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Submitted by Francis John McEnroe, M.A., M.Ed., for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, in the Department of Education. Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Glasgow.

September, 1986.
But there is one topic which I cannot pass over so easily - not, however, because I understand particularly much about it or have contributed very much to it. Quite the contrary: I have scarcely concerned myself with it at all. I must mention it because it is so exceedingly important, so rich in hopes for the future, perhaps the most important of all the activities of analysis. What I am thinking of is the application of psychoanalysis to education, to the upbringing of the next generation.

(Freud, *New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*, 1933, p.146)
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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I am in debt also to other people: to the staffs of Glasgow University Library, and The Mitchell Library, Glasgow, for their assistance; to Ms. Jill Duncan, Executive Officer, The Institute of Psychoanalysis, London, for sending me documents relevant to my thesis; and to John Aitkenhead, headmaster of Kilquhanity House, Castle Douglas, for finding the time to reply to my questions.

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Francis J. McEnroe
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SUMMARY

This thesis is a study of the educational ideas of four major psychoanalysts who have had a profound and acknowledged influence on the theory and practice of early education in Great Britain - Sigmund Freud (1856-1939), Anna Freud (1895-1982), Melanie Klein (1882-1960), and Susan Isaacs (1885-1948). The selection, it must be emphasised, is not arbitrary: Freud and his daughter, Anna, represent the 'orthodox' or mainstream school of psychoanalysis, while Melanie Klein and her followers, of whom Susan Isaacs was the most outstanding English educator, represent a schismatic but influential grouping which has remained controversial ever since.

It is important to emphasise, too, that the thesis is not another critique of psychoanalytic theory but, rather, concerns itself with two questions: (1) What is the educational essence of psychoanalysis? And (2) does this essence or core propose a unique, liberating pedagogy as believed and practised by many radical educators of the twentieth century, like Percy Nunn (1870-1944), Homer Lane (1876-1925), Alexander S. Neill (1884-1973), and Dora Russell (1894-1986).

In order to achieve some kind of historical perspective, the Introduction looks at the intellectual roots of Freud's work and sets it against two allied phenomena - the evolutionary theory of Charles Robert Darwin (1809-1882), and the redefinition of psychology as a mental science. As a result of this perspective it becomes evident that, despite Freud's claims to total originality, most of his central concepts and conceptualisations are to be found in the writings of Darwin, Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776-1841), Gustav Theodor Fechner (1801-1887) and Ernst Wilhelm von Brücke (1819-1892). Moreover, Freudian theory has endorsed, amplified and propagated three beliefs which were unassailable stanchions of the scientific community in the early decades of the twentieth century, and whose impact proved very important for twentieth century educational theory - (1) a belief in fixed intelligence; (2) a belief in genetic predeterminism; and (3) a belief that all behaviour is motivated by instincts or by painful stimuli.

What is the educational core of psychoanalysis?
The lynch-pin of Freudian theory is the belief – which Freud expressed as early as the 1890s to his friend Wilhelm Fliess (1858-1928) – that the aetiology of neurosis is always to be found in the repression of infant sexuality. The subsequent attempts of psychoanalysts to elucidate the implications of this belief involve four things: (1) a recognition of the crucial importance of the early years of childhood; (2) a recognition of the supreme importance of interpersonal relationships; (3) a theory of psychosexual development; and (4) a theory of repression.

The works of the four writers I have studied reflect these four aspects of psychoanalysis, but there is an important shift of emphasis from one analyst to another and from one aspect to another. For example, although the four subscribed to the belief that the early years of childhood are the crucial determinants of the whole course of human development, there is no unanimity with regard to the specific period in question. What years are crucial? Where Freud and Anna emphasised the first few years of life, Klein and her followers finally limited the period to the first few months.

With interpersonal relationships, too, there is a change of emphasis. All of them believed that our relationships, past, present and future are formed from the imagos of our parents, siblings and others who cared for us during the early, critical years. But, whereas for Freud, the father-imago was of paramount importance, the younger generation of analysts, including Anna Freud, Melanie Klein and Susan Isaacs, bestowed on the mother-child relationship an importance unparalleled in educational literature. With the change of emphasis, the father became a 'shadowy' presence, occupying a position in the family of secondary importance to the mother.

Does psychoanalysis propose a liberating pedagogy?

It becomes clear that the four psychoanalysts did not advocate a radical, liberating pedagogy which champions the 'free expression' of the individual at the expense of the established values of the State. On the contrary, all of them were clearly on the side of the State; that is, they envisaged their role as custodians and procurers of public morality. In practice, this entails the removal of the debilitating neurosis, the social 'disease' which renders individuals incapable of adopting/...
adopting a suitable social role and enjoying a 'normal', workable relationship with other human beings. And the 'cure' is considered adequately verified when the same individuals, formerly classified as 'neurotic', 'sick', 'maladjusted', 'crazy', 'delinquent', 'criminal', or whatever, are able at last to achieve a new, personal harmony with other human beings despite the rigorous constraints arising from living in a highly organised network of social relationships.

The thesis ends with an attempt to fit Freud's social philosophy into a broader, philosophical context. It is suggested that his advocacy of a closed society superintended by wise, benign Psychoanalytic-Guardians is compatible with the totalitarian philosophy of Thomas Hill Green (1836–1882), founder of the school of British Idealism which displaced the philosophy of Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) as the dominant tradition in British universities from 1870 into the twentieth century.
I can remember, as a young teacher, the excitement which greeted the publication in 1965 of *Primary Education in Scotland* or, as we always referred to it, the *Primary Memorandum*. Enthusiastically received as a 'revolution' and the harbinger of a new era in Scottish education, it was welcomed for its unequivocal endorsement of 'more progressive and experimental' teaching techniques.

Although I, too, was lyrically swept along for a time on the wave of this new movement, doubts, and serious ones at that, began to trouble me. Doubts, by the way, which were never expressed openly; I was much too diffident for that in the face of such national euphoria. Nor, as far as I could tell, were doubts expressed by anyone else. What were my misgivings? To begin with, there was the apparent contradictoriness of the *Memorandum's message*. Its advocacy of a radical progressivism seemed to me to go hand-in-hand with something entirely different. And this 'something' was definitely not any 'romantic', laissez-faire philosophy which favours the practice of individualism. There are things the child 'has to be taught', we were told, 'not only in the intellectual sphere, but also in order that his emotional, moral and social development may follow a pattern which will make him acceptable to the society in which he will live as an adult'.

This was certainly clear enough and seemed to me to be the traditional voice of Scottish education, redolent of John Knox and the *Book of Discipline*. And yet, on the same page, we were advised that the 'primary school child has a natural curiosity and a desire to learn which make him capable of seriously and deliberately pursuing his own education on the lines of his own choice'. Now, this was very radical for Scottish education, and certainly a sentiment of which A.S. Neill of Summerhill would have heartily approved.
But what on earth did it mean? Aren't Knox and Neill strange bedfellows? How could an educational philosophy purport to base itself on the 'needs and interests of the child', on the one hand, and then admit, on the other, to a strategy to actually 'condition the attitudes and behaviour of the pupils'? Was the apparent contradiction a real contradiction in substantive terms, a simple, logical inconsistency? Apparently not. The senior officials I managed to question on this could not see any contradiction, and they included a member of the committee which produced the document, a headteacher who joined the Scottish Inspectorate soon afterwards.

This left me with a puzzle. If there were no contradictions in the Memorandum's educational philosophy, then what was I to make of it? Was the 'liberalism' a ploy to catch us unawares, a clever strategem to induce a lowering of defences, a vitiation of intellectual acuity, leading to the uncritical acceptance of a bureaucratic control unprecedented in the history of Scottish education?

But there was something else which puzzled me, and this was the beginning of a long search which only ended years later with the completion of this thesis. If the Memorandum is coherent in philosophical terms, then on whose unique, socialising genius is it based? And this was the puzzle: a meticulous search of the text revealed no name of any person, living or dead; nor does the index. No philosopher, scientist, sociologist, educator, psychologist, or whatever, is mentioned anywhere. The most revolutionary and influential educational 'message' of the post-war years was transmitted to every primary school and college of education in Scotland without the slightest acknowledgement being paid to any of the educators responsible for its basic formulation.
Who were they? Were they giants from the past: Plato, Rousseau, Pestalozzi, Froebel, Montessori, the Macmillan sisters, or Dewey? To be sure, ideational relics of their theories can be found: the reification of social structures; the advocacy of having 'regard for the nature of the child'; the symbolic significance of play; the importance of providing 'structured' materials; the importance of health and hygiene; and the rejection of the traditional curriculum in favour of integrated studies based on children's interests in everyday things.

But there was something extra. I could discern another influence there, pervasive, subtle and profound, effecting a remarkable cohesion of these disparate elements. This was a new influence in Scottish education and went far beyond the didacticism of Montessori, the concreteness, the emphasis on the utility of the here-and-now of Dewey, and the metaphysical abstruseness of Froebel. Briefly, this new influence emphasised the psychic unity of mankind, the critical importance of the early years of infancy, and of the mother-child relationship; it found symbolism in the simple everyday things of human activity, especially children's play; and it concerned itself almost exclusively with a study of emotional relationships and the imagos arising from these. In a sentence, its philosophy is encapsulated in the old cliche; 'the child is father of the man'.

One name, of course, sprang to mind at this point: Sigmund Freud. But I could not be certain. After all, is it not true that Freud was a great liberator of 'repressed' mankind? Is it not true that A.S. Neill, the archetypal 'progressive' educator of the twentieth century, utilised Freudian theory as a justification for the radical cult of individuality practised at his school, Summerhill? Certainly, he said so:
Freud showed that every neurosis is founded on sex repression. I said, 'I'll have a school in which there will be no sex repression'. Freud said that the unconscious was infinitely more important and more powerful than the conscious. I said, 'In my school we won't censure, punish, moralize. We will allow every child to live according to his deep impulses'.

If Neill was correct, then Freud could not be the 'eminence grise' I was looking for.

Two years after the publication of the Memorandum the Plowden Report appeared, and the next stage in my search began in earnest. The two documents are very similar in style and substance. Indeed, the Memorandum - although it appeared earlier - could be called a miniature version of the two-volume Plowden. But where the Scottish document remains silent on the educators who exerted, directly or otherwise, an influence on the formulation of its policy, Plowden is specific in its recognition of those who have helped to mould the course of English education in the twentieth century. These included two British sociologists: Bernstein and Halsey; an international field of psychologists: Baldwin, Bruner, Burt, Hull, Inhelder, Luria, Pavlov, Piaget, Skinner, and Thorndike; several names eminent in the field of educational philosophy and practice: Rousseau, Pestalozzi, Froebel, Margaret and Rachel Macmillan, Whitehead, Montessori, and Dewey; and two psychoanalysts: John Bowlby and Susan Isaacs.

Admittedly, two psychoanalytic swallows do not make a summer; and the name of Freud does not appear at all in the index. But the references to Freudian theory in the main text, especially with regard to the emotional development of the child, are important and illuminating. Several caught my eye:
1. Emotional development takes place in a 'fixed sequence of stages based on instinctual drives which interact with such demands as those imposed by weaning or toilet training'. Failure to master one stage affects the next, leading to 'later difficulty or failure to adjust fully as a person and member of society'.

2. Children are at first 'dominated' by their 'needs and impulses'. They learn to deal with these in constructive ways which Anna Freud described as 'mechanisms of defence'.

3. Some aggressiveness is 'necessary in social life'. A major role of the school is to 'help the child to come to terms with these feelings and not to suppress them, but to understand them and thus to discover how to deal acceptably with them'.

4. John Bowlby's evidence to the Central Advisory Council which stressed the paramount importance of the mother-child relationship, and the serious and long-lasting emotional effects of 'maternal-deprivation'.

5. Children 'identify' with parents and others, imitate them, assume their attitudes, and project on to them many of their own infantile thoughts and wishes. Later, in school, children may re-enact this parental relationship with their teachers; and teachers may partly re-enact with colleagues their own earlier relationships with parents or siblings. Flowden comments: 'Such identification, and the formation of strong emotional bonds between child and teacher, can be valuable educationally if the bonds are positive bonds'.
6. The 'distinction between work and play is false, possibly throughout life; certainly in the primary school'. Play is the principal means of learning in early childhood. Through its unconscious symbolism children reconcile their inner lives with external reality. In play are the roots of drama, expressive movement and art.

7. The quality of the care and security provided by a child's home during the early years of life are of 'extreme importance' for later emotional development. 'Maladjustment may result from tensions in the family rather than from an illness in the child himself'.

These fragments of psychoanalytic theory, embedded like parts of a fascinating jig-saw puzzle in the *Plowden Report*, were of particular interest to me. And, although they were too few in number to form a coherent picture, the central feature was clear enough: the aetiology of social maladjustment is to be found in a break-down of interpersonal relationships at a crucial period in childhood. But although *Plowden* is more comprehensive and informative than the terse Scottish *Memorandum*, I was still left with my puzzle to explain the coexistence of 'progressive' techniques with bureaucratic control. *Plowden* merely implies that the use of Freudian techniques during this critical period of childhood produced a more efficient schooling. But why should they? What would happen, I wondered, if teachers inhibited play-activities? In what peculiar way is 'aggression' part of the process of social development? And why should teachers establish 'strong, emotional bonds' with their pupils?

Although I had no answers to these questions at that time, I was convinced that I was on the right track. Determined to make a proper study of psychoanalysis, I began to read the collected works of Sigmund Freud.
NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. G.S. Osborne, *Scottish and English Schools* (1966), p. 120. Osborne was Vice-Principal of Aberdeen College of Education from 1962 until 1978.

2. S.L. Hunter, *The Scottish Educational System* (1972), p. 88. Hunter was Senior Lecturer in Education at Jordanhill College of Education for many years. He lavishly praised *Primary Education in Scotland* (1965) for initiating a 'general reappraisal of teaching methods' in Scottish primary education (Hunter, *ibid.*, p. 88). But what educational philosophy underpinned the new methodology remained unexplained by him and all other commentators. See, for example, the three articles written by T.R. Bone and T.D. Morrow for *The Times Educational Supplement (Scotland)*, 1975, February 14, 21, 28. Bone is at present the Principal of Jordanhill College of Education.


4. Ibid., p. 12.

5. Ibid., p. vii.

6. Ibid., p. 90. What kind of things help to 'condition' the attitudes and behaviour of the pupils? The 'school routine, the organisation of the classroom, the teachers' methods, the content of the programme of work, the conduct of school meals and other social occasions, and particularly the outlook and example of the head teacher and the teachers, all help to condition the attitudes and behaviour of the pupils' (*ibid.*, p. 90).

7. For an analysis of the Primary Memorandum and its subtle techniques of reification, see my paper, 'Freudianism, Bureaucracy and Scottish Primary Education', *Scottish Culture and Scottish Education* (1983), edited by W.M. Humes and H.M. Paterson, pp. 244-266.

8. Ibid., p. 3. The Primary Memorandum apparently does not regard the 'nature' of the child as tantalisingly elusive. For enlightenment, teachers are pointed towards recent research which, yielding a 'considerable amount of information on these very points ... must exercise a decisive influence on the attitude and practice of teachers' (*ibid.*, p. 3). Unfortunately, the research remains unspecified.

9. Ibid., pp. 9-10. Feelings of exasperation, rage and many other emotions may be 'explored' harmlessly by means of play (*ibid.*, p. 9). Psychoanalysts call this phenomenon, 'abreaction'.

10. Ibid., p. 148.

11. Ibid., pp. 92-94.

12. Ibid., p. 37. The Primary Memorandum advises us that the
'curriculum is not to be thought of as a number of discrete subjects ... it is quite impossible to treat the subjects of the curriculum in isolation from one another if education is to be meaningful to the child... Integration ... should be a feature of primary education at all stages' (ibid., p. 37).


15. Ibid., p. 22, paragraph 66.

16. Ibid., p. 23, paragraph 67.

17. Ibid., p. 23, paragraph 67. Although Anna Freud is not mentioned by name, it is not unreasonable to assume that she is the author referred to who 'succinctly described' the 'mechanisms of defence' (ibid., p. 23, paragraph 67).

18. Ibid., p. 23, paragraph 68.

19. Ibid., p. 23, paragraph 68.


21. Plowden, p. 17, paragraph 44. The paragraph begins: 'The persistence of early responses and particularly of unconscious emotional attitudes towards other people has been stressed especially by the psychoanalysts'. Indeed, the whole paragraph is an endorsement of Anna Freud's psycholanalytic theory regarding the projection of the child's infantile thoughts and wishes onto others encountered in the classroom. This will be examined later in Chapter 3, Anna Freud.

22. Ibid., p. 193, paragraph 523.

23. Ibid., p. 24, paragraph 69.

24. Ibid., p. 24, paragraph 69.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS


The Writings of Anna Freud (1965-1982) (8 volumes) - Anna Freud, Writings.

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the contents of this thesis have not been taken from any external source, neither in whole nor in part, but are entirely the produce of my own labours.

Signed: __________________________

Author
INTRODUCTION

THE INTELLECTUAL ROOTS OF FREUDIAN THEORY

The lucky fellow has had a much easier time than I have. He has had the support of a long series of predecessors from Newton onward, while I have had to hack every step of my way through a tangled jungle alone. No wonder that my path is not a very broad one, and that I have not got far on it.

(Freud on Einstein, letter, 1927)\(^1\)

Although the validity of Freudian metapsychology remains controversial there is no doubt that Freudian theory contains a corpus of ideas which continues to exert a profound influence on the twentieth century. This is evident from the continuing impact of psychoanalysis on such diverse fields as aesthetics, anthropology, biography, criminology, education, ethics, literature, occultism, philosophy, political science, psychiatry, psychology, sociology and theology. In evaluating his stature as a creative genius many commentators place him on a par with the intellectual giants of the nineteenth century - Schopenhauer, Darwin, Marx and Nietzsche - all of whose speculations (with the notable exception of Marx's) left discernible impressions on Freud's theoretical conceptions.\(^2\)

To this extent, Freudian theory can be regarded as a product of the major conceptions, assumptions, and biases of the nineteenth century. In general terms, then, it is an eclectic endorsement of philosophical pessimism, patriarchal authoritarianism, evolutionary theory, hormic theory, unconscious motivational theory, association theory, recapitulation theory, scientism, anti-clericalism, Lamarckism and, not least, the uncompromising Newtonian determinism/...
determinism of the newly-emerged psycho-physiological sciences. To bring order to this seemingly intellectual chaos, it is necessary to set these movements, and Freud's work, against two other phenomena - the evolutionary theory of Charles Darwin, and the redefinition of psychology as a mental science.

The history of psychology in the nineteenth century is essentially the record of an intellectual drift from philosophy towards biology; and the greatest impetus to this movement came from Darwin's theories of evolution (1859, 1871). In his *An Autobiographical Study* (1925) Freud admitted that, while a senior pupil in the 'Sperlgymnasium' in Vienna, he was 'strongly attracted' to the theories of Darwin, for they held out 'hopes of an extraordinary advance in our understanding of the world...'.

But Freud's attraction to biology extended beyond Darwin. F.J. Sulloways' biography, *Freud, Biologist of the Mind* (1979) argues convincingly that the biological roots of Freudian psychoanalytic thought must first be understood if one is to comprehend fully many of Freud's most extraordinary and controversial claims about the human mind. Freud began his scientific career as a biologist, and his basic-scientific views were inculcated from his studies with the foremost Viennese authorities in the fields of zoology, anatomy, and physiology. During the formative years of psychoanalysis (1890-1905) Freud, not surprisingly, found it perfectly natural to place man as a biological entity at the core of his psychoanalytic system. But once he had finally achieved his revolutionary synthesis of psychology and biology, Freud consistently denied the biological side of his 'new psychology'. He became a crypto-biologist; and psychoanalysis, accordingly, a crypto-biology.

But let us return to Freud, the pupil. Why was he 'strongly attracted' to the theories of Darwin? What 'extraordinary advance' did they promise? What Darwin offered the late-nineteenth-century medical community was excitingly new: a dynamic model of instincts which challenged the physicalism of anatomist-psychiatrists.
Darwin's revolutionary paradigm had a tremendous appeal because it depended upon just two basic but all-encompassing instinctual drives - the will to survive and the urge to reproduce. The premise that 'love and hunger' are the basic instincts of humanity is not, of course, original to Darwin. Nevertheless, it was he who first provided a rational superstructure which recognised these two instincts, and no others, as the primary motivating force of all animal behaviour.

Darwin's message had a momentous impact on the general sciences, including the burgeoning field of psychopathology. Following the publication of *The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex* (1871), the medical community, by and large, endorsed self-preservation and sexual gratification as the only two instinctual aims known to physiology. Two of the most influential proponents of this message included Richard von Krafft-Ebing (1840-1902), a colleague of Freud's and Professor of Psychiatry at the University of Vienna, and G. Stanley Hall (1846-1924), American child- psychologist, who invited Freud to give a course of lectures on psychoanalysis at Clark University in 1909.

Of these two primal instincts - the self-preservative and the reproductive - it was the reproductive one, however, that received most attention from post-Darwinian students of mental pathology. There are several examples of this. In Germany, Albert Moll (1862-1939), psychotherapist and sexologist, argued that cultural development had greatly contributed to sexual perversion within the human species. (This hypothesis, by the way, was carefully noted by Freud.) In Germany, too, Hermann Rohleder (? - ?), neurologist at Leipzig, made one of the earliest assertions of the phenomenon of spontaneous infantile sexuality. In America, A.F.A. King (1841-1914), gynaecologist, hypothesised that hysteria is a consequence of the advent of civilisation and its proscription of sexual liberty. Finally, in England, Thomas Clouston (1840-1915), a psychiatrist, advocated a pansexualist theory of human development. It is worth noting, too, that Havelock Ellis (1859-1939) resolved, at the age of sixteen, to devote his life's work to the scientific study of sexuality.
In brief: Darwin is important for any study of Freud for two reasons: first, he underlined the biological importance of the instincts for survival and reproduction; and second, he offered the medical community, dissatisfied with the somatic theories of the brain-anatomists, a dynamic and dualist paradigm of instinct that purported to explain the whole of organic behaviour.

Although he never acknowledged Darwin's influence on psychoanalysis, Freud was certainly in accord with the new, post-Darwinian orientation. Indeed, he admitted that he took as his 'starting-point' Schiller's dictum that 'hunger and love are what moves the world'. Nor is it without significance that Ernest Jones (1879-1958), the great British champion of psychoanalysis in the first half of the twentieth century, referred to Freud as the 'Darwin of the Mind'.

Let us turn now to the second phenomenon - the concept of psychology as a science. Here, the three pioneers of psychophysics who left indelible impressions on Freud were Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776-1841), Gustav Theodor Fechner (1801-1887), and Ernst Wilhelm von Brücke (1819-1892).

Herbart's psychological ideas are to be found in his Textbook of Psychology (1816) and Psychology as a Science (1824-25). His principal thesis was that mental processes must be capable of being subsumed under scientific laws: 'Regular order in the human mind is wholly similar to that in the starry sky'. Ultimately, the processes must be measurable in terms of force and quantity. He dreamt of a 'mathematical psychology' and drew up a project for one (as Freud was to do years later).

Herbart's theory of mind, with its explicit use of such concepts as the unconscious, repression, suppression, and thresholds of activity, anticipated Freud in the most remarkable way. Herbart conceived of the mind and its ideational content as a kind of energy-system with 'forces' possessing specific 'quantities'. According to his conception of the unconscious - which was the only dynamic one before Freud's - unconscious mental processes are dominated by a constant conflict between ideas of varying intensity (a notion which Freud later replaced by...
a conflict of effects). Herbartian ideas are dynamic, and like energy-particles attract or repel one another; they are constantly in conflict and struggle to achieve consciousness; and they never vanish from the mind but, 'repressed', are pushed below the threshold or limen of consciousness by opposing ideas.

The similarities with Freud do not end here. People vary in the way in which the body responds to affects (Freud's somatic compliance), which Herbart calls the 'physiological resonance';\(^{17}\) this lead to a 'condensation of the affects in the nervous system'.\(^{18}\) Mental processes are characterised by a 'striving for equilibrium' (Freud's 'constancy principle').\(^{19}\) Ideas are indestructible and are never lost. They never exist alone, but only in the chains of ideas that are so interwoven with one another as to form networks. Affects arise only when the equilibrium is disturbed through an excessive quantity of intensity being present in the ideas. Consciousness of self (the ego) comes about when active ideas are inhibited (frustrated).

Was Freud familiar with Herbartian ideas, or is the similarity between the two men merely coincidental? Ernest Jones, Freud's biographer, revealed that in Freud's last year at the 'Sperlgymnasium' Gustav Adolf Lindner's Lehrbuch der empirischen Psychologie nach genetischer Methode (1858) was in use. The author's teacher was Franz Exner, the father of Freud's instructor at the Institute of Ernst Brücke. In the preface to the book, Lindner stated categorically that only thinkers of the Herbartian school are considered. Indeed, Jones admitted that the book may be described as a compendium of the Herbartian psychology.\(^{20}\)

With regard to the second pioneer, however, there can be no doubt of his influence. Freud openly acknowledged that he was 'always open to the ideas of G.T. Fechner',\(^{21}\) and that he 'followed that thinker upon many important points'.\(^{22}\)

It could be argued that experimental psychology was founded in 1860 with the publication of Fechner's Elements of Psychophysics (1860). His Introduction to Aesthetics (1876) is another milestone and marks the founding of a quantitative/...
quantitative, empirical approach to aesthetics. Fechner's psychology is built on Herbart's with two additional characteristics. First, his endeavour to apply to living organisms the recently discovered principle of the conservation of energy. Second, his claim that 'pleasure-unpleasure' phenomena can be treated quantitatively as well as qualitatively.

The word 'threshold' stands at the centre of all his writings, and he maintained that whenever certain physiological processes attained a given intensity they would be followed by conscious ones. Although Fechner remained uncommitted on the question of whether unconscious processes could be psychical, he was convinced of their importance: 'What is below the threshold carried the consciousness, since it sustains the physical connection in between'.

Fechner likened the mind to an iceberg which is nine-tenths under water and whose course is determined not only by the wind that blows over the surface but also by the hidden currents of the deep. This simile, incidentally, became very popular in psychoanalytic literature (Adams, 1922).

With the third pioneer, too, Freud openly admitted his debt, reminiscing years later that when he was a medical student he found 'rest and full satisfaction' for six years in the Physiological Institute of Ernst Wilhelm von Brücke who, with Émil du Bois-Reymond, Hermann Helmholtz, and Carl Ludwig, revolutionised German physiology during the second half of the nineteenth century.

Brücke's Lectures in Physiology (1874) views living organisms as dynamic systems of development subject to the inexorable laws of chemistry and physics. Freud accepted this, and attempted to extend the work of Brücke into a physiological understanding of the life of the mind. His ambitious attempt culminated in Project for a Scientific Psychology (1895). Freud's aim was to 'furnish a psychology that shall be a natural science': that is, to represent psychical processes as quantitatively determinate states of specifiable material particles, thus making those processes perspicuous and free from contradiction. The Project, unfinished and abandoned, disappeared during Freud's lifetime, and was only discovered some fifty years later with the rest of Freud's forgotten letters to his friend, Wilhelm Fliess (1858-1928).
Although abandoned, it would be misleading to suggest that Freud jettisoned with the *Project* the philosophical legacy of the Brücke Institute. It is not easy for any man, even a genius, to cast off ways of thinking which have been studiously nurtured. In this respect, it is important to remember that Freud's psychoanalytic career began comparatively late in life. He commented once that psychoanalysis was 'born in 1895 or 1900 or in between'. Freud was therefore middle-aged when he began to develop the core of psychoanalytic theory; and several critics have observed that his subsequent analytic conceptions bear the imprint of his years as a biological and neuroanatomical specialist on the nervous system (e.g. Ramzy, 1956).

The extent of this impact remains controversial. Nevertheless, although he eventually disagreed with Brücke's physicalist-reductionism of mental life, Freud never relinquished the belief that the whole gamut of human behaviour is explicable in terms of the Newtonian-Darwinian determinism characteristic of other natural phenomena.

4

These two phenomena – Darwin's evolutionary theory and the concept of psychology as a science – provide the backcloth for any consideration of the influences which moulded psychoanalytic theory. Notwithstanding Freud's claim that he held 'aloof' from biological considerations, his 'new psychology' endorsed, amplified and propagated three beliefs which were unassailable stanchions of the scientific community at the turn of the twentieth century, and whose impact proved very important for twentieth century educational theory.

First, a belief in fixed intelligence, later a basic assumption of the intelligence-testing movement. According to this conception of evolution by natural selection, the characteristics of an individual organism are fixed by heredity. The assumption of a 'constant I.Q.' is but a special case of this more general view, and was popularised in psychological thought by, among others, two men: James McKeen Cattell (1860–1944), who was a student of Darwin's cousin, Francis Galton (1822–1911); and G. Stanley Hall (1846–1924). Their pioneering work was continued in the United Kingdom by Charles Spearman (1863–1945), Godfrey Thomson (1881–1955), Cyril Burt (1883–1972), and Susan Isaacs (1885–1948), the psychoanalytic educator.
Second, a belief in genetic predeterminism. This belief is implicit in the notion that 'ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny', that each individual organism in its development traverses the same evolutionary stages as the species of which it is a member. Belief in 'recapitulation' was at the heart of Stanley Hall's developmental psychology and, of course, was communicated to his students. These included such important figures in the testing movement as Henry H. Goddard (1866-1957), Louis M. Terman (1877-1956) and Arnold L. Gesell (1880-1957), who gave the developmental psychology of the 1920s and 1930s its normative character.

Third, the belief that all behaviour is motivated by instincts or by painful stimuli, homeostatic needs, and sex, or by acquired 'drives' based on these. Associated with this belief, one name was pre-eminent: William McDougall (1871-1938). McDougall's influential book, Social Psychology (1908) attributed human behaviour to inborn instincts. Indeed, McDougall's work was so influential that many educational psychologists encouraged teachers to arrange the content of each lesson in association with one of the instincts. Freud, too, was developing his 'drive theory' during this period and popularising the notion that all behaviour is motivated by wishes originating in physiological stimuli, homeostatic needs, or pain. According to this doctrine, the aim of all behaviour is to reduce or to eliminate excitement from such sources. Implicit is the belief that animals and children will become quiescent in the absence of such motivation.

II

This, then, is the background which has to be kept in mind if we hope to achieve a true perspective of the historical significance of psychoanalysis. It is evident that Freudian theory does not represent a unique creation of ideas, conceptions and constructs owing little or nothing to the intellectual milieu of the nineteenth century. Rather, it would be more accurate to describe psychoanalysis as a crystallisation, unique and illuminating, of many of the major abstractions of nineteenth-century European thought. Indeed, it is a tribute to the astonishing success of the psychoanalytic myth of 'Freud as Hero' that psychoanalysis has come to be regarded as the sole progenitor of its own conceptual framework. Nevertheless, although nearly all of the tenets of Freudian/...
Freudian theory were anticipated in one form or another by English and German philosophers, psychologists, and scientists, it cannot be denied that Freud has provided their original insights with a new, imaginative paradigm which has enhanced their credibility and popular appeal.

This provides a rationale, too, if one should be required, for any study of the relationship between psychoanalysis and educational theory. Educational theory does not exist in vacuo; it is not created by human beings who, by some extraordinary means, have succeeded in disconnecting their intellectual antennae from the vital, formative and pervasive influences of their historical eras. Psychoanalysis, as the repository of the major conceptualisations of the nineteenth century, is a fascinating reflection of the greatest thinkers of a century which has vanished. Shall we discover, then, that an educational theory which purports to be 'psychoanalytic' reflects, too, the ideational residues which have helped to mould the intellectual institutions of our own century?

Considering the relevance of Freud for our times it is not surprising that there is a vast amount of literature dedicated to the study of his unique contribution. What is surprising, however, is that in spite of this, there has been no systematic study of the contribution of psychoanalysis to educational theory; and, in particular, its contribution to British educational theory. There are, of course, many disparate references, articles and essays purporting to explain the various aspects of Freudian thought in educational terms, but no serious survey of psychoanalytic pedagogy has ever been made. This thesis is a first attempt to fill, however imperfectly, this lacuna in educational theory.

It must be emphasised from the outset that the thesis is not a critique of Freudian theory. In recent years there has been an acceleration of erudite rejections of Freudian theory, but this study is not intended as a supplementary appendix to these. Nor will any attempt be made to map the areas in British education which have been most receptive to Freudian influence; not because this would be without importance or interest, but simply that such an attempt, undertaken seriously, would require another thesis. Such a thesis remains to be written. Instead, I concern myself with two questions: (1) What is the educational core of psychoanalysis? And (2) does this core constitute a unique, libertarian or liberating pedagogy - as claimed and practised by Homer Lane and A.S. Neill - or is it, rather, a new, disguised, and more 'scientific' kind of educational socialisation?
To answer these, a selection will be made of four analysts who have been most significant, directly and indirectly, on the course of early education in the United Kingdom - Sigmund Freud (1856-1939), Anna Freud (1895-1982), Melanie Klein (1882-1960) and Susan Isaacs (1885-1948). This selection is not arbitrary: Freud and his daughter, Anna, represent the 'orthodox' or mainstream school of psychoanalysis, while Melanie Klein and her followers, of whom Susan Isaacs was the most outstanding English educator, represent a schismatic but influential grouping which has remained controversial ever since.


The quintessence of psychoanalytic theory, however, is to be found in the writings of Sigmund Freud, Anna Freud, Melanie Klein, and Susan Isaacs, and it is with these that the thesis concerns itself.
NOTES AND REFERENCES


2. Freud refused to acknowledge the influence of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche on his work. In *An Autobiographical Study* (1925), he wrote: 'The large extent to which psychoanalysis coincides with the philosophy of Schopenhauer - not only did he assert the dominance of the emotions and the supreme importance of sexuality but he was even aware of the mechanism of repression - is not to be traced to my acquaintance with his teaching. I read Schopenhauer very late in my life' (*Standard Edition*, Volume 20, pp. 59-60). And he added: 'Nietzsche, another philosopher whose guesses and intuitions often agree in the most astonishing way with the laborious findings of psychoanalysis, was for a long time avoided by me on that very account; I was less concerned with the question of priority than with keeping my mind unembarrassed' (*ibid.*, p. 60). In fact, Freud belonged as a university student to the *Leseverein der deutschen Studenten Wiens* (Reading Society of the German Students of Vienna), a radical pan-German organisation which passionately discussed the views of Schopenhauer, Wagner and Nietzsche. Indeed, the members of this society even corresponded with Nietzsche, telling him of their extreme devotion to his philosophy (see W.J. McGrath, 'Student Radicalism in Vienna', *Journal of Contemporary History*, Volume 2, 1967, pp. 183-201). It is simply inconceivable that Freud, a member of the Reading Society for five years, could have escaped the influence of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche as he liked to assert (F.J. Sulloway, *Freud: Biologist of the Mind*, 1979, p. 468). Schopenhauer's anticipation of the central tenets of psychoanalysis is so remarkable that Thomas Mann once wrote that Freud's theories were Schopenhauer's doctrines 'translated from metaphysics into psychology' (H.F. Ellenberger, *The Discovery of the Unconscious*, 1970, p. 209). Schopenhauer's greatest work *The World as Will and Representation* (1819) stressed the pre-eminent role played by sexuality in the world of mankind: '...it is really the invisible central point of all action and conduct, and peeps up everywhere, in spite of all the veils thrown over it. It is the cause of war and the aim and object of peace, the basis of the serious and the aim of the joke, the inexhaustible source of wit, the key to all hints and allusions, and the meaning of all secret signs and suggestions, all unexpected proposals, and all stolen glances; it is the daily thought and desire of the young and often of the old as well, the hourly thought of the unchaste, and the constantly recurring reverie of the chaste even against their will, the ever ready material for a joke, only because the profoundest seriousness lies at its root' (*ibid.*, Volume 2, p. 513). The similarities between certain essential teaching of Schopenhauer and Freud have been shown also by Cassirer (1946) and Scheler (1929). For remarks on the similarities between the ideas of Nietzsche and Freud, see H.F. Ellenberger, *The Discovery of the Unconscious* (1970), pp. 276-278, and R.J. Hollingdale, *Nietzsche* (1973), pp. 110-115.


5. The Greek philosopher Empedocles (5th C. B.C.) considered 'love and strife' to be primitive substances on a level with earth, air, fire and water (see Bertrand Russell, *History of Western Philosophy*, 1946, pp. 72-73).


7. G. Stanley Hall (1844-1924) studied at Bern, Berlin and Leipzig, and founded the first American laboratory at Johns Hopkins University in 1883. Thereafter, he went to Clark University as president. He started *American Journal of Psychology*, edited *Pedagogical Seminary* (which later became *Journal of Genetic Psychology*), started *Journal of Applied Psychology*, and founded The American Psychological Association in 1892. An admiration for Darwin's theory of evolution was the unifying thread in Hall's intellectual life. He said: "As soon as I first heard it in my youth I think I must have been hypnotised by the word 'evolution' which was music to my ears and seemed to fit my mouth better than any other". (Lorine Pruette, *G. Stanley Hall : a Biography of a Mind*, 1926, p. 208).


14. Ernest Jones, *Papers on Psychoanalysis* (1913), p. xii. Jones' book contained two of the first papers to indicate the importance of psychoanalysis for education: 'Psychoanalysis and Education' (Chapter 19) originally published in *Journal of Educational Psychology*, November, 1910; and 'The Value of Sublimating Processes for Education and Re-Education' (Chapter 20), read by Jones before the American Psychological Association on December
29, 1911, and published in *Journal of Educational Psychology*, May, 1912.


16. Ibid., p. 408.
17. Ibid., p. 408.
18. Ibid., p. 408.
19. Ibid., p. 408.
20. Ibid., p. 410.

22. Ibid., p. 59.

26. The basic goals of the biophysics programme launched by Ernst Brucke, Emil du Bois-Reymond, Hermann Helmholtz and Carl Ludwig, may be summarised by two sentences from a letter of Emil du Bois-Reymond written in 1842: 'Brucke and I pledged a solemn oath to put into power this truth: no other forces than the common physical-chemical ones are active within the organism. In those cases which cannot at the time be explained by these forces, one has either to find the specific way or form of their action by means of the physical-mathematical method, or to assume new forces equal in dignity to the chemical-physical forces inherent in matter, reducible to the force of attraction and repulsion' (quoted in S. Bernfeld, 'Freud's Earliest Theories and the School of Helmholtz', *The Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, Volume 13, 1944, pp. 341-362).


29. Quoted in Sulloway, *Freud : Biologist of the Mind* (1979), p.17. In 1895, Freud & Breuer published his *Studies on Hysteria* and in 1900 Freud published his *Interpretation of Dreams*. Psychoanalysis was 'born' in between these dates.

30. Freud wrote that psychoanalysts 'have found it necessary to hold aloof from biological considerations during our psychoanalytic work and to refrain from using them for heuristic purposes, so that we may not be misled in our impartial judgement of the psychoanalytic facts before us'. ('The Claims of Psychoanalysis to Scientific Interest', 1913, *Standard Edition*, Volume 13, pp. 181-182). He reasserted his 'aloofness' from biology a year later when he wrote: 'I try in general to keep psychology clear from everything that is different in nature from it, even biological lines of thought' ("On Narcissism : An Introduction", 1914, *Standard Edition*, Volume 14, pp. 78-79).

31. James McKeen Cattell (1860-1944) was a student and then assistant of Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920), Professor of Philosophy at Leipzig. After a few appointments, Cattell was appointed Professor of Psychology at Columbia University in 1888, the first chair specifically in psychology anywhere in the world. Some 300 students, including E.L. Thorndike, R.S. Woodworth, and S.I. Franz, took their Ph.Ds with him. He edited *Popular Science Monthly*, *Scientific Monthly*, *Science*, *School and Society*, and *The American Naturalist*. Cattell coined the term 'mental test' in 'Mental Tests and Measurements', *Mind*, Volume 15, 1890, pp. 373-381. By 1893, Cattell was advocating the use of 'mental tests' in schools, and shortly thereafter he began publishing the results of the mental testing of his students at Columbia.

32. Francis Galton (1822-1911) is generally acknowledged as the father of individual psychology and mental measurement in Britain. His achievements are certainly impressive. He was amongst the first to apply the normal curve of frequency to mental phenomena; his formula for calculating the correlation coefficients of diverse data is widely used in the analysis of test responses; his system of percentile ranking is applied to psychometric statistics; his statistical methodology is the foundation of biometrics; his 'laws of regression' govern the biometric study of heritability; he was amongst the first to advocate the study of twins in order to determine the relative effects of environment and heredity in the development of human characteristics; and his 'anthropometric laboratory' was the starting-point for the 'psychological clinics' and 'child guidance centres' subsequently established throughout the world. Galton's seminal work has ideological implications; and it has been argued that he achieved a synthesis of liberal individualism with Darwinism which offered a rationale for a class-stratified, but socially mobile society (B Evans and B. Waites, *I.Q. and Mental Testing : An Unnatural Science and its Social History*, 1981, p. 38). The authors argued further that Galton 'can be seen as putting forward, on natural scientific grounds, an account of the circulation of elites within a social hierarchy of constant shape similar to that later advanced by Vilfredo Pareto on sociological grounds' (*ibid.*, p. 38). Galton's most famous publication is *Hereditary Genius* (1869) which hints at racial improvement through intervention in the evolutionary process, a programme which appeared in more explicit form in his *Inquiries into Human Faculty* (1883).
33. Spearman (1863-1945) postulated that intellectual activities have in common a single, general factor of 'g' ('General intelligence objectively determined and measured', *American Journal of Psychology*, Volume 15, 1904, pp. 201-293). He suggested that tests 'saturated' with 'g' should be chosen for test batteries. On this view 'g' is viewed as 'fixed'.

34. Sir Godfrey H. Thomson (1881-1955), psychologist and mathematician, was Professor of Education at Edinburgh University. One of the leaders of the intelligence-testing movement, he established Moray House College, Edinburgh as the largest producer of intelligence tests and other mental tests in Europe. (This activity is still carried on by the Godfrey Thomson Unit in Edinburgh University). His books include *A Modern Philosophy of Education* (1929) and *The Factorial Analysis of Human Ability* (1939).

35. Sir Cyril Burt (1883-1971) was the first educational psychologist to be appointed to a local authority in the UK (London in 1913). He was a key pioneer in the area of intelligence testing and his work prepared the way for the selective tripartite system of secondary education. Although he accepted that an impoverished environment could help to produce backward and/or delinquent children, he firmly asserted that intelligence was mainly inherited. In 1934 he wrote: 'By intelligence, the psychologist understands inborn all-round intellectual ability. It is inherited, or at least innate, not due to teaching or training: it is intellectual, not emotional or moral, and remains uninfluenced by industry or zeal; it is general, not specific, i.e. it is not limited to any particular kind of work, but enters into all we do or say or think. Of all our mental qualities, it is the most far-reaching; fortunately, it can be measured with accuracy and ease'. (Burt et al., *How the Mind Works*, 1934, pp. 28-29). In his book, *The Science and Politics of IQ* (1974), Leon Kamin alleged that Burt's researches were not only seriously defective, but contained a number of impossible coincidences. The explicit allegation of fraud was made in 1976 by the journalist, Oliver Gillie, who claimed that Burt's 'research assistants' probably never existed (*The Sunday Times*, October 24, 1976; *New Statesman*, November 24, 1978; and *Science*, Volume 204, 1979, pp. 1035-1037). The allegations of fraud were eventually proved conclusively to be correct following a detailed examination of Burt's personal diary by his biographer, Leslie Hearnshaw (L.S. Hearnshaw, *Cyril Burt, Psychologist*, 1979, pp. 240 ff.). The Burt scandal, together with a general critique of psychometric beliefs and practices, has seriously damaged the prestige of the whole mental testing movement. In 1979, a crucial test case was decided in California, where IQ tests had been used for selective purposes. Judge Peckham's ruling was an unequivocal rejection of the 'scientific' basis of mental testing: 'We must recognise at the outset that the history of the IQ test, and of special education classes built on IQ testing, is not the history of neutral, scientific discoveries translated into educational reform. It is, at best in the early years, a history of racial prejudice, of Social Darwinism, and of the use of a scientific 'mystique' to legitimate such prejudices' (quoted in B. Evans & B. Waites, *IQ and Mental Testing*, 1981, p.10).
36. The psychometric views of Susan Isaacs will be considered in Chapter 5.

37. H.H. Goddard (1866-1957) graduated Ph.D. from Clark University in 1899. He translated the Binet-Simon Scale into English in 1908, and used it in his studies of the feeble-minded at the Vineland Training School, New Jersey. Goddard, an ardent hereditarist, was the author of The Kallikak Family: A Study in the Heredity of Feeblemindedness (1912).

38. L.M. Terman (1877-1956) graduated Ph.D. from Clark University in 1905. He developed an American version of Binet's test, with norms for the American population, at the University of Stanford. His version, entitled the Stanford-Binet, was published in 1916. An English translation was produced by Burt in Great Britain and included in his book, Mental and Scholastic Tests (1921).

39. A.L. Gesell (1880-1957) graduated Ph.D. from Clark University in 1906. Following his teacher, Stanley Hall, Gesell wrote: 'Infancy is the period in which the individual realises his racial inheritance. This inheritance is the end product of evolutionary processes which trace back to an extremely remote antiquity' ('The ontogenesis of infant behaviour', in Manual of Child Psychology edited by L. Carmichael, 1954). Gesell's approach was concerned with describing what is characteristic of children at each age. The conceptual significance of this 'normative approach' is based upon the belief that development, mental and physical, is inherently or genetically pre-determined.

40. William McDougall (1871-1938) worked at the universities of London and Oxford, and held professorships at Harvard and Duke in America. He had a great admiration for Freud but rejected his determinism. McDougall's works include: An Introduction to Social Psychology (1908); Body and Mind (1911); The Group Mind (1920); Ethics and Some Modern World Problems (1924); The Battle of Behaviourism (1928); Modern Materialism and Emergent Evolution (1929) and Psychoanalysis and Social Psychology (1936). In Is America Safe for Democracy? (1921) and World Chaos (1931) he advocated racial eugenics, a subsidised intellectual aristocracy, and a world air police, to defend the finest (North European-American) type of civilisation.

41. Recent critiques of Freudian theory, ranging from sympathetic to hostile, include Archard (1984); Badcock (1983); Badinter (1981); Bocock (1976); Brandell (1979); Chasseguet-Smirgel (1985); Dilman (1983; 1984); Eysenck (1985); Farrell (1981); Fromm (1980); Fuller (1980); Gabriel (1983); Gallop (1982); Gellner (1985); Greenberg & Mitchell (1983); Horden (1985); Jahoda (1977); MacCabe (1981); MacIntyre (1971); Marcus (1984); Masson (1984); Medawar (1982); Meynell (1981); Popper (1963); Stannard (1980); Sulloway (1979); Szasz (1962; 1965; 1971); Williams (1974). See bibliography for further details.

42. It is extremely difficult to find biographical details of the many, lesser psychoanalytic figures who helped to influence British educational thought and practice. The reader will find scattered information in R.W. Clark, Freud: The Man and the Cause (1980); M. Bridgeland, Pioneer Work with Maladjusted Children (1971; P. Roazen, Freud and His Followers (1971); R. Fine, A

43. Many of the minor, 'progressive' British educators are barely mentioned today. There are, of course, biographies of Homer Lane (David Wills, 1964) and A.S. Neill (Jonathan Croall, 1983); and the autobiographies of Bertrand Russell (1967; 1968; 1969) and Dora Russell (1975; 1980; 1985) contain interesting comments on many of the most distinguished British educators of the twentieth century. Maurice Bridgeland's Pioneer Work with Maladjusted Children (1971) has information, too, on others whose work reflected Freudian theory.
CHAPTER 1

SIGMUND FREUD (1856-1939)

Few individuals, if any, have exerted more influence upon the twentieth century than Sigmund Freud (1856-1939). By teaching us that what 'appears to be' in the life of the mind is but a tiny and often misleading reflection of the overall psychical forces that govern our lives, Freud revolutionised our thinking about ourselves. Yet in spite of his enormous influence, Freud himself remains one of the most misunderstood thinkers in the history of Western thought.

(Sulloway, Freud, Biologist of the Mind, 1979)
Sigismund Freud (he changed his name to Sigmund when he was at university) was born of Jewish parents on May 6, 1856, in Freiberg, Moravia, now named Pribor, in Czechoslovakia. Sigismund's father was Kallamon Jacob Freud (1815-1896), a wool merchant, and a member of a Jewish minority within the town. His mother, Amalie Nathanson (1835-1930) was a young woman from Vienna who was under 20 years old when she married Jacob, and barely 21 when her first child, Sigismund, was born. Jacob, twice Amalie's age, had been married twice before and had already produced two sons: Emanuel (1834-1915), and Philipp (1838-1912). These sons had been born to Jacob's first wife, Sally Kanner, whom he married in 1831. It is not known what happened to her. Jacob's second wife, Rebecca, is a mystery, too; Sigmund never referred to her, and always asserted that Amalie was the second wife of Jacob.

In 1860, Jacob moved to Vienna with his wife, Amalie, and their two children, Sigismund and Anna (born 1858). Sigismund's half-brothers emigrated to Manchester, England. During the next six years, Amalie produced another five children: Rosa (1860); Marie (1861); Adolfine (1862); Pauline (1863); and Alexander (1866).

Sigismund was educated at a private primary school, and then, beginning in 1865, at the Sperl Gymnasium, Leopoldstadt, where he graduated summa cum laude. He entered the medical department of the University of Vienna in the autumn of 1873, although he had not then decided for certain on a career in medicine. During his first year he attended philosophy lectures at the University and read widely in the philosophical field, including works by Aristotle, Carlyle and Feuerbach—the German philosopher whose critique of religion had had such a pronounced effect upon the young Karl Marx. Later, in 1879, he translated into German a volume of the English philosopher, John Stuart Mill's, collected works. Freud's teacher in philosophy was Franz Brentano (1838-1917), whose ideas were to have a profound effect on the phenomenological and existentialist schools of thought. Incidentally, Brentano's work/...
work, *Psychology from the Empirical Standpoint* (1874) includes two detailed discussions of the concept 'unconscious' - albeit to deny the need for the term in psychology. Freud was so impressed with Brentano that he decided (temporarily) to take a Ph.D. in philosophy and zoology.

As a family treat for passing his Matura with distinction, Freud was allowed a trip to Manchester in 1875 to stay with his half-brothers; while he was there he read 'Tyndall, Huxley, Lyle, Darwin, Thomson, Lockyer and others' and finally decided on a medical career. When he returned to Vienna he entered the Physiological Institute of Ernst Wilhelm von Brücke and began a friendship with Josef Breuer (1842-1925), with whom he developed a theory of neurosis. Freud took a belated degree (M.D.) in 1881, and was appointed as Demonstrator at the same Institute. In 1882 he joined the Vienna General Hospital, first in the Department of Surgery, and later in the Department of Nervous Diseases.

In 1885 he was awarded a Travel Scholarship to study in Paris under Professor Jean Martin Charcot (1825-1893) of the Salpêtrière. This was the most momentous journey Freud ever made. He left Vienna as a budding neurologist, anxious to learn in the Salpêtrière everything about the anatomy of the nervous system. He returned to Vienna, 'Charcot's unqualified admirer' with a determination to study the problems of the human mind.

Shortly after his return to Vienna in 1886 Freud, disappointed with his career in research, set himself up in private practice as a neurologist, and married a Jewish woman, Martha Bernays (1861-1951), with whom he had six children: Mathilde (1887-1978); Jean Martin (1889-1967); Oliver (1891-1969); Ernst (1892-1970); Sophie (1893-1920); and Anna (1895-1982). The youngest, Anna, became the world's leading psychoanalyst after Freud's death in 1939.

In his private practice Freud gradually substituted the method of 'free association' for hypnosis, allowing patients to disclose their random thoughts when in a state of relaxed consciousness. From their childhood and dream recollections Freud became convinced of the fact of infantile sexuality and made/...
made this the core of his theory. This was too much for Breuer and their friendship came to an end. Freud gradually gathered disciples, however, and they formed a 'Psychological Wednesday Society' which first met in his home at 19 Berggasse, Vienna, in 1902. Out of this simple gathering grew an international movement. The Vienna Psychoanalytical Society was formed in 1908. In 1910, with Carl Gustav Jung (1875-1961) as first president, the International Psychoanalytical Society was founded. The International included such names as Alfred Adler (1870-1937), Karl Abraham (1877-1925), Abraham A. Brill (1884-1948), Sándor Ferenczi (1873-1933), Ernest Jones (1879-1958), Max Eitingon (1881-1943), Otto Rank (1885-1939), and Wilhelm Stekel (1868-1940).

1909 is a momentous date in the history of psychoanalysis. G. Stanley Hall (1846-1924) invited Freud, Jung and Ferenczi to Clark University in Worcester, Massachusetts, to give introductory lectures on psychoanalysis. They were well received and Freud was awarded the title of Doctor honoris causa, the first real recognition of the importance of his work as a psychoanalyst.

Freud's insistence on sexuality as the central dynamo of human development met with opposition, however, even within the psychoanalytic movement. The first major defection from Freudian 'truth' was by Alfred Adler in 1911, who developed a psychology of the ego. When Jung, the 'Crown Prince', showed signs of discontent, too, Ferenczi and Jones formed a secret 'Committee of Seven Rings' to uphold the psychoanalytic credo as enunciated by Freud. Despite their efforts, however, defections continued: Jung in 1913, Rank in 1924, Ferenczi in 1931, and Reich in 1934. With the defection of Rank, a member, the Committee found it impossible to keep its existence secret and gradually dissolved.

In 1923, it was discovered that Freud had cancer of the jaw. In April he had the first of thirty-three operations to stem the growth; a major one in October removed half his mouth and necessitated the use of a prosthesis.
Illness did not stop Freud's creative powers. In 1927, Freud wrote The Future of an Illusion, his most fundamental critique of 'ordinary religion', and an attempt, moreover, to defend psychoanalysis against possible adoption by priests, for whom Freud had a life-long aversion.\textsuperscript{14} Despite his general dismissal of religion as an 'obsessional neurosis', however, Freud was proud of his Jewish ancestry, grateful for his 'Jewish nature', and espoused Zionist ideals.\textsuperscript{15}

In January, 1933, Hitler became Chancellor of Germany, and in May the Nazis burned Freud's books in Berlin with the declaration: 'Against the soul-destroying over-estimation of the sex life - and on behalf of the nobility of the human soul - I offer to the flames the writing of one, Sigmund Freud'.\textsuperscript{16} After the Anschluss of 1938, Freud and his family fled to England and set up home at 20 Maresfield Gardens, Hampstead, London.

Freud died of cancer on September 23, 1939. His daughter Anna, and her friend, Dorothy Burlingham, spent the rest of their lives together at Maresfield Gardens which became the focal point of psychoanalysis throughout the world, and a shrine to the memory of its founder.

II

Analytic experience has convinced us of the complete truth of the assertion so often to be heard that the child is psychologically father to the adult and that the events of his first years are of paramount importance for his whole later life.

(Freud, An Outline of Psychoanalysis, 1940)\textsuperscript{17}

The most important aspect of Freudian theory from an educational point of view is the supreme importance which it bestows on the early years of childhood. It is wise to be quite clear what Freud claimed here: he steadfastly held the view that the period of infancy - that is, the first five or six years - is of such importance as to be the emotional determinant of every subsequent period of human development.
But what were Freud's reasons for holding such a view, a view which underpins the entire superstructure of psychoanalysis? Let us go back to the last years of the nineteenth century when Freud was treating neurotic patients in his private consulting rooms in Vienna with the new technique of 'free association' pioneered by his friend and colleague, Joseph Breuer (1842-1925). Although both men preferred this method to the controversial techniques of hypnosis and suggestion practised by most specialists at that time, they were keenly aware that some fundamental questions remained. What is neurosis? How does it arise? When does it arise? Is it the same for both sexes? And what role should the physician play in its resolution?

The estrangement of Freud from Breuer precluded the continuance of mutual discussion of these vital questions. But Freud found another confident in Wilhelm Fliess (1858-1928), a nose and throat specialist living in Berlin, with whom he conducted a voluminous and intimate correspondence between 1887 and 1902. These historic letters from Freud to Fliess—which were obtained, to Freud's chagrin, by one of his pupils in 1937—provide a fascinating insight into the genesis of many of the central concepts of psychoanalysis. For example, while many of his contemporaries regarded neurosis as the frequent consequence of an abnormal sexual life, Freud went further and asserted to Fliess in 1893 that 'neurasthenia is always only a sexual neurosis', adding that 'neuroses are entirely preventible as well as entirely incurable' with the physician's task 'wholly shifted on to prophylaxis'.

