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Development discourse and the Batwa of south west Uganda

Representing the ‘Other’:
Presenting the ‘Self’

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Abstract

This thesis focuses on a group of former forest based hunter-gatherers, the Batwa of south west Uganda, whose livelihoods and situations have been dramatically affected through their recent interactions with non-Batwa peoples. Once inhabitants of the rainforests of south west Uganda, the Batwa today live in bonded labour arrangements with their local neighbours and exist as a despised and marginalised group, positioned on the margins of Ugandan society.

In the first part of this thesis, Global Powers, I seek to lay out the theoretical foundations for the marginalisation of the Batwa by discussing the more general marginalisation and representation of Indigenous Peoples. In the rest of the thesis, I move on to discuss two specific questions. In the second section, Local Realities, I ask why the Batwa have ended up in their current situation and I investigate the historical and social contexts of the south west of Uganda that have shaped their present predicament. In the third section, Current Interface, I ask why national and international interventions, aimed at helping the Batwa, have failed to achieve their stated aims, and in some circumstances deepened their present marginalisation?

The thesis argues that representations of, and knowledge about the Batwa are constructed from an epistemology that seeks to create a subordinate ‘Other’ in order to assert a dominant ‘Self’. As such, their marginalised position replicates the situation of similar ‘Exotic Others’ found throughout the world. Importantly this construction plays a crucial role in the progression and validation of distinct social ontologies that the dominant ‘Modern World’ holds as self evident and true to its own social reality.

As a result, the Batwa have only two futures which are presented to them by the dominant forces that regulate their situation. On the one hand, they are coerced to assimilate towards the identity of the dominant ‘Self’ and in doing so cast off the identity which the dominant ‘Self’ has deemed to account for their ‘Otherness’. Or on the other hand, if they choose to maintain those aspects of their identity which identifies them as the ‘Other’, they are ostracised and depicted as unfit for the ‘Modern World’.

I conclude this thesis by suggesting that the current predicament of the Batwa has been constructed by external forces and that Development discourse continues to construct this marginalised position. I also conclude that in positioning the Batwa as the ‘Other’, what is being asserted is the identity of a dominant ‘Self’. This relationship between the dominant ‘Self’ and the marginalised ‘Other’, whilst being declared as a distinct and exclusionary relationship, is in fact an intertwined and entangled relationship. Finally, I argue that a fundamental shift in the paradigm of the ‘Modern World’ is needed in order to allow the Batwa, and other Indigenous Peoples, to be seen not as ‘Exotic Others’ but as equal participants in an interconnected world where multiple ways of knowing and being are mutually supported and validated.
INTRODUCTION

1. LOCATING ANTHROPOLOGY
   Participant Observation
   Fieldwork Site or Sites?
   Participant Observation Revisited
   Identity, Conflict and Emotion
   Conclusion
   Structure of Thesis

GLOBAL POWERS

2. ‘RETURN OF THE NATIVE’?
   The Indigenous Defined?
   Legal Definitions
   The Difficulty in Acceptance
   A Legitimate Alternative
   Conclusion

3. CONSTRUCTING ‘OTHERS’
   Poststructuralism
   Entangled Power
   Empowerment
   Hunter-Gatherer Perceptions of the Environment
   Conclusion

4. ‘PYGMIES’ AS THE ‘OTHER’
   The Rise of Social Darwinism
   Expeditions, and the Exotic ‘Other’
   ‘Pygmies’ on Display
   Conclusion

LOCAL CONSEQUENCES

5. A HISTORY AS THE ‘OTHERS’
   What’s in a Name?
   Origin of the Batwa
   Migration and Pre-colonial Kigezi
   Shifting Politics of Domination
Independence for Some, Subservience for the ‘Others’ ................. 114
Conclusion ................................................................................................. 116

6. CURRENT SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION .............................................. 117
Grounds for Marginalisation ................................................................ 117
Effects of Marginalisation ...................................................................... 122
Conclusion ................................................................................................. 130

CURRENT INTERFACE .................................................................. 132

7. HUNTING TO POACHING................................................................. 133
The Conservation Paradigm .................................................................. 133
A History of Protection in Uganda ....................................................... 138
A ‘New’ Conservation Paradigm? ......................................................... 144
Misconceptions of Nature-Culture Relationships .............................. 150
Conclusion ................................................................................................. 153

8. THE ‘OTHER’ PERSISTS ................................................................. 156
Defining Development ........................................................................... 156
Representing ‘Culture’ as the Problem ................................................. 167
Cultural Politics and Development ....................................................... 173
Conclusion ................................................................................................. 177

9. THE OPPRESSION OF REPRESENTATION ....................................... 180
The Problem with Participation ............................................................. 180
The Denial of Participation .................................................................... 184
A Failure to Respond .............................................................................. 188
Development as Discourse .................................................................... 191
Conclusion ................................................................................................. 197

BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................... 201
Table of Maps

Map A: British Colonial Map of Uganda showing Kigezi District ................................................................. 102
Map B: Kisoro, Kabale and Kanungu Districts of Uganda ............................................................................... 103
Map C: Bwindi, Mgahinga and Echuya Forests .............................................................................................. 104

Table of Plates

Plate 1: The illustration which accompanied Kuper’s article in the New Humanist magazine ..................... 30
Plate 2: ‘Eva Schonveld’s cartoon points out the fallacy of equating indigenous people’s claims for land rights with right-wing nationalism among dominant populations’ .............................................. 43
Plate 3: ‘Biologist’ with ‘Pygmies’ .................................................................................................................. 68
Plate 4: ‘Talking to pygmies is like trying to bridge a chasm of centuries’ .................................................. 70
Plate 5: ‘Chart Illustrative of the Geographical Distribution of Monkeys in Their Relation to that of some inferior types of man’ .............................................................................................................. 75
Plate 6: ‘The Pigmies as compared with English Officers, Soudanese, and Zanzibaris’ ............................... 76
Plate 7: ‘Mr. Renaud with two Pygmies from the Ituri Forest’ ........................................................................ 77
Plate 8: ‘Major Powell-Cotton and his Pygmy Trackers’ .............................................................................. 79
Plate 9: ‘The Male Kivu Gorilla shot by Author’ ........................................................................................... 79
Plate 10: ‘Young male Okapi shot by Dr. Christy in the Ituri Forest. Bambutte [sic] Pygmy trackers in background’ .................................................................................................................................. 80
Plate 11: A drawing of the two young Akka taken to Italy ............................................................................. 81
Plate 12: ‘Ethnographic Tableau: Specimens of Various Races of Mankind’ ................................................ 83
Plate 13: Pigmies from the Congo, Africa and huts ......................................................................................... 84
Plate 14: Ota Benga with Chimpanzee .......................................................................................................... 86
Plate 15: ‘Colonel Harrison’s African Pygmies’ [Postcard] ............................................................................ 89
Plate 16: Height measurements taken of the Six African Pygmies ................................................................ 90
Plate 17: Head profiles taken of Colonel Harrison’s Pygmies ..................................................................... 91
Plate 18: ‘Pygmies of Central Africa’ with British MPs .................................................................................... 93
Plate 19: ‘The Pygmies’ [Postcard] ................................................................................................................ 93
Plate 20: A Batwa community being filmed by a film crew ........................................................................... 120
Plate 21: Subsistence farming in Kisoro District .............................................................................................. 124
Plate 22: Two Batwa with their most prized possessions; their child and their radio .................................... 125
Plate 23: An extended family outside their houses .......................................................................................... 127
Plate 24: A Mutwa stands outside his home on land recently given to him by a Christian NGO .................. 127
Plate 25: Batwa land on the edge of BINP .................................................................................................... 128
Plate 26: Klaus Jürgen Sucker with his rangers in Mgahinga Gorilla National Park .................................... 142
Plate 27: MGNP Rangers with confiscated snares collected by Sucker and his colleagues ........................ 142
Plate 28: ‘Blasiyo, First Baptised Pigmy’ ....................................................................................................... 156
Plate 29: A Mutwa being symbolically cleansed of lice during the performance .......................................... 161
Plate 30: Batwa performers during the 10 year celebrations ........................................................................ 163
Plate 31: Batwa pose beside a plaque commemorating their benefactors .................................................... 164
Plate 32: Batwa dancers perform for the President of Uganda, Kisoro 2007 ............................................... 174
Plate 33: Consultation team discussion with a Batwa community ............................................................... 184
Plate 34: Batwa Participants at the May Regional workshop ......................................................................... 187

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Declaration

I declare that this thesis is my own original research work except where I have given due acknowledgment to the work of others. Copyright in text of this thesis rests with the author. This thesis is less than 100,000 words in length, inclusive of all maps, plates and bibliography.

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

ACHPR African Commission for Human and Peoples’ Rights
BINP Bwindi Impenetrable National Park
BMCA Bwindi and Mgahinga Conservation Area
CARE Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere, Inc
CFR Central Forestry Reserve
DTC Development Through Conservation
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization
ITFC Institute for Tropical Forest Conservation
IUCN International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources
LCI Local Council Level One
MGNP Mgahinga Gorilla National Park
MoU Memorandum of Understanding
MUZ Multiple Use Zone
NFA National Forestry Authority
NGO Non Governmental Organisation
NP National Parks
PA Protected Areas
UNP Uganda National Parks (replaced by UWA)
UOBDU United Organisation for Batwa Development in Uganda
UWA Uganda Wildlife Authority

Glossary of Key Language Used In Text

In Urufumbira all nouns in the people class are prefixed by ‘Ba’ in the plural and ‘Mu’ in the singular. For the root ‘Twa’, the ‘Twa People’ are the ‘Batwa’ and a ‘Twa person’ is a ‘Mutwa’. Additionally these can be prefixed by ‘a’ in the plural and ‘u’ in the singular. Thus ‘Abatwa’ would translate as ‘The Twa People’ and ‘Umutwa’ as ‘A Twa person’. In the text there is interchange between the terms from the writer, sources and interviewees. For example, The Twa, The Batwa or Abatwa.

RUFUMBIRA TRANSLATION

(A)Bafumbira Members of the Fumbira ethnic group (plural)
(A)Bahutu Members of the Hutu ethnic group (plural)
(A)Bakiga Members of the Kiga ethnic group (plural)
(A)Batutsi Members of the Tutsi ethnic group (plural)
(A)Batwa Members of the Twa ethnic group (plural)
(U)Mufumbira Member of the Fumbira ethnic group (singular)
(U)Muhutu Member of the Hutu ethnic group (singular)
(U)Mukiga Member of the Kiga ethnic group (singular)
(U)Mututsi Member of the Tutsi ethnic group (singular)
(U)Mutwa Member of the Twa ethnic group (singular)
“At the very time when my studies were most successful, there cut across this plan which I had as a scientist, a red ray which could not be ignored. I remember when it first, as it were, startled me to my feet…[The] news met me: Sam Hose had been lynched, and they said that his knuckles were on exhibition at a grocery store…I began to turn aside from my work….one could not be a calm, cool, and detached scientist while Negroes were lynched, murdered, and starved…”

Du Bois (1984: 67)
1. LOCATING ANTHROPOLOGY

In 2002 I undertook my first fieldwork amongst the Batwa as an undergraduate investigating their situation since their evictions from their ancestral lands. I can remember being torn during my research, between my interest in the Batwa’s relationship with the forests, and their contemporary situation outside the forests. I offer the following story, as it brings together three important strands of my research experience: the methodology; the context; and the position I took within this context, as a researcher, a friend and a colleague to the many people I was working with.

In 2002, in the United Organisations for Batwa Development in Uganda’s (UOBDU’s) new office, I interviewed two brothers who lived in the Kisoro area and who had formerly hunted inside the forest now designated the Mgahinga Gorilla National Park (MGNP). They talked at length about the history of their people and after half an hour I asked what I thought at the time was an innocuous question: ‘Do you want to go back into the forest and if so for what reason?’ I expected a response which would illuminate their relationship to their forests. Instead I was offered a response which illuminated their relationships outside their forest. One of the brothers explained that he was scared of going back to the forest because only months earlier his son had tried, and had been caught and beaten to death by local non-Batwa villagers. It was said that his neighbours were angry at his continued extraction of firewood from inside the national park.

Looking back today at the interview transcript, it is clear I simply continued with my questions as if this death had never been mentioned. I remember being shocked, and not knowing how to engage with this complex topic, I continued with my original line of questioning. I remember feeling helpless. There were no tools in my ‘anthropological toolbox’ that could help this man in his loss and I felt unable to begin to grasp such a complex situation. I was wholly out of my depth. Later, in an attempt to take some action, I went to the Police with representatives of UOBDU to enquire about the investigation into the death. The police officers insinuated that, since an investigation is not carried out for the death of a dog, why should resources be used to investigate the murder of this Batwa? Despite this attitude, and due to the persistence of UOBDU, suspects were later identified by the relatives of the deceased and taken into custody. Unfortunately, this led to death threats being directed at the relatives of the deceased and all charges were later dropped. The suspects were released back into the community in which the Batwa lived.

In 2005, a few months into my PhD research in Kisoro, the father of this murdered man, the man I remember interviewing so vividly, was himself murdered. Back in 2002 this man had narrated his son’s death and the denial of basic human rights to the Batwa. In 2005 his wife came to the office and told us of his murder, asking us to help her. I remember again feeling incensed by this brutality, and again feeling powerless, my helplessness venting itself in anger and rage. The police again seemed unconcerned with this death, blaming it on internal fighting among the Batwa. In

\[1\] Singular of Batwa
contrast, I believed that – like his son before him - he had been murdered by his neighbours within a wider context of violent discrimination. To date neither death has been successfully investigated nor have any suspects been brought to trial. The death of this man - who was one of the first Batwa I had interviewed - marked the transition in my research after which I was no longer able to stand aside and understand these deaths as happening to my informants. These events happened to my friends.

My response to the situation is telling, as I found it unethical to carry out my research without supporting the Batwa. My methodology was firmly rooted in advocating one position in a complex scenario. Through supporting the Batwa their struggle became my struggle and in being seen by other non-Batwa as a supporter of the Batwa, the animosity the Batwa were subjected to by their neighbours also became directed towards me. However my analysis has had to remain objective in order to provide robust material which can be used by the Batwa in their struggle. This chapter will try to understand the complex relationships I formed and understand the tension such relationships produced within me. Such information should not be seen as validating or invalidating my data, but offering a context within which this work should be read.

**Participant Observation**

In 2002 I began my relationship with the Batwa, unclear of the methods I should employ to collect my data during that first three month trip. As a result I utilised a number of different methods, including participant observation, focus groups and more formal structured and semi-structured interviews. I was unsure what method was best suited and instead found that each method had its own strengths and weaknesses. NGO workers often responded best to specific questions provided through structured interviews, while this method was too constrictive for many Batwa who negotiated questions and provided responses in non-linear ways. Focus groups allowed the Batwa to express a collective memory and helped to fill in the gaps a single informant might have had in their knowledge. Importantly, it was during this initial research period that I found that the most enlightening data came through my use of participant observation at times where the collection of data was not foremost in my mind.

In one setting I was attending a NGO workshop and during the lunch break decided to join some of the NGO staff outside the venue to smoke a cigarette. As I listened to their conversation, I realised that they were talking about how disgusting and inedible they found the food which was offered to them by the Batwa during community visits. As a marginalised people who suffer extreme food insecurity, the foods the Batwa eat are often left over or scrap food unwanted by their neighbours. These NGO staff laughed and joked about how they managed to get themselves out of eating the food offered to them and derided one member of the group who admitted to accepting it. The consensus was that Batwa food was only suitable for animals and the group went as far as implying that in eating this food the Batwa were no better than animals themselves.
This ethnographic moment proved crucial in understanding the situation the Batwa faced. On the one hand these NGO staff were participating in a workshop to support the Batwa in improving their lives. However at the same time, and out the back door of the workshop venue over a cigarette, they were deriding the very same people and creating a distinction, based on food consumption, between the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’. When I joined them outside for a cigarette I was experiencing, both physically and metaphorically, what Goffman has called ‘backstage culture’ (in de Munck 1998: 43). The frontstage interaction between the Batwa and the Development NGOs was filled with rhetoric which espoused ‘participation’, ‘empowerment’ and ‘rights’, whereas the backstage was filled with differentiation, discrimination and in this case disgust. As Nelson and Wright note, “participant observation fieldwork…is the one way in which the gap between the ideal (what people say should be the normative practice) and the real (what actually happens) is most clearly identifiable” (1995: 18). By accessing this ‘backstage’ through participant observation I was better able to understand the discrimination that lay behind the non-discriminatory rhetoric of some of the Development workers.

When I began to write my dissertation I realised that beyond backstage access, participant observation provided me with an ability to produce what Geertz referred to as ‘thick description’ (1993). De Munck explains this to be the ability to describe “behaviours, intentions, situations, and events as understood by one’s informants” (1998: 43). Part of the thickness of such description was also found in the ability of participant observation to let the informants speak for themselves (see Sobo and de Munck 1998: 17). Given the nature of the research, I felt compelled to use thick description so that the information I was being given, by Batwa or Development informants, could be understood in the entangled context in which it was presented. Additionally as Nelson and Wright note,

> During the seventies and eighties so-called scientific models of research through which neutral experts elicited objective facts were criticised for turning people into passive objects of knowledge. Surely, it was argued, the aim of research should be the opposite – to enable categories of people traditionally objectified and silenced to be recognised as legitimate ‘knowers’; to define themselves, increase their understanding of their circumstances, and act upon that knowledge. (1995: 11)

As the Batwa are ‘traditionally objectified and silenced’, to not allow them the opportunity to express their situation in their own terms only serves to disempower them further.

It was this firsthand experience, working with the Batwa, which prepared me for my PhD research in 2005. Not only did it provide me with an understanding of the methodological tools which I would need to carry out successful research, but it also allowed me to begin to consider the location and role I would need to place myself in when I returned in 2005. My initial research plan was to situate
myself within a Batwa community and embed myself in their everyday activities. The purpose of this research was to be able to understand how knowledge was transferred within a community and analyse patterns of conflict resolution among this community. In order for this plan to succeed I would have needed to create a role for myself amongst the Batwa and their neighbours which would situate my participant observation in an everyday setting. In effect I would have had to have purchased or rented agricultural land in order to participate in subsistence agricultural activities.

However, when I reached Kisoro my initial plans immediately became unfeasible. In addition to my earlier undergraduate research in 2002, I had worked in Kisoro for an Indigenous Peoples’ Rights group in 2003, fostering links between the Batwa’s own organisation and larger national and international organisations. When I reached Kisoro in 2005 my former role was still in the memory of many people, Batwa and non-Batwa alike. The Batwa assumed I was there to continue that support to their organisation and the non-Batwa immediately singled me out as a friend and supporter of the Batwa. This had dramatic consequences. I had to respond to the Batwa who were looking to me to support them in their struggle. The question I faced was whether it was ethical for me to deny them their request and demand that my research be constituted as a value neutral academic process? My prior work in advocacy also meant that my position within the wider social setting was already constructed when I arrived, so I decided to continue my support and took on a position as a support worker in the Batwa organisation.

Beyond this ethical response to the Batwa’s situation, I would argue, as do many feminists, that the concept of a value neutral knowledge and/or methodology is questionable (see Burton 2001, Gray 1968, Myers and Tronto 1998, Oakley 1981). Myers and Tronto state that “Value neutrality is often equated with the absence of political partisanship or a ‘passionate detachment’ that then lets the facts/arguments speak for themselves” (1998: 808). Oakley discarded the value neutral position in her own work:

[One] reason for departing from [value neutral] interviewing ethics was that I regarded sociological research as an essential way of giving the subjective situation of women greater visibility…What was important was not taken-for-granted sociological assumptions about the role of the interviewer but a new awareness of the interviewer as an instrument for promoting a sociology for women. (emphasis in original 1981: 48)

Additionally, Oakley acknowledges the effects her research had on the lives of those she researched. In questionnaires, three quarters of her respondents felt her research had affected their own experiences of becoming a mother. Her evidence rejects the belief that the researcher and research can become integrated in the lives of respondents but yet still remain ‘objective’ and she concludes that “all research is political, ‘from the micropolitics of interpersonal relationships, through the politics of research units, institutions and universities” (Oakley 1981: 54).
Recently, the need for an applied output from anthropology is again under discussion (see Bennett 1996, Hastrup and Elsass 1990). With the skills that anthropologists possess, it is often asked whether it is ethical to work and live with a marginalised people for months at a time and not help them in their struggles for recognition. Certainly it is becoming ever more evident to anthropologists that they have a responsibility to help the communities they work with so that in some way the communities are repaid for the information they have shared with the researcher. This may range from giving language classes whilst in the field to activist work on behalf of the community after the research period concludes, but anthropologists can no longer consider it ethical to work alongside another people and ignore this obligation to return something of meaning to them.

The way in which I carried out my research and the role I took during my fieldwork was not one in which I consciously positioned myself. On the one hand, that role was already formed before I arrived and had been created during my previous work in 2003. But on another level, my role was decided by the relationships I had formed with the Batwa previously and by the relationships I would form over the duration of my fieldwork period. I was a friend to many of my informants; I became a member of their family and a colleague in their organisation. As Hastrup and Elsass write, “in particular cases advocacy is no option but an implicit requirement of the social relationship established between the anthropologist and the local people” (1990: 301). To form these bonds and gain their trust but then fail to respond to their needs as a people would, in my mind, have been wholly unethical and would have removed my capacity to form these bonds in the first place. My relationships would not have been reciprocal and meaningful, so my ‘decision’ was one born out of necessity and not out of choice.

As a result of my need to respond to the Batwa in a meaningful way and the Batwa desire for me to continue to support their own organisation, I quickly changed my original research aims and focused on two more pressing issues. Firstly, I wanted to investigate the contexts which had located the Batwa in the precarious and marginalised position they inhabited in Ugandan society. Secondly, I wanted to investigate why the development interventions directed at the Batwa were failing to help them escape their situation and in many cases were serving only to entrench the processes of discrimination they were caught in. In hindsight, these were the very questions I failed to ask or tried to answer three years earlier when I had first interviewed the father whose son had been murdered and who would later be murdered himself.

I want to now examine the role my research had in relation to the Batwa’s wider objectives and struggle. Laura Thompson wrote in the 1970s that, “an applied anthropologist may help a client group as a consultant by defining the group’s practical options in local, regional, national, and global contexts” but that the “choice of a preferred alternative and its enactment, however, should remain the prerogative and responsibility of the client” (in Bennett 1996: S38). This last point was clear to me and I understood that I was in no position to make decisions on behalf of the Batwa.
Instead, I supported the Batwa to make the decisions on problems I uncovered, sometimes through consulting one individual and on several occasions by bringing together dozens of Batwa from throughout the region to make decisions on issues I presented to them.

Notwithstanding the appropriateness of Thompson’s advice, my work did more than just present options to the Batwa. In order to present options I was often involved in creating options which might not have already existed. This role used my own skills to open up political, economic and social spaces into which the Batwa themselves could step. According to Rappaport, the defining features of an empowerment research model is, “identifying, facilitating or creating contexts in which heretofore silent and isolated people, those who are ‘outsiders’ in various settings, organizations and communities, gain understanding, voice, and influence over decisions that affect their lives” (in Small 1995: 945). In this sense I advocated and negotiated for the Batwa to be included in project designs and implementations, whether by pressuring existing Development projects to include Batwa members within their management, or facilitating the Batwa to enact their own development and advocacy projects independently.

Accepting my position as an applied anthropologist acknowledged more than just the practical and ethical considerations of working with a disadvantaged group like the Batwa. It also acknowledged the influence my position had on the communities I worked with as well as the influence they had on me. As Goodman notes:

> It is not simply that, if they so desire, anthropologists can find ways around the inevitable effects that they have on the societies they study and those which the societies reciprocally have on them, but that such interactions are the very stuff of the anthropological project, providing as they do important information on the way that societies (both that of the anthropologist and the society they study) operate, think about themselves and change. We should embrace, incorporate and ‘translate’ the effect of these interactions rather than try to avoid them (2000: 152)

Taking up a support role for the Batwa’s organisation completely changed my intended research focus. This focus moved from the internal dynamics of a Batwa community and towards the relationships that such a community might have with external actors and groups. Despite this I quickly realised my repositioning now placed me central to a new topic which was crucial to the Batwa and their struggle. My position was part of what Bodley, in a response to an article by Bennett, suggested was a new movement in applied anthropology in which,

> …its practitioners are working for hundreds of small non-profit organizations around the world that are dedicated to social justice and sustainable development. They use anthropology’s holistic method and deal with cultural systems. I propose that ‘action anthropology’ shifts its research focus upward to what Bennett calls ‘the other in the
background who call the shots or hold the ultimate power,' ‘the basic power structure,’ or the ‘Big Boys who run the show’ (in Bennett 1996: S42).

Indeed, through my research I was able to offer valuable information back to my informants by taking on a role within their organisation which they would have otherwise been unable to pay for. Additionally, my new role allowed me to investigate the interaction between the Batwa organisation and the ‘Big Boys’ of the Development world. Due to my education and identity as a white European, I was able to enter into a world in which the Batwa were unwelcome and for whom the door was often closed. It was this access which enabled me to open up spaces whilst at the same time documenting the dynamics between the Development world and Batwa communities. I gained immediate access, through friendship and trust, with Batwa communities who saw me as someone working alongside them and therefore with them. And through this role within the Batwa organisation, I also gained access to those organisations working with the Batwa. As a result I inhabited a place never fully positioned on either side of the Developmental binary. I was educated and white, yet I chose to live in a village and support a marginalised people, and this caused most Developmentalists to never fully trust me. On the other hand, although I chose to locate myself amongst the Batwa, as a foreign university graduate I was never able to fully inhabit the social complexity of the situations the Batwa found themselves in.

This position, amongst the Batwa and their organisation, did enable me to gain a particular perspective, or what Feminists have called a standpoint, within Developmentalism. Hartsock, one of the original proponents of Standpoint Theory, explains that a “standpoint…[perspective]…carries the contention that there are some perspectives on society from which, however well-intentioned one may be, the real relations of humans with each other and with the natural world are not visible” (1998: 107). This idea of a standpoint rests on the assumption that “knowledge is situated and perspectival and that there are multiple standpoints from which knowledge is produced” (Hekman 1997: 342). The value of taking up a standpoint is that it can provide insights which other standpoints would fail to provide, “women’s lives make available a particular and privileged vantage point on male supremacy, a vantage point which can ground a powerful critique of the phallocratic institutions and ideology which constitute the capitalist form of patriarchy” (Hartsock 1998: 107).

This is a valuable way to understand the situation I faced in Uganda and my support for the Batwa. As I sought to understand the ways in which the dominating discourses of Development oppressed those it focused on, I found it more useful to side with the communities positioned on the periphery of the discourse. It was the Batwa who held that ‘privileged vantage point’ and they provided a different perspective on the workings of Developmentalism from those who promoted it. Despite the illumination Standpoint Feminism provides, it is, however fundamentally weakened by its claims to elucidate ‘real’ knowledge. This claim is summarised by Hekman, “whil[st] the ruling group’s perception of reality is ‘partial and perverse,’ that of the oppressed is not…[their perception] exposes ‘real’ relations among humans and is hence liberatory” (1997: 343). I would question this
proposition and suggest that ‘real’ knowledge can be constructed from alternate standpoints. And, as the experiences which generate knowledge are as real to one standpoint as they are to another then each perspective carries its own value. If this position is accepted, then all knowledge is in its own way ‘partial and perverse’. Additionally, even though I sought solidarity with the Batwa, my ability to understand their standpoint was placed within inescapable limits through issues of race, language and class. As a result, my research will be unable to fully understand and represent the standpoint of the communities I chose to support. Despite these comments, as Hekman concludes, Standpoint Feminism, “is undoubtedly a counterdiscourse, a discourse that seeks to break the hold of the hegemonic discourse, but it is no closer to ‘reality’ than the discourses it exposes” (1997: 345). Despite my reservations with standpoint theory, as a methodology, it is a useful tool due to its insistence on foregrounding what have historically been regarded as marginal perspectives. As such I would argue that a standpoint perspective was invaluable to my research as it allowed me to analyse a radically different perspective to the one articulated by Developmentalism.

Fieldwork Site or Sites?

In the preceding sections I have situated my methodological tools and the way in which I applied them. It now seems appropriate to explain where I physically situated myself. Where was my field site? The answer to this question also ties in to another question: when was my fieldwork? On one level my fieldwork took place in the town of Kisoro in south west Uganda during a sixteen month period between 2005 and 2006. After deciding to support the Batwa’s organisation, I realised that I would need to be based close to their office and began to rent a three bedroom house a few kilometres away from the town. Despite initially being the sole occupant, this house served to cement my role by providing the necessary adornments expected of an expatriate NGO worker. In later months I would share the house with three other members of staff and the periodic arrivals of their families and friends.

Each day I would visit the office belonging to the Batwa organisation, collect my e-mails, see what work was being done and catch up with the office staff. However, I made a conscious decision not to work from the office as I wanted to make clear to the staff that I was neither replacing nor supplanting their own positions and only supporting them. I neither wanted the organisation to become reliant upon me nor for myself to take on roles which would be better executed by existing office staff. As Cohen has noted:

I always want to advocate; but I also think that they (the people I’ve studied) could speak better for themselves than I could for them. And, further, to make myself an advocate would provide the other side – governments, officials, etc – with an excuse for not talking to the people themselves…I have to distinguish between the local
Their organisation was managed and run by Batwa and I wanted them to continue to know that the success of their organisation was the result of their endeavours. In this way I experienced a continuous tension between being asked (and wanting) to help, and also understanding the temporary nature of my situation in the organisation. I was explicit in only taking on responsibilities which I felt others in the organisation could not take on themselves. In one such case I canvassed other stakeholders to provide both financial and logistical support for a consultation programme amongst the Batwa. This was ultimately supported by four international groups. It would have been unfeasible for the Batwa to have accessed some of these groups, mainly because of their lack of English and the technical language which accompanies Development programmes. Once this support was secured, the Batwa were then able to enter that space through the consultations and represent their opinions within the consultation documents and outputs. This advocacy role, however, placed me in a powerful position as it required me to decide which spaces should be opened and which should be left closed. I tried as much as possible to follow the wishes of the Batwa but it was very clear that they regarded me, through my education and background, as better able to make those decisions on their behalf and my opinions were, more often than not, accepted and followed.

I carried out what Marcus terms “Multi-locale ethnography” where “the idea is that any cultural identity or activity is constructed by multiple agents in varying contexts, or places, and that ethnography must be strategically conceived to represent this sort of multiplicity” (in Rodman 1992: 645). One day I would be in Kisoro working with the office staff, while another day I might be in Kampala at a stakeholder conference. Some days were spent with stakeholders in their offices and project sites throughout SW Uganda while others were spent working or hanging out with Batwa communities. My informants during this process would vary between local people, Batwa and non-Batwa, NGO workers, civil servants, conservationists, tourists and researchers.

Not only was my fieldwork multi-locale, but also diachronic, as it encapsulated periods of research before and after my distinct PhD research period. I began working with the Batwa in 2002 and many of my relationships were made and information collected in the years preceding my PhD research. My fieldwork was then part of long-term research which Burawoy has termed the ‘punctuated revisit’, “in which the same ethnographer conducts separated stints of field work in the same site over a number of years” (emphasis in original 2003: 670). Throughout these periods, which stretch from 2002 until the present day, I also took on different fieldwork roles. Initially I was an undergraduate student carrying out fieldwork for the sole purpose of writing my dissertation. The following year, however, I was back in Kisoro as an advocate of the Batwa working as a consultant within their organisation, a position I again accepted when I returned in 2005, albeit in...
the guise of a PhD researcher. Most recently I have returned to Uganda, at the request of the Batwa, working as a consultant for a Conservation NGO on a tourism project involving the Batwa.

In between my times ‘in the field’, I continued my fieldwork experience through working remotely as an advocate for the Batwa; responding to e-mails, contributing to project designs, producing reports and providing analysis. My ‘field’ extended not only in time but also in space and was truly multi-sited. My ‘fieldwork’ ended in 2006, but today I still receive e-mails from friends and colleagues in Uganda looking for conversation or advice on a daily basis. The availability of the internet has allowed my fieldwork to extend beyond my sixteen month period in Kisoro into my present location in Scotland. The ability to provide an ethnographic update through revisits to Uganda, and working remotely in Scotland, has allowed me to collect a greater depth of information extending over a number of years, and to build on relationships beyond the face to face relationships started six years ago.

**Participant Observation Revisited**

The use of participant observation does not, of course, end with the decision to employ its techniques when in the ‘field’. Participant observation is not a monolithic technique and has a variety of forms whose use brings differing repercussions. Gold cites four roles that the ethnographer can assume: complete participant, participant-as-observer, observer-as-participant and complete observer (in Bryman 2004: 301). Alternatively, Bryman uses Gans expansion of the role of participant observer by breaking it down into three roles: total participant, where the ethnographer is “completely involved in a certain situation and has to resume a researcher stance once the situation has unfolded”, researcher-participant, where the ethnographer is “semi-involved in situations” and the total researcher, which “entails observation without involvement in the situation” (Bryman 2004: 302). As a dynamic methodology, I embodied different positions on the participant observation spectrum during my time in Uganda and would alternate between extremes of committed participation and detached observation, depending on the situation I found myself in.

Authors like Wright and Nelson (1995) suggest participant observation is flawed and inherently objectifies the subjects of its research. They instead promote participatory research as a method where participants are active subjects able to contribute and guide the research process instead of being only objects of the research. They state that its aim is to produce change within the contexts of its work and to empower the participants through the research process. It could be argued then that I was not involved in participant observation at all, but instead involved in participatory research. However, during my work with the Batwa they were not able to become equal members of the research process and large sections of my work was carried out without the knowledge of the Batwa communities. This was for very practical reasons as many of the communities had neither written skills nor proficiency in English. How then was I to involve the Batwa as active participants in my work when that often involved working on very complex technical reports for
Development agencies that I was often unable to interpret myself? Wright and Nelson’s (1995) insistence on the virtues of participatory research is based on the assumption that all ‘informants’ have the necessary tools to enter into an equitable relationship and fails to account for inequalities beyond the researcher’s control. It also fails to speak for research participants who are excluded from the very processes I was documenting, as the Batwa are from mainstream Development. Whilst I tried to foreground a participatory research approach so as to enable my informants to participate in my research, it was not always possible and I alternated between participant observation and participatory research.

Whilst the section above charts some of the issues relating to the position of informants within participant observation practices, it is also important to discuss the intellectual location of the researcher within their research. One of the alleged risks which has permeated participant observation since its inception is the risk of ‘going native’. According to Bryman this process happens “when [researchers] lose their sense of being a researcher and become wrapped up in the world view of the people they are studying” (2004: 302). If we take this definition to be accurate, then I question whether the act of ‘going native’ is inherently dangerous to the anthropological endeavour. As Tedlock points out,

> What seems to lie behind the belief that ‘going native’ poses a serious danger to the fieldworker is the logical construction of the relationship between objectivity and subjectivity, between scientist and native, between Self and Other, as an unbridgeable opposition. The implication is that a subject’s way of knowing is incompatible with the scientist’s way of knowing and that the domain of objectivity is the sole property of the outsider (1991: 71)

To think like the ‘native’ does not inherently suggest the throwing away of rationality. “To rule out the possibility of belief in another’s reality is to encapsulate that reality and, thus, to impose implicitly the hegemony of one’s own view of the world” (Ewing 1994: 572). ‘Going native’ suggests that the researcher has attempted, as best he or she can, to begin to think about the structures of a society and culture in terms other than the ones he or she has been given by their own society. To fail to ‘go native’ suggests the researcher has maintained an essentialised notion of both their informants and their own society as separate and unyielding categories which cannot be ‘stepped out of’. If culture is created and defined through interactions between those who enact that culture, then it can only be understood by participating with it and not by observing it from afar. I should also be clear that by suggesting I went ‘native’ I am not suggesting I attempted to or became a Mutwa. ‘Going native’ was a process where I attempted as best I could to fully embody the relationships I found myself in; to try and see the world in ways which were different to my own. In my own conception, ‘going native’ was an attitude I had which denied an objective separation between myself as a researcher and the Batwa as my subjects but nowhere did it become my task to become a Mutwa and nowhere do I try to represent the experiences of the Batwa as my own.
With my sixteen months in Uganda behind me and with my fieldwork situation reduced to e-mails and phone calls, I look back on my time in Uganda and can see no other way to have interacted with the Batwa other than ‘going native’ in the sense outlined above. My fieldwork experience and the process of ‘going native’ was not only a choice I made to better access another’s worldview or more embedded data, but also a response to human interaction. Indeed, “it is impossible for ethnographers not to become a part of the society in which they spend a significant part of their lives. Ethnographers are drawn, often involuntarily, into the nets of significance cast by the people among whom they conduct research and are thrust into their discourse and debates” (Ewing 1994: 578). In order to respond to someone in a meaningful way and be part of their lives, I could only become wrapped up in their world, invest emotions in that world, and try to understand the position they saw themselves in within that world. My fieldwork was not simply a route to an academic union card but rather the centre of my intellectual and emotional life at that point in time (Tedlock 1991: 82). To have done otherwise would have been to separate myself from the people I lived amongst, objectify my endeavour and fail to enter into meaningful relationships for a sixteen month period.

Identity, Conflict and Emotion

Rosaldo notes that the general rule of anthropological studies “seems to be that one should tidy things up as much as possible by wiping away the tears and ignoring the tantrums” (1984: 189). To remove such emotions would however, “distort their descriptions and remove potentially key variables from their explanations” (ibid: 188). This next section will recount some of the emotions and conflicts present in my research, not as a way to validate or invalidate my research but to show that as a key component of my lived experience, my emotions and responses are a variable in the data I present and need to be acknowledged.

In becoming entangled in the struggles of the Batwa, everything I saw or experienced became relevant to me. This made me better able to understand the complex problems the Batwa faced but it also opened me up to the emotional anguish of being witness to their situation. I became so emotionally involved with the Batwa that I often responded to situations outside of the implied objectivity a researcher is assumed to have. In most situations I knew no other way to respond. When a policeman told me that he did not have the time to investigate the murder of a friend, I knew no other reaction than to become enraged. These kinds of incidents moved beyond the abstract field of social investigation and tumbled into personal relationships and the lives of the people I knew. Despite my commitment to these relationships, and the honesty of my responses to incidents such relationships might involve, I often felt guilty as I perceived I was failing as a researcher. It was one thing to feel sadness at the loss of a friend whilst in the field, but I felt I had abandoned my ability to see the structural forces which shape the actions of individuals when I became angered by the response of the policeman. I felt I had lost, what I thought at the time was, the very essence of my anthropological identity.
For the duration of my PhD fieldwork I also felt anger, resentment or dislike for many of the NGO staff who were supposed to be my informants. In taking on the role of support staff with the Batwa I gained immediate trust and friendship with the many Batwa spread throughout the region. However, this research focus, the interaction between the Batwa and external Development agencies, meant that the majority of my time was spent with non-Batwa informants. These were the very people I was witnessing discriminate against the Batwa. It was their projects’ design and implementation which were marginalising the Batwa further. Robben writes of his own research with both sides involved in a conflict, “There were days when I talked in the morning to a victim of political persecution and in the afternoon with a military officer who had been responsible for the repression. These days were stressful because they demanded radical swings in empathetic understanding” (Robben 2007: 174). I similarly found it difficult to socialise with some informants despite knowing that this interaction was vital to my research. I often came home from a meeting or bar ready to explode after a night sitting listening to how the Batwa were to blame for their situation and how everyone would be better off if they just slowly died out. Ultimately, this resentment hampered my ability to form bonds with certain individuals and reduced my field of research as I avoided speaking to some individuals who may have had important information.

This situation is noted by Lee-Treweek who discusses her feelings towards auxiliary staff in the care home where she was carrying out her research. She explains that, “it would be fair to say that dislike was the predominant feeling I had towards the auxiliary care staff” (2000: 117). She interpreted these emotions, “as a sign of personal inadequacy. After all, I had not read many accounts where complete dislike and attempts to create distance were key components of a researcher’s response to their participants” (ibid: 122). It was not until she began the writing up process that she realised that these emotions, rather than being at best a section of her research she should keep unspoken, were actually crucial to her understanding of the context of which she was an integral part. They mirrored many of the emotions the care staff felt towards their patients and helped her understand why they responded to their patients in the way they did. My own emotions brought me closer to the Batwa by understanding their situation much more acutely, and as I learned to use these emotions as a tool to analyse my interactions, they allowed me to gain insight on what it was about each situation which caused such frustration.

Unlike the mythical fieldwork experience I thought I was entering into, where the researcher is loved and loves in equal measure the people s/he is researching, there were times in my own fieldwork where I was disliked as much as I disliked the people I was with. In walking into the role of a support worker I immediately stepped into a social setting I was unprepared for. I remember initially, full of excitement at the months ahead, explaining to people that I was there to work with the Batwa and support their struggle. I equally remember what felt like a physical blow knocking the wind from my chest when those same people turned to me to laugh and ridicule my endeavour. I had entered into this period confident about my work and proud of my role in supporting a
marginalised people. I had not given any thought to how non-Batwa would perceive me, and if I did, I naively assumed it would not matter to me as long as I was supported by the Batwa.

I was of course wrong, and spent some very dark months ostracised and alienated from the non-Batwa whom I lived and worked with and who made up 99% of the population. I often woke up feeling distress about the day ahead and had to force myself out of the house to face the people who disliked both me and the work that I was doing. In the end however, my situation is best described by Berreman who, in writing of his own research within a heavily segregated village in India, explains,

> Although I remained an alien and was never made to feel that my presence in the village was actively desired by most of its members, I was thereafter tolerated with considerable indulgence. I became established as a resident of Sirkanda, albeit a peculiar one, and no one tried to get me to leave (2007: 143)

I spent twelve months feeling alone and alienated. I was not visiting the Batwa communities because my research required that most of my contact and relationships were with non-Batwa people. I had friends I could have visited in Kampala and there were plenty of tourists intermittently travelling through the area that I could have sought out for friendship, but I felt determined not to rely on people external to the situation. I believe this tactic eventually worked and after the first year of my time I felt a noticeable difference in the way I was regarded by the community. de Munck (1998) describes three stages of ‘hanging out’ when on fieldwork. The first is the stranger stage where the researcher tries to become familiar with the community (or group) and they with you. The acquaintance stage comes as the researcher and participants begin to see each other as individuals, which then leads on to the intimate stage where the researcher and participants share a mutual history and range of experiences (ibid: 41-42).

I was never able to reach the intimate stage with all the people I lived with in Kisoro. Many relationships did not get past the stranger stage as some people failed to see me as anyone more than a supporter of the Batwa, an identity which bore many similarities to the way ‘kaffir lovers’ were viewed in apartheid South Africa. Yet others knew me by the end of my sixteen months as an acquaintance, saw beyond this stigma and regarded me as an individual. As more NGOs understood my work they began to ask for my support and I became a valuable tool for the Batwa through my ability to work within external organisations as an ‘expert’, helping to shape project designs and management to favour the goals of the Batwa. It was the Batwa and a few non-Batwa who allowed me to finally enter into intimate stages of hanging out, where our lives became one of respect and acknowledgement. However, as my informants were largely non-Batwa these intimate relationships were always in the minority.
I want to also discuss some ethical considerations I have negotiated during my work with the Batwa. Despite ethical rules being defined by the contexts in which they arise, I will consider a few sets of ethical issues which reoccurred throughout my work and provide some general responses. More than any other form of research methodology, participant observation requires the researcher to develop long term relationships with the informants they work with (Ellen 1984: 138) and raises specific issues which “relate to questions about reciprocity, mutuality and (in)equality in relationships” (Mason 1996: 100). A particular question raised in this respect is: to what extent can the researcher always refrain from active intervention in the lives of the people s/he has to live with? I decided to actively intervene in the lives of the Batwa through my day to day work supporting their organisation and through the advocacy work I do remotely when I am not in Uganda. From the sections above it is clear I was faced with an extreme situation where my interventions had immediate and often life changing effects on the Batwa. I have also discussed the tension I faced with this type of reciprocity, continually evaluating how much or how little support to provide.

I also had to negotiate the safety of my participants in my interventions in their lives. In 2002 on a routine community visit with other colleagues from UOBDU, half way through the visit we were confronted by an angry man who claimed that we had no right to talk to his Batwa. He was the local chairperson of the village and allowed the Batwa to live on his land as long as they worked the land for him. Looking back I realise that he must have been scared we were in the process of ‘liberating’ the Batwa he considered to be his own property; in many ways we were. But he responded to his fear by lashing out violently both physically and verbally and for a brief moment I asked my colleagues if I should defend not only us but the Batwa he was abusing. We agreed that this would only make things worse for the Batwa and we left. I was immediately aware of the danger we had brought to the Batwa community we had visited and the harm we were responsible for. I felt troubled and wanted to get away from this scene of guilt as quickly as possible. However, after fleeing their ‘patron’ the Batwa came running after us and demanded that we continue talking on some communal land ahead where their ‘patron’ had no authority over them. The Batwa wanted to be empowered through our visit and, despite the dangers, we continued the meeting and were thanked when we left.

My intention in telling this anecdote is to suggest that despite the mistake we made in visiting the community, in this situation the ultimate decision as to whether the meeting should continue rested with the Batwa. Since this experience I have attempted to allow the Batwa to negotiate many of the ethical dilemmas we have faced as our work together has progressed. In many of these issues they are more aware of the risks than I was and I learnt to trust their decisions and accept them. However, as I came to writing up my work I found that I must make ethical decisions for myself to make sure that no negative repercussions are felt by the Batwa as a result of my publications. As Ellen rightly notes, “in some political contexts minorities may be especially vulnerable and it may be thought necessary to withhold data or even refrain studying them at all” (1984: 149). As a result,
where possible the identity of all Batwa participants will be anonymous and I will choose to retain some data from finished works to protect them.

Finally, it is important to analyse the implications of my own position in south west Uganda as an anthropologist and the implications of the text that follows. As an anthropologist working amongst a group historically portrayed as the prototypical ‘Other’ it is important to acknowledge the historical and contemporary role of anthropologists in the very processes I was part of. Despite the objective and scientific claims of anthropology, the discipline has a troubled past which has been dogged by accusations of racism and colonialism (Asad 1991, Rigby 1996). Given anthropologist’s historically Eurocentric instruction, it comes as no surprise that anthropology has often been informed by and helped to support discriminatory ideologies central to European history. Not only have some anthropologists given theoretical weight to Social Darwinian ideologies and the Colonial enterprise (see Brantlinger 2003), but with the introduction of figures such as Malinowski and Evans-Pritchard, anthropologists have also become the hands of ‘practical man’ and been seen as influential in colonial and development discourses and practices (see Escobar 1991, Evans-Pritchard 1946, Evans-Pritchard and Firth 1949, Malinowski 1929). As a product of the same anthropological instruction, it would be easy for me to either continue in the production of the ‘Other’ through my ethnographic text or naively claim that I could escape such a fate entirely. As a result I will attempt to do neither and acknowledge that, despite my best attempts, this thesis will undoubtedly contain some of the historical and disciplinary markings of my education.

As Rigby argues, even though the ‘primitive’ has been replaced by the ‘urban’ and the ‘complex’ as the site of contemporary anthropological investigation, anthropologists still “fail to question the epistemological implications of defining their discipline solely by its object, even if this object is now more encompassing” (emphasis in original 1996: 47). Despite this failure, I would argue that I am attempting in this thesis to move away from an ethnography of ‘Others’ and instead attempting to “study the colonizers rather than the colonized, the culture of power rather than the culture of the powerless, the culture of affluence rather than the culture of poverty” (Nader in Rigby 1996: vii). Additionally, I am attempting to move away from producing a people as the object of my study and instead move towards the analysis of the social processes involved in the production of the ‘Other’. I believe that this shift in focus will minimise my own contribution to the continuance of the Batwa as the ‘Other’ in anthropological texts and provide a more robust analysis of their present situation.

Conclusion

My research largely involved working with non-Batwa informants and yet I have chosen to foreground the perspectives of the Batwa and not the non-Batwa informants in my thesis. As a result, this decision may produce conflict when my colleagues, informants and friends see the side of the fence I have chosen to stand on. The work of Mosse is an invaluable aid to understanding the situation I may find myself in when I return copies of my thesis to the different NGOs and
agencies who are integral components of my research. Mosse’s book ‘Cultivating Development’ (2004) documented his involvement in a Development project in rural India and provided a detailed critique of prevailing assumptions about Development policy-making and project practice. As Mosse states, “the book manuscript provoked unusual controversy…on the grounds that the book was unfair, biased, contained statements that were defamatory and would seriously damage the professional reputation of individuals and institutions, and would harm work among poor tribals in India” (2006: 935). His former colleagues urged for a meeting with Mosse and his academic peers and attempted to have the book, at the very least, rewritten. As I turn my own relationships from the field into data, and then place my analysis in public, I expect similar responses from many informants and colleagues in Uganda who may call me biased and unfair.

This is not my intention, and I am in no way attempting to tarnish the name of any of the people included in my research. Mosse felt the reaction of his former colleagues resulted from three emotive readings of his text: firstly that his colleagues failed to read his work “as an exploration of a general theme (perhaps a theory of policy) through the particular”, and secondly because they did not “share the ethnography’s interpretist view of project reality as a multiplicity of truth composed from different points of view” (Mosse 2006: 942). Finally his colleagues read his ethnography as an evaluation of their project and felt judged for their own contributions. Once again I expect my thesis to be read in a similar manner and for these three emotive readings of my text to be present in those who read it. As a way to mitigate against these potential readings of my work, I want to make several points.

