THE ALIENATED MIND:
The emergence of the sociology of knowledge in Germany
(1918-33)

Volume II

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CHAPTER FOUR

KARL MANNHEIM: From the Critique of Ideology to the Sociology of Knowledge?
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Mannheim shares with Scheler and Lukács an early concern for a theory of culture. This is evident from Mannheim's earlier writings such as the 1917 lecture "Lelek és Kultura" (Soul and Culture), his review of Lukács' Theory of the Novel (1920), his essay on the interpretation of world views (1923), and the important unpublished essay "Über das Eigenart kultursoziologischer Erkenntnis" (1922). Indeed the similarity goes further than this. Not only is Lukács' work, and especially his Heidelberger Ästhetik, important for Mannheim's early formulations of the problems of the sociology of culture, as Markus has recently shown but, as Kettler's study of the relationship between Mannheim and Lukács in Hungary has demonstrated, the influence of Lukács' views as a whole was central to the young Mannheim.

In relation to Scheler the connections are not so close. One may point, for example, to the references which Mannheim makes to Scheler's pre-war writings in his unpublished essay. At a more general level, the early writings of Mannheim - and this is again especially true of Über das Eigenart kultursoziologischer Erkenntnis - betray a heavy reliance upon a phenomenological standpoint which, in some respects at least, brings Mannheim closer to Scheler. The phenomenology that Mannheim refers to most, however, is that of Heidegger and not Scheler. Of course, Mannheim's phenomenological position is also fused with Dilthey's hermeneutics as well as Lukács own early amalgam of these two traditions. One may also detect, sometimes very clearly as in 'Lelek és Kultur', the fascination which Simmel's theory of cultural alienation had for Mannheim, as indeed it had for the early Lukács.

In another direction, the neo-Kantian philosophy of Rickert and Lask is evi-
dent in Mannheim's doctoral thesis 'The Structural Analysis of Epistemology' (1922, Hungarian original 1918) as is, once again, Lukács' early writings. However, it would be a mistake to assume that these early formulations of a sociology of culture are concerned only with a theory of culture. On the contrary, they often contain the rudiments of certain central problems which Mannheim later developed into his sociology of knowledge. There thus seems little point in making the claim, as Remmling does, that 'Mannheim made the transition from philosophy to sociology in 1925, when he published his article, "The problem of a sociology of knowledge".' Not only had Mannheim by this time already developed a sociology of culture but he had also developed a number of themes central to his sociology of knowledge. In what follows, in the first systematic section of this chapter, an attempt will be made to highlight the major themes of Mannheim's early work and demonstrate their relevance not merely for a sociology of culture but also for a sociology of knowledge. Close attention will be paid to Mannheim's unpublished essay not, as Kettler rightly points out, in order 'to create any sort of mystery about Mannheim. His published works of the time were more polished and "professional" and therefore more modest in aspiration. He took greater intellectual risks in the essays written for self-clarification and these are, accordingly, more self-revealing.' It is also within Mannheim's earlier work that it is possible to trace the important influence which Lukács exercised over Mannheim. This extends not merely from the common discussions in Budapest in the 'Szellemkek' group, which are investigated elsewhere by Kettler, but also to Mannheim's written work and his participation in the 'Free School of Human Sciences' in 1917 (Mannheim's lecture 'Soul and Culture' belongs to the lecture series given under its auspices). Lukács
himself many years later indeed went so far as to suggest that, in this period
'I stood in a close relationship to Mannheim when he was a student and he
was, one might say, my unofficial academic pupil'. Thus the relation-
ship between Mannheim and Lukács can be traced back to their earlier years
in Budapest. It remains to be seen to what extent Mannheim remained con-
scious of the need to confront Lukács' work, especially Geschichte und
Klassenbewusstsein, in his later writings.

In the second part of this chapter, attention will be focussed upon the explicit
confrontation with problems associated with the development of a sociology
of knowledge and the attempts to apply such a sociology of knowledge to
specific areas. Within the context of the first of these endeavours belongs
the essay 'Historismus' (1924), 'Das Problem einer Soziologie des Wiss-
sens' (1925), 'Ideologische und soziologische Interpretation der geistigen
Gebilde' (1926) and the important unpublished essay Eine soziologische
Theorie der Kultur und ihrer Erkennbarkeit. (Konjunktives und kommunikatives
Denken) - undated but, from the references cited, probably 1924 or slightly
later. The attempts to apply the sociology of knowledge in this period com-
prise Mannheim's Habilitationsschrift 'Das Konservative Denken' (written
1925, published 1927), 'Die Bedeutung der Konkurrenz im Gebiete des
Geistigen' (paper delivered in 1928, published 1929) and 'Das Problem
der Generationen' (published 1928). The examination of these essays is
not intended to imply that Mannheim had now turned his attention exclusively
towards a sociology of knowledge since the continued significance of problems
associated with a sociology of culture are still much in evidence. Rather,
the explicit taking up of a sociology of knowledge grows out of his earlier con-
cerns and develops new themes.
Such interests must necessarily lead to a re-examination of what is usually acknowledged to be Mannheim's major German work *Ideologie und Utopie*, published in 1929. This is, in many respects, a very different book from *Ideology and Utopia* which was introduced to the English speaking world in 1936. The earlier version - which had a major impact on German social thought - was much shorter, comprising only three chapters: 'Ideologie und Utopie', 'Ist Politik als Wissenschaft möglich?' and 'Das utopische Bewusstsein'. The original was, as we hope to show, much more concerned with some of the problems that appear in Lukács' *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein* than the later translation suggests. A central interest in this section of the present chapter will therefore be the relationship between Mannheim's theory and critique of ideology and the establishment of a sociology of knowledge. Only by a detailed analysis of *Ideologie und Utopie* will it be possible to account for the impact of this work in Germany, an impact which can hardly be comprehended by a study of the English translation.

Whatever the judgment upon *Ideologie und Utopie*, it is certainly apparent that Mannheim in his post 1929 writings assumed that, along with others, he had successfully established the sociology of knowledge as a recognised discipline. The role of the sociology of knowledge within sociology and the social sciences as a whole is a major theme of both his dictionary contribution, 'Wissenssoziologie' (published 1931 and now chapter five of both the English translation of *Ideologie und Utopie* and the post-war German edition), and his lecture, *Die Gegenwartsaufgaben der Soziologie* (delivered and published in 1932). It is in this period (i.e. roughly 1928-32) that Mannheim also intended publication of not only a substantial study of Max Weber's sociology but also a collection of essays *Soziologie des Geistes*...
(outline written 1930), as well as a briefer study of contemporary social thought - Weber, Troeltsch, Scheler - under the title *Zur Denklage der Gegenwart*. In fact, none of these volumes appeared in Germany, though three of the essays which were to comprise *Soziologie des Geistes* were subsequently published in a much altered form as *Essays on the Sociology of Culture* in 1956. Not only did Mannheim himself make 'a number of major revisions in the original draft' but 'in order to make the meaning and import of the ideas comprehensible in another idiom and to the readers of a different generation raised in a different national tradition, the editors had to rethink the original text without distorting the author's intentions'. It is therefore unfortunately not possible to refer to these essays in their translated form as belonging to this period.

However, what we do have access to is the considerable number of reviews which highlight the reception that *Ideologie und Utopie* received in Germany. It would logically follow from the outline of the present chapter that some discussion of this reception of Mannheim's work should be part of the present chapter. But since there are a substantial number of contemporary reviews of *Ideologie und Utopie*, it is perhaps more fitting that they form part of the succeeding chapter on the debates surrounding the sociology of knowledge in Germany.

Kettler's investigation of the relationship between Mannheim and Lukács in Budapest prior to and, in part, during the Hungarian Revolution has shown that Mannheim was very much under the influence of Lukács in this period.
Mannheim took part in the regular weekly discussions of the Szélemerkek group organised by Lukács and others between 1915 and 1918. This group of intellectuals, cut off from contact with the mass of the population, were concerned with the cultural renewal of Hungarian society. As one of the founders of this group relates,

'Amongst its founder members belonged the intimate friends of Georg Lukács: Béla Balázs, Lajos Fülep and Anna Lesznai . . . Those who also came along were the younger people ("the children"), Béla Fogarasi, Karl Mannheim and Arnold Hauser . . . Generally, these Sunday discussions were organised and dominated by Lukács; he put forward some topic for discussion which would be thoroughly discussed by the group. Typically it was concerned with a moral and/or literary problem in which one concentrated especially upon Dostojevski and German mystics like Eckart. One could crudely characterize the political leanings of the group as "left orientated"; however, it is more accurate to point out how unpolitical they all were. In fact the group had more in common with a religious gathering than with a political club.'

The unpolitical and, one might add, unsociological nature of these discussions which were crucial to Mannheim's intellectual development is also confirmed by the reminiscences of Arnold Hauser who suggests that

'In 1917 Karl Mannheim was uninterested in politics as were all the members of the group. The main responsibility for this lay with Lukács who was concerned with Lask, Weber and Jaspers and interested in philosophy and religion ever since he had returned from Heidelberg as a kind of mystic . . . We never discussed politics but rather literature, philosophy and religion. At that time no one was yet interested in sociology.'

In other respects, too, Mannheim had much in common with Lukács. In 1912 Mannheim studied in Berlin for a year and attended courses by Simmel as well as later studying at Freiburg and Heidelberg before returning to Budapest shortly before the First World War. As we have seen, Lukács' early writings exhibit a considerable debt to Simmel's theory of cultural alien-
ation. This is also true of the first published work of Mannheim, 'Lelek és Kultura'.

In 1917, again probably under Lukács' stimulus, members of the Sunday discussion group, Szellemkek, founded a 'Free School for the Geisteswissenschaften' which was to propagate the cultural-philosophical world-view of those who, in Lukács' words, constituted an opposition to capitalism in the name of idealist philosophy. What they had in common was the negation of positivism. Again, it should be emphasized that this 'opposition to capitalism' was not always of an overt political nature but lay rather in its idealistic, often spiritualistic rejection. Amongst those who gave lectures in this 'school' were Lukács, Mannheim, Fogarasi, Szabó, Hauser, Kodály, and Bartok. From the text of Mannheim's lecture we learn that only Erwin Szabó offered a directly political lecture: 'On the Basic Questions of Marxism'. Lukács lectured on aesthetics, Fogarasi on the methods of intellectual history, Hauser on dilettantism in art, Kodály on the Hungarian folk song and Bartok on folk and modern music.

Mannheim's lecture 'Soul and Culture' - delivered in the autumn of 1917 and published in 1918 - was intended as a programmatic statement of the group's intentions. Its general tenor, as Márkus comments 'originates in Simmel and in Lukács' essays, that is in the Philosophie der Kunst conceived in the spirit of these essays, although the Lebensphilosophie tendencies emerge in Mannheim significantly more strongly than in the Lukács manuscripts of 1912-14'. The Lukács works referred to here by Márkus are part of his then unpublished writings on aesthetics completed between 1912 and 1916 and are often referred to by Mannheim in his later writings.
However, much Mannheim may have been acquainted with Simmel’s work through Lukács’ reception of it - though Mannheim himself attended Simmel’s lectures in 1912-13 - it remains true that the central theme of his lecture is undoubtedly drawn from Simmel. As in Lukács’ writings from this period, Mannheim conceives of the contemporary crisis as a cultural one. He argues that ‘the greatest danger in contemporary culture is that it grows beyond our grasp and makes our relationship to it increasingly precarious’. Mannheim develops this theme in a manner which mirrors Simmel’s theory of cultural alienation and the opposition between subjective and objective culture. For Mannheim,

'It is the mutual dependency of objective and subjective culture which makes impossible the existence of the one or the other. Objective culture envelops us like an independent Leviathan, yet it cannot continue to develop and maintain its own existence without the assistance and co-operation of individuals. On the other hand, the individual denies his own fulfilment if he fails to regenerate the objective culture and constantly appropriate it.'

In the course of the lecture, Mannheim expands upon this growing separation of objective and subjective culture, again within the framework of a theory of culture which is reminiscent of that of Simmel. Mannheim maintains that objective culture is

'the totality of objectivations of the mind which, in their historical development, have become a human legacy. They comprise religion, science, art, the state and forms of life. In contrast, we speak of subjective culture when - as Simmel correctly observed - the soul strives for fulfillment not through itself, through an inward movement but indirectly through these cultural objectivations, that is, through their appropriation.'

Mannheim develops this theory of cultural estrangement with reference to the work of art which, though having its origin in its creator, becomes separated
from him when it becomes a cultural object, such that 'insofar as the work becomes a cultural object and an independent reality, it distances itself from the soul'. This process of separation is apparent at every stage in the creation of an artistic work. One general attribute of culture, for example, is that it makes possible continuity, not merely between generations but also with regard to style. At the same time, however, the continuity of technique and common meaning structure, for example, do not always coincide. In such instances, Mannheim argues, this is the source of 'the tragedy of culture'. Within this context, Markus has argued that Mannheim explicitly takes over Lukács' arguments from his 1912-14 Philosophie der Kunst as, for example, when he writes that

'Man is certainly capable of making the objectification of culture - when it has completely estranged itself from the soul - remain alive as form, of allowing it to be observed and even of making it mean something even though in an inadequate manner ... The aesthetic mode of interpretation is just such an inadequate interpretation and Lukács, the originator of this whole theory of inadequate contemplation, constructs the whole of aesthetics as a system of inadequate contemplation.'

Again, however, this reference to Lukács is also closely bound up with Simmel's theory of cultural alienation. Mannheim argues that 'the whole dynamic of culture' is a 'process of cultural over-development and false development' and that 'it was Simmel who recognised this tendency towards cultural hypertrophy'. This 'alienation process' extends to every cultural sphere and is acute in the present period in which 'the old forms are no longer immediately relevant and their contemporaneousness has been lost. We feel that, at the present time, we are living in such an epoch.' In such a period and as a result of this process of estrangement, form and content also become alienated from one another, a process which 'reaches its highest
point in impressionism'. This account of the alienation process at the cultural level not only reflects Simmel's theory of alienation but, in the reference to impressionism, even includes Simmel's work as part of this impressionism. Both Lukács (in his obituary of 1918) and Mannheim (in his unpublished 1922 essay) recognised very early the impressionistic stance of Simmel's own world view and approach to reality. In another respect, however, the characterisation of cultural alienation as, in part, the increasing irrelevance of older cultural forms points forward to Mannheim's later use of this notion in his typification of ideologies as being modes of relating to reality whose relevance has now passed. Yet within the confines of this lecture, Mannheim does not pose the ideological problem and remains within an idealist critique of culture.

This fragmentation of culture is echoed in contemporary philosophy. Mannheim is quite explicit in stating that 'our world view is idealistic'. But it is also a world view which has rejected philosophical Marxism as 'unfruitful' and has replaced it with a mode of research 'inclined towards pluralism', a 'methodological pluralism' that recognizes the fundamental diversity of reality. This 'methodological pluralism' and a pluralist notion of reality constitute the central core of Mannheim's subsequent analysis of cultural objectifications, including much later - his analysis of ideology.

However, as noted above, Mannheim is not concerned in this lecture with the analysis of ideology. Indeed, one of the potential sources of such a theory - Marx's writings - is seen to have been partly superceded. Amongst the 'superceded influences' to which the group's world view nonetheless still
owes something are 'naturalism and impressionism in art and Marxism in sociology'. In more general terms, Mannheim also lists the work of several others 'whose path is also our path': Dostojevski's world-view, Kierkegaard's aesthetics, Lask, Zalai, the works of Ernst and Riegl, modern French lyrical poetry, especially that of the Nouvelle Revue Francaise, Bartok, Ady and the Thalia theatre movement. As we have already seen, and as is confirmed in Lukács' diaries, many of these - especially Dostojevski, Kierkegaard, Lask, Ernst and Ady - are also central figures in Lukács' own early development and were the subject of discussions in the 'Szellemkek' group.

In the course of his summary of the themes and contents of the group's lectures, Mannheim is more explicit about his, and the group's, social and philosophical concerns. Whereas Mannheim announces that in his 'previous years lectures' he attempted a structural analysis of logic which he will develop more concretely in his ensuing lectures (in fact the basis of his doctoral dissertation awarded in 1918 by the University of Budapest), it is left to others to develop a sociological perspective on culture. But Mannheim's own viewpoint is instructive here. He asks 'whether cultural objectivations, such as, for example, the forms of art, have some kind of relationship to the social situations, social classes for instance, in which they emerge'. At this point, Mannheim explicitly refers to Marx's work and also to that of Lukács. He states that,

'Marx was the first to see clearly the relationship between the objectification of culture and the social structure and his starting point will not be superceded here at all. Certainly, our interpretation of this relationship is not that of Marx. We reject the theory of superstructure but the problem it throws up is - over and above Marx's
solution - also acute for us... That such a starting point can be fruitful, with its question of the penetration of societal forms in art, is shown by Lukács' *Geschichte des Dramas*.  

It can indeed be argued that Mannheim's early position vis-a-vis a sociology of culture did in fact reject Marx's theory of superstructure and, as we shall see, had recourse instead to both a philosophy of life and world-views derived from Dilthey and to phenomenology which Mannheim argues is 'the most interesting branch of modern logic'. What is also apparent from this lecture is the extent to which Mannheim's early work relies - and, as we shall see, continues to rely - upon Lukács' early writings on culture and aesthetics. These works, such as the analysis of modern drama and the Heidelberg manuscripts, remained important for Mannheim's own theory of culture. In 1917 its normative basis was an optimistic theory of cultural renewal, a call to break down the alienation of subjective and objective culture.

Mannheim's own contribution to this series of lectures was clearly the draft for his *Structural Analysis of Epistemology*, his doctoral dissertation awarded in November 1918 by the University of Budapest. A version of this dissertation appeared in Hungarian in 1918 and an extended version appeared in German in 1922, by which time Mannheim had moved to Heidelberg as a private scholar supported financially by his parents. The later version of *Structural Analysis of Epistemology* makes considerable use of the work of Emil Lask and, to a lesser extent, Rickert. Once more, Lukács' earlier work is also much in evidence, especially Lukács' *Heidelberger Ästhetik*.

In this work, Mannheim attempts a logic of philosophy in the sense of a
systematization of philosophical problems and levels of analysis. It is an attempt to understand and synthesize the structural diversity of intellectual endeavours since 'every mental, intellectual or cultural field has a structure of its own'. Mannheim argues that in the past such an analysis would have proceeded in a Cartesian or Hobbesian manner and explained complex structures in terms of simpler ones. The present trend, exemplified by an increasing interest in the theory of judgement, aims at explaining simpler structures in terms of more complex ones. In the course of his examination of the structure of particular disciplines in relation to philosophy, Mannheim produces an argument that is reminiscent of subsequent formulations by Popper and especially Kuhn. Mannheim argues that

"the special sciences, as long as they deal with their own topics and do not transcend their proper fields, are always concerned only with answerable "questions" (no matter how complicated the answers might be), rather than with "problems" properly so called. If a real "problem" does come up in a special science, it always has to do with marginal methodological aspects of that science - with a difficulty of procedure which makes the investigator stop and reflect. And that already amounts to philosophy: the philosophy of the science concerned."

Unfortunately here, as elsewhere, Mannheim does not take up the problem of the development of science. Indeed in this work, Mannheim specifically turns away from any formulation that would lead him towards his later relativistic problematic. He certainly states that he favours the kind of search for typologies of structures advanced, for example, by Dilthey but he refuses to take up the relationship between a particular structure and the empirical world on the following grounds:

"The historical interpretation of a meaningful whole is a possible and necessary task, but all too often the mistake is made of trying to explain the meaning itself with reference to the temporal features of
the work in question - with reference to empirical, real factors. If we seek to validate or invalidate meanings by means of such factors, we shall inescapably fall into relativism. The temporal as such contains only the conditions for the realisation of the meanings, but not the meanings themselves, they can only be represented by means of a structural analysis. 47

Such a view contrasts markedly with Mannheim's essay on 'Historicism' and with some of his subsequent writings. Here, however, Mannheim sharply demarcates his own position from that of historicism since

'Historical factors determine only the materialization of the mental content in question. The mere fact that history brings to light various types of systems of thought (and amongst them theories of knowledge) by no means entails a historicist, relativist philosophy of truth.' 48

Nonetheless, Mannheim does concede that at the present time many are concerned with finding 'the solution to the problem of historicity and timeless validity'. One of these many was indeed Lukács who, in his Heidelberger Philosophie, specifically devoted a whole chapter of that work to precisely this problem - though within the realm of aesthetics. 49 Mannheim, for his part, holds to a strict separation of genesis and validity. But in the course of his defence of this position, he advances a criticism of historicism which is crucial to the weakness of his own later analysis of ideologies. He argues that historicism 'flounders helplessly as soon as it treats all historical solutions as equivalent, and allows the notion of validity to lapse'. 50 In Ideologie und Utopie, on the other hand, Mannheim provides precisely such an account of competing ideologies all of which are equally 'valid'.

In the latter parts of this work, Mannheim sets out to develop a systematisation of epistemologies and ontologies. With respect to epistemologies, he
argues that 'the specific subject-object correlation is constitutive, and any epistemological theory is concerned with the determination and resolution of this correlation'. Though his analysis of the subject-object relationship draws upon Lukács' analyses, Mannheim does not advance a dialectical analysis of this relation. Nonetheless, the work as a whole testifies to Mannheim's early concern for synthesizing pluralities of structures and to his belief that 'the presuppositions of knowledge are always capable of becoming objects of knowledge in their turn'. This meta-theoretical quest is central to Mannheim's later sociology of knowledge.

On balance, however, it can be argued that Mannheim's thesis on epistemology does not lead us into the central core of his sociology of knowledge. In some respects, it leads firmly away from many of the problems which he subsequently took to be central to his sociology of knowledge. Against this interpretation, it could be argued that the work is concerned with the plurality of epistemologies, a typology of epistemologies and an examination of the meta-theoretical presuppositions of knowledge - all, in their way, potential themes for a sociology of knowledge as conceived by Mannheim. But the direction of his own research in this period does not confirm this interpretation. Rather, Mannheim is concerned with the establishment of a theory of culture, a theory of world-views and a sociology of culture that in fact establishes some of the major problematics for his sociology of knowledge.

The continued concern with a theory of culture can be seen, briefly in Mannheim's review of Lukács' Die Theorie des Romans published in 1920 - in fact, Mannheim's first work to appear in Germany. In this review, it is apparent that Mannheim is not yet primarily concerned with a sociology of cultural
forms. That is, he does not extract the sociological significance of this work for a sociology of the novel as, for instance, Goldmann has done. Rather, he is concerned to outline the plurality of perspectives through which we come to understand a work and the attendant problem of interpretation. Only one of these perspectives is the sociological one and it is not at the centre of Mannheim's review.

Instead, Mannheim takes up the diversity of contexts within which cultural forms can be understood - psychologically, sociologically, technically, stylistically, etc. All perspectives emerge out of the same object but take up different sides of it. As such they are to be sharply distinguished from one another since

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all these diverse modes of explanation correspond to diverse logical objects. Just as the individual natural sciences first create their logical object by means of method, so also the object of the respective human science emerges first in and through its method, through its viewpoint, through its approach and however this subjective-functional correlate of the changing object may be termed. The work of art "as an experiential complex", "as a sociological product", "as a form of art", etc. are inadequate characterisations of these possible fundamentally divergent logical objects.  
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This logically grounded perspectivism and Mannheim's insistence on the separation of these approaches not merely foreshadows his later preoccupation with relating diverse modes of interpretation but is also at the root of his problem of reconciling diverse ideologies, once this perspectivism has been translated onto a societal level. Mannheim goes on to treat the distinctions between academic disciplines as absolute and is then inclined to argue that within these 'diverse logical objects of the diverse disciplines there exists a hierarchy' of perspectives. In this way, Mannheim is led to arguing that
aesthetic objects should be explained from above and not from below - namely, on the basis of a metaphysics and philosophy of history rather than psychologically or sociologically. This provides the possibility for a 'deeper kind of explanation'. It is within this context that Mannheim praises Lukács' *Theorie des Romans* for its interpretation of the novel in terms of 'a higher standpoint', that of the philosophy of history. The review as a whole is not merely a justification for this hierarchical perspectivism but is also a reworking of the problem of the relation between accounts of cultural forms in sociological terms and in terms of a philosophy of history which we have already encountered as a central problem of Lukács' early work. It comes to the fore in most of Lukács' early works but particularly in his 'Zur Theorie der Literaturgeschichte' which appeared in Hungarian in 1910, and in which Lukács conceives of 'the synthesis of literary history in a new organic unity' as 'a unification of sociology and aesthetics'. But in Mannheim's review of Lukács' *Die Theorie des Romans* and later, the central feature of 'a possible new culture' was, as Apitzsch has rightly argued, 'not the contradictory objectivity itself but that phenomenon derived from it as a "generation with affinities to its sense of life" which saw itself in a position "to represent objective culture in a unified cross-section"'. One might add that at no point does Mannheim even, conceive of a 'contradictory objectivity' or, later, of contradictions within ideologies.

In the same year as Mannheim's review appeared, he moved to Heidelberg where he studied with, amongst others, Alfred Weber whose interest at that time centred around the development of a sociology of culture. Weber in fact published his influential article 'Prinzipielles zur Kultursoziologie' in 1920. It is instructive to note here how much Mannheim's early formu-
lations of a sociology of culture were indebted to Alfred Weber who, as he explains in the preliminary remarks to his 1920 article, had been concerned with the sociology of culture since 1909-10. Later, in 1915, Alfred Weber published a reply to a review by Georg Lukács on the nature and method of the sociology of culture in which he briefly advances some basic themes of a sociology of culture which were taken over by Mannheim. Weber argued that the sociology of culture must commence with the concept of culture itself and ensure that the uniqueness of cultural phenomena is not destroyed by a subsequent sociological analysis. With reference to the relationship between cultural phenomena and 'social aspects of life', Weber maintained that the analysis must remain at the level of 'a mutual functional dependency' such that the sociology of culture will 'remain not a causal discipline but an evidential discipline [Evidenzwissenschaft].' He cited as his example here Lukács' sociology of drama. Weber also refers to the 'plurality of worldviews' in a manner which Mannheim himself takes up in his 1922 essay. Finally, Weber argued that a sociology of culture should be concerned with the core of cultural phenomena, with the central 'life-feeling' of a period, without forgetting that its qualitative content is not fully open to sociological analysis.

In the course of the next six years, until his appointment as a Privatdozent at the University of Heidelberg in 1926, Mannheim set out to develop his own sociology of culture and, in the later part of this period, his sociology of knowledge. His longest work on the sociology of culture - Über die Eigenart kultursoziologischer Erkenntnis ('On the Nature of Knowledge in the Sociology of Culture'), a manuscript of 183 pages - remained unpublished. The work was commenced in September 1922 and was probably completed
early, 1923, before the publication of his essay 'Beiträge zur Theorie der Weltanschauungsinterpretation'. It is an important study for several reasons. Firstly, it allowed Mannheim to outline more freely than in his published works his attempt to develop a sociology of culture. Secondly, it is the source of outlines of several of his works in this period. It contains, for example, an outline of many of the themes of his later 'Ideologische und soziologische Interpretation der geistigen Gebilde', not published until 1926, as well as some of the issues raised in the essay on world-views mentioned above. Thirdly, perhaps more clearly than in some of his published work in this period, it provides us with a quite detailed perspective upon Mannheim's sociological orientation, especially his relationship to phenomenology.

Unlike his earlier works in which the sociological dimension of culture was not seen as the focal point of any interpretation and analysis, this essay on knowledge in the sociology of culture is concerned with 'what it means to submit culture to a sociological investigation'. From the very outset, Mannheim seeks to provide a phenomenological description of cultural phenomena. If we take an actual world-view than it is not, viewed sociologically, a theoretical structure which stands at its centre.

'trather, at the centre, there stands that substratum of the life-structure which is evaluated in "lived life" as precisely the ultimate substratum. That is, man does not merely think on the basis of his Intellectual composition, rather he also experiences hierarchically, i.e. there is constantly at hand a largely unreflected "system" of inner-worldly and environmental objects to which one is orientated in action, life and experience." 59

Within this order of things, some aspect of sphere is evaluated as the most important and the other spheres of life are organised around it. There is thus a 'hierarchical structure of experience' which is historically changeable.
For instance, Mannheim argues that in the middle ages this 'ultimate value emphasis' was a transcendental one which, as a world-view, constituted a relatively stable closed structure. In the present period, however, we are faced with 'a struggle of cultural spheres' in which that stable, central world view had been rendered problematic and increasingly disappeared. We are thus confronted with a competition between scientific, aesthetic and ethical culture in which no one of them alone is capable of regrouping the elements of our world-view. The individual is unable to relate the various elements of his world-view to a stable centre. Instead, he experiences the movement and dynamic of the historical process. As Mannheim later argues in his 'Historismus' essay, this world view becomes all pervasive, 'the real bearer of our world-view'.

This historical change in our world-view has important consequences for the modern conception of culture. Mannheim highlights six factors which characterize this new conception:

1. The relativisation of individual cultural spheres vis-à-vis one another, such that the value-emphasis upon the whole is absent.

2. Consciousness of the relativity and transitoriness of every historical manifestation of cultural phenomena.

3. Consciousness of the basically processual character of culture.

4. The formative nature of experience of cultural phenomena as such, the educational ideal [Bildungsideal].

5. The opposition between the concept of culture and the concept of nature.

6. Consciousness of the social character of cultural phenomena. 60

Each factor, in its own manner, is a persistent theme of Mannheim's work in Germany. In his various analyses, some combination of these factors is
emphasized, whilst at other times another combination comes to the fore. But what stands out from this characterization of the changes in our worldview is the manner in which it represents the central themes of Mannheim's sociology of culture and his sociology of knowledge: the relativisation of cultural areas (social group experiences; later, political ideologies); awareness of the transition of historical phenomena (the constant search for a 'dynamic' standpoint); the attempt to grasp social diversity as a totality (often as a synthesis); the quasi-independent role of culture and a concern with the didactic potential of the study (sociology of culture or sociology of knowledge) which not only investigates that cultural sphere but is, at the same time, a part of it; an assertion of the differences between natural and cultural scientific knowledge (even, later, the exclusion of natural scientific knowledge from social determination); and, finally, a consistent attempt to establish connections (relational, determinant, functional, causal etc.) between various cultural phenomena and the social milieux.

With respect to the latter two factors, Mannheim reveals the basis for his distinction between culture and nature and a concept of nature that is not dissimilar to Scheler's notion of 'real factors'. Nature, for Mannheim, is 'something that is completely free of meaning and of value, something that is merely the substratum of possible meaning'. It is something which is 'impenetrable by the intellect' and 'value-indifferent'. However, the more man becomes conscious of his historical determination, the less stable becomes his conception of what is natural and stable such that

1 in its expansion, the concept of culture absorbs increasingly more and more and as a residue there remains merely . . . our impulsive life and our sensuousness, which is now termed
However, unlike Scheler, Mannheim does not take up this residual natural element as a decisive determining factor upon culture. Rather, it often remains implicit in his early analysis of culture. In contrast, the cultural form is experienced as valuable and not merely as something existent (da-seiend). Through the phenomenological subject's intentionality, the cultural form is experienced as valuable and 'culture becomes a value'.

Thus, Mannheim's notion of culture is here grounded in the phenomenological notion of intentionality and experience (Erlebnis) - though the latter concept is just as easily derivable from Dilthey as it is from, say, Husserl. Indeed, Mannheim's phenomenology can be seen to be based more on that of Heidegger than Husserl.

Mannheim argues that this recognition of the historical nature of culture and its social determination is itself co-terminous with our awareness of social processes themselves. He suggests that Marx and his followers were the first 'to locate society in the economic sphere', to see the forms of sociation as having their genesis in the economic sphere. More recently, he argues, attempts have been made by Simmel, Kistiakowski and Max Weber to conceive of the social as a 'possible independent conceptual apparatus'. Hence, with the emergence of sociology as the study of society, it is possible to conceive of a 'socio-genetic' theory of culture and thus to interpret cultural changes 'from below to above' rather than from above to below (Mannheim had earlier praised Lukács' Theorie des Romans for successfully performing the latter).
However, Mannheim points to a number of methodological difficulties which must be faced in the establishment of a sociology of culture. He rejects a 'purely logical-methodological' analysis of the basis of a study of culture since it completely overlooks two factors:

'Firstly, the fact (and the methodological consequences of this fact) that the cultural sciences are themselves a part of this process which they describe, that therefore, in this case, the subject and object of this science in a certain sense coincide. Secondly, the fact (and the methodological consequences of this fact) that the subject of cultural scientific knowledge is not merely the epistemological subject, but the "whole human being".  

Mannheim sees the first factor as deriving from Hegel, the second from Dilthey. If we accept the implications of these two factors then we should not falsify cultural phenomena by interpreting them in a reified manner, by applying a methodology analogous to that of the natural sciences. We might add here that not only do such methodological reflections clearly relate back to Hegel and Dilthey, as well as to the early Lukács, but that they point forward to concerns that are present in the attempt to construct a dialectical-hermeneutical social science by Habermas and Apel.  

However, Mannheim does not develop these reflections in this direction at this point. Rather, Mannheim draws different consequences. He suggests that cultural phenomena are not to be conceived of as something rigid and nor is knowledge of them to be viewed as being static. In contrast, new cultural realities are always emerging and with them our conceptions of them change. Mannheim's plea is therefore for a dynamic sociology of culture. Any attempt to investigate the constitution of cultural-scientific knowledge must ask 'in what attitude [Einstellung] the total subject approaches the intellectual reality which it wishes to investigate scientifically'.  

For Mannheim this requires that
we attend to the second factor outlines above, namely, that the subject of
this knowledge is not the epistemological subject but the whole human being.
It follows from this that cultural phenomena are 'not reified', that they emerge
within the cultural process. Furthermore, it follows that they constitute
themselves 'in the process of being experienced [Erlebtwerden] and that
thereby in their inner structure they are projected into the attitude of the ex-
periencing human subject.' This is true not only for the creative human
subject but also for the person who seeks to understand cultural phenomena.
In the latter form, as 'receptive human subjects!' we can see the diversity
of the process of reception and interpretation. A phenomenological typology
of receptive human subjects has, Mannheim suggest, already been outlined in
Lukács' Heidelberger Ästhetik with regard to naive reception, the essayist,
the aesthetcian and the historian. Such a typology necessarily involves
a typification of concrete human subjects since

'The types are to be taken in an empirical-
psychological sense, because they never de-
scribe a real existing human subject in his em-
pirical-psychological disposition but rather
they describe the constitutive, typical possibili-
ties of conscious access to intellectual realities
according to their structural nature.'

Mannheim does not remain content, however, with 'a mere analysis of the
phenomenological subject of cultural-sociological interpretation' but, in a
Weberian sense, also calls for an explanation of cultural phenomena 'since
the sociology of culture is not merely a pure understanding of intellectual
forms but is, at the same time, a knowledge of these forms on the basis of
this interpretative approach'. At this level, Mannheim appears to favour
a neo-Kantian analysis of the methodological problems of concept-formation
and specifically alludes to Rickert's work. This leads Mannheim to the
second stage of his analysis, namely to the study of 'the immanent and
sociological observation of cultural phenomena - a study which prefigures in many ways his later article 'Ideologische und soziologische Interpretation der geistigen Gebilde' (1926).

Mannheim conceives of sociology as either the study of the development, organisation and change in social life - sociology as the study of society [Gesellschaftslehre] - or as the study of the embeddedness of cultural forms in social life: the sociology of culture. Society is a culture-forming factor whose 'forms and forms of sociation one can view, in a certain sense, even as cultural forms'. Another task of sociology - and especially the sociology of culture - is the investigation of the role which "social-historical reality" (Dilthey) plays in the constitution of cultural forms. But both aspects of a sociological study of culture are closely connected with one another since 'cultural forms rise up out of social life and return back to it; they are one of the functions of society; at the same time, however, it is one of their functions to operate as sociation.' Yet for Mannheim these two types of sociology are not of equivalent status and are to be distinguished in that:

'Sociology as the study of society is a fundamental science [Grundwissenschaft]; as the sociology of culture it is a method, a vantage point for the observation of a phenomenon which to a certain extent lies outside its own genuine sphere.'

The implication of this argument is that the concept of culture is constituted outside the realm of sociology. For Mannheim it is constituted by philosophy and not by a scientific methodology.

The objects of the sociology of culture can therefore only be grounded outside 'a merely methodological approach'; they can only be grounded phenomenologically. Mannheim argues that 'we must have a pre-scientific (ex-
periential) access to these basic phenomena which are capable of being checked by theoretical study. Thus, the conceptual constitution of a science is not merely 'a reflection of "reality" but is instead co-determined. We possess 'a completely atheoretical access' to cultural phenomena insofar as we are part of the cultural process which we experience. However, our knowledge of these phenomena is dependent upon our conceptual system, upon concepts which are conditioned not merely by the pre-theoretical phenomena but also by 'the state of the whole conceptual systematic' and problematic which we have developed. Hence, for Mannheim, not only is a pure phenomenological description inadequate on its own - however essential it may be as a starting point - but the progress of the human sciences themselves depends not merely upon a 'growing or penetrating pre-theoretical sensibility' towards the phenomenon under investigation but also upon 'the state of conceptual systematization'.

Viewed from this second aspect, the sociology of culture is a study which views its object from the level of sociological concepts. This means, Mannheim argues, that the normative aspect of cultural phenomena is 'bracketed' and treated as a factual entity. Whereas the 'immanent study' of a phenomenon occurs on the experiential level, a fuller investigation requires distance or detachment so that the phenomenon can, for example, be viewed within the context of 'the totality of life and experience'. Within the framework of this distinction between immanent and non-immanent study of an object, Mannheim suggests that a philosophical study of an object expresses its 'theoretical-immanent' investigation whereas a sociological study is 'non-immanent'.
This sociological 'non-immanent' investigation of cultural phenomena represents an 'approach to the social functionality of cultural forms', but one which is pre-theoretical. Hence

'the subject of social knowledge is not only the theoretical (e.g. aesthetic, etc.) subject but, as Dilthey termed it, the "whole human being" or, as we shall later state, it more specifically, the social human being'.

This functionality, Mannheim emphasizes, is far from being identical with a notion of organic functionality. Rather, it is the task of an interpretative sociology to grasp the functionality of cultural objectivations, not in relation to individual inner experiences but in relation to the social process. In turn, this means relating the cultural form to the communal experiential context from which it arose. The experiences of the individual cannot be conceived of as merely part of a stream of individual life. Rather,

'A large part of his total experiences are shared with other individuals. These experiences which are, as it were, at hand and which are the experiences of individuals within the same society and community must, however, be structurally related to one another in the same way as in the case of the strands of experience within an individual stream of experience.'

Indeed, we are only fully socialized to the extent that we have 'common stretches of experience' that we share with others. What this implies for the functionality of cultural forms is that 'such a functionality can only exist in relation to experiential contexts' which are not merely individual, but also social. An interpretative sociology is therefore concerned with exploring 'the functionality of an intellectual form in relation to a communal stream of experience', and not merely, as in Max Weber's version, with the understanding of individual social actions.
What Mannheim hopes interpretative sociology will aim towards is a 'social structure of consciousness', since 'by far and away the major part of the experiential constellation of the individual (even when apparently isolated) moves within a direction that is perfectly typical for a group or for an epoch.' 79

Within such limits, 'only relatively new experiences' can be incorporated into the constellation of the individual's experience, and within a given common life-structure only a limited amount of deviation can be tolerated. However, all this does not mean that the individual must be conscious of the functional relationship between his actions and his cultural objectifications, on the one hand, and the 'social stream of consciousness', on the other. On the contrary, a state of naive unreflection is the most common attitude. Recognition of this functional relationship is, indeed, only likely to occur 'when groups (e.g. strata, classes and races as entities) confront one another'. 80

The theory that awareness of social determination only emerges when confronted with another group is, as we shall see, one which is central to Mannheim's sociology of knowledge and indeed to his theory of ideology in Ideologie und Utopie.

However, at this stage of his analysis, Mannheim seeks to draw a number of important conclusions from this analysis of the functional relationship between cultural objectifications and social experiences. Firstly, he reiterates the view that 'not only the object but also the knowing subject of sociology is the socialized individual'. 81 Secondly, that 'the socio-genetic observation of cultural forms is really only an extension, a consequent resultant attitude of "everyday life-experience", that it cannot and should not readily leave this basis'. 82 Mannheim notes here that 'Dilthey has made everyday or "general experience of the world" a problem for philosophy. We see it in one of the
most important tasks which one could set it'. It follows from this that Mannheim is decidedly hostile to all positivistic attempts to completely free the social sciences from the attitude of the everyday world. Indeed, Mannheim argues that a sociology of culture should especially attend to 'the phenomenon of so-called "pre-scientific experience"', to 'everyday life-experience'. Furthermore, 'sociology need not be ashamed, therefore, of this origin and of this permanent connection with the pre-scientific, with the "whole human being" but should rather take up both of them in its presuppositions'. The final conclusion which Mannheim draws from this analysis is that 'this pre-theoretical origin of socio-genetic knowledge in no way implies an invitation to be inexact'. It is clear from Mannheim's subsequent analysis of the relationship between intrinsic and extrinsic interpretations of cultural phenomena that these pre-theoretical origins of socio-genetic knowledge are only a starting point and not the end result of his analysis.

As has been pointed out already, Mannheim's discussion of the differences between intrinsic and extrinsic interpretations of cultural phenomena forewarns the analysis subsequently published in article form in 1926 except that the ideological dimension - although present in this early version - does not receive as much attention as in the later version. Mannheim takes as intrinsic interpretations those which are concerned with an internal interpretation of work, an interpretation on the basis of an author's ideas and an interpretation in terms of another intellectual interpretation. All three are intrinsic interpretations of a work 'because they are concerned with the meaning content and do not inquire into the genesis of the meaning content'. Genetic interpretations of a work may take the form, amongst others, of a history of ideas interpretation, an individual psychological interpretation and a psycholo-
However, what particularly concerns Mannheim is the socio-genetic interpretation of thought since here it is the case that not only law, morality, life-forms, art, religion, etc. may be investigated in relation to their socio-genetic functionality but also that the process of thought and cognition, that the structure of thought forms as well as the concrete intellectual content of an epoch can be comprehended in relation to its socio-genetic function and even in relation to a functionality oriented towards several directions: on the one hand, as the function of comprehensive internal constellations, as the function of the world view of respective individuals and, on the other, as a function of the striving of groups for economic and social power.

However, such genetic interpretations contain a potential contradiction which Mannheim highlights with reference to Marx's argument that the ideas of specific groups in the production process are historically transitory products of the relations of production. Mannheim argues that such a statement proclaiming the relativity of all knowledge must also refer back to itself, i.e. that this statement must itself be relative. Yet, Mannheim goes on to suggest that analogous statements must be made in the sociology of knowledge 'even though one may not wish to trace the ideological moment in the last instance back to the relations of production as Marx does'. That is, the sociology of knowledge must make some statement about the derivation of 'theoretical contexts from extra-theoretical constellations'. It is worth noting here that a common feature of the sociology of knowledge advanced by Mannheim and Scheler is that the extra-theoretical is not itself theoretically apprehendable and therefore acquires an ultimate validity beyond which theoretical argument cannot go. In other words, Mannheim's argument here results in emphasizing a pre-theoretical base of such massivity that it cannot be discussed further and he does this in a manner analogous to Scheler's argument concerning the irrational bases of knowledge. However, it is also
worth observing here that, in this work, Mannheim is at pains to separate genesis and validity since

'the truth or falsity of a statement or of a whole theoretical sphere can never be reinforced or weakened by a sociological or other genetic explanation. How something has emerged, what functionality it may possess in certain contexts is irrelevant for its immanent validity. At the same time, this means that one can never construct a sociological critique of knowledge or, as has recently been asserted, a sociological critique of human reason.' 88

This is an explicit criticism of Jerusalem's positivist attempt to provide such a critique. 89 But what is more important here is the fact that Mannheim at this stage holds firmly to the separation of the spheres of genesis and validity and makes no bold claims for a sociology of knowledge. The sociologist of culture 'brackets' the question of the validity of the knowledge he is dealing with.

Mannheim is at pains to preserve both the immanent and the genetic interpretation of cultural phenomena. The structures of meaning in cultural forms are not merely comprehended but also experienced. This means that 'apart from their meaning content, the experiential context from which they emerge is also more or less given as well.' 90 Mannheim argues that cultural forms cannot be reduced merely to the one or the other; both moments of comprehension and experiencing must be taken into account. Although he does not see this relationship as explicitly dialectical, and although these moments are conceived within the framework of a Lebensphilosophie or possibly phenomenologically, this, nonetheless, is not too far removed from recent discussions by Apel, for example, on the dialectical relationship between reflection and engagement. 91 Mannheim is at least attempting to grasp this
process of acquisition of knowledge in a more sophisticated form than many
of his opponents and more sensitively than he himself subsequently often did.

Having examined, as Mannheim puts it, 'the intuitive element in cultural-
sociological experience', he now goes on to examine the internal structure
of cultural sociological knowledge. In the course of this elucidation of the
conceptual apparatus of the sociology of knowledge, Mannheim draws upon
the discussion of world-views which was about to appear during or after the
writing of this manuscript. As an example of the methodological problems
involved in the sociology of culture, Mannheim takes up the concept of style —
both an aesthetic and a sociological concept. In this example, he draws
heavily once more upon the early writings of Lukács and specifically upon his
essay 'Zur Theorie der Literaturgeschichte' published in Hungarian in 1910. 92
This early essay deals with the concept of style and with the relationship
between a literary aesthetic and a sociology of literature. Mannheim argues
that we may characterise an explanation of a cultural object as sociological
if it 'moves back from the work to the experiential context that lies "behind"
it'. More precisely, this experiential context must be shown to have a
specific social character, as when one refers to 'impressionism as being
derived from a self-disintegration of late-bourgeois individualism'. 93 That
is, the genesis of cultural objectivations is traced back to 'the general
structural forms of human sociation' (Weber) which are themselves in-
fluenced by their contents such as 'sexuality, breeding, economy, politics,
religion' etc. But Mannheim sees a problem in relating those 'two worlds'
of cultural objectivations and life experiences. There must be some
mediating factor between the two spheres and Mannheim argues that it is
'the world of the psyche which creates the bond
between meaning and "social reality". It is a humanistic psychology which forms a bridge between the sphere of validity of cultural structures and the forms of sociation.

This has important implications for the socio-genetic grounding of cultural objectivations; Mannheim provides the following example:

If one speaks of bourgeois existence [Bürgerlichkeit], then one no longer means by this merely the role of a social class in the production and distribution process of the social product but rather the experiential contexts [Erlebniszusammenhänge] which result from this economic, social and historically specifically determinable position. The social categories referred to do not imply human groups or concrete individuals but rather, for their part, experiential contexts.

Here Mannheim makes explicit the grounding of his theory of the functionality of cultural objectivations. Their genesis can be traced back not to social groups as such but to the constellation of their life experiences. In other words, cultural forms have their social genesis in structured human experiences and the relationship between their meaning and this social reality is mediated by the human psyche. Such a theory, heavily indebted to Dilthey and perhaps to Simmel, has the advantage of not reducing cultural forms immediately to social groups and their position in the productive process.

However, it should be clear from the use which Mannheim makes of the notion of experiential context that this is no essential mediating category but is itself, as it were, the basis or the grounding of cultural objectivations.

Yet Mannheim is more specific about the mediating element between the social and the intellectual spheres. This mediating factor is the world-view [Weltanschauung] which Mannheim views as having been derived from a humanistic psychology and is characterized as follows:

The world-view (of an epoch, a group, etc.) is a structurally connected series of experiential
contexts which, as it were, form for a larger number of individuals, the common basis of their life experience and their penetration of life. 96

What such a notion presupposes is that the basic experiences cannot emerge in isolation as the individual's living core [Lebenssubstrat] but rather the contents of these experiences are shared with other members of the same group. Secondly, the concept of world-view presupposes that individual stretches of life experience do not exist side by side in isolation but rather 'they possess an inner coherence and thereby constitute, as it were, a "life-system"'. However, this basic form is never directly describably; it can only be apprehended through the 'group formations' in which it is manifest. In turn, this means that the world-view is itself apprehendable within the most diverse spheres of objectification so that 'one and the same world-view of an epoch can be apprehended through its art, religion, morality, politics, economic structure, etc. 97 Each of those spheres reveals a different aspect of the same world-view. The social scientist must, of course, attempt to show the coherence of the different manifestations of the world-view. Indeed, the theoretical achievement of the sociologist lies in his 'attempt to penetrate the spheres of experiential contexts, which appear as completely untheorizable, in accordance with their structure'. 98 Ultimately, then, the sociologist of culture is not concerned with the analysis of cultural forms as such or with social formations but the analysis of the structure of individual world-views, with reference to the particular experiential contexts which gain their coherence in them.

What Mannheim's analysis of world-views reveals is, once again, that the potentially mediating category of world-view ceases to be a mediating cate-
gory and becomes, instead, 'the common basis' of individuals' life experience. As a cluster of life experiences, the world-view is certainly not a completely idealist construct; yet Mannheim constantly refuses to relate these experiential contexts back to particular types of social relationships. Rather, they constitute an oscillating basis of cultural formations. They are an oscillating basis since Mannheim is unsure of their exact location. World-views are both a coherent manifestation of clusters of life experience and, at the same time, they are these clusters. At this stage of his development, world-views constitute, for Mannheim, totalities. The sociology of culture is not concerned with an explanation of individual facts in terms of other individual facts but rather with an explanation derived from 'the totality (which one can term, amongst other things, a world-view) that lies behind them'. One may note in passing here the potential reduction of the concept of totality to that of a world-view. Within a historical dimension - and the world-view of an epoch must be located here - Mannheim distinguishes between history and the analysis of world-views on the grounds that 'history searches for causes whilst an analysis of world-views searches for the preconditions under which causes can be effective'.

