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THE ALIENATED MIND:
The emergence of the sociology of knowledge in Germany
(1918-33)

Volume I

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SUMMARY

The following study seeks to examine the emergence and development of the sociology of knowledge in Germany in the period from 1918 to 1933. Particular emphasis is placed upon the distinctive features of this tradition and upon three central figures connected with this tradition - Max Scheler, Georg Lukács and Karl Mannheim. The theoretical and practical context within which the diverse strands of this tradition emerged are investigated in order to show, in part, the extent to which the central problems of the sociology of knowledge were located within philosophical, sociological and practical crises in Germany.

In the case of Scheler, Lukács and Mannheim, it is argued that they all developed a sociology of knowledge or a critique of ideology out of an earlier concern with a sociology of culture and, in some instances, with the crisis of modern culture. Furthermore it is argued that it is not possible to fully comprehend their sociology of knowledge or critique of ideology without taking into account the meta-theoretical intentions of these writers. In part, this involves an examination of what Lenk has termed the 'tragic consciousness' of Weimar sociology and, more specifically the thesis of the 'powerlessness of the mind' (Scheler) and the 'homelessness of the mind' (Mannheim). The inclusion of Lukács within the context of this tradition in the sociology of knowledge necessarily raises the issue of the relationship between the sociology of knowledge and the critique of ideology, not merely in terms of Lukács' relationship to Mannheim but also in the light of the contemporary debate surrounding Ideologie und Utopie. Hence, as a way of highlighting contemporary assessments of and contributions to the sociology of knowledge, some attention is devoted to the debates and controversies that surrounded this discipline in Weimar Germany.
Finally, some of the aims of the sociology of knowledge suggest that it was intended as a new foundation for the social sciences. It is argued that this must be understood both in the light of the methodological preoccupations of writers like Mannheim and in terms of earlier methodological controversies. In turn, it is suggested that, at this level, there are some affinities between this aspect of the sociology of knowledge and more recent attempts in Germany to ground the social sciences.
INTRODUCTION
I

INTRODUCTION

The emergence of the sociology of knowledge in Germany after 1918 represents the development of an important tradition in this area of sociology.

This field of investigation which emerged in Germany after the First World War and was variously termed 'Erkenntnissoziologie', 'Soziologie des Erkennens', 'Soziologie des Denkens', 'Soziologie des Wissens', 'Soziologie des Geistes', and, most commonly, 'Wissenssoziologie', developed in a manner quite distinct from that of other traditions in this discipline. It cannot be argued that the problems which the German sociology of knowledge confronted originated in the Weimar period in Germany. Other attempts to establish a sociology of knowledge had already been made by Durkheim and his followers and by Pareto. The elements of another tradition, broadly contemporary, may also be traced in the writings of Thomas, Cooley and Mead. When attention is drawn to the problem of ideology, which certainly forms a central focus of the German tradition, any claim to originality must remain weak. The general discussion of the problem of the relationship between knowledge and society may certainly be traced back to the contributions made by Bacon, Vico, Helvotius and others. Within Germany itself, the discussion of ideology, which plays a crucial role in the development of this tradition, only came to the fore after the writings of Hegel and, more especially, Marx.

However, the German sociology of knowledge does not merely develop out of these earlier writers. There exists no simple linear development from Bacon through Marx to the German sociology of knowledge as a naive history of ideas.
The sociology of knowledge as a distinctive discipline emerged in Germany shortly after the end of the First World War and the German Revolution. Scheler's articles 'Die positivistische Geschichtsphilosophie des Wissens und die Aufgaben einer Soziologie der Erkenntnis' ⁶ and 'Weltanschauungen, Weltanschauungslehre und Wissenssoziologie' ⁷ and Wilhelm Jerusalem's 'Soziologie des Erkennens' ⁸ all appeared in 1921. Lukács' collection of essays, *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein* ⁹ appeared in Berlin in 1923, though the key to essays on orthodox Marxism and class consciousness were written in 1919 and 1920 respectively, whilst the essay on reification was completed in 1922. Karl Mannheim's first major article to be published - in fact his doctoral dissertation, 'Die Strukturanalyse der Erkenntnistheorie' - appeared in 1922. ¹⁰ Grünwald, the only writer to systematically examine the field, is therefore correct in suggesting that 'The epoch after the World War in the period between 1921 and 1924 can be designated as the point of time in which the sociology of knowledge was gradually constituted as a distinctive discipline.' ¹¹ These early writings were followed by the more
substantial contributions of Max Scheler in his collection of essays *Schriften zur Soziologie und Weltanschauungslehre* which appeared in 1923 and 1924,\(^\text{12}\)
in his edited collection *Versuche zu einer Soziologie des Wissens* in 1924\(^\text{13}\) and *Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft* in 1926.\(^\text{14}\) None of Lukács' later works in this decade had the same impact as *History and Class Consciousness* though his essay 'Moses Hess und die Probleme der idealistischen Dialektik' published in 1926 is worthy of mention.\(^\text{15}\) Mannheim's major work in this period, *Ideologie und Utopie*, appeared in 1929.\(^\text{16}\) From around 1924 onwards, the number of essays on the sociology of knowledge increased and reached a peak around 1930, largely as a result of the controversy surrounding Mannheim's *Ideologie und Utopie*. Thus the sociology of knowledge in Germany may be seen to occupy a definite circumscribed time period from 1920 to 1933.

It is probably true to say that no other tradition in the sociology of knowledge created such controversy in sociology and philosophy.\(^\text{17}\) In Lukács' case, this statement can be extended to the political sphere, as the critique of his major work in this period testify.\(^\text{18}\) Yet there at present exist only two studies of the emergence of the sociology of knowledge in Germany, both written from perspectives which are in no way comprehensive but rather are in some ways limited.

The first, and older of the two, is the work by Ernst Grünwald, *Das Problem der Soziologie des Wissens*, which appeared in 1934.\(^\text{19}\) Grünwald does discuss the development of the sociology in Germany during the Weimar era but his account is largely in terms of intellectual history and does not attempt an
explanation for its emergence except in relation to intellectual trends. It is difficult to see how such an explanation could emerge from Grünewald's categorisation of the various theories in the sociology of knowledge which commences with a dichotomy between psychological and historical theories of the relationship between knowledge and society and is later extended into positivist, positivist-Marxist, non-positivist and historicist theories. Yet Grünewald does, for the first time, attempt to bring together the various contributions to the German sociology of knowledge as well as suggest his own mode of dealing with the problems it faced.

The second study by Lenk, *Marx in der Wissenssoziologie* has, as its central theme, the response of the German sociology of knowledge to Marx's critique of ideology. As such it concentrates on the work of Scheler and Mannheim, the former already having been discussed in an earlier study by Lenk. Somewhat surprisingly, it contains no detailed discussion of Lukács' *Geschichte und Klassebewusstsein*. Lenk attempts to show that the sociology of knowledge in Germany is a manifestation of what he terms a tragic consciousness peculiar to social theory in that period. Lenk had originally applied this thesis to the work of Max Scheler but here it is generalised to cover the German tradition in the sociology of knowledge as a whole. Lenk's study, however, is concerned largely with what he takes to be the transformation of Marx's original establishment of a critique of ideology into the sociology of knowledge, a transition which he sees as negative in its import. Yet Lenk's study does contain many important theses on the development of the sociology of knowledge and these will be examined below.

This is not to suggest that there exist only these two studies of the German
tradition in the sociology of knowledge. In the post Second World War period, sociologists and philosophers have written on the sociology of knowledge in Germany, for example, Lieber, Schaaf and many others. However, with the exception of the two studies by Grünwald and Lenk, there still remains no systematic attempt to chart the development of the German tradition in the sociology of knowledge and to examine its place within sociology. This is not to deny that there do not exist many more recent discussions of ideology in society. In fact, to take but one important example, the critique of ideology has been a central concern of the Frankfurt School, though its earlier key members, notably Horkheimer and Adorno, have been hostile to the sociology of knowledge as a branch of study.

If attention is turned to the reception of this tradition within British and American sociology then the absence of any substantial examination of the German sociology of knowledge becomes more apparent. The introductory studies by Horowitz and, more recently, Hamilton do not devote any special attention to the German tradition, though Hamilton does discuss Scheler's contribution. Stark's introduction does discuss in some detail the work of Scheler, though again it is not especially concerned with an examination of the whole tradition. It also lends support to the view that the subject was defined in a very narrow manner. Most recently, work by Berger and Luckmann specifically attempts to distance itself from the German tradition. It does, however, raise some of the issues which concern the present study in so far as it argues that the German tradition in the sociology of knowledge is quite distinctive in many respects.
Many writers have indeed argued that the sociology of knowledge as it developed in Weimar Germany confronted a quite specific configuration of problems that were unique to that tradition. Berger and Luckmann, for instance, argue that

"The sociology of knowledge originated in a particular situation of German intellectual history and in a philosophical context. When the new discipline was subsequently introduced into the sociological context proper, particularly in the English-speaking world, it continued to be marked by the problems of the particular intellectual situation from which it arose."  

They go on to suggest that perhaps this accounts for its marginal position within contemporary sociology since the original problems appear no longer relevant. Berger and Luckmann suggest that

"the sociology of knowledge remained a peripheral concern among sociologists at large, who did not share the particular problems that troubled German thinkers in the 1920s."  

This 'peripheral concern' is echoed even by Mannheim himself later in his work, and long after his emigration to England and abandonment of concern for the sociology of knowledge, when he refers to the sociology of knowledge as 'this marginal field of human knowledge'.  

However, what is required is some explanation of the neglect of this tradition in the sociology of knowledge and this cannot be found directly in the work of Berger and Luckmann.

Any attempt at an explanation of the neglect of this tradition in the sociology of knowledge would be greatly aided by an account of the emergence of the sociology of knowledge in Germany itself. The two explanations are inter-connected in that it seems probable that, to some extent, an account of the one problem could be applied in an inverse form to an account of the other. Wolff, in a survey of work on the sociology of knowledge in the United States, has pointed
to a number of tendencies which characterize work in this area. He commen-
tences with

two tendencies that have characterized most, though not all, American writings in this field: indifference with epistemology and rejection of the idea that the sociology of knowledge occupy itself with it and, perhaps more than animosity, indifference toward Marxism and ignorance of it.31

Conversely, a preoccupation with epistemological problems and an active response to the Marxist discussion of ideology certainly characterizes the German tradition in the sociology of knowledge. Wolff further suggests that in the United States two further tendencies are apparent in the work on the sociology of knowledge. The first is that it usually 'takes an ahistorical-systematic, rather than a historical approach'32 to its subject matter. The second characteristic is its 'attention to social psychology and to G.H. Mead in particular'.33 Again it is apparent that historicism lies at the very centre of concern in the German tradition, whilst its relationship to social psychology is rather weak. If one takes account of Berger's assertion that Mead's social psychology could provide the basis for a micro-sociology of knowledge, then it is clear that such a concern is absent in the German tradition which, almost without exception, treated its problems at the macro level.34

A much simpler and equally relevant reason for the neglect of this tradition has been the absence of translations of the major works. This argument, however, can be applied in the opposite direction. If it could be shown that Anglo-American sociology remained hostile or indifferent to the German tradition in the sociology of knowledge, then this could account for the reluctance to translate the major writings. Yet the actual situation with respect to translations appears more complex. Of the central figures in this tradition,
Max Scheler has fared worst as far as Anglo-American readers are concerned. His major work in the field, *Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft* remains untranslated with the exception of one brief extract. The first of Scheler's major works to appear in English was the translation of *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie* in 1958. The posthumous collection of some of his essays, *Philosophische Weltanschauung*, including an important essay 'Die Formen des Wissens und die Bildung' appeared in translation in the same year.

That little interest was shown in Scheler's sociology of knowledge in the Anglo-American world is indicated by the appearance of the first article on his work in this area by Schilpp in 1927 and the second by Becker and Dahlke appeared as late as 1942.

The early writings of Lukács, and particularly *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein* are often seen by many writers as relevant to the sociology of knowledge in Germany but none have systematically examined the importance of this work for the development of this discipline. Indeed, this major work by Lukács, which originally appeared in 1923, did not even reappear in Germany until 1968. This is due in part to Lukács' own disavowal of this work as his recent introduction to the new edition suggests. In the intervening period, however, this work did exercise a significant, if somewhat subterranean, influence on European Marxism. It has quite recently appeared in English forty-eight years after its original publication.

The writings of Karl Mannheim, however, have appeared in English over a period of years. In particular, *Ideologie und Utopie* which appeared in Germany in 1929, was published in English in 1936. It is this work which is
most often mentioned in connection with the German tradition in the sociology of knowledge. Whilst Mannheim published a number of his own works in the period which he spent in England, almost none of them were from his most productive period in terms of his contribution to the sociology of knowledge, that is, from 1918 to 1933. The important essays from this latter period did not appear in translation until 1952 when Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge appeared. Later Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology appeared in 1953 and Essays on the Sociology of Culture appeared in 1956. Even then, some important essays on the sociology of knowledge remained untranslated, notably 'Ideologische und soziologische Interpretation der geistigen Gebilde' which only appeared in translation in 1963. Kettler has pointed to the existence of a number of other manuscripts from Mannheim's German writings which remain untranslated. Perhaps even more remarkable is the fact that these essays on the sociology of knowledge written during the period in which Mannheim was in Germany were not even reprinted in Germany until 1964.

It is true, then, that Mannheim's contribution to the sociology of knowledge in Germany is available, with some exceptions, in English translation. Yet the nature of these translations, especially that of Ideologie und Utopie is worthy of comment at this point. Commenting on the 1936 translation, Wolff suggests that

'It is doubtful whether a more literal version ... would have led to the success of the book in which Louis Wirth's and Edward Shils' rendition has resulted. Their version, however, replaces relatively idiosyncratic German by relatively standardized English, thus presenting us with a book of a character quite different from the original. This is not said in order to criticize but to
point to a problem, which is that of the implications and consequences of choosing faithfulness as against understandability as the first criterion of a translation. 48

Quite apart from the difficulties inherent in any translation, it would appear that Mannheim himself made many modifications to the translation. 49 However, it does not appear to have suffered as badly as its French translation, as Gabel has pointed out. 50

Whilst the English translation does retain some of the urgency of the original, the nature of the crisis which Mannheim experienced and detailed in 1929 is somewhat obscured. This is important for any attempt to understand the impact of that work upon philosophy and sociology in Germany. It will be argued below that the translation further obscures the connection which exists between that work and Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein. Many writers have suggested that a connection does exist, though none have documented systematically the nature of that connection. 51 Often this has taken the form of general statements to the effect that Mannheim was engaged in a debate with Marxism, a thesis which has also been advanced for the writings of Max Scheler. 52

If the three figures in the development of the sociology of knowledge in varying degrees have fared badly in terms of availability and nature of English translation of their works, then this is even more true of other contributors to the field. In fact none of these contributions has appeared in English translation. This is true of Alfred Weber, Wilhelm Jerusalem, Alexander von Schelting, Max Adler and many others. It is true also of many writers whose work is essential to the understanding of this tradition. The most notable example here is the work of Wilhelm Dilthey but relevant works of Ernst
Troeltsch are also worthy of mention in this connection. The preceding remarks on the availability and nature of English translations alone cannot account for the neglect of this tradition in the sociology of knowledge. The remarks by Wolff cited earlier on the distinctive features of the American response to the sociology of knowledge suggest that hostility to and ignorance of the German tradition must form a further contributory factor. This negative response was earlier expressed by Popper in *The Open Society and its Enemies* where he wrote:

"The sociology of knowledge is not only self-destructive, not only a rather gratifying object of socio-analysis, it also shows an astounding failure to understand precisely its main subject, the social aspects of knowledge, or rather, of scientific method."  

It has been restated, more forcefully, in a discussion of the recent methodological dispute in German sociology. Here Popper comments:

"I have been for many years a critic of the so-called "sociology of knowledge". Not that I thought that everything that Mannheim (and Scheler) said was mistaken. On the contrary, much of it was only too trivially true. What I combatted, mainly, was Mannheim's belief that there was an essential difference with respect to objectivity between the social scientist and the natural scientist, or between the study of society and the study of nature. The thesis I combatted was that it was easy to be "objective" in the natural sciences, while objectivity in the social sciences could be achieved, if at all, only by very select intellects: by the "freely poised intelligence" which is only "loosely anchored in social traditions"."

What Popper does highlight, from his own perspective, is the concern which the German tradition expressed for the social factors responsible for the development of scientific thought, though he never systematically analyses
any of their discussions.

A less hostile response, but again one which is closely associated with empiricism and a concern for natural scientific knowledge is to be found in a recent discussion by Elias. He argues that Marx's dualistic paradigm of consciousness and society

'has dominated with particular force enquiries into the sociology of knowledge; there it has greatly contributed towards delaying the transition from a dogmatic philosophical to an undogmatic scientific stage at which theoretical and empirical studies can proceed dialectically in cross-fertilization with each other.' 56

The association of the terms 'dogmatic' with the 'philosophical' characterizes much of the discussion of the sociology of knowledge and points to the importance of a further factor which may account for the neglect of the German tradition.

Sociology, within the Anglo-American traditions, has developed as a distinctive discipline in its own right with, until recently, few links with philosophy, though in various situations and at various times it has had close ties with economics and with social psychology. This is not to suggest that such sociology did not often rely upon philosophical premises. Rather, it is more accurate to suggest that these premises often remained unexamined. Most often these traditions were legitimated by recourse to a philosophy of science based either upon positivism or empiricism. In so far as the empiricist orientation to social phenomena predisposes researchers towards certain methodologies and techniques then there would be a tendency not to examine these areas of social life not amenable to such methodologies.

Even if such areas were examined - for example, ideologies in various forms -
then the discussion would take on a character peculiar to these methodologies. This is the implication, for example, of Merton's contrast between the development of the sociology of knowledge in its European versions and the development of mass communications research in the United States. 57

With respect to an understanding of the German tradition in the sociology of knowledge, what is of relevance here is the difficulty faced by an empiricist tradition in coming to terms with other traditions. In part, Mannheim, Scheler and Lukács developed their social theories out of an idealist tradition in philosophy. In a problematic manner, Lukács and, to a lesser extent, Mannheim also developed their theories of social consciousness out of Marx's writings and those of his successors. For diverse reasons, neither tradition is readily amenable to an empiricist interpretation, except at the expense of falsification of these traditions. 58

To take but one example, it will be apparent from later discussion that the German tradition in the sociology of knowledge is largely anti-positivist and deeply committed to German philosophical traditions associated with the Geisteswissenschaften. The neo-Kantian problematic of the duality of the natural and cultural sciences, of nomothetic and idiographic sciences advanced most notably by Rickert and Windelband, informs much of the discussion in the sociology of knowledge in this tradition. Habermas, commenting on the neglect of this discussion in Germany itself, suggests that

"The lively discussion of the methodological distinction between natural and cultural scientific research which was first opened by neo-Kantianism is today forgotten; the problematic which it sparked off does not appear real any more." 59
Habermas goes on to attribute this neglect to the apparent success of the positivist orientation within the German social sciences. This has further implications for any attempt to comprehend the German tradition in the sociology of knowledge.

If it can be argued that the positivist tradition has achieved relative success in the social sciences then, like other traditions, it will attempt to rewrite the history of those sciences in such a way that their previous development was characterized by the steady advance of its own standpoint. As Kuhn's remarks on the development of the natural sciences suggest, this could take the form of an attempt to show that the history of sociology, for example, is a history of the steady accretion and accumulation of knowledge such that earlier conflicts within the discipline are minimized to such an extent that victory appears inevitable for those who are in fact the victors. In another context, Gouldner has pointed to the limits of this convergence theory of intellectual development. The encouragement of a search for continuity with the past in any examination of a theoretical tradition seeks to reveal a tacit consensus of great minds and, by showing this, to lend credence to the conclusions that they are held to have converged upon unwittingly. Convergence thus becomes a rhetoric, a way of persuading men to accept certain views.

Gouldner goes on to suggest that this procedure leads to the neglect of theoretical conflict.

The ideology of convergence implies that if great theorists can be shown to have come to a consensus unbeknown to themselves, then it is these tacit agreements that are theoretically productive, rather than the polemics to which the men themselves often gave their attention.
Certainly the empirical tradition in sociology would judge the sociology of knowledge to be unsuccessful both in view of its incapacity to generate empirical propositions and because of its preoccupation with metaphysics or even with philosophical problems. Such a standpoint could only extract from the German tradition in the sociology of knowledge either a few empirical propositions or a negative judgment upon the whole enterprise. Neither response could provide any basis for an understanding of why the sociology of knowledge was preoccupied with its distinctive problems, or why it took on such a distinctive form in Germany. In the former case, the German sociological tradition would be seen as marred by the late development of a strong empirical tradition. Oberschall, for example, in an examination of the development of the empirical in sociology in Germany, certainly views this as a negative factor. In the latter case, the attempts by Mannheim to pose epistemological problems in a sociological context would be judged in a wholly negative manner.

Therefore, a basis for the understanding of this tradition in the sociology of knowledge must first be sought within the writings on the sociology of knowledge and not on the basis of criteria, classificatory systems and theories which are external to these writings. This initial process, however, in no way excludes the subsequent assessment of the sociology of knowledge from other standpoints. It merely intends that an account of this tradition should commence from a reconstruction of, for example, what the contemporary writers themselves saw as the task of the sociology of knowledge, which problems they saw as urgent and why, and how they attempted to solve these problems. It is only by commencing from these writings that it is possible to provide an account of why the sociology of knowledge took on so distinctive
a form in Germany and why it posed the problems in a specific manner.

Further, the writings themselves provide many clues as to the context - both theoretical and practical - in terms of which their work can be understood.

Such a mode of proceeding may go some way to avoiding the immediate negative judgment of the sociology of knowledge within this tradition and its consequent neglect. Since the writers within this tradition saw their activity as important, as vital to the understanding of contemporary theoretical and practical concerns, then an initial reconstruction must attempt to answer why this was the case. Again this does not preclude an assessment which may in many ways be negative, rather it attempts to avoid this pre-judgment from obscuring many important features of this tradition.

The preceding remarks should not be taken as an indication that the sociology of knowledge within the German tradition possesses no contemporary relevance. Even though it may be subsequently concluded that many of the solutions to the problems which it faced cannot be viewed as satisfactory from a number of vantage points, it will be argued that the problems which it posed do remain, even though within much of the contemporary sociological enterprise they are treated as surpassed or irrelevant. For instance, it is at least plausible to argue that the development of the sociology of knowledge in Germany can be seen as an important chapter in the Methodenstreit in the social sciences which has raged in that country for almost a century. In this respect the following study attempts to contribute to the discussion, reopened by Habermas, on the logic of the social sciences.

In some respects, the German tradition in the sociology of knowledge already
raises many of the issues developed by Habermas in *Knowledge and Human Interests* which intends 'analyzing the connections between cognition (Erkenntnis) and human interests'. In this work, Habermas attempts to 'reconstruct the pre-history of modern positivism', and whilst that study deals with many stages of reflection in Kant, Hegel, Marx and Dilthey which are particularly relevant for the sociology of knowledge as it developed in Germany, he does not concern himself with that tradition, even though the latter is certainly important for what Habermas terms 'the process of the dissolution of epistemology'. In fact, the sociology of knowledge was itself concerned with the transformation of traditional epistemology and the substitution of a social epistemology. His prefatory remarks are relevant for the present study which also attempts to reconstruct a much smaller part of the discussion of the relation between cognition and human interests.

Habermas argues that

'Retreading this path from a perspective that looks back towards the point of departure may help to recover the forgotten experience of reflection. That we disavow reflection is positivism.'

Habermas and others have reopened many of these stages of reflection on the nature of social theory and the relationship between cognitive process and interests. That this discussion is much in evidence at least within Germany may be evinced from the continuation of the earlier Methodenstreit at various levels of analysis. The present study is intended as a minor contribution to one chapter of that debate, though it is not exclusively concerned with it. Commencing from contemporary writings of social theorists in this field, the wider aim of this study is to explicate the central features of this tradition in the sociology of knowledge. In other words, it will be necessary to examine what the writers themselves saw as important problems to be solved, why
they engaged in this particular intellectual and practical project, what they saw as the aims of their study, how they proposed to carry it out, and what claims they made for their study.
INTRODUCTION

NOTES


4. On the intellectual ancestry of the problems discussed by the sociology of knowledge see E. Grünwald, Das Problem der Soziologie des Wissens, Vienna 1934, H. Barth, Wahrheit und Ideologie, Zürich 1945.


10. K. Mannheim, 'Die Strukturanalyse der Erkenntnistheorie', Kant-Studien, Ergänzungshefte no. 57, 1922. This doctoral thesis was in fact awarded to Mannheim in November 1918 at the University of Budapest.


17. See below ch.5. The major controversy centred round the reception of Mannheim's Ideology and Utopia.

18. Lukács himself criticized his work in 1924. His study, Lenin, which appeared in that year, was partly a response to the criticism he received from Lenin and other Soviet writers. For a collection of some of these responses and the ensuing debate see Cerutti, Claussen, Krah, Negt and Schmidt, Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein heute. Diskussion und Dokumentation, Amsterdam 1971.

19. E. Grünwald, loc cit.


28. Loc. cit., p.3.

29. Ibid., p.4.


32. Ibid., p.7.

33. Ibid., p.9.


It should be pointed out here that the English translation differs substantially from the original German volume. The German original consisted of three chapters - 'Ideology and Utopia', with a few key opening pages omitted in the English translation; 'Is Politics as a Science Possible? (The problem of theory and practice)'; 'Utopian Consciousness'.


See D. Kettler, loc. cit.

They were, in fact, presented by Kurt Wolff. See K.H. Wolff, Karl Mannheim, Wissenssoziologie, Neuwied/Berlin, 1964.

From Karl Mannheim, loc. cit., p.lxxi.

Personal communication from E. Shils, one of the original translators. For examples of the differences between the German original and the English translation see appendix.

'Mannheim et le Marxisme hongrois', loc. cit.

See above n. 39.


For Dilthey's and Troeltsch's relevant works, see ch. 1, below. The relationship between the emergence of the sociology of knowledge and the work of Dilthey, especially on the analysis of world-views, and that of Troeltsch, on the problem of historicism will be examined below. See ch. 1. This absence of translations remains true, despite the recent publication of two readers on the sociology of knowledge, neither of which includes this early material. See J.E. Curtis & J.W. Petras (eds.), The Sociology of Knowledge: A Reader, London 1971; G. Remmling, Towards the Sociology of Knowledge, London 1973.


57. See R.K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, New York 1957. Merleau-Ponty commented on the separation of sociology and philosophy in his opening remarks to 'The Philosopher and Sociology' where he wrote, 'Philosophy and sociology have long lived under a segregated system which has succeeded in concealing their rivalry only by refusing them any meeting ground, impeding their growth, making them incomprehensible to one another, and thus placing culture in a situation of permanent crisis'. In M. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, Language and Sociology, (ed. J.O'Neill), London 1974, p. 95.

58. This is not to suggest that there exist no links between the empiricist tradition and those mentioned but rather that as the sole basis for evaluating non-empiricist theories an empiricist stance remains inappropriate at the level of understanding.


61. See A.W. Gouldner, loc. cit., p. 17.

62. Ibid., p. 17.

63. A. Oberschall, Empirical Social Research in Germany, 1848-1914, Hague 1965. See also the discussion below, ch. 2.


Soziologie, Neuwied/Berlin 1969. See also my introduction to the English translation of the above volume, The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, London 1976. (Contains a bibliography of later contributions to this debate.)


67. J. Habermas, op. cit., p. vii
CHAPTER ONE

Antecedents and context
CHAPTER ONE

In an attempt to understand the distinctive nature of the German tradition of the sociology of knowledge in the Weimar Republic, it is important to re-examine not merely the immediate theoretical and practical context of its emergence but also its antecedents. This should not be intended as an invitation to rétrace, for instance, the development of a theory of ideology from Bacon, Helvetius, Holbach, Destutt de Tracy down to the twentieth century. Rather, our concern will be with those philosophical and sociological traditions that inform the sociology of knowledge that developed in Weimar Germany. Here the focus of attention might be on such traditions as the Marxism of the Second International, Dilthey’s Lebensphilosophie and Weltanschauungslehre, Nietzsche’s critique of ideology, Simmel’s theory of alienation, Weber’s theory of values and Troeltsch’s historicism. In turn, some of these traditions also permeate the theoretical crises in Weimar Germany - such as 'the crisis of historicism' (Troeltsch) or the Wissenschaftsstreit. Indeed, the whole atmosphere of crisis permeates much of the writings on the sociology of knowledge in Weimar Germany. Mannheim, for instance, saw his Ideologie und Utopie as itself 'conscious of an intellectual crisis situation'.

On the other hand, whereas Mannheim often saw this crisis as an intellectual one, there is little doubt that it was itself a part of a wider social and political crisis in Weimar Germany that surfaces in various forms in the sociology of knowledge. Often, the sociology of knowledge itself is seen
to emanate from these practical crises. Scheler, for example, as we shall see, suggests that the relativist outlook permeating the sociology of knowledge has its roots in the new parliamentarism. Similarly, one cannot fully comprehend Mannheim's theory of political ideologies without being aware that Ideologie und Utopie was written in the context of a crumbling fragmentary political structure in the latter part of the Weimar Republic.

In Lukács's case, Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein is itself both a theoretical and political response to the revolutionary aspirations of sections of the Marxist tradition and the failed revolutions in Hungary and Germany. In terms of an oversimplified model of the socio-political and economic constellation in Weimar Germany, one can point to three periods. The first is the aftermath of the First World War 'defeat', the Revolution of 1918/19, the political and economic upheaval down to 1923, including the uprising of March 1921. This is the period in which Lukács's essays that constitute Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein were written. For Lukács, of course, his role in the Hungarian Revolution and participation in Béla Kun's short-lived revolutionary government and his subsequent exile are also of central importance. This period between 1918 and 1923 may perhaps be characterised as one of near-total dislocation and uncertainty. It was, for Lukács, the period of adherence to what he later termed 'messianic Marxism'. The second period, characterised as that of 'relative stabilisation' extends from 1924 and the Dawes Plan down to the financial collapse of 1929. Lukács, in a later account of German philosophy and social theory, located Scheler's sociology of knowledge within this period. One might add that most of Mannheim's work on the sociology of knowledge also falls within this period. The third period from 1929 to 1933 is characterised by the economic collapse of the German economy and the increasing disintegration of the political structure. The fragmentation that
characterised the parliamentary political scene gave way to an increasing polarisation and, what was crucial for Mannheim, the collapse of parties occupying the middle ground of the political spectrum. Though, strictly speaking, this final period cannot be said to inform Mannheim's Ideologie und Utopie - since it was completed in 1928 - Mannheim nonetheless incorporated this fragmentation of the political structure into his sociology of knowledge, both in his paper on competition and in Ideologie und Utopie. Furthermore, as will be evident from an examination of the reception of Ideologie und Utopie, the fact that it was published in 1929 ensured that Mannheim's contemporaries would recognise that the 'intellectual crisis' of which he spoke was itself part of a much deeper crisis permeating the Weimar Republic.

What this suggests is that the sociology of knowledge was not merely viewed as an academic discipline concerned with broad theoretical issues but itself contained practical and sometimes overtly political aims. Scheler and Mannheim both saw a significant pedagogic role either for a Weltanschauungslehre or for the sociology of knowledge. Much of Mannheim's later work is intent on relating his sociology of knowledge insights to the contemporary situation. This becomes most explicit in Ideologie und Utopie where one of its immediate aims - and that of the sociology of knowledge - is 'a diagnosis of the times'. In Lukács case, the practical political intentions of the critique of ideology contained in Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein are openly presented. But in Mannheim's Ideologie und Utopie, too, the problem of ideology is also located within the context of a discussion of theory and practice.

In examining both the philosophical and sociological context and the practical socio-economic and political context of the sociology of knowledge in
Weimar Germany, an attempt will be made, wherever possible, to investigate these contexts initially in the light of the sociology of knowledge's own interests. In this way, they cease to be 'external' contexts but a constituent element of our textual understanding. Conversely, the works themselves must be seen as interventions in the crises, controversies of both the theoretical and practical domains and not merely writings about these crises.

II

It is possible to see in the various philosophical and sociological traditions that were taken up by the sociology of knowledge important modes of reflection upon issues that the sociology of knowledge later dealt with. A sociology of culture, a theory of ideology, hermeneutic and historicist reflection upon the problem of interpretation, a sociological-biological critique of reason, a base-superstructure model of society, a theory of cultural alienation, Weltanschauungsanalyse, and the relativist problematic are amongst some of the central themes in the sociology of knowledge in Germany. All had been developed within the various philosophical and sociological traditions that the sociology of knowledge was to take up in Weimar Germany. At the end of his essay on 'Wissenssoziologie', Mannheim very briefly reviews its development and highlights the most important of its forerunners. Those that are most relevant to the German tradition are Marx, Nietzsche, Dilthey and - Mannheim adds - for the modern period, Lukács and Scheler. Since Lukács and Scheler are associated with this tradition and are discussed in detail below, it would seem reasonable to examine the first three writers for their significance in the development of the sociology of knowledge in Germany.
But in itself this would not give us a sufficiently clear focus upon the specific problems raised by the sociology of knowledge and its distinctive mode of dealing with them. Rather, we need to know in advance what the common features of the sociology of knowledge were.

There is little doubt that one of the central features of the sociology of knowledge was either a confrontation with the theory of ideology or an attempt to develop it further or, finally, an attempt to transform it into a sociology of knowledge. One might provisionally assume that the source of this theory of ideology and its extension in the sociology of knowledge lay in Marx's critique of ideology. But even in the case of Lukács, whose *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein* seems most obviously to be a Hegelian-Marxist reinterpretation of Marx's critique of ideology, we find that his theory of ideology and reification is embedded in fundamental strands of German sociology, however critical of them he might be. In Mannheim's case, it has often been assumed that the roots of his sociology of knowledge lay in Marx. Grünwald, for instance, suggests that 'Mannheim's philosophical position ... is that of a historicism derived from Marx and Dilthey interspersed with phenomenological elements'. In the course of the discussion surrounding Mannheim's paper on competition, he himself agreed that 'Marx has influenced him but ... in association with Dilthey's spirit'. In Scheler's case - and he was less obviously concerned with the development of a theory of ideology - one is confronted with a bewildering array of influences. As Coser suggests,

As one proceeds to read his work, one is struck even more forcibly by the variety of his intellectual forebears. Besides Husserl, Influences of Dilthey, Bergson, of German neo-vitalism, and above all of
Nietzsche are unmistakable. But Scheler’s thought is also deeply marked by Saint Augustine and Pascal, by Cardinal Newman and Saint Francis. 9

Of course, not all of these are responsible for Scheler’s quasi-biological base-superstructure theory of knowledge and ideology. It is probably Nietzsche who is central to this aspect of his work.

Thus, whereas at first sight it might seem apparent that the theory of ideology in the sociology of knowledge is derived from Marx’s work, the situation appears more complex. The specific constellation of intellectual currents is well expressed by Barth with reference to the theory of ideology in Weimar Germany:

‘The problems that emerge with the concept of ideology in the present period, in their scope and comprehensiveness, become intelligible primarily on the basis of the intellectual-historical background which has been formed with the amalgamation of motives of recent historicism and philosophy of life together with Nietzsche’s biological-sociological critique of reason and Marx’s base-superstructure doctrine. 10

Barth highlights the four central strands that are important for an understanding of the German tradition in the sociology of knowledge: Marx, Dilthey (Lebensphilosophie), historicism and Nietzsche. In order to give some indication of the specific form which the theory of ideology (Ideologie) took in Weimar Germany, we may point to Barth’s account of its four basic presuppositions. He highlights them as follows:

1 In the anthropological conception, the irrational will and drives take over the leading functions. Intellect and reason appear as epiphenomena that owe their emergence to human beings’ need for orientation to the world and that are created and prove successful as instruments in the service of the life-struggle. Human intellectual
equipment is a form of adaptation to the general struggle for the maintenance and development of existence.

2 By means of the primacy of the will over reason, the main body of human activity is situated in this practical behaviour that is to be characterised, in the broadest sense of the word, as the economy. With the recognition of the predominance of the will over the mind and reason, the view is endorsed that the will directed toward life's welfare and the institutional forms in which it operates relate to human intellectual functions and their creations in the same way as the material base relates to the ideological superstructure. This viewpoint is dangerous in so far as it supports the tendency to believe that cognitive and concrete-practical behaviour can be separated from one another and in so far as it encourages the impression that the economic welfare of life takes place without the cooperation of intellectual functions. However, as Marx correctly remarked, the economy is always composed of both intellectual and mental labour.

3 Since intellectual activity develops originally in the closest contact with the provision of life and orientation to the world, since therefore it is assumed that it is linked with concrete-practical interests, there emerges the belief that, in its apparently "pure" development, its primary determination, to operate in the service of life, is not sacrificed.

4 There exists a relationship of dependency between the world of objective and subjective mind, on the one hand, and the economic-social basis, on the other. This dependency is embodied in an insidious and dubious metaphor: it is maintained that the contents and forms of the mind are the "expression" of these material existential foundations and their organisation.

We can see already, in the outline of the four fundamental presuppositions of the theory of ideology, that it would be erroneous to assume that this theory of ideology embodied in the sociology of knowledge is simply taken from Marx. Therefore, one of the tasks of illuminating the context within which this theory of ideology is developed in the sociology of knowledge in
Germany will be to examine its understanding of Marx's critique of ideology. In turn, this is only possible if we can examine this understanding in the light of its mediation through the Marxism of the Second International and German sociology itself.

In his study of the reception of Marx's work in the sociology of knowledge in Weimar Germany, Lenk demonstrates how far this tradition relied for its understanding of Marx's critique of ideology upon interpretations of Marx that had already gone some way towards 'destroying' Marx's critique of ideology. 12 Lenk argues that the sociology of knowledge in Weimar Germany obtained its interpretation of Marx either from the Marxism of the Second International or from German sociology itself in the writings of Simmel, Max Weber and Troeltsch. Despite the fact that Lenk seeks to draw a sharp demarcation line between Marx's and Engels' notions of ideology and base-superstructure notions that can hardly be maintained unproblematically in the light of recent analyses by Wellmer, 13 Böhler 14 and others, his account of the Marxism of the Second International and of Engels' own later work suggests that the development of vulgar Marxism was already well under way before the substantive development of sociology in Germany. That is, Lenk argues that the base-superstructure model of society, which itself presupposes two realms of existence, was already present in Marxism itself. For instance, Lenk suggests that

1In comparison with Marx, Engels exhibits a preference for concepts that signify a causal or interactional relation between base and ideology, expressions such as "mirror-image", "reflection", "economic reflection", etc, that in part are also already applied by Marx but which do not yet possess this dominating character as in Engels.
The simple reduction of the superstructure to a material base is therefore already present in Marxism itself. So, too, is the absence of reflection upon the nature of the truth of this 'consciousness' in the superstructure. Similarly, the naturalisation of society in the scientific and positivistic interpretation of Marxism also reduces any dialectical notion of the subject-object relationship to that of 'interaction'. Socialism as a scientific world view sought to understand Marxism as a world view that encompassed nature, history and society. In it science and politics, theory and practice are identical in the sense that politics is merely the application of scientific knowledge.  

A second tendency towards the 'scientization' of Marxism lay in the opposite tendency which commenced from a critical separation of empirical propositions and normative implications within Marxist theory.  

The implications of this 'scientific' Marxism, especially in its first variant, for the sociology of knowledge and probably already evident. Lenk maintains that if law-like regularities are valid for nature and society to the same extent, then the social base must be explained as the authentic reality - in the sense of an ontologised ens realissimum; the superstructure however, must be explained as a relatively insignificant epiphenomenon for the real movement of history and the social process. The naturalisation of society in this world-view must also lead to the demise of the significance of human practice. It is this view of Marxism, amongst others, that Lukács criticized under the rubric of 'orthodox' Marxism. In the sociology of knowledge, the two-sphere notion of reality is, as we shall see, at the centre of Scheler's sociology of knowledge. In its extreme form, this ontological separation of base and superstructure leads to what Scheler
himself termed 'the powerlessness of the mind', or, in a different context, to Mannheim's notion of 'the homelessness of the mind'.

The vulgar Marxist tendency was not merely present within the orthodoxy and revisionism in the Second International. This interpretation of Marxism was, Lenk maintains, also widely accepted in German sociology. Key figures in this tradition accepted the interpretation of Marxism advanced by the orthodoxy such as Kautsky and sought to counter its 'one-sidedness'. For instance, as Bosse suggests, in a study of the relationship between the sociology of religion and Marx's critique of ideology in the work of Max Weber and Troeltsch,

'Troeltsch and Weber, with their critique of "economism" and "materialism" claim to have refuted the core of the Marxist critique of ideology. They presuppose the unity and continuity of the Marxist critique of ideology from Marx to their Marxist contemporaries.'

This is not to suggest that they did not differentiate between their Marxist contemporaries or that Weber, for instance, - as Löwith argued - was not primarily concerned with a critique of orthodox Marxists such as Kautsky. Nonetheless, Marxism as the 'materialist interpretation of history' was criticized for its economic mono-causality whilst, at the same time, it was viewed as a fund of possible working hypotheses. Its approach to the study of society became one of many possible approaches. Specific aspects of Marx's theory, such as the theory of alienation and commodity fetishism, were - with the exception of Simmel - almost completely ignored in both German sociology and orthodox Marxism. Both were taken up by Lukács as central themes in his _Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein_. But in the sociology of knowledge, Insofar as it either remained fixed upon this earlier
interpretation of Marxism (Scheler) or failed to take up these aspects of Lukács' work whilst retaining others (Mannheim?), a theory of alienation was developed sometimes explicitly but often implicitly that had its origins not in Marx but in various traditions in German philosophy and sociology.

The reduction of Marx's critique of ideology to a base-superstructure theory of society, in which the causal relationships posited between the two led to the superstructure becoming an epiphenomenon, could also lead to the substitution of a theory of ideology without its critique. The simple positing of connections between base and superstructure as a theory of ideology can reduce the truth claims of propositions, theories, etc., in the superstructure to mere assertions that are invalidated merely by virtue of being socially rooted in the base. In other words, their truth claims are ignored. To what extent this was the direction in which the sociology of knowledge moved must be examined later.