Firstly, I acknowledge the analysis contained in this thesis is a positioned interpretation of a series of events and that it does not preclude other interpretations and accounts of the same events. Secondly, I do not aim to present a comprehensive record of the interplay between Indigenous communities and Development agencies, but just one perspective from within the complex relationships I was involved in. As Howitt and Suchet-Pearson write: “A text is not a neutral, passive presentation of an external truth. It is a partial, active re-presentation of complex worlds using particular strategies to persuade and influence readers for specific purposes” (2003: 559). Thirdly, I do not want to suggest that I am representing a ‘true’ reality or the Batwa’s reality within this thesis. Instead, my aim is to represent one perspective of a series of relationships between different groups. This is not the Batwa’s perspective but is a perspective firmly positioned amongst the Batwa and their situation. And finally, I firmly believe in the value of this positioned interpretation to help illuminate and analyse the way both Indigenous Peoples and Development agencies interact with each other, but I am aware of the perspectives this position fails to include. This thesis is meant to provide illumination on the policy and practice of Development and not critique the individual projects I encountered on the ground. In light of this, my work is not an evaluation of individual persons or projects but instead an evaluation of Development itself and a discussion of the theoretical underpinnings of the Development endeavour.
Structure of Thesis

In a paper given at the joint Canadian Anthropology Society and American Ethnological Society annual conference in 2007, Mario Blaser described modernity, or more specifically the ‘Modern World’, as the area where the specific arrangement of three elements is operative; “a relatively stark distinction between nature and culture, a dominant tendency to conceive self and other in hierarchical terms and a linear conception of time” (2007). In many ways the thesis which follows is an investigation of the function of modernity through these three elements and specifically the ways modernity affects the lives of those are deemed external to the “Modern World” it creates. However, this thesis originally set out to answer much more specific questions as to why the Batwa people of south west Uganda came to be in such a precarious and marginalised situation and why the interventions which have been employed to help them in their current situation appear only to entrench the situation further. In my pursuit of the answer to these questions I have entered into much larger questions and issues which have implications beyond the context of the Batwa. These questions encompass issues about who uses and controls concepts of identity, representation, rights, development, progress and evolution, and as my Blaser quote above suggests, I have found that the structure which encompasses all of these issues, the structure which frames and defines these issues, is that of modernity and the ‘Modern World’.

As Blaser infers, modernity’s defining feature may be best explained as one of rupture and of separation between nature and culture, the self and the other and between the past and the future. But more than this, modernity asserts its separation from the world it creates through the production of knowledge “as though the world were divided in this way into two: into a realm of mere representations and a realm of the ‘real’; into exhibitions and an external reality; into an order of mere models, descriptions or copies, and an order of the original” (Mitchell quoted in Escobar 1995: 7-8). Modernity acts then as if it is a flâneur; observing, representing and creating knowledge of the world it is part of, the whole time convinced it is separate and distanced from such a world.

I highlight this fractured state as it represents the structure of this thesis which I present in three parts. Part one of this thesis, Global Powers, is characterised by an investigation into the ‘realm of mere representations’ and seeks to understand how these representations are produced and where they are situated. Chapter two is framed within the debate posed by Kuper as to the implications and connotations of the term ‘indigenous’, and in it I seek to offer some ways in which it is possible to understand the representations of Indigenous Peoples within the social and political contexts Indigenous Peoples are part of. Chapter three examines the way the ‘Modern World’ seeks to abstract itself from the world and I use post-structural analysis and deconstructionism to analyse the creation of the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’. To conclude this part of the thesis, chapter four provides historical examples of the representations of Indigenous Peoples as the ‘Other’ and brings the focus back to Central African Forest People.
In contrast to Part one of this thesis, and mirroring modernity’s production of binaries, part two, **Local Consequences**, is characterised by an analysis of the ‘realm of the ‘real’’ and looks to situate the thesis both politically and historically. Chapter five documents the history of the Batwa people in south west Uganda and the processes they were involved in. Despite being represented as passive objects, the Batwa were active subjects who shaped and directed their society and politics in the face of dominant forces which ultimately overpowered them. Chapter six moves on from this historical analysis to focus on the current situation of the Batwa in Uganda, which orientates the study to the very pressing situation of the Batwa while at the same time providing a foundation for the final part of the thesis.

Part three of this thesis, **Current Interface**, seeks to reconcile the ‘realm of mere representations’ with the ‘realm of the ‘real’’ by focusing on the role of discourse. In doing so, I will be following on in the tradition of Foucault who described discourse as “a group of statements [which] belong to the same discursive formation…[and]…for which a group of conditions of existence can be defined” (Foucault 1989: 131). Discourses then consist of “phantasmatic representations, an element of symbolization” which do not act as “disturbing elements which…suppress its true voice” (ibid 76). These representations are instead its formative elements. I argue that it is in discourses more generally and, in the context of this thesis, the discourses of Development, that the relationship between the ‘real’ and ‘representation’ realms are mediated, where the relationship between power and knowledge are negotiated. Through analysing these discourses I will show that the representations they discuss have a historical appearance, are constructed and related to “a body of rules that enable them to form as objects of [the] discourse” (ibid 53).

Chapter seven seeks to achieve this by showing how historical Eurocentric representations of human/nature relationships continue to persist in Development discourses and in the practices of conservation initiatives in Uganda today. In particular this chapter demonstrates how these representations perpetuate a denial of rights for the Batwa and Indigenous Peoples more generally due to their inability to accommodate alternative ways of understanding the world. Chapter eight details more specifically how Development discourses, through constructing representations of the Batwa, “results in concrete practices of thinking and acting through which the Third World is produced” (Escobar 1995: 11). This chapter attempts to show that the situation of the Batwa can be directly linked to the ways in which they are presented and constructed by Development discourses. Until this point in the thesis, my representation of the Batwa will largely be as passive object which mirrors their representation by the ‘Modern World’; a process I am attempting to deconstruct. As a result in the final chapter of the thesis I look at some of the initiatives which have attempted to create participation and provide a voice for the Batwa. I conclude by suggesting that in order for these initiatives, and Development more generally, to achieve their intended objectives, to provide platforms which allow the Batwa to freely determine and sustainably manage their own futures, it is imperative that those in control of Development discourses reassess their position in the world and how that position interacts with ‘Others’ throughout the world.
"Let us...contrast piety with atheism, the philosopher with the rude savage, the monarch with the Chief, luxury with want, philanthropy with lawless rapine: let us set before us in one view, the lofty cathedral and the straw-hut, the flowery garden and the stony waste, the verdant meadow and the arid sands. And when our imagination shall have completed the picture, and placed it in a light which may invite contemplation, it will, I think, be impossible not to derive from it instruction of the highest class”.

William Burchell, 1824 (quoted in Comaroff and Comaroff 1991: 86)
2. ‘RETURN OF THE NATIVE’?

The Indigenous Defined?


Academics have often questioned the nature of ‘indigeneity’ (see Bowen 2000, Niezen 2003) and whilst most agree that ‘indigenousness’ can differ between contexts, some academics continue to define the term in an essentialised and restrictive manner. Kuper’s recent articles give no space to documenting how different Indigenous Peoples understand their own position in a wider context of relationships or how they understand the term ‘indigenous’ to relate to their own identity. He takes

Plate 1: The illustration which accompanied Kuper’s article in the New Humanist magazine

an ethnocentric approach by equating the term ‘indigenous’ with “‘primitive,’ ‘tribal,’ ‘hunting,’ or ‘nomadic’” and as a result suggests Indigenous Peoples are “precisely the quintessential ‘primitive societies’ of classical anthropological discourse” (Kuper 2003a: 389). He critiques ‘indigeno chooses’ as an essentialist term, but in doing so he allows only one definition of the term and becomes the very thing he argues against: an essentialist. We are left to wonder if this is the same understanding which causes Indigenous Peoples to define themselves as ‘indigenous’ in the first place. Kuper uses the rest of his article to denounce the term ‘indigenous’ and goes to great lengths to provide ethnographic examples to prove his point. He also uses this article to critique the Indigenous Peoples’ rights movement by highlighting the impracticality of applying the term ‘indigenous’ to collective peoples and uses the example of Canadian courts who apply the term on the basis of descent. He writes,

…descent is often hard to establish, and seldom pure, so that they end up applying a calibrated measure of descent. You have rights if you have a certain number of appropriate grandparents. This might fairly be called the Nuremburg principle. A drift to racism may be inevitable where so-called cultural identity becomes the basis for rights…(Kuper 2003b)

But as Barnard comments, “Kuper is looking for ‘real’ or idealised ‘indigenous peoples’…in the writings of fellow anthropologists, ‘indigenous peoples’ organisations, the UN, the ILO…to discredit them by pointing out the inevitable fallacy of the equation of ‘indigenous’ status with ethnographic fact” (Barnard 2006b: 10). In using this essentialised model of ‘indigenous’ to base his claims, Kuper’s argument is weakened. It is not enough to prove that the “ghostly category of ‘primitive peoples’ [has] been restored to life under a new label” (Kuper 2003a: 389), because whilst showing the evolution of the term from ‘primitive’ to ‘indigenous’, he has failed to acknowledge the possibility of the evolution of its meaning. Despite some discourses replacing ‘native’ with ‘indigenous’, it should not be assumed this replacement is valid in every context and particularly not in contexts where Indigenous Peoples identify themselves as ‘indigenous’. As Ramos points out: just because ‘indigenous’ had at one time this connotation does not mean you should “blame the conquered for the conqueror’s bad language” (2003: 397). If the term can be fluid enough to modify, then so can the definitions of such terms (Dahre 2006: 147). To fail to acknowledge this leaves Kuper’s semantic argument lacking the substance it needs.

Bowen feels that the first stage in defining indigenous status is to claim that “certain rights adhere to groups that were the first to settle a particular territory. It is this priority of residence that justifies creating a set of claims about Indigenous Peoples that are distinct from claims made about minorities or about peoples subject to discrimination or oppression” (2000: 13). It is this line of advocacy which fuels Kuper’s fires by suggesting the principal determinant of ‘indigenous’ identity is precedence of occupation. Kuper’s argument against the ‘indigenous-peoples movement’ is based on the assumption that the movement has “widely accepted premises that…descendants of
the original inhabitants of a country should have privileged rights...[and]...immigrants are simply guests and should behave accordingly” (Kuper 2003a: 390). He again uses ethnographic data to suggest primacy of occupation is almost impossible to prove. This contrasts with the opinion of the African Commission for Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) which stated,

‘Indigenous Peoples’ has come to have connotations and meanings that are much wider than the question of ‘who came first’. It is today a term and a global movement fighting for rights and justice for those particular groups who have been left on the margins of development and who are perceived negatively by dominating mainstream development paradigms, whose cultures and ways of life are subject to discrimination and contempt and whose very existence is under threat of extinction. (ACHPR and IWGIA 2005: 86)

However, suggesting that Indigenous Peoples have fought primarily for land rights does highlight how indigeneity has been constructed and maintained by Euro-American society, as Omura notes,

...in the political arena and the courts the definition of ‘indigenous’...are based on the assumptions of ties of blood and soil derived from the Euro-American essentialist or nationalist ideology...that is, constructed regardless of the reality of indigenous peoples’ societies...it indicates that indigenous peoples are still subordinate to Euro-American society because it is that society that defines indigenuousness and controls decision making on indigenous problems. (Omura 2003: 396).

Advocating for land rights does not inherently suggest a demand for exclusionary land ownership. Eurocentric understandings of land rights, prompted by the writings of John Locke (1823: 116), have been based on individual land ownership where property and rights are gained through the application of an individuals’ labour (see also Vaughn 1978). Many indigenous communities understand their role as collective guardians of their environment and not as owners as Kuper might have us believe. In the case of the Batwa in Uganda, they do not seek exclusive rights to their former forests and they do not see others as ‘simply guests’. They instead demand the return of their rights to access the forests; a position which does not exclude other parties from asserting their own demands or right to the same forests. As Asch and Samson write in the Canadian context, “indigenous peoples have repeatedly proposed that a just resolution of outstanding issues should be based on the principle that we are all here to stay” (my emphasis 2004: 261, see also Asch and Samson 2006: 146).

Additionally, Indigenous Peoples seek land rights not to regularise ownership, whether individual or collective, but to gain the right to relate to their land in ways other than the subduing of nature through human labour, as espoused by Locke (1823). This point relates directly to questions posed by authors like Malkki who question why Indigenous Peoples’ rights are seen as land issues.
Malkki writes, “Why should the rights of ‘Indigenous Peoples’ be seen as an ‘environmental’ issue? Are people ‘rooted’ in their native soil somehow more natural, their rights somehow more sacred, than those of other exploited and oppressed people?” (1992: 29)

Indigenous Peoples often place more importance on their land rights than do other oppressed people, because their situation is particularly connected to land, not just because they have been displaced, or because they are the prior occupants of that land, but because land plays a fundamental role in the very fabric of social relations. For Indigenous Peoples I am familiar with through the literature (e.g. Barnard 2002, Bird-David 1990, Feit 1995, Rose 1992, Saugestad 2001b), the environment is not simply something that is inhabited but something that is experienced in a relational way. It is this very concept that leads the Mbuti of the Ituri forest, for example, to relate to the forest as their ‘father’ and ‘mother’, ‘sibling’ and ‘lover’ and to describe themselves as ‘children’ and ‘people of the forest’ (Ingold 2000: 43-47, Mosko 1987: 898, see Turnbull 1962, 1983). In these contexts it should be argued that any attempt to separate culture and nature can only be done through an imposed distinction (see Ingold 2000: 40-43).

Understanding the relationships between Indigenous Peoples and their lands in this way, as an organic whole which involves a continually evolving and changing relationship working in both directions, enables us to view a loss of land by these Indigenous Peoples as a loss of their rights to practice and protect their entire epistemology. To answer Malkki’s question, it is not that Indigenous Peoples’ rights to land are more sacred than other disempowered groups but that land, and peoples’ relationships to that land, are one of the most vital elements of some Indigenous Peoples’ sense of social and cultural integrity.

Kuper is right to suggest racist extremists in Europe are fighting for exclusionary policies to restrict the migration of minority groups, but this is not the same objective that Indigenous Peoples seek. Whereas racist extremists fight for exclusionary policies that are symbolised by processes of discrimination, Indigenous Peoples are fighting for inclusionary policies that promote equalising processes. As Plaice suggests, the difference between these two groups’ objectives lie in “history, context, and location” and the fact that issues of prior rights for Indigenous Peoples are invariably “championed from a position of injustice, inequality, and disenfranchisement” (2003: 396). This is the very opposite experience to the one that the extreme far-right is situated in. Ramos elaborates further,

To put in the same category indigenous claims for legitimate difference, Nazi racism, and South African apartheid is to miss the point of differential power. In other words, to put Western powers of conquest on an equal footing with ethnic demands for recognition is either to ignore or to minimize the violence of Western expansion. (2003: 397)
The issue is not, as Kuper would have us believe, about Indigenous People’s Rights being given priority over other peoples, or being given exclusive rights to land which deny access to land for non-indigenous groups. As the ACHPR has recently noted, “the issue is that certain marginalized groups are discriminated against in particular ways because of their particular culture, mode of production and marginalized position within the state” (2005: 88). Or as Kenrick and Lewis suggest, the issue is whether to allow “equal rights based on an acceptance of the legitimacy of the economic and social basis of [Indigenous People’s] ways of life” (Kenrick and Lewis 2004b: 9). As such, indigenous identity represents one side of a relationship, “the side which has been dispossessed…and ‘indigenous rights’ describes a strategy for resisting dispossession that employs a language understood by those wielding power” (Kenrick and Lewis 2004a: 263). Kuper’s use of an essentialised understanding of ‘indigeneity’ and his failure to acknowledge the relational nature of the term, leaves his argument open to criticism and brings him into conflict with practitioners of Indigenous Peoples’ rights (Rosengren 2002). Anthropologists like Colchester, Kenrick and Lewis insist that it is dangerous to try and pigeon hole Indigenous People into well defined categories as this only serves to disempower them further and entrenches the situation that has produced their present marginalised position (Colchester 2002a, 2002b, Kenrick and Lewis 2004b).

In most cases this dispossession has been initiated through a denial of the legitimacy of Indigenous Peoples’ livelihood strategies and modes of production. Amongst Central African Forest People, their mobile way of life has not been seen as legitimate and their territories are understood as unoccupied and available for alternative uses (Kenrick and Lewis 2004a: 263). Rather than needing exclusive rights to land, Indigenous Peoples need to assert their rights to their modes of production and livelihood strategies which are targeted by their more powerful neighbours as legitimate reasons to dispossess them of their resources. Attempts to understand the situation in terms of cultural rights is, however, open to criticism. Some argue that this approach is a veiled attempt to essentialise indigenous culture and serves to keep ‘primitive culture’ in a static state. It would be dangerous to suggest that hunter-gatherers do not want to enter into non-hunter gather economies, but also naïve, as many hunter gatherer communities are already interacting with non-hunting and gathering economies.

In a similar vein, Kuper seems to question whether the loss of indigenous culture can be spoken of as a form of genocide (2003a: 390). He appears to suggest that indigenous culture is reified and seen by indigenous activists as more important than non-indigenous cultures. Once again however, he is taking for granted only the essentialised understanding of what it means to be ‘indigenous’ and placing it beside that which is ‘primitive’. The loss of indigenous culture is more correctly referred to as ‘genocide’ not because the culture itself is more important than other cultures, but because the nature of the loss is forced upon one group by a dominant other (see Suzman 2002: 7) and because the implications of such a forced assimilation are catastrophic to the social and physical welfare and integrity of a people. Very few indigenous communities are able to
maintain the integrity of their society alongside a dominant culture and maintain control over those attributes they wish to change or adapt (see Chennells 2001, Crawhall 2000). Instead many Indigenous Peoples are forcibly assimilated into the dominant modes of production against their own will. It is the nature of this assimilation which legitimises the use of the term ‘genocide’ or, more appropriately, ethnocide. A cultural rights approach therefore seeks “not the conservation of a preconceived identity anchored once and for all in an objectively existing (reified) culture but continuing control by the agents of a particular culture of the shaping of local history” (Hastrup and Elsass 1990: 306).

As Suzman argues, another criticism of a cultural rights approach is that, in the Southern African context, many Bushmen are not angry that their traditional culture is being marginalised but angry because they are, “impoverished, marginalised, and exploited by the dominant population” (2003a: 400). This is undoubtedly true but, as Suzman himself acknowledges in another article, the dominant Botswana saw the Gana and Gwi Bushmen’s poverty as a “contemporary manifestation of ‘their hunting and gathering culture’, which in turn was seen not only as an obstacle to development, but the subject of development” (2002: 3) Their marginalisation was then a result of discrimination born of a disregard for their mode of production. The underlying struggle should then be one which seeks the recognition of Bushman culture and livelihood strategies as legitimate.

Regaining land rights alone is ineffectual in solving the underlying problems precisely because the paradigm which dislocated Indigenous Peoples from their land still persists in the dominant group: the disregard and devaluation of alternative ways of being and relating to the world. The South African Bushmen’s situation can be seen as symptomatic of this problem (see Saugestad 2001b). They have now achieved great successes in their land rights struggle (see Chennells 2001, Crawhall 2000) but are still as exploited and disadvantaged as they were before they regained their land (see South African Human Rights Commission 2004). As a recent ‡Khomani Bushman delegate to a conference remarked, “We have found that the government gave us one of the keys [land rights] to unlock the door but that the door has many keys, which we are still trying to find. Three keys, which are important, are recognising our culture, language and heritage” (Crawhall 2003: 16). More succinctly, feedback from the same conference by the Hadza delegation from Tanzania stated that, “retention of land does not automatically lead to cultural integrity. Severe discrimination by stronger cultures...can result in language loss and cultural deterioration even when communities still have access to land” (Ujamaa Community Resource Trust 2003: 2).

Legal Definitions

Despite the discussion in the preceding sections, the term ‘indigenous’ is more than just a descriptive term and its use has legal and political consequences for those who employ it. As a result it will be provident at this stage to look at the legal use of the term ‘indigenous’, as it may help us to understand what it has come to define on a global level. Whilst recognition of
‘indigeneity’ emerged during the 40s and 50s, the first definitive policy resulting from this was the ILO Convention 107 of 1957 (ILO 1957). The UN later produced its own definition in 1986 but both definitions rested the legitimacy of indigenous status on precedence of residence. This theory has its problems however, especially with regards to Africa. In Australia and North America the colonial bodies remained after independence and “not only claimed a new identity as nationals of these territories, but also continued to assert political power over the local populations” (Barume 2000: 34). In these cases it was easier to highlight indigenous groups because the colonisers were distinct from the populations that were there before they arrived, as in the case of the Aborigines in Australia. As we will see in the next section this differentiation was not so evident in the African context where most colonial governments left at the time of independence.

Later approaches then acknowledged the complications that occurred in contexts like Africa and moved away from explicit definitions of ‘indigeneity’ towards guiding principles. These guidelines helped to highlight peoples who had suffered forced eviction from their historical areas, but had still managed to maintain a distinct identity. ILO Convention 169: Convention Concerning Indigenous And Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, which replaced ILO Convention 107, adopted this approach and stated that,

1. This Convention applies to:
   a. Tribal peoples in independent countries whose social, cultural and economic conditions distinguish them from other sections of the national community, and whose status is regulated wholly or partially by their own customs or traditions or by special laws or regulations;
   b. Peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonisation or the establishment of present State boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions.

2. Self-identification as indigenous or tribal shall be regarded as a fundamental criterion for determining the groups to which the provisions of this Convention apply (ILO 1989: Article 1)

In 1991 the World Bank adopted a set of guidelines in its Indigenous Peoples Operational Directive No. 4.20, which identified characteristics that could be used to help highlight peoples who may identify with the term indigenous:

a) Close attachment to ancestral territories and to the natural resources in those areas;

b) Self-identification and identification by others as members of distinct cultural group;

c) An indigenous language, often different from the national language;
d) Presence of customary social and political institutions; and
e) Primarily subsistence-orientated production (World Bank 1991: Article 5)

Finally, I want to highlight the recently adopted United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples before moving on in the next section to look at Indigenous Peoples’ relationships to the state. After twenty two years of debate the Declaration was finally adopted in 2007 by a majority membership of the UN. Canada, New Zealand, Australia and the United States were the only countries to oppose the Declaration. Its adoption brings unprecedented recognition of the rights of Indigenous Peoples, their historical marginalisation, and provides guidelines for structuring the relationships between Indigenous Peoples and their neighbours. In particular the declaration recognises,

…that all doctrines, policies and practices based on or advocating superiority of peoples or individuals on the basis of national origin or racial, religious, ethnic or cultural differences are racist, scientifically false, legally invalid, morally condemnable and socially unjust,

[...]

…that indigenous peoples have suffered from historic injustices as a result of, inter alia, their colonization and dispossession of their lands, territories and resources, thus preventing them from exercising, in particular, their right to development in accordance with their own needs and interests,

…the urgent need to respect and promote the inherent rights of indigenous peoples which derive from their political, economic and social structures and from their cultures, spiritual traditions, histories and philosophies, especially their rights to their lands, territories and resources. (United Nations 2007a)

As a result, this Declaration moves on from the legal definitions preceding it and recognises the relational and contextual nature of indigeneity that has been so lost in Kuper’s analysis. The history of the legal use of indigeneity highlights the way in which the definition has changed over time from an essentialised understanding based on the precedence of occupation to a more relational understanding of the term that acknowledges Indigenous Peoples’ treatment by more dominant sections of society. This historical shift in understanding would have served Kuper well had he allowed it to inform his own argument. It would have shown that despite indigeneity once being foregrounded in terms of precedence of occupation, it has since adapted to provide a more meaningful term for the people who identify themselves by it.

The Difficulty in Acceptance

In 2002 at a workshop in Uganda I witnessed an argument taking place between two participants. The viewpoint of one participant, the Ugandan programme officer for a Batwa development
programme, was that the Batwa were not a uniquely Indigenous People. He reasoned that as all Africans were black, and equally colonised by Europeans, they could all claim to be ‘indigenous’. The other participant, a Ugandan human rights lawyer, argued against this by suggesting that the Batwa were uniquely ‘indigenous’ based on the international definitions discussed above. His argument, however, failed to persuade the programme officer. If it is accepted that Indigenous People are a local group dominated by colonisers then this definition has led a number of people, including the programme officer, to conclude that all African populations are indigenous. Indeed article 10 of the constitution of Uganda states that any group existing and residing within the borders of Uganda before 1926 is Indigenous (Republic of Uganda 1995). In Botswana, home of over half of all San peoples of Africa, the government “refused to participate in the 1993-2003 UN Decade of the Indigenous People, on the grounds that in their country everyone was indigenous” (emphasis in original Lee 2006: 459). But this viewpoint is too simplistic a model of African population dynamics and fails to recognise the internal colonisation that Africa has faced. What this highlights is the tension within the application of international Indigenous Peoples’ rights definitions, particularly in the African context where ‘indigenous’ can be applied on different levels within the same situation.

Rights based initiatives focus on the effects ‘indigenous’ recognition has on the Indigenous Peoples they represent. However, it is important to understand the implications of indigeneity not only for Indigenous Peoples but also for those positioned as non-indigenous. In contexts such as Australia, North America and South America, non-indigenous identity causes no substantial problems. However, in an African context this acceptance becomes far more problematic (Barnard 2002, Kenrick and Lewis 2004b, Saugestad 2001a) to a point where indigenous identity becomes “inconvenient” for those who foreground their identity by it (Saugestad 2001b). McIntosh rightly states, “in colonial and successor states [indigenous status] is intimately linked with the struggle by formerly self-governing groups for land rights and self-determination, as well as claims for restitution, reparations and compensation for loss of life and liberty” (2002: 23) This is a much simpler process when one oppressor group and one oppressed group are clearly identified, as is the case in Australia, where Aboriginal communities are distinct from coloniser communities. In African contexts however, Indigenous Peoples are often asserting their rights in relation to those who have identified themselves as ‘indigenous’ against one time colonial oppressors.

The assertion of an indigenous identity by ethnic groups may be seen by current African governments as a demand for those governments to deny the status they originally used and to reclassify themselves as non-indigenous. In some situations governments may even feel that the assertion of indigenous status by others is tantamount to having to accept the very thing they once opposed, the identity of ‘colonials’. The political ramifications of this perceived demand by Indigenous Peoples shows very clearly why some African governments are in no hurry to acknowledge the indigenous status of certain ethnic groups in their countries. They may see themselves as being required to devolve some of their powers to such groups and this helps to
explain why the African members of the UN Human Rights Council spent years trying to stall the adoption of the UN Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. In 2006 the Namibian representative, speaking on behalf of the African group of countries at the Third Committee of the United Nations’ General Assembly, opposed the adoption of the draft declaration. He said, “…some of the provisions of the draft declaration contradict the national constitutions of a number of African countries and therefore these countries are unable to adopt the declaration in its present form” (Indigenous Peoples Caucus 2006). During this same session of the General Assembly the Botswana delegate also was reported as saying,

The [draft declaration] suggested that certain groups had the right to claim to be the sole indigenous peoples of specific regions of a sovereign Republic…Further, it gave blanket recognition to the right of regional, ethnic and tribal groups, in general, to full political and economic self-determination…The Declaration should clearly balance the rights of a group or tribe versus the rights of a nation as a whole. (United Nations 2007b)

Having so recently gained their independence from colonialism, it may be that many governments are concerned that in accepting Indigenous Peoples they place question marks against their own political authority since that was exactly what they demanded of the colonial powers in their own struggle. Mohamed Salih even suggests African governments create this fear purposefully, “[Indigenous Peoples] have been used as a scapegoat to cement a bankrupt and disintegrating political society looking for far-fetched legitimacy by creating an enemy image looming from the periphery and striving to hijack political power from the centre” (1993: 272).

Additionally “the denial of ‘indigenous rights’ by southern African governments is justified broadly by reference to nation building and the need to pursue an explicitly non-ethnic form of nationalism” (Suzman 2001: 285). This strategy is underpinned by the acknowledgement that “if African states are to take their rightful place in the world, progressive Africans believe, tribalism must be destroyed” (Clay 1985: np). In this process Indigenous Peoples can be seen as subversive and dangerous as their identification as ‘indigenous’ can be perceived to challenge the unified image of the nation, an image largely the product of dominant elites (see Rosengren 2002: 25, Saugestad 2000: 211). It is this definition of the nation state, created by the dominant elites, that Freidman describes,

[The nation state] is represented as a closed unit, whose population is homogenous and whose mode of functioning is dominated by boundedness itself, by territoriality, and thus, by exclusion...for this metaphor to work the nation state has first to be reduced to a cultural totality...When this notion is culturalized it suddenly implies total cultural homogenization, i.e. the formation of identical subjects (2002: 25)
Moving briefly outside of Africa to Asia, a comment from the former Prime Minister of Malaysia is revealing in its portrayal of a dominant elite’s political representation of indigenous communities within its borders. He was quoted as saying, “nowhere are [Indigenous Peoples] regarded as the definitive people of the country concerned. The definitive people are those who set up the first governments…Malays have always been the definitive people of the Malay Peninsula” (Gomes 2004: 10). This interpretation of Malayan politics has no room whatsoever for the history of the indigenous Orang Asli people. This example mirrors historical discourses, from Australia and Canada, over the legal doctrine *terra nullius*, which proposed in law that Indigenous Peoples’ lands were unoccupied because the Indigenous Peoples were too primitive to have political or legal rights that required recognition by the colonizing power (Asch 2004: 167). As Buchan and Heath write, in Australia, “The state of nature and civil society were not merely alternatives or opposites, but indexes of social progress away from savagery – understood as an absence of state and society – and towards state-governed civilization” (2006: 12). In these contexts Indigenous Peoples were simply too ‘savage’ to have the capacity to form any kind of civil governance and as a result could hold no claims to sovereignty over their own lands.

Can it then be said that Indigenous Peoples in Africa, by collectively asserting their indigenous identity in public forums, are actually questioning the imagined idea of nationhood created by national leaders? Certainly in Malaysia, the nation state has gone as far as creating laws that, “prohibits public discussion of the issue of indigenous status...[as it]...is considered seditious” (Gomes 2004: 10). Barnard goes further, he states that the ethnic identities of foraging people are framed in opposition to non-foraging people’s identities within nation states, and suggests forager’s identities to be inherently antagonistic towards dominant state identities (Barnard 2002: 18). In Botswana, attempts by Survival International to assert the Gana and Gwi Bushmen’s ‘indigenous’ status were viewed as unwanted interference by the government because, according to Suzman, “such sentiments are felt particularly acutely in post-colonies attempting to assert an indigenous – for want of a better word – national identity forged on an indigenous ethical code” (2002: 5). In turn this assertion by Survival International on behalf of the Bushmen was seen as little more than an “unfounded attack by a malevolent foreign force on their national integrity” (ibid: 5). If this is the case, then Indigenous Peoples and the NGOs that represent them are, in the eyes of nation states, inadvertently positing themselves outside of the state and becoming what Ramos describes as “internal outsiders” (in Conklin 2002: 1053). As a result, this may be one of the ways used by political leaders to justify their failure to provide the services and benefits of living inside a nation state to these marginalised groups.

With regards to the indigeneity debate discussed in this chapter, I argue that the analysis of the relationship between Indigenous People and their nation states highlights the need to have a relational understanding of indigeneity as opposed to the essentialised one Kuper takes for granted. It is clear that the resistance to indigeneity in Africa goes beyond claims of precedence in residence and the dispute over resources that such a claim might entail. In Africa such a claim to
indigenous identity asks dominant sections of society to do more than relinquish control. It asks nation states to reassess the very identity they have constructed for themselves, the values they base such an identity on, and the way they respond to other citizens whose values and identity are seen to be different. In the next section I will continue to question why Indigenous Peoples are represented as fundamentally different to dominant members of nation states and also highlight how this issue is analysed throughout the rest of my thesis.

**A Legitimate Alternative**

The dominant national image is of an Africa in a rush to become ‘civilised’, ‘developed’ and ‘first world’ in order to become accepted by the west and to “‘leap across the centuries’ to the Western present” (Argyrou 2005: 33). As Suzman notes of Botswana elites: they had a “strong sense of themselves as having progressed from a state of primitive penury to modern affluence” (2002: 3). But as Argyrou has noted, “Acceptance by native elites of the ideology of progress involved a fundamental contradiction. It was both a recognition of European superiority and an affirmation, however grudgingly, of the inferiority of one’s own culture” (2005: 22). He suggests,

The ‘developed man’...had no doubt about what ‘man’ could do in the long run with the use of science and technology. The trick was to get the ‘undeveloped man’ to believe in the same thing and act accordingly.

Such was the trick. ‘Undeveloped’ nations were economically backward precisely because they were ‘traditional’. They lived the past in the present and reproduced it over the centuries with little or no change. (Argyrou 2005: 28)

By maintaining what has been perceived to be, a ‘traditional’ way of life, Indigenous Peoples are therefore seen to stand in sharp contrast to this race for development. Where this dialectic view of the relationship between tradition and modernity exists, the dominant group are forced into understanding Indigenous Peoples in one of two ways. Indigenous communities are either backward, and their demands have no legitimacy, or their belief in alternative livelihood strategies means that the dominant ideology of Modernity may not be the only answer. Those holding to the dominant ideology will not accept a challenge to its validity, so it automatically assumes any opposing ideology must be illegitimate. This process of denial is made crystal clear in comments made by the then vice-president of Botswana and future president: “How can you have a stone-age creature continue to exist in the time of computers? If the Bushmen want to survive, they must change, otherwise, like the dodo they will perish” (in Suzman 2001:286).

As I will show in chapters three and four, Western dominant ideology has for centuries enforced the belief that Africans are wild and uncivilised and seeks to validate this through a particular understanding of their relationship to nature. In their rush to disprove the West’s perception of
Africans, African governments today paradoxically perpetuate this essentialist identity by acknowledging it and condemning as backward Indigenous Peoples’ culture with the particular livelihood strategies and relationships to the land these embody. If nothing else the dominant ideology is threatened by the very presence of Indigenous Peoples’ modes of production. As a result, the only way it can exist with it (since in many cases it has failed to kill it) is to class it as inferior and on the verge of extinction. In this way, until the dominant ideology adapts to accept difference, indigenous culture will always be seen as sufficient for nothing more than tourist curiosity. This is an issue I will discuss in more detail in chapter eight.

For these reasons I believe that asking governments in many African states to acknowledge the term ‘indigenous’ is actually asking them to do what they believe is tantamount to political suicide. This could go some way to explaining their reluctance to commit to the process of acknowledging Indigenous Peoples’ rights within their own countries. Whilst this does not negate Indigenous Peoples’ right to fight for their rights, the likelihood that it may be met with hostility does have to be taken into consideration before governments are met at the negotiating table by either indigenous communities or those who see themselves as acting on behalf of them. Saugestad goes further when she says,

…most [African] national governments ignore, reject or are downright antagonistic to the very concept. Why then use this concept as a political argument? Why challenge a sceptical government with the use of a controversial term, if perhaps a term like ‘marginalised minority’ may be used to single out the most deprived section of a population equally well? (2001a: 309)

In sub-Saharan African contexts might it be more useful to base debates on equality for Indigenous Peoples around concepts of ‘human rights’ instead of ‘indigenous rights’? In the eyes of sub-Saharan African governments, this difference in how rights are framed could signify a difference between divisiveness and something, “more in tune with the rhetoric of nation building,” on the one hand (Suzman 2001: 293). This is especially the case since this concept of nationhood is a major stumbling block to the acceptance of ‘indigenous’ identity. However, whilst this approach may be seen to be more appropriate for achieving social and economic equality for indigenous communities, it is still unknown whether individual human rights will be able to bring about a paradigm shift that will acknowledge alternative ways of relating to the world. As I hope to demonstrate, it would be this acceptance which would be needed to safeguard progress in economic and social equality for Indigenous Peoples, as it is cultural discrimination which produces the economic and social poverty Indigenous Peoples face. A response to Indigenous Peoples’ rights which neglects their specific cultural context would lack the insight needed to fully understand the generative processes which create symptoms of poverty (Saugestad 2000: 220).
If ‘indigenous’, as an identity, continues to be used at the local and international level to fight for social equality, then it is crucial to break down this stereotype that sees the nature of the indigenous struggle as being about control of power. Rosengren acknowledges what he describes as, “the colonial character of the indigenous condition which requires an opposing, non-indigenous, Other in order to understand the processes,” (2002: 25) but as Colchester notes, the history of human interaction “is far too messy to allow us to suppose that a simple dualism – indigenous/non-indigenous – can capture the true complexity of real world situations.” (2002a: 24) Thus the modern struggle for Indigenous Peoples’ rights should not be seen by governments as a struggle to reverse the roles of domination, but about self-determination largely within the boundaries and constitutions of current nation states.

Conclusion

Indigeneity is not a fact but a relationship (Kenrick and Lewis 2004a, 2004b, Saugestad 2001a). It refers to unequal relationships developed through interaction between two groups in a context in which both groups understand that one is attached to an area and that their identity is dissimilar to the other. Whilst this is not the only condition of indigeneity, it does help to show that the very nature of the term is relational and relies on more than just precedence in occupation of an area. Whilst Kuper and many African governments try to define and criticise the use of indigeneity as an

essentialised derivative of ‘primitivism’, I have shown that for Indigenous Peoples and their advocates, indigeneity says more about the relationships encountered by Indigenous Peoples than it does about the Indigenous ‘condition’. As “the reality of Indigenous Peoples eludes definitions and imagery constructed in terms of Euro-American essentialist ideology” (Omura 2003: 395) and cannot be seen within it, as Kuper would want us to believe, the focus of Indigenous Peoples’ rights should be on the current situations that marginalised peoples face. Since the term ‘indigenous’ is created through the interplay between two different groups, the actual manifestations of what it means to be indigenous is different in each context. Kuper fails to acknowledge this and using only an essentialist definition of ‘indigenous’ he ends up perpetuating the very argument he opposes. Despite the heterogeneity of Indigenous Peoples, if they find it prudent to use an identity like ‘indigenous’ to gain a “‘seat at the table’ in negotiations with governments” (Lee 2006: 458), it should not be for others to condemn them for that.

In the second half of the chapter I have shown that an ‘indigenous’ identity is one that proves very difficult to accept for many of the dominant actors who interact with Indigenous Peoples, particularly in Africa. This at first sight appears all the more remarkable as the authority of those actors rests on the historical deployment of the same terminology and demands the same rights from colonial governments as Indigenous Peoples demand today. Governments who once understood their identity as ‘indigenous’ through their position as subordinate to a more powerful colonial force now understand an essentialist definition of the term ‘indigenous’ where it is defined through precedence in occupation. However, as Hodgson has noted: “In the Americas and Australia [indigenous] has been used to represent original inhabitants…In sub-Saharan Africa, however, where ‘black Africans’ are the dominant population in the postcolonial era, indigenous has been used by distinct cultural minorities…who have been historically repressed by majority populations of Africans who control state apparatus” (emphasis in original Hodgson 2002b: 1086). It is clear that African governments have failed to recognise the validity in the struggles of Indigenous Peoples as a right to determine their futures and maintain their social integrity. This suggests that these governments have become the very thing they once fought against: an oppressor of less powerful groups, and suggests their failure may be a result of their desire to maintain their current positions of dominance. Indeed Mohamed Salih suggests, “Most post-independent African states were no less cruel towards their indigenous populations than the colonialists” (1993: 271) and that “[t]he neo-colonial mentality of the African neo-colonial elite is hardly distinguishable from their colonial predecessors” (ibid: 274).

In chapters five and six I will detail the situation of the Batwa People of south west Uganda and through extensive ethnographic data I will show that contrary to the argument that Kuper advances, the Batwa, through asserting their ‘indigenous’ identity, are not trying to gain power over their neighbours by a ‘precedence in occupation’ strategy. The Batwa are instead a marginalised and dispossessed people living on the margins of dominant Ugandan society. Through asserting their ‘indigenous’ identity they are trying to maintain the integrity of an alternative way of relating to their
environment in line with the equal rights of any other citizen of Uganda. More importantly, and in spite of the Batwa demands for equality, I will highlight in my final three chapters that the ways in which the Batwa are represented by some external actors suggests that Kuper was wrong to argue that the native has returned: in some people's imagery the native has never left.
3. CONSTRUCTING ‘OTHERS’

Poststructuralism

Poststructuralism became formally recognised through the writings of Jacques Derrida who critiqued structuralism and the process of ‘centering’, which formed the foundation of structuralist thought (see 1970, 1976). He questioned the ontological categories that Eurocentric thought was based upon – nature, man and truth – and suggested that they were in fact epistemological constructs that were passed down through generations of scientists and philosophers (Dixon and Jones III 2004: 83). Derrida explained that the creation of such terms involved ascribing a centre to its related parts at the same time as creating a margin which included all other non-related parts. This centering process was framed by a binary epistemology which both stabilised the meaning of the centre as well as its non-related opposite. As Derrida notes, structure

...has always been neutralised or reduced, and this by a process of giving it a center or referring it to a point of presence, a fixed origin. The function of this center was not only to orient, balance, and organize the structure…but above all to make sure that the organizing principle of the structure would limit what we might call the free-play of the structure. (emphasis in original 1970: 247-8).

This binary epistemology stabilises a term like ‘indigenous’ by relating those parts which make up ‘indigeneity’ to a centre at the same time as creating a periphery which demarcates the limits of ‘indigeneity’. All those parts which fall outside of this boundary then become the ‘Other’ and in this example become the parts which constitute ‘non-indigenous’. Using an analogy of a fence protecting a house, “The fence protects the lifestyle pursued in the house, but if it is too near it can add a dimension of claustrophobia to this lifestyle and thus diminish its quality” (Hage 2003: 32). As a result, a binary epistemology creates a number of dualisms which produce sharp contrasts between their respective opposites, for example, man and woman, culture and nature, truth and fiction and white and black.

Dixon and Jones III describe three objections poststructuralists make towards a binary epistemology. Firstly that in “binary systems, what appears to be the ‘foundation’ for a system of thought is but a hypothetical construct, one that reveals more about the society that produced it than the supposed character of the real world” (2004: 83). In understanding this, poststructuralists are drawn to the production of margins, centres and the boundaries which separate them to ask several key questions. Who has the control of the production of these centres and to what end is the production of these binaries directed? Secondly, ‘binaries presume a ‘totalising’ epistemology, so termed because either/or thought can only posit a world in which everything either ‘is’ or ‘is not’” (ibid). This constrains the way in which the world is understood and restricts the knowledge that investigations into that world produce. And thirdly, poststructuralists would argue that binaries are not only defined by their relationship to each other but are in fact defined through their relationship
to all other concepts which are not related. A man is not a man simply because he is not a woman, but because he is also not a car, a house or a book. In this way a binary epistemology oversimplifies the relational way in which concepts are given meaning by those who use them. Returning to my previous discussion on ‘indigenouness’, it can be seen that where Kuper (2003a) attempted to define ‘indigenous’ solely through an opposition to ‘non-indigenous’ identity, authors like Kenrick and Lewis (2004b) attempted to show that Indigenous Peoples understand their identity to be defined in relation, not only to non-Indigenous Peoples, but also to marginalised people and contrasted against powerful organisations and nation states.

In dealing with racism, Dwyer and Jones III (2000) have used the term ‘White socio-spatial epistemology’ to describe the way in which the ‘white’ identity is created through a particular way of knowing and valuing social life and where the “White Identity [is] – the normative and often unspoken category against which all other racialized identities are marked as Other” (ibid: 210). This idea of a ‘white socio-spatial epistemology’ is important to this thesis not in its direct application but in the illumination it will provide to understanding the construction of identities as centres and margins. Dwyer and Jones III describe ‘identity’ as,

…the product of categorization, a process…by which unmarked social alterity is discursively organized as difference, and differences are aligned into ‘nodal points’ of social identification. This discursive process works through ‘constitutive outside’, wherein identities are constructed, not through an inherent, self-asserted positivity, but through the negation of difference. Selves therefore emerge through the process of refusing the Other, and identities can thus be said to contain at their ‘centre’ an absent presence – the ‘trace’ of the Other that is at once constitutive of identity and the raw material for its destabilization. (2000: 211)

They describe three characteristics which emerge from this production of identities. Identities are “in the first instance, contingent, both historically and geographically…part of an ongoing social process”; secondly, identities are differentiated so that the “construction of identities are complex and interlocking, intertextually linked to a host of social axes”; and lastly, “identities are relational, dependent upon the Other for their meaning and constitution” (emphasis in original, ibid: 211-212). I will show that to be classed as the ‘Other’ is an extremely complicated and differentiated experience, born from more than one negation of an opposing identity and composed of a myriad of interwoven relationships that range in contexts from global politics and conservation to national identity and local history. I will show that in many ways the binary centres that locate and construct the Batwa as ‘Others’ do so not only to project the negative identity of the centre onto others, but also to re-affirm the identity of the centre to itself. As Rigby asserts, “The myth of the superior European (white) male…demands a diminished and humiliated ‘Other’” (1996: 4) in order to maintain its superiority.
Against this I will present another understanding of the ‘Other’, not as the margin to a Eurocentric centre, but as fundamental to the survival of ‘Western’ identity. As Hall is quoted as saying, “the English are racist not because they hate the blacks but because they don’t know who they are without the blacks” (in Dwyer and Jones III 2000: 212). Young extends this concept by suggesting that, “The one cannot exist in isolation without the other. So, in order to define itself, any majority must ‘simultaneously set itself apart from what it is not’ and yet remain ‘ineluctably haunted by what it seeks to exclude’ (2000: 200-201).

He continues by discussing Hegel’s analysis of master and slave:

…the master is dependent on the recognition of the slave for his position of mastery, in which case the power structure begins to reverse: he is only master because of the slave, and without that recognition, he would be nothing: ‘the truth of the master is in the slave’…in terms of identity…Mastery has to include slavery within itself in order to be itself… (Young 2000: 201)

Refusing to accept the foundational dualisms of structural thought as ontological, poststructuralists are involved in the deconstruction of the very metaphysics which binaries are based upon. Derrida states, “The quality and the fecundity of a discourse are perhaps measured by the critical rigor with which this relationship to the history of metaphysics and to inherited concepts is thought” (Derrida 1970: 252). Poststructuralists seek to focus on the centres and margins of binaries to locate the point where the binary opposition is found to contradict itself and undermine its own authority; points described by Derrida as ‘events’ or ‘moments’ (Derrida 1970). But as noted above, these centres and margins are socially defined, so the processes which create them are rarely neutral ones. Dixon and Jones III note:

Indeed, at stake in the naming of centers and the drawing of boundaries is social capital of many forms, since the representations influence the thoughts and actions of people…we might first note that those who stand to gain from this [binary] epistemology are often the same persons who can, in political discourse, mark the difference between the feasible and the impossible, or the realistic and the fantastic (to mention just two common either/or categorizations). And these will usually be the same persons who find utility in defining centers as stable, natural, and enduring, and who stand to gain from their seemingly self-evident qualities. (2004: 92)

One theme which runs through the rest of my thesis is the way in which the Batwa are constructed within foundational dualisms and placed on the margins as the ‘Other’. To the ‘developed’, the Batwa are the ‘undeveloped’; to the ‘civilised’, they are the ‘savage’ and to the ‘cultured human’, they are the ‘natured human’. It will be important that I seek out who controls the construction of identities and what ends those binaries serve. I will show how the centres rely on the location of
the Batwa as the ‘Other’, and I will seek to question the grounds by which centres gain privilege and power. Dixon and Jones III suggest that after locating a centre it is important to document “the processes that both maintain and permit its subversion” (2004: 93). Documenting the emergence of centres and showing the context in which they became asserted involves denying their ontological premise and identifying their sociohistorical production. Additionally, Deconstruction involves, “tracing the interrelations and limits of a center by examining the discourse associated with it…for example, one might examine how discourses of orderliness, sanitation, purity, and beautification link whiteness with a host of positive connotations” (ibid). Finally it is important to make clear that the goal of this deconstruction process is not to reverse the binary model and place the Batwa at the centre, just as it is not the intention of Indigenous Peoples who fight for their rights to then take on the role of dominators. As Parry, herself no supporter of post-structuralism, makes clear,

An agenda which disdains the objective of restoring the colonized as subject of its own history does so on the grounds that a simple inversion perpetuates the colonizer/colonized opposition within the terms defined by colonial discourse, remaining complicit with its assumptions by retaining undifferentiated categories, and failing to contest the conventions of that system of knowledge it supposedly challenges. Instead the project of a postcolonial critique is designated as deconstruction and displacing the Eurocentric premises of a discursive apparatus which constructed the Third World not only for the west but also for the cultures so represented. (2004: 37)

The goal then is not simply to undermine the processes which enforce binary categories onto ‘Others’. Instead, “by prying apart the stability of centers, deconstruction serves to open up new ways of naming and relating meanings, ones that are deliberated upon rather than taken for granted” (Dixon and Jones III 2004: 94). This thesis will ultimately ask if applying post-structural analysis in this way complicates matters by reducing stabilised concepts to messy complexities or if it opens up new ways of knowing and experiencing the world?

This deconstruction project was taken up by Mathias Guenther (1980, see also Lee 1992) in his paper discussing the changing identity, in the eyes of the ‘West’, of Bushmen communities from ‘brutal savages’ to ‘harmless people’. What is important is his acknowledgement that the construction of these identities often had little to do with Bushmen perceptions of themselves and more to do with the needs and requirements of European settlers to see them in those ways. By giving a historical account of Bushmen-European relations, he exposes the contrast between the negative stereotypes and the socio-historical situation. He suggests that the ‘brutal savage’ stereotype was allowed to flourish because the Bushmen had no cattle, so the early ‘Whites’ had no need to develop economic relations with them other than for the expropriation of their land. Further, as little missionary work had been done with Bushmen communities, they did not have “the
benefit of a missionary to shield them against the adverse effects advancing toward them from the European outside world” (1980: 136).