Hence, a causal analysis is only one possible type of analysis appropriate to the sociology of culture. In general terms, Mannheim sees three possible types of analysis as being legitimate: 'Either one applies the category of causality, or the relationship of the whole and the parts, or that of function or that of "correspondence"'. Mannheim argues that at the level of concrete analysis, Marxism utilizes a causal analysis which reduces the social sphere, in the widest sense, to the economic. Marxism as a philosophy of history, however, works with the category of function so that
Ideology is then the function of a stage of development of the process of production. The one-sidedness of Marxism lies in the fact that it replaces other forms of social aggregation by the economic-social forms and in so doing it is not clear why the remaining social formative factors cannot also be co-ordinated with ideologies. \[101\]

If the social sphere is reduced to a narrow definition of the economic then this will lead to many experiential clusters being ignored. In contrast, the analysis of correspondence is applied to the analysis of world-views.

These approaches to the sociology of culture can, in turn, be related to different conceptions of the nature of sociology itself. Mannheim sees three traditions of sociology - pure sociology, founded by Simmel and Tönnies and continued by Vierkandt, von Wiese and the phenomenological school; general sociology, which procedes empirically and seeks to establish sociology as a generalizing science (Max Weber is taken as typical of this tradition); finally sociology as the study of the historical dynamic. This later form of dynamic sociology is concerned not merely with historical genesis but with the genesis of meaning; it is 'an individualising type-forming discipline'.

In turn, Mannheim suggests that these different types of sociology can produce different versions of a sociology of culture. A pure sociology of culture, however, with its lack of concern for the historical dynamic, is unable to face the problems posed by historicism since

'Historicism has broken down people's feeling of static permanency and has set in motion the once stable world-view in which each thing and each living entity had its specific place accorded by divine plan. Our feeling for life tells us: everything could also be different. Everything has become historical. . . . The spot from which we previously viewed the world as if from a stable standpoint has been broken down, our whole self is abandoned; we seem, as it were, to be suspended
above ourselves. In thousands of forms we find ourselves again. . . . 102

Nor can this 'fundamental homelessness of our human existence' be comprehended fully by a general sociology of culture. One can, of course, like Dilthey, provide a general typology of world-views but they can never be fully appropriate to historically changing circumstances. History never repeats itself in an identical manner.

Mannheim therefore favours a dynamic sociology of culture, one which will relate cultural forms to a dynamic totality and to historically specific groups (e.g. rather than abstract social agents such as 'negatively privileged strata', historically specific social subjects such as the 'proletariat in high capitalism'). Such a sociology of culture is concerned with the 'total situation' of social positions and world-views. It will recognize that 'within a single historical body not merely one world-view is alive' but several; it will recognise that 'human beings within an epoch do not live in the same time'. Thus, at the end of his analysis, Mannheim is already moving towards a concern not merely with the analysis of world-views but also towards an attempt to explain their historical dynamic. This is taken up both in his essay on 'Historismus' (1924) and his 'Das Problem einer Soziologie des Wissens' (1925).

In his sociology of culture developed in this period, Mannheim relies not merely upon the phenomenological notion of intentionality but, perhaps more significantly, upon concepts derived from Dilthey. Already we can see the basis of Mannheim's theory of cultural knowledge in this unpublished work. Central to this theory are the notions of life, experience and world-view. History is viewed as a dynamic stream of life, as a sequence of similar and
opposing standpoints. The notion of existential boundedness (Seinsverbundenheit) that is so important in Mannheim's later work can be seen to have its roots here in the theory of culture. In particular, its roots lie much more in Dilthey's Lebensphilosophie than in Marx's theory of ideology. Intellectual phenomena for Dilthey are objectifications of life; life is, as it were, externalised in them. History as a stream of life is the result of human experience whose objectifications are comprehensible through understanding. However, the notion of cultural objectification becomes, in Mannheim's work, the general concept denoting superstructural phenomena as a whole. As Neusüss argues,

'The relationship between "inner" and "outer", experience and the expression of experience that Dilthey dealt with as a theoretical problem in the foundation of an autonomous human scientific method, is no longer directly under discussion in the sociology of knowledge; it takes over, to a certain extent, Dilthey's considerations as it finds them without itself making them problematic.' 104

Similarly, whereas Dilthey's concept of life only applies to the intellectual world it applies in Mannheim's work to the whole world of objects. As Neusüss suggests, 'material existence becomes a "massive" Geist'. 105

The mediation between nature and thought, that in Marx's work is located in labour, is missing in Mannheim's theory of culture. The natural world as life becomes immediately a cultural phenomenon. The mediation between life and thought is carried out through the world-view. Systems of life within the historical stream of life are given expression in different systems of world views. These world-views, in turn, are competing with one another in such a manner that there is no stable location within the stream of life. Instead, as Mannheim puts it, there is only a 'fundamental homelessness' - one that is later to become 'the homelessness of the mind.' In short,
Mannheim's theory of culture already forms the meta-theoretical basis for his sociology of knowledge as Neusüss and Lenk have argued. 106

III

If Mannheim's sociology of knowledge is grounded upon his sociology of culture then, as we have seen, his own preference for a sociology of culture is increasingly one which seeks to take account of the historical dynamic. Hence, a central theme of Mannheim's work in this period is not merely the need for a theory of culture which will incorporate the sociological element but also the centrality of a historical perspective - and this, for Mannheim, is a historicist perspective. If we can often detect in his work on the sociology of culture the influence of Lukács, then it is no less true that Mannheim's statement of the historicist problematic is heavily indebted to the work of Ernst Troeltsch. A strong case can be made - and this has, in part, already been made by Kettler - for arguing that his unpublished treatise Eine Soziologische Theorie der Kultur und ihrer Erkennbarkeit (1924 - possibly 1925) represents 'Mannheim's effort to meet the challenge of Lukács' "History and Class Consciousness", 107 which appeared in 1923. Perhaps slightly earlier, but still within the period in which Mannheim was attempting to formulate his sociology of culture and sociology of knowledge in a more systematic manner, it is clear that Mannheim was attempting to come to terms with and work out the consequences of Troeltsch's monumental survey Der Historismus und seine Probleme which appeared in 1922. 108 It has already been shown that Mannheim was attempting to incorporate the historically dynamic element within his sociology in his earlier unpublished essay of
1922. This process of incorporation is completed in his essay 'Historismus',
published in 1924 and probably written in 1923. However, it is not only
here that Troeltsch exercised an important influence upon Mannheim's formu-
lation of a sociology of knowledge. Although never published, Mannheim
intended to produce a work entitled Zur Denklage der Gegenwart which was,
in fact, advertised in the original edition of Ideologie und Utopie in 1929 and
which was still under discussion with Mohr Verlag at the end of 1930.
This survey of contemporary thought was to deal with the three thinkers, Max
Weber, Max Scheler and Ernst Troeltsch who Mannheim took to be crucial to
the formation of contemporary social thought. Elsewhere, Mannheim also
argues that his approach to the central problems of Ideologie und Utopie are
'directly affiliated with the approaches of Max Weber, Troeltsch and Scheler'.
All this is, of course, not to suggest that Troeltsch is the sole source of the
historicist problematic. From his early writings onwards, it is also apparent
that Dilthey is a central figure in Mannheim's formulation of historically
located world views and a historicist perspective. Nonetheless, Troeltsch's
major work brought together the key figures in the German philosophy of history
and the book itself was dedicated to Dilthey and Windelband.

In his own essay on historicism, Mannheim was not concerned with working
out the historical origins and development of the historicist problematic but
with working out its implications for his sociology of culture and his sociology
of knowledge. Such a project is essential for Mannheim in view of the nature
of the historicist perspective since it is

'an intellectual force of extraordinary significance;
it is the real agent of our world-view, a principle
which not only organizes like an invisible hand,
the whole of the work of the human sciences but
also permeates everyday life . . . Our view of
Life has already become thoroughly sociological and sociology is just one of those spheres which, increasingly dominated by the principle of historicism, discloses most fully our new orientation to life. 112

As such it is 'the very basis on which we view the socio-cultural reality'. Whereas Mannheim here sees historicism as the agent [Träger] of our world-view, he shortly afterwards argues that it 'is a world-view' and that 'it not only dominates our external and internal life but ... also our thought'. 113

In a strikingly idealist and contradictory manner, Mannheim sees historicism as the agent of our world-view, as itself a world-view which dominates us internally and externally. Such an idealist notion of history lies at the very core of Mannheim's historicist Lebensphilosophie and his philosophy of history. This is well-expressed by Lieber when he suggests that, for Mannheim,

'The historical process is a dynamic unity which encompasses spirit and life; since, however, both - spirit and life - are historical there exists no pure autonomy [Ansichsein] for the mind, no thought that remains undisturbed by the development and change in the real historical process. And since, for Mannheim, on the basis of the presupposition of a dynamic-historical Lebensphilosophie, there exists no development of the mind separated from existence, so also there can be no non-intellectual, purely natural occurrences that are historically significant. The relationship of superstructure to base and vice-versa is reciprocal.' 114

Hence, once more, one looks in vain for the location of this historicist world-view - it permeates our thought and our life. As a 'mode of thought and living' we confront it through our 'ability to experience every segment of the spiritual-intellectual world as in a state of flux, in the process of emergence'. 115

But then we learn that it is not merely an all-pervasive world-view but also a theory [Lehre] that is able 'to derive an ordering principle' within this flux by penetrating 'the innermost structure of this all-pervading change'. 116

Historicism is, then, both history and a philosophy of history.
As a philosophy of history, however, it is confronted with several problems. Mannheim seems to view historicism as, in part, a philosophy of the history of philosophies which incorporates 'old insights' into the new more comprehensive one. Philosophy, too, is part of this flux and the old formal categories of reason (represented by Kantianism) must give way to historicism since they no longer accord with the present 'real historical substratum of psychic and intellectual reality'. What historicism attempts in various spheres is a synthesis of elements which is in accord with 'the changed world situation'. Historicism locates various spheres within the context of totalities and is concerned with their synthesis. In this respect there is a correspondence between historicism and the changing social structure which Mannheim expresses in the following way:

'If the atomizing, sectionalizing mode of thought may be regarded as corresponding to a social structure which allowed a maximum dissolution of social bonds and produced an economy of liberalistic, independent, atomised individual forces, then the present trend towards synthesis, towards the investigation of totalities, may be regarded as the emergence, at the level of reflection, of a force which is pushing our social existence into more collectivistic channels.'

This motif of atomization giving way to synthesis is one which constantly recurs later in Mannheim's sociology of knowledge both in his essay on competition and in Ideologie und Utopie. However, what concerns us here is that historicism, too, is 'bound to the historico-philosophical position and its corresponding "life basis"'. This bond, however, appears to be no more than one of 'correspondence'. Indeed the relationship is even weaker since historicism, as we have seen, is a part of the 'dynamically developing totality of the whole psychic and intellectual life' which permeates actual life as well. It is both everywhere and nowhere.
Mannheim evades the charge that historicism is a relativistic philosophy by disposing of the epistemological problem altogether. By taking this 'dynamically developing totality' as the 'ultimately given', epistemology will be replaced by 'the philosophy of history as a dynamic metaphysics'. Historicism is 'a kind of philosophy which goes even beyond epistemology and tries to secure a basis for it. Thus, its systematic place corresponds to that of the "metaphysics" of earlier times'. At the root of this 'dynamically developing totality', which is the historical process, there lies 'the self-unfolding substratum of life itself'. This substratum of life is, in a sense, the 'thing-in-itself' which the historicist must penetrate. But as a 'self-unfolding substratum' it has presumably not been permeated by historicism. If this is the case, then it fundamentally contradicts Mannheim's original assertions concerning historicism as a world-view.

At a different level, Mannheim openly proclaims a theory of the historical variability both of and within the knowing subject, a theory of 'perspectivism'. This theory, however, applies specifically only to the human sciences since

'It is because the exact sciences can, in fact, make statements into whose content the historical and local setting of the knowing subject and his value orientation do not enter, that one may here legitimately construct a correspondingly abstract subject (free from historical determination).'

In contrast, in the human sciences, one must take account of Troeltsch's arguments that the knowing subject is not contemplative and that historical knowledge necessitates an evaluative standpoint. In extracting the consequences from Troeltsch's arguments here, Mannheim comes close to stating, in a different manner, the need to examine not merely the standpoints from which the knowing subject sets out but also the cognitive interests (though
Habermas accords them a 'quasi-transcendental' status and Apel a 'transcendental' status) which govern cognition. However, Mannheim argues, along with Troeltsch, that

'historical knowledge is only possible from an ascertainable intellectual location [Standort], that it presupposes a subject harbouring definite aspirations regarding the future and actively striving to achieve them. Only out of the interest which the present acting subject has in the pattern of the future, does the observation of the past become possible.'

This leads Mannheim to insist upon our examination not merely of the 'historical-philosophical (sociological) positional determination' of historical knowledge but also of the 'practical extra-theoretical aspirations', of the 'inner circle between aspiration and cognition'. Mannheim's statement of this relationship is still grounded in a Lebensphilosophie ontology, in a notion of the extra-theoretical as irrational. At the same time, however, Mannheim is aware of the hermeneutic problem of historical understanding even though located within a historicist framework. Within a historical epoch, 'the concrete values which serve as a standard have developed in their fullness of meaning organically out of the same historical process which they have to help interpret'. These standards, then, are rooted in 'the interpreter's own psychic-cultural situation'. The mediating function of tradition and other features of the hermeneutic circle, elucidated by Gadamer, for example, do not figure in Mannheim's analysis at all.

Instead, Mannheim, perceiving the potentially relativistic impasse of perspectivism, seeks to preserve a non-relativistic notion of truth by locating it within the dynamic of the historical process itself. Here, historicism as a world-view enables one to grasp 'the overall inner meaning of the historical
transformation process with the help of the category of "totality".\textsuperscript{123}

Though this conception may appear to have affinities with Lukács\textsuperscript{1} in \textit{Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein} - and Mannheim refers very favourably to this work (p. 124 n.1) - it differs in at least two important respects. Firstly, the category of totality is reduced in Mannheim's work to that of a synthesis of perspectives and trends. Secondly, and associated with it, is Mannheim's view that 'no one social stratum, no one class is the bearer of the total movement; nor is it legitimate to assess this global process merely in terms of the contributions of one class'.\textsuperscript{124} One might also add that Mannheim devoted some considerable space in this article to criticizing the Hegelian dialectic. Instead, Mannheim's argument already points in the direction of a synthesis of world views and later of ideologies (at least of their valuable elements) in order to provide a contemporary diagnosis of the historical dynamic.

The 'Historismus' article represents Mannheim's attempt not merely to come to terms with the historicist tradition, as developed and outlined by Troeltsch, but also to confront Lukács' philosophy of history as presented in \textit{Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein}. As has already been pointed out, Kettler argues that this confrontation with Lukács' work also plays a central role in his unpublished \textit{Eine soziologische Theorie der Kultur und Ihrer Erkennbarkeit}.\textsuperscript{125} This long study, as its title suggests, is still concerned with the sociology of culture - as was his earlier unpublished treatise - but it moves more certainly in the direction of a sociology of knowledge (here as a \textit{Soziologie des Denkens}). It also contains, more fully than in any of Mannheim's other works, his own position vis-a-vis the \textit{Methodenstreit} in the human sciences. Since this is a central feature of much of the discussion in the sociology of knowledge in this period, this aspect of Mannheim's treatise will be only
briefly summarised here. A fuller treatment of the role of the sociology of knowledge within the social sciences will be provided in a later chapter.

However, in order to outline those aspects of this treatise which are crucial to Mannheim's development of a sociology of knowledge, some reference must be made to his methodological standpoint since it provides the framework for his discussion of a sociology of culture and of knowledge. He sees the work as a whole as a contribution to the sociology of thought [Soziologie des Denkens] and argues that purely methodological problems cannot be solved without reference to a sociological orientation. The methodology and logic of knowledge proceeds purely immanently and overlooks the fact that knowledge takes on temporal forms, that a plurality of methodologies exist and that the dogma of supra-temporal knowledge has been challenged, for example, by the study of ideology. Mannheim argues that the sociological standpoint should be applied in two areas: in the self-orientation of the thinking subject in relation to the total social process and in the recognition that all thought is social. He applies these axioms at three levels: firstly, in relation to the sociological determination of methodology (I); secondly, in relation to a sociological theory of understanding and culture (II), and finally - though here the manuscript is incomplete - in relation to the social genesis of the sociology of culture (III), which he had earlier examined in his previous unpublished essay.

In the first section on the sociological determination of methodological reflection - which Mannheim himself views as 'a historical-philosophical and sociological self-orientation' - he seeks to establish not merely the difference between the human and natural sciences but also the wider social
origins of these differences. In contrast to the neo-Kantian distinction between the natural and the human sciences that is established at the level of the results of knowledge - for Rickert, in particular, at the level of concept formation - Mannheim seeks to introduce an ontological distinction by asking whether 'the object of the natural sciences and that of history differ in their mode of existence'. 127 Secondly, one might utilize the 'ontic distinction between the world of nature free of meaning and that of structures of meaning (culture)'. Finally, one might place 'a further ontic, pre-methodological question, whether or not the cognitive subject stands in a completely different relationship to the objects of the cultural sciences than in the law-seeking natural sciences'. 128 Mannheim in fact seeks to ground cultural scientific knowledge in 'pre-scientific modes of cognition' which are effective in everyday life. That is, he provides a phenomenological and Lebensphilosophische grounding for this knowledge.

But the reasons why these two different types of knowledge - natural and cultural scientific knowledge - should emerge historically has very different roots. The natural and cultural sciences not only develop out of different philosophies but also their methodologies possess definite presuppositions derived from different philosophical world-views. Whereas the new philosophy and methodology of the natural sciences was symbolised by Cartesian philosophy, the cultural sciences have their roots in 'the romantic consciousness'. In practical terms, the philosophy of the natural sciences was rooted in 'a technically orientated interest in nature', in 'a technical domination of nature' which sought to remove 'qualitatively conditioned thought' from the realm of science and developed 'a mistrust of all anthropomorphically associated sources of knowledge'. 129 In the course of the establishment of
this new ideal of knowledge, the rational was seen as a guarantee for the objectivity of knowledge as opposed to the subjectivism of anthropomorphic knowledge. Mannheim indeed argues that this points towards 'the striving for a societalisation of knowledge' in the natural-scientific cognitive ideal. As such it favours the 'depersonalization and decommunalisation of knowledge', the 'linking of universal validity and truth'. This quantification of the qualitative, this attempt 'to transcend the concrete historical human subject in order to have recourse to the abstract universal human element' does provide a greater degree of abstraction, but Mannheim argues that it is an inappropriate ideal for the human sciences. This stage of Mannheim's argument anticipates, in some respects, the views of Habermas and Apel in their attempts to argue for a consensus theory of truth and communities of knowledge. The link between the two will be discussed later.

For the moment, it is interesting to follow Mannheim's argument on the roots of this new natural-scientific and rationalistic world-view since it illustrates the manner in which he had been impressed by Lukács' discussion of reification. Natural-scientific rationalism may be 'imputed' to the 'capitalistic spirit', to 'the spirit of the emergent bourgeoisie'. Hence, there are strong affinities between the rationalism of the modern natural sciences and the structure and rationality of central aspects of an emergent capitalist society. Mannheim acknowledges that such links have already been suggested by Simmel, Sombart, Weber and Lukács but argues that all these writers, with the exception of Lukács, have failed to be sufficiently historically specific. All these writers assert links between this new rationalism and a money economy and commodity structure. Thus, for example,
perientially changing objects of the world which are associated with money forms ... yet in so doing he had abstracted, in a completely un-historical manner, the capitalistic money form from its capitalistic background and imputed the characteristic structural change to "money as such". 131

Similarly Weber and Sombart, although recognizing that rationalism and money calculation existed prior to capitalism, failed to recognize that 'it is precisely in modern capitalism and only here that the category of commodity becomes a universal category which structures the whole world view'. 132

This and other passages in this section testify not only to Mannheim's assertion of the need for historical analysis but also to his largely Marxist account of the relationship between natural scientific rationality and modern capitalism - an account that he derives from Lukács.

Mannheim indeed accepts Lukács' account of the emergence of reification that takes place through commodity fetishism and is symbolized in growing rational calculation. That is, it is an adaptation of Weber's notion of increasing rationalization and Simmel's theory of cultural alienation and, like Lukács, Mannheim relates the development of modern science to this process. Rational calculation and quantification through commodity production and exchange have important consequences for the dominant group in a capitalist society. The bourgeoisie, having created this system of commodity exchange and rational calculation, transpose these relationships onto all other relations in society. In particular, any other mode of experiencing the world that does not conform to this calculable, quantifiable rationality is degraded to a subjective, pre-scientific status. The communal subject of knowledge in pre-capitalism is replaced by 'on the one hand, the isolated individual and, on the other, the "consciousness as such" that resides in him'. 133
corresponds, Mannheim argues, with the transition from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft that is brought about by capitalism. Thus, the emergent bourgeoisie 'makes one sphere of knowledge into the paradigm of knowledge as such' and, in so doing, overlooks the fact that other 'methods of thought and modes of knowledge exist which differ from these structural forms'.

Unlike natural scientific knowledge which abstracts from situations, social and political knowledge is 'situationally bounded', that is, it is located in concrete situations and appropriated through modes of experience that take this into account. In a sense, it is 'given' by the 'situation'. This is one of the contexts within which Mannheim's subsequent arguments concerning situationally bounded knowledge must be placed - as part of an alternative methodology for the social sciences. It is intended as a counterpart to the methodology of the natural sciences, which is associated with giving up a personal and immediate relationship to nature in order to quantify it, or to place it within an objective conceptual framework. This approach to nature forms part of the much wider process under capitalism of reducing all relationships to impersonal abstract ones, of reducing concrete individuals to abstract individuals or functions of general processes. Hence

'the possibility of the reduction of all organic relationships to the contractual form, the possibility of depersonalised wealth and capital and the possibility of enterprises in the form of stock companies is only attainable through this new relationship which eliminates all that is qualitatively distinctive.'

Through such an analysis Mannheim hopes to have shown 'how a specific rationalism as a form of thought belonged to the "reifying" life structure of capitalism as a form of existence'.
Mannheim posits the existence of a complementary counter-current that has been maintained by 'social strata who were not incorporated in the capitalist process of rationalisation or at least had no functional role within it', and within the private spheres of life of those engaged within the capitalist process of rationalisation, even though excluded 'from the foreground of public and official life'. Mannheim recognizes, however, that the 'irrational' sphere of life - 'the more basic relationship of human beings to one another and to things' - has been pushed to the "periphery" of individual life and is to be located in traditional strata who are now more marginal to the new predominantly bourgeois world. It is in this context that Mannheim argues for the importance of the romantic reaction against the Enlightenment. This provides us with a different way of viewing Mannheim's concern with the romantic movement which he was to take up in his Habilitationschrift on conservative thought in the following year. This anti-rationalist counter-current to the Enlightenment and to positivism is seen to persist in the writings of Nietzsche, Dilthey, Simmel, Schopenhauer and one of the two contemporary currents in phenomenology (Heidegger).

As part of this tradition, and central to the formulation of an alternative methodology, is the historicist tradition. The concern for a delineation of what was specific about historical consciousness led to the problem of understanding. Although taken up later by Rickert in a rationalistic direction, it was Dilthey who showed that

"one cannot solve the problem of understanding as long as one bases methodology upon the epistemological subject and not the "whole human being"." 138

Though Dilthey later became interested in the phenomenological tradition, the latter at first operated with the notion of a supra-temporal consciousness.
Dilthey was also significant in establishing the analysis of world views as a theoretical task. However, Dilthey was falsely opposed to sociology as a discipline, partly because he saw only its negative positivistic side. Somewhat astonishingly, Mannheim argues that Marx saw the fruitful aspect of positivism which was transposed into a study of the social economic processes underlying ideologies. Mannheim indeed interprets Marx as a kind of positivist who amalgamated Hegel and positivism.

Within the same frame of reference, Mannheim sees the emergence of the proletariat and its world-view as a further crucial counter to the dominant bourgeois rationality. This opposition gives it certain affinities to conservative thought (its opposition to capitalism and to its abstraction) and to irrationalism (its chiliastic elements and its adoption of Hegelian dialectics which Mannheim also views as containing a strong irrational aspect). But in so far as proletarian thought must penetrate capitalist rationality it is 'in a certain sense, more rationalistic'. Unlike later work - especially Ideologie und Utopie - and unlike Lukács' major work, Mannheim does not develop his notion of proletarian thought any further here but instead moves in a direction which does, in fact, anticipate a central argument in Ideologie und Utopie.

Because these diverse tendencies of bourgeois rationalist thought, anti-rationalist (bourgeois) thought and proletarian thought do exist historically and because Mannheim is intent upon providing a perspectivism that will be able to grasp historical tendencies, he feels compelled to call for a 'synthesis' of these opposing currents. Having rejected any form of monism, of the notion of a single truth, Mannheim is compelled to commence his analysis with the problem of relativism which 'has become for us today a question of life'. 
Mannheim argues that 'the epoch has its truth' but that this truth is not immediately given. Rather, it

'is only possible from standpoints which are formed in history, which emerge as functions of history. However, since each direction of thought is partial (as are the social currents and their basic intentions which they bear), the totality can only be grasped in a synthesis.' 139

Hence, this totality is to be grasped 'not through a "leap" out of history but through an even deeper engagement in it'. At this point - i.e. at the end of the first section of Mannheim's methodological reflections - we see that Mannheim, on the one hand, recognizes that there can be no knowledge of the totality outside history (and that includes all positivistic abstractions from it) and that it must come from greater engagement but, on the other hand, he is unprepared to push the contradictory world-views any further (a task made impossible by his lack of commitment of any of them) and can therefore only call for a synthesis of them. As yet, the social location of this synthesis is not provided but the argument so far presented in no way contradicts the subsequent introduction of a relatively detached intelligentsia who are both engaged and detached. However, Mannheim proceeds - in the longest section of the treatise - to outline a sociological theory of understanding and culture which not merely advances his sociology of culture but also more fully illustrates the extent to which the sociology of knowledge is closely tied to the wider context of the Methodenstreit in the social sciences.

Mannheim pursues his sociological theory of understanding by developing the sociological foundations of one of the two methodological positions he outlined earlier. The positivistic, quantitative tradition culminated in 'the deanthropomorphizing of the results of knowledge', 'a societalization of
these results of knowledge', whereas the qualitative tradition is anthropomorphic and culminated in 'the communalization of the results of knowledge'.

On the basis of this distinction, Mannheim seeks to revise one part of the methodology of historical cognition, namely the theory of interpretation as it affects the historian or the sociologist of culture who

'either seeks to understand concrete cultural objectivations or individual characters or who makes it his task to ascertain the contexts of intelligible relationships between individual objectivations and the totalities of world-views associated with them, between social strata and their ideologies or is concerned with the elaboration of the continuities of ideas and their changes in function.'

What is important here is that Mannheim sees the study of ideology as part of a wider process of interpretation of cultural phenomena and not as in any way clashing with a sociology of knowledge as in some of his later work. Indeed, when he speaks of the existence of 'concrete interpretation in a specific form as the investigation of ideology, as the sociology of culture', it is almost as if he ascribes to them an equal status within a theory of interpretation. Yet Mannheim goes further than this and argues that, viewed historically, it was 'only the new group of tasks of the study of ideology [which] had also awakened the need within sociology to confront the problem of understanding'. What is not clear from this context is whether Mannheim is referring specifically to Lukács' Geschichtete und Klassenbewusstsein or, more generally, to the influence of the Marxist critique of ideology. It seems legitimate to surmise, however, that Mannheim implies both since this whole treatise abounds in the presentation and confrontation with Lukács' account.

The attempt to examine the presuppositions for a sociological theory of under-
standing and interpretation takes Mannheim to the very heart of the sociology of knowledge and his later concerns. Among the important themes which he examines are: the subject-object relationship in understanding, conjunctive knowledge, the conjunctive community of experience and the role of language within such a community, collective representations, the communal subject of interpretation and the dynamics of conjunctive knowledge. These will now be summarised in order to demonstrate not only how this treatise anticipates his later work but also how it unwittingly anticipates the recent critiques of positivism by Habermas and Apel.

The central unjustified presupposition of natural scientific methodology is that it 'hypostatizes one form of knowledge into knowledge as such'. It is rooted in 'a specific type of existential relationship', in a calculatory experience. This particular type of knowledge 'in fact implies a specific form not only of the depersonalization and dehumanization of knowledge, and as such alienates its objects, but it also presupposes such "estrangement"'. This calculatory knowledge not only implies a change in human relationships but a change that accords with a capitalist society. This narrow definition of what legitimately constitutes knowledge - on which excludes much of human knowledge - is symbolised in the separation of theoretical and practical activity in transcendental philosophy. Such a view of the natural scientific mode of cognition not only reiterates, in many respects, Lukács' critique of the natural scientific model but also, like Lukács, equates one of its modes - positivism - with natural scientific knowledge as such.

Nonetheless, Mannheim does attempt to outline a more general social theory of knowledge, some of whose premises would cover both natural scientific and
human scientific knowledge. He argues as his central thesis towards a socio-
logical theory of interpretation that

'every cognitive act is merely a dependent part of
an existential relationship between subject and
object, an existential relationship which, in each
case, establishes a different kind of communality
and a correspondingly specific unity between the
two.' 144

Mannheim here wishes to ground different types of knowledge ontologically.
He argues that Kantian philosophy is unable to examine the subject-object
relationship since it rules out the ontological dimension and since it seeks
to assert that knowledge commences with conceptualizations. In contrast,
Mannheim suggests that what is to be known involves the whole of conscious-
ness and not merely its theoretical side. The broader notion of knowledge
involves any existential taking up of the object by consciousness; the
narrower notion implies conceptual objectivation. Within the context of the
broader notions of knowledge, Mannheim is concerned to develop the basic
presuppositions and features of human knowledge. In so doing, he intro-
duces the concept of what he terms 'conjunctive knowledge' (taken from
von Weizsäcker).

Conjunctive knowledge is knowledge for interacting human subjects located
in the same existential community. It is perspectival knowledge which is
'completely one-sided'. Mannheim provides us with the familiar example -
used later in his work - of a landscape seen from various viewpoints and with
the example of the story-teller who lies behind a story. Both examples indeed
display Mannheim's extreme preoccupation with the subjective side of know-
ledge in the subject-object relationship. This limits the sphere of validity
of conjunctive knowledge to those with whom one has an existential relation-
ship; it is bounded by a community of experience and its validity is limited to participants. The advantage of this account lies in Mannheim's ability to escape the individual solipsism of much traditional epistemology for, he argues, 'the precondition for self-knowledge is social existence' and not the isolated self. The starting point of a social theory of knowledge must be - as in Scheler's sociology of knowledge - the 'we' relationship which can be enlarged from two people to a whole experiential community. Unlike Scheler, however, Mannheim constructs a whole theory of knowledge upon the basis of the 'we' relationship and contrasts this conjunctive knowledge with what he terms - somewhat inappropriately - 'communicative knowledge' that is the aim of natural scientific methodology and all who follow it. Whereas conjunctive knowledge is located in and bounded by an existential community, communicative knowledge is societalized knowledge, that is, it aims to be universal knowledge that is unbounded by experiential communities and perspectives.

The contrasts between the two types of knowledge can be illustrated by the role of concepts and language in conjunctive knowledge. Whereas natural scientific concept formation is predicated upon 'the utopian ideal' of creating 'a supra-temporal conceptual level', concepts and their meaning in conjunctive knowledge are anchored in the living community from which they emerged. Mannheim here speaks of 'the functional anchoredness of concepts and thought at the existential level'. But the function of concepts in conjunctive knowledge is different from that in natural scientific knowledge in that:

'life and, in particular, life in the conjunctive realm of experience, creates . . . concepts not for the purposes of theoretical contemplation . . . but rather in order to
continue to exist in them and with them. They are the organ of the ongoing current of life and, at the same time, living activity. 145

That is, it is not merely that they emerge from life's experiences but also return to that reality in order for it to continue to exist and in order for it to be transformed. Though Mannheim quotes Marx's eleventh thesis on Feuerbach in this context, he does not elaborate on the transformative function of language but continues to devote most of his attention to its emergence out of the stream of life experiences in the conjunctive community. Thus, it is precisely its dependency upon its experiential origins that is constitutive for this type of knowledge; it is fixed within a particular community of experience. The function of language within this sphere then consists in the articulation of this experience and its fixing within specific phases of the flow of conjunctive experience. Therefore, in order to understand conjunctively conditioned concepts, one needs to master 'the totality of this world and not the totality of an abstract conceptual realm'. 146 Whereas general concepts are potentially valid for all, conjunctive, historical concepts are valid only for members of a particular sphere of experience and hence 'the accumulated experience in a historical, conjunctive concept is and remains perspectival'. Mannheim sees this conceptual distinction as expressing the parallel sociological distinctions made by Tönnies between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft and by Alfred Weber between Kultur and Zivilization.

Mannheim concedes that it is possible to enlarge the community of experience as the basis of conjunctive knowledge but is undecided whether it can be extended to humanity as such. He does argue, however, that new generations both emerge into and transform the community of experience. This forms the basis for his later article on the problem of generations which
not merely conceives of them as communities of shared experience but also as co-determinants of social knowledge. Yet, at this stage, it is the overwhelming dependency of conjunctive knowledge upon 'life' and the living community that is paramount. This dependency testifies to the strength of Lebensphilosophie's hold over Mannheim's thought which prevents him from relating social knowledge back to anything more precise than common life-experiences, social strata or even merely 'life' itself. Precisely how 'life experiences' become an autonomous determinant of social knowledge is never made clear.

Rather, Mannheim persists with an analysis of conjunctive knowledge that not merely anticipates Schutz's phenomenological account of social knowledge but also deals extensively - and perhaps on the only occasion in Mannheim's work - with Durkheim's notion of collective representation. Mannheim again asserts that it is the group rather than the individual which forms the primary level of social knowledge and that - in anticipation of Schutz - it is likely to be 'a completely stereotyped field of experience' which confronts the individual. The world of social reality which confronts the individual is not one which immediately offers an infinite range of possible experiences but is already structured by stereotyped experiences, by ritualised social activity; by collective representations. Collective representations form a part of conjunctive experiences but are more than structures of experience; they constitute objectivities that are supra-individual, even though only for members of the particular community of experience. Mannheim suggests that Durkheim is mistaken in treating collective representations as things; rather, they 'relate' to things that exist. Similarly, though they extend beyond the individual mind, there is no single group individual that possesses all of a group's
knowledge and there is no collective representation that cannot be realised through an individual. Mannheim sees this as being closely related to the new idealist philosophy of Meinong and Husserl with its notion of intentional objects and their validity. Mannheim conceives of validity from two standpoints, from standpoints that are later to involve him in considerable difficulty:

'First of all, validity means quite simply a particular type of mode of being; it is, as such, an ontological category. On the other hand, however, in its expression validity also implies the notion that the relevant content is not merely a specific mode of being but also contains an imperative aspect [Forderungscharakter], it implies a norm - namely a norm confronting all possible human subjects.'

A statement can thus, in this second sense, possess supra-temporal validity. Once again, however, it must be pointed out here that Mannheim later neglects the normative aspect of validity and concentrates almost entirely upon validity as an ontological category. This conforms well with his theory of the existential boundedness of thought but prevents him from moving in the direction of a discussion of the normative aspect of knowledge that has more recently been expounded by writers like Habermas.

In relation to Durkheim's notion of collective representations, Mannheim argues that these are objective in terms of their relationship to the relevant group but are not supra-temporally objective. They are associated with group existence at a specific stage of history. Hence, the basic difference between a theoretical statement and a collective representation is that the former goes beyond the socio-historical constellation in which it has its origin whereas the latter possesses a functionality precisely for its constellation. In other words, they possess a documentary meaning as well as having an expressive aspect.
Having examined the objectification of communal experiences in conjunctive knowledge, Mannheim returns briefly to the notion of the cognitive subject of this knowledge. Whereas the cognitive subject of natural scientific methodology is a constructed concept, in the human, historical sciences it is the whole human being. Similarly, where we are concerned with historical knowledge, the cognitive subject is not a supra-temporal construct ('a consciousness as such in ourselves') but 'the collective communal subject in ourselves'.\(^{149}\) Within this conjunctive realm, there exist as many 'spheres of significance' as there are spheres of conjunctive experience and 'hence each specific conjunctive experience is tied to a specific context of significance which can only be realised in a specific community of individual and collective experience'.\(^{150}\) This dimension of Mannheim's argument prefigures the later phenomenological account by Schutz of what he terms 'structures of significance'.\(^{151}\) In itself, this should not be surprising since both rely heavily upon extrapolations from Husserl's phenomenology. More specifically, we know that, at least in his earlier works, Mannheim was impressed by Husserl and especially by Heidegger whose lectures he had attended in Freiburg. Unlike Schutz, however, Mannheim retains a notion of contexts of experience that is more akin to that of Dilthey than to Husserl's concept of the 'life-world'.

Mannheim introduces what, for him, is a central distinction between knowledge within the natural scientific realm and knowledge within the historical sphere. Since Mannheim argues that the cognitive subject of natural science is a supra-temporal subject, it is not surprising that he should view this subject of historical modes of thought—since it is rooted in communal experiences—as ultimately dynamic. Mannheim's erroneous view of the
natural sciences (for example, ignoring what is today a post-Kuhnian commonplace, namely, that this sphere of knowledge is also grounded in communal experience either empirically, in the form of the scientific community as in Kuhn or Popper, or transcendentally as in Apel’s theory) also leads him to argue that changes in meaning can only occur in the cultural sphere, within 'the sphere of the conjunctively bounded community of experience'. This view certainly strengthens his conception of historical knowledge as dynamic, but it also leads him to over-emphasize the subjective dimension of knowledge in this sphere and, correspondingly, to under-emphasize this dimension in natural scientific knowledge (e.g. the community of scientists). Thus, he argues that, in the conjunctive realm, 'change in the meaning of concepts is anchored in change in the collective phenomenon itself', without realizing that, even at the time of writing, the concepts of space, mass and time, for example, had radically changed in meaning with the new theory of relativity when compared to the seemingly identical concepts in Newtonian physics. Nonetheless, it is worth following Mannheim’s argument on the dynamic aspect of the communal realm of life and experience, since it illuminates very clearly his treatment of the dynamic dimension of historical knowledge - a dimension that was consistently significant in his writings.

The actual tempo of change in conjunctive knowledge is quite varied and dependent upon several factors. For instance, the process of stereotyping 'dams up' the flow of conjunctive experience. Similarly, the perspectives from which the communal subject views the institutions and norms of the society are likewise 'dammed up' by the process of stereotyping and the flow of collective representations is likewise retarded. This notion of the stereotyping process, which Mannheim derives from Weber’s concept of 'magical
stereotyping, is significant in the light of his later characterization of ideologies as a check upon and a block to genuine experience of a historical situation but, somewhat surprisingly, this connection is not made here. Rather, the discussion of stereotyping leads Mannheim to take up the notion of collective representations again and to argue that society's institutions are not merely existent entities but also reflected notions shared by the communal subject. Economic structures and forms of the state, for example, are not, for Mannheim, natural structures but must be understood in terms of the totality of the relationships which constitute them. Likewise, Mannheim agrees with Max Adler in considering 'the economic sphere not as a material natural sphere but already as a cultural geistige one'. That is, we do not experience our existence in a purely nominalistic manner but within a particular cultural context. Mannheim specifically counters Weber's excessive nominalism with the argument that it presupposes 'that only the individual subject exists and that contexts and structures of meaning only exist insofar as individual subjects conceive of them or are in some manner consciously orientated towards them'. In contrast, Mannheim claims that the historian and sociologist is interested in supra-individual structures that extend beyond individual consciousness, in structures that constitute 'interhuman constellations of meaning' and should not, as nominalism would have it, treat them as methodological constructs of the observing subject. Rather there exist 'extremely interesting existential relationships between the intellectual realities of an age and the reflexive, conjunctive experiences of them'. The former exist, as it were, 'behind the reflexive consciousness of the single individual'. These realities, as 'global' realities, are perceived from with conjunctive communities so that knowledge of them is perspectival and bounded by particular standpoints. Thus, there exists an
interaction between intellectual realities and reflection upon them from within a community. It is the dynamics of both realities and their relationship which interests Mannheim.

He expresses this dynamic relationship in the following manner:

"Each aspect of conjunctive knowledge of the historical sphere is not only bound up in its emergence to the social sphere of experience and to the intellectual realities that absorb it, but also each new aspect of knowledge is again returned back to ongoing life and transforms the formation and thereby the intellectual state of these intellectual realities." 155

Concepts and the intellectual realities which they express are not identical. It is, therefore, Mannheim's task to examine 'the dynamic of intellectual realities' and 'the dynamic of the conceptual level'.

Mannheim seeks to distinguish three types of intellectual reality: what Durkheim termed institutions; structures of meaning that comprehend the natural environment and the inner world and finally the individual 'work'. There exist also collective creations such as language and morality that are neither fully characterised as institutions or 'works'. Each of these intellectual realities has a particular mode of existence that cannot be identified with or reduced to the reified existence of individual psychological existence. The social realm is thus full of collective creations of the life-community. Each of them changes but not in isolation: 'the transformation of one sphere is codetermined by change in the others'. 156 In itself this would suggest a mutual interaction of intellectual realities which gave prominence to no single one of them. It also suggests a notion of reality as an interrelated network that is often found in Simmel's work. However, Mannheim argues
that objective tendencies can be extracted from within this flux, at least within the totality of a single intellectual totality. Any structure may contain several objective tendencies. Yet

'which of these tendencies is adopted by the total intention (Gesamtwollen) is only explicable from the existence of the living community and not solely from the structure of the objective form.' 157

In this way, Mannheim argues against those types of interpretation which interpret a work solely in terms of its own structure. Nonetheless, the existence of a wide diversity of cultural communities can only lead back to the possibility of asserting the dependency of perspectives upon different communities which the individual participates in. Within his total existence, the individual participates in 'various stages and circles of communities' and which one is important to him can only be derived from a historical analysis.

It is this diversity of perspective, rooted in specific experiential communities, which raises special problems for the social and human sciences. The immanent or intrinsic level within these sciences is small compared with the natural sciences; their total problematic grows out of the social process and 'especially out of social struggles'. Similarly, intellectual realities, though historically specific, have something global and total about them compared with perspectives, with 'particular reflexive knowledge'. Expressed differently, we can see that in the social sciences there is a specific problem of interpretation at issue here since every structure possesses 'an intended meaning and an objective meaning'. The former belongs to the conjunctive sphere, the latter to the communicative. What Mannheim is intent upon demonstrating is that we need to take account of the conjunctive sphere in the
social sciences. It is doubtful, however, whether he shows clearly how the
two spheres relate to one another. In a summary of this section, he does,
at least, state the problem he is faced with:

'Intellectual structures of the most diverse type
fill the communal sphere of experience; they
are objectivities opposed to the human subjects
which can have these structures in a dual manner
and at two levels. First of all, in pre-reflexive
intellectual intentionality in which one simply
realizes them (one also terms this "living in the
structures"). And secondly, in that one is orien-
tated theoretically and reflexively upon them.
One can only be orientated perspectivally towards
intellectual spheres ...' 158

Any epoch of a cultural community is confronted with a series of competing
'Intentions towards the world' [Weltwollungen] that also express diverse in-
tellectual intentions. Historical knowledge must therefore bring some order
to this diversity or, as Mannheim puts it, 'historical knowledge - insofar as
it constitutes an interpretation - is the ordering of intellectual realities of
heterogeneous origin within the historical realm of our life and experience'. 159

This distinction between pre-reflexive knowledge located within the community
of experience and theoretical reflexive knowledge, in turn, has important
implications for the problem of interpretation. Understanding, for Mannheim,
Involves two elements: understanding through contagion - in the sense of
Freudian psychology - or empathy, which is an inner capacity of the individual,
and understanding in terms of locating something within a life-context, which
is an intellectual capacity:

'hence we distinguish understanding of existence
(existential, inner contagion) and understanding
of meaningful entities (comprehension of mean-
ing, intellectual understanding). 160

In our ongoing life-experience, the two are clearly connected but in the case of
the understanding of intellectual realities which belong to a particular sphere of experience, we apprehend the particular existentially-bounded perspectival meanings only when we somehow investigate the sphere and structure of experience that lies behind them." 161

It is worth pointing out here that this distinction remains central to Mannheim's later analysis of ideology not only in the sense that intellectual understanding must somehow rise above pre-reflexive acceptance of ideologies in order for us to engage in a critique of ideology but also in that, for the 'relatively unattached intelligentsia', their experience of diverse conjunctive communities assists their intellectual understanding of the knowledge (ideologies) that are derived from them. At this stage of his analysis, Mannheim wishes to designate supra-conjunctive understanding \( \text{Verstehen} \) by another term, that of comprehension \( \text{Begreifen} \). This theoretically reflexive comprehension Mannheim terms 'interpretation', in contrast to understanding which he defines as 'the penetration of a communally bounded sphere of experience, of its structures of meaning and of the existential bases of these structures'. 162

The perspectival nature of both simple understanding and the interpretation of intellectual structures is manifested

'not only for reflexive comprehension in interpretation but already for the existential relationship of the human subject to the forms of alien subjects and alien world which, in a historical tradition, can confront him as a 'pre-world' \( \text{Vorwelt} \)'. 163

In other words, Mannheim recognizes here the central mediating function of tradition in hermeneutic understanding. There exists no pure interpretation by the human subject of his object; rather, this relationship is mediated by the pre-existing location of the objects within a specific historical tradition.

However, the relationship between the knowing subject and his object is
mediated not merely by a historical tradition that is already given to the human subject but also by utopia, a utopia which:

'contains a direction, standpoint, perspective and problematic from which the existent and the emergent first become graspable at all. The investigation of the structure of utopia is therefore one of the most essential tasks in the sociology of thought.' 164

Thus, in his first systematic reference to utopia, its function for Mannheim is within the context of a sociological theory of interpretation. But even at this early stage, Mannheim also argues for its political significance too. He views pure utopianism as pre-scientific, emerging out of the 'tension between existence and demand' and also perspectival. Even at the scientific level, concepts remain political since:

'Historical-sociological knowledge is also perspectival and each concept in such a dynamic reflection contains a dynamic perspectivity: the general tension lives within it. In the words "capitalism", "proletariat" and "culture" a compilation is not contained and intended but rather a directional movement viewed from a standpoint embedded in the historical flux. Of course, it is in their concrete specificity that these concepts are determined by a direction and not as abstract destillata.' 165

This prompts Mannheim to ask 'which of sociology's concepts are clearly not complicated and constituted by some political tension?' It leads Mannheim to question once more Max Weber's nominalism and theory of value-freedom.

The understanding and interpretation of intellectual realities in earlier epochs implies their injection into our own realm of experience. We can understand and interpret them naively or dynamically. We can also interpret them from within their own perspective ('immanent understanding and interpretation').

But there is the problem of the location of this perspective. Mannheim argues that there exist several realms of experience within the same epoch. For instance, who experience social mobility move from one milieu to another
and this means that the milieu lose their absolute character. Again, this is essential to Mannheim's later attempt to escape from the relativist problematic by positing the existence of an intelligentsia whose members possess socially diverse origins. It also presupposes that no one is necessarily rooted in any one of them; it presupposes a universe of possibilities that Musil outlined in Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften.

These aspects of conjunctive knowledge give rise to two specific problems that Mannheim already alluded to. The first is the nature of evidence in conjunctive knowledge. The second is the consequences of the stratification of realms of experience and the separation of community and consciousness.

Evidence is derived from the existential community and is qualitative. It is not guaranteed by formal methods that lie outside the community. Rather, the apprehension of the qualitative 'is not the result of the application of these methods but is the precondition for the fact that they can be applied at all'. Instead, Mannheim seeks in 'the phenomenon of genuineness' [Echtheit] an ontological criterion of truth, indeed a criterion that is close to Heidegger's notion of authenticity [Eigentlichkeit] in Sein und Zeit. It is summed up in the following passage:

'Where the inherent perspectivity of some particular conjunctive knowledge is given, then there exists within this perspectivity genuine and unguenuine existences and also genuine and unguenuine participation in experiences. An existence is genuine which exists on the basis of its ontological principle [Seinsprinzip]; an experience is genuine whose perspectivity is determined only through the perspectivity of the standpoint.'

In this way, genuineness becomes 'merely an expression of the search for such an ontological criterion of truth'. Truth thus resides within 'a conjunctive experiential community of authorities [Kennern]', within a community.
that is usually conservative and bounded by tradition. It is these ontological roots of knowledge (including ideology) that later give rise to the sheer massivity of competing ideologies that are each, from their own perspective, equally valid.

The second related problem which Mannheim confronts is the consequences of a stratified society for conjunctive knowledge. The unity of world intention and world structure is, he argues, only found in primitive stages of development. This unified world breaks down when relationships of subordination and domination emerge. Once consequence is that the same cultural reality is experienced and interpreted differently - from above and from below. However, institutional structures such as language give a stratified society a communicative sphere not restricted by conjunctive perspectivism. At the same time, the exclusiveness of class communities leads to the autonomous dynamic of their cultures so that we can speak, for example, of 'bourgeois art'. At the level of the naive experiencing of the world communicative, exact knowledge is pushed aside and we participate almost entirely in the conjunctive community of experience and knowledge. The individual's consciousness is 'as it were, to be seen as a petrefaction of previous epochs of the history of consciousness' whose layers and strata have to be reconstructed by a sociology of knowledge. However, there exists in stratified societies a 'relatively independent' intellectual culture \([\text{Bildungskultur}]\). Here the continuation and development of the cultural process 'does not result immediately from the life-community' and tendencies and world intentions are experienced, as it were, at one remove from the primary conjunctive communities. Nonetheless, 'the intellectual culture is not free-floating since it can only exist primarily out of the comprehension of such cultural communities'.
also not free-floating since its participants come from diverse existential communities which thereby provide it with its competing tendencies. This leads Mannheim to maintain that development in the human sciences is, unlike the natural sciences, bounded by specific cultural circles. Within the intellectual community at any one time, 'several standpoints for reflexive knowledge of the cultural sphere' are available. Mannheim concludes that 'the investigation and development of these standpoints prove to be the most essential task of any sociology of culture and thought'. This is not the least because, faced with the diversity of standpoints, it is essential to grasp the fundamental movement and relationship of these standpoints, to group them around the basic dynamic direction within the cultural process. This basic dynamic is focused around the development of the economic and social forms of capitalism and the groups that lie behind them. Thus, the conclusion to this section of Mannheim's manuscript already anticipates the problematic of Ideologie und Utopie - the competing ideological standpoints rooted in specific social existence; the need to grasp the totality of these standpoints or at least what is valuable in them and the crucial role of an intellectual strata in performing this synthesis. At this stage, he views the preceding analysis as the attempt 'to work out a systematic basis for a sociology of thought'.

