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THE INSTITUTIONALISATION OF URBAN UPGRADING PROCESSES AND COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN EGYPT

BY

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ABSTRACT

Urban upgrading of low-income areas in developing countries has a limited impact on the inhabitants’ lives if it simply means the physical improvement of housing and its surrounding environment. If upgrading is to be ‘sustainable’, it should incorporate ‘empowerment’, such that the beneficiaries are able to act independently and to participate in future activities with the state and civil society organisations after a project’s completion. The institutionalisation of sustainable upgrading is understood as a range of processes by which local government and community participation ensure the continuation of valued neighbourhood outcomes.

The achievements of urban upgrading are analysed through pilot urban upgrading schemes promoted by the Department for International Development (DFID) and the German Agency for Technical Co-operation (GTZ) in the Egyptian cities of Ismailia and Aswan. Their respective project objectives and management systems provide comparative insights into the potential of alternative conceptual and legislative approaches. A multi-method approach is employed through a multi-disciplinary framework owing to the paradigm shift in planning and foreign aid over the period of these projects.

A conceptual framework, ‘accountable bureaucratic capacity’ is utilised to investigate the ability of local government to institutionalise collaborative urban upgrading measures in partnership with civil society organisations. The main argument is that the latter cannot contribute to sustainable development, democratisation or to protect citizens’ rights in low-income neighbourhood without accountable representation from their side, a reciprocal and active representation from the citizens concerned, and an accountable public sector. The capacity of urban governance and the extent to which participatory initiatives can exploit the potential within existing structures and systems are examined. This examination allows an evaluation of how far a participatory project rated as ‘good-practice’ can enhance citizens’ awareness of opportunities, political participation and local government performance, while building collaborative and institutionalised planning capacity.

The research concludes that the sustainability of urban upgrading depends on the form of citizens’ participation and the management styles of cities. Successful participation during an upgrading project may have ‘transformative’ potential to encourage citizens’ political participation. If citizens are not active, even though they reject the government’s development agenda, or have to depend on ‘informal’ networks to provide their needs, they may be characterised as ‘free-riders’, who withdraw from urban governance and its collaborative decision-making processes. Legal recognition of squatter settlements is the first step required to institutionalise upgrading policies, particularly for indigenous or customary groups trying to survive in a world characterised by increasing interdependence and escalating threats to local ties. However, although this recognition strengthens a group’s ability to negotiate and interact with non-group members, it may also have detrimental effects if it is not supported by additional legislation. Local government needs institutional reform and a strategic capacity-building programme to forge partnerships and the joint responsibility of the public and private sectors, as well as of civil society.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

"Give someone a fish, they will eat for a day, teach them how to fish, they will eat forever".

(Chinese folk wisdom).

The above Chinese wisdom serves to outline metaphorically the new essence of the paradigm shift in planning, foreign aid and institutional capacity-building discourses. Planners are no longer required to act purely as technical experts, nor as mediators or negotiators, but as enablers of community self-empowerment, while citizens, themselves, are in the driver’s seat. The purpose of development, according to this paradigm, is to empower all citizens, especially those ‘marginalised’ by living in squatter settlements and who have been systematically excluded by structural inequalities of income, class, ethnicity or gender. Unfortunately, many official attempts sponsored by international agencies or national governments have failed to provide healthy and sustainable living spaces for growing urban populations because of institutional barriers and inattentiveness to this paradigm shift, rather than to financial constraints. The reliance on overly simplified economic concepts in recent debates on urban changes has tended to neglect the key importance of the institutional dimensions to the processes under way, which are the focus of this study.

The conceptualisation of the ‘development’-urbanisation relationship in purely economic terms is inadequate to shed light on the state of urban housing or to explain the successes and failures in the creation of viable neighbourhoods, or the sustainability of improvements in existing ones. Economy, society and politics are more transitional than ever in developing countries (DCs). The reality of urban change involves a more complex interplay between forces of various dualities, such as localisation and globalisation, structure and agency, fragmentation and integration, contingent and general forces, and economic and political factors, than has tended to be suggested so
far. Urban restructuring and collaborative policy making is thus extremely dynamic and varied process which makes reliance on a single duality untenable.

‘Development’ is difficult to define. The relationships between development and urbanisation, as well as in particular forms of urbanisation and urbanism, are complex with perceptions ranging over time and place from positive to negative causal interrelationships. What these have had in common is that ‘development’ has caused rapid urbanisation in DCs and insufficient investment in reproduction, as opposed to production; much of the population has been unable to participate in capitalistic land and property markets. Thus, concentration on production alone does not constitute development for the majority of civil society; economic gains do not ‘trickle down’ to generate effective demand in market terms. Despite ‘development’, these failures have given rise to the overcrowding and degradation of the existing stock, while constraints on legal access to land for housing the poor have resulted in the spontaneous creation of large numbers of ‘informal’ and ‘squatter’ settlements. Despite ‘development’, global poverty has been growing again during the 1980s and 1990s in many countries, reversing a trend that those countries had experienced in the twenty or thirty years before 1980: “The total number of people living on less than U$1 a day has risen in Latin America, South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe, Central Asia, the Middle East and North Africa” (World Bank 1999). Moreover, at least one billion human beings still lack adequate shelter and are living in unacceptable conditions of poverty, mostly in DCs (UNCHS 1997). Of course the negative impacts of such widespread poverty go beyond just creating an environment of social tension, high inequality, inefficiency and personal insecurity; they threaten social and individual interactions as a whole.

In a similar vein, the conceptualisation of institutionalisation, in the context of social change and the fear of disintegration, is also a complex issue. The dominant challenge of institutionalisation, which is understood as a range of processes by which local government and community participation ensure the continuation of valued neighbourhood outcomes, is not only to reform public policy, but to reduce the claim of the state to exclusive control of a definite territory, and knit together the myriad
institutions involved in the governing process and the salience of democratic processes (Jewson and MacGregor 1997). Institutionalisation requires ideological thinking and a set of tools of reform, must consider the existence of participatory processes and the consent of those who are governed, particularly those active citizens who are engaged in deliberation to influence public-sector decision-making. It must also consider the existing structure, environment, competence and capacity of government, at macro and micro levels, to formulate ‘appropriate’ development policies. Yet, the reformed institutions of merit selection and professional administration may delegitimise citizen involvement with the administrative side of governance. Moreover, the institutionalisation process, as a whole, may act as a barrier to finding solutions because of the inadequate premises that still exist in the conceptualisation of ‘development’ itself.

Despite development, official attempts to provide sufficient housing repeatedly fail and ‘informal’ practices continue to provide the majority of the low-income housing stock illegally. Government policies towards ‘informal’ housing vary, from one time to another, and from one country to another, according to the political and economic policies that each country follows. They may range from outright support and genuine charitable concern for the reduction of visible human suffering, to extreme hostility and suppression, stemming from a concern for order and cleanliness in the city. Such views may be voiced by radical community organisers, stressing the right of the poor to stay in the city and their right to share in its wealth, or by military rulers wishing to prevent street riots and insurrections. The issue may be adopted by politicians appealing for votes in squatter settlements, or by industrialists wishing to keep the cost of housing low so that wages can remain low. However, the failure of conventional housing and inefficient ‘anti-slum’ administrative measures resulted in the adoption of the concept of upgrading by some DCs (Turner and Mangin 1969). They recognised that squatter and informal housing is a permanent feature which requires permanent solutions and not just ‘stop-gap’ measures. More enlightened governments now perceived squatter and informal housing as a form of development which should be incorporated into plans. But they have also recognised that they cannot do this alone; to be effective they need the
integration of global and local civil society organisations and the exchange of urban experience. Following this doctrine, several genuine remedial policies have been introduced and accepted world-wide and on an increasing scale (Eiweida 1997). This has resulted in the gradual acceptance by other DCs and a continuous search for the most appropriate means to upgrade this stock and its environment to a standard conducive to good health, and to sustain this process through an empowered civil society.

Civil society includes various ‘communities’, whose actions have become widely recognised as crucial for democratisation, poverty reduction, environmental upgrading and sustainability. Yet, similar to ‘development’, ‘civil society’ is still a messy concept: it is a general and far-reaching entity within which the most important grouping is the associations of beneficiaries—namely membership groups or Grassroots Organisations (GROs) (Mitlin 1997). Definitions of civil society are often broadly drawn and include many kinds of non-profit or voluntary Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and associations, referred to as the third sector, which may also encompass ‘informal’ organisations and trade associations for commercial enterprises. Thus, the term embraces all organisations that are neither part of the government nor part of the private sector. Accordingly, not all components of civil society are implicated in urban development. The two with most immediate relevance are the local NGO sector and the formal or informal GROs. The importance of defining civil society in the contexts of ‘institutionalisation’ and ‘development’, centres on its ability to define the institutional conditions which create a network of non governmental institutions intermediary between the family and the state that can facilitate the upgrading process while, meantime, fortifying social cohesion in society. The existence of civil society is thus a pre-requisite for a coherent social order and an active democracy by which state domination may be controlled and called to account.

The complexity of civil society and its hierarchical links in space are seen to go in parallel to those of the state, local government and the market. Civil society relies on local government as a source of power and protection against the incursions of an increasingly powerful state (Walzer 1995). It is imperative that power relationships at a
range of scales—international, national, regional, local and community—and their role in shaping urban processes be understood. The prevailing perspectives on urbanisation often ignore, minimise or inadequately address the web of relations that increasingly synchronises the lives of people on a global scale (Smith and Tradanico 1987: 92). This entails greater analysis of the origins, functions and internal working of formal and informal institutions so as to appreciate their potential to harness resources—financial, social and organisational—and to improve collectively the quality of urban life by and for the majority.

Much of the DCs’ structures encapsulating civil society deliver the rather excessive power exercised by internal and external competing agents, namely nominally democratic but authoritarian national governments, who hold power through a centralised system, and a subaltern local government that is appointed to execute commands. Civil society organisations strive to project their interests, yet the power of ‘the state’ is all-encompassing and restricts ‘democratic space’. Furthermore, global and multilateral organisations have imposed harsh Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Programmes (ERSAPs) on DCs on the one hand, while loans and foreign aid to alleviate the citizen’s sufferings are offered on the other. As a consequence a vast proportion of society is suffused with harsh economic burdens which make daily life a continuous struggle. This asymmetry in power relations is replicated within countries.

The institutional systems through which national governments, international Donor Agencies (DAs), local governments, and communities ‘supposedly’ work collectively, have a significant bearing on the success and sustainability of any process. The relationships among these agents change and the strengths of such partnerships fluctuate, specially when their interests are contradictory in the ‘real world’, while the concrete mechanisms that mediate the interplay between global economy and local culture have not yet been conceptualised. Community struggles over the collective consumption of services, when combined with grassroots demands for cultural control over urban space and political control of local government jurisdictions, reshape and redefine both urban space and the socio-political character of urban life (Castells 1983).
Yet, the voices, experiences and political activities of men and women, advantaged and the disadvantaged, the poorest and the better-off in squatter settlements, are all still largely unrepresented in urban political analysis (Singerman 1997).

Thus, this study aims to assess how specific low-income communities in DCs perceive their needs and articulate them to outside bodies, such as external DAs, NGOs, and the state, through formal and informal channels. It examines two externally-funded urban upgrading projects, in which residents and local government departments participated. It focuses on the systems through which national governments, DAs, local governments and civil society can work collectively to establish sound and institutionalised urban upgrading policies, and examines whether or not the capacity acquired is sustainable and transferable to other projects. The framework, through which the major actors involved in this study operate, shapes the new landscape of participatory development at global/local, and within the country at the micro level.

A widespread doctrine believes that development of a community can only be fostered through the improvement of individuals’, groups’ and institutions’ problem-solving knowledges and skills (Castelles 1983; Rakodi 1997). Yet, it has also been argued that any institutional reform must be guided by theory and understanding as to why present institutions are failing. “Without such a theory, attention tends to focus on funding programmes that treat the symptoms of failure whilst neglecting their underlying causes. The resulting actions are almost inevitably overly expensive, fragmented, incomplete, often contradictory and ineffectual” (Korten 1996: 36). Meantime, it is equally important to start the process of structural reform from the micro-level of strengthening the local government system and community awareness, as well as at the macro level of central government structures. Therefore, the importance of issues such as empowerment, collaboration, participatory planning and capacity-building have been appreciated by foundations and neighbourhood organisations alike. A localism/globalism approach can link the economic issues, at local level (state/city) and global level (forces of globalisation), with the local and global political arena and brings them together in sensitive micro/macro institutionalist perspectives of urban restructuring and
governance. This can establish the type of ‘good’ performance, practices and experiences that might be sustainable and replicable, and the matrix of collaborative urban governance processes that should be institutionalised.

1.1- Field of research:

Development studies are currently constituted and reproduced in the literature within a set of material relationships, activities and ideologies- political-economic and socio-cultural- and dynamics at the local, as well as at national and global levels. Yet, in order to explain the real mechanisms of development operating outside the market, it is necessary to place it first within its operational institutional, historical and geographical context. Development is the central metaphor and the paradigmatic focal point which links non-profit making DAs and civil society organisations with the other two key agents associated throughout research- namely national and local government- in the context of sustainable and institutionalised urban upgrading policies and community participation. The term ‘civil society’ is employed within this research to refer to these specific components of civil society organisations. When a particular type of civil society organisation is meant, the specific term which defines it best will be used. Similarly, the term NGOs is used as a shorthand for all non-governmental, non-profit developmental organisations. The terms international NGOs or Northern NGOs refer to those which have their headquarters in Developed Countries, such as Oxfam or Save the Children. ‘Intermediary NGOs’ refers to Southern or local NGOs, which support grassroots work through funding, technical advice and advocacy. The term GROs refers to various kinds of ‘non-profit membership support organisations’ which are run and controlled by their own members. This includes various kinds of Community Development Associations (CDAs), and Member Based Organisations (MBOs).

The eradication of poverty through ‘sustainable development’, “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generation to meet their own needs” (WCED 1987), has been identified as the overriding development goal subscribed by all multilateral and international agencies, such as the United Nations
and the World Bank. The global nature of the situation is breaking down the barriers that in the past separated the conceptual interpretation of processes, and the strategies to cope with them, between developed and developing countries. On the contrary, there is now new understanding of the similarities and differences between the North and the South. There is an awareness of the benefits of pooling the wide range of resources of these societies in the common task of defeating poverty through safety nets for the most vulnerable, providing opportunities for households to increase their assets, and the creation of a policy framework as well as legal and physical context favourable to the particular activities of the urban poor (Rakodi 1995).

The Habitat programme gave special attention to these issues. A special programme, the ‘International Forum on Urban Poverty (IFUP)’ has been set up. The IFUP is a partnership of national governments, local authorities, civil society organisations including NGOs, experts, academics, bilateral and multilateral agencies working for the eradication of poverty according to a strategy based on sound governance, partnership and the participation of people living in poverty (UNCHS 1998). The central principle of IFUP recognises that interventions on the eradication of poverty need the participation of the people living in poverty, in partnership with the agencies, institutions, social movements and communities active in this field. Thus global institutions enhance the possibility of global DAs and NGOs to alter the conditions of local civil society by altering their structures with their own governments, while at a national level, many DCs are taking transitional steps towards democratisation.

A great many DCs are currently subject to another global process, the ERSAP, which sought to integrate national economies in market systems, promote private enterprise and encourage international trade and investment. But despite its application for more than a decade now, the problem with structural adjustment policies remains how to transform planned economies into market ones, while the global market itself has been unable to address the problems of increasing exclusion and inequalities (Rondinelli 1993). Poverty is still dominant and the globalisation of political-economic activities have weakened the central role of the state in driving development, so that it is seen as a
hindrance to development more than it is a help by its own citizens and DAs. Such a
global dilemma has resulted in a strong need to enhance decentralisation and bottom-up
planning, as well as a requirement for strong, open and accountable local government
institutions working in partnership with all interested parties. Consequently, there is an
increasing concern from both national governments and DAs to review the performance
of local government as a result of three main types of pressure, which act at different
scales: on the state, to be accountable for the aid it receives; on local government, to be
accountable for the services it provides; and on public spending, generally at a time of
declining resources. In addition to the requirement for increased accountability,
pressures on public spending have meant a sharp decline in capital spending on the one
hand, and in research into how to achieve greater efficiency in current services on the
other.

Accordingly, there has been a global paradigm shift, supported by all financial
and donor agencies, to promote good urban governance through clusters which link
operational and normative activities, focusing on urban management, urban environment
and urban safety. It is understood that the forces of globalisation are not enough to alter
the development landscape over the next several years, and that it is impossible to
integrate human, economic and technological resources in any efficient way without
considering the forces of localisation during the setting up of collaborative urban
governance processes (World Bank 1999). Confused governance and top-down policies
only lead to severe environmental degradation, increased poverty, low economic growth
and social exclusion, particularly of women and the less advantaged. Thus, Habitat's
global campaign on Urban Governance (UNCHS 1999) supports city consensus-building
processes between local governments and civil society to establish priorities for social
development and urban finance strategies. It also actively promotes the initiation of
international legal frameworks, policy reforms and enabling legislation which are
required to ensure good urban governance. Other activities include support to partners
for the systematic collection, analysis and dissemination of urban indicators, statistics,
best practices and good policies in support of sustainable urban development. However,
all successful experiences reveal that improved management critically depends on the active participation of public and private partners in urban affairs.

In this context, attention has shifted from housing *per se* to the context in which it is produced and to collaboration, empowerment and community participation, so as to harness resources and the delivery of services to satisfy basic needs. The central feature of community participation is the duality between the community and the state, which implies that the former cannot function satisfactorily when it operates as an integral part of the state structure; it should operate autonomously. Participation has been widely recognised as essential to ensure that proposals are appropriate to and supported by beneficiaries. This is achieved when participation empowers the community to define the shape, priorities and form of implementation of a development project. Yet, civil society empowerment requires a very different approach to the passive acceptance of a ready-made proposal. The most common assumption made about urban upgrading projects is that participation leads to sustainable 'empowerment', such that beneficiaries' are enabled to act independently and to receive serious consideration by the state after a project's completion. Thus, community participation, in its ultimate form, becomes a struggle to give rights to communities and to enhance the power, the self-confidence and the self-respect of communities. Awarding a key role to civil society organisation in the democratisation process is also essential to the success of empowerment. Local NGOs are seen as an integral component of a thriving civil society and an essential counterweight to state power, opening-up channels of communication and participation, providing training for activists, and promoting pluralism.

A great many DAs and NGOs have, indeed, carried out a large number of development projects, of which many have successfully supported self-reliance at the local level, integrating 'marginal' populations within the national economy. But local development should lead to 'sustainability' when official foreign funding is involved. Great dependence on such funding may compromise the performance of local governments and civil society organisation, including NGO and GRO, in key areas, distort their accountability and weaken legitimacy. Though pragmatic, such a
compromise requires additional resources. While it is argued that such a compromise will not be sustainable if used as a mechanism to ‘take over’ and reduce local groups to clients defined in political terms, there are few analyses that explain the process of empowerment, and whether the capacity acquired by local government and civil society is transferable to other local institutions, which is the focus of this research.

1.2- Stance of research:

The research focuses on sustainability of urban upgrading of low-income housing at the local level, both in the context of collaborative participation for community development and of accountability of local government. It starts with the premise that the upgrading of ‘informal’ and squatter settlements does not simply mean the physical improvement of the area and its surrounding environment. Sustainability is a process with specific institutions and incentives that ensure the continuation of valued benefit outcomes and the availability of services to the citizens. It is also a process which provides services that people want and need (Mayfield 1996: 232). Hence, it requires awareness from both the community and the local government as to how the capital to provide, operate and maintain services might be obtained. At community level, sustainable and successful upgrading must entail the ‘awareness’ of beneficiaries, raise their socio-economic status and intensify community self-reliance by means of effective participation, empowerment and job creation.

Hence one of the basic objectives for sustainable urban upgrading is the participation of target groups within all processes of planning, implementation and evaluation of improvements. Only then will they identify with the project and be able to build on this experience. Thus, it is essential for institutions, government or private, to understand how to assist communities to articulate their needs and priorities in order to achieve such a goal. Self-help activities contribute to the development of collective consciousness, which is the basis for a community-action long-term programme. Without community involvement, maintenance of the services and social infrastructure gained cannot be guaranteed. In addition, the payment capacity and the propensity of the target
groups to participate are the preconditions for generating investment to embark on and sustain urban upgrading projects.

Development of community awareness of opportunities and collective action are seen as a crucial starting point for any examination of sustainability in urban development policies and will be adopted as the means to assess the effectiveness of urban upgrading strategies. But it cannot be a one sided process; the research is designed to examine the change in awareness of the main beneficiaries—community, including its civil society organisations (as target actors), and local government (as enabling actors). Even so such a model must also consider the structures and factors acting at global, national and local scales, as they affect these diverse groups (Figure 1.1). Identification of those factors which make a community level beneficiary a more successful participant are obviously of paramount interest. While clearly the more education and capital the beneficiaries have, the more able they are to meet goals through greater awareness of their structures—which is easier to ascertain—the focus is on how empowering attitudes are fostered by the context, the family, expectations from the project and what is seen as their 'community' and its influence and contribution to improving living conditions. The research attempts to identify the causal factors which may either enhance the individuals' awareness of opportunities, or cloud and suppress them. Factors such as intrinsic social attributes and/or acquired personal characteristics and experiences lead to particular mind-sets or specific understandings of the scope for action. These mind sets might embody issues which are embedded in culture, ideology, customs and aspirations.

Consequently, the research examines the options open to squatters and the extent to which they can be pro-active and co-operative with an urban upgrading project. Possible actions are examined within two frameworks: their relationship to an upgrading project and people's self-initiatives. It is argued that sustainability is only achieved when individuals' actions are pro-active and reciprocal; if they are indifferent and do not participate during a project's duration, sustainability is jeopardised. The research attempts to test different configurations and impacts of causal factors. The sustainability of citizens' actions is viewed as a political rather than a mere administrative process,
which requires transformation from individual to group awareness of the scope for action within a particular context. Sustainability is also reflected in terms of the relationship constructed between the community and the local government and the degree of the community’s self-administration and its ability to form collective actions.

One of the most important issues pertaining to sustainability at local government level is the need to develop mechanisms for replicating successful local area-based projects elsewhere. Sustainability of vigorous urban policies forces local government to appreciate their role. Since urban policies do not operate in a vacuum and cannot be reformed in a vacuum, it is necessary to assess the capacity of the municipal bureaucracy to play a dynamic role in meeting the economic challenges confronting DCs now. It is argued that sustainability of collaborative planning and good governance cannot be granted without decentralisation and strategic municipal capacity-building programmes for participation. Planning is a service with an impact far greater than its expenditure might suggest. The total planning process is fundamental to the overall vision of the local authority and the council’s strategy for the future. Nonetheless, planning is embedded in structures and needs to negotiate its role and build collaboration within the state. This is crucial to its effective performance and sustainability. The quest for improvement in public sector performance has been a long one—embedded in wider social, political and cultural contexts into value systems attuned to status, communal obligations and other personal and business relationships. However, improvement and progress in any organisational environment require that these problems and constraints be identified, analysed, and reflected on in terms of what can and should be changed.
Figure 1.1: Actors involved in the urban upgrading and the institutionalisation processes

Actors Involved and Factors Influencing Urban Upgrading Processes

- Enabler Actors
  - Local Government
    - Internal Factors
      - Good Governance
      - Capacity-building
      - Institutionalisation
    - Local Market Forces
      - Local Development
      - Poverty Alleviation
      - Civic-empowerment
      - Physical Improvement
  - Northern NGOs
    - Not suited to work directly at grassroots level
  - Southern Intermediary NGOs
    - Advocate for all civil society. Play a critical interlocutor role

- Sustainable and Effective Urban Upgrading.
  - Community Empowerment and Participation Processes
    - Local Development
    - Poverty Alleviation
    - Civic-empowerment
    - Physical Improvement
    - Good Governance
    - Capacity-building
    - Institutionalisation

- Target Society
  - Intended Beneficiaries

Target Reciprocity Actors

Source: Author
1.3- Aims and objectives of research:

The specific aim of this research is to examine the mechanisms by which the processes of urban upgrading and community participation can be institutionalised. The general aims are to analyse the community's evaluation of their participation and the forms it took, and the views of the local government officials after the project's completion. These perceptions will be assessed with respect to the form and degree of participation across a range of circumstances, such as in specific upgrading projects, 'formal' political processes, and 'informal' collaborative and neighbourhood problem-solving activities. The research investigates whether the upgrading experience has inculcated attitudes and skills, i.e. knowledge, behaviour and capacity, in the direct (households) and indirect (municipal) beneficiaries that is transferable to other arenas. A concomitant analysis will focus on the perceptions and actions of local government concerned with the form of urban upgrading and its sustainability. The specific objectives of the research are:

1. To review the existing literature on development, empowered civil society, and the theoretical structures of urban governance so as to conceptualise a pertinent framework that can investigate local government accountability, citizen political participation and the level of consensus capacity-building needed for a collaborative model of urban governance in DCs.

2. To analyse the political and urban post-ERSAP challenges that DCs are presently facing, as exemplified by Egypt, with particular reference to the ways in which they impact upon local government and participatory initiatives.

3. To examine how DA support confronts such challenges, as explored through two DA-funded upgrading projects, and the extent to which these projects have achieved their objectives.

4. To assess community perceptions of participation in specific upgrading projects, and to attempt to identify the causal factors and attitudes which may enhance/suppress how individuals participate.

5. To evaluate the reality of post-project community empowerment. This is assessed through examining the transformative potential of participation, i.e. the translation of participatory practices during the project into potential political participation, as well as communal and familial 'informal' networks of collaborative actions to facilitate access, or provide alternatives, to the formal resources of the state.
6. To evaluate the sustainability of the capacity acquired by government departments through participation in such upgrading projects. The analysis focuses on the accountability, perceptions and action of local government concerned with urban upgrading.

7. To evaluate whether the capacities acquired by government departments have been institutionalised, and are sustainable and transferable to other projects at local and national levels.

This research provides evidence to test whether the presumptions about the effective role of civil society organisations in sustaining development, enhancing democratisation and protecting citizens' rights are legitimate. Although the scenario will be limited to two intermediate-sized cities in Egypt, it is hoped that the research will shed light as to the processes which achieve positive results that may be replicated elsewhere.

1.4- The setting of the research:

The research takes a broad perspective on the development of local participation as exemplified by the detailed case studies of two projects, in which the participatory upgrading experience or municipal capacity-building has been relatively extensive. The practices of United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in conjunction with the Department for International Development (DFID) (previously the British Overseas Development Association, ODA), and the German Agency for Technical Co-operation (GTZ), to promote pilot urban upgrading schemes with their respective municipal counterparts in the Egyptian cities of Ismailia and Aswan are reviewed and compared. Their respective provincial programme initiation and management systems provide comparative insights into the potential benefits and pitfalls of different project conception and legislative approaches, particularly in light of the diversity of techniques that DAs and local government have tried in both projects over the years.

The Ismailia case study focuses on the Hai El-Salam project (1977-date) which was embedded in the Ismailia Physical Master Plan (1976). Although the major physical activities were completed 10 years ago, the land sale programme and maintenance activities are still on-going processes operated by a specially established Project Management Unit (PMU Ismailia). The project focused on the 'provision' and improvement of housing and services and was actually a mix between sites and services
and upgrading projects on land identified in the course of the earlier Ismailia planning studies. The project's main aim was to enable householders and land developers to participate in the development process and consequently, develop improved versions of informal sector land development practices as a model for development elsewhere. In the other example, Aswan focuses on the case of the Nasriya upgrading project which involved local people in a government-NGO led initiative. The Nasriya project was also embedded in the Aswan Master Plan (1986-2017); it was originally scheduled to last 3 years from 1987 to 1990 but was subsequently extended until the end of 1998. One of the project's key objectives has been the development of community capacity to take over some functions that have previously been assumed to be the responsibility of government. It was also managed through a special PMU, which enjoyed a fair degree of autonomy.

Although there is a degree of similarity in the access to resources in both projects, policies of intervention vary with location, population, nature of each enabler, and the degree of political support. The difference of a decade in time between the instigation of each project witnessed changes in socio-economic status and attitude, the DAs' policies and agendas, and the government's treatment of 'informal' housing. The Government action has usually been triggered by specific events, which gave them a matter of urgency. Ismailia was growing fast because it was part of a national programme to rehabilitate the Suez Canal cities after the Arab-Israeli conflict of 1967-73. Citizens started to come back from nearby cities after seven years of evacuation. Such rapid resettlement and urbanisation, along with the devastation of the war, prevented the government from supplying either quick and efficient legal plans or sufficient 'formal' housing units. The outcome was the formation of 'informal' housing areas, most of which were on government-owned land. Aswan, located in the south of Upper Egypt, also faced a sudden rapid influx of population in the 1960s in unusual circumstances. The socialist government policies (1952-1970) targeted issues of national economic and social development and initiated large-scale infrastructure and industrial schemes. The construction of the High Dam and a fertiliser plant in Aswan were examples of the effort to increase social benefits, expand goods and services and increase regional equality in income distribution. Such schemes resulted in rapid rural-urban
migration, while housing estate projects failed to offer adequate provision in quantitative or qualitative terms. The occupation of government land in Nasriya, and many other areas in Aswan, was thus the only option for many migrants.

These two cases are selected because of their reputation as ‘successful’ projects, thereby providing an opportunity to examine the processes in what are reputed to be the best-run schemes, not only in Egypt but also among other DCs’ experiences; both projects were selected as examples of ‘good practice’ at Habitat 1996. They have tried to accomplish vigorous urban upgrading policies and mobilise the beneficiaries to participate efficiently. The fundamental question about projects such as Nasriya and Hai El-Salam, which received substantial external support and were limited when compared with the overall scale of the ‘informal’ housing problems, is the extent to which they can be replicated within mainstream government structures. Hence, the research endeavours to explore the processes of such collective initiatives, the participatory actions to strengthen the capacity of local governments concerned and their degree of success. The research also examines how directly and indirectly both projects have influenced government attitudes, policies and structures as whole. This examination can provide theoretical and practical guidelines for optimal intervention in the future, supplying impartial assessment on the utility of foreign aid. It also defines the scope of DAs’ influence on governments to enhance urban capacity and favour policies to combat discrimination against the poor by means of sustainable urban development. The ability of local governments to sustain such programmes while external inputs are declining by the end of the projects’ duration is also evaluated.

However, it is worth noting that the success and sustainability of Ismailia and Aswan projects have varied widely due to internal and external institutional barriers (Chapters 6-10). Although participatory experiences had not been well-conceptualised in the 1970s when the Hai El-Salam project was initiated, the project’s success was to insert informal sector housing practice into an official project. While the project succeeded in physical structural terms and in introducing municipal capacity-building initiatives with multiplier effects, including establishing quasi-independent urban institutions, its approach to participation was limited to consultation. Accordingly, this
research will deal with both case studies in an unsymmetrical way. The aim is not to determine which scheme has been more successful, but rather to evaluate variations in the role of internal and external institutions as enablers in the housing process. There are many forms of conditionality, and the aim is to examine the circumstances under which they have been, or are likely to be, successful and sustainable.

1.5- Role of the researcher:

The researcher has played a multiple role in the field which made him aware of the impact of the beneficiaries' own perceptions and stand points towards the projects as well as of those towards themselves as participants. Numerous levels of representation occurred from the moment of 'primary experience' until the completion of this research, including the level of participants' experience during a project, telling it to the researcher, transcribing and analysing what was told, which have all played a significant role in shaping the content and context of this research. Issues of 'inside' and 'outside' a researcher's positionality have been particularly important owing to the range of formal positions held by the researcher. The researcher worked as an architect and urban planner for the German GTZ's Nasriya upgrading project for four years (1989-1992); this introduced him to the residents as a professional, one associated with a beneficent development project, and narrowed the social distance between him and the community through their daily contact. This was particularly useful during the fieldwork survey in Nasriya, where an overwhelming majority of interviewees showed interest and trust, easily understood the questions and did not try to mislead the researcher in their responses intentionally.

In 1992, the researcher was employed by the government to work as the Coordinator of the Urban Development and Land Management Unit of Aswan Governorate (1992-1994). He was repeatedly in the company of the Governor which gave him invaluable chances for 'informal' discussions with key-actors, participation observation and relatively easier access to official data. Advantageously, local government officials viewed the researcher as a colleague, which generated a positive impact on their perception and degree of co-operation during the interviews. Of course, being a member in the primary group of Nasriya and Aswan local government contributed to knowledge
about the phenomenon under study and as to the type of questions to be asked (Appendix 1 and 2). The case of Ismailia was different, as the author had no previous connection with the local residents or the local government. Fortunately, a web of previous relational resources, developed through various stakeholders involved, introduced the researcher to the directorship of the UNDP-funded Sustainable Ismailia Project (1993-date), who was also the former Director of the Hai El-Salam project. Although this helped a great deal to introduce the researcher to the project area, to meet with senior government officials working in Ismailia and to obtain secondary data, many households in Hai El-Salam were suspicious of the real purpose of the interview during the pilot survey in 1996. Although the project has been in operation for more than two decades, some households have not acquired land-titles, while others have extended their house without a building permit; it was thought that if information was passed to the municipality, they would be in trouble. This problem was only overcome after a local urban planner, who used to work for the project and was, therefore, familiar to the local population, he accompanied the researcher voluntarily and introduced him to the community leaders in the area during the main fieldwork survey.

However, because of the unfamiliarity of the researcher with the details of the project, it was impossible to treat some secondary and primary data as straightforward ‘pictures’ of an objective reality. It was necessary to understand how ‘reality’ is being represented in words by different people. In addition to reconnaissance of several areas in Hai El-Salam and Nasriya, taking photos and producing a video tape, large numbers of additional interviews took place with local and external consultants, who had either worked for the projects or were knowledgeable about their development and pitfalls (Appendix 3). These investigated the realities of the subject and broke down any erroneous preconceptions. Finally, the fact that the author has studied multiple disciplines- namely architecture (BSc.), regional and urban planning (Pre-MSc.) and human geography (MSc.), has also helped a great deal to overcome boundaries which sometimes segregate the appreciation of the social, political and economic dimensions evident in studies of squatter settlements, local governance practices and urban geography theories.
1.6- Structure of research:

The research starts with reviewing the existing literature on development and civil society. After analysing influential concepts, e.g. globalisation and postmodernism, community development paradigms and approaches are reviewed and the discourse of participation is discussed. Chapter 3 reviews the theoretical structures of urban governance and local government so as to conceptualise a framework that can investigate local government accountability, citizen political participation and the level of municipal capacity-building needed in DCs. The methodology chapter reviews different epistemologies and methodologies associated with the issues addressed in this research, and selects the best-fitted formula. It also discusses the constraints encountered during the fieldwork. Chapter 5 analyses the political and urban post-ERSAP challenges that DCs are presently facing, as exemplified by Egypt, with particular reference to the ways in which they impact upon local government performance and participatory initiatives.

The subsequent Chapters, 6 and 7, examine how DA support confronts Egypt urban challenges, as explored through two Hai El-Salam and Nasriya upgrading projects, and the extent to which these projects have achieved their objectives. Chapter 8 assesses community perceptions of participation in the Nasriya project, and attempts to identify the causal factors and attitudes which may enhance/suppress how individuals participate. Chapter 9 evaluates the reality of post-project community empowerment, also using the Nasriya example. This is assessed through examining the transformative potential of participation, i.e. the translation of participatory practices during the project into potential political participation, as well as communal and familial ‘informal’ networks of collaborative actions to facilitate access, or provide alternatives, to the formal resources of the state. Chapter 10 analyses the accountability, perceptions and action of local government concerned with urban upgrading. It evaluates whether the capacities acquired by government departments have been institutionalised, and are sustainable and transferable to other projects at local and national levels. Finally, the concluding chapter provides a thematic and conceptual overview of the central issues of participatory upgrading, and offers policy implications in terms of institutionalising the processes of urban upgrading and community participation in Egypt.
CHAPTER TWO

DEVELOPMENT AND PARTICIPATION

Urban development and shelter policies have witnessed radical changes in practice and theory during the past two decades in the DCs. On the one hand, the globalisation of political-economic activities has weakened the central role of the state in driving development, while the reluctant receding of its control, in the face of the global and new market economies, has influenced the evolution of urban development and governance processes disproportionately (Burgess et al. 1997). On the other hand, the general retrograde outcomes of development in the economic, socio-cultural and environmental arenas are ascendant. The gap between rich and poor countries and strata has widened, while the global market seems unable to address the problems of increasing poverty, exclusion and inequalities. The impact at the regional level can be seen in uncontrolled urbanisation, while top-down central planning has failed to solve the problems of the housing deficit for the urban poor. Rapid rates of physical and demographic growth have resulted in drastic local transformations, urban and environmental, leading to global and local ‘environmental crises’ (Burgess et al. 1997). This raised an exigency for a vigorous civil society to carry out long-term plans and to legitimise the priorities, rights and needs of poor citizens, especially the marginalised urban proletariat.

While it has not yet been clear to national governments whether to regulate or liberalise, to support or resist, private sector flows of investment to and within DCs have tripled and seemed more efficient in delivering traditional state functions (Curtis 1997: 4). Although these financial flows are now four times as large as aid flows, it seems unlikely that the market can replace development co-operation completely. In such a climate, institutional changes are needed to build urban municipal capacity and enhance civil society empowerment. This has raised a new DAs’ policy agenda (Robinson 1993) and an urge for multi-lateral institutions to review their rules for guaranteeing the welfare of citizens and the fundamental rights of present and future generations. This chapter aims to discuss the changing development discourse and its paradigmatic and hermeneutic terms. A number of concepts, such as globalisation and post-modernism, assist us to make
sense of the failures to make an impact on urban poverty. The discussion will then focus on community development, community participation and civil society organisations, which form the core of this thesis.

2.1- Development discourse:

The contemporary development critique is characterised by ‘confusion’, as both the meaning and the purpose of development look rather ‘marshy’ and more often ‘practically chaotic’ (Crush 1995: 2). Development can best be analysed and discussed as a discourse of power. The post-structuralism framework has recently conceptualised development as an interwoven system of ‘practices’ and ‘languages’ which comprises an applicable regime of disciplinary ‘power’ and ‘knowledge’. Such a system possesses its own logic, effects, internal coherence, and external communications and interactions. Titled ‘Finishing with the Idea of Third World: The Concept of the Political Trajectory’, Jean-François Bayart (1991) emphasises that the political practices of development must be understood as a moment in a complex and very long-term story through which each country had to pass to produce a specific mix of permissive conditions. The variety of cultural characteristics permits the formation of the necessary consensus within each state apparatus, which in turn elaborates the development strategies to be adopted.

Meanwhile, development discourse is “particularly attuned to the language of development itself, pushing towards an analysis focused on the texts of development without abandoning the power-laden local and international context out of which they arise and to which they speak” (Crush 1995). There have been several attempts to define and categorise development, and bring order to a heterogeneous and constantly multiplying field of meaning and processing. For instance, development is defined in its ideal configuration as a process of becoming, and a potential state of being: “The achievement of a state of development would enable people in societies to make their own histories and geographies under conditions of their own choosing. The process of development is the means by which such conditions of human existence might be achieved” (Johnston et al. 1994: 128). Development is thus seen as a product of
conscious non-exploitative human labour operating in specific sets of social, material and natural crisis-free conditions and as a liberating process.

Development is not only restricted to its economic dimensions of welfare and growth, but extends to an amalgam of modelled processes related to social relations, existence and people's creative political struggle (Slater 1990). Although development can be explained through a historical and geographical process, which possesses its own variants and characteristics, it cannot be defined in universal terms. It is rather "a contradictory, often perverse, course of change" (Johnston et al. 1994: 130). It has also been argued that development is currently the most 'elusive' concept which ought to be banned until we arrive at an unequivocal definition (Sachs 1992: 4). According to the standards of 'ideal' development, it can be argued that "no society in history has ever achieved a state of development, and it may be argued that no society has ever engaged in a process of development" (Johnston et al. 1994: 128). However, while there are several pieces of research concerned with what exactly should be banished, others attempt to model 'real world' processes of development and their recurrent internal crises and impasses (Kay 1993; Leys 1996). Henceforth, the necessity to stabilise the concept of development and bring order out of ambiguity has been demanded repeatedly.

The contemporary discourse of development is global in its reach, encompassing apparatuses and bureaucracies in colonial, post-colonial and independent states. This is revealed throughout the action-processes and the specific language used by governments, multilateral organisations, Western aid agencies, the sprawling global network of NGOs, experts and private consultants, private sector organisations and the plethora of development studies programmes worldwide. Development is thus "fundamentally about mapping and making, about the spatial reach of power and the control and management of 'other' peoples, territories, environments, and places" (Crush 1995). Development was principally viewed as a technical problem, until the 1960s and 1970s, to be stimulated through a combination of knowledge, skill and finance. When the term 'development' was first employed by Keynes in the 1950s, it was basically applied to the economies of African colonies of European powers in the run up to decolonisation, while the two major
elements in US thinking, finance and trade, were seen as the means to create a world economic order tailored to its own desires through loans, credits and investments everywhere (Kolko 1988). Thus, it can be argued that 'development theory' was originally devoted to colonial, and then ex-colonial, states to accelerate national stability during a new epoch of international restructuring. The goal of development was economic growth, the agent of development was the state and the means was a set of macroeconomic policy instruments. These were taken-for-granted presuppositions of development theory as it evolved from the 1950 onwards (Leys 1996).

Development theory was also devised to justify the means by which national governments could manage their economies so as to maximise growth and employment, as was crystallised in the post-war international Bretton Woods agreement in 1944, and the subsequent establishment of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (Preston 1996: 157). Development agencies used development theory to provide grounds for immediate action which could maximise their profits within a new process of neo-colonisation. In contrast, academic theorists sought to introduce theory which could embrace the people of the ex-colonies. The ahistorical and political values of development theory were challenged by strong criticism from the 'left' in the 1970s. There was a struggle between those who tried to keep it within its original parameters, and critics who attempted to extend the debate and place all issues back into the framework of the historically oriented and ethical tradition of general development theory as formulated by Hegel and Marx.

The political arrangement of development, articulated in the Communist Manifesto, proposed to replace the marketplace and the processes of production driven by capitalistic competition with a governance system which was run by the people. Initially, Marx (1957) argued that in order to break the power of capitalists over governance, the forces representing labour should engage in 'class struggle' so as to take control of the state. Ultimately, the state, too, should wither away, leaving economic activity and governance to be managed by local communities. Thus, while orthodox Marxists view the process of development in 'capitalist' civil society as an unequal terrain of oppression
structured by class and state power, classical liberals view it as the sphere of liberty and autonomy (Preston 1996). In practice, wherever there were Communist or socialist regimes inspired by similar ideas of class struggle, they tended to reinforce the state, and the original Marxist idea of withering away was forgotten.

Development is also depicted differently by the various ideologies in contemporary economic discourse. Until the 1980s, the World Bank used to describe the development problem as “essentially a question of the quantity, quality and proportion of resources to be devoted to development on the one hand, and to economic management on the other” (Ikram 1980: 5). It was believed that the processes of production and distribution had to be planned to ensure efficient production and continuing growth, and for some protagonists of economic planning, a fair distribution of the benefits of growth. In reality, this resulted in the replacement of the market regulations of capitalist production processes with centralised planning and programming by the state, with individual enterprises driven by centrally-established production targets rather than the drive of profitability (Healey 1997). Economic activity was typically seen to consist of a number of production sectors, usually based on a conventional division between primary, secondary and tertiary, or service industries. Such a concentration of economic and political power at the apex of a national system not only encouraged forms of governance unresponsive to people’s needs, but also provided many opportunities for corrupt practice which, ultimately, resulted in regressive distributional consequences (Ward 1989). It diverted resources away from the poor, acted against society’s wider interest and undermined legitimacy (Szeftel 1983). Eventually, uneven development intensified and extended the existing relation of exploitation, dependency and stunted life-chances for the majority of the urban poor.

Now, ‘free-market’ ideologues view development as a process of sustainable economic growth, which can be measured by the gross national product per capita, resulting in the most efficient and socially optimal allocation of resources, while government interference is restrained. David Korten (1995) argues that this ideology, in its various guises, “is known by different names- neo-classical, neo-liberal, or libertarian
economics; market capitalism, or market liberalism”. The term ‘free-market’ can indeed be extended to embody ‘economic rationalism’, which explains the situation in Australia and New Zealand, and also what Latin American scholars call ‘neo-liberalism’. Generally speaking, Korten argues that in most countries, including the United States, the term goes without a generally recognised name: “Unnamed, it goes undebated- its underlying assumptions unexamined” (Korten 1995: 72). However, the neo-liberal political movements found ground in the new economic strategies, focusing on the supply side of the economy and the reduction of constraints on adaptation and innovation. It has also resulted in the concept and imposition of ERSAPs, which came to surface after the failure of the liberal approach to deal with the diverse forms of power relations which link state and civil society, the public and the private spheres. The pursuit of ERSAPs in many DCs (1990-date) introduced several measures of privatisation and financial liberalisation, including deregulation of prices, wages, customs, tariffs and exchange rates. The programmes focused on stabilisation to restore macroeconomic balance and reduce inflation, structural adjustment to stimulate and sustain medium-term and long-term growth, and accelerated implementation of current social policies to minimise the effect of the economic reforms on the poor (Rondinelli 1993).

Theoretically, the major objective of the neo-liberal strategy, including ERSAPs, was to reduce the role of the bureaucracy and politics in the management of the economy. It also aimed to ‘unfetter’ business from the burdens imposed upon it by a regulatory environment built up through the welfare state composed of wide ranging employment projects, state subsidised housing, free education and health system. It was thought necessary to transform the style of governance to make it decentralised, more relevant to the dynamics of contemporary economies and to promote an entrepreneurial rather than a regulatory ethos (Harvey 1989). Decentralisation within the state was thought to involve a transfer of authority to perform some services in territorial and functional terms. While the basis of territorial transfers was the desire to place authority at a lower level in a territorial hierarchy and thus geographically closer to service providers and clients, functional transfers aimed basically to delegate authority to a non-state agency that is
functionally more specialised, or the devolution of power to sub-national units of
governments (Turner and Hulme 1997: 152). The latter would include local governments,
local authorities, district councils, provincial governments and state governments, and was
seen as to combine the promise of local democracy with technical efficiency.

In practice, the ERSAPs that DCs have pursued have not proven to be a panacea
for making state-sponsored interventions more effective in promoting development
(Escobar 1995). Under the banner of decentralisation, national governments introduced
policies that concentrated power and decision-making and weakened local arenas for
political debate. Real devolution has been rare, and deconcentration or the establishment
of mixed authorities have been the favoured modes for many DCs’ leaders (Turner and
Hulme 1997: 152). Moreover, the neo-liberal political movement resulted in the
diminution of planning, and the return of the market as the key organising principle of
economic life in both developed and DCs. On the one hand, this attempted to advance
wealth regeneration and the spread of benefits, while on the other, flexible labour markets
created an insecure working class unable to consume the set of neo-liberalist measures
imposed in DCs (Friedman and Douglas 1998). The level of frustration increased in many
DCs, specially in Africa, as service delivery became static or declined: “A widespread
realisation has taken place that services alone do not produce development” (Curtis 1995:
116). The complexity of these political and economic changes caused multiple forms of
oppression and exploitation (Hooper 1992; Sandercock 1995); worsening social
inequalities resulted in civil rights movement and ongoing struggles based on ethnicity and
racism (Leys 1996), or poverty and systematic exclusions of class and gender in an
international development context (Friedmann 1992). Moreover, all these were fused
together with disastrous spatial results, as seen in environmental pollution, urban
deterioration and the periodic collapse of markets.

Development theory is undoubtedly faced now by the frequent retreat from
politics in face of the seeming success of capital which subordinates everything to the
arbitration of ‘global market forces’. Based on his work in Kenya in particular and in
Africa in general, Colin Leys (1996) focuses special attention on the actors for whom the
goals of development envisaged by various theories are formulated. He systematically analyses comparative evidence to clarify what seems to be at stake—namely the urgent need to revive development theory, not as a branch of policy-orientated social science within the parameters of an unquestioned capitalist world order, but as a field of critical enquiry about the contemporary dynamics of that order itself, with imperative policy implications for the survival of a civilised and decent life, and not just in the ex-colonial countries. Leys strongly argues that any equilibrium model is just a model; using it does not commit us to the view that the real world is in equilibrium, nor even that it tends towards equilibrium. He argues that the present ‘impasse in development theory’ and the unfolding tragedy, especially in Africa, are not due to the working out of an inexorable law of economics but, to a significant extent, to politically motivated policy decisions setting capital free to pursue profit wherever it wishes and on whatever terms it can impose, rationalised by a particular brand of development theory (neo-liberalism) which assigns all initiative to ‘the market’. The situation in Central America is not much different. Laura Macdonald (1997: 2) agrees that the impact of the neo-liberal adjustment programme on civil society is disempowering rather than empowering and, therefore, any examination of the potential role of NGOs in civil society must be placed in a specific historical and spatial context. Thus, during the 1990s both government officials and beneficiaries in DCs have become subjects for the compressed application of ‘development’ rather than initiators experiencing, contributing and responding to the exercise of that development. Escobar (1995) ascribes such a capsized situation to the outcome of a development apparatus which links forms of knowledge about the DCs with the deployment of forms of power and intervention, resulting in a specific mapping and production of DCs’ societies.

However, the post-modern epoch of development discourse acclaims local communities' experimental, grounded, contextual and intuitive knowledges, notwithstanding that ‘the public interest’ and ‘community’ are likely to exclude difference if they work separately (Sandercock 1998). In criticising the liberalism ideology, proponents of post-modernism attempt to find a new social ontology which views
development through the attributes of a person as a coeval with the society: "Our constitutive self-understandings comprehend a wider subject than the individual alone, whether a family or a tribe or a city or class or nation or people, to this extent they define a community in the constitutive sense" (Sandel 1982: 173). Thus the ideal of community arises in this way as a response to the individualism perceived as the prevailing theoretical position, and the alienation and fragmentation, class or gender, perceived as the prevailing condition of society (Young 1990: 306). Post-modernism deconstructs the modernist reliance on state-directed futures and its top-down processes, and concentrates instead on community-based development, from the ground up, geared to community empowerment (Sandercock 1998). It acknowledges that there are multiple publics and differences and therefore development planning requires a new kind of multi-cultural literacy (Sennett 1994; Jacobs 1996). The post-modern philosophical movement views planning for development as no longer exclusively concerned with comprehensive, integrated, and co-ordinated action, but rather more negotiated, political, and focused planning (Sandercock 1998).

On the other hand, Healey (1997: 42) argues that the post-modern challenges may, in fact, sustain the tired practices of the old modernity, foster scepticism, individual efforts and isolated autonomy rather than fostering the public realm and collaboration, which are needed for managing our relations of co-existence in shared spaces. According to the post-modern essence, individuals might adhere to one of the following scenarios: "One response is to turn away, to an interior life, or to enjoyment of what we can while we can. Another is to engage in a perpetual effort of resistance and deconstruction, individually defending ourselves against the threat of 'abstract systems' against our own 'lifeworlds'" (Healey 1997: 43). However, all responses seems to lead to hedonistic or anarchistic developmental polities rather challenging the neo-liberal political project and its reassertion of a narrow utilitarianism in public policy. Therefore, she attempts to find alternative routes out of such political incapacity and argues that the way ahead is to build up institutional preconditions for economic growth, including market 'health and vitality', in favour of planning the trajectory of the future collectively, rather than being perpetually
vulnerable to the volatility of markets, or the power of large-scale capitalist companies (Healey 1997: 9). This is, in essence, the foundations of the ‘transformative power’ praxis in development discourse, which is discussed in the following Chapters.

2.2- Community development- paradigms and approaches:

Community development is very much linked to the concept of self-help in that both represent issues of collaborative action for internally generated improvement and development in situ. Community development is defined in its broad consensus as “organised efforts to improve the conditions of community life and the capacity for community integration and self-direction” (Dunham 1970). It is thus the “long-standing tendency of membership of a group to act together to improve the lifestyle of the group as a whole” (FitzGerald 1980). The United Nations views community development as a total approach to development and defines it as “a process by which the efforts of the people themselves are united with those of governmental authorities to improve the economic, social and cultural conditions of communities, to integrate these communities into the life of a Nation and to enable them to contribute fully to national progress” (cited in Curtis 1995: 117).

The debate about community development raised fundamental questions about the causes of poverty, the role of development and the basis of democracy. But, instead of seeing this as an important international debate, these issues were seen as challenging the political and ideological base of the superpowers and of local governments. It became impossible to develop economic and social policies related to development without these being either consigned to a political pole or adopted by one of them. The result was a capitalist-communist conflict which pre-defined the wider arena and translated itself directly into a series of dualities on the ground. These might be state and community, oppressor and oppressed, landed and homeless. Each sector tended to create its own duality and that led to social justice issues in such spheres as ownership of land (Abbott 1996: 7). Since its origin in the eighteenth century in the UK and the US, the discourse of community development has been evolving, cross-cutting a wide range of disciplines, and is perhaps the most controversial concept now. Transforming the trajectory from
community development’ to ‘economic development’, ‘involvement’, ‘empowerment’, ‘management’, ‘mobilisation’ or ‘participation’, the associated paradigms reflect how discourses have been trying to place community development into an undivided context, and to conceptualise urban development through both intrasocietal and intersocietal dynamics of production and exchanges.

Most of the early interpretations of community development were based on the primacy of economic growth. These are best discussed through the ‘paradigm-approach model of development’, which “represents a tentative description of what the system might eventually look like and suggests possible relationships between variables” (Cotgrove 1967). The paradigm approach model argues that community development was first recognised as an approach which operated within the paradigm of modernisation theory, whereas empowerment was the superseding approach which operated within the paradigm of dependency theory (Figure 2.1).

Figure 2.1: The paradigm approach model of development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paradigm:</th>
<th>Original linkage</th>
<th>superseded by</th>
<th>New linkage</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Modernisation theory</td>
<td>Community development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependency theory</td>
<td>Empowerment</td>
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The modernisation theory used western society, and particularly the US, as a role model and argued that all societies shift from the traditional and primitive, which are apparently synonymous and both pejorative, to the modern through a series of clearly defined stages of economic growth. This is not a new concept. In the nineteenth century the members of the German historical school of economics were developing economic
stages in Germany and, to some extent, elsewhere (Hoselitz 1960: 193). What was different about the approach after the Second World War was its global perspective and the way in which it divided the world into two dominant categories of developed and underdeveloped. The malady of many underdeveloped economies was diagnosed as “a stable equilibrium of per capita income at, or close to, subsistence requirements. ... If economic growth is defined as rising per capita income, these economies are not growing. They are caught in a low level equilibrium trap” (Nelson 1956 cited in Abbott 1996: 12). Saving and investment were thus seen as the key to achieving meaningful levels of development.

In understanding how the capitalist countries moved from low to high levels of economic development, it was argued that “the opportunities for worthwhile investment exist; it is the capital which is lacking. ... what is needed is a massive investment over a short period to raise income levels above the containment rate” (Lewis 1954 cited in Abbott 1996: 12). Such over-simplistic manifestations in explaining the process of transition were later revised. Rostow (1956) introduced the concept of ‘take-off’ and laid the theoretical foundations of modernisation theory: “The process of economic growth can usually be regarded as centring on a relatively brief time interval of two or three decades when the economy and the society of which it is a part transform themselves in such ways that economic growth is, subsequently, more or less automatic. This decisive transformation is here called the take-off’. Such a linear conception of how underdeveloped could become developed was further expanded into a general model. “It is possible to identify all societies, in their economic dimensions, as lying within one of five categories: the traditional society, the pre-conditions for take-off, the take-off, the drive to maturity, and the age of high mass-consumption” (Rostow 1960: 4).

Talcott Parsons and his followers in the US also developed a classification of social structures which distinguished modern industrialised societies from traditional societies (Parsons et al. 1961; McLelland 1976: 16). Parsons saw the cultural system as fundamental and argued that there were changes, in what he defined as pattern variables, which were required for development to occur. These pattern variables were identified as
affectivity, diffuseness, particularism and ascription in a traditional or community-based society. He then tried to show how they shifted over time in the creation of a modern society associated with affective neutrality, universalism and achievement instead. Thus, for example, there have to be changes in the roles and relationships between people, reducing the traditional context. In a modern western society people take on specific roles, such as their jobs, whereas in a traditional society there are strong emotional and cultural associations linked with positions, a tribal chief for instance. So in a western society a job is taken out of the emotional and cultural environment and de-personalised. Hence, Parsons viewed the goals of development as: social, described as the integration of society; political, summarised as the need for the society to work for the attainment of goals; and economic, requiring adaptation to the new requirement.

In reality, all of these are based on the role model of a typical western society. Their primary importance, however, was to emphasise the need for structural change in society as a pre-condition of economic take-off as perceived by Rostow. Not only was this important in the anti-Communist struggle, deeply engraved in the Americans psyche and their social science, but it also provided the theoretical justification for western governments and multilateral agencies to interfere with the social and cultural society of countries in the name of economic development (Kolko 1988). While modernisation theory was subject to widespread criticism, it was the basis of what Latin American scholars called ‘developmentalism’, which used to measure development in terms of economic growth and aimed at overcoming ‘backwardness’. Although this approach perceived industrial development in the modern sectors of the economy as the main goal, this type of growth was likely to be dislocated and so caused social conflicts. Developmentalism reinforced individualism at the expense of the clan or community at large, was not really rooted and exaggerated the differences between rural and urban resulting in further inequality.

While Marxist development theory integrates underdevelopment into its own economic model, dependency theory treats it differently as representing “a limit-situation characteristic of societies of the Third World which cannot be understood apart from the
relationship with dependency. The task implied by this limit situation is to overcome the contradictory relationship between these ‘object’-societies and the metropolitan societies; this task constitutes the untested feasibility for the Third World” (Freire 1972). Freire analysed society in terms of a dualistic model in which a minority, termed oppressors, controlled the majority, who were oppressed. He argued that the oppressed, having internalised the image of the oppressor and adopted his guidelines, are fearful of freedom, which would usually require them to reject this image and replace it with autonomy and responsibility.

This led to a new approach, conscientisacion, which became a form of community participation to be seen in juxtaposition to community development. In its application, conscientisacion was strongly influenced by a specific component of dependency theory, derived from Freire’s concept of the oppressor/oppressed duality. With urbanisation as the focal point of struggle in Latin America during the 1970s, this was applied to explain the confrontation between the state, as oppressor, and the urban disfranchised poor, as the oppressed. However, the linkage between conscientisacion and empowerment is more complex. Empowerment gained its conceptual form in the 1970s, driven by world bodies such as the ILO, UNICEF, NUCHS and UNRISD, on the basis that such action would encourage meaningful change in society and enhance the satisfaction of basic needs. More specifically, empowerment is defined as “the organised efforts to increase control over resources and relative institutions in given social situations, on the part of groups and movements hitherto excluded from such control” (UNRISD 1979). The International Labour Office (ILO), for instance, has encouraged the use of this term to allow it to confront questions of power both ideologically and in its dealings with governments.

Dependency theory explains community development from an intersocietal point of view in the context of urban development. The basic issue is how patterns of urbanisation vary according to the socio-economic and political relations of locales to national and international hierarchies of core/periphery exploitation (Smith and Tardanico 1987). Coming after the failings of modernisation theory, dependency theory made strong use of comparative analysis. It did not seek to justify revolutionary action in terms of the
righting of past wrongs, but used instead the historical development of society, which views the world dualistically as a developed centre with a dependent periphery, as the theoretical basis for a more radical transformation of society. A good example of this is Frank’s critique of modernisation theory, including the pattern variables which Talcott Parsons identified.

Frank (1980) criticises both modernisation theory and the dualist approach. He argues that while modernisation theory ignores the structure of communities, the proposed dualist approach does not fit the real world. It neglects the real linkages between the traditional and modern sectors. Frank argues that the control of power by local privileged elites created increasing economic and technological dependence. Thus, neither changes in pattern variables nor contact with the west has led to development in the DCs. However, although dependency theory did not ignore, or relegate to secondary importance, the dynamics of international and interregional exploitation, it is criticised for inadequately addressing the dynamics of international capitalist development, class structure and its consequences for both the political-economic transformation of societies and their positions in the global capitalist order (Smith and Tardanico 1987).

Although community development discourse has evolved, its political incapacity to explain the full implications of power and the practical relationship between government and the community put it in jeopardy. It provided the space for a totally different interpretation which exposed communities to manipulation by government and opened the way for widespread criticism. The state and civil societies are often portrayed as passive instruments or direct reflections of capitalist interests and structures, rather than as an active, partially independent force (Smith and Feagin 1987). Such restriction focuses exclusively on the needs of communities as semi-independent entities. Thus, they are often disempowered or disenfranchised, or alternatively they may be seen as embittered or disillusioned (Abbott 1996: 70). Accordingly, any community wanting something is usually seen by politicians as a “cluster of votes that can be recruited in exchange for a small favour” (Curtis 1995: 118). This leaves community leaders often confused about how to respond to this patronage and disempowered to act on their own behalf.
Therefore, the contemporary discourse of community development has expanded to embody issues of participation, civil society, social citizenship and sustainability. The dimensions of time, space, marginalised social-economic groups, and dynamic economies have broadened its context, whilst the ideas of new knowledges and (re)framing issues are offered as a means to create new options. Sustainable community development is perceived as citizens' empowerment and participation in changing perceptions and choices regarding community resources, markets, rules, and decision-making capacity (Hulme and Edwards 1997; Nelson and Wright 1995; Healey 1997). Civil society, community participation and institutionalised collaborative governance are still trying to jointly build on these changes, taking community development discourse beyond the more traditional static definition, and placing it into an undivided political context comprised of the state, local governments, community and individuals, which are discussed in the following sections.

2.3- Civil society:

With the paradigm shift from nation-state to the city-state (Friedman and Douglas 1998), and the perception of city as the locus of new forms of 'insurgence' citizenship (Holston 1995), which is evident in the new social movements' struggles on behalf of the poor, of women for 'rights to the city' and of the marginalised and minorities for 'rights to difference', civil society is increasingly seen as an expression of all citizens asserting themselves. The role of civil society organisations in community development projects and programmes has become critical in two ways. First, they have an important role in planning and directly implementing projects, which address the basic needs of low-income groups they represent. Second, they can help to improve the quality of governance by placing pressure on government agencies to use resources more effectively to reduce poverty. Civil society has been increasingly recognised, specially by DAs, as being critical to successful realisation of community development. In part, the interest reflects a growing awareness of the importance of local institutions in supporting and undertaking development.
It is widely believed that civil society schemes seem to offer potential models for mutual and sustainable participatory development in DCs, while state efforts are often suffused with a sense of bureaucratic chaos and characterised by capital-intensive projects. Local NGOs are viewed by many official agencies and members of the public as more efficient and cost-effective service providers than governments, giving better 'value-for-money', especially in reaching poor people (Meyer 1992; Sollis 1992; Vivian 1994). DAs view markets and private sector initiatives, through which local NGOs and GROs operate, as the most efficient mechanisms for achieving economic growth, producing goods, and providing services, even if they do this imperfectly. The argument of 'imperfect markets are better than imperfect states' (Colclough and Manor 1991: 7) is exclusively applied to the entire geography of the imperfect public sector bureaucracy and performance of DCs. A scrutiny of NGOs' performance reveals that they regularly learn from their mistakes, respond to the demands from the real beneficiaries, evaluate their progress seriously, and some of them are keen on integrating their counterparts within the process of planning to make the means of development sustainable. Nonetheless, most NGOs not only design their programmes to be flexible, but they are also aware that in a post-modern world, complete systems which claim to produce comprehensive programmes are suspicious.

Accordingly, strengthening civil society organisations has become essential for all development and poverty reduction agencies, national or international, to ensure that government policies and programmes are effective and reflective. DAs have pursued a 'New Policy Agenda' which gives renewed prominence to the roles of local NGOs and GROs in poverty alleviation, social welfare, and the development of civil society (Robinson 1993). Naturally, the details of this policy agenda vary from one donor agency to another based on their specific economic and/or political targets. Politically, local NGOs and GROs are awarded a key role in the democratisation process by many DAs. They are seen as an integral component of a thriving civil society and an essential counterweight to state power, opening-up channels of communication and participation, providing training for activists, and promoting pluralism (Robinson 1993). Hence,
national governments tend to deal carefully with many local NGOs, knowing that while they are a good source for attracting foreign official aid, they can also be discarded when necessary (Smith and Lipsky 1993).