The major problem with his paper however, can be seen in the conclusions Guenther draws from his analysis of the historical situation. He states,

[t]he negative stereotype should thus be interpreted as an ideological mechanism...with which the white colonists justified the denial of land, freedom and life to the Bushmen members of their emerging colony of settlement. Such a stereotype permitted the development of attitudes which allowed that ‘total war be waged against the Bushmen’ (1980: 135)

I do not disagree with this statement, but it does not fully represent the construction of negative stereotypes of Bushmen communities. It is not enough to claim that the stereotype was created simply to justify the appropriation of land, particularly as these early colonials may not have needed to justify their actions to anyone but their fellow colonials who, despite a few missionaries, would have supported their actions. Guenther fails to expose the other side of this situation where negative stereotyping additionally validates the beliefs and identities held by those positioning themselves at the centre. By creating Bushmen as savages, early settlers in Southern Africa were validating their own beliefs in themselves as, “the Israelites of southern Africa” (Guenther 1980: 127). Without the Bushmen as the ‘Other’, they would not have been as secure in their belief in their position as God’s chosen people. These two issues of power and identity construction are crucial to the stereotyping of Bushmen communities and are intertwined in a self empowering relationship. As identities are constructed and polarised, the ability to exercise power is increased with the justification a stable centre brings. In turn, as power increases, the self’s ability to create and support a binary position, with itself as the stabilised centre, are increased, leaving the ‘Other’ marginalised.

As Said comments,

It should be obvious in all cases [of identity construction] that these processes are not mental exercises but urgent social contests involving such concrete political issues as immigration laws, the legislation of personal conduct, the constitution of orthodoxy, the legitimization of violence and/or insurrection, the character and content of education, and the direction of foreign policy, which very often has to do with the designation of official enemies. In short, the construction of identity is bound up with the disposition of power and powerlessness in each society, and is therefore anything but mere academic wool-gathering. (1995: 332)
Entangled Power

The preceding sections argue that the construction of identities, of both the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’, are vital to the creation of binary oppositions. I want to now investigate how power can be manipulated through this production of binary oppositions. Sharp et al. are in agreement with the construction of identity described above, and explain that in relationships of power, “domination and resistance cannot exist independently of each other, but neither can they be reducible to one other: they are thoroughly hybrid phenomena, the one always containing the seeds of the other, the one always bearing at least a trace of the other that contaminates or subverts it” (2000: 20). It is impossible therefore to conceptualise power as consisting of a simple dialectic of integrally defined concepts of domination and resistance, and instead power should be conceptualised as, “an amalgam of forces, practices, processes and relations, all of which spin out along the precarious threads of society and space” (emphasis in original ibid: 20). This mirrors Foucault’s conception of power where, “Power is everywhere: not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere…One should probably be a nominalist in this matter: power is not an institution, nor a structure, nor a possession. It is the name we give to a complex strategic situation in a particular society” (in Sheridan 1980: 184).

Sharp et al. use the term ‘Entanglements of Power’ to express the idea that power is composed of a myriad of relationships and to create a picture of power as a system that has links, not just to a single opposing force, but to a number of factors. In this matrix of power, entanglements are understood as the “spaces, places and networks which sustain, practically as well as imaginatively and symbolically” (Sharp et al. 2000: 1) the convergence of different social threads. These authors state that the very notion of ‘entanglement of power’ could better be expressed as the ‘power of entanglement’. This expresses their understanding that sites of entanglement in the threads carry the capacity “to make power happen, to set in train the relational encounters which are always replete with the effects of power, even of highly uneven contests between dominating and resisting power” (Sharp et al. 2000: 24-25).

Blaser (2004) allows us to add another layer to the concept of ‘entanglements of power’ through his description of ‘place’ which builds on Massey’s (1999) understanding of place as “a knot of a particular mix of threads” (Blaser 2004: 29). Blaser argues that “the links and connections that make place do not extend only spatially but also temporally” (ibid). He uses the idea of horizontal threads to refer to trans-place linkages in a spatial sense much as Sharp et al. conceive of the threads involved in the construction of power. However, Blaser is able to extend this interpretation of power when he suggests that in constructing ‘place’, vertical threads, which refer to connections between histories and places, should also be acknowledged “as previous ‘mixtures of threads’ are part of the genealogical make-up of contemporary constitutions of place” (2004: 29). Blaser’s conception of power is not only constructed through a myriad of connections in a contemporary setting, but also entangled within a myriad of historical connections.
Given that Sharp et al. see power as constructed through the knotting of various social threads, we can see that that the entanglements of power are “absolutely central to the constitution of power relations” (Sharp et al. 2000: 25). Additionally, within those relations power is seen as an “effect of the entanglements” because power is an expression of the relationship between two or more threads. The localities of these relations, both metaphorically and literally, are then the very sites where different units and bodies come together and where processes of exclusion or inclusion are enacted and inequality or equality is produced. The resultant leverage from this creation of inequality is then the power I am concerned with here. This idea of power, as the effect of entanglements of threads or relations, can help to explain the desire for some discourses to be based upon binary oppositions. As Rose has noted, “Western thought and action [are] dominated by a matrix of hierarchical oppositions which provides powerful conceptual tools for the reproduction of oppression. In this matrix the world is formed around dualities: man/woman, culture/nature, mind/body, active/passive, civilization/savagery, and so on in the most familiar and oppressive fashion” (1999b: 176). I would suggest that if the construction of power was exposed as a myriad of entanglements, two particular effects would be felt. Initially, the exposure of the entangled construction of power would subvert the authority of dominant discourses by highlighting the diffuse locations of power: a diffusion which dominant discourses attempt to construct as centred and bounded. Secondly, such an exposure of the construction of power would also highlight the relational and contingent nature of power and subvert the belief that power is produced by a given state of affairs. Binary oppositions then are valuable for those involved in discourses of power because they help structure discourses into unified and stable locations which are easier to maintain and manipulate.

What is happening through the discourse of binary epistemologies and essentialist discourse is a process of consolidating entanglements to fewer and fewer sites. This allows already dominant forces to compound and cement their position in a relationship as dominant and in power. As we will see later in this thesis, an example of the reduction of complex realities to essentialist classification happens to the Batwa when they are condemned for their apparent ‘nomadic’ lifestyle. This attribute is used to blame the Batwa for failures in Development interventions, but at the same time it masks the complexity and inequality of the context which the Development interventions themselves are located amongst and help to create. The advantage of presenting an argument against an entire people as a simplified dichotomy instead of an entangled perspective is that it closes off other alternative discourses and only allows one reality to become absolute and bounded. As Rose notes of the alternative relational paradigm, “[o]penness produces reflexivity, so that one’s own ground becomes destabilized. In open dialogue one holds one’s self available to be surprised, to be challenged, and to be changed” (ibid: 175). Even outside the context of my work, in the discourses of current geo-political alliances, complex realities are referred to by using terms such as ‘global terrorism’ and the politics of the discourses are reduced to assertions by the President of the United States of America that “you’re either with us or against us” (CNN 2001). By simplifying an argument to a binary relationship it becomes easier for the centre of the dichotomy to
define the ‘enemy’ and consolidate its own position without having to make itself open to change. As Rose also points out, "[p]ower lies in the ability not to hear what is being said, not to experience the consequences of one’s own actions, but rather to go one’s own self-centric and insulated way" (1999b: 177).

Additionally, this process of consolidation also takes place amongst those on the other side of the inequality, from a position of resisting power. In order to combat inequality, very diverse groups like ‘Pygmies’ or ‘Indigenous Peoples’ come together to present a united force against what they perceive as a dominant force. Unfortunately, because this very process of constructing essentialist identity is similar for both sides of the inequality, it allows some authors like Kuper to claim that Indigenous Rights are no different to extreme right-wing parties in Europe. What I have hopefully demonstrated in the previous chapter is that what this claim fails to recognise is the relationship of inequality between these two groups and the processes of domination and resistance they include. Whilst an essentialising process is engaged in by extreme right-wing parties to further their domination over another, the process Indigenous Peoples are engaged in is to seek equality with those intent on dominating them. As Paradies notes, “It has been suggested that only within this haven of pan-Indigeneity can Indigenous people ‘resist the seduction of assimilation and confidently work at rebuilding a unique identity’” (Paradies 2006: 356). As such the use of essentialist discourse by Indigenous Peoples can be explained as strategic essentialism4.

Those positioned as the ‘Other’ are ultimately restricted to resisting dominating processes by adopting the positioning of their oppressors and forming a unified position. But as Blaser et al note, even in these situations it is difficult for Indigenous Peoples to consolidate their power when they are being undermined by several dominant forces in different localities,

…the feasibility of a multi-pronged strategy that includes alliances with other social movements...is highly dependent on the existence of clearly delimited and visible rallying points of common interest. Such can be the case in the impending construction of a dam or mine...or the destruction in a short period of time of a vast expanse of forest...the problem is that the most common situation for Indigenous Peoples is...where pressures over their territories and resources are more or less continuous, consistent with a wider logic of economic development, but not necessarily connected through a master plan promoted by states or corporations. (Blaser et al. 2004: 16)

It is also important to note that I am not intending to essentialise these power relationships by only acknowledging them as binary oppositions. I do, like Blaser, find it important to acknowledge “the grey areas, those points in the networks...in which there is not only opposition but mutual

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4 This is not the same as Spivak’s understanding of ‘strategic essentialism’ which utilises essentialism to deconstruct the very discourses it is used in (see DANIUS, S., JONSSON, S. & SPIVAK, G. C. (1993) An Interview with Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, boundary 2, vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 24-50.).
reinforcement, unwilling collaborations, turning points, indifference or sympathy” (Blaser 2004: 35). But I am attempting in this thesis to document the manipulation of complex and entangled representations into binary representations of discourses, peoples and processes. As a result, and without denying the complexity of power relationships so far uncovered in this chapter, my analysis in the rest of this thesis will necessarily focus on the construction of binary representations.

From a deconstructivist perspective, a deconstruction of the centre or margin not only explodes the basis for the dominant group’s construction of identity but also explodes the availability of power that comes from that construction. Thus a deconstruction of the centre and margin has to involve the deconstruction of the benefits of being the centre, which is the control of power. To offer an example; one of the guiding principles of imperialism, terra nullius, was based on the belief that indigenous inhabitants of colonial territories possessed no “recognizable societies, law, property rights or sovereignty” (Buchan and Heath 2006: 5). This belief rested upon the supposition that Indigenous Peoples were underdeveloped and uncivilised and not able to make use of their land to the same capacities of the imperialist agents. Added to this were the missionising principles that sought to spread the word of God to those perceived to be in the dark. But what has challenged and to some extent halted the progress of this Imperialism is the understanding of the fallacy of these notions (in Australia through the legal case of Mabo v. the State of Queensland (No. 2) (see Buchan and Heath 2006: 19)). As it came to be shown that these newly ‘found’ ‘races’ of people were just as ‘intelligent’ and ‘civilised’, the imperialists no longer had the ability to justify their exploitation of them through the promotion of essentialist and binary oppositional doctrines. By losing their ability to justify their imperialist practices with binary oppositions, they no longer had the same power to subjugate those they encountered.

Empowerment

Throughout my thesis I will draw on ideas from Freire’s ‘Pedagogy of the Oppressed’ (1972). Despite being written over thirty years ago, largely to analyse the role of education in the oppression/liberation of people, there are a number of similarities which can help my critical examination of Developmentalism. In Developmentalism, as in education, the re/educating of people is a core principle. Whereas teachers educate their students, those who identify themselves with ‘Developmentalism’ ‘educate’ the ‘undeveloped’ of this world: people who are no more typified, in the eyes of Development, than the Batwa. Freire is concerned not only with the structuring of these two sides but also the structure of their relationship. He sees education as dominated by what he calls a ‘banking concept’ where “the scope of action allowed to the students extends only as far as receiving, filing, and storing the deposits…knowledge is a gift bestowed by those who consider themselves knowledgeable upon those whom they consider to know nothing” (ibid: 46).
Additionally, Freire acknowledges the maintenance of the oppression of people by those in power. He argues that the ‘banking concept’ is used to further oppression and encapsulates an entire education of the oppressed, albeit a false education. As the oppressed are never tutored to think independently and are instead directed into their position as the oppressed, the ‘banking concept’ is not a true pedagogy of the oppressed. Freire calls for a new pedagogy of the oppressed which uses ‘liberation education’ so students and teachers work together in a cognitive process to break free from their oppression. He emphasises the role of the oppressed in liberating themselves. He explains, “this lesson and apprenticeship must come, however, from the oppressed themselves” (1972: 22), and that it should be “a pedagogy which must be forged with, not for, the oppressed (be they individuals or whole peoples)” (emphasis in original ibid: 25).

The dominant paradigms which shape Development discourses have at their core the belief that those intended to be the recipients of their endeavours are passive and abstract entities not involved in the process of empowerment. Like the banking system of education, they are viewed as empty vessels waiting to be filled with knowledge about ‘income generation techniques’ or ‘community based resource management’. And despite the rhetoric of ‘Participatory Development’, which implies that the ‘teachers’ and ‘students’ will be working together, as will be seen later in this thesis, this rarely happens in practice. Development discourse tends to deny the entangled and lived situations of the people they work with. Instead they reduce complex issues in situations to instances of a lack, whether what is lacking is knowledge or material wealth.

This is evident in a case I will discuss later where one Development project highlighted the increased alcoholism amongst the recipients as a design flaw of the project and not a result of much larger patterns of marginalisation and discrimination. When the project co-ordinators analysed this problem they reasoned that this drinking was as a result of the new influx of money which their project had injected into the project recipients’ lives. As a result they recommended that a follow up project should be implemented that educated the communities in income management practices (see FAO 2005b). By suggesting yet another project, they continued their existence in the community’s lives and the community’s dependence upon them. In this case the entangled lived reality was one where the community was gaining less actual income as a result of the project and their abuse of alcohol was due to their dire social and economic oppression at the hands of their local neighbours and the nation state. With such persistent discrimination and marginalisation, most members of the community sought solace in alcohol rather than in a future which was undeniably bleak.

Developmentalism in Uganda continually objectifies its subjects instead of acknowledging the ability of people like the Batwa to solve their own problems. Additionally this discourse denies the complexity of the Batwa’s situation by reducing the cause of their extreme situation to a lack of some form of substance which the ‘Developmentalists’ possess. As Freire notes, “[t]he teacher presents himself to his students as their necessary opposite; by considering their ignorance
absolute, he justifies his own existence” (1972: 46). Importantly Freire believes that “these adherents to the [oppressed] cause constantly run the risk of falling into a type of generosity as harmful as that of the oppressors. The generosity of the oppressors is nourished by an unjust order, which must be maintained in order to justify that generosity” (1972:36). I would suggest, however, that ‘Developmentalists’, through the work they carry out, can only be loosely termed ‘adherents to the [oppressed’s cause]’. I argue instead that the reproduction of the ‘unjust order’ is the inevitable consequence of the binary discourses discussed in this chapter, where the centre demands the construction of the ‘Other’ in order to stabilise and reflect its own image. And whether Developmentalists intend to or not, instead of being the liberators of the oppressed, through their role as the reproducers of binary discourses and the ‘unjust order’ that results, they become the perpetual benefactors of the oppressed. As a result, I argue in the rest of this thesis that it may be more helpful to look at Developmentalism as part of the problem rather than the solution it suggests itself to be.

Before we leave Freire I will briefly attempt to synthesise his work with that of Sharp et al (2000) as I negotiate some of the critiques which have been directed at Freire (see for example Coben 1998, McLaren and Leonard 1993, Taylor 1993b). Freire suffers from the sexist language used throughout his work (see hooks 1993) and also from the lack of awareness of class. For Coben, these exclusions are manifest through Freire’s failure to include the role of power in his work,

Lacking an understanding of power, his idea of oppression is just too simple and indiscriminate to accommodate the multifaceted and contradictory nature of differential power relationships in terms of gender, class or any other social category...The oppressed, in Freire’s formulation, remain a generic other. Freire’s model cannot account for oppression within a social category. (emphasis in original 1998: 97)

Coben’s statement is entirely valid. Freire does not accommodate the intricacies of power and neither does he accommodate the entangled interactions which produce power, such as class or gender. As I have shown above through my reading of Sharp et al (2000) and Blaser (2004), power is indeed an ‘entangled’ phenomenon. It cannot be treated as existing within a simple ‘Freirean oppositional pair’ where oppression and power are exerted in only one direction.

But I would suggest that there is still great value in Freire’s works. By re-reading his work it may be possible to analyse how the entangled nature of power and the practice of oppression are conjoined. I would suggest that Freire locates the perspective of resistance/oppression as seen by those in power: that is a perspective which is constructed and reproduced by those in power as a way of maintaining their power. In essence then Freire analyses a perspective which is constructed by the oppressors and which necessarily does not accommodate the entangled perspective of power. I believe that whilst Freire was at fault for only acknowledging the dominant
discourse and not alternative discourses, he must be commended for detailing the significance of
the dominant system of education as a form of social control and a means to retain power by those
already in power.

However, I agree with Coben’s (1998) objection to Freire’s portrayal of ‘teachers’ vital role in the
liberation of the oppressed. Coben characterises this as a “bizarre notion of a revolutionary
leadership composed of patriarchal, charismatic, indeed messianic, members of the petit
bourgeoisie…One is left with a vision of relatively privileged individuals driven by guilt to atone for
the sins of their class through service to the poor” (ibid: 113). If Coben’s analysis is valid, I would
argue that the so called ‘underdeveloped’ do not need the ‘revolutionary leadership’ of the
‘developed’ to lead them out of their oppression. But I do agree with Freire that the oppressed will
ultimately need the participation of the oppressors at some stage in their liberation. The only way
to erode oppression must surely be to show the fallacy of the entire ‘Freirean oppositional pair’ and
reveal the existing entangled relationship between the oppressor and the oppressed. Thus the
oppressed have to convert or at least work with their oppressors if only to destroy the foundational
dualism upon which their opposition is built.

**Hunter-Gatherer Perceptions of the Environment**

From within the hall of mirrors it is almost impossible to imagine talking, thinking,
writing, doing, smelling, imagining and realizing worlds without ‘law’, ‘spaces’,
‘places’, ‘time’, ‘scale’, ‘nature’ and ‘self’. However, local and indigenous
communities are doing this as they construct processes, experiences, thoughts and
actions. (Howitt and Suchet-Pearson 2003: 566)

In the preceding sections I have outlined the dominant binary epistemology’s understanding of the
world based upon binary dualism. I looked at how foundational dualisms can lead those that
control the construction of discourses, identities and power, to impinge on the lived experiences of
what it constructs as the ‘Others’. It is in this position as the ‘Other’ that the ‘West’ has used
‘primitive societies’ to justify their own stance and have positioned themselves in the world as the
civilisers, the conservationists and the developers. What is missing from this account are
alternative discourses and the experiences of this process from the perspective of the ‘Other’ – in
this case Indigenous Peoples. We can see how they have been positioned as part of this dualistic
ontology, but do they themselves believe they belong as part of this ontology? For example,
Indigenous Peoples relate to their environments in ways manifestly different to the dualistic
approach outlined above which divide nature and culture? Many authors have already commented
on the difference between ‘Western’ societies and hunter gatherer’s economic, cultural and societal
However, for the purpose of this discussion I want to focus on environmental relationships amongst
hunter gatherers and for this I am indebted to recent works by Tim Ingold (1999, 2000, 2004).
Ingold argues that in ‘Western’ ontology, culture and nature are represented as two distinct entities where nature is representative of what might be called scientific nature. Culture has also become divided to form the culture that the western world creates and the culturally perceived world of nature (Ingold 2000: 41). By this Ingold means that each individual or society is understood as having the capacity to ascribe meaning to the environment it occupies and which may be completely different to the representation created by another person. These different representations are culturally created and are distinctly different to the ‘real’ nature science is understood as having access to. In the ‘West’ we see nature as something to which we have to ascribe meaning, something which we stand outside of, as opposed to something which we dwell within. What Ingold argues is that hunter-gatherers perceive themselves as acting within an undivided world and as engaging with its constituent parts which are already inherently meaningful, “(the western) [ontology] may be characterised as the construction of a view, that is, as a process of mental representation. As for the other, apprehending the world is not a matter of construction but of engagement, not of building but of dwelling, not of making a view of the world but of taking up a view in it” (emphasis in original Ingold 2000: 42)

How does this dwelling manifest itself for hunter-gatherers? Turnbull (1962, 1983) and later Mosko (1987) have shown how Mbuti Pygmies relate to the forest as their ‘father’ and ‘mother’, ‘sibling’ and ‘lover’ and describe themselves as ‘children’ and ‘people of the forest’. As Bird-David demonstrates, this account shows remarkable similarities to her study of Nayaka hunter-gatherers from India who refer to their forest environment as ‘big father’ or ‘big mother’ and themselves as ‘son’ or ‘daughter’ in that context (1990: 190). In this way the Mbuti and Nayaka understand their environment as something which they are able to interact with on a daily basis, so that there is not a fundamental differentiation between relations with human and non-human constituents of the environment. As Ingold remarks, “one gets to know the forest, and the plants and animals that dwell therein, in just the same way that one becomes familiar with other people, by spending time with them, investing in one’s relations with them the same qualities of care, feeling and attention” (2000: 47).

Ingold provides ethnography from the Waswanipi Cree of northeastern Canada and their experiences with the animals they hunt, experiences which go against the ‘Western’ belief that only humans have the capacity for personhood. For Cree hunters, respect must be given to their prey at all times on the understanding that they will not present themselves as gifts to the hunter if they are not respected by the hunter (see Feit 1995, Scott 1996). Kohler (2000) describes similar experiences with regards to Baka Pygmy relationships with elephants so that for both peoples “hunting itself comes to be regarded not as a technical manipulation of the natural world but as a kind of interpersonal dialogue, integral to the total process of social life wherein both human and animal persons are constituted with their identities and purposes” (Ingold 2000: 49)
Finally Ingold uses the example of Pintupi Aborigines’ Dreamtime to show an understanding of how landscape can be perceived differently by hunter-gatherers. He uses Myers’ accounts of how Aboriginal people understand their environment as being created by ancestral beings during the ‘Dreamtime’. They acknowledge their own interaction with their environment and see their lives mapped out on the landscape in much the same way as their ancestors’ lives were mapped out during Dreamtime. Myers writes that “for each individual, the landscape becomes a history of significant social events...previous events become attached to places and are recited as one moves across the country” (in Ingold 2000: 53). As Barnard also suggests, unlike most social scientists who see society sandwiched between the environment and cosmology in a hierarchical world order, in “Aboriginal thought, all these elements are so interrelated that it becomes difficult to separate them and certainly difficult to give priority to material causation or social behaviour over cosmological assumptions” (1999: 63).

In summary, Ingold shows that for Mbuti communities the forest they inhabit is regarded as possessing similar attributes to a human parent and that for Cree hunters their prey can also possess ‘personhood’. Lastly, he uses Pintupi understandings of environmental experience to show that for these communities the environment is another constituent of their world which they are able to interact with and not a substrate to which they must attribute meaning – instead this environment already has meaning inherent within it. In this way hunter-gatherers can be seen as embodying what Bird-David (1999), Ingold (1999, 2004) and Milton (2002) call a relational epistemology – a process of acquiring knowledge that recognises that the environment one inhabits does not need meaning imposed upon it but that it already possesses meaning which can be understood through interaction. Bird-David uses the comparison of a botanist cutting samples of bark from a tree to gain knowledge of it versus Nayaka practices of ‘talking with trees’, where ‘talking’ is used as shorthand to represent a myriad of social interactions. “To ‘talk with a tree’ – rather than ‘cut it down’ – is to perceive what it does as one acts towards it, being aware concurrently of changes in oneself and the tree. It is expecting responses and responding, growing into mutual responsiveness and, furthermore, possibly into mutual responsibility” (emphasis in original 1999: S77). She also recognises that instead of dichotomising the environment, the Nayaka communities experience of relational epistemology turns “attention to ‘we-ness’, which absorbs differences, rather than to ‘otherness’, which highlights differences and eclipse commonalities” (1999: S78).

‘Western’, or as Bird-David refers to them, ‘modernist’ beliefs hold that knowledge of our environment is socially constructed when mental representations are attributed to it through religion, education and scientific theories. The problem with this is that it creates a barrier between humans and the environment and denies the “role of the environment itself...in the production of knowledge” (Milton 2002: 41). Whilst knowledge is capable of being constructed through social experience, the belief that nature does not have the capacity for its own knowledge ignores the fact “that human beings are as capable as any other animal of picking up information directly from their
environment” (ibid: 41). So, a relational epistemology highlights the capacity of humans to understand that non-human objects are able to relate to them – as such it differs from dominant Eurocentric thought which sees the converse as the case. The dualistic ontology of the West has positioned humans as the only possessors of personhood whereas a relational epistemology does not see personhood as “part of what something is, an individual...[but instead]...personhood emerges out of what something does in relation to others” (emphasis in original Milton 2002: 47).

The very notion of relational epistemology has come under criticism from some authors for going against one of its main principles and creating a dichotomy of its own between “a dichotomous modernist epistemology and a non-dichotomous relational one” (de Castro 1999: S79). What needs to be clarified here is that a relational epistemology, with its reference to the generalised community of hunter-gatherers, does not necessarily imply a dualistic relationship between hunter-gatherers and ‘modernist’ societies. Bird-David rightly uses the term ‘authority’ to position the two epistemologies, not dualistically, but in an interplay of power between two epistemologies present in all societies. In a reply to Bird-David’s article Ingold goes further,

…the difference between hunter-gatherers and citizens of modern Western Nations is not that the former have a relational epistemology while the later have signed up for the modernist project. After all, a great many contemporary hunter-gatherers are citizens of Western nation-states. The difference is rather that within the context of the modern state and its political, economic, and educational institutions, relational ways of knowing have lost much of their authority (1999: S81)

In Modernity’s attempt to complete the ‘civilising process’ it has, as will be outlined in the next chapter, attempted to extract itself from nature so as to distance itself from what it sees as the uncivilised attribute of instinct. This has led to a change in the way we interact with nature and create knowledge of nature. This outlook must be questioned. As Milton remarks, “Not only does nature do things to us, we do things to nature, and nature responds in ways that impact on us. We are engaged in an interactive relationship with our environment” (2002: 51). If this is accepted, as surely it must, we can see the fragile conceptual relation the west holds with nature as a result of its ontology. On the one hand Eurocentric thought is pushing to prove its disjunct from nature by showing its control of nature. Yet it is constantly reminded of the ineffectiveness of this strategy by instances where it has been unable to control it, which leads these occasions to be represented as ‘natural disasters’. As Modernity has to believe in the surety of its ontology in order to carry it out as a life strategy, environmental events like ‘natural disasters’ often serve only to reinforce the imagined need to control nature instead of reminding us that humanity will always be acted upon by nature, as our relationship will always be interactive.
In taking on one foundational dualism, nature/culture, I have attempted in this brief section to demonstrate, through a deconstruction of this binary, its epistemological construction. Through the examples of hunter-gather epistemology, I have highlighted the fact that a binary epistemology is not the only way in which the world we live in can be experienced and understood. Accepting a relational epistemology as a valid alternative to a binary epistemology enables me to now investigate, in more detail, the basis and construction of several other ontological binaries throughout the rest of this thesis.

Conclusion

In this thesis I will attempt to trace the historical origins of Central African Forest People's production as the ‘Other’ and contrast that with their social and historical situation in the south west of Uganda. My aim is to “open [up] the varieties of otherness and reflect them in ways which force members of [my] own culture to assume different perspectives, to question the assumption they make about selves and others” (Banerjee and Linstead 2004: 224). This will involve charting how Central African Forest Peoples were constructed as the ‘Other’ in several foundational dualisms, and how they became represented as ‘savage’, ‘uncivilised’, ‘wild’, ‘undeveloped’, ‘childlike’, ‘dirty’ and ‘stupid’ in opposition to a centre, often located as white, civilized, educated, wealthy and male. In the later sections of this thesis I will move on from this historical outlook and focus on how these foundational dualisms have changed in type but not in nature. Whilst the Batwa may no longer be seen as ‘The Missing Link’ in modern discourses, they are nonetheless positioned in opposition to the dominant ways of knowing and experiencing the world.

Eurocentric thought draws upon Enlightenment science, industrial revolution technologies, market economics and/or Judeo/Christian philosophies (Howitt and Suchet-Pearson 2003: 557). Each of these social constructs are founded upon a binary epistemology which orders the world into discrete categories which define what something is by what it is not. In this exclusionary process, “Other knowledges are rendered silent. They are ignored, devalued and/or undermined so that Eurocentric knowledges see only themselves, becoming self-legitimating rather than self-aware” (ibid: 558). The Batwa are positioned by others on the margins of their own situations, separated from the centres. They are represented as unable to understand the problems they face or at worst, the direct cause of these problems. The solutions are in turn located in the centre and held by dominant agencies working in Developmentalism. As Rose describes it, the binary

…self sets itself within a hall of mirrors; it mistakes its reflection for the world, sees its own reflections endlessly, talks endlessly to itself, and, not surprisingly, finds continual verification of itself and its world view. This is monologue masquerading as conversation, masturbation posing as productive interaction; it is a narcissism so profound that it purports to provide a universal knowledge when in fact its violent erasures are universalizing its own singular and powerful isolation. It promotes a
nihilism that stifles the knowledge of connection, disabling dialogue, and maiming the possibilities whereby ‘self’ might be captured by ‘other’ (Rose 1999a: 177)

In trying to understand the marginalised position the Batwa inhabit in a complex environment it is striking how little capacity they have to freely determine and sustainably managed their own futures. In contrast, those who are in a position to determine and manage those lives are predominantly non-Batwa involved in Developmentalism whose aim is to empower the Batwa People. In witnessing the failure of the objectives promoted by Development orientated projects, I have also witnessed a conflict between how ‘Development’ is conceived and understood by the Batwa who receive it, and by the practitioners who hand it out. As Said notes,

Orientalism can be discussed and analyzed as the corporate institution for dealing with the Orientalism – dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, teaching it, settling it, ruling over it; in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient. (1995: 3)

However, replacing Said’s terms with ones more appropriate for this thesis, his text would read:

[Developmentalism] can be discussed and analyzed as the corporate institution for dealing with the [Undeveloped] – dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, teaching it, settling it, ruling over it; in short, [Developmentalism] as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the [Undeveloped]. (1995: 3)

This thesis is therefore grounded in a deconstruction of Developmentalism and its constituent parts. Although Developmentalism is a multi-sited entity, I will analyse it by subdividing it into four main areas which each maintain and promote the philosophy of Developmentalism and which were prevalent in my area of study in south west Uganda: ‘Conservation’, ‘Evangelism’, ‘Advocacy’ and mainstream ‘Development’. The reason I have included areas like ‘Conservation’ within Developmentalism is that it is grounded in the same set of binary oppositions, and in working to achieve its aims, ‘Conservation’ often works with local communities in education, health care or income generation projects. This is also the case for ‘Evangelism’ and ‘Advocacy’ initiatives, so I have found it impossible to exclude them from my study simply because they fall outside mainstream ‘Development’ classification.

Additionally I aim neither to essentialise these four categories within Developmentalism nor to suggest that they are bounded and discrete; for indeed they are not. But I will provide two justifications for my continued use of these terms in this thesis. Firstly, I will continue to use these four terms, as well as concepts like the ‘West’, to pursue Spivak’s concept of strategic essentialism
(see Chay 1991, Darius et al. 1993, Spivak 1988) which is “a strategic use of positivist essentialism in a scrupulously visible political interest” (Spivak 1988: 13). Importantly, and in contrast to Indigenous Peoples strategic essentialism, which uses essential terms to create strength and unity, I will employ Spivak’s sense of the term and use the strategic deployment of essentialist terms so that I can then interrogate those very terms throughout the course of my thesis and deconstruct the foundations upon which they are based. This is also in line with advice given by Derrida:

…conserving in the field of empirical discovery all these old concepts, while at the same time exposing here and there their limits, treating them as tools which can still be of use. No longer is any truth-value attributed to them; there is a readiness to abandon them if necessary if other instruments should appear more useful. In the meantime, their relative efficacy is exploited, and they are employed to destroy the old machinery to which they belong and of which they themselves are pieces. (1970: 254)

This strategic essentialism will be carried out not only to assert that the knowledge and values which underpin Developmentalism are socially constructed, but to show the inequality and dominance of Eurocentric thought in creating knowledge, in order to open up new ways for other forms of knowledge to become validated within a larger system of understanding. As Esteva writes,

I am now more than ever convinced that if one fully accepts cultural relativism…one must also accept its consequences, i.e., the dissolution of universal values. This does not mean, of course, having no guiding principles to live in community. It means exactly the opposite: to have them fully rooted in the perception and attitudes of daily life, instead of supplanting them with artificial constructs which are hypothetically universal and more or less ahistorical. (Esteva 1987: 138)

Secondly, and most importantly, these terms do present themselves in everyday policy and practice. Those involved in Developmentalism acknowledge these terms and promote their use in their discourses. Additionally those who are situated on the receiving end of these discourses, in this case the Batwa, experience actual, often life changing effects in their interaction with them.

I should be clear that in deconstructing terms like the ‘West’ or ‘Pygmy’, I do not intend to present new representations of what I conceive to be the ‘real’ ‘West’ or the ‘real’ ‘Pygmy’. There is no ‘real’ ‘Pygmy’ or ‘real’ ‘Westerner’ to show to the world through my thesis. However, as Said suggests in discussing the Orient, “…none of this Orient is merely imaginative…Orientalism expresses and represents that part culturally and even ideologically as a mode of discourse with supporting institutions, vocabulary, scholarship, imagery, doctrines, even colonial bureaucracies
and colonial style” (1995: 2). When I use the term the ‘West’ I do so in the full knowledge that it is socially constructed and never distinct from its binary opposite: however at the same time I understand that it represents a process which has real meaning and real effects in the world.
4. ‘PYGMIES’ AS THE ‘OTHER’

Once the limit of nature/culture opposition makes itself felt, one might want to question systematically and rigorously the history of these concepts...Concerning oneself with the founding concepts of the whole history of philosophy, de-constituting them, is not to undertake the task of the philologist or of the classic historian of philosophy...it is probably the most daring way of making the beginnings of a step outside philosophy. (Derrida 1970: 254)

Consideration of the ‘invention’ of the Pygmy, first as a distinct racial category and then as a global stratum or frozen moment in human physical and social evolution, usefully exposes the more general process of construction of racial types, and the manner in which such knowledge is constituted through a circular affirmation of ‘facts’ among popular travelogues, colonial reports, medical descriptions and professional or scientific pronouncements. (Ballard 2006: 134)

In this chapter I will investigate historical representations of Forest People that have been constructed by explorers, scientists, colonial officers, journalists and the European public in order to provide a historical analysis of the concept of the ‘Pygmy’5. As Said argues with regards to Orientalism, “without examining Orientalism as a discourse one cannot possibly understand the enormous systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage – and even produce – the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively” (1995: 3) Following Said’s account of the production of Orientalism, I will draw on representations of the Batwa from written accounts of the last two hundred years. None of these accounts should be regarded as representative of Forest Peoples’ own representations of themselves, so what I hope to provide is a clear picture of how the Batwa have been represented by others through the discourses of race, evolution, and Colonialism. As Comaroff and Comaroff have noted, in Africa, these discourses

...established the dark continent as a metaphysical stage on which various white crusaders struck moral postures.

The symbolic terrain of a rarely-seen Africa, then, was being shaped by a cascade of narratives that strung together motley “scientific facts” and poetic images – facts and images surveyed by an ever roving European eye. (1997: 87)

5 I reserve the term Pygmy/Pigmy for Eurocentric ideas and images of Forest Peoples
As we will see representations of Central African Forest People had a fundamental position within this ‘cascade of narratives’ and were crucial to its development and legitimacy. Later chapters will examine the impact of these representations on the Batwa themselves.

The Rise of Social Darwinism

Savages are of great use to political philosophers; their condition serves as a sort of zero in the thermometer of civilisation, - a point from which there is a gradual rise towards perfection. They are thus very valuable in hypothetical reasoning.

H. Merivale, Edinburgh Review, 1837

It would be a biological crime if we allowed such a peculiar race [Bushmen] to die out, because it is a race which looks more like a baboon than a baboon itself does...We have so far got about 20 who are just about genuine...It is our intention to leave them there [in the park] and to allow them to hunt with bows and arrows but without dogs. We look upon them as part of the fauna of the country.

Colonel Denys Reitz, Minister of Native Affairs, South Africa, April 3, 1941

Historical representations of Indigenous Peoples supported the belief that they were a living image of the former world in which we all lived, an idea heavily influenced by Darwinian thought. The assumption of this theory was that, in essence, all human beings were once hunter gatherers but had since evolved to a level where we could leave hunting and gathering behind us. The repercussion was that continuing hunter gatherer communities were seen to be behind the rest of humanity, a vestige of our former selves. In order to fully understand this position it will be fruitful to first investigate the relationship between Darwin’s concepts of biological evolution and ideas of social evolution.

Whilst scientists may now feel they are in a position to overwhelmingly confirm Darwin’s theories on evolution (see Carr 2005, Quammen 2004) the ramifications and interpretations of his theories should still be open for debate. Central to this debate should be how his theories relate to the concepts of human historical evolution and specifically human social evolution. Darwin’s two major pieces of work, The Origin of Species (1859) and The Descent of Man (1871) stand as testaments to how the scientific community and western society perceive the world in which it lives, but behind these works lies a distinct contradiction that needs to be acknowledged. In The Origin of Species Darwin’s argument rested upon the idea of diversity, with individual species modifying their characteristics over a series of generations to fill a specific niche in a given environment.

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This principle of preservation, or the survival of the fittest, I have called Natural Selection. It leads to the improvement of each creature in relation to its organic and inorganic conditions of life; and consequently, in most cases, to what must be regarded as an advance in organisation. Nevertheless, low and simple forms will long endure if well fitted for their simple conditions of life. (Darwin 1888: 160)

As Ingold summarises, “differences favourable to the reproduction of their carriers under environmental conditions...will tend to become established, while those less favourable gradually disappear” (2004: 209). This argument hardly mentioned social evolution and Darwin often commented that he was incompetent to discuss the social application of his theory (Rogers 1972: 265). Darwin did argue for the “complete interfertility of races” (Biondi and Rickards 2002: 368), thus arguing against race as exclusionary divisions. However, with the publication of The Descent of Man, Darwin chose to bring humankind directly into his theory of evolution.

Ingold argues that when Darwin wrote about evolution in nature in The Origin of Species he did so as if from a position outside of nature clearly symbolising his belief in humankind’s position above nature (Ingold 2004: 209). Ingold asks, how could it be that humans had transcended their position in nature to take up such a lofty stance? Clearly, Darwin felt that we had evolved beyond nature and as justification of such a stance he attempted in The Descent of Man to create a linear scale of evolution which included all animals and had man at its highest point. The historical basis for this scale was one of charting humans’ accumulation of reason over instinct, thus creating the understanding that, the “evolution of species in nature was also an evolution out of [nature]” (emphasis in original Ingold 2004: 210). Intelligence for Darwin manifested in what he referred to as ‘art’, or what might be better understood as skills and technologies; “At the present day civilised nations are everywhere supplanting barbarous nations...and they succeed mainly, though not exclusively, through their arts, which are the products of the intellect. It is, therefore, highly probable that with mankind the intellectual faculties have been mainly and gradually perfected through natural selection” (1871: 197). This expressed his belief that humankind did not differ in kind but only in degree from nature and that the degree was measured through distinctions between reason and instinct and between intelligence and emotions. It was this logic which was used to justify Colonial and Imperial endeavours and caused Baron Georges Cuvier to write that, “[i]t is not for nothing that the Caucasian race has gained dominion over the world and made the most rapid progress in the sciences, while the Negroes are still sunken in slavery and the pleasures of the senses” (in Lindfors 1983: 9).
So how did Darwinism affect ideas of human history? The Enlightenment movement of the 18th Century understood that human history concerned the rise of civilisation from the depths of primitive savagery (see Barnard 2004b, Ingold 2004: 210). All humankind was believed to carry the same capacities to rise above savagery, but ‘primitive people’ were further behind in the process. What Darwinian Theory made possible was to suggest that evolution out of instinct and into reason was accompanied by a growth in the powers of the human brain so that ‘primitive people’ were not only behind modern civilisation, but also inferior in mental capacity as a result. When this is linked to the doctrine of survival of the fittest it paints a picture of the ‘savage’ as an inferior, small brained race who in turn will be supplanted by superior and well-endowed races. Darwin himself suggests this, “At some future period, not very distant as measured by centuries, the civilised races of man will almost certainly exterminate, and replace, the savage races throughout the world” (1871: 242). Based on these concepts Social Darwinism sought to use Darwin’s theories of biological evolution to chart social evolution.

As late as 1927 Fleure was replicating this argument,

It appears that we still have in the modern world a few types in which the above growth in relative length of the head has not occurred, i.e., they are survivors of a very early stage in the process of the rise of modern man, and it is of importance that among them are found what seem to be the lowliest societies of mankind (1927: 127)

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And with particular importance to my thesis, Fleure describes ‘pigmies’ as such,

They have for the most part short, small heads, small build and short lives, as far as is known. They thus seem to represent an early stage of the development of modern humanity, without much of its typical increase of size and, in early stages, especially of length of head, without much of that increased growth which has such widespread importance among mankind, and without that lengthening of the life-cycle which is one of the outstanding features of our race (1927: 128)

But the imperialist doctrines Darwin’s theories were used to embellish ran counter to the argument he had developed in The Origin of Species, where species adapted to a particular environment and thus produced diversity. In The Descent of Man he now proposed that nature ran along a single path of evolution from the lowest of animals to the highest of men, “leading from instinct to intelligence and reaching its ultimate conclusion in modern European civilisation” (Ingold 2004: 211). In essence what The Descent of Man did was justify, through ‘science’, the view that ‘primitive’ societies were weaker and inferior to western society and it therefore formalised concepts developed during the Enlightenment. Astonishingly, the justifications of ‘primitive peoples’ as weaker and inferior gave little credit to “the fact that [such people] had survived for millennia and that they must have been quite remarkably ‘fit’ somehow” (Brantlinger 2003: 168).

Rogers comments that, “for those who could not distinguish between biological and social evolution, Darwin’s theory offered the public authority of science by which they could attempt to legitimize their private vision of human progress” (1972: 280). During the 19th Century Social Darwinism allowed colonial powers to justify their imperialist practices. Dennis comments that some 19th Century Social Darwinists,

…viewed European, and especially English colonialism, imperialism, and other efforts to control the natural resources and people of distant continents as natural components of the Darwinist principles entailed in the struggle for existence, survival and supremacy. However...[some Social Darwinists]...saw English political, economic, and cultural control of ‘inferior’ races as not only necessary to England’s political and economic survival, but also important for bringing civilization to the unenlightened. (1995: 245)

Many of Social Darwinism’s ideas were integral to arguments over the abolition of slavery, with those opposed to abolition arguing that slavery was the natural law of Africa and part of the condition of savagery. Comaroff and Comaroff have argued that despite their disagreement with the slave trade, the Abolitionists “tended to respond by blaming the slave trade itself for deforming the normal progress of civilization… [Abolitionism] made the case for the replacement of one mode of colonial extraction with another. Once emancipated, his humanity established, the savage would
become a fit subject of Empire and Christendom” (1997: 88). Regardless of whether the arguments were for the slave trade or not, in the process Africa was degraded and debased and placed firmly behind Europe on a social evolutionary scale.

The applications of Social Darwinism changed after the Second World War as a “reaction against fascism and Nazism led to widespread questioning of race-based theories” (Brantlinger 2003: 6). It was simply no longer acceptable to postulate that ‘primitive’ societies had smaller brains than so-called ‘civilised’ societies (Kleiman 2003: 2). Despite this, the faith and rationale behind the so-called civilizing process remained intact and any hope that the Holocaust would alter the way Indigenous Peoples were seen by ‘western’ cultures was not substantiated. As Ingold has noted: faced with the prospect of having to equate evolution within the frameworks of newly stated human rights, where all humans are equal in capacity and reasoning, scientists reverted back to previously held ideas from the eighteenth century (2004: 212). These views held that humanity followed two axes of evolution; one biological-cultural and one cultural. Despite humanity’s trajectory beginning along these parallel axes, at some point the cultural axis branched off to form a new axis separate from biology. It was this new axis which humans are believed to have followed, with the rest of nature remaining along the bottom axis of nature. In essence this concept followed the much older assumption that ‘man’ had evolved out of nature through his accumulation of reason.

Plate 4: ‘Talking to pygmies is like trying to bridge a chasm of centuries’

This idea alluded to the image that “standing at the threshold, at the point of origin when history diverges from evolution, and culture from biology, is the figure of the primitive hunter-gatherer, today’s equivalent of the eighteenth-century’s savage” (Ingold 2004: 213). Whilst there is no difference in biological capacity between a ‘primitive’ hunter-gatherer and the scientist who studies him, the difference is now explained through an evolutionary variation which has left hunter

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gatherers behind modern society's quest for civilisation through reasoning. Whilst the racial stratification of Social Darwinism has been left behind, the differentiation between instinct and reason, nature and culture, is still firmly present in the often demeaning representations of hunter-gathering communities' life strategies.

The ramifications for hunter-gatherer communities are that they have been left with two dialectic stereotypes; the ‘primitive’ and the ‘romantic’. Predominantly they are pitied for their perceived primitivism, and in many contexts this pity finds expression in anger and discrimination for their failure to develop like the rest of humankind. Academics also share blame for the development of this stereotype, as hunter gatherer communities are often studied in the belief that they represent a version of ourselves as we may have been centuries ago (see Godoy et al. 2005: 122, Marlowe 2003). Recent efforts to understand DNA are now being used to support this paradigm as scientists attempt to determine the position of individual groups on a linear history of human evolution (see Chen et al. 1995, Knight et al. 2003, Salas et al. 2002). Specifically, the importance Indigenous Peoples have played in the Human Genome Diversity Project has come under attack from Indigenous Peoples themselves, some renaming the endeavour the ‘Vampire Project’ (see Cunningham 1998, Furness 2006). As Ingold notes, genetic interest is put down to the notion that “they are living exemplars of a prototypical humanity, a childhood of man from which the rest of us have grown up” (1990: 210). If the words ‘grown up’ are replaced by ‘evolved from’ in the above quote, we can see that studies based upon this notion are still today firmly set within Social Darwinian notions of humanity. Additionally, academics have, in their eagerness to understand hunting and gathering communities, focused predominantly on communities they feel replicate their own ideas of hunter-gatherers in the purest form (Headland and Reid 1989: 50). As Kleiman notes, the result has been that “comparative data that might challenge, alter, or confirm the notion of the [pygmies] as primordial hunter-gatherers have often been ignored, and the racial premise has been in turn reinforced” (Kleiman 2003: 18, see also Rupp 2003).

It is also this subjective creation of data that Frankland alludes to when he suggests that anthropologists have preoccupied themselves with creating a fictional ‘romantic isolation’ of Forest People’s culture (see for example Turnbull 1966) instead of interpreting their identity as being “shaped and reshaped by and through the complex relations between globals and locals” (Frankland 1999: 73). This has led, paradoxically and in opposition to the view that Forest People’s culture is primitive, to romanticised public representations of Forest Peoples, developing what Frankland has called ‘Turnbull’s Syndrome’ (1999). In 1932, Johnson wrote,

The pygmies lead happy lives of care-free slavery in their Utopian forest homeland. They are mere children mentally as well as physically, always ready to sing, dance, and make merry. They spend their days like youngsters at an endless picnic, and there is nothing mean nor malicious about them. They are truly unspoiled children of nature (:

71
Today, Indigenous Peoples are often seen as holders of a sacred wisdom that acknowledges a more harmonious relationship between humankind and nature, and as such are revered. In the context of Canada’s Indigenous Peoples, Feit comments,

The positive version of Indians as non-Euro-Americans was that they are ancient, traditional, unchanged, and therefore in balance with nature. The negative version was that they were uncivilized, undomesticated, lacking industriousness, and therefore savage, querulous, and unproductive. But whether they were viewed positively or negatively, Indians were in both instances the opposites of Euro-Americans. (2004: 112)

This suggests that whilst romantic representations of Indigenous Peoples are in opposition to historically derogatory representations, they nonetheless serve to distance Indigenous Peoples from dominant society’s conceptions of their own identity, and position Indigenous Peoples in direct opposition to that identity. As Kleiman notes, “As a virtual poster child of natural selection theory, the modern-day Idea of the Pygmy plays much the same role it did in the past – mediating emergent knowledge about the origins and nature of human beings” (2003: 19).

