion, however, no comprehensive theory for the differentiation of whole societies one from the other is ever likely to be satisfactory, given that all human societies resemble each other in some aspects, and differ in others. More important for the study of *aidos* than the difference between shame-culture and guilt-culture is the difference in scale between Greek society and our own: this will account, I believe, for the greater urgency with which the average Athenian would consider the opinions of his neighbours, for, in the Athenian context, the individual has to deal on a more immediate and more significant level with those in his immediate environment: one's neighbour is not simply liable to spread gossip against oneself, but rather decisions taken by him and others like him at the highest political level could materially affect one's life. The Athenian citizen is much more visible and in much closer contact with people whose opinions matter than the average modern Briton, who will never see those who make important political, legal, financial and even moral decisions about his future. Despite the greater anonymity of modern life, however, and the greater fragmentation of our society, each and every one of us must inhabit some small-scale society, whether it be that of a local community, of a place of work or of a profession, in which the opinions of the other members are of great significance for ourselves, and it is to our experiences in this type of context, rather than to political and social ties on a national and international scale, that we should look if we really wish to understand *aidos*. If we do, then I am sure that the essence of the concept will become apparent, even if it remains difficult to define.
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