In the final section of this manuscript, Mannheim commences an analysis of the sociological genesis of a sociology of culture; a task which he had already set himself in his earlier unpublished treatise. However, this brief and unfinished section is, unlike the earlier attempt to deal with this problem, much more preoccupied with the theory of ideology, which is presented in a more sympathetic and sophisticated manner. Mannheim views 'the ultimate
goal of an investigation of ideology as being 'to grasp the total ideological super-structure with regard to its sociological determination'. Such an analysis must examine, for example,

'Specific type of methodology in its systematic points of origin is the expression of a specific intellectual intention [Denkwollen], the latter a part of a specific world intention [Weltwollen] and how this world intention directly coincides - through a certain tensio - with a specific strata in a determinate constellation of the social process. If one wishes to make more of the sociology of culture and the analysis of ideology than a collection of convenient observations upon interest-determined thought, then this latter method must be applied. For this purpose, we must introduce the concept of "immediate interestedness" and that of "mediated engagement" [mittelbaren Engagiertsein]. It would also be a brutalisation of the economic theory of history to interpret the whole superstructure in all its parts as being linked by immediate interests to the social base.' 171

Mannheim here reveals his conception of the analysis of ideology as one which moves from the intellectual structure, through an intellectual intention which is itself linked to a particular orientation towards the world. This, in turn, coincides with a specific strata in society. At the level of his own methodology, Mannheim still maintains that it is possible to remove what is false from the 'inherent perspectivity' of world views in order to finish up with a valid historical construct. Whereas Lukács argues that access to the totality of society is limited to the proletariat, Mannheim maintains that certain aspects of history are only accessible from certain 'centres of life' and that the whole historical process may only be graspable from a particular standpoint from which we can unify all existing methods and a view of 'the totality of the historical process'. Unlike Lukács, however, the nature of this totality is very differently constituted since it is derived from a synthesis of perspectives. What Mannheim does retain from Lukács, though again within
a very different context, is the notion of mediation. A sociological theory of culture is not to be one that is merely concerned with 'the investigation of the immediate interest of certain strata in specific contents but with mediated engaged existence'. It would be concerned not merely with 'the partial interest of groups that confront other interest of groups' but with the fact that 'worlds struggle against worlds'. Hence, Mannheim argues that the sociology of culture and the study of ideology are not concerned merely with analysing group interests in relation to a group's position in society but with human engagement and commitment to specific 'world intentions'.

Furthermore, Mannheim rejects working exclusively with the category of the ends-means relationship that is often implied in the notion of 'interestedness' and the direct study of interests on the grounds that this would only be possible were one to treat the cultural sphere as a natural process. He argues that 'Were human history merely the struggle for life, a vital process, then it would not be necessary that struggling strata should fight one another with world views, it would suffice ... that, apart from the means of brutal struggle, they also possessed political ideologies. However, it is as a result of the supra-natural sphere of human beings that it also possesses world-views in which these ideologies are embedded and also that hence ideologies are only effective as ideologies because they possess such a deep anchorage. Conversely, however, this cultural world-view sphere is not so free-floating that in its point of departure it is not connected with the natural and social side of social life: not in the sense of immediate determination but in the sense of a mediated anchored existence.'

Thus for Mannheim, ideologies are subordinate to the more comprehensive world-views in which they are embedded and from which they derive their effectiveness. It also follows from this conception of the sociology of culture and the analysis of ideology that it
"represents a combination a connection of natural scientific and human scientific methods. It connects a natural-scientific study of the social process with an interpretation of the whole cultural superstructure that runs in a specific direction." 174

More clearly than elsewhere in his work, Mannheim here provides the clue as to why his analysis of ideology appears at times both naturalistic and positivistic as well as within the hermeneutic tradition of interpretative understanding. It also points to the common conception of Marx's materialistic analysis of the social process as a natural scientific one since it is apparent that he associates an interest-theory of ideology with orthodox Marxism, if not with Marx's own work. For concrete instances of how Mannheim applies these two types of analysis and links them together one must turn to his subsequent writings.

The three attempts by Mannheim to apply the sociology of knowledge to specific areas are the studies of conservative thought, competition and generations. The first two are probably of greater significance than the third. What has been handed down to us as 'Das konservative Denken' 175 and, in English, as 'Conservative Thought' 176 are two versions of Mannheim's Habilitationsschrift which he wrote in 1925 and was awarded at Heidelberg University on 12th June 1926 after giving his required public lecture. Unfortunately, the original thesis is not available so that reference will be made to the published German essay which differs, in some respects, from the English version.

After his Habilitation, Mannheim was employed by Heidelberg University as a Privatdozent in the Institut für Sozial-und Staatswissenschaften from the winter semester of 1926-7 until he accepted the chair of economics and sociology (previously held by Franz Oppenheimer) at Frankfurt University in
Some of the details surrounding his Habilitation will be dealt with later since they illuminate several aspects of Mannheim's position at this time.

The essay on conservative thought is usually taken to be the prime example of Mannheim's attempt to apply the sociology of knowledge which he had already developed to a specific area. Certainly none of his other applications contain evidence of the kind of detailed research which went into this examination of German conservatism. But, of course, it is not merely an application of the sociology of knowledge. Rather, it also signifies an extension of Mannheim's earlier sociology of culture. In particular, it is an instance of his extension of the analysis of Weltanschauungen into the political sphere. As we have seen, this had already been touched upon in his second unpublished essay which even contained a brief outline of the themes to be developed in 'Das konservative Denken'. From 1926 onwards, it is possible to see Mannheim's interest in political world-views developing up until 1928 with the writing of Ideologie und Utopie. In this period we also see the transformation of an analysis of world-views into an analysis of ideologies. But the categories derived from a Weltanschauungslehre and aesthetics are dominant in 'Das konservative Denken'. It remains to be seen whether they are also retained in Ideologie und Utopie.

For the moment, it is worthwhile examining 'Das konservative Denken' in greater detail. Its theme is the development of a specific 'conservative style of thought' and the analysis of it seeks to determine the specific morphology of this style of thought, to reconstruct its historical
and social roots, to pursue the change in form \( \text{Gestaltwandel} \) of this style of thought in association with the social fates of the groups that bear it, to demonstrate its extension and its sphere of emanation in the whole of German intellectual life up to the present day." \( ^{177} \)

We have here some of the central features of Mannheim's programme for a sociology of knowledge and its weaknesses. The object of analysis remains rooted in the earlier framework of the analysis of world-views, namely, as a 'style of thought'. The changes in its Gestalt are to be examined in the light of the 'social fates' of the groups who produce such styles of thought. As so often in Mannheim's later work, the sociological analysis is to conclude with some reflections upon the relevance of this analysis for the present period - a 'diagnosis of the times' that is evident not merely in the book of that title but also in \text{Ideologie und Utopie}.

As with Mannheim's earlier work, the analysis of world-views is confronted with the problem of the mediation between particular cultural styles and specific social tendencies. This mediation is not necessarily clarified by a hermeneutic interpretation which sees all works, however far removed they may be from 'the battlegrounds of life', as 'part' of a 'comprehensive context of experience'. These contexts or constellations of experience \( \text{Erfahrungszusammenhänge} \) also include 'everyday life-experience'. The kind of knowledge that is to be investigated, however, does not possess this comprehensive quality. The conservative style of thought is also a form of political knowledge which is 'excessive', 'perspectival' and 'one-sided'. But if we confront this 'one-sidedness' and expose it then we can counter its 'propagandistic excesses'. \( ^{178} \) Thus, Mannheim appears to introduce a distinction between the political dimension of a style of thought or of a world-
view and that world-view as a whole. If the 'one-sidedness' of this political dimension is revealed as only a 'perspective' and its absolutist claims are undermined, then the style of thought may well remain valuable for human knowledge. In concrete terms, this means that the conservative style of thought is part of a stream of thought that lies at the roots of the philosophy of life of present times. Its critique of an excessive rationalism, Mannheim sees as not merely a valuable contribution to the human sciences but also, as we have seen, a basic step forward and a constituent element of his own sociology of knowledge (i.e. that knowledge is produced by real, historical human subjects rather than transcendental ones).

This conservatism is 'an objective-intellectual structural constellation'. In order to examine its specific 'mode of existence' (Seinsart), one must 'first of all strictly separate timelessness and objectivity from one another'. This structural constellation is 'a special connectedness of forms of the soul and intellect' which survives its individual bearers. In opposition to both nominalism (Weber) and realism, which Mannheim views as being unable to cope with the mode of existence of such a structural constellation, he seeks to advance a third alternative, that of a 'historical-dynamic structural constellation' that possess 'an objectivity that uniquely commences in time, whose fate is contained within it and which finishes with it'. At the root of this structural constellation there is 'a fundamental intention (Stilprinzip)' that is also historically dynamic and which changes 'with the concrete fates of living human beings'. This 'fundamental intention' is, in turn, the reflection of the life experience of a particular group. This must itself be investigated in greater detail.
Mannheim examines the development of German conservatism in the first half of the nineteenth century both in terms of its 'unity of style', its 'inner principle of development' and in terms of its relation to changes in German society. It becomes a systematic political style of thought only in reaction to other styles of thought (e.g. bourgeois liberalism). At the root of these styles lie different modes of experiencing the world; for instance, the 'conservative experiencing of property'. What is at issue is not the nature of property relationships but always for Mannheim - and this is true of other categories such as freedom - the mode of experiencing them. Hence, when comparing progressive and conservative thought, Mannheim insists that

\[\text{"here we have before us, ultimately, two original types of experience of things and the environment from which only subsequently two currents of thought result."} \]

Here, Mannheim clearly reveals his belief in 'experience' as something prior to 'thought' which appears 'only subsequently'. If we follow through this distinction to its conclusion, then we are faced with the problem of how to analyse this non-rational experience that is, for Mannheim the ens realissimum. Presumably it can only be approached indirectly through its manifestations in thought or other cultural complexes. For the moment, it is important to note that Mannheim sees the unity of the conservative style of thought as being rooted in the modes of experiencing property (p. 86 f), freedom (p. 90 f) and time (p. 98 f), which also includes the experiencing of history. All form part of a Grunderleben. Conservative thought is thus 'embedded in this form of experience of the environment and inner world'.

As 'modern structural forms of social existence' develop, so too does conservative thought become more reflexive and distanced from its original basic experience.
This analysis of the conservative style of thought as a comprehensive Gestalt is only the first part of Mannheim's sociological study. He goes on to examine the 'concrete-historical emergence' of this style of thought from the standpoint of 'stratification and development'. Thus, the phenomenological-logical analysis of style must be complemented by a sociological analysis of the 'social agents' of this style of thought. However, we find that at the root of the concrete-historical emergence of the conservative style of thought lies a conflict between 'feudal-traditionalistic intentions [Wollungen]' and bureaucratic-absolutist rationalism in Prussia. The romantic irrationalist reaction to the enlightenment is, like the enlightenment itself, given expression primarily by 'socially free-floating intellectuals'. In a remarkable footnote at this point Mannheim speculates as to 'at which social standpoint a philosophy of history, hence an interest in the totality of the historical process, is likely to arise'. Mannheim suggests as an answer to this truly Lukácsian question that was posed in Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein that, despite the free-floating intelligentsia's tendency to develop 'empty speculation',

'the best chance for the achievement of comprehensive views [Gesamtschauungen] of history nonetheless exists when intellectuals, gifted with an instinct for what is concrete, and who are, to start with, free floating, ally themselves with the aims of real existing social forces.'

At this point, Mannheim already substitutes the free-floating intellectuals for the proletariat in answer to the question originally posed by Lukács. But there is an important difference. Where Mannheim speaks of this strata in relation to specific historical situations, he argues that they provide of comprehensive perspective that is both valuable and, at the same time, falsified. He suggests that

'Their own social position does not bind them to any cause, but they have an extraordinarily re-
fined sense for all the political and social currents around them . . . let them take up and identify themselves with someone else's interests - they will know them better, really better, than those for whom these interests are laid down by the nature of things, by their social condition . . . Their virtue is not thoroughness but a flair for events in the spiritual and intellectual life of their society. Their constructions are therefore always false or even deliberately falsified. But there is always something that is astutely observed. 184

Later, of course, in Ideologie und Utopie, Mannheim suggests that, armed with the sociology of knowledge, they can in fact provide a historical synthesis of perspectives. Even here, Mannheim already argues that they are an essential element of modern society

'If . . . there were no such stratum of socially free and unattached intellectuals, it might easily happen that all spiritual content would disappear from our increasingly capitalistic society and leave nothing but naked interests. For it is indeed the latter that are the agents of both ideas and ideologies.' 185

Despite this correlation between 'naked interests' and ideologies, and, presumably, their central importance, the notion of social interests plays a remarkably marginal role in Mannheim's sociology of knowledge.

Instead, Mannheim moves on in his analysis of the 'sociological situation' of conservative thought with an examination of the social thought of some of the central figures in the German romantic conservative tradition. We find that the 'older stratum of experience and thought' came to life with its contact and association with 'the romantic orientation to the world'. 186 In reaction to the bureaucratic rationalism of the Prussian state, conservative thought emphasized life against the concept which later developed into a more general philosophy of life. Indeed, Mannheim views the polarities in nineteenth century philosophy between 'being' and 'thought', 'concept' and 'idea', 'spec-
ulation' and 'praxis' as an expression of the political polarities of liberal and conservative world orientations'. However, Mannheim argues that it is not enough to explain these different streams of thought in terms of their contrary intellectual positions. Rather, the analysis must have recourse to 'the ultimate presuppositions' of these styles of thought, 'their existential premises' and the relationship between theory and practice that is manifested in them. In this romantic conservatism 'thought is ... a function of life and praxis' and 'knowledge is action'. This is the source, Mannheim argues, of the modern concept of 'life': real 'existence' was no longer to be found in the empirical or everyday sphere but in 'pure experience'. Mannheim sees this later concept of life embodied in the phenomenological school, on the one hand, and Dilthey's historicism, on the other, and analyses its roots in the manner of Lukács. The philosophy of life points out that this rationalised world, 'this world of alleged reality is merely the world of capitalist rationalisation which, as such, conceals behind it a world of "pure experiences"'. Mannheim, in this context, also points to the affinities between Marxism and the philosophy of life;

'What Hegel and Marxism have in common with the philosophy of life is that for them, as for the philosophy of life, a relativization of "everyday", "static", "abstract" thought is possible and indeed on a dynamic basis. But whereas in the internalised "philosophy of life" this dynamic basis is something pre-theoretical - the pure "duree", the pure "experience" - in Hegel's thought the dynamic basis from which he relativizes "ordinary", "abstract" thinking is an intellectual one (rationality of a higher order), and for proletarian thought it is the class struggle and the economically based social process.'

Perhaps this fusion of Dilthey and what Mannheim takes to be a Marxist perspective accounts for contemporary confusion concerning the Marxist basis of Mannheim's own thought. What it does indicate, however, is
Mannheim's own 'dynamic synthesis' of Hegel, Marx and Dilthey.

Mannheim concludes with the same emphasis upon experience that he commenced with at the start of his study. The analysis of the differences between conservative and progressive style of thought has shown, Mannheim argues, that 'the social differentiation of experience and thought extends into the ontological sphere. The task of the sociology of knowledge in this respect is, by the refinement of 'the methods of social analysis, on the one hand, and the phenomenological analysis of meaning, on the other', 191 to make the emergence of historical consciousness itself a problem that can be successfully studied. But again it can be pointed out that the programme that Mannheim establishes for the sociology of knowledge seldom confronts the relationship between the two forms of analysis. In part, this is because his political intention - the diagnosis of the times, the interpretation of historical phenomena within a universal context - often leads to false syntheses and false justapositions of structures of meaning whose origins themselves remain unanalysed. In another remarkable passage in this study of conservative thought, Mannheim, perhaps unwittingly reveals the context of his later study, Ideologie und Utopie, when he writes that

'Whereas conservative thought is thus directed towards the past, insofar as it lives in the present and bourgeois thought, in contrast, since it is the agent of the present, lives from what is new now, proletarian thought seeks to grasp the elements of the future that also exist in the present by concentrating upon those present factors in which the future structural forms of social life can already be seen.' 192

Ideology (conservative thought) and Utopia (proletarian thought) are neither appropriate for the present. The crisis of bourgeois thought lies in the difficulty of diagnosing the present. In Ideologie und Utopie, it will be
assisted by the sociology of knowledge whose practitioners also occupy the middle, independent ground.

In passing, it is worth examining some of the contemporary background to this work, especially since this was Mannheim's Habilitationschrift. It was submitted in Heidelberg late in 1925 and was examined by Emil Lederer, Alfred Weber and Carl Brinkmann. Of the three Gutachten, only Lederer's was substantial. It was also unequivocally positive. Lederer states that it investigated

'... the sociological problem ... the dependency of thought upon the period, its social structure and, within it, upon the position, the standpoint of the thinker. ... In so doing, the problem of reality and "superstructure" is raised, but reality is understood here not merely in the sense of naked economic interests but also the social forms of appearance, the social structure of a period.' 193

Lederer goes on to suggest that the sociology of knowledge raises the issue of the social basis of the Geisteswissenschaften themselves. He concludes that in Mannheim's study

'A new sphere of scientific work is traced out whose results must also be of the greatest fruitfulness for the investigation of intellectual-historical connections just as one may also expect from penetrating intuition for the analysis of economic-social problems and for knowledge of their cultural significance.' 194

Alfred Weber's much briefer Gutachten holds Mannheim's study to be 'a significant achievement' though he does have some reservations since his

'personal viewpoint would have sometimes put forward other formulations and questions too. The superstructure-base-theory that Mannheim—although no historical materialist—has indeed not completely grown out of seems to me to play too great a role in the establishment of the study.' 195

As we shall see, Weber was to retain this conviction that Mannheim's
sociology of knowledge operated within a quasi-Marxist framework. Birkmann's Gutachten, though very brief, was also positive. As an indication of Mannheim's interests at this time, we find him offering three possible themes for his 'Fakultätsvorlesung' - 'on Max Weber's sociology, 'the sociological problem of generations' and 'the sociological problem of the intelligentsia'. As his Antrittsvorlesung in the same letter of 4th January 1926, Mannheim offered 'The Contemporary Situation of Sociology in Germany', which he in fact gave on 12th June 1926. After taking out German citizenship, which was deemed to be essential for him to be awarded this thesis - and which was the subject of some opposition in Württemberg though not, apparently, in Baden - Mannheim was appointed as Privatdozent for the winter semester of 1926-7 in Heidelberg, where he remained until 1930.

It is possible to see in the study on conservative thought, the development of the notion of competing world-views as manifestations of the objective struggle of systems of life. Further, Mannheim already argues that these world-views suffer from their particularity unless we can remove their claims to absolute validity. Thus, Mannheim is faced with the dual task of scientifically analysing world-views and overcoming their absolutist claims. This dual task is much more evident in his paper on 'The Significance of Competition within the Intellectual Sphere' given at the Sixth German Sociological Congress in 1928. This paper was the subject of a significant debate which is examined in the next chapter.

The essay on competition is important for a number of reasons, both in its own right and in relation to the development of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge. Much more so than the study of conservatism, the essay on competition high-
lights the permanent tension in Mannheim's programme for a sociology of knowledge between a sociological analysis of the determination of knowledge and a social theory of knowledge that will constitute a Zentralwissenschaft or Grundwissenschaft (both are Mannheim's terms). In the essay on competition, this dual task is posed in terms of its confrontation with "two comprehensive groups of problems (which are closely related to one another) . . . First of all it is intended to make more concrete the problem of competition and secondly it is intended as a contribution to a sociological theory of the mind." 201

This concern for the development of a sociology of the mind - the actual dimensions of which always remained unclear - was a constant theme in Mannheim's work until his emigration. We find, for instance, that in November 1930 Mannheim was offering Mohr Verlag a collection of his essays - under the title Soziologie des Geistes - which included the essay on competition. 202

In this essay, Mannheim himself notes that, along with his essay on generations, it is to be understood as a contribution to a sociology of the mind. However undefined this project maybe, Mannheim does give some indication of the issues it will take up in his programmatic outline of the themes covered by his paper. 203 Thus, it will be concerned with the necessity of examining intellectual life from the sociological standpoint. Social and human scientific knowledge will be seen as an instance of 'existentially bounded cognition and knowledge', some of whose characteristics are the problem of Verstehen, 'the constitutive projection of the world view-background (not only in the form of evaluation) into the results of thought' and 'the will bound up with the social world-view and social sensibility as creative principles, at the same time, as the vital limits of each kind of existentially bounded
Within the context of the process of competition in social life, modern thought is seen to exhibit the following processes:

A. Contrary thought
   a) The social division of the centre of the will (Willenszentrum) that lies behind thought
   b) The social division of sensibility (sphere of intuition)
   c) The social differentiation of the statement of the problem . . .
   d) The social division of methods and categories of thought, axiomatics
   e) The social division of "historical experience of time"
   f) The social division of ontological experience of reality
   g) The social division of the hierarchy of values

B. Mutual thought (synthetic tendencies)
   a) The orientation of competitors with one another
   b) Mutual enhancement
   c) The opponent as the ground for self-knowledge
      Emergent reflexivity
   d) Learning from one another
   e) The phenomenon of "transcendence".

Further, as well as considering other consequences of competition (e.g. at the ideological level), Mannheim hopes his paper will prompt discussion of an evaluation of the significance of existentially bounded thought for the human sciences.

Though Mannheim by no means deals with these and the other topics he outlines in his paper on competition, the programmatic outline does provide
some interesting insights into his sociology of knowledge. However un-
clearly formulated, this programme indicates a sequence of determination
from the will via the world-view to social thought. Both the will that lies
behind the world-view and 'social sensibility' constitute the limits of exist-
entially bounded knowledge. They are the sources of creativity and would,
at first sight, appear not to be existentially bounded. However, it is clear
that Mannheim also speaks of their social differentiation. Indeed this
differentiation is an essential feature of his conception of society as consist-
ing of opposing, differentiated system of life and the conflict of competing
world-views.

Such considerations lead us into the heart of the paper on competition.
Competition is a central feature of 'social life as a whole' that 'enters as
a constituent element into the form of and content of cultural objectivation
and into the concrete form of cultural movement'. Mannheim considers
competition to play 'a co-constitutive role' in social life. Indeed, in accept-
ing a dialectical view of 'the form of development and change in intellectual
life', Mannheim argues that competition, along with generations, constitute
two 'structural determinations of social life'. As we shall see, this em-
phasis upon competition as a determinant of social thought introduces, in
an ahistorical manner, a market model of society and social change that
can be applied to social groups, world-views and, later, ideologies. Com-
petition is 'a general social relationship' that also permeates economic
life: hence it must be universal and not historically specific. Since Mann-
heim emphatically excludes the questions of truth and validity in this analy-
sis, these world-views can be seen to have equal value.
This lack of evaluation of world-views is paralleled in Mannheim’s delimitation of the sphere of ‘existentially bounded thought’. Not only is natural scientific knowledge excluded but the social knowledge that is existentially bounded is lumped together as an undifferentiated whole. It comprises

‘historical thought (the mode and manner in which one conceives of history and represents it for others), political thought, human and social scientific thought and also everyday thought.’

Mannheim thus implicitly maintains that these forms of knowledge are all existentially bounded in the same manner. This, of course includes the human and social scientific thought that is itself concerned with everyday thought or political thought. In all instances, the thinking subject is crucial to the results of thought. All these forms of knowledge are perspectival, which means that

‘only specific historical-social structures of consciousness can open up specific qualitative features in the historically living object.’

This does not lead to relativism but to relationism since, Mannheim argues ‘specific (qualitative) truths are not apprehendable or formulable other than as existentially relative’. What is incontestable from Mannheim’s analysis is the notion that these structures of consciousness and world-views, though rooted in group experience, do come together in the process of competition. More specifically, parties compete for what Heidegger terms the ‘public interpretation of reality’, for ‘possession of the correct (social) view’. It also occurs in the humanities and social sciences in the attempt to secure the ‘correct’ interpretation in a particular field. Neusüss suggests that Mannheim’s competition of world-views can be seen as a counterpart to Popper’s notion of competing theories in the progress of science, except that, for Mannheim, objective knowledge is not possible. Certainly there are
affinities here with at least some of Kuhn's formulations of a theory of scientific development. 211

However, Mannheim's main concern here is with the competition for the 'public interpretation of reality'. This arises because 'every historical, world-view, and sociological piece of knowledge ... is embedded in and carried by the desire for power and recognition by specific concrete groups who seek to make their interpretation of the world the public one.' 212

Again, we are never presented with the possible parameters of this struggle for power except in the notion of competition. This is evident from Mannheim's typology of the various forms in which the public interpretation of reality emerges - through consensus, monopoly, atomised competition and concentration (in economic categories, oligopoly or duopoly). Atomised competition, for example, comes about through the challenge to the monopolistic position of the church's public interpretation of reality. It is also part of the process of the democratisation of the mind. Ironically, having earlier (in his second unpublished essay) questioned Simmel's analysis of money on the grounds of its lack of historical specificity and failure to locate its particular capitalistic features, Mannheim here provides an analysis of competition that suffers from exactly the same weakness. Mannheim's account of the various forms of competition does lead him to introduce a number of ideal types of forms of political knowledge but they remain largely abstractions. His real interests perhaps lay elsewhere.

After analysing the concentration of competition, Mannheim poses the question as to whether competition produces a synthesis as well as polarisation. Mannheim's reply is that synthesis and polarisation spring from 'the
same social process' - 'the simple law of "competition on the basis of achievement"' in the sense that one party borrows from its opponent and vice-versa. Not only are there many instances of syntheses in social thought but, most significantly, the sociology of knowledge itself can synthesize viewpoints since it

'provides just such a viewpoint pushed further back from which purely theoretical-philosophical differences, that can no longer be reconciled immanently, can be seen through in their partiality and thereby can be apprehended from a synthetic standpoint.'

Here synthesis is facilitated by the process of distancing from social competition and conflict and is a constituent element of Mannheim's later theory of an intelligentsia armed with the insights of the sociology of knowledge.

However, Mannheim points to a central problem of the process of achieving a synthesis. Syntheses involve selection and necessarily raises the question of the standards for such selection. For Mannheim, the principle of selection is

'that which is the most applicable, thus the most useful for the living world orientation of all parties in an epoch.'

But Mannheim is aware that this introduces a merely pragmatic criterion of truth. He argues that, at this point, the question of the criterion for truth cannot be answered by the sociology of knowledge, since it is concerned with quaeestio facti, but must be answered by epistemology, which is concerned with quaeestio juris. However, the sociology of knowledge would suggest that epistemologies are also existentially bounded since each epistemology exists only as the justification of a mode of thought that already exists or is just emerging and 'in the historical-social context, epistemologies are
only advanced posts in the struggle between styles of thought'. At this point, of course, such reflections on the part of the sociology of knowledge would suggest that it has replaced the 'structural analysis of epistemologies' as a more comprehensive discipline.

By the end of the paper on competition, Mannheim had sketched out, not merely his contribution to the 'sociology of the mind' but also two central problematics in Ideologie und Utopie. The first is the problem of competing world-views and ideologies in a period of increasing concentration of ideologies and political positions. In fact, shortly after the publication of Ideologie und Utopie, the fragmentary political structure of Weimar Germany did give way to an increasing polarised political structure. The second problem, associated with a 'sociology of the mind', is that of truth and validity claims of ideologies within a market model of ideologies and world-views. This was the question that Mannheim posed at the end of his paper on competition. Both problems were brought together in Ideologie und Utopie.

IV

Mannheim's Ideologie und Utopie which appeared in 1929 is in many ways a different book from the one we know as Ideology and Utopia. It comprises only three chapters: 'Ideologie und Utopie', 'Ist Politik als Wissenschaft möglich?' and Das utopische Bewusstsein' and contains a brief introduction to the first chapter that is omitted from the English edition. There is a consistent attempt in the English translation to distance Mannheim from the Marxist terminology of the original. To give but one example,
whereas a subheading in the first chapter of the original reads 'The problem of "false consciousness"', the English version reads 'Objectivity and bias'.

In an unpublished paper on Mannheim's adjustment to England, Kettler has pointed to a whole series of changes including 'over four hundred shifts in meaning which do not seem to be ordinary products of translation'.

Kettler goes on to summarise some of the most important changes in meaning and the philosophical context of these changes. He writes:

1 The German terms for the spirit, its properties, and operations are brought more nearly in line with the psychological language current in English philosophy of mind and for American pragmatist psychology:
- spirit becomes intellect or mind
- consciousness becomes mental activity or even evaluation
- determinations of will become interests, purposes, norms, ends
- false consciousness becomes an invalid ethical attitude
- primaeval structures of mind become irrational mechanisms
- the human essence is not undergoing a process itself essential whereby it comes into existence within an arena; there is, rather, a matrix within which man's essential nature is expressed.

2 The philosophic operations being performed in the study are redefined
- causal explanations, referring to influences and determinations, increase at the expense of interpretative claims which find the meaning of some cultural product by relating it to some social context
- philosophy of consciousness is rendered as "more comprehensive philosophy"
- the scientist-writer distances himself further from the phenomena he is discussing; he is less disposed to speak of his work as self-clarification
- the notion that thinking the problem through will lead to its transcendence is displaced by a greater stress on sociology of knowledge as a tool against bias and an aid to objectivity.

Many of these changes we made by Mannheim in order to communicate better with his English audience. In a letter to Wirth, Mannheim gives two reasons
for publishing a new book out of the old. These are that

'The greater security which rules in this nation has not opened the minds of even the most clear-headed among the local intellectuals to the problem of the sociological antecedents of consciousness. Most would consider the old book as nothing more than a document from a world closed to them ... The second difficulty one encounters in this country is that there is no tradition of sociology ... no conception of an empiricism which can be something more than counting, measuring or describing.' 221

Since our concern is not with Mannheim's reception in the English-speaking world but with the development of the sociology of knowledge in Germany, it is all the more important to return to the original text of Ideologie und Utopie and attempt to reconstruct its context.

One essential part of that context is contained in the introductory remarks to the first chapter which were not included in the English translation. Though Mannheim argues that the sociology of knowledge is too new 'to make possible a systematic and architectonic' treatise, nonetheless the themes examined in Ideologie und Utopie signify a 'new orientation to the world'. As a new approach, it is not confined to 'a rigid organisational schema'. Instead,

'Thought, viewed from the total context, is never an end in itself but rather a permanently self-reconstituting living organon that forms itself anew with the changes in historical events; an emergent structure in whose elements the new anthropogenesis also takes place.' 222

Hence, Mannheim intends that his study will not be lifted out of 'this living stream' in which things are rendered problematic. Rather, it will remain sensitive to the 'immediate existential situation and the "predicament of life"' that require to be approached through interpretation and empathetic understanding [Nacherleben].
At the substantive level, Mannheim argues that the problem of ideology will be systematically examined within the context of 'the decisive currents of contemporary thought', particularly since within specific problem areas, such as the relation of theory to practice, the determination of concepts themselves varies 'according to the social standpoint of the observer'. Furthermore, whereas 'the present utopian and ideological rootedness of thought has been seen up till now largely in party terms (i.e. only in the opponents thought) Mannheim will examine this rootedness for all thought. Only when this 'unavoidable radicalisation' of the problem of ideology and utopia has been worked through will it be possible to ask 'how at this level of thought it can still be recognised as such, how at this level of being intellectual existence is still possible'. Thus, from the very outset, Mannheim is posing the question of the possible alienation and powerlessness of the mind. Mannheim will seek to direct his analysis at the 'totality' of the present 'crisis situation of thought' but in the knowledge that 'no premature solutions' are possible. The analysis will deepen the crisis by revealing the contradictions that exist within the various possibilities open to us.

But this crisis is not merely an abstract intellectual one. Ideology and Utopia do not represent two isolated phenomena. Rather, 'The words ideology and utopia do not simply signify the historical emergence of two new facts but, rather, the serious emergence of a fundamentally new theme. The whole world has become a theme in a new sense through them, because in their medium the meaning relevances which the world first makes into the world, confronts us in a new manner. 223

This new mode of encounter with the world and with ourselves arises out of the fact that 'whereas the earlier, naive person lived fixed upon "contents
of ideas", we experience these ideas in the light of this tendency increasingly as ideologies and utopias. We now live out these ideas as ideology and utopia not as ideas in themselves. Indeed 'what is common and ultimately decisive in ideological and utopian thought is that in them one experiences the possibility of false consciousness'. This is the starting point of the original analysis of ideology and utopia. Again, it is evident that, for Mannheim, the crucial issue is alienation from our own thought which has been transformed into ideology or utopia. Further, this aspect of Mannheim's statement of the problem, and especially the emphasis upon the possibility of false consciousness, places his analysis potentially much closer to that of Lukács than is evident in the English translation.

In the first chapter of Ideologie und Utopie, Mannheim aims to develop further Marx's study of ideology and render it scientific (value-free) and hence to develop a new theory of ideology. Mannheim's notion of ideology is both a heuristic concept and seen as a process that permeates all human thought in all historical periods. In proceeding to his value-free concept of ideology and to the sociology of knowledge, Mannheim starts out by separating the particular and total concepts of ideology. The particular concept refers to the rejection of "specific" ideas and "representations" of one's opponent which are seen as 'more or less conscious disguises (Verhüllungen) of a situation whose true recognition does not lie in the interests of the opponent'.

In contrast, the 'radical, total concept of ideology' refers to 'the total structure of consciousness' of an age or a concrete social group. What both have in common is that the intended content of the ideas is not apprehended directly but indirectly through an understanding of a particular 'collective or individual subject' and the 'existential situation of the subject'. That is,
the ideas are 'interpreted as functions of this existential situation'. Hence, 'the concrete constitution, the existential situation of the subject is of co-
constitutive significance for these opinions, assertions and knowledge'.

But there are significant differences between the two concepts. The particu-
lar concept referred to 'only a part of the assertions of the opponent' and
even then only to their content, whereas the total concept 'places in question
the whole world-view of the opponent (including the categorial apparatus) and
also seeks to understand these categories from out of the collective subject'.
Secondly, the particular concept engages in 'functionalisation only at the
psychological level'. In contrast, the total concept 'functionalises the
noological level' - the contents, form and conceptual apparatus of thought.
Thirdly, the particular concept operates with

'a psychology of interests; the total concept, in contrast, with a much more formalised, where
possible a concept of function that is intended
towards objective structural connections.'

Furthermore, this implies that the particular concept is associated with a
causal analysis, the total concept with a notion of correspondence. Finally, the
particular notion refers to a psychological, real' functionalisation, the
total concept functionalises thought in terms of 'an "imputed subject"'.

Mannheim cites Marx's conception as an instance of the total concept of
ideology. But in subsequently asserting that ideology is universal, Mann-
heim removes it from Marx's more specific formulations. Ideology becomes
a concept that refers to a general connection between thought and existence;
it becomes existentially bounded thought. But as we shall see, this conn-
ection can only have meaning when the concept of existence is precisely de-
fined. Furthermore, Mannheim's analysis once more raises the question of its relationship to Marx's critique of ideology. Before we can examine these questions, we must proceed further with Mannheim's own account.

The total conception of ideology involves a much more 'radical doubt' and 'destruction' of thought, an attempt to destroy 'the intellectual basis' of one's opponents thought. This is only possible in a world subject to fundamental transformation, a world of 'decisive social polarities'. Such a world emerged out of the bourgeoisie's 'new approach to the world' (Weltwollen) which developed a new economic system and 'a new style of thought'. The most important stage in the development of the total concept, indeed 'the last and most important step' was its association with social classes so that styles of thought could be seen to vary with class divisions. But this very attempt to destroy the structure of consciousness of a whole group in its totality brings with it the problem of the possibility of false consciousness - which Mannheim takes to be an age-old problem. As an indication of the changes in the English edition of Ideologie und Utopie, it is worth pointing out at the point that in the English text 'The Problem of "False Consciousness"' becomes 'Objectivity and Bias' and a highly significant definition of false consciousness is added which is not in the original. It is defined as 'the problem of the totally distorted mind which falsifies everything which comes within its range', a truly individualistic, psychologistic definition!

After tracing the recent development of the concept of ideology from its 'irreality' thesis in relation to politician's praxis (Les ideologues) to modern Marxism, Mannheim suggests that the concept has retained its relation to political praxis to such an extent that "pragmatism" in specific spheres of
life belongs, as it were, to the natural world-view of modern man. 

Today, the concept has become the weapon of 'strata who find themselves in opposition, above all the proletariat'. But it 'cannot permanently be the intellectual privilege of a single class'. Rather, it can be and is applied by all groups in society. However, 'through this general expansion of the ideological conception a fundamentally new state of consciousness is constituted' and 'the problem of false consciousness, the problem of reality etc., receive a new meaning! which 'transforms our whole axiomatic, our ontology and epistemology'.

As soon as we move beyond a specific sociological analysis of ideology and recognise that our own standpoint is ideological, we move to a general conception of the total concept of ideology'. Indeed, 'This general conception of the total concept of ideology whereby human thought of all parties and in all epochs is ideological, is difficult to avoid.'

But it is at this very point of generalisation of the total conception of ideology that the sociology of knowledge emerges and it is here that the existential boundedness of thought (its Seinsgebundenheit) becomes the theme of 'intellectual-historical research'.

In turn, this 'modern historical-sociological insight into the factual standpoint-boundedness of all historical thought' raises another problem: that of relativism. Mannheim argues that relativism emerges out of the conflict between this insight and adherence to a traditional 'static paradigm of thought' that rejects any knowledge that is bounded by its standpoint as merely relative. What it overlooks is the sociology of knowledge insight that 'epistemology is just as much embedded in the historical stream (Werdestrom) as is our whole thought'.

There exist 'areas of thought in which standpoint-free, unrelated knowledge is inconceivable'. In particular, historical
knowledge is 'essentially relational' and only formulable in terms of its relation to a standpoint. If this is the case then, Mannheim argues, we must ask 'which standpoint has the greatest chances of an optimum of truth'.

In relation to the general and total conceptions of ideology, Mannheim conceives of two possibilities: a 'value-free' approach and an 'evaluative (epistemological-metaphysical) approach. The value-free, total and general concept of ideology is to be found in historical research where the question of the 'correctness' of the ideas studied is not raised but merely the question of 'how particular socially structured existential situations press for particular forms of interpretation of existence'. But the very awareness of the permeation of ideology in all thought is itself only possible in a period of 'rapid and radical social and intellectual transformation'. In such a period and it is clear from the context that Mannheim is thinking of contemporary Germany - 'there exist too many positions of equal value and intellectually of equal force that mutually relativise one another' for one to take up a single position. It is a 'twilight in which all things and positions reveal their relativity'. In this sense, it is a privilege of the present times to be in a position to be able to see 'all things suddenly become transparent'. This means, however, stepping out of 'the fortuitous existence of the everyday world (das zufällige Sosein des Alltags) where today romanticised notions ("myths") belong'. In turn, as Mannheim recognises, this implies operating within 'an evaluative, epistemological and, ultimately, in an ontological-metaphysical evaluation' and 'asserting to a particular worldview'. It is, in fact, 'an unavoidable ex-post-ontology', it is our horizon which no ideological destruction can destroy. It points to a possible solution to the problem of ideology in that
the unmasking of ideology and utopia can only expose thought (Gehalte) with which we are not identical and it raises the question as to whether or not, in particular circumstances, the constructive lies already in the destruction itself, whether the new will and the new human being are already present in the direction of exposure to questioning. 235

Although extremely vague, and though Mannheim - as he himself admits - never returns to this issue, it does illuminate his belief in an ontology that lies deeper than ideological and utopian distortions.

Yet Mannheim's solution to the problem of ideology does not lie in this direction. The development of the value-free concept of ideology at the level of historical and sociological research opened up 'two important alternative world-view-metaphysical decisions'. Either one assumes that history itself is arbitrary and that changes are fortuitous or one assumes that changes in relationships, in their simultaneity and their sequence, arise out of necessity. Mannheim argues that historical research must choose the second option and examine historical factors in terms of an 'emergent totality'. The study of ideology undertaken along these lines represents a 'sociological diagnosis of the times' in which 'the concept of ideology itself can be applied in the diagnosis of the contemporary intellectual situation'. 236 Once more, Mannheim at this point crystallizes the dual intentions of the sociology of knowledge - as a value-free study of the social bases of thought and as a diagnosis of the times.

In moving over to an evaluative concept of ideology, impelled by 'the historical dialectic', the problem of false consciousness recurs once more since the evaluative concept of ideology seeks

'to distinguish from amongst norms, modes of
thought and schemes of orientation at one and the same time, the true and untrue, the genuine and ingenuine.\textsuperscript{1} 237

False consciousness therefore prevents us from grasping the newly formed existence that makes up our present time. Its recognition is only made possible by a dynamic concept of ideology.

'Accordingly, in the ethical sphere a consciousness is false when it is oriented towards norms that, even with the best will, are incapable of dealing with a given stage of existence, when therefore the individual's failure cannot be interpreted as an individual violation but rather the erroneous action arises from the compulsion of a falsely grounded moral axiomatic. In moral self-interpretation, a consciousness is false if through the customary sources of meaning (life-forms, forms of experience, interpretation of the world and humanity), it obscures and hinders new moral reactions and new human activity. A theoretical consciousness is false if, in "wordly" orientation to life it thinks in categories which, if taken seriously, would lead to one being unable to cope with a given stage of existence. Hence, it is primarily redundant and outmoded norms and forms of thought, as well as modes of interpreting the world, that can degenerate into this 'ideological' function'. 238

Mannheim adds in a footnote that false consciousness as consciousness that is 'inadequate to existence' (seins-inadäquat) can also exist in relation to consciousness that is ahead of its 'existence', i.e. utopian thought. For the moment, Mannheim argues that this new concept of ideology is both evaluative and dynamic, evaluative because it makes judgments concerning 'the reality of contents of thought and structures of consciousness and dynamic' because 'these judgments are measured against a reality that is always in constant flux'. This new concept recognises that 'diversely situated false structures of consciousness can exist in the same historical-social realm', structures that refer to a form of existence that is either past or not yet in existence. These false structures of consciousness, in turn, can only be
measured against 'a "reality" that only reveals itself in praxis'.

In arguing that ideological and utopian thought is striving for and is to be measured against reality, we are confronted with the nature of this reality. This is important for two reasons. The first is that Mannheim's criterion of truth appear to be appropriateness for the present reality, as when he states that 'thought should contain neither less nor more than the reality in whose medium it operates'. Secondly, and more importantly, Mannheim argues that our notion of reality has also been called into question. With regard to the problem of reality, Mannheim argues that 'precisely upon the multiple forms of this concept depends the multiple forms of our whole thought'. The implication of this for a diagnosis of the times is that 'only when the investigating individual has assimilated all the decisive, important series of motivations that have developed historically and socially and characterise in their actual tension the contemporary situation - only then can it be possible to conceive of finding a solution appropriate to the present life-situation.'

But Mannheim goes on to argue that the problem here lies in the appropriation of the relevant material since 'facts' themselves are constituted in 'an intellectual and life-context' and concepts have their 'perspectivity'. Therefore, one cannot appeal to a single standpoint since 'the intellectual crisis is not the crisis of a single standpoint but the crisis of a world which has reached a certain stage in its intellectual development'.

Mannheim's solution is to search for the totality that is arrived at by taking up particular viewpoints which are also intent upon grasping the whole of reality and achieving 'the maximum possible enlargement of our horizon of vision'. The situational analysis of the sociology of knowledge is thus to
be directed towards knowledge of the totality.

In this first chapter, Mannheim already outlines the central issues of his sociology of knowledge and his new concept of ideology. Many contemporary commentators were particularly concerned with the relationship between Mannheim’s concept of ideology and false consciousness and that of Marx. For the moment, it is worth pointing to a number of significant differences. Insofar as Mannheim generalizes the notion of ideology as permeating all human thought in all periods, he removes it from Marx’s more specific formulations.

There is a tendency to assume that the particular and total concepts of ideology are those of Marx. However, neither the psychologistic aspects of the particular concept nor the total negation of thought in the total concept are to be found in Marx. But perhaps most significantly of all, false consciousness for Marx is one which is a true representation of a false reality. That is, the accent has upon the object and not the subject. The reverse is true for Mannheim. This inversion is formulated by Neusüss as follows:

"Whereas Mannheim reproaches thought for not being at all autonomous but rather existentially bounded and hence ideological, Marx reproaches "existentially bounded" thought for being ideological insofar as it takes itself to be autonomous... The connection between being and consciousness which, where it is not reflected upon, becomes the characteristic of ideologies for Marx, appears by Mannheim to be itself the index of what is ideological."  

Further, one might add here that whereas the problem of ideology for Marx (and Lukács) is a consequence of alienation and reification, for Mannheim it is the result of an abstract existential boundedness. Even if we accept the significance of social dependency in Mannheim’s argument, there remains the problem of what exactly this social dependency is based upon. Mannheim so often only provides apparent definitions of reality and existence.
Often the definition of reality (Sein) is an amalgamation of being and meaning, i.e. it is the meaningful experiencing of what is there or at hand. Thus, whereas one can often find apparently concrete references to social processes and entities, there remains at the meta-theoretical level, as Neususs argues, a more fundamental phenomenological-Lebensphilosophie identity of being and meaning, of life systems and social theories. For instance, to take an example central to Marx and Lukács, social classes do not derive from a material process of reproduction but from their association with world-views. Reference to such relationships as to the production process and systems of domination that can be found in Mannheim's work are most often seen as part of a centre of experience. Indeed, at the centre of Mannheim's analysis, and this can be seen clearly in his notion of what constitutes false consciousness, is the human individual who mediates the spheres of existence and meaning. For all Mannheim's emphasis upon praxis, the theory of action that is implied in his notion of ideology and utopia (i.e. both prevent adjustment to the present) is both extremely passive (e.g. adjustment, coping etc) and is ultimately not a theory of action at all. At its roots lies a notion of human beings not primarily as actors but as experiencing human subjects of history. Being and consciousness are not mediated through a concrete process but are unified in experience. In turn, the individual and his experience are embedded in a dynamic stream of life that is constituted by the sequence of similar and opposing standpoints, life-systems, world views and structures of experience. The individual is, therefore, not a point of observation of this process but a part of this process itself. This reflexivity is, of course, quite valid except that the individual does not constitute this process, he merely experiences it. Theories, for example, are merely a stream within a stream; Marxism, for example, is no longer a social theory
but a metaphysics - in fact, one amongst others.

However, Mannheim provides a central chapter of _Ideologie und Utopie_ precisely upon the relationship between theory and practice. In fact, when discussing the English translation with his publishers, Mannheim originally suggests this essay should belong first. Though this was not followed up - even by Mannheim himself - it is interesting to note that this is the largest chapter of the book. In the light of the preceding discussion, one might argue that if Mannheim's theory of social action is to be found anywhere, then it should be in a chapter entitled 'Is Politics possible as a Science? (The Problem of Theory and Practice)'.

Mannheim argues that the question as to whether politics is possible as a science must raise the problem of the nature of political action. This is directed towards state and society 'insofar as these are still conceived in the process of becoming'. Hence, we need to ask 'Is there a science of what is in flux, what is becoming, a science of the creative act?'. In turn, this depends upon the existence of areas of society not already brought under the process of rationalisation and administration. For Mannheim, 'the most important areas of our social sphere are even now still anchored in the irrational'. These include the economy and the class structure.

But the problem of acquiring knowledge of this sphere is that it is in a state of permanent flux. More importantly, the observer himself is a participant in 'the conflicting forces' and that means not merely that he takes up a position within this conflict but also that 'the form of stating the problem, the most general form of his mode of thought and even his categorial apparatus' are bound up with the 'vital political undercurrents'. This then, in an
acuto form, is part of the problem of the relationship of theory to practice.

Thus far, Mannheim has reproduced the political sphere some of the problems which he already outlined in the first chapter - the political sphere as permanently in flux; knowledge of this sphere is existential roots; these roots are themselves in flux. Similarly, when he turns to an analysis of the relationship between theory and practice in the most important 'ideal-typical representatives' of social and political currents in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Mannheim's response, as with ideological perspectivism earlier, is to search for a synthesis.

Mannheim examines the bureaucratic conservatism, conservative historicism, liberal-democratic bourgeois thought, the socialist-communist conception and the fascist versions of the relationship between theory and practice. The ideal-typical presentation of these five perspectives would seem to accord to each of them an equal status. As with the discussion of ideologies earlier, Mannheim's response is to argue that their content is dependent upon the social standpoint from which they emerged:

'Not only the ultimate orientations, evaluations, contents but also the manner of stating the problem, the type and mode of observation and even the categories in which one subsumes, collects and orders experience vary according to the standpoint.' 248

One way out of this apparent impasse, is the formation of party schools that will examine their own world-views but this would encourage the suppression of 'the problem of the whole', the conception of politics and society as a totality.

A more promising possibility for Mannheim lies in the very fact of recog-
nising 'the partisan boundedness of knowledge of politics and world views'.