Kleiman (2003) charts the construction of the ‘Other’ with specific reference to Central African Forest People and discusses two concepts; the ‘Idea of the Pygmy’ which has been used as a “commonplace icon for the alien ‘other’”(ibid: 10), or as Frankland notes, to stand as the illusion of ‘ultimate difference’ (2001: 239). The other concept she refers to as the ‘Pygmy Paradigm’ which has primarily been used to “generate and test theories about human origins and evolution”(ibid: 3). For Kleiman, the ‘Idea of the Pygmy’ is present as far back as the Egyptians (see Dawson 1938, El-Aguizy 1987, Naville 1905, Smith 1905) with the most acknowledged account being that of King Pepy II (2278 - 2184 BC) who requested that a pygmy, found by Khewefhar amongst an unknown southern people, be brought back to his residence (Dawson 1938: 185). The Egyptian ‘Idea of the Pygmy’ carried with it reverence, as magical attributes were believed to be held by ‘dwarf’ people. Egyptians saw the sight of such people as the “embodiment of both youth and old age…reminiscent of Re’s rebirth each morning…and his passage to the netherworld (i.e. death) each night” (Kleiman 2003: 4). Conversely, at a later date, Aristotle located Pygmies in a position lower than the rest of man on a nascent version of the Great Chain of Being, which would centuries later become resurrected in dominant theory. Despite these two examples being separated by centuries, what is important to understand is that regardless of the positive or negative impacts from either Egyptian or Greek manifestations of the Idea of the Pygmy, what can be generalised is the idea that these people were constructed as different and positioned as the ‘Other’.

In modern times the ‘Idea of the Pygmy’ took a heavily derogatory form and gained a heightened sense of ‘Otherness’ when early explorers encountered the large tropical rainforests of Central Africa. Europeans’ desire to conquer Africa’s inhabitants, territories and wealth found the early
explorers confronted by the obstacle of these alien and unknown forests. As a way of reconciling their grand vision of domination over nature and their largely failed attempt to conquer the forests of Central Africa, early explorers portrayed the forests in exaggerated terms as a “hostile, primeval environment, a green hell where humans could do nothing more than survive” (Kleiman 2003: 1). Fleure described these ‘torrid forests’, “the dampness and darkness of the forest, its tangled leaves and its dread diseases, its oppressive warmth and its wild beasts, would all contribute to the difficulty of life” (Fleure 1927: 128). An implication of such discourse was that any people who chose a life spent in these forests were seen to be the most primitive of peoples. In this way the very culture and society of Forest Peoples in Central Africa became reconstructed as a euphemism for the most savage and uncivilised of existences: the people most removed from modern society and those closest to wild nature (Bradford and Blume 1992).

As mentioned earlier, this tendency to stigmatise ‘primitive’ society in a derogatory way changed somewhat after the Second World War where science endeavoured to understand the ‘unity of mankind’ rather than demarcate differences between the world’s peoples. But in doing so it continued with evolutionary theory as its model and as such used hunter-gatherers as a tool in its search for answers. Whilst the racist connotations were removed, the discriminatory position of Indigenous Peoples’ society below Modernity remained. In a recent journal article, which called for the integration of cultural evolution within the science of evolutionary biology, it was suggested that “cultural evolution exhibits key Darwinian properties” (Mesoudi et al. 2006: 329). Characteristically, when the authors discussed the Aka, a Central African hunter-gatherer society, they described them as living in a “traditional society” (ibid: 340). As Kleiman notes, the ‘Pygmy Paradigm’ has prevailed such that, “in the modern-day context, the [Pygmies] continue to be seen as a people whose biology and lifestyle can help us to decode the human genome, understand human adaptation, and reconstruct the deep hunting and gathering history of all human beings” (Kleiman 2003: xvi).

**Expeditions, and the Exotic ‘Other’**

Whilst ‘Pygmies’ were entering Greek mythology through Homer and Aristotle as early as the 8th Century BC, (Flower 1889: 73, Quatrefages 1895: 1-3) it was not until the 17th Century AD that they were acknowledged in British literature as living beings. In his well known essay, Edward Tyson investigated whether a skeleton belonged to the, until then, mythical ‘Pygmies’. The full title of his essay reveals the answer he thought he had uncovered, *Orang-Outang, sive Homo Sylvæstris: or, the Anatomy of a Pygmie compared with that of a monkey, an ape, and a man: to which is added, A philological essay concerning the pygmies, the cynocephali, the satyrs, and sphinges of the ancients: wherein it will appear that they are all either apes or monkeys, and not men, as formerly pretended* (Tyson 1699). Despite the investigation being a failure (it later transpired this corpse actually belonged to a chimpanzee) Tyson began a process of objectification directed towards
‘Pygmy’ People as a frozen moment of physical evolution. 150 years after Tyson, Maury positioned Africans within the ‘Great Chain of Being’ (see plate 5). He wrote,

On ascending to Man...is it, I would enquire, by accident that the highest approximations to the human form dwell closely along the Equinoxial line, almost in antipodean juxtaposition, -viz...the black gorillas and chimpanzees in Africa?

And, is it again through accident, I ask, that the converse of this proposition is true, viz: that the lowest forms of mankind in Africa...vegetate, to this day, precisely where the highest, most anthropoid, types of the monkey “species” respectively reside?

Others may believe in “accident”. I do not... (Maury et al. 1857: 648)

It was not until the physical ‘discovery’ of ‘Pygmy’ Peoples, in 1865, by Du Chaillu (Balch 1904: 186-187) that this narrative was resurrected with specific reference to Central African Forest Peoples. Flowers’ book, *The Pygmy Races of Men* (1889) came at a time when explorers were ‘breaking through’ the interiors of Africa and bringing back news of distant lands. It was at this juncture that Forest Peoples were transformed from an imagined ‘Other’ into an experienced ‘Other’ and became a curiosity for all who came in contact with them. Despite this transformation from mythical to actual, as Ballard notes, “earlier myths [were] instantiated through acts of encounter that are then, themselves, re-mythologized” (Ballard 2006: 135). What I will now turn to is this re-mythologisation through the writings of explorers and travellers who came in contact with Forest Peoples and in some cases brought them back to Europe and North America.
Plate 5: 'Chart Illustrative of the Geographical Distribution of Monkeys in Their Relation to that of some inferior types of man'

After returning from his expedition to Africa, in 1900 Stanley wrote of 'Pygmy' Peoples,

To-day the descendants of the primitive Africans are to be found south of the twentieth degree of north latitude...they have retained in a remarkable degree the physical characteristics of their primeval progenitors...He is still the wild, shy man of the woods...He lives the same precarious existence, in earth burrows, or diminutive huts, preying on insects, ground game and mud fish, or on what he can steal from his taller neighbors. (1900: 660-661)

![Plate 6: 'The Pigmies as compared with English Officers, Soudanese, and Zanzibaris'](image)

As part of the Uganda-Congo Boundary Commission team, R.G.T. Bright records a similarly derogatory attitude,

The Batwa or Bambutu inhabit the forest. They stand about 4 feet high, and are long-armed, short-legged, and ugly, being usually distinctly prognathous. They have no religion and no industries. No attempt is made to cultivate, but they depend entirely on game and what they can steal from their neighbours. (1908: 490)

Later in 1922, the explorer Barns develops the bestial and primordial image of 'Pygmies' further,

Both my wife and myself looked at these sturdy little men with undisguised interest. What need to look further for the Missing Link when he stood before us! Short legs,

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12 A medical term denoting jaws that project forward to a marked degree
long arms, heavy torso; short neck, rounded head, deep set, penetrating, see-in-the-dark kind of eyes; square long lips, protruding jaw. The ape was all there… (Barns 1922: 149)

The descriptions of many authors during this time all confer these bestial attributes upon the Forest Peoples they meet. A European hunter, Pearson, describes the Mbuti as, “a simple people, and not much higher than the beasts which keep them company” and with regards to their language he comments, “I doubt if they had one, any more than the monkeys whom they resemble” (Pearson 1936: 119). In 1936, another European comments that, “[t]he Pygmy does not indulge in the luxuries of bathing or washing. When he wakes he rubs his eyes, and that completes his day’s toilet”. And further that “they have lived for millennia in the eternal gloom of these primeval forests, and have sunk in character and physique almost as low as the wild animals themselves” (Roome 1936: 266). In addition to the representation of ‘Pygmy’ Peoples as animalistic, there is in each documentation of them a description of their height and physiology. This fascination can be seen clearly in descriptions; “This little man of elfin height, this shrunken sample of humanity bewitched me…Think of it I am among a Race of Tom Thumbs!” (emphasis in original Geil 1905: 182) and in pictures like the one below, through the subject’s positioning beside the tallest member of Barn’s hunting group.

Plate 7: ‘Mr. Renaud with two Pygmies from the Ituri Forest’ 13

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If anything their height as an ethnic group only added weight to the theory proposed by Tyson (1699) and given support by interpretations of Darwin’s *The Descent of Man* (1871). A newspaper journalist for the New York Times conveyed the following story involving the explorer Samuel Verner, which provided one ‘Pygmy’s’ thoughts on his genesis,

In all anthropological sense these pygmies are still a puzzle. Do they show a lowering in the scale of humanity? Are they to be considered the missing link? Once one of the Pygmies brought to Mr. Verner a young ape, whose peculiarity was, that the simian had a white face. Mr. Verner told the man that the wise ones of America asserted that his people, the pygmies, had descended from the apes of the forest.

Turning his eyes on the saxon propounder of the insulting hypothesis concerning his progenitors, and noting the saxon and the Soko ape alike were strictly white, the shrewd old pygmy chap dryly asked: “if we black Batwas come from the black monkeys in the forest, who then comes from that white soko?” (Anon 1904b)

Twenty years later the ‘old pygmy’s’ lesson had still not been understood by Sir Harry Johnston, the ‘colonial luminary’, who thought ‘Pygmy’ Peoples were “mostly stopped in some rut, some siding of human culture, whereas the White man during the last thousand years has gone speeding ahead till he has attained the powers and outlook of a demi-god” (in Ballard 2006: 134). The position was never made clearer, White People were the apex of human civilisation and ‘Pygmy’ Peoples were their antithesis: if not the ‘missing link’ then only one step removed from it.

In all the documentation available there is only one theme where favourable attributes are awarded to ‘Pygmy’ Peoples. The theme regards Forest Peoples Indigenous Knowledge and is recurrent in hunting expeditions where they were used to track game. In one article Prince William of Sweden explains, “[the Batwa] disappear in the forests, where, with their highly developed local knowledge, they find a thousand hiding places which a white man could never discover” (1923: 75). Hunting the Mountain Gorillas in Uganda, Ayroyd states the Batwa, “are good hunters, and know the habits of the gorilla” (1934: 180) whilst another hunter writes that the Batwa, “know the country well and have an uncanny sense of direction and knowledge of the lurking places of gorilla” (Maxwell 1931: 11). And in Congo, Powell-Cotton stated, “In all my wanderings I have never met a native race so adept at tracking or so thoroughly acquainted with every habit and haunt of the animals of their country” (1907: 5).
Plate 8: ‘Major Powell-Cotton and his Pygmy Trackers’

Plate 9: ‘The Male Kivu Gorilla shot by Author’


These representations do not counter the negative representations of the Batwa from other sources. But how can this appreciation of their culture be reconciled with the other derogatory attitudes towards Forest Peoples? I would suggest that hunting provided the only perceived commonality between the white explorers and the ‘Pygmy’ communities and as a result bypassed other mechanisms of discrimination. At the same time the acceptance of their tracking skills could be allowed because it was a field of expertise which no ‘civilised’ human would care to study. At the time, these explorers firmly believed they came from a society which had progressed out of nature. The ‘Pygmies’ were allowed to be experts because they remained within nature and as such this acceptance of ‘Pygmy’ culture did nothing to release them from their position at the lowest stratum of evolution. Regardless of how early explorers resolved the tension of representing ‘Pygmy’ peoples with positive attributes, such attributes were quickly dissolved by some and incorporated into the abilities of non-‘Pygmy’ peoples. As Christy writes, “Their powers of tracking appear simply marvellous till one learns, by frequent association with them, something of the art oneself” (my emphasis, Christy 1915: 205).

Plate 10: ‘Young male Okapi shot by Dr. Christy in the Ituri Forest. Bambutte [sic] Pygmy trackers in background’ ¹⁶

‘Pygmies’ on Display

As soon as explorers came in contact with ‘Pygmy’ Peoples they attempted to capture ‘specimens’ and bring them back as trophies from their travels. Predating other attempts was that carried out by the Egyptians under King Pepy II (2278 - 2184 BC) who is reported to have requested that a ‘Pygmy’ be brought back to his residence “from the land of great trees away to the south” (Keane in Smith 1905: 426). Flower speaks of several attempts, some 4,000 years later, the first in 1870 when, “[i]n exchange for one of his dogs, Schweinfurth obtained from Mounza one of these little men, whom he intended to bring to Europe, but who died on the homeward journey at Berber” (1889: 87). Some years later Quatrefages tells of an Italian by the name of Miani, who obtained two Akka boys in exchange for a dog and a calf (1895: 175). Miani died during the journey home, “but left his collections, including the young Akkas, to the Italian Geographical Society” (Flower 1889: 88).

Plate 11: A drawing of the two young Akka taken to Italy 17

St Louis World’s Fair

Despite these earlier and sporadic interactions with Forest Peoples, it was not until the beginning of the 20th Century and the advent of the great world fairs that Forest Peoples were taken from their homelands and shipped off to be displayed to a Western public. In 1904, noted explorer Samuel Verner returned from the Belgium Congo with six Batwa Pigmies he intended to present to the public at the St. Louis World’s Fair. Under the direction of the anthropology department at the World’s Fair, “1,200 Filipinos, Ainu, Native Americans, Zulus, and ‘Pygmies’ were brought to St. Louis to be studied, to be dissolved, if possible, into the numerical ordering system provided by anthropometry and psychometry” (Blume 1999: 191-192). The anthropologist’s hopes were to use these live exhibits of the ‘lowest known cultures’ to test out and confirm the theoretical discoveries of the time laid down by biologists like Darwin. When the tests were completed the ‘Pygmies’ were seen by these ‘scientists’ to have, “behaved a good deal in the same way as the mentally deficient person, making many stupid errors and taking an enormous amount of time” (Bradford and Blume 1992: 121). It should also be noted that the anthropometrical tendencies of anthropologists and scientists were not halted at the turn of the century. Whilst racial classification of Europeans became unfashionable after the Second World War, fifty years after St. Louis’, scientists were still fascinated by the anthropometry of ‘Pygmies’. In 1955, Gusinde described the anthropometry of Batwa from Rwanda,

…the average stature for men 152.96 cm, and for women 144.18 cm…Their trunk is relatively long. Lordosis is lower than it is with Negroes, but there is no steatopygia…they have in common long arms and short legs…The colour of the skin is predominantly dark brown, approximately No. 28 and 29 of Luschan’s table of skin colours. In addition, yellowish light brown hair covers the whole body…The head is large…The cephalic index for men is 76.62 and for women 75.48…The face…is most frequently broad-oval. The nose of the Twa is flat and low. Two types can be distinguished, the so-called ‘button’ nose and the ‘funnel’ nose. (Gusinde 1955: 40-41)

In 1976, anthropometric studies were still being carried out on Batwa participants in Zaire to see how their reduced size affected their tolerance to heat compared to Bantu populations (see Austin and Ghesquiere 1976).
Plate 12: 'Ethnographic Tableau: Specimens of Various Races of Mankind'  

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The plate below shows the six Batwa members outside their huts in St. Louis. This plate is of a ‘stereoview’ or ‘stereograph’ whose use allowed its owner to view images in 3-D. According to its proponents, “stereographs allowed people to ‘tour’ foreign lands without the expense and hassle of actually going there” (Spiro 2006). In order to do this they contained exotic landscapes, largely from Egypt, as well as other corners of the world. What is interesting in the stereograph below is that its location is not exotic but is actually America: the St. Louis World’s Fair. Counter to its intended purpose it fails to transport the viewer to a foreign land, it does however provide the exoticness required by the owner. The Batwa are the ‘exotic’: whilst the location is mundane the subjects are the exotic ‘Other’, both strange and unknown. This stereograph then provides a stage for the construction of the Batwa as the ‘Other’. On the reverse of the card the exoticness of the ‘Pygmies’ are confirmed,

This queer village and the queerer little black folk…These are Batwa people, natives of the Congo district of Central Africa…They live on various kinds of raw or dried meat. That little fellow in particular …has fine sharp teeth like those of a dog or a wolf…He expects a gratuity for showing off the fire-making contrivance which he has in his lap [is] a piece of apparatus which some far-off ancestor devised and which marks human progress one step farther up than the wild beasts of the home forests. (Underwood & Underwood n.d.)

The local media in St. Louis painted a similar picture of the exotic for their readers. The St. Louis Republic stated that the ‘Pigmies’ represented “the lowest degree of human development” (Anon 1904e), and on June 26th the St. Louis Post-Dispatch described the Batwa as, among other things; ‘pigeontoed’, with ‘abnormally large heads’, ‘cruel, finding delight in torturing animals’ and ‘reported

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19 Source: [Stereoview] UNDERWOOD & UNDERWOOD (n.d.) Pygmies from the Congo, Africa, and huts - man whirling sticks to make fire - World's Fair, St. Louis, U.S.A [postcard], From Notes of Travel, no. 14, London

Plate 13: Pigmies from the Congo, Africa and huts

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84
to practice cannibalism’ (Anon 1904a). This theme of cannibalism was retold by the *Post-Dispatch* on July 2nd, in an article titled "Pygmies Demand a Monkey Diet", where the paper questions whether the Exposition will be able to supply the Batwa with their accustomed diet of monkeys and humans (Anon 1904d).

In a final act of display, at the end of the World Fair the six Batwa were presented to the President of the fair so that he could bestow upon them presents for their service. The *Post-Dispatch* described the Batwa as being 'loaded down with riches’, however this reference seems more to do with their size than the size of the gifts. For their work in the Fair over the summer the President gave each of the nine ‘Pygmies' their own watch fob and 15 cents which they could spend on their trip back home (Anon 1904c). The paper failed to report whether or not the Batwa had been pleased with their payment.

**Ota Benga**

*From his native land of darkness,*  
*To the country of the free*  
*In the interest of science*  
*And of broad humanity,*  
*Brought wee little Ota Benga,*  
*Dwarfed, benighted, without guile,*  
*Scarcely more than ape or monkey,*  
*Yet a man the while!*

*So, to tutor and enlighten –*  
*Fit him for a nobler sphere –*  
*Show him ways of truth and knowledge,*  
*Teach the freedom we have here*  
*In this land of foremost progress –*  
*In this Wisdom's ripest age –*  
*We have placed him in high honour,*  
*In a monkey's cage!*

*'Mid companions we provide him,*  
*Apes, gorillas, chimpanzees,*  
*He's content! Wherefore decry them*  
*When he seems at ease?*  
*So he chatters and he jabbers*  
*In his jargon, asking naught*  
*But for “Money – money – money!”*  
*Just as we have taught!*
Ota Benga was one of the six Batwa who had been found by Verner and taken to St Louis. Upon completion of the fair in St. Louis Ota, had remained in America. Verner took him to the director of the Bronx Zoo, William Hornaday, who immediately suggested that Ota become a live exhibit at the Bronx Zoo. Within days he had been placed in the monkey house beside an orang-utan, a parrot, and a sign reading, “The African Pygmy ‘Ota Benga’. Age 23 Years. Height 4 feet 11 inches. Weight 103 pounds. Brought from the Kayai River, Congo Free State, South Central Africa, by Dr. Samuel P. Verner. Exhibited each afternoon during September” (Anon 1906f). However, the sign was not even necessary as an advertisement: “[a]s a Pygmy, he had not only decades and centuries, but millennia of advance billing” (Blume 1999: 193). As a result some 40,000 people came a day to see Ota at the peak of his fame (Anon 1906a).

Plate 14: Ota Benga with Chimp

Ota was portrayed as a child in the media, and in one article bearing the subtitle ‘A man in a boy’s body’, one journalist wrote,

Though Otabenga is a man in years, he is in many ways as simple as a child…Otabenga’s capacity to convey his impressions is limited. He lacks a basis for comparison. He spends his days in a wonderful place filled with strange gods, its entrance guarded by the great God of Playtime. (Anon 1906d).

Despite this, there was tension in public perceptions of the exhibit of Ota within the monkey enclosure, as highlighted in the poem earlier. The day after the opening of Ota’s exhibit the *New York Times* wrote,

There was an exhibition at the Zoological Park, in the Bronx, yesterday which…made the serious minded grave…“Something about it that I don’t like,” was the way one man put it.

The exhibition was that of a human being in a monkey cage. The human being happened to be a Bushman [sic], one of a race that scientists do not rate high in the human scale, but to the average non-scientific person in the crowd of sightseers there was something about the display that was unpleasant. (Anon 1906b)

During the days Ota spent at the Bronx Zoo there were protests over ‘the degrading exhibition’, and against the implication of Ota being presented beside an ape, by a committee of the ‘Colored Baptist Ministers’ Conference’. One Minister explained that, “[w]e are frank enough to say we do not like this exhibition of one of our race with the monkeys. Our race, we think, is depressed enough without exhibiting one of us with apes. We think we are worthy of being considered human beings, with souls” (Anon 1906g). It must however be acknowledged that the indignation of the Ministers to Ota’s treatment was also allied with a concern that Ota’s exhibition may be used to prove the validity of evolution and therefore damage their own creation story (Anon 1906g).

Whilst the protests over his exhibition continued, Ota faced increased and persistent abuse from the thousands of people who visited him. The *New York Times* reported that on the 18th September the crowds from the previous Sunday “chased him about the grounds all day, howling, jeering, and yelling. Some of them poked him in the ribs, others tripped him up, all laughed at him” to the extent “he had been driven to desperation” (Anon 1906a). The following Friday the crowds were so aggressive in their attempts to touch and prod Ota that he retaliated by shooting one in the face with an arrow (Anon 1906h). With continued protests demanding his release, the zoo relented and deposited Ota with the ‘Howard Colored Orphan Asylum’ in New York (Anon 1906c, Anon 1906e), but ten years later, in 1916, Ota took his own life. At the time, the individual who had brought him to America, explorer Samuel Verner explained the death by surmising that “[f]inally the
burden of the white man’s civilization became too great for him to bear, and he sent a bullet, through his heart” (Anon 1916). At least for Ota the tragic circumstances of his life had ended, but the discourses that found him in a cage in the Bronx beside an ape continued. Blume suggests,

If we can for a moment imagine the Bronx Zoo as a wilderness, as the Zoo founders, with their emphasis on natural habitat, their fetish for realism, often insisted on doing, then the presence of Ota Benga is neither ornament nor accident. It is essential. It authenticates their project and brings it to its climax. When the wilderness is ready for him, then the wild man comes. (Blume 1999: 198-199)

But how would Ota Benga be presented to America if he came in the present day; would he be presented as a musician, perhaps, or as a tourist? In Yvoir, Belgium in 2002, 10 Baka were exhibited at the Oasis Nature Park as part of a ‘humanitarian project’. The Baka sat among recreated huts in the butterfly house as tourists listened to their music and watched their ‘traditional culture’. The information advised visitors to “Discover black Africa and the pygmies” and to “Help these people who live at the start of the third millennium as we did 2,000 years ago” (Guardian Unlimited 2002).

Protests were made, as they were in New York almost a hundred years before, but little had changed between 1904 and 2002. Indeed when the Belgian government did carry out an investigation they concluded that the show was in “extremely bad taste but not racist” (quoted in Kamua 2002). Whilst it seemed the Baka had come of their own free will and whilst the intention was to raise money for services for the Baka People, some aspects of the display remained similar. The Baka were viewed as passive objects for the consumption of the paying public and, as objects in Eurocentric thought cannot speak, cannot think and cannot know, both Ota and the Baka in Belgium were disempowered. The Baka were referred to as ‘Pygmies’ as was Ota and this representation as a homogenous group denied the complex historical processes and current situation Central Africa’s Forest Peoples experience. As Turnbull notes, despite any similarities between ‘Pygmy’ Peoples, “cultural factors are such that each population deserves to be treated in its own right” (1983: 1).

As in New York, the displaying of ‘Pygmies’ did not end in Yvoir, and the practice looks set to continue. In July 2007, a group of 20 ‘pygmies’ taking part in a music festival in Brazzaville, Congo Republic, were housed in a zoo as the organisers, in consultation with the Forestry Ministry, “had hoped to try to create their natural habitat” (Tsoumou 2007). The musicians on the other hand were angered, as in the festivals of the previous five years they had always been housed in hotels along with the other festival participants. In a rerun of the events of Yvoir, tourists came to take pictures and human rights groups, making references to the Great World Fairs of previous centuries, objected (Anon 2007).
The displaying of Indigenous Peoples was not restricted to the United States and the United Kingdom has a similar history of exhibiting ‘Bushmen’, ‘Zulu’ and ‘Pygmy’ peoples, among others. A group of four Bushmen who were exhibited in the early 1850s caused Dickens to reflect,

I call him a savage, and I call a savage something desirable to be civilised off the face of the earth…Think of the Bushmen. Think of the two men and two women who have been exhibited about England for some years. Are the majority of persons—who remember the horrid little leader of that party in his festering bundle of hides, with his filth and his antipathy to water, and his straddled legs, and his odious eyes shaded by his brutal hand, and his cry of “Qu-u-u-u-aa!” (Bosjesman for something desperately insulting I have no doubt)—conscious of an affectionate yearning towards that noble savage, or is it idiosyncratic in me to abhor, detest, abominate, and abjure him! ...the world will be all the better when his place knows him no more.

(quoted in Skotnes 2001: 300)

In 1904, a similar endeavour to Verner’s was being pursued by Colonel Harrison and what were advertised as his ‘Pygmies’ (see Plate 15). Harrison’s endeavour consisted of a series of public performances of his ‘Pygmies’ which visited the length and breadth of the British Isles. Harrison had been in Congo on several occasions before, but in 1904 he went with the express concern of finding a group of Forest People to return home with. He had organised an arrangement with the Moss-Stoll Empire theatre circuit so that upon his return the ‘Pygmies’ would be pressed into immediate service on the big stage (Green 1999: 159).

21 Source: SCOTT RUSSELL & CO (1905) Colonel Harrison’s African Pygmies [postcard], The ‘Scott’ Series of Pictorial Post Cards, no. 747, Birmingham
Plate 17: Head profiles taken of Colonel Harrison’s Pygmies

Source: Ibid.
On their way to Britain the six ‘Pygmies’ spent a period of time in Cairo awaiting shipping arrangements. Whilst there, Elliot Smith, a fellow of St. John’s College, Cambridge examined them and produced a series of measurements, photographs and skiagrams24 (see Plates 16 and 17). Smith wrote,

…the pygmies are certainly negroid and many of the negro features, such as the projection of the jaw and lips, the flatness of the nose, the elongation of the palate, the large size of the teeth, and the characters of the hair, are even exaggerated – i.e., are ultra-negroid in the pygmies. (1905: 430)

Smith also wrote of the experience that,

The abundant secretion from the large sebaceous glands yielded a most powerful and objectionable odour which did not become appreciably less until more than a week of daily ablutions and even up till the last day of their stay in Cairo the odour still clung to them. It may be compared to the well-known “nigger smell” but it was even more pronounced. (1905: 430)

Unlike in St. Louis, ‘Harrison’s Pygmies’ received a far better welcome and appreciation. They were invited to parliament (see Plate 18) where they met with various MPs and within a month of their arrival in the UK they were invited to attend Buckingham Palace for Princess Victoria’s birthday party (Green 1999: 163-165). As Green notes,

The stage show, twice nightly, with the bogus forest backdrop and alleged war dance, was one presentation. The African entertainers were still seen by many as uncivilised savages, but they had been trusted enough to be armed in the presence of royalty [and] legislators. (ibid: 166)

Despite these allowances from the aristocracy in Britain this group of ‘Pygmies’ were nonetheless seen by the theatres and the public as objects to be viewed, the same exotic ‘Others’ as the group who had been taken to St. Louis in 1904. Indeed The Era reported the new act at the London Hippodrome as, “the group of little people who will for some time be objects of curiosity to amusement-seeking Londoners” (quoted in Green 1995: 33). Over a million Britons paid to see them perform (ibid) and a series of postcards and phonograph records were made to be consumed by the ‘amused’ public (see Plate 19).

24 A picture or photograph made up of shadows or outlines
Plate 18: ‘Pygmies of Central Africa’ with British MPs

Plate 19: ‘The Pygmies’ [Postcard]

25 Source: http://www.history.umd.edu/Faculty/Landau/Website/Website-Pages/Image11.html accessed on 20/12/2004 [original photograph by Sir Benjamin Stone]

The *Daily Telegraph* newspaper responded to their arrival in the UK by writing of “Savages untouched by European customs” (quoted in Green 1999: 160) and in Liverpool the Empire Theatre billed them as, “The Talk of all Europe! The most curious people ever seen. They are halfway between anthropoid apes and man!” (quoted in Green 1995: 36). The Hippodrome Theatre called the ‘Pygmies’, “‘ape-like,’ ‘absolute specimens of primitive creation,’ ‘the most curious race in the world,’ asserting that ‘they prefer, it seems, to inhabit trees’ and that their dances ‘seem intended to imitate the play of monkeys’ (Green 1999: 163).

In 2007, over one hundred years later, the very same myths survive regarding the Batwa and Forest Peoples. One community in Uganda was described in a national newspaper by a NGO director in the following way; “the pygmies don’t have houses, they eat raw food and take natural herbs and do not wear clothes…They are resistant to change or any modern livings [sic] conditions and are hostile to other people” (Mugisa 2007). Referring to the same community, in 2006 during a question time in the Ugandan Parliament, the Energy Minister blamed ‘Pygmies’ for the delay in bringing electricity to their district. The *Daily Monitor* newspaper reported that the Minister informed Parliament,

> Bundibugyo has taken long to be connected to the national grid because of the issues of pygmies…These people enjoy climbing trees and they can climb electrical poles and die…Those who have stayed with the pygmies say they don’t like staying in houses. They prefer sleeping in trees. (Nandutu et al. 2006: 4)

Unlike the ‘Pygmies’ brought to England in 1905, the Ugandan Batwa reaction to this derogatory narrative is recorded. Geoffrey Inzito responded in the same newspaper the following week,

> How many Batwa has [the Energy Minister] seen climbing poles?

> We don’t climb electricity poles but like any other person, we climb trees, which have edible fruits. Do electricity poles have fruits or firewood? Hasn’t [the Energy Minister] climbed a tree in his village for a fruit? That was an abuse to us and he should come here personally and apologize. (Nandutu 2006)

**Conclusion**

In this chapter we have seen how the dominant ‘Western’ Imagination has sought to place ‘Pygmy’ Peoples at the centre of its ideology of physical evolution through the representation of Forest People as the ‘Exotic Other’. As Ballard rightly notes, “Pygmies have long served, both in Western imagination and in Western science, as a sheet anchor for racial hierarchies and for putative sequences of human and social evolution” (2006: 133). We have seen Forest Peoples being represented as primordial by travellers like Stanley and bestial by authors like Barns. Finally of
course we have seen their infantilization in the perpetual reference to Ota Benga as a boy despite being a twice married father. But as much as this process constructed the identity of Forest Peoples it also constructed the identities of those who produced and perpetuated the idea of the ‘Pygmy’. To Forest Peoples as primordial, bestial and infantile, the producers of the ‘idea of the Pygmy’ identified themselves as reasoned, cultured and mature. Importantly, not only were the majority of these producers predominantly members of the West, but more significantly they were all in positions of dominance within the discourses they constructed and promoted.

It is important at this stage to also acknowledge that these discourses were not uniform, and that complexities and tension were present within them. Within the Abolition struggle, Africans were not simply victims of ‘Western’ expansion, but also producers of powerful critiques. Likewise ‘Westerners’ were equally critical of their position in promoting concepts of social evolution. However, in using strategic essentialism I have attempted to focus on the producers of these discourses in an attempt to show how the construction of the ‘Other’ was staged and produced by those who controlled the discourses. This should not be seen as an attempt to deny the complexity of the discourses but an attempt to highlight the dominant positions taken within it.

Nevertheless, my thesis seeks not simply to highlight prior racialization through theories of physical evolution, but to chart the continuation of such discrimination through present day narratives of social evolution and progress. The representation of Forest Peoples is now, as one hundred years ago, based on evolutionary hierarchies founded on mythical attributes that bear little or no relation to the complex, historically and culturally shaped situations Forest Peoples experience. These myths are created and reaffirmed by Evangelists, Developmentalists and Conservationists much as they were by colonial explorers. In each case the Batwa are devalued and objectified so that the proponents of these myths can reaffirm and secure their own locations in these complex dynamics. It is to the present context that I will now turn my focus, to look at the continuity in representations of Forest Peoples as the ‘Exotic Other’, located at the lowest stratum of human social evolution.
“In stories about settlement, pygmies are the guides who taught the immigrants how to cope with various habitats within the rainforests, even in the great marsh. The stories are all the more remarkable because, by the nineteenth century, all surviving bands of pygmy hunters and gatherers were serfs for the villagers, who held profoundly ambivalent views about them. They were a despised, uncivilized, subhuman race, unfit for sexual congress with any farming woman. Yet they were the fountain of civilization: the first in the land; the inventors of fire; the teachers about habitats; the wise healers with medicinal plants; sometimes even the first metallurgists; and, on occasion, the first farmers. The inhabitants of the Kuba kingdom, for instance, so intertwined the very notion of untutored nature, its bounty and its dangers, with the notion of pygmy hunter and gatherer that the image of the powerful nature spirits was modelled after the ideal pygmy, that the prohibition of incest was said to have been taught by pygmies, and that any claim to mastery of the land had to involve the legitimizing presence of a quintessential autochthon, a pygmy”.

Vansina (1990: 56)
5. A HISTORY AS THE ‘OTHERS’

As my thesis deals with the current situation and marginalisation of the Batwa in Uganda, it is important to provide information which historically situates their current predicament. I have already shown how the historical discourse surrounding Forest Peoples provided an ideological framework which mediated contact between Forest Peoples and outsiders. But this account only offers a framework for ‘Western’ interactions and does not take into account the interactions between the Batwa and their immediate neighbours. It also fails to offer any insight into the local political, economic and social processes which led to the Batwa’s current marginalised status. To answer these points I will attempt in this chapter to provide a brief historical account of the Batwa and their interactions with their neighbours. This information will highlight the political, economic and social influences which dramatically altered the environment and structures in which the Batwa were embedded and which led to their current situation.

What’s in a Name?

This section will set out the terminology used to describe the people on whom my research focused. I have already referred to these people as the Batwa, but this should not suggest that this is the only name the Batwa in Uganda are called or would wish to be called. As a marginalised and discriminated People used as markers in historical understandings of human evolution, all of the terms used to refer to them are contentious.

Abatwa

Despite most Forest Peoples in Central Africa identifying themselves by other names, the term Batwa is used almost universally by their local neighbours and academics to describe these otherwise diverse ethnic groups (see Kleiman 2003). In Uganda, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Burundi however, the term is used by Forest Peoples themselves. The root ‘twa’ is Bantu in origin and is used throughout Southern and Central Africa to refer to several ethnic groups despite the diversity and distance between the contexts in which these groups live. The works of both Schadeberg (1999) and Jeffreys (1946, 1953) shed light on the meaning of the term, although each author offers different explanations.

Schadeberg (1999) traces the widespread use of the term across sub-Saharan Africa and finds three distinct locations for its use. In southern Africa the root word ‘twa’ has been used to mean ‘Bushmen’, and its most common derivative, ‘Basarwa’, is found across much of South Africa, Botswana and Namibia. An early explorer, Von Rosen, described his encounters with the Batwa People from present day Zambia where he recorded, “Batwa signifies swamp dwellers, or perhaps more correctly the people of the wilds” (1914: 105, see also von Rosen 1925). Secondly, in Central Africa it is used almost exclusively to describe ‘Pygmies’ or ‘bushdwellers’, and in both Central and Southern Africa the term is synonymous with negative attributes. This is highlighted clearly in
contexts where the term is used to define the minority indigenous community; it will also be used by
dominant Bantu groups when insulting a person from their own group (Motzafi-Haller 1994). As
Kabananukye and Wily note, among neighbouring ethnic groups in Uganda, “a person who is
considered dirty, lazy or backward, may be described as ‘Mutwa’” (1996: 27, see also Shalita 1996:
9). The third location has the same root but paradoxically, in southern Tanzania, the term has
come to mean ‘chief’ and carries no negative connotations. By way of explanation, Schadeberg
quotes Guthrie who understood the word as a remnant from when “the speakers of Bantu
languages were at one time actually subjugated by the original inhabitants” (1999: 29). It is this
last definition that has inclined authors like Kleiman (2003) to use the term universally to describe
all Forest Peoples of Central Africa. Kleiman does so in the belief the term has been used by
Bantu speakers to refer to the autochthonous peoples they encountered when they first expanded
into Central Africa: “it refers simply to non-Bantu-speaking autochthons” (ibid: xix). This
understanding however gives significance to the ‘non-Batwa’ in the naming of Forest Peoples and
fails to acknowledge the present negative connotations of the term. Kleiman’s brief
acknowledgement of its discriminatory use does not justify her continued use of Batwa to describe
the collective Forest Peoples of Central Africa. With the exception of the Batwa of Burundi,
Rwanda, Uganda and parts of the DRC, all other Forest People have their own names for
themselves.

In contrast to the meaning of ‘Batwa’ as autochthon, Jefferys explains the meaning of the root ‘twa’
as “stranger, foreigner, alien” (1953: 45) and argues that its use carries negative connotations in
most contexts. Jefferys, somewhat unconvincingly, argues that ‘Batwa’ does not mean ‘pygmy’ or
‘bushman’ because it is found in one or two contexts where those being referred to as ‘Batwa’ are
not in fact small. What he and Schadeberg both agree on, supported by current ethnographic data,
is that the term Batwa is predominantly used by dominant Bantu ethnic groups to describe those
hunter-gatherer peoples that live amongst them. Whether being used to mean ‘autochthon’ or
‘alien’, both uses suggest that the Bantu groups have come to define their neighbours in terms
other than the ones their neighbours have used to define themselves. Through either use as
‘autochthon’ or ‘alien’, the implication is still the same: those identified with such a term are being
positioned as the ‘Other’. In this way it is clear that Bantu Peoples have come to see, and
subsequently name, their hunter-gatherer neighbours in a way that is fundamentally different to
themselves.

Despite the tension in the definition of ‘Batwa’ as it is generally used, in the Ugandan context
Batwa has become the term which Forest People choose to call themselves. Unlike other Forest
Peoples in Central Africa who have other indigenous identities such as Baka and Mbuti, the Batwa
of Uganda use this term as a marker of their indigenous identity, and I will use Batwa throughout
this thesis to refer to the communities I worked with. It is important to note that this does not deny
the different local situations the Batwa experience. As I will discuss later in this chapter, the Batwa
have different language groups and different geographical histories. The Batwa also have different
contemporary experiences, with some communities living in urban environments where they depend on begging strategies and other communities maintaining rural subsistence activities in areas close to their former forests. Additionally, there are variations between the experiences of men and women, youth and elders. All of these differences in experience might suggest that any attempts to unify these people under a common identity are misleading and ill thought out. However, in each of these communities some common social experiences are recognised. Each community expresses both an intimate relationship with the forests of south west Uganda as well as a common experience of dispossession and discrimination at the hands of more dominant actors. My use of Batwa therefore not only recognises the self definition by these communities as Batwa, but also recognises the shared histories and present experiences of these communities both inside and outside the forests. I do acknowledge however that in identifying these communities as the Batwa, I will be disempowering and excluding certain other narratives and experiences from my analysis that are equally powerful in their own right.

Abayanda
Despite the emphasis on the term Batwa, the people discussed here are also known by another name in the Ugandan context. Kabananukye and Wily suggest that the Batwa, "have made it clear through [our] survey, that they prefer to be known by their own name for themselves, Abayanda" (1996: preface). Kabananukye and Wily do suggest that this affiliation exists predominantly around the southern edge of Bwindi Impenetrable National Park (BINP) and Mgahinga Gorilla National Park (MGNP), but they do not investigate the history or source of this term. During my fieldwork I did not hear any Batwa acknowledge its existence until I managed to get a response from one elderly Mutwa,

It means the clan that cannot help itself in any way and we feel it as if a curse because if you call someone that name you have no interest in helping that person. Instead of calling me Umuyanda you can call me Umutwa...[an Umuyanda is] a person who is completely neglected and without respect. You are not somebody. You can even be killed because no one bothers about you. That is why we don't like that name.

Additionally another Mutwa explained, “I used to ask my father why there is the Batwa and the Bayanda. He could tell me that the Bahutu call the Batwa Abayanda because [the Batwa] eat too much. But that is just distorting our name”. When I asked her if she liked being called Abayanda she replied, “I don’t like it, at least [people] call me Batwa because to call someone Umuyanda is just an abuse”. I proceeded to ask the elderly Mutwa why some Batwa, as suggested by Kabananukye and Wily (ibid), chose to call themselves Abayanda. He replied that, “It is because some of them don’t give themselves respect. It is a way of feeling. They are not minding about what other people are talking about them”. What is interesting here is that the elderly man
suggests that calling oneself an Abayanda is a ‘feeling’. For that man, Abayanda defined more than his ethnic background; it defined his state as a human being within a wider context.

Kabananukye and Wily (1996) may have been correct in stating that some Batwa preferred to be called Abayanda, but my interviews suggest the Batwa may have done so because they were trying to define themselves beyond ethnicity and in terms of their current situation. When asked who they were, it may have been that they were trying to say to Kabananukye and Wily that they were a destitute people, a begging people. They were saying this, not because that situation defined them indefinitely but because that was their current reality, an accurate understanding of the situation they found themselves in.

I would like to suggest then, in contrast to Kabananukye and Wily, that the term ‘Abayanda’ should not be used to classify the Batwa People for two reasons. Firstly because it is not linguistically appropriate to use it to refer to all Batwa People, as the word is derived from Kinyarwanda, the language of Rwanda. Kinyarwanda is only spoken by the Rufumbira speaking Batwa of MGNP and southern BINP, and is not spoken by the Rukiga speaking Batwa from northern BINP. Secondly, the term itself refers to people who are unable to take care of themselves and who survive by begging, and its use is intended to stigmatise and dehumanise the Batwa by their more dominant neighbours.

‘Pygmy’/‘Pygmoid’

I will now make a distinction between another two terms used to describe the Batwa, ‘Pygmoid’ and ‘Pygmy’. Both are derived from the Greek word, pygmê which measures the distance between the wrist and the elbow (Flower 1889: 73). Despite initially being used by Homer and Aristotle to describe a mythical race of dwarves, at the end of the 19th Century the term ‘Pygmy’ was advanced to describe people who measured an average of less than 1500 mm. This was coupled with the term ‘Pygmoid’, which designated those Peoples whose average height exceeded 1500 mm by a few millimetres. At the time such terms included peoples not only from Africa, but also Asia and South America (see Gusinde 1955, Quatrefages 1895). Despite this previous use, today the term has been used by many Indigenous Peoples’ rights groups to represent the collective Forest Peoples of Central Africa. The current use of ‘Pygmy’ is intended to bring unity to an extended group of peoples and is not intended to carry the negative connotations implied in historical contexts.

I have explicitly capitalised the spelling of ‘Pygmy’ to make a distinct difference from the other representation of ‘pygmy’. As it is used in some contexts, ‘Pygmy’ acts as a noun and refers to a large body of people who share many cultural and social characteristics and who live in Central Africa. The term ‘pygmy’ however should be understood as an adjective which is typically used by dominant neighbours to derogatorily refer to the Batwa. It is used by them to suggest that the Batwa are lazy, dirty, gluttonous, wasteful, ignorant and stupid. Additionally ‘pygmy’ is used by
non-Batwa as a term to scold one another. A mother, for example, may turn to her child and chastise them for ‘acting like a pygmy’. As ‘Pygmy’ peoples rarely refer to themselves as ‘Pygmies’, I will use the identities they favour themselves, e.g. Batwa, Baka, Mbuti. For as Turnbull notes, despite any genetic or historical relationship, ‘Pygmy’ peoples are culturally diverse and “each population deserves to be treated in its own right” (1983: 1).

Forest People and Hunter Gatherers
Despite having limited use today, the term ‘hunter gatherer’ is still used as a term to describe Central African Forest People. The continued use of this term does create a tension between those who still hunt and gather and those who have in recent years chosen or been forced to adapt their livelihood strategies to include other modes of subsistence. It order to ease this tension the use of ‘former-hunter gatherer’ has been employed, but as peoples’ livelihood strategies are subject to change, often forcibly, I will refrain from their use entirely. Initially described as a ‘forest people’ by early explorers, it was not until Colin Turnbull’s publications (see 1962, 1983, 1963) that the term ‘Forest People’ was more widely used. Turnbull, uncomfortable using ‘Pygmy’, derived the term from the Mbuti who described themselves as being ‘children of the forest’. Turnbull describes the Mbuti as living in symbiosis with the forest which they see as their provider of economic and cultural sustenance. In this sense the use of Forest People by Turnbull and subsequent authors conveys an impression of people having an embodied relationship with their forests.

Alternatively, some have used the term more literally to represent peoples situated in a forested environment. In this use the representation is focused more on the actual geographic location of people and has similar tensions in its use as hunter gatherers has above. The use of ‘Forest People’ and ‘former-Forest People’ suggests a people’s identity is subject to change on the basis of their geographical location and suggests that a previously forest-based people can no longer identify themselves as Forest People if they have been evicted by external forces. Despite this conflict in using the term, I will persist with the use of Forest People to refer explicitly to the collective group of peoples found throughout Central Africa who have historical relationships with forested areas. However, its use is not limited by communities’ access or distance to a forest and instead suggests a people’s relationship to their forest which can be continued physically or symbolically, in situ or remotely.

Non-Batwa
In some of the historical references throughout my text I may use the terms Bahutu and Batutsi, however as these two terms are not commonly used by those same inhabitants I will endeavour to use the current ethnic identities of Bakiga to refer to the groups in Kabale and Kanungu, and Bafumbira to refer to the people of Kisoro. As discrimination against the Batwa purposefully excludes them from both Bakiga and Bafumbira society, my reference to the Bakiga and Bafumbira People should not suggest the inclusion of the Batwa in these categories.
In light of my discussion of colonial and post-colonial contexts, I will also set out the geographical location of my work and the ethnic groups who inhabit this area. As in much of sub-Saharan Africa, the names of places and peoples have changed during colonial and post-independence periods. Importantly, the creation of nation states served to unite different ethnic groups but also fracture existing groups and structures.

Initially, the area of my study was occupied by the Batwa before other ethnic groups moved in from the south around 2,000 years ago (see Hamilton et al. 1986, Morrison and Hamilton 1974, Taylor et al. 2000, Taylor 1990, 1993a). These migrating groups were the Bahutu and Batutsi peoples. Originally the Bahutu moved to the area to flee the Batutsi, but soon after the Batutsi followed them northwards (Mateke 1970). German and then Belgian colonial administrations controlled this area under the administration of Ruanda, which is now present day Rwanda (ibid). At the start of the 20th Century Britain annexed the north of Ruanda and integrated it into the administration of Uganda (see Map 1). This district was called Kigezi and despite being subdivided and no longer in use by the present Ugandan Government, the name is still used to describe the general area of south west Uganda by many of its inhabitants.

Map A: British Colonial Map of Uganda showing Kigezi District

Since independence the district of Kigezi has been separated into the four districts of Kisoro, Kabale, Kanungu and Rukingiri (see Map 2). Through the colonial and post independence periods the terminology used to describe the people who lived within these districts also changed. In the districts of Kabale, Rukingiri and Kanungu, furthest north from Rwanda, the Bahutu people were the majority of the occupants and in time they became known as the Bakiga people. When Edel worked in the area during the 1930s, the Bakiga did not exist other than as a generic term for “those people who lived in the hilly country of the southwest” and whose affiliations were contained within their kinship and lineages (1965: 368). Today no references are made to their Bahutu origin except in historical accounts and they are all seen to exist as a singular ethnic group called the Bakiga. Despite a Bahutu majority, Kisoro District also contained Batutsi and Batwa. In time these people too experienced a change in ethnic terminology and today they are all known collectively as the Bafumbira people. This change has not entirely removed previous ethnic identities and many still describe themselves and others as Hutus or Tutsis if asked. Most differentiated of all are the Batwa, who are seen as a distinct ethnic group particularly when their neighbours seek to create distance from them.

Finally it will be useful to situate the three forests of south west Uganda (see Map 3). In the north lies Bwindi Impenetrable National Park (BINP) which contains half of the world’s Mountain Gorillas. To the south of the area is Mgahinga Gorilla National Park (MGNP) which is part of the wider Virunga Ecosystem and home to the remaining Mountain Gorillas. This park is largely situated in Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, however a small section still remains in Uganda. In between and to the east of these two National Parks lies the Echuya Central Forest Reserve (ECFR) which is protected by fewer regulations than the other two National Parks.

**Origin of the Batwa**

Despite the Batwa identifying themselves as a united group under the one ‘Batwa’ name, they do share different historical and geographic ties. The groups north of BINP share their history with other Forest People across the border in the DRC and to the north, although they have no knowledge of any migrations as part of their history. The groups to the south, who associate with MGNP and ECFR, share a history related to Rwanda and identify their origins as being from that area. Whilst this seems to suggest that one group has migrated to present day Uganda and another has always been present, it has to be understood that Rwanda lies less than a kilometre
from some Batwa settlements and its boundaries have changed over time. Statements that suggest they have moved have then to be understood as suggesting movement of only a few kilometres in many cases.

This differentiation produces many variations in history and culture and it would be naive to understand Batwa identity as homogenous. However, these two groups of Batwa do share a common history of marginalisation and displacement from their ancestral territories, commonality in social systems and their current predicament in Ugandan society. As a result it would be equally naive to see them as two distinct entities with little or no unity. With this in mind and given their own wish to be recognised under a unified term I will use the term Batwa to refer to these two historical groups. Through my use of the term Batwa I will respect their commonalities but also acknowledge the tensions that exist in such a term.