A critique of ideology, although not systematically developed in his work, can also be found in the writings of Nietzsche. This critique of ideology - as Barth and, more recently, Funke have shown - is perhaps as important as the theory of ideology taken over by the sociology of knowledge from Marxist orthodoxy and German sociology's understanding of Marx for an understanding of the sociology of knowledge itself. In examining the relevance of Nietzsche's work for the sociology of knowledge, it will not be possible to do more than outline some of the salient features of his critique of ideology and his philosophy of history. Its significance for the sociology of knowledge, however, is particularly evident in Scheler's work but Mannheim also argued that, aside from Marx,
'The other source of the modern theory of ideology and the sociology of knowledge is to be found in the flashes of insight of Nietzsche, who combined his concrete observations in this area with a theory of drive-structures and a theory of knowledge that is reminiscent of pragmatism. Though he too employed sociological imputation, it is largely the categories "aristocratic and democratic cultures" to which he imputed specific modes of thought.25

Is this, in fact, where the relevance of Nietzsche's work for the sociology of knowledge lies?

In his examination of Nietzsche's theory of ideology, Barth draws attention to the connection in his work between his biological and sociological critique of reason and truth, on the one hand, and his theory of ideology on the other. The latter is a constituent element of the former. Nietzsche's critique of reason is one that reduces the whole cognitive apparatus back to a biological basis, and in particular 'the will to power'. He engages in a radical destruction of logical forms and laws which he views as merely manifestations of the will to power. In more general terms, the search for knowledge in all its forms is reduced to a function of the will to power: hence, questions of truth become questions of power.

But this search for truth and quest for knowledge is itself an essential social need. The intellect creates a world for us that is of value to us but it is a world of illusions. As Nietzsche put it: 'We only live through illusions' or 'The fundamental aspect of all that is great and lively rests upon illusion. The pathos of truth leads to decline'.26 Hence, the most general consequence of the intellect is delusion about oneself and the world since its creations ignore the fact that it is itself merely an organ of the will. Man, for his part, is not interested in 'the truth' as such but merely in the use he
can put it to. In his theories and his morality, man seeks to establish timeless, and reified (the concept of Verdinglichung occurs often in Nietzsche's work) notions that ignore 'the eternal flux of all things', 'the eternal transformation'. Hence, 'There are no eternal facts: just as there are no absolute truths'. The 'relative' truths that we produce are the result of our pragmatic interests. In this connection, Habermas has suggested that

'Nietzsche's "theory of knowledge" ... consists in the attempt to comprehend the categorial framework of the natural sciences ..., the concept of law ..., the operational basis of experience ..., and the rules of logic and calculation as the relative apriori of a world of objective illusion that has been produced for the purposes of mastering nature and thus of preserving existence.'

This 'world of objective illusion' - that also exists in the moral sphere too - is relative because both intellect and drives are, for Nietzsche, 'reducible to the will to power'. It is also 'a perspectivistic illusion' since this world 'can be interpreted differently, it does not have a meaning behind it, but innumerable meanings. - "Perspectivism". It is our needs that interpret the world; our instincts and their pro and con.'

The theory of knowledge must therefore be replaced by a theory of perspectives - a task not carried out by Nietzsche but by a doctrine of world views (Weltanschauungslehre) and the sociology of knowledge.

The key to Nietzsche's critique of ideology lies in his 'universal reduction of psychological, intellectual and social forms and contents of life to the will to power'. We may take morality as an instance of one of these forms that is a central focus of attack in Nietzsche's critique of ideology. Nietzsche posits a diversity of moral systems that fulfil the needs of various social strata which are themselves either emergent or declining, powerless or dominant. This diversity is related to the diversity of their creat-
ors and agents and takes a hierarchical form:

'Each class and each strata possess the morality that is appropriate to its interests and its will to power. For Nietzsche, the principle of this social order rests in the polarity of domination and subordination, command and commanded, leaders and led... The sociological aspect of his critique is thus manifested in the fact that he investigates the notions of moral behaviour as to whether they are the expression of an elite or a mass.'

Barth goes on to suggest that the whole of the 'superstructure' in Nietzsche's critique of ideology possess an instrumental character; it is the instrument of vital interests of the organism and especially of the will to power. It thus robs both reason and the mind of any autonomy and removes any questions of truth from this 'superstructure'. The mind is always 'directed' (dirigiert) by the will to power even in a period of the devaluation and inversion of valued (another central theme in Scheler's social philosophy). In such a period there exists a 'war of the mind', a struggle for power but in the form of a struggle between 'value-judgments' and an attempt to devalue those of one's opponent. These value-judgments change with the conditions of life but they, in turn, can be reduced to drives and impulses, i.e. to a biological basis. Hence, the mind is merely a part of a larger organism and is distinguished from biological processes only by its 'sophistication'. As Nietzsche put it, the mind is 'merely a means as an instrument in the service of higher life'.

Nietzsche's radical critique of ideology, with its socio-biological reductivism, its elite-mass mode of society, its destruction of truth claims and hence its predication of relativism (or 'perspectivism') is, as we shall see, central to an understanding of Scheler's sociology of knowledge and,
to a lesser extent, that of Mannheim. But even in Mannheim's sociology of knowledge, which is deeply impregnated with a historicist standpoint, Nietzsche's philosophy of history, as an early instance of this historicism, is also relevant. History is significant for Nietzsche only insofar as 'history serves life'. It too is instrumentalised. In his critique of ideology, we have also already come across the importance of perspectivism. Historical knowledge, too, is possible only through perspectivism. Each approach to history presupposes an interest structure that is dependent upon specific life-situations. Mannheim, too, often traces these life situations back to world-orientations and forms of the will. But more significant for an understanding of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge is Dilthey's Lebensphilosophie, Weltanschauungslehre and theory of Verstehen.

Lenk, in his study of the sociology of knowledge, suggests that, alongside the critique and reception of Marx, historicism is the most important strand of German sociology since Simmel. He maintains that 'What links historicism and Marxism with one another in the perspective of German sociology is the interpretation of intellectual categories and forms as expressions of the existential realm that lies behind them.'

What differentiates historicism and Marxism, he argues, is the concept of existence to which intellectual forms are reduced: experience (Erlebnis) in the one case and the concrete totality of social phenomena in the other.

However, in order to approach Dilthey's work, in particular, it is necessary to take a more specific focus. The significance of Dilthey's work for Mannheim's sociology of knowledge and especially for his earlier writings has already been alluded to; namely, than Marx's work was interpreted by Mannheim in the spirit of Dilthey. Similarly, Grünwald
argues with reference to Dilthey's work that in it

'there lie contained in nuce all the difficulties with which subsequently historicism and the sociology of knowledge founded upon it had to struggle.' 36

These include the delineation of the form of existence to which knowledge is related, the understanding of expressions of that existence, the interpretation of world-views, the relativity of world-views and the attempt to synthesize these world-views. 37

In his theory of the Geisteswissenschaften and his critique of historical reason, Dilthey takes as his starting point a cognitive subject that is not, as in Kant, a transcendental ego but 'the whole human being' as a historical and psychological reality - existing within a real life-process. The activity of consciousness is related, therefore, to effective life. The human sciences are to be grounded in the context of experience (Erlebnis), expression (Ausdruck) and understanding (Verstehen). Experience is the fundamental 'fact of consciousness'. The contents of this individual experience are contextual in character. They are located within the context of the 'course of life' (Lebensverlauf). This flow of life contains 'our notions, evaluations and purposes'. Life (Leben) is thus more comprehensive that experience, and individual experiences are to be interpreted in the context of life as a totality. Schnädelbach describes their status as follows:

'If, along with Dilthey, one interprets experience as the unity of inner and outer, subjectivity and objectivity and as an element in the context of life, then "life" too must also be understood as such a unity, i.e. not as a transcendental metaphysical principle [but] . . . after Hegel, i.e. after the discrediting of absolute idealism, "life" is the concept of totality that . . . enters in the systematic place of Hegel's "absolute spirit".' 38
Hence, the concept of life becomes both the transcendental basis for the critique of knowledge and the constitution of the historical world and a metaphysical principle (later developed by countless philosophers as Lebensphilosophie).

However, what is of significance for the sociology of knowledge is not merely its own attempt to ground historical knowledge (especially in Mannheim's unpublished essays) but also the importance of the hermeneutic problem of interpretation and understanding (Verstehen). Individual experiences, for Dilthey, are manifestations of life. The relationship between the two is reflexive since the interpretation of experiences and their objectivations in terms of life is itself to return to human beings themselves who constitute this life. Hence, the totality of human studies constitutes the scientific self-understanding of life, that is, the self-knowledge of humanity. The orientation of the knowing subject, therefore, and its attitude with regard to its objects is what constitutes the human sciences. The cognitive subject interprets the objectivations of life in the light of his own life-experiences, i.e. within the context of life itself.

But this interpretation of the objectivations of life is also located historically and temporally. The model of historical understanding is the autobiography since

"The autobiography is the highest and most instructive form in which the understanding of life confronts us... here we approach... the roots of all historical interpretation." 40

Historical understanding, therefore, must be rooted in individual experience. But the instance of the autobiography is also instructive in that it is one in which
the distance between the subject of understanding and the object of understanding is here demonstrably mediated by the "living" identity of subject and object, a phenomenon that, according to Dilthey is constitute for historical knowledge as such. 41

In other words, the relationship between subject and object is unproblematic.

In order to comprehend the significant of Dilthey's notion of historical knowledge and the sociology of knowledge, we must examine his notion of history and historicity further.

Dilthey's tendency, in his earlier writings at least, to provide a psychological foundation of history in the individual human subject leads him into considerable difficulties. One of these is highlighted by Lieber when he argues that

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In his later writings, Dilthey attempts to deal with the temporality of life.

Time as something concretely experienced is located in life:

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Each of these dimensions of time are to be apprehended in different ways since

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When we look back in memory, we comprehend the context of the past element of the flow of life with the category of meaning (Bedeutung). When we live in the present that is filled with realities we experience in intuitive understanding their positive or negative value, and as we hold
out the future before us there emerges out of this process the categories of purpose. 44

In short the past is apprehended through the category of meaning or significance, the present through that of value and the future through purpose.

Of these categories, the crucial one for Dilthey is that of meaning:

'Only the category of meaning overcomes the mere juxtaposition, the mere subordination of aspects of life. And just as history is memory and this memory belongs to the category of meaning then, so too, is this the genuine category of historical thought.' 45

Lieber draws the implication from this that 'history must always have already occurred in order for it to be able to be comprehended as a significant context of meaning'. 46 The problems of ex post interpretation and the imputation of meaning are central to Mannheim's sociology of knowledge. Similarly, the past (ideology), the future (utopia) and the present ('diagnosis of the times') in his theory of ideology can also be related to Dilthey's distinctions.

However, within the context of Dilthey's philosophy of history, there exist another set of problems that are crucial to the German tradition in the sociology of knowledge: the analysis of world views. 47 Since a philosophy is bound up with the times in which it emerged, difference philosophical systems - at this level of analysis, philosophy, too, is reduced to a worldview - confront one another in their 'historical anarchy'. Since they strive towards universally valid knowledge, this confrontation, this 'anarchy' is inevitable. As we shall see, Mannheim's critique of existing epistemologies is precisely that they claim absolute validity and yet are existentially bounded. However, the similarities between Dilthey's Weltanschauungslehre and Mannheim's sociology of knowledge go much deeper.
Dilthey produces a theory of the development of world-views that is not confined merely to philosophy. At the roots of elementary world-views lies the experience that

'Every great impression shows man a particular side of life; the world appears in a new light; our attitudes towards life develop as such experiences are repeated and combined.' 48

Dilthey distinguishes between these lower forms of world-view (perhaps what Mannheim would also term 'world-view') and a higher form (what Mannheim would term an 'ideology') as follows:

'Such attitudes towards life ... form the lower stratum for the formation of world-views. These try to solve the enigma of life on the basis of the experiences in which the individual's varied relationships to life are reflected. In the higher forms of world-views, one procedure is particularly prominent—understanding something which cannot be grasped as it is given to us by means of something more distinct.' 49

It is in this second level that philosophy belongs and it is at this second level that 'the historical anarchy of these systems' of philosophy takes place. Dilthey argues that

'In each of the definitions of philosophy, only one aspect of its essence appears. Each of them is merely the expression of a standpoint which philosophy adopted at one stage in its history. Each states what to one or more thinkers in a certain context seemed requisite and possible as its role. Each of them defines a particular group of phenomena as philosophy, excluding from this group the other things often so-called. The great oppositions of standpoints, contending with equal force, gain expression in the definitions. They assert themselves over against one another with equal justification. And the dispute can be settled only if a standpoint above the factions can be found.' 50

Dilthey's solution is to provide a 'philosophy of philosophy' that will examine existent philosophies. This is possible because, despite the
'historical anarchy' of philosophies, the same types of world-view recur again and again in the historical process. They are confined to naturalism, subjective idealism and objective idealism. Since they confront one another 'with equal justification' no rationally groundable decision can be made in favour of any one of them; any decision can only be an existential one. Lieber draws a further implication from Dilthey's analysis of world-views; namely, that within the history of philosophy, 'what has become fact and objectivated in this history becomes the irreducible norm for the historical self-interpretation and self-creation of men.' This constancy in the recurrence of the same types of world-views probably derives from Dilthey's notion of human nature, as when he maintains that

'A common human nature and the arrangement by which individuality is produced are vitally related to reality which is always and everywhere the same; life always shows the same sides.'

This would appear to conflict with his own view that, once 'voluntary theory' developed we became aware of 'the relativity of every historical form of life'. But perhaps, for Dilthey, 'human nature' is prior to 'life'.

As will be clear from an analysis of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge, the situation of conflicting, irreconcilable world-views is the starting point for his theory of ideology. The synthesis of world-views to be undertaken by a 'philosophy of philosophy' in Dilthey's work is performed by the sociology of knowledge in relation to competing ideologies. As Gadamer has argued, many of Dilthey's own problems arise from his 'entanglement in the impasses of historicism'. The historicism of Dilthey and later writers constitutes a further significant dimension in the sociology of knowledge, particularly in Mannheim's.
It has already been suggested by Lenk that historicism, interpreted in its widest sense, is, along with the reception of Marxism, one of the essential impulses in the sociology of knowledge. Lenk argues that the whole Lebensphilosophie tradition had an important influence upon the concept of historical development. The element of directedness, and its progressive element are lost in a merely formal dynamism of 'dull will and drive'. History ceases to have a meaning. Its meaning and truth are instead derived from the soul of creative individuals. As we have already seen in Dilthey's work, the search for a synthesis within- or, rather, from without - this stream of life is a central intention of his Weltanschauungslehre. In other writers, such as Simmel or Troeltsch and later in the sociology of knowledge itself, there is a persistent searching for a cultural synthesis when faced with the relativist consequences of historicism, This cultural synthesis is to be a synthesis not merely of streams of thought but is also to be relevant for practice. It is most fully developed perhaps in Troeltsch's writings on historicism.

In the period around and shortly after the First World War, historicism, as a mode of thought and philosophical position that interpreted the validity of concepts and norms only in terms of the historically given and accepted a throughgoing historical relativism, was seen by many to be in a crisis. This crisis, it was assumed, could be overcome. Heussi, in a later study of the crisis of historicism, suggests that 'the crisis of historicism is the crisis of historical thought in the years after the World War' and includes the work of Mannheim within this context as well as that of Troeltsch. In his essay on the crisis of historicism, Troeltsch defines historicism as 'the historicization of our whole knowledge and
experience of the intellectual world, as it emerged in the course of the nineteenth century. We see here everything in the flux of becoming, in the endless and ever new individualisation, in the determination by what has passed and in the direction of an unrecognised future. The state, law, morality, religion and art are dissolved in the flux of the historically emergent. . .

Noticeably, it is the 'superstructure' that is historicized here, the whole of the cultural and intellectual apparatus. In the period around the First World War, 'all previously self-evident standards were shaken and thereby all images of development'. It was a period of 'general historical relativism', scepticism towards history and often deep pessimism. More specifically, the crisis of historicism had to deal with the epistemological and logical problems of the study of history, to confront the introduction of sociological elements into historical research and explanation and 'the shaking of ethical systems of value'. The latter results in 'the anarchy of values' and the struggle of value systems one with another. Troeltsch sees the solution to this crisis in 'a new contact between history and philosophy': 'Historicism longs for ideas, philosophy for life. Both can be helped by such a connection.' Elsewhere, Troeltsch calls more forcefully for a cultural synthesis. But it is clear that such solutions remain firmly anchored within the historicist problematic. This is the starting point for one of the key dimensions of the sociology of knowledge. In its final form in Mannheim's work, we are still confronted with the demand for a cultural synthesis as its solution.

Within the sphere of sociology and social theory itself, Lenk has argued,
with some plausibility, that from the beginning of the century at least
German sociology was permeated by a 'tragic consciousness'. He
suggests that it may be summarised in the form of three central motifs:

'Firstly, in the first quarter of our century sociology
reflects the process of independence of circumstances
and institutions created by individuals from human
needs. State organisations, bureaucratic appar-
atuses and political institutions have, as a result
and to a considerable extent, taken on a self-
dynamic that is hardly controllable any more ...
(theory of alienation): secondly, in these sociolo-
gical outlines, the sphere of economic, political
and social relations and decisions of power ("real
factors", interests, "social being") confronts the
sphere of values ("ideal factors") that is relative-
ly unbounded by the former (two-realm-theory);
thirdly, the intellectual-ideal sphere, measured
against the "massivity" of the social base, takes
on a more or less unreal, powerless character
(thesis of powerlessness).'

Included within this 'tragic consciousness' and as one of its central
strands - as can be seen from the theoretical references - is the sociology
of knowledge itself. Lenk even goes so far as to suggest that this tragic
consciousness is also characteristic of the whole of the crisis symptoms
of the German cultural and human sciences in the inter-war period that has
its roots in 'the collapse of German imperialism'. Insofar as this is the
case, it would appear to lose its specific interpretative value for the
sociology of knowledge in Germany. On the other hand, these tragic
dualisms do recur continually in the sociology of knowledge - especially in
the work of Scheler - even though they do not have their origins there.

Rather, along with some of the philosophical tendencies that have already
been discussed, it is necessary to examine in this context the relevance of
two central figures in the German sociological tradition - Simmel and Max
Weber - for the development of the sociology of knowledge.
In Simmel's case, we can point to the importance of his theory of cultural alienation not merely for Mannheim's sociology of knowledge but also for Lukács' theory of culture. In Philosophie des Geldes and elsewhere in his writings on culture, Simmel presents us with a theory of cultural alienation and an unbridgable subject-object duality that is manifested in the gulf between subjective and objective culture. This duality within his theory of cultural crisis gives it its tragic pathos. Though there are many apparent similarities between Simmel's theory of alienation and that of Marx, the central thrust of his argument is against historical materialism. Simmel makes this clear in the preface to Philosophie des Geldes where he explicitly states his intention:

'to construct a new storey beneath historical materialism such that the explanatory value of the incorporation of economic life into the causes of intellectual culture is preserved, whilst these forms themselves are recognised as the result of more profound valuations and currents of psychological, even metaphysical preconditions.'

Such an intention ensures that the forms of alienation and estrangement that Simmel discusses will constitute merely a part of a wider tragic situation.

Simmel's theory of cultural alienation rests upon the separation of human beings from what they themselves have produced. One might add that this separation might just as easily be described initially as objectification rather than alienation. The theory of alienation is also rooted in the confrontation of individuals and 'society':

'The interaction between individuals is the starting point of all social formations... Further development replaces the immediacy of interacting forces with the creation of higher supra-individual formations... These formations... are ideal products
of human conceptions and valuations, which in our mind now stand beyond the will and action of the individual as "pure forms". 1

There exists, for Simmel, an eternal conflict between individual energies and will, on the one hand, and their forms of historical expression on the other.

Even where Simmel is most explicit in his account of alienation, as when he examines the consequences of the division of labour, the instances that he provides - though reminiscent of Marx's early writings - are located within the context of the development of a theory of subjective and objective culture. This theory is predicated upon an inevitable dualism of subject and object that can no longer be united dialectically. Thus, Simmel is here concerned with the increase in 'material culture' and the lag in 'individual culture', with the

'accentuation of the enigmatic relationship which prevails between social life and its products on the one hand and the fragmentary life-contents of individuals on the other.' 67

Hence, when Simmel produces instances of the alienation of the producer from his product and where 'the product is completed at the expense of the development of the producer', they are to be located within this context. One must concur with Lenk that

'Where Marx speaks of the "development of forces of production", Simmel moves in the direction of the development of the 'history of culture' that is dependent upon this sphere but has become detached from it. "Objectified labour" becomes transformed into "forms of historical expression of life". "Living labour", however, is enlarged with "ever flowing . . . ever extending life".' 68

In contrast to Dilthey, who at least is concerned with historical currents and historical knowledge, Simmel, according to Kracauer, 'interprets the
historically diverse as a chaos'. Similarly, the development of the money
economy and the various instances of alienation, although we can often see
them as being located only within capitalism, are given no historical location
by Simmel. Instead, as Kracauer suggests, 'he introduces examples from
all periods of history or he works with the supra-historical significance of
intellectual types'.

In his later writings, the location of these fragments and indeed all social
phenomena within 'life' becomes more apparent. Kracauer argues that for
Simmel

'Life becomes to him an absolute principle out of
which all phenomena can be explained and to
which the many forms of existence, objective
structure and norms as well as the subjective
interpretations of diverse entities must equal
be traced back . . . He was indeed convinced
that from a single standpoint the world can
never be fully comprehended.'

The totality is to be found, rather, in 'the absolute flowing movement' of
life. The relativist problematic permeates Simmel's work too.

Another theme in his later writings is the crisis of culture, a crisis that is
to be located once more in our alienation from culture. As Ludwig Marcuse
expressed this alienation: 'Simmel suffered from the powerlessness of
thought (Ohnmacht des Denkens) before life'. More clearly than in
Philosophie des Geldes, concrete forms of alienation become merely part
of a 'very general cultural predicament'. The paradoxical fate of the con-
tents of culture is that

'they were originally created by subjects and for
subjects: but in their intermediate form of object-
ivitv, which they take on . . ., they follow an
Immanent logic of development. In so doing
they estrange themselves from their origin as well as from their purpose. 173

This separation of subjective and objective culture, of 'ideal' and 'real' factors, as well as the explicit relativism of particular perspectives constitutes a significant strand of the sociology of culture and knowledge in Weimar Germany.

Although neither Scheler nor Mannheim ascribe to Max Weber a major role in the development of the sociology of knowledge in Germany - even though, as in Mannheim's case, Weber's work plays a significant part - nonetheless, certain aspects of his work are relevant to its emergence. If we include Lukács within the context of this tradition, then Weber's theory of rationality and the process of rationalisation are much in evidence in Lukács' delineation of reification in Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein. This is quite apart from the use that Lukács makes of the notion of 'imputation' (Zurechnung) and 'objective possibility' both in his earlier works and in his studies on class consciousness. 74

Lenk points to two aspects of Weber's work that are important for an understanding of the context of the sociology of knowledge - his individualistic methodology and his postulate of value-freedom. Sociology, for Weber, is to commence from individual social action and not from collective action by, for instance, social classes or parties. If individual social action was the basis for a sociology, then methodologically it must also be individualistic in its orientation. As he wrote in 1920:

"If I am now a sociologist . . . I am so essentially in order to put an end to the use of collective concepts, a use which still haunts us. In other words: even sociology can only start from the action of one
or a few, or many individuals, i.e. pursue a strictly "individualistic" method. 75

On this basis, it is possible to understand part of his critique of historical materialism. Individual meaningful social behaviour takes place between individuals. Any teleological understanding of history and any notion of developmental tendencies in history are the result of, as Lenk put it, the 'hypostatisation of particular value-judgments into quasi-scientific propositions'. 76

Within the context of a theory of individual social action, it is not surprising that Weber should have seen as the greatest threat to the individual, the progressive rationalisation of all spheres of life. In particular, the inevitable bureaucratisation of the political sphere and, under socialism, the economic sphere left little to choose between the two. On balance, Weber remained committed, as Mommsen has shown, to 'the principle of individual enterprise'. 77 The process of rationalisation, the increasing 'disenchantment of the world' and the all-pervasive bureaucratisation of modern society together made it increasingly difficult to conceive of individual social action. The individual becomes, as in the Simmel's theory of alienation, increasingly powerless. Scheler, in this context, spoke of Weber's 'exaggerated love of darkness, of tragic insoluble tension in life, a love for the irrational as such'. 78

However, Lenk sees a further consequence of Weber's methodological individualism and, in particular, his neo-Kantian tendencies in the strict separation of fact and value. He suggests that

'Insofar as . . . the realm of value, in which particular acting individuals participate, is
located in an extra-social sphere, that, for its part, possesses no visible connection with social realities, the possibility of a critical analysis of social relations disappears in favour of an immanent-theoretical critique of knowledge.179

This immanent-theoretical critique operates with abstract ideal-types that are elevated to 'objects' of knowledge. The realm of value is excluded from the scientific examination of social phenomena which is governed by the principle of value-freedom. The preservation of an autonomous realm of values is, as we shall see, one of Scheler's central aims.

Another related central theme in Mannheim's sociology of knowledge is the conflict and competition between world views and ideologies. For Weber, at least in 'Wissenschaft als Beruf', the postulate of Werturteilsfreiheit was essential 'because the diverse orders of value in the world stand in an insoluble struggle with one another'.60 Furthermore,

'there, in fact, the diverse Gods also struggle with one another and indeed for ever more ... The old plurality of Gods, disenchanted and therefore in the form of Impersonal forces, rise from their graves, strive to gain power over our lives and again resume their eternal struggle with one another.81

Science itself can never bridge or overcome this eternal struggle. Hence, the scientist must perform, as Lenk puts it, a kind of 'internal division of labour' between his scientific activity and his activity as a concrete individual. But the maintenance of this value-freedom postulate is to be distinguished from one of the sociology of knowledge's aims. As Lenk argues,

'Compared with the sociology of knowledge's demand for a cultural synthesis, Weber's postulate of the value-freedom of scientific statements - despite its, as ever, disputed character - must be characterized as much more realistic.'82

Lenk also suggests that in Weber's writings, the demand for the value-freedom
of scientific thought stands in place of a critique of ideology.

Nonetheless, Mannheim's sociology of knowledge, and in particular his analysis in *Ideologie und Utopie*, attempts to grapple with the value-freedom of the social sciences - and politics in particular - as well as calling for a cultural and political synthesis. His theory of ideology also posits the development of a value-free concept of ideology. But, much more so than Weber, Mannheim is concerned to advance beyond the separation of theory and practice that is evident in Weber's scientific demarcations. In so doing, it may be that he oversteps the boundaries of science altogether. This, however, can only reinforce the extent to which the sociology of knowledge had not only theoretical but practical intentions. It is to these practical intentions and the socio-historical context of the sociology of knowledge that we must now turn.

IV

There can be little doubt that the sociology of knowledge in Germany was conceived of not merely as an academic contribution to another branch of sociology but also as a response to various crises in German intellectual life and society. These crises were not necessarily ones that would spring readily to mind after a detailed analysis of Weimar Germany but they represent those crises in intellectual life and society that were perceived to be urgent and significant by those who developed the sociology of knowledge.

Perhaps nowhere is this crisis situation more acutely stated than in Mann-
heim's retrospective examination of German sociology that he published in 1934. There he argues that 'German sociology is the product of one of the greatest social dissolutions and reorganisations, accompanied by the highest form of self-consciousness and of self-criticism... a process of social dissolution and crisis is not simply a negative process. For the significance of crises lies in the fact that they are not simply disintegrations but are, rather, the attempts which society makes to overhaul the whole of its organisation... In this context, then, sociology is seen to be not only the product of this process of dissolution but also a rational attempt to assist in the reorganisation of human society, to help in the reorganisation and readaptation of the individual himself... If the function of a period of crisis and upheaval is defined in this sense, then the period since 1918 may be truly described as the most dynamic period in the history of German society. It was the most dynamic period of society because these two decades saw a continuous and incessant shifting and displacement of social forces.'

However, when we come to examine writings on the sociology of knowledge for an investigation of these 'social dissolutions', we find that it is hardly in evidence. Indeed, in Mannheim's case, the crises are almost always seen as intellectual. Thus, in Ideologie und Utopie, the most overtly political of Mannheim's German writings, Mannheim is concerned with the 'crisis situation of thought'. This is despite the fact that he also argues that the concepts of ideology and utopia reveal 'the possibility of false consciousness'. What this suggests is the extent to which the sociology of knowledge views its field of study as firmly located within the 'superstructure'.

In a similar vein, Mannheim's description of the 'three debts to the dynamic forces of the last fourteen years' owed by German sociology comes nowhere near to grasping the significance of the 'dynamic forces' and crises of Weimar Germany. Instead, they too are located within the realm of con-
sciousness. These three forces are:

1. The awareness that every social fact is a function of the time and place in which it occurs.

2. The whole sphere of spiritual life appears in the new light of this constant variability.

3. Besides this visible interdependence between objective facts and ideas, this social mobility and dissolution reacts upon the human psyche; thus a period of social upheaval has its psychic aspect too.

Only the third of these forces comes close to raising at least the possibility of an examination of the recent changes in German society.

Elsewhere, Mannheim can only relate the development of German sociology - and with it the sociology of knowledge - and its distinctive concerns to the most general of social changes. In his essay on sociology in Germany, for instance, he attributes its emergence to two factors. The first is that the new sociology arose at an hour when the economy broadened into a world economy, when nations and countries were brought closer, but also were ranged against one another, when the occident broke into the orient.

This led, Mannheim argues, to a radical questioning of our position and situation in the world. The second factor lay within German society itself:

Social strata and classes which in decisive matters were previously present only in a passive capacity and whose will, range of instincts, thoughts, and habits had been passed by, broke into the power structure and into the sphere of consciously attended culture with claims of their own.

This is presumably an oblique reference to the emergence of the working class - and possibly the middle classes too - into the political and cultural structure of the Weimar Republic after their exclusion in Wilhelmian Germany.
But once again, the result of this intervention is merely seen as raising the question, 'Who are we?', both in terms of the present and also historically. Within his writings on the sociology of knowledge, it is difficult to gain a clear conception of Mannheim's notion of society. The search for such a conception is necessary in terms of Mannheim's own programme for the sociology of knowledge. As a 'diagnosis of the times', it is remarkably reticent about the composition and structure of the society within which that 'diagnosis' is to take place. In the essay on competition, it is evident that Mannheim adopts a pluralist notion of the composition of German society. It is composed of competing strata and social classes who objectify their world-view within various institutional arrangements such as political parties. In much of Ideologie und Utopie, despite the existence of the concentration of world views and ideologies into a limited number - already suggested in the essay on competition - Mannheim is again reluctant to delineate the composition and structure of the society within which these ideologies hold sway. On occasion, these ideologies are located within the context of class antagonism but in the main world-views and ideologies are seen to be competing rather than conflicting with one another. This would give support to the view that Mannheim operates with a market model of society, at least with regard to world-views and ideologies. In the chapter on Utopia, however, Mannheim more often applied a model of society based upon domination and subordination, though its features remain unclear.

If we turn to Scheler's sociology of knowledge and his contemporary writings, there can be little doubt about his conception of German society. It, too, is a vision of the crises and dissolution of the social structure but from
a distinctive perspective. It springs from a conviction that society, including its rulers, has become decadent. It is a model of society that is firmly based upon a division between incapable elites and 'unruly' masses. Shortly before the First World War, Scheler argued that the basis and fundamental direction of society is provided by elites. It is

'Not an impersonal "idea" (Hegel), not a free-floating "set of laws of reason" or the rational will (Kant and Fichte), not a law-like . . . ongoing development of reason and science (Comte), not the dark, hardly noticeable fate of blood-mixing (that) determines, in the last instance, what exists and what will be, the structure and development of social groups but the existing dominant minority of these who set the pattern and leaders.' 89

This view of the primacy of elites is retained in his post-war writings and within the context of the increasing threat to aristocratic and higher values by the masses. The elite is necessary to overcome the perversion of values that has taken place with industrialization. Scheler's critique of capitalism is that of the neo-romantic anti-capitalist. It is a critique that is constantly wary of the 'unruly' masses who are susceptible to ideologies. Marxism, for instance, is 'a typical ideology of the oppressed and a critical protest ideology'. 90 Scheler consistently describes the German economy as 'capitalist'. Its problems, however, are most often viewed as religious or psychological in origin. Thus, in a lecture in 1920, Scheler asks

'How can and should new, living religious and moral motors be developed in the soul of our people that will give back to them once more the will, energy and desire and satisfaction of work.' 91

German society is, for Scheler, a capitalist society which does contain social classes but they are not the most significant social groupings. In an 'age of adjustment' to the increasing proletarianisation and massification of
society, it is elites and masses that are Scheler's central categories, just as it is presumably an intellectual elite that, by developing the sociology of knowledge, will seek to preserve 'essential' values.

In fact, Scheler saw the sociology of knowledge as itself emerging out of a confrontation with the extreme relativism that has its origins in democratisation and the development of parliamentarianism. He states that

'The new relativistic study of world-views is the theoretical reflection of this democratic parliamentarianism which extends to world-views.'

This process of democratisation threatens the maintenance of absolute values held by a traditional intellectual elite which is faced with 'the increasing unruliness and uncontrollability of the masses and of capitalistic finance grown independent of its creators'. In this age of adjustment or adaptation (Zeitalter des Ausgleichs), one is confronted with a bewildering array of adaptations:

'mutual adaptation of race tensions; mutual adaptation of the mentalities and the ways of regarding oneself, the world and God in all the great cultures, mutual adaptation between the special capacities of the male and female principles in Man; mutual adaptation between comparatively primitive and hypercivilized mentality; relatively mutual adaptation between youth and age in the sense of adequate evaluation of each other's spiritual attitudes; mutual adaptation between class-logics, class conditions and the rights of the upper and lower classes...'

In such an age of adaptation, it becomes all the more important to preserve traditional elites from extinction.

Such a metaphysical vision of contemporary German society is far removed from Lukács' estimation of the crises facing German society in the post-First
World War period. There is no doubt at all that Lukács' analysis of German and other central European societies - such as Hungary - was in terms of the crises of capitalist societies. This is true, at least, for his post-1917 analyses after his 'conversion' to Marxism. What is in doubt is whether Lukács' analysis of capitalism constitutes a 'renewal' of Marx's critique of capitalism or whether it is based upon a combination of Marx's analysis of commodity fetishism, Weber's theory of bureaucracy and, possibly, elements of Simmel's theory of alienation. These issues will be discussed below. For the present, it is important to note that what Lukács took to be the crisis of European and, particularly from 1921 onwards, especially German society was located for him in the 'ideological crisis of the proletariat'. As Grunenberg argues, after the events of March 1921 in Germany and the failure of the workers' uprising,

'Lukács took up the "ideological crisis of the proletariat" as the fundamental problem as such and, in contrast, placed the analysis of the objective factors in the background.'

The development of a revolutionary consciousness, Lukács argued in Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein, should be a precondition of any revolutionary strategy that deals with naked class conflict. Empirically existent class consciousness or 'everyday' class consciousness is not Lukács' concern. With the increasing failure of the working class movements in Germany and elsewhere, Lukács could only develop the notion of an 'imputed' class consciousness that was based on a social class's 'objective possibilities'.

Paradoxical as this may seem, Lukács' analysis of the crisis of capitalism also appears to centre around a crisis of 'consciousness' though, unlike Mannheim, this crisis is specifically located within a particular class, the
proletariat. What this means, however, is that we cannot turn to Lukács for an account of the crisis of German society that Mannheim saw as the source of German sociology and the sociology of knowledge. The 'ideological crisis of the proletariat', however, is the source of a critique of ideology that sought to overcome this crisis through the postulated development of a revolutionary class consciousness.

Yet when we argue that the sociology of knowledge and the critique of ideology have not merely theoretical but practical aims or intentions, then this is nowhere more apparent than in Lukács' *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein*. Lukács himself saw this work as an attempt 'to clarify the theoretical problems of the revolutionary movement' and to re-examine the methodology of critique. The methodological dispute surrounding Marx's mode of procedure in his critique of political economy, for instance, is not a merely theoretical issue. Rather, Lukács maintains that

"the logical conclusion for the dialectician to draw . . . is not that he is faced with a conflict between different scientific methods, but that he is in the presence of a social phenomenon and that by conceiving it as a socio-historical phenomenon he can, at once refute it and transcendent it dialectically." 98

More significantly, Lukács develops in this work what Habermas terms 'a philosophy of history with a practical intent'. 99 Lukács' practical intention lies, then, in an examination of the relationship between the process of reification and the generation of a false praxis, the relationship between the 'ideological crisis of the proletariat' and the development of a revolutionary class consciousness, and the relationship between a critique of ideology and the organisation of revolutionary party activity. The critique of ideology, for Lukács, is decidedly concerned with the relation between theory and practice. Whether Lukács was successful in his aims must be left to a later chapter.

For Mannheim, too, the sociology of knowledge is not merely a theoretical
discipline but has specific practical intentions. When commenting on the contemporary development of sociology in Germany, Mannheim suggest that sociology itself exceeds the narrow confines of an academic discipline since

'the sociological problem constellation in the narrower sense transcends itself in two directions - in the direction of philosophy and in the direction of a politically active world orientation.' 100

This is because in Germany sociology 'met philosophical tradition that was alive, as well as Marxism as a perspective that was politically activated in all its elements'. 101

With regard to the sociology of knowledge itself, Mannheim provides substantial evidence for the view that he sees it as having practical aims. The longest chapter of Ideologie und Utopie is not merely concerned with the possibility of politics as a science but is also subtitled 'the problem of theory and praxis'. The sociology of knowledge's aim in overcoming the limitations of ideologies is not merely to provide a 'diagnosis of the times' but in order to aid our 'adjustment' to the present social situation. Ideologies prevent certain forms of social action and block a 'correct' understanding of the present situation. By 1932, Mannheim was claiming practical success for his sociology of knowledge. In the course of his review article on American sociology, Mannheim argues that

'a closer contact with central political problems involves the danger that judgments of value creep into science, reducing it to mere political propaganda. In fact, this danger constantly threatens German sociology just because it is closely in touch with political problems. However, if we know about this danger, we can take precautions against it, evolving methods which help to detect and eliminate political bias... The desire to treat politically important problems without being a victim to bias was responsible for the development
in Germany of a new branch of social science, Wissenssoziologie. This new branch of research, intended to be an organ of critical self-control, has already succeeded in detecting and subjecting to control important groups of sources of error. 102

Mannheim saw the sociology of knowledge as extending the critical intention of sociology as a whole since it too 'has from its beginnings been an organ of self-reflection and self-enlargement'. 103 Whether Mannheim's residual positivist intention of removing political bias by means of the sociology of knowledge was successful must also be left to a later chapter.

In examining the writings on the sociology of knowledge in Germany, an apparent paradox recurs again and again: On the one hand, there is ample evidence to suggest that the sociology of knowledge is a response to crises in German society and that the key figures who developed the sociology of knowledge saw its concrete practical aims as being every bit as important as the theoretical aims. On the other hand, there is nowhere a concrete analysis of the crises of German society. This suggests that, in fact, the perception of these crises is largely in theoretical terms. In his introduction to Ideologie und Utopie, for example, Mannheim asserts that 'this book is itself conscious of an intellectual crisis situation' to which he can provide no ready solution. The crises which he alludes to crises out of the conflict and struggle between systems of world-views, ideologies and forms of life. Since, as we shall see, the delineation of these forms of life is largely absent, we are left with the conflict of world-views and ideologies as constituting what Mannheim actually viewed as the crisis. This is not to
suggest that he viewed the sociology of knowledge as merely an empirical analysis of world-views and ideologies. It was also, for Mannheim, a new form of orientation to life and a possible means of synthesizing world-views and ideologies. In other words, to state it somewhat crudely, the crisis lies in the 'superstructure' - especially as the sociology of knowledge itself, with its theses of the 'powerless of the mind' and the 'homeless of the mind', had already reduced the critique of ideology to an analysis of superstructural phenomena.

The crisis is a crisis for intellectuals. They play a substantial role within the sociology of knowledge, not merely as its creators but also as the source of the resolution of the crisis. This is true not merely for Scheler's notion of a cultural elite but also for Mannheim's relatively detached intelligentsia and for Lukács' intellectual vanguard. Within the context of the practical intentions of the sociology of knowledge and the critique of ideology, they play a central role. In Scheler's case, they are concerned with the preservation of the essential order of values, in Mannheim's case with a cultural synthesis, and in Lukács' case with the revolutionary party's mission. The role of the intelligentsia does not emerge out of a sociological analysis of German society. Its origins lie elsewhere. As Lenk argues,

'Mannheim's theory of the "free-floating intelligentsia" does not arise out of a sociological context of problems but out of a postulate in the philosophy of culture and history. The structural analogy between the formal-logical thin strata, that is to form the archimedean point from which a transcendence of the relativistic consequences of historicism becomes possible, and the determination of the "social-intellectual middle" is obvious." 104

The intelligentsia are thus an essential part of the contemporary diagnosis of society and the attempt to construct a sociology of the modern era. But, in Mannheim's case, this remains merely a programme that is never fulfilled.
CHAPTER 1

NOTES

1. Cf. An account of the historical antecedent of the theory of ideology, on the one hand, & the sociology of knowledge, on the other, is to be found in the following two studies: H. Barth, Wahrheit und Ideologie, Zürich 1945, and E. Grünwald, Das Problem der Soziologie des Wissens, Vienna 1934, esp. pp. 1-51. Cf. also, more briefly, K. Lenk, Ideologie, Neuwied/Berlin 1967, 3rd ed., pp. 17-59.


5. On the contemporary reaction to Ideologie und Utopie, see ch. 5 below.


11. Ibid., p. 295-296.


17. Ibid., p. 203.
18. Ibid.
27. Ibid., p. 228.
28. J. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, op. cit., p. 295.
30. H. Barth, Wahrheit und Ideologie, op. cit., p. 245.
31. Ibid., p. 247.
34. K. Lenk, Marx in der Wissenssoziologie, op. cit., p. 43.