But how does neurosis arise? In 1896 Freud outlined what Strachey was to call later the 'standard formula for the development of a neurosis':

The course taken by the illness in neuroses of repression is in general always the same: (1) the sexual experience (or series of experiences) which is traumatic and premature and is to be repressed. (2) Its repression on some later occasion which arouses a memory of it; at the same/...
same time the formation of a primary symptom. (3) A stage of successful
defence, which is equivalent to health except for the existence of the
primary symptom. (4) The stage in which the repressed ideas return,
and in which, during the struggle between them and the ego, new symptoms
are formed which are those of the illness proper; that is, a stage of
adjustment, of being overwhelmed or of recovery with a malformation. 25

This much is clear: forbidden, asocial, sexual wishes are repressed, but return
at a later time, and the ensuing conflict with the ego produces the illness.
But two things are not clear. First, if there is a direct link between
repression and neurosis as the above paragraph suggests, is repression, then,
a bad thing, something to be avoided at all costs? And secondly, when does
repression occur? In adulthood, adolescence, or childhood? Or is it an
ongoing phenomenon which can occur haphazardly at any time in the life of
an individual?

Freud gave the answers to these fundamental questions in three subsequent
letters to Fliess. In 1896 he wrote that, although during childhood sexual
release would seem to be obtainable from very many parts of the body,
the abandonment (that is, repression) of these 'erotogenic zones' determines
'progress in culture', and 'moral as well as individual development'. 26 In 1897
he asserted unequivocally that neurosis is 'fixed in earliest childhood',
adding later in the year that hysterical phantasies go back to 'things heard
by children' from the age of six to seven months onwards. 27

Now, what does this mean, 'things heard by children'? What Freud meant was
that the psychical structures which are affected by repression are impulses
which arise from 'primal scenes' - that is, scenes of sexual intercourse between
parents, and actually viewed by a child. 28 But why should these 'primal scenes'
involve repression? This is because they arouse, not surprisingly, emotional
excitement in a child. More specifically, they are, Freud claimed, the genesis
of a death wish, arising from incestuous wishes, directed against parents of
the opposite sex. 29 This, of course, was the first hint of Freud's famous
Oedipus complex which he soon claimed is a 'universal event of early childhood'. 30
Before leaving these letters one other observation which was to underpin subsequent Freudian theory of female development must be mentioned. In November, 1897, Freud drew Fliess' attention to the fact that a girl in the course of her sexual development has to change her leading genital zone, from clitoris to vagina. Moreover, until this change is successfully achieved a girl is overwhelmed by a 'flood of shame'.

Let us recapitulate: neurosis is caused by repression of forbidden wishes, invariably of a sexual nature, in the earliest years of childhood. Two points must be stressed here. First, Freud did not say that repression always leads to neurosis, but only that it can do so. Second, he reiterated that repression is necessary for cultural progress. Indeed, if the 'sexual zones' are not extinguished with the successive waves of a child's development, moral insanity, he said, may result as a developmental inhibition. The paradox can be put in a nutshell: although repression can lead to neurosis, non-repression, too, can have the same result. Subsequent Freudian theory, clinical and metaphychological, may be viewed as an explication of this paradox.

It is clear why Freud emphasised the unique importance of childhood from a medical point of view. But does it have unique importance from an educational point of view? After all, most humans are, definably, 'normal', and this being so they could reasonably claim that for them childhood was just a transitory period, important, of course, but no more so than adolescence or adulthood. Is Freudian theory, then, of intrinsic interest only to medical students specialising in neurotic disorders?

Such a question was dispelled by The Interpretation of Dreams (1900) where Freud wrote that 'psychoanalytic research finds no fundamental, but only quantitative, distinctions between normal and neurotic life'. We are all, in other words, neurotic to some degree; and Freudian theory is, therefore, applicable to all. But how far is it relevant, educationally? To answer this question is it necessary to pursue Freud's theory of the psychosexual development of children.
The whole occurrence - that is, the Oedipus complex - may probably be regarded as the central experience of the years of childhood, the greatest problem of early life and the strongest source of later inadequacy.

(Freud, *An Outline of Psychoanalysis*, 1940)

As the Oedipal crisis is so 'central' an experience for children we shall begin with it. As indicated Freud first hinted at the Oedipus complex in two letters to Fliess in 1897. The first published work of Freud's to actually introduce the Oedipus complex to the general public was *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900) where Freud concluded: 'It is the fate of all of us, perhaps, to direct our first sexual impulse towards our mother and our first hatred and our first murderous wish against our father'. There, too, Freud used the complex to explain the affective power of two great tragedies of literature, *Oedipus Rex* and *Hamlet*.

The Oedipus complex is not, of course, an isolated phenomenon in the life-history of an individual, but merely the central focus of a long, continuous line of development. Freud's most fundamental work devoted to the symptomatology of sexual neurosis is *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* (1905) which James Strachey (1953) paired with *The Interpretation of Dreams* as his 'most momentous and original contributions to human knowledge'. It is worth noting that the *Three Essays* - typical of Freud's early bias - were based on a study of males only, for Freud wrote in the first essay that sexuality is 'best studied in men, for their erotic life alone has become accessible to research'. This is a strange admission, indeed, from a man who had already published case-histories of female patients. But why should the sexuality of women be inaccessible to research? That of women, he explained, - 'partly owing to the stunting effect of civilised conditions and partly owing to their conventional secretiveness and insincerity - is 'still veiled in an impenetrable obscurity'.
In the second essay, 'Infantile Sexuality', Freud explained his theory of sexual development. He believed that human sexual development is diphasic, that is, that it occurs in two waves. The first of these, characterised by the infantile nature of the sexual aims, begins between the ages of two and five, and is brought to a halt or to a retreat by the latency period. The second wave begins with puberty and determines the final outcome of mature sexual life.

This does not mean, however, that sexuality is absent before the age of two years. Freud had no doubt that 'germs of sexual impulses are already present' in new-born children; they enjoy sexual satisfaction when they begin to take nourishment and seek to repeat the experience in the familiar activity of thumb-sucking. During the first two or three years of life, sexual activity of a rudimentary, primitive kind is centred around the erotogenic zones the mouth, anus, and genitals. These preliminary stages are normally passed through smoothly, without giving more than a hint of their existence. It is only in pathological cases that they become active and recognisable to superficial observation.

Freud identified two of these early organisations of sexual life, which 'almost seem as though they were harking back to early animal forms of life'. The first of these is the oral or, as it might be called, cannibalistic pre-genital sexual organisation. Here, sexual activity has not yet been separated from the ingestion of food; nor are opposite currents within the activity differentiated. Nevertheless, the object of both activities is the same: the incorporation of the object, the prototype of a process which, in the form of identification, is later to play such an important psychological part in the socialisation of the child. A second phase is that of the sadistic-anal organisation where the opposition between two currents, which runs through all sexual life, is already developed. They cannot yet, however, be described as 'masculine' and 'feminine', but only as 'active' and 'passive'.
The final outcome of the development lies in the genital stage, the 'normal' sexual life of the adult, in which the pursuit of pleasure comes under the sway of the reproductive function. Here, the component instincts, under the primacy of a single erotogenic zone, form a firm organisation directed towards some extraneous sexual object. 

In 1923 Freud added a third phase, the phallic, in the sexual development of childhood subsequent to the two organisations outlined above. In general terms, then, Freudian theory posits five psychosexual phases or stages of human development - oral, anal, phallic, latency, and genital.

As well as this account of the psychosexual stages, the second essay contains a description of three instincts which play an important role in the educational development of a child. Infantile life, Freud claimed, despite the dominance of erotogenic zones, exhibits components of the sexual instinct which from the outset involve other people as sexual objects. Such are the instincts of exhibitionism, scopophilia (pleasure in looking) and cruelty. How do they manifest themselves?

Infants are essentially without shame, and during their earliest years enjoy exposing their bodies, especially the genitalia. The counterpart of this supposedly perverse inclination, scopophilia, probably does not become manifest until later in childhood when the development of a sense of shame has already curbed the earliest exhibitionism. Nevertheless, scopophilia can also appear as a spontaneous manifestation. Once their attention has been drawn to their own genitals, infants usually develop an active interest in the genitals of other children. Since opportunities for satisfying this curiosity usually occur in the course of satisfying the two kinds of excretory need, children become voyeurs of the processes of micturition and defaecation. The third component, cruelty, comes easily to children, generally speaking, due to the late development of the capacity for pity. While admitting that the fundamental psychological analysis of this instinct has still to be satisfactorily achieved/...
achieved, Freud made two assumptions: first, the impulse of cruelty arises from the instinct for mastery; and second, its appearance dominates the pre-genital period of sexual life. Children who display special cruelty towards animals and playmates, usually also display a precocious sexual activity arising from erotogenic zones. Though all the sexual instincts may display simultaneous precocity, erotogenic sexual activity seems to be the primary one.

What are the implications of Freud's analysis? The absence of the capacity for love brings a danger that the connection between the cruel and the erotogenic instincts, established in childhood may prove unbreakable in later life. Referring to Rousseau's Confessions as evidence that the painful stimulation of the skin of the buttocks is one of the erotogenic roots of the passive instinct of cruelty (masochism), Freud concluded that this kind of corporal punishment should not be inflicted upon any children whose libido is liable to be deflected from 'free' expression into 'collateral channels' by the later demands, potentially pathogenic, of cultural education.

Despite the earlier admission of 'obscurity', Freud attempted to take his ideas further on female psychology in the third essay, 'The Transformations of Puberty', where he reiterated his observation to Fliess that the leading erotogenic zone in girls, homologous to the masculine genital zone of the glans penis, is located at the clitoris. Moreover, it is by following the vicissitudes of the excitability of the clitoris that we can understand why a girl turns into a woman. The turning point, Freud claimed, is at puberty when, in contrast to the efflorescence of libido in boys, clitoral sexuality is repressed and the vaginal orifice is adopted by girls as the new leading zone for the purposes of later sexuality. A male retains his leading zone unchanged from childhood. These two facts - the change of erotogenic zone and the pubertal wave of repression - are the chief determinants of the greater proneness of females to neurosis and especially to hysteria. These determinants, too, Freud concluded, are 'intimately related to the essence of femininity'.

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But in what way are these determinants related to the essence of femininity? Indeed, what is the essence of femininity? Nearly twenty years were to pass before Freud returned to the problem, and his hypotheses will be considered later.

After the first wave of sexuality the child enters the latency period, when sexuality is quiescent until its efflorescence in puberty. This does not mean however, that the libido ceases to function but, rather, that its store of energy is employed to 'find an outlet and use in other fields'. Freud recognised the educational value of this process of sublimation, writing that 'any premature sexual activity diminishes a child's educability'. Moreover, he called sublimation one of the origins of artistic activity and added that, in proportion to the completeness or otherwise of the sublimation, a characterological analysis of a gifted artist may reveal a mixture of 'efficiency, perversion and neurosis'.

It would be difficult, then, to overestimate the importance of the latency period for the socialisation and mental health of the child. As Freud put it - the period of latency 'appears to be one of the necessary conditions of the aptitude of man for developing a higher civilisation, but also of their tendency to neurosis'.

But what brings the first period of sexuality to an end? Or, to put it another way, what cataclysmic event dissolves the Oedipus complex and heralds in the period of latency? The answer to this is to be found in another of Freud's concepts, the castration complex, which was to play a central role in the work of Melanie Klein.

The first explicit mention and discussion of the 'castration complex' is to be found in Freud's paper 'On The Sexual Theories of Children' (1908) which explains the emergence of the castration complex in simple terms: the child, having been mainly dominated by penile excitations, will usually have obtained pleasure by masturbation. Detected by his parents or nurse he will have been terrorised by the threat of castration. The effect of this threat, proportionate to the value the boy sets upon his organ, is 'quite extra-ordinarily deep and persistent'. Legends/...
Legends and myths, Freud thought, testify to the upheaval in the child's emotional life and to the horror which is linked with the castration complex - a complex which is subsequently remembered by consciousness with corresponding reluctance.

IV

Let us recapitulate: these concepts and conceptualisations constitute the ideational core of Freud's theory of psychosexual development - the Oedipus complex (1897); the change of erotogenic zone in girls from clitoris to vagina (1905); the diphasic development of sexuality (1905); the erotogenic zones (1905); the latency period (1905); the component instincts of exhibitionism, scopophilia and cruelty (1905); the castration complex (1908); and the psychosexual stages (1915, 1923).

We can now return to our original question. Is Freudian theory relevant, educationally? Freud, certainly, was convinced of it. As exemplification let us consider four aspects of children's development which have an intrinsic interest for educators - emotional development, sexual development, intellectual development, and social development.

It is not being suggested, of course, that these areas are disparate in educational essence. They are not, but are, rather, inter-related manifestations of the child's burgeoning interests, coiled together, as it were, by libidinal threads radiating from the Oedipal core of Freudian sexuality.

1

The little-known paper, 'Some Reflections on Schoolboy Psychology' (1914), is an explicit enunciation of Freud's belief that our emotional attitudes to other people are ineluctably fixed during infancy. This is confidently asserted:
The nature and quality of the human child's relations to people of his own and the opposite sex have already been laid down in the first six years of his life. He may afterwards develop and transform them in certain directions but he can no longer get rid of them.\(^{71}\)

Furthermore, the people to whom the child is 'fixed' or 'bonded' are his parents, brothers, sisters, and others who cared for him in infancy. All of those whom he comes to know later - and this is of crucial importance for educators - become surrogate figures for these first objects of his feelings. The paper continues this vein:

> These substitute figures can be classified from his point of view according as they are derived from what we call the 'imagos' of his father, his mother, his brothers and sisters, and so on. His later acquaintances are thus obliged to take over a kind of emotional heritage; they encounter sympathies and antipathies to the production of which they themselves have contributed little. All of his later choices of friendship and love follow upon the basis of the memory-traces left behind by these first prototypes.\(^{72}\)

They are not, however, of equal importance. Of all the imagos of childhood, the paper continues, none is more important for a youth or a man than that of his father. Indeed, the father's imago is so potent that God is described as only an exaltation of this picture of the father as he is represented in the mind of early childhood.\(^{73}\)

The father-son relationship is characterised by an emotional ambivalence, organically necessitated, which Freud found 'most strikingly expressed in the Greek myth of King Oedipus'.\(^{74}\) The father becomes both a model for the son to imitate and a rival to get rid of, in order to take his place in the mother's affection. But this is not all. In the second half of childhood a change occurs in the boy's relation to his father - 'a change whose importance cannot be exaggerated', Freud claimed.\(^{75}\) What is this change? From his nursery the boy begins to cast his eyes upon the world outside, and makes discoveries/...
discoveries which undermine the original high opinion of his father. He discovers that his father is only a mere mortal, after all. He is not the mightiest, wisest, and richest of beings. With this growing dissatisfaction the boy learns to criticise and evaluate. This disenchantment is underlined as a crucial factor in the boy's development: 'Everything that is hopeful, as well as everything that is unwelcome, in the new generation is determined by this detachment from the father'.

If parents and siblings are the prototypes of all subsequent emotional relationships, what happens when the children go to school? Freud explained the dramatic encounter in this way: when boys go to school the teachers, not all of whom are fathers themselves, become their 'substitute fathers'. This is why, even though they are still quite young, they strike their pupils as so mature and so unattainably adult. The boys transfer on to them the respect and expectations they attached to the omniscient father of their childhood, and treat them accordingly. Confronting the teachers with the same ambivalence acquired in their own families, they struggle with them as they had habitually struggled with their fathers in the flesh. Freud concluded: 'Unless we take into account our nurseries and our family homes, our behaviour to our schoolmasters would be not only incomprehensible but inexcusable'.

Moreover, children as pupils have other and scarcely less important experiences with the successors of their brothers and sisters - their schoolmates. What did Freud say about the relationships between brothers and sisters which could throw light on their subsequent behaviour in school?

In *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis* (1916-17) Freud observed that children do not necessarily love their brothers and sisters; often they obviously do not. What is interesting, educationally, is Freud's additional comments that there is 'no doubt' that children hate their brothers and sisters as competitors, an attitude which often persists for many years, long after maturity has been reached. Even when the hatred is succeeded or overlaid by a more affectionate attitude the hostile one, Freud thought, seems very generally to be the earlier.
But why should this be so? Another paper from the same work contains the remarkable assertion that the position of children in the family order is 'a factor of extreme importance' in determining the shape of their later lives and should deserve consideration in every life-history. How did Freud explain this? When other children are born, the Oedipus complex is enlarged into a family complex with two consequences: first, the first-born receives the new arrivals with repugnance and wishes to get rid of them; and second, the mother is not easily forgiven for this loss of place. Indeed, feelings of great bitterness arise in him, and are often the basis of a permanent estrangement.

As brothers and sisters grow up, their attitudes to one another undergo very significant transformations. The boy, for example, may take his sister as a substitute love-object for his 'faithless' mother. Where there are several brothers courting a younger sister, situations of hostile rivalry, which are so important for later life, arise already in the nursery. The little girl, too, may find in her elder brother a substitute for the father who no longer takes an affectionate interest in her as before. Or she may take a younger sister as a substitute for the baby she could not receive from her father.

The foregoing papers seem to suggest that the emotional development of boys and girls unfolds on parallel lines. That is, that all children, irrespective of sex, are sexually sculptured in identical ways by the Oedipal catalyst with, of course, expected but minor differences according to sex. For example, the boy will take his mother or sister as a love object, and the girl will take her father or brother. But the overall pattern appears to be the same; and knowing Freud's theory of emotional development of boys, one could easily outline, with changes of subjects and love-objects, the emotional development of girls.

Freud, indeed, thought this for a long time.
The first paper to lay emphasis on the different course taken by the development of sexuality in boys and girls was 'The Dissolution of the Oedipus complex' (1924), where Freud attempted to answer the obvious question: if the Oedipus complex, the 'central phenomenon of the sexual period of early childhood', succumbs to repression, dissolves, and is followed by the latency period, what brings about its destruction?

The answer, Freud decided, lay in the threat of castration. Consider, first, the development of a male child. For a while a boy does not believe in the threat or obey it in the least. The observation which finally convinces him is the sight of the female genitals where the absence of a penis is obvious. With this, the loss of his own organ becomes imaginable, and the threat of castration real.

But what is the actual effect of this threat on a boy? Let us go back a little in time when the Oedipus complex offered him two possibilities of satisfaction, an active and a passive one. Actively, he could take his father's place and have intercourse with his mother, running the risk of his father's enmity; or, passively, he could take the place of his mother and be loved by his father, in which case his mother would become superfluous. But his acceptance of the possibility of castration put an end to both possible ways of obtaining satisfaction from the Oedipus complex. For both of them entailed the loss of his penis. As a result of the conflict, his ego turns away from the Oedipus complex, the object-cathexes are replaced by identifications with the authority of parents which, introjected into the ego, forms the nucleus of the superego.

But how does the corresponding development take place in girls? The female sex, too, develops an Oedipus complex, a superego and a latency period. But, according to Freud, the 'morphological distinction is bound to find expression in differences of psychical development'. When a little girl compares her 'inferior' clitoris with a boy's penis she perceives her 'inferiority' as a wrong done to her and as a ground for inferiority. That is, she assumes that at an earlier date she had possessed an equally large organ and had lost it by castration.
The essential difference, then, is that a girl accepts castration as an accomplished fact, whereas a boy fears the possibility of its occurrence.

What is the effect of this on a girl? (1) Without the fear of castration there is no powerful motive for the setting-up of a superego or for the dissolution of the infantile genital organisation. A girl's Oedipus complex is simpler than a boy's and, in Freud's experience, usually entails the 'taking of her mother's place and the adopting of a feminine attitude towards her father'. (3) A girl slips - 'along the line of a symbolic equation' - from the penis to a baby. Her Oedipus complex culminates in a desire, long retained, to bear her father a child. The two wishes - to possess a penis and a child - remain strongly cathetced in the unconscious and 'help to prepare the female creature for her later sexual role'.

What did Freud mean when he said that there is no powerful motive for the setting-up of a superego in a girl? Did he mean that a girl has no superego at all? Or merely that it is different in some ways from a boy's? Freud did not answer these questions in this paper and admitted, candidly, that his insight into the developmental processes in girls was 'unsatisfactory, incomplete and vague'.

He returned to the problem, however, in a later paper, 'Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction between the Sexes' (1925), which is the first complete re-assessment of Freud's views on the psychological development of women. Furthermore, it contains the germs of all his later work on the subject.

Freud's basic thesis in this paper is that a two-fold change is required of a little girl - and not merely one as he had previously intimated - before she can arrive at the 'normal' Oedipus complex: (1) a change in her leading sexual organ and (2) a change in her sexual object. And these necessary changes become possible at the precise moment when a girl realises she does not have a penis and falls victim to 'penis-envy'.
Here the masculinity complex of females branches off. The hope of some day obtaining a penis in spite of everything and so of becoming like a man may persist for many years, and may become the motive for strange actions. Or, a 'disavowal' process may set in when a girl refuses to accept the fact of being castrated, harden herself in the conviction that she does possess a penis, and subsequently behave as though she were a man.

The psychical consequences of penis-envy are various and far-reaching.

1. After she has become aware of the wound to her narcissism, a girl develops, 'like a scar', a sense of inferiority.

2. When she realises that her sexual character is a universal one, she begins to share the contempt felt by men for her sex.

3. Penis-envy continues to exist in the character-trait of jealousy.

4. A fourth consequence seems to be a 'loosening of the girl's relation with her mother as a love-object'. In the end the girl's mother is 'almost always held responsible' for her lack of a penis.

5. The fifth consequence, 'undoubtedly the most important of all', is an intense current of feeling against masturbation. A girl's recognition of the anatomical distinction between the sexes forces her away from masculinity and masculine masturbation, on to new lines which will turn her into a 'little woman'.

What are the effects on a girl's superego?

Whereas in boys the Oedipus complex is destroyed by the castration complex, in girls it is made possible and led up to by the castration complex. Thus, in girls, the motive for the demolition of the Oedipus complex is lacking: it may be abandoned slowly or dealt with by repression, or its effects may persist far into women's normal mental life. And what are these effects? Freud's reply has infuriated feminists and is worth quoting:

I cannot evade the notion (though I hesitate to give it expression) that for women the level of what is ethically normal is different from what it is in men. Their super-ego is never so inexorable, so impersonal, so independent of its emotional origins as we require it to/...
to be in men. Character-traits which critics of every epoch have brought up against women - that they show less sense of justice than men, that they are less ready to submit to the great exigencies of life, that they are more often influenced in their judgements by feelings of affection or hostility - all these would be amply accounted for by the modification in the formation of their super-ego which we have inferred above. 100

If these character-traits of girls are symptomatic of a different ethical system an important question arises. Do they also involve a different intellectual system? Are girls and boys on different intellectual levels? Freud, certainly, suggested as much in *New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis* (1933) where he conjectured that 'shame', for example, could be a reason why women have made few contributions to scientific discoveries and inventions in the history of civilisation. The invention of plaiting and weaving, he thought, however, could possibly be attributed to them. 101 102

But here we are looking at the end-result of a cognitive development stretching over many years. Let us go back in time to early childhood and ask: What is the genesis of the intellect?

3

In his 'Notes Upon A Case of Obsessional Neurosis' (1909), the 'Rat Man' case study, Freud first referred to a sexual instinct of looking and knowing (the scopophilic and epistemophilic instinct) and 'the sexual pleasure which is normally attached to the content of thought'. 103 The hypothesis of a link between knowledge and sexuality was reiterated by the 'Little Hans' study, published in the same year, where Freud said: 'Thirst for knowledge seems to be inseparable from sexual curiosity'. These ten words constitute the core of Freudian educational theory.
Freud gave an example of this. Hans had a lively interest in his penis. This interest aroused in him the spirit of inquiry by which he discovered that the presence or absence of a penis could be used as a criterion of differentiation between animate and inanimate objects. He assumed that all animate objects were like himself, and possessed this important bodily organ. Thus, Hans's sexual curiosity roused the spirit of enquiry in him and enabled him to arrive at genuine abstract knowledge.

Freud referred again to an instinct for knowledge in *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* (1915 edition). His comments there on the genesis of this instinct are the most elaborate in his entire oeuvre and deserve to be quoted in full:

> At about the same time as the sexual life of children reaches its first peak, between the ages of three and five, they also begin to show signs of the activity which may be ascribed to the instinct for knowledge or research. This instinct cannot be counted among the elementary instinctual components, nor can it be classed as exclusively belonging to sexuality. Its activity corresponds on the one hand to a sublimated manner of obtaining mastery, while on the other hand it makes use of the energy of scopophilia. Its relations to sexual life, however, are of particular importance, since we have learned from psychoanalysis that the instinct of knowledge in children is attracted unexpectedly early and intensively to sexual problems and is in fact possibly first aroused by them.

The efforts of the young investigator, however, are 'habitually fruitless', and end in a renunciation which not infrequently leaves behind it a permanent injury to the instinct for knowledge. Nevertheless, as the sexual researches of these early years of childhood are always carried out in solitude they constitute a first step towards an 'independent attitude in the world', and imply a high degree of alienation of children from the people who formerly enjoyed their complete confidence.
The achievement of this 'independent attitude', so important for a child's intellectual development, is threatened, however, from another source. In *The Future of an Illusion* (1927) Freud wrote that religion plays a pathogenic role in the intellectual development of children:

Think of the depressing contrast between the radiant intelligence of a healthy child and the feeble intellectual powers of the average adult. Can we be quite certain that it is not precisely religious education which bears a large share of the blame for this relative atrophy?

Freud argued his case this way: if we did not bother a child with supernaturalism it would be a very long time before he began to trouble himself about God and 'things in another world'. But we introduce him to religious doctrines when he is neither interested in them nor capable of grasping their import. Is it not true, Freud asked, that the two main points in contemporary educational programmes are retardation of sexual development and premature religious influence? As a consequence, by the time the child's intellect awakens, the doctrines of religion have become unassailable; and this uncritical acceptance of the 'absurdities' of religious dogma produces a weakness of intellect.

But in what way is religious dogma absurd? And why should it produce a weakness of intellect? Freud gave four reasons: first, it is an illusion born of wish-fulfilments; second, it is an obsessional neurosis arising from the life-long dependency of childhood; third, it has not succeeded in making the majority of mankind happy; and finally, it acts as a narcotic and inhibits independent, critical thinking.

How did he explain the psychical origin of religious ideas? These, which are not precipitates of experience or end-results of thinking, are illusions, fulfilments of the 'oldest, strongest and most urgent wishes of mankind'. What/...
What are these wishes? Where do they come from? They arise from the terrifying impression of helplessness in childhood which arouses the need for paternal protection. Moreover, the recognition that this helplessness does not disappear with childhood necessitates the continuing belief in the existence of a supernatural, omnipotent 'father'. As a consequence of their illusionary essence religious doctrines are insusceptible of proof. Some of them are so improbable, so incompatible with the scientific view of the 'reality' of the world that they can be compared with delusions. We cannot judge the reality-value of most of them; and as they are incapable of validation, they remain irrefutable. 113

Why is religion a neurosis? As a child cannot successfully complete its development from the egocentric to the social stages without passing through a phase of neurosis, humanity itself during its evolution fell into states analogous to the neuroses. Religion is thus the 'universal obsessional neurosis of humanity; like the obsessional neurosis of children, it arose out of the Oedipus complex, out of the relation to the father'.114 Accordingly, as humanity has progressed from the primitive to civilised stages, it is to be 'supposed', Freud reasoned, that a discarding of religion is bound to occur with the 'fatal inevitability' of a process of growth.

How can educators help people who are under the dominance of prohibitions of thought to attain Freud's 'psychological ideal', the primacy of the intelligence? Should we merely prohibit religion? This would be senseless and hopeless. An entrenched belief is not destroyed either by arguments or by prohibitions, as the Prohibition Period in American has illustrated. The effect of religious consolations on humans is analogous to sleeping pills or narcotics. Can a person accustomed to taking these for years be expected suddenly to do without them? In the same way, human beings are drugged by the consolation of the 'religious illusion' if the 'sweet poison' has been instilled in them from childhood onwards. 115
But is this true of other people who have been sensibly brought up? Surely those who do not suffer from the neurosis will need no intoxicant to deaden it? Freud agreed but added a note of warning to those who will not be able to fall back on religious illusion for consolation. They will have to accept their helplessness and insignificance in the machinery of the universe; they can no longer be the centre of creation, nor the object of tenderness from the beneficent deity. But human beings cannot remain children for ever; they must in the end go out into 'hostile life'. This is 'education to reality'.

Scientific work is 'the only road' which can lead us to a knowledge of reality outside ourselves. It is merely an illusion to expect anything from intuition and introspection; they can give us nothing but particulars, complex and confusing, about our mental life; and they never yield any information about the riddles which religious doctrine finds so easy to answer. Freud's primacy of the intellect lies, admittedly, in a 'distant, distant, future', but probably not in an infinitely distant one. Logos, 'our God', whose aims are the love of humanity and the decrease of suffering, will gradually fulfil His wishes and produce a 'new generation of men'. On the way to this distant goal, however, religious doctrines, antithetical to both reason and experience, will have to be discarded.

But how will Logos produce a 'new generation of men' free from hypocrisy, illusion and neurosis? What sort of characterological transformation of human beings is necessary to build such a New World?

Freud wrote in *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* (1905) that a child's character is built up largely from the material of sexual excitations. Its composition is threefold: instincts fixed since childhood, constructions achieved by means of sublimation, and other constructions used for effectively keeping under control perverse impulses.
Here, the connection between character and sexuality is clear. But what are these constructions? Who builds them? Who controls them? And what are the means of achieving their permanency?

Freud answered this — and the answer takes us to the very centre of psychoanalytic praxis — in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921) where he asked himself three questions. What is a group? How does it acquire the capacity for exercising such a decisive influence over the mental life of the individual? And what is the nature of the mental change which it forces upon the individual? 122

Freud poured high praise on two works — Le Bon's 'deservedly famous' Psychologie des Foules (1895) and McDougall's The Group Mind (1920) — whose hypotheses agree with the fundamental postulates of psychoanalysis. (As McDougall agreed, 123 in essence, with Le Bon's analysis, it is proposed to deal here with the latter only).

Le Bon defined a group as a collection of individuals which possesses a 'sort of collective mind' which makes them feel, think, and act in a manner quite different from that in which each individual of them would feel, think, and act in a state of isolation. In what way are individuals 'different' when they join a group? Le Bon thought that when the particular acquirements of individuals become obliterated in a group their distinctiveness vanishes. The racial unconscious emerges; what is heterogeneous is submerged in what is homogeneous. And what produces this change? Le Bon alluded to the 'suggestibility' of the group where individuals find themselves in 'special states', which much resemble the states of fascination in which hypnotised individuals find themselves in the hands of the hypnotiser. No longer themselves they become automatons which have ceased to be guided by their wills. Also, when they form part of an organised group, humans descend 'several rungs in the ladder of civilisation'; with a lowering of intellectual ability they become barbarians, acting solely by instinct. 124

With such a portrait of the characteristics of a group, one could be excused for expecting the corresponding morals to be low. Le Bon, however, insisted that this/...
this is not always the case.\textsuperscript{125} It is true that when individuals come together in a group all their individual inhibitions fall away and the cruel, brutal and destructive instincts, dormant relics of a primitive epoch, are stirred up to find free gratification. Nevertheless, under the influence of 'suggestion', groups are also capable of high achievements in the form of abnegation, altruism, and idealism. With isolated individuals, personal interest is almost the only motive force; but with groups it is very rarely prominent. Indeed, it is possible for the moral standards of an individual to be raised by a group:\textsuperscript{126}

But where does the 'suggestion' come from which produces such high ethical achievements? Does it come from one individual who is the creative thinker of the group? Or does it come from the members as a whole, inspired by the creative dynamics of group interplay? Freud, while agreeing fundamentally with Le Bon's analysis of the group-mind, made an observation which had escaped the Frenchman's consideration: if the individuals in the group are combined into a unity, there must surely be something to unite them, and this bond might be precisely the thing that is characteristic of a group.\textsuperscript{127}

All that Le Bon could offer as explanation of this was that as soon as living beings are gathered together in certain numbers, they place themselves instinctively under the authority of a chief. More than this, a group, he declared, is an obedient herd, which could never live without a master. But what is the nature of this bond? Le Bon ascribed both to the ideas and to the leaders a mysterious and irresistible power, which he called 'prestige'.\textsuperscript{128}

But Freud was dissatisfied with this explanation and, using the concept of libido,\textsuperscript{129} theorised that Eros constitutes the essence of the group mind: 'a group is clearly held together by a power of some kind: and to what power could this feat be better ascribed than to Eros, which holds together everything in the world'. Significantly, the emotional tie between members of a group is based upon the 'tie with the leader'.\textsuperscript{131} Freud's formula for the libidinal constitution of groups, that is, those that have a leader, is expressed: 'A primary group of this kind is a number of individuals who have put one and the same object in the place of their ego ideal and have consequently identified themselves with one another in their ego'.\textsuperscript{132}
One feature of identification is its demand that equalisation shall be consistently carried through. In his discussion of two artificial groups, Church and Army, 133 Freud claimed that their necessary precondition is that all their members should be loved in the same way by one person, the leader. Freud, however, was not espousing an egalitarian philosophy; the members of a group are equal to one another but are happy to be ruled by the leader, who is 'superior to them all':

Do not let us forget, however, that the demand for equality in a group applies only to its members and not to the leader. All the members must be equal to one another, but they all want to be ruled by one person. Many equals, who can identify themselves with one another, and a single person superior to them all - that is the situation that we find realised in groups which are capable of subsisting. 134

It is difficult not to be impressed and, indeed, inspired by the 'new generation of men' which Freudian therapy purported to create - a race of individuals, civilised and useful, free from hypocrisy, delusion and neurosis, dedicated to the service of their new god, Logos, and united in harmony for the good of the common weal.

But what would Freud's new society really be like? Remember his claim that education is a prophylaxis, intended to obviate damage to the individual and so produce a civilised and useful citizen. But civilised and useful for what kind of society? What did civilisation mean for Freud? In Civilisation and its Discontents (1930) he wrote that it 'must present the struggle between Eros and Death, between the instinct of life and the instinct of destruction, as it works itself out in the human species'. 135

This is an extraordinary picture of civilisation poised between two great, warring instincts, Eros and Thanatos. 136 Moreover, the inclination to aggression is 'an original, self-subsisting instinctual disposition in man' and constitutes 'the greatest impediment to civilisation'. 137 Freud, rather, preferred the highly organised, efficient, automated, social world of the Insecta where individualised aggression or 'cultural struggle' does not exist:
Why do our relatives, the animals, not exhibit any such cultural struggle? We do not know. Very probably some of them - the bees, the ants, the termites - strove for thousands of years before they arrived at the State institutions, the distribution of functions and the restrictions on the individual, for which we admire them today. 138

It is quite clear that Freud did not favour aggression or, its derivative, cultural struggle. Nevertheless, he described the aggressive instinct, the hostility of each against all and of all against each, as a 'natural' instinct of man, the derivative and the main representative of the death instinct, and sharing world-dominion with Eros. Does this mean, then, that mankind will be torn asunder forever between these two, opposing instincts? Freud thought not. Civilisation is a special process which mankind undergoes; a process in the service of Eros, whose purpose is to combine human individuals, families, races, peoples and nations, into one great unity, the unity of mankind: 'These collections of men are to be libidinally bound to one another. 139 Necessity alone, the advantages of work in common, will not hold them together.

Let us briefly recapitulate. Arising from the child's 'central experience' of the Oedipus complex Freud identified several essential features of early life. (1) Our emotional attitudes to others, past, present and future, are 'fixed' during infancy on the imagos of our parents and siblings, with special importance attributed to the imago of the father. (2) The ethical standards of girls are different from boys in accordance with the inadequate response to the castration complex. This response is probably responsible, too, for the poor intellectual achievement of women throughout history. (3) Intellectual development is rooted in sexuality. (4) Religion, an obsessional neurosis, is inhibitive of critical thinking. (5) 'Character' is built up largely from the material of sexuality. And (6) social cohesion is achieved when members of a group submerge their individualities in a libidinal tie to their 'superior' leader.
It must be emphasised that Freud remained resolutely consistent with these views. Surveying the whole field of psychoanalysis at the end of his life, he re-articulated the panoptic importance of the libido and infancy:

During the study of the sexual functions we have been able to gain a first, preliminary conviction, or rather a suspicion, of two discoveries which will later be found to be important over the whole of our field. Firstly, the normal and abnormal manifestations observed by us (that is, the phenomenology of the subject) need to be described from the point of view of their dynamics and economics (in our case, from the point of view of the quantitative distribution of the libido). And secondly, the aetiology of the disorders which we study is to be looked for in the individual's developmental history - that is to say, in his early life. 140

But what did he say regarding the role of the school in all this? What kind of schooling did Freud favour?

V

Considering the private role of sexuality in his developmental schemata it is not surprising that Freud should have advocated a programme of sexual enlightenment for schools. In 'The Sexual Enlightenment of Children' (1907)141 he insisted on two things: first, that children have a 'fully developed capacity for love' long before puberty; and second, the 'mystery making' of adults merely prevents them from being able to gain an intellectual grasp of activities for which they are psychically prepared and physically adjusted.142

Children, he claimed, are faced with two great problems. First, the distinction between the sexes; and second - 'only at a somewhat later age, no doubt' - the question of the origin of babies, the 'oldest and most burning question that confronts immature humanity'.143 The customary answers given to them in the nursery are pathogenic in two ways: they damage their genuine instinct of research, and invariably undermine confidence in their parents. As a consequence, children usually mistrust all adults, and keep their intimacies secret from them.
But even when the sexual questions of children are just ignored by adults the consequences remain dire. When this happens, children torment themselves with the problem in secret, mingle truth with grotesque untruths, or whisper information to one another in which, because of their sense of guilt, everything sexual is stamped as being 'horrible and disgusting'. As a result, children usually lose a sensible attitude to sexual questions, and many of them never regain it.

What, then, did Freud recommend? To begin with, he ridiculed the methods used at the turn of the century: all sexual knowledge was kept from children as long as possible, and then on one single occasion the disclosure was made in 'solemn and turgid language'; more than this, the disclosure was only half the truth and generally came too late. Freud was so sceptical of this practice that he preferred parents 'not to embark on the business of enlightenment at all'.

But if parents are not to be trusted with sexual enlightenment, who can be? Society, of course, has special institutions - schools - created to initiate children into the realms of worthwhile knowledge and it is on these that Freud placed responsibility for sex education. They should ensure that pupils never get the impression that the facts of sexual life are more secret than any other matter which is not yet accessible to their understanding. From the outset anything to do with sexuality should be treated like anything else regarded as worthwhile knowledge. The main facts of reproduction and their significance should be included in lessons about the animal kingdom and stress should be laid on the fact that mankind shares 'every essential' in mental apparatus with the higher animals. Above all - and this may come as a surprise to those educators who interpret psychoanalysis as the advocacy of libertarian practices - the lesson should emphasise the 'social significance' of sex; that is, children should be made aware that there are 'moral obligations' attached to the satisfaction of the instinct. If schools take this kind of initiative then the dangers of subsequent neurosis will be avoided.
In 'Little Hans' (1908) Freud criticised the educational practice of the European schools of his time. Their kind of education had only set itself the task of controlling or suppressing the instincts (unlike psychoanalysis which replaces suppression by a conscious self-condemnation). The results had been 'by no means gratifying'; nor had anyone enquired by what means and what cost the suppression of the inconvenient instincts had been achieved.\textsuperscript{150}

Freud proposed, instead, a new educational task to replace the old: educators should help their pupils to become 'civilised and useful' members of society with the least possible sacrifice of their own activities.\textsuperscript{151} And in the execution of this task the information gained by psychoanalysis upon the origin of pathogenic complexes and upon the nucleus of every nervous affection should be regarded by educators as an 'invaluable guide' in their conduct towards children.\textsuperscript{152}

There is nothing basically new, of course, about Freud's proposal. Many educational philosophers, from Plato to Dewey, had emphasised the importance of producing 'civilised and useful' citizens. What, then, is different about Freud's recipe? The difference lies not in the aim of education but in the technique for its accomplishment. Previous educators had suppressed, with varying degrees of brutality, the 'asocial' instincts of their pupils. Freud was proposing, instead, that the hidden complexes - of which the asocial instincts are merely the discernible symptoms - should be lifted into consciousness, explained, fought over, condemned, and thus harmlessly dissolved. The end result is the same; but Freud's technique is much more subtle. Education, on this view, is a prophylaxis, intended to obviate both neurosis and perversion.\textsuperscript{153}

But how can education obviate both neurosis and perversion? Fortunately, Freud offered an example of a perversion - prophylaxis in 'A Child is being Beaten: A Contribution to the Study of the Origin of Sexual Perversions' (1919). In this paper Freud postulated that phantasies of child-beating, entertained very early in life, remain potent when a child becomes a pupil in primary school./...
When a child is a witness to other pupils being beaten by the teacher, two things can happen. First, if the phantasies are dormant, this experience awakens them; and second, if they are still present, it reinforces them and noticeably modifies their content.¹⁵⁴

But if children in school are neither spectators of beating nor personally subjected to it, are they then free of danger? Freud thought not. Although the senior pupils in Viennese schools were no longer beaten by the teachers, the influence of such occasions was replaced—'and more than replaced'—by the effects of reading.¹⁵⁵ In the socio-economic milieu of Freud's Vienna it was almost always the same books which gave a new stimulus to beating-phantasies, such as Uncle Tom's Cabin (1852) by Harriet Beecher Stowe (1811–1896), and the series of novels by the Comtesse de Ségur (1799–1874).¹⁵⁶ The effect of such books on children were clear: they began to compete with them by producing their own phantasies and by constructing a wealth of situations and institutions, in which children were beaten, or were punished and disciplined in some other way, because of their bad behaviour.

In sum, Freud was saying in this paper that, first, the mere witnessing of scenes of beating can produce life-long perversion; and second, literature which contains such scenes can stimulate pathogenic phantasies.

3

In the 1920's Freud began a major reformulation of his theories, a reformulation which laid the foundation of all subsequent theories of 'ego psychology'. In The Ego and the Id (1923) he posited a new topography of the mind with a tripartite division into id, ego and superego.¹⁵² Neurosis, too, was now viewed as the result of conflict between the ego and id.¹⁵⁸ In 'Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety' (1926) he propounded a new theory of anxiety where the ego is the actual seat of anxiety and not the id.¹⁵⁹

Freud used this new topography in 'The Loss of Reality in Neurosis and Psychosis' (1924), and his summary of this paper contains two ideas which were to have a profound influence not only on all subsequent psychoanalytic theories of play but on aesthetics generally:
neurosis ... is apt, like the play of children, to attach itself to a piece of reality - a different piece from the one against which it has to defend itself - and to lend that piece a special importance and a secret meaning which we (not always quite appropriately) call a symbolic one. Thus we see that both in neurosis and psychosis there comes into consideration the question not only of a loss of reality but also of a substitute for reality.\(^{160}\)

The two ideas are: first, neurosis and children's play are similar in essence; both are substitutes for reality.\(^ {161}\) Second, both lend the 'new reality' a special importance, and a secret, symbolic meaning. Consequently, play is not what it seems, but has to be interpreted in order to reveal its 'true' meaning.

How can teachers interpret the arcane symbolism of this world of phantasy? Does it not presuppose their possession of a new kind of knowledge? Are they qualified for this quasi-medical task? Aware that something extra was needed, Freud recommended in 'Preface to Aichhorn's Wayward Youth (1925)' a psychoanalytic training for every educator, since without it children must remain 'an inaccessible problem'.\(^ {162}\)

4

Let us close this section with \textit{New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis} (1933), which contains the last of Freud's discussions on the relationship between education and psychoanalysis.\(^ {163}\) There he wrote that the difficulty of childhood lies in the fact that in a short span of time a child has to appropriate the result of a cultural tradition which has evolved over thousands of years. The key concepts of this tradition are control and adaptation: control of unruly instincts and adaptation to the social order. How can children possibly achieve this monumental task? Alone, they would not achieve much: most of the modification 'must be imposed ... by education'.\(^ {164}\) Accordingly, 'education must inhibit, forbid and suppress ...' \(^ {165}\) But is it not this suppression of instincts which involves the risk of neurotic illness? Freud agreed, and added: 'Thus education has to find its way between the Scylla of non-interference and the Charybdis of frustration'.\(^ {166}\)
Freud's picture of education/schooling is clear: education must help the child to control his unruly instincts and adapt to social mores. Accordingly, schools must inhibit, forbid and suppress the aggressive impulses of children and they do so by utilising the magical, unifying power of Eros to mould groups of pupils into a voluntary submission to their teacher-analyst, who is recognised as their chief, superior to all. Moreover, the leader's job would be much easier if each child were analysed. Freud, however, admitted that to the great bulk of his contemporaries such a suggestion would seem to be a 'monstrous outrage' and, in view of the negative attitude of parents to analysis, 'any hope of putting through such an idea must be abandoned for the time being'. Such a prophylaxis against neurotic illness would probably be very effective, Freud added, but 'presupposes a quite other constitution of society'.

But, a critic might interpose, must the balance be weighted so heavily in favour of a mild acceptance of the prevailing social order? Would it not be possible for educators, with a more critical social conscience than others, to use Eros to encourage a more defiant response to life's problems? Reich, for example, was aware of this option and suggested as much to Freud; he was rebuffed and ridiculed as a result. Others - Neill, Marcuse, Fromm, for example - followed Reich's example and attempted to use psychoanalysis as part of a general critique of Western capitalism.

Freud, alarmed by such interpretations, consistently refused to indulge in any consideration of the revolutionary potential of psychoanalytic hermeneutics. And in this work, New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, he made explicit comment on the role of psychoanalysis vis-à-vis the established social order. If an analyst is convinced of 'defects in our present social arrangements', should he attempt to liberate his patient from obeisance to the prevailing demands of society? Freud was unequivocal: this is not the legitimate function of analysis. Is it the business of a doctor who is called in to treat a case of pneumonia to concern himself with the moral state of the patient, or whether he deserves to recover, or whether one ought to wish him to? Moreover, Freud added significantly, 'psychoanalysis would be refused any influence on education if it admitted to intentions inconsistent with the established order'.

Freud's final comment is once again a clear rejection of the 'wild analysts' of the 1920s and 1930s, who propagated the potential of psychoanalytic education as a radical agent of social change:

Psychoanalytic education will be taking an uninvited responsibility on itself if it proposes to mould its pupils into rebels. It will have played its part if it sends them away as healthy and efficient as possible. It itself contains enough revolutionary factors to ensure that no-one educated by it will in later life take the side of reaction and suppression. It is even my opinion that revolutionary children are not desirable from any point of view.

VI

At the core of Freud's therapy is the belief that the aetiology of neurosis is to be found in repressions of infant sexuality. This is not to say that repression, therefore, is something to be avoided; on the contrary, some degree of repression is necessary for civilised development.

All of our emotional relationships are formed from the imagos of our parents, siblings, and others who cared for us in infancy. Of these imagos, however, none is more important than that of the father. (Later analysts, notably Klein, were to emphasise the role of the mother.)

Freud divided human development into five psychosexual stages: oral; anal; phallic; latency; and genital. The latency period, when sexuality is quiescent, can and should be utilised by teachers for socialisation.

The anatomical differences between the sexes have profound psychical consequences. For example, a girl's change of genital zone from clitoris to vagina is accompanied by a 'flood of shame'. She feels she has been 'castrated' and is, therefore, an inferior male. The effects of this on females are deep and permanent: they show less sense of justice than males; they are less ready to face up to the hurly-burly of 'life'; and they are more 'emotional' in their judgements.
Freud posited a close link between knowledge and sexuality. (This link was explored more thoroughly by Klein, and will be examined later.) Believing that religion has a pathogenic influence on intellectual development, Freud postulated that Logos is the only road to a knowledge of reality outside ourselves.

The role of the school is to 'inhibit, forbid and suppress' the asocial instincts of children, but as this, of course, can lead to neurosis, a way has to be found between the 'Scylla of non-interference and the Charybdis of frustration'. Freud suggested several ways teachers can achieve this precarious balance. First, by a comprehensive programme of sexual enlightenment. Second, by the abolition of corporal punishment. Third, by a careful censorship of reading material. Fourth, by securing the psychoanalysis of each pupil. And, finally, by undergoing themselves a psychoanalytic training.

When the insights and techniques provided by this psychoanalytic training are fused with a love of Logos, teachers will be able to lay the foundation of Freud's Ideal Society - a 'new generation' of social beings, civilised and useful, libidinally bound to one another through their allegiance to their charismatic leaders, 'superior to them all'.

Although Freud revised his theories regularly throughout his long, creative life, he never abandoned his belief that the early years of life are of paramount importance for all subsequent development. Allied with this belief is the view that the play-activities of children are essentially symbolic in character, and have to be interpreted in order to reveal their 'true' meaning. Freud's theories, of course, were post-dictive; that is, he deduced the development of children from his analyses of neurotic adults. He, himself, took little interest in the analysis of children, content to leave this to a younger generation of disciples.

Let us turn, now, to an examination of the beginnings of child-analysis.
NOTES AND REFERENCES


3. The book of Aristotle's which particularly impressed Freud was *Nichomachean Ethics* (Freud-Silberstein, August 13, 1874; quoted in Clark, *Freud*, p. 35). Two basic doctrines characterise the *Ethics*: (1) the 'good' is happiness, and happiness consists in successful activity; and (2) every virtue is a mean between two evil extremes (this is the famous doctrine of the 'golden mean'). In the *Ethics*, too, there is an acceptance of inequality. Not only is there no objection to slavery or to the superiority of husbands and fathers over wives and children, but Aristotle held that what is best is essentially only for the few - magnanimous men and philosophers. We shall see later that these three aspects are characteristic, too, of Freudian ethics. Bertrand Russell's verdict on Aristotle's *Ethics* is condemnatory: 'Those who neither fall below nor rise above the level of decent, well-behaved citizens will find in the *Ethics* a systematic account of the principles by which they hold that their conduct should be regulated. Those who demand anything more will be disappointed. The book appeals to the respectable middle-aged, and has been used by them, especially since the seventeenth century, to repress the ardours and enthusiasms of the young. But to a man with my depth of feeling it is likely to be repulsive' (*History of Western Philosophy*, 1946, p. 185). Parallels between the doctrines of Aristotle and Freud are discussed in Bernfeld (1951) and Ramzy (1956).

4. Freud wrote to his friend Eduard Silberstein, a young Roumanian who had been a pupil in the same class as Freud at the Sperlgymnasium, that Carlyle's *Sartor Resartus* (1833-1834) 'deserves to be advertised'. Freud was attracted to the book because it 'starts from the assumption that clothes are a representation of the apparent and physical, behind which the spiritual shamefully hides' (August 13, 1874; quoted in Clark, *Freud*, p. 35).

5. Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872) was a 'Young Hegelian whose sophisticated iconoclasm was later to recommend him (through his translator, George Eliot) to a generation of sceptical, anti-authoritarian Englishmen' (Roger Scruton, *From Descartes to Wittgenstein: A Short History of Modern Philosophy*, 1981, p. 215). Although Freud never acknowledged the influence of Feuerbach on his religious thought, the parallels between the two men remain striking. Feuerbach, like Freud, attempted to 'unmask' Christian beliefs by being rigidly empirical in method. In Das
Wesen des Christentums (1841) he concluded that religion is a form of the projective spirit in man, the means by which man 'projects his being into objectivity and then again makes himself an object to this projected image of himself thus converted into a subject; he thinks of himself not as an object to himself but as an object of an object, of another being than himself' (Macmillan, The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Volume 3, 1967, p. 191). Thus, religion is 'the dream of the human mind'; that is, it is a dream of human, not divine, development. For example, the Christian idea of the Incarnation is nothing but a reflection of the dream of man to become God. Philosophy must, therefore, 'destroy and illusion' that deprives man of the power of a free life as well as a genuine sense of truth and virtue, 'for even love, in itself the deepest, truest emotion, becomes by means of religiousness merely ostensible, illusory ...' (ibid., p. 192).

6. Theodor Gomperz, professor of history in the University of Vienna, was editing a collected German edition of Mill's work. He was looking for a translator for the twelfth volume and Brentano recommended Freud. Although Freud admired Mill he refused to take seriously the English philosopher's acceptance of the equality of women. Freud wrote to Silberstein on February 27, 1875: 'A thinking man is his own legislator and confessor, and obtains his own absolution, but the woman, let alone the girl, does not have the measure of ethics in herself. She can only act if she keeps within the limits of morality, following what society has established as fitting. She is never forgiven if she has revolted against morality, possibly rightly so' (quoted in Clark, Freud, p. 45). Freud never wavered from this view. Gomperz played a more significant role in Freud's life. Freud later wrote that he heard from him the 'first remarks about the role played by dreams in the psychic life of primitive men - something that has preoccupied me so intensively ever since' (Letter to Elise Gomperz, November 12, 1913; quoted in Ernst Freud et al., Sigmund Freud : His Life in Pictures and Words, 1985, p. 85).

7. Besides Freud, Brentano's students included Christian Freiherr von Ehrenfeld (1859-1932), Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), Anton Marty (1847-1914), Tomas Garrigue Masaryk (1850-1937), Alexius Meinong (1853-1920), Karl Stumpf (1848-1936), and Kasimierz Twardowski (1866-1938). Freud described Brentano as a 'peculiar, and in many respects, ideal man, a believer in God, a teleologist, a Darwinist and altogether a darned clever fellow, a genius in fact' (letter to Silberstein, March 7, 1875; quoted in Clark, Freud, p. 34). Freud took five separate courses in philosophy with Brentano, who was a specialist on Aristotle and Logic. The specific influence of Brentano on Freud, however, remains problematic. P. Merlan has pointed out that (1) Freud's consistent opposition to the physicalist-materialist medical philosophy of his time was probably inspired by Brentano's uncompromising insistence upon the distinction between physical and psychic phenomena; and (2) Freud, quite possibly, first became acquainted with the problem of the unconscious through Brentano's book Psychology from the Empirical Standpoint, (1874) and his lectures ('Brentano and Freud', Journal of Historical Studies, Volume 6, 1945, pp. 375-377). More recently, A.S. Rancurello has claimed that 'Brentano's teaching seems to have played a decisive role in leading Freud towards a point of view which, be it only in a limited way, recognised the intentional
nature of man ...' (A Study of Franz Brentano, 1968, p. 128). Indeed, in one of his latest papers, 'Analysis Terminable and Interminable' (1937), Freud went so far as to express the conviction that 'each ego is endowed from the first with individual dispositions and trends, though it is true that we cannot specify their nature or what determines them' (Standard Edition, Volume 23, p. 240). While admitting that it would be wrong to consider Freud's view as a belated assimilation of Brentano's views, Rancurello insisted, nevertheless, that 'it is undoubtedly consistent with them, and as such bears witness to their historical significance' (A Study of Franz Brentano, p. 128).


9. Breuer, a Viennese physiologist and internist, had been, like Freud, a pupil of Ernst Wilhelm von Brücke's. He was not only a highly regarded general practitioner, but also an outstanding theoretical and experimental physiologist. Indeed, his physiological researches provided a conceptual foundation for the theory of hysteria that he and Freud later proposed.


12. The first members of the 'Psychological Wednesday Society' were four doctors practising in Vienna: Alfred Adler, Max Kahane, Rudolf Reitler, and Wilhelm Stekel. Stekel reported the discussions of the 'Psychological Wednesday Society' every week in the Sunday edition of Neues Wiener Tagblatt. Others who joined the group were Paul Federn (1903), Eduard Hitschmann (1905), Otto Rank (1906), Sandor Ferenczi (1908), Oskar Rie (1908), Viktor Tausk (1909), Hanns Sachs (1910), and Herbert Silberer (1910). See Jones, Sigmund Freud, Volume 2, 1955, for an account of this period.

13. Jones mooted the idea of the secret 'Committee of Seven Rings' to Freud who eagerly responded: 'What took hold of my imagination immediately is your idea of a secret council composed of the best and most trustworthy among our men to take care of the further development of psychoanalysis and defend the cause against personalities and accidents when I am no more ...' Jones, Sigmund Freud, Volume 2, 1955, p. 173. The seven members of the committee were Jones, Ferenczi, Rank, Sachs, Abraham, Eitingon, and, of course, Freud. The committee first met on May 25, 1913, and Freud celebrated the event by presenting each member with an antique Greek intaglio from his collection which they mounted in a gold ring, (Jones Sigmund Freud, ibid., p. 174). Ernest Jones was elected Chairman.

14. Freud first encountered Catholicism as a child from a maid-servant, who told him a 'great deal about God Almighty and hell' (Masson, The Complete Letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess 1887-1904, 1985, p. 268. Many years later, when one of his
disciples was trying to persuade him to leave Vienna in the face of a possible Nazi invasion of Austria he answered: 'The Nazis? I am not afraid of them. Help me rather to combat my true enemy ... The Roman Catholic Church' (Isbister, Freud, p. 16).