Regardless of which modern nation state communities historically associate themselves with, they all tell stories of living in the forest before the arrival of Bantu groups. This answer from a member of one community near BINP to the question ‘where do you originally come from?’ was simple. He just turned to face the forest and pointed to it. Even when I probed further my question still made no sense to him. No matter how far back I enquired, from great grandfather to great-great grandfather the answer was always the same: the forest.

The Batwa clearly identify themselves as having been the sole inhabitants of the forests of the region and as we will see later this recognition was affirmed by the Batutsi requirement to have their royalty consecrated by the Batwa (Lewis 2000: 7). I have heard countless stories retold of the Batwa’s ‘first contact’ with Bantu groups from the older Batwa. One version was narrated to me by an old man from Nyakabande who in turn had learned it from his elders. He explained,

In the beginning the non-Batwa came into the forest with a walking stick and a machete and a hoe and said ‘mwaramutse?’ [how is your morning?]. The Mutwa started looking around and saying ‘who is this?’ Then his wife asked ‘what do we do?’ So they decided to move away slowly. Then the Hutu said ‘waraye [morning] you Mutwa how are you?’ But the Batwa would not reply and the Hutu would think the Batwa have gone so the Hutu would decide to use that camp and start to hunt and eat meat. (Mutwa, Nyakabande 2007)

Science offers arguments to support this interpretation of the pre-history of south west Uganda and the emergence of other peoples. Benjamin Smith (2005, 2006) has been able to offer the first insights into the 3,000 known rock art sites dotted throughout Central Africa. These sites are distinctive in nature from other rock art sites in Africa due to the dominance of geometric styling (Smith 2005: 1392). Smith believes this art predates the migrations into Central Africa of Bantu populations and belong to an older group of people remembered by present day societies as the
'Batwa’. If Smith is correct then, as he says, “the huge swathe of geometric rock art implies a massive area of Pygmy occupation in the not so distant past...the zone reached from the coast of Angola in the west to the southern coast of Tanzania in the east and the Zambezi in the south to Lake Victoria in the north” (2006: 89).

Scientific information collected by Taylor (2000, 1990, 1993a) and Hamilton (1986, 1974) leads them to estimate the date of the start of agriculture and forest clearance in the Kigezi region. Pollen samples from swamps in the area document the prevalence of forest pollens versus non-forest pollens. This data, when compared to data concerning climate changes, leads to estimates of the date of human led changes in the surrounding area. As a result Taylor suggests that whilst some small scale human deforestation may have occurred as far back as 2,200 BP, the only distinct human period of intense deforestation occurred between 1300 BP and 900 BP. A further study by Taylor et al (2000) confirms that when the pollen and climatic data are considered in relation to archaeology and cultural data, the onset of human activity in the area is estimated to have occurred between AD 622 and AD 1078.

I will now discuss stories which tell of the Batwa’s creation and which offer specific spiritual origins to these historical events. During my fieldwork I became interested in how the Batwa represented their creation. In Kisoro I did not hear a story of creation that stood independently of the other ethnic groups in the area, as every story was told in association with the Bahutu and Batutsi. It seemed the Batwa understood their origin in relation to these other groups and as such these stories provide a telling insight into the inter-ethnic relationships of the area.

I asked one female Mutwa what the origins of the Batwa were. She responded,

What our grandfathers could tell us was that there were three tribes, Bahutu, Batutsi and Batwa. They [were given to hold] bottles...that were all full of milk. Then after it came to the night, the Mutwa was just caught with it asleep, when he was [going to] sleep the milk spilt. Then he got hungry [and] then he drank all that milk. Then the Mututsi, the bottle was still full. But the Bahutu fell asleep and the milk dropped off. The one who gave them the three bottles I think may have been god because the Mutwa as finished everything they called him Mutwa so he can keep on begging. Then because the Muhutu had at least a portion they told him get this hoe and you will dig. The Mututsi had the whole bottle when it was still full. He said you will keep cows and be rich. So it means the origin of the Batwa [began with] poverty.

This same story is recounted by Shalita (1996: 5) although in his version it was three sons, Gatwa, Gahutu and Gatutsi that were given the task by their parents Gihanga and Nyiragihanga. This story is interesting because it is said that this family lived in the forest and are referred to as Impunyu, a term still used to describe those Batwa in Rwanda who depend on the forest resources
for their subsistence. In essence it hints that there is, amongst the three ethnic groups in Kisoro
district, a common understanding that the forefathers of the area came from the forest. Additionally
the story told by Shalita tells of another feature of the rewards given to Gatutsi upon his winning of
the task, “Gahanga said that Gatutsi would be very rich with herds of cattle and plenty of food.
Gatutsi would also head his brothers and they would serve under him” (ibid).

Various ideologies persist and are reaffirmed through the telling of this story. Most obviously a
hierarchy is created which places the Batutsi at the top and the Batwa at the bottom. This
hierarchy is based upon values held by the dominant group, the value of the cow. It is significant
that as the winners of the task the Tutsi were honoured with cows, a detail which affirms the Tutsi
belief that cows are a god given animal. Additionally the test was set by measuring the importance
given to milk by the sons. As the only person to revere the milk as something other than a source
of sustenance, it was the Tutsi who won the task. Finally it also fits into wider beliefs that the
Batwa are an ignorant and gluttonous people who are improvident, unable to see beyond their
immediate future and who are only fit to remain as beggars amongst their older and ‘wiser’
brothers.

Finally there is a third version recounted by Maquet (1954: 151-2, 1971: 173-4) of the first man,
Kazikamuntu, who fathered many children, among whom were, Gatwa, Gatutsi and Gahutu. Gatwa killed one of his brothers and was cursed by his father. Gahutu was chosen by his father as
his successor but one day was found after he had eaten too much and fallen asleep. Kazikamuntu
replaced Gahutu with Gatutsi who went on to do a good job and was then placed by their father as
the superior brother. Maquet writes, “From that time the curse on Gatwa, the punishment of
Gahutu and the reward to Gatutsi have been passed on to their descendents, the Tw, Hutu and
Tutsi” (Maquet 1971: 151-2).

I would suggest that the function of these creation narratives represent different attempts to justify
and acknowledge these groups’ histories and inter-ethnic relationships. The Batwa story differs in
one respect from the stories told by Mateke and Maquet as the Mutwa told of three tribes rather
than three brothers. It is possible that this story offers the Batwa the chance to maintain their belief
in their existence in the forests before the arrival of the Bahutu and the Batutsi whilst still
acknowledging their marginalisation and disenfranchisement. This story also acknowledges and
incorporates the current relationships between the three ethnic groups and may also satisfy some
of the Christian beliefs held by Batwa communities in the area.

Conversely, the second and third stories suggest that the Batwa are actually brothers of the other
two ethnic groups. This denies the Batwa their ancestral rights to their forests and resources
because as brothers they must share their wealth equally. They then go on to legitimate the denial
of such rights to their share of the resources that the Batwa may have had by blaming the Batwa
for their own downfall. It was, after all, Gatwa, the progenitor of the Batwa race, who denies the Batwa their share of their father’s riches forever more.

A final story is recounted by Maquet which offers a more blunt conception of Batutsi and Batwa relationships and histories. He writes,

> Some tales, more widely known than those concerning the creation of man, relate how the first Batutsi came to Ruanda [sic] from the heavenly world. According to some versions of this tale, they came with their servant, Mutwa, who mated with a forest ape. From that union all Batwa are descended. (1954: 186)

Once again, this tale clearly reveals the dominant position adopted by the Batutsi in relation to the Batwa and the position each group was seen to occupy within the collective social hierarchy. Additionally, this story suggests that representations of the Batwa as animal like were not only reserved for Western or Colonial authors, as described in chapter four, but also found amongst the Batwa’s local neighbours. In the case of Rwanda, the depiction of the bestial origins of the Batwa has allowed the more dominant groups to legitimise their representations of the Batwa with negative attributes more commonly associated with animals. These representations describe the Batwa as sexually immodest, dirty, and indiscriminate drinkers and eaters: the direct opposite of how the Batutsi see themselves.

**Migration and Pre-colonial Kigezi**

Very little is written about the years between the scientific records referred to earlier and colonial rule in Kigezi. Certainly there are some records of the Bakiga and Bafumbira Peoples but rarely are there any of the Batwa. A typical case can be found in *Kigezi and its People* (Ngologoza 1998) where, despite detailed accounts of the ancestry of the Bantu populations in Kigezi, there are no specific comments on the Batwa. Another account in *Peoples and Cultures of Uganda* (Nzita 1997) offers no more than stating that the Batwa are the “original inhabitants of Bufumbira” (ibid: 61). They are seen as having no part in shaping the political and economic history of Kigezi and are relegated to passive objects in an otherwise turbulent period. As a dominated people it should come as no surprise to learn that their history has, as they have been, marginalised almost out of existence. To write off their involvement would however be a mistake, as Mateke notes, “Batwa activities seem to indicate that they might have become military leaders in Bufumbira...It is often forgotten that the Batwa played an important part in the history of Bufumbira before the effective imposition of colonial administration” (Mateke 1970: 41). It is therefore vitally important that this period is accounted for to understand how their status changed from, “owners of the ‘domain of the bells’ (from the bells attached to their dogs’ collars)” (Kingdon 1990: 240) in reference to the forested areas where the Batwa would hunt, to a despised underclass no longer seen as fit to drink from the same cup as their neighbours (Veber et al. 1993).
The precursors of the modern day Bafumbira and Bakiga Peoples are represented by the Bahutu and Batutsi Peoples from present day Rwanda. In time the Bahutu living north and east of Echuya and Bwindi forests would come to be known as the Bakiga. Those Bahutu who remained to the south west of these forests would, together with the Batutsi and Batwa, become the Bafumbira, named after the geographical location. Mateke writes that the first Batutsi arrived in Rwanda about 1000 A.D. where they found the Bahutu already organised in clan affiliations (1970: 34). As the Batutsi began to consolidate their position within Rwanda and exercise their authority over the Bahutu, Kigezi region in Uganda began to experience influxes of Bahutu originating from Rwanda around the 18th Century (see Kingdon 1990: 240, Turyagyenda 1964: 127). In the 1930s the Batutsi Monarchy decided to ‘re-subjugate’ the Bahutu who had fled from their earlier attempts and the Batutsi monarchy sent expeditions into Kigezi to do just that (Mateke 1970: 35).

The Bahutu resisted this renewed attempt to subdue them and for many years one group called Abatongo repelled all Batutsi forces and controlled much of Bufumbira. This is where the first accounts of the influence of the Batwa come into play. The Abatongo killed Rugyira, leader of a Bahutu clan who supported the Batutsi,

Following the death of Rugyira, his nephew, Mushakamba son of Bivange, was appointed chief over the Abasinga clan. Mushakamba’s major goal was to defeat the Abatongo. Since he could not do it alone he sent for the Batwa living on the western side of Lake Bunyonyi and feasted them on beer and meat. Then one morning the Abatongo found themselves encircled by the Batwa and Abasinga warriors. The Batwa were experts at shooting with bows and arrows. After a few hours nearly all Abatongo men were dead. (ibid: 36)

With this support the Batutsi eventually overcame the rebellion and extended their kingdom from Rwanda well into present day Uganda. To this day the Batwa refer to the Batutsi as ‘their’ Kings and patrons. But why should the Batwa have sided with the Batutsi? Mateke suggests that the Batwa must have resented the Bahutu as colonisers of their lands and would therefore have supported the Batutsi to inflict damage on their old enemy (ibid). However this is only half of the story as the Batutsi themselves must have been regarded as colonisers by the Batwa. Kingdon offers additional insight,

According to the land rights of Tutsi kings…these high altitude forests belonged to the Twa, who paid tribute to the King’s court in ivory and animal skins. As owners of the ‘domain of the bells’…the Twa were entitled to claim a toll from caravans passing through their territory and payments in food and beer from farmers who encroached on forest areas. (1990: 240)
It could be argued therefore that caught between two powerful forces, the Bahutu and Batutsi, both physically and politically, the Batwa supported the group who appeared to respect their ancestral land rights. This historical allegiance towards the Batutsi helps explain the present day resentment towards the Batwa from the Bafumbira and Bakiga who are both largely made up of former Bahutu People. The military might brought against the Bahutu by the Batwa and the subsequent domination by the Batutsi must not have been so easily forgotten. Kabananukye and Wily acknowledge that even today the Bakiga have a saying *Abatwa Babi*, literally translated as ‘The Bad Batwa’ which refers to the bitter memories of the Batwa raids (1996: 33).

Despite these alliances with the Batutsi, by this time the Batwa were already regarded as ‘not fully human’ and “were said half-jokingly to be more akin to monkeys than human beings” (Maquet 1970: 111). Maquet writes, “Tutsi were said to be intelligent (in the sense of astute in political intrigues), capable of command, refined, courageous, and cruel; Hutu, hardworking, not very clever, extrovert, irascible, unmannered, obedient, physically strong; Twa, gluttonous, loyal to their Tutsi masters, lazy, courageous when hunting, without any restraint” (1961: 164). But more than just sitting at the bottom of this hierarchy, the Batwa were contrasted with their pastoral and agricultural neighbours due to their closeness to the forests and distance from cultivated spaces. As a result, “the Twa was the first group in Rwanda to occupy the semantic pole of alterity” (Taylor 2004: 354).

Historically such resentment towards the Batwa was contained by the Batwa’s relationship with the powerful Batutsi. By 1896 and the death of the then Batutsi King Kigeri IV Rwabugiri, many Batwa were significant personages in the courts of the Batutsi royalty as musicians, dancers, jesters, hunters, and honey-collectors whilst others served as messengers, spies, pimps and executioners (see Codere 1962: 48, Kabananukye and Wily 1996: 31, Maquet 1954: 182, Maquet 1970: 95). de Briey, a Belgian Colonial officer, witnessed the Batwa “enjoying certain privileges, such as that of carrying the king [in his throne]…and of receiving the flesh of animals offered as sacrifices” (de Briey 1918: 299). Many Batwa eventually received recognition of ownership over small tracts of land and some Batwa held control over large sections of land, demanding taxes from all who passed through them (see Kabananukye and Wily 1996: 32, Maquet 1961: 106, Mateke 1970: 39). As one Mutwa explained, “The Divinity has given to the Batutsi cattle to milk; to us He has given the forest to milk” (de Briey 1918: 299).

Despite this relationship many Batwa still felt aggrieved by their serfdom since they “were the most powerful group militarily and yet were denied political and social recognition in Bufumbira” (Mateke 1970: 39) and on one occasion revolted against their Batutsi masters. One group of Batwa knew that with their skills with the bow and arrow they could not be beaten, so demanded that the daughter of the local sub-chief and half-sister of the regional Prince Nyindo were given to them to be married off to Batwa men (ibid). Prince Nyindo gave little notice to the request and the Batwa, feeling offended, took up arms and overthrew the small Batutsi army in Bufumbira. Remarkably,
considering the Batwa’s current situation, Mateke goes as far as suggesting that, “[f]or a time it appeared as if the Batwa would take over all of Bufumbira” (ibid: 40). This as we know did not happen and the Tutsi King enlisted the Belgium authorities, by that time colonial masters in Rwanda, to put down the revolt and regain authority for the Batutsi Kingdom.

By the end of this 1000 year period the Batwa had changed from largely unhindered occupants of the montane forests of south west Uganda to marginalised communities reliant upon ever decreasing resources. The Bahutu agriculturalists and Batutsi pastoralists needed land and as a result the forests were encroached upon to the point of disappearance. Talking to one informant in Kisoro, an aged man in his twenties when the colonials arrived, he informed me that even by that time the Batwa were already regarded as beggars. Kingdon supports this,

By the 1930s cultivation and forestry had greatly reduced the territory of the Batwa who, as their autonomy progressively declined, became more and more dependent on farmers for food and land on which to settle. Kiga farmers exploited this dependence and imposed their economic domination upon the Twa by forcing them to accept less equal exchanges. (1988: 2)

Or as one Mutwa explained,

Since the beginning we have always lived in the forest. Like my father and grandfathers, I lived from hunting and collecting on this mountain. Then the Bahutu came. They cut the forest to cultivate the land. They carried on cutting and planting until they had encircled our forest with their fields. Today they come right up to our huts. Instead of forest, now we are surrounded by Irish potatoes. (in Lewis 2000: 8)

As the Batwa had no livestock or crops to use as payments of tribute, they relied exclusively on the resources in the forest, not only for their sustenance, but for their political survival. The era I will now turn to both completed the Batwa’s exclusion from the forests and the access to resources they depended on for their sustenance and influence. However, despite this reduction in resources the Batwa did remain politically important to the Batutsi through their use as archers in the ever present disputes between Bahutu and Batutsi.

**Shifting Politics of Domination**

The change in politics that came with the advent of colonial rule had a brutal impact on the Batwa. Whilst their patronage by the Batutsi was to continue under Belgian rule, the advent of British rule in 1909 led to an entirely different situation. This was when the Batwa lost the last of their political and economic resources and they were reduced to a society of beggars, despised and downtrodden, struggling to survive in vastly different circumstances. The Belgians arrived in
Bufumbira in 1898 and whilst they continued the indirect rule of Bufumbira from Rwanda they did begin to erode the King’s powers. The British arrived in 1909 and after a short series of meetings they returned to Kampala after informing the ruling chief, the Batutsi Prince Nyindo, that Bufumbira was British and belonged to them (Mateke 1970). Nyindo was allowed to continue to give tribute to his brother the King of Rwanda and visit him across the new border as long as he kept in mind his obligations to the British government (Reid 1912b).

The first report of the Batwa from this period, was written as the British attempted to establish their administration in Kigezi and is by the political officer, Captain Reid. He writes,

…two principle causes have continued to make the settlement of the district under report somewhat slow and difficult. The first of these causes was the severe famine…Rukiga was almost depopulated and the few remaining inhabitants fell an easy prey to the marauding bands of Batwa, a hill tribe from the south. (Reid 1911: 2)

Later in, 1912, Reid wrote,

The Batwa proper are men of very short though sturdy physique, of low mental development and probably represent the original inhabitants of this country. There can be little doubt that in the past they were frequently in the habit of raiding their neighbours…these raids were probably carried out with impunity. (Reid 1912a: 1)

This idea of the Batwa as ‘marauders’ is furthered by Reid’s colleague in the British administration at Kisoro, Jack, who refers to the Batwa as having a “treacherous and thieving disposition” (in Rutanga 1991: 52). In an article he goes on,

…in the thick bamboo forest near Mabaremere and on the shores of Lake Bunyonyi live the Batwa, a race of fierce and savage pigmies. These people live on what animals they can snare or kill, and on the food that they steal from their more peaceful neighbours, whose land they are constantly raiding. The Bakiga hold the Batwa in the most lively dread. The Batwa come, I was told, at night and knock at the door of the hut, and when the door is opened, needless to say by a woman, the woman is seized, and the Batwa proceed to plunder the hut, and probably kill the men. When I asked the native who told me this why the men did not fight, he made gestures which I took to mean that they were so paralyzed by fear that they could do nothing. (Jack 1913: 538)

The supposed savageness is confirmed by another British officer who wrote that, “[t]he Batwa are by nature born raiders and there can be little doubt that unless prompt measures are taken the
aforementioned raid will only be the first of a series and the peaceful development of that part of the country will thereby suffer a severe set back” (Critchley-Salmonson 1912: 2)

Edel explicitly states this when she writes of these times, “The Pygmy raids seemed particularly terrible to the Chiga [sic] because they were entirely destructive. The Pygmies were not interested in stealing live cattle; they slaughtered all they could lay hands on, and burned and destroyed all the villages in their path” (Edel 1957: 4). Despite this she goes on to say in her book that this “terrible Pygmy army which inflicted untold damage” was justified by more than simple destruction: it was done as part of alliances with warring Bakiga clans. Far from being savage and destructive, the Batwa were playing a tactical and very complicated game of alliances, much as the rest of the Bakiga People carried out on behalf of their clans. Edel writes, “the Chiga [sic] as I knew them in the nineteen thirties had no ‘tribal’ unity whatsoever….Different Chiga clans, and even sub-clans, were constantly fighting one another; there were cattle raids, feud killings, even open battles” (1965: 368). It should also not be forgotten that Batwa families were by this point already under the patronage of their Bantu neighbours and would have fought to support such clan affiliations.

I interviewed Binyavanga, the oldest man in Kisoro, concerning this time as it seemed to be crucial to understanding the path the Batwa took in regional politics and society. According to him, the British, not fully trusting the Batutsi rule under Nyindo, sent Abdullah, a member of the Baganda tribe, to act as Nyindo’s advisor and representative of the British government. Binyavanga recounted the story of their relationship,

Abdullah called Nyindo to [get] eggs for him and send [them to] him. Nyindo refused. The child of the king cannot [fetch] eggs. Abdullah said ‘you will do it’. A servant of Abdullah came to tell Nyindo again and Nyindo had to beat him. After the beating Abdullah came to fight Nyindo. They fought and Nyindo had a lot of spears and they killed some of Abdullah’s people. Abdullah took refuge in Kabale. When they reached there he told the district commissioner. He was a white man and he gave him soldiers to come and fight Nyindo. Nyindo fought with those soldiers and he was defeated…

Mateke tells of a different story, one born not out of personal difference but one born out of World War I and the struggle between British held Uganda and German held Rwanda. Mateke suggests that the Germans asked the Tutsi King to urge his half brother Nyindo to rebel against the British. The revolt began, moreover, when Abdullah asked Nyindo to provide porters to carry the luggage of a British official (1970: 43). However, when the revolt began the Batwa’s role was vital. One British officer wrote,

The Batwa returning again and again to the attack, firing arrows from every bit of cover; as large reinforcements came up to assist the attackers…The Batwa seem to
have no respect for rifle fire, and are adept at taking cover, crawling from mound to mound, wriggling like snakes, firing arrows and crawling away again, hence they are difficult to hit. Luckily they do not adopt rush tactics. One constable, Olochi Majan, was wounded, an arrow was fired at a distance of over 120 yards, which will give you some idea of what skilled bowmen the Batwa are. (Thomas 1966: 167)

Despite this often fierce resistance to the colonial rule of the British and to the Batutsi and Bahutu Peoples, the Batwa were never able to achieve a position where they were their own masters. As Taylor notes,

Twa were fierce fighters but, like foragers elsewhere in central Africa, they were simply in the way of agricultural expansion. When push came to shove, they were the ones who were pushed and shoved. In both Rwanda and Burundi, they were demographically overwhelmed by cultivators and herders whose productive systems could support much larger populations. (2004: 364)

Even with Nyindo being replaced by another Batutsi chief, the authority of the Rwandese, the Batwa’s only supporters in Bufumbira, was forever weakened. This had two devastating impacts on the Batwa. In these actions the Batwa fought alongside their patrons against the British and as we have seen this allegiance caused strong resentment by the British towards the Batwa. Alongside their support for Nyindo, during World War I the British were also warding off Batwa raids from Katulegye, the Bakiga chief of the Batwa in Bunyonyi, and raids from Rwanda under the Batwa chiefs of Gruer and Bassebia (see Rutanga 1994). Secondly, this series of events and the subsequent loss of power of the Batutsi People caused the Batwa to lose any political influence they still wielded. The Batwa were left without any support and in the hands of British and Bahutu rule.

**Independence for Some, Subservience for the ‘Others’**

By 1922 the British felt able to replace the Rwandan led administration of Kigezi and they introduced educated Ugandans to administrative posts (pers. comm. Binyavanga 2006). This move placed authority firmly with the previously marginalised Bahutu people of Kigezi, the same Bahutu who had suffered greatly under the Batutsi rule and the attacks of their Batwa armies. This, however, was not the last influence from Rwanda. To this day in Kisoro District, many Batwa and Bafumbira Peoples still see themselves as being allied to Rwanda as opposed to Uganda. The extended families of many Bafumbira still lie across the border in Rwanda and the language and culture they share is similar, if not the same as that of Rwanda. Despite the administrative states created by the colonials, the politics of Rwanda was an ever present influence in the lives of the Batwa and Bafumbira People. In light of this I will briefly recount some of the more important historical events in Rwanda which influenced the Batwa in Uganda.
As Newbury rightly notes, “[a]lthough German and later Belgium colonial rulers did not create state domination and Hutu/Tutsi inequality – for these already existed – colonialism did significantly alter...the forms of domination, and the nature of political competition” (1988). Like the British in Kigezi, the Belgians in Rwanda had looked to preserve “what they saw as ‘traditional’ structures of power, in which Tutsi aristocrats ruled over Hutu peasants” (ibid 1998: 10). As they increased their support of the minority Batutsi and marginalised the Bahutu, further support for political upheaval grew.

The catalyst for uprising by the Bahutu occurred in 1959 with the death of Mwami (King) Mutara Rudahigwa (Newbury 1988: 193). The Belgium authority’s inability to influence the choice of the new King was read by Rwandese as a sign of the weakness of the colonials and brought about an acceleration of politicisation amongst the indigenous Rwandese. By the end of 1959 two main parties existed in Rwanda, the Parti du Mouvement de l’Emancipation Hutu (Parmehutu) and the Tutsi led Union National Rwandaise (UNAR) (Taylor 1999: 44). Bloodshed erupted between these two groups and whilst this was contained by the Belgium Army it did force thousands of Tutsi refugees into neighbouring countries. As violence continued the UN forced Belgium to introduce an open election which took place in 1961 and which the Hutu led Parmehutu won massively (Melvern 2000: 15). By now there were an estimated 135,000 mainly Tutsi refugees in neighbouring countries, and in a final act of defeat for the Tutsi People the Hutu led government abolished the monarchy in 1962 (ibid: 16).

Even from this brief summary of events in Rwanda it is still possible to infer the fall out that would have been felt by the Batwa. Despite losing the monarchy’s influence in Kigezi in 1922, social networks of influence built round the Tutsi chiefs would still have been active in Kigezi. With independence and the abolition of the monarchy in Rwanda in 1962 and the subsequent demise of Tutsi influence, the Batwa lost all avenues of support. Lewis and Knight note, “[t]he events of 1959-61 brought down the Tutsi monarchy and left the Twa without support” (1995: 35). Their forests had all but gone as had their powerful patrons and what was left was an administration run by their former enemies, the Bahutu. They were homeless, marginalised and utterly dependent upon the Bahutu for shelter and sustenance.

One elderly Mutwa explained the situation to me,

The issues of discrimination came after the separation with the kings. When the kings left we now have been scattered and become squatters on neighbouring lands. Before that the Twa had many relationships with the kings and our life was much easier than now. We would sit by the king and eat from close by him and together with the kings they would crack jokes to the Batwa.
Despite being the serfs to the Tutsi for several hundred years, the Batwa had always retained some independence through Tutsi acknowledgement of their historical status and through the exclusive military and forest resources they possessed. Under Hutu controlled serfdom the Batwa were left with no resources or political weight with which to bargain. The only resource they had left was their physical bodies and it has been with these bodies that the Batwa have hired themselves out, for nominal forms of payment, in order to survive. As with other bonded labour relationships it has been common for Batwa to be controlled exclusively by their ‘masters’. I have often been refused access to Batwa communities by their ‘owners’ and in one case was attacked by a man who was scared I was attempting to liberate his Batwa workers. Another community is still ‘owned’ by the descendant of Chief Katulegye, who had led the community’s ancestors to war against the British. Up until the present day Batwa pay tribute to Katulegye’s grand-son with money received from tourists.

Devoid of their Tutsi patrons the Batwa became the outcasts of Rwandese and south west Ugandan society. Taylor writes that “[a]lthough not all Rwandans showed antipathy toward the Twa, among those who did it was not uncommon to hear that Twa were thieves, sexually immodest, dirty, smelly, and perhaps worst of all, gluttonous and indiscriminate drinkers and eaters” (2004: 359). In addition he writes, “[i]t is probable that because of their early opposition to sedentary peoples, all things associated with the Twa came to be seen as threatening and later as uncouth, wild, and uncivilized. These valuations persisted well after their complete subjugation and the Twa suffered the fate of most conquered peoples – disgrace, ostracism, and devaluation” (ibid : 365).

Conclusion

In this chapter I have charted the reduction in political and economic resources which affected the freedom of the Batwa. We have seen that the reduction in the size of the forest as a result of incoming agricultural and pastoral communities reduced resources available to the Batwa. In response, the Batwa used their other resources of entertainment, hunting skills, and military expertise to become integral components of the Batutsi Kingdom. But these resources also failed the Batwa as the Batutsi Kingdom withered under colonial rule, leaving the Batwa to face their enemy’s wrath, under their enemies rule. By the time Uganda and Rwanda reached independence the Batwa were landless, homeless, economically bereft and dependent upon the charity of their former enemies. The Batwa were not only conquered by their neighbours, but also by the Germans and then the British in Uganda, and the Belgians in Rwanda, who each imparted on the Batwa their own form of disgrace, ostracism and devaluation. As we will see in the next chapter this situation has until recently left their survival wholly in the hands of the Bahutu Peoples and this is the situation that continues to the present day.
6. CURRENT SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION

The function of this chapter is to provide a review of the current social and economic situation of the Batwa of south west Uganda. At the end of the last chapter we saw how the Batwa had become completely marginalised from their ancestral forests and as a result marginalised from their only resources for sustenance and independence. They had become excluded from, and despised by, their neighbours and without land, food and income, they were left in a vulnerable position reliant upon the generosity of those same neighbours who discriminated against them. This situation has not remained static and in the last few years a growing number of agencies have responded to the Batwa's plight. At the same time the Batwa themselves have organised into a group, seeking to assert their rights in the Ugandan State.

This chapter is divided into three main sections. Firstly I will look at some of the grounds for their present marginalisation and I will focus on their continued experience of discrimination both locally and nationally. The second section will then move on to look at some of the effects of this continued discrimination and will focus on their socio-economic situation. Lastly I will look at the current response to the Batwa’s situation by both external groups in the form of government agencies and Non-Governmental Agencies (NGOs), and by the Batwa’s own advocacy group, the United Organisation for Batwa Development in Uganda (UOBDU). By the end of this chapter I intend to have laid the foundation for my subsequent analysis of specific interventions by various development agencies.

Grounds for Marginalisation

Discrimination

I will first examine some of the forms of discrimination faced by the Batwa in Uganda to address some of the reasons why the Batwa have poor access to schooling, health care and employment. Their inability to access various forms of support and resources, however, is not limited to the local level so I will also review some of the persistent attitudes towards the Batwa at a national level. As will be shown each of the three types of discrimination Woodburn (1997) highlights as affecting African hunter-gatherers – negative stereotyping, denial of rights and segregation – are present in Batwa life. In many cases non-Batwa will openly tell you that the Batwa are different from them, wild and savage people who are gluttonous. Woodburn notes that amongst non-hunter gatherers,

The bush, the forest, is perceived as alien and uncivilized…farmers typically make a major distinction between their homes…from which trees have been cleared and wild animals and bird nests repelled, and the alien outside world. This inside/outside distinction is often much elaborated. In terms of this distinction, hunter-gatherers may be seen as prototypical uncivilized, alien outsiders. (1997: 353)
Indeed during my own time in Uganda I was constantly warned against driving through the forest on my motorbike on my own in case dangers fell upon me whilst inside the forest. When I asked why, I was only informed that bad things happened inside the forest; that was where the animals belonged. As a result those who wish to live inside the forest, or are historically attached to the forest, like the Batwa, are treated as animal like and as Woodburn suggests, “the reference is to their life in the bush, their nomadism, their lack of property, but also their diet” (1997: 353). The eating of wild game was seen as taboo by the Batutsi, as was the consumption of mutton (see Maquet 1961: 14-17, Maquet 1970: 115, Woodburn 1997: 358). In 2003, I was offered the following comments by women who had joined an interview I was conducting with a group of Batwa. One woman, when questioned why the Batwa live apart from their neighbours, replied, “They are the people of the bush. The bush people. They are wild. We cannot mix”. Another woman responded when asked by a Mutwa why she refused to share food and drink with her by saying, “I have to refuse beer, because I discriminate against you”. In Uganda, as in Rwanda, the Batwa are not allowed to share the same drinking straw as a non-Batwa and if a cup is used it has to be smashed after its use. As one elderly Mutwa explained to me regarding the situation a few years ago, “We would be given some food and it would be poured into our hands and not into plates or cups”.

Consistently local people view the Batwa as inferior because of their ‘begging’ and they are routinely described as dirty. As Kabananukye and Wily heard from one respondent, “I would describe the general attitude as real discrimination; we are very sectarian as far as Batwa are concerned. We do not want to share facilities like hospitals, schools or water sources with them. We consider them dirty. This is what is holding them back” (1996: 180). These and other qualities attributed to the Batwa may be seen as products of their marginalised status but instead are seen by most local people as qualities inherent in Batwa society. In conversation throughout south west Uganda many people would tell me that if only the Batwa stopped begging they would be able to integrate into ‘normal’ society. And many would add that it is impossible to help the Batwa because all they want to do is beg: they are too lazy to work. I employed a friend to help me around the house I was living in and to guard the property at night. One day my landlord visited the property and said to me, “so you have a Mutwa working for you, you know it is difficult to find Batwa who work, they don’t work. Where did you find this one?” When I responded that ‘this one’ was my friend and that is where I had found him, he laughed and walked off.

The marginalisation of the Batwa also allows their neighbours to control them within bonded labour agreements. In one 1996 study one non-Mutwa responded, “These people are mine; they live on my farm. You cannot come here and talk to them without me. You need not worry about them. I am looking after them” (Kabananukye and Wily 1996: 180). This comment mirrors Forest Peoples’ experience throughout Central Africa and this relationship between Forest People and their neighbours has been the source of much debate in academia (see Grinker 1990, 1994, Kenrick and Lewis 2001, Kohler and Lewis 2001, 2002, Lewis 2002, Turnbull 1966, 1983). However, the
situation in Uganda is unlike most other contexts because the Batwa are unable to enter into such relationships with any autonomy intact. In other contexts, the statement ‘these people are mine’ might mask other experiences of the relationship, for example, the dependence of Bantu farmers on ‘their’ Forest People or Forest Peoples own agency in such relationships. However, in Uganda such statements as ‘these people are mine’ can be taken literally in both meaning and experience for each side of the relationship.

Baker notes that, “[t]here appears to be a retrogressive assumption that the Batwa are a temporary society destined to be assimilated and to ‘disappear’ into the dominant society as a result of ‘modernization’” (2001: 17). These notions of Social Darwinism can be seen at the local, national and international levels. One local interviewee in a 1996 report stated, “Batwa should be left to die out. The laws of natural selection will sort things out. The weakest will die. That is natural selection. Why are you (researchers) trying to work against nature?” (Kabananukye and Wily 1996: 180). Another respondent in 2001 said, “Batwa are well treated when there is political gain or financial gain from tourists. Then you dress them in suits, take pictures, after which they revert to the forest. In any case they are disappearing” (Baker 2001: 18). This sentiment is not restricted to their neighbours alone. In one instance I was asked by the Batwa to accompany a group of film makers from Italy who wanted to film a community of ‘Pygmies’ (see plate 20). My role was to act as mediator in the exchange as often the Batwa are manipulated and feel uncomfortable about the intrusion. However, they continue with such visits because they provide a valuable source of income for the Batwa. In this instance the film makers were insistent on seeing ‘real Pygmies’ as they felt the homeless Batwa beggars in Kisoro Town were not sufficiently ‘authentic’ for their film. On the trip to the community one of the film crew questioned my reasons for supporting the Batwa when, as he believed, it was common knowledge that in evolution, powerful cultures take over weaker cultures and ‘make them extinct’.
At the national level these discriminatory views are equally present. In 2005, I personally experienced this sentiment when taking part in a NGO workshop. One of the participants responded to the issue of the Batwa by stating, “…they will intermarry and in 40 years time there will be no Batwa left. That is their future”. This was his attempt to suggest any work to empower the Batwa by NGOs was a waste of time and should be stopped. Additionally, as will be seen in chapter seven, the Ugandan Government's representation of the Batwa is that they are lower than other people, like the Baganda, on an evolutionary scale intimately linked to modernization. The result is that many local government officials respond to the Batwa’s situation by suggesting it would be resolved if they developed skills like other ‘normal’ Ugandans: skills like carpentry or mechanics.

Conservation/Forest Access
One factor which has furthered the Batwa's marginalisation in the recent past has been the conservation initiatives carried out during the 1990s. We have already seen the impact on the forests in south west Uganda from migrating populations which depleted the resources available to the Batwa. However the conservation initiatives of the early nineties represented the final blow in access to remaining resources. I will examine the conservation initiatives in more detail in chapter seven, but at this stage it is important to make some observations regarding the effects such initiatives have. Many Batwa are still reliant on the forest for support even though this is deemed
an illegal act, and during my time in the area I became aware of the Ugandan Wildlife Authorities (UWA) attitudes to the violation of these rules. The fact that the Batwa continued to enter the park even though they knew it was illegal was proof in the eyes of members of the UWA that the Batwa were a problem. It strengthened the stereotype that members of the UWA had of the Batwa as people incapable of following their rules.

This contrasts with the Batwa’s perspective of the situation. The Batwa I interviewed were terrified of entering the park. They are very aware of the fact that entering the park for any reason is illegal and punishable. One Mutwa commented, ‘We are fearing [entering the park]…because of today’s situation we can even be shot’ and another that ‘We are not allowed [to enter the park]…if we go they will put us in prison’. These comments were not made lightly. They were made in 2003 shortly after one respondent’s son was murdered by local neighbours in reprisal for being caught in the forest collecting food. The father later told me that despite this he was still forced to enter the park to get food. The Batwa are regularly imprisoned for violating the rules of these protected areas. The Batwa acknowledge imprisonment as a hazard but continue to harvest items like bamboo as it is often their only source of money. They are often caught but rarely go to court to be sentenced. Instead the police hold them in jail for days and often weeks. One Mutwa told me how he had been held for almost six weeks by the police for collecting bamboo. He did go to court, but was sent back to jail and spent a further two weeks there until he escaped. Because it is known that Batwa cannot pay the fines and that nobody will complain, the authorities can detain them for as long as they wish.

These instances highlight the substantial difference between official responses to illegal activities carried out by the Batwa compared to the activities of other neighbouring communities. In 2003, at MGNP, the Park Warden informed me that his rangers had apprehended several men caught grazing cattle within the park boundaries. When I asked what would happen to them he informed me that they would not be arrested, as this caused animosity between the local communities and the park. Instead they would be put through the traditional community justice systems. This would mean that instead of being jailed the men would receive monetary fines. The Community Warden for the park also said that this local system provided a better environment with which to educate the communities about the parks and conservation. It became apparent that the Bafumbira surrounding MGNP receive differential treatment because they were physically and politically a much larger community who could cause more problems to the park officials than could the minority Batwa. This attitude persists despite the more critical reliance upon the protected areas by the Batwa for their survival. In this ad hoc justice system, Batwa activities are seen to warrant jail terms when they collect foods to stave off hunger, in contrast to other ethnic groups who are only fined for cattle grazing. One Ugandan academic has suggested that against the intentions of the UWA, this policy of, “excluding local institutions from settling cases…[instead]…perpetuates the illegal activities” (Namara 2006: 56).
Regional Conflict
Without giving a comprehensive analysis it is important to acknowledge the impact of the various regional conflicts in the Great Lakes area. When the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) began their invasion of Rwanda in the early 1990s they did so from the cover of ECFR and MGNP in Uganda. During the course of the war and the subsequent genocide in Rwanda, thousands of Batwa were murdered. A study in 1995 estimated that at least 30% of Batwa in Rwanda died or were killed as a result of the bloodshed compared to 17% of the general population (Lewis and Knight: 79). Due to their historical allegiance with the Batutsi monarchy, many Bahutu viewed the Batwa as Batutsi sympathisers. There were also accounts of Batwa who were pressed into service through violent intimidation and sustained coercion despite the Batwa rarely taking political sides in the struggle. The result was that they were seen by both sides as enemies and killed en masse.

Across the border in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the ongoing conflict has devastating consequences for the Forest Peoples there. Despite never taking to arms in the conflicts, the communities have been targeted by several armed groups due to their wealth of knowledge of tracking and navigation through the dense forests. Many communities have been forced from their villages to escape the fighting and most services have been disrupted. However, things took a dramatic turn for the worse between October 2002 and January 2003 when two armed groups carried out a systematic and premeditated campaign of attacks on the human population of the Ituri forest called ‘Effacer le tableau’ (‘Erasing the board’) (see Pottier 2007, Reseau des Associations Autochtones Pygmees 2004). The Bambuti were specifically targeted either because of a belief in their supernatural powers or because of their supposed collaboration with other armed groups. As a result, instances of rape against Bambuti women were reported. There were also claims of cannibalism of murdered Bambuti by their killers who believed eating their flesh would transfer the Bambuti’s perceived supernatural powers onto themselves.

In Uganda, despite a stable political environment in recent years, the effects of the surrounding conflicts have had a persistent impact on the Batwa. Armed groups regularly cross into Ugandan territory to steal supplies from local villagers (Lewis 2000: 23-25) and during the course of my research in 2005-6 I was unable to visit communities along the border for safety reasons. These communities were forced to sleep in their fields at night to hide from such armed groups. Between 2006 and 2008 fighting between the DRC government and a rebel group led by Laurent Nkunda forced thousands of refugees into Uganda and dozens of Congolese Batwa were forced to stay in Uganda with their relatives.

Effects of Marginalisation

Land
South West Uganda is one of the most populated areas of Uganda and, with neighbouring Rwanda, one of the most densely populated non-urban areas in Africa. Human populations
densities can reach upwards of 600 people per km² (Plumptre et al. 2004: 7). This has meant that in contrast to other areas of Africa that are sparsely populated, in South West Uganda eviction from an area leaves the landless nowhere to go, as all other land is already owned. In the case of the Batwa this has meant that after their eviction from the forests they have become dependent upon the patronage of their neighbours to provide land for them to live on. This dependence is fragile and offers the Batwa no security. As one Mutwa commented to me,

I can’t really tell the Batwa future…Instead of developing like the other tribes these other Hutu and other tribes, other local people came in and hijacked part of the land from the Batwa. That’s why you see us moving in every place because we don’t have the settlement and I really can’t tell our future.

By 1996 Kabananukye and Wily found that amongst the Batwa, 82% were entirely landless, “they live either on the land of other farmers (80%), on government land (9.4%) or on church land (10%)” (1996: 116). This meant that 82% were entirely dependent, for their survival, on the very people who discriminated against them. Some Batwa have owned land, however there are instances of this land being expropriated by neighbouring communities. This normally takes place through encroachment by Bakiga and Bufumbira neighbours who subsequently refuse to move when challenged by the Batwa owners. These processes of intimidation and discrimination, perpetrated by neighbouring communities, continue with the confidence that, “who will hear a Mutwa?” (ibid: 121). There are even reports of land being forcibly taken from the Batwa by neighbours with the help of the local police.

Since 1996 concerted efforts have been undertaken to purchase land for the Batwa to help them break free from bonded labour and become self sufficient communities. Land has been bought by one major NGO tasked with supporting communities affected by the creation of national parks, however, this programme was halted when funds stopped. In their place, several Christian organisations have begun land acquisition programmes. Despite the desperate need for land and the need for this land to offer security for those Batwa who live on it, to date no land has legally been handed over to Batwa communities. All donated land remains titled to the NGOs and church groups and questions need to be asked about the future ownership of the land. Are appropriate measures in place to stop the land being taken away from the Batwa? Importantly, when asked why the land cannot be titled under the Batwa’s own names, the response is that the NGOs cannot trust the Batwa to maintain the land as the NGOs wish it to be maintained (pers. comm. 2006). Whilst the current land is more secure than land held under patronage from neighbours, it is still not as secure as many Batwa would like. Until the land is titled in their own name, they will struggle to feel the security the NGOs and churches claim to provide.
A study in 2004 by the Batwa’s own NGO found that despite the best efforts of these groups, of the 623 Batwa families in the three districts of Kisoro, Kabale and Kanungu, only 351 families were living on their own land (United Organisation for Batwa Development in Uganda 2004). That left 272 families, some 44% of all Batwa, still landless. Another study conducted in the same year found that Batwa around BINP possessed, on average, 1.18 fields and those Batwa around MGNP and ECFR on average owned no fields (Plumptre et al. 2004: 45). When compared against the same areas the same study found their neighbours owned 4.52, 7.29 and 7.50 fields respectively (ibid). In 2006 most land acquisition programmes had terminated and the number of landless Batwa remained at the levels found in 2004. They are in effect owned by their landlords, having no access to income generation, no health care, are more vulnerable to sexual and physical abuse by their neighbours and have no sense of security regarding their future existence.

Employment
In 1996 only three of the approximately 3,000 Batwa were in full time employment (Kabananukye and Wily: 132). Of the remaining Batwa only 168 could be said to receive regular cash incomes through self-employment and only 300 were found to receive irregular cash incomes (ibid: 140). This shows that a huge proportion of the Batwa community in Uganda receive no income whatsoever to pay for food, health care or necessities. As Lewis found, “They have become badly paid, low-status casual labourers or porters and many rely on demand sharing (begging) to support
their families” (2000: 120) Indeed Kabananukye and Wily found that the Batwa had no concept of wealth or poverty in an economic sense but only “poverty as simply being without food, and conversely, if one has food to eat, one is wealthy” (1996: 132). In the 2004 Batwa NGO survey little had changed. Of the 2551 Batwa interviewed only 38 men and 8 women described themselves as being employed. The remaining 2505 Batwa, some 98%, said they were not in full time employment.

Plate 22: Two Batwa with their most prized possessions; their child and their radio.

Education
With very few Batwa earning an income, no Batwa are able to consider sending their children to school without external assistance. Uganda does provide Universal Primary Education, where the fees are covered by the government, but this still leaves the parents to pay for stationery, uniforms and provide food for the children to take to school. In 1996 it was estimated that only 60 Batwa were attending school (Kabananukye and Wily 1996: 157). One NGO website claims to now be sponsoring 700 Batwa children in primary education (BMCT 2007). To date no Batwa have completed Secondary level education and none have attended University. Lack of money is not the only problem affecting Batwa education. As one non-Mutwa commented, “Batwa do not need education. They can continue working for us, whether they are educated or not” (Kabananukye and Wily 1996: 155). Many Batwa children suffer discrimination at the hands of classmates from neighbouring ethnic groups (Akankwasa 2001: 238-9). Whilst many start out at school, few are found at the end of the schooling system. In 2004 it was found that 523 children were in Primary
Education whereas only 6 were in Secondary Education. The onset of Universal Secondary Education in 2007 may help improve those figures, but with the financial obstacles and the threat of discrimination, education is still a difficult resource to gain for the Batwa. Couple with this is the generations of adults who have never been to school. The results is a people crucially lacking skills that are vital in Uganda today. The Batwa have to catch up with their neighbours just to hold their own and survive. However, this is proving almost impossible for most Batwa, when one of the most basic tools for self-empowerment, education, is proving to be very hard to come by.

Health
It is of no surprise that as an impoverished group with little, if any, land and no form of income generation, the Batwa suffer poor access to healthcare. On average, a Batwa woman will lose more than two children during infancy compared to the regional average of only 0.8 children (Kabananukye and Wily 1996: 72). In 2000, a medical team found that amongst the Batwa there was a 40% mortality rate of children under the age of five compared to the local average of 20% (Episcopal Medical Missions Foundation 2007). In 2004 a follow up study found that after four years of intervention by a Missionary Medical Team providing free care, the rates of infant mortality amongst the same Batwa had fallen to 18% but also found that those Batwa who were landless and without medical aid suffered an infant mortality rate of 59% (Kellermann and Kellermann 2004).

Disease and illness do not only affect the children. In 2003 upon arriving at the homestead of a Batwa family, I found one of the elderly female members seriously ill. The elderly woman had been suffering for days with malarial symptoms at a time when an outbreak of malaria had killed over 80 people in the area. Her relatives had taken her to the health clinic but she had been refused treatment because they were unable to pay for the medical costs, approximately 200 Ush (£0.10). Where before the Batwa would have used medicinal herbs from the forest, they are now unable to prevent sickness and disease and they have no way to seek the right medication, herbal or pharmaceutical, to combat it. There are frequent stories of discrimination where Batwa are turned away from health centres because the nursing staff claim they are dirty and refuse to treat them.

Housing
The housing conditions that most Batwa live in are of very poor quality. As most are not able to secure long-term use of the land they live on, Batwa are unable to invest in permanent structures for fear of these being taken away from them by the landowner. Jackson notes that most structures consist of “huts made of a circle of poles, or even flimsy maize stalks, thatched with grass, leaves and anything else to hand, such as cardboard” (2003: 57). And Kabananukye and Wily note that, “[Batwa] take it for granted that rain will enter the house” (1996: 127). The reality is that the Batwa are the only ethnic group living entirely in this condition. Families of different ethnic groups can live in equally deplorable conditions, but these are a minority of people from these ethnic groups, while for the Batwa it represents the normal state of affairs.
Plate 23: An extended family outside their houses

Plate 24: A Mutwa stands outside his home on land recently given to him by a Christian NGO

30 Source: Picture courtesy of Penninah Zaninka
Food
The Batwa have extreme food insecurity and are often dependent on charity from their neighbours in order to survive. Other methods with which they obtain food are begging, local charities, payment for work, as a share of crops harvested from landlord’s farms or as a payment from the landlord for work undertaken on their land. In a 2005 study, 42.6% of Batwa interviewed provided their own labour to obtain food (African International Christian Ministry: 9). Now that some communities have had land given to them by NGOs, they are able to produce their own crops. However much of this donated land was sold to NGOs because it was land that nobody else wanted, largely because it was infertile or too close to the forests and susceptible to crop damage from baboons. This has meant that the provision of land has still left many Batwa suffering shortages of food on a regular basis. The only other method with which to obtain food is to look to the forest, which in 1996 55% of all households were estimated to do (ibid: 143). Whilst illegal this must be seen as a necessity as it provides one of the only ways by which they can find enough food to survive. If this safety net were removed it would signify an even greater disaster for most Batwa communities and lead to massive increases in fatalities through hunger and malnutrition.