In a manner similar to Simmel, Mannheim argues that all knowledge is fragmentary but Mannheim sees in the complementary nature of these partial perspectives of the totality the possibility of attaining knowledge of the totality. Their partiality lies in the fact that

'the different vantage points (standpoints) as they emerge in the stream of social life enable each one from its particular point in the stream to recognise the stream itself. 

All political viewpoints are merely partial because the historical totality is always too comprehensive to be grasped by any one of the individual points of view that emerge out of it. But precisely because all these points of view emerge out of the same historical and social stream, because therefore their partiality is constituted in the elements of an emergent totality, it is possible to see them in juxtaposition and their synthesis [Zusammenschau] becomes a task that must be continually reformulated and resolved.' 249

This synthesis of thought styles must be dynamic and must cover not merely the contents of thought but also their basis.

The agent of this synthesis is, for Mannheim, the intelligentsia. Mannheim also recognises, however, that historically the desire for a synthesis of perspectives has usually come from 'those middle classes who feel themselves threatened from above and below and who, from the outset and out of social instinct, seek a mediation between extremes'. This synthesis can be static - 'the arithmetic average' of viewpoints - or dynamic. In the latter case, it must be based upon a political position

'that affords a progressive development of history in such a manner that it will retain as much as possible of the accumulated cultural acquisitions and social energies.' 250

Such a position is not likely to be the middle strata but that of 'a relatively
classless stratum that is not too firmly anchored in the social order' - 'the socially free-floating intelligentsia'. This intelligentsia cannot be simply located in social class categories even though 'our intelligentsia is, to a considerable extent, a rentier intelligentsia that lives from industrial loan capital' and contains state officials and members of the liberal professions. But in all these instances, it is the case that they are 'less clearly identified with one class than those strata who directly participate in the economic process'. This is the first criterion of their suitability for performing a synthesis of political viewpoints. Here, of course, there is an implicit assumption that the degree of political commitment also varies in proportion with the degree of direct participation in the economic process.

The second criterion is 'a unifying sociological bond between intellectual groups, namely education'. This is because

'participation in a common education heritage tends increasingly to suppress differences of birth, status, occupation and ownership and unites the individual educated people on the basis of this education.' 251

Thirdly, this 'modern education' is 'a living struggle, a microcosm of the conflicting purposes and tendencies in the social sphere'. The individual is thus subjected to the opposing tendencies of social life, unlike someone directly participating in the production process who 'tends to take up the world-view of the specific life-circle and act exclusively on the basis of the determination of his specific situation'. Intellectuals are therefore determined in the outlook by both their social background and their education.

As a free-floating intelligentsia, they have two courses of action open to them. The first is attachment to one of the antagonistic social classes. Even here there is, Mannheim argues, an implicit tendency towards a dynamic synthesis
since this adherence has usually been to the class or party in need of intellectual development. The second option lies, not in the development of class consciousness but in 'the concrete conscious recognition of their own social position and the mission that emerges out of it'. Though not playing an independent politically active role, they can nonetheless seek out the position 'out of which a total orientation to events is possible', they can choose 'to be nightwatchmen in an otherwise all too dark night'. Here we come across the fourth criterion for intellectuals' role as synthesizers, namely, their ability to choose a position, 'to create a forum outside the party schools that secures the perspective of and interest in the particular totality.'

The political knowledge of the totality gained by the intelligentsia and - by implication - political science is a form of situationally determined knowledge that is not secured merely by 'observation' but by 'active participation'. It is, Mannheim argues, a new form of knowledge 'for which decision and viewpoint are inseparably bound together' and in which 'one must never separate impulse of the will, evaluation and world-view from the result of thought'. Mannheim is assuming here that only political knowledge is the result of engagement as well as reflection - to use Apel's terminology - and not the whole of human knowledge. Ironically, the form of engagement which he has in mind is itself the product of the intelligentsia's detachment. It is the search for a synthesis of 'the one-sidedness' of knowledge derived from particular social positions.

This political and historical knowledge is 'partial, perspectival, connected with collectively bounded group intentions' and develops only in connection with them. Hence, it 'interprets reality in a specific manner' and is a form
of knowledge with an 'orientation towards action'. These insights, Mannheim argues, into the nature of political knowledge are only possible through the sociology of knowledge. By implication, the sociology of knowledge will also be a Grundwissenschaft in relation to the study of politics if not to its practice. However, the sociology of knowledge has three options open to it with regard to political knowledge. One can argue that its existential boundedness makes any true knowledge and understanding of politics impossible. This is presumably a strictly scientific viewpoint. Secondly, Mannheim suggests that the sociology of knowledge's task could be

'disentangling the evaluative, standpoint and impulsive element from every concrete, existing "knowledge", eliminating it as a source of error and doing so in order to arrive at a "value-free", "supra-social", "supra-historical" realm of "objectively" valid knowledge." 254

This is presumably a positivistic strategy not unlike that recommended by Geiger. 255 Mannheim sees it as the strategy employed by Max Weber and adherents to 'formal sociology' and it is one which he regards as legitimate for certain spheres of knowledge.

Mannheim himself, however, adopts a third strategy which argues that in the case of political knowledge the evaluative element cannot be easily separated from the non-evaluative. Nonetheless, there does exist a consensus ex post with regard to an increasingly larger area of political knowledge. Though Mannheim does not suggest this here, this would appear to be precisely the kind of knowledge derived from his own analyses of ideology and utopia. Mannheim's strategy involves a 'decision' in favour of a dynamic synthesis. But his own strategy also contains a strong positivist element since he argues that the advances in the sociological analysis of ideologies will enable us
to calculate more precisely the collectively bounded wills and their corresponding thought and to predict approximately the ideological reactions of social strata.¹

At no point does Mannheim examine the ends to which these predictions and calculations will be placed, except that they will rest upon an ethics of responsibility (Verantwortungsethik). Again echoing Weber, Mannheim argues that this kind of knowledge is part of the increasing rationalisation of the world in which politics is replaced by administration insofar as the irrational realm - for Mannheim the root of political activity - becomes correspondingly narrower.

Mannheim's search for a synthesis of one-sided, political perspectives can be seen as an extension of his earlier argument for the synthesis of ideologies in the broadest sense. The cultural synthesis has become a political synthesis and presumably a synthesis that mediates class and political conflicts. This dynamic political synthesis can thus be seen as an extension of the search for a synthesis that Mannheim had postulated ever since his essay on historicism. As Lenk argues, 'thinking through historicism to its ultimate limits also implies at the same time, thinking through ideologies to their limits'.² Hence, one should not regard Mannheim's theory of intellectuals merely as a response to a sociological problem since 'Mannheim's theory of the "free-floating intelligentsia" does not spring from a sociological problematic but a cultural and philosophy of history postulate.³ Mannheim assumes that this intelligentsia is distanced from the historical process and that this very distance and its social lack of attachment gives it the best chance of revealing the synthesis of historical, political standpoints.

Mannheim sees the harmonisation of conflicting class positions and polarised
political ideologies as a possibility even in the later period of the Weimar Republic. Perhaps nowhere more clearly than in the theory of the relatively detached intelligentsia can one see the practical, political intention behind Mannheim's sociology of knowledge as the mediation of political conflict. Within a different context, Lukács, only three years previously, had pointed to this notion of a detached intelligentsia when he argued that

'This belief in being suspended above all class antagonism, all egoistic human interests is the typical standpoint of intellectuals who do not directly-participate in the process of production, whose existential basis, both material and intellectual, seems to be the "whole" society, without class differences.' 259

It is possible to state Mannheim's position more forcefully. In a world in which all ideologies and political positions have been reduced to equal status - rather like the equivalent exchange value of commodities - and all seem to be competing with one another on an equal basis - as in the notion of a free market model of society - the liberal response is to search for some commanding position above these ideologies and conflicting parties from which it will be possible to regulate them or, at least, extract from each what is valuable in them. With some exaggeration, one could say that Mannheim's free-floating intelligentsia in late Weimar Germany play a not dissimilar role to Hobbes' Leviathan in a mid-seventeenth century England that has been disrupted by civil war. 260

Mannheim's free-floating intelligentsia form a necessary part of his attempted contemporary diagnosis of society and his attempt to construct a sociology of the modern world in a period of crisis. But the search for a cultural synthesis was itself a common theme amongst many sections of the intelligentsia in Weimar Germany. In part, it had its origins in the development of the anal-
ysis of world-views before the First World War by philosophers such as Dilthey. In the post-war period, as Ringer suggests, the disintegration of German society and especially the crumbling status of the Gelehrtenstand, prompted more urgent searches for cultural syntheses. Perhaps part of the appeal of Mannheim's Ideologie und Utopie lay in the forceful manner in which the author drew the political parallel to the need for a cultural synthesis and a period of increasing social and political crisis. This is the context, for example, within which Neusüss comments on Mannheim's political intentions when he suggests that:

"In Mannheim, a typical member of that German late-liberal learned world is evident which saw itself hemmed in between the fronts of a situation of rapid social upheaval that it conceived of as a "cultural crisis" and in danger of being destroyed. Mannheim's path of confronting this danger through a "cultural synthesis" and thereby at the same time of raising himself above the social and political struggle of his time, in fact therefore implied an attempted escape. It finished up in the fictitious position of a "free-floating intelligentsia" that, more a wishful image than reality, was to synthesize everything with everything else, whereas in fact it was the expression of social, political and intellectual hopelessness.

This political motive in his sociology of knowledge was not to return in his writings to such a prominent extent until much later, and under very different circumstances, in some of his English works. Furthermore, as will be evident, this intelligentsia also plays its role not merely in synthesizing ideologies but also in producing utopias. 'Utopian Consciousness' is the third and final chapter of Ideologie und Utopie.

In the only detailed study of Mannheim's notion of utopia, Neusüss argues that, as employed by Mannheim, its contradictory definitions can only be
understood in the light of Mannheim's meta-theoretical intentions. Mannheim certainly does not provide us with a fixed definition of utopia. It appears as a form of consciousness similar to ideological consciousness, as the revolutionary principle of history and as fictional thought. Its meaning differs with the context. Mannheim starts out by defining utopian consciousness as one that 'does not find itself covered by the "reality" (Sein) that surrounds it'. This incongruity arises from the fact that

'such a consciousness is oriented in experience, thought and action towards factors that this "reality" does not contain as realised.'

Thus far, this definition is identical with one of the definitions of ideology. However, Mannheim goes on to argue that

'Only those orientations that "transcend reality" will be referred to by us as utopian which, transformed into action, tend to shatter, partly or wholly, the prevailing order of existence.'

This implies that, to be utopian, consciousness must not merely conceive of states of affairs beyond the status quo but must actually be realised. All historical periods have had states of consciousness that transcended their reality but they did not operate as utopias but as ideologies, as 'appropriate ideologies to this stage of existence, as long as they were "organically" (i.e. without revolutionary effectiveness) integrated into the world-view of the period.'

Mannheim himself suggests that what is crucial to such definitions of utopia is the notion of existence or reality which utopias transcend. For Mannheim, this is a reality or existence that is 'concretely valid', 'a functioning and, in this sense a real determinable social order', one which contains not merely economic and political structures but 'all forms of human interaction'. Such an effectively operating order of life is also 'enmeshed by notions that are therefore to be designated as "transcendent of existence, "as" unreal"' because
they cannot be lived out in that society. In an illuminating passage, Mannheim states the motive for a sociology of knowledge. He suggests that

'All those ideas which do not fit into the current order of life are "existentially transcendent" or unreal. Ideas which correspond to the concretely existing and de facto functioning present order of existence, we term "adequate", existentially congruent ideas. They are relatively rare and only a consciousness fully clarified by sociology (soziologisch völlig geklärtes Bewusstsein) operates through existentially congruent ideas and motives.' 267

More clearly than elsewhere in Ideologie und Utopie, Mannheim here points to the sociology of knowledge's role as ensuring that consciousness is congruent with present existence. This is why a diagnosis of the present time is so significant. In ideology and utopia, the present is precisely what is absent.

Mannheim argues that ideologies are 'those existentially transcendent notions that never succeed de facto in the realisation of their projected contents'. Indeed, Mannheim maintains that there exists 'a whole scale of possible types of ideological consciousness' from the dominant axiomatics of thought, to 'cant-consciousness' which conceals vital interests and ideologies of lies.

But whereas utopias are also existentially transcendent, they are not ideologies insofar and to the extent that they succeed through counter-activity in transforming the existing historical existential reality in the direction of their own notion.' 268

Mannheim concedes that the designation of what is ideological and what utopian presents difficulties but essentially rests upon 'at which stage of existentially reality one applies the standard'. In turn, this implies that the
standard is determined by the human subject's position and perspective.
For instance, 'the representatives of a specific existential reality will term
utopian all those notions that from their point of view can, in principle, never
be realised'. 269 They will conceive of them as 'absolutely utopian'. In
contrast, Mannheim argues that he will speak of 'merely relative utopia,
i.e. one that seems to be unrealisable only from the point of view of an
existent stage' of existence. Even here, however, the notion of utopia,
like all other historical concepts, depends upon the perspective of the person
using the term. But once more Mannheim is in search of the 'correct'
concept of utopia - the one 'most adequate to our stage of thought'. This
can only be in relation to the present existing social order. Therefore, as
Mannheim himself argues, 'the utopias of today can become the realities of
tomorrow' and, presumably, the ideologies of tomorrow. The other implicat-
ion of this 'historical' notion of ideologies and utopias (i.e. the fact that
they are judged in terms of an absent present) is that, for Mannheim, dom-
inant groups will determine what is utopian and ascendant groups what is
ideological. Despite these difficulties, however, when we look into the
past we can see an unambiguous criterion for both forms of consciousness:
'The criterion for ideology and utopia is realisation'. 270 It need hardly be
pointed out here that this is an ex post criterion, which makes it impossible
to recognise what is utopian in the present. Thus, when Mannheim proceeds
to argue that what are utopian are 'all those existentially transcendent notions
(hence not merely wish-projections) that in anyway have a transforming effect
upon historical-social existence', 271 we cannot know whether they will have
a 'transforming effect' until that effect has been realised.

In the examination of utopias, what interests Mannheim specifically is 'the
concrete analysis of the historical-social position from which they arose: from the structural situation of that stratum which at any time espouses them'. Historically, utopias change their form in response to changing social circumstances and the 'constantly shifting total constellation'. So far, the analysis would be concerned with the 'socially bounded form of utopia' at a particular time. It is also possible, however, to investigate 'the problem of a transformation of "utopian consciousness"', but only when the utopian element ... tends to be completely infused into every aspect of the dominant consciousness of the time, when the form of experience, the form of action and mode of observation (perspective) are organised in accord with this utopian element, can one cum fundamento in re speak not only of diverse forms of utopia but, at the same time, also of diverse forms and levels of utopian consciousness.'

Although Mannheim does not make this explicit, his notion of 'utopian consciousness' presumably corresponds with the total conception of ideology, at least with regard to its comprehensiveness. Mannheim, in fact, proceeds to develop four historical ideal types of utopian consciousness: the orgiastic chiliasm of the Anabaptists, the liberal humanitarian idea, the conservative idea and the socialist-communist utopia. From what Mannheim has already said, it is clear that genuine utopian consciousness springs only from whole social groups. Further, some utopias like Thomas More's - mentioned by Mannheim - are not utopias at all on his criterion since they are not successful and not realised. From the examples Mannheim provides, it is obvious that he proceeds only with an immanent analysis of the concept of utopia. Each utopia can potentially be played off against the others. As with the instances of political ideologies, it is difficult to see any criterion for evaluating them. They are not related to substantive historical changes but are instead interpreted merely in terms of their immanent changes in form.
As in each of the two previous chapters, Mannheim concludes with an analysis of the contemporary situation with regard to utopian consciousness. The utopian forms Mannheim has just analysed are seen to compete with one another in different forms in the modern period. Indeed, through their mutual struggles they tend to destroy their intensity by revealing their historical and social determination, i.e. their partiality. Utopias in the modern world become 'guiding perspectives', 'heuristic principles' and 'possible points of view'. The disappearance of utopias is accompanied by the disappearance of a total perspective which is now confined to the left (Lukács) and right (Spann) wings - the only groups who still believe in a totality of historical development. Others, like Troeltsch, retain it as a working hypothesis or like Alfred Weber retain it as a Gestalt. In the middle are those like Max Weber who search for 'eternally valid structures of types'.

In the modern period, with the disappearance of utopias, 'qualitatively differentiated time becomes a homogeneous space'. We experience the 'homogenisation of events in which every fact loses its particular temporal index and its local colour' and 'all those elements of thought and perspective rooted in utopias are now relativised sceptically as ideologies'.

This disappearance of reality transcendence - both ideological and utopian - has taken other forms. In a somewhat obscure passage, Mannheim seems to suggest that Marxism both reduced the intellectual sphere to the social-economic situation whilst at the same time was 'materialist only in name' since this economic sphere was 'a structural context of mental attitudes'. But this process of undermining the intellectual sphere was extended to its relativization, to an 'eternal human substratum of drives' by writers like Freud and Pareto. This 'process of the complete destruction of all spiritual
elements' has also permeated the arts, sexual relations, sport - where 
*Sachlichkeit* predominates - as well as the political sphere where politics has been reduced to economics. Indeed, 'all ideas have been discredited, all utopias destroyed'.

Faced with this pervasive reified and ahistorical *Sachlichkeit*, Mannheim asks whether all that we can hope for is the maintenance of 'integrity' (Echtheit) or genuineness in the ethical sphere. This was certainly an important category in his unpublished writings but now Mannheim is inclined to suggest that it, too, has fallen prey to modern *Sachlichkeit*. Mannheim goes on to suggest that there are, in fact, only two possible ways out of 'the contemporary lack of tension' between the existent and the transcendent. The first is socialism and communism which retain 'at least one form of utopia'. If there is a peaceful evolution towards 'a later, more complete form of industrialism' then Mannheim suggests that the subordinate strata will also undergo the same kind of transformation that he has just outlined. If it can be achieved only through revolution, then the utopian and ideological elements will flare up anew. The 'fate of reality - transcendence' therefore rests, in part, upon this form of social opposition. The second possibility for the maintenance of utopias and the intellectual sphere lies with 'a distinctive social-intellectual middle stratum'. This 'thin stratum' (Dünnschicht) is narrower than the intelligentsia as a whole. Mannheim implies that it is the critical elements within the intelligentsia - its 'free-floating intellectual-unity' - that remains out of accord with the existing situation. As a stratum it is faced with four alternatives. The first is affiliation with 'the radical wing of the socialist-communist proletariat'. Mannheim suggests, however, that they live in 'an aproblematical situation'. For them there still
exists no conflict between intellectual and social allegiance. The second option (Max Weber, Pareto), having discarded utopias, 'becomes sceptical and, in the name of integrity, proceeds... to destroy ideology in science.' The third alternative is a retreat into the past. The fourth and final alternative shuts itself off from the historical process and returns to the 'ecstatic'.

Mannheim offers no prophecy of which of these alternatives will come to dominate the future since 'because we are human beings and not things', much depends on our will:

'what one here opts for lies ultimately with each individual. What has been presented so far can only contribute towards helping him to see the significance of his option.' 276

In the last resort, therefore, all Mannheim's emphasis upon 'existential boundedness' falls away and one is left with the decisions of the individual will. As a final comment, Mannheim suggests that is possible to conceive, in principle, of a world that is 'absolutely lacking in ideology and utopia'. But 'the most fundamental distinction between the two forms of transcendence of reality' would become apparent since

'Whereas the disappearance of the ideological represents a crisis only for specific strata and the objectivity (Sachlichkeit) that emerges from the unmasking of ideologies always implies self-clarification for the totality, the complete disappearance of the utopian would transform the structure of the whole of human nature. The disappearance of utopia brings about a static Sachlichkeit in which man himself becomes a thing (Sache).' 277

In such a state of affairs, man, 'with the relinquishing of diverse forms of utopia, loses the will to make history and thereby a vision of it'. Here, Mannheim makes explicit his belief that utopias supply the dynamic to history just as we saw earlier that competition and generational changes were the co-
determinants of changes in forms of knowledge.

Yet it is also apparent that utopias are of a different order to competition and generations in Mannheim's metaphysics of history. Utopia is the dynamic of existence and of history, a dynamic that can be both evolutionary and revolutionary. Mannheim views utopias as impulses of consciousness or the will. Once more, the problem of social strata arises in his sociology of knowledge in their status as the agents or bearers of forms of consciousness. They do not emerge out of the process of social reproduction. On the other hand, Mannheim's analysis appears to be orientated towards a dichotomous model of society in his discussion of utopia insofar as utopias emerge from below and ideologies are seen to operate in the reverse direction. This is in contrast with his more pluralistic model of society both in the essay on competition and in earlier chapters of *Ideologie und Utopie*. Similarly, the sociological concept of ideology employed in the earlier chapters is characterised by a closed partial standpoint that can be overcome through cultural synthesis. The concept of utopia, on the other hand, is ultimately to be located not in a sociological context - though Mannheim does attempt this somewhat unsuccessfully in his analysis of historical examples of utopias - but within the context of an ontology of human history. Utopia is here to be seen at the end of the chapter as a kind of voluntaristic moment of human consciousness that is enlightened and dynamic.

But if we accept this as being the case, then it is difficult to see what, precisely, is the role of the sociology of knowledge with regard to utopian consciousness. Of course, one role is the examination of the social foundations of historical utopias. But with regard to Mannheim's ontological
notion of utopia and in relation to his philosophy of history, the sociology of knowledge would appear to be robbed of its crucial role, for example, as synthesizer of perspectives. It can only point to the significance of utopia as the dynamic of history. The diagnosis of the present crisis then appears without any resolution – except the hope that utopian consciousness will be preserved in the future.

These kinds of ambiguities in the notion of utopia, however, form part of the wider context of the divergent conceptions of both ideology and utopia. Neustiss has usefully outlined these various diverse conceptions in his study of utopian consciousness. He argues that it is possible to distinguish in Ideologie und Utopie the following concepts of ideology and utopia:

1 General, total and value-free concept of ideology. This concept concerns the existence of the 'existential boundedness' of all thought and knowledge. It is an uncritical concept that says nothing concerning the truth or falsity of thought.

2 General, total and evaluative concept of ideology. Describes 'false consciousness in the sense of an "ingenuneness" (Unechtheit) that is grounded in a philosophy of history'.

This concept, too, does not distinguish between ideology and utopia.

3 Concept of reality incongruence or existentially inadequate consciousness. This can also refer to both ideology and utopia.

3a Pragmatic concept of ideology. Refers to consciousness which 'hides social and political reality in favour of dominant interests'.

3b Particular concept of ideology. Refers to specific contents of thought.

3c Total and special concept of ideology. Refers to 'the total consciousness of a dominant strata' (cant-Bewusstsein)
4 Utopian consciousness. A consciousness that 'transcends' existence and leaps out of reality.

4a Revolutionary utopia. The consciousness of subordinate strata and hence the complement to ideology as defined in 3b and 3c.

4b Potential utopia. Refers to ideologies that can become utopian.

4c Dynamic concept of utopia. The dynamic element of all human thought.

4d Utopia that is adequate and immanent to existence. The 'dynamic synthesis of existentially inadequate utopias', in fact, the sociology of knowledge itself. 277

As Neusüss argues, such a diversity in the usage of the two concepts casts considerable doubt upon their fruitfulness for empirical sociological analysis, which is at least one of the intentions behind Mannheim's sociology of knowledge. The sociological dimension of the concepts is fused with their ontological, philosophy of history dimension. Furthermore, we have seen the extent to which they change their significance and meaning in the course of Ideologie und Utopie. Their 'congruence, adequacy and transcendence' in relation to social and historical reality or existence also raises the question as to the nature of the reality against which consciousness is judged. Furthermore, Neusüss is correct to point out that at least one of the concepts of utopia (4d) in fact denotes the sociology of knowledge itself. Its function as the synthesizer of inadequate utopias would suggest that, within the sociological dimension, it is a 'scientific' utopia and within the philosophy of history and also ontologically it is the form of consciousness most adequate to contemporary reality. But, once more, as Neususs suggests, we are confronted with

'the core of the ontological problems of the sociology of knowledge ...: can "reality" (Sein) as such in terms of itself be "adequate"^-or carried
still further: Does not the adequacy of "reality" (Sein) to itself not lie in precisely its being inadequate to itself, insofar as it constantly transcends itself? 280

The sociology of knowledge and its consciousness is itself a part of that reality or existence against which consciousness is judged to be adequate.

Adequacy, for Mannheim, must also include the possibility of transcendence.

Whereas many later commentators have identified the central problem of the sociology of knowledge at the epistemological level - as the relativist problematic - it would seem more reasonable to argue that it lies further back, in Mannheim's case, in the basic ontological presuppositions upon which it is based. Mannheim is not merely advancing a sociology of knowledge that possesses a sociological dimension but behind it, and often fused with it, are a series of meta-theoretical presuppositions grounded in a questionable philosophy of history and ontology.

V

Within a year of the publication of Ideologie und Utopie, Mannheim succeeded to Oppenheimer's chair of sociology and economics at Frankfurt University in 1930. Though Mannheim was still working on the sociology of knowledge until 1933, and had in hand a number of projects, little was published directly in this area. 281 Two brief pieces that were published in this period are worthy of some discussion. The first is the contribution to Vierkandt's Handwörterbuch der Soziologie published in 1931. 282 The second is Mannheim's lecture on the contemporary tasks of sociology published in 1932. 283 Both illustrate the extent to which Mannheim by now regarded the sociology
of knowledge as an established tradition within sociology and with its own distinctive history of development. It had achieved encyclopaedic if not textbook status within sociology. In so doing, it lost, in many ways, its problematic status and its relationship to a diagnosis of the times. In other words, it lost that sense of urgency which is apparent both in Ideologie und Utopie and, as we shall see, the reception of that work.

In his article on 'Wissenssoziologie', Mannheim views the sociology of knowledge as pursuing two aims: as a theory, it develops 'a doctrine of the so-called "existential boundedness" of knowledge' and as 'historical-sociological research' it traces the different forms which this 'existential boundedness' has taken in the past and the present. As a discipline that emerged with the 'contemporary crisis situation of thought', it has sought to take as one of its central themes 'the social boundedness of theories and modes of thought', which requires 'an unreserved, radical thinking through to its limits of this problem' in order to arrive at 'a theory appropriate to the present situation'.

As a discipline, the sociology of knowledge is closely related to the theory of ideology whose task has been 'to unmask the more or less conscious lies and disguises of human interest groups and especially of political parties'. The sociology of knowledge is not so much concerned with deliberate lies but with the way in which phenomena reveal themselves 'in a necessary manner' according to the social standpoint of the observer.

'Thus, it is not the intention to disguise that determines in all these instances the "one-sidedness" and "falseness" of statements, but the inavoidably diverse forms of structures of consciousness of diversely situated types of human subject in the historical-social sphere.'
The sociology of knowledge wishes, accordingly, to distinguish between a particular and a total concept of ideology. The particular concept of ideology exists at the psychological level and is concerned with concealment, falsification or deception. The total conception, in contrast, does not raise the 'accusation of deception' (Lügenverdacht) and hence in the sociology of knowledge the word 'ideology' is 'no longer pejorative'. Indeed, the sociology of knowledge will increasingly seek to avoid the concept altogether and speak instead of 'an "existentially bounded - or standpoint-bounded - perspectival structure (Aspektstruktur)" of a thinker'. We see here how quickly Mannheim has distanced himself from the discussion of ideology in Ideologie und Utopie or, at least, how soon he has moved over to a 'value-free' concept of ideology.

The sociology of knowledge is now to be primarily concerned with the 'existential boundedness' of thought which denies the notion of an immanent development of knowledge and which sees the existential factors that are responsible for the perspectival nature of knowledge as much more than of 'mere genetic relevance'. It will examine the collective 'living, energies and outlooks derived from the will that stand behind the theoretical' sphere. This will include the investigation of social scientific knowledge and the "permeation of the standpoint" of the observer into the results of knowledge and their 'existential relativity'. In turn, this involves an analysis of the kind of concepts used by social groups, the structure of their categorial apparatus, the 'so-called' thought model' used to apprehend an object, the level of abstraction and concretisation of thought. All these are 'bound up with social existence in the same manner'.
This new mode of analysis would appear to arise in what Scheler termed an 'age of equalization' in which different groups and their world-views confront and conflict with one another and in which they often 'talk past one another'. The sociology of knowledge should be able to restore communication through persuading people to 'distance' themselves from their specific situation, to 'relationise' their mode of thought and to recognise its 'particularistic' nature (i.e. to remove its claim to absolute validity).

All these processes also lie at the very basis of sociology of knowledge analysis itself. But in performing this task of opening up communication, the sociology of knowledge is more than 'a sociological description of facts'. It is also a 'critique' but only insofar as it reconstructs the limits of the scope of statements. It is, indeed, a far cry from a critique of ideology.

What is also new in this account of the sociology of knowledge when compared with Ideologie und Utopie is Mannheim's more explicit concern for its relationship to epistemology. In particular, Mannheim takes up the phenomenon of the 'particularisation' of thought where we are dealing with an instance in which

'a pure determination of a fact (the fact of the partiality [Partikularität] of a perspective that is confirmable in human assertions) may be relevant to its meaning (Sinnrelevant), a genesis that may be relevant to the genesis of its meaning and therefore at least makes the further construction of the sphere of validity as autonomous from its genesis very difficult.' 286

Unfortunately, Mannheim argues, the present dominant epistemology does not allow this to be taken into account since it would challenge its primacy over individual disciplines. But epistemology itself, though it is the fundamental science (Grundwissenschaft) of individual sciences (Einzelwissen-
schaften)' is itself 'based upon the state of existing cognitive situations'.
upon a 'historically and socially pregiven substratum'. There is a further
instance of the inversion of the supremacy of epistemology over individual
disciplines in the development of knowledge itself since

'New forms of knowledge emerge, ultimately,
out of collective life-contexts and do not first
emerge after a science of principles has demonstr-
ated their possibility; hence they do not need
to be first legitimated by an epistemology.' 287

Mannheim here anticipates some elements of Kuhn's argument concerning
the development of scientific knowledge in that he argues that revolutions
in epistemology succeed revolutions in science and not vice-versa and in
that he sees epistemology as a mode of legitimation of the existing state of
science. However, this is not the main thrust of Mannheim's argument which
is, instead, directed primarily against the domination of the natural scientific
paradigm as the standard for what constitutes knowledge.

Indeed, here, Mannheim would appear to argue against Kuhn in that
Mannheim views natural science as largely detached from 'the historical-
social perspectival structure of the knowing subject'. On the other hand, he
does argue for historical knowledge at least that its notion of truth is depend-
ent upon what 'is realised' in a particular period. But the absence of any
further discussion of the notion of historical period at this point leaves
Mannheim with a thorough-going historicist stance in relation to truth. The
central problem in the historical and social sciences is, for Mannheim, that
of their objectivity. In the case of 'existentially bounded thought', object-
ivity is only attainably 'by indirect means' in those instances where ob-
servers do not share the same perspective. It is attained through seeking
out 'a formula for the conversion and translation of these diverse perspectival
viewpoints with each other'. The criterion here is the comprehensiveness of the various standpoints. A second possibility lies in the very recognition of the existential boundedness of thought and the neutralisation of its partiality so that one can move to a higher level of abstraction. Mannheim suggests that this approach is pursued by formal sociology which produces general categories through the 'neutralisation' and 'formalisation' of particular facts. Mannheim concludes, however, that the weakness of this approach is that this formalism is likely to overlook the qualitative contents and meanings of particular phenomena. In the end, Mannheim does not come down in favour of either approach to what he considers to be objectivity in the social sciences.

At the level of concrete analyses in the sociology of knowledge, Mannheim argues that the central methodological approach is not dissimilar from 'the methods of art history as the history of style'. In particular, the 'imputation of meaning' (sinnemässe Zurechnung) and the 'imputation of facticity' (Faktizitätszurechnung), are central to its approach. One first form of imputation seeks to construct unities of styles of thought and perspectival structures by tracing the various elements back to a 'focal world-view and sense of life (Lebensgefühl)'. These ideal types are then examined in relation to their actual appearance in society, i.e. to the composition of the groups and strata which expressed them. Mannheim's notion of imputation does not, therefore, proceed to a notion of 'objective possibility' as developed by Lukács but transforms it into a heuristic device that will produce valuable hypotheses for empirical research. It is also worth noting here that Mannheim retains his central orientation towards world-views and styles of thought which, as we have seen, was developed in his earliest writings.
In this essay on the sociology of knowledge, we can detect Mannheim's increasing distance from the problem of ideology and a firmer orientation towards an empirically orientated sociology of knowledge. At the same time, however, he retains an interest in the epistemological problems raised by his sociology of knowledge though, as with his account in *Ideologie und Utopie*, he remains as far as ever from any solution to them. Possible solutions are still presented as tentative suggestions. In his later works, neither the problem of ideology nor the epistemological problems were substantially developed any further. Similarly, his programme for an empirical sociology of knowledge remained a programme for him, although he supervised a number of works in Frankfurt on empirical themes. He did, however, turn to an examination of the role of the sociology of knowledge within the context of sociology as a whole in the last work published before his emigration.

*Die Gegenwartsaufgaben der Soziologie* (The Contemporary Tasks of Sociology) 289 is, as its title suggests, concerned with sociology in general and not specifically with the sociology of knowledge. However, Mannheim does examine the role of the latter within the wider context of the discipline. For sociology itself, Mannheim sees two roles:

'Sociology can confront us in a dual form and function: as a particular discipline and as a foundational science (Grundwissenschaft)'. 290

As a particular discipline (Spezialwissenschaft), sociology has its own thematic and methodology: 'the intellectual strategy that was applied in the conflict concerning sociology from Simmel to von Wiese was to legitimate our discipline as an individual discipline'. Since then, however, we have moved towards the total problematic of the *globus intellectualis* and
our viewpoint has been extended towards sociology as a universalistic science, Mannheim argues that there are three basic constellations of sociology - as a special science (general sociology), as the sociology of individual disciplines (e.g. politics) and as the study of the social character of culture and its development.

Amongst the sociologies of individual disciplines, Mannheim singles out the sociology of knowledge. As a special discipline, it has two areas of research: the theory of ideology and the sociology of knowledge. As a theory of ideology, it is concerned with all conscious and unconscious lies and illusory interpretations since

'the everyday interpretation of the world is full of concepts, intellectual schema and myths that are either still so primitive that they can really only be understood as the rudiments of magical-mythical consciousness or as conscious, ready to hand deceptive tales that can be interpreted as the suppression of an appropriate social orientation.'

In order to counter such illusions, sociology must have 'a critical and rational consciousness' and 'knowledge of social forces'. The study of ideology should achieve not the destruction but the 'exposure of reality, of real phenomena that surround us'. It is therefore an illusion to maintain that ideologies only exist within the political sphere. Rather they permeate 'the whole of our everyday reality'. Hence

'In this sense, the purification of the basic concepts and erroneous interpretation of the everyday world, a revelation of the forces and interests that socially determine history, is an absolutely essential pedagogic mission of sociology and particularly of that branch which we have termed the theory of ideology.'

At a deeper level, this 'self-revision of thought' takes place through the sociology of knowledge in the more restricted sense of the term. It seeks,
'over and above the conscious and semi-conscious deceptions of the everyday world and party interests, to examine that constitutive false approach of thought that is evident in the sciences themselves... Its task therefore lies in the elimination of all those masks that emerge out of particular outlooks, out of particular outlooks which originate in the natural limitation and confinement of individual sciences, of spheres of life and historical situations.'

Our intellectual apparatus only reveals some sides and contents of the world. In so doing, it represents a form of masking of the total situation since it overlooks other perspectives. It is therefore sociology's task to reveal false perspectives not merely in everyday thought but also in other disciplines insofar as it is able to reveal 'from which social standpoint' different theories emerge.

The third sociological domain is that of the 'study of the total context of social-intellectual phenomena' - the sociology of culture. As such, it is not concerned with a definite sphere of the social process but with 'the totality of cultural spheres in relation to social life'. Here culture is interpreted as 'an expression of life' or 'a causal or mutual interactional relationship' is seen to exist between society and cultural spheres or a 'dialectical development' of the two is seen as a dynamic whole. In this context of the sociology of culture, it is interesting to note that Mannheim no longer - as in his earlier writings or as in Scheler's major work - views the sociology of knowledge as part of this sphere of sociology.

When Mannheim turns to the principles governing the choice of subject-matter for sociology, he also sees the sociology of knowledge playing a significant role, especially in relation to the examination of values. Sociology itself should not espouse a political position since 'It would be
the death of sociology if it became merely an instrument of agitation for
one or several parties. On the other hand, sociology should not shy away
from examining 'the political and social themes of life'. Such themes
should be examined but within a value-free context:

'The very fruitful confrontation over the value-freedom
of the social sciences has . . . shown the way in which
politics can be taught without the suggestion of judg-
ment and evaluation. And if too, in this context,
the sociology of knowledge pointed to some diffi-
culties that remain even in the complete abstention
from values, and in the complete "freedom from eval-
uation", that a certain amount of standpoint-
boundedness remains in this notion, then it did so
precisely in the interests of a still more thorough-
going self-control and objectivity but not in order
to open every possible gateway and door.' 294

The sociology of knowledge is here seen as functioning 'in the service of
self-criticism and the distancing of existential boundedness'. On the other
hand, Mannheim also insists that sociology emerged as an 'oppositional
science' (Oppositionswissenschaft) and 'is born in conflict with the diverse,
collectively pregiven attitudes to society'. As an attempt to group the
various currents in society,

'sociology is the appropriate orientation to life by
people in an industrial society . . . whether this
society is organised on a capitalist or socialist
basis.' 295

Sociology provides an understanding of the total constellations out of which
individual life situations can become intelligible. In this respect, therefore,
what Mannheim earlier argued was a central feature of the sociology of know-
ledge has now become a task of sociology itself: namely, 'a deeper self-
understanding and . . . an enlarged understanding of the world'.

Within the wider context of the task of generating greater self-understanding,
It should not be assumed that sociology is seeking to replace philosophy
since 'it is an erroneous interpretation of sociology when one claims that it
wishes to take the place of philosophy itself'. On the other hand, this
should not, in turn, imply that sociology has nothing to do with philosophy:

'One can leave the fundamental primacy of philosophy
untouched and nonetheless concede that quite essential
self-corrections of concrete, existing philosophies can
emerge through reflection based on the sociology of
knowledge. For the fact that particular philosophies
had primarily, fulfilled the functions of ideological masking
is now quite clear. This does not imply, however,
that this must, in principle, always be the case. If
one correctly understands the significance of sociology
for philosophy, then recent developments initiate a
co-operation between ontology and sociology. Here
one must concede the fundamental primacy of onto-
logy over sociology whilst, at the same time, one
must see how each concrete historical ontology is
endangered by its identification with hypostatiza-
tions. Ontology must therefore be investigated in
order to discover whether or not a particular and parti-
san perspective lies, most often unconsciously, be-
neath it. In this context, the sociology of knowledge
can offer a through-going critique and correction.' 296

Here, Mannheim's interest in the relationship between the sociology of know-
ledge and philosophy appears to have shifted from a challenge to traditional
epistemologies - evident even in his earlier writings - to the sociology of
knowledge's role as a 'corrective' to absolutist claims in particular onto-
logies. At no point, however, is it possible for Mannheim to apply this re-
flection to the ontological foundations of his own philosophy. As we have
seen, this ontology and, as Neusüss argues, the meta-theoretical foundations
of his sociology of knowledge, remain largely unreflected upon and hidden
from the reader. These foundations are, of course, present in his sociology
of knowledge. For all Mannheim's concern for ideology here, it is noticable
how little reflection is devoted to his own ontological assumptions.
This would be the natural point at which to examine the reception of Mannheim's work in Germany and especially the response to Ideologie und Utopie. This is reserved for the next chapter in the form of an examination of the debate surrounding his paper on competition and the many reviews of Ideologie und Utopie. In terms of Mannheim's work as a whole in Germany, we can say that he was the principal contributor to the sociology of knowledge in Germany. Unlike Scheler, who seems to have lost interest in the sociology of knowledge after 1926 and turned his attention to the development of a philosophical anthropology until his death in 1928, Mannheim maintained his interest in the development of the sociology of knowledge up to his emigration in 1933. It is impossible - and probably fruitless - to speculate as to what the later reception of his work in Germany would have been after 1933 had the Weimar Republic survived. What is certain is that little was published in the Third Reich on the sociology of knowledge. Alexander von Schelting's study of Max Weber's methodology, published before he too emigrated, contains a critique of Mannheim's work as does the study of the sociology of knowledge by Ernst Grünwald. But both fall outside the immediate period with which we are concerned. On the positive side, Mannheim developed the interest of others in the sociology of knowledge but not the already assembled members of the 'Frankfurt School', who remained openly hostile to the whole project.

This would also seem the place to examine Mannheim's relationship to Lukács, especially as commentators such as Kettler and Huaco have pointed to the connections between the two writers. But since in the final chapter
of this study the subsequent interpretation of the sociology of knowledge in
Weimar Germany is examined in some detail it is perhaps more appropriate
that this discussion can be placed in that wider context.

Similarly, the range of issues contained in Mannheim's sociology of know-
ledge are so wide-ranging and often diverse that attention must be devoted
to them in the last chapter. Some indication of the kind of issues which
Mannheim's sociology of knowledge raised is contained in two of the 'debates'
surrounding the sociology of knowledge and it is to these that we must now
turn.
CHAPTER IV

NOTES


18. K. Mannheim, Ideologie und Utopie, Bonn 1929. All references will be to the fifth ed., Frankfurt 1969.


22. Cf. Karl Mannheim's correspondence with Dr. P. Siebeck, the director of Mohr Verlag in Tübingen. From correspondence in 1929 (27.3.29 and 2.10.29), it is clear that the volume on Max Weber was to have been a substantial study. Mannheim states that he had been working on it for several months before March 1929. In October Mannheim suggest that a monograph on Weber might also be a possibility. Work on the intended volume, Zur Denkklage der Gegenwart, on Weber, Scheler and Troeltsch was, according to a letter of 6th November, 1930, postponed in view of Mannheim's move to Frankfurt and in view of the change in themes on which he was working. In the same letter, he offers Mohr Verlag a collection/
collection of essays entitled *Soziologie des Geistes: Versuche* which, as well as five of his earlier essays would also contain two new ones on 'Die Bedeutung der Intelligenzschichten für die Gestaltung der Politik und Kultur' and 'Die Demokratisierung des Geistes', as well as an introduction. None of these three volumes appeared in Germany and it has not been possible to trace the whereabouts of these manuscripts.


25. See ch. 5 below.


32. Ibid., p.84.

33. Ibid., p.69.

34. Ibid., pp.72-3.

35. Quoted in G. Markus, 'Lukács' 'erste' 'Ästhetik', loc.cit., p.230. This translation differs from the one by Ernst Mannheim.


37. Ibid.


41. Ibid., p.81.

42. Cf. Athenaeum, 1918, nos. 5 and 6.

43. K. Mannheim, Die Strukturanalyse der Erkenntnistheorie, op. cit.

44. Markus suggests that the original Hungarian version of the thesis makes explicit reference to Lukács' 'Aesthetik'. Cf. G. Markus, 'Lukács' 'erste' 'Ästhetik', loc. cit., p.230.


46. Ibid., p.35. In some respects, this is the reverse of, say, Popper's formulation of the importance of scientific 'problems'.

47. Ibid., p.37.

48. Ibid., p.39.

49. Cf. G. Lukács, 'Geschichtlichkeit und Zeitlosigkeit des Kunstwerks', in Heidelberger Philosophie der Kunst (1912-1914), op.cit., pp.153-232. Here Lukács argues that a sociology of art can offer only negative 'laws' or 'conditioning laws': 'it can only say something about the possibilities of realisation but not about the realisation itself'. (p.183). Lukács also speaks of the material for a work of art as 'a form of experience and of our attitude to it varying, phenomenological, according to our 'standpoint' (p.186)


51. Ibid., p.45. Original is italicized.


59. K. Mannheim, Über die Eigenart Kultursoziologischer Erkenntnis, ms. 1922, p.3.

60. Ibid., p.10.

61. Ibid., p.16.

62. Ibid., p.17.

63. Ibid., p.15.

64. Ibid., p.24.


66. K. Mannheim, Über die Eigenart Kultursoziologischer Erkenntnis, op. cit., p.27.

67. Ibid.


70. Ibid., p.29.

71. Ibid., p.32.

72. Ibid.

73. Ibid., p.34. Emphasis in original. This conception of sociology as a foundational science is retained by Mannheim through to his last published German work (cf. K. Mannheim, Die Gegenwartsaufgabe der Soziologie, Tübingen 1932, p.4.


75. Ibid., p.48.

76. Ibid., p.58.

77. Ibid., p.61.
78. Ibid., p.62.
79. Ibid., p.63.
80. Ibid., p.65.
81. Ibid., p.66.
82. Ibid., p.67.
83. Ibid., p.178, n.67.
84. Ibid., p.69.
85. Ibid., p.72.
86. Ibid., p.77.
87. Ibid., p.79.
88. Ibid., p.80.
90. K. Mannheim, Über die Eigenart Kultursoziologischer Erkenntnis, op. cit., p.82.
94. Ibid., p.94.
95. Ibid., p.95.
96. Ibid., p.96.
97. Ibid., p.98.
98. Ibid., p.101.
99. Ibid., p.104.
100. Ibid., p.103.
101. Ibid., p.106.
102. Ibid., pp.156-7. N.B. The numbering of the pages should not be taken to indicate that a whole section of the manuscript has gone astray. Rather, it merely means that the pagination is erratic.
103. Ibid., p.165.

105. Ibid.


110. Cf. the correspondence referred to in n.22 earlier.

111. K. Mannheim, 'Problems of Sociology in Germany', in K.H. Wolff (ed.), From Karl Mannheim, op. cit., p.266, n.3.


113. Ibid., p.85. Translation amended.


116. Ibid.

117. Ibid., p.96.

118. Ibid., p.127.


120. Ibid., p.102. Translation amended.

121. Ibid., p.104.


124. Ibid., p.125.
K. Mannheim, Eine soziologische Theorie der Kultur und ihrer Erkennbarkeit, ms. pp. 169. The manuscript is in three sections, each of which is numbered separately. Therefore, reference will be to page numbers in section I, II or III.


Ibid., p. 18.

Ibid.

Ibid., pp. 5-6.

Ibid., p. 8.

Ibid., p. 9.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 12.

Ibid., p. 13.

Ibid., p. 20.

Ibid., p. 21.

Ibid., p. 22.

Ibid., p. 37.

Ibid., p. 47.


Ibid., p. 5.

Ibid., p. 6.

Ibid., p. 7.

Ibid., p. 8.

Ibid., p. 31.

Ibid., p. 38. This is almost the reverse of Wittgenstein statement that 'the limits of my language are the limits of my world'.


Ibid., p. 53.
150. Ibid., p.56.
153. Ibid., p.65.
154. Ibid.
155. Ibid., p.70.
156. Ibid., p.78.
157. Ibid., p.80.
158. Ibid., pp.91-2.
159. Ibid., p.93.
160. Ibid., p.94.
161. Ibid.
162. Ibid., p.95.
163. Ibid., p.97.
164. Ibid., p.99.
165. Ibid., p.100.
166. Ibid., p.108.
169. Ibid., p.130.
170. Ibid., p.134.
172. Ibid., p.5.
173. Ibid., p.7.
174. Ibid.

177. K. Mannheim, 'Das Konservative Denken', loc. cit., p.68.

178. Ibid., p.71.

179. Ibid., p.75.

180. Ibid., p.95.

181. Ibid., p.104.

182. Ibid., p.115, n.76.

183. Ibid., pp.115-6.


185. Ibid., p.128. Translation slightly changed. My emphasis.


187. Ibid., p.471.

188. Ibid., p.484.

189. Ibid., p.491.

190. Ibid., pp.493-4.

191. Ibid., p.495.

192. Ibid., p.102.


194. Ibid., p.12.


196. See ch.5 below.

197. This is yet another of Mannheim's unpublished works that it has not been possible to trace. It may well be that part of it was incorporated into the early part of his article, 'Zur Problematik der Soziologie in Deutschland', Neue Schweizer Rundschau, vol.22, 1929, pp.820-29.
198. As an indication of Mannheim's teaching interests in this period, it may be useful to indicate the courses he offered while at Heidelberg:

Winter Semester 1926/27 - Introduction to problems in sociology and the history of ideas.
- History and sociology of political thought in Germany (I) Conservatism.

Summer Semester 1927 - The political and social significance of philosophy in the nineteenth century.
- Seminar on the economic and intellectual foundations of imperialism.
  (with Emil Lederer)

Winter Semester 1927/28 - Max Weber's sociology.

Summer Semester 1928 - Introduction to sociology.
- Seminar on sociology.

Winter Semester 1928/29 - General sociology.
- Sociology of the press and public opinion.
- Seminars on the sociology of knowledge.

Summer Semester 1929 - Sociology of the press and public opinion.
- Seminars on problems of sociology and modern phenomenology.

Winter Semester 1929/30 - Sociology of public opinion and the press.
- Seminars on the history of modern ideas.
  Introduction to the sociological interpretation of sources.

(What is of interest here is, like Weber, the interest in the press and, like Weber, little evidence of having followed up this interest subsequently.)


200. See ch. 5 below.


203. These are presented at the beginning of the paper and were not translated into English.


205. Ibid., p.37.
206. For a discussion of this outline see ch. 5 below.
208. Ibid., p. 41.
209. Ibid., p. 42.
213. Ibid., p. 74.
214. Ibid., pp. 77-8.
215. Ibid., p. 80.
216. Ibid., p. 81.
217. K. Mannheim, Ideologie und Utopie, Bonn 1929. Recent German editions of this work have incorporated the additional material from the English edition into the text. Since the new edition is more accessible, all references will be to K. Mannheim, Ideologie und Utopie, Frankfurt 1969, 5th ed. The English edition was first published in 1936 as K. Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, London 1936. It contained a preface by Louis Wirth, an additional introductory chapter by Mannheim and his encyclopaedia article on the sociology of knowledge.
220. Ibid.
221. Ibid., p. 8.
223. Ibid., p. 52.
224. Ibid., p. 53.
225. Ibid., p. 54. In the English translation 'co-constitutive' is reduced to 'influence'; cf. K. Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, op. cit., p. 50.

