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I.

THESES:

"The nature of the human Soul and its immortality in the thought of Plato and St. Paul."

Submitted to the University of Glasgow for the Degree of Ph.D. in the Faculty of Divinity by
The Very Rev. Archinandrite
Athenagoras Nikolaos Zakopoulos,
B.D. (Athens).
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II.

To

My Father and Mother

τροφέα
SUMMARY.

The whole Thesis is divided into three parts:

In the first part the views of Plato's forerunners on the nature of the human soul and its immortality are discussed very briefly.

The survey shows that Plato's predecessors treat the whole problem in connection with the Universe relying on vague and unreliable myths, folklore and popular beliefs.

The nature of the human soul and its immortality is also examined in the second part, as it is represented in the Platonic dialogues and in the third one, as it is portrayed in the Pauline Epistles.

In the second part it is stated that Plato conceives the human soul as a pure spiritual principle, a rational distinct entity, the source of life, in fact life itself; though it is uncreated, nevertheless it is a "process", albeit not a physical one, being intermediate between the Forms and the Universe.

Plato views the soul as simple and uncompounded. The so-called "parts" are not real or distinct parts or separate elements of the soul at all; they are simply spiritual faculties, transitory and temporary manifestations, owing their existence to the soul's connection with the body, which
is the prison-house of the soul, a hindrance to it, an
impediment to the higher activities of the soul and on the
whole the source of evil and corruption. Finally he
regards the soul in general, and hence, the individual soul in
particular as being inherently immortal and deathless.

The third part deals with the psychological terms; soul,
spirit, body, with the trichotomy of man and the resurrection
body.

Soul, not a very important term, denotes for St. Paul
the vital principle, the principle of animal and human life
involving a state of consciousness, of will and feeling.

Spirit is described as the ruling inner power of our
entire human existence; it is the source of human
consciousness and intelligence, the seat of feeling and will;
further it is the God-conscious element in man.

The body is the temple of the Holy Spirit; it can be
transformed and redeemed, it is accessible to God or evil.

St. Paul's trichotomic passage (1. Thess. 5-23) is a
rhetoric-liturgical sentence and is concerned with the
preservation and sanctification of the whole, of the entire
man.

The resurrection body must be thought of not as
identical with or similar to our physical and earthly one,
but as an inherent organic continuum, a psycho-physic organism, a unified person, the entire man, fit and suitable for the new, glorious and perfect life in the Kingdom of God, which in our day we call the individual, the personality, the self, the "I".

The resurrection of believers is an act and gift of God through our risen Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ.

The conclusion is that we cannot speak lightly about similarities or parallelisms in any form between the two great thinkers on the theory of the human soul and its immortality. There is no affinity whatsoever between them either in ideas, language, form, content, points of doctrine, or phraseology. The difference between them emerges sharp and real.
PART ONE.

PRE-PLATONIC BACKGROUND:

Plato's forerunners on the nature of the human soul and its immortality:

1. Homer.
2. Orphics.
3. Heraclitus of Ephesus.
4. Pythagoras and Pythagoreans.
5. Empedocles of Acragas.
6. Anaxagoras of Klazomenai.
7. Socrates.
   Conclusion.

PART TWO.

PLATO ON THE NATURE OF THE HUMAN SOUL AND ITS IMMORTALITY:

Some introductory remarks:

a. Plato's Theology.
b. What is Man?
c. A general definition of the human Soul.

8. Origin of the human Soul: generated or ungenerated?
9. The division of the Soul.
10. Soul-body: their relationship.
11. The Immortality of the Soul.
IV.

PART THREE.

ST. PAUL'S THEORY OF THE HUMAN SOUL AND ITS IMMORTALITY.

Preliminary remarks:

Psychological terms or anthropological concepts:

12. Ἰουχή or Soul,
   a note on Image Dei (Gen. 1.26.27)
   and Gen. 2.7.

13. Ἰανεύμα or Spirit,
   a note on

14. Σῶμα or body.

15. Trichotomy? Some general remarks on
   1 Thess. 5. 23.

16. A consideration of the resurrection
   body in 1 Corinthians 15. 35 - 58 and
   2 Corinthians 5. 1 - 10.

An assessment - Conclusion.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.

I should be sadly lacking in courtesy and in gratitude if I did not record here my warmest thanks to the Senatus Academicus and the Faculty of Divinity for accepting me as a research student for the Ph.D.

Next it is my pleasant duty to acknowledge my indebtedness and to express my sincere thanks to my research Supervisor, the Reverend Professor William Barclay, M.A., D.D., Dean of the Faculty of Divinity, for suggesting the thesis, for patient and sympathetic supervision, for kindness, for encouragement, for invaluable advice, for help and for reading my thesis and making several suggestions.

I further wish to record my deepest gratitude to HIS ALL HOLINESS the Ecumenical Patriarch Athenagoras, Head of all the Orthodox Churches; to the Holy Synod of the Orthodox Church of Greece; to His Eminence, my Spiritual father, the Metropolitan of Kozane (Greece) Dionysios; to my Professors of the Faculty of Divinity of Athens University and particularly to Professors P. Bratsiotis, V. Vellas, V. Ioannidis, who all encouraged me and also helped me to come abroad and pursue my studies.

Furthermore my warmest thanks are due to the Librarian of Glasgow University, R.O. MacKenna, M.A., A.L.A., and his staff and to the Librarian of Trinity College, Glasgow, the Reverend S. Mechie, D.D., for kindness and help.

Finally I should like to thank most sincerely Mrs. H. McGregor, Mrs. A. Macbeth and Miss St. Charalambous for typing out my thesis with skill and patience.
## VI.

### PRINCIPAL ABBREVIATIONS:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AV</td>
<td>English Authorized Version, 1611.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EGT</td>
<td>Expositor's Greek Testament.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex.B</td>
<td>Expositor's Bible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERE</td>
<td>Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics (ed. J. Hastings).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IB</td>
<td>Interpreter's Bible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Critical Commentary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCL</td>
<td>Loeb Classical Library.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPG</td>
<td>Migne, J.P. Patrologia Graeca.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPL</td>
<td>Migne, J.P. Patrologica Latina.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBC</td>
<td>Torch Bible Commentary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TWNT</td>
<td>Kittel, Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vulg.</td>
<td>Vulgate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WC</td>
<td>Westminster Commentary.</td>
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VII.

P R E F A C E.

The aim of this work is to study the Platonic and Pauline theory of the human soul and its immortality and to detect possible similarities.

Our study is exegetical and historical rather than speculative.

The material is drawn in Plato from authentic works alone; In St. Paul likewise from the undoubted works, with only occasional references to Ephesians, the Pastorals and Hebrews.

The translations in Plato are taken from the Loeb Classical Library, Cornford, Hackforth and others; the Pauline from the RSV.
PART I

PRE-PLATONIC FOUNDATIONS: Plato's forerunners on the nature of human soul and its immortality.

1. HOMER

It is extremely difficult, I think, to form a clear picture of, or to define precisely, the Homeric psyche in our modern sense as "Homer has no one word to characterize the mind or the soul" and "he has an unusually large psychological vocabulary".

In the first place, the Homeric psyche means breath, breath-life, breathlike, something airy or ghostlike.


Its meaning is better explained by Professor Page, who very discerningly says: "Psyche, for which 'ghost' is a much better word than 'soul', is not to be thought of as a spiritual essence or inmate of the body, or as the sum of its intellectual and emotional faculties. It is very like what we might call a 'ghost'."  

Further, this psyche has neither any connection with the living body nor any intellectual or emotional function whatever. Its only recorded association with the body which we find in the Homeric poems is to leave it. Thus the soul may leave the body temporarily when it faints or swoons or it escapes through the teeth (mouth); it escapes through "the stricken wound".

Since the psyche holds the above mentioned function toward the living man it naturally follows that the body seems to be far more important and more essential than the soul. In this respect, W. Capelle observes "all the

1. D. Page, The Homeric Odyssey, Oxford (1955) p.22; Similarly S.E.F. Salmond in his book, The Christian Doctrine and Immortality, Edinburgh (1895) p.121, writes: "The ψυχή is more a physical thing than a mental; material rather than immaterial; apprehensible yet shadowy. It is the bond or principle of animal life, something more than breath but less than mind or spirit".

2. See also E.R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational, p.15.


4. 11. IX 408-9.

5. 11. XIV 518-9; 11. XVI 505, 856; 11. XXII 362.
activities, mental or other of the human personality, such as feeling, thought, volition, exertion, are regarded as being possible only so long as body and soul are united; in fact they are in the strictest sense functions of the body. (μένος, νόος, μήτος, βουλή καὶ θυμός) also are bodily faculties or powers, and although they can assert themselves only with psyche, at once the "second ego" of man and the principle of his animal life remains within him, yet they are in no sense evolved from the inherent capacities of the soul which has absolutely no share in the waking activities of man".¹

But where does the real living man lie, or which one of the two component factors constitutes the complete personality or ego? In this matter Homer is self-contradictory. According to a number of passages he contrasts with the body: "and sent forth to Hades many valiant souls of warriors, and made themselves (αυτοὺς)".² Also "For the whole night long hath the spirit of hapless Patroclus stood over me, weeping and wailing, and gave me charge concerning each thing and was wondrously like his very self"³ (ὁθεσακελον αυτῷ) or with the soul, "until

² Il. I, 3-4, trans. A.T. Murray, Homer, the Iliad, Vol.1, London (1937) p.3 in LCL; also D.B. Monro, Homer, Iliad, Books I-XIII, Oxford (1894) p.248, who rightly translates "their bodies" and remarks, p.LXX, para.46: hence in Il. I 4 to distinguish the body as the actual person from the soul or life".
such time as I myself (αὐτῶς εἴγὼν) be hidden in Hades". 1

The answer might be expressed as follows:

For Homer, neither the psyche alone nor the body itself is the living man or real personality or ego, but the union or fusion of both.2

We must mention here that some scholars hold different views from those of Rohde:3 they suggest that Homer regards the Thymos (θυμός) as a third distinct entity in living man and then he uses it in a sense of psyche and instead of this word.4 Gomperz traces "a two-soul theory" in Homer and suggests that the word thymos may be taken as a second soul in addition to the soul.5

1. Il. XXIII, 244, trans. A.T. Murray, Homer, the Iliad, Vol. II, p. 513; see also in Il. XI, 262-3, XIV 456-7, XV 251-2.

2. See also E. Rohde, Psyche, p. 6; "both the visible man (the body and its faculties) and the in-dwelling psyche could be described as the Man's 'self'. According to the Homeric view, human beings exist twice over; once as our outward and visible shape and again as an invisible 'image' which only gains its freedom in death. This, and nothing else, is the psyche".

3. S.G.F. Brandon, Man and his Destiny in the Great Religions, Manchester (1962) on p. 160 n. 5, and especially see in Professor R.B. Onians, The Origin of the European Thought, Cambridge (1951) pp. 23-40, 44-61, 66-74, 79-83, 93-100, 103-12, where there is a wide variety of references.


We can hardly accept and support the contention that thymos stands instead of soul in Homeric poems, in spite of the fact that the above scholars etymologically, linguistically and with skill and profundity, have expanded and elaborated this. The fact remains that thymos in Homer "is neither the soul nor (as in Plato) a 'part of the soul'". It may be defined roughly and generally as the organ of feeling\(^1\) or as "the generator of motion or agitation while mind (νοῦς) is the cause of ideas and images".\(^2\)

Rohde, who rejects and refutes at length the Gomperz "two-soul" theory, explains this statement much more clearly when he says: "Again and again the thymos (θυμός) is clearly referred to as a mental faculty of the living body; either thinking or willing or merely feeling. (θυμῷ, νοῷ, ἔρασθε θυμῷ, νοῷ, δεῖσαι, γνῶσις θυμῷ, ἔχολάσατο θυμῷ ἐδώκῃ ....)

It is the seat of the emotions, (μι ἡ νοσ: .....

 ἕλαβε θυμῷ) and belongs to the body of the living man, and especially enclosed in the (φρένες). In the face of this, it is impossible to regard it as something

\(^{1}\) E.R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational, p.16.

\(^{2}\) B. Snell, The Discovery of the Mind, p.8.
independent of the body. Once indeed, H 131,\(^1\) the thymos (θυμός) is spoken of instead of soul (ψυχή) as that which goes down to Hades, but this can only be an error or an oversight . . . . . .\(^2\) and elsewhere: "In the Line H 131 we really then do have thymos (θυμός) instead of soul (ψυχή) either as the result of a misunderstanding of the real meaning of the two words or merely through an oversight. But never (and this is the most essential point) do we have a case in Homer of the opposite exchange of significance, i.e. of soul (ψυχή) used in the sense of thymos (θυμός) etc. as meaning the mental power and its activity in the living and waking man\(^3\).

Now let us turn our attention to see what Homer has to say about the soul's immortality.

Homer writes that the soul after death leaves the body and departs to Hades,\(^4\) a place which is nothing else than a gloomy, shadowy and inaccessible land.

These souls in Hades are nothing more than mere images

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1. The H 131 comes from Homer, Iliad. E. Rohde is very unsystematic and inconsistent in his mode of quoting from ancient authorities. According to his translator, in spite of the fact that his translator has made an effort, as he says in his translator's note (E. Rohde, Psyche, XV, p. ) to reduce the number of inconsistencies and give references where possible to modern editions.

2. E. Rohde, Psyche, p.50 n.58.


4. Ili. XXII 362-3; also XX 294, XIII 415, XXIV 246; Od. X 560, XI 65.
or phantoms or shades of the living man,\textsuperscript{1} "powerless heads"\textsuperscript{2} without wits\textsuperscript{3} and therefore destitute of consciousness and intelligence.\textsuperscript{4} A fine description of the Homeric souls in Hades is given by Apollodorus in his work on the Gods: Homer "assumes that the souls resemble the images appearing in mirrors and arising in water, which are made in our likeness and imitate our movements, but have no solid substance to be grasped or touched".\textsuperscript{5}

While the souls lie unconscious and witless in Hades, a few favoured ones indeed enjoy a happier fate (e.g. Tiresias who by favour of Persephone retained his consciousness in Hades (\textit{Od.} X 493 ff), Menelaus and Radamanthus in Elysium (\textit{Od.} IV 561 ff), Hercules (\textit{Od.} XI 600).\textsuperscript{6}

It is far beyond our main purpose to discuss the above instances in detail for they are exceptions and are regarded

\begin{enumerate}
\item The locus classicus is \textit{Il.} XXIII 103, 104; also see 66 ff, 99 ff; and in J. Burnet, "Soul", \textit{ERE}, XI (1920) p.738 n.2.
\item \textit{Od.} XI 29.
\item \textit{Il.} XXIII 104.
\item \textit{Od.} XI 476.
\item E. Zeller, \textit{Pre-Socratic Philosophy}, I, p.124.
\end{enumerate}
by many critics and scholars and especially the Nekyia of
the Odyssey as interpolations of the later period.¹

After this rapid and very brief survey, it becomes
crystal clear that we cannot ascribe to the Homeric poems
any consciousness of immortality after death; if we should
do that we would be very properly faulted by E. Rohde and
J. Adam² for the simple reason that life after death becomes
so pale and empty that it is not far from non-existent³ and
the so-called existence of the shades is more of words than
a reality. "It contains no element of value that men
should look forward to it".⁴

1. More about it may be seen in Professor D. Page's book,
   *The Homeric Odyssey*, Oxford (1955) and especially
   pp.21-52, "Odysseus and the Underworld", where he points out that there was once an independent
   poem which was inserted to Odysseus later.

   of Greece*, Edinburgh (1923) p.58.

   p.138.

   p.21.
2. ORPHICS

There is no real comparison between the airy ghost, the so-called Homeric psyche, and that entirely new and revolutionary idea of the Orphic Soul which is divine and of celestial origin. The soul for Orphics "is a particula divinae aurae, a particle of the pure empyrean substance or aether",¹ it is, as Empedocles has it: "an exile from heaven and a wanderer".²

Further, we can draw a far clearer picture of the Dionysiac descent (divinity) and immortality of the soul from the content of the following Orphic Plates: "I am a child of Earth and starry Heaven; but my race is of Heaven"; "I am the Son of Earth and starry Heaven", and, "For I also avow that I am of your blessed race".³


"The body of all men is subject to all-powerful death, but alive there yet remains an image of the living man; for that alone is from the gods. It sleeps when the limbs are active, but to them that sleep in many a dream it revealeth an award of joy or sorrow drawing near".  

This immortal soul is sharply distinguished from the Titanic element, the body, which is regarded by the Orphics as a prison house, as a grave or tomb. Here are their own words according to Plato and Philolaus which here I simply mention, reserving comment to a later and more appropriate place.

"Some say that the body (soma) is the tomb of the soul, as if the soul in this present life were buried; but I think it most likely that the name was given by the followers of Orpheus, with the idea that the soul is undergoing whatever penalty it has incurred and is enclosed in the body as in a sort of prison house for safe keeping".  

"The ancient theologians and seers bear witness that for certain purposes of punishment, the soul is yoked together with the body and buried in it as in a tomb".

Opening his paragraph on Heraclitean theory of the soul, Q. Huonder observes that: "The doctrine of the soul according to Heraclitus stands in closest relation to his doctrine of the logos. As the outflow of the Divine logos is the human soul gifted with the reason. The soul has its own law (logos, which increases itself, i.e. grows according to its needs)"¹ and, in saying so, it seems to me he is not far from the truth, as logos is the centre and source of all things. Logos, in the enigmatic, oracular and picturesque expression of Heraclitus, contains everything in himself (everything are contained to him and whatever takes place: comes from him and it is directed by him).

But let us examine a little more closely and very briefly what has been said by Heraclitus himself about the logos and in relation, of course, to the human soul.

In the first place, logos is the "πυρ ἀειζων"²

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2. Fr. B 30 in DK I, p.158.
ever-living fire, kindled in measure and quenched in measure.¹ This ever-living fire, is the one made up of all things and all things issue from the one² and transforms itself into sea, earth.³ These transformations take place through strife and war,⁴ through this universal and creative force, or as Heraclitus again calls it, "the way up and down".⁵ In this continuous motion and change the soul also participates, becomes death, water, earth and vice-versa.⁶

Secondly, the logos is conceived by Heraclitus as a rational entity, as wisdom, thought and intelligence⁷ who, on the one hand, steers the course of all things and is called Zeus or God⁸ and on the other hand, as divine law⁹ who feeds the human law, he prevails as much as he will and suffices for all things.

Without any further discussion and hesitation it may

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1. Fr. B 30 in DK, I, p.158.
2. Fr. 59, fr. 22 in J. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, pp.137, 135.
3. Fr. 21, 22 in J. Burnet, ibid. p.135.
4. Fr. 44, fr. 62 in J. Burnet, ibid, pp.136, 137.
5. Fr. 60 in DK, I, p.164.
7. Fr. 19, 28, 91a-c, all in J. Burnet, ibid. pp.134, 135, 139.
9. Fr. 91b in J. Burnet, ibid. p.139.
well be said from the foregoing that:

1. Heraclitus still remains in the Ionian ground and expresses his ideas in a corporealistic, hylozoistic and to a great extent, pantheistic way; nonetheless, he endows his Logos - ever-living fire, with intelligence and wisdom, which are to be regarded as valuable and of great importance.

2. The human soul is a portion of the ever-living Fire, divine Law and Logos, but it is not a separated and distinct entity or personality. Notions, such as selfhood, consciousness and immortality are completely foreign to his theology.

3. Heracitus mentions something about the life beyond when he says: "There awaits men when they die such things as they look not for nor dream of" and "Souls smell in Hades". But these fragments do not produce anything new, as they contradict the notion of "the way up and down". The soul does not survive as a permanent individual or ego after


2. Fr. 27 and 99 in Dk, I, p.157; comp. also with fr. 62, 63 in E. Zeller, Pre-Socratic Philosophy, II, pp.85-87; trans. J. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, p.136, fr. 38 and 141 fr. 122, as it is obvious Burnet follows the arrangement of the fragments of Bywater's "exemplary" edition and not that of Diels and Kranz.
death. This again does not mean utter annihilation, but change into another element according to Philo.\(^1\) The only sense of immortality which we can conceive is that which is closely connected with the Way up and Down theory. This point has been worked out very well by J. Ithurriague, whom I quote: "We have been led to the belief that Heraclitus could not in any sense entertain the concept of individual immortality; his doctrine of eternal change precludes any such conclusion and contains no real basis on which to found belief in metempsypsyosis. For him, the soul, a mere spark from the universal fire, exists from all eternity. The obscure formulae in which he wraps his concepts have managed to lead certain expositors astray; they signify, however, nothing other than the series of new transformations which a man undergoes after death. In places, Heraclitus says quite explicitly, that the soul becomes water; now, since the essence of the soul is fire, such a metamorphosis can only mean extinction (literally "death"). Consequently, the immortality of the soul can be understood only in terms of an unceasing cycle of renewals,

\(^1\) Philo, De Aet. Mundi, 21 (77.8 Cohn-Reiter on fr. 36).

in W.K. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, I, pp.463 n.2 and 460 n.1.
"renouvellements", from death to life and from life to death".  

1. PP. La Croyance de Platon, pp.120-1; see also E. Rohde, Psyche, pp.363, 370, 394 n.19; J. Adam, The Religious Teachers of Greece, p.239; H. Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism of Pre-Socratic Philosophy, pp.297-9 n.29; Kirk and Raven, The Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p.210; W. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, pp.479-80. While J. Burnet, Greek Philosophy, p.63, admits that "there are certainly fragments that seem to assert the immortality of the individual soul; but when we examine them, we see they cannot bear this interpretation. Soul is only immortal so far as it is part of the ever-living fire which is the life of the world. Seeing that the soul of every man is in constant flux like his body, what meaning can immortality have?" Oddly enough, he checks Rohde, who "refused to admit that Heraclitus believed the soul survived death" and adds, "Strictly speaking, it is no doubt an inconsistency; but I believe with Zeller and Diels that it is one of a kind we may well admit. The first argument which Plato uses to establish the doctrine of immortality in the Phaedo is just the Heraclitean parallelism of life and death with sleeping and waking". J. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, p.154 n.2. Do not both Burnet's views contradict each other and represent him as being in two minds?
4. PYTHAGORAS AND PYTHAGOREANS

Nobody can expect clarity about the soul's origin, nature and immortality in the Pythagoreans, because of the lack of authentic evidences and of the ambiguity of the existing passages, more particularly for the famous theory of "soul-harmonia" which has aroused endless discussion and argument among the scholars.

Nevertheless, something must be said about it in general:

In Alexander Polyhistor's account we read, the "soul is a torn-off fragment of aither and the hot and the cold; it is not coterminous with life, and it is immortal because that from which it has been detached is immortal".¹

Further, another passage² says that the human soul before

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entering the human body pre-existed.

In addition to these views, Aristotle enumerates some other aspects of the human soul held by the Pythagoreans, saying:

"The theory held by the Pythagoreans seems to have the same purport; for some of them said that the soul is the motes in the air, others it is what moves them. They spoke of motes because they are evidently continual motion, even when there is a complete calm".¹

This notion that the soul is either the motes in the air or that which moves them must be regarded "as a real popular belief which has already been partially elevated to a philosophical standing",² and that "belongs to the early and unwittingly corporealist generation which thought that units were extended in space".³ On this point I found most interesting and quite illuminating, what H. Cherniss says and I quote below:

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² E. Rohde, Psyche, p.396 n.40.

³ G.S. Kirk and J.E. Raven, ibid, p.262.
18.

"The 'identification' of a soul and the motes is obscure, unless it refer to an old superstition rather than a philosophical doctrine (Cf. Zeller-Nestle, op.cit.I, p.561 n.3) and in that case each speck of dust was probably considered to be a soul, so that Aristotle's soul implies complications which did not exist. But the 'other' Pythagoreans who identified the soul with the power that moves these motes, if they really existed, must have been very late, for their theory implies a truly immaterial soul which is simply a motor force; such a theory, since fundamentally it has nothing to do with the motes, must have been an accommodation of the earlier superstition to the more highly developed psychical theories of later times".1

Another Pythagorean view, according to Aristotle again, is that the soul has no esoterical organic connection or "relationship" with the body; it is not what may be called the personality of the individual visible man; "any soul

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may dwell in any body".1

But the most controversial and puzzling of all theories, as I mentioned before, or as L. Robin likes to call it "a subject of scandal and horror to pious Pythagoreans",2 was, and still is, the so-called "soul-harmonia" which has been handed down to us and concerning which there are many opinions for and against.

According to this theory, the soul "is a kind of attunement; for attunement is a blending and composing of opposites, and the body is constituted of opposites" (the translation is from Kirk and Raven, The Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p.261).3

The first reactionary voice and opposition came from Simias, who clearly observed that: "Now if the soul really is a kind of attunement, plainly when our body is unduly relaxed or tautened by sickness or some other trouble, the

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soul, for its divine nature, is bound forthwith to be destroyed just as much as any other attunement or adjustment in musical notes, for instance, or in a craftsman's product ......... So see what answer you can find for us to this argument, which insists that the soul, being a blending of the bodily constituent, is the first thing to perish in what is called death".1

In other words, Simias regards the "soul-harmonia" doctrine as inconsistent with the immortality of the soul, its transmigration and in general, the opposite of any kind of its existence after death.

An ardent supporter of this view is Professor J. Burnet, who not only shares this opinion but strongly stresses it.2

Wilamowitz too "was inclined to think that Philolaus denied the immortality of the soul that it was an attunement of the bodily parts, though he could not quite make up his mind".3

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2. J. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, London (19584), pp.295-6; J. Burnet, Greek Philosophy, London (1961), pp.92-93, where he characteristically remarks "on the other hand, nothing can be more inconsistent with earlier Pythagorean view of the soul as something that existed before the body. This doctrine, on the contrary, makes the soul a mere function of the body, and leaves no room for the belief of immortality".

It is far beyond our main scope to plumb the whole matter and discuss it thoroughly. All we may do is to repeat the words of the late Prof. Cornford on the one hand, that the Pythagoreans and especially "Philolaus held both that the soul is, in some sense, a harmony and that it is immortal"\(^1\) and on the other hand, those of Prof. Guthrie who writes as a conclusion in his remarkable *History of Greek Philosophy* (where he devotes a whole paragraph to this matter in a most able account) as follows:

"Two different notions of soul, then existed in contemporary belief, the psyche which 'vanished like smoke' at death, and which medical writers (including no doubt some sceptical and therefore heretical Pythagoreans) rationalized into a harmonia of the physical opposites that made up the body; and the more mysterious daimon in man, immortal, suffering transmigration through many bodies, but in its pure essence divine. This too could be called psyche, as it was by thought, and both also survived in the curious combination of mathematical philosophy and religious

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mysticism which made up Pythagoreanism".  

As we proceed in Empedocles, we observe that from the first he holds two widely different and incompatible views of the nature and the immortality of the soul.

On nature, he says that the physical basis of consciousness is in the blood,\(^1\) which blood again arises from four elements.\(^2\) Here Empedocles expresses himself in a purely materialistic way, as a "thorough materialist"\(^3\) and leaves no room for immortality.

On the other hand, in the Purifications, and particularly in the Fr. 115, Empedocles expressly states that he is calling the soul daemon, a fugitive and a wanderer from the gods.\(^4\)

Between these two views, there is an apparent discrepancy and contradiction. But is this discrepancy irreconcilable? The answer, I think, lies in this:

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4. Fr.115; see also Hippolytus Ref. VII, 29; Plut. de exilio 17 607c; in G.S. Kirk and J.E. Raven, ibid., pp.352-3, 356.
that he tried to bring together all the cosmological-physical theories (Anaximander, Parmenides, etc.) of his predecessors with their theological conclusions and to reconcile them, but he failed to achieve this. He speaks with two different voices.

E. Rohde, F. M. Cornford, G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven attempted harmonisation. They believed themselves to have effected this quite successfully and convincingly.

E. Zeller, J. Burnet, and J. Adam took exactly the opposite view and they reached the incontestable conclusion that his cosmologico-religious teachings are not only contradictory but irreconcilable.

1. Psyche, pp. 382-3.
2. From Religion to Philosophy, pp. 224-42.
3. The Pre-Socratic Philosophers, pp. 39-60.
5. Early Greek Philosophy, p. 250.
6. ANAXAGORAS OF KLAZOMENAI

Whatever trouble, disagreement and dispute Anaxagoras has caused among scholars,\(^1\) the fact remains that for the first time in the history of Greek philosophy, he introduced and contributed something of great importance and significance; the principle Mind (Nous).

But how does Anaxagoras conceive the meaning of Mind? It is true to say that he regards the Nous as something material, corporeal and occupying space,\(^2\) but these are not his last words. He further characterizes Nous as "infinite and self-ruled," it is mixed with nothing but is all alone by itself .... it has all knowledge about everything and the greatest power; and minds and controls all things, both greater and smaller, that have life .... Mind arranged them all".\(^3\)

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Is it not an indication that he would imagine or conceive of it as an immanent, transcendent, spiritual, omnipotent and intelligent Deity or God?¹

Unfortunately, he did not develop and elaborate such an idea and he left it for his posterity to do so, holding for himself the same notion as his predecessors. While he introduced something of immense value, that is, a spiritual and intellectual principle, nevertheless "he fails to understand fully the essential difference between that principle and the matter which it forms or sets in

motion'.

It is needless to attempt any clear account of the individual soul, selfhood, consciousness, immortality and self-existence in Anaxagoras, as he "n'est pas parvenu a la conception d'une âme individuelle, vivant d'une vie éternelle" and as Aristotle says of Anaxagoras that he does not speak clearly about Mind and soul. He seems to regard them but as different aspects of the same nature.


2. J. Ithurriague, La Croyance de Platon, p.123.

3. De Anima, A2, 404 b.1; and in DK, p.29; E. Zeller, Pre-Socratic Philosophy, II, p.364 n.5, 6, p.347 n.2; E. Rohde, Psyche, p.410, n.115. See also Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism of Pre-Socratic Philosophy, pp.291-2 and 295-6.

The following remarks of Rohde are quite to the point and worth quoting: "Anaxagoras could not speak of the continued existence of individual, self-existent 'souls' after the dissolution of the material concretions in which moving and animating 'soul-force' had once lived". For him the individual, the personality conscious of itself and of the outer world, can be nothing but a manifestation of the universal, whether the latter is regarded as fixed and at rest, or as a living process that untiringly develops itself, recruits itself, and reconstructs itself in ever renewed creations. The only permanent, unchanging reality is the universal, the essential and fundamentally real nature which appears in all individual things, speaks out of their mouth, and in reality, only works and lives in them. The individual human soul has its identity with the universal that represents itself in it. The individual forms of "appearance" having no independence of their own, cannot permanently abide.¹

However this may be, it is said that for Anaxagoras, soul is moving force² and has two forms, the moving and

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the knowing\(^1\) and also that the particular consciousness ceases to exist when the soul leaves the body.\(^2\)

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1. Psell.d.omnif.doctr. 15 in DK, I, p.29; and in K. Freeman, *Companion to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers*, A 101 a, Oxford (1946) p.274 n.g.

It could be assumed that Socrates introduced the notion of the human soul, of the true self, with what he openly said to his fellow citizens of Athens about the soul's care and its perfection: "... ὥς τῆς ψυχῆς ὡς ἀριστή ἔσται"

but, at any rate, this assertion does not prevent us from saying that Socrates was more concerned with the moral aspect of the soul and its perfection than with the rational and philosophical exposition of the soul's doctrine as a whole, which great achievement belongs to his disciple, Plato. The words of E.W. Simson also confirm this: "As we consider now the psychology of Socrates, we shall find it comprehensible by his forthcoming interest in ethics that there is with him no developed doctrine concerning the nature of the soul......


2. Apol. 29E, 30A; also Xen. Mem. 12 "ταύτην γὰρ τὴν ἔξειν .... τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιμέλειαν οὐκ ἐμποδίζειν ἔφη."
But a scientific instruction and development in his thoughts about the soul and its nature is, as we have said, not available.¹

Concerning the destiny of the soul in the life after death he says: "For the state of death is one of two things; either it is virtually nothingness, so that the dead has no consciousness of anything, or it is, as people say, a change and migration of the soul from this to another place."²

As his very own words stand, they express an uncertainty, ignorance and caution. However, I should not like to imagine for a moment that Socrates professes the nihilist or even the agnostic view. I think his views about the perfection of our souls³: "Moreover, the soul of man, which more than all else that is human, partakes of the divine, reigns manifestly within us, and yet is itself unseen"⁴. "... no evil can come to a good man either in

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1. Der begriff der Seele bei Plato (1889) pp.20, 21; also in A.E. Taylor, Socrates, Edinburgh (1933) p.139: "The Socratic doctrine, we must note, is neither psychology, in our sense of the word, nor psychophysics. It tells us nothing on the question of what the soul is, except that it is in us, whatever it is in virtue".


3. Plato Apol. 29E, 30A.B.

life or after death, and God does not neglect him".1

"I go to die, and you to live; but which of us goes to
the better lot is known to none but God".2 "...and so
why should I not be justly accounted blessed and enjoy an
immortality of fame?",3 in an appropriate manner combined
and interpreted help us to assume that Socrates was a firm
and strong believer in the hereafter, and "for his part,
accepted one of the alternatives as his personal belief;
and this alternative is not the Homeric idea of a shadowy
existence in an unsubstantial Hades, nor the utter
annihilation in death, but a real life, in blessedness,
under the protection of the gods".4

2. Apol. 42A; trans. ibid.
3. Trans. W. Miller, Xenophon Cyropaedia, London (MCMXIV)
   (1914) Vol. II, p.427 in LCL.
4. E. Ehnmark, "Socrates and the immortality of the soul"
in Eranos, Vol. XLIV (44) (1946) p.122. Other
interesting points in pp.108, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121,
122. Also E.A. Taylor, Plato (The Man and his Work),
London (1960) p.138 n.2. "The caution should not be
understood to mean that Socrates doubts the fact of
immortality. His firm belief in that is the
assumption of the Phaedo and is really presupposed
by Apolog. 40C-41C". Also some other scholars hold
moderate views: E. Zeller, Socrates and the Socratic
School, London (1868) pp.147-9, ns. 1, 3, 4, 5;
p.99; J.J. Forbes, Socrates, Edinburgh (1905),
pp.232-5, 6, 7; R.K. Gaye, The Platonic Conception of
Immortality, pp. 14-5; B. Russell, History of Western
Philosophy, p.109.
CONCLUSION

From what has been said so far, and by contrasting and comparing Plato's teachings with those of his predecessors concerning the human soul and its fate in the hereafter, we may draw the conclusion that there is a vast difference between them.