![Plate 25: Batwa land on the edge of BINP](image)

Violence
As a marginalised group it should come as no surprise that the Batwa are vulnerable to violence from their more dominant neighbours. During my fieldwork I experienced moments of both verbal and physical abuse directed towards Batwa communities and incidents have been reported in the
media (see Schuurman 2003). One problem with a great deal of this violence towards the Batwa is that it lies underneath the surface of many of the interventions aimed at supporting them and can be hidden from view. During one weekend I spent in Buhoma I witnessed two separate instances of abuse from staff employed to work with the Batwa. In one instance a Mutwa employee of a medical centre was reprimanded by a Mukiga superior for touching the superiors’ arm whilst trying to get his attention. The ensuing verbal abuse from the superior left the elderly Mutwa humiliated and cowed in full public view. In another instance children’s clothes were being handed out to Batwa women for their children. The Mukiga in charge of dispersing the clothes only allowed the Batwa women to collect them after they had all been reprimanded for their prior conduct. They were lectured and told that they should stop coming to the missionaries begging for things now that they had these clothes. This paternalism, where the Batwa are seen by others as lesser individuals and blamed for their poverty, is widespread and exacerbates the disempowerment of the Batwa communities.

Many women also suffer persistent sexual abuse at the hands of their neighbours, often on their way to their fields to work (see Balenger et al. 2005, Jackson 2003). Being socially and politically vulnerable, Batwa women are often easy targets and rape is often motivated by the widely held myth that having sexual intercourse with ‘Pygmy’ women enables the man to cure a number of ailments including back ache and HIV. The physical violence towards men is in some situations so routine that in one community in Kisoro alone three of its men have been murdered in the last five years, apparently by members of the neighbouring ethnic group.

As a consequence of this level of systematic abuse and disempowerment from external groups, the Batwa have high levels of violence within their own communities (United Organisation for Batwa Development in Uganda 2005: 10). Domestic abuse is common and fuelled by high levels of alcoholism. Two instances I witnessed within minutes of each other are symptomatic of the internal violence and its prevalence amongst the Batwa. The first case involved an act of domestic abuse between a young couple who had a young infant. In the midst of continuing arguments between the mother and father the child was left, severely distressed, on the roadside with neither parent accepting responsibility for it. According to the community who were watching, the couple were regularly drunk during the day and they were abusive to each other on a regular basis.

Additionally a number of young Batwa women are being drawn into prostitution with the hope of accessing new forms of income. One young teenager I met after the first incident appeared to have little parental involvement and was heading to the local bars after finishing primary school. It was unclear if she was working as a prostitute or not, but it was clear that she was often staying away from her family and not returning home until late in the evening, spending the time with adult men in the local bars. On talking to the girl it seemed that the mother had left the family home and had no further role in her life and that the father was an abusive alcoholic. The break down in social cohesion in the community meant that no one in the community was either able to step in to
help the father with raising the child or prevent her from visiting the local bars even when they found her there. In a nearby community three girls were involved in similar behaviour and in 2005, when one brother decided to remove his sister from the bar she was in, he became embroiled in a fight and was stabbed to death by the non-Batwa patrons of the bar.

**Conclusion**

The response to the situation of the Batwa has been both swift and slow. The Ugandan government has so far neither adequately addressed the current concerns of the Batwa nor responded to the dispossession of their lands to make way for protected areas. In regular meetings with district officials it was continually reiterated that if the Batwa became more like everyone else they would not have the problems they do. This assimilationist rhetoric presents the Batwa’s problems as a result of their failure to learn ‘modern’ trades. Their continued practice of begging is seen as a cultural trait. At workshops where the Batwa’s rights to access the forests were being advocated, local officials held the firm belief that the onus was on the Batwa to negate these rights and accept what the officials saw as their only future; a future in agricultural subsistence, wealth creation and commodity exchange.

However, in 2000 the Batwa from Rwanda urged an Indigenous rights group to extend their support in Rwanda to their ‘brothers and sisters’ in Uganda. With this support the Batwa in Uganda formed their own organisation, the United Organisation for Batwa Development in Uganda (UOBDU). This organisation has grown in strength and is today composed and managed entirely by Batwa membership. Each Batwa community in south west Uganda is included in the general membership and each community elects one male and one female representative to the general assembly which governs the management and objectives of the organisation. Largely through UOBDU’s persistence in keeping the Batwa’s rights at the forefront of Development initiatives, some commendable results have been achieved. As a result of lobbying in the United States, South Africa, Europe and recently at the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights in the Gambia a large number of organisations are now stepping up to support the Batwa and UOBDU. But whilst this support is swift, it often comes with little or no thought for the wider picture of Batwa empowerment and leaves individual groups working on an ad hoc basis.

In 2003 I recorded 31 different organisations which were working or had a mandate to support the 3000 Batwa People in Uganda and this figure has steadily increased. Despite many organisations having cross disciplinary goals and activities it is possible to order them into four main disciplines, based on their main objectives; Development, Conservation, Evangelism and Advocacy. Each of these four categories can be placed within the broader discourse of Developmentalism as they each have ‘Development’ orientated projects within their wider objectives. The Development category encapsulates mainstream Development organisations representing national governments, international groups and also community level groups and their work is largely centred on the
‘development’ of social concerns framed within ‘Western’ conceptions of wealth and social advancement. As such the organisations which work with the Batwa are largely concerned with agricultural support, health and education services, income generation and animal husbandry.

The objectives of Conservation policy are the protection of the world’s natural resources and particularly areas of genetic diversity and natural beauty. However, as the majority of these areas overlap with the ancestral areas of Indigenous Peoples (United Nations Environmental Programme 2002) and larger populations of the world’s poor, in the recent past, Conservation has also become more poverty focused (Colchester 2003b). In Uganda this has seen conservation organisations work with local communities on income generation, tourism, healthcare and agricultural projects where they have taken the lead in project design and implementation. Evangelism likewise has come from a rather different background but now uses Development orientated projects to extend its wider aims. In Uganda, as in most of sub-Saharan Africa, Evangelical groups have become as financially important as many mainstream ‘Development’ organisations, offering health care, education and income generation activities as well as becoming involved in land acquisition programmes. Lastly, as rights and poverty are inextricably linked among impoverished groups like the Batwa, advocacy groups have responded to the issues of poverty in a more direct manner. Questions unfortunately need to be asked: who is driving these advocacy strategies and who is on hand to safeguard the rights of marginalised groups in the processes designed to regain them?

These and other questions will be discussed as I look at these interventions in more detail throughout the remainder of the thesis. It is important to understand that many of these organisations carry out exceptional work that have dramatic and life saving outcomes for the Batwa. But I will argue that there is a tension in this work which regularly conflicts with the rights and goals of the Batwa. On the basis that the involvement of the recipients of ‘Development’ are rarely considered in project designs, (despite the claims of ‘Participatory Development’), it could be argued that the basis for many of these groups’ interventions is designed to satisfy only those wishes and demands which these groups deem worthy of their support, and not the demands and needs of the Batwa themselves.

Additionally, Kenrick and Lewis write that, “In situations where discrimination against a category of people is entrenched in a dominant society, it is often to be observed that those who think they are opposing the discrimination are very often actually reinforcing it in what would appear to be a more benign but equally destructive way” (2001: 312). With this in mind a failure to provide a critique of these activities because of the good intentions with which they are carried out would be a grave injustice to the aspirations of the Batwa. In light of the absence of this critique in many of the projects working with the Batwa, I will now provide a more detailed analysis of these projects in my remaining chapters.
“…the relationship of Europe to the “dark continent”: a relationship of both complementary opposition and inequality, in which the former stood to the latter as civilization to nature, saviour to victim, actor to subject. It was a relationship whose very creation implied a historical imperative, a process of intervention through which the wild would be cultivated, the suffering saved. Life would imitate the masterful gestures of art and science. The “native” would be brought into the European world, but as the recipient of a gift he could never return – except by acknowledging, gratefully, his own subordination”.

Comaroff and Comaroff (1991: 88)
7. HUNTING TO POACHING

The concept of wilderness as the untouched or untamed land is mostly an urban perception, the view of people who are far removed from the natural environment they depend on for raw resources. The inhabitants of rural areas have different views of the areas that urbanites designate as wilderness, and they base their land-use and resource management practices on these alternative visions. Indigenous groups in the tropics, for example, do not consider the tropical forest environment to be wild; it is their home. (Gomez-Pompa and Kaus 1992: 273)

Nature...is not born but made. It is a cultural construct that takes shape and meaning only within a particular social web of signification. Nature...acquires definition and import within a matrix of competing and often contradictory social interests. At stake in the struggle to make claims over Nature are what it means, how it should be used, and who has the power to decide. Rather than embodying an absolute essence, therefore, Nature is the effect of particular discursive processes of power/knowledge that have historically fashioned the domains where distinction, meaning, and truth are made. (Sawyer and Agrawal 2000: 74)

Interventions made in the name of Conservation have had a heavy influence on the Batwa and continue to do so today. Whilst the Batwa had suffered immense change as a result of immigration and through the effects of colonial governance, the advent of conservation signalled the withdrawal of the Batwa’s last remaining rights to their ancestral forests. Despite the impact of these initiatives to protect the last forests of Kigezi, culminating in their designation as national parks, the legacy and conduct of conservation is as important today as it has always been through its mediation of human/environment relations. Spurred by a need to accommodate people’s demands on natural resources, conservation today has entered a period where people are recognised as important components of successful conservation initiatives. This chapter will analyse the success of the participatory methods employed by conservationists and ask both who it is that are being asked to participate and whose goals are being achieved through such participation. Before looking at the direct impact of conservation in Uganda, I want to first chart the rise of conservation as a discourse and examine its theoretical foundations.

The Conservation Paradigm

And God said unto them,
Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth,
And subdue it: and have dominion
Over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air,
And over every living thing that moveth upon the earth  (Genesis 1:28)
In the West, historically with Judeao-Christian and Greek traditions and supported by the Enlightenment and later Darwinism, Western thought has evolved an ideology which dictates that humans and nature cannot co-exist; humans being civilised and nature being wild (Colchester 1994: 1, Thomas 1983: 17-50). As a result ‘nature’ was “to be mastered, tamed, brought under ‘man’s’ control, bent to his will, forced to reveal her secrets, compelled to satisfy his needs and minister to his happiness” (Argyrou 2005: vii). It was within this paradigm that eighteenth-century writers, like Adam Smith, came up with the first theories of development which charted the development of mankind out of nature and into modernity. For Smith, human economic activity evolved through a series of four stages, commencing with hunting and gathering, which he described as “the lowest and rudest state of society, such as we find among the native tribes of North America” (Smith 1776: Book V, Ch I, Part I). Economic activity was then seen to progress through pastoralism, settled agriculture and culminating in commerce and manufacturing (ibid, see also Barnard 2004b: 37, Cowen and Shenton 1995: 31). Prior to this John Locke had famously recounted his theories of property in Two Treaties of Government (Locke 1823). It is here that Locke justifies the private ownership of land and goods through the application of labour,

Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every man has a “property” in his own “person.” This nobody has any right to but himself. The “labour” of his body and the “work” of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whosoever, then, he removes out of the state that Nature hath provided and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with it, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by him removed from the common state Nature placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it that excludes the common right of other men. For this “labour” being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good left in common for others. (Locke 1823: 116)

Not only are Locke’s theories of property ownership enforced by this text but we can see his reliance on a distinction between land in a ‘state of Nature’ and domesticated land which has been adapted by the labours of ‘men’. Locke’s theories have two implications for Indigenous Peoples and the focus of this chapter. Firstly, Locke’s theories deny Indigenous Peoples their rights of ownership, individually or collectively, to their ancestral lands. Further, they legitimise the appropriation of these lands by colonial forces, a process of exploitation, which continues today in the denial of rights of Indigenous Peoples to the protected areas which were formerly their homes. Specifically, Locke writes that the failure to apply ones labour denies individuals or groups the ability to call that good or piece of land ones’ own; “if either the grass of his enclosure rotted on the ground, or the fruit of his planting perished without gathering and laying up, this part of the earth, notwithstanding his enclosure, was still to be looked on as waste, and might be the possession of any other” (Locke 1823: 121).
As Buchan and Heath write, “Land use other than settled agriculture was declared ‘waste’, rather than industrious and rational use, and incapable of forming the basis of property rights. This Eurocentric framework establishes Indigenous social forms as inferior and reduces their distinctive features to a derisory comparison with European social forms” (2006: 8). This concept of ownership through the application of labour was joined by a second theory, derived from nineteenth century evolutionary anthropology, which suggested that,

...indigenous peoples were seen to be extremely primitive insofar as they apparently did not have institutions or concepts related to sovereignty or jurisdiction. They could not, therefore, legally occupy their own lands. Since it could be presumed that the lands were ‘vacant’ from a legal point of view, the Crown could legitimately acquire sovereignty and jurisdiction merely through placing authorized colonists on the lands. (Asch 2005: 431)

When these two theories were used together they enabled colonial forces to deny the customary land rights of Indigenous Peoples formalised through the legal concept of terra nullius in Australia and Canada, and “vacant et sans maîtres” (which literally means empty land and without masters) in French Central Africa (Nelson 2001: 56,59). However, the use of these justifications for the appropriation of lands has not ended with colonialism and has continued in the present day, often by former colonial subjects. It is this Eurocentric framework, informed by Adam Smith’s notion of economic development, which justified the following remarks made by a Ugandan State Minister in 2005,

Constantly people are in competition for natural resources, the state must then harmonise the groups so that all of them survive...the Batwa and Bambuti [hunter gatherers] are common to the Great Lakes and these people represent the original communities and represent the simplest form of social organisation. How do you protect these people? Then you have the Karamajong [pastoralists] who are a bit advanced who have established some leadership around a warlord who leads raids on the Dinka and the Turkana. Their understandings on rights to natural resources are different to the Batwa. Then more advanced than that are the Baganda [agriculturalists] who have central authority [a King]. Understanding rights to natural resources are dependent on the social development of the groups. The Baganda believe the land belongs to the king, the Karamajong do not have one leader. Our thinking’s are different so that is why we are here to discuss these ideas.

In this speech given at communal land rights conference I attended we see the same justifications used by Locke, reproduced. As a result the Batwa are assumed to have no rights to their land because of the form of their political and ecological relationships. Asch writes that in the Canadian context a similar hierarchy is produced, “the identification of male British ancestry as the cultural
norm is so deeply embedded that it becomes the normative standard against which all other Canadian identities are measured. As [Mackey] says, “The major process here is not the erasure of cultural difference but the proper management of cultures – a hierarchy of cultures – within a unified project” (Asch 2004: 167).

Returning now to the second implication of Lockean thought, his theory of property compounds the distinction between culture and nature and creates the ‘wild lands’ and ‘wildlife’ needed to sustain the conservation discourse. For Locke, the removal of goods and land from the state of Nature was achieved through the application of labour and the purpose of this was the production of economic value. Of indigenous communities in America he wrote,

There cannot be a clearer demonstration of anything than several nations of the Americans are of this, who are rich in land and poor in all the comforts of life; whom Nature, having furnished as liberally as any other people with the materials of plenty…for want of improving it by labour, have not one hundredth part of the conveniencies [sic] we enjoy, and a king of a large and fruitful territory there feeds, lodges, and is clad worse than a day labourer in England. (Locke 1823: 122)

The distinction between ‘wild’ and ‘domestic’ can also be applied to animals, where animals that produce items of value and are intimate to livelihoods, like sheep and cattle, are described as domesticated whereas animals like deer are defined as wild. It is this distinction which lies at the heart of conservation discourse and which continues to structure the way it conceives of the lands and animals it attempts to ‘conserve’. More than this, the implication of Lockean thought regarding the status of the non-human animal world is that unless animals are domesticated they cannot be owned by an individual and can only be owned by the state. Conservation discourse was able to grasp this ideology and transform the non-human world into areas of wilderness and wildlife it believed it could then lay claim to: specifically because it believed no one else had the right to.

In many ways modern conservation was created as a reaction to the Development paradigm whose telos was, “the total subjugation of nature, entailing the disappearance of wilderness and all wild creatures, including ‘wildly free’ human beings” (Brantlinger 2003: 7). Or as Argyrou writes, “mastery of nature came to be seen as the unmistakable mark of civilisation, the core characteristic not of European ‘man’ but ‘man’ as such. To paraphrase Marx…‘man’ makes himself only insofar as he remakes the world around him. The more he changes the world around him, the more he becomes his true self” (2005: 5). In the same way that the denial of the validity of the ‘indigenous’ has as its by-product the romanticisation of the ‘indigenous’, conservation can also be seen as the romantic by-product of the advent of nature’s destruction through social development. Conservation is then part of what Thomas calls ‘the human dilemma’: “how to reconcile the physical requirements of civilization with the new feelings and values which that same civilization had generated” (Thomas 1983: 301). As a result, conservation served to institutionalise the
dichotomy which sees the measure of our humanity as the distance we have removed ourselves from nature “by establishing protected areas free from human occupation but available for recreation” (Colchester 1994: i). It was these protected areas, created for the benefit of man not animal, which allowed modern individuals a release from their newly domesticated world and, as Thomas writes, were seen to serve “a function not unlike that which toy animals have for children; they are fantasies which enshrine the values by which society as a whole cannot afford to live” (Thomas 1983: 301).

Africa, seen as the prototypical model of nature, is represented in often dialectic images in the West’s imagination. On the one hand it can represent the site of the primordial aspects of our perceived human nature, the savagery and barbarism, and at the very same time the site of extreme beauty and paradise. As Colchester remarks, nature is seen as “both a threat to social order and as a refuge from the stresses of civilised life” (1994: i) This second image is portrayed most fervently by conservationists who cling to the faith of Africa as a wilderness, often in stark contrast to its reality. As Adams and McShane write, “The march of civilisation has tamed or destroyed the wilderness of North America and Europe, but the emotional need for wild places…persists” (1996: xii). Early European explorers promoted the belief that Africa was a virgin land, untouched by mankind, and it is this belief that shapes conservation discourse and was expressed most vividly by the conservationist Grzimek, who wrote, “A National Park must remain primordial wilderness to be effective. No men, not even native ones, should live inside its borders” (in Adams and McShane 1996: xvi). The irony is that nature as an enclosed system, untouched by human influence, is nowhere more inconceivable than Africa itself where, “man has been an integral part of the African landscape for over 2 million years” (ibid : xiii). However this belief persists amongst conservationists today. The mission statement of the African Wildlife Foundation, an important actor in the conservation of the mountain gorillas in Uganda, reads ‘The African Wildlife Foundation, together with the people of Africa, works to ensure the wildlife and wild lands of Africa will endure forever’.

Conservation has long been marked by the idea that people are in direct conflict with nature which is in part derived from the West’s understanding of nature as a resource (Milton 2002: 53). This has led to a position where protected areas are seen as necessitating the removal of people, because a) they do not belong there and so, b) if they stay there they will only destroy it. Conservation perpetuated this paradigm of pristine wilderness set apart from humankind by establishing nature preservation based on approaches labelled as ‘protectionism’ or ‘Fortress Conservation’, where boundaries were created and guards posted to protect areas from incursions by humans. The aim, in Africa, was to recreate what had worked for conservationists in Yosemite and Yellowstone parks in North America, although it is worth noting that even in these early parks the practice of eviction of Indigenous People had already been established (Colchester 2003a: 27). The view of nature as a vast wilderness devoid of human interaction was transplanted to another continent where this picture was no more true than it had been in North America. The fact that
innumerable African societies have historically co-existed with nature went unnoticed by most conservationists who — in order to legitimise their ventures — branded these African hunters as poachers and placed themselves as the saviours of nature (Adams and McShane 1996: xv). Further, Sawyer and Agrawal suggest that the processes of expropriation legitimated by colonial discourses are continuing to be legitimised by conservation discourses, “[m]imicking colonial predecessors, biodiversity experts have appropriated Nature as global and simultaneously appointed themselves her keeper” (Sawyer and Agrawal 2000: 89).

This method has hardly changed in a century and almost universally has created “park[s] surrounded by people who were excluded from the planning of the area, do not understand its purpose, derive little or no benefit from the money poured into its creation, and hence do not support its existence” (Adams and McShane 1996: xv). Further, the result of parks of this type include “forced relocation, impoverishment, cultural destruction and the undermining of traditional systems of natural resource management” (Colchester 1994: i). Despite this, in Central Africa resettlement resulting from conservation projects has been on the increase in the last fifteen years with no evidence to suggest that any Forest People have been compensated for their forced removal (Cernea and Schmidt-Soltau 2006, Nelson and Hossack 2003, Schmidt-Soltau 2003). Schmidt-Soltau writes that in the Noubale Ndoki National Park in the Republic of Congo, “The pygmies had been expelled from a territory which the government and international experts saw as ‘no-man’s land’” (2003: 528). These and other ‘pygmy’ communities throughout Central Africa were given no compensation for the evictions and Schmidt-Soltau suggests that they are unlikely to in the future as a) “all territories which are not used for agricultural production or officially demarcated as private property are classified by law as government land” and b) “conservation projects that refused to compensate indigenous forest dwellers in the region, did so because they thought that recognizing traditional land titles would jeopardize their resettlement programmes, since it would be impossible to refund the losses of the inhabitants ‘equally’ in cash or in kind” (2003: 532-3). I will now shift focus to the specific conservation of the forests in south west Uganda to examine how the themes I have outlined in the sections above present themselves in the practices of conservationists in this context.

**A History of Protection in Uganda**

Despite previous protection regimes established by the King of Belgium, the current Protected Areas (PAs) in Uganda were established by the British Colonial Administration. In 1930 Mgahinga was gazetted as a Gorilla sanctuary and in 1932 Bwindi was protected as the Kasatoro and Kayonza Crown Forests (UWA 2003: 12). The chief objective in all three forests was the protection and preservation of the Mountain Gorilla, and it seems that the initial colonial conservation measures were contradicted by the conservation measures which would follow. As such, the Batwa were not seen as a threat and their way of life went largely unhindered. One administrator wrote that, “[t]he fear of native poachers raiding the gorilla communities is certainly not serious.
Personally, I do not think it ever occurs. All the natives are far too afraid of gorilla; even the Batwa…” (Fenn 1929: 8). In 1930 one administrator’s wife wrote that,

The danger to gorilla to be apprehended from local Africans is very little…a Swedish expedition offered the Kigezi mountain pygmies what to them was wealth to enlist their services as hunters for a museum specimen. They met with a blank refusal. The flesh, moreover, is considered by them as “an abomination.” To suggest eating it is an insult. As regards the pelt, even the professional tanners will not touch it. They “would as soon consent to flay a brother’s skin”. (Phillipps 1930: 13)\(^\text{31}\)

Indeed protection was needed from foreigners intent on collecting ‘museum specimens’, and as a result the administration left the Batwa relatively unhindered in their use of the protected areas. One administrator even advised the government that the Batwa’s rights should be protected,

The killing of animals is necessary for [the Batwa’s] existence…The Batwa cannot be restricted in their habituation of the area nor can their hunting habits be interfered with. Fortunately they do not hunt the gorilla nor molest it in any way nor eat its flesh. Under such circumstances it will be necessary to modify the park regulations. Though maintaining the usual restrictions on visitors from outside, suitable modifications will be necessary in order to permit the Batwa to continue hunting...

(Hingston 1931: 417)

In 1942 Kasatoro and Kayonza Crown Forests were unified as Bwindi Impenetrable Central Crown Forest and in 1961 followed Mgahinga in becoming gazetted as a gorilla sanctuary. At the time the threats to the gorilla no longer came from hunting parties of either white explorers or local communities. By 1960 great numbers of Batutsi and Bahutu had entered the area from northern Rwanda and habitat destruction became the greatest danger to the gorillas (Dart 1960: 331). It is unclear how these earlier changes in protection affected the Batwa but in 1964 Forest and Game Acts were introduced in Uganda which had serious effects on their access to their forest resources. Residing, hunting and farming were made illegal inside the park as was the use of hunting dogs or the possession of hunting weapons. Around this time between 50 and 100 Batwa families were evicted (IUCN 1994: n.p.). However the enforcement of these Acts suffered, during the post-colonial troubles which blighted Uganda, as government legislation was ignored. When the National Resistance Movement came into power in 1986 the stability they brought Uganda opened the door to various conservation interests who took over the work which had stalled during the civil war period (Wild and Mutebi 1996: 5). As early as 1988 the Uganda National Parks department (UNP) presented a report to the Ugandan Cabinet proposing Bwindi as a National Park and in 1989 the process began that led to the creation of Bwindi Impenetrable National Park (BINP) and Mgahinga Gorilla National Park (MGNP) (Hamilton et al. 1990: 16).

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This trajectory towards increasing levels of protection for these forests and the corresponding restrictions on access such protection entailed did not go unnoticed by the communities surrounding these forests. In June 1990, a team comprising members of the UNP, Game Department and World Wildlife Fund for Nature carried out a public enquiry to provide recommendations for the creation of a management plan for the proposed BINP. The content of the report is very clear in presenting the attitudes of the local Bakiga and Bafumbira communities. The communities felt it vital that nobody should lose any land as a result of Bwindi becoming a national park; financial benefits, particularly from employment, should accrue to communities; access should be given for communities to collect forest resources, and local communities should be involved throughout the process (Hamilton et al. 1990: 32-41). The injustice felt by the people entailed in the proposed restrictions led one community to ask, “Does the government care more about the gorillas than people?” and further, “Tourists come from countries where they have killed their own animals. Why shouldn’t they go to see animals in zoos instead of coming to Bwindi?” (Hamilton et al. 2000: 39-40).

But more than stressing the animosity felt by the local communities, the authors are strongly critical of the Public Enquiry process. In a section titled ‘Insufficient time allocated’, the authors conclude by saying,

> While every effort has been made by the Establishment Team to undertake the work as well as possible, the short notice and time available for the Mission has been inadequate for proper consultation or for other required procedures for an Establishment Plan to be properly followed. (Hamilton et al. 2000: 15)

The copy I have obtained is the draft report and has a number of handwritten comments made in 1990. In every instance where the authors have criticised the validity of the final report due to the lack of time, lines have been drawn through the text and recommendations made to delete the wording. It is therefore unclear how much of the author’s views ever reached the final report. The ramifications however, suggest that community attitudes to the gazettement of Bwindi as a national park came far down the list of priorities for the government. The Batwa’s views are neither sampled nor represented anywhere within the report.

The creation of these two new national parks in 1991 went ahead with the insistence of government officials and global conservation groups, and with the stroke of a pen the Batwa became squatters on their own land (Reed 1997: 94). Initially these groups’ conservation method was firmly based on the ‘Fortress Conservation’ model. Communities were seen as being the cause of forest degradation and the best way to conserve the forest was to exclude them from any contact. As part of this process some 1300 farmers were evicted from MGNP for encroaching on land inside the original boundaries. Compensation was given for people who had an economic interest inside the park. Those who destroyed the forests through farming, grazing, pit-sawing or
gold mining were rewarded for their destruction whilst the Batwa who depended upon and maintained the forest were punished and evicted with no compensation. This model of compensation mirrors Locke’s treatise on property. It is clear that rights which demanded compensation were only those rights which had been attained by, what the authorities deemed, the application of labour, e.g. the transformation of nature into an economic commodity through mining or farming.

From a copy of the official records I obtained, it appears that only two Batwa were given compensation for their removal from MGNP. No Batwa were compensated for their eviction in BINP. After personally consulting communities in 2006, the common theme from Batwa respondents was that they were never informed of their impending evictions and therefore not able to register their interests with the park management. Information which should have been dispersed through Parish Chiefs failed to reach the Batwa and when they did try to register they were told the registration period had finished. One Mutwa explained that the Batwa are “always ignored unless it is for votes and then [the officials] visit every [Batwa] house”.

In 1999 one UWA employee candidly explained the faults of the compensation programme,

> All communities were considered as though they were a uniform group. Information was never segregated to reflect any unique characteristics and Batwa property was often included in that of their landlords. Batwa views on compensation were not sought. The valuing was flawed and the donors determined the procedure for compensation. They insisted on payment through the bank using cheques. (quoted in Zaninka 2003: 171)

Beyond these practical issues, I would argue that the definition of both the rights of individuals and groups and the compensation which accrued from these rights was constructed with a Western framework of use and value attached to property and livelihoods. As a result the Batwa would have been marginalised whether their voices had been heard or not.

In MGNP the theory of ‘Fortress Conservation’ became a physical reality when the conservationists erected metal barricades to demarcate the parks boundary. The Batwa and other local people were no longer allowed to enter MGNP and attempts to collect water and firewood were repelled by heavily armed guards (see Salopek 2000). But despite these exclusionary methods, tension was present amongst the conservationists themselves with some opting for a more community orientated approach. This tension between ‘Fortress Conservation’ and ‘Community Conservation’ is nowhere more evident than in the death of one of the leading conservationists involved in Mgahinga, Jürgen Sucker.
Plate 26: Klaus Jürgen Sucker with his rangers in Mgahinga Gorilla National Park

Plate 27: MGNP Rangers with confiscated snares collected by Sucker and his colleagues

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32 Source: http://www.klaus-juergen-sucker.de/images/galerie/parkranger_okongo_sucky.jpg
33 Source: http://www.klaus-juergen-sucker.de/images/galerie/vorstudie_snares.jpg
In 1989 Jürgen Sucker was sent by Berggorilla & Regenwald Direkthilfe to head up the newly created Mgahinga Gorilla National Park Project. His colleagues described this project as “one of the most successful conservation projects in Africa” and Jürgen as “a rare example of a determined and courageous nature conservationist” (Berggorilla & Regenwald Direkthilfe 1994: n.p.). He confiscated over 7,000 snares and traps, halted the destruction of the forest and ended smuggling and illegal cattle grazing. But the local communities felt his tactics were heavy handed and over zealous, needlessly jeopardising their dependence on sustainable forest resources like fresh water and firewood (Salopek 2000: n.p.). Faced with this tension Sucker and his colleagues strongly favoured the gorillas over the people: “Klaus-Jürgen Sucker was convinced that humans must not use everything for their own purposes. When the survival of species is at stake, the interests of people must take second place” (Berggorilla & Regenwald Direkthilfe 1994: n.p.).

Other conservationists feel differently. In 2000 one deputy manager of a community conservation project said,

> The rich world wants places like Mgahinga preserved, and they usually get their way, but it’s always at the expense of the people who live there…When these places became parks…thousands of villagers lost access to firewood, building materials, food and medicinal plants overnight…Our job is to try and find ways to compensate their losses. (Salopek 2000: n.p.)

Other conservationists recently reinforced this,

> We must be exceedingly careful in how we manage the resources [Bwindi] contains. We clearly cannot ignore the interests of the surrounding human population, and conserving the forests without their support would be almost impossible. (McNeilage and Robbins 2006: 9)

With these sentiments in mind, in 1988 Development through Conservation (DTC), a project facilitated by the NGO, CARE was created to help local communities gain access to the National Parks for specific sustainable resources. An immediate conflict was created by Sucker’s visions for the management of Mgahinga and the new Community Conservation initiative. As Sucker fought for what he believed was right, he created animosity and was eventually transferred to another protected area. Unfortunately the day he was to leave for his new post Sucker was found hanging from the roof of his house. Despite his colleagues’ claims that he was murdered and their likening his situation to that of the murdered conservationist, Dian Fossey (Karlowski 1995, Karlowski and Kohnen 1995) it appears that, frustrated by the change in conservation method, Sucker took his own life (Salopek 2000).
These events not only outline the tension between conservationists and local communities, but also the tension between conservationists themselves and their different conservation models. In spite of these tensions CARE-DTC went ahead and it has formed the basis for Community Conservation models in Uganda and across the world. Despite CARE-DTC’s claims of success, the DTC project has failed the Batwa persistently over its 15 year life. The next section will specifically look at the DTC programme and suggest why it was failed in its support of the Batwa.

A ‘New’ Conservation Paradigm?

It is only now, at the turn of the century, that some of the large conservation organisations are starting to question protectionist policies. The 1990s saw the call for a radical change in the nature of conservation provision, particularly in Africa, which sought to go beyond the colonial and neo-colonial construct of ‘Fortress Conservation’ and develop a new conservation (see for example Arambiza and Painter 2006, Carey et al. 2000, Colchester 1994, Gomez-Pompa and Kaus 1992, Hulme and Murphee 1999, Pimbert and Pretty 1995). During the 1990s evidence began to suggest the many shortcomings of protectionist approaches to conservation,

- in ecological terms (enclaves of protected ecosystem tend to lose their biodiversity over time);
- in developmental terms (PAs have negative impacts on the livelihoods of many poor people and commonly impose heavy regional and national opportunity costs);
- in financial terms (PA and wildlife management are net drains on public finances);
- in management terms (usually protectionist policies are only weakly implemented);
- and, in moral terms (is it socially just that the customary use-rights of poor Africans are extinguished in the pursuit of conservation?). (Hulme et al. n.d.: 1)

These new forms of conservation were conceived as involving local communities in conservation efforts and rejected the notion that local communities could only be viewed as degraders of ecosystems. They also attempted to equate the conservation of biological diversity with the sustainable development of local communities (Arambiza and Painter 2006: 20). These new models of conservation were also envisaged at a time when ‘man’s’ relationship to ‘nature’ was being re-evaluated by the scientific community. As Argyrou suggests,

Gone are the manly postures of confrontation, the language of subjugation and exploitation, the images of ‘glorious struggles’. Human beings, it is now pointed out, can no longer afford to be locked in combat with nature. They have caused enough, possible irreversible damage. They must disengage, relent and make peace. They must relearn how to coexist and live in harmony with nature. (Argyrou 2005: 37)

Importantly, this new style of Conservation acknowledged that, “[c]onservation no longer require[d] that man and nature be kept separate by state coercion” (Hulme and Murphee 1999: 278).
Nonetheless, this ‘community conservation’ model varied in the degree of participation it offered ‘communities’. At one extreme is a community centred approach that “transfers all management responsibilities and full property rights over natural resources to communities at the local level” (ibid). At the other end lies an approach that sees ‘communities’ “not as proprietors of the nation’s conservation estate but merely as its neighbours” (ibid).

Echoing Argyrou’s claims above, Sawyer and Agrawal suggest that humankinds’ relationship to nature has fundamentally changed: “The era of conquest is over. Management is the current fetish” (Sawyer and Agrawal 2000: 89). I will argue in this chapter that this change in relationship did not only apply to nature but also to conservation’s relationships with communities who are no longer conquered but instead managed by conservation policies. As will become obvious in the forthcoming sections, the park outreach strategies employed in Uganda saw ‘communities’ as secondary to conservation objectives. In Uganda, one conservationist explained that the idea behind community conservation in BINP and MGNP was “to compensate the local community for the loss of access to the reserve and to motivate the community towards enhancing biodiversity conservation, [as a result] incentive measures were initiated” (Tamale 1996: 1). Outreach programmes were then seen as a way of managing communities’ demands rather than a way of returning rights to communities who had been marginalised by the previous regimes of conquest.

Starting in 1988, CARE’s DTC project sought to support the conservation of BINP and MGNP alongside the sustainable development of neighbouring communities. It addressed the movement within conservation discourse which was beginning to develop new initiatives designed at involving local communities and linking efforts to conserve biodiversity with the creation of economic incentives (Eghenter 2000: 1). Despite being lauded by many conservationists for the ‘innovative measures it has brought to conservation’ (Hamilton et al. 2000, Hamilton et al. 2002) and the ‘abundant benefits’ it brings to the community (Makombo 2003: 12), it has had great difficulty in reaching many of the groups it was designed to help.

During the initial phase of DTC between 1988 and 1991, efforts were focused on training local communities in tree planting, soil conservation and environmental conservation education (CARE n.d.). The second phase between 1991 and 1996 included a pilot project for the utilisation of non-timber forest products from areas of these two national parks which were termed Multiple Use Zones (MUZs). These MUZs are areas of the national parks which are not within the ranges of the Mountain Gorillas and able to provide sustainable forest resources to communities without jeopardising the conservation of the gorillas. One consultant recommended that the following resources and activities become available to local communities: edible wild plants, beekeeping and honey collection, medicinal plants, basketry and bamboo as well as building poles, bean poles and firewood (Cunningham 1996: 15-46).
The final phase of the DTC project carried out from 1997 until 2003 was intended to focus on “the poorer section of the population who lost most from the establishment of the two parks, and with the fewest livelihood options” (CARE n.d.). Project documentation continually highlights the Batwa as a vital target group, but by the end of the project the benefits to the Batwa People had not materialised. Before I suggest why the inclusion of the Batwa failed during the DTC project, I would like to first confirm that their situation had been acknowledged within DTC documentation.

In 1993 the mid-term evaluation of the DTC project provided a specific section on the Batwa,

Two issues of direct relevance to DTC present themselves. The first is humanitarian. The Evaluation Team believes that efforts should be made by the international community to determine if the Batwa population need food relief in the immediate term.

The second involves a long-term solution regarding needs for access [by the Batwa] to forest resources and alternatives to forest use…DTC needs to take an active role in solving these issues…(Anon 1993: 23)

A 1995 DTC review of the multiple use programme found that,

The Batwa people, who once depended largely on the forest and still have a unique knowledge of it, have suffered most as a result of exclusion from the forest…Batwa resource users have been included in [Memorandum of Understanding]’s, although it is not clear whether they have a fair allocation of access to resources. The MoU team have become well aware of the special situation of the Batwa and of the attitudes of the Bakiga towards them…

…something should be done and there may be scope for UNP/DTC to improve their situation and at the same time save some of their unique knowledge…Extra effort could be made to introduce into the MoU’s one or two resources important for the Batwa – mud fish and perhaps wild yams. (Bensted-Smith et al. 1995: 25)

By 1996 no change had been recorded and the same issues were still being raised within CARE. A final evaluation of the second phase of DTC concluded,

The Batwa, as a distressed minority community, require a project strategy to address their problems and needs.
Without access to forest products they lose a substantial part of their livelihood system. A strategy to address this dilemma is indicated, as failure on this score will be a blemish on the final goal of the project. (Metcalfe 1996: 24)

Four years later in 2000, no action had been taken and previous advice was being contested. Three consultants in a mid-term review of the final phase of the project commented,

A particular group of people that deserves special mention within this category is the Batwa…It was clear that not only are the Batwa among the “poorest of the poor” but they are also the group that has lost the most from the setting up of the [Protected Areas] and currently get the least benefit…we discussed whether DTC should have a separate strategy to deal with the Batwa…Opinions on this were strongly divided with some maintaining that the Batwa should not be treated “differently” as this would cause further resentment among local communities and others feeling that this is such an important group that DTC should have a strategy for working with the Batwa… (emphasis in original Worah et al. 2000: 11-12)

In a review in 2002, three further consultants observed that “[d]espite recognition of their history and the rights and priorities accorded to them by legislation and local programming support, the Batwa remain on the fringes of the Multiple Use Programme” (Davey et al.: 10) and that “the Batwa…deserved and should receive special attention” (ibid: 18).

In 2003, as the DTC project was being wrapped up, the Deputy Project Manager of DTC presented a paper at the World Parks Congress in Durban. Despite fifteen years of DTC participation with local communities around BINP and MGNP and eleven years of DTC reports highlighting the situation of the Batwa, he made this alarming statement,

The voice of the Batwa…is yet to be heard in the governance of Bwindi Impenetrable National park. The current programmes around BINP…are addressing the needs of Batwa outside the forest, such as access to agricultural land, formal school education, employment and health care. However, the question of the relationship between Batwa and Bwindi forest still remains largely unanswered. (Mutebi 2003: 12)

Finally, in 2004 an independent study analysed the attitudes and demands on the multiple use zones in Bwindi amongst a number of communities (Bitariho et al. 2004). Sixteen years after the inception of DTC the number one recommendation of the report was that, “[t]he Batwa living adjacent BINP forest should be involved in multiple use as a matter of urgency. The Batwa should be treated as special group and granted special permission to access some of the resources that are important to them” (ibid: 15). As has been shown, during the life of the DTC project, the Batwa
had been clearly identified, at regular intervals, by consultants and CARE employees, as the most in need of benefiting from the project. However, by the close of the project the Batwa had still to receive any tangible benefits.

The Batwa have equally been marginalized from the management of these PAs by the Government of Uganda (GoU) and its wildlife agency, despite a rhetoric of participation. Today they have no access to the forest to visit their ancestral burial sites or to collect materials or resources which they have previously depended on. GoU legislation should have protected the Batwa’s rights in relation to their former ancestral territories, at least in terms of access and resource rights. Article 37 of the Constitution states, “Every person has a right as applicable, to belong to, enjoy, practice, profess, maintain and promote any culture, cultural institution, language, tradition, creed, or religion in community with others” (Republic of Uganda 1995). Despite many suggesting that the rights of the Batwa come second to the preservation of the Mountain Gorillas, the Wildlife Statute of 1996, article 26(3) does state that, “The [Ugandan Wildlife] Authority may study, identify and protect historical or cultural interests of any individual or class of persons resident in a wildlife conservation area not protected by any other law” (Republic of Uganda 1996).

As a result of this legislation, the management of BINP and MGNP have attempted to respond to the issue of the Batwa. The 2001-2011 management plan for the Bwindi and Mgahinga Conservation Area (BMCA) specifically recognises the situation of the Batwa and sets out objectives to help meet their demands. Currently there are almost no Batwa employed by the park despite 90% of the park labour force coming from neighbouring communities (Makombo 2003: 9). The Batwa have principally lost out because the park management requires employees to have a proficiency in English, and as one conservationist has commented, “this policy places many of those most knowledgeable about the forest, such as the Batwa, who are mainly illiterate, at a disadvantage” (Hamilton et al. n.d.: 7). The management plan for BMCA does make the following concession,

Batwa’s knowledge of the CA could be exploited in form of employment to provide services like tracking and guiding. One of the best field assistants at ITFC is a Mutwa. Absorbing some Batwa into UWA’s labour force requires special consideration since they do not possess the qualifications required to work as rangers or guides. A special category of employees under UWA can be created to allow their absorption. (UWA 2003: 39)

This task of employment was to be completed in years 2-5 of the management plan. By 2006 only one Mutwa was employed by the UWA, albeit as a guard to protect BINP from illegal activities conducted by his fellow Batwa. On the occasions I enquired with the park managers as to the progress of Batwa employment, they informed me that the Batwa had to first learn English, as this was a requirement of all UWA employees. When I explained that the management plan specifically
provided for a special employment category to mitigate against a lack of English, they just laughed at me and asked which Batwa I thought could do a job inside the parks. Indeed in negotiations between the Batwa and the Executive Director of the UWA in 2006, Batwa were once again told that they could not receive employment from the UWA as a result of their lack of English (pers. comm.). Additionally, the management plan also acknowledged that there might be other resources which the Batwa would like to harvest from the PAs. It states:

There is demand for access to fish within the rivers in BINP…particularly from the Batwa. In addition to fish, the Batwa need for wild yams and wild honey from the PAs have not been considered for access in the Integrated Resource Use Programme…As such the Batwa genuinely feel that their needs have been marginalised in this programme, and yet the costs they incur due to the creation of the park are greater than for other community members.

And that,

Within the [Conservation Area] are sites that people visited for spiritual purposes…this is an issue for Batwa, who openly express their desire to be officially allowed to access the sites. Batwa are known to illegally go to these sites anyway, such as at Garara in MGNP. (UWA 2003: 92)

Despite a constitution which allows all Uganda’s people to freely observe their own faiths and awareness within the management plan that this was an important resource, by 2006 – 5 years into the management plan – no religious sites or cultural sites were open to the neighbouring communities. And, despite a wealth of conservation documentation supporting the Batwa’s right and ability to sustainably extract resources from the forest, particularly wild yams and honey, (Bitariho et al. 2006; Bitariho et al. 2004, Byarugaba 2004, Byarugaba n.d., Byarugaba et al. 2006, see for example Cunningham 1999, Hamill et al. 2000, Kajobe and Roubik 2006) the UWA and GoU have still failed to accommodate their demands.

I want to now show that this failure to involve the Batwa in the conservation of their forests was caused by a misconstruction of the relationship between people and their environment held by those in charge of conservation in Uganda. This nature/culture divide, prevalent in the founding ideologies of conservation, is still present in the rhetoric and practice of conservation groups today. Despite this, I do want to acknowledge that there were also other more practical problems with the DTC project and the management of these PAs. However, I would argue that even if these practical issues had been addressed, the Batwa would have continued to be marginalised because their livelihood strategies and relationship to the forests would still not have been accepted by conservation project workers.
Misconceptions of Nature-Culture Relationships

I have shown in the preceding sections that, despite any change in dominant understandings of human/environment relations, the Batwa in Uganda are viewed in much the same way as ‘Americans’ were by Locke. Fundamentally, the theoretical foundation which drives the conservation discourse in Uganda is still located in the same paradigm which supported Locke and which continues to mediate the interactions of people and their surroundings.

I argue that the implications of Lockean thought on the conservation of these PAs has two main effects for the Batwa which lead to their marginalisation in access and participation in the running of these PAs. Firstly, I argue that the relationship of humans to the natural environment is understood within the framework of man subduing nature for his own ends. The result sees humans as a threat to conservation, sees their dependence on the PAs being driven by consumption, and additionally derogates any form of relationship other than an economic or scientific one. As Kohler notes,

One of the paradoxes of conservation is the claim to a world shared by all organisms, in which the decisions about a hierarchy of values and forms of resource exploitation are, however, made by humans and ultimately in human interest. Moreover, conservation in its current form is based on metropolitan science, be it biology or economics, and dominated by western interest. (Kohler 2005)

As a result, the Batwa’s indigenous knowledge, whilst acknowledged, was never utilized and was instead subsumed by scientific knowledge. As Namara rightly points out, in relation to BINP and MGNP, “some of these decisions are justified by reference to ‘science’, which is itself a reflection of power relations that determine whose ‘science’ is accepted as legitimate. Science is often used to support the dominant paradigm subscribed to by the powerful and privileged” (Namara 2006: 52). Claims to the right to access protected areas, like BINP and MGNP, based on cultural, spiritual or historical justifications are easily overpowered by conservationist’s claims to science and economics. In Uganda, claims based on a cultural necessity are countered by claims to conserve the Mountain Gorillas despite the fact that these demands are not mutually exclusive. Milton has shown quite clearly that the debates on protecting the environment are firmly controlled within a framework of science and rationality in which emotionality and alternative ways of experiencing the world are marginalised (Milton 2002: 129-146). Against this view of rationality in opposition to emotionality, authors like Colchester (1994) and Milton (2002) argue that it is for this very reason that Indigenous Peoples are best placed to preserve the long term future of the worlds’ protected areas because they have an interest in its survival beyond the scope of rationality and market forces.
Nevertheless conservationists in Uganda understood that populations had no interest in conserving the forest and were only concerned with what they could extract to provide an income. This, in the case of south west Uganda, is not an unfounded claim. The forests were being decimated and were being used by local people to provide a financial resource. But this belief in the forest versus ‘community’ relationship neglected the existence of other forms of relationships. In this case it denied the Batwa People their alternative demands from the forest which were vital to the Batwa’s social integrity.

During my fieldwork in 2005-6 I was confronted by this view regularly. At a National Forestry Authority (NFA) workshop looking at community participation in the management of Echuya Central Forest Reserve, participation was seen to be achieved if income generation through resource extraction could be offered to the ‘communities’. One manager from the NFA concluded that, “people are looking at the forest and asking what they can get from it”. As such it was assumed that the ‘communities’ demands on resources could be explained through the model of the ‘Rational Economic Man’, where it is assumed that “individuals, households, and communities make rational decisions based on economic interests” (Crewe and Harrison 1998: 36). When I urged the participants to see that other resources like burial and cultural sites may be equally important, one person only agreed by responding, “The Batwa are like a tick on a cow, they can’t feel they can be removed from the forest”. This metaphor suggests the Batwa’s relationship to the forests is parasitic in nature and not a relationship bound by a mutual reciprocity. It conforms to dominant ideas about human culture relationships and representations of hunter-gatherer resource use as being absent of investment in the productivity of their land. This comment shows similarities to colonial representations of Australian Aborigines which were used to support the implementation of terra nullius. As Rose notes, “In Elkin’s classic phrase, they were parasites of nature: ‘the Aborigines are absolutely dependent on what nature produces without any practical assistance on their part” (Rose 1996: 64). At least in the Australian Aboriginal case, this misconception has since been proven inaccurate (ibid).