226. Ibid., p. 55.


229. Ibid., p. 69.

230. Ibid., p. 70.

231. Ibid., p. 72.

232. Ibid.

233. Ibid., p. 76.

234. Ibid., p. 78.

235. Ibid., p. 79.

236. Ibid., p. 82.

237. Ibid., p. 83.


239. Ibid., p. 86.

240. Ibid., pp. 86-7.

241. Ibid., p. 92.

242. Cf. ch. 5 below.


244. Ibid., p. 50f.


247. Ibid., p. 100 My emphasis.

248. Ibid., p. 128.

249. Ibid., pp. 131-2.

250. Ibid., p. 134.

251. Ibid., p. 136.
252. Ibid., p. 141.
253. Ibid., p. 149.
254. Ibid., p. 163.


257. K. Lenk, Marx in der Wissenssoziologie, op. cit., p. 76.

258. Ibid., p. 78.


262. A. Neusüss, Utopisches Bewusstsein und freischwebende Intelligenz, op. cit., p. 236.

263. Ibid., pp. 112-182.


265. Ibid.

266. Ibid.

267. Ibid., p. 171. My emphasis.

268. Ibid., p. 172.

269. Ibid.

270. Ibid., p. 178.

271. Ibid., p. 179.

272. Ibid., p. 181.

273. Ibid., p. 182.

274. Ibid., p. 218.
275. Ibid., p. 220.
276. Ibid., p. 224.
277. Ibid., p. 225.
279. Ibid., pp. 134-6.
280. Ibid., p. 136.
281. On Mannheim's project in this period see the reference to his correspondence with Mohr Verlag in n. 22 above. The only other article in any way connected with the sociology that was published in this period aside from the two referred to below, was K. Mannheim, 'Über das Wesen und die Bedeutung des wirtschaftlichen Erfolgsstrebens. Ein Beitrag zur Wirtschaftssoziologie', *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft*, vol. 63, 1930. English translation by P. Kecskeméti in K. Mannheim, *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge*, London 1952, pp. 230-275.
285. Ibid., p. 229.
286. Ibid., p. 246.
287. Ibid., p. 248.
288. Ibid., p. 258.
290. loc. cit., p. 4.
291. Ibid., pp. 18-19.
292. Ibid., p. 19.
293. Ibid., p. 20.
294. Ibid., pp. 39-40.
295. Ibid., p. 41.
296. Ibid., pp. 54-5.
297. See ch. 5 below.


300. See, for instance, the list of dissertations in the bibliography attached to K. Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, op. cit., pp.303-4.

CHAPTER FIVE

The debate surrounding the sociology of knowledge: 1918-33
CHAPTER FIVE

An examination of the debates surrounding the sociology of knowledge in Weimar Germany represents not merely an extension of the discussion of this sociological tradition but also, in one sense, a summary of it. The debates illustrate the extent to which the sociology of knowledge existed not, as today, largely as a marginal discipline hovering between sociology, social philosophy and the philosophy of science but as a discipline which questioned and sometimes challenged the foundations of sociology itself. This was, of course, viewed then and subsequently both as its strength and, by most commentators, as its weakness. But over and above this, an examination of these debates enables us to at least prepare the ground for a discussion of the role and significance of the sociology of knowledge within the German tradition.

Within this period, there were at least three 'debates' which were directly concerned with the sociology of knowledge. In 1924, at the Fourth German Sociological Congress, the issue of the relationship between science and social structure was discussed by Max Scheler and Max Adler and commented upon by many others.¹ This was the first explicit sociological debate surrounding this new discipline, if one excludes the brief exchanges between Scheler and Jerusalem in 1921 and 1922 referred to earlier.² Of course, some of the issues that were later to be central to the controversy surrounding the sociology of knowledge - especially after the publication of Mannheim's Ideologie und Utopie in 1929 - were already
aired in what Siegfried Kracauer termed 'the so-called Wissenschaftsstreit' which followed from Weber's 'Wissenschaft als Beruf' lecture of 1919 and which concerned writers such as Singer and Scheler. However this was, strictly speaking, prior to the emergence of the sociology of knowledge as a distinctive discipline in Germany although Scheler was himself one of the participants. This is not to suggest that this debate was insignificant; indeed, it will be examined for the light it throws upon the role of the sociology of knowledge in the next chapter. What concerns us here is the strictly sociological debates surrounding the sociology of knowledge. If the Scheler-Adler discussion of the relationship between science and social structure was the first of these public debates, it cannot be said that it subsequently generated further discussion apart, perhaps, from a paper by Dunkmann on the sociological foundation of science which was published in 1927 and which explicitly dealt with Scheler's views on science.

The second major debate surrounding the sociology of knowledge occurred at the Sixth German Sociological Congress in Zürich in 1928. One section of this conference was concerned with the sociological treatment of the phenomenon of competition and comprised papers by von Wiese and Karl Mannheim. As is evident from the ensuing discussion, it is Mannheim's paper on the significance of competition in the intellectual sphere, rather than von Wiese's paper concerned with more general aspects of competition, which sparked off a heated debate on the sociology of knowledge. This congress stimulated a discussion by Alfred Meusel of both papers, not published until 1930. It 'also formed the starting point' for a discussion by Alexander von Schelting of the conflict surrounding the
sociology of knowledge (‘Zum Streit um die Wissenssoziologie’) published in 1929. Von Schelting indeed saw Mannheim’s paper in particular as making this interest in the problems thrown up by the sociology of knowledge ‘more lively’. It is important to review this article in view of von Schelting’s subsequent critique of Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge in his Max Weber’s Wissenschaftslehre published in 1934.

The third ‘debate’ - although not, strictly speaking, a ‘debate’ - consists of the extensive reviews of Mannheim’s major work Ideologie und Utopie from 1929 onwards. The large number and broad range of the reviews and critiques testifies not merely to the interest in the sociology of knowledge but also to the significance which Mannheim’s work had for the sociological tradition and, more generally, for the social sciences and philosophy in Germany. It constitutes the peak of interest in the sociology of knowledge in this period and coincides with the dramatic heightening of the economic and political crisis of German society after 1929. In the light of this, von Schelting was not exaggerating when he suggested that the sociology of knowledge ‘today undoubtedly stands in the foreground of sociological cognitive interests’.

In view of our subsequent evaluation of the significance of the sociology of knowledge for German sociology, attention will also be paid to the reception and critique of Mannheim’s version of the sociology of knowledge provided by the Frankfurt School within this period. This is for a number of reasons. Firstly, commentators such as Lenk, have sharply demarcated the Frankfurt School’s critique of ideology from the sociology
of knowledge tradition in Germany, especially that established by Mannheim. Secondly, and of more contemporary interest, writers hostile both to the sociology of knowledge and to the Frankfurt School tradition, like Popper and Albert, have suggested links between critical theory and the sociology of knowledge. Albert, for example, has pointed to the affinity between the discussion of cognitive interests by Habermas and Apel and Scheler's version of three cognitive interests. It is therefore useful to examine the early reception of the Frankfurt School to the sociology of knowledge, not least because from 1930 until 1933, Mannheim himself succeeded to Oppenheimer's chair of economics and sociology at Frankfurt University.

Unfortunately, it is not possible to review all the other contributions to the sociology of knowledge in this period, though some brief mention will be made of them. A comprehensive account of the sociology of knowledge in this period should perhaps also include contributions to the critique of ideology. Indeed, at least since the publication of Lukács' Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein in 1923, and certainly after the publication of Mannheim's Ideologie und Utopie in 1929, the whole of the literature associated with the critique of ideology could legitimately be included in such a survey. However, much of this literature must, of necessity, be excluded. This is particularly unfortunate in the case of writers like Korsch, for whom a case has been made as being an important influence upon the early Frankfurt School. Yet his discussion of ideology did not otherwise directly influence the sociology of knowledge tradition. This is in contrast perhaps to some of the work of the Austro-Marxist Max Adler whose work was not only influential as a neo-Kantian
Marxist version of the sociology of knowledge but who personally participated in one of the debates surrounding the sociology of knowledge in 1924. Even so, Adler's version of a sociology of knowledge was hardly taken up at all in Germany.

Despite these limitations, the following survey of the debates should at least illustrate the extent to which the sociology of knowledge and the problems associated with it were of central importance to the course of German sociology in the Weimar period. More specifically, the survey should confirm the extent to which the development of the sociology of knowledge was not merely of interest to Scheler and Mannheim but was of interest to many of the contributors to the debates. That is, the work of, say, Scheler and Mannheim must have achieved some resonance within the German sociological tradition in order for it to become a major concern of sociologists at least towards the end of the Weimar period. What this suggests is that the sociology of knowledge was able to develop out of concerns which other sociologists shared or at least were aware of - to some extent, a common tradition which made it likely that sociology would take up the problems associated with the sociology of knowledge within this period. This tradition and some of the mediating social factors have already been outlined in the first chapter of this study.

II

The debate at the Fourth German Sociology Congress in 1924 surrounding Marx Scheler's paper on 'Science and Social Structure' is significant
because it is the one occasion upon which a sociological standpoint (Scheler's) is confronted explicitly with a Marxist one (Adler's). In the light of later interpretations of the sociology of knowledge, this is a somewhat surprising finding since many writers today contrast the sociology of knowledge with the critique of ideology - quite possibly with good reason. Hence one might have expected greater public debate within the sociological tradition between a 'sociological' and a 'Marxist' standpoint especially in such areas as the sociology of knowledge where the 'debate' with Marx seems so explicit. Less surprising is the fact that, as a debate, the 1924 confrontation was hardly productive in terms of the development of the sociology of knowledge. Scheler's discussion of science was taken up in his own later writings, especially in *Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft* but only Dunkmann's article 'Die soziologische Begründung der Wissenschaft' (1927) can in any way be traced back to this discussion of which he was a participant. Much of Adler's reply to Scheler hardly addressed the issue of the relationship between science and social structure, though it does provide a clue to his own version of a sociology of knowledge. However, Adler's approach was hardly taken in at all within the German tradition. The subsequent major controversies surrounding the sociology of knowledge centred around Mannheim's approach, which many contemporaries took to be either some version of a Marxist approach or at least a confrontation with it.

Scheler's discussion of 'Science and Social Structure' has already been dealt with in an earlier chapter. There it was shown that Scheler extended his theory of biological drives to the sphere of scientific knowledge and treated science within the context of his metaphysics. As we shall
see, Adler and many other discussants doubted whether Scheler's position was a sociological one. What is of interest in Adler's long reply to Scheler is, however, not merely his own criticisms of Scheler but the outline of his own position on the sociology of knowledge. Adler's emphasis upon his own position rather than a systematic critique of Scheler's was due, in part, to the fact that Scheler's paper was not made available to him before the congress.

As we have seen earlier, Adler's central argument against Scheler's paper was whether it formed a contribution to sociology at all. Adler suggested that Scheler commenced with an 'intellectual-historical' approach that confuses the intellectual-historical and social determination of thought. A sociological interpretation of forms of thought should commence when the 'whole intellectual historical process is investigated in terms of its social dependency and beyond its inner psychological and ideological determination.' The sociological approach presupposes the intellectual-historical dimension but is not co-terminus with it. In this context, Adler objects to Scheler's broad contrast between the European and Asiatic mentality as 'a mere phenomenology of intellectual history'. Indeed, 'the sociological problem in fact first commences where this phenomenology is terminated.' However, when Scheler's analysis moves onto his theory of drives (Trieblehre), Adler suggests that he can see 'neither a phenomenological nor a sociological advantage and indeed believes that, wherever intellectual problems are traced back to a drive, a methodological error is present since, in so doing, an actual ideological problem is reduced to a biological one. The drive is always to some extent biological and we can never come from biology to sociology. In any case, these drives display, for Scheler, a very remarkable
Adler seems to suggest, in fact, that this theory of drives is a substitute for Marx's analysis of the material base but, he argues, Scheler's confrontation with Marxism is misplaced. Adler both criticizes Scheler's position and proceeds to outline his own Marxist standpoint in much of the remainder of his reply.

Adler accuses Scheler of a false notion of Marxism in that 'like so many other opponents of Marxism, he believes that the materialist interpretation of history brings the whole of intellectual life, ideology into a one-side causal dependency upon something non-intellectual, upon the so-called material relations of economic life so that, according to this interpretation, the intellectual sphere is directly derived from the economic'.

Adler in fact argues that Marxism is not primarily materialist in the single sense of material determination but is concerned with intellectual relations within material relations in that

'economic relations are not something factual that confronts human beings as alien but rather that they are their own, that is, also intellectual relations, their work and interaction relations under which they live. In this manner, Marxism represents social life as a system of continuous intellectual activity.'

Marxism, Adler argues, does not maintain a dualism of economy and ideology in which the former is alien to the intellect but rather asserts that 'the economic relations are themselves already intellectual relations'.

This version of Marxism, although it is an implicit critique of the parody of Marxism in German sociology, can only be understood in the light of
Adler's neo-Kantian Marxism which he sees as providing the basis for a sociology of knowledge.

Adler argues that there are two senses in which one can speak of a sociology of knowledge (Wissen) and cognition (Erkenntnis). There is a sociology of knowledge that is concerned with the manner in which 'historically given knowledge is determined by the social structure of the group in which it arises'. In a very different sense, one can speak of a sociology of knowledge when one is concerned with the fact that 'already before all historically determined development of intellectual life, this life consists in its very nature completely of socialized nature'. In the light of these two senses of a sociology of knowledge, Adler maintains that the former embodies 'merely a historical sociology whereas this latter provides the foundation of sociology'. Although Adler does not make this point, it is clear that he here raises the dual claims for a sociology of knowledge that have stood at the centre of the controversy which surrounds it: namely, the conception of the sociology of knowledge as a branch of the sociology of culture or historical sociology and a conception which sees it as a foundational discipline, (Begründungswissenschaft). It is in fact this latter project which particularly interests Adler but he suggests that since Scheler interpreted the sociology of knowledge in the first sense he is unable to develop the second meaning further. In his reply to Scheler, Adler merely states that it is concerned with the fact that 'the cognitive process itself, although it takes place only within the individual, is nonetheless, in accordance with its transcendental preconditioning thoroughly social and socialized, I have termed this cognitive-critical character the transcendental-social aspect of experience and
shown that as a social apriori it still also belongs to the forms of all experience in the same way as space, time and categories.  

This version of a sociology of knowledge is developed elsewhere by Adler, not merely in his early work Kausalität und Teleologie im Streite um die Wissenschaft but in his contemporary writings such as Kant und der Marxismus and his essay 'Soziologie und Erkenntnistheorie'. As a version of neo-Kantian Marxism, it was the subject of considerable criticism, for example, by Siegfried Marck and Herbert Marcuse. As such is not merely represents a Kantian foundation for Marxism but also for sociology with its 'concept of the transcendental social formation of the individual consciousness. With Kant and Marx we are erecting the structure of modern critical sociology'. This critical sociology also appears to be one that is firmly rooted in German sociology. Adler concurs fully with Max Weber's insistence upon the 'value-freedom of all objective science ... Marxism, too, stands decisively on the basis of value-free science' and is not based upon 'arbitrarily or unconsciously presupposed evaluation'. Similarly - though not mentioned in his reply - Adler was very favourably impressed with Simmel's 'epistemological investigation of a science of social relationships'.

However, when Adler addresses himself to the role of science he locates his remarks within the context of the first version of the sociology of knowledge that is concerned with the social determinants of modes of thought. Adler argues that there are two currents of science in the present period that can be characterised as stationary and evolutionary or bourgeois and proletarian, both of which 'are determined, even though
largely unconsciously, by class interests in the last instance. Adler seeks to avoid the terms bourgeois and proletarian science and attempts to counter the hostility to his remarks at this point with an argument on the unitary nature of science. He asserts that

'there are no Marxists who would consider asserting that scientific truth is one thing for the proletariat and another for the bourgeoisie but rather only that each class holds something different for the truth. These exist only a single science but there are results of that science which do not possess the same significance and the same acceptability for everyone.'

Similarly, Adler rejects the dualism of the natural and social sciences most strongly asserted in neo-Kantian circles since

'the social sciences too can only be constructed on the same epistemological and logical foundations as natural science, namely on the basis of a law-like conformity of being and causality. Social science, too, is a causal science of existence (Seinswissenschaft) and not a normative science of ends (Zweckwissenschaft). Nonetheless, the distinction between natural and social science emerges in the type of existence and causality that exists in the sphere of social phenomena.'

Whereas nature stands estranged from man and quite outside man's 'socialized and goal directed strivings', society consist precisely of the latter. Unfortunately, Adler does not develop this standpoint further in his reply but merely expands slightly upon his distinction between stationary and evolutionary science. The former remains 'confined to within bourgeois society' as a naturally given milieu, the latter is able to go beyond it. Unlike Lukáč's analysis in Geschichte und Klasse bewusstsein, however, no satisfactory account of why this is so is provided.
Even from this brief summary of Adler's reply to Scheler, it is clear that this 'debate' is yet another instance of opponents talking past one another. However, Adler's reply does illustrate the extent to which, even in the early stages, the discussion of the nature of the sociology of knowledge very quickly moved in the direction of the nature of social scientific knowledge. This is not merely another instance of the extent to which the debate surrounding the sociology of knowledge can be seen as an extension of the Methodenstreit and possibly also the Werturteilsstreit within one sphere of sociology. It also testifies to the very restricted nature of the definition of what is to constitute 'knowledge' for a sociology of knowledge. That is, the field of study can very quickly become another kind of discussion of the nature of social scientific knowledge within some form of neo-Kantian parameters. In this way, one strand of the discipline can be seen as a sociological extension of the pre-First World War neo-Kantian discussion of the logical and philosophical foundations of the distinction between natural and social science. 36

Indeed, this ambiguity on the nature and aims of a sociology of knowledge was sensed by a number of the participants at this sociological congress. This was taken up most dramatically and misleadingly by Dunckmann in the following manner when he argued that,

"If we claim that all science is somehow dependent upon the social structure then it is also certain that all science depends upon sociology. There then emerges the problem that, in my opinion, is the decisive one - and one that has not been dealt with here by either of the two speakers. How is sociology as a science possible if all science depends upon sociology? From whence does sociology take its standard as a science?
If all other sciences (i.e., in art, religion, morality, law and even metaphysics and philosophy) depend upon the social structure, that is, are sociologically determined?  

Were Dunckmann to develop this argument fully then we would be faced with a perfect example of sociologism. Indeed, later commentators on the sociology of knowledge did in fact denounce the sociology of knowledge as sociologism. Like most of his contemporaries, Dunckmann goes on to exclude 'science, mathematics, logic, or we can think of statistics, that are not dependent upon social structures'. With regard to the two speakers, Dunckmann argues that Scheler's analysis is limited to a theory of drives and a notion of spiritual creators and that Adler's analysis of bourgeois and proletarian science begs the question of how sociology as a science can exist in such a way as to transcend class distinctions.

On the problem of sociology as a science, Sulzbach argues that Scheler, though he spoke of three interests in knowledge, failed to ask whether different types of understanding exist, whether these differences derive from the social structure and hence may be understood by sociology. The possible diversity of sociological standpoints was also noticed by Salin when he suggests that 'today's lectures have shown us how impossible it is up to now to speak of a unified science of sociology. What has been given to us is at most, in so far as it was sociology at all, different sociologies: Max Scheler's sociology, that of Max Adler and, besides, that of the discussants.'

However, what is also of interest in this discussion is the response to Marxism since it gives some indication as to why so little attention was
subsequently paid to Adler’s sociology of knowledge. Further, it shows how little the influence of Lukács’ *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein* was a year after its publication. Alfred Weber, in his contribution, rejects both stationary and evolutionary, bourgeois and proletarian modes of apprehension. More significantly, Weber states his case against Marxism as follows:

'what separates us from those who today call themselves Marxists, although they are perhaps best called quasi-Marxists, is that they are rationalists and, in fact, pure rationalists. They treat everything in this manner and in this sense they are 'progressives' and cannot be anything else. In this sense, they must be evolutionists; since for a rationalist there exists no historical movement other than progressive evolution. What separates us from their completely rational approach and the attempt to explain everything by this rationality is... above all a pre-war experience from the time when things were still going very well for us and one could still count us economically amongst the 'bourgeois' and not primarily a war or post-war experience since which things have gone badly.'

If we pass over the somewhat obscure use of the term 'rationalist' in this context - which only serves to point to Weber's lack of knowledge of Marx's work - then what is striking about this passage is the rejection of the evolutionary perspective on Marxism common to many members of the Second International and, apparently, to Max Adler even in the post-war period as Bottemore has recently indicated. It is also an indication of the changed nature of German society and the recognition of the need for 'another way' and 'another perspective' since 'progress' can no longer be presupposed. Also worth bearing in mind at this point is that Weber at this time was quite possibly a significant influence upon Mannheim. This challenge of a new situation is, of course, much
more fully worked out in Mannheim's later work and especially in *Ideologie und Utopie*.

The other discussants exhibited a varied response to Marxism. Dunckmann suggests that he did not understand what a 'materialist interpretation of history' was. Michels, in his brief remarks, makes no reference to Marxism except to suggest that Adler should not overlook that there exists 'not only a bourgeois but also a proletarian human type'. Of the discussants, only Alfred Meusel refers to specific Marxist works relating generally to the sociology of knowledge. Significantly, Meusel criticizes both Scheler's and Adler's papers on the grounds that it does not suffice to show how a specific social group is impelled towards specific ways to knowledge and kinds of knowledge on the basis of its concrete set of interests but, over and above that, to allude to the close affinity of form and structural identification between economic base and intellectual superstructure - in the very same manner, for instance, as Georg Lukács in *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein*.

At least in raising this kind of issue, Meusel argues that 'Professor Scheler has shown himself to be a better Marxist than Professor Adler.' On different grounds, Meusel also rejects Adler's discussion of a static and dynamic sociology. But perhaps of greatest interest in the context of the reception of Marxism within the sociology of knowledge is the contribution by Arthur Salz who accepts that he has 'a "vulgar" interpretation of Marxism'.

Salz attempts to locate the need to confront the Marxist standpoint in the changes that have taken place in German society. He argues that
There seems to me to be no doubt that we have been drawn much closer to the materialist interpretation of history which is the foundation of Marxist philosophy of history, in recent decades than earlier, than in the decades before the war and that we experience the need for a confrontation with this doctrine and the questions it raises much more immediately and in a completely different manner than previously; in fact this is not the result, for instance, of an intellectual development that we have passed through in the meantime but, rather, the result of political and economic events which we have laid the course for in our own lives. Quite simply, it is the result of the fact that, to state it briefly, the proletarian prime experience has become the national consciousness for us Germans, that today the whole nation or large parts of it have internationalised their role in the social whole that previously only the proletarian class occupied, that this proletarian feeling is, in fact, 'socialized'. That polarisation of society, of which Marx spoke, and which he saw as the basic fact of capitalist society, that disintegration of society into the exploiting wealthy and the exploited propertyless has taken possession of nations themselves and any sociological perspective on the present that does not start out from this fact, that in this sense there exist today proletarianized, enslaved peoples, is doomed to failure. 42

This sense of universal proletarianization and its extension from the proletariat to the whole of society is certainly a central theme of Max Scheler’s wartime and post-war writings. The polarisation within German society - and not the polarisation of nations in which Germany is proletarianized as Salz argues - was later to become a central theme of Mannheim’s analysis of society and its attendant conflicting ideologies.
But the core of Salz's contribution lies elsewhere. It lies in a restatement of some of the issues thrown up by Lukács. Salz indeed refers to dialectical method as having been developed 'from Hegel and Marx to Lukács'. It is this dialectical method which he sees as 'the core of the materialist interpretation of history' and, like Lukács, he criticized orthodox Marxism for itself being undialectical. Salz, too, refers to the argument that commodity relations are the basis of forms of objectification and reification. However, he argues strongly against 'the mythologization of the proletariat'. Thus, however unsympathetic Salz may have been to the Marxist standpoint, his contribution is the only one to refer in any detailed manner to Lukács' position. Indeed this is the only instance of Lukács' central arguments in Geschichte und Klassebewusstsein being taken up at a sociology congress in this period. However, it must be emphasised that even though Lukács' arguments are taken up, their fruitfulness for a sociology of knowledge or a critique of ideology are not developed by Salz at any point in his contribution.

In his closing remarks to this session, Adler again returns to his central thesis 'that the assumption of objective knowledge is itself class-determined in its possibility and totality'. Adler counters the view that 'progress never starts out from the masses but only always from individuals; that culture is something creative whereas the proletariat is not'. However this should not be taken to mean that bourgeois or proletarian thought is that of 'the average thought of the individual bourgeois or proletarian'. Rather, it is a characterization of the 'motives, tasks and limits of thought'. And in answer to Dunckmann's posing of the problem of the determination of sociology and science, Adler argues
that he did not state that

'science is dependent upon sociology, which is certainly itself a science, but is dependent upon the social structure; and the presentation of this dependency is primarily the task of sociology. When Professor Dunckmann argues further, that there must certainly be a pure sociology that, like mathematics or mechanics does not consist of a merely partisan truth, then I gladly concur fully with him.' 44

We know from his other writings that Adler has in mind as a basis for a pure sociology that of Georg Simmel, even though Adler's version is one which combines Kant and Marx.

In terms of the development of the sociology of knowledge, this first public 'debate' points to a number of features of the discipline that run throughout later confrontations. Firstly, that Scheler's discussion of the relationship between science and social structure is not taken up and developed in this period. Indeed, the development of natural scientific knowledge is seldom raised as a theme at all, except, as we have seen, in Mannheim's unpublished essays and even there it seems to rest largely upon Lukács' earlier account in Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein. 45

Secondly, it is the case that the Scheler-Adler debate does raise—particularly in Adler's contribution—the question as to the foundations of sociology itself as a discipline. This certainly remains a theme within the sociology of knowledge even to the extent that we can see it as taking up earlier issues from the Methodenstreit and the Werturteilsstreit. This aspect will be examined in more detail in the next chapter. Finally, the debate indicates the extent to which the Marxist perspective is ever-present as a background to the discussion of the sociology of knowledge.
But it is interesting to note that this often takes the form of a caricature of the orthodox Marxism of the Second International and hardly ever confronts the more penetrating version of writers like Lukács which, at least potentially, had considerable relevance for reconstructing a critique of ideology, if not for the sociology of knowledge broadly conceived. In the Immediate context of the Scheler-Adler debate, it must also be pointed out that Adler's version of the sociology of knowledge found almost no resonance whatsoever amongst later writers. In subsequent sociological 'debates', it was to be Mannheim's presumed assimilation of the Marxist perspective that was to the focus of attention. This indeed was the case at the Sixth German Sociological Congress held in Zürich in September, 1928 and it is to this second debate that we must now turn.

III

Mannheim's paper on 'The Significance of Competition in the Intellectual Sphere' at the Sixth German Sociological Congress sparked off an interesting discussion amongst the participants. It also stimulated, subsequently, two papers on themes raised at the conference: one by Alexander von Schelting which was wide-ranging and sympathetic to Alfred Weber's position who, as we shall see, was hostile to Mannheim even though he had been one of his assessors for his Habilitationsschrift at Heidelberg in 1926, and a further much briefer discussion of the conference by Alfred Meusel. Although unconnected with the actual theme of this session of the conference, it is also worth examining briefly Mannheim's comments on Sombart's paper on 'Understanding' at the same congress.
It will be recalled that when discussing Mannheim's paper on competition it was treated under the broad heading of an instance of his application of the sociology of knowledge to specific areas of social life. In fact, this is, in part, misleading since Mannheim's aim was to deal with 'two comprehensive groups of problems (which are closely related to one another)

... First of all it is intended to make more concrete the problem of competition and secondly it is intended as a contribution to a sociological theory of the mind.\(^{50}\)

Not surprisingly, in the discussion of Mannheim's paper both intentions were commented upon but especially his contribution to the discussion of the Seinsverbundenheit of knowledge. In fact, Mannheim himself provided a summary of the issues he was to deal with, together with some specific questions which he thought participants might particularly take up (neither were translated into English).\(^{51}\) The questions Mannheim submitted for discussion were:

a Does the phenomenon of existentially bounded knowledge exist?

b Does the competition of strata asserted here have significance for our contemporary intellectual situation?

c Which areas of the humanities and social sciences (esp. sociology) are not to be considered as existentially bounded knowledge?

d Can one draw an exact line between where existentially bounded knowledge ends and 'exact' timelessly valid knowledge commences?

e Must one unconditionally evaluate existentially bounded thought negatively? Is it not because of a too one-sided orientation of epistemology (predominantly on the basis of the paradigm of the exact natural scientific image of knowledge) that one does not deal justly with the innermost quality of this mode of thought?\(^{52}\)
It is these kind of questions rather than the discussion of competition between intellectual strata that were the focal point of the subsequent debate at the congress. In fact it marks the first discussion at a sociology congress in Germany of those issues which lie at the heart of the German tradition in the sociology of knowledge.

Alfred Weber, the first speaker to comment on Mannheim's paper, agreed with what he took to be Mannheim's substantive theses, namely, that competition is a general sociological category, that it is apparent 'within the sphere of existentially bounded thought', that it play 'a co-constitutive role' there, that Mannheim's four categories of consensus, monopoly, atomised competition and concentration can be fruitfully applied there and finally that Mannheim correctly characterized the present intellectual situation. However, with regard to Mannheim's 'epistemological problematic', Weber had major reservations. This is particularly true of the extent of the 'relationizing of thought'. On the one hand, Weber argues,

'I stand completely on the foundation of the existence of a thoroughgoing relationizing of thought. I believe that we still have hardly any idea as to how our thought is relationized, that probably we or each of us who has worked on the historical and the sociological and really attempted intellectually to enter into the spirit of strange historical phenomena is horrified at how relationized human thought in fact is.' 53

What Weber has in mind here seems to be different national traditions (e.g. Greek, Indian) of thought. On the other hand, he states

'I believe that it is really hardly necessary to express the fact that there exists a realm of thought and knowledge that is not relation-


This universal sphere of knowledge is quite separate from existentially determined thought. It is the sphere that is common to all human beings and appears to be similar to the Kantian apriori categories of thought, though this is by no means clear from Weber's statement. However, Weber continues, the fact that

> these categories, that have grown out of the universal human positions vis-a-viz nature and the necessity to dominate nature, that are embodied, above all in natural science - though not solely in natural science - that are today in fact parts of human knowledge which are universally valid and necessary can indeed hardly be contested. \(^55\)

Thus, once more, the problematic relationship between the natural and social sciences finds its resonance in the exclusion of natural scientific from social determination. Perhaps it is this aspect of the sociology of knowledge that continually required a confrontation with the natural/cultural sciences debate.

For Weber it is, apparently, metaphysical thought that, at least as far as its content is concerned, is the most existentially bounded form of knowledge since

> everything that we term metaphysically anchored concepts, cognitions and values associated with them, are all things of which we must immediately concede that, in accordance with their total contents, they possess their historically partial quality in the closest existential boundedness. Every sociologist must see this, otherwise he cannot carry out any historical sociology. \(^56\)
Weber argues that, for Mannheim, there exists an 'intermediate area' between metaphysical-value-laden knowledge that is existentially determined and the sphere of universally valid knowledge. Within this intermediate area, Mannheim wishes to speak of styles of thought which give rise to different objects of cognition. What Weber objects to is the absence at this level of a distinction between the contents of knowledge and their meaning since 'cognition is a processual concept. Style of thought is a formal concept. Knowledge is an ontological concept.'

Weber sees Mannheim as advancing the position that styles of thought produce different objects, thereby presumably challenging the ontological foundation of knowledge as Weber understand it. Weber takes the example of class perspectives on capitalism and argues that

'Capitalism is a quite definite, unique, clear object. I simply take here its empirical, historical-positivistic reality. In my opinion, there can only be a different approach and a different illumination here of the same object but it is impossible for there to be different objects and a different knowledge of it. Rather, there exists only one object and one complete knowledge.'

It is clear from what Weber goes on to say at this point that what is at issue here for him is not, for example, a critique of a phenomenological standpoint that can undoubtedly be found in Mannheim's work but rather a critique of the kind of position Lukács puts forward in Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein with respect to class knowledge - a position which Weber presumably views Mannheim as adhering to.

This is made clear when Weber continues with what is 'perhaps the decisive' point in Mannheim's argument, namely

'that out of these different existentially bounded knowledge - or better cognitive
or intellectual positions - you seem to
to wish to continually draw positions of
the will (Willenspositionen). We
would perhaps say - you call this another
standpoint - the ideals of specific classes, you
appear to identify them with interpretations
of existence as you indeed put it: a public
statement concerning existence, a public
interpretation of existence. 1

Although not wishing to extend the discussion further, Weber sees this
position as at least raising the question of value freedom. Apparently,
this arises for Weber out of the introduction of certain assumptions
associated with the materialist interpretation of history. What Weber
specifically misses in Mannheim's paper is

'the recognition of the intellectually creat-
ive as the foundation of action and of classes,
for example. What I reject is the reduction
of all these things ultimately to intellectual
categories with the addition of some - if you
will excuse me - of the sociological cate-
gories that belong to the old materialist
interpretation of history. You have spoken
of positions of social power, of intentions
that flow from them, of a public interpre-
tation of existence that is combined with
these positions of power and intentions,
of further factors in this context: What is
this but a materialistic interpretation of
history advanced once more with extra-
ordinary refinement and brilliance?' 59

Weber concludes that this 'sublimated intellectualism' can only lead
to the same results as 'the vulgarised intellectualism that is adhered
to by the old materialist interpretation of history'.

However, the notion that Mannheim is committed to the materialist
interpretation of history is contested by Werner Sombart, the next
speaker, who argues that Mannheim
'Is no longer influenced by the materialist interpretation of history . . . and indeed so detached from it that he does not make the objectivity of existence dependent upon the subjects of knowledge - that is what is decisive - and that, above all, he does not dispute the reality of the mind. For the materialist philosophy of history there is no reality of the mind; this is only a reflection of the economy. If I have correctly understood the referent, then he firmly maintains, in contrast to the materialist interpretation of history, firstly that there is an objectivity of existence and secondly that there exists a reality of the mind. Is that the case? (Dr. Mannheim agrees).’

But though Sombart agrees broadly with the Seinsverbunderheit argument he has reservations about the problem of the universal validity of knowledge. Indeed he suggests that 'one of the most essential achievements of our age' is that 'it has separated the problem of objectivity and that of universal validity which we see in Kant to be still bound together'. Sombart points to two attempts to solve the problem of universal validity in the present period. The first attempt, the philosophical one, starts out from the conviction that

'the world is knowable and that there exists an objective determinate entity, hence a specific object of knowledge and is convinced that knowledge of this object - the world - can be approached from different sides. And these sides are the personal standpoint of the individual thinker.'

This accounts, Sombart argues, for the diversity of philosophical systems.

The second attempt to solve the problem of universal validity occurs in the modern natural sciences. In Sombart's view the modern natural sciences 'do not seek to know the essence of things but rather . . . they seek to order phenomena . . . according to functional and, in part, fictional considerations'. Hence, they merely seek to create an order-
This is perhaps another indication of the astonishing ignorance of the natural sciences among social scientists in this period, an ignorance that is all the more remarkable in view of the widespread discussion, for instance, far beyond the confines of science, of the theory of relativity. Sombart's presentation of the philosophical 'solution' to the problem of universal-validity, on the other hand, finds its echo in Mannheim's perspectivism, which is perhaps most pronounced in Ideologie und Utopie (Mannheim had finished writing this volume by the time this conference took place in September, 1928).

Sombart's main concern, however, is with the cultural sciences and his remaining argument concerns the role of values there. Sombart takes up a positivist position on the role of values by asserting the impossibility of evaluations even achieving universal validity and in his assertion that the cultural sciences must commence from the postulate of value-freedom since

''consideration of values is ultimately a personal matter. The postulate of value-freedom has nothing to do with a relativization of values. Values remain absolute; they are objective. Evaluations, however, are personal and hence socially and historically determined and lack universal validity.'' 63

This does not mean, Sombart continues, that we should not recognise that the choice of problems is value-determined or that our object of study contains values. The relevance of this whole argument for Mannheim's paper is that Sombart argues that Mannheim has contributed to the 'psychology of value-freedom' in so far as he asserted that 'the standpoint of value-freedom is ultimately an emanation of liberal convictions'. But Sombart argues that even when he himself adopted a
Marxist position he also took up a value-free position.

Related themes were taken up by Wilbrandt, the next contributor. Firstly, Wilbrandt suggests that the audience were astonished to find Mannheim advancing an argument which increasingly replaced philosophy with the social sciences. Wilbrandt suggests that Mannheim's paper reminded him of Schmoller's contribution to the Werturteilsstreit. The struggle of values, one with another, was for Schmoller 'a kind of Darwinism on the intellectual level'. It occurred to Wilbrandt that Mannheim's arguments concerning competition between different world interpretations must refer to hostile and not to peaceful competition since the purpose is surely the hegemony of one world interpretation over another. Mannheim at this point objects that 'compromise situations' exist.

Secondly, Wilbrandt attempts to clarify Mannheim's relationship to historical materialism since he had been both accused of being a historical materialist and applauded for distancing himself from it. In fact, Wilbrandt suggests, most significantly, that 'in a private conversation this lunchtime, Mannheim has spoken about this and stated that Marx has influenced him but, as he said, in association with Dilthey's spirit'. Wilbrandt argues that what Mannheim shares with Marx is the notion that man does not think for himself alone but in a social situation and thinks differently according to the social situation.

In his remarks on Mannheim's paper, Jerusalem - perhaps the most significant adherent of a positivist sociology of knowledge in Germany - is extremely brief. He argues that Mannheim has raised some of the most
important issues affecting sociology as a discipline. He then goes on to interpret what Mannheim has said in terms of his own perspective and in particular, in contrast to von Wiese, in terms of his notion of a collectivity - 'that form of life where human beings as bearers of a collective mind are bound together mentally'. However, illuminating this may be for Jerusalem's own position, he hardly addresses himself to Mannheim's paper.

Singer, in his comments on Mannheim's paper, first of all takes up a substantive issue, namely whether his analysis of competition of world views, taken as it is from a market model of society, is not thereby limited in its application and whether the notion of 'social strata' employed by Mannheim is as unambiguous as he seems to believe. However, Singer does agree that the decisive question is what the social determination of a world view says about its validity. At this level, Singer argues, sociology must be philosophical - in contrast to those who seek to exclude such issues from sociology.

Emil Lederer, Mannheim's colleague in Heidelberg, defends him against Weber's attack by arguing that Mannheim excluded the sphere of validity from his analysis and that the notion of creativity and its source has nothing to do with Mannheim's assertions. At the substantive level, Lederer argues that 'a certain competition amongst strata is the basis and precondition for intellectual productivity itself'. Further, he claims that this productivity and creativity is not something arbitrary but rather 'it must have quite concrete preconditions for its existence and realisation'.

The three succeeding commentaries by Adolf Löwe (a friend of Mannheim's), Alfred Meusel and Norbert Elias all take up central issues in Mannheim's sociology of knowledge. Löwe argues that the existential boundedness of knowledge 'exists in all periods' but the recognition of this determination has taken on a distinctive form in our present age. Furthermore, one can be more specific and argue that it is the sociological boundedness of knowledge which is not only peculiar to our present age but that, in its self-consciousness, it constitutes 'revolutionary knowledge'—through it, the real dynamics of social phenomena are grasped in the realm of knowledge, a social and political tension is carried over into the theoretical sphere. Löwe goes so far as to suggest that it is revolutionary in a further sense that it restructures not only the theoretical world image but also social reality itself, whose tension has destroyed the time-honoured stasis of thought.

This sense of a revolutionary change in our approach to the social world also permeates Elias' contribution who argues that Mannheim's thought is 'in a quite specific manner, revolutionary, not in the sense of a socialist or social revolution but in the sense of an intellectual revolution. These thoughts are the expression of a shattering of that intellectual position which has hitherto been the dominant one.' Mannheim's paper represents not merely a new theory but is the expression of a specific feeling of life (Lebensgefühl). Hence, Mannheim's notion of the 'consensus' of an age signifies that we experience nature, for example, in a distinctive way and cannot do otherwise. This is over and above that naive notion of consensus concerning, for example, the fact that \[2 \times 2 = 4.\]
A somewhat more critical contribution is provided by Alfred Meusel who takes up Mannheim's relationship to Marx and the contradiction between Weber's and Sombart's views on that relationship. In contrast to the latter speakers, Meusel argues that one of the strengths of Mannheim's paper is precisely that it is influenced by Marx. However, against Mannheim's view, Meusel argues that Marx looked at the question of how 'correct, adequate knowledge of social existence' was possible given the social boundedness of thought, i.e. anything but an interest-free approach. Meusel goes on to argue that Marx located this 'correct' and 'adequate' knowledge within a specific group in society whose subjective values and objective situation were identical. Nonetheless, Meusel concludes by praising Mannheim's paper and his other works in this area.

The two final contributions to the discussion by Jonas and Eppstein concentrate upon the philosophical and methodological aspects of Mannheim's paper. Of central importance is Jonas's contribution. Jonas raises three problems associated with Mannheim's paper and the ensuing discussion. He asks whether Mannheim's position is, as Alfred Weber argues, one of intellectualism. In reply, Jonas maintains that

'The idea of an existentially bounded knowledge, knowledge concerning the existential boundedness of intellectual positions, as such certainly implies the functionalisation of knowledge in terms of the totality of human beings, of existence in the totality of their involvements with reality - indeed not solely in material reality . . . Functionalisation in terms of the real situation thus implies in fact the replacement of the old concept of the "theoretical subject", of the abstractness of "consciousness as such" which is nothing other than a pure cognitive subject
with a completely new agent of knowledge which is, in contrast, the whole, historical human being and for whom the ideal of the absolute universal validity of knowledge - precisely in the sense in which Sombart has developed it - is no longer conceivable at all. 67

Theoretical forms, as partial phenomena, are thus to be related back to the 'total facticity of human beings'. The whole of this argument advanced by Jonas in support of Mannheim is, as we have seen, developed in detail in Mannheim's two unpublished essays discussed earlier. 68

Jonas continues by raising the question concerning the relevance of this functionalisation of thought for the validity of knowledge. A relativistic reductionism is possible, Jonas maintains,

"If the concern is with a one-sided functionalisation in terms of the economic-material situation, ultimately in terms of the mere givenness of drives - and hence estranged from the mind - rather than in terms of the total situation: then, in fact, the actual claim to truth of intellectual forms as mere "ideological superstructure" are at the same time annulled by this relativisation. But the concern is with the total situation, in which the intellectual cosmos itself, as a moment of the total facticity, is already associated with it as an initial precondition." 69

Hence, rather than reducing intellectual phenomena to a material base, it is possible to view them as co-constituents of the totality. By means of their relativisation to the total situation, their validity is not destroyed but rather their absolute claim to truth is qualified by the historical, social total context. With regard to the annulment of absolute truth claims, Jonas argued that

"This annulment, carried out in the form of the arrangement of one-sided partial aspects in a comprehensive synthesis"
that transcends their exclusiveness ... is possible - this annulment of a necessarily "false" absolutization through its functionalization in terms of a historical actual situation is thus, to a certain extent, in fact a preservation of the truth content of a temporally and socially conditioned theory and in no way its negation. 70

This interpretation of the truth contents of a theory in terms of their relationship to a total synthesis, is, of course, subsequently extended by Mannheim in Ideologie und Utopie to ideologies. Here, however, Jonas does not allude to ideologies.

Finally, Jonas asks where the existential boundedness of a system of knowledge is particularly obvious. On much less firm ground, Jonas argues that there exists in any world view an 'unavoidable excess' of assertions that go beyond what can be factually asserted. Here, he argues, we are confronted with the apriori assertions of metaphysics. A sociology of knowledge can, he argues, also annul the absolute nature of the dogmatic apriori by revealing its social basis. These aspects of the world view, thus 'purified', can be made fruitful by the researcher who 'belongs to the "free-floating" intellectual strata that is not itself engaged in group conflicts'. 71

Jonas's contribution is significant in that, at least as far as the first two problems are concerned, he raises issues in the sociology of knowledge that have remained central to subsequent controversies surrounding its status. Though not specifically referring either to a mechanistic Marxism or to Scheler's sociology of knowledge, he does point to the reductionism that is evident in both positions and indeed to the implicit alienation
of the mind’ thesis. Again, in the second issue which he raises, Jonas points to a possible way out of this reductionism. However, with regard to his third problem, his conception of the sociology of knowledge as a neutral purifier of world views, whilst not dissimilar to that presented by Mannheim, retains these positivist presuppositions about the relationship between fact and values that were incorporated into subsequent positivist critiques of ideology as advanced by such writers as Geiger. 72

Unlike Jonas, Eppstein’s comments do, in part, touch upon the role of ideology in Mannheim’s paper. Eppstein suggests that ‘Mannheim combines phenomenological vision with dialectical method; his methodological position is a synthesis of phenomenological observation and dialectical-dynamic thought’. 73 This enable Mannheim to overcome the weakness of a ‘statically conceived phenomenology’. Eppstein’s major concern, however, is with the problem of attributing partiality to ‘relativised (relation-ized) perspectives and standpoints’ and then taking this partiality to be the constituent feature of the ideologization of thought. Eppstein argues that one does not need to take the partial aspect itself to be ideological.

In his concluding remarks to the discussion, Mannheim himself takes up methodological issues associated with the sociology of knowledge as well as attempting to confront some of the controversy surrounding his paper. Mannheim suggests at the outset that the major questions which his paper raised were thrown into the background in the ensuing discussion, but not because there was already a consensus surrounding them. Within the context of sociology itself, Mannheim argues that he tried to
deal with strictly sociological issues for a specific reason:

'It is indeed to be recommended that the methodological, voluntaristic, evaluative, metaphysical and epistemological, on the one hand, be separated from the purely sociological on the other, not because they are separated in the objective world (in reality they are ... connected together) but because, in the clarification of problems, a provisional separation of these spheres is perhaps advisable.' 74

However, Mannheim goes on to suggest that, nonetheless, these evaluative, metaphysical questions 'are today for us in fact perhaps the decisive ones'.

As an instance, Mannheim attempts to answer the question as to whether his own position is basically a materialist or idealist one. From his paper it should be clear, Mannheim argues,

'that I hold the synthetic in a specific relationship to be the best of what occurs in the historical process, that I am of the opinion that precisely in the synthesis tensions will suddenly be relatively overcome that were still untranscendable for a previous epoch, i.e. that a third aspect is found where one suddenly realises that in fact these distinctions: matter-spirit, freedom-determination etc. cannot be absolutised. This cannot imply that both parties and both aspects are in the right but rather that somewhere in the social process and intellectual system one can be free to realise certain synthetic insights. Perhaps you will be dissatisfied when I say: I am neither a materialist nor an idealist but rather I still believe in the creative freedom within the absolute sphere in an exclusively material determination.' 75

Mannheim suggests that what concerns him as a sociologist of knowledge is why people should wish to view the world within these polarities. In order not to absolutize such polarities, Mannheim seeks a synthesis of what is valuable in a mechanistic and an idealist model: 'The solution, which I have provisionally found, consists in the fact that each of the conflicting parties hypostatizes a partial aspect'. The mechanistic
viewpoint hypostatizes an objective reality, the idealist viewpoint hypostatizes the subject of knowledge (perhaps in the form of a free moral decision).

In methodological terms, this duality lies at the centre of the discussion of the relationship between the natural and human sciences.

Here Mannheim argues that

'the justification of duality (or plurality) of intellectual methods does not lie in the sphere of the object but rather that there already exists, for example, in the intellectual sphere itself a specific sphere that is 'free', that is not apprehensible by 'mechanistic' models, but is another sphere that is still subject to a specific mechanism.' 76

However, for Mannheim, the deterministic and free elements that co-exist in the intellectual realm do not allow him 'to seek only understanding, only freedom in the intellectual realm and perhaps erect the comparisons: nature = necessity, mind = freedom'. Rather, Mannheim points to the danger in the human sciences in Germany of reducing everything to interpretation, to a 'deeper meaning' - a danger that he sees existing in politics too. In terms of methodology, one must sometimes use formal concepts to deal with intellectual phenomena - even though they may not perfectly fit the phenomena as it appears to us - since 'there exists in intellectual things too, structures that are subject to a "mechanical apparatus" and, when it is a matter of apprehending them, then one must apply formalised concepts'. This is the source of the two major attacks upon the sociology of knowledge: that it is too formalised and that it introduces the functionalization of ideas in terms of other mechanisms. But, Mannheim argues, 'if I wish to explain functional
connections in the intellectual sphere then I must formalise; if I only wish to understand them then I can rest content with historical, individual, intuitive concepts'. What this implies for the debate surrounding Verstehen is, for Mannheim, 'that understanding justifiably exists in fact in a specific sphere of the intellectual realm and represents a method sui generis but that in the humanities it is not merely to be understood but also to be explained'.

What Mannheim in fact hopes for from the sociology of knowledge is that it will synthesize the two approaches which he sees at present as being polarised:

'What I have in mind is a synthetic situational analysis which . . . , viewed from the social and intellectual movement of forces, is at least as possible and necessary as the polarisation itself. Thus, I aspire - to put it briefly - to give life once more to the basic desire for value-freedom. Not, however, in order to realise with a single blow scientific objectivity in the humanities and social science in the old all too intellectualised manner (which will not succeed) but rather in order to gradually bring this objectivity, on the basis of an exact scientific analysis that focuses upon it, whose problems and methods we must first investigate step by step, closer to solution.'

