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A Study of

the Mind-Body Theory in Spinoza
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by

Sam-Yel Park

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Arts in Fulfilment of the
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Abstract

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This thesis investigates Spinoza’s mind-body theory starting with the discussion of the diverse interpretations of his mind-body theory such as hylomorphism, idealism, epiphenomenalism, and materialism. From the critical comments on inadequacies of these interpretations, it turns out that Spinoza’s argument of the relationship between the mind and the body should be understood as holding that there is a non-causal relationship between the mind and the body and that they have equal weight.

Although the parallelistic interpretation is compatible with the above understandings, we cannot ascribe traditional parallelism to Spinoza. His parallelism is derived from his argument of identity between the mind and the body, which is based on his substance monism and attribute dualism. We should therefore understand Spinoza’s mind-body theory as an identity theory which leads to a parallel relationship between the mind and the body. Since the double aspect theory argues both identity and parallelism between the mind and the body, the doctrine we should ascribe to Spinoza is the double aspect theory.

Furthermore, owing to the fact that Spinoza maintains substance monism and attribute dualism (assuming an objective view of the attributes of thought and extension, which are distinct), there is, in Spinoza’s theory, an identity between mental and physical events while there is no identity between mental and physical properties: the mental and the physical events are one and the same event described under mental and physical properties, respectively. From the fact that Spinoza finds identity in individuals or events, but not in properties, it follows that his theory should also be understood as a kind of token identity theory.
There are difficulties in this interpretation. Spinoza tries to combine mind-body identity with the separation of attributes, but some have argued that the identity would threaten the doctrine that thought and extension are causally separate. Again, some have argued that if the attributes are distinct then a substance has more than one essence; while if they are not really distinct, but only *seen as* distinct, then even God cannot know the true nature of reality. It is difficult to render Spinoza’s claims both consistent and plausible, but I have tried to find arguments for some of Spinoza’s claims in this area: my interpretation of Spinoza’s mind-body theory entails both token identity and property (or conceptual) parallelism whilst ruling out type identity as well as substance parallelism. So, I have called Spinoza’s mind-body theory a token double aspect theory.

Spinoza’s discussion of the representative nature of ideas does not sit easily with his doctrine of parallelism, at least so far as finite beings are concerned. I have tried to make the doctrines consistent, but ultimately Spinoza seems to bring his representationalism and parallelism into line by appealing to the confused nature of human ideas.

Despite all the problems, Spinoza’s thought on mind and body has seemed to many to promise real insight into the nature of mind and body, and I have tried to see how far modern versions of materialism (anomalous monism), person theory, and some developments in cognitive science can be said to follow strands in Spinoza’s work.
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Abbreviations

_Ethics_ is cited by the following abbreviations: \( E = Ethics \), and indicates (1) Number of the Part, (2) Number of Axiom, Definition, Proposition or Postulate, (3) Where appropriate, Demonstrates, Corollary or Scholium, with the following abbreviations:

- `Ax` = Axiom
- `Corol` = Corollary
- `Def` = Definition
- `Demon` = Demonstration,
- `Post` = Postulate
- `Prop` = Proposition
- `Schol` = Scholium

Thus, for example, “E, II, Prop 13, Schol” stands for the scholium to proposition thirteen of part two of _Ethics_, and “E, II, Prop 16, Corol 2” stands for the second corollary to proposition sixteen of part two of _Ethics_.

Unless otherwise indicated in the footnotes, passages from Spinoza’s _Ethics_ in this thesis will be quoted from:


Although James Gutmann translates the Latin term “Scholium” as “Note”, I shall in this thesis use the term “Scholium”.

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Chapter One

Introduction
1. Introductory Remarks

There have been diverse interpretations of Spinoza’s doctrine of the relationship between the mind and the body—hylomorphism, idealism, epiphenomenalism, materialism, parallelism, and the double aspect theory—all of which are controversial. It seems that all interpreters of Spinoza have adopted one or other of these theories. In contemporary thought, however, there has been no consensus or agreement as to whether to adopt one theory or another to interpret and evaluate Spinoza’s solution to the mind-body problem and other related doctrines of his philosophy of mind and metaphysics.

I shall explicate the widely misunderstood interpretations of Spinoza’s account of the mind and its relation to the body, and then I shall elucidate Spinoza’s mind-body theory by offering a new idea: (1) Spinoza’s mind-body theory ought to be understood as involving token identity together with property (or conceptual) parallelism, and thus should be classified as a token double aspect theory, and (2) this double aspect theory could be supplemented by introducing the concept of representation. My belief is that this idea may provide a way of understanding Spinoza’s ambiguity on the mind-body problem which is caused by his perplexing views on the attributes of the one substance, and that may help to redefine the explanation of his mind-body theory and give it stronger support. Thus I shall try to unravel the difficulties behind Spinoza’s ideas and attempt to reveal the real meaning behind his thought.

To investigate Spinoza’s mind-body theory, I shall unfold this thesis from the following angles:

Firstly, in chapters two and three, I shall consider various interpretations of Spinoza’s mind-body theory in detail so that I can analyse the grounds and logic on which these interpretations are based, and try to find out how and why his theory was misunderstood.

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1 R. J. Delahunty informs us of the diverse interpretations (except idealism) and briefly comments on them in his Spinoza (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985), pp. 191–197.
Secondly, in chapter four, I shall concentrate on Spinoza’s doctrine of the attributes in order to establish a basis for interpreting Spinoza’s mind-body theory as the double aspect theory. I believe that Spinoza’s account of the relation of the mind to the body is inferred from substance monism together with attribute dualism.

Thirdly, in chapter five, I shall move on to argue for the validity of the double aspect theory, and try to explain why Spinoza’s mind-body theory should be considered as a version of the double aspect theory, which holds that the mind and the body are two different ways of describing the same thing, namely substance. I shall also consider the problems of interpreting Spinoza’s mind-body theory, comparing the double aspect theory with event-parallelism and deciding in favour of the former view. Furthermore, I shall offer a new interpretation that Spinoza’s mind-body theory entails both token identity and property parallelism whilst ruling out type identity as well as substance parallelism (event-parallelism): if Spinoza’s mind-body theory is a token identity theory, which leads to a parallel relationship between the mind and the body, we ought to regard Spinoza as a token double aspect theorist. In addition to this, I shall attempt to support the double aspect theory through the other areas of Spinoza’s thought, such as his metaphysical determinism and moral theory. Unlike his mind-body theory, it is accepted by most commentators that a consensus exists in interpreting Spinoza’s metaphysics as determinism, whereas his mind-body theory has been controversial with a variety of diverse interpretations. From my perspective, this kind of agreement or consensus regarding determinism could open the way towards seeking a solution to Spinoza’s account of the relation of the mind to the body. In fact, Spinoza’s account of the relation of the mind to the body relies on the one-substance doctrine, and this doctrine is also commonplace in the interpretation of Spinoza. Thus I shall consider Spinoza’s metaphysical determinism so as to find a clue to the solution of his mind-body problem through his determinism. I believe that we can acquire some understanding of Spinoza’s mind-body theory from his moral theory. Thus I shall also draw out Spinoza’s points of view on the moral theory which can provide insight into the interpretations of the relationship.
between the mind and the body. This kind of work may help to redefine the explanation of his mind-body theory and give it stronger support. In so doing, I shall show that the double aspect theory gives us the most fundamental perspective on Spinoza's system.

Fourthly, in chapter six, Spinoza's mind-body theory will be approached not only through his metaphysics but also through his epistemology. The former is the double aspect theory which is based on the relationship between the mind and the body, and the latter is representationalism which is based on the mind as the idea of the body. To understand Spinoza's mind-body theory in a comprehensive manner, we have to consider both doctrines. Therefore, I shall explore the concept of representation in Spinoza's mind-body theory.

Fifthly, in chapter seven, I shall explore whether Spinoza's mind-body theory can be aligned with any theory of contemporary philosophy of the mind. I believe that some contemporary versions of the mind-body problem are in some way related to Spinoza's mind-body theory and hold the possibility of demonstrating a connection with Spinoza's perspective. Thus I shall deal with cognitive science and Strawson's person theory, and also compare Spinoza's position with Davidson's anomalous monism. The concept of representation in cognitive science can be seen as having links with Spinoza's mind-body theory, as both argue for the importance of a representational function. However, Spinoza's notion of mental causation is more robust than that used in cognitive science. Strawson has a similar position to Spinoza in arguing identity not in the onesideness of materialism or idealism but in a common referent of the mind and the body. But for Strawson this dual ascription is limit to one sort of object, that is, humans in the world, whereas for Spinoza everything has both sorts of property. Furthermore, for Spinoza, there is an identity between mental and physical events, whereas for Strawson, mental events are not identical with physical events. Spinoza finds identity of the mental and physical within tokens or events as opposed to Strawson who finds identity within a primitive concept, person. As to Spinoza and Davidson, Spinoza's double aspect theory maintains that the mind is a thing which is described by the mental descriptions and the body is the very same
thing which is described by the physical descriptions. The core of his theory is that the mind and the body are one and the same individual although they have different types of descriptions. Similarly, Davidson’s anomalous monism argues that the mental event and the physical event are one and the same event, which has mental and physical descriptions respectively. Further, both of them claim the identity of mind and body without the reduction of one to the other. However, for Davidson physical descriptions dominate, whereas for Spinoza both descriptions are of equal weight. I think that this kind of work is worthwhile in considering how far his mind-body theory contributes, as a classic theory, towards mind-body problems and provides, a route to tackling this problem today.

Before proceeding with the main discourse, I shall briefly outline a preview of Spinoza’s mind-body theory which is based on my perspective so as to lay the foundation-stone of this thesis.

2. A Preview of Spinoza’s Mind-Body Theory

(1) God as Substance: Monism

One cannot understand many philosophers’ mind-body theories without first understanding their metaphysical systems. This is even more true of Spinoza whose mind-body theory is based on substance and attributes. In my view, Spinoza’s metaphysical monism which emphasises the unity of substance should also be considered in relation to his mind-body theory, since without God (substance), it is not possible for finite modes to exist and therefore his metaphysical system cannot be established. Further, Spinoza tells us directly that identity between the mind and the body is inferred from the one-substance doctrine:

[S]ubstance thinking and substance extended are one and the same substance, which is now comprehended under this attribute and now
under that. Thus [sic], also a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing expressed in two different ways. (E, II, Prop 7, Schol)

This quotation implies that, in order to find identity between the mind and the body in Spinoza's theory, we should rely on the one-substance doctrine. Bennett takes the above quotation not as an inference, but as a comparison by treating the Latin term sic as likewise. However, the fact that the mind and the body are modes of the one substance under the different attributes offers the interpretation that the relationship between the mind and the body follows the relationship between substance conceived under thought and substance conceived under extension. For Spinoza the mind and the body are the modifications of one and the same substance under the different attributes of thought and extension, respectively. As long as the mind and the body come from the one substance, Bennett's view that regards sic not as an inference but as a comparison is hardly acceptable to Spinoza's intention. Thus, I shall describe Spinoza's metaphysics before considering his mind-body theory, as I understand it.

The first part of Spinoza's *Ethics* is entitled "Of God," but it would be possible to entitle it "Of Substance," because the term Substance is used in defining "God" and more precisely, for Spinoza, God is no more than substance. Spinoza defines God as the "substance consisting of infinite attributes, each one of

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2 Bennett states that "I have rendered the Latin sic as 'likewise', which is one of its meanings. Another meaning is 'therefore'; but I think its sense here is comparative rather than inferential. Two identity propositions, each involving a straddle of the attributes, are being laid side by side and rightly implied to be similar" (Jonathan Bennett, *A Study of the Spinoza's Ethics* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984], p. 142).


4 Richard Schacht argues that "it would have been still better if it had been entitled 'Concerning Substance'; for this term is the most basic of the three [God, Substance, and Nature]" (*Classical Modern Philosophers: Descartes to Kant* [London: Routledge, 1993], p. 75).
which expresses eternal and infinite essence” (E, I, Def 6), and God is the only possible substance. If there were any substance besides God, this substance would exist possessing some attributes of God, because God possesses all possible attributes (infinite attributes) due to the fact that God is an absolutely infinite Being; accordingly, there would exist two substances which have the same attribute (E, I, Prop 14; Def 6). However, for Spinoza, it is impossible that there be two or more substances with the same nature or attribute in Nature (E, I, Prop 5). Consequently, besides God no other substance can be granted or conceived of (E, I, Prop 14). In this way, God is identified with one single substance in Spinoza’s metaphysics. This is his official statement as to substance monism.

However, for Spinoza, it is impossible that there be two or more substances with the same nature or attribute in Nature (E, I, Prop 5). Consequently, besides God no other substance can be granted or conceived of (E, I, Prop 14). In this way, God is identified with one single substance in Spinoza’s metaphysics. This is his official statement as to substance monism.

However, a minor problem arises from the term “infinite.” Either “infinite” does not mean what we normally take it to mean, or Spinoza’s argument is a bad one. When Spinoza mentions “substance consisting of infinite attributes” in definition 6, the term “infinite” has to be regarded as denoting number. Otherwise Spinoza’s demonstration would not be understood. That is to say, unless we take “infinite attributes” to imply all possible attributes, Spinoza’s argument would be unjustified. We can infer this point from the following statement:

Since God is Being absolutely infinite, of whom no attribute can be denied which expresses the essence of substance (Def 6), and since He necessarily exists (Prop 11), it follows that if there were any substance besides God, it would have to be explained by some attributes of God, and thus two substances would exist possessing the same attributes, which (Prop 5) is absurd. (E, I, Prop 14, Demon; my italics)

I think that the phrase “of whom no attribute can be denied” implies that God possesses “all possible attributes.” We should distinguish the statement that God is
the being *infinite* from the statement that God possesses *infinite* attributes. The
former statement means that God is the being *absolutely perfect* (i.e. our general
sense), whereas the latter means that God possesses *all possible* attributes. It
follows that God is the being "perfect without limitation" constituting "all
attributes without exception." I think that Spinoza believed that if God has the
nature of the infinity God must have infinite numbers of attributes.

It is commonplace to regard "infinite attributes" as all possible attributes. Curley states about this point: "[I]f there must be a substance which has infinite
attributes (where having infinite attributes implies having *all possible* attributes),
...." Bennett also has the same point of view: "The role of infinity in *Ethics* Ip14d
shows that Spinoza takes ‘God has infinite attributes’ to entail that God has all the
attributes. This entailment does not hold when ‘infinite’ is used in our way; so
Spinoza’s meaning for the term differs from ours, and the question is, ‘How?’ One
possible answer is that he used ‘infinite attribute’ to mean ‘all (possible) attributes,’
so that Nature’s having infinite attributes is consistent with its having only two." From these explanations, I suggest that we should bear in mind all possible
attributes, when Spinoza mentions "infinite attributes."

Returning to his substance monism, there necessarily exists only one thing
which exists *per se* (in itself), namely God. Nothing else can be in itself, that is to
say, there necessarily exists only one substance. If so, what is the status of all other
things? According to Spinoza, they are not substances but merely modifications of
the one substance, God. Thus mind and body are modes not substances. In

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5 George Kline claims these two senses of the term “infinite” in Spinoza (“On the infinity of
Spinoza’s attributes,” in Siegfried Hessing [ed.], *Speculum Spinozanum 1677–1977* [London:
to Spinoza* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 65. Alan Donagan also takes
“infinite attributes” to mean “all attributes without expect attributes” following George Kline’s
treatment of "infinite attributes" (“Spinoza’s Dualism,” in Richard Kennington [ed.], *The
Philosophy of Baruch Spinoza* [Washington D C: The Catholic University of America Press,
J. I. Friedman regards “infinite attributes” as “infinitely many attributes” (“Spinoza’s Denial of
Free Will in Man and God,” in Jon Wetlesen [ed.], *Spinoza’s Philosophy of Man* [Oslo:
Universitetsforlaget, 1977], p. 53).
Spinoza's metaphysical system, however, we can find the attributes of thought and extension between the substance and modifications; the concept of the attribute is very important in interpreting Spinoza's metaphysical system as well as his mind-body theory. According to Spinoza, an attribute is that "which the intellect perceives of substance as constituting its essence" (E, I, Def 4). That is to say, the attribute is that "which expresses the essence of the divine substance" (E, I, Prop 19, Demon). In the discussion of Spinoza's notion of the attributes, there have been the subjective and the objective interpretations. Nowadays, although most commentators support the latter, there have been many different suggestions within the objective interpretation (as we shall see in chapter four). There are infinitely many attributes, but humans can only perceive the attributes of thought and extension. Spinoza understood that humans are manifested in the mode of the mind through the attribute of thought as well as in the mode of the body through the attribute of extension.

From these expositions of Spinoza's metaphysics, we can summarise the position as follows:

(1) There is only one substance and this substance is God, which necessarily exists.
(2) Substance possesses the infinite numbers of attributes, which express the essence of the substance.
(3) All finite beings are modifications of the substance.
(4) Between the substance and modifications, there are the attributes of thought and extension which are the only ones we as humans can perceive.
(5) Therefore God (the substance) has the attributes of thought and extension.
(6) The modes are the modifications of substance under the approximate attribute; the mind is the mode of the substance under the attribute of thought and the body is the mode of the same substance under the attribute of extension.
(7) It follows that all things belong to the one substance, that is to say, that nothing can exist or be conceived of without God (substance).  

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8 In addition to these, there are also immediate infinite modes and mediated infinite modes which solve the unbridgeable gap between the infinite realm and the finite realm in explaining his ontological system from the substance to the modes.
This conclusion is the basis on which the common characterisation of Spinoza as a monist is maintained in relation to the unity of substance.

Spinoza, as is well known, maintains that one substance has the attributes of extension and thought, unlike the dualism of Descartes, where the thinking thing and the extended thing are different substances. Spinoza recognises the unique existence of substance, and therefore he establishes monistic metaphysics. Conceptually, thinking substance is different from extended substance due to the fact that one single substance has the attributes of thought and extension. However, these two substances are in reality one and the same thing (substance). The order of the whole of Nature or the connection of causes should be explained through the attribute of thought as long as things are considered under the attribute of thought alone, whereas when things are considered under the attribute of extension, the order of the whole of Nature must be explained through the attribute of extension alone. Accordingly, when we consider one substance under the attribute of thought it is the substance thinking and when we consider one substance under the attribute of extension it is the substance extended. From this, we can see that one and the same substance differs in how it is conceived, and this is Spinoza's substance monism.

(2) The Mind and the Body

Spinoza's mind-body theory is rooted in his substance monism. Spinoza regards the mind as the mode (the modification) of the substance under the attribute of thought and the body as the mode (the modification) of that substance under the attribute of extension. Namely, the mind is the modification of the substance conceived as thing thinking and the body is the modification of the very same substance as thing extended. When Spinoza says that the mind and the body

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9 There is a fine expression as to the relation between Descartes and Spinoza in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy: "It is certainly true that the study of Descartes was seminal for Spinoza, and there are obvious debts both of doctrine and of terminology. Nonetheless, Spinoza's philosophy is in one crucial respect at the opposite pole from that of Descartes" (Alasdair MacIntyre, "Spinoza, Benedict," in Paul Edwards [ed.], The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 7 [New York: Macmillan, 1967], p. 534).
are the modes of attributes, we should understand him as meaning that the mind is the mode which expresses the essence of the substance under the attribute of thought, and the body is the mode which expresses the essence of the very same substance under the attribute of extension. The mind and the body are not distinct modes of the attributes of thought and extension, but they are modes of the same substance through the attributes of thought and extension respectively. The mind is the mode of the substance as given by mental descriptions (attribute of thought), and the body is the mode of the same substance as given by physical descriptions (attribute of extension).

Since the mind and the body are modes of the one same substance, we can infer his position on the identity of the mind and the body from substance monism. It follows that if the substance thinking and the substance extended are one and the same thing, the mode considered mentally (the mind) and the mode considered physically (the body) are one and the same thing. Hence, just as a single substance is a substance thinking as well as a substance extended according to the attributes of thought and extension, so a single individual thing is at one time a mode mentally and at another a mode physically which both express the substance in a certain and determinate manner. The latter relationship is only a special case of the former. One and same mode differs in how it is conceived, as one and the same substance differs in how it is conceived; the former is Spinoza’s mind-body identity theory derived from the latter, his substance monism. Spinoza did not leave any doubt as to the identity of the mind and the body. He mentioned “mind and body are accordingly one and the same thing conceived at one time under the attributes of thought, and at another under that of extension” (E, II Prop 7, Schol). This statement makes it quite clear that even if there are differences between the mind and the body, they are ultimately and essentially the same thing with two different aspects.

However, some commentators concentrate on there being two attributes of thought and extension, and from this they claim that there must be two sets of events. However, as I have argued, the mind and the body are not the modes of the

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10 This issue will be discussed in detail in chapter five (pp. 133–136).
attributes, but are modes of the one substance considered at one time under the attribute of thought and at another under the attribute of extension. Substance monism guarantees identity between the mind and the body, so mental events and physical events are not two different sets of events but are one set of events. Those commentators who assert that these two sets of events are parallel with each other rely most on Spinoza’s statement that “[t]he order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things” (E, II, Prop 7).

However, this does not mean that there are two orders of events, but it means that there exists one order of events. Why is it that the event which has mental properties and the event which has physical properties are one and the same event for Spinoza? Without one substance doctrine, we cannot answer this question. Since there exists one single substance, substance conceived as mental and substance conceived as physical possess the same essence and consequently they are identical. Then, since there is one sort of event owing to the fact that they are modes of one substance, the event described by mental properties (the mode of the former substance) and the event described by physical properties (the mode of the latter substance) possess the same essence and consequently they are identical with each other.

I suggest that the parallel relationship occurs not in two sets of events but in one set of events: one event under the mental descriptions and the same event under the physical descriptions are parallel. The two attributes-doctrine does not provide a one-to-one correspondence between the mind and the body. Rather, substance monism is the reason that the mind and the body are one and the same event. This fact that there is one set of events is the reason that “the event under mental descriptions” (mind) and “the same event under the physical descriptions” (body) are parallel with each other. Thus, I disagree with the interpretation that

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11 As we shall see in chapters three and five (pp. 67–69; pp. 136–137), for Spinoza a parallel relationship occurs not only between “the event under mental descriptions” and “the same event under the physical descriptions” but also between the mental and the physical properties (or descriptions). The former would be called conceptual parallelism, the latter property parallelism. Both of them are derived from Spinoza’s doctrine that there is one order of events; there is no identity between the mental and the physical properties due to the fact that the attributes of thought and extension are really distinct.
argues the parallel relationship between the mind and the body without considering identity between the mind and the body. I also disagree with the interpretation that regards parallelism as being prior to the identity theory by arguing that parallelism entails the identity theory.

In this way, if the mind and body are one and the same individual conceived in two different ways and their relationship is parallel due to the fact that they are one and the same thing, we can regard this as a version of the double aspect theory. As we shall see in chapter five, the double aspect theory entails both identity and a parallel relationship between the mind and the body. If there were two substances (thinking and extended) with respect to the mind and the body, it could not be considered as the double aspect theory. But this, as we have seen, is absurd for Spinoza due to his substance monism; according to his monism there is only one substance and one order. Therefore, once we establish the formulation that they are identical with each other from the fact that the mind and the body are both aspects of the same entity which is one substance, we need to ask what the relationship is between the two aspects, and then our answer is that there is a parallel relationship as the outcome of identity.\textsuperscript{12} I believe that this version of the double aspect theory gives us a whole perspective on Spinoza's system. The double aspect theory as the mind-body theory is consistent with Spinoza's monism and his explanations of the parallel relationship of the mind and the body. Thus, Spinoza's mind-body theory should be considered within the version of the double aspect theory which holds that the mind and the body are two different ways of describing the same thing, namely substance.

\textsuperscript{12} Spinoza also argues that representational relationship exists between the mind and the body. I shall discuss this in chapter six.
Chapter Two

Diverse Interpretations of Spinoza’s Mind-Body Theory
The first premise in this chapter is that the relative weighting of thought and extension is equal, and therefore we can give greater weight neither to the body nor to the mind. That is to say, the body is not prior to the mind or *vice versa*. The second premise is that there is no causal relationship between what is thought and what is extended, and consequently the mental never causes the physical or *vice versa*. With respect to this, Spinoza states as follows:

The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things. (E, II, Prop 7)

Hence it follows that God’s power of thinking is equal to His actual power of acting, that is to say, whatever follows *formally* from the infinite nature of God, follows from the idea of God [Idea Dei], in the same order and in the same connection *objectively* in God. (E, II, Prop 7, Corol)

The body cannot determine the mind to thought, neither can the mind determine the body to motion nor rest, nor to anything else if there be anything else. (E, III, Prop 2)

Therefore, as the order and connection of the ideas in the mind is according to the order and connection of the modifications of the body (Prop 18, pt. 2), it follows, *vice versa* (Prop 2, pt. 3), that the order and connection of the modification of the body is according to the order and connection in the mind of thoughts and ideas of things. (E, V, Prop 1, Demon)

It follows that we must be suspicious of any interpretation which is not compatible with these premises, even if it offers some otherwise adequate explanation of Spinoza’s theory. In other words, any interpretation has to be in accord with the premises. Among the various interpretations which have been advanced, epiphenomenalism is contradictory to the first premise as well as the second, and
materialism and idealism have problems of compatibility with the first premise. They deny the equality of the mind and the body; either the mind or the body is given priority in these interpretations. On the other hand, hylomorphism, parallelism, and the double aspect theory can retain "the equality of the mind and the body" and "no causality between the mind and body," and therefore they are compatible with the two premises. This gives us some reason to prefer one of these interpretations. However, even if the former interpretations are incompatible with our two premises, they may have some other advantages. We should, therefore, consider their strengths as well as their problems, and this can help us arrive at a clearer understanding of Spinoza's mind-body theory. Therefore I shall, in this chapter, examine their perspectives on Spinoza and discuss some of the problems which arise from their interpretations and the inadequacies of applying them to Spinoza's mind-body theory.

1. Hylomorphism

Hylomorphism has its origin in Aristotle's "matter and form" system which posits that every natural object is somehow composed of matter and form. There is a hylomorphic interpretation of Spinoza's philosophy of mind, which is advocated by H. A. Wolfson. According to him, Spinoza's philosophy inherited this doctrine through Aquinas' metaphysics during the scholastic period. This interpretation emphasises Spinoza's intellectual inheritance from Aristotle and the resemblance between the systems of Aristotle and Spinoza.

(1) Hylomorphism in Aristotle

In order to examine the hylomorphic interpretation, we need to grasp the outline of Aristotle's "matter and form" system. According to Aristotle, a particular thing such as a house, is a composite of matter such as bricks and timber,
formed in a certain way. In a further example, we can distinguish “what stuff a thing is made of” from “what makes that stuff the thing it is—say a bronze sphere”; the former is matter (bronze), and the latter is form (sphericity). The “form,” however, should not be thought of simply as “shape” as in the example of a bronze sphere. In the case of an oak tree, for example, the “form” is not simply its visual shape. It encompasses its whole organisation which is characterised by activities such as growth by synthesising water and other nutrients, and its production of fruit.¹

This “form-matter system” can be illustrated as follows.²

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>bronze</td>
<td>sphericity</td>
<td>a bronze sphere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wood and iron</td>
<td>ability to chop</td>
<td>an axe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bread and cheese</td>
<td>cheese between bread slices</td>
<td>a sandwich</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bricks and timber</td>
<td>ability to shelter</td>
<td>a house</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>letters</td>
<td>placed in order</td>
<td>a word</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An item (1) constitutes an item (3) if it has the appropriate item from (2); therefore (1) is designated “matter,” (2) is “form,” (3) is “composite.” Regarding axes, for instance, some wood and iron constitutes an axe by virtue of its having the power to chop.

Here we can see that “form” is, in Aristotle, regarded as properties, structures, and powers. He regularly distinguishes form, matter, and the composite i.e. the actual thing. The distinction between matter and form is to explain what an individual thing is. In other words, to speak of form and matter is to speak of the form and matter of such a thing. The form and matter system is also applied to living things such as human beings. More precisely, in Aristotle, the soul is the

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form of a natural body with organs and the terms “body, soul, man (or animal or
plant)” is “matter, form, and composite,” respectively. In the case of human beings,
therefore, “what makes a body a man” is his having a rational soul. To be sure, the
hylomorphic conception of a human being is a composite of an organising form, or
rational soul, and of matter, the flesh and blood of the body. In other words, the
soul is regarded as the form of the body which is matter.

Although interpretations of Aristotle’s account of the relationship between
body and soul have been widely divergent, the above is a general interpretation of
Aristotle’s “matter-form system” in relation to the mind and body of living things
(man, animals, plants), and Wolfson’s hylomorphic interpretation of Spinoza is
posited on this point of view of Aristotle.

(2) The Hylomorphic Interpretation of Spinoza

The hylomorphic interpretation of Spinoza’s mind-body theory treats his
“mind” and “body” as Aristotle’s “form” and “matter.” According to Wolfson,
Spinoza’s mind-body theory and other related areas of his philosophy should be
interpreted as stemming from this doctrine. He strongly asserts and insists upon
Aristotle’s influence on Spinoza through the medieval Aristotelians. He develops
this point of view throughout his book, The Philosophy of Spinoza, and we can see
that he stresses this influence on Spinoza’s mind-body theory as follows:

Consequently, following the Aristotelian view that it is the form of a
thing and not its matter that is identical with the soul, Spinoza says that
the first thing which is identical with the actual human mind is the idea
of a thing; the term “idea” here is used by him in the most general sense,
comprehending what Aristotle would call the sensible, imaginable, and
intelligible form of a thing. Since the mind or the soul is identical with

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3 Ibid. See also Richard Sorabji, “Body and Soul in Aristotle,” in Jonathan Barnes, Malcolm
4 The term “soul” is anima in Aquinas’ Latin, and psyche in Aristotle’s Greek.
the idea, Spinoza sometimes uses the expression “idea or soul” (idea, seu anima).  

Let us examine Wolfson’s hylomorphic interpretation in more detail. The principal points that Wolfson suggests as the main influences of Aristotle on Spinoza are as follows:

(1) The ontological system
   the doctrine of substances and modes (Spinoza) / the principle of species and genus (Aristotle)
(2) The doctrine of attributes
   extension and thought (Spinoza) / the system of matter and form (Aristotle)
(3) The psychological doctrine
   mind as the idea of the body (Spinoza) / soul as the form of the body (Aristotle)

Firstly, as to Spinoza’s doctrine of “substance and mode,” Wolfson holds that the relation of mode to substance can be explained as the relation of species to genus in Aristotle. He emphasises that even if Spinoza reconstructs and amends the mediaeval Aristotelians’ definition of substance in terms of the additional phrase “conceived through itself” and by restricting it to God alone, there is, in fact, no change from the mediaeval definition.  

Thus the mediaeval definition of the term “substance” has not undergone any change in Spinoza, though its application was restricted only to God. It is still defined as that which is in itself.

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6 Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 61–78. As to Spinoza’s “modes,” Wolfson claims that in spite of the fact that Spinoza’s modes are entirely changed from Aristotelian accidents, his modes can also be found in Aristotelian logic, i.e. “species in its genus.” He states that “[t]his is what Spinoza means by his definition of mode as ‘that which is in another thing through which also it is conceived’; that is to say, it is in another thing in the sense that it is conceived through it, namely, as the individual in its genus” (*ibid.*, vol. 1, p. 76).
Even the additional fact of its being a *summum genus*, undefinable
and unknowable, is not new; it is a mediaeval commonplace.\(^7\)

Hence, for Wolfson, when Spinoza states that the modes exist in substance it
implies Aristotle’s concept of genus and species as well as of substance and
qualities. That is to say, Spinoza speaks of modes and substance in the same sense
as Aristotle in saying that “man is in animal and generally species [is] in
genus.”(Physics, IV 3, 210a 18). In this way, Wolfson conceives of Spinoza’s
substance as the most general genus, the genus of any species, and a mode as a
species of a genus. In Wolfson’s words, “[w]e shall therefore use here the term
‘genus,’ and describe Spinoza’s conception of the relation between mode and
substance as that between the individual essence and its genus.”\(^8\) Therefore,
Wolfson suggests that just as in Aristotle the genus is prior to the individual, so in
Spinoza substance is prior in nature to its modes (E, I, Prop 1).\(^9\) Here, we can see
that Wolfson attempts to make Spinoza an Aristotelian. Speaking more precisely,
Wolfson unfolds his view that in spite of amending the definition of substance,
Spinoza’s metaphysical system is under the influence of Aristotle.

Secondly, with respect to the attributes of extension and thought,
Wolfson’s treatment of them is that the root of Spinoza’s attributes is to be found
in Aristotelian matter and form rather than in Descartes. According to him,
Spinoza’s “extension and thought” are the two constituent elements of the world,
matter and form, which Spinoza prefers to call extension and thought.\(^10\) The
translation of “form and matter” into “thought and extension” is the fundamental
task for Wolfson in order to adduce his hylomorphic interpretation of Spinoza. As
to the reason for changing “form” into “thought,” Wolfson says “the reason for
Spinoza’s substitution of thought for form is quite obvious, for the highest form or
God is spoken of by Aristotle and throughout the Middle ages as pure thought.”\(^11\)
Next, concerning “matter into extension,” he mentions as follows.

\(^7\) Ibid., pp. 76–77.
\(^8\) Ibid., pp. 75–76.
\(^9\) Ibid., pp. 77–78.
\(^10\) For Wolfson’s treatment of Spinoza’s “extension and thought,” see ibid., pp. 214–261.
\(^11\) Ibid., p. 235.
The common matter underlying the four elements, according to Aristotle and his commentators, is something extended; in fact, it is the first kind of matter that is extended, and hence could be called extension.12

Wolfson explains that Spinoza needed to find certain equivalents for matter and form, and he found these two terms in extension and thought which stand respectively for one traditional specific matter and for one traditional specific form. Thus, according to Wolfson, Aristotle’s terms “form” and “matter” are modified to “thought” and “extension” by Spinoza to suit his own theory.13 In this way, according to Wolfson’s view, the Aristotelian metaphysics is transformed into the metaphysics of Spinoza.

Lastly, regarding the mind as the idea of the body, Wolfson, as quoted at the beginning of this section, termed it “the soul as the form of the body in Aristotle.” The key to this point of view for Wolfson is Spinoza’s doctrine that omnia animata. Spinoza states in his Ethics, “those things which we have proved hitherto are altogether general, nor do they refer more to man than to other individuals, all of which are animate, although in different degrees” (E, II, Prop 13, Schol). This statement is the starting point of and the reason for a hylomorphic interpretation of Spinoza’s mind-body theory. Wolfson interprets this not as panpsychism but as hylomorphism by holding that all things are said to have an anima in the same sense as in older philosophy where all things have a forma. In the Aristotelian “matter-form” system, Wolfson tries to find the real meaning behind Spinoza’s utterance that all things are animate, defending Spinoza from a panpsychistic interpretation. In his words:

This statement that all things are animate, as we have been trying to show, does not point to a panpsychistic conception of nature. ... All that he means by his statement that all things are animate in different

12 Ibid., p. 234.
degrees is exactly what Aristotle would have meant by saying that all things have forms in different degrees.\textsuperscript{14}

Spinoza’s term “idea” is used in the sense of the intelligible, imaginable, and sensible forms. Wolfson holds that Spinoza uses it in the place of the old term “form” which corresponds to Aristotle’s cognition, imagination, and perception respectively. Therefore, just as Aristotle’s “form” exists in all things in a variety of different meanings, so Spinoza’s “idea” exists in all things in a different degree. In this way, Spinoza’s \textit{omnia animata} is explained, and the hylomorphic interpretation is generated by Wolfson.

\textbf{(3) The Inadequacy of the Hylomorphic Interpretation of Spinoza}

In the Letter to Hugo Boxel, Spinoza says that “[t]he authority of Plato, Aristotle, and Socrates does not carry much weight with me” (Letter 56).\textsuperscript{15} This seems to imply that Spinoza’s system is difficult to interpret as hylomorphism or at least that Spinoza was rather confused. In the face of the such evidence, Wolfson’s insistence on seeing Spinoza as a hylomorphist seems strained. Let us examine whether his solitary position is justified.

\textit{a. Metaphysical System}

Wolfson’s view that the term “substance” denotes genus and the term “mode” denotes individuals, may provide us with a source of historical influence on Spinoza. However, this interpretation of Spinoza’s terms “substance” and “mode” is not convincing.

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 58–59.
Wolfson regards Spinoza's "substance" as Aristotle's "genus," and also his "mode" as Aristotle's species, or ultimately individual things. Wolfson treats Spinoza's substance as "a transcendent immanence" or "a whole transcending the universe," and therefore he regards the relationship between substance and mode as whole and part, in the same sense as the relationship between genus (whole) and species (part) in Aristotle. 16 Therefore, he alleges, both "genus" in Aristotle and "substance" in Spinoza have the common characteristic that they exist in themselves and they are prior to individual things or modes; Spinoza's substance also exists in itself (E, I, Def 3) and it "is by its nature prior to its modifications" (E, I, Prop 1).

In fact, the relationship between genus and species in Aristotle cannot be identified with the relationship between substance and mode in Spinoza. We should, therefore, pay careful attention to the difference between "substance and mode" in Spinoza and the Aristotelian "genus and species/individual things." 17 The difference is that for Aristotle there is no suggestion that a genus is more real than (species or) individual things, whereas for Spinoza the individual thing is less real than substance. Furthermore, as Curley rightly points out, if modes exist in substance in the same sense as individuals exist in a genus, as Wolfson claims, the modes would have to be, in predicative sense, substances by the principles of Aristotle's logic. 18 Let us consider this point in some more detail.

According to Aristotle, for example, if Socrates is a member of the species "man" and "man" is a species of the genus "animal," we can say that Socrates is a man and also say that he is an animal: "the species is predicated of the individual, the genus both of the species and of the individuals" (Categories, Ch. 5, 3a 36–39). 19 But in Spinoza's philosophy this kind of relation cannot be found. If the

16 See Wolfson, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 74–75.
17 Wolfson uses at one time the word "species," at another uses "individual things."
18 Curley, op. cit., p. 32.
19 Aristotle, again states: "[M]an is predicated of the individual man, and animal of man; so animal will be predicated of the individual man also—for the individual man is both a man and an animal" (Categories, Ch. 3, 1a 10–15). As to Aristotle's quotations in this chapter, I use W. D. Ross (ed.), The Works of Aristotle Translated into English, 2 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1926).
relation of mode to substance is the relation of a species to a genus in the Aristotelian sense, as in Wolfson's Spinoza, we would have to say that "substance" is predicated of modes. We cannot say this of modes in Spinoza. Therefore, we cannot derive substance from mode in the same way as we can derive genus from species. Here lies the problem. One of the fundamental principles in Spinoza is that modes are not self-subsistent but are the modifications of substance. In so far as modes are dependent on substance in Spinoza, it is clear that the relationship between substance and mode is not the same as the relationship between species and genus.

Furthermore, there is a problem with "priority" in Aristotle and Spinoza. Wolfson argues that substance is prior to modes in Spinoza in the same way as genus is prior to species in Aristotle, so that the relationship between substance and modes in Spinoza is rooted in the relationship between genus and species. It is certain that for Spinoza substance is prior to modes. It follows that if genus is prior to species, Wolfson seems to have evidence for interpreting Spinoza as an hylomorphist. However, we should not accept this without examining the sense of "prior to" in the relationship between genus and species.

For Aristotle, the sense of "prior to" is unfolded in several ways: (1) time—"older" or "more ancient"; (2) non-reciprocity as to implication of existence—A is prior to B when, if there is B there is A, but if there is A there is not necessarily B; (3) order—in geometry the elements are prior in order to the propositions; (4) value—better and more valued; (5) cause—A causes B (Categories, 12, 14b). However, we cannot infer that genus is prior to species from any of these definitions. These definitions are in a context where Aristotle is picking out different uses of "prior." Priority of genus over species is unusual in Aristotle (though some medieval philosophers might have defended the priority of genus). Thus we need to examine whether genus is prior to species and the nature of the priority. Concerning this, Aristotle writes as follows:

For annul the genus and differentia, and the species too is annulled, so that these are prior to the species. They are also more familiar; for if the
species is known, the genus and differentia must of necessity be known as well (for any one who knows also what a man is knows also what animal and terrestrial are), whereas if the genus or the differentia is known it does not follow of necessity that species is known as well; thus the species is less intelligible (Topics, VI, 4, 141b28-34).

Wolfson maintains that this statement of Aristotle corresponds with his fourth definition of priority—"better and more valued" (above). If they do correspond, we can infer "the priority of genus to species" from the assertion that genus is better known or more intelligible than species. We can therefore say that in some sense genus is prior to species in Aristotle as Wolfson maintains. But, Wolfson's quoted passage is not very typical. See Categories Ch. 5, 2b 6-10: "Of secondary substances, the species is more truly substance than the genus, ...," and Ch. 5 on secondary substances 2b 29: "It is more informative to give man than animal."

Moreover, even if Wolfson is right in pointing out that genus is prior to species in Aristotle, we still need to discover whether Aristotle's sense of "priority" between genus and species is the same as Spinoza's sense of "priority" between substance and modes and Wolfson is wrong about this for the following reasons. Wolfson takes two senses of "priority" between genus and species: "better" and "the cause of something." However, I cannot find that genus causes species, as in Aristotle's fifth definition of priority. Since substance is the cause of mode in Spinoza, genus must be the cause of species in Aristotle, for Wolfson's interpretation to be correct. Wolfson asserts: "This seems to be nothing but a legitimate extension of its use in the sense of 'cause,' for the genus is considered by Aristotle as the cause of the individual essence. Or it may also reflect Aristotle's statement that the whole is prior in nature to the parts." But the relationship does not imply the sense of cause. From where, then, does Wolfson infer that genus causes species? Where Wolfson says, as above, that "the genus is considered by Aristotle as the cause of the individual essence," his footnote indicates that this is

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20 Wolfson, op. cit. vol. 1, p. 77.
21 Ibid., p. 78.
from *Analytica Posteriora*, II, 2, 90a, 31. But, I cannot find the fifth definition of cause in the discussion on priority in that text. Furthermore, that text has no discussion of "genus and species." It is hard to find evidence that "priority" of genus does imply the sense of "cause." It seems clear that Wolfson misinterprets the sense of priority between genus and species in Aristotle and applies this misinterpretation to Spinoza. It is misleading to make Spinoza Aristotelian by emphasising genus so much and regarding it as prior in causality to the individual. Hence, Wolfson's perspective cannot be adopted in interpreting Spinoza's "substance and mode" system.

Wolfson, as we have seen in the first section, also maintains that Spinoza's "thought and extension" is transformed from the Aristotelian "form and matter." It cannot be denied that Spinoza's "thought and extension" is influenced by Aristotle's "form and matter." Nevertheless, Wolfson misses an essential aspect of Spinoza's thinking which is derived from Descartes. Spinoza's conception of metaphysics is greatly influenced by Descartes in spite of his objection to Descartes' dualism. Descartes selected extension as the essence of material substance, and thought as the essence of immaterial substance. The difference between these concepts of Spinoza and Descartes is that Descartes distinguished between extended and thinking substance, while Spinoza treated them as attributes of the one single substance. Apart from the difference of the status of "extension and thought." Spinoza follows Descartes' conception of them. Therefore, there is not only Aristotle's influence but also Descartes' on Spinoza's concepts of extension and thought. However, in Spinoza, these concepts are derived less from Aristotle's concepts of "matter and form" than Descartes' concepts of "extension and thought." Furthermore, Wolfson argues that "in fact, it is the first kind of matter that is extended, and hence could be called extension." However, for Aristotle, pure matter is just potentiality with no properties at all, whereas, for

22 The passage is as follows: "For perception tells that it is now screening it (for it is clear that it is now eclipsed); and from this the universal would come about. So, as we say, to know what it is is the same as to know why it is—and that either *simpliciter* and not one of the things that belong to it, or one of those that belong to it, e.g. that it has two right angles, or that it is greater or less" (*Posterior Analytics*, II, 2, 90a 31–34).

Descartes and Spinoza, extension is the essence of material substance. In view of the above explanations, it is clear that in spite of Aristotle’s influence, Spinoza’s acceptance of Descartes’ view does not allow us to interpret Spinoza’s “extension and thought” as hylomorphism.

In addition to this, Wolfson’s subjective interpretation of the attributes is contradictory to his connection between Aristotle’s “form and matter” and Spinoza’s “thought and extension.” If the attributes are an illusion or invention of our mind as Wolfson argues, it is hardly acceptable to argue “thought and extension” are derived from Aristotle’s “form and matter,” since for Aristotle “form and matter” exist outside our mind and they are not the illusory concepts. Thus, Wolfson’s view that Aristotelian “matter and form” is transformed into Spinoza’s “extension and thought” is problematic.

b. Mind-Body Theory

Furthermore, Wolfson asserts that the relationship between mind and body in Spinoza is understood as differing only in terminology from the Aristotelian point of view that the soul is the form of the body. That is to say, he interprets Spinoza’s “mind as the idea of the body” as the Aristotelian “soul as the form of the body.” Concerning this, he advances the view that “it [Spinoza’s definition of mind as the idea of the body] is nothing but a new way of restating the Aristotelian definition of the soul as the form of the body.” Here we can see that Wolfson identifies the term “idea” in Spinoza with “form” in Aristotle.

The clue to Spinoza’s position at this point is provided by his concept of the idea. We should understood Spinoza’s “idea” not as Aristotle’s concept of the form but under the epistemological version. In Spinoza, the idea is the medium

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24 I discuss the objective and the subjective interpretations of attributes in chapter four.
25 Here are the statements of Spinoza with reference to “mind as the idea of the body”: “The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body, or a certain mode of extension which actually exists, and nothing else” (E, II, Prop 13), or “[t]he idea which constitutes the formal being of the human mind is not simple, but is composed of a number of ideas” (E, II, Prop 15). Proposition 13 is quoted from Edwin Curley for the sake of clarity (The Collected Works of Spinoza, [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985], p. 457).
26 Ibid., p. 48.
which represents (confusedly) the human body and external bodies. The human mind, "perceives no external body as actually existing unless through the ideas of the modifications of its body" (E, II, Prop 26). From this proposition, we can infer that the cognitive situation requires the presence of ideas and the ideas represent both the knower's own body and external bodies. This role of the idea is clearly distinct from the role of the form in Aristotle. In Aristotle, as we have seen at the beginning of this paper, the form is regarded as properties, structures, powers and so on. In the case of human beings, accordingly, the body is "what a man is made of" and the soul as the form is "what makes the body a man." There is no representative role in Aristotle's concept of the "form" as in Spinoza's concept of idea. It seems to me that Wolfson does not pay attention to this kind of representative role of idea in Spinoza's mind-body theory.