Most of his forerunners do not tackle this burning problem as a separate one at all, and when they do deal with it, they treat it in connection with the universe and in a mythical and quite incomplete way.¹

Plato knows his precursors and refers to their teachings, but he touches first the psychologico-eschatological problem and metaphysics in general as a whole in a different way.


Their views might be summarized as follows: Plato gave to the Orphico-Pythagoric notion about soul and its immortality a reasoning and philosophic basis.
He first develops the theory of the soul and its life after death philosophically, he examines it in a dialogue form and searches every possible aspect in a dialectical and imaginative fashion. He succeeds in many ways; even when he fails, at least he ventures to put problems and logical questions for further speculative elaboration by his successors. His predecessors, as I have said, expressed themselves obscurely and relied on vague and unreliable myths, folklore and popular and mythical beliefs, without any effort to elaborate and explain them logically.

Plato himself uses myths, but he uses them in a more logical and dialectical way.¹

1. The difference which Cicero discerns between the Pythagorean and the Platonic treatment of the question seems to be quite applicable here. He writes: "They scarce ever gave any reason for their opinion, but what could be explained by numbers and characters. It is reported of Plato, that he came into Italy, to acquaint himself with the Pythagoreans; and that when there, he learned from them all the tenets of the Pythagoreans; that he not only was of the same opinion with Pythagoras, concerning the immortality of the soul, but he brought reasons in support of it". Cic. Tusc. Disp., I, XVII. Trans. ed. by W.H. Main, London (1824) p.23; See also R.K. Geve, The Platonic Conception of Immortality and its Connexion with the Theory of Ideas, London (1904) p.16 n.1. He quotes the passage in Latin.
PART II

PLATO ON THE NATURE OF THE HUMAN SOUL AND ITS IMMORTALITY

SOME INTRODUCTORY REMARKS: (a) Plato's Theology
(b) What is Man?
(c) A general definition of the human soul.

(a) Plato's Theology.

It appears necessary, and indeed unavoidable, to preface the second part with a few general remarks about Plato's theology, as this is closely connected with it, notwithstanding the fact that Plato himself expressly admits that "The maker and father of this universe it is a hard task to find, and having found him, it would be impossible to declare him to all mankind." And it becomes even more difficult by reason of Plato's very wide application of the term God (Θεὸς). As M. Dies says, many things are called "God" or divine. The Demiurge is

1. Tim. 28c3-5; trans. F.M. Cornford, Plato's Cosmology, The Timeus of Plato, London (1956) p.22; comp. with St. John 1.18:
'Εάν οὐδεὶς ἐρωτάσθη πώς ἐμποδίζεις τὸ πατρὸς, ἔχεινοις ἴδρυσας τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ κόσμου'; John of Dam. De fide Orthodox, MGP. 94, 800B, "ἀρχὲν σῶν τὸ θεὸν καὶ ἀκαταληπτὸν καὶ τὸ τούτο μόνον αὐτοῦ καταληπτόν, ἦ ἀπειρία καὶ ἀκαταληψία".
a Theos, so is the created Universe (Tim. 40E), and the possible plurality of good souls in Laws X; the adjective Divine (Θεῖος) is commonly applied to the forms, and if the reading at Tim. 37C, a shrine brought into being for the eternal gods, is to be kept, the forms which are comprised in the intelligible living creature are actually called Gods. ¹

However complicated and perplexed it is, we shall endeavour to present a clear picture of it, as briefly as possible, and especially of the identification of God with the idea of Good, which caused so much argumentation and disputation among the Platonic scholars, and on which a great deal of ink was used up.

It must be noted from the beginning that the following brief survey does not imply an exhaustive or complete penetration of the entire subject; such a venture would require detailed examination of all the Platonic passages and careful study of all the available sources, and would cover many hundreds of pages.

But first let us see what is Plato's conception of God.

Some scholars have recently approached the problem of Deity from a natural and ontological point of view and have supported the opinion that the soul is a source of movement and consequently, God. Indeed, we meet such assertions in his dialogues, where he expressly states that "soul is identical with the prime origin and motion of what is, has been and shall be, and of all that is opposite to these, seeing that it has been plainly shown to be the cause of all change and motion in all things ...... It has been proved most sufficiently that the soul is of all things, the oldest, since it is the first principle of

1. J.B. Skemp, *The Theory of Motion in Plato's Dialogues*, Cambridge (1942) pp.112-115; R. Demos, "Plato's Metaphysics" in *Journal of Philosophy* (1935) XXXII, p.562, he says (Phaedrus 245e) "... we thus posit a principle of inherent spontaneity, a self-initiating motion, and this is the psyche and ultimately God". H. Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy*, Vol.1 (1944) pp.606-7 (Appendix XI); J. Burnet, *Greek Philosophy*, pp.335-337; mainly see F. Solmsen, *Plato's Theology* (1942) who "depends largely on the Tenth Book of the Laws". (E. Frank in his review, in *American Journal of Philology*, Vol.4 XVI (1945) p.93) and who in a modified way remarks - p.113, "The aspects of the physical world which give it its ontological status and dignity are Movement (traced to a perfect prototype), Life, Order, Design, Rationality. When focusing on the first two, Plato thinks of the divine principle as Soul (which in order to bring about the other three, must ally itself to Mind). On the other hand, when he is primarily concerned with the rational order and structure of the Cosmos, Plato (like Anaxagoras) conceives of the Deity in terms of Mind. This is the situation in Timaeus ...... p.162. The concept of a divine World-Soul as the fountain of movements and as the intelligent power controlling the world of Becoming is the cornerstone of the whole new system".
motion". And "All soul is immortal ..... and this is also the source and beginning of motion for all other things which have motion".

While other interpreters are quite content with the equation of Soul to Deity, the late Prof. Taylor goes further in identifying God with Creator and Best Soul.

This identification is characterised by Solmsen as


2. Phaedrus, 245C; trans. R. Hackforth, Plato's Phaedrus, Cambridge (1952) pp.63-4. I shall give my attention to the apparent contradiction between generated or ungenerated and Timaeus, Laws and the Phaedrus later.

3. A.E. Taylor, A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus, Oxford, (1928) pp. 62, also 64, 77 ff; Idem. Plato, The Laws, (1960) pp.LIII, LIV, 292; Idem. Plato, the Man and his Work, London (1960) pp.442-45, 490-93; Idem. critical note on F. Solmsen, Plato's Theology, in Mind (1943) LII, p.181. We must bear in mind, although Taylor is in favour of this identification, nevertheless, A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus, p.678, he does not minimise the difficulties of the whole matter. F. Solmsen, Plato's Theology, p.121 n.43, seems to suggest that Bovet and Demos are of the same opinion as Taylor, when he writes: "Bovet (Ch.II, n.27) looks in Timaeus for confirmation of his theory that the Platonic definition of God would be 'un dieu est ame parfaite' (p.152 f). Demos, on the other hand, The Philosophy of Plato, London (1939) pp.99-125, relies as far as I can see, mainly on Timaeus, and fails to do full justice to Laws".
arbitrary.¹

One may observe here that the late Prof. Cornford not only does not hold such a view as those above-mentioned, regarding the Demiurge not as a religious figure (Deity), but as a symbol, a mythical one.² Even he finds it difficult to identify the visible Universe with the Demiurge and prefers "to hold back from this or any other conclusion and confines his attention to the world with its body and soul and the reason they contain".³

On the other hand, H. Cherniss, contrasting and combining various Platonic passages, quite plainly says "Moreover, the work of the Demiurge is the work of Mind (νοῦς) (Timaeus 47E3-4) and Mind (νοῦς) can exist only in Soul (46D5-6, 30B3; cf. Philebus 30C9-10; Sonhist

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1. F. Solmsen, Plato's Theology, p.113, particularly p.121 n.43. It must be stated that R. Hackforth, "Plato's Theism", in Classical Quarterly (1936) 30, n.6, also rejects this idea. "however, whether we believe this or not, it is certainly not the case that Laws X asserts the doctrine of One God, viz. the Best Soul".

2. F.M. Cornford, Plato's Cosmology, London (1937) nn.34, 35, 37, 38, 197.

249A), so that the Demiurge must be a soul.¹

Needless to say, we are not at all ready to accept the inferences of Prof. Grube, who, without any difficulty, identifies the World Soul with the Demiurge² or of Theiler, who also equates the Demiurge "with the Reason in the World Soul",³ for the simple reason that in Plato's eyes World Soul is nothing more than a mixture of absolute and corporeal beings.⁴

Whereas all the above-mentioned Platonic critics insisted on the fact that Plato's God was equal to Demiurge or Best Soul, Prof. Hackforth, on the other hand, took

1. Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy, Vol. I, Baltimore (1944) p.425. See also some other references "..... for it is Soul that is the principle of all motion and 'arrangement' and so the artificer of everything whether 'natural' or 'artificial'" (cf. Laws, 892A, 896A-D; Phaedrus, 245D, 246B 6-7) op. cit. pp.251, 603, 605, especially 607. God, therefore, must be "soul having νοῦς or "enlightened soul" (Laws 897B: φυχή ...... νοῦν προσλαβοῦσα cf. Timaeus 46 E4: μετά νοῦ.


4. Tim. 35A.
exactly the opposite view, in a brief but very
suggestive and interesting article, and tried to point
out: (a) that Mind is an ultimate principle, independently
existant and an entirely separate entity from the soul, and
(b) that "Mind (νοῦς) and Mind alone" is identified with
God, not the soul or even the Best Soul.¹

To dismiss Prof. Hackforth's assertion, we have to
turn to Plato himself.

As a matter of fact, Plato sneaks quite clearly and
emphatically on this issue. He writes that Nous —
"intelligence, cannot be present in anything apart from the
soul".² It cannot exist apart from the soul. "Surely
reason and mind could never come into being without soul".³

In other words, here it is perfectly explicit that
Nous is neither an ultimate principle, nor an entity distinct
from the soul and identified with God. It is simply,
according to Plato, a secondary associate of the Soul,
"just the soul's ability (cf. Republic 508E) to "see the

¹ I.R. Hackforth, "Plato's Theism", in Classical
Quarterly, (1936) 30, p.7; Idem. Plato's Phaedrus,
p.71.
² Tim. 30b3, trans. F.W. Cornford, Plato's Cosmology,
p.33.
³ Philebus 30 10; also Soph. 249A. See also H. Cherniss,
Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy, p.425;
J.B. S Kemp, The Theory of Motion in Plato's later
Dialogues, Cambridge (1942) p.112.
ideas or the state in the soul (i.e. ὅδηγεν 615, Rep. 511D, Tim. 52A) produced by sight of them." It is, as Taylor rightly called it, "Its vehicle" or it is "thinkable as a function of the immortal part of the soul", an intellectual function. Generally speaking, Hackforth's whole attempt to establish the fact that the Platonic Deity is Nous, attractive as it is, "is perhaps rather too Aristotelian".

It would be of great interest and benefit to add a few more words about Jaeger's attitude and approach towards the Platonic theological problem, although the late Prof. Jaeger did not write any single work on this subject as he did on

3. J.H.M.M. Loenen, De Nous in het Systeem Van Plato's Philosophie, Dissertatie Universiteit van Amsterdam (1951) Jassoners Universiteitspers, Amsterdam, pp.55, 56, 57, 58, 269 and 270. This is a very informative and interesting terminological, philological and philosophical investigation of the νοῦς-ψυχή "the development of the teleological explanation of nature and its place in the system"; also R.C. Lodge, "Mind in Platonism", in Philosophical Review, 3 (1926) pp.201-20, "discusses Mind in its relation to movement, but rather as we now understand the matter than as Plato understood it". (F. Solmsen op. cit. p.96 n.25).
"the Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers". Nevertheless, he drew our attention to the fact that Plato's "primary approach to the problem was the Socratic and not the pre-Socratic one", that is to say he approached it from an ethical and moral angle, admitting at the same time the diversity of aspects and forms of the Divine in Plato.¹

We must now turn our attention to what Plato has to say about the Idea of Good² and to see whether the following mathematical equation, so to speak, The IDEA OF GOOD = GOD is proved true or not.

As to the first point, Plato describes it in the first place as the source of knowledge (science) and truth³ and of the very being (essence)⁴ as the "causa essendi and causa cognoscendi of all that is"⁵ and secondly that it is not the same thing as being, that is to say the good itself is not essence, but even beyond being, surpassing

². Rep. 505A 2 "ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἱδέα μέγαστον μάθημα".
it in dignity and power.¹

Next we come to consider the vexed question, whether God can be identified with the Idea of Good or not.

Both theories may claim the support of eminent and distinguished scholars who profess them with quite strong views and arguments.

Amongst those interpreters who are in favour of the identification are E. Zeller and T. Adam. Both, as great lovers and scholars of Plato, refer to various passages of Plato's dialogues, and particularly to Philebus 22B 6-10, C 1-3: "I remember a theory ... about pleasure and intelligence, to the effect that neither of them is the good, but something else, different from either and better than both ... it couldn't continue to be identical with the good, could it?",² and point out very strongly that the Demiurge is identical and equivalent to

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the Idea of Good.

This identification has been challenged by many equally prominent scholars and critics of Plato on the ground that the idea of Good is not a soul, or a personal being at all. On the contrary it is the supreme form of all the forms and the cause and source of knowledge.

l. (Contd.) Archer-Hind, Commentary on Timaeus, p.95 n.10, all qtd. by A.N. Rich, "The Platonic Ideas as the thoughts of God", in Mnemosyne, Bibliotheca Classica Batara, Series IV, Vol. VII, Lugduni (1954) p.123 n.2, 4., of making the idea dependent upon God as a thought resident in his mind. It will take us too far to point out quite the opposite. Nonetheless, the following words of A.N.M. Rich, ibid., I should think, are to a great extent a disapproval to it: "To disprove it is, however, a comparatively simple matter, for reference to the Platonic Dialogues makes it immediately clear that any concrete evidence in favour of this interpretation is completely lacking. Plato never describes the Ideas either as the thoughts of God or as the content of God's mind."
(science), truth and being.¹

I share the above standpoint, with some reservations as to what Plato himself meant by both of them: (God - Good).

In view of Plato's reluctance and hesitation in describing and defining exactly his Deity (Tim. 28C, Rep. 506D-E, Second Epistle, 312E, Seventh Epistle 341C-D), of the clash of opinions of his scholars and critics and of this very rapid and brief survey, it would not only be a hard and unsuccessful task in some ways, but also a venturous one, to draw any definite conclusion on Plato's theology in general unless Deus ex machina intervenes or Plato himself gives us another immortal dialogue, in order

to solve the riddle, things which are improbable, even
impossible and mere empty words and wishes. At any rate
I should be more inclined, with Prof. Dodds, "to explain
Plato's lack of clarity on this subject by the cleavage
between his mythical or religious thinking and his
dialectical or philosophical thinking, and the fact that
the former was not bound, or not bound in the same degree
as the latter, by the requirement of logical consistency.
Our confusion about Plato's God is, I think, an instance.
His philosophical thinking about the nature of goodness and
the truth led him to posit an Absolute, which is the form
of the Good. This Absolute is hardly a possible object of
worship, and he nowhere in fact, calls it or any of the
Forms, a God. His religious feeling, on the other hand,
created the figure of a benevolent and mighty (though not
omnipotent) Father - God, father and maker of God and men
and of the world itself. If we try to identify the two,
in the hope that they will add up to the equivalent of One
Christian Deity we make, as I think, nonsense. I incline
to see in him the highest God of Plato's personal faith,
whom we meet also at the end of the sixth letter (323D),
and whom I should suppose Plato speaks of in the singular
without further explanation. Plato then, if I am right
in my general view, admits two types of belief or two
levels of truth, which we may call respectively truth of
religion and truth of reason. The former are, as such,
indemonstrable, and he does not claim for them more than
a probability that this or something like it (Phaedr. 114D, 82n) is true. I find nothing surprising in this: Most men, including, I suspect, most philosophers, believe in practice a good many things which they are incapable of proving. But since Plato preferred to convince his readers by reasoning, if possible, rather than by emotive eloquence, he continually tried to transpose his religious beliefs from the mythical to the philosophical level, thus transforming them into truths of reason.  

1. E.R. Doads, "Plato and the Irrational", in the Journal of Hellenic Studies (1945) pp.23, 24; Idem. The Greeks and the Irrational, Berkeley and Los Angeles (1963) pp.221 and 232 n.67. I quote his words in full, because of their importance and because they hardly admit of summary. See also similar notions: J.A. Stewart, Plato's Doctrine of Ideas, Oxford (1909) pp.101-2; K.F. Doherty, "God and the Good" in the New Scholasticism, pp.459-60. It is, however, worth mentioning that A.E. Taylor, Plato, the Man and his Work, p.289, speaks about "Good - Christian God ...... ens realissimum", while Ernst Hoffmann, Griechische Philosophie bis Platon, Heidelberg (1951) p.175, is neither prepared to identify nor to reject it. He nevertheless remarks that Plato, as a philosopher, never gives a result in his Dialogues, but always shows a way which will lead to a result. "....... Was Platon in Seinen Dialogen als Philosophie gibt, ist niemals ein resultat, sondern ist immer ein Weg, der zum Resultat, hinfuhren will ......".
(b) What is Man?

What then is man? Anyone who would take pains to go through the Platonic dialogues would receive some answers to this question, such as: "the name 'man' indicates that the other animals do not examine or consider or look up at any of the things that they see .... but man looks up at and considers that which he has seen. Therefore of all the animals man alone is rightly called man, because he looks up at what he has seen".⁰ In addition, man is described as a play-thing of the Gods or even a toy for God,² as the most God-fearing of all living creatures³ or as God possessions⁴ etc.

But this is not the true, the real definition of man for Plato. For him, man is something more than that; he is something deeper and more significant; something of a higher and nobler nature, not a mere clay toy, but a reasoning, spiritual creature; something which does not perish or disappear. It is something immortal and divine.

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2. Laws VII, 803C 4-5.
3. Laws X. 902B5.
4. Phaedo 62B8; Statesman 271E6-7.
Plato, then, not only conceives man as immortal, but he quite clearly declares in the *Laws* that man's true self (the real man) resides in the divine and immortal part, that the real self of each of us is the immortal soul.¹
The same notion may be found somewhat elaborated in the *Apocrypha*, *Alcibiades* or in another writer² who echoes Plato's views and emphatically rejects the idea that man is neither the body alone nor the body and soul together (συναμφότερον) but the immortal soul in itself.³

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2. It is not for us to decide about the authenticity of this dialogue. It will take us far beyond our main scope if we do so; we simply note here that in favour of Plato's authorship are Grote, Hermann, Friedlander, J. Adam and others, and against it, A. E. Taylor, *Plato*, p. 522-3.

It must also be said that "the standing Academic definition of man is a soul using a body",\(^1\) or as Plato himself has it, a "composite structure of soul and body".\(^2\) But this does not affect our assumption that for Plato the true self is the soul, that is, the soul is the man. This statement is proved true time and again in almost every Platonic dialogue. After all, the soul's union with its body is a temporary one, the body is mortal, of the earth, and in time passes away. The Soul on the contrary, is an immortal senior and permanent entity.\(^3\) We maintain then that Plato regards man individually as a soul, that the true self, the real man, is soul.

3. *Phaedo* 80D; *Timaeus* 34C; *Laws* 892A, 959A, 967D.
(c) A General Definition of the Human Soul.

Since we have already accented that the real man is soul, we must turn our attention to it and see in a very brief and general manner how Plato speaks of the human soul, how he describes its own nature.

In the first place, the main characteristic of the soul, its essence, very idea, is self-motion.\(^1\)

Further, soul is the self mover and the source and first principle of motion for all other things that are moved,\(^2\) the source and origin of the life, "for a living thing controls its motion from within itself and initiates motion in its relation to the environment".\(^3\) In other words we could say soul is not only the source of life, or the cause of it\(^4\) but the life itself, soul and life are

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1. **Phaedrus** 245E2-4: "ἀθανάτον δὲ πεφασμένον τοῦ ὑφ’ ἑαυτοῦ κινουμένου, φυχῆς οὐσίαν τε καὶ λόγον τούτου αὐτῶν τις λέγων, οὐκ ἀπόχυνεται"; Laws 896A1-3; comp. also with Aristotle, *de Anima* A 2 403b20-28 and in V. Goldschmidt, *La Religion de Platon*, Paris (1959) p.51, where he observes: "The soul, according to the unanimous observations of the ancients, gives animation to the movement and sensation of that which lives".


3. **Phaedrus** 245C7-10.

4. **Cratyl.** 399D11-12 and El-2: "..... τοὺς τὴν ψυχῆν ὁνομάσαντας ... αὕτιον ἐστι τοῦ ζῆν αὐτῷ, τῆς τοῦ ἀναπνεύσειν δύναμιν παρέχον καὶ ἀναψύχον";
one and the same thing.¹

Furthermore, the soul is characterised by Plato as
divine, indestructible of a single form, accessible to
thought and changeless, ever constant and abiding true to
itself,² immortal,³ without birth, ungenerated,⁴ and the
like.

Realising that it is not enough merely to set out the
various references to the soul as they occur in the
Dialogues - since Plato's theory of the soul is not rigidly
uniform and occasionally is even contradictory - we propose
to treat the whole subject under the following headings,

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1. Rep. 353D7-9: "Τι δ' ἀρτὸς ζῇν; ψυχής φησομεν ἐργον
εἶναι; Μάλιστα γ' ἔφη".

2. Phaedo 80B1-3: "... τῶ μὲν ὑπὸ τὴν καὶ ἀθανάτῳ καὶ νοητῷ
καὶ μονοειδῆ καὶ ἀδιαλείπτῳ καὶ οὐκ ὁμοιότῳ κατὰ ταὐτὰ
ἐχοντι ὀμοιότατον εἶναι ψυχήν".

3. Phaedo 80B1, 105E6, 106E9: "ἀθάνατον ἄρα ψυχή";
Phaedrus 245C5: "ψυχῆ πάσα ἀθάνατος";
ibid. 246A1: "ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἅπα ἀθάνατον ἄν εἶναι";
Republic 608D3: "... ὅτι ἀθάνατος ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχῆ καὶ
οὐδέποτε ἀπώλεσθαι";
ibid. 611B9: "... ὅτι μὲν τοῖνυν ἀθάνατον ψυχή".

4. Phaedrus 245D1 "
ibid. 246A1-2:
viz:—

1. The Origin of the soul: generated or ungenerated?

2. The Division of the soul

3. Soul - body: their relationship

4. The Immortality of the Soul.

8. The Origin of the Soul: generated or ungenerated?

The soul is described in the Timaeus as follows:—

The Demiurge, the divine craftsman who made the cosmos and the gods, took the same bowl wherein he had mixed and blended the World Soul, poured into it what was left of the former ingredients of the World Soul's composition (same - other, being - existence)¹, mingling it somewhat after the same manner, yet not as pure as before but coming second

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and third in purity.\textsuperscript{1} And when he had compounded the whole he divided it into souls equal in number with the stars and distributed them each soul to its several star.\textsuperscript{2}

Besides this passage in the \textit{Timaeus}, Plato, charging everyone as ignorant and knowing nothing of the origin\textsuperscript{3} repeatedly states in the \textit{Laws} that soul has been produced first, came first, she is the first born of all things and

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{1} Comp. Philebus 30A; Rene Schaerer, \textit{Dieu, l'homme et la vie d'apres Platon}, Neuchatel (1944) p.42, agrees also that the human soul retains a small quantity of pure principle but that this principle, however, is now ousted by the Other, whereas in the cosmic soul, on the contrary, it was that which involved it. Further, ibid. p.42 n.1, he illustrates the difference of the ingredients' quantity as follows:

\begin{quote}
"La formule de l'âme cosmique est:
\[ \text{Mem} + \text{Autre} + \left( \frac{\text{Meme}}{2} + \frac{\text{Autre}}{2} \right) \]

celle de l'âme humaine est:
\[ \text{Autre} + \left( \frac{\text{Meme}}{2} + \frac{\text{Autre}}{2} \right) \]
\end{quote}

F. Soliasen, \textit{Plato's Theology}, New York (1942) p.93, is of the opinion that the individual souls are either parts of the Universal Soul or at least of the same stuff. E.W. Simson, \textit{Der Begriff der Seele}, p.85, reviewing what Plato in Timaeus writes about the soul's formation, discovers in a general way that the ground of the origin of the human soul is the same as that of the World-Soul and that its origin occurred in the same manner as the World-Soul.

\item \textit{Timaeus} 41D4-E2.

\item \textit{Laws} 892A4.

\item "... φυχή δι' ἐννυρότους γεγενημένη ... πρεσβυτέραν οധαν σώματος ..."; ψυχή τῶν ἀπάντων πρεσβυτάτη; γεγομένη ἄρχη κινήσεως ... ψυχήν μὲν προτέραν γεγονέναι σώματος ἤμιν ..."; "... ψυχήν γένεσιν ἀπάντων εἶναι ..."; ... ψυχήν ἐλέγομεν, ὡς πρεσβυτάτον τε καὶ θειότατον ἐστιν ..."; "... φυχή τε ὡς ἐστιν προσβυτάτον ἀπάντων καὶ κυνηγετήρες ὡς τελευταίον ...";
prior to body.¹

One's task of interpreting the soul's origin would be easier and less complicated if Plato himself either had not taken the diametrically opposite and contradictory view in the Phaedrus that the soul is (ἀγένητος) absolutely without beginning, uncreated and ungenerated,² or if he had not declared that soul is an incomposite being, something which, since it has no constituent parts, as the body has, will not be liable to dissolution or death;³ it is related to the eternal forms and there is a great affinity

1. Laws 892C3-8:
   ibid. 896A-C:
   ibid. 899C7:
   966D9-10, l-2:
   ibid. 967D6-7:
   also Timaeus 34C4-5:

2. Phaedrus 245C6-246A2: "Ψυχή πάσα ἀθάνατος ... τοῦτο πὴ ηὲ καὶ ἄρχῃ κινῆσεως, ἄρχῃ δὲ ἀγένητον, ἐξ ἄρχης γάρ ἀνάγκη πάν τὸ γιγνόμενον γιγνεσθαι, αὐτὴν μηδ' ἐξ ἐνὸς ... μὴ ἄλλοτι εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἐαυτό κινοῦν ἡ ψυχήν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀγένητον τε καὶ ἀθάνατον ψυχή ἡν εἶνεν".

3. Phaedo 78C1-4: "... τυγχάνει ὃν ἀξύνθετον, τοῦτο μόνῳ προσήκει μὴ πάσχει ταῦτα ...."
between them, while soul is said to exist "always" or "for all time".

The apparent or real discrepancy between the above-mentioned passages has disquieted all the Platonic scholars (ancient and modern) and has forced them to give it a considerable amount of thought.

With regard to Timaeus' theory of the creation of the human soul, I think we may justifiably pass it over and leave it out for the simple reason that Plato himself warns us not to take his account of the creation, and consequently of the soul's composition as well, seriously:

1. *Phaedo* 79B8-12: "... δυνοῖτερον ἄρα ψυχή σώματος ἐστιν τῷ αἴδει ..... ", ibid. 79D1-4: "διὰν δὲ γε αὐτή καθ' αὐτή σκοπή, ἐξετῶθεν ο' άλεται εἰς τὸ καθάρον τε καὶ ἄει ὄν ἀθανατον ..... καὶ ὡς συγγενής οὔσα αὐτοῦ ἄεὶ μετ' ἐκείνου τε γίγνεται".

2. *Meno* 86A-B: "δῆλον γέρ ὅτι τὸν πάντα χρόνον ἐστὶν ἢ οὕκ ἐστὶν ἀνθρωπος".


4. We may note herein passing that Plutarch first tried to reconcile the relevant statements in the *Phaedrus* and *Laws* about the soul's origin with a literal interpretation of the *Timaeus*, without success, of course, as his exposition is entirely illogical and untenable, in "Περὶ τῆς ἐν Τιμαῖῳ Ψυχογονίας", or "De animae procreatione in Timaeo, 1016C-D, 5-15 in Plutarchi Moralia, Vol. VI, fasc.1 (ed. by C. Hubert and H. Drexler, Lipsiae in Eadibus B.C. Teubueri MCMLIX, p.153; see also in R.M. Jones, The Platonism of Plutarch, pp.81-85; A.E. Taylor, A Commentary on Plato's *Timaeus*, pp.117-8; H. Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy, p.426 n.360."
lettre. He claims, through Timaeus' mouth that his exposition is neither a logical premise nor a scientifically accurate statement, but a (ἐξωθικὸς μυθικὸς) a mere myth, a probable tale, and as such claims no further investigation.¹

The late Prof. R. Hackforth, despite Plato's warning, refers to 34C4 and seems to suggest that in Timaeus, Plato would have kept in mind a soul uncreated and prior to the

1. Timaeus 29D1-3. Scholars supporting the mythical exposition are E. Zeller, Plato and the Older Academy, New York (1962) p.405 n.40; E. Rohde, Psyche, p.479 n.18; G. Grube, Plato's Thought, p.142; F.M. Cornford, Plato's Cosmology, pp.28-32; F. Solmsen, Plato's Theology, pp.108-9; H. Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism of Plato, pp.426 n.359, 430-31; A.E. Taylor, Commentary on Plato's Timaeus, p.73; Idem. Plato, pp.440-1 gives somewhat different view; Ernst Howald in his paper "eikos logos" Hermes 57 (1922) pp.63-79, seems to make considerable exaggerations and in F. Solmsen, ibid. p.120 n.32; R. Hackforth, "Plato's Cosmology (Timaeus 27D ff)" Classical Quarterly, N.S. IX (1959) p.21; E.W. Simson, Der Begriff der Seele, p.85. It may be noted on the other hand that G. Vlastos, "The disorderly motion", Classical Quarterly, XXIII (1939) pp.71-83, arguing for a literal interpretation of the pre-cosmical disorderly motion, supports the view that the inconsistencies are "symptomatic of the contradiction inherent in Plato's conception of γένεσις" and P. Frutiger, Mythes de Platon, Paris (1930) p.173 ff, distinguishes two senses of the myth or story; see also F.M. Cornford, Plato's Cosmology, pp.31-32 n.1.
body, or to use someone else's words, he "still retains a basic appreciation of the really uncreated status and priority of the soul".¹ "The words γενέσει προτέρα must, however, be interpreted in accordance with the general scheme of the creation myth in which an analysis of factors in the universe is presented in the guise of a cosmogony".²

Next, Hackforth, again in an article published shortly after his death, maintains that Plato in the Timaeus is still holding a view about the soul similar in some degree to that of Orphics, Pythagoreans and even Phaedo, that is, a soul divine or semi-divine, wholly spiritual and rational and "partly discriminated from Mind or Reason".³

Reasonable though Hackforth's exposition seems, it does not prove his case. Plato's statement of εἰκὼς μὴθος I think is the answer to the soul's creation.

We must not, therefore, worry about Timaeus' theory and may ignore it altogether.

1. H.D. Rankin, Plato and the Individual, p.28.
2. R. Hackforth, Plato's Phaedrus, Cambridge (1952) p.62; also in H.D. Rankin, ibid. p.28 n.4.
3. R. Hackforth, "Plato's Cosmogony (Timaeus 27D ff)" in Classical Quarterly, N.S. IX (1959) p.21; E. Rohde, Psyche, p.479 n.18, remarks: "The creation of the soul in Timaeus is only intended to represent the origin of the spiritual from the θεμιτουργὸς not the coming into being of the soul in time".
Nevertheless, the greatest difficulty, as I have already said, lies between the Laws, where Plato categorically declares soul as: "first born (ἐν πρώτοις γεγεννημένη)," prior to body (προτέραν γεγονέναι σώματος) in Plato, Laws (trans. R. G. Bury, Plato, Laws, II, p. 563 in LCL). (πρεσβύτατον ἀπάντων ἡς γονῆς μετεληφεν) and in Phaedrus 245C6-246A2 in which we read soul as uncreated, ungenerated (ἀγένητον).

Now in view of this apparent conflict between the two dialogues, any linguistic and literary attempt to remove the difficulties and find a satisfactory solution is going, I incline to think, to fail completely.

Plato's commentators intervene at this point and each one separately offers his own respective solution of this apparent antithesis.

Since Prof. Cherniss' reconciliatory effort is clear, well-founded and succeeds in many ways, it would be better, I believe, to allow the scholar himself to develop his arguments...; and defend his case with his own words: "The scope of the argument in the Laws is determined by the thesis which it is meant to refute, namely that fire, water, earth and air are πρῶτα and that soul is ἐκ τούτων ὀστερον (891C). To refute them he need say nothing as to whether soul is absolutely without beginning,
but has only to prove that it is πρεσβυτέραν σώματος .........

.... In other words, Plato does not explicitly draw the conclusion here that the soul is absolutely without beginning simply because that point is superfluous to his present argument and like a skilled debater, he confines himself both in assumption and proof to the minimum necessary for establishing his case. He goes on to say that "there are clear indications in the course of the argument that he has not abandoned the position of the Phaedrus. In 894E-895B, he argues first that moving things necessarily imply self-motion, as the ultimate principle of their motion, and secondly that if all things should be assumed at rest, a first motion would have to be self-motion, for since there is no change in the things at rest, change induced by something other than self-motion (i.e. by a moved mover) could not be prior to this.