15. See Freud's 'Address to the Society of B'nai B'rith', Standard Edition, Volume 20, pp. 272-274. The B'nai B'rith (Sons of the Covenant) is an order which represents Jewish interests, cultural, intellectual and charitable. It was founded in the United States of America in the middle of the nineteenth century, and it has today branch lodges in many parts of the world. Freud joined in 1895 and occasionally gave lectures in his own field at the meetings. He remained a member until the society was dissolved in 1938 by the Nazis.


19. The history of Freud's relations with Wilhelm Fliess is fully narrated in Chapter 13 of the first volume of Ernest Jones's biography of Freud (1953). Freud communicated his thoughts to Fliess with the utmost freedom and did so not only in his letters but in a series of papers ('Drafts' as they are called in the Standard Edition) which presented organised accounts of his developing views and are in some cases first sketches of his later published works. The most important of these papers is the long one - some 40,000 words - to which Strachey gave the title of Project for a Scientific Psychology.

20. The other side of the correspondence, that is, from Fliess to Freud, has never been discovered, and probably was destroyed by Freud.

21. Some years after Fliess's death in 1928 his widow sold the packet of 284 'extremely private' letters to a bookseller in Berlin, Reinhold Stahl. Stahl fled to France when the Nazis came to power and there, in 1937, sold the letters to Princess Marie Bonaparte for £100. In spite of Freud's indignation, Bonaparte refused to destroy them (Jones Sigmund Freud, Volume 1, 1953, pp. 316-317). A selection of these letters was published in German in 1950 and in English in 1954 with the title The Origin of Psychoanalysis. The complete collection was published recently (Masson, 1985).

22. Draft B (February 8, 1893) from 'Extracts from the Fliess Papers' (1950), Standard Edition, Volume 1, p. 179.

23. Ibid., p. 183.


27. Letter 57 (January 24, 1897), ibid, p. 244.

28. Letter 59 (April 6, 1897), ibid., pp. 244-245.

29. Letter 61 (May 2, 1897), Standard Edition, Volume 1, p. 247. This is the first appearance of the term 'primal scene' which in later years played such an important part in some of Freud's clinical cases. The most important of these is the 'Wolf Man' analysis (1918), Standard Edition, Volume 18, p. 121 (footnote), but see also the 'Dora' case-history (1905), Standard Edition, Volume 7, pp. 79-81, and Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905), Standard Edition, Volume 7, p. 196. Freud also used the term 'sexual scene' for 'primal scene' in Letter 46 (May 30, 1896) to Fliess, Standard Edition, Volume 1, p. 230.


31. Letter 71 (October 15, 1897), ibid., p. 265. Why Freud should have accorded the Complex universality remained unargued. Nevertheless, the hypothesis is used to explain the 'riveting power' of Sophocles' Oedipus Rex: the Greek legend utilises a compulsion which everyone recognises because 'each member of the audience was once, in germ and in phantasy, just such an Oedipus' (ibid., p. 265). Freud first suggested in this letter, too, that the same thing may lie at the bottom of Hamlet. He was not saying that this was Shakespeare's conscious intention, but rather that the poet's unconscious understood the unconscious in his tragic hero.

32. Letter 75 (November 14, 1897), ibid., p. 270.

33. Freud never wavered from the view that neurosis is caused by repression of forbidden wishes, invariably of a sexual nature, in the earliest years of childhood. Thus, at the end of his life he wrote in 'Moses and Monotheism' (1939) that 'the genesis of a neurosis invariably goes back to very early impressions in childhood' (Standard Edition, Volume 23, p. 73). And in An Outline of Psychoanalysis (1940) he wrote: 'It seems that neuroses are acquired only in early childhood (up to the age of six), even though their symptoms may not make their appearance till much later. The childhood neurosis may become manifest for a short time or may even be overlooked. In every case the later neurotic illness links up with the prelude in childhood'. (Standard Edition, Volume 23, p. 184). Moreover, the 'symptoms of neurosis are, it might be said, without exception either a substitutive satisfaction of some sexual urge or measured to prevent such a satisfaction ...' (ibid., p. 186).

34. Letter 75, ibid., p. 270.

35. Standard Edition, Volume 5, p. 383. Freud remained consistent with this view. Thus in The Question of Lay Analysis : Conversations with an Impartial Person (1926) he wrote that '...
we are tempted to say that neurosis in children is not the exception but the rule ...' (Standard Edition, Volume 20, p. 215).


37. It is important to bear in mind that Freud considered the Oedipus complex to be the central experience of childhood for all children. In Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1920 edition) he wrote: 'Every new arrival on this planet is faced by the task of mastering the Oedipus complex; anyone who fails to do so falls a victim to neurosis' (Standard Edition, Volume 7, p. 226 footnote). In Totem and Taboo (1912-13) he called the complex the 'unclear complex of the neurosis' (Standard Edition, Volume 13, p. 129).

38. The actual term 'Oedipus complex' was first used by Freud in 'Contributions to the Psychology of Love' (1910) Standard Edition, Volume 11, p. 171.


40. The discovery of the Oedipus complex is confirmed, Freud alleged, by the legend of King Oedipus who slew his father Laius and married his mother Jocasta. There is an 'unmistakable indication in the test of Sophocles' tragedy itself that the legend of Oedipus sprang from some primeval dream-material which had as its content the distressing disturbance of a child's relation to his parents owing to the first stirrings of sexuality' (Standard Edition, Volume 4, pp. 263-264). Oedipus Rex moves a modern audience because its effect lies in the particular nature of the material on which that contrast is exemplified. Oedipus' destiny still moves us because the oracle laid the same curse upon us before our birth as upon him. Freud linked Oedipus Rex with a modern masterpiece, Hamlet, writing that it 'has its roots in the same soil as Oedipus Rex' (ibid., p. 264). But there is a difference in treatment. The changed treatment of the same material reveals the secular advance of repression in the emotional life of mankind from ancient to modern times. In Oedipus Rex the child's wishful phantasy that underlies it is openly enacted as it would be in a dream. In Hamlet, however, it remains repressed; and - just as in the case of a neurosis - we only learn of its existence from its pathological consequences (ibid., p. 264). Freud was not content merely to use his discovery of the Oedipus complex to explain the parent-child relationship and the psychological character of literary creations. In Totem and Taboo (1912-13), a psychoanalytic study of social anthropology, he insisted that the 'beginnings of religion, morals, society and art converge in the Oedipus complex' and concluded that the problems of social psychology are 'soluble on the basis of one single concrete point - man's relation to his father' (Standard Edition, Volume 13, pp. 156-157).


42. Ibid., p. 151.


45. The sections 'The Sexual Researches of Childhood' and 'The Phases of Development of the Sexual Organisation' were added in the 1915 edition of the work. Several of the ideas were introduced in the paper 'On the Sexual Theories of Children' (1908), **Standard Edition**, Volume 9, pp. 207-226.


47. In 1915 this figure was 'three'. Freud altered it to 'two' in the 1920 edition.

48. *Ibid.*, p. 176; see also p. 232. Freud wrote that an aptitude for polymorphous perversions is innately present in the disposition of each child. Indeed, a disposition to perversions of every kind is a 'general and fundamental human characteristic' (*ibid.*, p. 191).

49. Freud defined an erotogenic zone: 'It is a part of the skin or mucous membrane in which stimuli of a certain sort evoke a feeling of pleasure possessing a particular quality'. Although the character of erotogenicity can be attached to any part of the body, some erotogenic zones are predestined as is shown by the example of sucking (*ibid.*, p. 183).


51. Karl Abraham's paper 'A Short Study of the Development of the Libido' (1924) divided both the oral phase, and the later sadistic-anal one, into two sub-divisions, which are characterised by differing attitudes towards the object. Abraham (1877-1925) was mentor and analyst of Melanie Klein.


54. It is worthy of note that Freud eventually gave up the idea of a rigid chronological sequence. In 1938 he wrote of the oral-anal-phallic phases: 'It would be a mistake to suppose that these three phases succeed one another in a clear-cut fashion. One may appear in addition to another; they may overlay one another, may be present alongside of one another'. (**Standard Edition**, Volume 23, p. 155).

55. Strachey (*Standard Edition*, Volume 12, p. 316) noted that the order of publication of Freud's views on the successive early organisation of the sexual instinct may be summarised as follows: auto-erotic stage, 1905 (already described in private, 1899); narcissistic stage, 1911 (in private, 1909); anal-sadistic stage, 1913; oral stage, 1915; phallic stage, 1923.


57. The first published use of 'libido' is in the paper 'On the Grounds for Detaching a Particular Syndrome from Neurasthenia under the Description 'Anxiety Neurosis'' (1895), **Standard**

59. Ibid., p. 120.
60. Ibid., p. 221.
61. Freud admitted he borrowed the term 'period of sexual latency' from Fliess, ibid., p. 178 footnote.
62. Three Essays, ibid., p. 238.
63. Ibid., p. 234.
64. Ibid., p. 238.
65. Ibid., p. 234.


67. This paper launched for the first time a quite remarkable quantity of new ideas. These include the radical notions of fertilisation through the mouth and of birth through the anus, of parental intercourse as something sadistic, and of the possession of a penis by members of both sexes.

69. In 'Little Hans' (1909) Freud took his ideas on the castration complex further. Referring to the 'invariable presence' of the castration complex he pinpointed two consequences. First, it is the deepest unconscious root of anti-semitism; for even in the nursery little boys hear that a Jew has something cut off his penis - a piece of his penis, they think - and this gives them a right to despise Jews. Second, it is the strongest unconscious root for the sense of superiority over women (Standard Edition, Volume 10, p. 36 footnote). Over the years Freud gave increasing importance to the castration complex. In An Outline of Psychoanalysis (1940) he referred to the complex as 'the severest trauma' of a child's life. The results of the threat of castration are 'multifarious and incalculable; they affect the whole of a boy's relations with his father and mother and subsequently with men and women in general ...' (Standard Edition, Volume 23, p. 190).

70. It is worth recording that Freud consistently emphasised the central importance of sexuality in his theories of human development. As already noted (p. 23) he wrote to Fliess in 1893 that 'neurasthenia is always only a sexual neurosis' (Standard Edition, Volume 1, p. 179). In his paper 'My Views on the Part Played by Sexuality in the Aetiology of the Neuroses' (1906) he
wrote: 'I think it is worth emphasising the fact that, whatever modifications my views on the aetiology of the psychoneuroses have passed through, there are two positions which I have never repudiated or abandoned - the importance of sexuality and of infantilism' (Standard Edition, Volume 7, pp. 277-278). In his paper 'The Claims of Psychoanalysis to Scientific Interest' (1913) he praised psychoanalysis: 'Psychoanalysis has brought to light the wishes, the thought-structures and the developmental processes of childhood. All earlier attempts in this direction have been in the highest degree incomplete and misleading because they have entirely over-looked the inestimably important factor of sexuality in its physical and mental manifestations' (Standard Edition, Volume 13, p. 189). It is clear that Freud considered sexuality to be very important, indeed, as a main-spring of human motivation. Nevertheless, he rejected the view that his sexual theories constituted a 'pan-sexualism' (Preface to the fourth edition, 1920, of Three Essays on The Theory of Sexuality, Standard Edition, Volume 7, p. 134) while indicating in the same passage the close similarities of the 'enlarged sexuality of psychoanalysis' with the philosophical writings of Arthur Schopenhauer, and the Eros of the 'divine Plato'.

72. Ibid., p. 243.
73. Freud consistently emphasised the importance of the father-imago. For example, in Totem and Taboo (1912-13) he wrote that religion, morality and a social sense were originally one and the same thing, acquired phylogenetically out of the father-complex: religion and moral restraint through the process of mastering the Oedipus complex itself, and social feeling through the necessity for overcoming the rivalry that then remained between the members of the younger generation (Standard Edition, Volume 13, pp. 146 ff). In The Ego and the Id (1923) Freud wrote: 'The male sex seems to have taken the lead in all these moral acquisitions; and they seem to have then been transmitted to women by cross-inheritance' (Standard Edition, Volume 19, p. 37). He added that the social feelings arise in the individual as a superstructure built upon impulses of jealous rivalry against his brothers and sisters. Since the hostility cannot be satisfied, an identification with the former rival develops.

75. Ibid., p. 244.
76. Ibid., p. 244.
77. Ibid., p. 244.
78. Ibid., p. 244.
81. Ibid., p. 334.
82. Ibid., p. 334.
85. Ibid., p. 175.
86. Ibid., p. 176.
87. The more powerful the Oedipus complex is, and the more rapidly it succumbs to repression (under the influence of authority, religious teaching, schooling and reading), the stricter will be the domination of the superego over the ego in the form of conscience or of an unconscious sense of guilt. In The Ego and the Id (1923). Freud expressed the relationship between the ego and the superego in Kantian terms: 'Although it is accessible to all later influences, it nevertheless preserves throughout life the character given to it by its derivation from the father-complex — namely, the capacity to stand apart from the ego and to master it. It is a memorial of the former weakness and dependence of the ego, and the mature ego remains subject to its domination. As the child was once under a compulsion to obey its parents, so the ego submits to the categorical imperative of its superego (Standard Edition, Volume 19, p. 48).
89. Ibid., p. 178.
90. Ibid., p. 178.
91. Ibid., p. 179.
92. Ibid., p. 179.
93. 'Female Sexuality' (1931) Standard Edition, Volume 21, pp. 223-243, is in essence a restatement of the 1925 paper. There are, however, two respects in which the later paper enlarges upon its predecessor. First, it lays further emphasis on the intensity and long duration of a girl's pre-Oedipal attachment to her mother; and, second, it emphasises the active element in femininity in general. As a consequence, the pre-Oedipal phase gained a new importance in psychoanalytic theory.
95. Ibid., p. 253.
96. Ibid., p. 253.
97. Ibid., p. 254.
98. Ibid., p. 254.
99. Ibid., p. 255.
100. Ibid., pp. 257-258.

102. Ibid., p. 132. Freud made a guess (ibid., p. 132) at the unconscious motive for the achievement. 'Nature herself would seem to have given the model which this achievement imitates by causing the growth at maturity of the pubic hair that conceals the genitals. The step that remained to be taken lay in making the threads adhere to one another, while on the body they stick to the skin and are only matted together'.


104. Ibid., p. 9.

105. Ibid., p. 106.


107. What is the nature of this permanent injury to the instinct for knowledge? Freud returned to this in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) where he said that the Oedipal catastrophe leaves behind it a permanent injury to self-regard in the form of a 'narcissistic scar' which, in his opinion, contributes more than anything to the sense of inferiority which is so common in neurotics. The child's sexual researches, on which limits are imposed by his physical development, lead to no satisfactory conclusion; hence such later complaints as 'I can't accomplish anything', 'I can't succeed in anything'. (Standard Edition, Volume 18, pp. 20-21)


109. In his Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (1916-17) Freud referred for the last time to the scopophilic and epistemophilic instincts for looking and for gaining knowledge and described them as 'powerfully at work' during the 'prenatal' phase when the sadistic and anal instincts are in the forefront (Standard Edition, Volume 16, p. 327).


112. Ibid., pp. 30-31.

113. Although Freud was convinced of its illusionary essence, he was not blind to the beneficial consequences of religious belief: the benevolent rule of a Supreme Being allays our daily fears of danger; the establishment of a cosmic morality ensures the ultimate fulfilment of juridical demands which so often remain thwarted in human affairs; and the belief in a life after death provides the local and temporal framework in which these wish-fulfilments occur. Also, answers to the riddles which have bewildered human explanation from time immemorial, such as the
evolution of the universe or the nature of the mind-body relationship, are developed in conformity with the underlying assumptions of this religious paradigm (ibid., p. 30).

114. Ibid., p. 43.
115. Ibid., p. 49.
116. Ibid., p. 49.
117. Freud's conclusion (ibid., pp. 55-56) is virtually a paean to his 'god Logos' and rejects all criticisms of the 'unreliability of science'. In particular he castigated the radical attempt to discredit scientific endeavour as an illusion itself, that being bound to the conditions of our own mental apparatus, science can yield nothing but subjective results, whilst the real nature of the external world remains inaccessible. Freud rejected this critique of science for several reasons: (1) our brain has evolved as an instrument to explore the external world, and it must, therefore, have realised in its structure some degree of expediency; (2) it is itself a constituent part of the world we investigate, and it readily admits of such an investigation; (3) the task of science is fully covered if it indicates how the world must appear to us in consequence of the particular character of our mental apparatus; (4) the ultimate findings of science, precisely because of the way in which they are acquired, are determined not only by our mental organisation but by the things which have affected that organisation; and (5) the problem of the nature of the world without regard to our percipient mental apparatus is an empty abstraction, devoid of practical interest. Freud's dismissal is much-quoted: 'No, our science is no illusion. But an illusion it would be to suppose that what science cannot give us we can get elsewhere' (ibid., p.56).

118. Ibid., p. 53.
119. Ibid., p. 54.
120. Freud's view of religion as an obsessional neurosis and as prohibitory of critical thinking constitutes contemporary psychoanalytic orthodoxy. Reuben Fine, an American analyst, bears witness to this: 'No prominent analyst today could be said to believe that religion has any real value for mankind' (Fine, 1979, p. 449).

121. Standard Edition, Volume 7, p. 238. In 'Character and Anal Erotism' (1908) Freud laid down a formula for the way 'character' is formed from the early erotogenic instincts: 'the permanent character-traits are either unchanged prolongations of the original instincts, or sublimations of those instincts, or reaction-formations against them' (Standard Edition, Volume 9, p. 175). The most remarkable example of such a process is found in the anal erotism of young children. The original interest in the excretory function, its organs and products, is changed in the course of their growth into a group of traits which are familiar to us as orderliness, parsimony and obstinacy - qualities which, though valuable and welcome in themselves, may be intensified till they become markedly dominant and produce what Freud called the 'anal character' (ibid., p. 175). The three character-traits


123. William McDougall, in *The Group Mind* (1920), agreed with the most important theses of Le Bon's analysis, namely, the collective inhibition of intellectual functioning and the heightening of affectivity in groups. For example, McDougall referred to the 'exaltation or intensification of emotion' produced in every group-member; and an unorganised group is described as 'excessively emotional, impulsive, violent, fickle, inconsistent, irresolute and extreme in action, displaying only the coarser emotions and the less refined sentiments; extremely suggestible, careless in deliberation, hasty in judgement, incapable of any but the simpler and imperfect forms of reasoning; easily swayed and led, lacking in self-consciousness, devoid of self-respect and of sense of responsibility, and apt to be carried away by the consciousness of its own force, so that it tends to produce all the manifestations we have learnt to expect of any irresponsible and absolute power' (quoted in *Standard Edition*, Volume 18, pp. 84-85).

124. Ibid., pp. 73-77. Le Bon pointed to the similarity of the group mind with the mental life of primitive people and of children: it is impulsive, changeable and irritable; it is led by the unconscious; nothing about it is premeditated; it has a sense of omnipotence; it is extraordinary credulous and open to influence; it has no critical faculty; the improbable does not exist for it; it thinks in images, which call one another up by association; it goes directly to extremes; it can only be excited by an excessive stimulus; contradictory ideas exist side by side and tolerate each other; it demands illusions, and cannot do without them; it constantly gives what is unreal precedence over what is real; it has an evident tendency not to distinguish between what is true and what is untrue; it respects force and regards kindness as a form of weakness; it wants to be ruled and oppressed and to fear its masters; it is fundamentally conservative, with an unbounded respect for tradition and a corresponding aversion to all innovations and advances; and it is subject to the magical power of words (ibid., pp. 77-80).

125. Ibid., p. 79.

126. Notice that Le Bon was referring exclusively here to moral standards. While insisting, on the one hand, that the ethical conduct of a group may rise as high above an individual as it may sink deep below it, he insisted, on the other, that the intellectual capacity of a group is 'always far below that of an
individual' (quoted in ibid., p. 79).

127. Ibid., p. 73.

128. Ibid., p. 81.

129. Freud defined libido as 'the energy, regarded as a quantitative magnitude (though not at present actually measurable), of those instincts which have to do with all that may be comprised under the word "love"' (ibid., p. 90). He made it quite clear also that the psychoanalytic libido is sexual in essence: 'I cannot see any merit in being ashamed of sex; the Greek work 'Eros', which is to soften the affront, is in the end nothing more than a translation of our German word Liebe (love) ...' (ibid., p. 91).

130. Ibid., p. 92.

131. Ibid., p. 108.

132. Ibid., p. 116. In The Ego and the Id (1923) Freud said of the id that it is 'totally non moral; of the ego that it 'strives to be moral'; and of the superego that it 'can be super-moral and then become as cruel as only the id can be' (Standard Edition, Volume 19, p. 54). The id has no means of showing the ego either love or hate. It cannot say what it wants. It has achieved no unified will. Eros and the death instinct struggle within it for mastery. The ego, on the other hand, strives to be moral, and to bring the influence of the external world to bear upon the id. It endeavours to substitute the reality principle for the pleasure principle which 'reigns unrestrictedly' in the id (ibid., p. 54). The ego represents what may be called reason and common sense, in contrast to the id, which contains the passions. The relation of the ego to the id 'is like a man on horseback, who has to hold in check the superior strength of the horse' (ibid., p. 54). Most significantly of all, the ego is the representative of Eros, and desires to live and to be loved; and to the ego, 'living means the same as being loved - being loved by the superego' (ibid., p. 54). To win this love the ego renders harmless the death instincts of the id by fusing them with the erotic components of Eros. What is the nature of the superego which the ego loves? It has its origin in an individual's 'first and most important identification, his identification with the father in his own personal prehistory' (ibid., p. 31). Faced with the task of repressing the Oedipus complex, the superego borrows strength to do this from the father and subsequently 'retains the character of the father' (ibid., p. 34).

133. Ibid., chapter V.

134. Ibid., p. 121.


138. Ibid., p. 123, emphasis added.

139. Ibid., p. 122.


141. The Sexual Enlightenment of Children (An Open Letter to Dr. M. Furst), 1907, Standard Edition, Volume 9, pp. 130-139. This is the only paper from Freud's entire oeuvre devoted specifically to the subject of sexual enlightenment. It was written at the request of Dr. M. Furst of Hamburg for publication in a periodical devoted to social medicine and hygiene of which he was the editor. He asked Freud three questions (1) Should children be given any enlightenment about the factors of sexual life? (2) If so, how should they be informed? And (3) at what age should it begin? Freud gave a much fuller account of his views on the subject in a discussion at the Vienna Psychoanalytical Society on May 2, 1909 (Ernest Jones, Sigmund Freud, Volume 2, 1955, pp. 327-328).

142. Ibid., p. 234.


144. Ibid., p. 137.

145. Ibid., p. 137-8.

146. Ibid., p. 138.

147. Ibid., p. 138.

148. Ibid., p. 138.

149. Such a lesson should be given to the pupil at the end of his time at his elementary school (Volksschule) and before he enters his intermediate school (Mittelschule) - that is, before he is ten years old. It was thirty years before Freud returned to the topic of sexual enlightenment of children in the last paragraph of Section IV of his paper 'Analysis Terminable and Interminable' (1937) where he admitted that the prophylactic effect of this liberal measure has been 'greatly overestimated' (Standard Edition, Volume 23, p. 234). They 'behave like primitive races who have had Christianity thrust upon them and who continue to worship their old idols in secret' (ibid., p. 234).


151. Ibid., p. 145.

152. Ibid., p. 146.
Freud clarified the distinction between education and psychoanalysis in his introduction to The Psychoanalytic Method (1913) by Oscar Pfister (1873-1953), a Swiss pastor and a psychoanalyst (Standard Edition, Volume 12, pp. 329-331). There, Freud wrote that education and psychoanalysis must not be confused. Education seeks to ensure that certain of a child's dispositions and inclinations shall not cause any damage either to the individual or to society. Therapeutics come into action if these dispositions have already led to pathological symptoms. Education, on this view, is a 'prophylaxis', intended to obviate both neurosis and perversion; psychotherapy seeks to undo the less stable of the two outcomes and to institute a kind of after-education (ibid., p. 330).


Ibid., p. 180.

The works of Segur which Freud referred to as the 'Bibliotheque Rose' novels (from the colour of the book-binding) are Après la pluie le beau temps; Comédies et proverbes; Diloy le chemineau; Francois le Bossu; Jean qui grogne et Jean qui rit; La fortune de Gaspard; La soeur de Gribouille; L'auberge de l'Ange gardien; Le général Dourakine; Les bons enfants; Les deux nigauds; Les malheurs de Sophie; Le mauvais Génie; Les petites filles modèles; Les vacances; Mémoires d'un Ane; Nouveaux contes de fées; Pauvre Blaise; Quel amour d'enfant! and Un bon petit diable.


Standard Edition, Volume 20, p. 140. Anxiety, in this view, is a 'signal' given by the ego that danger threatens the psychic equilibrium of the individual (ibid., p. 125). There are three obvious manifestations of anxiety in children - when a child is alone, in the dark, or is left with an unknown person. Freud reduced these three instances to a single condition - namely, that of 'missing someone who is loved and longed for' (ibid., p. 136). Convinced that he had found the 'key' to the universal puzzle, Freud defined anxiety as 'a reaction to the felt loss of the object; castration anxiety as a fear of being separated from a highly valued object; and the earliest anxiety of all - the 'primal anxiety' of birth - as caused by a 'separation from the mother' (ibid., p. 137). Freud's revised theory of anxiety conferred a new importance on the oral stage, the relationship between mother and child before the father enters the picture. It is remarkable that Freud, despite his consistent emphasis on the significance of the infantile factor, recognised the importance of the oral stage only at a late period in his work. Before this he seems to have believed that nothing serious could go wrong between a mother and her child and that, accordingly, neurotic difficulties must begin later. The new theory, stressing separation from the mother as the paradigm for all anxiety, inaugurated a new era in psychoanalytic thinking. It
reached full swing only after World War II and in many respects is still continuing: 'The second theory of anxiety carried such an overwhelming sense of conviction that it has not been seriously challenged. It has become one of the bases of all psychoanalytic and psychological theory' (Fine, A History of Psychoanalysis, 1979, p. 60).

160. Standard Edition, Volume 19, p. 187; Freud's emphases. In 'The Loss of Reality in Neurosis and Psychosis' (1924) Freud wrote that in a neurosis the ego, in its dependence on reality, suppresses a piece of the id (of instinctual life). This, however, is not yet the actual neurosis which consists, rather, in the processes which provide a compensation for the damaged portion of the id - that is, in the reaction against the repression and in the failure of the repression. Neurosis, then, is the result of a repression that has failed; or, in other words, the 'return of the repressed' constitutes the 'illness proper' (ibid., p. 183 and footnote). Moreover, the neurosis usually avoids a piece of 'disagreeable reality' and attempts to replace it by one which is more compatible with the subject's wishes. This is made possible by the existence of a world of phantasy, a domain which became separated from the real external world at the time of the introduction of the reality principle. It is from this world of phantasy that the neurosis draws the material for its new wishful constructions, and it usually finds that material along the path of regression to a more satisfying real past (ibid., p. 187).

161. It is worth noting here that for Freud the activity of the creative writer 'does the same as the child at play'. In 'Creative Writers and Daydreaming' (1908), he wrote that the creative writer 'creates a world of phantasy which he takes very seriously - that is, which he invests with large amounts of emotion - while separating it sharply from reality' (Standard Edition, Volume 9, p. 144). Again, 'a piece of creative writing, like a day-dream, is a continuation of, and a substitute for, what was once the play of childhood' (ibid., p. 152). With regard to art, generally speaking, he thought in Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (1916-17), that the 'artist is once more in rudiments an introvert, not far removed from neurosis' (Standard Edition, Volume 15, p. 376).

162. Standard Edition, Volume 19, p. 274. Aichhorn's book, a classic in the field of juvenile delinquency, is concerned with the influence which education can exert over young miscreants. August Aichhorn (1878-1949) had worked for many years in Vienna as a director of municipal institutions for delinquents before he became acquainted with psychoanalysis. In his Foreword to Wayward Youth, Freud wrote that Aichhorn's attitude to youth sprang from 'warm sympathy' and an 'intuitive perception' of their mental needs (ibid., p. viii). Psychoanalysis could teach him little that was new of a practical kind, but it brought him a 'clear theoretical insight into the justification of his way of acting and put him in a position to explain its basis to other people' (ibid., p. viii). These comments could be applied equally well to another pioneer in the education of juvenile delinquents - Homer Lane (1876-1925), an American who directed the Little Commonwealth in England from 1913-1918, and whose influence on 'progressive' educators (especially Neill, Simpson
and Wills) was profound. Psychoanalysis was not, as Freud admitted, the original spur to action for these giants of the British 'progressive movement' but its provision of a theoretical underpinning to their intuitive practice enhanced their 'scientific' credibility, and subsequently had a decisive influence on official views of the concept and treatment of 'maladjustment'.


164. Ibid., p. 147.

165. Ibid., p. 149.

166. Ibid., p. 149.

167. Ibid., p. 149.

168. Ibid., p. 149.

169. See M. Higgins and C.M. Raphael (eds.) *Reich Speaks of Freud*, 1975, p. 57 ff. It is not being suggested that the differences between Freud and Reich were merely political; there were profound theoretical differences. See Janine Chasseguet-Smirgel and Bela Grenberger, *Freud or Reich? Psychoanalysis and Illusion* (1976; English translation 1986).


171. Ibid., p. 151.

172. In 'Little Hans' Freud dealt with the misgivings of many doctors who 'misunderstand the nature of psychoanalysis and think that wicked instincts are strengthened by being made conscious' (**Standard Edition**, Volume 10, p. 144). On the contrary, Freud replied, 'Hans' recovered, ceased to be afraid of horses, and got on to rather familiar terms with his father. This is what Freud expected: 'For analysis does not undo the effects of repression. The instincts which were formerly suppressed remain suppressed; but the same effect is produced in a different way. Analysis replaced the process of repression, which is an automatic and excessive one, by a temperate and purposeful control on the part of the highest agencies of the mind. In a word, analysis replaces repression by condemnation' (ibid., p. 145; Freud's emphases). See also Freud's paper 'Wild Psychoanalysis' (1910), **Standard Edition**, Volume 11, pp. 220-227.

173. Jones recalled in his biography of Freud that there were scores of 'wild analysts' in the early 1920s and 'all their misdemeanours were ascribed to the iniquities of psychoanalysis' (Jones, *Sigmund Freud*, Volume 3, 1957, p. 50). Amongst these 'wild analysts', Jones recalled, was an American teacher who was sent to prison, and then deported, for indecent behaviour with 'patients'. The American was probably Homer Lane, and Jones sent a letter to The Times 'disclaiming any connection with him' (ibid., p. 50).

We had no misgivings over applying analytic treatment to children who either exhibited unambiguous neurotic symptoms or who were on the road to an unfavourable development of character. The apprehension expressed by opponents of analysis that the child would be injured by it proved unfounded. What we gained from these undertakings was that we were able to confirm on the living subject what we had inferred (from historical documents, as it were) in the case of adults. But the gain for the children was also very satisfactory. It turned out that a child is a very favourable subject for analytic therapy; the results are thorough and lasting.

(Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, 1933)
Not surprisingly, child-analysis began with Freud. He was well aware that simple, everyday actions are often symptomatic of hidden conflicts. In *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* (1901) he explained how profound insight is afforded into mental life by 'innocent' and 'meaningless' acts, and how early in life the tendency to symbolisation develops. He gave an example of hand-playing with a lump of bread-crumb. His patient was a twelve-year-old boy who for almost two years had been severely hysterical despite a lengthy stay in a hydropathic institution. Freud admitted 'going on the assumption' that the boy must have had sexual experiences and be tormented by sexual questions, 'which was likely enough at his age.' But the boy was unable to express his fears and Freud was reluctant to help him with overt explanations. Then Freud noticed something:

One day it struck me that he was rolling something between the fingers of his right hand; he would thrust it in his pocket and continue playing with it there, and then take it out again, and so on. I did not ask what he had in his hand; but he suddenly opened his hand and showed me. It was bread-crumb kneaded into a lump.

At the next session Freud noticed that the boy used the bread to model figures of little men, with a head, two arms and two legs like prehistoric idols, and with an appendage between the legs which he drew out into a long point. When Freud had convinced the boy that he understood what the figures represented, he was able to cure him.

In 1905 Freud's case-study of 'Dora' was published, and in this he explained the symbolism of everyday things: box, fire, jewel-case, jewellery, key, picture, room, stairs, station, water, and wood. During one session, 'Dora' wore at her waist a small purse; and, as she lay on the sofa and talked, she kept playing with it - opening it, putting a finger into it, shutting it again, and so on. Freud watched for some time and then explained to her the nature of a 'symptomatic act'. His explanation is worth quoting:
I give the name of symptomatic acts to those acts which people perform, as we say, automatically, unconsciously, without attending to them, or as if in a moment of distraction. They are actions to which people would like to deny any significance, and which, if questioned about them, they would explain as being indifferent and accidental. Closer observation, however, will show that these actions, about which consciousness knows nothing or wishes to know nothing, in fact give expression to unconscious thoughts and impulses, and are therefore most valuable and instructive as being manifestations of the unconscious which have been able to come to the surface.

Dora's purse, Freud explained, which came apart at the top in the usual way, was nothing but a representation of the genitals, and her playing with it, opening it and putting her finger in it, was an entirely unembarrassed yet unmistakable pantomimic announcement that she would like to masturbate.

An episode of a similar kind occurred to Freud with another patient. In the middle of a session the patient brought out a small ivory box, ostensibly in order to refresh herself with a sweet. She made some efforts to open it, and then handed it to Freud who pointed out to her that the box—like the purse—was only a substitute for the shell of Venus, for the female genitals. Freud concluded from his investigations that this kind of symbolism is frequently encountered in life and that it is easy to bring to the surface:

There is a great deal of symbolism of this kind in life, but as a rule we pass it by without heeding it. When I set myself the task of bringing to light what human beings keep hidden within them, not by the compelling power of hypnosis, but by observing what they say and what they show, I thought the task was a harder one than it really is. He that has eyes to see and ears to hear may convince himself that no mortal can keep a secret. If his lips are silent, he chatters with his finger-tips; betrayal oozes out of him at every pore. And thus the task of making conscious the most hidden recesses of the mind is one which it is quite possible to accomplish.
The beginnings of child-analysis date from the year 1909 when Freud published 'Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-year-old Boy', the case-study of a boy usually referred to as 'Little Hans'. Hans suffered from an agoraphobia related to his inordinate fear of being bitten by a horse in the street. Freud laid down the general lines of the treatment, and on one single occasion, when he had a conversation with the boy, he took a direct share in it; but the treatment itself was carried out by the child's father. As a result, the father managed to uncover his Oedipus complex, both positive and negative, with the result that Hans' neurosis disappeared.

This analysis was the foundation-stone of all subsequent child-analysis. Indeed, it has had a profound and lasting effect on the whole field of child-psychiatry ever since. Freud drew several important conclusions from the case: (1) It is possible to observe in children at first hand the sexual impulses and wishes which psychoanalysts dig out so laboriously from the 'débris' of adults; (2) Anxiety-hysterics are the most common of all psycho-neurotic disorders. But, above all, they are those which make their appearance earliest in life; 'They are par excellence the neuroses of childhood'; (3) The case proved 'beyond a shadow of doubt' that children are born with an innate sexual knowledge - Hans 'knew in his unconscious' where his baby sister came from and where she had been before. Indeed, Freud considered that this was perhaps the 'most unassailable feature' of the case; (4) Sexual precocity is a correlate, 'seldom absent', of intellectual precocity, and that it is, therefore, to be met with in gifted children more often than might be expected; (5) No sharp line can be drawn between 'neurotic' and 'normal' people - whether children or adults; (6) It is 'extremely probable' that a child's upbringing can exercise a powerful influence for good or for evil upon the predisposition to neurosis; (7) As the neuroses of his adult patients could 'in every instance' be traced back to the same infantile complexes that were revealed behind Hans's phobia, Freud was, therefore, tempted to claim for this neurosis of childhood the significance of being a 'type and a model'; and (8) Analysis 'replaced repression by condemnation'. This, for Freud, was the long-looked for evidence that consciousness has a biological function.
At the time of publication Freud thought that only the father could undertake successfully the analysis of a child, but in later papers he altered this view. In 'From the History of an Infantile Neurosis' (1918), for example, which describes the case of the man who came to be known as the Wolf Man, he discussed the possible advantages of child-analysis, and made no such restrictions.  

Freud, unfortunately, made no systematic study of children after 'Little Hans' and was content to leave such matters to his growing band of pupils. Psychoanalytic pioneers in the field of juvenile education included August Aichhorn, Alice Balint, Siegfried Bernfeld, Berta and Steff Bornstein, Paul Federn, Anna Freud, Hermine von Hug-Hellmuth, Melanie Klein, Ada Müller-Braunschweig, Isidor Sadger, and Alexander Staub. But only three of these figures were truly pivotal in the history of child psychoanalysis - Hermine von Hug-Hellmuth, Anna Freud and Melanie Klein.

II

Hermine von Hug-Hellmuth (1871-1924) is one of the most mysterious figures in the history of psychoanalysis, largely as a result of her own efforts to remain self-effacing. Little is known about her. She was murdered on September 9, 1924, at the age of fifty-three, by her nephew, Rudolph Hug, and the following obituary subsequently appeared in the professional journals:

On September 9, 1924, in her fifty-third year, Frau Dr. Hermine Hug-Hellmuth, a member of the Vienna Society, of whose merit, especially in the field of child psychology, our readers need no reminder, was murdered by her eighteen-year-old nephew, Rudolph Hug. In a will made a few days before her death, she expressed the desire that no account of her life and work should appear, even in psychoanalytic publications.

Dr. Siegfried Bernfeld, Secretary.
Her last wish, which sounded like a premonition of her violent death, was respected by the psychoanalytic community. Hermine Hug-Hellmuth remains a mystery. Sometimes her name is mentioned in connection with *A Young Girl's Diary* (1919), the edited publication of a manuscript purportedly given to Hug-Hellmuth by a young, upper-class Viennese girl. Freud called the diary a 'little gem', offering a 'clear and truthful view' of the mental impulses that characterise a girl's development during the years before puberty. It was suspected by others that Hug-Hellmuth was really the authoress of the book, and publication was discontinued after the third edition.

Fortunately, the investigations that led to the arrest of her nephew unearthed some facts about Hug-Hellmuth's life and work. Hermine Hug von Hugenstein—her real name—remained a spinster all her life. She received a Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Vienna, worked as a teacher in the elementary schools of Vienna, and retired with a good pension. From 1914, she lived at an apartment at 10 Lustkandlgasse, which consisted of a room, consulting room, anteroom, and kitchen. Although she was a member of the Vienna Psychoanalytical Society she did not practise therapy, enjoying instead a reputation as a highly respected healing educator. Many parents entrusted her with the education of their retarded children whom she taught in their own homes. Hug-Hellmuth also gave popular courses and lectures on child education, and supervised the Psychoanalytic Educational Advisory Board of Vienna until her death.

Hug-Hellmuth had a close relationship with her nephew, Rudolph (Rolf) Hug, the illegitimate son of her only sister. The father was a private teacher. Both sisters devoted themselves to the child's education with an openness and intensity rare for that time. Unfortunately, by granting him unbridled satisfaction of his wishes, perhaps out of a misunderstanding of the theories of Montessori and Freud, they created in the boy a low threshold of frustration tolerance.

It is worth mentioning that Rudolph was not in psychoanalytic therapy with his aunt or any other therapist. But, in a series published in *Imago* beginning in 1912, Hug-Hellmuth described her detailed observations of the boy, the relationship of the two sisters to him, and her own role as a father surrogate.
The boy's mother died of tuberculosis in 1915, and in her will entrusted Hermine with his education. As noted, the boy had enjoyed a very libertarian upbringing and great difficulties arose during adolescence. The selfish demands he made on his aunt increased, and when she finally refused some of his wishes, he proceeded to rob her. Afraid of him, she put him in the Sankt Veit children's shelter. One night Rudolph entered the apartment through an open window in order to steal money and valuables his aunt had previously refused him. When Hug-Hellmuth woke up and began to scream he strangled her.

Hug-Hellmuth was an enthusiastic pupil of Freud and attempted to use psychoanalysis as the theoretical bed-rock of her educational observations. But in comparison to Anna Freud and Melanie Klein she cannot, strictly speaking, be defined as a child-psychoanalyst. What she attempted to found was an educational practice based on psychoanalytic principles. Nevertheless, since her death, tributes have been paid to Hug-Hellmuth as the first outstanding pioneer of child-analysis. Even Klein, who disagreed with many of her fundamental opinions, paid tribute to Hug-Hellmuth who 'for so many years was almost alone and certainly pre-eminent in this field of work ...' 2

Hug-Hellmuth published her first case, the dream-analysis of a 5½-year-old boy, in 1911. In 1921 she summarised her therapeutic experiences with children in her paper 'On The Technique of Child-Analysis', published in the International Journal of Psychoanalysis which gives a clear exposition of her principles and technique.

In this historic paper, Hug-Hellmuth agreed that the analysis both of the child and of the adult has the same end and object, namely, the 'restoration of the psyche to health and equilibrium which have been endangered through influences known and unknown'. 28 There is an essential difference, however, between/...
between the physician working with adults and the analyst working with children. The task of the former is fulfilled when a cure has been affected, 'no matter what ethical and social standards the patient pursues ...'\textsuperscript{29} The curative and educative work of child-analysis, however, does not consist only in freeing children from their sufferings, but must also furnish them with 'moral and aesthetic values'.\textsuperscript{30} Children have to be strengthened through the educative guidance of the analyst, in order to develop strong wills and definite aims. Hug-Hellmuth expressed the essence of her psychoanalytic philosophy in one sentence: 'He who is both analyst and educator must never forget that the aim of child-analysis is character-analysis - in other words, education'.\textsuperscript{31}

Sensitive to accusations that the psychoanalysis of children was a dangerous practice, Hug-Hellmuth insisted - like Freud before her\textsuperscript{32} - that no child had ever been harmed 'either in a sexual, or any other way, by a properly-conducted analysis'.\textsuperscript{33} The temporary increase in bad behaviour which induces the layman to believe otherwise, is really a sign of progress to the percipient analyst. Nevertheless, Hug-Hellmuth insisted that a proper analysis can only be carried out 'after the seventh or eighth year',\textsuperscript{34} in the child's home, and the analyst must be satisfied with 'partial results',\textsuperscript{35} where there is a danger that the child 'might be intimidated by too powerful a stirring-up of his feelings and ideas, or that too high demands upon his powers of assimilation are being made, or that his soul is disturbed instead of freed'.\textsuperscript{36}

The first hour in treatment is of the 'utmost importance',\textsuperscript{37} when the communications or symptomatic actions 'demonstrate the nuclear-complex of the infantile neurosis'.\textsuperscript{38} Although no rules and no programme can be laid down, this hour accords the analyst the opportunity for establishing a rapport with the child, for 'breaking the ice'.\textsuperscript{39}

If there are no rules and no programme to follow, what can the analyst do to 'break the ice'? Hug-Hellmuth suggested that 'kind and sympathetic attention, encouraging occasionally, joking words at the right moment, a loving/...
loving interest in all the trifles which are by no means trifles to the child', 40 indicate the way to gain the full confidence of the child. In addition, the analyst should 'forget nothing' 41 and 'confuse nothing said in previous sittings ...' 42

Play, too, will very often enact an important part throughout the whole treatment, and by sharing in the play activities the analyst will 'recognise several symptoms, peculiar habits, and character traits ...' 43

Does the phenomenon of 'transference' occur during the analysis of children? Hug-Hellmuth certainly seemed to think so, writing that the child's 'first ... attitude at the beginning of the treatment is generally a strong positive transference, owing to the fact that the analyst, by sympathetic and dispassionate listening, realises the child's secret father - or mother - ideal'. 44 Indeed, she added, the child 'just like the grown-up, when at the height of his positive transference, is unwilling to end the treatment'. 45

Should disturbed children who are placed in special institutions as boarders or day-pupils receive psychoanalytic treatment? Hug-Hellmuth doubted the value of this for two main reasons. First, children in such a situation find the necessity for secrecy very difficult to endure; and second, they easily become targets for ridicule from other children when they require a special 'treatment hour'. 46 Even when psychoanalytic homes for young children have been established, Hug-Hellmuth emphasised the need for 'quite special tact', 47 and great educational skill and experience, 48 to cope successfully with the great difficulties which will arise during psychoanalytic treatment as a result of the stress and strain of collective life. Nevertheless, she believed that the creation of psychoanalytic homes would either solve the problem of how to guide the 'difficult' child, or at least make the problem easier.

This paper makes it clear, too, that Hug-Hellmuth was no revolutionary but, rather, a proponent of a 'not-too-much-not-too-little' approach to child-care as an educational prophylaxis:
We may sum up our knowledge obtained from child-analysis in a few sentences. Almost always we find mistakes in education, through which a bad disposition or a harmful experience, instead of decreasing in destructive effects, is fostered. Too much strictness on the one hand, and too much leniency on the other, with nearly always a lack of consistency in the upbringing, bring about these evils, from which both parents and children alike suffer. If the parents themselves were analysed, in all probability fewer children would be in need of analysis.

These principles were to become the bones of bitter contention between Melanie Klein and Anna Freud, and led, we shall see later, to a clear bifurcation of their analytic schools. But what was the precise nature of the controversy between these two greats of psychoanalysis, a controversy so bitter that it reverberates to this day?

III

Fortunately, Anna Freud gave a lucid explanation of these differences in her book Introduction to the Technique of Child-Analysis which was published in Vienna in 1927 and in London — because of Ernest Jones' opposition in 1946.

In 'Preparation for Child Analysis', Anna Freud launched into a critique of two papers of Melanie Klein (1923, 1926) which claimed that (1) any disturbance in the intellectual or emotional development of a child can be resolved or at least favourably influenced by an analysis, and (2) that analysis greatly benefits the development of any normal child and will in the course of time become an indispensable complement to all modern upbringing. Anna Freud thought that this was an unwarranted extension of analytic practice, and maintained that analysis is appropriate only where a child has developed a genuine infantile neurosis.
The attitudes of Anna Freud and Melanie Klein to child analysis were fundamentally different in other respects, too. The technique of child analysis is founded on the simple fact that the adult is a mature and independent being, while the child is immature and dependent. It was evident for both women that to deal with such different subjects the method cannot remain the same; what is necessary for the adult may be too risky for the child.

If the situation is different, what can analysts do? Can they use any of the techniques they use with adults? Anna Freud dealt with this in her second paper, 'The Methods of Child Analysis'. In the technique of adult analysis they have four expedients. First, they turn to account whatever the patient's conscious memory can furnish for the establishment of a comprehensive history of the illness. Second, they employ dream interpretation. Third, they assess and interpret the ideas conjured up by the patient's 'free association'. And finally, through the interpretation of 'transference' reactions, they obtain access to those parts of the patient's past experience which would otherwise remain unconscious.

With memories, analysts encounter the first important difference. In adult cases they eschew any attempt to obtain information from the patient's family and rely entirely upon voluntary revelations. This restriction is founded on the fact that communications imparted by the relatives to the analyst are apt to be 'unreliable and incomplete' and coloured by the relatives' personal attitudes towards the patient.

In contrast to this, children cannot make much of a contribution to the history of their illness. Their memories are fragmentary without the aid of analysis. They are so present-orientated that 'the past pales in comparison'; and they cannot pinpoint with any accuracy the inception of their pathology or when they first appeared to be 'different' from other children. Moreover, they/...
they show little inclination to make personal comparisons with other children or to measure their failures against the backcloth of self-imposed tasks. Consequently, the child-analyst 'must in practice obtain the case history from the patient's parents and make allowances for possible inaccuracies and misrepresentations arising from personal motives'.

With dream interpretation, however, analysts can apply unchanged to children what they have learned from their work with adults. There are two basic reasons for this: during analysis the child dreams neither more nor less than the adult; and the transparency or obscurity of the oneiric content is, as in the case of adults, a reflection of the strength of the resistance. Although she found children's dreams easier to interpret than adults, Anna Freud admitted that they are not always so simple as the examples given in her father's classic book, *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900). In fact, she and her colleagues found in them all those distortions of wish fulfilment that correspond to the complicated neurotic processes of the child patient. But, in spite of this, there is 'nothing easier' to make the child grasp than the 'jigsaw puzzle' of dream interpretation.

The interpretation of daydreams, as well as of ordinary dreams, plays an important part, too, in the analysis of children. It is usually very easy, Anna Freud thought, to induce children to recount their daydreams once their confidence has been won. They tell them more readily and unashamedly than adults, who condemn daydreaming as 'childish'.

Drawing is a further technical aid which, besides the use of dreams and daydreams, 'comes very much to the fore' in many analyses of children. In three of her early cases, drawing-interpretation almost took the place of all other communications for some time.

Anna Freud realised that she had sketched an idealistic picture of the conditions obtaining in the analysis of children: the family readily providing all/...
all requisite information; the children participating eagerly in dream-
interpretation, bringing a rich outpouring of daydreams and drawings to
facilitate conclusions about their unconscious impulses. She insisted,
however, that it is basically correct. Why, then, should child-analysis
have been regarded by other analysts as an especially difficult area?
This is so because the idealistic picture is shattered in relation to the next
phenomenon, free association, crucial to adult-analysis. It is crucial, too,
for an understanding of the profound differences between Anna Freud and
Melanie Klein.

3

All the foregoing advantages are rendered null and void by reason of the fact
that children are unable to participate in 'free association'. The reason for
this is not difficult to find: it is impossible for children to assume the
recumbent position prescribed for the adult; to expunge by an effort of their
own will all criticism of emerging ideas; to exclude nothing from their
communications; and with the analyst explore the surface of their
consciousness. This requires a level of sophistication beyond the capacity
of the most intelligent child.

It is important to emphasise that both women were in complete agreement
on this point. The bone of contention between them was over the question:
is there a precise substitute for 'free association'? Is there anything that
can be put in place of it? Hermine Hug-Hellmuth thought not and
recommended playing with children, observing them in their own homes, and
trying to become familiar with all their intimate daily circumstances.
Melanie Klein, however, was convinced that she had found a precise
substitution with her unique play technique. This can be described briefly:
she started from the premise that action is more natural for children than
speech, and put at their disposal a host of tiny playthings, a 'world in
miniature' as Anna Freud described it, thereby creating for them the
opportunity to act in this play world. Equating all the actions which
children perform in this way with the adult's spoken ideas, Klein interpreted
them as analysts do with adult patients.
Anna Freud admitted in 'The Role of Transference in the Analysis of Children' (1927) that the Kleinian play-technique is 'very valuable' for several reasons. First, it saves the analyst the time and trouble of pursuing children into their home environments; 'at one stroke' the whole of their known world is established in the analyst's room. Second, in this way the analyst has the opportunity of becoming acquainted with children's various reactions, the strength of their aggressive impulses or of their affections, as well as their attitude to the various objects and persons represented by the toys. Third, the toys are easily manipulated by children who can perform with them all the prohibited actions which in the real world are confined to phantasy. All these merits, Anna Freud concluded, make the use of the Kleinian play technique 'virtually indispensable' for establishing familiarity with children, for whom 'action is more natural than verbal expression'.

Anna Freud took exception with Melanie Klein, however, when she went one step further in the employment of this technique in her attempt to 'find the symbolic content underlying each single move in the play'. Klein assumed that these play actions of the child are 'equivalent to the free associations of the adult patient', and persisted in 'translating every action that the child performs into the corresponding thoughts'. For example, if the child overturns a toy lamppost or figure, Klein interpreted this action as an aggressive impulse against the father. Again, a deliberate collision between two toy cars is interpreted as evidence of the child having observed sexual intercourse between the parents.

The fundamental question, of course, is this: was Melanie Klein justified in equating the child's play activity with the adult's 'free association'? Let us look at the problem another way. What are adults doing when they freely associate? When we say that their ideas are 'free', we mean that the adult patients have abandoned conscious direction of their thoughts. Nevertheless, they retain a therapeutic goal in mind: they hope to be cured; and, of course, their associations are crucially influenced by their awareness of being in analysis. In contrast, the child does not have a goal in mind. But if this is/...
is so, Anna Freud argued, there is 'no justification' for treating child's play as having the same significance as the adult's free association. Instead of being invariably invested with symbolic meaning - as Melanie Klein contended - the child's play may 'admit of harmless explanations'. For instance, the child who topples a toy lamppost may have recently witnessed such an incident in the street; similarly, a car collision may be a reproduction of a similar event. And the boy who opens a lady's handbag is not necessarily, as Klein maintained, expressing curiosity whether his mother's womb conceals another baby; he may merely be repeating an experience when another lady brought him a present in a similar bag. Indeed, Anna Freud asked, do we feel justified in ascribing symbolic significance to every act or idea of adults? Do we not do so only to those which arise under the influence of the analytic situation which adults have accepted?

Aware that her theoretical arguments would not easily settle the contention, Anna Freud began a critique from another point. In addition to all the activities which the child carried out with the toys, Klein also used as material for interpretation whatever the child did in relation to the objects in the treatment room and to her own person. Here again she followed strictly the modus operandi of adult analysis where the behaviour and attitudes of the patient towards the analyst, including the little voluntary or involuntary actions, are incorporated in the analysis. In doing this, the analyst relies on the state of the patient's transference which can invest otherwise trivial behaviour with symbolic significance.

But what is the role of transference in child-analysis?

Aware that people will support or oppose Klein's views depending on the stand they take with regard to transference, Anna Freud asked three questions: does a child manifest the same transference phenomenon as an adult? If so, how is the transference manifestation expressed? And in what way does it lend itself to interpretation?
Anna Freud explained that she took great pains to establish in the child a strong attachment to herself in order to induce a relationship of dependence. Indeed, this affectionate attachment or positive transference to the analyst becomes the prerequisite for all later analytic work. Anna Freud expressed this idea in a striking sentence: 'Children, in fact, believe only the people they love, and make efforts only for the love of such people'.

The analysis of children needs much more of this positive element than is the case with adults. Side by side with the analytic work, Anna Freud pursued a goal which might be called re-educational. She unequivocally averred that the 'success of upbringing always - not only in child analysis - stands or falls with the child's attachment to the person in charge of him.'

Consequently, it is not enough merely to establish a transference with the child regardless of whether it is friendly or hostile (as Klein did). Although adult analysts can work for prolonged periods of time with a negative transference with a child, negative impulses towards the analyst - however revealing they may be - are essentially disturbing and should be dealt with analytically as soon as possible. The really fruitful work takes place in positive attachment.

In connection with the preparatory period, Anna Freud had already described how she established this tie. Its manifestation in phantasy and small or larger actions is 'hardly distinguishable' from the equivalent processes in adult patients. The negative manifestations are encountered whenever analysts attempt to free a fragment of repressed material from the unconscious thereby drawing upon themselves the resistance of the ego. At such a time they appear to the child as dangerous and feared tempters, and receive expressions of hatred and repulsion.

If the positive impulses are 'hardly distinguishable' from the transference situation with adults, are they, to all extents and purposes, equivalent? Anna Freud thought not. Adult patients gradually transform in the course of analytic treatment, the neurotic symptoms. They relinquish the old objects on/...
on which their phantasy were fixed, and direct their neuroses upon the person of the analyst. In analytic terms, they replace their previous symptoms with transference symptoms, transpose their existing neuroses into transference neuroses, and display all their abnormal reactions in relation to the analyst who can then trace the development and growth of the individual symptoms. It is on this 'cleared field of operations' that the final struggle ensues for insight into the unconscious, pathogenic processes of the patient.

But the situation is different for children. Unlike adults, Anna Freud argued, children are not ready to produce a 'new edition' of their love relationships, because the 'old edition is not yet exhausted'. Their original love-objects, the parents, are still real and present (in contrast to their phantasy existence with the adult neurotic). Although the analyst shares with the parents the child's love or hate, there is no necessity for the child to envisage the analyst as a substitute for the parents when they are still there, real and tangible.

Having established these points, Anna Freud reconsidered Klein's method, and made two objections to it. First, when children show hostility towards her at the first meeting, Klein believed this was sufficient proof of their ambivalent attitudes towards their mothers, with the hostile component displaced onto the analyst. But Anna Freud's interpretation was different. The more tenderly children are attached to their own mothers, the fewer friendly impulses they have towards strangers. Indeed, the converse obtains. It is especially with children, accustomed to indifference at home, that a positive relationship is often most quickly established. They obtain from the analyst what they have until now expected in vain from the original objects. Second, in the analysis of adults the analyst remains 'impersonal and shadowy', a 'blank page' on which they can inscribe their transference phantasy analogous to the way in which a motion picture is projected upon an empty screen. The analyst avoids issuing prohibitions and allowing gratifications. But child-analysts must be anything but shadows. For children they are interesting persons with impressive and attractive qualities. The educational implications result in the children having a clear picture of what the analysts consider desirable or undesirable, and what they sanction or forbid. Such well-defined persons are/...
are poor transference objects with little hope of achieving an adequate interpretation of the child's transference. It is as though the screen on which a film was to be projected already bore another picture. The more elaborate and vivid it is, the more will it tend to efface the outlines of what is superimposed.