On the other hand, there are many questions regarding civil society performance, accountability, and its ability to act independently. With the entitlement of civil society organisations to play a supplementary role at the local level to overcome local inertia, they carried out large numbers of development 'projects' aiming basically to support self-reliance and to integrate marginal populations within the national economy (Macdonald 1997: 10). Large numbers of 'underdeveloped' skills and the mechanisms of the 'third system' economy were thus utilised within many development activities. While community participation was seen as a cheaper and more efficient method of ensuring a project success in both technical and economic terms, this ideology required continuous mobilisation and encouragement from the project agency and better management of civil society organisations. As a result, many have become dependent upon foreign funding and/or local decision-making processes. Although government funding of local NGOs and GROs enhanced their resources and scope, they failed to remain autonomous from the state's intervention. The acceptance of government funding repeatedly placed real constraints upon their strategies. Such interference could be blatant or subtle. This fact raised important questions concerning NGO-state relations, and the ability of NGOs and bilateral agencies to act independently in pursuing their goals. Edwards and Hulme (1996) argue that although official funding usually tends to encourage civil society organisations to become providers of social and economic services on a much larger scale than hitherto, even though their long-term comparative advantage is doubtful, this weakens their legitimacy as independent actors in society, diverts their accountability away from grassroots constituencies, and over emphasises short-term, quantitative outputs. It is evident that increasing numbers of local NGOs GROs are becoming more dependent on official aid, while there is a discernible flattening-out of voluntary contributions by the public in many Northern countries.
Macdonald (1997) explores the issues which shape and restrict NGO roles and actions in supporting civil society and the delivery of development assistance. Using a materialistic and historical hermeneutic model, Macdonald analyses six NGO projects in Nicaragua and Costa Rica focusing on three main themes: choice of development strategies; forms of popular participation; and the role played by international agencies in their relationships with local partners. Macdonald deconstructed all approaches that romanticise NGOs and exaggerate their ability to represent the disenfranchised by means of enhancing democratisation in a 'global civil society'. In a similar vein, Escobar (1995) discussed a series of crucial cultural questions associated with the practice of NGOs. First, to what extent can the position of NGOs and GROs outside of the organised state-sphere permit a role on ideological grounds rather than empirical justification? Second, what is the impact of NGO/GRO cultural differences on mobilising cultural identity as a transformative engagement with modernity? Escobar concluded that local community organisations and 'tradition' are neither erased nor preserved as the bases for 'alternative' development, but are refashioned as a hybrid. This hybridity entails "a cultural (re)creation that may or may not be (re)inscribed into hegemonic constellations". Hence, when communications between Northern and Southern local communities take place through official aid schemes, this becomes the core discussion of the new geo-political subjectivity which imposes a 'transcultural status in-between world reality' (Escobar 1995). Such important issues are examined in more detail throughout the research case study in Chapters 8 and 9.

2.4- Implementing participation:

A transition from economic development programmes, and the primacy of economic growth, which influenced the paradigm approach model of development, to project-based development has resulted in the growth of 'community participation' as an alternative approach. The move towards a project-based approach has also opened up a wide debate on the objectives of community participation, including levels of participation, types, purposes and who should participate. But despite the extensive, if not overwhelming literature which defines, surveys and analyses the experience of community
participation, most publications are detailed case studies which document aspects of community participation in the implementation of specific projects (Moser 1989). There is a small number of workers who have developed conceptual ideas to explain community participation. None of these approaches is complete in itself, because they are not situated in the wider political, economic, ideological and social environment, which leaves us unable to deal with the fundamental gap existing between theory and practice.

Participation is a very broad concept. It involves shifts in power within communities; between people, policy-making and resources-holding institutions; and within the structure of those organisations (Nelson and Wright 1995). Although there have been many attempts to create an abstract order of participation, people have always been positioned very differently in relation to the development agency: as objects of a theoretical process of economic and political transformation (World Bank 1994), as expected beneficiaries of programmes with pre-set parameters, as contributors of casual labour to help a project to achieve its ends (Burgess 1982), as politically co-opted legitimisers of a policy, or as citizens trying to determine their own choices and direction independent of the state (Curtis 1995). One of the early attempts to create an abstract order of participation was Arnstein’s ladder of citizen participation. Arnstein (1969) conceptualised participation as a power game, in which elites retain power that citizens struggle to gain access to. There are four levels of participation in Arnstein’s ladder: it begins with non-participation, which is equated with manipulation and exploitation; moving up we find tokenism, which is equated with placation; then listening and sharing, which is equated with information sharing and consultation; and at the top of the ladder is citizen power, which is equated in ascending order with partnership, delegated power and citizen control. But in real field settings, the continuum repeatedly collapses in on itself because participatory approaches are always attempted in communities with complex histories and social dynamics, which make them very difficult to foster (Dichter 1995). There will be times in any participatory project when the process is top-down and led entirely by outsiders, times when citizens themselves initiate aspects of the project and even manipulate the implementing agency, times when there is harmony and mutual
sharing, and times when such harmony breaks down and powerful people on both sides may obstruct progress or manipulate and placate the people (Figure 2.2).

Figure 2.2: Levels of citizen participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Citizen control</th>
<th>Delegated power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Partnership</td>
<td>Placation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultation</td>
<td>Information sharing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Therapy</td>
<td>Manipulation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Arnstein (1969: 216) and Dichter (1995).

Therefore, when the term is used in the context of development the first question to answer is exactly what type of participation is worth consideration. It is important to make a distinction between voluntary and coercive participation. In practice, this is not easy, particularly when extensive material incentives are employed to ensure co-operation. Participation in the construction and implementation stages of a project is now very common and often involves the beneficiaries contributing part or all of the labour. Here participation is a practical matter, equated with co-operation and incorporation into pre-determined activities to lower costs. This is only one stage in the development process, and therefore, participation in decision-making, implementation, maintenance, in benefits, and in evaluation of either success or failure must also be considered. The other type of participation is what Chambers (1995) calls 'participatory appraisal'. It aims at starting projects with correct information based on the notion that every human being knows his/her own world better than any other. But this only appears to be empowerment if a collective view is taken of society as made up of free-floating actors, each with different interests which they pursue by negotiating with each other in interactional space.
However, there are methods of gathering information in a participatory manner involving citizen representatives.

Fostering participation is more difficult when decision-making processes are included as well. Contradictions arise in getting people to ‘buy in’ or ‘own’ project decisions (Dichter 1995); power involves the ‘outsider’ enabler and is often present in multiple and heterogeneous social relations, which makes the process of negotiation and working collectively more difficult but not impossible. Shepherd (1983) argues that “decision making processes are the most obvious instance of exercise of power. Therefore if participation in decision can be broadened or made effectively representative, this means that power is being shared and that groups formerly excluded from the exercise of power are included”. The last type of participation refers to ‘cognitive participation’ or ‘initiating action’ (Paul 1987). This is the highest intensity of participation according to which those who are objects of policy should have the opportunity to participate not only in specific decisions but in the definitions of the situation on which these decisions are based. Therefore this type of participation is the most complex and cannot be rushed. Yet again field reality may witness all of the types of participation discussed above.

The second dimension of participation concerns who should participate. In a truly participatory approach, we might expect all those affected to have a role to play at all stages of the development process. This highlights the fact that certain groups, e.g. the poorest and women, have been bypassed by previous development and should now be included, or even ‘put first’. The GTZ, involved in this study, starts participatory development processes by defining the stakeholders who either affect or are affected by the development project’s actions and policies. According to the World Bank (1994), the primary stakeholders are the target citizens, including the poor and the marginalised who lack information and power and are excluded from the development process; secondary stakeholders include government bodies, NGOs, businesses and professional bodies which have technical expertise and linkages to resources and primary stakeholders. A GTZ project incorporates tiers of ‘ZOPP’ sessions, German acronym for ‘Objective Oriented Project Planning’, at beneficiary nation level, before reaching the primary stakeholders at
the site of the project. Thereafter, the primary stakeholders are asked at numerous informal meetings held in their own civil society organisations to identify their neighbourhoods' problems, whilst subsequent rounds of formal discussions through ZOPP workshops serve to define the cause of the problems and to explore possible solutions (GTZ 1987). The process serves to identify goals and to forge relationships within the community, between it and the project personnel and between both and the city's authorities. Efforts are made at all stages to cast perceptions into realistic and achievable cause and effect chains. ZOPP workshops are repeated annually with participants to reassess achievements and failures, and to prepare and update the project planning matrix (PPM), which outlines the project's purpose, objectives, activities, stakeholders' responsibilities and the time table of implementation.

Once the scope of participation and the participants have been ascertained, the focus shifts to how this is to be achieved in practice. The mix of how and what in a particular situation is basically determined by the purpose of participation, and whether it is 'participation as an end' or 'participation as a means' (Lane 1995: 183). The fact that participation has a variety of meanings suggests that we should be wary of approaches that use the term uncritically or view it as unequivocally good (Figure 2.3). Although participation as a means develops a commitment to the project and local self-reliance to succeed the project, it involves the beneficiaries' contributing labour and other resources. Participation as an end suggests a wider scope and greater intensity than where participation is viewed as a predetermined input. The community or group sets up a process to control its own development. Although most DAs define participation now as "a process through which stakeholders influence and share control over development initiatives, decisions and resources which affect them" (Nelson and Wright 1995), the analysis of community participation should be able to place the process within a wider context in a coherent and logical manner. This is implicit in earlier work, but has rarely been successful. The first description of this wider contact was through economic development, outlined by the paradigm approach model of development, which proved inadequate and was overtaken by events: The second was the 'project environment'.
Unfortunately, those who controlled the international funding system supported this structure, primary because it could be linked with a quantifiable product, e.g. a water supply or health clinic, and could be controlled by the project cycle. But it did not offer any guidance in how to evaluate the qualitative outputs or to uphold sustainability; it proved even less satisfactory and opened the way to a multiplicity of interpretations. Thus community participation was increasingly seen as a means of ensuring a satisfactory end-product (Abbott 1996: 7).

Figure 2.3: Purposes of participation

Building on both the ‘paradigm approach model’ and the ‘project-based model’ Abbott (1996) attempted to develop a practical model of the community participation process, including its relationship with the wider environment in a structured way. The new model combines both an appropriate awareness of the wider environment, along with various issues required for detailed implementation. Abbott criticises the paradigm approach model for it never successfully addressed the issue of detailed implementation; it focused instead on the relationship between the approach and the dominant paradigm. The project-based model, on the other hand, focused almost exclusively on implementation, without giving adequate consideration to the wider surround. While
Abbott agrees that the project-based model has showed reasonable success regarding the use of community management, since it operated almost exclusively within the arena of inclusion for which it is well suited, his new model aims basically to determine the type of implementation that can be associated with the other arenas of consensus and confrontation.

In order to incorporate the arena of consensus, it is necessary to strike a balance between idealism and pragmatism, between what is desired and what is practically achievable; hence there is a goal against which the implementation strategy can be measured. This is defined as customising the conceptual framework and comprises a two-stage process. The first is to identify the elements which encapsulate the key issues of participation process—namely the needs of community, project, state and other actors. The end product of this stage is a working model that represents a set of working principles that all parties agree to as the basis for the project (Figure 2.4).

**Figure 2.4: Evolution of the working model of community participation**

![Diagram showing the evolution of the working model of community participation](image)


The second stage is to illustrate the much wider and more complex relationship which exists between the two constituent parts of the participation process—namely the elements and the structure of the participation process itself. The end product of this stage
Chapter 2 Development and Participation

is a cycle which shows how to monitor and evaluate the community participation process, and makes extensive use of iterative feedback (Figure 2.5). These processes are, to a large extent, similar to the preparation of a GTZ’s project planning matrix (PPM), constructed by civil society representatives in partnership with the project’s experts and secondary stakeholders through tiers of ‘ZOPP’ sessions.

Figure 2.5: Relationship between the elements and the structure of the participation process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The conceptual framework comprising the community participation process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Arena of consensus</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Customised conceptual framework 1</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Customised conceptual framework 2</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Working model</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Evaluation of the community participation process</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Definition of the arena of community participation within which the project operates, in terms of complexity and openness of government.**
- **Identification of actors.**
- **Point on entry of the community.**
- **Differing needs of the community.**
- **Needs of other actors.**
- **Develop the hierarchy of objectives for the combined activity/community participation process.**
- **Practical implementation.**
- **Role and relationships of different actors.**
- **Quantify intervention strategies.**
- **Intensity of community.**
- **Involvement.**
- **Extent of consensus.**


The arena of consensus is the only one of the three operating arenas sited in a complex environment, which makes it the most likely one to utilise all elements. Therefore “having carried out the allocation within this arena, the same process can then be repeated for the arena of inclusion and confrontation” (Abbott 1996: 132). The structure of community participation within the arena of inclusion is broadly similar to that of consensus, but much simpler, both in respect of the working model and of the number of active elements. The activities which form the basis for community participation in the
arena of inclusion are much more strongly community-oriented than those operating in the
arena of consensus; external actors do not operate independently, but rather are aligned
either to the government or the community. This reduces the elements which are
applicable and thereby simplifies the structure. The essence of community participation in
the arena of inclusion is that there should be no distinction between the activity and the
community participation process. In other words, the activity is both a means (providing
an output in the form of a product) and an end in itself (community growth and
development). According to Abbott’s model, that these two should not be separable, but
rather operate in a symbiotic relationship; thereby avoiding the weakness associated with
Arnstein’s ladder where the continuum collapses in real field settings.

The basis of the community participation process in the last arena, confrontation,
defines the nature of relationship only between two actors, the government and the
community organisation, with the part played by the former being the central issue.
Participation in this arena is concerned not so much with involvement in the decision-
making process as with confrontation and control over it. If the needs of both actors differ
significantly and the government refuses to acknowledge the needs of the community,
such as land title acquisition, then the needs of the community stand in direct opposition
to the needs of the government and the project becomes the focus of a struggle for
power. The only avenue for people to express their needs in this situation is through
confrontation (Abbott 1996: 149). This confrontation is the arena in which successful
empowerment projects operate, but the political nature of the struggle, means that the
only way to achieve success is to unite large numbers of people which, in the absence of
conscription, means a focus on one specific activity. Therefore, the elements which go to
make up the components of the conceptual framework and the working model do not
apply in this arena.

Thus, the significance of Abbott’s model lies in its ability to accommodate large
numbers of the different variants of the participation process. Perhaps the most complex,
but also the most cohesive, is the participation process in the arena of consensus. With a
changing global economy and an increased awareness of the interaction between
development and the environment, an increased number of community-based activities can operate in this arena. But, unlike the two other operating arenas, there is no experience to date of the problems and constraints of operating in this environment (Abbott 1996: 151). Meanwhile, although the conceptual framework of Abbott provides the basis for choosing the appropriate arena, it does not detail how the transition to an effective implementation strategy will happen. Nor does it describe that strategy, which will be different for different arenas. However, the model reduces inter-related conflicts over resources and control, enables each actor to develop his/her own set of priorities, and emphasises the fact that a multi-level, multi objective intervention strategy can only begin with the core group of beneficiaries, and then slowly moves out to encompass sub-groups, identifying and enabling access to services for each sub-group as the process expands outwards.

Thus it can be concluded that what various concepts and approaches associated with community participation have in common is that 'gradual empowerment' is the only form of participatory development which can enable people to make their own geographies under conditions of their own choosing and human coexistence (Johnston et al. 1994), and to do so without threatening the regime in power (Mayfield 1996), or being perpetually vulnerable to the volatility of markets or the power of large-scale capitalist companies (Healey 1997). However, it is also argued that although this form of empowerment is transitional, it requires a process of concession from the state to allow a greater role of civil society to participate in the urban governance processes, enhance its political rights, and to apply democratic forms of citizen political participation in the policy-making process progressively. Meanwhile local government needs to regain its accountability gradually. These are the focus of Chapter 3, which investigates these challenges in the context of collaborative urban governance.
CHAPTER THREE

COLLABORATIVE URBAN GOVERNANCE

As early discussions revealed, although empowerment and participation as an end are commendable, they are quite complex processes which require strong, open and accountable local government institutions working in partnership with all interested parties to produce adequate policies and programmes for the development of human settlements. While the challenges facing national governments to strike a balance between the harsh ERASPs and their attempts to enhance decentralisation and establish autonomous local government seem overwhelming, the ability of local governments to improve public services through sustainable, collaborative, consensual and negotiated planning approaches becomes even more problematic. They are often criticised for poor performance, work apathy, institutional confusion, bureaucratic disdain for the public and widespread corruption, all of which constrain the freedom of urban communities. The establishment of good governance has therefore been identified as an overriding development goal and has become widely accepted as a critical element in securing stable economic development and an empowered civil society.

Good governance is envisaged by the World Bank (1995) as “the practice by political leadership of accountability, transparency, openness, predictability, and the rule of law- ... [but it] has been shown to be a virtual pre-requisite of the enabling environment for market-led economic growth”. However, the broader questions concern what types of economic policies, organisational systems, institutional performance, accountable local government and citizen-state relation are required, in real terms, to apply good and institutionalised governance that can involve citizen collaboration. Moreover, it is questionable as to what level of institutional capacity-building would be sustainable if the existing patterns of public sector behaviour are still tailored to maintain the status quo rather than productivity, let alone the definition of sustainability. In order to answer these questions in an objective manner, the discourses of governance and urban governance, including existing forms of citizen political participation in the policy-making in DCs and western countries, are reviewed below; the paradigm shift in urban planning towards
collaborative models of urban governance is discussed, and various approaches to
measure local government institutional performance following this paradigm shift are also
investigated. Two models of governance- namely ‘collaborative planning’ and ‘citizen
governance’ are commonly used to explain these issues. Although neither model is
specifically designed for DCs, they both recognise participation as the key to flourishing
in a complex and ever-changing world system. By analysing these substantive core
contexts, it is possible to conceptualise a pertinent framework, ‘accountable bureaucratic
capacity’, that can best be used to investigate local government accountability, citizen
political responsibilities, and the level of consensus capacity-building needed.

3.1- Urban governance:

Urban governance, which is defined as “an efficient and effective response to
urban problems by democratically elected and accountable local governments working in
partnership with civil society” (UNCHS 1999), implies political power being decentralised
with respect to relations both between the state and civil society and between different
levels of government. It is greatly improved when it is based on multi-stakeholder
strategic planning, participatory urban management and the promotion of civic values,
while democratic rules protect the public realm. Local authorities have a key role to play
in ensuring that these processes are put in place. The benefits of urban governance can
include economic efficiency, increased social equity, overall sustainability and improved
living conditions. However, because governance and urban governance are inextricably
linked, it is necessary to consider first the discourse of the former. Although governance
is defined abstractly as “the control of an activity by some means such that a range of
defined outcomes is attained” (Hirst and Thompson 1996: 184), some scholars argue that
good and workable definitions of governance have been difficult to find (McCarney 1996;
Turner and Hulme 1997). Most existing usage seems to fall into a trap; governance is
simply equated with government, focusing on the state side of the picture, which
concentrates on accountability, transparency and management and ignores the role of
groups in civil society in the governing relation.
Chapter 3  Collaborative Urban Governance

The World Bank, for instance, identifies four institutional and organisational key dimensions to governance: public sector management, accountability, the legal framework for development, and information and transparency (World Bank 1992) (Box 3.1). Clearly the implementation of such institutional and organisational dimensions usually requires a redesign of public policy and social provision; this is rarely done given the massive transformations in the global marketplace and the complexity and multiplicity of levels of types of governance, which characterise late twentieth-century capitalism and the new political world (Osborne and Geabler 1993).

Box 3.1: The World Bank key dimensions to governance

- **Public sector management**: Government must manage its financial and personnel resources effectively through appropriate budgeting, accounting, reporting systems and by rooting out inefficiency, particularly in the parastatal sector.

- **Accountability**: Public officials must be held responsible for their actions. This involves effective accounting and auditing, decentralisation, ‘micro-level accountability’ to consumers and a role for non-governmental organisations.

- **The legal framework for development**: A set of rules must be known in advance, and be enforced; conflicts must be resolved by independent judicial bodies and rules’ amending mechanisms when they no longer serve their purpose.

- **Information and transparency**: Information must be available on economic efficiency, as a means of preventing corruption, and to provide a basis for policy analysis and debate.

Source: Adapted from the World Bank (1992).

However, in the context of social change and the fear of its disintegration, the dominant challenge is not only to reform public policy, but to knit together the myriad institutions involved in the governing process and to enhance democratic processes (Jewson and MacGregor 1997: 6). Nonetheless, a distinctive and central element in modern politics remains the claim of the state to exclusive control of a definite territory. However, transformations in international economic relationships and the enhanced vigour of locally based social movements have, to some degree, challenged this claim and developed increasing demands for change in governance processes and the public sector performance through two concepts—‘good governance’ and ‘new public management (NPM)’, both aiming at setting the intellectual agenda for reform and change.
Although there are a variety of interpretations of the exact nature of good governance, a common core of ideas and a new orthodoxy have emerged (Moore 1993). This orthodoxy is promoted by focusing intellectual and political activity on the issue of good governance and, less subtly, by agencies attaching political conditionalities to loans and grants (Robinson 1993). The promotion of good governance in DCs has become a prime objective for many international DAs, and fundamental changes in political and administrative structures through the application of the ERSAPs have become a prerequisite to receiving aid. Despite fundamentally building on the World Bank’s key dimensions of institutionalised governance, the British DFID, for instance, places good governance in a broader participatory socio-political context and defines it through four main components: legitimacy, accountability, competence and human rights (ODA 1993) (Box 3.2).

Box 3.2: The DFID components of good governance

- **Legitimacy**: Government must consider the existence of participatory processes and the consent of those who are governed.
- **Accountability**: The political and official elements of government must be accountable for their actions, this requires the availability of information, freedom of the media, transparency of decision making, and the existence of mechanisms to call individuals and institutions to account.
- **Competence**: Government must be competent to formulate appropriate policies, make timely decisions, implement them effectively and deliver services.
- **Human rights**: Guaranteeing individual and group rights and security, and respecting the rule of law are indispensable measures to provide a framework for economic and social activity and to allow and encourage all individuals to participate.

Source: Adapted from ODA (1993).

The new public management concept (NPM), on the other hand, has been specifically tailored by DAs for DCs as a measure to improve their public sector performance. It aims basically to sweep away the traditional public administration paradigm that underpins their bureaucracies and apply instead new reform paradigms. Dunleavy and Hood (1994) identify five main ‘shifts’ in the move from public administration to the NPM. These are a) reworking budgets to be transparent in accountancy terms; b) viewing organisations as a chain of low-trust principal-agent relationships rather than fiduciary or trustee-beneficiary ones; c) disaggregating separable
functions into quasi-contractual or quasi-market forms; d) opening up provider roles to competition between agencies or between public agencies, firms and not-for-profit bodies; and e) decentralising provider roles to the minimum feasible sized agency. The proponents of the NPM often identify USA, UK and New Zealand as an example of this mode of administrative reform. However, the NPM has been criticised for its inability to tackle the fundamental problems underlying public sector performance in DCs, such as human error, poorly designed programmes, corruption and patronage. This critique points to the need to question whether NPM can change organisational culture, or whether the approach will be absorbed in rhetoric while previous practices persist (Turner and Hulme 1997).

This has shifted governance discourse to a new radical direction for change. Hiny Schachter (1997) addresses new paradigms of reform by contrasting two models—'reinventing government' and 'active citizenship'. The first has been developed by Osborne and Gaebler (1993) as a part of the 'march of history' and the 'global revolution'. Reinventing government places its foundation on 'entrepreneurial revolution' as a way of creating change through managerial technique. But this is viewed as a passive, mere managerial and consumerist model that limits the engagement of citizens in the decision making processes (Schachter 1997). In contrast, according to the 'active citizenship' model, people are engaged in deliberation to influence public-sector decision making, animated, at least in part, by concern for the public interest, a concept that each individual may define in a different way. “Active citizens shape the political agenda, they deliberate on the ends that governments should pursue as well as evaluating how well particular public-sector programmes work now” (Schachter 1997).

Evidently, there are a lot of similarity between Schachter's model of 'active citizenship' and Abbott's practical model of community participation process, discussed earlier. In fact, it can be argued that both models have actually based their essences on the new paradigm of urban planning, according to which urban governance is practised as a communicative participatory activity (Habermas 1987; Innes 1995; Forester 1989). However, let us establish first what are the existing forms of citizen political participation in the policy-making process (referred hereafter as forms of governance) in both DCs and
briefly in western countries, so that the nature of the paradigm shift required in urban planning, and the new forms of democratic governance, can be appreciated.

3.2- Present forms of governance:

Democratic forms of governance are not only encouraged in western countries, but also strongly urged upon DCs through the application of the ERSAPs. The general perception of governance forms in DCs is that there are fewer participants in the process of policy-making, and the official channels for political participation are more restricted, which frequently yield non-democratic forms of mobilising power including violent challenges to the government (Turner and Hulme 1997: 70). This is best understood through comparing two sets of policy change models, society-centred and state-centred, constructed by Grindle and Thomas (1991) and adapted by (Turner and Hulme 1997). While society-centred include models that focus on social class analysis, pluralism and public choice, state-centred include models the envisage rational actors, bureaucratic politics and state interests (Figure 3.1).

In society-centred models explanations are based in terms of the power relations between social groups such as classes and interest groups. The mechanisms of decision-making take a minor role. In contrast, state-centred analysis focuses on decision-making within the organisational context of the state. The decision-maker has considerably more capacity for choices, while societal constraints are less emphasised as investigators of debate, complex actor motivation or delve into organisational politics of the state. Therefore, Nordlinger (1987) argues that taking the state seriously still requires bringing statist and societal accounts of state autonomy together in mutually illuminating and analytically integrated ways. Although state-centred models provide wider chances for enhanced state-society relations, especially within the state-interests approach, the majority of DCs actually apply a form of governance which often combines the pluralism and the bureaucratic politics forms. The Head of state often acts as the princely arbiter of disputes, sometimes overruling the cabinet, while appointed or elected provincial rulers frequently influence the sovereignty of local councils.
Chapter 3 Collaborative Urban Governance

Figure 3.1: Forms of governance in developing countries

Social class analysis:
Characteristic of Marxist and dependency theory. Policy is the prerogative of the dominant metropolitan bourgeoisie. May incorporate some concessions to the subordinate classes.

Pluralism:
Adapted model of western democracy. Power is theoretically distributed among active societal groups and civil society, while the state acts as an arbiter in democratic competition responding to pressures from society.

Public choice:
Similar to pluralism, but seems irrational because organised interest groups or individuals obtain preferment from the state and facilitate access to public goods and regulations. The poor lose unless they articulate their interests.

Rational actors:
Actors (whether persons, governments or interest groups) behave as rational choosers between alternative actions. Involves idealistic sequence of goals, objectives and priorities which are difficult to achieve in the real world.

Bureaucratic politics:
Decision-making model in which public officials engage in politics, co-opt or compromise to secure desired policy outcomes. Constant conflict over policy options as power is concentrated and subject to personal idiosyncrasies.

State interests:
Macro-political neo-Marxist model in which the state acts autonomously against dominant classes in defining the nature of public problems and developing solutions. Local government-society pursue collective interests.

Source: Author - Adapted from Grindle and Thomas (1991); Turner and Hulme (1997).

Democratic forms of governance in many DCs, such as parliaments and congresses, are typically closed or shorn of power, regime opponents may be imprisoned, the media are tightly controlled and citizen mobilisation is at the behest of the state (Turner and Hulme 1997). Of course this is inveterate; imperious public servants, army intervention in politics or prolonged authoritarian military regimes have been common forms of political reign in a great many DCs, which are far from constituting a homogenous society. The implication of these forms of governance in the context of urban reproduction is that while a large number of under-qualified decision-makers are frequently co-opted by the state through a systematic organisation of patron-clientelism and nepotism in exchange for their faithfulness (Lowder 1989; Schenk 1989), they often appoint inexperienced practitioners to be in charge of urban planning, who fail to promote
any democratic developmental policies. Thus, elites are loath to thrust authority on those below them, and those below are unaccustomed to accept responsibility.

On the other hand, there are basically four forms of western governance, which have been adopted interchangeably by different governments at different phases of the modernisation process. These are representative democracy, pluralist democracy, corporatism, and clientelism (Figure 3.2). While most state-centred scholars have tended to focus on national institutions (national legislatures, central bureaucracies, political party systems- embedded in representative democracy and corporatism), most society-centred models have focused on the pluralistic perspectives (interest groups and lobbyists) or a Marxist perspective (class-based interests) in demonstrating the dominance of various societal/political forces in the governance process (Mayfield 1996: 17).

Figure 3.2: Forms of governance in western countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Existing forms of governance as reflected in regulation, allocation and justification</th>
<th>Source: Author- Adapted from Healey (1997); Mayfield (1996) and Box (1998).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Representative democracy:**  
Idealistic model of a democratic state, in which governments are created on behalf of, and at the service of citizens as electors. Practitioners report to politicians who, in turn, are answerable to citizens through the ballot box. |
| **Pluralist democracy:**  
Mindful of diversified interest groups. Although politicians are also elected through the ballot box, they have an enhanced role to act as arbiters among different groups rather than to articulate the public interest (politics of voice). |
| **Corporatism:**  
Neo-elite realistic version of representative democracy and pluralism. Based on 'shared power', specially among powerful interest groups, e.g. trade unions and major businesses. Intensifies partnership and stable consensus. |
| **Clientelism:**  
Ever-present form of governance. Allocation and distribution of resources are based on reciprocal relations of obligation. In return for a vote and other favours, patrons (politicians and practitioners) direct resources to clients. |

According to representative democracy, citizens elect their representatives, the politicians, who are in turn responsible for articulating the 'public interest' and overseeing the work of practitioners and public administrators. Governance is thus focused on the institutions of formal government, and carried out with the assistance of hierarchically-
structured bureaucracies. Municipal officials justify their actions and decisions upwards to their superiors and the politicians to whom they are accountable, rather than outwards to citizens (Healey 1997: 221). This model is hardly applicable in the real world because it presumes that society is homogenous and all citizens are politically active, while in reality politicians do not aggregate all citizens’ interest on every issue, not all citizens participate, and officials are often subject to all kinds of influences in all areas of governance. Conversely, interest diversity is recognised in the model of pluralist democracy, which presupposes a society is composed of many different groups and interests, which compete to define the government’s agenda of action. As within DCs, western politicians in pluralist democracies spend less effort on articulating the public interest than on arbitrating between different interest groups. Pluralist democracy produces a ‘politics of voice’ in which competing claims and groups are encouraged to articulate their concern in adversarial forms as fixed interests and preferences (Healey 1997: 223). However, the model of pluralist democracy has been criticised for its assumption that all groups are relatively equal in the competitive game; in reality, this model has resulted in creating political lobbyists and social discrepancy in which preoccupied citizens say ‘no’ to any proposal coming from the government or any other group (Forester 1989; Mayfield 1996). In cities, the role of planners has thus transformed from experts into mediators between competitors and arguing for particular qualities of local environments, which raised major problems of ethics and legitimacy (Healey 1997: 224).

In trying to excise these weaknesses of pluralist democracy, corporatism recognises that governments are far from being an egalitarian ‘politics of voice’, but rather the creatures of, responder to, a few powerful interests- referred to as a neo-elite version of democracy (Harding 1995). At all levels of governance- national, regional or local, a form of collaboration between government, major business organisations and the trades unions is routinely practised to determine and prioritise the public interest in a ‘shared power’ process (Mayfield 1996). It has been argued that the corporatism model has many advantages. It can develop and deliver a stable consensus, co-ordinates various dimensions of governance, enables long-term horizons to override the ebb and flow of
political majorities, allows ‘mutual learning’ among all partners, and avoids the kind of adversarial competitive politics embedded in the pluralist approaches, which have developed in the US, the UK and Australia (Healey 1997: 225). While the corporatism model is widely practised in Europe, apart from the UK, and most notably in Germany and the Netherlands, representative democracy and corporatism are, however, “the models most associated with apparatus of the modernist, managerial state by post-modern critiques” (Healey 1997: 231).

Although the last western form of governance, clientelism, involves an interactive relationship between politicians and government officials, the processes of implementation are highly politicised; it does so in particularistic hidden ways based on personal and social networks in which elected politicians and officials become critical gatekeepers in managing, allocating and distributing resources (Grindle and Thomas 1991: 66). The model of clientelism is based on a system of reciprocal relations of obligation. In return for a vote and other favours, patrons (politicians and elected mayors) dole out resources to their clients (family members and friends), e.g. through access to government funds, land, binding regulations or tolerance of illegal building (Healey 1997: 229). It lacks a developmental agenda and is thus deeply conservative. The patronage structure embedded in clientelistic governance both reflects and reinforces the existing power relations of political communities. Although this type of governance has been long practised in Southern Italy, it is also widely associated with relatively weak and/or post-colonial governments world-wide. However, it has been argued that various forms of governance, in both western or DCs, still lack inclusionary ways of collaboration, consensus-building and explicit efforts to generate and maintain the structural framing of our contemporary societies, given the diverse interests and cultural backbases in our differentiated societies (Walzer 1995; McCarney 1996; Healey 1997; Friedman and Douglas 1998). This has focused attention in search for new models of collaborative governance.

3.3- Collaborative models of governance:

The evolving forms of democratic governance are based on the paradigm shift in urban planning in which collaborative urban governance is seen as a necessity for any
institutional change or restructuring of society, where culture and identity have been
reinterpreted and people have come to see the natural environment as something more
than a resource or a setting for human action (Forester 1996; Sandercock 1998). In trying
to develop the 'representative democracy' approach of governance further, collaborative
models of urban governance invoke the argument that governance is not just the province
of the state, but rather it includes a wide range of activities. As a result of the continuing
urban economic crisis and the binary split between the 'localist' and 'globalist'
approaches, urban governance has now moved beyond the often simplistic suppositions of
the 1980s (Graham 1995: 88). Renewed interest in theorising the continued significance
of subnational territories within a seemingly ever more closely integrated global economy
has shifted the paradigm from reinvigorating the theory of agglomeration (Scott 1986), to
tracing the 'new regionalism' produced from re-scaling of political process (Keating
1997), and the autonomous institutional capacities of regions to organise for economic

In view of the latter, the proponents of the institutionalised performance of urban
governance are now concerned about how to give various stakeholders a voice in
planning through the creation of new constitutions and institutions that provide citizens
with the necessary empowerment. Associative democracy (Amin and Thrift 1995),
interactive governance (Amin and Hausner 1997), collaborative planning (Healey 1997),
and citizen governance (Box 1998) have each found favour as possible formulations of a
'third way' between market-based and centrally-planned forms of economic and political
governance (Giddens 1998). The two models of 'collaborative planning' and 'citizen
governance', in particular, agree that planning is a policy-driven, co-ordinative,
knowledge-rich, and future-oriented approach to urban governance. Although both
models completely reject the pluralist and clientelistic forms of governance, they
acknowledge the existing forms of 'representative democracy' and 'corporatism', in that
they can provide a stable consensus around which policy programmes can develop, as
well as a way of developing a 'unitary' conception of the 'public interest' with which to
develop policy direction. However, 'representative democracy' and 'corporatism' are also
criticised for they tend to operate in rigid hierarchical ways: "They encourage a separation of policy development and delivery from the arenas of political argumentation. They involve a narrow range of interests in the processes of governance, either through the representation of elected politicians or a partnership with business" (Healey 1997: 231).

In search for an alternative form of urban governance, Healey (1997) proposes a new framework for 'spatial and environmental planning', referred to as the transformative power praxis in development, which is rooted in institutional realities and centres on forging new discourses between different groups, agencies and individuals in fragmented societies as a way of planning and making sense together while living differently. Drawing mainly on institutionalist sociology, regional economics, and the communicative approach to planning theory, Healey aims at applying a new understanding to contemporary participatory planning and policy making. Focusing on the writings of the sociologist Anthony Giddens (1984; 1990) and the philosopher Jurgen Habermas (1987), Healey develops Giddens' theory of structuration, thereby playing a major role in the developed institutionalist approach, as it expounds the argument that individuals are neither fully autonomous nor automatons. Structuring forces in society shape our actions but we can also shape those structuring forces. This has obvious application to spatial planning, as Healey points out, which in this conception becomes an effort in shaping or framing the webs of relationships through which people give value and take actions with respect to their related places and symbolic/institutionalised organisation. In the urban upgrading context, this refers to the processes through which squatters can participate in a collective dialogue to construct their imaginary transformed place and reconstruct/enhance their own sense of identity. The transformative power praxis and the proposed 'collaborative planning' framework argue that urban governance has traditionally been 'trapped' inside a modernist instrumental rationalism for many years without recognising the links between the ways people live their lives, nor did it recognise the operation of systems of local and national governance and the planning decisions that shape our built environment. This places fundamental principles of 'good' urban upgrading practice and promoting active
and representative citizen participation in which community members can meaningfully influence decisions that affect their lives.

Box (1998) has also attempted to develop a ‘citizen governance’ model which serves the public and, in its ideal form, strengthens the professionalism of development practitioners in USA. The thrust of this model is the argument that the way to find the development practices best suited to the community is to use the principles of governance, i.e. scale, democracy, accountability, and rationality, as a primary guide. The three basic actors in citizen governance are the governing bodies, citizens, and practitioners. The model attempts to change their roles: the citizens from outsiders to decision makers, the governing bodies from representative of elite interests to legislators responsive to the needs of the whole community, while practitioners are the experts (Box 1998). To do this, a Co-ordinating Council, a Citizen’s Board and a Helper are needed. The function of the Co-ordinating Council is to move elected governing bodies from a ‘central decision making’ role to a ‘citizen’s co-ordinating’ role, delegating power to citizen boards, hearing their recommendations and affirming or modifying their work to fit overall community goals. The Citizen’s Board, on the other hand, is responsible for creating citizen advisory boards to assist in administering major local government functions, such as utilities, public works and social services, while the Helper aims basically to change the role of public service practitioners from controlling public bureaucracies to assisting citizens in understanding community issues and services, helping them to make informed decisions about public programmes, and carrying out daily tasks of implementation (Box 1998: 164).

Although there are important differences in the origin and emphasis of Healey’s ‘collaborative planning’ and Box’s ‘citizen governance’ models, there are also some important similarities. For instance, both place the building of institutional capacity and the inclusive involvement of all relevant stakeholders in the governance processes, through the setting up of new systems and policy-making procedures, at the centre of their democratic transformative power praxis. In doing so, both models try to avoid converting societies into a legal morass of litigation and target, instead, gradual and
systematic institutional change through creating new structures that can consider the full range of stakeholders’ rights and duties, build links which can foster social learning, and encourage practices in a public realm of multi-cultural confrontations.

Recent debates in planning theory, that emphasise a ‘dark side to institutional interactions and social actions’, have nevertheless criticised both the ‘idealistic visions’ of communicative participatory activity, including ‘optimistic’ normative models, such as ‘collaborative planning’ and ‘citizen governance’, as well as some of the key-dimensions of urban governance, such as democratisation and participatory urban management (Flyvbjerg 1998; Yiftachel 1998). Such Theorists draw upon a tradition which dates back to Machiavelli to show how the widespread presence of ‘realpolitics’ and Machiavellian behaviour may belie or distort communicative action. With their emphasis on the potential asymmetry that exists between power and rationality in the real world, the opponents of collaborative urban governance argue that the distorting effects of power are more pervasive than the effects of rationality, a situation which is more likely to occur in the context of DCs planning. One important product of power, as it is exercised by individual stakeholders and apparent in the structuring of social action with collaborative governance, is the presence of ‘strategic direction’ as an ‘ideal’ and benign form of direction. Amin and Hausner (1997: 17) strongly criticise such a ‘strategic guidance’ and depict it as “a mixture of highly diffused and reflexive governance capability resulting in inter-institutional overlap and contact ... and forms of leadership in which the main task is not to dominate but to guide, arbitrate and facilitate”. However, they also acknowledge two less benign forms of direction- namely ‘hegemony’ (structural dominance) and ‘leadership’ (formally constituted hierarchical power)- which may, in fact, run the risk of becoming a democracy of, and for, the powerful and thus promoting associative forms of urban governance in the long-term (Phelps and Tewdwr-Jones 1999).

A similar critique against another one of the main essences of urban governance, sustainability, is raised by Marcuse (1998), who argues that sustainability, acting as a concept and a slogan, has been both an honourable goal for carefully defined purposes and a camouflaged trap for the well-intentioned unwary. Marcuse argues that
sustainability and social justice do not necessarily go hand in hand in a collaborative governance process because sustainability encourages several forms of unjust status quo world-wide resulting in many bad programmes being sustainable, e.g. owned and operated public housing and/or forcible evictions without due process of law. Thus sustainability should not be considered as a goal for a housing or urban programme, but as a constraint whose presence may limit the usefulness of a good programme.

While sustainability may be a useful formulation of goals on environmental issues, it is a treacherous one for urban governance since it suggests the possibility of a conflict-free consensus on policies whereas vital interests do conflict in the real world (Marcuse 1998; Abbott 1996). Indeed, sustainability, as a process which provides services that people want and need (Mayfield 1996: 232), takes more than simply better knowledge and a clearer understanding to produce change (Marcuse 1998). It requires inputs and resources that are available over an extended period of time, and is based on organisational/management systems which are compatible and relevant to the political, economic, social, and cultural realities in which they function. Finally, sustainability/institutionalisation requires an awareness of how capital costs to provide new services might be obtained, as well as how recurrent costs for present activities will be financed in the future. Only then, can sustainability imply the ability not only to formulate and operate a desirable urban programme, but also to see it continue without detracting from others (Marcuse 1998); thus the concept may usefully emphasise the importance of long-term practicality of such programmes.

3.4- The local government context:

In a global context of profound change, many countries in DCs are engaged in processes of decentralisation of state structures and functions, and trying to initiate critical transitional steps to democratisation as a part of their ERSAPs. Yet, issues of community participation have raised a large number of questions regarding the role of local government, its accountability and performance, in the urban governance processes. These concern the structure best suited for a responsive local government, the services expected from it, the locus of greatest power and control in communities, the roles that
citizens, elected representatives and practitioners can play to increase their effective participation, and the level of institutional capacity-building which leads to greatest efficiency.

While outlining the challenges that confront DCs in their quest for economic reform is a relatively easy task, it is a far more difficult task to assess the capacity of their bureaucracies to meet those challenges and to implement the institutional and structural adjustment parts of reform (McCarney 1996). There are limitations to national government and civil society action, limitations of competence and resources, resulting from the increased reluctance of the public to allow government control over their lives (Turner and Hulme 1997). Along with the inefficiencies of large-scale social welfare programmes and scepticism about government’s ability to administer its programmes competently, the shortage of resources, especially access to legal land and basic infrastructure, has led citizens to expect less from their national governments and to turn instead toward their own community organisations and/or local governance entities as the focus of their problem-solving efforts. This has placed pressure on governments to strengthen the capacities and performance of local government, and to reinforce measures to ‘eradicate’ corruption and ensure greater transparency, efficiency, accountability, responsiveness and community participation in the management of local resources (UNCHS 1997).

Some research has argued that small and responsive local government means government shaped in response to citizen desires for lean and effective governments; government that is less intrusive into private lives, delivers services according to citizens’ requirements and does so in a user-friendly manner rather than as a ponderous bureaucracy (Grindle and Thomas 1991; McCarney 1996; Healey 1997; Box 1998). Meanwhile, as a result of the economic restructuring of local economies and deep-seated changes in the machinery of government at both local and national levels, public-private partnership is now widely accepted as a new entrepreneurial form of local government that entails new styles of management and accounting for public finance (Jewson and MacGregor 1997). This new public sense, along with the application of ERSAPs, yielded
many other measures, i.e. privatisation of public services, entrepreneurialism in public management, total quality management and customer service orientation. Although all of these measures share the same values of partnership, including self-reliance, individual liberty, and creating responsive local government, not all of them are useful in all situations (Box 1998). Habitat’s agenda for capacity-building and institutional development, for instance, encourages local governments in DCs to establish a specific kind of partnership, ‘partnership for urban innovation’, that can promote policy dialogue among all levels of government, the private and community sectors, and other representatives of civil society (UNCHS 1997). Theoretically, Habitat argues that this kind of partnership can analyse, evaluate and disseminate information.

Partnership and good performance of local government are, indeed, crucial for the prosperity of any society. But, in reality some local governments in DCs are facing profound challenges not only as a result of the shifting global context, but also due to an internal bureaucratic culture which impedes efficiency. There is a persistent myth or perhaps naïve assumption that policies made by DAs or politicians are implemented rationally by public servants, as if implementation is something utterly simple and automatic (Turner and Hulme 1997). While politicians and bureaucrats are active in promulgating this myth in order to remain in control, the reality is somewhat different and, therefore, the end product is often undesirable. Many examples stemming from different DCs’ cities reveal that sporadic joint-ventures to reform local governments have failed simply because the reform policies did not consider the existing performance levels of newly empowered local governments, enmeshed in a post-colonial bureaucratic culture, which set the real norms of bureaucratic performance (Choguill 1987; McCarney 1996; Mayfield 1996; Opeskin 1996; Randel and German 1997). It is difficult for such local governments, established along traditional lines to regulate, administer and manage the local environment and the delivery of services, to operate within a non-traditional city built largely outside of any regulatory framework (McCarney 1996). Local government performance and accountability are more than just a technical or administrative milieu, and more than just a reformed bureaucratic structure with new autonomous powers and
functions. This dictates both a better understanding of local government capacity, performance and a reconsideration of its accountability.

3.5- Accountable bureaucratic capacity:

Performance is a slippery concept (Jackson 1995). How do we know improved performance if it is claimed, and what are the critical measures of success? There is a broad agreement in the literature that it is multidimensional, and that there is no single ideal indicator (Carter 1991; World Bank 1992; Jackson 1995). While some disciplines may only point in one direction, political judgement frequently trades one indicator off against other, e.g. service supply economy as against efficiency. But if dimensions of performance cannot be measured, there is nothing to trade off (Jackson 1995: 2). Therefore, performance measurement still stands at the cross-roads of many of the 'big issues'. It is not a simple technocratic exercise. Any serious treatment of performance measurement needs to get beyond discussion of the adequacy of the measures themselves. It should confront the problems of what local government should be doing; whose values are to count in a value-for-money audit; how conflicting values can be reconciled; and establishing the critical factors for success. The key question is: how accountable democratic local government can be designed to ensure that appropriate incentives exist to assure high performance. Value-for-money is, in fact, more than just ensuring financial propriety (Jackson 1995: 2). It brings with it assurance and hence confidence in the functioning of the system of local government, a trust that resources are being allocated to those issues that the majority of the electorate care about- even to those areas that represent minority interests.

The quest for improvement in public sector performance has been a long one embracing the personnel, the organisation and methods of local government offices, focusing on what government can properly and successfully do, and how it can do it with the utmost possible efficiency and with the least possible money or energy (Jackson 1995). Today the debate continues; what activities and functions should be done by local government and what functions are better done by civil society and a private sector partnership. The fact that these issues remain contentious and unresolved does not reflect
the lack of wit on the part of public policy analysts. Rather, the allocation of functions to government reflects ideological preferences. Jackson (1995) argues that there is no long-run stability in the dominant ideological view, so the issue is continuously debated. Moreover, changes in technology have resulted in changes in the comparative advantages of the market and the institution of government in delivering services. This is reflected in the new wave of contracting out and the notion of government as an ‘enabler’ rather than absolute ‘supplier’ (World Bank 1992).

No longer is it necessary for local government to produce all the services that it provides. Rather, it must ensure that services are provided to a predetermined specification based on citizen’s need. Whether or not local government acts as an enabler, it is also charged with the responsibility of assuring that its budgets give value for money. The phrase ‘value for money’ is imprecise but is generally thought to refer to the performance of public sector departments and agencies. The quest for ‘value for money’ in local government has stimulated the spread of performance measure systems. Such systems contain sets of performance indicators (PIs) constructed to provide information on the various dimensions of performance, commonly referred to as the ‘Three Es’: Economy, Efficiency and Effectiveness. These have been defined by Jackson and Palmer (1989) and adapted by Jackson (1995) (Box 3.3).

Box 3.3: Indicators of bureaucratic performance (the ‘Three Es’).

| Economy: | The terms and conditions under which an organisation acquires human and material resources; an economical organisation acquires these resources in appropriate quantity and quality and at least cost. It is concerned with minimising the cost of resources acquired or used, having regard to appropriate quality; thus ‘spending less’. |
| Efficiency: | The relationship between the goods and services produced and the resources used to produce them; an efficient organisation produces the maximum output for any given set of resource inputs, or minimises the inputs necessary to produce a given quality and quantity of outputs. How far is maximum output achieved for a given input, or minimum input used for a given output; ‘spending well’. |
| Effectiveness: | The extent to which the defined task or work programme has been accomplished in relation to overall aims. It is concerned with the relationship between the intended results and the actual results of projects, programmes, or other activities. How successfully do outputs of goods, services or other results achieve policy objectives, operational goals and other intended effects; ‘spending wisely’. |

Source: Jackson (1995).
Although the concepts of economy, efficiency and effectiveness are often employed by local governments to define performance, such a narrow view can limit discussions of performance largely to the cost of providing public services. Public sector performance means different things to different groups. It reflects the variety of values placed upon the activity of government. Performance measurement cannot and should not be reduced to the metric of the cost accountant. No one would dispute that whatever it is that the local government does, it should do so at least cost for maximum output and quality. That is axiomatic. What remains an issue is what activities government should perform. Discussions of performance cannot be separated from those involving the design of democratic institutions. Such institutions need to resolve the conflicts of interests and values surrounding public services (Jackson 1995). Introduction of performance measures and indicators can quickly result in a reduction in commitment, or loss of a sense of vocation and morale. The notions of public service duty have tended to be superseded by the charge that all public sector bureaucracy is naturally inefficient and must be tightly controlled. Performance measures are then seen as an instrument of control.

In a similar vein, the types of PIs most frequently collected by institutions relate to costs, volume of service, utilisation rates, time targets and productivity. Such indicators are relatively simple to quantify. Indicators of quality of services, customers' satisfaction and the achievement of goals appear less often, if at all. This imbalance is frequently noted in the literature on performance measurement (Pollitt 1986; Jackson 1988; and Carter 1991). Authorities, perhaps not surprisingly, concentrate on measuring what is easily measurable and this often results in a bias towards measuring performance in terms of economy and efficiency, rather than effectiveness (Palmer 1995: 91). It is therefore necessary to review local government against a wider spectrum as well. This leads us to the second dimension of the institutionalisation and reform processes—namely local government accountability.

The concept of local government' accountability is frequently used in the literature by governments, DAs, and the plethora of development studies programmes world wide, but without clear explanation of what precisely is meant. One view is that it refers to the
public's confidence in their local government institution; it is mindful of local needs and liable for the money it collects or receives, the services it provides, its public spending, and for the consequences of its actions in general (Korten 1996). Another interpretation discusses local government accountability more widely to include its structural setting up, bureaucratic 'Three Es', staffing conditions and inter-organisational co-operation, not only with other agencies and departments of government but also the private and community sectors including local NGOs and civil society (Peltenburg et al. 1996; Jackson 1995; Healey 1997; Mayfield 1996).

Based on the above-mentioned substantive core contexts, it is possible to conceptualise an explanatory framework in order to examine local government accountability and the level of institutional capacity-building needed through a checklist of analytical variables. The proposed framework, accountable bureaucratic capacity, argues that local government performance is, in fact, a function of four key-dimensions: structural and organisational variables (decentralised setting up, work environment and training to enable municipal officials to be motivated and work well); behavioural variables (worker morale, and committed individuals who are self-motivated and creative or ready to learn); client-interaction variables (bureaucratic respect for the public and fair citizen representation within popular local councils); and environment variables—economic, political and public—(which place equal and shared responsibility not only among central and local governments, but also lay stress on the responsibility of the public to participate in the political life) (Figure 3.3).

Of course it would be unrealistic to expect it to be easy to achieve all aspects of this 'rational' institutional concept in DCs' cities late-capitalism. This is not to support the arguments of the 'dark side', discussed earlier, but to assume, as Healey (1997) argues, that a complex and interconnected strategy-making process could build on social goals by analytical routines based on empirical inquiry, observations and deductive logic. Thus, whilst goals express the most desirable ends of strategies, analysis works out the most appropriate means. Nonetheless, the proposed institutional framework, accountable bureaucratic capacity, stresses equal emphasis on the necessity of analysing the hard
infrastructure side of local governance (criteria-driven policy measures, i.e. rights, rules, resources and competence), the consensus-building which concentrates on both the soft infrastructure (governance style) as well as governance efficiency, and the participatory bases which, in addition to both, emphasises the style of reasoning and the construction of citizen’s rights with respect to process. The framework examines the extent to which the form of local government is open to the urban governance process, permitting partnership, and encouraging higher levels of citizen political participation throughout DCs.

Figure 3.3: Responsive and accountable local government framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accountable Bureaucratic Capacity</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Structural organisational</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Decentralised allocation of functions, resources and responsibilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Institutional creation based on cultural adaptation oriented setting up.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Clarity of governing jurisdictions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Hierarchical authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Recruitment and staffing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Formal communication and co-ordination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Proper work environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Training and promotion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Behavioural cultural</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Drive and innovation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Flexibility and self-motivation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Career satisfaction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Commitment to responsibilities rather than evasion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Obliterate servility and obsequiousness to work superiors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Reduce elite bias, patron-clientalism and nepotism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Client-interaction</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Build confidence and rapport with the masses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Expunge corruption, red-tape and inequity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Reduce intrusion into private lives.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Fair citizen representation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Disburse information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Partnership with civil society and private sector.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Environment</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Economic: appropriate staff pay and incentives, inflation and resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Political: bureaucratic efficiency rather than a welfare system; clarity of priorities and autonomy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Public: enhance citizens’ political participation and reduce dependency on government to supply all services.</td>
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The criteria-driven measures are grounded in the structural organisational variables of the ‘accountable bureaucratic capacity’ framework. These are seen as the means of achieving the four institutional dimensions to good governance and NPM-namely legitimacy, accountability, competence and human rights. Theoretically speaking, the criteria-driven approach assumes that governments have the legitimacy to make policies in which a set of regulatory criteria and performance targets are designed to encourage the efficient achievement of objectives (Wolman *et al.* 1994). This approach has developed as a response to the neo-liberal ideology and the limitation of market and
social behaviour in contemporary urban societies. The objective has been to devolve as much of the delivery of collective activities, "from research and development to rubbish collection, to private or semi-private agencies, and to constrain these through a mixture of regulatory structures and financial incentives" (Healey 1997: 232). However, the criteria-driven approach tends to construct policies based on the monetary values of the 'Three Es' and performance indicators, which are not likely to be shared in the political communities for which such policies are designed. Thus, although these forms of hard infrastructure and formal rules are necessary to (re)establish effective urban governance institutions in DCs, they cannot lead per se to an accountable bureaucratic capacity; they must be complemented with a set of soft infrastructure and consensus-building, as well as considering partnership with civil society.

The consensus-building embedded in the accountable bureaucratic capacity framework emphasises that reviewing institutional performance and accountability in a frequent manner is crucial to restore control of productive assets to local people and communities on which their livelihoods depend. It is also essential before endeavouring to prepare any capacity-building strategy as an integral part of strategic development. Accountability variables go beyond a single-focused aspect of consensus capacity-building, e.g. training or equipment supply, to ensure that local government institutions are able to support individuals by giving them responsibility, freedom to act, adequate respect, pay, and work conditions, which encourage motivation and energy. The objectives of such multiple consensus-building are the promotion of national human resource development policies and strategies for urban management and development, which can ensure that local government service gradually becomes a profession of respect. Building institutional capacity in urban governance means transforming, creating and mobilising the 'institutional capital' of a place in the collective effort of shaping the future localities (Peltenburg et al. 1996; Healey 1997). Thus a key attribute of consensus-building is its openness to employ the existing webs of formal and informal relations (soft infrastructure), including stakeholders' networks, knowledge resources, trust, norms and
ways of thinking and acting, which are embedded in urban governance structures and stemmed from the various ideas of 'social capital'.

Institutional capacity refers to the ability of urban governance to make a difference in transforming cities through ways that expand stakeholder involvement and shape the driving forces affecting life chances, economic opportunities and environmental qualities (Healey 1997). Capacity-building is part of the new paradigm in planning, it aims to enable all actors involved to perform effectively, efficiently and sustainability, both in doing their own job and in working in collaboration with other partners (Wakely 1996). This goes beyond just the formal organisation and technical skills of agencies involved in governance; it encompasses also the more intangible 'governance cultures' of places, the degree of interdependency between the various nodes of business and social life, and the density and quality of the relationships between these. It hence embraces all the issues of empowerment, enabling, decentralisation, partnership, privatisation, deregulation and accountable bureaucratic capacity (Figure 3.4).

Figure 3.4: Capacity-building definition, actions and targets of local strategy

- Encompasses the country's human, technological, organisational, institutional and resource capabilities.
- Evaluates and addresses the crucial questions related to policy choices and modes of implementation among development options.
- Enhances the performance of local governments.

Source: Author— Adapted from UNCHS (1997); Wakely (1996) and Peltenburg et al. (1996).

The cornerstone of the UNCHS (Habitat) Capacity-Building Strategy is the strengthening of national and local institutions for human resource development,
facilitating policy-development dialogue, dissemination of useful practices, societal awareness-building and civic education (UNCHS 1997). Many clients can benefit from capacity-building programmes, e.g. communities, civil society organisation, private commercial sector and central government entities. However, the focus here is on local governments. Municipal capacity-building refers hereafter to a process that involves value added instructions, the training of municipal officials, activities with multiplier effects, and networking to improve urban management performance through the accountable bureaucratic capacity framework. This could be supplied by DAs, NGOs or the national government. Although Figure 3.4 proposes a set of actions for local capacity-building strategy, it is worth noting that the needs for capacity-building are always changing; there are no ready solutions, and any programme must be appropriate for the local situation and organisation.

The last strand of the proposed framework, participatory bases, suggests that accountable bureaucratic capacity should warrant a type of inclusionary discursive local government that could enhance participatory development in a practical way through a collaborative form of governance, in which citizens are in the driver’s seat. Hence, the environment variables embedded in the proposed framework, economic, political and public, place equal responsibility on central and local governments as well as on the public to participate in political life through the ballot box and open council sessions. As assumed in the model of a pluralist democracy, all members of society and territorial political communities have a right to make a claim for attention. Clearly, such claims for attention require collaborative action by civil society activists and community representatives (public environment), while the local government has to be willing to listen. However, as discussed earlier, there will be times in any participatory approach in reality when the process is top-down and led entirely by outsiders resulting in possible resistance and protests, and times when citizens themselves initiate aspects of the project and even manipulate the implementing agency.
3.6- Theoretical basis:

Having conceptualised a framework that can be used for examining local government accountability, including the level of consensus capacity-building required, a theoretical base is still needed that can a) link it with society/individual involvement in the urban governance process, and b) predict possible conflictual modes of participation associated with development in the real field. Sharp and Bath (1993: 213) argue that citizens' political participation or quiescence are still not well articulated in the urban governance debate. Little attention has been given to the development of theory that accounts not only for citizen mobilisation but also for whether it is manifested in conflictual or collaborative activity with governance: “most theories point to what it is that activates citizens rather than what predicts the direction (valence) of their activation or the quality and effects of their participation”.

Sharp and Bath (1993) have developed a theory that highlights the importance of the community's need for development (jobs, growth and prosperity) and the individual's need to be protected from the negative consequences of growth or development initiatives, such as congestion and displacement. Developmental participation theory recognises the potential conflicts between one's need as a member of the collectivity and one's individual needs. This provides bases for predicting the specific form that citizen participation in economic development may be expected to take. Developmental participation theory is based on ideological syllogism; it posits that, a) if political awareness is sufficiently high, and b) contingent upon the mediating effects of institutional arrangements such as reformism, governmental fragmentation, citizen participation arrangements, and quasi-public development bodies, c) the propensity for and character of citizen participation in economic development is a function of community and individual needs in the developmental sphere (Sharp and Bath 1993: 223). The theory acknowledges that when a community is economically distressed, everyone has a strong stake in making the community more economically competitive. In contrast, when the community is prosperous, conflict over economic development is likely to be more sustained; commitment to further development initiatives is more limited and the transformation into
collaboration is more unlikely. Hence, need might be understood to refer to the stakes that particular types of citizens have in a government’s developmental policy initiatives. Peterson (1981) characterises these stakes as collective in nature and tied to the economic competitiveness of the city.

The four mediating institutional arrangements on which the developmental participation theory builds must be analysed because of their bearing on the ability to mobilise citizens around developmental issues. They mediate the effects of need and awareness on political mobilisation. These are metropolitan governmental organisation, reformed or unreformed institutions of local government, citizen involvement in local governance, and public authorities and similar quasi-public entities. Theory with respect to the first of these is, in fact, an application of microeconomic theory to the metropolitan realm. The essential insights of the theory with respect to political participation are preserved, intact, in a political economy theory that serves as a challenge to metropolitan reform traditions (Sharp and Bath 1993: 219). The political economist’s theory predicts that political participation is greater in a fragmented metropolitan area than in a more centralised metropolitan area (Ostrom 1984). Citizens tend to find the larger and more hierarchical organisations of a unified metropolitan government less accessible and less understandable.

Second, theory with respect to the impact of the reform institutions on political participation is largely derived from interpretations of the logical implications of the reform movement. These include the presumption that citizen participation will, over all, be lower in reformed than in unreformed settings, because the depoliticisation of local affairs through non-partisanship and at-large elections short-circuits the avenues for mobilisation of the public by politicians, and because the reform institutions of merit selection and professional administration delegitimise citizen involvement in the administrative side of governance (Welch and Bledsoe 1988). Third, theory with respect to citizen involvement in local governance argues that cities have introduced a variety of organisational arrangements for citizen access to local government decision making in part because of the legacy of federally mandated citizen participation requirements and in
part because of the need to counterbalance the unresponsive tendencies of reformism (Sharp 1990). Such arrangements ranged from citizen boards to broad-casting of city council meetings to municipal ombudsmen. Increased use of initiative and referenda at the sub-national level has focused attention on these institutional arrangements of direct democracy (Caves 1992). While it is theoretically argued that such institutional arrangements enhance citizen participation, particularly of the electoral and protest type, empirical research suggests that development policy activity of local government is only responsive to fiscal stress when institutional arrangements for citizen access to development policy-making are more elaborate (Sharp 1990).

The last mediating institutional arrangement, public authorities and similar quasi-public entities, argues that the potential for citizen participation in economic development planning and decision making can be inhibited by the housing of development activities in quasi-public entities such as development boards, corporations or authorities. Various analysis have documented the ways in which such quasi-public entities can be used to insulate development activities from public awareness and involvement and to allow private interests to function virtually as a shadow government (Stoker 1987; Hula 1990). Developmental participation theory is perhaps the most useful synthetic theory for the specific targets of this research. It is not only designed to account for the style or valence of citizen participation but also for political activation itself as well. Moreover, the theory outlines the possible reactions of local government towards the conflictual modes of participation, such as protest and other efforts to block plans or projects. It stipulates that in economically distressed communities, such as slum and squatter settlements, city leaders faced with such conflict have two possibilities. They can attempt to demobilise those citizens involved in the conflict, typically through the use of non-responsiveness tactics that exhaust the challenging group's resources. This leads to alienation or exit on the part of those defeated and demobilised. Alternatively, “city officials can respond in ways designed to defuse perceptions of highly negative individual consequences of development initiatives, either by negotiating actual changes in the initiatives or through symbolic manipulation of perceptions. If successful, this transformation can lead to
collaboration based upon a congruence of individual and community needs” (Sharp and Bath 1993: 223).

Whether the form of governance attempts to demobilise conflictual modes of participation associated with development in the field, transform them into collaborative modes, or defuse the perceptions of highly negative individuals, this Chapter revealed that various forms of governance, in both western and DCs, still lack inclusionary ways of collaboration, though at different scales. They also lack explicit efforts to incorporate and respect the diverse interests and cultural ideologies in our differentiated societies. The voices, experiences and political activities of every one in society are not adequately represented in urban political analysis. However, understanding different forms of citizen political participation in the policy making process in both western and DCs helped to appreciate the nature of the paradigm shift in urban planning. It also helped to identify the fundamental principles of ‘good’ urban upgrading, that are assumed to promote active and meaningful citizen participation. But all these kinds of commitments require a belief that ‘we’, all individuals including city leaders and municipal officials, have made the structural forces, which direct our action, and thus ‘we’ have the power to make changes by altering the rules, the flow of resources and the way we think about things (Giddens 1984, 1990). Only then can policy reform support city consensus-building with civil society to establish priorities for social development and urban finance strategies, support the development of evaluation and research dissemination, and enable legislation required to ensure institutionalised urban governance and upgrading. In doing that, the micro-practices of everyday ‘life-world’ will become key sites for the mobilisation of transformative forces through a long process of ‘social learning’ (Habermas 1987). These processes are outlined in Chapter 4, which investigates how ‘we’ can look at knowledge differently (epistemological approaches), collect data (methodological approaches), examine the interrelationships between a wide range of structural forces concerning this research, and view people as individuals with choices and personal intentions rather than merely as objects to be studied and observed.
CHAPTER FOUR

METHODOLOGY

"... the wonderful thing about academic work today, particularly fields like political and social theory, (is) that you can cross over disciplinary boundaries. And not just cross boundaries, but do work that is genuinely post-disciplinary, in all kinds of ways".