1. H. Cherniss, Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato and the Academy, p.430-1 n.365; compare with Procli Diadochi in Platonis Timaeum commentaria, ed. by E. Diehl, Lipsiae, MCMIV, Vol.II, 175D11-23 n.117, whom Cherniss follows in his concluding remarks:

"ἐστι δε γένεσις ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς οὐχ ἡ κατὰ χρόνον (ἀγένητον γάρ καὶ ἀνώλεσθον ἔδειξεν ἐν φαλάρῳ (246α) τήν ψυχήν), ἀλλ’ ἡ κατ’ οὐσίαν πάροδος ἀπὸ τῶν νοητῶν αἰτίων ............. ἀλλὴ ἡ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς γένεσις καὶ ἀλλὴ ἡ ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος ἡ μὲν προτέρα καὶ πρεσβυτέρα προσεχεστέρα γάρ ἐστι τῶν πάντων δημιουργῶν."
In this passage, which is simply an expansion of Phaedrus 245D7–E2, the first part implies that "generated self-motion" is a contradiction in terms, and the second that, if soul, as motion, were "generated", not it but its generator would be self-motion and the ἀρχὴ κινήσεως πασῶν ..........
That soul is called πρῶτη γένεσις does not at all imply that it ever did not exist or was ever "generated" in the sense of being "now" after not having been "before". The soul is, of course, a "process", though not a physical process, being intermediate between the ideas and the physical universe; it too is dependent upon the real being of the ideas, but the very fact that it is called πρῶτη γένεσις of all things that are or have been or will be and of all their contraries (Laws 896A, 899C6–7) shows that Plato did not here envisage any "production" or "creation" of it.¹

The late Prof. Hackforth also attempted two different explanations of the "puzzling" passages in the Laws.
1. In an earlier article, which he later believed "to have been wrong, though," he thinks, "the main conclusions of his paper may stand without it", ² he

1. H. Cherniss ...... please see at page 62 n.1.
2. R. Hackforth, Plato's Phaedrus, Cambridge (1952) p.67 n.3.
suggests that the words "δισα γονῆς μετεληφεν" (Laws 967D) mean "no more than γένεσις eldest of all things that are generated" and that "soul then is a γένεσις or γεγονός or "participates in birth". This γεγονός does not imply any creation in time. They are simply derivative existents depending on something more ultimate.

2. Later, he holds that Plato repeats and expands in the Laws the theory of the self-moving soul, and as it is quite natural, everyone would have expected him to reaffirm its ungenerated nature. Unfortunately, he refrains from doing so and instead tries "to confute the atheistic materialists who make body prior in origin to soul, he adopts their temporal category and confines himself to demonstrating the reverse priority".2

Next Rankin, taking up the point, argues that it is apparent from the Timeaus (37D) - and this accords with Hackforth's opinion - that Plato recognized an inadequacy in the use of language employing ordinary time - concerts of


2. Idem. Plato's Phaedrus, p.67. It may be of interest to note that in his posthumous article "Plato's Cosmogony", Classical Quarterly N.S. IX (1959) p.21, he sees Phaedrus' ungenerated soul as "the necessary presupposition of all movements that occur in the Universe, coeval with the Universe".
cosmological ideas. The time divisions of the "temporal" world are seen as irrelevant to the "extra-temporal" and as the "temporal" world is a created thing, so also is its character of temporality, a flickering shadow of the enduring substance of eternity. In this context, only the present tense can have any force, and past and future alike are meaningless. This is not to say that Plato never uses the "irrelevant" tenses in writing of the timeless cosmos. He acknowledged that men were conditioned to thinking in such terms, and regarded it as a work of supererogation to avoid tensed language completely. This "conditioning" was expressed in the idea that man and time were, as it were, twins - an idea inherent in much Greek writing, and found, particularly, in the Laws (721c). Time, in this system, exists alongside a man, paralleling his own age at each juncture, young when he is young, old when he is old, and born when he is born. This way of thinking smooths over the apparent contradiction in the Timaeus of saying that something which is ungenerated was "made" at a specific moment, although that "moment" is really outside of time. In the same way, one can describe the soul as "older" than all other things, or to say that something "extra-temporal" existed "before" time. If time is "born", the extra-temporal already existed when time was born. According to the Timaeus, time (37c) actually began, had a point of origin. It is in such terms that the extra-temporal
soul can itself be said "to be born". 1

Muller, on the other hand, is of the opinion that in the Laws, soul's creation has no place, as in Timaeus, and the words πρωτέρα and πρεσβυτέρα have by no means a temporal sense: ("Das wäre im Timaios vielleicht möglich wo mindestens die Seele geschaffen wird; in den Nomoi aber hat die Schöpfung keine Stelle", 2 and "..... Daher die Begriffe πρωτέρα und πρεσβυτέρα die in den Nomoi keines Falls zeitlichen sinn haben"). 3

In addition to the above mentioned points of view, some other scholars expressed quite contrary opinions as to the soul's origin. Vlastos, for instance, adduces some passages and claims that Plato had assumed the soul's creation, "but prudently, refrained from presenting it as a problem". 4 In other words he claims, so to speak, that when he wrote the Laws Plato believed the soul to be created i.e. to have had a beginning.

4. G. Vlastos, "The disorderly motion in the Timaios", Classical quarterly, XXXIII (1939) p.79 n.2. and p.82 n.1; see also H. Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy, p.430 n.365.
Prof. Skemp for his part, charges Plato's commentators with being slow to acknowledge that the soul is a created thing, "except διδασκαλίας χάριν" and this, of course, in virtue of the apparent ἀντίφασις of Phaedrus and Laws. Further, in a footnote, he observes that Laws X speaks of the ψυχή as γεγενημένη at 892C; cf. 892A, 896A and at the "crucial" passage XII 967D.¹

In conclusion, we may say this:

The key answer to the apparent discrepancy lies not in the narrow grammatico-lexicological, or literal, exposition, but in the main purpose of the Laws book X. Those who have already worked in this direction (Proclus, Cherniss, Hackforth and Rankin) succeeded in many ways, while those who have approached the problem differently have failed to produce results leading to a satisfactory solution (G. Vlastos and Skemp).

While we must exclude any creation of the human soul in time as contrary to what Plato teaches, we are obliged to endorse the view of Proclus, Cherniss, Hackforth and Rankin as well founded and convincing, that the human soul

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¹ J.B. Skemp, The Theory of Motion in Plato's later Dialogues, Cambridge (1942) p.112 n.1.
is a "process", not necessarily a physical one, being intermediate between the Forms and the Universe; the soul is a derivative existent, as the physical universe, depending on something more ultimate, more transcendent, indeed upon the real being of ideas.
9. THE DIVISION OF THE SOUL.

The statement under consideration could be expressed as follows:

Is the human soul simple, of one form or kind (μονοειδής) uncompounded (αξόνθετος)\(^1\) or tripartite\(^2\) and composite, or in other words, is soul a differentiated unity or a simple unity or both, a one and a many?

The whole question, as it is understood, is neither an easy one nor without its complexities. Since this is so, and if we wish to gain the clearest possible view, then we have to go round a longer way.\(^3\)

Thus our proposed investigation falls into the following sections:

1. Origin of the doctrine: Pythagorean or Platonic?

2. Tripartition of the Soul:
   (a) in the Republic
   (b) in the Phaedrus
   (c) in the Timaeus
   (d) in the other dialogues.

3. Conclusion: proposed solution.

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1. Phaedo 78C4-7, 80B1-4; Republic 611B1-8.
2. Cf Republic IV, 435C5, 435C-441; 611B-612A; also Phaedrus, 246A ff; Tim. 69C-72D.
3. Republic 435D4-5.
1. **Origin of the doctrine: Pythagorean or Platonic?**

While Pythagoreans did not pronounce any clear statement about a tripartite soul, nevertheless some modern scholars favour the notion that the origin of the doctrine of the threefold soul is Pythagorean rather than Platonic.

Burnet, for instance, regarding the *Phaedo* 68c2, as implying the tripartite division of the soul, refers this "somewhat primitive psychology" as being older than Socrates, for it stands in intimate connection with the famous Pythagorean apologue of the three lives - compared to the three classes of men who go to Olympia, (1) ὑπὸ ἐνεκα (2) to compete (δόξα) (3) to buy and sell (κέρδος) (Iambl. V.P. 58). Further, in support of his view, he quotes Poseidonius and Iamblichus, as saying that the doctrine of the three parts of the soul goes back to Pythagoras himself and that it originally was Pythagorean indeed and Plato himself worked out and completed it.¹

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In an excellent article, J.L. Stocks, following Burnet's line of thought, finds it unnecessary to search the records of Greek philosophy for further detailed evidence of the profound and continued influence of the doctrine, and he is content to remark in conclusion that all probabilities favour the truth of the tradition of its Pythagorean origin.¹

Cornford, on the other hand, remarks that he is not sure that the doctrine of the three lives implies a definite division of the soul into three parts. He rather suggests that the natural impression produced by this passage is that the three lives were a commonplace but no-one had at least based the doctrine on a tripartite psychology.² Further, he argues that the tripartite psychology has as its final basis a social structure older than Pythagoras himself and it does not matter at what date or in whose hands interpretation in terms of psychology took place.³


3. F.M. Cornford, ibid, p.247 n.2.
The above view that the doctrine of the three parts of the soul is rooted in the Pythagoreans, has recently been challenged by two equally eminent scholars, Grube and Hackforth.

Professor Grube, charging Burnet, Taylor and their followers as missing the whole point in giving such faulty explanation concerning the divine soul, writes that the difference lies in this: "Whereas the Phaedo (with the Pythagoreans) speaks of three different types of men, in the Republic and the Phaedrus these become three parts of the same soul". The passions of the philosopher in the Phaedo are not parts of his soul.¹

Professor Hackforth also speaks against it, ascribing with the late Professor W. Jaeger (Aristotle, E.T. 1948², p.98) the origin of the three types of men to the Academy rather than to Pythagoras and rejects the suggestion that the Republic I, 581, has its origin in Pythagoras and rules out Burnet's implication of a tripartite soul on Phaedo 68c1-4 and in the whole dialogue as impossible and groundless.²

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1. G.M.A. Grube, Plato's Thought, p.133 n.1.
Grube and Hackett may be right as far as the alleged tripartite soul found by Burnet in the *Phaedo*, but not, I think, as regards the origin of the three types of men which, according to Burnet's evidences, seems to belong to an older generation than that of Plato.

2. **The tripartition of the soul:**
   (a) in the *Republic*.

   Plato had already shown that justice and a just society exist when each of its three classes keeps to its own proper business, does not interfere with others' work, and properly and rightly performs its own.¹

   "Since the qualities of a community are those of the component individuals, we may expect to find the three corresponding elements in the individual soul. All three will be present in every soul, but the structure of society is based on the fact that they are developed to

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¹ *Republic* 434C6-10.
different degrees in different types of character".¹

Plato, having accepted the tentative proposition that the three psychological kinds or forms correspond to the three orders of the city, proceeds now to consider, "from a common human experience, that of conflict in the mind",²

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1. F.A. Cornford, The Republic of Plato, Oxford (1961) p.126; also H.L.P. Lee, Plato: The Republic (Penguin edition) (1955, 1964) p.182; Republic 434D3-5 and 435B3-6. On the parallelism between state and soul and especially on the question "which is prior, the tripartition of state or the tripartition of soul?", which does not concern us directly. We may add, in passing, of course, the following: F.A. Cornford, "Psychology and social structure in the Republic of Plato", Classical Quarterly (1912) VI, pp.247-265, proves that the division of the state came first, rather than that of the soul; R. Hackforth, "The Modification of Plan in Plato's Republic", Classical Quarterly (1913) VII, p.265, on the contrary, relying to Cornoed's assertion, believes that "Plato to have had a tripartite psychology in his mind from the beginning of Book II - a psychology, indeed, which is prior to the building up of the political structure"; R.C. Cross and A.D. Woolley, Plato's Republic, London (1964) pp.130-2, are of the same opinion as Hackforth; C.J. Classen, Sprachliche deutung, etc., on cit. p.22-23, argues, on the other hand, that the problem worth solving is not where the tripartition first appears, but where the parallel between state and soul has its origin. Generally on the question one may consult also E.G. Ballard, "Plato's movement from an ethics of the individual to a science of particulars", Tulane Studies in Philosophy, Vol.VI (Studies in Ethics), Tulane University, New Orleans (1957) pp.14, 15-16 and more particularly in the excellent article of the late H.W.B. Joseph, "Plato's Republic: the comparison between the soul and the state", in Essays in Ancient and Modern Philosophy, Oxford (1935) pp.82-121.

2. G.M.A. Grube, Plato's Thought, p.130.
the question whether the three "arts" or better elements or faculties concerned are distinct or identical or the same or different?¹

Plato, to prove his case, applies first the so-called Law of Contradiction, viz. the general principle "that the same thing cannot act in two opposite ways or be in two opposite states at the same time, with respect to the same part of itself, and in relation to the same object".² The better to illustrate this general principle, he discusses it at some length by giving some examples (standing man, moving his head and arms, etc., Republic 436C9-11 and a nog-top, spinning etc., 436D-E etc.). But the most outstanding example, which better fits and explains his point, is that of a thirsty man.³ Every thirsty man desires to drink,⁴ but if there is something which holds him back and forbids him drink, this something, according to the law of contradiction, must be an element in the soul other than the thirsty impulse.⁵

¹ Republic 436B5-6.
³ Cf. Republic 437B7-439D.
⁴ Ibid. 439A9-439Bl.
⁵ Ibid. 439B3-6.
So far, Plato has pointed out that the elements in the human soul are two, different and distinct of each other: the rational principle (λογιστικόν) with which the soul and the irrational appetite (ἀλογιστόντε καὶ ἐπιθυμητικόν), which is closely connected with pleasure and satisfaction.

Plato next turns his attention to the "spirited" element in the soul.

This spirited element (θυμός) manifested in indignation and anger, is different from the desire or appetite and sometimes opposes it. Further, the spirit, although akin to reason and its ally, nevertheless is distinct from it.

The fact that the spirit is not identical with the reason can be seen either in children or animals, who are full of passionate feelings from their very birth, but never become reasonable, or in the man described by Odysseus: "Strikes himself on the chest and calls his
heart before to order, where the one element rebukes
another.

Thus, Plato has established his case and arrived at
the conclusion that there are the same three elements in
the human soul as in the state.

In addition, Plato makes use of his threefold
distinction of the soul in two other occasions, in a rather
summary fashion: (i) in the interpretation of the four
virtues. Here wisdom is of the reason and courage of the
spirit, when spirit is subordinated and ideally under the
control of the rational faculty, while self-control and
temperance exist, when all these three elements not only are
in full harmony amongst themselves - without any internal
conflict whatsoever between the rational faculty and the
other two, but when all are unanimously agreed that the
reason should be the ruler and controller of the ardent
through the agency of the spirited, Justice, finally, is a
virtue which is concerned no longer with man's external

1. Republic 441B4 - 441C1-3; Homer, Odysseus, Book XX, 17;
in W.W. Merry, Oxford, MDCCCCI, p.126 n. XX, 17
p.124 and in H.L.P. Lee, Plato, the Republic, r.193 n.1.
2. Ibid. 441C5-7.
3. Ibid. 441E4-5.
4. Ibid. 441E.
5. Ibid. 442C10-111, DL.
sections, but with man's inward self. And (ii) in the
discussion of pleasure. In Book IX he clearly states that
each faculty (element) of the soul not only has its own
specific pleasures, peculiar desires, but any one of the
three may govern the soul.  

Earlier, Plato has described the soul as constructed
of three "parts" or functions. Now, in the course of the
discussion of immortality in Book X he advances a new,
extremely sketchy, and "rather suggested (612A)" argument.

He argues that we cannot think of the true nature of
the soul as full of diversity and full of internal conflicts,
as a composite substance for such a composite entity
cannot easily be eternal. He adds besides that if we
want to have as clear a picture as possible of the true
nature of the soul, we must view her apart from the body.

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1. Republic 443C9-10, D ff.
2. Ibid 580D6-8; also in 581C5.
4. Ibid 611Bl-3.
5. Ibid 611B5-6; comp. cf. Phaedo 78C; Plotinus, Enneades I, 1, 12, plotini, opera, Tomus I, ed. by
6. Ibid 611B5.
7. Ibid 611B10-C1-2 ff; Phaedo 82E, 83D-E, 81C.
The apparent disagreement between the above-mentioned passages and of the IV and IX books, has been interpreted differently by various scholars, who, however, with a few exceptions, arrive at more or less the same conclusion.

For P. Shorey, the question debated by psychologists since Aristotle's time (Eth. Nic. 1102a31) to the present day is unimportant and of a secondary nature, and consequently it does not deserve detailed study and scientific development; it is simply a matter of rhetoric, poetry and point of view.

For some purposes we may describe the elements of the soul as distinct entities, for others, we may again treat them, not as separate "parts", but as mere aspects of the same thing.

Plato himself was very conscious of this and on different occasions lays emphasis on the aspect which suits and serves his purpose better.

Further, he sees no contradiction at all between the Republic 436AB passage and X 611-12 and Phaedo 68C, 82C.\(^1\)

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Two other eminent scholars, E. Rohde and A.E. Taylor, one after the other, give the following explanation:

E. Rohde, on the one hand, argues that the reason which forced Plato to abandon his conceptions of the natural trichotomy of the soul into parts, given in the Republic and still maintained in the Phaedrus, was "the consideration of its immortality and vocation to intercourse with the Divine, immortal and everlasting ( θεόν καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἄφθονον )".¹ Emotions and passions are due to the communion of the soul with the body and this is proved by reason that if they "were indissolubly linked to the soul the latter could never escape from the cycle of rebirths"² and if only the λογιστικῶν "as the only independently existing side of the soul"³ passes into judgment, then it would not be necessary really for the incomposite and uniform soul to attempt a new ἐνσώματωσίς since this "process implies materiality and desire".⁴

Taylor, on the other hand, similarly suggests that for the philosopher, who earnestly desires the supreme good,

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1. E. Rohde, Psyche, p.481 n.29.
2. Ibid. op. cit. p.481 n.29.
3. Ibid. p.481 n.29.
4. Ibid. p.481 n.29.
draws nearer and nearer to it every day and "makes progress towards the goal", towards his objective, such a theory of a tripartite division of the human soul into distinct parts, is of little importance, incomprehensible in many ways and "becomes increasingly impossible."

Next J. Adam, regarding the "so-called lower parts" not of the nature of the soul, but "only incidental to its association with body", clings to a simple, uncompounded and μονοειδής soul. ²

The acute critic, Frutiger, applying the traditional interpretation, seems to deny on the one hand the simplicity of the soul on the grounds that (1) he uses the lengthy negative periphrases (τὴν ἀληθεστάτη φύσιν) instead of using the word μονοειδής (2) he takes the trouble to tell us that a composite thing can with difficulty be eternal and (3) the words (ὁς νοῦ ἡμῶν ἐφάνη ὡς ψυχή) allude not to Book IV but to Books VII and IX. On the other hand, he seems to favour a

differentiated unity, capable of immortality.¹

Professor W.K.C. Guthrie, moreover, in a very brief paper discussing, among other aspects of the soul, also the passages Republic IV and X, infers that the soul, for Plato, in essence is still simple, and only appears composite as the result of its association with the body.²

Frutiger's interpretation and attempt at reconciliation of the two passages of the Republic as indicating a differentiated unity soul, though it is ingenious and attractive and has some truth in it, nonetheless does not remove difficulties involved with it. For this reason, we favour the view of those who regard the tripartite theory of the Republic as leading towards a simple unity-soul.³

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1. P. Frutiger, Les Mythes de Platon, Paris (1930) p.93. It should be noted also that Dr. R.H. Hall, Plato and the Individual, pp.150-1, influenced by Frutiger, as it is obvious, insists that a careful analysis of the passage (X 611B-612A) will reveal that there is a fundamental consistency between it and the account in Book IV, if we regard both as presenting at least as probable an account of the soul as a complex or differentiated unity.


3. More reasons for this view we shall give below in the general conclusion of the whole tripartite problem.
(b) in the Phaedrus.

The soul's triplicity occurs also in the Phaedrus in an extremely sketchy account. Its image is described in a myth as follows:

The human soul is likened "to the union of powers in a team" consisting of a winged charioteer and two winged steeds which he is attempting to drive. In the case of gods the driver and the two horses are all good and of noble breed, but in the case of other species, and most particularly with us men, it is not quite the same. The fact that the charioteer has to drive and rule over two steeds of a different strain, one of noble stock and the other of ignoble, makes his task difficult indeed, not to say wearisome and unmanageable.2

This allegory clearly implies that the charioteer stands for the reason, the horse of good stock for the spirited element, and the horse of bad stock for the irrational appetite.

A few pages later he makes use of this analogy in

1. R. Hackforth, Plato's Phaedrus, p.67; A.E. Taylor, Plato, p.307 n.1., comments on Phaedrus 246A6-7:

"forming a single living whole. ...... It is inserted in order to insist on the unity of the individual mind. We are to think of the driver and his horses as a single organism".

order to elucidate the conflict which is going on in the soul of the lover-charioteer. In this struggle, while the good horse which is the lover of honour and glory combined with modesty and temperance, needs no whip but is controlled by the word of command and by reason, its fellow, on the contrary, which is deaf, hot-blooded and the companion of insolence and wantonness, is conquered only with great effort and force, that is with whip and spur.¹

Now the new, the startling, point which Plato makes here is that he attributes the lower "parts" to the discarnate soul as well.²

We could pass over the tripartite theory of the discarnate soul fairly easily on the grounds that the whole setting of 246A-253C-254E is "a myth, and rigid exactitude of doctrine is not to be expected",³ but since some critics dealt with the problem and express their own views on the issue, following one of the two courses, it is most desirable to recapitulate their statements.

Taylor categorically rejects the idea about tripartite discarnate souls and even gods who are never embodied at

¹. *Phaedrus*, 253 -254E.
². Ibid. 246A-E, 248C-249D.
all. His reasons are that (1) such a doctrine would be at variance with the hints of the Republic and the express teaching of the Timaeus, and (2) we are not allowed by any means to draw hard and fast lines on metaphysical theories from imaginary tales, from myths.¹

Wilamowitz observes that the picture of the charioteer of the soul with the two steeds—complicated as it is—is only devised for the condition of the soul in human life, when it is at its best. He further finds that the Divine soul in the Phaedrus is equally complex.²

Hackforth argues that Plato wavers to the end between two conceptions of the soul; the Orphic-Pythagorean notion of soul, divine and complete, free from all physical functions and the scientific conception of a soul as self-mover and source for other things too.³ He, contrary to what A.E. Taylor and Wilamowitz⁴ said, goes on to say that the explicit statement of the Phaedrus about the tripartition of the human soul before and after its incarnation,

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3. G.E.L. Owen, "The place of the Timaeus in Plato's dialogues", Classical Quarterly, N.S. Vol.III (1953) p.95, takes the view that "the contradiction in Timaeus, Phaedrus, 246A ff and Laws 897A is apparent and not real." We avoid the conclusion that Plato "wavered to the end" between these alternatives, if we set the Phaedrus after Timaeus.

4. See pp.84 and 85.
must be taken "as seriously meant".¹

Guthrie, devoting in his recent article a somewhat lengthy paragraph to the matter, poses a different solution. He points to Empedocles as a source for the complex eschatological system of Plato, in terms of which the soul is seen as essentially divine, but involved in a reincarnational cycle as a "punishment for sin" — although the nature of the sinfulness is left rather vague. The Phaedrus, asserting that this "sin" has cost the soul its purity, goes on to describe how it spends ten thousand years circling the cycle of punishment, from which it cannot be released unless it succeeds in living the philosophic life for three incarnations in succession. The point is made, however, that a thousand years elapse between the start of one incarnation and that of the next, so that the greater part of the cycle is actually spent in a discarnate state. This makes it impossible to identify the soul's "impurity" entirely with its incarnate condition, and with that alone, for during its "inter-incarnational" period it is still tainted with the stain of the "sin" which imprisoned it within the circuits of the wheel. The concept of immortality thus assumes shape quite distinct from a mere opposition between imprisonment of the soul within a body, and the soul released from the body's thrall;

¹. R. Hackforth, Plato's Phaedrus, p.76 n.3.
the disability which binds the soul is from within, and the soul would never experience a bodily existence if it had not by prior sin incurred the punishment of incarnation.

Here, immortality gains a moral meaning, and no longer implies mere durability.

Guthrie does not accept the common statement that the psychology of the Phaedo denies the survival in the discarnate state of the lower parts of the soul - a survival which the Phaedrus, per contra, asserts. He admits that the Phaedo declares these lower parts to be no true attribute of the soul's proper nature, but proceeds to point out that we are then told "that a soul that has given itself over to bodily desires and pleasures while in the body is, when it leaves it, still permeated by the corporeal". This view is found again in the Gorgias, which considers the soul as something of a Picture of Dorian Gray, marked inescapably with the character of the life lived in the body, a character which, however well it has been disguised by the body, becomes known beyond any pretense or concealment on death, and on the basis of which the soul is judged.

Guthrie therefore finds no contradiction between the statements of the Phaedo and Plato's other references to the matter. He finds it "particularly difficult to agree" with Hackforth's conclusion that "even 'pure' soul is θυμοειδής and ἐπιθυμητικὸς as well as λογιστικὸς ", for he
sees the aim of the philosophic life as being to attain beyond the reach of such taints, thus beyond the grip of the wheel, and thus "like unto a god", regaining the soul's original condition.

Plato's imagery is aimed at describing a state of affairs which is known empirically - viz, that the nature of man is mixed, good and evil being both present. It is not intended to explain this fact, or to indicate the origin of the evil admixture. It cannot, therefore, be adduced in evidence for suggesting that the content of the image - the chariot and its team of horses - necessarily implies anything about the nature of the souls of the gods themselves, and whether they are, like those of men, peccable. Plato, like Empedocles, is concerned with the effects of the condition of sinfulness, rather than with that conditions source. He finally remarks that Plato turned to a myth in order to illustrate better a religious truth which he passionately believed, "but of which neither he nor any other man can give a rational explanation".¹

(c) In the Timaeus.

Timaeus's account concerning the triplicity of the soul, fascinating and fanciful as it is, runs in many respects on the same lines as those of the Republic.1

Here Plato declares that only the rational part – anima rationalis – was created by the Demiurge out of the same ingredients as the world soul.2

This part is located in the head3 and alone enjoys the privilege of being immortal.4

Further, he speaks of the mortal parts of the soul, together with the body itself, as made by the celestial gods.5

Now, the apparent bipartition, immortal – divine – mortal, becomes tripartite by the analysis of the mortal (ἐννητοῦ) in spirited and appetitive element.6

The spirited element on the one hand, is situated

1. A.E. Taylor, A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus, p. 496 n. or. 69c7, finds Timaeus's teaching of the threefold soul corresponding precisely to that of the Republic, with the difference, of course, that the inferior two parts are mortal and located in the body.

2. Timaeus 41D4-El; 69B8-Cl-3; comp. also 34BC and 90A5-8.

3. Ibid. 44D4-6; 45A1-2; 69D6-7, El.

4. Ibid. 44D5-6; 45A1-2; 69C5-6; 69D5; 69D6; 90A1-9.

5. Ibid. 42D6-El-4; 69C3-El.

6. Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 1, 13, 10, prefers (is in favour all the way of) the bipartition: "ὀλον τὸ μὲν ἀλόγον αὐτῆς εἶναι, τὸ δὲ λόγον ἔχον".
between the midriff and the neck, that is, in the heart,\(^1\)
and the appetitive one is placed in the belly, viz. below
the midriff.\(^2\)

Plato's concluding remarks that what has been said
before is provisional and tentative and would be an
accurate scientific statement if only a god would have
confirmed and proved it is, I am inclined to believe, of a
greater significance and weight than the preceding
discussion about the immortal and mortal parts, which, after
all, as has already been noted, is a mythical, popular
doctrine, as the whole creation is, and belongs to the
sphere of myth, probable account, rather than to the sphere
of scientific truth.\(^3\)

So far, we have been dealing with the threefold theory
of the human soul as it is set forth most fully in the
Republic and Timaeus and mythically only in the imposing
allegory of the Phaedrus. However that may be, we still
feel something must be said also about the doctrine in the
Phaedo, the Statesman and the Laws.

In the Phaedo we cannot trace, I believe, a soul's
division, for Plato clearly speaks of a simple, uniform,

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1. Timaeus 70A-D6.
2. Ibid. 70D7-El-3; the appetitive form belongs also to the
trees, plants and seeds. Timaeus 77AB.
3. Ibid. 72D4-8; comp. also with Phaedrus 246Al-4 and
Republic 435CD.
incomposite and immortal soul.¹

In the Statesman a vague distinction of a divine and a human or animal element of the soul occurs.²

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1. Phaedo 78C1 and 80B1-3; with regard to Phaedo's teaching on the triplicity of the soul some scholars argue as follows: R.H. Archer-Hind (Πλάτωνος Ἁλόων) the Phaedo of Plato, London (1894) pp.XXXIII, XXXIV-V opposes the division of the soul in general and particularly here (in Phaedo) and is in favour all the way of a simple and uniform soul. He rejects the lower "parts" as different and adopts the milder expression "modes of the soul's activity"; Wilamowitz, Platon, I, p.341, that Plato wanted to avoid over-loading his exposition; P. Shorey, The Unity of Plato's Thought, and W.A.C. Guthrie, "Plato's views on the nature of the soul" in Recherches sur la trайд tion Platonicienne, in Entretiens sur l'antiquité classique, p.12, maintain that Phaedo (79BCE ff) does not affirm that the soul is simple and uncompounded, but that the body is more akin to the composite, and the soul to the simple and unchanging; P. Frutiger, Mythes de Platon, p.77, on the other hand, holds that the soul was composed of three parts, of which one only was immortal. He would certainly not have given to this last the generic name of ὑμνημον nor passed in silence completely over the other two ("...... ni passe les deux autres entrée remont sous silence"); R. Hackforth, Plato's Phaedo, pp.11-12, notes that the simplicity and incomposite nature of the soul is categorically asserted in the dialogue of the Phaedo.

As far as the division of the soul in the *Laws* is concerned, it could be asserted right from the outset that Plato says nothing specific there; notwithstanding D.A. Rees and T.J. Saunders, the former referring mainly to *Laws* IX 863E-864A, 626E, 630A-B, 689A-E, 696C, 840B-C, *Magna Moralia* I, 1182A 213 ff, *Protrerticus*, *Nic. Eth.* IX, 1168B28 - 1169A3, X, 1177B31 - 1178A3, *Nic. Eth.* I, 13, 1102A26-28 and *De Anima* III 432Q24-26, claim that "the *Laws* in fact suggest a bipartition of the soul more naturally than a tripartition, as is confirmed by IX, 863E-864A" and the latter, repeating the same passages again and adding some new ones (869E, 93A, 731AB, 717D, 770D and 783A) reaches the general conclusion that the soul in the *Laws* can be analysed into the three elements equivalent to those of the *Republic*.

One cannot, I should say, expect accuracy and precision.


3. This point seems to be admitted by both Rees op. cit. pp.113 and particularly 115, Saunders op. cit. pp.38 and 41.
from these general considerations and conclusions, in spite of the fact that both papers are very informative, interesting and ingenious, for the simple reason that in the Laws there is no one single clear statement about the threefold soul as in the other dialogues (Republic, Timaeus, Phaedrus).

Coming to the end of our survey of "the problem of the tripartite soul" which, indeed, "is amongst the thorniest of all Platonic problems", and replying to the opening question, whether the soul is simple and incomposite or composite and compound, we may, now, generally say (1) that the human soul is in its true nature incomposite, uncompounded and simple (ἀξύνθετος καὶ μονοειδής) and that the so-called lower two parts or elements are not, by any means, distinct or real parts, but are, on the contrary, its temporary and transitory manifestations, mental aspects, activities and phases, owing their own existence in its connection with the corporeality and they

1. R. Hackforth, Plato's Phaedrus, p.75.
last as long as the soul is related to the body. ¹

Our preference for a simple and uncompounded soul with mental energies and activities, while it is connected with the body, is based on the following reasons:

1. It elucidates more satisfactorily and throws enough light on the issues: soul's - body's relation and soul's immortality.

2. Plato himself hardly uses a word denoting "part" in its true literary sense and material force. On the contrary, he employs such terms as εἰδὴ in 435B2, Κλ,

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5, E2, 439E2, γένη 441C4, 443D5, in a metaphorical and convenient way, signifying forms or functions or principles of action, not as parts in the material sense. The word μέρος is used when the whole trinitarian discussion comes to an end, and only once in 442B11 and B3, which cannot be translated literally "part" as it does not suit the context, meaning rather "element", "factor", etc. After all, we must bear in mind that Plato never developed a precise terminology.

3. We would perhaps do well to remind ourselves of his warning that his accounts concerning the trinitarian soul are provisional and tentative and that scientific precision must not be expected.

4. It should be noted that Plato's main concern here is evidently the ethical and political theory, not the psychology itself, as a special branch of science, or the scientific analysis of the mind. He found the trinitarian division of the soul helpful and according to the


2. H.W.B. Joseph, Essays Ancient and Modern, p.48, remarks that "Plato is not pedantically rigid in his use of terms".

3. Timaeus 72D4-7; Phaedrus 246A3-6; Republic 435CD ff.
circumstances, the context and discussion matter he adapts the doctrine in each dialogue to suit his purpose.¹

Finally, it might be said that it is held by some scholars as a "popular, non-scientific" doctrine,² a "mythic"³ one, "of little importance",⁴ and consequently "too much reliance should not be placed"⁵ on it.


3. P. Frutiger, Mythes de Platon, p.96.


5. W.F.R. Hardie, A Study in Plato, p.138. It should be borne in mind here that E. Zeller, Plato and the Oldor Academy, p.417 and R. Hackforth, Plato's Phaedrus, p.75 are of the opinion that the tripartite doctrine is unsolved in Plato's mind.
10. SOUL-BODY: THEIR RELATIONSHIP

Corresponding to Plato's metaphysical dualism,¹ is his psychological dualism.