39. Cf. ch. 4 below.


42. Ibid., p. 33.


44. Ibid., p. 201.


49. Ibid., p. 137.

52. H.P. Rickman (ed.), Dilthey Selected Writings, op. cit., p.140.
53. Ibid., p.135.
55. K. Lenk, Marx in der Wissenssoziologie, op. cit., p.46.
56. For a useful discussion of the various meanings of 'Historismus', see H. Schnädelbach, Geschichtsphilosophie nach Hegel, op. cit., p.19f.
60. Ibid., p.589.
62. Ibid., p.39.
63. Cf. ch.3 below.
67. Ibid., p.454.
68. K. Lenk, Marx in der Wissenssoziologie, op. cit., p.17.
69. S. Kracauer, George Simmel. Ein Beitrag zur Bedeutung des geistigen Lebens unserer Zeit, unpublished ms., c. 1919-20, p.89
70. Ibid., p.90
71. Ibid., p.103.

73. G. Simmel, 'The Conflict in Modern Culture' in G. Simmel, The Conflict in Modern Culture and Other Essays, (trans. P. Etzkorn), New York 1968, p.42

74. Cf. ch.3 below.


76. K. Lenk, Marx in der Wissenssoziologie, op. cit., p.25.


81. Ibid., p.605.

82. K. Lenk, Marx in der Wissenssoziologie, op. cit., p.231.


84. Ibid., pp.211-212.


86. Ibid.

87. Ibid.

88. Cf. ch.4 below.


92. M. Scheler, *Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft*, op. cit., p. 84.


94. Ibid., pp. 106-7.


97. Cf. ch. 3 below.


100. K. Mannheim, 'Problems of Sociology in Germany', *loc. cit.*, p. 263. My emphasis

101. Ibid., pp. 263-4.


103. K. Mannheim, 'Problems of Sociology in Germany', *loc. cit.*, p. 263.

CHAPTER TWO

Max Scheler: From the Sociology of Culture to the Sociology of Knowledge?
Max Scheler was the principal founder of the sociology of knowledge in Germany. His early articles in this sphere - in which he still spoke of an 'Erkenntnissoziologie' and a 'Soziologie des Wissens' - were published in 1921 and 1922. Despite Wilhelm Jerusalem's claim to have been the first to have discussed this area of sociology in an article in Die Zukunft in 1909, it is clear from his remarks there that he did not develop these ideas in any substantive manner. This Scheler did in his edited collection Versuche zu einer Soziologie des Wissens published in 1924, as well as in his two volume collection of essays Schriften zur Soziologie und Weltanschauungslehre published in 1923 and 1924. In the same year, in 1924, Scheler presented a paper on 'Science and Social Structure' to the Fourth German Sociology Congress which was published in the following year. In 1926 his major work on the sociology of knowledge Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft was published.

Yet despite the extent of Scheler's publications in this area, few sociologists - either his contemporaries or his successors - have developed his theses on the sociology of knowledge or taken up his orientation to this sphere of study. More than this, there exist very few published works directly on Scheler's sociology of knowledge, despite the existence of several hundred contributions to other aspects of his work. Perhaps the major reason for this paucity of works on Scheler's sociology of knowledge lies in the very nature of Scheler's own conception of this field of study. Many writers have pointed to the difficulty of extracting a specifically sociological study of knowledge from his work.
in this area. Already in 1924, the sociologists present at Scheler's paper on 'Science and Social Structure' complained of the absence of sociological content to Scheler's remarks. Scheler's referent, Max Adler, asked

'Is what has been presented here sociological? Of course, Professor Scheler has at various points in his presentation thrown in sociological observations. But the standpoint from which the speaker has commenced his work, the guiding direction of his thought which is the basis of that work is itself not a sociological but an intellectual-historical (geistgeschichtlicher) standpoint.'

Yet perhaps this is to overlook the relationship between Scheler's conception of the sociology of knowledge and its relation both to his sociology of culture and to his philosophical anthropology. Indeed it has been suggested many times that Scheler's sociology of knowledge cannot be understood except in terms of his philosophical intentions. Grünwald, reviewing Scheler's contribution in 1932, comments

'It is certainly no coincidence that, for Scheler, the sociology of knowledge stands in particular close contact with the philosophical total system: for it is precisely Scheler's philosophy that contains in substantial measure the presuppositions which alone could meaningfully establish a system of the sociology of knowledge. A complete understanding of the sociology of knowledge developed by Scheler is therefore only possible by recourse to these ultimate meta-empirical premises, to which Scheler - in contrast to any form of positivism - openly and proudly refers.'

Such a judgment could certainly be substantiated by reference to subsequent commentators on Scheler's sociology of knowledge as well as by reference to the response of many of his contemporaries.
Thus, it might be possible to extract, in an abstract manner, the strictly sociological propositions from Scheler's work ('strictly sociological' in some empiricist sense) but, in so doing, we would necessarily be unable to grasp the precise manner in which the problems of the sociology of knowledge were presented. In discussing the emergence of this particular tradition in the sociology of knowledge, it is essential to provide the original presentation of its problems. It is the first task of the present investigation of Scheler's work in this area to sketch out, however briefly, Scheler's metaphysical position or his philosophical anthropology, before proceeding to examine his sociology of culture and sociology of knowledge.

The attempt to outline Scheler's metaphysical position is itself not some aim that is external to his sociology of knowledge. That is, his metaphysical standpoint should not be understood as part of our background knowledge for an estimation of Scheler's sociology of knowledge but, rather, is itself part of that area of investigation. On this point, Scheler himself is quite explicit. In the preface to the first edition of Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft, Scheler states that 'One can only understand the author's metaphysics when one has read this book', and that the book is 'an introduction to the metaphysics of the author'.

A recent study of the philosophical presuppositions in Scheler's sociology of knowledge by Bracht comments:

'the results of his philosophy are decisive for Scheler's empirical sociology; for these (metaphysical D.F.) theses are introduced into the sociology without discussion, largely as an axiomatic'.

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Indeed, Scheler sees the two contributions which form the major part of his *Die Wissenformen und die Gesellschaft* as providing the basis for strict methodical metaphysical cognition and thought. The reasons for the strong reassertion of the role of metaphysics in Scheler's sociology must itself be sought in the nature of Scheler's aims in developing a sociology of knowledge which we shall discuss later.

Yet it is not only a Verschmelzung of metaphysics and sociology that has worried both Scheler's contemporaries and successors. His fusion of metaphysics and sociology in the development of a sociology of knowledge might be said to be peculiar to Scheler. But what the major contributions to the German tradition in the sociology of knowledge do have in common is an attempt to relate epistemological problems to sociology and to establish the social determination of epistemological problems. This has been one of the decisive areas of dispute in Mannheim's contribution to this area. But Scheler is also at pains to investigate the relationship between the two spheres. Again, in the foreword to *Die Wissenformen und die Gesellschaft*, Scheler states that

'The simultaneous taking up of a contribution to the sociology of knowledge and an extensive epistemological and ontological study in one and the same work might, at first glance, excite astonishment. It has its deeper basis in my fundamental guiding conviction that epistemological investigations without the simultaneous investigation of the social-historical development of the highest types of human knowledge and cognition are condemned to emptiness and unfruitfulness ... An absolute historical constancy of "human" forms of reason and principles, which the major part of all previous epistemologies has naively presupposed as the
That the results of Scheler's investigation of the relationship between epistemology and sociology is to substantially reduce the importance of epistemological concerns almost completely - since they are socially and historically varied - and to assert instead the primacy of ontology and a static ontological stability, can only be clearly seen once we have examined Scheler's metaphysical standpoint which pervades his sociology of knowledge.

Our investigation of Scheler's sociology of knowledge, therefore, proceeds in the following manner. In the first section of this chapter, an attempt is made to analyse the salient elements of Scheler's metaphysics with respect to their relevance for his sociology of knowledge. In the second section, Scheler's sociology of culture is examined and in the third formal aspects of his sociology of knowledge. It will then be possible to examine some of those areas with which Scheler was particularly concerned and this will consist of an analysis of his treatment of science. Finally, some assessment will be made of the problems which Scheler raised in his attempt to develop a sociology of knowledge and how his contemporaries and critics have responded.

Lenk argues that the key to Scheler's philosophy is 'the question of the relationship of "Geist" and "Leben". It is the key to his metaphysics and anthropology. The determination of the nature of "Geist" and
"Leben" is the central theme of any critical presentation of Scheler's philosophy. It would be true to say that the whole of Scheler's metaphysics not only rests upon this dualism - and this dualism was, of itself, not peculiar to Scheler - but that it forms the basis for the other dualisms that animate his metaphysics and his sociology. In his metaphysics, the dichotomies of Sosein and Dasein, essence and existence, absolute and relative, spirit and nature, spirit and history play a crucial role; in his sociology, as we shall see, ideal factors and real factors, ideal sociology and real sociology, 'Geistlehre' and 'Trieblehre' are crucial to his development of a sociology of culture; in his view of society, a biological base and an idealised superstructure, elites and masses are central dichotomies. Grünwald, too, has argued that this 'powerlessness of the spirit' (Scheler's own phrase) lies at the centre of Scheler's metaphysics and that this position is to be derived from the ontological dualisms which we have just indicated. However, Grünwald suggests that Scheler held this position in common with many of his contemporaries - and he includes Mannheim here - so that 'this conviction of the unreality of the spirit is a characteristic not only of the sociology of knowledge but of the whole intellectual climate of the present period. One can see the contrast most sharply when one contrasts the theses of the sociology of knowledge with, for instance, Hegel's statement of the "powerlessness of nature" and the omnipotence of the spirit. However, what is important in the present context is not merely to acknowledge the significance of Scheler's central motif but to show what was distinctive about the way in which these fundamental dualisms basically shaped his sociology of knowledge. Lieber, for example, argues that at the basis of Scheler's philosophy 'lies the ontologically interpreted separation of
existence and essence, nature and spirit as two ultimate ontological
givens which in their development in his sociology of knowledge are
basically directed against the Marxist superstructure-base thesis. ¹⁷

In an earlier article, Lieber speaks of Scheler dealing with "the old
ontological and static dualism of spirit and life." ¹⁸ It is, perhaps,
this base-superstructure relationship which seems to give to the sociol-
ogy of knowledge an apparent affinity with some versions of Marxism.
However, any examination of the manner in which this relationship
between base and superstructure is treated and the actual content of those
two elements will reveal how far away from any kind of Marxist position -
either mechanistic or dialectical - Scheler really is.

Scheler's metaphysics seeks to reverse what he takes to be erroneous
and decadent tendencies in modern thought and life, that is, to correct
what he saw as the 'subversion of values.' ¹⁹ His static dualistic
metaphysics leads him into innumerable contradictory positions. For
example, it is clear, as Lenk argues, that a central concern of Scheler's
philosophical anthropology is the study of Geist as 'a supra-natural
essence.' It has already been seen that the Geist-Leben dualism is a
common feature of much German philosophy of the period. What
Scheler specifically seeks to do in his metaphysics is to oppose the
tendency in Lebensphilosophie to reduce consciousness to a stage in
the development of life, to reduce consciousness to existence. Scheler,
in contrast, seeks to assert the irreducibility of the human mind. Since,
for Scheler, human beings are the ones who carry out mental acts and
realise them in a concrete form, it is the concept of the autonomous
person who confronts his environment that is crucial to Scheler's
preservation of the autonomy of the mind. Yet the human being as such has become a problematic entity for Scheler. In 1926 Scheler writes

'We are the age in roughly ten thousand years of history in which the human being has become completely and absolutely "problematic"; in which he no longer knows what he is, whilst at the same time he also knows that he does not know.'

Furthermore, to see the Geist as a timeless essence that is embodied in the concrete form of the person in the temporal life process is to give to the very entity that Scheler seeks to preserve an element of unreality. As Lenk puts it, 'the denaturalisation of the mind expresses ... its impotence in relation to historical reality.' The mind seems at times to be reduced to a passive recepticle. This difficulty in preserving the autonomy of the mind is compounded by Scheler's assertion of the identity of physiological and psychic life processes. Scheler in fact speaks of the 'functional identity of psyche and physiology.' In so doing, Lenk argues 'the psychic self is ... reduced to a mere "consciousness correlate of the vital impulses and life processes".'

Another commentator, Altmann, speaks of the 'biologization of the self.' Not only does this imply a separation of consciousness and Geist but it leads Scheler into establishing what was precisely the opposite of his original intention, namely, that Geist is subordinate to Leben. This is nowhere more apparent, as we shall see, than in his sociology of culture and the assertion of the primacy of 'real factors.' This Geist-Leben duality certainly presents Scheler with difficulties that he cannot resolve, except by coming down in favour of the primacy of the one or the other. In an article on 'Spirit and Life in Contemporary Philosophy'...
published in 1930, Cassirer puts two questions to those philosophies which are grounded in this dualistic vision of the world, two questions which are central to Scheler's own philosophical and sociological standpoint. Cassirer asks how the quite disparate worlds of life and spirit can accomplish a homogeneous work and how the spirit is able to exert any effect upon a world to which it does not itself belong. The spirit is unable to affect anything beyond itself; it is a testimony to the powerlessness of the mind.

This paradoxical conclusion is also evident in Scheler's relationship to phenomenology. The distinction between essence and existence, between Sosein and Dasein is central to Scheler's epistemology. Scheler adopts an essentialist notion of truth, that is, a truth which is revealed through a phenomenological reduction, through a bracketing of existential phenomena. Scheler sees his phenomenology as one which 'goes behind all causal connections and reveals the absolute facts.' How much Scheler's epistemology rests upon this pervasive dichotomous standpoint may be seen from the schema of epistemological propositions which Lenk extracts from Scheler's later writings.

1 The distinction between essence [Wesen] and existence [Dasein] within all that is relatively existent is not only one that is taken from the phenomenological method but is also an ontic one, that is, it exists in the nature of phenomena themselves.

2 This division is universally valid for all possible forms of being.

3 The evidence for the duality of essence [Essenz] and existence [Existenz] can, in principle, be shown for any possible intentional object.
Knowledge of essence and knowledge of existence are qualitatively distinguished both with regard to evidence for them and with regard to their attainability for the cognitive consciousness.

Existential knowledge, both in its scope and content, is more limited than essential knowledge.

As well as Kant's formal a priori there exists a material a priori, an a priority of essence that emerges out of the phenomenological standpoint. This material a priori belongs to the phenomenal givens themselves.  

This ontological notion of knowledge, at every stage, leads Scheler back into the powerlessness of the mind. It should be clear that Scheler is in no way to be described as an orthodox phenomenologist since his philosophy is in many respects antithetical to the phenomenology developed by Husserl. To take but one important difference between Husserl and Scheler, and again to quote Lenk,

'Scheler enlarges the division between knowledge of facts and knowledge of essences that Husserl only intended to be a logical-epistemological division in the sense of the phenomenological method into an ontologically conceived dualism of spirit [Geist] and drives [Drang]. To the metaphysics of the spirit there corresponds a study of drives [Dranglehre] that provides the foundation for his theory of reality... Scheler's dualism allows the sphere of what is real to appear ultimately as the manifestation of impulsive blind impulses.'

Scheler's apparent phenomenological standpoint is not only inconsistent with that advanced by Husserl and many of his followers, but he also seeks to ground phenomenology itself in the ontological premises of his metaphysics. The cognitive subject who might engage in phenomenological reductions and apply the phenomenological method to reality is, as it were, imprisoned in that reality through his vital drives and impulses.
Scheler's theory of reality has important implications for the nature of the knowledge that the sociology of knowledge investigates and itself produces. This knowledge cannot be of the same order as that which is produced in other phenomenological accounts that do not share this ontologically grounded dualist metaphysics. The objects which Scheler's phenomenology reveals are not those that would be recognised in an orthodox phenomenological analysis. As Bracht comments, "Scheler's phenomenology . . . contradicts itself since it does not bring the object to self-givenness but rather determines its object as ideal being. The established ideal sphere stands quite unrelated over against the free human being."

But it is not only in relation to the phenomenological method that the nature of the object of Scheler's analyses is questionable. More significantly, perhaps, for his sociology of knowledge are Scheler's notions of history and society.

Scheler's interpretation of history has a religious basis, namely, in the doctrine of the Fall. For Scheler, the notion of progress is completely rejected; indeed, the reverse is constantly the case for Scheler. In his sociological writings, this is manifested in his analysis of decadence - a theme derived from Nietzsche - and in his assertion of the reversal of the hierarchy of human values such that the highest values are now given the lowest estimation. Honigsheim suggests that one of the basic negative impulses in Scheler's work is his 'insight into the perverted-ness of the whole modern bourgeois world.' Where Scheler does examine something approaching historical events, his account of those events rapidly becomes biological or psychological. Thus, for example,
referring to contemporary mass movements and specifically the youth movements of the post First World War period which, for Scheler, represent a 'systematic revolt of impulse and instinct', he goes on to suggest its cause:

'I hold this movement to be in no way an ephemeral 'after-the-War' apparition — it began, beyond a doubt, before the War, as the fact of Nietzsche shows — no, I hold it to be mass movement, channelled deep in the previous course of Western history, toward a new distribution between the cerebral cortex and the rest of the organism, of Man's total energy.'

The change in Scheler's argument from an actual social movement to an account of this movement in terms of a change in man's physiological constitution demonstrates Scheler's desire to explain changes in the spirit in terms of changes in basic drives. This kind of argument is by no means untypical but, when we come to examine Scheler's account of the sociology of culture that he develops in Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft, it is important to bear in mind that the rather formal analysis presented there is manifested in Scheler's other work at this more concrete level.

The theme of the decadence of the modern world abounds in Scheler's post First World War writings, and thus coincides with his attempt to develop a sociology of knowledge. In the essay quoted above, Scheler speaks of 'the increasing unruliness and uncontrollability of the masses and of the machinery of capitalistic finance grown independent of its creators'. Scheler's solution is not in terms of a change in the nature of social, political and economic institutions but in terms of a
balancing of technical intelligence and mechanisation by 'a new art of contemplation and patientia'. The powerlessness of the mind is persistently apparent in these and other passages in Scheler's work for the additional reason that there is never any explanation of social phenomena at this level - this level of reality continues to dominate, as it were, behind men's backs.

What is missing in Scheler's philosophical anthropology is a notion of society, social system, social structure and other related concepts that might mediate between these notions of spirit and drives and impulses. The individual person, though a central category in Scheler's philosophy, is so robbed of active characteristics - his consciousness is reduced to physiological impulses, his actions regulated by drives - that it is insufficient to fulfil this mediatory role. In an earlier work, Ressentiment, the final version of which was published in 1915, Scheler presents us with a residual concept of society that could in no way fulfil this mediatory role. There he states that:

"society" is not the inclusive concept, designating all the "communities" which are united by blood, tradition, and history. On the contrary, it is only the remnant, the rubbish left by the inner decomposition of communities. Whenever the unity of communal life can no longer prevail, whenever it becomes unable to assimilate the individuals and develop them into its living organs, we get a "society" - a unity based on mere contractual agreement. When the "contract" and its validity ceases to exist, the result is the completely unorganised "mass", unified by nothing more than momentary sensory stimuli and mutual contagion."
The components of the Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft distinction most fully advanced by Tönnies, become emptied of even more content by Scheler. Society, for Scheler, is composed of helpless elites and unruly masses. The masses threaten the preservation of the aristocratic rank order of values and the elites are unable to regenerate themselves to face the challenge from below. In 1925 Scheler speaks again of 'our age of disunity and of masses which are no longer controllable' and says that 'I know of no time in history when the guiding elites were in greater need of true culture and when it was harder to attain'.

This elites-masses dichotomy again expresses Scheler's own 'powerlessness of the mind' thesis and, at a somewhat more concrete level, parallels the abstract Geist-Leben dichotomy.

In a fundamental sense, the categories of history and society are absent from Scheler's philosophical anthropology except as empty receptacles or vehicles for more basic forces. Where the dualistic view of the world establishes itself as a dichotomy between a base and a superstructure and where the relationship between the two is viewed in a mechanistic manner - either as a mechanistic Marxist base superstructure model or here, in Scheler's case with a Geist-Leben duality - this leads to a notion of the superstructure which is unreal. In Scheler's case, it leads to a thesis of the powerlessness of the mind.

Furthermore, in Scheler's case, there is not merely a striking absence of any dialectical conception of this relationship but also the absence of any mediating categories that could engage the two elements.

Specifically, what is absent in Scheler's philosophical anthropology
is any notion of conscious human activity, of praxis. Instead, Scheler presents us in his writings with a rhetoric of passivity - the individual is no longer an actor but a receptacle, a medium for the manifestation of other forces. Human beings are not conceived in terms of their societal relationships and connections but in terms of irrational drives and impulses, against which the ideal sphere, the value hierarchy is powerless. As Troeltsch puts it, 'thus, as with Nietzsche, man is a dead end of biological evolution, the sick animal that can only develop itself in an intellectual direction and thus absorb its animal drives'. The rhetoric of passivity - 'essential being is revealed' to man; free will is a 'negative power to control and release the impulses of drives'; 'experiences of all kinds happen' to man, etc. - is instructive in that it shows how man as a creator, as an actor, as a transformer is absent from Scheler's anthropology. This central feature of Scheler's philosophical anthropology - on his own admission, that the mind is powerless against reality - leads him into a purely conservative position.

As Lenk aptly states it, 'The assertion that the realisation of the highest ranked values can never, in whatever manner, be influenced by what is socially given, that their manipulability extends only to the relatively low values leads, eo ipso, to the view that there is no point in striving for an improvement in social circumstances.'

It was Scheler himself who advanced the thesis of the powerlessness of the mind (Ohnmacht des Geistes and also Machtlosigkeit des Geistes) within his sociology of knowledge. But the wider issue of the alienation of the mind is already present in his pre-war writings. To give but two
instructive examples, we may turn to Scheler's review of Werner Sombart's *Der Bourgeois* \(^{38}\) and his article on the future of capitalism ("Die Zukunft des Kapitalismus") \(^{39}\) written in January and February 1914 respectively. The first of these articles opens with a dramatic statement on the alienation of the mind, the inversion of fundamental values and the perversion of intellectual energies. Scheler announces that

> 'Amongst the many signs that demonstrates to us the death of the system of life under whose energy and direction we still live, I can see none more convincing than the deep alienation that today in its specific system of life. The history of this alienation is still quite young.' \(^{40}\)

Scheler sees manifestations of this alienation in such writers as Nietzsche and George. But it extends today beyond writers and poets to those in control of economic life such as Walther Rathenau. However, what all of them have experience is the same, namely that

> 'the totality of forces that have erected what is typical of the whole of our contemporary system of life could only rest upon a deep perversion of all basic intellectual energies, upon a delusory subversion of all meaningful orders of value.'

This alienation is so pervasive that it threatens 'the human type' that was responsible for the existence and maintenance of this system of life.

Although Scheler is extremely vague about the nature of this alienation, it is possible to see some central elements of his thesis of the alienation and powerlessness of the mind. Firstly, it is clear that this alienation is intellectual and spiritual. Secondly, it involves the inversion of intellectual energies and value systems that were previously part of some natural relationship to nature and society. And finally,
it is important to note that this alienation does not, for example, threaten an economic order but 'the human type' which gave rise to capitalism. All this is to suggest that the alienation of the mind has become all-pervasive. But elsewhere in this review, where Scheler is examining the 'spirit of capitalism', he in fact argues that the intellectual sphere is the most significant historically since 'the change in dominant ideals and images of desires ... is much more fundamental than that in the historical reality of events'. Thus, on the one hand, the intellectual sphere is the most significant in historical change whilst, on the other, it is threatened by a deep alienation that renders it powerless.

However, what this article already points to with its emphasis upon the human type under capitalism is a kind of psychic-biological reductionism that is, as we shall see, accentuated in Scheler's sociology of knowledge. This is already evident in Scheler's notion of capitalism in the second article mentioned above where he argues that

'Capitalism is, in the first place, not an economic system of property distribution but a whole system of life and culture. This system has sprung up out of the goals and value preferences of specific bio-psychic type of human being, in fact the bourgeois type.'

Hence, the decline in capitalism comes about with the decline in the superiority of this type of human being. But even the state socialism and its hoped for maximization of welfare that Scheler sees Germany moving towards 'with full sails' is itself one of the 'cruelest consequences of the domination of the capitalist spirit'. The only hope of overcoming capitalism is through a new human type that Scheler sees
emerging in the youth movements. They are not limited to specific social classes or parties but penetrate all classes with their new spirit. Similarly, in his wartime writings, Scheler sees the war as not being the result of rationalisable interest but as having its 'roots in the essence of life itself'. Indeed, Scheler views the war as strengthening the intellectual existence of a nation, no doubt as a way out of this deep alienation and sickness. This vitalism extends, as we shall see, into Scheler's sociology of culture and his sociology of knowledge, even to the extent that it strengthens the alienation of the mind. Paradoxically, the alienation of the mind is then explained by a theory that itself has as one of its central presuppositions the alienation of the mind.

This brief account of the metaphysics, philosophical anthropology and earlier social philosophy of Scheler has brought us to the point at which we can commence an examination of his sociology of culture which Scheler sees as being the foundation for his sociology of knowledge.

II

Scheler sees the sociology of knowledge as being an intrinsic part of a wider study of the sociology of culture. That is, the problems in the sociology of knowledge - such as the social determination of thought - are to be seen within the context of the determination of culture by social, 'real' factors. In one sense, Scheler shares with Mannheim and the early Lukács the view that the starting point for an investigation of those problems which constitute a sociology of knowledge lies in an examination of the nature and determination of human culture.
However, the way in which these three writers go about this investigation differs markedly. This is immediately apparent from Scheler's intentions with regard to integrating the sociology of knowledge within the larger context of a sociology of culture. In the foreword to *Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft*, Scheler states that "the "sociology of knowledge" is, in its first part, concerned with the "essence and order of historical causal factors", at the same time with the first positive attempt to basically overcome the one-sidedness and fundamental errors of both the naturalistic study of history, primarily the economism of Karl Marx, and the ideological and scientistic interpretations of history (Hegel and Comte)."

With this as his central aim, Scheler seeks to develop a "basic law [Grundgesetz] of the changing forms - temporally and according to epochs of culture - of the interplay of the intellectual-ideal and impulse driven-real determining and influencing factors of historical-social life." It is worth pointing out here that what Scheler takes as his central areas of attack - Comte's law of three stages and his positivism, Marxism, etc. - are also reproduced in a different manner in Scheler's own work. For example, we have already seen that, in many places, Scheler adopts a base-superstructure distinction (this is even more pronounced in his sociology of culture); in countering positivism, Scheler too asserts the possibility of basic laws and provides their axiomatic foundation; in attacking Comte's law of the three stages of knowledge, Scheler adopts his own three types of knowledge, but ranks them differently - almost in reverse order - to Comte. Scheler goes further and suggests that "ultimately we fully accept Karl Marx's statement that it is men's being (though not only his economic, "material" being as Marx takes it
to be) which directs all their possible "consciousness", "knowledge" and the boundaries of their understanding and experience. However, this affinity with Marx at this point is only apparent.

Scheler starts out by stating that he will investigate "the fundamental fact of the social nature of all knowledge" and will also take into account the sociology of knowledge's relationship to epistemology and logic, to psychology, to the history of knowledge, to the sociology of culture and to 'real sociology (sociology of blood, - power - and economic groups and their changing "organisation")'. The sociology by means of which these investigations will be undertaken is one that is concerned 'not with individual facts and events ... but with rules, types (average and logical ideal types) and, where possible, with laws'. This sociology is concerned with 'factual, thus not "normative" ... determination'. Sociology is to be divided into a sociology of culture and a sociology of what is real, that is, a 'sociology of the superstructure and base of the whole of human life's contents'.

This duality of the sociological domain presupposes certain kinds of investigations in each of these realms; 'a necessary presupposition for the sociology of culture is a study of the mind of men and for the sociology of what is real a study of men's drives'. It might appear as if this distinction between the two sociologies and the two areas of study is an arbitrary one but for Scheler, however, 'this distinction is ... an ontologically and not only "methodologically" grounded distinction'. Thus, Scheler's metaphysical presuppositions lie at the very root of his attempt to establish a sociology of knowledge.
since this field of study is itself dependent upon the sociology of culture.

Already, however, Scheler's widening of the base of 'the whole of human life's contents' into a study of drives and impulses removes the independence of the societal dimension from the centre of a theory of society and replaces it with a psychological and biological base. This is exemplified in Scheler's assertions that 'without the drive for subsistence and the objective goal that it biologically serves - nourishment - there would be no economy' or that 'without a drive for power there would be no state'. Yet Scheler argues that sociology will study not merely these two realms of the ideal and the real but also the 'interaction of the ideal and the real, the mentally and drive-conditioned determining factors'. So, to return to the examples of the economy and the state, we find that they are not merely determined by drives and impulses since 'without the mind and its normative rules there would be no economy, no state'. Whether or not this is the case, or the manner in which one of these spheres determines or conditions the other, it still remains true that Scheler's social categories ultimately remain suspended between the ideal and the real spheres.

However, the key to an understanding of these two spheres - the ideal and the real - lies in the nature of the interaction between them. Scheler argues that the goal of 'causal sociology' is the search for the factors that determine 'the realisation of the ideal and the real' spheres; more specifically, the search for 'a law of ordering the realisation of ideal factors and real factors'. This law should be capable of accounting not merely for the historical temporal succession of the life process but
should also be 'a law of the potential dynamic emergence' of the life-contents of social groups. The law is concerned with 'the basic type of co-operation in the ideal and real factors, objective mind and real life relationships'.

Scheler argues that the mind can affect what might potentially emerge but not what will emerge. In itself it lacks 'power' or 'effectiveness' in relation to existence. Though it is a 'determining factor' it is not a "factor of realisation" of possible cultural development. Negative realisation factors or real selective factors... are rather the real, drive-determined life circumstances, i.e. the particular combination of real factors.

Scheler freely admits that one consequence of this thesis is that the "purer" the intellectual sphere, the more powerless it is in the sense of dynamic effects in society and history, and that conversely the sinking in the evaluative level of any intellectual entity... through increase dissemination and gaining of power amongst the masses is thus an inescapable law of all human realisation of meanings and values.

In order to become effective, therefore, the intellectual realm must attach itself to real forces and tendencies in society, otherwise it will remain a mere potentiality. As Scheler puts it, "It is only where "ideas" of whatever form unite with interests, drives, collective impulses or... "tendencies" that they gain indirect power and the possibility of being realised...

The positive realisation factor of a purely cultural constellation however is always the free act and the free will of a "small number" of persons, primarily the leader, the exemplary figure, the pioneer who can show a majority how to copy and imitate the new cultural trend. The extent of influence exerted by the intellectual realm is therefore strictly limited.

It can aid or modify real factors but cannot realise itself without the aid
of these factors:

'Thus, in the intellectual-cultural sphere, there exists "freedom" and autonomy for what occurs according to its essence, meaning and value - but always in the real expression suspendable by the specific causality of the "base"; one might term this liberté modifiable ("suspendible"). Conversely, in the sphere of real factors there exists only that "fatalité" modifiable, of which A. Comte has aptly and correctly spoken.'

It is here that Scheler's own thesis of the 'powerlessness of the mind' achieves one of its clearest expressions. The intellectual cultural sphere may be realised in those directions which the real factors permit; the real factors can only be modified by the intellectual-cultural sphere, they cannot be fundamentally changed or removed. One important vehicle for the realisation of ideal factors is the relationship between the elite that creates the intellectual cultural realm and the masses who assimilate it and, by implication, make possible its realisation. The elite, too, is powerlessness without the masses. The human cultural realm is thus basically anchored in the realm of real factors. There can be no genuine possibility for mutual interaction or for a dialectical relationship.

Scheler expands his sociology of culture through the further delineation of the ideal and real spheres and provides a series of axioms with regard to the content and changes that occur within each sphere. This exposition is prefaced by a second conjuncture of causal factors that is located in the relationship between the various conditioning factors, the relationship of the ideal factors to one another (for example, whether they are static or
dynamic), the relationship of individual forms of real factors to one another and, finally, the relations between the major groups of real factors to the individual forms of ideal factors.

Hintze, a contemporary commentator on Scheler's work, aptly remarks that although 'the objective just as much as the subjective human mind, the individual just as much as the collective mind, is quite incapable of producing anything in the real world through its own free creation' and although 'the real factors certainly form the base of all culture, yet the content and essence of the ideal superstructure is not explicable in terms of these real factors but in terms of its autonomous, independent qualities'. Thus, for Scheler, there exists a set of axioms or laws for the nature and development of the ideal and the real spheres. There also exists a fundamental contradiction here since these independent laws governing the ideal factors cannot themselves be truly independent since they are themselves governed by the laws which determine the real factors.

Within the ideal sphere, Scheler distinguishes between an 'objective mind' that is a 'meaning content embodied in some material substance or in reproducible psycho-physical entities such as tools, works of art, language, written works, institutions, morals, customs, rites, ceremonies' and a corresponding subjective mind, 'a changing structure of the "mind" of the group which, for the individual member, possesses a more or less binding importance or power and is experienced as "obligatory"'. These various forms of objective mind and these ideal factors exist in a definite relationship to one another; there exists be-
tween them 'essential and not merely fortuitous empirical dependencies', for example, between 'religion, metaphysics, positive science, between philosophy and positive science', and so on. These relationships and dependencies, however, are a manifestation of their different origins in the directions of human drives and impulses. The mind or spirit thus exists 'only in a concrete plurality of infinitely varies groups and culture'.

Scheler here explicitly rejects any Enlightenment notion of a single human reason or of an earlier, though still common, notion of a single human nature (a single human nature must come into question since the plurality of ideal factors rests ultimately upon real factors): 'To speak of some kind of factual "unity of human nature" as a presupposition of history and sociology is thus useless, even pernicious'. A common structure only exists within the 'cultural elements of a group', with 'a cultural concretion'. Similarly, the a priori notion of a universal human reason is also to be rejected on the same basis: 'rather, the pluralism of groups and forms of culture is the starting point from which all sociology commences'. At first sight, this assertion of the plurality of groups and forms of cultures may appear to be soundly based and not liable to confront Scheler with fundamental problems. But if we consider, further, that these groups have diverse intellectual apparatuses and that these cultural forms developed by diverse groups are ultimately grounded in different human drives then the problem of relativism seems to arise at least at a factual level. This Scheler recognizes but goes on to argue that such a view may still be opposed to philosophical relativism, though not by subsuming the plurality of values and cultural forms under the values of one culture - as Scheler argues is the case for Troeltsch -
but rather by asserting that 'similar to Einstein's theory within its realm - the essential idea of man with regard to the absolute realm of ideas and values quite firmly stands much higher above all factually existent historical value systems'. It is a feature of all relativist positions, Scheler argues, that they are always solved by the assertion of the existence of something absolute that stands outside or above them. This is not the case with Einstein's theory since nothing stands outside the relativities of which he speaks; rather, these relativities are in the world. For Scheler, relativities are in the world but, because of their determination by real factors, they must be seen to be based on something outside both the real and ideal spheres in order to enjoy any independent existence. It is at this point that Scheler asserts the existence of a sphere about that of the ideal and the real - a transcendental sphere can have no relation to human beings since it would itself be part of one of the two spheres. This sphere is, for Scheler, a 'pre-presupposition [Urvoraussetzung] of a human history, even of human beings themselves'.

Besides the existence of a 'functionalisation' of genuine ideas as a result of their being taken up by the masses and therefore becoming capable of being realised, Scheler develops a series of axioms that deal with the cumulative development within a single intellectual structure. The 'differentiation and integration of intellectual spheres' should be the subject of investigation as Spencer has already shown but the ordering of the levels of this differentiation has, Scheler argues, led to many spurious claims. In particular, Scheler seeks to counter the positivist claim, specifically that of Comte, that the different spheres of knowledge
can be viewed in a hierarchy of historical progression, though to their credit, Scheler argues that only Comte, Spencer and other positivist philosophers have 'brought epistemology into closer connection with sociological statics and dynamics'. Scheler argues, was to take the three forms of knowledge - religious, metaphysical, positive - and attempt to show that each grew out of the other in a historical sequence commencing with the religious form. Comte's error was to treat as 'temporal stages of development what is de facto only a process of differentiation in the mind'. As Scheler stated his position earlier, 'religious, metaphysical, and positive thinking and knowing are not historical stages of the development of knowledge but permanent attitudes of mind and form of knowledge given with the human mind as essential features of it'. Scheler does accept the importance of the classification of knowledge into these three types and subsequently does attempt to provide an investigation of their features and development that is based, ostensibly, on his sociology of knowledge in Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft. But he does seek to separate the three forms of knowledge which he sees as resting on 'three different motives, on three entirely different groups of acts of the knowing mind, three different aims, three different personality types, and three different social groups. Also the historical forms of movement of these three mental powers are essentially different'.

A second section of the sociology of the culture therefore has to deal with 'the social forms of intellectual co-operation'. The religious form of knowledge is organised into 'holy knowledge, religious communities, churches, sects'; the metaphysical into 'schools of wisdom' and
'educational' communities in the ancient sense'; the positive form, based on the division of labour rests on 'teaching and research organisations'. These forms develop their own form of language, conventions and axioms. Scheler takes each of these forms of knowledge to be genuine, independent forms of knowledge.

He argues that such forms are to be sharply distinguished from the 'common mixed forms of collective interests and (supposed) contents of knowledge derived from people's membership of strata, occupations, classes and parties, strata, occupational, class and party prejudices which we wish to subsume under the general title of "prejudices".

The specific quality of this 'illusory knowledge' lies in the fact that the roots of the collective interest in this knowledge always remains 'unconscious'. These prejudices, which do not constitute genuine knowledge, are also to be distinguished from ideologies that emerge, according to Scheler, in the following manner. He argues that where 'these systems of automatic and unconscious "prejudices" consciously seek to justify themselves behind a particular tendency in religious, metaphysical or positive scientific thought or even by drawing upon dogmas, principles and theories that emerge out of those higher organisations of knowledge, the new mixed form of "ideologies" emerges whose most powerful example in recent history is Marxism as a form of "ideology of the oppressed".

In this early formulation of the notion of ideology, we see that Scheler views ideology as having its roots in collective 'prejudices' that are formulated within the context of a higher form of knowledge. They thus have connections with both base and superstructure.
There thus exist for Scheler at least three types of potential knowledge or apparent knowledge. Firstly, there are the genuine forms of religious, metaphysical and positive knowledge that form the centre of his field of interest in the sociology of culture and, as we shall see, of his sociology of knowledge. There exist, however, two other subordinate types of pseudo-knowledge. The first is the body of supposed knowledge that is, in fact, a bundle of prejudices that are unconsciously absorbed by certain groups in society. The second is, for Scheler, a mixture of these prejudices with genuine forms of knowledge, a mixture that leads to the distorted form of ideologies. These ideologies would appear to emerge out of the attempt to legitimate or justify the prejudices of a specific social group and are, in contrast to prejudices, conscious constructs. In his sociology of culture, however, Scheler does not develop his notion of ideology any further so it is appropriate to consider it later in connection with his discussion of social class world views and with his notion of the 'relatively natural world view' or world-taken-for-granted.

Scheler's examination of the axioms necessary for developing an account of the ideal sphere proceeds in a very schematic manner. As well as examining the forms of intellectual co-operation, Scheler argues that we must also examine the basic forms of human grouping as such - 'the fluctuating horde', 'the ongoing life community', 'society' and the form of personalistic systems of solidarity amongst individuals.

A sociology of culture must examine how particular phases of knowledge emerge with distinctive categorial structures such as the organic and the mechanical-technical forms of thought. It must examine the
forms of movement in cultural spheres such as that of cumulative progress or decline. Scheler hints at a whole series of problems which the sociology of culture must examine but he does so in only the most programmatic manner, in a manner that is somewhat akin to Gurvitch's axiomatic and taxonomical incursions into the sociology of knowledge. Thus far, however, we have only examined the one side of this idea-real factor dualism. Within Scheler's discussion of the main elements of his sociology of culture it remains to examine the features of the real factors.

In a sense, Scheler argues that the axioms relating to the ideal sphere and its organisation are secondary when compared with 'the deepest and most fruitful questions in the sociology of culture' which is concerned with the nature of the regular order of effects that the structures of drives and real constitutions has upon the development of the 'ideal world of meaning'. This refers to the constant difference between the potentially realisable and the actually realised elements of the ideal sphere, to the 'effectiveness of the real factors in the history of the mind'. But this does not mean that one should subscribe to the fallacy of all naturalistic explanations of history which seek to reduce the ideal to the real sphere or, as Scheler puts it, to assert that 'this ideal world can even be "explained" from the real historical world'. Similarly, one need not subscribe to the Idealist converse of this that real history constitutes an unfolding of the human mind. Rather, Scheler argues that the mind guides or directs an already ordered phase of the human will but cannot itself overrule the movement of real history. Thus, 'where ideas find no forces, interests, impulses, drives that are objectivated in institutions,
then, in terms of real history, they are . . . completely unimportant. 70 Historical study has to explain the difference between the potentially possible work and the realised work but real history does not determine 'the positive meaning content of the work of the mind'; rather, 'in a definite manner and order it opens and closes the sluices to the intellectual stream'. Part of that order in which real factors influence the ideal spheres refers to Scheler's three major phases of a culture - its youthful phase, where guidance is rejected, its collectivistic moment of fatality in which the sense of human determination grows and its last phase, the massification of life. Scheler here comes close to a cyclical theory of human culture.