On another occasion I discussed the situation of the Batwa with an NGO which was considering the kinds of projects they were willing to fund. The NGO worker explained that their aim was to minimise the impact on the environment from local communities and they had decided to focus on small business enterprise as a way for communities to generate money and reduce their dependency on the forest. During our meeting their representative said, “Without small enterprise communities like the Batwa are more [like] forest people and less [like] resettled communities…we are focusing on small enterprise to stop this”. This is surprisingly close to colonial attitudes from the previous century. One colonial official in 1905 discussed his own response to the ‘Pigmy’ communities under his jurisdiction:

There is nothing for the Government to do with the Pigmies. No work can be asked of them...The only likely way to secure their submission is to create a need and
habituate them to habits of buying, for instance, cloths. By and by after several years, they will perhaps be obliged to come and ask for work for getting cloths. (Geil 1905: 208-9)

I would argue that the Batwa have been actively denied access to those resources, by conservationists and Developmentalists, that were essential to their relationship to the forests. Additionally, as the comments above suggest, NGOs were actively attempting to assimilate the Batwa to conform to sedentary, agricultural livelihoods much as Colonials had the previous century based on the assumption that hunting and gathering modes of production are inadequate in the ‘modern’ world. This assumption will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

Secondly, in relation to Lockean thought, I argue that the concept of terra nullius discussed earlier in this chapter has continued relevance to the Batwa in Uganda as their livelihood strategies have not been recognized as producing rights to the forests. This was represented most vividly in the eviction and compensation stage of park protection where the Batwa were denied compensation because they had not been seen to have applied any labour to the forest, so were stripped of their property rights to it. This discrimination has continued and helps to explain the disparity between conservationists intended participation of the Batwa in conservation projects, and the project outputs which continually failed to accommodate the Batwa’s needs. Even when they did try to understand the Batwa’s situation from a rights perspective, they were working within an ideological framework whose very foundation concluded that the Batwa had no rights to the resources in question.

This denial of rights, justified by Lockean notions of property, is not reserved to land inside the forest and the Batwa are additionally denied their rights to land outside the forests. As a landless population, several Christian groups and Development agencies have purchased agricultural land for the Batwa. However, without exception these groups have failed to legally title the land to the Batwa families who live on it. Whilst some groups refuse this transferal of rights because they foreground their own interests ahead of the communities’ interests, some groups refuse to transfer title until the Batwa prove they can use it in a manner dictated by the organisations (pers. comm.). In all cases the objective the Batwa must attain is the full use of their land, for agricultural production, which is deemed the only appropriate use for the land. Any failure to use this land for agricultural production not only prevents the Batwa from gaining full rights to that land but it has been suggested that families who are ‘misusing’ their land will be evicted from it. Once again, to have rights the Batwa have to conform to dominant ways of relating to their environment. This situation is reminiscent of the treatment of the Innu by their Colonial government who required them to “sign a contract stating that they were to live in the house for a period of ten years. At the end of this time, if the house was deemed to have been kept in a good state of repair, the ‘homeowner’ received title to it” (Samson 2001: 232).
The discourse of the ‘new conservation’ thinking of the 1990s focused on the linkage between conservation and human needs (see for example Adams and Hulme 2001, Adams and Infield 2003, Infield and Adams 1999). However, many Batwa understood the situation in terms of the linkage between conservation and human rights (United Organisation for Batwa Development in Uganda 2006, United Organisation for Batwa Development in Uganda and Uganda Land Alliance 2006). In a 2003 paper, the former head of the CARE-DTC programme asked, “Is resource use...a ‘right’ that local people can exercise and demand, or a ‘privilege’ offered to certain communities under certain conditions?” (Blomley 2003: 244-245). Whilst not providing an answer, more generally he certainly feels that in the case of BINP and MGNP in Uganda, access to forest resources was certainly seen by those in power as a privilege,

One major problem has been the balance of power in the negotiation process, which appears to have favoured park staff, who adopted a stance of negotiating from a position of strength. Rather than entering into open-ended negotiations with compromises made on both sides, the quality of this process was limited by the unwillingness of park management to concede (or even discuss) access to resources of any significant value. (ibid: 245)

Despite being hailed for the way it brought local communities into conservation practice, the MUZs run by CARE-DTC and UWA are simply, “another form of state control over resources...with the protected area management authority unwilling to trust resource users and subsequently to relinquish some of its responsibilities and authority” (Namara 2006: 58) to the extent that the UWA “maintain[s] local people as subjects, with no decision making or control powers” (ibid: 61). Pimbert and Pretty’s paper in 1995, which called for a new conservation, described 1970s conservation as being based on an understanding of ‘participation’ as a ‘tool’ for achieving the voluntary submission of people to protected areas schemes (Pimbert and Pretty 1995: 25). The evidence in this chapter suggests that over 30 years after this form of conservation began to be rejected, the GoU and the UWA are still reluctant to view community participation as anything other than a token gesture aimed at keeping the angry masses subdued. As Hulme and Murphee rightly note, “While the labels of community conservation and community-based conservation have become widely used this is, to a significant degree, because of the positive image generated by the idea of ‘community’ rather than because of their accuracy” (Hulme and Murphee 1999: 283).

Conclusion

...in every case the laws are made by the ruling party in its own interest; a democracy makes democratic laws, a despot autocratic ones, and so on. By making these laws they define as ‘right’ for their subjects whatever is for their own interest, and they call anyone who breaks them a ‘wrongdoer’ and punish him accordingly. (Plato 1961: 18)
This process of domination of ‘Western thought’ over ‘Third World’ conservation bears all the hallmarks of the ‘Development’ discourse which Escobar explains as “apparatus that links forms of knowledge about the Third World with the deployment of forms of power and intervention, resulting in the mapping and productions of Third World societies” (2005: 342). Through the deployment of ‘protectionist’ policies by conservationists, communities which surround PAs are produced from the same mould of ‘modernist’ societies that see humans separate from nature: where before there were hunters, now there are only poachers. This enforcement of Western ideological discourse has two crucial components, one which projects and the other which reflects an image. For Escobar, “development has been the primary mechanism through which the Third World has been imagined and imagined itself, thus marginalizing or precluding other ways of seeing or doing” (2005: 342). In the same vein, through Conservation dominant discourses seek to impose their image of the ‘Other’ onto the Global South at the same time as reflecting and defining their own image. In this way conservation discourses create the ‘African poacher’ at the same time as they create the ‘hero conservationist’.

In conclusion, in the Ugandan context, any claims to have introduced meaningful community participation in conservation management are ill founded. Instead, the Batwa have bore the brunt of a continuation in dominant discourses regarding human relationships to their environment. All that has changed are the practices such discourses inform and the practices of conquest have been replaced by community conservation strategies. Whilst these new practices espouse rhetoric’s of participation they nonetheless mask the fact that they are still informed by persistent understandings of human relationships to their environment. These new practices are still unwilling to validate alternative ways of relating to the environment and therefore fail to genuinely offer the management of protected areas to local communities.

As Argyrou suggests with relation to ‘Environmentalism’,

…environmentalism reflects a return of the same, the reproduction of the same sort of global power relations and the same sort of logic that mark the modernist paradigm at its core…the ability of a group of societies to define and redefine, construct and reconstruct the order of the world and the world order. Environmentalism repeats the historical gesture that marked the colonial enterprise and its civilising mission. The rest of the world is once again presented with a new reality…and is expected, cajoled, encouraged, assisted, threatened to take a stance and come to recognise it as such a reality. (Argyrou 2005: x-xi)

Conservation is controlled by technical institutions from the Global North and the result has been that “mainstream conservationists have sought to impose their culturally-bound vision of natural resource management on indigenous peoples without taking into account their rights under international law or their different priorities and perceptions” (Colchester 1994: i). Until the elite in
the conservation world and the staff who implement their policies are able to understand their own world and relationships to nature in fundamentally different ways, communities like the Batwa will be ostracised and denied their basic rights to economic, cultural and spiritual integrity.
8. THE ‘OTHER’ PERSISTS

The San are being compelled to conform to identity expectations placed on them by states and the international donor community, all of whom expect to find a bounded cultural entity to which rights can be attached, and a culturally discrete ‘target community’ for development funding. (Sylvain 2002: 1081)

I have already discussed the historical construction of Batwa identity by non-Batwa ‘Others’, and in this chapter I want to present current representations and show how they relate to wider discourses that have been examined in this thesis. I have argued that the Batwa exist in multiple and entangled contexts and as a result their situation cannot be understood by representing them only as a homogenous group, ‘the Batwa’. These contexts allow the Batwa to identify themselves as farmers or hunters, urban dwellers or rural dwellers as well as allow room for individuals to identify themselves as hunters who may also farm; Christians who also believe in spirits. Despite this, as Sylvain suggests above, many discourses – and those individuals who promote those discourses – often only acknowledge an essentialised identity which, through its use, defines what is acceptable and authentic and what is unacceptable and false.

Defining Development

Plate 28: ‘Blasiyo, First Baptised Pigmy’

[Blasiyo] was my first God-child, the first of these wee and ancient people to step forth from their physical and spiritual darkness and before the listening Host of Heaven declare his belief in God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost, his faith for salvation, for salvation in Christ's sacrifice, and his desire to never be ashamed 'to fight under the banner of the Cross'. (Fisher 1905: 164-165)

Why should they who chronologically are the first, be the last to receive the healthful results of Christian philanthropy? While the Pigmy has his Forest, his food and his fun, yet he is poor in opportunities to know his destiny…Let Christian scholars humanise, civilise and Christianise the jolly miniature Nimrods of the vast equatorial woodlands! (Geil 1905: 250-1)

The reflections above were written by two authors involved in the same expedition into ‘Deepest Africa’ at the start of the last century, and it was in Uganda that they encountered their first ‘Pygmy’. Without returning to the discourses discussed in chapter four, I do however want to point out one of the guiding principles which ran throughout Colonialism’s and Christianity’s discourses on Africa; the notion of progress. As Sbert suggests,

…progress is more than just a journey or an ideal. It is a modern destiny…Modern man is defined by progress. His self-esteem is rooted in it …The idea has been the most influential and ubiquitous notion in the formation of modern thought, merging the power of the modern world with the spell of a chimerical metamorphosis of Christian faith. (Sbert 1992: 195)

‘Primitive cultures’ were seen to stand in the way of progress and were assumed to represent dead ends in social evolution. As a result it was widely regarded by anthropologists, political leaders, Development experts, and missionaries that ‘primitive cultures’ would inevitably die out as a result of the march of progress (see Bodley 1977: 35, Brantlinger 2003, Escobar 1991, Ferguson 2005). Indigenous Peoples’ only alternative was to throw away their indigenous cultures and assimilate to the ways of the ‘Modern World’ as their cultures were seen to have no role in their future. For Christians like Geil and Fisher, progress was achieved through the acceptance of Christianity, which instantly humanised and civilised its followers and separated not only believers from non-believers but also the advanced from the backwards, the developed from the undeveloped. Despite an origin in 18th Century theories it was not until 1949 that the term Development became the emblem for the next 50 years of progress (Cowen and Shenton 1995: 29). In that year American President Truman, in his inaugural speech remarked,

We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas.
The old imperialism – exploitation for foreign profit – has no place in our plans. What we envisage is a program of development based on the concepts of democratic fair dealing. (my emphasis, quoted in Esteva 1992: 6)

This supposedly marked the end of progress defined by Colonialism, Imperialism and the civilizing mission of Christianity. The question which underlies this chapter, however, is whether or not the change from Imperialism to Development marks a distinct shift in relationships between the ‘First’ and ‘Third’ worlds, as Truman suggested, or whether both the old and the new discourses are still bound within the same paradigm of progress which is defined by the ‘First World’ and assumed to be the goal of all humanity. Brantlinger suggests that little has changed, especially as the destruction of so-called ‘primitive cultures’ continues: “What now seems inexorably destructive is not the auto-genocide of savagery nor the biological (racially determined) demise of the unfit, but the juggernaut of economic development, which to peoples trying to maintain traditional ways of life can be just as destructive as armed massacres” (Brantlinger 2003: 190).

Whilst some may argue that the attitudes and values of colonials and missionaries like Geil were historically situated, similar sentiments were recently replicated and enforced by France’s President Sarkozy in a speech delivered in Senegal. Initially Sarkozy’s speech created a distinct juncture between Colonialism and present day relationships to African states,

…it is true that a long time ago the Europeans came to Africa as conquerors…They told your forefathers what they had to think, what they had to believe, what they had to do…They were wrong…They believed that they were superior, that they were more advanced, that they were progress, that they were civilisation. They were wrong. They wanted to convert the African, they wanted to make them in their image…They were wrong. (my emphasis Africa Resource 2007)

Nevertheless, despite this admission, Sarkozy went on to replicate the same representations of Africans that had been so prevalent in Colonial discourses. He suggests that African societies are unable to progress and are bound by tradition,

The tragedy of Africa is that the African has not fully entered into history. The African peasant, who for thousands of years has lived according to the seasons, whose ideal life was to be in harmony with nature, only knew the eternal renewal of time…In this imaginary world, where everything starts over and over again, there is no place for human endeavour or for the idea of progress…This man (the traditional African) never launched himself towards the future. The idea never came to him to get out of this repetition and to invent his own destiny…Africa’s problem is that it lives the present too much in nostalgia for a lost childhood paradise. (my emphasis Africa Resource 2007)
Returning to Truman, it is important to note that on the day he made his speech in 1949 and Development as an emblem was created, another more devastating term was introduced: underdevelopment. Truman represented the underdeveloped as such: “More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery. Their food is inadequate, they are victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas” (quoted in Escobar 1995: 3).

Esteva notes that as a result of Truman’s speech,

On that day, two billion peoples became underdeveloped. In a real sense, from that time on, they ceased being what they were, in all their diversity, and were transmogrified into an inverted mirror of others’ reality: a mirror that belittles them and sends them off to the end of the queue, a mirror that defines their identity, which is really that of a heterogeneous and diverse majority, simply in the terms of a homogenizing and narrow minority. (Esteva 1992: 7)

In the following sections of this chapter I will provide ethnographic accounts of current representations of the Batwa; their history, ‘culture’ and present situation. I will argue that these representations, promoted through missionary and Development organisations, cannot account for the relational and entangled context in which most Batwa are situated, but instead represent a simplified ‘reality’ defined by dominant notions of progress and development.

Buhoma Village Walk

When gold mining and logging were stopped in Bwindi, the nearby communities cursed. Now, Bwindi has become a safe haven for endangered species and the communities have began [sic] minting money out of the God-Given creatures. (Tenywa 2003)

The area of Buhoma lies to the north of Bwindi Impenetrable National Park and is the departure point for tourists and visitors seeking to track the Mountain Gorillas. As a consequence, these scattered farming communities have become a major centre for tourism, with lodges, curio shops, and drinking bars for the guides and drivers of the tourists. Buhoma has received a higher concentration of Development initiatives than elsewhere as a result of the tourism and conservation in the area, and at present has ongoing initiatives facilitated by conservation, development, missionary and advocacy agencies. As a result, the Buhoma area encapsulates all the major issues facing the Batwa and highlights the external forces that can impact on them, for good or bad.
In this section I will focus on a community-based tourism project in the Buhoma area called the Buhoma Village Walk (BVW), which consists of a tourism walk through villages which border the national park. Tourists are introduced to a handcraft site, a medicinal healer, a banana brewer, an orphans school, ‘Batwa cultural dancing’ and a local bee keeper (FAO 2005a, FAO 2005b). The walk is designed to introduce tourists to the ‘culture’ of local communities. In July 2005, as part of an UOBDU team carrying out community consultations with the Batwa communities in Buhoma, I took the opportunity to visit the Batwa Dancing section of the Buhoma Village Walk. I was left so disturbed by the experience that in the consultations’ official report I wrote that I had found watching the performance to be a “demoralising and shameful experience” (United Organisation for Batwa Development in Uganda 2005: 19). The walk portrayed the Batwa as passive objects for the entertainment of the tourists and there was no direct interaction as the non-Batwa guides acted as the interface for all communication. The guides had a powerful position in relation to the Batwa and this enabled them to control the identity the Batwa were presenting to the tourists. I found this situation not only uncomfortable for the Batwa but also for the tourists. In several client questionnaire forms at the Buhoma Community Campground, the tourist respondents said that they felt “uncomfortable” watching the Batwa perform whilst others felt “it was degrading” to the extent they were “concerned about [the] exploitation of [the] indigenous population” (Buhoma Village Walk 2005). I want to now narrate and analyse several sections of the performance to contextualise the dynamics of the Batwa and tourist interaction.

The tourists were introduced to the community with a short speech on the Batwa's history by the guide. Much of this speech told a story different to those I had heard from the Batwa, but because it was presented by the guide the Batwa were unable to provide their own interpretations. At one point the guide explained that the Batwa’s ‘grand grandparents’ used to live in the forest, which misled the tourists to believe the current community had been ‘out’ of the forest for generations. This representation failed to acknowledge that many of the Batwa present at the dance used to access the forest themselves and that some continue to do so illegally today.

The history of the Batwa’s removal from the forests is also presented in a manner that denies much of the violence which occurred during that process. The guide explained to the tourists that the Batwa were ‘convinced’ to come out of the forest by their neighbours, the Bakiga. However, the interpretation I provided in chapter five of this thesis suggests the Batwa were evicted from the forest, against their will, in 1991 and before that they were increasingly forced out of the forest through scarcity of resources as a result of deforestation by non-Batwa cultivators. The use of ‘convinced’ evokes a passivity that belies the often violent interactions between the Batwa, conservationists, and local communities.

During the performance the guide provided the interpretation of the songs that the Batwa performed for the tourists. One song focused on the ‘environment’,
They are talking about the environments we have...they have been trying to encourage everybody to protect the environment here because it is good for the nation, the local people, for now and for the younger generation. So we have to protect it. Because of the environments we have that's why tourists are visiting them, that's why their children are getting educated, they are drinking good water, that's why they have their own land, which is new for them so they are feeling very much happy of the environment they have around.

Once again this overly simplistic representation of the Batwa’s history and current situation denies much of the complexity of the Batwa’s experience. The suggestion that the Batwa are in a better situation as a result of the conservation of their former home stood in stark contrast to the malnourished Batwa children with swollen bellies who were dancing for the tourists, and the adult who lay to the side of the group, a few weeks before his death from AIDS. It was also a misrepresentation to claim that owning land ‘is new to them’ or that ownership has come to the Batwa as a result of the conservation of the forests. Historically, Batwa communities have had guardianship over large tracts of the forest and they believe that the ‘new’ land bought for them was provided as compensation for the loss of access to the forest. However, as I discussed in chapter seven, this representation of the Batwa’s landlessness may stem from the belief that they never had rights to the land in the forest because they never applied their own labour to it through agriculture.

Plate 29: A Mutwa being symbolically cleansed of lice during the performance
The next song to be played for the tourists was a song about the living conditions inside the forest. It was translated to the tourists as follows,

[The Batwa] have been trying to show you that by the time when their grand grand parents were used to live in the forest all of them their bodies were full of lice…but since they left the forest all of the lice which was on their body was swept [sic] out…so they have been trying to show you how they were at that time.

Once again the Batwa’s history inside the forest is portrayed in a derogatory way. This representation suggests that the Batwa have better health as a result of living outside the forest, but says nothing about the 59% child mortality rate of families who have no land and medical aid, compared to the 18% rate of their more dominant neighbours. This representation also contradicts every interview and discussion I have had with Batwa communities throughout south west Uganda who, without exception, respond that their lives are immeasurably worse since their eviction from the forest, both in terms of economic poverty and also political and social poverty (see Ohenjo et al. 2006).

Batwa Festival

I now want to look at a particular event in July of 2006 where the Batwa were invited to a festival in their honour to celebrate their ‘culture’. It is useful to examine how differing viewpoints conflicted during the course of the day and how the intention of the day was achieved in spite of the structure of the event, rather than as a result of it. Additionally, this festival was similar to the Buhoma Village Walk in the way Batwa ‘culture’ was framed and represented. I was informed of the event months before when the missionary organising it told me that he wanted to gather Batwa communities from throughout the south west of Uganda to take part in a cultural festival. He was extremely excited by the possibilities of such an event and thought it was an excellent opportunity to collect and document the traditional Batwa dances before they were ‘lost’. After the event and in a letter to the Sierra Presbyterian Church, he narrated a long story about an elderly Mutwa to explain the need for the festival,

He sat for a while and then began singing an animated song about hunting with bow and arrows and the excitement of returning home with plenty of food for all. Afterwards a wizen[ed] elderly mutwa stepped forward and said “Nijuka” (I remember) and she began singing and dancing. And then several others recalled songs from the forest. Then was born the idea of having a [competition] of indigenous dance between various Batwa communities at the celebration, the winner would receive a cow and all others goats. (Kellermann 2006)

He later described the festival as “truly a gala affair, voices and dust raised in profusion with exuberant song and dance” (Kellermann 2006).
I was equally excited by the prospect of the festival and thought that it would provide an amazing opportunity for disparate groups of Batwa to come together and exchange both differences in performances as well as views and opinions. My enthusiasm was cut short when I received an invitation to the event from the Diocese of Kinkiizi who were sponsoring the event which explained, “With great pleasure, you are cordially invited to attend the Batwa celebrations to mark their movements from the forest” (Diocese of Kinkiizi 2006, pers. comm.). It seemed that instead of celebrating Batwa ‘culture’, an entirely different celebration was being suggested: a celebration of the Batwa’s eviction from the forest, the event which marked the biggest attack on their forest based livelihoods.

One American guest at the festival described the last ten years of the Batwa’s history by saying that “such a demonstration of the gospel [from] the Bakiga Christians have brought the Pygmies out of the forest and given them new hope and life” (McWilliams 2006a). Once again we find a denial of the violent measures which have been used to exclude the Batwa from the forested areas and the extreme suffering they have faced since their eviction. This rendition of the historical events assumes the Batwa were led out of a miserable existence by the salvation that the Christian gospel brought them once it had been made available to them.

This American guest goes on to reaffirm that “about 600 Batua [sic] (Pygmies) who have come out of the forest [have] found new hope and health for their life and children…but…there are still several thousand Batwa in the forest, and it is hoped that many more will be led by these to a new and better life” (McWilliams 2006b). The tacit assumption is that the way of life associated with the

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forest is inadequate and that the word of Christ can bring salvation and provide new hope and health. This however contradicts findings of the very missionaries who organized the festival, who in 2004 found that the Batwa infant mortality rate in children under five was 59% amongst landless families (Sierra Presbyterian Church 2006).

This Christian theme that posits the forest as an evil place and Christianity as the saviour of the Batwa was continued at the festival by the Chairman of the organizing committee who stated that in the past the Batwa, “lived in the forest where they…had no clothing, no shelter, no beddings and even they never minded about their personal hygiene like bathing” (McWilliams 2006b). He also stated his thanks to the Bishop of the Diocese of Kinkiizi and the government of Uganda for helping to bring the Pygmies out of the forest. Ultimately, what others had hoped would be a celebration of the Batwa people and their ‘culture’ turned out to be what one expatriate guest described as, “long speeches and numerous songs saying how miserable the forest was and how grateful the Batwa were to have been rescued by Diane Stanton, the Bishop and Jesus” (pers. comm.).

Plate 31: Batwa pose beside a plaque commemorating their benefactors

Instead of being a celebration of Batwa ‘culture’, the guests were being asked to celebrate the Batwa being ‘civilized’ by the church. This mirrors the representation of the Batwa in the Buhoma Village Walk, where the songs and dances replicate the themes of development and progress and also mirrors representations of the Batwa’s ‘development’ in the national press. Describing one community and the interventions of a Christian NGO, The New Vision celebrated the ‘Pygmies’ first school’:

Originally, the Batwa pygmies migrants from Congo’s Ituri forest were bushmen whose lives depended chiefly on hunting and gathering in Semliki forest. Living in modern shelters was an unwelcome fairy tale and education was unknown to them.

They were uncivilized, hostile and lived within the wide root divisions of huge trees. They resisted contact with the outside world when Yonasani Wabumundo, a Seventh Day Adventist Pastor, stumbled onto them in the 1970s.

After years of persuasion, they moved closer to civilized societies. The breakthrough came in 1992 when Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA) in collaboration with Bundibugyo Local government successfully struggled to resettle them out of Semliki forest, which was to be gazetted as a national park. (Okello 2005)

In Buhoma, despite the Diocese’s best attempts to lead the Batwa out of the forest into their view of civilisation and despite the Buhoma missionary’s failed attempt to create a festival of traditional ‘culture’, the Batwa decided to take matters into their own hands after the conclusion of the festival. One expatriate guest clearly encapsulates the structure and ultimate dichotomy of the festival,

Although the day was full of things that it would have been easy to be cynical about (some of the ‘traditional’ songs they sang thanking [the missionary] Diane…and the Bishop….and saying how miserable life was in the forest until they were “saved” by Diane, Jesus and the Bishop and brought into the modern world) there was some real joy… The three of us went for an evening walk to where hundreds of Batwa from all over the region were all camping. We joined them in some spontaneous singing and dancing… I suspect that the reason lies closer to the earth than Jesus, though37. (pers. comm.)

It seems then that despite everyone’s best efforts to have the Batwa conform to the identity they thought best suited their future, the Batwa managed to navigate such politics and ultimately have the festivities that they wanted: a large congregation of disparate communities, an event meant for celebrating.

Education
Finally I want to analyse the situation of a young Mutwa, a gifted student who has been presented as the ‘future’ of the Batwa. This boy was funded by missionaries to attend a private school in Kanungu district and upon completing his Uganda Primary Leaving Exam he was accepted by one of Uganda’s top privately run secondary schools near the capital city. The student is currently still at this institution and whilst this may seem an exceptional opportunity for the young boy to receive

37 A reference to the Batwa’s use of cannabis
the best schooling, it must also be placed in a wider context that includes the expectations placed on him by others and the role he is perceived to have.

Most noticeable is the expectation of the missionaries who continue to fund his studies. In a 2003 documentary one missionary was quoted as saying, “The future of the pygmies can be summed up in one word; you know one name, a fellow named [David]” (Roveda 2005). It is evident that this statement expresses more than just the missionary’s feelings about the boy. What it implies is that a particular future is being valued. If an educated Mutwa is the future for the Batwa, then what is the future for those not able to receive education? I would suggest that this vision of the future disempowers the Batwa, as it pressures them into accepting a future that others have created for them. As Freire writes, “The educated man is the adapted man, because he is more ‘fit’ for the world. Translated into practice, this concept is well suited to the purposes of the oppressors, whose tranquillity rests on how well men fit the world the oppressors have created, and how little they question it” (Freire 1972: 50). Read within this context, this situation suggests that the only future the Batwa have is one which is constructed for them, and that the success of their participation in that future is measured by their ability to conform to it. No role is given to the oppressor’s ability to accept other Batwa alternatives for their future.

The hierarchy constructed between the Batwa’s supposedly ‘modern’ future and their supposedly ‘backward’ past is evident in the wording of a Ugandan researcher in 2004 who, ironically, thought he was disproving such a hierarchy. He explained that the purpose of his research, funded by an international human rights organisation, was to,

…establish whether Batwa, although mentioned in the Uganda Constitution as one of the country’s constituent communities, are animals. Of course initially one would be moved to adopt this theory, especially given the fact that all their time of creation they have always known the thick impenetrable rain forest of the tropics as their habitat. They never wore clothes; built houses, except extremely tiny nest-like shacks; never grew crops for food; and lived purely on hunting and gathering. But most important, Batwa always ran away from other people! They always hid in the forest and sometimes even fought people. In a nutshell, they were not only wild but also violent and hostile. Thus the local communities were in a way appropriate concluding that Batwa are animals!

By the careful investigations and findings of [my] research, Batwa have been established to be human. They think and act like all of us. They have a language and can learn and work with others. In other words, Batwa are real humans. They are amenable to community life. They are appreciative of socio-political organisation and indeed have a sense of institutional law and order. In other words, Batwa are
ideological, technological, cultural and religious. They even have a sense of history. (pers. comm. 2004)

It appears from this quote and the evidence of this chapter that within Development discourses the Batwa are only validated, in this case as humans, once they have been seen to have met the lofted standard of the people and institutions that contrast themselves against the Batwa. As Freire suggests, “the interests of the oppressor lie in ‘changing the consciousness of the oppressed, not the situation which oppresses them’” (1972: 47). However, it should be remembered that it is this dominant paradigm that has caused the Batwa’s current predicament and which they are now being forced to accept. Instead of suggesting that David’s education is one of many futures, by promoting him as the messiah of the Batwa people, the missionaries tacitly imply that what they perceive as the Batwa’s ‘traditional’ past is not appropriate for what they perceive as the Batwa’s ‘modern’ future.

**Representing ‘Culture’ as the Problem**

To most Tswana officials San ‘underdevelopment’ and poverty was (and indeed still is) understood to be a contemporary manifestation of their ‘hunting and gathering culture’, which in turn was seen not only as an obstacle to development, but the subject of development. From this point of view economic transformation is cultural transformation, and presently the desired end of the development process is the re-acculturated, self-sufficient, subsistence farming San (Suzman 2002: 3).

In the previous section I have given ethnographic accounts of situations where the Batwa have been represented within a paradigm of progress and development. In this section I will give ethnographic evidence of discourses which have been used to justify and explain why the Batwa have failed to attain projected levels of progress and development. Predictably these discourses framed the cause of this failure as a failure not of the projects designed to help the Batwa or the nature of development itself, but of the Batwa and their ‘culture’ instead. Importantly, in order to project blame onto the ‘culture’ of the Batwa, the discourses I will analyse have understood ‘culture’ as a bounded and ahistorical entity with defined and unchanging characteristics. My argument against this interpretation will be that instead of seeing ‘culture’ as a bounded entity, culture needs to be seen as a dynamic, fluid and constructed process that responds to, and provides meaning to, events in a particular set of places and times. Given the tension between my own position and that of the discourses I will analyse, I will present dominant notions of ‘culture’ within quotation marks to signal the conflict in meaning attached to the term.

**Nomadism**

The representation of the Batwa’s forest based ‘culture’ as a hindrance is highlighted in the misuse of the term ‘nomadic’ by various actors to describe Batwa settlement patterns. In 1997 the Diocese
of Dallas, who support the Buhoma Missionaries, wrote in an Episcopal News article that the land they bought for the Batwa, “is full of Batwa who have been convinced by the church to perform self-sustaining work. It has often been a struggle because of the centuries-long Batwa [sic] lifestyle of wandering from place to place in search of food” (Goodson 1997). Later the Buhoma missionaries themselves were quoted in a national newspaper,

Although the land was purchased, there is still a problem. The pygmies never settle in one place. Because of the nature of their livelihood, they keep shifting and have been leaving this land uninhabited. [The missionary] says that at first he thought the land was not good enough, so he decided to buy another piece at the edges of the forests, which he felt would give the pygmies the comfort of living in a forest. “I was wrong actually. Pygmies have a funny visitation nature. When they visit relatives, they go for ages. One can spend up to two years on a visit. All they need is to find free food there and they will stay” (Wadri 2005)

In highlighting these accounts I do not mean to suggest that the practice the church is describing as ‘nomadic’ does not exist. Indeed the Batwa often leave one location in search of another location to reside in. My criticism lies in the misrepresentation of why the Batwa move location and what this misrepresentation suggests. Sylvain depicts a similar situation in southern Africa,

Today, White farmers frequently report that San workers will disappear without giving notice, only to return months or years later asking for their old jobs. The explanation usually given by the farmers is that the Bushmen are incorrigibly – perhaps even innately – nomadic. Whereas farmers explain the San’s ‘unreliability’ in terms of their innate ethnic character, the San themselves provide class-based explanations for their disappearances. One former San farmworker explained the situation to me this way:

“It’s about money. If you are on a farm and they [the farmers] are not very good and don’t give enough money, then you have to go to another farm. If that farmer is not very good, he gives enough money, but the rations are not very good, then you leave for a different farm. If there is enough food and money, but he is cruel, then you leave and go to another farm”. (2005: 360-361)

From interviews with communities throughout SW Uganda I have been given a multitude of reasons as to why families seemingly abandon their homes and stay with relatives. One of the most important reasons offered is that it is a consequence of the death of a member of the household. In this situation the Batwa will be forced to bury their dead on their domestic land, where before they would have been buried in the forest. Due to the scarcity of land amongst the Batwa this has often meant having to bury their dead underneath the house they are living in.
Traditionally they would have moved on after such a death, and this desire to relocate is especially pronounced when the grave lies underneath a homestead that may only be a few metres square.

Additionally, many Batwa live on unfertile ground, as this is all that is left available to them since it is land that others do not want. Many families are also unable to adequately utilise the land by their own labour and as a result are forced into moving to a community which can support their subsistence or where resources can be pooled together. Further, many Batwa cannot utilise land that is too close to the forest because it is prone to crop damage from baboons. The point I am trying to stress is that there are a variety of complex reasons which can cause a family to move location, and rarely is it done simply to visit relatives.

The use of the term ‘nomadic’ is mirrored in the way the Batwa are represented by the Kisoro District Local Council. Its website reads, “Kisoro also happens to be the home to extinct [sic] human species – the Batwa who prefer to stay in the wilderness” (Kisoro District Local Council 2006a) whilst another page suggests the Batwa are “a pigmy ethnic group that is threatened by extinction and lives in isolation up the hills” (Kisoro District Local Council 2006b). Against this representation of the Batwa, choosing to live in isolation in the ‘wilderness’, the Batwa I knew spoke of being forced to live on the tops of hills because it was the most unfertile land and the land that others did not want. On the other hand land at the bottom of the valleys, which is predominantly reclaimed marsh land, is highly fertile and only available to those who can afford it. Despite this, the representations of the local council suggest that the Batwa chose to live in isolation, and that they are to blame for their failure to “integrate into the community” (Tushabomwe-Kazooba and Mbamanya 2005: 6).

Representations of the Batwa’s land use patterns are used in an inherently negative way in these situations and this process becomes deeply disempowering for the communities toward which it is directed. It gives the impression that the Batwa are powerless and childlike in their inability to cope with agricultural subsistence and have to be convinced of its benefits. Conversely, I argue that the Batwa have used fluid patterns of movement to avoid times of scarcity within forested environments and are using it in the present day because it is one of the only ways of surviving the current patterns of scarcity. Rather than staying in one location without food, the communities move to relatives where they have a better chance of survival together. As such, nomadism is not a distinct, unchanging aspect of Batwa culture but a response to a given set of circumstances and situations.

Ferguson writes that with regards to more powerful Development projects, their intentions,

are only the visible part of a much larger mechanism through which structures are actually produced, reproduced, and transformed. Plans are explicit, and easily seen and understood; conspiracies are only slightly less so. But any intentional
deployment only takes effect through a convoluted route involving unacknowledged structures and unpredictable outcomes. (Ferguson 1994: 276)

If this holds true for more dominant processes like Development, then I argue that the intentions of the Batwa need to be understood as involving a more complex rationale than simply ‘cultural ignorance’. The missionaries’ attempts to justify their agricultural project’s failures on the Batwa’s nomadism “dismisses the fact that actors exist within wider historical and social forms of rationality which have structural properties” (Rossi 2004: 3).

In the examples above, the use of nomadism also involves an implicit assumption that dominant sedentary forms of subsistence are both preferable and inevitable. Nomadism can only be represented as a problem when it is contrasted against an alternative like sedentism. The assumption is never more present than in the assertion by the District Council that the Batwa are facing extinction, it is implied, as a result of their life in the ‘wilderness’. The drive to sedentarize the Batwa shows all the hallmarks of similar projects carried out against other Indigenous Peoples. Samson writes that in the Canadian context aboriginal policies were based on the assumption that sedentarization would facilitate the extension of certain benefits to the Innu, like housing, healthcare and schooling, that colonials already enjoyed (Samson 2001: 233). He writes,

> The key to the creation of sameness [between the Innu and the colonials] was therefore the destruction of nomadism…Thus, the Innu were urged to swap ‘loafing’ for ‘working’, hunting for settlement, the Animal Gods for the Christian God, and their language for English. Native ‘rights’ could only be guaranteed if the natives ceased to be natives. (Samson 2001: 233)

‘To Save’

A similar example of the disempowering effects of a discourse can be seen through the use of the verb ‘to save’ in relation to the Batwa’s ability to accumulate financial resources. In discussions I and others had with the missionaries in Buhoma, they repeatedly used the lack of the verb ‘to save’ in the Batwa language (or the failure to use the future tense) as a sign of how hard their work to help the Batwa had been. In effect they again positioned the Batwa’s ‘culture’ as being deficient. What the missionaries failed to add was that the Batwa no longer use their own language, Rutwa, but instead use the language of their dominant neighbours, the Bakiga. What this additional information highlights is that if the Batwa are constrained by language and if their ‘culture’ is to blame for their current situation, then it is actually someone else’s ‘culture’ that should be blamed. Moreover, for the missionaries’ claims to be correct you would expect similar circumstances to be present amongst the Bakiga People who also use the language and who also have no verb ‘to save’. The truth is that the Bakiga People are one of the most economically successful of Uganda’s peoples, having colonised large areas of the country. It would seem that they have no problems, as a ‘culture’, a people or as individuals, with either saving money or envisioning the
future. The limited use of the future tense also occurs in many Bantu languages and it would be wrong to suggest that other Bantu speakers are unable to understand differing concepts of time.

However, the Batwa’s perceived inability to save was not only represented by the missionaries in Buhoma. In 2005 the principal organisation which funded the Buhoma Village Walk published a report analysing the development of the project in Buhoma. By 2005 the walk had been running for almost three years and the FAO found that there were four main lessons to be learned,

1. It is key to involve all stakeholders from the beginning to ensure the project’s success
2. Proper marketing makes a major difference to product sales
3. Service quality is essential for enterprise sustainability
4. It is important to ensure beneficiaries are capable of managing additional incomes

This last point is crucial, because in the eyes of the FAO they were specifically addressing the case of the Batwa. The subtext of point four stated that, “increased income generation has corresponded with increased use of alcohol by community members, especially in the Batwa ethnic group. This shows that activities for income generation should be accompanied by activities to support the good management of savings” (FAO 2005b: 10).

Several assumptions have been made in these statements and the FAO have implicitly represented the Batwa as innocent children of the forest who have been unable to handle their new found income and have used it to fuel alcoholism. They state that if the Batwa had the right training they would be able to practice ‘the good management of savings’. Alternatively, I would argue that the alcohol abuse present amongst the Batwa in Buhoma is not a sign of their inability to manage money, but a direct result of their marginalised and disempowered status within society. Marginalisation from political, economic and social structures and severe discrimination have all resulted in the social dysfunction of the Batwa communities and the income from the walk has only served to fuel the Batwa’s problems. The eradication of alcoholism cannot be accomplished through the provision of money management skills, but through a complete overhaul of the ways in which the Batwa are seen and treated by wider society.

When trying to understand why Developmentalists continue to use the lack of saving or future tense to explain the Batwa’s ‘undeveloped’ status, it could be argued that its use helps the listener to instantly understand the problems of the projects and create sympathy for the practitioners. Unfortunately what this also does is allow organisations like the FAO to refuse to acknowledge their responsibility or acknowledge other reasons for their situation, many of which lie closer to home. The missionaries remarkably provided one explanation themselves during an interview for a documentary, when they said, “how do you give seeds to a starving people and expect them to plant and several months later reap the products of their labour?” (Roveda 2005).
Representing Batwa ‘culture’ as a hindrance to their development only serves in the oppression of the Batwa by depicting them as trapped by a static set of beliefs and practices and therefore in need of others to help them break free from it. It denies the Batwa’s ability to articulate their situation and the suffering they are facing, which includes starvation. It places blame on their ‘culture’, intimating that it is unfit to serve the Batwa in the ‘modern’ world, and places blame on the Batwa themselves for holding their ‘culture’ as valuable to their continued existence. Whilst Developmentalists attribute specific problems to specific aspects of, what they perceive as, Batwa ‘culture’ in order to create fixed entry points for their interventions (Wright 1998: 8) they neglect the wider social, political and historical contexts. Feit describes the situation of the Cree as being similarly represented as,

The incapacity for adequate ‘collective action’ and agency rests on the ultimate frailty of the Cree culture and knowledge that are blocked and that cannot develop quickly enough. It is their failing that limits them, not the political-economic context of Development decision-making which politically excludes the Cree and prevents them from effectively acting on their knowledge and plans for the future. (Feit 2004: 115)

This perceived frailty of Batwa ‘culture’ is nowhere better represented than in comments made by a staff member of a Gorilla conservation NGO. When discussing problems which might get in the way of the aims of one project, a staff member responded by saying, “[The Batwa] are very intelligent but their culture holds them back” (Kisoro 2006).

The derogatory use of ‘nomadic’ and the reiteration of the lack of the verb ‘to save’ serves to cement the position of groups like the church as a ‘shepherd of the flock’, and reproduces a discourse in which the Batwa are represented as dependent upon the church for their training and education. Additionally, Developmentalists seem unable to acknowledge that they may have bought unfertile land, land too close to the forest or failed to accommodate people’s practices for their dead. As a result their denial enables themselves to argue that the inability of the Batwa to save is simply due to ‘cultural ignorance’. As Crewe and Harrison suggest, “[f]or Developers, the notion of ‘cultural barriers’ simplifies complexity. It also serves to situate the ‘failure’ of their technology within rural communities” (1998: 146). By falling back on the ‘innocent hunter gatherer’ identity, groups like the missionaries refuse to acknowledge either their own responsibility or the wider contexts and reduce the Batwa to submissive communities in need of their help. Worryingly, they validate their own position by disempowering the Batwa. As Freire suggests, “Projecting an absolute ignorance onto others, a characteristic of the ideology of oppression, negates education and knowledge as processes of inquiry. The teacher presents himself to his students as their necessary opposite; by considering their ignorance absolute, he justifies his own existence” (Freire 1972: 46).
Cultural Politics and Development

Ironically, at the same time that the Batwa are being devalued for their ‘culture’ and for the perceived ignorance this ‘culture’ produces, there is also a parallel discourse which laments the ‘loss’ of their ‘culture’ and holds their ‘traditional’ forest related ‘culture’ in high esteem. Either way, their ‘culture’ is seen as a bounded and static entity rather than a dynamic process of meaning making. Sylvain states that “[e]thnotourism is a site at which identity politics joins with market demand, and this union has inspired concerns about the commodification of ‘culture’, the perpetuation of Western imperialist nostalgia, and the promotion of a neo-colonial quest for the authentic exotic other” (2005: 356). As an example of the quest for the ‘authentic exotic other’ in Buhoma, one tourist’s recommendation for the Buhoma Batwa community was that “the pygmy men could wear original native clothes” and not jeans and t-shirts, whilst another complained that he “thought [‘pygmies’] were small. Less than 150cm” implying these Pygmies were fake. Conversely, another respondent when describing her best attraction stated, “The pigmees [sic]. They are still very natural” (Buhoma Village Walk 2005). It is clear that their responses indicated that they had a particular and essentialised expectation of Batwa identity which was either fulfilled or neglected during their visit and was related to a ‘natural’ or ‘traditional’ Pygmy.

Buhoma Village Walk however, is not the only place where the promotion of ‘traditional/authentic’ Batwa ‘culture’ is pursued. In Mgahinga Gorilla National Park in Kisoro there are plans to create a Batwa cultural tourism ‘product’ inside the park and many of the Batwa communities in Kisoro District are already being visited by tourists who seek ‘authentic’ ‘Pygmies’ to question, watch and film. In Kabale District around Lake Bunyonyi, where there are a number of tourist hotels and lodges, the communities are frequently visited by tourists, encouraged by advertisements to seek out the ‘Pygmies’. One reporter, from a Ugandan newspaper, responded to visiting the Batwa by saying that “the thought of interacting with them was terribly inspiring. From what we had been told, they are a peculiar community that holds faith in the unattractive social-cultural norms of their aborigines” (Okello 2002). Alternatively some tourism companies claim to be against “showing fake folklore for naïve tourists, like the proud Pygmies dancing on command to raise few dollars” and instead advise customers to be ready to go fishing with the Pygmies or learn their spectacular traditions (Africadventures n.d.). Either way, what is being sought is the ‘authentic’ or ‘traditional’ Pygmy who is represented as possessing something the rest of us do not have, who lives in harmony with nature and whose wisdom has been passed down through generations. Indeed, when the President of Uganda came to Kisoro town, in the build up to national elections, the otherwise despised and derided Batwa ‘culture’ was transformed into the focus of District pride when the President was welcomed by a Batwa dancing group.
It is also of concern that this preoccupation with the ‘harmonious hunter gatherer’, particularly when advanced through cultural tourism, only serves to keep the Batwa marginalised. It does so by denying them the right to actively shape their own identity and forces them to take the identity tourists decide is best for them. This is conveyed by Sylvain, when she says, “Ethnotourism does present an important economic opportunity...but there are grounds for reservation...the only identity given ‘scope’ for expression here is the one that is marketable – that is, the traditional foraging identity as it is defined largely by stereotypes feeding the demand for this kind of ethnotourism” (2002: 1080). I personally experienced the ŦKhomani San’s ethnotourism when I visited their communities as part of a conference in 2003 where we were invited to watch a San ‘Trance Dance’. The performance, however, finished abruptly and the organiser came round the delegates and apologised for the performers who were too drunk to perform. His apology appeared to signify that he thought there was a more appropriate way to carry out this performance of San culture. Looking back now, the stunted, drunken performance I witnessed was a remarkably accurate representation of the situation of the ŦKhomani communities who at the time were trying to rediscover their community in the face of abject poverty and social rupture.

The Batwa are well aware of the market demands placed upon them through tourism and the tension they face between how they represent themselves to earn a living and how they wish to be seen. In Buhoma I knew one Mutwa who regularly wore a second-hand T-shirt which had the caption, in English, ‘Dick – Male Escort Service’. I explained the meaning of this caption to the man after I had seen a number of amused tourists being photographed with him. He realised why

38 Source: unknown

Plate 32: Batwa dancers perform for the President of Uganda, Kisoro 200738
the tourists always asked to have their picture taken with him on the days he wore the t-shirt, and upset, he walked off to his house to change into another top. However his wife stopped him and after a brief conversation he returned to our group, still wearing his old t-shirt. When I asked him why he had changed his mind, his wife responded that now that they knew why the t-shirt received such interest, her husband would be wearing it every day. If he removed it he would lose the extra money he received from having his photograph taken, and by wearing it every day the couple now hoped to increase their earnings. I would argue that in this situation, despite the Mutwa not conforming to an external representation of the ‘harmonious hunter-gatherer’ stereotype (he was wearing a ‘Western’ t-shirt and not a loin cloth), he nonetheless satisfied the tourists quest for the ‘harmonious hunter-gatherer’ through his perceived ignorance of the symbolism of the t-shirt and its caption, which the tourists perceived to be in contrast to their hunter-gatherer stereotype. This account also clearly shows that despite the couples’ small measure of agency in controlling how they presented themselves to the tourists, it was the tourists who were in control of the identities being valued, and mirrors other examples of tourism’s control of ‘Bushmen’ identities described by Sylvain (2002, 2005), Buntman (2002) and Guenther (2002, 2006).

Despite having highlighted how the promotion of the forest related aspects of Batwa ‘culture’ is driven by tourists and ‘Westerners’, it is important to acknowledge that the Batwa themselves want better contact with the forest than they currently have. The Batwa argue that their relationship to the forest is an important part of their self identification and will continue to be so in the future. The important point is not to contest whether the Batwa are former hunter gatherers or sedentary farmers, but to resist the temptation to see these categories as distinct, exclusive and all encompassing. The Batwa are able to see themselves with different identities at different times and are conscious of the often varied and entangled identities they embody. Instead of forcing them to embody essentialist identities and ‘cultures’, the Batwa need to be allowed to regain control of the forces which shape their livelihoods and to represent themselves in whatever form they wish.

Cultural survival projects are therefore important to the Batwa, however I do want to distance myself from certain conceptions of what ‘cultural survival’ initiatives entail. Sylvain’s valid description of the heterogeneity of San identity and the fallacy of essentialist discourse clearly rejects the ‘cultural survival’ strategies employed to preserve a static or ahistorical cultural identity (see 2002, 2005, 2006). Since this is often the case, she is right to suggest that such strategies are deficient in understanding often deeply embedded political economies involved in indigenous identity. But given that what is often perceived as cultural survival is essential to practical strategies which aim to keep the space open for the Batwa to make their own decisions about their future, an alternative understanding is needed. Bodley suggests an alternative strategy which he has termed ‘cultural autonomy’ (1975, 1977). Cultural autonomy suggests processes where it is not the ‘culture’ that is being ‘saved’, but a communities’ ability to maintain its own integrity and its ability to define what is being saved or discarded (this notion of self-determinacy has also been described as cultural auditing by other authors (see Chennells 2001, Crawhall 2000)). When
looked upon in this way, the culture created through autonomy strategies is not the objective of the strategy. The objective is instead the autonomy of the group of people to create and maintain their own cultural response to a particular context. As Wright acknowledges, “the flows of creativity...[associated]...with ‘vigorous’ culture is a product of continuous assertion of the power to define in a political process involving local, national and international actors” (1998: 14). The resultant culture is neither validated nor invalidated through references to ‘traditional culture’ or to ‘modern culture’; it is only control of the process itself which can validate indigenous culture. As Hastrup and Elsass suggest, “cultural survival therefore implies not the conservation of a preconceived identity anchored once and for all in an objectively existing (reified) culture but continuing control by the agents of a particular culture of the shaping of local history” (Hastrup and Elsass 1990: 306).

During my research I was often presented with the idea that the Batwa had lost their ‘culture’ by various individuals and agencies and invariably the culture which was being described as ‘lost’ was that part of the Batwa’s culture which related to their hunter-gatherer mode of production in the forest. A typical example can be seen in recent comments by an American making a documentary on the Batwa,

The Batwa we have seen so far are simply culturally shattered. There are no recognizable remnants of what they used to be, only some communal attitude and songs, which both are already widely common in this area anyway. [A missionary] came today though and immediately insisted that we go to the more traditional Batwa settlement a days drive away. Exciting! (Wolfe 2007)

Defining the movement in ‘culture’ as ‘loss’ places a value judgement on one representation of their identity (that part which is lost) and essentialises that part to represent an entire ‘culture’. They are either hunter gatherers or they are not ‘authentic’. Additionally if their culture has been lost, are they now in the position of being without culture, of being culture-less? Discussing the ‡Khomani San from South Africa, Sylvain suggests that

[†]he problem with pegging cultural identity to a unique relationship to the land – and associating political economic context with cultural loss – is that we are compelled to conclude that the ‡Khomani San (along with a great many other San) have already been ‘deculturated’ and so no longer possess a culture that could count as ‘indigenous’ (2002: 1076).