For these reasons, Anna Freud insisted that children form no transference neuroses. In spite of their ambivalent impulses towards the analyst, they continue to display their abnormal reactions in the home. The implication of this for Anna Freud was clear: child-analysts must take into account the area where the neurotic reactions arose - the child's home. Analysts are thus 'dependent on a permanent news service' about the child; they must know the people in the environment and how they react to the child. Ideally, they share their work with the persons who are actually bringing up the child; just as they share with them the child's affection or hostility.

IV

Let us briefly recapitulate: Anna Freud criticised Melanie Klein for (1) the unlimited application of analysis to children; (2) the excessive symbolism of her interpretations of children's play; (3) her claim that her play-technique is exactly analogous to 'free association'; (4) her assertion that children experience a transference-neurosis identical to the adult manifestation; and (5) her rejection of the educational role of the analyst.

Fortunately, Klein answered these criticisms in a paper she read at the Symposium on Child-Analysis which was convened in London in 1927 for this very purpose. At this Symposium, special attention was given to Anna Freud's book, Introduction to the Technique of Child-Analysis, which we have just considered.

Klein began by discussing the fact that though child-analysis had its birth in 1909 with the 'Little Hans' case and had been practised ever since, its...
most fundamental principles had still not been clearly enunciated. This is 'remarkable' compared with adult psychoanalysis where all the basic principles had been not only established but had been 'empirically tested and proved beyond refutation'. 79

What is the explanation of this? Why has the development of child-analysis been so much more controversial? Is it simply that children are not suitable objects for analysis? Certainly, Hug-Hellmuth was very sceptical about the results to be obtained with children, and admitted she had to content herself with 'partial results'. Moreover, she restricted the treatment to a limited range of cases. Anna Freud, too, set very definite limits to its applicability, although she was more optimistic about the potentialities of child-analysis than Hug-Hellmuth.

Klein did not agree. 80 She thought that child-analysis had developed without unanimity of opinion because it was not approached in a spirit of free and unprejudiced enquiry, as adult analysis was, but was hampered and burdened from the outset by certain preconceptions. Hug-Hellmuth and Anna Freud, for example, were convinced that in analysing children, analysts actually discover less about childhood than when they analyse adults. Klein was convinced, however, that if analysts approach child-analysis with an open mind they will discover ways and means of probing to the 'deepest depths' 81 and so realise the child's true nature. Klein, consequently, could see no need to impose any restriction on analysis, either as to the depth to which it may penetrate or the method by which it may work.

As a consequence, Klein considered Anna Freud's pre-analytic 'breaking-in' period unnecessary. Klein's criticism is not that Anna Freud activated anxiety and the sense of guilt, but on the contrary that she did not resolve them sufficiently. The radical difference between the two women can be explained briefly: Anna Freud made use of anxiety and guilt to secure the emotional attachment of the child, while Klein enlisted them from the outset in the service of the analytic work.
Anna Freud criticised Klein's interpretation of the content of the drama enacted in children's play as symbolic. Anna Freud thought that they might be occasioned, rather, simply by actual observations or experiences of daily life. She said disparagingly of Klein: 'If the child overturns a lamp-post or a toy figure she interprets this action, e.g., as an aggressive impulse against the father; a deliberate collision between two cars as evidence of the child having observed sexual intercourse between the parents'.

Klein denied any such 'wild' symbolic interpretations of children's play. When a child gives expression to the same psychic material in various repetitions and through various media - toys, water, by cutting-out, drawing, etc. - and when these particular activities are mostly accompanied at the time by a sense of guilt, manifesting itself as anxiety, Klein then interpreted these phenomena and linked them up with the child's unconscious and the analytic situation. But she insisted that the practical and theoretical conditions for the interpretation are 'precisely the same' as in the analysis of adults.

It is important to realise, then, that the little toys Klein used were only one means she provided - paper, pencils, scissors, string, balls, bricks and, above all, water, were others. They were at the children's disposal to use as they liked, and the purpose of them all was simply to gain access to and to liberate their phantasies. Indeed, some children will not touch a toy for a long time and would rather only cut things out. In the case of children altogether inhibited in play, the toys can be used by analysts simply to study more closely the reasons for their inhibition. With other children, often the youngest ones, the playthings are an opportunity to dramatise some of the dominating phantasies after which they put the toys aside altogether and pass on to every imaginable kind of game in which they, various objects in the room, and the analyst have to take part.
Although she admitted that she attributed fundamental importance to the symbolism contained in children's actions, Klein denied that she attempted to do without the help of free association. While admitting, of course, that children cannot and will not associate in the same way as adults, Klein thought it probable that children cannot, not because they lack the capacity to put their thoughts into words (this would really apply only to very young children), but because anxiety resists verbal associations.

Symbolic representation by means of toys, however, does not invoke the same anxiety as confession by word of mouth. If, then, analysts succeed in allaying anxiety and in getting in the first instance more indirect representations by means of the play-technique, Klein was convinced that they would elicit for analysis the fullest verbal expression of which the child is capable.

Klein denied, then, that she made no use of verbal associations. Indeed, she stated that she would not regard any child-analysis as terminated unless it was successfully expressed in speech, and so linked up with reality.

With this method - symbolic representation by means of toys and verbal expression - Klein claimed a perfect analogy with the technique of adult analysis. The only difference is that with children the unconscious prevails to a far greater extent, and its mode of expression, therefore, is far more predominant than in adults. We must also, of course, take into account the child's greater tendency to anxiety.

Anna Freud concluded, it will be remembered, that while in children there may be a satisfactory transference, a true transference-neurosis is absent. Children, she argued, are not ready, unlike adults, to enter upon 'new editions' of their love-relations, because their parents, the original love-objects, still exist as objects in reality.
Klein disputed this. The analysis of very young children had convinced Klein that even three-year-old children have left behind the most important part of the development of their Oedipus complexes. Consequently, they are already far removed, through repression and feelings of guilt, from the objects whom they originally desired. Their relations to them have undergone distortion and transformation so that the present love-objects are now imagos of the original objects. Hence, in reference to the analyst, children can enter upon a new edition of their love-relations.

Klein was convinced her observations of children bore out her belief: their symptoms change, are accentuated or lessened in accordance with the analytic situations; there is an abreaction of affects during the analysis; anxiety arises and the children's reactions work themselves out during the analytic encounter.

Again, Anna Freud considered that in analysing children analysts are not, as they are when the patients are adults, 'impersonal, shadowy, blank pages' who avoid imposing prohibitions and permitting gratifications. But, in Klein's view, this is exactly how child-analysts 'can and ought to behave', when once they have established the analytic situation. Their activities are only apparent, for even when they throw themselves wholly into all the play-phantasies of children, conforming to the modes of representation peculiar to children, they are doing just the same as analysts of adults, who also willingly follow the phantasies of their patients. Besides this, Klein did not permit child-patients any personal gratifications, either in the form of presents or caresses or personal encounters outside analysis. In short, Klein kept on the whole to the approved rules of adult analysis.

On the question of transference, therefore, Klein's experience was in complete contradiction to Anna Freud's observations. The reason for this difference is this: it depends on the different way in which they handled the transference. Anna Freud thought that a positive transference is a necessary condition for all analytic work with children. She regarded a/...
a negative transference as undesirable. But, Klein retorted, a thorough resolution of the transference is universally regarded by analysts as one of the signs that an analysis has been satisfactorily concluded. On this basis, psychoanalysis has established a number of important rules which prove necessary in every case. Anna Freud, then, had set aside these rules for the most part in child-analysis.

If the analytic situation is not produced by analytic means, if the positive and the negative transference are not handled logically, Klein was convinced that analysts will neither induce a transference-neurosis nor achieve the resolution of the child's reactions in relation to analysis and the analyst. Anna Freud's method of utilising the positive transference to attach the child to herself, and of lessening the negative transference when it is directed against herself, seemed to Klein not only psychoanalytically incorrect but, in effect, to militate far more against the parents than Klein's method. For it is only natural that the negative transference will then remain directed against those with whom the child is associated in daily life.

Should the analyst combine analytic and educational considerations?

Anna Freud argued in 'Child Analysis and the Upbringing of Children' (1927) that the child's superego - by itself - should not be expected to assume complete responsibility for the direction of the asocial instincts which the analyst has brought into consciousness. She believed that the child, left to bear such a responsibility, can take only a 'single, short, and convenient path - that towards direct gratification'. What, then, should be done? Anna Freud was reluctant to leave the decision to the persons at home responsible for the child's training and she thought that the analyst should 'guide the child at this important point'. In other words, educational intervention on the part of the analyst is necessary.
But, Klein replied, if the Oedipus complex is the 'nuclear complex' of neurosis, as Freud claimed, then analysis, if it 'shrinks from analysing that complex, cannot resolve the neurosis either'. If, then, Anna Freud had submitted the child's Oedipal impulses to a more thorough analysis, there would have been no necessity to teach the child how to control them. And at the same time the cure would have been more complete.

What were Anna Freud's reasons for refraining from an analysis to investigate unreservedly the child's Oedipus complex? First, Anna Freud was reluctant to intervene between child and parents because she felt that the home training would be endangered and conflicts aroused in the child. Second, she feared that children who have been analysed and remain in surroundings hostile to analysis will, on account of their detachment from their 'love-objects', become more opposed to them, and hence more of a prey to conflicts. Consequently, Anna Freud favoured the occasional placement of children in psychoanalytic institutions.

Klein disagreed with both reasons. She replied, first, that she, too, would never attempt to prejudice children against those with whom they are emotionally involved. But if the parents have entrusted their children to her to analyse, either in order to cure a neurosis or for other reasons, Klein felt justified in pursuing the line which she considered to be in the children's best interests. And she meant by this to analyse - 'without reservation' - their relations to those about them, and in particular to their parents and brothers and sisters. Second, because of her faith in analysis, Klein thought it unnecessary to place children in psychoanalytic institutions. Kleinian analysis, she argued, had 'proved repeatedly that when a child becomes less neurotic it becomes less tiresome to those around it who are themselves neurotic or lacking in insight ...' Kleinian analysis, then, 'will exercise only a favourable influence on their relationships'.

Klein had absolutely no doubt about this, and claimed that her findings on this 'crucial' point had been 'constantly confirmed'. She concluded that the/...
the danger apprehended by Anna Freud - that the analysis of children's negative feelings to their parents will spoil their relationships - is 'always and in all circumstances non-existent'. Rather, the 'exact opposite' is the case. Because of this, Klein eschewed the assistance of parents. Although admitting that it is desirable and helpful for parents to support analysts both during and after the analysis, she insisted, nevertheless, that such gratifying instances are so much in the minority that they represent the ideal case, and on this Kleinians cannot base their method. In contrast to Anna Freud, then, Klein's experience gradually led her to 'emancipate' herself in her work as 'far as possible from these persons'.

Consequently, Klein disagreed with Anna Freud's attempt to combine analytical and educational work. Indeed, she considered that the one activity cancels the other. If analysts, even only temporarily, become the representatives of the educative agencies, they become the representatives of the repressing faculties. What Klein advised, instead, is that analysts should simply establish and maintain the analytic situation and to 'refrain from all direct educative influence ...' 

Klein, evidently, was not in favour of exerting a direct influence on children. What did she advise instead?

The child-analyst should wish only to analyse and not to wish to mould and direct the minds of his patients. If anxiety does not prevent him, he will be able calmly to wait for the development of the correct issue, and in this way that issue will be achieved.

It is equally evident that Klein was in favour of exerting an indirect influence on children. For what purpose? What is a 'correct issue'? Were Klein's therapeutic aims different in essence from Anna Freud's? These questions are complex and will be discussed in the following chapters.
Although Klein found followers in England after her emigration in 1926, it would be misleading to refer to a specific Kleinian school at that time as distinct from the British school of psychoanalysis as a whole. But this changed dramatically in 1935 when Klein read her revolutionary paper, 'A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States', to the British Psychoanalytical Society. Edward Glover, who had been an enthusiastic supporter, led the opposition to her with an outspoken repudiation of her new work as 'non-analytic'. He pointed out, too, that Klein was not medically qualified and therefore did not have the necessary psychiatric experience to unravel the complexities of psychosis. Among those who joined the attack on Klein - and this was a bitter pill for her to swallow - was her daughter, Melitta Schmideberg, Glover's analysand.101

Ernest Jones - who had sided with Melanie Klein in the aftermath to her 1935 paper - decided, as President, to initiate a series of scientific discussions on the controversial issues which were splitting the Society apart. These discussions, which are known as the 'Controversial Discussions', occupied the British Psychoanalytical Society from January 1943 until May 1944 - with eleven meetings in all. The basis for them was provided by four major papers which attempt a clarification and justification of Klein's views. They are 'On the Nature and Function of Phantasy' by Susan Isaacs, 'Some Aspects of the Role of Introjection and Projection' by Paula Heimann, 'Regression' by Susan Isaacs and Paula Heimann, and 'The Emotional Life and Ego Development of the Infant with Special Reference to the Depressive Position' by Melanie Klein.

Although the papers attempted to refute the prevailing accusation that Klein departed from basic Freudian views about the nature of psychic conflicts, anxieties and defences, they also attempted to demonstrate how Klein, operating within the framework of Freudian theory, reached other conclusions - for example, the dating of the Oedipus complex, the beginning and formation of the superego, the view of female sexuality, and a number of other things.
During the controversy both sides quoted Freud repeatedly, but the quotations were selected, significantly, from different stages of his theory. Joan Riviere remarked that Klein's opponents tended to refer to Freud's early work, while the Kleinians referred more often to his later. This is particularly clear in relation to the death instinct.

Not surprisingly, then, the 'Discussions' did not achieve an harmonious resolution of theoretical differences, as Jones had hoped. On the contrary, the only result was the emergence of three distinct schools of psychoanalytic thought: the followers of Anna Freud, those of Melanie Klein, and the majority of British analysts who refused to be categorised, and drew their inspiration from all areas of psychoanalysis.
NOTES AND REFERENCES


3. Ibid., p. 198.

4. Ibid., p. 198.

5. Ibid., p. 198.


7. Ibid., p. 77.

8. Ibid., pp. 77-78.

9. Little Hans' father was Max Graf, a Viennese musicologist and admirer of Freud. He attended the Wednesday meetings in Freud's home.


12. Ibid., p. 129.

13. Ibid., p. 129; original emphasis.


15. Ibid., p. 142.

16. Ibid., p. 146.

17. Ibid., p. 146.

18. Ibid., p. 147.

19. Ibid., p. 147.

20. Ibid., p. 145; original emphasis.


24. Ibid., p. 341.


50. Ernest Jones opposed Anna Freud's theories of child-analysis and refused to publish her *Four Lectures on Child Analysis* which contain a trenchant critique of Melanie Klein's theories. The Freud family emigrated to England in 1938 and the lectures were published in 1946.

51. The two papers of Melanie Klein which Anna Freud criticised are 'Infant Analysis' (1923) and 'The Psychological Principles of Infant Analysis' (1926). Both papers are contained in Klein, *Writings*, Volume 1, 1975.


53. Ibid., p. 24.

54. Ibid., p. 24.

55. Ibid., p. 24.

56. Ibid., p. 24.

57. Ibid., p. 25.

58. Ibid., p. 30.

59. Ibid., p. 35.

60. Ibid., p. 37.

61. Ibid., p. 37.

62. Ibid., p. 37.

63. Ibid., p. 37.

64. Ibid., p. 37.

65. Ibid., p. 37.

66. Ibid., p. 37.

67. Ibid., p. 38.

68. Ibid., p. 38.

69. Ibid., p. 39.

70. Ibid., p. 40.

71. Ibid., p. 40.

72. Ibid., pp. 40-41.

73. Ibid., p. 41.

74. Ibid., p. 44.

75. Ibid., p. 44.
76. Ibid., pp. 45-46.
77. Ibid., p. 45.
78. Ibid., p. 46.
79. Melanie Klein, Writings, Volume 1, p. 141.
80. Ibid., p. 141.
81. Ibid., p. 142.
82. Anna Freud, Writings, Volume 1, pp. 37-38.
83. Klein, Writings, Volume 1, p. 147.
84. Ibid., p. 147.
85. Ibid., p. 148.
86. Ibid., p. 150.
87. Ibid., p. 151.
88. Ibid., p. 152.
89. Ibid., p. 153.
90. Anna Freud, Writings, Volume 1, p. 60.
91. Ibid., p. 60.
92. Klein, Writings, Volume 1, p. 163.
93. Ibid., p. 163.
94. Ibid., p. 165.
95. Ibid., p. 165.
96. Ibid., p. 165.
97. Ibid., p. 165.
98. Ibid., p. 166.
100. Ibid., p. 167.
101. For an account of the 'Controversial Discussions' see Hanna Segal, Klein (1979), pp. 91-111.
102. Segal, Klein, p. 95.
103. Ibid., p. 110.
CHAPTER 3

ANNA FREUD (1895–1982)

The effect of Anna Freud's wartime work, her subsequent publications, and her continuing influence as a great teacher of teachers and therapists is incalculable.

(Bridgeland, *Pioneer Work with Maladjusted Children*, 1971)
Anna Freud was born on December 3, 1895, the same year that Sigmund Freud's and Joseph Breuer's *Studies on Hysteria* marked the beginning of the history of psychoanalysis. She was educated at the exclusive Cottage Lyceum in Vienna where the principal, Dr. Salka Goldmann, and most of the students, were Jewish. In 1911, at the relatively early age of fifteen, Anna Freud was awarded the Matura diploma. In June, 1914, she took her first teachers' examination and, to fulfil the requirements for the second one, began a two-year preparatory period in the elementary school of the Cottage Lyceum. She took her second teachers' examination in 1917, and continued teaching until 1920 at this school.

During these years as a teacher Anna Freud became increasingly engaged in psychoanalysis. During the First World War she attended her father's lectures on psychoanalysis at the University of Vienna. In addition, for two years between 1915 and 1918, she regularly joined Paul Schilder (1886-1940) and Heinz Hartmann (1894-1971), two assistant doctors who were later prominent in psychoanalysis, on their ward rounds at the Psychiatric Clinic of the Vienna General Hospital. Permission for these extraordinary visits was given by Julius Wagner-Jauregg (1847-1940), the clinic's director, and a friend of Sigmund Freud's from their student days together.

Between 1918 and 1921 Anna Freud studied psychoanalysis with her father. Her first independent psychoanalytic work, 'Beating Phantasies and Daydreams', appeared in 1922; and in the same year she became a member of the Vienna Psychoanalytical Society. She then set herself up in independent practice at the family home at 19 Berggasse, analysing both children and adults.
At this time Melanie Klein was also engaged in the analysis of children and differences between the two soon became apparent. On May 4 and 18, 1929, Anna Freud attended a symposium on child-analysis organised by the British Psychoanalytical Society where her book, *Introduction to the Technique of Child Analysis*, was criticised and disparaged. The speakers were Joan Riviere, M. Nina Searl, and Ella Sharpe, who later belonged to the 'Melanie Klein School'. Edward Glover and Ernest Jones were the closing speakers and sided with Klein. At this stage Anna Freud refused to defend herself, fearing that had she done so a schism between Continental and British psychoanalytic schools would have ensued. In spite of her reticence, however, a schism did eventually materialise.

The year 1928 brought the first real sign of official recognition in Austria of the value of psychoanalysis for education. Inspector Jalkotsky of the Board of Education of the City of Vienna invited Anna Freud to teach an introductory course on psychoanalysis for educators. The four lectures of this course were subsequently published in 1930 in book format under the title *Psychoanalysis for Teachers and Parents*.

In 1935 Anna Freud and Dorothy Burlingham (1891-1979) took over the care of a group of young, socially disadvantaged, infants at the Montessori Kindergarten, The Children's House, on Rudolphsplatz. This unit was called the Jackson Day Nursery, financed by Dr. Edith Jackson of America and also supported by Dorothy Burlingham. Although housed in The Children's House it was fully independent of the Montessori staff, and Anna Freud described it as an 'analytical-educational experiment'. The day-nursery lasted only two years; the Nazis closed it with the incorporation of Austria in the Third Reich.
With the Anschluss of 1938 and the subsequent proscription of all Jews from the intellectual life of Austria, life became intolerable for Sigmund Freud and his family and in June of that year they emigrated to England.

In 1940 Anna Freud and Dorothy Burlingham opened residential nurseries for children separated from their parents. The insights gleaned from their work at these Hampstead Nurseries provided material for their subsequent collaborative publications—Young Children in War-Time: A Year's Work in a Residential War Nursery (1942), and Infants Without Families: The Case For and Against Residential Nurseries (1944). The Hampstead Nurseries closed on November 1, 1945, when the children returned to their families.

The foundation of an 'Anna Freud School' materialised in 1947 with the establishment of the Hampstead Child Therapy Course to give courses in child-analysis. With the later annexation of a children's clinic, the institution created by Anna Freud and Dorothy Burlingham attained its present-day format—The Hampstead Child Therapy Course and Clinic.

In April, 1950, Anna Freud took her first trip to America where she gave several lectures and was enthusiastically received. The Faculty of Law at Clark University—where Freud was invited in 1909—awarded her the title Doctor honoris causa. The relationship between psychoanalysis and law was a life-long interest of Anna Freud's and for several years she participated in seminars at Yale Law School.

Anna Freud remained in England until her death on October 8, 1982.
From Anna Freud's psychoanalytic theory of the child, a distinct therapy - a psychotherapeutic technique - is logically derived, which can be learned and successfully applied. Such a congruence between the theory and therapy of the child's psyche can be found nowhere - not in Sigmund Freud and not even in Piaget, with whom Anna Freud cannot be compared for various reasons.

(Peters, Anna Freud: A Life Dedicated to Children, 1985)

Anna Freud, unlike Melanie Klein, make no radical revisions of her father's work but remained, as Ernest Jones (1879-1958) described her, a 'true daughter'. Because of this, it is not necessary to give an elaborate outline of her psychoanalytic theory; such an outline would merely repeat, fundamentally, the basic concepts and conceptualisations of Sigmund Freud. Nevertheless, as she was actively involved in a psychoanalytic education of children which attempted to translate these ideas into practice - while her father was not - it is instructive to look briefly at how she used a few key issues of her father's theory to explain to teachers and the general public the fundamental aspects of child development. After this we shall examine her opinions regarding the socialisation of children from two perspectives: psychoanalytic and educational.

Two sets of lectures which Anna Freud gave to teachers, parents and other interested parties in Vienna in 1926 and 1929 are of particular interest. There are several reasons for this: first, they are an extremely lucid introduction to psychoanalytic theories of child development by a recognised authority; second, they are specifically intended to capture the interest of educators of young children; third, they were commissioned by the Board of Education of the City of Vienna, and the seal of official approval enhanced their credibility with the educated public; and finally, they were given in the late 1920s when Freudian theory had undergone a major revision, and thus represent the crystallisation of Freud's mature thought.
In 'The Instinctual Life of Early Childhood' (1930) Anna Freud traced the close emotional tie between infant and mother to the first nourishment and care given to the child by the mother. In the first weeks of existence food is the most important thing for children; their mouths and the surrounding areas are the most important parts of their bodies. Sucking at the mother's breast is very pleasant and children retain the wish for the continuation and repetition of this sensual experience even when hunger has been satisfied. Moreover, the pleasure-giving activity of the mouth is not confined to food intake and finger-sucking. Children act as if they would like to explore the whole world within their reach by means of their mouths. They bite, lick, and taste everything near them.

Although the pre-eminent part played by the mouth as the source of pleasurable experience lasts only for the first year of life, its derivatives - greediness and craving for sweets, for example - persist into far later ages and stages.

A very important factor gradually enters into the child's life - training in cleanliness. During this stage children begin to show extraordinary interest in their own faeces, which are pleasurable and delight the child; they try to touch them, to play with them, and, if they are not prevented, will even put them into their mouths. The significant point is that this pleasure is no longer connected with the strength or weakness of the sphincter muscles of bladder or anus. Just as infants discovered a pleasure gain as a by-product of food taken orally, they now experience a pleasure gain as a by-product of their excretory activities. The area around the anus becomes the most important body zone. During the oral stage children obtained mouth-pleasure independent of food-intake by sucking their fingers; now they attempt to obtain pleasure from the anal region by withholding their faeces and manipulating that part of their bodies. If toilet training actively presents them from doing this, they preserve the memory of such pleasures by engaging in the more acceptable games with sand, water, mud, and 'smearing' with paints.
Adults complain that at this period children are dirty and messy but excuse them for aesthetic senses too rudimentary to understand the difference between clean and dirty, or sweet and offensive. But these observers of children, according to Anna Freud, are prejudiced and commit an error of judgement. Children are dirty and messy because such activities are symbolic of their faeces which education forbids them to enjoy. Nor is there anything wrong with their sense of smell. They merely differ from adults in their appraisal of the various smells. The scent of a flower which delights an adult will leave children quite indifferent unless they have been trained to voice approval.

People remark, too, on the cruelty of children during this period. For instance when children tear off the legs and wings of butterflies and insects, kill or torture birds, or vent their destructive urges on toys or other articles, their elders have attributed this to their lack of empathy with living creatures, or comprehension of the financial value of things. But in this respect, too, analytic observation teaches something different. Analysts believe that children torture animals, not because they do not understand that they are inflicting pain, but precisely because they want to inflict pain; and for this purpose small, defenceless insects are the most suitable. Again, children destroy objects not because they are unaware of their value but because the actual value is negligible compared with the joy of destruction. Analysts 'guess' the motive for their behaviour from their facial expressions and the intense joy with which they pursue their purposes. They behave as they do because it gives them pleasure.

After successful toilet-training the anal zone loses its role for the provision of pleasurable sensations. Its place is taken by an even more important part of the body, the genitals. At this time children's thirst for knowledge is directed towards the discovery of the differences between the sexes. They delight in showing their sexual parts to other children, and demand to see theirs. Their passion for asking questions has as its basis the difference between the sexes and its connection with the origin of children, which they 'somehow or other' dimly feel. Although Anna Freud did not go further here, other analysts did not hesitate to posit an innate sexual knowledge.
In 'Infantile Amnesia and the Oedipus Complex' (1930) Anna Freud drew attention to the fact that the tiny human being, similar to a newborn animal in many respects, is worse off in some ways. Young animals are dependent on their mothers for only a short period, at most a few weeks. After that they evolve into independent creatures who can manage without further care. It is quite different with human beings. Neonates differ fundamentally from young animals in their complete dependence on the mother. For at least a year infants remain so completely dependent on their mothers that they would perish if they withdrew their care. But even after the expiration of this year of infancy, independence is still far away. Human beings need fifteen years or more before they can completely dispense with the protection of the adults and become autonomous individuals. The importance of this evolutionary fact Anna Freud stated simply: the child's prolonged period of complete dependence on the mother 'determines his entire destiny'.

The relationship between infant and mother soon extends far beyond what can be explained as a striving for the preservation of life. Children want their mothers near and long for them even when their hunger is satisfied and no special dangers are threatening. In response to their tender love and care, bonds with their mothers have been established, independent of the instinct for self-preservation.

Now for the first time the external world enters as 'a disturbing factor' into this relationship. Children who have left infancy realise with consternation that they have no exclusive rights to their mothers. Their families, of which they are only small and relatively unimportant parts, have other members: fathers, brothers and sisters, who appear to be equally important. They, too, assert rights to the possession of the mothers.

Confronted with this assertion children regard their brothers and sisters as enemies. They are jealous of them and wish them out of the way so as to restore the original relationships with their mothers. Moreover, Anna Freud regarded/...
regarded this jealousy of small children as serious. It springs from the same motives as the jealousy of adults, and causes children the same amount of suffering as adults endure when their relation to a beloved person is disturbed by rivals. The only difference is that children are physically more restricted in their actions and the satisfaction of their jealousy usually goes no further than a wish. Nevertheless, they do not merely wish the tiresome brothers and sisters to go away; they would like them to be dead. Indeed, to the little child who has not yet learned to grasp the meaning of death 'there is as yet no difference between going away and being dead'.

Anna Freud added three comments to the above: first, the wish for the brothers and sisters to be dead is 'thoroughly natural' on the part of children; second, the more they value the possession of their mothers, the more violent is this desire; and third, they are at first 'completely single-minded in their hostility.' An emotional conflict arises within them only when the mothers demand that they relinquish the evil wishes, share them with their siblings, and even love them. 'Here is the starting point of all the difficulties in the emotional relations among children within a family.'

The turmoil of feelings which children experience in relation to their siblings is 'relatively harmless' compared with the emotional conflict with the father. The father plays a double role in the child's life. On the one hand he is hated as a rival who claims ownership of the mother, takes her away, and insists upon sleeping with her. On the other, he is also loved and admired by the child who relies on his help, believes in his strength and omnipotence, and identifies with him. Thus for infants there arises the apparently insoluble problem that they love and admire the same person whom they also hate and wish to be dead.

This conflict plunges children into further difficulties: the fear of the power of their evil wishes, of their father's revenge and the loss of his love, the destruction of all ease and innocence in their relations to their mother, their bad conscience, and their fear of death.
In 'The Latency Period' (1930) Anna Freud stressed that 'children are already finished human beings' when they enter primary school, having 'already passed through a host of profound emotional experiences'. They have suffered a curtailment of their original egoism through love for the parents; they have experienced a violent desire for the possession of their mothers; they have displayed outbreaks of jealousy, and have defended their rights by death wishes directed against others. In relation to the father they experienced the torment of competition with a stronger rival, the sense of impotence, the depressing impact of a disappointment in love, and the gradual development of feelings of respect and admiration. They have moreover, passed through a complicated instinctual development, suffered strong fears and anxiety, and accomplished enormous changes within themselves. Burdened with this past, the 'child is indeed anything but a blank sheet'.

The transformation which has taken place by the time they come to school, however, is 'truly amazing'. The parents have every right to be proud if they have succeeded in turning the animal-like creature, crying, troublesome, dirty, hedonistic and sexual, into a 'more or less reasonable human being'. However, Anna Freud highlighted an observation which calls into question the value of the parents' work. Children of three or four years of age astonish observers with the wealth of their fantasy, perceptiveness, the lucidity of their minds, and the inflexible logic of their questions and conclusions. Yet the same children, when they enter primary school appear to the adult 'rather mediocre and commonplace'. Whatever has become of the child's cleverness and originality?

Psychoanalysis has an answer: these 'gifts' are not able to withstand the socialising demands which are made of infants; after the first five years of life they are 'as good as gone'. Evidently, to raise children to be 'good' is not without its dangers. The repressions, the reaction formations, and the sublimations required to achieve this result are acquired at the price of originality/...
originality and spontaneity. The limitations which are placed upon their thinking, and the obstacles put in the way of their primitive activities, result in 'restrictions of thinking and inhibitions of acting'.

This explanation seems clear enough but, surprisingly, Anna Freud admitted that the issue is far from being settled. There is 'no guarantee at all', she said, that the good behaviour of the older child is the product of education rather than simply the biological consequence of having reached a certain stage of development. There is no evidence to help decide what would happen if young children were allowed to develop without interference. Would they grow up like 'little savages' or would they spontaneously pass through a series of successive modifications? It is indubitable, of course, that education exerts a tremendous influence on children, but the question remains unanswered: what would happen if the adults around children refrained from checking them in any way?

Anna Freud returned to the nature/nurture controversy and to the discernible behavioural residues of the body zones in one of her last books, Normality and Pathology in Childhood (1965), where she assumed that with all normally endowed, organically undamaged children the 'lines of development' indicated are included in their constitution as inherent possibilities. On the side of the id, endowment lays down the maturational sequences in the development of libido and aggression; and on the side of the ego, certain tendencies towards organisation, defence, and structuralisation; perhaps also, though Anna Freud was unsure about this, some given quantitative differences of emphasis on progress in one direction or another. But for an explanation of what singles out individual lines for special developmental promotion, she advised us to look to accidental environmental influences. In the analysis of older children and the reconstructions from adult analysis Anna Freud found these forces embodied in the parents' personalities, their actions and ideals, the family ethos and the impact of the cultural setting as a whole.
And in the family setting Anna Freud re-emphasised the critical importance of the mother. Analytic observations of young infants have demonstrated, she claimed, that it is the individual mother's interest and predilection which act as stimulants. After birth the infant seems to concentrate on the development along those lines which most ostensibly elicit the mother's love and approval, and conversely, to neglect others where her approval is absent. This implies that activities which are acclaimed by the mother are repeated more frequently, become libidinised, and thereby stimulated into further growth.

There are several possible consequences of the mother's influence. First, the mother's contact with her infant through talking (in contrast to physical contact) seems to make a difference to the timing of speech development and the quality of early verbalisation. Second, some mothers express irritation with the growing infant's adventurousness and developing motility and induce a quiescent, smiling state. Third, early contact with the mother through her singing has consequences for the child's later attitudes to music and may promote special musical aptitudes. Fourth, the mother's disinterest in the infant's body may result in clumsiness, and lack of grace in movement. And, last, depressive moods of the mother during the early post-natal years create in the child a tendency to depression (which may not manifest itself until many years later). These infants achieve their sense of unity and harmony with the depressed mother not by means of their developmental achievements but by 'producing the mother's mood in themselves'.

In sum: tendencies, inclinations, and predilections (including the tendency to depression) which are present in all human beings are eroticised and stimulated towards growth through the mother-child emotional link.

This book is interesting, too, from another aspect. In her lectures in Vienna, Anna Freud had given a straightforward account of the psychosexual stages and their importance for human development. In this book she interpreted the/...
the sign - or signal-functions associated with these stages. That is, as a by-product of child analysis, many of the child's actions and preoccupations have become 'transparent' to psychoanalysts who can translate them (for the benefit of parents and teachers) into the unconscious counterpart from which they are derived. 56

The following are some of Anna Freud's examples of 'sign-functions' which derive from the psychosexual stages - oral, anal, and phallic.

The behaviour of children towards food reveals more to the 'knowing observer' than a mere 'fixation to the oral phase', to which the majority of food fads are commonly ascribed, and of which the child's greediness is the most obvious manifest representative. 57 The disturbances of eating are developmental ones, tied to particular phases and levels of id and ego growth, and their 'detailed observation and exploration fulfil the sign - or signal-function of behaviour details to perfection. 58

Orderliness, time sense, cleanliness, unaggressiveness are 'unmistakable pointers' to bygone conflicts with anal strivings. 59

Indicators for conflict in the phallic phase are shyness and modesty which are reaction formations to former exhibitionistic tendencies. 60 Buffoonery or clowning is a distortion of phallic exhibitionism with the showing off displaced from an asset of the individual to a defect. 61 Exaggerated manliness and noisy aggression are overcompensations for underlying castration fears. 62 Complaints about maltreatment and discrimination are transparent defences against passive phantasies and wishes. 63 And when children complain about excessive boredom 'we can be certain' that they have forcibly suppressed their masturbation phantasies or masturbatory activities. 64

Attitudes towards clothes offer other 'valuable clues' to hidden conflicts. 65 It is well known in analysis that exhibitionism can be displaced from the body to its coverings and appear in the form of vanity. If repressed and reacted against/...
against, it appears as untidiness in matters of dress. Undue sensitivity with regard to stiff and 'scratchy' materials indicates repressed skin eroticism. In girls, dislike of their female anatomy reveals itself in two opposite ways: as avoidance of feminine clothes, frills, and adornment; or as excessive wishes for showy, expensive dresses.

Even observation of the child's 'typical' play activities and games, Anna Freud claimed, is productive of 'inside information'. The well-known sublimatory occupations of painting, modelling, water and sand play point back to anal and urethral preoccupation. Dismantling toys to find out what is _inside_ betrays sexual curiosity. The manner in which children play with their toys is significant: whether their main pleasure is derived from staging crashes (symbols of parental intercourse); whether they are predominantly concerned with building tunnels and underground lines (expressing interest in the inside of the body); whether their cars and buses have to be loaded heavily (symbols of the pregnant mother); or whether speed and smooth performance are their main concern (symbols of phallic efficiency).

A boy's favourite position on the football field is a symbolic betrayal of his intimate relationships with other boys. Is he a defender? Is he an attacker? Is he able to compete? Does he really have a wish to succeed? Does he 'fit' an active, masculine role?

Anna Freud's explanation of a girl's obsessional love of horses is quintessentially psychoanalytic:

_A little girl's horse-craze betrays either her primitive autoerotic desires (if her enjoyment is confined to the rhythmic movement on the horse); or her identification with the caretaking mother (if she enjoys above all looking after the horse, grooming it, etc.); or her penis envy (if she identifies with the big, powerful animal and treats it as an addition to her body); or her phallic sublimations (if it is her ambition to master the horse, to perform on it, etc.)._
This multitude of attitudes, attributes, and activities, is displayed openly by children in their homes and schools. Since each item is tied genetically to a specific psychosexual stage which has given rise to it, they 'permit direct conclusions to be drawn' from the children's behaviour to some of the concerns and conflicts which play a central role in their hidden minds.

In *Normality and Pathology in Childhood*, too, Anna Freud returned to an abiding interest of hers - the involvement of psychoanalysis with legal definitions and proceedings. In particular, she was concerned with definitions of three things - dissociality, delinquency, and criminality. The uncertainties about the age limit for their application are reflected clearly in the perennial legal debates. For example, when should a child brought before a Court be classified merely as 'out of control', or 'in need of care and protection'? Or, up to which age should there be at least the 'presumption of lack of criminal responsibility'? Or, how long should the young person before a Court be given 'benefit of age' when intent is proved?

Anna Freud admitted that in psychoanalytic and educational usage, too, there is uncertainty about the ages for which the designations of dissocial, delinquent, or criminal are appropriate.

Despite the uncertainty shared by the legal, educational, and psychoanalytic professions, we might ask how Anna Freud dealt with the problem of delinquency. Sigmund Freud, we noticed, made his opinion crystal clear on this issue: he was not in favour of revolutionary children 'from any point of view'. Where did Anna stand on this? To answer this it is necessary to examine briefly how she conducted her psychoanalytic practice. What were her canons of behaviour? What did she expect from her patients? What criterion of therapeutic cure did she promote?
The analyst accordingly combines in his own person two difficult and diametrically opposed functions: he has to analyse and educate, that is to say, in the same breath he must allow and forbid, loosen and bind again. If the analyst does not succeed in this, analysis may become the child's charter for all the ill conduct prohibited by society.

(Anna Freud, *Four Lectures on Child Analysis*, 1927)

In 'Preparation for Child Analysis' (1927) Anna Freud related that she used a 'preparatory period' — a 'period of breaking the child in for analysis one might call it' — in order to produce the 'missing willingness to undergo analysis'. During this period she made no attempt to make unconscious processes conscious or analyse transferences and resistances but attempted, rather, to convert an 'unsuitable situation into a desirable one, by all the means which are at the disposal of an adult dealing with a child.'

How did she achieve this?

With one of her patients, a delinquent girl, she revealed that her procedure was essentially that recommended by her friend, August Aichhorn, for the treatment of delinquent children. He advised anyone entrusted with the care of such children to first of all take their side and assume that their rebellious attitudes are justified. In this way they will succeed in working with children instead of against them.

It is important to emphasise here that Anna Freud was not recommending the adoption of delinquency as legitimate social action. She was merely agreeing with Aichhorn that the best way to cure delinquency is to win the confidence of delinquents by becoming their allies against unsympathetic authority. When this confidence is won the process of social adjustment can begin.
How did Anna Freud win the confidence of her child-patients? She admitted in 'Child Analysis and the Upbringing of Children' (1927) that she used 'various means of enticement' such as crochetting, knitting, and games. Her central principle of 'enticement' represents the quintessence of psychoanalytic technique and has enormous implications for educational practice:

> Whatever we embark on with a child, whether we teach him arithmetic or geography, whether we intend to educate or analyse, we must always first establish a very definite emotional relationship with him.

Two further comments of hers are important. First, the more difficult the academic work, the greater will be the strain exerted on this attachment. And second, the establishment of this emotional bond is not determined by psychoanalytic theory and technique, but follows its own rules, based on the child's nature.

But to what end was the analytic material utilised when the child's confidence and trust had been secured 'by means of such cumbersome preparation and by so many paths and bypaths'? Anna Freud's explanation begins with a reconstruction of her everyday practice with adult patients. Their neuroses are exclusively internal dramas, involving three 'protagonists', the id, the ego, and the superego. The task of the analyst is to raise the conflict between these 'protagonists' to a higher level, by making conscious what is unconscious. Is analysis neutral in this conflict? Anna Freud left us in no doubt: analysis takes the side of the superego, which represents the 'ethical and aesthetic demands of society', and it is essential for the patient to be aware of what analysis is doing and to be a willing participant in the process:

> The instinctual impulses were until now repressed and therefore removed from the influence of the superego. Analysis frees them and makes them accessible to the influence of the superego which henceforth will determine their further fate. Repression is replaced by conscious critique/...
critique, which will reject some of the instinctual impulses, sublimate others, and having divested a part of them of their sexual aims allow them gratification.

How does this condition compare with that of child patients? Children's neuroses are internal affairs, too, determined by the same three forces, the instinctual life, the ego, and the superego. But there is an important difference. With children, the 'outer world penetrates deeply' and becomes an integral part of their psyches.

This is seen in the development of the child's superego. The child's superego is still weak and dependent for its development on a warm relationship with the parents. The adult's superego, in contrast, has become the autonomous representative of the moral demands made by society. But how does the superego make this progression from dependence to autonomy? This is achieved by 'identification'. The superego, she explained, owes its origin to the identification with the first and most important 'love objects' of the child, the parents, to whom society has transferred the task of establishing its current ethical claims and enforcing restrictions upon the drives. In the course of development from childhood to maturity, what was originally a personal obligation felt towards the parents becomes an ego ideal which functions independently of its human prototypes in the external world.

In the case of the child, however, the superego is not yet capable of such independence. Detachment from the parents still lies in the future, and identification with them is accomplished slowly and gradually. Even though the superego already exists and interacts with the ego at this early period, it is still dependent on the parents to whom it owes its existence. If the level of good relations with the parents rises, so does the internal status of the superego. If the former is lowered, the superego is diminished as well.

Analysts are convinced from their work with adults that a disturbance in children's ties to the parents 'critically affects moral development and character formation'. If at this time children lose their parents through separation/...
separation 'of any kind', or if their worth as human beings is depreciated in their eyes, perhaps through mental illness or criminality, their rudimentary superegos are also in danger of dissolution. As a result children lack firm internal structures to control the instinctual impulses which press for satisfaction. This may provide an explanation, Anna Freud thought, for the origin of some dissocial tendencies and character deformations.\textsuperscript{94}

For this reason, Anna Freud insisted on a difference between the analysis of a child and an adult. The analysis of a child is by no means an entirely private affair, played out exclusively between two persons, the analyst and the young patient. Insofar as the frail superego has not yet become the impersonal representative of social strictures and is still organically connected with it, the relevant external objects play an important role in the analysis itself.\textsuperscript{95}

The foregoing raises a question of fundamental importance. Who bears responsibility, then, in a child's analysis? Is it the parents or the analyst? To remain consistent with her theory Anna Freud would have to confer responsibility upon the parents with whom the child's superego is still inseparably bound up. But she had serious reservations.\textsuperscript{96} It was the excessive demands of these parents or guardians which drove the child into an excess of repression, and rarely does an analysis produce a permanent change in parental conduct. It seems dangerous, then, to leave the decision about the fate of the newly 'liberated' child entirely in their hands. There is too great a risk that the child will be forced once more into the path of repression and neurosis.

Nor is it realistic to put the onus of decision on the children themselves and expect them to deal successfully with the forbidden impulses placed again at their disposal. On which moral precepts should they rely, and by which criteria would they evaluate the existing external conditions? Anna Freud believed that, left alone and with every external support withdrawn, they can take only a 'single, short, and convenient path' towards direct gratification.\textsuperscript{97}
As indicated above, this was not recommended by the orthodox Freudians who claimed that it is desirable to avoid too much direct gratification of a child's 'necessarily perverse sexuality' at any stage of his development. Such a gratification, they claimed, will 'prove to be a hindrance to further normal development ...' 

What is the solution? For Anna Freud there was 'but one', and it settled an awesome responsibility on the shoulders of analysts as custodians of public morality. The analyst, she said, must claim the liberty to guide the child at this important point, in order to secure the achievements of analysis. The analyst's views 'must in the end determine what part of the infantile sexual impulses must be suppressed or rejected as unsuitable in civilised society; how much or how little can be allowed direct gratification; and what outlets can be opened up via sublimation'.

It is quite clear from her reply that Anna Freud, like her father, envisaged the role of the psychoanalyst as representative of 'civilised society'. The parents, too, of course, are representatives of society. Ideally, there should be no discord between them if they are both committed to the socialisation of the child. But what happens if there is a clash of values between the two - analyst and parent? Does the analyst's authority take precedence over all other considerations, including parental objections? The analyst, Anna Freud insisted, must succeed in taking the place of the child's ego ideal for the duration of the analysis; and ought not to begin any 'analytic work of liberation' until it is certain that the child is 'eager to follow'. For this purpose it is essential that the analyst has a 'position of authority'; before the highest place in emotional life, that of ego ideal or superego, can be transferred from the parents to the analyst, the child needs to feel that the 'analyst's authority is even greater than theirs'.

This is not to suggest, however, that Anna Freud undervalued parental co-operation. If the parents learn something from the child's illness, and 'show/...
show an inclination to conform to the analyst's requirements', a division of analytic and educational labour between home and analyst becomes possible - or rather, a co-operation between the two. In this case the child's education suffers no interruption but passes back, wholly and directly, from the analyst to the enlightened parents.

But what would happen if the parents refuse to accept the hegemony of the analyst and use their influence to undermine the child's confidence? The outlook is bleak. Since the child is emotionally attached to both parents and analyst, the result is a situation similar to that in an unhappy marriage where the child has become a contentious issue. As the child plays off father against mother, the analyst, too, can be played off against home, and the conflicts existing between them used as a means to escape from all demands in both cases.

What, then, did Anna Freud recommend when an environment is hostile either to analysis or to the child?

In such an instance, she wrote in 'The Role of Transference in the Analysis of Children' (1927), the sick child may have to be removed from the family and placed in a suitable institution, such as a house supervised by a child analyst or a school organised according to psychoanalytic principles and 'geared to co-operation with the analyst'. In the former, the re-enactment of the pathology would be a genuine transference neurosis in the sense in which we use this term in relation to adults - with the analyst as focal object. In the latter, we should simply have artificially bettered the home environment, by creating a substitute home which allows us to see into it, as far as this seems necessary for the analytic work, with substitute parents whose relations towards the child we could influence.

Thus the removal of disturbed children from their homes might appear to be the most practical solution. But Anna Freud mentioned two objections to it. First, it involves the precipitation of the natural development of children at a crucial stage by detaching them prematurely from their parents on whom they are still emotionally dependent. Even if the analysis lasted a long time there would/...
would probably remain a hiatus between its termination and the beginning of adulthood, during which children need education, protection, and careful guidance. Second, there is no assurance that after successful analyses children will be able to deal adequately with 'emotional' situations. When they return home they are treated awkwardly, almost as strangers; and their further guidance is entrusted to the very adults who made them ill to begin with. On inner grounds they are not capable of self-reliance. They would be placed in a position where they would find again most of the conditions that originally gave rise to their conflicts.

What can children do in such a difficult situation? Anna Freud was pessimistic: they can take again either the path to neurosis, or if this is closed by a successful analysis, the opposite line of open rebellion. From the purely therapeutic point of view Anna Freud admitted that this may seem an improvement; but 'from the aspect of social adjustment which after all is demanded from every child', it will not appear so.  

If Anna Freud recommended the removal of neurotic children from their homes to a suitable institution or school run on psychoanalytic principles for the purpose of social adjustment, then we might ask at this stage: did she view schooling, too, purely and simply as a process of socialisation - as her father did? If so, what educational principles did she expound?

IV

'Step by step education aims at the exact opposite of what the child wants, and at each step it regards as desirable the very opposite of the child's inherent instinctual strivings'.

(Anna Freud, Four Lectures on Psychoanalysis for Teachers and Parents, 1930)

In 'The Instinctual Life of Early Childhood' (1930) Anna Freud returned to the verdict given by a German law court that the education of a child begins with the first day of life. The verdict raises a question: what should we conceive of/...
of as 'education' from the first day of life? What is there to educate in the tiny 'animal-like creature' whose mental processes are virtually unknown to us? According to the description sketched in 'Infantile Amnesia and the Oedipus Complex' (1930) of children's traumatic relations with the people of their environment, one might, perhaps, think the answer is simple. Our task would be to check the child's hostile wishes directed towards siblings and father, as well as the wish for sexual possession of the mother, and to prevent them from materialising.

But this definition of early education is clearly unsatisfactory. It assumes that children are dangerous when, in fact, they are not. Young children are really helpless and powerless in the world of adults. Every comparison of their strengths with adults is very much to their disadvantage. They have, therefore, not the slightest chance of carrying out their dangerous wishes.

Anna Freud attempted, therefore, a definition from a new starting point - again in reference to the legal verdict quoted at the end of 'Infantile Amnesia and the Oedipus Complex' (1930) - by comparing two ideas of child care and child education. There is no difficulty about giving a definition of child care. This basically consists of the fulfilment of the child's bodily needs. Whoever takes care of children satisfies their hunger, keeps them clean, warm and comfortable, and protects them against troubles and dangers. Children are given all they need for their basic existence without anything being asked in return. Education, however, 'always demands something of the child'.

What, then, are the demands or aims of education? These are innumerable and differ according to the diverse values of the adults. Nevertheless, the plethora of aims have one feature in common: they desire to 'turn the child into a grown-up person not very different from the adult world around him'. Consequently, Anna Freud considered the starting-point of education occurs wherever the child differs from adults; 'it struggles with the child's demeanour or as the adults see it his misdemeanours'.

How do parents react to these misdemeanours? One is a feeling of hopelessness; scarcely have they broken the child of one bad habit than another takes its place. The other is a sense of bewilderment: they cannot understand/...
understand where all these disgusting habits come from. The misdemeanours of children remain merely a chaotic, disorderly mass of peculiarities. This bewilderment is shared with the scientific observers who have not regarded the child in a much more objective light but have denied all these features which did not harmonise with the innocent picture which they have outlined of the child's nature. It was psychoanalysis, Anna Freud claimed, that 'first freed itself from the judgements, the assumptions, and the prejudices with which adults have from time immemorial approached the evaluation of infantile nature'.

As a result, the 'mass of inexplicable and displeasing phenomena arranged itself into an organic whole'. What had appeared as arbitrary peculiarities was shown by Freud to be an 'orderly sequence of developmental stages such as have been long recognised for the growth of the human body'. Psychoanalysis also found the answer to the parents' two complaints mentioned above. Neither the rapid replacement of one habit by another nor their arousal without external influence remain puzzling once these habits are no longer seen as 'deplorable, haphazard abnormalities', but are viewed as 'natural, normal links in an organic chain of development'.

Throughout this whole period of time children behave as if nothing were more important than the pursuit and gratification of their own pleasures, whereas the adults act as if the prevention of these aims was their most important task. The result is a perpetual battle between child and adults. The latter want to replace the child's pleasure in dirt by disgust for it, shamelessness by shame, cruelty by pity, destructiveness by care. They want sexual curiosity and genital play eliminated by prohibitions, lack of consideration for others changed into considerateness, and egoism converted into altruism.

To put the situation briefly: to children the 'attainment of pleasure is the main object of life'. The adult, however, wants to teach them to regard the claims of the external world as more important than internal urges. Children are present-orientated: impatient and acting only to indulge their momentary whims; the adult persuades them to postpone the gratification of impulses in the light of future needs.
It is essential to realise what analysts are claiming: children live in a world of sexual hedonism where every action is pleasure-seeking. Thus Anna Freud claimed that 'there is no essential distinction made between the pleasure gained from finger sucking and from playing with the genitals.' Indeed, from the standpoint of psychoanalysis 'no such distinction exists'. Moreover, the pleasurable acts performed by the child are of a sexual nature: Psychoanalysis invests them all with sexual significance whether they are carried out directly on the sexual organs, or the mouth, or the anus.

But what happens if adults are unable to persuade children to forego gratification of their instincts? When this happens they run the risk of becoming perverts; and this in turn, affects their emotional and intellectual development. Anna Freud explained this as follows: there are abnormal cases in which the gratification of one or more of the infantile impulses never becomes subordinated to that obtained at the genital zone, but remains at one of the earlier stages, dominating the adult's sexual life to the exclusion of normal sex. These persons are called perverts. It is characteristic of them that in their sexuality they have remained at the stage of the pre-genital child, or have returned to that stage.

For this reason adults restrain children from the gratification of their impulses. Anna Freud expressed the normal process as follows: the phases of development through which children have to pass 'should be no more than stations on the way to a prescribed goal'. When one of these stopping places appears too attractive to children, there is the danger that they will want to settle there permanently and refuse to continue the journey to a further stage of development.

What can educators and parents do to discourage children from staying too long at one station? There are two ways to prevent them succumbing to these 'dreaded gratifications'. First, they may be threatened with physical violence. And second, parents may threaten to withdraw their love.
Anna Freud admitted that both methods are equally effective. Under pressure children learn to abandon their primitive wishes. Gradually, as they identify increasingly with adults, they accept their values as the 'true ones', forget that they have ever felt otherwise, turn away from everything they formerly desired, and block a return to these earlier pleasures by an absolute reversal of the feelings connected with the former satisfactions.

What are the consequences of the renunciation of hedonism for the child's individual mental development? First, children apply the standards which have been enforced on them to other human beings and become intolerant to those who have not achieved the same. Second, as their memories turn away from the pleasurable experiences once so highly prized, all the feelings and experiences associated with this period of life are simultaneously ejected. They forget the past, which now in retrospect can appear to them only as 'unworthy and repulsive'.

Although children forget the first most important experiences of childhood, it must not be thought that these experiences are no longer potent. The child is still, emotionally, a prisoner of the past and teachers must take this into consideration when they meet the child in school. Consequently, Anna Freud insisted in 'Infantile Amnesia and the Oedipus Complex' (1930) that teachers are mistaken if they think that the older children with whom they deal have outgrown the stage of emotional bondage with the mother, the early jealousy, and all those stormy conflicts of the first years of life. Instead, she posited a direct, emotional link between the children who arrive in primary school and the children who have been entangled in a home-spun web of love, hate, jealousy and aggression:

What you meet in your groups of classes are phenomena directly connected with this earlier period of life. The children whom you call quarrelsome, asocial, envious, and discontent are substituting their school-mates for their siblings, and there, at school, are fighting out with them conflicts which have remained unsolved at home. Similarly, those who react violently if you exercise the slightest show of authority, or those who are so cowed that they do not even venture to look you in the face or to raise their voices in class, have substituted you for their father and transferred to you either the hostility and death wishes towards him or the rejection of such wishes, with the resultant anxious submissiveness.
This is in complete accordance, of course, with her father's viewpoint: the family is of paramount importance and pre-determines the relationships of children with their school-mates and teachers.

Although teachers must recognise this emotional link with the past, in 'The Latency Period' (1930) Anna Freud counselled teachers to utilise the period covering the primary school years (the latency period), when children are less disturbed by their drives and not exclusively engrossed in their inner conflicts, to begin a training of the intellect. Schoolteachers seem to understand that children are the more capable of learning the less subject they are to their instinctual urges, and consequently they disapprove of pupils who seek drive gratification.

But how are the two periods of infancy and latency related? How are the possibilities of education in these periods related to one another? Is there a difference between the attitude of infants to their parents and that of primary school children to their teachers and tutors? Does the teacher simply inherit the role of the child's parents?

As the children's emotional situation changes in the latency period so their relations to their parents change also. As the infantile drives begin to weaken, the passionate feelings which have hitherto dominated the parent-child relationship are mitigated. Children begin to see their parents in a more reasonable light: they correct their 'overestimation' of the father, whom until now they have regarded as omnipotent; and the intense love for the mother 'gives way to a tenderness which makes fewer claims and is no longer devoid of criticism'.

At the same time children try to obtain a certain amount of freedom from their parents, and begin to seek additional objects for their love and admiration. They initiate a 'process of detachment' which continues throughout the whole of the latency period. However, this detachment from the parents, the/...
the earliest and most important love objects, does not mean that the influence of the parents ends with removal from them. Their influence simply changes from an external to an internal one. Children develop an inner force, an 'inner voice', a conscience, which determines their actions.