However, the key question for the sociology of culture is whether there exists in human history a constant or a systematically changing order in the effectiveness of the real factors. The three potential determining factors Scheler sees as being racial, political or economic and all have been used to provide naturalistic accounts of the determination of human culture. Scheler argues that at various stages of human history each of these factors has been important and that in the course of a circumscribed cultural process there do exist three phases which correspond to the predominance of blood relationships, political relationships and economic relationships. However, with regard to the general question of the possibility of a single factor always being dominant, Scheler argues that 'there exists in the course of history no constant independent variable amongst the three highest main groups of real factors: blood, power, the economy; but, nonetheless, there does exist a law of ordering of respective primacies of them for the intellectual historical restriction
or encouragement of realisation, that is, there does exist a diverse law of ordering for specific phases of the course of the history of a culture. 171 Scheler asserts that he can not only establish this law of ordering of the three factors inductively by an examination of the course of human history but that this law can be established deductively from the study of the origins of human drives: to blood relationships there corresponds a sexual and propagatory drive, to political relationships there corresponds a drive for power and to economic relationships there corresponds a drive for survival. As Scheler makes clear in many passages, a central motive for his construction of a sociology of culture and a sociology of knowledge in this manner is to counter what he takes to be the onesided economic determination of society and the ideal sphere that is advanced by Marx. He specifically argues that, in contrast to Marx's position,

'There exists no constancy in the primary effectiveness of real factors; rather there exists here an ordered variability. Nonetheless, there does exist a fundamental relationship of the ideal factors to the real factors as a whole . . ., that possesses the strictest constancy in all human history and in no way permits a reversal or even merely a change.' 172

However, the constancy of this relationship between ideal and real factors testifies once more, not only to the powerlessness of the mind but also to the strength of the structure of drives. This material base is not, strictly speaking, a social one but a biological-psychic one. At the same time, Scheler assumes that he is preserving some degree of autonomy for the ideal sphere over against social existence but this is obtained only at the price of a de-historicizing of society. Thus, we return to the problem stated earlier, namely, the absence of any mediating concepts between the ideal and the real, the absence of any notion of
human praxis and engagement. It is perhaps the absence of such factors which makes Scheler's analysis appear so formalistic and static. Potentially mediating categories are, as it were, trapped in the dualistic metaphysics which Scheler has constructed and which lies at the basis of his sociology of culture and, as we shall see, his sociology of knowledge.

III
In commencing an examination of Scheler's most fully developed position on the sociology of knowledge that is to be found in Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft, it is necessary to trace the outline of his conception of the sociology of knowledge both within that volume and in other related writings. By the time that Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft had been published in 1926, Scheler had already made a number of contributions to the sociology of knowledge. 'Über die positivistische Geschichtsphilosophie des Wissens' had already appeared in 1921 as well as a reply to Jerusalem's critique of that essay. In 1922 an article on 'Weltanschauungslehre, Soziologie und Weltanschauungsetzung' appeared which deals not merely with the study of world views but also relates directly to the debate surrounding Max Weber's 'Wissenschaft als Beruf' essay - the so-called Wissenschaftsstreit - which will be examined in a subsequent chapter. These two essays and many others appeared in three small volumes in 1923 and 1924 under the title Schriften zur Soziologie und Weltanschauungslehre and though they are not all equally relevant to an understanding of Scheler's sociology of knowledge some are worthy of attention. In 1924 Scheler published a collection of contributions to the sociology of knowledge by a whole
variety of authors under the title Versuche zu einer Soziologie des Wissens. 76

At the opening of that volume appeared Scheler's 141 page introduction entitled 'Probleme einer Soziologie des Wissens'. It is this long contribution which - with important additions - appears as the first essay in Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft. One of the significant additions to the original essay is an extension of Scheler's discussion of the sociology of science that arose out of his contribution to the fourth German Sociological Association congress in 1924 entitled 'Wissenschaft und soziale Struktur'.77 The other significant addition is Scheler's discussion of ideologies in relation to the class structure. The 1926 volume also contains a long examination of the relationship between knowledge and work which Scheler sets within the framework of a critique of pragmatism. The volume concludes with an essay on the role of the universities and schools which lies outside our present concerns. The second edition of Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft also contains a number of relevant pieces assembled by Maria Scheler from his manuscripts and these must also be taken into account when examining Scheler's sociology of knowledge.78

The second section of Scheler's major essay 'Probleme einer Soziologie des Wissens' is concerned with Scheler's attempt to develop a sociology of knowledge on the basis of his sociology of culture. This section is itself in two parts: the first concerned with formal problems, the second with material or substantive problems. As instances of substantive problems, Scheler deals with a sociology of the three major forms of knowledge that he has already enumerated - religion, metaphysics, positive science - and with the reassertion of metaphysics in the face of
the domination of science and technology. The discussion of the development of knowledge in relation to political development, and specifically what Scheler terms the 'logic of classes' and the 'sociological study of idols', is enlarged in the 1926 version. The section concludes with reflections upon the effects of the world war upon the intellectual structure of European societies.

Since we shall later examine in detail Scheler's discussion of science and labour, this will be omitted for the present and our attention will be concentrated upon the formal problems faced by a sociology of knowledge. However, we shall be concerned with Scheler's study of the relationship between knowledge and class structure since this has a direct bearing upon the question as to whether - like Lukács and Mannheim - Scheler sees the critique of ideology as a central concern in the sociology of knowledge.

The sociology of knowledge raises a number of formal problems which, for Scheler relate directly to the theory of knowledge and logic and to developmental psychology. These problems Scheler formulates in three basic axioms of the sociology of knowledge. The first is that 'the knowledge that each human being has of being a "member" of a society as such is not empirical but a priori knowledge. It genetically precedes the stages of his so-called self- and self-evaluative consciousness: No "I" without a "We" and the "We" is always genetically filled with content before the "I". Commenting on this first axiom, Schilpp suggests that the basis for this axiom lies in two of Scheler's earlier works, only one of which Scheler refers the reader to.
The Nature of Sympathy, Scheler argued that

'In the case of the development both of the individual and of primitive man there is, to begin with, no differentiation between ego-experiences and alter-experiences... at first both flow on together as an undifferentiated stream of experiences. And if there is a tendency in one direction more than in the other it is rather in the direction of the alter.'

However, much research in developmental psychology would suggest that the reverse is the case, namely, that whilst there may be little ego-alter differentiation in the early stages of development the child incorporates the alter with its identity and not conversely. Schilpp also suggests that this axiom has its roots in an even more dubious line of argument found in Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die Materiale Wertethik where

'Scheler had already shown that an hypothetical Robinson Crusoe, who had never in his life seen or heard any of his own (human) kind, would nevertheless have this (a priori) social consciousness because of certain act-intentions which would be his by virtue of his very nature as man and which are intentions directed toward others of his kind (even though there be no such 'others' actually present or empirically known to him).'

It is difficult to see how the knowledge that each person has as a member of a society is not empirical. Scheler can here do no more than assert the a priori nature of this knowledge in order to proceed with a quasi-phenomenological account of social knowledge. One can indeed suggest here that the importance of the relationship between self and others for the generation of human identity is dealt with more plausibly by Hegel and by Mead.

The second axiom is that 'the empirical relations of a person's
participation in the experiences of his fellow men are realised in various ways according to the basic structure of the group. These may be represented ideal typically along a continuum from complete identification - as found amongst 'primitive peoples, the masses, hypnosis, in certain pathological states, in the relationship of mother and child' - to inference by analogy. The implication of Scheler's association of such groups and relationships as instances of complete identification would suggest that, to take but one example, the masses are not capable of reflective though - which in turn implies that they do not participate in the generation of the world of meaning in the ideal sphere. As well as enumerating other possible modes of apprehension, Scheler goes on to suggest that the basis for the acquisition of knowledge, apart from instances of genius, is hereditary. Scheler is convinced that inherited "talents" for the acquisition of knowledge are different in origin not only for individuals but also for genealogical hereditary races - and that the chief basis for the specific composition of fundamental differentiation of castes, estates and occupations lies in these differences in peoples rather than in differences in class situation, social need or any kind of effects on the part of the social milieu.

Once again, Scheler develops an axiom that apparently deals with the 'sociology' of knowledge and then, as he expands his argument, it becomes clear that the relationship that he is examining has its basis not in society but in biology or, at least, in some sphere to which sociology cannot contribute.

As part of this second axiom, Scheler puts forward 'two categories without which the sociology of knowledge cannot develop: namely, the group soul and the group mind'. Scheler insists that these two
categories 'are not metaphysical entities that basically precede joint living and experiencing'. The group soul refers solely to 'those mental activities which are not carried out "spontaneously" but which "perform themselves", such as expressive reactions or other automatic or semi-automatic psychophysical functions'. In contrast, the group mind refers to 'the subject that constitutes itself in the joint performance of fully conscious spontaneous acts with an objective-intentional direction'.

As examples of phenomena based on the group soul, Scheler gives myths and fairy tales, customs, folk songs and other similar phenomena; as examples of phenomena based on the group mind, Scheler gives the state, law, philosophy, science, etc. Though Scheler has insisted that these two notions are not metaphysical, his account of the differences between the two readily recalls his earlier distinction between ideal and real factors: 'The group soul "lives and grows", as it were, in all human beings even while they sleep; only its effects are "organic" in the Romantics' sense. In its origins, the group soul is impersonal, anonymous.'

It is always determined in its content, values, aims, and direction by personal leaders and examples, at any rate by a "small number" (von Wieser), an "elite" (Pareto) . . . The group soul is effective in the group from "below" to "above", the group mind from "above" to "below".

Thus, that part of the sociology of knowledge which deals with the dissemination of knowledge from the apex of society down to the masses and with the distribution of knowledge is concerned with the group mind. Though Scheler does not make this clear, such an examination must necessarily be restricted by consideration of the real factors which limit the reception of such products of the mind and which - for Scheler at
least—seem only to emerge out of a societal elite. It is also unclear whether the group soul is to be the concern primarily of a sociology of culture or a substantive (real) sociology, though this would appear to be the implication both at this point and in the light of Scheler’s previous discussion.

The third basic axiom in Scheler’s sociology of knowledge—which is also an axiom in epistemology, states that there exists a fixed law of ordering in the order of origin of our knowledge of reality... and in the order filling in the spheres of knowledge and correlated objects that are constants in human consciousness. These spheres, which are not reducible to one another, comprise:

a) the absolute sphere, of the real and valuable, of the sacred;
b) the sphere of a co-world [Mitwelt], pre-world and after-world in general, i.e. the spheres of society and history or of the "others";
c) the spheres of the outer world and the inner world, and the sphere of one’s own body and its environment;
d) the sphere of what is thought to be "alive";
e) the sphere of the corporeal world which is dead and appears as "dead".

Whereas philosophy has unceasingly attempted to reduce these spheres to one another, Scheler argues that they are irreducible; and, as spheres, all are equally genuinely given with every human consciousness. Nonetheless, there does exist a fundamental essential order in the givenness and pregivenness of these spheres which remains constant in all possible human development.

The most basic of these orders of pregivenness for a sociology of knowledge is that the social sphere of the co-world and historical sphere of
the ante-world is pregiven to all subsequent spheres with respect to (a) reality, (b) content and concreteness of content. It is this particular order of pregivenness - though Scheler does give examples of others - that is central to the sociology of knowledge since it already anticipates the conclusions which he derives from these axioms, namely that

's the sociological character of all knowledge, of all the forms of thinking, perception, cognition is incontestable: not, of course, the content of all knowledge and still less its objective validity, but the selection of the objects of knowledge according to the predominant social perspective of interests; that, further, the "forms" of mental acts within which knowledge is gained are always necessarily sociologically co-conditioned, i.e. through the structure of society.'

Scheler expresses the second of these conclusions somewhat differently in the unpublished notes for this article: 'There exists a sociological and historical interest perspective for the world of meaning. But this world itself does not emerge out of society and history - only its selection.' The first of the propositions - 'the sociological character of all knowledge' - would, in its unqualified form, lead Scheler into sociologism, especially as it is not the 'social' character of knowledge that is at issue but the sociological. But the second proposition immediately qualifies the first since it is only the process of selection of objects of knowledge that is at issue and neither the content nor the validity of that knowledge. Even this highly qualified proposition remains unclear since Scheler does not illuminate his notion of 'Interessenperspektive'.

Again, one can only infer that, in the last resort, this perspective of interests is derived from the drives and impulses that are responsible for the realisation of a particular form of knowledge. Scheler assumes that it is his third proposition - that the forms of mental acts are
sociologically co-conditioned — which saves his sociology of knowledge from the charge of sociologism or, as he charges Durkheim, of 'positivistic sociologism'. But this escape is only at the price of accepting a timeless and ahistorical essentialism. Scheler sees sociologism as being avoided

"if one regards all functional forms of thought as leading back to the functionalisation of the interpretation of essences in the things themselves, and views only the particular selection which lies beneath this functionalisation as the work of society and its interest perspective as against the "pure" realm of meaning." 93

Aside from pointing to the problems associated with establishing this "pure" realm of meaning and with the persistence of timeless essences, Scheler is confronted with two other difficulties.

Firstly, he has nowhere shown much interest in delineating either the nature of society or its structure, nor, as has already been stated, the nature of these interests. Again it can only be assumed that such categories are to be filled out by recourse to the real factors. In fact, in the unpublished manuscript fragments for this essay he does argue that the selection is 'dependent on the construction of the typical drive-structure of society'. 94 Scheler does acknowledge that empirical studies have already demonstrated the co-conditioning of the classification of the world by the divisions and classifications of groups and that 'these structural identities of world-views, images of the soul, of God with social levels of organisation' are 'a particularly fascinating object of the sociology of knowledge', but, in a contradictory manner, he appears not to accept basic categories such as the division of labour, except as
being based on biological factors. In his reply to Jerusalem's critique of his attack on the positivist standpoint, Scheler takes issue with Jerusalem's assertion that all social differentiation derives from the division of labour. Scheler offers his own account of social differentiation and asserts that

"the primary ground for social differentiation is differentiation in the innate endowments and skills of groups (according to race, inheritance, etc.) and it is primarily within the differentiation of blood tendencies and the political power positions of groups co-determined by them that the division of labour begins about differentiation. "Castes" and "estates" and their cognitive communities do not emerge from the division of labour."

Once more we see that the real factors are to be reduced to the biological level.

Secondly, Scheler fails to confront a more important but related problem. In his sociology of culture, he had already asserted the plurality of cognitive apparatuses in opposition to Kant's standpoint. In the Zusätze to this essay on the sociology of knowledge, Scheler argues that three basic propositions must be rejected:

1 The constancy of a categorial system that is immanent to consciousness,

2 historical relativism and interpretation of all world views as the fable convenue of a historical group,

3 the "ignorant" making of an exception for our world view.

Scheler also asserts that the relativist standpoint is itself related to a particular type of society when he states that "the new relativistic study of world views ... is the theoretical reflection of this democratic
parliamentarism that extends into the world-view according to which one discusses the meaning of all possible opinions without asserting them, one acts without deciding. Scheler's solution to the relativist problem that is associated with the rejection of all three propositions is an essentialist conception of truth that lies behind relativist standpoints. Knowledge, for Scheler, is rooted in our very being. In his lecture 'The Forms of Knowledge and Culture', given in 1925, he makes this quite clear when he says:

"Knowledge is an ontological relationship, one which assumes that entity and part are forms of being. In this relationship, one being partakes in the circumstance of another, without causing this circumstance to change. What is "known" becomes "part" of the person who "knows" but without displacing the other person and without itself changing in any way. This ontological relationship is established without reference to time, space and causality."

In the unpublished additions to the essay on the sociology of knowledge, Scheler speaks of 'a system of relativity of logic, ethics, aesthetics - as a consequence of genuine absolutism. Yet this relativity is transcended through the same history which creates it. Every standpoint in the stream of history has its history which is objective regardless of whether one recognises it. Thus, behind historical relativities there lies an essential truth which we can presumably grasp. Scheler tries to make his position clearer through a graphic analogy when he states that 'just as Einstein has to locate the absolute objects of nature, the object of theoretical physics, behind the changing determination of mass and measurement of bodies in terms of their form, scope and time, so we locate the value order and truth behind the changing historical perspectivism'. Scheler's solution to the relativist
problem lies in rejecting 'a cheap absolutism' and substituting a 'genuine absolutism'. Here, too, it is clear that Scheler's notion of history is that of a fortuitous flow of events, without actors but with perspectives.

Having examined the major axioms of a sociology of knowledge, Scheler goes on to investigate the major types of knowledge under three aspects - their identification, their social origin and their forms of movement. Scheler takes the major types of knowledge to be the 'absolutely constant natural world-view', 'the relatively natural world-view' and the 'relatively artificial' or the "educated" world-view'. In his earlier essay on 'Weltanschauungslehre' (1921), Scheler appeared to take the absolutely natural world-view as being derived from genuine and living traditions. By genuine traditional contents of thought he meant 'only that content of a tradition which obviously survives as contemporary but which to its bearers is completely unconscious and unrecognised as a tradition'. There, too, he saw such a world-view to be descriptively delineated by philosophy and, from a historical-sociological standpoint, he saw such a world-view as being 'unchangeably "constant"'.

In Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft, however, this concept is taken to be a limited concept - limited in its usefulness, not in its actual usage - that is taken by epistemologists to be the basis for all knowledge, 'to be the minimum constant found at any time and any place where "men" happen to live'. It possesses, Scheler argues, the same weakness as that philosophical notion of the state of nature that figures so prominently in such 'typical ideologies' as those of Hobbes, Rousseau and Marx. Therefore the 'traditional concept of an absolutely constant
natural world-view must be completely rejected by the sociology of knowledge. Instead, the sociology of knowledge takes as its basis the notion of the 'relatively natural world-view' that arises in the following manner:

'To the relatively natural world-view of a group, subject (originally to unity of common descent) belongs everything that is accepted as "given" without question in that group, as well as every object and content of meaning in the structural forms of that "given" without special spontaneous acts, which is generally held and felt to be something that cannot and need not be justified. But it is precisely this view which can be fundamentally different for different groups, or for one group in different stages of its development. There exists, therefore, a plurality of relatively natural world-views the diversity of which 'extends into the categorial structure of the given itself'. This diversity, however, is 'to be explained neither historically, nor psychologically nor sociologically. Only a study of racial inheritance that extends to psychic inheritance can form the starting point for such an investigation. Similarly, when it comes to explaining the changes in relatively natural world-views, Scheler argues that they are 'natural growths' which advance only 'in very great temporal dimensions' and 'can probably be changed in a more than superficial sense only through racial mixing and possibly the mixing of language and culture'. At any rate they belong to the lowest centres of the automatically functioning "group soul" - and not at all to the group "mind". Scheler thus makes perfectly clear that it is his real factors which, at every stage, determine the types of knowledge that he subjects to analysis - in this case the diversity and transformation of the relatively natural world-views are both to be explained largely in terms of biological factors.
a different formulation of the problem of accounting for the changes in the relatively natural world-views, Scheler suggests that such an explanation will only be forthcoming if the sociology of knowledge establishes the closest relationship with developmental psychology and uses for its own purposes the parallel co-ordination of stages of development already discovered in that field. The examples of parallel co-ordination which Scheler views as already empirically established, illustrates not only his frequent and doubtful recourse to seemingly empirical studies but also the deep-seated nature of his elite-masses dichotomy. To cite but three of the examples of parallel co-ordination for which he provides no evidence, but which were presumably to have been substantiated in his Philosophical Anthropology (which, in fact, never appeared):

1. between the behaviour of masses and that of children; ...
2. between the psychic life of children and that of women ("constitutional" infantilism of the female psycho-physical organism) ...
3. between the mentality and education condition of the lower classes and the educational condition of the elites of two, three or more generations earlier ("stratification theory of knowledge and class structure").

From such 'empirical' evidence, it is clear that, in many respects, the masses behave like children, women react like children and the masses are mentally at least two generations behind the elite. The masses, women and children are all, apparently, encapsulated within the lowest centre of the group soul. Nonetheless, they are at least worthy of investigation by the sociology of knowledge since it is concerned not merely with 'truth but also the sociology of social delusion, of superstition, of the sociologically conditioned errors and forms of deception'.

It is only the completely abstract extraction of this concept of the relatively natural world-view from its context that enables Schutz or Berger and Luckmann to see the notion as a fundamental one for the establishment of a sociology of knowledge or for Werner Stark to write, 'Scheler's whole theory, which seems to us the most satisfactory approach to the basic problem of the sociology of knowledge that has yet been tried, is summed up in one crowning concept - the concept of the "relatively natural" (i.e. normal) world-view'. This is all the more remarkable in view of the fact that in his discussion of the relatively natural world-view, Scheler seldom expands upon its 'sociological' dimensions but rather concentrates on its deep-seated roots in biological and psychological factors. But then, in part, this is precisely what constitutes his 'real' sociology.

The third major type of knowledge, which itself rests upon the 'great solidity' of the relatively natural world-views, is that of the 'relatively artificial or "educated" world-views'. It is some of these relatively artificial world-views which form the major part of Scheler's subsequent examination of concrete material problems in the sociology of knowledge. When Scheler assembles these relatively artificial world-views according to their degree of artificiality, he seems to be doing so on the basis of a hierarchy of proximity to the group soul. That hierarchy is arranged as follows:

1 myth and legend
2 natural folk language
3 religious knowledge
4 mystic knowledge
5 philosophical-metaphysical knowledge
6 positive knowledge (including Geisteswissenschaften)
7 technical knowledge.

Each of these forms of knowledge develops its own special language
(except the mystical) and its own distinctive style in the formulation of
its knowledge. One problem associated with this hierarchy has been
stated by Schilpp who asks:

'If Scheler insists on such a sharp distinction
between "group soul" and "group mind" and
also insists that the relatively natural
Weltanschauungen "belong to the lowest
centres of the automatically working group
soul and not at all to the group mind", one
cannot help wondering just where in his
"Division of the Higher Forms of Knowledge"
the "group soul" ceases to function and the
activity of the "group mind" belongs'. 109

That is, what Schilpp points to here is yet another indication of the
powerlessness of the mind; on this occasion, the group mind.

The arbitrariness of the hierarchical arrangement of these forms of
knowledge and the problem raised by Schilpp are by no means resolved by
Scheler's discussion of the origin of such types of knowledge, which
forms the final aspect of Scheler's treatment of the formal problems in
the sociology of knowledge. In fact, on Scheler's own admission, the
'chief types of knowledge' are the religious, metaphysical and positive
scientific. In all these instances 'the striving for knowledge ... grows
out of an inborn drive-impulse [Triebimpuls], which man has in common
with the higher vertebrates, especially the apes'. 110 Thus, we see,
once more, that the highest forms of knowledge are in fact rooted - at
least as far as our search for that knowledge is concerned - in the real
factors, in the biological-psychological drives.
Scheler argues that there are three basic drives or emotions responsible for our striving after the three highest forms of knowledge:

1. There is the urge "first of the whole group and only secondarily of the individual, to "rescue", to "serve", their existence, fate and welfare and to get in touch with a reality seen as "overpowering and holy". This is the source of the search of religious knowledge.

2. There is also "the more intentional sense of wonder... This act of wonder and the feelings that accompany it are the abiding source of all searching for metaphysical knowledge".

3. Finally, there is "the striving for power and domination over nature, over men and events of society, over psychic and organic processes". This is the source of our search for positive knowledge, and the source of "all forms of technology".

Scheler is particularly concerned with the third of these drives since it has important implications for philosophy and for positivism. Firstly, Scheler argues that it is neither pure reason nor sense experience that is the source of the positive sciences but rather "that completely biological - and in no way rational or "intellectual" - drive for domination and power" which determines both intellectual and practical behaviour in this sphere. Any attempt to ground these sciences by any other means would thus appear to be worthless. Secondly, it follows from Scheler's elevation of these three forms of knowledge to some kind of equal status that "the positivism of Comte and Spencer - which is not a philosophy but merely a specific West European ideology of late western industrialism - acknowledged only the third of the roots of man's desire for knowledge, without however clearly perceiving its biological origin".

One might add that, nonetheless, Scheler does still adhere to three basic
types of knowledge even though he does not view their effectiveness in
terms of a historical sequence. Yet even his attempt to give equal
weight to the three types of knowledge is only partially genuine since it
is clear that, for Scheler, the scientific is the dominant form in con-
temporary society. What Scheler wishes to do is to challenge its
hegemony and reassert the importance of the metaphysical and religious
forms.

Scheler concludes by arguing that an understanding of the roots of these
three types of knowledge is essential in order to be able to go on to
examine:

1 the different ideal typical forms of leadership
in these three areas of knowledge...

2 the different sources and method of their
acquisition of knowledge...

3 the different forms of movement of their
development

4 the different basic social forms in which
the acquisition and conservation of
knowledge is presented

5 their different functions in human society

6 their different sociological origin in
classes, occupations, strata...

It is clear from this list of areas of research that follow on from an examin-
ation of these 'roots' of the three types of knowledge that the study of
the drives responsible for these types of knowledge in fact precedes a
'sociological' examination of their origin, that is, that the biological,
psychological and emotional should be examined before taking up a
sociological investigation. This implies that amongst the 'real factors'
which shape the cultural sphere, the sociological by no means play a
primary role.
It remains to be seen whether, in his treatment of the material, substantive problems in the sociology of knowledge, Scheler does advance a 'sociology' of knowledge. Scheler examines the central feature of the three major types of knowledge - religion, metaphysics and science - and the social bases for changes in these forms. He asserts once more the autonomy of these types, and this is particularly true of religious knowledge. However, since we shall be dealing with Scheler's examination of one of these types of knowledge in some detail - namely, positive science - we shall pass on to Scheler's examination of the relationship between social stratification, social classes and group knowledge and, on a more general level, the relationship between the sociology of knowledge and the critiques of ideology.

Such an examination is important since one of the central problematics in the German tradition in the sociology of knowledge is precisely its relationship to the critique of ideology. This is most obvious in the case of Mannheim but, as Barth suggests, 'It is remarkable that the discussion of ideology and ideological consciousness in Germany was not provoked earlier in connection with Max Scheler's work, Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft'. One reason may be that the discussion of ideology was only introduced into that volume in 1925 (Scheler's preface is dated November, 1925) and then only as an insertion of eight pages into the already existing 1924 manuscript that had formed the introduction to Versuche zu einer Soziologie des Wissens. As such, this discussion of ideology did not have the central place in Scheler's work that it did, for example, in Mannheim's Ideologie und Utopie. Nonetheless, there are some points of similarity in Mannheim's treatment of ideology when
compared with that of Scheler. Further, although it is true that the
discussion of ideology did not play a central role in Scheler's work, he
had already alluded to this problem in his 'Weltanschauungslehre' article
in 1921 and in his discussion of the sociology of culture that first appeared
in 1924.

It is clear from many remarks in *Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft*
and elsewhere that the emergence of the proletariat as a class with its own
political parties and world-view (Scheler views Marxism exclusively in
terms of a world-view) constitutes a threat to Scheler's conception of the
value-order of the world and to his assertion - though in fact only an
assertion - of the key role of elites. The economic and political emerg-
ence of the lower classes and their role in the development of 'political
and social "democracies"' brings about, Scheler argues, a retreat from
'the aristocratic-metaphysical spirit', and increasing 'dogmatisation'
of religion and an accelerating progress in the 'positive scientific and
technical spirit'. 117 As we shall see, Scheler links the emergence of
science with the emergence of new social groups who generate mere
ideologies that legitimate their activities. Thus, for Scheler, 'scientific
rationalism and intellectualism (which views all technology merely as
the application of pure theory) just as much as the proletarian manual-
worker pragmatism is false - . . both of them represent ideologies of
interests: the former of the liberal bourgeoisie, the latter of the prole-
tariat'. 118 Already it is apparent that what Scheler presumably opposes
to ideology is some non-class specific set of Ideas, perhaps related to
the salvation of man, or perhaps some notion of 'genuine' science.
Scheler adopts a position in which the legitimation and justification of
sciences can be ideological but not the contents of the sciences themselves. In his earlier essay on 'Weltanschauungslehre', Scheler, opposing the notion of a 'new proletarian science', argues that 'there are bourgeois and proletarian "ideologies" (i.e. constructions of history and programmes of action directed by hidden and preconscious class interests); but there exists only "the sciences", which have nothing in the least to do with such "ideologies"'. If Scheler assumed that he could dispense so readily with the problem of ideologies in this earlier work, then this is no longer true of his discussion in Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft since, as was mentioned above, Scheler added a section on classes and ideologies to the 1926 edition that was absent when the essay first appeared in 1924.

Scheler attempts to show that the class relativism that emerges with attributing ideological determination to the thought of all classes can be overcome by the argument he has already advanced against philosophical relativism, namely, that it is only the selection and choice of categorial systems that is socially determined. Scheler states the relativist problem in relation to class ideologies as one which leads to its resolution in a form of transcendence:

"If there were really no instance in the human mind that was capable of raising itself above all class ideologies, then all possibilities for true knowledge would be a delusion. All knowledge would then be merely a function of the outcome of class struggles. The form of logic and the form of cognition would also be merely a function of class situation itself or an option open to such a situation. On the other hand, it is certainly a readily ascertainable fact that class situation largely determines both the ethos and the mode of thought (Denkart)."
Scheler thus maintains that it is possible to rise above class ideologies and that the forms of logic and cognition are not a function of class situation. Yet he does concede the 'class related determinism of formal modes of thought' and provides a schema of such formal modes as they relate to upper and lower social classes that is worth citing in full.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lower Class</th>
<th>Upper Class</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Value prospectivism of consciousness of time</td>
<td>Value retrospectivism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Contemplation of becoming</td>
<td>Contemplation of being</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Mechanical view of world</td>
<td>Teleological view of world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Realism (the world predominantly as &quot;resistance&quot;)</td>
<td>Idealism (the world predominantly as the &quot;realm of ideas&quot;)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Materialism</td>
<td>Spiritualism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Induction, empiricism</td>
<td>A priori knowledge, rationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) Pragmatism</td>
<td>Intellectualism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) Optimistic view of the future and pessimistic view of the past</td>
<td>Pessimistic view of the future and optimistic view of the past (&quot;the good old times&quot;)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9) A mode of thought that looks for contradictions of &quot;dialectical&quot; mode of thought</td>
<td>The mode of thought that seeks identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10) Theoretical milieu thought</td>
<td>Nativistic thought</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the authors of *Aspects of Sociology* (*Soziologische Exkurse*) point out, 'this schema of lower and upper class ... is much too crude.'
and displays "the absence of any historical consciousness" as well as being "inadequate to the concreteness of social differentiation" and "to the formation of ideologies". One might add that the reason why Scheler's categories of social class are so crude is that for him social classes are not fundamental groups in society. In the light of the preceding discussion, it is apparent that Scheler more readily views society as composed of elites and masses. Further, the absence of a historical dimension applies not merely to this schema but to the whole of Scheler's outline of a sociology of culture and a sociology of knowledge. The schema also reflects the impossibility of the emergence of the problem of false consciousness in Scheler's discussion of ideology and class determined modes of thought, not merely because the examination of modes of thought is totally without reference to a social class's actual activity in society but because, as the ninth formulation suggests, Scheler believes that, unlike Marx or Lukács, the lower class already possess a "dialectical" mode of thought, that is, they are already in a state of true consciousness as far as their own position in society is concerned. Finally, Scheler has already made it clear that such inclinations are unconscious - these modes of thought can have no possible relationship to class consciousness of the kind that Marx or Lukács discuss. Nor is it the case that this schema is concerned with philosophical theories; rather it is concerned with

"living modes of thought and forms of viewing the world themselves in their functioning" - not with reflexive knowledge of these forms. These are class determined inclinations of an unconscious type to conceive the world predominantly in one or the other form. They are not class "prejudices", but rather they are more than prejudices; they are the formal
laws of the formation of prejudices and specifically formal laws, which, as laws of the predominant inclinations to form certain prejudices, are rooted solely in class situations - quite regardless of individuality, occupation and the mass of knowledge of men, as well as their race, nationality, etc." 123

These 'class determined inclinations' are, for Scheler, rooted in the classes themselves, not in social class relationships nor in their relationship to a particular form of society. In this sense they are subjectively determined by the nature of one's class position; they do not relate to activity but to views, conceptions, notions; they are unconscious reactions to the world.

Scheler suggests that if these 'formal laws' of the formation of 'prejudices' were fully comprehended then this would form a constituent part of the sociology of knowledge:

"If they were fully known and their necessary deviation from class situation were understood, then they would actually constitute a new doctrine of the sociology of knowledge which, in analogy to Bacon's doctrine of the idols (doctrine of delusions) of external perception and my doctrine of idols of inner perception, I would like to designate as the "sociological doctrine of the idols" of thought, contemplation and judgment." 124

In contrast to Bacon's doctrine, however, 'these sociologically determined idols are more than errors... These idols are traditional to the classes - they are absorbed, as it were, with the mother's milk.'

Yet again Scheler argues that such idols are peculiar to class situation without reference to the relationship which that class has with other classes. The idols are erroneous views that are automatically imbibed by social classes.
Despite the traditional and seemingly necessary nature of such idols and class conceptions, Scheler assumes that they can be overcome. He argues that the errors of the 'economistic theory of knowledge' emerge 'when one equates these class conditioned systems of idols with the ontological and emergent forms of things, and, secondly, with the objective forms of thought, interpretation and evaluation and judges them by analogy with these categorial perspectives of class interests; thirdly, when one takes them to be not merely "necessary" inclinations of thought and interpretative impulses - which is what they actually are - but also takes them to be causally necessary as well. 125

However, for Scheler these systems of idols are not necessarily and causally binding. Rather 'the class prejudices and also the formal laws of the formation of class prejudices are ... in principle transcendable for each individual member of a class. They can - the more they are recognised by the sociological study of idols in their sociological lawfulness - be withdrawn from use by any person, whatever their class position.' It is thus 'a practical-educational central value of a sociology of knowledge of classes' to reveal these idols and to make people aware of them. Although Scheler does not use the phrase, it is legitimate to suggest that what he has in mind here is the 'unmasking of ideologies' which plays a central role in some of Mannheim's accounts of ideology. Scheler, like Mannheim, seeks to show that the sociology of knowledge has a practical role to play in this respect but he fails to show how individuals can escape from these idols and leaves totally out of account any notion of social classes as a whole overcoming their illusions, as Lukács argues. Scheler had earlier argued in his essay on 'Weltanschauungslehre' - in many ways a discipline that is a fore-
runner of the sociology of knowledge - that the study of world-views is 'a very important and rich discipline', one which could 'serve to increase the understanding of our people and its sections; it can possess a high value for the contrasting learning to understand and coming to self-understanding of the families, classes and parties of our political fatherland that has largely disintegrated too much into irresponsible parties based on maxims and opinions.

For the Volkshochschule, for example, the study of world views is, moreover, the fundamental discipline [Grunddisziplin].

This practical educative role of the study of world-views is certainly a forerunner of Scheler's subsequent claims for the sociology of knowledge, and perhaps also for the practical intentions of Mannheim's claims for the sociology of knowledge as a Grundwissenschaft.

It is very doubtful, then, if Scheler has any conception at all of a critique of ideology. Rather, he substitutes for that activity a doctrine of ideologies which remains undeveloped. This substitution has its deeper origins in Scheler's sociology of culture in that, as Lieber argues, Scheler's sociology of knowledge establishes the essential form of knowledge as an element that is undisturbed by the historical-social process; in so doing, both the concept of false consciousness and that of truth lose their meaning. The bridge to a critique of ideology is broken, and the sociology of knowledge that results from this can only confirm even more the irrationality of the social process it has itself abandoned, especially as it grounds that process - in association with the historical-social explanation of the powerlessness of the mind - in the natural structures of drives.

Indeed, instead of a historical-social analysis of the process by which
ideologies develop out of systematic features of the nature of exploitation and domination in society, we are presented with an account of ideologies that is deeply subjectivist. We might add here that it is not only the notion of ideology that is subjectivist in origin. It has already been shown that Scheler's concept of society is a merely residual one and therefore plays no central role in his sociology of knowledge. If we were to attempt to integrate Scheler's doctrine of ideologies into a theory of exploitation and domination in society, then we would be confronted with a further difficulty. This is that the designation of particular societies is in itself subjectivist in origin and is ultimately related to a theory of drives. We could not use the concept of a capitalist society, for instance, because Scheler argues that 'the capitalist economy is based upon the will to unlimited acquisition (as an actus), and not upon acquisition (as an increasing ownership of objects).'

Capitalism, too, is rooted in individual or collective drives. Similarly, ideologies cannot emerge out of such a form of society but must have their origin elsewhere. Ideologies are endemic to social classes and have a basis that is hardly social; rather, they originate out of automatically stimulated prejudices, however much they may be formulated in such a way as to hide this origin. Similarly, the process by which we can, as individuals, escape from ideologies is hardly touched upon by Scheler, except in the form of an assertion that the sociology of knowledge, for example, can make people aware of them. Again, this act of being made aware is in no way related to human action but rather has a passive connotation. Scheler's 'Idolenlehre' or 'Ideologienlehre' remains a doctrine which views ideologies as emerging from within social groups in a quasi-automatic manner as drives or views or inclinations.
It has been suggested by Staude that 'the notion of ideology was crucial to Scheler's sociology of knowledge' and that Scheler's discussion of ideology is, in part, a response to Lukács' *History and Class Consciousness*. We hope to have shown that the notion of ideology did not play a central role in Scheler's sociology of knowledge. It was only in 1926 that Scheler devoted more than a paragraph to its discussion in his works. Even then, the preceding discussion of his sociology of knowledge should have shown that Scheler's account of ideology is not only inserted into the wider context of a sociology of knowledge and culture but also can only be understood as a continuation of themes already raised by Scheler in that wider sphere of a sociology of culture and of knowledge. Further, Scheler's discussion of ideology, unlike his central themes in the sociology of culture, did not permeate his other writings which are judged to lie outside the strictly sociological realm. This suggests that the depth of Scheler's preoccupation was hardly a great one. Nor is it at all obvious that Scheler is responding to Lukács' work, not merely because he makes no reference to him but because his arguments betray either no understanding or no willingness to confront the problems which Lukács raised.

IV

Scheler's examination of the role of science and its relationship to the social structure - which is the example we shall take of his own application of the sociology of knowledge - betrays its origins in his attempt to combat positivism as exemplified not only in Comte's law of three stages but also in Marx's presumed positivist account of the
role of science. Scheler's concern with science is a consistent theme in his sociology of knowledge. In his 1921 essay on the positivist philosophy of history, Scheler sought to challenge the status that positivists such as Comte, Mill, Spencer, Mach and Avenarius had given to positive science and to restore the importance of religion and metaphysics as forms of knowledge. These three forms of knowledge, Scheler argued, 'rest on three different motives, three completely different groups of acts of the knowing mind, three different aims, three different personality types, and three different social groups. The historical forms of movement of these three mental forces are also basically different.' In this early article, Scheler also related science to the emergence of the working class and, as he later emphasized in subsequent works, to work activity.

In Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft, Scheler provides a detailed account of some social aspects of positive science and in a long article entitled 'Erkenntnis und Arbeit' takes up the theme of pragmatism as a legitimation of science and work. The discussion of science in this volume relies heavily upon the paper which Scheler delivered to the fourth German Sociological Association meeting in 1924. Its title 'Wissenschaft und soziale Struktur' suggests that, ostensibly, it is the place in which Scheler most specifically discussed the relationship between science and society and, since it was one of the first discussions of this theme outside earlier Marxist discussion and since it sparked off a heated debate at that meeting, it is this paper that will form the centre of our discussion.
There is another reason why it is important to examine Scheler's account of the relationship between positive science and society — however much he repeats what he has already formulated in his sociology of culture and formal sociology of knowledge — and this is that scientific knowledge has had a very problematic position within the sociology of knowledge. Some writers have, at times, totally excluded science from consideration on the assumption that an examination of the relationship between scientific knowledge and society might call into question the truth claims of natural scientific theories. This exclusion of science also has its origins in Marxist and neo-Marxist writings in the assertion of a rigid science-ideology dichotomy which results, as Sohn-Rethel argues, in a materialist account of ideology and an idealist account of science. He asks: 'Is a Marxist then a materialist with regard to historical truths but an idealist with regard to natural truths? Is his thought split between a dialectical concept of truth in which time plays an important role, and an undialectical concept of truth of timeless observance?'\[131\] This is a question that is not merely relevant for Lukács but also, and perhaps especially, for Mannheim. In Scheler's case, one can at least argue that he consistently deals with science as part of his investigation of the three major forms of knowledge. As we have already seen, Scheler too adopts a rigid separation between science and ideology even in his early contributions to the sociology of knowledge.

However, Scheler does at least take up the theme of the relationship between science and the social structure in some detail in his 1924 paper. This paper commences with a repetition of Scheler's arguments on the three forms of knowledge and their sources in different drives,
impulses and emotions - 'the problem of the origin of types of knowledge is a problem for the sociology of knowledge of the first rank' - and with an assertion that he is seeking 'laws of development and connection' between the cultural realm and social life. He repeats here that the source of positive scientific research is the 'biological (and in no way rational or "intellectual") drive to domination and power'.

In contrast to the positivists, Scheler also argues that, as a form of knowledge, science stands 'in the innermost and creative connection' to metaphysics, though science is concerned with 'existential relativity' and metaphysics with the human totality and 'absolute values'. Science and metaphysics also differ in their social origin in that whereas metaphysics is the work of an educated upper strata, positive science has its origins in 'two social strata ... the one a strata of free contemplative people and the other a strata of people who have rationally gathered together the experiences of work and craftsmanship'.

That is, science and 'the formal-mechanical principle, the explanation of nature' cannot emerge merely from contemplation but from those people 'who must move diverse things from place to place and whose activities of transport and work create increasing new experiences of the nature of bodies and forces. The economic work and transport communities of patrilineal expansive cultures ... are universally the primary sociological origin of positive science.' By arguing that positive science has its social origins in two social groups - one philosophical and contemplative, the other concerned with work activity and practical - Scheler intends to show the onesidedness and erroneousness of both the 'Marxist interpretation of the relations between labour and science (Boltzmann, E. Mach, W. James, Schiller, etc.)' - a truly remarkable collection
of authors who are said to hold a Marxistic interpretation, which only
betrays Scheler's use of negatively valued groups, such as Marxists,
to incorporate whoever else he dislikes - and the purely intellectualist
account that sees science as arising solely out of contemplation.
Rather, in his view, science is 'the child of the marriage of philosophy
and work experience'.

The more fundamental distinction between marxistic accounts of the
origin of science lies not merely in the social groups out of which science
is said to emerge but in the nature of the relationship between science and
material factors. Scheler argues that

>'the forms of production techniques of
human labour (in the technical sense)
each form a parallel to the form of
positive-scientific thought, without
one being able to say that one of the
formal worlds is the cause or inde-
dendent variable of the other. The
independent variable which determines
both sequences of forms of knowledge
and work techniques is that of the exist-
ing drive structure of the highest leaders
of society . . . in the closest relationship
with what I term "ethos". . . with the
leading values and ideas upon which the
leaders of groups and, in and through
them, the groups themselves are commonly
directed.'