Thus Plato in the *Phaedo* maintains that the soul in every way resembles the invisible (άληθεία), the immaterial and everlasting world, while the body has much more affinity with the visible (δρατήρ) and belongs to the material world.²

With regard to the soul, we have said above at length what was necessary and we need not repeat what has been noted there.

Dealing here most particularly with the question of the soul-body relationship, we may add, in passing, a note about the body itself, as it is described in Platonic dialogues.

In the first place, it is said that the body is made up of four elements or kinds:—Earth, Fire, Water and Air.³ This body, because it belongs to the world of senses and materiality, is very like it, viz., human, liable to death and dissolution, manifold, unintelligent, changing and

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2. Ibid. 79B16-17.
never constant.\(^1\)

As far as the relation of the soul to the body is concerned, we have to note the following:—

Whereas the soul gives to the body the power to breath, and is the cause of its living and its reviving force,\(^2\) the body, on the other hand, is represented (\(\tau\rho\iota\sigma\iota\nu\iota\) in the Dialogues as its prison-house or tomb (according to the Orphic Poets). In it, the soul is buried in the present life; it undergoes punishments for any misdeed, and in it it remains until the penalty is paid.\(^3\)

In addition, Plato writes that the body is the source of evil and exerts an evil influence upon the soul. To be more precise, and use his own words; the body and its appetites cause disturbance and confusion to the soul; they prevent its acquisition of truth and wisdom and its pursuit of true being.\(^4\)

Furthermore, the body and its appetites not only act as perpetual impediments to the higher activities of the soul, which they fill with passions, desires, fears,

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1. Phaedo 80B3-5; Phaedo 106E5-6; Cratyl 399E1-2; Axiochus 365E5.
2. Cratyl 399D11-12, El-3; Phaedo 105C9-10, D1-5.
3. Cratyl 400B10; comp. also with Gorg. 493A3; Phaedo 82E, 91E8, 92; Phaedrus C5-6; Axiochus 365E5-366A.
4. Phaedo 66A4-7, 66C1-2, 66D5-7, 79C.
imaginations of all sorts and foolishness, but they are also the real cause of war, discord and strife.¹

While Plato expressly attributes desires, passions, fears, wars and the like to the body and its appetites,² in the Philebus, where he develops the doctrine of the bodily pleasures and pains³ most fully, he quite openly denies this and characteristically remarks that "it is to the soul that all impulse and desire, and indeed the determining principle of the whole creature, belong".⁴

One wonders whether we are faced with another real or apparent contradiction.

The whole question has been taken up and worked out by a number of scholars, whose arguments and deductions are generally conclusive and quite convincing.

Two points emerge from Hackforth's discussion of the

1. Phaedo 66C2-8; Republic 611C1-2, 611D; Timaeus 86B-87B and also 82AB. For a full discussion of Timeaus, see 86B-87B section, which is not without its intracacies; see A.E. Taylor, A Commentary on Plato's Timeaus, pp.589 ff and more specifically pp.610-18; F.M. Cornford, Plato's Cosmology, pp.343-9.

2. See p.98.

3. The above doctrine is expounded also in Republic IX (583B-587C); Timaeus 64A-65B; Gorg. 493B-494E; Phaedo 60B3-C7, 66C; A.E. Taylor, A Commentary on Plato's Timeaus, pp.445-65, deals with this doctrine at some length; F.M. Cornford, Plato's Cosmology, pp.266-9, makes some very brief remarks as well.

Philebus 3 B:—

1. Plato here wished to correct misconceptions which might have arisen with regard to the role which both soul and body play in pleasure and desire.

2. Although the Philebus speaks of pleasure, pain and even desire as psychical events, 35D1-3 and 55B1-3, other passages of the same dialogue, 45A, 46B and cf 41C and especially Republic 584C (similarly Aristotle speaks of bodily pleasures E.N. 1104b5, 1154a8, cf 1173b7-13) where Plato's real belief is expressed, seem to imply quite the opposite, namely that desire, pleasure, pain, are all in the body, are bodily experiences and reach the soul through the body.¹

Shorey sees no contradiction at all in so far as the nature and seat of desire, pleasure and pain are concerned and reminds us of Plato's statement that only a careless or captious reader would misunderstand him.

Further defending his case by citing:

Philebus 33, 34, 43B, C cf; Republic 462C, 584C, cf Laws 673A; Timaeus 451 and again Philebus 39D, 45B; Phaedo 65A; Timaeus 64A; Republic 584C, 485D; Philebus 45A, 41C, 436C, 33D; Timaeus 64ABC; Theat 186C, Shorey reaches the

¹ R. Hackforth, Plato's Examination of Pleasure (The Philebus), Cambridge (1945) p.61.
conclusion that the bodily states produce pleasure and pain only when they cross the threshold of consciousness.\(^1\)

Similarly Archer-Hind finds no disagreement at all between Phaedo 66D and Philebus 35CD and holds that the apparent discrepancy between the Phaedo and the Philebus is reconcilable. In the Phaedo, desires, etc., are attributed to the body as the result of the conjunction between soul and body; in the Philebus Plato ascribes more carefully and precisely the desires etc. to the soul, because they are an affection of the soul through the body.\(^2\)

As we are coming near to the end of this chapter, one unhurried inference could be drawn that Plato thinks of the body in general as the tomb, prison-house, enemy of the soul, and finally as its source of evil, disorder and

\(^1\) P. Shorey, The Unity of Plato's Thought, pp. 45-6 or 171-2 n. 328, 330, 333.

I have not mentioned any other notion of the soul-body relationship for I believe there is no other in the Platonic dialogues than that with which I have already dealt above. However this may be, R. C. Lodge, Plato's Theory of Ethics, London (1928) pp. 175-216, produces a different and startling theory of the nature and inter-relation of soul and body which he characterises as "thoroughly Platonic" (!!!) The central points of his theory are:

(1) the nature of the body as an instrument, as adapted to spiritual purposes,

(2) the function of the soul as director of the body to the spiritual ends, and

(3) soul and body being regarded as correlates. In his effort to interpret the Platonic passages in such a way in order to suit his purpose, I think, he misinterprets them and goes too far in his conclusions.
As we are coming to the end of this section dealing with the immortality of the soul, two things stand out for consideration:

1. The doctrine of the immortality of the soul, as it is represented and set forth principally in the *Phaedo*, *Republic* and *Phaedrus*, and very briefly and quite incidentally, in some of his other dialogues.

2. Whether Plato, with what he says about the immortality of the soul, proves his case, viz. that the soul survives death and continues to be intelligent and to exist in some consciousness after the death of the individual.

(a) Immortality in the *Phaedo*.

Plato, as is well known, discusses particularly the soul's immortality - a theme of universal and perpetual interest in the *Phaedo*.

His whole theory may be summarised into the following:

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1. *Phaedo* 70B2-4: "ὡς ἦστε τε ἡ ψυχή ἀποθανόντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ τίνα δύναμιν ἔχειν καὶ φρόνησιν".
three arguments.

The first of the three arguments (69C-78B) consists of two parts, (a) 69C-72E and (b) 72C-78B.

The first part, the so-called "cyclical" doctrine, or the doctrine of the cycle of opposites, rests upon the rebirth the physical law of (γενεσις εξ ταντών) runs as follows:-

Socrates, wishing to prove that the belief in the existence of the soul after death and its retention of intelligence beyond the grave is sound, adopts and reminds Cebes, of the old Orphic doctrine, according to which souls which have come to this world exist in the other, and conversely souls come and are born into this world from the world of the dead. If that is true, if the living are born from the dead, this clearly implies that the souls must exist in the world beyond.¹

Further, Socrates, noticing that his companion Cebes is not satisfied at all with his earlier argument and wanting to establish his point, turns Cebes's attention to the whole animal and vegetable world.²

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1. Phaedo 70C5-10, D1-5.
2. Ibid 70D8-9.
Here, he makes two points:

1. that contraries are produced from contraries, as from bigger to smaller, from stronger to weaker and from slower to faster.\(^1\)

2. as there are pairs of opposites, there must also be pairs of two becomings or processes of generation from the one to the other and back again.\(^2\)

Socrates, turning now the discussion to his first argument of rebirth or "cycle" and applying to it the previous analogy of the opposites and their becomings, in conclusion demonstrates what in the beginning he had put as a problem, that is, the souls of the dead must exist in some place from which they will be reborn.\(^3\)

The second part (72E-77A) of the first argument depends upon the doctrine of \(\Delta\nu\alpha\mu\nu\eta\sigma\alpha\varsigma\) and on the existence of forms which are the objects of reminiscence.

According to Cebes, Socrates' theory that learning is in itself recollection, is another indication that the soul is something immortal.\(^4\)

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3. Ibid 72A4-10.
Socrates, discussing the doctrine of recollection once more, finds that the content of sense-perception resembles the ideas, although with a certain degree of defectiveness.

This, of course, implies that our knowledge of the form of equality must have been acquired before our birth (the same could be said for the ideas of the good, the beautiful, the just and the Holy). If these objects (the beautiful and good and all reality of that sort) do exist if we relate all the data of our senses and compare them to this reality, it must follow that our souls do exist before we are born and possess intelligence as those principles do.

Further, Socrates places emphasis on the utmost significance of the existence of the supreme and absolute entities, the ideas for the existence of the soul as well. The existence of forms and that of souls before their incarnation are interrelated and in one word stand or fall together. Now in view of the first argument (opposite

1. Phaedo 75B-76C1-9.
2. Ibid 76D7-9-E1-4 and 76C11-13.
3. Ibid 76E4-9 - 77A1-5.
from opposite, the living from the dead and conversely) the soul must exist also after death.

2. **Second argument from the affinities (78B-84B).**

   A.E. Taylor, opening the second argument, writes the following: "This argument goes much more to the root of the question, since it is based not on any current general philosophical formula, but on consideration of the intrinsic character of a soul".¹

   This is true, because Plato, in order to refute Cebe's assertion, that the soul may be dispersed at death² and established the fact that soul survives death, is immortal, divine and, as he put it in his own conclusion: "absolutely indissoluble (indestructible) or nearly so",³ attempts to prove his argument this time not from outside, but from within, namely, from the soul itself, from the nature and essence of the soul, from a detailed study of its nature as a whole and more particularly from its affinities to the invisible world, to the unseen order, to the Forms.

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¹ A.E. Taylor, *Plato*, p.139.
² *Phaedo* 78B5-6.
³ Ibid 80B9-10.
Since Plato refers us to the soul's affinities to universals, to laws and spiritual principles, to his famous theory of Ideas, let us see how he develops this soul's relation to the Forms.

1. While composite things are liable to be split up into their component parts, the incomposite are not. Again composite things are mutable and incomposite constant and unchanging, but Socrates says such things, which never admit any sort of alteration or undergo any change whatsoever, are the Forms, which at the same time, are invisible and intelligible, in contrast to particular things of the world, which are ever changing and never constant.

This leads Socrates' remarks to the point that there are two classes of things visible and invisible. This distinction again helps Cebes to agree with Socrates, that the soul is akin to and belongs to the invisible and the body to the visible.¹

2. Again when the soul seeks truth all by itself, it passes to that other world of pure, immortal and imperishable Forms; it always remains there, and comes in close and constant contact with these unchanging realities. Cebes admits that this is another reason which forces us to believe that the soul resembles and is more akin to the

¹ Phaedo 78C,D,E - 79A,B.
everlasting and unchanging being.\(^1\)

3. Furthermore, it is in the soul's nature to rule and be master of the body and the body's always to serve and obey. Since it is also the function of the divine to rule and to lead and of the mortal to be ruled over and serve, it implies then that the soul is like the divine and the body like the mortal.\(^2\)

The result of the whole discussion amounts to Socrates' affirmation that the soul is very like the Forms, viz. divine, immortal, intelligible, indestructible and uniform\(^3\) and also it is completely indissoluble or nearly so.\(^4\)

Between the second argument and the third and final one, Plato discusses on the one hand, Simmias's and Cebes' objections that the soul is a "harmony" or an "attunement" of the bodily constituents which may exist before birth, but finally disappear and perish when we die, and on the other hand, Socrates' refutation.

I do not think we have to make any comment on them, as they have nothing to add to our immediate concern.

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1. *Phaedo* 79D, E.
2. Ibid 80A.
3. Ibid 80B1-4; see also 84B2-3.
4. Ibid 80B9-10.
This implies that we must deal with the third and last argument.

3. The crowning and final argument (102A-107A) relatively long, and with its difficulties as stands, is based also on the existence of the Forms and could be expressed very briefly as follows:

Socrates proves the general principal by means of analogies of tallness - shortness, hot - cold, snow - fire, even - odd, that opposites exclude each other, cannot coalesce with one another or arise out of one another. In other words, neither a transcendent idea not a form-cony, an immanent character, can take upon itself the nature of its opposite.¹

Socrates, now applying the already established principle, argues that life is a necessary concomitant of the presence of a soul, the vehicle of life, for soul is, by definition, that which gives life to the body. Hence the soul will not admit death and consequently since it excludes its opposite, death, we may call it "immortal" deathless ( ἄθανατον )².

Plato, discussing a further point, that of

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2. Ibid 105B5-E.
imperishability or indestructibility\textsuperscript{1} in the remainder of

1. **Phaedo 106A-E.** This additional examination of the indestructibility of the proposition soul has variously been connected, interpreted by different scholars: Williamson, *Phaedo* (1904) commenting on 105E7, writes: "It is a very curious turn of logic by which Plato, having arrived at the conclusion that \( \phi \chi \eta \alpha \delta \alpha \nu \alpha \tau \) and wishing to prove that it is also \( \alpha \nu \omega \lambda \varepsilon \theta \rho \) assumes, for the purpose of his proof the very point he is proving, viz. that \( \tau \delta \alpha \delta \alpha \nu \tau \) \( \kappa \alpha \) \( \alpha \nu \omega \lambda \varepsilon \theta \rho \) \( \varepsilon \sigma \tau \varepsilon \) ..... The step from \( \alpha \delta \alpha \nu \alpha \tau \) to \( \alpha \nu \omega \lambda \varepsilon \theta \rho \) is unwarranted. It may have probability on its side, but logically it is worthless"; qtd. by R.S. Bluck, *Plato's Phaedo*, p.188. J. Burnet, *Plato's Phaedo*, Oxford (1959) n. on 105E10 holds that the \( \alpha \delta \alpha \nu \alpha \tau \) is, ipso facto, \( \alpha \nu \omega \lambda \varepsilon \theta \rho \) also L. Robin, *Phaedo* (Bude'ed 1949) n. on 106D, remarks, "non-mortal .... est par definition indestructable"; A.E. Taylor, *Plato*, p.206, argues as follows: "He is not actually called on to argue this fresh point, since his auditors at once assert their conviction that if what is 'undying' is not imperishable, nothing can be supposed to be so, whereas there are, in fact, imperishables, such as God and 'the form of life'. Thus in the end, the imperishability of the soul is accepted as a consequence of that standing conviction of all Greek religion that \( \tau \delta \alpha \delta \alpha \nu \tau = \tau \delta \varepsilon \varepsilon \tau \) ...." Next Prof. J.B. Skemp, *The theory of Motion in Plato's later Dialogues*, p.8, calls it a "blatant petitio principii". R. Hackforth, *Plato's Phaedo*, p.164, sees "at 106D on the surface, no more than a rhetorical flourish which dismisses the question at issue as if it should never have been raised; but it may be that beneath the surface there is an appeal religious faith if the soul is deathless it is divine and therefore \( \alpha \nu \delta \iota \nu \) everlasting". Finally, R.S. Bluck, ibid, discussing the whole question of imperishability in a (very) brief appendix, pp.188-194, quoting the previous scholars and some others and complaining against some of them as treating the point under consideration in a "cavalier fashion" (p.194) makes the point that the implication of the present argument and the kernel of the last part of this final proof of the soul's indestructibility, is that destruction is a contradiction of soul (p.193). Further, ".... The whole proof that the soul's \( \alpha \nu \omega \lambda \varepsilon \theta \rho \) like the particular of the admissibility or non-admissibility of opposites and hence .... upon his theory Forms ...." (p.194). Furthermore, he is of the opinion that "Plato regarded this final proof as both sound and conclusive (p.194 n.2) and also (p.189 n.1).
the present argument, infers categorically and firmly that
the soul is deathless, immortal and imperishable and that
our souls will exist in the other world.¹

With the reference to the Phaedo's preceding
arguments for immortality, it may perhaps be said that they
are not scientific proofs in the true sense of the word and
are very puzzling and hard to follow, though intelligent
in philosophical study and research.² However, it is, I
believe with Rodier, incontestable, that if one admits the
theory of Ideas, they are conclusive, and that if it is
true that the old theology had inspired Plato to belief in
immortality, "it is not the least matter that he has made
his own in establishing thus validly these most fundamental
doctrines. From his point of view the immortality of
reason is validly demonstrated".³

1. Phaedo 106E9, 107A1, "Ψυχή άθανατον καὶ άνώλεθρον καὶ
τΩ ξόντι έσοντα κημών αι Ψυχαί εν "Λύσου",
comp. also 106E1-8. It must be noted here that
Simmias 107B remains still in doubt about their
assertions concerning the soul's immortality. To his
doubts, Socrates recommends a fuller and more thorough
going examination of the matter. Socrates' suggestion
here does not imply that Plato himself doubted the
validity of his previous arguments.


3. G. Rodier, "Les preuves de l'immortalité d'après 'le
Phédon', Etudes de philosophie Grecque", Paris (1957)
p.154.
(b) Immortality in the Republic.

In the Republic, Plato produces a new, straight-forward and persuasive proof, which must be rather regarded as a supplementary one to the already existing proof in the Phaedo of the immortality of the soul.

According to this new argument nothing can be destroyed and perish except by its own specific and peculiar evil or disease, by its (σύμφοτον κακόν καὶ νόημα) for example, ophthalmia for the eyes, disease for the body in general, mildew for grain, etc.¹

Now the special evils or vices of the soul are injustice, intemperance, cowardice, ignorance. But these do not destroy the soul at all; far from it, as experience shows that the truth is surely just the opposite; they fill the wicked and unjust man with life, vigour and vitality. But if the particular evil or wickedness of the soul is incapable of diminishing and destroying it,² then we may safely arrive at the natural conclusion that the soul must exist for ever and since it exists for ever the logical sequence demands that it must be immortal as well.³

1. Republic 609A.
2. Ibid. 609B9-610E10.
3. Ibid. 611A1-2: "δὴ λοιπὸν ὅτι ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ ἀεὶ ὑπὲρ ἐναντίων ἔλεγ' ἀεὶ ὑπὲρ ἀΘάνατον".
(c) Immortality in the Phaedrus.

In the Phaedrus, the argument for immortality is stated and represented in a general and dogmatical, so to speak, way and relies on the conception of the soul as self-mover and originator of all movement and consequently of all life.

The self-mover, Plato argues, never leaves its motion, never abandons its own nature. It is the source and origin (beginning) of motion for all other things that are not self-moving. In addition, it is ungenerated, that is, without source or beginning, and indestructible and immortal.

But these same attributes may easily and precisely apply to the essence and the very idea of the soul.¹

Now if this analogy is correct, namely that which moves itself is nothing else but soul, then an unhurried inference is deduced that soul is ungenerated and immortal.

A parallel conception of the soul, as we have already said, as the self-moving source of all motion, we find also in the tenth Book of the Laws and more specifically in Laws 894, 895 and 896. However, we must remark with hacksforth that here the "indestructibility of the soul is

2. Ibid 246A1-2: "ξε ἀνάγυς ἀγένητον τε καὶ ἄθανατον ψυχή ἄν εἶνη".
not explicitly asserted but the conclusions of the Phaedrus argument are clearly implied.\textsuperscript{1}

Apart from the above mentioned dialogues, one hardly finds any clear view about the soul's immortality in the other dialogues of Plato. It could be said that the \textit{Meno} and the \textit{Timaeus}, and the \textit{Symposium} contribute something. But if we like to look at them a little closer we shall notice that these dialogues do not contribute very much to the problem we are investigating.

The \textit{Meno}, for instance, examines the re-existence and immortality of the soul only with reference to the doctrine of recollection and a prior knowledge\textsuperscript{2} but such an argument, which is completed later in the \textit{Phaedo}, hardly withstands any criticism and "survives logical scrutiny".\textsuperscript{3}

As to the \textit{Timaeus}, it should be observed that no serious student of Plato could expect to trace any concrete and solid material concerning the immortality of the soul, other than that which has already been noted, viz, the mythical distinction of the immortal part of the soul.

\begin{enumerate}
\item R. Hackforth, \textit{Plato's Phaedo}, p.23.
\item \textit{Meno} 80D ff, 81C ff and the inference 86Bl-2: "Οὐκοῦν εἶ ἀεὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια ἡμῖν τῶν ἄνωτων ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἀθάνατος ἄν ἡ ψυχή εἶναι..."
\item R. Hackforth, \textit{Plato's Phaedo}, p.19.
\end{enumerate}
fashioned by the Demiurge (41D) and (69C2) mortal parts created by the celestial gods (42D), and the location of the three parts in certain organs of the body, i.e. the immortal situated in the head, the spirited in the heart and the appetitive part in the belly (69D-70E).

The Symposium next, seems to recognize only the immortality of procreation and the subjective immortality of fame. It does not recognize personal immortality, only a "vicarious survival, not an immortality of the

1. Symposium 207D, 208A7–8, B1-3; 212A6-7.
117.

personal self".¹

Before we reply to the second question dealing with the soul's survival after death, we must make some general remarks on two points:—

1. Whether the immortality of the soul refers to the entirety of the soul or only to its rational part.

2. What is the precise meaning of Ὑψη πᾶσα ἀθάνατος. (Phaedrus 245CB).

¹. R. Hackforth, Plato's Phaedo, p. 20. It must be further noted that Hackforth, "Immortality in Plato's Symposium" in Classical Review, LXIV (1950) pp. 43-45, and again in his Plato's Phaedo, pp. 20-21, maintains that the Symposium shows us a relapse into temporary scepticism; it drops the claim that soul, collective or individual, is imperishable; comp. also G. M. A. Grube, Plato's Thought, p. 149, note on Symposium 205C, 208C; J.V. Luce, in his reply to Hackforth "Immortality in Plato's Symposium" in Classical Review, N.S. II (1952) pp. 137-41 (pp. 135-7 here) disagrees with Hackforth's view and holds that there is no cleavage between Phaedo and Symposium on the immortality of the soul. He further remarks that their apparent inconsistencies are reconcilable when one remembers that the Phaedo lays more emphasis on the immortality of Ἁγνη πνεύμα and the Symposium on the immortality of the ἀνθρώπινη φύσις; He is followed in his view by R.S. Bluck, Plato's Phaedo, p. 28 n.1; Prof. H. Cherniss, in a note in Classical Review, N.S. III (1953) p. 131, points to Laws 712BC, "as by itself proving the invalidity" of Hackforth's conclusion and as alluding to a personal survival. Two other interpreters of Plato, A. E. Taylor, Plato, p. 228 n.1, on the one hand, insists that there is not a single word in Symposium which speaks of the perishability of the soul; Ι. Συκοφαντής, Πλάτωνος Συμπόσιον, κελεύων, κίσμοι, Athens (1950) pp. 210-11 n. 1, distinguishes between divine and human immortality and sees no disagreement or discrepancy between Symposium and Phaedo.
For the first point we say this. Consistent with what we have earlier said about the soul, as being simple, uniform and incomposite, but in connection with the body assuming certain phases (ἐπισυμμητικῶν ὑμοειδεῖς) which are temporary and only exist as long as they are connected with the body, we shall do well to note that the immortality applies to the entirety, wholeness of the soul, as a rational and spiritual entity, as a vital principle and acting force.

1. R.K. Gaye, The Platonic Conception of Immortality, pp. 37, 41, dealing with this point refers to Mr. Archer-Hind's "On some difficulties in the Platonic Psychology," Journal of Philology, X (1882) pp. 120-131 cf 129-31; Phaedo (1894) London, pp. XXXII-XXXVII; and concludes that is is as a single nature that soul is immortal; W.C.K. Guthrie, "Plato's views on the nature of the Soul", Recherches sur la traditione Platonicienne, in Entretiens sur l'antiquité classique, Tome III, p. 19 and J. Adam, The Republic of Plato, II, p. 427 n. on 611B12 are of the opinion that soul in its true nature is the highest part, the λογιστικόν and this λογιστικόν alone is perfect, divine and immortal. K.F. Hermann takes up this point in his instructive dissertation: "Praemissa est disputatio de partibus animae immortalibus secundum Platonem", in Index Scholarum, publice et Privatium in Academia Georgia Augusta per semestre hibernum, anni MDCCCL-MDCCCLI Adie XV, Octobris usque ad XV Martii, habenturum, Gottingae, pp. 8-9; and claims that Plato intended to represent only the rational part as immortal and the other two parts as mortal. He is charged by G. Grote, Plato and the other Companions of Socrates, London (1867) II, p. 161 n.a., that he failed to realize that Plato, when he used the various passages, sometimes held one language, sometimes the other, and that there is a big discrepancy between Phaedo and the other Platonic dialogues.
The exact meaning of ψυχή πᾶσα which troubled and embarrassed both ancient and modern scholars is particularly discussed by Frutiger and Hackforth at some length. The former, while he examines the usage of πᾶς with and without the article, finally rejects it as involving us in difficulties and leading us nowhere; he adopts the distributive meaning and characteristically wants to see ψυχή πᾶσα translated not into πᾶσα ἡ ψυχή but into "every soul", parallel to its correlative πᾶν σῶμα. "In conclusion, is it not very probable that ψυχή πᾶσα ought to be translated, not in the same fashion as πᾶσα ἡ ψυχή from which it differs grammatically, but conformably to πᾶν σῶμα, its correlative, that is to say for each soul, no matter which soul?"\(^1\)

The latter, on the one hand, argues that there is no distinction here between collective and distributive senses before Plato's mind\(^2\) and, on the other hand, he prefers the rendering of ψυχή πᾶσα ἀθάνατος into "all soul is immortal, because the collective sense is that primarily

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2. R. Hackforth, *Plato's Phaedrus*, p.64.
demanded by the logic of the argument".¹

Further, whereas Hackforth admits that the Phaedrus argument, 245C-246A, cannot be regarded as a direct argument and proof for the immortality of individual souls, he is convinced, "that Plato regarded any demonstration of the immortality of 'soul' in general as applicable to individual souls".²

The whole question of the individual's immortality is well stated in the words of Gaye: "So far as personal immortality is concerned, it supplies at most a negative argument; that is to say, it creates a certain presumption in favour of personal immortality in so far as it tends to invalidate the popular view of the finality of death. There is certainly a sense in which the soul survives the death of the individual Ἐμψυχων, but whether this soul continues to exist as a conscious personality is, of course, a different question, and there is nothing in the proof of immortality which we have been considering that

1. R. Hackforth, Plato's Phaedrus, p.64 n.3; J.B. Skemp, p.3 n.l. is in favour of the collective translation and writes: "πᾶν σῶμα at 245E4 .... seems the counterpart of ὑψή πᾶσα here and both seem to have a meaning approximating to πᾶσα ἡ ψυχή and πᾶν τὸ ἄψυχον at 246B".

can be said to furnish a direct argument in favour of it .... From whatever source he may have derived his justification for believing in personal immortality, there can be no doubt that he did believe in it, and moreover that he considered the proof that all soul is immortal" to give some support to the belief".¹

Furthermore, it should be observed that the myths of *Phaedo*, 107C ff, *Republic* 614 ff, *Gorgias* 524 ff, assume individual immortality.

¹. R.K. Gaye, *The Platonic Conception of Immortality*, p.39. A.E. Taylor's view on personal immortality, *Plato*, p.203n4, is quite convincing and worth quoting: "If the question is asked whether the faith defended in the *Phaedo* is a belief in 'personal' immortality, I can only reply that though the language of philosophers was not to acquire a word for 'personality', for many centuries the faith of Socrates is a belief in the immortality of his ψυχή and by his ψυχή the seat or suppositum of all we call 'personal character and nothing else', 'tendence of the soul' is precisely what we call the development of moral personality". G.M.A. Grube, *Plato's Thought*, p.148 and B. Bosanquet, *A Companion to Plato's Republic*, pp.406-7, argue that the soul's immortality involves complete loss of personality together with a merger of the rational element with a world or cosmic mind or soul. One wonders whether such views do not lead towards a pantheistic interpretation??!!? A reply refuting their mistaken assertion is that of R.D. Archer-Hind, *The Phaedo of Plato*, p.XXXII: "Plato knew very well that neither he nor anyone else could demonstrate the immortality of individual souls, yet he was strongly disposed to believe .... that every soul on its separation from the body will not be reabsorbed in the universal, but will survive as a conscious personality even as it existed before its present incarnation".
Arriving at the end of this chapter, we must draw a conclusion by replying to the second question, the survival of the soul after death; but what kind of inference may be deduced from the above pages? The answer lies in Hackforth's words: "I believe that both Republic X and Phaedo, he (Plato) thinks he has proved it; in Phaedo particularly the repeated use of ἀποδημυνον, λόγον διδάναι and the like ...... taken together with Socrates' emphatic conclusion at 106E παντός μᾶλλον ψυχή ἄθάνατον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον καὶ τῷ δόντι ἔσονται ἡμῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ ἐν ᾿Αιδοίον seems conclusive, despite Socrates' encouragement of "honest doubt" at 107B. The final argument of Phaedo no less than Phaedrus appears, however, to regard personal immortality as a corollary of the immortality of "soul".¹

For Plato the immortality of the soul in general and of the individual particularly, was not a vain hope and an "ethical postulate".² On the contrary, it was a firm belief, a strong and unshaken conviction, a certainty and reality, a serious problem, which urges us to accept it,³

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1. R. Hackforth, Plato's Phaedrus, p.65 n.1.
2. P. Shorey, The Unity of Plato's Thought, p.40 (or 166).
3. C. Ritte, The Essence of Plato's Philosophy, pp.119, 301. See also a very interesting and illuminating article of the Rt.Hon. Sir P. Duncan, "Immortality of the soul in Platonic Dialogues and Aristotle" in Philosophy Vol.XVII (1942) London, pp.304-323, where he tries to justify and endorse Ritter's conclusion as "irresistable".
but not a dogma,¹ a fundamental and very important issue.²

Thus Plato passionately and firmly believed not broadly in the unseen, in the spiritual, in the ideal, but in the immortality of the soul and more particularly in personal immortality, self existence after death and survival with full consciousness and continued self-identity.

1. E. Zeller, Plato and the Older Academy, p. 397, 408 on the other hand argues that the doctrine of the immortality is the point, the strictly dogmatic signification of which can least be doubted. "Not only in the Phaedo but in the Phaedrus and Republic too, it is the subject of a complete philosophic demonstration ..... but also in the strictest scientific enquiries".

2. Important and fundamental, yes, but not to the extent which M.F. Sciacca, "Il problema dell'immortalità dell'anima et metempsicosin Platone", Studi Sulla filosofia antica, Napoli (1935) p. 221, would have it when he writes that the whole of Plato's philosophy addresses itself to the problem of the immortality of the soul and of the destiny of man. "Dopo cio è evidente, che attorno al problema dell'immortalità dell'anima cal destino dell'omo si articola tutta la filosofia di Platone, il cui fondamento come resta confermato eticoreligioso".
PART III

ST. PAUL'S THEORY OF THE HUMAN SOUL AND ITS IMMORTALITY.

Preliminary Remarks.

It is customary and fashionable for everyone who deals with St. Paul's theology, and more particularly in our case with his psychology or anthropology, to preface it with something about its difficulties.

Since a great deal has been written by others which we do not wish to repeat here, we turn right away to our immediate task, which is to investigate the real meaning and nature of the human soul and its immortality in St. Paul's mind, as we did with Plato. But we must say from the beginning that our task in discussing it is not an easy one. On the contrary, it is extremely difficult to trace the soul's true meaning, for two simple reasons:

1. the word psyche is not of very frequent occurrence
2. He uses other parallel synonyms and interrelated terms of equal and great importance (or even of greater significance, i.e. \( \nu \varepsilon \upsilon \mu \alpha \) ) such as \( \nu \varepsilon \upsilon \mu \alpha , \sigma \omega \mu \alpha , \sigma \alpha \rho \varepsilon \) etc.

However, if we wish to get the best possible picture of the Pauline human soul, it is of the utmost necessity to consider the above terms as well. Thus our inquiry may come under the following headings:

Psychological terms or anthropological concepts.

12. \( \Psi \upsilon \chi \eta \) or Soul; a note on Imago Dei Gen. 1.26,27 and Gen. 2.7.

13. \( \Pi \nu \varepsilon \upsilon \mu \alpha \) or Spirit; a note on \( \Psi \upsilon \chi \iota \kappa \omicron \varsigma - \Pi \nu \varepsilon \mu \mu \alpha \tau \iota \kappa \omicron \varsigma \).

14. \( \Sigma \omega \mu \alpha \) or Body.

15. Trichotomy? Some general remarks on 1 Thess. 5.23.


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12. ΨΥΧΗ OR SOUL.

The very infrequency of the occurrence of this term in St. Paul (13 times, against the disproportionate use of πνεῦμα) makes it difficult to reach a firm conclusion as to which of its various uses gives the best clue as to the word's real meaning and, indeed, to distinguish clearly from each other the uses themselves.

In view of this fact, we are invited to build up St. Paul's theory of the soul exclusively on the 13 passages.

For a better understanding, clarification, and clearer view, we may classify these passages according to their own various meanings and connotations into three groups, as follows:

(a) Soul as life, vitality, life principle.
(b) Soul as the seat of the feeling, will, emotion and thought.
(c) Soul as individual.
(a) Soul as life, vitality, life principle.

The meaning of the word psyche, which denotes life, life-principle, vitality or principle of the physical life, "without psychological content" occurs in Pauline letters 6 times.