There has been a long debate in the discourse of human geography over the merits and problems of doing multi-disciplinary research, or post-disciplinary as Mitchell (1996) calls it, utilising different research methodologies, and choices of epistemological approach(es) according to the research problem. While research methodology refers here to the techniques employed in the analysis/interpretation of the data collected, research epistemology refers to the way in which 'we' look at knowledge, and what it is possible to know within any given field. In human geography, this can be related to positivism, realism, postmodernism, post-structuralism and so on. Various epistemological definitions currently used in the discourse of human geography are first reviewed briefly in the context of the specific aims of this research, before justifying the choice made. Then the selected methodological approach is discussed, including fieldwork surveys and the problems encountered.

4.1- Epistemological approaches:

It is important for the specific aims of this research to identify the role of development in what Johnston (1991) calls 'the nature of the place'. While this concept involves a resuscitation of traditional 'regional geography', it is a unique resuscitation suffused by the more recent philosophical concepts of 'phenomenology' and 'realism'. While 'post-modernism' might be seen in contrast with these concepts, it also possesses a number of bases which could enhance the debate in this research. First, phenomenology is a term used to refer to philosophies concerned with phenomena. Different interpretations of the meaning of the word phenomena have led to different usage of the term
phenomenology. However, phenomenology sought to establish how the mind is known through an examination of its knowledge and behaviour. This is particularly important for all micro-level studies in order to view people as individuals with choices and personal intentions rather than as objects to be studied and observed. Modern phenomenology, derived largely from Husserl (1977) aims to reveal phenomena as intuited essences through direct awareness. Phenomenological statements are thus non-empirical descriptions of phenomena. More important is ‘constitutive phenomenology’ which deals with the structures of social meaning, with frames of reference and systems of typification which constitute the ‘multiple realities’ embedded in the lifeworld (Gregory 1978; 1996).

Second, realism is a philosophy which holds that material objects exist independently in our sense experience (Bhaskar 1978; Sayer 1985). It is concerned with the identification of causal mechanisms and empirical regulations, and is opposed to both phenomenalism and idealism. Phenomenalism is the view that there is no distinction between essence and phenomenon, and therefore we can only record what is directly experienced. Instead, realism seeks to reveal the causal mechanisms through which particular events are situated within underlying structures. Within ‘transcendental realism’ developed by Sayer (1989), this is achieved through the process of abstraction. Realism replaces the regularity model with one in which objects and social relations have causal powers which may or may not produce regularities. In fact, proponents of realism claim that all of the post-positivist tendencies in human geography can be interpreted as roads towards realism, be they labelled Marxist, humanist or even other ‘mainstream’ geographies (Cloke et al. 1991: 135). The importance of realism centres on its referring not only to a philosophy but also its competence in describing a mode of representation (Bhaskar 1978; Sayer 1985). Transcendental realism sees the basic objects of knowledge as the structures and mechanisms that generate phenomena, and seeks to a) identify how something happens and b) establish how extensive a phenomenon is (Outhwaite 1987; Sayer 1989).

Third, despite the static application of structuration theory (Giddens 1984, 1990), it seeks to transcend hermeneutics, functionalism and structuralism through the
integration of knowledge of human agents with the wider social structures in which they are embedded. Hermeneutics is the discipline concerned with the interpretation of meanings. Giddens theory of structuration emphasises that individuals are neither autonomous nor automatons. Powerful forces are all around us, shaping our lives, and presenting both opportunity and constraint. But structure is not something outside us. It is not an ‘action space’ within which we operate, as rationalist policy analysts tended to imagine. Individuals are not mechanically controlled by the structural or administrative realities of a given social situation. We live in multiple relational webs, each with its own cultures, that is, modes of thought and systems of meaning and valuing (Healey 1997: 47). Once citizens become self-reflectively aware of the social and political conditions in which they function, e.g. with the assistance of their respective civil society organisations, they also become able, consciously and sometimes quite freely, to formulate and implement specific actions structured to achieve desirable goals (Bernstein 1978). Giddens acknowledges and describes this process in voluntaristic terms, arguing that human beings transform nature socially, and by ‘humanising’ it, they transform themselves. The production and reproduction of society thus has to be treated as a skilled, interactive and discursive effort on the part of its members, not as merely a mechanical series of processes. Conscious reflexivity on ‘our’ assumptions and modes of thinking, on our cultural referents, thus carries the potential of transformative power, through which the micro-practices of everyday life are key-sites for the mobilisation of transformative forces (Sharp and Bath 1993; Healey 1997).

The last philosophical epistemology discussed here, post-modernism, is perhaps now the most controversial one, and especially when it is applied to the DCs development discourse. Entrikin (1991) focuses especially on the identity of ‘place’, and consequently the conceptualisation of its full dimensionality. He implicitly recognises the very different standpoints of ‘empirical-analytic’ and ‘historical hermeneutic science’, and concludes that ‘place’ is best viewed and explained from layers located between objective and subjective realities. This conclusion ties up with the essence of postmodernism in that human activity is culturally encompassed, open to various interpretations according to
different perspectives, and therefore can best be analysed through understanding the objective regularities as well as the subjective explanations of these regularities. Postmodernism has witnessed rapid developments during the past two decades. Starting from a new discourse in 'postmodern style', the vehement reaction to such style has become the paradigmatic focal point in the debate over 'postmodern method' and the 'postmodern epoch' in general (Dear 1986). The cultural umbrella of postmodernism has promoted different assessments within different disciplines. It has been viewed as a new aesthetics, a theory, a philosophy, a new period for a new epistemology (Lyotard 1986), a 'regime of signification' (Lash 1990), a 'structure of feeling' (Williams 1977), a dominant element in the cultural logic of late capitalism (Jameson 1987), or merely a 'fragmented consciousness' (Harvey 1989). Postmodernism is currently "confronting the terrain of the humanities and social sciences" (Gregory 1996), it is a material phenomenon of globalising and universalising imperatives where time and space seem obsolete and paradoxically, to be simultaneously absolute and relative. Postmodernism is the cultural response to the harsh compression of time and space and the shaping of objectives, images and ideas by the global marketplace (Larson 1993). It is, therefore, directly relevant to the local/global approach utilised in this research.

4.2- Research epistemology:

This research adopts a post-disciplinary approach in an attempt to obliterate all synthetic confines which separate, often unrealistically, social, political and economic theories from urban geographies theories. The research also adopts a multi-epistemology approach. It is thought that adoption of a particular epistemological position may condition what kind of knowledge is sought and what emphasis is imposed upon the ways in which that knowledge is obtained. The separation of structures and causal relations, which Sayer (1992) calls the 'expressive' and the 'objective' respectively, has serious consequences for the social sciences and for social policy. The approach adopted sustains substantive social theories that are capable of identifying the relations between different ontological domains and, at the same time, recognising their integrity as
differentiated features of social reality, which can guide the vital task of conceptualisation. Therefore, inevitable because of the specific aims of this research.

Transcendental realism is utilised at both the macro and the micro levels to examine and explain structures of central government, local government and civil society organisations, including their respective relationships with DAs. There are various actors represented, which sometimes overlap in the 'real world': civil society with civil servants, administrators with politicians, central government with local government and local NGOs with foreign DAs working in DCs. Hence, to look at the micro-processes, which underlie and sometimes oppose the macro structures, constitutive phenomenology defines the reality of each agent, the relations between individuals and organisations and the relations between the free agency of individuals and the constraints of structures. There are various levels of tensions and conjunctures between different structures or actors addressed throughout this research. Sayer (1985) places special emphasis on the necessity of making rational abstractions in order to disentangle such conjunctures sufficiently, so that it is possible to conduct cohesive research: "In real life we live in conjunctures whose boundaries are arbitrary; they haphazardly cut across structures and causal relations, and unless we devote considerable energy to their understanding, we only disentangle such conjunctures sufficiently for us to cope with everyday tasks. As theorists, however, we seek to understand the world by making rational abstractions which isolate unified objects, structures or groups, and we try to conduct concrete research by starting from such abstraction" (Sayer 1985). Accordingly, Chapter 5 will attempt to make an abstraction and an unequivocal disentanglement of the different structures and actors involved in this study, before examining the 'exercise' and 'effect' of causal powers of each of them.

The agreement of this research with postmodernism and humanism lies in its rejection of univocal explanation and its celebration of difference. Contrary to the argument that post-modern debate fosters scepticism, individual efforts and isolated autonomy rather than fostering the public realm and collaboration (Healey 1997), it is argued here that all human activity is culturally encompassed according to
postmodernism and, thus, open to variable interpretations according to different perspectives (Appendix 3- CP, 12-08-99). Post-modernism advocates community-based development, from the ground up, geared to community empowerment (Sandercock 1998: 30). The conceptual model utilised throughout this research, accountable bureaucratic capacity, assumes that people, as ‘actors’, are always situated in particular places at particular periods, with the context of their actions contributing to their sense of identity. This is reflected in the methodology selected. Quantitative methods are employed to assess the regularities, while qualitative analysis offers the explanations of these patterns and regularities, and establishes the nature of social objects and mechanisms on which causal relations depend.

The research emphasises the subjective reality of individual bureaucrats in which they, as individuals, function responsibly and autonomously according to their goals and values. It assumes that social institutions are the constructions of human agents and therefore the same human beings possess the power to change those institutions. Any assessment of quality is thus viewed as a measure of relative value, but based on an evaluation of the general characteristic or intrinsic nature of what we are assessing (Dey 1993: 10). However, it is helpful to distinguish relations of different types before making abstractions. A basic distinction is made first between ‘substantial’ relations of connection and interaction on the one hand and ‘formal’ relations of similarity or dissimilarity on the other. This will help to reveal how far individuals are connected to various associated ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ agents, and whether they interact directly, bear a purely formal relation, or lack any interaction, as objects having similar characteristics.

Another distinction is made between ‘external or contingent’ relations and ‘internal or necessary’ relations. Objects in ‘external’ relations can exist without interdependency with each other although they may still have significant interrelated effects, e.g. local NGO and DA. By contrast, the existence of one object necessarily presupposes the other in ‘internal’ relations and hence change in one part is dependent on the other. Internal relation does not mean tautology; consequently objects can be identified separately, e.g. landlord and tenant. Accordingly, the structure of the agents’
system of interest is discovered by asking the survey population simple questions about such relations. Sayer (1992) argues that while these questions may seem simple to the point of banality, the answers are often complex and many errors of conceptualisation and abstraction stem from evasions of them. Henceforth, it is essential first to clarify what aspect of relations we are considering, which may seem somewhat descriptive, otherwise any attempt to distinguish internal from external relations, or necessary from contingent conditions, will result in confusion. Finally, it is equally important to emphasise that the structure of the argument here is not based on personal disapproval; indeed, the explanation of mechanisms and social phenomena entails that we evaluate them critically. Criticism cannot reasonably be limited to false ideas, abstracted from the practical contexts in which they are constitutive, but must extend to critical evaluation of their associated practices and the material structures which they produce and which in turn help to sustain those practices (Sayer 1992: 40).

4.3- Research methodology:

Survey methodological problems fall into three broad categories: from whom to collect the information; what methods to use for collecting it; and how to process, analyse and interpret it (Moser and Kalton 1989: 53). The divisive gap between qualitative and quantitative methods is viewed now as "a form of intellectual hardening that closes minds, restricts insight, and undermines our collective understanding" (Hodge 1995: 426). While the subjective/qualitative deals with meanings mediated mainly through language and action, it places emphasis on the process through which the addressed agents operate and produce. It also employs verbal descriptions and explanation. In contrast, the objective/quantitative deals with measurements and involves emphasis on structures. It is applied when the scale of situational analysis implies a high level of spatial and temporal causes, and uses statistical analysis. There are advantages in combining quantitative and qualitative approaches in social research, as a polyvocal approach can avoid privileging a particular way of looking at the social world (McKendrick 1996).
A multi-method approach is considered to be the best-fitted formula, following from the above and the nature of this research. The objective/quantitative refers here to a society's basic 'microstructures level' (Smith and Tardanico 1987: 87) which refers to the medium of the everyday activities of households. Quantification is applied at the level of the heads of households' (HoHs) life, work, family, mobility and interrelationships with the upgrading project and other agents involved. It uses 'structured' forms of data collection (Appendix 1). It aims at translating knowledges and data into numeric forms condensed into categories and generalisation. These objective thoughts are allegedly free from the subjective influence of the researcher's personal prejudice or bias. Such methodological techniques can deal with various levels of analysis. It is not necessary to approach the micro level in a subjective/qualitative manner; it is as responsive to quantitative approaches as are larger scales of analysis.

On the other hand, subjective/qualitative techniques are applied to the level of institutional phenomena, and include 'semi-structured' forms of data collection to understand local government's performance and policies (Appendix 2), as well as participation observation. Qualitative techniques are also applied in the form of open-ended interviews with selected community leaders, senior decision-makers and bureaucrats, elected politicians, local urban and community development consultants, and DAs' short and long term consultants. This investigative stage aims basically to understand the rhetoric and practice of the institutions involved, as well as the assessment of private sector consultants and DAs' experts (Appendix 3). Finally, focus meetings with groups living in the case study areas are held to understand the squatter settlers' explanations for the complex 'real world' in which they live in, and to try to say something sensible about their endurance and struggling through life's difficulties. Focus meetings are also held with some municipal officials and academics.

4.4- Fieldwork methodology:

The fieldwork methodology is based on a cross between Blumer's conception of 'naturalistic research' (Blumer 1969) and a 'flexible data collection' strategy. Both of these emphasise the advantages of deciding about 'what data to collect and how' over
the course of the research, without risking the objective of meeting the initial aims of
research, rather than following a pre-established structure. Thus the research involves the
construction, and continual reconstruction, of a model of the process under study. While
this research builds on Blumer’s principles, it disagrees with his disparagement of the use
of interviews or questionnaires designed to document types of attitude or personality, and
‘flexibly-designed interviews and questionnaires’ will be employed. The study aims to
unearth further relations among the phenomena through an inductivist approach.

The methodology applies a ‘complementary data sources’ technique to both
primary and secondary data. This technique aims to broaden the debate, intensify the
analysis and minimise possible misinterpretations. A wide range of secondary data, drawn
from official sources, the media and cyber-data sources (the internet), are utilised,
including bilateral and multilateral agency reports, national policies, census data, laws and
regulations, project appraisals and evolution reports, maps, video films, photos and aerial
photos. Primary data are collected in two fieldwork phases, involving two questionnaire
surveys, with their respective pilot projects, site visits and participant observation. The
first phase of fieldwork explores the research case studies and identifies the real
mechanisms of co-operation between state, civil society and DAs. Chapter 5 presents and
discusses the issues of urban governance, NGOs/DAs/State tensions, and the power
hierarchies and powerless agents, which arise in Egypt. Building on the factual
assessment and knowledge gained from the first phase, the follow-up fieldwork concerns
the in-depth scrutiny of NGO programming and accountability, local government
performance, the reality of civic-empowerment and community participation, the
attainability of urban upgrading and development policies, and how far such processes
are, or can be, institutionalised in Egypt.

The first phase survey aimed to investigate the reality of the subject and thereby
eliminate misconceptions. The cities of Aswan, Ismailia and Cairo were visited during the
Summer and Autumn of 1996 to collect secondary data for Aswan’s project, Ismailia’s
projects, and from the Information Centre of the Cabinet. These data covered the housing
and NGO policies in Egypt, Nasriya’s and Hai El-Salam’s appraisal reports, project
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evolution reports, maps of Aswan and Ismailia, aerial photos, and some portentous reports prepared by the UNCHS, the USAID, the GTZ and Liverpool University. The survey was restricted intentionally to factual and descriptive assessments of the nature of relevant phenomena and aimed to understand how far the three agents, i.e. community, local government and DA, were working collectively in both case studies. This approach provided invaluable information about the case studies, answered many theoretical questions and gave an adequate explanation of some problematic issues. It also developed a knowledge of each area on which the second phase survey was based. For instance, the initial assessment during different facets of the Hai El-Salam project revealed a very low profile of community participation during the project. Data collected from meetings with 20 randomly-selected HoHs and a group interview (IGI1, 17-10-96), contradicted much of the rhetoric found in the project’s documentation, as discussed in Chapter 6. Accordingly, a decision was made to discontinue the HoH in-depth systematic survey, and to concentrate instead on open-ended interviews with community leaders, senior municipal officials, and local and international consultants who had worked for the project at the time, in search of explanations as to why community participation was not formally incorporated within the project.

The second phase/major survey took place in the same cities and was conducted during January-July and September-December in 1998. The fieldwork was programmed flexibly so that it could shift strategies according to whatsoever might offer further understanding. After absorbing official documents and media sources data, various survey techniques were employed, including participant observation and interviewing individuals from different sectors of interest and levels of power, e.g. beneficiaries from civil society, municipal officials from local government, decision-makers from the central government, senior leaders and members from NGOs, and project advisors and consultants from DAs (Appendix 3). Notes were also taken at meetings during May, 1996, with the researcher’s supervisor and a large number of decision-makers, academics, experts and consultants working in Egypt when broader contextual issues were raised. Participant observation included several visits to community centres where
public discussions took place between residents, key-figures and leaders in both areas. Meanwhile, day and night activities were noted and photographed. This helped to understand the people and their surrounding environments, appreciate the flow of their daily life, see the situations that arose and observe the problems they addressed in their conversations. Participants from both areas were acute observers and expressed their opinions regarding their respective projects at several informal meetings.

The two broad categories of population associated with this research are the ‘survey population’ and the ‘target population’. The term ‘survey population’ is applied to those actually interviewed in Aswan, Ismailia and Cairo, 108 HoHs in Nasriya, representing 1.44% of the total households in the area (7500 units), a small qualitative sample of 20 HoHs living in Hai El-Salam representing only 0.2% of the total households in the area, and the senior municipal officials working in the cities of Aswan and Ismailia. Although this population covered both the intended beneficiaries at community level and local government level, it was incomplete without other enabling actors—namely policy and decision-makers working at local and central government levels, locally elected politicians, internal and external consultants or experts working for DAs, and members of various civil society organisations working in both areas. The ‘target population’ represented the population, individuals and institutions, for which results were required. The target population of this research includes professionals and decision-makers working for national governments and their respective counterparts in DAs, Northern and intermediary NGOs.

The major principle underlying sample design is to avoid bias in the selection procedure. Bias may occur if sampling is carried out using a non-random selection method, a sampling frame which does not cover the population adequately, completely or accurately, or if some sections of the population are impossible to find or refuse to cooperate (de Vaus 1990). The aim of the sample was to be representative of the responses and characteristics of the survey population, so selection was made on a random basis from a pre-stratified spatial grid; a grid was superimposed on the map of Nasriya and the dwelling at, or nearest to, the intersection of the grid lines was selected. The size of each
cell of the grid was established at about 80m by 80m which resulted in 108 households, a number suitable for tests of statistical significance and feasible given the resources available to the researcher (Figure 4.1). This stratification also granted geographical and group representations, as housing conditions differed and ethnic groups were clustered. The response rate was high (3/108), only three HoHs refused to participate, all located in Sector 8. They were replaced by the nearest dwellings to the intersection of the grid lines. A similar technique was applied in Hai El-Salam building on a previous sampling grid (Davidson and Payne 1983), but the response rate was much lower than that of Nasriya (6/20), six HoHs refused to participate in different geographical locations and were also replaced by the nearest dwellings to the intersection of the grid lines. The decision to conduct the household survey with the HoHs was made on the basis that they are usually viewed as the core of the family in Egypt. All household members look to them for guidance and support. In this context, the HoH is generally the oldest man; other members of the household are reluctant to voice opinions contrary to his or to engage in activities concerning the household without his permission. Widows receive the same respect from their households, but only 10 HoH fill this category. However, members of the household were often present during the interviews and contributed to the answers, which represented a family consensus about the project. The specific voice of women was incorporated through observing some meetings of the Nasriya Women’s Development Association (WDA), while interviews with the Project’s Consultant for Gender and Development (GAD) revealed the project’s voice.

In addition, key-figures or prominent individuals, who had been associated with either project for long, were asked to nominate some knowledgeable HoHs or ‘community leaders’ (Head of GROs) who had witnessed the birth of both projects as additional informants for focus groups. But such a sample was most unlikely to produce a representative sample or reliable estimates of the population. Meanwhile, the survey tried to interview most of the senior officials and policy-makers who were at the top of the administrative hierarchy of the institutions involved in this study, or those who were thought to influence the development processes.
Figure 4.1: Nasriya - The sampling grid.
Interviewees of senior officials included the chief planners and administrators in charge of the Nasriya and Hai El-Salam projects, all previous and present directors of the Aswan Urban Development and Land Management Unit (UDLMU), and all senior urban planners working for the Ismailia Urban Planning Office (UPO). At the NGO level, the interviews included the Chair of the Nasriya’s CDA, several members of its Board, and the Head of the largest NGO located in the Ismailia project area, the Abna’a El-Sharkiya community centre. At the DA level, informants included the Chair of the Habitat Programme for Sustainable Development in Ismailia, which monitors the El-Salam project now, the German Advisor of the GTZ projects in Aswan, in addition to 9 other international consultants working at present for various DAs in Egypt.

Finally, the survey conducted a focus meeting with 4 Professors working at the Faculty of Regional and Urban Planning, Cairo University. The Thesis Supervisor was present at some of these meetings. It is generally thought that ‘face to face’ interviews are the only efficient means of administering questionnaires in Egypt; they permit clarification of any misunderstandings of the aims of the survey, maximise the response rate and reliability, and make it possible to obtain the interviewee’s first reaction and response without being influenced by neighbours or peers. This was particularly important for ascertaining ‘knowledge’ as against ‘behaviour’. Hence, all interviews were administered in person; HoHs were interviewed by means of structured questionnaires, while senior municipal officials’ questionnaires were semi-structured. Open-ended interviews were also held with policy-makers, NGO and DA members, while further discussion continued via electronic mail to update the researcher’s knowledge and to answer questions which arose while the research was progressing.

4.5- The questionnaire surveys:

The head of households (HoHs) interview examined the interrelationships between a wide range of variables under three main categories: a) possible causal factors, including personal data, migration and mobility, house data and characteristics, and articulations of land-supply; b) community action, including relationships with the upgrading project, perception of participation and self-initiatives; and c) sustainability, as
expressed in membership in civil society organisations, self-administration and relationships with the municipality (Figure 4.2).

Figure 4.2: Construction of questionnaire- head of household survey

**Personal data:**
Marital status, age, education, occupation, income, additional financial sources, and family/extended family size and personal data.

**Migration and mobility:**
Place of birth, length of residence in birthplace, migration motives, length of residence in study area, why it was chosen, likelihood of further migration, why, and willingness to sell the house if offered a good price.

**House characteristics:**
Ownership, method of construction, building permission, physical condition, size, connections to infrastructure, cost of maintenance and bills, and future plans for extension or improvement.

**Land-supply data:**
Initial and present articulations of land supply, and intention of legalising land status if currently illegal.

**Relationships with the upgrading project:**
Perception of problems that exist in the area, familiarity with the upgrading project, assessment of the most successful, unimplemented or inappropriate activities undertaken by the project, disagreements between the project and the community, and assessment of specific activities, e.g. micro-credit and women’s activities.

**Participation and self-initiatives:**
Beneficiaries’ perception/evaluation of their participation during the planning, implementation and evaluation phases, the forms it took and subsequent behaviour, problem-solving activities, familiarity with other upgrading projects in the city, and comparison of successes.

**Self-administration:**
Membership of civil society organisations, their objectives and main achievements, familiarity and/or membership of a mother association (CDA), support of its role, participation in voluntary work, acknowledgement of other social groups in the area, nature of conflicts within the area, how they are solved, political participation (tested through familiarity with representatives and voting at the area, popular local council and parliament levels).

**Relationships with the municipality:**
Problem-solving contact, general perception of the attitude of the municipal bureaucracy, specific problems encountered during contact with the municipality.

Source: Author (see Appendix I for the questionnaire).
Second, the questions addressed to the senior municipal officials examined the nature of housing and upgrading policies in Egypt and problems in application of public decision-making process. These included choice of sites to upgrade, choice of beneficiaries, beneficiary participation, recuperation of investment, legality of tenure and role in the land/housing market, institutional performance, time dimension and monitoring of performance (Appendix 2). Finally, open-ended interviews with decision-makers, DA officials, community leaders, and members of local NGOs working in both areas, targeted three major issues. The first concerned 'funding' of upgrading and capacity-building projects, including the amount, period, alterations and freedom of choice as to how to spend funds. The second issue concerned the interrelationships between civil society/DA and the State. Special emphasis was placed on ascertaining what level of government, institution or counterparts was involved, the degree of partnership and at what stage it took place, the formal compatibility with goals, deadlines, and the degree of autonomy over decision-making. Information required in this section focused on the criteria of area selection, institution, processes and people, how the problem was conceptualised by the institution initially and over the time of the project (Objective Oriented Project Planning (ZOPP) approach for instance), and finally the context at the time, the site and the personnel.

There are four types of question content- namely behaviour, knowledge, beliefs and attitudes (Dillman 1978). The primary questions of the main survey focused on behaviour and knowledge, ascertaining what people do in a certain situation, and their associated characteristics (knowledge). Questions related to beliefs and attitudes were more complex but necessary to gauge the attributes of the bureaucracy and how far its beliefs enabled it to play a dynamic role in the developmental process. They were also important at the community level to examine how far the beliefs and attitudes of the poor enabled them to make an assertive, concerted effort to improve their community, and if so, how far they have been successful in affecting change. This was necessary to test the contention that many poor neighbourhoods are apathetic. A number of complementary methods were employed to address different facets of the research questions. The
researcher was keen to approach the same question from different angles to the same interviewee, as well as ascertaining different perspectives by asking the same question to respondents at different levels of responsibility and power. The researcher recorded the answers so as to avoid the possible embarrassment of illiterate HoHs; this also allowed municipal officials to concentrate on the question content and to offer unhurried answers.

The reliability of the responses was ascertained by comparing response patterns among similar items as well as by matching response patterns with some ‘well-established’ characteristics of the bureaucracy (as previously assessed in the literature and/or observed by the researcher throughout his experience as a practitioner dealing with both actors, squatters and bureaucrats). The community beneficiaries/municipalities interrelationship was examined by comparing response patterns to similar questions asked to both HoHs and senior municipal officials. This tactic helped to understand the actors’ own explanations of their actions and perceptions and whether there were contradictions in their responses. If a contradiction was found, such that they could not both be correct, the fact that what was said was mistaken is not to deny that it was said and perceived to be true; and therefore explained their behaviour.

The analysis of the data proceeded from exploratory through to explanatory approaches by means of description to either univariate or bivariate statistical techniques. Inferential statistics were used only for the HoHs sample survey in Nasriya. The nominal variables, such as gender, home origin/ethnicity or location, allowed qualitative classification of individuals into categories. The ordinal variables included socio-economic status, education, age group, house condition, land legal status and household size among others. Since this research focuses more on qualitative measures of society, the only interval variables were household economy and investment in the house. Because the people of Nasriya come from different home origins, reside in quite diverse spatial locations and at different standards of living, most of tests employed non-parametric distribution-free methods concerned with the difference between independent samples and of relationships between variables. Cluster analysis was also used to classify
HoHs according to their assessment of their level of participation during the project’s duration, and their electoral participation and familiarity with political representatives.

### 4.6- Constraints of the fieldwork:

The task of collecting secondary data and conducting fieldwork surveys in Third World countries is by no means easy. The issue of how interviewees respond to ‘us’, researchers, based on who we are in ‘their’ lives— as well as the social categories to which we belong, such as age, gender, class, dialectic group or race— is a practical concern as well as an epistemological and ethical one. Constraints stemming either from the official administrative level (bureaucratic culture factors) or from the civil citizens’ level (cultural factors) can hinder any survey and/or mislead the researcher. A story told to a particular researcher might take a different form if someone else was the listener (Riessman 1993: 11). Hence, the desire of many of us “to treat interview data as more or less straightforward ‘pictures’ of an external reality can fail to understand how that ‘reality’ is being represented in words” (Silverman 1997: 4).

It is difficult to ascertain what is available in many governmental institutions in Egypt. “Information is considered to be a precious commodity—a key ingredient of power—and something to hoard, not to disburse” (Mayfield 1996: 138). Admittedly, the researcher managed to access data in many institutions only because he was known by some senior staff working there from the days he worked for the UDLMU and the Nasriya project in Aswan (1989-1994); this helped a great deal to extend his ‘professional connections’ to various institutions. He has become a familiar and trusted figure for them. Most of the fieldwork survey, including the interviews, could not have been completed successfully without ‘personal relations’ with senior employees working there.

The impact of bureaucratic cultural constraints on the fieldwork operation was manifold. Although the survey aimed to interview senior officials at municipal level, it was obvious that some of them were reluctant or unable to express sincere opinions regarding their subordinates, superiors or the administrative system in general. This
constraint is referred to general anxiety: “People tend to give complete deference and loyalty to their superiors and expect similar behaviour from their subordinates” (Mayfield 1996: 138). In such a climate of bureaucratic consternation and submission to municipal directives, it was always necessary to obtain permission from the superiors of the intended senior municipal officials in order to enable them to express their opinions freely and to avoid any misunderstandings between them and their superiors. On the other hand, as the researcher spent ten years working for the Aswan project and/or observing the development that has taken place there, two major factors concerning positionality and possible bias had to be considered. Many senior officials interviewed in Aswan regarded the researcher as a colleague who by no means knows any less than them. Whenever he questioned any critical sensitive area, he repeatedly received the answer: “Oh come on, you know the answer very well, do you not?” The researcher had to explain that “it is a subjective point of view, and I want to know your own opinion”, suggesting that what is conceived as ‘self-evident’ might, in fact, be open to different interpretations. Fortunately, this problem did not exist in Ismailia, but another one arose. Some senior officials could not devote enough time for the interview because they were repeatedly interrupted by other work, visitors, phone calls, or documents requested urgently by their superiors- thereupon asking the researcher to terminate the meeting and come again another day, even though an appointment had been made.

Turning to the beneficiaries survey, cultural constraints were, in fact, more influential and could have misled the researcher during the first phase survey. Some of the householders interviewed in Ismailia frequently gave vague answers when they were asked about their assessments regarding project management, municipal performance, or municipal official’s attitude in general. It was obvious that they were uneasy about expressing their views to ‘strangers’. It is also worth mentioning that strangers are not always welcome to enter houses in squatter settlements in Egypt and to question householders. There is a common feeling among some residents of being either embarrassed, because of the poor condition of their houses, or suspicious regarding the real purpose of the interview. This is even more intense in the case of those occupying
illegal plots. Despite the researcher's explanation that the purpose was purely academic, some still believed that if this information reached the municipality, they would be in trouble. However, the fact that the researcher is well known in Nasriya helped a lot to remove such suspicions. Nonetheless, a committed sociologist who used to work for the project volunteered his assistance, which helped a great deal due to his popularity in the area. Hence, it was much easier to arrange meetings with HoHs in Aswan than in Ismailia. Members of the Nasriya's CDA, specially the members of the Women's Committee, were also a great help in arranging meetings and introducing the researcher to many receptive female HoHs. Absence of such a unified CDA in Ismailia forced the researcher to introduce himself with no community support.

Many randomly-selected HoHs, 6/20 in Ismailia, refused to co-operate during the pilot fieldwork, which jeopardised the survey because of possible bias in selection. This problem was overcome later as the researcher was assisted by an urban planner who used to work for the Ismailia project and knew many community leaders in the area. Meanwhile, 'personal understanding' of fate and destiny meant that several interviewees in Ismailia and Aswan were incapable of expressing the reasons for something happening, e.g. a certain difficulty they faced in their lifetime or their planning for the future. Their answers referred to the 'Will of God' and resoluteness to face every action that occurs. Hence, it was necessary to bear in mind Sayer's argument that language is not a matter of subjective opinion; concepts are constructed in terms of an inter-subjective language which allows us to communicate intelligibly and interact effectively (Sayer 1992: 32). The researcher continuously tried to understand people's own 'vocabularies of life'.

There is undoubtedly human bias from the researcher's side. The Nasriya project was always likely to be over emphasised. The researcher was not only born in Aswan and knew it by heart, but also was working there and so was familiar with a wide range of development details. This could have made him subconsciously reluctant to understand the real origins of the situation in Ismailia's case, blind to other interpretations or too willing to assumes potential similarities. This was recognised by the researcher; it is worth stating that his bias is for greater citizen empowerment and control over their own
resources in all poor societies. He is therefore sensitive to all forms of top-down procedures, whether practised by community civil society organisations, local government, central government or external donor agency, bilateral or multilateral. Criticism of case study institutions discussed throughout this research to illustrate examples of 'unjust' policy or 'embroiled' performance, at least as perceived by the survey population and previous writings in the literature, do not imply attacks on these institutions, but rather an effort to explain processes that arose in specific circumstances.
Egypt is presently in a state of transition, facing manifold challenges and competing urban, political-cultural and socio-economic forces, which will not easily be resolved by the national government per se but rather by means of effective local government and empowered civil society. Because Egypt has long had locally defined provinces and districts along the Nile Valley (Figure 5.1), the prime purpose of central government has always been to control specific agricultural and commercial activities. Such divisions have never granted local autonomy or any normative commitment to a democratically organised system of local structures and institutions. Moreover, the local administration system is defined in legal and organisational terms that discourage any form of democratic openness or the empowerment of civil society in many ways (Mayfield 1996). Although there are formal democratic institutions, they represent the interests of patron-clientalism rather than the society at large, and discourage criticism.

At present social pressures are demanding greater institutional decentralisation and the creation of a more open and pro-active society; further investigation is needed into the practice of international donor agencies (DAs) working in Egypt and the means by which they can support both these processes. These suggestions correspond to Habitat’s Agenda for ‘Capacity Building and Institutional Development’ (UNCHS 1997), which places special emphases on decentralisation and on improving the performance of local governments in DCs and countries whose economies are in transition: “Governments should accord a high priority to implementing a comprehensive policy for capacity-building. The international community should help them to develop their capacity, identify and assess their institution-building priorities and strengthen their management capacity”. This capacity-building strategy is assumed to act as an integral part of institutions’ urban development strategy and their investment programmes or business plans. This means it will be integrated technically and in terms of commitment and resource allocation (Peltenburg et al 1996: 3). Accordingly, it is necessary to understand the fundamental bases of urban governance in Egypt, including system legacies, legitimacy and stability. It is also equally important to review local government structure, its staffing conditions and
inter-organisational co-operation not only with other institutions but also with the private and civil society sectors. This investigation can clarify our understanding of the processes to establish a more open and proactive society, and an autonomous local government that could allocate resources according to democratic forms of collaboration.

This Chapter briefly reviews the major political events witnessed in the last five decades since the 1952 Revolution, before focusing on the contemporary challenges that now confront Egypt and their impact in shaping urban policies. Subsequently, the reality of foreign aid and DAs conflicting aims are analysed. Since Egypt's political and administrative systems are closely inter-related, a brief review of the development of the country's political legacies is followed by a review of the administrative systems. The extent to which contemporary local government enhances decentralisation is scrutinised with particular reference to the ways in which it impacts upon participatory initiatives. Finally, the constraints facing civil society and the opportunities for creating more open and pro-active society are discussed in detail. This examination can draw conclusions as to what form of urban governance is present in Egypt.

Figure 5.1: Egypt - Major cities.
5.1- Urban and political challenges:

There have been dramatic changes in housing programmes and urban sector policies in Egypt over the last five decades. Egypt has experienced a major transformation of its political economy during this period that has impacted not only on daily life but also on the international situation in the Middle East. The years from 1952 to 1999 were punctuated by one massive Revolution, two major wars, two riots and recently by fundamentalist terrorism. Each one of these events reflects the socio-economic and political environment at its time. Urban development programmes have been affected either positively or negatively by these events; for while some led to the formation of squatter and informal settlements in Egypt, others stimulated the government to upgrade existing settlements.

The 1952 Revolution, which ended centuries of colonisation, swept into power a small group of military officers. Despite their negligible experience in state management and development, they refused to leave national affairs to civilians and strove to transform the polity and the socio-economic structure rapidly into a socialist system via radical policies of land reform and nationalisation. Then the dramatic defeat in the Arab-Israeli conflict (1967-1973) resulted in thousands of Egyptians moving from their lands in the Suez Canal zone to other urban centres in Lower Egypt. This defeat not only resulted in an acute sense of inferiority among many Egyptians up to the apparent victory in the 1973 war, but also gave rise to religious movements urging spiritual revitalisation. In 1977, Egypt was again shaken to its very core by urban food riots. Several hundred thousands citizens poured into the streets of all major cities in an effort to demote President Sadat when his government tried to increase the prices of basic subsidised consumer goods. After the military had restored order, the message was very clear to the government—never again attempt any radical cuts in the social ‘safety net’.

In February 1986, police conscripts and squatter dwellers rioted again in Cairo. This riot emphasised two particular points to President Mubarak’s government. The first was that tensions over economic inequality simmer beneath the surface and that if the economy continues to struggle, break out again. It was the urban poor who had revolted, conscripted by the police. The second point emphasised that the next time, those who
revolt might be civilians and suppression by the army might have wider consequences for
civil unrest. The most recent event concerns the rise of religious fundamentalism. Sadat’s
assassination in October 1981 prompted a massive outpouring of contemplation,
speculation and exaggeration about the power of radical religion in all its forms in Egypt
(Eiweida 1997). It is well known now that members of this movement come from poor
neighbourhoods. The hardship and social repression have led to alienation and resulted in
many squatters joining the fundamentalist movement.

In economic terms, the implementation of the Economic Reform and Structural
Adjustment Programme (ERSAP) (1990-date), involved measures of privatisation and
financial liberalisation, including deregulation of prices, wages, customs, tariffs and
exchange rates; all have had a major effect on society. The programme focused on
stabilisation to restore macroeconomic balance and reduce inflation, and structural
adjustment to stimulate and sustain medium-term and long-term growth. The International
Development Association (IDA) supported Egypt with a US$140 million credit for the
establishment of an emergency social fund to accelerate implementation of current social
policies and to minimise the effect of the economic reforms on the poor. The programme
as a whole was also supported by a standby arrangement from the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), and a $300 million World Bank ERSAP loan (World Bank 1991: 129).
Contemporary leaders in Egypt share a vision of a dynamic modern economy, one based
on market principles and integrating Egypt into the global financial and trading
community. The ERSAP has been broadly successful, leading to a reduction in the fiscal
deficit, disciplined monetary growth, financial deregulation and deregulated trade and
investment policies. Moreover, because Egypt was one of the world’s most heavily-
indebted countries, US$43.7 billion in 1989, which required servicing at a cost equivalent
of 22 per cent of Egypt’s exports of goods and services, the Paris Club agreed in 1991 to
‘debt relief’ covering half of Egypt’s foreign debt (Licari 1997: 14). In 1997, the World
Bank assessed Egypt’s stabilisation policies as highly successful, notwithstanding criticism
which was raised about the slow process of privatisation and the low profile of private
investment (World Bank 1997: 1).
On the other hand, the ERSAP resulted in the elimination of many consumer subsidies (Holt and Roe 1993), privatisation of state-owned industries and a large reduction in public spending and public employment (Sullivan 1990). Poverty and unemployment are thus pressing problems. The incidence of poverty and income inequality increased as a result, and is now evident in all poverty measures. Based on the individual's affordable consumption expenditure in Egypt, it is estimated that near half of the population either live below the poverty line or are moderately poor (UNDP 1996). Among the poor, 7.4 per cent of Egypt's population, about 4.4 million, are deemed to be ultra poor, living below the food-based poverty line. Many of these live in rural areas but urban poverty is also sizeable. The poor segment of urban society, who live on less than £E2 (£0.30) daily subsistence per person, constitutes 58 per cent of the total urban population. The headcount index at the basic-needs urban poverty line increased from 18.2 per cent in 1981/82, to 20.3 per cent in 1990/91 and to 22.5 per cent in 1995/96 (Table 5.1). The high prevalence of poverty in urban areas could also be explained by rural-urban migration and the lack of remunerative employment in the urban sector.

There is a clear geography of poverty in Egypt, regions and Governorates vary, not only in wealth and natural resources endowment, but also in the way social and public services are distributed. Lower Egypt is relatively better off than Upper Egypt, with only one-fifth of its urban population poor compared to one-third in Upper Egypt, though the total population of the latter is lower (UNDP 1996). Rural areas of Upper Egypt have the highest rate of poverty, 32% of the poor population live in these areas.

Table 5.1: Egypt- Urban poverty measurements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographic location</th>
<th>Headcount index</th>
<th>Poor population (Million)</th>
<th>Relative share of the poor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- All Urban</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>5.800</td>
<td>42.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- All Rural</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>7.868</td>
<td>57.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Urban and Frontier Governorates</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>2.086</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Urban Lower Egypt</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>1.527</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Urban Upper Egypt</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>2.276</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>13.668</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from UNDP (1996: 27).
The World Bank (1997) estimates that despite a real GDP growth of between 4.4 and 4.6 per cent between mid-1996 and mid-2005, urban unemployment will rise from 10.3 per cent to 17 per cent of the labour force. It would require a growth rate of 5.7 per cent rising gradually to 7.5 per cent over the same period to bring unemployment down to 6 per cent. This is misleading because many of those nominally in employment are in reality underemployed. The government is committed to finding jobs for the 375,000 new entrants to the labour market every year, in addition to reducing unemployment, primarily through accelerated privatisation and support to competitive markets. Given the difficulties inherent in economic transition, the government’s approach tends to reduce absolute liberal pluralism and to permit various forms of state corporatism instead. This has obvious implications for the forms of civil participation that are possible.

Women’s status has been affected. Data collected by the 1995 Egypt Demographic and Health Survey (EDHS 95) suggest that Egyptian women have limited control over important aspects of their lives and limited autonomy in household decision-making. Despite the significant narrowing of gender differences since the last International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD), Cairo 1997, women’s financial autonomy is still limited and the opportunities open to them are still less than those open to men. Although the pressure of feminist movements in Egypt comes from major cities, they have been activists and established large numbers of small development projects in urban and rural Egypt to increase social awareness and dispel Islamic misconceptions about population policies. They have also established family planning clinics, employed physicians and nurses to provide reproductive health care, eradicate illiteracy, enhance women’s financial independence, and combat ‘traditional practices harmful to women and children’, e.g. female circumcision and child labour (Al-Ahram Weekly: 19 November 1998). Feminist movements face many obstacles in achieving their development targets. Although about 15% of the total 15,000 registered civil society organisations working in Egypt are devoted exclusively to carrying out gender related projects, NGO activists complain that despite the ICPD, NGOs have been faced with major challenges. Policies have been broadened to integrate women’s comprehensive health care with family planning projects, but NGOs did not have the necessary financial or human resources to meet these challenges. Funds have always been a major obstacles, and the new policy
remains ambiguous to many (IM, 15-12-98). Indeed these obstacles preclude the establishment of effective and independent civil society and are, therefore, discussed in more detail in Section 5.5.

The present regime is, in fact, faced by several quandaries. On the one hand, it must maintain authoritarian control in order to remain in power, while there is a clear recognition that civil society and new social forces are stimulating pressures for greater pluralism and democratisation on the other (Mayfield 1996: 1). The state’s recognition that modernisation and economic development require a greater commitment to secularism and modern society, is countered by the equally persuasive notion that some form of Islamic government may be needed to protect Egypt’s traditional values as it faces the challenge of modern life, as is evident from the fundamentalist religious movements that have surfaced. Although they are still generally disorganised in many cities, they have been quite powerful in rural Upper Egypt as a response to the government’s urban and regional biases (Eiweida 1997). This has left the government in a dilemma between maintaining authoritarian control to install security, or embracing civil society organisations as a means of enhancing prosperity. The latter embodies a risk that some extremist organisations might masquerade as law abiding civil society interests.

Egypt is thus facing a series of urban challenges not only due to rapid population growth in its cities and their geographical constraints, as repeatedly discussed in the literature, but also because of internal and external institutional deficiencies. According to the UN’s report, ‘The Sex and Age Distribution of the World Populations’ (UN 1994: 331), it is expected that, based on a medium variant projection, the population in Egypt will reach about 69 million in 2000 and 117 million by 2050, more than double the population of 1986. Presently, more than half of the population is rural (57.6%), but the country is experiencing rapid urbanisation. Although the urban growth rate is only 2.5% per annum (World Bank 1997), this annual increase is tremendous in the Greater Cairo Region (GCR), which forms the biggest metropolitan area anywhere in Africa or the Middle East. The population of GCR, 10.6 million in 1986, was estimated to reach 16.1 million by 2000 (UNCHS 1993: 98), i.e. 50 per cent of the total Egyptian urban population. Nevertheless, the rate of growth reaches 4% per annum in many Egyptian
cities specially in Upper Egypt where the levels of education are lower, families are larger and poverty is higher.

Because the decision of transforming a village to a city depends on political and administrative regularities in Egypt regardless of its size or function (PADCO 1982; Poppe 1991), urban growth is largely uncontrolled and occupies scarce and valuable agricultural zones which are rapidly decreasing in the Nile Delta and Valley. The 1979 Housing Plan estimated that some 60,000 feddans (25,210 ha.) of agricultural land were being lost annually due to urbanisation, resulting in a loss of 20% of the arable land by the year 2000 (Abt 1982: 34). The 1996 census revealed that 16 villages have become cities, 8 have agglomerated to form 2 new cities, and 20 villages have jointed 8 existing cities in the period between 1960-1996 (CAPMAS 1996). This is a severe problem for Egypt because of geographical constraints. The inhabited and cultivated area of the country represents only 5% of the total land area on which almost 99% of the population live, while the rest is a vast desert. The increasing population has had a severe impact upon the ratio of arable land per person, which had shrunk from 0.2 hectare in 1900 to 0.08 hectare in 1970 and continues to shrink. This situation raises fears that the limits to which increased productivity can make up for the decrease in area will soon be reached.

Housing and land provision for low income groups within the existing city boundaries have almost disappeared with the application of the ERSAP. Instead, the government has concentrated its efforts on spatial decentralisation away from the River Valley by means of constructing new cities, satellite cities and mega projects, such as the Toshka New Valley, South-west Egypt, and the El-Salaam Canal from the River Nile to Sinai. These new communities aim basically to decongest the already over-populated cities and enlarge the existing inhabited and cultivated area from 5% to 25% by 2020 (Al-Ahram: 16 December 1998). However, this is a centralised practice at the Cabinet level which does not follow clear guidelines and diverts the state's scarce resources away from the poor. The urban poor will eventually be forced to leave their settlements and re-accommodate themselves in the new communities (MH, 06-06-96). Unsurprisingly, the state has already announced its plan to clear 81 slum pockets in 24 Governorates (UNDP
1996: 54). The government totally ignored the large numbers of failed slum clearance experiences replicated in DCs, these issues are discussed in detail in Chapter 10.

Meanwhile, the government has started to sell desert land to large real estate associations, in line with the privatisation policy and building up partnerships with the private sector. The tidal wave of the new 'paradise' residential communities and sea resorts have become the focus of these Egyptian associations' interest. Unsurprisingly, they only build expensive new developments equipped with fibre optic connections, swimming pools and golf courses for the affluent classes. As a result, some individuals have profited greatly from such construction and speculation on land prices. While the main concern of those wishing to live in these new developments is whether or not the promoters have already embarked on the construction operations, such projects have provoked envy and fury among the poor. Furthermore, urban core areas have lost status, as higher income groups move out to new 'middle class' areas, leading to stagnation and their branding as 'slums'. In many areas, e.g. the old quarter in central Cairo, the result is physical and social deterioration, to the extent of the collapse of some buildings. Alternatively, they may be redeveloped in a piecemeal manner, as developers buy up existing buildings to construct medium or high-rise buildings for residential or commercial use, evicting or paying off existing tenants in the process.

The absolute increase in housing in urban areas is one of the most pressing problems in Egypt. The government took responsibility for the provision of low-income housing from the early 1960s. But, given the pace of urban population growth, it became less and less capable of satisfying demand, while private sector initiatives were only concerned with profit-maximisation. Although the 1986 census revealed that there were 1.8 million vacant housing units in Egypt and 523,000 in Cairo alone, most of these were beyond the reach of the urban poor. They were constructed by the private sector which always demanded large down payments (key-money) in advance. The effects of this are most notable in GCR; statistics reveal that 84% of new housing originated from a development process labelled as 'informal housing' by the government (Abt 1982). While core areas deteriorate, informal housing settlements provide essential access to employment opportunities and housing for low-income families. However, they do this at
Most informal settlements sprout at the city periphery and consequently, take place on agricultural land. They are thus a prime contributor to the loss of scarce agricultural land that has already been noted.

Although high urban population increase is obviously a driving factor of annual urban growth, it is also a consequence of uneven development which appears to be a symptom of urban and regional bias (Eiweida 1997); rural migrants are drawn to those urban agglomerations and city core areas where the concentration of industries and public and private services are most likely to allow their integration into the job market. However, statistics suggest that natural increase is now a bigger contributor than immigration to urban growth (CAPMAS 1996). Moreover, because popular and economic housing units and/or their accessibility to the poor have been neglected in housing policy, the urban poor ignore, in their turn, the housing code and planning or zoning arrangements (UNDP 1996: 54). Similar to other ‘self-built’ settlements in DCs, post facto planning and regularisation are expensive because squatters choose marginal sites (Turner 1988), thereby provision of services places great strains on the scarce resources of Egypt’s central government. The pace of informality results in increasingly overcrowded settlements deprived of a healthy environment and basic urban services.

These ‘situations’ do not benefit low-income urban groups. Urban problems are compounded by two fundamental political dilemmas, each with its own set of conflicting options. First is the need for central control over the policy implementation processes related to national development and the competing need for decentralisation in order to stimulate local initiative, responsibility, and creativity. Although the deconcentration of central-level personnel to local areas, including limited delegation of central prerogatives and authorities, took place during the past two decades, complete devolution of legislative authority and financial autonomy is still distant from Egypt’s local government system (Mayfield 1996). The Egyptian Ministry of Fiscal Planning has always the last word as to how resources are allocated throughout the central ministries and downwards to the Governorates level. Such centralisation of allocative and political power undermines legitimacy and encourages forms of governance unresponsive to local people’s needs. Second, local citizens need to be given opportunities for meaningful
participation to become willing to be politically active. These issues are discussed in more
detail in Section 5.5.

5.2- Donor agencies and power:

External development assistance has constituted the major input to urban sector
development in Egypt over the last three decades. Since embarking on the modernisation
processes after the 1952 revolution, diverse models of economic development, national
administration, land and housing management have been proposed and sponsored by
multi-and-bilateral donor agencies (DAs). There have been more than 15 major DAs
contributing some US$2.3 billion to the Egyptian economy every year. These, in order of
magnitude include the USA, the African Development Bank, Germany, the Islamic
Development Bank, the European Investment Bank, France, Japan, Denmark and the UK.
Complementary support for structural reforms has been funded by the IMF, the World
Bank and the European Union (EU). Individual contributions of such multi-and-bilateral
donor agencies to Egypt have been presented by each of them as substantial and vital to
Egypt’s development needs.

Most of these large aid flows into the urban sector in Egypt have failed to achieve
the intended results of sustainable development for the poor (Zetter and Hamza 1997).
Based on data collected from the 1970s and 1980s, Zetter and Hamza (1997) re-evaluated
three urban upgrading case studies: the Helwan Project, Cairo (USAID funded), the
Garbage Collectors Settlement, the Zabaleen, also in Cairo (World Bank, Oxfam and
Ford Foundation funded), and the Nasriya Project, Aswan (GTZ funded). They all
targeted issues of community development and participation, though the last had not been
completed when their assessment took place. Their analysis revealed common limitations
in project formulation, i.e. the ambiguous political rationale for participation, the desire
for short-term project visibility, and the poor conceptualisation of models of participation
and institution building. The above study argued that the failure of the pragmatic
managerialist approach adopted in Egypt, and the resulting conflicts in programme design
and delivery, can only be understood using a macro-micro methodology, linking macro
level political economy perspectives with micro level project-based analysis. While
acknowledging many forms of institutional deficiencies at the macro level of Egypt’s
bureaucracy, the study was critical of the DAs' performance as well, arguing that funds were inappropriately allocated because of reluctance on the part of donors to implement development projects unless these satisfied their set of criteria. For instance, the emphasis on high visibility and consumption rather than production outputs meant that housing was addressed through a pragmatic managerialist approach which associated participation with administrative factors, such as the use of centralised bureaucratic organisations. This approach can only provide second level solutions which do not address the conceptual, cultural and institutional complexities underlying the intervention processes. Rather, the instrumental requirements of the donors will serve the internal political and bureaucratic interests' resistance to structural change in urban policy and strategy (Zetter and Hamza 1997: 164).

Several proposals made by international DAs are, indeed, based on occidental criteria with little concern for the characteristics of a given place and its specific structures and values. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 1993), for instance, recommends two steps by which national governments can avoid possible clashes between citizens and their 'inflexible' government systems. The first is to start a rapid democratic transition, along with a strengthening of civil society institutions. Secondly, they should decentralise, granting more authority to local governments, and give much greater freedom and scope for action to local NGOs and GROs. The execution of such specific proposals, though necessary in the long term, may be unrealistic and even dangerous in the short. They are characterised by totality, universality and indifference to divergent cultural and ruling mechanisms in DCs. Rapid transition in any authoritarian regime can only cause its sudden weakening, which would probably spark off wide-spread anti-government demonstrations and civil disturbance, and consequently a sudden economic slump, which might fuel further intense political conflict (Linz 1978; Baloyra 1987). Such outcomes are likely to paralyse and eventually cause the collapse of the regime, leaving the country in a potential state of chaos and anarchy, which surely does not promote peace, development or positive civil participation. Democratic transition within the existing regime in Egypt is a quite problematic and involved process. Mayfield (1996: 329) argues that increasing pluralism and the process of democratisation would better begin at the local people's council level. Transition can best be conceptualised as a
process of concession from above by which greater civil and political rights are gradually extended, but at a rate of change that is not too threatening to the regime in power.

While it is justified for donor countries to benefit from any aid they offer, surely it is even more so for the recipient; Egypt, too, should have gained from aid to solve its urban problems. The romantic view of the co-operative role of external development assistance to alleviate poverty and sustain development in Egypt has become to a large extent redundant. International development agencies have always constructed an image of Egypt as a place with a vast population packed within a limited agricultural area and increasing in size at a rate that outpaces its ability to feed itself. Clearly this image is useful to the state in maintaining the status quo. It diverts attention from services and housing supply and establishing collaborative forms of governance based on public trust. It has also shifted the country’s resources gradually from staple foods production to more expensive items of imported consumables (Mitchell 1995). Techno-culturally, the motive behind the focus on such deceptive imaginative geographies has always been a discursive regime of power-knowledge created to promote a justification for the need for external technical and administrative know-how ‘intelligence’ to solve these problems (Said 1995; Gregory 1995: 456).

Building on the geo-political standpoint, Mitchell continues his criticism of the policies of DAs working in Egypt and takes the practices of USAID and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as examples, since they constitute the largest multi-and-bilateral DAs contributing to the Egyptian economy every year. He argues that from the late 1980s, as USAID and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) imposed policies that removed price subsidies, increased unemployment, and brought economic recession, the degree of inequality almost certainly increased (Mitchell 1995: 133). The United States always repeats that Egypt has received an excess of US$24 billion over the last 20 years, but in fact, it has imported commodities and machinery worth US$48 billion from the US, and the bulk of US grants and loans has been spent on American experts (Palmer et al. 1988). American experts supervising the building of a water station in Bani Sweif Governorate, for instance, received more than US$100 million in salaries, benefits, vehicles and feasibility studies over a period of ten years (Mayfield 1996). Donor governments
often gain many times more than they spend on assistance programmes, which offer them more investments abroad, prevents economic crises in their countries and create job opportunities. A USAID report, for instance, documents some of the direct economic benefits of US assistance to American companies and institutions in 1993-1994: “Close to 80 percent of USAID's contracts and grants flow back to American firms. Shipping contracts, technical expertise, supplies, and agricultural products have meant American jobs and economic benefits in our own back yard. US assistance programs have also helped open some of the most dynamic markets for US exports abroad” (USAID 1999).

While the report stresses that US aid effectively helps US diplomacy and makes the world more receptive and respectful towards the United States, its citizens and its interests, the undisclosed aim is to continue expanding US markets beyond its borders. American exports to developing countries rise by 12% every year, while the annual increase in American exports to industrial nations is less than 6%. Despite the fact that Egypt might not be gaining real development from using the US aid, there is a continuous threat to terminate this assistance if Egypt does not follow US goals and interests. The last US threat to terminate aid to Egypt was in 1998 when some U$50 million of Egypt’s annual share of US aid was cut. Stressing the success of the economic reform programme in Egypt in marginalising the importance of US economic assistance, the Egyptian Minister of Economy declared that a reduction or termination in US assistance is not expected to cause any adverse repercussions for the Egyptian economy: “The U$2.1 billion that Egypt receives from the US is a mere two per cent of Egypt’s U$75 billion Gross National Product (GNP). US aid was about 10 per cent of GNP at the outset of the programme in 1991 but now the economy can deal with any attempt on the part of the US to cut aid without incurring heavy losses” (Al-Ahram Weekly: 19 February 1998). Thus Egypt is mulling over ideas to be offered to the US on reducing economic aid, but with particular emphasis on supporting the country's economic reform drive, i.e. ‘Trade not Aid’.

These are the contemporary global mechanisms resulting from the ERSAP, which leave little choice to the Egyptian government other than to accept instructions from above. Bilateral agencies pour into Egypt where each one sets its own agenda to fulfil
specific demands. They often introduce new policies and systems to approach the
problems, with varied results. Within such a climate, any attempt to institutionalise the
process of urban development in Egypt must consider the broader mechanisms of foreign
aid involved, local government and its current administrative reform and accountability
rebuilding, and civic-empowerment processes and their associated constraints. The
prospects for a "rapid democratic transition" to contemporary Egypt require an
examination of multiple-variant factors at the local internal level, which is the focus of the
following sections.

5.3- Egypt's political context:

The effect of Egypt's political, legislative and administrative systems on local
government are inter-related in a way that makes it difficult to consider one without the
other. According to the 1971 Constitution, Egypt is an autonomous republic in which the
People's Assembly has legislative power. The Assembly has a total of 454 seats, of which
10 are usually filled by presidential decree. The last election was in 1995 when more than
1,000 candidates from 13 political parties and over 2,500 candidates without declared
party affiliation contested 444 seats. The President's party, the National Democratic Party
(NDP) won with an overwhelming majority. Egypt's political and legislative system is in
many ways hierarchical (Figure 5.2). The President is nominated by two-thirds of the
elected People's Assembly and has broad constitutional powers. He appoints vice
presidents, prime ministers, and the Council of Ministers- the cabinet or 'government'.
Presidential appointees include senior civil servants, heads of autonomous agencies,
governors, judges and public sector senior managers. A large presidential bureaucracy,
managed by a ministerial level appointee, is a personal instrument of control over the
wider bureaucracy. The Prime Minister wields a lot of powers as well. He commands the
large state bureaucracy through the Council of Ministers and can personally intervene at
any level to achieve his objectives if the chain of command proves sluggish. Since the
levers of macro-economic policy- banks, the budget, and the large public sector- are
under government control, broad responsibility for running the economy is within the
Prime Minister's domain.
Figure 5.2: Egypt- Administrative and legislative functional structure

Central level

People’s Assembly
Legislation, public approvals and public inputs

President
Prime Minister
Policy formulation and co-ordination

Committees
Economic Affairs, Services, Production, and Legal Affairs
Co-ordination and policy review

Deputy Prime Minister
Urban Affairs, Economy Finance and Planning
Policy directives, investment co-ordination and approval, monitoring and evaluation

Member of People’s Assembly (MPs)
Citizens representative to play intermediary role

Cabinet
Co-ordination and review

Local level

Popular Local Councils
At Governorate level
Public approvals and inputs

Governors Offices
Overall
Data collection, planning and programming, budgeting and revenues, project development, monitoring and evaluation.

Governors

Line Ministries
Departments & Branches of Central Agencies
Sectoral-Governorate
Data collection, planning and programming, budgeting and revenues, project development assistance, and monitoring.

Regional Planning Authorities
Nine regions
Information, planning and programming assistance, data collection, monitoring and evaluation.

Popular Local Councils
At district, city and village levels.
Public approvals and inputs.

Municipalities (Mayors)
At local administration level: District, city and village.
Data collection, budgeting and revenues, implementation and development control and monitoring.

Source: Author- Adapted from PADCO (1982).
Chapter 5 Politics and Urban Government in Egypt

Similar to the Council of Ministers, which operates at the central level, there is a Governors’ Council which is also led by the Prime Minister and is responsible for reviewing matters relating to the local government system and proposing changes in procedures and legislation. All governors in Egypt are appointed by the centre as generalist representatives of the president and, in a similar way to the French prefectoral system, are assumed to represent the same national interests as central government. However, they have substantial authority and power to issue a wide range of decrees, which is positive for decentralisation. The mayors come next in the power hierarchy; they function as ‘council-managers’ because they are not elected but appointed by the Prime Minister.

The history of centralisation and the current concentration of decision-making power at the centre cannot be ignored when considering strategies for the development of participatory structures and systems. Central ministries are usually defined by functional specialisation and operate through formalised programme implementation; they are seldom capable of shifting priorities or adapting national policies to local needs. Moreover, since the 1952 revolution, the National Democratic Party is firmly established in power and dominates the political process at all levels. From the point of view of participatory processes, this has advantages and disadvantages. While the main advantage is that of continuity, there are two obvious disadvantages in a situation in which political change is unlikely. The first is the lack of incentives for improved performance among politicians and senior officials. The second is the danger of political apathy. Fergany (1995) reports the results of an opinion poll carried out in Cairo, which revealed that over half the 1500 people interviewed had no opinion on whether a specific party represented them, while over a quarter considered that none of the present parties represented them. Of course such a low profile of citizen political participation jeopardises the establishment of a meaningful model of citizen governance. The forces that shape and direct citizens' political participation will be addressed.
5.4- Local government system:

Local government has limited power in Egypt. Administrative systems were very centralised from 1923 up to the 1952 revolution, although the Constitution and associated laws were frequently amended. The first constitution of 1923 provided a framework for local administration, dividing Egypt into provinces, districts, and villages. The 14 provinces were each headed by a high-level central government official who reported to the Ministry of the Interior, they were further subdivided into 96 districts, each headed by a police officer, and some 4000 villages, each headed by a village chief. It has been suggested that the Egyptian bureaucracy during this time was ill-equipped to stimulate and develop the country's economy and that its main tasks were to maintain order and collect revenue (Bianchi 1989). The leaders of the 1952 revolution continued the tradition of centralising power, giving almost total responsibility for the planning and implementation of their ambitious economic and social development programmes to central government bureaucrats.

A new constitution, introduced by referendum in 1956, was vague about the role of local government, stating only that "The Egyptian republic shall be divided into administrative units, and all or some of them may enjoy a corporate status". A total of 25 Governorates were created in 1960 under law 124 which delegated all functions which were predominantly local to local authorities. These were further divided into smaller units as will be explained later. During the 1960s local administrative units fell under unitary authorities, including elected, selected and ex-officio members. All elected members had to be elected under the Arab Socialist Union (the official party) system. The last Constitution of 1971, including its amendments in 1980, also said little about the local government system. In 1975, a dual system of a non-elected Executive Council and a partly elected popular council was introduced at each administrative level to enhance citizens' representation. In 1979, the Local Administration Law 43 was amended to strengthen the authority of governors by reducing the administrative and budgetary controls of the central government over the Governorates. Local government was given wider powers to sell land and raise local taxes, which reduced their demands on the central treasury. Although these amendments were fully utilised by some Governors, who
issued local decrees to enhance decentralisation and reform, many others did not. However, it has been argued that these amendments were not enough, and the local government structures and administrative hierarchy are still in many ways submissive to the centre (Palmer et al. 1988; Mayfield 1996).

Egypt is currently divided into 26 Governorates of which four (Cairo, Alexandria, Port Said and Suez) are predominantly urban. Other Governorates are subdivided into districts, cities and villages in descending order. Cities and each of the four predominantly urban Governorates are divided into quarters (Figure 5.3). These quarters correspond roughly to the village level found in more rural governments. The Governorates and their offices at the district and local levels, which are the main vehicle for the provision of municipal services, are linked with central government in two important ways. First, the governors are appointed rather than elected and second, there is no separate cadre of local government officers employed directly by the Governorate administration. Rather, representatives of central ministries, line-ministries, are placed at the various levels within the Governorate structures.

Figure 5.3: Egypt- Local government hierarchy

Source: Author
5.4.1- The operating context:

The operating context of Egypt's administrative and legislative structures is to a large extent complicated. While the President, the Prime Minister and the cabinet operate at the central level and head the administrative hierarchy, the People's Assembly operates as a counterweight at the central level and heads the legislative system. This is replicated throughout Governorates at the local government level. While governors and mayors head the administrative system and the Executive Councils at their respective levels, elected Popular Local Councils represent the legislative power. In effect, the Executive Council is the administrative branch of government while the local council embodies the democratic and local regulatory aspects of the system. Although the local administrative and legislative system work interdependently, it is easier to consider them separately first, in order to examine the chances open for shifting the balance from centralised, expert-based systems to decentralised, citizen-centred systems.