The introduction of the will and drive structure is, once more, Scheler's
corrective to pragmatism and economism. This is expressed for Scheler
in 'one of the most important statements that the sociology of knowledge
has to offer', namely, that 'the will to domination and control co-
determines both the methods of thought and perspective and the goals of
scientific thought - and this means co-determination, as it were, behind
the backs of individuals' consciousness whose personal motives for
research are thus completely irrelevant. Perhaps nowhere else in Scheler's sociology of knowledge is it apparent that his intention of creating an empirical discipline that searches for the laws - and these are interpreted in the very same naive positivist manner as the groups who he opposes - governing forms of knowledge is fundamentally contradictory. On the one hand, Scheler continually and deliberately evades any causal explanations at the level of social entities and substitutes notions such as 'parallel', 'affinity', 'homology', etc. whose explanatory power is much weaker. On the other hand, every social form of knowledge is seen to be determined in a rigid manner not by these parallels, which exist at a social level, but by the structure of drives, of the will, of emotions, of biological impulses which are so deeply rooted in the ontology of human beings - one cannot even say their psyche since that too is a physiological phenomenon for Scheler - that this second, deeper level of determination is in no way open to investigation by a sociology of knowledge.

In the light of this, it is not surprising that when Scheler comes to examine the crucial, and today even more contemporary, issue of the 'sociological-historical connection between technology and science' precisely the same dualism in his account of that relationship appears. Having reduced Marxism to a mechanistic account of the relationship between economic base and superstructure and having excluded altogether any dialectical relationship whilst, to some extent, retaining the base-superstructure dichotomy, Scheler is compelled to argue that the relationship between the two is an interesting but weak one on the social level but strong and overdetermined at the biological, ahistorical
level. He makes his position clear in the following statement when he says that

'Marx speaks of the direct or at least determining causal dependency of not only positive science but also all intellectual products upon the economic relations of production; we only refer to positive science and even here only of a parallelism that has a third common higher cause, namely the hereditary drive structure of the leader, ultimately of a blood origin and a corresponding new ethos.'

What this means is that however interesting and insightful the parallels may be which Scheler produces, and however fruitful they might be in a social-historical context, we must always remember that their real determination lies not at this socio-historical level but a biological level.

Scheler does attempt to show that the early origins of modern science do display close connections with technology and that this can, in part, be traced to the connections and ultimately the fusion of the two social groups responsible for the emergence of science. More specifically, Scheler sets out to show that modern science originates in the emergent bourgeoisie's challenge to traditional religion during and after the Reformation, in the emergence of a nominalist form of thought, in the increased concentration upon worldly labour and occupations - already documented by Weber - and upon the increased separation of church and state as a guarantee for the freedom of science.

Scheler also seeks to account for the emergence of modern science by utilizing a second 'sociological law of knowledge [Wissensgesetz]' -
'the pioneering activity of the "love of those who are knowledgable", the
dilettantism prior to officials in scientific disciplines, the "love of know-
ledge".'

Science in the early modern period is associated with a 'new emotional relationship to animals and plants', with the emergence of new generations - 'according to the law of generations, thus according to a basically biological rhythm'. This dilettantism is 'unmethodical, turbulent' and vastly overestimates the value of any newly discovered area. The new theoretical world-view and the practical real world both have their origin in 'the new ethos and structure of drives'. The extent of this new ethos is manifested in the analogies of style when comparing art, philosophy and science. Scheler generalizes such new culturally emergent phenomena into a quality of human history such that these new phenomena awaken and activate the 'sleeping forces of the soul'. However, as well as referring to the importance of such constant phenomena in human history as a means of accounting for the emergence of modern science, Scheler points to a second positive factor - the first having been the Reformation and its consequences - namely, the desire on the part of the emergent urban bourgeoisie to systematically dominate nature and to capitalise upon the kind of knowledge that would facilitate such domination. However, one consequence of the successful realisation of such an idea is to absolutize the world-view (provided by positive science) based on such motives into the sole image of the world. Scheler argues that such a tendency is not only prevalent in these sciences but in those interpretations of science such as positivism, pragmatism and Marxism which accept the hegemony of the scientific world view. Scheler views such accounts as being intrinsically deterministic.
It is against such standpoints that Scheler adopts the notion of parallelism and analogy. As well as arguing for the 'parallelism' of forms of knowledge and society, Scheler also asserts that the sociology of knowledge should investigate 'the series of analogies of meaning [Sinnentprechungen] between the structure of modern science, on the one hand, and technology on the other, as well as between technology itself and the economy'.

Such analogies are not to be understood as providing from the outset an 'explanation of a causal type', though subsequently 'a causal explanation can and must be sought'. Such analogies may be seen in the transition from feudalism to the modern period, in the transition from a power drive over human beings to a new form of drive over nature. That is, Scheler deliberately argues against concrete historical explanation and passes over to meanings and ultimately to the structure of drives. This becomes apparent when Scheler clarifies the analogy between science and technology with the assertion that

'It is not technical needs that determine the new science, nor the new science that determines technical progress but rather both the original transformation of the logical system of categories of the new science and the new simultaneously emerging technical drive towards the domination of nature as grounded in the new type of bourgeois man and his new structure of drives and his new ethos'.

Since both science and technology are the result of this single psychoenergetic process they must complement and interact with one another. Scheler is not only at pains to undermine the pragmatist and Marxist interpretations which, he argues, seek to make science dependent upon technology but is also insistent that, in the last resort, they are both grounded in the same structure of drives.
In his analysis of the sociology of science, it is evident that not only is his 'powerlessness of the mind' thesis further confirmed but also - as we saw earlier in relation to his metaphysics - the unreality of the socio-historical structures in his base-superstructure model is apparent. The sociol-economic and historical structures do not themselves possess a concrete existence but are, rather, grounded in drives and impulses. In his discussion of the analogies of meaning between the economy and science, we learn again that "the capitalist economy is based upon the will towards unlimited acquisition (as an actus) and not upon acquisition (as an increasing ownership of objects). Modern science, too, administers neither a given stable possession of truth nor does it engage in research in order to find solutions to specific tasks that are determined by needs, but rather it is primarily a striving towards "methods"."\footnote{142}

Modern science is thus 'a type of logical machinery. Scheler wishes to preserve science as one form of knowledge amongst others, even though that form is ultimately determined by biological drives. In a sense, Scheler sees this as being preferable to the positivist interpretation which not only asserts the primacy of scientific knowledge over all other forms but also implies 'the tendency of science to sink into technicism \textit{[Technizismus]}'. Rather, Scheler hopes that the sociology of knowledge will be able to demonstrate the need for a new 'cultural synthesis' of metaphysics and science, of the techniques of the soul and the techniques of domination.

The response to Scheler's paper by his contemporaries was largely negative. It has already been mentioned that Adler, the co-referent for Scheler's paper, questioned the sociological nature of Scheler's remarks
on the relationship between science and social structure as well as the interpretation of Marxism that Scheler criticised. Alfred Weber reiterated this question when he suggested that 'what he has offered us here is a "sociology" only in quotation marks. I believe it was a philosophy with a sociological prognostic.'¹⁴³ Weber continues by arguing that Scheler's discussion 'commenced from a triple division of knowledge. This division, Comte's three divisions, which you accept, and have transposed onto another level, is, as far as I can see, an a priori of your whole procedure. I want to ask you whether this is an unconditional law or only a division for specific intellectual purposes?'¹⁴³ Dunkmann also questioned the basis for Scheler's sociology of knowledge but on different grounds. He asked 'how is sociology as a science possible if all science is dependent upon sociology? From where does sociology take its standard as a science, if all other sciences ... depend upon the social structure, that is, are sociologically determined?'¹⁴⁴ Meusel criticized Scheler and Adler for not addressing themselves sufficiently to the question of the actual relationship between science and social structure. That part of the discussion which was given over to discussion of Scheler's paper suggested a high degree of dissatisfaction with the sociological nature of Scheler's paper. This dissatisfaction was reflected more widely in the reception of Scheler's sociology of knowledge as a whole.

It can be stated in Scheler's favour that he did at least take up the issue of the relationship between science and social structure and that cannot be said for many other contributors to the sociology of knowledge in this period. However, the manner in which Scheler treats this relationship and the way in which he conceived of both knowledge and social structure
reflects Scheler's metaphysical preoccupations rather than his sociological intentions. Positive science as one 'form' of knowledge amongst others is seen to rest, in vital respects, upon the drive structure of pioneers in science. Scheler's analysis is not, in a sense, sensitive to the nature of the object that he investigates. The object becomes subservient to his wider metaphysical intentions, such as the restoration of metaphysics itself or, at least, as Scheler conceives it. On a social-political level, Scheler is intent on preserving elites at the apex of society and views them as the prime creators of cultural innovation. It is not surprising, therefore, to learn that Scheler - unlike, say, Merton - saw no necessary connection between science and democracy; indeed, he argued that the socio-political regime most favourable to science would be 'an enlightened aristocracy and monarchy', perhaps the regime which Scheler conceived as being the most favourable in all respects. Thus, at almost every stage of his analysis, Scheler incorporates his object of investigation into a set of preconceptions which provide little room - in the last resort - for the independent development of potentially interesting 'parallels' and 'analogies of meaning'. These preconceptions also rule out the possibility of Scheler examining such issues as science in relation to the productive process or relationship between science and cognitive interests.

V

Scheler conceived of his sociology of knowledge as a discipline that could permanently combat what he took to be the erroneous tendencies in social, political and philosophical theory - positivism, Marxism, historicism and
relativism. At various stages of his attempt to ground this new discipline, these phenomena which he opposes in fact shape, to a considerable extent, the nature of Scheler's project. As Alfred Weber argued, the positivist law of three stages does animate Scheler's sociology of knowledge even though the categories are discussed at a different level. The interpretation of a crude Marxism which Scheler ascribes to does, at various points, provide Scheler with a base-superstructure model in which both the base and superstructure take on new dimensions and in which the relationship between the two is fundamentally altered.

At a more strictly methodological level, Scheler hardly takes seriously his attempt to establish an explanatory model for the sociology of knowledge. Scheler's resort to supposed empirical evidence is erratic and often based on a desire to support his metaphysics. On the other hand, Scheler's rigid adherence to his metaphysical position with all its contradictions, prevents him from establishing empirically analysable relationships between knowledge and society. This is not to suggest that a causal analytic model is the only appropriate one for the sociology of knowledge but since Scheler at times appears to assume that he is establishing such a sociology of knowledge it is at least legitimate to question whether he is capable of doing so. The same problem arises for the presumed phenomenological foundation for the sociology of knowledge which Scheler is presumed to have provided. Not only is Scheler a most unorthodox phenomenologist but it is true to say his metaphysical position seriously prevents him from establishing a consistent phenomenological approach. Therefore, as has been pointed out earlier, it is only with the greatest difficulty and with the most spurious level of abstraction that one
can claim that Scheler did establish a phenomenological basis for the sociology of knowledge. Such a positive evaluation is provided by Alfred Schulz though his arguments are not convincing. Scheler's categories can be extracted from their context and applied elsewhere but then the end result is no longer Scheler's own sociology of knowledge.

It is, perhaps, this fusion of sociological and metaphysical intentions which led many of his contemporaries to question whether he had provided a sociology of knowledge. Contemporary reviewers were deeply sceptical on this point. Hintze, in the most detailed contemporary review of Scheler's sociology of knowledge, questioned whether the crucial mediating societal categories between the ontologically grounded dualism in his sociology of culture had been established by Scheler. Eleutheropulos, reviewing Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft, suggests that 'in fact a very large part of this contribution really has nothing to do with the "sociology of knowledge".' Müller-Freinfels, in a brief but positive review, also states that the work is 'without a doubt not a "sociology" in the specific scientific sense' and suggests that the volume marks Scheler's deep separation from Husserl and phenomenology. The most thoroughgoing and perceptive examination of Scheler's sociology of knowledge - or at least of a section of it - is provided by Mannheim in his essay 'The Problem of a Sociology of Knowledge' published in 1925 and therefore written with reference to Scheler's Introduction to Versuche zu einer Soziologie des Wissens. As an indication of Scheler's lack of influence upon the development of the sociology of knowledge in Germany, it is worth noting that Mannheim's critique is the only detailed one to appear from within that tradition if we except Adler's reply to
Scheler's paper on science and social structure. Mannheim is the only contemporary critic who points to Scheler's use of a schematic phenomenology to justify Catholicism and 'Catholic concepts of "timelessness", "eternity", with new arguments'. Mannheim's major criticism of Scheler's position - and the preceding discussion would seem to confirm it - is that his sociology of knowledge is rooted in a static dualism in which the determining factor, the base, is a 'supra-temporal, unchanging entity'. In Mannheim's terms, Scheler's sociology of knowledge cannot be dynamic since it commences with the absolute as its starting point. But perhaps his critique as a whole must be seen in the light of Mannheim's intention to counterpose the, for him, superior historicist position to Scheler's version of phenomenology. However, there are, as we shall see, many points of similarity in the positions adopted by Scheler and Mannheim in their construction of sociology of knowledge.

It is perhaps not difficult to see why Scheler's sociology of knowledge was not taken up by other sociologists and developed in other directions. Firstly, it is impossible to extract Scheler's sociology of knowledge from his metaphysics and few sociologists have been at all convinced by Scheler's metaphysical position. Secondly, it is clear that Scheler himself seems only to have taken up the sociology of knowledge for a brief period of time, namely from 1921 to 1926 and then to have moved on to the development of a philosophical anthropology. His writings after 1926 - however brief they may have been, since Scheler died in 1928 - do not betray a continuing interest in the sociology of knowledge. Thirdly, those writers who might have seemed to find Scheler's sociology of knowledge appealing - and this is perhaps especially true of pheno-
menologists - did not take up aspects of Scheler's work until much later. The central notion of 'the relatively natural world-view' which has been taken up by Schutz as the world-taken-for-granted and been widened into the basic for a sociology of knowledge concerned with everyday knowledge by Berger and Luckmann was only developed much later in the post Second World War period. This is also true of Stark's attempt to construct a sociology of knowledge on the basis, at least in part, of Scheler's work. Schilpp's largely positive review of Scheler's sociology of knowledge in the United States in 1927 did not lead to any development of Scheler's ideas in American sociology. The next review of his work in 1942 by Becker and Dahlke was also positive to the extent that they concluded that 'we may regard Max Scheler as among the greatest exponents of that substantive sociology of knowledge which is slowly winning its way'. However, it would be inaccurate to describe Scheler's sociology as 'substantive' in any meaningful sense and perhaps the authors were guilty of special pleading.

This not to suggest that there was no development at all arising out of Scheler's sociology of knowledge. The one positive exception was, in fact, the volume which Scheler himself assembled and published in 1924 as *Versuche zu einer Soziologie des Wissens*. As well as Scheler's long introduction, the volume included articles divided into two areas in much the same way as Scheler's own introduction had been, though with a different emphasis. In the first section were articles by, amongst others, Jerusalem, von Wiese and Honigsheim, dealing with the 'formal sociology of knowledge and epistemology'. The second section comprised articles on material (substantive) sociology of knowledge and
'historical types of scientific co-operation' by Landsberg, Honigsheim, Plessner and others. It consisted largely of an examination of various types of thought (e.g. Honigsheim on the 'sociology of realistic and nominalistic thought') or on institutions concerned with intellectual activity (e.g. Plessner's 'Towards a sociology of modern research and its organisation in German universities'). In part, it might be said to comprise attempts to incorporate Geistesgeschichte within Wissenssoziologie. But, once again, this did not prove to be the start of a cumulative process for Scheler's version of a sociology of knowledge.

Indeed the whole debate surrounding the sociology of knowledge ceased to centre around the issues which were central to Scheler's sociology of knowledge but shifted in the direction which Scheler had already briefly inaugurated, namely the study of ideology and its relationship to the sociology of knowledge. The focus of attention at least from 1928 onwards - the year of the discussion surrounding Mannheim's paper on 'Competition as a Cultural Phenomenon' at the Sixth German Sociological Association Congress - lay in the direction of Mannheim's treatment of ideologies.

It has already been suggested that a central aspect of Scheler's social theory is to account for the sense of alienation in modern society, as experienced especially by its elite. At the centre of this notion of alienation is the concept of the alienated mind and its powerlessness. Though, for example, Lenk's critique of Scheler is set largely within the context of this 'powerlessness of the mind' thesis, it is important to remember that it is Scheler's own concept and not merely
some latter-day judgment upon his work. It was commented upon by some of his contemporaries. For instance, Siegfried Marck in a discussion largely taken up with Mannheim's sociology of knowledge also criticises Scheler's version, particularly with reference to the powerlessness of the mind. There, Marck argues that in Scheler's work

'the whole realm of the substantive study of value and the ontological metaphysics that is built upon it is divorced from any from any existential relativisation. Material values and their rank order as well as the ontological reality in which they are grounded are independent in their strict givenness (Sosein) from the transformations of existence (Dasein). According to the interpretation of Scheler's later philosophy, the mind is indeed powerless over against real transformations. It requires sublimated power factors in order to have an indirect influence upon real events.\textsuperscript{157}

In other words, Marck is pointing to the significance of the powerlessness of the mind thesis for the preservation of essential values. But this powerlessness of the mind also has implication for human subjects themselves. As Marck goes on to suggest, the mind

'is also independent of these real events - as the realm of pure essentaility it is detached from existential determination. What is typical of this sphere of Scheler's "mind" is his interpretation of it beyond the opposition of subject and object. To him the mind means a purely ontic structure, its apriori nature has nothing to do with the formative human subject but rather rests upon the substance itself. . . . the whole world of historically conditioned qualities and purposes are relativised by him in contrast with the world of pure values itself.\textsuperscript{158}

This dualism can only lead to the absence of any notion of interaction, of dialectic between mind and society. In fact it is a manifestation of
one of the many dualisms that permeates Scheler's philosophy: absolute/relative, essential/existential, ideal factors/real factors, superstructure/base, mind/life, elites/masses, etc. It is if the dynamic of intellectual activity and society are frozen and solidified in an attempt to preserve what Scheler takes to be the essential human values. But the price paid for this preservation is the absence of human actors, the absence of a dialectic between engagement and reflection, between knowledge and society.

Lenk in fact suggests, with some justification, that Scheler's theory of history is permeated with an uneasy resignation before the permanent fall of higher values. It is a form of capitulation to alienation and is exemplified in the powerlessness of the mind thesis. In this thesis thought has already alienated itself to such an extent that it can no longer recognize reification as being produced by human beings, as socially necessary illusion but has hypostatized it into the essence of things themselves. 159

The implications for a sociology of knowledge are that, since its categories are derived from an ahistorical anthropology, it cannot itself analyse this alienation, it can only reflect it. For an attempt to analyse reification in a very different context we must turn to Lukács' early writings and especially to Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein.
CHAPTER 11

NOTES


7. This is pointed out in M. Bracht, Voraussetzungen einer Soziologie des Wissens, erarbeitet am Beispiel Max Scheler, Tübingen 1974, p.vii.

8. Verhandlungen des 4. Deutschen Soziologentages 1924, op. cit. p.183. Cf. also below ch.5 for a further examination of the discussion at this congress.


15. K. Lenk,
   Von der Ohnmacht des Geistes,
   op. cit., p.2.

16. E. Grünwald,
   Das Problem der Soziologie des Wissens,
   op. cit., p.186.

17. H.J. Lieber,
   'Beurkmanungen zur Wissenssoziologie Max Schelers'
   in P. Good (ed.), Max Scheler in Gegenwartsgeschehen der Philosophie, Bern/Munich 1975,
   p.228.

18. In an earlier article, Lieber speaks of Scheler dealing with 'the old ontological and static dualism of spirit and life', in H.J. Lieber,

19. Cf. M. Scheler,
   Cf. also below for his notion of alienation in his work.

20. M. Scheler,
   Philosophische Weltanschauung, Munich/Bern 1954,
   p.62.

21. K. Lenk,
   Von der Ohnmacht des Geistes,
   op. cit., p.6.

22. M. Scheler,
   Philosophical Perspectives (trans. O.A. Haac),
   Boston 1958, p.22.

23. K. Lenk,
   Von der Ohnmacht des Geistes,
   op. cit., p.7.

24. Quoted in K. Lenk,
   loc. cit., p.7.

25. Cf. E. Cassirer,
   'Spirit and Life in Contemporary Philosophy'

26. K. Lenk,
   Von der Ohnmacht des Geistes,
   op. cit., p.11.

27. Cf. for instance, H. Spiegelberg,
   The Phenomenological Movement, Hague 1965,
   vol.1, pp.228-268, which deals with Scheler's relations with Husserl.

28. K. Lenk,
   Von der Ohnmacht des Geistes,
   op. cit., p.13.

29. M. Bracht,
   Voraussetzungen einer Soziologie des Wissens,
   op. cit., p.55.

30. P. Honigsheim,
   'Max Scheler als Sozialphilosoph', Kölner Vierteljahreshefte fur Soziologie, vol.8, 1929, p.106.

31. M. Scheler,

32. Ibid, p.104.


37. This is remarked upon briefly and compared with Mannheim's notion of the homelessness of the mind in Hannah Arendt's review of Mannheim's *Ideologie und Utopie*. Cf. H. Arendt, 'Philosophie und Soziologie', *Die Gesellschaft*, vol. 6, 1930.


41. Ibid.


43. Ibid., p. 404

44. For a useful brief discussion of Scheler's wartime views see H. Lubbe, *Politische Philosophie in Deutschland*, Basel/Stuttgart 1963, pp. 221-227.


46. Ibid, p. 11.

47. Ibid, p. 18n.


50. Ibid, p. 20.


52. Ibid, p. 20.

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid, p.23.
60. Ibid, p.25-6.
67. Ibid.
70. Ibid, p.40.
71. Ibid, p.42.
72. Ibid, p.50.
76. M. Scheler, (ed.) Versuche zu einer Soziologie des Wissens, Munich 1924.
77. Cf. Verhandlungen des 4. Deutschen Soziologentages 1924, op. cit. See also below and ch.5 for a summary of the discussion surrounding Scheler's paper.


82. Ibid.


84. G.H. Mead, Mind, Self and Society, Chicago 1934.


86. Ibid, p. 54.

87. Ibid.


89. Ibid, pp. 55-56.

90. Ibid, p. 56.

91. Ibid, p. 58.


95. Ibid, p. 328.


97. Ibid, p. 84.


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124. Ibid.
128 M. Scheler, *Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft*, op. cit., p.129.
129. J.R. Staude,
133. Ibid, p.142.
134. Ibid, p.142-3.
137. Ibid, p.144.
140. Ibid, p.163.
141. Ibid, p.165.
143. Ibid, p.216
144. Ibid, p.217.
145. 'Zusatze to M. Scheler, *Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft*, op. cit., p.447.

For a fuller discussion of this whole debate see ch. 5 below.
This is not to suggest that other writers did not adopt an empirical approach to the sociology of knowledge. For a collection of essays, many of them 'empirical', in this area assembled by Scheler see M. Scheler (ed.), Versuche zu einer Soziologie des Wissens, op. cit.


O. Hintze, 'Max Scheler's Ansichten Über Geist and Gesellschaft' loc. cit.

A. Eleutheropulos, 'Sozialpsychologie und Wissenssoziologie',


This is not to suggest that the sociology of knowledge perspective disappears completely since it can still be found in his later works. See, for example, M. Scheler, Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos, Bern/Munich 1966 (7th ed., first published 1928), esp. pp.56ff. But even here it is quite apparent that Scheler's own interests had shifted towards a universalistic philosophical anthropology. Similarly, Scheler still speaks here of the 'powerless mind'. (p.71).

O. Becker and H.O. Dahlke, 'Max Scheler's Sociology of Knowledge', op. cit., p.322.

This is, in fact, the title of Lenks critique of Scheler; Cf. K. Lenk, Von der Ohnmacht des Geistes, op. cit. See also K. Lenk, Marx in der Wissenssoziologie, Neuwied/Berlin 1972.

S. Marck, 'Zum Problem des "seinsverbundenen Denkens", Archiv für systematische Philosophie und Soziologie, vol.33, 1929, pp.238-252. The main content of this article is also discussed below in ch.5.

S. Mark, 'Zum Problem des "seinsverbundenen Denkens"', op. cit., p.248.

Ibid, p.249.

K. Lenk, 'Von der Ohnmacht des Geistes, op. cit., p.63.
CHAPTER THREE

George Lukács: From Relification to the
Critique of Ideology?
CHAPTER THREE

It is in Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein that Lukács presented a number of problems that were central to the sociology of knowledge in Germany. However, that work itself hardly a contribution to the sociology of knowledge defined as an academic discipline and existing within the tradition of German sociology. Indeed, it is possible to extrapolate from it an implicit, incisive critique of the attempt to develop a sociology of knowledge within the framework of writers like Scheler and Mannheim. This critique remains implicit both in the sense that Lukács did not explicitly set out to provide a critique of the sociology of knowledge and because, when the work appeared in 1923, no substantive contributions to the sociology of knowledge had appeared.

Lukács' study predates any major contribution to the sociology of knowledge in Germany. Scheler's collection of contributions to the sociology of knowledge and his detailed outline of a framework for a sociology of knowledge, Versuche zu einer Soziologie des Wissens, appeared in 1924. Mannheim's first essay to be substantially and specifically concerned with the sociology of knowledge, 'The Problems of a Sociology of Knowledge', appeared in 1925. Many of the essays which make up Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein in fact predate any contribution to the sociology of knowledge in Germany.

However, in order to demonstrate the importance of Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein for the sociology of knowledge in Germany we need to show that it is either, to some extent, part of the German traditions of sociology and
philosophy or at least a reception of those traditions. We also need to show that the themes and problems it raises have relevance for the themes and central problematic of the sociology of knowledge in Germany. Furthermore, it is necessary to show how Lukács' work influenced the development of this tradition in Germany. This does not mean, however, that we have to demonstrate that Lukács' mode of presentation of the problems facing a sociology of knowledge was identical with that of later contributors nor does it mean that we have to subscribe to the view that Lukács himself solved all these problems successfully. Indeed, if we examine subsequent contributions to the sociology of knowledge, we find that, with the exception of Mannheim, Lukács' work played a subterranean role within this discipline.

In what sense, then, can we say that Lukács' Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein is part of, or a critique of, the German tradition in sociology and philosophy. Although Lukács himself saw the work as an attempt 'to understand the essence of Marx's method and to apply it correctly' and in particular to restore the importance of a historical dialectical interpretation of Marx's work that had disappeared in the revisionism and orthodoxy of the Second International, the actual content of Lukács' work utilizes many elements of contemporary German sociology and philosophy. In particular, the work of Max Weber is central to Lukács' analysis of capitalist society and, to some extent, so are some of his methodological concepts. Weyembergh has pointed to the general relevance of Weber's sociology to Lukács,
work and Maretsky has shown how much Weber's notion of capitalism and rationality is central to that of Lukács. Similarly, Fetscher has shown how Weber's methodological 'concept of "objective possibility" plays a central role in Lukács' theory of class consciousness. In more general terms, Arato has argued that Lukács sought 'to reconstruct the critique of political economy in terms of a critique of total society, i.e. the critique of sociology'. We hope to show that Lukács' understanding of the process of reification owes something at least to Simmel's Philosophie des Geldes. Some aspects of this relationship between Simmel and Lukács has been sketched out by Arato.

It is clearly possible to demonstrate Lukács' central role in the revival of a dialectical interpretation of Hegel and a restoration of the importance of Hegel's dialectic for an understanding of Marx's work. It is also apparent that the central chapter of his work 'Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat' is, in its critique of 'the antinomies of bourgeois thought', largely concerned with a critique of Kant. It is less often pointed out, however, in what way contemporary German philosophers influenced Lukács' work at certain points. This is true not only of Emil Lask, who is crucial for Lukács' critique of Kant, but also true of the neo-Kantians and especially Heinrich Rickert who - despite Lukács' apparent abandonment of neo-Kantianism - is important for the manner in which Lukács both describes and separates the natural and the human sciences.

All this, of course, is to suggest that Lukács' work cannot merely be interpreted as a brilliant reinterpretation and reconstruction of Marx's work in abstraction. Indeed Lukács himself many times acknowledged the signifi-
cance of strands of contemporary German sociology and philosophy for his increased interest in Marx. Lukács later saw these influences as largely, thought not entirely, negative and many interpreters have suggested that Lukács' work is a critique of these sociological and philosophical traditions. However much that may be true, it may also be the case that many elements of those traditions were retained even in the very process of their critique. Lukács himself suggested in the Preface to the new edition of Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein in 1967 that his study of Marx commenced around 1908 and that "It was Marx the "sociologist" that attracted me — and I saw him through spectacles tinged by Simmel and Max Weber. I resumed my studies during World War I, but this time I was led to do so by my general philosophical interests and under the influence of Hegel rather than any contemporary thinkers." 11 Elsewhere, Lukács specifically testifies to the importance of Simmel for his understanding of Marx, at least during his early acquaintance with his works. In a Hungarian introduction to some of his selected writings published in 1968, Lukács writes: "A properly scholarly use of my knowledge of Marx was greatly influenced by the philosophy and sociology of Simmel, who was experimenting with the fitting in of certain aspects of Marxism into the German Geisteswissenschaft [en] which [were] then in [thei] early stages." 12 In a later preface to another collection of writings published in Budapest in 1970 and again commenting on his early interest in German philosophy, Lukács states that "It is hardly surprising that ... my starting point could only be Kant. Nor can it be surprising that when I looked for the perspectives, foundations and methods of application of philosophie generalisation, I found a theoretical guide in the German philosopher Simmel, not the least of reasons being that this approach brought me closer to Marx in certain respects, though in a distorted way." 13
Lukács in many ways viewed his relationship to some figures in German sociology in a positive manner as when he says that he does 'not at all regret today that I took my first lessons in social science from Simmel and Max Weber and not from Kautsky. I don't know whether one cannot even say today that this was a fortunate circumstance for my own development'.

Lukács argues for the positive influence of Simmel even though in Die Zerstörung der Vernunft, he was extremely critical of Simmel's attempt to 'deepen historical materialism', on the grounds that this 'deepening of historical materialism in fact exists in the subsumption of its results under a Lebensphilosophie framework, that in this case appears as the insoluble opposition between subjectivity and cultural forms, between soul and mind. This opposition is, according to Simmel, the peculiar tragedy of culture'.

Again in the Hungarian 'Preface' referred to above, Lukács recalls his meeting with Ernst Bloch: 'The experience of meeting Bloch (1910) convinced me that philosophy in the classical sense was nevertheless possible'.

This classical sense of philosophy was perhaps revived for Lukács by his intensive study of Hegel to which he alludes in his 1962 preface to The Theory of the Novel -- completed in the winter of 1914-15-- by which time he 'had become a Hegelian'. Indeed, Lukács claims that this work 'was the first work belonging to the Geisteswissenschaften school in which the findings of Hegelian philosophy were concretely applied to aesthetic problems', even though 'the author ... was not an exclusive or orthodox Hegelian'.

In Lukács' aesthetic writings in this period one should also recall the importance of Max Weber's methodological writings and especially his notion of ideal types. As Hanak argues, works such as The Theory of the Novel 'would be inconceivable without the influence of Max Weber. Weber's
"ideal types" permeate Lukács' aesthetic thought. Kettler and Markus have both pointed to the centrality of culture and cultural renewal in Lukács' early writings up to and including the period of his transition to Marxism. Markus, for example, argues that 'since the beginnings of his development as a thinker, the question of culture meant for Lukács the question of the possibility of a life free from alienation'. The analysis of alienation that Lukács utilized was not that of Marx but of the Lebensphilosophie tradition, and especially Simmel. This analysis already contained a critique of bourgeois culture but was itself caught up in other contradictions. Lukács' 'road to Marx' lay in increasingly distancing himself from this Lebensphilosophie. Markus argues that this direction of Lukács' work brought him closer to Kant:

'The last major systematic work from the pre-Marxist period, the Ästhetik of 1916-18, exhibits clearly and decisively a Kantian character - in the spirit of a very distinctive, extremely dualistic interpretation of Kant. This brought Lukács himself to the point at which, in the first chapter of this work, he explicitly concerned himself with the connection between his viewpoint as a whole and that of Rickert and Lask.'

It is this late work - comprising four complete chapters and one incomplete - that Lukács was considering for submission as a Habilitationschrift in Heidelberg as late as May 1918, with Rickert and Maier as assessors. This did not in fact take place but it does testify to the centrality of Lukács' philosophical concerns in Germany as late as May 1918.

This very brief outline of Lukács' connections with important strands of German sociology and philosophy - some of which will be taken up in detail later in this chapter - is not meant to suggest that there exists some break,
some rupture in Lukács's work which enables us to speak of a young and a mature Lukács, a non-Marxist and a Marxist Lukács. As Breines argues, "while Lukács' turn to Marxism in 1918-19 stands as a watershed of his career, the pre-Marxist phase that preceded it is inextricably linked to the Marxism that followed. It can also be argued... that the whole matter can be looked at in the other direction, which reveals that Lukács' Marxism is organically bound up with the pre-Marxist phase of his work."23

Indeed, we might go further and suggest that this continuation of his earlier concerns and modes of formulation of problems gives Lukács' Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein, in part, its distinctive character and in its fusion of these concerns with an attempt to understand and interpret Marx presents him with the difficulties that are evident in his analysis.

The second misunderstanding of the previous brief outline of Lukács' connections with German sociology and philosophy is the thesis that Lukács' work owes its origins solely to these German traditions and that the Hungarian context is irrelevant. Whilst the intention has been to suggest that Lukács' work is, in important respects, grounded in these traditions, it should not be forgotten that the context of this assimilation was not merely study in Berlin under Simmel or with Weber, Rickert and Lask in Heidelberg but also the cultural milieu in Budapest in the pre- and First World War period. This context has been particularly well illuminated by Kettler's study which shows not merely Lukács' concerns in Budapest but also - and this is important for a succeeding chapter - his relationship with Mannheim in Budapest intellectual circles.24 Kettler not only illustrates the continuity of Lukács' concern with culture - In 1919 during the Hungarian Revolution, Lukács could still argue that 'politics is merely a means, culture is
the goal, and that the political standpoint may only be a filter but not the sole source; but he also shows that there does not exist a complete radical break with the past when Lukács entered the Communist Party in December 1918. One should also add that specifically Hungarian influences were important to Lukács, especially his relationship with Ady, Szabo and Balázs.

The second problem associated with arguing that Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein is important for the German tradition in the sociology of knowledge is how to demonstrate that the themes and problems that it raises are relevant for those examined by the sociology of knowledge. Some commentators would indeed reduce the whole discussion of ideology which is at the centre of Lukács' work to the role of an historical antecedent to the sociology of knowledge. Werner Stark, for example, argues that the doctrine of ideology is no more than an historical antecedent of the sociology of knowledge; its centre of interest lies in a different level of mental life; it is also different in its nature because it is a psychological rather than a sociological discipline; the sooner the traditional connection of the two studies is severed, the better it will be for both of them.

Aron's judgment is more negative - though he does credit Lukács with being 'more profound than most other Marxists' - when he argues that Marxism considered as a sociology of knowledge is perhaps naively dogmatic in its outright condemnation of bourgeois ideology and its justification of proletarian ideas. We might add here that neither Stark nor Aron would appear to have understood the nature of Lukács' work - the critique of ideology is not a psychological activity, nor is it concerned with moral 'condemnation' and moral 'justification' of 'ideas'. If we can
criticize the level of understanding of Marx's work, for example, that is to be found in the writers on the sociology of knowledge in Germany in the Weimar Republic then such criticism must also be levelled at many later commentators who at least have had the chance of access to a whole range of Marx's writings that were unavailable to earlier writers.

We might restate this problem in a different manner. Why is it that central figures in the sociology of knowledge such as Mannheim felt compelled to confront Lukács' work - or at least their interpretation of it? One answer might be that the sociology of knowledge itself grows out of the critique of ideology. This is certainly the assumption that lies behind Mannheim's account of the transition from the study of ideology to the sociology of knowledge, from an engaged critique to a neutral academic discipline, from an evaluative to a non-evaluative concept of ideology. Scheler, as we have seen, seems to make great use of a very wide base-superstructure dichotomy which, though he did not derive it from Lukács, he certainly advanced as a counter to a mechanistic interpretation of historical materialism. But it is doubtful whether it is possible to argue that the sociology of knowledge grew out of the critique of ideology. As Lenk correctly remarks, it is only the most complete misunderstanding of Marx's theory that could have led contemporaries to argue that Mannheim's sociology of knowledge was 'Marx's theory in the garb of bourgeois science'.

Thus, it is neither accurate to state that the critique of ideology does or should have nothing to do with the sociology of knowledge nor that the latter simply grew out of the former. In Lukács' case, there is considerable doubt as to whether his orientation to the problems raised in the sociology of knowledge was taken up in the positive sense of developing that tradition. Lieber argues
that Lukács' work, apart from its reception by Marxist writers, hardly had any effect upon the sociology of knowledge in Weimar Germany. He suggests that if one examines . . . the controversies surrounding the sociology of knowledge in the nineteen twenties as to its relation to Lukács and its capacity to make his contributions to the problem of reified consciousness and class consciousness fruitful for the discussion of the problem of ideology, then one must state that such a confrontation with Lukács was reduced to a few references, mostly only in footnotes. This means that Lukács' work was hardly of importance for the discussion of the sociology of knowledge. The understanding of Marxism remained fixed in what was taken to be, and what had gained influence as, mostly in the vulgar Marxist garb, the historical-materialistic or Marxist "world-view".

Part of this 'world-view' was, of course, the vulgar Marxist base-superstructure relationship interpreted in an extremely mechanistic manner.

Lieber's view, however, is not unchallenged. It is certainly true that references to Lukács' work by contributors to the sociology of knowledge remain few and often only in footnotes. However, it has been argued by Huaco that Mannheim's discussion of ideology has affinities to that presented by Lukács. Huaco states that 'it is fairly easy for anyone to verify that, at least at a formal level, the argument presented by Mannheim is almost a mirror image of the earlier argument developed by Lukács'.

Kettler, in a more detailed article suggested that Lukács' Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein was 'a work of decisive importance for Mannheim's development . . . for its influential argument that the cultural "solution" of the moral philosophic problems presupposes a social frame of reference and action, and for its provision of such a framework'. Kettler, referring to an unpublished essay by Mannheim, 'Eine soziologische Theorie der
Kultur und ihrer Erkennbarkeit', suggests that 'it represents Mannheim's effort to meet the challenge of Lukács' History and Class Consciousness and concludes that 'after 1923, and at least until 1930, Mannheim no longer claimed a confident superiority to Marxism.' Even though Mannheim's references to Lukács may only be in note form they are usually positive as when in his 'Historismus' article published in 1924 he refers to the attempts to construct a rational dialectic and states that 'the most profound and significant of all these attempts is probably that of George Lukács'. These unpublished works of Mannheim and his relationship to Lukács will be examined in greater detail in the next chapter.

We may conclude, therefore, that whilst Lukács' work did not necessarily provide the 'paradigm' for other discussions of the problem of ideology and whilst his work was often only referenced by writers on the sociology of knowledge we can say that, at least in Mannheim's case, Lukács' position was one which had to be seriously confronted, even though not on the terms or in the framework established by Lukács. We would also concur with Lieber's view that almost all the writers on the sociology of knowledge who confronted the Marxist critique of ideology did not in fact confront Marx's work but a crude version of mechanistic materialism which Lukács himself was at pains to attack.

Yet in order to show that the themes and problems raised by Lukács' account of class consciousness, reification and the critique of ideology are relevant for the sociology of knowledge, it is clearly necessary to develop Lukács' own position. Lukács' own intentions were not to develop a sociology of knowledge but to reconstruct Marx's dialectical method of understanding
society. Even though the present study is concerned with the development of the sociology of knowledge and, in this instance, with Lukács’ relationship to it, it must not be forgotten that Lukács’ work stands in its own right as a Marxist attempt to reconstruct the dialectical method and, together with Korsch’s Marxismum und Philosophie, to combat the very same vulgar Marxism that was the focus of attention in the sociology of knowledge. Lukács’ work stands, again with Korsch’s work, as a detailed attempt to extend the critique of ideology to Marxism itself. Arato argues that whereas Marx’s central concern was the critique of political economy, Lukács’ was the critique of sociology, i.e. the critique of the totality of capitalist society and the self-critique of Marxism. The critique of sociology attempted to take the double form of Anerkennung (recognition) and Aufhebung (overcoming). The self-critique of Marxism was a more difficult task for Lukács, and the incompleteness of this self-critique is a clue to many of the theoretical failures of *History and Class Consciousness*. Arato seems to imply that the critique of sociology was more successful than the self-critique of Marxism. Yet it can be argued that Lukács did not ‘overcome’ that tradition which was the object of his critique but remained within many of its basic assumptions. For this reason alone, Lukács’ relationship to German sociology is an ambiguous one.

A further consequence of examining Lukács’ work within the terms of his own concerns is to reveal, perhaps, the sharp differences that exist between the critique of ideology and the sociology of knowledge. Writers within the Frankfurt School tradition, for example, have always drawn a sharp dividing line between the critique of ideology and the sociology of
knowledge and have, perhaps for this reason, never examined Lukács' work in the light of the sociology of knowledge but rather, have drawn a demarcation line between the two. Thus, for instance, Kurt Lenk - who owes much to the Frankfurt School tradition - in his investigation of the reception of Marx's critique of ideology within the sociology of knowledge in Germany makes scant reference to Lukács, presumably on the grounds that he does not belong to this tradition. Whilst this is true, it remains interesting to compare Lukács' reception of Marx's critique of ideology with that of writers in the sociology of knowledge tradition. Such an investigation would also reveal the divergencies and affinities between Lukács' position and that of the Frankfurt School, though this is not our central concern here. Furthermore, Lukács' work provided perhaps the most important basis, together with that of Korsch and perhaps Lewalter, for a critique of the German tradition in the sociology of knowledge and for an understanding of the most developed Marxist critique of ideology. It is interesting to examine how far Lukács' work was applied in this direction, not by Lukács himself, but by other writers who confronted the sociology of knowledge and especially the account of ideology provided by sociologists such as Scheler and Mannheim. In this context, and on one level at least, what is at issue is whether interpreters are correct in attempting to show Lukács' importance as an influence of Mannheim, in order perhaps to provide a more Marxist interpretation of Mannheim's work, or whether they are justified in distancing Lukács from Mannheim, from the German sociology of knowledge tradition and from German sociology as such in order to establish a sharp demarcation between Lukács' critique of ideology and Mannheim's sociology of knowledge. In the latter case, it is all too easy to lose sight of the fact that even though in no sense does Lukács intend to
develop a sociology of knowledge, his treatment of the nature of the social
determination of thought, the process of reification, the development of
class consciousness nonetheless deals with issues that are central to the
sociology of knowledge. In so far as Lukács' _Geschichte und Klassen-
bewusstsein_ presents the major attempt in the early part of this century to
develop Marx's critique of ideology and since most writers on the sociology
of knowledge were at some time necessarily concerned with the issues raised
by such a critique, we may concur with Lenk that 'the central theme of the
sociology of knowledge, the determination of respective relations between
mental formations and social structures, was inconceivable without Marx's
critique of ideology'. 40 This is not to suggest — and this was emphasized
earlier — that the sociology of knowledge grew out of Marx's critique of
ideology or was an extension of it. Rather, the sociology of knowledge
had other roots which make its interpretation of the relationship between
mental forms and social structure distinctive. 41 Nonetheless, some of
the themes which that discipline took up, however differently they were
treated, were also present in Marx's critique of ideology and in Lukács' ex-
tension of that critique. In the strict sense, it is only Lukács' critique
of ideology that is inconceivable without that of Marx. The sociology of
knowledge, when it dealt with similar issues, was primarily concerned with
opposing a vulgar Marxist position to which writers in that tradition them-
selves sometimes adhered.