In Romans he twice uses the word psyche instead of life. In 11.3, where he freely and no doubt from memory quotes the LXX I Kings 10.10, 14, 18 and he recalls Elijah's words that they are seeking "my life" and in 16.4, he speaks about Prisca and Aquila his fellow-workers, who risked their own necks to save his "life".

Further passages are, e.g. "For he (Epaphroditus) nearly died for the work of Christ, risking his life to


complete your service to me"; 1 "so .... were ready to
share with you not only the gospel of God but also our
own selves", 2 must be understood and interpreted exactly
in the same way as in their own preceding context.

There remain two other cases, the words "The first
Adam became a living soul" 3 are taken from Gen. 2.7 and
are an exact translation of the Hebrew יָּetration (הָּם לֵּאשָּּׁם). 4

In 2 Corinthians 1.23 St. Paul in a very emphatic and
solemn statement appeals to God to witness on his psyche
why he did not visit Corinth not because of caprice or
cowardice or selfishness but out of consideration and
compassion towards them. The exact translation of the
word psyche is slightly problematic here, as there are

1. Philip. 2.30 RSV; comp. also with Matth. 2.20; 6.25;
10.39; 16.25; 20.28; Mark 8.35-36; Luke 12.20-23;
John 10.11; 15.17; 12.25; 13.37; Acts 5.26; 20.10-24;
27.10; 22; I Pet. 4.19; I John 3.16; Apoc. 12.11.

2. 1 Thess. 2.8; RSV; "Vulg." etiam animas nostras"; AV
"our own souls"; NEB "our very selves"; JB "our
whole lives".

3. 1 Corinthians 15.45 "ἐγένετο δ' πρώτος Ἄδαμ ἐκς ψυχῆν ζῶσαν"
RSV "a living being"; Vulg. "animam viventem"; AV
"a living soul"; NEB "an animate being"; JB "a living
soul".

4. It must be noted here that we do not fully discuss the
meaning of living soul (ψυχή ζῶσα) for we are
going to consider it later in a special additional note
at the end of this chapter.
129.

different renderings of the original. Moreover, Stacey, while he does not rule out other possible translations, is in favour of "life" as the most likely here.

From the above, it becomes clear that when St. Paul speaks of the word psyche, in the preceding examples he simply uses it to express, as it has been already said, life, life-principle, vitality, principle of the physical life.

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1. AV "upon my soul"; RSV "against me"; NEB "I stake my life upon it"; Moffatt and RS "against my Soul"; also Vulg. "In animam meam". Aug. "super animam meam" quoted in A. Plummer, 2 Corinthians (ICC) p.43.

(b) **Soul as the Seat of Feeling, Will, Emotion and Thought.**

To the use of the "soul" as the seat of the will, feeling, St. Paul refers us only in three cases. He exhorts the slaves to do the will of God, not in the way of eye-service as men pleasers, but heartily, with singleness of heart, "not grudgingly or formally, but ex animo, with readiness of heart",¹ as servants of Christ.²

In Col. 3.23, the same exhortations are repeated and the meaning of ἐν ψυχής is similar to that of Eph. 6.6. The presence of the ἐν ἐνὶ πνεύματι in the same sentence (Phil. 1.27) makes the μιᾷ ψυχῇ susceptible of more than one meaning. AV and RSV have it "in one spirit, with one mind" and NEB, "one in spirit, one in mind". Chrysostom compares it with Acts 4.4, "ἡν ἡ καρδία καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ μία " and with Theodore of

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2. Eph. 6.6; Vulg. "ex animo"; AV and RSV "from the heart"; NEB "whole-heartedly"; cp. Matt. 22.37; Mark 12.30; Luke 12.27.
Mopseustia joins μα φυχη with στηκετε  

H.W. Robinson considers that it means "desire" and R. Smith treats it as "life". Bultmann and Stacey elaborate and add a few lines more on this point than the previous one. Here is what they say one after the other: "The phrase 'with one psyche' (like in one spirit) means in agreement i.e. having the same attitude or the same orientation of will; and there is no difference between psyche here and other expressions that mean tendency of one's will, one's intention (cf. I Cor. 1.19 'united in the same mind - nous - and the same judgment'). Words compounded with the root psyche, indicate the same thing. Sympsychos means 'being in agreement' (of one mind) Phil. 2.2 RSV; the isopsychos (Phil. 2.20) is the like minded, Eusychein 'be of good cheer, hopeful, confident' (Phil. 2.19), offer

1. also in H.A.A. Kennedy, The Epistle to the Philippians (EGT) London (1903), p.403 n. on 5.27; W.R. Vincent, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistles to the Philippians and to Philemon (ICC) Edinburgh (1897) pp.33-4 n. on 5.27 connecting on μα φυχη and regarding it as "the mind as the seat of sensation and desire, on the contrary suggests that "Here μα φυχη is not to be construed with στηκετε but only with συνασθοπνες".


a somewhat different nuance. It does not mean the willing of something, it is true, but it does also express the intention element of that vitality which is denoted by psyche." 1 Stacey on the other hand remarks: "The key is that it is meant to emphasize ἐν ἐν ἀνεύματι. Paul wanted a word that would repeat the sense of ἀνεύμα and he used ψυχή because in one sense ἀνεύμα and ψυχή are synonyms. In doing so, he draws ψυχή into a meaning which it does not usually bear, but which ἀνεύμα often bears". 2

In three other instances the word psyche stands for everyone, for the living person, for the self and the like. 3

2. W.D. Stacey, The Pauline Doctrine of Man, pp.122-3; F.W. Beare The Epistle to the Philippians in BNTO, London (1959) p.67, seems to oppose here any distinction between "soul" and "spirit" and to emphasize the demand for the "entire inward unity".
St. Paul affirms that there is no favouritism with God. Everyone, every single man, every human being, every individual, either Jew or Greek, who commits sin and is doing wrong or is against God, will be punished. Here it is apparent that the word psyche implies the whole man, the total man, the whole person, the self (like ὄν). 2

The expression πᾶσα ψυχή is a Hebraism, 4 which emphasizes the individuality in general, and means simply every person, everyone, every individual, 5 or as we might say, a living person or simply a soul. 6

1. Romans 2.9; "Ἐν πᾶσαν ψυχήν" Vulg. "in omnem animam hominis"; AV "every soul of man", RSV, NEB "every human being"; 13.1; see also Acts 2.41, 43; 3.23; 7.14; Rev. 18.13; etc.


3. Romans 13.1; comp. also with references of p.16 n.1 and Epict. 1.28.4; Lev. 7.27: πᾶσα ψυχή, ἡ ἡμῶν φύσις ἀνήμα; Rev. 16.31 καὶ πᾶσα ψυχή ζωῆς ἀπέθανε; see also for references only in F.J. Leenhardt, Romans, p.325 n.*.

4. W. Sanday and A. Headlam, Romans in (ICC) p.366 n. on 5.1; also in J. Denney, Romans, in (BGT) p.695 n. on 1; V. Taylor, To the Romans, p.84; K. Barrett Romans in BNTC p.245.

5. AV "every soul"; RSV, NEB "Every person"; F.F. Bruce, Romans (TNTC) p.236.

Another example having exactly the same meaning as its two previous counterparts is the passage in which St. Paul emphatically says to the Corinthians, I will most gladly and willingly spend all I have (money, property, time, etc.) and even be spent out myself for you, for your souls' sake.

Stacey detects here the possibility of ascribing to psyche the force of spiritual state, but goes on to say that such an interpretation, though possible, is not exclusive, referring self consciousness rather to pneuma.

There remain to be considered 1 Thess. 5.23 and the adjectives ψυχικὸς-πνευματικός, but here we say nothing about them as we are going to discuss them later in special chapters.

Arriving at the end of this chapter, the first thing we have to note is that for St. Paul the word psyche is

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2. W.D. Stacey, The Pauline View of Man, p.123; J.H. Bernard, 2 Corinthians in EGT p.113 n. on 5.15, says something similar to it: "Ψυχή is here used (as at Heb. 13.11.17, 1 Pet. 2.11) of the spiritual part of man, the interests of which are eternal".
neither a significant term or idea (dass \( \psi \nu \chi \eta \) bei Pls. Kein bezeichnender Begriff ist)\(^1\) nor a word determining his thought,\(^2\) far from it.

The least we could say for its meaning is to summarize what has been already set out.

What emerges from the foregoing pages is this:

It is evident that St. Paul thinks of the \( \psi \nu \chi \eta \) along the lines of the Old Testament's teaching. In other words the Pauline concept of psyche is equivalent to the \( \chi \nu \gamma \sigma \eta \) and mainly denotes life, the breathing, the vital principle, the principle of physical life, of the human life, "man as a living being".\(^3\) Further, by metonomy, psyche, on the one hand, designates the individual, the human being, and in other cases, on the other hand, stands for a conscious being, thinking, feeling and acting.

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Bultmann's words well state the case, but do not readily admit of summary and are quoted as they stand: "Hence it is incorrect to understand psyche in Paul as meaning only "the principle of animal life" and as standing in close relation to "flesh" understood as the matter enlivened by that psyche. Rather psyche is that specifically human state of being alive which inheres in man as a striving, willing, purposing, self." ¹

¹ R. Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, I, p.205; see also H. Wehl-Kochlein, L'homme selon L'Apôtre Paul, p.21, who appears to follow and adopt Bultmann's views throughout his treatment; W.D. Stacey, The Pauline View of Man, n.125 n.1, who quotes the first and gives only the reference of O. Pfleiderer, Primitive Christianity, Vol. I, N.Y. (1906) pp.271-2; Pfleiderer seems to express a somewhat similar view to that of Bultmann's with what he remarks below: "We must not conclude however ...... that Paul thought of the latter (viz. soul) as a purely animal principle with the exclusion of spiritual functions, rather he uses "Soul" as well as spirit for subject of personal states of consciousness, especially feelings, in which the whole undivided man is concerned". See also C. Spicq, Dieu et l'homme Selon le Nouveau Testament, pp.155-6.
A note on Gen. 1.26, 27 and Gen. 2.7.

Gerhard Von Rad observes that there is absolutely no unity in the ideas of the Old Testament about the nature of Man. In view of this statement we regard it as unnecessary to deal with the Hebrew psychology (Old Testament, the Apocrypha and the Rabbinic teaching) as a whole. It is sufficient for us to investigate the true and exact meaning, as far as possible, of Gen. 1.26, 27 and Gen. 2.7 which are mentioned by St. Paul and are relevant to our thesis and of great importance, not at length, as this would take us far beyond the limits of our present inquiry, but briefly.

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(a) **Imago Dei; Gen. 1.26, 27.**

Among the various passages in which we meet the word *image,* **ἐκμον,** two passages, at least, stand out for the description of every man, man's humanity in a marginal sense and directly refer to Gen. 1.26, 27.

The two Pauline passages which refer to Gen. 1.26, 27 run as follows:

(i) "For a man ought not to cover his head, since he is the image and glory of God," and

(ii) "and have put on the new nature, which is being renewed in knowledge after the image of its creator" (RSV).

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1. Passages referring to image in general are the following: **Rom. 1.23; 8.29; 1 Corinthians 11.7 and 15.49; 2 Corinthians 3.18; 14.4; Col. 1.15 and 3.10.**


3. **1 Corinthians 11.7;** see also S.V. McCasland "The Image of God according to Paul", *The Journal of Biblical Literature,* LXIX (1950) n.85, 87; C.R. Smith, *The Bible Doctrine of Man,* p.182; and also in the following commentaries: J. Denney, **1 Corinth.** in EGT (19083) Vol.II, p.873 n. on 5.7; H.L. Goudge, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, WC, London (1913) p.96 n. on 5.7; L. Morris, **1 Corinthians,** TNTC, London, (1958) p.153 n. on 5.7.

Now, to trace the true meaning of the word Image, we have to go back and consider the Gen. 1.26, 27.¹

St. Gregory of Nyssa underlines the difficulty of understanding and interpreting this.²

To most of the Greek Fathers the terms image and likeness do not have the same meaning, but are distinguishable. The interpretation of one of the greatest and most eminent systematic theologians of the Greek Orthodox Church, St. John of Damascus, who epitomised and systemized in a scientific way, the doctrinal teaching of his predecessors, may be regarded as representative of all the Greek Fathers.

His exposition may be rounded off into defining imago in terms of rationality and freedom and likeness as

1. Comp. also with Gen. 5.1-3 and 9.5-6.

2. St. Gregory of Nyssa: Ad Imaginem Dei et ad MPG 44,1328.1 Similitudinem "Εστι γάρ, ἔστιν ὡς ἐμοὶ γε δοκεῖ, ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατασκευὴ φοβερὰ τις καὶ δυσερμήνευτος, καὶ πολλά καὶ ἀπόκρυφα μυστήρια θεοῦ ἐξεικονίζουσα;"

also ibid. 1340B.
140.

appertaining to assimilation to God through virtue.¹

1. John of Damascus, De fide orthodoxa, 2, 12; MPG 94, 920, "τὸ μὲν γὰρ κατ’ εἰκόνα τὸ νοερὸν δηλοὶ καὶ αὐτεξοόσιον τὸ δὲ καθ’ ὁμοίωσιν, τὴν τῆς ἀρετῆς κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ὁμοίωσιν"; see also in the following:

1. ραταρία as signifying the rational faculties and freewill:
   (a) rational part: Origen, Commentary in Joan, Tom. 2, 75; MPG 14, 153B; Clement of Alexandria, Strom. Lib. 5, cap. 14; MPG 9, 140A; Athanasius, Orat. de incarnacione verbi, 3, 40; MPG 25, 101B; St. Gregory of Nyssa, in verba, Fac. hom. ad imag. et simil., orat. I; MPG 44, 273A BCD; St. John Chrysostom (sever.) De mundi creatione oratio, 2, 4, MPG 56, 443; Cyril of Alexandria, in John Evangelium, Lib. 9 (821) MPG 74, 276D, 277A.
   (b) freewill: Justin the Martyr, Apologia I pro Christ 43, MPG 6, 393B; St. Basil de Hominis structura oratio I, 20, MPG 30, 32BC; Macarius of Egypt, Homiliae, Hom. 15, 22-23, MPG 34, 592A; St. Gregory of Nyssa, De Hominis onificio, 16, MPG 44, 184A-D; St. John Chrysostom, in Cap. IV, Genes. homil. 19, i, MPG 53, 158D; Cyril of Alexandria, in Joannis Evang. Lib. 9, 14 (822), MPG 74, 277D.

2. ὁμοίωσις as denoting similarity through virtue: Origen, De Principis, Lib. 3, Cap. 6 (152), MPG 11, 333 BCD; Clement of Alexandria, Strom. Lib. 2 Cap. 22, MPG 6, 1080C; Methodius Symp. (Conviv. dec Virg.) orat. 1, 4, MPG 18, 44CD; St. Basil, de hominis Struct. orat. I, 21-22, MPG 30, 32D-33A-C; Gregory of Nyssa, in verba, fac. hom. orat. I, MPG 44, 273A-D; St. John Chrysostom, Genes. Homil. 9-3, MPG 53, 78.
For the Latin Fathers we quote first of all Irenaeus, who first attempted to define in a systematic way the meaning of *imago*. He writes: "Homo vero rationabilis et secundum hoc similis Deo",\(^1\) secondly, Augustine, who relates the image to mental and intellectual part of man: "Ubi imago Dei? In mente, in intellectu!"\(^2\) and lastly St. Thomas Aquinas, who deals with the question under consideration at some length\(^3\) and finds that the image of God is impressed on his mind; as a coin is an image of the King, as having the image of the King.\(^4\) Further, he makes a subtle distinction between image and likeness as that of John of Damascus.\(^5\)

Luther appears to regard the *imago* as comprehending the moral faculties and thus as being lost by the Fall, and

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5. *Summa Theologica*, CXCIII, generally art. 9 and especially his answer and reply to obj. 1-4, pp. 302-304.
Calvin aligns *Imago Dei* with the totality of human nature. As this nature is totally depraved in consequence of the Fall, so it is the *imago* defaced—though not effaced. It is the fruit of Redemption that the *imago* is restored in like totality.  

The position of modern exegesis and scholarship is that there is no distinction whatsoever between image and likeness, but simply a straightforward case of Hebrew parallelism, in which a second phrase repeats the meaning of the phrase that has gone before. Or as Th. C. Vriezen puts it: "Besides 'The image of God' we also find 'the likeness of God'. This latter phrase is a further definition of the former, it does not add a new element. Those dogmatics which have founded certain speculation upon this view are therefore on the wrong track; the expression 'after our likeness' is no more than a further explanation

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of the words 'in our image (1.26, v.3)'."  

The position of G. von Rad may be taken as characteristic of that of modern scholarship. Starting from the foregoing premise, he takes into consideration the primitive concept of a demiurge literally fashioning an "image" of himself from clay, as the first step towards creating a man. Von Rad points out that Hebraic anthropology, in its very refusal to make a firm dichotomy between body and soul, must have taken account of the primitive concept, applying its own theological genius to interpret imago in terms neither merely physical nor solely spiritual. Again, it is a totality to which imago refers.  

Here, it is highly relevant to quote Driver, who suggests that "both words refer here evidently to spiritual resemblance alone" and Skinner, who holds that "it may be truer to say that it denotes primarily the bodily form but includes those spiritual attributes of which the former is

the natural and self-evident symbol".  

It falls outside the scope of the present note to discuss also the theological development and treatment of the subject. It would be sufficient to observe that this wholesome task has been undertaken by E. Brunner in his great book, *Man in Revolt* and K. Barth, in his *Church Dogmatics*, Vol. III, 1, III, 2.

1. J. Skinner, *Genesis (ICC)* London (1930) see also some other various views more or less along the same lines. W. Eichrodt, *Theologie des Alten Testaments*, Berlin (1950) II, p.62; "Image in the Conscious Personality", E. Jacob, *Theology of Old Testament*, London (1958) p.172; L. Koehler, *Old Testament Theology*, London (1957) p.147; Dr. Paul Heinisch, *Theology of the Old Testament*, Minnesota, U.S.A. (1955) p.170 (A Roman Catholic view): "The basis of man's sovereignty over animals lies in his creation 'in the image of God, conformable to his 'likeness'. This can refer only to man's spiritual endowments, it consists in intelligence, which distinguishes man from the remaining visible creation. Man excels not in bodily strength, in fact he is inferior in this to many animals, but in mental capabilities". And two quite opposite views, C.R. Smith, *The Bible Doctrine of Man*, pp.29-30, 95-7, 182-5, maintain throughout all these pages that Gen. 1.26, 27, refer to "man's outward form," and that this form must be understood as "physical" and not "material"!!! The same line of thought P. van Imschoot, *Theologie De L'ancien Testament*, Tome II, L'homme, Paris (1956) pp.8-9 follows: "Several exegetes maintain that for the author of Genesis 1.26, 27; 5.1; 9.6; man is the physical, corporeal image of Elohim (God). This resurposes that the author conceives God under a human form".

2. See also E. Brunner's article, "The New Barth" in *Scottish Journal of Theology* (1951) 2, pp.123-35. A very brief account and analysis of Brunner's and Barth's views is given by D. Cairns, *The Image of God in Man*, pp.146-205.
(b) Gen. 2.7.

As far as the second note on "εἰς ζωὴν ζῶον" St. Paul quotes Gen. 2.7. (περὶ ζωῆς) which primarily we could say with R. Bultmann, denotes a living being, an animate person and in contrast with "πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν." life giving spirit, that is, to the divinely given capacity for eternal life, psyche, is now the merely natural earthly vitality. But the case is not as simple as it appears and cannot be dismissed with a single sentence. It needs further treatment and the best we can do is to go back to Gen. 2.7 and recapitulate its true meaning as briefly as possible, confining ourselves to some of the modern scholars.

1. I Cor. 15.45.

2. R. Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, I, p.204; comp. also with John 5.21: "...οὕτως καὶ ὁ θεός οὐς ἐξελεῖ ζωοποιεῖ"; see also W.D. Stacey, The Pauline View of Man, p.122, "In I Cor. 15.45 ζωοποιεῖ is an exact translation of the Hebrew of Gen. 2.7 and clearly conveys the natural 'aliveness' of man; apart from what might be called spiritual life, ζωοποιεῖ add to and interpret each other"; John 6.63; 20.22; Acts 11.33; 2 Cor. 3,6.17. One may find more or less or similar or slightly different views also in the following commentaries: G.G. Findlay, I Corinthians, in EGT, p.397-8; F. Codet, I Corinthians, Vol. 2, pp.417-23; H.L. Goudge, I Corinthians, in WC, p.57 n.1; L. Morris, I Corinthians, in TNTC pp.228-9.
Verse 7. "Then the Lord God formed man of dust from the ground and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living being,"¹ which describes anthropomorphically and mythologically the origin and creation of man and which is a locus classicus of Old Testament anthropology,² must be conceived and interpreted according to many modern scholars not in the analytical old Greek fashion or way, but more in the modern one, that is, the synthetical. In other words, the infusion of breath, which exists also in the animal world³ by God into the nostrils of man does not stand for an independent element and distinct spiritual, divine and immortal entity or a kind of man's higher part and principle, as with the Plato, it simply denotes life, animal life, the vital power which gives life to the body and cannot exist outside and without it or as A.R. Johnson expresses better, "The term is obviously being used to indicate not something conceived as but one (albeit the superior) part of man's being, but the complete personality as a unified

1. Vulg. "animam viventem"; JB "a living being"; AV, RV, "a living soul"; A.R. Johnson, The One and the many in the Israelite conception of God, Cardiff (1961) p.2; The Vitality of the Individual in the Thought of Ancient Israel, Cardiff (1964) p.19 n.1, regards AV, RV's rendering as misleading, prefers that of RSV and translates it as "a living person".

2. T. Skinner, Genesis in ICC p.56; also in G. von Rad, Genesis, p.75.

3. Gen. 2.19; 6.17; 7.15, 22.
manifestation of vital power, it represents what Pedersen has called "the grasping of a totality".\(^1\)

It must be noted that L. Koehler seems to differ from the undermentioned scholars by holding the general statement that "It does not say man has a living soul. Soul is the nature of man, not his possession .... man is a soul".\(^2\)

Dr. Laurin, relying on L. Koehler, takes up again the point and tries to establish more or less the fact that man is a soul, on the grounds that nephesh very often signifies the man and represents the complete individual and on the exegesis of the creation story (cf. Gen. 2.7, Job 27.3, 33.4).\(^3\)


His statement that "man is a soul", which is a curious and ambiguous one, and some other of his conclusions, have been challenged by W.D. Stacey and dismissed with the words that "Nephesh is thus just one of a dozen words that represent both a constituent element in man and an aspect of his whole person".

Nephesh, therefore, when it is not referring to the whole person, means nothing more than the animal vitality that first came upon man in Gen. 2:7 and that distinguishes the living from the dead.

Nephesh, therefore, does not have special function of representing the body-spirit unity "except in the sense that all the terms for the constituent elements in man represent it. Consequently, it is misleading to say that man is a soul".

Coming to an end of the present paragraph, we should note two things:


1. That in Israelite thought man is conceived, not so much in dual fashion as body and soul, but synthetically as a unit of vital power or (in current terminology) a psycho-physical organism, and

2. So to sum up with an emphasis upon the "extensions" of the personality we may say of the Israelite conception of man that it was so diffuse that Heraclitus might well have been speaking in Hebrew rather than Greek terms when he said, "Though thou shouldst traverse every path, then could it not discover the boundaries of 'soul', it hath so deep a meaning".  

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1. A.R. Johnson, The Vitality of the Individual in the Thought of Ancient Israel, p.87; Idem. The One and the Many, pp.1-2; H.W. Robinson, "Hebrew Psychology" in The People and the Book, p.366, also defines Hebrew man as follows: "What is man? and try to answer it, not in the old theological, but in the new psychological fashion, we shall say that for the Hebrew, man is a unity, and that unity is the body as a complex of parts drawing their life and activity from a breath-soul, which has no existence apart from the body".

13. Spirit or Πνεῦμα: The Concept of Spirit.

To trace the true and precise meaning as far as possible of the "keyword" pneuma, which after all is "the most important word in Paul's psychological vocabulary, perhaps in his vocabulary as a whole" is not an easy thing. It is, on the contrary, an extremely difficult and complex one because of the large number of cases when there is doubt as to whether it refers to God or to man.

The difficulty is aggravated by the simple orthographic fact that the Greek texts of the Pauline writings do not employ the distinction used in present day English of signifying "Spirit" with a capital letter when the Holy Spirit is meant, and leaving "spirit" of man with a minuscule. In whichever sense the word is used, however, the thing signified is "the link between God and Man" from one side or the other. Further, it is to man alone, of all living creatures in the world, that pneuma is attributed.

While we acknowledge the difficulties and complexities, and however hard is the task, we must note right from the beginning that we do not intend here to discuss all the

aspects of Paul's use of "Spirit", but the psychological

1. The word spirit occurs in Pauline epistles 146 times (H.W. Robinson) in The Christian Doctrine of Man, p.109; Idem. Hebrew Psychology in relation to Pauline Anthropology, p.281; (Jacquier) as he is quoted by Le. P.E. - B. Allo, Saint Paul, première entrée aux Corinthians, Paris (1956) p.91, "Le mot πνεῦμα apparaît fois (Jacquier) dans les écrits de Paul" and it is distinguished in various senses; H.W. Robinson, ibid, pp.109-10; and ibid. pp.281-2, classifies them as follows: "(1) In the natural sense of "wind" it is not used by Paul, who employs anemos in this sense (Eph.4.14), (2) Most of the cases (116) fall into the second class, namely, "super-natural influences" .... we read of the pneuma of God or Christ (Rom. 8.23) in Hebrew psychology etc. p.281, (3) the use of ruach to denote the principle of life or breath (in man) is hardly represented amongst the usages of pneuma (The Christian Doctrine of Man, p.110 n.1), 2 Thess. 11.8 (of Isa. 11.4) belongs to the second group). This connotation, like that of "mind" has been displaced by the higher associations of the term. (4) There remain 30 cases of the psychical use of pneuma in the narrower sense, of which 14 refer to the higher nature of a Christian man and are hardly to be distinguished from the result of the divine pneuma, whilst 16 denote a normal element in human nature". W.D. Davies, an eminent N.T. scholar himself, also lists different meanings of the word spirit in his article: "Paul and the Dead Sea Scrolls: Flesh and Spirit" in The Scrolls and the New Testament, ed. by K. Stendahl, London (1958) p.178, as follows: ".... of the spirit of man (22 instances), of the spirit as opposed to the flesh (6), of the Spirit of God (Holy Spirit, 72), of the spirit as opposed to the Law and the letter (4); of the spirit denoting a quality or disposition (13); of the Spirit of Christ (8); of the spirit of evil or the world (2); W.D. Stacey, The Pauline View of Man, pp. 128-9, similarly separates and defines six senses of pneuma in the Pauline corpus (ibid. p.128). For the various meanings of the spirit in general see the following works: W.P. Dickson, St. Paul's use of the terms Flesh and Spirit, Glasgow (1883) pp.130-97; E.F. Scott, The Spirit in the New Testament, London (1925) pp.127-86; E.D.W. Burton, Spirit, Soul and Flesh, pp. 178-82; Le P.E-B. Allo, Saint Paul, Première entrée aux Corinthians, pp.91-4, 101-15, "Les sens divers de πνεῦμα " and most particularly the excellent treatment of the term pneuma by E. Schweizer, "Πνεῦμα".
one and more particularly we could put it this way: we 
are going to deal with two things: (1) to discover as 
thoroughly as possible the true and precise meaning of 
those Pauline passages which directly refer to man and 
then (2) to assess the relationship between the spirit of 
man and Spirit of God or as Prof. Barclay would put it, 
"But the real problem is to know whether the pneuma, the 
spirit, is part of man as such, or whether it is only 
part of a man after he has become a Christian, whether 
the pneuma is part of human nature or whether it is the 
gift of God to redeemed human nature". 2

Since we accepted that the two points are sufficient 
to give us a clearer view of the second psychological 
term pneuma, we may take this as one point of departure 
for considering that term as applied to man. The 
different meanings of these passages may be classified as

1. (Contd. from page 151). in Kitte's TWNT Vol. VI (1959) 
   pp.413-36, ET, under the title "Spirit of God", in the 
   series Bible Keywords, London (1960) pp.54-88.

2. W. Barclay, Flesh and Spirit, p.14; See also W. Bawer, 
   Worterbuch zum Neuen Testament, ET by W.F. Aindt and 
   F.M. Grindrich, pp.680-85.
follows:

1. spirit denoting the whole man, the self, the ego, the I.
2. spirit as synonymous with soul.
3. spirit as the seat of emotion and will, (pneuma in the psychological sense of an ensemble of faculties, dispositions, tendencies, good or bad, or indeed the subjective principle of these attributes).
4. pneuma in the strictly moral sense, spirit as opposed to the flesh, which signifies weakness and human vices.
5. pneuma as the seat of (human) consciousness and intelligence (or the human soul or its psychological faculty in general intelligence or psychological perception).
6. pneuma signifying the spirit of man sanctified, united with God, divinised.

Now let us have a closer look at these categories one

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1. We are well aware of the questions and doubts arising about this classification, and we admit with P. E.-B. Allo, op. cit. p.94, "Nous essayons une classification, quoique, dans tel ou tel passage, l'assignation du mot à telle ou telle des catégories que nous indiquerons reste douteuse, ou qu'il puisse rentrer dans plusieurs à la fois".
by one and the corresponding Pauline passages:

1. When St. Paul, at the closing of his first letter to the Corinthians, 1 Cor. 16.18, expresses pleasure, his joy and gladness at the arrival of Stephanas, Fortunatus and Achaicus, representing their own church, and adds characteristically that "they refreshed my spirit as well as your's", it can simply mean "me and you", the person's very self or ego. The same thing may be said for the following passages. 2 Cor. 2.13, "But my mind (Vulg. "spiritui meo", RSV and NEB, "spirit", AV, JB, "I in mind") could not rest because I did not find my brother Titus there", and also 2 Cor. 7.13, "and besides our own comfort we rejoiced still more at the joy of Titus, because his mind (Vulg. "Spiritus ejus", RSV and NEB "spirit" AV) has been set at rest by you all". Further, in the concluding greetings or in the concluding benedictions like this: "μετά τοῦ πνεύματος ὑμῶν " are used instead


2. Comp. with 2 Cor. 7.5: οὐδὲμιλαν ἔσθημεν ἄνεσιν ἡ σάρξ ἡμῶν; "our bodies (RSV, NEB: flesh AV) had no rest"; see also R. Bultmann, ibid. p.206; also A. Plummer, 2 Corinthians in ICC p.65 and 217.

3. Gal. 6.18; Phil. 4.23; 2 Tim. 4.22; Philem. 25.
of the usual "μεθ ἐννοών or μετὰ πάντων ἐννοών (because of the rhetorical pathos); what is meant is exactly the person as a whole, the man, the self, just the "I" and "you".

2. St. Paul used the pneuma and psyche together at least in two cases, Phil. 1.27, "I may hear you that you stand

1. I Cor. 16.24; 2 Cor. 13.13; Eph. 6.24; Colos. 4.18; I Thess. 5.28; 2 Thess. 3.18; I Tim. 6.21; Tit. 3.15.


firm in one spirit, with one mind (ἐν ἑνὶ πνεύματι, μείζων ψυχῇ) and in 1 Thess. 5.23, synonymously and as equivalent to each other." Further, E. Schweizer points out that the pneuma-psyche in the above mentioned passages and also the Hebrew 4.12 "piercing to division of soul and spirit" (ἀρχὴ μερισμοῦ ψυχῆς καὶ πνεύματος) must not be regarded as independent and distinct parts for the man; but in his own words: "In 4.12 'spirit' and 'soul' are distinguished in purely psychological terms, as two closely interdependent parts; in other words the distinction is a cliche". According to E. Schweizer then, we have not here a distinction of the parts of human personality but simply a stereotyped literary phrase, a cliche, but more of this later.

1. St. Luke 1.46, 47; Jn. 11.33; Comp. 12.27; I Cor. 2.11; see also E. Schweizer, "πνεῦμα" in Kittel's TWNT, p.433, E.T. "Spirit of God", in Bible Keywords, p.84; C.R. Smith, The Bible Doctrine of Man, p.141; R. Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, p.205; M.R. Vincent, To the Philippians and to Philemon in ICC, p.33; F.F. Bruce, The Epistle to the Romans, p.47; Cramer, Lexicon, op.cit. p.584; Le P-B Allo, op. cit. p.92.

2. E. Schweizer, "Πνεῦμα" in TWNT, p.444, E.T. "Spirit of God", p.100; to the same effect C. Sricq, L'érisme aux Hebrewx (1953) ad loc; worth mentioning are also the following, M.R. Vincent, op. cit. pp. 33-4, "there are cases where the meanings of ψυχή and πνεῦμα approached very nearly, if indeed they are not practically synonymous ..".
3. St. Paul, using 1 Cor. 2.11, an argument "a minori ad majus", a human comparison and analogy, writes that "there are certain things which only a man's own spirit knows, there are feelings which are so personal, things which are so private, experiences which are so intimate that no-one knows them except a man's own spirit. No-one can really see into our hearts and know what is there except our own spirits. Now, Paul goes on to argue, the same is true of God. There are deep and intimate things in God which only God's spirit knows ...".

We are not far away from the truth if we observe that the pneuma is used here, as elsewhere, in the purely psychological sense, and denotes the seat of human

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1. A. Robertson and A. Plummer, 1 Cor. in ICC, p.44; also G.G. Findlay, 1 Cor. in EDT, p.782 n. on 2.11.