The administrative context:

At each level of the local administrative system, there is an Executive Council chaired by a chief executive (Governor at the Governorate level and Mayor at the city or village level), and the members are the representatives of line ministries that have functions and responsibilities at each level. While the structure of functions performed at the village Executive Council level seems simple, it expands at the city and district levels to include more offices and there is also a shift of functions out of the headquarters into the service department area, e.g. supply, youth and sports. The District Executive Council operates also as the Executive Council of the city in which the district seat is located. The structure of the Executive Council becomes even more involved at the Governorate level as there is an even greater proportion of functions in the service department area. A simplified representation of the Governorate Executive Council shows it to be made up of eight divisions (Figure 5.4).

Other types of office operating within the Governorates, which are not accountable to the local administration because they are established at the Governorate level and represented at the Governorate Executive Council level, are the field offices of various central agencies, such as the Central Agency for Population, Mobilisation and
Statistics, the Central Agency for Organisation and Management, the National Authority for Roads and Bridges, the National Authority for Telecommunication. Governors are authorised to establish what are called Governor’s Affairs Offices. These include, in Aswan Governorate for instance, the Production and Economic Affairs Office, Urban Development and Land Management Unit, Complaints and Citizen’s Services, and Legal Affairs among others. Heads of these offices are also represented in the Governorate Executive Council (Figure 5.4).

Figure 5.4: Egypt- Governorate Executive Council structure

The structure of Executive Councils is criticised for it contains a dualism that becomes more pronounced as one moves up the levels of the system. The split is between offices that are fully under the management control of the unit chief (Mayor) and those that are administratively under his control but technically under the control of a central
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ministry. The dualism is typically expressed as a difference between headquarters departments and service departments. The basic structural features of the Executive Council system are not easily made out from the welter of office designations and organisation charts, but there are significant differences between sectors. Agriculture, education, health, and even social affairs, for instance, seem to be highly centralised and hardly responsive to local councils at any level. To a large extent, they have their own local administrative geography based on the locations of co-operatives, schools, health units and so on.

The structural feature which governs the performance of service sectors, e.g. water, sewerage, roads, etc., is the dualism of the directorates' structure and the headquarters' structure. At the district, city and village levels, technical functions are managed by the engineering affairs departments, which are part of the local unit headquarters. Thus the environmental impact of any service sector project should be co-ordinated with these departments. At the Governorate level, service directorates receive substantial procedural and technical directions from their parent ministries. Their budget allocations for capital, operation and maintenance, and salaries are listed individually and separately from the headquarters capital. They also have their own contracting and procurement departments. All these give relative autonomy for service directorates, notwithstanding they ought to co-ordinate through the regular Executive Council meetings. However, policy implementation at the Governorate and district centre levels falls into almost watertight compartments with co-ordination arranged centrally or through the interplay of the Governorate Executive Council (Mayfield 1996). Certainly, it seems that officials at the municipal level look to their own central ministries for guidance on 'technical' matters.

The legislative context:

The legislative structure- namely the Popular Local Councils (PLCs), works in parallel with the executive administration but its members and heads are all elected. Each PLC comprises 10 directly elected representatives from each district, who in turn elect a Head. Elected PLCs have acquired the power, at least theoretically, to approve or disapprove the local budget. Authority on matters relating to budgets and the
implementation of policy is delegated to the Executive Councils, while PLCs are instruments of ratification and public participation, with general review and consultative responsibilities. According to Article 12 of the Local Administrative Law (43/1979) and its subsequent amendments, thirteen specific tasks are assigned to the PLCs (Box 5.1).

**Box 5.1: Egypt- The main responsibilities of the Popular Local Councils.**

- Determining the projects to be included in social and economic development plans.
- Proposing the annual budget of the Governorate, following up its execution and approving the proposal of the final statement account. This refers to the Governorate level and is the same at more local levels.
- Preparing a plan for local people’s participation which identifies possibilities for supporting local projects. Although the exact degree of participation envisaged is not clear, the focus is likely to be on financial participation.
- Approval of general projects relating to housing, construction and utilities and urban planning.

Source: Adapted from Local Administration Law 43 (1979).

Subsequent amendments to the law have had some significance for municipal systems. Law 59, passed in 1981, introduced some minor amendments to Law 43, increasing the responsibilities of local councils in some areas and giving them some added authority to raise local revenues. However, Law 145, passed in 1988 increased central control over some fiscal matters, including the disbursement procedures for the various Special Account Funds. However, the potentially most interesting clause from the point of view of the development of local participatory procedures is Article 133 which explicitly states that the popular council has the right to seek resolution from the Ministry of Local Administration or the Prime Minister if it disagrees with the Governorate budget as presented to it. Mayfield (1996) notes the possibility that this may be a ‘sleeper’ clause with important implications for strengthening popular councils in the long run.

By the mid-1990s, deconcentration and local delegation started to become more of a reality. The Council of Governors tries, at least theoretically, to let special local conditions formulate local policies and plan in a bottom-up manner. The Local Administration Law 43 (1979) was amended in 1996 to give more equitable representation of people within the popular local councils. The government’s election ‘list’ system was deemed unconstitutional and was replaced with a ‘direct’ election
system. Moreover, the total number of representatives at all levels of local popular council was increased. In the case of Governorates, the total number of representatives from each district has also increased from six to ten members. Table 5.2 gives details of the hierarchy of popular councils and their composition.

Table 5.2: Egypt- Local popular councils hierarchy and composition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Total number of representatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governorates</td>
<td>10 representatives from each district. This number increases to 14 in the Governorates of Canal Zone, Matrooh, New Valley, North and South Sinai and the Red Sea. (Article 10).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Districts</td>
<td>10 representatives from each local unit in the district except for the capital city (represented by 12 members) and cities with more than one quarter (represented by 14 members). (Article 39).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cities</td>
<td>14 representatives from each quarter. If the city consists of only one quarter, the total number of representatives becomes 24. (Article 47).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quarters</td>
<td>12 representatives from each administrative section. If the quarter consists of only one administrative section, the total number of representatives becomes 18. (Article 59).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Villages</td>
<td>A total number of 24 if the local unit consists of only one village, and 2 representatives from the mother village and 1 representative from each helmet village if the local unit comprises more than one village up to a maximum number of 24. (Article 66).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author- Adapted from the Local Administration Law 43 (1979) and its amendments in 1996.

Strongly supported by the Prime Minister through the Governors’ Council, Governors are encouraged to enhance co-ordination among all government bodies working in their Governorates and they enjoy more authority over their local revenues. Moreover, they are authorised to transfer heads of districts and cities within the premises of the Governorates and to appoint new heads to quarter and village local units in order to improve the performance of municipalities. Such practices used to be very centralised until 1997. However, it seems that the PLCs’ power is more theoretical than real at present. While the functions of PLCs cover nearly the entire scope of local administration, their specific role, as set out in the local administration law, is best described as advisory. Heads of PLCs, at Governorate level, are no longer represented in the Governors’ Council, at national level, and thus are excluded from discussions of action options or making changes based on observed performance.
The fieldwork survey revealed that PLCs have virtually no budgets or staff under their direct control, hence have little access to information. Public policy decisions are made based on the preference of elite practitioners or deliberation limited to some elected representatives. They are granted a small area of responsibilities in public policy and given very little real authority. The PLCs can suggest plans, projects, studies, and procedures. They can also ratify plans and budgets, notwithstanding it is not clear whether they have the right to contest them according to the law. Although their authority includes the right to challenge decisions of the Chief of the Executive Council and to question an official's capacity for command, this right often remain intact, depending on the clout and influence of the Governors and key individuals within each Governorate. The reality of the democratic relationships between the legislative and administrative systems at the local level, including such personal and contextual factors, are discussed in detail in Chapter 10.

5.4.2- Municipal functions:

Local government units are responsible for establishing and managing a range of public utilities within their respective administrative areas (district, city and village), and within the limits established by the Government's general policies and plans. Each takes charge of all the tasks performed by the ministries pursuant to the applicable laws and regulations, with the exception of national utilities of a special nature, such as motor ways, airports, dams and embankments. Law 43 (1979) specifies the utilities to be established and managed at the Governorate level and those to be entrusted to more local units of government. Articles 5 to 27 of the executive regulation of Law 43 (1979) determine twenty three areas of services to be planned and established by the local government units in co-ordination with the Governorates. These include educational facilities, health care, housing, urbanisation and local infrastructure utilities, social affairs, food supply, agricultural affairs, land reclamation, irrigation, cultural development, youth and sports, transportation, economic and rural development, vocational small-scale industries and security. While some responsibilities are delegated to all levels of the system down to the village unit, most are delegated to the district level.

For all Egyptian cities, Engineering Departments within municipalities comprise five main sub-sections (Box 5.2). Housing and physical infrastructure are the
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responsibility of departments reporting to the Ministry of Housing and Utilities. In the case of water and sewerage utilities, other than in Greater Cairo, the Ministry works through the National Organisation for Potable Water and Sanitary Drainage (NOPWSD). In Cairo, city-level municipal companies take responsibility for water supply and drainage. These no longer report to the Ministry which does not have direct responsibility for them.

Box 5.2: Egypt- The main sub-sections of municipal Engineering Departments

- **Land Properties** *(el-Amlak)*: Land sale and management.
- **Organisation and licences** *(el-Tanzeem)*: Building control, alignment and the inspection of all buildings under construction.
- **Projects section** *(el Mashroaat)*: Construction management of government buildings that do not fall under a specialist ‘general’ organisation such as the General Organisation of Educational Facilities.
- **Environmental Section** *(el-Bee’aa)*: Solid waste management.
- **Utilities** *(El-Marafek)*: Design and supervision of all infrastructure and utilities’ work.

Source: Fieldwork survey.

Although the Engineering Departments of village units have a special subsection for public participation projects, responsible for reviewing all proposals for projects partially or totally funded by local community leaders and groups who have raised their own resources outside the formal government budget process, the law does not clarify the extent to which this mechanism is actually used, while nothing is mentioned about cities. Municipal officials interviewed in Ismailia and Aswan did not appear to recognise it in the form described here (OA, 26-11-1998; MA, 01-04-98). Even if it is used, it is likely that participation is by Popular and Executive Council members rather than the community in general. Nevertheless, it provides a possible institutional mechanism for supporting participatory initiatives.

Urban planning ordinances in Egypt are ‘unrealistic’, considering the existing capabilities of local governments and their performance. The overall urban planning strategies are defined at the centre by the Ministry of Housing and Utilities through its General Organisation for Physical Planning (GOPP). The GOPP is not represented in every Governorate. Instead, there are nine regional planning offices covering the Greater Cairo Region, Alexandria, Matrooh, Delta, Suez Canal, North Upper Egypt, Assuit, the Red Sea, and South Upper Egypt. Meanwhile, the legal framework of urban planning law
in Egypt gives scope for municipalities themselves to prepare and adjust the technical planning process at local level. Urban Planning Law 3 (1982) makes local government units, or municipalities, responsible for urban planning and local development schemes for existing cities. This responsibility is theoretically applied at three main planning stages: the Structure Plan, General or Master Planning and Detailed Planning. The last includes specific initiatives such as land subdivision schemes and urban upgrading schemes.

Theoretically, all urban planning processes should be done in co-ordination with the local political decision-makers and require the final approval of the General Organisation for Physical Planning (GOPP) in Cairo (SS, 30-05-96). Public participation sessions for specific local discussions and public hearings are a requirement. Throughout the process, planning decisions should be discussed with all political and administrative bodies in order to achieve a common understanding of the problems identified, the strategies proposed and the actions required. In reality, municipalities cannot fulfil all these tasks efficiently; there is a shortage of qualified staff, and problems of co-ordination and information exchange between organisations. Another factor is the lack of a planning ‘culture’ within local government. These variables of ‘accountable bureaucratic capacity’ will be taken into account when considering options for improved approaches to urban planning involving greater levels of citizen participation in Chapter 10.

5.4.3- Municipal finances:

Government finances are highly centralised in Egypt; over 96% of total government revenue is collected centrally (Mayfield 1996). An analysis of Governorate budgets for the years 1986/87 showed that central transfers accounted for an average of 73.4% of total expenditure, although the percentage is rather less for urban Governorates. Much of this funding was provided through ‘sectoral’ allocations to the Governorates made through the various central ministries located in Cairo. At first sight, these figures confirm that the Egyptian fiscal system is highly centralised. However, there is potential for local resource mobilisation. The direct sources of revenue for local administrative units include taxes, fees and charges (licenses). Direct sources of revenue in urban areas include property taxes on buildings (based on the assessed rental value of the buildings), taxes on places of entertainment, utility tariffs and receipts from public markets.
Article 51 of the amended Law on Local Administration provides city councils with access to eleven itemised sources of revenue in the form of taxes, fees, licenses, service tariffs and other charges. Taxes imposed on buildings located within the city’s administrative boundary are perhaps the most important of these. Seventy-five percent of the revenue collected from agricultural and property taxes can be retained at the city level with the remainder being forwarded to the Governorate. Article 54 of the Law on Local Administration states that each PLC at the Governorate, district, city and village levels should establish a Local Services and Development Fund (LSDF). These funds have the long-term objective of stimulating greater local resource mobilisation and developing greater local autonomy in respect of finances and programme implementation. Until the 1970s, the funds were mainly used for welfare type activities, including food subsidies for the poor.

In the 1980s, some local councils began to use LSDFs to finance projects aimed at generating income to supplement revenues from central government budget resources. Today, the LSDFs represent the largest and most discretionary of the revenues being collected by local units. There is some tension between the desire of the Centre to control and audit the use of locally generated funds and the drive for greater local autonomy. While Mayfield (1996) argued that it is generally recognised that LSDFs provide a flexible source of funding which has, in most cases, been allocated for worthwhile projects and services, he reported that the Central Agency for Auditing has reported misuse of funds in some instances and has suggested that some form of greater control needs to be established. Box 5.3 lists the sources of finance for the LSDF at the Governorate level.

Box 5.3: Egypt- Sources of finance for the Local Services and Development Fund (LSDF) at the Governorate level.

- Fees imposed by Popular Local Council specifically for the fund, these are collected at the Governorate level with a portion being distributed to lower level units.
- Profits from income generating projects financed by the fund.
- Income from donations, grants and legacies to the fund which the Governorate’s Popular Local Council approves for allocation to the fund.
- Half of any increase in the Governorate’s revenue over the amount estimated in the budget, with the remainder going to the public treasury.

Source: Author- Adapted from the Local Administration Law 43 (1979).
The Local Administration Law emphasises that the fund is to be used in accordance with the decision of the PLCs for a range of purposes including the financing of projects which are established by local efforts and participation. This appears to offer a mechanism for financing community initiated schemes and corresponds to Egypt’s recent emphasis on the need to encourage local entrepreneurship. In Ismailia Governorate, for instance, sources of finance for the LSDF at the Governorate level have been extended to include money generated from land sales. The revenues are now used to finance part of new infrastructure networks, the construction of a wholesale market with the intention of supporting local small-scale entrepreneurs, confronting the problem of solid-waste disposal, constructing low cost housing units, and implementing several upgrading projects throughout the Governorate, explained Ms Habiba Eid, Director of the UNDP-funded Sustainable Ismailia Project (HE, 17-12-98).

Two other positive initiatives by municipal officials to generate funds for LSDFs through, for instance, soliciting of extra payments for the issuing of certain certificates have been noted (Mayfield 1996). This practice appears to be a variant on ‘rent seeking’ behaviour with the important difference that a receipt is provided for the extra payment which is deposited in the LSDF rather than the official’s pocket. It would seem probable that this mechanism works best at the village level where social pressure may help to prevent true rent-seeking behaviour and there may be a shared interest in collecting funds for specific local purposes. Another common practice is to solicit donations for a given project from a prominent family and to use its commitment to leverage funds out of other such families. This practice suggests that small rural municipalities tend to be more financially self-sufficient than urban units. However, according to the amendments of the Law 43-1979, local governments are encouraged to enter into joint ventures with private investors; in effect developing a partnership between government officials and the local rich that parallels the open-market alliance at the national level encouraged by current government policy. While there is clearly considerable scope for local resource mobilisation, there is a danger that such a mechanism could be used to suit the needs of the elite rather than the community as a whole. This issue is important and hence, will be further investigated in Chapter 10.
5.5- Civil society participation:

In the light of the ERSAP and the state’s shift from producing to planning and monitoring production and distribution, it has been expected that civil society’s role will increase. In reality, the state jurisdictions have been working against establishing that particular type of civil society concerned with maintaining democracy and ensuring that the government is accountable and effective. The government has reduced the realm of politics to distribution. At the citizens’ level, the government constantly strives to limit and control mass political participation, while maintaining its legitimacy by providing goods and services to the population (Singerman 1997: 245). Thus the state sustains its power through monitoring production and distribution, whilst citizens participate by consuming. “To be political, and remain out of danger, is to consume. To be political, and be in danger, is to participate seriously in formal politics” (Singerman 1997: 245). The government’s policies of political exclusion have thus gone hand in hand with their public commitment to provide the basic needs for the masses in return for their political acquiescence.

Even those politically active citizens who venture to participate, are discouraged in many ways. Issuing vote cards, for instance, is only possible during two weeks in December and citizens are required to submit several documents. They also have to tolerate embroiled red tape bureaucracy before they get the card. In this context, any form of pluralist activation at groups’ level is also restrained. The state controls and regulates every common mechanism that people use to enhance their collective interests, e.g. unions, meetings of any kind, political parties, newspapers, voluntary associations, interest groups, demonstrations, books, radio, and television. Those who consciously resist the state, or who engage in strategies that conflict with statist objectives, are rarely free of fear and retribution. Although theoretically speaking the stronger civil society is, the more a state can act indirectly to fulfil its commitment (Walzer 1995: 3), it seems that the government in Egypt has never empowered civil society to act entirely according to its own agenda, or to address the needs of its fellow citizens.

A draft law articulated in 1997 to amend the regulations which govern the activities of some 15,000 NGOs working in Egypt, Law 32 of 1964, has opened
widespread controversies, especially among human rights activists. The government has tried to over-contain civil society within the framework of the state through the amendment of its domineering jurisdictions. "The law is not prohibitive and the row is about procedures.

If NGOs were left alone they would not be able to function, or at least they would not function as effectively as when they are backed by the government", said the Minister of Social Affairs (Al-Ahram Weekly: 4 June 1998). Such patronage not only over-regulates the activities of NGOs but also stifles all forms of civil society. Although active civil society organisations in Egypt have been trying to urge the government to facilitate the procedures of registration and restrict the authority of administrative bodies, the draft law introduces the new proviso that all NGOs must be approved and registered with the Ministry of Social Affairs. It also gives the government the right to appoint its own officials to NGO boards which will definitely weaken the authority of members of these boards in favour of the Ministry of Social Affairs. While the draft law has dropped the government's right to dissolve an NGO and suggests instead that disputes be taken to court, the power is still tilted in the state's favour because the judiciary will rule according to the NGO law, not according to the far less restrictive civil law. In spite of the fact that the draft has been open for discussion with advocacy organisations and leaders of human rights, the latter view the by-law as repressive and consider that it only "fosters the state's control and limits civil society independence"; according to Abu Zahra, Professor of Behavioural Science, Alexandria University, and Head of 'Friends of the Environment', an active NGO in Egypt (Al-Ahram Weekly: 11 June 1998). Moreover, the draft law uses many vague terms which can easily be manipulated by the government in order to impose further restrictions. As yet, the draft by-law has neither been approved by the public nor officially endorsed.

Undoubtedly, as power is concentrated, the machinations of the elite who run the ERSAP guide state objectives, whilst the power of the popular sector in low-income areas, the subject of this study, is assumed by the state to be 'neutralised'. Thus the urban poor and popular classes "have either been brutally repressed, co-opted, or have grown apathetic and acquiescent, socialised into accepting elite domination" (Singerman 1997:
3). The political participation of ordinary men and women is circumscribed as repression and fear work to intimidate their voices and their leaders. But this negative scenario does not seem to be all-encompassing in Egyptian cities. A study carried out about family, politics, and networks in poor urban quarters of Cairo proved that, far from being politically apathetic, or acquiescent, the urban poor engage in a range of activities that have political import and aggregate power for collective benefit (Singerman 1997). The following Chapters will also examine the potential dynamics which exist in another two cities, Ismailia and Aswan.

The performance of civil society organisations themselves and the extent to which they are accountable for the services they provide and/or the foreign aid they receive are also questionable. Some research, presented during a conference on the ‘Role of Non-governmental Organisations in Egypt’s National Development Strategy’ (Cairo 1993), agreed that an overwhelming majority of active NGOs working in the area of community development still lack managerial capabilities and planning skills, such as community needs assessment, project planning, implementation and appraisal (UNICEF 1994). They also face many other problems and constraints which hinder their action and reduce their effectiveness. They are unable to raise sufficient financial resources and thus their independence and freedom of action is questionable (Al-Sawaf 1995: 6).

A detailed study of the constraints facing Egyptian private voluntary organisations and the role of management training was carried out by a UNICEF survey in 1993 in the Governorates of Cairo, Alexandria and Assuit. Many active NGO leaders and members were interviewed; in addition, three participant-observation workshops, each attended by between 23 to 28 members representing civil society organisations and municipal officials, were held (Al-Sawaf 1995: 7). Interviewees were requested to identify the main problems and constraints faced by civil society organisations in their respective Governorates. The results showed a relatively high degree of consistency and concurrence among the answers, while most of the problem areas were mentioned in all three Governorates. A long list of the problems found has been clustered into four categories, financial, managerial, institutional and cultural (Box 5.4).
Box: 5.4: Egypt- Obstacles facing the effective operation of civil society organisations

- **Financial obstacles**: insufficient financial resources to carry out independent development project; and lack of financial and moral incentives for NGO staff and volunteers.

- **Managerial obstacles**: lack of adequate knowledge of the regulating articles; inadequate skills in assessing needs, project planning and management skills, including lack of innovative project ideas; problems in communication and management among NGO board of directors, NGO full-time staff and social affairs directors; inadequate technical and administrative capacities of NGO staff and shortage of technical and managerial skills; and shortage of NGO trained leaders and volunteers.

- **Institutional obstacles**: inadequacies in the laws and regulations governing civil society; non-availability of information on community needs; the frequent changes in government and donor policies; and lack of co-ordination among NGOs themselves.

- **Cultural obstacles**: inadequate public relations on the part of NGOs and the lack of attention given to them in the mass media; men often dominate gender projects; and women's perspectives are often ignored in such projects.

Source: Adapted from UNICEF (1994).

Although assessing an NGO's development performance is a complicated task, since it involves achievement on at least three levels: operational activities, strategic choices, and organisational standing in society (Fowler 1997: 163), the UNICEF study has focused attention on the urgent need for training programmes, technical assistance, on-the-job advice, monitoring, advocacy, dialogue and selective financial and material assistance (UNICEF 1994). However, there is always a fair degree of scepticism about the impact of training programmes in Egypt. “Most training programmes in Egypt tend to be theoretical because practitioners often lack sound professional and practical grounding”, ascertained Professor Salah Arrafa of the American University in Cairo and a GTZ Community Development Consultant (SA, 04-06-98). Many training programmes are too generic, 'off-the-shelf' and not tailor-made to fit the specific needs of participants. The same materials are repeatedly used by the trainers and some exercises designed in the West are used without any adaptation, especially in the area of gender sensitisation (SA, 04-06-98).

Training programmes are also conducted as 'one-shot' interventions with little follow-up, and are often aimed at developing individuals' skills rather than improving the performance of organisations, including counter-part bodies of local government.
Interpretations of civil society performance and its needs are, in fact, multilevel because the various actors involved provide different inputs and hold different perspectives. Therefore, participatory techniques and multiple-stakeholder survey methods are sought to better highlight the real needs and interests that civil society organisations have without gathering distorted or biased information (Fowler 1997: 170). This is particularly evident in the case of Egypt, where the state fulfils a patronage function, and civil society organisation is often ruled by the elite, or has replaced some government services which have withered away. These issues are addressed in more detail throughout Chapters 8 and 9 in order to test the performance and accountability of civil society organisations considered in this research.

5.6- Conclusions:

The above examination of urban politics in Egypt reveals that Egypt presently applies state-centred forms of governance, bureaucratic and corporatist politics, more than a society-centred pluralism model. The local administration system of urban management is defined in legal and organisational terms that disempower local governments from acting autonomously or independently. Urban decision-making processes are more defined as based on some type of functional representation within the organisational context of the state, e.g. the GOPP and Ministries of Finance and Planning, rather than a 'pluralist democracy', based on a multi-party governing system and empowered civil society. Thus central ministries are defined by functional specialisation and operate through formalised and centralised programme implementation. Such administrative elites often develop urban policy preferences which are quite divergent from societal interests.

Although the government has taken some measures to reduce centralisation, form partnerships with various organisations representing key sectors in the society, and mediate among competing interest groups, most of these measures conspired to over-regulate the activities of different interest groups and stifle all forms of civil society. Participation in the administration of local-planning authorities is still characterised more
by a corporatist state-centred approach than by pluralist forms of interest mediation. Moreover, most amendments made under the local administration system of urban management have increased the possibilities for relatively unchallenged corporatist interest inter-mediation. Thus, it is difficult for civil society organisations and pluralist groups outside the single-party organisation to negotiate or participate effectively in the urban governance process.

On the other hand, the process of urban development and urbanisation in Egypt is currently facing several challenges. Although rapid population growth and geographical constraints are seemingly the most pressing problems, there are also institutional deficiencies at both internal and external levels. Power is concentrated in the hands of those who run the ERSAP, supported by occidental measures of reform imposed by international DAs and characterised by totality and indifference to different cultural and ruling mechanisms. Despite its seeming success in macro economic terms, the ERSAP has resulted in increased rates of unemployment, urban poverty and informal squatting. Many scholars have demonstrated how large aid flows into the urban sector in Egypt have failed to achieve the intended results of sustainable development for the poor due to external institutional deficiencies. Where aid agreements require that most of the financial aid received by Egypt be spent in the donor country, use its shipping and employ its firms, the real benefits that Egypt gained from aid are still questionable. This is examined in more detail throughout the research case studies in the following Chapters.

State jurisdictions foster control and work against establishing an independent civil society concerned with maintaining democracy and ensuring that the government is accountable and effective at the internal level within Egyptian cities. Accordingly, activists and the popular sector in low-income areas are induced, in many ways, to become, or remain, politically inactive. Such a political climate has given rise to several competing social movements that reflect the influence of different interest groups, such as Islamists, secularists, feminists or human rights activists. These movements have been triggered by many traumatic or energising events over the last five decades, including riots and terrorism, which have, in turn, increased the potential political unrest that exist in urban
poor areas and among suppressed civil society organisations. Clearly, these forms of governance and urban political events have influenced the development agenda of the joint-venture projects in Ismailia and Aswan, the level of citizens' trust, participation in upgrading projects and political activation in formal institutions, and local government performance and accountability, which are the focus of the following Chapters.
CHAPTE R SIX

SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF ISMAILIA

Ismailia is a medium-sized city in the north-east of Egypt at the centre of the Suez Canal zone. Ismailia's growth after the Arab-Israeli conflict of 1967-1973 exceeded the capacity of the government to cope with housing demands. Rapid resettlement and urbanisation raised the population to 175,000 in 1975, preventing the government from supplying sufficient formal housing, while the incomers spilled over onto the city's peripheries where services were non-existent and difficult to supply. These 'informal' housing areas, mostly on government-owned land, formed about 50% of the total housing stock of the city (Davidson 1984: 125). Clearly the most urgent priority was to tackle the growing housing problem, which made the Egyptian government resolved to try new approaches to urban planning and management.

The Ministry of Housing and Reconstruction, in conjunction with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), entrusted the first physical Master Plan (1975-2000) to a British consultancy firm, Clifford Culpin and Partners. Assisted by other local and international firms and specialists, the consultants defined the overall goal of the plan as to make Ismailia city, in particular, and the Canal Zone, in general, play a positive and increasing role in the development of the Egyptian economy. Some of the pressure on the already congested cities of Cairo, Alexandria and other large cities in the Nile valley and delta would be relieved by means of a rehabilitation programme for the city (ARE 1976). Following the completion of the Master Plan, the British Ministry of Overseas Development (now DFID) funded the preparation of 'Demonstration Projects', while the American USAID financed the execution of large parts of the infrastructure networks.

The Master Plan recommended the launch of two pilot schemes combining urban upgrading and sites-and-services in two areas. The one in the north of the city, called El-Hekr, was at the time the largest 'informal' low-income area in Ismailia. It has since been re-named Hai El-Salam or 'District of Peace' in the aftermath of President Sadat's peace initiative, and it is on this that the research focuses. The other, to the south, Abu Atwa, concerned rural development (Figure 6.1).
Besides the technical issues of housing supply, e.g. upgrading and sites-and-services, the project targeted the issues of 'resourcefulness' and sustainability by means of cross-subsidy, community involvement and participation, and the creation of a project implementation agency as a nucleus for an integrated urban development apparatus (UNCHS 1996: 4). The Master Plan listed the project objectives, which aimed to be 'realistic', relevant to low-income groups, quickly implementable, replicable, flexible, and based on the best possible understanding of the existing 'situations' (Box 6.1). These objectives were backed up by the political will to implement them as well as the administrative will to instigate changes in the institutional framework. The
implementation started at once and the major activities were completed 15 years ago, although the land sale programme and maintenance activities are still on-going processes.

Box 6.1: Ismailia- Hai El-Salam project objectives

- "Be relevant to low-income groups, which form the majority of the population; be capable of implementation with minimum subsidy;
- be based on the best possible understanding of the existing situation in its social, cultural, economic and physical aspects;
- be able to be administered without the need for a high level of sophistication and continued support from outside expertise;
- be realistic, e.g. should be implementable within the existing administrative and executive structures and not require fundamental legal or organisational reform;
- be capable of implementation as soon as possible;
- be capable of modification from experience and with changing external factors; and
- be replicable, in form and content, at other sites in the future."

Source: ARE (1976).

Despite some deficiencies in terms of community participation and land management policies, the project is of particular interest since many of the concepts accepted as everyday givens were first developed and given form in Hai El-Salam. It has been argued that several upgrading projects throughout DCs have adopted many of the principles first tried in Ismailia (UNCHS 1996). This is illustrated in the foreword of Dr Wally N'Dow, Assistant-Secretary-General of United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (UNCHS- Habitat), to the Ismailia Project’s Report submitted to ‘The City Summit’, Istanbul-1996, as an example of best practice (Box 6.2).

Box 6.2: Hai El-Salam- The UNCHS’s assessment

The Hai El-Salam project, Ismailia, has become a classic example of solid professional work applying innovative concepts in the field of upgrading, community improvement and the provision of land for lower income groups. The project itself and its implementation provide a variety of lessons to be learned ranging from the methodological approach to the problem, the inception of the physical planning concept, to its implementation and occupation. For these reasons, the Hai El-Salam project represents an example of successful management of the human settlements development process and, as such, has been selected for inclusion in the catalogue of best projects for the 1996 United Nations Conference on Human Settlements, Habitat II.

Indeed, the Hai El-Salam project was considered to be at the forefront of urban development practice in the 1980s. In the Egyptian context, it broke new ground in its attempts to bring informal sector housing practice into an official project. The examination of Ismailia’s experience illustrates the extent to which the project objectives were met. This Chapter examines the various facets of the project, starting from the pre-project situation to what actually happened 20 years after its launching. The study does not focus on the supply issues of technical infrastructure since supply followed conventional provision methods rather than community participatory initiatives. Instead, special emphasis is placed on the land and community management issues, and how far the process of sustainability has flourished both in terms of collaborative participation for community development and of decentralisation of local government. Each of these aspects is discussed in terms of an analysis of the existing situation, proposals and implementation. Data collected from the fieldwork surveys in 1996 and 1998 are utilised to evaluate and highlight the lessons learnt throughout the process.

6.1- Area background and characteristics:

The Hai El-Salam area is about 1.5 km from the centre of Ismailia city. The area abutted built-up areas of the city to the east and south, agricultural land to the west and desert land to the north (Figure 6.2). The area ranged from densely developed housing in the south to a sparsely populated desert fringe in the north. The project covered an area of approximately 226 hectares, of which 132 hectares were already 'informally' developed with a population of some 37,000 in 1977 (ARE 1978: 4). The area had no physical constraints to urban expansion or to the development of effective links of internal and external road patterns. The general lie of the land was conducive to the eventual installation of main services such as gravity sewerage systems. Hai El-Salam lacked physical infrastructure including running water and sewage networks. It was also very deficient in the provision of community facilities. There was only one primary school, a church and some small mosques. Other schools, a neighbourhood centre and a hospital existed a nearby area, and were used by the residents of Hai El-Salam. According to the land use map of 1977, the western quarter of the study area was agricultural, being
essentially low lying ground, irrigated from the adjacent sweet water Canal. This area was not suitable for urban development. Equally, the south-west corner of the area was occupied by the Suez Canal Authority's plant nursery and an agricultural college, in addition to housing. These sections had been later excluded from the project area boundary for technical and administrative reasons.

Figure 6.2: Hai El-Salam - area boundaries and land use in 1978.

Source: Based on Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE 1978, volume1).
An estimated 56 per cent of the built-up area in 1977 was devoted to residential use, containing within it shops and workshops. These activities were concentrated along the principal streets and in particular the two widest ones. Most workshops were small-scale and concerned carpentry, blacksmithing and vehicle and bicycle repair, and were located on the ground floor of the owner's dwelling. Larger industrial or commercial uses were few, the only significant premises being a bakery, a timber yard and a grain store in the commercial area concentrated along one of the main streets. Although the first settlement took place in 1937, and the major acceleration occurred after the conflict of 1973, the reconstruction of Ismailia attracted many labourers, especially from Upper Egypt and the Delta, intending to settle in the area. Statistics in 1977 reveal that half of the population had lived in the area for about ten years prior to the project. One fifth had lived there for less than two years, having moved to Hai El-Salam primarily so as to own a house of their own, or to save so as to be able to achieve home ownership eventually (ARE 1978).

The housing typology in 1977 ranged from rural or modified traditional forms to those with a concrete skeleton. Traditional rural houses consisted of one floor built of stone or mud bricks, while wood beams or metal pipes were used to carry roofs made of mud, palm leaves or corrugated metal sheets. Such poor-quality buildings tended to predominate along the western fringe of the project area, and probably represented agricultural settlements of greater age, which were then engulfed by urban settlement. Modified traditional houses consisted of stone walls using cement mortar, with concrete ceilings, and were built so that a second floor could be added. The area also contained some public housing, the majority of which had a concrete skeleton and belonged to 'middle income' families who, because of their employment with the government, Governorate, or other public agency, had privileged access to such subsidised housing (ARE 1978). Hai El-Salam provided the main supply of low-cost land for owner-builder construction and a large proportion of new low and moderate-cost rental accommodation prior to the project. Most households lived in individual houses but one fifth occupied shared dwellings in 1977. Approximately one quarter of households rented
accommodation, including 15% renting individual houses. The low-cost rental accommodation was scarce, of poor quality and remotely located. The moderate cost units were scarce too, and their services were deficient although rents were increasing rapidly (ARE 1978). The land tenure was mainly quasi-formal (Hekr) by which the government owned the land but the settlers held a lease and paid nominal fees annually to the municipalities in order to get temporary rights to stay on the land (Eiweida 1997: 113). Most of the land was unserviced, while the sale of it to the original settlers and to newcomers in the extension area was a major source of funds for the project.

6.2- Project conception:

The first socio-economic and needs-assessment survey of the existing population and the target group took place in 1977. The survey was carried out by a team of teachers from the area under the guidance of the project’s consultants and sociologists during the summer school vacation. Covering the whole of Hai El-Salam, this was the only means to “ensure easy accessibility and acceptability by the residents in addition to a high degree of reliability in the results of the survey” (UNCHS 1996: 9). Indeed, teachers not only constituted an active section of the beneficiaries, but also “were more likely to be trusted by the community, had instant access to the families of pupils they taught, as well as good capability to collect accurate data, and served as good communicators whereby they informed the residents about the project”, argued Ms Habiba Eid, a former Director of the Hai El-Salam Project (HE, 17-12-98). The 1977 needs-assessment survey showed a clear consensus of the residents on the priorities for improvement.

While the condition of the housing in the area was generally not felt to be a problem, though they aimed to make improvements when they could afford them, the provision of water, surfaced roads and sewerage were felt to be the priorities for government-aided improvement. The survey also revealed the economic status of the population prior to the project. Households of Hai El-Salam consisted of on average 5.6 persons. The population was mostly within the bottom 30 percentile income bracket of the Egyptian population with a mean household income of £E25/month (U$35.7 in 1977) equal to a half month’s salary for a junior government employee in the 1970s. The
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Project's estimations revealed that while 57.3% of the households had very low incomes which fell below this and no expectation of any improvement in their status, 28.5% of the population were experiencing or expecting an improvement in their status, even though they had low incomes. The rest of the population had either low to moderate incomes (12%), or moderate incomes (1.6%) with the latter earning some £E70 a month (US$100).

The land tenure of nearly all households was provisional (Hekr), but despite this a land market existed. Security of land tenure was an underlying concern for people throughout the area. Taking into account the high proportion of unskilled labourers (51%) and the proportions of clerical workers (20%) and craftsmen (17%) who tended to have higher incomes, the project recognised that providing sufficient public housing for all would be beyond the resources of the government. It therefore proposed to utilise the capacity of the people to organise the building of their own houses by providing the existing occupiers with a legal land-title and the new comers with basically serviced plots on which to build. The project acknowledged the advantages of progressive incremental construction of housing by small contractors and the owners themselves.

It was appreciated that upgrading usually entails the removal of some dwelling units to allow street alignment or the provision of services or utilities. Hence, the development of the area's unbuilt fringe was necessary to relocate the affected inhabitants. The new development also aimed at accommodating services requiring large sites, such as schools, a hospital and green areas, as well as providing legal housing opportunities that would prevent further squatting (Figure 6.3). Mr David Sims, one of the founders of the project and now a partner in Clifford Culpin and Partners, explained that the project proposals were to strengthen and improve the role of Hai El-Salam in Ismailia's housing market by providing surveyed and serviced plots, improving levels of services in the existing squatter area, and, more importantly, by facilitating and supporting construction, improvement and expansion of houses in the existing and new areas for owner-occupiers and for rental of a housing unit, shop or a workshop. Supportive policies included land tenure regularisation and simplification, the supply of plans and permit requirements, improvement of the supply system of state-subsidised

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materials, provision of credit for low-income owner-builders, and the provision of services on terms affordable by the population.

Figure 6.3: Hai El-Salam - The new development and land rationalisation plan.

Source: Based on Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE 1978, volume1).

No direct construction by the Project Agency was proposed, except in the case of resettlement housing (DS, 18-12-98). Improvement proposals for the rationalisation/regularisation of the layout of streets and for the creation of plot clusters around the communal spaces in the existing area, were meant to cope with changes of the boundaries of some plots by provision of new in-fill plots in the sporadically developed
areas. The sale of land to settlers, in return for legal tenure and improvement, granted land security to the residents and bolstered the self-financing concept of the project. The sale of land to the existing residents was preferred by the community to hekr or the collection of fees; low income groups are willing to pay for legal ownership of land, particularly if it is serviced (HE, 17-12-98). The other reason why legal ownership of land was more preferred by the community was probably ideological; “private individual ownership of land is part of sharia law” according to Islam (Rakodi 1997: 374). Land is more easily financed by lending institutions than utility fees, and fees are often difficult to collect from low-income groups, particularly if all the upgrading occurs simultaneously.

Thus revenues from land sales underwrote the capital costs of infrastructure installation as has occurred in many other upgrading projects in developing countries.

The subdivision plan for the new development area resulted in about half the plots having medium dimensions of about 108m² (6m x 12m or 9m x 12m), with a third smaller (6m x 12m or 6m x 15m) and a fifth larger (9m x 18m) (ARE 1978). Some 68 per cent of the plots were planned with 6m frontages, 28 per cent with 9m frontages, and less than 5 per cent were planned with frontages of 12m or more (12m x 12m). In total 3,527 low-cost plots were planned in five neighbourhoods. Plot pricing was determined on ‘technical’ grounds in relation to affordability. The idea of offering concession plots was first developed by the project in the 1970s. Besides the low-cost plots, the new subdivision offered a number of plots, 169 plots in the first phase, ranging between 360m² and 576m² in concession areas at commercial prices. These plots were sold fully serviced at market prices to fulfil the idea of internal project cross-subsidy. Furthermore, some plots were earmarked and sold later by auction to generate further revenues for the project. The intention was that the project agency would be financially sustainable, with money from land sales being used to finance the acquisition of more land and the provision of basic services for the urban poor. However, this intention was undermined in the 1990s by local government rules which did not allow the same agency to retain incoming moneys. Generated money was diverted from participatory programmes that
could benefit the urban poor; these issues are the focus of the following section and Chapter 10.

Inhabitants were able to generate income from housing by allowing mixed land uses within the community; housing was thus a contributor to household income rather than merely a commodity. Shops and workshops on the ground floor, as well as flats above, could be rented out. Revenues could be used to finance further building and cover the payment of the cost of the land and infrastructure maintenance. More importantly, "innovation was also evident in the form of the administration proposed for the project, which was directly linked to local government in order to bypass the bureaucracy of central government" (Khoury 1996: 198). The technical aid-assistance to Ismailia Governorate helped to establish both a Project Agency for Hai El-Salam for the execution of the project, as well as an Urban Planning Office (UPO) for the Governorate. The Governor took advantage of the Local Administration Law, which empowered Governors to create semi-autonomous agencies to plan and manage the development of urban projects within Governorates, to establish a new organisation in the form of a Project Agency Board in 1978. The Project Agency Board included senior representatives of the Governorate, the City Council and its concerned departments, the Housing Directorate, the local office of the Ministry of Finance and the Project Manager; it was directly answerable to the Governor (Figure 6.4).

The Project Agency was freed from the restrictions of the local bureaucracy. This mandated autonomy was not only from the departments responsible within the central and local government for the decision-making process, but also granted financial independence. The Project Agency acquired the power to buy and sell land, enter into contracts and manage its own budget (ARE 1980: 5), but it could not act in total isolation. It was suggested that the Agency should be governed by a board of directors, who could also act as the governing board for similar projects. Furthermore, the same mechanism was used in 1981 by the Governor to establish an Urban Planning Office (UPO) at the level of the Governorate. Such actions are significant in the context of
urban governance decentralisation and municipal capacity-building, and they will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 10.

Figure 6.4: Hai El-Salam - The Project Agency Organisation

Source: Adapted from ARE (1978: volume 1)

6.3- Participatory initiatives:

Assessment of the reality of community participation in the different facets of the Hai El-Salam project is not easy. There is considerable doubt about the achievement of two of the project's main objectives - namely to 'be relevant to low-income groups' and to 'be based on the best possible understanding of the existing situation in its social, cultural, economic and physical aspects'. Data collected from meetings with randomly-selected HoHs in Hai El-Salam, community leaders, as well as housing and development consultants working in Egypt, were found to contradict much of the rhetoric repeated in the project's documents and reports. First, participation in the project conception process does not seem to have been all-encompassing. Almost half of the HoH respondents interviewed in Hai El-Salam denied that any needs-assessment survey took place, though
they claimed that they experienced and remember the initiation of the project very well. The project’s documents argue that community participation in the decision-making process throughout the project’s duration was maintained through ‘natural mediators’ from the area. Representatives were selected from the area residents to co-ordinate with the Project Agency. These representatives were ‘natural’ social leaders within the community identified during the survey. The community representatives were supposed to act as a liaison between the residents and the project, to define problems with their fellow citizens, resolve obstacles, and form a people’s committee “which was instrumental in identifying the realistic ability of the residents to pay for upgrading costs” (UNCHS 1996: 17). In reality, all HoHs interviewed and a community leader in the area (YS, 27-10-96) had no knowledge of such a committee and could not remember that they had ever been invited or consulted. In addition, despite the theoretical importance of such a committee, it was not formally incorporated within the Project Agency Board structure shown in Figure 6.4.

Second, there was no formal participation in the implementation of infrastructure options, and low initial levels of service were chosen on the basis of financial criteria developed by project staff using data on costs and incomes. Although the residents showed a lot of willingness to participate, the project’s consultants preferred to ‘supply’ the area with infrastructure and services through contractors, rather than ‘enabling’ the residents and allowing ‘mutual learning’ among all partners. A group of HoHs interviewed during the fieldwork survey (IHI, 17-10-96) remembered the readiness they showed to participate when the first surveying was initiated: “We welcomed the surveyors to our houses, carried the surveying instruments and held the measuring stick even in wet streets or over ruins. We were ready to cut trenches, but we were not asked”. Indeed, coming back ‘home’, after many years of evacuation, had made the residents eager to participate in improving their spatial environment and reconstructing their houses, but this willingness was not utilised by the project.

One of the first planning Consultants in the project argued that participation was much more possible on an arbitrary basis: “Although people were not invited for meetings
on a regular base, it was like an open door, if anybody from the area wanted to come and talk, he/she would find someone to listen to. Participation was based on self-initiative rather than imposed from the top. Meanwhile, the location of the Project Agency’s office within the settlement was a vital aspect to ensure continued communication with the community” (FD, 17-1-98). In fact, this liberal philosophy seemed to embody some negative features raised by the Marxist interpretations of self-help, which view it as exploiting squatters twice over, both by the problem and its ‘solution’ (Burgess 1982), rather than vesting in citizens a higher degree of power and involving the community in the decision-making process through an institutionalised framework. Thus, it is argued that the term ‘community participation’ was used in the documentation of the Hai Al-Salam project as a ‘cosmetic label’, as Chambers calls it (1995: 30), to make whatever was proposed in the 1970s appear ‘politically correct’ in the 1990s, while, in fact, the rhetoric could not be substantiated in the field, most probably because of different conceptualisations of ‘participation’ and ‘empowerment’ at that time.

The residents tended to settle in socially-related groups in Hai El-Salam. This gave rise to sections that were still predominantly occupied by groups of families with common origins. Each community segregated itself from the others, but was keen to construct a focal neighbourhood centre (GRO) for its members. It was noted during the research’s fieldwork survey in 1998 that most of the GROs in the area were not very active in terms of carrying out development-related activities. Members of GROs used their buildings only for social events, such as weddings and condolences on deaths. The two most active civil society organisations were the Abna’a El-Sharkiya and the El-Khair Wal-Baraka. While the first was a GRO established by people coming from Sharkiya, the latter was a large NGO established by a group of well-off religious people to assist the poor and disadvantaged. The services offered by these were to a large extent similar, but were carried out at a larger scale by the El-Khair Wal-Baraka. A Board Member of the Abna’a El-Sharkiya GRO explained that the organisation offers medical care services, first aid, literacy programmes and social assistance to the poor, such as loans and charity grants (YS, 27-10-96). In addition to such services, the El-Khair Wal-Baraka also dealt
with the distribution of money collected from the Zakat (Muslim annual donations to the poor). Both associations were open to any resident and the services available were not exclusive to their members. However, such groups in Hai El-Salam had never tried to come together and establish any sort of unified NGO at settlement level. It could seem that the disparities in origins, period of residence and standard of living were too great to generate a common identity with the area.

6.4- Land management crisis:

At present, urban land management in Ismailia is faced by enormous technical and administrative problems (Khoury 1996). Hai El-Salam is currently facing a series of socio-economic repercussions structured by class and state power due to underestimation of population mobility, and mismanagement of land policy and regulations. A survey carried out in 1985 indicated that although the number of inhabitants (70,000) had greatly exceeded projections for that year (60,000), the area included a great variety of ‘unexpected’ social groups (GOHBR 1985). The study also noted an increase of commercial activities in the area. The most drastic changes had occurred in the new sites-and-services area, where housing standards had improved, indicating that the purchasing power of new residents was much greater than of households resident before the upgrading process. The HoHs interviewed and those participants in the group interview in 1996 (IGI1, 17-10-96) explained that the poor were continuously replaced by middle and higher income groups; when the original beneficiaries sold their plots, attracted by some cash in a climate of increased land prices owing to the upgrading, their tenants were forced to leave because of rapid rent increases. Official statistics confirmed that: “Some 75 per cent of the land sold [to beneficiaries] was purchased by second buyers in an informal manner” (Metwalley 1993).

This process meant that the owners benefited at the expense of the poorer groups, while the government has lost because the specific target groups, in whom DAs and the government had invested a massive capital injection, have re-entered the informal market by squatting elsewhere on other government-owned land. “Although several incentives were offered to the low-income groups of Hai El-Salam to stimulate housing
improvement, such as subsidised construction materials, cheap architectural design models and access to credit facilities, many settlers made substantial profits merely from holding and transferring land without investing in its improvement or paying taxes on its increasing market value”, said an Urban Planner in the Ismailia’s UPO, who had worked for several years for the Hai El-Salam project before he became a Director of El-Safa Upgrading Project- a project which followed in the footsteps of Hai El-Salam (GG, 26-11-98). Increasing pressure on serviced urban land in Ismailia stimulated the market, but efficient formal markets require a more rapid and transparent mechanism of title provision. Otherwise, like in Hai El-Salam, land tenure becomes obscured by undocumented informal transactions.

The extent to which the project succeeded in serving its intended target, low-income groups, as stressed in the project’s initial objectives, is questionable. First of all, despite the target population being defined as the existing population of Hai El-Salam, composed predominantly of low income groups, surprisingly, “the project was not designed exclusively for this income group, as families with higher income levels in Ismailia also required plots for housing. This was seen as a good opportunity to undertake cross-subsidy of the plots for lower income groups” (UNCHS 1996: 10). Consequently, a certain proportion of plots were sold by auction with few restrictions at a higher price, and the profits allowed lower prices to be charged for plots for the lower income groups. An income ‘ceiling’ was proposed for the subsidised plots. Prices varied according to location and standard of services. Besides the benefits of cross-subsidy, the idea of allowing access to higher income groups was also thought to help “to remove the pressure which they would otherwise bring to bear to replace or buy out the low income groups. ... Yet another advantage is that instead of developing a large single income-group ghetto, a reasonably balanced section of the city can develop” (UNCHS 1996: 10). In reality, some higher income groups were not content with their share. Supported by land speculators, they started to expand into the areas of lower income groups, buying up plots one by one. It was evident during the fieldwork area reconnaissance that large parts had improved substantially and are clearly not a low-income housing area, being
comprised of high quality buildings, almost all multi-storey and made of modern materials using more complex structural systems (Plate 6.1).

Plate 6.1: Hai El-Salam- Large parts of the area have improved substantially and do not resemble a low-income housing area.

The quality of most buildings, including structures made from traditional materials and with traditional techniques, was generally good. Either the residents have suddenly become rich and reconstructed their houses, or they have been replaced by higher income groups. The latter is more probable, given that social surveys of the newly formed squatter settlements around Ismailia city, Abu Halous and El-Kilo Etnain, reveal that by 1998 many of their residents were Hai El-Salam beneficiaries (OA, 26-11-98). This suggests that families who managed to invest in construction were able to stay, while those who moved out were tempted to sell their land, and so possibly fund future construction elsewhere. The only locations in which this process did not seem to have occurred were the narrow streets and alleys in which the Urban Planning Law enforced height restriction- the height could not exceed one and half times the width of the street. The field reconnaissance revealed that modified traditional houses survived in the old sections of the area, especially where the narrow streets kept the land value low (Plates 6.2 and 6.3).
Plate 6.2: Hai El-Salam- Example of the traditional houses which characterised the area prior to the upgrading project and the invasion of speculators in the 1980s.

Plate 6.3: Hai El-Salam- Example of the modified traditional houses that still exist in the old section of the area, especially in narrow streets. Height restriction protected the inner areas from the greed of urban speculators and the replacement of the urban poor residents by higher income strata.
A parallel process was evident in the sites-and-services area in which it was originally planned to allot the plots of land overlooking the main streets to middle income groups at market prices, while plots along the narrower, subsidiary streets were allotted to the urban poor. The design included a number of spaces for common use. However, some private interest groups pressured project officials in the 1980s to convert the narrow streets and common urban spaces into wide streets instead. Dr Manal El-Batran, an Urban Development Advisor to the Egyptian Minister of Housing (1997- date), condemned this action as wider streets permitted higher building which, indirectly, led to an increase in land prices beyond the financial reach of low income families (ME, 19-12-98). Thus the price of a square metre, which was sold by the project at £E2.5-10 (£0.60 - 2.5) in 1985, had risen to £E1800 (£310) in 1998, far beyond the inflation rates during the same period. Moreover, while the concept of concession plots was very necessary for the self-subsidy philosophy of the project, “price speculation in areas located near to the sites-and-services area, such as the Sheikh Zaied area, was not predicted. It is very likely that people now still practice the same idea of the project 10 years ago and always try to freeze [earmark] their valuable plots until their prices increase significantly” (FD, 17-1-98). Indeed owners did earmark their plots so as to capitalise on their increased value when the neighbourhood consolidated. This situation has also encouraged an increased number of middle-income settlers, who live in what was the sites-and-services area, to realise the enhanced value of their property and sell out to higher income groups, thereby reducing the social mix and making it even more difficult for other low income groups to gain access to Hai El-Salam.

Although it was recognised from the beginning of the project that there would be pressure on allocatees to re-sell their plots illegally, no regulations were enforced; “it is difficult to argue against the right of allocatees to re-sell if they genuinely cannot afford to build, but excessive pressure in this direction can be reduced by providing alternative possibilities for middle-and upper-income groups” (Davidson 1984: 145). Of course this policy was unrealistic and made a fatal assumption that the local government would continue to reproduce efficient urban plans even after the withdrawal of the foreign aid-
assistant. This assumption collapsed because of institutional problems which hindered the sustainability of the UPO’s performance, as will be discussed in Chapter 10. In the 1990s, with the rapid increase in the land prices, specific local regulations to control land resale were devised. In order to register the resale of an urban plot, the owner is required to pay an amount equal to the initial land cost to the UPO, if the buyer is from Ismailia, or one and half times the amount if he/she is not. Only half the amount is required if the buyer is from the same nuclear family (OA, 26-11-98). Such regulations are ineffective in the face of increasing land prices in the informal market. The amount paid to the UPO in any case is much less than the price received by the sellers. Besides, outsider buyers always circumvent the regulations by ‘proving’ that they are local Ismailians so that they pay less. It can thus be argued that, whilst the society has changed and land has become increasingly market driven, local regulations to control land resale have neither adapted nor been enforced for a long time.

Provision of full land titles has undoubtedly transformed public perceptions of previously ‘informal’ settlements into attractive neighbourhoods. The prevailing concept of the politicians, consultants and policy makers in the 1970s was that the Hai El-Salam area should not look like just another informal area after the project’s completion, explained a large number of consultants and senior municipal officials (DS, 18-12-98; FM1, 26-11-98). Inhabitants were directed and assisted, through subsidised construction materials, to build to higher construction specifications than their traditional methods; using skeleton structures and reinforced concrete (OA, 26-11-98). These high building standards resulted in high property values. Whilst the granting of full land titles has been of considerable benefit to local owners and investors, it has also led to dramatic increases in rent levels which have forced existing tenants out of the area (HE, 17-12-98). It was observed during the fieldwork survey that the average rent for three-room units has increased from £E10/month (£5) in the late 1970s to £E300 (£50) in 1999. In addition, key-money of £E15,000 (£2580) is also required if the tenant wants to acquire a long-term contract. This amount is equal to about 50 months’ wage of a senior government employee with ten years experience. A key planner working for both the Ismailia’s UPO
and the Sustainable Ismailia Programme (SIP) noted that the application of the recently amended Landlord-Tenant Law in 1996, which allowed landlords to negotiate the duration and rate of any new rent contract, resulted in many people now buying a new flat rather than renting one. This, in effect, stimulated further demand for large serviced plots in distinct locations. The UPO has become unable to keep pace with the investors' escalating demand. This further inflated the land prices not only in the informal market, but also in the formal one (OA, 26-11-98). The fieldwork survey revealed that the average size of the plots sold by auction in 1998 was 1000m² at a price of £E3000 (£517) per square metre. Unsurprisingly, given the evidence of such capital availability, investors targeted high standard housing units and pressured the planning apparatus to permit the construction of multi-storey apartment blocks (Plate 6.4).

Plate 6.4: Hai El-Salam- The average size of plots sold by auction in 1998 was 1000m² which cost £E3000 per square metre, obviously out of reach of middle income groups, let alone the poor.

Despite these fundamental problems, a Project Management Unit (PMU) is still operating in Hai El-Salam almost 20 years after the start of the original demonstration
projects. The PMU Director, stated that they will keep working until the last plot is sold to its beneficiary, and the entire area is adequately serviced (SK, 26-11-98). The PMU is, in fact, a similar organisation to the initial Project Agency but smaller in scale, since many activities have already been completed and the DA had completed its mission. More interestingly in terms of sustainability, the Sustainable Cities Programme, launched by UNCHS (Habitat), negotiated with Ismailia Governorate in the early 1990s so as to develop the Hai El-Salam experience into a more general Sustainable Ismailia Programme (SIP).

The SIP recognised a gap between the contents of the Master Plan and the city's realities: "The rapid urbanisation of the city, the heavy demands of its inhabitants for services and the weakness of the institutional framework to manage the city through the Master Plan approach, have aggravated urban problems during the last few years. This has given rise to the need for a new approach in overcoming the city's problems" (Khoury 1996: 200). The SIP project aims to support environmentally sustainable development and growth by strengthening local capacity to plan, co-ordinate and manage environment-development interactions in a framework of broad-based participatory systems, operationalised through working groups constituted by stakeholders (Together Foundation and UNCHS 1998). The SIP also aims to promote integrated and dynamically updated development plans and sector investment strategies. The working groups and the Environmental Planning and Management (EPM) process initiated through it, have been successfully carried out, as demonstrated by the increased level of popular participation, the environmental strategies and bankable projects generated through the working groups, and the concrete steps being taken to institutionalise the EPM process within the Governorate's structure.

The SIP Director, Ms Habiba Eid, who is also a Local Popular Council Member, explains that the SIP’s aim is to move on from the early position of the Hai El-Salam project and to prepare an environmental planning and management strategy for Ismailia based on a more appropriate participatory planning approach (HE, 17-12-98). The programme is intended to address both the city’s development sectors and human/natural
resources as well as replicating the experience of urban upgrading. The new approach seeks to overcome the weaknesses inherent in the Master Plan approach (Halla 1994). It recognises that since every actor should participate in the action of planning and its implementation, the lack of relevance and lack of implementation that so often characterised the Master Plan approach should be avoided. The extent to which the SIP has succeeded in achieving its objectives, without contradicting the initial municipal capacity-building strategies established during the Hai El-Salam project, is examined in Chapter 10.

6.5- Conclusions:

The evidence suggests that while the Hai El-Salam project succeeded in physical terms, achieved many of its objectives and, indeed, was pioneer in inserting informal sector housing practice into an official project in the 1970s, there is considerable doubt about the achievement of its first two objectives: to ‘be relevant to low-income groups’ and to ‘be based on the best possible understanding of the existing situation in its social, cultural, economic and physical aspects’. The Hai El-Salam project failed to provide sustainable living spaces for the target urban population not due to financial constraints but because of serious land management problems and ineffective legislation. The case study revealed that while the project’s initial objectives aimed to favour the urban poor and be relevant to low-income groups, the project’s philosophy, which was prepared by a western consultant firm, was very much market-driven, while local government was insufficiently aware of the dynamism of land markets in upgraded areas, which subverted the original plans and objectives. Little consideration was given to the social, cultural and economic consequences, and inadequate legislation hampered the goal of legalising land tenure for the poor.

There are various side effects of the granting of tenure which were not foreseen by the project. The invasion of legalised areas by higher income groups and land speculators, resulting in urban gentrification and the displacement of poorer people, especially tenants, and further illegal land occupation, were a result of blanket promises of secure tenure. Payne (1997: 46) argues that tenure policies which give preference to
freehold tenure or long leases at the expenses of other options, such as rental tenure, whilst offering many long-term advantages, may have adverse short- and medium-term impacts on the efficiency and equity of urban land markets. In this sense, free, or unconstrained, urban land markets may serve to inhibit, as well as facilitate, national economic development. Yet, the Global Strategy for Shelter to the Year 2000 is sceptical about 'informal' processes: "There is however, considerable doubt that the established informal supply process can continue to meet needs (even if it were desirable to look on informal supply as the permanent de facto policy of the government). Therefore, some form of intervention by government may be necessary" (UNCHS 1990). Indeed, the experience of Hai El-Salam showed clearly that soon after the upgrading project, demand for land in the area rose, speculators got involved, and land-sale transactions to higher income groups, many of whom were tenants from inner city crowded and rented houses in Ismailia, grew rapidly. They paid off lower-income owners in Hai El-Salam, who in turn moved away and squatted elsewhere. Once the new 'informal' settlements were established, government land protection laws became virtually impossible to enforce.

The Ismailia experience shows that much of the population involved has been unable to participate in the capitalistic land and property markets. Given the difficulties of predicting the outcome of land tenure policies, it is essential to involve the community in collaborative decision-making processes and to build up an effective institutional framework within which people operate. At the community level, the upgrading project did not enhance the 'awareness' of beneficiaries, raise their socio-economic status and intensify community self-reliance by means of effective participation, empowerment, promoting pluralism and job creation. The project's approach did not go beyond consultation, in terms of community participation, which surely did not help sustainability of community development by the residents themselves. Support for this argument stems from their low response rate during the survey. The land legislation processes ignored people's participation in collaborative policy making, and the result was the adoption of land tenure policies which have reinforced land value inflation and absorbed funds which could be put to more productive economic use. Once many residents of Hai El-Salam
were offered cash, they sold their plots and left the area. Building social infrastructure is not less important than simple infrastructure improvement. Physical infrastructure provision *per se* can lead to false expectations of tenure security (Payne 1997). Ismailia’s experience shows that people may be replaced by higher income groups after improvements in infrastructure have taken place.

Meanwhile, it can also be argued that the absence of a unified civil society organisation and any clear economic development agenda in the Hai El-Salam area have left its economically insecure residents prey to either pressure to sell their plots, or to pay increased rents. The project did not encourage the residents of Hai El-Salam to create a civil society organisation, which could have crystallised their common interests, and consequently, the capitalistic market and state powers have been all-encompassing in shaping the area. In the context of the discourses of the 1990s, citizens and their values are both the means, ends and judges of development and markets should be in the service of them (Fowler 1997). The importance of the Hai El-Salam experience was that it demonstrates some of the issues that future projects needed to address. Let us now discuss Aswan’s experience and compare its approach to that of Ismailia.
CHAPTER SEVEN
THE REALITY OF THE ASWAN PROGRAMME

Like many other areas in Egypt, Nasriya was named after the former Egyptian President Nasser in the 1960s, when rural-urban migration became a major phenomenon sweeping hundreds of thousands into the big cities unexpectedly; the population of Aswan almost doubled. Similar to Ismailia, albeit a decade before, spontaneous land occupation in Nasriya, as one of the thirteen other peripheral areas in Aswan, was the only option for many induced rural migrants (Figure 7.1). Although Nasriya suffered from the lack of any technical infrastructure, adequate community facilities and social support programmes before the 1970s, the inhabitants themselves had made several attempts to improve the infrastructure by themselves. By the 1980s, services were still by no means adequate; conflicts over resources, such as access to clean water and streets, increased and many quarrels among the residents arose, although they were all solved internally without intervention of the police or any other formal institution (NGI 119-04-98). This situation roused the Egyptian government to reconsider its urban development policies, which encouraged the German co-operation (GTZ) to propose and initiate a pilot urban development and land management scheme in Aswan in 1987, which included an urban upgrading project for its largest quarter- the Nasriya area.

The Nasriya project shared similar initial objectives to the Hai El-Salam project aiming to demonstrate the feasibility of maintaining an existing residential area whilst providing it with appropriate infrastructure at a minimum cost through the participation of its inhabitants (GTZ 1992). But, in addition to the technical supply of physical infrastructure, one of the main goals of the project was to strengthen the self-confidence of the community and to enhance the traditional ties. Throughout the processes of building the infrastructure supply, the inhabitants were placed in the position of being able to participate in the future planning of the programme and community organisation, GTZ German Project Adviser (1988-1998) (OA, 21-03-98). The project was designed in a flexible way and its objectives were refined at the end of each implementation phase. The project started in 1987 by assisting the community to establish a GRO, the Nasriya Community Council (NCC), not only to carry out and follow up the project activities, but
also to provide an organisational counter-weight framework to the local government. This model was transcended in 1992 by a more institutionalised Community Development Association (CDA), which could represent all the residents of the area through an elected assembly, articles of association and executive committees responsible for various community activities. In a similar vein, following in the footsteps of Ismailia, GTZ offered technical assistance to Aswan Governorate to establish an Urban Development and Land Management Unit (UDLMU), so that the sustainability of urban development would be secured and the replicability of urban upgrading within other squatter settlements would be possible. There are several questions regarding the ‘real’ capacity of the beneficiaries to maintain the material advances obtained at the community level, as well as their sustainability and/or replicability at the institutional level. A critical scrutiny of the advantages and weaknesses of such a project, including the roles of ‘self-help’ in physical and community initiatives, provides useful insights into the variety of problems associated with the concept of participation when it comes to implementation. The study also pinpoints the sort of constraints confronting community development and municipal capacity-building programmes.