Psychoanalysts have no doubt regarding the origin of the conscience, or superego. It is the 'continuation of the voice of the parents which is now operative from within instead of, as formerly, from without'. The children have absorbed, as it were, through a kind of psychical osmosis, their values and attitudes and have made them an essential part of their being. Their egos accord a 'special place of honour' to this internalised authority, regard it as an ideal, and willingly submit to its demands. When they are strong enough to disobey it, they are overcome with guilt feelings. When they obey it they feel pleased with themselves. Thus the former overt relations between child and parents are perpetuated within the child, and the severity or mildness of the parent-care is reflected to a degree in the attitude of superego to ego.

The former question concerning the differences between education in early childhood and in the latency period is now easy to answer.

The earliest educators and the small children are opposed to each other like two warring factions. The parents want something that the children do not want; the children want what the parents do not want. The children pursue their aims with single-minded passion; the parents resort to bribes, threats, or forcible measures to thwart them. In this early period one goal is diametrically opposed to the other.

In the latency period the situation is altogether different. The children who confront the primary school teacher are no longer undivided beings; they are divided within themselves. If their egos occasionally pursue their earlier egoistic aims, their superegos - the successors to their parents - are on the side of the educators. This psychical split offers a golden opportunity to educators. What they ought to do, Anna Freud said, is to recognise the split within the child and act accordingly; and if they 'succeed in allying themselves with the child's superego, the battle for drive control and social adaptation will be won'.
If the teachers do succeed in assuming the role of the superego for each of the children in school, they acquire the 'right to their submission'. If they merely represented a parent for each child, then all the unsolved conflicts of early childhood would be enacted around them; moreover, the class-group would be torn asunder by rivalry and jealousies. But if they do succeed in representing their superego, the ideal of the group, 'the compulsory obedience changes into voluntary submission'. Moreover, all the children under their guidance will 'develop ties to each other and become a united group'.

In her last lecture, 'The Relation between Psychoanalysis and Education' (1930), Anna Freud dealt with the question which many teachers will consider of supreme importance in the light of psychoanalytic theory: should educators of the young be more or be less authoritarian than they have been in the past?

She said that psychoanalysis 'so far' has stood for limiting the efforts of education by emphasising some specific dangers associated with it. Recall the struggle by which children come to fulfil the demands of the adult world; how they overcome their first strong emotional attachments by identification with the parents; how they escape from their external influence, only to submit to a new agency within themselves, the superego, which continues to maintain their parents' influence. It is this incorporation of the parent figure which Anna Freud claimed is a dangerous step, since due to it the parents' prohibitions and demands become fixed and unchangeable, that is, 'historical residues which are incapable of adapting themselves to external changes'.

What should teachers do, then, to help pupils? There are two conflicting answers to this from two opposed schools of analytic thought and the ensuing controversy has endured to the present day. The analyst whose therapeutic work consists of resolving such inhibitions and developmental disturbances is tempted to advocate liberation from restraint. Would it not have been better to have placed somewhat less emphasis on decorum and convention? Would the permission of gratifications really have any effect as adverse as the neurosis caused by their prohibition? What education has done, this proponent would argue, is to split the children's psychical structures: to...
incite internal conflicts; to diminish their capacity to love freely; and to render them incapable of enjoyment in life and work. The analytic educators to whom all this is apparent - Wilhelm Reich (1897-1957) and A.S. Neill (1884-1973) are examples - resolve not to participate in such efforts, but to leave their pupils free rather than to educate them in this way. They decide to 'risk their being somewhat unruly rather than enforcing on them such crippling of their personalities'.

The second viewpoint is quite different. Education appears in a very different light when viewed not from the aspect of neurotic inhibition but from the aspect of delinquency. In his book *Wayward Youth* (1925) August Aichhorn claimed that children become delinquents because they do not succeed sufficiently in inhibiting drive gratification; they cannot divert enough energy from their sexual drives to employ it for social purposes. They refuse, therefore, to submit to the restrictions which are essential for the working of any community, and withdraw from any participation in its activities. But the situation would have been different, in Aichhorn's view, if education had succeeded in first imposing external checks to be transformed later into internal standards.

Which of the viewpoints did Anna Freud recommend? The first course of allowing gratifications, or the second of checking these and diverting the energy to other pursuits? Following Aichhorn she recommended the classic Aristotelian 'golden mean':

The task of upbringing based on analytic understanding is to find a middle road between these extremes - that is to say, to find for each stage in the child's life the right proportion between drive gratification and drive control.
Let us recapitulate. The derivatives of the body zones—mouth, anus, and genitals—persist far into later life. For example, greediness and craving for sweets are derivatives of the oral zone; playing with sand, water, and mud, 'smearing' with paints, and modelling are derivatives of the anal zone; and the thirst for knowledge is a derivative of the genital stage when children are aware of sexual differences.

Each item of a multitude of attitudes, attributes, and activities, is tied genetically to a specific psychosexual stage, and they permit direct conclusions to be drawn from children's behaviour to some of the concerns and conflicts which play a central role in their hidden minds.

Whereas Freud emphasised the critical importance of the mother late in his life, Anna Freud— and all subsequent analysts—consistently emphasised the mother's centrality from the outset. Like her father, Anna traced the close, emotional tie between infant and mother to the first important zone, the mouth, the receptacle of her lacteal nourishment.

The tie with the mother has important consequences for all aspects of human development. For example, for the timing of speech development and the quality of early verbalisation; for the degree of adventurousness and motility; for later attitudes to music; for clumsiness and lack of grace; and for the general emotional states of the child.

In a more general sense, all subsequent inter-personal relationships are based on the child's relationships within the family setting. Thus, children are not 'blank sheets' when they enter primary school, but have passed through a host of profound emotional experiences in relation to the imagos of parents, siblings and others close to them in early life.
What, then, should teachers do? Anna Freud outlined, as an analogue, what analysts do in relation to child-patients. First of all, they 'must always first establish a very definite emotional relationship'. When this has been achieved, the analyst's views determine what instincts must be suppressed or rejected or sublimated in accordance with the standards of 'decent' society. If there is a clash of opinion between the analyst and the parents regarding the conduct of the child's therapy, it may be necessary to place the child in a psychoanalytic institution. This is not to say, however, that Anna Freud undervalued parental co-operation - far from it, she (unlike Klein) welcomed parents as important catalysts in the therapeutic process. But it is essential for the analyst to have a 'position of authority' when dissension arises.

The plethora of educational aims have one feature in common: they desire to turn children into grown-up persons 'not very different' from the adults around them. Education, then, starts with children's demeanours or, as the adults see it, their misdemeanours. These misdemeanours should not horrify adults: they are part-and-parcel of the sexual, hedonistic world of children where the 'attainment of pleasure is the main object of life'.

Nevertheless, the phases of development through which children have to pass should be no more than 'stations' on the way to a prescribed goal. The educational task of adults is to 'lead' children from one station to the next towards 'maturity'; if teachers fail in this task children run the risk of becoming permanently settled at one station with a pathogenic effect on their emotional and intellectual development.

The latency period (when children are less disturbed by inner conflicts) is the best time to begin the process of socialisation. During this period children obtain more emotional freedom from their parents than hitherto. This does not...
not mean that parents have no more influence with their children; but the influence changes from an external to an internal one. Children develop an 'inner voice', a conscience, which determines all future actions. This 'voice', the superego, is a continuation of the voice of the parents, the children absorbing as it were, through a kind of psychical osmosis, the parental values and attitudes.

The emergence of the child's superego is a golden opportunity for teachers - all they have to do is to take the place of the superegos of their pupils and so win the battle for drive control and social adaptation. If they succeed in doing this, the compulsory obedience changes into 'voluntary submission'. Moreover, the children will develop ties to one another and become a united group.

It is quite clear that Anna Freud followed closely in the footsteps of her father. It is not being suggested by this, however, that her work is merely a dutiful repetition of the basic tenets of her father. Such an implication would seriously undervalue the great contribution which she made to the creation of a 'psychology of the ego'; that is, the problems faced by the ego in its attempts to reconcile the hedonistic, asocial desires of the id with the socialising strictures of the superego. This concern is evident in her life-long preoccupation with delinquency and her related attempts to create a psychoanalytic sociopathology.

While Anna Freud was working in Vienna her great rival, Melanie Klein, had emigrated in 1926 to England where she established an influential school of child-analysis. Klein thus had an advantage over Anna Freud who did not emigrate to England until 1938. During these dozen years Klein had the opportunity to publicise her views among the British psychoanalytic community which included Susan Isaacs, a devoted disciple and friend.

Let us turn, then, to an examination of the work of Melanie Klein.
NOTES AND REFERENCES


3. Paul Schilder (1886-1940) and Heinz Hartmann (1894-1971) were the first and second assistants respectively to Wagner-Jauregg. Speaking in 1964 of her hospital rounds with them, Anna Freud revealed their psychoanalytic importance for her: 'The ward rounds, especially when led by Schilder, were highly instructive, and what they taught was never forgotten by me. We all listened spellbound to the revelations made by the patients, their dreams, delusions, fantastic systems, which the analytically knowledgeable among us fitted into a scheme' (quoted in Peters, *Anna Freud*, p. 30).

4. Julius Wagner-Jauregg (1847-1940) was appointed Professor of Psychiatry and Neurology at the University of Vienna in 1893. In 1927 he received the only Nobel Prize ever awarded to a psychiatrist for his 'Malaria Therapy of Progressive Paralysis' (Peters, *Anna Freud*, p. 28).

5. It is probable that Anna Freud was analysed by her father. This has aroused adverse comment from the Kleinians who claim that, this being so, her Oedipus complex must have remained unresolved. The resolution of the Oedipal conflict depends on an adequate transfer of the analysand's ambivalent feelings for the father to the 'neutral' analyst. But if the analyst is also the father who inspired the feelings to begin with, an adequate 'transference' is impossible. As a consequence, the Kleinians argue that Anna Freud's analysis was incomplete, and that she, therefore, was not 'qualified' to analyse patients. Peters, however, deals sympathetically with this issue in favour of Anna Freud. Indeed, he adduces new evidence that Melanie Klein herself actually analysed her own children and that her early theories of child development, based on these analyses, are suspect. (Peters, *ibid.*, pp. 85-93).


7. Although Edward Glover had enthusiastically accepted and promoted Klein's teaching during the 1920s, he came to realise the extent of speculation in her thought. Glover subsequently resigned all his positions in the British Society, acknowledging that he had

8. In 1938, shortly after emigrating to England, Anna Freud was approached by another inspector, J.C. Hill, the London County Council Inspector of Schools, who enlisted her help in presenting a series of lectures on psychoanalytic psychology to teachers and educators in London. Hill was personally interested in Freud's psychology and its application to education and teaching. Anna Freud agreed to a series of three lectures which Hill described as 'very well attended and enthusiastically received' (Raymond Dyer, The Work of Anna Freud, p. 139).

9. Dorothy Burlingham (1891-1979) came from the wealthy Tiffany family, and enjoyed financial security. She left her husband, whom she considered 'mentally disturbed' and moved to Vienna in 1925, bringing her son with her for a consultation with Anna Freud. Eventually, all four of Burlingham's children received analytic treatment. Dorothy Burlingham, too, was analysed, first by Theodor Reik, and then by Freud. From 1928 until the Anschluss she lived at 17 Berggasse, one floor above the Freuds, and became the most intimate friend of Anna Freud. In 1932, Burlingham became an associate member of the Vienna Psychoanalytical Society, and began to practise analysis with children and adults in 1934. She became a full member of the Vienna Society in 1937. Burlingham joined the Freuds when they emigrated to England in 1938, and stayed with Anna Freud at 20 Maresfield Gardens, London, until her death on November 19, 1979. Dorothy Burlingham shunned publicity and little is known about her. See Uwe H. Peters, Anna Freud, Raymond Dyer The Work of Anna Freud, and Paul Roazen Freud and His Followers for relevant information.

10. Edith B. Jackson, an American psychiatrist, had trained in Anna Freud's child-analysis seminar. The key workers at the Jackson Nursery were, in addition to Anna Freud and Edith Jackson, Josephine Stross as paediatrician, Julia Deming in charge of feeding schedules, Dorothy Burlingham, and a number of both Austrian and American professional and volunteer workers (Anna Freud, 'Edith B. Jackson: in memoriam; Journal of the American Academy of Child Psychiatry, Volume 17, 1978, pp. 730-731). The motivation for the 'analytical-educational experiment' was the wish to 'gather direct (as opposed to reconstructed) information about still earlier ages, particularly the second year of life, which we deemed all-important for the child's essential advance from primary to secondary process functioning; for the establishment of feeding and sleeping habits; for acquiring the rudiments of superego development and impulse control (and) for the establishment of object ties to peers' (Anna Freud, ibid., p. 731). The Jackson Nursery was the model for the later Hampstead War Nursery, opened by Anna Freud and Dorothy Burlingham.

11. Anna Freud's description of the Jackson Day Nursery, and her relationship to Montessori educational theory is quoted in Peters, Anna Freud, p.46.

13. Accounts of the foundation and conduct of the Hampstead Child Therapy Course are contained in Peters, *Anna Freud*, pp. 175-176, and Dyers, *The Work of Anna Freud*, pp. 193-203. Besides Anna Freud's Hampstead Child Therapy Course, there are two other organisations offering training in Great Britain: The Society of Analytical Psychology (Jungian) and The British Association of Psychotherapists (Freudian and Jungian).


19. Ibid., p. 98.

20. Ibid., p. 99.

21. Ibid., p. 100.

22. Ibid., p. 100.


24. The belief that sexual knowledge is innate is part-and-parcel of Freud's belief that '... each individual somehow recapitulates in an abbreviated form the entire development of the human race ...' ('The Archaic Features and Infantilism of Dreams', 1916-1917 Standard Edition, Volume 15, p. 199). Consequently, Freud was convinced that both the development of the ego and of the libido 'are at bottom heritages, abbreviated recapitulations of the development which all mankind has passed through from its primeval days over long periods of time' ('Some Thoughts on Development and Regression - Aetiology', 1916-1917, Standard Edition, Volume 16, p. 354). The central experience of childhood, the Oedipus complex, is 'one of them' - that is, the phylogenetically inherited schemata ('From the History of an Infantile Neurosis', 1918, Standard Edition, Volume 17, p. 119. Freud's belief that sexual knowledge is innate is stated unequivocally in 'Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year Old Boy' (1909). 'Little Hans' noticed his mother's pregnancy, which had ended with the birth of his little sister when he was three and a half years old. Freud was convinced that Hans 'knew in his unconscious where the baby came from and where it had been before ...' (ibid., Standard Edition, Volume 10, p. 129). This was 'proved beyond a shadow of doubt' by his analysis, Freud claimed; indeed, this is 'perhaps its most unassailable feature' (ibid., p. 129).

25. Anna Freud, 'Infantile Amnesia and the Oedipus Complex', Writings, Volume 1, p. 83.

26. Ibid., p. 83.

27. Ibid., p. 84.

28. Ibid., p. 84.

29. Ibid., p. 85.

30. Ibid., p. 85.

31. Ibid., p. 85.

32. Ibid., p. 85.

33. Ibid., p. 85.

34. Ibid., p. 86.

35. Ibid., p. 87.
Anna Freud referred to an important psychoanalytic experiment which was conducted to investigate the 'natural' upbringing of children. In 1921, Vera Schmidt, a Russian analyst, founded in Moscow a residential home for thirty pre-school children. She called it Children's Home Laboratory. Schmidt employed 'scientifically trained' teachers to observe quietly the children's various emotional and instinctual manifestations. Although they could help and stimulate, the teachers were instructed to 'interfere as little as possible with the changes that were taking place in the children's personalities' (ibid., p. 113). In this way, Schmidt hoped to establish two things: (i) whether the various phases which follow one another during the first years of infancy arise and disappear spontaneously without any direct educational influence; and (ii) whether children, without coercion, would abandon their pleasurable activities and the sources of these after a certain period of time and substitute new ones (ibid., pp. 113-114). Unfortunately, Schmidt's school closed as a result of Marxist hostility to psychoanalysis, and the experiment remained unresolved. An account of the Russian and Soviet-Russian interest in Freud is given in the current standard work on the history of Soviet psychology, A.V. Petrovsky, Isotorya sovetskoj psixologii (1967), pp. 79-94.
53. Ibid., p. 87.
54. Ibid., p. 87.
55. Ibid., p. 87.
56. Ibid., p. 18. Anna Freud was not the first psychoanalyst to draw attention to the sign- or signal- functions which behaviour details may have for the observer. Indeed, she referred to Heinz Hartmann's paper, 'Psychoanalysis and the Developmental Psychology', The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, Volume 5, 1950, pp. 7-17, as an example of this general psychoanalytic awareness (ibid., p.18).
57. Ibid., p. 20.
58. Ibid., p. 20.
59. Ibid., p. 18.
60. Ibid., p. 18.
61. Ibid., pp. 18-19.
62. Ibid., p. 19.
63. Ibid., p. 19.
64. Ibid., p. 19.
65. Ibid., p. 21.
66. Ibid., p. 21.
67. Ibid., p. 19.
68. Ibid., p. 19.
69. Ibid., p. 19.
70. Ibid., pp. 19-20.
71. Ibid., p. 20.
72. Ibid., p. 20.
73. Ibid., p. 21.
74. Ibid., p. 165.
75. Ibid., p. 165.
82. Ibid., p. 10. August Aichhorn was born in Vienna on July 27, 1878. At the age of twenty, the year his twin brother died, he became a teacher in one of the grade schools of the City of Vienna. When in 1907 military settlements for boys were introduced in Vienna, he led a successful fight against that institution. In the following year he became the chairman of a new board which was officially assigned the duty of organising boys' settlements. In 1918, with a group of idealistic followers, he organised an institution for delinquent boys in Oberhollabrunn, Austria. Aichhorn's work there formed part of his book, Wayward Youth (1925). K.R. Eissler recorded in his preface to Wayward Youth that as soon as Aichhorn came into contact with psychoanalysis he 'knew that he had found a key to the maze of his puzzling observations' (ibid., p. xii). Indeed, Aichhorn admitted that his book was the 'application of psychoanalysis to the treatment of delinquent youth' (ibid., p. 3). Following the success of his experiment in Oberhollabrunn he organised and conducted for the City Administration child guidance clinics throughout Vienna. After his retirement from municipal service Aichhorn was made chairman of the child guidance clinic of the Vienna Psychoanalytical Society. He died on October 13, 1949.

83. Anna Freud, 'Child Analysis and the Upbringing of Children' (1927), Writings, Volume 1, p. 50.

84. Ibid., p. 51.

85. Ibid., p. 51.

86. Ibid., p. 53.

87. Ibid., p. 53.

88. Ibid., p. 53. Anna Freud continued to emphasise the importance of the emotional tie between adult and child for the achievement of social adaptation. In Infants Without Families (1944), she and Dorothy Burlingham concluded that success or failure of education in the residential nursery will depend on the strength of the child's attachments to the grown-ups of the nursery. 'If these relationships are deep and lasting, the residential child will take the usual course of development, form a normal superego and become an independent moral and social being. If the grown-ups of the nursery remain remote and impersonal figures, or if, as happens in some nurseries, they change so often that no permanent attachment is effected at all, institutional education will fail in this important respect. The children, through the force of inner circumstances, will then show defects in their character-development, their adaptation to society may remain on a superficial level, and their future be exposed to the danger of all kinds of dissocial development' (ibid., pp. 105-106).
89. Ibid., p. 53.
90. Ibid., p. 54.
91. Ibid., p. 54.
92. Ibid., pp. 55-56.
93. Ibid., p. 56.
94. Ibid., p. 56.
95. Ibid., p. 58.
96. Ibid., p. 58.
97. Ibid., p. 60.
98. Ibid., p. 60.
99. Ibid., p. 60.
100. Ibid., p. 60.
101. Ibid., p. 60.
102. Ibid., p. 60.
103. Ibid., p. 60.
104. Ibid., p. 60.
105. Ibid., p. 60.
106. Ibid., p. 60.
107. Anna Freud, 'The Role of Transference in the Analysis of Children', Writings, Volume 1, p. 47.
108. Ibid., pp. 48-49.
109. Ibid., p. 49.
11. Ibid., pp. 92-93.
12. Ibid., p. 93.
15. Ibid., p. 94.

32. Ibid., p. 87. Anna Freud remained consistent with the view that children's behaviour in school can only be understood in relation to Oedipal conflicts. In 'Dynamic Psychology and Education' (1976), she recalled that, working with nursery school teachers in Vienna in the early 1920s, she and her colleagues had demonstrated that playrooms became 'stages where sexual and aggressive scenes in the parental bedroom were acted out by the children, and that understanding of this non-verbal communication offered a key to the children's confusions, distresses, anxieties, unruliness, and unco-operativeness, i.e. to behaviour problems which remained inexplicable otherwise' (*Writings*, Volume 8, 1982, pp. 309-310.).
140. Ibid., p. 118.
141. Ibid., p. 119-120.
142. Ibid., p. 120.
143. Ibid., p. 120.
144. Ibid., p. 120.
145. Anna Freud, 'The Relation between Psychoanalysis and Education' Writings, Volume 1, p. 123.
146. Ibid., p. 123.
147. Ibid., p. 124.
148. Ibid., p. 126.
149. In his book, Wayward Youth (1925), August Aichhorn revealed that he used the techniques of psychoanalysis to induce social conformity: 'Psychoanalysis enables the worker to recognise dissocial manifestations as the result of an interplay of psychic forces, to discover the unconscious motives of such behaviour, and to find means of leading the dissocial back to social conformity' (ibid., p. 3). And, like Freud, Aichhorn utilised the transference phenomenon, the emotional tie arising from the analyst-patient or teacher-pupil encounter, to achieve this conformity: 'In remedial training we cannot be content with transient results which arise from the emotional tie of the dissocial boy or girl to the worker. We must succeed, as in psychoanalysis, in bringing the wayward youth under the influence of the transference to a definite achievement. This achievement consists in a real character change, in the setting up of a socially directed ego-ideal, that is, in the retrieving of that part of his development which is necessary for a proper adjustment to society' (ibid., p. 236).
150. Anna Freud, 'The Relation between Psychoanalysis and Education', ibid., p. 128.
CHAPTER 4

MELANIE KLEIN (1882-1960)

The influence Melanie Klein had on psychoanalytic technique begins with child analysis, and extends beyond the work of her immediate followers and pupils. The play technique she evolved is the basis of psychoanalytic play therapy, now almost universally accepted and widely used throughout the world.

(Segal, Klein, 1979)
Melanie Klein was born on March 30, 1882, at 8 Tiefer Graben in Vienna, only a few blocks from the Freud's apartment. Her father, Dr. Moriz Reizes, came from an Orthodox Jewish family who arranged his marriage to a girl he had never seen. He rebelled, however, against their orthodoxy and, contrary to hopes that he would follow a religious vocation, studied in secret, acquired the Matura, and entered medical school in Vienna where he later practised maxillary surgery.

When he became independent, Dr. Reizes divorced his first wife and subsequently married Libussa Deutsch, a young Jewish girl from an enlightened rabbinical family. Four children were born of this marriage - Emily, Emmanuel, Sidonie and Melanie. Melanie, the youngest, was deeply marked by her relation to Sidonie and Emmanuel, both of whom died tragically young. Hanna Segal, a pupil and subsequently colleague of Klein, wrote in her study of her teacher that their deaths contributed 'not a little to the lasting streak of depression which was part of Melanie's personality.'

Klein studied at Vienna's Gymnasium, and left in 1899 when she received the Matura diploma. She then studied art and history at the University of Vienna, but left without graduating. In 1903 she married her second cousin, Dr. Arthur Klein, an industrial chemist, and for several years lived with him in small towns in Slovakia and Silesia. The first child, Melitta, was born in 1904 in her grandparents' house in Rosenberg, Hungary. Klein's first son, Hans, was born in 1907 and died in a climbing accident in the High Tatras in 1934. The second son, Erich, was born in 1914, and today lives in London under the anglicised name Eric Clyne.

The turning-point of Melanie Klein's life came in 1910 when she moved with her family to Budapest where her husband was offered an executive position at Count Henkel-Donnersmarck's paper mills. She came across Freud's book *On Dreams* (1901), the beginning of her life-long study of psychoanalysis. Luckily...
Luckily, one of her husband's colleagues was a brother of Sándor Ferenczi, the Hungarian psychoanalyst. While her husband was serving in the Austro-Hungarian army during the First World War, Klein went into analysis with Ferenczi and, with his encouragement, began to analyse children. She was introduced to Freud in 1917 at a meeting between the Austrian and Hungarian Psychoanalytical Societies. She read her first paper, 'The Development of a Child', to the Hungarian Society in 1919 and shortly afterwards became a member of the Budapest Society. In 1920 she published her first, rarely mentioned work, *The Family Novel in Statu Nascendi*, in which she reported several rather naive observations of her son, Erich, whom she mentioned by name.

In the same year, 1920, Melanie Klein was a guest at the psychoanalytic congress at The Hague, where she met Karl Abraham (1877-1925), a German psychoanalyst, who also encouraged her work in child-analysis. In 1921, she moved to Berlin, where her husband had built a house. Through Abraham, she received immediate entrée into the Berlin psychoanalytic group, and established a psychoanalytic practice for adults and children. Dissatisfied with the results of her analysis with Ferenczi, she persuaded Abraham in 1924 to accept her as a patient. The analysis, however, was interrupted by his sudden death nine months later.

After Abraham's death, life in Berlin became difficult for Melanie Klein. Anna Freud had started work with children independently of Klein, but her approach was different. In the ensuing controversy and conflict between the two women, the Berlin Society, by and large, supported Anna Freud and considered Klein's work 'unorthodox'. In 1925, however, Klein's fortunes improved. She met Ernest Jones (1879-1958), the leading British psychoanalyst, at a conference in Salzburg where she read a controversial paper on the technique of child-analysis. Jones, however, was impressed and invited her to give some lectures on child-analysis in England. Klein accepted, and, in 1925, in the house of Dr. Adrian Stephen, she gave six lectures which formed the basis of the initial part of her book, *The Psychoanalysis of Children* (1932).
Pleased with the response she received, Klein emigrated to England in 1926 with her youngest son, Erich. A few years later, Melitta and her husband, Dr. Walter Schmideberg, joined her. Both were doctors and practising psychoanalysts. For a while Melitta was a staunch supporter of her mother's work, but in 1935 she broke all professional and personal ties with her mother. In 1963 she went further and withdrew from both British and International Psychoanalytic Associations and closed her psychoanalytic practice.

Melanie Klein spent the rest of her life in England where she collected a band of devoted followers who formed the 'Melanie Klein School' of child-analysis in overt opposition to Anna Freud and her supporters. In 1943, in an attempt to resolve the differences between the two 'schools', Ernest Jones organised a symposium in London to debate the fundamental issues involved. Unfortunately, the symposium - referred to in psychoanalytic circles as the 'Controversial Discussions' - merely achieved a hardening of attitudes, and the splitting of British analysts into three camps - the Continental School (Anna Freud and her supporters), the British School (Melanie Klein and her supporters), and a Middle Group of analysts unattached to any specific grouping.

Melanie Klein died on September 22, 1960. Consonant with Freud's view of religion as an obsessional neurosis, Klein was an atheist, and she left explicit instructions that no religious service would be conducted at her funeral for social or conventional reasons. Nevertheless, a former colleague has revealed that 'she was very aware of her Jewish roots, liked some of the Jewish traditions and had little respect for those who denied their Jewishness'.

II

It is true I am of the opinion that your Society has followed Frau Klein on a wrong path, but the sphere from which she has drawn her observations is foreign to me so that I have no right to any fixed conviction.

(Letter from Freud to Jones, May 26, 1935)
Hanna Segal has divided Melanie Klein's contributions to psychoanalytic theory and technique into three distinct phases.

The first phase (1921-1932) starts with Klein's paper 'On the Development of the Child' (1921) and culminates with her book *The Psychoanalysis of Children* in 1932.

During the second phase (1934-1940) Klein formulated the concept of the depressive position and the manic defence mechanisms in two major papers, 'A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of the Manic Depressive States' (1934), and 'Mourning and its Relation to Manic Depressive States' (1940).

During the third phase (1946-1957) Klein formulated another revolutionary concept, the paranoid-schizoid position, mainly in her paper 'Notes on some Schizoid Mechanisms' (1946), and in her book *Envy and Gratitude* (1957).

Although the second and third phases are of interest for the critical importance they bestow on the first six months of life, the first phase, educationally, is of most interest to us for several reasons. First, during this phase Klein laid the foundations of her unique form of child-analysis; second, she traced the Oedipus complex and the superego to an earlier stage of development than had Freud before her; and, finally, her writings during this phase offer a specific consideration of the child in relation to school activities, and the role of the teacher in relation to the child.

Let us consider, then, the salient features of Kleinian theory in this first phase and their variant emphases of Freudian theory.

In 'The Development of a Child' (1921), her first paper to be published in English, Klein reiterated the fundamental postulate of psychoanalytic theory: the results of psychoanalysis, she wrote, 'always in every individual case' lead back to repressions of 'childish sexuality' as the causes of subsequent illness; and she drew the 'irrefutable' conclusion from this that children should, whenever possible, be protected from any 'over-strong' repression, and thus from illness or a disadvantageous development of character.
In this, Klein was in complete agreement with Freud. One of her most important disagreements came with her hypothesis that the Oedipus complex comes into operation earlier than Freud supposed. In her paper, 'The Psychological Principles of Early Analysis' (1926), she reached the conclusion that the Oedipus tendencies are released in consequence of the frustration which the child experiences at weaning; that they make their appearance at the end of the first and the beginning of the second year of life; and that they receive reinforcement through the anal frustrations undergone during training in cleanliness.

By pre-dating the Oedipus complex, Klein described a new, complex, phantasmagoric world of the child's relationships to the mother's body. To the suckling infant the mother's body offers a plethora of riches - nourishment, magic faeces, babies, and the father's penis which is imagined as incorporated by the mother during intercourse. This relationship, however, is ambivalent in nature. On the one hand it inspires libidinal desires in the child to possess and enjoy these delightful riches; and, on the other, fear and hatred that they may be thwarted. What effect, if any, has this emotional ambivalence on the course of the child's development? And why should the mother-child relationship leave indelible marks on the child's psyche?

In 'Weaning' (1936) Klein wrote that infantile feelings and phantasies leave imprints on the mind which 'do not fade away but get stored up, remain active, and exert a continuous and powerful influence on the emotional and intellectual life of the individual'. But what is the connection between these feelings and phantasies and the child's relationship with the mother? The earliest feelings are aroused by external and internal stimuli. The first gratification which children derive from the external world is from the mother's lacteal nourishment. This gratification is double-faceted; one part results from the alleviation of hunger and another part - 'no less important' - results from the sexual pleasure experienced when the baby's mouth is stimulated by sucking the mother's breast. This gratification is an essential part of infantile sexuality, and is indeed its initial expression. Even when the baby reacts to unpleasant stimuli which cause frustration with feelings of hatred and aggression, these feelings, too, are directed towards the breasts of the mother.
Klein believed that phantasy-building is the most primitive mental activity. Indeed, she was convinced that phantasies are in the mind of infants almost from birth. But what is the connection between 'feelings' and 'phantasies'? Using a simple Stimulus-Response formula, Klein hypothesised that every stimulus received is immediately responded to by phantasies; the unpleasant stimuli produce phantasies of an aggressive kind, and the gratifying stimuli those which focus on pleasure. The object of all these phantasies is at first the mother's breast which infants imbue with the characteristics of good and evil. The 'good' breast becomes the prototype of what is felt throughout life to be good and beneficent while the 'bad' breast symbolises everything evil and persecuting. This process is termed projection.

Another process, introjection, plays an equally important role in the development of children. By this process children internalise perceptions of the outside world beginning with the mother's breast, the 'object of constant desire'. From this beginning a picture is built up of the external world. In phantasy sucking the breast, chewing it and swallowing it, infants feel that they possess it within themselves in both its good and bad aspects. Gradually, they begin to see the mother as a 'whole' person, connecting the smiling face and caressing hands with the gratifying breast. In this way, by putting the bits together, as it were, the power to perceive 'wholes' spreads beyond the mother to incorporate other 'whole' persons in the home - the father, siblings, grandparents, and other people entrusted with the care of the young. Eventually the bits and pieces of the external world are put together in the same way.

Although conflicting emotions, love and hate, exist from the very beginning of the mother-child relationship it would be quite wrong to consider the effects of aggression as entirely negative in the course of human development. On the contrary, Klein was convinced that they are of far-reaching importance for our future mental health, our capacity for love and social development. From/...
From them, for example, springs the child's desire to restore, which expresses itself in numerous phantasies of saving the mother and making all kinds of reparation for the imagined harm inflicted on her. These tendencies to make reparation, she claimed, are the 'driving forces' in all children's constructive activities and interests. They are the basis of their first play-activities, and their satisfaction in the simplest achievements - putting one brick on top of another, for example, or replacing one which has been knocked down. But even their much earlier achievements, such as playing with their fingers, crawling, standing, walking, and all varieties of voluntary movements contain the reparation element.

Let us recapitulate. The child introjects the 'real', outside world through three stages of perceptual awareness: first, by introjecting the 'good' and 'bad' breasts; second, by introjecting the 'whole' mother (again conceived as a good and bad mother); and third, by introjecting the father and others in the environment. Although the secondary figures grow in importance and differentiation to the child as the years pass, the mother remains the indisputable linch-pin of the Kleinian theory of human development:

If the child succeeds in establishing within himself a kind and helpful mother, this internalised mother will prove a most beneficial influence throughout his whole life. Though this influence will normally change in character with the development of the mind, it is comparable with the vitally important place that the real mother has in the tiny child's very existence.

III

It is important to emphasise that, despite some important differences of clinical technique and theory, Klein retained the cluster of concepts which lie at the core of Freudian theory - libido, repression, sublimation, superego, ego, id, Oedipus complex, castration complex, sadism, anxiety, guilt, and - the most controversial of all - death instinct.
As corroboration of this common conceptual kernel let us consider her use of these concepts to answer four questions of importance to educators: (1) What is the genesis of knowledge? (2) Why is it that girls often do better in primary school than boys? (3) What is the aetiology of specific talents? And (4) to what extent is schooling libidinal in essence as Freud suggested?

Klein's answers are startling.

1

It was in 'The Development of a Child' (1921) that Klein first introduced the term 'instinct for knowledge' and coupled its progress with 'relaxation of authority'. That is to say, Klein believed that the idea of an omnipotent authority, human or divine, can be a critical barrier to the intellectual development of children. In particular, she emphasised two kinds of authority which can be pathogenic: (1) the idea of an omniscient parent and (2) that of an omniscient God.

In the first case, when the natural curiosity of children is opposed by parents who are, in their eyes, omniscient, then the more profound enquiries (in which they are unconsciously afraid of encountering forbidden, 'sinful' things) are also repressed with it. More seriously, all impulses to investigate deeper questions in general also become inhibited.

In the second case, the idea of a God 'overwhelms thought' to such an extent that children dare not attempt a struggle or a doubt against it. The belief in such a powerful, insuperable authority can so 'shatter' the reality-sense that they become unable to reject the incredible, the unreal, and the ability to recognise the tangible, 'obvious things' in intellectual matters is repressed together with the deeper processes of thinking. This repression, moreover, is not obviated by any subsequent enlightened upbringing.

In this paper Klein was concerned only with the inhibition of the progress of the instinct for knowledge. But what did she say about its genesis? In 'Early Analysis' (1923) Klein, like Freud, associated the epistemophilic instinct with sexual interests, an association which frequently results, she thought, in 'inhibition or obsessional neurosis and brooding mania'.
But what sort of sexual interests? In a later paper, 'Early Stages of the Oedipus Conflict' (1928), she associated the instinct with the infant's sadistic relationship with the mother's body. The infant, wishing to appropriate the contents of the mother's body, becomes curious about their actual composition. In this way the epistemophilic instinct and the desire to possess become intimately connected not only with one another but with the sense of guilt aroused by the incipient Oedipus conflict.

In brief: sadistic impulses against the mother's body activate the child's instinct for knowledge. The anxiety which follows as a reaction to these gives the instinct a powerful impetus. Knowledge, in this analysis, is the means used by children to master anxiety; this leads to a desire for more knowledge which brings in its train more anxiety and guilt.

How can we tell when the instinct for knowledge has become inhibited besides, of course, the obvious sign of a total lack of interest in academic pursuits? It may be assumed, Klein wrote in her most famous book The Psychoanalysis of Children (1932), that if children - even those who seem to be well-adjusted - dislike going to shows of any sort, such as the theatre or cinema, take no pleasure in asking questions and are inhibited in play or can only play certain games with no phantasy content, they are suffering from severe disturbances of the instinct for knowledge and from an extensive repression of phantasy. Such children, Klein claimed, usually satisfy the desire for knowledge at a later time in an obsessional way.

In the above, Klein was offering a general theory of the progress and inhibition of the epistemophilic instinct without any attempt at sexual differentiation. But is it not true that girls often do better in school than boys? Certainly, Klein thought so. Is the instinct, then, more prone to inhibition in boys than girls?
In her paper 'The Role of the School in the Libidinal Development of the Child' (1923), Klein postulated that part of the inhibitions shown by children at school - and this is the more important for later development - results from the repression of genital activity and directly affects ego activity and interest; another part results from the attitude of the child to the teacher. 47

The boy, unfortunately, has both these burdens to shoulder. On the one hand, all the sublimations which derive from the genital desire for the mother lead to an increased consciousness of guilt towards the male teacher (father-symbol) and a wish to make reparation. 48 On the other, school-lessons which in the unconscious signify coitus, lead him to dread the teacher as avenger (castrating-father). Thus the conscious wish to satisfy the teacher by his efforts is counterbalanced by the unconscious dread of doing so. This ambivalence leads to an insoluble conflict that determines an essential part of the inhibition. The conflict, however, diminishes in intensity when the boy is no longer under the direct control of the teacher but free to assert himself more aggressively in life. But this possibility of wider activities is present, in a greater or lesser degree, only where the castration-fear has affected the pupil-teacher relationship rather than the school activities and interests. This explains why some very unsatisfactory pupils achieve eminence in later life while others, whose curricular interests were inhibited, remain for ever with unfulfilled potentialities. 50

The prognostication for girls is better. First, the relationship to a male teacher, so burdensome to the boy, acts on the girl rather as an incentive. And second, as her anxiety originating in the Oedipus complex is, in general, not nearly so powerful as its analogue in the boy, the girl's relationship to her school-mistress, too, is more harmonious. 51 With these advantages, then, why do women fail to emulate the achievements of men? This, Klein thought, is due to the fact that women, generally, have less 'masculine activity' to employ in sublimation. 52
So far we have discussed Kleinian theory with regard to two aspects of the epistemophilic instinct: its genesis, and greater proneness to inhibition in boys.

There is, of course, a special kind of 'knowledge' which has puzzled many, including Freud. That is, the special knowledge expressed through the wonderful gifts, talent and genius of exceptional individuals. But how can we explain such gifts? Why are some adults and children blessed with them while others are capable only of mediocrity? Closely allied with this question is another: what determines the specific medium through which genius is expressed? Why did Shakespeare, for example, become a poet, Newton a scientist, Mozart a composer, and Picasso a painter?

Klein attempted to answer these questions in 'Early Analysis ' (1923), where she referred to the work of Freud and Ferenczi on the analogies and relations between art and hysteria on the one hand, and hysteria and coitus on the other. As the hysterical attack uses a peculiar condensation of phantasies for its material, in a similar way the development of an interest in art or a creative talent would depend greatly upon the wealth and intensity of fixations and phantasies represented in sublimation. Three things are of importance here: the quantities of relevant constitutional and environmental factors present; their harmonious interaction; and the degree of genital activity which can be deflected into sublimation.

But how did she explain the genesis of a specific talent? Why does one child show a passionate interest in painting, for instance, but not in music?

Artistic and intellectual fixations, she said, including those which subsequently lead to neurosis, have as one of their most potent determining factors the 'primal scene' or phantasies of it. But what determines the direction or form which the fixation takes? This depends on which of the senses is more strongly excited: 'whether the interest applies more to what is to be seen or to what is to be heard'. This will probably determine also, and will depend upon, whether ideas present themselves to the subject visually or auditorily. Klein had no doubt that constitutional factors play a great part in this.
Let us look briefly at some examples from Klein's case-book of the importance of primal scenes or phantasies in the development of artistic sublimations.

Although one of her young patients, Felix, had shown no musical talent, a marked love of music gradually developed as Klein's analysis brought into consciousness his fixation to early infantile observations of coitus. The sounds - some of which he had heard proceeding from his parents' bed and the rest of which he had phantasied - had formed the basis of a very strong (and very early inhibited) interest in music, an interest which Klein liberated again during analysis. Klein was convinced that the genesis of music interest and talent was not unique to Felix but is of universal applicability: 'This determination of the interest in a gift for music I found present ... in other cases as well, and I believe it to be typical'.

Klein found that a keen appreciation of colours, forms and pictures in an adult patient was similarly determined, with the difference that the early infantile observations and phantasies of coitus were now concerned with what could be seen. For instance, a certain bluish tinge in pictures directly represented the male element; it was a fixation of the analysand to the colour of the penis in erection. These fixations led to comparisons with the colour and form of the penis when not in erection; and, further, to observations of a certain change in the colouring and form of the penis when viewed in different lights, the contrast with the pubic hair and so forth. Klein was confident that analysts can 'repeatedly establish' the fact of this libidinal cathexis of pictures as representing penis or child (the same applies to works of art in general), and of painters, virtuosi and creative artists, as symbolising the father.

In fixation to the primal scene (or phantasies) the degree of activity, important for sublimation, 'undoubtedly' determines whether the child develops a talent for creation or reproduction. For the degree of activity certainly influences the mode of identification. By this Klein meant that it is a question whether it will expend itself in the admiration, study and imitation of the masterpieces of others, or whether there will be an endeavour to excel these by the subject's own performances. In Felix, for example, Klein found that the first interest...
in music which manifested itself in analysis was concerned exclusively with criticism of composers and conductors. As his activity was gradually released he began to try to imitate what he heard. This analysis showed Klein what other analyses 'confirmed': that criticism 'always has its origin in the observation and criticism of the paternal genital activities'. Indeed, speech itself has 'always' a libidinal cathexis of a genital-symbolic nature and assists not only the formation of symbols and sublimation, but is itself the result of one of the earliest sublimations. With Felix it was clear that he was both onlooker and critic, and that in his phantasy he took part also as a member of an orchestra in what he saw and heard. It was only at a later stage of released activity that he could assume the paternal role with confidence; that is, it was then that he would have been able to summon up courage to become a composer himself, if he had had sufficient talent.

In answering the first three questions Klein purported to show that the libidinal pursuits of children solely determine the genesis and the subsequent progress or inhibition of the epistemophilic instinct; and, moreover, the nature and aetiology of specific interests, talents and genius. How, then, did she explain the process of schooling? Is it possible to explain the whole complex phenomena of schooling – curricula, examinations, learning, inter-personal relationships, children's games, remediation, and so on – in terms of libido?

Klein's paper 'The Role of the School in the Libidinal Development of the Child' (1923) is an astonishing contribution to educational theory. The first sentence sets the confident and radical tone of the whole paper: 'It is a well-known fact in psycho-analysis that in the fear of examinations, as in examination-dreams, the anxiety is displaced from something sexual onto something intellectual.' The matter is then put succinctly: 'the fear of examinations, in dreams as in reality, is the fear of castration'.

But is the sexual displacement a phenomenon unique to examination-fears? According to Klein every aspect of schooling is libidinally determined:
The extremely important role played by the school is in general based upon the fact that school and learning are from the first libidinally determined for everyone, since by its demands school compels a child to sublimate his libidinal instinctual energies. The sublimation of general activity, above all, has a decisive share in the learning of various subjects, which will be correspondingly inhibited, therefore, by the castration-fear.

In brief: schooling is placed within a web of basic Freudian concepts - libido, sublimation, inhibition, and castration-fear; and the key-concept, the source of all educational inhibitions, is castration-fear (or, in more general terms, anxiety).

Klein gave examples from a number of her analyses of children, purporting to establish the libidinal significance of the walk to school, school itself, the teacher, and the many activities employed at school. For instance: reluctance to stand up to talk in class is interpreted as an inhibition determined by the fear of castration; dais, desk, slate, and 'everything that can be written upon' have penis-meaning; the school-report signifies potency of penis or child; the place in class is the coital place in the mother; the master is the homosexual wish-object of the male pupils; the manner in which the school-task is performed signifies coitus or masturbation; the rise and fall of the voice and the movements of the tongue represent coitus; being a pupil means learning about coitus; and practising a profession means performing coitus.

The letters of the alphabet had sexual significance for Klein's young patients. For Fritz the lines meant roads and the letters rode on motor-bicycles (on the pen) upon them; the letter 'i' represented the penis, 'e' the vagina, and 'l' the faeces; the dot of the 'i', the full-stop and the colon, were thrusts of the penis; the letter 's' was Fritz himself, and 'ss' his father. For Grete the curve of the letter 'u' was associated with the curve made when little boys urinate; for her, too, the full-stop and colon were sexually determined. For all the children/...
children, however, the letter 'i' had a special significance for reading and writing. Any inhibition with respect to these activities proceeded from this letter which, with its simple up and down movement, Klein called the 'foundation of all writing'.

The libidinal significance of reading is derived from the symbolic cathexis of the book and the eye. In reading and writing other determinants based on the component instincts have to be considered, such as 'peeping' in reading, and exhibitionistic, aggressive, sadistic tendencies in writing. In general terms, Klein regarded reading as a more passive activity than writing, and for their inhibitions the various fixations at the pre-genital stages of organisation are significant.

Grammar, the analysis or dissection of sentences, is a sublimation of the child's phantasies regarding dismemberment of the mother's body.

Analogous to the libidinal significance of the letters of the alphabet, integers have a similar cathexis. For example, the 'up and down' of 'I' is identical with that of 'i' and Klein concluded that the penis is symbolically represented by this numeral, which 'forms the basis for counting and arithmetic'. The significance of the numberal '10' is determined by the number of the fingers which are unconsciously equated with the penis from which the number 'derived its affective tone'. The numeral '3' derives its symbolic meaning from the Oedipus complex - the triadic relationship of father, mother and child - as Karl Abraham, Klein's analyst and teacher, indicated.

Arithmetical processes are libidinal: addition signifies parental coitus; multiplication, procreation; and division, a 'dividing up', a coitus at a sadistic, cannibalistic stage of organisation.

History, 'what people did in earlier times', is a sublimation of the study of the relations of the parents to one another and to the child. Here, such infantile phantasies as battles and slaughters play an important part, according to the child's sadistic conception of coitus.
Physics is viewed in terms of coitus with, for example, the air representing semen. 92 Klein claimed that the repressed interest in the mother's womb - the basis of the inhibition of the sense of orientation - explains why interest in the natural science is frequently inhibited. 93

Klein's analyses of children 'repeatedly demonstrated' that behind drawing, painting, and photography there lies a much deeper unconscious activity: 'the procreation and production in the unconscious of the object represented'. 94 At the anal stage of organisation it signifies the sublimated production of the faecal mass; at the genital stage the production of the child.

Klein summarised her analysis of the school curriculum in this way:

I have endeavoured to show that the fundamental activities exercised at schools are channels for the flow of libido and that by this means the component instincts achieve sublimation under the supremacy of the genitals. This libidinal cathexis, however, is carried over from the most elementary studies - reading, writing and arithmetic - to wider efforts and interests based upon these, so that the foundations of later inhibitions - of vocational inhibition as well - are to be found, above all, in the frequently apparently evanescent ones concerned with the earliest studies. 95

Why should the 'apparently evanescent' inhibitions associated with the early studies be the foundations of future inhibitions? How do they arise in the first place? The inhibitions of these earliest studies, Klein explained, are 'built upon play-inhibitions', and 'all the later inhibitions, so significant for life and development', evolve from the earliest play-inhibitions. 96

This is the first mention of children's play in the paper and we must pause to consider its import. If all inhibitions evolve from children's play-inhibitions, then children's play is of crucial importance, indeed, for education.

But what are these play-inhibitions? What form do they take? And what advice did Klein offer teachers regarding these?
In 'Early Analysis' (1923) Klein gave examples of characteristics which proved in a 'typical way' to be inhibitions: awkwardness in games and athletics and a distaste for them; little or no pleasure in lessons; lack of interest in one particular subject; the varying degrees of laziness; and capacities or interests which are 'feebleer than the ordinary'. But how do these inhibitions arise? Why should activities which appear to be harmless become inhibited? The basis of these inhibitions, Klein contended, is a strong primary pleasure which is repressed because of its sexual character:

Playing at ball or with hoops, skating, tobogganing, dancing, gymnastics, swimming - in fact, athletic games of every sort - turned out to have a libidinal cathexis, and genital symbolism always played a part in it. The same applied to the road to school, the relation with men and women teachers, and also to learning and teaching in themselves.

Klein believed that in the greater number of these inhibitions, the task of reversing the mechanism was accomplished by dealing with the child's anxiety and, in particular, with the 'dread of castration'; only when anxiety was resolved by her unique play-technique did Klein believe it was possible to make any progress in removing the inhibition.

Klein gave an example in this paper of the inhibition of the sense of orientation in one of her young patients to prove her point. Fritz's original pleasure in exploring roads and streets (which formed the basis of his sense of orientation) was determined by the desire for coitus with the mother and remained inhibited until the castration-anxiety had been resolved. Subsequently, his increasing interest in simple mapping developed into an interest in geography. Klein believed that this libidinal determination of the sense of orientation is 'typical' and that favourable development or, alternatively, inhibition of the sense of orientation due to repression, depends upon it. The inhibition of the sense of orientation is of 'very great' consequence for educators because it radiates to the most diverse interests and studies.
Apart from leading to an interest in geography, Klein 'discovered' that the sense of orientation is one of the determining factors in the capacity for drawing and the interest in natural science and everything to do with the exploration of the earth. In Fritz, Klein found also a very close connection between his lack of orientation and his lack of interest in space and in time. Corresponding to his repressed interest in the place of his intra-uterine existence was the absence of Fritz's interest in details as to the time when he was there. Consequently, the pre-natal where and when questions were repressed. As the inhibition of the sense of orientation has such general importance for cognitive development, and was resolved by her play-technique, Klein concluded that the 'inhibition and restriction of interests in play leads to the diminishing of potentialities and interests both in learning and in the whole further development of the mind'.

Obviously, play is crucially important for Kleinian theory. But what are children really doing when they play? Are they just playing in the common, everyday sense of the word, or is their activity symbolic of deeper processes? If the latter, how can we comprehend it? Klein dealt with these important questions in another paper, 'The Psychological Principles of Early Analysis' (1926), where she anchored 'play' firmly within the parameters of classical Freudian ideology:

In their play, children represent symbolically phantasies, wishes and experiences. Here they are employing the same language, the same archaic, phylogenetically acquired mode of expression as we are familiar with from dreams. We can only fully understand it if we approach it by the method Freud has evolved for unravelling dreams.

Having posited a link between children's phantasmagoric play and the primordial experience of mankind, Klein disclosed her method of comprehending it. To begin with, it is important to remember that toys can have many different symbolic meanings to a child. Sometimes they represent the penis, or an abducted child, or simply the young child himself or many other things. It is only/...
only by a minute examination of every detail of the game that the connections become clear to us and the interpretation becomes effective. What details should we examine? The material that children produce; playing with water, cutting out paper, or drawing; the manner in which they do this; the reason why they change from one thing to another; and the means they choose for their representations. All of these multifarious factors, which so often seem 'confused and meaningless' to the superficial observer, are really 'consistent and full of meaning'. The underlying sources and thoughts are revealed if we interpret them 'just like dreams'.

Play, then, is crucially important for understanding the 'hidden' phantasy lives of children. In 'Neurosis in Children' (1932) Klein described play as a 'facade', with its latent content only unveiled by means of a thorough analysis, in the same way that analysts discover the latent content of dreams. But analysing children's play presents an additional difficulty. Owing to its closer relation to reality and its 'paramount role' as the expression of the infantile mind, play often undergoes a stronger, secondary elaboration than dreams. As a result, it is only gradually, through the changes which children's games undergo, that analysts can comprehend the various currents of their mental lives.

Furthermore, the analysis of play is the shibboleth of success for Kleinian therapy. The play of children, she said, gives a 'clear indication' when their analyses can be considered as completed in respect of their future capacity for sublimation. Before she considered the analysis of children completed, their inhibitions in playing had to be largely reduced; and she considered this accomplished when their interest in play appropriate to their ages had become not only deeper and more stable, but had also been extended in various directions.

Klein believed, too, that the whole of children's play and sublimations are based on masturbation phantasies, and she concluded from this that (1) the character of these phantasies will indicate the nature of the later sexual life of children; and (2) child-analysis is able to effect not only a greater stability and capacity for sublimation in the child, but to ensure mental well-being and prospects of happiness in the adult.
Klein was not suggesting, of course, that children's play is the only indicator of psychic disturbance. In 'Neurosis in Children' she revealed other indicators of emotional disturbance in children which, to the ignorant observer, seem to be without 'hidden' meaning. For instance, an obvious manifestation of anxiety is the night-terror (pavor nocturnus) of many children; but Klein insisted that modifications of this anxiety - disturbances of sleep, such as getting off to sleep late, waking up early, having a restless or easily disturbed sleep, and being unable to sleep in the afternoon - are, also, 'definitely neurotic manifestations'. In the same way, disturbances in eating will often turn into habits of eating slowly or not chewing properly or into a general lack of appetite or even merely into bad table manners.

But why should these inhibitions or disturbances arise? They arise, as in the case of play-inhibitions, because of the libidinal cathexis connected with them. Klein gave many examples of this in 'Neurosis in Children', but a few chosen at random will suffice for our purpose:

The unruly behaviour of children while being bathed or having their hair washed is nothing but, Klein 'repeatedly found', a hidden fear of being castrated or having their whole bodies destroyed.

The ambivalence of children towards gifts is based on the fact that gifts signify all the love-offerings which were frequently denied to them - breast, milk, penis, urine, stool and babies.

In one boy, keeping his mouth open signified a confession of having performed fellatio, and his whistling signified the withdrawal of that confession.

Nose-picking, in both children and adults, represents, among other things, an anal attack on the bodies of their parents.

Taking an object out of a box signified for one child an aggressive attack on the mother's body.
Klein considered physical accidents and illnesses to be symbolic, too, of inner disturbances. The little accidents to which children are prone - falling down and knocking or hurting themselves - were regarded as expressions of various fears and feelings of guilt, and 'soft' modifications of the death instinct. She also emphasised the psychogenic element in the various illnesses which effect children. She was convinced that many children find an expression for their anxiety and sense of guilt in falling ill (in which case getting well has a reassuring effect) and that, generally, their frequent illnesses at a certain age are partly determined by neurosis. This psychogenic element affects not only the child's sensitivity to infection, but the severity and length of the illness itself. And Klein found, in general, that 'after a completed analysis the child is much less liable to colds in particular'. Indeed, in 'some cases its susceptibility to them has been almost entirely removed'. Klein concluded that the 'difficulties which are never lacking in the development of a child are neurotic in character'. In other words, 'every child passes through a neurosis differing only in degree from one individual to another.'

How can we tell, then, when children are not neurotic? Klein recognised three 'favourable signs': first, they enjoy playing and give free rein to their phantasy in doing so, being at the same time sufficiently adapted to reality with really good relations - not over-affectionate - to their love-objects; second, they show a relatively undisturbed development of the instinct for knowledge without the compulsive character typical of an obsessional neurosis; and third, they exhibit, paradoxically, a certain amount of affect and anxiety which Klein considered a pre-condition of a favourable development.

How can teachers assist the favourable development of children?

V

As previously indicated, in 'The Development of a Child' (1921) Klein found the aetiology of illness in past repressions of infant sexuality, and she concluded there that children should, therefore, whenever possible, be protected from any/...
any 'over-strong' repression. Two points are worth stressing here: first, Klein was claiming, unequivocally, that all difficulties - emotional, social, intellectual and educational - are the results of repressions of infantile sexuality; and second, Klein was merely objecting to 'over-strong' repression, not to repression per se.

Obviously for her, as for Freud, sexuality is of paramount importance in any psychoanalytic theory of child development. What, then, did she advise us to do educationally? How can we alleviate the severity of a child's repression? We can do this by freeing - 'first and foremost in ourselves' - the whole wide sphere of sexuality from the 'dense veils of secrecy, falseness and danger spun by a hypocritical civilisation upon an effective and uninformed foundation'.

By doing so, in averting this repression, we are laying the foundations for health, mental balance and the favourable development of character. This 'incalculably valuable' result has another and not less significant consequence - a decisive influence upon the development of the intellect.