Apart from the role of the idea, there is some similarity between Spinoza's idea and Aristotle's form, since there are the two uses of idea in Spinoza. Spinoza talks of the difference between the idea of Peter which constitutes the essence of Peter's mind, and the idea of Peter which is in another man (E, II, Prop 17, Schol). The former seems to be closer to Aristotle's concept of "form." Nevertheless, a similarity does not lead us to making Spinoza a hylomorphist. Furthermore, in Aristotle, the soul has more actuality than the body whereas there is no suggestion in Spinoza of mind having priority over body (as we have seen in the first premise), and thus this similarity is not sufficient in interpreting Spinoza's theory as hylomorphism. From this, we can confirm that Spinoza's concept of "idea" (even the similar one) is, after all, different from Aristotle's "form."

The contradiction between Wolfson's subjective interpretation of the attributes and his connection of Aristotle's "form and matter" with Spinoza's "thought and extension" does not also allow us to interpret Spinoza's mind-body theory as hylomorphism. For Aristotle, the mind is the form of the body, that is, the mind is what makes a body a man. However, if the attributes of thought and extension are an illusion as in the subjective interpretation, we cannot argue that for Spinoza the mind as the idea of the body would make the body a man in spite of Spinoza's claim that the idea constitutes or explains the essence of the man.
Even more, Wolfson's subjective interpretation of the attributes cannot justify his other argument that just as Aristotle's doctrine that "form" exists in all things in a variety of different meanings so Spinoza's "idea" exists in all things in a different degree, because under the subjective interpretation of the attribute "idea" does not really exist in all things due to fact that the attribute of thought (together with all the other attributes) does not really exist.

There is another ground for refuting the hylomorphic interpretation to be found in Spinoza's metaphysical determinism. We have seen that the crux of this interpretation is that the relationship between mind and body in Spinoza is understood as differing only in terminology from the Aristotelian point of view that the soul is the form of the body. That is to say, Wolfson interprets Spinoza's "idea (mind) as the form of the body" as the Aristotelian "soul as the form of the body."

However, Spinoza's metaphysical determinism rejects this hylomorphic interpretation. In this interpretation, the idea is "what makes the body a man," but according to Spinoza's determinism a man is determined by substance in a certain manner. A man is not made in terms of the function of form but is determined by substance (God) in Spinoza's system in two attributes of thought and extension. Consequently, the idea does not correspond to form as in the soul of Aristotle's theory nor is the body "stuff" as in Aristotle's matter. It is just as much "form" as the mind is. The mind and the body are nothing but the modifications of the attributes of the substance in a determinate matter, and therefore a man is not "what the idea makes from the body" but the modification of substance in both thought and extension. Furthermore, if the mind makes the body a man as in the hylomorphic interpretation, it implies that to a certain extent the mind can determine the body even if it is doubtful whether this relationship is causal or not. But it is true that there is no interaction between the mind and the body, since from Spinoza's determinism the mind and the body are determined by the attributes of thought and extension respectively, but neither can extension determine the mind nor can thought determine the body. Therefore, it follows that the hylomorphic position that treats the soul as the form of the body is not compatible with Spinoza due to his metaphysical determinism.
Wolfson makes an ingenious attempt to interpret Spinoza's mind-body theory and other related areas of his philosophy via an historical approach. Nevertheless, Aristotle's influence on Spinoza which Wolfson strongly asserts and insists upon throughout his writings is overstated. He does not, in my opinion, express accurately Spinoza's mind-body theory as we have seen in this section. Therefore, Wolfson's hylomorphic interpretation does not provide us with an adequate perspective on Spinoza's system.

2. Idealism

Unlike hylomorphism, the idealistic interpretation makes much of Spinoza's doctrine that there are an infinite number of attributes, of which we know only thought and extension (E, I, Prop 11). However, an idealistic interpretation of Spinoza, like the hylomorphic interpretation, is fundamentally dependent upon the dominance of the attribute of thought over extension and the other attributes; the attribute of thought is, following this interpretation, highlighted and treated as the primary one. The main arguments in favour of the dominance of thought in the idealistic interpretation are derived from the following sources: Spinoza's definition of substance, the definition of attributes, and "letter 66" to Tschirnhaus. I

27 Some commentators criticise Wolfson's interpretation by pointing out that he too much undercuts Spinoza's originality. Curley states: "We could reconstruct nearly the whole of the Ethics just by making appropriate selections and arrangements of the doctrines of his predecessors. This is an extreme thesis—one which Wolfson is forced, later, to qualify in curious ways, and one which makes Spinoza's originality quite problematic" (Curley, op. cit., p. 30). R. J. Delahunty also states: "By minimising his originality, Wolfson falsifies his thought" (Spinoza [London: Routledge & Kegan Paul: 1985], p. 194).

shall, in this section, consider these sources as they are the grounds for supporting the dominance of thought in the idealistic interpretation. 29

(1) The Sources of the Idealistic Interpretation

Those who support an idealistic interpretation highlight the phrase “the intellect perceives of” in the definition of the attributes. Spinoza’s precise definition is as follows: “By attribute I understand that which the intellect perceives of substance as constituting its essence” (E, I, Def 4). J. Clark Murray uses this definition in claiming the precedence of thought over the other attributes. Murray states the view as follows:

[A]ll attributes are defined to be what they are in themselves by what intellect conceives them essentially to be. That is to say, they are defined by their relation to thought; and thus thought becomes the supreme attribute or category, by relation to which all else must be interpreted. 30

In this way, Murray argues that Spinoza’s attributes are ordered in the intellect, and he adopts the phrase “the intellect perceives of” as evidence of the dominance of thought. He gives a privileged position to thought and asserts that “all attributes are ultimately interpretable in terms of thought.” 31 Following on from this, Murray claims that in Spinoza all attributes are united in substance and he designates this unity as an intelligible unity. 32

So as to support his idealistic interpretation, Murray also uses the definition of substance and emphasises the phrase “is conceived” as he does in the definition

29 The idealistic interpretation of Spinoza is different from idealism in a general sense since the former maintains that mind has dominant or extensive power over body rather than mind is real and body is unreal.
31 Ibid., p. 481.
32 Ibid., p. 480.
of the attributes. His idealistic point of view from the definition of substance is as follows:

Substance is defined to be, not merely that which is in itself, but also that which is conceived by itself; and, to make the meaning perfectly explicit, this latter predicate is more fully expanded into "that of which the concept does not require the concept of anything else, by which it has to be formed." Substance is, therefore, not an empirical idea taken up simply as something which happens to be found among the natural furniture of our minds. It is a necessary concept of reason.33

Murray tries to solve the problem of the one substance and the diversity of attributes by interpreting Spinoza’s system as idealism. In other words, he tries to make the unity of thought and substance the key to understanding Spinoza’s system and making it intelligible. Concerning this point, Murray refers to the scholium to proposition 10:

[Spinoza] is at pains to explain that there is no absurdity in supposing a substance to possess several different attributes (I, 10, Schol). But there is another connection between the two attributes of thought and extension. Thought is conscious of itself, but it is conscious of extension as well. Inferentially we may add that thought must be conscious of all the attributes of substance.34

In Murray’s opinion if there is unity of thought and substance, the system of “one and many” is not hard to explain, because all the modes of infinite attributes are ordered in the system of thought.

Spinoza’s correspondence with Tschirnhaus is another of the grounds used to support an idealistic interpretation; Erroll E. Harris used this letter as the source

33 Ibid., pp. 477–478.
34 Ibid., pp. 479–480.
of the idealistic interpretation of Spinoza. Tschirnhaus raises the issue that in Spinoza’s system, the argument of infinite modes of infinite attributes is contradictory to the argument that our mind perceives only the body.

Hence it seems to follow, that the modification constituting my mind, and the modification constituting my body, though one and the same modification, is yet expressed in infinite ways—first, through thought; secondly, through extension; thirdly, through some attribute of God unknown to me, and so on to infinity, seeing that there are in God infinite attributes, and the order and connection of the modifications seem to be the same in all. Hence arises the question: Why the mind, which represents a certain modification, the same modification being expressed not only in extension, but in infinite other ways,—why, I repeat, does the mind perceive that modification only as expressed through extension, to wit, the human body, and not as expressed through any other attributes?

What Tschirnhaus points out here is that if we are modes of infinite attributes, there is a conflict between our existing as modes of infinite attributes and our awareness of ourselves as the mind’s perception of the body; the fact that the mind cannot perceive modes in attributes other than extension is problematic. Here is Spinoza’s answer to this question.

But in the answer to your objection I say, that although each particular thing be expressed in infinite ways in the infinite understanding of God, yet those infinite ideas, whereby it is expressed, cannot constitute one and the same mind of a particular thing, but infinite minds; seeing that each of these infinite ideas has no connection with the rest, as I have

explained in the same note to Ethics, II. vii., and as is also evident from I. x. If you will reflect on these passages a little, you will see that all difficulty vanishes, &c. 38

In this way, Spinoza distinguishes the infinite intellect from the finite mind, and therefore he claims that the infinite series of attributes and modes appears not to the finite mind but to the infinite intellect.

The idealistic interpretation can be derived from this letter. From this letter, Harris inferred the fact that thought is more dominant than any of the other attributes, since although our mind cannot comprehend any other attributes besides thought and extension, the infinite intellect comprehends all attributes. According to him, in God’s thinking there is an idea of the modes of every attribute, and it follows from this that the attribute of thought is more comprehensive than the others: "First, because if there is an infinity of singular minds (or ideas) for every mode of substance, and if this infinity is, as it must be, comprehended in God’s intellect, then the attribute of thought is, in spite of all Spinoza says, in some sense more comprehensive and 'wider' than any other attribute. For every mode in every attribute will have its own idea and all ideas belong to the attribute of Thought." 39

Furthermore, Harris points out the contradiction between the dominance of thought and the independence of all attributes, and regards it as an inconsistency in Spinoza. With respect to this, he states:

37 Among the many statements in the scholium of proposition 7 in part II, the relevant statements are as follows: “Nor have I had any reason for saying that God is the cause of the idea, for example, of the circle in so far only as He is a thinking, and of the circle itself in so far as He is an extended thing, but this, that the formal being of the idea of a circle can only be perceived through another mode of thought, as its proximate cause, and this again must be perceived through another, and so on ad infinitum. So that when things are considered as modes of thought we must explain the order of the whole of Nature or the connection of causes by the attribute of thought alone, and when things are considered as modes of extension, the order of the whole of Nature must be explained through the attribute of extension alone, and so with other attributes.” And proposition 10 in part I is as follows: “Each attribute of a substance must be conceived through itself.”


39 Harris, op. cit., p. 71.

40 Ibid.
No doubt, Spinoza’s theory of infinity of the attributes is untenable and cannot be made self-consistent, and no doubt, to be consistent, he should have maintained that the modes in all attributes were united to one another as the mind is united to the body. His statement in the 66th letter is itself out of harmony with his main teaching, and contradictory even on its face. For he says that each thing is expressed in infinite ways in the infinite intellect of God, and yet that the infinite ideas by which it is expressed cannot constitute one and the same mind of a singular thing.41

This problem is discussed in his later article “Infinity of Attributes and Idea Ideae,” and is argued as follows. (1) The dominance of thought as complex or multi-dimensional in the letter is incompatible with Spinoza’s argument that “the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things” in proposition 7 of part II in Ethics, because “the order of causes in any attribute other than Thought is, so to say, one dimensional, the order of ideas in God’s intellect is, as it were, multi-dimensional to infinity.”42 (2) The assertion that “each of the infinite numbers of ideas has no connection with the rest” in the letter is consequently posited on the perspective that there must be separate worlds. But this is incompatible with Spinoza’s position.43 (3) In Spinoza, there must be an infinite number of modes on the basis of the infinite numbers of attributes, so that there must be as many different ideas of different modes as there are different attributes. However, Spinoza’s theme that “all corresponding modes”44 are identical in substance is incompatible with the theme that the ideas of the modes of all other attributes than thought are not identical with one another; Harris infers the latter from Spinoza’s statement that the ideas of the modes of all other attributes than thought cannot constitute one and the same mind of a particular thing, and

41 Ibid., p. 89.
43 Ibid.
44 The mind, the body, and the rest of the unknown modes at same time. Harris states: “So body and mind are one and not two entities, being identical in substance. It should follow that the corresponding modes in other attributes are identical with our bodies in substance” (ibid. pp. 10–11)
have no connection between themselves.\footnote{Ibid.} Harris is aware that this incompatibility is solved by Spinoza's theses "(a) that an absolutely infinite substance must have infinite attributes, and (b) that the human mind can become aware of two only." Accordingly, Harris regards these as the apparent incompatibilities, and the reason that these incompatibilities appear in Spinoza's philosophy is due to the contradiction between dominance of thought and the independence of the attributes.\footnote{Thomas points out this (Thomas, op. cit., pp. 192–193).} Harris highlights the former, and therefore his interpretation of Spinoza is idealistic.

\section*{(2) Remarks on the Idealistic Interpretation}

The above description of the idealistic interpretation is the main argument in its favour. We can subject this interpretation to the following criticisms.

Firstly, as Murray argues, Spinoza's definitions of the attributes and substance could be the ground for an idealistic interpretation. In fact, as Frederick Pollock argues, so long as Spinoza defines an attribute in terms of what "the intellect perceives," whether it is Spinoza's intention or not, the attribute of thought is counted twice as opposed to the other attributes. Pollock states that "inasmuch as Attribute is defined by reference to intellect, and Thought is itself an attribute, Thought appears in a manner counted twice over."\footnote{Frederick Pollock, \textit{Spinoza: His Life and Philosophy} (London: Duckworth and Co., 1899), 2d ed., p. 153.} Pollock also emphasises the privileged position of the attribute of thought in Spinoza's system. He asserts this point as follows: "The series of ideas or modes of Thought is whole and continuous; no other Attribute has any part in it. ... Hence all the Attributes except Thought are really superfluous: and Spinoza's doctrine, when thus reduced to its simplest terms, is that nothing exists but thought and its modifications."\footnote{Ibid., p. 164. Robert N. Beck also argues for that "the attribute of Thought has a predominant and hence idealistic role in Spinoza's metaphysical vision" ("The Attribute of Thought," in James B. Wilbur [ed.], \textit{Spinoza's Metaphysics: Essays in Critical Appreciation} [Assen: van

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{}Ibid.
\bibitem{}Thomas points out this (Thomas, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 192–193).
\bibitem{}Ibid., p. 164. Robert N. Beck also argues for that "the attribute of Thought has a predominant and hence idealistic role in Spinoza's metaphysical vision" ("The Attribute of Thought," in James B. Wilbur [ed.], \textit{Spinoza's Metaphysics: Essays in Critical Appreciation} [Assen: van
\end{thebibliography}
However, in my opinion, the fact that Spinoza uses the phrase “the intellect perceives of” in the definition does not imply that he holds the view that thought is dominant over the other attributes.\footnote{Let us define the intellect as infinite intellect, because Spinoza’s definition is not the definition of only attributes of thought and extension but the definition of the infinite attributes in general, and in Spinoza, even though it is insufficient as Tschirnhaus asserts, it is clear that the finite intellect cannot perceive the other attributes besides thought and extension (and this is what Spinoza makes clear in Letter 66). That is to say, as long as the definition talks about the attributes in general, the intellect has to be the infinite one due to the fact that the finite intellect can only perceive only two attributes of thought and extension. Although Murray does not mention whether the intellect is the infinite or the finite, it should be the infinite intellect in his argument due to the above fact. I discuss this definition of attributes in chapter four.} What we can infer from this phrase is not that everything \textit{is} or \textit{exists} in God’s thinking but that everything is \textit{represented} or \textit{perceived} by God’s thinking. The difference between the former and the latter is important. The former leads to the dominance of thought in the idealistic interpretation, whereas the latter emphasises the representational role of thought. If in God’s thinking the attribute of extension, or any other attribute exists, it exists not as itself but as the idea of extension. Thought expresses the essence of God as well as representing the other attributes. It follows that we ought to distinguish representational dependency from ontological dependency, and pay attention to the fact that “the dominance of thought” is not related to the latter but related to the former. Even if thought is distinctive or singled out from the other attributes, this is the representational function of thought. The dominance of thought should be regarded not as ontological dependency but as representational dependency. “The dominance of thought in a representational sense” does not lead to idealism. Moreover, in Spinoza’s system, for every idea there is an ideatum, and this implies that the idea is equally dependent on the ideatum. Here we can see that representational dependency occurs in both ways which is from the mental to physical as well as \textit{vice versa}. If the dominance of thought is treated as arising from the representational function between the mental and physical, representational dependency does not lead to either idealism or materialism. Hence, idealism is not an obvious conclusion.

Gorcum, 1976], p. 10). Beck also states that “a type of idealism may be ascribed to him [Spinoza] because of the kind of priority the attribute of Thought has” (p. 1).
The same criticism can be attached as to the idealistic interpretation in terms of Spinoza’s Letter 66, because it also asserts the dominance of thought. As we have seen in the above, Harris observes that the attribute of thought is more comprehensive than the others from Letter 66. Why is it more comprehensive? The reason for his suggestion is because, from the letter we can infer that in God’s thinking there is an idea of the modes of every attribute. And this is the manner of the dominance of the order of God’s thinking. However, if in God’s thinking there were the modes themselves of every attribute, we would say that thought swallows up all the other attributes, and the idealistic interpretation could be ascribed to Spinoza. But, in reality, as long as there is an idea of the modes of every attribute instead of the modes themselves, we should say that thought is representative unlike the others; it follows that although we could say it is “more comprehensive,” we cannot say it is more real. From this perspective, as to both the definition and the Letter 66, I would like to suggest the representative interpretation rather than the idealistic interpretation. It follows that we can point out the uniqueness of thought in Spinoza’s system in terms of the representative function, but should not interpret Spinoza’s system as idealism.

For Spinoza, as in one of the premises in this chapter, the relative weighting of thought and extension is equal, and therefore we can give greater weight neither to the mental series nor to the physical series. I shall cite again Spinoza’s statements on this point.

Hence it follows that God’s power of thinking is equal to His actual power of acting, that is to say, whatever follows formally from the infinite nature of God, follows from the idea of God [idea Dei], in

50 One might say that the representative role of the attribute of thought is related to the dominance of thought over the others i.e. the dominance of thought in a representative sense. But even in this case, it is difficult to support the idealistic interpretation, because the dominance of thought in a representative sense does not imply that thought is real and extension is unreal. In other words, if the other attributes belong to God’s thinking as an idea in a representative sense, the doctrine of the attributes has a certain distance from the idealistic interpretation. In my opinion, even though the dominance of thought is the idealistic element in the interpretation of Spinoza, it does not play a major part in his system but a small part which we have to unravel.
the same order and in the same connection objectively in God. (E, II, Prop 7, Corol)

The idealistic interpretation is not compatible with the above statement, while the representative interpretation is compatible with it. Viewed from this perspective, it is clear that the idealistic interpretation is a misunderstanding of Spinoza's real tendency, and consequently it is hardly possible to regard Spinoza as an idealist.

3. Epiphenomenalism

We can quickly dismiss one further viewpoint, advocated by Harold Barker, that Spinoza was an epiphenomenalist. This interpretation is not only incompatible with a non-causal relationship between the mind and the body but also with the equality of weight between the mind and the body. However, it will be helpful to explore the rationale behind Barker's claim. Especially, in view of the interest to modern theories of mind, it is worth looking at this claim.

Initially, we should reflect on some general definitions of "epiphenomenalism" so that Barker's point of view is better understood. Epiphenomenalism is generally defined as the view that "all mental events [are considered] to be the effects of physical events but never the causes of either

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51 The representative interpretation will be dealt with at some length in chapter six.
52 One might say that even if idealism is not Spinoza's intention, Spinoza is somehow committed to the assertion of the dominance of thought and subsequently his system can be regard as an idealistic one. However if Spinoza was committed to it, we should regard it as a contradiction or inconsistency rather than interpreting it as idealism. The most important point in the interpretation of Spinoza, as in the interpretation of any philosopher, is trying to find his real tendency and thinking. Spinoza's real tendency is not arguing the primacy of idealism but overcoming the inadequacy of materialism and idealism. Therefore we should not infer an idealistic interpretation from the definition and the letter, since Spinoza's real tendency in both sources is, as I have explained, not an idealistic but a representative one.
physical or other mental events,” and epiphenomenalists “have maintained that the body acts upon the mind to produce consciousness, thought, and feeling, but that the mind itself has no physical effects.”

(1) H. Barker’s Notes on Ethics

a. The Priority of the Body

From the above substantially similar definitions, we can identify and arrange the characteristics of epiphenomenalism as follows.

(1) There is only one direction of causality—from the body to the mind. In other words the body acts upon the mind but not vice versa.

(2) The mind is never the cause of even any other mental events.

(3) Without the body, there can be no mental effects such as consciousness, thought, and feeling. In other words, bodily effects result from bodily causes and mental effects also result from bodily causes.

From the above three characteristics, we can recognise that epiphenomenalism is posited on the basis of the priority of the body to the mind.

Now, Barker, throughout his article, in order to maintain consistency with the epiphenomenalistic interpretation as well as to support it, emphasises the priority of the body in Spinoza’s discussion of the relation of the mind to the body. We can note the fact that Barker has a scheme which is intended to hold the priority of the body in his mind from the first page of his article by expressing dissatisfaction with the phrase “per se concipi” (be conceived through itself) in proposition 10 of Ethics, part I: “Each attribute of a substance must be conceived through itself.” Here, he holds that thinking and knowledge depend upon an

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objective world. That is to say, he places stress on the priority of extension over thought in the relationship between these two attributes and thus argues against the independence of the attributes.\textsuperscript{56}

Barker adheres to this kind of tendency in explaining the relationship between the attributes of thought and extension, the mind and the body. For example, he emphasises the priority of the body, even arguing that it is misleading to translate “Deus” in the Ethics as “God” especially with respect to the attributes of thought and extension. The term “Deus,” according to Barker, should have been understood as “Natura.” Hence, it ought to be translated into English not as “God” but as “Nature,” since the “Deus” of Spinoza is not the “God” of ordinary linguistic usage.\textsuperscript{57}

Barker maintains that as long as someone uses the ordinary term “God” which concerns “the divine mind and divine omniscience,” he will fall into the difficulty of criticising God as a thinking thing rather than God as an extended thing. In Barker’s words, “he will be less critical about the notion of Deus as res cogitans than he is about the notion of Deus as res extensa.”\textsuperscript{58} He further carries the criticism into the domain of “thought” in Spinoza’s “attributes-modes” system. As to the attribute of extension, Barker does not regard it as giving rise to difficulties of understanding. However, concerning the attribute of thought, he regards it as posing a difficult problem.

Next, we can see that he tries to move Spinoza’s theory from parallelism to epiphenomenalism. He unfolds an epiphenomenalistic interpretation pointing out some problems of parallelism, or at least he presents the argument of “the priority of the body over the mind” effectively. He states in relation to this interpretation the following:

[I]n spite of his denial of any communio between the attributes, his argument repeatedly suggests that he is really thinking of the mind as

\textsuperscript{56} H. Barker, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 101.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., pp. 110–111.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., p. 110.
determined by the body, so that, not parallelism, but epiphenomenalism, would be the word to describe the real tendency of his thought.\textsuperscript{59}

What is the reason for Barker asserting the above point of view? In other words, in what sense does he think that the mind is determined by the body in Spinoza’s theory? I shall explore the answer to this question.

\textit{b. The Epiphenomenalistic Interpretation}

I would like to take two statements presenting Barker’s main argument from which he adduces his epiphenomenalistic interpretation, although there are other statements alleged by him. The first is on the ground of the scholium to proposition 13, part II, the other is on the ground of the scholium to proposition 2, part III. Here are parts of the statements.

Firstly, after he complains of the confusion of the scholium to proposition 13, he offers an epiphenomenalistic interpretation. He states this as follows: “But in the sentence that begins, \textit{Hoc tamen in genere dico} [Thus much, nevertheless, I will say generally], he is evidently thinking of the body as the organ of mind or indeed as determining it, and the stress he lays on a prior knowledge of the body as the key to an understanding of the mind then takes on a different significance.”\textsuperscript{60}

That is to say, even though Spinoza claims the union of mind and body in the first paragraph of this scholium, Barker argues that in the second paragraph the mind is determined by the body—for instance, “in proportion as one body is better adapted than another to do or suffer many things, in the same proportion will the mind at the same time be better adapted to perceive many things”\textsuperscript{(E, II, Prop 13, Schol). In this way, Barker interprets this scholium (at least in the second paragraph), as showing that Spinoza’s mind-body theory is epiphenomenalistic, because he interprets the above statement as that the body acts upon the mind but not \textit{vice versa}, that is to say, changes in the body are the cause of changes in the mind but not \textit{vice versa}.\textsuperscript{

\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., p. 144.\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., p. 149.
Secondly, Barker's epiphenomenalistic interpretation finds support in the scholium to proposition 2, part III. From the scholium he brings in his epiphenomenalistic statement of Spinoza's philosophy of mind. This is related to what he sees as the essential point and obvious tendency of this scholium. Barker says: "[T]he essential point is that he really gives priority or predominance to the body, in spite of his professed doctrine of the complete independence and equality of the attributes. The obvious tendency of the scholium to III, 2—in spite of what the proposition itself asserts—is to glorify the body at the expense of the mind." 61 From this statement, we can see that Barker emphasises the priority of the body as determining the mind, and therefore he takes a strongly epiphenomenalistic point of view on Spinoza's mind-body theory.

(2) The Inadequacy of the Epiphenomenalistic Interpretation

I shall criticise Barker's epiphenomenalistic interpretation in the following respects: firstly, I shall treat the scholium of the proposition 2 in part III at length; 62 and secondly, point out that Spinoza's mind-body theory contradicts definitions of epiphenomenalism. By doing so, I shall show that Spinoza's real tendency is not epiphenomenalistic.

a. The Equality or Priority between the Mind and the Body: the Scholium of Proposition Two, Part Three 63

Spinoza regards thought and extension as equal attributes, although some passages seem to imply the priority of extension. Spinoza also strongly attacks interaction between the mind and the body. Let us consider these two points in the following passage (E, III, Prop 2, Schol); I shall break this passage up by numbering for convenience.

61 Ibid.
62 Barker, also, as we have seen, relies on the scholium of proposition 13 in part II. As to this scholium, I shall deal with it when I discuss the materialistic interpretation in the next section.
63 There are no divisions within the passages in this scholium in the Latin text, but for convenience I shall divide one long section into some passages.
(i) denial of “the superiority of the mind over the body” and of “mind-body interactionism”

Although these things are so, and no ground for doubting remains, I scarcely believe, nevertheless, that without a proof derived from experience, men will be induced calmly to weigh what has been said, so firmly are they persuaded that, solely at the bidding of the mind, the body moves or rests, and does a number of things which depend upon the will of the mind alone, and upon the power of thought. For what the body can do no one has hitherto determined, that is to say, experience has taught no one hitherto what the body, without being determined by the mind, can do and what it cannot do from the laws of Nature alone, in so far as nature is considered merely as corporeal.

(1) For no one as yet has understood the structure of the body so accurately as to be able to explain all its functions, not to mention the fact that many things are observed in brutes which far surpass human sagacity, and that sleepwalkers in their sleep do very many things which they dare not do when awake—all this showing that the body itself can do many things from the laws of its own nature alone, at which the mind belonging to that body is amazed.

(2) Again, nobody knows by what means or by what method the mind moves the body, nor how many degrees of motion it can communicate to the body, nor with what speed it can move the body. So that it follows that, when men say that this or that action of the body springs from the mind which has command over the body, they do not know what they say, and they do nothing but confess with pretentious words that they know nothing about the cause of the action and see nothing in it to wonder at.

(3) But they will say that, whether they know or do not know by what means the mind moves the body, it is nevertheless in their experience that if the mind were not fit for thinking the body would be inert. They say, again, it is in their experience that the mind alone has power both to speak and be silent, and to do many other things which they therefore think to be dependent on a decree of the mind. But with regard to the first assertion, I ask them if experience does not also teach that if the body be sluggish the mind at the same time is not fit for thinking? When the body is asleep, the mind slumbers with it and has not the power to think, as it has when the body is awake. Again, I believe that all have discovered that the mind is not always equally fitted for thinking about the same subject, but in proportion to the fitness of the body for this or that image to be excited in it will the mind be better fitted to contemplate this or that object.

(4) But my opponents will say that from the laws of Nature alone, in so far as it is considered to be corporeal merely, it cannot be that the causes of architecture, painting, and things of this sort, which are the results of human art alone, could be deduced, and that the human body, unless it were determined and guided by the mind would not be able to build a temple. I have already shown, however, that they do not know what the body can do, nor what can be deduced from the consideration of its nature alone, and that they find that many things are done merely by the laws of Nature which they would
never have believed to be possible without the direction of the mind, as, for example, those things which sleepwalkers do in their sleep, and at which they themselves are astonished when they wake. I adduce also here the structure itself of the human body, which so greatly surpasses in workmanship all those things which are constructed by human art, not to mention, what I have already proved, that an infinitude of things follows from Nature under whatever attribute it may be considered.

I shall give the main points of each stage of the argument:

(1) An explanation can in principle be given for much behaviour in terms of the corporeal.
(2) The hypothesis of mental/physical interaction is more abstruse than that of physical action.
(3) There is an illusion of the mind freely bringing about change in the corporeal, but if the body is sluggish the mind is also sluggish.
(4) For all we know a physical explanation is possible for any action.

From this summary, we can see that this passage concerns bodily explanation in order to refute the common belief, held in Spinoza's time, of the superiority of the mind over the body, and also presumably to repudiate Cartesian interactionism. We can see that Spinoza denies the dependency of the body upon the mind by pointing out repeatedly a common misunderstanding regarding the body. He holds that the body can do many things without the direction of the mind from the analogy of sleepwalkers. All these examples and explanations are intended to undermine the view that the mind can determine or act upon the body, that is to say, the mind can cause the body to move.

It may be argued however that Spinoza's real tendency is to assert the priority of the body over the mind as Barker suggests. However, does Spinoza really hold a priority of the body over the mind in this scholium? I think not. The proposition itself informs us of two points: (a) the body cannot determine the mind, (b) the mind cannot determine the body. What Spinoza seeks to do in the second paragraph, as he mentions in the first sentence, is to prove point (b) so as to persuade those who strongly believe in the dependency of the body upon the mind. He regards this belief as blocking a fair consideration of the matter. It was a
common belief in Spinoza’s time that the mind commanded the body. The following statements of Spinoza’s (at the beginning of the above quotation) conveys this fact: “… so firmly are they persuaded that, solely at the bidding of the mind, the body moves or rests, and does a number of things which depend on the will of the mind alone, and upon the power of thought.” Spinoza might not have felt the need to offer a proof of point (a) since the belief that the mind commands the body was so widespread. We cannot argue from his silence here that he thought there was physical-mental causality, in view of the fact that he clearly denies it in several places.

The passage which could possibly be regarded as claiming the priority of the body is restricted to “in proportion to the fitness of the body for this or that image to be excited in it will the mind be better fitted to contemplate this or that object.” However, we should note that Spinoza’s meaning is that the mind and the body move together as well as that the mind is the idea of the body and the body is the object of the mind. That is to say, we should regard this not as giving priority to the body but as asserting equality to the body. Spinoza’s intention and purpose in arguing against the common belief that the mind determines the body is to support his denial of causal interaction between the mind and the body, which he claims in the proposition itself. Spinoza’s explanations in the scholium are compatible with this interpretation. I shall consider more passages in the scholium of proposition 2.

(ii) one order of event and two descriptions of the mental and the physical

[T]he infant believes that it is by free will that it seeks the breast; the angry boy believes that by free will he wishes vengeance; the timid man thinks it is with free will he seeks flight; the drunkard believes that by a free command of his mind he speaks the things which when sober he wishes he had left unsaid. Thus the madman, the chatterer, the boy, and others of the same kind, all believe that they speak by a free command of the mind, whilst, in truth, they have no power to restrain the impulse which they have to speak, so that experience itself, no less than reason, clearly teaches that men believe themselves to be free simply because they are conscious of their own actions, knowing nothing of the causes by which they are determined; it teaches, too, that the decrees of the mind are nothing but the appetites themselves, which differ, therefore, according to the different temper of the body. For every man determines all things from his emotion;
those who are agitated by contrary emotions do not know what they want, whilst those
who are agitated by no emotion are easily driven hither and thither. All this plainly
shows that the decree of the mind, the appetite, and determination of the body are
coincident in Nature, or rather that they are one and the same thing which, when it is
considered under the attribute of thought and manifested by that, is called a "decree,"
and when it is considered under the attribute of extension and is deduced from the laws
of motion and rest is called a "determination."

The same order of events which can be described mentally can also be described
physically; there is also a suggestion that "appetites" are a different way of
describing "decrees" and "determinations." Are they mental, or physical? If mental,
he might be implying that reference to appetites is a better way of describing the
mental than reference to "decrees."

(iii) denial of "the command theory of mind" 64

This, however, will be better understood as we go on, for there is another thing which I
wish to be observed here—that we cannot by a mental decree do a thing unless we
recollect it.

(1) We cannot speak a word, for instance, unless we recollect it. But it is not in the free
power of the mind either to recollect a thing or to forget it. It is believed, therefore, that
the power of the mind extends only thus far—that from a mental decree we can speak or
be silent about a thing only when we recollect it.

(2) But when we dream that we speak, we believe that we do so from a free decree of the
mind, and yet we do not speak, or, if we do, it is the result of a spontaneous motion of
the body. We dream, again, that we are concealing things, and that we do this by virtue
of a decree of the mind like that by which, when awake, we are silent about things we
know. We dream, again, that, from a decree of the mind, we do some things which we
should not dare to do when awake.

(3) And I should like to know, therefore, whether there are two kinds of decrees in the
mind—one belonging to dreams and the other free. If this be too great nonsense, we
must necessarily grant that this decree of the mind which is believed to be free is not
distinguishable from the imagination or memory, and is nothing but the affirmation
which the idea necessarily involves in so far as it is an idea (Prop 49, pt. 2).

(4) These decrees of the mind, therefore, arise in the mind by the same necessity as the
ideas of things actually existing. Consequently, those who believe that they speak or are
silent or do anything else from a free decree of the mind dream with their eyes open.

64 I shall also break up this passage by numbering for convenience.
Spinoza goes on to develop the view that reference to "decrees" is inadequate and confused:

(1) It shows an inadequacy which does not cover all mental acts
(2) Decrees in dreams do not really bring about anything
(3) Unless there are two sorts of decree, we must treat all decrees of the mind as ineffective
(4) Apparently free decrees are really caused.

This passage thus supports the argument contained in the second paragraph. It refutes the common belief that the mind commands the body, or even, perhaps, that the mind commands the mind. His point is that we engage in some activity not by the free will of the mind but by responses to external stimuli. In other words the action of the body does not depend upon the free will of the mind.

Now, we can see that this scholium is not concerned with either giving a priority to the body or glorifying the body at the expense of the mind, as Barker argues. But it is concerned with the explanation of the experience of the body in order to refute the common belief of the superiority of the mind over the body and to refute Cartesian interactionism by showing the causal independence of the body from the mind. I think that, in the scholium, Spinoza's intention is to expound and prove what he says in the proposition (the mind cannot determine the body) through the example of sleepwalkers, and he does not have any further intention to give priority or predominance to the body.

Barker uses the phrase, "in spite of what the proposition itself asserts," hence, it is evident that he is aware of the clear sense of proposition 2, part III. Nevertheless, he seems to reinterpret it. Here, we should remind ourselves that this scholium is attached to proposition 2. That is, "the body cannot determine the mind to thought, neither can the mind determine the body to motion nor rest, nor to anything else if there be anything else" (E, III, Prop 2). In Spinoza, we should not consider any scholium without the associated proposition in the Ethics. How would Barker be able to treat the proposition itself? Barker should have interpreted this scholium in a manner faithful to the proposition itself. Moreover, we have seen

65 Ibid., p. 149.
that the scholium does not necessarily lead to the priority of the body over the mind. Consequently, as long as Spinoza holds proposition 2 and the scholium is consistent with the proposition, it is hardly possible to interpret his position as epiphenomenalism.

b. Incompatibility between Definitions of Epiphenomenalism and Spinoza’s Theory

Barker, as we have just seen above, tries to attach epiphenomenalism to Spinoza’s mind-body theory. I shall discuss some problems of this kind of interpretation dealing with the definition of epiphenomenalism. At the beginning of section 1, I drew some points from the definition of epiphenomenalism. These were:

(1) There is only one direction of causality—from the body to the mind. In other words the body acts upon the mind but not vice versa.
(2) The mind is never the cause of even any other mental events.
(3) Mental events such as consciousness, thought, and feeling are always the effect of bodily causes.

As to point (1), I have just criticised Barker’s assertion with relation to these points. Now, let us examine points (2) and (3) in the definition of epiphenomenalism. Normally in Spinoza, the relationship between mind and body is presented by saying that a mind is the idea of a mode of extension and a body is the object (ideatum) of a mind. This kind of relationship, however, also occurs within the mental process since Spinoza states, “[t]his idea of the mind is united to the mind in the same way as the mind itself is united to the body” (E, II, Prop 21; my italics). Therefore we can see that there is an idea of the idea in Spinoza’s system, and that the object of this idea is not the body but the mind. This gives self-consciousness. If Spinoza is interpreted as an epiphenomenalist, the fact that “the body is the object of the mind,” must imply that the body is the cause of the mind, and the mind the effect of the body. Likewise, concerning the idea of the idea, “the mind is the cause of the idea of the idea,” since here the mind is the object
[objectum] of the idea of the mind. This contradicts the definition of epiphenomenalism, precisely, in point (2): the mind would have to be causally active in producing the idea of the mind. Due to the above fact, it is not true that Spinoza’s mind-body theory can be interpreted as epiphenomenalism. In other words, so long as there is the theory of idea ideae in Spinoza’s philosophy of mind, it is unlikely to be possible to treat Spinoza’s theory as epiphenomenalistic.

According to Barker, the idea ideae is “a reflective awareness of what is in the mind,” and he adds “reflective knowledge can only become aware of, not create, any unity or continuity there is in the mind.” However, the mind must be the cause of the idea of the mind in respect to the epiphenomenalistic sense, since the body is, in epiphenomenalism, treated as the cause of the mind.

Apart from this argument, we can simply dismiss the epiphenomenalistic interpretation. There exists a consensus that for Spinoza, there is a causal relationship within the realm of the mind (also within the realm of body), whereas there is no causal relationship between the mind and the body. In Spinoza’s view, causation occurs between mental events and does not rely on causation of the physical. For Spinoza, the causation of mental events is determined by mental laws (and physical events are caused by physical laws), although there is ultimately one order of causation. Here we can see that the mind is active in Spinoza’s theory unlike the mind according to epiphenomenalism. Thus, if Barker maintains the epiphenomenalistic interpretation he is the only one who disagrees with this consensus, since the thesis of epiphenomenalism is completely the reverse of each case of the causality. Consequently, since all characteristics of epiphenomenalism contradict Spinoza’s mind-body doctrine, epiphenomenalism should be discarded in the interpretations of Spinoza’s mind-body theory.

When Barker interprets Spinoza’s statement, in my view, he places too much stress on the isolated statements which seem to suggest that Spinoza speaks of the priority of the body rather than concentrating on the whole context of what Spinoza says. Moreover, he does not accept Spinoza’s direct statements literally.

66 Ibid., p. 157.
as we have seen in the discussion on proposition 2 of part II. It seems to me that Barker’s treatment of Spinoza’s statements of the mind-body theory is suspect because it is preconditioned by his own epiphenomenalistic interpretation. Barker’s view sometimes seems attractive when we find the isolated statements which seem to suggest that Spinoza speaks of the priority of the body. However, even if there were the priority of the body in Spinoza’s system, it could not be interpreted as epiphenomenalism, since it is clear that in Spinoza’s system, there is no causal relation between the mind and the body while there is causality in the mental realm. These essential points of Spinoza’s mind-body theory are not compatible with the definitions of epiphenomenalism. So the priority, if there is one, requires a different sort of explanation. As we shall see later, others have found an explanation in Spinoza’s discussion of the representative function of ideas. (See chapter six.)

Briefly, for now, if we consider the role of the “idea” in the relationship between mind and body, we can realise there is the representational function in Spinoza’s mind-body theory, and this function is the most important part of the mind-body relationship, as well as the crux of interpreting his point of view on that relationship. For Spinoza, the cognitive situation requires the presence of ideas and these ideas of the events in the body are contained in the mind. Therefore the ideas in the human mind represent the nature of its own body, together with external bodies which affect the human body. In Spinoza’s epistemological realm, the relationship between the human mind and its body or external bodies is a representative one through the medium of ideas which represent those objects.67

Barker does not consider this kind of representational role. He just highlights “the priority of the body” and converts Spinoza’s mind-body theory into a position whereby “the body is the cause of the mind” through Spinoza’s assertion that “the body is the object of the idea of the mind.” He misses the representational role of the idea in Spinoza’s mind-body theory, and the doctrine of representationalism is irrelevant to “the priority of the body.”

67 Even though the word “representation” is rare in Spinoza, we can infer a representative role from his cognitive theory.
In section 1, I used determinism to criticise the hylomorphic interpretation. From my point of view, determinism is also available as a means to criticise an epiphenomenalistic interpretation of Spinoza’s mind-body theory. We can criticise it in terms of Spinoza’s metaphysical determinism.

Barker, as we have seen, regards epiphenomenalism as Spinoza’s real tendency. But if it is Spinoza’s real tendency, it is contradictory to his metaphysical determinism. For Spinoza the cause of thought is substance and not anything else, and the cause of extension is also substance. If Spinoza’s substance is merely a physical one, epiphenomenalism is plausible in the interpretation of Spinoza’s mind-body theory. But it is clear that Spinoza’s substance is not only physical but also mental. In Spinoza, there are two distinct causal series: one is from thought to the mental modes, the other from extension to the bodily modes. The mind is determined only by the attribute of thought, and the body is determined only by the attribute of extension. Thought cannot be the cause of the body and extension cannot be the cause of the mind, because the attributes are conceptually independent (E, I, Prop 10); for Spinoza, the mind is conceived through the attribute of thought and the body is conceived through the attribute of extension, and the phrase “is conceived through” implies causation (E, I, Ax 5; E, II, Prop 6, Demon). Hence, his metaphysical determinism makes clear the fact that there is no causal interaction between the mind and the body. This kind of metaphysical determinism in Spinoza is quite enough to refute an epiphenomenalistic interpretation of Spinoza’s theory. Unlike epiphenomenalism, in Spinoza’s system what determines the mind is not the body or any other physical thing, but the attributes of thought belonging to the one substance. Therefore, in so far as his metaphysical determinism is allowed in both the mental and the physical realm, that is to say, in so far as for Spinoza the mind is determined by substance and this substance has the attribute of thought together with the attribute of extension, epiphenomenalism has no ground for support in Spinoza’s mind-body theory.

Viewed from the perspectives which I have explained in this section, we can say that Spinoza’s position on the mind-body theory is not epiphenomenalism.

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68 This issue is discussed pp. 83–84 in chapter three.
since that would not be an accurate interpretation or an adequate one. Therefore, I would like to conclude this section by suggesting that, in relation to Spinoza’s assertion that “the body is the object of the idea of the mind,” representationalism rather than epiphenomenalism is the key to interpreting Spinoza’s mind-body theory. 69

4. Materialism

In philosophical discussions of the mind-body problem, there has been from the time of the ancient Greeks until the present day a wide range of theories of materialism such as classical materialism, behaviourism, reductive materialism, central state materialism, and so on. Strictly, materialism is posited on the view that mental events are really nothing more than physical events occurring to physical objects, but, as we shall see, it can also refer to positions which emphasise the dominance of the physical explanations over the mental explanations.

The first premise in this chapter is that for Spinoza the relative weighting of thought and extension is equal, and therefore neither can we give greater weight to the body nor to the mind: the body is not prior to the mind nor vice versa. However, from time to time, some commentators give weight either to one or to the other; as, for example, we have seen in Harris’ idealism and Baker’s Epiphenomenalism. Furthermore, among the various interpretations of Spinoza’s mind-body problem, there is a notable materialistic point of view: “modified materialism” by Stuart Hampshire. In the following two sections, I shall consider the appropriateness of his perspective on Spinoza and discuss some of the problems which arise from his interpretation and some of the inadequacy of applying it to Spinoza’s mind-body theory.

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69 See chapter six for more on this.
(1) The Interpretation of Stuart Hampshire

a. The Principal Point of the Book "Spinoza"

In order to examine and evaluate Hampshire’s materialistic interpretation of Spinoza’s mind-body problem, we need to expound his point of view regarding Spinoza’s mind-body theory as it is asserted in his books Spinoza and Freedom of mind.

Firstly, in his book Spinoza (1951), Hampshire tends to regard Spinoza as holding the view that humans are nothing more than a part of nature, and he naturally finds it difficult to understand how individuals can become free in Spinoza’s theory. He is thus doubtful as to whether Spinoza’s Ethics really provide a way of salvation or merely a means of distinguishing between servitude and a freedom which we can never attain.70 Thus he states Spinoza’s position as follows: “[O]ur whole duty and wisdom is to understand fully our own position in Nature and the causes of our imperfections, and, having understanding, to acquiesce; man’s greatest happiness and peace of mind (acquiescentia animi) comes only from this full philosophical understanding of himself.”71 Elsewhere Hampshire briefly points out that Spinoza’s position is that a human body embodies a human mind. More precisely, “every modification of, or change of state in, a human body necessarily involves, in view of the identity of the order of causes within the two attributes, a modification of the idea of that body, and so involves a modification of the mind.”72 Then, Hampshire does justice to the innate power of the mind by comparing it with Freud’s conception of libido. According to him, it is a reflection of man’s physical energy.