7.1- Area background and project initiatives:

Set apart from the urban core, Nasriya is situated on the slopes of mountains, 2 km to the North East of the centre of Aswan City. Nasriya stretches along a stony mountainside, which rises at first gently then more steeply reaching a height of 60m differentiation within the area. The first settlement was that of Nubians in 1933-34 displaced by the second elevation of the Aswan Old Dam. By 1955 other peoples migrated to Aswan from villages in Upper Egypt seeking job opportunities in the new industries. The rate of immigration reached its peak in 1960-1967 due to the inflow of workers during the construction of the High Dam, specially from villages belonging administratively to the Districts of Ques and Luxor, Quna Governorate. The communities were named after the migrants’ home origin. Nasriya was the most populous urban area in Aswan, with a population of 45,000 in 1987. Despite its large area, about 100 hectares (250 acres), Nasriya was not the most densely populated area because 95% of its residential plots consisted only of one floor (Plate 7.1).
Figure 7.1: Aswan - Informal areas and directions of urban growth.

Plate 7.1: Nasriya- General view showing the steepy topographic features of the area and urban morphology.

The land-use map revealed that the built-up area comprised about 80% of the total area, and consisted of houses, mosques, community centres, three schools and unregulated commercial facilities, while there were no green areas (Figure 7.2). The social distribution map revealed that each community constituted a spatial neighbourhood, usually surrounding a community centre constructed by themselves (Figure 7.3). Nasriya had suffered for more than 25 years from the lack of any proper community facilities, paved access, sanitation and water supply. The municipality installed ten public taps in the 1970s along the open Kima Canal, a fetid open sewer at the bottom of the slope running along the western boundary of the area. Most of the residents, especially women and children, had to carry water containers on their shoulders for long distances over high ground and often uphill to their houses. Better-off families used donkeys to transfer these containers or hired daily carriers. The hardship was worst for the people living far from these taps, especially those at the eastern fringe at the upper elevated areas of Nasriya, according to a group of HoHs living there (NGI1, 07-04-98).
Figure 7.2: Nasriya - Land use map in 1987.

Source: Adapted from GTZ (1992).
Figure 7.3: Nasriya - social distribution map.

GROUPINGS OF NASRIYA ACCORDING TO ORIGIN

1. Luxor
2. Ques
3. Helal
4. Nubians
5. Other

Source: Adapted GTZ (1992).
Although some households had pit latrines, waste water was often reused in construction and shallow ditches channelled the excess to the Kima Canal, which was also the receptacle of solid waste as well. Aswan was proposed as a case study for elaborating Physical Structural and General Plans, during the Egyptian/German co-operation to improve the performance of the General Organisation of Physical Planning in Egypt GOPP (1982-1988). A joint mission comprising some German experts and senior planners from the GOPP went to Aswan to evaluate the potential for such a scheme. After several meetings with the Governor of Aswan, Mr Kadry Osman (1984-1991), it was decided that the Regional Planning Apparatus of Aswan (RPA) would host the scheme and provide a wide range of local specialists in various disciplines. Because the RPA used to work with many multilateral organisations prior to the construction of the High Dam, its technical members were the only professionals in Aswan with experience at that time. The outcome was several complementary studies, besides the Aswan General Plan (1986-2010). Although this was not the first attempt to elaborate such a comprehensive study, it was definitely the first to yield a 'realistic' and highly professional plan (Figure 7.4). The co-operative effort also trained many local staff who later became responsible for the Nasriya upgrading project, and for running the first Physical Planning Office (1988-1992), which expanded afterwards to function as the Urban Development and Land Management Unit UDLMU of Aswan Governorate (1992-date).

Nasriya was proposed as an 'Action Area' for upgrading according to the recommendations of the Aswan General Plan. It was also identified as an area for vertical densification after upgrading. Nasriya was expected to "offer potential for reasonable improvement and thus absorption capacities for future population increase" (GOPP; GTZ 1986: 24). However, the residents of Nasriya argue that "the selection of the area was also made because of the willingness and enthusiasm of its inhabitants to embark on a self-help project, while their enthusiasm and determination moved the process of the project's selection and identification in a bottom-up direction. The residents made several attempts to improve their living environmental conditions even prior to GTZ's involvement", explained Mr Mahmoud Sabri, Chair of the Nasriya CDA (MS, 28-05-98).
Figure 7.4: Aswan General Plan (1986 - 2021).

Source: Adapted from GOPP; GTZ (1986).
The residents organised themselves through a hierarchy of extended families developed into quarters, forming a community for each social group based upon their village of origin. They then established neighbourhood community centres (GROs) in which meetings on important occasions and traditional festivities were held. The community leaders organised the construction and maintenance of the community centres, mosques and associated guest houses, and thus laid the foundation for social and educational programmes. In addition, the elected representatives of the community centres, some of whom were government employees, maintained contact with the local authorities in order to propose measures for physical improvement within their areas of competence.

7.2- Project design and management:

The first ‘Socio-Economic and Environmental Assessment Survey’ was carried out in December 1986, as part of the General Plan studies. The survey, as in Ismailia, was carried out by a local team under the guidance of the project leaders. Besides scrutinising the economic standards and social status of the community, the survey aimed at identifying the community’s demands, and their expectations from the project. Infrastructure supply, was at the top of the residents’ priorities, with 90% of those interviewed citing sanitation as their first priority, compared to only 4.7% who cited water as a first requirement. Unsurprisingly, this small proportion represented residents of the remote and elevated fringe of Nasiya (Figure 7.5).

Figure 7.5: Nasiya- Urgent necessities of the residents (1986)

Source: Author- Adapted from Lewin (1987).
Conversely, as a second priority, water was ranked first, scoring 38% while only 2% of those asked cited sanitation as second priority. The remaining 10% of first priorities included roads, community facilities (with particular emphasis on health and education), solid-waste disposal, the clean-up of the Kima Canal, electricity, house improvement, and other specific services in descending order. It is evident that the respondents in this survey demanded the most essential needs. Job creation, for instance, did not emerge as a priority. However, it should be noted that the interviewees were HoHs, most of whom were male; almost one third were labourers, with others holding a wide variety of self-employed positions, while only 6% were civil servants in 1987 (Lewin 1987).

After this survey was analysed and the priorities were established, the project started the process of planning and discussion with the people. More than one hundred meetings took place in the community centres during the planning phase. These included the municipal officials concerned, and were organised by the respective community leaders (Heads of GROs), who also worked as key-figures for approaching the residents and introducing the project's staff. “In-depth discussions between the project's consultants, municipal officials and the community leaders highlighted the potential level of community participation in each component and therefore, the concept of ‘self-help’ shaped the main framework of the project”, asserted the Project's Egyptian Director (1991-1998) (AH, 06-09-98). The focus of the Nasriya project was on environmental health conditions at the roots, at community level; it also targeted issues of community participation, governance and the consolidation of civil society. While making citizens responsible for critical decisions about complex issues was at the top of the community development agenda, infrastructure supply was at the top of the environmental agenda. Thus, the project's planning was designed to achieve four main objectives in the first phase (Box 7.1).

**Box 7.1: Aswan-Nasriya project objectives**

- To improve the living conditions in the area;
- To supply the area with the required social and physical infrastructure;
- To enhance the participatory potentials of the inhabitants; and
- To establish the importance of community participation and empowerment.

Source: Fieldwork survey.
Accordingly, the engagement of community members in the diagnosis of problems was a deliberate policy of the project. “It is a standard procedure for GTZ projects to incorporate a participatory dimension in their project planning and design”, according to the Project Adviser (OA, 21-03-98). Community participation within the processes of planning and decision-making in Nasriya was maintained through applying tiers of ZOPP workshops. The early ZOPP sessions in Nasriya produced a project planning matrix (PPM), constructed by local representatives in partnership with the project’s experts and the municipal officials. The first PPM encouraged brainstorming, strategising, information gathering and consensus building among stakeholders (JK, 08-02-98). The involvement of municipal officials helped to ensure that they were fully involved in the project process, this is crucial in the context of municipal capacity building (Peltenburg et al. 1996), as will be discussed in Chapter 10.

Subsequent ZOPP workshops were held regularly over the period of the Nasriya project. In the course of these workshops, consecutive planning matrixes were produced to match community demands, covering a large number of activities to be implemented, e.g. establishing improved water supply, sewerage and solid waste management facilities, as already suggested by surveys and the actions of the community. Other priorities that emerged from these workshops related to improvements to existing schools, construction of a community Service Centre, improvement of the roads and lanes inside the area, execution of a social programme with special emphasis on women’s development, the provision of loans for house improvement and income generation, the opportunity of land ownership linked to a remodelling plan, establishing an Urban Development and Land Management Unit (UDLMU) at the Governorate level, offering on-job training for the municipal officials concerned, and the elaboration of a plan for a new extension in East Nasriya to make new plots available for the inhabitants of Nasriya so as to avoid any further informal growth and overcrowding (GTZ 1991, 1992, 1994). While many of these activities were implemented successfully, the only failure was the solid waste disposal system, the cause of which will be examined later.

The setting up of a Project Management Unit (PMU) in 1987 was not easy. The project recognised the initial difficulty of working through the existing municipal
structures and took a conscious decision to by-pass those structures (OA, 21-03-98). The Nasriya PMU comprised an Egyptian Project Director and a number of specialists supplied from various government departments based on the specific experience and qualifications that were required at the time. The structural organisation of the PMU consisted of four main departments during the first two phases of the project (1987-1994): infrastructure, community facilities, social development and administration and finance. The GTZ supplied this team with a full-time German Project Adviser to play a coordinating role between the project and other local and national bodies and to help in building municipal capacity in respect to participatory urban upgrading policies and maintenance measures. Furthermore, GTZ paid for some local full-time employees, e.g. the heads of community facilities and social development departments, secretaries and translators, in addition to a large number of local and expatriate short-term consultants to help in planning and monitoring the project’s activities and to promote urban upgrading and community participation. To some extent, this structure meant that impacts on municipal capacity have been limited but this was inevitable given the starting situation, as will be discussed in detail in Chapter 10. The local civic representatives and organisations were responsible for mobilising the inhabitants, reflecting their demands and supporting the project’s team in their work, which are discussed in the following sections.

7.3- Roles of self-help in development initiatives:

There is a common agreement in the literature that the term ‘self-help’ concerns not only the construction processes but also self-planning, (re)development, the management of resources, self-contracting of skilled labour, and self-provision of utilities (Turner 1976; Ward 1982; Choguill 1987; Moser 1989). In Nasriya, the variety of ways in which families have built their own houses and/or attempted to improve their environment, with or without the technical aid assistance and the government supports, have expanded the ‘roles’ of self-help beyond the ‘Marxist viewpoints’, leaning instead toward the contrasting ‘Liberal approach’ (Figure 7.6). Proponents of the Marxist approach criticise self-help housing recommendations and the arguments upon which they are based. Burgess (1982), for instance, argues that the proposal of self-help often boils down to “the economic and ideological means necessary for the maintenance of the status
quo and the general conditions for capitalist development”. Self-help is thus doomed to failure because self-help housing cannot be accommodated as a commodity in a system in which the capitalist mode of production is dominant.

Figure 7.6: Nasriya—Self-help processes during the formation and upgrading of the area

Governmental policies:  
[Liberal critique]  
- Sound pricing policies.  
- Productivity of the poor increased by creating employment in house constructions.

Govenment policies  
[Marxists critique]  
- Relative autonomy of the state.  
- Squatters are exploited twice over: by the problem and its ‘solution’.

Formation of self-help Nasriya

Nasriya upgrading principles  
[Liberal critique]  
- Minor improvements which require labour only can always be undertaken by self-help.  
- Squatters can improve their environment in their free or underemployed time.  
- Nasriya can provide the households with a vehicle of upward mobility.

[Marxists critique]  
- Housing improvement often does not have a high priority among squatters, or even the homeless pavement dwellers.  
- Distinction between social appearance and social reality.  
- Appearance is deceptive and a true scientific approach should try to penetrate the world of phenomenal form to a deeper underlying reality.

Humane housing  
- Economic exchange networks and informal economy which underpin the socio-economic status of the area.  
- Vernacular architecture.  
- Functional social relations and close-knit social structure.

Atrocious housing  
- Physically precarious.  
- Brittle and friable social relations.  
- Social pathologies.  
- High rate of unemployment.

Potential for genuine remedial policies

Multi-lateral recommendations and agreement in the literature upon the necessity of improvement programmes.

Potential for reactionary palliative policies

Source: Author—Adapted from Turner (1976); Burgess (1982) and Eiweida (1997).
Conversely, the Liberal approach stands strongly against centrally designed economic development strategies which frequently displace people, either forcibly or by choice, who cannot be absorbed by the settlements concerned. It suggests that instead of threatening the existing efforts of squatters, governments should respect and support them. Turner coined the term ‘viable housing’ for policies that rely on the self-help approaches, not only during the formation processes of squatter settlements, but also during the urban upgrading processes, and within sites-and-services projects. Self-help is thus the approach whereby the user is an active and effective part of the whole, or part, of the housing process (Turner 1976: 140). It usually involves an incursion into functions that would normally be the responsibility of the public or private sectors but which they are either unable or unwilling to provide.

It has been argued that self-help went beyond the mere physical upgrading of Nasriya (GTZ 1992). Although the initial objective of the project was to improve the infrastructure in a sustainable way at minimum cost through the empowerment and the participation of the inhabitants, the project involved employment, welfare, regeneration, training, social development and community facilities, as argued the GTZ Project Adviser (OA, 21-03-98). Cost recovery was based on mechanisms of cost sharing in the form of labour provided by the residents. The form of participation was decided in collaboration with residents after they had refused any form of direct cost recovery, regardless of how low the instalments or the interest rates were to be. More importantly, GTZ principles of self-help also targeted the involvement of municipal officials concerned in a process of ‘learning by doing’ throughout participation in planning and implementation of all activities (JK, 08-02-98). Self-help performed various roles throughout the project’s duration in the field. It involved individual as well as group inputs, and corresponded to a system of production, financing, and maintenance in which a significant part was organised and carried out by that person or group. Citizen participation took various forms according to their abilities and the technical parameters of the task (GTZ 1992). Therefore, it is worthwhile to review the experience of self-help within each of the project’s components, the extent to which it has been socially and economically useful, and examine the various roles performed by the community or the municipality. The discussion will also explore the causes of the areas of success and failure. Emphases are
particularly placed upon the lessons that have been learnt in the context of policies of participatory upgrading.

7.3.1- Physical infrastructure:

First of all, it is worth mentioning that 84% of HoHs interviewed (108 cases) perceived the infrastructure initiatives as the best service achieved. The execution of the on-site sewage and water networks, house connections and community facilities improvement was targeted for self-implementation under technical supervision and with the devices supplied by the project. Community leaders decided during the early ZOPP sessions that sophisticated activities which required special technical expertise should be tendered. Local contractors in the area were always encouraged to tender for operations within their sphere of competence. All supervisors and technical labourers were selected from the residents themselves and received the required training. The idea behind this strategy was to enable active members of the community with new skills that could aid them in the long-run to improve their income, a principle which was also expanded to include local capacity-building initiatives at community level.

To implement the physical infrastructure scheme, a working team was established consisting of a specialised site engineer (head of the team), engineer-assistant and eight supervisors and technicians. While the site engineer was seconded from the Housing Directorate, his assistant and all the supervisors were residents from Nasriya, with no or little previous experience and were paid by the project. Specialist masons and skilled labourers for cutting the rocky soil were also hired from the area whenever required, and were usually paid on a daily basis at the local rate (£E6-8/day, about £1.50). This team formed the nucleus of the Infrastructure Department within the project. They were supplied with an on-site office, storage space, surveying equipment, compressors and a renewable stock of manual excavation tools. The project offered technical assistance to the Youth Directorate in Aswan to complete the construction of the Nasriya Youth Centre and used it as the PMU (it was later refurbished by the project and is used now for youth’s and women’s activities).

A materials depot and work area for the machinery was established in a part of the centre’s courtyard. The tools and facilities were also located there to ensure control over
the equipment and its maintenance. A local contractor was responsible for supplying gravel and sand for the pipe beds. The supply of PVC pipes was delivered regularly by a reputable factory in Cairo. Due to the limited storage space, they were reordered whenever the stock fell to 30% in the course of the pipe-laying. However, a special store was constructed in 1990 for the infrastructure equipment and pipes with a view to subsequent use by the solid-waste disposal programme. The chief of the Infrastructure Department was given responsibility for the co-ordination of the work at three different levels: with the institutions concerned at both the local and national levels; the project experts, consultants and contractors; and with the community representatives. The infrastructure team was also responsible for introducing the scheme to the people in cooperation with the project’s sociologists and the community representatives. Public meetings took place within each community centre. This step was essential for mobilising the residents and organising the work on the one hand, and for demonstrating the work mechanisms to the government officials on the other.

The overall responsibility for all the infrastructure activities was transferred to the Utilities Department at the Aswan City Council (ACC) by a decree from the Governor in 1990, but the PMU did not completely phase out from this component until 1994. This overlapping period aimed at increasing the involvement of the municipal officials in the final stage of implementation so that they could operate and maintain the networks easily after the project’s team’s withdrawal. It also tried to rebuild the mistrust deeply rooted between the residents and their respective local government. An inter-sectional committee was established, in which all the organisations concerned were represented, to test and commission all the sewage and water elements completed. Likewise, a similar committee was constituted for the permanent control of on-going construction work and for invoicing the contractors. While work carried out by contract was supervised by the Housing Directorate, the ‘self-help’ work was supervised by the project’ team in cooperation with the Infrastructure Committee of the NCC. Co-ordination between and within these committees was very positive and efficient, judging by interviews with the Mayor of Aswan, project administrators and many community leaders (MA, 01-04-98; MF, 05-11-98; TA, 16-06-98; MS, 28-05-98; AA, 05-11-98; and AW, 20-05-98).
Chapter 7
The Reality of the Aswan Programme

Only 4% of the Nasriya houses had been provisionally connected to an old waste-water line running parallel to the Kima Canal prior to the project; the line was to connect the pumping station with the main city treatment plant (south of the area). The inhabitants used to dig shallow pits at the roadside following the natural slope which would finally channel the waste-water into the canal. A few other conduits in the western area also directed sewerage into it. After exchanging proposals between the PMU and the residents as to how to implement the network, the willingness of the residents to implement it themselves encouraged the project to commence the design of the programme as soon as possible. A consultant firm from Cairo was contracted and started the first survey in mid-1987. The system was designed considering that the off-site main collector would be constructed by a contractor since it required sophisticated techniques, while the on-site collection system would be constructed by the ‘self-help’ of the residents. Before starting any excavation work, people were usually invited to one of the community centres located within the targeted section; here the Project’s Engineer would explain the process of implementation, and how manual equipment would be distributed. Excavation levels were given to each householder subsequently, and machinery was supplied for rocky areas.

Many participants interviewed explained that before beginning the excavation in a new street, the residents involved would meet those who had already dug their trench to discuss the difficulties faced and how they managed to solve them (NGI1, 07-04-98; NGI2, 05-12-98). Occasionally, some residents objected to excavating themselves and preferred to hire labour, but soon recognised that this was not a wise decision because it proved to be costly and slow, CDA Board member and Head of the Infrastructure Committee (MA, 21-10-96). “Social cohesion networks served to deepen the role of participation by means of co-operation and solidarity”, he added. With no prompting from the project, young men and neighbours volunteered to do the work of widows and elderly residents, said a Nubian widow who is also very popular in her area (UmS, 18-09-98). This was even more important in the narrow alleys where the excavations blocked house entrances and hindered walking (Plate 7.2). Again, residents showed considerable care and concern for their neighbours delivering water and goods and helping the elderly to walk through, confirmed the Chair of the CDA (MS, 28-05-98). Although the work
used to take place in the evenings until late at night, the residents were always active and enthusiastic. Food and drink were unceasingly offered and lights were generously installed, as agreed all the HoHs interviewed. Undoubtedly, once the residents believed in the project, they recognised that it was in their best interest to finish the work as quickly as possible.

Plate 7.2: Nasriya- The challenge of cutting trenches in the rocky soil. Excavations in the narrow alleys blocked house entrances and hindered walking, but social cohesion networks served to deepen the role of participation by means of cooperation and solidarity.
Chapter 7 The Reality of the Aswan Programme

The administration of the domestic sewage connections was given to the Engineering Department at the ACC. The applications from house-holders were received by the Infrastructure Department of the project and listed in files including the name of the applicant, serial number of the manhole to which the connection was proposed and its location. These lists were handed-over to the Sewage Department along with a sectional sewage map (1/1000) indicating the houses' locations and the proposed manholes. A copy of such a document was always kept for the project’s records and was passed on later to the CDA. The system was designed with relatively short distance between the manholes because of the labyrinthine topography of the area, which resulted in the short lengths of the streets. The construction of additional manholes proved to be necessary. Because the average distance between the manholes was approximately 15m (max. 25m), it was decided that the domestic connection pipes should be conducted directly into them. Although this meant the trenches for such pipes would be longer, the required depth was only 1.0m (Plate 7.2). This made excavation feasible and it was completed willingly by the residents themselves. Self-help resulted in a reduction in the total cost and later enabled the residents to clean and maintain the network easily by themselves. The total length of the sewage network was about 32km. The residents dug about 42,000m³ of trenches, which saved about 30% of the total cost if the work had been implemented by a contractor (GTZ 1992). Loans were made available for house improvements including infrastructure connections. By 1998, around 6000 houses were already connected to the network, representing some 80% of the total number of plots.

As for the water network, the whole of Nasriya had been serviced by an 8 inch line running along the west side of the Kima Canal in 1987. The line was 3500m long but there were no data about plot connections, most of which were illegal. Some 15 communal water taps existed in Nasriya, but 10 of them were along the Canal. The pressure of the existing line was insufficient for a constant supply even to some of the lower parts of the area. The project’s aim was that a completely new water network would supply the entire area of the Nasriya and its urban extensions constantly and efficiently. The average water consumption was expected to rise from 10 litres/person to 50 litres/person by the end of the first phase, and up to 100 litres/person at the final stage. Only about 30% of the expected water supply network would rely on the existing
line along the canal. The water supply system was designed by an Egyptian consultant firm based in Cairo in 1987, but was later modified by the project’s local experts and municipal officials.

It was evident that the consultant firm had not considered the local conditions and the envisioned self-help component. The location of the pumping station, the main pressure line and the proposed location of the water tank had to be changed. This resulted in a substantial reduction in the overall length of pipelines, offered easier access for traffic and did not necessitate any house demolition. The number of vertical pumps was also reduced and an underground tank and supplemental pump were built instead to compensate for any sudden fluctuation in water pressure in the municipal system, as explained the Project Director, emphasising the necessity of consulting local experts and community representatives during the design process (AH, 06-09-98). Construction started in 1988 with a connection of the supply-line from the city network to the booster-pumping station. It was done by the ACC (water supply off-site). Meanwhile, bids were invited for the pumping main up to the water tank, through announcements in two national newspapers; a local contractor from Aswan won the contract. The work started in May 1989 and was completed and tested in December 1989. By September 1990, the ACC took over the water supply component. As it was planned for the construction of the water distribution system to be done by self-help, a similar organisational structure to the sewage system was established. However, it was not possible to embark on the water programme before finishing all planned sewage work. Unsurprisingly, it was found that the inhabitants in the upper elevated area were more willing to dig trenches because water was badly needed, than in areas with a more or less sufficient supply (NGI2, 05-12-98; AH, 06-09-98). The intensity of physical need for services was a factor in determining the level of participation, which is examined in more detail in the following Chapter.

The road network component was not perceived as successful by 25% of the HoHs interviewed. It had been considered of minor importance during the first two phases of the project, in view of the restraints caused by the sewage and water components, the Project Administrator (TA, 16-06-98). The construction of the east bank road was
dependant on the completion of the main sewage collector and a retaining wall for the Kima Canal. Likewise, the implementation of the internal road system was largely dependent on the progress on the main sewage and water lines. However, the project failed to implement all these plans in time. They were only completed in 1994, when substantial financial support was given to the Governorate by the ‘National Programme for Urban Upgrading’, which aimed to improve 33 squatter pockets within Aswan Governorate. This support came from the central government and constituted the Egyptian share of the project regarding this component (the extent to which it replicated the participatory experience of Nasriya is discussed in Chapter 10).

The main failure was the solid waste collection and disposal system, according to 40% of the HoHs interviewed. Nasriya lacked any municipal waste-disposal system before the project. Refuse with potential for recycling was usually stored on house roofs. Domestic refuse used to be dumped either in the nearest vacant area, where goats would eat the organic materials including paper, or in the flood water of the Kima Canal, which was already polluted by the effluent of the Kima fertiliser factory, the discharge of Aswan’s sewage treatment station and the municipal hospital, let alone the illegal discharges of houses alongside the canal (Plate 7.3). The main difficulty in establishing an effective system was the physical features of Nasriya- steep topography, high density of the built-up area and narrow alleys and paths. Almost 80 per cent of roads were less than 4m wide and the numerous intersections made vehicles’ manoeuvring difficult.

Local government, Nasriya’s community leaders and GTZ experts were supposed to learn how to work together through the project. But while the former were constrained by wider city demands, tight budgets, audits by outside authorities and enmeshed in procedure, which made project officials impatient, the NCC and the CDA, although answerable to a much narrower constituency, also had to subsume ethnic communities. These difficulties were instrumental in the failure of the solid waste system, for neither the GTZ consultant nor the community consulted the ACC during its design. The initial waste collection system was designed by a GTZ German expert based on a survey to estimate the daily volume and nature of the waste. This revealed that about 10 tons per day were generated, of which 80% was found to be sand, ashes, dust and stones owing to the
continuous building process (GTZ 1992). It was only realised later that this survey was biased, as residents seized the opportunity to off-load an accumulation of rubble and plastic.

Plate 7.3: Nasriya- Domestic refuse used to be dumped in the flood water of the Kima Canal, which was already polluted by the effluent of the Kima fertiliser factory and several ‘illegal’ discharges.

Moreover, the GTZ expert proposed to use five small ‘imported’ diesel tractors that could go through certain routes on a regular basis and stop at ordained collection points where people could expel their solid wastes themselves directly into the tractors’ hoppers. The idea of arranging a local collection system using non-mechanical means was discouraged by the GTZ’s expert due to the topography of the area and his perception of ‘modernisation’, notwithstanding the fact that municipality itself was using donkey-carts even within the ‘formal’ quarters (AA, 05-11-98). Consequently, the chosen type of vehicles proved inadequate, given the demanding terrain and climate in Aswan. This failure was also attributed to the mismanagement of the system by the CDA, according to another German adviser of a subsequent joint-venture programme operating at the city level (RS, 03-03-98). He claimed that vehicles were abused by local drivers; regular
routes were not respected and breakdowns were frequent, necessitating costly repairs. Moreover, some drivers ignored the ordained collection points, favoured relatives and accepted bribes, complained 24% of HoHs interviewed.

Conceptually speaking, the system was planned on a cost recovery basis in which the operational and maintenance responsibility was given to civil society organisations. Taking into account the limited capability for municipal waste collection at the beginning of the project, it was planned to set up the system as an integral part of the self-administration programme. The responsibility was given first to some GROs, the Biadia and then the Shaghab community centres, but neither of them had the legal authority to collect the fees and were consequently overburdened (AA, 05-11-98; AW, 20-05-98). The task was then given to the Youth Club, as it was the only ‘formal’ institution in Nasriya with the legal status and willingness to run the system at the time. But soon after, the municipal administration objected and claimed that the system should be entirely organised and run by the ACC- East Quarter (the quarter to which Nasriya administratively belongs, being the rightful entity according to the Local Administration Law).

Belatedly, the ACC was approached, but its offer of management and maintenance was on condition it housed the vehicles, said the Mayor of Aswan (MA, 01-04-98). As the CDA could not accept such a loss of face, the vehicles were run into the ground and the service collapsed. Undoubtedly arrogance and rigidity on all sides contributed to this costly failure, which left the CDA’s Board feeling frustrated and badly advised, as the Chair of the CDA expressed bitterly (MS, 28-05-98). This experience made the need for early collaboration and the integration of Nasriya’s operations abundantly clear. The lessons were learnt and regular joint meetings were thereafter instituted between officials and the CDA Board to discuss the operation of the whole range of projects and services. In many cases these discussions are attended by the Mayor or even by the Governor of Aswan (MA, 01-04-98; SM, 02-04-98). The main problem facing the system now centres on the limited capabilities of the local government and the CDA to deal with fluctuations in revenue. However, the GTZ now runs another solid-waste disposal programme at the city level where a better system of fees collection is sought.
7.3.2- Sale of land:

As an overwhelming proportion of the Nasriya’s houses were constructed on state-owned land, residents used to be under constant threat of being evicted at any time. This was a major deterrent to investment in house improvement. Streets’ regularisation to permit better access for traffic and emergency services was achieved through a remodelling plan (Plate 7.4). It was elaborated jointly by the ACC and the PMU and was completed at the beginning of the project, so that any householder wanting to buy his/her plot would know exactly the distance that the house had to set back. Of course some main roads were designated for future widening so as to improve the access in the area, especially for ambulances and the fire brigade. This activity is still on-going. The land price has been set at a concession rate so as to acknowledge the efforts of inhabitants. The first price was set at £E5-10 which was about one-third of the market price. The current price ranges from £E7-15, depending on the plot’s location. Before the applicant pays the purchase price, the plot is surveyed and compared with the leased surface area entered in the ACC land register.

Plate 7.4: Nasriya: Land regularisation plan. Once a householder wants to re-build the house, he/she has to set the main façade back up to 1.5m (e.g. horizontal and vertical middle streets in the photo). This simple model was presented in public meetings as well as for disseminating the experience elsewhere.
Two types of payment are made available—cash down which gives a bonus of a 10% reduction, or a minimum down-payment of 25% followed by monthly instalments over a maximum period of three years at a 3% interest rate. In attempting to reduce land speculation, purchase is only permitted to the registered leaseholders, or their descendants who regularly pay lease (*hekr*) to the state. Once a land-title is offered, the land-owner is not allowed to resell the plot within a period of ten years from the date of signing the contract. A revolving fund for house improvement was established to encourage residents to reconstruct. Once a householder wants to re-build the house, he/she has to set the main façade back up to a maximum distance of 1.5m. It is not obligatory to reconstruct immediately, rather it is a long-term plan. As most of roads are planned to be only some 6m wide, people encourage and help each other to set their main façades back or reconstruct.

However, it was observed throughout the fieldwork’s duration (1996-1998) that illegal land occupation in the eastern fringe of the area is still on going. While existing settlers supply their extended family members or social groups with a plot based on a non-commercialised customary basis, local land developers and speculators subdivide surrounding government-owned land illegally, and supply new comers with plots on commercial bases, charging the same land prices of the Nasriya project. Meantime, although tenants can also buy the lots where they live in Nasriya, they are required to present a declaration of consent from the leaseholder in which he/she should clearly state the acceptance of transfer of the property (focus meeting with senior municipal officials FM2, 26-11-98). This is scrutinised in more detail in the following Chapter.

7.3.3- Urban extension:

The main aim of East Nasriya was to reduce the size of squatter growth in Nasriya. The new extension was designated as a low income residential zone in the physical structure plan of Aswan (1986-2017), the layout being fine tuned by the UDLMU. The CDA defined the target beneficiaries as three groups of people: residents living in over-crowded multi-family houses who want to live independently, newly-married couples, and families living in substandard housing conditions which could not be improved *in situ*—giving priority to tenants who failed to get a letter of consent from their
landlords or leaseholders. A pilot area was selected for the first land subdivision (superimposed on the area on which the fast ‘informal’ growth was taking place); the priorities for land distribution were announced and only Nasriya people could apply. As the total number of applications submitted to the ACC rose to approximately 900, an *ad hoc* committee was established to visit each eligible case and select only those with real needs.

In order to avoid favouritism or corruption during the selection process, three organisations had to be represented on the committee- the ACC, the PMU and the CDA. The committee revealed that some 238 plots were urgently required for the pilot phase and that plot sizes should range from $90m^2$ up to $200m^2$. Lot allocation related size to need and was made by public lottery, the idea being to match appropriate size of plots with each target family's dimensions and ability to pay. Table 7.1 reveals the plot size requirements and classification, the system of proposed area per family size and the total number of earmarked plots targeting cross-subsidy. As each plot had a different view, orientation and location, a public lottery was arranged to avoid any injustice in the distribution process and was attended by the Governor of Aswan, the Mayor and all selected beneficiaries (Plate 7.5). The names of beneficiaries eligible for the same group of size-ranged plots were put together in one pot, the plot number was stated clearly and then a name was randomly picked up by a child and announced at once.

Table 7.1: Nasriya- East Nasriya, first phase plot classification and data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of household (persons)</th>
<th>Eligibility</th>
<th>Plot size required ($m^2$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Over-crowded (No.)</td>
<td>New couples (No.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-4</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-6</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-9</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-11</td>
<td>06</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>more</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Required Plots (No.)</td>
<td>238</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earmarked plots (No.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UDLMU 1996
Plate 7.5: East Nasriya- New plots were distributed by public lottery to avoid any injustice in the distribution process. From the left, the German Project Adviser, the Governor, the researcher, the Chairs of the CDA and the WDA.

Plate 7.6: East Nasriya- The model house
Although this was a new approach and applied for the first time in Egypt, it turned out to work very effectively and no complaints were received from the people. The land use plan of the pilot area also included a school, sports field, recreation and green areas, and a Women’s Centre. A model house was also constructed by the project (Plate 7.6), an \textit{in situ} blocks production unit was operated by the CDA, and a theatre play was performed by the CDA to demonstrate a variety of potential designs and the use of local construction materials, said the GTZ Consultant for East Nasriya Development (HM, 20-01-98 ). The conception of East Nasriya was to enable families to invest directly in their own housing, rather than pay for something decided and provided by someone else. Self-help, the direct investment by families, took the form of family members’ and friends’ labour, purchased materials and hired labour, or a combination of both similar to the way they had constructed their houses in Nasriya. The PMU offered a group of skilled labourers from the area, who had been trained through constructing previous community facilities in Nasriya and would, therefore, charge less than the average market price because of being local.

Theoretically speaking, this variety in the forms of self-help distinguished sites-and-services not only from conventional construction, but also from what we might call ‘conventional self-help’, in which family or project labour mainly replaces real market paid labour in an otherwise conventional construction process. Self-help in East Nasriya came closer to its most common form, as seen in the complete planning and organisation of housing production by families in Nasriya, where the functions of planning and financing were as important as family labour. As for the perception of the local government policymakers, the gradual construction and reliance on self-help reduced housing costs, and therefore was more favourable to them than state housing. “Considering the limited finance supplied by GTZ, East Nasriya settled more families than in many other conventional housing estates throughout Aswan Governorate, while houses were more suitable for the residents’ daily needs than conventional flats”, as explained the Governor of Aswan (SM, 02-04-98). Gradually as the project was phasing out in 1998, civil society organisations in Nasriya took complete responsibility for co-ordination with local government.
However, the fieldwork revealed that settlement in East Nasriya was very slow. Despite published prices, beneficiaries complained about the expense of the land (£E15-25/m²); that hurdle was lowered by agreement between the GTZ and the CDA- that part of the house improvement/construction loan could be used for land purchase. Nobody could solve the problem of access through Nasriya to expedite the transfer of recycled building materials; barring large scale destruction, the access road being necessarily circuitous. The complaint that lack of water made construction almost impossible was solved by the provision of a public tap following the instructions the Governor and the Mayor after a joint workshop. Thus the CDA and local government have become accustomed to consulting one another.

7.3.4- Community facilities:

The idea of constructing a Service Centre resulted from the many facilities that the area lacked. The selected site was the only vacant plot in the central area of Nasriya and was used as an informal garbage dump. The inhabitants cleared the site with the assistance of the Municipality and persuaded the leaseholder to donate it to the project. The service centre was built by a local contractor and managed and supervised by a ‘construction unit’ consisting of the project team, to supply materials and local workers, and an engineer from the Housing Directorate to supervise and prepare the invoices. This reduced the total cost by as much as 30 per cent (GTZ 1992). Using Nubian sandstone, the building is constructed in the traditional style with vaults and domes for the roof. It has introduced a distinguished architectural model that guided the local authorities in their design for many other public buildings in Aswan (Plate 7.7). The Service Centre consists of two floors and is run now by the CDA. The ground floor houses a training centre, a land sale office that is run by the ACC, a bakery, a post office, an office for the loan programme, a branch of the Social Affairs Department, a pharmacy and a shop. The upper floor contains an office for the CDA board, a multi-function room (a library, a children’s club or a meeting room), a basic clinical and first aid unit and a laboratory.
Plate 7.7: Nasriya- The Service Centre supplied the area with many facilities that it lacked before, and introduced a distinct architectural model that guided the local authorities in their design of many other public buildings in Aswan.

Plate 7.8: Nasriya- The new school extension in the largest school’s yard. The new building offered another example of vernacular architecture.
The project also introduced various programmes to improve educational provision in Nasriya. The students and teachers were involved in environmental campaigns, educational trips, the basic cleaning and painting of classrooms and blackboards and the landscaping of open areas. Meanwhile, the project improved the three schools that existed in Nasriya with the participation of the students and a local contractor for concrete work. Mindful of the absence of any vacant land in Nasriya, the project also constructed a new extension in the yard of the largest school. The new building comprised 13 classrooms, a library and vocational training rooms. The new extension was also an example of vernacular architecture that involved the potential users in the processes of design, used local materials in construction, considered the hot climate of Aswan and fulfilled the demands for sound educational facilities considering the limited financial resources (Plate 7.8).

Improvement of neighbourhood community centres was also one of the most praised components by the residents; 43% of HoHs rated it as the second best service outcome of the project. Although rural-urban migration was the major generator of ethnic clustering in Nasriya and Hai El-Salam, grouping living in close proximity, co-operation and interaction between sub-communities in the former seemed more evident; they had the same target of improving their living environment and each ethnic group constructed a community centre, named after the village of origin, which functioned as a focal institution for enhancing their social consolidation, as argued the Project Co-ordinator (MF, 05-11-98). It was necessary for the project to capitalise on these existing organisations and activate their role in carrying out and supplying social programmes at the decentralised level. These issues are examined in detail in the next Chapter.

There were 39 such community centres and most of them were neither in good physical condition nor registered with the Social Affairs Directorate, which prevented receiving any outside assistance legally. Despite the fact that the upgrading of these centres was not included in the first project document, increasing demands from the inhabitants to improve those centres with ‘self-help’ motivated the project to modify its initial position. A pilot phase programme was initiated to make use of the enthusiasm and organisational capabilities of the most active centres, offering them the materials and
The last component, gender and development (GAD), received special attention from the project, though it was a complex issue considering the conservative Muslim identity of most residents in Nasriya. There was an absence of gender awareness at all levels of the project structure in the early phase. While its integration at a later phase is to be commended, the way it was integrated was problematic. There was the issue of how to define gender-relevant project intervention in the local context. Unfortunately, much of the gender training done in Egypt uses tools and concepts developed in the 'North', asserted the GTZ Consultant for Gender and Development (KM, 05-08-99). While gender sensitisation is essential in any context, including the Egyptian, it is an issue of how the
Chapter 7 The Reality of the Aswan Programme

concept is developed and integrated, a Women Information and Communication Office (WICO) was first established, but was soon substituted by the Women Committee, operating within the CDA’s structure.

Following the targets of the Nasriya project to improve the socio-economic status of all residents, including women and the disadvantaged, the project held several meetings with the members of the CDA and the Women Committee in 1992. The collective group agreed upon the necessity of strengthening the capabilities and awareness of women in society by two means. The first was to improve the performance of the existing community centres, as they form a preliminary base for assembling the residents and could supply better women’s development activities at a decentralised level. But due to the limited area available at each centre, the size of rooms dedicated for women’s activities was often insufficient. The second arose during an evaluation visit from the German Ministry of International Co-operation and Development in 1993. The women’s team proposed to build an independent Women’s Centre in the Upper-Middle part of Nasriya; to be incorporated within the planning of the East-Nasriya new extension.

By 1995, and despite the fact that the women’s team had been active for more than five years, a clear plan for women’s development, especially for those who were responsible for the mobilisation of the women’s community of Nasriya, was still lacking. The discussion between the project staff and the women’s team took a top-down direction, and clearly stated that only when the team was adequately qualified and supported by the project, or from other outside or inside sources, would they be able to answer the needs expressed by women in the community. The project thought that to make the process of women’s empowerment successful, it was necessary for the women themselves to identify their particular strategic gender needs in co-operation, and with the supportive assistance of the CDA, explained the Project Co-ordinator (MF, 05-11-98). Fortunately, this policy seemed to work. A core of female members of the CDA, dissatisfied with their low representation on the Board, pressed for and succeeded in establishing an independent Women’s Development Association (WDA) in 1996. They immediately set the targets of the proposed Women’s Centre as basically to serve active women in Nasriya and to encourage sceptical and less-active ones to join in their various
activities (focus meeting with the WDA Board FM4, 04-04-98). After several meetings between the project’s architect and the WDA members had taken place, it was agreed that the design should incorporate five main components (Box 7.2).

Box 7.2: Nasriya- The Women’s Centre components

- **Educational Unit**: designed to offer a) programmes to improve the quality of life of Nasriya women by increasing their knowledge in specific areas, e.g. reproductive health and legal rights relevant to their daily lives, b) training courses taught by professionals at a minimum fee to support East Nasriya preparatory and secondary school students in their academic studies, and c) a children’s club to provide local children with an opportunity to play in a safe and fun environment and to benefit from a pre-school educational programme;

- **Cultural Unit**: designed to develop the social/cultural awareness of Nasriya girls and women by means of a wide range of activities, e.g. seminars, audio-visual facilities, theatre plays and cultural trips;

- **Health Unit**: to provide affordable basic medical services to East Nasriya inhabitants, including general examinations, vaccinations, immunisations and injections, reproductive health and first aid, (the Unit reports to the Directorate of Health in Aswan);

- **Income-generating Unit**: which aims basically to produce reasonable priced ready-to-wear clothes and bed-linen, while creating job opportunities for women from the area; and

- **Loans Unit**: seeks to help women, specially single women and the poorest, to improve their economic situation via micro-credit and income generating projects.

Source: Key Informants (FM4, 04-04-98).

A joint supervision team was established between the project’s construction consultant and the WDA, the implementation process started immediately, and local contractors and skilled labourers in the area were encouraged to tender for operations, added the Head of the WDA (ZA, 05-04-98). The Women’s Centre was the last input of the GTZ in Nasriya, and the building was officially inaugurated in December 1998. The sustainability of the WDA-supplied activities is examined in the follow-up Chapters.

7.4- Conclusions:

The Nasriya project demonstrated the possibility of improving an existing squatter settlement through providing its residents with the required infrastructure and community development at a low cost by means of applying sound community participation. In particular, the project has proved that participatory approaches can be welcomed by civil
society organisations, as well as local government entities, while their performance is improving over time. The processes of self-help went through different phases during the implementation of various components, thereby building capacity of ‘learning by doing’.

The Nasriya project faced difficulty in the beginning to promote participatory development and to bring about radical changes in systems and administrative structures in Aswan, but has undoubtedly laid the foundation for further development and gradually involved the local government in a new participatory approach in Aswan. Its experience illustrates the desirability of at least being aware that all projects should have long-term community and municipal capacity-building goals.

While the role of self-help in implementing many physical activities was palpable, building self-confidence for the residents by means of community empowerment, self-administration, gender and development, and land security, is a distinctive example of a sort of self-help achievement that cannot be quantified. Some roles of self-help had to be changed, partly because policies had changed in response to community demands or unsuccessful components, which necessitated the application of different purposes of self-help in different contexts. It is commonly assumed that the best form of participation will always be the most complete form of participation. The theoretical assumption is that community control is better than delegated power or partnership, which are, in turn, assumed to be better than consulting, informing, or the ‘cheap labour’ types of participation (Arnstein 1969).

The experience of Nasriya challenged this ladder. The early participation of community members in the project amounted to little more than the provision of cheap labour. It shaped an essential entity in the development of effective empowered community organisations. The important point is that this limited form of participation was appropriate for the time, given the previous lack of government involvement in the Nasriya area and the consequent limited trust between community members and government officials. This conclusion ties in with that of Smith (1998) who argues that ‘weak’ forms of participation— including the provision of labour material and cash, the enlistment of community members as workers of various kinds and community consultation on plans prepared by others— can lead to benefits and perhaps increase the
possibility that ‘stronger’ forms of participation can be introduced later. An important point in Nasriya was that initiatives such as the sewerage and water-supply improvement programmes were very much in line with people’s initial priorities. This suggests that the project intended to achieve objectives that the people viewed as important.

Whilst the governments of Egypt and Germany shared the costs of the upgrading project, the co-operation of the inhabitants contributed to a substantial reduction in these costs. Initial calculations show that some 30% of the construction and development costs have been saved due to the efforts of the inhabitants (GTZ 1992). “This is an indication that the project’s goals have been achieved. It is not only a question of an infrastructure network being laid out and connected to every house, but of showing how the project components, can be articulated and implemented, overcoming many technical or organisational difficulties, with effective community self-administration”, as asserted H.E. Salah Mosbah, the Governor of Aswan (SM, 02-04-98). It is the latter aspect which has led the Egyptian/German co-operation project of Aswan to act as an orientation point for future urban development planning and improvement programmes in Egypt. “The Nasriya project has shifted low-income housing policies in a different direction by calling attention to the potentials that exist for cost-saving, infrastructure construction and strengthening of community solidarity through the participation of the population and their self-efforts” (SM, 02-04-98). This is significant in that empowerment created by the collective action and enhanced community spirit was not perceived as a threat to the local government in Aswan.

On the contrary, it can be argued that the project has clearly influenced the attitudes of the government officials at all levels from the Governor down, particularly those who have been directly involved with it. The establishment of the UDLMU at the Aswan Governorate level is a great success on its own. Although it still needs many administrative and financial reforms, as discussed in Chapter 10, it continues to function and is fulfilling, to a degree, a major task in implementing the Aswan Physical Master Plan, small-scale urban plans, urban upgrading and daily communication with other local and national institutions, besides offering consultation to the Governor of Aswan and all municipalities in Aswan. It is also true that the Unit has been doing a major role in
enhancing the planning awareness of many government officials since its establishment. The Unit’s staff attend meetings at top local levels and are consulted in almost every major development project, either financed locally or by the central government.

The fundamental question about the Nasriya and Hai El-Salam projects, which received substantial external support and were limited in scale when compared with the overall scale of squatter settlements in Egypt, is the extent to which they can be replicated within mainstream government structures. Indeed, initiatives such as Nasriya should ideally be seen as the first step in a medium to long-term process aimed at institutionalising participatory approaches. But replicability only operates within institutionalised processes, and both require more than just demonstration projects. They require the micro and macro-level initiatives to be seen as an integrated entity with the need to influence the macro situation being taken into account in the design of local initiatives. They require ‘accountable bureaucratic capacity’, including its four key-variables: structural and organisational, behavioural, client-interaction and environment variables. They require active participation from civil society as well as citizens. Therefore, it is probably premature to predict the long-term institutionalisation of participatory processes before first examining citizens’ collaborative action and political participation.
CHAPTER EIGHT

COLLECTIVE ACTION AND COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION

The discourses and procedures of participation in practice stretches from people at local societal level, through in-country governmental and non-governmental organisations to international donor agencies (DAs). In order to reduce the disempowering repercussions of the ERSAP on the DC’s poor, the World Bank has introduced the idea of ‘stakeholders’ as parties who either affect or are affected by the Bank’s actions and policies. Defining the Bank’s overriding objectives as poverty reduction, the primary stakeholders were unequivocally stated to be the poor and marginalised: those who lack information and power and are excluded from the development process (World Bank 1994: 2). Participation was thus defined as “a process through which stakeholders influence and share control over development initiatives, decisions and resources which affect them” (World Bank 1994: 6).

According to the World Bank proposals, the goal of participation is to reach and engage primary stakeholders in ways that are transformational (getting communities to decide on their own priorities), not instrumental (getting people to buy into a donor’s project). In reality, instrumental participation has repeatedly been the inadvertent outcome of many urban development projects carried out by the World Bank and many other bilateral donor agencies (Nelson and Wright 1995: 5). Participation has positioned people very differently in relation to the development apparatus- as objects of a theoretical process of economic and political transformation; as expected ‘beneficiaries’ of programmes with pre-set parameters; or as contributors of casual labour to help a project achieve its ends (Nelson and Wright 1995: 6). Although instrumental participation projects might achieve their ‘physical’ aims more efficiently, effectively, quickly or cheaply, primary stakeholders would always remain passive recipients, informants, labourers in a development effort, unable to set up the collaborative process, or to control their own development. In contrast, participation as an end fosters sustainability by means of self-administration and considering the power relationships between members of a community as well as between them, the state and agency
institutions. Participation as an end can thus be employed to "describe an empowering process which enables local people to do their own analysis, to take command, to gain in confidence, and to make their own decisions. In theory, this means that 'we' participate in 'their' project, not 'they' in 'ours'" (Chambers 1995: 30).

The Hai El-Salam project did not go beyond consultation in terms of community participation, whilst the approach that the Nasriya project adopted 'seemed' to advocate participation as an end and worked across organisational boundaries. This paradigm shift from 'things' top-down to 'people' bottom-up, as Chambers calls it (1995), reflected a ten-year gap between project initiation. On that account, this chapter focuses on the experience of Nasriya. It aims to examine the extent to which the goals of participation have 'really' evolved as an end, and to understand and explain the key issues required for successful collaboration at local society level. In practice, collaboration is difficult owing to the diversity of mind-sets; cultural and social groups frequently have different aims, practices, expectations, and power resources (Huxham 1996). Accordingly, the processes of people's participation during the project's planning, implementation and evaluation are analysed. The discussion explores first the extent to which the population of Nasriya has been empowered and involved, and examines the means and features of creating and sustaining value for the participants in such a context. The various options which have been made available to the Nasriya community to work toward sustainable community economic development are scrutinised. Particular emphases are placed on beneficiaries perceptions of their participation, the causal factors and mind-sets that may enhance/suppress the forms and degrees of their participation, and actions taken by the institutional triangle of state, community and DA to sustain participation at community level after the project's withdrawal.

8.1- Participatory initiatives (1985-1995):

The transformation of citizens into collaborators is more likely, as is their commitment to further development initiatives, when the community is economically distressed (Sharp and Bath 1993). Conflict over economic development is less probable when everyone has a strong stake in making the community more affluent. Such
transformative processes had been experienced in the Nasriya community before the upgrading project started; several open interviews with Nasriya’s community leaders revealed that the community initiatives to get government support for action to improve sewerage and water supply facilities were significant in triggering the project’s identification and planning.

The first serious attempt had been made in early 1985, when the population of Nasriya took a unified stand and assertively presented its position to the municipal administration, demanding infrastructure improvements. The second attempt took place in 1986 and was perhaps more significant. After no action was taken by the municipality, some £E4000 (equal to sixty-months’ salary for a junior government employee in 1986) had been collected by community associations from the Nasriya residents for the construction of a limited sewer and water supply network, as explained the Head of the Shaghab Community Centre (AW, 20-05-98). Soon after the local sewage network was implemented, the Ministry of Irrigation made an official objection at the local police station on account of the fact that the sewage network was constructed illegally and the sewerage was being discharged directly into the Kima Canal without treatment. In response, the police arrested the leaders who had collected the money and organised the construction work. “All relatives, neighbours and friends of the arrested people rushed in groups to the local police station and demonstrated there for three days. We were about 300 people defending the accused ones and praising their moral character” (AW, 20-05-98). Of course such popular political activity did not emerge suddenly at the peak moment of the demonstration, but was only the end result of a political process mobilising potential collective forces.

Thus it is argued that this ‘police’ action could have conceivably been a potential stimulus for a series of protests by the entire community of Nasriya. To break the deadlock, a request was then made by the people to meet with the Governor. “I went there with three other community leaders, and we put all our problems and complaints straight on the table. The Governor listened carefully but we were all surprised to see him again on the following day at 1.00am, visiting Nasriya for the first time, along with
the Mayor of Aswan. He stopped first at the Nasriya Bridge [crossing the Kima Canal] to see the situation himself, and once the people realised that the Governor was truly in the area, they invited him one by one to visit their houses and showed him the terrible conditions they had been living in”, Head of the Shaghab Community Centre (AW, 20-05-98).

These active complaints and organised protests of the community encouraged policy-makers to position the project in partnership and to give their demands prime consideration. The residents’ action exemplified Blumer’s definition of social movement as “collective enterprises to establish a new order of life” (Blumer 1969). “Two days after the Governor’s visit to Nasriya, he asked for a public meeting with the people of Nasriya to be organised, and some 500 people were gathered in the Biadia Community Centre to express their problems themselves. ... The selection of our community centre was not because Mr Abdel-Rahman Sayed Omar was from Biadia [the first Director of the Physical Planning Office, Aswan Governorate, (1987-1988), who also became later the first Director of the Nasriya Project (1988-1989)], but because we were the most active community centre in the area, the most suitable in physical condition, central in location and one of the largest in size”, Head of the Biadia Community Centre (AA, 05-11-98). Two or three months later, the Governor came again to the Biadia Centre and introduced the German Consultants to the community for the first time. They soon started the dialogue with the community’s and the NCC’s leaders.

“When the Germans met us first, they proposed to repeat the same idea we implemented before and collect £E250 from each house in Nasriya so that they could construct a greater sewage network. Of course we refused because we knew that nobody would be willing to pay. We then proposed instead to dig the trenches ourselves and the idea was later accepted by the GTZ”, (AW, 20-05-98). So, it can be argued that the project was driven by community demand in a very real sense. Decision-making processes are the most obvious instance of exercise of power (Shepherd 1983), and because participation had been broadened by effective representation in Nasriya, power
Chapter 8 Collective Action and Community Participation

was shared, and excluded groups had become included, these issues are the focus here and Chapter 9.

The order in which facilities were provided was very much based on community priorities when the project started in 1987. These had been established in a formal way through social surveys, public hearings and ZOPP meetings (Objectives-Oriented Project Planning, in German). However, despite the project’s attempts to incorporate all citizens in the planning process, the people’s own assessment of the degree of their active participation varied. While less than half of the respondents believed that their participation during the planning phase had been effective, the same number perceived it as none at all (46%), and the rest (8%) described it as limited (Table 8.1). And yet, participation during the implementation of the project seemed overwhelming, with 87% describing their participation as effective. The first requirement in implementation was to discuss with residents the technical details of the work to be carried out and the approach to be adopted. Subsequently, the challenge of ‘self-help’ had to be conceptualised by the project and supported by the local government, which was not used to administering such a collaborative approach. Once the basic concept of participation within the construction phase had been established, community leaders started to organise the people into groups for implementation. This was achieved by some 150 meetings that took place before and during the project’s implementation. The main concern of the early meetings was to enable community leaders to introduce the project’s staff, allow them to explain the technicalities of the work and answer questions.

Although an overwhelming proportion of the residents trusted the project, and were enthusiastic to carry out the scheme, there was some powerful opposition at first. “Some individuals in the Aswan Local Popular Council tried to convince people that the project’s staff wanted residents to participate in the work so that they could pocket the money set aside for the hire of contractors. We [Nasriya community leaders] were sure that they wanted to redirect the foreign aid project into their own areas instead. Unfortunately, they succeeded in creating a strong lobby against the development project amongst some of the residents themselves” (AW, 20-05-98). This was resisted by the
first Nasriya Community Council (NCC, 1986-1992). "The NCC brought together residents from different sections and social groups and played an essential role in overcoming this conflict. The first Head, Sheikh Ahmed Younes, was a charismatic leader, enjoying a lot of support from the residents due to his assertiveness and enthusiasm, and thus was able to defuse the negative criticisms through open and honest dialogue", said the German Project Advisor (OA, 04-02-98). Sheikh Ahmed Younes explained the reality of the project’s philosophy to the people on several occasions, and succeeded in transforming the perceptions of sceptical individuals into collaboration based upon a congruence of individual and community needs. He also assisted the inhabitants to organise their efforts and exchange experiences between groups.

The process of construction brought people closer together through cutting trenches, sharing food and drink, providing lights to facilitate work at night, and helping neighbours to pass the temporary barriers created by the excavated material. A feature of the work was the way in which young men and neighbours offered to do the work of widows and elderly residents who could not do it themselves. People were also brought together in improving their community centres, and in the construction of the sportsfield in East Nasriya, the Service Centre and the Women’s Centre. Thus enthusiasm and active support had been sustained over eight years. By 1995, the basic infrastructure network had been laid out and connected to some 80% of the area’s houses, almost half of households had taken the initiative to legalise their plots and were offered land titles, and community facilities and services had been established and were fully run by the community organisations. The chair of the Nasriya CDA pointed out that because the sewerage and water supply networks have been taken over by the Aswan City Council (ACC) following their completion in 1995, all major physical maintenance problems are directly addressed to and discussed with the Head of the East Quarter. If problems are found to require a higher authority, a meeting with the Mayor will immediately be requested, take place and problems are usually resolved at this level of administration. Apart from the Service Centre and the Women Centre, Nasriya’s civil society
organisations are now completely responsible for running and maintaining the services in Nasriya in collaboration with other government bodies.

“Similar to any other quarter in Aswan, Nasriya is included in the city’s annual fiscal plan for infrastructure and services renewal and/or replacement. Moreover, Nasriya has been enrolled in the National Programme for Urban Upgrading and the National Programme for Maternity and Childhood, where increasing volumes of investment have been assigned for further development”, said the Mayor of Aswan (MA, 01-04-98). Such ‘formal’ arrangements seem conventional by virtue of not involving direct community participation. The difference from conventional practice lies in the presence of strong community organisations, particularly the CDA, which have the power to fully capitalise on their external communications and place pressure on the local government if it fails to maintain facilities adequately. However, there is evidence that the residents deal with minor problems themselves in an ‘informal’ manner. The HoHs survey revealed an awesome willingness among the residents (68%) to deal with minor blockages in the infrastructure networks themselves. “Small amounts of £E2 [£0.30] are usually collected from each house in the affected street, and a local labourer is hired to deal with the problem”, was the explanation repeated by many HoHs during the survey in the tradition of self-help still there. It seemed that the strong networks existing within the community engendered co-operation and solidarity, providing a firm underpinning for the participatory process.

8.2- Participants’ perceptions (1987-1995):

The challenge of urban upgrading and community development is not to achieve efficiency per se but to realise a community vision chosen and enacted by its residents. Conceptually, what so called ‘living democracy’ (Lappe and Du Bois 1994) means is a redefinition of the role of the citizen from passive consumer of government services to an active participant in the development of his/her area (Box 1998). This redefinition requires that citizens take a greater responsibility for determining the future of their community. The reality of popular participation during the planning, implementation and
evaluation of the Nasriya project as expressed by the people themselves varied widely. Despite the fact that a large proportion of the survey population devalued their participation in the planning (45%) and the evaluation (65%) phases, many of them attributed this to either their inactive attitude, or to the project, including the previous NCC, not inviting them to participate (Table 8.1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of participation</th>
<th>Participation in planning %</th>
<th>Participation in implementation %</th>
<th>Participation in evaluation %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effective</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>08</td>
<td>05</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>08</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total %</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The HoHs interviewed interpreted ‘effective participation’ in planning or evaluation in terms of attendance at almost all meetings, public hearings or workshops that took place in their area and were organised by the project or respective civil society organisations (CDA, WDA or GRO) to plan or evaluate the progress in one of the project’s components. They also perceived it as keenness to contact the project, or their respective GRO, whenever they wanted to demand certain services or to complain about the bad quality of some services. Effective participation in implementation meant that they cut the sewerage trenches in front of their houses on time and according to the project’s specifications, regardless of whether they did the cutting themselves or hired labourers.

Conspicuously, the majority of the residents (87%) perceived their participation in implementation as having been effective. All HoHs who participated effectively in the evaluation of the project, had also been consistent and participated effectively in the planning and implementation of the project. Participation in evaluation or planning took place either formally, by attending one of the project’s workshops or community hearings, or informally by expressing their opinion either to the Project Management Unit or to their respective community organisations, including the NCC or the CDA. Based on HoHs’ assessment of participation in each stage, three respondent patterns/clusters
became evident (active, less active and not active), which had unique combinations of attributes (Table 8.2). While cluster 1 comprised HoHs who perceived their participation as effective during all of the project’s stages (active group: 27 cases representing 25% of all respondents), cluster 2 represented HoHs who perceived their participation as more effective during the implementation than during the planning, while their participation was limited or non-existent in the evaluation (less active: 31 cases representing some 30%), and cluster 3 consisted of those who participated only in the implementation phase, including a small proportion (18%) who did not participate at all (not active: 50 cases representing 45%).

Table 8.2: Nasriya- Clusters of participation during the project

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of participation during:</th>
<th>(Cluster 1) Active group</th>
<th>(Cluster 2) Less Active</th>
<th>(Cluster 3) Not Active</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Effective</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Limited</td>
<td>04%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- None</td>
<td>00%</td>
<td>00%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Effective</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Limited</td>
<td>00%</td>
<td>00%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- None</td>
<td>00%</td>
<td>00%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Effective</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>00%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Limited</td>
<td>00%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- None</td>
<td>00%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Groups (No.)</td>
<td>(27)</td>
<td>(31)</td>
<td>(50)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The personal characteristics of each group’s members reveal the contingencies that enhanced or prevented participation. Older people (45 years old or more), who had also lived longer in the area, were more likely to participate more actively in the project; even so only 28% of the older people were ‘active’ as against 19% of the younger. These differences were not significant statistically (chi square at p-level 0.24). Neither was education a significant factor in inducing participation, as similar proportions of all levels were represented in the active group (p-level 0.38). Of course older people were expected to have less education, as basic education (preparatory school until age 15) became compulsory only in the 1970s; younger people had better chances of higher.
education. Similarly, it was not surprising that as female HoHs (10% of the survey population) were more likely to be illiterate or to have little education, half of them were ‘not active’, while the adult children of the others represented them in meetings and making complaints. An important indication related to participation was that the majority of HoHs (95%) were keen on educating their children; almost half of the adult children in Nasriya were either technical or trade school graduates, while nearly 15% were university graduates. The residents of Nasriya have the aspirations of the bourgeoisie, the perseverance of pioneers, and the values of patriots. The upgrading project gave them an opportunity to fulfil part of these aspirations, and they endeavoured to improve their social attributes.

Of course, some HoHs did not want to be involved in solving problems in Nasriya, especially working on questions of planning and evaluation. Many HoHs interviewed said that “even if we had wanted to, we did not have the time to participate and did not know how to participate”. This was commonly the case for private sector employees and the self-employed entrepreneurs in Nasriya; only 19% of them were classified in the active group as against 31% of the public employees. It was reported that some of them even hired labourers to cut the trenches instead of doing this themselves. Unlike the public sector employees who work only 8.00am-2.00pm in Egypt, the private sector employees and the self-employed entrepreneurs work for longer hours and usually for two shifts. Thus it can be argued that they had less free time to participate in the project’s activities. However, no association between occupation and the categories of participation could be detected; this may reflect the considerable range of occupations within both the public sector and self employment. Support for this interpretation stems from their respective income.

The less active group had the highest incomes reported among the three groups (£E650/month), as well as the highest median income (£E320/month), which was even higher than either the median income in Nasriya (£E300/month) or the average (£E286/month) (Figure 8.1). Private sector employees and some self-employed entrepreneurs may earn twice as much as public sector employees in Egypt. However, it
is worth noting that the median income in Nasriya is only slightly above the 'food-based poverty line' and below the 'lower income poverty line' according to the Egypt Human Development Report. The probability of earning the minimum income in Nasriya (£E18-60/month) was very low, corresponding mostly to female and elderly HoHs. This level of income often indicates dependence on state social assistance, Sadat's pension programme, which assists elderly people or single mothers who are not eligible for any retirement income.

Figure 8.1: Nasriya- Income by clusters of participation

Total cases 89, missing values, 19 cases, deleted.

Home origin was significantly associated with activating or suppressing popular participation (chi square significant at p-level 0.05). People coming from Luxor were the most active; the first Head of the NCC, Sheikh Ahmed Younes, as well as most of the council's members, were originally from Luxor or its surrounding villages and therefore had good communication with their own populace (Table 8.3). Moreover, most of the meetings prior to, and at the start of, the project took place in one of the Luxor-related community centres, which encouraged them to participate. Many HoHs complained that areas of Luxor origin were favoured with more activities during the project. The first meeting with the Governor in 1988 was in the Biadia Community Centre and the first
rehabilitated community centre was also Biadia, according to 70% of HoHs living in other areas. The Project Co-ordinator defended this by arguing that: "Nubians and people of Luxor were the most active groups when the project started, we tried to capitalise on this fact to create competition among different groups" (MF, 05-11-98). In fact, using internal social division as a stimulus for each group to perform better than 'others', might badly affect the integration and social solidarity of a local society as whole.