Here, perhaps more clearly than in his published works, Mannheim reveals the close connection between his programme for a sociology of knowledge and the disputes surrounding methodology and value-judgments. Mannheim sees the sociology of knowledge as gradually affording a solution to both disputes.
Though these are Mannheim’s concluding remarks on the discussion of his paper, it is worthwhile pursuing his views on methodology a little further since on the following day he himself contributed to the discussion of Werner Sombart’s paper on ‘Das Verstehen’. His remarks there in many ways constitute a continuation of some of the issues he himself had raised in his concluding comments on the previous day.

Mannheim views the discussion of the problem of understanding to have been more fruitfully advanced by individual researchers in the humanities and social sciences than by philosophers since the latter are, he argues, thoroughly caught up in a pre-given system of thought. Hence the value of Sombart’s paper as one who works on actual interpretative social research. However, Mannheim sees a number of difficulties arising from Sombart’s presentation. The first is his apparently sharp separation between ‘motive’ and ‘idea’. Without entering into the content of Sombart’s paper, it is still instructive to follow Mannheim’s critique at this point since he raises general issues concerning the problem of interpretation. The problem associated with the separation of ‘idea’ and ‘motive’ lies in the fact that

‘on the one hand, one provides an objectivated (which implies a desubjectivated) context of the creations of the mind that are to be understood through it and a principle resting upon it, a principle that develops out of itself, the ‘idea’; on the other, however, purely subjective processes and an infinite number of subjective motivations. Both of these two discrepant groups of phenomena, however, are related to one another and yet nonetheless cannot be brought together in our theories.’

The reason for this persistent separation has been the ‘completely diverse
intellectual paradigms' for dealing with each of them. Max Weber, for example, attempted to throw out the 'idea' and operate only with 'subjectively intended meaning' ('motive' in Sombart's sense). In contrast, Mannheim sees Sombart as attempting to preserve the 'idea' as something timeless, perhaps as an eternal Platonic essence. But ideas are never timeless. Mannheim takes 'the spirit of capitalism' as an instance of an 'idea' in sociological research. The problem here is not, Mannheim argues, that such a 'spirit' exists but rather 'in what kind of existence this phenomenon exists', in its 'specific mode of existence'.

An extreme nominalist like Max Weber will only allow the existence of this spirit in inverted commas; one cannot apprehend this 'spirit' if one starts out from 'subjectively intended meaning'. This spirit remains even though subjectively intended meanings change and even though it is manifested through them. On the other hand, one should not be tempted to accept the converse - precisely what Weber sought to avoid - namely, that the 'idea' can be formulated as 'something pre-existent, pre-formed'. An undue emphasis upon either pole prevents us from adequately describing the relationships between 'the so-called "real" and "ideal" factors of history'. One may indeed be led to interpret new phenomena inadequately in a conservative manner in the sense that they are always interpreted in terms of the past and not as the phenomena are actually experienced.

Mannheim offers a new paradigm for dealing with the 'idea', one that does not have to choose between 'psychologically apprehendable, subjectively intended meaning, on the one hand, and the existentially transcendent timeless 'idea' that can be apprehended only in ideation', on
the other. The predominant relationships must be examined as far as
their genuine qualities are concerned until we can detect their relevance
in subjectively intended meaning. At the same time, one must avoid
any 'illusion as to pre-existence and pre-formation' of the 'idea' in
order to preserve the genuine objectivity of the idea. Mannheim is quite
clear that 'the objective "spirit" of an epoch cannot be reduced to the
sum of the subjective intentions of isolated individuals'.79 Mannheim
bases this model of interpretation upon Fiedler's theory of art in which
the 'idea' that an artist works with is not pregiven but 'emerges in the
creative process'. It emerges as the artist works upon his materials.
Such a model for interpretation was already evident in Mannheim's un-
published essays. It is also reminiscent of Lukács' discussion in his
'Heidelberger Philosophie der Kunst' and especially in his essay
'Geschichtlichkeit und Zeitlosigkeit des Kunstwerks',80 which, as we
have seen, Mannheim had long been acquainted with.

If we take the debate over Mannheim's paper and his contribution to the
discussion of Sombart's paper at the same conference together, what is
their significance for the development of the sociology of knowledge in
Germany? The 1928 debate at the Zürich congress constituted the
major public sociological discussion of the sociology of knowledge in
Weimar Germany. As in the earlier Scheler-Adler discussion, the
relationship between the sociology of knowledge and Marxism is taken up
by many participants and is the focal point of Alfred Weber's attack on
Mannheim. But interestingly enough, this aspect of the discussion does
not take the form of a contrast between the sociology of knowledge and
the Marxist critique of ideology. This discussion only commenced in
earnest after the publication of Ideologie und Utopie in the following year -
though Mannheim had already completed the writing of the volume by the
time he gave his paper on competition. Instead, the discussion on
Marxism again, as in 1924, takes the form of an attack upon some naive
notion of historical materialism. It does not confront the positions of
writers like Lukács and Korsch.

More obviously than the 1924 discussion, the debate surrounding Mannheim’s
paper centres around the relationship between the sociology of knowledge and
the Methodenstreit and, to a lesser extent, the Werturteilsstreit. This is,
in part, the result of Mannheim’s explicit attempt in his paper to illustrate
the relevance of the Seinsverbundenheit thesis for the social sciences.
But as is clear from the comments of some of the participants, the sociol-
ogy of knowledge was seen as forging nothing less than an intellectual
revolution in the social sciences and humanities. It was seen as a new
mode of interpretation of phenomena which relied not merely upon tradition-
al hermeneutic methods but also empirical social science. In this respect,
it could be seen as forming a significant bridge between the natural and
cultural sciences as understood, for example, by neo-Kantian philosophers.
It was thus clearly viewed by some as bringing about a paradigm shift in
the humanities and social sciences. In Mannheim’s remarks on the
problem of understanding, too, this is quite explicit.

The new and challenging significance of the sociology of knowledge is also
the theme of an article published in 1929 by Alexander von Schelting: ‘Zum
Streit um die Wissenssoziologie’. At the very start of the article, von
Schelting proclaims that ‘the sociology of knowledge . . . today undoubtedly
stands at the forefront of sociological cognitive interests and that this interest will be 'even more lively' as a result of the Zürich conference discussion which itself 'also forms the starting point for the following remarks'.

However, von Schelting's paper is largely concerned with an exposition of Alfred Weber's contribution to the sociology of knowledge which is not our concern here. Indeed, although von Schelting makes out a case for the significance of Alfred Weber's sociology of culture, it is difficult to see how it played a major role in the sociology of knowledge in this period. Indirectly, we can see Weber's influence upon Mannheim's early Heidelberg writings and von Schelting in fact argues that the basic categories in Mannheim's 'Historismus' article are grounded in Alfred Weber's work. Later, in the following decade, the study by Norbert Elias of the process of civilization utilizes Weber's categories of culture and civilization. But these categories are not peculiar to Weber and were indeed shared by many other writers in the pro-First World War era and constitute part of the social philosophical presuppositions of much Lebensphilosophie in that period.

Von Schelting seeks to argue that Alfred Weber's sociology of culture provides a middle ground between the ahistorical immanent interpretation of cultural phenomena and a deterministic sociologism. In particular, he highlights the dangers of the Marxist thesis of 'the ideological character of all intellectual forms' which results in an unreconcilable conflict between a 'bourgeois' and a 'proletarian' explanatory context. On the other hand, he takes the essence of the sociological standpoint as that
of a 'concern with the "totality" of historical-social events, that it does not isolate historical phenomena but rather has to interpret them in their "placement" or "embeddedness" in the total context of an age, a culture, the "living whole" of a society etc."  However, the precise relationship to these totalities is most varied and sociology has hardly clarified it successfully. In this context, then, it is all the more surprising that von Schelting should go on to explicate Alfred Weber's contribution to this area since the vagueness of his categories of culture and civilization could themselves hardly clarify the relationship between historical phenomena and the totality within which they are to be located. In the light of these reservations, and von Schelting's failure to take up directly Mannheim's competition paper, his own contribution will not be dealt with further at this point.

The second subsequent article on Mannheim's competition paper by Alfred Meusel - who had already commented briefly at the 1928 congress - does explicitly discuss Mannheim's contribution. Meusel agrees with Mannheim that in the study of cultural phenomena 'the interpretation cannot remain purely ideological, it must become a sociological one'. Nonetheless, Meusel suggests that Mannheim did not extract all that he could from his theme since he starts out from problems of intellectual history or philosophy and not from economics or another social science. This would lead him into a concern not merely with a sophisticated philosophical viewpoint but also with 'practical everyday life'. Since he cannot adequately deal with the latter he bridges the two spheres 'with the emergency bridge of a mere assertion concerning their inner connection'.
In contrast, Meusel argues that it is necessary to investigate why the competition between strata leads to competition of intellectual positions. Mannheim possesses too great a desire for synthesis such that, Meusel argues, it is too easy to say that every intellectual direction provides us with a partial aspect of reality. Instead, we need to look at the wider context of competition and contrasting intellectual viewpoints. In the capitalist epoch, the economy forms an ens realissimum that sociology must examine. Mannheim is therefore correct in investigating the 'deep voluntaristic anchoredness of every theory' in the economy. But, Meusel contends, this requires us to think out the problem of value-freedom again since

"Insight into the existential boundedness of thought indeed indicates that individual directions are not merely distinguished from one another in their programmatic intentions that are external in origin, but in fact in the manner in which things are approached ... The personal element, however, that the supporter of value-freedom saw as being located in value-judgments and that one could, as a rule, easily exclude if one merely clearly distinguished the presentation of the existence (Sein) from that of the desire (Sollen) of particular wishes, penetrates knowledge in a much deeper, more basic, indeed more dangerous manner than was accepted at the time of the debate over value-judgments." 87

This requires us to think beyond the confines of Max Weber's solution, it requires 'a "demythologizing" cognitive sociology (the social science counterpart to Friedrich Nietzsche's "demythologizing" Psychology)'.
Meusel is highly critical of the attempts by Alfred Weber and Werner Sombart to deal with this question. He points to the inconsistency between Weber's acceptance of the Seinsverbundenheit thesis in relation to a contrast between Indian and European-American modes of thought but its rejection when the issue of "capitalism" as a single object is concerned. Similarly, Meusel argues that Sombart too, like Weber, adopts a position which 'has led to the abandonment of existential determination and a return to the value-freedom line'.

In contrast to these attempts to examine the relationship between the existential boundedness of thought and the universal validity of knowledge, Meusel suggests that Marx's neglected contribution to cognitive sociology should be re-examined. This involves the recognition that those in a dominant position in society or with an interest in its preservation will seek to avoid recognizing the reality of its development and that 'divergent social classes have divergent cognitive chances'. Meusel, however, raises two problems associated with such a position: firstly, that Marx underestimated the strength of illusions within the subordinate class and secondly that the notion of development presupposes the existence of a strata that can anticipate this development from a non-existentially bounded position. Ironically, these are also two central issues in Mannehim's Ideologie und Utopie which he attempts to solve by presupposing a 'relatively free-floating intelligentsia'.

Hence we can again legitimately suggest that von Schelting's and Meusel's contributions both attest to the widespread recognition that the Seinsverbundenheit thesis advanced by the sociology of knowledge must challenge
the foundations of sociology itself and that, especially in Meusel's comments, the sociology of knowledge must have as one of its central tasks the opening up of the methodological disputes which raged in Germany before the First World War. Both the extent to which the sociology of knowledge rendered problematic the bases of social scientific thought and the extent to which the sociology of knowledge itself held a problematic position within the social sciences were amongst the persistent themes of the reception of Mannheim's *Ideologie und Utopie* which forms the third 'debate' and to which we must now turn.

IV

Despite the extensive nature of the reviews of Mannheim's *Ideologie und Utopie*, they possess a number of important characteristics which suggests that certain groups were particularly interested in his work. Furthermore, despite the wide scope of many of the reviews, Mannheim himself only replied directly to one of the earlier and more hostile reviews, that of Curtius. Between 1929 and 1932 no less than five articles appeared in *Die Gesellschaft* - a left-wing Social Democratic journal founded by Rudolf Hilferding - which dealt with Mannheim's *Ideologie und Utopie*, of which three were major reviews (those of Tillich, Arendt and Marcuse) and two others (by Kleinberg and Speier) which took up aspects of his work. Three other reviews by Wittfogel and Fogarasi constituted the relatively orthodox Marxist response to *Ideologie und Utopie*. Another Marxist review was provided by Ernst Lewalter. The major sociology journals also contained reviews of *Ideologie und Utopie*.
by Plessner (Kölner Vierteljahreshefte für Soziologie), Fritz Stern (Archiv für Sozialwissenschaften) Julius Kraft (Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Soziologie) and Karl Dunckmann (Archiv für angewandte Soziologie). Critiques of Mannheim's work were also published by Siegfried Marck and by Landshut in his Kritik der Soziologie. The early Frankfurt School provided a critique by Max Hokheimer and the already-mentioned review by Marcuse (though he was not, strictly speaking, a member of the group until later). Adorno's critical comments on Mannheim are scattered in his early works (e.g. his Antrittsvorlesung in 1931).

What is noticeable about these reviews is that only Helmuth Plessner can lay claim to having been a contributor to the sociology of knowledge in Germany. Thus, aside from the philosophical reviews of Mannheim's work and, occasionally, those by a social scientist (e.g. Landshut), the remainder of the reviews came from writers within the Marxist tradition. Nor could one say that these reviews were vulgar critiques of Mannheim's position. Most of them took Mannheim's arguments in Ideologie und Utopie very seriously and felt it necessary to critically confront them. This may be interpreted either as the result of the fact that Mannheim provided a convincing critique of the Marxist position that had to be answered or that Mannheim utilized many of the arguments already employed by Marxists (e.g. Lukács) within the context of a radical reorientation of the social sciences which challenged, necessarily, the basis for a Marxist social science. Although many of these writers recognised the value of Mannheim's work - and especially in its relation to contemporary theoretical and practical problems - this did not prevent them from remaining highly critical of it. Because of the continuation of their tradition,
this is most obvious in the case of key members of the Frankfurt School who, from the very outset when Mannheim was himself at Frankfurt from 1930 to 1933, consistently opposed the whole project of a sociology of knowledge - however close it might be in some respects to their own tradition and central themes.

A further consequence of the wide Marxist interest in Mannheim's work is that it would ensure that one of the central issues taken up in relation to Ideologie und Utopie was the relationship between the sociology of knowledge and the critique of ideology - especially as Mannheim argued that the former had superceded the latter. This is true not merely, as one would expect, from critiques by authors like Horkheimer, but also for the penetrating review by Plessner who could by no means be termed a Marxist. The relationship between the sociology of knowledge and the critique of ideology has, in fact, remained one of the central areas of dispute surrounding the sociology of knowledge and must be examined further in the next chapter.

For the moment, it is useful to examine one of the earliest reviews of Ideologie und Utopie - that by Ernst Curtius - since it was the only review to which Mannheim replied. Curtius' critique - entitled 'Soziologie - und ihre Grenzen' - is, as its title suggests, concerned to restrict sociology's intervention in the Geisteswissenschaften. It is also written from a radical conservative standpoint. Curtius starts out by hoping that German sociology will not play the same radical political and ideological role that it did in France during the Third Republic since it would be discredited as a legitimate individual discipline. However, what specifically
concerns Curtius is that Mannheim seeks to transform this particular discipline into a universal science which will give a new meaning to the totality of historical events. *Ideologie und Utopie* raises 'nothing less than the question of the function of the mind in the present world' since it asks how it is possible to think and live once the problem of ideology and utopia has been radically confronted. But, Curtius argues, this is merely 'a variant of . . . European nihilism, i.e. a state of mind of uprooted intellectual strata that has already been described by Nietzsche'. Hence, rather than see Mannheim's work as something historically specific and new, it is merely 'a temporally bounded form of scepticism that belongs to the constants of intellectual history'.

Nonetheless, Curtius maintains that Mannheim's views must be countered since he falsely evaluates change (as positive) and stasis (as negative) 'in the wake of modern philosophies of life'. Mannheim's views are a danger to 'German youth'; a critique of sociologism is essential to preserve German science and universities. We must insist, Curtius argues, upon the importance of the 'unique person' when we examine from various directions the 'essential determination of human beings'. Curtius in fact favours the development of a philosophical anthropology along the lines already advanced by Max Scheler - presumably because it, too, is concerned with essences and metaphysics. This is in contrast to Mannheim's position which Curtius sees as resting upon the 'irrational experience' of Kierkegaard and mysticism. Ultimately, Curtius views Mannheim's argument as one that seeks to replace philosophy with sociology and to provide 'a theory and metaphysics of knowledge'.
But there is one area of Ideologie und Utopie which particularly impresses Curtius, namely, his 'outstanding analysis of the sociological problem of the intelligentsia'. The analysis of the free-floating intelligentsia, however, cannot remain at the sociological level but must return to an idealist standpoint. In other words,

'The sociological analysis of the intellectual stratum must be completed by a philosophy of the mind. The mind can only recognise itself, however, in the collective display of its forms. Temporally, it is rooted in the past. Yet to the consciousness of the mind itself it is given as the eternal present. Hence it is neither ideological nor utopian to believe that the intellectual, if he understands himself, must experience this transcendence as reality and prove it in this existence.' 108

However one may judge Mannheim's account in Ideologie und Utopie, it is certainly directed against such intellectualist absolutization of the mind.

But as Ringer has shown, views such as those of Curtius were common among the German 'mandarins', especially in the Geisteswissenschaften. Mannheim's reply to Curtius in a later issue of the same journal is, in part, an attempt to locate the problems of German sociology within a social and historical context - and is, quite possibly, a reworking of his unpublished Habilitationsvorlesung of 1926 - as well as a detailed critique of Curtius' attack. The earlier section of this article has already been referred to in the opening chapter and need not concern us here. In his remarks specifically addressed to Curtius's review, Mannheim does concede that the sociology of knowledge is indeed concerned with the irrational since it seeks to show

'by means of empirical research those positions in all tendencies of thought in the humanities, social sciences, and in politics which have their roots in the irrational and, by means of
conclusive analysis, of pursuing the question how taking such positions comes through even in the categorial apparatus."  

This irrational element is thus responsible for the inevitable nature of the element of Weltanschauung as to a certain extent a structural determinant of a particular area of thought: so-called "existence-related thinking". In turn, his 'existentiality' is seen as a determinant stemming from irrationality and Weltanschauung. Finally, these features taken together are presumably responsible for the one sidedness of certain aspects of all points of view and of all parties and this must be revealed by a sociology of knowledge.

Secondly, Mannheim seeks to counter Curtius' charge of nihilism by contrasting his own 'dynamic relationism' which invites every position for once to call itself in question and to suspend the self-hypostatization that is a habit of though self-evident to everybody. As a result, the sociology of knowledge and the analysis of ideology will be able to demonstrate that almost all historical and social positions can be shown up in their existentiality. This radical thinking through and Cartesian questioning is, Mannheim argues, neither the nihilism nor 'spiritual spinelessness' that Curtius claims it to be.

Finally, on the question of the relationship between sociology and philosophy, Mannheim expressly claims that he does 'not wish to replace philosophy by sociology. . . I am not only not against but expressly for metaphysics and ontology, and even teach their indispensability for an existence-related empiricism. . . I am only opposed
to the presence of metaphysics which is not recognised and thus can serenely absolutize particulars. 1

Indeed, Mannheim specifically praises Heidegger's ontology as 'one of the most decisive achievements of contemporary philosophy'. In the end, Mannheim is perhaps most opposed to the notion of pure autonomy of philosophy, as if other disciplines cannot take up its problems, for instance, for fear of being accused, in the case of sociology, of sociologism.

On no other occasion did Mannheim publicly reply to his critics. Had he done so, he would certainly have had more difficulties with some of the other reviews of _Ideologie und Utopie_ since they are much more concerned with a detailed critical analysis of his work than is Curtius' attack on Mannheim. However, Curtius' review does illustrate what was probably a by no means untypical response from conservatives in the humanities. Mannheim's reply is also significant in that he again shows clearly the ultimately scientistic element of his programme for a sociology of knowledge that by empirical analysis, will reveal and presumably correct 'irrationality', _Weltanschauung_ and 'existentiality' in intellectual standpoints.

However, the present task is to examine the various responses to _Ideologie und Utopie_. In so doing, it will not be possible, for reasons of space, to examine all those reviews which merely touch upon specific aspects of Mannheim's work such as Speier on the intelligentsia or Kleinberg on his sociology of culture. Rather, the philosophical, sociological and Marxist reception of _Ideologie und Utopie_ will be broadly examined, even though the boundaries between these areas, particularly where the sociology
of knowledge is concerned, are difficult to draw. The three 'philosophical' reviews examined are those of Hannah Arendt, Siegfried Marck and Paul Tillich, the three 'sociological' reviews are those of Günther Stern, Julius Kraft and Helmuth Plessner, and the three 'Marxist' reviews are those of Ernst Lewalter, Adalbert Fogarasi and Karl Wittfogel. Finally, the 'neo-Marxist' reviews of Herbert Marcuse and Max Horkheimer will be discussed. Though this list of reviews is not exhaustive, it does hopefully cover the most significant responses to Mannheim's Ideologie und Utopie.

Hannah Arendt's review specifically sets out to examine the philosophical aspects of Mannheim's work and the implications it has for philosophy.

Mannheim's central thesis of the Standortgebundenheit of thought and his lack of commitment to anyone of these Standorten immediately raises the question as to the possibility of Standortlosigkeit as such. After destroying various philosophies' absolute claims to validity and indeed those of theories about the world, Mannheim's sociology goes in search of reality, of what is useful for orientation towards the world ('Brauchbare zur Weltorientierung'). But as Arendt points out,

'the striving for world orientation, however, signifies from the outset insight into the relevance of the intellectual sphere; a decision for lack of standpoint, knowledge about the possible fruitfulness of neutrality. In any case, this decisively distinguishes Mannheim's position from that of Georg Lukács who certainly also destroys the intellectual sphere's absolutist claim but from a particular standpoint, that of the proletariat and who thereby, unnoticed and without reflection, substitutes the concept of interest that is correctly valid there (and is very fruitful in concrete interpretation).'

Instead, what Mannheim does is to inquire into the reality that lies behind
the intellectual sphere, into 'the possible genuine origin of the intellectual sphere'. Secondly, he sees all standpoints and all 'interpretations of existence' as orientations to a specific, historically given world. In other words, Mannheim is concerned at this level with the relationship between the ontic and the ontological. This Arendt sees as being a concern that is also paramount in the contemporary philosophies of Heidegger (the concern with the Sein des Seienden) and Jaspers (concern with Existenz), except that Mannheim's sociology is concerned 'with the emergent existence (das Seiende) that lies at the root of this "interpretation of existence" (Seinsauslegung)'. However, Mannheim's approach destroys the absolute distinction between the ontic and the ontological; the destruction of the absolutization of thought not merely takes place through its relativization but through its refutation: 'Its refutation is the demasking of consciousness derived from the unconditional as ideology (in the sense of "total ideology")'. This has an important implication for philosophy since,

'viewed sociologically, philosophy is thus no longer the reply to the question of the existence of the emergent (Sein des Seienden) but now only exists itself as enchained and confined to the world of the emergent and its possibilities for motivation, as one emergent entity amongst other...its claim to unconditionality rests upon the fact that it has forgotten its historical rootedness.'

Such a sociology thus radically questions those philosophies which are also concerned with the search for 'reality', with 'existence'.

Indeed, sociology moves in the opposite direction to such philosophies. It is not concerned with 'Being-in-the-world' (In-der-Welt-sein) as 'a formal structure of human existence as such' but with 'the respective
historically determinate world in which man lives at a certain time'. In itself this distinction between philosophical and sociological concerns is 'apparently harmless' unless sociology claims that philosophy cannot or is unable to examine this 'formal structure of human existence.' But at this point are confronted with a version of the 'powerlessness of the mind' thesis that Arendt sees as most evident in Scheler's work.

However, whereas Scheler was concerned with the powerlessness of the mind, Mannheim is concerned with the homelessness of the mind. This comes about, according to Arendt, in the following manner:

'Everything spiritual is interpreted either as ideology or utopia. Both, ideology just as much as utopia, "transcend existence", both arise from a consciousness "that does not find itself in accord with the existence that surrounds it." The mistrust of the mind that is observable in sociology and its attempt at destruction is the source of the homelessness to which the mind is condemned in our society. This homelessness and apparent uprootedness ("free-floating intelligentsia") makes everything intellectual suspicious from the very outset; a reality is sought after that is more basic than the mind itself and all intellectual products are to be interpreted or destroyed in relation to it. Here, destruction [Destruierung] does not simply mean destruction [Zerstörung] but the reduction of a claim to validity to that situation from which it has emerged.'

Arendt finds this destruction of the intellectual sphere to be not disimilar to that undertaken in psychoanalysis except that Mannheim's sociology of knowledge still leaves the situationally-bounded validity of the spiritual infact to a certain extent and, what is more decisive, the reality to which the intellectual sphere is reduced is a historical one which man creates or has created. But both sociology and psychology
require a fundamentally different mode of understanding than is recognized in the humanities: not a direct understanding that the interpreter takes to be what exists, not an immediate confrontation but a diversion via a reality that is taken by the interpreter to be more fundamental. 116

Even though the reality to which psychoanalysis refers is more estranged from the mind than that which concerns sociology, both conceive of the mind as primarily 'secondary, estranged from reality'.

The reduction of the intellectual sphere to a secondary status, and the tracing back of its objects to a prior historical reality prompts Arendt to inquire into the nature of this reality and, since it is historical, into the competence of sociology to carry out historical research. The reality to which the mental sphere is traced back is, for Mannheim, the 'concrete existent order of life' that is most clearly observable in particular types of 'economic-power structures'. Mannheim even sees in this existential boundedness a 'chance for knowledge' in that knowledge does not remain unlocated in some void. This reality to which the mind is reduced is a 'public existence' that is taken to be the world by its members. Only this existence can be historical since any other (birth, death, etc.) relates only to natural facts. But again, this reduction of the mind to a historical reality can only lead to its alienation since

In that sociology destroys, it already takes the mind to be homeless, i.e. as living in a world that is fundamentally estranged from it. The mind transcends this strange world and becomes ... ideology and utopia. 118

Hence, the interpretation of the Intellectual sphere as ideological or utopian assumes that 'Geist, as such, first exists when consciousness is no identical with the existence in which it is created.' False consciousness there-
fore arises when the categories for orientation to the world are not appropriate; that is, ideology and utopia are distinguished by their relevance for reality. Arendt concludes from this discussion of the 'reality' that sociology appeals to that it is not concerned 'simply with reality but rather with the reality that has power over the mind'.

The second question Arendt raises, that of sociology's status - or at least that of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge - can be seen in the light of the preceding analysis. As Arendt points out, 'sociology claims to be a "central science" (Zentralwissenschaft) because it alone is in a position to disclose the determinants of thought. But this claim, paradoxically, gives it 'a remarkable marginal character' since the mind (as ideology and utopia) is from the outset given as something homeless in the world and its possible freedom 'can only come to exist outside historical interaction', i.e. ahistorically. Geist therefore exists as an 'ultimate residue' that is transcendent and ahistorical since 'the reality of history is so understood that there remains no actual place for it within it'. From this Arendt concludes that sociology too has its historically bounded place at which it could first of all emerge: namely where a legitimate mistrust of the mind was awakened out of the homelessness of the mind. Hence, as a historical science, there is a quite definite limit to its historical competence. The interpretation of the intellectual sphere as its destruction into ideology and utopia first justifiably emerges where the economic sphere has extended itself so far that the mind can and must factually become "ideological superstructure".

The mind thus becomes homeless when its position is secured not by tradition (intellectual?) but by its reliance upon the economic sphere. As
Arendt points out, Mannheim speaks specifically only of the homelessness of the mind in the modern world.

Siegfried Marck, too, starts out from the problem of the existential boundedness of thought and this is indeed the title of his article. This existential boundedness implies the dependency of thought upon some real existence and stated in its simplest form can also imply a kind of epistemological determinism. The problems associated with this thesis have been more radically stated in sociology with the introduction of the concept of ideology. Marck refers back to Mannheim's paper on competition and argues that his introduction of the particular and total concepts of ideology has deepened the understanding of the Marxist interpretation of history. Marck attempts to show that what both Marxism and Mannheim's position have in common is:

'The thesis that specific knowledge and specific value-positions are to be functionalised in terms of a real human subject, that in a specific sphere social life-co-constitutes knowledge, that the mutually conflicting ideologies of a period compete for "possession of the public interpretation of existence" - these are the common assertion of the most modern type of sociology and of Marxism.'

But Mannheim's analysis of ideologies is to be distinguished from a Marxist one in that his conception refers to a value viewpoint (particular ideology) and to a world-view (total ideology). In the first case, we have a 'polemic against class-and domination-determined ethical and political value standpoints', in the latter a 'more theoretical attempt at the causal derivation of knowledge and especially of culture from economically given phenomena'. Marxism's polemical stance, Marck argues, prevents it from reflecting upon its own ideology and applying its concept to itself.
This Marck sees as having been performed by Mannheim to the extent of removing Marxism from its monopolistic position in relation to ideological critique. In another respect, too, Mannheim's position differs from the Marxist standpoint, namely in being concerned only with 'political, historical thought, knowledge in the humanities and social sciences as well as everyday thought' and not with natural scientific knowledge.

In another respect, however, 'close connections exist between the methodology of sociology of knowledge and the problem of dialectics'. Both seek to relativize absolutist claims through the relativization of the contents of knowledge as elements of a systematic totality. In the discussion of politics in *Ideologie und Utopie*, Mannheim sees the boundedness of standpoints as a source of creative insights but they produce only partial truths that must be corrected in a dialectical synthesis; that is, they are only partial moments of truth and the totality. Hence, Marck characterises the sociology of knowledge and of culture as a 'dialectical perspectivism'. However, unlike Hegel, the dialectical synthesis is not a fundamental law of the mind but is rather the attempt to search out chances of synthesis in the present social situation. Again, Marck sees this as particularly true of Mannheim's article on competition and, in a different way, in his attempt to secure 'a possible autonomy of the mind over against its socially manifested forms' via the intelligentsia.

But in an important respect, Mannheim's affinity with a dialectical approach is only apparent. Despite Mannheim's claims, Marck argues that his theory of the existential boundedness of thought in fact has affinities with sociologism as well as dialectics. In contrast, Marck argues that
the law of dialectics represents a dynamic basic law, that thereby the justification of ideal dialectics is asserted, that in this sphere there exists only a decision concerning the primacy of ideal and real dialectics. However, a real dialectics that does not recognise such a primacy, in fact no longer means a dialectics but transforms the dialectical law into sociological causality.124

As we have seen earlier, Marck argues that this argument and the consequent acceptance of a powerlessness of the mind thesis can be applied to Mannheim as well as to Scheler.

At a more substantive level, Marck is critical of Mannheim's distinction between ideology and utopia. One cannot distinguish between the two merely in terms of a distinction between immanence and transcendence since, as far as their existential determination is concerned, both are taken into account and 'transcendence by consciousness is, in the sociological method, in fact related to immanent social existence'. If this is true, then utopia is

not in fact characterised by its timelessness, its essential absolute character, its separation from existence. Hence, however, the distinction between ideology and utopia is relativised. If evolutionary ideology realistically orientates itself towards seizure of domination and power, then already prepared elements of opportunistic ideology are included in this utopia. The contrast between both structures, the criterion for their differentiation is then, in fact, merely abandoned to the future.125

This is indeed the option favoured by Mannheim who states that 'the criterion for ideology and utopia is realisation.' In this respect, Marck argues, Mannheim's argument comes very close to that of Marx and Lukács and 'the future becomes the undisputed judge of the content of contemporary consciousness.'
Paul Tillich's review of Ideologie und Utopie which, like Arendt's, also appeared in Die Gesellschaft and, in fact, alongside Marcuse's review, is a largely positive account of Mannheim's work. Tillich sees the book as of fundamental importance to sociologists and philosophers and, above all, socialists. Like Marck, however, he has serious reservations concerning Mannheim's distinction between ideology and utopia in terms of their transcendence of existence since it 'is in both cases something so different that it is only the sound - and not the meaning of the word-which creates an identity'. On the other hand, Tillich finds the relationship between absolute and relative utopias a fruitful distinction.

More problematical for Mannheim's theory, Tillich argues, is the notion of a total and general concept of ideology. Tillich suggests that the concept of ideology is not 'total' if one thesis is taken as being free from its rootedness in the ideological sphere, namely the thesis of a concrete dynamic truth. Nor can there be a 'general' concept of ideology if one strata - the intelligentsia - is excluded from its existential boundedness.

In terms of Mannheim's overall problematic, Tillich is favourably impressed and he suggests five areas of Mannheim's argumentation that should be extended further - that the concept of ideology should retain 'its concrete-political conflict-laden character' and that 'the particular and special concept of ideology should not be elevated into the general'; that one must ask how much ideology lies in one's own political theory, i.e. a plea for great self-criticism; that the dynamic notion of truth should be developed further but this cannot be done without there being presupposed 'at one point an absolute standpoint in existence and hence in thought'; that the latter may be developed out of the concept of 'cognitive chance' though
this may not necessarily, as in Mannheim's case, be the intelligentsia but might still be the proletarian social situation; finally, that one should not treat the ideological problem as something general and intellectual but as rooted in concrete social existence itself.

This brief overview of some of the philosophical reviews of *Ideologie und Utopie* should indicate the extent to which in this period philosophers were prepared to treat the problems raised by Mannheim's sociology of knowledge in a serious manner and did not find it too threatening to do so. However, it is significant that Arendt and Marck should point to the persistent weakness in this tradition, namely the tendency to uphold a thesis on the powerlessness of the mind when advancing propositions concerning the existential boundedness of thought. The concept of powerlessness was, of course, explicitly advanced by Scheler but Arendt also points to the importance of the homelessness of the mind thesis for Mannheim's analysis.

The 'sociological' reviews that will be examined are those of Günter Stern, Julius Kraft and Helmuth Plessner. Of these three articles, the review by Julius Kraft entitled 'Sociology or Sociologism' is the most hostile to Mannheim's work. Indeed, he starts out by asking whether the sociology of knowledge as a discipline is possible at all since 'sociology is certainly the (or, at least, a) theory of social phenomena and knowledge is in and for itself not a social phenomenon but a psychic one'. On the basis of this remarkable argument, Kraft argues both that the distinction between sociological and psychological phenomena is crucial and that this is the source of the persistent danger of sociologism, of the reduction of social phenomena to social facts, etc. Nor is Kraft certain in the case of
the sociology of knowledge whether 'what is at issue is a new empirical
science or a new philosophy'.

On the problem of ideology, Kraft suggests, without any grounds, that
instead of a distinction between the particular and total concept of ideology,
Mannheim should "distinguish between a psychological and an epistemolo-
gical principle of ideology". More seriously, he argues that Mannheim
does not satisfactorily solve the problem of recognising the ideological
nature of all standpoints. Kraft suggests that Mannheim's relationism
is also a form of relativism. Indeed he sees it as emanating from Scheler's
'functionalisation' of basic 'interpretations and agrees with Curtius that
Mannheim's own standpoint here is a fundamentally nihilistic one. Kraft
goes even further and suggests that Mannheim's position represents the
'dethroning of science and the enthroning of mysticism: What is real lies
in the "extra-historical-esthetic". Mannheim's position is contradictory
in that he wishes to proceed in a value-free manner whilst at the same time
seeing to provide a 'sociological diagnosis of the times' that will ultimately
lead to 'evaluation and to ontological decision'. Certainly Mannheim does
have considerable problems with his 'diagnosis of the times' but they are
not resolved merely by pointing to this contradiction.

At the substantive level, Kraft vehemently denies that politics is not
already a science, thereby rendering redundant the second chapter of
Ideenlogie und Utopie. Kraft also challenges the manner in which Mannheim
draws up the various political positions in that chapter and sees in his
attempt to synthesize political styles an instance of 'Kantian Marxism'.
In short, at the end of his review, Kraft argues that there can be no
sociology of knowledge either at a philosophical level nor at the level of an empirical science, again on the grounds of its inherent reductionism.

More significant and fruitful as a critique of Mannheim's position is Günther Stern's review entitled 'Concerning the so-called "existential boundedness" of consciousness'. Stern seeks to extract some consequences of the existential boundedness of thought thesis that Mannheim has overlooked. For instance, if we assert the dependency of thought upon existence or situation,

"then in so doing something is indirectly asserted about existence, about the situation. Now, from the outset, consciousness or self-interpretation etc. must conversely be taken into account as contributory factors in existence, in the situation, etc. This purely formal statement asserts: If consciousness is advanced as a function of the existential situation, then it can no longer be compared with it or judged to be 'false' in the light of it - for the situation is nothing without this consciousness."  

Mannheim, Stern argues, does not see this consequence but instead operates with a dual notion of ideology that, on the one hand, refers to the situational and relational dependency of thought and, on the other, refers to false consciousness. This prompts Stern to ask whether the concept of consciousness that Mannheim operates with is inadequate for his problematic and whether the discrepancy between situation and consciousness actually represents a discrepancy between existence and consciousness. In part, the latter is a historical problem.

Stern suggests that, in itself, the examination of consciousness in the light of 'the basic situation and the specific existence of human beings'
says nothing against historical method. However, historicism immediately becomes dangerous if it is the case

that the existential concept of historicism - "historical existence" - represents an illegitimate absolutization, that, despite the fundamental freedom of human beings in relation to history, it allows it to become unhistorical, hence a human existence that cannot be conceived of historically and an unhistorical human world. 131

If this is conceded then we have here a fundamental philosophy of history thesis that may well be embedded in the sociology of knowledge. In other words, what Mannheim fails to examine is

whether the existential base, to which one relativizes (in this case, in fact, history) is itself absolute; whether it is not . . . for its part, a specific situation and represents only a specific mode of human existence that is somehow fundamentally to be distinguished from the unhistorical existence of human beings. 132

Stern examines this problem in the light of an analysis of the present (Heute), the 'today' that is so important in Mannheim's 'diagnosis of the times'. For the historicity of human beings does not reside in their living in an 'unequivocal present' but rather that they appear 'to be with one foot already here and with another still there, i.e. to have an equivocal present'. What this implies is that the reduction of consciousness to a specific situation overlooks history itself since 'consciousness itself, qua existentially bounded, also represents an emergent or an existent factor that also takes part in the making of the historical situation against which it is to be measured'. Secondly, the problem of the plurality of present times in which people exist raises the question as to which one is 'genuine', which one is the norm for knowledge of the present for 'there exists many presents, many present existences "simultaneously" side by
side, and because of the simultaneity of generations, in partial conceal-
ment'. The incongruence between consciousness and existence must
therefore be viewed in a different light. It cannot be that consciousness
is merely incongruent to a group of people but that their existence is incon-
gruent (Stern gives the example of the 'unhistorical' peasant threatened
by emergent machine production and argues that it is not his consciousness
that is incongruent but his existence). More significantly, this analysis
of the 'present' shows us when ideology emerges - in 'situations without
a present', in situations in which forces or worlds with their own history
confront other worlds in an ingenuine present. Here there emerges the
notion of a plurality of truths. In 'historically adverse' situations
ideologies provide us with a false present. Again, what is false is 'not
consciousness of the present . . . but the present "is false". In so far
as it makes a claim to historical dignity'. Though he does not specifically
state the problem, what Stern pinpoints here is a crucial feature of Mann-
heim's philosophy of history embodied in his theory of ideology and utopia -
the philosophy of the absent present.

In the light of Stern's argument concerning the 'present', one can see
that history itself, which plays such a crucial role in Mannheim's argument,
becomes problematical. As Stern puts it,

'history, that appeared for Mannheim as the
destroyer of every absolute truth-claim, as
the genuine emergent, as the basis of des-
tructions, seems sub specie the unhistorical
situation, which in a real sense is not one
situation and not being a single one is not in
a real sense emergent, to be itself problematical,
itself an absolutization.' 133

Thus, whilst the argument that Mannheim's position is nihilistic is in no
way valid since it rests upon 'the secure basis of "history" whose existence he never doubts', the claim is valid for the above argument since it is never clear 'in what existential medium history is realised'. Certainly Mannheim sees a discrepancy between reality and history but whether this justifies a new task for sociology, Stern seriously doubts. What Stern in no way doubts, however, is the presence in Mannehim's work of

'the relativisation of history itself or its claim to be the absolute medium of all that occurs. And the evidence that Mannheim's appeal to history, that originally had had a viewpoint which merely relativized validity, must itself become the absolutisation of history. More plausible than by means of the analysis of the ingenuine present is the legitimation of such relativisations by reference to positive unhistorical forms of existence.' 134

Ultimately, Stern views the study of ideology as based upon 'a metaphysics of history' that is itself rooted, paradoxically, in 'a vote of mistrust against history'. This metaphysics Stern formulates as follows:

'Although nothing exists other than history, history is its own history of concealment, it is the flight from its own existence, that moves in other modes of existence only located in the superstructure. In so far as it lives in other modes of existence, such as transcendence, validity, etc., then it is, despite itself, in the wrong.' 135

Here then perhaps lies an important clue to one of the sources at least of the sociology of knowledge in Weimar Germany, at least in its radical historicist version if not in that advanced by Scheler.

It is a different historical perspective that is taken up by Plessner in his article 'Modifications of the notion of ideology', which has already been
referred to in the opening chapter. Though not merely a review of Mannheim's *Ideologie und Utopie*, it does pay sufficiently great attention to his work - as one of the transformations of the concept of ideology - to merit its inclusion here. Plessner seeks to show how the notion of ideology has been transformed from its inception in Marx's work, through its extension in historicism, to its restriction within the sociology of knowledge.

The first 'fateful metamorphosis' of the concept of ideology occurred with its historicist generalisation. Whereas the original concept in Marx is both 'weapon and concept, political means and sociological reality' and has reference to concrete historical class formations and forms of class domination, its basic features can be taken out of this context and generalised. In other words, the notions of base and superstructure and their correspondence can be retained and extended in the direction of a 'universal comparative sociology' and a comparative history of culture. In so doing, however, Plessner argues that it loses

1 its unequivocal reference to a single development becomes indifferent to true and false or genuine and ingenuine; it loses

2 its unequivocal reference to the concept of social class and economic political interest ... Ideology becomes ... a pure epiphenomenon of a vital lower stratum which ultimately can only still appear as an irrational limiting sum without any kind of positive determination in the "study of ideology".

The humanities and sociology have both sought, Plessner suggests, to move away from the nineteenth century concept of development (and indeed to view it as an ideology). Instead, they have sought to exclude their own value position and treat it as being as objective as any other (e.g. 17th century France). The consequence of this procedure is far-reaching:
'The thus determined levelling of one's own standpoint at the level of objectivity . . . is continued with a radical reserve in relation to the validity - claims of values in every particular value-sphere of every particular cultural circle. ' 138

This methodological relativism also goes hand in hand with a transformation of the concept of false consciousness which now becomes that of

'consciousness that stands in relation to a specific human existence and standpoint. This consciousness is not false because it does not yet possess the truth that it can have but because it cannot be detached from it and cannot secure a truth as an independent one. What is correct for one state of consciousness must be incorrect for another. Thus, consciousness stands indifferent to the true and the false in its particular relationally valid perspective.' 139

Hence, consciousness now becomes false precisely because it is derived from a specific existential basis, and this 'falseness' can no longer be corrected by human intervention since 'the possibility is absent of measuring the particular "worlds" in which social forms live in terms of something'.

The notions of superstructure and base are also transformed in this historicist generalisation of the notion of ideology. The superstructure - as religion, art etc - now stands in relation to 'practical or natural vital "interests"' or a 'psychophysical base' and in itself 'its claims have no basis. They are merely an expression of life that it needs in order to live'. The whole world becomes ideological and man himself 'an ideological animal'.

Similarly, the base is no longer an economic situation, a social class as a historical subject but merely 'a piece of nature - - life'. In other words, 'the base, the ideological destruction declines to the level of the subhuman, the animal-like and ultimately - - to the level of naked vitality'.

Similarly, the relation between base and superstructure moves in the direction of 'a radical historicism'. Plessner is sceptical of recent attempts to deal with this principle of correlation. He argues that Weber sought to observe this correlation and yet leave open the question of the ultimate validity of values that stood in relation to social interests. In a different mode, Plessner views Scheler's attempt to anchor values transcendentally whilst recognising this correlation a failure.

Against the background of this historicist enlargement and extension of the concept of ideology and as a counter to charging one's own critique with being ideological (so that Marxism itself is explained as the ideology of the proletariat), a restricted concept of ideology leading to the sociology of knowledge emerged. Mannheim, taking up the radical argument that all positions are ideological, sees 'the chance for a new objectivity: out of the mere study of ideology the sociology of knowledge will emerge'. But Mannheim seeks to introduce an evaluative concept of ideology in contrast to the historicist one. He wishes to move to a diagnosis of viewpoints through a correct understanding of them. Hence, Mannheim returns to the notion of false consciousness as a critical concept and to an evaluative dynamic concept of ideology. The concept of reality is also opened up once more and it seems as if Mannheim is returning to the original Marxist problematic.

But Plessner points to the significant differences that remain between the Marxist concept and its variant in the sociology of knowledge. In short, the sociology of knowledge concept of ideology lacks three of its original features:
For the sociology of knowledge there is no progressive development of history. There exists there only events taking place without reference to a comprehensive goal, also without an unequivocal gradient that results, independently of any expectation, from dialectical constraint. Ideology is here... the ever possible solidification in a state of consciousness that has been surpassed: the poor accord with the times of what has lagged behind.

Similarly, the sociology of knowledge's notion of ideology lacks the unequivocal reference to class interest and hence political unequivocalness. In its place is the formalised "group interest"... a category that was earlier characteristic of the historicist line of thought. It can be applied to the most diverse social forms.

Finally, this concept of ideology lacks the clear, specifiable criterion of true/consciousness... Thus, a consciousness is true which stands in existential accord or equilibrium with praxis. A criterion for this, especially in Mannheim's sense, does not exist... We never know when and what the present (Heute) is. It is the essence of the present (Gegenwart) to remain secret.

In all these respects, Plessner argues, the new concept of ideology is radically different from that of Marx. But these are not the only problems facing Mannheim's sociology of knowledge since he is also making other claims for it. Foremost amongst Mannheim's claims would appear to be that sociology can solve many of philosophy's problems. Plessner sees a tendency to identify philosophy with 'acceptance of absolution and a fixation with transcendental questions'. In contrast, Plessner argues that the concept of ideology itself rests upon basic philosophical presuppositions concerning the historical nature of human existence. But this does not mean, Plessner argues, that sociology should take up the whole complex of
philosophical anthropology; rather it should remain neutral towards it.

In conclusion, Plessner argues that sociology should recognise that it differs substantially from Marxism, however important it has been in the past development of sociology:

'For neither research nor politics has an interest in the false peace between sociology and Marxism which brings about means of more or less conscious change in the value and meaning of the concept of ideology, its transformation into a category of empirical sociology. A decontaminated "ideology", reduced to a category, to a principle of investigation, a "tension between base and superstructure" that has been reduced to a general human mode of existence is contained in a Marxist orientated sociology and is eternalised in its particular "revolutionary - materialist" theses without burdening itself with the risks and consequences of Marxism.'

Plessner goes on to suggest that Marxism has played the role that Darwinism played in the development of zoology. But this false peace between sociology and Marxism is to the detriment of both. He detects a tendency to transform elements of Marxism with 'an eternal programme for sociology'. But the result is

'A semi-Marxist perspective in the social sciences and precisely because of this a gradual blindness to the social realities to which Marxist concepts actually give expression. For there exists situations, for which the strategic instrumentarium, outlined by Marxism, in the sense of its revolutionary polemic, possesses an empirical, sociological truth value . . . But what is of concern here is in fact, specific situations and not, as fashion would have it, constants of every previous or even, over and above that, every possible human situation.'

Though Plessner is nowhere specific here as to who he is referring, there can be little doubt that he pinpoints one of the central features of the sociology of knowledge's problematical relationship to Marxism and, especially,
to the concept of ideology, regardless of whether it is a sociology of knowledge advanced by Scheler or Mannheim.

Not surprisingly, the manifestly Marxist reviews of *Ideologie und Utopie* also saw the central part of their critique of Mannheim's position as lying in the problematical relationship between his sociology of knowledge and Marxism. This is true of the reviews by Lewalter, Fogarasi and Wittfogel but perhaps less true of the neo-Marxist critiques by Marcuse and Horhheimer. However, it is with the first three that we are for the moment concerned.

Wittfogel's brief review of *Ideologie und Utopie* exists within the context of a more comprehensive review of recent literature on the sociology of knowledge. The whole of this tradition - Wittfogel includes Troeltsch and Weber within it - is seen as part of a wider 'crypto-Marxist' movement which, though relying on Marx's work, has nothing to do with its political element and which seeks to avoid in a scientific manner the 'one-sidedness' and 'exaggerations' of his work. In Mannheim's case, Wittfogel does discern 'left' tendencies in *Ideologie und Utopie* such as the emphasis on the crisis-ridden nature of the world, the play with Marxism and with the notion of a revolutionary solution to the crisis. But his relativisation of Marxism results merely 'from the standpoint of a formalistic eclecticism'. Similarly, despite Mannheim's use of the notion of the class-boundedness of knowledge, he always falls back upon 'highly vulgar categories from the realm of parliamentarism and from the sphere of circulation' such as 'opposition' and 'competition'. Indeed, in the latter case, Mannheim has no conception of class limits to knowledge and instead merely speaks of class competition. In short, for Wittfogel, the destruction of the class
basis of Marx's concept of ideology becomes manifest in *Ideologie und Utopie* with Mannheim's reluctance to raise the question of 'which' standpoint is the basis for correct knowledge. Instead, with respect to both ideology and utopia it is merely a question of 'when' they appear which determines their truth value. What this implies is that competition between ideologies, for example, takes place 'within the same cognitive level' and 'structural diverse cognitive processes' that take place on 'diverse social class levels' are ignored. Even where Mannheim does refer to social classes his analysis is purely external, unconcerned with their roots in the production process.