Hatred and love, jealousy and pride, and the other emotions which he feels, can be shown to him as the compensations necessary to restore loss of “psychical energy.” … Every person is held to dispose of a certain quantity of psychical energy, a counterpart (for

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71 Ibid., p. 121.
72 Ibid., p. 68.
Spinoza at least) of his physical energy, and conscious pleasures and
pains are only reflexions of the relatively uninhibited expression and
frustration of this energy.\textsuperscript{73}

Hampshire does not directly propound any kind of materialistic interpretation of
Spinoza in any part of the book \textit{Spinoza}, and it seems to me that Hampshire's
assertions in his book \textit{Spinoza} cannot be formulated clearly enough to explain
Spinoza's standpoint on the relationship between mind and body. Moreover,
initially his two pages (pp. 68–69) of explication of Spinoza's mind-body theory
(under the title "Mind and Body") do not seem to give this subject adequate
consideration. The points in these two pages is that (1) for every body there is an
idea of that body, (2) a body involves a mind (an idea of that body) in view of the
identity of the order of causes, and (3) the greater or less power and perfection of a
human mind follows from the power and perfection of the body and \textit{vice versa}.
Hampshire does not argue these points but merely states them, so that it is difficult
on their basis to assert a distinctive position on Spinoza.

However, throughout the book we can surmise that his point of view on
Spinoza's mind-body problem is basically a materialist interpretation. For example,
Hampshire states: "In the last century Spinoza was sometimes celebrated, and
much more often abominated, as a precursor of materialism; but his was a
materialism with a difference, if only because the word 'matter' normally suggests
something solid and inert, and no such notion of matter is to be found in his
writing."\textsuperscript{74} He also claims that, in Spinoza, the body can do many things without
the mind. In other words, Hampshire believes that, in Spinoza's theory, behaviour
can be explained without mental processes such as will or judgement through the
example of the behaviour of animals and of sleepwalkers.\textsuperscript{75} (See quotation on pp.
44–45.)

\textsuperscript{73} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 141.
\textsuperscript{74} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 79.
\textsuperscript{75} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 130–131.
b. A Kind of Materialism

Hampshire returns forcefully to his materialistic interpretation of Spinoza about 20 years later. We can find this in his book *Freedom of Mind* (1972), in the chapter called “A Kind of Materialism.” I shall, therefore, move on to *Freedom of Mind*, within which a clearer materialistic interpretation is advanced by Hampshire. Here, Hampshire interprets Spinoza’s mind-body theory as “a modified materialism” which is a new term among the variety of interpretations of Spinoza’s philosophy. Hampshire regards “a modified materialism” as “the sense, or point, of Spinoza’s so-called double aspect theory of personality.”

The main assertion of this theory is that, for Spinoza, “every change in the state of the organism, which is a change in thought, is also a change in some bodily state, and usually in the principal instrument of thought, the brain.” In other words, his point of view on the relation of the body to the mind in Spinoza is that the body is a contrivance for producing thought, and therefore the mind is embodied in the body as its contrivance. With respect to this point, Hampshire says that “if the condition of the instrument is grossly changed, as by drugs, the power of thought is grossly changed also.” This implies that the body is prior to the mind in the order of explanation. Hampshire’s above explanation is, I assume, rooted in the apparent asymmetry between the mind and the body in the scholium to proposition 13 in the *Ethics*, part II; Hampshire does not quote or indicate the source of his explanations, but they bear a strong resemblance to the aforementioned scholium.

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78 *Ibid.*, p. 218. Hampshire’s terminology is initially puzzling. The trouble is that phrases such as “instrument of thought” and “physical instrument of the mind” tend to suggest “that which is employed by thought.” This gives all the wrong associations. To describe the brain as the instrument of thought suggests something thought uses: Mind calls the shots. Thus, even though Hampshire uses this phrase, I avoid it and use the phrase “machine for producing thought” except in the direct quotations, since this better represents his materialistic interpretation.
80 This scholium will be considered in more detail from p. 59.
According to the modified materialistic interpretation, modes of thought and modes of extension are irreducible one to the other, since this interprets Spinoza's two orders as follows: "the order of thoughts can only be adequately explained by the rational and associative connections peculiar to thoughts, and physical states by their connection with other physical states in accordance with the laws of physics." Therefore, Hampshire holds that "the classical materialists are wrong in supposing that the two orders of explanation could properly be reduced to one." In this way, Hampshire points out that Spinoza denies reductionism of the mental to the physical. He means that Spinoza's mind-body theory is materialism without reduction.

Now, we can identify the crux of the modified materialistic interpretation as follows:

(1) The priority of the body over the mind
Not only is the body independent from the mind in explaining it, but it is also primary and the mind is secondary in the order of explanation by virtue of the predominance of the laws of physics (with the mind being secondary). At final analysis, the mind is embodied in the body, especially in the brain (and not vice versa).

(2) The problem of reduction
Unlike classical materialism, this doctrine regards the two orders of explanation (mental and physical) as irreducible.

Modified materialism can thus be seen as accepting a central feature of the double aspect theory namely the double order of explanation. In that sense, it is a reconsideration of the interpretation of the double aspect theory through materialistic glasses.

Hampshire's materialistic interpretation and double aspect view both involve physical descriptions and mental descriptions. But the difference between

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81 Ibid., p. 229.
82 Ibid. In his book *Spinoza*, Hampshire also considers this point: "[B]oth conceptions of the Universe are complete in themselves, but one is not reducible to the other" (p. 58). Here it is not so clear that the order of thoughts is complete.
them is that in Hampshire’s materialistic interpretation he emphasises that physical
descriptions are prior to mental descriptions in getting an overall picture of the
world.

(2) Inadequacy of Hampshire’s Interpretation

First of all, I would like to point out the fact that modified materialism
differs from strict materialism, since “materialism” is generally presented as
follows:

Materialism must either deny that there are any nonmaterial mental
objects, events, and states, or claim that while there are some entities
classified as mental, each one is actually not only identical with but
reducible to purely material phenomena, usually said to be certain
brain processes.83

From the above definition of strict materialism, we can infer that it is difficult to
classify modified materialism as strict materialism. The reason is that modified
materialism, as we have seen, accepts the fact that there are nonmaterial laws and
explanations and it does not accept the possibility of reducing one order of
explanation to the other. Therefore, we can see that modified materialism is the
doctrine that the mental order exists, but the physical order dominates; but yet that
mental events do not exist over and above physical events.

Modified materialism involves both the double aspect theory and
materialism. Hampshire, as we have seen, insists on his materialistic point of view
on Spinoza by treating the brain as the machine for producing thought. According
to him, for Spinoza, the body—principally, the brain—is a machine for producing
thought, and the mind is associated with the body in the sense that the mental
properties are ultimately a physical state of the brain.

83 James W. Cornman, Materialism and Sensations (New Haven and London: Yale University
It is, however, problematic to say that this kind of interpretation can be regarded as Spinoza's view. Although Hampshire does not quote or indicate directly, the reason or ground for his interpretation is, as I mentioned, Spinoza's following statement:

Therefore, in order to determine the difference between the human mind and other things and its superiority over them, we must first know, as we have said, the nature of its object, that is to say, the nature of the human body. I am not able to explain it here, nor is such an explanation necessary for what I wish to demonstrate. Thus much, nevertheless, I will say generally—that in proportion as one body is better adapted than another to do or suffer many things, in the same proportion will the mind at the same time be better adapted to perceive many things, and the more the actions of a body depend upon itself alone, and the less other bodies co-operate with it in action, the better adapted will the mind be for distinctly understanding.

(E, II, Prop 13, Schol)

There is an asymmetry between the mind and the body in this statement. Hampshire seems to take this asymmetry as ground for the physical order dominating, so that he thinks that this leads to a materialistic interpretation. However, I do not think this asymmetry argues for materialism. In the above passage, Spinoza is saying that the best way of discovering mental differences is by studying physical differences. Body is prior to mind as far as gaining knowledge is concerned: Spinoza favours the physical over the mental as a way of gaining knowledge. This ties up with what we said earlier (pp. 43–49 in section 2): the way we explain how minds work is more confused than the way we explain how bodies work: talk of commands, with no proper measurements (E, III, Prop 2, Schol). Does that argue for materialism? Not really. What Spinoza claims in the above statement is not that the physical is actually prior to the mental, but that the way in which we explain things using mental vocabulary is less successful than the way we explain things using physical vocabulary. I shall emphasise that this passage does not argue for materialism by the following points. Firstly, in many places Spinoza
argues for the equivalence of adequate mental and physical descriptions. Secondly, there is no reason to think Spinoza would have permanently ruled out the possibility of good mental explanations. The present position is best seen as a temporary phase in our coming to acquire a better knowledge of things. We can hope for complete mental as well as physical explanations one day.

I think that Spinoza really has this sort of attitude in arguing his philosophy: that is, our knowledge at the present day is not capable of completely grasping some facts, but we shall be able to discover them when our knowledge is increased by more scientific discovery. Even when Spinoza talked of unknown attributes, he makes this point:

From what has now been said, it is clear that Idea of infinite attributes in the perfect being is no fiction. But we shall still add the following: After the proceeding reflection on Nature we have not yet been able to find in it more than two attributes that belong to this all-perfect being.\(^\text{84}\) (my italics)

Regarding the attributes of which God consists, they are nothing but infinite substances, each of which must, of itself, be infinitely perfect. Clear and distinct reason conceives us that this must, necessarily, be so. So far, however, only two of all these infinite attributes are known to us through their essence: Thought and Extension.\(^\text{85}\) (my italics)

\(^\text{84}\) Spinoza, *Short Treatise of God, Man and Human Welfare*, Part I, Chapter I, [8], note. d in Curley (ed. and trans.), *The Collected Works of Spinoza*, vol. 1, pp. 63–64. The note continues as follows:

"And these give us nothing by which we can satisfy ourselves that these would be the only ones of which this perfect being would consist. On the contrary, we find in ourselves something which openly indicates to us not only that there are more, but also that there are infinite perfect attributes which must pertain to this perfect being before it can be called perfect.

And where does this Idea of perfection come from? It cannot come from these two, for two gives only two, not infinitely many. From where, then? Certainly not from me, for then I would have had to be able to give what I did not have. From where else, then, than from the infinite attributes themselves, which tell us that they are, though they so far do not tell us what they are. For only of two do we know what they are" (my italics).

From the above passages, we can see that Spinoza claims that in the contemporary position we are not completely aware of some facts, but we may be able to know them in the future. By our knowledge up to the present day, we can grasp only two attributes of thought and extension and this knowledge does not lead to denying the existence of the other attributes; one day, we may be able to know what they are (so, they are not unknowable).  

I believe that concerning our knowledge of the mind and the body, Spinoza takes the same kind of position: even though we know the existence of both the mode of thought and the mode of extension, our temporary position does not permit us to obtain knowledge of the mind without relying on the knowledge of the body. Owing to the fact that science is not yet enough developed for us to know what the mind is, we have firstly to gain access to the body in order to give access to the mind.  

Now, we can see that our understanding of the mind depends upon our understanding of the body as far as our gaining knowledge is concerned, more precisely, as far as our gaining knowledge *up to the present day* is concerned. Can or should we take this as a justification for materialism? Certainly not. This does not lead us to materialism since this dependence originates from our temporary understanding of the present day. It is certain that there is not, in reality, any priority or dependence between the mind and the body in Spinoza’s theory. I shall confirm this by the following textual evidence:

> Between the idea and the object there must necessarily be a union, because the one cannot exist without the other. For there is no thing of which there is not an Idea in the thinking thing, and no idea can exist unless the thing also exists.

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86 H. H. Joachim and Erroll E. Harris observe this point, and they also present Letter 56 as textual evidence, but they are confined here to its unknown attributes; they do not apply this to the scholium of proposition 13, as I do (H. H. Joachim, *Study of Spinoza’s Ethics* [Oxford, 1901], p. 39, note 5; Erroll E. Harris, “Infinity of Attributes and Idea Ideae,” *Neue Hefte Fur Philosophie*, vol. 12 [1977], pp. 17–20).

87 In Spinoza’s mind-body theory, it is certainly possible for us to know of the mind by reliance on the body, since the mind and the body are one and the same thing.
Further, the object cannot be changed unless the Idea is also changed, and vice versa, so that no third thing is necessary here which would produce the union of soul and body.\(^8\)

If we consider this statement with Spinoza’s perspective of our provisional knowledge, we can confirm the view that the scholium of proposition 13 should be understood as indicating not that the physical explanation is, in effect, prior to the mental, but that the best way of discovering mental differences is by studying physical differences; that is, the body is prior to the mind as far as gaining knowledge is concerned. Therefore, Hampshire’s argument that if the condition of the body is changed, the power of thought is also changed is contrary to Spinoza’s real position, since for Spinoza the converse must be also true;\(^9\) it follows that for Spinoza the relationship between the mind and the body should be described by either that “the changes in the mind are dependent on the changes in the body and vice versa” or that “the changes in the body come before the changes in the mind in our provisional understanding.” The dependence, here, however, is not causal

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\(^8\) Spinoza, *Short Treatise of God, Man and Human Welfare*, Part II, Chapter. XX, note c, # 10 in Curley (ed. and trans.), *The Collected Works of Spinoza*, vol. 1, p. 136. The final statement in that note is as follows:

“But it should be noted that here we are speaking of such Ideas as necessarily arise in God from the existence of things, together with their essence, not of those Ideas which things now actually present to us* [or] produce in us. Between these two there is a great difference. For in God the Ideas arise from the existence and essence [of the things], according to all they are— not, as in us, from one or more of the senses (with the result that we are nearly always affected by things only imperfectly and that my Idea and yours differ, though one and the same thing produces them in us.).”

*Curley informs us that the phrase is treated as “things, actually existing, present to us” by the Pleiade editors, and as “things, as they now exist, present to us” by Gebhardt (Curley, *ibid.*).

\(^9\) I shall offer Spinoza’s other statements on this point:

“As thought and the ideas of things are arranged and connected in the mind, exactly so are the modifications of the body or the images of things arranged and connected in the body” (E, V, Prop 1).

“Therefore, as the order and connection of the ideas in the mind is according to the order and connection of the modifications of the body (Prop 18, pt. 2), it follows, *vice versa* (Prop 2, pt. 3), that the order and connection of the modification of the body is according to the order and connection in the mind of thoughts and ideas of things” (E, V, Prop 1, Demon).
dependence but a consequence of the truth of parallelism: that is, given parallelism of explanation, to change one order of explanation is to change the other. The present point, then, is that given parallelism of explanation and the imperfect state of our knowledge of mental explanation, our knowledge of physical explanation may give us an entry into mental ones. Hampshire misses or ignores the point that this explanatory dependence occurs only in our provisional understanding.\(^90\) Even if Spinoza argued that we will never know, this would not be regarded as a justification for materialism in so far that this is within our understanding. Furthermore, if it is a provisional dependence in our understanding, there is no room for us to treat it as an argument for materialism.\(^91\)

Hampshire seems to regard "modified materialism" as an illustration of Spinoza's own point of view. However, in my opinion, "modified materialism" can only be viewed as a development from Spinoza's mind-body theory, especially since in Hampshire's essay he does not give a full range of Spinoza's statements as the reason or ground for his interpretation. Hampshire should have adduced Spinoza's statements to support his interpretation and to make his point of view clearer, when he advocated his modified materialism. However, we can assume that he relies on the scholium of proposition 13 in part 2.\(^92\)

\(^90\) It might be argued that common sense is closer to Hampshire than Spinoza. However, more precisely speaking, I think that common sense of the present day is closer to Hampshire than Spinoza. Hampshire says that: "He [Spinoza] is modern, in the sense that he thinks principally about the future applications of the physical sciences to the study of personality" ("A Kind of Materialism," p. 210). But, we could say that Spinoza was even more modern than Hampshire thinks of him.

\(^91\) In fact, with reference to this issue, Hampshire's position in the article, "A Kind of Materialism" is different from his position in the book Spinoza. Hampshire (Spinoza, p. 68) states that "A human mind has greater or less power and perfection in so far as the body, of which it is the idea, has greater power and perfection; the converse must also be true" (my italics). This is different from his later position (in "A Kind of Materialism"). However, I have argued this issue on the basis of his later position.

\(^92\) Curley also interprets Spinoza as a materialist. He states as follows: "[I]f we follow out the details of Spinoza's treatment of the mind, as it develops in the course of Part II, I do not see how we can characterize it as anything but a materialistic program. To understand the mind, we must understand the body, without which the mind could not function or even exist. In spite of all the parallelistic talk, the order of understanding never proceeds from mind to body" (Behind the Geometrical Method: A Reading of Spinoza's Ethics [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988], p. 78), and also states that "the existence of the mind is tied, in the most intimate way
It is clear that Hampshire’s modified materialism digresses from the double aspect theory as well as strict materialism. Hampshire should have made explicit the crux or key point as to how the two perspectives, the double aspect theory and materialism, are related.

At this stage, we need to grasp the definition of double aspect theory so as to consider its compatibility with materialism. With respect to the definition of the double aspect theory, Richard Taylor states as below.

Still others, finding the same difficulty in the idea of the body’s acting upon the mind as in the idea of the mind’s acting upon the body, have suggested that there is really only one kind of substance, and that what we call “mind” and “body” are simply two aspects of this. This is called the double aspect theory.93

Within the above definition, I hold the view that the main points are in the terms “one kind of substance” and “two aspects of this.” The something (a single substance in Spinoza) which underlies the two aspects includes both the immaterial process and the material one. Therefore, this thing is regarded as a reality more fundamental than the mind and body, and the mind and the body are regarded as the aspects of this reality which itself is not solely mental nor solely material but both. Modified materialism falls within the realm of the double aspect theory. However, modified materialism is really a kind of materialism and therefore this doctrine emphasises materialistic aspects such as the view that the brain is the machine for producing thought. Hampshire thinks that physical descriptions are more widespread than mental, and more easily regarded as self-contained. Therefore, we can say that he has a “one-and-a-half aspects theory,” with the possible, to the existence of the body” (p. 75). In this way, along with Hampshire, he also relies on an asymmetry (in the scholium to proposition 13) between the mind and the body in arguing his materialistic interpretation. Hence, Curley’s materialistic interpretation is also implausible as an interpretation of Spinoza by the same points in the criticism of Hampshire; as I mentioned, Baker’s epiphenomenalistic interpretation (in the previous section) also relies on an asymmetry in this scholium apart from the scholium of proposition 2 in Part III. Thus, we can clearly confirm that epiphenomenalism should be dismissed from interpretations of Spinoza.

93 Richard Taylor, op. cit., p. 17.
mental aspect less prominent. Here, a problem arises, since it is contradictory to Spinoza’s view of equality between the mind and the body. The first premise in this chapter is that the weighting of thought and extension is equal, and therefore we can give greater weight neither to the body nor to the mind. Materialism, even Hampshire’s modified version, is thus difficult to consider as an adequate interpretation of Spinoza’s mind-body theory.

From my point of view, Spinoza tries to keep a clear course between materialism and idealism; and this course is posited on a reality comprising an order which is both material and mental, both having equal weight. In other words, there is only one and the same reality which is both the mind and the body, and this reality is a single substance. For Hampshire, the physical aspect is more coherent and fuller than the mental; he sees Spinoza as a (non-reductive) materialist. Therefore, it is problematic to adopt Hampshire’s interpretation as Spinoza’s mind-body theory.

For Spinoza, both thought and extension are legitimate, so that we should not underestimate or abandon one or the other. Spinozistic identity between the mind and the body should be found in that which encompasses both the mental and physical; we should say that one thing is describable either as mental or as physical. I think that this is what Spinoza means when he says that the mind and the body are one and the same thing. Since there is one thing with two different descriptions in Spinoza’s system and these descriptions do not have different power or weight but only different functions, Spinoza’s theory should be regarded as monism without materialism or idealism. This kind of monism belongs to the realm of the double aspect theory, which I shall explain in chapter five.

Chapter Three

Parallelism
One of the popular interpretations of Spinoza’s mind-body theory is parallelism. Parallelism is based on the distinction between the mind and the body which results from the distinction between the attributes of thought and extension. I shall, in section 1, describe the general outlook of the traditional parallelistic interpretation and compare it with Spinoza’s parallelism, in order to show how Spinoza’s theory differs from the former position. In section 2, I shall explore Bennett’s and Della Rocca’s more sophisticated arguments in which parallelism can seem to entail identity of mind and body. The main issue I shall consider in section 3 is the problems of the parallelist interpretation by appeal to the identity of the mind and the body. I shall also refer to the problems of “the ideas of the mind” with which parallelism is confronted in interpreting the relationship between the mind and the body in Spinoza.

1. Outlook of the Parallelist Interpretation

(1) Traditional Parallelism and Spinoza’s Parallelism

Writing of parallelism, J. Shaffer states: “[T]he mind and the body are too utterly different to be able to interact causally with each other. So the parallelist holds that the mind and the body are like two clocks, each with its own mechanism and with no causal connection between them, yet always in phase keeping the same time.”¹ Literally, parallelism posits that the mind is parallel with the body because they are entirely different in nature and they have their own activities unfolding at the same rate. Therefore the basis of parallelism is that the mind is distinct from the body.

At this stage, one may think that it is impossible to regard Spinoza’s theory as parallelism owing to the fact that for him the mind and the body are identical. However, for Spinoza, parallelism ought rather to be argued within an identity doctrine. Unlike traditional parallelism, Spinoza’s mind-body theory presents the

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identity of mind and body. Spinoza does not conceive that the mind and the body are mysteriously unfolded inducing a parallel process with each other. There exists one process alone which appears to be thought (inwardly) and to be extended (outwardly). Whereas traditional parallelism argues that the mind and the body are parallel because they are entirely different in nature, Spinoza argues that the mind and the body are parallel because they are identical with each other. Parallelism arose from dissatisfaction with Descartes' interactionism between mind and body, and is historically associated with a dualistic position. Thus, it is initially surprising that parallelism is argued for within an identity theory, and that it can be used to support an identity theory.

The following problem may arise: parallelism has to be argued for as relating to two substances or two orders of events, but if the mind and the body are identical then there exists only one thing: how is it possible to argue parallelism while arguing an identity theory? It is clear that traditional parallelism needs two things or two orders of events. But in Spinoza's realm of thought, it is not necessary for parallelism to be argued in two substances or two orders of events. Although the mind and the body are one and the same thing, since they have their different properties or descriptions we can still argue the parallelistic relationship between these two concepts: one thing which is given a mental description and the very same thing which is given a physical. More significantly, the mind and the body must be identical for a parallel relationship to exist between them. For Spinoza's parallelism it is integral that the mind and the body are ontologically identical with each other, since their parallelistic relationship is derived from the fact that they are identical.

As it is well known, Descartes' mind-body theory is of a substance dualism, which regards the mind and the body as two distinct substances. Descartes explains their relationship by interactionism, and by doing so, he tries to argue the union of the mind and the body. Owing to the fact that he regards the mind and the body as substances, he falls into difficulty in establishing the union of the two. Spinoza sees this problem in Descartes' mind-body theory, and establishes the relationship between the mind and the body in a different way.
Now we can see how Spinoza's parallelism differs from traditional parallelism. According to the traditional view, parallelism is basically a dualistic position, but in Spinoza's view, it is a monistic position. That is to say, traditional parallelism is substance dualism, while Spinoza's parallelism is conceptual or property dualism within substance monism. It follows that we ought not to consider Spinoza's parallelism in an ontological sense, but in a semantic sense, since for Spinoza the relationship between the mind and the body is ontologically one and the same and therefore we cannot claim that they are parallel. Spinoza's parallelism is derived from one substance and one order of events, so his parallelism should be understood in the sense that the mental description of one event is parallel to the physical description of the same event.

(2) The Sources of the Parallelist Interpretation

Some commentators understand that the relationship between the attributes of thought and extension in Spinoza is that they are strictly parallel to each other. Hence, according to them, this implies that the mind and the body which are modes under the attributes of thought and extension respectively, are also parallel to each other. Joel Friedman describes Spinoza's mind-body theory by saying that "whatever happens modally in the physical world must have an exact parallel in the mental world, and conversely."2 That is to say, he apparently takes it that in Spinoza's mind-body theory, the mental process is strictly (non-identical but) parallel to the physical process. This might suggest that the relationship between the mental realm and the physical realm in Spinoza's metaphysics is to be regarded as one of parallelism.3 Now if this parallelism is taken to be an accepted fact about the world, it seems highly remarkable, a strange coincidence, which would need to be explained.

Fundamentally, a parallelist interpretation relies on Spinoza's assertion that there is no causal relationship between the mind and the body while there is a

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3 In fact, Friedman is arguing for property parallelism. See below.
causal relationship within each of the mental and physical realms. The main theses of parallelism are that (1) there is no causal relation between mental events and physical events, (2) mental events exist in a causal relation with mental events, and, similarly, physical events with other physical events, and (3) there is a one-to-one correspondence between mental events and physical events. Spinoza’s assertion of the causal relationship is compatible with points (1) and (2). Concerning this, Spinoza, states that “[t]he body cannot determine the mind to thought, neither can the mind determine the body to motion nor rest, nor to anything else if there be anything else” (E, III, Prop 2). As to point (3), this interpretation is based on the following statements, which are not good sources in my view since the statements strongly suggest identity rather than mere parallelism.

A mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing expressed in two different ways. (E, II, Prop 7, Schol)

The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things. (E, II, Prop 7)

The mind and the body are one and the same thing, conceived at one time under the attribute of thought, and at another under that of extension. (E, III, Prop 2. Schol)

Let us consider the parallelist interpretation in relation to these quotations. Regarding the second and third statements, Hubbeling asserts that “This is rooted in his doctrine of parallelism. For although thinking does not influence extension and vice versa and the body does not influence the soul and vice versa the processes in each attribute (mode) run parallel, so that the quantitative magnitudes in the attribute of extension have their exact parallels in the attribute of cogitatio.”

This kind of interpretation might be correct if it were argued with the view that Spinoza’s parallelism is rooted in the doctrine of identity between the mind and the body.

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With respect to the first statement, Friedman does precisely this. He claims that “Given this passage, I argue that there can be no exceptions whatever to the parallelism. For there is only one substance, together with its modifications, each expressible in infinitely many ways, i.e., under infinitely many attributes” (my italics). Thus the modification of substance, the set of events, which is expressed as my body is also expressed as my mind. However, some parallelistic interpreters merely ascribe parallelism to Spinoza without explaining the basis of the parallelism: identity. Further, they infer parallelism from statements in Spinoza which imply identity rather than simply parallelism, like Hubbeling above. We can see that the third quotation explicitly asserts “identity” (mind and body as one and the same thing) and the first also talks of “one and the same thing.” The second quotation is perhaps more ambiguous, but compatible with there being one set of events. Furthermore, Spinoza mentions “identity” in many places in *Ethics* and in his other writings. Therefore, it is clear that parallelistic interpreters are confronted with strong evidence of Spinoza’s belief in identity of mind and body, and they should not ignore it. If commentators assert parallelism without considering identity of mind and body, their interpretations are not adequate when applied to Spinoza’s system. However, some commentators, like Friedman, explain the parallelism by appeal to identity (one substance doctrine). This seems to me correct.

Traditional parallelism holds the view that the mind and body run parallel with one another and never converge nor diverge. However, when we consider Spinoza’s mind-body theory we should do so along with his ontological theory. We should not discuss Spinoza’s mind-body theory without considering his whole metaphysical system, especially substance monism, and we should strive to make his mind-body theory compatible with his whole system.

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5 Ibid.
2. Identity and the Separation of Attributes

There is, however, a problem about asserting identity, raised by Delahunty. This is the problem of whether an identity theory is compatible with the strict prohibition on causal interactions between the mental and the physical. Delahunty’s argument, as expressed by Della Rocca, is this:

(1) There are causal relationships between mental events, as there are also between physical events: a mode of thought causes another mode of thought and a mode of extension causes another mode of extension. In other words, mental “A” can be the cause of mental “B” and bodily “A’” is the cause of bodily “B’.”

(2) According to the identity interpretation, a mental event is identical with a physical event. Thus, for example, mental A is identical with physical A’, and mental B with physical B’.

(3) Hence, it follows that a mental event can be the cause of a bodily event (which = a mental event) and a bodily event can be cause of a mental event (which = a bodily event). Thus, for example, mental A can cause mental B which is the same as physical B’: there is the causal interaction between the mind and the body.6

The above inference owes much to Donald Davidson’s argument in Mental Events. To comment briefly on the above inference, it is a particular instance of the law of identity: i.e. if Fa and a = b, then Fb.7 Here, we can see that the conclusion that physical event A’ causes mental event B (= physical event B’) is contradictory to Spinoza’s denial of causal interaction between the mind and the body. Therefore, from this perspective, it is difficult to regard the identity interpretation as Spinoza’s position.

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7 Let “F” = “causes c.”
Bennett raises a more general objection. It is more or less along similar lines to Delahunty's; the difference between them is that Bennett argues that the relationship between mental and physical is from within the relationship between natura naturans and natura naturata, the attributes and their modes, whereas Delahunty argues it purely within natura naturata. Bennett's objection is as follows:

(1) The mind involves the attribute of thought and the body involves the attribute of extension.

(2) On the identity interpretation, the mind is numerically identical with the body.

(3) Hence, it follows that the mind involves extension and the body involves thought; then therefore every mode involves every attribute.

In this case, conclusion (3) is incompatible with Spinoza's position that each mode involves the concept of its own attribute, but not of another one; that mind cannot involve extension and the body cannot involve thought. This argument can be expressed formally in the same manner as Delahunty's argument: if \( a = b \) and \( a \) is F (mental, say) then \( b \) is F, and there can not be strict separation of mental and physical. Again, we can see the problems concerning the identity interpretation and its place in Spinoza's theory.

(1) Bennett and the Separation of Attributes

Bennett thinks that mind-body parallelism needs justification. If mental events and physical events are distinct and not causally linked, however, what keeps them in step? Why assume that mental events and physical events are synchronised, unless we can show causal connections between them? If they are not kept in step by causality, it seems to be a huge coincidence; it is easier to deny the synchrony or to assume that there is causal interaction. However, Bennett

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thinks that Spinoza’s theory offers a better justification of parallelism. Let us examine the most important steps in his interpretation.

There are three theses which Bennett takes as central in Spinoza’s theory. They are (A) the one-substance doctrine, (B) the mode identity thesis, and (C) parallelism. (A) is based on the statement that “substance thinking and substance extended are one and the same” (E, II, Prop 7, Schol). (B) is based on the statement, “a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing” (E, II, Prop 7, Schol)—which Bennett thinks cannot be taken at face value. (C) is based on the statements, “the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things” (E, II, Prop 7), or “whether we think of Nature under the attribute of extension or under the attribute of thought, ... we shall discover one and the same order or one and the same connection of causes” (E, II, Prop 7, Schol).²

Bennett argues that Spinoza used (A) substance monism and (B) the mind-body identity thesis—suitably interpreted—to explain (C) parallelism. In other words, for Spinoza, the reason why (C) is true is because (A) and (B) are true. Bennett infers this argument from the following passage.

For example, the circle existing in Nature and the idea that is in God of an existing circle are one and the same thing which is manifested through different attributes; and, therefore [ideo], whether we think of Nature under the attribute of extension or under the attribute of thought or under any other attribute whatever, we shall discover one and the same order or one and the same connection of causes, that is to say, in every case the same sequence of things. (E, II, Prop 7, Schol)

According to Bennett, the term “ideo”¹⁰ suggests that Spinoza is offering an explanation of parallelism from the identity thesis (and substance monism), since the statement before this term stands for the doctrine of identity, the statement

² Bennett, A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics, p. 142.
¹⁰ Bennett takes “ideo” as meaning “for that reason” or “on that account” so that his translation of it is “that is why” (ibid.).
after this term implies parallelism and this term links the two doctrines, the former being the reason for the latter. It seems that Bennett treats parallelism as being derived from identity of mind and body (together with one substance doctrine), and thus his interpretation explains the above three doctrines in a reconcilable manner. In this context, Bennett is more progressive than some commentators who interpret Spinoza’s theory as either parallelism or identity theory. In my view, since Spinoza claims both identity theory and parallelism, we should interpret Spinoza’s mind-body theory as retaining both doctrines rather than as dropping one or the other. Bennett seems to interpret Spinoza as retaining both doctrines and also argues that one substance doctrine is related to mind-body theory as Spinoza argues. But Bennett finds this defence of parallelism implausible and (B) the mind-body identity above incredible, taken at face value, and thinks it needs a better justification. Bennett in effect rejects the mind-brain identity doctrine and claims a partial qualitative identity. He rejects numerical identity of mind and body in Spinoza, on the grounds that such an identity would threaten the separation of attributes: “I submit that that is Spinoza’s doctrine: his thesis about the identity of physical and mental particulars is really about the identity of properties. He [Spinoza] cannot be saying that physical P1 = mental M1; that is impossible because they belong to different attributes.”

Bennett hopes to provide a better justification for identity and parallelism by introducing the term “trans-attribute differentiae” which are the most fundamental modes. Now, I shall describe Bennett’s interpretation, as I understand it.

(1) The most basic properties of the one substance are not attributes but the trans-attribute modes, since the attributes do not constitute the essence of substance but merely express it.

(2) Trans-attribute modes are combined with the attributes. Consequently there are two kinds of modes, i.e. trans-attribute modes and attribute-confined modes.

11 Bennett, A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics, p. 141.
12 See ibid., pp. 143–151.
The former are modes which are not modes of extension, of thought or of any other attribute; that is to say, trans-attribute modes are combinable with the attribute of extension and are also combinable with the attribute of thought.

Therefore, according to Bennett, if a trans-attribute mode, F, combines with extension, it becomes "extension and F": a mode combined with the attribute of extension. And if a trans-attribute mode, F, combines with thought, it becomes "thought and F": a mode combined with the attribute of thought.

Consequently, the mind is "thought and F" and the body is "extension and F." Mode-identity turns out to concern identity of properties. Here, it comes out that F not only explains the identity of the mind and body but also gives the reason why attribute-confined modes i.e. "thought and F" (mind) and "extension and F" (body) are parallel to each other. There is a common property possessed by the underlying reality, substance, which keeps them in step.

It is impossible for any mind, however powerful, to have the concept of F, a trans-attribute mode, in abstraction from thought or extension or any other attribute. No-one can grasp or conceive the trans-attributive differentiae.

In this way, Bennett considers parallelism in terms of modes confined within attributes, whereas he considers the explanation of the parallelism of the mind and body to lie in the trans-attribute modes. As to the problem of the attributes and parallelism, he resolves it by treating trans-attribute modes (rather than the attributes) as the basic properties of substance, due to his view that the distinct attributes do not constitute the essence of substance but fix and express it. He says, "I say that Nature really has extension and thought, which really are distinct from one another, but that they are not really fundamental properties, although they must be perceived as such by any intellect." He offers an analogy. A circle is a figure whose points all lie equidistant from a central point (property F) in two dimensions. A sphere is the same property F in three dimensions. The different dimensions constitute the different attributes; the common F the trans-attribute mode. (In the analogy, but not in reality, F is knowable).

\[\text{Ibid., p. 141.}\]
For Spinoza, each mode must be, as we have seen, conceived through each attribute, so how can there exist such a trans-attribute mode? Bennett was aware of this problem, but he argues that if we ascribe this concept to Spinoza, we can get an advantage, that is, we are able to remove conflict between identity between the mind and the body and the separation of the attributes.

However, even though we ascribe the concept of trans-attribute mode to Spinoza, this cannot justify Spinoza’s claim of identity: since no one can grasp the trans-attribute modes, there is no possible concept of any such mode, and so they cannot mediate a connection between mind and body. Therefore, it seems that Bennett’s interpretation can explain Spinoza’s argument that the mental and the physical modes are one and the same thing, but only by appeal to unknowables. That is to say, since no one can have the concept of F, F cannot be applied to (mental) a and (physical) b where a = b.

Even if the mental and the physical are involved with the same trans-attribute mode, they cannot be numerically identical (one and the same thing) through the trans-attribute mode, since neither the mental nor the physical is identical to the trans-attribute mode. At best, as Della Rocca points out, this offers only a partial identity between the mind and the body. Bennett takes the mind and the body to be attribute-confined modes and thus the mind is “thought and F” and the body is “extension and F.” This does not give sufficient reason for their identity. The mental and the physical are still different kinds of attribute-confined mode, even if not fundamental properties. The fact that they have “F” in common does not lead to their identity but only to their partial identity.

One may argue, in favour of Bennett, that the common properties are not so much meant to secure identity between the mental and the physical properties as to keep them in step with each other and that the mental and the physical properties do not have to be numerically identical in property parallelism (which requires one thing or one event with two sorts of properties, m-properties and p-properties). But, this is not Bennett’s case: he does not argue for identity between

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the mental and the physical events. Bennett regards modes as properties of substance. Since Spinoza argues that the mind and the body are modes and that they are identical (Bennett accepts this), we have to explain identity in such a way that these two modes are identical. Now for Bennett’s Spinoza, modes are properties. If, as Bennett claims, the mental properties and the physical properties (the mind and the body) are not identical, then Spinoza’s argument that the mental and the physical modes are identical to each other cannot be justified by Bennett’s interpretation.

Bennett’s perspective is criticised by many commentators as being alien to Spinoza’s thinking. For example, according to Edwin Curly, “I find his [Bennett’s] explanation of the mind-body identity extremely implausible,” and he goes on to say that “Bennett thinks he can explain why Spinoza affirms this identity, but I find his explanation (§§ 34–36) incredible. I cannot see Spinoza granting the existence of trans-attribute differentiae which cannot be grasped by any intellect”—even God. Even if Bennett’s concept of trans-attribute differentiae were compatible with Spinoza’s position, this would not explain Spinoza’s argument that the mental and the physical modes are one and the same, but would only explain a partial identity, as we have just seen.

Bennett’s interpretation, that of a partial identity of properties, has another problem. Although Bennett’s alternative identity of mind and body can explain the three doctrines (one substance doctrine, identity of mind and body, and parallelism) in a reconcilable manner, I do not think that it can be taken as Spinoza’s real intention. Bennett’s account of such an identity is textually problematic. To establish his interpretation of identity, Bennett asserts that for Spinoza mind-body identity is not inferred from one-substance doctrine by treating the Latin word sic as not “therefore” or “thus” but as “likewise.” Let us consider the relevant passage.

[S]ubstance thinking and substance extended are one and the same substance, which is now comprehended under this attribute and now


\[16\] Ibid., p. 156, note 26.
under that. Sic [Thus/Likewise], also, a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing expressed in two different ways. (E, II, Prop 7, Schol)

Since Bennett translates sic as "likewise," he takes the above passage not as inferential but as comparative. This allows him to argue that Spinoza's claim of identity of mind and body is not the claim of a numerical identity but that of a partial qualitative identity.

However, even if Bennett is right in reinterpreting "sic" as "likewise," there is an obstacle to Bennett’s interpretation of a partial qualitative identity. That is, Bennett’s interpretation cannot justify Spinoza’s usage of the terms "one and the same" and "thing" in the above passage. He may treat the term "thing" not as meaning "particular" but as an otiose word. But, Spinoza later informs us that the term "thing" in this context means "particular." Spinoza writes: "{T}he mind and the body, are one and the same individual" (E, II, Prop 21, Schol; my italics). Secondly, Bennett’s partial qualitative identity is not enough to justify the term "one and the same." And thirdly, on Bennett’s reading, Spinoza’s comparison between substance identity and mode identity as similarly seems strained because the two cases are very different. So, Bennett would have to argue that Spinoza expresses himself very badly concerning the terms "one and the same" and "thing." But I would rather say that Bennett digresses from the text in order to make sense of Spinoza. It is implausible to argue that Spinoza expresses himself badly to such an extent.

According to Bennett, instead of his partial qualitative identity, we might treat the above passage as follows: "{W}hen he [Spinoza] said that my mind and my body are one and the same thing he had forgotten that my mind and my body are modes,"17 and Bennett rejects this assumption saying that it should not be entertained "unless we run into disaster by interpreting the texts, as I am doing, in a less intrusive and more accepting manner."18 But, Bennett’s interpretation has the same problem. Since Bennett regards modes as properties, he would have to

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17 Bennett, A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics, p. 141.
18 Ibid.
suppose that when Spinoza said that my mind and my body are one and the same thing he had forgotten that they are only partially identical and that modes are only properties; this is why Spinoza says the mind and the body are one and the same thing. This is an implausible position.

The reason that Bennett interprets Spinoza's identity of mind and body as a partial qualitative identity is to save Spinoza from the threat of collapse of attribute dualism. However, there is no reason to suppose that Spinoza saw any such threat. Although his interpretation can hold a kind of identity without collapsing the separation of the attributes, it has costs: Spinoza's claim that the mode of extension and the idea of that mode are the same becomes difficult to interpret and justify. To say mode identity is property identity makes Spinoza's mind-body theory worse, not better, from Bennett's point of view. One way of maintaining identity could be to argue that thought and extension are not really distinct, but just mistakenly different ways of seeing the one F. This is what Wolfson thought, but Bennett specifically rejects this, and insists on the reality of the attributes. Bennett argues that mind and body must be kept causally distinct because causation implies an intellectual grasp of a connection. 19

As we shall see at some length later, if we regard modes as things or events rather than properties, we are able to explain Spinoza's argument that the mental and the physical modes are one and the same without collapsing the separation of the attributes. In that case, event-identity covers the fact that the mental and the physical modes are identical, and properties do not have to be identical: properties should not be identical, as the attributes are really distinct. This gives a version of the double aspect theory in a sense of token identity theory, as we shall see in chapter five.

(2) Della Rocca on Identity and Parallelism

There is another account which attempts to explain Spinoza's concept of identity through his parallelism and the separation of attributes. Michael Della

19 Ibid., p. 145.
Rocca has recently claimed that Spinoza's denial of the transparency of causal context provides support for the identity interpretation of Spinoza's mind-body theory. On the basis of this argument, he attempts to find this identity in the concept of a neutral property based on Spinoza's argument of parallelism; he labels this identity "trans-attribute mode identity." Della Rocca's concept of neutral property has basically a similar format to Bennett's trans-attribute modes. However, in my view, unlike Bennett's trans-attribute modes, Della Rocca's "neutral properties" point to a better case for making the mind and the body identical. Let us consider how he holds the concept of a neutral property and formulates trans-attribute identity between the mind and the body; by doing so, we can determine whether or not his arguments would be acceptable to Spinoza.

a. Referential Opacity

As we have seen, objections have been raised to the identity interpretation of Spinoza's mind-body theory. The objections assert that this interpretation is incompatible with his belief in a non-causal relationship between the mind and the body. If so, and given the firmness of Spinoza's rejection of mind-body causation, it seems scarcely possible to hold the identity interpretation as presented by Spinoza. However, Della Rocca claims that the above problem can be solved.

Let us, firstly, consider Delahunty's argument (given on p. 72) and Della Rocca's suggested solution. A shared basic premise is that it is clear that Spinoza denies causal interaction between the mind and the body (and, more generally, between thought and extension). But, according to Delahunty, we cannot hold the identity interpretation because it turns out that this interpretation is incompatible with the denial of mind-body causation. However, Della Rocca attempts to solve this obstacle to the identity interpretation. His argument relies on the concept of "referential opacity" which we must now explain.

We can characterise referential transparency by saying that F is transparent if, if Fa and a = b then Fb. Thus "is red-headed" is transparent, as are most predicates. On the other hand some predicates, such as "is believed by Tom to be
red-headed" are not transparent, but opaque. The above inference does not carry through in such cases. For example, if Nigel is believed by Tom to be redheaded and Nigel is Mary's bother, then it does not follow that Tom believes Mary's bother is red-headed: Tom might not realise that Nigel is Mary's brother. Since Delahunty's objection to identity theory is posited on the basis that causal contexts are referentially transparent, it follows that if there is no referential transparency in Spinoza's causal contexts then Delahunty's objection to the identity interpretation can be dismissed, and then the view that identity holds between the mind and the body is still available. 20 Let us consider Della Rocca's arguments concerning Spinoza's denial of referential transparency.

With respect to causation, substance as thinking causes mode of thought x, while substance as extended cannot cause mode of thought x, even if the thinking substance is identical with extended substance. Likewise, regarding transitive causation, extended mode x causes extended mode y, while thinking mode w cannot cause extended mode y, even if thinking mode w is identical with extended mode x. From these explanations, Della Rocca draws the conclusion that Spinoza denies referential transparency in a causal context, so that we can resolve Delahunty's objection. Thus, the numerical identity interpretation is, he argues, still acceptable within Spinoza's theory. 21 Della Rocca says that from the separation of causal relations and explanatory relations, we could say that Spinoza does not deny causation, but he denies there are explanations between the mind and the body: "The idea would be that a mode considered as physical must be explained only in terms of other modes considered as physical, whereas that same mode considered as mental must be explained only in terms of other modes considered as mental. According to this view, then, explanatory contexts are opaque, but causal contexts are not. For this reason, on this view the explanatory separation of the mental and the physical does not by itself commit one to the denial of causal interaction

20 Della Rocca mentions another option to deal with Delahunty's objection. We can treat Delahunty's objection as recognising inconsistency in Spinoza; for example, "Spinoza did not realise that there is such a conflict." However, Della Rocca does not accept this option (Della Rocca, "Causation and Spinoza's Claim of Identity," pp. 266–267).

21 Ibid., pp. 268–269.
between the mental and the physical; even if there are no explanatory relations between the mental and the physical, there can still be causal relations. But Della Rocca argues that this is not acceptable to Spinoza, because Spinoza did not distinguish between these two relations.