Table 8.3: Nasriya- Home origin by clusters of participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Home origin</th>
<th>(Cluster 1) Active group</th>
<th>(Cluster 2) Less Active</th>
<th>(Cluster 3) Not Active</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Row %</td>
<td>Row %</td>
<td>Row %</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxor</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>08</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ques</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helal</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nubians</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All groups</td>
<td>(27)</td>
<td>(31)</td>
<td>(50)</td>
<td>(108)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

People from Ques represented 39% of the total survey population, in which a half were not active. However, it is worth noting that almost half of Ques HoHs were private sector employees or self-employed entrepreneurs, who tended to participate less. Likewise, almost two thirds of Helal were either self-employed entrepreneurs (54%) or unemployed (15%); they have byres and horse or donkey husbandry adjacent to their houses, and all household members, including children, help in animal breeding, milk production and/or transporting goods or people by donkey carts or horse drawn carriage. They were less or not active. Income and home origin were indeed interrelated; the lowest median income was associated with Helal and the Nubians (£E200/month), although the minimum income of the Nubians (£E100/month) was twice as that of Helal. Those of Ques had the highest median value reported (£E300/month) as well as the highest income (£E650/month). Although Nubians were active at the beginning of the project as the Project’s Co-ordinator suggested, their participatory initiatives declined until they had completely disappeared by the time the project withdrew; 64% were classified as less active in general. They lived in the peripheral area of Nasriya, sector 9;
land-titling services had not been offered to them because of municipal institutional confusion, up to the time of the survey. They are not represented at all at present within the CDA's structure, and many social services, which were previously enabled by the project in their Community Centre, Amberkab, have almost certainly stopped.

Another explanatory dimension for variation in participation concerns the internal geography of Nasriya. A sector's spatial location, perpendicular to the Kima Canal was inextricably linked with the home origin of HoHs, and both seemed influential, although the association between location and participation was less significant statistically (p-level 0.09). The inhabitants of the middle sectors of Nasriya (sectors 4-6) were more active than those living in the peripheral sectors (north sectors 1-3, or south sectors 7-9). There are many reasons for this state of affairs. The project's site-office, the Service Centre, the CDA's office and the Biadia Community Centre were all located in the middle part, in which the project's efforts to mobilise people to participate in the planning and evaluation were concentrated. This was compounded by its occupation by people from Luxor, who tended to be more active. Although sector nine was peripheral, it belonged to the less active group simply because it was mainly inhabited by the Nubians, who are a very self-contained community. Sector eight scored more under the 'not active' category because it was mainly inhabited by people from Helal and Ques, almost one third of each community lived there. The community representatives failed to persuade a large proportion of the residents of this sector to rehabilitate or replace an old sewerage network which was constructed by themselves prior to the project.

The Project's Administrator attributed this situation to a very low profile of self-initiatives in this particular section of sector 8 and the complete absence of group action. "We tried several ways to encourage the residents of this section to cut trenches so that pipes could be laid out, but all attempts went in vain. They had an old self-help sewage network which was badly used by some Helal residents for animals' waste disposal as well as sanitation. Despite our technical advice, they did not want to replace this old network. Now, it is completely deteriorated, but it is too late because the project is phasing out" (TA, 16-06-98). Indeed, almost all their neighbours from Ques and Nubians
complained that Helal residents still keep animals either in front of their houses or in an attached byre, which cause pollution and an unpleasant smell. It was also observed that the Helal people were viewed differently in Nasriya. While some respondents viewed them derogatively, because they deal with animals, live in unhygienic housing conditions and are not keen on educating their children, other residents appreciated their role as the only suppliers of many services, e.g. cheap transportation, milk and home-made cheese. It is worth noting that the only three cases who refused to be interviewed during the fieldwork survey were located in this sector which in itself could be attributed to the weak relationship between them and the project.

Differences in spatial elevation was expected to shape the degree of people’s participation; the gap between the active and the not active groups was less sharp among, and in favour of, residents living in the upper elevated area. Because this remoter area was deprived of many services, residents worked harder to improve their situation. “We used to carry clean water sometimes even from the railway station. The water pressure was usually low and the public taps were either useless or busy. We never threw away our waste water. It was very important for any one who wanted to construct here. All families would usually offer the water from their laundry and give a hand to their neighbour in construction”, commented a group of HoHs living in the upper elevated area of Nasriya (NGI1, 07-04-98). Being poor and sharing the same daily problems, transformed any possible conflictual modes of participation into collaboration. In contrast, most of the people living in the lower area, along the Kima Canal and near to the urban centre, were less active or not active at all. Their participation was limited during the implementation stage because their water and sewage networks were built by contractors (the main off-line). Consequently their participation was also limited, or not at all, in the planning and evaluation stages.

As the spatial distribution table shows (Table 8.4), the highest concentration of the active group (83%) came from the middle sectors (sectors 4, 5 and 6) of the upper-elevated area where the physical need for basic services was at a maximum, and the distance to the project management unit and the CDA was relatively short. This was
followed by the middle sectors of the centrally-elevated area (54%) where the level of physical need for many services, especially clean water and access to health and education facilities, was lower (nearer to the Service Centre and to the urban centre of the city). Meanwhile, the lowest profiles of participation occurred on the North periphery of the upper-elevated area (82%), followed by the South periphery of the lower-area (73%). The residents of the former area were the latest to squat in Nasriya, the furthest from the project management unit and the CDA, and were less assimilated into the project. Those in the latter were used to spoon-feeding by the municipality as they occupied state-built housing and the main sewerage and water off-lines were constructed by a contractor.

Table 8.4: Nasriya- Sectors and elevation differentiation by clusters of participation

|                      | (Cluster 1) Active group (%) | (Cluster 2) Less Active (%) | (Cluster 3) Not Active (%) | Total No. | %  
|----------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|-----------|------
| North periphery/     | 09                           | 09                          | 82                        | 11        | 100  
| upper area           |                              |                             |                           |           |      
| North periphery/     | 43                           | 07                          | 50                        | 14        | 100  
| central area         |                              |                             |                           |           |      
| North periphery/     | 38                           | 25                          | 37                        | 8         | 100  
| lower area           |                              |                             |                           |           |      
| Total (No.)          | 10                           | 04                          | 19                        | 33        |      

| Middle sectors/      | 83                           | 00                          | 17                        | 6         | 100  
| upper area           |                              |                             |                           |           |      
| Middle sectors/      | 54                           | 23                          | 23                        | 13        | 100  
| central area         |                              |                             |                           |           |      
| Middle sectors/      | 12                           | 38                          | 50                        | 8         | 100  
| lower area           |                              |                             |                           |           |      
| Total (No.)          | 13                           | 06                          | 08                        | 27        |      

| South periphery/     | 10                           | 50                          | 40                        | 10        | 100  
| upper area           |                              |                             |                           |           |      
| South periphery/     | 11                           | 48                          | 41                        | 27        | 100  
| central area         |                              |                             |                           |           |      
| South periphery/     | 00                           | 27                          | 73                        | 11        | 100  
| lower area           |                              |                             |                           |           |      
| Total (No.)          | 04                           | 21                          | 23                        | 48        |      

Values of more than 50% are in Bold.

Intervening variables of property stakes, e.g., land legal status, house ownership and housing physical condition are linked closely to neighbourhood status, and were also explored. Land legal status did not influence the degree of participation; the proportion
of the active group (24%-28%) varied little between the three statuses of land, notwithstanding 59% of those living in legally owned plots were either active or less active, and around the same proportion of those living in illegally occupied government-land were classified as not active. Although most of the 'hekr' leaseholders were either less active (24%) or not active (52%), they were all motivated to improve their living standards; 90% of them had wished to legalise their plots before but were unable to because of shortage of money and had to wait for their turn in the house loan scheme.

House ownership status was highly significant (p-level 0.01). Although a similar proportion from both statuses belonged to the active group (25%), the owner-occupiers were less likely to belong to the non-active group than were the tenants; 40% as against 70% respectively. There are explanations for this low state of participation amongst the tenants; because rents are very low in Nasriya, compared to other urban areas in Aswan, owners wanted to raise rents considerably once the area was serviced. They are, therefore, loath to give tenants a declaration of ownership consent which allows the work to go ahead. A three room house in Nasriya could be leased for £E20-60/month (£4-10), depending on its location, physical condition and the length of contract, which is almost a third of the housing cost in 'formal' areas in Aswan. Thus, tenants are under threat of being evicted by landlords who try actively to circumvent the Landlord-tenant Relationship Law. They do not carry out the annual maintenance of the house, thus its physical condition deteriorates; then, with the support of a friend or a relative working in the municipality, they obtain a decree of demolition, forcing the tenants to evacuate. Obviously, this fear of eviction does not promote high levels of participation in any long-term planning and decision making processes.

The last intervening variable, the physical condition of housing, was the most significant in inducing participation (p-level 0.001). People living in good housing were far less likely to belong to the not active group than those living in bad condition (37% as against only 84% respectively). Those living in fair housing conditions were distributed almost equally among the three clusters. Unsurprisingly more than half of those living in bad housing conditions, as expressed by themselves and confirmed by the researcher
during the interview, were also tenants, while 93% of those living in good house conditions were owner-occupiers. However, it is worth noting that family size was not a factor in determining the quality of house condition. While 60% of people living in good housing conditions had a family size corresponding to the average household size in Nasriya (6-8 persons), almost the same proportion of households living in bad conditions were smaller.

8.3- The institutionalisation of sustainability (1995-1998):

It has been argued that successful NGOs should be able to make a contribution to the rolling back of the state (Wood 1997). This contention resulted in a dilemma. On the one hand, it is commonly assumed, by those who view NGOs as based exclusively in civil society, that this rolling back can really strengthen the role of citizens to influence state actions. On the other hand, such a rolling back contributes more to the identification of the private sector as the main provider of essential goods and services for the entire population, including the poor and disadvantaged (Hulme and Edwards 1997). In this case civil society organisations are closely linked to the market or commercial sector where protecting market advantages is more important than reducing the exploitation of low-income households (Mitlin 1997). The New Policy Agenda, discussed in Chapter 2, has attempted to strike a balance in which non-profit making civil society organisations, including NGOs and CDAs, can best be seen as a counter-weight to state and market powers: opening channels of communication and participation, providing training grounds for activists and Grassroots Organisation (GROs), promoting pluralism, protecting human rights and alleviating poverty (Robinson 1993). Yet, five areas of competence are required for civil society organisations in order to ensure that they are developmentally effective and organisationally viable: appropriate organisational set up, leadership and human resources, managing through achievement, external relationships, and mobilising sustainable financial resources (Fowler 1997). Given these doctrines, and building on the ‘accountable bureaucratic capacity’ framework outlined in Chapter 3, it can be argued that an effective role for civil society organisations in sustaining development, enhancing democratisation and protecting citizens’ rights cannot be
achieved without three assumptions: accountable and fair representation in civil society organisations, reciprocal and active participation by the citizens concerned, and effective public sector performance behaviour and appropriate ethics.

Evidence from Nasriya suggests that the last phase of the project (1995-1998) aimed basically to accomplish the targets of the New Policy Agenda through the Nasriya Community Development Association (CDA), the Women’s Development Association (WDA) and their electoral system. The last phase targeted issues of sustainability so that the maintenance of the activities implemented could be assured, as well as to continue enabling women and the disadvantaged to improve/determine their life choices. The GTZ has recognised that the CDA can play a critical role in both reducing poverty directly and in strengthening democracy, which would ensure that inclusive development strategies are continued. The existing electoral system of the CDA members (1998) passed through several stages until it reached what is currently thought to be its optimal representation. It started with the project’s inception in 1988 when an organisation model was designed and supported by a government decree. This took the form of a Community Council (NCC, or Majlis Ahali in Arabic) comprising elected representatives out of which a chair, a deputy, a treasurer and other executive committee members would be elected (GTZ 1992: 31).

The NCC established committees, which became responsible for the flow of information between it and the inhabitants. Moreover, each specialised committee had an additional role to mobilise the inhabitants and discuss the feasibility of proposals with the community. However, after four years of operation, it was recognised that the establishment’s procedures were top-down and the constituencies from which the NCC was elected corresponded to an abstract territorial division which did not allow for the representation of different community organisations in the area. The NCC’s arrangements tended to by-pass existing community structures and formulated elite grouping; it was dominated by people coming from Luxor. The weaknesses of the first NCC escalated when its Head, Sheikh Ahmed, started to favour his relatives and people coming from the same village- Biadia, Luxor. Moreover, he failed to keep a balance
between his increasing responsibilities and popularity in the area, with all its associated infatuations, and the expected integrity from his side when dealing with senior government officials, including the Governor, commented the Mayor of Aswan (MA, 01-04-98). However, although the NCC did not represent all the residents of Nasriya fairly, the first people's mobilisation and participation owed its success to a large extent to the popularity and assertiveness of its Head.

These sort of problems were largely overcome once it was realised that the project was producing results and a new type of representation, including a new community organisation model, was proposed. It was declared that the overall goal was to build up community cohesion and self-administration in tandem with the technical infrastructure supply. Therefore, it was necessary to look for ways in which local self-administration could be conceived and realised, which in turn, would carry on independently after the programme which had been partially initiated and funded by the project. “The project team’s task was, therefore, to act in an advisory and supportive function in setting-up local self-administration” (GTZ 1992: 31). To achieve such a target, an organisational framework of a Community Development Association (CDA) and a Women’s Development Association (WDA) was established and legalised in 1992 and 1996 respectively. Each included an elected Steering Committee or Board, articles of association, official accounts and statutes. In contrast to the former NCC, which was imposed on the community from above, the new associations were not established solely by government decree but in co-operation with their respective communities, and were thus readily accepted by the majority of the population. Local leaders were keen to ensure that these associations would represent all the residents in an unbiased way and to register them officially under the public law.

By its registration, the CDA obtained financial independence and is only answerable to the Department of Social Affairs. All further planning for the area has to deal with it and must be carried out with its consent and co-operation. The CDA’s current organisation includes eight committees, each headed by one of the Board members. Membership is open to any adult resident in Nasriya. The CDA’s registered
members (230 in 1993 and about 1000 in 1998) form a General Assembly, which meets annually, and members of each sector elect one representative to the Board (2 each for sectors eight and nine because of their sizes). In addition, the General Assembly elects two members, with relevant experience and a good reputation in the area, directly to the Board. As men were expected to dominate this type of representation (nominated sector representatives are often men in Nasriya), active female members at the General Assembly were allowed to join the Women’s Committee directly and to elect two persons to represent them directly on the Board. These 15 Board members elect a Chairperson (Figure 8.2).

Figure 8.2: Nasriya- Organisational structure of the CDA

Source: Author
Increasing numbers of young women joined the General Assembly (1992-1996), causing a core of female members of the Women’s Committee to press for a Women’s Development Association (WDA); this has become the second formally registered umbrella-NGO in Nasriya. Although the WDA currently works independently, offers a wide range of advice and training and participates in all major meetings concerning development in the area, its sustainability is questionable. The situation of the WDA was different to that of the CDA; while the WDA was still phasing up to act independently (1996-1998), the project had to phase out, thus it did not have the luxury of a trial period. “I had the sense that the project staff had not been empowered by the gender training they received, and consequently questioned its relevance to the project, at times seeing gender as a project component thrown at them by Eschborn [the city of the GTZ Head-office]”, said GTZ’s short-term Consultant, long term resident in Egypt (KM, 05-08-99). Indeed, the project lacked long-term local personnel with a theoretical grounding in gender and experience in introducing gender concepts at the local level. Moreover, the establishment of the WDA and the construction of the Women’s Centre, absorbed increasing amounts of the project’s time and money, which was criticised by the CDA and other project components. This is a structural problem typical to newly-established NGOs working in the same area, mainly about money, power, influence, and sometimes of the patriarchal domineering attitude of the CDA, according to GTZ’s short-term Consultant for community development (GGh, 19-01-98). This structural problem confined gender interventions to those with the WDA, and set gender in opposition to other aspects of the project, particularly the CDA (Box 8.1).

Box: 8.1: Nasriya- Difficulties of establishing a collaborative programme of GAD
When I came on board as the gender consultant in the last year of the project, there was a distinct lack of transparency in the relationship between the project and the WDA, which exacerbated WDA’s already highly dependent relationship with the project, as the provider of all technical, material, financial, and human resource support.

We worked with the WDA on how to develop programmes, implement feasibility studies, develop budgets, and manage a centre, and they made great strides in that last year. But due to budgetary constraints at GTZ they had to go it alone. Although they could have greatly benefited from periodic evaluation of preliminary programming in order to ensure the quality and sustainability of programmes.

Source: Key Informant (KM, 05-08-99).
Indeed, changing attitudes about the participation of women in a conservative Muslim society has been a sensitive issue on ideological grounds. Gender is not the same thing as women in development, as it takes a comprehensive approach to development, looking at both females and males, their social roles and power relationships, and how to support and improve the overall developmental structure. When gender was perceived by many CDA Board members as working with women to the exclusion of men, or as subverting young women’s Islamic ideology, as CDA Board members accused the GTZ short-term Consultant of doing during the first gender sensitisation workshop in 1996, the process was understood as one of ‘women in development’ (WID), an outdated paradigm in DAs’ strategies, superseded by ‘gender and development’ (GAD). The CDA and WDA decided to hold regular round table sessions in order to agree a common goal, overcome mutual mistrust and enhance co-operation and co-ordination. This has clarified the aims of WDA and women’s empowerment. Traditional conceptions have not been erased by GTZ’s perception of modernisation, but are being refashioned as a hybrid, which entails ‘cultural (re)creation’ (Escobar 1995). These discussions led to many parents allowing their daughters to attend evening meetings, talk in public meetings, and to travel alone in Egypt and abroad for the first time (one of the WDA members participated in the Habitat Summit, Istanbul, 1996).

However, the most serious challenge presently threatening WDA’s sustainability is getting out of a dependent relationship, to develop programmes that address the needs of the local community and to cover the costs of their implementation. While financial sustainability may be secured in the future through membership fees and shop rental in the Women’s Centre, at present it is dependent on assistance from government and NGOs; the WDA has recently linked-up to the post-ERSAP Social Fund’s training programme. This should enhance their skills to develop effective programmes that address the needs of women in Nasriya, as well as feasibility studies, budgeting and management to run the Women’s Centre. If the WDA manages to garner the respect of the community through its programmes and services, it will then be seen as something more than ‘Banat el Mashroua’- (the 20 little girls of the project who have formed
WDA’s core staff and represented its most vocal supporters from the outset), as perceived by some residents. This is crucial to ensure the long-term sustainability of the WDA/Women’s Centre.

8.3.1- The present role of the CDA and its performance:

Although a wide range of municipal organisations have been involved in the planning and implementation stages of initiatives, the responsibility for ongoing management of many activities has been devolved to community organisations, the CDA, the WDA and the local community centres (Table 8.5). On the government side, the ACC has taken over responsibility for the ongoing operation and maintenance of water and sewerage facilities, the administration of land titles and the development of East Nasriya.

Table 8.5: Nasriya- Responsibilities for provision and subsequent management of facilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facility/service</th>
<th>Institution involved with people in planning and implementation</th>
<th>Institution now responsible for running and sustainability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Water supply and sewage networks</td>
<td>Housing Directorate</td>
<td>Aswan City Council-Aswan Water Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waste-disposal system</td>
<td>Aswan City Council</td>
<td>Aswan City Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nasriya Service Centre</td>
<td>Housing Directorate</td>
<td>CDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nasriya Women’s Centre</td>
<td>Housing Directorate</td>
<td>WDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local community centres</td>
<td>Social Directorate</td>
<td>Community Centres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved/additional schools and school facilities</td>
<td>Housing and Education Directorates</td>
<td>Education Directorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports areas</td>
<td>Youth Directorate</td>
<td>CDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhances community organisation</td>
<td>Social Directorate</td>
<td>CDA, WDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment of social programmes at the CDA’s and community centres’ levels</td>
<td>Social Directorate, the Woman and Childhood Centre</td>
<td>CDA, WDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment of a revolving fund for house improvement and income generation loans</td>
<td>Financing Directorate</td>
<td>CDA, WDA and Social Directorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offering of land titles through a land-sale programme</td>
<td>Aswan City Council</td>
<td>Aswan City Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Nasriya extension</td>
<td>UDLMU</td>
<td>Aswan City Council</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fieldwork
One of the most significant findings of the survey centres on the role of the CDA in opening channels of communication and participation, providing training for activists and GROs, promoting pluralism and establishing effective poverty alleviation programmes. Internal communication is sustained by means of the CDA's representative structure. Sector representatives are responsible for communication with the residents and community centres in their geographical area of responsibility, as well as presenting their demands and complaints at the Board’s meetings. In addition, the CDA has published and distributed an illustrated leaflet explaining its activities as well as a regular newsletter to the community centres in Nasriya in an attempt to increase membership. Communications have also been established with the local press and the TV channel of Aswan, and several programmes have already been presented about Nasriya and the CDA’s activities.

External communication is sustained by means of the CDA’s power and responsibilities. While the project has been phasing out gradually, the GTZ has made an effort to supply the CDA members with the necessary power to deal with local institutions, and to enable them to run most of the activities by themselves. This power resulted from the formalisation of accounts and statutes, increasing the volume of pump-priming funds, and strengthened links with senior government officials and prominent consultants not only in Aswan but also in Cairo and Egypt generally. The CDA currently plays a major role in maintaining communications at external level with institutions in Aswan and Cairo, and has even started to exchange experiences with similar organisations in other cities within Egypt.

The CDA also maintains a bottom-up flow of people's opinions, complaints and demands and arranges regular meetings with the municipal officials concerned where problems are discussed and decisions are either taken or forwarded to a superior level. Mindful of the absence of such structures elsewhere in Aswan, the CDA’s leadership uses its closeness to senior government officials in Aswan, including the Governor, to expand effective operations and advance new projects that require an organised community representation. The position of the CDA has been further strengthened by the
fact that its Chair represented and presented the Nasriya project as an example of 'good practice' at the Habitat Summit in Istanbul in 1996 and at many other conferences. This has supplied the CDA with international recognition and further clout.

Special attention has been given to the provision of practical training in intermediary capacity-building of the community. The GTZ and the CDA's principles of good practice have targeted the promotion of active and representative citizen participation so that community members can meaningfully influence decisions that affect their lives. The CDA and WDA are jointly responsible now for supplying training in a sustainable manner for both young activists and women (e.g. vocational training, computer skills, domestic management etc.). Dialogue with other similar CDAs and WDAs in Egypt has also been advantageous. It has established a network for exchanging experience in fund raising, problem solving, dissemination of training materials and undertaking new viable activities.

The promotion of pluralism and of democratic action has been seen as the key to a flourishing, complex and ever-changing system. It has been argued that the New Policy Agenda of DAs is not monolithic and details may vary from one DA to another as long they accord with neo-liberal economics and liberal democratic principles (Robinson 1993). The survey revealed that, in contrast to Ismailia's experience, GTZ collaborated with the CDA in establishing a sustainable vehicle for 'democratisation' and 'leadership' as an essential component of a thriving civil society. This was achieved by giving citizens a positive, inclusive role in the policy process, and involving a larger number of them in the public decision-making and governance processes.

The GTZ further empowered the CDA by supplying it with increasing volumes of pump-priming funds to pursue poverty alleviation and income-generating activities, and to take on structural forms that could enhance the likelihood of access to other funds. The CDA acts now as a non-profit-seeking 'third sector', located between the public and private sectors, and supplies services to fill a gap in the government's supply system. An example is the basic clinical and first aid services at the Service Centre which are offered almost at cost-price. About 62% of respondents interviewed declared that they prefer to
get their health care at the Service Centre. Meanwhile, other services supplied in the Service Centre, such as a children’s club, a pharmacy, a bakery, shops, telecommunications and typing services as well as various training courses are all targeting service-supply rather than profit-maximisation. Access to loans and micro-credit is the most direct action towards genuine poverty alleviation. During the last phase of the project, the GTZ supplied the CDA with £E1.2 million (£207,000) to establish a revolving fund for the provision of individual-based credit for micro-enterprises, self-employment, house improvement and to enable residents to buy land and construct in the new development area of East Nasriya.

Although the World Bank estimates that in the early 1970s about 1.5% of the total income for development NGOs world-wide was derived from official donors, and that this had sharply risen to around 30% by the mid-1990s (ODI 1995: 1), this was not the case in Nasriya; the GTZ only donated seed corn finance, offered the required training and made sure that the CDA could manage it properly before its withdrawal. The CDA established a financial system through which sustainable funding could be locally generated. Although each inhabitant is charged a nominal annual fee to remain a member of the association (£E5.0 or £0.80), this constitutes only a small proportion of its budget. The money generated from rentals in the Service Centre not only covers the operation of CDA’s services, but also the salaries of doctors, nurses, trainers and other supportive staff, in addition to the maintenance of the building and frequent purchase of new medical and audio-visual equipment. The CDA’s annual budget is now about £E1.3 million (£224,000), roughly equal to the total annual expenditure of Aswan Governorate on development-related projects in the entire East Quarter (180,000 inhabitants) in which Nasriya is located.

In the context of community economic development theory, such a sustainable policy has changed perceptions and choices regarding community resources, markets, rules, and decision-making capacity. People have the resources to look after their own welfare, either by providing services themselves or by mobilising to obtain the services that they need from the state. The dimensions of time, space, marginalised socio-
economic groups, and dynamic economies have indeed broadened the concept of sustainable development beyond the more traditional physical definition. The impact of this policy on society has many more advantages than public ‘provision’ and/or basic needs ‘protection’. The idea of new knowledge and re-framing issues is offered as a method to create new options. Generally speaking, this broadened concept has proved to be financially sustainable (Dichter 1997) and possesses potential to be scaled-up quickly.

However, this policy is, in fact, double-edged. The GTZ provided increased volumes of official aid to the CDA which, in turn, operationalised the economic and political dimensions. This has raised questions regarding the nature and distribution of power within society. While funds have supplied the CDA members with the necessary power to deal with local institutions and, consequently, enabled them to run their own activities independently, it can be argued that this power has been a result of the capital possessed by the CDA rather than its own status and the sort of activities it has been running. Moreover, its possession of such capital has positioned the CDA in competition with the government agencies. The CDA currently acts as both ‘prince [state] and merchant [market]’, according to Nerfin’s (1987) terminology, in which its relationship with the ‘people’ has granted it a greater public legitimacy than the government and its structured managerial features have permitted reasonable levels of cost control and efficiency. As a result, government control over the CDA’s operation of the poverty reduction programme has been increased; the budget has to be reviewed annually by the Ministry of Social Affairs, and the bank account has been audited several times by the Central Agency of Auditing. While such intervention to control and regulate civil society organisation is common in Egypt, it is justified as a measure of policy dialogue and a tool for readjustment if financial errors occur rather than control, commented the Mayor of Aswan (MA, 01-04-98). Indeed, this vision represents the central government’s policy: “If NGOs were left alone they would not be able to function, or at least they would not function as effectively as when they are backed by the government”, said the Minister of Social Affairs (Al-Ahram Weekly: 4 June 1998). One of the challenges facing Egypt now is to strike a balance between maintaining authoritarian control to instil security and
embracing civil society organisations as a means of enhancing prosperity. Because the latter embodies a risk that some extremist organisations might masquerade as law abiding civil society interests, several measures to examine the performance, accounts and members of NGOs have been instituted.

Finally, accountability underlies any discussion of democratisation and public sector ethics. The public has a right to know how their respective civil society organisations use the power and resources entrusted to them. The form of CDA’s representation in Nasriya seemed to coerce its members into maintaining contact with their constituents, informing them of, and protecting, their legitimate rights. The Chair of the CDA placed special emphasis on the ability of the CDA to play an ‘in-betweenness’ role, as Blair (1997: 25) calls it, where the CDA lies between the state on one side and the individual or family on the other (MS, 28-5-98). However, the survey revealed an area of citizen confusion regarding both the administrative order and the levels of the hierarchy to which complaints had to be addressed, as well as the utilisation of community representatives as mediators. While most of the respondents interviewed were conscious that complaints had to be addressed first to the East Quarter, only 29% mentioned that they would first complain to, or seek support from, their community representative. Besides, only 56% of the survey respondents knew about the precise purpose and activities carried out by the CDA and its geographical location, whereas one third were familiar with their political representatives at the area level. Although such figures reflect considerable accountability for CDA performance, they reveal a gap of communication between the citizens and their respective CDA representatives, which is discussed in the following Chapter in detail.
8.4- Conclusions:

The dilemma of how to cover the costs of implementing social development programmes in a low-income area is a particularly challenging one. The policy context of self-help in Narsiya has many significant characteristics. On the one hand, local government in Aswan and the GTZ have benefited from applying the 'self-help' approach through the saving of scarce person-power resources and thus expenses, by having the NCC, and later the CDA, undertake tasks they would otherwise have had to do themselves. These included issues of people's mobilisation and organisation, determining local improvement priorities and policing collective activities. Local government has also benefited from the promotion of social development by increasing local self-reliance, making political capital by demonstrating that the people and the government have been working hand-in-hand, and increasing political and social justice by co-opting a strong community leadership.

On the other hand, there were a host of reasons expressed by the people, who had been active participants during the project, as to why community participation was deemed desirable by them. Some of the main benefits they confidently perceived referred to the reduction of the project costs and, therefore, of the repayments they made to buy land. Participation also ensured that the improvements proposed would correspond to their priorities, and that the links with their CDA or relevant community centre would persist after the withdrawal of the GTZ. Moreover, it was understood that effective participation would enhance the chance of establishing some local autonomy, reducing the dependency on outside agencies. Finally, there was a belief that participation would provide local society with the basis for local community politicians and foster strong relationships with city politicians.

Although the evidence reveals that not every resident wants to be involved in solving problems, every citizen who participates in the evaluation, participates in all other stages, while it is not true that everyone who participates in the implementation, will participate in the other stages as well (Table 8.6). This is significant in the context of self-help in practice, because it highlights the need for upgrading projects to mobilise
both the less and non-active groups, while sustaining and utilising the efforts of those who are more active.

Table 8.6: Degree of citizens’ participation according to their clusters and the stage of the upgrading project

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cluster of participation</th>
<th>Participate in evaluation</th>
<th>Participate in planning</th>
<th>Participate in implementation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non Active</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>XX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Active</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>XXX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>XXX</td>
<td>XXX</td>
<td>XXX</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(xx) Effective participation (xx) Limited (−) None

Nasriya community has been empowered through organised efforts to increase control over resources and related institutions by groups and movements which hitherto had been excluded. The form of the CDA representation in Aswan seems to coerce its members into maintaining contact with their people and protecting their rights. They learnt from the mistakes of the NCC. When the first organisational model for the CDA was developed in 1992, it involved a fairly large number of the existing community centres and engaged the previous leader of the NCC as a symbolic mediator in solving conflicts and disagreement between different tribes. The CDA is currently able to determine and undertake new projects, and implement and manage them successfully on its own. The CDA changes are grounded in local life and priorities while incorporating resources from outside the neighbourhoods. That has not only shifted the relationships between key actors in community building efforts significantly, but also created a long succession of charismatic local leaders, thus enhancing sustainability.

Unlike the CDA, which evolved naturally and had passed through a sufficient period before the withdrawal of the upgrading project, it was essential for the WDA to establish itself as an independent development association as soon as possible and before the completion of the project and the withdrawal of its GAD consultant. But while the project was phasing out, the WDA was still trying to phase up. Hence it was dependent on support from the GTZ to implement its programmes, as there was no way the local women community could pay the kind of rates the WDA would need to charge, nor the
real expenses needed to run the several activities included in the newly established Women’s Centre and to make them self-sustaining. The WDA needs to take care not to move from one dependent relationship to another, and this requires leadership and vision. A successful WDA will need to have persons on the board and among its ranks that have strong ties to business, development, NGO, and governmental circles in order for it to develop and survive. Obviously, the skills needed to run the Women’s Centre and cover costs, are quite different from those needed to do simple development activities.

It is evident that participation and sustainability are equated with co-operation, and incorporation into pre-determined activities by the inhabitants. In a truly participatory approach, all those affected must have a role to play at all stages of the development processes; certain groups, e.g. the poorest or the disadvantaged, should not be bypassed any more because they might be the most active ones during an upgrading project. Experience shows that inclusive, or even ‘put first’, is much better than exclusive. It is important to make a distinction between voluntary and coercive participation, particularly when extensive material incentives are employed to ensure co-operation. The sustainability of community participation seems even more complex; its processes should be analysed within a wider political context, which is the focus of the next Chapter.
Participation means active, not passive, involvement and the transformation and positioning of the urban poor as politically co-opted legitimisers of decisions affecting their own life chances. Successful popular participation means citizens' translation of participation and being active during a project's life sufficiently to ensure sustainable political participation (World Bank 1994). If citizens are not mobilised politically, even though they find the government's economic development activities and agenda objectionable, they may be "candidates for exit, the ultimate withdrawal from the community" (Sharp and Bath 1993: 221), and thus alienated and politically apathetic. Hirschman (1970) argued that apathetic citizens are usually waiting for someone else to take action and to deal with their problems. Yet citizen apathy or withdrawal diminishes the responsiveness of practitioners and the legitimacy of legislators.

It has been argued that the only way out of this dilemma is to restore democratic principles by giving citizens a positive, inclusive role in the policy process, and involving a larger number of them in public decision making and governance processes (Mayfield 1996). Involving citizens in governance can develop greater understanding of the role of government in society, the complexities of policy development, the difficulties of achieving consensus among diverse interests and the nature of the public administration (Turner and Hulme 1997). Hitherto, narrow and restrictive citizen involvement processes placed people in the position of contesting actions of government instead of participating in decision making and problem solving activities. Now the important questions are how to gauge the political involvement and activation of citizens in DCs' low-income areas, and how to involve the less active ones in the governance processes if they are disinterested.

In Egypt, most citizens of low-income areas have never been involved in formal political processes and therefore cannot be candidates for exit; the state's policies of political exclusion limit and control mass political participation, while legitimacy is
conceived in terms of providing goods and services (Singerman 1997). Citizens are left to participate through ‘informal’ networks of collaborative action at neighbourhood level, which reinvigorate their communal and familial networks. Although the Nasriya approach attempted to promote democratic principles by offering a larger number of opportunities to participate effectively in the policy process of local development, which many citizens did, the deeper question concerns the ‘transformative’ potential of participation (World Bank 1994).

This Chapter evaluates the reality of post-project community empowerment. To This is assessed through examining the transformative potential of participation, i.e. the translation of participatory practices during the project into potential political participation. The latter includes formal membership of civil society organisations, participation in local and national democratic processes, citizen demand making and relationship with local government, as well as communal and familial ‘informal’ networks of collaborative actions to facilitate access, or provide alternatives, to the formal resources of the state. ‘Informal’ networks are examined through the transformation of sub-communities in Nasriya from use-value conflictual modes to sustained collaborative modes of participation and problem-solving. These are the crux of sustainability arguments and the key-areas to understand the reality of self-reliance and administration at community level.

9.1- Mobilising formal participation:

Formal participation in local and national democratic processes may be gauged by citizen electoral involvement at the CDA, Aswan Popular Local Council (PLC) and the Egyptian Parliament levels, as well as by their familiarity with their representatives at each level. The familiarity of citizens with their representatives and the means for contacting them are the minimal requirements for a claim to participate actively in governance (Turner and Hulme 1997). It has been argued that citizen mobilisation to participate in the democratic processes cannot be secured by legislation that does no more than restraining the government’s own executive arm (Cranston 1967). “One has the right to vote only if one’s vote is counted and given effect in a system of collective...
decision that determines policy, leadership and authority" (Woldron 1998: 309). Accordingly, individuals are mobilised into group-based political action and problem-solving activity on the basis of their assessment of the impact of the proposed policies or existing arrangements (Hirschman 1970; Olson 1971; Sharp and Bath 1993). However, ‘political awareness’ extends beyond the familiarity of citizens with their representatives and the means for contacting them for assistance, to cover areas of knowledge, attitudes, and resources (Jones 1980). Both a perception of need for assistance, and political awareness are required to activate high levels of citizen interaction with officials and representatives, while broader longer-range issues in the developmental sphere are required to mobilise citizens for a transformative form of participation (Sharp and Bath 1993: 220).

The CDA acts as the parent civil society organisation in Nasriya. Although it is committed to a wide range of objectives to increase the well-being of residents, grassroots support has remained weak. Despite several publicity campaigns by the CDA to encourage a larger proportion of adult residents to become members, membership did not exceed 1000 (with 15% women) until 1998, representing only 6-8% of the eligible residents. While this figure increased almost four times between 1993 and 1998, it is still low, which necessitates a close scrutiny of the real impact of the project arrangements to institutionalise sustainability, and the extent to which the project instilled the concept of community participation. The survey revealed that only 56% of HoHs knew the precise purpose of the CDA, its activities, and its geographical location. Moreover, a quarter of them (14%) discredited the existing Board of the CDA because it was not seen to fairly represent all home origins in the last election. “People of Ques and Luxor occupy most of the Board’s seats and twist its priorities to favour their own people”, was a complaint heard several times from HoHs who were not convinced that the CDA representation and operation was equitable. Although Nubian and Helal are minorities in Nasriya, representing only about 20% of the population, their respondents claimed that both groups were not represented at all in the last election, a criticism which was found to be
true during the fieldwork survey. But it is also true that 60% of them declared that they did not participate in the last election of the CDA’s Board in 1998.

Although the CDA is still in its first phase of well-establishment and getting known by Nasriya residents, which takes time, community support for it may decline in the future due to a widespread distrust of its existing structure; this is diminishing the consensus between supporters and groups as well as individuals’ political activities and participation. The first step required to avoid this situation is to drop issues of home origins and ethnicity and focus instead on genuine community development. “I can see this is materialising slowly but surely”, asserted Professor Salah Arafa of the American University in Cairo, and the GTZ Community Development Consultant for Nasriya (SA, 04-06-98). Only one third of HoHs interviewed (32%) were familiar with their representatives in the CDA (knew their names). Moreover, only 16% who were members of the CDA, considered that their votes ‘counted’, that they would affect the CDA’s decision-making system, leadership and authority, and thus voted in the last election. Of course those of Ques and Luxor, had been active and voted so as to support their relatives, and thus maintain the existing network of patron-clientelism in the CDA’s power hierarchy and relations, as noted earlier. This may account for the fact participation rates were much lower than the knowledge respondents had of their representatives and voting behaviour in and to the Popular Local Council and the Egyptian Parliament (Figure 9.1).

Figure 9.1: Nasriya- Citizens’ formal participation

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Know CDA reps.</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote at CDA</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know PLC reps.</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote at PLC</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know Parliament reps.</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote at Parliament</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The familiarity of respondents with their representatives (knowledge) corresponded to their electoral behaviour. All respondents voting at any level were familiar with their representatives, and many of them had been in touch with their representatives. Those who did not vote in the last election at the Popular Local Council (65%) or the Parliament (64%) held very negative views of the government’s rigging of elections. They claimed that it would make no difference whether they went or not because the elected politicians had been selected already. Bearing in mind the bureaucratic difficulties they often face (as discussed in Chapter 5), they were not even keen on the issuing of voting cards. However, such views were completely discounted by the people who voted. “During Popular Local Council and Parliament elections, candidates coming from my home area [Ques] would usually arrange campaigning, mobilise people, introduce their agenda and arrange means of transportation, so that every eligible vote belonging to the social group would count”, said Head of the Shaghab Community Centre. “If every citizen became indifferent and did not use his right to vote, no alteration of one’s rights and duties would occur in our society”, he added (AW, 20-05-98).

The respondents familiarity with their political representatives and their electoral participation may be classified, by the same procedures as people’s participation during the project. The respondents are clustered into three groups, ‘activists’, ‘watch-dogs’ and ‘free-riders’, terms conceptualising citizenship along a continuum of desire to affect, or to avoid and ignore, the local public policy process. These allow the major forces that cause and shape participation to be analysed, shedding light on the conditions for political mobilisation, the characteristics of each cluster and the direction of citizen involvement. The three terms originated from contrasting two models of governance, ‘reinventing government’ versus ‘citizen owners’ or ‘active citizenship’ (Schachter 1997). ‘Reinventing government’ is a way of creating change through passive managerial and consumerist techniques, which yields less active citizens or ‘free-riders’. Active citizenship concerns involves purposive action to influence public-sector decision making, often out of concern for the public interest as well as private gain. Hence, the
activist is placed at the other end of the continuum and defined as "a person deeply involved in a variety of community issues and organisations. The activist cares about the community and wants to have a positive, lasting impact" (Box 1998: 74). Active citizens may shape the political agenda and deliberate on the ends that the government should pursue as well as evaluating how well particular public-sector programmes work. An active public is essential for increasing agency effectiveness and responsiveness.

In contrast, the term 'free-rider' is taken from the economic study of public services and is often associated with those who receive free service paid for by others (Olson 1971). Interchangeably, it is used to mean "a person who pays little attention to community affairs and allows others to do the work of citizenship, the work of studying and discussing issues and helping to make decisions about local public policy" (Box 1998: 73). This person is obviously a 'consumer' of public services and, therefore, located at the end of the continuum. Of course the two extreme positions, 'active citizenship', versus 'consumerist free-riding citizenship' tend to be less absolute in the real world; in the middle is the 'watch-dog' who is attentive to community matters but becomes involved in only a few key issues of direct interest (Lowery et al. 1992: 76). As Table 9.1 illustrates, political activists participated in at least two levels of elections and knew their representatives (31 cases representing 29% of all respondents). The watch-dogs, who knew the candidates but did not vote at all levels, comprised 36% of the respondents, while the free-riders were either not active at all or participated at only one level, the CDA (38 cases representing 35%).

Table 9.1: Nasriya- Clusters of political participation after the project

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Know representatives/ voted in elections</th>
<th>(Cluster 1) Activists Column %</th>
<th>(Cluster 2) Watch-dogs Column %</th>
<th>(Cluster 3) Free-riders Column %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Know representatives at:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- CDA level</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Local council</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Parliament</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote at:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- CDA level</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>08</td>
<td>05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Local council</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Parliament</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Groups (No.)</td>
<td>(31)</td>
<td>(39)</td>
<td>(38)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Although it has been argued that the activists are the group most engaged in deliberation to influence urban governance and the decision-making processes over issues related to their lives, it is acknowledged that individuals’ behaviour is shaped by multiple influences. People, as ‘actors’, are always situated in particular conjunctions at particular periods, with the context of their actions contributing to their sense of identity (Sayer 1985; 1989). Thus it was not surprising that there was no clear pattern among HoHs in which voting at a certain level, determined voting at all other levels as well. Even the most active group, the activists, were inconsistent in their political participation. While all of them voted in the last election of the Aswan Local Council (27 cases), less voted at the Parliamentary level, and only a third of them voted at the CDA level. The important questions concerned whether or not active people during the project’s planning, implementation and evaluation have remained politically active afterwards, and why, if they have not.

As Table 9.2 shows, the transformative potential of participation, from being active during the project into activists after the project, was inconclusive. Those active group during the project were divided almost equally between the activists, watch-dogs and free-riders, while most of the less active group during the project were found activists (52%) instead of becoming watch-dogs. Even more than half of the not active group, who were expected to be free-riders, were either activists (10%) or watch-dogs (46%). The association between the degree of participation in the project and formal political behaviour was insignificant statistically (Chi square at p-level 0.195).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participation during the project</th>
<th>(Cluster 1) Activists</th>
<th>(Cluster 2) Watch-dogs</th>
<th>(Cluster 3) Free-riders</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Active</strong></td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>27 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Less active</strong></td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>31 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Not active</strong></td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>50 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All groups (No.)</strong></td>
<td>(31)</td>
<td>(39)</td>
<td>(38)</td>
<td>(108)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although this table reveals that the translation of the ‘active citizens’ during the project into ‘activists’ in the formal political arena was not linear, the impact of the
upgrading project should not be dismissed. The majority of respondents were not politically acquiescent; a large section were 'activists', who participated in the CDA's, Popular Local Council's and Parliament's elections and knew their representatives, or 'watch-dogs', who were more likely to know their representatives than to actually vote. Only one third of HoHs were classified as 'free-riders', who participated at only one level in the formal political arena, the CDA. The following section attempts to reveal variables which may explain why individuals are, or are not, mobilised into active formal participation.

9.2- Explanations for degree of participation:

In order to understand who is politically active and who is not, and why, the clusters of political participation are examined against the same sets of personal variables, which were used before to shed light on participation during the project. The data reveal that although many younger people (less than 45 years), had become marginally more active than during the project, they were still less likely to be activists (24%) than the older group (31%) (Table 9.3). The association between age and political participation was insignificant statistically. However, it is worth noting that younger HoHs were most likely to be watch-dogs, and less likely to belong to the free-riders, perhaps because of the better education most of them had received.

Table 9.3: Nasriya- Age by clusters of political participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>(Cluster 1) Activists</th>
<th>(Cluster 2) Watch-dogs</th>
<th>(Cluster 3) Free-riders</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 45 year old or more</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Less than 45</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All groups (No.)</td>
<td>(31)</td>
<td>(39)</td>
<td>(38)</td>
<td>(108)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Education did seem to activate political participation, producing a highly significant chi-square value at (p-level 0.0006). Higher education was closely associated with active political participation; 48% of those who had received secondary to university education were activists compared to only 6% of the illiterates. This might also explain why public sector employees were more politically active than those in the
private sector or self-employed entrepreneurs in Nasriya, with over a third of them (35%) being classified as activists (Table 9.4).

Table 9.4: Nasriya- Education and occupation by clusters of political participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>(Cluster 1)</th>
<th>(Cluster 2)</th>
<th>(Cluster 3)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Activists</td>
<td>Watch-dogs</td>
<td>Free-riders</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Illiterate</td>
<td>06%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Literate to basic school</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Secondary to university</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All groups (No.)</td>
<td>(31)</td>
<td>(39)</td>
<td>(38)</td>
<td>(108)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Occupation:                      |             |             |             |       |      |
| - Public employee                | 35%         | 38%         | 27%         | 45    | 100  |
| - Private sector or self-employed entrepreneurs | 15% | 56% | 29% | 27 | 100 |
| - Pensioner, unemployed or housewife | 30% | 20% | 50% | 36 | 100 |
| All groups (No.)                 | (31)        | (39)        | (38)        | (108) |

There was a major shift as well in the behaviour of the private sector employees and the self-employed entrepreneurs in Nasriya; their previous tendency was to be less active (33%) or not active (48%), but the majority were either political activists (15%) or watch-dogs (56%). Of course the ‘formal’ political arena has a great impact on the daily business of self-employed entrepreneurs and therefore it was in their interest to participate effectively; the association between occupation and formal political behaviour produced a significant chi square value at (p-level 0.05).

Income also was a significant factor in inducing higher levels of political participation (a chi-square value of 16.82, significant at p-level 0.05). The activists had the highest incomes reported among the three groups (£650/month) and the highest median value (£300/month), though the latter is similar to that recorded by the watch-dogs and corresponds to the general average of Nasriya as whole. Meanwhile, the free-riders had the lowest incomes (£18-500/month) as well as the lowest median value (£200/month), although the range was large (Figure 9.2)
Home area again seemed to play a role in activating political participation, although not a statistically significant one (p-level 0.08). Unlike their previous level of participation during the project, people coming from Luxor were not the most active group (Table 9.5). Being the largest group in Nasriya, it seemed that people of Ques have become better organised at all electoral levels; after taking most of the CDA’s seats previously held by people from Luxor, better ‘self-mobilisation’ took place during elections for both the Aswan Local Council and the Parliament. Moreover, because almost half of the respondents coming from Ques were private sector employees or self-employed entrepreneurs, who tended to be more politically active, 31% were activists compared to only 17% active during the project.

The other notable difference concerned the Nubians; 46% of them were political activists compared to only 18% during the project. The Nubians have been culturally and economically distressed since some 16 thousand of their families who used to live south of Aswan went through a major relocation programme, prior to the construction of the High Dam and the formulation of Lake Nasser in the 1960s, which submerged their
villages (NCSCR 1985). They moved to newly-established villages north of Aswan and many came to live with their relatives in Nasriya. As has been hypothesised, such a distressed climate encourages a high degree of collaboration and solidarity (Sharp and Bath 1993: 225), which increases the transformative potential of participation. Many Nubians explained with pride their cohesive community spirit and keenness to reinforce a sense of common identity through sticking together and supporting their political representatives, especially at the national level.

Table 9.5: Nasriya- Home origin by clusters of political participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Home origin</th>
<th>(Cluster 1) Activists</th>
<th>(Cluster 2) Watch-dogs</th>
<th>(Cluster 3) Free-riders</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. %</td>
<td>No. %</td>
<td>No. %</td>
<td>No. %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxor</td>
<td>27% 50% 23%</td>
<td>26 100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ques</td>
<td>31% 26% 43%</td>
<td>42 100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helal</td>
<td>08% 69% 23%</td>
<td>13 100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nubians</td>
<td>46% 36% 18%</td>
<td>11 100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>31% 13% 56%</td>
<td>16 100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All groups</td>
<td>(31) (39) (38)</td>
<td>(108)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Spatial location might be expected to influence the degree of formal participation, considering the greater accessibility of lower and middle sectors to the locales of political institutions and meetings. Spatial location perpendicular to the Kima Canal, middle sectors or north and south peripheries, showed a specific pattern of citizen activism and political participation, most probably related to the social distribution of home origin, though this was not significant statistically (p-level 0.24). While a half of HoHs living in the middle sectors were classified as free-riders, a higher proportion of those living in the north (67%) or in the south (71%) were classified as activists or watch-dogs. In contrast, location by spatial elevation differentiation seemed more influential, though was again not significant in statistical terms (p-level 0.09).

While most people living in the lower area were activists (37%) or watch-dogs (37%), those living in the upper elevated area, with less education and income, were predominantly free-riders (52%) or watch-dogs (41%). Living in a remote area without basic services raised objective needs which made them participate very actively during
the project, but the mechanisms for more abstract participation were probably not so well grasped. Respondents living in central Nasriya were divided almost equally between the activists, watch-dogs and free-riders.

Variables of land legal status, house ownership and housing physical conditions (property stakes) are strongly linked to personal characteristics and spatial location, and were thus expected to influence the degree of political mobilisation and formal participation in Nasriya. Land legal status seemed to influence political activation; 70% of those living on legally owned plots were either activists or watch-dogs, whilst around the same proportion of those living in illegally occupied government-land were free-riders and none of them was activist. Although most of the ‘hekr’ leaseholders, the quasi legal articulation of land supply, were either watch-dogs (41%) or free-riders (33%), they were all motivated to improve their life standards as discussed earlier. Obviously, those living on illegally occupied land were the new comers to Nasriya, mainly settled in the upper elevated areas, the poorest and the least educated, hence, were the least politically active group. However, there were only 7 cases of the latter in the sample and therefore the association between land legal status and political participation was too weak to be statistically significant.

In contrast, house ownership status was very influential (chi-square significant at p-level 0.003). The owner-occupiers were more likely to be politically active than the tenants; 32% as against only 17% respectively (Table 9.6). Tenants tended to belong to the lowest income group in Nasriya in general (65% earned the median value or below), and appeared earlier to be less politically active. Thus 61% of the tenants were classified as free-riders and 22% as watch-dogs. Nevertheless, because tenants were aware of the different means that landlords use to try to evict them, with the support of a friend or a relative working in the municipality, the majority interviewed had no faith in formal institutions and associated municipal officials with favouritism and corruption. Clearly this ‘mistrust’ does not promote high levels of political participation in any formal institution or decision making processes.
Table 9.6: Nasriya- House ownership and condition by clusters of political participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>(Cluster 1) Activists</th>
<th>(Cluster 2) Watch-dogs</th>
<th>(Cluster 3) Free-riders</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House ownership:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Owner-occupiers</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Tenants</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All groups (No.)</td>
<td>(31)</td>
<td>(39)</td>
<td>(38)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing condition:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Good</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Fair</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Bad</td>
<td>05%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All groups (No.)</td>
<td>(31)</td>
<td>(39)</td>
<td>(38)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Housing physical condition, was also very important (chi-square 11.18, at p-level 0.003). HoHs living in good housing conditions were much more likely to become politically active than those living in bad conditions; 36% as against only 5% respectively (Table 9.6). Apparently, higher income groups were more able to legalise their land status (buy the land and acquire a clear land-title), procure an official building permit and either improve or reconstruct their houses. As expected, most of the respondents living in fair housing condition (42%) belonged to the watch-dogs.

9.3- Citizens’ need awareness:

In order to predict the direction of community activation in Nasriya and the extent to which it might lead to sustainability, two additional criteria of citizens’ formal activation are examined: citizens’ need-awareness, and relationship with the municipality. Citizens showed quite high levels of consciousness regarding individual contacting government institutions and complaints (Table 9.7). Almost all HoHs interviewed (96%) knew which administrative body they belonged to (East Quarter), regardless of the cluster of ‘formal’ political participation they belonged to. Moreover, 88% of them were quite familiar with the administrative hierarchy and had dealt before with the municipality. They had also been in frequent contact with various departments of local government to resolve any major physical problems that had occurred in their areas.
Table 9.7: Nasriya- Types of citizen’s formal and informal activation/participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individuals</th>
<th>Group-based</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Formal political participation</strong></td>
<td>- Familiarity with political representatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Voting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Formal and informal protest and complaints</strong></td>
<td>- Individual contacting government institutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Complaints.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Informal activation, social solidarity, collective action and problem-solving</strong></td>
<td>- Volunteer work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Communal and familial solidarity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Organised demonstration/protest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Neighbourhood organisation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Lobbying/demand making.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Organisational litigation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Established social control and self-regulation measures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Over 39 registered and unregistered community centres (GROs).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Group-based operation and co-production.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author- Adapted from Sharp and Bath (1993: 215)

Obviously, those who had not dealt before with the municipality (12%), had neither legalised their land and house status nor had they legal infrastructure connections. They had also never contacted any of the local government entities before to resolve physical problems affecting the infrastructure networks, no matter whether it was a minor blockage or a major break down. While some might solve the minor physical problems themselves, many adopted an indifferent position and left the problem to deteriorate. This situation was quite notable in specific areas throughout Nasriya, specially at the southern periphery. Although those who solved problems themselves might be seen positively as a type of ‘informal’ community collaborating for group-based problem-solving, it can also be argued that all those who have never dealt before with the municipality, even though they found the government’s development agenda objectionable, obstruct the processes of bottom-up construction of collaborative planning with the local government, thus decreasing agency effectiveness.

People’s awareness of the administrative hierarchy and their rights, was not an indication of their satisfaction with the bureaucracy. The assessment of HoHs of the co-operation and attitude of the municipality in Aswan ranged widely. Although nearly one third of the respondents described the officials’ assistance as helpful, a tenth considered them unco-operative. Approximately one half associated civil servants with red tape,
favouritism, corruption and arrogance in descending order. Although a considerable number of those who had dealt before with the bureaucracy had no complaints of the service (41%), over a quarter (27%) claimed that they had to bribe some municipal officials, directly or indirectly, in order to get work done. Nearly the same proportion complained of long bureaucratic procedures and their time consumption, but only 6% claimed to have suffered from mistreatment or inequality.

However, the inhabitants of Nasriya were aware of the sort of problems facing the municipality, which enabled them to be in a position to judge their officials, notwithstanding that many of them had been vulnerable and had experienced quite alarming misbehaviour from some public servants in Aswan. Indeed, there are no common standards for public servants' behaviour and therefore the conduct of officials should be legitimately subject to public scrutiny: "Practices differ from country to country on such issues as accepting gifts or other benefits, declaring ownership of shares or property, personal or business relationships, and participation on private boards" (OECD 1997). As one of the three assumptions needed for an effective role of civil society organisations in sustaining development, enhancing democratisation and protecting citizens' rights, is efficient public sector performance and appropriate ethics, these issues are discussed in more detail in the next Chapter.

9.4- Informal networks and activation:

The Nasriya residents use traditional ethics and 'informal' networks as a way to bypass the corruption, repression, and ineptitude of the government. The citizens have reinvigorated their 'informal' networks to facilitate access, or provide alternatives, to the 'formal' resources of the state, because of the deficiencies of an overly bureaucratised and largely authoritarian society. Individuals, families and groups try to supply services through co-production systems. Informal and traditional networks represent and further the interests of the groups who have little access to, or influence over, the formal political processes. They do not displace the formal power of the state; they constitute a separate and independent system filling the gaps of the excluded, as the first step to change. "God does not develop a society, unless members start the changes themselves",
according to many HoHs referring to a ‘Hadith’ (saying) of the Prophet Mohammed. This strong moral code not only configures citizens’ protest, demand-making and organised litigation, but also directs their collaborative activation and ‘informal’ networks, which are as important as their formal forms of political participation (Table 9.7). They are also crucial for self-administration and sustainability at the individual, household, social group and community levels.

At the individual level, 79% of the survey respondents belonged to one of the 39 registered or unregistered neighbourhood centres (GRO) in Nasriya, pay its annual fees and contributions for its maintenance, and frequently participate in its activities. In addition, 89% of those interviewed had regularly volunteered for a wide range of activities, including helping their neighbours in good and hard times, and giving a hand in the construction or physical improvement of the community services in the area, including their own neighbourhood centres. Meanwhile, 76% of all respondents affirmed that their help would extend to any neighbour in-need, and is not exclusively for their own extended family, relatives, clan or religion members. All those who had volunteered before had also donated money, at least once before, to construct a new mosque or community centre, or to improve one of the existing facilities in the area.

Solidarity and collaboration were most notable at the household level, whether in nuclear or extended families. More than half of the HoHs interviewed (56%) asserted that they would extend the house vertically and allow their progeny to live with them when they got married. However this tendency seemed to vary in nature; while Nubian HoHs usually allow their daughters to share the house with them for a while until their husbands get an independent house, other groups allow only their adult sons to share the house with them for good (the total number of multi-family extended houses represented 33% of the total survey population). The other form of family solidarity was economic; almost half the HoHs, who had offspring living with them, claimed that they would usually receive financial contributions from their adult children every month or a contribution linked to the household expenses, e.g. buying food or drinks, paying some of the monthly bills or contributing to house maintenance. Such contributions were
difficult to quantify. Even those who did not receive any contribution linked this to the unemployed status of their descendants and not to the disloyalty of their adult children or extended family members.

The social groups in Nasriya have also established control and self-regulation measures. All community leaders agreed that the rule in the case of disputes is to avoid the intervention of people other than close relatives or those from the same social group, if the conflict is among those from the same home origin; it should be resolved in the nearest community centre if it is between individuals from different home origins (AA, 05-11-98; AH, 21-03-98; AW, 20-05-1998; FN 15-10-98; MK 29-09-98; MS, 28-5-1998; and ZA, 15-02-1998). Each group is self-regulating, capable of solving its own problems internally by peaceful means. To take a case outside the community is considered an admission of failure for the whole community. The survey revealed very low rates of violence, bullying, drug abuse, theft or robbery, while murder was almost unheard of. Community leaders attributed that to two distinctive traits of the average resident’s personality in Nasriya: honesty and a belief in peaceful coexistence. They all also agreed that the upgrading project enhanced these attributes and stopped other sorts of conflicts; people used to fight because of discharging their sewage in the streets. The upgrading project reduced conflicts over their basic needs, such as clean water and subsidised food.

At community level, volunteerism and co-production have been inclusive, regardless of the citizen’s socio-economic status, group or gender. Contrary to some western evidence that volunteers are more likely to be from higher income groups (Thomas 1986; Sharp 1990), it is common ideology in Muslim societies that every one, including women and the poor, should volunteer to his/her best to help those in more need. This was evident in the prevailing spirit of togetherness, co-existence and help given to anyone in-need in absolute secrecy. Volunteerism and ‘informal’ collective actions were particularly evident in the upper elevated area, where incomes were lower, and amongst the women and the poorest in Nasriya. In spite of the fact that residents in the upper elevated area were not politically active in ‘formal’ terms (familiarity with
political representatives, voting, and citizen-initiated contacting), they were quite
dynamic in a communal sense, including social consolidation and group-based problem
solving. Confronting frequent crises, such as snake bites and scorpion stings, encouraged
a closeness beyond mere sociability and formed strong patterns of neighbourliness and
social consolidation, was the impression got during interviewing a group of HoHs living
there (NGI1, 07-04-98). Nonetheless, the majority of people interviewed (65%) claimed
that their volunteer activities were not limited to their social group but also for
neighbours, friends and any benevolence needed in the area (Table 9.7).

The other vivid example of the successful transformative participation of citizens
into collaborative modes of ‘informal’ activity arose from an incident in the more
elevated area between sectors seven and eight. “Although all of us [households of the
area] cut the trenches and laid out the sewerage pipes, we could not be connected to the
main sewage network until 1998. There were three houses obstructing any possible
connection, and because of the nature of the area [steep slope, and narrow and irregular
alleys], the project could not find any other alternative. As we knew that the project was
about to leave, we started to collect £E70 from each of the 450 houses affected in this
area. This enabled us to buy new three houses elsewhere in the area, reaccommodate the
families and knock down the houses obstructing the connection. Therewith we connected
our local network with the main sewerage network of Nasriya ourselves, and constructed
the required manholes according to the project’s specifications and under their
supervision”, said a group of people living in this area (NGI2, 05-12-98). This incident
asserts that citizens had strengthened their own capacities to achieve change themselves
in societal perspectives. Community self-organisation now works as a foundation to
support citizens to take on limited roles within specific services, facilitate accesses to the
formal resources. Although these types of activities start ‘informally’, they have
potentials to scale up quickly, build community confidence to enter gradually the
decision-making processes, and provide both the opportunity and support necessary to
enable dialogue to develop ultimately.
Gender transformative participation and ‘informal’ activation have also been most notable. All female HoHs interviewed pointed out that they rely highly on the ties of family and neighbourhood whenever help is needed. They explained how all women neighbours co-operate during good and bad times to form familial and informal networks for social and economic support. For instance, if any wedding is to take place in their area, money and gifts are usually collected and given to the bride; neighbours assist in constructing a temporary wedding stage in one of the local streets, and food and drinks are continuously offered by all women’s in the neighbourhood to all guests. Sympathetic support and financial assistance are also given during funeral processions and the period of condolence.

The material side of women communal problem-solving was most lucent in the area of Nubians in sector nine. “After the project’s efforts to operate and sustain a proper solid-waste disposal programme in the area had all gone in vain, we had to take action. We all met in the Amberkab Community Centre and decided to operate our own small-scale project. We hired a domestic refuse collector, using a donkey cart, who now comes once a week knocking door by door to collect our domestic wastes. We pay him only two pounds because we do not produce huge quantities every week. All plastic containers and tins are reused while organic waste is recycled as fuel for our domestic stove”, proudly said Um-Shehrzad, Mother of Shehrzad, representing Nubian women in the area (UmS, 18-09-98). This type of collaboration indicates a collective transformation to sustained collaborative modes of participation, and must be distinguished from a totally passive consumerism form, which only seeks to maximise individual self-interest.

Henceforth, it can be argued that the participatory upgrading project has contributed to strengthen community cohesion, social consolidation and solidarity among the Nasriya residents. This was evident in so much as 80% of people interviewed asserted that they are now more attached to the area and do not intend to go back to their home origin or elsewhere in the future. Although the 20% who were less committed were a relatively small proportion, they were asked for the reason they might leave. The
explanations they offered included in descending order: lack of some services in the area (schools, open green spaces and solid-waste system); the poor image held by some native urban dwellers of them as informal squatters (which might affect their pride and hinder the marriage of their daughters); the desire to resettle in the East Nasriya new development (because their houses were too small to accommodate their extended families, and to have better access to the new community services supplied there); a preference to go back to their home origin when they became old (in order to die and be buried there according to their tradition and customs); or because they lived in the remote elevated areas, very far from the urban centre where their jobs were located.

To establish the extent to which people are attached to Nasriya after the upgrading project and how far they can avoid land speculation by themselves, even with little legislative intervention from the state, all respondents were asked a hypothetical question as to whether they would sell their houses if someone offered a 'good price'. Nearly three quarters asserted that they would never sell their houses even under these conditions. This was a good indicator that land speculation has been to a large extent averted in Nasriya. Of course tenants (19%) were not asked because they were not allowed to sell the houses they rented. However, even half of those who showed readiness to sell (4%) remained tenacious and attached to Nasriya. They wanted to do this so that they could buy a better house elsewhere in Nasriya, or to construct a new one in the new extension of East Nasriya. They also viewed the area as improving over time and predicted that development would continue in the future. The other half were those who either wanted to return to their home area or preferred to rent a flat in the urban centre instead.

9.5- Conclusions:

The experience of Nasriya has revealed that the evaluation of political activities and the potential of transformative participation in squatter settlements during and after upgrading involves a complex analysis of actors, interests and values. The society's basic microstructures—namely household characteristics, networks of households and related
formal and informal social networks connecting the workplace and community life, comprise the primary units of material and cultural reproduction and have great impact in shaping society's knowledge and building the practical awareness of its members' daily life. Collective action and the dynamics of 'community-governance networks' are embedded in, and spring out of, this awareness. Nasriya's experience revealed many important issues. A real participatory bottom-up approach can, to a large extent, succeed in transforming a certain segment of the society from recipients into proactive partners, while those disillusioned by the experience of formal political institutions revert back to themselves and strengthen their 'informal' networks. The Nasriya organisation has succeeded in transforming the relationship between its citizens and the systems outside their boundaries. Citizens have participated 'formally' and 'informally' at different levels, motivated by the individual's characteristics, group values and political interests.