In the simplest terms, then, what were the themes which Lukács developed
that are relevant for the sociology of knowledge? At the centre of Lukács'
_Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein_ lies the problem of how it is that we are
able to grasp, to know and to understand social reality. For Lukács, social
reality is not some objectively given body of facts to which forms of thought may be related but rather is itself mediated by forms of consciousness. That is, the immediate apprehension of social reality in no way implies the apprehension of some 'true' reality but, on the contrary, usually implies false consciousness, an illusory apprehension of that reality. Stated simply, then, Lukács' problem is how to examine this reified reality and this false consciousness and how to overcome it. This necessarily leads Lukács to examine the process of the generation of ideologies, false consciousness, class consciousness and reification. It leads him to an attempt to delineate that process which we already know from Marx's writings to be the critique of ideology, but not merely a critique of ideology as a mode of apprehension of the world and its relationship to human engagement in the world but a critique of that reality which ideology purports to comprehend. In Marx's work, for instance, the critique of political economy is not merely a critique of the theories of political economists but, at the same time, a critique of that reality which their theories purport to explain. In Lukács' work, then, we must investigate what it is that he criticises and what is the nature of the reality that is subjected to critique. In other words, is Lukács' notion of capitalism and his conception of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat identical with those of Marx? Does philosophy and sociology play the same role in Lukács' critique of ideology that political economy plays in Marx's critique?

In the course of his critique of bourgeois ideology, Lukács confronts the problem of how social classes perceive social reality. Specifically, Lukács examines how social reality manifests itself in the class consciousness of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. In the course of such an in-
vestigation, Lukács discusses how we may study class consciousness and through which central relationships in these groups is social reality grasped and transmitted. If the immediate identity of the subject and object of consciousness is rejected, as is the case in Lukács's work, then the critique of ideology must examine how limitations and illusions emerge in various modes of grasping social reality. Do specific modes and methods of apprehending social reality provide objective knowledge of society? For Lukács this involves an examination of the origins and relationship between alienation, reification and ideology. The task of any critique of ideology, however, must always be directed towards not merely an account of how that ideology comes about but how human beings are able to be emancipated from such ideology. For Lukács this can only take place within the context of conscious political activity.

If the above sketch, in a crude form, represents some of the central issues that Lukács's examination of the critique of ideology deals with, then we may add that similar themes are dealt with, in a very different manner, by writers in the sociology of knowledge, especially where that discipline concerns itself with an examination of ideology. Yet other writers did not conceive this discussion within such an explicitly political dimension as did Lukács, although, as an examination of Scheler's and Mannheim's writings reveals, the political dimension is not totally absent from their work either. What is distinctive about Lukács's work is the mode of conceptualising the problems which he faces. The notions and configurations of such concepts as alienation, reification, objective possibility in relation to class consciousness, the subject-object dialectic, and the relationship between theory and praxis, dialectic, mediation and totality must form
a central part of any discussion of Lukács' critique of ideology. However, in the light of the preceding remarks on Lukács relationship to some German traditions in sociology and philosophy, we must first examine the role that such conceptions play in Lukács' work prior to the publication of Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein in 1923. Such a study will enable us to investigate how far Lukács' major work in this period represents a break with his earlier writings and to draw out the implications of this continuity or break for an understanding of Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein.

Our study of Lukács' work, therefore, proceeds in the following manner. Lukács' early writings are examined in order to examine some of the assumptions that have already been made with regard to his relationship to certain strands of German sociology and philosophy and to throw some light upon how far such traditions are still important in Lukács' major work of this period. Secondly, since Lukács ascribes to Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein a central methodological role, some of the methodological problems that he raises for a critique of ideology will be investigated. Lukács' delineation of the notion of class consciousness must be studied in detail in the light of his use of the concept of objective possibility. Further, an important section of the present investigation must be a critical examination of Lukács' notion of reification, its origins and its areas of application. The manner in which Lukács poses the problem of how to overcome reification must also be a central concern. Finally, the reception of Lukács' Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein within the sociology of knowledge is examined.
It has already been pointed out that Lukács' early work was concerned with the problem of culture largely within the context of a contemporary framework of Lebensphilosophie. Further, we have already seen that Scheler conceived his sociology of knowledge within the context of a wider, and more significant in Scheler's eyes, sociology of culture. In Mannheim's case, it can also be shown that his central early concerns were with the understanding of cultural expressions and with the search for modes of cultural renewal that he shared, in part, with Lukács. However, such apparent affinities between the three writers arise out of an abstract examination of the notion of 'culture' and hides important differences between them. It is necessary to examine Lukács' early work not only in order to define such differences but - and more importantly - because these early writings have a direct bearing upon an understanding and interpretation of Lukács' Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein. One may read this major work as a Marxist study of ideology and then use that understanding in order to retrace the Marxist standpoint inherent in Lukács' earlier writings on the problems of culture. Or, one may read his early writings in order to show that the non-Marxist elements are retained in Lukács' later work, especially Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein. In the former case, we see Lukács pressing beyond the interpretations of, say, Weber and Simmel, whilst in the latter case, the basic flaws in Lukács' major work in this period are traced back to Lebensphilosophie and Simmel. The former interpretation is characteristic of Goldmann, Breines, and Arato the latter of Coletti and Steadman-Jones. For both positions, however, the understanding of Lukács' early writings is central to their subsequent
There are, of course, other pitfalls associated with readings of the 'early' and the 'later' Lukács. As a recent article on the relevance of Lukács early work for an understanding of Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein states it,

'there is a tendency to view Lukács' relationship to his neo-Kantian past either in terms of a complete break or in terms of a continuance of a "romantic Marxism" throughout his life. Both fail to appreciate the specific contribution which Lukács makes the former by neglecting the way in which his later position is a refinement of an already critical attitude towards bourgeois society . . . , the latter by devouring both Lukács and neo-Kantianism under the ready-made terms "romanticism" or "historicism" and by drowning the specific theoretical achievements of both in a sea of superficial parallels.' 48

Such interpretations can only be avoided if one undertakes a careful study of Lukács' earlier writings and Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein. Fortunately, this work of reinterpretation has recently been undertaken from a number of different directions, 49 but all of them take account of the early works of Lukács', some of which have only recently been published. 50 These are referred to in the examination of Lukács' early writings that follows.

As Kammler argues, we may discern three intentions in Lukács' writings on aesthetics and his early Marxist writings on culture. Lukács' early work is orientated towards 'a historical-sociological analysis especially of literary forms and problems'. 51 This sociological analysis is most evident in the essay 'Zur Soziologie des modernen Dramas' which, though published in 1914 in German, was Lukács' own translation of a study in Hungarian that had been completed in the winter of 1908-9. 52
tation can be seen, more briefly, in a review of a volume in a series edited by Alfred Weber. In this review, entitled 'Zum Wesen und zur Methode der Kultursoziologie', Lukács discusses some aspects of a sociology of culture. It is also apparent in an early article on the methodology of the study of literature, now recently translated into German. The most concrete and applied version of this sociological-historical intention is The Theory of the Novel, written in 1914-15 and published in book form in 1920.

A second fundamental intention in Lukács' early writings is the development of the 'basic structures of a philosophy of art with the intention of securing a philosophy of life, a world view'. This interest is manifested in The Soul and its Forms, in Lukács' then unpublished Heidelberg writings on aesthetics and in the important article 'Die Subjekt-Objekt-Beziehung in der Aesthetik' published in 1918. The third interest, and one which cannot be separated from these other two orientations, is Lukács' concern for a cultural renewal in bourgeois society. This problem is at the centre of the 1917-18 discussion in the 'Szellemkek' group in Budapest of which Lukács was a member. These discussions and their relationship to the work of Lukács and Mannheim are discussed in Kettler's Marxismus und Kultur and in Kammler's study referred to above. This interest is continued in Lukács' early Marxist writings and is typified by his article 'Alte Kultur und neue Kultur' published in 1920. It is these three intentions or interests that will be examined in order to throw light upon the development of Lukács' thought and its central categories.

At the very start of his essay on modern drama, Lukács recognises that 'all that is sociological in the dramatic form only determines the possibility
of the realisation of the aesthetic value but not this value itself. How value and value realisation are connected and how far historical-sociological phenomena are important for the structure of value itself. Lukács hopes to consider in other works. This neo-Kantian and Lebensphilosophie separation of the social-historical sphere from the sphere of spiritual ideal values is characteristic of Lukács' early works and reflects the persistent influence of writers like Simmel and the neo-Kantian tradition. This influence is apparent throughout this essay. Lukács takes modern drama to be a 'symbol of the whole of bourgeois culture' and its crisis: 'every drama is bourgeois because the forms of culture in modern life are bourgeois and because the forms of every expression of life are today determined by these cultural forms'.

This crisis lies in the powerlessness of the individual and his values against the pure facticity of what exists. Kammler, in this context, points to a certain affinity with Scheler's view that the 'ideal factors' are fundamentally powerless against the 'real factors' once this dualism accepts no possibility of mediation. With reference to this power of the existent, Lukács argues that it is 'not only that every idea and every theory is powerless when confronted with its power [that of 'the existent, of naked existence' D.F.]: rather, they immediately come under the domination of this unformulatable law ... from the moment when they are expressed'. This separation and alienation of ideas and values when confronted with the existent, this separation of man and history, theory and practice, is embodied for Lukács in the dominant values in bourgeois culture - Individualism and historicism. These values reflect this dualism, the one by emphasizing an individualism that cannot be realised, the other by emphasizing the unrealizability of Individualism. More concretely expressed, this crisis, this 'problem of life' arises out of the relationship between the individual and his culture and the
economic structure of a capitalist society. In a remarkable passage, Lukács highlights the way in which individualism has become a 'problem of life'. This problematic lies in forms of alienation:

'This new life' of modern capitalism has made everything "uniform" - clothing, transport, "the diverse forms of activity" 'viewed from the workers' standpoint' have become 'increasingly similar (bureaucracy, industrial machine labour); education, the experiences of childhood become increasingly similar (the influence and ever increasing importance of the metropolis) etc.' 67

Lukács, like Simmel, also refers to the uniformity of the soldier's occupation compared with earlier times. Along with this uniformity, and parallel to it, is the 'objectification of life' [Versachlichung des Lebens]:

"From the standpoint of the individual, the essence of the modern division of labour is perhaps that it makes work independent of the always irrational, thus only qualitatively determinable, capacities of the worker and places it under objective, goal-oriented criteria that lie outside his personality and have no relationship to it. The major economic tendency of capitalism is this same objectification of production, its separation from the personality of the producers. By means of the capitalist economy, an objective abstraction - capital - becomes the real producer even though it hardly stands in an organic connection to the personality of those who happen to own it; indeed, it becomes increasingly superfluous whether the owners are persons at all (joint stock companies)." 68

This loss of relationship between the individual and his activity also applies to modern scientific methods which become 'increasingly objective and impersonal'. This applies to work as a whole which 'takes on a specific, objective life over against the individual character of the human being, so that he is forced to express himself in some form other than in what he does'. 69

A further consequence is that the relationship between people becomes increasingly impersonal. Commenting on part of the passage quoted above,
Breines writes that 'the links between Lukács' standpoint here and the theory of alienation developed by Marx . . . are striking'. What is, in fact, more striking is that the whole of this passage can be drawn from sections of Simmel's *Philosophy of Money*, a book which is deeply critical of Marx and one whose political economy probably has its origins not in Marx but in writers like Schmoller, on the one hand, and marginal utility theory, on the other. Thus, one should not be surprised, as Breines is, that Lukács 'saw absolutely no revolutionary prospects in the objectification of labour in capitalist society'. If there is an anticipation of Lukács' later Marxism in these passages on modern drama, then this anticipation derives from Simmel who, as has been pointed out several times, did not have a detailed knowledge of Marx when compared with some of his contemporaries such as Tönnies. Such passages do, however, testify to the profound influence which Simmel's *Philosophy of Money*, with its theory of reification and alienation has upon Lukács. Simmel's influence is also manifested in Lukács' treatment of forms of life and cultural forms. As Kammler comments, "life" and "form" solidify in the formal typology of two "groups of forms". The concept of form derived from Simmel is one which rules out the historical dimension and reduces the social historical process to an ontological level.

The second intention that is manifested in Lukács' early writings - the search for a new world-view, a philosophy of life - is closely connected with the themes raised in the discussion of modern drama. In other writings in the same period, Lukács seeks to show how the ideal spheres of values, the realm of the essential, can be identified in the work of art. Such value and such essentiality cannot, as we have seen, arise out of the act of material...
production. Nor can they arise out of the reified, uniform life of modern society. That life is for Lukács, as for Simmel, fragmentary. For Lukács, in 'The Metaphysics of Tragedy',

'life is an anarchy of light and dark: nothing is ever completely fulfilled in life, nothing ever quite ends; new confusing voices always mingle with the chorus of those that have been heard before. Everything flows, everything merges into another thing, and the mixture is uncontrolled and impure; everything is destroyed, everything is smashed, nothing ever flowers into real life.'

The problem, then, is how 'true life' and structures of meaning can emerge out of this chaos. Lukács' answer is in terms of the 'form' of a work of art: 'Form is the highest judge of life ... Form is the only pure revelation of pure experience, but just for that reason it will always stubbornly refuse to be imposed on anything that is oppressive or unclear'. This pure manifestation of life-experience, of Erlebnisse, is also the bearer of values: 'Form is the highest judge of life. Form-giving is a judging force, an ethic; there is a value-judgment in everything that has been given form. Every kind of form-giving, every literary form, is a step in the hierarchy of life-possibilities'. This metaphysic of forms is conceived of as lying quite outside historical social reality. Its basis lies in a 'Kantianism that has been reworked by Lebensphilosophie'. Form and ideal values can only be realised over against and in opposition to an objective reality; they remain, as Kammler argues, an 'abstraction of the subject from reality'. Such a position led Lukács to expouse various forms of mysticism in the period around 1912.

But, as Kammler argues, Lukács' way out of this mysticism and, in part, his retreat from Lebensphilosophie lay in his study of Hegel, a study that, on
a more concrete level, produced The Theory of the Novel and, at the abstract level, 'Die Subjekt-Objekt-Beziehung in der Aesthetik'. In The Theory of the Novel, this enabled Lukács to develop a historical perspective and, at least in terms of this historical philosophical conception, to relate forms dialectically to history. The notion of form also moves further away from that developed by Simmel and from its relationship to the metaphysics of Lebensphilosophie towards a methodologically more secure development of Weber's concept of ideal type.

In The Theory of the Novel, the themes that Lukács raised in his early work again appear but with a heightened degree of concretion. Lukács contrasts the epic and the novel as two representative forms of very different societies. Whereas the epic is able to conceive of the individual and society as a totality, this is no longer possible in the novel in an age of total alienation. Instead, the novel is an expression of 'the transcendental homelessness of man'. Again, the conception of the tragic separations of the individual and society comes to the fore but now in a more historical form. In modern society it is no longer possible to posit an immediate totality of the individual and society. Alienation takes on the form of alienation from nature as a result of man being alienated from second nature, that is the society he has created. Thus, 'estrangement from nature (the first nature) ... is only a projection of man's experience of his self-made environment as a prison instead of as a parental home'. 80 This second nature is 'the world of convention, a world from whose all-embracing power only the innermost recesses of the soul are exempt, a world which is present everywhere in a multiplicity of forms too complex for understanding ... It is a second nature, and, like
This conceptualisation of a first and second nature is derived from Hegel but, as Kammler points out, the function of these concepts is altered by Lukács. Kammler argues that

"for Hegel, the "second nature" of societal forms is not, as is the first nature a conceptless necessity estranged from meaning but rather it is ultimately realised reason, objective spirit. Lukács certainly revises the Hegelian reconciliation of subject and object, man and society, but he does not yet connect it with Marx's transformation of the problem into one of the social praxis of human beings."

One should add that, in a sense, Lukács' revision of Hegel's notions is in the direction of a return to a Kantian conception of the unknowable thing-in-itself - itself the subject of a detailed critique in the chapter on reification in *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein*. One should also add that the problem of alienation as conceived by Lukács is not yet the remarkable social conception of estrangement rooted in labour that is found in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind* in his discussion of the master-slave dialectic and the unhappy consciousness. The typology of novel forms which constitutes the second part of *The Theory of the Novel* not only recalls the Weberian use of ideal types - and of all Lukács' work, Weber saw this as the embodiment of what could be achieved by the human sciences - but in its basis in diverse world-views it also recalls the abstract typology of world views that Dilthey uses to characterise diverse metaphysical positions. Lukács himself later characterised the work as being a product of his 'youthful enthusiasm for the work of Dilthey, Simmel and Max Weber'. But Lukács does certainly point to the introduction of the Hegelian notion of totality and 'the historic-
isation of aesthetic categories. 84

It is in Lukács' later essay 'Die Subjekt-Objekt-Beziehung in der Aesthetik', however, that the notion of totality comes to the fore. This article, Lukács states in a note to its title, 'presupposes a phenomenology of creative and receptive behaviour' but the notion of phenomenology it uses 'should be understood more in the sense of that of Hegel rather than Husserl'. 85 Lukács here constructs an aesthetic model in which the artist shapes and creates an autonomous world microcosm with its own laws and the work of art generates a harmony of subject and object, form and content. The eternal shaping of the unending creative process of the artist reaches its highest manifestations in the subject-object relationship. In the strict sense, that is, in the sense in which in a subject-object relationship neither pole is negated, a subject-object relationship only exists in the aesthetic sphere: 'the aesthetic subject merely stands, in the strict sense of this sphere, over against an object, the work of art: the subject himself is, in the same strict sense, a pure and immediately experiencing subject'. 86 Only the work of art is adequate to this subject and the work of art is 'a microcosm'; it possesses a 'cosmic character'; it is 'a totality that is autonomous, complete and self-sufficient'. 87 One important implication of this article is that this microcosm, this totality that is the work of art is only possible for a subject that is also a totality. However ahistorical and abstract this conception may be, it constitutes an important aesthetic model that Lukács transposes into the political sphere in Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein when he seeks to identify the identical subject and object of history, the identity of which secures autonomy for its standpoint. In this earlier work, it is the artist and the work of art that constitute a totality.
The affinities with Hegel's conception of totality are well illustrated by Pascal's characterisation of Hegel's notion of totality in his *Aesthetik.*

There,

'Hegel distinguishes art from science, from rational understanding, by saying that art does not analyse, but grasps reality "in its living existence in the particular"; art dwells "in the substantial entity" that analysis has not broken up. This complex entity of the work of art he calls a "Totalität", an essential feature of which is its completedness, so that he repeatedly speaks of it as a "total and free whole", with the "independence", or self-sufficiency, that characterises the work of art. And Hegel relates this self-sufficient totality of the work of art to a basic ontological characteristic of man, his "interest and need to be a real individual totality and living independent being ..." Totality appears in Hegel (as in Lukács) both as the fulfilment of life and as the essential characteristic of art.* 88

For Lukács, in his later work the identical-subject-object of history is no longer the artist or the work of art but the proletariat and later, as Ludz argues, the partisan. 89 In his later work, Lukács also provides an account of why this totality has been lost. Here, too, there is a remarkable affinity with Simmel who has often been criticised for aestheticising social reality. 90 In Lukács' work of this period, however, it is the aesthetics of Hegel rather than those of Simmel that receive increasing attention. It may well be that Lukács himself is not exempt from similar criticism since the centrality of his aesthetic model in his earlier writings is carried over into the political sphere.

Having briefly examined the first two of Lukács' aesthetic intentions in his early work - the sociological analysis of literary problems and the search for a philosophy of life through aesthetics - we may now turn to the third
motif in Lukács' work, that of the problem of cultural renewal, which will bring us to the period prior to the formulation of the major chapters of Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein. This motif relates to Lukács' position in Hungary after his final return to Budapest in 1917. The nature of Lukács' participation in the 'Free School for the Geisteswissenschaften', and in the 'Szellemkek', along with Mannheim and others, is open to some debate. Looking back upon that group many decades later, Lukács said that 'the basic binding element amongst the participants was an opposition to capitalism in the name of idealist philosophy. What held the group together was this opposition to positivism'. Lukács also suggests that the discussions were no longer important to him:

'Towards the end of the war a group gathered around Béla Balázs and myself which soon grew into the "Free School der Geisteswissenschaften". My earlier work no doubt played a certain role in its formation. It became important later thanks to the role played abroad by some of its members (Karl Mannheim, Arnold Hauser, Frigyes Antal, Károly Tolnay); its influence in Hungary is often overestimated today for the same reason. It did not really mean anything important to me since it was essentially linked to a way of thinking and acting that I had already got over.'

The persistence of themes from Lukács' earlier commitments to the Leben philosophic tradition and, as Kammler points out, the continued importance of his distinction between the sociological and historical philosophical perspectives for his early Marxist work suggests, however, that he had not 'got over' the topics of these discussions. In another sense, however, Lukács was changing course in the period 1916-18 since this signalised his renewed interest in Marx's work, but this time it was a Marx seen through Hegel's glasses and no longer through those of Simmel... I sought, basically on a Hegelian foundation, to synthesise Hegel and Marx in a
"philosophy of history". This change of course was further signalised by Lukács' entry into the Hungarian Communist Party in December 1918.

In his early essays on Marxism, Lukács retains the distinction that was already apparent in his early writings on aesthetics, namely the separation of sociology from a historical philosophical standpoint. This distinction is apparent from a passage from Lukács' early Marxist essay 'Bolshevism as a moral problem' which originally appeared only in Hungarian. In that article, the problem of the relationship between theory and practice comes to the fore but within the context of this earlier distinction. Thus, Lukács writes:

'Unfortunately, Marx's philosophy of history has seldom been consciously separated from his sociology and thus many people have not noticed that the two cardinal elements - namely, the class struggle and the socialist social order - do not emerge out of the same concept formation, even though they are still closely connected with one another. The first element represents the fundamental assertion of Marx's sociology: society has always existed and so too has its driving force; ... The second element represents the utopian postulate of Marx's philosophy of history: the moral purpose for a coming world order.'

This separation of sociology from the philosophy of history in Marx's work, a separation of theory and practice, is resolved, for Lukács, by the taking up of a revolutionary ethics that is related both to the revolutionary class and the concrete individual. The proletariat must press beyond the sociologically determined facticity towards the generation of a genuine freedom in society. Lukács sees a structural identity between the purposive action of 'the historical subject - the revolutionary proletariat - and that of the ethical subject - the moral individual', but this identity remains a purely formal and
abstract identity. This abstract identity between the moral and historical or political spheres is supported by the maintenance of the ideal of 'classical harmony' that Lukács retains from his aesthetics. In the same article Lukács asks: 'Is it possible to achieve the good through bad means, freedom through repression; can a new world order come into existence if the means of its generation are only distinguished in a technical sense from the means of the old system that have been rightly exposed and condemned'\(^96\). In quoting this passage, Kammler argues that 'the ethical question is immediately transformed into a political one', that is, the aesthetic judgment is transferred into the political realm without any mediation whatsoever.\(^97\)

This very same separation between sociology and a philosophy of history is retained in a slightly later work, 'Tactics and Ethics'\(^98\), in which the centrality of the moral dimension is again asserted and in which Lukács discusses 'the decisive criterion of socialist tactics: the philosophy of history. The fact of the class struggle is nothing other than a sociological description and an elevation of events into laws which are effective in social reality; the meaning of the class struggle of the proletariat, however, goes beyond this fact'.\(^99\) In this work, and later, the gulf between these two spheres is resolved by the notion of 'objective possibility' in relation to class consciousness. This notion of objective possibility is applied by Lukács both to individual and collective action. However, in the context of the dual spheres outlined above, the first prerequisite for this objective possibility is the formation of class consciousness. In order for correct action to become an authentic, correct regulator, class consciousness must raise itself above the level of the merely given; it must remember its world-historical mission
and its sense of responsibility. For the class interest, the attainment of which makes up the content of class-conscious action, coincides neither with the sum of the personal interests of the individuals belonging to the class nor with the immediate short-term interest of the class as a collective entity.¹¹⁰

It is this class consciousness which goes beyond the sociologically existent whilst taking it into account and unifying it with the historical philosophical standpoint. Already in this early work, Lukács anticipates some of the central notions and arguments in *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein* as well as taking up notions of objective possibility and the formation of ideal type constructions derived from Weber and placing them in a political context. One of Lukács' later intentions is to combat the dismissal of philosophy and especially of the philosophy of history from Marxism, a dismissal which leads to a mechanistic and scientistic conception of Marxism. In 'Tactics and Ethics', Lukács is already arguing against the naive belief in a scientific Marxism that has already predicted historical inevitabilities. Rather, for Lukács, 'science, knowledge, can indicate only possibilities - and it is only in the realm of the possible that moral, responsible action, truly human action, is itself possible'.¹⁰¹ Indeed, Kammler argues that, for Lukács, the concept of objective possibility is 'the decisive instrument for the mediation of a philosophy of history and theory of society relevant for praxis on the one hand, and individual praxis on the other'.¹⁰² Kammler goes on to suggest that despite the affinity between some of Lukács' formulations and his earlier works, 'Tactics and Ethics' represents a decisive break with the past since 'Lukács not only unambiguously asserts the priority of the historical philosophical perspective, but also - even though at first only programmatically - for the first time relates the determination of the direction
of praxis to the "material" of his philosophy of history, concrete society'.

This same transitional character of the retention of earlier formulations and their reworking within a new context is also apparent in Lukács' early Marxist discussion of the problem of culture. In an article entitled 'Alte Kultur und Neue Kultur' published in Kommunismus in 1920, it is possible to see how far Lukács has moved from a 'sociological' to a 'Marxist' account of culture. Earlier, in a review article, 'Zum Wesen und zur Methode der Kultursoziologie' published in 1915, in which, incidentally, Lukács praised Tönnies' Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft and Simmel's Philosophie des Geldes as isolated examples of a sociology of culture, Lukács criticized several aspects of the attempt by Alfred Weber and others to ground a sociology of culture. What he did not criticize, however, and what is significant in this specifically Marxist account of culture, is Alfred Weber's distinction between culture and civilization as a basic for the discussion of the social determination of culture. Lukács still speaks here of 'the concept of culture (in contrast to civilization)' and argues that it 'comprises numerous valuable products and capacities that can be dispensed with in reference to the immediate maintenance of life'. In this sense, culture is the product of an economic surplus; of an independence from the basic necessities of life. It is also an internal phenomenon. Lukács argues that 'just as culture is the inner domination of human beings over their environment, so civilization means its external domination over their environment'. This external domination is manifested primarily in the economy. Not only under capitalism is everyone, including the dominant class, subordinate to the productive process but capitalism itself implies 'the domination of the economy'. This insufficient determination
of capitalism is evident in Lukács' presentation of the process of alienation under capitalism which he sees merely as being based on the relationship of the producer to his product. The analysis of the exploitation of labour power and the whole dimension of exploitation is missing in Lukács' account of the alienation process. The alienation of the producer from his product in the form of commodity production is contrasted with an earlier harmonious relationship between culture, ideology and society in the same manner as Lukács previously contrasted the novel as a disjointed art form with the earlier harmony of art and society that produced the epic as a literary form. Lukács even takes as his example of the consequences of market production, the phenomenon of fashion that is found, not in Marx, but in Simmel's Philosophie des Geldes and in his Soziologie. Echoes of Simmel's sociological analysis of capitalism are also found elsewhere in this article. Lukács here advances the argument that is later central to his conception of a critique of ideology in Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein, namely that the bourgeoisie necessarily creates a disjunction or contradiction between its ideology - that of individual freedom - and 'the system of production, of society' which necessarily cannot grant freedom to the working class. At the level of cultural phenomena, this contradiction expresses itself as a contradiction between their form and their content, in a manner similar to that analysed - at a somewhat more abstract level - by Simmel in Philosophie des Geldes. The culture-civilization dichotomy, which also informs the form-content distinction, also forces Lukács to accept a concept of the capitalist production process that necessarily leads to culture and technical industrial production as simple oppositions. Ultimately, then, Lukács believes that by destroying 'the autonomy of the economy' through 'the socialist organisation of the economy', the form of alienation which he has
outlined will be transcended. This abstract standpoint, which is totally without reference to the process of exploitation and which is based upon a hypostatisation of 'the economy' has another important consequence for 'the new culture'. The culture-civilization dichotomy and the hypostatisation of the economy combine to produce a further dualism between the sociological analysis of the framework with which culture is created and the creative individual. Lukács argues with reference to a socialist society that 'culture is the form of the idea of the human essence of man. Culture will therefore be created by men not by circumstances. Such a transformation of society thus forms only the boundaries, only the possibility for free self-creativity, for the spontaneous creative force of men'.

We thus return once more to the distinction between sociological determinations and the philosophy of history. The new society will realise what classical idealism was unable to bring about 'for the idea of man as an independent goal, the basic idea of the new culture, is the legacy of the classical idealism of the nineteenth century'. It would appear that Lukács' notion of 'the new culture' in fact recreates the problem of the relationship between theory and praxis rather than solves it. It also assumes a specifically Hegelian reinterpretation of Marx's theory in which an autonomous, and no longer 'unhappy', consciousness will generate 'the new culture'. The weakness of this 'messianic utopianism' - as Lukács was later to refer to his work in this period - lies, as Kammler persuasively argues, in the fact that

'Lukács, on the basis of the one-sided emanation from theory, is not able to mediate between the theoretically postulated necessity of the revolutionary process and actual revolutionary praxis. His theory cannot suffice to realise his
Implicit claim, the practical realisation of the unity of theory and praxis through the existing concretisation of theory because it all too inclusively subsumes the constructive idea of the substratum of theory, the historical society and the constituted specific forms of social praxis. 110

This failure led Lukács, ultimately, into the examination of the problems of the organisation of social and political praxis that forms the final chapter of *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein*.

The preceding analysis of three central intentions in Lukács' early work and his transitional works has suggested that, not only does Lukács retain a body of interpretations of cultural phenomena that can be derived from German sociology and philosophy but that the maintenance of these intellectual configurations has important implications for Lukács' later work, and especially for *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein*. There can be no question of a radical break in Lukács' work from German sociology and philosophy to a consistently Marxist standpoint. This should, however, not be interpreted as implying that Lukács' work underwent little change. Indeed, as Lukács himself pointed out; one important change in these early writings was from an interpretation of Marx based on Simmel to one based upon Hegel; though even here it would appear that it is Hegel's *Aesthetics* rather than his *Phenomenology of Mind* that is significant for these earlier writings. It can, at least, be seen that many of the concepts and formulations generated in this period do receive a new treatment in the context of *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein*. 
In Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein, Lukács leaves the reader in no doubt that his central aim is a methodological one. The central task of that work is 'to understand the essence of Marx's method and to apply it correctly'. The focus of this methodological intention is not seen in isolation from theoretical and practical activity but is rather a critical reflection upon it. Nor does it lead to scientific hypotheses or axioms to be tested in the empirical realm but rather it leads to a greater understanding. This hermeneutic intention is directed towards

'... an interpretation, an exposition of Marx's theory as Marx understood it ... our underlying premise here is the belief that in Marx's theory and method, the true method by which to understand society and history has finally been discovered. This method is historical through and through. It is self-evident, therefore, that it must be constantly applied to itself... this entails taking up a substantive position with regard to the urgent problems of the present; for according to this view of Marxist method its pre-eminent aim is knowledge of the present.'

This immanent understanding of Marx's method is faced with a number of problems. The reconstruction of Marx's method must reveal an understanding of that methodology that is not fully present in Marx's writings. This is due to the relative paucity of Marx's own remarks on methodology and to the restrictions imposed on Lukács' reconstruction by what was actually available to him at the time of writing. This included the Introduction to the Grundrisse as well as the Theories of Surplus Value but did not include the Paris Manuscripts. More significantly, the reconstruction of Marx's method must confront the existing interpretations of Marx's work, especially by the Marxist 'orthodoxy' of the Second International. This could only lead Lukács in the direction of a self-critique of Marxism.
itself, that is, in the direction of applying that method to itself. The very assertion that 'orthodoxy refers exclusively to method' forms part of that self-critique of Marxism which is directed against these mechanistic interpretations of Marx's work that saw Marx's work as a completed set of theorems which could be applied abstractly and externally to an existing social reality. That is, Lukács is concerned with restoring the dialectical relationship between Marxist theory and practice, a concern which led him to re-examine Marx's relationship with Hegel.

One important aspect of the restoration of the dialectical relationship between theory and practice is the examination of the specific mediations of a theoretical perspective and a praxis-related orientation to society. The notion of mediation is central to Lukács' account since, following Hegel, he never accepts either the concept of pure immediacy or that of pure contemplation but faces the problem which arises when the actual mediation of theory and practice is examined. When a dialectical relationship between the two ceases to exist, then one must fall back upon theory, upon a philosophy of history or upon practice, upon the historical organisation of the political party or upon spontaneous action. For Lukács, consciousness is crucial to the outcome of revolutionary activity, both in the sense that he assumes that revolutionary success depends upon the ideological ripeness of the proletariat and that the decisive barriers to revolution are of an ideological nature.

At a more concrete level, an elucidation of the mediations in human activity challenges a mechanistic base-superstructure model of society. This is evident in Lukács' treatment of the economy within historical materialism.
As Meszaros argues,

'the assertion about the importance of economics becomes meaningful only if one is able to grasp the manifold specific mediations in the most varied fields of human activity, which are not simply "built upon" an "economic reality" but also actively structure the latter through the immensely complex and relatively autonomous structure of their own.'

The neglect of 'concrete mediations' leads to those mechanistic versions of Marxism that were and remain common at various levels of orthodoxy.

However, the historical nature of Marx's method implies that the theory of capitalist society cannot merely be applied in an external manner to its object since the theory and the method are a part of that historical process that is constituted by a capitalist society. Thus, the historical interpretations of a theory which is practically orientated (in this case, Marxism) have had practical consequences that Lukács wishes to criticize in terms of their appropriateness for a theory of the present, for 'knowledge of the present'. When confronted with these conflicting traditions, Lukács argues that the dialectician must assume:

'not that he is faced with a conflict between different scientific methods, but that he is in the presence of a social phenomenon and that by conceiving it as a socio-historical phenomenon he can at once refute it and transcend it dialectically.'

The historical nature of this dialectical method implies that the method must be applied to itself and that it must also include an explication of a philosophy of history. The practical intention present in this method and in this theory of society implies that the type of hermeneutical understanding advanced by Lukács cannot be contemplative or passive with respect to practical problems but, rather, it must presuppose engagement in society.
Only through some mode of engagement in society is such a theory realisable. This is also true of a critique of ideology which ceases to be merely a 'theory' of ideology but is instead intended as a 'critique' of ideology. That is, the problem of the mediation of theory and practice, of (to use Apel's notions) reflection and engagement is one which must be solved by any thoroughgoing 'critique' of ideology.

Lukács suggests that the very nature of Marx's theory - the 'materialist dialectic' - 'must be fully grasped before we venture upon a discussion of the dialectical method itself'. For Lukács, this involves a rejection of the traditional distinction between theory and method and, instead, an attempt to analyse how theory is realised, that is, the relationship between theory and practice. All theories stand in some relationship to practice, though most neither make explicit the nature of that relationship, nor do they locate themselves in or indicate their relations to practice and thereby introduce the possibility of practice interacting with theory. Lukács, however, points to three 'crucial determinants of dialectics' which make it clear that this method necessarily addresses itself to this relationship. These are 'the interaction of subject and object, the unity of theory and practice, the historical transformation of the categories as the basis of their transformation in thought'. Yet such a materialistic dialectic must be reconstructed since methodological understanding has usually reduced theory either to the subject (as contemplation) or to the object (as determined by the facts).

In the earlier version of 'What Is Orthodox Marxism?' written in 1918, Lukács contrasts two dominant responses to the problem of Marxist orthodoxy. The first response is to treat orthodoxy as a matter of rigid adherence to the letter of Marx's writings and so 'like the medieval Schoolmen... to
approach the truth by constant justification of their bible. The second response is to view Marxism as superceded by empirical facts. Adherence to this second position would commit one to studying facts impartially from some apparently neutral scientific standpoint. This restricted understanding results in ultimate recourse to 'true' believers or 'true' facts; it can never lead to an understanding of the dialectical method.

The contemplative stance was introduced into the understanding of Marx's method by Engels in Anti-Dühring for whom dialectics is 'an unbroken transcendence of oppositions, their sublation in one another. In consequence, a one-sided and rigid causality must be replaced by interaction. But he (Engels) does not even mention the most vital interaction, namely the dialectical relation between subject and object in the historical process.'

Lukács argues that such an interpretation of dialectics renders it contemplative and therefore undialectical since it fails to highlight the crucial difference between a metaphysical approach to an object which remains contemplative and a dialectical method whose central problem is to 'transform reality'. Where the historical nature of the categories in a theory are obscured, dialectics itself must necessarily appear as a superfluous appendage, as a mere ornament of Marxist "sociology" or "economics".

Where such a view is accepted, then it appears as if this dialectical method is a positive hindrance to the attainment of the pure scientific nature of Marxism which is based on an impartial examination of the facts. The contemplative approach to Marx's theory would thus take the view that the theory could be 'accepted or rejected in accordance with the prevailing state of science without any modification at all to one's basic attitudes to the question of whether or not reality can be changed.'
Lukács' critique of the positivistic interpretation of Marx's method is directed against the 'vulgar materialists' of the Second International, who sought to free Marx's method from a philosophy of history and, more especially, from Hegel. A dialectical conception of the relationship between subject and object, theory and practice, was replaced by the affirmation of the primacy of facts. The naive appeal to the facts can be countered with arguments found not only in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind* but also in Weber's methodological writings. Hence, along with Weber, Lukács argues that the simple enumeration of facts 'already implies an "interpretation". Already at this stage, the facts have been comprehended by a theory, a method; they have been wrenched from the life-context in which they were originally based and inserted into the context of a theory.¹²² In this sense, they have become abstract. However, a more sophisticated version of this standpoint would concede the importance of theory and its relationship to facts but would interpret that relationship as being one which is identical to that current in the natural sciences, namely through a method which 'distils "pure" facts through observationary abstraction, experiment, etc., and locates them in their relevant contexts'. But for Lukács, this generation of facts which rests upon the natural scientific model is based upon an objectivistic illusion since

¹The "pure" facts of the natural sciences arise when a phenomenon of life is placed (in reality or in thought) into an environment in which their causal regularities can be inspected without the interference of
other phenomena. This process is reinforced by reducing the phenomena to their purely quantitative essence, to their expression in numbers and numerical relations. Opportunists always fail to recognize that it is in the nature of capitalism to process phenomena in this way. 123

Lukács here implies, firstly, that these pure facts only emerge out of an artificial research situation - artificial in the sense that it is abstracted from the life-process itself; secondly, that the 'purity' of such facts is enhanced by their translation and reduction to a particular complex of non-linguistic signs - and hence they appear even more abstract; finally, that such facts only appear in this abstract form in a society which itself reduces all relationships to the level of abstraction.

Lukács thus rules out the possibility of a positivist critique of ideology that counters social illusions with a naive appeal to the facts. More significantly, from a methodological standpoint, Lukács argues that the nature of the 'data' produced from certain scientific methods arises out of the capitalist productive process which itself is grounded in an abstraction process. These abstractions are, in turn, reproduced at a theoretical level. Lukács describes this process as follows:

'The fetishistic character of economic forms, the reification of all human relations, the constant expansion and extension of the division of labour which subjects the process of production to an abstract-rational analysis, without regard to the human possibilities and abilities of the immediate producers, all these things transform the phenomena of society and with them the manner of their perception. In this way arise the 'isolated' facts, isolated complexes of facts, specialist disciplines (economics, law, etc.) which already in their immediate forms of appearance seem to have done much to pave the way for such scientific methods.' 124
This is the reason for the apparent affinity between that type of society and its theoretical objectifications, both at the level of atomistic facticity and at the level of a failure to provide the basis for a complete understanding of the nature of that facticity. What is omitted in such scientific methods—and necessarily omitted, according to Lukács—is a recognition of the 'historical character' of the facts which form the basis for this objectivistic methodology. The recognition of the historical nature of these facts challenges their immediacy and leads us to examine the mediations that exist between the knowing subject and his object. Such facts

'are, as the product of historical development, not only conceived in a continuous process of change, but they are—precisely in the structure of their objectivity—the product of a determinate historical epoch: namely capitalism. Thus, when 'science' maintains that the manner in which they are immediately given is an adequate foundation of scientific conceptualization and that their actual form is the appropriate starting point for scientific concept formation, it thereby takes its stand simply and dogmatically on the basis of capitalist society. It uncritically takes its nature, its objective structure and its law-like nature as the unalterable foundation of "science".' 125

The acceptance of the immediacy of such facts 'obscures the historical, transitory nature of capitalist society'. This illusion can, at the methodological level, only be overcome through 'the simultaneous recognition and transcendence of immediate appearances' which, for Lukács, takes place when we simultaneously understand both the apparent form which phenomena take and the movement to the 'inner core' of the phenomena. Only in this way can the illusion be dispelled of 'confusing the intellectual reproduction of reality with the actual structure of reality itself'.