Della Rocca turns to Bennett’s argument (given on p. 73) and offers a rebuttal of Bennett’s objection to the numerical identity interpretation. It is also made on the basis of the concept of “referential opacity.” Beforehand, Della Rocca needs to develop one more aspect in relation to Bennett’s use of the term “involve” in step (1) of his argument (on p. 73): “[T]he mind involves the attribute of thought and the body involves the attribute of extension.” Della Rocca points out that for Spinoza, with respect to attributes, “the notions of x involving the concept of y” is equated to “x being conceived through y”; for example, saying that the body (or the substance) involves the attribute of extension is the same as saying that the body (or the substance) is conceived through extension. Then, Della Rocca regards the term “x is conceived through y” as implying causation by attributing the proposition “x is conceived through y only if x is caused by y” to Spinoza; i.e. “only if x must be conceived through y, does y cause x.” Subsequently, the argument of the denial of referential transparency of causal context can also be used in Bennett’s objection; in other words, the opacity of causal context is also available regarding Bennett’s objection. Speaking in detail, to rebut Bennett’s objection, we have to show that the context “x is caused by y” like the context “x is conceived through y” is opaque. As Della Rocca argues, given that the context “x is caused by y” is opaque, and given that the proposition “x is conceived through y only if x is caused by y” is true, it follows that the context “x

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23 This proposition is inferred from the following statement of Spinoza’s:

“Those things which have nothing mutually in common with one another cannot through one another be mutually understood, that is to say, the concept of the one does not involve the concept of the other” (E, I, Ax 5).

“Each attribute is conceived by itself and without any other (Prop 10, pt. I). Therefore the modes of any attribute involve the conception of that attribute and of no other, and therefore (Ax 4, pt. I) have God for a cause in so far as He is considered under that attribute of which they are modes, and not so far as He is considered under any other attribute” (E, II, Prop 6, Demon).
is conceived through y” is also opaque; the opacity of the causal context is transmitted to the opacity of the other context if the latter entails the former.\textsuperscript{24} Thus, events are conceived as thought or conceived as extension. Although they are the same events, they are not conceived as being the same. This fact underlies Della Rocca’s attempt to defend the numerical identity interpretation from Bennett’s objection.\textsuperscript{25}

In this way, against Delahunty’s and Bennett’s objections, Della Rocca holds that the identity between the mind and the body is compatible with the separation of attributes if we do not attribute referential transparency in a causal context to Spinoza; he plausibly argues that Spinoza denies referential transparency in a causal context; so that we can resolve Delahunty and Bennett’s objections. On the basis of the argument of opacity, Della Rocca further unfolds his arguments concerning numerical identity in Spinoza’s theory.

\textit{b. Neutral Properties}

On the grounds of referential opacity, Della Rocca divides properties into intensional properties and extensional properties. The former are properties which have opacity in attribute context, and the latter are all other properties which have transparency. Being thinking and being extended are opaque (intensional): even though the thinking substance = the extended substance, it does not follow that being thinking = being extended. He tries to ground the mind-body identity in the

\textsuperscript{24} Della Rocca makes this more formally, and he calls it “the Opacity Transmission Principle”:

If
\begin{align*}
(i) & \text{ for any term “t,” “F(t)” entails “G(t)”} \\
(ii) & \text{there are possible situations in which G(t), } t = t^*, \text{ and } -G(t^*), \text{ and} \\
(iii) & \text{in at least some of those situations F(t),} \\
& \text{then} \\
& \text{there are possible situations in which F(t), } t = t^*, \text{ and } -F(t^*)
\end{align*}

From this, we can confirm that the context “t is conceived through extension (thought)” and the context “t is extended (thinking)” are opaque, since for Spinoza those contexts entail “t is caused by the extended substance (the thinking substance)” and in at least some situations t is conceived through extension (thought) or t is extended (thinking); the entailment of causal context is found in E, II, Prop 6, and its demonstration.

\textsuperscript{25} Della Rocca, “Causation and Spinoza’s Claim of Identity,” pp. 270–271.
transparent properties. To support this, he applies Leibniz's principles: one principle is “if a = b, then they have all their (transparent) properties in common,” and the other converse principle is “a = b if a and b have all their (transparent) properties in common.”

What are the transparent properties for Spinoza? They must be, first of all, neutral, which does not presuppose either being thinking or being extended. We can discover, according to Della Rocca, what these properties are and why the mind and the body share them in terms of Spinoza's parallelistic argument, which is “the order of connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things” (E, II, Prop 7). Further we can derive neutral properties from the fact that the order and connection in the two series are the same. It seems to me that he regards the neutral properties as something which suffices to make these orders the same; one example of the neutral feature is “having five immediate effects.” It follows that if the mind and the body, which are the parallel counterparts of each other, have the same order and connection, the mind and the body share all the neutral properties. The parallelism of the modes reflects the sameness of order and connection, the neutral properties, which are shared by the parallel modes. Therefore, he argues that we can infer mind-body identity in terms of his Leibnizian principle that, if all (transparent) properties are the same, then \( a = b \). In this way, Della Rocca finds the identity thesis in Spinoza's parallelism; Della Rocca states that “[Spinoza] would have to see the sharing of these neutral properties as a sufficient basis for determining that these modes are identical.”

He calls this trans-attribute mode identity. To sum up the argument of this identity:

(1) There are the neutral properties \( F \) by virtue of the sameness of the order and connection of parallel modes.

(2) The mind and the body share \( F \), so that \( F \) is seen in two different ways (have different opaque properties)

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27 Ibid., p. 207.
(3) It follows that the mind presents \( F \) taken as thinking, and the body presents \( F \) taken as extended.\(^{28}\)

(4) Therefore, the mind is identical with the body, but seeing something as mind is distinct from seeing it as body.

Della Rocca also mentions another neutral property, which is, the property of "being a complex individual." Owing to the fact that certain modes unite into a single individual in both mental and physical realms, mind and body share these neutral properties. This fact is also, according to Della Rocca, based on parallelism; for example, if the human body is composed of several parts, then the idea of that body is composed of these several ideas of the parts (E, II Prop 15, Demon).

3. The Problems of Identity in Parallelism

(1) Trans-Attribute Modes and Neutral Properties

Apart from Bennett's and Della Rocca's arguments on parallelism, I shall consider whether Bennett's concept of trans-attribute modes and Della Rocca's concept of neutral property are compatible with Spinoza's doctrine of identity between the mind and the body. Bennett's and Della Rocca's position is that we can better explain Spinoza's doctrine in terms of the concept of trans-attribute modes and the concept of neutral property, even though Spinoza did not mention

\(^{28}\) Since it is not clear for Della Rocca whether all properties are neutral or not, his position might be that there are specific mental and physical properties, as well as neutral ones. This depends on whether the intensional properties are real or unreal; if it is the former, there are distinct intensional properties. However, an overall picture of his argument is that intensional properties are not real enough since those properties are the properties when neutral properties are seen in the mental way and in the physical way. Thus, there is identity between the mental and the physical properties and there is also identity between the mental and the physical events. I shall consider the problem of his concept of intensional properties in chapter five. In this chapter, I deal with his argument on the basis of the view that intensional properties are unreal and thus that there are not specific intensional (mental and physical) properties.
those concepts. Nevertheless, there is a difference between the features of their concepts, as Della Rocca himself points out:

Although there are no trans-attribute modes on the numerical identity interpretation, there are ways of describing modes in neutral terms, that is, terms that do not presuppose any particular attributes. ... But the possibility of such descriptions does not make the modes trans-attribut[ive] in the sense that they would be neither modes of extension nor modes of thought. On the numerical identity interpretation, the same mode that is neutrally specifiable is identical with a mode of thought as well as identical with a mode of extension. 29

The difference is that Bennett thinks that trans-attribute modes have to exist separately from the mental and the physical in order to make the mind and the body parallel, whereas Della Rocca thinks that this kind of mode does not exist. I think that my earlier statements in the discussion of Bennett and Della Rocca give help on this point: for Bennett, the mind is “thought and F” and the body is “extension and F,” whereas for Della Rocca, the mind presents F taken as thinking, and the body presents F taken as extended. For Bennett, there exist the trans-attribute modes which cannot be spoken of. But for Della Rocca, there exist only the neutral properties (those which are not specifically thought or extension).

Both Bennett and Della Rocca are trying to see how Spinoza could both accept mind/body identity and also treat mind and body as both causally and conceptually separate. They are trying to explain how given identity, we can keep the attributes as distinct as Spinoza wants; that is, how we guarantee that parallelism holds without the collapse of the attributes, as identity threatens to do. Spinoza may not have even seen the problem, so we have to guess how he would have handled it or even could have handled it, (if he was not just inconsistent). Although, both their attempts to get Spinoza out of trouble are ingenious and worthwhile, I think that Della Rocca’s argument is more compatible with Spinoza in arguing that trans-attribute modes do not exist and that there is not a partial

29 Della Rocca, Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza, p. 159.
identity but a numerical identity between the mental and the physical modes (things). However, I do not think such a compatibility leads to an accurate interpretation of Spinoza’s doctrine. The problem arises from the fact that he attempts to infer identity from parallelism.

(2) The Relationship between Identity Theory and Parallelism

Della Rocca holds that Spinoza is committed to identity. For Della Rocca’s Spinoza, (1) parallelism entails “sharing the neutral properties” and (2) “sharing the neutral properties” entails the identity theory. Here are Della Rocca’s statements concerning these: (1) “Spinoza explicitly claims that parallelism guarantees that modes of extension and modes of thought share a wide range of neutral properties.”  

(2) “For this sharing of all neutral properties to guarantee that parallel modes are identical, we need to show that the neutral properties encompass all the extensional properties.”  Consequently, he says that “[f]or Spinoza to treat parallelism as entailing the identity thesis, he would have to see the sharing of these neutral properties as a sufficient basis for determining that these modes are identical.”

Della Rocca states:

But parallelism goes well beyond such a claim [one-to-one correspondence]. For Spinoza, the fact that the order and connection within the two series is the same entails that certain neutral properties are shared by parallel modes.

In this way, Della Rocca argues that Spinoza would have to accept that parallelism implies the identity theory (given Leibniz’s law). One of Della Rocca’s aims in his article is to show that we can argue the identity between the mind and the body in

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30 Ibid., p. 199. Della Rocca also writes that “All of these neutral features are, by virtue of parallelism, shared by each mode and its parallel counterpart” (ibid., p. 198).
31 Ibid., p. 203.
32 Ibid., p. 207.
Spinoza’s theory without relying on his one substance doctrine. Thus for Della Rocca, Spinoza would have to see in parallelism the implication of identity.

Parallelism cannot be the reason for identity, since the sameness of the order and connection in two series, the sharing of the neutral properties does not guarantee identity. Suppose there are two clocks which indicate the same time at every moment, the order of connections within clock A being the same as the order of connections within clock B. However, this sameness of order and connection does not imply the identity of clocks A and B, but only offers the fact that the two orders are parallel to each other and A and B have a one-to-one correspondent relationship. It might be objected that Spinoza’s doctrine is not the case of two clocks, but one clock, so that the case of two clocks ought to be ruled out. However, when one infers identity from parallelism, one cannot presuppose that there is one clock. Since the conclusion one wants to prove is the existence of one clock (identity), one cannot presuppose this fact as the premise of the inference without circularity.

Della Rocca gives us two examples of the neutral properties, which are, “having five immediate effects” and “being a complex individual.” Without parallelism those properties cannot be shared by the mind and the body, since they are derived from the sameness of the order and connection. However, even if the neutral properties are such as are mentioned above, I do not think that they can provide identity; they are merely a repetition of parallelism. Even if the sameness of the order and connection in two series provides the fact that two modes share all the neutral properties, this does not provide identity, but only indicates that the order and connection in two series are parallel and that they correspond to each other. It does not follow that there is one order of events. Della Rocca argues that Spinoza regards the sameness of order and connection between the mental and the physical as providing a sufficient ground for the claim of identity, and that this is why parallelism guarantees the argument of identity. But, the sameness of order and connection only provide a sufficient ground for parallelism, and identity theory makes parallelism necessary, since the sameness of order and connection is inferred from the fact that the mental and the physical events are one and the same.

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thing and that the mental and the physical properties express the same essence of a thing (the essence of the same thing) in an orderly way.

Considering this explanation and the clock analogy above, it is evident that we cannot infer identity from Spinoza's parallelism without presupposing identity, whereas we can infer parallelism from identity without presupposing parallelism. The reason why we can infer identity from Spinoza's parallelism (property parallelism) is because his parallelism is derived from his identity theory i.e. because identity is already presupposed in his parallelism. We cannot infer identity theory from parallelism in Spinoza without circularity; for Spinoza, identity theory is prior to parallelism since parallelism is the consequence of identity theory. It follows that we cannot explain Spinoza's mind-body identity without relying on his one substance doctrine. The claim that we can infer identity from parallelism still looks suspect, unless we can see how Spinoza might have inferred identity from parallelism.

One may argue that we can infer identity from parallelism, so long as the identity of indiscernibles holds. And, as Della Rocca argues,34 Spinoza seems to say that where there are two things there must be a difference in quality between these two things: the identity of indiscernibles. Thus, if the only real qualities are the neutral ones, then identity follows from conceptual parallelism. Hence, we can infer identity from Spinoza's parallelism in conjunction with the identity of indiscernibles, whereas we cannot do this from traditional parallelism alone. This is why Della Rocca argues that identity follows from conceptual parallelism.

However, even if by assuming the identity of indiscernibles Della Rocca can go from parallelism to identity, for Della Rocca's Spinoza, we can also go from identity to parallelism: the inference between them is reciprocal. Della Rocca complements his argument in his book Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza a few years later. He alleges, in his book, that Spinoza also infers parallelism from identity, so that for Della Rocca's Spinoza, the inference between identity theory and parallelism is reciprocal. This reciprocity is dependent upon the equivalence between parallelism and identity. Della Rocca writes: "Here

34 Ibid., pp. 194–207.
Spinoza seems to regard the thesis of parallelism as equivalent to the claim of identity of modes across attributes.\textsuperscript{35} Thus he argues that "[s]o the equivalence between parallelism and mode identity puts Spinoza in a position to infer parallelism from mode identity and to infer mode identity from parallelism."\textsuperscript{36}

Be this as it may, some passages strongly suggest that the inference goes from identity to parallelism:

\begin{quote}
The mind and the body are one and the same thing, conceived at one time under the attribute of thought, and at another under that of extension. \textit{For this reason}, the order or concatenation of things is one, whether Nature be conceived under this or under that attribute, and \textit{consequently} the order of the state of activity and passivity of our body is coincident in Nature with the order of the state of activity and passivity of the mind. (E, III, Prop 2, Schol; my italics)
\end{quote}

The passage supports identity as prior to parallelism. We should pay attention to the fact that Spinoza begins with identity and derives one order and concatenation of things from it, and also to his use of the term "consequently": the fact that the order of the body is parallel to the order of the mind is consequent upon the identity (one order of things). Thus, we can see that for Spinoza, the doctrine of identity is more fundamental than parallelism, and that Spinoza’s mind-body theory

\textsuperscript{35} Della Rocca, \textit{Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza}, p. 138. The source of this equivalence is the following statement of Spinoza: “[W]hether we conceive nature under the attribute of extension, or under the attribute of Thought, or under any other attribute, we shall find one and the same order, or one and the same connection of causes, i.e. [hoc est], that the same things follow one another” (E, II, Prop 7, Schol).\textsuperscript{*} Della Rocca’s argument that the inference between identity and parallelism is reciprocal relies on the term \textit{hoc est}. The inference from \textit{the same order to the same things ordered} looks a bit quick.

\textsuperscript{*} This passage is quoted from Edwin Curley for the sake of clarity (\textit{The Collected Works of Spinoza}, [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985], p. 451). James Gutmann’s translation is as follows: “... that is to say [hoc est], in every case the same sequence of things.”

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., p. 139. He also states: “The argument contends that, given other aspects of Spinoza’s system, the fact that parallelism holds entails that the idea of a given mode of extension is identical with that mode of extension. And, of course, this entailment works in the other direction as well: Identity of modes across attributes entails sameness of order and connection” (ibid., p. 138).
should be treated as an identity theory which leads to parallelism. Despite Della Rocca’s excellent arguments, his attempt to derive identity from parallelism rests ultimately on the identity of indiscernibles, which is somewhat controversial. In fact, Della Rocca does not have to derive identity from parallelism, if the aim is to rescue Spinoza. It is enough if he can show that Spinoza could consistently hold both identity of mind and body and the separation of attributes. That was the original objective of Della Rocca’s argument. Della Rocca’s attempt to show that we can explain Spinoza’s mind-body identity without relying on his one-substance doctrine is unnecessary.

There is another problem for Della Rocca concerning the argument of identity. For Della Rocca, since intensional properties are irrelevant in deciding identity, only extensional (neutral) properties are relevant to the issue of identity. As long as both the mind and the body have these extensional properties, the mind is identical with the body. Della Rocca argues that parallelism provides the fact that the mind and the body share these neutral properties, since the sameness of the order and connection within the two series entails that the neutral properties are shared by both the mind and the body. However, although it is true that both the mind and the body have the neutral properties by virtue of parallelism, in order to discover this fact we have to rest upon intensional properties, because the mental and the physical properties are intensional properties and they are our only access to neutral properties; we can only see neutral properties through intensional properties. Hence, we need to depend on intensional properties in deciding identity between the mind and the body. But, according to Della Rocca, intensional properties are irrelevant in deciding this issue.

To sum up: in principle, the issue of identity between A and B should be determined by neutral (extensional) properties; they are only relevant in determining identity. To discover whether a neutral property, say, “having five effects” is a property of A and B both have, we need to rest that A has, say, five mental effects and B also have five physical effects. But “having mental effects” and “having physical effects” are intensional and they are irrelevant to identity of A and B. In this way, for Della Rocca, without intensional properties we cannot
discover that neutral properties are shared by the mind and the body; but this is incompatible with the argument that intensional properties are irrelevant in determining identity.

(3) Della Rocca and the Asymmetry in the Scholium of Proposition Thirteen

It is clear that Spinoza holds both the identity doctrine and parallelism, and that parallelism of the mind and the body is derivable from his doctrine of identity. However, there is a problem with Della Rocca's account of the relationship between the mind and the body: that is, his treatment of the asymmetry which appears in the scholium of proposition 13 in Part II.

Della Rocca argues that according to parallelism, not only the fact that body has a certain degree of reality entails that mind has the same degree of reality, but also *vice versa*, and he treats this entailment as representing the structural similarity between the mind and the body. Thus, for Della Rocca, this entailment which is one of the features in parallelism does not conflict with Spinoza's claim of the explanatory barrier.\(^{37}\)

Next, Della Rocca considers the relationship between the mind and the body in the scholium of proposition 13, and he admits an asymmetry as Barker, Hampshire, and Curley did (see earlier discussion in chapter two, sections 3 and 4). Nevertheless, he argues that it does not violate the explanatory barrier between the mind and the body in the following way: we can still hold Spinoza's claim that the mind must be explained only by mental terms and the body must be explained only by physical terms in spite of the asymmetry that "our ability to assign a certain degree of reality to the mind is somehow posterior to our ability to assign that degree of reality to the body"; this asymmetry is compatible with Spinoza's claim of explanatory barrier.\(^{38}\)


Della Rocca may be right in maintaining both that the entailment does not conflict with the explanatory barrier and that the asymmetry does not damage the explanatory barrier. However, I think that his treatment of this asymmetry does not solve the problem; that it conflicts with parallelism. Although there is no conflict between the entailment and the explanatory barrier nor between the asymmetry and the explanatory barrier, there is a conflict between the symmetry of the entailment in parallelism and the asymmetry in the scholium of proposition 13. Della Rocca seems to be aware of the latter problem. He says, "by virtue of parallelism, we can also say that the fact that a mode of thought has a certain degree of reality entails that the parallel mode of extension has the same degree of reality." But, Della Rocca admits that this is not possible according to the scholium of proposition 13: "However, what Spinoza says in 2p13s does point to some kind of asymmetry between modes of thought and modes of extension." He goes on to say, "[a]lthough Spinoza says here that in order for us to assign a certain degree of reality to the mind, we must know the degree of reality of the body, it does not seem that he would also say that in order for us to come to know the degree of reality of the body, we must know the degree of reality of the mind. Thus, Spinoza seems in 2p13s to claim that our ability to assign a certain degree of reality to the mind is somehow posterior to our ability to assign that degree of reality to the body."

In this way, Della Rocca realises the problem, but he does not attempt to solve it. He merely goes on to explain that the asymmetry does not violate the explanatory barrier. Presumably, since Della Rocca was concentrating on the problem of the explanatory barrier, he failed to see another problem; or he seems to think that if he shows that the asymmetry is not a problem in the explanatory barrier, then it does not conflict with parallelism. But, although the asymmetry is not a problem for the explanatory barrier, the asymmetry may still be problematic in his parallelistic interpretation of Spinoza. As we saw in the previous chapter, some interpreters do not treat the asymmetry as violating the explanatory barrier,

39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
but do see it as leading to a materialistic interpretation. So, the more important task is not to solve the problem of the explanatory barrier, but to solve the problem of mind's dependence on the body in the sense that physical explanations are prior to mental ones, since the latter is a crucial point in defending parallelism from the materialistic interpretation of Spinoza.

Since Della Rocca admits this asymmetry, what he should have shown is not only that this asymmetry does not damage the explanatory barrier, but also that this asymmetry does conflict with parallelism. To complete the latter task, Della Rocca has to know the reason why Spinoza argues this asymmetry, but he does not have the answer to this: "What remains unclear, however, is why Spinoza asserts this asymmetry. That is why does Spinoza claim that our grasp of certain features of minds requires our prior grasp of certain features of body? I do not know the answer to this question and, fortunately, my purposes in this chapter do not require that I venture a solution to this perplexing problem."42

Since Della Rocca does not know the reason for it, he cannot be sure that this asymmetry does not conflict with parallelism, and moreover, if he cannot show the compatibility between them, it is then difficult for him to maintain a parallelistic interpretation. He says, "my purposes in this chapter do not require that ...." But, I do think that Della Rocca is required to solve this problem, since even though the asymmetry is not the problem in the explanatory barrier it is a problem in parallelism, and since he is, in this chapter, unfolding Spinoza's theory as parallelism.

When I criticised the materialistic interpretation in the previous chapter (see, pp. 59-63), I argued that this asymmetry does not lead to materialism, since this asymmetry is an accident of history and that one day we shall have just as good mental explanations as physical ones. So, the asymmetry should be treated as the asymmetry in our temporary position which does not, in effect, imply the body's dominance over the mind: it follows that the asymmetry does not damage the parallelism. I argued there that this apparent asymmetry was not genuine and that Spinoza is claiming that our understanding of the mind is secondary to our

42 Ibid., p. 22.
43 The title of the chapter is "Parallelism and Individuals."
understanding of the body as far as our gaining knowledge up to the present day is concerned. This asymmetry exists only in our temporary understanding of the present day because our provisional understanding of the body is better than that of the mind owing to the fact that science is not yet enough developed for us to know what the mind is. For Spinoza, in reality, there exists a symmetry between the mind and the body: “[T]he object cannot be changed unless the idea is also changed, and vice versa.” In this way, we should treat this asymmetry as saying that the best way of discovering mental differences now—though not necessary always—is by studying physical differences, and therefore we can still argue for parallelism without the obstacle which Della Rocca has.

(4) The Idea of the Mind and the Mind

If the idea of the mind is identical with the mind, and it is the very same relationship as between mind and body, then we can make an argument for supporting identity of mind and body by using what Spinoza says about the idea of the mind. In this section, I shall show how this may be done.

The main theses of traditional parallelism are, as we have seen in section 1, that (1) there is no causal relation between mental events and physical events, (2) mental events do exist in a causal relation with other mental events, and, similarly, physical events with other physical events, and (3) there is a one-to-one correspondence between mental events and physical events. But these explanations conflict with Spinoza’s “the idea of the mind” argument.

Spinoza holds that “[t]his idea of the mind is united to the mind in the same way as the mind itself is united to the body” (E, II, Prop 21). Just as the body is the object of the mind, so the mind is the object of the idea of the mind. The relationship between the idea of the mind and the mind must be the same as the relationship between the mind and the body. In the theory of parallelism, the mind is the counterpart of the body and vice versa, therefore, the mind and the body

correspond to each other. If so, the relationship between the idea of the mind and the mind is also a one-to-one correspondence, since for Spinoza their relationship is the same as the relation of the mind to the body. It follows that the one mental event has correspondence to the other mental event. If we regard the relationship between the mind and the body as parallelism, the relationship between the idea of the mind and the mind must also be regarded as parallelism.

We have seen that mental events exist in a causal relationship with other mental events. But, for Spinoza, if there is no causal relationship between mental events and physical events, there is also no causal relationship between the mental events constituting the mind and idea of those mental events, the idea of the mind. Parallelists cannot say that the mind causes the idea of the mind, given E, II, Prop 21. There seem to be two other possible responses.

Firstly, one might treat I(I(b)), the idea of idea, as the mode of the 3rd unknown attribute, and treat (I(I(b))) as the mode of the 4th unknown attribute and so on ad infinitum. Or, secondly, one might distinguish different levels of mental event; the level of I(b) and of I(I(b)). The same consequences follow from both hypotheses: there is no causal relation between b and I(b) or between I(b) and I(I(b)), etc., since they are all either in different attributes or on different levels, whereas things in the same attribute or on the same level are causally related, for instance, b₁ causes b₂, I(b)₁ causes I(b)₂, and I(I(b))₁ causes I(I(b))₂ etc. It follows that ideas cause other ideas, but not ideas of ideas. This argument is consistent with the theses of parallelism (1) and (2) above, and consequently one can integrate Spinoza's argument concerning "the idea of the mind" into parallelism, thus making parallelistic interpretation still valid.

Of these two arguments, the first is not plausible. The mode of the 3rd unknown attribute cannot be mental, but I(I(b)) must be mental. For Spinoza, I(I(b)) is a mode which is conceived under the attribute of thought like I(b) is. Of this, Spinoza states as follows: "[T]he idea of the mind, therefore, and the mind itself are ... considered under one and the same attribute, that of thought" (E, II, Prop 21, Schol). Hence, it is evident that we cannot regard I(I(b)) as the mode of the third unknown attribute.
The second argument, claiming a one-to-one correspondence between ideas and ideas of ideas, is more plausible. However, it is ruled out by the full statement of the passage above: "[T]he idea of the mind, therefore, and the mind itself are one and the same thing, which is considered under one and the same attribute, that of thought" (E, II, Prop 21, Schol; my italics). He goes on:

It follows, I say, that the idea of the mind and the mind itself exist in God from the same necessity and from the same power of thought. For, indeed, the idea of the mind, that is to say, the idea of the idea, is nothing but the form of the idea in so far as this is considered as a mode of thought and without relation to the object, just as a person who knows anything by that very fact knows that he knows, and knows that he knows that he knows, and so on ad infinitum. (E, II, Prop 21, Schol)

This makes it plain that there is no real difference between the idea of idea and the idea, just a difference in the way it is conceived, and Spinoza, as we have seen, clearly holds that the relationship between the idea of the idea and the idea is the same as the relationship between the idea and the body. If this is an example of how the relationship between mind and body should be conceived, then Spinoza is claiming that mind is identical with body.
Chapter Four

One Single Substance and Two Attributes: 
the Subjective and the Objective Interpretations
Before we decide which interpretation is the most adequate one to represent Spinoza’s mind-body theory, we need to work on Spinoza’s conception of the attributes. Without discussing the notion of the attributes, we can hardly define the relationship between the mind and the body in Spinoza: the attributes are closely related to the mind-body theory as, for instance, the mind (thinking mode) is the mode of the substance under the attribute of thought, and the body (extended mode) is the mode of the substance under the attribute of extension. Therefore it is necessary to discuss the notion of the attributes.

1. The Subjective and the Objective Interpretation of Attributes

There have been basically two kinds of interpretation of Spinoza’s position regarding the attributes in relation to substance which have remained controversial in the history of philosophy. In Spinoza’s works, the status of the attributes could be explained in terms of a subjective interpretation, which is based on the view that attributes are in intellectu, or in terms of an objective interpretation, based on the view that they are extra intellectum.¹ The former view is emphasised by H. A. Wolfson, and the latter by F. S. Haserot, A. Wolf, and most commentators. Discussion of this issue is one of the central tasks in any treatment of Spinoza’s viewpoint on attributes, and is, as was said above, divided into two groups; the subjective and the objective interpretation.

Each interpretation, of course, has a rationale and validity based on distinctive passages in the text, and provides advantages as well as disadvantages in attempting to explain Spinoza’s metaphysical system as a whole and in connecting with other important doctrines. Although it is quite right to say that these interpretations are incompatible with each other, it is necessary to identify their advantages and disadvantages within Spinoza’s system. Thus I intend to explore

these two interpretations regarding the attributes, and to consider their merits and
defects. In outlining the possibilities, I shall follow Haserot's discussion of the
text. In so doing, I hope to arrive at a clearer understanding of Spinoza's notion
of the attributes.

(1) The Status of the Attributes

I shall begin by describing the subjective argument. The main assertion of
the subjective interpretation is that the attributes are nothing but a concept of the
human intellect which we ascribe to substance as if they constituted its essence; as
is argued by H. A. Wolfson. This subjective interpretation emphasises Spinoza's
claim made on the basis of the Ethics part I, demonstrations of proposition 4 and
of proposition 15—that the only things extra intellectum are substances and
modes. It is posited on the view that the attributes are in intellectum, having no
existence outside the mind.

With this interpretation, there are no independent attributes. There is only
our conceptions of essence. That is to say, attributes exist as concepts, while
essence (of substance) exists as the reality which these concepts pick out.
Accordingly, as to the distinction between the attributes of extension and thought,
the subjective interpretation disposes of the distinction by explaining that our
thought-concept differs from our extension-concept, although they do not differ
from each other in reality due to the fact that they are our illusion of the essence of
substance. Furthermore, Wolfson claims that Spinoza is in favour of the subjective
position held in the medieval period which "endeavour[s] to reconcile the apparent
contradiction between the plurality of attributes and the simplicity of essence," by
reducing "all the different attributes to one." Wolfson's perspective on the
subjective interpretation can be well presented by the following statements: "The

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2 Francis S. Haserot, "Spinoza's Definition of Attribute," in S. Paul Kashap (ed.), Studies in
Spinoza (London: University of California Press), pp. 28–42
3 Ibid., p. 146.
4 Ibid., p. 154.
two attributes must therefore be one and identical with substance,“5 “The two attributes appear to the mind as being distinct from each other. In reality, however, they are one.”6

It is, therefore, clear that subjectivists are not obliged to establish whether substance is identical with all its attributes or not, since the attributes are concepts which originate in our mind. Instead, they can argue that substance is identical with its attributes in the sense that substance is the objective reality or essence of our concepts of the attributes, and they can further argue that substance is different from its essence only in the sense that “substance” suggests a thing, and “essence” the defining properties of that thing.

Next, the objective interpretation, in contrast to the subjective one, is posited on the view that attributes for Spinoza are extra intellectum: they exist outside the mind.7 According to this interpretation, Spinoza argues that substance has a plurality of attributes and that this is reconcilable with the position that the totality of attributes is identical with substance. Thus the attributes of intellect and extension are “ultimate characteristics of reality, in the sense that neither can be reduced to the terms of the other.”8 This interpretation, therefore, is characterised by saying that each attribute constitutes the essence9 of substance and it has real existence.10 Now, let us examine the above-mentioned two kinds of interpretation in some more detail with respect to the definition of the attributes.

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5 Ibid., p. 156.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid., p. 146.
9 I shall consider the relation between the attribute and the essence and substance in some length later.
10 Further, the objective interpretation holds that even though attributes are defined with respect to what the intellect perceives, according to definition 4 of Ethics part I, they are still objectively related to substance and each other.
(2) The Issues in Relation to Definition Four

The two interpretations exist due to some ambiguities in the use of the terms in the definition of the attributes in Ethics.

By attribute I understand that which the intellect perceives of substance as \( tanquam \) constituting its essence. (E, I, Def 4; my italics)

From this, some ambiguities which can arise are as follows:

1. The problem of the correct translation of the Latin word \( tanquam \) which could be translated as either “as if” or “as.”
2. The problem of the weighting between the two phrases “which the intellect perceives of substance” and “constituting its essence”; does the former outweigh the latter or vice versa?
3. The issue of the meaning of the term “intellect”; what does the “intellect” refer to? i.e. does it mean “human intellect” or “the infinite intellect of God”?

I shall deal with these three issues in turn.

Regarding the first problem, the objectivist and subjectivist views rely upon the translation of “\( tanquam \)” (either by “as” or “as if”). If it is translated as “as if,” it supports the subjective interpretation, because it is suggested that the intellect does not perceive substance as it is in itself, and that attributes are not real but merely concepts to the intellect. If, on the contrary, it is translated as “as,” it could be understood that the attributes really do constitute the essence of substance and they exist in reality. They are not merely thought to constitute the essence of substance. They do constitute the essence. The translation of \( tanquam \) as “as,” therefore, tends to the objective interpretation.\(^\text{11}\)

However, whenever the term “\( tanquam \)” is translated as “as if” or “as,” each is an accurate translation from the grammar of Latin, since “\( tanquam \)” has a dual use in Latin. Hence, the task of translating this term as one or the other is not conclusive, compared with the task of examining whether the attributes have reality

\(^\text{11}\) The translation “as” would not rule out the subjective interpretation, whereas the translation “as if” does rule out the objective interpretation.
or are merely concepts. The former task, of giving a good translation, is dependent on the result of the latter. According to the solution of the latter, it can be decided whether it is "as if" or "as." Hence, we should pay attention to the task which reveals whether the attributes really exist or not rather than the problem of the translation of "tanquam."

Let us move on to the second issue. In definition 4, there are two main phrases; "which the intellect perceives of substance" and "constituting its essence." Which one carries the greater weight? If the former is highlighted, the status of the attributes for Spinoza is interpreted as subjectivism, while, on the contrary, if the latter phrase is emphasised, it can be claimed that the attributes exist objectively. Wolfson comments on this as follows:

If the expression "which the intellect perceives" is laid stress upon, it would seem that the attributes are only in intellectu. Attributes would thus be only a subjective mode of thinking expressing a relation to a perceiving subject and having no real existence in the essence.12

He further adds that "to be perceived by the mind means to be invented by the mind ...."13 In fact, definition 4 does not tell us whether Spinoza means that the attributes exist in the intellect, or outside the intellect. Wolfson, however, interprets the attributes of extension and thought as the "inventions" of the human intellect i.e. the mind, and not "discoveries" by the mind. He pays particular attention to the phrase "which the intellect perceives of substance" rather than "as constituting its essence." And consequently, his translation of the term tanquam is not "as" but "as if"—"as if constituting it essence." If the attributes were really constitutive of its essence, Wolfson argues, the simplicity of substance could not be saved. I shall discuss this point in the next section.

On the other hand, the objective interpretation puts the emphasis on the phrase "as constituting its essence." From this, it can be inferred that attributes have a certain kind of real existence in the essence of God. Hence, on this view,

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12 Ibid., P146.
13 Ibid.
definition 4 supports the view that the attributes, like substance, exist outside the intellect. And the objective interpretation treats the first phrase "which the intellect perceives of substance" as implying no more than the fact that each attribute constitutes the essence of substance and are not the modifications of substance. That is to say, in the objective interpretation, the first phrase does not give us any ground for thinking that attributes are illusory.

In addition to definition 4, in *Ethics* there are some statements which can provide support for each of the interpretations. Regarding the subjective interpretation, we ought to consider the statement "[e]verything which is, is either in itself or in another" (E, I, Ax 1). We can infer that the former is substance and the latter are modifications from the following statement of Spinoza; he says that "in Nature there is nothing but substances and their modifications" (E, I, Prop 6, Corol), or repeatedly he states that "besides substances and modes nothing is assumed" (E, I, Prop 15, Demon). These statements may be taken as clear evidence of the subjective interpretation, since attributes do not exist according to these statements. However, Spinoza sometimes identifies attributes with substance, we cannot take these as supporting the subjective interpretation. Once we believe the objective interpretation is the right one, we can use these statements as supporting the view that for Spinoza the attributes are, in some sense, the same as substance. We shall shortly consider the relationship between substance and attributes.

On the other hand, the following statement seems to support the objective interpretation:

The more reality or being a thing possesses, the more attributes belong to it. (E, I, Prop 9)

Each attribute of a substance must be conceived through itself. (E, I, Prop 10)
By God I understand Being absolutely infinite, that is to say, substance consisting of infinite attributes, each one of which expresses eternal and infinite essence. (E, I, Def 6)

Taken together with definition 4, these different interpretations are still controversial. In this way, the above issues do not make any change to the argument of the subjective versus the objective interpretation, nor give any clue to this matter. In order to determine the status of the attribute for Spinoza, we need to concentrate on the third issue which I shall discuss next.

The “intellect” in definition 4 is also controversial regarding whether it is referring to the infinite intellect of God, or the finite human intellect. H. A. Wolfson, who is a subjectivist, argues that the term “intellect” has to be regarded as the finite human intellect. Wolfson argues this point as follows:

By the term “intellect” in this definition [definition 4, part I] Spinoza means the finite human intellect. When he says in Ethics, II, Prop VII, Schol, that “we have already demonstrated, that everything which can be perceived by the infinite intellect as constituting the essence of substance pertains entirely to one substance, and consequently that substance thinking and the substance extended are one and the same substance, which is now comprehended under this attribute and now under that,” it is not to be inferred that an attribute of substance is that which can be conceived only by the “infinite intellect.” What the passage means to say is that “everything which can be conceived by the infinite intellect as constituting the essence of substance”—and the infinite intellect can conceive of an infinite number of things as constituting the essence of substance—is only an attribute of substance and not a substance itself, and consequently extension and thought, which alone can be conceived by the finite human intellect as constituting the essence of substance, are only attributes of substance and not substance themselves.\(^\text{14}\)

\(^\text{14}\) H. A. Wolfson, \textit{op. cit.}, vol. 1, p. 153, note 2
I take his argument (from the second sentence) to defend the subjective interpretation from the objection that one may raise by taking that passage of Spinoza's as the evidence of the fact that "intellect" in definition 4 is only "infinite intellect." However, what Wolfson is actually obliged to do is not to explain why the term "intellect" in definition 4 is not only "infinite intellect" but to explain why the term "intellect" cannot include "infinite intellect" since he asserts, in the first sentence, that by the term "intellect" Spinoza means the finite human intellect. If it is not only the infinite intellect, it can be also the finite intellect. But I do not see why this fact is a justification for the interpretation of "the finite intellect"; it can be only a justification of the interpretation of "any intellect." Thus, whether all the other sentences are the explanations of the first sentence or not, Wolfson does not have any justification for the interpretation of "finite intellect" (only), despite the fact that he claims it.

In fact, for the subjective interpretation, it is integral to argue that it is the finite human intellect. If it is the infinite intellect, the subjectivists cannot argue that the attributes are mistakenly conceived by the intellect, since God (the infinite intellect) cannot be mistaken. Thus, the subjectivists have to offer a justification for the view that the term "intellect" means only the finite intellect. But, as we have just seen, Wolfson fails to offer it, and I do not see any reason for that.

Rather, we can find a justification for the view that the term "intellect" means the infinite intellect as follows. It is clear that the finite intellect cannot perceive the other attributes besides thought and extension. But, Spinoza's definition 4 is not the definition of only attributes of thought and extension but the definition of the attributes in general, which are infinitely many. Thus, as long as the definition talks about the attributes in general, the intellect has to be the infinite one due to the fact that the finite intellect can only perceive only two attributes of thought and extension. It follows that the attributes are not an illusion but they really exist, since God cannot be mistaken. This is what the objectivists commonly argue against the subjectivists.\(^{15}\) As long as the subjectivists cannot offer the reason

\(^{15}\) However, even if it was only the finite intellect, there would be no guarantee for supporting the subjective interpretation. There is only a possibility that the attributes could be the invention of our mind i.e. a belief in more than one attribute. In this case, there is also another possibility that
why it has to be the finite intellect, the subjective interpretation is not justified, and thus we should conclude that the objective interpretation is more plausible than the subjective one.

2. Comparison between the Subjective and the Objective Interpretations

(1) The Problems of the Different Interpretations

As we have seen above, the interpretation of definition 4 is perplexing in understanding Spinoza’s view of attributes. Moreover, with respect to the issue of the subjective and objective interpretations, it is also controversial. In both cases there are some difficulties in adducing their argument concerning the relationship between substance and the attributes, and each interpretation has advantages and disadvantages in explaining Spinoza’s view. Now, I shall give an outline of these problems raised by many interpreters of each interpretation.

Regarding the subjective interpretation, the problem is as follows. Spinoza says that bodies are modifications of the attribute of extension. If there are no real attributes, where do the modes come from? If the attributes of thought and extension are invented by the finite human mind as Wolfson argues, it is difficult to answer this question. If extension is only an “invention” of the human mind, the problem arises regarding the reality of a material world. Again, if there is only an invention of the human mind, how can the mind do that unless it in some way issued from substance? In this case, there is no mind nor body since mind and body cannot be distinguished from one another due to the fact that the attributes lose.

the attributes are not an illusion of our mind, as long as the human mind can have an adequate idea of the essence of God: “The human mind possesses an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God” (E, II, Prop 47). Thus, I do not see why is it taken for granted that the attributes are an illusion of the human mind. Therefore, even if the intellect is the finite human intellect, this does not necessary support the subjective interpretation nor counts against the objective interpretation.
their reality. Furthermore, if the intellect in definition 4 is the finite intellect which can only perceive the attributes of thought and extension, we cannot explain Spinoza's doctrine that there are an infinite number of attributes.

Next, in the objective interpretation, the problem arises of the compatibility between simplicity of substance and the plurality of attributes because Spinoza holds that substance is simple and indivisible (E, I, Prop 13). Here we ought to notice the fact that if attributes have reality, then they are really distinct. Therefore, the following questions should be asked:

(1) If Spinoza's attributes are regarded as objective, how can the attributes constitute the nature of the substance which is single? i.e. how can one indivisible substance have many distinct natures which have real existence?  

(2) How can an objectivist explain the meaning of the phrase "which the intellect perceives of"?

It is difficult to answer the above questions under the objective interpretation. In addition to this, concerning the phrase "which the intellect perceives of substance," I would ask an objectivist why Spinoza puts this phrase in definition 4 unless it means something.

(2) Bennett's View on Attributes

There is an interesting point of view on Spinoza's attributes presented by J. Bennett. He interprets the attributes from an objective perspective, but in another way. In Bennett's view, (i) the attributes of thought and extension are real, (ii) they are really distinct from one another, (iii) the attributes do not really constitute the essence of substance. The statements (i) and (ii) are the same as the other objective interpretations, but (iii) is different. Taken together with definition 4,

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16. There is a further problem: how ultimately can a reality be one and indivisible if there are many attributes? I shall say no more about this, except that it is not obvious that Spinoza thinks all division is, as Wolfson argues, illusory: is the deceived mind different from the reality which it misunderstands? But this topic would take us beyond the scope of this thesis.

proposition 9 of part I seems to imply that attributes do constitute the essence of substance: "By attribute I understand that which the intellect perceives of substance as constituting its essence" (E, I, Def 4), and "the more reality or being a thing possesses, the more attributes belong to it" (E, I, Prop 9). Bennett resists the implication. His reason for denying that the attributes constitute the essence is as follows:

(1) The sense of Latin word "constituere" does not always mean "constitute." Bennett states that "Latin dictionaries permit this by associating the verb with 'fix', 'define', 'determine' and almost-‘stake out’" and it does not necessarily imply the sense of identity. Bennett prefers to use "express" instead of "constitute." This interpretation promises a solution to the problem of the ontological status of attributes and modes. It maintains the objective interpretation, as well as also having the solution in relation to the problem of the compatibility of "one and many" because the attributes do not really constitute the essence in this interpretation. In spite of these advantages, however, Bennett's interpretation cannot be identified as Spinoza's view on the attributes.

Bennett regards "the intellect" as referring to the infinite intellect as well as to the finite intellect. Now one of the criticisms of Wolfson's view is that Spinoza states that "[a]ll ideas, in so far as they are related to God, are true" (E, II, Prop

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18 Ibid., p. 65.
19 Ibid., pp. 146–147. Spinoza's definition of essence is as follows: "[T]o the essence of anything pertains that, which being given, the thing itself is necessarily posited, and, being taken away, the thing is necessarily taken; or, in other words, that without which the thing can neither be nor be conceived, and which in its turn cannot be nor be conceived without the thing" (E, II, Def 2).
20 Ibid., p. 62; p. 146.
32). All of God’s ideas are true and God cannot be mistaken about his own essence in Spinoza’s theory, and therefore Wolfson is not accurate in his interpretation of Spinoza’s doctrine of the attributes if Wolfson intends by “the intellect perceives of” to refer to infinite intellect. Objectivists criticised Wolfson’s subjective interpretation on this ground. Bennett was aware of this, but does not seem aware of the danger to his own position. He states: “But the gunfire aimed at Wolfson’s interpretation goes wide of mine. I say that Nature really has extension and thought, which really are distinct from one another, but that they are not fundamental properties, although they must be perceived as such by any intellect” (my italics). 21

It is clear from this that for Bennett, too, God has erroneous ideas, contrary to E, II, Prop 32. God believes wrongly that thought and extension are fundamental. For Wolfson, there might be an escape route in saying that the intellect has to be regarded as the human intellect, so that Spinoza’s view that God cannot be mistaken about his own essence becomes irrelevant. Since Bennett says explicitly that “the intellect” includes the infinite intellect, there is no such escape.

Further, there is the following problem: how could Spinoza (or Bennett) know that the attributes are not really fundamental, since they have to see them as fundamental?; can anyone both perceive attributes as fundamental and know that they are not? So, Bennett’s statement is a little like saying: “that is the truth but nobody knows it.” Then, how does he know it?

From the above criticisms, we can see that Bennett’s interpretation is not sufficient to solve the problem.

(3) The Correspondence between De Vries and Spinoza

As to the problem of the relation of the attributes to substance, Simon De Vries, who was a friend of Spinoza, brought this issue up in a letter to Spinoza.

21 Jonathan Bennett, op. cit., p. 147.
Finally, at the beginning of P8S3\(^{22}\) you write:

> From these [propositions] it is evident that although two attributes may be conceived to be really distinct (i.e., one may be conceived without the aid of the other), they do not, on that account, constitute two beings or two different substances. The reason is that it is of the nature of a substance that all of its attributes (I mean each of them) should be conceived through themselves, since they have [always] been in it together.