Despite the elite state institutions and their measures of exclusion, control or regulation over the urban poor and their civil society organisations, the majority of citizens in Nasriya have not been politically acquiescent or free-riders. A large section of the population have indeed participated in electoral activities and been quite familiar with their political representative. Many citizens have been activists, acted as a counter-force in the overall political dynamic and influenced the selection of their political representatives, government personnel and the actions they take. Those activists have been engaged in deliberation to influence public-sector decision making, animated, at least in part, by concern for the public interest. Through active participation in organising electoral campaigning and voting, they shape the political agenda, they deliberate on the ends that governments should pursue, as well as evaluating how well particular public-sector programmes work.

Community participation, in its ultimate form, is a struggle to give rights to communities and to enhance the power, the self-confidence and the self-respect of the community as whole. The result, which in this instance refers to local development, is extended to issues of citizens political participation and sustainable development when official urban upgrading is involved. Although the society, as whole, has been active and
possessed a high degree of collective control over their daily-life issues, even before the commencement of the upgrading project, not every citizen was politically active. As Figure 9.3 summarises, there is a complexity of variables working at different levels, at different times and in different spatial locations that shape and direct citizens’ participation during an upgrading project, and the sustainability of their political participation afterwards.

Background variables (characteristics of individual citizens), which may explain the motives for citizens’ active political participation, do not necessarily indicate the same impact in activating participation during the upgrading project. Younger HoHs tended to be more politically active outside the project; they had better chances for higher education, which was significant in activating political participation. Although higher income also indicated higher levels of political participation, it did not necessarily indicate that the lower-income group or the poorest were the least active during the project. In contrast, the objective needs of the poorest, and those living in the remote elevated areas, for basic services and assistance made them participate very actively during the project.

But this type of need-oriented physical participation was not translated into ‘formal’ political participation afterwards. Active political participation was related to a set of intervening variables related to legalised land status, house ownership and housing physical condition, which has implications in the policy context of urban upgrading. The importance of this group analysis centres on its examination of the motives and characteristics of each group to shape its action despite their shared experience of oppression, disadvantage and exclusion.
Figure 9.3: Nasriya - Summary of the variables influenced citizens participation in the project, their political participation, and chance for formal and informal sustainability.

**Causal Factors (Background variables)**
- Personal criteria and spatial location
  - Younger age
  - Higher education
  - Higher income
  - Public sector occupation
  - Home origin
  - Middle spatial location
  - Remote elevated area

**Active participation during the upgrading project**

**Active political participation after the project**

**Property stakes (Intervening variables)**
- Active participation during the upgrading project
- Land status
- Owner-occupiers
- Housing condition

**Active political participation after the project**

**Citizens' need-awareness**
- Informal: sustained collaborative modes of participation and problem-solving based on shared vision of their development needs
- Sustainability Direction of community activation
- Formal: direct and progressive relationship with municipality

Source: Author
- (more tendency)
- (less tendency)

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It can be concluded that the transformation of the active citizens during the project into activists in the ‘formal’ political arena is not linear. Individuals may be mobilised into active political participation on the basis of supporting candidates coming from the same clan or area of origin, or on the basis of their objective assessment of the impact of proposed policies to increase their income, e.g. the motives for self-employed entrepreneurs to participate politically. However, the direction of community activation—as predicted through citizens’ need-awareness, relationship with the municipality and community ‘informal’ collaboration, indicates a collective transformation to sustained collaborative modes of participation. As people’s self-identity had been for long devalued and individuals had been largely powerless to change in formal terms, citizens strengthened their own capacities to achieve change themselves in societal perspectives. Community self-organisation now works as a foundation to increase understanding, support citizens to take on limited roles within specific services, provide alternative solutions to those suggested by practitioners, build confidence to enter gradually the decision-making processes, and to provide both the opportunity and support necessary to enable dialogue to develop ultimately. This form of community collective action, though it starts informally, must be distinguished from a totally passive consumerism, which only seeks to maximise individual self-interest.

A large section of society in Nasriya has been identified with the CDA’s activities and is now increasing in number and becoming more able in qualitative terms to build on its development experience. Formal and/or informal networks have been established, payment capacity and community involvement in the maintenance of all the services and social infrastructure gained are guaranteed, which suggests they will be sustained. Meanwhile indicators of the community propensity to continue their collective actions and group-based problem-solving also seem positive. Participation has given people a ‘voice’; the participatory approach of Nasriya and its land management concept have succeeded in preventing land speculation without the need for sophisticated regulations. However, citizens’ activation alone cannot deliver urban development; it requires a concomitant transformation of local government, which is examined in the next Chapter.
CHAPTER TEN

ACCOUNTABLE BUREAUCRATIC CAPACITY

The paradigm shift from 'things' to 'people' and from 'top-down supply' planning to 'bottom-up demand' participation has caused professionals' interactions with people to shift from providing/controlling to enabling/empowering (Chamber 1995: 32). In practice, it seems that the tools required to implement such a shift have not been accessible in many cities throughout DCs. Therefore, it is argued that successful participation requires major consensus with respect to transformation from normal 'professionalism, bureaucracy, careers and training', which combine in top-down standardisation and pressures for speedy action, into an enabling professionalism, a decentralised bureaucracy, and more innovative methods and responsive rules in careers and training (Nelson and Wright 1995; Chamber 1995: 33).

Although ERSAP in Egypt could be considered an economic success, the challenge the government is facing now is to shift the country from its legacy of statist economic structures and deeply-rooted bureaucratic traditions to a responsive and accountable government (Mayfield 1996). Macro stabilisation has already been achieved; the next stage is deep structural reform, especially at the local government level. But, institutionalised policies and programmes for the sustainable development of human settlements require strong, open and accountable local government institutions working in partnership with all interested parties. This necessitates a clear identification of the post-ERSAP problems and constraints facing local governments and their policy perspective regarding low-income areas and squatter settlements in general. Local capacity-building, including improvement and progress in any organisational environment require that the problems and constraints be identified and analysed first in terms of what can and should be changed.

This chapter aims to investigate the extent to which accountable bureaucratic capacity to manage urban affairs admits an effective role for civil society. Special emphasis is placed on the implications for participatory processes in general, and the
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reality of the democratic relationships between the legislative and administrative systems. This is followed by an examination of the extent to which the Ismailia and Aswan projects have changed municipal operational systems in these cities, and the main institutional obstacles these projects have faced when following the paradigm shift in planning and capacity-building. The final section examines whether the capacities acquired by government departments have been sustainable and transferable to other projects at national level and draws conclusions on the reality of institutionalising collaborative urban upgrading in Egypt.

10.1- Local government performance and accountability:

Bureaucratic structure covers a multitude of factors relating to its mechanisms and organisation and its urban governance processes, which not only influence its capacity to facilitate efficient governance, but also shape the cultural behaviour patterns of its practitioners. Most multilateral DAs pinpoint a major challenge in Egypt as being the need to move from a centralised, state-planned economy, to a more decentralised, market-oriented, system (Licari 1997, World Bank 1999). The structural organisational challenge in Egypt must go beyond this reliance on purely economic dimensions, as they repeatedly neglect recent debates on urban changes and the key importance of the institutional and cultural dimensions of the processes under way. The repercussions of over-centralisation and low fixed salaries disempower local government from meeting the challenge of collaborative urban governance and the institutionalisation of urban upgrading in Egypt (Figure 10.1). While over centralisation has produced rigid patterns of hierarchical structures, low fixed salaries have contributed to the establishment of inappropriate patterns of client-interaction and the imposition of top-down rules, procedures and institutional forms. The paradox of centralisation in Egypt is that it is practised at all scales. While local governments often conform to central directives and take no action without specific instructions from Cairo, Governors hold substantial power at the local level to deal with religious conflicts, diverse ethnic loyalties, neighbourhood clashes, and the ever-present threat of food shortages, including administrative disruptions in the distribution of food staples.
Figure 10.1: Egypt—Institutional constraints to accountable bureaucratic capacity

Institutional problems of municipalities in Egypt

Over centralisation (Structural organisation)
- Hierarchical and rigid patterns of authority
- Further weakening of structural organisational variables and impeding any reform initiatives
  - Second job
  - Lack of qualified and experienced staff
- Concentration, over-staffing and dead-wood

Low fixed salaries (Economic environment)
- Inappropriate patterns of client-interaction
  - Corruption, elite bias, patron clientalism and nepotism
- Scarcity of information and institutional confusion

Negative behavioural cultural
Bureaucratic pathology and negligence

Lack of drive, innovation and flexibility.
Red-tape, inertia and indiscipline.

Unaccountable bureaucratic capacity and embroiled institutional system

Disability of elaborating and implementing institutionalised and collaborative urban upgrading policies

Source: Author—Adapted from Eiweida (1997: 94)
In spite of the moves towards decentralisation (Chapter 5), central government still has tight control over the local government system, which makes it difficult for groups outside the single-party organisation to enter into effective negotiation with the administrative or legislative bodies. The participation of public interest groups in the budgeting process, for instance, is limited to the inputs they provide to the elected representatives at the local and national level, i.e. the Popular Local Councils (PLCs) at the local level and in the People’s Assembly (Mayfield 1996: 148). Because fiscal planning is the responsibility of the Ministry of Planning and its subsidiary departments at the Governorate level (Article 64- Regulations of Law 43), local departments at the Governorate level and below are required to develop their plans in a way that is consistent with the more general plans prepared at higher levels in the administration. Moreover, the centre has the power to impose its decisions upon the local leaders, since over 96% of total government revenue is still collected centrally in Egypt.

Likewise, the overall urban planning strategies are defined at the centre by the Ministry of Housing and Utilities and its General Organisation for Physical Planning (GOPP). They set housing policies, and allocate funds to the Governorates and provincial administration, which have very limited delegated powers. This is practised all over Egypt even in Governorates with the larger budgets under the Local Services and Development Fund (LSDF), such as Ismailia. “Governorates are responsible for selecting sites and implementing projects, but they have little freedom in changing the use of funds” (AA, 27-11-98). This fact excludes meaningful local initiative. Although the Local Administration Law (43/1979) describes extensively the power conferred upon local units, central government has the power to oppose any decision made by the local units which may interfere with its own policy.

Thus urban governance processes need to move from a centralised allocation of functions and responsibilities, top-down communication and rigid hierarchical authority to an autonomous and collaborative system of governance based on mutual partnership with civil society. Mayfield (1996) suggested a set of what might initially be perceived as mutually exclusive conditions: the need for central government co-ordination and control
as well as the demand for local participation and civic-empowerment. The tensions generated by these two interacting forces reflect the ideological need to impose a common national vision and standard, generally conceptualised in legal-rational terms of constitutional mandates and modern systems of collaborative urban governance. Mayfield argued that the model of ‘reflective tensions’ could, idealistically, be operationalised as a process of decision-making by which the political leadership of a given provincial, regional, or village community would be able to reflect and act on the issues of their political environment in ways that solve problems, introduce meaningful change, and establish legitimate responsible community.

Centralisation at the local level is widely reflected in Governor-centred urban politics. The Local Administration Law allows Governors in Egypt to review any decisions or measures taken by executive authorities downwards in the administrative hierarchy. The Executive Council at the Governorate level, headed by the Governor, has the power to supervise any Executive Council below it, e.g. at district, city and village levels. Governors can veto measures that might seem illegal and are also responsible for appointing subordinate executive officers at the local unit level. It was observed that while all line ministries are represented in each Governorate and provide members for the Governorate’s Executive Council, some government functions are controlled directly by Governors while others fall within the remit of line ministries. Moreover, although the Directors of Governorate-level departments or line ministries are responsible for appointing and transferring junior employees within their departments, they are required to obtain formal approval from the Governor for decisions regarding more senior posts, which often entail time consuming bureaucratic procedures. Governors chair many executive committees within their Governorates, and if not, they appoint, control or dismiss the committee’s Chair freely.

Although the law considers Governors as the key-administrators in the local government framework and empowers them to take many decisions, they may misuse this power out of personal interest, lack of experience or because of uncertainty as to the reaction of central government. Many urban plans have been kept in drawers without any
attempt to implement them because Governors, often retired army generals, were indecisive and hesitated to approve them. In spite of the fact that plans should be presented and approved first by the PLCs, directors of urban planning units cannot skip the verbal permission of the Governors to present the plans to the PLCs. “You cannot be an overt activist if you work with the Governor” (FD, 17-01-98). Thus while specialists need to be objective and state facts and the implications of these facts, they have to consider how to tailor facts for different audiences. Such rigid hierarchical authority patterns reinforce the Governor, while discouraging the assumption of responsibility by their subordinates. On the other hand, the system works well under experienced and decisive Governors, speeding up urban projects and disseminating experience (Box 10.1). Thus the fate of urban upgrading projects are largely decided by Governors, who are also responsible for co-ordination with DAs working within the Governorate’s premises. Undoubtedly, concentrating power in one person, without establishing efficient institutional systems advocating democracy, does not help the sustainability process, no matter how charismatic or competent this political leader is.

Box 10.1: Egypt- Examples of the positive/negative effect of Governors in urban policies

- **Positive support**: The Governors of Aswan were proud of the Nasriya project’s achievements, they ensured that central authorities and their colleagues were made aware of them through invitations, the hosting of meetings and the presentation of Nasriya as good practice in relevant national and international occasions. Ismailia’s Governors also used their clout to negotiate with central authorities, to seek innovative ways to facilitate the project’s operation and to ensure the co-operation of line ministries and local government departments.

- **Negative reaction**: The Physical Master Plan and legal framework of Tanta city, a joint venture with the GTZ in 1986, failed to include the development concept for Tal El-Haddadin area because the Governor refused to accept the concept of gradual upgrading and renewal of the existing squatter settlement.

Source: Key Informants (SM, 02-04-98; HE, 17-12-98; HS, 08-05-96).

This is also reflected in the reality of the democratic relationships between the legislative and administrative systems at the local level. Acting as chief executives of local governments and the representatives of the President, Governors engage in politics and co-opt or compromise to secure the state’s desired policy outcomes. They perform as the princely arbiter of local disputes, and often overruling PLCs. Formal meetings and discussion are dominated by them and their particular agendas (AH, 21-03-98). Because Governors are freely appointed and dismissed by the Head of the State, they always try to
satisfy the central government rather than the demands of PLCs. This means that elite politicians and practitioners do not see public policy making as an important enterprise that deserves time, careful thought, or opportunities for citizen representatives to express themselves and to be heard. Moreover, Governors have substantial authority and power to issue a wide range of decrees without referring to the PLCs. They also have the right to reject any decision taken by the citizen representatives if it contradicts their plans, and may repeal the PLCs ‘in case of need’ (AH, 21-03-98). Elected citizen representatives have limited opportunities to participate because involvement is only open in purely functional areas, as with planning and infrastructure review, which require specialised or professional knowledge (ZA, 15-02-98). Such undemocratic relationships do not make many elected citizens feel welcome to participate. Thus the whole system of local government is only tolerated in this legislative and planning culture. Most PLCs act as registry offices for the decisions of the Governorate’s authorities rather than as assemblies where decisions are debated. Surely this overall setting for public dialogue jeopardises the aim of self-determination and any control over local public life by the citizens themselves.

The other constraint to accountable bureaucratic capacity, low fixed salaries in a climate of privatisation and elimination of consumer subsidies, erodes employee motivation, urges experienced professionals to seek better-paid jobs elsewhere, and prompts many others to hold two jobs. The type of expertise required for setting up and implementing a participatory urban upgrading is that held by senior technical personnel with good training and long experience, but the experienced planners have been attracted by the higher salaries offered by rich Arab countries or the private sector. Most of the senior planners interviewed in Ismailia and Aswan have a second job, working evening-shifts at private consultancy offices. Surveyors and inspectors work as carpenters, electricians, plumbers, painters, or taxi-drivers. Although it is evident to senior administrators that this reduces the productivity levels of their subordinates, the practice is tolerated as a norm: “The best income any of us may earn is only £E400/month (£70/month), therefore I cannot ban any subordinate from seeking a second job”, said the UDLMU’s Director (EM, 05-01-99). Although the second job may bring in three times as
much as the official one, officials do not leave since the governmental job offers free health care, insurance, a pension and social prestige.

The Egyptian planners and engineers actually charged with the elaboration of physical master plans and detailed planning in municipalities are neither motivated nor experienced, nor capable of drawing up comprehensive plan or even implementing and controlling what has been planned. This reinforces centralisation as the deficiency is made up by GOPP. But GOPP has managed to prepare physical master plans for only about 25 of the 150 cities in Egypt since it has been established in the 1970s (SS, 30-05-96). Most of these plans were done in co-operative ventures with international donors such as UNDP, GTZ (Germany), IAURIF (France), DFID (UK), and USAID (USA). Furthermore, municipalities in many of these cities are not able to embark on any further detailed planning or specific action proposals (FM2, 23-10-96). Although the urban planning law allows municipalities to hire private consultant offices to prepare general detailed plans, the limited budget available for urban planning schemes from the central or local government prevents the practice.

"Low and stagnant governmental salaries make employees vulnerable to corruption, which is widespread in municipalities", admitted the Minister of Information (Mayo: 31 August 1998). Belatedly, authority seem to appreciate the negative effects of low pay in terms of bureaucratic inefficiency and the establishment of inappropriate patterns of client-interaction. The existing system of civil society incorporation is certainly neither accountable nor equitable and is even more disenfranchising. When officials working in state stores divert subsidised construction materials to the black market, the public is forced to subsidise the fortunes of black marketeers and fewer commodities are available for the needy poor in squatter settlements (Singerman 1997). When building inspectors take bribes to ignore the building code and buildings collapse, the public is deprived of basic security. When powerful landlords encourage building inspectors to declare a house unsafe so that they can evict the tenants and raise the rents, as is Nasriya, they deprive ordinary people of a place to live. When landlords land speculators do the
same in Ismailia so they can sell the property on the booming real estate market, they also deprive the urban poor of a place to live.

Such practices empower private entrepreneurs over the mass of the citizens. Richer individuals may also be empowered; municipal officials in an Engineering Department, Land Properties Sections (el-Amlak), may enable better-off people to ‘jump the queue’ and buy a plot in a new land sub-division project, or ignore the illegal occupation of state-owned land by a wealthy person. Inspectors are bribed to allow changes to an approved design during implementation. Some staff in Utilities Sections (el-Marafek), are bribed to make illegal connections of water and sewage for a landlord with an elapsed licence. Other behaviour is purely corrupt in that it only benefits the official. Some staff in Organisation and Licenses Sections (el-Tanzeem), deliberately impose red-tape in order to force the applicants to ask them to prepare the design or to modify it, so they can get some cash, according to 9% of the Nasriya respondents and a group interviewed in Ismailia (IGII, 17-10-96). Staff in charge of giving final licences are bribed to give their approval. Technicians ignore breakdowns until they get illegal ‘speed’ money. If residents want the garbage to be collected regularly, they had better pay the municipal cleaners. When poor people are obliged to bribe the underpaid junior official, whose multitude of minor transactions are not easily monitored by government assessors, bribery will function as an additional tax or ‘service charge’ (Lowder 1989: 125).

Although corrupt influence may ‘speed’ implementation so that it short-circuits bottlenecks, and it can offer cheaper options, it will always tend to favour the ‘haves’ rather than the ‘have nots’- particularly where the stakes are larger (Johnston 1989). There are many shades of corruption in urban institutions in Egypt. Certainly the elite benefit both in the short and long term. But, under conditions of extreme scarcity the poor, too, may benefit at least in terms of day-to-day survival. The unanswerable question is- who can be blamed, the briber or the ‘beriberi’, the deprived resident in a squatter settlement who desperately bribes an underpaid civil servant to get illegal infrastructure connections or to turn a blind eye while a new poor comer starts the process of informality. In the short term, the poor person was exploited twice, first, when the
government could not offer him a cheap plot to build a shelter, and second, when scarce money was spent on a bribe for a basic service. In the long term, he may manage to give his plot a degree of legality until an upgrading scheme can take place. But, as many respondents reported from Nasriya, once municipal inspectors are bribed, information is passed to their work colleagues about the case and its location, and they keep threatening the same household one after another. It is a network of blackmail (NGII, 07-04-98; NGI2, 05-12-98). In the short term, the low-paid municipal official earned some support for his life, but in the long run, he loses his integrity and self-respect. In fact, society has lost both, in the short and long run. This is a side effect of the ERSAP's measures which is seldom discussed for it is the personal vulnerability of some municipal officials, in the present climate of harsh economic reform and stumbling institutional adjustment in Egypt, which is to a large measure responsible.

Elite bias prevails, housing supply is presently largely directed to satisfy the demands of better-off people, while lower-income people, even those fully employed in formal sector industry, are unable to obtain housing and services at prices they can afford (GG, 26-11-98). The physical impact of these combined factors is seen in increased overcrowding, with concomitant stress on informal settlements' development, typically without access to sufficient, if any, infrastructure and other services (Eiweida 1997). The government's role is limited to the 'formal' sector. It involves control of the location and design of all houses in urban areas and regulation of the supply of subsidised building materials, which are only available to those building to full standard in 'formal' subdivisions (El-Batran and Arandel 1998). Access to low-cost land supply and subsidised materials is controlled by patron-clientelism. Consequently, only middle- or upper-income groups can afford the land costs involved in this form of provision to the detriment of low-income groups whose chances are blocked.

In this environment, it is hardly surprising that the middle and lower ranks of the state machine are enmeshed in a costly and inefficient behavioural culture, according to numerous informants (FM1, 26-11-98; FM2, 23-10-96; FM3, 29-05-96; MH, 06-06-96), which has grown since the open-door policy of Sadat and the implementation of the
ERSAP. Successive national governments have not decided about whether to regulate or liberalise, to support or resist. The failure of leadership was undoubtedly decisive: a corrupt elite can hardly provide administrative leadership or fail to demoralise many honest officials at lower levels. The system has become largely incapable of rewarding the efficient or penalising under-performers. Poor urban governance will continue until practical methodologies for capacity assessment of the whole urban sector are made and strategic capacity-building policies are implemented at national and local levels.

10.2- Project input to municipal capacity-building:

Although the immediate goals of the Ismailia and Aswan projects were to provide their respective areas with physical infrastructure, the development of a capacity-building policy for local government bodies was a primary target during their subsequent phases. Their local capacity-building programmes focused on two dimensions: a) criteria-driven measures, including institutional reform and organisational development, and b) human resource development, including appropriate training at different levels, equipment supply and consensus-building. A specific initiative stemming directly from both projects was the establishment of the Urban Planning Office in Ismailia Governorate (1981-date) and the Urban Development and Land Management Unit in Aswan Governorate (1992-date), although the success and sustainability of their actions have varied widely due to internal and external institutional barriers.

10.2.1- Ismailia’s initiatives:

Ismailia’s capacity-building differed during its setting up phase (1981-1990) and follow-up phase (1991-date). The technical aid-assistance DAs (UNDP and DFID) helped the local government establish an Urban Planning Office (UPO), three years after starting the implementation of the Hai El-Salam project, to function at the Governorate level in 1981. The intention was to create a local agency which would have the technical capacity, the legal basis and the financial and human resources required to undertake the type of development initiatives that the government expressed as its objectives (HE, 17-12-98). The DAs proposed that the UPO should have general planning responsibilities, ranging
from squatter upgrading and sites-and-services to money-generating high-income land subdivisions, industrial and recreation projects, in addition to a development responsibility in key locations assigned to it by the Governorate itself. This proposal was supported by the Governor, the senior staff and local council on the basis of the success of the Demonstration Projects (Davidson 1990: 286). The Governor, Mr Abdel-Moniem Emnara (1976-1991), used recent amendments in the Local Administration Law No. 43/1979 (which strengthened the authority of Governors by reducing the administrative and budgetary controls of the central government over the Governorates) to establish the necessary mechanisms of the UPO, including the powers to buy and selling land and to invest the proceeds in infrastructure. It was proposed that the UPO should be under the supervision of an Urban Development Committee chaired by the Secretary General of Ismailia Governorate and comprising nine members representing line-ministries and government departments concerned in Ismailia Governorate. It was necessary to establish the UPO as an independent apparatus in order to by-pass the bureaucracy of the municipality, which had been not able to carry out the planning demands outlined in the Master Plan’s proposals in 1975 (FD, 17-01-98). It was also proposed that this Committee could draw on a fund generated directly by land-sale revenues and monitored by the Governorate’s auditors.

These proposals were very much supported by the legislative arm, the PLC, and as soon as the Governor’s decree (No. 200/1981) was endorsed, announcements were made to recruit qualified staff on a long-term contractual basis. “The British Consultants helped the newly appointed Director to select the staff, and we had to go through tough interviews in the early 1980s”, remembered a group of Urban Planners who are now senior government officials in the UPO (FM1, 26-11-98). After supplying the UPO with the needed equipment, human resource development was seen as a key to better urban management in Ismailia, as well as improving the institutional performance of both the Hai El-Salam Project Agency and the Ismailia UPO. The DAs applied three main methods of human resource development: on-job training, formal generic training for men and women, and the provision of guidebooks and urban manuals (Box 10.2).
Box 10.2: Ismailia- Flexible strategy of human resource development

- **On-job training:** Local and international consultants were hired to offer on-job training in specific tasks, and to help the local government staff in the implementation of the upgrading and new development plans. This has also promoted further institutional development. "The consultants were able to work closely with the local staff and then withdraw from certain activities when they were being handled well. Training was mainly on-job with additional support from ad hoc evening classes. This type of training was the most preferred by all senior municipal officials interviewed.

- **Generic training:** ‘Formal’ training was supplied through regular weekly planning seminars where the ideas behind the practical day-to-day work were explained and discussed.

- **Guidebooks:** The production of an ‘Urban Projects Manual’ by two of the project consultants (Davidson and Payne 1983) helped a great deal to explain the process of design, illustrate different approaches and alternative means of managing urban development, discuss relevant techniques, and to disseminate the lessons learnt to wider local and national levels.

Source: Davidson and Payne (1983); Davidson (1984, 1991); Informants (FM1, 26-11-98).

The most significant institutional innovation associated with the establishment of the Ismailia’s UPO centred on its financial autonomy. The UPO had the power to sell government-owned land, either to private developers by auction or to local citizens after preparing land subdivision plans. Revenues could be used as an effective tool to increase the resources of the Urban Development Committee’s Fund and guide further development in the city through cross-financing and cross-subsidy among the different development projects in Ismailia Governorate in general. Further revenues have been reused in a wide range of activities, that could facilitate the reproduction of the planning processes (AA, 27-11-98; FM1, 26-11-98):

- **Appropriate pay:** All staff appointed to the UPO received attractive salaries (at least double the average income of a municipal official with equivalent length of experience); over-time and incentives were paid directly out of the land-sale revenues, without imposing any financial burden on the central government budget or distressing the local resources of Ismailia Governorate.

- **Recruitment flexibility:** Whenever the work load exceeded the ability of the existing staff of the UPO, its directorship could recruit further qualified staff on a short-term contractual basis, and/or request a part or full-time deployment/secondment of individuals working in other government institutions in Ismailia and pay them directly from the Fund, sustained the Deputy-Director of the UPO.

- **Urban (re)production:** The UPO had the authority to reuse the land sale revenues in planning, hiring consultants, arranging architecture and planning competitions, bidding, directly implementing physical infrastructure and low-income housing units, and/or arranging the legal procedures required for selling further land by auctions to generate further revenues for the Fund.
• **Provincial equilibrium**: Ismailia was the only Governorate in Egypt in which some of the Fund’s money could be lent to other local government units within the same Governorate with the Governor’s formal approval, provided that these units paid back the loan by monthly instalments at the interest rate set by the National Central Bank for other government transactions.

On that account, it can be argued that the Ismailia’s first phase of capacity-building (1981-1990) succeeded in establishing priorities for urban development and decentralised financial strategies. It resulted in collaboration between the administrative arm of the local government and the legislative popular arm to collectively promote the initiation of adequate mechanisms, actualising policy reforms and enabling legislation, which were required to ensure good urban governance. Several municipal officials interviewed in Ismailia attributed the success of this institutional reform particularly to the leadership, clout and cognisance of its previous Governor, Mr Emmara (1976-1991), regarding the legislative tools and decrees needed to start up the reform processes. “We used to see him at any time in our offices, discussing the urban plans with us and the British consultants and making sure that we receive decent incentives. He also used to walk in the squatter and informal settlements talking with people or praying with them in their local mosques especially on Fridays. This supportive behaviour fortified our morale and motivation to work even harder” (FM1, 26-11-98). Beside these personal attributes, the fact that the Governor was also a native Ismailian with a professional background made him even more aware of the local structures, socially and administratively, and increased his popularity, especially amongst the native dwellers and the PLC. Indeed, this popularity enhanced his clout with the central government as a local leader who was able to keep ‘peace and order’ in a post-war zone while enhancing development, which further empowered him to overcome the bureaucratic inertia of the existing organisational structures at both the central and the local government levels. No wonder he was promoted in 1991 to work at the cabinet level, got a PhD and became Egypt’s Chair of the Supreme Council of Youth and Sports.

But the Governor was not working alone. The UPO’s former team leader, Ms Habiba Eid (1985-1989), who had been the previous Director of the Hai El-Salam and Abu Atwa demonstration projects (1981-1984), had also an important role in supporting
the Governor and in bypassing normal administrative procedures. Her ability to assist the different interest groups in reaching consensus on priorities and actions was crucial (Khoury 1996). All the local and foreign consultants interviewed asserted that Ms Eid’s personality and leadership had enabled her to push further and to incorporate different associations. This specific role of charismatic leadership is significant in terms of soft-infrastructure and governance style in the context of consensus-building.

- **Soft infrastructure**: Despite her excellent experience and qualifications, she did not seek any senior political status and therefore was not seen as a political threat to any senior official in the Governorate. This helped her a lot to take free actions, employ the existing webs of formal and informal relations and to get all stakeholders’ support.

- **Governance style**: Ms Eid never used words such as ‘corruption’, she expressed herself in a rather more subtle way; her predecessor used to take the credit for any success to himself and never used the word ‘we’, emphasising an individualistic approach rather than a team-work managerial attitude. Although he was a dynamic individual, this did not help to promote the aims of sustainability and resulted in a quite low profile of trust, freedom to act, motivation and knowledge resources.

In fact, charismatic leadership is a very important tool for the success and progress of any urban project in Egypt, not only for the consensus-building it involves, but because the institutional system is driven by individuals rather than by pre-set goals or the accomplishment of results. This was evident in 1990, the processes relied on her and almost totally collapsed as soon as she left Ismailia to work in Cairo. Despite the production of several urban plans that suited all income and social strata, the Auditing Department criticised the decentralised financial strategies of the Governorate’s semi-autonomous projects, such as Hai El-Salam and the UPO, because the number of such projects (26) made their monitoring and auditing processes almost impossible. They proposed instead to combine all these small funds into three main ones: a LSDF, an Economic Housing Fund, and a Land Reclamation Fund, all of which would be headed by the Governor himself. These proposals reflected instructions made by the Governors’ Council in early 1990, which forbade the sale of any government land not directly administered by the municipality concerned. The Governor was thus obliged to issue a new decree (No. 513/1990) which abrogated the previous decree (No. 200/1981), the
Urban Development Committee was dissolved, and all land-sale revenues were automatically directed to the LSDF. Subsequent institutional confusion prevailed.

Soon after this decree was issued and the Governor was promoted to the cabinet level, his successor, Dr Ahmed El-Goa’ilee (1991-1996) issued another decree (No. 512/1991) to re-establish the Urban Development Committee. It was to be chaired by the General Director of Housing and comprise twenty members representing line-ministries, general offices, the PLC, as well as the Mayors of the five Districts of Ismailia Governorate and the Mayors of the three Quarters of Ismailia city. But, unlike its predecessor, the new executive regulations comprised many strict administrative and financial articles to monitor and control the planning processes, rather than to facilitate the bureaucracy. Unfortunately most of the 28 articles were either unrealistic or did not consider the existing capabilities of the UPO and municipalities concerned. Whilst Article 6, for instance, affirmed that the Urban Development Committee had to meet at least twice a month, it actually only meets once a year (OA, 26-11-98). The impact of such institutional restructuring and bureaucratic complications has had a negative effect on the UPO’s performance during its second phase (1991-date).

Although this phase had targeted issues of sustainability, the withdrawal of the British consultants on the completion of the technical-aid assistance to Ismailia Governorate reduced the capacity-building processes. UPO suffered from significant reductions in the rates of overtime and incentives given to all the UPO’s staff. Although a ratio of 2.5% of the value of any land sold by auctions was previously paid as incentives to the planners and surveyors who did the job, an increasing number of employees working for other government departments in Ismailia, including the auditors themselves, started to demand a share of this money, based on a web of favouritism and patron-clientalism. This, of course, left very little for the people who really did the job. “I have been working for 17 years now and still only earn a monthly income of £E600, with a 10% annual increase to keep pace with the inflation rate. Although this amount is almost double what any municipal official would generally earn, it is by no means enough to cover my family’s expenses. Although I obtained a post-graduate degree in 1984, I
received neither ascension nor promotional increase in my salary. Many of my colleagues who work for the private sector now, some of whom have even less experience than me, earn at least three times as much as I earn. We used to rely a great deal on overtime, the incentives and bonuses generated from the land-sales, but all such additional stipends have sharply declined from £E450/month in the 1980s to less than £E80/month now” (GG, 26-11-98). Indeed, with the impacts of the ERSAP in increasing prices whilst eliminating many consumer subsidies, a salary of £E600/month is not enough for an average middle-class educated family with children at school in urban Egypt.

Moreover, the UPO was not allowed to recruit any new qualified employees on a contractual basis under ERSAP. Instead, some staff would be seconded from the Municipality on a short-term deployment basis on the approval of the Governor, whenever there was an increase in the work load and additional members were required. “But these individuals are neither self-motivated, nor qualified for the type of planning we carry out. They usually end up as dead-wood occupying our offices which is not good for the work environment” (FM1, 26-11-98). Finally, according to the Governor’s decree (512/1991), a special Financial Unit was established within the Governorate’s structure to monitor and audit all land-sale revenues, including the UPO’s budget and expenses. But because this Unit is suffused with a bureaucratic attitude, it is extremely difficult to purchase any new equipment or surveying devices as soon as they are needed, which has further obstructed the planning production processes.

The only initiative which survived all this institutional chaos is the LSDF; it had some £E20 millions [£5.27 millions] in its account by 1998. But it can also be argued that the LSDF has survived because the UPO was only producing money-generating high-income subdivisions, rather than low-income sites-and-services based on the experience gained in Hai El-Salam. The urban poor lacked legal access to land resulting in the spontaneous creation of large numbers of ‘informal’ and ‘squatter’ settlements beyond the city boundaries during the 1990s’ liberalisation, such as Abu Halous and El-Kilo Etnain. The demands of all inhabitants for services has also increased, while the institutional framework to manage the city has aggravated many urban problems. Despite the
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Launching of the UNDP-funded Sustainable Ismailia Project (SIP) (1993-date), which marked the beginning of a new phase of local capacity-building in Ismailia Governorate (Together Foundation and UNCHS 1998), and the return of Ms Eid as its Director, the SIP has also resulted in many urban conflicts, referred to here as the ‘Four Ps’ (Box 10.3).

Box 10.3: DAs’ supremacy and contradictory capacity-building approaches

- **Policy contention:** This is evident in the overlapping of functions in addition to frequent problems of decision reverse of land use, e.g. from a park to a hospital, due to external pressures from the Governorate level.

- **Power insurgence:** The supremacy of the SIP, acting as a typical external technical and administrative know-how ‘intelligence’ and supported by discursive regime of power-knowledge and excessive capital, has been all-encompassing and completely replaced the UPO’s local powers in acting as the Governor’s favourite consultative arm.

- **Patronage conflict:** Observations in 1996 and 1998 revealed that while the SIP office has moved to the newly constructed Governorate’s building, working next door to the Governor’s office and is well furnished and equipped, the UPO remained in the old building where the work environment has sharply deteriorated.

- **Personnel loss:** The most active planners of the UPO have moved to work for the SIP on full or part time basis attracted by higher salaries and better chances to attend training courses and conferences abroad, which has further drained the UPO of its qualified staff.

Source: Fieldwork survey

Not surprisingly, most of UPO’s staff have lost the incentive to work as hard as before and almost all of them presently have a second job (FM1, 26-11-98). “We have lost both the moral and the financial support, so why should we continue working hard? We only work now to conciliate our own conscience” (GG and NM, 26-11-98). Of course, all these institutional repercussions can only draw one conclusion: the UPO’s position as an independent and self-financed agency has been progressively undermined, transforming it into a typical municipal pro-forma institution, a system which the technical aid-assistance DAs tried to avoid. The UNDP policy of intervention has been contradictory; it only provided second level institutional solutions, which did not address the conceptual, cultural and financial complexities underlying the intervention processes and the people involved. Despite the success of the SIP in identifying the urban environmental issues and implementing several strategies through co-ordinated interventions with the public, private and community sectors (Khoury 1996), such an external fund will only last for one or two
years. Unless serious action is taken to improve the performance and work conditions of the permanent UPO institution, it will continue to decline in efficacy and efficiency.

10.2.2- Aswan’s initiatives:

The difference between Ismailia’s and Aswan’s capacity-building approaches centred on the latter’s initiatives to build public participatory grounds from the start. It would appear once again that the base on which these institutions was erected was insufficiently conceptualised within a strategic capacity-building policy at the national and local government levels. Awareness of the need for a new planning and management entity arose shortly before the completion of the Nasriya project’s first phase in December 1991. A ZOPP workshop was held with all stakeholders concerned and the municipal officials identified the ‘core problem’ themselves as: “Urban management in Aswan is insufficient for sustainable development” (ZOPP 1991). This was a very important breakthrough in the context of municipal capacity-building in general; the first step required to promote any institutional reform and management development is to admit that there is a problem and to define its causes (Peltenburg et al. 1996). Subsequently, the ‘problems tree’ identified eight detailed causes (GTZ 1991), which can be grouped into the structural, the organisational and the environmental variables of accountable bureaucratic capacity.

- **Structural**: Institutional capacities were inadequate as compared to the development needs in Aswan, physical planning instruments were not sufficiently applied, and there was no appropriate system for land management.
- **Organisational**: No systematic project planning was applied, and the flow of information concerning planning and implementation was slow and inaccurate.
- **Environmental**: There was a lack of knowledge regarding people’s needs, hence infrastructure and community facilities were insufficient, and low-income urban housing in Aswan was inadequate in quantitative and qualitative terms.

This was a turning point for the Nasriya project, to enter a new phase aimed at municipal capacity-building. While the first project’s aim was to make ‘urban management in Aswan sufficient for sustainable development’, the new phase was more specific and aimed to ‘improve sustainable target group-oriented urban planning and management systems and to apply them in selected areas in Aswan’. The project was thus renamed
'Urban Development Aswan', so the second phase (1992-1995) was to develop and test an Urban Development Unit, land management instruments for extension areas in East Nasriya, land management instruments for urban upgrading areas, and instruments to facilitate the self-help improvement of housing, while enhancing the municipal capacity to implement and sustain upgrading schemes (GTZ 1991). In spite of the fact that the Urban Planning Law 3/1982 gave the responsibility of urban planning and development to the municipalities, it was not possible to establish the proposed Unit within the structure of the Engineering Department in 1992; its centralised financial system neither allowed the appointment of new staff nor the establishment of the required office and its outfitting. Neither were there qualified staff in the Engineering Department to carry out the expected tasks of the proposed Unit. Thus, a decision was made to by-pass the municipal structures; but instead of establishing a semi-autonomous agency similar to Ismailia's UPO, a Governor's decree (222/1991) was issued to establish the Unit within the Housing Directorate's structure without any separate financial budget or the necessary powers to buy and sell land and reinvest the proceeds in infrastructure. Although the Unit operated within the Housing Directorate for more than two years, during which it established itself as a needed entity among other local institutions in Aswan and produced several new development and upgrading plans, there was a clear conflict and overlap between the urban policy makers (the Unit) and the executors (the Housing Directorate) which made this institutional arrangement inappropriate.

A ZOPP workshop was held in 1994, and the stakeholders themselves identified many institutional problems that the Unit had been facing; all were typical of many other planning institutions in Egypt. These included ambiguity as to the real task of the Unit and absence of proper co-ordination and co-operation with other relevant governmental institutions. Consequently, the Unit suffered from a lack of basic information and maps to start the work despite their availability in other Governorate entities. Moreover, planned tasks could not be fulfilled because new tasks were continuously added while professional staff, skills and knowledge were still limited. The absence of a budget to buy office
materials, survey tools or to pay overtime and bonuses did not encourage qualified staff to stay in the Unit (GTZ 1994: 19).

Accordingly, a decision was made in 1996 to transform the Unit into a semi-independent apparatus working as one of the Governor's Affairs Offices (Decree No. 5/1996). A separate annual financial budget was allocated from the Governorate's budget (£E10,000) and additional part-time staff have been seconded to it. But this budget was too small to carry out all the tasks of the Unit. In fact, this re-establishment process was only a placation measure because "the GTZ did not offer any adequate technical advice as to how to solve the real problems identified during the workshop, to prepare clear job descriptions for its staff, or to establish a financial system", said the Unit's previous Director (KE, 05-12-96). By 1997, the number of Urban Planners working for the Unit dropped from six to three, and the technical staff (draftsmen, surveyors and secretary) from eight to four. It was also suffering from "disorganised work conditions, poor payment of its staff, lack of prospects, and lack of monitoring and evaluation programmes which all contributed to worker apathy and irresponsibility" (JK, 08-02-98). The Governor changed the Unit's directorship three times in 1998, after the GTZ had made several complaints that the Unit was not driven by pre-set goals. Such a post-hoc rationalisation further destabilised the institution.

Despite all of these deficiencies, the need for such a planning institution by the local government in Aswan saved it from a complete break down; fieldwork revealed that the Unit is still working on a range of development projects even after the completion of the Nasriya project and the withdrawal of the GTZ's financial support in December 1998. The Unit has been involved in monitoring the upgrading of 33 squatter settlements in Aswan Governorate through the National Programme of Urban Upgrading (NPUU) with a total budget of £E220 millions (£57.9 millions). The efficacy of this programme is discussed later. The Unit has also been responsible for preparing Borderlines and Structure Plans for all the cities and villages of Aswan Governorate with the technical assistance of the Danish International Development Assistance DA, DANIDA (1996-date). However, the sustainability of the Unit is still questionable; it does not have enough
qualified staff, it suffers from frequent shortages of finance to cover its daily expenses, and lack of financial incentives for the staff. Despite its institutionalisation within the administrative structure of Aswan Governorate and the strong commitment of its members, they complain that it is always difficult to maintain their focus on project-related activities due to the huge amount of further tasks coming randomly from above.

The second dimension of local capacity-building, human resource development, started soon after the GTZ equipped the UDLMU with the needed pick-up vehicle, drawing and survey equipment, furniture, a photocopier and typewriters. A wide range of training programmes were organised and offered. These were designed to supply government officials with technical skills as well as new work attitudes and behaviour. After sending many individuals to join some training courses in Cairo, it was found that the perceived inputs were limited and irrelevant to local problems. Alternatively, on-job training was revealed to be more realistic, interactive and productive. It was not only with a view to cost-saving but also to allow an increasing number of people to join, especially women who could not travel because of family commitments or tradition. Several consultants were hired at local, national and international levels and some municipal officials from the Engineering Department and Housing Directorate (as the responsible executors) also joined the training processes. After the readjustment of the Aswan General Plan in 1993, the on-job training programme was extended to give examples as to how to elaborate detailed plans for areas targeted for new extensions, e.g. East Nasriya, including land use planning, urban upgrading, land management policies and community participation. It had always been a target to show trainees how to achieve the best results with the limited resources they had in hand (JK, 08-02-98). Exchange experience with similar schemes in other DCs had also proved to be a very good tool in giving insights into possible radical changes in the local capacity-building policies. Under a programme called ‘South-South Dialogue’, GTZ sponsored two trips to Amman, Jordan and Dakar and St. Louis in Senegal. Each trip comprised about ten municipal officials representing the UDLMU; Aswan Governorate and the engineering department, and mainly focused on
exchanging experiences and lessons learnt in issues of urban planning and squatter upgrading with community participation.

Despite these human resource initiatives, a crucial obstacle to the Unit's efficiency is the institutional confusion and the low capacity of local government in Aswan to attract, motivate and retain qualified staff through appropriate pay, career-development opportunities, and sufficient operational budgets. This is due to the absence of a legal financial decree that can generate revenue and control costs. They only have a small annual budget which hardly covers their daily requirements of paper and maintenance. Although the planning costs of all large-scale projects elaborated by central agencies are paid for by the Governorate (e.g. the GOPP is paid for the planning of Aswan New City), the Unit is not paid for any planning work it achieves. This discrepancy is very discouraging for the Unit's staff and, therefore, its qualified members are not willing to continue working there, which hugely jeopardises its sustainability. Of course the GTZ, acting as a technical aid-assistance according to a specific set of criteria, insisted on investing only in institutional reform, equipment supply, know-how and training issues. It refused to pay any incentives for the local staff or to recruit additional qualified staff on a long term basis, so that the system would not collapse after the withdrawal of its financial assistance.

Meantime, the Egyptian contribution was limited to office space. The unit does not have financial security, and this means it cannot develop long term programmes and is dependent on funded requests from above. Moreover, pay levels are not commensurate with either its members' responsibilities, their skills, or pay offered in the private sector. Consequently, staff morale is low and able people leave; the fact that three directors were appointed in quick succession in 1998 suggests that the problem was seen by the Governor as personal, rather than structural. Typical of many local government organisations in Egypt, the Aswan Governorate failed to find other financial resources to deal adequately with the recruitment and maintenance needs at the local level. Its financial insecurity ties its future to the Governor's support. Unlike the scenario in Ismailia, which, to a certain extent, succeeded in bringing about institutional reform and organisational
development that could be semi-autonomous and self-sustained in financial terms, the GTZ neither learnt from that experience nor actualised a sustainable policy of capacity-building in Aswan within the UDLMU. It can also be argued that local organisations in Aswan lacked the legislative knowledge needed for a successful reform, notwithstanding they were open to implement any of the GTZ technical proposals or ZOPP results.

10.2.3- Municipal capacity to incorporate participation:

Another objective of Aswan’s capacity-building initiatives was to change municipal attitudes to participation, encourage gradual system adaptation, and the dissemination of the experience and the lessons learnt. Although the project used a Project Management Unit (PMU) located outside mainstream government departments and comprising seconded staff, so as to circumvent the complex bureaucratic structures and to facilitate the inception and implementation of the project, the experience of Nasriya suggests that effective participatory initiatives can lead to changes in municipal attitudes and increases in productivity directly or indirectly. Most of the capacity-building efforts of the project went into the development of the human resources of this special PMU with the aim of achieving the project’s physical and community development objectives. Although these efforts have had little direct influence on the capacity of mainstream government departments and their officials, there have been various indirect impacts on municipal capacity through staff returning to parent departments with experience of participation, particularly those who returned to senior positions; interest generated by the project and its impact on government national upgrading programmes; and the role played by community representatives, among other civil society organisations, in ‘promoting’ aspects of the project approach elsewhere. Gradually, as the project evolved, government officials came to value participation not only for its cost-sharing aspects but also for developing local consensus in urban planning schemes (McCommon 1995: 20). Aswan officials and PLC often organise community forums now as the first step in developing upgrading policies or master plans for new areas.

Nasriya project intervention for changes in capacity-building had based itself on gradual policy/system adaptation. The GTZ had been functioning as a catalyst which
would always require co-ordination, integration and political support. The personal belief of the Governors of Aswan, Mr Kadry Osman (1984-1991) and Mr Salah Mesbah (1991-1999), in the project’s philosophy and their ultimate support have contributed significantly to mediate with the central government and articulate specific local regulations (by-laws) that could meet the project’s requirements. They comprehended that Nasriya’s initiatives were driven by goals and required flexibility, responsiveness and clarity in dealings with civil society. Such political assiduity, effective leadership and administrative readiness to make change laid a solid foundation to instigate changes in the government structures and adapt the systems to facilitate the project’s participatory approach, which concerned interrelated strands, as follows:

- **Financial exemptions:** On signing the project agreement by both governments, all activities financed directly by the German side were exempted from going through the usual tender and bidding procedures and from tax or vat charges on invoices. Furthermore, direct contracting for implementation, materials and equipment procurement was allowed. This saved money and time and allowed the project to deal with local contractors and suppliers. It also gave the project a window between materials supply from the market and implementation by self-help which was crucial to participants.

- **Incentives:** The low-pay problem was evident at the beginning of the Nasriya project but was quickly eradicated by the Governor. He issued a decree by which all government employees seconded to the project would earn a monthly incentive to the value of 50-80% of their basic salaries. Additional overtime payments were also made available. The latter was necessary to enhance the communication between the project’s staff and those working residents who were only available in the evening.

- **Bureaucratic devolution:** The Aswan City Council supplied the area with an on-site land-sales office hosted in the Service Centre and operated by a local municipal official, which encouraged increasing numbers of leaseholders (hekr owners) to participate and legalise their plots. Municipal surveyors were also available to help the residents in implementing house connections and improvements.

- **Semi-autonomous fund:** A special housing fund was established. The Governor managed to get the government’s approval to issue a decree by which a large share of money generated from land-sales in Nasriya would go back to the project’s budget. This completely covered the Egyptian government’s contribution to the project thus obviating any further burden on the central government, but was not replicated at the Governorate level through the UDLMU, similar to the LSDF of Ismailia.

The Governor perceived community empowerment as both a perception by the holder and others, as well as the power to accomplish desires. Despite the fact that the NGOs Law banned any sort of official co-operation with unregistered community centres,
the project was permitted to work with any community centres in the area, 60% of which were not registered with the Social Affairs Department at the beginning of the project. Registration was perceived by the community as a costly measure which would usually require a bank account, a formal managerial system and give the Social Affairs Directorate the authority to audit their accounts (ZA, 15-02-98). It is worth noting that physical and administrative improvements in unregistered community centres only started to take place after permitting the project to deal with them. Nonetheless, all civil society organisations were exempted from paying the building permit fees (£E1200) only because they were making such improvements by 'self-help' according to the design prepared by themselves and the project’s architect. In 1996 the CDA offered a room to the Social Directorate to establish its East Quarter's Department within the Service Centre, which further narrowed the gap between different community centres in Nasriya and the government. Now, almost all community centres are registered and have become eligible for further state and donor financial assistance and equipment supply.

Local government’s recognition that the improvement of existing housing stock in the so-called ‘informal’ settlements is not an impossible task, that it is cost-saving and can raise political capital through community participation, encouraged the government officials, led by the Governor himself, to play an active role in promoting the participatory approach of Nasriya and to disseminate the lessons learnt. At national level, the Governor of Aswan presented the Nasriya project at a very large conference before the initiation of the NPUU (1992-date). The conference’s aim was to discuss the lessons learnt from previous pilot projects implemented in Egypt; it was chaired by the Prime Minister and attended by the Governors of the eleven Governorates in which the programme was planned to take place at the time. Moreover, the Local Development Committee of the People’s Assembly and several members of the National Ministerial Committee of the Shrouk programme (1994-date), which aims to improve the quality of life in 3,542 villages, had been invited by the Governor, introduced to the Nasriya project and walked a long distance through the area before they laid the foundation for the Shrouk programme. Following on Nasriya’s footsteps, a civil society organisation has been established to run
the programme, and the payment capacity and the propensity of the villagers to generate local investments, such as the donation of a piece of land to construct community services, have become the preconditions for initiating the programme in any village (SE, 16-10-96).

Exchange experience between Governorates was also most notable. “When the Governor of Giza recognised the difficulties that his senior staff were facing to get the Boulak El-Dakrour project initiated [another GTZ urban upgrading project in Giza (1996-date)], he sent a senior delegation to Aswan to learn from the Nasriya experience”, said the Governor of Aswan (SM, 02-04-98). Headed by the Secretary General of Giza and the GTZ Project Advisor, the commission included the Mayor of Giza and all the senior municipal officials concerned. Members of the delegation gained insight into the issues from their equivalent officials in Aswan as to how they adapted government structures and systems to facilitate the project’s bottom-up approach. Likewise, when the GTZ initiated another urban upgrading project in a very large squatter settlement in Cairo, Manshia’at Nasser, in 1997, many of the Nasriya staff and CDA members were invited to share their experience and attend several planning workshops sponsored by the GTZ office in Cairo (DS, 18-12-98). These examples reveal significant contributions to enhance horizontal and vertical inter-agency co-operation. It is a common practice in capacity-building interventions that certain organisational cultures may strongly resist innovation, to acquire knowledge, to appreciate creativeness or to take risks. In such case individual training may not be very effective and exchange experience with similar schemes is more helpful.

At international level, the General Director of the Housing Directorate and the Nasriya Project, the Head of the CDA and a WDA Board’s member presented the project in several conferences (e.g. Shelter and Organisation- Cairo 1992, Habitat City Summit-istanbul 1996 and Sustainable Cities- Ismailia 1998). Similar to the Hai El-Salam project, a video tape, a booklet, a web site, and several reports, leaflets, posters, media articles, TV programmes and academic papers have been published discussing the project and its approach. These have been a means for extending general capacity-building in Egypt and abroad via access to new information technologies and the media. However, the following section will examine the extent to which these capacity-building measures have succeeded.
in changing the government’s responses towards low-income settlements in Egypt, and whether or not an institutionalised system of participatory upgrading has been established within the NPUU.

10.3- The institutionalisation of collaborative upgrading:

Despite the insights demonstrated by the Hai El-Salam and Nasriya projects, it is argued here that centralised decision-making processes and the costly behavioural culture discussed above account for government apathy towards squatter settlements and the lower-income people who live in them. Indeed, informal development was largely ‘invisible’ to government officials until 1993. The government adopted a laissez-faire attitude, the services were minimal and provided only after citizen protest. The official approach was that ‘illegal’ settlements should be cleared and replaced by government housing, a view held initially by some municipal officials in Aswan prior to the Nasriya upgrading project, explained the first Project Director (AO, 23-10-96). Despite the issue of Law 135 in 1981, which outlined procedures for the regularisation of informal areas (Seralgeldin 1991), and the implementation of three pilot participatory projects through co-operative ventures with the British, American and German DAs in the 1970s and 1980s, government housing policy remained unchanged.

The government only espoused a systematic approach to urban upgrading in 1993, when the danger of inhabitants of squatter and informal areas being swayed by the rhetoric of religious fundamentalists was appreciated. The National Programme for Urban Upgrading (NPUU) aimed to upgrade 523 informal settlements in 11 Governorates (3 in Lower Egypt and 8 in Upper Egypt), and spent £E1.2 billions (£226 million) during 1993-96. The 1996/97 fiscal plan included a further £E171 million (£30 million) to start new projects in other cities. Despite this expenditure, the 1999/00’s figures suggest that an additional budget of £E3.1 billions (£534 million) is required to complete the task of upgrading all informal settlements in Egypt, 1034 settlements in 24 Governorates (Rose Al-Yousif: 24 September 1999). The NPUU provided squatter areas with basic physical infrastructure, i.e. water, sanitation, electricity, road networks and a limited supply of large solid waste bins. House connections to the infrastructure networks were
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implemented by households under the technical supervision of Engineering Departments. While the NPUU does represent a quasi-acceptance of the existence of informal development and a change in the government’s belief in upgrading policies, it is at best post-hoc rationalisation; it was more likely a political response to the spread of fundamentalist religious ideology in informal settlements, which was accompanied by intensification of repression against terrorism (Egyptian Consultative Council 1994). The modus operandi of the programme has been a top-down approach of service provision, which admitted very little or no chance of public participation. The government assigned the planning job to ‘professional’ staff in the Ministries of Housing and Local Development, trained in conventional housing techniques, they had little idea as to how to incorporate popular participation and civil society in their planning. Thus it is argued that the NPUU has, in fact, negative side effects which will need to be confronted.

The government did not appreciate that self-help upgrading programmes are ‘different’ and require special approaches to deal with different problems; the scheme was limited to a ‘once off’ approach of one or two fiscal years in each Governorate and the issues of cost recovery were not targeted. After short and limited tendering procedures, large construction companies carried out the work under the supervision of local authorities. Clearly this gave the beneficiaries no chance to participate in the planning, decision making or implementation processes. Moreover, it was hard to believe that millions of pounds had been spent in several ‘NPUU-upgraded’ areas in Aswan, Cairo and Ismailia; garbage was heaped everywhere, the narrow streets were full of uncovered sewerage ‘manholes’, many households were unable to pay for ‘formal’ infrastructure connections, and everyone complained how difficult it was to make a living. The woes of poverty were seen not only in the squalor, but in the spread of diseases, high illiteracy rates and child labour. Despite upgrading, 71 per cent of the children in Mounira El-Gharbiya and Ezbet El-Mufti (Imbaba, Giza Governorate), which witnessed one of the worst battles between the government and Islamist militants in 1992, have never been to school, and have worked from an early age (Al-Ahram Strategic Report 1995). Hence it is argued that the government’s inability to provide adequate housing and services, as well
as the political vacuum left by political parties within squatter and informal areas, will continue to enable militant Islamist groups to assimilate willing members as they strive to fill the gap in service supply.

On the other hand, it is now evident that the blanket promises of secure tenure given by the state and the provision of structured infrastructure from above through the NPUU have impacted negatively on the propensity of the target groups to contribute, which is one of the preconditions for generating investment to embark on and sustain urban upgrading projects. Although the state’s recognition of informal and squatter areas alleviated the fear that ‘illegal’ houses might be cleared one day, the provision of infrastructure gave de-facto security of tenure, which made many residents, especially the poorest, reluctant to pay for either the land or the improvements, once these areas had been upgraded, as observed in Tabya, Aswan Governorate. Top-down infrastructure provision without engaging the ‘awareness’ of beneficiaries, raising their socio-economic status and intensifying community self-reliance by means of effective participation and job creation, similar to the community initiatives that the Nasriya project tried to introduce, has led to false expectations of tenure security. Observations in Aswan, Ismailia and Cairo show that once improvements in infrastructure have taken place, squatters are gradually replaced by higher income groups (FM1, 26-11-98; EM, 05-01-99; HM, 20-01-98). Many poor squatters are pressured by speculators to sell their land, as in Hai El-Salam, but although happy with some cash in hand, they squat again on nearby state-owned lands. Payne (1997) links such a situation to the complex set of psychological and cultural factors associated with urban land, which go beyond economic rationale. Indeed, in a climate of post-ERSAP deprivation, squatter dwellers use land as a sacred trust, which is either protected on a customary basis for their children to extend vertically, or used as a commodity to be exploited or exchanged like any other.

Moreover, the NPUU ignored all the lessons learnt from the previous pilot participatory projects; it proposed to clear 12 slum areas in Cairo, 4 in Giza, 9 in Alexandria and 56 in other cities throughout Egypt (Egyptian Parliament 1993: 4; Rose Al-Yousif: 24 September 1999). The government described such settlements as physically
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precarious, and suffering from a range of social pathologies, such as a high crime rate, and brittle and friable social relations. Cairo's Governor, for instance, denounced settlers as squatters who 'deformed' Cairo's image by building slums everywhere. He insisted that he would "save the big city from these human pollutants by uprooting them. ... [and] glamorise the heart of the city by removing slums which are a scar on the city's face" (Egyptian Gazette: 10 February 1998). The continuous failure of the government to meet its housing deficits for low-income people has led it to lurk in the dark until the people themselves have solved the problem only to denounce them as squatters distorting Egypt's image. The government has claimed that house improvement does not have a high priority among slum dwellers, leading it to assert that upgrading policies are not likely to succeed. As Figure 7.6 suggested, governmental perception of slum settlements as 'atrocious housing', only results in 'reactionary palliative policies' (Eiweida 1997).

Of course when the government announced in 1998 its intention to clear the first of these areas, Manshia'at Nasser, which accommodated among others the largest society of garbage collectors in Egypt and their families, the Zabbalin, the people were in a state of terror and anxiety, and vehemently rejected relocation even if it was to a better area (DS, 18-12-98). Although the GTZ was already working to upgrade the area, the basic fact that the ability of a bureaucracy to play a dynamic role in the upgrading process is inextricably linked to levels of trust and confidence between the local government and its residents partners was ignored. Neither GROs nor MPs in Manshia'at Nasser were consulted. The 1.5 million residents wondered why the government had left them undisturbed for so many years. They accused the government of "rubbing its cheeks on the shoulders of wealthy investors and businessmen who, loosening the strings of their fat wallets, demanded to buy the area in order to build modern communities and investment projects", at one of the GTZ public hearings in the area. Sharp-minded investors allegedly tried to seize Manshia'at Nasser because of its strategic location. Despite the DA's initiatives to (re)construct the confidence between squatter settlers and the government, undemocratic urban governance raised doubt and resistance, and discouraged the establishment of any meaningful mass involvement in the development goals of the state.
Because the government believed that clearance was the only approach to solve the environmental problems posed by slums, it was soon in a dilemma as to how to curb the riots and where to resettle the displaced. The relocation plan was cancelled after the inhabitants appealed to the President and the Prime Minister “to intervene quickly, and take into consideration the social dimension during the process of planning and developing the quarter, which should be coherent with the existing situation which dates back to 1960. ... We have confidence in your sense of justice, and that you will restore our confidence, reassurance, stability and will not render our families homeless” (Al-Osbou: November 1998). The centralisation of decision-making is highlighted in this approach to the Head of the state to resolve a local problem. The government’s response towards ‘informal’, squatter and slum settlements will always flounder in a sea of uncertainty because the decisions of Egypt’s senior policy-makers lack clarity and priorities are vague and shifting. Decisions are taken within the organisational context of the state, according to the present state-centred models of governance in Egypt, which involve the excessive imposition of rules, procedures and unsuitable institutional forms to group collaboration. Residents of squatter and informal settlements are unlikely to take the present government seriously; they know that any threat will gradually wither until it dies away completely, and further squatters will continue to build new homes unless the housing deficit is solved. It is doubtful whether collaborative upgrading policies will ever be institutionalised in such conditions.

10.4- Conclusions:

Egypt’s urban administration system does not work effectively. It is formal and complex, which has restricted its response to rapid urban growth and the needs of low-income residents. There are structural organisation problems, behavioural culture constraints, and a lack of confidence and rapport with the masses in post-ERSAP Egypt. The economic and political environment does not encourage municipal officials to commit themselves to their proper work. Lack of planning capacity and culture, at both the central and local levels, restrict local government performance. The implementation of the four institutional and organisational key dimensions to good governance, outlined by
multilateral organisations, are therefore almost impossible at the present time. The public sector has failed to manage urban affairs or to be accountable. There is no clear set of rules or legal framework for development known in advance, information is not publicly available and transparency is questionable. The system as a whole needs to change from a bureaucratic one, based on conformity to rules and regulations, to a management system based on problem solving and achieving set goals. Local Government needs to be reformed and transformed from a centralised to a decentralised system. Although legislation has empowered Governors to deal with a wide range of local problems, they need to delegate power further to local government administrators and to enhance citizens participation by means of tolerating and respecting the supremacy of PLCs in acting on behalf of the citizens they represent.

It must be recognised that consciousness raising and capacity-building are needed to enhance the consensus that development is served by an integrated process of political and economic stability, good governance and popular participation. That requires investment in people, reliance on civil society, concern for the environment and a vigorous of the private sector. Shifts in administrative thinking will require a totally new set of administrative and managerial role definitions, with a new set of expectations and reward/incentive systems, before changes can be realised. This is a long-term process of development which will never be implemented without a strategic capacity-building policy, at macro, national, and micro, local, levels and better human resources directed by a competent administrative, financial and legal system. A fundamental goal of capacity building is thus to enhance the ability to evaluate and address the crucial questions related to policy choices and modes of implementation among development options, based on an understanding of environmental potential and limits and of needs perceived by the secondary stakeholders concerned. Congruous models of upgrading must thus be presented and discussed with different institutions concerned in an effort to improve their professional capacity for upgrading and assimilate successful insights in their long-term policies. The above institutional deficiencies, in addition to the vulnerability of the urban system to confront the changes accompanying liberalisation, have also restricted DAs'
local capacity-building initiatives in Ismailia and Aswan. The frequent changes in local
government’s policies in Ismailia, as well as the contradictory agendas of the donors
involved, have weakened the efficacy of established institutions, increased confusion
among stakeholders concerned and reduced the impact of training programmes. In spite of
the fact that the initiatives of GTZ in Aswan Governorate to implement a local capacity-
building strategy started almost a decade after the launching of Ismailia’s programme, it
seemed that the lessons of institutional reform were not learnt. As with Ismailia’s UPO,
the survival of the Urban Development and Land Management Unit (UDLMU) of Aswan
Governorate was also very uncertain by the end of 1998.