There remains another important limitation in the scientific standpoint that
asserts the primacy of facts, namely its failure to recognise the real nature of the contradictions that lie in its subject matter. This limitation is not only significant for Lukács' argument here but it also illuminates the basis for Lukács' separation of natural and social sciences, nature and society as well as his restricted understanding of the natural sciences. This methodology of the natural sciences

\[\text{recognizes no contradictions or antagonisms in its subject matter. If, despite this, contradictions do spring up between particular theories then this is only a sign that the level of knowledge achieved up to now is still not complete.}\]

Theories which appear to contradict one another must find their limits in these contradictions; they must, therefore, be transformed and subsumed under more general themes in which the contradictions will finally disappear. However, in the case of social reality, these contradictions are not a sign of the still incomplete scientific apprehension of reality; on the contrary, they belong inseparably to the nature of reality itself, to the nature of capitalist society. In the knowledge of the whole they will not be transcended and thereby cease to be contradictions. Quite the contrary, they will be conceived as necessary contradictions, as the antagonistic fundament of this system of production.  

This passage is only intelligible in the light of Lukács' critique of Engels' extension of dialectics to nature where, Lukács argues 'the crucial determinants of dialectics ... are absent from our knowledge of nature'. In contrast, Lukács argued that 'nature is a social category' but, as many of his critics pointed out, for Marx it is not merely a social category but possesses a material quasi-independent existence.  

In the light of the passage just quoted, we can see that Lukács not only treats unproblematically the natural scientific method when applied to its own sphere but also seems to adhere to a positivistic understanding of the natural sciences.
Lukács presupposes a scientific 'method' that is followed in the natural sciences as if there exists no conflict within the sciences. The unproblematic conception of the natural sciences frees them from the problem of ideology, at least at the level at which Lukács discusses it in this context. The natural scientific ideal only becomes problematic when applied to the social realm since 'the cognitive ideal of the natural sciences when applied to nature, merely serves the progress of science, yet when directed towards social development, it appears as the ideological weapon of the bourgeoisie.'

This uncritical notion of natural science leads to the separation between an idealist account of the natural sciences and a materialist account of the social sciences. In Lukács' case, this distinction testifies to his continued adherence of the neo-Kantian, and especially Rickert's, separation of natural and social scientific methodology. In its radical versions, this separation results in the avoidance of a confrontation with the positivistic self-understanding of science rather than a critique of that interpretation of science.

However, within the realm of the social sciences, the failure to come to terms with contradictions has important implications for the possibility of a critical theory of society. Lukács argues that bourgeois social science confronts the problem of contradictions in two ways. Either, when faced with contradictions in the systems of production and social relations or in the categories used to conceptualize these systems, an attempt is made to show, as in the case of periodic economic crises, that such contradictions are purely surface phenomena that do not affect the productive system itself or, on a more abstract level, an attempt is made to reduce crucial contradictions endemic to this system to eternal contradictions, as in the
reduction of the antagonisms present in the struggle between classes to an
instance of the eternal conflict between individual and society. Both
modes of coming to terms with contradictions fail to understand history
't as a unified process' even though attempts are made to construct a unified
notion of history

'in the form of abstract sociological con-
ceptualizations of history of the type of
Comte and Spencer, whose inner contra-
dictions have been convincingly exposed
by modern bourgeois historians, most in-
sively by Rickert, and on the other hand,
in the form of the demand for a "philosophy
of history" whose relation to historical
reality turns out to be a methodological
insoluble problem.' 130

Lukács here poses not only the central problem of his earlier writings - how
to bring together a sociological account of historical reality with a philo-
sophy of history 131 - but also the problem with which he is faced in

Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein: to explain how the concretely existing,
historically contingent proletariat is the bearer of the historical process as
a whole. At a more abstract level, Lukács seeks to show how the immediate
realm of knowledge and illusion becomes intelligible within the context of the
historical process as a whole. In order to develop both these concerns,
Lukács has recourse to the category of totality which is central to his critique
of ideology.

The concept of totality not only lies at the heart of Lukács' critique of ideol-
ogy but may also be seen to form a crucial aspect of his attempt to provide
a historical hermeneutics as well as being essential to his reinstatement
of the importance of Hegel in a dialectics for Marxism. 132 The under-
standing of any social phenomenon can only take place through an under-
standing of its relationship to the totality in which it is found. As Lukács put it 'the intelligibility [Erkennbarkeit] of objects develops in proportion as we grasp their function in the determinate totality in which they move'.

However, this should not be understood as implying merely that the parts are related to the whole as found, for instance, in a mechanistic account of the relation between the elements and the whole. That is, the relationship which Lukács posits is not some kind of causal interaction of unchanging entities or 'the reciprocal influencing of otherwise unchanging objects. It does indeed go further in its relation to the whole is the determination which determines the form of objectification of every object of cognition. Every essential transformation which is relevant for knowledge expresses itself as a transformation in the relation to the whole and thereby as a transformation of the form of objectification itself.'

This changing relationship of parts to the whole is historical through and through. The changes in this relationship determines the form of objectification which the individual memento takes on in our apprehension of it.

Lukács therefore argues that the notion of totality is not merely some naive statement to the effect that parts are related to the whole. Nor is it to be understood as implying a mere interaction [Wechselwirkung] of parts and whole, as found, for example, in Simmel's work. Thirdly, Lukács argues that this notion of totality is not abstract but concrete and that this distinguishes its use by Marx in contrast to Hegel. Whereas Hegel conceived of theory as the self-understanding of reality, this reality ultimately remained embedded in philosophy as absolute spirit. Thus, Hegel aimed at 'knowledge about an essentially alien material' rather than an understanding
of the nature of 'the production and reproduction of real life'. But this
is not to suggest that Lukács completely rejected Hegel's notion of theory
and totality. Rather, as Kammler argues 'Lukács is here concerned with
the structure of Hegel's concept of reality: true reality - distinguished from
existence, appearance [Realität] and the existent - was; for Hegel, the
existence of the idea as the "unity of concept and objectivity"'. In
a similar vein, Lukács asserts that 'concrete totality is therefore the true
category of reality'. Lukács argues that Marx's advance over Hegel lay in
taking 'the historical tendency in Hegel to its logical extreme: he radically
transformed all the phenomena both of society and of socialized man into
historical problems'. This fundamentally historical totality has im-
portant implications for the subject and object of knowledge. A thorough-
going historical understanding of societal totality cannot exclude its own
understanding from the movement of this totality. It must be capable of
understanding why its mode of apprehension and comprehension of reality
must be historical. This mode of comprehension, this recognition of
society as reality is possible 'only under capitalism, in bourgeois society.
But the class which carried out this revolution
did so without consciousness of its function . . .
It was necessary for the proletariat to be born
for social reality to be fully conscious. The
reason for this is that the discovery of the class
outlook of the proletariat provided a vantage
point from which to survey the whole of society'.

Here Lukács states for the first time in this work the important thesis which,
when amplified, enables him to justify the necessity of historical material-
ism as the sole source of knowledge of that totality of society. This problem
of the relation between the emergence of the proletariat and the emergence
of historical materialism has formed a consistent source of crisis in Marxism,
especially where a coincidence between the two has been rendered problematic. Yet for Lukács at this point in time, the relationship is not a problematical one and the problems of the self-understanding of historical materialism and that of the proletariat are seen to be soluble and to be inextricably bound up with one another.

What is significant for Lukács' critique of ideology is that it is the 'class outlook' of the proletariat that makes possible a conception of the whole society. Marx's analysis of the capitalist system of production as a whole was not based upon the 'class outlook' of the proletariat but upon the critique of political economy. Lukács decisively shifts the problem of achieving a survey of 'the whole of society' away from a concrete totality towards the problem of class consciousness. Furthermore, it seems to be the case in Lukács' analysis that the proletariat takes on a necessarily abstract existence since it is incorporated into a subject-object dialectic as a category rather than as a concrete historical class. There is, throughout Lukács' analysis in Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein, that tension which was apparent in his earlier work between concrete sociological analysis and a philosophy of history. The concrete analysis is often subordinated to a philosophy of history which renders concrete social groups abstract. This may be seen in Lukács' notion of totality which oscillates between these two levels. On the one hand, the notion of totality that is presupposed in a comprehensive understanding of reality (that is, an understanding which permits both enlightenment and emancipatory praxis) is thoroughly historical since,

'First, historical materialism became a formal objective possibility only because economic factors created the proletariat, because economic
factors created the proletariat, because the proletariat did emerge (i.e. at a particular stage of historical development) and because the subject and object of the knowledge of social reality were transformed. Second, this formal possibility became a real one only in the course of the evolution of the proletariat. 138

Such a standpoint should lead to a concrete analysis of how the evolution of the proletariat is related to the emergence of historical materialism. But this does not occur in Lukács' work. Instead, Lukács seems to restore to the notion of totality the absolute claims for it that are found in some of Hegel's writings. The concept of totality acquires an independent existence as when Lukács argues that

'The category of totality ... determines not only the object of knowledge, but also the subject ... The totality of an object can only be posited if the positing subject is itself, it must conceive of the object as a totality.' 139

A level of abstraction is reached in Lukács' analysis in which it is categories themselves which determine the concrete and not vice-versa. Yet Lukács does recognise the dialectical relationship between theory and reality to the extent that he sees the realization of the formal possibility of historical materialism as only being possible through that theory itself. That is, as soon as the dialectical relationship between the subject and object of cognition and action is abandoned, there emerges an unbridgable gap between empirical existence and theory, such that the theory is unable to explain how it can be realized through its activity. This occurs

'as soon as you decide to remain on the "natural" ground of existence, of the empirical in its stark, naked brutality, you creat a gulf between the subject of an action and the milieux of the facts in which the action unfolds so that they stand opposed to each other as harsh, irreconcilable principles.' 140

This inexplicable gap widens where facts are explained in terms of the auto-
matic workings of laws in a mechanistic manner. In that case, the mediatory role of consciousness, of a historical materialist hermeneutics, disappears. A mechanistic Marxism is also one which cannot conceive of the subject of the totality - a class or a party - dialectically. It is a version of Marxism which has ceased to be revolutionary since

'The category of totality, the all-pervasive supremacy of the whole over the parts is the essence of the method which Marx took over from Hegel and brilliantly transformed into the foundations of a wholly new science. . . . Proletarian science is revolutionary not just by virtue of its revolutionary ideas which it opposes to bourgeois society, but above all because of its method. The primacy of the category of totality is the bearer of the principle of revolution in science. ' 141

Only an understanding directed towards the totality can overcome the empirical historical immediacy of capitalist society and though many barriers stand in the way of that understanding, it can only be achieved by a subject that is the identical subject-object of the historical process.

The notion of totality that is central to Lukács' critique of concrete immediacy in capitalist society and central to his critique of ideology is not, however, merely a detached tool of analysis but is directed towards conscious activity. One of the neglected features of any critique of ideology is that it presupposes a theory of action and an intention towards not merely enlightenment, i.e. making us aware of ideology, but also towards emancipation, i.e. the destruction of the ideology. This feature is also present in Lukács' account of totality:

'The facts no longer appear strange when they are comprehended in their coherent reality, in the relation of all partial aspects to their inherent, but hitherto unelucidated roots in the whole; we then perceive the tendencies
which strive towards the centre of reality, to what we are wont to call the ultimate goal. This ultimate goal is not an abstract ideal opposed to the process, but an aspect of truth and reality. It is the concrete meaning of each stage reached and an integral part of the concrete moment. Because of this, to comprehend it is to recognise the direction taken (unconsciously) by events and tendencies towards the totality. It is to know the direction that determines concretely the correct course of action at any given moment - in terms of the interest of the total process, viz, the emancipation of the proletariat. 142

Without knowledge of 'events and tendencies' in relation to the socio-historical totality, conscious transformative action is not possible.

What is missing in Lukács' notion of totality is the level of concreteness which, as we shall see, prevents him from conceiving of the subject of his theory - the proletariat - in anything but abstract terms. Mészáros argues that the concepts of totality and mediation are closely interrelated in Lukács' work but goes on to suggest that his analysis 'cannot go beyond the limitations imposed on Lukács by the lack of a greater concreteness in his conception of "mediation"'. 143

However, for all their defects, Lukács' methodological reflections did decisively challenge accepted theories of reality and ideology. The restoration of a dialectical relationship between the subject of cognition and the object of knowledge, however abstractly it was stated, enabled Lukács to overcome the limitations of the Cartesian dualism and, at least in principle, Kant's separation of the phenomenal and the noumenal worlds. The restoration of a dialectical theory of knowledge in Marxism also had important implications for a theory and critique of ideology. Lukács' positing of a dialectical
relationship between subject and object and the assertion of a concrete totality as the 'true reality', his restoration of the importance of consciousness in human activity and the, as yet, undeveloped notion of praxis enabled him to challenge the mechanistic Marxism of the Second International. Although Lukács did not refer in these early methodological remarks to Lenin's theory of reflection either as [Abbildungstheorie] or as [Wiederspiegelungstheorie], they nonetheless formed the basis, and were read as such by his contemporaries, for a critique of a naive theory of reflection in the theory of ideology and a simple base-superstructure dichotomy that was not only prevalent in the Marxism of the Second International but which formed the basis for many attempts to develop a sociology of knowledge in Weimar Germany.

Thus, the philosophical and methodological foundations for a dialectical critique of ideology not only run counter to orthodox Marxism but also constitute a challenge to the caricatures of the Marxist position - most often in the form of an undialectical base superstructure dichotomy and a naive theory of reflection - that were prevalent in the sociology of knowledge in Germany. Few writers on the sociology of knowledge were able to come to terms with a radical critique of ideology that was rooted in a dialectical theory of knowledge derived from Hegel and Marx. This cannot be because Lukács did not deal with issues central to the sociology of knowledge. Indeed, in some respects, Lukács' methodological reflections on the understanding of social phenomena form the beginnings of a materialist and critical hermeneutics, a theory of interpretation that has been absent not only in orthodox Marxist attempt at a critique of ideology but also from the sociology of knowledge itself.
As the title of Lukács' major work in this period indicates, one of his central concerns was the elucidation of the notion of class consciousness. This is carried out at a number of levels that are not always clearly distinguished. For example, class consciousness is important for Lukács since it is one of the crucial phenomena in which the category of totality is embodied. As such, it is part of the subject-object dialectic that has already been alluded to and part of Lukács' Hegelian philosophy of history. At another level, class consciousness is significant for Lukács since it is embodied in a particular institutional and organisational form, the analysis of which constitutes the later chapters of *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein*. Thus, Lukács argues that 'the form taken by the class consciousness of the proletariat is the Party'.

More specifically, Lukács sets out to locate class consciousness within the class structure of capitalist society. But, as we shall see, this class consciousness is not an immediate empirical phenomenon but one that must be imputed to particular classes.

In order to understand these various levels of analysis of class consciousness we must relate them both to the actual context within which Lukács was developing his theory (this is provided in Kammler's and especially Grunenberg's recent accounts) and to the continuing centrality of certain themes in his work which persist in *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein* (again this is provided in Kammler's account but is supplemented by that of Apitzsch).

We have already seen that in his pre-Marxist writings, Lukács had already developed a subject-object dialectic in the realm of aesthetics (one which
relied heavily on Lask as well as Hegel\textsuperscript{147}) which continued to be important in \textit{Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein}, albeit on a different level and within a different context.\textsuperscript{148} Similarly, Kammler has pointed to the hiatus in Lukács' earlier writings between a philosophy of history and a sociology of culture which attempts to be concrete. We may also bear in mind the centrality in Lukács' 'Heidelberg aesthetics' of the problem of timelessness and historicity, a problem which, in a different form, becomes acute in \textit{Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein}.\textsuperscript{149} In short, it is impossible to examine Lukács' central arguments in \textit{Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein} without being aware that not only are many of these essays reformulations of earlier pieces but that certain central themes from Lukács' earlier work persist in this volume.

However, the polemical nature of \textit{Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein} should also suggest that the actual historical context of these essays must be taken into account for a complete understanding of their meaning. That is to say, these essays were not intended as academic articles for learned journals but represented Lukács' own political interventions in the post-First World War period in Hungarian and German politics. As Kammler argues, the central political themes of Lukács' work in the early 1920s are that the fate of the revolution depended upon the ideological maturity of the working class and that the central concern should be with the decisive barriers in the way of the formation of a revolutionary ideology. The crucial concepts of class consciousness and objective possibility had already appeared in \textit{Taktika és ethika} in 1919\textsuperscript{150}. Both concepts are raised early in this work but with reference to individual human action. Lukács here argues that 'morally correct action is related fundamentally to the correct perception of the given historico-philosophical situation, which is in turn only
feasible through the efforts of every individual to make this self-consciousness conscious for himself. The first unavoidable prerequisite for this is the formation of class consciousness. In order for correct action to become an authentic, correct regulator, class consciousness must raise itself above the level of the merely given; it must remember its world-historical mission and its sense of responsibility. For the class interest, the attainment of which makes up the content of class-conscious action, coincides neither with the sum of the personal interests of the individuals belonging to the class nor with the immediate short-term interests of the class as a collective entity.

In this passage, the difference between the conceptual form of the philosophical-historical dimension of class consciousness and actual empirical form does not appear unbridgable. At the same time, it is worth noting that Lukács is already loth to identify class interests at least as being co-terminous with the concrete empirical interests of a social class.

But after 1920, that is, after the failure of the 1918/19 revolutions in Hungary and Germany, Lukács' essays no longer constitute a utopian anticipation of the revolution. Rather they are increasingly concerned with the gap between the notion of a revolutionary class consciousness capable of grasping society as a totality and the actual level of working class consciousness. This is made evident where earlier essays are reworked for their publication in Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein, for example, in the essay on 'Class Consciousness' already published in 1920. Grunenberg in fact specifically relates the change in Lukács' position to his hopes for and the failure of the March offensive in Germany in 1921. Henceforth, she argues, 'Lukács took up the "ideological crisis of the proletariat as the fundamental problem and, in contrast, placed the analysis of objective factors in the background". Lukács henceforth sought 'to confront the daily struggles of the working class
with the idea of the pure class struggle'. Lukács' interpretation of the defeats of the revolutionary movement in this period was not in terms of the uneven power struggles between the bourgeoisie and the working class but 'was exclusively the result of a false consciousness on the part of the working class and a falsely applied tactics on the part of the VKPD'.

Hence, in the reworked article on class consciousness, 'Lukács had emphasised the crucial role of class consciousness in the decisive phase of the struggle for power. Yet, at the same time, he had characterised the actual empirical consciousness of the working class as completely incapable of taking over this role'. It is not surprising then that 'at the centre of Geschicht und Klassenbewussstsein there stands therefore not the everyday consciousness of the worker from the standpoint of its revolutionary transformation but a theoretical, historico-philosophical clarification of the question: what might revolutionary consciousness look like?' Within such a context we are able to see why Lukács does not take up empirical class consciousness as the starting point of his analysis and why, in its place or rather in complete contrast, imputed class consciousness and the notion of objective possibility play a central role in his theory of class consciousness. Once more in Lukács' writings we are confronted, as Kammler suggests, with 'the danger of an unmediated dualism of speculative concept and socially related factors, of idea and reality'.

Lukács argues against the 'belief that the concrete can be located in the empirical individual of history ("individual" here can refer to an individual man, class or people) and in his empirically given (and hence psychological or mass psychological) consciousness' since for him concrete analysis means
This rejection of any psychological analysis of class consciousness is of course associated with a rejection of any analysis of class consciousness at the level of empirical immediacy. However, the two arguments are not identical since Reich's analysis of class consciousness and some of the work of the Frankfurt School in the 1930s would suggest that a social psychological approach need not remain confined to the level of empirical immediacy. Nonetheless, it does remain true that most attempts at an empirical analysis of class consciousness have either concentrated on immediate levels of awareness of class (consciousness of class) or have been compelled to reduce class consciousness to some empirical indices such as trade union membership and participation. Lukács' equation of any attempt to examine class consciousness at the level of its immediate existence (leaving aside, for the moment, the question of whether it is necessary to remain at this level) with opportunism only serves to heighten the need for a non-immediate notion of class-consciousness. On the basis of the arguments so far advanced, the philo-
sophiological rejection of an analysis at the level of immediacy, a metho-
dological rejection of a social psychological account of class con-
sciousness and a political identification of 'the actual, psychological state
of consciousness of the proletariat' with opportunism, leaves Lukács with no
alternative but to argue for a sharp differentiation of the empirical conscious-
ness of the proletariat from true class consciousness.

However, this non-empirical notion of class consciousness is also pre-
dicated upon an abstract notion of the proletariat as the identical subject-
object of the historical process. Lukács had already argued that only a
historical subject which is itself a totality is capable of apprehending history
and society as a totality. This central category of totality is also 'the
bearer of the revolutionary principle in science' and, as such, Lukács argues
that it is the crucial category which Marx took over from Hegel. Hence
Marx's theory of society and history enables those who understand it to com-
prehend society as a totality. It is clear that, at any particular point in
time, the majority of the working class are not amongst this group who under-
stand Marx's theory. As we shall see from Lukács' analysis of the process
of reification, the illusions created by the commodity structure of a capitalist
society are all-pervasive, affecting the bourgeoisie and the proletariat alike.
Therefore, it must be shown how the proletariat is able to break out of this
reified world-view and how it is possible for it to develop a true class con-
sciousness. At any point in time, this class consciousness (which at times
seems to be coterminous not merely with a comprehension of Marx's theory
of society but actually identical with it) can only be imputed to the working
class. The nature of the working class's position in the production process
(at a philosophical-historical level, almost identical with the position of
the slave in Hegel's master-slave dialectic) guarantees that the development of such a class consciousness is, at least, objectively possible.

Lukács' philosophical-historical standpoint is clearly indebted to Hegel in several ways. We have already seen that the category of totality, though having its origins in Simmel's philosophy, as Rücker has pointed out with reference to Lukács' early writings, was transformed by Lukács into a Hegelian notion of methodological significance, since Lukács argued that this category was at the very roots of the methodology which Marx took over from Hegel. At the epistemological level, Lukács also sought to make concrete Hegel's concept of reality: as Kammler puts it, 'the true reality - in contrast to Dasein, Realität and Existenz - was for Hegel the existence of the idea as the "unity of the concept and objectivity"'. At the level of a philosophy of history, the subject-object dialectic which Lukács had already developed in relation to aesthetics becomes, in Geschichte und Klassebewusstsein, a Hegelian dialectical philosophy of history. This has important consequences for Lukács' interpretation of Marx. Fetscher rightly suggests that, according to Lukács' interpretation, 'Marx's supercession of Hegel results not from a materialist critique (in Feuerbach's sense) but... makes it possible for Marx to show that in the proletariat actually lies the real subject-object of history, the "we" whose actions history actually is'. For Lukács, then, the notion of the proletariat is very close to that of the slave in Hegel's master-slave dialectic. This is reinforced by the central role which Lukács ascribes to the process by which the proletariat comes to full consciousness of its position just as the slave, for Hegel, must achieve full recognition of his position. Similarly slave-consciousness for Hegel, as with empirical proletarian consciousness for Lukács, remains trapped at...
the level of immediacy. There is even some support for the view that Lukács at times would subscribe to Hegel's belief in this context that *Anerkennung is Aufhebung*, that 'recognition' is 'transcendence'. Be that as it may, what is central here is that this Hegelian philosophy of history serves to reinforce Lukács' lack of concern with - and even faith in - actual working class consciousness. As Grunenberg argues 'empirical consciousness is viewed by him as form of expression, as a flat reflection of reified social relationships'. 162

Instead, Lukács utilizes and develops a notion of class consciousness that can be imputed to a social class, one which 'consists in the fact of the appropriate and rational reactions "imputed" [zugerechnet] to a particular typical position in the process of production. This consciousness is, therefore, neither the sum nor the average of what is thought or felt by the single individuals who make up the class.' 163

The first part of this definition is, in fact, with its emphasis on the 'appropriate', the 'rational' and the 'typical' a completely Weberfan formulation of class consciousness. 164 Lukács argues that it is possible to infer 'the thoughts and feelings which men would have in a particular situation if they were able to assess both it and the interests arising from it in their impact on immediate action and on the whole structure of society'. 165 This inference is made possible 'by relating consciousness to the whole of society'. What Lukács does not point out in this connection is that since this relation between consciousness and the whole of society does not exist, our knowledge of the existence of this 'true' class consciousness can only be established *ex post*. 166
Nonetheless, Lukács does go on to point out the difficulties involved in the use of this notion of objective possibility. We need to know whether the distance between this class consciousness and the empirically given is the same for all classes in society and to examine 'the practical significance of these different possible relations between the objective economic totality, the imputed class consciousness and the real, psychological thoughts of men about their lives'.

Later in the same article, Lukács also makes clear that there are probably different levels of empirical consciousness within the working class which need to be examined. Yet, as he suggests, 'the stratification of the problems and economic interests within the proletariat is, unfortunately, almost wholly unexplored, but research would undoubtedly lead to discoveries of the very first importance'. Thus, Lukács is at least aware of some of the problems involved in his use of a dualistic notion of consciousness.

With regard to this notion of 'objective possibility', Lukács suggests that we must examine 'how far is it in fact possible to discern the whole economy of a society from inside it?' The notion must enable us to both transcend individual immediate awareness whilst at the same time recognising the extent to which this awareness is constrained by 'the economic structure of society'. By arguing that concrete analysis is knowledge of society as a totality, by imputing to social classes a class consciousness that is based upon that knowledge as an objective possibility, Lukács is able to introduce his version of the notion of false consciousness. Indeed, it is only on the basis of positing the concept of objective possibility that Lukács is able to develop a theory of false consciousness. Immediate consciousness appears as something which is subjectively justified.
in the social and historical situation . . .
At the same time, objectively, it bypasses
the essence of the evolution of society and
fails to pinpoint it and express it adequately.
That is to say, objectively, it appears as a
'false consciousness'. On the other hand,
we may see the same consciousness as some-
thing which fails subjectively to reach its
self-appointed goals, while furthering and
realising the objective aims of society of
which it is ignorant and which it did not choose.' 169

It is quite clear from this passage that we can only recognise false conscious-
ness if we are aware of the objective possibility of a class position in re-
lation to the whole of society. Only by positing this 'objective possibility'
is it possible to ascribe 'falsity' to consciousness.

It is also apparent that Lukács uses the notion of class consciousness in
two ways - as 'true' class consciousness and as 'false' class consciousness.
The transition from false to true consciousness is made possible by utilizing
the notion of 'objective possibility'. This false consciousness is, in the
last resort, determined by the economic structure of society - a determination
of which one is not aware since

'class consciousness implies a class-conditioned
unconsciousness of one's own socio-historical and
economic condition. This condition is given as a
definite structural relation, a definite formal nexus
which appears to govern the whole of life. The
"falseness", the illusion implicit in this situation
is in no sense arbitrary; it is simply the intellect-
ual reflex of the objective economic structure.' 170

Hence, until it is possible to recognise these determinations in the economic
structure, false consciousness will be a permanent state. Lukács gives as
an example of a common illusion that the price of labour power is in fact
the price of labour and then goes on to suggest that 'it requires the most
painstaking historical analysis to use the category of objective possibility
so as to isolate the conditions in which this illusion can be exposed and a real connection with the totality established. What Lukács is implicitly suggesting here is that Marx in fact used this notion of objective possibility. Even granting that this were true - and there is no evidence that the notion stems from Marx - this would still suggest that false consciousness is removed by ex-post analysis which, in all probability, would not be undertaken by the subjects of that analysis but would appear from a source external to them.

Since these concepts of objective possibility and imputed class consciousness are of central importance to Lukács' theory of class consciousness it is worthwhile investigating their origins. Lukács' attempt to bridge the gulf between a speculative concept and empirical immediacy almost certainly has its roots in Max Weber's methodology though, as we shall see, Lukács' use of 'objective possibility' and 'imputation' [Zurechnung] differs from that of Weber in several important respects. Weber himself points out that he took the concept from 'the works of the outstanding physiologist v. Kries' and from the legal writings and critique of Radbruch. Weber's reason for taking up this concept and developing its usage in social science methodology is stated by Fetscher in the following manner: 'Max Weber introduced the concept of objective possibility into the methodology of the social sciences in order to gain a criterion for the standard of the choice of historically relevant facts out of the vast, heterogeneous continuum of reality'. Weber argues that the social scientist seeks such facts as have a causal effect. The historian, for example, makes use of a thought experiment (Gedankenexperiment) when he takes over the thought process from the legal context of apportioning blame for certain events. Weber suggests that when one
asks 'under what circumstances can one assert that someone, through their action has "brought about" [verursacht] a definite external consequence' then this 'is purely a question of causality - and is clearly of the same logical structure as the historical question of causality'. 175 Weber takes this mode of procedure as being applicable to individual action, whether of the historical individual or of the private person. The social scientist must impute objectively possible consequences of action from the myriad of possible factors. This involves the act of selection which is itself based upon our cognitive interests. Hence, Weber argues, 'the possibility of a selection from amongst the infinity of determinants is determined first of all by the nature of our historical interest'. 176 This concept of objective possibility must commence from a rational reconstruction of alternative developmental possibilities, but can also take account of irrationality since rationality is only a tendency within the necessarily heterogeneous continuum of reality and can never be complete. 177

However, Fetscher argues that there are two crucial limitations in the use of the notion of objective possibility in Weber's work, both of which Lukács, in turn, seeks to overcome. The first is that the rational calculating individual is the sole basis of objective possibilities. Fetscher argues that Weber fails to examine the historical development of such a bourgeois individual. One might add that this individual remains a crucial ideal-typical construct in the social sciences and especially in political economy. Secondly, Fetscher argues that for Weber the actions of collectivities are either left out of account or are reduced to instances of individual action: 'community action and social action are merely specific forms of the action of individuals'. 178
Certainly, Weber was strictly opposed to collective notions and he sought 'to put an end to the use of collective concepts, a use which still haunts us. In other words: even sociology can only start from the action of one or a few or many individuals, i.e. pursue a strictly "individualistic" method'.

Lukács is one of the first writers within the Marxist tradition to both apply Weber's notions of objective possibility and imputation in a new direction and to attempt to solve the weaknesses of the concepts as outlined by Fetscher. Lukács acknowledges that the notion of imputation is borrowed from Weber and that the notion of the ideal type occurs in Marxism, for example, as 'the very important category of the "economic persona"'. However, he suggests that he cannot at present take up 'the relation of historical materialism to comparable trends in bourgeois thought (such as Max Weber's ideal types)'. Nonetheless, as we have seen, Lukács, like Weber, is involved with theoretical constructs, with the construction of an adequate proletarian class consciousness just as Weber is concerned with the construction of ideal types of rational action. However, Lukács relates the concrete class situation and 'objective' class interest to the objective structures of capitalist society as a totality. It is clear that for Weber the notion of society as a totality plays no role whatsoever in his use of the theory of objective possibility. Similarly, Lukács gives a historical dimension to the notion of objective possibility. A social class as an acting subject of history not only construes the past but also the future objective possibilities. Thus, as Fetscher argues, Lukács' use of objective possibility extends far beyond that of Weber when he

1. not only construes past but also future "objective possibilities" of class action and
2. seeks to demonstrate that political action on the basis of adequate proletarian class consciousness as the only conceivable way to overcome the antagonistic contradictions in the capitalist mode of production. The concept of "objective possibility" thereby takes on a radically different character and gains, as it were, an ontological and normative dignity. 

It should by now be clear that Lukács' notion of imputed class consciousness is certainly not that of a sum of individuals but is only the action of a social class as a totality. In all these respects it diverges sharply from Weber's use of the theory of objective possibility.

Even within Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein, Lukács' treatment of the realisation of the objective possibility of proletarian class consciousness changes as the work progresses. In the original essay (1920) on class consciousness, the influence of Rosa Luxemburg is still much in evidence and the degree of autonomous development of class consciousness appears to be much greater than in the essay on reification (1922) where its effects are seen to be all pervasive. This would imply that the development of class consciousness must be stimulated from outside. Hence, we find that in the essay on organisational problems (1922), Lenin's theory of organisation of the communist party comes to the fore. Fetscher, in fact argues that the party takes on the form of objective possibility of proletarian class consciousness and hence, in terms of our earlier comparison, replaces Weber's rational calculating personality, except that whereas Weber's rationality of the bourgeois individual is limited, for Lukács the party's perfect rationality is limited only by the objective historical process.

Be that as it may, there can be no doubt that Lukács' argument as to the
objective possibility of the development of true class consciousness on the part of the working class remains extremely abstract. Although not entirely unaware of all the concrete problems involved in the development of class consciousness— for instance, Lukács merely remarks as an aside that 'status consciousness - a real historical factor - masks class consciousness; in fact it prevents it from appearing at all'— Arato's comment on Lukács' theory of class consciousness is apposite when he remarks that 'not having thoroughly analysed e.g. the stratifications of the working class, the social reproduction of the worker in the family, and in schools, and the political legitimation of the capitalist system of domination, Lukács never faced most of the constraints that interfere with the possibilities of class consciousness'. But this is not surprising in view of his reluctance to confront 'empirical' class consciousness.

V

If Max Scheler's sociology of knowledge and his treatment of a base-superstructure model of social determination of thought can be characterised as one of the 'powerlessness of the mind' (Scheler's own phrase) in which the sheer massivity of the psycho-biologico-social base overdetermines the superstructure, then it is possible to see Lukács' position as, in some ways, representing the opposite standpoint. Whereas many writers within the Marxist tradition have been concerned with clarifying the manner— both mechanistically and dialectically— in which the superstructure of society has its roots in a material base, it has been claimed that Lukács takes up an opposing position. Apitzsch, for example, argues that Lukács is not concerned with an attempt - as Gramsci expresses it - to comprehend the
"material structure of ideology", but rather one might formulate it con-
versely, that he seeks to grasp the structuring function of ideology in the
base process itself. This is most obvious in Lukács' treatment of
reification. Indeed, as far as the analysis of capitalist society is concerned,
Lukács had earlier sought to avoid the conceptual schemata of base and super-
structure, though this was sometimes only partly successful, as when he
writes that,

"Ideological factors do not merely 'mask' economic interests, they are not merely
the banners and slogans: they are the parts, the components of which the real struggle is
made. Of course, if historical materialism is deployed to discover the sociological mean-
ing of these struggles, economic interests will doubtless be revealed as the decisive
factors in any explanation."

In the later discussion of reification, Lukács moves further away from a simple
base-superstructure dichotomy, as when he argues that

"thought and existence are not identical in the sense that they 'correspond' to each other, or
'reflect' each other, that they 'run parallel' to each other or 'coincide' with each other
(all these expressions are only concealed forms of a rigid duality). Rather their identity lies
in the fact that they are moments of one and the same real-historical dialectical process."

Apitzsch argues, however, that a version of the base-superstructure model is
retained in Lukács' work in that

"on the one side we have the 'true structure of society... in the independent rationalised
and formal partial laws' which, however, rest upon an irrational interpretation of the total
process; on the other side we have the logic of the praxis of proletariat, its 'intention to-
wards totality', whose substance is in no way immediately given to it but rather only in re-
lation to the reifications produced by the bourgeoisie."
Certainly, in the reification article, there is a subjective-objective dialectical process which pushes Lukács' analysis back in the direction of a base-superstructure model.

However, to return to the original suggestion made by Apitzsch that Lukács is concerned with 'the structuring function of ideology in the base process itself', this can be seen most clearly in the central section of Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein which takes up the process of reification and its consequences for the working class. It is an analysis which points towards a new version of the sociology of knowledge in its widest sense, insofar as it takes the medium of communication in capitalist societies to be that of commodity production and holds the commodity to be the universal category of the whole of social existence under capitalism. Yet, as we shall see, such an analysis was not developed within the context of the sociology of knowledge in Germany, despite the very substantial links between Lukács' analysis of reification and some aspects of the work of Weber and Simmel. Lukács' analysis does, once more, illustrate his continued reliance upon German sociology even when he assumes that he has distanced himself from it.

Lukács argues that the problem of commodities appears as 'the central, structural problem of capitalist society in all its manifestations in life'. 189 Lukács takes the essence of the commodity structure to be 'that a relation between people takes on the character of a thing and thus acquires a "phantom objectivity", an autonomy that seems so strictly rational and all-embracing as to conceal every trace of its fundamental nature: the relation between people'. 190 He assumes that his own analysis is based on 'the pre-supposition of Marx's economic analysis' and that this analysis will provide
us with 'a clear insight into the ideological problems of capitalism and its decline'. Thus, from the very outset of his account of reification, Lukács makes a number of questionable assumptions. He had earlier assumed that reification was the central barrier to the development of proletarian consciousness and that 'the ideological crisis of the proletariat' was the crucial problem to be faced: 'Only the consciousness of the proletariat can point to the way that leads out of the impasse of capitalism. As long as this consciousness is lacking, the crisis remains permanent'. This 'permanent' crisis is, in fact, reinforced in Lukács' own analysis by the all-embracing process of reification. How this comes about must be central to our analysis of Lukács' account of reification. Secondly, Lukács assumes that his account of reification is predicated upon Marx's analysis. This raises two issues: whether in fact the theory of reification does rest upon Marx's analysis of the commodity structure and whether, in merely predicing this analysis, Lukács confines himself to an account of the 'phenomena' of capitalism and not its 'essence'.

As far as can be discovered, Marx himself uses the concept of reification (Verdinglichung) only once in his work at the very end of volume three of Kapital, though within this same context he does refer to objectification (Versachlichung). In this passage, in which the concept is obscured in the existing translation, and part of which Lukács himself refers to (though not, strangely enough to this sole reference to reification), Marx refers to 'the mystification of the capitalist mode of production, the reification (Verdinglichung) of social relations' and to 'the enchanted, perverted, topsy-turvey world, in which Monsieur le Capital and Madame La Terre do their ghost-walking as social characters and at the same time as mere things'.

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All this is within the context of a critique of vulgar economy and a three factors of production account of the capitalist mode of production which Marx refers to as 'the trinity formula'. It is perhaps ironic that Lukács should cite this passage in which Marx castigates vulgar economics' evasion of the relationship between the three kinds of revenue - wages, rent, interest - and their origin in the extraction of surplus value through exploitation since Lukács himself consistently avoids the theory of surplus value and exploitation in his own analysis of capitalism.

The concept of reification does appear in the work of Nietzsche and, more significantly, on several occasions in Georg Simmel's Philosophy of Money which, as Lukács himself subsequently acknowledge, had been highly influential in relation to his earlier development. Hence there must arise in any analysis of Lukács' discussion of the reification process the extent to which Simmel's own theory of reification finds echoes in Lukács' Marxist work. In this context, it is important to point out that reification does not merely appear as a concept within Simmel's work but also as a theory of cultural alienation. Significantly, Lukács, like Simmel, makes no distinction between reification and objectification. Thus, even at a preliminary glance, the question as to whether Lukács' account of reification 'presupposes' Marx's analysis has many other ramifications than a mere clarification of the 'faithfulness' of Lukács' account in relation to Marx would suggest. Lukács' Geschiche und Klassenbewusstsein potentially offered the most forceful and original statement of a critique of ideology in the Marxist tradition. It has been clearly demonstrated by Lenk that the sociology of knowledge tradition in Germany was seriously deficient both in its knowledge and understanding of Marx's work and more especially of his theory of ideology.
work is particularly significant in this context since it provided a corrective and an alternative to the often vulgar Marxism of the Second International which was caricatured in the German sociological tradition as a whole. Lukács' own understanding and presentation of a critique of ideology within the Marxist tradition is therefore worthy of careful investigation.

The extent to which Lukács' analysis of reification does differ in many respects from that of Marx must be placed within the context of Lukács' analysis of capitalist society and its 'Ideological problems'. For Lukács, the decisive determining factor in social consciousness under capitalism was not the contradiction between labour and capital, between the relations and forces of production but the reified nature of the commodity structure. 197 The reification produced by commodity relations is seen by Lukács to be all-pervasive; indeed capitalism itself seems to take on the character of a hermetic totality of reification, in which the material forces of production combine with the capitalist relations of production into a negative homogeneity whereas Marx saw the decisive dynamics of capitalist society which ultimately necessarily were revolutionary as being based upon this increasingly explosive contradiction between productive forces and the capitalist relations of production. 198

We may question the automatic nature of this contradiction posited here but the central point which Kammler makes is important, namely, that Lukács removes this dimension from his analysis of capitalism.

Recent studies by Maretsky, 199 Kammler 200 and Grunenberg 201 have argued that Lukács' analysis of capitalism is indeed almost consistently at variance with Marx's own. Grunenberg, for example, demonstrates that Lukács' account of the emergence of reification differs markedly from Marx's
account of the development of capitalism in important respects. Lukács argues that reification emerges with the transition from simple to capitalist commodity production and implies a qualitative distinction between the two types of commodity production: 'The distinction between a society where this form [commodity form D.F] is dominant, permeating every expression of life, and society where it only makes an episodic appearance is essentially one of quality'. Grunenberg argues that Lukács' working out of this distinction there lie two erroneous assessments of simple commodity production. On the one hand, Lukács romanticizes simple commodity production and speaks of 'an organic process within a community'. On the other, Lukács argues that only under capitalism does the mode of production determine social life whereas in pre-capitalist societies it was determined by 'state-legal forms'. Neither view can be traced back to Marx. Once the commodity has become 'the universal category of society',

'a man's own activity, his own labour becomes something objective and independent of him, something that controls him by virtue of an autonomy alien to man. There is both an objective and a subjective side to this phenomenon. Objectively a world of objects and relations between things springs into being ... Subjectively ... a man's activity becomes estranged from himself, it turns into a commodity which, subject to the non-human objectivity of the natural laws of society, must go its own way independently of man just like any consumer article.'