The reality is that the Batwa are living, communicating and exchanging in all the ways that produce ‘culture’ and identity. I argue that the definition of ‘culture’ as ‘lost’ implies a value judgement regarding which representations of a persons’ identity or ‘culture’ is acceptable or not and depicts that ‘culture’ as an ahistorical and bounded entity. In reality the Batwa have lost nothing of their
‘culture’ or identity and instead it has changed and adapted, sometimes proactively and sometimes under duress. Either way ‘culture’ needs to be removed from a bounded and essentialised understanding and instead seen as a dynamic process of meaning making which can adapt and retain validity in whatever forms it takes (see Wright 1998).

**Conclusion**

The stigmatisation and discrimination of Forest people by other local people is endorsed and reinforced by official attitudes to these ‘Pygmy’ peoples that tend to perceive of their hunter-gatherer way of life as primitive and shameful to the national heritage, yet celebrate their extensive knowledge of plants for healing and magic, and their incomparable skills as singers and dancers. (Kenrick and Lewis 2001: 317)

In conclusion to this chapter I argue that, as Kenrick and Lewis suggest, Indigenous Peoples are caught in a double bind between discourses that offer contradictory values and goals. In relation to Environmentalism Argyrou has written that,

> The important thing to note here…is the balancing act that the ‘developing’ countries were from now on forced to carry out in their struggle for development and national prestige. The problem to be negotiated was a set of conflicting values: first, that poverty is cultural pollution because it is indicative of superstition – which is the ignorance of backwardness – and second, that environmental pollution is cultural poverty because it is indicative of the refusal to come to terms with the ‘truth’ about the nature of nature – which is the ignorance (and arrogance) of ‘man’. (Argyrou 2005: 45)

When Argyrou’s environmental double bind is applied to Development as discussed in this chapter, we can see that the Batwa face the same dilemma. On the one hand they have been repeatedly represented as being in poverty as a result of ‘cultural pollution’ or more specifically as a result of cultural deficiency: they are represented as lacking the right knowledge or skills to negotiate the modern world, whether those skills are Christianity, agricultural skills, the ability to save or a sedentary way of living. In various narratives in this chapter such knowledge has been presented to them by their agricultural neighbours who convinced them to leave the forest, by the missionaries intent on civilising them, and by Development organisations intent on developing them. In each case the intention has been to progress the Batwa to a state of being like that of their ‘beneficiaries’: i.e. the self-proclaimed developed, Christianised or civilised world. When the Batwa continue to resist specific interventions, they are then represented as being slaves to their ‘culture’, whether it is their ‘restrictive’ language or their nomadic ‘habits’ which are to blame. Crewe and Harrison have also noted Development discourse’s representations of ‘cultural barriers’. They suggest these barriers are portrayed in two ways: (a) as barriers derived from
ignorance, and (b) as barriers created by cultural rules (1998: 44). As I have shown, the first barrier is employed by Development discourse to explain why the Batwa have failed to ‘progress’ – they have been lacking knowledge or technology - and the second barrier is brought into play if, after Development intervention, recipients like the Batwa are still perceived to have failed to progress – they have cultural rules which hold them back.

At the same time, however, the Batwa have been represented in discourses which value and objectify their ‘traditional culture’, or at least those aspects which can fit into dominant paradigms without presenting a threat to it. As a result, the social, political and economic aspects of their ‘traditional culture’ have been used to justify their poverty whilst the artistic aspects, found in their singing and dancing, have been glorified and labelled as ‘authentic culture’. This double bind leaves the Batwa in an impossible dilemma. If they conform to the pressures exerted by dominant society and become ‘developed’ they risk being labelled as fake and no longer identifiable as ‘authentic’ Batwa. This logic of cultural assimilation is mirrored in comments regarding the Batwa’s biological assimilation. One government representative succinctly made this point, ‘they will intermarry and in 40 years time there will be no Batwa left. That is their future’ (pers. comm.), whilst another Development worker wrote in an article that the Batwa “are not strictly ‘pygmies’, as they have interbred with the Bakiga ethnic group” (Baldiscini 2001: 3).

On the other hand, if they reject the pressure to assimilate and embrace aspects of what is perceived as their ‘authentic culture’, they risk being ostracised even more from the society and the structures which place them in this double bind. Feit discusses this same problem in relation to Canada’s Indigenous populations,

The Indian was cast as the opposite of the Euro-American, and if they were no longer opposites then they were Euro-American...The positive versions of Indians as non-Euro-American was that they are ancient, traditional, unchanged, and therefore in balance with nature. The negative version was that they were uncivilized, undomesticated, lacking industriousness, and therefore savage, querulous, and unproductive...Being by definition opposites, they live eternally under the threat that as they change they lose their distinctive identity as non-Euro-Americans and become civilized and modernized. There is no space for hybrids – no place for true Indians who are modern, nor for traditional Indians who change without becoming modern. (Feit 2004: 112)39

These demands represented the Batwa in an essentialised manner – whether developed or undeveloped, authentic or fake – leaving no room for the Batwa to be whoever it is they find themselves being. Rather than being a farmer who occasionally hunts or a Christian who occasionally worships his ancestors, the Batwa are increasingly being forced to adopt essentialised

39 In this quote Feit reserves the term ‘Indian’ for Euro-Canadian ideas and images of Canada’s Indigenous Peoples
identities which deny them the right to acknowledge the shaping power of history and the political space and opportunities available to them. As Sylvain notes of the rights movement among the San in southern Africa,

The San are struggling for rights on a very narrow and contradictory field of recognition: they may be denied rights as an ethnic group on the grounds that their underclass status dissolves their cultural authenticity; and they may be denied rights as modern citizens on the grounds that their ‘authentic’ cultural identity is defined by premodern, prepolitical primitivism. (Sylvain 2006: 196)

The situation is an almost impossible one and the Batwa have struggled to shape their future within the demands and restrictions that are made upon them. In the final chapter of this thesis I will look at some of the ways the Batwa have responded to their current situation by means of advocacy and rights initiatives, and I will analyse how successful those responses have been.
9. THE OPPRESSION OF REPRESENTATION

False charity constrains the fearful and subdued…to extend their trembling hands. Real generosity lies in striving so that those hands – whether of individuals or entire peoples – need be extended less and less in supplication, so that more and more they become human hands which work and, by working, transform the world. (Freire 1972: 21)

The oppressed must be their own example in the struggle for their redemption…Pedagogy which begins with the egoistic interests of the oppressors (an egoism cloaked in the false interests of paternalism) and makes of the oppressed the objects of its humanitarianism, itself maintains and embodies oppression. It is an instrument of dehumanization. (Freire 1972: 30)

These two passages from Freire’s, ‘Pedagogy of the Oppressed’ (1972) offer the core sentiments that will be expressed in the following chapter. I will detail and analyse a narrative in which the Batwa were disempowered or ‘oppressed’ by actors who failed to allow them to control and participate in their own futures. The outcome left them as “passive agents awaiting the emancipatory intervention of development organizations” (Green 2000: 68); no more than an ‘abstract category’. I will argue that the Batwa have been denied the spaces needed to effectively represent their situation and will provide a number of cases where this denial occurred. In the first section I will show how the Batwa’s voice has simply not been heard in Development projects, before turning to examples when, even after spaces had been created for the Batwa to represent their situation, that space was co-opted by more dominant discourses and the Batwa’s voice was suppressed.

The Problem with Participation

One of the local causes of the Batwa’s failure to be represented is a result of the discrimination they suffer at the hands of their local neighbours. In 1996 a report looking at the creation of the Multiple Use Zones I discussed in chapter seven wrote,

Ensuring the effective involvement of the minority Batwa was much harder, particularly in one parish where there was historic enmity between Bakiga and Batwa. At our first community meeting there, the Batwa sat apart away from the meeting...When introducing themselves they made statements such as:

“I am glad to be asked my name as I thought we were not considered people. The forest, where we used to get our food, is closed. We have no permanent houses, no places to dig, we are just floating.”
They did not attend following meetings and we learnt that they had been warned off by other community members. We discovered they lived completely separately, not attending the schools…and had no access to education or health care. Community leaders told us that the Batwa had been included on the lists of resource users, but they were not. We felt it was best not to confront the community but continue the process, we had much trust to build with them. (Wild and Mutebi 1996: 34)

From my own experience this description of events is symptomatic of the attempts by Development projects to include the Batwa. Dominant neighbours typically discriminate against the Batwa and even if their participation is enforced by the project planners, the Batwa’s more dominant neighbours will simply acknowledge such participation before diverting the benefits to their own interests. In this way participation only serves to “open up an opportunity for certain interests within the community to be ‘written in’ to the project design, or to gain control of its implementation, which tends to skew benefits to better-off sections of the population” (Gardner and Lewis 1996: 113).

The narrative above also highlights another problem with most Development projects, which is the way projects utilise the concept of ‘community’. The authors suggest they did not respond to local discrimination because they did not want to upset the trust they were building with the ‘community’. It seems then that the Batwa were not seen as part of the ‘community’ because it was not the Batwa’s trust they were trying to honour when they failed to respond to the discrimination. As Gardner and Lewis suggest, participation is problematic because it “masks differences between people: local heterogeneity is dissolved into vague notions of ‘community’. This may disregard important cross-cutting divisions of class, gender, and age, which may lead to substantial differences in local views and interests” (1996: 112).

The project planners in the narrative above made the mistake of thinking of local people as a homogenous ‘community’ which in reality did not exist. Accounting for less than 1% of the entire population in south west Uganda, the Batwa are rarely envisaged by their more dominant neighbors as part of their community and are actively isolated from them. By assuming that the local people live in a homogenous group, the Batwa are inevitably left isolated and marginalized from most Development projects and their discrimination is left unaddressed. As the narrative above suggests, even when the discrimination is acknowledged, many projects choose to ignore it to maintain good relationships with the majority of project beneficiaries. In situations like this ‘participation’ is a hollow term which is instead used to “legitimise a project by gaining the sanction or formal approval of key people in the community, which then feeds back into project appraisal criteria and helps to make the project a ‘success’” (Gardner and Lewis 1996: 112).

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The results of failing to include the Batwa and the discrimination they face within design projects can have serious consequences. In 2003 I was contacted by a tourist who had witnessed money being forcibly taken from a Batwa community by guides of the Buhoma Village Walk (BVW)\(^{41}\). After talking to the management of the walk I realised that the Batwa had virtually no role in the design or management of the walk and because the guides had full control of the interaction between the tourists and the community, the Batwa occupied a vulnerable and silenced position. The design of the walk had failed to address the discrimination faced by the Batwa and, indeed, perpetuated it by handing the control of the community’s income over to those who discriminate against them.

After expressing my concerns about the walk to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) which designed the BVW they replied that in their own investigation of the matter the Batwa had denied that the event had ever taken place and that they “felt reassured that the ‘tourist incident’ that [I] had mentioned had been blown out of proportion and grossly exaggerated by the tourists” (pers. comm.). However, I would question this analysis. In this type of situation the Batwa often enter into such meetings intimidated by institutions, like the FAO, which are in control of projects like the walk. Freire recounts a similar situation,

> A sociologist friend of mine tells of a group of armed peasants in a Latin American country who recently took over a latifundium. For tactical reasons, they planned to hold the landowner as a hostage. But not one peasant had the courage to guard him; his very presence was terrifying. It is also possible that the act of opposing the boss provoked guilt feelings. In truth, the boss was ‘inside’ them (1972: 40)

As a vulnerable group it must be acknowledged that the Batwa often find it difficult to engage in open discussions about project related problems directly with project managers. As Bourdieu notes, “The propensity to speak politically, even in the most rudimentary way...is strictly proportionate to the sense of having the right to speak” (Bourdieu 1984: 411). Secondly, in an environment like this where they feel disempowered they will often choose not to discuss issues which they worry might jeopardise their already meagre source of income or lead to retaliation from those who control the walk. As Mauss has pointed out: “to give is to show one’s superiority, to show that one is something more and higher...To accept without returning or repaying more is to face subordination, to become a client and subservient” (1970: 72). As a result it may be argued that the notion of Development as providing free aid and support devoid of a politics of power is extremely dangerous and as Saugestad argues, “What is wrong with the so-called free gift is the rejection of mutuality between the one who gives and the one who receives. The gift that cannot be returned becomes a humiliation” (Saugestad 2000: 231).

\(^{41}\) A full account of these events can be found in the article by Schuurman (SCHUURMAN, D. (2003), ‘A People Betrayed’, *Africa Geographic*, vol. 11, no. 10, p73-77)
More generally, what is clear is that the FAO understood their participation with the Batwa within a framework of project management and not within a framework of power relations, and thus failed to acknowledge the imbalance of power created through their project and the power they held over the Batwa. I would also argue that in order for the FAO and other Developmentalists to understand their relationship to their beneficiaries as a politics of power, it would require them to question the validity of their claims that their partnership with local communities is based on equality. It would force them to acknowledge the inherent inequality in their own position. Importantly, when I talked to the Batwa privately a few weeks later they explained they did have concerns about the walk. They explained that the guides often take money from them but that they feel too intimidated and threatened by the guides to refuse their demands or complain.

However, an even more problematic reason why the Batwa are rarely represented in projects comes as a result of objectives which rarely meet the needs of the Batwa. In chapter seven we saw that despite demands by the Batwa to include wild honey, wild yams and religious sites within the MUZ’s in Bwindi, the final list of resources only included resources demanded by the majority non-Batwa communities. The response to Batwa complaints is typified in comments made in a project report written in 2005, “…the batwa can partly blame them selves [sic] the reason as to why they were marginalized in the current MUZ programme. During the initial negotiations concerning the rules of harvesting, many of the batwa chose to opt out because their requests couldn’t be complied with, in a level they found satisfactorily” (Nielson 2005: 12). This example clearly represents the situation the Batwa face in many contexts. They are offered only those options created by other people and when they complain about those options or ask for alternatives they are criticized and further alienated. The result is that the Batwa are forced to assimilate in order to be accepted and if they do not they are blamed for their own inadequacies. As Ribot notes, “Communities in project areas who choose not to accept the conditions of ‘participation’ and those simply not chosen for projects, have no legal control over the disposition or forest resources…These local governments and village communities simply do not have the right to say ‘no’…This is hardly participatory forestry” (Ribot 1996).

From this section two main themes emerge. The first is that the Batwa are rarely given a suitable structure in which to engage Development projects. By assuming the concept of ‘community’ is unproblematic, the Batwa’s discrimination and segregation from the wider society goes unnoticed and their participation is denied. Secondly, it is also the case that the very objectives of these projects exclude the Batwa because they are structured in ways which neglect the specific needs and wishes of the Batwa. I will now recount a different situation where spaces were created for the Batwa to represent their experience to their Development partners. Nevertheless, as will become apparent, even in this scenario such spaces were still co-opted by more dominant actors and interests.
The Denial of Participation

The oppressor shows solidarity with the oppressed only when he stops regarding the oppressed as an abstract category and sees them as persons who have been unjustly dealt with, deprived of their voice, cheated in the sale of their labour...
(Freire 1972: 26)

Towards the end of 2005 I became increasingly aware that some Development and human rights groups were attempting to instigate legal cases on behalf of the Batwa, yet none of them were working with a mandate from the Batwa. In response to these interests and the continued legal work of several other groups, I contacted an indigenous rights group seeking funds to carry out community consultations with the Batwa. This was done with the intention of creating a clear mandate from the Batwa which could then inform the work of these different groups.

Plate 33: Consultation team discussion with a Batwa community

In March 2006, I participated in a consultation team composed of members of UOBDU and a land rights group which visited eight Batwa communities in south west Uganda to carry out lengthy discussions on their current situation and how they wished to proceed in having their land rights addressed. The communities directly related their current situations to their previous dispossession of land by the government, and were willing to advocate for those rights to be
readdressed. None of the communities we visited had been consulted by any groups about proposed legal action on their behalf and the report from the consultations noted that “it was repeatedly emphasized that anyone…intending to develop a legal case on their behalf should come and consult with them first. There was widespread indignation that organizations might be intending to sue the government on their behalf without first speaking with them” (United Organisation for Batwa Development in Uganda and Uganda Land Alliance 2006: 38).

One community responded by saying that,

…it is for us, the Batwa, to tell [NGOs] what we want from the government…[NGOs] are not there to tell the Batwa what they should say…I am ready to raise my voice. (ibid: 26)

Another that,

…Fine, they can do that but how do they represent us without first coming to consult us, see where we are, hear our views…it makes no sense to go ahead without listening to us…those people, let them come here, see everything, talk to us, if they’re still interested they should come here… (ibid: 32)

And lastly another that,

…those other people [NGOs] should visit us and hear our views other than putting the Batwa’s views first without consulting them…those who would fight the government must always first consult us so we can decide whether the steps they take are what the Batwa want or not and whether they are good or bad… (ibid: 34)

It was clear to the team that the Batwa were adamant they wanted to take control of the process of regaining their rights and many had already formed their own organisations to do exactly that. Several communities stated they wanted to first form groups which they would use to begin negotiations and they suggested they would start at the lowest level of government, the Local Council Level One (LCI) and confront these elected leaders about their issues. Such suggestions clearly refuted the negative stereotypes held by some agencies about the Batwa’s inability to recognise their problems and acknowledge the steps needed to address them (ibid: 39). However, many who were told about the Batwa’s wish to organise and lobby at a local level were sceptical and thought that this would not achieve results. These organisations believed change would only come through national level legal action. My immediate reaction to these views was cautious as it appeared that once again the Batwa’s capacity to fight their own struggle was being denied. Additionally, I felt that village and parish level lobbying would be useful in helping to build
confidence and capacity amongst the Batwa so that if they were required to pursue their fight at a national level they would be better able to cope with the struggle this would entail.

In her work with San representative organisations, Saugestad has noted that, unlike Indigenous Peoples in Canada, USA and New Zealand who have had long periods of internal mobilisation to develop and consolidate local organisations, the San have been

(a) immediately supported by an existing international indigenous network...which meant that (b) they immediately set out to address the most complex of all possible issues: rights to land and water. Inevitably, this means that extremely controversial issues are being addressed before what we might call the 'normal' process of local mobilisation and awareness-raising has run its course towards the consolidation of regional and national organisational structures. (Saugestad 2001b: 233)

The result of this kind of 'flying start' has been that the processes and indigenous organisations used to regain the rights of the Batwa have, like those of the San, been left vulnerable to larger and more powerful interests. The kind of approach suggested by the Batwa should then be seen as the best strategy to retain their control of the process from more powerful allies. Blaser suggests this approach is,

...a politics of partnership – that is, 'a politics of accommodation, negotiation, and long-term pressure [applied to states, markets and international organisations] rather than confrontation or threats of political reprisal' (2002: 29) The political horizon of these grassroots movements is, through alliances, to gain long-term capacity in order to transform their circumstances; thus they have to display a 'politics of patience' in order that the urgency of the problems assailing them does not take over and lead to their being overcome by their more powerful partners’ interests. (Blaser 2004: 37)

From my experience in the legal strategies and alliances formed by the Batwa during 2006 it was apparent that the groups who responded to their wishes, nevertheless, were restricted by the fact that they saw the Batwa’s problems and objectives as a win or lose game. As Blaser notes,

Many urban-base NGO allies start from a position in which resistance to a particular development project constitutes an attempt to maintain a previous status quo. Thus, their interest is very circumscribed, and a campaign is for them a win or lose game. Of course this means that there are not many other connected issues that can be offered to such NGOs for negotiation. In contrast, Indigenous organisations cannot disregard offers to negotiate. In part, this is because...negotiations have something to offer when contrasted to development that is presented to them as fait accompli... (Blaser 2004: 36)
Negotiations were seen as appropriate only because they offered an avenue for victory rather than seeing the inherent value of negotiations as a method of social transformation that could provide a structure for Batwa empowerment regardless of the final outcome. Finally, by targeting the national level directly it was my worry that not only would the Batwa be marginalised from the process, they would be denied the chance to empower themselves and lead their struggle. I was also concerned they would be denied the chance to create awareness amongst neighbouring communities; the very people who would be tasked to implement any resolutions from a court of law.

The communities who were initially consulted asked if funds could be sought to organise a regional meeting bringing representatives from every Batwa community together throughout south west Uganda and in May 2006, UOBDU carried out these regional consultations at a Kisoro based workshop. The outcome of this workshop largely replicated the opinions collected in the March consultations. From both rounds of consultations the following points were repeatedly expressed:

1. The Batwa were unhappy about the current state of their rights
2. Given appropriate support, the Batwa were able and willing to pursue processes to have their rights readdressed
3. No legal action should be investigated until the Batwa carried out negotiations with the government and exhausted all other measures
4. No organisation should initiate legal proceedings without the express consent and mandate from the Batwa People through their own organisation UOBDU

The final step in this consultative process was to organise a meeting in Kampala attended by eight different organisations so that the Batwa could present the consultation’s findings and solicit the support of the groups invited. At this meeting the number one output was the recognition that UOBDU should be recognised as the representative group for the Batwa and that they should be the lead implementer in all initiatives dealing with the Batwa’s rights (United Organisation for Batwa Development in Uganda 2006: 11). Additionally it was recognised that UOBDU had specifically asked the actors present for their support in achieving the goals of the Batwa and that, “All present agree to co-operate and share on their experience and their work” (ibid). I clearly remember walking away from the meeting optimistic that a variety of groups working in often conflicting directions would now work together based on a unified mandate from the Batwa.

When I left Uganda for medical treatment, three months after our initial meeting, I did so a matter of days before the follow up meeting. After this second meeting, however, some of the activities of certain participants went against the explicit objectives agreed at the first meeting. Initially I heard that two of the groups had initiated a joint proposal without informing UOBDU or the Batwa, despite the Batwa being highlighted as the lead implementer in the previous meeting. I tried to contact these two organisations but having received no reply I asked a former employee of one of the groups to try and investigate the situation when he returned to Kampala in October 2006. His response was alarming as he explained that these two groups had indeed submitted a project proposal, and also that another group was going ahead and moving forward with an intent to sue the government. None of these three groups had consulted UOBDU or the Batwa.

**A Failure to Respond**

When I look over the course of the narrative above, it appears that the rights of the Batwa ebb and flow based on the wishes of external groups and as such those rights were no more than exchange items whose value fluctuated. In one circumstance, when groups submitted proposals to uphold Batwa rights, such rights were valued. Alternatively, those same rights were valueless as the same groups neglected the Batwa’s right to self determination in the fight for their legal justice by denying their consent in the very same proposals. At the end of 2005 the Batwa were being disempowered in several NGOs initiatives which were not founded on a mandate from the Batwa. At this stage there could have been an element of ignorance on the part of these Development agencies who may not have believed that the Batwa were able to fully participate in these processes. However, such ignorance only replicates the concepts of progress discussed in the previous chapter and the assumption that the ‘undeveloped’ inherently start from a position of impoverishment and need the benefits of the ‘developed’ before they can progress.

In 2006, despite eight NGOs and Development agencies being informed by and supportive of the Batwa mandate, several of these groups continued to act without the consent of the Batwa. This suggests there was a co-opting of the Batwa’s mandate, from a demand to be the leaders of their
struggle, into their mandate acting as an approval for external groups to continue along a predetermined route. In essence, then, the Batwa only legitimised decisions which had already been taken (Gardner and Lewis 1996: 111), and like Innu communities meeting with mining companies in Canada, “were invisible – only the pretext of the meeting” (Samson 2001: 242). This denial of self-determination could be explained by certain agencies’ beliefs that they possessed a level of experience and capacity to make decisions which the Batwa did not. Freire suggests that more than support and actions are needed if benefactors are to help people like the Batwa: “our converts…truly desire to transform the unjust order; but because of their background they believe that they must be the executors of the transformation. They talk about the people, but they do not trust them; and trusting the people is the indispensable precondition for revolutionary change” (Freire 1972: 36). And in addition that,

…to consider oneself the proprietor of revolutionary wisdom – which must then be given to (or imposed on) the people – is to retain the old ways. The man who proclaims devotion to the cause of liberation yet is unable to enter into communion with the people, whom he continues to regard as totally ignorant, is grievously self-deceived. The convert who approaches the people but feels alarm at each step they take, each doubt they express, and each suggestion they offer, and attempts to impose his ‘status’, remains nostalgic towards his origins (ibid: 37)

More specifically, in a Development context Rahnema has noted that of those Development agencies and NGOs which see their approaches as participatory, few actually see those they chose to participate with as equal partners,

To involve the ‘patients’ in their own care was the instrumental task which the participatory concept has been assigned by development...[However]...Few were actors genuinely seeking to learn from the people how they defined and perceived change, and how they thought to bring it about. The change, of which they considered themselves the agents, was only the projection of a predefined ideal of change, often highly affected by their own perception of the world and their own ideological inclinations. (Rahnema 1992: 123-4)

It is of concern that many ‘developers’ assume themselves to be inherently in the position of authority when it comes to creating projects to ‘develop’ people. As Rose notes, “practices of colonization are so institutionalized in political and bureaucratic structures and policies that they are almost unnoticed” (1999b: 182). Rather than seeing people as the tools of their own development, they see people simply as passive objects and at worst people crippled by circumstance, a people lacking the tools to change their own futures. Consequently, “Locals’ are problematized, portrayed as deficient in various ways, and this deficiency is referred to when legitimizing the intervention of
expatriates. Locals are seen as lacking in skills, corrupt, uneducated, or tradition bound” (Crewe and Harrison 1998: 30).

And as Suzman notes in the context of the San,

little emphasis [is] placed on ‘local knowledge’, which being ‘cultural knowledge’ is not only ignored, but also devalued since it is perceived to be part of the problem itself. In this sense, San are not simply thought of as ‘ignorant’, but also to have the ‘wrong’ sort of knowledge. Thus, in this deeply paternalistic environment, the low emphasis placed on participatory decision-making, empowerment and capacity building are not seen to contribute to the problem but to constitute an important part of the solution (Suzman 2002: 3)

The result of this continued faith in the developed/undeveloped binary as self-evident is a continuation of prevailing power inequalities. Propositions of participation are little more than rhetorical flourishes when the control of planning and funding of Development projects remains in the hands of the Developed North. When pushed to clarify their intentions to allow the Batwa to participate in their project, one of the three NGOs discussed above replied that they would first design the projects and source the funding and then contact the Batwa. I would argue then that despite communities being chosen to participate, this kind of participation “is quite different from ensuring that decisions affecting the lives and resources of indigenous people are not taken without their informed consent” (Fisher 1997: 455). Instead, this participation is merely intended to rubber stamp and validate already determined objectives and projects designed by external agencies.

What then is the role of the ‘developed’ in the progress of those classed as ‘underdeveloped’? Human agents, acting in line with the key conceptions of Development discourse, too often decide for themselves how and why other people should be developed and in this process they do the one thing they are supposedly trying not to do, they disempower people. Development fails to acknowledge that, “the ‘pedagogy of the oppressed’, [is] a pedagogy which must be forged with, not for, the oppressed” (emphasis in original Freire 1972: 25). Only when people are in charge of their own development, when they have ownership of that development, are they able to fully empower themselves and as a result change the path of their own futures. In spite of this many Developmentalists had simply not wanted to acknowledge the agency offered by the Batwa. Maybe they were scared that if they acknowledged this agency they would be accepting their own position as redundant. Maybe others felt that in acknowledging Batwa agency they would be allowing the lunatics to take over the asylum. Sadly I fear that many recognise the agency in communities like the Batwa, but unfortunately interpret it as false agency or agency without the appropriate knowledge to solve the problems. For these external groups, to be ‘underdeveloped’ meant that groups like the Batwa did not have the tools required to become ‘developed’: if the Batwa had the tools they would not be ‘underdeveloped’. These groups believed that there was no
point asking the ‘underdeveloped’ for their opinion because any opinion they would have would not be the right one.

Finally, at the end of this section I feel I must offer some comment on the apparent failure of the Batwa’s attempt to liberate themselves from their oppressors. Freire suggests that creating a pedagogy of the oppressed involves turning a ‘banking concept’ of education into a liberating education in which education consists of “acts of cognition, not transferrals of information” (1972: 53) and where the students and teachers work with each other to produce the knowledge of liberation. Some may argue this is the very situation I have documented in this chapter, a situation in which the Batwa tried to pursue their own liberation from their oppression with the support of external agencies. I would however suggest that this attempt at liberation was never the kind Freire would have approved. Despite working in conjunction with the ‘teachers’ of Development, those teachers never fully accepted their position as equal to the Batwa; they never let go of their oppressor’s mentality. As a result this chapter has shown those ‘teachers’, in the guise of Developmentalists, re-affirm the existing structures of oppression and deny true liberation.

Development fails to achieve its stated aims precisely because it frames its relationships to the undeveloped within a hierarchy where it is superior but also because it faces the inherent contradiction that it can never develop the undeveloped because to do so would be to deny itself the ‘Other’ it needs to affirm its own position as the ‘Self’. As I highlighted in chapter three of this thesis, a binary epistemology – which creates both the developed and the undeveloped and the teacher and the student – places itself within a double bind, which in the one instant produces an undeveloped as the subject of development, but at the same time demands that this subject remains undeveloped in order to reaffirm its own identity. This double bind was also shown to be evident in chapter seven where on the one hand modernity achieved its emblematic status through the subjugation of nature and at the same time, through conservation discourses, sought to protect and reify nature as the ‘Other’ of modernity. Further, in chapter eight we saw that Development discourses were used to problematise and decry ‘primitive’ Batwa culture at the same time as certain aspects of ‘traditional’ Batwa ‘culture’ were being reified. Development discourses were then used to sustain a Batwa culture which it needed to critique and develop but which it also needed to remain constant in order to maintain its own image.

**Development as Discourse**

There is a sense in which rapid economic progress is impossible without painful adjustments. Ancient philosophies have to be scrapped; old social institutions have to disintegrate; bonds of caste, creed and race have to burst; and large numbers of persons who cannot keep up with progress have to have their expectations of a comfortable life frustrated. Very few communities are willing to pay the full price of economic progress.
Unfortunately, many of the factors which determine the ability to climb up the ladder are largely beyond the scope of specific energy development programmes. Among these are household income and size, climate, settlement size and – let’s be realistic – culture and tradition to a large extent.

FAO 1997 (quoted in Crewe and Harrison 1998: 43)

In the last three chapters I have attempted to present Development as “a historically and culturally specific form of rationality which is inseparable from related regimes of practices and configurations of power” (Rossi 2004: 1) and which should be seen as a discourse that produces and defines representations and knowledge about the ‘Third World’. In framing it as a discourse I am implying that, “practices don’t exist without a certain regime of rationality”; that this regime of rationality is historically rooted; and that it works as a structure of knowledge, allowing, at any particular time, certain events and patterns of agency… and rendering unthinkable, unsayable, and undoable others” (Rossi 2004: 2). Escobar further suggests that this construction of the Third World is achieved by discourses which produce “permissible modes of being and thinking while disqualifying and even making others impossible” (1995: 5).

This understanding of Development as a discourse follows authors like Sachs (1992), Esteva (1987, 1992), and Escobar (1984, 1992a, 1995). Escobar writes that “without examining Development as discourse we cannot understand the systematic ways in which the Western developed countries have been able to manage and control and, in many ways, even create the Third World politically, economically, sociologically and culturally” (1984: 384). When seen as a discourse, we are then enabled to,

...identify the appearance, development and articulation of a general strategy for dealing with the problems of underdevelopment, the practices generated by such a strategy, the mechanisms by which these practices operate and, in general, the ways in which development enters into a nexus of power and knowledge, i.e. the ways in which development is ‘put into discourse’. In this way, development will be seen, not as a matter of scientific knowledge, a body of theories and programmes concerned with the achievement of true progress, but rather as a series of political technologies intended to manage and give shape to the reality of the Third World. (Escobar 1984: 384)

Chapter seven has shown that the availability of rights and livelihood options to the Batwa have been restricted to options constructed by Development discourses and supported by notions of progress and the submission of nature. This imposed framework is propagated by various
agencies that rally under the banners of Development for goals which respond to an entire epistemological set of values and principles. As Escobar writes, “Epistemologically and politically, the Third World is constructed as a natural-technical object that has to be normalized and moulded through planning to meet the ‘scientifically ascertained’ characteristics of a ‘development society’” (1992b: 136). When analysed as such one finds that instead of the stated aims of Development projects, what occurs is the “offering or even forcing upon recipients of aid, using all means of persuasion, the accepted cultural values of the giver, in all their materialistic, spiritual, or ideological features” (Binder 1977: 51).

Chapter eight took this foundation and went on to show how Eurocentric discourses were used to disempower the Batwa and specifically how Development discourses were used to respond to situations where their ‘planning’ and objectives were questioned. The response co-opted, “skills into lacks, commons into resources, men and women into commodified labour, tradition into burden, wisdom into arrogance, autonomy into dependency” (Esteva 1992: 18). The application of Development discourses turned the Batwa from subjects of their own futures to objects of an imposed future; unable to progress without Development’s assistance. And finally in this chapter I have shown how the Batwa’s ability to represent themselves and speak out about the injustices these discourses produce have been co-opted and subsumed within dominant understandings of their situation, one which is framed around assumptions regarding their necessary dependence on others.

As Escobar has noted, “The question of the making of the Third World through development discourses and practices has to be seen in relation to the larger history of Western modernity, of which development seems to be one of the last and most insidious chapter” (1992a: 22). The wider discourses of modernity have long affected the Batwa and I have tried to show throughout my thesis that the history of these discourses has its origins in notions of evolution, development, progress, science, economics and the environment that coalesced at the end of 18th Century (Escobar 1988: 438, see also Esteva 1992: 8-10). As such the practices resulting from this coalescence have modified over the years, from Colonialism and the Civilising Mission through to its current form in Developmentalism, but despite these changes the founding principles, the discourses built on notions of evolution and progress, have remained constant. In effect then Colonialism and Developmentalism have different forms, but exist fundamentally as only different manifestations of the same episteme. Crewe and Harrison write that “Evolutionist development paradigms may use culture, technology, and economics as their reference points, rather than the more ancient biological ones, but they are still hugely influential” (1998: 28-9) so that in common with the civilizing mission three centuries ago, present Development discourses rationalise their “role in aid with reference to [their] more advanced technology and technical expertise” (Crewe and Harrison 1998: 31). During this ‘evolution’ in the framing of progress the discourses which have accompanied it have themselves continually modified and adjusted to withstand the criticisms they have faced. The revolt against evolutionary theory at the end of the Second World War altered the
Colonial discourse into one focused instead on Development as a tool to progress the human species. It was decided that, “the conqueror should be capable of economically developing the conquered region and at the same time accepting the responsibility of caring for the well-being of the natives. After the identification of the level of civilization with the level of production, the dual mandate collapsed into one: development” (Esteva 1992: 10).

Not surprisingly Development has itself come under increased criticism and as a result has led to attempts to salvage the discourse under the banners of ‘sustainable development’, ‘grassroots development’, ‘women and development’ and ‘empowerment development’ (Escobar 1992a: 26). In the last twenty years in particular, “NGOs have become the ‘favoured child’ of official development agencies [and] hailed as the new panacea to cure the ills that have befallen the development process” (Fisher 1997: 442). But as has been shown in this chapter, the notion of participation has done nothing for the meaningful participation of the Batwa in their own development, as the wider Development discourses have continued to be used to position the Batwa as subservient to the more capable members of the ‘developed world’.

When I discuss the discourses of progress found today in Developmentalism, I think it is appropriate to use Freire’s descriptions of relationships within dominant forms of education, if in a slightly modified way. Freire highlights the following aspects which enable continued oppression under the dominant model of education:

1. The teacher teaches and the students are taught.
2. The teacher knows everything and the students know nothing.
3. The teacher thinks and the students are thought about.
4. The teacher talks and the students listen – meekly.
5. The teacher disciplines and the students are disciplined.
6. The teacher chooses and enforces his choice, and the students comply.
7. The teacher acts and the students have the illusion of acting through the action of the developed.
8. The teacher chooses the programme content, and the students (who were not consulted) adapt to it.
9. The teacher confuses the authority of knowledge with his own professional authority, which he sets in opposition to the freedom of the students.
10. The teacher is the subject of the learning process, while the students are mere objects.

(Freire 1972: 47)

However, if I replace the subjects and objects of this quote with ones key to this debate on Developmentalism, his quote can clearly represent the politics of Development discourses.
1. The [developed] teaches and the [undeveloped] are taught.
3. The [developed] thinks and the [undeveloped] are thought about.
5. The [developed] disciplines and the [undeveloped] are disciplined.
7. The [developed] acts and the [undeveloped] have the illusion of acting through the action of the developed.
8. The [developed] chooses the programme content, and the [undeveloped] (who were not consulted) adapt to it.
9. The [developed] confuses the authority of knowledge with his own professional authority, which he sets in opposition to the freedom of the [undeveloped].
10. The [developed] is the subject of the learning process, while the [undeveloped] are mere objects.

I hope to have shown in this thesis that all these aspects were present in the relationship between the Batwa and their more dominant neighbours, both locally and nationally. As a result the Batwa, and their capacity to determine and manage their own futures, has been subverted by those in power, forcing the Batwa into a subservient and marginalised status. In spite of this positioning of the Batwa as disempowered and marginal, I recognise the point made by writers who suggest that this poststructural approach to ‘development as discourse’ offers an “inadequate theorization of agency” (Delcore 2004: 33). Parry writes that,

...the statements of the theoretical paradigms, in which it can appear that the efficacy of colonialism’s apparatus of social control in effecting strategies of disempowerment is totalized, are liable to be read as producing the colonized as a stable category fixed in a position of subjugation, hence foreclosing on the possibility of theorizing resistance. (Parry 2004: 37)

I acknowledge that my accounts of Colonialism and Developmentalism have been represented as totalized theoretical paradigms which could suggest I see the Batwa as only being able to embody a subjugated position. However, as Foucault suggests, it would be wrong to imagine a world of only dominant and dominated, accepted and excluded, discourses. We should think instead of a “complex and unstable process whereby discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy” (Foucault 1978: 100-1).
It is true that the Batwa have been resisting more dominant forces and discourses since the immigration of their current neighbours several thousand years ago and that they continue do so today. Moreover their subjugation has not only come at the hands of European or ‘Western’ discourses, but as Akakwasa notes, “unlike the natives of North America who had to put up with European colonialism, the Batwa are victims of a type of internal colonialism which has been made worse by the internalized foreign values, beliefs and practices with some degree of exaggeration and a limited sense of selection” (2001: 237).

However, precisely because of such resistance the Batwa are a homogenous group of subjugated people; homogenous in the sense that their subjugation at the hands of more dominant discourses includes all those people who identify themselves as Batwa and subjugated in the sense that their livelihood options and future potentials are impinged upon by the application of the dominant discourses discussed in this thesis. My thesis then is neither an attempt to deny nor represent different forms of resistance, nor deny other discourses that exist both as part of and external to the dominant discourses of Developmentalism. Instead, my aim has simply been to fully represent the levels of subjugation prevalent in the Batwa’s past and present and the dominant discourses which have enabled such subjugation.

In the same vein, my argument may be read as not only denying space for resistance but also denying space for any agency. As de Vries writes,

> There is…something wrong in assigning responsibility to some impersonal ‘development apparatus’. Blaming some abstract ‘anti-politics machine’ for the marginalization of the settlers absolves a number of actors who might, rather consciously indeed, have been in favour of such outcome, and others who did not care very much about its consequences. (quoted in Rossi 2004: 4)

I have been aware of this potential criticism and struggled against the impulse to analyse and critique individual actors and agencies within my work. To have done so would have been to critique the often genuine humanitarian actions of individual interventions and shift focus away from the powerful dynamics which shape those actions at a local, national and international level. I believe my discourse analysis approach, more than any other, is vital and that,

> Shedding light upon the operation of power/knowledge has potentially liberating effects for those actors who are marginalised in specific cultural settings. This approach is vital in any attempt to unravel the structures of meaning which sustain a global order that produces inequality, while claiming to deal with it. (Rossi 2004: 25)

Lastly, and given my emphasis on identities, representations and discourses I have opened myself to critics of identity politics who have “noted that an overemphasis on representation and
‘discourse’ distract us from pressing problems of poverty and economic inequalities” of Indigenous Peoples (Sylvain 2006: 199). I would agree with these critics insomuch as I am acutely aware of the need to provide specific and concerted attention to the problems of poverty and economic inequalities. However, this thesis has been an attempt to ask why the Batwa are marginalised and discriminated against, and in the process of answering that question I have uncovered representations and discourses which facilitate the structures that maintain the Batwa's poverty and economic inequalities. My approach is a constructionist approach to representation where,

According to this approach, we must not confuse the material world, where things and people exist, and the symbolic practices and processes through which representation, meaning and language operate. Constructivists do not deny the existence of the material world. However, it is not the material world which conveys meaning…It is social actors who use the conceptual systems of their culture and the linguistic and other representational systems to construct meaning, to make the world meaningful and to communicate about that world meaningfully to others. (emphasis in original Hall 1997: 25)

Poverty is a very real issue for the Batwa, but for the economic inequalities to be addressed it is important to first understand the meaning and value placed upon those processes which produce such inequalities. As Saugestad suggests, “A development programme needs to go beyond the symptoms (the manifest poverty) and look for the generative processes that create these symptoms” (Saugestad 2000: 220). And rather than tackling them in an economic, objective and value free way as if they are the result of processes devoid of human participation, it should be acknowledged that terms such as ‘poverty’ are themselves constructed with meaning and value. Only by acknowledging identity and representations can we build a picture of the discourses that representations are part of and produced by.

Conclusion

In this thesis I have sought to understand two pressing questions: (a) what explanations can be given for the situation of the Batwa today and (b) why have Development initiatives failed to address their situation? After investigation I would argue that both questions have in fact the same general answer, if in a slightly altered form.

The Batwa have become marginalised throughout their history by the peoples they encountered because their mode of production was unanimously understood and rejected as inferior and inadequate. Importantly this mode of production, or more broadly, this Batwa epistemology that provided meaning to their world and has allowed the Batwa to flourish in their environment, has been represented by more dominant forces as the antithesis of all those attributes the dominant world has taken to be integral to its own existence. It has been used against them to subjugate
them and has provided justifications for interventions which have sought to modernise, adapt or assimilate them. Development interventions have failed the Batwa because they have been based within this modernist paradigm that whilst explicitly trying to support and empower them, implicitly disempowers them by reserving them to positions of submission and inadequacy.

Bourdieu has represented this objectivity of the modernist paradigm as *doxa*:

> Systems of classification which produce, in their own specific logic, the objective classes, i.e. the divisions by sex, age, or position in the relations of production, make their specific contribution to the reproduction of the power relations of which they are product, by securing the misrecognition, and hence the recognition, of the arbitrariness on which they are based...The instruments of knowledge of the social world are in this case (objectively) political instruments which contribute to the reproduction of the social by producing immediate adherence to the world, seen as self-evident and undisputed, of which they are the product and of which they reproduce the structures in a transformed form. (Bourdieu 1977: 164)

If the Batwa’s position in society today is as a result of actions resulting from a dominant mode of thought, then I argue such a *doxa* has been produced by a binary epistemology which sustains itself by creating distinctions, limitations and simplifications. I argue that *doxa* is facilitated by discourses – in this thesis Development discourses – which seek to affirm what the modern world holds to be self-evident. As Bourdieu states, “the self-evidence of the world is reduplicated by the instituted discourses about the world in which the whole group’s adherence to that self-evidence is affirmed” (1977: 167). It is important to acknowledge that self-evidence in the ‘doxic mode’ is affirmed through the construction of binaries which represent what is acceptable and what is not acceptable. Progress is self-evident only through the production of the ‘Undeveloped Other’ which stands as an exemplar of everything that an orthodox view of the world assumes to be backward. The advantage of such a system of binary thought over a more relational understanding is that it is perceived that “the stabler the objective structures and the more fully they reproduce themselves in the agents’ dispositions, the greater the extent of the field of *doxa*, of that which is taken for granted” (Bourdieu 1977: 165-6). This stabilisation, of course, is an advantage only to those already in a dominant position, and at the expense of those utilised as the ‘Other’ for the benefit of the ‘Self’.

Rose describes the conversation between the dualities produced by a binary epistemology as one of monologue, as the ‘Other’ never gets to talk back on its own terms (Rose 1999b: 176). This thesis has shown that the Batwa are required to listen to monologue throughout their lives. They are allowed to participate only if such communication is on the terms set by the ‘self’ and rights are only given in situations which conform to western understandings of land ownership. The ability of the Batwa to define their cultural identity is only recognised if such an identity conforms to
Eurocentric notions of culture and representation is only allowed if what is being represented agrees with the projects of the ‘Self’. If the ‘Other’ decides to communicate to the ‘Self’ in terms other than those imposed on it, the ‘Other’ runs the risk of being denied its rights, the appropriation of its lands, blamed for its poverty, condemned as backward, silenced from representation and denied the ability to participate. As Rose notes, the power for the ‘Self’ “lies in the ability not to hear what is being said, not to experience the consequences of one’s actions, but rather to go one’s own self-centric and insulated way” (1999b: 177). Alternatively, as what is essential “goes without saying because it comes without saying” (emphasis in original Bourdieu 1977: 167), any attempts by the ‘Other’ to question the justification of what is essential leaves ‘Others’, like the Batwa, ignored or devalued.

I suggest that those members of dominant society who understand the world through a binary epistemology are not confined to see the world only within this epistemology, but simply that a binary epistemology has become the dominant epistemology by which such people understand the world and their place within it. Conversely I argue that Indigenous Peoples are not the mythical holders of an otherwise unattainable life view, but that they simply foreground relational ways of experiencing the world. It is within this ‘relational experiencing’ that what Rose has called ‘intersubjective mutuality’ is created and sustained, where personhood and subjectivity are located in multiple sites instead of being confined by the boundaries of our skin (Rose 1999b: 180). Importantly her notion of intersubjective mutuality, which has been shown to her by Aboriginal communities in Australia, does not suggest that Indigenous Peoples are free from the conflicts and tensions experienced by the ‘Modern World’. To claim this would serve only to entrench essentialised representations of the ‘Noble Savage’ further. Rather Rose shows,

this multiplicity of social contexts provides innumerable opportunities to argue about social context, social responsibility and social action…however, this same multiplicity of contexts works to contain tension and conflict. The cross-cutting of categories and the multiple sites of subjectivity ensure that power is located throughout the system. Politics lies in the art of locating one’s self in as many contexts as possible, rather than in accumulating contexts and collapsing them into a singularity.

The person who exists in others, and in whom others exist, is vulnerable to what happens outside their own skin, but that same person finds their power in the relationships which are situated beyond the skin. To share a subjectivity is to share a self-interest. Thus, duties of care are understood quite profoundly to be mutual and reciprocal....And while no individual is connected to all others, the overlap of connections sustains a web of interdependencies. (Rose 1999b: 180-1)
The task is not for the ‘Others’ to assimilate to the representations created by the dominant ‘Self’, but for the ‘Self’ to accept more fluid ways to relate to and represent other people. This will inevitably destabilise the ‘Self’s’ understanding of its own identity and force the ‘Self’ to see itself in fundamentally different ways. Instead of seeing itself as distinctly different to the ‘Other’, the ‘Self’ will see itself, as Derrida has suggested, intimately bound to not only the ‘Other’ but to all ‘Others’. As Howitt and Suchet-Pearson write,

> Boundaries around concepts can no longer be concrete, impenetrable no person’s lands. Rather, they become blurry, fluid, complex, interacting and multiple. As with the metaphor of edges in the constantly shifting and changing tidal zone, boundaries and relationships are conceived as constructive places which ‘entwine and interpenetrate in a complex and fecund embrace of coexistence’. (Howitt and Suchet-Pearson 2003: 565)

Returning to Kuper’s debate at the start of this thesis, the ‘Native’ has not returned specifically because the ‘Native’ has never left. As long as our experience of the world, and the knowledge such experience produces is based upon and framed by hierarchical and distinct categories, the ‘Native’ will always exist. It will exist because there will always be the need for a ‘Native’ in one form or another, as the ‘Other’, to validate hierarchies and the position of the dominant ‘Self’ within such hierarchies. However, Indigenous Peoples are not the holders of an unattainable life view that the ‘Modern’ world does not have, has not had, and must learn from the ‘Others’. Such a way of relating to the world is present simply from being a part of the world. As Rahnema suggests, “‘relating’ is intrinsic to the very act of being and living. To live is to relate, or to participate in the wider living world of which one is only a part” (1992: 126). Indigenous People should not then be romanticised as being the solution to the problems of Modernity, as the solution lies with those who construct and maintain Modernity as much as with those Modernity constructs as ‘Others’. The solution lies in large part with the members of the ‘Modern World’s’ ability to “acknowledge the brokenness of our intersubjectiveness, and to recuperate connection” (Rose 1999b: 182). This reconnection can only be done if we dismantle the confines of binaries and dualities and “embrace noisy and unruly processes capable of finding dialogue with the peoples of the world and with the world itself. We must shake our capacity for connection loose from the bondage of the monological self” (Rose 1999b: 177). We must stop seeing ‘Others’ and start seeing ourselves.
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