This advocacy of sexual enlightenment for all led in the same paper to general principles of child-care. As these were the foundation-stones of the philosophy underlying Sysan Isaacs' Malting House School they are worth repeating in full:

We shall therefore lay down as an unconditional necessity that the child, from birth, shall not share the parental bedroom; and we shall be more sparing of compulsory ethical requirements in regard to the tiny developing creature than people were with us. We shall allow him to remain for a longer period uninhibited and natural, less interfered with than has hitherto been the case, to become conscious of his different instinctive impulses and of his pleasure therein without immediately whipping up his cultural tendencies against this ingenuousness. We shall aim at a slower development, that allows room for his instincts to become partly conscious, and, together with this, for their possible sublimation. At the same time we shall not refuse expression to his awakening sexual curiosity and shall satisfy it step by step, even - in my opinion - withholding nothing. We shall know how to give him sufficient affection and yet avoid a harmful superfluity; above all we shall reject physical punishment and threats, and secure the obedience necessary for upbringing by occasionally withdrawing affection.
Is there not a familiar ring to these words? They are, of course, in harmony with Rousseau's credo of 'natural' upbringing and share his suspicion of ethical judgements. Sexuality, nevertheless, is the new factor in the equation, and in the light of Klein's claim that adult illnesses are caused by repressions of childish sexuality it must be considered the crucial factor.

In addition to these general principles we must include Klein's advocacy of 'relaxation of authority' with regard to the concept of God. We have considered her view that the idea of a divine authority can so 'shatter' the reality-sense and so profoundly inhibit the progress of the epistemophilic instinct that the harm done is not obviated by any subsequent enlightened upbringing. What, then, should be done?

Let us consider first what Klein said should not be done. It is not sufficient to omit dogma and the 'methods of the confessional' from children's training. Nor is it enough to introduce the concept of God into the religious curriculum and leave it to be dealt with according to individual development. To call this freedom, she warned, would be a mistake. Such an authoritative introduction of the idea at a time when they are intellectually unprepared, means that children can never again, or only at the cost of great struggles and expense of psychic energy, free themselves from it.

Instead, Klein preferred the removal from education altogether of any concept of an omnipotent being, convinced that to 'accept the simple as well as the wonderful only on one's own substantiations and deductions, to incorporate in one's mental equipment only what is really known, is to lay the foundations for a perfect uninhibited development of one's mind in every direction'.

Considering the many risks that children encounter through sexual mystification, religious dogmatism, and a host of other related items, it is not surprising that Klein should have considered the advocacy of psychoanalytic therapy for all children. But does every child need an analysis? In spite of an earlier assertion/...
assertion that 'no upbringing should be without analytic help', Klein admitted that there are a number of 'entirely healthy', excellently developed adults and children who show no neurotic traits, or have got over them undamaged. But these, she insisted, are comparatively few, quoting Freud's famous saying that 'no sharp line can be drawn between "neurotic" and "normal" people - whether children or adults'.

But Klein was not satisfied with analyses being given to children only. Dealing with the dynamic repurcussions of Oedipal traumata presupposes a sound knowledge of psychoanalytic theory. Consequently, Klein would prefer all parents, nurses and teachers to be analysed, but admitted that this will probably remain a 'pious wish' for a long time yet. In the meantime she favoured the founding of kindergartens at the head of which there would be women analysts quick to spot the emergence of neurotic traits in children.

Let us summarise her ideas so far: as all adult neuroses can be traced back to repressions of infant sexuality it is essential to protect children from 'over-strong' repression. We can achieve this in several ways: by a thorough sexual enlightenment, 'withholding nothing'; by shielding children from any 'primal scenes'; by allowing them to be 'more natural and uninhibited'; by allowing a slower development which will enable their instincts to be brought into consciousness and sublimated; by rejecting corporal punishment and securing obedience through the offer, or withdrawal of affection; by the rejection of religious dogma and, indeed, the very concept of God; by giving all pupils, parents, teachers and nurses a personal analysis; and finally, by founding psychoanalytic kindergarten.

But what is the role of the school? And, more specifically, what is the role of the teacher? In 'The Role of the School in the Libidinal Development of the Child' (1923) Klein wrote that she regarded the role of the school as on the whole a passive one; it proves to be a touchstone for the sexual development that has already been more or less successfully achieved. And the/...
the role of the teacher? She thought, first, that the sympathetic teacher can reduce that part of the inhibition that arises from the child's perception of the teacher as 'avenger'. Secondly, the 'wise and kindly' teacher can offer himself to the homosexual component of the boy and the masculine component of the girl as an object for the exercise of genital activity in a sublimated form.

Further to these two suggestions Klein remained pessimistic. Where repression of genital activity has affected the occupations and interests themselves, the possibility of a good teacher easing the conflict is a 'very slight one'. The boundaries of effective intervention are drawn by the child's complex formations, particularly by his relationship to his father, which pre-determines his attitude towards school and teacher. This explains why the results of years of pedagogical remediation bear no relation to the effort expended. Analysis, however, can remove inhibitions in a 'comparatively short time' and replace them by complete pleasure in learning. It would be best, therefore, to reverse the process and begin with a pre-school analysis to remove the inhibitions 'more or less' present in every child.

If such a pre-school analysis could successfully remove all inhibitions from all children as a first and better start to the educational demands of schooling, then, indeed, such an analysis would be welcomed by most educators. But how efficient, really, is psychoanalysis as a prophylactic? In 'Early Analysis' (1923) Klein admitted that Fritz, one of her young patients, had had from his early days 'a careful up-bringing' by persons influenced by analytic views; nevertheless, inhibitions and neurotic character-traits had arisen. She concluded from this: 'We cannot alter the factors which lead to the development of sublimation or of inhibition and neurosis', but added that the fixations which lead to the inhibitions may form the basis of 'splendid capacities'. She meant by this that neurosis and sublimation 'for some time ... follow the same path'. It is the force of repression which determines whether this path will lead to sublimation or turn aside to neurosis. It is at this point, too, that 'early analysis has possibilities', for it can substitute sublimation for repression and thus divert the path to neurosis into that which leads to the development of talents.
What Klein was claiming here is that although analytic educators cannot alter the factors which lead to the development of sublimation, or of inhibition and neurosis, early analysis makes it possible, at a time when this development is still going on, to influence its direction in a fundamental manner. But what direction did Klein wish the child's development to take? Does her strategy not presuppose a predetermined set of values? If it does, do these values involve 'freedom' for the child in the libertarian sense? Or do they involve, in concurrence with Freud, a subtle adaptation to social mores?

Intimately tied to this problem is another: what does the analyst hope to achieve as the result of a successful analysis? In 'The Psychological Principles of Early Analysis' (1926) Klein had no doubt: as a result of psychoanalysis the 'emotional relation to the parents improves'. Indeed, she said, conscious understanding comes only when this has taken place. This understanding is achieved by modifying the demands of the superego - the 'voice of the parents' - in such a way that they can be 'tolerated and complied with' by an ego which, less oppressed, is able to comply. The secret of success for Klein was not to confront children with new knowledge of their relation to their parents or, in general, to absorb knowledge which was burdensome.

In Klein's experience the beneficial effects of successful analyses, 'gradually elaborated', are three-fold: they relieve children of anxiety; they help to establish a fundamentally more favourable relation to their parents; and they increase their powers of social adaptation. When this stage has been reached, repression is replaced to some extent by 'reasoned rejection', the sense of guilt inevitably lessens, and the wishes which previously were wholly repressed are harmlessly sublimated. This manifests itself in practice in the disappearance of play-inhibitions, and in a beginning of numerous interests and activities.
The socialising programme of Klein can be seen clearly in a later paper, 'The Effects of Early Anxiety-Situations on the Sexual Development of the Boy' which was published in *The Psychoanalysis of Children* (1932). In this paper Klein discussed the case-history of 'Mr. B.', a man in his middle thirties, who suffered from a severe inhibition in work and a deep depression. This inhibition was so debilitating that he had been obliged to give up his research work and to resign his teaching post. He was a 'true' homosexual, that is, while having good relations with women as human beings, he rejected them sexually so completely that he was quite unable to understand how other men found them attractive.

Klein traced back his fits of depression to early childhood. As a result of bottle-feeding, the boy's oral-sucking fixation on the breast had been prevented. This frustration increased his destructive impulses against the breast which became transformed in his imagination into dangerous beasts and monsters. At the same time the boy had equated the breast with his father's dangerous penis which, he thought, was re-emerging from his mother's body. Soon after this he had begun to compare the mouthpiece of the bottle to a 'good' penis, eagerly turning to it as an object of satisfaction for his oral-sucking desires.

Klein had no doubt that 'Mr. B.'s inhibitions, depression and homosexuality were the outcome of his bad relationship with his mother. Homosexuality, then, is not something which Klein regarded as being 'right' or 'natural' in itself but symptomatic of an unresolved flaw in human development, and therefore curable. Klein took great pains to establish 'Mr. B.'s heterosexuality but in this she admitted only partial success. She attempted to achieve a cure in two ways: first, by reducing his fears of his unrealistic mother-imago; and secondly, by reducing his fear of his father's 'bad' penis so as to strengthen his identification with his 'good' father.

Klein summarised her ideas: the foundation of a successful sexual development of the male - and Klein meant heterosexual development - is the supremacy of a 'good' mother-imago which assists the boy to overcome his sadism and fears. In/...
In the genital stage this is a pre-condition for his attainment of sexual potency. An adequate belief in the 'good' contents of his body is necessary in order that his penis, the representative of his body as a whole, shall produce 'good' and wholesome semen. This belief, which coincides with his belief in his capacity to love, requires the establishment of 'good' imagos, especially a 'good' mother-imago.

In this paper Klein was concerned exclusively with the sexual development of boys. In her companion paper, 'The Effects of Early Anxiety-Situations on the Sexual Development of the Girl', although agreeing with Freud that psychoanalytic investigation has thrown much less light on the psychology of women than on that of men, Klein 'emphasised the significance of a good mother-imago for the formation of a good father-imago'. When the girl entrusts herself to the internal guidance of a paternal superego, it always means that she has good mother-imagos as well. It is only when she has sufficient trust in a 'good' internalised mother that a girl is 'able to surrender herself completely to her paternal superego'.

In brief: a good relationship with the mother is a prerequisite of socialisation; only when this has been achieved, when the inside of her body represents a place where 'harmony and beauty reign', can the girl surrender, 'without reserve, both sexually and mentally, to her paternal superego and to its representatives in the external world'.

For Klein, then, as for Sigmund and Anna Freud, a 'healthy' social development, neurosis-free, productive and heterosexual, demands or requires a complete surrender to the values and attitudes of the prevailing social milieu as represented by the paternal superego; and the crucial first step in this socialisation is the establishment of a 'good' mother-imago.

VI

Despite obvious disagreements with Freudian theory – for example, the dating of the Oedipus complex, the origin of the superego, and female sexuality – Klein retained the cluster of concepts which lie at the core of Freudian theory including/...
including the most controversial of all - the death instinct. Klein, moreover, agreed with Freud that the aetiology of illness is to be found in repressions of childish sexuality and concluded that children should be protected, whenever possible, from 'over-strong' repression.

Klein, too, like Anna Freud, emphasised the centrality of the mother-child relationship which, they both believed, left indelible marks on the child's psyche. From this relationship, for example, springs the child's desire to restore, which expresses itself in phantasies of making reparation to the mother for the imagined harm inflicted on her. These tendencies to make reparation are the 'driving forces' in all children's constructive activities and interests.

Klein went much further, however, by investing this relationship with a new, complex, phantasmagoric significance. More specifically, the mother's breast is imbued with the characteristics of good and evil. The 'good' breast becomes the prototype of what is felt throughout life to be good and beneficent, while the 'bad' breast symbolises everything evil and persecuting.

The mother-breast-child relationship is the key, too, to the child's cognitive development. The child introjects the 'real' outside world through three stages of perceptual awareness: first, by introjecting the 'good' and 'bad' breasts; second, by introjecting the 'whole' mother; and third, by introjecting the father and others in the immediate environment. Schooling is placed within a web of basic Freudian concepts - libido, sublimation, inhibition, castration-fear; and the key-concept, the source of all educational inhibitions, is castration-fear (or, in more general terms, anxiety). Examples of characteristics which are 'typical' of these inhibitions are awkwardness in games and athletics and a distaste for them; little or no pleasure in lessons; lack of interest in one particular subject; the varying degrees of laziness; and capacities or interests which are 'feeble than the ordinary'.


These inhibitions - which are fundamentally inhibitions of play - have a libidinal cathexis and are only removed by the use of Klein's toy-technique which purports to unravel the symbolic phantasies, wishes and experiences which are being 'acted-out' when children play; that is, Klein used the same method Freud evolved for unravelling dreams.

What are the characterological effects of Kleinian analysis? Children are relieved of anxiety; the parent-child relationship is improved; and social adaptation is achieved by the internalisation of a 'paternal superego'.

The educational implications of Kleinian theory are important: first, all difficulties - emotional, social, intellectual and educational - which children experience are the results of repressions of infantile sexuality; second, Klein was merely objecting to 'over-strong' repression, not to repression per se; and third, the aim of education, as of psychoanalytic therapy, is to produce an harmonious adaptation of the child to the prevailing social mores.

2

Melanie Klein gave a comprehensive survey of the evolution of her play-therapy in one of her last papers, 'The Psycho-Analytic Play Technique: Its History and Significance' (1955). Here she claimed, with justification, that her play-technique has influenced work with children in other fields, for example, child guidance work and education. With regard to education, she bestowed special praise on the work of her outstanding pupil, Susan Isaacs:

The development of educational methods in England has been given fresh impetus by Susan Isaacs' research at the Malting House School. Her books about that work have been widely read and have had a lasting effect on educational techniques in this country, especially where young children are concerned. Her approach was strongly influenced by her great appreciation of child analysis, in particular of play technique; and it is largely due to her that in England the psycho-analytic understanding of children has contributed to development in education.
This is surely high praise for an educator from one of the great figures of British psychoanalysis. In pursuit of this, the next chapter will examine the influence of Kleinian theory on Susan Isaacs.
NOTES AND REFERENCES


3. Sidonie taught Melanie to read and to write. She died at the age of nine, when Melanie was about five (Segal, Klein, p. 29). Melanie's relation with her brother, Emmanuel, was 'most formative for her' (Segal, ibid., p. 29). He coached her in Greek and Latin to pass her entrance examination to university. He died when he was twenty-five (ibid., pp. 29-30).


5. Sándor Ferenczi (1873-1933) accompanied Freud to America in 1909 to lecture at Clark University at Worcester, Massachusetts. He was a member of the Secret Committee of Seven Rings. Ferenczi was the leader of the Hungarian Psychoanalytic Society which became, in Freud's opinion, a 'centre of intense and productive work... distinguished by an accumulation of abilities such as were exhibited in combination by no other Branch Society' (Freud, 'Dr. Sándor Ferenczi', 1923, Standard Edition, Volume 19, p. 268).


7. Professor Uwe Peters has rightly drawn attention to Klein's first publication, The Family Novel in Statu Nassendi (1920), which is rarely mentioned today. He contended that Fritz and Felix, two young patients who figure prominently in Klein's early papers, are identical with her sons Erich and Hans respectively. This means that Klein gathered all her early analytical experience from her own children. Peters argued that any evaluation of the processes of Klein's analysis of her children, and of the inferences drawn from these 'cannot dismiss the fact that the analyst is the mother and that the Oedipal entanglements, as well as other problems, are thus brought into play' (Peters, Anna Freud: A Life Dedicated to Children, 1985, pp. 87-88). Yet the same Melanie Klein, Peters recalled, specifically called for the removal of children from their homes for the purposes of therapy, precisely because the Oedipal entanglement must be avoided. Moreover, Klein criticised Anna Freud for having been in analysis with her father, Sigmund, so belittling the objectivity of her work. If Peters is correct, then the objectivity of Klein's early work must be called also into question.
8. Karl Abraham (1877-1925) was elected President of the International Psychoanalytic Association in 1914 in succession to Jung. Abraham had several eminent future analysts in training analyses - Helene Deutsch, Edward and James Glover, Karen Horney, Melanie Klein, Sandor Rado, Theodor Reik, Ernst Simmel, and Alix Strachey. In his published obituary of Abraham, Freud called him 'one of the firmest hopes of our science, young as it is and still so bitterly assailed, and a part of its future that is now, perhaps, unrealisable' (Freud, 'Karl Abraham, 1926, Standard Edition, Volume 20, p. 277).

9. Ferenczi did not analyse the negative transference (hostile feelings towards the analyst) and Klein felt that his analysis did not give her any lasting insight (Segal, Klein, p. 32).

10. For Abraham, Klein had 'unmitigated gratitude and admiration' (Segal, Klein, p. 33). She considered her work a logical development of the theories of Freud and Abraham.


12. Klein's controversial paper was published in 1926 under the title 'The Psychological Principles of Early Analysis', Writings, Volume 1, pp. 128-138.


14. Dr. Adrian Stephen, brother of Virginia Woolf, was a member of the famous Bloomsbury group which included several analysts amongst its members - James Strachey, Alix Strachey, Lionel Penrose, John Rickman and Karin Stephen. See P. Meisel and W. Kendrick (eds.), Bloomsbury/Freud (1986) for a fascinating glimpse of the Bloomsbury group.

15. For a feasible explanation of Klein's estrangement from her daughter, Melitta Schmideberg, see Paul Roazen, Freud and His Followers (1979), pp. 476-477.

16. Anna Freud's 'Continental School' included Dorothy Burlingham, Eva Rosenfeld, Jeanne Lampl-de Groot, Marianne Kris, Ernst Kris, and Anny Katan.

17. Melanie Klein's 'British School', or 'English School' as it is sometimes called, included Joan Riviere, Nina Searl, Ella Sharpe, Melitta Schmideberg, Susan Isaacs, Paula Heimann, John Rickman, Marion Milner, and Hannah Segal.

18. The 'Middle Group' of analysts included John Bowlby, Donald Winnicott, Michael Balint, Sylvia Payne, W.R.D. Fairbairn, and Harry Guntrip.

19. Segal, Klein, pp. 29, 159.

20. Ibid., p. 29.


23. By 1919, when Klein began her work, psychoanalytical theory had undergone a considerable evolution and Freud's theory of psychic development was in some respects complete. There were, however, two major theoretical developments to come in the 1920s which Segal (1979) regards as one of the turning points in psychoanalytical theory. In *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920) Freud formulated his controversial theory of the duality of the life and death instincts; and in *The Ego and the Id* (1923) his structural theory of the mind with a tripartite division into id, ego and superego. These developments led to a revision of his views on the nature of psychic conflict, anxiety and guilt. These theories made a deep impression on Klein in three ways. First, convinced of the importance of innate aggression, Klein was the only major follower of Freud to adopt wholeheartedly his theory of a death instinct and establish its clinical implications. Second, she developed Freud's structural theory of the mind with new ideas on the origin, composition and functioning of the superego. Third, her approach to anxiety and guilt depended on these later speculations of Freud.

24. Klein, 'The Development of a Child' (1921), *Writings*, Volume 1, p. 1. The hallmarks of Klein's work are evident in this long paper: a commitment to Freud's basic concepts; a belief in the decisive influence of unconscious phantasies; adherence to the principle of psychic continuity; a belief in the dual determination of development by constitution and home-environment; an acceptance of speech, play, movement and dreams as equally expressive of the unconscious; an unqualified belief that the aetiology of adult illness is to be found in repressions of infant sexuality; and a dismissal of religion as illusory and pathogenic.


26. Klein, 'The Psychological Principles of Early Analysis' (1926), *Writings*, Volume 1, pp. 128-138. There are two basic ideas in this paper. First, the superego exists in the child much earlier than Freud had supposed. Second, the analysis of children is fundamentally the same as the analysis of adults, but adjusted to the child's mode of communication by play.


28. Ibid., p. 290.

29. Ibid., p. 290.

30. Ibid., p. 290.

31. Ibid., p. 291.

32. Ibid., p. 291.

33. Ibid., p. 294.
34. Ibid., p. 294.
35. Ibid., p. 294.
36. Ibid., p. 295.
38. 'The Development of a Child' is in two parts. Part I is titled 'The Influence of Sexual Enlightenment and Relaxation of Authority on the Intellectual Development of Children'. Part II is titled: 'Early Analysis'.
40. Ibid., p. 24.
41. Ibid., p. 25.
42. Klein's paper, 'Early Analysis' (1923), Writings, Volume 1, pp. 70–105 is based on three unpublished papers, 'The Development and Inhibition of Abilities', 'Infantile Anxiety and Its Significance for the Development of the Personality', and 'On the Inhibition and Development of the Ability to Orient Oneself'. 'Early Analysis' is complex and deals with several basic concepts - anxiety, inhibition, symptoms, symbol formation and sublimation.
43. Klein, 'Early Analysis', ibid., p. 87.
44. Klein, 'Early Stages of the Oedipus Conflict' (19238), Writings, Volume 1, p. 188. This is one of the most important of Klein's papers. For years she had claimed that the Oedipus Complex begins earlier than Freud had supposed: in 'Early Analysis' (1923) she suggested that it starts when a child is between two and three years old; in 'The Psychological Principles of Early Analysis' (1926) she implied that it starts in the first year of life, at weaning, and she stated this explicitly in 'Symposium on Child Analysis' (1927). But 'Early Stages of Oedipus Complex' (1928) goes beyond mere earlier dating and presents a new conception of the Oedipus complex.
45. In 'The Importance of Symbol Formation in the Development of the Ego' (1930), Writings, Volume 1, Klein postulated that it is the anxiety arising in the sadistic phase which 'sets going' the mechanism of identification. This 'mechanism' produces an infinite series of symbolic equations forever changing in an attempt to escape the recurring anxiety: 'Since the child desires to destroy the organs (penis, vagina, breasts) which stand for the objects, he conceives a dread of the latter. This anxiety contributes to make him equate the organs in question with other things; owing to this equation these in their turn become objects of anxiety, and so he is impelled constantly to make other and new equations, which form the basis of his interest in the new objects and of symbolism. Thus, not only does symbolism come to be the foundation of all phantasy and sublimation but, more than that, it is the basis of the subject's relation to the outside world and to reality in general' (ibid., pp. 220–221).
46. Klein, 'Neurosis in Children' *Writings*, Volume 2, 1975, p. 102. The way in which children react to festivities and holidays may be 'one of the signs of a neurosis in the child' (p. 99).


48. Ibid., p. 74.

49. Ibid., p. 75.

50. Ibid., p. 75.

51. Ibid., p. 75.

52. Ibid., p. 75.


54. Ibid., p. 103.

55. Ibid., p. 103.

56. Ibid., p. 102. For a list of Klein's patients, children and adults, see Klein, *Writings*, Volume 1, p. 444.

57. Ibid., p. 102. Klein referred to the adult patient as 'Mrs. H.'

58. Ibid., p. 102.

59. Ibid., p. 103

60. Ibid., p. 103.

61. Ibid., p. 104.

62. Klein, 'The Role of the School in the Libidinal Development of the Child', *Writings*, Volume 1, p. 59. For corroboration of the 'well-known fact' that in the fear of examinations, as in examination-dreams, the anxiety is displaced from something sexual on to something intellectual, Klein referred the reader to two publications: (a) W. Stekel, *Conditions of Nervous Anxiety and Their Treatment* (1923); and (b) S. Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900), Standard Edition, Volumes 4 and 5.


64. Klein, *ibid.*, p. 59; original emphasis.

65. Ibid., p. 60. Klein's interpretation is based on her analysis of Felix, aged thirteen. Felix associated his reluctance to stand up in class with his observation that girls stand up quite differently, and demonstrated the difference in the way boys stand up by a gesture that indicated the genital region and showed clearly the shape of the erected penis (*ibid.*, p. 60).
66. Ibid., p. 60, footnote. The 'maternal significance' of dais, desk, slate, and everything that can be written upon, as well as the 'penis-meaning' of the penholder, slate-pencil and chalk, and of 'everything with which one can write', became 'so evident' for Klein in this and other analyses, and was 'so constantly confirmed' that she considered it to be 'typical' (ibid., p. 60 footnote).

67. Ibid., p. 61, footnote.

68. Ibid., p. 61, footnote.

69. Ibid., p. 61, footnote. Felix's homosexual wish was strengthened by the repressed wish to achieve coitus with the mother in spite of the father; that is, to attain the first place in the class.

70. Ibid., p. 63. Felix explained to Klein that to get rid of a school exercise quickly, he began to write very fast and wrote faster and faster, and then got slower and slower, and finally could not get it finished. This description he had also used about his attempts at masturbation (ibid., pp. 63-64).

71. Ibid., p. 62. One of Klein's young patients, Grete, sang in the school choir. When the teacher came close and looked into her mouth, Grete felt an irresistible need to hug and kiss her. Grete's stammering 'proved' to be determined by the libidinal cathexis of speaking as well as of singing (ibid., p. 62).

72. Ibid., p. 62. Ernst, a young patient, played during analysis that he was a mason. In the course of his house-building phantasy he talked about his future profession; he wanted to be a 'pupil', and later to go to the technical school (ibid., p. 62). His house-building represented coitus and the procreation of a child (ibid., p. 62, footnote).

73. Ibid., p. 62. During his house-building, Ernst made it evident that he was only the mason who still required the directions of the architect and the assistance of other masons (ibid., p. 62).

74. Ibid., p. 64.

75. Ibid., pp. 64-65. For Fritz, the letters 'i' and 'e' ride together on a motor-bicycle that is usually driven by the 'i', and they love each other with a tenderness quite unknown in the real world (ibid., p. 64). The letter 'l' is represented by Fritz as being stupid, clumsy, lazy and dirty. It lives in a cave under the earth. In 'L' town, dirt and paper gather in the streets (ibid., p. 64).

76. Ibid., pp. 66. For Grete, too, the full-stop and comma had penis-meaning.

77. Ibid., p. 65. Fritz wrote one 's' when he should have written 'ss'. This mistake was determined by castration-wishes against his father (represented by 'ss'), and disappeared after analysis (ibid., p. 65).
78. Ibid., p. 66. Grete had a 'special preference', too, for drawing beautiful scrolls that proved in her case to be parts of the male genitals (ibid., p. 66).

79. Ibid., p. 66, footnote.

80. Ibid., p. 66. Klein added in a footnote to this page that the earlier picture-script, which underlies the modern script, is still active in the phantasies of every individual child. The various strokes, dots, etcetera, of the modern script are only simplifications, achieved as a result of condensation, displacement and other mechanisms familiar to analysts from dreams and neuroses, of the earlier pictures.

81. Ibid., p. 67.

82. Ibid., p. 67.

83. Ibid., p. 71. In reference to the analysis of sentences, Grete spoke of an actual dismembering and dissection of a roast rabbit. Roast rabbit, which she had formerly enjoyed eating, represented the mother's breast and genitals (ibid., p. 71).

84. Ibid., p. 67. For Fritz, the number '1' is a man who lives in a hot country, and is usually naked. For Fritz, too, numerals in general are people who live in a very hot country. They correspond to the coloured races, while letters are the white ones. Another young patient, Lisa, told Klein that she made 'just a short scratch' for the down stroke of the numeral '1', an action determined, Klein averred, by her castration complex (ibid., p. 67).

85. Ibid., p. 67. Associated with the libidinal significance of the numeral '10' was the phantasy that a ten times repeated coitus or ten thrusts of the penis are necessary for the procreation of a child.

86. Ibid., p. 67. Klein recommended Karl Abraham, 'Psychoanalytical Studies on Character Formation', in Selected Papers on Psychoanalysis (1927), for a discussion of the symbolic meaning of the numeral '3'. This is inaccurate. Abraham discussed the symbolic meaning of the numeral '3' in 'Two Contributions to the Study of Symbols' (1923), Clinical Papers and Essays on Psychoanalysis (1927), pp. 81-85.

87. Ibid., pp. 67-68.

89. Ibid., p.11. Fritz had an inhibition in doing division sums, to the bewilderment of his teacher, for he understood the process involved, but always did the sums wrong. Klein discovered that he always confused the remainder with the quotient in division, and always wrote it in the wrong place, because in his mind it was bleeding pieces of flesh with which he was unconsciously dealing (ibid., p. 70).

90. Ibid., p. 71.

91. Ibid., pp. 71-72.
92. Ibid., p. 72. Felix told Klein that physics was quite uncomprehensible to him. He could not understand, for example, how sound could propagate itself. On one occasion he described Klein's room as an air-tight space, and said that if people were to come in, some air must enter with them, too (ibid., p. 72).

93. Ibid., p. 72.

94. Ibid., p. 72. Felix, for example, could not think how one sketched or drew a plan; he could not imagine at all how the foundations of a house are laid in the ground. For Felix, drawing was the creating of the object represented and any incapacity for drawing represented impotence.

95. Ibid., p. 73.

96. Ibid., p. 73.

97. Klein, 'Early Analysis' (1923), Writings, Volume 1, p. 77. Klein was not unique in calling the everyday characteristics of human beings examples of inhibitions. Karl Abraham, her former tutor, had purported to show in his paper, 'A Constitutional Basis of Locomotor Anxiety' (1913), that the motor inhibitions of neurotics are libidinal (K. Abraham, Selected Papers on Psychoanalysis, 1927, pp. 235-243).

98. Ibid., p. 77.

99. Ibid., p. 78.

100. Ibid., p. 96. Fritz had many phantasies which showed he was under the influence of the mental image of the inside of his mother's body and, by identification with her, of his own body. He pictured his mother's body as a town, often as a country, and later on as the world, intersected by railway lines (ibid., p. 96).


102. Ibid., p. 99.

103. Ibid., p. 99.

104. Ibid., p. 99. The unconscious equation of sleep, death and intra-uterine existence Klein found evident in many of Fritz's sayings and phantasies, and connected with this was his curiosity as to the duration of these states and their succession in time. Klein claimed that the change from intra-uterine to extra-uterine existence, the prototype of all periodicity, is 'one of the roots of the concept of time and of orientation in time' (ibid., p. 99). In this conclusion she was in agreement with I. Hollos (1922) who arrived at the same result in his paper, 'Uber das Zeitgefühl', Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse, Volume 8.

105. Ibid., p. 97, footnote.

107. Ibid., p. 134, footnote.
108. Ibid., p. 134, footnote.
109. Ibid., p. 134, footnote. At the Eighth International Psychoanalytical Congress, held in Salzburg in 1924, Klein postulated that a fundamental mechanism in children's play and in all subsequent sublimations is the discharge of masturbation-phantasies. This, she claimed, underlies all play-activity and serves as a constant stimulus to play (compulsion to repetition). Inhibitions in play and in learning have their origin in an exaggerated repression of these phantasies and, with them, of all phantasy (ibid., p. 135, footnote).
111. Ibid., p. 105.
112. Ibid., p. 104.
113. Ibid., p. 110. Klein, in her footnote, drew attention to Hanns Sachs' course of lectures, 'On the Technique of Psychoanalysis', delivered in Berlin in 1923, which mentioned the evolution of masturbation phantasies from the anal-sadistic to the genital stage as one of the criteria which indicate that the treatment has been completed.
114. Ibid., p. 95.
115. Ibid., p. 95.
116. Ibid., p. 96.
117. Ibid., pp. 98-99.
118. Ibid., p. 96.
119. Ibid., p. 96.
120. Ibid., pp. 96-97.
121. Ibid., p. 98.
122. Ibid., p. 100. In some cases of whooping-cough, Klein found that the coughing fits increased in violence during the first week of analysis but rapidly decreased after that, and that the illness ended 'much sooner than usual' (ibid., p. 100, footnote). In these cases every coughing fit, 'owing to its unconscious meaning', released severe anxiety, and this anxiety, again, considerably reinforced the stimulus to cough (ibid., p. 100, footnote).
123. Ibid., p. 100.
124. Ibid., p. 100.
125. Ibid., p. 100.
126. Ibid., p. 100. In support of her views, Klein quoted Freud: 'Since we have learned how to look more sharply, we are tempted to say that neurosis in children is not the exception but the rule, as though it could scarcely be avoided on the path from the innate disposition of infancy to civilised society (The Question of Lay Analysis, 1926, Standard Edition, Volume 20, p. 215).

127. Ibid., p. 103. In her earliest papers Klein regarded anxiety chiefly as an inhibitor of capacities. In 'Early Analysis' (1923), however, she viewed developmental progress as dependent on the resolution of anxiety. In 'Infantile Anxiety-Situations Reflected in a Work of Art and in the Creative Impulse' (1929) she went further and interpreted anxiety as 'one of the incentives to achievement' (Writings, Volume 1, p. 218). In 'The Importance of Symbol-Formation in the Development of the Ego' (1930) she claimed that anxiety and its resolution is the prerequisite of development (Writings, ibid., pp. 219-232). Indeed, in Envy and Gratitude (1957) she described her approach to anxiety as a 'focal point' of her technique (Writings, Volume 3, 1975, p. 215).

128. See note 24.


130. Ibid., p. 1. Klein claimed that her conclusion regarding the value of sexual enlightenment had been 'clearly and irrefutably borne out' by her analysis of Fritz (ibid., p. 2).

131. Ibid., p. 26. Klein was convinced that her educational principles 'can be carried out in practice ... and that they are followed by distinctly good effects and by a much freer development in many ways' (ibid., p. 26). Nevertheless, she admitted that the 'inner possibility for this might not always be present on the part of an unanalysed person' (ibid., p. 26).

132. Ibid., p. 25.

133. Ibid., p. 25.

134. Ibid., pp. 24-25.

135. Ibid., p. 45.

136. Ibid., p. 51. How can we recognise children who are 'healthy'? If they show sexual curiosity and endeavour step by step to satisfy it; if they show no inhibitions in this and fully assimilate the enlightenment received; if in games and phantasies they uninhibitedly live through the Oedipus complex, and if they listen with pleasure to Grimm's fairy-tales without subsequent anxiety-manifestations. If they can do these things, then, 'early analysis could probably be omitted, although even in these not-too-frequent cases it might be employed with benefit ...' (ibid., p. 52).


138. Klein, ibid., p. 53.
139. Ibid., p. 75.
140. Ibid., p. 76.
141. Ibid., p. 76.
142. Ibid., p. 76.
143. Ibid., p. 76.
144. Ibid., p. 76.
145. Klein, 'Early Analysis' (1923), Writings, Volume 1, p. 105.
146. Ibid., p. 105.
147. Ibid., p. 105.
148. Ibid., p. 105.
149. Klein, 'The Psychological Principles of Early Analysis' (1926), Writings, Volume 1, p. 137.
150. Ibid., p. 137.
151. Ibid., p. 138.
152. Ibid., p. 138.
154. Ibid., p. 277. Klein claimed, however, that 'Mr. B's deep depressions and his inhibition in work had been almost completely removed and his obsessional symptoms and the paranoid and hypochondriacal anxiety considerably diminished' (ibid., p. 277). She was certain that a further period of treatment would have enabled 'Mr. B' 'fully to establish a heterosexual position' (ibid., p. 277).
155. Klein treated 'Mr. B' with 380 sessions over two years - and the treatment was incomplete when he had to return to his own country.
156. Ibid., p. 277.
158. Ibid., p. 237.
159. Ibid., p. 237.
160. Ibid., p. 237.
161. Ibid., p. 237.
Klein's emphasis on the relationships to objects, external and internal, was such that her views became known as an 'object relation theory'. Today it is more usual to speak of 'Kleinian' theory or viewpoint, and the term 'object relation theory' refers more often to the theories of Winnicott, Balint, and particularly Fairbairn, who, in contrast to Melanie Klein, departed completely from Freud's instinct theory.

In *The Psychoanalysis of Children* (1932), Klein wrote that 'educational difficulties are the expression of significant processes of development which reach completion with the decline of the Oedipus complex. They are therefore the after-effects of the developing or already formed character and the basis of the later neurosis or of any defect of development. They show themselves among other things, in excessive educational difficulties and it would be more correct to call them neurotic symptoms or characterological difficulties (rather than educational ones)' (ibid., p. 100).

A biography of Melanie Klein was published very recently after this section was written: Phyllis Grosskurth (1986) *Melanie Klein: Her World and Her Work*. 
CHAPTER 5

SUSAN ISAACS (1885-1948)

THE TRIUMPH OF PSYCHOANALYTIC PEDAGOGY

No one English educationalist, by reason of her teaching, writing and practice has had more influence on the treatment and understanding of young children than Susan Issacs.

(W.A.C. Stewart, The Educational Innovators, volume 2, 1968)
Susan Isaacs was born on May 24, 1885, the ninth child of William and Miriam Fairhurst, in the village of Bromley Cross near Bolton, Lancashire. She was baptised Susan Sutherland Fairhurst, the second name being that of her mother's Scottish Highland family. Only seven children of the family survived infancy - Willie, Enoch, Archie, Bessie, Miriam, Susan and Alice.

By the time of her mother's death, when Susan was six years old, William Fairhurst was the editor of the Bolton Journal and Guardian. He was also a 'very staunch' Methodist lay preacher who sentenced his children to many meals of bread and water for such things as grammatical errors of speech. Alice was to recall years later that Susan and she had 'the dreariest of Sundays' - attendance at morning Sunday School, Chapel Service, lunch of Yorkshire pudding, back to Sunday School, home to tea, early Prayer Meeting, evening Chapel, and then some other Meeting to round off the day.

William Fairhurst re-married shortly after his wife's death but there was never much affection between the children and their step-mother who had been their mother's nurse during her last illness; Archie ran away to join the army and Willie was seldom at home.

The whole family were gifted artistically as well as intellectually. Enoch was a 'cellist as well as an artist. Miriam and Alice qualified as teachers; and Miriam afterwards went to South Africa where she married and had a distinguished political career. Susan was very musical.

Susan went to the local Council School and then to the new Bolton Secondary School. Besides Bessie, she was closest to her brother Enoch who had a considerable influence on her inquisitive mind. He introduced her to philosophical writings, and she became agnostic. This led to a rift with her father who removed her from school and refused to speak to her for about two/...
two years. Susan had no choice but to live at home and help Bessie and her step-mother with the household chores. As recompense the two sisters were allowed five shillings each per week to cover their entire expenses. But they were intelligent, talented girls and besides making their own clothes they rose early in the morning in order to have time for study.

Susan's reading ranged widely in many fields though the two which are always associated with her - psychology and education - were not as yet among them. Her reading included biography and history and she became deeply interested in philosophy in which she took her degree. Later, her interests included biology and geology. She had a lifelong love of great literature, especially novels and poetry, with a special affection for Shakespeare's Sonnets. She also loved music, especially Beethoven, Mozart, Bach, Silbelius, Schubert and Brahms; and she always found great pleasure in playing the piano.

Susan showed an early and lasting interest in politics. While still living at home she joined the Fabian Society and also became an ardent but not militant supporter of the Women's Suffrage Movement. Later, at the University of Manchester, she became one of the founders of the University Socialist Federation.

Tired of housekeeping, Susan took a private post teaching a young and delicate boy. Later, she obtained a post as a nursery governess with an English family and went with them to Morocco for a year. After her return she taught again for a time in a small private school in Bolton. Regretting her lack of training, she persuaded her father to allow her to go to the University of Manchester to train as an infant-teacher. The head of the course, Grace Owen, a pioneer of progressive education for young children, encouraged Susan to read Froebel and Dewey, and persuaded her to drop the teacher-training course and read for a degree in philosophy under Professor Samuel Alexander (1859-1938).

Susan eventually graduated with a First-Class Honours in 1912 and was awarded a graduate scholarship to study for a year at Cambridge. Her research topic - chosen, incidentally by her professor - was not philosophical, however, but/...
but psychological - the aetiology of good and bad spelling. But this fortuitous choice had an important consequence, indeed. Susan was so fascinated by this new field of study that she turned from philosophy to psychology. She read widely, including the work of two French psychologists who opened up new educational vistas for her - Alfred Binet (1857-1911), a pioneer of intelligence tests, and Pierre Janet (1859-1947), who had been a student friend of Freud's when they studied under Charcot in Paris.

When she left Cambridge, Susan was appointed lecturer in Infant School education at Darlington Training College. While there she married William Brierley, a botanist, whom she had met at the University of Manchester. In 1914 the University of Manchester offered Susan the post of lecturer in logic in the department of philosophy, an appointment she held for only one year because Brierley obtained an appointment in research into plant diseases at Kew. They moved to London. While there, Susan lectured for the Workers' Educational Association and was enrolled also as a lecturer for University Tutorial Classes.

Her marriage to Brierley was not a success. She divorced him and married Nathan Isaacs in 1922. By 1921 she had published her *Introduction to Psychology* and had begun a serious study of psychoanalysis. She started her first long analysis with John Carl Flugel (1884-1944) which she supplemented with a brief analysis with Otto Rank (1885-1939) in Berlin. She was elected to full membership of the British Psychoanalytical Society in 1923.

The two greatest events of Isaacs' life followed within the next decade. In 1924 she was appointed head of the Malting House School in Cambridge, founded by Geoffrey Pyke (1894-1948), a financial entrepreneur. With the publications based on her work at this experimental school, Isaacs became internationally renowned. In 1933 she was appointed head of the new Department of Child Development, founded by Sir Percy Nunn (1870-1944), at the University of London Institute of Education. Her lectures and seminars from 1933-1943 were attended by inspectors, lecturers and teachers from all areas of education.
In 1935 the first symptom of cancer made its appearance. With treatment Isaacs seemed to recover and in 1937 she was part of an international conference held by the New Education Fellowship in New Zealand and Australia.\(^\text{18}\)

During the Second World War Isaacs settled in Cambridge\(^\text{19}\) where she continued to work with certain patients who moved there. She also gave a course in normal child psychology to the students of the London School of Economics who were training to be psychiatric social workers. She also became involved in a research into the problems of evacuation both for children and their temporary foster parents.\(^\text{20}\) Her evidence to the Curtis Committee on the case of children deprived of normal home life was based on this.

In 1943 Isaacs resigned her post at the Department of Child Development. She died on October 12, 1948.

II

Three obituaries written on the occasion of Isaacs' death testified to her unique achievement. Sir Cyril Burt said: 'Her loss to educational psychology will be quite irreparable'.\(^\text{21}\) Evelyn Lawrence, a member of staff of the Malting House School and subsequently Director of the National Froebel Foundation, wrote in *New Era* that due to Isaacs 'more than to any other single person' the nation as a whole was 'advancing rather rapidly in its way of handling young children both at home and at school...'\(^\text{22}\) The obituary written by Sir Fred Clarke (1880-1952), Professor of Education at the University of London (1936-1945) and Director of the Institute of Education for most of the period when Isaacs was head of the Department of Child Development, said simply that she 'achieved great things which will live on and grow, and thousands who have never known her will be the happier for what she has done...'\(^\text{23}\)

Obituaries, of course, are customarily eulogistic, but since Isaacs' death the references to her have been frequent and laudatory, especially from the British/...
British psychoanalytic community justly proud of its greatest educator. Donald Winnicott's description of her as a 'truly great person' and a 'tremendous influence for good on the attitude of parents and of teachers to the children in their care' can be regarded as the typical response of the entire psychoanalytic milieu.

It would be totally misleading, however, to suggest that the praise has come only from Freudian disciples sharing, despite the inevitable vagaries of interpretation, a common corpus of essential analytic concepts. A few examples will testify that Susan Isaacs' work has continued to captivate writers of diverse backgrounds. G.H. Bantock (1965) referred to her as 'one of the most justly celebrated of educational psychologists'. W.A.C. Stewart (1968) confirmed that no other 'English educationalist... has had more influence on the treatment and understanding of young children than Susan Isaacs'. Cyril Burt in a letter to Isaacs' biographer, D.E.M. Gardner, declared her work to be 'superior to and much more exact than Piaget's'. And Gardner herself in her biographical peroration described Isaacs' work at the Malting House School as 'one of the great influences on the education of children under seven in the State schools of this country'. She added approvingly: 'That influence is now spreading upwards into the junior schools. It is probable that by now few teachers are aware of how much the influence originated from her work'.

Let us consider, then, Isaacs' historic work at the Malting House School in Cambridge.

III

Although the Malting House School existed for only three years its indirect influence has been out of all proportion to its life-span or size...

(Stewart, The Educational Innovators, volume 2, 1968)

In the spring of 1924 this extraordinary advertisement appeared in New Statesman:
WANTED - an Educated Young Woman with honours degree - preferably first class - or the equivalent, to conduct education of a small group of children aged 2½ - 7, as a piece of scientific work and research.

Previous educational experience is not considered a bar, but the advertisers hope to get in touch with a university graduate - or someone of equivalent intellectual standing - who has hitherto considered themselves too good for teaching and who has probably already engaged in another occupation.

A LIBERAL SALARY - liberal as compared with research work or teaching - will be paid to a suitable applicant who will live out, have fixed hours and opportunities for a pleasant independent existence. An assistant will be provided if the work increases.

They wish to obtain the services of someone with certain personal qualifications for the work and a scientific attitude of mind towards it. Hence a training in any of the natural sciences is a distinct advantage.

Preference will be given to those who do not hold any form of religious belief but this is not by itself considered to be a substitute for other qualifications.

The applicant chosen would be required to undergo a course of preliminary training, 6 - 8 months in London, in part at any rate the expenses of this being paid by the advertisers.

Communications are invited to Box No. 1.

It is no exaggeration to say that this advertisement set in motion a chain of events which were to have a deep and lasting influence on British early education. The advertiser was Geoffrey Pyke (1894-1948) a financial entrepreneur who had amassed a fortune from investment in the purchase and sale of metals. After the birth of his son in 1921 Pyke, having read some psychoanalytic/...
psychoanalytic writings, made some important decisions. First, the educational socialisation of his son must begin as early as possible. Second, as no school in Cambridge, or indeed in England, could provide a psychoanalytic education for infants, he would found such a school himself. Third, the essential research function of the school would be emphasised and publicised in order to effect a psychoanalytic reorientation of English Schools. And finally, he would undergo a personal analysis in order to gain the necessary insight as a parent into the 'new psychology'.

Susan Isaacs applied for the post and was appointed in 1924. She remained Principal until 1927 when she left because of increasing friction with Geoffrey Pyke who, apparently, found it difficult to accept her role as the equivalent of Prime Minister. She returned to London and spent the next few years writing up the Malting House material. From this labour came a quartet of publications which made an immediate and lasting impact on the British educational establishment - The Nursery Years (1929); Intellectual Growth in Young Children (1930); The Children We Teach (1932); and Social Development in Young Children (1933).

Isaacs gave three reasons for gathering and publishing the Malting House material: (a) her interest in 'everything that little children do and feel'; (b) the 'great, the desperate need of children themselves to be understood'; and (c) the 'scientific value' of the material, described by Isaacs as 'objective behaviouristic records'.

The school began in Cambridge in 1924 with a group of 10 boys, ranging in age from 2 years 8 months to 4 years 10 months. During the year 1926-7 the age range was 3 years to 10 years 5 months; and in the last term covered by Isaacs' records, there were 20 children in the group, of ages between 2 years 7 months and 8 years 6 months.
At first it was a day-school only, but in the second year they began to take children into residence, and in the third year about one-third of them lived at the school.

Most of the children came to the school from 9.30 in the morning to 3.30 in the afternoon; a few of the younger ones left at lunch-time.

The children were from professional families, many of highly distinguished parents. On the scales used at the time they were all well above average. The first girl came in the third term of the first year. During the period covered by Isaacs' records, the proportion of girls to boys never rose above one to four.

The pupils in the school constituted two quite different categories. In one category were the children of parents who were 'fully sympathetic' to the aims and methods of the school. In the other category were the children who were sent only because they had already proved themselves 'difficult to manage at home'. When the parents of some of these 'difficult' children rejected her educational methods and psychoanalytic diagnoses Isaacs sent the children away. By this method of 'natural selection' Isaacs created a cohesive group of parents which 'understood and valued the work of the school and gave it continued support'. In addition to this obvious advantage Isaacs admitted to another: she never had the problem of stupidity to deal with, and even the most difficult of the children possessed for her the 'endearing quality of high intelligence'.

The number of staff was two in the first two years, three in the third year, and five in the last term of these records.

The aims were threefold: (1) to stimulate the active inquiry of the children themselves, rather than to 'teach' them; (2) to bring within their immediate experience the facts of the external world - 'not the school subjects'; and (3) to provide for the development of the child's own bodily and social skills and means of expression.
Isaacs claimed that her school was the first in England to take Dewey's ideas seriously and put them into practice in the education of young children. Hitherto, educators had been content to apply their psychological knowledge of how children learn, to the ways of getting them to learn better the old things. They had not used it to enrich their understanding of what they need to learn nor what kind of experiences the school should offer them. The school had remained a screen between children and their living interests.

Let us turn now to an eye-witness account of the school written by a member of staff. Then we shall consider the views of Isaacs herself.

Evelyn Lawrence's account of the school reveals clearly that Isaacs' chief concern was to produce a 'new generation less nerve-ridden than the old'. They were guided by the 'newest psychology', that is, psychoanalysis, which had taught them something about 'what to avoid in the way of repression, what kind of attachments should be encouraged and what discouraged, what sort of emotional outlets should be provided'.

Lawrence claimed three main advantages accrue from psychoanalytic freedom of action and emotional expression. First, 'you can get to know your children' when their crudities, disorder, and savagery, even, are allowed to show. Emotional troubles can then be dealt with 'scientifically' or allowed to straighten themselves out given time. Second, the danger of driving strong emotions underground 'to work havoc in the unconscious' is avoided. Isaacs permitted the open expression of sexual interests, but where possible they were 'canalised by being turned into scientific channels'. Hostility, another 'uncomfortable passion', was allowed freedom of expression: if the Malting House children hated a person they said so. It was then possible for the staff to investigate the reason for that hatred, and attempt to remove it. When fights and squabbles occurred, and the fighters were fairly evenly matched, they were 'left to work out the adjustment themselves'. 
The third advantage accrues from the abolition of conventional discipline whereby the child is kept 'wriggling' under a dead weight of adult disapproval and prohibition. In the Malting House School discipline was very free with no punishment and little admonition; Lawrence described the child's position as that of 'a fencer, continually adapting himself to the shifting conditions of the group mood'.

With so much freedom given to the pupils we are immediately interested in the role of the teachers. What on earth were they supposed to do? The aim of the teachers - as far as possible - was to 'refrain from teaching', and to let the children find out all they could for themselves. They were urged to answer their own questions, with the teachers helping them discover where the answers were to be found.

This is indeed astonishing: a school whose chief concern is the production of a new generation less 'nerve-ridden' than the old; where 'repression' is avoided; where children do pretty much as they like; where there is no fixed curriculum; and where teachers 'refrain from teaching'. The picture is charming, idyllic, and Rousseau-esque. But did the teachers really refrain from teaching? Were the children really free from adult control and design? If so, what did the teachers do? The work of the educator, it appeared, was 'so to select his material, and at time indirectly to suggest activities, that the child will of his own accord do things which are useful for his growth'.

Now, Lawrence was not suggesting here that children know what things are useful for their growth. The clear implication is that they will use the selected material and follow the suggested activities which the adults consider will be useful. Furthermore, as well as a careful selection of material and an indirect suggestion of activities, the children were under 'trained observation' in and out of school hours. In fact, there was no break between their school and their out-of-school life; and practically all that they did, and much of what they said, was recorded. The children were discussed individually, and the meaning of their actions, as well as how to deal with them, considered.
This constant surveillance should not really surprise us. In a psychoanalytic culture every gesture, word, look, omission and act assume importance. Nothing is trivial because nothing is meaningless. Isaacs admitted this: 'I myself happen to be interested in everything that little children do and feel'.

Finally, Lawrence's account of the Malting House School reveals that during the life of the school Isaacs' position changed: as a result of her observation of this group of children, and of the 'discoveries of Melanie Klein' which were then first becoming available, she realised increasingly the young children's 'need for order and stability', for adult support of their loving and constructive impulses against their own hate and aggression; in short, for an 'element of guiding firmness'.

This is interesting. According to Lawrence, Isaacs' methodology of dealing with children changed, partly from her everyday experience and partly from her growing acceptance of Kleinian theory. How important, then, was psychoanalysis for Isaacs? More specifically, what was the extent of Klein's influence on her work?

IV

My own personal study of young children has served only to increase my deep admiration and gratitude for the genius of Freud, in being able to penetrate so deeply and so surely to the actual mind of the little child, through the study of the minds of adults.

(Isaacs, Social Development in Young Children, 1933)

D.E.M. Gardner, her friend, colleague and biographer, revealed that Isaacs' psychoanalytic work 'meant more to her than any other part of her professional life'. But when educationalists write about her work (especially at the Malting House School) they write of her almost exclusively as an 'educator'...
'educator' or 'psychologist', and seriously under-estimate the decisive role which psychoanalysis played in her professional deliberations (e.g. Bantock, 1965; Stewart, 1968; Entwistle, 1970; Selleck, 1972; Whitbread, 1972; Hannam, 1983).

Let us consider briefly her psychoanalytic background.

Isaacs was first analysed by J.C. Flugel (1884-1955) an orthodox Freudian and for that reason rather old-fashioned to the radical constellation of young British analysts captivated by the revolutionary ideas of Melanie Klein. When she became convinced of the value of Klein's work, Isaacs decided to have a new analysis with Klein's pupil, Joan Riviere (1883-1962). That Isaacs was subsequently satisfied with this analysis is obvious from the dedication of her book *Social Development in Young Children* (1933): 'To Joan Riviere who has taught me to understand my own childhood'. In addition to her analysis with Riviere, Isaacs went to Germany for a brief analysis with Otto Rank (1884-1939) whose theories emphasising the crucial role of the mother in the parent-child relationship had a decisive influence on Klein and, indeed, on the subsequent course of psychoanalytic theory and practice. She was a member of the British Psychoanalytical Society from 1923; a member of staff of the London Clinic of Psychoanalysis, 1931; a member of the training Committee of the London Clinic of Psychoanalysis, 1944; and a member of the Council of the London Clinic of Psychoanalysis, 1946.

It is in *Social Development in Young Children* (1933) that the influence of Kleinian theory is most evident. From the outset Isaacs acknowledged her debt, personal and theoretical, to the work of Melanie Klein and Nina Searl (d. 1955), admitting openly that her interpretations and conclusions of the social behaviour of her pupils in the Malting House School are Kleinian:

I am very deeply indebted to these two leaders in the psychoanalysis of children not only for their published researches, but also for the personal teaching they have both given me in the work of child analysis. My...
My theoretical interpretations of these observations of children's behaviour rest upon their fundamental and epoch-making researches into the psychology of infants and young children; their work, in its turn, owes its foundations and its inspiration to the discoveries of Freud.  

She admitted, too, that the broad lines of classification adopted for the material arose mainly from her own 'initial interests' with the Kleinian preoccupations of 'love and hate, and of the relation between sexuality and guilt'.

With this admission, let us look at Isaacs' use of Kleinian theory to explain three aspects of human growth - emotional development, intellectual development and social development.

In *Intellectual Growth in Young Children* (1930) Isaacs affirmed Freud's emphasis of the therapeutic value of 'play' for the child in the abreaction of infantile traumata. Psychoanalytic studies of little children have shown, she claimed, that 'children work out their inner conflicts in an external field, thus lessening the pressure of the conflict, and diminishing guilt and anxiety'. Such a lessening of inner tension through dramatic representation, she added, makes it easier for children to control their real behaviour, and to accept the limitations of the real world. In other words, it 'furthers the development of the ego, and of the sense of reality'.

But what is the source of these 'inner conflicts', 'guilt and anxiety'? Children give external form and expression to each of the different aspects of their real parents, as they apprehend these at the different levels of their own development, through their own wishes and impulses. The child's 'inner conflicts', then, arise from the emotional relationship with the parents. More specifically, Isaacs, following Klein, underlined the supreme importance of the mother-child relationship. The child, she claimed in *Social Development in Young Children* (1933), suffers 'psychic death' when the mother does not respond at once to his wish:
There can thus be for him no mere indifference, no accidental deprivation, no mere loss of satisfaction. That is to say, loss is always felt by him as due to a personal action on the part of his mother. If he is not satisfied, it is she who fails to satisfy him, who is indeed felt to be actively hostile. 79

Jealousy, rivalry, fear, aggression are the dominant emotions of the child's early years according to Isaacs. Thus she states that children 'tend to be jealous and afraid of the relationship between their parents - or indeed between any significant adults'. Because of this the child 'so often seeks to attach the one or the other entirely to himself'. Indeed, 'this wish to separate the parents, to get in between them and win one of them to oneself, is always found in the deeper and unconscious levels of every individual mind'. 80

Isaacs went further than this. At a very early age, 'certainly by the end of the first year', children not only are jealous of the father's relation with the mother and the mother's with the father, but have some 'intuitive awareness of its nature'. Indeed, they are 'perfectly aware that it is an intimate bodily relation of some kind'. Moreover, the sexual relation of the parents 'creates a crucial emotional problem for the human child, and gives rise to fundamental anxieties which every child has to try to deal with in one way or another'. This is the ' apex' of the child's mental conflict. But perhaps this problem will arise only for children who actually share their parents' bedroom during their first or second years of life? This is not the case. Isaacs insisted that, in its broad structure, the problem 'arises within the psyche of every human child'. 82

One mechanism for dealing with these anxieties is that of 'making good', restoring, giving back, re-creating, what has in phantasy been taken from the parents or rivals. These tendencies are often collectively referred to by psychoanalysts as tendencies to restitution and they believe them to be of the 'utmost importance in the normal development of ordinary children', helping them to learn to adapt to the real world, and to become co-operative and helpful in social life. 89
Many children meet this situation by building up the hope of returning to the mother (or the father) what has been taken. In this way they hope to make her better again, and thus make themselves better again. The sexual expression of this - the giving of love and power, of semen and children - is a normal constituent in the later development of the boy, and a normal element in the sexuality of the adult male. Since they have this power of real sexual restitution, the destructive impulses in males do not undergo complete repression, but commonly find sublimatory channels of expression in the real world. In girls, the anxieties connected with the biting and aggressive impulses towards the mother's body give rise to fears of their own bodies being destroyed. These fears are compounded by the lack of a penis. Indeed, this 'castration' seems to be evidence that they have, in fact, been punished.