2. 1 Cor. 2.11, "τις γάρ οἶδεν ἀνθρώπων τά τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἰμή το πνεῦμα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τό ἐν αὐτῷ";


4. 1 Cor. 5.5; 7.34; 2 Cor. 7.1; 1 Thess. 5.23; comp. also Matt. 5.3; Mark 2.8; Luke 1.80.
consciousness, intelligence, \textsuperscript{1} psychological reception, and the intellectual faculties, or as Bultmann would put it "pneuma approaches the modern idea of consciousness".\textsuperscript{2}

4. In the following passages pneuma stands for (a) the source and seat of feeling, expressing a spiritual state of mind, a disposition or temperament, or as Allo has it: "\textit{Πνεῦμα or sens psychologique d'une ensemble de facultés, de dispositions, de tendancies bonnes ou mauvaises, ou bien de principe subjectif de ces attributs}"\textsuperscript{3}, Rom. 1.4, "and declared to be the Son of God with power, according to the spirit (Spirit RSV) of holiness" (AV); 8.15, "for you did not receive the spirit of slavery to fall back into fear, but you have received the spirit of sonship", RSV, AV, NEB "\textit{Πνεῦμα δούλειας ...... Πνεῦμα υλοθείας,} 12.11 "With unflagging energy, in ardour of spirit (Spirit RSV), serve the Lord" (NEB, AV,


\textsuperscript{3} Le P.E.B. Allo, \textit{St. Paul premiere entretie aux Corinthians}, p.92.
Vulg. ψπειτω ψεψυκται εν τω πνευματι ζευγτες

1 Cor. 4.21 "Shall I come to you with a rod or with love in a spirit of gentleness?" (RSV) 2 Cor. 4.13 "Since we have the same spirit of faith", Gal. 6.1 "... in a spirit of gentleness" (RSV) Ephes. 1.17 "that the God ... may give you a spirit of wisdom and of revelation in the knowledge of him" (RSV), 2 Tim. 1.7 "For God did not give us a spirit of timidity but a spirit of power and love and self-control" (RSV); or (b) Pneuma may be placed in

contrast (a) with the flesh in Rom. 8.4-6; ".... who walk not according to the flesh but according to the Spirit (RSV, AV, NEB, Vulg. "spiritum", JB "as the spirit dictates"), Rom. 8.9, 13: ".... ὑμεῖς δὲ οὐκ ἔστε ἐν σαρκὶ ἀλλὰ ἐν πνεύματι ......... κατὰ σάρκα ......... εἰς ἐν πνεύματι."

(Vulg. "spiritu", AV, RSV, NEB "Spirit"), l Cor. 5.5 "... for the destruction of the flesh, that his spirit" (RSV), 2 Cor. 7.1 "... let us cleanse ourselves from every defilement of body and spirit (ἀπὸ παντὸς μολυσμοῦ σαρκὸς καὶ πνεύματος)".

(RSV). (b) with the body, Rom. 8.10 "... although your bodies are dead because of sin, your spirits are alive because of righteousness", l Cor. 5.3 "For though absent in body I am present in Spirit (τῷ σώματι ......... δὲ τῷ πνεύματι ), 7.34 "how to be holy in body and spirit", Col. 2.5 "For though I am absent in
body, yet I am with you in spirit".  

The second and final point of this chapter is the relationship between the Spirit of God and the spirit of man.

This relationship or difference becomes most clear in Paul's most famous and richest passage about the Holy Spirit, and the spirit of man in Rom. 8.1-17 and in Cor. 2.11 where the spirit of man and the spirit of God are expressly distinguished from each other and set over against each other.

Here then, in Paul's mind the distinction and contrast between the two spirits is obvious and fundamental. It rules out any kind of absorption and signifies fellowship and communion between them. Finally, it would not be natural with men who identified man's pneuma with God's.


Further while it is true to say that St. Paul has inherited the O.T. double use of ruach (after the exile) for a supernatural influence and for a natural element in human nature, that he is thinking in terms of the Hebrew ruach and that his framework of belief about spirit is exactly the Old Testament framework, we must not overlook the very fact that since his conversion at Damascus where he met the risen Christ and found himself in a new situation, his personal and intimate knowledge and experience of our Lord enabled him to look at and interpret everything and this is particularly relevant for our case, here, "not through some soaring imagination, not in the midst of some demonic experience ...... through the Spirit, who is neither rational nor irrational, but who is the LOGOS, the beginning and the end ...... Jesus Christ in his particularity and existentiality from life to death

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4. Compare also with S.C. Smith, The Bible Doctrine of Man, p.142, "the differentia of the New Testament, however under the doctrine of the spirit of man, does not appear so long as the pneuma of man is considered alone, but only when it is related to the pneuma of God"; W.D. Stacey, ibid. p.133, "the true nature of the human spirit is discovered only in the sight of God's spirit"; see also E. Schweizer, "Spirit of God" in Bible Keywords, pp.86-7.
and from death to life." As we may notice throughout his letters or again as W.D. Stacey has it, "Paul's knowledge of the Spirit was first hand. Paul did not gather ideas, he met a person and in intimacy with that person, his knowledge of both Spirit and spirit grew. Knowledge can only be communicated in words, and in the Epistles we see Paul bursting to express what he had seen and known". Now if this is the case we may be allowed to conclude with two well known New Testament scholars that the spirit of man is that element within him which is, by its nature, accessible to the Spirit of God or "in Paul the human spirit may perhaps be described as the God-conscious element in man, which is dormant or dead until it is stirred into life by the Spirit of God, or it may be thought of as "the Christian personality" of "men who, if we may put it so, are not only alive, but 'Christianly'.

1. K. Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, p.298.
Furthermore, it would be a mistake if we did not add a comment about an admittedly thorny point and problem about which many scholars keep silent, that is, the inter-relationship of the spirit of believer and unbeliever or "whether the entry of God's Spirit creates a nullil is a new spirit in the Christian, which exists side by side with his natural spirit, or whether the Spirit recreates the natural spirit, so that the Christian possesses only one Spirit different in quality from that of unbelievers."

1. F.F. Bruce, Romans in TNID, p. 48; comp. also C. Spicq, Dieu et l'homme selon le N.T., p. 161 n. 2 and 5, "Biblical writer would define man as a reasonable (rational) animal. They all conceive him essentially as a religious being". St. Paul alone would have subscribed to Plato's affirmation "man is (a) soul (ψυχή)" but he would have added, "the Christian is a spirit (πνεῦμα)." In the order of words (pneuma in the first place) and the movement of the phrase in the prayer of 1 Thess. 5.23, Paul begs from God the full, accomplished and complete sanctification of Christians". E. Schweizer, "Spirit of God" in Bible Keywords, p. 87, "Consequently the Spirit remains entirely God's and is never merged in the spirit which is never given to the individual (cf. Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament Vo. I, pp. 206-7) yet at the same time it can be the deepest "I" of the man whose life no longer proceeds from his own being but from God's being on his behalf."

This is not the place to deal with it in detail. Stacey treats it at some length and reproduces some of the views of various scholars.

Some of the scholars hold the first view, although from our point of view Stacey's two-fold question is a more scholastic and technical one, that is, they insist on the distinction and regard "the Spirit as a special gift of God, not a property of the soul of man as such". ¹

Stevens, with whom we would like to associate ourselves, concludes that "the human πνεῦμα is not a donum superadditum which is conferred in regeneration. It is a factor of man's personality which is developed and assumes dominance in the Christian Life". ² Sanday and Headlam³ share his view in spite of the unjust criticism of Snaith in some ways. ⁴

However, Snaith's conclusion is that "the word

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pneuma used of the natural man is not the same thing at all as the pneuma of the spiritual man," and further, "All men have pneuma from birth but the Christian pneuma in fellowship with the Spirit of God takes on a new character and a new dignity (Rom. 8.10)."


A Note on Ψυχικός-Πνευματικός

The word *psychicos* is set in sharpest contrast to *pneumaticos* in the etymological sense and nearly so in the ordinary sense in 1 Cor. 2.14-15 and 15.44-46.¹

The *psychicos* (AV Natural; Vulg. Animalis homo; RSV and NEB unspiritual) is the "unrenewed",² the "unregenerate"³ and is contrasted with the *pneumaticos* on the ground that the former does not welcome the things of spirit; he refuses them, he rejects them. Such a man is not equipped to discern the activities of God's Spirit. To him they are no more than foolishness.⁴ Morris, however, goes on to point out that *psychicos* is what might be described as a biological rather than an ethical term, and that it is not to be taken as equivalent to sinful.⁵ This view is taken by Robertson, also, who sees no need to regard the word as stemming from a supposed "trichotomous" psychology, but rather as designating "the mere correlative of organic life". He goes on to say that *psychicos* is the

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2. A. Robertson, ibid. p.49.
5. L. Morris, ibid. p.60.
unrenewed man, the natural man, as distinct from the man who is actuated by the Spirit,¹ none the less, psychicos must be taken as synonymous with sarkinos or sarkitos.² This antithesis is still more clearly expressed in Jude. 19, ὕψικτος μὴ πνεῦμα ἔχοντες³ While the unspiritual man is more concerned with the things about this life and cannot and does not appreciate the things of the Holy Spirit, the pneumaticos on the contrary, who is gifted with the Spirit, "has an insight into the meaning of everything" (Phillips). This communion with God's

1. A. Robertson, A. Plummer, I Corinthians in ICCp. 49; Comp. also H. Clavier, "Breves remarques sur la notion de σῶμα πνευματικόν" in the Background of the New Testament and its eschatology, p. 345-46 remarks, ὕψικτος the ending ὄν as in σαρκικόν seems to indicate that this adjective does not designate a composition, a psychic formation, in ψυχή but a dependence or a direction.

2. A. Robertson, ibid. p. 49; E.D. Burton, Spirit, Soul and Flesh, p. 205; R.H. Charles, Eschatology, London (1913); the proposition that the "soulish man" and "fleshly man" are used as kindred and interchangeable terms over against the spiritual man, finds full support and approval in the following as well: O. Pfleiderer, Primitive Christianity, I, p. 271; G.B. Stevens, Theology of the New Testament, p. 341. However there is this difference between psychicos and sarkicos: "Yet the ὕψικτος, μὴ ἔχων πνεῦμα (Jude. 19) may be lower than the σαρκικός, where the latter as in 3.3 and Gal. 5.17, 25 is already touched by the life-giving πνεῦμα " G.G. Findlay, I Corinthians in EGT p. 783 n. on v. 12, 14.

Spirit and fellowship, which must not be thought of as a different natural endowment from that of the psychicos,\textsuperscript{1} "enables him to penetrate the divine mysteries"\textsuperscript{2} and "to acknowledge God's saving work"\textsuperscript{3} for him personally. The distinction between the two adjectives is still better illustrated in the words of Prof. Barclay; Paul distinguishes two kinds of men (a) there are those who are pneumatikoi. Pneuma is the word for the Spirit; and pneumatikos is the man who is sensitive and obedient to the Spirit; the man whose life is guided and directed by the Spirit; the man who makes all his decisions and exercises all his judgments under the influence of and the guidance of the Spirit; the man who lives in the consciousness that there are things beyond the things of this world; that there is a life beyond the life of this world .......... and (b) there is the man who is psychikos. Now psyche in Greek is often translated soul but that is not its real meaning; psyche is the principle of physical life. Everything which is alive has psyche; ...... but it has not got pneuma. Psyche is that physical

\begin{itemize}
\item L. Morris, 1 Corinthians in TNTC, p.61.
\item W. Bawer, WZNT, E.T. 685.
\item E. Schweizer, "Πνεῦμα" in TWNT, p.435, E.T. "Spirit of God" in the Bible Keywords, p.87.
\end{itemize}
life which a man shares with every living thing, but *pneuma*, spirit, is that which makes man a man. The *psychikos* is the man who lives as if there was nothing beyond physical life; as if there were no needs other than physical and material needs; whose values are all physical and material values; who judges everything from purely physical and material standards. A man like that cannot understand spiritual things ...... and a man who has never a thought beyond this world cannot understand the things of God. To him they look mere foolishness".  

Dr. E. White takes the same view, affirming that in the New Testament "soul stands for the animal life, the life of the mind and body". This life man acquires by natural inheritance, so that *psychicos* can be translated in this context as "natural", whereas the *pneuma* is a supernatural gift, derived directly from God. 

Dr. White describes the natural man as living on the temporal, material plane, with "no insight into spiritual things". These "belong to a different realm .... a new realm of truth", which is the level at which the spiritual

man experiences existence.¹

The distinction which we are examining becomes yet clearer in 1 Corinthians 15.44, where St. Paul, presenting to his fellow Christians of Corinth his arguments about resurrection, sets in contrast the σῶμα φυλακόν (natural AV; physical RSV; NEB animal), the present, the ordinary body with the σῶμα πνευματικόν, the spiritual, the post-resurrection body.² Further "the term is associated (v. 45) with the fact"³ that "just as the first Adam had introduced the order of animate life on the physical or earthly plane, so Christ, the second Adam, had introduced a new order of life in the Spirit".⁴

We have said enough, I think, to point out the distinction between these two opposing epithets. It is

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1. E. White, "The Psychology of St. Paul's Epistles" in Journal of the transaction of the Victoria Institute or philosophical Society of Gt. Britain, Vol.LXXXVII, (1955) p.8. Prof. F.F. Bruce in his written communication Dr. E. White's paper and in the same Vol. p.110, describes as psuchicos the man who is "self-centred, self-dominated" and "his spirit is unresponsive to the Divine Spirit" and pneumaticos the man who "is responsive and obedient to every prompting of the Holy Spirit" and "whose Spirit is en rapport with the Spirit of God".

2. We shall consider the point further and at some length in its proper place.


4. W.D. Davies, Paul and Rabbinic Judaism, p.49.
no part of our purpose to trace their whole Pauline background, beyond saying that Reitzenstein claimed that satisfactory parallels to St. Paul's usage could be found in the Hellenistic Mystery Religions (cults).¹ He has been successfully refuted at some considerable length by a number of scholars and more particularly by Kennedy² and G. Vos³ and W.D. Stacey too (although very briefly but skilfully).⁴ Kennedy and Davies argue that the relation of psuche to pneuma and psuchicos to pneumaticos are best explained in the Old Testament usage,⁵ in the light of Old Testament anthropology.⁶ Bultmann likewise rules out a Greek or Old Testament influence and sees only a Gnostic one.⁷ We, for the reasons given ad loc. and explained


by the critics themselves, prefer to endorse the two following conclusions: "To begin with, it may be noted that these all-important adjectives are really the apostle's own coinage. No light can be shed on them from the Old Testament ...... The terms can only be understood from the apostle's own use of them",¹ and another, "The general background of ψυχή and πνεῦμα is the Old Testament, and in an indirect way, the Old Testament lies behind the adjectives, but if Paul's view of πνεῦμα showed an advance on previous conceptions, his views on πνευματικός showed an even greater one ...... Moreover, Paul himself gave to the adjective subtle shades of meaning, all derived from his conception of πνεῦμα. Consequently, the word is Paul's word, and the force and effect of the contrast must be largely attributed to his own religious insight".²


While we do not overlook or minimise the significance and relevance of the flesh by omitting it,

1. Passing over that very important and "much discussed" (H.W. Robinson, Christian Doctrine of Man, p.111) term, one may be allowed to mention the double natural and moral meaning by referring to some definitions of others: J.A.T. Robinson, in his excellent and concise book, The Body, London SCM Press (1961) pp.19, 25, 31, defines flesh as denoting man in his character of creature, i.e. as belonging to the temporal, and therefore, by definition, decaying order, as contrasted to God, "in his distance from God"; see also W.D. Davies, "Paul and the Dead Sea Scroll: Flesh and Spirit", in The Scrolls and the New Testament, pp.162, 278 n.32; Prof. W. Barclay defines it as follows: "The flesh is exactly the bridgehead through which sin invades the human personality .... The flesh stands for human nature weakened, vitiated, tainted by sin. The flesh is man as he is apart from Jesus Christ and his Spirit" (Flesh and Spirit, pp.21-22; Ambassador for Christ, Edinburgh (1960) p.150). He returns to this in another outstanding book of his, The Mind of St. Paul, Fontana (1954) emphasising the idea of flesh as meaning human nature's helplessness in the face of sin, its proneness there to all, deriving from the very fact of its "Christlessness". C.H. Dodd writes "The flesh is the common stuff of human nature which we inherit. Paul does not think of it as necessarily evil but as powerless for moral ends. A. Scheatter, Der Theologie der Apostel (1922) p.272: "The Spirit is the mark of God and the agent of his activity. Flesh on the other hand, is the mark of man in all his dissimilarity from God". From the wide range of bibliography, studies, papers, articles, etc. on this topic we mention here only the following, some of considerable length, some short: A.W. Robinson, The Christian Doctrine of Man, pp.111-122; G.B. Stevens, The Theology of the New Testament, pp.338-48 (Flesh and Spirit); J.A.T. Robinson, The Body, pp.17-26; W.D. Stacey, The Pauline View of Man, pp.154-173; R. Bultmann, Theology, Vol.I, pp.232-38 (the term flesh) and also 239-46 (flesh and sin); K.G. Kuhn, "New Light on temptation, sin and flesh in St. Paul" (he
it is almost necessary to confine ourselves only to the examination of the word *soma* which is "the Keystone of Paul's theology. In its closely interconnected meanings of the word *soma*, knits together all his great themes ... Here with the exception of the doctrine of God are represented all the main tenets of the Christian faith - the doctrines of Man, Sin, the Incarnation and Atonement, the Church, the Sacraments, Sanctification, and Eschatology"\(^2\) even although we might not be prepared to go so far as Dr. Robinson. His words do indicate the importance of the terms we for our part, shall more specifically pay closer attention to those passages only, which will serve our purpose.


Leaving aside all the passages which denote either the external man "l'organisme physique", the physical body, i.e. Gal. 6.17 "I bear on my body the marks of Jesus" (RSV), 1 Cor. 9.27 "I pommel my body and subdue" (RSV), 1 Cor. 13.3 "... if I deliver my body to be burned" (RSV), hom. 1.24 "... to the dishonoring of their bodies among themselves" (RSV), Rom. 4.19 "He did not weaken in faith when he considered his own body" (RSV); or the whole man: 2 Cor. 10.10 "... but his bodily presence is weak" (RSV), 1 Cor. 5.3, "... absent in body I am present in spirit" (RSV), Col. 2.5² "... absent in body, yet I am with you in spirit" (RSV), or is used instead of "tantot la personne elle-même", a personal pronoun in the following cases: Eph. 5.28 "Even so husbands should love their wives as their own bodies"


(RSV), also in Rom. 6.12 f, 12.1, 1 Cor. 6.15, 1 Cor. 12. 27, Philip. 1.20; or may stand for man as being "in the world" in contrast to God: 2 Cor. 12.2 f "... whether in the body or out of the body I do not know, God knows" (trans. RSV) and in 2 Cor. 5.3, 6, 8.10.

We are coming to consider whether the body in its nature is evil, imperfect, weak and responsible for the sin of man or, to put it in another way, whether the soma is identical and synonymous with the sarx and whether it differs from it.

The identification and synonymity of the body with the flesh appears to be almost complete, when we are confronted with St. Paul's own words: in Romans he refers to it as sinful body (τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἀμαρτίας 6.6) mortal body (ἐν τῷ θνητῷ υμών σώματι) 6.12 (τὰ θνητὰ σώμαta) 8.11) or a body of death (ἐκ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ θανάτου 7.24) and of humiliation (Phil. 3.21 τὸ σῶμα τῆς ταπεινώσεως) 3. Besides


it must be noted that Dr. J.A.T. Robinson begins by stating the case for this identification between flesh and body and it is only fair to give his *insissima verba*:

"So there is a σῶμα τῆς ἀμαρτίας (Rom. 6.6), a body that belongs to sin, just as there is a σάρξ ἀμαρτίας as (Rom. 8.3) .... Like the σάρξ, the σῶμα is mortal (Rom. 6.12; 8.11); "The deeds of the body" in Rom. 8.13 are none other than the results of living κατὰ σάρκα. In Rom. 8.10, "the body" that "is dead because of sin" is but a periphrasis for the flesh; while in Rom. 7.22-25, we have the following equivalents; my members (i.e. my σῶμα ) = that which is in captivity under the law of sin = the flesh = the opposite of the νοῦς or inner man where I delight in the law of God. Col. 3.5 makes the identity of σῶμα with sin even more complete: "Mortify, therefore, your members which are upon the earth; fornication etc." It is here not merely, as in Romans, "Sin in your members": "Your members are themselves sin".¹

This may well be so, but there are Pauline passages which speak against this identification and suggest noteworthy difference.

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This difference becomes clear and the basic contrast comes out sharply when St. Paul declares quite categorically in 1 Cor. 15.50 that: "I tell you this, brethren; flesh and blood cannot inherit the Kingdom of God, nor does the perishable inherit the imperishable", (RSV). And again in 1 Cor. 6.13-20 "Food is for the belly and the belly for food ...... and one day God will put an end to both .... the body is for the Lord and the Lord for the body ......". R. Bultmann poses the sarx-body distinction clearly. He recognises that the flesh is that which must die; the body is that which will rise with Christ¹ and Dr. Robinson adds "Paul promises no resurrection of the flesh, he proclaims it for the body."²

In addition Prof. Barclay observes that the body as such is accessible to God, and indeed can be the Temple of Holy Spirit. In support, he quotes the following passages: "The body can be redeemed (Romans 8.23) and transformed (Phil. 2.21). The body can be taken and

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offered as a sacrifice to God (Rom. 12.1), and with it and in it a man can glorify God (1 Cor. 6.20; Phil. 1.20). The body can be and for the Christian is, the temple of the Holy Spirit (1 Cor.)." "Equally", he points out, "the body, as such is accessible to evil, and is of course involved in man's physical mortality but it is not of itself evil, and its fate depends on whether the powers of good or these of evil are allowed to dominate it, it has tremendous potentialities for good and evil, according as it is dominated by sin or dedicated to God: for Paul the body itself is quite neutral".  

Finally the difference between soma and sarx is well stated in J.A.T. Robinson's words. Dr. Robinson with his usual lucidity has it: "While σώμα stands for man, in the solidarity of creation, in his distance from God, σάρξ stands for man in the solidarity of

There remains to be examined how two great and prominent N.T. scholars have understood the meaning of soma. It is defined and described by R. Bultmann: as the real Self, ego, as the very essence, the "I" (p.194): "Man .... can be called soma, that is, as having a relationship to himself .... Or, more exactly, he is so called as that self from whom he, as subject, distinguishes himself, the self with whom he can deal as the object of his own conduct, and also the self whom he can perceive as subjected to an occurrence that springs from a will other than his own.

1. The Body, p.31. We must mention here, and by the way, that Pfleiderer building on the assumption that St. Paul is a dichotomist, distinguishes and calls "the outer man" body in reference to its form as an organism, "flesh" in reference to its material substance, Primitive Christianity, Vol.I, E.T., p.270, or as again he has it in Paulinism, E.T. Vol.I, p.49: "The σῶμα is the material of the (earthly) body, but the body is the organized form in which this matter exists as a concrete earthly individual". (R. Bultmann op.cit. p.192 f.) such a distinction regards it as "un-Pauline" and argues against it. To us also this appears highly Aristotelian in formulation, and worthier of Mediaeval scholasticism. J.A.T. Robinson, The Body, pp.31-2 n.1, insists that Sarx and Soma do not represent different parts of man's make-up, but that each stands for the whole man differently regarded - "man as wholly perishable, man as wholly destined for God". He further quotes Prof. P. Althaus to support his case and condemns the tendency to discuss this relation sarx-soma "in terms of the modern and un-Hebraic category matter", p.32 n.1. Further, W. Stacey, op. cit. p.186, concludes as follows: "In its most highly developed meanings, σῶμα is far away from σῶμα but in the simplest sense, they are interchangeable".
It is such a self that man is called *soma*,¹ and further and in conclusion he goes on to say, "More accurately, man is *soma* when he is objectivized in relation to himself by becoming the object of his own thought, attitude, or conduct; he is man in that he can separate from himself and came under the dominion of outside powers"². Dodd puts it in his descriptive way as "the individual self as an organism .... But his conception of the body, as the organised individual self, may be illustrated by the concept of the sentiment in modern psychology".³

Bishop Robinson comes out against them, controverts them and rejects their own way of thinking as "essentially un-Hebraic and indeed post-Cartesian".⁴ He holds for himself the view that "*Soma* is the nearest equivalent to our word "personality"".⁵ He further admits that he has

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5. Ibid. p.28.
been mistaken in his old view about man as made up of sarx and psyche\textsuperscript{1} and adopts a new one: "\(σῶμα\), ὑπόσκεψις and ὀυκήθες all represent the whole man under different aspects"\textsuperscript{2}.

1. J.A.T. Robinson, The Body, p.13 n.1, and his In the End, God, London (1950) p.84 and cf. p.85, with F.J. Leenhardt, exposition of \(σῶμα\), The Eristle to the Romans, p.162, as "appropriate organ through which the personality expresses and realises 'itself'". We are in general agreement. His subsequent attempt at a more lapidary statement seems to succeed only in seriously over-simplifying: "My body is myself; I am my Body".

15. Trichotomy: Some General Remarks on 1 Thess. 5.23.

The only genuine Pauline passage, and this probably applies to the whole New Testament, which clearly and directly speaks out about man's threefold nature, trichotomy, is the well-known and above-mentioned passage which runs as follows:¹ "May the God of peace himself sanctify you wholly; and may your spirit and soul and body be kept sound and blameless at the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ".

Since the present chapter is not a detailed and exhaustive study but a general survey of this quotation, I see no better and more profitable way of dealing with it — by saying this we do not exclude other ways of course — than that of a very-very brief historical review of this question, in some ancient and modern scholars who are in favour of trichotomy and those who are against it, with a short concluding discussion.

We do not refer to the early Fathers — Greek and Latin — at length, for we believe that they do not say much directly concerned with the text under consideration; and

1. 1 Thess. 5.23:

"Αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ Θεὸς τῆς εἰρήνης ἁγιάσαι ὑμᾶς ὀλοτελεῖς, καὶ διάκλητον ὑμῶν τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ ἡ φυλή καὶ τὸ σῶμα ἀμέμπτως ἐν τῇ παρουσίᾳ τοῦ Κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἀνθρωποῦ Χριστοῦ τηρηθεὶς".

¹ "Let the God of peace himself sanctify you wholly; and may your spirit and soul and body be kept sound and blameless at the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ."
when they deal with the matter, either directly commenting on 1 Thess. 5.23, or in a general manner thinking of the trichomistic problem, they express themselves in a vague and ambiguous way and it could be said that their views resemble more the Platonic and the Aristotelian.

However, it must be observed that some of the Fathers favour a dichotomistic view, some a

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1. In favour of the dichotomistic view are: Athenagoras de Resur. 15 (12) B.4. 322-23 and 320-21, MPG 1004A-D, 1005A; Cyril of Jerusalem Catech. 4, 18, MPG 33, 477; Athanasius oratio contra Gentes, 33, MPG 25, 65B-D; Gregory of Nazian. (Theolog.) Orat. 45 in Sanc. Pascha, 7, MPG 36, 632AB; Gregory of Nyssa, De hom. Opificio, 29, MPG 44, 233D; St. Basil, Comment. in Isaiam. Proph. cap. 1, 13, MPG 30A, 140A; St. Chrysostom, in Cap. 1, Genes. homil. 14, 5, MPG 53, 117; Idem. in Epist. ad Rom. homil. 13, 2, MPG 60, 510; St. Augustine's and St. John of Damascus views are quite relevant, well stated and representing the consensus of opinion of all the above mentioned Fathers and for that reason are worth quoting: St. Augustine, The City of God, London (1945) A rev. and translation by R.V. Tasker, in Dent's Everyman's Library, Vol. 2, book 13 cf. 24, p.22: "This man therefore being frame of dust or loam .... when it received a soul was made an animate body .... being neither soul only, nor body only, but consisting of both. It is true, the soul is not the whole man but the better part only; nor the body the whole man but the worse part only, and both conjoined make man; .... Yes, it both calls (the H. Scripture) the body and the soul conjoined by the name of man ....". St. John of Damascus, exp. of the Orthodox faith, book 2, ch.12, trans. by S.D.F. Salmond, in the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Oxford (1898) Vol. 9, pp.30-31; "... He creates with his own hands man of a visible nature and an invisible ... on the other his reasoning and thinking soul He bestowed upon him by his in-breathing ... Further, body and soul were formed at one and the same time".
trichomistic.  

Amongst the modern writers who hold the trichomistic view of man and are in favour of it without any hesitation are the following: C. Vitriuga,\(^2\) Olshausen\(^3\) and

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1. In favour of trichomistic view are the following Fathers: Justin, fragmenta, 8 and 10, MPG 1585 and 1589; Irenaeus, contra hereses, 5, 6, 1; 2, 33 chaps. 4 and 5; 5, 9, 1; 5, 10, 1, MPG 7, 114, 833, 1137 and 1144; Justin: Apol. I pro Christ Clement of Alex. Strom. 6, 12; MPG 9, 283; Idem. Paedag. 3, 1; MPG 8, 92; Origen, comment in Joan, tom. 22, 2; MPG 741-5; Idem. Comm. in Eríst. ad Rom. Lib. 1, 18 MPG 865-8; Tertullian, Adv. Marc. Lib. 4, ch. 37, also Lib. 5, ch. 15; MPL 2, 483AB, 552; Tatianus, Orat. adv. Graecos, 1, 4, 12, MPG 6, 829C; St. Didimus of Alex. De spiritu Sancto, 54, 55, 59, MPG 39, 1079-82; Idem. De Trinitate 3, 31, MPG 39, 956-7.


3. "The \(\pi\nu\varepsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha\) being vis superior, agens, imperans in homine; the \(\nu\iota\nu\varepsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha\) vis inferior quae agitur movetur, in imperio tenetur," Olshausen: de naturae humanae trichotomia in Opusc. p. 154, qtd. in (as we have not been able to trace it anywhere) C. Ellicott's St. Paul's Epistles to the Thessalonians, London (1866\(^2\)) p. 85 n. on 5.23; see also H. Olshausen, Thessalonians, E.T. in T.T. Clark, Edinburgh (1851) pp. 457-8.
1. C. Ellicott, *Destiny of the Creature*, Sermon 5, pp. 99-120 and, discussing the text at some length and citing some Scriptural and patriotic passages, draws the general conclusion "that a body, soul and spirit are the three component parts of man's nature. That the spirit is the realm of the intellectual forces, and the shrine of the Holy Ghost. That the soul is the region of the feelings, affections, and impulses, all that peculiarly individualizes and personifies. Lastly, that these three parts, especially the two incorporeal parts, are intimately associated and united, and form the media of communication, both with each other, and with the higher and the lower elements"; further in his Epistle, ibid., p. 85 n. on 5.23, he maintains the same view; rejects D. Wette's assertion as rhetorical enumerations and Jowett's, who argues against any kind of distinction, as setting aside "all sound rules of scriptural exegesis", finally finds Lunemann's attribution to Plato unsatisfactory and remarks "And if Plato or Philo have maintained (as appears demonstrable) substantially the same view, then God has permitted a heathen and a Jewish philosopher to advance conjectural opinions which have been since confirmed by the independent teaching of an inspired Apostle!!!

2. *Thessalonians*, London, ed. by C.I. Ellicott, Cassell & Co. Ltd., Vol. VIII, p. 146 n. on 5.23, "This is St. Paul's fullest and most scientific psychology, not merely a rhetorical piling up of words without any particular meaning being assigned to them". (???)

3. Lectures on the Epistle to the Thessalonians, Edinburgh (1884) pp. 238-246 and cf. pp. 239-242, where he favours such a view.

4. *A System of Biblical Psychology*, Edinburgh (18692) p. 110: "It appears therefore, that Paul distinguishes three essential elements of man, to everyone of which the work of sanctifying grace extends in its manner".
J.B. Heard, 1 G. Luneman, 2 B.F. Westcott, 3 W. Borneman, 4 J.B. Lightfoot. 5 With all due respect to their views, weight of scholarship and learning, at least of some of them, the fact remains that they have not seriously discussed the subject and "their statements are more in the nature of incidental reflections" 6 or as the late

1. The tripartite Nature of Man, Spirit, Soul, Body, Edinburgh (1866). Its title is indicative enough but special for our case see pp.67-70.

2. Thessalonians in H.A.W. Meyer's critical and exeg. comm. T.T. Clark (1880) pp.163-4, who argues that: "the totality of man is here divided into three parts .... we are not to assume that this has a purely rhetorical signification .... The origin of the trichotomy is Platonic (!!!); but Paul has it not from the writings of Plato and his scholars, but from the current language of Society; into which it has passed from the narrow circle of the school".


4. Die Thessalonicher briefe .... von H.A.W. Meyer, Gottingen (1894) p.247, while he admits that the origin of trichotomy is Platonic and in its present form St. Paul did not derive it directly from Plato and his School of Writers. Nevertheless, he adds: "πνεύμα ist dann die höhere, rein geistige Seite des inneren Lebens ( νους ), Ψυχή die niedere, physischenimalische Seite des nichtsinnlichen Wesensteiles, Welche mit dem Gebiet der Sinnlichkeit in Berührung tritt".

5. Notes on Epistles of St. Paul, London (1895) np.88-9 n. on 5.23; he sees here a tripartite division of man, he does not like at all the idea of treating it "as a mere rhetorical expression".

Prof. J. Laidlaw puts it, "Yet their utterances on this point are little more than obiter dicta".  

In our own day Festugiere and Allo hold some form of tripartite view and "rattachement la pensee de l'apotre a une conception Grecque". Festugiere's research, although "n'est pas toute vaine" and well worth it, very informative and in an excellent way developed, does not succeed in its purpose to interpret 1 Thess. 5.23 in a trichotomistic Greek way, that is, to discover borrowings from Plato and Aristotle through their posterity down to St. Paul. He fails in his effort and misses the whole point, on the ground that his findings and conclusions are unbiblical and entirely un-Pauline.