In this way you seem, Sir, to suppose that the nature of substance is so constituted that it can have more than one attribute, which you have not yet demonstrated, unless you depend on the fifth\(^{23}\) definition of an absolutely infinite substance, or God. Otherwise if I should say that each substance has only one attribute, and if I had the idea of two attributes, I could rightly conclude that, where there are two different attributes, there are two different substances.\(^{24}\)

In this way, De Vries points out the problem of the compatibility between one substance and two attributes (at least two). Spinoza's view of this problem was that distinct attributes could constitute the same substance. De Vries seems to take attribute as essence; he perhaps relies on definition 4, without taking the phrase "that which the intellect perceives of" too seriously.

Now let us consider how Spinoza replies to De Vries' question.

Nevertheless, you want me to explain by an example how one and the same thing can be designated by two names (though this is not necessary at all). Not to seem niggardly, I offer two: (i) I say that by


\(^{23}\) Definition 6 in part I; Curley also offers the information that the sixth definition of the Ethics part I was the fifth definition of an earlier stage in the development of Ethics (*ibid*).

\(^{24}\) Letter 8 in Curley, *ibid.*, p. 192.
the name Israel I understand the third patriarch; I understand the same by the name Jacob, the name which was given to him because he had seized his brother's heel; (ii) by flat I mean what reflects all the rays of light without any change; I understand the same by white, except that it is called white in relation to a man looking at the flat [surface].

I feel these analogies are not sufficient in replying to De Vries' question. The reason is that as Donagan points out, the different names denote not attributes but modes. But, the analogy has to be regarded as an analogy, so we should attempt to find the point which Spinoza wants to make by these examples. They imply that it is possible for substance to be conceived under the distinct attributes and that the attributes are related to a single subject in the sense that the names "Israel" and "Jacob" differ in sense, though both denote the same thing, the third Patriarch. However, all we can know from this letter is that many attributes can constitute one substance for Spinoza, and he does not offer in this answer whether this occurs in the manner of the subjective interpretation or the objective interpretation, or how it can occur on the objective interpretation.

There is a possibility that we may infer the existence of distinct attributes from the letters. We can assume the following point. It is certain that De Vries raises the question from an objective point of view. In this case, if Spinoza thought that attributes did not really exist and did not really constitute the essence of the substance, he would inform De Vries of this rather than offering the analogies. If Spinoza had the subjective point of view, he would answer by saying that the attributes do not really constitute the essence of the substance rather than seeking

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25 Letter 9 in Curley, ibid., pp. 195–196; the square blankets are the translator's.

26 Alan Donagan writes: "Yet in both Spinoza's examples, his different names designate modes, not attributes. In the first, being the third Patriarch, and grasping his brother's heel, are different modes of the man called 'Israel' and 'Jacob,' and not attributes constituting his essence. The second example is in even worse case. For, taking plane as a mode of matter, and white as a mode of a perceiving mind, the names 'plane and 'white' cannot be supposed to designate even modes of the same substance" ("Essence and the Distinction of Attributes in Spinoza's Metaphysics," in Marjorie Grene [ed.], Spinoza: A Collection of Critical Essays [New York: Anchor Books, 1973], p.168).
to explain how they constitute the essence of the substance. That is to say, because Spinoza has the view that distinct attributes exist, he attempts to explain the “one and many.” If so, this is a legitimate reason for denying that Spinoza held a subjective view.

Nevertheless, the analogies are not still decisive as between the subjective and the objective interpretations. I think that from the analogies, it is hardly possible to decide which one is Spinoza’s position; the analogies do not directly concern this matter. Thus, we ought to decide this matter from Spinoza’s other texts, and we have seen that the objective interpretation should be ascribed to Spinoza. What we should concentrate on from the analogies is not to find whether Spinoza is an objectivist or a subjectivist, but to find how it is possible that there are many attributes for one substance under the objective interpretation. That is to say, if the fact is true that Spinoza is an objectivist, we should treat the analogies as Spinoza’s explanation, in the objective interpretation, of how it is possible that there are many attributes for one substance. Once we accept the objective interpretation, the analogies teach us in what sense we should argue an objective interpretation.

In my view, the analogies tend to suggest that two attributes afford two different ways of referring to the same essence (two ways of picking out the same thing) and that the attributes do really exist, as affording different ways of conceiving the same thing; for example, “being the third patriarch” and “being the seizer of his heel” each exist in some sense and they express the same person in its own way. Spinoza’s answer by the analogies is that although we have the idea of two attributes, it is not necessary that there are two substances, since the attributes express the same substance in its own way as the same person or the same thing is expressed in different ways. What the analogies show us is how it is possible that many attributes express the same essence.

In addition to this, I think De Vries is asking: “how can there be more than one essence of a substance?” He is claiming that two objects should imply two attributes, and vice versa. Why? If he is thinking of attributes as essences then this makes sense. A thing cannot have two separate essences. He says “if I had the idea
of two attributes I should rightly conclude different substances." If he is thinking of attributes as qualities in general, why does he ask this rather than, "if I had the idea of two attributes should I be committed to plurality?" But, Spinoza does not seem to treat attribute as the same as essence, since he treats attributes as ways of conceiving the essence of the same thing. However, since the analogies still do not supply a sufficient answer to the problem of "one and many," we need to discuss further the relationship between substance and essence and attribute to solve this problem.

3. A Proposed Solution to the Problems of the Objective Interpretation

The arguments of the objective interpretation are mostly contained in the following way: (1) the intellect in definition 4 cannot be the finite intellect because there are infinite attributes in Spinoza's doctrine (E, I, Def 6; Prop 11) and the finite intellect cannot perceive them all (Letter 64); (2) the infinite intellect is not mistaken; all ideas in the infinite intellect are true (E, II, Prop 32); (3) therefore, it follows that the attributes really exist and that they are really distinct.27 In this way, the objective interpretation has textual backing unlike the subjective interpretation. Thus, in some ways, it is the obvious interpretation. However, as I have mentioned, there are two main problems in this objective interpretation which are commonly raised by Spinoza's commentators. Let us recall them.

(1) If Spinoza's attributes are regarded as objective, how can distinct attributes all constitute the nature or essence of the substance which is single?

27 To support the objective interpretation, Delahunty informs us of the ten textual facts, which are pointed out by him and others. The facts are mostly related to proving the above points (1) and (2). See R. J. Delahunty, *Spinoza*, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985), pp. 116–117.
(2) How can an objectivist explain the fact that Spinoza introduces attributes through the phrase “which the intellect perceives as (constituting the essence of substance)” in definition 4 of part II and elsewhere?

I think that the above problems should not lead us to hold the subjective interpretation. If we succeed in solving them, we can hold that Spinoza’s interpretation is coherent instead of holding together incoherent stands. I shall attempt to offer the solution to these problems. To complete this task, it is essential to consider the relationship between substance and essence and attribute from Spinoza’s other statements.

(1) The Problem of “One and Many”

a. The Relationship between Substance and Essence and Attribute

In order to achieve a clear understanding of Spinoza’s notion of the attributes and to solve the problem of “one and many,” it is necessary to examine the relationship between substance and essence and attribute. With these terms, the following options are available to understand Spinoza’s doctrine of attribute.

(i) Substance, essence, and attribute are all identical with each other.
(ii) Substance is identical with attribute, but essence is not identical with either of them.
(iii) Neither substance, essence, nor attribute are identical with each other.
(iv) Substance is not identical with either essence or attribute, but essence and attribute are identical with each other.
(v) Attribute is not identical with either substance or essence, but substance is identical with essence.

To decide which option is Spinoza’s, I shall review some theses of attributes which are commonplace in the interpretation of Spinoza’s philosophy.

(1) Substance monism: there exists only one single substance.
(2) Attribute pluralism: there are infinite numbers of attributes. (Attribute dualism is relevant to the mind-body theory)
I believe that it is beyond dispute that Spinoza holds the two doctrines above, whereas the relationship between substance and essence and attribute is still controversial. Now, from an understanding of the above two doctrines, we can be suspicious of a couple of the options—(i) and (ii).

As to the first option, (i) “substance, essence, and attribute are all identical with each other,” it is hardly possible to ascribe this to Spinoza’s system, since it is not compatible with the two doctrines, substance monism and attribute pluralism. If essence is identical with attribute as well as substance, it is apparent that the number of essences is self-contradictory. Given that substance monism and attribute pluralism is true, essence has to be either just one or more than two. That is to say, essence can only be identical with either substance or attribute, but cannot be identical with both of them at once.

Regarding the second option i.e. (ii) “substance is identical with attribute, but essence is not identical with either of them,” the problem of the incompatibility between the number of substances and the number of attributes still remains, so this, too, fails.

Before we examine the other options, we need to consider what the essence of substance is for Spinoza. By doing so, we can begin to determine the number of essences, so that we can come close to an understanding of the relationship between substance and essence and attribute. Spinoza’s statements about the essence are as follows:

To the essence of anything pertains that, which being given, the thing itself is necessarily posited, and, being taken away, the thing is necessarily taken; or, in other words, that without which the thing can neither be nor be conceived, and which in its turn cannot be nor be conceived without the thing. (E, II, Def 2)

By cause of itself I understand that whose essence involves existence, or that whose nature cannot be conceived unless existing. (E, I, Def 1)
The essence of that thing which can be conceived as not existing does not involve existence. (E, I, Ax 7)

It pertains to the nature of substance to exist. (E, I, Prop 7)

*Demonstration.* There is nothing by which substance can be produced (Corol Prop 6). It will therefore be the cause of itself, that is to say (Def 1), its essence necessarily involves existence, or, in other words, it pertains to its nature to exist.

God or substance consisting of infinite attributes, each one of which expresses eternal and infinite essence, necessarily exists. (E, I, Prop 11).

*Demonstration.* If this be denied, conceive, if it be possible, that God does not involve existence. But this (Prop 7) is absurd. Therefore God necessarily exists.

From the above statements, we can see that the essence of the substance involves its existence and that Spinoza's notion of essence is not different from the conventional notion: the essence is the most fundamental quality of a thing, or that which makes a thing what it is. It seems that there is only one essence for one thing; there is one essence for one substance, insofar as the essence is the most fundamental quality. So, for Spinoza, if there is one essence, there must be one substance, and *vice versa*. Therefore, it follows that we should not identify attribute with essence, whereas we should think that there is the one essence for the one substance and in this sense we can identify essence with substance.

This line of Spinoza's thought on "essence" does not allow us to take (1) an argument that denies identity between substance and essence or to take (2) an argument that makes the number of essences plural by identifying essence with the infinite numbers of attributes. Thus, we ought to turn down all the options (i)–(v) above except the fifth option that "the attribute is not identical with either substance or essence, but substance is identical with essence"; the option (i) entails the second argument, the options (ii) and (iii) entail the first argument, and the option (iv) entails both arguments. By substance monism and attribute pluralism
we can reject options (i) and (ii), and by Spinoza’s assertion of the concept of essence, we can reject options (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv). So, it appears that only option (v) is adequate as an understanding of the relationship between substance and essence and attribute. Since for Spinoza the attribute is not treated as the essence, it does not follow that there are many essences for one substance, but that there is the one essence and many attributes for the one substance. Thus, we are led to the view that there is, one single substance, one essence, and an infinite number of attributes in Spinoza’s system. Bearing in mind this idea, we should consider how they are related to each other.

\[b. \text{An Implication of Identity in the Term "Constituere"}\]

If attributes are not essences as is concluded above, the problem of “one and many” seems to be solved. Insofar as attributes are not essences but qualities in general, it is not a problem to claim that many attributes constitute one substance. However, several passages of Spinoza’s provide an obstacle to this conclusion. The problem passages are as follows:

By attribute I understand that which the intellect perceives of substance as constituting its essence. (E, I, Def 4)

The more reality or being a thing possesses, the more attributes belong to it. (E, I, Prop 9)

It is far from absurd, therefore, to ascribe to one substance a number of attributes, since nothing in Nature is clearer than that each being must be conceived under some attribute, and the more reality or being it has, the more attributes it possesses expressing necessity or eternity and infinity. (E, I, Prop 10, Schol)
By Substance I understand what is in itself and conceived through itself, i.e., whose concept does not involve the concept of another thing. I understand the same thing by attribute, ....

We have already considered Bennett’s reasons for resisting the conclusion that an attribute is that which constitutes the essence of the substance. Taken all together, the above passages apparently lead to the view that a substance can have many essences. One may identify essence with attribute while abandoning the standard meaning of the term “essence.” In this case, there can be many attributes (essences) for the one substance. Of course, the possibility of this depends on the concept of attribute. But at least there is not the problem derived from the doctrine that there must be one essence for one substance. It would follow that, for Spinoza, essence is nothing but attribute, but essence here is different from essence in the usual sense. However, it is very unlikely that Spinoza holds this position. Spinoza’s assertion of essence which we have seen so far clearly conflicts with this.

It is necessary to look more closely at the route taken by Bennett for us to avoid the conflict, at the translation of “constituere” and at the phrase “which the intellect perceives ... as.” But we shall not be taking Bennett’s route out, of supposing that there are trans-attribute modes which cannot be comprehended in their pure form. Spinoza says that the attributes are what the intellect perceives as constituting the essence. In definition 6 of Part I, he refers to attributes expressing the essence.

The Latin term “constituere” means determine, arrange, and fix, and so on. Thus, Bennett suggests, we should say that the attributes fix or characterise the essence of the substance. Of course, we can translate this term into “constitute” in English, but we have to be wary that the English “constitute” has all the meanings which the Latin dictionaries indicate; the Oxford English Dictionary tells us that the term “constitute” has 7 kinds of meanings and that last is “make up.” Speaking briefly, the Latin term “constituere” should be translated to “constitute”

in English. However, as there are many meanings for the Latin term, so there are many meanings for the English term; these two terms are equivalent. It follows that there is no guarantee that the meaning is “make up.” Moreover, most Latin dictionaries do not say this term has the meaning of “make up.” In this circumstance, “constitute” need not be taken as implying identity.

According to the dictionaries, the literal sense of the term *constituere*, is “to settle,” “to found,” or “to set up,” etc., and the transferred sense of this term is “to appoint,” “fix upon,” “arrange,” “establish,” “to decide,” etc. However, they do not mention “*constituere*” as “constitute,” and there is not even a translation like “constitute” (i.e. “make up”). Moreover, English-Latin dictionaries inform us that when “constitute” means “to make up,” this is translated as either *componere* or *efficere* in Latin, whereas when “constitute” means “to establish,” *constituere* is one of the terms which it can be translated as. In the discussion of Spinoza’s doctrine of the attributes, however, “constitute” is universally translated and used in the sense of “to make up,” and in similar contexts in mediaeval philosophy it is the same. (Only one dictionary of those I consulted contains the meaning “make up” as well as the several other meanings: P. G. W. Glare, *Oxford Latin Dictionary*, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1982.)

I searched the following dictionaries:


Thomas Holyoake (1616? ~ 1675), *A Large Dictionary in Three Parts*.

Another way to confirm this fact is looking up the word “constitute” in English-Latin dictionaries. The dictionaries inform us that when “constitute” means the essence of a thing such as “to make up,” “form,” or “compose,” this is translated as either *componere* or *efficere* in Latin, whereas when “constitute” means “to establish,” “fix,” and so on, *constituere* is one of the proper Latin terms which it can be translated as. That is to say, even though *constituere* can be translated as “to constitute” meaning “establish,” it cannot be translated as “to constitute” meaning “make up.” I shall adduce the definitions in the English-Latin Dictionaries:


Now, I shall consider the fact that Bennett runs into problems concerning "constituere."

(1) Bennett claims that "constituere" should be translated as "fix," "define," "determine" etc.\(^{31}\) Therefore, for Bennett's Spinoza, the attributes do not constitute the substance, but they fix the substance.

(2) Bennett treats the phrase "the intellect perceives of" as if Spinoza uses it in order to indicate that attributes do not actually constitute the essence of substance.\(^{32}\)

The above two points seem to be the plausible rationales or grounds for arguing that, for Spinoza, attributes do not really constitute the substance (the essence of substance), so long as we consider each point separately. However, if we consider two points together, there is a problem.

Spinoza's claim in definition 4 of part I is that "the intellect perceives the attributes as constituting the essence of the substance." Whether our or God's intellect is involved, Bennett takes it that there is an illusion here: the attributes do not constitute the essence of substance, although they are perceived even by God as doing so. The natural way to express this is to say that the attributes fix the essence but are taken to constitute the essence. But this implies that "constituere" is sometimes used to mean "constitute."

Bennett translates "constituere" as fix or characterise in scholium of proposition 10.\(^{33}\) But, in definition 4 he seems to translate "constituere" not as "fix," but as "constitute" as in the ordinary translation. Bennett may claim that since the Latin term "constituere" has several meanings, we can or should translate it differently according to the context. However, both these statements have the same context concerning the translation. The statement which Bennett translates as "fix" is that: "[I]t is evident that, though two attributes are conceived as distinct—that is, one without the help of the other—yet we cannot conclude from this that

\(^{31}\) Jonathan Bennett, op. cit., p. 65.

\(^{32}\) Ibid., pp. 146-147.

\(^{33}\) Bennett also regards "constituere" as "apply to" or "are instantiated by" ("A Note on Descartes and Spinoza," Philosophical Review, vol. 74 [1965], p. 380).
they constitute two entities or two different substances .... It is ... far from an absurdity to ascribe several attributes to one substance” (E, I, Prop 10, Schol; my italics). And, the statement which he seems to leave as “constitute” is that: “By attribute, I understand that which the intellect perceives of substance as constituting its essence” (E, I, Def 4; my italics). Bennett should translate “constituere” in both statements as either only “constitute” or only “fix.”

(2) The Meaning of the Phrase “Which the Intellect Perceives of”

Now, the problem is that although we solve the problem of “one and many”—one essence, many attributes—we are still confronted with solving the problem of the sense of the phrase “the intellect perceives of.” I shall cite the definition, again.

By attribute, I understand that which the intellect perceives of substance as constituting its essence. (E, I, Def 4)

Why does Spinoza put the phrase “which the intellect perceives ... as” in his definition of the attributes? In other words, by this phrase what does Spinoza want to ascribe to features of the attributes? We can say that the intellect’s perception, whether it is infinite or finite, is somehow related to expression. Definition 6 uses “express” where definition 4 uses “constituere”: “By God I understand Being absolutely infinite, that is to say, substance consisting of infinite attributes, each one of which expresses eternal and infinite essence” (E, I, Def 6; my italics).

We can also infer this point from the following statements of Spinoza, which I have quoted once when I have explained the problem of “one and many” in the attributes.

By substance I understand what is in itself and conceived through itself, i.e., whose concept does not involve the concept of another thing. I understand the same thing by attribute, except that it is called
attribute in relation to the intellect, which attributes such and such a definite nature to substance.\textsuperscript{34}

Here, we can see that attribute is related to the intellect, which attributes such and such a definite nature to substance, and that this is the same meaning as what definition 4 offers: “By attribute I understand that which the intellect perceives of substance as constituting its essence” (E, I, Def 4).

In this way, if we take the phrase “which the intellect perceives of as constituting” along with “express,” I believe we can explain Spinoza’s doctrine. Furthermore, as I have mentioned earlier, we can make the definition more complete and comprehensive, since in this case, the definition offers us sufficient information on what attribute is, which Spinoza asserts throughout \textit{Ethics}. In fact, Spinoza informs us that definition 4 is related to the concept “express” when he uses this definition to demonstrate proposition 19 and 20 of part I. He uses the term “express” or “manifest” instead of “which the intellect perceives of as constituting.” Here is the textual evidence:

Again, by the attributes of God is to be understood that which (Def 4) expresses the essence of the divine substance, that is to say, that which pertains to substance. It is this, I say, which the attributes themselves must involve. But eternity pertains to the nature of substance (Prop 7). Therefore, each of the attributes must involve eternity, and therefore all are eternal. (E, I, Prop 19, Demon; my italics)

Again, in the demonstration of proposition 20, he states as follows:

God (Prop 19) and all His attributes are eternal, that is to say (Def 8), each one of His attributes expresses existence. The same attributes of God, therefore, which (Def 4) manifest the eternal essence of God, at the same time manifest His eternal existence, that is to say, the very

\textsuperscript{34} Letter 9 in Curley (ed.), \textit{The Collected Works of Spinoza}, vol. 1, p. 195. This is the third definition of an earlier stage in the development of \textit{Ethics}.
same thing which constitutes the essence of God constitutes at the same
time His existence, and therefore His existence and His essence are one
and the same thing. (E, I, Prop 20, Demon; my italics)

I think that we have now arrived at the sense of the phrase “the intellect perceives
of.” In definition 4 and throughout Ethics, Spinoza’s real intention about the
concept of the attributes is that there are infinite ways of expressing the essence of
the substance; attributes express the essence of the substance each in its own
distinctive way. (How this is to be explained in detail will be taken up in chapter
five and discussion will be deferred until then.)

(3) What Is Structurally Common to All the Attributes: Essence

Now, the question is how we treat Spinoza’s statement which identifies
attribute with substance—“I understand the same thing by attribute.” There have
been some suggestions about this point. Bennett regards the attribute as not
constituting (as meaning “making up”) but only expressing the substance, so there
does not exist any sort of identity between substance and attribute. We have
already seen that this interpretation runs into difficulties. Curley suggests that the
substance is not identical with any one attribute, but must be identical with the
totality of the attributes. 35 Wolf also suggests that “Substance (or Nature or God)
is the unified totality of Attributes.” 36 But what I think Spinoza means is that the
attribute itself is identical with the substance, so that any one attribute must be
identical with substance. By solving this problem, we can arrive at a clearer
understanding of how the attributes can constitute the essence of the substance (or
the substance).

35 Edwin Curley, Behind the Geometrical Method: A Reading of Spinoza’s Ethics (Princeton:
36 A. Wolf, “Spinoza’s Conception of the Attributes of Substance,” in S. Paul Kashap (ed.),
Studies in Spinoza: Critical and Interpretive Essays (Berkeley: University of California Press,
I think that we can argue some sense of identity between substance and attribute consistently with what Spinoza said. This depends on what kind of identity we argue. I claimed when arguing against Bennett that the substance (the essence) is not beyond each attribute, and this is why each attribute constitutes and expresses the essence of the substance. To explain Spinoza's view that attribute is identified with substance, we should bear this point in our mind: the essence of the substance is not beyond each attribute.

If we take essence of the substance as "what is structurally common to all the attributes," we can explain identity between substance and attribute. Since the attributes constitute and express the essence of the same substance (or the same essence of substance), there must be something common in all the attributes as there is what is structurally common in the ways of expressing the same thing; what is structurally common is expressed in all infinite numbers of attributes or ways. This common structure in all the attributes is nothing but the essence of substance. This is why it appears that the attribute is, on the one hand, the same thing as substance and on the other hand, all the attributes are different from substance for Spinoza. If what is structurally common to all the attributes is the essence and in each attribute there is this which is common, then the many attributes can constitute the essence and they (whether each attribute or many attributes) are, in some sense, identical with the essence of the substance (or the substance). This can be understood in the following way: the numbers \( \frac{1}{2}, \frac{2}{4}, \frac{3}{6}, \frac{4}{8}, \ldots \) can be regarded as different expressions of the same rational number. The same rational number can be expressed in any of these infinite different ways. For the purpose of rational numbers \( \frac{4}{8} \) is the same as \( \frac{5}{10} \); they form an equivalence-set.

\[37\] Spinoza states once that attributes constitute the essence of the substance, and at another time, that attributes constitute the substance. However, I regard both statements in the same context. If the attribute constitutes the essence of the substance and the essence is the most fundamental property, we can say that the attributes constitute the substance. Strictly speaking, when Spinoza says that the attributes constitute the substance, he means, in fact, that they constitute the essence of the substance as Alan Donagan observes; he regards "constitute the substance" as a natural ellipsis for "constitute the essence of the substance" ("A Note on Spinoza, Ethics, I. 10," *Philosophical Review*, vol. 75 [1966], p. 381).
Again, a second analogy can help us to explain how each attribute constitutes and expresses the essence of the substance: let us suppose that there is a tune and that this tune can be played on the piano, hummed, whistled, written in musical notation, inscribed on bits of plastic, or fixed on tape by magnetism; it is clear that all of these media express the same tune. When we apply Spinoza’s sense of the substance to the tune, there are infinite ways of expressing the tune; the essence of the tune is what is structurally common to all these ways, but is not a way of expression itself. Hence, the infinite ways of expression are one and the same, since they all express the same tune, and they are different since they have their own ways of expressing it. If we ask someone “what tune did she sing?” that tune can be given in several ways. The differences between humming, written notation, etc., do not matter. They all give the tune.

Just as in this example, in Spinoza’s system, there are infinite ways of expressing the essence of substance, and these ways are attributes which express the essence of substance in their own ways. I think that this is Spinoza’s real intention. Furthermore, the above analogy does help us to solve the problem of “how many attributes can constitute the essence” by treating “essence” as “what is structurally common to all attributes.” Thus, if we consider both of them, we can better explain the relationship between the attributes and the substance in Spinoza’s system. 38

The perspective that what is structurally common in the ways which express the same tune is the essence of the tune (or the tune) gives a clearer understanding of the relationship between attribute and substance (essence). If the

38 Returning to the correspondence between De Vries and Spinoza. I think that De Vries understands Spinoza’s concept of attribute as essence. That is why De Vries argues that each attribute has only one attribute and that if there are two different attributes there are two different substances. If De Vries was aware that for Spinoza the concept of attribute is not essence but the definite nature which the infinite intellect ascribes to the substance, he would not raise this question. Spinoza’s position is, as we have seen, that any of the attributes (thought, extension, etc.) are equivalent expressions of the essence, and all of them are basic expressions of the essence. There is only one essence for one substance, and that is what is structurally common to all infinite attributes. In this sense, attributes are identical with the essence, and that is why there can be many attributes for one substance. If De Vries understood Spinoza’s system in the perspective in this section, he would not ask this question.
attributes express the essence of the substance, the attributes are each conceived as *constituting* the essence. How can many different things each constitute the essence? This is because the essence is what all these things have structurally in common. So, we cannot *say* what the essence is, but we can *show* what it is, just as we can display the tune by humming it, whistling it, writing it down, etc. Since the tune is not something *beyond* the humming and whistling, but it is *in* them as what they have in common, they can constitute the tune.

As we have seen, Bennett thinks each of the attributes *fixes* or *characterizes* the essence, but for his interpretation of Spinoza, the real essence is *beyond* the attributes which are mistakenly seen (even by God) as fundamental. In contrast, my view is that the essence is *that which is structurally common* to all the attributes. Since the two positions are at first glance similar it might help to contrast them. Bennett says that if $P_1$ is systematically linked with $M_1$ (a non-identity) then $P_1$ is extension-and-$F$, $M_1$ is thought-and-$F$, for some differentiating property $F$. He offers an analogy: a circle is two-dimensionality plus being-bounded-by-points-equidistant-from-one-point and a sphere is three-dimensionality plus that property. However, in the case of thought and extension, the common $F$ is unknowable on its own, even by God—otherwise, Bennett thinks, the separation of attributes would be threatened. In contrast, I hold that there is nothing unknowable here, though the essence cannot be grasped independently of any attribute. On the analogy of the tune, we cannot give the tune without giving it in some way—whistling it, writing it down, etc. The essence cannot be given without being expressed in some way.

The perspective which I have suggested in this chapter may help us to understand better Spinoza’s concept of the attributes. It allows for one essence, many attributes, no illusion while explaining how the attributes constitute the substance (the essence of substance), and also while explaining how they are identical to each other and how distinct from each other. It also allows us to

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39 This is done more fully in chapter five (pp. 159–161).
answer the meaning of the phrase "which the intellect perceives of" and to answer the problem of "one and many," while not making Spinoza self-contradictory and while holding the objective interpretation which is plausible and has more advantages. Thus, from this kind of interpretation, we achieve a better and clearer understanding of Spinoza's notion of the attributes.
Chapter Five

One Thing and Two Descriptions in Spinoza: the Double Aspect Theory
I have explored, in chapters two and three, some interpretations and have pointed out that they are troublesome to apply to Spinoza's mind-body theory. Then, besides these, what is Spinoza's real tendency with respect to the relationship between the mind and the body? I would like to suggest the double aspect theory and representationalism as the interpretations which can be regarded as Spinoza's real thought. In the following two chapters, I shall consider those theories within Spinoza's realm of thought; I shall discuss double aspect theory in this chapter and representationalism in the next chapter.

1. Statement of the Double Aspect Theory

(1) One Thing Which Is Described Either As Mental or As Physical

a. Textual Evidences concerning Double Aspect Theory

I shall adduce some of Spinoza's statements with respect to double aspect theory.

[S]ubstance thinking and substance extended are one and the same substance, which is now comprehended under this attribute and now under that. Thus, also, a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing expressed in two different ways. (E, II, Prop 7, Schol)

[T]he idea of the body and the body, that is to say (Prop 13, pt, pt. 2), the mind and the body, are one and the same individual which at one time is considered under the attribute of thought, and at another under that of extension. (E, II, Prop 21, Schol)

For example, the circle existing in Nature and the idea that is in God of an existing circle are one and the same thing which is manifested
through different attributes; and, therefore, whether we think of Nature under the attribute of extension or under the attribute of thought or under any other attribute whatever, we shall discover one and the same connection of causes, that is to say, in every case the same sequence of things. (E, II, Prop 7, Schol)

The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things. (E, II, Prop 7)

All the above statements are encapsulated in the main point of the double aspect theory that the mind and the body are parallel manifestations of one and the same thing. The first and the second quotations establish that the mind and the body are one and the same thing manifested under the two different attributes (thought and extension, respectively). The third quotation tells us that since the mind and the body are one and the same thing, we shall find one and the same order or one and same connection of causes. Hence, it follows that since there is one order, Spinoza tells us, as in the last quotation, that the order and connection of minds is the same as the order and connection of bodies.

Speaking briefly, (1) “identity in double aspect theory”: the mind and the body are one and the same thing manifested in two different ways. Therefore, (2) there is one order and connection of causes. Consequently, (3) “parallel manifestations in double aspect theory”: the order of the mind is the same as the order of the body. Here we can see that Spinoza’s mind-body theory is nothing but the double aspect theory, which combines identity with parallel relationship.

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1 Spinoza also states, in this scholium, that “when things are considered as modes of thought we must explain the order of the whole of Nature or the connection of causes by the attribute of thought alone, and when things are considered as modes of extension, the order of the whole of Nature must be explained through the attribute of extension alone, and so with other attributes” (E, II, Prop 7, Schol).

2 For Spinoza, if the identity doctrine is not true, the other doctrine is also not true, because the latter relies on the former. Thus, identity is the most important argument in his theory.
b. Substance Monism and the Mind-Body Theory

For Spinoza, identity between the mind and the body is inferred from the one-substance doctrine. The first quotation above initially informs us of how his substance doctrine is related to his mind-body theory; the quotation obliges us to infer his position on the identity of the mind and the body from his substance monism. If substance thinking and substance extended are one and the same thing, the mode mentally (the mind) and the mode physically (the body) are one and the same thing. Now, the question is: why substance thinking and substance extended are one and the same substance and consequently why the mind and the body are one and the same? The answer is rooted in the doctrine that there exists only one substance. Since the mind is a mode of the substance under the attribute of thought, and the body is the same mode of the substance under the attribute of extension, a single individual thing is at one time a mode mentally and at another a mode physically which both express the substance in a certain and determinate manner, just as a single substance is a substance thinking as well as a substance extended according to the attributes of thought and extension. The former relationship is only a special case of the latter.

At this stage, we need to consider Spinoza's notion of "mode" in some more detail, since we are examining his doctrine of the relationship between the mind and the body and Spinoza regards the mind and the body as modes. Spinoza defines modes as follows:

By mode I understand the modifications of substance, or that which is in another thing through which also it is conceived. (E, I, Def 5)

If we consider this definition with substance monism, both the mind and the body are modes of the same substance. However, the notion of the term "mode" is ambiguous due to the fact that Spinoza sometimes denotes the mind and the body not as the modes of the substance but as the modes of the attributes. Spinoza states:
Every mode which exists necessarily follow either from the absolute nature of some attribute of God or from some attribute modified by a modification which exists necessarily and infinitely. (E, I, Prop 23)

The modes of any attribute have God for a cause only in so far as He is considered under that attribute of which they are modes, and not in so far as He is considered under any other attributes. (E, II, Prop 6)

Individual things are nothing but modifications or modes of God’s attributes, expressing those attributes in a certain and determinate manner. This is evident from Prop 15 and Def 5. (E, I, Prop 25, Corol)

The above three quotations lead to the thought that the mind is the mode of the attribute of thought and the body is the mode of the attribute of extension. In this case, the relationship between the mind and the body is not derived from there being one substance, but their relationship follows from the relationship between the attribute of thought and the attribute of extension.

However, when Spinoza says that the mind and the body are the modes of attributes, we should understand him as meaning that the mind is the mode which expresses the essence of the substance under the attribute of thought, and the body is the mode which expresses the essence of the very same substance under the attribute of extension. Spinoza’s definition of body makes clear this understanding.

By body I understand a mode which expresses in a certain and determinate manner the essence of God in so far as He is considered as the thing extended. (E, II, Def 1)

Spinoza does not give a corresponding definition of the mind. However, Spinoza would have to define the mind in the same manner as the definition of the body. Considering this definition with there being one substance, we can see that the
mind and the body are not the modes of the attributes of thought and extension, but they are the modes of the one unique same substance through the attributes of thought and extension respectively. The mind is the mode of the substance in mental descriptions (attribute of thought), and the body is the mode of the same substance in physical descriptions (attribute of thought). Just as substance as thinking thing and substance as extended thing is one and the same substance which is comprehended under the two different attributes, so the mode of the former (mind) and the mode of the latter (body) are one and the same mode conceived in two different ways or descriptions.

The fact that the mind and the body are modes of the one substance under the different attributes suggests that the relationship between the mind and the body follows the relationship between substance conceived under thought and substance conceived under extension. If the mind and the body are modes of the one same substance, we can hardly deny that the relationship between the mind and the body is derived from the substance as thing thinking and the same substance as thing extended. Humans are manifested in the mode of the mind through the attribute of thought as well as in the mode of the body through the attribute of extension. Since the mind and the body are not the modes of the attributes, but are modes of the one substance considered at one time under the attribute of thought and at another under the attribute of extension, it is clear that the mind (the mode of the one substance under thought) and the body (the mode of the one substance under extension) are identical. The mind is the modification of the substance conceived as thing thinking and the body is the modification of the very same substance as thing extended. Substance monism guarantees identity between the mind and the body, so mental events and physical events are not two different sets of events but are one set of events, differently described.

Now we can see that since the mind is the mode of the substance under mental descriptions (attribute of thought) and the body is the mode of the same substance under physical descriptions (attribute of thought), they are one and the same thing. This should be considered as the core of Spinoza's mind-body theory. For Spinoza, the mind and the body are not two different things, but rather one
individual with two different aspects; it follows that there is one order of events, not two.

c. Parallelism Between the Mental and the Physical

As we saw in chapter three, Spinoza argues parallelism on the basis of identity between the mind and the body: for Spinoza, the mind and the body are parallel because they are identical with each other. But when Spinoza claims that the mind and the body are identical and that they are parallel, does he refer to mental and physical events or mental and physical properties? For Spinoza there is an identity between events whereas there is no identity between properties (unless the subjective interpretation of the attributes is right).

The fact that there is an identity between mental and physical events is the reason that “the event under mental descriptions” (mind) and “the same event under the physical descriptions” (body) are parallel with each other. As I mentioned in chapter three, although the mental and the physical events are identical, since they have their different properties or descriptions, we can still argue a parallel relationship between these two sets of concept: one event which is given a mental description and the very same event which is given a physical description. This is Spinoza’s conceptual parallelism, or, if you like, semantic parallelism, since it is not argued in two substances or two different events but in two sorts of concept of one event.

Apart from conceptual parallelism, there is property parallelism in Spinoza’s system. We can simply explain that the reason why there is conceptual parallelism is because the two sorts of concept, mental and physical, pick out one set of events. But since the mental and the physical properties are not identical, this reason is not enough to explain the parallel relationship between properties. Then, why are they parallel to each other? We saw in the previous chapter that the essence is “what is differently expressed by all the attributes” (or “what is structurally common to all the attributes”) and that there is one order and connection of causes due to the fact that there is one substance. It follows that the
mental and the physical properties express the essence of the same event (the same essence of the event) in an orderly way. This is why there is a systematic connection between the two properties. Since there is one set of events, there is one order of events. Then, the mental and the physical properties express the event according to one order and connection of causes. Thus, property parallelism is also argued on the basis of identity between mental and physical events.

In this way, if the mental and the physical event are one and the same event conceived in two different ways and if there is a parallel relationship between the mental and the physical event as well as the mental and the physical property due to identity of events, we should regard Spinoza’s doctrine as a version of the double aspect theory, since the double aspect theory entails both identity and a parallel relationship between the mental and the physical as we shall see as follows.

(2) Double Aspect Theory Entailing Identity and Property Parallelism

Spinoza’s identity doctrine is different from identity theories in contemporary philosophy, in the sense that he avoids versions of materialism (and versions of idealism). At first, I take this difference as being derived from the fact

3 Concerning this Spinoza’s states as follows:

“[T]he circle existing in Nature and the idea that is in God of an existing circle are one and the same thing which is manifested through different attributes; and therefore, whether we think of Nature under the attribute of extension or under the attribute of thought or under any other attribute whatever, we shall discover one and the same order or one and the same connection of causes, that is to say, in every case the same sequence of things” (E, II, Prop 7, Schol; my italics).

“[T]he mind and the body are one and the same thing, conceived at one time under the attribute of thought, and at another under that of extension. For this reason, the order or concatenation of things is one, whether Nature be conceived under this or under that attribute, and consequently the order of the state of activity and passivity of our body is coincident in Nature with the order of state of activity and passivity of our mind” (E, III, Prop 2, Schol; my italics).

4 Douglas Odegard points out the difference between the identity doctrine in Spinoza and contemporary identity theories (“The Body Identical with the Human Mind: A Problem in Spinoza’s Philosophy,” in Eugene Freeman and Maurice Mandelbaum [eds.], Spinoza: Essays in Interpretation [LaSalle: Open Court, 1975], pp. 61–83). Stuart Hampshire also talks about a
that his identity theory is a version of the double aspect theory. For any kind of contemporary identity theory alleges that there exist only physical events, whereas for Spinoza, there is one thing which can be described either as mental or physical: the same set of events admits of two equally good and equally comprehensive descriptions. The main point in Spinoza's identity theory is that the mind and the body are one and the same thing, and this theory does not fall into materialism or idealism because the thing can be described as mental or physical equivalently. This is why Spinoza's identity theory differs from contemporary identity theories. Speaking more accurately, since Spinoza's assertion of identity between the mind and the body is posited on the double aspect theory which holds not only identity but also parallel manifestations, his claim of identity is distinct from the contemporary one. It may be argued that there is another version of the double aspect theory (the one-and-a half aspect theory), posited in the view that there are two sorts of description, but the physical one is best, so that when one thing is described as physical it is better than when the same thing is described as mental (and some contemporary versions of the double aspect theory are also materialistic). However, the original version of the double aspect theory is posited in the view that both aspects are equal: the parallelistic double aspect theory, as I would call it. Whenever I use the term "double aspect theory" in my thesis, I mean the original version unless it is indicated. Now, let us consider the double aspect theory with respect to identity and parallelism.

First of all, I would like to point out that the equivalence between the mind and the body in the double aspect theory indicates that the double aspect theory is closely related to property parallelism. From this indication, we can assume that
double aspect theory entails both identity and property parallelism.\textsuperscript{5} If the fundamental feature of the double aspect theory is identity, and identity theory entails property parallelism, it follows that the double aspect theory entails not only identity but also parallelism. The following definition\textsuperscript{6} of the double aspect theory sheds light on this point.

\textbf{Double Aspect Theory:} ... The theory of the relation of the mind and the body, which teaches that mental and bodily facts are parallel manifestations of a single underlying unity. (my italics)

The double aspect theory acknowledges the incomparability of material and conscious processes, and maintains the impossibility of reducing the one to the other, in terms either of materialism or idealism (spiritualism). It professes to overcome the onesideness of these two theories by regarding both series as only different aspects of the same reality, like the convex and the concave views of a curve (G. H. Lewes); or, according to another favourite metaphor, the bodily and the mental facts are really the same facts expressed in different language. The most characteristic feature of the theory is its strenuous denial of the possibility of the causal interaction between the body and mind, or vice versa, in deference to the supposed necessities of the law of the conservation of energy. For interaction it substitutes parallelism or concomitance. Each side seems to “get along by itself,” or rather, as Bain puts it, “we have always a two-sided cause. The line of causal sequence is not mind causing body, and body causing mind, but mind-body giving birth to mind-body” (\textit{Mind and Body}, 132). This doctrine of “a double-faced unity,” as Bain calls it, has more recently appropriated to itself the name of MONISM.

\textsuperscript{5} Parallelism can be the doctrine that mental events are distinct from, but run in step with, physical events. This is not a plausible interpretation of Spinoza (see chapter three, pp. 67–71 above). Property parallelism involves one set of events, equivalently describable.

If identity theory is connected with parallelism (or vice versa) then that identity theory is the double aspect theory. If one has a proper understanding of what the double aspect theory is, one can hardly fail to ascribe this theory to Spinoza. We should ascribe the double aspect theory to Spinoza while being aware that double aspect theory is the identity theory with (conceptual or property) parallelism.

(3) Spinoza as a Double Aspect Theorist

a. A Numerical Identity of Events: One Event with Two Properties

Spinoza's claim of the numerical identity between the mind and the body can be understood either as claiming (1) the mental and the physical event are identical (are one and the same event), or (2) the mental and the physical property are identical (are one and the same property differently grasped).

If we put these claims in terms of his metaphysics, (1) is that "the thinking substance and the extended substance are one and the same substance," and (2) is that "the attribute of thought and the attribute of extension are one and the same property." In the case of (2), to argue the numerical identity, we would have to hold a somewhat subjective view of the attributes: the difference between the mental and the physical property only reflects differences in our belief-contents, not in the facts targeted by those beliefs, and thus they are different ways of describing one property. Moreover, we cannot ascribe a real existence to these ways of conceiving the property. Thus, these ways in the case (2) are treated as being derived from a subjective view. This argument is simply that in order to explain that identity between the mental and the physical property a subjective interpretation of the attributes must be given. We saw, in the previous chapter, that the French and German equivalents of the term "double aspect theory" show some connection with identity and parallelism, respectively: "Ger. psycho-physischer Parallelismus [psycho-physical parallelism] (not an adequate equivalent, unless connected with the identity theory of mind and body—K.G.); Fr. Théorie de l'unite a deux faces [double aspect unity theory]; Ital. teoria del doppio aspetto [double aspect theory]" (ibid., p. 295; my underlining). However, the terminological problem of the term "double aspect theory" is only a minor one. The important thing is to be aware of the fact that the double aspect theory denotes "the identity theory with property parallelism."
Spinoza does not hold the subjective interpretation of the attributes and thus that for Spinoza there is no (numerical) identity between the attributes of thought and extension. It follows that we have to take Spinoza’s claim of identity between the mind and the body as presenting only an identity between the mental and the physical event. In my view, the relationship between the substance and the attributes of thought and extension is the same as the relationship between event (or individual) and the properties of mental and physical. This leads consequently to the perspective that the mental and the physical event are one and the same event with different properties or descriptions, just as the thinking and the extended substance are one and the same substance with different attributes of thought and extension.

Spinoza regards the mind as the mode (the modification) of the substance under the attribute of thought and the body as the mode (the modification) of that substance under the attribute of extension. Namely, the mind is the modification of the substance conceived as a thinking thing and the body is the modification of the very same substance as the thing extended. If the mind and the body are not the modes of the attributes of thought and extension, but the modes of the one same substance through the attributes of thought and extension respectively, we can argue identity between the mind and the body while holding an objective interpretation of the attributes. For Spinoza, the mind and the body are not two different things, but rather one thing with two different properties or descriptions.

In my view, the identity which Spinoza wants to claim is not type identity but token identity. For Spinoza, the mind and the body are identical to each other because they are one and the same individual while the mental and the physical properties do not count against an identity; we just leave them as different types. To discuss this issue, a comparison between type identity and token identity should be considered. A reductive type identity claims initially that:

1. There is one and the same individual (event) apparently having both mental and physical properties.
2. There is a systematic connection between these two apparent sorts of property.

It is subsequently argued.
(3) We can reduce mental properties to physical properties.

(4) So, there is only one sort of property, the physical.

To be any kind of type identity theorist, it is integral to hold (1), (2), and in addition to hold that there is one sort of propriety. If a type identity theory is physicalist one it maintains (3) and (4) in addition, and if it is subjective one it holds (1), (2), and (4) which is modified: (4) there is only one sort of property which can be seen as mental or physical.

To be a token identity theorist, it is necessary to deny (3) and (4), but to hold (1). As to point (2), it is not necessary for a token identity theorist to deny this point; it is compatible with token identity. Although Davidson’s token identity theory (anomalous monism) does not maintain point (2), it is not integral for token identity to deny those points.

Spinoza’s mind-body theory maintains points (1) and (2), and denies (3) and (4), and thus his theory can perhaps best be classified as a token identity theory, Spinoza’s argument of a systematic connection between the mental property and the physical property may lead us to think that his theory is a kind of type identity theory. However, that argument is irrelevant to such a type identity theory, since the reason for a systematic connection is not on account of the reduction of the mental to the physical property as type identity argues. For Spinoza, there is no such identity between them.

The fact that Spinoza holds substance monism and property dualism (attribute dualism) which is given an objective interpretation suggests that Spinoza’s mind-body theory is a kind of token identity theory. Since Spinoza does not assert that the identity between the attribute of thought and the attribute of extension, but rather maintains the separation of the attributes, it is hardly possible to argue that the mental and the physical property are identical to each other. The

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8 By a subjective type identity theory, I mean the theory is presented by claiming that there are no mental nor physical properties, but there are only the (neutral) properties which are seen as mental or physical; if the subjective interpretation of Spinoza’s concept of the attributes were right, we would have to interpret Spinoza as a subjective type identity theorist.

9 If the subjective interpretation of the attributes were adequate, Spinoza’s theory would be subjective type identity theory.
fact that Spinoza holds the objective interpretation implies that he argues identity between the mind and body not as the same type but as the same individual.