Though Mannheim is always reluctant to locate his own position, it is revealed in his notion of the free-floating intelligentsia, in the evolutionary goals of the S.P.D. to which Mannheim subscribes and in his ultimate 'decision in favour of the dynamic centre'. In short, 'the great fashion of bourgeois social science, the sociology of knowledge, has nothing at all to say to Marxism'. On the other hand, Wittfogel's Marxist review, behind all the invective, does accurately point to the source of Mannheim's political and economic categories in parliamentarism (it will be recalled here that Scheler saw this as the social source of relativism) and the circulation process (competition).

A more interesting orthodox Marxist review of *Ideologie und Utopie* is provided by Adalbert Fogarasi in his essay entitled 'The sociology of the intelligentsia and the sociological intelligentsia'. Fogarasi argues that a fundamental critique of the sociology of knowledge is necessary
'since the issue is not merely an abstract methodological school, but a tendency that has a deep social and political significance'. 147

The fundament point of *Ideologie und Utopie* is, Fogarasi argues, the transcendence of Marxism in that its theory of ideology may be applied to itself. This prompts Fogarasi to ask what it means to apply a proposition to itself in both logical and dialectical terms, whether this problem was unknown to Marx and whether Marxism is itself an ideology. Formal logic, Fogarasi argues, has already refuted scepticism on the grounds that its assertion that all truths are open to doubt is itself not open to doubt. More interestingly, Forgarasi argues that the application of concepts and categories to themselves has led to the development of a 'philosophy of philosophy' (Croce or Bergson) or a 'logic of philosophy' in the case of Emil Lask. It is, he continues, a kind of self-destruction of philosophy (e.g. Lask's logic of the 'logic of logic') that Mannheim himself participates in both in his epistemology of epistemology ('Structural Analysis of Epistemology'), developed under the influence of Lask and Lukács which 'relativizes all individual tendencies' and, more recently, with his sociology of sociology (presumably in *Ideologie und Utopie*). But

'The consequence of this critique of epistemology was clear in its masters - Mannheim, Zalai, Lukács just as much as Lask. Zalai, Lukács and Lask strove to move from epistemology to metaphysics. They wished to transcend epistemology in order to replace it with metaphysics. Mannheim is less explicit on this but his tendency is nonetheless precisely the same. This must be asserted in order to clearly recognise the character of his critique of Marx.' 148

For Fogarasi, however, scepticism and idealism are not transcended by formal logic but by praxis. Instead, what Mannheim does is to engage
in 'a tedious empty play with formulae' that he applies to Marx's argument in order to refute them. Fogarasi also argues that this universal application of formal logic and universalisation of the social boundedness thesis does not confront Marx's theory at all. Its social boundedness is completely different from the social boundedness of bourgeois ideology. Thought becomes ideological in a capitalist society 'not because it is determined as such but because it is determined by the antagonistic relations of production in capitalist society' and by the fetishism of commodities and the illusions it creates. In contrast, Mannheim's analysis of ideology is that of a kind of 'critical critique' which treats all social boundedness alike. For instance,

bourgeois ideology is not therefore false consciousness because it is a class standpoint as such but in fact because it is a specific class standpoint, the capitalist class standpoint and because from this standpoint reality necessarily appears inverted.' 149

Similarly, social classes have an interest in supporting or transcending certain forms of consciousness but Mannheim's analysis also excludes such interests.

When Fogarasi comes to consider Mannheim's sociology of knowledge in the light of his presumed transcendence of Marx's theory of ideology, he argues that it represents a 'kind of sociological intellectual history' that erroneously believes in some neutral position from which it can judge the whole. Mannheim's sociology of knowledge seeks to overcome the deep intellectual crisis of the times from 'the standpoint of eclecticism' by synthesising the partial truths of all other standpoints. In other words it seeks

'to overcome ideology purely ideologically.'
It interprets the crisis of bourgeois ideology as a purely intellectual crisis and does not see that this relativistic intellectual crisis is merely the reflection of the deeper crisis of the capitalist system itself. The first fundamental illusion and self-illusion lies in the fact that one can overcome ideology through abstract considerations upon the relativity of all ideology. The second fundamental error is the eclectic viewpoint that one can group a specific part of reality from each standpoint.

But this procedure merely leads one to argue that what is wrong with ideology is merely its one-sidedness rather than its distortion of reality. Secondly, Fogarasi argues that the synthesis derived from eclecticism, the Zusammen-schau, is associated with the irrational, anti-intellectualism of modern bourgeois philosophy (e.g. the phenomenological school) and represents merely a mechanical addition of parts of knowledge and, ultimately, a renunciation of scientific knowledge. By this means it is impossible to grasp the totality which is a dialectical not a mechanistic concept.

If the guiding thread of Ideologie und Utopie is the intellectual crisis then, Fogarasi argues, this is in itself nothing new. It does not differ greatly from what Simmel saw as the 'crisis of modern culture'. But this crisis is that of a specific capitalist society. The Weltfremd manner in which philosophy takes up this crisis leaves room for Mannheim to see the crisis as capable of being solved scientifically by a sociology of the intelligentsia. The agents of this synthesis must be above party and class and Mannheim finds them in the relatively detached intelligentsia, a classless stratum.

But Fogarasi suggests that if we examine the composition of this stratum then we can see that it does have a political significance. It is composed of the free professions, state officials (Fogarasi views this as significant
for social fascism), those in the middle who do not constitute a class and are therefore not class conscious but nonetheless are conscious of their task, and those engaged in partyless politics in universities and political schools. If a political decision has to be made then it will be 'a decision for the dynamic centre'. Fogarasi dismisses this theory of the 'Heidelberg sociological school' as a mask for bourgeois ideology, as linked with the social fascism of the social democrats.

In contrast, the most thorough attempt to analyse the relationship between Mannheim's sociology of knowledge and Marx's theory of ideology is the detailed article by Ernst Lewalter entitled 'The sociology of knowledge and Marxism'. Lewalter sees German sociology as having changed its response to Marxism after the First World War from one of 'ignoring' or 'refuting' Marxism to 'overcoming' it. This new position he sees as being best represented by Mannheim's work and especially his attempt to go beyond Marx's critique of ideology. After outlining Marx's theory in some detail, Lewalter goes on to critically examine Ideologie und Utopie chapter by chapter.

He commences with Mannheim's notion of the ideological nature of thought. Whereas Marx's notion of ideology contains two elements - the degree and character of ideology is correlated with the particular stage of social existence and the possibility of the development of theory is largely limited to dominant classes in society - these are reduced in much modern sociology to the vulgar Marxist correlation of ideology with specific social classes. Mannheim, however, with his distinction between total and particular ideology come close to Marx's distinction between concrete and ideological
consciousness but they differ in that

"for Marx "concrete consciousness" is, in principle, first possible after the "communist revolution"; for Mannheim it is ... already contained in the individual's "existential experience" and only requires, in some respects, prudent self-critical further development." [132]

Mannheim's notion of particular ideology also differs from Marx's in that the 'standpoint-boundedness' of thought contains, for Mannheim, not merely a negative side (its limited validity) but a positive side (it contains a section of the total truth). Thus, Mannheim is rightly opposed to the absolutization of thought but, according to Lewalter his 'brilliant analysis and deductions' are subject to considerable erroneous assertions. For instance, how can historical materialism be imputed to the proletariat in the same manner as classical political economy is imputed to the bourgeoisie? The notion of imputation is, Lewalter argues, totally inappropriate here.

In any case, Lewalter continues, a clear statement is 'how far Marxism is the "ideology of the proletariat" and hence only a "particular" truth is missing'. Perhaps part of the problem lies in Mannheim taking up elements that he thinks belong to Marx's concept of ideology but which do not do so, such as a presumed prevalence of praxis over theory, an economistic interpretation and a presumed determinism. Indeed, Lewalter suggests that Mannheim is much more deterministic than Marx since

'The "existential boundedness"of thought ... contains a strong deterministic element. If "I" am really bound up with my thought in my "standpoint in the sociological sphere", then in fact this thought appear in fact to be so much determined that, to a certain extent, I can only think "as a citizen", "as a worker", "as an academic", "as a politician", etc, and that the possibility of ideology-free thought in principle is not present so long as the "sociological sphere"
is not homogeneous, i.e. as long as classes are not transcended. The two claims that Mannheim provides - the proposition of class boundedness as a social-psychological determinant of every system and the proposition of the "striving for totality" - stand as it were right in the way of access to his "dynamic relationism". 153

One of the problems here, according to Lewalter, is that Mannheim tends to misinterpret the notion of existence determining consciousness as referring to 'the "social-vital" boundedness of the individual thinker to his "stand-point"'. But, as Lukács strongly argued, Marx's theory cannot be psychologized in this manner. Lewalter concludes by suggesting that the existential boundedness thesis is one of correspondence for Marx and one of determination for Mannheim.

Lewalter goes on to argue that more than the concept of ideology seems to have been taken by Mannheim from Marxism. The second chapter of Ideologie und Utopie is concerned with praxis, with 'politics as political praxis' and 'action in a still not regulated situation'. When Mannheim outlines five major tendencies of political thought in relation to the notion of praxis, he fails to see, in Lewalter's view, that it is the Marxist one which in fact comes closest to his notion of dynamic relationism. Instead, he moves on immediately to the question of synthesizing political perspective through the intelligentsia. Here, Lewalter suggests that the assumption that the possession of education can lead to group solidarity is actually a hypostatization of intellectuals themselves. With regard to Mannheim's ultimate 'decision' for dynamic relationism, Lewalter sees it as 'a form of active resignation, a "diagnosis" of the present that is directed towards an, in principle, unrecognisable future, an extreme attempt to hold as value
free what is necessarily value-laden'.

One might imagine, Lewalter suggests, that as one moves on to the third chapter of Ideologie und Utopie one moves on to the most significant aspects of Marxism, having already been through the 'economistic' image in the first chapter and the 'theory-praxis philosophy' of Lenin and Lukácš in the second. Indeed, the question that the discussion of utopia prompts Lewalter to ask is whether historical materialism or dynamic relationism has a deeper insight into the principles of historical development. Here there seem to be certain affinities in that both are,

1 Individualising theories of history . . . Hence both reject "generalising", "causalistic" and "deterministic" theories since they rob the specific present moment of its existential significance.

2 Activistic theories of history In so far as the study of its principles is to serve the "therapeutic" via the "diagnosis". Hence both reject "contemplative theories" (cf. for instance Marx against Feuerbach, Mannheim against Scheler's doctrine of the "pre-existence of the superstructure").

3 Ontic theories of history In so far as they claim to reveal the "essence" of historical development in "historical time" . . .

4 Dialectical theories of history In so far as they make the growth of theories out of existence . . . into an axiom. '155

However, Lewalter points out that it is at the level of the determinants of historical ontics that the difference between Mannheim and Marx is greatest since, in Mannheim's case, there is almost no evidence to suggest what the basis of his theory is. But often, Lewalter argues, Mannheim's reservation about Marxism is 'a purely sceptical one'. But if we agree with this, then we are likely to argue either that the basic motive of his position is
Marxist or that his scepticism enclosed as perspectivism does indeed lead beyond Marxism. Lewalter argues that the last section of Mannheim's book would lead one to believe that 'this scepticism is absolute.

If we turn, finally, to the reception of Mannheim's *Ideologie und Utopie* by the 'Frankfurt School' then, as with the more orthodox Marxist review a common response is not at all evident. This may be due to the fact that the reviews by Herbert Marcuse and Max Horkheimer represented very different positions, not merely because Marcuse was not yet a member of the *Institut für Sozialforschung* but, more significantly, because his Marxism was still very much mediated by Heidegger's philosophy. Perhaps for this reason it is not surprising that Marcuse's review is much more favourable than Horkheimer's, especially in view of Mannheim's affinities with phenomenology. One may note in passing that Adorno's response to Mannheim's work in this period was also much closer to Horkheimer's than Marcuse's.

Marcuse, in his review, sees 'the whole problematic of our present scientific situation (which is itself the problematic of present human existence)' as being presented in a dramatic fashion in *Ideologie und Utopie*, namely, 'the universal historicity of human existence and the questionable nature of the traditional separation of real and ideal being that springs from it.' Marcuse states that he will concentrate his remarks upon one of its problems: 'the truth of historical existence'. The sociological method of interpreting intellectual phenomena itself emerges out of the scientific knowledge of universal historicity. Mannheim presents a radical interpretation of this thesis with his notion of the existential boundedness and ideological
nature of thought, including Marxism itself. Hence, for Mannheim, Marxism too is seen as the ideology of a particular social class—the proletariat. Marcuse sees a positive gain in this interpretation of Marxism since it views Marxism as a theory that relates back to the social existence of the proletariat and can only be understood in this manner. This is in contrast to both revisionism and the transcendental-sociological interpretation of Marxism (by Adler) both of which obscure this fact. Marcuse also sees the advantages of this perspective as being that it recognizes Marxist theory as a concrete theory of political praxis and that this theory refers to the concrete actuality. But Marcuse goes on to ask whether there are not dangers in this relativisation of Marxism. In fact he suggests that one could counter with the argument that 'the concrete historical determination of a theory... does not say anything at all about the truth and validity of this theory'. But Mannheim shows that the question of the truth and validity of a historical theory cannot be solved by the traditional concept of truth that presupposes an 'ideal, universal, timeless system detached from history itself.' What Mannheim does is to raise the problem of the historical nature of theories that are a function of the social existence from which they emerge. He provides, Marcuse argues, two solutions to the problem of historical truth: that of 'true and false consciousness' and that of the 'dynamic totality'. Marcuse critically examines both.

Mannheim's first solution is to suggest that consciousness is false when it is not in accord with its realisation at a given stage of existence. But where, Marcuse asks, are the grounds for its realisation? Sociology ignores two aspects of the existential nature of events. Mannheim, Marcuse
argues, 'takes the particular historical stage of existence as the ultimate datum that is irreducible and necessary for the sociological method'. But if one takes 'apparently stable, rigid, unequivocal stages of existence', such as feudalism or early capitalism, it is clear that when one examines them further in their concrete actuality and not merely as abstract conceptions, then they appear as 'in themselves dynamic, fluctuating, equivocal'.

Secondly, the sociological method ignores the 'intentional element of all events', in the sense that modes of existence are related to something; historical situations realise something that must already be given to them. Marcuse draws two implications for the problematic of historical truth from these considerations. Firstly, that 'the sociological method cannot take up the historical stage of existence (Seinstufe) as merely a given foundation and make it into the concrete instance for a decision as to truth', not least because the particular consciousness is itself a constituent of that existence. Secondly, and this is particularly important for Marxism, it should be remembered that 'the political-social stage of existence is itself not something ultimate but as a historical necessity can and must be transformed'.

In short, Mannheim's first solution cannot be developed any further than this point.

The second solution, that of a 'dynamic synthesis', maintains that each particular theory, as an existentially bounded theory, contains a partial aspect of the truth. Hence a possible criterion for truth is the comprehensive synthesis that 'realises the historically possible optimum of the total view'. Marcuse asks what the concrete presuppositions are for such a synthesis. These are that
'the theories dealt with were historically prior and that the new standpoint was historically so situated that it made possible the comprehensive perspective. Both presuppositions again represent the given stage of existence as the ultimate decisive instance. The second approach therefore leads back to the first. Only by presupposing that the particular historical stage of existence is also eo ipso the historically "true" stage of existence can such a synthesis guarantee the optimum of truth.'

In contrast, Marcuse argues that the historical stage of existence is not given as an ultimate foundation but also 'transcends itself'. However, this in turn implies that one cannot remain content merely with an evaluation of consciousness since, 'in the realm of history it is not only a consciousness, a line of thought, a theory that is true or false but also a concrete situation itself and its mode of life'. Thus both consciousness and historical situations are not, with reference to truth or falsity, of 'equal value'. Valuations are already contained within a particular historical situation and its form of life. In other words, a historical situation already contains valuations of it that extend beyond it to what is not immanent to it. Hence, once more, we are confronted with the fact that we can never take a particular mode of organising life as a mere facticity.

In conclusion, Marcuse argues that the problems that Mannheim raises for historical truth cannot be concluded as swiftly as Mannheim does but have to be examined in greater depth. But at least Mannheim has raised the problem and been prepared to develop it in all its uncertainty.

In contrast to Marcuse's critical but not unsympathetic review, Horkheimer's attack on Mannheim's concept of ideology leaves little than can be salvaged from _Ideologie und Utopie_. Like Plessner, Horkheimer is concerned with...
the inversion and distortion of Marx's original concept of ideology in Mannheim's sociology of knowledge. In Marx's case,

'...the purpose of his science was not knowledge of a "totality" or a total and absolute truth, but the transformation of specific social circumstances. In connection with this purpose, philosophy too was criticised but without putting a new metaphysics in the place of the old.'

This, Horkheimer later seeks to show, is precisely what Mannheim intends—though one may note in passing here that the critique of the centrality of the totality is also an implicit criticism of Lukács.

Horkheimer argues that Mannheim radicalizes and generalises the concept of ideology in the direction of a 'correspondence' between group situation and modes of cognition, evaluation and action (i.e. not merely the 'content' of thought). Similarly, whereas the original total concept of ideology was bound up with the political particular concept, for Mannheim the concept of false consciousness is generalised. This new 'value-free' application of the concept of ideology leads to 'a new separation of intellectual systems with reference to their truth'. Their degree of agreement with the existing stage of reality is the norm for deciding their truth-value. Hence, the contemporary crisis lies in the fact that each competing 'system of life' is 'particular', even though each claims to represent the totality.

This 'new' concept of ideology operates within a totally different context when compared with Marx's concept since

'Marx wished to transform philosophy into a positive science and into praxis, the sociology of knowledge pursues a philosophical final purpose. The problem of absolute truth, its form and its content, disturbs it; it sees its
mission in its illumination. The ever-deeper insight into the change in all metaphysical decisions ... itself becomes a metaphysical procedure.'

Horkheimer here suggests that Mannheim's preoccupation with the change in intellectual forms as 'the essence of man' indeed restores a metaphysical intention that is reminiscent, as we have seen, of Dilthey's philosophy of history. But ultimately Mannheim has recourse to ahistorical elements such as 'ecstasy', to a metaphysics of history which his own theory of ideology would negate as being ideological. Marx's critique of ideology, on the other hand, was directed against metaphysics, against viewing the 'essence', man, as the subject of history and against viewing history as a harmonious totality. Rather Marx viewed history as the result of 'processes that grow out of the highly contradictory relationships in human society' and not as composed of competing world-views. At the root of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge, however, lies an 'idealist conviction' which results in the restoration of the metaphysics of history.

This is the context within which Mannheim's radicalisation of the concept of ideology can be understood. There is little doubt that the concept has been so generalised as to no longer have any specific content. It has also been removed from the realm of political critique. It no longer refers to 'individual theories and evaluations of opposing parties but immediately to the whole of consciousness'. Mannheim's notion of ideology replaces any psychology of interests by a structural analysis. But what this analysis consists of is unclear. Systems of world-views are presumably viewed as developing not out of 'the real life-situation of human beings' but as being bound up with 'specific social strata'. In a similar vein,
the system of world-views also includes a specific 'economic intention' (Wirtschaftswollen) but there is never any suggestion that social or economic processes determine the intellectual totality. Rather, Mannheim searches for "correspondence of form" between the social situation and the world-view totality conceived roughly in the sense of an "ideal type". For Horkheimer, this notion of totality is also problematical since he suggests that Mannheim conceives of it in the form of a superficial concept of Gestalt. This implies that one can understand a world view in terms of its intellectual form in an immanent and intuitive manner. This, Horkheimer argues, is an 'idealist illusion'.

In turn, this raises the question of the nature of the existential boundedness and the nature of this 'existence' itself in Mannheim's sociology of knowledge. For instance, despite Mannheim's insistence that the intellectual sphere is closely bound up with social classes, 'still his idealist endeavour to think of intellectual processes untarnished by the crude power struggles of real human beings is so strong that each indefinite connection between being and consciousness actually appears as a merely external juxtaposition, even as fateful submission. For him there exists the crude struggles of the historical every day world and also alongside them the conflicts between "systems of world-views". 164

This can only be because Mannheim lacks a comprehensive theory of the concrete structuring of society that can locate this 'being' and these 'world views'. Otherwise, 'without such a theory, the expression Seinsgebunden remains completely without content'. Mannheim does make reference to specific groups in society but an account of their determination in turn remains unclear.
Obviously, this has consequences for his notion of truth - the criteria can now only be whether thought is appropriate to its 'times'. But, Horkheimer argues, this is a completely arbitrary standard since there exists no means of deciding whether thought is appropriate to its times, i.e. whether it is Zeitgemässig. This is all the more remarkable in view of Mannheim's intention of providing a 'diagnosis of the times' which, based as it is on idealist presuppositions,

'must provide a highly one-sided picture: it certainly advances the claim that from it "our total existential and intellectual situation" will be grasped "in a cross section", but this cross section leaves the most important parts of social reality undisturbed.' 165

Even where Mannheim does take up a specific mode of thought and attempt to locate it socially and historically - as in his essay on conservative thought,

'few indications are to be found as to the connections between the intellectual group categories as "conservative" and social reality. The historical circumstances of the agents of his thought, their relations to other social strata and the total political situation are only occasionally sketched out, as if the "conservative" world image were intelligible at all without the most careful study of these states of affairs. The whole work limits itself almost exclusively to "phenomenological - logical analysis of style", "immanent analysis of world-views", analysis of "experience", analyses of the common currents of diverse intellectual styles and similar sounding analyses of intellectual forms.' 166

In conclusion, Horkheimer argues that Mannheim's sociology of knowledge, whilst utilizing 'a highly "radical" language and Marxist intellectual means' ultimately leads to the transformation of 'existing contradictions into the oppositions of ideas, "intellectual styles" and systems of world views'.
It should be apparent from this brief overview of Marxist and neo-Marxist responses to *Ideologie und Utopie* that all the reviewers felt the necessity for a serious confrontation between Marxism and Mannheim's sociology of knowledge and especially his introduction of a 'new' concept of ideology. Perhaps more surprising is the fact that writers like Lewalter and Marcuse, despite substantial criticisms, should feel that the sociology of knowledge does have something valuable to contribute to an understanding of problems already raised within the Marxist tradition. That is, some reviewers saw Mannheim's work as containing something more than a Marxist rhetoric.

Within the Marxist tradition itself, what is noticeable about these reviews is the relative absence of references to the work of Lukács (and Korsch) on ideology. One might have expected that their accounts would be taken up in defence of a radical critique of ideology. In the case of orthodox Marxist reviews this is less surprising since both writers were not in favour in this period. Hence, from the orthodox Marxist standpoint of Fogarasi, for example, it is possible to link Lukács' work with the general problematic within which Mannheim himself operates. But there is hardly a suggestion that a Marxist account of ideology might deal with the problem of reification and commodity fetishism, even within the neo-Marxist camp. This is indeed all the more surprising in view of the subsequent concentration upon commodity exchange as a central motif in the critique of culture by members of the Frankfurt School. However that may be, a key feature of these reviews must remain the reluctance to take up the critique of ideology from Lukács' standpoint as a counter to, or alternative to the
sociology of knowledge. Hence, when reviewers in the Marxist tradition took up Mannheim's theory of ideology they compared it not with Lukács' account but with that of Marx. All of them, to a greater or lesser degree, found substantial differences between Mannheim's and Marx's accounts of ideology. Only an inadequate knowledge of Marx's work could therefore prompt Otto Neurath to characterise Mannheim's work as 'bourgeois Marxism' - an epithet that has also been used subsequently to describe the work of many other writers and even sociology itself.

In conclusion, it seems plausible to argue that, despite the extent to which most of the writers on the sociology of knowledge both had a poor knowledge of Marx's work and very often distanced themselves from it, nonetheless the 'ghost of Marx' was present at all three 'debates'. This is, of course, most obvious in the case of the reviews of Ideologie und Utopie but also true of the Scheler-Adler debate and the discussion of Mannheim's paper on competition. The opposition between the sociology of knowledge and the critique of ideology - most consistently advanced by members of the Frankfurt School - can also be seen in the light of the reviews of Ideologie und Utopie, to be not their sole preserve. Indeed, it would be possible to construct of devastating critique of Mannheim's work - even ironically, in the spirit of his yearning for a synthesis - by bringing together all the critical comments made in the reviews of Ideologie und Utopie. Interestingly enough, Mannheim very quickly abandoned his 'Marxist' rhetoric after 1929. His subsequent writings do not betray those traces of Marxist
terminology that no doubt prompted his reviewers to pose the question of
the relationship between the sociology of knowledge and Marx's critique
of ideology. Nonetheless, the fact remains that the interest in the
sociology of knowledge in Weimar Germany reached a peak in the period
1929-32— if reviews and contributions are any indication of interest. This
interest, of course, coincides with the development in Germany of a crisis
that was more deep-rooted than Mannheim's 'intellectual crisis'. But
the manner in which Mannheim posed some of the problems in the sociology
of knowledge— of the competition and then concentration of ideologies,
for example—did coincide, firstly, with the increased fragmentation of pol-
itical parties and ideologies and then, after 1929, with an increased polar-
isation of political parties and ideologies. Similarly, many commentators
have pointed to the striving for a synthesis of perspectives in the humanities
and social sciences, the proliferation of 'paradigms' in philosophy through-
out the Weimar period and especially after the 'relative stabilization' of
German society from 1924 until 1929. It was in this latter period, Lukács
later argued, that Scheler's sociology of knowledge found its greatest
resonance. 168

However, all this seems to suggest that contributions to the sociology of
knowledge were merely provided by Scheler and Mannheim. Whilst it is
true that they remain the two central figures in Weimar Germany responsible
for stimulating an interest in this area, many other writers did make sig-
nificant contributions. Unfortunately, it is not possible to give an account
of all the various studies in this field but a brief mention of some of them
should at least suffice to show that there was considerable interest in the
problems raised by the sociology of knowledge. This interest was dis-
played in a variety of fields and directions. In the early period of European crisis down to 1923, several contributions appeared on the problem of ideology. Most noteworthy are Szende's article on 'Masking and Demasking', which tends to take a psychological standpoint in relation to ideology; Otto Bauer's 'World Image of Capitalism' which is written from the Austro-Marxist standpoint and Korsch's 'Marxism and Philosophy' essay. Szende was also one of the few writers to take up the relationship between natural science and social structure with articles on scientific systems, the theory of relativity and an attempt at a sociological theory of abstraction. The discussion of the problem of ideology prior to Mannheim's _Ideologie und Utopie_ can also be found in Gottfried Salomon's study of the relationship between historical materialism and the study of ideology and in Ziegler's article on ideology, the only article in the period and in this area which makes substantive use of Pareto's account of ideology. One source of a variety of contributions to the sociology of knowledge is, of course, Scheler's edited collection published in 1924. As an indication of the variety of works it contained we may cite Jerusalem's study of the sociological determination of thought - perhaps the only orthodox positivist standpoint which makes reference to French work in the Durkheim school -; Plessner's study of the organisation of modern research and Paul Honigsheim's various contributions, for example, on the unity of styles in economic and intellectual culture. Contributions to the sociology of knowledge did not merely come from sociologists and those in the Marxist tradition. Sometimes philosophers themselves ventured into this field. Here the most notable instance is Landsberg's outline of a sociology of epistemology.
These and other contributions, together with the 'debates' surrounding the sociology of knowledge in this period, should indicate the extent to which this area of study attracted considerable interest within sociology and, often, outside its boundaries. Perhaps this interest outside sociology was itself an indication of the problematical position of the sociology of knowledge itself which many saw as not merely another branch of sociology (like the sociology 'of' the family or 'of' industry) but also as a more fundamental area of study - even as a Grundwissenschaft. It is to the role and significance of the sociology of knowledge that we must now turn.
CHAPTER V

NOTES


2. See ch.2.


4. See ch.6.


7. See below.


10. K. Mannheim, Ideologie und Utopie, Bonn 1929. As another indication of the interest this work aroused, it was reprinted in 1930.


15. A still useful summary of many of these contributions is to be found in E. Grünwald, Das Problem der Soziologie des Wissens, Vienna/Leipzig 1934.


18. Most notably, of course, those broadly within the Frankfurt School tradition.
19. See ch.2.


22. Ibid, p.190.


27. See M. Adler, Kant und der Marxismus, Berlin 1925; M. Adler, 'Soziologie und Erkenntniskritik', op. cit.


30. M. Adler, 'Wissenschaft und soziale Struktur', loc. cit., p.212. See also Bottomore's Introduction to the selections from this tradition.


34. Ibid, pp.201-2.


36. The relation between the sociology of knowledge and such debates is examined in the next chapter.


39. Ibid, p.221.

41. 'Diskussion', loc. cit., p.225.

42. Ibid, p.227.


44. Ibid, p.234.

45. Cf. the discussion in ch.4.


47. A.V. Schelting, 'Zum Streit um die Wissenssoziologie', loc. cit.


50. K. Mannheim, 'Die Bedeutung der Konkurrenz', loc. cit., p.38. It is interesting to note here that Mannheim was already thinking of a sociology of the mind (Soziologie des Geistes), especially as he subsequently intended to publish a collection of his essays under that title.

51. Ibid, pp.35-38.

52. Ibid, p.38.


54. Ibid.

55. Ibid, p.90.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid, p.91.

58. Ibid.


60. Ibid, p.93.

61. Ibid, p.94.


63. 'Diskussion über "Die Konkurrenz" ', loc. cit., p.95.
64. Ibid, p.97.
67. Ibid, p.112.
68. See ch.4.
69. 'Diskussion über "Die Konkurrenz"', loc. cit., p.112.
70. Ibid, p.113.
71. Ibid, p.114.
73. 'Diskussion über "Die Konkurrenz"', loc. cit., p.114.
74. Ibid, pp.119-20.
75. Ibid, pp.120-21.
76. Ibid, p.122.
77. Ibid, pp.123-4.
78. 'Diskussion über "Das Verstehen"', loc. cit., p.239.
81. A. V. Schelting, 'Zum Streit um die Wissenssoziologie', loc. cit.
83. Ibid, p.12 n.18.
84. Ibid, p.9.
86. Ibid, p.338.


101. S. Landshut, Kritik der Soziologie, Munich/Leipzig 1929, pp. 84-96.


110. K. Mannheim, loc. cit., p.266.


112. Ibid, pp.269-70.


119. Ibid, p.171.

120. Ibid, p.175.


123. Ibid, p.244.


132. Ibid., p.493.
133. Ibid., p.502.
134. Ibid., p.503.
135. Ibid., p.508.
138. Ibid., p.152.
139. Ibid., pp.152-3.
140. Ibid., pp.159-160.
141. Ibid., p.169.
142. Ibid., p.170.
144. K.A. Wittfogel, loc.cit., p.100.
145. Ibid., p.102.
147. A. Fogarasi, loc.cit., p.359.
148. Ibid., p.363.
149. Ibid., p.366.
153. Ibid, p.103.
159. Ibid, p.363.
164. Ibid, p.298.
166. Ibid, pp.302-3.


CHAPTER SIX

Some Problems in the Sociology of Knowledge
CHAPTER SIX

In the course of the final chapter of this study, it will not be possible to examine all the problems raised by the German tradition in the sociology of knowledge. Rather, an attempt will be made to bring together, and into sharper focus, some of the issues that are either present in the works of the major writers in this tradition - and especially in Mannheim's works - or which were raised by their contemporaries. This is not to suggest that one must remain restricted by their problematics but, as we shall see, some of the key issues raised by later commentators do indeed have their origin in contemporary discussions.

In the previous chapter, which sought to survey some of the contributions to the various debates and controversies surrounding the sociology of knowledge in Weimar Germany, a number of issues were raised which require further examination. It has already been shown that the relationship between the sociology of knowledge and Marxism was raised not only in the debates at the German Sociological Association congresses of 1924 and 1928 but that, when we examined the reviews of Mannheim's *Ideologie und Utopie*, this issue received a firmer focus. In particular, the relationship between the sociology of knowledge and Marx's theory of ideology was raised not merely, as one might expect, by writers already committed to a Marxist position but also by many others too. In part, this is a necessary consequence of Mannheim's own claims in *Ideologie und Utopie* to have replaced Marx's theory of ideology with a sociology of knowledge. Much more indirectly, Scheler, too, sought to demonstrate the superiority of his sociology of knowledge to
what he took to be a critique of ideology that was very restricted in its scope.

In his study of the reception of Marx's work in the sociology of knowledge, Lenk seeks to expose the differences between the sociology of knowledge and the critique of ideology, not just by a confrontation of the sociology of knowledge with Marx's own critique of ideology but also by means of an examination of the Marxism of the Second International. In the course of his study, Lenk fails to examine two areas of concern in this connection. Firstly, he ignores the relationship between Mannheim's sociology and Lukács's critique of ideology. This may possibly be because he assumes Lukács' work to be a genuine extension of Marx's critique of ideology. But as we have already seen, there are many aspects of Lukács' work which have their origin not in Marx's work but in that of contemporary German sociologists and philosophers. More recently, however, Kettler has suggested that Mannheim's sociology of knowledge may be seen in general terms as a confrontation with Lukács' critique of ideology. Even more specifically, Huaco has sought to draw the parallels between Lukács' Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein and Mannheim's Ideologie und Utopie. Other writers such as Gabel and, on occasion, Goldmann, have sought to argue not for the confrontation of the two traditions but rather their similarities. The relationship between Lukács and Mannheim must, therefore, be re-examined.

In contrast, Horkheimer's review of Ideologie und Utopie was merely the first of a series of articles and references to Mannheim's sociology of knowledge from the standpoint of the Frankfurt School that aimed to argue for the radical opposition between the sociology of knowledge and Marx's critique of ideology. Lenk's study, as he himself admits, falls within this tradition.
However - and this is the second of Lenk's omissions - he fails to question Marx's own critique of ideology. Instead, this is taken as a given starting point that seems, for Lenk, to be completely unproblematical. What this implies for his interpretation of Marx's critique of ideology is that he adheres to the earlier Frankfurt School tradition of Horkheimer and Adorno which tended on occasion to take Marx's critique of political economy, for example, as a model of critical theory and, more importantly as an unproblematical model. More recently, and still - questionably - within the broader confines of the tradition of critical theory, writers like Habermass and Apel have sought to reconstruct the methodological foundations of the notion of critique itself. In particular, they have sought to re-examine the relationship between a critique of ideology and hermeneutics. Within this context and this tradition, Böhler, for example, has attempted a 'metacritique' of Marx's critique of ideology. If we at least accept for the moment the plausibility of this re-examination of the foundations of a critique of ideology, then it raises the issue - in terms of our present concerns - as to whether one can simply compare the sociology of knowledge with a critique of ideology (Marx's) that can be taken as an unquestioned given. Therefore, the second task of this chapter will be to investigate, within this wider context, the relationship between the sociology of knowledge and a 'Marxist' critique of ideology.

In the course of this investigation, we shall be confronted with a third issue that has already suggested itself in our discussion of Mannheim's work in particular. At least in their intentions, most writers within this tradition of the sociology of knowledge - and Wilhelm Jerusalem is the only prominent exception - adopted an anti-positivist stance. This is true of Scheler
and Mannheim - again, in terms of their intentions at least - as well as Lukács, if one is to include him here. More specifically, Mannheim, at various stages in his development, advanced the view that the sociology of knowledge could also contribute towards a new methodology in the social sciences. Indeed, at times, he even went so far as to suggest that the sociology of knowledge itself constituted a new foundational discipline for the social sciences. As we have seen, Mannheim's attempt to develop an alternative methodological framework was evident not merely in his earlier writings on problems of interpretation (in particular, the analysis of world-views) but also, and above all, in the second of his two unpublished studies, *Eine soziologische Theorie der Kultur und ihrer Erkennbarkeit*. There, Mannheim quite explicitly set out to locate his sociology of knowledge within the context of the Methodenstreit. In the course of the development his alternative methodological programme for the human sciences within this study, Mannheim sought to develop the rudiments of a theory of conjunctive and communicative knowledge that, in some respects at least, is not dissimilar from recent work by Habermas and Apel in this area. An examination of the methodological and foundational aims and claims of the sociology of knowledge is not merely important in its own right but also forms a link with the second of the issues that must be examined in more detail.

Within a wider context, it is possible to argue that the sociology of knowledge in Weimar Germany is not merely a confrontation with a 'Marxist' critique of ideology but is also a continuation, in a different form, of the Methodenstreit and Werturteitsstreit within the social sciences in Germany. In some of its aims, at least, and in some of the questions that it posed, this tradition in the sociology of knowledge has affinities with the kind of projects in
this area that have been more recently attempted in Germany. The mode of posing these questions, however, must be placed within the context of the sociology of knowledge's wider meta-theoretical aims.

II

One need not seek out the opinions of subsequent commentators in order to confirm Lukács' significance for Mannheim's development of a sociology of knowledge. Aside from the references to his work - the Heidelberger Ästhetik in his earlier writings and Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein after 1923 - we have Mannheim's own estimation of Lukács' contribution to the sociology of knowledge in his article on 'Wissenssoziologie' published in 1931.¹⁰ There, Mannheim gives prominence to only two contemporary writers - Max Scheler and Georg Lukács - as being significant for the development of a sociology of knowledge. Of Lukács' contribution, Mannheim writes:

'The sociology of knowledge method was refined . . . through Lukács who adheres to Marx and who articulates the fruitful Hegelian elements in his work and in this manner arrived at a very fertile, constructive and dogmatised solution to the problem, but one that suffers from the one-sidedness and dangers of a specific philosophy of history conception. Lukács remained fully within Marx's conception insofar as he failed to separate the problem of unmasking ideologies from the sociology of knowledge.'¹¹

Despite Mannheim's criticism of Lukács here, it remains true that he saw Lukács as a significant contributor to the development of the sociology of knowledge. However, what is at issue here is not so much the fact that Mannheim is indebted to Lukács but whether his own work on ideology is an attempt, specifically, to go beyond Lukács' position in Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein. One need not argue that Mannheim is engaged upon
the same kind of project as Lukács in order to maintain that his own Ideologie und Utopie represents, in part, a confrontation with Lukács' work.

This has been argued most forcibly by Huaco who takes as his point of departure for the thesis that Mannheim's major work is a confrontation with Lukács' the argument from Lichtheim's account of the development of ideology.

There, Lichtheim argues that

'Ideology and Utopia (1929) was the positivist's rejoinder to History and Class Consciousness (1923). Mannheim ... adapted what he could use for his own purpose, which was frankly "theoretical" in the contemplative sense condemned by Lukács ... Ideology and Utopia is full of passages which reflect its author's awareness of the issues Lukács had stirred up a few years earlier ... Mannheim's position can be defined very precisely as an amalgam ... of Weber and Lukács.'

Though Lichtheim does not substantiate this claim, an attempt is made by Huaco to outline the similarity 'at a formal' between the two works. Huaco proceeds to outline what he takes to be the central arguments of the two writers. In Lukács' case, Huaco argues that

'1 He merges Marx's theory of ideology and Engel's doctrine of false consciousness. In this merger, he suggests that "false consciousness" is a typical case of "ideology".

2 He replaces Marx's theory of truth as correspondence or empirical verification with Hegel's doctrine that "the truth is the Whole" ...

3 Lukács adds Hegel's doctrine that the "truth" or "whole" is a historical emergent.

4 ... the "false" component of "false consciousness" ... is generalised illegitimately: All knowledge in all class societies in history is declared to be false.

5 ... the statement that all knowledge in bourgeois society is false includes Lukács' statement to that effect, etc.'
6 ... each historical class has less "false consciousness" than the previous class. But only the "last class" - the proletariat - has access to the "whole" or "truth". Therefore only the proletariat has the potential capacity to transcend "false consciousness" ...

7 ... this potential capacity to transcend "false consciousness" (or "ideology") is not actualized in proletarians as such, but only in party intellectuals such as Lukács.  

The difficulties inherent in Huaco's account of Lukács' argument in History and Class Consciousness lie in his own acceptance of a positivist interpretation of Marx and Lukács (having already castigated Lichtheim for his gratuitous use of the notion 'positivist'). In so doing, it is possible to bring Lukács much closer to Mannheim than is the case. Nonetheless, Huaco does point to some central problems in Lukács' argument and, in particular, his attempted escape from a position of total reification of consciousness. Huaco also points to the diachronic nature of Lukács' argument as opposed to the synchronic argument in Ideologie und Utopie which, according to Huaco, runs as follows:

1 We can distinguish the "particular" or "purely psychological" conception of ideology from a "more inclusive" or "total" version ...

2 Mannheim erroneously attributes both the "particular" and the "total" conception of ideology to Marx ...

3 Mannheim's next move is to generalize the "total" conception of ideology into ... the "general" or "general total" conception ...

4 Mannheim escapes the paradox of the Cretan by shifting his allegiance to Hegel's version of truth as logical coherence, and by appealing to the Hegelian "totality" or "whole" ...

5 ... only the "socially unattached intelligentsia" can escape ideology and know the "whole truth" because it is "relatively classless" ...
The apparent similarities between the two sets of arguments advanced by Lukács and Mannheim - and these similarities are certainly in evidence in this reconstruction - hide significant differences. Huaco alludes, as we have seen, to the diachronic and synchronic arguments of Lukács and Mannheim respectively. The dynamic and static accounts of ideology are evident in Lukács and Mannheim's arguments. But Mannheim's own intention was, as we have seen, to provide a dynamic account. This dynamic element was derived from the meta-theoretical philosophy of history that underlay his theory of utopian consciousness. In order to compare Lukács' and Mannheim's accounts of ideology more fully, it would be necessary to include this aspect. Furthermore, since Huaco relies upon the English translation of Ideologie und Utopie, he does not point to the strong emphasis upon the problem of false consciousness in the original. This would, in fact, bring Mannheim's arguments closer thematically to those of Lukács. But the reduction of the two arguments to the simple propositions outlined by Huaco, hides both the manner in which the two writers arrive at these 'propositions' and the presuppositions that lie behind them. For instance, Huaco assumes that both Lukács and Mannheim take up a Hegelian conception of totality. But, as Schmidt has argued,

'A dominant theme ... in Mannheim's work is a conception of a social totality which completely subordinates each of its parts to the whole and which can be theoretically reconstructed only by a surpassing of any one part by the series of remaining parts. The metaphor which Mannheim employs constantly ... is that of perspectives opening onto an object, an adequate perception of the object must include as many perspectives as possible.'

This is overlooked in Huaco's schematic outline, as is the significance of perspectival knowledge for Mannheim.
Nonetheless, the centrality of the problem of false consciousness in *Ideologie und Utopie* and the retention of the notion of totality - even though reduced, in fact, to a static, almost quantitative concept - do suggest that Mannheim was attempting to confront Lukács' earlier arguments and go beyond them. Mannheim did maintain that his sociology of knowledge, which was to be empirically based, transcended the narrow boundaries of a critique of ideology. On the other hand, it is equally certain that Mannheim had other aims in *Ideologie und Utopie* than a confrontation with Lukács. He did assume that he was contributing to the construction of a new foundation for human scientific knowledge as well as providing the basis for a 'diagnosis of the times'. But then Lukács' own diagnosis of the times, and especially his assessment of the revolutionary potential of the proletariat, was also central - even if, in its concrete details, it remained implicit - to his own project.

If it can be argued that Mannheim confronted Lukács' central arguments in *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein* - and felt compelled to confront them - in order to develop his own sociology of knowledge, then it is probably no less true that, in some areas at least, the early Frankfurt School members used Mannheim's central arguments in *Ideologie und Utopie* as a point of confrontation with which to develop their own theory of ideology. It has already been seen that Horkheimer, for example, provided a highly critical review of *Ideologie und Utopie* in 1930. In the same year, and less well known, Horkheimer published a short study of the origins of the bourgeois philosophy of history. This brief study, the preface to which was written in January 1930 (i.e. not long after the publication of *Ideologie und Utopie*), is in many ways a confrontation with Mannheim's *Ideologie und Utopie* but, unlike the review article of the same year, within the context of Horkheimer's own concerns.
Within the context of a study of the philosophy of history of Machiavelli, Hobbes, Vico and strands of utopian thought, Horkheimer often seeks to develop his own theory of ideology and utopia. In the preface to his study, Horkheimer declares that

'the problem of ideology, of a specific function in the social struggle ... stands at present in the centre of philosophical and sociological discussion. If ideology produces illusion then, in contrast, utopia is the dream of the "true" and just order of life. In this sense, it takes part in every philosophical judgment of human society. Ideology and utopia should be conceived as the standpoints (Haltungen) of social groups from the total social reality.' 19

Horkheimer's reference to the contemporary nature of this discussion of ideology is surely made with Mannheim's work in mind. But Horkheimer takes up a standpoint vis-a-vis ideology that is distanced from Mannheim's theory of ideology in some respects. With reference to ideology, Horkheimer writes,

'The theory of the historical relativity (Bedingtheit) of intellectual structures does not lead to historical relativism. The relativity of a statement and ideology is of two kinds. The limit to that which we may rightly term ideology indeed defines the contemporary state of our knowledge.' 20

Horkheimer, following Marx, argues that ideology does not derive from accepting 'socially effective illusion' that diverges from the science of a period but in hypostatizing the state of knowledge as a whole as 'eternal reason', instead of 'recognising it as a moment of the social total process that in the progress of history is submitted not merely to analysis but also verification and under circumstances of change'. Hence, for Horkheimer, 'insight into the historical relativity of a theory is never identical with the assertion that it is ideological'.
In a similar vein, Horkheimer also develops his own theory of utopia:

'Utopia has two sides; it is the critique of that which exists and the representation of that which should be. The significance basically lies enclosed in the first element.' 21

This critical element of utopia is, as we have seen, absent from Mannheim's conception of utopia. Whether Mannheim provides a critique as opposed to a theory of ideology must also be doubted. In an essay written two years later, Horkheimer also states the crucial problem of the autonomy of the mind when he maintains that

'The mind can neither recognize itself again in nature nor in history since if the mind is not to be merely a questionable abstraction, it cannot be identical with reality.' 22

The reduction of the mind and the 'superstructure' to the base (as 'drives', 'life', etc.), however, that is a central thesis in much of the sociology of knowledge of Weimar Germany, in fact proclaims this identity of the mind with reality. In other words, it proclaims its total alienation.

In other respects, however, the early writings of members of the Frankfurt School, and particularly those of Horkheimer reveal a kind of sociologism that is perhaps also characteristic of some of Mannheim's work. This is particularly true of his early accounts of science. 23 In a recent discussion of science, Apel has pointed to the sociologism present in Horkheimer's position when he states

'that understanding the significance of natural science is fundamentally and hence primarily a matter of a social history of modern capitalism, so that, instead of philosophical epistemology, social history could adequately account for the cognitive validity of science by reducing it to being just a moment in the rationalised social process that belongs to the economic system of capitalism. I think one may fully recognize
that modern capitalism was a crucial empirical condition, i.e. external causal stimulation for the rise of a technologically relevant natural science, and yet nonetheless reject Horkheimer's position as a sociologistic - historicistic overstatement which jeopardizes the universal truth-claim of science and hence also of Marxist social history as a science. 24

This 'sociologistic-historistic overstatement' is also to be found, as we have seen, in Mannheim's account of science and especially where, in turn, he is drawing heavily upon Lukács' earlier account. 25

Although it is not possible here to develop the various positions taken up by the early Frankfurt School, or their critical attitude towards Lukács, the above remarks should suffice to introduce at least a cautionary note to those interpreters who wish to draw too sharp a dividing line between Mannheim's German work and the early Frankfurt School. 26 As with the relationship between Mannheim and Lukács, so here the relation between Mannheim and the early Frankfurt School would seem to be the latter's confrontation with Mannheim in order to develop their own position just as Mannheim felt obliged to confront Lukács' work. But this confrontation need not rule out the possibility that certain affinities remain.

III

Whereas few contemporary commentators upon the sociology of knowledge in Weimar Germany referred to the relationship between Mannheim's sociology of knowledge and Lukács' critique of ideology, there is abundant evidence of questions concerning the relationship between the sociology of knowledge and Marxist critique of ideology. However, it has already been
suggested that such a comparison cannot merely commence from Marx's critique of ideology as an unproblematical given. Rather, it must start out from the broader context of the presuppositions for the possibility of a critique of ideology. This is necessary because of the context within which the sociology of knowledge was located within Weimar Germany and because of our own contemporary concern to re-examine the foundations of a critique of ideology. In Weimar Germany, the sociology of knowledge was certainly viewed as something more than a mere branch of sociology, such as the sociology of industry or of the family. In view of its subject matter, it was seen as a methodology for the examination of social thought as a whole and also as a means of grounding social scientific knowledge that took account of its specific nature. However, it is necessary to examine what the sociology of knowledge was not particularly concerned with in order to highlight its specific approach to the critique of social thought.

To anticipate our subsequent discussion of this problem, we can already suggest on the basis of our existing knowledge of this tradition that it was not concerned with the role of language as such and that, except in Mannheim's second unpublished study, it was also not concerned either with the problem of the communication of ideologies and other forms of social thought or with human communication as the presupposition for social scientific knowledge. Furthermore, aside from the occasional reference to Pareto's sociology of knowledge, as in Ziegler's article, little attention was paid to the psychological dimension of a potential critique of ideology or its role within the sociology of knowledge. Of course, Scheler's sociology of knowledge is grounded in a theory of drives that can be interpreted in a psychological and biological manner. But it hardly raises the kind of issues that
are present either in Reich's account of class consciousness or in the Frankfurt School's studies of the social-psychological bases of authoritarianism and fascism. Nor, because of its virtual ignoring of the problem of communication, does it come anywhere near the examination, for example, of what Habermas has termed 'systematically distorted communication.'28 Perhaps most obviously of all, the sociology of knowledge in Weimar Germany appears to systematically and consistently avoid the issue of the truth claims of knowledge, either by means of a phenomenological 'bracketing' of them or by reducing them to a simple social determination.