Allo, on the other hand, excluding Paul's borrowings from Pagan Hellenic psychology and even from Philo, he thinks (along with Festugiere) "that the two had a common

1. The Bible Doctrine of Man, p.67.
4. Ibid. p.388.
source, and that the St. Paul's trichotomy, like that of the older philosopher, is 'a Jewish concept', or elaborated after Jewish conceptions based on the text of Genesis'.¹ Further, he does not feel very sure and happy about trichotomy and says that for the Apostle, there exists in 1 Thess. 5.23 "a model difference only between Ἡγων as the soul in the totality of its functions, above all living and conscious, and πνεῦμα as the same soul in its high intellectual functions, without implying two creative acts by God".² Contrary to these trichotomistic views are those who see the Divine Spirit in the believer and relate pneuma here to the Divine Spirit granted to Christians.³ In the Martyrium of Polycarpus we read the following words "Εἰς Ἀνάστασιν Ἠγων αἰωνίου Ἡγων τε καὶ σώματος ἐν ἀφθορίᾳ Πνεῦματος 'Αγίου". ⁴ The Antiochene Fathers speaking against Apollinaris

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2. Ibid. p.104.

3. We may mention here, that about the relation between human spirit and divine spirit and the believer's spirit to an unbeliever, we have spoken earlier in the chapter ψυχή πνεῦμα or Spirit.

heresies advance this explanation:

Thus "Regards υμῶν τὸ πνεῦμα as equivalent to ἐπιχορηγουμένη υμῖν ἡ Χάρις τοῦ πνεύματος. So Chrysostom: τὸ πνεῦμα τὴ φησὶν ἐνταῦθα; τὸ Χάρισμα and Thdt., to the same effect. Next another anonymous exegete explains very accurately the thought of the Apostle: "God has never placed the three, soul, spirit, and body in an unbeliever, but only in believers. Of these, the soul and the body are natural, but the spirit is a special benefit (energesia) to us, a gift of grace to those who believe". (Trans. from W. Barclay, Flesh and Spirit, p.14). 2

1. "Οὐδὲποτε ἐπὶ ἀπόστολον τὰ τρία τέθεικεν, πνεῦμα, ψυχήν, καὶ σῶμα, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ μόνον τῶν πιστευόντων ὡν ψυχή μέν καὶ σῶμα τῆς φύσεως, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα τῆς εὐεργεσίας, τούτεστιν τὸ Χάρισμα τῶν πιστευόντων".


1. Die Thessalonichen briefe, Gottingen (1909) in Meyer's Commentary on N.T., Vol. 10, especially: Exkurs zur Trichotomie, pp. 230-32. The author insists that trichotomy is not biblical at all, alien to Josephus, Philo, Aristotle; that it appears for the first time clearly in the Neoplatonists from whom it passed to the Christian Neoplatonists (Origen, Apollinaris). Further, he believes soma and psyche and pneuma is the new living element from God, which enters into the Christians. To prove his case he cites Chrystostom's Theodoret's, anonymous writer's Cramer, Mart. Polycs, Ambrosiaster's, Pelagius' and Ambrose's word.

2. Thessalonians in ICC, p. 212, "The divine in man and the human individuality must be kept intact, an undivided whole".

3. Christus unter Geist bei Paulus, Leipzig (1932) in untersuchungen, zum NT Heff. 23, pp. 42-44, cf. p. 44 where he ends as follows: "When Paul speaks of the body and the soul, means the border lines of the respectively human and Christian dealings and not the constituent parts of human nature. This shows itself already previously in exposition of the passage 1 Thess. 5.23. Consequently the word pneuma - where it signifies the Christian ego, has nothing to do with trichotomical anthropology, but it stands in the last analysis for an entirely different thing .... it is related to the Holy Spirit".

4. Man in the New Testament, London (1963) pp. 44-45: "There appears to be a trichotomy here, with a distinction between psyche as the lower and pneuma as the higher function of man's inner life. But that would be very strange, and one must either accept that Paul, without further thought, places psyche and pneuma beside one another here in a liturgical form, without the pneuma being distinguished in any way as standing closer to God, or else one must (which is more probable) relate pneuma here to the Divine Spirit accorded to Christians".
Neither the trichomistic view nor the view of the Divine Spirit in the believer satisfies. Others, taking the moderate view, put it better: they think that either St. Paul "is not writing a treatise on the soul, but pouring forth, from the fulness of his heart, a prayer for his converts"\(^1\) or "the enumeration is not systematic but hortatory, to emphasize the completeness of the preservation. It should be compared with the somewhat similar enumeration of Deut.6.4, 5(cf. 4.29, 10.12 etc.): "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart (leb) and all they soul (nephesh), and with all thy

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1. B. Jowett, *The Epistles of St. Paul to the Thessalonians, Galatians, and Romans*, A Translation and Commentary, London (1894) p.51 n. on 5.23; G. Milligan, *St. Paul's Epistles to the Thessalonians*, London (1932) p.78 n. on 5.23; E.J. Bicknell, *The First and the Second Epistle to the Thessalonians*, London (1932) in WC p.64 n. on 5.23, while indirectly refers to Jowett, he remarks that "St. Paul is not giving a lesson in psychology. It is a complete misunderstanding of the nature of the passage to base on it a system of trichotomy .... What he is concerned with is the preservation and consecration of the whole man. There is an element of rhetoric in his description of the totality of human nature".
might", or they regard it "as a popular statement, and not as an expression of the Apostle's own psychology", or as an eminent biblical scholar and original thinker has it, as a formulation coming from liturgical-rhetorical

1. W. Robinson, "Hebrew psychology and its relation to Pauline Anthropology", Mansfield College Essays, p.280; idem. The Christian Doctrine of Man, p.108; J.A.T. Robinson, The Body, p.27 n.2; E. Schweizer, πνεῦμα in TWNT, p.433 n.685, E.T. op. cit. 85 n.1; Comp. also with D. Pfleiderer, Primitive Christianity, p.272 n.2, asserting that soul and spirit are not different parts, but only different names for the one human being, adds: "Even 1 Thess. 5.23 is not inconsistent with this, since here the apparent trichotomy πνεῦμα, ψυχή and σῶμα is only a rhetorical emphasising of the completeness of the man, just as in Phil. 1.17 έν ένι πνεῦματι, μία ψυχή and in Luke 1.46 η ψυχή μου, τό πνεῦμα μου are placed in rhetorical parallelism without any reference to different subjects being intended; Similarly F. Prat, The Theology of St. Paul, Vol.II, p.54 n.4, writes "the enumeration ( τό πνεῦμα, η ψυχή καλ τό σῶμα ) seems to prove that it is a question here of grandeurs of the same order" and B. Rigaux, Thessalonians, p.597 n. on 5.23 adds also: "Il y a un element de rhetorique dans ces fins de developpement Paulinien. On ne doit pas y chercher une doctrine sur la psychologie, qu'il n'a pas voulu y mettre".

(perhaps traditional) diction.¹

In addition the liturgical-traditional-rhetorical origin and nature of the passage under discussion is well stated by Masson: Placing side by side similarly worded Pauline texts—Gal. 6.18, Phil. 4.13, Philemon 25 and 2 Tim. 4.22—he draws the conclusion that the formula μετά τοῦ πνεύματος ὑμῶν is simply

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¹. R. Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, Vol. I, pp. 205-6; comp. also with M. Dibelius, An die Thessalonicher I, II and die Philippire, in HZNT Tubingen (1937) p. 32, who says, "we have here to accept it .... that the Apostle here follows the customary liturgical terminology usage." W. Gutbrod op. cit. 90-91, arguing that St. Paul in all probability has not considered the question whether man consists of a trichotomy or dichotomy, that employs these particular expressions wholly unemphasised and that it will be best to see here a description of man which shall be the most concrete possible, and which most likely by the names man comprised in the further elements of his being, says characteristically, p. 91, "So werden wir πνεύμα auch hier als das Innenlebendes Menschen zu verstehen haben, ohne doch diesen liturgischen brief schluss terminologisch ausbenten zu wollen;" see also Prof. F.F. Bruce, from his written communication to Dr. White, naper on. cit. p. 67, ".... 1 Thess 5.23. It is not certain that Paul is propounding a formal trichotomy in these words. It would be equally valid to deduce a formal tetrachomy of heart, soul, mind and strength from Mark 12.30"; Dr. A. McCaig, op. cit. p. 136, arrives at the same conclusion. "Paul without further thought, places psyche and pneuma beside one another here in a liturgical form;" E. Schweizer, TWNT, p. 433 n. 685, E.T. op. cit. p. 85 n. 1, goes on as follows, "The greeting is very likely traditional, if not liturgical and so tells us little about Paul's conception of man (Dibelius Thess. 3 ad loc); on the other hand, W. Neil, The Epistle of Paul to the Thessalonians, in the Moffat NT, London (1950) 133, observes, "The triple combination may indeed have been a current liturgical formula in Christian or Jewish circles. At all events, Paul is certainly as unconcerned about psychology as was our Lord when he gave us the chief commandment to love God with heart, soul, mind and strength (Mark 12.30)".
"another, more solemn manner of saying μεθ’ ὑμῶν and goes on to equate πνεῦμα in this context with person - " ὑμῶν τὸ πνεῦμα - you, personally". From this, he is able to render the cognate phrase ὅλοκληρον ὑμῶν τὸ πνεῦμα, "your whole person", indicating its two constituent elements - the soul and the body.1

What conclusions shall we draw amidst so many different views and various opinions? The reply would be simply this: St. Paul is not a scientific psychologist or a philosopher in the true sense of the word and he consequently does not use his, so to speak, anthropological - terminology with literary accuracy and precision, he

1. C. Masson, Les Deux Epitres aux Thessalonians, Paris (1957) in CNT, I1a, pp.77-78, while we agree with and accept his given account on the text as liturgical etc. nevertheless, we are unhappy with his last words of the present paragraph (p.78) and his other words too, (p.77): "L'esprit erait l'element superieur, purement spirituel, psychologique, plus directement en rapport avec le corps", which suggest that the pneuma would be the superior element of the inmost being of man and consequently could mean the whole person, the whole man, and soul and body its inferior parts and we should very much like to record with W.G.Kimmel, op. cit. p.45 n.51, our own disagreement. We are wondering, does not his view approach Plato's view of man??!! By the way, we may note that Π. Μπατσιώτης, 'Ο Ἀνδρώπος ἐν τῇ Καλή Διαθήκη, Athens (1955) pp.10-11, while he rejects the trichotomistic view of 1 Thess. 5.23, understands the distinction between psyche and pneuma as that between the animal and spiritual (higher-lower) life principle; see also W.G. Kimmel, ibid. ο.45 n.51.
makes use of the current, popular, simple and approximate language of his time. ¹

Here, as we have already said, he is speaking rhetorically, not theologically, in a traditional, liturgical fashion. Here, as elsewhere in his Epistles, he does not look at human nature in a trichotomistic way; he is not thinking of man as composed of three different distinct parts, or exclusive elements or entities, nor does he divide the human being "into three well-defined compartments". ² On the contrary, St. Paul in the present text is speaking for the entire man, for the whole man. He is concerned for the preservation and sanctification of man's entire being, for his totality, for his personality, for the man as a whole. Milligan has it: "They are evidently chosen in accordance with the general O.T. view of the constitution of man to emphasize a sanctification which shall extend to man's whole being, whether on its immortal, its personal, or its bodily side".³


2. W. Neil

or again, as G.G. Findlay puts it, "here the entire man is surveyed, with his whole nature in its manifold aspects and functions, as the subject of sanctifying grace".¹ Once more St. Paul emphasizes here the preservation and sanctification of man in his completeness, in his totality, in his wholeness, in his entire being.

Thus *pneuma*, *psyche* and *soma* are not distinct parts, elements of man, but different aspects and functions of man himself, of his actuality, of his personality, of his entire unity, different names of his entire being. Man is not made up of parts, does not consist of separate elements, he is a living unity. Man here and throughout the Pauline letters and in the Bible generally, is "an indissoluble whole, manifested under one aspect or another. It is a case not of a "human composite" but of a monism".²

Brunner insists that while the physical, psychical and spiritual functions are distinguishable in man, they cannot be isolated from their synthesis in him. All three are involved in man as a creature, all three will be involved in his eternal destiny. It is clear that Brunner

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refuses to regard any of the three as "dispensable matter" which eternity will ultimately consign to the dust-bin. ¹

¹ E. Brunner, Man in Revolt, London (1939) pp. 362-3 n.1 (cf. p. 363 n.1). Perhaps it may be of interest to refer to Dr. A. Carrel's remarks on this point from a psychophysic and biological point of view, Man the Unknown, Penguin Books (1948) pp. 115-6, 138, 256, which are quite relevant indeed.
As we enter into the discussion of our last chapter, two things most particularly stand out for consideration:

1. The nature of the resurrection body as it is represented in the locus classicus 1 Cor. 15.35-58 (cf. 35-49)\(^1\) and 2 Cor. 5.1-10.

2. The relationship of 1 cor. 15.35-58 to 2 Cor. 5.1-10.

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1. In saying this we do not rule out other passages in Pauline writings dealing with the resurrection body or transformation of the body directly or indirectly, briefly or in detail; on the contrary, such passages are the following: Rom. 8.11, 18, 25; 2 Cor. 4.7-18; Phil. 3.20, 21; Col. 3.4; but we maintain that 1 Cor. 15 and 2 Cor. 5 are the main and especially the most celebrated 1 Cor. 15.
1. The nature of the resurrection body:
   (a) in 1 Cor. 15.35-58.

   After establishing that Christ's resurrection is a historical fact beyond doubt and question,\(^1\) the cornerstone and foundation of our faith, the heart of the Holy Gospel, which will be a lie and delusion without it, and also the basis of the resurrection of the living and dead,\(^2\) St. Paul proceeds next to answer those who held either the crude Jewish notion of a resurrection of flesh in a literal sense or the Greek one of a disembodied immortality of the soul after death and demand to know the manner and the nature of the resurrection body.\(^3\)

   To give a reply to these questions he turns to a series of analogies and illustrations.

   We would form an idea as to the nature of the resurrection body, says St. Paul, if we turn our attention to the phenomenon of the seed.

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1. 1 Cor. 15.1-11.
2. Ibid. 15.12-19 and 20-23.
3. Ibid. 15.35.
The bare grain of wheat must be sown in the ground and die in order to give a new and glorious body. God gives the seed the sort of body according to His will and laws.¹

The interesting thing here is that "Paul is showing that, at one and the same time, there can be dissolution, difference and yet continuity, and yet, in spite of the dissolution and in spite of the difference, it is the same life, the same seed".²

From the sowing of a seed and its growth into a plant, St. Paul passes on to the world in general and adds a supplementary illustration. He points out that there are varieties of flesh, different types of animal life: there is the flesh of human beings, another flesh of animals, another flesh of birds and a different one of fishes. In like manner there is also a difference between celestial bodies and terrestrial ones, not only in quality but in glory as

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1. 1 Cor. 15.36-38; comp. John 12.24.
2. W. Barclay, The Letters to the Corinthians, p.175.
Now that the Apostle has removed the objections and made his point, he applies this analogy to the antithesis and difference between the present, earthly body and the resurrection body.

To emphasize the marked antithesis between the body that now is and the body of the future and to make clearer his point, Paul uses four contrasts.

He argues that (1) the present body is mortal, perishable and liable to corruption, decay and death, while the resurrection body will be imperishable, incorruptible and immortal; (2) the body of earth is a body of dishonour, of humiliation, the future body is a body of glory, of splendour; (3) the body that is now is weak, feeble and the body to come is powerful; and (4) the earthly, the present body is a

1. 1 Cor. 15.39-41.
2. Ibid. 15.42: ἐπεί πεταὶ ἐν φθορᾷ, ἐγείρεται ἐν ἀφθαρσείᾳ.
3. Ibid. 15.43: ἐπεί πεταὶ ἐν ἀτιμίᾳ, ἐγείρεται ἐν δόξῃ. comp. Philip. 3.21.
4. Ibid. 15.43: ἐπεί πεταὶ ἐν ἀσθενείᾳ, ἐγείρεται ἐν δυνάμει.
natural, physical, and animated body, whereas the future, the resurrection body will be a spiritual body.\(^1\) In the fourth contrast, which is the heart of the matter and the core of the whole argument, St. Paul concludes that if there is a natural, physical body, surely there must be a spiritual one as well.\(^2\)

Paul, to confirm what he has just been saying, turns this time to the Holy Scriptures and furnishes a parallel between Adam and Christ.

The main idea of this parallelism may be stated in summary fashion as follows:

The natural body corresponds to the first man, Adam, who became an animate being\(^3\) through the divine act of creation. Adam is earthly and passes on to the whole human race a form of animate life which is the physical body; the spiritual body is related and

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1. 1 Cor. 15.44: "σπερματικόν, ἐγελοτικόν. Vulg. "Corpus animale ... corpus spiritale"; AV "natural ... spiritual"; RSV "physical ... spiritual"; NEB "animal ... spiritual"; comp. also with Jud. 19.

2. Ibid. 15.44.

3. 1 Cor. 15.45; comp. also with Gen. 2.7 and 5.3.
corresponds to the second Adam, Christ himself, the life-giving Spirit, who through his incarnation, life, death and resurrection, has brought into being a new kind of human existence, completely controlled by the Holy Spirit and consequently incorruptible, glorious, powerful, spiritual.¹

Having answered the questions of v.35 and completed the picture of the nature of the resurrection body in vv. 36-49, in v.50 he emphatically reaffirms what has earlier been said and prepares the reader for the next section vv.51-58.

His reassertion goes like this: It is not only impossible, but at the same time inconceivable that flesh and blood will ever participate in the Kingdom of God. Indeed, such a thing is utterly impossible for the simple reason the perishable, transitory, temporal and corruptible cannot inherit the everlasting, incorruptible and immortal.²

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1. 1 Cor. 15.45-49; comp. with Dan. 7.13; John 6.63; Rom. 8.29; 1 Cor. 15.20-28; 2 Cor. 3.6, 17; Philip. 3.21.

2. 1 Cor. 15.50: "Τούτο δὲ φησί, ἀδελφοί, ὅτι σάρξ καὶ αἷμα βασιλείαν θεοῦ κληρονομησάι οὐ δύναται, οὐδὲ ἤ φθορά τῆς ἀφθαρσίας κληρονομεῖ;", comp. with Gal. 1.16; Heb. 2.4; Matt. 16.17; Eph. 6.12.
Since this verse might be regarded as a conclusion of vv. 36-49 and has a significance of its own, let us pause for a moment and see its real meaning through the eyes of some commentators:

St. John Chrysostom and Photius argue that flesh and blood must be taken in its moral sense as denoting moral frailty.\(^1\) Theodoretus and Cyril of Alexandria took it to mean the mortal and corruptible human nature.\(^2\) Some others understood it as ".... our present physical organism",\(^3\) ".... human nature in its present material, mortal, corruptible state",\(^4\) ".... our present mortal nature, not our evil propensities",\(^5\) "the body as capable of corruption and

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1. Chrysostom, "σάρκα τὰς πονηρὰς πράξεις καλεῖ".

   Photius: "Οἱ σαρκικοὶ καὶ ἐμπαιδεύσασιλελαν θεοῦ οὐ κληρονομησοντι";

2. Theodoretus: "σάρκα καὶ αἷμα τὴν θνητὴν φύσιν καλεῖ";

   Cyril of Alexandria: "Έως ἐστὶ τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἀνθρώπινον σάρξ καὶ αἷμα, τούτ' ἐστι θνητὸν καὶ φθορτὸν"\(^7\) in Π.Ν. Τριμιτέλα, "Ὑπομνήμα γεγ. τός ἐπίστο-


of being or causing any inconvenience',1 "It is stated firmly as a conclusion, that the Jewish thought of a resurrection of this fleshly body is to be rejected",2 ".... human nature as opposed to the Divine",3 "is not the material as distinguished from the immaterial, it is the natural as opposed to the supernatural",4 "The phrase describes humanity living under present earthly conditions. These are not continued in the Resurrection (Mar. 12.25)".5 In recent years Jeremias, in an excellent and illuminating article, makes the following remarks about the meaning of 1 Cor. 15.50: The whole sentence has not been created by St. Paul himself, but it goes back to the

1. E. Evans, The Epistles of Paul the Apostle to the Corinthians, in CB, Oxford (1930) p. 147.
eschatological teaching of the early Church and means 'the natural man as a frail creature in opposition to God'. Further, the meaning of 'flesh and blood' is that neither the living nor the dead can take part in the Kingdom of God as they are in their present state. The same sentence refers to the change of the living at the Parousia and not to the resurrection of the dead. ²

Whiteley finds Jeremias's solution correct and convincing and follows him. ³

Allo charges Robertson and Plummer, who had made much the same point as Jeremias, with being unduly subtle, but adduces no reason to substantiate his judgement. ⁴

The remaining section of the text runs as follows:

1. St. Paul says with a solemn way and firmness, we shall not all die, but we shall all pass through a change and transformation. This "change will not be a long-drawn-out affair", but on the contrary will be a sudden one, instantaneous, will take place in the twinkling of an eye, when the last trumpet sounds. As soon as the trumpet sounds the dead shall be raised imperishable and incorruptible and we (the living) shall be changed as well.

2. It is quite natural and almost inevitable to give an answer to the question: how shall we be transformed and raised up? Paul's answer to this question is positive and "a wholly Christ-centred and a wholly moral one". He says quite explicitly that

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1. There are some other readings or variants here. We for our part follow that of AV, RSV, NEB, JB, KALVNI ΔΗΛΩ ΜΗ ed. BFBS and the recent edition of Greek New Testament ed. by K. Aland, M. Black, Am. B.S., BFBS etc.

2. 1 Cor. 15.51; comp. also with 1 Thess. 4.15, 17.

3. L. Morris, 1 Corinthians in TNTC, p.233.

4. Ibid. 52; comp. with Matt. 24.31; Rev. 8.2; Esdr. 6.23.

God who raised Our own Lord Jesus Christ from the dead will also raise us by His power. St. Paul here does not speculate, he does not use vague and incomprehensible terms, he does not play with the words, he does not use ambiguous expressions and put across into people's minds dubious and false ideas; quite the opposite, he makes use of simple words and clear statements; he speaks out from the bottom of his heart, from the inmost part of his very being, with unusual, unsurpassed firmness and certainty, as he feels, as he believes, as the Holy Spirit inspires him.

His words imply and convey to every Christian this most fundamental and important message: we are not immortal creatures by nature, in our own right; we do not possess immortality within us or a potentiality capable of giving immortality; we shall be transformed and raised up from the dead through the infinite love and mercy of God, by the Grace and glorious power of God, through our Redeemer and Saviour, through the crucified and Risen Christ, who has been raised up by

1. 1 Cor. 6.14; 15.20-22; 2 Cor. 4.14; Rom. 8.11; 5.18; 6.5; Philip. 3.21; Colos. 3.1-4; 1 Thess. 4.16; comp. with Matt. 22.31-32; John 6.39, 40, 44, 54; 11.25; Acts 4.2.
the Father.

Our own resurrection then is not our own natural possession, it is the gift of God to us, it is the beneficence of God towards us.

In the remainder of the section, St. Paul reminds us of the coming change. He distinguishes again between perishable and imperishable, adding for the first time here the word immortality, not necessarily in the Platonic sense, far from it.¹

For St. Paul, Our Lord's resurrection and victory over death are so profound and fundamental that, by combining and adapting Isa. 25.8 and Hos. 13.14, he celebrates and declares triumphantly the annihilation of death, the victory over sin and death and, in a word, the final triumph which is due to God through our risen Lord and Saviour Christ.²

In v.58, as elsewhere, we can trace the greatness of his mind and personality. He is the theoritician but simultaneously the practical minded man. He deals with abstract and abstruse subjects

1. 1 Cor. 15.53, 54.
2. 1 Cor. 15.55-57.
many times, but on the other hand puts them into practice and applies them in every-day life, urging others to follow the same course of action.

Thus he closes the whole chapter with a practical conclusion. Knowing very well that the Corinthians were prone to fickleness, inconstant, easily changeable in their faith and full of doubts, he urges them never to give in and admit defeat, but to stand firm and immovable in the hope of future glory, doing God's work, applying God's will in their daily lives and serving God as it pleases Him, taking into account that their labour and strife will not be in vain,\(^1\) or as two commentators, in their standard work have it: "They must get rid of the unsettled and unfruitful state of mind caused by habitual scepticism, and must learn to be firmly seated, so as to be able to resist the false teaching and other hostile forces that would carry them away (Col. 1.23). Let there be less

\(^1\) 1 Cor. 15.58.
speculation and more work.”¹

Since we have already outlined St. Paul’s teaching on the resurrection body, we must ask how are we to understand his words, how after all shall we express it in modern terms?

Right from the outset we must rule out any notion of the future resurrection body as being similar to our physical one, to the material, earthly

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¹ A. Robertson and A. Plummer, 1 Corinthians in ICC, p.379; some scholars, in order to explain better the meaning of the present passage, quote Aristotle, Nic. Eth. 2.4.3 where Aristotle is insisting on moral actions being the outcome of conscious, steady character. "In the case of moral excellence a man must know what he is doing, then he must choose to do it and to do it for its own sake, and finally his actions must express a stable, immovable character". G.G. Findlay, 1 Corinthians in EBG, p.943 n. on v.58; A. Robertson and A. Plummer, 1 Corinthians in ICC, p.379 n. on v.58; J. Moffatt, 1 Corinthians in MNTC, p.269; G. Simon, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, in Torch Bible (paperback) SCM Press, (1965) p.58.
such a view would be a grossly misleading

1. Most of the Greek and Latin Fathers, generally speaking, are moving towards these lines. They assume the identity of the risen to the natural body and believe in the resuscitation of the very same body that lived on earth: Justine the Martyr, Adv. 1 pro Christ, 18, 19, MPG 6, pp. 356-7; Athenagoras, De resurr. 15, 18-25, MPG 6 pp. 1004-5 and 1009-24. The interesting point about Athenagoras is that he thinks of man as a composite being, soul and body together, not as soul or body alone and such a happy partnership of soul and body will participate in the future life; Irenaeus, Con. Heres. 5.3, 3 MPG 7, p. 1131; Tertullian De resurr. carn. cap. LII, LV, MPL 2 pp. 918-9, 923-5; Jerome Con. Joan Hieros. 16, MPL 23 pp. 384-5; Methodius of Olympus, De resurr. 2.3, MPG 18, p. 268; Eustathius of Antioch, De engastr. con. Origen, 22, MPG 18, p. 660; Epiphanius ad Haer. Lib. 2, tom 2, Haer. 64.20-22 MPG 42 pp. 63-8; ibid. Haer. 66.34-42, pp. 87-92 (all the three anti-Origenists); Ambrose, De excess. Sat. 2, 87, 88, MPL 16, p. 1398; Augustine, De civitate Dei, Lib. 22 cap. 13-30 cf. 19-21, MPL 41, pp. 776-804; Chrysostom, Hom. in ep. 2 ad Cor. hom. 10 MPG 61, pp. 466-74; Hom. in Ep. 1 ad Cor. 41.2 MPG 61 pp. 356-7, although asserts the identity of the two bodies, nevertheless lays stress in particular on the Pauline distinction between the present and the future body. Origen, Con. Cels. 5.18-19 MPG 11 pp. 1205-9; ibid. 3.41, pp. 972-3; ibid. cf. 4.56, 61 pp. 1121-28; ibid. 7.32 pp. 1465-66; ibid. 8.49 p. 1589; idem. De Princ. 2.10.3 MPG 11 pp. 235-6; ibid. 3.6, 6 pp. 338-40, adhering to Platonism adopts a spiritual and idealistic theory; Gregory of Nazianzus, Orat. 2.17, MPG 35 pp. 426-8; ibid. Orat. 7.21-3 pp. 781-5; Gregory of Nyssa, De hom. onif. 27 MPG 44, pp. 225-9; idem. De anim. et resurr. MPG 46 pp. 73-80 and 145-9; and perhaps Basil the Great, Hexaem. hom. 8.8 MPG 29 pp. 184-5; idem. homin d. temp. fam. et 5 ICC 9 MPG 31 pp. 327, adopted the idealizing and spiritualizing views of Origen; some other Fathers follow cautiously along lines reminiscent of Origen but they avoid anything which is prominent Origenistic element: Cyril of Jerusalem, Catech. 18.18, MPG 33 p. 1040; Amphilochius, sentent et excerc. 10 MPG 39.
interpretation of St. Paul's words.

The resurrection body while it will have real organic continuity with the former natural body and an identity of essence, it will be an entirely different organization, absolutely distinct from its earthly counterpart. It will be the transformed human nature, renewed by the Holy Spirit. It will be an organic individual, a psycho-physical organism, a form of existence free from the limitations and imperfections of this physical life (Mark 12.25 and 1 Cor. 6.13) and similar to that of our Risen Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, fit and well-adapted for the glorious and perfect life of the eternal Kingdom of God.

1. (Contd. from page 215). p.108; Didimus of Alex. frg. in ep. 2 ad Cor. 5.1, 2, MPG 39 p.1704; Isidore of Pilousio Epist. Lib. 2. ep. 43; St. Thomas Aquinas, The "Summa Theologica", part (suppl.) 3, QQ 75, 78, 79 cf. 80 pp.118-128, 148-85, ed. and trans. by Dom. Fathers, adopts the doctrine of the identity of the risen to the natural body of the Ancient Church with many strange conjectures, such as the numerical identity of the body which dies and rises again; H. Clavier "Breves ... sur la notion de σώμα πνευματικόν in the Background of the N.T. and its Eschatology, ed. by W.D. Davies and D. Daube, p.347 n.4, argues against Thomas Aquinas's numerical identity and finds a recent article; J.W. Cobb "The Nature of the Resurrection Body" in the Review and Expositor (Oct. 1952) p.435 ff, interesting, but inadequate and unconvincing.
Thus St. Paul's resurrection body is rendered in modern terminology as the complete man, organism or frame, the real man, the individual, "the somatic identity",\(^1\) the personality,\(^2\) as the termination and perfection of the whole man before God who gives him eternal life.

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1. M.E. Dahl, *The Resurrection of the Body*, (a study of 1 Corinthians 15) SCM Press (1962) p.94; it may be of interest to note that R.J. Daly, reviewing the above interpretation in *New Testament Abstracts* (Spring 1963) Vol. 7, No. 3, p.369, 972 r. finds that Dahl's study has several weaknesses, among which the most important are: (1) Dahl neglects the role of Jesus Christ's Resurrection, the most essential element in the interpretation of 1 Cor. 15. (2) "The main handicap of this highly stimulating interpretation seems to be the singling out of the individual and physical aspect of resurrection at the expense of its christological, soteriological and communal basis".

(b) Next St. Paul takes up the question of the resurrection body again in 2 Corinthians 5.1-10. The whole section might be one of the finest passages in his writings and its verses might be too beautiful and full of meaning which "afford an admirable example of the importance of attending, not merely to the words at the moment before us, but to the mind of St. Paul as a whole".¹ This might perhaps be so, but we must not forget that the present passage under discussion is, at the same time, one of the most obscure passages in the Pauline letters, if not in the whole New Testament because of the mixture of metaphor and is full of difficult problems. No wonder then, that there is the variety of interpretations and divergence of opinions on the matter.

Now let us recapitulate it first then consider very briefly the problems involved.

Once more St. Paul affirms emphatically that we know that when we are done with the earthly body, the house of our tabernacle, with our "personality-involved-

¹ H.L. Gudge, 2 Corinthians in WC
in-perishable body”¹ we have a heavenly house, "personality-glorified-by-spiritual-body",² a building made, not by man, but by God. From the image of the earthly body as a tent, St. Paul points to that of clothing. We groan and earnestly desire to be clothed with the house which is from Heaven; with such clothing we shall not be found naked.³

While his expressions are as human and homely as anybody else's, nevertheless, he does not wish to be unclothed and stripped of this house; on the contrary he earnestly longs to put on a heavenly garment over it, so that what is mortal is swallowed up by life.⁴

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2. Ibid. pp.46 and 246 ns. 69, 70.

3. 2 Cor. 5-1-3: "οὐδὲμεν γὰρ ὅτι ἐὰν ἐκιόνης ἡμῶν οἰκία τοῦ σκηνούμενος καταλυθῇ, οἰκοδομὴν ἐκ θεοῦ ἐκκόμισαν οἰκίαν ἀκινητοῦ αἰῶνος ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς... τὸ αὐτοῦ τῆς ἡμῶν τοῦ τι ὁμοίου ἐπενδύσασθαι εἰς σαλωμόν. comp. also with Job 4.19; 2 Pet. 1.13, 14; 18.38.12; Rom. 8.23; 1 Cor. 15.44-49, 51-53; Col. 3.3-4; Ph. 3.20.

4. 2 Cor. 5.4: "... ἐφ' ὧν θέλομεν ἐπενδύσασθαι ἀλλ' ἐπενδύσασθαι, ἵνα καταποθῇ τὸ θνητὸν ὑπὸ τῆς ζωῆς", comp. with Is. 25.8; 1 Cor. 15.53-54.
In addition to it and in v. 5, the Apostle goes on to insist time and again that it is God who effects this change, by His Spirit, who was given to us as a guarantee, "pledge and instalment", (Moffat) the assurance of its truth.\(^1\)

The resume of the vvs. 6-8, I think is simply this: though the assurance of the Holy Spirit inspires confidence, the fact remains that the life in the body is likened to the life of an exile away from Christ; for it is by faith we walk, not by sight. When we can see God face to face, then we shall have full communion, fellowship and union with Christ; for that reason we would really rather be away from the body and at home with the Lord.\(^2\)

Finally, he concludes that our most important task is to do God's will here and please Him, for we must all appear before the judgment seat of Christ and each of us will receive his due reward or punishment for

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1. 2 Cor. 5.5; comp. with Rom. 8.16, 23; 2 Cor. 1.22.
2. 2 Cor. 5.6-8: "... μᾶλλον ἐκδημήσαι ἐκ τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἐνδημήσαι πρὸς τὸν Κύριον". see also Phil. 1.23.
the things he did in the body, good or bad.¹

2. After the recapitulation of the above controversial section, its relation to 1 Cor. 15 calls for some comments.

In v.1 and indeed in the whole passage, some scholars detect a hellenization, hellenistic influences.