Whenever Spinoza claims identity between the mind and the body, he suggests their identity as an individual or a thing and leaves the attributes as the different types:

Thus, also, a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing expressed in two different ways. (E, II, Prop 7, Schol; my italics)

[The mind and the body, are one and the same individual which at one time is considered under the attribute of thought, and at another under that of extension. (E, II, Prop 21, Demon; my italics)]

These statements make it quite clear that even though there are differences between the mind and the body, they are one and the same thing with two different aspects. In other words, the mental event and the physical event are one and the same event although the mental properties are different from the physical properties. In this way, if we argue the identity theory while holding the objective interpretation, our arguments should be tied up with the substance monism and property dualism.

b. Token Double Aspect Theory

I classify the above theory of Spinoza's as the version of the double aspect theory which maintains both an identity and a parallel relationship. However, we need to specify this double aspect theory if we are to entertain Spinoza's double aspect theory. We can think of two kinds of double aspect theory:

(1) Token double aspect theory: this is posited on an objective interpretation of the attributes. The mental and the physical event are one and the same event expressed in the different aspects; here "aspect" is used as a metaphor for the properties or attributes which express or describe the essence. And there is a
parallel relationship between the (apparent) mental and the (apparent) physical event as well as the mental and the physical properties (two aspects): the former is conceptual parallelism in events and the latter property parallelism (or ontological parallelism in properties).

(2) Type double aspect theory: this is posited on a subjective interpretation of the attributes. The mental and the physical properties are one and the same property expressed in the different aspects: here “aspect” is used in the literal sense, a point of view. The one (neutral) property is seen as mental and physical. And the property seen as mental and the property seen as physical are parallel to each other (due to the fact that they are identical). This parallelism is not property parallelism (or ontological parallelism in properties), but conceptual parallelism in properties.\(^{10}\)

Certainly, Spinoza claims the first one, token double aspect theory, as he holds an objective view of the attributes. Unlike Davidson’s anomalous monism, a token identity theory, Spinoza’s token double aspect theory argues not only an identity of individuals but also a systematic connection between the mental and the physical properties. (Furthermore, as we shall see in the next chapter, Spinoza also claims representationalism in his mind-body theory). Unlike the reductive type identity theory (and the subjective type identity theory), Spinoza does not argue identity between the mental and the physical properties. He claims only a systematic connection between two properties. Before Davidson, Spinoza had already distinguished token from type identity and had claimed token identity (although he did not use the term nor did he formulate the concept clearly). In this way, Spinoza argues that there is one event with different sorts of mental and physical properties, and that these two sorts of properties are systematically connected. Thus, his mind-body theory should be regarded as the double aspect theory based on the token identity of events, and for this reason, if we need a label for his theory, I should like to call it a token double aspect theory.\(^{11}\)

\(^{10}\) Concerning events, it is also conceptual parallelism in events.

\(^{11}\) Alternatively, we can call it a systematic token identity theory; one might wish to call it a non-reductive type identity theory, but this is misleading. As we have seen, although for Spinoza there
2. Some Criticisms of the Double Aspect Interpretation

There have been objections to the double aspect interpretation of the attributes and of the mind-body theory in Spinoza. In the following two sections, I shall consider those criticisms. In this section, I shall explore J. B. Bakker's objection which is raised in his article "Did Spinoza Have a Double Aspect Theory?," and in the next section, I shall consider all the other criticisms which I have detected so far. Bakker's article is intended to raise two objections to the double aspect theory: firstly, an objection to the terms used in the argument ("double," "aspect") and secondly, to the argument itself. I shall, in subsection 1, describe Bakker's arguments, and in subsection 2, I shall criticise some points of his argument.

(1) Bakker's Rejection of the Double Aspect Theory

a. The Terms "Double" and "Aspect"

In his article, Bakker asserts that the expression of attribute is the most important part in interpreting Spinoza's metaphysics and the mind-body theory. Following this, in section II, he moves on to reject the double aspect theory by pointing out the inadequacy of the term "double" and "aspect."

First of all, he deals with the term "double." He argues that the double aspect interpretation is misleading because Spinoza's attributes are not two but infinite. He tries to make this point clear by showing that even if humans know only two attributes of thought and extension and do not know the other attributes, we express more than two i.e. the infinite attributes (aspects). Due to the above fact, he claims, placing the double aspect label on Spinoza is mistaken, because "double" suggests only two aspects unlike the infinite aspects in Spinoza's

is a systematic connection (a parallel relationship) between mental and physical properties, since one is not reduced to the other, there is no identity between two sorts of properties or types.
This objection does not upset the basic strength of the interpretation; if anything it shows only that the label could be misleading if we are thinking of God rather than humans. Regarding the first problem of the terms, it seems to be right to say that the terms are misleading although it is, as Bakker admits, a minor point. Perhaps the term “double” is not compatible with Spinoza’s claim that there are not two attributes but infinite attributes, and therefore it should be infinite aspects rather than two aspects. However, I think that since Spinoza mostly talks of just two attributes it is a permissible way of speaking.

Next, he moves on to the more substantial point with respect to the term “aspect.” After he points out the term “aspect” is not used by Spinoza, he maintains that “aspect” is not an accurate term to explain Spinoza’s metaphysical system. The reason is that the term “aspect” cannot refer to “the whole” but refers only to “the part”: Spinoza’s attributes express the essence of the one substance while the term “aspect” implies that it cannot express the essence of that substance since it is only a partial appearance. Thus, he states “it would be equally nonsensical to argue that one part of a thing could constitute its essence.” Also, just as it is not possible to regard the attributes as different aspects of one substance, so the mind and the body cannot be regarded as different aspects of a single human being. At this stage, Bakker is maintaining that a mode cannot be an aspect which is a partial appearance, because a mode is the complete expression of a substance within an attribute. He recognises a possible objection to the above point: “[The mind and the body] do only imperfectly express the essence of substance.” Against this, he defends his view by arguing that his point concerns not substance but person: either the mind or the body expresses the essence of the person, but if the mind and the body are aspects of the person, they cannot express the essence of the person because aspects are not an essential but merely a partial

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13 Ibid., pp. 5–6.
14 Ibid., p. 6.
15 Ibid., pp. 6–7.
16 Ibid., p. 7.
appearance. In his words, "though the person, understood either as a mind or as a body, is, as a mode, an incomplete expression of substance, it does not follow that mind and body is an incomplete expression of what the person is." Therefore, his point is that with respect both to thought and extension of substance and to the mind and the body of person, the term "aspect" is not appropriate and should be avoided, since "aspect" is not a sufficient term to represent Spinoza's attributes-doctrine and the mind-body theory.

b. Equivalence-Identity

Bakker, in section III, suggests that we should use the term "identity theory" as a substitute for the term "double aspect theory" as being a more appropriate term. His main argument for identity theories is as follows: in Spinoza's system, each attribute equivalently constitutes as well as equivalently expresses the essence of the one same substance, hence all the attributes are identical in substance. As with the attributes, the mind and the body are also identical with each other because they equivalently express the same person and also the same substance through the attributes of thought and extension. Thus, he designates this relation as an "equivalence-identity" and he emphasises that this identity is a non-reductive identity unlike traditional materialism and many other contemporary identity theories which hold that the mind is a part of the body. Regarding the theory of "equivalence-identity," he states that "the mind and the body must be understood as independent, but nevertheless equivalent, expressions of the essence and existence of the person."

He tries to make clear the difference between the double aspect theory and the theory of "equivalence-identity" by using the analogy of a concavo-convex object. For instance, the concave surface and the convex surface of a lens are not the same surface although they are surfaces (aspects) of the same lens, whereas a

17 Ibid., pp. 7-8.
18 Ibid., p. 7.
19 Ibid., pp. 9-10.
20 Ibid., p. 11.
curved line is one and the same line which is at once both concave and convex; therefore the concave is one and the same line as the convex. 21 According to Bakker, the former is an analogy of the double aspect theory and the latter is an analogy of the equivalence-identity theory: "[A] concavo-convex line is therefore a good example of the identity of mind and body for which Spinoza argued." 22 From the analogies, I take his point as meaning that in the case of the former the concave and the convex are only partial characterizations of the same lens, while in the latter they are essential and complete expressions of the same line. With this analogy, he describes his perspective on Spinoza’s theory as follows.

Just as two different descriptions of the same concavo-convex line may appear to be descriptions of two different lines to someone ignorant of the nature of lines, in the same way mind and body appear to be different entities because we are ignorant of the nature of individual things, what Spinoza called "modes." 23

In this way, Bakker argues that we should pay more attention to the concept of expression in Spinoza’s system. We can summarise his claim as follows: Spinoza has an identity theory as to attributes and mind/body, and this theory is based on the concept of expression within which each attribute equivalently expresses the essence of substance. Thus according to Bakker, we should call this theory an equivalence-identity theory rather than a double aspect theory.

(2) Remarks on Bakker’s Arguments

Bakker claims that the term “aspect” is an inadequate word for explaining the essential expression, since this term refers only to partial expression of substance. Bakker says that this point is more substantial than the problem of the term “double.” However, even if he is right about the term “aspect,” it is not

21 Ibid., p. 11–12.
22 Ibid., p. 12.
23 Ibid., p. 14.
substantial but still only a minor point. As long as it concerns merely the misleading choice of the term "aspect" it does not affect the theory as we have expressed it; it is only the problem of the usage of the term.

Bakker speaks of two theories in his article, and these are as follows.

(1) a double aspect theory: he criticises this for not expressing the essence of the substance but only referring to a partial aspect.

(2) an equivalence-identity theory: he introduces this theory as a new interpretation of Spinoza or as an improvement of the double aspect theory, i.e. the equivalence-identity theory; which he thinks is an adequate interpretation of Spinoza's attribute-doctrine and mind-body theory since this theory refers to an essential expression of substance unlike the double aspect theory.

However, the former is not the commonly-held version of the double aspect theory. Rather, the latter is what the double aspect theory holds. In fact, the former perhaps represents Bennett's position, whereby there are fundamental trans-attributive modes combining with thought and extension. The double aspect theory as normally expounded does not argue for the partial appearance or expression of the basic properties of a person, but that the attributes express as well as constitute those basic properties, not partially but completely and equivalently. Thus, Bakker's equivalence identity interpretation is not a new interpretation but only the repetition of the argument of double aspect theory under another name.

Indeed, the analogy of the concavo-convex line which Bakker uses is actually used in the definition of the double aspect theory, as by Baldwin.24 Another point which Bakker stresses is the complete and essential expression of substance in each of the attributes. But we can find this point in the double aspect theory, too. W. von Leyden, who holds what he calls a double aspect interpretation of Spinoza, claims: "In its own sphere each of the two phenomena would seem to

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24 Baldwin writes: "[The double aspect theory] professes to overcome the onesidedness of these two theories [materialism and idealism] by regarding both series as only different aspects of the same reality, like the convex and the concave views of a curve (G. H. Lewes); or, according to another favourite metaphor, the bodily and the mental facts are really the same facts expressed in different language" (Baldwin [ed.], op. cit., vol. 1, p. 295).
be a complete and true expression of one and the same underlying reality.\textsuperscript{25}

Therefore, it is evident that Bakker’s interpretation is nothing but the contents of
the double aspect theory under another name. In fact, we entirely agree with
the content of his article and take it (terminology apart) as supporting the double
aspect theory.

Wallace I. Matson similarly criticises the term “aspect”:

The other label that one finds in the text books, “double aspect theory,”
presumably derives from the remark just quoted, “one and the same thing
expressed in two different ways” (“\textit{una eademque est res, sed duobus
modis expressa}”). But this says nothing of two \textit{aspects}, only of two
\textit{expressions}. The difference is important. Two aspects require two
observers, or at least two observation points; and what might those be? That
is how mythological entities proliferate.\textsuperscript{26}

From one point of view, Matson does not criticise the double aspect interpretation
of Spinoza, but merely criticises the terminology of the double aspect theory; he
interprets “aspect” very literally. As I have already argued in the last section, the
term “aspect” is related to “expressions,” “explanations,” or “descriptions” in the
argument of the double aspect theory of Spinoza.\textsuperscript{27} In fact, one of the main
concepts in the double aspect interpretation of Spinoza is the concept of
expressions. On the other hand, Matson may be indicating that there is no need to
infer two sets of properties from two descriptions. This brings us on to the
subjective interpretation of the attributes.

\textsuperscript{26} Wallace I. Matson, “Spinoza’s Theory of Mind,” in Eugene Freeman and Maurice (eds.),
\textsuperscript{27} The phrase “considered under the attribute of . . .” is another phrase which Spinoza uses.
3. Attributes and the Double Aspect Theory

(1) The Subjective Interpretation

Next, to the double aspect theory and subjective interpretation, which R. J. Delahunty briefly states as follows.

On this interpretation, 'the double aspect theory "explains" psycho-physical correlations by saying that one and the same event, which is neither mental or physical, may be apprehended introspectively or perceptively: insofar as it is apprehended in the former way it is mental, insofar as it is apprehended in the latter way, it is physical'.

We need not tarry long over this interpretation; it commits at least three straightforward errors, all of them involving the mistaken 'subjectivist' account of the attributes. First, in supposing that the attributes are 'aspect', it implies that they depend on being perceived (Vesey (1), p. 146); second, it asserts that for Spinoza things in themselves are unknowable (which he denies) and neither mental nor physical (when he holds they are both); third, it takes Spinoza to claim that the 'mental' is the introspectible, and the physical the perceptible (which in Spinoza's terms would be to make the attributes derive from introspecting and perceiving, when these are only modes of thought).

If the double aspect theory is held on the basis of the subjective interpretation of the attributes and the subjective interpretation is not an adequate point of view of Spinoza, as Delahunty states, it is hardly possible to regard Spinoza's theory as a double aspect theory. Now I shall deal with the above criticisms in turn.

Among the above criticisms, the first point is more or less along the same line as Matson's criticism as to the requirement of two observation points. Here, I

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28 This is Pap's double aspect interpretation of Spinoza. See A. Pap, The Elements of Analytical Philosophy (New York, 1972), pp. 278–279.
agree with Delahunty's statement regarding attributes and aspects within the double aspect theory. However, I would question the implication he draws from this, namely that they depend on being perceived as in the next phrase. In our ordinary sense of the term "aspect," an "aspect" implies a point of view. On the subjective interpretation, the same is true, since the human mind perceives the attributes of thought and extension. However, the ordinary sense of the term "aspect" is not important in the double aspect interpretation of Spinoza. We have to remember that the term "aspects" is a metaphor. W. von Leyden who holds the double aspect interpretation of Spinoza states "[i]n its own sphere each of the two phenomena would seem to be a complete and true expression of one and the same underlying reality,"\(^{31}\) and he also says: "We should now consider some of the details of the double-aspect theory. The doctrine is that all God's attributes, among them thought and extension, are irreducible aspects of one and the same real reality, and while each is always found together with the others they all express reality or any part of it in full measure by themselves separately."\(^{32}\)

Next, concerning the second criticism, I do not think that this point can be applied to the double aspect theory of Spinoza. Delahunty asserts that the point that things are neither mental nor physical is contrary to Spinoza's position because Spinoza holds they are both. However, this point does not belong to the double aspect theory of Spinoza. In fact, for Spinoza, things are both mental and physical as Delahunty states in the bracket, and this is what the double aspect interpretation holds. In different versions of the double aspect theory, things can be both mental and physical or neither mental nor physical; Delahunty assumes that a double aspect theory must hold the latter, but it is hard to see the reason why. It is certainly a misunderstanding of Spinoza's theory. It is evident that Spinoza holds that substance is mental as well as physical: "Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking thing" (E, II, Prop 1), "Extension is an attribute of God, or God is an extended thing" (E, II, Prop 2). Therefore, even if some double aspect interpretations hold that things are neither mental nor physical as in Pap's point of

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\(^{31}\) W. von Leyden, op. cit., p. 193.

\(^{32}\) Ibid., p. 192.
view cited by Delahunty, and even if some general definitions of double aspect theory also hold the same explanation, when we talk about Spinoza’s case it has to be posited that things are both mental and physical. With respect to an inadequate double aspect interpretation, Delahunty’s second criticism is right, but regarding an adequate interpretation, his criticism is not valid.33 A more adequate interpretation is available as follows.

We can find an adequate double aspect interpretation from Leyden’s perspective. I shall quote his statements: “[E]very finite mode of substance, i.e. every individual object or person, must likewise be characterizable in terms of all the attributes of substance, certainly of the two known ones, thought and extension.”34 He also states that “any of the finite things that make up reality must at one and the same time both have a mind, or at least be a thought or an idea, and also have a body, or at least be extended,”35 and “every mode of existence must be characterizable by extension as well as thought.”36 Kenneth Blackwell also holds this point of view: “Thus what Spinoza holds is a double-aspect theory—as Russell says, every event is both a physical and a mental event, as well as an infinity of other kinds of events, since there are an infinite number of attributes (E1P11).”37 From the above statements, we can see that the second criticism cannot be applied to an adequate double aspect interpretation of Spinoza.

As to the third criticism, that the introspectible and the perceptible are both only modes of thought, the same explanation can be attached. That is to say, it cannot be available within an adequate double aspect theory such as Leyden’s interpretation. It is not the mode of apprehension, but what is apprehended that matters. The problem for Delahunty is that he only considers Pap’s interpretation of the double aspect theory and does not address any alternative interpretation.

33 Even though he mentions that there are more plausible double aspect interpretations such as Vesey and Leyden, he does not describe or criticize these interpretations but merely mentions the fact that “[t]here are, of course, forms of the Dual Aspect Theory which are more plausible than Pap’s” (R. J. Delahunty, op. cit., p. 195).
34 W. von Leyden, op. cit., p. 192.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
Due to this fact, all his three criticisms are very limited. But these criticisms apply only to Pap's (and related) explanations and not to other more valid explanations. When the double aspect interpretation is posited on the objective interpretation of the attributes, those criticisms are not valid.

(2) The Compatibility between the Double Aspect Theory and the Objective Interpretation

Is the subjective interpretation of attributes integral to the double aspect interpretation of Spinoza? I think not. The double aspect interpretation does not have to be posited on the subjective interpretation, according to which attributes are illusory and there is no real difference between mind and body.

Those who think that the double aspect theory must be given a subjective interpretation argue that the mental and the physical properties are identical to each other, whereas for Spinoza there is no identity between the mental and the physical property: for Spinoza what is identical is the mental and the physical event. This is compatible with the objective interpretation of the attributes. We should not confuse the property with the substance double aspect theory. The double aspect interpretation is compatible with not only the subjective interpretation of attributes but also the objective interpretation.

Now, I shall give another approach to my explanation of this compatibility. Because the term "aspect" is regarded as a way of conceiving or looking at a single substance, this theory can be misunderstood if it is taken to be only posited on the subjective interpretation. However, I should like to recall the fact that this is a metaphor to explain that each attribute expresses the essence of substance in its own way. When we define the attributes as existing outside our mind in the objective interpretation, the double aspect theory can still be held. In this case, "aspects" are not the concept in our mind or the concept from our perceiving, but what express the essence of substance. Therefore, whether the attributes are subjective or objective does not depend upon the double aspect theory; if one has the subjective point of view of the attribute one can claim the double aspect theory,
and if one has the objective interpretation, one can also claim the double aspect theory. The double aspect theory is compatible with the objective interpretation.

The most common reason people do not take the double aspect theory as an adequate interpretation of Spinoza is because they think that this theory must be given a subjective interpretation. Why must this theory be given such an interpretation? The term “aspect” leads them to think so. Just as two aspects are posited on the subjective view, so are attributes of thought and extension, which are equivalent to the term “aspect,” posited on the subjective view. But the fact that the double aspect theory must be given a subjective interpretation cannot be derived from a literal meaning of the term “aspect,” since it is used as a metaphor. Thus we can interpret Spinoza as a double aspect theorist whilst holding an objective interpretation.

The attributes in the double aspect theory under the objective interpretation, can be explained from our familiar analogy of the tune, which is played on the piano, hummed, written in musical notation, inscribed on bits of plastic, or fixed on tape by magnetism. The infinite ways of expression are equivalent, since they express the essence of the same tune, and they are different since they have their own ways of expressing it. Just as in this example, so there actually exist infinite ways of expressing the essence of substance, and these ways correspond to the attributes. They exist not merely in our mind but exist outside our mind i.e. exist objectively. The above explanation can be classified as the objective interpretation. And, the “aspects” in the double aspect interpretation should be understood in the same sense as that the attributes are the ways of expressing the essence of substance; therefore, we can designate these attributes as “aspects.” In this way, the double aspect theory can be posited on the objective interpretation.

Consequently, if there is one substance and there are ways of expressing the essence of this substance as in the double aspect interpretation of Spinoza, the ways can exist in our mind as in the subjective interpretation, and the ways can also exist outside our mind as in the objective interpretation. Hence, we can say that there is no problem in maintaining the compatibility between the double aspect
interpretation and the objective interpretation, and therefore the double aspect interpretation cannot be criticised in terms of criticisms of the subjective interpretation as long as it can hold the objective interpretation.

4. Bennett and Della Rocca

(1) Properties and Events: Partial and Numerical Identity

Apart from my view i.e. a token double aspect theory, the following interpretations are possible of Spinoza's claim of identity between the mental and the physical.

(1) Bennett: there is (partial) identity between the mental and the physical property in terms of F, trans-attribute mode, and this is what Spinoza regards as identity between the mind and the body.

(2) Della Rocca: there is a single set of transparent (extensional) properties which are conceived as mental or physical; the same properties (for example, "having five immediate effects" and "being a complex individual") are conceived in different ways. There is also a numerical identity between mental and physical events; the former identity i.e. identity between properties implies the latter identity i.e. identity between events, as type identity implies token identity. (This view can be regarded as a type double aspect theory). 38

Regarding Bennett's interpretation, the partial identity is not what Spinoza wants to claim. Of course, by partial identity through the concept of "F," Bennett's aim is not to explain identity between properties but to explain property parallelism. But the problem for Bennett is that he does not claim a genuine identity such as a numerical identity between events or properties. As Della Rocca says in criticism, Bennett wrongly rules out event-identity, and he considers that the partial identity between properties is what Spinoza wishes to claim. However,

38 The interpretations of Bennett and Della Rocca were examined in chapter three.
for Spinoza, the mind and the body are one and the same thing or individual, and thus we have to explain Spinoza’s argument of identity in terms of some kind of numerical identity between events.

Next, Della Rocca’s numerical interpretation of both events and properties has the following problem. Della Rocca explains a numerical identity of properties by claiming that the mental properties are neutral properties seen as mental and the physical properties are the same properties seen as physical. If this is what Della Rocca claims, this is apparently no more than a subjective interpretation. In other words, he has to hold a subjective interpretation of the attributes, which is implausible in the interpretations of Spinoza. We cannot argue a numerical identity between the mental and the physical property without a subjective interpretation of the attributes.

Could we regard Della Rocca as arguing that the intensional properties are real and distinct properties, but ones which do not count against an identity of events? In that case, Della Rocca need not be arguing for the identity of properties, since intensional properties would still be real properties although insignificant in claiming identity.

Let us consider Della Rocca’s problem in some more detail. In brief, the elements of Della Rocca’s position are as follows:

(1) Event-identity: there is an identity between mental and physical events.
(2) Property-identity: there is an identity between mental and physical properties.
(3) The objective interpretation of the attributes: each attribute distinctly exists.

Now, as we have seen, Della Rocca’s position on the reality of properties is ambiguous due to the fact that his treatment of intensional properties is unclear. His position could be explained in the following two ways.

(A) There are only neutral properties, which can be approached in a mental way and a physical way: the mental and the physical properties are intensional properties. Intensional properties are not real properties and thus there are no real mental and physical properties. There are no mental properties as such: only mental ways of seeing the neutral properties. The mental and the physical
are but two ways of conceiving the same properties. The same properties are conceived in different ways. This is in effect what I have been calling conceptual parallelism.

(B) Not only extensional properties but also intensional properties (mental and physical properties) are real properties. But, these intensional properties are strange properties which do not count against the identity of things possessing one of those properties and not another: intensional properties do not affect the scope of identity between things or events. 39

I think that Della Rocca is unclear and perhaps inconsistent concerning two positions, but in my reading of him, his intention is normally to maintain (A).

39 I shall offer Della Rocca’s statements concerning (A) and (B). Apart from Della Rocca’s argument of “referential opacity” in causal context and of its transmission to attribute context, we can find the fact that he holds (A) from the following statements: “Throughout this chapter I have relied on the view that, for Spinoza, various kinds of properties are intensional. As I mentioned in the preface, this intensionality involves a kinds of relativity: An object has, for example, the property of being physical only relative to a certain manner of conceiving or describing it. This conception- or description-relativity of mental and physical properties in general is additional to the mind-relativity of content in particular” (Della Rocca, Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza, p. 139).

On the other hand, the statements which lead us to thinking that Della Rocca holds (B) are as follows: “There are certain kinds of properties that are such that the fact that a has properties of that kind, and b does not, does not by itself undermine the claim that a = b. The properties not included within the scope of the above principle are, of course, the intensional properties” (ibid., p. 130), and again “According to Leibniz’s Law, we can determine whether a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are numerically identical by determining whether they have all their extensional properties in common. Intensional properties are irrelevant in deciding the issue of identity” (ibid., p. 132).

However, the last two quotations concerning (B) do not rule out the possibility of holding (A): we can still maintain (A) in these quotations, whereas we cannot maintain (B) in the first quotation. In the case of (A), if the neutral property is (say) “having five effects,” the intensional properties are (say) “having five mental effects” and “having five physical effects” since these properties are the neutral properties described in the mental and the physical ways, respectively. When the neutral properties are seen as mental or physical these properties are (become) intentional properties and thus they should not be included within the scope of identity; they should be irrelevant in determining the issue if identity. When these mental or physical descriptions peel off the intensional properties are (become) the neutral properties and thus we can determine identity of the mind and the body by determining whether the mind and the body have all these neutral properties in common. Thus, the last two quotations can be understood as follows: in determining identity between the mind and the body, we have to rule out these properties when they are seen as mental or as physical, and we need to accept these properties when they are not described in any way.
However, whether Della Rocca’s position is (A) or (B), he has the following problems. In the case of (A), it is incompatible with point (3) i.e. the objective interpretation: the argument (A) has to be given a subjective interpretation of the attributes. And in the case of (B), it destroys point (2) i.e. property-identity.

If Della Rocca’s argument is that there is a numerical identity between events and properties, his interpretation ought to be regarded as a version of double aspect theory in the sense of type identity (which should be posited on the subjective interpretation of the attributes); and if his argument is that there is identity between events, and that there is no identity between properties, his interpretation is a version of a token double aspect theory, which should be given the objective interpretation, as does my interpretation of Spinoza. In both cases, there is a problem concerning the relation of neutral properties to essence of substance. Those two concepts are not argued in a consistent manner as we shall see in the following section, despite the fact that Spinoza’s mind-body theory follows his one substance doctrine, and that Della Rocca accepts this view.

(2) Trans-Attribute Modes, Neutral Properties, and “What Is Structurally Common”

To consolidate a grasp of the differences among Bennett, Della Rocca, and my view, it is worthwhile to compare interpretations of essence in Spinoza’s theory: trans-attribute modes for Bennett, neutral properties for Della Rocca, and “what is structurally common” for my view. Spinoza does not explicitly claim any one of those concepts. However, we have to infer some concept from the contextual sense, if we hope to make sense of Spinoza. Let us firstly compare Bennett’s concept of “trans-attribute mode” with my concept of “what is structurally common.”

a. Bennett

Bennett claims the concept of trans-attributes mode on the basis of the fact that the essence (the most fundamental property) is not the attributes. This fact is
inferred from his reading of the phrase “which the intellect perceives of” as referring to something illusory: consequently, the attributes do not constitute the essence of the substance and thus the essence is something beyond the attributes i.e. “the trans-attribute differentiae or modes.”

The source of my concept of “what is structurally common” is somewhat like Bennett’s F, trans-attribute differentiae: both concepts rely on the fact that the most fundamental properties are not attributes but the essence. However, in my view, unlike that of Bennett, there is a sense in which the attributes constitute the essence; there is no illusion for the infinite intellect. The reasons why the attributes are disregarded as the essences in my view, as we saw in the preceding chapter, are as follows: firstly, Spinoza’s assertion of essence does not allow us to consider many essences for one substance, and secondly, there is a sense in which the person humming and the person whistling are doing the same thing—they are both giving the same tune.\(^{40}\) And the essence as what is structurally common to all the attributes is not beyond the attributes, but is in them, whereas Bennett’s essence as trans-attribute mode is beyond essence owing to the fact that the attributes do not constitute the essence. The difference, consequently, makes the different formats of the mental and physical property in the following way.

We have already seen that Bennett introduces the concept of “trans-attribute mode” and tries to explain parallelism by means of these trans-attribute modes; in Bennett’s interpretation, therefore, there are “thought + F,” and “extension +F.” Bennett tries to clarify this by means of an analogy. A circle is a two-dimensional figure having all its points equidistant from a given point; a sphere is a three-dimensional figure having all its points equidistant from a central point. On the analogy, the property of having all points equidistant from a given point is F, incapable of being grasped on its own. Circularity (two-dimensionality) and Sphericity (three-dimensionality) correspond to the attributes, which are taken as fundamental (even by God) but are not really so. F guarantees a correspondence between circles and spheres.

\(^{40}\) For the tune analogy, see pp. 127–128 in chapter four.
My view is, on the face of it, somewhat similar. The tune can be expressed on many instruments, or written down, or whistled. But there is nothing we fail to grasp. The tune is not something whose pure nature is hidden behind the hummed or trumpeted notes. We perceive what they have in common, all that there is to perceive, when we match these trumpeted sounds, these whistled sounds, these marks on paper, these grooves on plastic. It is true that in this analogy what these things share is obvious. Whereas parallelism of the mental and the physical is not (though Spinoza seems to have been conceived of it). Furthermore, in my view, the essence is shown in each attribute as the tune is in them, whereas for Bennett, the essence is a separate, indescribable property: F is in principle separable from the two-dimensionality and the three-dimensionality, though even God cannot separate it in thought. From this, we can consequently see that why Bennett presents the mental and the physical as “the attribute of thought-and-F” and “the attribute of extension-and-F” to explain parallelism. In contrast with this, on my interpretation, there is nothing which God fails to do in separating the essence, any more that one fails if one cannot give a tune without humming it or writing it down, or whistling it, etc. The mental and the physical property correspond to the attributes of thought and extension, since my concept of essence is in them, as what they both express. We cannot say what that is, but we can show what it is. 41

b. Della Rocca

Next, let us compare Della Rocca’s concept of neutral property and my concept of what is structurally common. On interpretation (A) above, the difference lies in that Della Rocca’s neutral property involves numerical identity between the mental and the physical properties, whereas for me “what is structurally common” does not involve numerical identity (even partial identity) between them; it only covers identity between mental and physical events. In my interpretation, unlike that of Della Rocca, one property is not seen as a mental

41 It is as if one could not state, but only show, what the circle and sphere have in common.
property or a physical property, although one event is seen as mental or physical. On interpretation (B) above, this difference would disappear, but others remain.

Another difference is that I see "what is structurally common" as essence, while for Della Rocca, the relation of the neutral, transparent properties to essence is not clear: he does not seem to identify essence with these neutral, transparent properties. In my case "what is structurally common" is derived from the relationship between essence and attribute, whereas Della Rocca asserts the opacity of causality permits neutral properties. However, the difference concerning the source is not so important, if Della Rocca’s concept of neutral property is compatible with Spinoza’s position. The point is that although Della Rocca does not infer this concept from the relationship between essence and attribute (and this is his aim, to show identity between the mind and the body without relying on the one substance doctrine), this concept should be compatible with Spinoza’s doctrine of essence.

However, Della Rocca runs into trouble on this point, as follows. When Della Rocca interprets the mind-body theory of Spinoza, he argues that there is a neutral way to describe the substance and this is why there are neutral properties. He claims that "[a]lthough there are no trans-attribute modes on the numerical identity interpretation, there are ways of describing modes in neutral terms, that is, terms that do not presuppose any particular attribute."\(^{42}\) This leads us to think that the essence can be described in a neutral way. The individual is not confined to one attribute: there is mind-body identity. Hence, one would suppose, what it is to be an individual must be something not confined to the mental or the physical, and neutral properties seem to fit the bill. However, when Della Rocca considers the essence of the substance, he explains it not in terms of attribute-neutral properties but in an infinite way i.e. the way of having all attributes. He states:

But there is an important way of describing God under which we have not as yet specified God’s essence. Here God is not described as the thinking substance in particular, or as the extended substance in particular, but rather

as God simpliciter. As Idef6 points out, God is defined as the substance of infinitely many (that is, all) attributes. Thus, to describe the substance simply as God is equivalent to describing it as the substance of infinitely many attributes. Under this description, God's essence cannot be constituted solely by thought or solely by extension. ... It seems, then, that under the descriptions "God" or "the substance of infinitely many attributes," the essence of God is either constituted by all the attributes together or is not constituted by any of the attributes. 43

He goes on:

[I]t follows that the essence of God under this description is to be such that for each attribute X, God is describable in such a way that X constitutes that substance's essence. So the essence of God (simpliciter) is, in some sense, a second-order essence: an essence that makes reference to the essence of the substance (under other descriptions of the substance). 44

In this way, Della Rocca does not regard essence as being described in the neutral way, but as being described in infinite ways i.e. the way of having all attributes. It is clear that for Della Rocca there is an essence for each attribute. The essence of God is to have an essence in each attribute but first-order essence is attribute-bound. Traditionally, "essence" is closely related to identity. Hence, if one and the same individual is both mental and physical it is hard to see how it could have an essence in each attribute. It would mean that one individual would have more than one essence, and we are back with De Vries' worry (p. 112).

What applies to God presumably applies to humans: they have an essence in each of two attributes, thought and extension. It is not that the essence is made up partly of mental properties and partly of physical properties (as man was sometimes held to be rational and an animal), but each essence is complete on its own. If the essence says what it is to be an individual of a certain sort, attribute-

43 Ibid., p. 167.
44 Ibid.
bound essences can only give what it is to be an individual looked at in a certain way. My view is that the essence of a human being is what is structurally the same in the mental and physical descriptions, and from this point of view Della Rocca's neutral properties look interesting. But Della Rocca's neutral properties can be stated; we have said that my structurally common properties cannot, but (like the tune) are seen in the different modes of expression.

The neutral properties of Della Rocca are not the right sort of properties to pertain to essence. He instances "being at time t" but Spinoza says that having a beginning in time is not part of a human's essence. The other properties: "having five immediate causes," "having three immediate effects" would not seem enough to establish an identity. In any case, there is no general concept of causation in things only physical causation and mental causation from which these structural properties are extrapolated. So, while Della Rocca's neutral properties are similar to the essential properties in being structurally common, they are not the right sort of structural property.

Why does Della Rocca confine essence to the attributes? Perhaps he realised the inadequacy of his neutral properties to serve as essence. In any case, even if it seems reasonable to define God as the being with infinite essences it is difficult to see how this can be extended to modes. Presumably humans are things (modifications of substance) with essences in thought and extension.

5. The Double Aspect Theory, Determinism, and Morality

(1) Determinism

Spinoza's metaphysical determinism could open the way in seeking a solution to his account of the relation of the mind to the body. I have attempted, in chapter two, to rule out epiphenomenalism and hylomorphism as interpretations of
Spinoza's mind-body theory in terms of his metaphysical determinism. Now what else can be obtained from his determinism in seeking a solution to Spinoza's mind-body theory? I would suggest that his determinism together with his monism can support the double aspect theory. Thus, after I describe Spinoza's metaphysical determinism, I shall then try to find a clue to the solution of his mind-body problem through his determinism.

a. The Outlook of Determinism in Spinoza

Richard Taylor described determinism as "... in the case of everything that exists, there are antecedent conditions, known or unknown, given which that thing could not be other than it is. That is an exact statement of the metaphysical thesis of determinism. More loosely, it says that everything is not only determinate but causally determined." Further, he also defines this in Edwards' Encyclopedia: "[D]eterminism is the general philosophical thesis which states that for everything that ever happens there are conditions such that, given them, nothing else could happen."

Where does Spinoza mention determinism? We can find determinism throughout his Ethics, especially in part 1, "Of God." One of the most exemplary and strongest statements in Spinoza in relation to determinism is as follows.

In Nature there is nothing contingent, but all things are determined from the necessity of the divine nature to exist and act in a certain manner. (E, I, Prop 29)

Things could have been produced by God in no other manner and in no other order than that in which they have been produced. (E, I, Prop 33)

It is, therefore, beyond doubt to say that Spinoza claims determinism in his metaphysics. It is further evident that one of the formulations of determinism is causality, i.e. everything has its cause, even if the analysis of his notion of causality is controversial. For Spinoza, there is no doubt that all things have God, substance, as their cause. He states that “God is the immanent and not the transient cause of all things” (E, I, Prop 18). Again, he reinforces this point, “God cannot be properly called the remote cause of individual things .... But all things which are in God, and so depend upon Him that without Him they can neither be nor be conceived” (E, I, Prop 28, Schol). We can, therefore, see Spinoza’s descriptions of strict determinist causality, and from this fact we can establish the presence of determinism in Spinoza’s metaphysical system.

In Spinoza’s metaphysical determinism, we should notice that God is substance consisting of infinite attributes and that humans can only know the attributes of thought and extension. When Spinoza says that the mind and body are determined by God, he means more precisely that the mind is determined in the attribute of thought and the body is determined in the attribute of extension; when Spinoza refers to “all things,” this involves not only bodies but also minds. Accordingly, Spinoza’s metaphysics of determinism can be described as follows.

There is only a single substance, which is divine. That substance is characterised by infinitely many attributes. And as to these attributes, we only know two, which are thought and extension. The modes follow on from each attribute, and these are either finite or infinite. If they are infinite, then they are either immediate or mediate. The infinite immediate mode of extension is motion and rest, and its infinite mediate mode is “the face of the universe.” The infinite immediate mode of thought is the infinite intellect. Further there are the finite modes, minds and bodies which follow from the attributes of thought and extension. And all this, as we have seen above, happens in a certain and determinate manner. In other words, the causes of the mind and the body are the attributes of thought and of extension, yet their ultimate cause is God, namely substance, because God possesses the attributes of thought and extension. From this fact, we can see that Spinoza’s determinism is encapsulated in both the mental
and the physical realm, and I believe that this kind of metaphysical determinism can offer some insights in relation to Spinoza's mind-body theory.

b. The Mind and The Body Determined by One Substance

In Spinoza's system, as we have seen above, only one substance determines both the mind and the body. Even if there are the attributes of thought and extension, since they proceed from a single substance, we should hold that the ultimate cause or source of both the mind and the body is one substance. We should note that there is only one order in Spinoza's deterministic system. This one order can be looked at from two points of view. It can be conceived under the attribute of thought or under the attribute of extension. In other words, even though it appears that there are two orders and two chains of causality, in reality there is only one order and it can be conceived by us in two ways. Spinoza writes: "[W]hether we think of Nature under the attribute of extension or under the attribute of thought or any other attribute whatever, we shall discover one and the same order or one and the same connection of causes, that is to say, in every case the same sequence of things" (E, II, Prop 7, Schol).

The parallelism to be found in Spinoza's mind-body theory is property-parallelism. "Property-parallelism" can be claimed as falling within the version of the double aspect theory. Once we establish the formulation that the mind and the body are both aspects of the same entity which is one substance, we need to ask what the relationship is between two aspects, and then our answer must be that there is a parallelism. Thus I believe that the version of the double aspect theory gives us the whole perspective of Spinoza's system. The double aspect theory of mind and body is consistent with his determinism, monism, and property parallelism. Spinoza's metaphysical determinism can support the double aspect theory.

47 It is certain that one substance is the cause of the mind as well as the cause of the body, and therefore the ultimate source of them is God, substance. We can regard this as a version of the double aspect theory. Regarding substance monism, Spinoza states that "Besides God no substance can be nor can be conceived" (E, I, Prop 14).
(2) Moral Theory

Spinoza's determinism pervades his account of moral theory in part 4 of the Ethics. Thus I shall, in this section, draw out Spinoza's point of view on "human bondage," and then move on to consider how the moral theory can provide insight into the relationship between the mind and the body.

a. Human Bondage

Bondage is, for Spinoza, "[t]he impotence of man to govern or restrain the emotions" (E, IV, Preface). That is to say, our lack of the power to moderate the emotions is called bondage, and Spinoza's assertion of this kind of human bondage can be found in the following statements.

The force by which man perseveres in existence is limited, and infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes. (E, IV, Prop 3)

It is impossible that a man should not be a part of Nature, and that he should suffer no changes but those which can be understood through his own nature alone, and of which he is the adequate cause. (E, IV, Prop 4)

Hence it follows that a man is necessarily always subject to passions, and that he follows and obeys the common order of Nature, accommodating himself to it as far as the nature of things requires. (E, IV, Prop 4, Corol)

In the scholium to proposition 18, we can see Spinoza's transition from the discussion of bondage to the exposition of the virtuous life. This doctrine of virtue leads us to the understanding of moral freedom. Spinoza equates virtue with endeavour and with happiness. Our happiness depends upon things external to us because we are finite modes. This is not explored in detail in proposition 18, but further on; Spinoza argues concerning virtue from proposition 23.
Spinoza holds that we can only be said to possess virtue to the extent that we form adequate ideas and preserve our being under the guidance of reason, but what we essentially endeavour (in accord with reason) is to understand. Since reason considers nothing as being good except understanding, true good and evil are what aid or detract from the exercise of understanding, respectively. Spinoza echoes this discussion of virtue again as follows: "There is no single thing in Nature which is more profitable to man than a man who lives according to the guidance of reason" (E, IV, Prop 35, Corol 1). Therefore, for Spinoza, a free man is "a man who lives according to the dictates of reason alone, [and] is not led by the fear of death (Prop 63, pt. 4), but directly desires the good (Corol Prop 63, pt. 4), that is to say (Prop 24, pt. 4), desires to act, to live, and to preserve his being in accordance with the principle of seeking his own profit" (E, IV, Prop 67, Demon). Thus, we can call him free if he is led by reason alone. 48

b. Moral Theory and Mind-Body Theory

Now, I shall try to consider the relationship between the above account of Spinoza's moral theory and Spinoza's account of the relation of the mind to the body. We have seen in section I that for Spinoza, humans are regarded as a part of Nature and nothing besides. When Spinoza says that we are a part of Nature, he does not refer merely to the physical world, but his term "Nature" is also related to the mental world, since Nature is God possessing the mental as well as the physical. Therefore, under the attribute of thought, the mind follows mental laws, just as under the attribute of extension the body follows physical laws. Spinoza writes:

All efforts which we make through reason are nothing but efforts to understand, and the mind, in so far as it uses reason, adjudges

48 The following questions can be raised with respect to the connection between determinism and morality. Is it predetermined who is good and who is not? If I have got the right kind of contemplative mind I seek wisdom: but if I do not have it how do I get it? Would someone deserve punishment for doing wrong, if determinism is true? But this topic takes us beyond the scope of this thesis.
nothing as profitable to itself except that which conduces to understanding. (E, IV, Prop 26)

We do not know that anything is certainly good or evil except that which actually conduces to understanding, or which can prevent us from understanding. (E, IV, Prop, 27)

In part III, proposition 6–8, Spinoza claims self-preservation: “Each thing, in so far as it is in itself, endeavours to persevere in its being” (E, III, Prop 6). Therefore, we can see that Spinoza has two kinds of concept regarding endeavour: one is “persevere” and the other is “understand.” That is to say, in Spinoza's theory, there are “the endeavour to persevere” and “the endeavour to understand”; the former refers to the body and the latter to the mind. Hence, it comes out that we endeavour to preserve as well as understand. Now, I shall consider what these concepts refer to and how they are related to each other by following J. Thomas Cook's perspective.

When Spinoza holds self-preservation, he means a human being's endeavour to persevere in its being and this endeavour is the very essence of the individual. And, it is clear that for Spinoza man is a physico-psychical organism. On the one hand the human body is, on the physical side, characterised by the tendency to maintain its physical integrity through being affected in various ways by things in the surrounding environment. On the other hand, this same individual is, on the mental side, a complex idea made up of the ideas of those many extended things which constitute the human body. And this mind is characterised by the tendency to understand, which consists of its power to form what Spinoza calls “adequate ideas” or “common notions” which are ideas of things which all bodies have in common and which are equally in the whole and in the part of all extended things. The mind's endeavour to understand is an endeavour to form such adequate ideas.

49 Concerning this, Spinoza states that “the effort by which each thing endeavours to persevere in its own being is nothing but the actual essence of the thing itself” (E, III, Prop 7).
Therefore, a man endeavours to maintain his integrity as a complex physical organism when viewed as a body under the attribute of extension, and he also has the endeavour to form adequate ideas when viewed as a mind under the attribute of thought. Hence it follows that a man's endeavour not only to persevere but also to understand are under the attributes of extension and thought, respectively. Now I can suggest that the body's endeavour to maintain its integrity as a complex physical organism can be equated with the mind's endeavour to form adequate ideas. That is to say, the body's endeavour to persevere and the mind's endeavour to understand are one and the same endeavour, conceived under the two attributes, extension and thought.51

I take this formulation as the same paradigm as the version of the double aspect theory of the relation of the mind to the body. In parts II and III, Spinoza states that "substance thinking and substance extended are one and the same substance, which is now comprehended under this attribute and now under that" (E, II, Prop 2, Schol). Further he also states that "the mind and the body are one and the same thing, conceived at one time under the attribute of thought, and at another under that of extension" (E, III, Prop 2, Schol). Here, we can see that Spinoza's version of the double aspect theory is consistent with his metaphysical as well as his moral theory, in particular his account of our endeavour. And subsequently, this account can offer some insight in interpreting his mind-body theory as the double aspect theory.

I believe that the double aspect interpretation gives us a whole perspective on Spinoza's system. The double aspect theory as the mind-body theory is consistent with Spinoza's metaphysical monism and determinism, with his concept of the attributes, with his explanations of identical and parallel relationship between the mind and the body, and with his account of morality. Spinoza's mind-body theory should be considered within the version of the double aspect theory. Thus, we can say that the double aspect interpretation can be attributed to Spinoza's mind-body theory more successfully than the other interpretations.