The government has not comprehended that collaborative urban upgrading, rather
than top-down physical provision or ‘slum clearance’, extends economic opportunities to
those most in need, the urban poor. It produces a low-cost housing system, usually in
locations which enable the inhabitants to retain the maximum disposable income. It
preserves communities which have many internal linkages to support households and the
group. ‘Slum clearance’, on the other hand, is sociably disruptive and economically
unfeasible in Egypt. Even when this action clears land for profitable commercial
developments, those displaced by slum clearance rarely receive appropriate
accommodation for their life style; they return and resume squatting, often in the same
place or nearby, which will eventually require another massive capital injection for
upgrading. The establishment of dialogue between ‘squatters’ and municipal officials is a
necessary starting point for institutionalising collaborative upgrading; it provides forums in
which experiential and professional knowledge can be shared. However, this dialogue is
often uncomfortable for the latter are unused to being questioned by their clients. Despite
the ‘theoretical’ notion of collaborative governance to increase citizen participation in
public decision-making, there are challenges associated with developing such dialogue and
deliberation particularly between those who may be defined as ‘free-riders’, those who
have been deliberately excluded, and municipal officials, who are gate-keepers to the
services needed. Within this power imbalance, citizens who speak out may put themselves
at risk and, therefore, always need the ‘informal’ support of their peers.
CHAPTER ELEVEN
CONCLUSIONS

Development is the central metaphor which links non-profit making DAs and civil society organisations with the other two key agents which have been addressed throughout this research- namely national and local government- in the context of sustainable and institutionalised urban upgrading policies and community participation. The research has revealed that the reliance on overly simplified economic concepts in recent debates on urban changes has tended to neglect the key importance of the institutional dimensions to the processes under way. Informal and squatter settlements are the products of failed policies, bad governance, inappropriate regulation and client interaction patterns, and dysfunctional land markets and financial systems. Each of these failures adds to the toll on people already deeply burdened by poverty and constraints the opportunity for human development.

Successful upgrading project may lay the foundation for further developments and foster vigorous types of municipal capacity for participation. The research suggests that micro and macro-level initiatives need to be integrated, with the need to influence the national policies being taken into account in the design of local initiatives. Initiatives must be flexible; participation evolves throughout a project’s duration. While ‘community consultation’ and ‘cheap labour’ may respond to the early focus on ‘ends’, they can lay the foundation for more complex forms of ‘delegated power’ and ‘community control’. Only then participation can foster empowerment and can have a transformative potential to mobilise citizens into participation in the democratic processes. The important implications are that the power relationships between members of a community as well as between them, the state and local government institutions can change over time. However, community self-reliance can only be achieved through gradual concessions from above, matched by gradual intensification of citizen participation. Collaborative urban upgrading is partial at best if it is restricted to an infrastructure network and house connections; the developmental components need to involve policy adaptation and effective community self-administration.
11.1- Urban development and governance:

The first objective of the research, to conceptualise a pertinent framework that can investigate local government accountability, citizen political participation and the level of capacity-building needed for a collaborative model of urban governance in DCs, has revealed that the discussion and analysis of development can be based on syllogism: while development is perceived differently by different disciplines, and contemporary critique is 'confused', it is best analysed as a discourse of power. Urbanisation is inevitable, and can be considered as an attribute of development, in that cities offer greater opportunities and the promise of a better life. However, the imposition of ERSAP neo-liberal development has had less positive outcomes in the economic, socio-cultural and environmental arenas at all geographic scales. The gap between rich and poor countries and strata has widened, while development directed by market principles is unable to address the problems of increasing poverty and socio-economic exclusion. The impact in a great many DCs can be seen in the failure of top-down central planning to solve the problems of uncontrolled urbanisation, while housing deficits and environmental degradation are suffered by the poor.

The conceptualisation of the 'development'-urbanisation relationship must integrate the issues of civil society empowerment, participation as an end and collaborative urban governance. These are complex processes; they require strong, open and accountable local government institutions working in partnership with all interested parties to (re)produce adequate and 'sustainable' urban policies, as well as 'institutionalised' programmes for the upgrading of low-income settlements. Collaborative urban (re)development requires the establishment of democratic forms of governance in DCs to replace patron-clientelism, imperious public servants, army intervention and prolonged authoritarian military regimes. Partnership and good performance of local government are crucial for the prosperity of any modern society. But, DCs' local governments are facing profound challenges not only as a result of the shifting global context, but also due to their internal bureaucratic culture and structural organisational settings, which impede efficiency.
A framework of ‘accountable bureaucratic capacity’ has been proposed here, which can be used to evaluate local government accountability. Local government is, in fact, a function of four key-dimensions: the structural and organisational, the behavioural, client-interaction, and the economic, political and public environment. The framework distributes responsibility between central and local governments equally, and stresses the role of citizens and civil society organisations in participating in political life. Capacity-building builds on criteria-driven measures, consensus-building and participatory grounds. It is argued that civil society organisations cannot contribute to development, democratisation and the protection of citizens’ rights without accountable and fair representation in their decision-making structures, reciprocal and active participation by the citizens concerned, and effective and ethical public sector performance. While it is appreciated that this ‘rational’ institutional concept is not easy to achieve in many DC cities, it is believed that those ‘individuals’ who shape the structural forces of existing local governments, do have the power to change the present institutional deficiencies.

The analysis of the political and urban post-ERSAP challenges in DCs as exemplified by Egypt, the second objective of this research, revealed that the present regime is subject to political-cultural quandaries, as well as urban challenges above those repeatedly discussed in the literature, because of internal (administrative) and external (DAs conflicting aims) institutional deficiencies. Privatisation and financial liberalisation effects vary according to the segment of society. ERSAP focused on the macroeconomic, medium-term and long-term growth, and only lately on social policies to minimise the effect of these economic reforms on the poor. Whilst international financial institutions evaluated the measures directed at the first as ‘to a large extent successful’, they criticised measures directed at the others. Finance remains highly centralised, social transition is slow and the government still restrains liberal pluralism. The rise of fundamentalist religious and social movements in response to urban and regional biases, especially in rural Upper Egypt, has raised dilemmas of whether to maintain authoritarian control in the name of security, or to embrace civil society
organisations as a means of enhancing democratisation and prosperity. The state controls societal interest groups so as to restrict the number who would demand to participate in policy-making processes. State jurisdictions are tailored to foster control; they work against an independent civil society concerned with maintaining democracy and ensuring that the government is accountable and effective at city level. When these political-cultural and urban-economic 'situations' were examined against the variables of 'accountable bureaucratic capacity', it became evident that institutional decentralisation, institutional reform to establish strong, open and accountable local government institutions working in partnership with all interested parties, and the enhancement of a more open and pro-active society are required.

11.2- Collaborative urban upgrading:

The DA support confronts such challenges, as explored through two DA-funded upgrading projects, the third objective, differed in scope and in the resources they devoted to promoting participation and developing community and municipal capacities (Figure 11.1). Participatory experiences had not been well-conceptualised in the 1970s when the Hai El-Salam project was initiated. The project's success was to insert informal sector housing practice into an official project. While the project succeeded in physical structural terms, its approach to participation was limited to consultation. It neither enhanced the beneficiaries' awareness, raised community self-reliance and civic-empowerment, nor promoted pluralism. This was evident in the low response rate and 'mistrust' of HoHs, which clearly jeopardises sustainability. The project's philosophy towards land management has also given rise to enormous technical and administrative problems now. The Hai El-Salam case study revealed that there are various side effects of the granting of tenure which should be confronted by effective legislation. This deficiency, in addition to underestimation of population mobility, has had several repercussions resulting in the continuous replacement of beneficiaries by higher income groups. Land legislation did not involve collaborative policy making, resulting in land tenure policies which have reinforced land value inflation and absorbed funds better spent in more productive economic uses.
Figure 11.1: Summary—Comparative evaluation of two urban upgrading approaches

Hai El-Salam:
- Conventional and expensive infrastructure networks built by contractors. Costly maintenance carried out by local government entities embedded in top-down structures.

Nasriya:
- The community’s participation reduced the cost of social and physical infrastructure. The only failure was the solid waste disposal system.

Hai El-Salam:
- Land supply for lower income groups was expected but not supported by effective legislative means. Despite successful cross-subsidy, the poor were gradually replaced by higher income groups.

Nasriya:
- Affordable and sustainable living spaces for the target beneficiaries was provided. Speculation has been averted by effective legislation and resident attachment to the area.

Hai El-Salam:
- Participation was limited to consultation with community representatives, though it was possible on an arbitrary basis.

Nasriya:
- A ‘community consultation’ and ‘cheap labour’ approach at the start, led gradually to ‘delegated power’ and ‘community control’.

Hai El-Salam:
- GROs have been unable to participate in capitalistic urban markets. No assistance to establish a ‘united’ civil society organisation.

Nasriya:
- Assistance to establish a CDA; representation of all residents through an elected assembly. Effective organisational counterpart to local government.

Hai El-Salam:
- Superficial: physical improvement but not by the target groups. Replacement by higher income groups.

Nasriya:
- Deep: transformation of a large segment from ‘recipients’ into proactive ‘partners’ engaged in maintenance, while the community, as a whole, reinvigorated its informal and traditional networks.

Source: Author
While Aswan's Nasriya project (1987-1998), also transformed an 'informal' settlement physically, its existing socio-economic structures were maintained by enabling community participation in the infrastructural improvement. Participation in planning was considered by the initiator, the secondary stakeholders and the primary beneficiaries as essential to ensure appropriate proposals. The work was implemented through 'self-help' and claimed with pride by the participants, who asserted that the co-operative skills learnt were invaluable in further construction activities. The Nasriya project showed that not only are participatory approaches welcomed by community beneficiaries but that the capacity of local government can be gradually improved. The project also demonstrated how vernacular architecture and use of local construction materials can foster 'modernity' and embrace intellectual and technological progress. The Governor of Aswan perceived these achievements as indications that the project's goals have been achieved.

11.3- Participation and civil society empowerment:

Nasriya supplied the empirical example to illustrate community perceptions of participation, the fourth objective. Nasriya inhabitants were neither unorganised nor apathetic prior to the project. Their action and political activation forced the local government to reconsider its urban policies, prompted by the rise of terrorism and religious movements at the time. Community perceptions of participation 10 years after differed; participation was perceived primarily as practical work with a tangible outcome. It was evident that while almost all 'active' HoHs viewed their participation as effective throughout the project's phases; the 'not active' only did so during the implementation phase, while the 'less active' had a limited role in the planning. Personal attributes shed light on the membership of these groups.

Those from the same home area as the Head of the early civil society organisation working in Nasriya at the time were more likely to be 'active'. The 'less active' had on the whole higher household incomes, but many were self-employed and lacked time to participate personally even in the implementation phase. The inactive were mainly tenants or those who were used to spoon-feeding from the municipality as they occupied state-
built housing and the main infrastructure off-lines serving them were constructed by contractors. This analysis of groups is necessary for upgrading projects to highlight the need to mobilise the less and not active groups, while sustaining and utilising the efforts of the active.

Post-project community empowerment, the fifth objective, was assessed through the linkage between participation during the Narsiya project and formal political participation as well as 'informal' collaborative action. The translation of the 'active citizens' during the project into 'activists' in the formal political arena was not linear. Individuals were mobilised into political active participation on the basis of supporting candidates coming from the same clan or home origin, or on the basis of their objective assessment of the impact of proposed policies just to increase their own profits, e.g. the motives for self-employed entrepreneurs to participate. However, the impact of the upgrading project prevailed, the majority of citizens were not politically acquiescent; a large section were 'activists', who participated in the CDA's, Popular Local Council's and Parliament's elections and knew their representatives, or were 'watch-dogs', although they were more likely to know their representatives than to actually vote. Only one third of HoHs were classified as 'free-riders', who participated at only one level in the formal political arena, the CDA.

A variety of variables directed citizens' formal participation. Political activism was associated more clearly with personal characteristics. The 'activists' were on the whole younger with higher household incomes and higher education. Self-employed entrepreneurs were over-represented, which may explain their significantly higher average income. Active political participation was also influenced by a set of 'intervening variables' related to property stakes. The 'activists' had on the whole legal land status, and were owner-occupiers living in good housing conditions. However, the lack of formal participation might be construed as confident self-reliance of excluded citizens-both formally in terms of actual constraints on their citizenship rights, or through organisation which makes it difficult for them to realise the substantive rights of citizenship- rather than as apathy or lack of capacity. Informal kin, ethnic and traditional
neighbourly support networks are the norm and highly active in Nasriya’s culture. The experiences of exclusion, negligence and disadvantage intensified the significance of identity as a factor defining both the motivation to act collectively- to develop groups in which identities can be formed and expressed, and the objectives pursued by such groups.

The Nasriya project has achieved a considerable degree of success in empowering the community as a whole, to enhance citizens’ self-administration processes and to provide channels through which they can access government resources and services, in the context of civil society. The organisations acquired legal frameworks, articles of association and statutes as well as access to funds. The main means was the Community Development Association (CDA) representing almost all the sub-communities, attempting to avoid the mistakes of its predecessor which had been exclusive. The CDA is currently responsible for co-ordinating the communities’ activities, opening channels of communication and participation, providing training for activists and GROs, promoting pluralism and establishing effective poverty alleviation programmes. However, the present democratic structure does not satisfy all groups.

The dissatisfaction of female members of the CDA was instrumental in the demand for independent Women’s Development Association (WDA). The future of the WDA is, however, questionable; being established at the end of the project. Training was limited, no permanent qualified staff were employed by the project during the establishment phase, and in particular there was considerable rivalry between the organisations. The successful applicability and replicability of gender initiatives requires personnel with a strong theoretical grounding in gender, along with an equally strong record of practical implementation/adaptation of gender concepts at the local level. However, the project did give a considerable boost to women of all ages, despite raising men’s traditional prejudices. The WDA is still dependent financially but is a strong bulwark against women’s disempowerment within the neighbourhood.
11.4- Municipal capacity-building:

The sixth objective of this research has investigated local government accountability and evaluated municipal capacity-building approaches in Ismailia and Aswan. Egypt’s urban administration system does not work effectively. Structural organisational variables, particularly economic centralisation, preclude the establishment of collaborative urban governance. The confining traditions are that power is dependent on relations with those in the higher echelons, and the key to effectiveness and promotion is procedural and a question of conformity to rules, rather than goal-achievement or risk-taking. While over centralisation has produced rigid patterns of hierarchical authority, low fixed salaries have contributed to inappropriate client-interaction, which has further weakened the organisational structure of the bureaucracy. Although the legal framework allows municipalities to prepare and adjust the technical planning processes at the local level, this is difficult owing to shortages of qualified staff, problems of co-ordination and information exchange between organisations, and the lack of a planning ‘culture’ within local governments.

Ismailia and Aswan projects tried different approaches to establish efficient capacity-building programmes, but were faced by similar institutional obstacles within this bureaucratic climate. Their capacity-building initiatives involved activities with multiplier effects, the training of municipal officials, and networking to improve urban management performance (Figure 11.2). Both initiatives tried to by-pass the existing municipal structures and introduced new criteria-driven measures by means of establishing quasi-independent urban institutions. The interest and political will of both of Ismailia’s and Aswan’s Governors permitted these institutional reform processes. Similar human resource development strategies were introduced and applied, which relied on the co-ordination of the various administrative and public sectors, with the technical and financial support coming from the DAs concerned.
Figure 11.2: Summary- Comparative evaluation of two local capacity-building strategies

**Ismailia:**
- The DAs proposed the establishment of the UPO with general planning responsibilities, which was supported by local senior staff and the PLC on the basis of the success of the Demonstration Projects.
- Purely financial; semi-autonomous fund generated directly by land-sale revenues and monitored by the Governorate's auditors. Revenues facilitate planning reproduction.
- On job training in specific tasks by local and international consultants, regular weekly planning seminars and an 'Urban Projects Manual'.
- Land-sale revenues enabled the UPO to buy drawing and survey equipment, furniture, photocopiers and computers.
- Academic papers, a booklet, leaflets, posters, media articles, TV programmes and several reports have been published. The project was presented in Istanbul 1996 (Habitat, Sustainable Cities) as 'good practice'.

**Aswan:**
- Awareness of the need for a new planning and management entity arose shortly before the completion of the Nasriya project's first phase. Stakeholders identified the 'problem-objective' themselves.
- Semi-independent apparatus is one of the Governor's offices. The UDLMU lacks financial, legislative and administrative support.
- On job training programmes with special emphasis on participatory urban upgrading, formal training courses, and exchange experience with similar schemes in other DCs.
- The DA equipped the UDLMU with a pick-up vehicle, drawing and survey equipment, furniture, a photocopier and typewriters.
- In addition to the above, local government officials, led by the Governor, actively promoted the participatory approach, especially to the central government.

Source: Author
Ismailia had financial autonomy because the UPO had the power to sell government-owned land, while the revenues increased the resources of the Urban Development Committee's Fund and guided further development in the city through cross-financing and cross-subsidy within the Governorate. Although this financial autonomy had the potential to be sustainable, the UPO was only producing money-generating high-income land subdivisions rather than low-income sites-and-services based on the experience gained in Hai El-Salam. The urban poor lacked legal access to land and continued to squat beyond the city boundaries. Although both local governments benefited from the establishment of urban institutions, their sustainability is uncertain because of institutional confusion and the low capacity of local government to attract, motivate and retain qualified staff and sufficient operational budgets. Their financial insecurity ties their future to Governor's support, as were many of the project's instruments. Aswan's strength was collaborative; all stakeholders identified the 'core problem' themselves. Nasriya showed that it is possible to respond to demand through decision-making processes which mainly involve senior government officials and representatives of international agencies if they are willing to listen to local people and take their concerns into account when developing proposals. The long-term impact of the Nasriya process is that senior officials, including the Governor, are now used to holding regular meetings with CDA and WDA Boards, to allow open dialogue about policy issues and to take decisions that are responsive to community concerns.

As the Nasriya project management unit's staff were seconded from local government departments, the latter may benefit from the knowledge, skills and attitudes developed in the course of the project to the extent which they allow scope for the development of participatory processes. The UDLMU, for instance, has improved planning capacity at the local level and has done so in a way which incorporates participatory elements. Moreover Nasriya have probably raised official awareness of the positive contribution that informal settlements can make to urban development, a step essential to meaningful participation in urban upgrading. The advocacy of the Governor of Aswan has helped to promote the Nasriya approach to participatory upgrading.
amongst other senior government decision-makers. However, it must be recognised that even when policy makers are committed to change, it may be blocked by the lack of interest or even hostility of lower-level bureaucrats. The development of participatory attitudes and procedures is best seen as a process, but such efforts to change the attitudes of municipal officials and introduce them to participatory models may not overcome their fears of job security and lack of motivation resulting from poor salaries. Thus other political and economic factors influence changes in government approaches, and it is difficult to disaggregate the impact of these different factors.

Consequently, the last objective of the research has evaluated the evidence as to whether the capacities acquired by government departments have been sustainable and transferable to other projects at local and national levels. Although there is enough evidence to show that decentralising government forces are still active, a negative complexity of variables operating within the bureaucratic framework constrains the institutionalisation of collaborative urban upgrading. This was evident during the National Programme of Urban Upgrading (NPUU, 1992-date). Cities of 24 Egyptian Governorates included 1034 pockets of ‘informal’ and ‘slum’ settlements, which exemplified the failure of urban development to solve the problems of housing deficit, poverty and social exclusion. While the NPUU did represent a quasi-recognition of the existence of informal development, as well as a change in the government’s belief in upgrading policies, it was only a social response to the spread of fundamentalist religious ideology, particularly in informal settlements, which accompanied the intensification in the repression of terrorism. The design and management of the programme took a top-down approach to service provision, whilst the structural organisational constraints on bureaucratic capacity provided no chance for public participation during the institutionalised processes. Despite the application of many insightful capacity-building initiatives through Ismailia and Aswan projects, lessons were not learnt, the upgrading process was dependent on central national policies, and ‘slum clearance’ was still seen as a ‘solution’ by many policy-makers. It is thus doubtful whether collaborative upgrading policies can be institutionalised under the present structures.
11.5- Policy implications:

‘Accountable bureaucratic capacity’ requires a new set of skills, attitudes, role orientations, and technical capabilities. A crucial dilemma to establish institutionalised urban upgrading policies is the need to distance an autonomous and collaborative system of governance based on partnership with civil society from centralised allocation of functions and responsibilities, Governor-centred decision-making, top-down communication and rigid hierarchical authority. The roots of this dilemma lie in an administrative system structured over the past five decades, yet reflective of a governmental system in place for centuries. DAs’ training programmes per se cannot change these realities in the short term; there is a need for strategic capacity-building at all levels. Fortunately, there are numerous Egyptian officials, chief executives and management personnel who are committed to improving the effectiveness of local administration organisations through gradual shifts in the planning and administrative cultures. Such shifts require a totally new set of administrative and managerial role definitions, with a new set of expectations and new reward/incentive systems. The long-term process of development needs a better trained human resource base directed by a competent administrative system, and that the system, as a whole, must change from a bureaucratic one, based on conformity to rules and regulations, to a management system based on problem solving and achieving set goals.

Four steps are recommended to Egypt’s government and its development partners to establish institutionalised collaborative urban policies. First, in order to integrate the macroeconomic and financial side of development with the structural and social side, the government needs to delegate more central prerogatives, to devolve legislative authority and to grant financial autonomy to local governments. It is not necessary for the government to deliver many of the services it currently provides; it should act as an ‘enabler’ and ensure that services are provided to a predetermined specification. The overall transition can be conceptualised as a process of concession from above by which greater civil and political rights are gradually extended. At the micro level, the government needs to redefine the local administration system in legal and
organisational terms that encourage forms of democratic sovereignty and an empowered civil society. This accords with the implementation of a comprehensive municipal capacity-building policy so that partnership at all levels can be assured.

Second, legal recognition of squatter settlements is important for strengthening a group's ability to negotiate and transact with non-group members. It is a valuable tool for protecting the group against undue interference from government and other outsiders. However, this recognition can also have detrimental effects if it is carried out by institutional forms that are alien to communities, or if it is not supported by legislative means which reduces the excessive imposition of rules and procedures. Collaborative upgrading policies should, among other things, seek to stimulate economic development for low-income squatters, to weave communities within a metropolis into a cohesive whole, and to ensure equal access to public services and workplaces within the framework of an open and democratic urban governance structure.

Third, awarding a key role to civil society organisation in the democratisation process is essential to the success of 'accountable bureaucratic capacity'. Local GROs should be seen as an integral component of a thriving civil society and an essential counterweight to state power, opening-up channels of communication and participation, providing training for activists, and promoting pluralism. Egyptian NGOs have carried out a large number of development projects, many of which have successfully supported self-reliance at the local level, integrating 'marginal' populations within the national economy. However, a scrutiny of NGOs' performance in Egypt reveals that they need to be more responsive to the demands of the beneficiaries by evaluating their own progress, learning from their mistakes, and further integrating their members within the planning and implementation processes. Hence, further support from international DAs in specific areas is needed.

Finally, the support of the 15 major DAs, which presently contribute some US$2.3 billion to the Egyptian economy every year, can be instrumental in the above suggestions. Besides offering the technical assistance needed for the adjustment of the macroeconomic and financial side of development, DAs may also encourage and
capacitate civil society organisations, including local NGOs and GROs, to become providers of social and economic services on a much larger scale. However, this should not weaken local NGOs' and GROs' legitimacy as independent actors in society, divert their accountability away from grassroots constituencies, or over emphasise short-term quantitative outputs. Governing multi-lateral organisations concerned, e.g. the World Bank and the IMF, should make sure that the foreign aid is invested where most effective. 'Demand-orientation', putting the needs of the poor at centre stage, is more helpful than 'supply-orientation', in which each donor provides its specialised goods and services at the lowest cost. The returns of demand-oriented strategies are slower but are more likely to be sustainable. Further research is needed to compare the outcomes of these two strategies where applied in different case studies. Further conceptual development is also needed to in the transformative potential of participation and its ability to make community development and empowerment sustainable.
Appendix 1  

QUESTIONNAIRE  
TARGET GROUPS  
(Effective head of households- HoH No. ....... )

1- GROs, pluralism and self-administration (Sustainability):  
1.1- Do you belong to any community centre(s) inside this area?  
Yes ( )  
No ( )

IF YES:  
1.2- Which and what are its objectives?  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the association</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
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<td>Social assistance ( )</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Clinic and health care ( )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Feasts and general occasions ( )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.3- What are the main achievements accomplished by this association?  
Answer: ........................................................................................................

TO ALL RESPONDENTS:  
1.4- Is there any mother association to represent all the residents of the area?  
Yes ( )  
No ( )  
Don't know ( )

IF YES:  
1.5- What is its name and what are its objectives?  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the association</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social assistance ( )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Solving conflicts ( )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hostel ( )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Clinic and health care ( )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Feasts and general occasions ( )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.6- Are you a member?  
Yes ( )  
No ( )  
why not? .................................................................

TO ALL RESPONDENTS:  
1.7- Have you ever participated in any voluntary work inside or outside the area?  
'Please explain'.  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Type of help</th>
<th>Beneficiaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes ( )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No ( )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.8- Are there any different social groups living in the area?  
Yes ( ) please name them: .................................................................  
No ( )  
Don't know ( )

1.9- Are there any conflicts within this area? How are they usually solved?  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Conflicts between</th>
<th>Solutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes ( )</td>
<td>Children hanging around ( )</td>
<td>Police ( )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No ( )</td>
<td>Neighbours ( )</td>
<td>Neighbours assistance ( )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know ( )</td>
<td>Families ( )</td>
<td>Elderly people assistance ( )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Teenagers and students ( )</td>
<td>Family assistance ( )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Land and properties ( )</td>
<td>Community centres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tribal conflicts ( )</td>
<td>reconciliation ( )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Revenge killing ( )</td>
<td>Other ( ) specify: ..............</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bullying ( )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other ( ) specify: ..............</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.10- How do you usually spend your spare time? With whom?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>With whom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>At home</td>
<td>With family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sitting on the mastaba</td>
<td>With neighbours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the mosque</td>
<td>With friends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In open space</td>
<td>With work colleagues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In coffee house</td>
<td>With community colleagues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the community centre</td>
<td>With any body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No free time</td>
<td>Alone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other ( ) specify: ................................</td>
<td>Other ( ) specify: ..................</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.11- Did you vote to choose your current representatives?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Local council</th>
<th>Parliament</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes ( )</td>
<td>Yes ( )</td>
<td>Yes ( )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No ( ) why:</td>
<td>No ( ) why:</td>
<td>No ( ) why:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IF NO AT ANY LEVEL:

1.12- Do you know your representatives?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Local council</th>
<th>Parliament</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes ( )</td>
<td>Yes ( )</td>
<td>Yes ( )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No ( )</td>
<td>No ( )</td>
<td>No ( )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2- Relationship with the municipality (Sustainability):

2.1- Who do you contact if you have a problem regarding a utility supply?
Answer: ..........................................................

2.2- Where do you get your health care services? Why and how much is the cost of each attendance?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Cost (LE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General hospital</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health insurance clinic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service centre clinic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private clinic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't need any</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.3- What is the attitude of the municipal bureaucracy in general?

Co-operative ( ) Not co-operative ( ) Rigid routines ( ) Favouritism ( )
Corrupt ( ) Arrogant ( ) Inexperienced ( ) Don't know ( )
Other ( ) Specify: ..........................................................

2.4- Have you ever dealt with the City Council or the District?

Yes ( ) what for?: ..........................................................
No ( )

IF YES:

2.5- Have you ever had any problem with them?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Incident(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes ( )</td>
<td>Mistreatment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all ( )</td>
<td>Prejudice ( )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refuse to answer ( )</td>
<td>Graft ( )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other ( ) specify: ................................</td>
<td>Time consuming ( )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3- Relationship with the upgrading project (Action):

3.1- Are there any problems in the area now which you believe need attention?

Yes ( ) ‘please prioritise’: .................................................................................................................................

No ( ) Don’t know ( )

3.2- Are you familiar with the upgrading project which took place in the area?

Yes ( )

No ( )

IF NO: End of sections 3 and 4

IF YES:

3.3- What were the most successful activities that the project achieved?

Answer: 1) ................ 2) ................ 3) ................ 4) ................ 5) ................ 6) ................

3.4- Were there any planned activities that you think the project failed to achieve? Why?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Unimplemented activities</th>
<th>Reasons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes ( )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No ( )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know ( )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.5- Were there any mistakes or inappropriate activities that the project implemented? Why?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Inappropriate activities</th>
<th>Reasons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes ( )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No ( )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know ( )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.6- Were there any disagreements between the project and the community?

Yes ( ) ‘please explain’: .................................................................................................................................

No ( ) Don’t know ( )

3.7- Did the project offer loans for house improvement?

Yes ( ) what happened?: .................................................................................................................................

No ( ) Other ( ) specify: .................................................................................................................................

3.8- Did the project offer to help you, or any of your household, to improve income?

Yes ( ) what happened?: .................................................................................................................................

No ( ) Other ( ) specify: .................................................................................................................................

3.9- What did the project offer for the women in the area?

Answer: ............................................................................................................................................................

Nothing ( )

4- Participation and self-initiatives (Action):

4.1- How do you evaluate the participation of your community with the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process</th>
<th>Answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Planning of the project</td>
<td>- Very effective ( )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation</td>
<td>- Limited ( )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation</td>
<td>- Not at all ( )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IF VERY EFFECTIVE OR LIMITED:

4.2- In which activities did the people participate? How?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>How</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.3- What was your exact role in participation?
Answer: ...................................................................................................

IF LIMITED OR NOT AT ALL:
4.4- Did you try to solve this problem?
Yes ( ) how?: .................................................................
No ( ) why?: .................................................................

TO ALL RESPONDENTS:
4.5- Who chose this area for upgrading? Why?
Answer: ................................................................. Reason: .................................................................
Don't know ( )

4.6- Do you know any other upgrading schemes in the city?
Yes ( ) which?: .................................................................
No ( )

IF YES:
4.7- How successful was yours compared to them? Why?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Reason</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very successful</td>
<td>( )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Successful</td>
<td>( )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The same</td>
<td>( )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less successful</td>
<td>( )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No comparison</td>
<td>( )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>( )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5- Plot data and articulations of land-supply (Possible causal factors):
5.1- What was the initial type of your land/house supply? and what is it now?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initial type of land/house</th>
<th>Existing status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Owned house on owned land</td>
<td>( ) Owned house on owned land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owned house on hekr land</td>
<td>( ) Owned house on hekr land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owned house on occupied land</td>
<td>( ) Owned house on occupied land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rented house on owned land</td>
<td>( ) Rented house on owned land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rented house on hekr land</td>
<td>( ) Rented house on hekr land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rented house on occupied land</td>
<td>( ) Rented house on occupied land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other:</td>
<td>Other:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IF OWNER:
5.2- Do you rent any part of your house?
Yes ( ) No ( )

IF NO:
5.3- Would you rent part of your house to some one offers good price?
Yes ( ) No ( ) Don't know ( )

IF THE LAND IS NOT OWNED:
5.4- Have you ever tried to legalise your land-status?
Yes ( ) what happened? .................................................................
No ( ) why? ................................................................. Cannot, I’m a tenant ( )
5.5- Do you wish to buy this land in the future?
Yes ( ) why? ............................................................................................
No ( ) why? ............................................................................................

TO ALL RESPONDENTS:
5.6- Land and house cost:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land:</th>
<th>Initial costs (LE)</th>
<th>Consequence costs (LE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>House:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hekr:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First rent rate:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.6- Land and house cost:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land title:</th>
<th>Consequence costs (LE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>House:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hekr:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First rent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6- House data (causal factors):
6.1- How was your house constructed?
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>By the owner</th>
<th>By yourself</th>
<th>With family assistance</th>
<th>With neighbours assistance</th>
<th>Hired labours</th>
<th>Local contractor</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( )</td>
<td>( )</td>
<td>( )</td>
<td>( )</td>
<td>( )</td>
<td>( )</td>
<td>( )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.2- Who designed this house for you?
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The owner</th>
<th>Yourself</th>
<th>Relative</th>
<th>Contractor</th>
<th>Technician</th>
<th>Engineer</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( )</td>
<td>( )</td>
<td>( )</td>
<td>( )</td>
<td>( )</td>
<td>( )</td>
<td>( )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.3- Was there building permission for this house?
Yes ( ) No ( ) Don't know ( )

6.4- How would you describe your house's condition?
Good ( ) Fair ( ) Bad ( ) Very bad ( )

6.5- What is the reason that your house is in this condition?
Yes ( ) why: .................................................................
No ( ) Don't know ( )

6.6- House data:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of floors</th>
<th>Materials of construction</th>
<th>No. of flats</th>
<th>No. of rooms</th>
<th>Years of construction</th>
<th>House connections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Concrete ( )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Water ( )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Traditional ( )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sewage ( )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mixed ( )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Elec. ( )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Garbage ( )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes ( )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No ( )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.7- How much do you pay monthly for the following?
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electricity</th>
<th>Water/Sewage</th>
<th>Waste disposal</th>
<th>Telephone</th>
<th>Maintenance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

6.8- Have you ever changed the use of any rooms in your house? What and why?
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Changes</th>
<th>Reasons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes ( )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No ( )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.9- Do you have any plans for extension or improvement to your house in the future?
Yes ( ) what: .................................................................
No ( ) Don't know ( )
7- Demographical data (causal factors):
7.1- Name: ........................................... 7.2- Sex: male ( ) female ( )

7.3- Please fill in the following data about all members in the household:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Person</th>
<th>Marital status</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>2nd job</th>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Contribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Yourself</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Your spouse</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Your children</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other members</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IF THE RESPONDENT IS MARRIED:
7.4- Do you have any children who don't live here?
Yes ( ) How many: ......................... No ( )

IF YES:
7.5- Do they contribute?
Yes ( ) No ( )

TO ALL RESPONDENTS:
7.6- How many persons of your children/extended family will you allow to live with you in this house? Why?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Person</th>
<th>Reason</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.7- Do you find your household income sufficient for your needs?
Yes ( ) It's just sufficient ( )
No ( ) how do you survive then? ...........................................................

7.8- What is the best way, do you think, to help you to improve your income?
Answer: ..................................................................................................

8- Migration / Mobility (causal factors):
8.1- Where were you born?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village:</th>
<th>Governorate:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

City: ...........................................

IF THE RESPONDENT IS A MIGRANT:
8.2- When did you leave your birthplace? Why?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Reasons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8.3- What did you do before you settled here?
Answer: .............................................................................................................

8.4- When did you move to this area? Why did you choose it specifically?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Reasons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TO ALL RESPONDENTS:

8.5- Will you move out of this area in the future? Why?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Reasons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes ( ) No ( ) It depends ( )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8.6- Would you sell your plot if someone offered a good price?
Yes ( ) No ( ) Cannot, I'm a tenant ( ) Don't know ( )

IF YES:

8.7- Where will you live then?
Elsewhere in the area ( ) Out of the area ( ) In the new extension ( )
Back to home origin ( ) Other ( ) Please specify ..........................................

9- Additional Comments:

9.1- What are your ambitions/goals in life?
Answer: .............................................................................................................

9.2- What do you think this area will be like in 10 years?
....................................................................................................................

Special remarks by the interviewer:
.............................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................
### Appendix 2

#### QUESTIONNAIRE

**MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS**

1- Institutional performance:

1.1- How do you describe the exact role of the municipality?
   
   **Answer:** 

1.2- What is exactly your job-description?
   
   **Answer:** 

1.3- What sorts of bureaucracy cause major problems?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bureaucratic problems</th>
<th>Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

1.4- Do you think the bureaucratic system is centralised?
   
   **Yes ( )**  **No ( )**  **Don't know ( )**

**IF YES:**

1.5- Do you think this results in any problems at both local and national levels?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>At the local level</th>
<th>At the national level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes ( )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No ( )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.6- What are the possible benefits gained of centralised policies?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>At the national level</th>
<th>At the local level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

1.7- What red-tape practices do you think cause major obstacles?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Red-tape practices</th>
<th>Obstacles resulted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

1.8- What types of corruption and inequity occur within the Egyptian institutional apparatus?

1.9- Do you suffer from overstaffing and 'dead-wood' within your department?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Reasons</th>
<th>Proposals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes ( )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No ( )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.10- How far is the existing administrative system efficient regarding rewarding and penalising its employees?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
<th>Your proposals for reforms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

1.11- Is it easy to get all the information you need to carry out your responsibilities efficiently?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Reasons</th>
<th>Proposals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes ( )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No ( )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.12- Do you think that qualified and experienced persons are still willing to join the municipalities?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Reasons</th>
<th>Proposals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

- Yes ( )  - No ( )

1.13- Do you have enough qualified and experienced staff?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Reasons</th>
<th>Actions and measures taken</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

- Yes ( )  - No ( )
2. Time dimension and monitoring:

2.1- Who is responsible for monitoring and evaluating various types of upgrading schemes in Egypt—e.g. a co-operation project, 'self-help' project or state project?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Project</th>
<th>Monitor</th>
<th>Gauge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

2.2- What can beneficiaries do if they are not satisfied?

2.3- What can donors do if they are not satisfied?

2.4- What can state institutions do if they are not satisfied?

2.5- Which arm of Government is most affected by the schemes?

2.6- Is it evaluated in purely cost effective terms, or in moral and political ones?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cost effective terms ( )</th>
<th>Moral ( )</th>
<th>Political ( )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other ( ) please specify:</td>
<td>.............................................................</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Institutional experience in regularisation schemes:

3.1- What previous upgrading projects have taken place in the city?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Site choice (Who chose/why?)</th>
<th>Planning agency</th>
<th>Implementer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

3.2- How do you assess the outcome of each?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Places of success</th>
<th>Reasons</th>
<th>Places of failure</th>
<th>Reasons</th>
<th>General assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Excellent ( )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Good ( )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bad ( )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.3- Which institutional body must be -by law- responsible for the upgrading schemes in Egypt?

3.4- How far do you think they are able to carry out such a responsibility?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Reasons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Able ( )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unable ( )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unwilling ( )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Choice of sites to regularise:

4.1- What types of popular settlements exist in this city?

4.2- Please define and list the problems of each type.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Definition-Features</th>
<th>Problems</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

4.3- What are the origins of these settlements? 'Please prioritise'.

4.4- For what reasons did the government neither control their growth nor upgrade them during the past time until the National Upgrading Programme was launched in 1992?

| Reasons |
4.5- What type of data are available for you about popular settlements located in your area of responsibility?

4.6- How do you collect these data?

4.7- What are the bases of identifying targeted areas for upgrading?

4.8- What are the stages of identifying targeted areas for upgrading?

4.9- Who does carry out the following decisions/tasks:

- a) Mapping of all popular settlements?
- b) Selecting sites for upgrading?
- c) Determining the upgrading activities?
- d) Co-ordinating with other institutions concerned?
- e) Implementation?
- f) Monitoring and evaluating?

5- Legal framework of regularisation schemes:

5.1- What are the relevant laws which control the formation and upgrading of squatter settlements in Egypt? and what are the advantages of each law in your point of view?

5.2- What are the defects of each law in your point of view?

6- Choice of beneficiaries:

6.1- How do you evaluate the participation of local representatives within the following urban processes?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process</th>
<th>Answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>- Very effective ( ) - Reasonable ( ) - Limited ( ) - Not at all ( )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision making</td>
<td>- Very effective ( ) - Reasonable ( ) - Limited ( ) - Not at all ( )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation</td>
<td>- Very effective ( ) - Reasonable ( ) - Limited ( ) - Not at all ( )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation</td>
<td>- Very effective ( ) - Reasonable ( ) - Limited ( ) - Not at all ( )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.2- What precautions are taken to insure that only existing residents benefit?

6.3- What precautions are taken to protect the area from land speculators?

6.4- Are there any controls to prevent beneficiaries from the possibility of moving away or selling their plots- or part of them- to new comers?

6.5- How are speculators prevented from entering the implementation processes?

7- Beneficiary participation:

7.1- What are the different shapes of people's representation found in the squatter settlements?

7.2- To what extent are people's opinion considered by the project agency during the following processes?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process</th>
<th>Answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>- Very much ( ) - Reasonable ( ) - Limited ( ) - Not at all ( )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision making</td>
<td>- Very much ( ) - Reasonable ( ) - Limited ( ) - Not at all ( )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation</td>
<td>- Very much ( ) - Reasonable ( ) - Limited ( ) - Not at all ( )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation</td>
<td>- Very much ( ) - Reasonable ( ) - Limited ( ) - Not at all ( )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7.3- What are the procedures to resolve disagreements between beneficiaries and the authority?

7.4- Who are the 'brokers' who can interpret the various views of those involved?

7.5- How decisions are taken within the projects?

7.6- What is the role of the city local council?

7.7- To what extent do you believe that the local council represents the people?
   Absolute representation ( ) Partial ( ) Not absolute ( )

7.8- To what extent do you believe that the local council takes decisions freely?
   Absolutely free ( ) Partially influenced ( ) Absolutely influenced ( )

7.9- Do you believe that the new amendments on the Local Administrative Law will improve the efficiency of representation and performance? why?

7.10- Who is actually involved in formulating the state views?

8- Recuperation of investment:

8.1- Where do the resources to finance upgrading schemes come from?

8.2- How are these budgets generated?

8.3- Should beneficiaries contribute to pay back the cost of upgrading?

8.4- How far can land sale programmes help to generate substantial finance for project activities?

8.5- What measures are taken to recuperate investments?

8.6- Was the land sale concept an important component during the previous experience in upgrading?

8.7- What financial systems can ensure the continuity of upgrading in the city?

8.8- By whom are these systems evaluated?

9- Legality of tenure and role in the land/housing market:

9.1- What are the side effects of granting tenure and what measures can avoid negative consequences?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Various side effects</th>
<th>Measures considered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

9.2- What measures can avoid the invasion of legalised areas by higher income groups and the displacement of poorer people, especially tenants?

9.3- How can further squatting be avoided as a result of blanket promises of secure tenure?

9.4- What legal position is envisaged for these areas in the future?

9.5- Can they be subdivided, rented or sold? - and if so, to whom?

9.6- Should the process be controlled? - and if so, by whom and how?

9.7- Is it legal to supply an informal area with infrastructure networks and house connections without transforming it first into a legal one through a regularisation project and land-sale programme? what are the consequences?
10- Personal data:

10.1-

1- Name*:
2- Institution and Department:
3- Education:
4- Occupation:
5- Years of experience:
6- Rank of employment:

* You may not mention your name if you wish.

10.2- How many subordinates do you head?

10.3- What managerial system do you follow to direct your subordinates?

10.4- On what upgrading projects have you participated?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Project components</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Responsibilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

10.5- How much is your average monthly income including any overtime or incentives?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basic salary</th>
<th>Constant allowances (Badalat)</th>
<th>Incentives, overtime, etc.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

10.6 - What is the approximate annual increase rate in your salary?

10.7- How much could you earn in the private sector?

10.8- Do you have a second job? Why?

10.9- What is the approximate percentage of your subordinates having a second job?

10.10- What do you think of the practice of municipal officials carrying out work on the side for citizens dealing with the municipality?
APPENDIX 3

KEY INFORMANTS

AA, 05-11-98 (Aswan- community leader). Mr Ahmed Abdel-Atey is a Nasriya CDA Board member, Head of the Environment and Solid-Waste Committee and Head of the Biadia Community Centre. Mr Abdel-Atey is originally from Luxor.

AA, 27-11-98 (Ismailia, senior municipal official). Mr Abdel-Hamid Amer is the Deputy-Director of Ismailia Urban Planning Office (UPO). Mr Amer has been working for the UPO for more than 10 years.

AH, 21-03-98 (Aswan- community leader/elected politician). Mr Adly Hassan is the Helal community leader in Nasriya, and a member of Aswan Popular Local Council. He works as a public employee in the Social Affairs Department, Aswan. Despite his active political participation in the Aswan Local Council, Mr Hassan terminated his membership in the CDA in 1998 and decided to devote all his voluntarily work to his own people and Community Centre. “There are several lobbies now within the CDA and its current constituency neither represent all home origins in Nasriya nor are they the best community leaders to represent the Nasriya residents. ... Helal tried several times before to be represented within the CDA but every time we found resistance. ... I cannot work alone and even if all my group worked together and insisted to join the CDA constituency, serious conflicts and disputes might be created.”, Mr Hassan said.

AH, 06-09-98 (Aswan- senior municipal official). Mr Abbass Hegazy was the Nasriya Project’s Egyptian Director (1991-1998). He now works as the General Director of Housing, Aswan Governorate (1992-date).

AO, 23-10-96 (Aswan- senior municipal official). Mr Abdel-Rahman Sayed Omar, the first Director of the Physical Planning Office, Aswan Governorate, (1987-1988), and also the first Director of the Nasriya Project (1988-1989). Mr Omar has been instrumental to the success of the GTZ and the GOPP in the preparation of the Aswan Physical Master Plan (1986-2017) because of his 24 years experience in Aswan Regional Planning Office. He also worked for a few months as the UDLMU Director in 1996, but he was removed by a Governor's decree after a professional disagreement. This was a focus meeting attended by other officials in Aswan (FM2, 23-10-96).

CP, 12-08-99 (Glasgow- academic). Chris Philo is a Professor at the Department of Geography, University of Glasgow. Professor Philo wrote widely about landscapes and environments within the UK, the social geography of ‘outsiders’ particularly in rural areas fields of political and cultural geography. He is a co-author in “Cloke et al. (1991) Approaching Human Geography: An Introduction to Contemporary Theoretical Debates”.
DS, 18-12-98 (Ismailia-Cairo-London, DA expert). Mr David Sims is one of the founders of the Hai E-Salam Project and now a partner in Clifford Culpin and Partners. Mr Sims has more than twenty years of experience in urban upgrading and sites-and-services policies. He led a team of experts in Ismailia to assist with the preparation of detailed project plans and offer training for the newly appointed planners of the Ismailia Physical Planning Office. Since 1997, Mr Sims has been involved once again in urban upgrading in Egypt to support local development agencies and local consultants for city-level planning, project design, implementation and management throughout the Manshia‘at Nasser Project (a co-operative venture administered by Cairo Governorate and GTZ 1997-date). Similar to Nasriya, Manshia‘at Nasser is a mountainous area located on flanks of El-Mokattam hill, East of Cairo. The first settlement took place in 1961 when the government cleared the Darrasa area from shacks to construct what is now known as the El-Khaledeen Park. Unsurprisingly, the ejected inhabitants had no other option but to move to the nearest uninhabited area, Manshia‘at Nasser. Now, the population there is almost a million.

EM, 05-01-1999 (Aswan, senior municipal official). Mr Essa Mabrouk is the Director of Aswan’s Urban Development and Land management Unit UDLMU (1998-date). Mr Essa Mabrouk also participated in a focus meeting in 1996 (FM2, 23-10-96).

IGI1, 17-10-96 (Ismailia, HoHs group interview). Ismailia Group Interview No. 1. This interview took place with three HoHs living in Hai E-Salam; Mr Mahmoud Ahmed, 53 years old, literate, originally from Faques, El-Sharkiya Governorate, migrated to Hai El-Salam in 1975 to work in the Sinai Reconstruction Apparatus and he is now retired; Mr Faheem Abdel-Rady, 72 years old, illiterate, originally from El-Baliyana, Souhag Governorate, left his home origin in 1948 to work in a cement Factory in Kafr El-Dawar and was transferred to work in Ismailia in 1977, he is now retired; and Mr Sadik Mohamed, 73 years old, literate, originally from Tookh, Monufiya Governorate, left his home origin in the 1940s to work in Alexandria and migrated to Ismailia in 1955 to work in the army as a gardener.

FD, 17-01-98 (Ismailia-Cairo-Rotterdam, DA expert/academic). Mr Forbes Davidson is the Head of the Urban Management Department, Institute for Housing and Urban Development Studies (IHS), the Netherlands. Mr Davidson has twenty-five years’ experience in urban and regional planning, urban management, land management institution building, institutional assessment, low income housing, capacity building, training and project management. He was one of the first Planning Consultants working for the British firm, Clifford Culpin and Partners, to elaborate the Physical Master Plan of Ismailia (1975-2000) and the development strategy of the Hai E-Salam Project in the 1970s. Mr Davidson wrote many journal articles, book sections and an urban manual about the Ismailia experience. Meeting took place in the Flamenco Hotel, Cairo.
FM1, 26-11-98 (Ismailia, senior municipal officials focus meeting). Focus meeting No. 1 with 4 government officials working for the Ismailia Urban Planning Office (UPO). The meeting was attended by Mr Gouma M. Gouma (GG, 26-11-98), Mrs Naiema Moheb (NM, 26-11-98), Mr Osama Abdel-Aziz (OA, 26-11-1998), and Mr Sadek Shebabe (SS, 26-11-98). Meeting took place in the UPO.

FM2, 26-11-98 (Aswan, senior municipal officials focus meeting). Focus meeting No. 2 with 3 government officials working for the Aswan Urban Development and Land Management Unit (UDLMU). The meeting was attended by Mr Abdel-Rahman Sayed Omar (AO, 23-10-96), Mr Essa Mabrouk (EM, 05-01-99), and Mr Khalid El-Agmey (KE, 05-12-96).

FM3, 29-05-96 (Cairo, academics focus meeting). Focus meeting No. 3 with 4 academics working for the Faculty of Regional and Urban Planning, Cairo University. The meeting was attended by Professor Abdel-Mohsen Barada, Dean of Faculty; Professor Hassan Kotry, Vice Dean; Professor Magdy Rabie; and Professor Tarek Wafik. The meeting was also attended by Dr Stella Lowder (Thesis Supervisor). Meeting took place in the Dean’s office.

FM4, 04-04-98 (Aswan, gender and development). Focus meeting No. 4 with the Board and all members of the Nasriya Women Development Association (WDA). Participation observation in a meeting that took place between the WDA and Professor Ralph Mills (the Aga Khan Prize for Architecture- Technical review mission), in the aftermath of nominating the Nasriya project for this prestigious Award. The women’s team presented the objectives of the WDA, roles performed, problems encountered and their plans of sustaining development after the withdrawal of GTZ.

FN, 15-10-98 (Aswan, community leader). Mr Fadl-Allah Nour is a Nubian community leader. He used to be the Head of the Aberkab Community Centre.

GG, 26-11-98 (Ismailia, senior municipal official). Mr Gouma M. Gouma, is an Urban Planner in the Ismailia Urban Planning Office (1981-date). He who worked for several years for the Hai El-Salam project before he became the Director of the El-Safa Upgrading Project- a similar project that followed in the footsteps of Hai El-Salam. Mr Gouma also participated in a focus meeting on the same day (FM1, 26-11-98).

GGh, 19-01-98 (Aswan-Berlin, DA expert/academic). Mr Gennaro Ghirardelli is a GTZ’s German Community Development Consultant for Nasriya (1988-1998). Mr Ghirardelli believes that the Egyptian society is still to a large extent characterised by peasant culture. A long period as an oppressed colony resulted in a suppressed society reluctant to rebel and express its opinion freely. People are aware of corruption and routine but very little action is taken for reform. Meanwhile, the passive attitude of some inhabitants of squatter settlements in Egypt can be due to their harsh economic life, the high occupancy rate of housing and a conviction that the government
does not care about them. The question which is more important than how far inhabitants are familiar with their representatives concerns what they do if they feel mistreated or disagree with a certain project or the municipality.

HE, 17-12-98 (Ismailia, local DA expert). Ms Habiba Eid is a former Director of the Hai El-Salam and Abu Atwa demonstration projects, and was also a Director of the Ismailia Urban Planning Office (1985-1989). Ms Eid is currently the Director of the UNDP-funded Sustainable Ismailia Project (SIP), she is also an elected member of Ismailia’s Popular Local Council. It is worth noting that all consultants who were interviewed in the course of this research agreed that Ms Eid is a very charismatic leader. “The SIP team leader also had an important role in bypassing normal administrative procedures. Her ability to assist the different interests groups in reaching consensus on priorities and actions is crucial. Her success can be attributed to strong leadership abilities gained through long experience in the field of development programmes in Ismailia” (Khoury 1996: 207).

HM, 20-01-98 (Aswan-Cairo, local consultant). Mr Hany Mineawy is well-know Egyptian Architect and Planner. He was the GTZ’s short-term consultant for the East Nasriya extension and the Urban Development Unit (1990-1998). Mr Mineawy explained that the most worrying thing for them was the different language, jargons and dialect used by architects and technicians from one side and beneficiaries from the other. Hence, he did not want to present a manual including technical drawings and phrases which people might not understand. Alternatively, simple drawings and text were elaborated and the idea of presenting such a work as a theatre play appeared spontaneously. A meeting with the CDA and the WDA to discuss the idea was proposed. Mr Mineawy was doubtful after presenting the idea but some CDA’s members asked him to leave the scenario and drawings with them for a while. A few weeks after, he was amazed that the CDA had proceeded to design all the details to make the play and managed to perform it in a very good manner. The play used the model house as a case study of gradual construction based on the idea of core-unit.

HS, 08-05-96 (Aswan-Berlin, DA expert). Mr Hans G. Schild is a German Consultant working in Berlin, partner in FPB (Freie Planungsguppe Berlin GmbH). He was one of the first GTZ’s long-term planning consultants working for a capacity-building project to improve the performance of the General Organisation for Physical Planning in Cairo (GOPP) in the 1980s. Through on-job training programmes, the GOPP staff co-operated with the local officials of Aswan, Abu Simble, Edfu and Tanta to produce the Physical Master Plans for these cities. Mr Schild has also contributed to the initiation of the Nasriya project and worked later as a GTZ’s short-term Adviser for the UDLMU in the 1990s to readjust Aswan Master Plan (1986-2017) and to prepare the planning of East Nasriya.
JK, 08-02-98 (Aswan-Berlin, DA expert/academic). Dr Jochen Korfmacher is a German Consultant and was a GTZ short-term Project Adviser for the Nasriya project (1992-1998).

JL, 13-10-99 (Aswan-Copenhagen, DA expert). Mr Jacob Lund is Senior Technical Adviser, Head of the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), Aswan office (1997-date). Mr Lund was previously involved in a capacity-building project for the Aswan Water Authority. One of the most relevant projects Mr Lund is involved in now is the Aswan Capacity-Building Project.

KM, 05-08-99 (Aswan-Cairo-USA, DA expert). Mrs Krista Masonis was the GTZ Short-term Consultant for Women’s Development during Nasriya’s last phase of institutionalisation (1995-1998). The first meeting took place with Mrs Masonis on 28th May 1998 in Aswan where she explained the general strategy of the Women Development Association in Nasriya, and a another discussion took place via the electronic mail in August 1999 to evaluate the situation after the withdrawal of the GTZ.

KE, 05-12-96 (Aswan, municipal official). Mr Khalid El-Agmey was the Director of Aswan’s Urban Development and Land Management Unit (1995-1998) and works now in the Director of the Engineering Department, Edfu District, Aswan Governorate. Mr El-Agmey also participated in a focus meeting in 1996 (FM2, 23-10-96).

KT, 15-05-98 (Aswan-Ismailia-London, DA expert). Mr Kevin Tayler is a British Consultant, Director of GHK Research & Training Ltd. Mr Tayler has worked for the British DFID in several urban development and capacity-building projects in Egypt, India and Pakistan among others. Mr Tayler and the Author have compiled together a research paper for the DFID, which is incorporated now in: “Plummer, J. (forthcoming). Building Municipal Capacity for Community Participation. A Guidebook. London, DFID”.

MA, 21-10-96 (Aswan- community leader/municipal official). Mr Mahmoud Imam is a CDA Board member and Head of the Infrastructure Committee. He is originally from Ques, 41 years old and came to Nasriya in 1957 with his parents. His Father came to work for the Steel Company, south-east Aswan. Mr Imam is a municipal official works as a Building Inspector for the Municipality. He works voluntarily for the CDA. Mr Imam is a classic example of the community leaders in Nasriya who benefited the area a great deal through their municipal position.

MA, 01-04-98 (Aswan, senior municipal official). Mr Mostafa Abbass is the Mayor of Aswan (1996-date). Mr Abbass has worked all his life in municipal operations in Aswan Governorate. He also worked as the General Director of Aswan Governorate Public Relations.
MAA, 02-10-98 (Aswan, senior municipal official). Mr Mubarak Ali Ahmed is the Vice Mayor of West Quarter in Aswan and the GTZ sociologist for the Nasriya and Tabya Upgrading Projects.

ME, 19-12-98 (Cairo, senior policy-maker/academic). Dr Manal El-Batran is the Urban Development Adviser to the Egyptian Minister of Housing (1997- date). Dr El-Batran wrote widely about urbanisation processes, land management and informal housing in Egypt. She also teaches at the American University in Cairo.

MH, 06-06-96 (Cairo, academic/local consultant). Dr Milad Hanna, former head of the Egyptian Parliament Housing Commission, is a prominent housing expert working in Egypt. Dr Henna is now a member of the Supreme Council of Culture as well as President of Egypt’s Commission for Scientific Culture. He has for many years championed the rights of the poor to decent housing and wrote several book and articles regarding this issue. Nonetheless, Dr Hanna has assisted to promote Egypt’s unity, between Muslims and Copts, and the reinforcement of civic responsibilities throughout his various capacities, whether through writings, as President of the Coptic Tawfiq Society (one of the oldest voluntary work organisations in Egypt), or as the founder of organisations promoting human rights in the Arab World. Therefore, “Milad has been nominated by UNESCO Director-General Federico Mayor for the 1998 International Simon Bolivar Prize” (Al-Ahram Weekly 22-10-1998). Meeting took place in Dr Hanna’s house in Cairo and was attended by Dr Stella Lowder (Thesis Supervisor).

MK, 29-09-98 (Aswan, community leader). Mr Mahmoud Khatary is a community leader among people from Khatariya, Ques, living in sector eight. He used to be the Head of the Khatariya Community Centre and the Head of the Employment Committee of the early Nasriya Community Council (1987-1992). Mr Mahmoud criticised Nasriya’s first Community Council and directorship on the basis of their favouritism of people coming from Luxor, and the current CDA, as it favours those coming from Ques and living in the central sectors of Nasriya.

MF, 05-11-98 (Aswan, DA local expert). Mr Mohamed Foda was the Nasriya Project Coordinator almost since the beginning of the project (1988-1998). He is an Architect and had worked before for USAID in their Helwan Upgrading Project, Cairo.

MS, 28-05-98 (Aswan, community leader). Mr Mahmoud Sabry is the Chair of the CDA. He is a government employee at Aswan Governorate Diwan and meantime a member in the Popular Local Council. Mr Sabry is one of the new generation who took the lead of the CDA after the NCC was dissolved.
NGI1, 07-04-98 (Aswan, HoHs group interview). Nasriya Group Interview No. 1. This interview took place with five HoHs living in the upper elevated area of sector two. They were a mix of people coming from Ques and Helal.

NGI2, 05-12-98 (Aswan, HoHs group interview). Nasriya Group Interview No. 2. This interview took place with four HoHs living in the upper reaches of an area located between sectors seven and eight. They all migrated originally from Ques or its surrounding villages (one came from El-Emaish and one came from Danfik). They explained the processes through which the community organised itself and collected money to construct a sewerage connection the project could not do because three houses obstructed the designed course for the connection.

NM, 26-11-98 (Ismailia, municipal official). Mrs Naiema Moheb is an Urban Planner in the Ismailia Urban Planning Office (1981-date). She has been involved in a large number of upgrading and urban development projects in Ismailia Governorate and was also the Director of the small-scale industries scheme in Ismailia. This interview was part of a focus meeting (FM1, 26-11-98).

OA, 21-03-98 (Aswan-Berlin, DA expert/academic). Professor Omar Akbar, was the Nasriya project German GTZ Project Adviser (1988-1998). Professor Akbar was instrumental to the success of the project specially during its first phase which witnessed a lot of conflicts over resources and decision making. He introduced the concept of community participation smoothly and did not leave the project until the community was to a large extent empowered. No wonder he works now in a very prestigious position in Germany- Director, Bauhaus Institute of Architecture, Dessau.

OA, 26-11-98 (Ismailia, senior municipal official). Mr Osama Abdel-Aziz, is an active Urban Planner in Ismailia’s Urban Planning Office and one of its founders. He was interviewed in 1996 during the pilot survey, accompanied the researcher during his visits to the Hai El-Salam area and the SIP office and participated in a focus meeting (FM1, 26-11-98).

RS, 03-03-98 (Aswan-Hamburg, DA expert). Mr Rowlf Shifner, was a GTZ Project Adviser for the Aswan Solid-Waste Management Project. The interview aimed to investigate the problems that faced the project and its experience with the Nasriya CDA and why this activity failed.

SA, 04-06-1998 (Aswan-Cairo, DA local expert/academic). Professor Salah Arafa is a staff member of the American University in Cairo, and a GTZ’s Community Development Local Consultant for the Nasriya Project. Professor Arafa is an Egyptian authority in community development and civil society organisations. Beside the several development projects he is involved in, he also administers the Egyptian Coalition of NGOs and work with several bilateral
and multilateral donor agencies working in Egypt. Meeting took place on the aeroplane between Aswan and Cairo.

SE, 16-10-96 (Cairo, senior policy-maker). Mr. Sameh El-Shazly is a Development Adviser to the Egyptian Minister of Rural Development (1993-date). He is also a GTZ Local Consultant for development and municipal capacity-building initiatives, including Nasriya (Aswan), Boulak El-Dakrour (Giza) and Manshia’at Nasser (Cairo) projects.

SK, 26-11-98 (Ismailia, senior municipal official). Mr. Sayd Keylani is the Hai El-Salam PMU Director.

SM, 02-04-98 (Aswan, Governor-President’s regional representative). H.E Salah Mesbah is the Governor of Aswan (1992-date), meeting took place on at the Governor’s office, Aswan. The following long quotation was recorded while the Governor was presenting the experience of the Nasriya Project to Professor Mills Tetty of the Aga Khan Award for Architecture, who was on a mission to evaluate the project after it had been nominated for the Award.

SS, 30-05-96 (Cairo, senior policy-maker). Mr. Shawky Shaban is Vice Chair of GOPP, Cairo. The meeting was attended by Dr. Stella Lowder (Thesis Supervisor). Meeting took place in his office at GOPP.

SS, 26-11-98 (Ismailia, senior municipal official). Mr. Sadek Shebabe is an Urban Planner in the Ismailia Urban Planning Office (1981-date). Besides his work in the Hai El-Salam Project, Mr. Shebabe also lives in the area, he was also interviewed in 1996 during the pilot survey in Ismailia and participated in a focus meeting in 1998 (FM1, 26-11-98).

TA, 16-06-98 (Aswan, DA local expert). Mr. Taher Abdel-Basit was the Nasriya Project’s Administrator (1987-1998) and was one of the first social and urban surveyors who helped the German and Egyptian consultants at the beginning of the project.

UmS, 18-09-98 (Aswan, female community leader). Um-Shehrzad, Mother of Shehrzad, is a very active Nubian woman representing all women in sector 9. She is widow, a mother of 4 boys (34, 31, 18 and 15 years old) who share the house with her and two married daughters now living outside Nasriya. One of them, Shehrzad, was one of the most active members of the early women’s committee at the time of the Nasriya Community Council, to whom the success of women’s activities in sector nine is always attributed. After Shehrzad was married and left the area, her mother replaced her but in informal manner. “I have been living here for some forty years now since I got married in 1960. My husband used to work as a driver during the construction of the High Dam and we both constructed this house block by block. I was very keen to educate all my children and never thought about getting married again. Now, all I wish is to see
my 18 and 15 years old sons well educated and all of the children happily married.”, said Um-
Shehrzad.

YS, 27-10-96 (Ismailia, community leader). Mr Younes Sabit is the Head of the Abna’a El-
Sharkiya community centre. Working as a GRO, this community centre is one of the largest civil
society organisation located in Hai El-Salam area.

ZA, 15-02-98 (Aswan, community leader/elected politician). Mr Zain Al-A’abedeen is a
community leader, Head of the Naga’a Hamady Community Centre and Director of the Middle
East Press, Aswan Branch, and elected member of Aswan Popular Local Council. It was observed
during the fieldwork survey that the Naga’a Hamady Community Centre was undoubtedly the
most active centre, still running a clinic, a nursery, a first aid unit, the literacy programme and
many social charitable activities. Although they got the same attention and financial support from
the upgrading project, they managed to maintain the activities and raise further funds, continuing
the physical improvement and extension of the Centre. Mr Al-A’abedeen explained the financial
and administrative systems of the Centre, the difficulties they faced to run all the activities and
how they co-operate with both the CDA and local institutions in Aswan. Mr Al-A’abedeen did not
join the CDA Board because he did not agree with its last constitution.

ZA, 05-04-98. (Aswan, Women’s community leader). Mrs Zienab Abdien is the Head of the
Nasriya Women Development Association (WDA). Mrs Abdien explained in this meeting how the
women’s team was incorporated in all process of design, tendering, and implementation of the
Women’s Centre. The WDA established a special committee for the construction of the Centre in
1997, which was responsible for the delivery of materials, selecting local contractors and
labourers, and supervising the work with the project’s consultant so that they would know the
technical background of the building, which could help them for the maintenance of it in the
future.
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