Yet the relationship between the sociology of knowledge in Weimar Germany and the critique of ideology raises other important issues even within the context of the former's own intentions and claims. In order to go beyond or transcend the critique of ideology, the sociology of knowledge must presumably be able to cover at least the issues dealt with by a critique of ideology. In order to be superior to it, the sociology of knowledge must deal with the critique of ideology's object domain and provide not merely a more acceptably account of it but also cover issues that it is incapable of dealing with. In Ideologie und Utopie, at least, Mannheim seems to be suggesting that his sociology of knowledge performs precisely these tasks.

But as we have seen, the sociology of knowledge in Weimar Germany developed a critique of ideology that located ideology, world-views and social thought, in general firmly within the superstructure. The base-superstructure model is a consistent, though in its contents diverse, feature of both Scheler's and Mannheim's sociology of knowledge. In contrast, Böhler has suggested that the critique of ideology in Marx's account at least has a different intention.
He argues that

'The historicist sociology of knowledge and positivistic misunderstanding, which even Marxists often indulge in, is pre-critical and pre-Marxist insofar as it sees the critique of ideology as being concerned merely with theory, with world-views and with "superstructure". Marx's critique of ideology was always concerned with theory and practice and, in fact, from the standpoint of an enlightened theory - praxis mediation. 29

The most articulated critique of ideology within the German sociology of knowledge tradition is that of Mannheim. Is it the case that his version of the critique of ideology can also be seen to suffer from these weaknesses?

As we have already seen, those of Mannheim's contemporaries who compared his sociology of knowledge and critique of ideology with that of Marx argued that Mannheim's account had serious shortcomings. This is not surprising in the case of orthodox Marxists such as Wittfogel and Fogarasi. But perhaps the most interesting critique of Mannheim's position came from Plessner's analysis of the changes in the concept of ideology from Marx to Mannheim. Plessner argued that the sociology of knowledge signified a new development towards the restriction of the notion of ideology after its historicist universalisation and trivialization. In part, Plessner argued, Mannheim's concept of ideology constituted a partial return to Marx's concept of ideology in that Mannheim reintroduced the concept of false consciousness (which implied an evaluative dynamic concept of ideology) and the problem of reality itself (in the form of a diagnosis of the times). With regard to Böhler's criticism of the sociology of knowledge, in fact, Plessner seems to suggest that Mannheim's position advances beyond the historicist reductions of ideology to 'a pure epiphenomenon'. It is doubtful, however, whether Mannheim successfully escaped the 'fateful metamorphosis' of the concept of ideology into its historicist variant. What Plessner takes to be
its 'radical reserve in relation to the validity-claims of values', its
'indifference to the true and false' and its reduction to 'an expression of
life' can also be found in Mannheim's theory of ideology. It will also be
recalled that Plessner suggested that substantial differences remained be-
tween Marx's concept of ideology and Mannheim's sociology of knowledge.
In the latter case, there was 'no progressive development of history', no
'unequivocal reference to class interest and hence political unequivocalness'
and no 'clear, specifiable criterion of true consciousness'. These and other
differences between Marx's and Mannheim's notions of ideology would seem
to place Mannheim outside the Marxist tradition of a critique of ideology and
more firmly within a historicist generalisation of the concept.

Nonetheless, if we take the minimal preconditions for the possibility of a
critique of ideology that have been outline by Böhler in relation to Marx's
concept of ideology, then we may be able to focus more clearly upon the
distinctive features of Mannheim's version of the critique of ideology. At
the start of his reconstruction of Marx's critique of ideology, Böhler high-
lights 'the major aspects of an emancipatory critique of ideology in the
service of a "mediation of theory and practice"'. 30 We may take these
aspects, for the moment, to be necessary dimensions of such a critique
of ideology. This may seem a somewhat arbitrary procedure but since
Mannheim nowhere systematically develops his own dimensions of a cri-
tique of ideology it may be useful, initially, to take as our starting point
a reconstruction of Marx's critique of ideology that is not confined to an
orthodox mechanistic interpretation of that critique or to its transform-
ation in the sociology of knowledge. 31
The first dimension of any critique of ideology is that of an 'immanent understanding' of the ideology in question and specifically of the way in which 'it is understood by human beings who participate in it'. An ideology possesses its own meaning content that must be understood hermeneutically. That is, any ideology must first be rendered intelligible in relation to its own normative framework. Ideological discourse, for instance, is one way of rendering the world intelligible to its participants and can be considered as one restricted form of communication between members of society. To ignore this hermeneutic dimension of a critique of ideology is to remove any possibility for the relatively autonomy of ideology and to open up the possibility of reducing it to the status of a mere illusion or epiphenomenon. Böhler points to the consequences for any critique of ideology that ignores this dimension when he argues that

"If it is not to reduce society to an objective causal mechanism and, in accordance with this prior decision, to conceive of meaning content as the mere product of material relations, but instead to take account of intentional communicative action as such, then, indeed, it not merely implicitly presupposes hermeneutics but is explicitly dependent upon hermeneutic methods." 32

Hence, any critique of ideology that employs a reductive strategy with regard to its object does not so much ignore the hermeneutic dimension but rather transposes it or reduces it to another level of analysis (e.g. class determination). In short, the hermeneutic dimension must reveal how ideologies come to be intelligible to their adherents and how they are interpreted.

However, a critique of ideology could not be confined to this hermeneutic aspect since this would presuppose that the critique of ideology was in fact superfluous. 33 Böhler maintains that a second dimension of any critique of ideology, but one which is most often identified as constituting the key
element of a Marxist critique is the 'critique of ideology as the analysis of interests in the broadest sense'. 34 Such analysis, however, is not always conceived as an inquiry into the material societal interests that generate specific conceptions and solutions to practical problems. One could conceive of a critique of ideology that interpreted these interests in an idealist manner (as a set of historically invariant, biological-psychological drives). More commonly, however, the analysis of interests sets out to reveal the insufficiency of a hermeneutic understanding of our interpretations and theories in relation to historical and social practice. What this implies is that the critique of ideology would be superfluous if human beings could perfectly understand their own and others' meanings and theories in relation to the historical and social context in which they are located. It is precisely because we do not yet consciously make our own history (as Mannheim pointed out at the end of his chapter in utopia in Ideologie und Utopie) that we must examine the preconditions under which any such project becomes possible. In the course of the development of the critique of ideology, the analysis of interests has often taken the form of a theory of domination—not merely social but also psychological and even biological. A social theory of domination, however, necessarily presupposes the engagement of man in the social world.

This engagement already suggests that we cannot merely treat the analysis of interests in an objectivistic manner and reduce them to a social-economic and sociologistic basis. It presupposes that we are not merely concerned with an analysis of material interests that underlie ideologies. Insofar as our concern is with a critique of ideology, it presupposes

'a critical emancipatory interest that is directed towards the overcoming of social "opacity".'
"unreasonableness" and "alienation" in a "transparent", "unalienated" society that is directed by the collective "reason" of human beings." 35

The grounds for its own existence necessarily presuppose engagement in society. In terms of its relation to the second dimension, an analysis of interests would itself be insufficient without some theoretical and practical notions of how it is possible to overcome ideology. Conversely, the mere assertion of a critical emancipatory interest is insufficient when that interest lacks any concrete context.

Fourthly, Böhler argues that where the analysis of interests and society is not confined to a mechanistic conception of society as merely a system of production but also an ideological sphere, it is necessary for a critique of ideology to be conceived as a 'reworking of tradition (and secularisation). 36

This dimension is important for any attempt to provide not merely an understanding of meanings and theories in relation to socio-economic practice but to provide a critique of the tradition within which such understanding is at all possible. The history of the tradition in which ideology is located must itself be rendered problematic.

The fifth dimension of a critique of ideology is that of 'social situational research'. Any critique of tradition presupposes an understanding of a contemporary situation (in Mannheim, the 'diagnosis of the times' perhaps), a postulate which has been the source of considerable difficulty in the development of hermeneutics. Böhler suggests the need for this dimension as follows:

'A critique of tradition which is not arbitrary but seeks to be grounded and maintain the claim to scientific rationality and clarity (Durchsichtigkeit)
refers, for its part, to the necessity for social situational research. The critic of tradition commences apriori from his understanding of a contemporary situation. 37

In this way, the critique of tradition is made concrete and is rendered capable of correction. This dimension not merely refers back to the need for a concrete location of the hermeneutic dimension of meaning, but is necessary for the realisation of the critical emancipatory interest in that such social situational research can point to

\[ \text{which traditional value-conceptions and orientations to action can possess a concrete emancipatory function in the present and in the foreseeable future of a society.} \, 38 \]

In this context, Böhler points out that the mediating dimension of communication has usually been ignored in social scientific research insofar as this fifth dimension has reduced the critical emancipatory interest and the critique of tradition to an analysis of domination and labour. By eliminating emancipatory self-reflection and communication mediated through tradition, such research has provided an unsatisfactory mode of integrating the critique of ideology into social and historical practice.

Finally, Böhler argues that the practical claims of the critique of ideology must also presuppose a theory of action and praxis in order for critique to be translated into practice. One might add here, however, that a theory of action must already be presupposed in any theory of ideology since it is often characterised as preventing 'real', 'true' or 'appropriate' action in a given situation. In Mannheim's critique of ideology, the manner in which ideology prevents appropriate 'adjustment' to the existing present situation must also implicitly presuppose a theory of action.
In the light of these dimensions of a critique of ideology, does the sociology of knowledge in any way approximate to this critique, both in its intentions and in its actual result? The hermeneutic dimension is certainly present in Mannheim's earlier writings on the sociology of culture. In his analysis of the problems faced when interpreting world-views, Mannheim comes down in favour of the examination of documentary meaning as the most fruitful for their interpretation. Any cultural product may be given to us immediately or medially. In the latter case, the mediating role is a function of expression, on the one hand, or documentation or evidence on the other. A cultural product has an objective meaning that 'can be fully grasped without knowing anything about the "intentional acts" of the individual "author"', whereas expressive meaning is to be grasped authentically as it appeared to its creator. In contrast, documentary meaning derives from the objectification of our own and others actions and is realised in signs and forms that can be interpreted by the 'spectator'. In this case, documentary interpretation can employ constructs - collective subjects, ideal types, etc - and is, as Mannheim later puts it, a form of 'extrinsic interpretation'. Unlike the other two forms of interpretation, it must be performed anew in each epoch and is 'the only one a dynamically changing subject can have of a dynamically changing object.' But as we have already seen in the examination of Mannheim's unpublished manuscripts, this extrinsic interpretation or 'functional meaning' of cultural phenomena is in terms of the life-experiences of a particular group of individuals within which a world-view is rooted. The plurality of group life-experiences and the dynamic nature of these experiences makes it difficult to attain a perspective of the whole epoch. It is probably this transition to the historicist problematic that accounts for Mannheim's abandonment of his earlier hermeneutic interests in Ideologie und Utopie.
Here we are provided with any account of how we can have access to the expressive meaning of ideologies. This is important since any analysis of ideology must start out by predicking its intelligibility or plausibility for its adherents. One might suggest, for example, that an ideology resolves artifically certain contradiction in the situation and relationships of certain social groups. That is, we can argue that the contradictions in their relationship to other groups are not resolved except at the level of ideology. Mannheim, however, in predicking the ideological nature of all social thought as a result of its social embeddedness also introduces the immunizing strategy that is so common to ideological discourse; namely, that viewpoints, arguments, etc., can be denounced as merely a function of those who offer them, thereby preventing any examination of the validity of their truth-claims.

Truth-claims can only be considered either as a function of the superiority of one of these positions (world-views, life experiences, etc.) or as a function of a synthesis of what is valuable in these positions. In either case, access to truth-claims is blocked. Therefore, it is difficult not to conclude that although Mannheim was certainly sensitive to the hermeneutic problems of interpretation, as Bauman has recently shown, these problems tend to disappear in his later analysis of ideology.

The second dimension of a critique of ideology that Böhler isolated - the analysis of interests - appears in Mannheim's account of ideology only as the need of certain groups to control the public interpretation of reality. Precisely why they have this need or interest remains obscure. Even in the chapter on utopia in Ideologie und Utopie which, as we have seen, is predicated upon a model of society that is dichotomous - in terms of dominant and subordinate groups - there is very little reference to concrete social
and political interests in domination. More to the point, Mannheim's analysis does not show how it is that access to 'knowledge' or 'truth' is blocked as a means of reinforcing this subordination. There is a suggestion that increased rationalisation prevents the development of social and political utopias but this process of rationalisation remains unlocated. When compared with Lukács' analysis of the role of reification, Mannheim's account of the reasons for the necessity of utopian consciousness can only be extracted from the meta-theoretical presuppositions of his philosophy of history.

In turn, however, this already suggests that, at least implicitly, Mannheim retains a notion of the need for a critique of ideology since, as he himself states at the opening to *Ideologie und Utopie*, in ideology and utopia we experience the possibility of false consciousness. This false consciousness exists, for Mannheim, in relation to our inability to relate adequately to the present. That is, this false consciousness is manifested in both ideology (which orientates us towards the past) and utopia (which orientates us towards the future). One might imagine at first glance that the emancipatory interest in Mannheim's sociology of knowledge was located at the level of the need for engagement in the present. But this engagement is not conceived of in terms of activity or praxis but as adequate adjustment to the present. The emancipatory potential - at least at the meta-theoretical level of his philosophy of history - lies with utopian consciousness. This contradiction between the avowed aims of the sociology of knowledge (a diagnosis of the present times) and the meta-theoretical philosophy of history (utopia supplies the dynamic - i.e. activity - to history) is subsequently resolved by Mannheim in favour of the abandonment of utopian consciousness and greater emphasis upon sociology of knowledge analyses that can provide
greater 'control' of our action and remove 'errors'.

Böhler's fourth dimension of the critique of ideology - the reworking of tradition and the recognition of the quasi-autonomy of the tradition from which an ideology emerges and which it itself develops - is hardly present in Mannheim's analysis of ideologies in *Ideologie und Utopie*. Where Mannheim does examine the traditions within which ideologies are located, his persistent use of ideal type analysis tends to reduce traditions to mere types of thought or consciousness. Moreover, we have already suggested that Mannheim's analysis of ideologies blocks access to a critique of the tradition within which an understanding of the meaning of an ideology is possible.

The fifth aspect of a critique of ideology - that of social situational research - possesses a paradoxical status within Mannheim's theory of ideology. On the one hand, it is relatively easy to extract from *Ideologie und Utopie* and his later German works, many assertions as to the need for empirical social research into ideologies and other forms of social thought. Certainly, in his period at Frankfurt, Mannheim sought to encourage empirical studies of aspects of social knowledge and institutions (e.g. the press). Similarly, a central aim of *Ideologie und Utopie*, made more urgent by the ideological and utopian obscuring of the present, was a 'diagnosis of the times'. Mannheim did indeed commence from his understanding of the contemporary situation but, paradoxically, we are provided with almost no social analysis of that situation. We are told that it is a period of deep 'intellectual crisis'. We know from his earlier account in his essay on competition that Mannheim saw the ideological situation of his times as one of increasing polarisation of ideologies. But actual concrete social analysis of this 'crisis situation'
is largely absent from *Ideologie und Utopie* even though this is probably the most overtly political and contemporary of Mannheim's German writings. One could, of course, interpret his aim as not being that of providing a concrete social analysis or a 'diagnosis of the times' but as providing the tools for such an analysis in the form of an evaluative sociology of knowledge. Then, however, one would have to question to what extent the sociology of knowledge, as Mannheim conceived it, was capable of providing such an analysis. His analysis of ideologies hardly approaches the level of an account of them that would provide us with a contemporary diagnosis of the times. The 'relatively detached intelligentsia' are also hardly in a position to provide it either, particularly in the later years of the Weimar Republic.

As has been pointed out, Böhler argues that a critique of ideology must, as a critique, presuppose a theory of action and a theory of how that critique can be translated into practice. Here, Mannheim assumes that the sociology of knowledge, by providing its analyses and thinking the crisis through to its limits, enables individuals to reach a more rational decision to what their own course of action should be. Subsequently, (e.g. in the essay on 'American Sociology') Mannheim assumed that his sociology of knowledge, as 'an organ of critical self-control', had indeed 'succeeded in detecting and subjecting to control important groups of sources of error'. The critique of ideology in the form of the evaluative sociology of knowledge was to implement its critiques presumably on the basis of the persuasiveness of its analyses. At the level of social action, the removal of ideological and utopian limitations to social thought would permit more 'adequate' forms of consciousness appropriate to the present situation.
It can be seen, therefore, that Mannheim's theory of ideology and sociology of knowledge does, on Böhler's criteria, retain elements of all the dimensions of a critique of ideology as he outlines them. But whether Mannheim provides a critique of ideology as opposed to a theory of ideology and whether it is an emancipatory interest that lies behind his sociology of knowledge must remain open to question.

IV

The sociology of knowledge in Weimar Germany was not merely a confrontation with the Marxist critique of ideology and the various ways in which it had been interpreted in the Second Internation and in German sociology. It was also a contribution to the discussions surrounding the methodological foundations of the social sciences that had taken place in Germany since the original Schmoller-Menger Methodenstreit. More specifically, Scheler contributed to the so-called Wissenschaftsstreit surround Max Weber's 'Wissenschaft als Beruf' lecture. As Bracht has argued, Scheler's sociology is fundamentally concerned with the problem of values and value-relativism. It is plausible to argue that, in part, Scheler's sociology of knowledge is an attempt to retain an order of values, despite the arguments against such strategies in the earlier Werturteilsstreit. Mannheim, for his part, takes up, both directly and indirectly, all these controversies in his work. His early reliance upon the work of Dilthey is manifested not merely in his early writings on problems of interpretation but also in his examination of the 'sociological determination of methodology' (die soziologische Bedingtheit der Methodenlehre) in his unpublished study, Eine soziologische Theorie der Kultur und ihrer Erkennbarkeit. Just as Dilthey set out to establish
the foundations for the critique of historical knowledge, so Mannheim may be seen as locating his sociology of knowledge within the framework of the reconstruction of the foundations of social scientific knowledge. In his later work, the centrality of the problem of competing world-views and ideologies that reaches its peak in Ideologie und Utopie can also be viewed as an extension of some of the issues already raised in the Werturteilsstreit. Finally, the chapter on politics as a science in Ideologie und Utopie refers explicitly to Weber's own views on the possibility of politics as a science and hence, indirectly, takes up issues from the Wissenschaftsstreit.

The very existence of these controversies and their inter-relationship already suggests the extent to which the foundations of sociology were not merely disputed but were also viewed as part of a more pervasive intellectual crisis. The possibility of science as such, the existence of competing methodological paradigms, the plurality and relativism of value standpoints, and the crisis of historicism all combined to transform earlier 'debates' into intellectual 'crises'. Certainly in post-First World War Germany, these 'intellectual' crises took on a new significance in the context of the polarisation of German society, and the apparently radical destruction of the whole social and political structure of the pre-war period. Military defeat, revolution and persistent internal unrest all combined to radicalise earlier problems and controversies. After the uneasy 'relativ Stabilizierung' between 1924 and 1929, Weimar Germany was again the battleground of conflicting social and political tendencies as well as economic collapse. Only with considerable detachment could Mannheim look back upon it as a kind of 'second Peri-clearage'.
Nor could these crises be viewed as merely those of the 'mandarins' in the Geisteswissenschaften. The crises permeated the natural sciences, too, as Forman's recent study of the scientific community in Germany has shown. Nonetheless, the sociology of knowledge, with its ambitious intentions and claims, and its pre-occupation with these crises, in however muted a form, may surely be viewed as highlighting in the most radical manner the crisis of intellectual endeavour itself, a crisis that is epitomised in Scheler's 'powerlessness of the mind' thesis and in Mannheim's 'homelessness of the mind'. It is also encapsulated in what Gurwitsch recognised in the sociology of knowledge a 'mistrust of the mind' (Misstrauen gegen den Geist). Out of this radical questioning of the foundations of social scientific knowledge and even of scientific endeavour itself, the sociology of knowledge emerged as a significant element of German sociology in the Weimar Republic.

The intervention of the sociology of knowledge in the methodological debates surrounding the social sciences commenced with Scheler's contribution to the Wissenschaftsstreit. In order to clarify the sociology of knowledge's role here it is necessary to return to that debate and its context. The debate that succeeded Weber's 'Wissenschaft als Beruf' lecture of 1919 is located by Wittenberg - in one of the few attempts to examine this debate - within the context of the heightened tension between the belief in an autonomous, timeless reason and a 'unique' historical life that resulted from experience of the World War. However, this very emphasis upon the uniqueness and specificity of the historical world had already been stated by Dilthey, Windelband and others well before the war. Wittenberg suggests that the experience of the war, of a 'unique' historical event without any
foundation in previous experience produced a profound shock to the belief in universal reason. In particular, he argues that this was felt specifically by the younger generation,

'for they found themselves at the end of the world war at the graveyard of their hopes; never before had a generation of youth experienced such a distinctive destruction of all values, sciences and arts; never before was the distance so great and unbridgable between the credulous hope with which the youth went onto the battlefield and the hard and cold reality.' 51

Kracauer points to the 'hatred of science' felt by 'the best part of present-day academic youth', 52 as a result of its apparent barrenness and inability to grasp basic experiences. In the human sciences, it constituted a reaction to conceptual formalism and the naive collection of facts, to a relativism that arises out of and induces a profound scepticism.

Against this background, Wittenberg terms Weber's 'Wissenschaft als Beruf' lecture 'a last high-point of a rational foundation' that recognises the 'disenchantment of the world', whilst firmly asserting the objectivity of science and the goal of scientific progress against a notion of science as achieving the 'absolute' or 'true being'. Instead, the world of thought in the form of academic disciplines and the world of action are to be strictly separated and science is to be necessarily excluded from producing the ideals of life. Similarly, in 'Politik als Beruf' Weber 'requires of the politician exactly the same qualities' as those of the scientist: 'Politics is made with the head but not with other parts of the body and the soul'. The politician, too, should be concerned with the truth and factual objectivity by means of a systematic, unpartisan testing of facts. Both activities are to be based on purposive-rational action.
More specifically, Weber seeks to establish the separation of science and politics, personality and objects and science and religion. Above all, he insists upon the separation of facts and standards, and science and world-views. From the standpoint of science, all value-decisions are relative and cannot be rationally grounded. It is here that the sociology of knowledge takes up Weber's position on science and politics from a number of directions. Both Scheler and Mannheim recognise the need for value-free science. Both apparently take up the social relativity of world-views but Scheler seeks to maintain essential values from social determination. Indeed, where Scheler explicitly concerns himself with Weber's central argument important differences emerge.

Scheler, like Weber, emphasizes the growing intellectualisation, specialisation and bureaucratisation in the organisation of modern science. But whereas Weber sees this an an unavoidable fate, Scheler sees

"In these symptoms evidence of a crisis of western culture that can no longer rest solely upon a scientific basis."

Scheler insists upon the existence of three forms of knowledge - salvational, educational and knowledge for domination - that exist in all periods including the present.

"Thus, according to Scheler's interpretation, Weber's concept of science encompasses only the small and restricted zone of purposive knowledge, but in no way provides a true picture of the reality of the situation of science in the past and the present."

Indeed, in his sociology of knowledge, Scheler no longer holds knowledge of reality to be possible merely on the basis of science as such since it too, as one form of knowledge amongst others, is also socially determined.

Scheler departs even further from Weber here since, as we have seen, the
'human existence' that 'directs' this knowledge is not merely social but also biological and psychological.

At the practical level, Scheler insists upon the separation of research and vocational study and maintains that the gulf between the two is unbridgeable. His solution is to call for the foundation of Bildungsakademien in which the major synthesizers of knowledge will teach. In contrast, Volkshochschulen will be reserved for the non-academic majority. Wittenberg summarizes the theoretical and practical consequences of Scheler's position as follows:

'with the triple division of all knowledge, Scheler breaks with the central claim of German idealism of the possibility, meaningfulness and value of a single, genuine knowledge. Scheler's doctrine of the sociological determination of all knowledge likewise arrives at the pronouncement of the end of science as such. Scheler's degradation of universities into pure technical schools would reduce academics to technicians, make science into a means of production and place the whole of knowledge in the service of external progress.' 55

What Wittenberg fails to grasp with regard to the last consequence of Scheler's position is that Scheler is unwittingly referring to changes that have taken place in higher education and which had already been referred to by writers such as Veblen. 56 Despite this, Wittenberg does indicate the extent to which Scheler's sociology of knowledge directly takes up key aspects of Weber's position in 'Wissenschaft als Beruf'.

It may be worthwhile pointing out here that Scheler's reduction of science to knowledge for domination, in one respect, has the same result as a positivist reduction of science to technique in which, as Habermas argues,

'The social potential of science is reduced to the powers of technical control - its potential for enlightened action is no longer considered. The
empirical, analytical sciences produce technical recommendations, but they furnish no answers to practical questions. 57

That is, the critical dimension of science is ignored. This further distances Scheler from Weber who at least argues that the function of science is 'to render problematic what is given as conventionally self-evident'. In Weber's case, however, the separation of the 'completely heterogeneous problems' of securing facts and grounding normative judgments together with the absence of a critique of ideology makes it difficult for him to attain this goal. 58

For Scheler, the problems are quite different, though he too accepts the plurality of values in 'relatively natural world-views', as well as the principle of value-freedom for the sociology of knowledge. In his earlier work, and especially in Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik, Scheler sought to show how values constituted the 'practical world'. Furthermore, as Bracht has shown, Scheler sought also to secure an objective order of values and since, for Scheler, human 'drive is value-determined, he asserted a . . . convergence between the human structure of drives and the objective order of values. The values, which direct the drive, are objective even when they are in fact only found in human beings. 60

But, as Bracht shows, these values which direct the drives are also relative. The values of life are also 'relative' values that can only be 'objective' if they are grounded in higher values. There exists, then, for Scheler - in his ethics at least - a distinction between absolute intellectual values and relative values. The relevance of this for Scheler's sociology of knowledge is that the concept of value is the source of the separation of 'real' and 'cultural' sociology. Again, to cite Bracht,
'The separation between mind and reality, culture and nature, ideal factor and real factor, group spirit and group soul, value and drive in sociology are the result of the already mentioned difference between relative and absolute values, that Scheler merely . . . juxtaposes with one another as immediated facts.' 61

That is, the concepts of value and value orders are transposed from his earlier ethics into the historical dimension of his sociology of knowledge. But the sociology of knowledge is to deal with the plurality of values and world-views and the changes in corresponding forms of knowledge. The problem then becomes one of realising these values since

'Scheler makes his concept of value into the interpretative model for historical change as such. The insoluble problem that thereby emerges is the problem of the realisation of diverse types of value by means of an identical subject, whether it is the group or the individual; for the types of value contradict one another.' 62

As we have already seen, Scheler's sociology of knowledge rests upon his philosophical anthropology and metaphysics. The resolution of the problem of value, if indeed it can be resolved in the manner in which Scheler formulates it, cannot be found in his sociology of knowledge but in a metaphysics that ultimately secures the objectivity of values by positing the possibility of God as an ens realissimum. It is a manifestation of the peculiar combination of a 'thorough eclectic' who, as Kracauer argued, can combine Catholicism and relativism. 63

In his writings in Weimar Germany, Mannheim too confronts the problem of value-relativism in different guises both in his earlier work an historicism and, more explicitly, in Ideologie und Utopie. For the moment, however, it may be more fruitful to re-examine Mannheim's explicit contributions to the Methodenstreit since they are every bit as central to his
sociology of knowledge. An attempt will therefore be made to outline some of the salient features of Mannheim's contribution to the methodological dispute surrounding the social sciences.

Whereas in his brief review, 'Zum Problem einer Klassifikation der Wissenschaften', Mannheim appears to argue against the constitution of the sciences in terms of their object domain or their methodology and in favour of the intentionality of the cognitive subject, he is by no means clear how this comes about. Indeed, at one point in his argument, he appears to be uncertain as to whether the notion of intentionality (i.e. consciousness of something) is the solution at all. Nonetheless, the central problem which confronts his later work on the constitution of social scientific knowledge is already stated in this review as, for instance, when he argues that

'If we concede that we have direct, immediate experience of the nature of an object or an object-domain, then nonetheless the fact remains undisputed that its nature theoretically is always apprehended only from a viewpoint... a classification of the sciences, D.F.] can only result on the basis of a viewpoint; which viewpoint is the most adequate is decided by the nature of the object; the nature of the object, however, is theoretically always apprehended only from a viewpoint; the whole problem therefore seems to move in a circle.' 65

Even at this early stage of his work, Mannheim is already confronted with the perspectivism and relativism that permeates his later work. But he has not yet developed this perspectivism as a central feature of human scientific knowledge, even though, as we saw earlier, this was also sketched out in his review of Lukács' Die Theorie des Romans.

However, in 1922, in the same year as the review on the classification of the sciences was published, Mannheim also commenced his unpublished
study Über die Eigenart kultursoziologischer Erkenntnis which starts out from the differences between the cultural and natural sciences. Though this study has been discussed earlier, its relevance for Mannheim's reconstruction of the foundations of the human sciences must be briefly outlined here. Mannheim starts out by distinguishing between natural and cultural phenomena on the grounds that the former are 'free of meaning and value' or 'value-indifferent' whereas the latter 'is experienced as valuable' by the intentional cognitive subject. Following Dilthey, Mannheim argues that the cognitive subject in the cultural sciences is not a transcendental ego but 'the whole human being'. Furthermore, since the cultural sciences are part of the process they investigate, the subject and object of these sciences coincide. However, Mannheim, unlike Lukács, does not concentrate his attention upon the subject-object relation as a means of explicating the specificity of social knowledge but rather upon the human subject constitution of cultural scientific knowledge through their attitude (Einstellung) towards their object-domain. Since the human subject is a part of the cultural process he experiences, he has 'pre-theoretical' access to his object-domain.

This social subject of cultural knowledge experiences the cultural world with other human subjects. Cultural knowledge thus becomes a function of 'experiential contexts' and is to be understood in this manner. This 'socio-genetic knowledge' is, in turn, pre-theoretical in origin and invites attention to 'everyday life-experience' on the part of the cultural sciences. Indeed, the socio-genetic grounding of cultural objectifications does not, for Mannheim, lie in such entities as production relations or class positions but in 'experiential contexts' (Erlebniszusammenhänge). These experiential
contexts or constellations are a group phenomenon and, when structural
connected as a series, they constitute a world-view. Individual facts are
to be interpreted in terms of these totalities (i.e. world-views) that lie
behind them.

In this early attempt to formulate a theory of socio-cultural knowledge and
to define the distinctive of this form of knowledge, Mannheim reveals the
meta-theoretical intentions that lie behind his sociology of knowledge and
culture. That is, the specific propositions concerning the relationship be-
tween knowledge and culture, on the one hand, and society, on the other,
can only be fully understood in the light of the meta-theoretical assumptions
concerning the constitution of knowledge and reality itself. At the end of
this unpublished study, Mannheim indicates that a further dimension of
cultural knowledge that must be considered is its historically dynamic nature.
This is examined in his essay on historicism. But the most explicit attempt
by Mannheim to confront the Methodenstreit is to be found in his other un-
published study, *Eine soziologische Theorie der Kultur und ihrer Erkennbarkeit*.

Though it has also been summarised in some detail earlier, it is necessary
to indicate briefly those aspects of this work that directly relate to the
Methodenstreit. It will be recalled that in the first section of this study,
Mannheim maintains that methodological issues cannot be resolved without
a sociological orientation since forms of knowledge vary both historically
and socially and because a plurality of methodologies exist whose roots can
be traced back to underlying social factors. More specifically, Mannheim
raises the possibility of both an ontological distinction between the objects
of the natural and human sciences (on the basis of their 'mode of existence')
and an ontic distinction between 'nature free of meaning' and 'structures of meaning (culture)'. Further, he poses the possibility of the different relationship of the cognitive subject to his object in the natural and human sciences.

This meta-theoretical account of the differences between the natural and human sciences also contains a historical dimension in so far as these sciences grew out of different philosophical world-views (Cartesianism and Romanticism) which in turn have their roots in different cognitive interests ('a technically orientated interest' in the domination of nature and a practical interest in understanding). Historically and sociologically, Mannheim - following Simmel, Lukács and possibly Weber - 'imputes' natural scientific rationality to the 'capitalist spirit' and the specific rationality of a capitalist society. Since this is the dominant form of rationality in this society, its most 'appropriate' form of knowledge is taken to be the model for all forms of knowledge, i.e. it is both quantified and universalized. It is both based on and presupposes the alienation of human subjects who become the object of calculation and quantification. In contrast, social and political knowledge is 'situationally bounded', qualitative knowledge. It is only possible from historically-formed standpoints and it is a partial knowledge, the totality of which 'can only be grasped in a synthesis'.

The main body of this study, however, is concerned with yet another way of grounding the distinction between the natural and human sciences, namely, in the distinction between 'communicative' and 'conjunctive' knowledge. Communicative knowledge is societalized knowledge that aims at universalization. Its concepts are supra-temporal. It is usually located within
the natural sciences. Conjunctive knowledge, on the other hand, is located in and bounded by an existential community and is knowledge for interacting human subjects within this community. Its validity is limited to participants in this community. The cognitive subjects of the two types of knowledge are also correspondingly different. Whereas in communicative knowledge, the cognitive subject is a static, artificial construct, in conjunctive knowledge the cognitive subject is a dynamic, 'whole human being'. In the case of the latter, the human subject has a particular perspective deriving from his existential community or, if socially mobile or confronted with other communities, from several communities. The question necessarily arises as to whether it is possible to transcend the perspectivism of conjunctive knowledge. Mannheim argues that we can live within our existential community at an empathetic level. That is, we understand this conjunctive knowledge because we participate and interact in the existential community from which it emerges. This is the level of pre-reflexive knowledge. But we can also seek to understand phenomenon in terms of the context from which they emerge. That is, this form of understanding presupposes not engagement but reflection, not merely living in the existential community but also being distanced from it. Mannheim distinguishes the two forms of understanding as Verstehen (pre-reflexive) and Begreifen (reflexive). It is again worthwhile emphasizing here that Mannheim's role for the intelligentsia as synthesizers can only be fully comprehended in the light of these meta-theoretical assumptions concerning the social nature of understanding at the level of conjunctive knowledge.

Though the terminology is different, it is in this theory of conjunctive knowledge that we can find some affinities with more recent attempts to ground
social knowledge transcendentally. In particular, Apel's recent attempts to ground the preconditions for the possibility of knowledge at the pragmatic level of communication communities and his explication of the role of engagement and reflection appear to develop similar lines of argument. However, there are important differences aside from the differences in terminology. The communication community, for Apel, is the presupposition for all knowledge whether social or natural scientific knowledge. Furthermore, in contrast to Mannheim's conjunctive community, it is presupposed transcendentally and need not be perfectly realised. The interaction between engagement and reflection in the generation of critical knowledge of society does not lead Apel to search for synthesizers of engaged knowledge since engagement and reflection are features of all knowledge. Indeed, ideological distortion can be seen to emerge when the dialectical relationship between engagement and reflection is broken off or blocked. However, to pursue further the apparent affinities between Mannheim's arguments here and recent philosophical developments would lead us away from the task of examining the relationship between the sociology of knowledge and the methodological controversies surrounding the social sciences.

To return to Mannheim's sociology of knowledge, we can plausibly argue that the stance which Mannheim adopts on the methodological distinction between the natural and human sciences itself presents him with some of the problems which his sociology of knowledge must face. Indeed, Mannheim's sociology of knowledge can be interpreted, in part, as precisely this attempt to resolve these problems. The basic subjectivism of social knowledge that is located in diverse and, later, competing and conflicting communities of experience provides the meta-theoretical basis for our
understanding of his theory of competing world-views and, later, ideologies, as well as the need for a synthesis once their total partiality has been proclaimed. One can also detect in Mannheim's methodological incursions, the tendency to reduce social scientific knowledge to knowledge of world-views. The undifferentiated use of the notion of knowledge as meta-scientific knowledge, normative knowledge, everyday knowledge, historical-philosophical world views as knowledge, etc, has often been remarked upon.

In Ideologie und Utopie, it is not so much the methodological dispute that is at issue for Mannheim but rather the problems raised by the Werturteilsstreit. Mannheim's account of the ideological nature of all social thought reveals the sociology of knowledge's dual position as the scientific basis for the destruction (or unmasking) of all other intellectual positions and as the basis for their constructive synthesis. It is as if a 'value-free' position is adopted for the critique of values embedded in world-views and ideologies and then an evaluative position is adopted for their synthesis and for a 'diagnosis of the times'. The radical historical relativization of values clearly has its origins in historicism. Ideologies thus become of equal value at this level. But Mannheim also introduces a qualitative evaluative consciousness of value insofar as some aspects of some standpoints are more adequate than others in relation to the historical present. It is here that the notion of false consciousness as 'inadequate to existence' is located.

In these two intentions - a scientific critique of standpoints and a diagnosis of the times by means of a synthesis of standpoints - one can see Mannheim attempting to mediate, as Hofmann suggests, between the philoso-
phical margins of the discussion surrounding value-judgments and the pract-
icial margins of a social politics of values. In the case of the philoso-
phical debate surrounding the role of value-judgments in science, Mann-
heim adopts a value-free position. This standpoint, in turn, contains a
central neo-Kantian separation of Sollen and Sein that has an important episto-
mological consequence. As Hofmann argues.

'Behind the demand for the absence of value-
judgments in science there stands an episte-
mological conception: value-judgments are
not the result of a cognitive act.'

The postulate of the value-freedom of science may have been viewed in
this light as the result of a practically existent value pluralism in which
science is not able to distinguish itself without becoming a party to a
value position. Mannheim, however, does not shy away from a study of
these non-cognitive value-judgments. He does, however, on occasion
accept that they, along with the most important areas of social life, are
still 'anchored in the irrational'. One of these areas is, for Mannheim,
the political sphere and the question as to the possibility of politics as a
science that is raised in the central chapter of Ideologie und Utopie forces
Mannheim to adopt a social-political analysis of values. Here, too, we
are confronted with the context within which the role of the intelligentsia as
synthesizers of value-laden standpoints become intelligible. In terms of
the options open to the sociology of knowledge's study of politics, Mann-
heim recognizes the value-free stance that removes 'the evaluative stand-
point' and 'impulsive element' from forms of knowledge as of only limited
validity. He himself favours a 'decision' in favour of an ex post synthesis
of value-laden standpoints in order, subsequently, to be able to 'predict
approximately the ideological reactions of social strata'. Ultimately, how-
ever, this 'decision' rests upon the responsible individual researcher and
does not depart, markedly, from Weber's notion of Verantwortungsethik.

In conclusion, it is plausible to argue that the sociology of knowledge in Weimar Germany represents an extension of both the debates surrounding the methodology of the social sciences that had already developed before the First World War and the controversies surrounding the role of value-judgments in science and even the role of science itself. In the latter case, as we have seen, the sociology of knowledge radicalised the problems of value-judgments and the role of science to the point of accentuating the 'crisis situation of thought' that Mannheim pointed to at the very start of his analysis in Ideologie und Utopie. One can also maintain that the methodological standpoints in the sociology of knowledge are part of a crucial meta-theoretical basis for the understanding of its propositions. This meta-theoretical basis is also constituted, especially in Mannheim's case, by a distinctive philosophy of history. That the two levels are connected can be seen in the extent to which Mannheim's methodological reflections are insolubly linked with his practical intention of providing a 'diagnosis of the times' within the context of the restrictions imposed by the past (ideology) and the future (utopia). In short, the methodological reflections are intended - in Ideologie und Utopie, at least - to terminate in an analysis of the absent present.

It has been necessary to reconstruct the presupposition and meta-theoretical intentions that lay behind the sociology of knowledge in Weimar Germany in
order to render the whole theoretical and practical project comprehensible.

In the examination of the debates surrounding the sociology of knowledge and, in particular, the reception of Mannheim's *Ideologie und Utopie*, it was found that contemporaries readily understood the theoretical and practical issues that this project confronted. To a greater or lesser extent, they shared its preoccupations or, at least, could conceive of them as real and also as urgent. Hence, as Neusüss argues in relation to Mannheim's work,

"For present day awareness, the reaction to Mannheim's sociology of knowledge in the social sciences and humanities at the close of the Weimar Republic can therefore only be completely comprehended if the specific intellectual and political atmosphere is recalled in which the problems of relativism and historicism, of the autonomy of the human mind over against all political and social determinations and the independence of "culture" over against a threatening "mass civilization" were still burning existential questions for intellectual strata." 

As we have seen, all these issues were present, to a greater or lesser degree, in the sociology of knowledge of this period and especially in Mannheim's work which, Eisermann argues, is "perhaps the most specific contribution that German sociology has contributed to the whole construction of this discipline". But it is not merely the case that the sociology of knowledge took up all these issues. Rather, it presented them in a radical form as theoretical and practical problems. For instance, it was not merely the case that all the philosophies which the sociology of knowledge took up also raised the problem of relativism. The fact that these competing philosophies were seen to exist within the same temporal sphere also heightened the sense of relativism. More importantly, however, the sociology of knowledge, in reducing these philosophies to the status of world-views (a project already commenced by Dilthey) and, in turn, in reducing world-views to systems of life, transformed relativism into a practical issue that
had to be resolved not merely theoretically but also practically. This was particularly urgent if, at the same time, one had already called into question the possibility of 'theoretical' solutions by reducing the 'superstructure' of society to the status of epiphenomena. The crisis of consciousness, in very different forms, is at the root of the work of Lukács, Scheler and Mannheim. Whereas for Lukács the problem is that of the transformation of consciousness out of its reified state, for Scheler it is the 'powerlessness of the mind' and for Mannheim the 'homelessness of the mind' that are central issues. In all cases, again in very different contexts, some can speak of the centrality of the alienation of the mind.

Similarly, the historicist problematic was not confined to questions relating to how one can interpret cultural phenomena, though the hermeneutic intention was particularly strong in both Lukács' and Mannheim's work. Rather, the presupposition of a historically dynamic flux within which cultural objectification were located and to be understood, combined with the conflict between 'cultures' in the sense of system of life called forth a desire for synthesis. Again, this was not confined to the sociology of knowledge but was often to be found in these traditions which the sociology of knowledge took up. Troeltsch, for example, saw his work, Der Historismus und seine Probleme, as being not merely concerned with the historical emergence of modern thought but as itself 'a historical-philosophical theme'.

In the preface, he writes that

'My fundamental notion is . . . directed towards the formation of a contemporary cultural synthesis out of the historical inheritances, for which task it is unimportant whether one belongs to the emergent or declining branch of cultural development.' 72
For Mannheim, however, at least by the time of the publication of Ideologie und Utopie, the demand for a synthesis had become not merely cultural but also political. The sociology of culture had become the sociology of political ideologies. Furthermore, it now mattered for Mannheim where one was located within the totality of historical development: one had to be located in the progressive historical flux. In short, however, the problem of historicism had also taken on a practical and political urgency.

The immediate aspects of the philosophy of history within this tradition were also significant in that for Lukács, and to a lesser extent, Scheler - in their different ways - a 'philosophy of history with a practical intent' (Habermas) was of considerably urgency. Lukács saw the progressive decline of capitalism as not bringing about a revolutionary consciousness in the proletariat. His concern was to retain this consciousness as an 'objective possibility' and, later, to embody it within the political party. Lukács' orientation was still towards the future. Scheler, in contrast, viewed the disintegration of post-war society and the threatening collapse of what he took to be essential values with dismay. In this sense, his orientation is towards the past insofar as his intention is the preservation of essential values. Mannheim, too, was preoccupied with social and political disintegration and the consequent lack of orientation. His response is to seek to develop a 'diagnosis of the times', i.e. an orientation towards the present.

In this respect, Lenk's characterisation of the sociology of knowledge as embodying a 'tragic consciousness' is strictly speaking, most accurate for his original analysis of Scheler. The finality of the Leben/Gelst
division and their insoluble opposition, combined with the laws of the relationship between the two, lead to a 'powerlessness of the mind' thesis and a 'tragic consciousness'. For Lukács - whom Lenk does not discuss - the gap between reified consciousness (the description of which does contain elements of tragic consciousness, especially in the case of the bourgeoisie) and the 'objective possibility' of revolutionary consciousness can be overcome through both political activity and political reflection. For Mannheim, the 'homelessness of the mind' is resolved by locating it within the relatively detached intelligentsia and, by implication, the sociology of knowledge itself. Each, in their different ways, is concerned with the alienation of consciousness.
CHAPTER VI

NOTES


7. For a critique of Lenk's study on these grounds see E.M. Lange's review in *Philosophische Rundschau*, 21, 1975, pp. 129-138.


15. Ibid., pp. 251-2.
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41. Cf. Z. Bauman, 
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48. P. Forman, 
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49. A. Gurwitsch, 
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50. E. Wittenberg, 
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51. Ibid., p.238.

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53. E. Wittenberg, 
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54. Ibid.
55. Ibid., p. 256.
60. Ibid., p. 24.
61. Ibid., p. 60.
62. Ibid., p. 56.
65. Ibid., p. 157.
69. W. Hofmann, loc. cit., p. 54.
73. K. Lenk, Von der Ohnmacht des Geistes, Tübingen 1959.
CONCLUSION
This study of the development of the sociology of knowledge in Germany has concentrated upon the work of three writers - Max Scheler, Karl Mannheim and Georg Lukács - who directly or (in Lukács' case) indirectly contributed to its emergence in Weimar Germany. It has been argued that earlier attempts to dismiss the sociology of knowledge as dealing merely with pseudo-problems or being hopelessly caught up in the relativist problematic have resulted in taking attention away from the aims and problems which this tradition raised. Furthermore, those who argue that some of the problems it was concerned with - e.g., the problem of ideology - are now of merely historical interest and that those who dealt with them are merely precursors of a more sophisticated social theory of knowledge ignore the extent to which the problems that the German tradition raised - though probably not its solutions - remain central to recent discussion on the methodology and foundations of the social sciences. In this context, the present study has merely suggested rather than systematically analysed the connections between, say, Mannheim's contribution to the methodological dispute and recent discussions by Apel and Habermas. Similarly, contemporary discussion surrounding the foundations of a critique of ideology can be seen to be retracing some of the issues raised earlier by Lukács and Mannheim. The inadequacy of hermeneutics alone as a basis for interpretation in the social sciences and the need for a critique of ideology is argued not merely in recent works by Apel and Habermas but also by Mannheim. However, a fuller examination of these connections would have taken us away from the central focus of this study which has been the emergence of the sociology of knowledge in Germany during the Weimar Republic.

This more explicitly historical study has led to a critical examination of the context within which these subsequent connections must be placed. For
Instance, it is certainly true that Mannheim's and, to a lesser extent, Lukács' early works are preoccupied with an elucidation of hermeneutic problems of interpretation. But these concerns, even in Mannheim's early works, must be seen in the light of his attempt to develop a sociology of culture that moved increasingly in the direction of a historicist mode of interpretation. In his later, German works, Mannheim's attempt to develop a sociology of knowledge and a theory of ideology that is, ultimately, superseded by this new discipline often appears to be one that ignores his earlier insights into the role of interpretation. Similarly, it has been argued that his treatment of the central themes in Ideologie und Utopie can only be understood in the light of his meta-theoretical intentions and his philosophy of history. In short, the attempt to extract the contemporary relevance of say, Mannheim's work - which certainly does exist - must follow from a detailed examination of Mannheim's work and its context and not commence with a re-reading of it in the light of current concerns. This would appear, in part, to be the weakness of Simonds' otherwise illuminating study.

If we return to the sociology of knowledge of the Weimar period then we can see that, for three central figures, the sociology of knowledge or the critique of ideology (in Lukács' case) is to be located within a sociology of culture and a critique of culture. In different ways, one theme of this sociology or critique of culture is the alienation of that culture from human purposes and control. This is the source of the 'powerlessness' or 'homelessness' of the mind. In Lukács' case, it is the source of his attempt to reconstitute a critical consciousness in the face of an all-pervasive reification of social relations.
But whereas in the early period of the Weimar Republic, the sociology of knowledge is firmly rooted within a sociology of culture (most obviously in Scheler's contribution), by the end of the Weimar Republic it is seen as possessing a more independent existence. However, this is not the only change that has taken place in the intervening period. If the theme of ideology was not taken up except by Lukács in the early period, this was no longer true after 1928, and especially after the publication of Ideologie und Utopie in the following year. Both the ideological and political dimensions of a sociology of knowledge had come explicitly to the fore, as the reviews of Mannheim's key work testify. These reviews and the earlier debates, along with other contributions to the sociology of knowledge, do suggest, as some commentators argued, that the sociology of knowledge had become much more central to sociology itself. In part, this may be due to the fact that the issues raised by the Methodenstreit and Werturteilsstreit before the First World War were now taken up in a different manner in the Weimar period. In particular, the sociology of knowledge, and especially Mannheim's contribution, can be seen as incorporating and continuing those earlier debates.

However, what contributed to the sociology of knowledge's impact in this period was not merely the continuation of methodological debates but the practical aims of the discipline. This has been almost completely overlooked by those Anglo-American critiques of the whole enterprise of a sociology of knowledge that have concentrated upon its epistemological claims. The sociology of knowledge was not merely another theoretical branch of sociology. It also often had quite explicit practical intentions. Whereas today it is commonly viewed as an abstract discipline, it was seen
by its central adherents in Weimar Germany as raising the relationship between theory and practice and as having an important pedagogic role. These practical intentions, however, were made all the more urgent not merely by the crises of Weimar Germany but by the crisis of the alienated mind or consciousness that lay at the heart of the new discipline's metatheoretical presuppositions.
CONCLUSION

NOTES


4. Cf. J. Habermas, 'Der Universalitätsanspruch der Hermeneutik' in K.-O. Apel, et.al, Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik, Frankfurt 1971, as well as the other contributions to this volume.

5. A.P. Simonds, Karl Mannheim’s Sociology of Knowledge, Oxford 1978. Unfortunately, this study appeared too late for its arguments as a whole to be taken into account. It is, however, worth pointing out that Simonds deals critically with earlier interpretations of Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge in order to show that they most often lead to a misinterpretation of his work or even prevent access to its hermeneutic interpretation.
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