51 Ibid., p. 194.
Chapter Six

The Problem of Representation in Spinoza
We have seen, in the previous chapter, that Spinoza's account of the mind and its relation to the body can be explained by means of the double aspect theory, which is based on substance monism and attribute dualism. However, by relying only on the double aspect theory, we cannot sufficiently explain Spinoza's account of the relationship between the mind and the body. So, what other kind of concept or theory should we ascribe to Spinoza? When I criticised, in chapter two, the interpretations of Spinoza's mind-body theory, I indicated that the role of representation is overlooked in the interpretations of hylomorphism, epiphenomenalism and idealism. Especially concerning the idealistic interpretation, I pointed out that the role of representation is misunderstood and misinterpreted by it; the ground that this interpretation really rests on is no more than representationalism, and this concept of representation is based on "the mind as the idea of the body." It follows that Spinoza's mind-body theory involves both the double aspect theory and representationalism. The former, it seems to me, involves an ontological thesis about the mind-body theory; the latter an epistemological one. Thus, in this chapter, I intend to examine these two theses concerning the mind-body problem, especially the concept of representation, and to explore the relation between them. In so doing, I hope to arrive at a clearer understanding of Spinoza's mind-body theory.

The exploration of the concept of representation is one of the important tasks to be undertaken in order to understand Spinoza's mind-body theory. However, there have been some different accounts of Spinoza's concept of representation, so that it is difficult to identify the genuine tendency in his concept of representation. Recently, Della Rocca has elucidated Spinoza's theory of representation. Thus I shall, in section 2, explore Della Rocca's arguments and point out some problems in his arguments after describing the general outlook of Spinoza's notion of the representation in section 1. Then, in section 3, I shall move on to consider the compatibility between parallelism and representationalism.
1. Spinoza on Representationalism

(1) The Outlook of Spinoza's Concept of Representation

Spinoza's concept of representation is differently understood by the commentators due to the problems of its compatibility with the parallel relationship between mind and the body derived from their identity. The basic issue is Spinoza's claim that the mind is the idea of the body. From this, the following problems arise: (1) whether the object of the idea constituting the human mind is only its body or both its body and other affecting external bodies, (2) the distinction between "the object of the idea" and "the object which that idea represents," (3) whether Spinoza was confused between the parallel and the representational relationship.

However, we ought firstly to grasp the outlook of his representationalism without considering the compatibility with the other doctrine. Then, we can explore problems (1) to (3) and redefine his representationalism.

Spinoza claims that the mind is the idea of the body, and the object of the idea is the body and nothing else: "The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body, or a certain mode of extension actually existing, and nothing else" (E, II, Prop 13). If the object of the idea is what is represented by it, this appears on the face of it manifestly false, since we think about other things than our bodies. However, other passages suggest his overall view is not that a person's mind is an idea of only his or her body. Spinoza also holds that the human mind can be aware of external bodies but only through their effects on the perceiver's body, the human body. In Spinoza's representationalism, the relationship between the human body and the external bodies as the objects of the human mind is an undetachable connection by means of what he terms "modification" i.e. the way in which the human body is affected by external bodies.

Regarding the external bodies, firstly, the human mind can have knowledge of external bodies only by means of their effects on the human body. The human mind, therefore, "perceives no external body as actually existing unless through the ideas of the modifications of its body"(E, II, Prop 26; my italics). Hence, in so far as the human body is affected by any external body the human mind perceives the
external body and in so far as the human body is not affected in any way the human mind does not perceive any external body.

The same applies to a human mind’s knowledge of its own body. When its body is affected by the external body, the human mind can perceive its body. Without the external body’s effects on the human body, the human mind does not know its own body: “The human mind does not know the human body itself, nor does it know that the body exists except through ideas of modifications by which the body is affected” (E, II, Prop 19; my italics). That is to say, the way in which a human mind perceives its own body is available through the external body’s effects on its own body. Hence, it follows that the human mind is not able to have a knowledge of the human body without an external body, and also is not able to perceive the external body itself or the affecting external body without its own body. A human mind knows neither the human body nor the affecting external bodies without the modifications on the human body. Regarding this point, Spinoza writes as follows:

If the human body be affected in a way which involves the nature of any external body, the human mind will contemplate that external body as actually existing or as present, until the human body be affected by a modification which excludes the existence or presence of the external body. (E, II, Prop 17)

Now, from this it appears that the object of the mind is not only the human body but also the affecting external body, so that the mind represents or perceives the nature of both the affected human body and the affecting body at the same time.

Spinoza repeatedly reminds us, in Ethics part II propositions 14–29, of this point, that firstly, the human mind has knowledge of the human body as well as external bodies only through the modification by which the human body is affected by the external bodies. The following statements of Spinoza make this point clear:
The idea of every way in which the human body is affected by external bodies [modification] must involve the nature of the human body, and at the same time the nature of the external body. (E, II, Prop 16)

Hence, it follows, in the first place, that the human mind perceives the nature of many bodies together with that of its own body. (E, II, Prop 16. Corol 1)

Thus it seems that, for Spinoza, the human mind perceives two kinds of bodies—the human body and external bodies—at the same time; the ideas of the modification of the human body also involve the nature of external bodies.

Let us consider the relationship among the three concepts as the object of the idea: the human body, external bodies, and modifications. Here, I argue that the concept of modifications (affections, states) plays an important role in Spinoza’s representationalism, since without the idea of modification of the human body, the human mind cannot have an idea of nor represent the human body itself or the affecting external bodies. In Spinoza’s words, a modification is “every way in which the human body is affected by external bodies,” so that the meaning of “modification of the human body” is what happens in the human body when it is affected by the external body; that is to say, events or changes in the human body affected by the external bodies. Now, I shall consider the process of representation concerning the modification of the human body. When the human body is affected by the external bodies, we perceive, in the first place, the modification before we perceive either the human body or the external body. That is to say, the human mind perceives the modification at the first stage, and then perceives the human body and the external body at the second stage. Hence, it follows that the human mind cannot represent either the human body or the external body before it

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1 Spinoza repeats this in the Ethics:
"There are in truth (Prop 16, pt. 2) the ideas of modifications of the human body which involve its nature as well as the nature of external bodies" (E, II, Prop 18, Schol).
"The ideas of the modifications of the human body involve the nature both of external bodies and of the human body itself" (E, II, Prop 28, Demon).
represents the modification of the human body. As to this point Spinoza states as follows:

The human mind does not know the human body itself, nor does it know that the body exists except through ideas of modifications by which the body is affected. (E, II, Prop 19)

The human mind perceives no external body as actually existing unless through the ideas of the modifications of its body. (E, II, Prop 26)

Now, we can see that for the human mind to represent the human body and the external body it has to firstly represent or have ideas of the modifications of the human body. But, the processes are not entirely distinct: one and the same idea which represents the modification of the human body also represents the human body and the external body. In the order of explanation, the modification comes first before the human body and the external body.²

In fact, however, once one idea represents the modification, since this idea involves the nature of the human body and of the external body, this idea represents both the human body and the external body (E, II, Prop 16). Representing the human body and the external body depends on representing the modification of the human body. For example, when I perceive John, there is the way in which my body is affected by John’s body i.e. the modification of my body. At the first stage, my mind perceives this modification (the event in my body) and at the second stage my mind perceives both my body itself and John’s body. That is to say, without having the idea of the modification of my body, we can represent neither my body nor John’s body.

The following statement of Spinoza’s confirms this two-stage process of representation.

² Spinoza wants these stages to be logically distinct, but not distinct in time.
The human mind perceives these modifications and, consequently (Prop 16, pt. 2), the human body itself actually existing (Prop 17, pt. 2). The human mind, therefore, perceives the human body, etc. (E, II, Prop 19, Demon)

Although Spinoza does not mention the external body, the same argument should be applied to it, since the idea of the modification entails the nature of not only the human body but also the external body and thus "the human mind perceives the nature of many bodies together with that of its own body" (E, II, Prop 16, Corol). Thus, it is clear that by virtue of the fact the mind has the idea of the modification of the body, ideas in the human mind can represent the human body and the external body.

From the exposition above, in Spinoza's representationalism, we can see that there are the following four items.

1. The human body, which is the object of the human mind and is affected by external bodies.
2. External bodies, which affect the human body: "The individual parts composing the human body, and consequently the human body itself, are affected by external bodies in many ways" (E, II, Post 3). 3
3. Modifications (affections, states) of the body, which involve the nature of the body as well as of the external bodies affecting it.
4. The human mind, which is the complex idea composed of the ideas of the body and of the affecting external bodies: "The idea which constitutes the formal being of the human mind is not simple, but it is composed of a number of ideas" (E, II, Prop 15).
5. The ideas which represent both (1) and (2) by means of representations of (3).

Now, we can conclude that for Spinoza, the cognitive situation requires the presence of ideas, which are contained in the mind, and these ideas represent the nature both of its own body and of external bodies. In other words, there is a

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3 Before proposition 14 in part II, there are six postulates.
representative relationship between the human mind and its body or external bodies through the medium of ideas which represent those objects.

(2) The Problems of Spinoza's Representationalism

One problem is that there is apparently a glaring contradiction between propositions 13 and 16 in part II. Spinoza alleges that the human mind is the idea of the human body alone in proposition 13, he claims that the human mind represents not only the human body but also the external body from proposition 16.

The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body, or a certain mode of extension actually existing, and nothing else. (E, II, Prop 13; my italics)

The idea of every way in which the human body is affected by external bodies [modification] must involve the nature of the human body, and at the same time the nature of the external. (E, II, Prop 16)

Is Spinoza really intending to say in proposition 13 that the object represented by the human mind is only the human body? If so, how can we account for the later shift in proposition 16, that is, the idea in the human mind represents both the human mind and the external body?

Some commentators such as Pollock, Barker, and Taylor argue that the problem arises owing to the fact that Spinoza is confused between the parallel and the representational relationships concerning the term "idea."

Pollock, for example, recognises that Spinoza uses the one term idea in the two kinds of relation and complains that Spinoza is confused between these two relations: the representational and the parallel relation. Pollock states:

But, Spinoza makes use of the one term idea to denote the two kinds of relation, and we have to find out by the context which he means. If I think of
Peter, the state of my consciousness in an idea of Peter according to Spinoza's first usage of term. But according to his other usage, it is the idea, not of Peter, but of the corresponding state of my own brain and nerves, or such parts of them as are, in modern language, the organs of that particular phase of conscious thought. In the one sense the object of the idea is Peter, in the other it is the bodily organism correlated to the thinking mind. And it is important to observe that in this other sense idea has a far wider application than in the first and more familiar sense. The material correlate which is called the object of the idea may be a living organism, but also it may not. The idea may coincide with a concept in a conscious mind, or with a conscious mind forming concepts, but also it may not.4

He also states that "[n]ow a man can easily think that of his own body, but he is not always doing so, and when he does his thought will not be accurate unless he has learnt something of physiology. And even if every human being were an accomplished physiologist, the constant relation of the mind as a whole to the body as a whole would still be something different from the relation of the knowing to the known."5

A. E. Taylor also argues the similar point: "It is this neglect to insist on the unique character of all knowing as an apprehension of an object by a subject which explains the standing and apparently unconscious Spinozistic equivocation by which ‘the idea of Peter’ may mean either ‘the mental complex which corresponds to Peter’s brain and nervous system, the mind of Peter’, or ‘the mental complex which exists when Paul thinks of Peter’, Paul’s ‘idea’ of Peter, or may mean both in the same breath, if it is convenient for the argument that it should."6

Barker, following Pollock, argues the similar point, and points to the contradiction between propositions 13 and 16 as the result of Spinoza’s confusion.

5 Ibid., p. 124.
Such a case presents itself in II, 13. Spinoza there says, in terms which seem to admit of no dubiety, that the object of the mind's knowledge is the body, and nothing else than the body. ... [I]t is contradicted by Spinoza's own statements, for example, in 16 C 1 (where he says that the human mind perceives plurimorum corporum naturam una cum sui corporis natura 7), and in 17 (where he says that, when the body is affected by an external body, the mind idem corpus externum ut actu existens vel ut sibi praesens contemplabitur 8). How, then, could he assert the et nihil aliud 9 of 13? 10

Barker's answer is that "[t]here must, then, it would seem, be some serious confusion in Spinoza thought, if his assertion of our proposition is to be explained." 11 Spinoza's confusion is, according to Barker, as follows:

Spinoza uses affectiones to denote the bodily process or facts, and speaks of the ideae affectionum, but he fails apparently to see that the ideae which occur in the mind when the affectiones occur in the body need not have the affectiones or the body for their object. Ideae affectionum may mean either ideas which correspond to the affectiones, or ideas which are aware of or know the affectiones, but Spinoza apparently identifies the two meanings, that is, identifies correspondence and cognition, but now from a physiological rather than an epistemological point of view. 12

Thus, Barker concludes that "I think, then, that we must agree with Pollock that, when Spinoza speaks of the mind as idea sive cognitio corporis [idea or knowledge of the body], he is confused and is using the word idea in a new and strange way." 13

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7 "the nature of many bodies together with that [the nature] of its own body"
8 "will contemplate that [the same] external body as actually existing or as present"
9 "and nothing else"
11 Ibid., p. 137.
12 Ibid., p. 142.
13 Ibid., p. 143.
Now, we can see that some commentators argue that owing to the fact that Spinoza uses the term “idea” to present the parallel relationship between the idea and the human body as well as to present the representational relationship between idea and the external bodies, he was confused between the two relations. As a result, Spinoza confusedly regards the term “idea” used in the parallel sense, as presenting the representational relationship. This is why Spinoza thinks that the idea in the human mind also represents the human body.

2. Della Rocca’s Interpretation of the Concept of Representation in Spinoza

Della Rocca refuses the interpretation which ascribes a confusion to Spinoza, since he thinks that this attribution underestimates Spinoza’s intelligence. An important point for him in solving the problem is the mind-relativity of content, that is, ideas insofar as they are in the human mind are confused and the same ideas insofar they are in God’s mind are adequate. Let us consider his argument in detail.

(1) Parallelism and the Concept of Representation

Della Rocca divides parallelism into “bare parallelism” and “representational parallelism,” and ascribes the latter to Spinoza; the former is parallelism (in the semantic or conceptual sense) without representation, and the latter is parallelism with it. Della Rocca’s tendency is to combine two theories: representationalism and parallelism. According to him, Spinoza’s parallelism, with respect to the notion of minds, requires the following claims: “(1) The idea of the effect depends on the idea of the cause (2) There is an idea of each physical object (3) There is a physical object for each idea (4) There are no causal relations in
thought in addition to those that mirror the causal relations in extension."\textsuperscript{14}

Therefore, we can see that there are, in Spinoza's theory, ideas and the objects of these ideas, and that they are parallel to each other. However, Della Rocca treats the object of the idea constituting the human mind as not both the external body and the human body, but as only the human body, although he argues that the idea in the human mind represents both the human body and the external body. It follows that the ideas which are contained in the human mind are not "ideas that are parallel to other [external] bodies," but "ideas that are parallel to each part of the human body."\textsuperscript{15}

Next, Della Rocca moves on to explain that this sort of collection of ideas is a single individual or a mind instead of a hodgepodge of ideas. Owing to the fact that Spinoza does not explain complex mental individuals, he depends on Spinoza's account of complex physical individuals. Thus by virtue of the fact that Spinoza's parallelism entails a mirroring of complex individuality across attributes, Della Rocca argues that we can infer the human mind's individuality from the body's. Therefore, there is a hierarchy in thinking individuals, as in extended individuals: just as the infinite extended mode which is motion and rest (the immediate infinite mode) and the face of the universe (the mediate infinite mode) is a complex physical individual, so the infinite intellect is a complex mental individual. In other words, from the fact that Spinoza regards the whole universe as "an all-inclusive extended individual," we can infer that the infinite intellect is an all-inclusive thinking individual.

\textit{(2) The Containment Thesis and the Mind-Relativity of Content}

In this way, we have just seen that Della Rocca regards the infinite intellect as the totality of all finite modes of thought and claims that this totality is not a hodgepodge of ideas but a complex individual like a human mind.\textsuperscript{16} Hence we can


\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 26–27.

\textsuperscript{16} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 30–40.
see that the human mind is a part of God’s mind just as the human body is a part of
the whole extended individual. The human mind is contained in God’s mind, and
accordingly ideas in the human mind are identical with certain ideas in God’s mind;
Della Rocca names this “the containment thesis”: he states that “we can consider
an idea insofar as it is in God’s mind and that same idea (qua particular mental
state or event) insofar as it is in my mind。” However, the contents of this same
idea are different in each case: the content of the idea in the human mind is
different from the content of the very same idea in God’s mind. Thus we can see
that there is a difference between representation in God’s mind and representation
in the human mind; Della Rocca names this “the mind-relativity of content。”

Della Rocca unfolds his own views as follows. Representation in God’s
mind easily explains representational parallelism, since each idea in God’s mind
represents its extended counterpart. Unlike representation in God’s mind, each idea
in the human mind represents not only its extended counterpart, i.e. the parts of the
human body which are causally parallel to each idea, but also the cause of that
extended counterpart, namely the external cause of that counterpart.” Points to be
noticed are:

(1) He combines the fact that the idea in the human mind is parallel to its extended
counterpart e, with the fact that the human mind represents e, so that “the idea
parallel to e is what represents e in the human mind”, this combination is on the
basis of his view that the concept of representation is better understood in terms of
parallelism.

(2) An idea in the human mind represents not only e, its extended counterpart, but
also c, the cause of that counterpart.

(3) However, the fact that an idea has two objects (e and c) does not imply two
different senses of representation nor two different ideas of two objects.

\[17 \text{ Ibid., p. 40.} \]
\[18 \text{ Ibid., p. 44.} \]
\[19 \text{ Ibid., pp. 44-47.} \]
\[20 \text{ Ibid., p. 47.} \]
Therefore, a single idea represents both extended counterparts and external bodies in the same sense of representation.

The points from 2 to 4, Della Rocca argues, are explained by a confusion of the human mind. One and the same idea is in God’s mind as well as in the human mind, but the content of this idea is different in each case since the content is relative to the two minds and there are some differences between God’s mind and the human mind. One difference is that the idea in the human mind represents both $e$ and $c$, and another is that the idea in the human mind is confused; these notions are coextensive. Hence, the fact that the idea represents its object confusedly is associated with the fact that the idea represents both $e$ and $c$, and that the idea cannot distinguish these objects. It follows that the idea represents two different objects without distinction between them. Therefore, in this case, the mind cannot have the idea of $e$ or $c$ alone, but can only have a blend of these two, namely a confused idea.

In this way, he appeals to distinction between adequate ideas in God’s mind and inadequate ideas in the human mind, to explain why there is the duality of represented objects, (that is, why the ideas insofar as they are in the mind represent both the human mind and the external bodies).

(3) The Problem for Della Rocca’s Interpretation

Della Rocca introduces the existing interpretations of Spinoza’s concept of representation and attempts to solve the problems revealed by the interpretations by offering his own interpretation. In his treatment of Spinoza’s term "idea of" as possessing both the representational and the parallel feature and his attempt to integrate the concept of representation into parallelism, he is more advanced than the previous interpreters. However, problems still remain.

In order to make representationalism compatible with parallelism, Della Rocca seems to appeal to the distinction between adequate ideas in God’s mind and inadequate ideas in the human mind. According to him, a representational parallelism does not occur in the human mind, but only in God’s mind, and there
occurs only a bare parallelism in the human mind, since the ideas in the human mind are inadequate whereas ideas in God’s mind are adequate. Thus, representation in the human mind i.e. the fact that one idea represents two objects does not violate parallelism, since it is not the plain truth: in principle, one idea (which is adequate) represents one object. The imbalance between parallelism and the concept of representation in our inadequate ideas does not violate the truth of parallelism.

Even though we can save Spinoza from the incompatibility between parallelism and representationalism by appealing to inadequacy and confusion of our ideas (rather than confusion and inadequacy in Spinoza), this cannot help us to save Spinoza from another incompatibility between propositions 13 and 16, since the term Spinoza uses in proposition 13 is “the human mind.” According to Della Rocca’s appeal to inadequacy of our ideas, since ideas in the human mind are inadequate there does not occur a representational parallelism in the human mind and thus one idea represents two objects, whereas since the ideas in God’s mind are adequate there occurs a representational parallelism and thus the parallel relationship always runs together with the representational relationship in God’s mind. If so, Della Rocca cannot explain Spinoza’s argument in proposition 13: “The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the human body.” If the ideas in the human mind are inadequate, the object of those ideas should be both the human body and the external body as they represent both. The terms “human mind” together with “the (human) body” in proposition 13 tell us that we cannot appeal to a distinction between adequate ideas in God’s mind and inadequate ideas in the human mind, in order to solve the problems. There is still the problem of reconciling proposition 13 and proposition 16.
3. Parallelism, Representationalism and Proposition

Thirteen

Are there alternative readings of proposition 13 which would avoid the problems raised so far? Here are some suggestions.

(1) “A Body” Instead of “the Body”

The Latin word “corpus” in E, II, Prop 13 allows us two possible translations which are “the body” and “a body”; it means the human body in the case of “the body,” and some other body in the case of “a body.”

The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body [a body], or a certain mode of extension actually existing, and nothing else. (E, II, Prop 13)

If we treat “the object of the idea constituting the human mind” in proposition 13 as “a body” instead of “the body,” we might make it fit with proposition 16. The reasoning is as follows. If the object is “a body,” the object confusedly represented is both human body and the external body. Thus, Spinoza might regard the external body as well as the human body as the object of the idea in the human mind in proposition 13 and thus when he says that the human mind represents not only the human body but also the external bodies in proposition 16, there is no clear contradiction. Let us examine whether we can regard “corpus” as “a body” (both the human body and the external bodies).

Della Rocca supports the definite article translation, “the body,” as most commentators do. The reason for him is that firstly, the term “nothing else” in proposition 13 of part II seems to indicate that it is the human body (the body of the person having the idea), since if it is some other body, the term “nothing else” would be unnecessary, and secondly, the fact that Spinoza refers to the human body in some statements after proposition 13 can make proposition 13 refer to the human body in particular, and this indicates a definite article translation.
However, I think that the first indicator (the term “nothing else”) is not
sufficient in supporting the definite article translation, “the body,” although I agree
with this translation owing to the second reason. If Spinoza’s usage of the term
“nothing else” means “nothing else but the (human) body,” the reason that Spinoza
uses this term is to exclude external bodies from the object of the human mind.
However, if it does not, would this term be otiose or unjustified, as Della Rocca
argues? I think that it would not. For there could still be a reason for using this
term. Besides the attributes of thought and extension, there are infinite numbers of
unknown attributes, so that there are unknown modes besides the mind (the mode
of thought) and the body (the mode of extension). It follows that if the term
“nothing else” means “nothing else but a body,” the reason that Spinoza uses this
term is to exclude these unknown modes from the object of the human mind; what
Spinoza would then be taken as saying in this proposition is that besides the mode
of extension, nothing else can be the object of the idea constituting the human
mind. Therefore, the term “nothing else” does not rule out the possibility of “a
body.”

Furthermore, we can find a possibility of interpreting it as an indefinite
body, “a body,” in the second half of the demonstration of this proposition:

Again, if there were also any other object of the mind besides [a]
body, since nothing exists from which some effect does not follow
(Prop 36, pt. 1), the idea of some effect produced by this object
would necessarily exist in our mind (Prop 11, pt. 2). But (Ax 5, pt.
2) there is no such idea [i.e. no idea of unknown modes], and
therefore the object of our mind is [a] body existing, and nothing
else. (E, II, Prop 13, Demon; my italics)

Where Spinoza says that “there is no such idea” he means that “there is no such
idea except for ideas of bodies and of minds”: “No individual things are felt or
perceived by us except bodies and modes of thought” (E, II, Ax 5). Here, we can
see the possibility that Spinoza is excluding the modes of unknown attributes from
the object of the idea constituting the human mind, and this is the reason why he
uses the term "nothing else." That is to say, since there are no such ideas of modes of unknown attributes, the object of the idea constituting the human mind has to be "a body". The demonstration can be restated as follows in the case of "the body":

If there were any other object of the human mind besides the human body, the idea of that object would have to exist in our mind. However, there are no such ideas except the idea of the human body [i.e. there are no such ideas of external bodies], and therefore the object of our mind is the human body existing and nothing else.

This would support the claim that the object of the idea constituting the human mind is not the human body but a body (the human body and the external body).\(^{21}\)

However, despite the possibility of this interpretation, Spinoza’s later statements concerning proposition 13 make clear that the term "corpus" refers to the body of the person having the idea. Also, in proposition 13 "... or a certain mode of extension ..." does not fit the interpretation "a body," and does fit "the body." Let us consider some statements concerning this point.

The idea which constitutes the formal being of the human mind is the idea of [the/a] body (Prop 13, pt. 2) which (Post 1) is composed of a number of individuals composite to a high degree. (E, II, Prop 15, Demon;\(^{22}\) my italics)

In the quotation, the phrase "[the/a] body (Prop 13, pt. 2) which (Post 1) is composed of" indicates that "corpus" in proposition 13 is no more than "corpus" in postulate 1, and the postulate specifically states that "corpus" is the human body: "The human body is composed of a number of individual parts of diverse nature, each of which is composite to a high degree" (E, II, Post 1; my italics).

\(^{21}\) Here, I am not supporting the interpretation of "a body," but only indicating that we cannot take the term "nothing else" as a sufficient justification for the interpretation of "the body."

\(^{22}\) The proposition is as follows: "The idea which constitutes the formal being of the human mind is not simple, but is composed of a number of ideas" (E, II, Prop 15).
There is more evidence to clarify the interpretation of “the body.” When Spinoza uses proposition 13 to demonstrate proposition 19 and 26 of part II, he informs us that “corpus” in proposition 13 is not “a body” but “the body.” He makes clear this point by using the term “the human body.”

The human mind is the idea itself or the knowledge of the human body (Prop 13, pt. 2). This knowledge (Prop 9, pt. 2) is in God in so far as He is considered as affected by another idea of an individual thing. (E, II, Prop 19, Demon; my italics)

Again, in the demonstration of proposition 26, he states as follows:

If the human body is in no way affected by any external body, then (Prop 7, pt. 2) the idea of the human body, that is to say (Prop 13, pt. 2), the human mind, is not affected in any way by the idea of the existence of that body, nor does it in any way perceive the existence of that external body. (E, II, Prop 26, Demon; my italics)

I think that those statements are enough evidence to support the interpretation of “the body.”23 The interpretation of “a body” can only rely on one indicator in the demonstration of proposition 13, that is, Spinoza’s appeal to axiom 5. But, it is quite likely that his reference was the sign that his argument is confused here.

If the term “corpus” means “the human body,” we can hardly avoid making Spinoza inconsistent. The reason is that when Spinoza explains the concept of representation in proposition 16, he argues that an idea in the human mind represents both e and c, and thus this idea has two objects. Either Spinoza should have regarded the term “body” as not only the human body but also the external body as long as he argues that the human mind represents both e and c, or that he should have held that the human mind represents not the external body but only the human body (insofar as he regards the object of the idea constituting the human

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23 The corollary of proposition 13 and the demonstration of proposition 21 in part II can also be taken as textual evidence.
mind as only the human body). It is clear that Spinoza maintains these two doctrines which are difficult to make compatible. The problem may be connected with the fact that Spinoza is trying to establish the human body as the object of the human mind in the first place (up to proposition 13), and then—after breaking off to discuss the motion of bodies—from proposition 14, onwards he starts to address our knowledge of the external world. Interpretations of Spinoza are confronted by an apparent contradiction. We should try to interpret Spinoza in a consistent manner before we conclude that Spinoza is committed to a self-contradiction. Otherwise, we would have to conclude that Spinoza was confused between the parallel and the representational relationship as some commentators claim. Here are some further suggestions for resolving the problem.

(2) The Distinction between the Parallel Object and the Representational Object

There is the possibility that we could argue that the object of the idea constituting the human mind is the human body while arguing that the idea represents both the human body and the external body. We could distinguish “the object of the idea” from “that which is represented by the idea.” Thus, “the relationship between the idea and its object” is different from “the relationship between the idea and the thing represented.” It follows that “what the idea is of” is the human body and “what the idea represents” is both the human body and the external body; the parallel object of the idea is the human body and the representational object of the same idea is both the human body and the external body. This distinction between “the parallel object of the idea” and “the

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24 This is Daisie Radner’s distinction (“Spinoza’s Theory of Ideas,” The Philosophical Review, vol. 80 [1971], p. 346).

25 For Radner, the parallel object of the idea is the human body the representational object of the same idea is only the affecting external body, since for her interpretation of Spinoza the human mind does not represent the human body. But this is misleading: Spinoza attaches the same terms such as “perceiving” and “knowing” to both the human body and the affecting external body, and thus if the external body is represented by the human mind, so is the human body. Therefore if there is this distinction for Spinoza, what the idea represents is not only the external body, but both the human body and the external body.
representational object of the idea may allow us to make Spinoza consistent if we can claim that the object in proposition 13 means not the representational object but the parallel object. In this case, we can argue that in proposition 13, Spinoza refers to the parallel object of the idea, whereas he refers to not the parallel but the representational object when he explains the knowledge of our mind. This is why the object of the idea is, at one time, only the human body and at another, both the human body and the external body: the object which is parallel to the idea is the human body and the object which is represented by the idea is the human body as well as the external body. This kind of understanding seems to make Spinoza consistent.

However, there is no sign that the term “the object” in proposition 13 means only the parallel object. Rather, we can find proposition 13 is related to the representational object as follows. For Spinoza “having the idea of,” “knowing,” and “perceiving” are all representational terms. As Della Rocca claims, Spinoza uses these terms interchangeably as the representational terms. By virtue of the fact that “having the idea” is the representational term, the phrase “the human mind has (is) the idea of the object” implies that “the human mind represents the object of the idea”; they are interchangeable. If so, the phrase “the object of the idea constituting the human mind” in the proposition is closely related to the representational object. Therefore, we cannot claim that the term “object” in proposition 13 means only “the parallel object,” and thus the distinction between the parallel and the representational object does not help us to solve the incompatibility. This argument can simply be understood as follows: as long as the idea in the human mind also represents external bodies the human mind has to somehow contain ideas of external bodies, and therefore it is not plausible to argue that the object of the idea constituting the human mind does not include external bodies.

One might argue that although “perceiving” and “knowing” are interchangeably representational terms, “having the idea of” is not a

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26 For Radner, this term would be “the parallel object of the idea” (the human body) and “the representational object of the same idea” (the external body).

27 Spinoza also uses “contemplating” as the representational term.
representational term but only a parallel term. Then, one can still argue that the term "object" in proposition 13 means only the parallel object (the human body), whereas the other statements where Spinoza uses the terms "perceiving" and "knowing" are related to the representational object (the human body and the external body). Thus, according to this argument, we can explain why "the object" in proposition 13 is only the human body despite the fact that the idea represents both the human body and the external body.

But, there is textual evidence for the argument that for Spinoza "perceiving it" is synonymous with "having the idea of it." For example, Spinoza states that "[w]e perceive that a certain body is affected in many ways" (E, II, Ax 4; my italics), and then when he uses this axiom in the demonstration of proposition 13, the axiom is restated as follows: "But (Ax 4, pt. 2) we have ideas of the modifications of a/the body, therefore ..." (E, II, Prop 13, Demon; my italics). In this way, we can see that "having the idea of it" is also a representational phrase, and therefore the problem remains.

(3) The Expanded Body: The Human Body As Including the External Body

It seems that if we want to make sense of Spinoza, we should argue that either (1) "the object" in proposition 13 is both the human body and the external body or (2) the doctrine is that the ideas represent in some sense only the human body. We have seen that there is a solid basis against point (1), and thus that "the object" has to be only the human body. In that case, perhaps we should turn to consider point (2). We can perhaps think of Spinoza's view as being that in the same way that the body of the forest includes the trees, so the affecting external bodies are parts of the represented body. If Spinoza maintains this view, it might be a clue to solve the problem. I shall show that Spinoza holds this kind of view—that we are parts of a wider whole—and examine whether it is implied in his concept of representation (or whether we can connect it to his concept of representation). I shall start with Spinoza's metaphysical system concerning "individuals."
a. Part of the Wider Whole

According to Genevieve Lloyd, for Spinoza, the most basic individual bodies are composite bodies which are made up of the simplest bodies on the basis of the maintenance of the ratio of motion and rest among the simplest bodies. It follows that for Spinoza what makes a body an individual is the ratio of motion and rest. This individual body is unified with other individual bodies in the larger body which itself is also regarded as an individual. Therefore, there exists a hierarchy of individuals in Spinoza’s metaphysical system, and the apex of the hierarchy is the universe as a whole. Individual bodies in Spinoza’s system are, according to Lloyd’s critical standpoint, regarded as parts of wholes. More precisely, for Spinoza, an individual body is a part of a wider whole, and this wider whole is also an individual body as a part in relation to the more comprehensive wider whole. In other words, for Spinoza, any dimensional body which is part of the wider whole, no matter how large it is, is regarded as an individual.28

With respect to the individuality of minds, she argues that as in the case of bodies, there exists a relationship between the part and whole in the realm of the mind; in Lloyd’s own words, “the mind is integrated into wider systems that correspond in their totality to the universe as a unified whole.”29 Hence, a human mind becomes a part of God’s mind, in other words just as bodies are included in a totality of material modes so the human mind is a set of ideas in the mind of God which is a totality of ideas as modes of thought.

From Lloyd’s arguments above, we can see that there exists a hierarchy of individuals in the mental and physical realm in Spinoza’s system. From this, we could infer that when the human body is affected by the external body, there is a wider body which includes the human body and the external body. We can regard this wider body as the expanded human body which includes the affecting external body and the human body before being affected. If so, when Spinoza argues that the human mind represents the external bodies, we can regard the external bodies

29 Ibid., p. 16.
as a part of the (expanding) human body. This can make Spinoza consistent as it is compatible with his argument in proposition 13 that “the object” is the body. Andrew Collier’s arguments shed more light on this point.

b. Body-Actual and Body-Cosmic

Collier divides the concept of the body in Spinoza into two domains: one is the “body-actual” used in a narrow sense and the other the “body-cosmic” used in a wider sense. My body-actual is the “patch of the attribute of extension that is bound by my skin” i.e. some of its parts such as “the spleen, lymph and so on,” and my body-cosmic is “the whole body of the universe” namely “world as the body” which is an integrated concept involving my body-actual and its outside world such as “my house, my bike, my path to work across Southampton Common, and so on”; therefore, his concept of my body-actual is implied in the concept of body-cosmic.

Collier goes on to apply this concept of the body to the relationship between the mind and the body. In Spinoza’s system, the body under the attribute of extension corresponds to the mind under the attribute of thought. From Collier’s perspective, for Spinoza’s system, regarding the former as “body-cosmic” is more plausible than regarding it as “body-actual.” If my body is body-actual, no external thing can be a part of my body even if my body-actual causally interacts with the outer world. But if my body is body-cosmic, the body-actual as well as external things are implied in my body; they can be parts or elements of my body-

30 According to Collier, it is something like Marx’s “inorganic body,” however he regards “body-cosmic” as the more accurate term (Andrew Collier, “The Materiality of Morals: Mind, body and interests in Spinoza’s ‘Ethics’,” Studia Spinozana, vol. 7 [1991], p. 73, note 1).


He states as to the concept of the body-cosmic as follows: “Rather, we are “more perfect” than other organisms in that we are able to affect and be affected by more of nature in more ways than others. In a sense, we spread ourselves more thinly over nature, but in a sense nature is more part of us than it is of other organisms. It is, as Marx puts it, our inorganic body” (Andrew Collier, “The Materiality of Morals,” p. 77).

"The more we are sensitive to the world around us, and the more we control it, the more it is part of us."  

Collier does not connect this sort of view with Spinoza’s concept of representation and neither does Lloyd. But I think that if we connect the concept of “body-cosmic” with the concept of representation, it offers an approach to apprehending Spinoza’s representationalism. One of the important points of the concept of the body-cosmic is that this is an integrated concept between my body and the external bodies (in Collier’s words, my body-actual and its outside world). Let us take an example.

When I walk along Byres Road in Glasgow there is, in Spinoza’s theory, a body-cosmic (as my body which includes Byres Road). The human body-actual and the affecting external body is integrated into the concept of the body-cosmic. In this case, in my mind, there is one compound idea for one compound body which is my body-cosmic, and also two simpler ideas for two simpler bodies (my body-actual and Byres Road) which constitute the compound body. Therefore, the fact that my mind has the idea of my expanded body which absorbs Byres Road entails that my mind has the idea of my body and of Byres Road. If we proceed along with this line, we can allege that there is compatibility between proposition 13 and proposition 16 by virtue of the fact that the human mind represents the external body as a part of the (expanded) human body. Furthermore, we can also allege that there is compatibility between parallelism and representationalism by virtue of the fact each idea in the human mind matches its object; one idea represents one object whether it is a single or a compound individual.

What I have explained is that from this kind of view, we might get a clue to solve the problem. The attraction in connecting between the concept of “body-cosmic” and representationalism is the hope that we may explain Spinoza’s contradiction between the two propositions. But does Spinoza really understand “representing the external body” or “having the idea of the external body” along with this line of thought? To say “yes,” we are faced with the problems, which

33 For Collier, Spinoza’s perception is the proprioception of the body-cosmic rather than body-actual.
lead us to concluding that we cannot ascribe the doctrine of “body-cosmic” to representationalism.

The above view is textually problematic in connecting this doctrine of Spinoza’s with his concept of representation, since Spinoza argues the doctrine apart from representationalism, and the doctrine of “body-cosmic” seems to be irrelevant to the concept of representation. In fact, nothing in the text supports this kind of view of Spinoza’s propositions on representation. From the text, we can rather find some indications against it. Spinoza writes:

It follows, secondly, that the ideas we have of external bodies indicate the constitution of our own body rather than the nature of the external bodies.

(E, II, Prop, 16, Corol 2; my italics)

The concept of the body-cosmic is a compound of the body-actual and the external bodies, and thus this doctrine would argue that the ideas we have of external bodies indicate the constitution of the body-cosmic rather than of the body-actual. But what Spinoza says in the quotation is that those ideas indicate the constitution of body-actual; the term “our own body” does not mean the “body-cosmic” but the “body-actual,” since in the quotation, Spinoza clearly takes “external bodies” as bodies other than our (ordinary) body. Thus, the quotation severely damages the “cosmic body” interpretation.

The concept of the “cosmic body” in interpreting Spinoza on representationalism has another problem: it can be objected to by arguing from Spinoza’s doctrine of error. In proposition 17 of part II, Spinoza is explaining how we can be mistaken. Our bodies are affected on seeing a tree, say. If the tree does not continue to exist but the affects in our body continue we will continue to suppose the tree is there. So even though on the disappearance of the tree the cosmic body contracts, the human mind still has the idea of the tree; that is how error is possible. According to the doctrine of the cosmic body, if the tree goes out of existence but the affects in the body remain we ought to say that the cosmic body has shrunk. But Spinoza says that we have the idea of the external object
although it no longer exists. If the human mind still has the idea of the tree as a part of the expanded human body despite the disappearance of the tree, this does violate the argument of the cosmic body. The fact that for Spinoza, even though the tree does not continue to exist the human mind has the idea of the tree makes the concept of the cosmic body incompatible with Spinoza’s representationalism. In this way, Spinoza’s account of error does not fit the account of the cosmic body, so that we cannot rely on the doctrine of the cosmic body to explain the contradictions between the two propositions.

(4) The Distinction between Adequate Ideas and Inadequate Ideas

We are driven back to Della Rocca’s suggestion. Spinoza’s doctrine of “adequate and inadequate ideas” could explain why the idea represents two objects (the human body and external bodies) despite the fact that the object of the idea constituting the human mind is only the human body. It could also explain why there is the (apparent) incompatibility between parallelism and representationalism.

In Spinoza’s view (following Della Rocca), ideas in the human mind are inadequate whereas ideas in God’s mind are adequate. Thus, the same idea can be adequate as well as inadequate depending on whether it is in the human mind or in God’s mind. The idea of the human body in the human mind represents both the human body and the external body since it is confused and inadequate, although the same idea in God’s mind represents the human body since it is adequate. This can explain why there is the apparent incompatibility between parallelism and representationalism. Our representative knowledge which is inadequate does not involve strict parallelism. Only the adequate knowledge in God’s mind implies strict parallelism. So, we should distinguish an adequate from an inadequate representation; the former is always linked with parallelism, whereas the latter is not because it is confused. The incompatibility between parallelism and representationalism only occurs in the human mind which is inadequate, and this incompatibility results from confused ideas. Confused ideas do not count against parallelism; because what they give us is not the plain truth. As we saw, Della
Rocca uses this strategy to explain the problem of the duality of represented objects, but does not deal with the contradiction between propositions 13 and 16. Nonetheless, this view has much to be said for it, and will be retained in attempting to reconcile propositions 13 and 16.

The reason why Spinoza claims in proposition 13 that the object of the idea is only the human body despite his later argument that the idea represents two objects (the human body and external bodies) is that in proposition 13 Spinoza refers to an adequate representation while he refers to an inadequate representation in the later argument. Thus, it seems that if we distinguish the adequate representation from the inadequate representation, not only the incompatibility between two theories but also the incompatibility between his claim in proposition 13 and his later argument can be solved.

However, as we saw when examining Della Rocca’s interpretation, there is a solid obstacle to this interpretation. That is, in proposition 13, Spinoza uses the term “human mind”: “The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the [human] body” (my italics). For Spinoza, ideas in the human mind are not adequate but confused and inadequate. If so, “the object” in the proposition should not be just the body (the human body) but the external body as well as human body.

\(5\) The Essence of the Human Mind

Now, we might be inclined to think that due to the fact that Spinoza is confused between the parallel and the representational relationship, he is committed to a self-contradiction. However, I still think that it is more than an unconscious or confused commitment, because Spinoza says it repeatedly in many places. Spinoza should have a reason for this, and thus we ought to try to find it.

We can think of Spinoza’s representationalism in the following way. Although the human mind has the idea of the human body as well as of the external bodies (i.e. ideas in the human mind represent both the human mind and the external bodies), the idea which constitutes the essence of the human mind is only the idea of the human body. In proposition 13, Spinoza perhaps refers to the
essence of the human mind, and this is why the object of the idea in the proposition is not both the human body and the external bodies but only the human body. To find whether this is Spinoza's real intention or not, we have to beforehand examine whether he holds this distinction among ideas. From the following statements, we can see that Spinoza certainly maintains it:

[W]e clearly see what is the difference between the idea, for example, of Peter, which constitutes the essence of the mind itself of Peter, and the idea of Peter himself which is in another man; for example, in Paul. For the former directly manifests the essence of the body of Peter himself, nor does it involve existence unless so long as Peter exists; the latter, on the other hand, indicates rather the constitution of the body of Paul than the nature of Peter; and therefore so long as Paul's body exists with that constitution, so long will Paul's mind contemplate Peter as present, although he does not exist. (E, II, Prop 17, Schol; my italics)

In this way, for Spinoza the idea of Peter in Peter's mind constitutes the essence of Peter's mind, whereas the idea of Peter in Paul's mind does not constitute the essence of Paul's mind. Here, we can see that Spinoza distinguishes "ideas which constitute the essence of the human mind" from "ideas which do not constitute it": the former is the idea of the human body, the latter can confusedly represent external bodies.

Some commentators normally regard the former ideas as presenting the parallel relationship and the latter ideas the representational relationship, and they continue to argue that since Spinoza is confused between two kinds of ideas, he claims that ideas in the human mind represent the human body. But, it is unlikely that one is confused if one has a clear distinction between two sorts of idea. As Della Rocca rightly argues, Spinoza intentionally regards the correspondence as implying (or involving) the representation, and thus the former ideas should be regarded as presenting not only the parallel relationship but also representational one. This is why Spinoza consciously argues that ideas in the human mind also represent the human body. In that case, the following problems can be raised: (1)
how we can explain a duality of represented objects and its compatibility with one-to-one correspondence in parallelism, (2) how we can explain the incompatibility between the two propositions.

The distinction between adequate ideas in God's mind and inadequate ideas in the human mind could explain the problem of (1): the reason why there is a duality of represented objects is because ideas in the human mind are inadequate, and concerning adequate ideas in God's mind a duality of represented objects does not happen. Thus, although in the human mind there is incompatibility between the duality of represented objects and parallelism, there is no such incompatibility in God's mind. We can explain the incompatibility by appealing to adequate ideas in God's mind. Nevertheless, as we have seen, this distinction cannot explain the problem of (2).

To explain this problem, we have to appeal to the essence of human mind: the proposition 13 ought to be understood as giving the nature or essence of the human mind. What Spinoza wants to claim in the proposition is that the essence of the human mind is constituted by the idea of the human body. The corollary to proposition 11 in part II is relevant here: "When we say that the human mind perceives this or that thing, we say nothing else than that God has this or that idea ... in so far as He constitutes the essence of the human mind." Just before this, in the demonstration to proposition 11 he says "the first thing which constitutes the actual being of the human mind is the idea of an individual thing actually existing." And, having established that the essence of the human mind is the idea of the human body, Spinoza goes on, in the remainder of the corollary to proposition 11, to make the distinction between clear and confused ideas (the latter involving reference to external objects).

Therefore, when Spinoza says in proposition 13 that the object of the idea constituting the human mind is only the human body, the phrase "constituting the human mind" means "constituting the essence of the human mind." It is likely that Spinoza just omits the word "essence."35 The use of "constitute" strongly suggests

35 Spinoza, as we have seen, restates proposition 13 in many places, and one of them informs us that there is an ellipse of the term "formal being": "The idea which constitutes the formal being of the human mind is the idea of the body (Prop 13, Part II)" (E, II, Prop 15, Demon; my italics).
this. Where Spinoza talks of the idea of external bodies, he tends to use “have,” for example, “the ideas we have of the external bodies” (E, II, Prop 16, Corol 2; my italics). So, when Spinoza uses the term “constitute” in relation to the idea constituting the human mind, the term “constitute” should be taken as referring to essence: “[T]he idea constituting [the essence of] the human mind.” In this way, we can explain the contradiction between propositions 13 and 16.