Grunenberg rightly remarks on this passage that, whereas Marx speaks of the relationship of producers to the total societal labour and hence of the dual nature of the commodity of labour as labour and as labour power, 'Lukács explains the same problem in terms of the distancing of the worker from the product of his labour, as the confrontation of producer and product'. In this respect, Lukács' analysis here remains at the level of 'the super-
ficialities of the phenomena of capitalist commodity production'. 206

However, what Grunenberg fails to point out is the close relationship between this analysis in *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein* and Lukács' earlier accounts of estrangement. Similarly, what is also omitted is the affinities which both these accounts possess with Simmel's own theory of reification upon which Lukács had so heavily relied in his 'Sociology of Modern Drama'. 207

It is almost as if Lukács retained Simmel's theory of cultural reification and sought to give a justification for it, an explanation of it in terms of Marx's account of commodity fetishism - which is certainly a dimension that is absent from Simmel's theory of reification. Nonetheless, Simmel's theory of reification also rests upon the separation of the product from its producer and goes on to emphasize the ramifications of this process in the division of labour. This is precisely what Lukács does, except that his grounding of reification in the labour process is heavily indebted to Max Weber's analysis of rationalisation and the universalisation of rational calculation. And in terms of tracing antecedents here, we do not know enough about the extent to which Weber himself drew upon Simmel's work, though we do know that he was highly impressed by his *Philosophy of Money*. 208 This work does contain a remarkable analysis of the processes of reification, fragmentation, atomisation, objectification and standardisation brought about by the division of labour. Thus, when writers like Grunenberg comment on the extent to which Lukács' account of reification deviates from that of Marx they may be pointing not merely to Lukács' misinterpretation of Marx and a considerable reliance upon Weber's work on rationalisation but also to Simmel's analysis of the consequences of the division of labour. For it is certainly not Weber but Simmel who devoted so much attention to the analysis of the
consequences of the division of labour. It is also Simmel, incidentally, who was the only writer, within the German sociological tradition in this period - with the exception of Sombart - to take up Marx's labour theory of value and, whatever the mistaken nature of his critique, subject it to criticism.

At a different level, Lukács' description of the situation of the bourgeoisie trapped in the reified world which they created as a 'tragic' one clearly echoes not merely his own earlier writings and perhaps his own situation - but also the tragic consciousness of Simmel. Simmel, too, sees the precarious position of the individual threatened by the processes of reification as profoundly tragic and is pessimistic and melancholic. At the level of everyday consciousness and with the universalisation of the reification process, Lukács' argument is also pessimistic. All social groups are trapped in this reified totality. This is, in fact, a constituent element of what Fehér has termed Lukács' 'romantic anti-capitalism' which was evident in his response to the First World War and which explains his relationship to other 'romantics' such as Paul Ernst. What saves Lukács from offering a totally pessimistic picture is his messianic postulation of an abstract proletariat (or an equally abstract party) as the potential identical-subject-object of history. That is, the pessimism which one could ascribe to the empirical world is cancelled out by the ungrounded optimism of a messianic philosophy of history.

Lukács argues that it is only when the commodity is 'the universal category of society as a whole' does it 'become crucial for the subjugation of men's
consciousness to the forms in which this reification finds expression and for their attempts to comprehend the process or to rebel against its disastrous effects and liberate themselves from servitude to the "second nature" so created. This 'subjugation' to 'the forms in which this reification finds expression' derives ultimately from the labour process. More specifically, it derives from the progressive rationalisation of the division of labour.

The transition to machine industry exhibits

'a continuous trend towards greater rationalisation, an increasingly intensified elimination of the qualitative, human-individual qualities of the worker. On the one hand, the labour process is progressively broken down into abstract, rational, specialised operations, so that the relationship of the worker to the product as a whole is broken and his work is reduced to a specific function that is mechanically repeated. On the other hand, socially necessary labour time, the basis for rational calculation, is converted, as mechanisation and rationalisation of the labour process from a merely empirically perceivable average labour time to an objectively calculable work-stint that confronts the worker as a fixed and autonomous objectivity. With the modern, "psychological" analysis of the work process (the Taylor system) this rational mechanisation is projected right into the worker's "soul": even his psychological attributes are separated from his total personality and placed in opposition to it so as to facilitate their integration into specialised rational systems and their reduction to statistically viable concepts.'

The analysis of the progressive rationalisation of the division of labour within the factory and its progressive calculability is then extended, without further argument, to the functioning of the social division of labour as a whole.

Again, as Grunenberg points out, Marx established a basic distinction between the division of labour within the factory and within society as a whole in order to demonstrate the contradiction between the seemingly planned nature of the division of labour within the factory and its totally unplanned
nature in society as a whole, between the concentration of the means of production in the hands of capitalists and the fragmentation of these means as far as workers are concerned. Lukács, in contrast, argues that the internal organisation of the factory contains 'in a concentrated form the whole structure of capitalist society'.

Not surprisingly, therefore, Lukács' account of this process moves in a direction totally at variance to that of Marx. It is concerned with 'the principle at work here: the principle of rationalisation, based on what is and can be calculated'. This Weberian grounding of the nature of capitalism moves further and further away from the capitalist process of accumulation, the theory of surplus value and exploitation. It thereby removes from the analysis of capitalism all those contradictions which Marx held to constitute the dynamic of capitalist societies. Instead, Lukács proceeds to examine two crucial changes brought about by rationalisation. Firstly, this increased calculability of the work process becomes 'the objective synthesis of rationalised special systems whose unity is determined by pure calculation'. Hence this results in the 'fragmentation of the object of production'. Secondly, the subject of production, the worker, too becomes fragmented; he becomes 'a mechanical part incorporated into a mechanical system', a system which functions independently of him so that 'his activity becomes less and less active and more and more contemplative'. This contemplative stance induced by the workers' confrontation with the mechanical fixed laws of the machine process 'must likewise transform the basic categories of man's immediate attitude to the world: it reduces space and time to a common denominator and degrades times to the dimension of space.'
Confronted with this reification, 'the personality can do no more than look on helplessly while its own existence is reduced to an isolated particle and fed into an alien system'. But 'this isolation and fragmentation is only apparent'. It is merely 'the reflex in consciousness of the fact that the "natural laws" of capitalist production have been extended to cover every manifestation of life in society'.

This all-pervasive 'principle of rational mechanisation and calculability' and its attendant reification leads Lukács into viewing the modern division of labour 'exclusively from the aspect of an increasingly more total inhumanity' and provides his analysis with a fateful tragic conception of the possibilities of overcoming this fate. The structural contradiction in capitalist society cannot be overcome by means of any changes in that society's structure. Lukács has provided us with an account of a one dimensional process of reification which has affinities not merely with Weber's but also with Simmel's analyses. As Grunenberg argues, 'it is apparent in Lukács' analysis of the division of labour, which he conceives solely as a "question of organisation", that for him his concern is not with a materialist analysis of the capitalist mode of production but rather with an earlier cultural-critical description'. But Grunenberg goes on to ascribe this to Lukács' increasing reliance upon Weber's account of capitalism and his attempt to fuse this analysis with that of Marx. Certainly the discussion of rational calculation and, in part, the emphasis upon the organisation of work do rest upon Weber's analysis of capitalism. But in several respects, Lukács' account of reification, especially in relation to the division of labour, could readily be derived from Simmel's account in the Philosophy of Money.
It has already been suggested that Lukács' tragic conception of the fate of the bourgeoisie owes much to his own earlier writings and also to Simmel's own tragic vision. Of more relevance in the present context is Simmel's account of the consequences of the division of labour. In the last chapter of the *Philosophy of Money*, Simmel, like Lukács, views these consequences largely in terms of the relationship between the producer and his product. The extension of the division of labour 'is achieved at the expense of the individual producer' who is 'robbed of energy essential for the harmonious development of the self'.\(^{222}\) Similarly, the 'lack of vital congruence between the worker and his product ... makes it particularly easy for the product to become completely divorced from the worker', it acquires a 'fragmentary character' and becomes 'an objective achievement detached from the individual', something 'purely impersonal and autonomous'.\(^{223}\)

Furthermore, 'in addition to the means of work, actual work itself becomes separated from the worker. This is what is meant by saying that labour has become a commodity' and implies that as a commodity it has become 'something objective in relation to the worker himself, something which not only is no longer him, but which he no longer even has'.\(^{224}\) It is worth noting in passing here that Lukács, like Simmel, does not distinguish between labour and labour power in this context. Finally, it is worth pointing to Simmel's argument that the division of labour affects the products too such that 'the products of capitalist labour are objects with a definite independent existence, possessing ehir own dynamic laws and alien to the very individuals who produce them'.\(^{225}\) It hardly requires pointing out how close this kind of analysis of the division of labour is to that advanced by Lukács in his account of the development of reification. One might even go further here and suggest that the manner in which Lukács presents us with the con-
tradiction between a determined totality of reified existence and the necessity of generating 'true' consciousness outside this totality has some affinity between Simmel's opposition between objective and subjective culture. In both cases, one can only be pessimistic with regard to the objective structures and optimistic (messianic) with regard to the possibilities for human consciousness. Of course, in Simmel's case, it is the autonomous individual who must be preserved; for Lukács, it is revolutionary proletarian class consciousness and later the revolutionary party that is the motor for change.

The increasing reliance upon Max Weber's analysis of capitalism is also very much apparent. Lukács, like Weber, emphasises rational calculability as a crucial feature of capitalism, indeed as the basic principle generating reification. Yet, as Grunenberg points out 'the principle of rational calculation was . . . for Weber, not only applicable to the developed capitalist mode of production but in his view determined the whole course of development since the middle ages'. Similarly, Maretsky has argued that the manner in which Lukács takes over Weber's account of capitalism has important consequences for his own analysis. Maretsky argues that Lukács takes over Weber's notion of the hierarchical organisation of the labour process without realising that its consequence is that 'the opposition between property and lack of property, capital and wage labour is thereby no longer a specific social determination . . . but a natural quality of the labour process itself'. Maretsky also claims, though with less justification, that the discrepancy between part and whole upon which Lukács places great emphasis is merely the other side of Weber's distinction between formal and substantive rationality. He also concludes, like Kammler and Grunenberg, that
Lukács' identification of the development of reification ensures that revolutionary possibilities are absent within the capitalist mode of production and that hence a revolutionary proletarian consciousness has to be developed outside this process.

What are the consequences, then, for Lukács' theory of reification? There exists a contradiction between Lukács' avowed aim of understanding Marx's work and his actual analysis of capitalist society which diverges sharply from that of Marx. Thus, there is a hiatus between what Lukács assumes he is doing and what he actually does. This means that it becomes difficult to see Lukács' analysis of reification as an extension of Marx's critique of ideology, even though it may have been intended as such. Rather, a strong case can be made for saying that it is an extension of the critique of culture - already commenced by Lukács - that has its origins in the work of Weber and Simmel no less than in that of Marx. Of course, Lukács' critique is more radical and in many respects takes up a Marxist position. Had it not done so, it would not have proved such an irritating work for so many orthodox Marxists.

At the other end of this spectrum, as it were, and unlike Lenk, for example, who tends to draw a sharp demarcation line between the sociology of knowledge in Germany (especially that of Scheler and Mannheim), it is possible to argue for Lukács' theory of reification that not only does it share many elements in the German sociological tradition but also that the distance between the two is not necessarily as great as has been assumed. Certainly Lukács' theory of reification, though not taken up in the German sociology of knowledge tradition, was highly important for the development of the work of the early Frankfurt School, especially Horkheimer, Adorno and possibly Benjamin. Not surprisingly this tradition, too, claimed to be extending
Marx's critique of ideology and, since it developed, in part, at the same time as the sociology of knowledge always drew a sharp demarcation line between critical theory and the sociology of knowledge. Be that as it may, its strong Hegelian impetus and its cultural critique owed much to Lukács' work. In that cultural critique, Lukács' theory of reification proved to be a central motif, even retaining some of its political implications (whilst usually rejecting Lukács' optimism with regard to proletarian consciousness and the revolutionary party).

But Lukács' theory of reification did not terminate with an analysis of the origins of reification in the division of labour and the universalisation of the principle of rational calculation. Lukács went on to show why two avenues to an escape from reification did not in fact exist - namely, science and philosophy. Unlike many subsequent and present-day theorists who seek to preserve at least one of these avenues by a sharp demarcation between science and ideology, Lukács saw science - and philosophy - as being trapped within the reified consciousness that had permeated every other area of life. In the course of presenting this argument, Lukács provided a sustained critique of German philosophy. Part of this critique involved - probably unwittingly - a severe attack upon a position in the sociology of knowledge that was subsequently taken up by Mannheim.

Even in removing science as a possible candidate for providing a view of the totality, Lukács developed an argument that was later to be central to Mannheim's concerns, if only in relation to the social sciences. Lukács argues that the increased specialisation that is attendant upon a more advanced division of labour 'leads to the destruction of every image of the whole'.
This is no less true of modern science since

the more intricate a modern science becomes
and the better it understands itself methodologically, the more resolutely it will turn its back on the ontological problems of its own sphere of influence and eliminate them from the realm where it has achieved some insight. The more highly developed it becomes and the more scientific, the more it will become a formally closed system of partial laws. It will then find that the world lying beyond its confines, and in particular the material base which it is its task to understand, its own concrete underlying reality lies, methodologically and in principle, beyond its grasp. 230

Not only is the position stated here the central problematic of the Frankfurt School's subsequent critique of positivism - lack of self reflection, a closed system of laws unrelated to actual reality, the absence of a grasp of the totality - but it is also a statement of Mannheim's avowed intention in providing a sociology of knowledge that will form the basis for the social sciences. However, this is not the direction taken by Lukács here. Rather, Lukács goes on to argue that in the social sciences, and especially in bourgeois political economy, 'it is the very success with which the economy is totally rationalised and transformed into an abstract and mathematically orientated system of formal "laws" that creates the methodological barrier to understanding the phenomenon of crisis'. 231 Both modern economics and law are permeated by formal rationality so that, for example, law becomes merely a formal calculus and its substantive basis and the basis for its transformation is lost from view. Again it is worth noting how much Lukács relies for his critique upon Weber and, in the case of law, Jellinek. 232

This same critique is extended to philosophy which has also succumbed to the formalised reifications of the special sciences. Lukács is aware that
there is a desire for philosophy to synthesize, to achieve a grasp of 'that overall knowledge which the particular sciences have so conspicuously renounced' but argues that such a synthesis would have to do more than 'unite the special sciences mechanically: they would have to be transformed inwardly by an inwardly synthesizing method'. However, it is not possible for philosophy to perform this task since,

'philosophy stands in the same relation to the special sciences as they do with respect to empirical reality. The formalistic conceptualisation of the special sciences become for philosophy an immutably given substratum and this signals the final and despairing renunciation of every attempt to cast light on the reification that lies at the root of this formalism.'

Hence, neither science nor philosophy can, for Lukács, provide a way out of the reified structures and formalism that has been established by the universalisation of the commodity form. As we shall see, Lukács once more sets out a problematic - the impossibility of a traditional philosophical synthesis - which provides a starting point for Mannheim's subsequent attempt to provide a dynamic synthesis of perspectives. Once more, the logic of Lukács' argument blocks any path towards Mannheim's solution of this problem.

In his analysis of classical philosophy - which can in part be understood as a philosophical-sociological critique of the development of modern philosophy - Lukács argues that it was bourgeois society itself - its structure and its organisation - which prevented modern philosophy from solving the problem of the thing-in-itself, the relation between subject and object and other 'antinomies of bourgeois thought'. It is a philosophy which 'springs from the reified structure of consciousness' and which ultimately remains within its confines since
'It did not manage to do more than provide a complete intellectual reproduction and the a priori deduction of bourgeois society. It is only the manner of this deduction, namely the dialectical method that points beyond bourgeois society. And even in classical philosophy this is only expressed in the form of an unsolved and insoluble antinomy.'

Even at its most critical moments it was unable 'to break out of the limits imposed on formal and rationalistic (bourgeois, reified) thought'. In terms of a sociology of knowledge, what Lukács offers us here is an account of the way in which the reifications in commodity structure permeate all aspects of life; these reifications permeate human consciousness and give it a particular structure; at an abstract level, these reifications are 'reproduced' in philosophy in the form of a series of insoluble antinomies; this philosophy possesses a similar (identical) structure to that of bourgeois society since it, too, attempts to 'universalise rationalism'. There is a danger in such an analysis of reading back the structure of a specific society into the past in order to account for the structure of thought of earlier philosophers who, though 'bourgeois', can hardly be said to have lived in a society that was thoroughly 'bourgeois'.

However, in the course of his analysis of the antinomies of bourgeois thought, Lukács also makes other connections between consciousness and society which refine and complicate the simple notion of a 'reproduction'. Reference has already been made to Lukács' argument concerning the increasing control of society by the bourgeoisie. In the present context Lukács even seems to suggest that it is 'the thought of bourgeois society' which 'acquires increasing control over the details of its social existence, subjecting them to its needs. On the other hand it loses - likewise progressively -
the possibility of gaining control of society as a whole. This apparently idealist stance in which consciousness determines existence is a central theme of Lukács' analysis in *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein*. There is thus no simple mechanistic base-superstructure dichotomy at this level of Lukács' analysis. Instead, there is an attempt to argue that when consciousness has permeated the material basis of society (division of labour, commodity structure) it in turn reacts back upon the consciousness. This is presumably Lukács' view of the role of the natural sciences, as when he argues that

> all human relations (viewed as the objects of social activity) assume increasingly the objective forms of the abstract elements of the conceptual systems of natural science and of the abstract substrata of the laws of nature.  

Lukács here, as elsewhere, is prone to obscuring the material nature of scientific activity and in fact ascribing to its intellectual content (its theories, its laws) a determining function which it would be difficult to substantiate. Nowhere does Lukács attempt to answer the question as to why it is, even within the framework of his own views, that the natural sciences can exert such a decisive influence. Presumably this could only be because they are central to the reproduction of surplus value and capital accumulation, as Marx argues in *Capital*. However, as with the roots of reification, this dimension of his analysis is absent.

Lukács is indeed at pains to show that neither science nor philosophy are capable of a transformation of bourgeois society since both are caught up in the systems of reified relations of that society. The only way out of this reified consciousness lies in the development of the revolutionary consciousness of the proletariat and its realisation in praxis. In the course of this
final section of the essay on reification, Lukács not merely elaborates upon and sometimes contradicts his earlier discussion of class consciousness and the means whereby knowledge of society as a totality can be appropriated but also develops a theory of the relationship between consciousness and existence that is relevant for the development of the sociology of knowledge. This is especially true of his critique of a reflection theory of truth and his treatment of the relativism problem.

Lukács develops the problem of mediation in greater detail than in his essays on class consciousness and orthodox Marxism. As in the essay on class consciousness, Lukács asserts that 'the objective reality of social existence is in its immediacy "the same" for both proletariat and bourgeoisie'. But he goes on to argue that the 'specific categories of mediation' through which this immediacy becomes 'the authentically objective reality' are 'fundamentally different' and that this is related to their different positions in the economic process. In a critique of the neo-Kantian standpoint on historical knowledge and its reliance - at least in Rickert's work - upon 'cultural values' as an index of its objectivity, Lukács argues that the bourgeoisie is unable to advance beyond the level of immediacy; it remains trapped in the givenness of its existence. The proletariat, however, is able to advance beyond the level of immediacy as far as Lukács is concerned because 'once this immediacy turns out to be the consequence of a multiplicity of mediations' the worker's consciousness 'is the self-consciousness of the of the commodity; or in other words it is the self-knowledge, the self-revelation of the capitalist society founded upon the production and exchange of commodities'. And it is not merely a question of becoming conscious since 'this knowledge brings about an objective structural change in the
object of knowledge. For the working class this implies that the awareness that its commodity—labour power—is a use value which generates surplus value 'becomes social reality'.

What Lukács offers us is the same problem which was confronted in the essay on class consciousness, and even earlier, namely, the radical disjunction between a level of empirical immediacy and objective possibility, between the 'given' consciousness of the proletariat and a philosophy of history in which only proletarian class consciousness yields a knowledge of the totality of society. What is different is that here the problem is raised a stage further along the path to class consciousness. Nowhere does Lukács specify to any degree of concreteness how this class consciousness emerges. Instead, he takes up the implications of the situation in which it has emerged and leaves the process by which workers become aware of their position within the commodity structure obscure. In turn, this can again only open up the possibility for stimulating this process from outside—from the intervention of the revolutionary party. In other respects, the view of capitalist society remains the same as that found in the essay on class consciousness. Thus, for example, Lukács argues that with regard to commodity production 'interrupted abruptly now and again by "irrational" catastrophes, the way is opened up for an infinite progression leading to the through-going capitalist rationalisation of society as a whole'.

It is by removing this reified veil from the world produced by this rationalisation that we are able to recognise that history is a process which is made by human beings. When this occurs, the 'image of a frozen reality that nevertheless is caught up in an unremitting, ghostly movement at once
becomes meaningful. However, to take man as the measure of all things can lead to a relativist standpoint. Lukács argues that 'relativism moves within an essentially static world'. He seeks to distinguish this relativism from his own position which attempts to expose the historical function and meaning of particular truths. To do this he argues that

'it is one thing to relativise the truth about an individual or a species in an ultimately static world... And it is quite another matter when the concrete, historical function and meaning of the various "truths" is revealed within a unique, concretised historical process. Only in the former case can we accurately speak of relativism.'

All relativism rests ultimately on the assertion of some absolute and in its present-day versions represents merely a symptom of the crisis in contemporary society. In a passage that is central to his understanding of relativism and which unwittingly offers a critique of the positions of both Scheler and Mannheim, Lukács asserts that what modern relativists do is

'to take the present philosophy of man with its social and historical limits and to allow these to ossify into an "eternal" limit of a biological or pragmatic sort. Actuated either by doubt or despair they thus stand revealed as a decadent version of the very rationalism or religiosity they mean to oppose. Hence they may sometimes be a not unimportant symptom of the inner weakness of the society which produced the rationalism they are "combating". But they are significant only as symptoms.'

Indeed, Lukács goes further and argues that at the present time 'the only possible function of truth is to establish the various possible attitudes to an essentially uncomprehended world in accordance with man's needs in the struggle to master his environment'. In this reified world, truth can only be objective 'relative to the standpoint of the individual classes and the
objective realities corresponding to it'. In other words, within this context, truth can only be relative in Lukács' second sense of the term. But his argument does not stop here. He goes on to suggest that once mankind has understood and changed 'the foundations of its existence' the notion of truth will take on its true form as the '(societal) self-knowledge of man'. This is because the grounds for the existence of the relative and the absolute will have disappeared in the process of de-reification, a process which commences 'when the proletariat becomes conscious of its own class point of view'.

What Lukács seems to be arguing here is that what is true is related to the historical process, which is capable of being transformed. This implies that truth is not relative to a static historical process which is posited as an absolute but that certain groups are at given periods of time capable of transforming this historical process of which they are a part. In present circumstances this is, for Lukács, represented by the proletariat. Hence the importance of the transformation of its consciousness in order for it to transform capitalist society. In turn, as we have seen, this does not imply that the actual working class at any one point of time is capable of effecting this transformation. Rather it means for Lukács that there exists an objective possibility for its role as the transformer of society. Unfortunately, we also know that Lukács' argument for stating that the proletariat is the identical subject-object of history rests very uneasily beside his notion of their concrete situation and that the links between the two are unsuccessfully elaborated.

Lukács adopts a theory of reality as a process of becoming which means,
in turn, that his criterion of truth is not a simple correspondence theory. He argues that the criterion of truth is provided by relevance to reality. This reality is by no means identical with empirical existence. This reality is not, it becomes. However, the dominant stance adopted towards 'reality' by a reified consciousness is a contemplative one - subject and object are always separate entities. Lukács argues that thought itself must be conceived of as a form of reality that is in the process of changing.

This notion of reality as a process of becoming also has an important implication for historical knowledge. Lukács asserts that 'as long as man concentrates his interest contemplatively upon the past or future, both ossify into an alien existence. And between the subject and the object lies the unbridgeable "pernicious chasm" of the present'. It is possible to see this specific problem of historical knowledge as lying at the heart of Mannheim's discussion of ideology and utopia and his attempt to grasp knowledge of the present. In *Ideologie und Utopie*, for example, Mannheim too conceives of a 'total coincidence between existence and consciousness in a universe which has ceased being in a state of becoming'. It must remain an open question for the moment as to whether Mannheim finds a way out of this 'pernicious chasm'.

Lukács thus appears to reject a correspondence theory of truth. He argues this most sharply when he suggests that

thought and existence are not identical in the sense that they "correspond" to each other, or "reflect" each other, that they "run parallel" to each other or "coincide" with each other (all expressions that conceal a rigid duality). Their identity is that they are aspects of one and the same
In a sense what Lukács is asserting here is not a correspondence theory of truth but an identity theory of truth in which the problem is shifted further back to that of how to grasp the 'real historical and dialectical process'. And we know that for Lukács this is not produced through reflection, through the mere recognition of the process of becoming but through the realisation of such insights into practice. It is for this reason that Lukács asserts that 'proletarian thought is in the first place merely a theory of praxis which only gradually (and indeed often spasmodically) transforms itself into a practical theory that overturns the real world'. This not merely highlights once more 'the crisis of proletarian consciousness' and its importance but also points towards a necessary component of any theory and critique of ideology: namely, that a theory of ideology which asserts that ideological thought is contemplative and is therefore unable to grasp (i.e. transform) reality must presuppose a theory of action. Similarly, Mannheim's theory of ideology is concerned precisely with the problem of how ideologies prevent people from acting. In Lukács' theory of reification we have an account of why the process of reification is a barrier to praxis, of why the frozen categories of a reified world merely cause people to reproduce the illusions of that world and prevent them from understanding its real basis. A critique of ideology therefore necessarily presupposes not merely the hermeneutic problem of understanding but also a theory of action, however that theory might be formulated.
Although it has not been possible to develop all the subsequent arguments in *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein* and though the outline of Lukács' development has only been schematically presented, it should now be possible to return to the question which was posed at the beginning of this chapter; namely, what relevance is Lukács' work to the development of the sociology of knowledge in Germany?

It is certainly true that Lukács' major work did not lead to the establishment of a major tradition in the sociology of knowledge in Germany. However, his extension of the critique of ideology to a theory of reification and his notion of false consciousness did play a central role in the development of Critical Theory, however much writers in that tradition — like Horkheimer — were already critical of Lukács' position. But the relevant articles produced by this group in the period under consideration are concerned either with a critique of Mannheim (Horkheimer and Marcuse) \(^\text{251}\) or with the reception of Marx's early writings (Marcuse). \(^\text{252}\) In any case, it must be emphasized that, by and large, the early Frankfurt School distanced themselves from the sociology of knowledge tradition and the relationship between its members and Mannheim, for example, who was Professor of Sociology at Frankfurt from the summer semester of 1930 until 1933, was not close. Jay suggests that, at least in the early years of this tradition's development, the work of Karl Korsch may have been more important in their formulation of a neo-Marxist position. \(^\text{253}\)

Within the more orthodox Marxist tradition, Lukács' *Geschichte und Klassen-
bewusstsein suffered heavy criticism from writers like Rudas and Deborin. Indeed Lukács himself in 1924 in his study, Lenin, retracted his earlier position. It was therefore unlikely that Lukács' Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein would have exercised a powerful influence upon the orthodox Marxist position. Positive critiques of his work were, however, provided by Revai, Marck and, not surprisingly, Ernst Bloch. But it remains doubtful whether one can say that Lukács' work stimulated the development of a critical Marxism in this period - with the possible exception of the early writings of the Frankfurt School. Writers who did provide either contemporary critiques of ideology, such as Szende, or critiques of orthodox Marxism, such as Korsch, appear to have developed their ideas independently of Lukács, even though in Korsch's Marxismus und Philosophie - likewise condemned by the Comintern along with Lukács' Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein - there are many lines of thought which move in a direction similar to those of Lukács.

In this context, one can at least argue that Lukács provides a critique of orthodox Marxism both of the Second International and of the Comintern. More especially, Lukács restored to Marxism the dialectical dimension which lay in Hegel's philosophy and in Marx's own writings. What this implied was that Lukács aligned himself - however temporarily, in view of his retraction of his views in Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein - with those attempts at the development of a dialectical and historical theory of society - along with writers like Korsch and Gramsci - which ran counter to the increasingly dominant mechanistic materialism. More specifically, Lukács' work pointed towards the rejection of a simple base-superstructure
theory of ideology with its associated reflection theory of truth. This is important in terms of the development of the sociology of knowledge since it was this caricature of the Marxist position which was the subject of critiques by Scheler, Mannheim and others. However, this does not mean that the German sociology of knowledge tradition adopted Lukács' standpoint, although Mannheim, whilst not accepting it, usually took it into account at crucial points of his development. Rather, it is the case that this tradition largely identified Marxism with its caricature and often attempted to reduce Lukács' position to such a caricature. This is particularly true, for example, of Scheler's treatment of Marxism in this context.

However, it has already been argued that there is a more compelling reason for taking Lukács' position into account. The relationship between the work of the early Lukács and that of Mannheim in Germany requires substantial re-examination. Kettler has already demonstrated in Marxismus und Kultur the close links that existed between the two writers in Hungary up to the revolution in 1919. At the substantive level, it has often been argued that the works of Lukács and Mannheim have much in common, at least in terms of their choice of problems though not their treatment of them. Gabel has argued this case most forcefully in a series of articles and in his work False Consciousness. He argues for instance that

'Histoire et Conscience de Classe est sans doute l'un des ouvrages les plus conséquemment dialectiques de toute la littérature marxiste; avec Idéologie et Utopie de K. Mannheim, c'est aussi l'un des deux classiques du problème de l'idéologie et de la fausse conscience.'

Similarly, Lucien Goldmann, although he often distanced the two writers considerably, did, on occasion, place Mannheim within a critical tradition in
which few other commentators would locate him. With reference to the relationship between Lukács' *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein* and other European theorists, Goldmann suggest that,

'A peine paru, il eut un retentissement extraordinaire, fit naître une sorte "d'école" théoretique, dont les principaux représentants furent: Karl Korsch, Herbert Marcuse et Karl Mannheim, mais suscita aussi des réactions très énergétiques dans les milieux du marxisme traditionnel liés aux deux grands courants internationaux de la social-démocratie et du communisme. 264

Whilst few would probably agree with Goldmann's grouping together of these writers in this context, it does nonetheless point to a line of interpretation which must be taken into account at least as far as Lukács and Mannheim are concerned.

Perhaps the boldest statement of the case for reassessing Lukács' relevance for the sociology of knowledge and that of Mannheim in particular is that advanced by Watnick who, with reference to *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein*, states that 'it was Lukács' book which supplied much of the impetus for the development of a sociology of knowledge, particularly the form it took in the work of Mannheim', especially since 'Lukács was the one to furnish him with two of his principal methodological tools'. 265 Yet as we have seen in our examination of Scheler's work, it would be difficult to argue that Lukács' work provided the impetus for his sociology of knowledge, even though a case can be made for suggesting that Scheler's attempt to confront the critique of ideology may have been in response to Lukács' work. Therefore, whilst Watnick goes too far in attributing to Lukács the foundations of the German tradition in the sociology of knowledge, his argument is on firmer ground in the case of Mannheim. This case has been made more recently by Lichtheim who has
argued that *Ideology and Utopia* (1929) was the positivist's rejoinder to *History and Class Consciousness*. Mannheim adapted what he could use for his own purpose. An attempt to substantiate this connection at a more concrete level has been made by Huaco who argues that compared with the central themes of Lukács' work 'Mannheim developed a synchronic or atemporal version of essentially the same argument. There is a complete change of actors, but the formal similarity remains fundamental.' It is these and similar claims which will be examined in the next chapter.

What all these arguments have in common, in contrast to the claims advanced by Adorno, Horkheimer and Lenk, is a view of the major works of Lukács and Mannheim in this period which seeks to break down the sharp demarcation line between Lukács' *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein* and some elements of the German sociology of knowledge tradition, especially the work of Mannheim. It has been argued earlier that such arguments need not assume that Lukács was intent on writing a treatise on the sociology of knowledge in order for these connections to be made. Rather, a more general case can be made for suggesting that Lukács' early writings including *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein* are central to a fuller understanding of the development of the sociology of knowledge tradition in Germany.

Firstly, it has been shown that many of the roots of Lukács' early writings on the sociology of culture and the critique of ideology lie within a tradition of German sociology (Simmel, Weber) and philosophy (Dilthey and neo-Kantians such as Rickert and Lask) that is shared by many of the writers in the sociology of knowledge. Of course, it is difficult to generalise such a statement which is more true for Mannheim than it is for Scheler.
theless, when commentators like Lenk offer an account of the German tradition in the sociology of knowledge - especially that of Scheler and Mannheim - in terms of its commitment to a 'tragic consciousness' that derives from, amongst others, Simmel and Weber, it is difficult not to extend this line of argument to Lukács as well whose thought certainly exemplifies, at various stages a 'tragic consciousness'. Lenk also argues, quite correctly, that the sociology of knowledge in Germany must be understood within the context of a wider sociology of culture, then this argument too applies not only to Scheler and Mannheim but also to Lukács. In some respects, even, it might apply more to Lukács than to either Scheler or Mannheim. One reviewer of Lukács' _Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein_, Siegfried Marck, suggests that his philosophy of Marxism does not rest upon methodological questions of sociology and economics, as in the case of writers like Max Adler, but rather provides a comprehensive philosophy of culture, indeed from Lukács' standpoint, implies the sole possible solution to the fundamental cultural philosophical problems of the present time. This basic problem however is the "crisis" of contemporary culture. A theory of bourgeois culture and its critique - especially in the analysis of reification - was certainly a central concern of Lukács' work, at least down to 1923. Indeed, it has already been suggested that not only does much of Lukács' early work uphold a theory of cultural alienation - another version of the alienated mind thesis - but in _Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein_ this alienation sometimes appears to be total. It is not possible to escape all-pervasive nature of reification without presupposing some kind of 'leap into freedom'. In Lukács' case, this is a philosophy of history which assumes that the proletariat is, potentially, the identical-subject-object of history and can escape the universal reification. Perhaps it is this pervasive reification to which Bloch refers when he speaks
in his review of the 'exclusively sociological homogenisation of the process' of history. Herein lies an element of continuity in Lukács' work since even in Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein the critique of alienation remains trapped within an idealist framework in so far as its critique of capitalist society continually takes its orientation from the culture of that society whilst ignoring, for instance, the process of ideological production.

Secondly, it has already been suggested that Lukács' work, both his earlier writings and his analysis of reification and class consciousness, presents and attempts to solve many of the problems subsequently raised in the sociology of knowledge. This is most apparent in his treatment of the critique of ideology, and the relativist problematic. One could go further and suggest that his statement of such central problems in the sociology of knowledge within the German tradition in fact antedates their being taken up by Scheler and Mannheim as well as other writers.

In a similar manner, one can argue that, especially in Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein, Lukács presents the most forceful contemporary statement of the need for a critique of ideology. Since the central figures in the sociology of knowledge tradition in Germany also saw a central practical problem of their time as the cultural and ideological crisis - though from very different standpoints - this tradition too had to confront these crises. In so doing, it would not be too far-fetched to argue that it would probably feel compelled to confront what was the most powerful presentation of the crisis of capitalist society within a sociological-philosophical framework that was not too distant from their own that it would prevent it from being considered at all.
Finally, although this is necessarily an *ex post* judgment, Lukács' work unwittingly provided a critique of some of the ways in which central aspects of the sociology of knowledge were taken up. Again, this is especially true of the manner in which Mannheim developed many of the strands of the sociology of knowledge which he almost certainly felt compelled to confront as a result of his extensive knowledge of Lukács' treatment of ideology, history and the relativist problem. Though one need not accept Lukács' critique, it must be conceded that, at times, it is almost as if Lukács is providing a critique of the central problem in a tradition that had not yet developed.
CHAPTER III

NOTES

1. In fact Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein is a collection of essays written between 1919 and 1922. They are dated as follows:


8. This relationship has been sketched out in my introduction to G. Simmel, The Philosophy of Money, (trans. T. Bottomore and D. Frisby), London, 1978, pp. 1-49.


11. G. Lukács, 'Preface' (1967), History and Class Consciousness, op. cit., p.ix, my emphasis.


25. D. Kettler, Marxismus und Kultur, op. cit., pp.43 and 44.

34. D. Kettler, Sociology of Knowledge and Moral Philosophy', loc. cit., p. 420.
36. See, for example, the discussions in ch. 5 below.
38. A. Arato, 'Notes on History and Class Consciousness', op. cit., p. 387.
41. These have already been discussed in ch. 1.
42. See ch. 4 below.
44. P. Breines, 'Lukács, Revolution and Marxism, 1885-1918', op. cit.
45. A. Arato, 'Notes on History and Class Consciousness', op. cit.


51. J. Kammler, Politische Theorie von George Lukács, op. cit., p. 15.


55. G. Lukács, Die Theorie des Romans, op. cit.


57. G. Lukács, Die Seele und die Formen, Berlin 1911.

58. G. Lukács, Heidelberger Ästhetik, op. cit.


60. D. Kettler, Marxismus und Kultur, op. cit.


64. Ibid, p.663.


69. Ibid, p.666.


72. See my discussion in 'Introduction to the Translation', The Philosophy of Money, op. cit., p.22f.

73. Ibid.


75. Later Simmel was to make fragmentation an essential feature of his metaphysics of life. See, for example, G. Simmel, 'Der Fragmentar_charakter des Lebens', Logos, vol.6. 1917, pp.29-40.


77. Ibid, p.172.

78. Ibid, p.173.


84. Ibid, p.15.

86. Ibid, p.7.
90. For an account of the relationship between Lukács' and, amongst others, Simmel's concept of totality see S. Rücker, 'Totalität als ethisches und aesthetisches Problem', Text und Kritik, 39/40, pp. 52-64. On aestheticisation see my introduction to G. Simmel, The Philosophy of Money, op. cit.
91. Quoted by D. Kettler, Marxismus und Kultur, op. cit., p.20.
96. Ibid, p.31.
100. Ibid, p.9.
103. Ibid, p.81.
104. G. Lukács, 'Alte Kultur und neue Kultur', loc. cit.


109. Ibid.


118. G. Lukács, 'What is orthodox Marxism?', Political Writings 1918-29, op. cit., p.19.

119. G. Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, op. cit., p.3. Here, as elsewhere, I have amended the translation after comparison with the original.

120. Ibid, p.4.

121. Ibid.

122. Ibid, p.5.

123. Ibid, p.6.

124. Ibid. This argument concerning the division of labour can, of course, also be found in G. Simmel, The Philosophy of Money, op. cit., esp. p.446f.
I25. G. Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, op. cit., p.7. Here, of course, the argument differs from Simmel's in that Simmel is seldom explicit about capitalism as such.


I32. The concept of totality is also important in Lukács' early writings and, as Silvie Rucker argues, can also be traced back to Simmel. Cf. S. Rücker, 'Totalität als ethisches und ästhetisches Problem', Text und Kritik, 39/40, pp. 52-64.


I34. Ibid.


I36. G. Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, op. cit., p.17.


I40. Ibid, p.23.

I41. Ibid, p.27.

I42. Ibid, p.23.

I43. I. Mészáros, Lukács' Concept of Totality, op. cit., p.65.
144. G. Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, op. cit., p.41.


148. V. Apitzsch, Gesellschafstetheorie und Ästhetik bei Georg Lukács bis 1933, op. cit., p.98.


150. G. Lukács, 'Tactics and Ethics' in G. Lukács, Political Writings, op. cit.


152. A. Grunenberg, Bürger und Revolutionär, op. cit., p.185.


154. Ibid.

155. Ibid.


159. S. Rücker, 'Totalität als ethisches und ästhetisches Problem', loc. cit.


162. A. Grunenberg, Bürger und Revolutionär, op. cit., p.195.


165. G. Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, op. cit., p. 51.

166. As we shall see, Mannheim's conception of ideology and utopia, by evaluating them in relation to the present, also confronts the same difficulty.


168. Ibid, p. 79.

169. Ibid, p. 50.

170. Ibid, p. 52.

171. Ibid, My emphasis


180. G. Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, op. cit., p. 81, n. 11.


182. Ibid, p. 524.

183. G. Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, op. cit., p. 58.

185. U. Apitzsch, Gesellschaftstheorie und Ästhetik bei Georg Lukács bis 1933, op. cit., p.84.

186. G. Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, op. cit., p.58.


188. U. Apitzsch, Gesellschaftstheorie und Ästhetik bei Georg Lukács bis 1933, op. cit., p.90.

189. G. Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, op. cit., p.83.

190. Ibid.

191. Ibid, p.76.


193. Ibid, p.838. This is obscured in the English translation where the passage appears as 'the complete mystification of the capitalist mode of production, the conversion of social relations into things'. Cf. K. Marx, Capital, vol. 3, Moscow 1962, p.809.

194. Quoted by G. Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, op. cit., p.95.


197. This Lukács himself acknowledged in 1967 'Foreword' to History and Class Consciousness.


201. A. Grunenberg, Bürger und Revolutionär, op. cit.

202. G. Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, op. cit., p.84.


204. G. Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, op. cit., p.87.
205. A. Grunenberg, Bürger und Revolutionär, op. cit., p. 219.

206. Ibid.


209. The critique is to be found in G. Simmel, The Philosophy of Money, op. cit., pp. 409-428.


211. G. Lukács, Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein, Berlin 1923, p. 86.

212. Ibid., p. 88. Translation amended.

213. A. Grunenberg, Bürger und Revolutionär, op. cit., p. 222.


215. Ibid., p. 88.

216. Ibid., p. 89.

217. Ibid.

218. Ibid., p. 90.

219. Ibid., pp. 91-2.


221. A. Grunenberg, Bürger und Revolutionär, op. cit., p. 224.


223. Ibid.

224. Ibid., p. 456.

225. Ibid.

226. A. Grunenberg, Bürger und Revolutionär, op. cit., p. 225.

228. Ibid., p. 311.


231. Ibid., p. 105.


234. Ibid., p. 110.

235. Ibid., p. 148.

236. Ibid., p. 121.

237. Ibid., p. 131.

238. Ibid., p. 150.

239. Ibid., p. 168.

240. Ibid., p. 169.

241. Ibid., p. 171.

242. Ibid., p. 181.

243. Ibid.

244. Ibid., p. 188.

245. Ibid., p. 189.

246. Ibid., p. 203.

247. Ibid., p. 204.


249. G. Lukács, Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein, Berlin 1923, p. 204.

250. Ibid., p. 205.

251. See ch. 5 below.


267. Ibid., p. 251.