Thus Thackeray traces a hellenistic influence on Paul's thought and in particular a literary connection only – without any basic alteration of his views concerning the resurrection body – between 2 Cor. 5.1, 4 and Wisdom 9.15: "for a perishable body presses down the soul, and this tent of clay weighs down the teeming wind" (trans. JB). (..<φθαρτόν γάρ σώμα βαρύνει φυσίν, καὶ βρύζει τῷ τε
γέωδες σκῆμος μοῖν πολυφρόντιδα.) which goes back to Pythagoreans and Plato.²

1. 2 Cor. 5.9-10.

2. For parallels and other references see also in C. Clemen, Primitive Christianity and its non-Jewish Sources, Edinburgh (1912) pp.68-9; H. Windisch, Der Zweite Korintherbrief, Gottingen (1924) p.158; W.L. Knox, St. Paul and the Church of the Gentiles, Cambridge (1939) pp.136-7 n.8; W.D. Davies, Paul and Rabbinic Judaism, pp.311-12, n.1.
Further, some other scholars who support the above view, argue as follows: Windisch argues that St. Paul shows here a clear similarity to Hellenism in his dualistic anthropology.¹ Here are his words: "Mit dem Griechentum und der durch Plato beeinflussten hellenistischen Religionsphilosophie teilt Paulus jedenfalls die dualistische Antropologie und das bedruckende Gefühl, dass dieser irdische Leib eine Last für den Geist ist, ein beengendes Kleid, eine Fessel oder ein Gefangnis, wie die Hellenisten in ihren Vergleichen es ausdrücken"!!

Knox, starting from his general position that Paul's epistles show a progressive adaptation of the Christian message to the general mental outlook of the

¹. H. Windisch, Der Zweite Korintherbrief, p. 164; R. Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, I, pp. 201-2, accepts the same position: "The case of 2 Cor. 5.1 ff is different. Here Paul comes very close to Hellenistic-Gnostic dualism not merely in form of expression .... but also in the thought itself".
Hellenistic world, maintains that St. Paul's 2 Cor. 5 "is largely devoted to a complete revision of Pauline eschatology in a Hellenistic sense". To prove his case he discusses it at some length in the succeeding pages and makes the points: the Apostle, on the one hand, speaks about the body as a burden from which he earnestly longs to be delivered; on the other hand, the notion that the "present state of the Christian life as one in which the soul was an exile from its true home in heaven", because the soul itself or the highest part of the soul "was of divine origin and, although a celestial being, imprisoned in the material

1. W. L. Knox, St. Paul and the Church of the Gentiles, p. 26 n. 2; Ibid. p. 128. Others who take the same view in a different way are: Pfleiderer, Teichmann, Holtzmann and others, whose views are examined and criticised by A. Schweitzer, Paul and his Interpreters, London (1912) pp. cf. 69 ff; C. Clcmen, Primitive Christianity and its non-Jewish Sources, p. 367, where he supports the view that 2 Cor. 5.1-10 depends on Greek philosophy and that the same passage is "the clearest instance of Paul's indebtedness to Greek philosophy"; W. H. P. Hatch, "St. Paul's view of the future life" in Paulus-Hellas-Oekumene, Athens (1951) p. 96, concludes that though Judaism and Hellenist religion fundamentally are quite distinct and differ a great deal in almost all points, notwithstanding they exercised an influence on the formation of Paul's ideas on the future life.

world", is basically of Hellenistic origin.¹

A refutation of the above view is carried out by Schweitzer,² Davies,³ and Grundmann.⁴ Their contentions may be expressed in Davies words: "The language of Paul can be explained without recourse to Hellenistic sources".⁵

Some other scholars maintain that St. Paul's thought in the interval between writing 1 Cor. 15 and writing 2 Cor. 5.1-10 had undergone a very significant development, that is, reviewing his previous position of the matter (in 1 Cor. 15) in the face of death (2 Cor. 1.8-10), he now puts forward new ideas.

1. W.L. Knox, St. Paul and the Church of the Gentiles, p.140.


Charles, for instance, argues that St. Paul felt in the interval between the time of writing First and Second Corinthians, the inconsistency of his earlier traditional view concerning the Resurrection body at the Parousia and now in the 2 Cor., he adopts the resurrection of the righteous following immediately on death. He next sees no contradiction between 1 Cor. 15.35-49 and 2 Cor. 5.1-8 concerning the idea of the future body as a divine gift, but maintains that they complement each other.1

Pfleiderer, on the other hand, argues that both Greek and Jewish concepts could co-exist quite harmlessly side by side in Paul's mind, for a shorter or longer period, "without any thought of their essential inconsistency".¹

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¹ O. Pfleiderer, *Paulinism*, Vol. I, p.264; A. Schweitzer, *Paul and his Interpreters*, p.77, finding Pfleiderer's view "an untenable theoretical hypothesis", further remarks "From the whole range of the history of thought no analogy could be produced for this harmonious co-existence of two different worlds of thought"; Dr. J. Lowe, "An Examination of attempts to detect developments in St. Paul's Theology", *The Journal of Theological Studies*, (July-Oct. 1941) Vol. XLII, pp.129-142, cf. 141-42, after examining the character of the letters, the chronology, the topic of eschatology in the Pauline letters and Knox and Dodd's views at some length, holds the above view too. He characteristically concludes: "One of the essential clues to Paul's thinking is surely this coupling of opposite poles, this tireless emission of flashes of insight which he never bothers to relate to one another .... these revolutionary ideas with an almost reactionary conservatism in the matter of social practice, this streaky mixture of Hebraic and Hellenic elements ... Fortunately he left the whole wonderful muddle unarranged and alive, and we are the richer for it". In our day some others taking up the point in excellent and very illuminating papers, assert the following: R.F. Hettinger, "2 Corinthians 5.1-10", *Scottish Journal of Theology* (1957) Vol. 10, No. 2, pp.174-194 cf. 191-4, first discusses the views advanced by others and secondly argues that this transition and development of thought was for St. Paul important, but not central and, though he expected to die before the Parousia, nevertheless he still lived with the threat of the end of this age. Further, he summarizes his exposition as follows (p.194): "In other words, although baptism and not death is the decisive moment for the Christian, he does
1. (Contd. from Page 226). enter at death upon a significantly new stage of that embodiment in Christ which will be consummated at the Parousia"; R. Berry, "Death and life in Christ: the meaning of 2 Corinthians 5.1-10", Scottish Journal of Theology (1961) Vol. 14, No. 1, pp.60-76, after considering the verses of the text 2 Cor. 5.1-10 one by one and Hettlinger's views on it, and rejecting (ibid. p.67) the change of mind attributed to Paul, upholds the view that St. Paul "was in two minds about death", disliking and drawing back from the aspect of "nakedness" and longing for the other aspect of it, the communion and fellowship with Christ; C.F.D. Moule, "St. Paul and dualism", New Testament Studies (1962) Vol. 12, No. 2, pp.107-23, while he does not reject the supported view of a change in St. Paul's outlook between 1 Cor. 15 and 2 Cor. 5.1-10, he examines it from a different angle. He sees the difference between 1 Cor. 15 and 2 Cor. 5.1-10 not in the when, the moment of the change, as in the manner of it. As he has it (p.116) "the change is in Paul's ideas about the relation between the two phases of *soma*, between *soma psychicon* and *soma pneumatikon*, between the body of humiliation and the body of glory, between the "outward and the inward" and further (p.123): "the essential distinction between his positions in 1 Cor. 15 and 2 Cor. 5 is only that, in the former, he too lightly looked for addition, whereas by 2 Cor. 5, he was more realistically reckoning with exchange; and that throughout his thinking in the extant epistles, he maintains, with remarkable tenacity, a basic consistency regarding dualism". By dualism he means not the metaphysical or demonic dualism but the moral one, that is, "the dualism of will—a dualism of obedience and disobedience". (pp. 106-7, 121-3).
Paul's ideas on the future life, on a subject so vital and essential, has been subjected to severe criticism by many scholars.

Kennedy, for example, has sharply criticized the theory of those writers who hold the hypothesis of St. Paul's alteration of mind within such a short period of time, a hypothesis which "really springs from a literalistic, pedantic interpretation". He further, excluding any reference of time, of period, in 2 Cor. 5.1, claims that the same passage may be taken as equivalent to that of 1 Cor. 15.38, "God giveth it a body". Furthermore he argues that the

2. "οἰκοδομήν ἐκ θεοῦ ἐξομεν" Vulg. "quod aedificationem ex Deo habemus"; AV "a building of God"; NEB "a building which God has provided"; RSV "a building from God".
3. H.A.A. Kennedy, *St. Paul's Conception of the Last Things*, pp. 265-6; E.E. Ellis, "2 Corinthians 5.1-10 in Pauline eschatology", in *New Testament Studies* (1960) Vol. 6, No. 3, p. 217, maintains that "heavenly habitation" is not an individual spiritual body at all, but it refers to the corporate solidarity in Christ. He acquiesces in the judgment of J.A.T. Robinson, *The Body*, p. 76, who writes "whenever Paul uses the word (except in the purely figurative sense of 'edification'), it means the Body of Christ, the Church (1 Cor. 3.9; Eph. 2.21; 4.12, 16) not an individual body". R. Berry, op. cit. p. 62, observes that Robinson's suggestion is unconvincing and "the statistical evidence he adduces is insufficient to uphold his contention"; P.E. Hughes, 2 Cor. in *NLCNT*, additional note on 5.1-10, p. 184, argues to the same effect.
words of 2 Cor. 5.4: "For while we are still in this tent, we sigh with anxiety; not that we would be unclothed, but that we would be further clothed, so that what is mortal may be swallowed up by life" (trans. RSV) "give a hint of St. Paul's earnest desire and hope of surviving to the Parousia, and so escaping the terrifying experience of death".  

In addition, he protests against those who read in St. Paul's words "we may not be found naked" (οὐ γυμνοὶ εὑρεθήσομεν) (2 Cor. 5.3),

an intermediate state, calling such notion

1. H.A.A. Kennedy, St. Paul’s Conceptions of the Last Things, p. 268. The same position is maintained by R.H. Strachan, 2 Corinthians in Moffat NTC p. 100, who follows Kennedy; G.B. Stevens, The Pauline Theology, p. 358-9, is content to note that Paul does not give any definite answer to this problem, "beyond expressing the confident hope that the believer enters at death into fellowship with Christ"; W.D. Davies, Paul and Rabbinic Judaism, p. 318, asserts that "there is no room in Paul's theology for an intermediate state of the dead"; Oenke "γυμνός" in TtNT, E.T. Vol. 1, pp. 774-5, rejects any idea of intervening state; also E.E. Ellis, "2 Cor. 5.1-10 in Pauline Eschatology", New Testament Studies (1960) Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 222 cf. 224; Scholars who interpret the "naked" as implying disembodied intermediate state are: A. Plummer, 2 Corinthians, in ICC, p. 147 ff; A. Schweitzer, The Mysticism of St. Paul, p. 134; and most particularly, O. Cullmann, Christ and Time (SCM paperback) pp. 238-9, citing some quotations from Pauline letters, supports the same view; Idem. Immortality of the Soul or Resurrection of the Dead, London (1955) p. 52-7; J.A.T. Robinson, The Body, pp. 29, 77; J.N. Sevenster, "Some Remarks on the γυμνός in 2 Cor. 5.3", Studia Paulina, Harlem (1953) pp. 206-7 and 210-11 and Paul and Seneca, Leiden (1961) pp. 238-9, where he advocates an interim state. He suggests that St. Paul probably believed that soul in the future life "would continue to live on separately .... for the period that elapses between the death of the individual and the resurrection of the dead and the last judgement". The individual does not lose his identity, but he exists in the intervening period in a state of nakedness (2 Cor. 5.3), "which probably means in the soul detached from the body". He further accepts the fact that the Apostle does not elaborate on the point; F. Prat, The Theology of St. Paul, Vol. 2, pp. 358-9, remarks that "the Apostle says nothing on the subject", nonetheless

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"imaginary hypothesis".

He goes on to observe on the same point the following, which is worth quoting: "We do not attribute to the Apostle any theory of a sleep of the

1. (Contd. from page 230). he is of the opinion that the bare facts demand such a view. It must be further noted that Dr. Ellis, op. cit. pp.219-21, interprets the adjective "naked" in a different way. He firstly believes that "the Greek trail has been a false detour". Next he attempts an exposition of the "naked" on the basis of Old Testament eschatology and not on the Greek anthropology. His suggested exegesis amounts to this equation: in the Old Testament, late Judaism and in the New Testament "nakedness (or being stripped) and shame often denote the guilty under the glaring light of God's judgement and are virtually equivalent terms". Thus naked does not refer to a disembodied soul, but to judgement and simply means guilty ".... without the garment"; Prof. C.D.F. Moule, "St. Paul and Dualism", op. cit. p.121 n.1, says that this interpretation "is scarcely plausible".
soul or of a meditative condition of calm waiting in preparation for a fuller bliss ... Nor may infer any notion of semi-consciousness or the like.  

Gudge is another scholar who rejects, without any hesitation, the idea of a Hellenistic influence on 2 Corinthians 5.1-10, and offers a solution on the lines of Kennedy more or less.

Since quite a few writers have adopted his exposition in recent years, we regard it necessary to summarise it very briefly.

1. O. Cullmann, *Immortality of the Soul or Resurrection of the Dead*, pp. 48-57 cf. 51-57, produces the startling view that interim state for the soul implies "sleep of the soul", in other words the verb *koimaomai-koimomai* could be said to have two meanings: the meaning of death and the meaning of unconsciousness. His exposition, though attractive and interesting at first sight, is rather unconvincing and it does not do justice to his arguments. After all nothing is new in his short book. Others have dealt with the matter briefly or in detail before him. The great attraction and the real contribution to theology is that he draws, with his customary clarity and weight of scholarship, a clear distinction between the Greek doctrine of immortality and the Christian doctrine of resurrection of the dead; Ch. Masson, "Immortalité de l'âme ou resurrection des morts?" *Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie* (1958) Vol. 8, n. 265, is of the opinion that Cullmann's ideas on the resurrection of the body and the intermediate state are irreconcilable with the teaching of the Apostle Paul; D.E.H. Whiteley, *The Theology of St. Paul*, pp. 262-71, reaches a like conclusion by a different way.

Goudge's argument very briefly runs somewhat as follows:

1. Vvs. 2 Cor. 5.1-2 are related to 1 Cor. 15.38, 47, 52, 53-54 and refer to the hope of the resurrection body to be received at the Parousia.¹

2. Vvs. 2 Cor. 5.3-4 are paralleled to 1 Cor. 15.53, 54 and express the Apostle's apprehensiveness of dying before the Parousia and so experiencing a term of incompleteness (nakedness) instead of an immediate transition from the state of mortality to that of the resurrection.²

3. From vv. 5-10 Paul speaks about the victory over this apparent fear with confidence on the grounds that God has given us His Spirit as a pledge and the tribunal of Christ, before which we will stand at the Lord's return.³

¹ H.L. Goudge, 2 Corinthians, London (1928²) in WC, pp.45-7 and 52-3.
² Ibid. pp.47-8 and 52-3.
³ Ibid. pp.48-9 and 51.
4. There is no inconsistency whatsoever between the teaching of the 1 Cor. 15 and 2 Cor. 5.1-10. ("The second epistle was written but a few months after the first, and the teaching of the first Epistle about the body of the future is the chief doctrinal teaching to be found in it").¹

What shall we say to this divergence of opinions concerning the relation of 2 Cor. 5.1-10 to 1 Cor. 15?

1. H.L. Goudge, op. cit. pp.45 and 52. Other writers who support the same view are: A. Plummer, 2 Corinthians in ICC, p.161; James Denney, 2 Corinthians in Ex. B. London (1594) pp.178-84; F.V. Filson, 2 Corinthians, New York (1953) in IB, pp.326-32; O. Cullmann, Christ and Time, SCM, pp.238-9; R. Hanson, 2 Corinthians, Torch Commentary, p.47; A.M. Ramsey, The Resurrection of Christ (in Fontana Books) pp.109-10; L.S. Thornton, The Common Life in the Body of Christ, London (1944) pp.284-6, in a brief but excellent additional note, "St. Paul on the Resurrection of the Body", shares also Goudge's interpretation. Points of interest are: (1) 2 Cor. 5.1 corresponds to 1 Cor. 15.38 and 2 Cor. 2-4 correspondingly to 1 Cor. 15.53, 54 and (2) "both passages emphasize the continuity which connects the two forms. In 1 Cor. 15 this is effected by the analogy from nature. In 2 Cor. 5.5 it is effected by reference to the ἀρραβών of the Spirit".
Not much really, for we dealt with the matter of the two sections of the two Corinthians in a sketchy way and it lies outside the main scope of the present chapter, which is, as it is understood, to discover the true meaning of Resurrection body.

Then, we should be too naive if we should claim that we can offer a new reconciliatory solution, since "great scholars, past and present, have confessed to bewilderment"¹ and "Paul is talking about things that no one really knows anything about. He is not talking about verifiable matters of fact, but about matters of faith. He is trying to express the inexpressible and to describe the indescribable ... Paul is again dealing with things which defy language and which baffle expression".²


2. W. Barclay, The Letters to the Corinthians, pp.175, 178.
However this may be, we simply say this: in the main we agree with and endorse Kennedy's and Gouge's interpretation as well-founded and convincing, for reasons given ad loc. and on the ground that it involves no departure from the teaching of 1 Cor. 15. Since this is so, we may safely say that both passages express a coherent teaching about the resurrection body to be received at the Parousia.

Consequently, an assumption which detects a Hellenization of 2 Cor. 5.1-10, a difference, a conflict, between the two texts, and a development in St. Paul's mind must be ruled out.

The former supposition of Hellenistic influences on the passage has skilfully been refuted by Davies, the latter of the radical transformation does not stand logical scrutiny, or as Stevens would put it, is "an assumption wholly destitute of proof and in

1. W.D. Davies, Paul and Rabbinic Judaism, pp.311-14.
It is impossible to believe that St. Paul changed his views in such a short time on a subject on which he believed so firmly and passionately and concerning which he wrote "If we live, we live to the Lord, and if we die, we die to the Lord; so then whether we live or whether we die, we are the Lord's" (Rom. 14.8 RSV trans.).

There is not a single passage in the Pauline letters, as far as we know, which alludes to such an alteration. The alleged 2 Cor. 1.8-9 does not really suggest that this terrifying experience Paul had gone through could alter his views on

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1. Comp. with the much quoted Wernle's dictum: "The man who wrote the great Resurrection chapter in 1 Corinthians, did not possess the capacity for altering his opinions which belongs to the modern theologian", qtd. by H.A.A. Kennedy, St. Paul's Conceptions of the Last Things, p.271; also with L.S. Thornton's words, The Common Life in the Body of Christ, p.286, which point to the same effect: "... if the teaching of 2 Cor. 5. 1-10 were in radical conflict with that of 1 Cor. 15 and were meant to supercede it, then the solemn protest of 2 Cor. 2.17 would be a vain and empty boast".
Resurrection in general. The emphasis here is on his unshaken trust and confidence in God.

Let us bring this discussion of the present chapter to an end. What has finally emerged from it?

As we have already said, and we repeat here, for St. Paul the Resurrection body is neither the disembodied soul or spirit, nor the embodied spirit or soul, but the inherent organic continuum, a psycho-physical organism, a psycho-somatic union, a unified person, fit and suitable for the new, glorious and perfect life in the world to come. In more modern terms when St. Paul speaks of resurrection body, he is concerned with the wholeness of man, with the entire man, with the individual, with the real person, the personality, the self, the "I", the "ego", who will be raised, not because of his natural right, but because of Our Lord Jesus Christ's Resurrection. Our own resurrection in full consciousness and intelligence is not our natural possession, but the royal gift of God to us through our Risen Lord and
C. D. F. Moule, op. cit. p. 116, finds the individual's identity maintained throughout the Pauline writings. Ipsissima verba do not readily admit of summary and are quoted as they stand: "It is not that the soul escapes from the body's prison .... but that an entire person, a dies, and the same person is raised to life. It is not the same form: there is a radical transformation. He dies mortal and corruptible and is raised a glorious body; he dies animal and is raised spiritual. But always it is the same individual".
An assessment – conclusion:

We have been dealing so far in Parts Two and Three with the reflections of Plato and St. Paul on the human soul and its immortality and have arrived at some conclusions. In the present chapter we bring together all our findings and attempt an assessment, with the sole purpose in mind of detecting similarities or dissimilarities, resemblances or differences.

Methodological considerations compel us to treat the comparison and contrast in the same pattern-division as in the previous parts.

The scope of the present chapter allows us only to make a general observation on this comparison and contrast, before we embark on it.

Neither Plato nor St. Paul can be regarded as scientific psychologists in the strictest modern sense of the word.

Neither the former, writing in dialogue style, nor the latter, writing in epistolary form, ever succeeded in fashioning their scattered ideas of the soul in a uniform, systematically elaborated and consistent corpus of dogma. They do not give us a scientific analysis of the theory (doctrine) of the soul. Neither sets out an ordered system, but both deal with problems concerning the soul and its immortality as and when they occur in the
course of the discussion, making use of terms, (more particularly St. Paul) not accurately and precisely, but with a certain degree of approximation.

However this may be, it does not prevent us from saying that they have contributed a great deal towards the understanding of inner conflict of man and his perplexed problems and made some valuable and acute psychological observations which have found their place in the history of psychology, anthropology, philosophy and theology in general. It would be a grave mistake, and we should be unjust critics of both, if we did not point out here that their theories of the immortality of the soul and of the resurrection of the body are in a more precise, logical, coherent and dialectic way.

From the above general remarks we pass on to another concerning the view of man in both writers.

Plato views man in dualistic fashion with accent on the superiority of the soul.

For him man is a compound structure, consisting of two clearly distinct entities; body which is mortal, a tool, and instrument of the soul and which in time passes away, and soul which is a senior and permanent entity,

1. For the difference between the body and soul we shall see more later.
immortal, the real man, in short, the man, as we have already seen.

Such a dualistic description is absent from our Pauline writings. St. Paul thinks of man along monistic lines. Man is not conceived by Paul in the Platonic dual fashion, but in the Hebraic one. Man is neither soul, spirit nor body alone, but an essential unity, a unitary organism, a psycho-physical organism, the entire man, what we call personality under different functions. Man is a living and indissoluble unity; body, soul and spirit together. These component parts have meaning only in connection with the totality of his being. Man is viewed as a unity, an ensouled body, rather than an embodied soul. Perhaps we may give Bultmann's Ipsessima verba, as well stating the conception of man: "Man does not consist of two parts, much less of three; nor are psyche and pneuma special faculties or principles (within the soma) of a mental life higher than his animal life. Rather man is a living unity. He is a person who becomes an object to himself. He is a person having a relationship to himself (soma). He is a person who lives in his intentionality, his pursuit of some purpose, his willing and knowing (psyche, pneuma). This state of living toward some goal, having some attitude, willing something and
knowing something belongs to man's very nature and in itself is neither good nor bad."¹.

¹. R. Bultmann, *Theology of the N.T.*, Vol. X., p. 209; S. Laenchli, "Monism and Dualism in Pauline Anthropology", *Biblical Research* (Papers of the Chicago Society of Biblical Research) 3, (1958), 15 - 27, protests against those who interpret Paul's view of man along monistic Hebraistic lines. He, for his part, urges that man in Pauline letters must be examined in pluralistic terms, though "this pluralism' within Paul's view of the man is not his basic concern. His central drive is theological, the newness of the man in Christ as the break-in in to the old sarx.
Since the real man, the true self is soul for Plato, and he gives it such prominence, it follows that there must be clear-cut and distinct differences between the Platonic conception of soul and the Pauline one.

In the philosophy of Plato the soul is a pure spiritual principle, a rational distinct entity, the subject of thought and intelligence; it is the self mover and the source and first principle of all other things that are moved, the source of life, the origin of life, the life itself, and as such it is bound to be immortal, divine, indestructible and ungenerated.

Whereas the platonic soul is portrayed in such a colourful way - still in a general manner - in Paul's Epistles it does not hold the same exceptionally prominent position. Its infrequent use denotes the same as the \( \psi \) of the Old Testament and \( \phi \) of the LXX, that is, breathing, the vital principle, the principle of animal and human life involving a state of consciousness, of will and feeling, which disappears with death.

The soul retires, as is well known, into the background and its place is taken by the infinitely important word 'spirit', a term far richer in meaning than 'soul'.

Though the term spirit is of paramount importance for Paul's theology and anthropology and very
indeed, we are not to think of it in a platonic sense. It cannot be described as a distinct pure spiritual or intellectual entity of the human constitution. Such a view is hardly plausible in the Pauline letters. We are safe, if we interpret spirit in a psychological sense as signifying the source of human consciousness, intelligence, the seat of feeling and will; spirit is the ruling inner power of our entire human existence. It is this power of our spirit which directs all our intellectual activities, thoughts, emotions, etc. What is more important "In Paul the human spirit may perhaps be described as the God-conscious element in man, which is dormant or dead until it is stirred into life by the Spirit of God. Or it may be thought of 'as the Christian personality' of men who, if we may put it so, are not only alive, but 'Christianly' alive." 1.

So far we have compared and contrasted the definition of man and human soul in both writers.

Now we go on to compare and contrast the Pauline and Platonic views of the soul-body relationship, division of the soul and the immortality of the soul and the resurrection of the body.

1. F.F. Bruce, Romans in T.N.T.C., p. 48; see also supra p. ; also in W. Barclay, Flesh and Spirit, p. 14; see also supra p 165, n.1.
With reference to the soul's origin, Plato seems as if he were in two minds - and using two different languages: sometimes he speaks of the soul as uncreated, ungenerated and absolutely without beginning, (Phaedrus). At other times he refers to it either as being created by Demiurge (Timeus: A mythical view) or as being produced first, as the first born of all things and prior to the body (Laws). These antithetical views, as we have said in the preceding pages combined and interpreted in an appropriate manner lead to the conclusion that Plato hardly envisaged any creation of the human soul in time.

However this may be, we feel with Proclus, Cherniss, Hackforth and Rankin that the human soul is a "process", not necessarily, of course, a physical one, but an intermediate one between the true and eternal principles and ultimate realities, the Form and the Universe. It may then be said that the human soul is a derivative existence like the physical world, depending on something more ultimate, more transcendent indeed, upon the real being of ideas, and more particularly upon the Idea of Good, which is not only the source of knowledge and truth and of the very being, but it is beyond being, surpassing it in dignity and power.

Though St. Paul has not dealt with the matter at
length, he is more explicit about it.

He ascribes the soul's origin to God. He teaches nothing new about the creation of the soul, for he repeats what the Old Testament (Gen. 2-7) teaches. There it is categorically stated that man's creation as a whole, as one unit, as a psycho-somatic organism, is due to a distinct divine creative act, by which it was drawn into being from sheer nothingness. As a consequence of this the soul was created directly and immediately by God out of nothing. Therefore the soul's creation is the result of God's personal intervention and special act of creation in time. In speaking of the soul's creation we must not understand, as we have already said, the infusion of breath by God into the nostrils of man in terms of an independent element and distinct spiritual, divine, immortal part of man, as with Plato, but simply as denoting the animal life, the vital power which gives life to the body and cannot exist outside and without it.

With regard to the soul's relation to the body, Plato treats the whole question in dualistic fashion. Soul and body are treated as belonging to two different worlds and as being separate, distinct and independent entities. The soul, as we have seen, in every way resembles the invisible and belongs to the divine, immaterial and eternal realm:
The body is related to the visible world and belongs to the material and sensible world. It is mortal, subject to corruption and will decay after the moment of physical death. But what is more important is this: While the psyche is the reviving force of the body, confines itself in it during life on earth and is likened by Plato to a sailor in a boat or to a prisoner in a jail, body, according to Plato's estimation is nothing but a prison-house, a tomb, an encumbrance, a hindrance to the soul; it acts as a perpetual impediment to the higher activities of the soul and on the whole is the source of evil, disorder and corruption.

We hardly meet a similar view in Pauline writings, for St. Paul scarcely thinks of man's make-up in dualistic terms. For him the body is not a detachable, separate part of man which is distinguished in dualistic fashion from the soul.

Paul does not regard the body as evil, responsible for the sins of man, and in a word identical with the flesh, though he seems to do so, at least in some passages; nevertheless other passages speak against this identification and mark the difference between sarx and soma, as has been already shown.

The human body is neither despised nor condemned in
the Pauline letters, on the contrary it is given a prominent and an honourable place in Pauline Theology and anthropology.

He writes that for the Christian the body is God's shrine, the temple of the Holy Spirit. Further the body can be redeemed, transformed and recreated, can be taken and offered as a living sacrifice to God, and with it and in it every man must honour and glorify God.

It can be said then, that in Paul's thought the body is not basically bad, but is accessible to God or evil and its fate "depends on which force controls it for good or evil."¹

We hardly need to look for a parallelism or at least for an analogy on the division of the soul.

Both views differ widely and contradict each other in content and form.

The obvious big difference between the two views is this in general: Plato is concerned with the threefold division of the soul and Paul is concerned with the trichotomy of the entire man, if there is any. We say "if there is any", because our investigation has shown that neither writer holds such views.

¹ W. Barclay, *Flesh and Spirit*, P. 17.
Plato, on the one hand, assumes an incomposite, uncompounded and simple soul with, so to speak, mental impulses, aspects, spiritual faculties, transitory and temporary manifestations, modes or phases, owing their existence to the soul's connection with the body, and not with the three real and distinct parts or elements.

St. Paul, on the other hand, does not set out a scientific trichotomic theory of man in a single passage; he simply speaks of the preservation and sanctification of man in his completeness, in his totality, in a loose, rhetorical traditional language.

The noteworthy sharp distinction and main difference between the Platonic immortality of the soul and the Pauline resurrection is the following. Plato teaches that the soul as a purely spiritual, rational, simple and indestructible entity will continue in unending and eternal existence, apart from the body. The soul for Plato is inherently and intrinsically immortal, viz. in its own right and in virtue of its nature as soul, by its inherent deathlessness,

St. Paul neither teaches such a view nor does he make any claim to do so.

There is no room in St. Paul's teaching for an inherently disembodied soul or spirit.
The Apostle is not concerned with the immortality of the psyche or spirit as separated and distinct parts, but with the resurrection of the whole complex soul-spirit-body of man, of the whole man's make up as the consequence of Christ's Resurrection.

Paul's conception of the resurrection-body has nothing to do with the resuscitation of dead bodies in the grave.

His conception of resurrection body may be better expressed as the transformation, re-creation, reconstitution and resurrection by the power of God, of the whole man's unity, of the same person, of the personality, of the true self, of the psycho-somatic organism, of the human psycho-physical individual.

Our future resurrection will take place not as our own natural possession, but as the royal gift of God.

Thus St. Paul conceives of the resurrection of believers as an act and gift of God through our risen Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, and not as an inherent right of their very being.

Arriving at the end of our enquiry we draw the following general conclusion:

It is abundantly clear throughout our research that Plato has not exercised any influence upon St. Paul directly or indirectly concerning the nature of the human
soul and its immortality.

There is neither similarity nor any affinity whatsoever between the two on the matter under discussion.

There is not even any community of mind or real kinship of thought between those two giants of human spirit who have changed the course of history and the pattern of European thought and of human life as a whole with their teachings.

1. Prof. E.J. Price, "Paul and Plato", The Hibbert Journal, (Oct. 1917 - July 1918) (1918) Vol. 16, pp. 263-282, in an interesting article has brought together some passages and carried out a survey in order to point out the affinities between the two. His whole attempt amounts to this: "This survey of the teaching of Paul and Plato reveals not a little affinity between those two great minds. I do not suggest that Paul was Platonist or borrowed his leading ideas from the founder of the Academy. Many of the coincidences which I have brought forward may appear superficial; very often, no doubt, they can be explained as merely accidental approximations of Greek and Hebrew thought. Still, the general result should be that the indirect influence of Greek thought on the mind of Paul was greater than is often supposed;" and further ...... "The religious affinities between Paul, the theologian of the primitive Church, and Plato, the theologian of the Greek Schools ...... because of the very real affinities the thought of Plato and the New Testament;" Though his article is a praiseworthy and valuable attempt, nevertheless, and with all due respect to his learning, it seems to us unconvincing. His arguments on "psychology" (cf. pp. 274-77) and the inference which primarily concerns us, do not, strictly speaking, stand logical scrutiny and strict scientific criticism. His
We then maintain that

1) We cannot speak loosely and lightly about similarities or parallisms in whatever form between the two great thinkers on the theory of the human psyche and its destiny after death. There is no affinity or...
similarity whatsoever between them either in ideas, language, form, content, points of doctrine or phraseology. The difference between them in what we have discussed is sharply distinct and real.

2) St. Paul's borrowings directly from the Old Testament, to which he gives new meaning, are only those which concern immediately the human soul, that is, its meaning and origin (Creation: Imago Dei, Gen. 2:1, 26, 27 and Gen. 2-7) and partly the human body, spirit and trichotomy of man.

3) Most of the material set out in the preceding pages is purely Pauline, entirely his own, and wholly Christian. We say "wholly Christian" because we believe that the meaning of man and his destiny in the life to come, the Pauline anthropology and eschatology, in general can be studied, examined and understood only through and in relation to Incarnate, Crucified and Risen Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, and not apart from him. Any attempt to examine it on a purely philosophi-

1. Comp. also W.D. Stacey: The Pauline View of Man, p. 241: "From studying St. Paul we have learnt little about the constitution of man, but very much about man in relation to God. The Christian believer will not regret this because it is for religion, and not for psychology, that we turn to
and psychological basis, lexicological and linguistic segmentation alone would fail. Such an attempt, apart from Christ and in isolation, would not produce the expected logical results.

(Cont'd from p.254) the Bible. If we can understand what Paul said about man in relation to God, we shall have gained new light on the meaning and purpose of the Christian Faith itself."
256.

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