This fact supports our view that proposition 13 ought to be understood as giving the nature or essence of the human mind.
Chapter Seven

Spinoza and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind
Some contemporary versions of the mind-body problem are in some way related to Spinoza's mind-body theory. We have seen that the main arguments of Spinoza's mind-body theory are (i) identity between the mind and the body (ii) the parallel relationship between the mental and the physical by virtue of identity (iii) the concept of representation. Of these, I found that point (i) is similar to versions such as Davidson's anomalous monism, or Strawson's person theory. However, there is another kind of version that holds the possibility of demonstrating a connection with point (iii) on the basis of point (ii); this is claimed by Lee C. Rice. He has put forward the view that the main points of cognitive science theory can be closely related to the main points of Spinoza's mind-body theory. Therefore I shall, in this chapter, examine some arguments from cognitive science, P. F. Strawson and Donald Davidson, in turn in order to consider the possibility of whether they can be used to throw light on Spinoza's mind-body theory.

1. Cognitive Science

(I) Rice's Comparison Between Cognitive Science and Spinoza

According to Lee C. Rice, a comparison with cognitive science provides insight into Spinoza's perspective with respect to the relationship between the mind and the body. The main emphasis in his article is the framework of cognitive science, emphasising points of similarity between some doctrines of cognitive science and Spinoza's theory. However, it should be said that Rice's approach to cognitive science is coloured by a sympathy with behaviourism, and is to that extent atypical of cognitive scientists' ideas.

First of all, Rice emphasises that Spinoza clearly denies that there is a causal connection or any other interaction between the mind and the body as the two attributes of thought and extension have no relationship and are distinct, and he further emphasises the argument that, for Spinoza, "the representative feature
... could play no role in the physical causal account." His interpretation is based on Spinoza's analogy of sleepwalkers: "I have already shown, however, that they do not know what the body can do, nor what can be deduced from the consideration of its nature alone, and that they find that many things are done merely by the laws of Nature which they would never have believed to be possible without the direction of the mind, as, for example, those things which sleepwalkers do in their sleep, and at which they themselves are astonished when they wake" (E, III, Prop 2, Schol). Whatever is going on mentally in this case, a complete explanation is possible in physical terms according to Spinoza.

Spinoza's assertion that there is a complete physical explanation seems to run counter to the views of cognitive science, since cognitive scientists claim that any account of human behaviour which is at all plausible must take account of the way in which a subject represents to himself what is happening. (It is no good a behaviourist referring to "stimuli" because features of the situation are not stimuli until they are attended to.) Rice stresses the view that Spinoza's position is the same as the perspective of cognitive science in some respects. For workers in cognitive science:

The semantics of representations cannot literally cause a system to behave in the way it does. This point is exactly the same as Spinoza's argument (against Descartes specifically, and against any form of dualism generally) that ideas cannot move bodies, nor bodies ideas [E 2P53S]. Only the material structure of the representation ... is causally efficacious.

Rice rightly points out that in Spinoza the cause of physical behaviour is not ideas but physical stimuli. For cognitive science, and for Spinoza, the content of a mental representation cannot cause physical changes. What much of cognitive

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4 E 2P53S is presumably a misprint for E 3P2S, since there is no proposition 53 in the Part II of the *Ethics* and proposition 2 and its scholium in part III contain that argument.
science hopes is that some kind of symbolic coding occurs.\textsuperscript{6} The physical properties of the symbols are causally efficacious, and inferences between the contents of ideas correspond to physical interactions between the symbols. The symbols are physical, but they also in some way have representative content. The representational function supervenes on the physical properties. Rice, therefore, regards this position of cognitive science as the same as parallelism in Spinoza.

Whether Rice's interpretation of Spinoza's mind-body theory as parallelism is accurate or not, when restricted to the point of Spinoza's denial of the causal relation between the mind and the body he is certainly correct. Rice attempts to spell out the connection between Spinoza and cognitive science by the use of the concept of a transducer. He makes this point as follows.

The basic role which transducers play, if we momentarily step out of the CS [cognitive science] framework, is that of receiving physical stimuli from the environment and translating these into primitive symbolic representations. The primitive output from the transducers is the paradigm of spinozistic parallelism: it is a simple representational structure (idea) which can figure in subsequent nonprimitive operations of the semantic engine.\textsuperscript{7}

In this way, Rice argues that we can find the paradigm of cognitive science in Spinoza's system. Rice's claim seems to be that just as physical stimuli are translated into symbolic representations in terms of the transducer in cognitive science, so, in Spinoza, events in the world are mapped into ideas through some means or device functioning as a transducer.

\textsuperscript{7} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 217.
I agree with this point of Rice’s comparison between cognitive science and Spinoza’s mind-body theory in terms of the representational features based on (1) the argument of a non-causal relationship and (2) the function of the transducer. However, in applying the term “transducer” in Spinoza we should examine this concept in some more detail, since Rice does not explain it sufficiently. According to Pylyshyn, generally “a transducer is a device that receives patterns of energy and retransmits them, usually in some altered form. Thus a typical transducer simply transforms or maps physical (spatiotemporal) events from one form to another in some consistent way.” In cognitive science, “[a] description of a transducer function shows how certain nonsymbolic physical events are mapped into certain symbol systems.” We can, therefore, see that the function of the transducer is to receive physical stimuli and send them on in altered form. As Rice puts it, “transducers are, by definition, stimulus-bound” that is, they respond to particular changes. We can find this function of the transducer reflected in Spinoza’s view that without the external body’s effects on the human body, the human mind can represent neither its own body nor the external body (E, II, Props 19 and 26). However, there are some differences arising from Spinoza’s parallelism. The mapping from transducers to representations does not lead to representations of the transducers as a rule. But the ideas associated with parts of the body are of parts of the body (albeit confused representations: see E, II, Prop 28).

Let us recall Spinoza’s concepts relevant to representationalism, which I have mentioned in chapter six. There are the following elements:

(1) The human body, which is the object of (represented by) the human mind and is affected by external bodies.

(2) External bodies, which affect the human body.

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9 Ibid., p. 152.
10 Rice, op. cit., p. 217
(3) Modifications (affections, states) of the body which involve the nature of the body as well as of the external bodies affecting it.

(4) The human mind, which is the complex idea composed of the ideas of the body and of the affecting external bodies. (That is to say, the complete consciousness, not that which gives the essence of an individual).

(5) The ideas which represent both (1) and (2) by means of representations of (3), and which go to make up the human mind.

From the above, I think that we can regard (3) the modification of the human body, as corresponding to the concept of transducer.

Let us put it in the following way. The terms in cognitive science could be translated into Spinoza's terms, using Rice's perspective: physical stimuli are replaced by external bodies, the human body is the engine for producing thought, the transducer is the modification of the human body, and the output, primitive symbolic representations, is the idea. In this way, regarding the term "transducer," there are replaceable or comparable terms within Spinoza's theory. Thus, we can find that in Spinoza's system there is a representational feature of the mind with respect to the body which is the same paradigm as the argument of cognitive science that certain nonsymbolic physical events are mapped on to certain symbolic systems or that physical stimuli are translated into symbolic representations. Both of them have the same format of representational feature: the formulation of cognitive science that physical stimuli are translated into symbolic representations has the same format as Spinoza's formulation that physical events are mapped into ideas. In fact, both representational features are based on the argument of a non-causal relationship between the mental and the physical (the argument that the mental cannot cause the physical).

However, this fact does not offer an especially fruitful view concerning similarities between Spinoza and cognitive science, since the place of mental representation in explaining behaviour is quite different. Rice claims that "cognitivists are unanimous in holding that any account of human conditioning which makes use of the idea that a subject is being informed of what is happening will provide a better and more predictive explanation of observed phenomena than
one which is based more narrowly on reinforcement contingencies" (my italics). Thus, we must, in order to predict behaviour, attribute to bodies mental representations of the world. Spinoza denies that. Physical explanations are in principle self-contained, for him.

Despite appealing to the importance of mental representations in explaining behaviour, defenders of cognitive science have to ward off the threat of epiphenomenalism. Fodor considers the threat: (1) the causal powers of an event are entirely determined by its physical properties; (2) intentional properties supervene on, but are not identical with, physical properties. If one then says that (3) a property is causally responsible only if it affects causal powers, then intentional properties are not causally responsible. Fodor does not accept (3).

In spite of their similarities, we can find a difference in so far as Spinoza has the view that one idea straightforwardly causes another, and cognitive science thinks that causation between ideas is derivative. Fodor presents the problem in this way in The Elm and the Expert. Mental processes tend to be truth preserving: starting from true statements, people tend to reason in ways which lead to true statements. The solution? “Well, as Turing famously pointed out, if you have a device whose operations are transformations of symbols, and whose state changes are driven by the syntactic properties of the symbols that it transforms, it is possible to arrange things so that, in a pretty striking variety of cases, the device reliably transforms true input symbols into output symbols that are also true.” Even if there is causality among ideas, it rests upon physical causality. There is a normative element in relations between ideas. In contrast, Spinoza’s theory gives equal weight to the mental and the physical, and takes rationality and mental causation to be closely identified. Rice argues that for both cognitivists and Spinoza, “[o]nly the material structure of the representation (conceived as genetic,

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11 Ibid., p. 213.
neurological, or even hormonal) is causally efficacious.” As we have seen, not all defenders of cognitive science would accept this. In any case, it is far different from what Spinoza understands. For Spinoza causation in the mental realm is not supervenient on causation in the physical: there are mental and physical laws of causation, although there is only one order of events which can be conceived in both ways. The mind does not need causation in the body, since it has its own causation. There is no such a causal dependency from the mind to body, and vice versa. Spinoza’s view that the mental cannot cause the physical and vice versa, does not imply that only the material structure of representation is causally efficacious, but implies that both are causally independent.

Another related difference is that in Spinoza’s mind-body theory, there is a prominence given to consciousness, whereas cognitive science tends not to discuss consciousness at any length. Spinoza also maintains self-consciousness of the mind in his argument of “the idea of the idea.” When we restrict Spinoza’s mind-body theory to the representational feature the mind’s dependency upon the body should be recognised, since “what is represented” is somehow dependent on its object. But this representational feature is not one which can determine the body’s priority to the mind. In order to determine the matter of the priority between the mind and the body, we should examine the concept of the mind. If, for Spinoza, the mind exists not only objectively but also formally, his theory does not argue the body’s priority to the mind, whereas Rice’s Spinoza and cognitive science claim the body’s priority to the mind. I shall consider this issue in some more detail.

If the mind exists only objectively and only the body exists formally it is hardly possible to deny that the mind depends on the body, and therefore we can take it as the justification for physicalism. In other words, if all representing is done by physical things, and there is no more to mind than representation, then physicalism holds true. From this, one may further assume that any representationalism arguing that the mind represents the body actually existing implies the ground of physicalism. It is true that in the representational relationship

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between the mind and the body, the mind as the idea is somehow dependent upon the body as the object. But, this should not be treated as leading to physicalism, since it is simply the outcome of the representational function, carrying no ontological implications.

We saw in chapter two that Spinoza gives equal ontological weight to the mind and to the body. Thus, he believed that the mind is itself active and the mind exists not only objectively but also formally. The following statements of Spinoza's lead us to think in this way.

By idea I understand a conception of the mind which the mind forms because it is a thinking thing.

*Explanation.* I use the word "conception" rather than "perception" because the name perception seems to indicate that the mind is passive in its relation to the object. But the word conception seems to express the action of the mind. (E, II, Def 3)

From Spinoza's reason for using the term "conception," we can see that Spinoza wants to confirm the activity of the mind, and that presumably he worries that people may be misunderstanding his theory: that is, owing to the representational relationship between the mind and the body, people think that the mind does not have formal reality but has only objective reality.

As Alan Donagan notices, for Spinoza, following Descartes, the mind has a double reality (objective and formal). Donagan writes:

Descartes analysed the representativeness of ideas as the medieval Aristotelians did, by ascribing two kinds of *esses* to them: *esses formale*, the being they have as individual modes of substance under the attribute *cogitatio* (which corresponds to the medievals' *esse naturale*), and *esses objectivum*, the being they have as being of something—as representing something (which corresponds to the medievals' *esses intentionale*) (AT VII, 41–47). As E IIP8C and P48S[NS] show, Spinoza accepted this
Cartesian distinction as sound, and was willing to make express use of it.\textsuperscript{15}

We can clarify the claim that for Spinoza the mind exists objectively and also formally from his following statements:

\[\text{T}he \text{ object cannot be changed unless the Idea is also changed, and vice versa}\text{ \textsuperscript{16}}\]

As thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged and connected in the mind, exactly so are the modifications of the body or the images of things arranged and connected in the body. (E, V, Prop 1, Demon)

If the mind does not have formal reality, those quotations would be unjustified. In this way, since the mind has also formal reality, there is no possibility of treating Spinoza’s representationalism as leading to physicalism or materialism, which is the implication of Rice’s position.

To sum up, when we restrict Spinoza’s mind-body theory to representationalism, Spinoza has the same position as cognitive science has in arguing that the mind exists objectively and the body formally. Furthermore, both of them have the same paradigm of representationalism in the mental, locating it in a physical part of the human body; the transducer in cognitive science and the modification of the human body in Spinoza’s terminology. But, Spinoza’s overall picture is not compatible with cognitive science, since, as we have just seen, for Spinoza the mind exists not only objectively but also formally, whereas for

\textsuperscript{15} Alan Donagan, “Homo Cogitat,” in Edwin Curley and Pierre-Francois Moreau (eds.), \textit{Spinoza: Issues and Directions} (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1990), p. 105. E, II, Prop 8, Corol are as follows: “Hence, it follows that when individual things do not exist unless in so far as they are comprehended in the attributes of God, their objective being or ideas do not exist unless in so far as the infinite idea of God exists.”

cognitive science the mind exists only objectively. These differences are related to Spinoza’s argument of the equality between the mind and the body, and this argument separates him from cognitive science.

In summary, one might say that there are perhaps some similarities between Spinoza and the programme of cognitive science, but the important differences should not be overlooked.

2. Strawson’s Person Theory

In contemporary mind-body theories, there is a version which attempts to avoid falling into materialism or idealism by holding a concept besides the mind and the body, which is the ultimate source of them; this is theory of P. F. Strawson. Therefore, in comparing Spinoza’s mind-body theory with contemporary theories, it is worthwhile to consider Strawson’s “person theory,” since within it we can find a similar framework of thought to that of Spinoza, despite their differences. Therefore, I shall, in this section, examine his main argument and consider the possibility of whether it can be considered as being close to Spinoza’s mind-body theory.

(1) Person Theory

Strawson, in his book *Individuals*, suggests the concept of “person” to solve the mind-body problem. According to Strawson, “person” is defined as follows:

What I mean by the concept of a person is the concept of a type of entity such that *both* predicates ascribing states of consciousness *and*
predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics, a physical situation, &c.
are equally applicable to a single individual of that single type.\(^{17}\)

In this way, Strawson describes "person" as an entity to which predicates ascribing both states of consciousness and corporeal characteristics are applied. Strawson’s "person" is logically prior to mental experiences or bodily events; once there is the concept of "person," then mental or bodily states can be attributed. "Person" is, therefore, regarded as being logically prior to the concepts of "mind" and "body" in Strawson’s doctrine. In his own words, "The concept of a person is logically prior to that of an individual consciousness. The concept of a person is not to be analysed as that of an animated body or of an embodied anima."\(^{18}\)

Strawson divides predicates which describe a person into two groups. One group is called M-predicates which are only applied to material bodies, not consciousness, and the other is P-predicates namely all other predicates which are applied to persons; the examples of the former are "weighs 10 stone," "is in the drawing-room," and so on. And the latter "is smiling," "is going for a walk," "is in pain," "is thinking hard," "believes in God" and so on.\(^{19}\) Strawson’s position is that the concept of person possesses these two kinds of predicate. From his perspective, the mental and the physical should be distinguished from each other, and they cannot be reduced one to the other. Hence, if we accept somehow the unity of the person as well as the logical distinction between the mental and physical, and reject one-sided monism such as any variety of materialism or idealism, we need to set up a third concept as the primitive or ultimate ground to which both mental events and bodily events are ascribed, and we can see that Strawson designates this as "person."

Let us consider the concept of "person" in some more detail. According to Strawson, having the concept "person" in our ordinary life is bound up with the pronoun "I." With respect to this point, Strawson criticises not only Cartesian dualism but also the no-ownership doctrine. There are, in Cartesian doctrine, two


\(^{18}\) Ibid., p. 103.

\(^{19}\) Ibid., p. 104.
distinct substances, two substances of different types. It follows that there are two subjects, one thinking and the other extended, and "I" is used in two senses. Strawson argues that Descartes' version, in which the subject of consciousness is purely immaterial is problematic, and that holding the concept ego is only an illusion. He points out that this is an error which occurs in Cartesian dualism. 20

Strawson also rejects the "no-ownership" or "no-subject" doctrine, that there is no subject to which our states of consciousness are ascribed. He criticises Wittgenstein's statements in *Tractatus* (5.631–5.641) such as "The thinking, presenting subject—there is no such thing." 21 According to Strawson, for example, when Smith says "John is in pain" and when John says "I am in pain," they refer to the same fact, being in pain, and to the same subject. Hence, we have to admit the existence of the subject which possesses the pain, which is in pain. 22

His point in rejecting Cartesian dualism and "no-ownership" doctrine is that we can overcome the problems in the two theories by regarding the term "I" as denoting "the person" to which we can then ascribe both mental and physical predicates; that is to say, the owner of consciousness is not purely immaterial or material but both mental and physical, and this is the very concept of "person." Strawson's "person" is described by saying that "Persons, then, are distinct from material bodies, but they are not therefore immaterial bodies or incorporeal

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The other statements cited are as follows: "In an important sense there is no subject," "The subject does not belong to the world, but is a limit of the world," and "There is [therefore] really a sense in which in philosophy we can talk non-psychologically of the I. The I occurs in philosophy through the fact that the 'world is my world.' The philosophical I is not the man, not the human body, or the human soul of which psychology treats, but the metaphysical subject, the limit—not a part of the world."
nonbodies. A person has states of consciousness as well as physical attributes and is not merely to be identified with one or the other.²³

(2) Spinoza and Strawson

Person theory is regarded as "a modified version of the double aspect theory" by Jerome A. Shaffer. He interprets Spinoza's mind-body theory as double aspect theory, and from this standpoint, he attempts to draw a connection between Spinoza and Strawson. Shaffer makes the claim: "The historical ancestor of the person theorist is Spinoza, the Dutch philosopher of the seventeenth century."²⁴ And again, he says that "[i]n recent philosophy, a modified version of the double aspect theory which we will call the person theory has been presented by P. F. Strawson."²⁵ It seems that Shaffer treats person theory as a sort of double aspect theory. According to him, these two theories are the same in the sense of holding one thing which has both the mental and the physical properties. Furthermore, Shaffer claims that Strawson rejects both materialism and Cartesian dualism as Spinoza did in the 17th century, and both of these philosophers attempt to find a compromise between these two theories.²⁶

I basically agree with Shaffer's argument in the sense that both Spinoza and Strawson reject materialism as well as Cartesian dualism, and that both of these philosophers attempt to avoid onesideness of materialism or idealism. Douglas Odegard claims this sort of similarity between Spinoza and Strawson. He writes:

In certain respects Spinoza's view is similar to the kind of position adopted by P. F. Strawson in "Persons," according to which a human being, or person, is a subject of both mental and corporeal predicates.

Like Spinoza, Strawson dismisses Cartesian and Humean dualism, avoids reductive forms of materialism and immaterialism, excludes neutral monism, claims more than a merely contingent connection between mind and body and refrains from identifying a person with the central nervous system. 27

So as to make identity between the mind and the body (of humans for Strawson and of everything for Spinoza), both Spinoza and Strawson do not ignore the mind or the body and do not admit the reduction of one to the other. The fundamental point is that both of them attempt to find identity between the mind and the body not in the onesideness of them but in a common referent of the mind and the body. When we restrict Strawson’s doctrine to humans, Strawson’s format is similar to Spinoza’s: they both attempt to reconcile the identity of the human mind and the human body by suggesting a common referent for the mental and the physical. From this, we can say that at least Strawson’s basic paradigm is the same as Spinoza’s.

Even so, there are different points upon which Strawson would have to disagree with Spinoza. For Spinoza, the mental and the physical are in principle conceptually independent. We saw in chapter two, that as far as our knowledge up to the present day is concerned, our understanding of the mind depends upon our understanding of the body. Thus, for Spinoza, since science is not yet enough developed for us to have a satisfactory independent science of the mind, our temporary position does not permit us to obtain knowledge of the mind without relying on knowledge of the body. Strawson also argues for a dependency of the mental on the physical, but this time a logical dependency:

[O]ne does genuinely ascribe one’s states of consciousness to something, viz., oneself, and ... this kind of ascription is precisely such as the theorist finds unsatisfactory, i.e., is such that it does not seem to make sense to suggest, for example, that the identical pain which was in fact one’s own

27 Ibid., pp. 66-67.
might have been another’s. We do not have to seek far in order to understand the place of this logically non-transferable kind of ownership in our general scheme of thought. For if we think of the requirements of identifying reference, in speech, to particular states of consciousness, or private experiences, we see that such particulars cannot be thus identifiably referred to except as the states or experiences of some identified person. 28

We can see that Strawson’s point in the above quotation is that we can justify particular states of consciousness only by attributing the experiences to a “person.” Nevertheless, even though both Spinoza and Strawson maintain that we can gain access to the mental by giving access to the physical, Spinoza says it is at present true, but not necessary, while for Strawson it is essential; Spinoza does not really make the mental depend on the physical as opposed to Strawson who argues for a logical dependency of the mental on the physical.

There is another difference concerning the causal and the exploratory barrier. Douglas Odegard presents a difference between Spinoza and Strawson as follows:

A less deeply metaphysical, but more interesting, difference, however, lies in the distinction between the Strawsonian remark “A man is a single subject of both mental and corporeal predicates” and the Spinozistic remark “A man is a subject of mental predicates when conceived under thought and a subject of corporeal predicates when conceived under extension.” Both remarks imply that there is just one subject throughout, but the second remark, unlike the first, warns us not to mix our mentalistic and physicalistic talk indiscriminately. 29

This non-mixing of the attributes in Spinoza's theory is not compatible with Strawson's person theory. Spinoza does not allow causal and explanatory interconnection between the mind and the body as opposed to Strawson who requires it. From my perspective, this is a crucial difference between "double aspect theory" and "person theory," and therefore this is why Strawson should not be classified as a double aspect theorist. Furthermore, for Strawson some P-predicates are involved with the physical. Strawson counts "... is smiling" as a P-predicate, for example, it is applied to others on the basis of observation, yet it implies the existence of consciousness. Not all P-predicates are like this: "... is thinking of Christmas" cannot be applied to others on the basis of observation, and in that sense is purely mental. Spinoza would not allow P-predicates of the first kind.

We have seen that according to Shaffer, these theories of Strawson and Spinoza are the same in the sense of holding that there is one thing which has both mental and physical characteristics. They both rest upon a common referent of the mental and the physical in arguing for their monistic theories. In Strawson the referent is person. In my view, the correct analogue in Spinoza is mode of substance so long as we talk of what has both mental and physical predicates. But it is not so good an analogue when Strawson goes on to talk of person as being prior to the mental and the physical. Spinoza's concept of mode is not prior to the mental and the physical. Instead, "mode" is physical as well as mental.

One might tend to suggest that what best corresponds to "person" in Spinoza's theory is not mode of substance but substance, and thus that Spinoza is similar to Strawson in arguing that the common referent is prior to the mental and the physical; in Spinoza it is substance which is prior to modes; in Strawson it is person which is primitive. However, if substance is the analogue of person in Spinoza's philosophy it is difficult to avoid the issue of panpsychism. Spinoza attributes mind to everything in nature (in order words, a very large number of modes, now described as physical and now as mental), whereas Strawson limits the attribution of mind to humans. Strawson thinks that persons are distinctive
among physical things, but Spinoza thinks that everything has a mental aspect (although in very different degree).  

As we saw in chapters three and five, for Spinoza mind and body are modes of substance and these modes are things or events. For Spinoza, there is an identity between mental and physical events: a mental event is an event as given by a mental description and the physical event is the very same event as given by a corresponding physical description. However, for Strawson, mental events are not identical with physical events. He never suggests that someone’s pain is identical with a physical state of that person. As we have seen in Strawson’s statement (p. 213–214), he describes “person” as an entity to which predicates ascribing both states of consciousness and corporeal characteristics are applied. However, there is no identity between events in consciousness and events in the body. Hence Strawson’s position rests upon the fact that these distinct sorts of event are attributed to one referent, person. But, this is a very limited monism, not to be compared with Spinoza’s identity theory. The frameworks of their theories are not along the same lines, since Spinoza finds identity of the mental and physical within tokens or events as opposed to Strawson who finds identity within a primitive concept.

As we have seen, Shaffer states: “The historical ancestor of the person theorist is Spinoza, the Dutch philosopher of the seventeenth century.”, and again, “[i]n recent philosophy, a modified version of the double aspect theory which we will call the person theory has been presented by P. F. Strawson.” But he overstates the similarity between Spinoza and Strawson owing to his misinterpretation of Spinoza. The only similarity we can find is that both Spinoza and Strawson attempt to avoid onesideness of materialism or idealism. The similarities of the two theories are easily exaggerated.

30 This has been explored by Thomas Nagel, but lies outside the scope of this thesis; Nagel presents an argument for dualism of properties, but also suggests that perhaps at some deeper level proto-physical properties might be seen as identical with proto-mental properties, and thus that there is one kind of ultimate (fundamental) property as a common source of mental and physical properties (Thomas Nagel, “Panpsychism,” in his Mortal Questions [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979], pp. 181–195). But from our point of view this would cut against Spinoza’s doctrine of the separation of the attributes.
3. Davidson’s Anomalous Monism

One philosopher who has recently found identity within events is, as well known, Donald Davidson who originates token identity theory. It is beyond doubt that Spinoza’s understanding of the mind-body theory is monistic. His monistic stance follows similar lines to Davidson’s in the sense that they claim identity of the mental and physical within individuals. Davidson’s theory, in my opinion, shows a connection with Spinoza’s perspective and can be treated as an explanation which provides a link with Spinoza’s position, although some details of their arguments are different. Let us consider Davidson’s token identity theory to find how far his theory is similar to and different from Spinoza’s.

(I) Outline of Davidson’s View

Davidson defines his anomalous monism as “monism, because it holds that psychological events are physical events; anomalous, because it insists that events do not fall under strict laws when described in psychological terms.”31 Here, I shall briefly describe his theory as I understand it. Anomalous monism starts from three principles any two of which are apparently inconsistent with the third. They are as follows.32


Some mental events, at least, cause physical events and vice versa.

(2) The Principle of the Nomological Character of Causality.

Wherever events are related as cause and effect, there must be a strict deterministic law.

(3) The Anomalism of the Mental.

32 Ibid.
There are no strict laws which are able to explain and predict mental events. That is to say, there are no purely psychological or psycho-physical laws.

From principles 1 and 2, we can infer that mental events as causes or effects of physical events, are under strict deterministic laws. But, according to principle 3, there are no such kinds of laws. If so, then apparently principles 1 and 2 are in contradiction with principle 3. Davidson, however, claims that there is no inner contradiction. To substantiate his claim he maintains that "laws are linguistic"; principle 1 is "blind to the mental-physical dichotomy" and principle 3 "concerns events described as mental."³³ On the basis of this explanation, Davidson asserts that the demonstration of identity follows easily from these three principles.

Now, I shall consider Davidson's argument for identifying mental events and physical events in terms of the above principles.³⁴

(i) Suppose \( m \), a mental event, caused \( p \), a physical event (in accordance with principle 1).
(ii) They are under strict laws (based on principle 2).
(iii) These laws are neither psychological nor psycho-physical laws but purely physical laws (by elimination from principle 3).
(iv) Only in the case of using a physical description, are strict and deterministic laws possible.
(v) Hence, \( m \) falls under physical laws.
(vi) Then, \( m \) must be describable in physical terms. In order words, \( m \) has a physical description.
(vii) Therefore, \( m \) is a physical event, in addition to being a mental event. More precisely, \( m \) is an event with physical properties (a physical description) in addition to mental properties.

From the above explanation, we can see that all mental events that are involved in causal interactions must be identical with physical events. There must be some

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³³ Donald Davidson, "Mental Events," in his Essays on Actions and Events, p. 215.
³⁴ Ibid., p. 224.
description of a "mental" event which instantiates a strict law and this description cannot be mental but must be physical, since only physical descriptions can instantiate strict laws. Therefore, mental events that causally interact with physical events admit of a physical description, and then it is apparent that all events are physical under this strict law. Thus, Davidson’s anomalous monism can be described by saying that mental events are identical with physical events, but no strict laws connect the mental and the physical, or the mental and the mental.

It is generally accepted that Davidson’s anomalous monism is a kind of token identity theory that denies "reduction between the psychological and the physical," "reductive type-type identities."35 Thus, anomalous monism should be understood in such a way that we cannot have reductive type-type identities.

Now, I shall draw out some obvious implications of Davidson’s position so as to compare it with Spinoza’s accounts of the relation of the mind to the body.

(1) When there is cause, there must be a strict law.
(2) There is a lack of (strict) psycho-physical laws.
(3) There is a lack of (strict) purely psychological laws.
(4) Physical descriptions are to be preferred to mental descriptions, since only the former can instantiate strict laws.
(5) The reducibility of the mental to the physical is rejected.
(6) There is a combination of materialism and dualism of descriptions: "Anomalous monism resembles materialism in its claim that all events are physical, but rejects the thesis, usually considered essential to materialism, that mental phenomena can be given purely physical explanations."36
(7) There is token (event) identity theory: unlike the type-type identity theory, he sees no identity of mental and physical types (properties or descriptions), but mental events are identical with physical events.

36 Davidson, “Mental Events,” p. 214.
(8) He admits psycho-physical causation: some mental events cause physical events and vice versa.

(2) Similarities and Differences

Davidson’s argument requires not only the lack of the psycho-physical laws but also the lack of psychological laws. But Spinoza explicitly admits of the latter kind of laws. In other words, there is only one set of strict laws in Davidson, whereas Spinoza requires two sets of strict laws. Even more Spinoza does not give greater weight to either one or the other. He states as follows:

God’s power of thinking is equal to His actual power of acting, that is to say, whatever follows formally from the infinite nature of God, follows from the idea of God [idea Dei], in the same order and in the same connection objectively in God. (E, II, Prop 7, Corol)

We should pay attention to the fact that, for Spinoza, the weighting of mental and physical is equal. We have seen, in chapter two, that Spinoza denies that the mind is dependent, or supervenient on the body and vice versa. There is a strict law in the mental and the physical realm respectively, and therefore the mind is autonomous in so much as the body is.37

There is further difference between them concerning causation: there is, for Spinoza, a causal barrier between the mind and the body, whereas there is causal interaction for Davidson. I think that for Spinoza there is no clear distinction

37 If we reject the materialistic identity of the mind and the body we are obliged to propose another kind of identity, because, for Spinoza, the mind is somehow identical with the body and vice versa. So far as I am aware and as I explained in chapter five, the identity of the mind and the body can be derived from substance monism with attribute dualism. We can explain the identity of the mind and the body in terms of the conjunction of substance monism with property dualism: “[S]ubstance thinking and substance extended are one and the same substance, which is now comprehended under this attribute and now under that. Thus, also, a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing expressed in two different ways” (E, II, Prop 7, Schol).
between the concept of cause and explanation, whereas Davidson separates, like other contemporary philosophers, the notions of the explanatory and the causal.

We saw in chapter three that Spinoza’s identity theory is compatible with a non-causal relationship between the mental and the physical, since Spinoza denies referential transparency in a causal context. But, for Davidson, since causation is transparent, if we deny causal interactions between the mental and the physical, we cannot hold mind-body identity. In other words, for Davidson, since causation is transparent and a mental and a physical event are one and the same event, there have to be causal interactions between the mental and the physical. On the other hand, for Spinoza, since mental and physical events are identical and there is no causal interaction between them, causation has to be opaque.

In spite of some important differences between their positions, both Davidson and Spinoza claim an identity theory combined with the view that the mental is not reducible to the physical. That is to say, the fact that they hold not only the identity theory but also the irreducibility of the mental to the physical supports a feasible connection between Spinoza and Davidson. This irreducibility entails another notable similarity between Spinoza and Davidson. Both Spinoza and Davidson identify mental and physical events. The mental event is an event under a mental description and the physical event is the very same event under a physical description for both Spinoza and Davidson, although the physical description for Davidson is paramount, though not for Spinoza. Odegard’s view of Spinoza’s identity theory very briefly talks about “event”: “He [Spinoza] identifies the two events in such a way that they are really a single event conceived under two attributes—under thought as the making of a decision and under extension as a bodily event.”\(^{38}\) Odegard never compares Spinoza to Davidson,\(^{39}\) however I think that this is an appropriate statement when explaining the similarity between Spinoza and Davidson.

\(^{38}\) Douglas Odegard, op. cit., p. 68.

\(^{39}\) Possibly, Odegard was not acquainted with Davidson’s anomalous monism, since Davidson’s “Mental Events” was written in 1970 and Odegard’s article was written in 1971 when Davidson’s theory was not yet well-known.
Della Rocca has recently pointed out a similarity between Davidson and Spinoza concerning explanatory relation between the mind and the body. According to Della Rocca, both Spinoza and Davidson are the same in arguing explanatory independence, although Davidson’s explanatory barrier is weaker than Spinoza’s. Furthermore, Della Rocca regards this explanatory independence as the important feature for both Davidson’s and Spinoza’s theories. Concerning this point, Della Rocca states as follows: “Spinoza’s system teaches us the surprising lesson that the radical explanatory separation of mental and physical properties may lead to (instead of preclude) the identity of mental and physical particulars. One philosopher, however, to whom this lesson would come as no surprise is Donald Davidson. He, too, recognises a certain kind of explanatory independence of mental and physical properties, and he argues in part from this independence to the identity of mental and physical particulars.”

I think that this explanatory barrier is, for both Davidson and Spinoza, the fundamental feature in establishing non-reductionism in their identity theories, and that this also leads them to find identity of mind and body in individuals.

I take non-reductionism and token identity as the important similarities between them since these kinds of identity theory contribute insight to contemporary philosophy of mind. The mind and the body are one individual which has two descriptions for both Davidson and Spinoza. Like Davidson, Spinoza also regards the mind and the body as the same individual: “[T]he mind and the body, are one and the same individual which at one time is considered under the attribute of thought, and at another under that of extension” (E, II, Prop 21, Schol). Therefore, despite the fact that Spinoza’s monism is not anomalous as he allows strict laws involving the mental (though not psycho-physical laws), it is fair to say that what Spinoza thinks about a pattern of identity between the mental

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and the physical is the same framework as that of Davidson’s anomalous monism: both philosophers argue identity not within properties or descriptions but within individuals.
Chapter Eight

Conclusion
My purpose in this study has been to unravel the meaning behind Spinoza’s real thoughts on the relationship between the mind and the body. For this purpose, I explored Spinoza’s mind-body theory beginning with a critique of the diverse interpretations of Spinoza’s mind-body theory. I shall summarise these interpretations and the reasons why they cannot belong to Spinoza’s realm of thought.

The hylomorphic interpretation insists upon Aristotle’s influence on Spinoza through the medieval Aristotelians. As we saw Wolfson with whom this position is chiefly associated, ascribes hylomorphism from the following angles: (1) the relation of mode to substance can be explained as the relation of species to genus in Aristotle; (2) the attributes of thought and extension in Spinoza are the translation of Aristotelian matter and form; (3) Spinoza’s doctrine of “mind as the idea of the body” is a new way of restating the Aristotelian definition of the soul as the form of the body. We argued that there are fundamental differences in each case: (1) a substance is the cause of mode in Spinoza whereas genus is not the cause of species in Aristotle, and for Aristotle there is no suggestion that a genus is more real than (species or) individual things, whereas for Spinoza the individual thing is less real than substance; (2) in Spinoza, the concepts of extension and thought are derived less from Aristotle’s concepts of “matter and form” than Descartes’ concepts of “extension and thought.”—for Aristotle pure matter is just potentiality with no properties at all, whereas for Descartes and Spinoza extension is the essence of material substance; (3) Spinoza’s two uses of the term “idea” makes his theory different from the Aristotelian definition of the soul as the form of the body. For Spinoza, there is the idea of Peter which constitutes the essence of Peter’s mind, and the idea of Peter which is in another man. Even though the former idea explains the essence of Peter’s body as in Aristotle’s concept of “form,” there is no such concept of the latter idea in Aristotle. For Spinoza, the cognitive situation requires the presence of ideas and the ideas represent both the knower’s own body and external bodies. This role of the idea is clearly distinct from the role of the form in Aristotle.
The idealistic interpretation is fundamentally dependent upon the dominance of the attribute of thought over extension and the other attributes; the attribute of thought is, following this interpretation, highlighted and treated as the primary one. According to this interpretation, Spinoza's infinite attributes are ordered in the intellect, and thus all attributes are interpretable in terms of thought. In God's thinking there is an idea of the modes of every attribute, and it follows from this that the attribute of thought is more comprehensive than the others. But, even if thought is distinctive or singled out from the other attributes and is more comprehensive than the other attributes, this should be regarded as the representational function of thought. If in God's thinking the attribute of extension or of whatever exists, it exists not as itself but as the idea of extension, and in God's thinking, there do not exist the modes themselves of every attribute but, an idea of the modes of every attribute, this should not be interpreted as idealism. It is not the case for Spinoza that everything is or exists in God's thinking, but that everything is represented or perceived by God's thinking. The former leads to the dominance of thought in the idealistic interpretation, whereas the latter emphasises the representational role of thought. It follows that we can point out the uniqueness of thought in Spinoza's system in terms of the representative function, but should not interpret Spinoza's system as idealism. "The dominance of thought in a representational sense" does not lead to idealism.

Barker interprets Spinoza as an epiphenomenalists, holding that Spinoza's real tendency is to argue "the priority of the body over the mind." He finds support in the scholium to proposition 2, part III and argues that the obvious tendency of this scholium is to glorify the body at the expense of the mind. However, the scholium is not concerned with either giving a priority to the body or glorifying the body at the expense of the mind. But it is concerned with the explanation of the experience of the body in order to refute the common belief of the superiority of the mind over the body (i.e. the common belief that mind commands the body). The proposition to which this scholium is attached is that "the body cannot determine the mind to thought, neither can the mind determine the body to motion nor rest, nor to anything else if there be anything else" (E, III,
Prop 2). This proposition would be unjustified if we treat the scholium as presenting "the priority of the body over the mind" as Barker argues.

Furthermore, there is an incompatibility between Spinoza's theory and definitions of epiphenomenalism as follows: Spinoza's denial of causation between the mind and the body is a solid basis for rejecting this epiphenomenalistic interpretation since epiphenomenalism holds that there is causality from the body to the mind. Moreover Spinoza's affirmation of causation between mental events is also incompatible with the definition of epiphenomenalism that the mind is never the cause of even any other mental events. Even more, due to Spinoza's argument of the sameness of "the relationship between the mind and body" and "the relationship between the idea of the mind and the mind," epiphenomenalistic interpretation is committed to a self-contradiction.

Hampshire, who interprets Spinoza as a kind of materialist, holds that for Spinoza the body is a machine for producing thought, and therefore the mind is embodied in the body as its machine or contrivance. Not only is the body independent from the mind in explaining it, but it is also primary and the mind is secondary in the order of explanation by virtue of the predominance of the laws of physics. Hampshire emphasises that physical descriptions are prior to mental descriptions in getting an overall picture of the world. Hampshire's explanation is rooted in the apparent asymmetry between the mind and the body in the scholium to proposition 13 in the Ethics, book II: "[I]n order to determine the difference between the human mind and other things and its superiority over them, we must first know, as we have said, the nature of its object, that is to say, the nature of the human body." But this asymmetry runs contrary to the thrust of Spinoza's argument. Arguably, Spinoza is claiming that our understanding of the mind is secondary to our understanding of the body as far as our present state of knowledge is concerned. Spinoza really has this sort of attitude in arguing his philosophy: our knowledge at the present day is not capable of completely grasping some facts, but we shall be able to discover them when our knowledge is increased by more scientific discovery. For Spinoza, in reality, there exists a symmetry between the mind and the body. In many places, Spinoza argues for the
equivalence of mental and physical descriptions: for example, “the object cannot be changed unless the idea is also changed, and vice versa.”

Apart from the above interpretations, Spinoza’s mind-body theory is most often interpreted as parallelism and this interpretation is compatible with the two key conditions: that there is not a causal relationship between mind and body, and that he gives equal weight to mind and body. But it is crucial to recognise that Spinoza’s parallelism differs from traditional parallelism. For Spinoza, parallelism ought to be argued within an identity doctrine. Unlike traditional parallelism, Spinoza’s mind-body theory asserts the identity of mind and body. Whereas traditional parallelism argues that the mind and the body are parallel because they are entirely different in nature, Spinoza argues that the mind and the body are parallel because they are identical with each other. We can see how Spinoza’s parallelism differs from traditional parallelism. According to the traditional view, parallelism is basically a dualistic position, but in Spinoza’s view, it is a monistic position. Traditional parallelism holds the view that the mind and body run parallel with one another and never converge nor diverge. However, when we consider Spinoza’s mind-body theory we should do so along with his ontological theory. We should not discuss Spinoza’s mind-body theory without considering his whole metaphysical system, especially substance monism, and we should strive to make his mind-body theory compatible with his whole system. That is to say, traditional parallelism is substance dualism, while Spinoza’s parallelism is conceptual or property dualism within substance monism. Spinoza’s parallelism is derived from one substance and one order of events, so his parallelism should be understood in the sense that one event with a mental description is the very same event which can equally be given a physical description.

Bennett and Della Rocca interpret Spinoza somewhat along these lines. So their interpretations seem to be closer to Spinoza. However, the problem is that Bennett minimises Spinoza’s argument for identity while Della Rocca perhaps overstates it. On Bennett’s interpretation, there is neither a numerical identity

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between mental and physical events nor a numerical identity between the mental and the physical properties; there exists only an identity of non-graspable determinables of which the mental and the physical are determinates. On Della Rocca’s interpretation, there is a numerical identity between the mental and the physical events and perhaps also between the mental and the physical properties (depending on whether he thinks the attributes are really distinct or not).

But, given that Spinoza maintains substance monism and the real distinction between the attributes of thought and extension (and that his mind-body theory follows from his doctrines of substance and attributes), we should argue that for Spinoza there is a numerical identity between mental and physical events and that there is no identity between mental and physical properties: the mental and the physical events are one and the same event described under mental and physical properties, respectively. From this fact, it follows that his theory should be understood as a kind of token identity theory. Thus, my interpretation of Spinoza’s mind-body theory entails both token identity and property (or conceptual) parallelism whilst ruling out type identity as well as substance parallelism. If Spinoza’s mind-body theory is a token identity theory, which leads to a parallel relationship between the mind and the body, we ought to regard Spinoza as a double aspect theorist, since the double aspect theory entails both identity and parallelism. For this reason, I have called his theory a token double aspect theory.

My interpretation of Spinoza’s mind-body theory has to maintain the objective interpretation of the attributes. Although the objective interpretation is nowadays the most common interpretation and I agree with it, there are the problems in this interpretation: (1) if Spinoza’s attributes are regarded as objective, how can distinct attributes all constitute the nature or essence of substance? (2) how can an objectivist explain the fact that Spinoza introduces attributes through the phrase “which the intellect perceives as (constituting the essence of substance)” in definition 4 of part II and elsewhere? In order to reinforce my interpretation of Spinoza’s mind body theory, it is necessary to solve these problems. A clue is provided by the fact that Spinoza uses the term
"express" or "manifest" interchangeably with the phrase "which the intellect perceives as constituting."

This line of understanding of the attributes suggests a solution to the problems in the objective interpretations. Since the attributes constitute and express the essence of the same substance (or the same essence of the substance), there must be something common in the ways of expressing the same thing; the tune analogy was appealed to in order to explain this point. The advantages in treating essence as "what is structurally common to all attributes" are, as I have mentioned throughout this thesis, as follows: (1) it can explain some statements in which Spinoza seems to identify attribute with essence, (2) it can also explain how each attribute constitutes and expresses the essence of the substance, (3) it offers a ground for Spinoza's argument that mental and physical properties are parallel to each other, (4) it helps us to explain that the double aspect theory is compatible with the objective interpretation, and (5) it makes my interpretation of the attributes consistent with the interpretation of the mind-body theory, as Spinoza wishes to claim.

There is a further problem in making sense of Spinoza's mind-body theory. This arises from his representationalism. His concept of representation seems to be problematic if we consider it together with his argument of parallelism in double aspect theory. Since Spinoza argues that ideas in the human mind represent both the human body and the external bodies, his representationalism is contradictory to his argument of one to one correspondence between the mental and the physical. Furthermore, his argument in proposition 13 that the object of the idea constituting the human mind is the human body and nothing else is clearly inconsistent with his claim in proposition 16 that the human mind represents external bodies as well as the human body. Some commentators have tried to explain these incompatibilities as resulting from Spinoza's confusion between the parallel and the representational relationship owing to the fact that he uses the same term "idea" in two different ways.

I argued that before we conclude that these problems result from Spinoza's confusion we should try all possible interpretations. I considered some
existing interpretations, but suggested that if we understand proposition 13 as referring to the essence of the human mind the problem can be eased (ameliorated). What Spinoza wishes to claim in proposition 13 is that the essence of the human mind is constituted by the idea of the human body. This can account for the distinction Spinoza makes between the idea of Peter in God’s mind and the idea of Peter in Paul’s mind. Even so, I have argued that Spinoza must ultimately appeal to the fact that our ideas are confused to hold his representationalism and parallelism in line.

Finally, I looked briefly at the way that Spinoza has been seen as influential in contemporary mind-body theories such as person theory, anomalous monism, and some aspects of cognitive science. My aim there was to warn against taking some remarks of Spinoza and using them without taking his whole doctrine into account. Hence I have not fully endorsed the use made of Spinoza. Nevertheless, it is clear that Spinoza’s theory contains much which chimes in with modern approaches to the problem.
Bibliography

This Bibliography is a list of cited books and articles in the text and the footnotes.

I. Spinoza’s Works


II. Other Works