In brief: tendencies to restitution are normally stronger in girls for two reasons. First, the drive towards giving back to the mother, restoring, making better, is necessarily stronger; and second, their fears of destructive impulses are greater and more persistent. Isaacs described this Kleinian explanation as 'probably one of the essential keys to the greater inhibition of curiosity which undoubtedly occurs in most girls, as compared with boys, and especially that inhibition of the mechanical interests, and taking things to pieces, which are so characteristic of the boy'. Another consequence of this emotional situation facing girls is the need to cherish and save life. With some girls, Isaacs claimed, the need to restore to the mother becomes so persistent and acute that their lives are spent in serving other women and children.

In congruence with Kleinian theory, then, Isaacs emphasised that the mother-child relationship, the fountain-head of emotional development, is the 'apex' of all mental conflict. In The Children We Teach (1932) she gave the specific example of children who are non-readers. Sometimes these children make dramatic progress when treated by a skilled and sympathetic psychologist in a clinic. But very often they regress when they return to school. Isaacs concluded that the ability to read - 'like most other abilities' is not a mysterious, innate, mechanical function but depends on the total emotional setting:
With the growing child at any rate, the ability to read is always an ability (or failure) to read here and now, with these particular persons listening, and in these particular circumstances. The emotional setting is thus the essential key, rather than any particular mechanical defect.

Emotional factors are very important, too, in other areas of the curriculum. In arithmetic, for example, - 'perhaps more than anywhere else'97 children may get held back from emotional causes as well as from inherent intellectual defects.

In Intellectual Growth in Young Children (1930) Isaacs pinpointed two points centrally important for the understanding of intellectual growth in very young infants. These are the problems of interest, and the relation between thought and phantasy.98

In Isaacs' view the progressive differences in interest may help to determine the characteristic modes of knowing and reasoning at different ages. She suggested, too, that the more intelligent children in these early years are those who 'show the most lively concern with things and events in the physical world, and those whose interest flows on to the more subtle and more fully integrated modes of handling everyday experience'.99

The chief differentia between children of one age and of another may in the last resort turn out to be the direction of their concrete interests. For whilst it is true that infants do concern themselves directly with physical objects and changes, it is also true that most of their interest goes to other activities. Indeed, they spend so much time in the dramatic representation of their own wishes and phantasies, that this 'might well be looked upon as the characteristic type of mental activity in these years'.100 When children are/...
are left quite free to occupy themselves as they wish, three main types of spontaneous activity can be observed: (a) the perfecting of physical skills of all sorts; (b) make-believe play varying according to sex, age, recent 'real' experiences, and the material to hand; and (c) the direct concern with physical things, animals and plants for their own sake, and direct inquiry into the questions associated with these.

Discovery, reasoning and thought may and do grow, of course, out of any one of these situations. It is by no means only the last of the three that gives rise to new knowledge and the growth of true thought. For one of the outstanding facts about the mental life of children of these ages is that these different sorts of activity pass so readily into one another. Make-believe, for example, can slip easily into genuine inquiry, and it offers, too, many occasions for the furtherance of skill. On the other hand, the pursuit of facts or new bodily skills may at any time give place to phantasy and dramatic representation.

If dramatic representation, or imaginative play, is the 'characteristic type of mental activity' during the years of infancy, what is the connection between it and thought?

What imaginative play does, in the first place, is to create practical situations which may be pursued for their own sake, leading to actual discovery, or to verbal judgment and reasoning. This does not, of course, always happen. Sometimes the play of children can be purely repetitive, without progression and without thought. But at any moment, a new line of inquiry or argument might flash out, and a new step in understanding be taken.

Isaacs described this first kind of relation between phantasy and thought as a circumstantial relation. But she was convinced, however, that the cognitive value of the play situation rests also upon a second and deeper relation between thought and phantasy. Isaacs' description of this relationship, with the/...
the parent-child dyad as an explanation of all human development, is Kleinian in essence. As the relationship, moreover, constitutes the foundation on which Isaacs erected her entire educational superstructure, it is worth quoting the extraordinary passage in full:

Much of the child's earliest interest in physical objects is certainly derivative, and draws its impetus from early infantile wishes and fears in relation to its parents. As I suggested in an earlier passage, the first value which the physical world has for the child is as a canvas upon which to project his personal wishes and anxieties, and his first form of interest in it is one of dramatic representation. The psychoanalysis of young children by Klein's play technique has shown that engines and motors and fires and lights and water and mud and animals have a profoundly symbolic meaning for them, rooted in infantile phantasy. Their ability to concern themselves with real objects and real happenings is a relative matter. It exists, in a very effective sense, and can be used for intellectual growth, as I have shown. But its deepest sources lie in the first 'symbol-formation' of infantile mental life; and it will continue to renew its vitality from the repressed wishes and fears and phantasies of that period.

Isaacs claimed, too, that free, dramatic play furthers the development of the ego, and of the sense of reality. She concluded: 'Imaginative play builds a bridge by which the child can pass from the symbolic values of things to active inquiry into their real construction and real way of working."

Isaacs pointed out, moreover, that in spite of these various intimate relations between thought and phantasy, children, at any rate beyond the first three years, 'very rarely' confuse them. They are aware of the difference between imagining the fulfilment of a wish, and actually gaining it.

It is very important, Isaacs thought, that theories of intellectual growth should not blur this distinction between thought and phantasy. Although infants are 'autistic'...
'autistic', we cannot justly say that their processes of thought are autistic. They do not yet think at all; besides, the ego-centrism of children is strictly an affair of feeling and phantasy, not of thought. They are ego-centric in so far as they have not yet learnt to think. But as experience comes to them, and noetic synthesis grows, true relational thought emerges more and more out of the matrix of feeling and phantasy. The elaborated make-belief of infants is half phantasy, half thought; and makes a bridge from the one to the other.

Thus: through (1) the continuous growth of actual experience, both of physical fact and of other people's behaviour, and (2) the continuous development of intelligence itself, children become able to build the pattern of the objective world more and more securely into their modes of response. Ego-centric phantasy thus becomes more and more automatically tested against recognised experience, and more and more transformed by real situations. Isaacs did not mean, however, that phantasy no longer finds expression. It continues to do so in imaginative art and literature and in scientific hypothesis-making. 108

Isaacs' theory of intellectual development, then, closely follows Kleinian theory. Isaacs, however, did introduce a new study into her educational philosophy - psychometrics. In this she was in accord with the contemporary views of the psychometrists, especially Cyril Burt, her friend, whom she quoted frequently and approvingly in Intellectual Growth in Young Children (1930). It is now 'pretty certain', Isaacs wrote, that 'nature is all-powerful in fixing the level of intelligence or general mental ability to which any one of us attains'. 110 It is also reasonably well established that throughout the years of growth this innate general ability keeps with each of us a 'practically constant relation with the norm for our age', 111 and that 'none by taking thought can add a cubit to his stature'. Furthermore, nature not only gives the original measure of general ability, but has also the 'main voice'...
voice' in decreeing its forms of expression in the successive periods of development. These progressive changes which are to a great extent independent of the variable elements in experience, 'such as education and circumstance', come to an end at fourteen years of age (or at the latest sixteen). Thereafter, Isaacs claimed, although we can add to our knowledge and take up new fields of knowledge, the level of our intelligence 'will (apparently) not change nor advance'.

These comments of Isaacs are exclusively concerned with the hypothesis of the constitutional constancy of 'intelligence' or 'mental ability'. The implications of this for schooling will be considered later. In the meantime, we can ask a related question to the above: what is the actual genesis of intelligence? If the 'level' of general ability is fixed by 'nature', is there anything which promotes its growth? Or is everything merely a process of inevitable maturation?

According to Piaget the key to intellectual development lies in the first appearance of the 'social instincts' about seven to eight years of age. Before this, children are ego-centric, and therefore syncretistic. When they become sensitive to the criticism of others, self-criticism is awakened; and from self-criticism, logical judgement and the ability to reason are born.

The social factor is thus for Piaget the key to intellectual growth; but he gave no key to social development in its turn. No psychological explanation of the genesis of the social instincts is offered. For Piaget, they are, presumably, the result of some biological process of maturation of the nervous system, and their roots are not to be sought, then, in previous psychological happenings.

In Intellectual Growth in Young Children (1930) Isaacs argued that Piaget's view is not justified. She urged, in accord with basic psychoanalytic thinking, that/...
that the process of socialisation is gradual and continuous, that the 'social instincts' which appear more marked at seven to eight years have an individual history, and a strictly psychological genesis, 'as Freud has shown'.

They are not to be thought of as a simple and direct expression of a biological process of maturation.

Let us consider, then, Isaacs' theory of social development as adopted from Freud and Klein.

In Social Development in Young Children (1933) Isaacs wrote that psychoanalysts are in a 'specially privileged position for the study of the genesis and history of social relations as such'. By this Isaacs meant that the genesis and history of all social relations are to be found in the Oedipal dramas of the early years of infancy. Isaacs expressed this fundamental postulate in this way:

'Human society rests upon the long plasticity of childhood, coupled with the permanent relation of the child's parents in the sexual and parental functions. The particular tensions of jealous rivalry, the love and longing and hatred, to which the human child is exposed from a very early age take their rise in this family situation. And from these influences and conflicts are ultimately derived all the varied characteristics of later social life'.

The way in which, for example, the relations of children to their first teachers are intimately influenced by the 'special colouring' of their previous relations with their parents; the way their attitudes to playmates at school, and friends in later life, reflect their earliest conflicts with rivals in the home; the way their feelings and phantasies about their parents mould their adult sentiments about 'home and country and government'; the way the cross-currents of their later/...
later relations to men and women, are related to their own children or their grandparents; \(^{123}\) the way in which their earliest play interests become elaborated or deflected into the sustained pursuits of adult life; \(^{124}\) and the way that 'every aspect' of their later social responses is brought into relation with their deep phantasy lives, on the one hand, and their earlier, real experiences, on the other. \(^{125}\)

In addition to this, Isaacs emphasised three other things of great importance for social development - companionship, infant sexuality, and aggression.

From her study of early egocentrism, and of group hostility and aggression, she concluded that 'children are carried on to real independence through discovering the value of other children as allies, against the fear both of real grown-ups and of the internal superego'. \(^{126}\) This banding together is a 'fundamental step forward in social development', underlying all possibility of reciprocal action and feeling among equals. \(^{127}\) The mutual support which the children give each other in this common action against grown-ups is an integral part of their growth towards co-operation and love within the social group. It is an 'immense step forward' on the attitude of the child who had hitherto felt nothing but fear and rivalry towards other children. \(^{128}\)

But why should fear and rivalry arise in the first place? They arise from the guilt and anxiety attached to the Oedipal relationships. What did Isaacs suggest we do, then, with regard to infant sexuality?

Isaacs was convinced that the evidence she gathered at the Malting House School would help to establish the truth that infantile sexuality is not only a matter of symbolic interpretation and unconscious phantasy, but of 'actual observable behaviour' amongst normal and healthy children. \(^{129}\) Parents should understand, therefore, that some amount of open sexual behaviour, such as masturbation, mutual display and examining of sexual parts, and 'rude' talk about the excretory processes, normally and generally occur among young children./...
children. Where sexual behaviour is 'flagrant and persistent' in children over five years of age, it is very likely that the children in question do need 'some special psychological help'. But this is not true of occasional but secret sexual play of the same kind, which Isaacs insisted is quite ordinary and normal in the early years, and may occur with any child. Nor does it need any special attention on the part of adults. Does this mean, then, that we should be indifferent to such displays of sexual interest? Isaacs' advice is interesting: 'Little more may be required than a deflection of interest to other pursuits, a fuller opportunity of co-operative play in non-sexual directions'. That is, sexual interests are normal in children; nevertheless, when they do appear they should be deflected to other pursuits of a non-sexual nature.

There is another factor, related to infant sexuality, of great importance for social development. Aggression is 'so normal' as to represent a 'definite stage in social development'. In spite of the admitted practical difficulties it creates for the adult in charge, Isaacs believed that aggressive behaviour is the 'most promising first response' from a child who lacks social expertise and presages an 'active and vigorous social life' in the near future - under careful handling.

But why should aggression represent a definite stage in social development? Does it not sound like a contradiction in terms? After all, most people would consider aggression to be asocial in essence and something, therefore, to be avoided at all costs.

Isaacs argued, in accord with Kleinian theory, that there are two general modes of dealing with the anxiety connected with aggressive impulses. These - of 'universal significance' in the normal development of children - are (a) the 'flight to phantasy', and (b) the 'flight to reality'.

In the first of these, children attempt to withdraw from contact with real people and real situations, where this has become too difficult and dangerous. They/...
They take refuge in a temporary flight into the realm of imagination, with some type of wish-fulfilment. Such a flight occurs to some extent in every neurosis, as well as in ordinary day-dreaming. It is found in a more general and serious form in certain psychotic illnesses, notably schizophrenia.

In the 'flight to reality', children actively seek real experience with people and events outside themselves, reality having been found (as it normally is) to be safer and better than their inner phantastic fears. They limit their thinking, too, as far as possible to the terms of real experience, and try to exclude imagination and imaginative pursuits.

These two modes of allaying anxiety 'play a considerable part in the normal development of children' - their make-believe play, on the one hand, and their normal development in skill and understanding on the other. Isaacs was claiming here a universal fact: all children show these two mechanisms on various occasions and in various directions. Which of the two is more permanently adopted will depend upon the course of actual experience in the early days of infancy and childhood.

Let us briefly recapitulate: the genesis and history of all social relations are to be found in the Oedipal dramas of infancy. Peer-companionship is of 'immense value' for social development because children need allies against the fear both of adults and of their internal superegos. Why should they fear these? They fear adults, of course, because of the guilt and anxiety arising from the Oedipal relationships; and they fear their superegos, too, because these, the forerunners of adult consciences, represent the 'controlling parents' who, being more powerful, are able to thwart their asocial desires and punish them at whim. Also any manifestations of infant sexuality and aggression are normal and necessary aspects of social development, and with 'careful handling' can be deflected to other, more socially acceptable, pursuits.
It is quite clear that Isaacs was not recommending that children should be left without any control or guidance. Indeed, in some directions, she thought, children 'cannot do without our guidance'. What, then, do they need? They need the 'help of external restraints in learning to control and deflect' their impulses, particularly the aggressive ones. On the other hand, they need our 'passive help as educators' in giving them opportunities for indirect expression in social activities and the mastering of skill.

But how can we help children to 'control' and 'deflect' their impulses while being 'passive' educators at the same time? What did Isaacs say was the role of the school?

V

In *Intellectual Growth in Young Children* (1930) Isaacs wrote that children 'must be given a large measure of freedom to imagine or to think as the need and occasion arises'. If we, as teachers, 'tried to teach them these things formally, or to exert pressure upon them in these directions, we should simply waste our time, and might even do positive harm'. Now, if formal teaching is a 'waste of time', what about conventional schooling with its rigid differentiation of subjects? Isaacs was not impressed: for her, the direct interests of children in the concrete processes in the world around them seem far more significant in themselves, and as a medium of education, than knowledge of the traditional 'subjects' of the school. In other words, she could see 'no reason to let the school and its conventions stand between the child and real situations in the world'.

This, Isaacs frankly avowed, is in line with Dewey's educational philosophy. In *The Children We Teach* (1932) she took these ideas further and warned against 'hazardous theories', however fashionable, which did little more than seduce educators from a proper study of the facts. In particular, Isaacs mentioned two: the 'recapitulation' theory, a generalisation popular in her time, which posits that growing children recapitulate the biological stages of the human race, and a variant of this, the 'culture epoch' theory/...
theory, which avers a parallel between the child's growth and the successive types of culture in the history of peoples. On the basis of such theories educators tried to dictate what the child ought to be learning at successive ages. Some historians, for example, suggested that the teaching of history should begin with the caveman, solely on the grounds of a putative affinity between the minds of young infants and Palaeolithic hunters.

Isaacs dismissed such 'premature theories' and, instead, enunciated four general principles on which the primary school should be based:-

First: 'it is the children's activity that is the key to their full development'. This principle is of the greatest importance to Isaacs and from it she specified the duty of the teacher:

The first great duty of the educator is thus to create such conditions as will allow the freest possible and the most ample bodily movement. When we ask children not to move, we should have excellent reasons for doing so. It is stillness we have to justify, not movement.

Second: activity is more fruitful when it is most 'concrete and practical', dealing with 'real things that can be seen and handled and made and measured'.

Third: children need the 'opportunity of verbal reasoning', the chance to put their experiences into 'words, to describe, to discuss, and to argue'.

Fourth: the organisation and grouping of the children should be based upon the psychometrical study of individual differences.

Isaacs re-emphasised in this book her complete faith in the psychometrist position as follows: a child's mental ratio, when properly measured, is 'one of/...
of the most stable and permanent things about him'. Thus a child who starts by being on the dull side of average is 'most likely to stay there all his life'; and conversely, the child who begins above the normal is 'never likely to drop below it'. This being so, people can be divided into four groups, 'defective, dull, average, or superior', and Isaacs was confident that, although one may show up in different years a little less or a little more intelligent, one will 'hardly' drop or rise right out of one's original group. This fact makes it 'so useful to discover a child's mental ratio, at any rate by the end of his Infants' School days'. Isaacs conceded that the amount of knowledge they may show at any time will depend upon their opportunities in home and school as well as upon their own gifts. But intelligence as measured by standardised tests, however, is 'very largely independent of chance and opportunity, of good or bad teaching'. It seems to be in the main a matter of biological inheritance. Isaacs concluded: 'If one wants to be a really intelligent person, it is far more important to choose one's parents well than one's schoolmasters!'

As well as casting doubt on the efficacy of good teaching, Isaacs was convinced that mental ratio, as measured by a skilled investigator, is 'a more trustworthy index than the teacher's general impression of a child, or even than his actual school record'. With such a view it is not surprising that she claimed, too, that ability as expressed in mental ratio is the 'soundest general basis for classifying the children in the primary Schools', and she approved of the suggestion that for the school of ordinary size each class should have its three sections - the fast, the medium, and the slow; and each section should have its own syllabus. The normal line of progress would be from a given section of one class to the corresponding section of the next.

It must be emphasised, however, that although Isaacs regarded 'activity' as the key to the child's development, she was not suggesting that children should be left to organise their own affairs. In the social life of the Primary School, she warned, we must not expect the self-control of a later age.
Children at this stage of education are 'not ready for self-government' in any substantive sense. They cannot yet understand complex social relationships, nor does their vision encompass much beyond the immediate situation.\textsuperscript{163}

Notwithstanding these dismissals of 'free' education Isaacs wished to respect the child's individuality. In \textit{Social Development in Young Children} (1933) she made this clear and gave an interesting reason why: the personality of the child rests in the last resort upon the inner flux of forces within the child's own mind, which is 'beyond our power to affect and control by any deliberate act'.\textsuperscript{164}

This begs two questions. How do we respect the child's individuality? And, if we cannot affect and control the inner flux of forces within the child's mind, can we do it in another way?

Let us take the first question - how do we respect the child's individuality? Isaacs' way was to accord the child as much freedom as possible to imagine or to think as the need and occasion arose. With regard to play, for example, Isaacs taught that it is not less important that parents and teachers should leave ample opportunity to the child for 'quite free, unhindered, unorganised, imaginative play', than that they should provide didactic apparatus and materials for development in physical skill.\textsuperscript{165} This 'passive work' of educators in leaving the child free to make-believe is as valuable a part of their function as their more active services - a 'point sometimes lost sight of in the modern nursery school'.\textsuperscript{166}

But why is 'free, unhindered, unorganised, imaginative play' so important? -

\begin{quote}
Play is not only the means by which the child comes to discover the world; it is supremely the activity which brings his psychic equilibrium in the early years. In his play activities, the child externalises and works out to some measure of harmony all the different trends of his internal psychic life. In turn he gives external form and expression, now to the parent, now to the child within/...\
\end{quote}
within himself, and to each of the different aspects of his real parents, as he apprehends these at the different levels of his own development, through his own wishes and impulses. And gradually he learns to relate his deepest and most primitive phantasies to the ordered world of real relations.

As well as providing opportunities for unimpeded play, educators should give children 'opportunities for sublimations'. Here again, Isaacs emphasised, it is the function of educators to be 'passive'. They should not, for example, introduce a moral element into the teaching of art, as by over-valuing neatness, accuracy or 'formal virtues of any kind'. They need to leave children free with their painting or modelling materials, to develop their own skills of expression. The wisest teachers have shown us, Isaacs claimed, that we cannot order or control expression in art. We can but give children materials and opportunities, and leave them free to their own creative spirits. But why are we unable to direct or control aesthetic expression? This is because the indirect expression of unconscious phantasy which analysts call sublimation can 'never appear at the behest of the superego, whether the primitive internal superego or the real external teacher'. Rather, it is 'always the fruit of the child's own creative wishes'. If educators attempt to control and contain it, they simply make it 'lifeless and formal'. The active function of the educator at this stage is to be 'passive and merely supporting'.

3.

Let us consider now the second question - if we cannot affect and control the inner flux of forces within the child's mind, can we do it another way? One thing, Isaacs wrote in Social Development in Young Children (1933), of the 'deepest significance and widest relevance' which educators must take into consideration, is the reality and power of the superego in the early years. Isaacs believed that asocial children, once called 'moral defectives' or 'moral imbeciles', who are accused of suffering from a lack of conscience, really suffer from too severe and overwhelming a conscience of the/...
the primitive sadistic type, belonging to the pre-genital levels of libidinal development. Their delinquent behaviour is an outcome of the need to ease the internal pressure of their sadistic superego.

It is therefore important, Isaacs advised, that difficult children should not be handled as if they are creatures of mere bad impulse, and that the idiosyncracies arising from anxiety should not be dealt with by harsh threats and punishments, since this mode of treatment would simply serve to increase the severity of the superego. 175

This does not mean that children need and can make use of 'complete and absolute freedom'. 176 What children actually need is that the parents and the adults who make up their social world should represent 'a stable and ordered world of values', 177 values closely related to the children's real abilities at any given age, and based upon an understanding of their psychological needs, but which are, nevertheless, 'firm and unwavering' in themselves. 178 Young children do need to feel that the adults around them are stronger than themselves and represent, 'not the forces of destruction, but those of ordered creation'. 179

But if the teacher cannot alter the 'inner flux of forces' deliberately, what did Isaacs recommend? Ideally, as Freud said, the teacher should personify the superego of each child; when this happens children transfer their superegos onto the person of the adult-in-charge, and love and obey this adult as they would their own parents. Isaacs expressed it in this way: 'when a group of little children are contentedly accepting the leadership of the adult in charge, she is functioning towards them as and in the place of the superego in the mind of each child'. 180

But what is the function of the Teacher-as-Superego? This - despite Isaacs' criticism of Montessori - is fundamentally a moral one: 'She has to help them to be good, and to make good again those whom they wished to destroy in/...
in their moments of rage and hostility'. The stern parent who 'rules only by fear and prohibition' cannot give children this 'happiness' or further their social development. Social development, of course, depends on the willing acceptance of rules and regulations which limit the freedom of the individual. And Isaacs, like Sigmund Freud, Anna Freud and Melanie Klein before her, realised that the use of 'love' is the most efficient way for the teacher to secure obedience: 'It is when she is helping them to be good and to make good that they love her the most, and follow her most contentedly'.

What is the essential outcome, then, of Isaacs' educational philosophy? She admitted, on the very last page of Social Development in Young Children (1933), that the key to an understanding of her work at the Malting House School lies in her 'emphasis on technique rather than on morality'. This does not mean, of course, that Isaacs was not concerned with morality. We have already noted her concern to help children to be good and to make good. But by utilising the covert subtleties of psychoanalytic techniques, Isaacs hoped to achieve a more effective moral socialisation of children into a reified society, depicted as a 'real world' with 'real values':

We have seen how profound a drive towards morality the child has in his own nature. We have not to create this in him. What we have to do is to show him how to attain his moral ends in the real world. We have to give him the skill which makes possible an effective morality, and the psychological conditions which will foster his own seekings for such skill. In so far as he needs our help towards a change in his moral values, it is towards making him more tempered, more humane, more secure in a world of real values.

VI

Susan Isaacs has continued to occupy an honoured place in British education as one of the foremost educational psychologists of the twentieth century. It/...
It is interesting, however, that assessments of her stature and influence as an educator have continually neglected her role as a dedicated and senior practising member of the British psychoanalytic community. But the neglect goes further than this: psychoanalysis was the central interest of Isaacs' professional career or, to be more precise, the radical elaboration of Freudian analysis as formulated by Melanie Klein.

Superficially, the Malting House School was a research experiment based on the theories of John Dewey, emphasising active inquiry learning, 'passive' teaching, and integration of subjects. But this chapter has attempted to indicate that: (1) Kleinian theory has 'significance' on Isaacs' theoretical interpretations of the observations made of children's behaviour in the Malting House School in Cambridge; (2) the broad lines of classification adopted for the material arose from the Kleinian preoccupations of love and hate, and of the relation between sexuality and guilt; and (3) the final recommendations advanced for adoption for educational practice are Kleinian in essence. It is significant, too, that Geoffrey Pyke intended the school to be psychoanalytic, and Evelyn Lawrence, a staff-member, revealed Isaacs' concern to produce, using the 'discoveries' of psychoanalysis, a new generation less 'nerve-ridden' than the old.

Consonant with Kleinian theory, Isaacs emphasised the critical importance of the parent-child relationship for all aspects of human development; and at the heart of this relationship is the all-embracing figure of the Mother, the Goddess of the infant's early years, who spins the child on a psychical thread of ambivalent emotions.

Isaacs, admittedly, did introduce a new ingredient into her educational recipe of Dewey and Klein - psychometrics. Her psychometric views - which have been largely ignored, too, by commentators of her work - are in complete accordance with the 'mentalist' school of psychology as exemplified by Burt and others: the level of intelligence is fixed by 'nature'; a child's mental ratio, when properly measured, is 'stable' and 'permanent'; people can therefore be divided into four groups - defective, dull, average and/...
and superior; intelligence as measured by standardised tests is 'very largely independent of chance and opportunity, of good or bad teaching'; and each class should have its three sections - the fast, the medium, and the slow, and each section should have its own syllabus.

Finally, despite her criticism of Montessori's attempt to exert a moral influence on pupils, Isaacs' educational philosophy is moral, too, in essence. The function of the teacher-analyst is to operate as the Superego of each member of the group of children, and utilising the love, respect, and admiration accruing from this, inculcate 'goodness', that is, the moral values which have been endorsed with the seal of public approval. In this way, children will be initiated into a 'world of real values'.
NOTES AND REFERENCES


2. The only biography of Susan Isaacs to be published was written by D.E.M Gardner, a colleague of Isaacs at the Department of Child Development, University of London Institute of Education. The biography, however, is merely hagiographical; no hint of criticism, either personal or professional, appears anywhere. Moreover, there are surprising inaccuracies: the title of one of Isaacs' major publications, Social Development in Young Children (1933), is incorrectly given (Gardner, Susan Isaacs, 1969, pp. 59, 71, 72, 78, 147, 188); and the passage which closes the biography is not from Isaacs' book, The Children We Teach, as claimed. Nor is Gardner unique in this respect. The five lines devoted to Isaacs by Derek Rowntree in A Dictionary of Education (1981) contain six errors. The reader will find uncomplimentary references to Isaacs by James Strachey in Bloomsbury/Freud (1986) edited by P. Meisel and W. Kendrick. A good biography of Susan Isaacs remains to be written.


5. Gardner has conjectured that the repudiation of Isaacs' father, and possibly also anxieties related to her older brothers, may explain why in later life Isaacs' deep affection was always given to younger men (Gardner, ibid., p. 32).

6. A friend of the family, Mrs. Rogerson, recalled Susan and Bessie visiting her home on Sunday evenings where Darwin's Origin of Species was 'very fully discussed' (Gardner, ibid., p. 31).

7. Isaacs was greatly influenced by the writings of Paine, Emerson, Hazlitt and Winwood Read (Gardner, ibid., p. 34). Read (1838-1875) was an English adventurer and novelist. His The Veil of Iris (1861) is an attack on all religious beliefs, particularly the Catholic religion; and The Martyrdom of Man (1872) expresses his strong, atheistical beliefs.

8. Grace Owen (1873-1965) was 'well known as a pioneer of progressive education for young children' (Gardner, Susan Isaacs, p. 37). She was President of the Nursery School Association of Great Britain; lecturer for the Local Education Authorities of West Riding, Bradford and Leeds; lecturer in education, University of Manchester, 1906-1910; University College of Reading, 1910-1912, and Leeds Training College, 1913-1916; Principal of Mather Training College for Nursery and Junior School Teachers, 1917-1924; and Principal of the City of Manchester and Mather Training College, 1924-1926. Owen wrote a paper, 'Nursery School Education', for Education by Life (1925), edited by Henrietta Brown Smith, a lecturer in education at Goldsmith's College, University of London. In her introduction to the book, Brown Smith called attention to Freud's work in connection with the
unconscious life, work that can be 'usefully applied', but something, however, that 'might be dangerous' (ibid., pp. 4-5). She did not mean to detract from the ultimate value of such an 'important piece of investigation', but rather to put a slight arrest on those who would rush ahead of science and apply 'half-formed and half-discovered truths' (ibid., p. 5). Brown Smith's early assessment of Freudian theory is interesting: 'At the same time we are safe in saying that more importance than ever can be placed on the quality of early impressions, the need for harmonious surroundings in childhood, for the wise treatment of children's emotions and a sympathetic and discriminating interpretation of their conduct. We knew those things mattered, but now we have begun to realise that their effects are deeper than we had ever dreamed of: how deep only future investigation will reveal' (ibid., p. 5).

9. Samuel Alexander's earliest work, the Green Prize essay in moral philosophy, subsequently published as Moral Order and Progress (1889), shows the influence of the idealist ethics dominant at the time. But after a year spent in Hugo Munsterberg's psychological laboratory at Freiberg, Germany, Alexander's subsequent philosophy became more closely related to the development of the empirical sciences, particularly biology and psychology. He was elected to the chair of philosophy at Owens College (later the Victoria University of Manchester) in 1893, a post he held until his retirement in 1924. During this tenure Alexander promoted the study of physiological psychology at a time when British universities were slow to recognise its value. His major work is Space, Time and Deity (1920). Other works include Locke (1908), Beauty and the Other Forms of Value (1933), and Philosophical and Literary Pieces (1939).

10. While at Cambridge, Isaacs met Cyril Burt for the first time (Gardner, ibid., p. 44).

11. Isaacs conducted her research at Cambridge into the aetiology of good and bad spelling under Charles Samuel Myers (1873-1946), who was successively demonstrator, lecturer and reader there in experimental psychology. Many of Myers' students 'formed the backbone' of British psychology between the wars - F.C. Bartlett, E. Farmer, C.A. Mace, W.J.H. Sprott, R.H. Thouless, and C.W. Valentine (L.S. Hearnshaw, A Short History of British Psychology, 1840-1940, 1964, p. 174).

12. Alfred Binet (1857-1911), like Freud, studied with Charcot at the Salpetriere hospital in Paris. Binet is known today mainly for his work, with his younger colleague Theodore Simon (1873-1961), in devising tests for assessing children's intelligence. The Binet-Simon scale, published in 1905 and revised in 1908 and 1911, constituted the first systematic and effective attempt to devise sets of simple tasks, on which norms for different age groups in the school population were carefully worked out. American versions were produced, revised, and standardised by Louis Terman and his colleague at the University of Stanford in 1916 and 1937.

13. Pierre Janet (1859-1947) studied with Charcot in Paris. He later became director of the Salpetriere, and professor of psychology at the Sorbonne (1898) and the College de France (1902). There was considerable rivalry between Freud and Janet. Freud insisted that
psychoanalysis is completely independent of Janet's discoveries, just as in its content it diverges from them and goes far beyond them' (Freud, An Autobiographical Study, 1925, Standard Edition, Volume 20, p. 31). See also Ernest Jones, Sigmund Freud : Life and Work, Volume 3, 1957, where Freud indignantly repudiated the widespread suggestions that he had 'stolen' Janet's ideas (pp. 228-229). Freud insisted that he 'never saw him or heard his name in the Charcot time ...' (Jones, ibid., p. 228). Janet's major work is The Major Symptoms of Hysteria (1907).


15. Flugel revealed from his analysis of Susan Isaacs that she was much concerned with the idea of separation, a concern which was related to the death of her mother (Gardner, ibid., p. 52).

16. Members of the Kleinian school were much influenced by Rank's birth-trauma theory (1932) which held that the anxiety shown by young children on separation from their mother reproduces the trauma of birth. For Rank, birth-anxiety is the prototype of all the separation anxiety subsequently experienced.


18. The conference attended by Susan Isaacs was arranged by the New Educational Fellowship and the Australian Council for Educational Research with the cooperation of the New Zealand Council. The members of the Overseas Delegation included William Boyd, Beatrice Ensor, and Cyril Norwood. For a full list see Gardner, ibid., pp. 119-120.

19. During the Second World War Melanie Klein lived with Isaacs in Cambridge for a year, and then moved to Pitlochry in Scotland where she continued to analyse.

20. Isaacs' research into the problems of evacuation during the war years in Cambridge was published as The Cambridge Evacuation Survey (1941), edited by Susan Isaacs, S. Clement Brown, and R.H. Thouless.


23. Clarke's appraisal of Isaacs is quoted in Gardner, ibid., p. 141.

24. Gardner, ibid., p. 6. Donald Winnicott wrote the Foreword to Gardner's biography of Isaacs.


28. Part of Burt's letter is quoted in Gardner, *Susan Isaacs.*, pp. 145-146. Prior to the establishment of the Department of Child Development, University of London Institute of Education in 1933, Isaacs was appointed by Burt in a part-time capacity to supervise advanced students of psychology at University College.

29. Gardner, *ibid.*, p. 75. Burt ascribed the rapid spread of Isaacs' influence partly to the frequency with which her work was quoted both by Sir Percy Nunn, Director of the University of London Institute of Education, and C.W. Valentine, Professor of Education at the University of Birmingham, whose books were 'much read in training colleges for teachers', and also to her contributions to the Board of Education's Consultative Committees (Gardner, *ibid.*, p. 146). These contributions were the memoranda which Isaacs wrote for the Hadow Report (1933): *Infant and Nursery Schools* and the Curtis Report (1946): *Care of Children*.


32. Pyke's advertisement is quoted in full in Gardner's biography, pp. 54-55.

33. Pyke became bankrupt in 1928 and the Malting House School closed.

34. Isaacs, *Social Development in Young Children*, 1933, p. 13, original emphasis.

35. Ibid., p. 13, original emphasis.

36. Ibid., p. 17.

37. Details of the pupils and staff of the Malting House School can be found in *Intellectual Growth in Young Children* (1930) p. 14. For a description of the school itself and the equipment used see pp. 14-17.

38. Isaacs estimated that the intelligence quotients of her pupils at the Malting House School ranged from 114 to 166, with a mean of 131 (*Intellectual Growth in Young Children*, p. 14).


40. Ibid., p. 21.

41. Ibid., p. 21.

42. Ibid., p. 23.


44. Ibid., p. 17.
45. Ibid., p. 20.
46. Ibid., p. 20.
47. Ibid., p. 21.

48. Gardner, Susan Isaacs, p. 61. Evelyn Lawrence joined the school in 1926. Isaacs asked her to record her impressions of the school and her account is printed in full in Gardner's biography of Isaacs, pp. 59-68.

49. Gardner, ibid., p. 61.
50. Ibid., p. 65.
51. Ibid., p. 65.
52. Ibid., p. 65.
53. Ibid., p. 65.
54. Ibid., p. 65.
55. Ibid., pp. 65-66.
56. Ibid., p. 66.
57. Ibid., p. 66.
58. Ibid., p. 64.
59. Ibid., p. 64.
60. Ibid., p. 63.

61. Ibid., p. 66. The parents of the Malting House pupils were encouraged to record minute observations of their children. Isaacs extended a special thanks to one of the mothers 'who with great patience and assiduity kept such full and detailed records of her daughter's sayings and doings', and allowed Isaacs to 'make use of even the more intimate passages, for the purpose of furthering the general understanding of children'. (ibid., p. xii).

62. Isaacs, Social Development in Young Children, p. 13; original emphasis.

63. Gardner, Susan Isaacs, p. 68. Until Melanie Klein visited the school, verbal aggression had gone unchecked. Klein advised Isaacs that the permission of this practice was not only too painful to be tolerated by the victim, but productive also of guilt in the aggressor. The practice stopped (Gardner, ibid., pp. 67-68).

64. Isaacs, Social Development in Young Children, pp. xi-xii.
65. Gardner, Susan Isaacs. p. 144. When Percy Nunn, Director of the University of London Institute of Education, asked Isaacs to direct a new Department of Child Development in the Institute, she declined at first with the reply: '. . . I cannot bear to give up the work of analysis' (Gardner, ibid., p. 81).

66. G.H. Bantock's essay 'Fact and Value in Education', from Education and Values (1965) is an excellent evaluation of Isaacs' work at the Malting House School. Bantock admitted to a 'certain dissatisfaction with the values inherent in Susan Isaacs' purposes' (ibid., p. 116), but besides a recognition of her Freudian distinction between the 'real' world and a 'phantasy' one (ibid., p. 110), the influence of Kleinian theory on Isaacs' work is ignored.

67. In his book, The Educational Innovators, Volume 2, 1968, W.A.C. Stewart pinpointed three particular influences on Isaacs - Maria Montessori, John Dewey and Sigmund Freud (ibid., p. 120). The major thrust of Stewart's analysis centres around Dewey, however, and there is only a superficial reference to Isaacs' work 'supporting infantile sexuality in its oral, anal and genital phases ...' (ibid., p. 124).

68. Harold Entwistle rightly has drawn attention to the fact that Isaacs' use of child-centred techniques and the realisation of child-centred values in education 'requires a favourable sociological climate' (Entwistle, Child-Centred Education, 1970, p. 193). But, despite an admission that the 'development of depth psychology has inevitably produced a new orientation in our thinking about childhood' (ibid., p. 56) there is no attempt anywhere in his book to show the effect of this 'new orientation' on Isaacs' work.

69. R.J.W. Selleck disputed the 'neutrality' of Isaacs' observations but the effect of psychoanalysis on her neutrality as a 'detached scientist' is nowhere discussed (Selleck, English Primary Education and the Progressives, 1914-1939, 1972, pp. 111-112.

70. In her book The Evolution of the Nursery-Infant School (1972), Nanette Whitbread praised Isaacs for setting the British child study movement on a 'sound footing ...' (ibid., pp. 68-69). Although aware that psychoanalysis 'was of significance' in Isaacs' observations and interpretations of children's early emotional behaviour (ibid., p. 70), Whitbread, nevertheless, explained this merely in terms of a 'more generally permissive attitude to early upbringing and discipline' (ibid., p. 70). The influence of Kleinian theory, in particular, on Isaacs is not mentioned.


72. Joan Riviere translated several of Freud's works into English. She was analysed by Ernest Jones and their emotional entanglement and conflict with Freud is described in Vincent Brome, Ernest Jones: Freud's Alter Ego (1982).
73. Nina Searl (d. 1955) conducted her first child analysis in 1920 with a girl of six, not only before Klein's work had become known but also, by her own testimony, even before she had read Freud's 'Little Hans' case history (P. Miesel and W. Kendrick, editors, Bloomsbury/Freud, 1986, p. 43). Nevertheless, she admitted Klein helped her to develop a play technique in which she could have confidence (ibid., p. 43). Along with Susan Isaacs, Searl was particularly interested in the application of psychoanalysis to education.

74. Isaacs, Social Development in Young Children, p. xi.

75. Ibid., p. 24.

76. Isaacs, Intellectual Growth in Young Children, p. 102.

77. Ibid., p. 102. But Isaacs added a caveat to any theory which extolled the therapeutic value of play. The value is only true 'within the limits set by neurosis. No amount of play will cure neurosis in a child; but in so far as his energies are free for sublimations, his play will carry him on in the directions opened up by sublimations, thus lessening anxiety, and helping him to adapt himself to the demands of real social and intellectual life' (ibid., p. 102, footnote).

78. Isaacs, Social Development in Young Children, p. 289. The experience of 'psychic death' has social repercussions. The feeling of being kept in a state of helpless tension by the intense wish for love and food from the mother, together with the resulting impulses of rage, is something that children cannot tolerate. It means suffering psychic death, and in phantasy they will inflict death upon others rather than endure this themselves (ibid., p. 289).

79. Ibid., p. 289.

80. Ibid., p. 237; original emphasis.

81. Ibid., p. 238.

82. Ibid., p. 240; emphases added.

83. Ibid., p. 298.

84. Ibid., p. 298.

85. Ibid., p. 299. Isaacs referred to M.N. Searl's paper 'Danger Situations of the Immature Ego' (1929) which deals with the sexual relation of the parents and the profound emotional problems which this relation presents to the child (International Journal of Psychoanalysis, Volume 10, Number 4, pp. 299-302).

86. Ibid., p. 302.

87. Ibid., p. 302.

88. Ibid., p. 302.

89. Ibid., p. 302.
90. Ibid., p. 316.

91. Ibid., p. 316.

92. Ibid., p. 317.

93. Ibid., p. 317. The girl's wish to restore, make good, is exemplified with 'great clarity and vividness' during analysis (ibid., p. 317). The child will attempt to make things better again by undertaking some piece of real construction, 'drawing or sewing, or modelling, or cleaning the room, whatever activity happens to be closely relevant to the particular phantasy of the moment ...' (ibid., p. 317).

94. Ibid., p. 317.

95. Isaacs, The Children We Teach (1932), p. 57. The substance of The Children We Teach first appeared as a series of twenty-four articles in The Teacher's World. Isaacs addressed the dedication 'To Melanie Klein and M.N. Searl Who Understand the Minds of Children'. This is Isaacs' only book dealing specifically with the primary school child, and according to Gardner, it was 'very widely read, especially by teachers and students in colleges of education' (Gardner, Susan Isaacs, p. 78).

96. Ibid., p. 57; original emphasis.

97. Ibid., p. 61.


99. Ibid., pp. 97-98. Isaacs found support for her views from V. Hazlitt, Ability (1926), and P.B. Ballard, 'The Psychological Aspects of the Break at Eleven Years of Age', Report of the Seventeenth Annual Conference of Educational Associations (no date specified). Victoria Hazlitt (1887-1932) lectured in psychology at Bedford College, London. In her book, Ability (1926) she discussed her pioneering experiments in the selection of British university students. P.B. Ballard (1865-1950) was an inspector employed by the London County Council. With three colleagues - C.W. Kimmins, W. Winch, and A.G. Hughes - he was instrumental in securing Cyril Burt's appointment in 1913 as an educational psychologist (the first appointment of its kind anywhere in Britain).

100. Ibid., p. 98.

101. Ibid., p. 99.

102. Ibid., p. 101.

Children will 'very rarely' confuse thought and phantasy, apart from neurosis, of course, or from the 'temporary clouding of judgment under emotional stress' (ibid., p. 106, footnote).

Maturation, Isaacs explained, is in the first instance 'undoubtedly' an affair of increase in the depth, breadth and range of synthetic ability, or noetic synthesis (ibid., p. 67). Burt, she continued, considered this noetic synthesis to be the main intellectual difference between the child of seven and one of fourteen. Isaacs suggested that the growth of noetic synthesis characterises development at all ages, and can be seen in the progressive articulation even of perception in the very young child, as well as in the rise and elaboration of concepts (ibid., p. 67).

In the Preface to Intellectual Growth in Young Children, Isaacs thanked Burt who 'very kindly read several of the chapters and made many important detailed criticisms and suggestions' (ibid., pp. x-xi).

Isaacs added in the footnote to this page: 'This is now such familiar ground that it is hardly necessary to adduce evidence or authorities'. For the reader who is interested, however, she recommended C. Spearman's The Nature of Intelligence and the Principles of Cognition (1923), and The Abilities of Man (1927); C. Burt's Distribution of Educational Abilities (1917), and Mental and Scholastic Tests (1922); P.B. Ballard's Mental Tests (1920); A. Gesell's Infancy and Human Growth (1928); and E. Lawrence's An Investigation into the Relation between Intelligence and Inheritance (in the press at the time of publication of Isaacs' book). Isaacs quoted with approval a sentence from Lawrence: 'The discovery of a correlation between the intelligence of children and the social class of their parents, when they have never seen those parents, is fairly conclusive evidence that the correlation so generally found for children in their own homes is not mainly due to the direct social influences of the home, but is a genuinely biological fact' (Isaacs, ibid., p. 59, footnote).
116. In syncretistic thinking, Isaacs explained '... two objects or two features are given simultaneously in perception. Henceforth the child perceives or conceives them as connected or rather as fused within a single scheme. Finally, the schema acquires the strength of reciprocal implication, which means that if one of the features is isolated from the whole, and the child is asked for its reason, he will simply appeal to the existence of the other features by way of explanation or justification' (ibid., p. 75).

117. Ibid., p. 79. I am not arguing that Piagetian theory is hostile or incompatible with Freudian theory. Piaget agreed with Freud 'on the main lines of repression and the basic mechanism of the unconscious ...' (J.C. Bringuier, Conversations with Jean Piaget, 1980, p. 86). It is not generally known that Piaget had a didactic analysis with one of Freud's students, 'every morning at eight o'clock for eight months' (Bringuier, ibid., p. 123), and was a member of the International Psychoanalytical Association. In 1920 he delivered a lecture, 'Psychoanalysis in Its Relations with Child Psychology' to an audience of French teachers, and concluded that Freudian doctrine is of the 'highest interest. It poses new problems, it is very rich in suggestive perceptions, it provided a method of investigation' (ibid., in The Essential Piaget, 1982, edited by H.E. Gruber and J.J. Voneche, p. 57). Nevertheless, he remained sceptical regarding the principle which seems to constitute the 'nerve centre' of Freudian theory - pansexualism (ibid., p. 57). There are traces of Freud's influence on Piaget in The Child's Conception of the World (1929), The Moral Judgment of the Child (1932), and Play, Dreams and Imitation in Childhood (1951). Indeed, one writer has argued that 'Piaget's debt to Freud is profound' (see J. Sants, 'Piaget's Attitudes to Education', in Jean Piaget: An Interdisciplinary Critique, 1983, edited by S. Modgil, C. Modgil, and G. Brown; p. 87).

118. Isaacs, Social Development in Young Children, p. 208. Isaacs' experience, both in her personal analysis and in working with patients, gave her a 'sense of the profound illumination which psychoanalytic theory and practice is able to throw upon the outward behaviour of young children' (ibid., p. 208). The theory, she said, 'gives us a more solid ground of understanding of the open anxieties and difficulties, as well as of the ordinary interests and activities of the child, than any merely classificatory description or quantitative study has done or could do' (ibid., p. 208).

119. Ibid., p. 298.
120. Ibid., p. 207.
121. Ibid., p. 207.
122. Ibid., p. 207.
123. Ibid., p. 207.
124. Ibid., pp. 207-208.
125. Ibid., p. 208. Isaacs was at pains to underline the 'vast amount of research' carried out by Freud and an increasing number of 'technically trained analysts' into the psychology of individuals of all types, normal, neurotic and psychotic (ibid., p. 207). In the 'microscopic study' of individual histories which psychoanalysis makes possible, 'every detail' of the personal and social relations at each phase of development in the history of the individual is worked out from the inside. The particular distributions of mental energy in relation to instinctual trends, and the characteristic mechanisms for dealing with mental conflict, are 'in each case traced and evaluated' (ibid., p. 207).

126. Ibid., p. 427. Isaacs defined the superego as 'that organisation of forces within the total psyche which is very early differentiated off in development, after the pattern of the controlling parents, to do their work when they are absent. It is the forerunner of the adult conscience. Conscience is indeed but the 'conscious representative of this far deeper, more primitive and earlier formed superego in the unconscious levels of the mind' (ibid., p. 270).

127. Ibid., pp. 260-261.
128. Ibid., p. 261.
129. Ibid., p. 428.
130. Ibid., p. 429.
131. Ibid., p. 429.
132. Ibid., p. 231. Isaacs used the term 'aggression' in its 'widest sense to cover all forms of aggressive behaviour, whether or not this arises from the need for defence - not just that narrower meaning which is implied in the appellative aggressor. It will be found in fact that most of the aggressive behaviour of small children has a considerable element of defence in it' (ibid., p. 218, footnote).

133. Ibid., p. 232.
134. Ibid., p. 312.
135. Ibid., p. 316.

137. Ibid., p. 428.
138. Ibid., p. 428.
139. Ibid., p. 428.

140. Isaacs, Intellectual Growth in Young Children, p. 102.
141. Ibid., pp. 102-103.
142. Ibid., p. 21.
143. Ibid., p. 20.
144. Isaacs, The Children We Teach, p. 124.
145. Ibid., p. 124.
146. Ibid., p. 125. In Intellectual Growth in Young Children Isaacs referred approvingly to Burt's memorandum on 'Mental Characteristics from Seven to Eleven Plus', prepared for the Consultative Committee of the Board of Education, which she 'had the privilege of seeing in typescript' (ibid., p. 61). Isaacs concurred that the views Burt developed in his memorandum as to the stratigraphical and recapitulatory theories are in 'complete accordance' with her own (ibid., p. 61). Burt's memorandum was incorporated as Chapter 3 of the Hadow Report (1933).
147. Ibid., p. 151; original emphasis.
148. Ibid., p. 68; original emphasis.
149. Ibid., p. 152.
150. Ibid., p. 152; original emphasis.
151. Ibid., p. 153.
152. Ibid., p. 39.
153. Ibid., p. 39.
154. Ibid., p. 39.
155. Ibid., p. 39.
156. Ibid., p. 39.
157. Ibid., p. 39.
158. Ibid., p. 40.
159. Ibid., p. 40.
160. Ibid., p. 40.
161. Ibid., p. 41.
162. Ibid., p. 44. The suggestion that each class should have three sections came from P.B. Ballard in his book, Group Tests of Intelligence, 1935, pp. 232-233.
163. Ibid., p. 97.
164. Isaacs, Social Development in Young Children, p. 426. Although the unique individuality of each child is determined by 'imponderable forces within the child's own psyche, which we can but respect' Isaacs was not suggesting that we can yield no influence. Where the child is in special difficulties, analysts
'can aid him, either by providing a more adequate, more secure and more stable environment, or by strengthening his ego through the special work of analysis' (ibid., p. 427).

165. Ibid., p. 426.

166. Ibid., p. 426.

167. Ibid., p. 425. Isaacs conceded that educators have long appreciated the significance of play, but it has remained for psychoanalysts, she insisted, and in particular those working with young children, to show in the greatest detail how play is indeed the 'breath of life' to children since it is through play-activities that they find mental ease, and can work upon their wishes, fears and phantasies, so as to integrate them into a living personality (ibid., p. 425).

168. Ibid., p. 426.

169. Ibid., p. 426.

170. Ibid., p. 426.

171. Ibid., p. 426.

172. Ibid., p. 426.

173. Ibid., p. 426. Despite advising us, as teachers, to be 'passive and merely supporting', Isaacs reminded us to 'recognise that other side of our educational responsibility that need to help our pupils control the more crudely destructive impulses, and to train them to a 'settled routine' in the fundamental activities of daily living, as well as those 'minimal levels of mutual consideration which make social relations possible' (ibid., p. 427).

174. Ibid., p. 416.

175. Ibid., p. 417.

176. Ibid., p. 419.

177. Ibid., p. 421.

178. Ibid., p. 421.

179. Ibid., p. 421. In The Psychological Aspects of Child Development (1935), Isaacs reiterated that children cannot make use of absolute freedom. What they need, rather, is that their parents and educators should represent a 'stable and ordered world of values ... firm and unwavering in themselves' (ibid., p. 39). If this real external control is 'mild and tempered, although firm and secure', it enables children to master their destructive impulses and learn to adapt their wishes to the 'real world' (ibid., p. 39). After Isaacs' death, Melanie Klein undertook some revisions of the section on 'The Unconscious Mental Life', to 'take account of more recent work as embodied in her own studies and expressed in Susan Isaacs' later papers' (ibid., Foreword, p. 5).
180. Ibid., p. 271.

181. Isaacs criticized Montessori for giving 'her genius for devising technique to the narrow ends of the scholastic subjects. In the exercises for practical life her humanity broke through the conventions of the school; but even so, more for the purposes of practical necessity than for the purpose of knowledge. These practical exercises seem to be, with her, the field of morals rather than the field of intelligence' (Intellectual Growth in Young Children, p. 21).

182. Social Development in Young Children, p. 271; original emphasis.

183. Ibid., p. 217.

184. Ibid., p. 271. Isaacs was convinced that educators cannot do their work well unless they attract to themselves 'mainly the forces of love' (ibid., p. 410). They must provide, it is true, generous opportunity for expression of the impulses of destruction in the real world, but in a very modified form (for example, in the rivalry of games and sports, or in various forms of handicrafts). But they must not attract to themselves the 'negative, explosive reactions of hatred and aggression' (ibid., p. 410). If they do, their work as educators is made much more difficult. They must behave in such a way that the child can love them, even though they use the love 'solely for the child's governing and training ...' (ibid., p. 410).

185. Ibid., p. 456; original emphasis.

186. Ibid., p. 456.
Now, if governments make philosophy the means to their political ends, then scholars see in professorships of philosophy a trade that nourishes the outer man just as does any other.

(Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, 1844)
Let us recapitulate: the heart of the social philosophy of Freudian theory values the authority of the State above the autonomy of the individual; values conformity above the freedom of self-expression; values the use of 'enlightened' techniques to achieve this conformity; values the use of school systems to 'inhibit, forbid, and suppress'; values the 'common good' above egoistical philosophies; and requires the creation of an élite, the Psychoanalytic-Guardians, to cure the 'maladjusted' citizens whose failure to adjust to the prevailing mores threatens the stability of the State.

I

Can we place this programme of socialisation in a more general philosophical context? Does it belong in essence to any particular philosophical 'school' which has been associated with authoritarianism in political and educational philosophy? Marxist philosophers have argued that there are in principle only two main philosophical systems: idealism, according to which mind or spirit is primary in the universe, and materialism, according to which matter is primary in the universe. Certainly Freud's value-beliefs have a lot in common with the basic tenets of the philosophy of idealism which had a tremendous impact on British educational theory in the early twentieth century. The hey-day of this complex movement has been put between 1870 and 1920 (Gordon and White, 1979), but its major exponents can be traced from Socrates (c.469-399B.C.) to Gentile (1875-1944).

There are, of course, several types of idealism - absolute idealism, metaphysical idealism, subjective idealism, objective idealism, philosophical idealism, and transcendental idealism - and it would be most surprising not to find differences from one thinker to another over such a long period of time, but there are, nevertheless, several common beliefs: (1) Reality is not to be identified with the physical world which is composed of transitory images; it is mental or spiritual. (2) Human beings are essentially social creatures, indistinguishable from the life of the State. (3) Education, whereby children are trained to become citizens, is one of the State's foremost concerns. (4) The State requires an élite, intellectual or spiritual, to guide the destiny of its affairs.
Of the many philosophers who can be called 'idealist', in one sense or another, it is easy to highlight two who exerted the greatest impact on British educational theory - Plato and Hegel. Indeed, it can be argued that all other idealist theories are merely modifications of their views.

There were, broadly speaking, four major influences on Plato: Pythagoras, Permenides, Heraclitus, and Socrates. From Pythagoras, Plato derived the fusion of intellect and mysticism, religion and mathematics, the belief in immortality, and the other-worldliness. From Permenides, he derived the belief that Reality is eternal and timeless, and consequently, all change must be illusory. From Heraclitus, he derived the negative doctrine that everything is in a state of flux, that there is nothing permanent in the sensible world. Combined with the doctrine of Permenides, this led to the conclusion that knowledge is not to be derived from the senses, but from the intellect only. And he adopted from Socrates his preoccupation with ethical problems, and his tendency to seek teleological rather than mechanical explanations of the world.

Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel (1770-1831) was the first 'official' philosopher of Prussianism. From 1818, when he was appointed professor of philosophy at Berlin, until his death in 1831, Hegel dominated the intellectual life of Germany, despite the fact that scientists never took his ideas seriously. Nor was his success without criticism from other philosophers: Schopenhauer, for example, called this period of German idealism the 'age of dishonesty'; and, more specifically, dismissed Hegel's philosophy as 'colossal mystification'. But these criticisms were swept aside by a wave of national acclaim, and Hegel's supporters, installed in the most prestigious academic posts, spread his ideas to every branch of Germany's educational system.

Hegel won support in Britain, too, from those who were attracted by his 'higher' idealism, and by his claims to 'higher' morality.

Hegel's extraordinary success is not difficult to explain: his philosophy provided a dynamic interpretation of world events, put the era of revolutions into an historical perspective, and comforted the bourgeoisie with the belief that they/...
they were part of a divine plan. Nor has his influence vanished. Despite fluctuations of credibility in the twentieth century, Hegelianism remains today a powerful force in moral, social, and educational philosophy. Moreover, Hegel's philosophy of history profoundly affected political theory. Marxist and Fascist extremists, for example, base their political philosophies on Hegel: Marxists replace the war of nations by the war of classes, and Fascists replace it by the war of races; but both acknowledge him as a seminal source.

Hegel was the culmination of German Idealism. With his work the glorification of the State reached an intensity unprecedented in philosophical literature. In *Philosophy of Right* (1821), for example, Hegel reified the State as 'the actuality of the ethical Idea. It is ethical mind qua the substantial will manifest and revealed to itself, knowing and thinking itself, accomplishing what it knows and in so far as it knows it'. But in *The Philosophy of History* (1830-1831) he conferred the ultimate accolade: 'The State is the Divine Idea as it exists on earth'.

How are the Platonic and Hegelian theories connected with authoritarianism in politics?

First, the best state will be the one which most nearly copies the heavenly model of Goodness and Reality; it will have a minimum of change and a maximum of static perfection; and its Rulers will be those who have been educated to understand the eternal Good.

Second, the Rulers to be good statesmen, must know the Good; and they can only achieve this by a comprehensive intellectual, moral and physical training lasting many years. If those who have not had the benefit of this discipline are allowed a share in government, they will inevitably corrupt their high office.

Third, obedience to the State, the 'Divine Idea', is 'natural', 'good', and 'just'.

These ideas received their greatest crystallisation in Plato's *The Republic*, the first Utopia in world literature, and a perennial source of inspiration since for all 'idealists' philosophers. It has, of course, been savagely attacked, too, and a recent critique of Plato (and Hegel and Marx) is contained in Karl Popper's *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, published in 1945. In his book Popper attacked Plato's 'holism', and related it to Plato's longing for the 'lost unity of tribal life'.
Popper's thesis, vitiated, it must be said, by a biased selection of material, argues that Plato's 'tribal collectivism', concerned solely with the health, unity and stability of the collective body, results in a 'closed society' antithetical to democratic ideas. (It is interesting, by the way, that in the third millenium before Freud, Plato regarded the history of human society as the history of an illness; the patient is society and the statesman is a kind of physician or saviour.)

British philosophical idealism of the late nineteenth century was founded primarily on the philosophy of Hegel, but drew inspiration also from the ideas of four other philosophers who had contributed much to Hegel's thought - Plato, Aristotle, Kant and Fichte. But before the systematisation occurred in the 1860s and 1870s the ideas of German idealism appeared in the literary, religious and political works of writers like Wordsworth (1770-1850), Coleridge (1772-1834), Carlyle (1795-1881), Thomas Arnold (1795-1842), Ruskin (1819-1900), and Matthew Arnold (1822-1888).

It was at Balliol College, Oxford, that the systematisation took place. The pre-eminent figure was Thomas Hill Green (1836-1882), a Fellow of Balliol from 1860 until his death, who created a coherent philosophy by weaving together the loose, unsystematic strands of British idealist thought with the Greek and German philosophy which inspired them. Hegelian in essence, but without the abstruse abstractions of Hegelian logic, it rapidly became enormously influential, both in the development of British philosophy and as an inspiration for educational and social reformers.

Greengarten's book *Thomas Hill Green and the Development of Liberal-Democratic Thought* (1981) traces the major impetus to Green's work to the social, political, and economic problems of nineteenth century England, which were undermining his society and way of life. Believing that the utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill and the tradition on which it was based were unable either to suggest practical measures of social amelioration or to provide a logical theoretical underpinning for a stable and secure society, Green attempted to formulate/...
formulate a philosophy that could. Greengarten concluded that Green's political philosophy not only reflected the social, political and economic climate of nineteenth century English society, but was, indeed, a justification of the industrial-capitalist basis of that society.22

One of the most important of Green's concepts is that of the true or ultimate good, which challenges the Benthamite view of man as a consumer in pursuit of the greatest possible pleasure. For Green the ultimate good, the *summum bonus* lies in the process of 'making a possible self real'; and this is achieved when humans realise their innate potential, transcend their animal natures, and identify with the eternal self. Moreover, and this is central to Green's political philosophy, the true good must be a common good, a good shared by members of a society; and it must be common in the sense of being mutually beneficial, non-exclusive, and non-competitive.24

Green's theory of the true good or self-realisation is finally reducible to his assumption that man is by nature a social creature. But what is the connection between the 'good' and the State? The State, as one particular form of society, namely, political society, is an 'institution for the promotion of the common good'.25 As individuals, then, we can achieve our true good only through membership in society or more precisely in political society; for only through the State can we express our ontological essence. Without the complex of institutions which comprise the State we 'literally' should not have a life to call our own, nor should we be able to ask for a justification of what we are called on to do.26 Without a recognition of a common good the very consciousness of having ends of our own and lives which we can direct in a certain way, lives of which we can make something, would remain 'dormant' in us.27

A logical implication of Green's theory of political rights is that there can be no right to act unsocially. Since all rights derive from society, a right against society is 'a contradiction'in terms.28 Total subservience to the laws of society logically follows:

> No one, therefore, has a right to resist a law or ordinance of government, on the ground that it requires him to do what he does not like, and that he has not agreed to submit to the authority from which it proceeds; and if no one person has such a right, no number of persons have it. If the common interest requires it, no right can be alleged against it.29
But our subservience to the State should not be based on force; 'Will, not force, is the basis of the state.'\(^{30}\) Neither force nor the fear of force can account for political obligation, the 'habitual obedience' rendered by the members of a state to their political superior. Such obedience must rather be ascribed to the general will, the 'impalpable congeries of the hopes and fears of a people, bound together by common interests and sympathy', which we call the general will'.\(^{31}\)

And this 'habitual obedience' is achieved when a conception of the 'common good' is promoted by the great institutions of the State:

The doctrine that the rights of government are founded on the consent of the governed is a confused way of stating the truth, that the institutions by which man is moralised, by which he comes to do what he sees that he must, as distinct from what he would like, express a conception of a common good; that through them that conception takes form and reality; and that it is in turn through its presence in the individual that they have a constraining power over him, a power which is not that of mere fear, still less a physical compulsion, but which leads him to do what he is not inclined to because there is a law that he should.\(^{32}\)

Green, of course, was not the only British philosopher engaged in the creation of an idealist philosophy. Other important influences were Benjamin Jowett (1817-1893),\(^{33}\) Green's tutor at Balliol; two Scotsmen, Edward Caird (1835-1908),\(^{4}\) Professor of Moral Philosophy, University of Glasgow, 1866-93, Master of Balliol, 1893-1907, and William Wallace (1843-1897) who succeeded Green as Professor of Moral Philosophy, 1882-97; Richard Lewis Nettleship (1846-1892),\(^{36}\) Francis Herbert Bradley (1846-1924), Bernard Bosanquet (1848-1923), and Andrew Cecil Bradley (1851-1935), all graduates of the University of Oxford. Indeed, it is quite remarkable how many of the leading philosophers of British idealism were associated with the universities of Oxford and Glasgow.

Green died in 1882, and the leading English idealist philosophers after that were Francis Herbert Bradley and Bernard Bosanquet. In Scotland, where idealism soon/...
soon prevailed in the universities, Edward Caird's *A Critical Account of the Philosophy of Kant*, published in Glasgow in 1877, and Andrew Seth's (later Pringle-Pattison's) *Hegelianism and Personality*, published in Edinburgh in 1887, were notable contributions. Many of Caird's Glasgow students were destined for the church, and his liberalising influence on religion was widely transmitted through them beyond the classroom.

The specific influence of idealism on British educational theory is complex and has been analysed elsewhere (Gordon and White, 1979). But a few further acknowledgements are relevant here. Plato's educational theory was a seminal source of inspiration and landmarks of Platonic studies are Jowett's translations of the Dialogues, especially of *The Republic*, Nettleship's essay 'The Theory of Education in the Republic of Plato' (1897), followed in 1900 by Bosanquet's *The Education of the Young in The Republic of Plato*. Jowett's translation, together with these commentaries, played an important role in making Plato's educational thought accessible to a wider circle of readers.

Other educators who spread the idealist philosophy included T.G. Rooper (1847-1903), a school inspector; John MacCunn (1846-1929), another Scot from the University of Glasgow, whose book *The Making of Character* (1900) was 'widely and justly honoured in all teacher-training colleges' for many years; Henry Jones (1852-1922), who succeeded Caird in the Chair of Philosophy at the University of Glasgow in 1894; Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947), Professor of Mathematics at Imperial College, University of London, 1914-1924, and of Philosophy at the University of Harvard, 1924-1937, whose 'rhythm of education' was influenced by Hegel; John McTaggart (1866-1925), lecturer at the University of Cambridge, from 1897 until 1923; Robert Rusk (1879-1972), lecturer at the University of Glasgow until his retirement in 1951, whose book *The Philosophical Bases of Education* (1928) can be considered one of the last major contributions of British idealism to educational theory; and Fred Clark (1880-1952) who succeeded Percy Nunn as Director of the University of London Institute of Education, from 1936 until 1945.
By the beginning of the twentieth century idealism had become the most powerful force in the universities of the English-speaking world. Empiricism and realism were believed to have been finally discredited, along with the utilitarianism and individualism associated with them. Philosophical truth was thought to be a unity, and a similar principle inspired idealist works on aesthetics, ethics, religion, and politics. Such leading British statesmen as Arthur James Balfour (1848-1930), and Richard Burdon Haldane (1856-1928), and the South African prime minister Jan Christiaan Smuts (1870-1950) wrote books defending the idealist point of view. Indeed, when the new provincial universities were being founded in Great Britain, Haldane encouraged them to foster the study of philosophy as a central, unifying subject.

Why, then, did idealism decline as a philosophical and educational force? The reasons are many and complex but one reason, certainly, was its removal from the dominant position it had held in British philosophical circles. The first landmark here was a critical and influential article by a young Cambridge philosophical realist, George Edward Moore (1873-1958), published in Mind in 1903, entitled 'The Refutation of Idealism'. Bertrand Russell (1872-1970), too, urged that idealists had ignored the latest developments in the philosophy of logic, and that their theories, therefore, were untenable. Furthermore, with the carnage of the First World War, 'organic' theories of society lost favour with moral and political thinkers who promoted instead the rights of the individual against the hegemony of the State. Idealist social philosophy came under vigorous attack from Leonard Trelawney Hobhouse (1864-1929), Professor of Sociology at the University of London. His book, The Metaphysical Theory of the State (1918), criticised the view that individuals realise themselves, ontologically, only as members of a State, a supra-personal entity, or substance, existing as an end in itself. In particular, Hobhouse poured scorn on the 'Hegelian theory of the god-state' which, in his view, had 'sapped the rational humanitarianism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries'.

But the greatest philosophical landmark was the publication in 1922 of Tractatus Logico - Philosophicus by Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951). This extraordinary, revolutionary work, symptomatic of a new, pluralist, anti-speculative approach to/...
to philosophical problems, changed the course of subsequent British philosophy. It exerted a powerful influence, too, on the small group of philosophers, mathematicians, scientists and economists who formed the 'Vienna Circle'. Founded by Moritz Schlick (1882-1936) in 1925, this group of 'logical positivists' included Otto Neurath (1882-1945), Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970), Friedrich Waismann (1896-1959) and Kurt Godel (1906-1978). What they attempted, generally speaking, was to add the technical equipment and the vigour of the new mathematical logic of Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) and Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) to the empirical tradition of David Hume (1711-1776), Auguste Comte (1798-1857), and Ernst Mach (1838-1916), with its hostility to metaphysical theology.

In 1929 the Circle published a manifesto entitled The Scientific Conception of the World: The Vienna Circle which stressed four theses: (1) the assertion of the tautological character of the true propositions of logic and mathematics; (2) the rejection of metaphysics as meaningless; (3) the rejection of claims for 'philosophy as a basic or universal science alongside or above the various fields of the one empirical science'; and (4) the adoption of the 'verification principle' as a tool of analysis. Three leading representatives of the 'scientific world conception' are mentioned in the Manifesto as sources of inspiration: Albert Einstein, Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein.

In German-speaking countries, the Vienna Circle was a small minority group with little influence; for the most part, German-speaking philosophers were still committed to some variety of 'German idealism'. But its ideas spread abroad, largely by way of publications, congresses, and personal contacts with other individuals and groups. In his Philosophy in the Twentieth Century (1982) Alfred J. Ayer (b.1910) recorded that he, with the American Willard Van Orman Quine (b.1908), and the two Austrians, Wittgenstein and Karl Popper (b.1902) met and discussed philosophical problems with members of the Circle.

Ayer, in fact, was a very influential proponent of logical positivism. He attended meetings of the Circle in the winter of 1932-3 and his book Language, Truth and Logic, published in January, 1936, spread the Circle's ideas. When it was re-issued in 1946 with a new introduction it enjoyed a large sale in the English-speaking world, and was translated into many foreign languages.
Ayer, of course, was not the only British philosopher acquainted with the Circle. Others who were influenced included the Cambridge philosophers L. Susan Stebbing (1885-1943), Frank P. Ramsey (1903-1930), and John Wisdom (b.1904), and the Oxford philosopher Gilbert Ryle (1900-1976). Ayer's tutor, who introduced him to the work of Wittgenstein.

Moreover, the Circle was closely associated with three groups sympathetic to its views. One was a group in Berlin led by Hans Reichenbach (1891-1953), with whom the Circle jointly published the journal Erkenntnis. The second was a group of brilliant Polish philosophers and mathematical logicians, of whom the best known is Alfred Tarski (b.1902). The third was a group of American pragmatists who believed that they had a lot in common with the Viennese positivists. The most important figure, educationally, of the pragmatist movement is John Dewey (1859-1952) whose theories had a profound effect on educational theory and practice in his own country and in Great Britain.

The murder of Schlick in 1936 by a student and Hitler's occupation of Austria in 1938 brought the Vienna Circle to an end as an organised group, but its ideas were developed, under the name of logical empiricism, by various members who emigrated to the United States of America and to Great Britain.

The British form of Absolute Idealism had faded almost as quickly as it had arisen. The young philosophers who gathered around Moore, Russell and Wittgenstein regarded it as a temporary aberration in the 'true' tradition of British philosophy - empiricist, individualist, atomist, and ahistorical. In educational theory, the new era of individualism was related to idealism in one of two ways; it either developed out of it, or grew up in deliberate opposition to it. Edmond Holmes (1850-1936) is an example of the first development. He came under the influence of Green's idealism when an undergraduate at Oxford, and traces of idealist thought always remained in his writings. But his fascination with Oriental religions and his subsequent conversion to Buddhism induced a reverence for...
for the unique individuality of each human being; and this, in turn, led to an espousal of 'self-realisation' as the highest educational ideal. As Chief Inspector of elementary schools for the Board of Education, Holmes was in a privileged position to judge the educational standards of the schools of his day. And what he saw did not please him:

Activity, versatility, imaginative sympathy, a large and free outlook, self-forgetfulness, charm of manner, joy of heart - are there many schools in England in which the soil and atmosphere are favourable to the vigorous growth of all these qualities? I doubt it. 78

There were a few pioneers, however, who 'dared, with splendid courage, to defy the despotism of custom, of tradition, of officialdom, of the thousand deadening influences' that were brought to bear upon them, and to follow for themselves the 'path of inwardness and life'. 79 Holmes' 'premature' retirement afforded him the golden opportunity to express these opinions publicly. His book, What is and What Might Be, caused a sensation when it appeared in 1911.

Holmes was one of the pivotal figures in the history of the 'progressive movement' in education in the early years of the twentieth century, and with Beatrice Ensor ( ? - ? ), Norman MacMunn ( ? -1925) and Percy Nunn (1870-1944) formed the nucleus of an influential and international group, the New Education Fellowship, which was founded in 1921. 84

Percy Nunn was an explicit opponent of idealism, and his book Education: Its Data and First Principles (1920) marked a complete break with the other tradition. Like G.E. Moore and Bertrand Russell he was a staunch realist, being associated with a group known as the New Realists. 85 In Education Nunn rejected the 'deadly doctrine' of Hegel that the State can admit 'no moral authority greater than its own', and he deplored the use of an educational system, from the primary school to the university, as an 'instrument to engrain these notions into the soul of a whole people'. 86
Nunn's picture of human beings is essentially biological, and he praised the methods of psychoanalysis, at once 'truly scientific and truly humane', for throwing a 'flood of light upon the whole question of hormic organisation'. His 'child-centredness' is expressed with the striking aphorism: 'Individuality is the ideal of Life'. Not surprisingly, with such a basic tenet Nunn found it 'impossible to judge conduct, in general, by any external criterion', and used instead the principle that 'human lives, like works of art, must be judged by their "expressiveness"'. In such an ideal school the 'ultimate veto lies with the pupil ...'. The school, in his view, must be thought of primarily 'not as a place where certain knowledge is learnt, but as a place where the young are disciplined in certain forms of activity ...'. Conceptual learning is acquired from active concepts or patterns which are innate or derived by abstraction from experience. Perception and understanding depend upon the ability to read 'patterns' into the images received from the external world; and some of these 'patterns' must be 'archetypal in Jung's sense', though they multiply greatly in the course of experience. In the understanding of play, too, 'lies the key to most of the practical problems of education'; for play, Nunn argued, taken in the narrower sense as a phenomenon belonging especially to childhood, shows the creative impulses in their clearest, most vigorous and most typical form.

Bertrand Russell, too, was a life-long opponent of Hegel's political theory which justifies, Russell claimed, 'every internal tyranny and every external aggression that can possibly be imagined'. In 1926 his book On Education, Especially in Early Childhood was published, emphasising individuality, creative self-expression, and a careful and rigorous training of the intellect. As there was no school in England compatible with these views, Russell and his wife Dora (b. 1894) opened a school of their own, Beacon Hill, in 1927. Like Summerhill, Beacon Hill attracted much notoriety with its advocacy of self-government, and its tolerance of nudity, masturbation, and freedom of expression.

Although he was no anarchist Russell deplored the kind of social training which induced a docile obedience to the State. In Education and the Social Order (1932) he insisted that 'citizenship as an ideal is inadequate, for as an ideal it involves an absence of creativeness, and a willingness to acquiesce in the powers that be, whether oligarchic or democratic, which is contrary to what is/...
is characteristic of the greatest men, and tends, if over-emphasised, to prevent ordinary men from attaining the greatness of which they are capable. Creativity and independence of mind, then, were the key-notes of Beacon Hill's philosophy. This is not to imply, of course, that the Russells encouraged any romantic flights of Nietzschean individuality in their pupils. They accepted that all of us have to accept some constraints of personal liberty and freedom of expression if we hope to live and work peacefully together. But they both rejected the conventional methods of punishment used by most educators of that time to inculcate respect for authority. Rather, they believed, as Dora reminisced many years later in her autobiography The Tamarisk Tree (1975, 1980, 1985) that 'freedom given and understood early enough would result in a natural evolution to maturity and self discipline'.

The change of Zeitgeist, theoretical and historical, had important consequences for educational practice. Pleas for institutional autonomy found support from theorists like Nunn. Elitist schools, colleges and universities are the servants of nature's evolutionary purposes, it was argued, and social constraints on their activities would merely endanger the higher, 'natural' ends to which they should be devoted. Consequently, educational institutions should be treated as ends in themselves; children should be free from constraints imposed by their teachers; and teachers, in turn, should be free from the imposition of externally imposed objectives.

This kind of thinking was certainly reflected in the official decisions of the post-war years. In 1926 the Board of Education left elementary schools and teacher-training colleges free to determine their own curricula and objectives. (Secondary schools were freed in the same way in 1945). The three Reports of the Consultative Committee under the chairmanship of Sir Henry Hadow, The Education of the Adolescent (1926), The Primary School (1931) and Infant and Nursery Schools (1933), endorsed a more liberal, individualistic approach to education with the famous suggestion from The Primary School that the curriculum be thought of in terms of 'activity and experience, rather than of knowledge to be acquired or facts to be stored'. Universities, too/...
too, insisted more than ever on their right of 'academic freedom', and
Workers' Educational Association and university extension classes relinquished
their traditional role as promoters of working-class education and became
'isolated centres of genteel culture in the middle-class suburbs'.

In all these ways, then - in the concept and aims of education, in the rejection
of any kind of elitism, in views on the function of the teacher, the role and
autonomy of the school and other educational institutions - the vision of the
idealist reformers was superseded after the First World War by a far more
individualistic Weltanschauung. It was in this period of child-centred
education, when 'freedom of expression', and individuality as an ideal were
the new watch-words, that Freudian theory found its many converts. What
attracted Homer Lane, MacMunn, Alexander S. Nell, Percy Nunn, the Russells, and
other 'progressives' so strongly to Freudian theory was its appearance of
liberality, and a 'scientific' status which endorsed their individualist practices.
It was a long time before any of them realised that Freud was not a new
apostle of liberalism but of conformity; and that he brought with him new
techniques, honed to perfection through many years of clinical practice, to
achieve this. Thus, Homer Lane began to practise Jungian psychotherapy
in London after the closure of the Little Commonwealth, and Neill, too,
turned more and more to Wilhelm Reich and his radical revisionism of
psychoanalysis.

But what was the result of this post-war individualism? By the 1960s, the
education system presented a bewildering spectacle of diversity at all levels:
schools arbitrarily devising aims and curricula; primary schools disconnected
from their local secondary schools; secondary schools disconnected from
tertiary institutions; training-colleges disconnected from schools and valuing
their prestigious links with university departments; an inspectorate uncertain
of its role; and universities which had become - in the public's eye - centres
of arcane and doubtful wisdom, 'ivory towers', far removed from the hurly-
burly of civic affairs.
But in the last twenty years the scene has changed dramatically, if not towards idealism then at least towards themes which idealists have traditionally valued. Education is now being seen more and more as a web of interlocking relationships involving every aspect of life - home, school, local community, industry, higher education, social work, health, and religion - with a tighter control from local authorities and central government. This 'community-based' approach to education is evident in the various official reports published in recent years: The Youth Service in England and Wales: The Albemarle Report (1960); Half Our Future: The Newsom Report (1963); Children and Their Primary Schools: The Plowden Report (1967); Educational Priority: The Halsey Report (1972); Fit for the Future - Child Health Services: The Court Report (1976); A New Partnership for our Schools: The Taylor Report (1977); and Special Educational Needs: The Warnock Report (1978). As well as these, Comprehensive Schooling for all, too, has purported to integrate children from different socio-economic backgrounds by means of a common philosophy.

'Public accountability is the new watchword. In higher education, polytechnics challenge the supremacy of the universities; English colleges of education have largely been absorbed into polytechnics or other institutions under the control of local authorities. The 'Great Debate' of 1976 questioned the schools' autonomy over aims and curricula. And today, new national syllabuses and examinations have been drawn up and accepted, notwithstanding the current industrial action, by the major teachers' unions and local authorities; and even the thorny question of teacher assessment is being seriously discussed.

On top of all this, a new dimension has entered British education, a dimension which has grown in importance in recent years. Indeed, in many ways British educators are having to face the problems which confronted American educators of a century ago. With the growing number of ethnic groups entering the educational system, the question of social cohesion assumes an importance unprecedented in British educational practice. Thus recent documents have recommended a shift of curricular planning to incorporate the needs of a multi-cultural country.
In philosophy, too, the situation has changed. Logical positivism, considered as the doctrine of a small, Viennese sect which influenced the greatest thinkers of two continents, has disintegrated. This is not to say, however, that the influence simply disappeared. In various ways the ideas have been absorbed into the international movement of contemporary empiricism, within which the old disputes are still being contested. But the doctrinaire confidence, the sureness, almost arrogance of opinion, has gone. And the carefully-defined parameters of their philosophy, which were presented in blatant opposition to any philosophy, especially idealist, which dabbled in non-verifiable, metaphysical preoccupations, have been badly shaken with the passage of time. Ayer, for example, has admitted in his review of the work of the Vienna Circle that metaphysics is 'no longer a term of opprobrium'; that the 'pragmatic treatment of scientific theories is less in favour ...'; and that both the 'analytic-synthetic distinction and the very concept of sense-data have been put in question ...

With the disintegration of logical positivism there has come a renewed interest in Hegelian philosophy. Indeed, during the last twenty years there has been an 'explosion of interest' in Hegel, with many new editions, translations, commentaries, and articles appearing throughout the world. But why should Hegel, the most vilified philosopher of the twentieth century arouse so much interest now? Richard J. Bernstein in *Philosophical Profiles* (1986) linked the interest with two things: the international student unrest of the 1960s and the revival of interest in Marx. Students, especially of the New Left, protested against the plight of the poor and oppressed, the rising tide of violence, and the widespread political humbug which attempted to disguise the emptiness and artificiality of much of contemporary life in western societies. They protested, too, against the 'conservative' intellectual orientations which had become so entrenched in the prestigious academic institutions, orientations which did not provide either a satisfactory rationale for the deep-rooted inequalities of society or a blueprint for changing them. It was in this context that Marx was rediscovered by the young radicals. Marx appeared to provide what other political philosophies could not - a theory for changing the world through revolutionary praxis. And to understand Marx, of course, one has to understand Hegel.
As the pendulum swings back from autonomy towards accountability, from individualism to collectivism, the work of the idealist educational reformers assumes a new relevance. The central question today is: given that most of us would welcome a more cohesive, rational educational system, what role should the State play in its provision and maintenance? It is not my intention here to attempt an answer to this, except to draw attention to one danger: when the content of education is decided at the centre, it is possible for a small cabal of policy-makers, discreet, anonymous and powerful, to mould the intellectual and spiritual life of a whole nation. State direction then becomes totalitarianism.

Certainly, idealist systems of social thought have frequently ended in totalitarian forms of government, from Plato's *The Republic* to Gentile's espousal of Mussolini's Fascist State. And Freudian theory, the anonymous voice of the Scottish 'Memorandum', provides the special techniques whereby such a totalitarianism of the political right or left can be achieved. What is truly remarkable about these techniques is that, to the superficial reader of Freud, they appear excitingly liberalising and radical; in fact, as already noted, they constitute the most subtle and effective means of socialisation in the history of educational theory. 118
NOTES AND REFERENCES


2. For discussions which treat materialism and idealism as mutually exclusive categories, see the later writings of Engels, especially Herr Eugen Duhring's Revolution in Science (1878), also known as Anti Duhring; Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy (1888); Dialectics of Nature (1925); Lenin's Materialism and Empirio-Criticism (1909); and Lukács' History and Class Consciousness (1923). Significantly, Freud's views are rejected by Soviet psychologists for their 'idealist' content. They criticise his theory of an ego which develops in virtual isolation from the real world. Furthermore, his idea of an 'unconscious' detached from reality and uninfluenced by the external environment, is rejected as an abstract construction typical of idealist thinking (see J. McLeish, Soviet Psychology: History, Theory, Content, 1975, p. 137). Lenin's dismissal of Freudian theory as the latest apologia of bourgeois morality is worth recording: 'The extension on Freudian hypotheses seems educated, even scientific, but it is ignorant, bungling. Freudian theory is the modern fashion. I mistrust the sexual theories of the articles, dissertations, pamphlets, etc., in short, of that particular kind of literature which flourishes luxuriantly on the dirty soil of bourgeois society. I mistrust those who are always contemplating the sexual question, like the Indian saint his navel. It seems to me that these flourishing sexual theories which are mainly hypothetical and often quite arbitrary hypotheses, arise from the personal need to justify personal abnormality or hypertrophy in sexual life before bourgeois morality, and to entertain its patience. This masked respect for bourgeois morality seems to me just as repulsive as poking about in sexual matters. However wild and revolutionary this behaviour may be, it is still really quite bourgeois. It is, mainly, a hobby of the intellectuals and of the sections nearest them. There is no place for it in the Party, in the class conscious, fighting proletariat' (quoted in L. Rahmani, Soviet Psychology: Philosophical, Theoretical and Experimental Issues, 1973, pp. 9-10.

3. A more comprehensive list of idealist philosophers would include Socrates (c. 469-399 B.C.), Plato (c. 427-c. 347 B.C.) and Aristotle (384-322 B.C.; Rousseau (1712-1778) and Pestalozzi (1746-1827); Leibnitz (1646-1716), Kant (1724-1804), Fichte (1762-1814), Hegel (1770-1831), Schelling (1775-1854) and Froebel (1782-1852); Caird (1835-1908), Green (1836-1882), Bradley (1846-1924), Bosanquet (1848-1923) and McTaggart (1866-1925); Royce (1855-1916); Croce (1866-1952) and Gentile (1875-1944).

4. Mathematics, in the sense of demonstrative deductive argument, begins with Pythagoras (c. 570 B.C. - c. 500 B.C.) with whom it is interwoven with a peculiar form of mysticism. Indeed, he is the source of the conception of an eternal world, revealed to the intellect but not to the senses. But for Pythagoras, Bertrand Russell argued, 'Christians would not have thought of Christ as the Word; but for him, theologies would not have sought logical
proofs of God and immortality' (History of Western Philosophy, 1946, p. 56). And Russell concluded that the influence of mathematics on philosophy, partly owing to Pythagoras, has been 'both profound and unfortunate' (ibid., p. 49).

5. Parmenides (c. 515 B.C. - ?) is historically important for his invention of a form of metaphysical argument that, in one form or another, is to be found in the theories of most subsequent metaphysicians, including Hegel. The doctrine of Parmenides is set forth in his poem On Nature. He considered the senses deceptive, condemned the multitude of sensible things as mere illusion, and described the 'One', the only true being, as infinite and indivisible.

6. The three doctrines of Heraclitus (c. 530 B.C. - c. 470 B.C.) are (a) Everything is in a state of flux. (b) Unity in the world is formed by the combination of opposites. This doctrine contains the germ of Hegel's philosophy, which proceeds by a synthesising of opposites. (c) Fire is the primordial substance, everlasting, and yet continually changing, its permanence rather that of a process than that of a substance.

7. The preoccupations of Socrates (c. 470 B.C. - 399 B.C) were ethical. In Apology he told his accusers: 'I tried to persuade each one of you not to think more of practical advantages than of his mental and moral well-being, or in general to think more of advantage than of well-being in the case of the state or of anything else'. (The Collected Dialogues of Plato, 1980, edited by E. Hamilton and H. Cairns, p. 21). Other dialogues, too, show Socrates searching for definitions of ethical terms. Charmides is concerned with a definition of temperance or moderation; Lysis with friendship; and Laches with courage.

8. Why did the Prussian State require the services of a philosopher? The answer to this lies in the historical background to Hegel's life and career. Prussia was defeated by Napoleon at Jena in 1806 and by the Treaty of Tilsit agreed to accept a French army of occupation and pay a huge financial indemnity. In 1807 Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1824) in his Addresses to the German Nation called for all Germans to create a new, corporate State on the foundation of a new, moral order. Central to Fichte's vision was the reconstruction of the system of education as the agency of corporate regeneration. Fichte was not alone in his wish to create a new Prussia: King Frederick William III (1770-1840), too, determined that Prussia would become a bureaucratic meritocracy with education playing an essential role. But the spirit of creative reform did not long survive the peace that followed the Congress of Vienna in 1815. By 1817 students in German and Prussian universities had formed student societies, Burschenschaften, which aroused the suspicions of Prince Klemens von Metternich (1773-1859). In 1819, he issued the notorious Carlsbad Decrees which inaugurated the conservative reaction throughout Europe. The press was heavily censored, universities more closely controlled, and student societies declared illegal. In the years that followed the Carlsbad Decrees the concept of a corporate, totalitarian Prussian State continued to be developed. The chief exponent was Hegel whose philosophy was given the stamp of official approval. Indeed, during the student unrest that led to the Carlsbad Decrees, Baron Karl von Allenstein, Minister for
Spiritual, Educational and Medical Affairs, arranged for Hegel to lecture to students, public officials and army officers on the philosophy of politics.

9. For comments on Hegel and his 'scientific' ideas see Karl Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (1945), Volume 2, pp. 27-29.


15. Popper, for example, made much of Plato's alleged advocacy of a Republic ruled by 'Philosopher-Kings' with the majority of citizens in a state of total subjugation, and translated a passage from *Laws* to support his thesis: 'The greatest principle of all is that nobody, whether male or female, should be without a leader. Nor should the mind of anybody be habituated to letting him do anything at all on his own initiative; neither out of zeal, or even playfully. But in war and in the midst of peace - to his leader he shall direct his eye and follow him faithfully' (*ibid.*, volume 1, p. 7). But Popper was being less than honest here: he did not reveal that Plato in the above passage was giving specific advice on the training of soldiers to protect the State. It is absurd to suggest that the above principle was meant to be applied to the children being educated as 'Philosopher-Kings'.

16. In his youth, William Wordsworth (1770-1850) was deeply influenced by the ideas of Rousseau and William Godwin, and he ardently supported the French Revolution. But as he grew older he became increasingly conservative in his political views and orthodox in his religion. Wordsworth's great appeal to idealists lay largely in his literary depiction of an immanent intelligence harmonising warring elements in order to achieve social equilibrium: 'There is a dark/Invisible workmanship that reconciles/Discordant elements, and makes them move/In one society' (*The Prelude*, Book I, 1926, lines 352-355).

17. Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772-1834) developed a form of idealism in virtual isolation from the main stream of English empirical philosophy. In 1798 he accompanied the Wordsworths to Germany where he assimilated the works of Kant and the German romantic philosophers, particularly Schelling. His mature views on social philosophy are contained in *On the Constitution of the Church and State, According to the Idea of Each* (1830), which was begun as an attempt to formulate objections to various bills for Catholic emancipation, and finished as an idealist treatise. Coleridge's well-functioning society requires the reconciliation of forces
working for permanence with forces working for progression. These
are identified with the aristocratic, landed interest, and the
bourgeois, commercial interest of early Victorian England. A
monarch, too, is required to maintain cohesion. By generalising
in this way from the history and the contemporary pattern of
British political institutions, rather than attempting to draw a
description of the ideal state, Coleridge surrounded the British
constitution with an aura of metaphysical sanctity.

18. Thomas Carlyle (1795-1881) was born in Ecclefechan, Scotland. In
1809 he became a divinity student at the University of Edinburgh,
but he soon left. In 1819 he began his career as a freelance
journalist. In 1822 he experienced the spiritual crisis later
recorded in Sartor Resartus (1833-1834). His translations of
Goethe's Wilhelm Meister in 1824, and his Life of Schiller in
1825, established Carlyle as the first interpreter of German
literature to the British public. On Heroes, Hero Worship, and
the Heroic in History (1940) blended mythology and metaphysics in
an attempt to produce Carlyle's image of the ideal type of
individual needed as the saviour of mankind. Like the hero of
Sartor, Diogenes Teufelsdrockh, Carlyle found a new, secular faith
in the moral efficacy of work, a personal, psychotherapeutic
discovery which became a leitmotiv of mid-Victorian culture.

19. Thomas Arnold (1795-1842) was headmaster of Rugby (1828-1842) and
set the modern pattern for the entire English public-school
system.

20. The most remarkable aspect of the work of John Ruskin (1819-1900)
is the development of art into a moral critique of industrial
capitalism. His philosophy of art can be stated briefly. The
artist's function is to reveal aspects of the universal truth;
truth being synonymous with beauty. Any corruption of the moral
nature of the artist is an inevitable corruption of this
revelation. It is impossible for an artist to be good if society
is corrupt. The art of any society is, correspondingly, the
reflection of its social and political virtues. Where there is a
lack of 'wholeness' in society; neither can be achieved without
the other. For Ruskin, the individualism of industrial
civilisation is the enemy of 'wholeness' by the substitution of
'production' for 'wealth', and the basic misunderstanding of the
nature of work. Ruskin's work had an important formative
influence on the British labour movement, both directly and
indirectly through its influence on William Morris. Ruskin's
works include The Seven Lamps of Architecture (1849), The Stones
of Venice (3 volumes, 1851-1853), The Political Economy of Art
(1857), Unto This Last (1862), The Crown of Wild Olive (1866),
Munera Pulveris (1863, 1872), Sesame and Lilies (1865), Time and
Tide (1867), and Fors Clavigera (8 volumes, 1871-1884). See
Raymond Williams, Culture and Society, 1958, Part 1, Chapter 7.

21. Matthew Arnold (1822-1888) entered Balliol College, Oxford in 1841,
and was elected a Fellow of Oriel in 1845. After a brief spell
teaching at Rugby, he became private secretary to Lord Lansdowne.
Arnold was President of the Committee of Council on Education from
1847 until 1851, Inspector of Schools from 1851 until 1886, and
Professor of Poetry at Oxford from 1857 until 1867. Arnold tried
to achieve wholeness and unity in his poetry. He believed that
the future of England lay with the middle class, but was vexed by
its complacent love of liberty and individualism. Arnold's strategy was twofold. First, he introduced new authors and new ideas in an attempt to improve the impoverished culture of the middle class. Second, he argued for a substitution of the principle of authority, both in intellectual and political matters, for the cult of individuality which he believed was bringing the nation towards anarchy. In Culture and Anarchy (1869), Arnold found the principle of authority in the State, the 'organ of our collective best self, of our national right reason' (*Matthew Arnold: Selected Poetry and Prose*, 1953, p. 239). By this 'best self we are united, impersonal, at harmony. We are in no peril from giving authority to this, because it is the truest friend we all of us can have; and when anarchy is a danger to us, to this authority we may turn with sure trust' (*ibid.*, p. 238).


33. Benjamin Jowett (1817-1893) first introduced Hegel's philosophical system into England. (The first publication was *The Secret of Hegel* by J.H. Stirling in 1865). Jowett's translations of Plato's dialogues, especially *The Republic*, are classics. He urged his Balliol students to devote themselves to the pursuit of academic excellence and public service.

34. After graduating from Glasgow, Edward Caird (1835-1908) read philosophy at Balliol from 1860 until 1863. He was deeply affected by his reading of Hegel and Carlyle. He returned to Glasgow in 1866 as Professor of Moral Philosophy, and became the centre of a group of devoted disciples. In 1879 he founded the Glasgow Witenagemote Society by means of which he attempted to plant a few 'germinative ideas' in the minds of his students *Dictionary of National Biography: Twentieth Century, 1901-1911*, p. 293). Caird called these students his 'young lions' (H. Jones and J.H. Muirhead, *The Life and Philosophy of Edward Caird*, 1921, p. 90). They included John Henry Muirhead (1855-1940), who later became
Professor of Philosophy at Birmingham; John Stuart Mackenzie (1860-1935), later Professor of Philosophy at Cardiff; Henry Jones (1852-1922), later Professor of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow; Andrew Seth (Pringle-Pattison) (1856-1931), later Professor of Philosophy at Edinburgh; and William Paton Ker (1855-1923), later Professor of Poetry at Oxford. Caird became Master of Balliol in 1893, following Jowett's death. Caird described his life as devoted to the 'Nature of the all-embracing Unity on which every intelligible experience must rest...'(Dictionary of National Biography, ibid., p. 294). His works include A Critical Account of the Philosophy of Kant (1877), and The Social Philosophy and Religion of Comte (1895).

35. William Wallace (1843-1897), a graduate of St. Andrews, entered Balliol in 1964, and was elected a Fellow of Merton in 1867. He succeeded Green as Whyte Professor of Moral Philosophy in 1882. Wallace contributed to the work of the London Ethical Society, founded by Bosanquet and others in 1886, which he described as a 'few human beings linked in action for the purpose of bettering the general standard of ethical feeling...'(Wallace, Lectures and Essays on Natural Theology and Ethics, 1898, p. 61).

36. Richard Lewis Nettleship (1846-1892) entered Balliol in 1865, and was elected a Fellow in 1869. He died from exposure whilst climbing Mont Blanc. His Lectures on the Republic of Plato (1897) has been reprinted many times.

37. Francis Herbert Bradley (1846-1924) entered University College, Oxford in 1965, and was elected a Fellow of Merton in 1870. He was undoubtedly the pioneer in the new development of idealistic philosophy...'(P. Gordon and J. White, Philosophers as Educational Reformers, 1979, p. 117). His Appearance and Reality (1893) re-argued Hegelian metaphysics on a new, logical foundation. And in his essay 'My Station and its Duties', he reinforced the Platonic-Hegelian message that we are social beings with obligations attached to our 'station and its duties' (Ethical Studies, 1876, pp. 202 ff.). His other works include Principles of Logic (1883), Essays on Truth and Reality (1914) and the posthumous Collected Essays (1935). For a critical study of Bradley's philosophy, see Richard Wollheim, F.H. Bradley (1959).

38. Bernard Bosanquet (1848-1923) entered Balliol in 1867, and was elected Fellow of University College in 1871. He remained a lifelong admirer of Green, who described him as the 'best equipped man in the College' (A.C. Bradley, 'Bernard Bosanquet, 1848-1923', Proceedings of the British Academy, volume 11, 1924, p. 2). Apart from spending five years as Professor of Moral Philosophy at St. Andrews, a past for which he was recommended by Haldane, Bosanquet's activities were centred mainly in London (J.H. Muirhead, Reflections by a Journeyman in Philosophy, 1942, p. 102). He was a founder member of the London Ethical Society. His writings include Essays and Addresses (1889), A History of Aesthetics (1892), The Philosophical Theory of the State (1899), and The Education of the Young in 'The Republic' of Plato (1900).

39. Andrew Cecil Bradley (1851-1935) was the brother of F.H. Bradley. He entered Balliol in 1869, and was elected Fellow in 1874. He was Professor of Modern Literature at University College, Liverpool (1882-1889), Professor of English Language and
Literature at Glasgow (1889–1900), and Professor of Poetry at Oxford (1901–1906).

40. Andrew Seth (1856–1931) adopted the surname Pringle-Pattison in 1898 as a condition for inheriting a family estate in Scotland. He studied Philosophy at Edinburgh under Alexander Campbell Fraser (1819–1914). He was appointed to the foundation chair of Philosophy at University College of South Wales, Cardiff, in 1883; Professor of Logic and Metaphysics at St. Andrews in 1889; and Professor of Philosophy at Edinburgh in 1891, in succession to Campbell Fraser. His works include Scottish Philosophy: A Comparison of the Scottish and German Answers to Hume (1885), Hegelianism and Personality (1887), Man's Place in the Cosmos (1892), The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy (1917), The Idea of Immortality (1922), Studies in the Philosophy of Religion (1930), The Balfour Lectures on Realism (delivered 1891), with a memoir by G.F. Barbour (ed.), 1933.

41. Thomas Godolphin Rooper (1847–1903) entered Balliol in 1866 where he was deeply influenced by Jowett, Green and Bosanquet. After a few years as a private tutor, he became a school inspector in Northumberland, Bradford, and finally, Southampton. Rooper was an enthusiastic champion of popular education and took, 'as might have been expected from a pupil of T.H. Green, a keen interest in other public and social questions' (Selected Writings of Thomas Godolphin Rooper, edited by R.G. Tatton, 1907, p. xlvii). Rooper was concerned, too, of course, with the everyday classroom concerns of teachers and his essays are an attempt to link Herbertianism and idealism in a practical way. He admitted that Green was the 'original source' of his ideas (Tatton, ibid., pp. xxvii–xxviii).

42. J.H. Muirhead, Reflections by a Journeyman in Philosophy (1942), edited by J.W. Harvey, p. 50 (footnote). John McCunn (1846–1929) was educated at Greenock Academy and the University of Glasgow. He entered Balliol in 1872 and studied under Green. After some years as a private coach in Oxford, he was appointed Professor of Logic, Mental and Moral Philosophy and Political Economy at the University College of Liverpool in 1881. The Making of Character, subtitled 'Some Educational Aspects of Ethics', was first published in 1900 in The Cambridge Series for Schools and Training Colleges, and was reprinted many times. The book is set in an idealist framework and contains three basic doctrines. First, the influences of social and natural surroundings are not mutually antagonistic, but interfused and cooperant ('Wordsworthian Education of Nature', ibid., p. 70). Second, 'character is the one supreme and satisfying end for which all politics exist' (ibid., p. 125). Third, the family is of cardinal importance, especially in the early years. (See P. Gordon and J. White, Philosophers as Educational Reformers, 1979, pp. 180–185, for a more comprehensive analysis of MacCunn's book.)

43. Henry Jones (1852–1922) entered the University of Glasgow as a mature student in 1875 (he was the headmaster of an Ironworks School, 1873–1875). Under the influence of Caird he made a study of Hegel. In his essay, 'The Education of the Citizen' (1917), Jones wrote that the sole end of education is the citizen himself. The 'only education which should ever be given is a moral education' (ibid., p. 247). Consequently, everything that the
teacher does in school has a moral significance: 'He may be teaching the multiplication table or the paradigm of a Greek verb ... but his permanent care is, by any or all of these means, to liberate the possibilities of character in his pupils' (ibid., p. 251). Universities should lead the way in this moral crusade by training all of their undergraduates directly in citizenship. Jones succeeded Caird as Professor of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow in 1894, a post he held until his death in 1922. His works include Old Memories (1922), Essays on Literature and Education (1924), and, with J.H. Muirhead, The Life and Philosophy of Edward Caird (1921).

44. Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947) entered Trinity College, Cambridge, with a scholarship in mathematics; in 1884 he was elected to a Fellowship. Bertrand Russell was his ablest student and they collaborated on Principia Mathematica (1910-1913) which purports to prove that mathematics can be deduced from premises of formal logic. In 1924, Whitehead accepted a chair in philosophy at Harvard University. Bertrand Russell described Whitehead's metaphysics as 'a form of systematic Idealism, though it is not quite of the character of the Idealist strains in Dewey's philosophy. Where Dewey's conception of wholes goes back to Hegel, the Idealism of Whitehead has more in common with the organic notions of the later Schelling' (Wisdom of the West, 1959, p. 297). Surprisingly, Gordon and White (1979) say 'next to nothing' about Whitehead in their study of the influence of idealism on British educational thought and practice (ibid., p. 176). Whitehead's works include Science and the Modern Worlds (1925), The Aims of Education (1929), and Adventures of Ideas (1933).

45. John McTaggart Ellis McTaggart (1866-1925) went to Trinity College, Cambridge and took first-class honours in the moral science tripos in 1888. He was made a Fellow of Trinity in 1891, and taught there from 1897 until he retired in 1923. It is extraordinary that Gordon and White (1979) omit any reference to McTaggart, by all accounts a seminal influence on the course of British idealism. Karl Popper, an explicit opponent of idealism, regarded him as 'really brilliant ... well above the level of Hegel ... ' (The Open Society and Its Enemies, 1945, volume 2, p. 29). Bertrand Russell, who became acquainted with McTaggart at Trinity, later reminisced: 'He had a great intellectual influence upon my generation, though in retrospect I do not think it was a very good one' (Russell, Autobiography, 1978, p. 60). The friendship came to an end during the First World War because McTaggart disapproved of Russell's pacivism (Russell, ibid., p. 60). McTaggart's philosophy is a peculiar variety of Hegelian idealism. His works include Studies in the Hegelian Logic (1896); Studies in Hegelian Cosmology (1901); A Commentary on Hegel's Logic (1910); and The Nature of Existence (2 volumes; 1921, 1927). The standard commentary is C.D. Broad's Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy (2 volumes; 1933, 1938).

46. Robert R. Rusk (1879-1972) was educated at Glasgow, Cambridge and Jena, and was lecturer in education at the University of Glasgow until his retirement in 1951. He also held office as Director to the Scottish Council for Research in Education until 1958. Rusk's book The Philosophical Bases of Education (1928) attacks Percy Nunn's individualism for ignoring the idealists' claim that 'man's
higher or spiritual nature is essentially social' (ibid., p. 43). Man, Rusk claimed, 'must be taught to rise above his individuality, and to seek in social activities and social service the satisfaction of his spiritual needs' (ibid., p. 47). His works include The Doctrines of the Great Educators (1918); Experimental Education (1919); The Philosophical Bases of Education (1928); and A History of Infant Education (1933).


48. Arthur James Balfour (1848-1930) was educated at Eton and Trinity College, Cambridge, where he came under the influence of Henry Sidgwick. He became a Conservative M.P. in 1874, and in 1902 succeeded his uncle, Lord Salisbury, as prime minister. Among many distinctions, he was Chancellor of both Cambridge and Edinburgh universities, Fellow of the Royal Society, President of the British Academy, President of the British Association, President of the Aristotelian Society and one of the founders of the Scots Philosophical Club. Philosophy, indeed, was his main pursuit in private life, and in Foundations of Belief (1895) he argued that in a world where nothing is certain, everything rests on belief and belief is founded, not on induction, but on the more enduring basis of 'authority', the climate of traditional opinion, by which all reasonable men live. Balfour pursued his 'idealistic' defence of a 'higher reason' in Theism and Humanism (1915) and Theism and Thought (1923). The leading biographies of Balfour are Mrs. Dugdale (his niece), Arthur James Balfour (1937) and K. Young Arthur James Balfour (1963). The former has an appraisal of Balfour's philosophy by Andrew Seth (Pringle-Pattison).

49. Richard Burdon Haldane (1856-1928) was first attracted to idealism through the works of Fichte and Hegel, which he read during a term spent at Gottingen in 1874 (An Autobiography, 1929, pp. 6-9). He completed his university education at Edinburgh where he became a friend of Andrew Seth (Pringle-Pattison), and James Hutchison Stirling (1820-1909), the author of The Secret of Hegel (1865). With Pringle-Pattison he edited and contributed to Essays in Philosophical Criticism (1882) and dedicated the volume to the memory of Green. In The Pathway to Reality (1902-1904; 2 volumes) Haldane praised Aristotle and Hegel as the two supreme thinkers of the world (ibid., volume 2, passim). Haldane was a leading figure in Liberal politics from the 1890s to the First World War, but his greatest passion was for education, especially tertiary education. And here his achievements are certainly impressive. He played an important part in the workings of the Workers' Educational Association; he was the driving force behind the foundation of the British Institute of Adult Education; and, with the Webbs, he was responsible for the foundation of the London School of Economics, the foundation of the Imperial College
of Science and Technology, and the passing of the University of London Act. He headed also a small group whose deliberations eventually led to the creation of the University Grants Commission; and he was Chairman of two Royal Commissions on university education. Haldane wanted British universities to play a central role in creating a leadership class which would endeavour to raise the consciousness of all people in society: 'A nation's stature is closely bound up with its enlightenment, and without work from the Universities the fullest enlightenment cannot come. What we rely on is the passion which the working classes, like other classes, have for what is of high quality. That passion manifests itself only in a comparatively small class of individuals. But their numbers tend to grow, and leadership naturally passes to these men' (Haldane, 'A Vision of the Future', in The Way Out: Essays on the Meaning and Purpose of Adult Education, edited by S. Oliver, 1923, pp. 12-13).

50. Jan Christian Smuts (1870-1950) was born in South Africa. He graduated from Cambridge in 1874, where he studied law. Returning home in 1895, he was admitted to the bar, entered political life, and during the Boer War commanded a force against the British with the rank of general. During the First World War, however, he was a staunch defender of the Allied cause. In 1918 he published a pamphlet entitled The League of Nations: A Practical Suggestion, which influenced President Wilson. From 1919 to 1924, and again from 1939 to 1948, he was prime minister of South Africa. In the period between premierships he completed his sole philosophical work, Holism and Evolution (1926) which introduced the concept of 'holism' into philosophy. For a biography of Smuts see Kenneth Ingham, Jan Christian Smuts (1986).

51. For a critique of idealism see Bertrand Russell's The Problems of Philosophy (1912), Chapter 4.

52. Leonard Trelawney Hobhouse (1884-1929) was educated at Corpus Christi, Oxford. On leaving Oxford in 1897, Hobhouse joined the staff of the Manchester Guardian, with which he was associated for many years. He also held the Martin White chair of sociology at the University of London. The strongest influences on Hobhouse were Herbert Spencer's evolutionary philosophy, Auguste Comte's Positivism, and the social philosophies of J. S. Mill and T. H. Green (although he rejected the idealists' reduction of all things to the spiritual).

53. Hobhouse, The Metaphysical Theory of the State, 1918, p. 6. Hobhouse dedicated his book to his son, who was serving as an officer in the RAF. In the dedication he wrote: "In the bombing of London I had just witnessed the visible and tangible outcome of a false and wicked doctrine ... the Hegelian theory of the god-state' (ibid., p. 6). Other works include Mind in Evolution (1901), Morals in Evolution (1906) and Social Development (1924).

54. A. J. Ayer has recorded that when he first read the Tractatus as an undergraduate at Oxford in 1931, it made 'an overwhelming impression' on him (A. J. Ayer, Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, 1982, p. 111). Bertrand Russell, too, has recorded that the Tractatus had a 'profound' effect on his thought (Russell, My Philosophical Development, 1985, p. 83). Wittgenstein submitted the Tractatus to the University of Cambridge for a Ph.D. degree.
Russell was one of the examiners (Moore was the other) and his report to the Council of Trinity on Wittgenstein's thesis is interesting: 'The theories contained in this new work of Wittgenstein's are novel, very original, and indubitably important. Whether they are true, I do not know. As a logician who likes simplicity, I should wish to think that they are not, but from what I have read of them I am quite sure that he ought to have an opportunity to work them out, since when completed they may easily prove to constitute a whole new philosophy' (Russell, Autobiography, 1978, p. 440).

55. Moritz Schlick (1882-1936) read physics under Max Planck at the University of Berlin. Schlick's professional knowledge of the methods and criteria of research in the natural sciences left him dissatisfied with the epistemological notions both of neo-Kantianism, and of Edmund Husserl's phenomenology. Instead, his starting-point was the analyses of the basic concepts and presuppositions of the individual sciences carried out by Ernst Mach, Hermann von Helmholtz, and Henri Poincaré. In 1922 – a year after the publication of Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus – Schlick accepted the chair in philosophy at the University of Vienna. Under the influence of Wittgenstein and Carnap, Schlick's philosophical views underwent a profound modification. He no longer thought that the goal of philosophy was the acquisition and presentation of knowledge as a system of propositions but, rather, the application of a method. And in applying this method, philosophers have a new aim: to discover and understand the meaning of the statements, concepts and formulations of problems of the sciences, philosophy, and everyday life. Schlick's works include General Theory of Knowledge (1918), Problems of Ethics (1939), and Philosophy of Nature (1949).

56. Otto Neuruth (1882-1945) was a Marxist socialist. His major work was in sociology, economic and social planning, scientific method, visual education, history of science, political and moral theory, economic history and statistical theory. He was also engaged in recurrent efforts to create a new International Encyclopaedia of Unified Science of which only parts have appeared.

57. Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970) studied at the universities of Freiburg and Jena from 1910 to 1914, specialising in physics, mathematics and philosophy. One of his teachers at Jena was Gottlob Frege who, with Bertrand Russell, exerted the greatest influence on his thinking. In 1926, at the invitation of Moritz Schlick, Carnap went to the University of Venice as Privatdozent. He emigrated to America in 1935 and was appointed professor of philosophy at the University of Chicago. In 1954 he accepted the chair of philosophy at the University of California, made vacant by the death of his friend, Reichenbach. Carnap's works include The Logical Construction of the World (1928), Logical Syntax of Language (1934), Introduction to Semantics (1942), Formulation of Logic (1943), Meaning and Necessity (1947), and Logical Foundations of Probability (1950).

58. With the rise of Hitler, Waismann escaped to England and, after a brief period at Cambridge in the shadow of Wittgenstein, obtained a Readership at Oxford, where he remained until his death in 1959. His major philosophical works are An Introduction to Mathematical Thinking (1936), The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy (1965),
and How I See Philosophy (1968).


60. The writings of Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) on the philosophy of language and the foundations of mathematics were published from the 1870s onwards, but were 'not generally appreciated at their full value until very nearly the present day' (Ayer, Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, p. 19). Wittgenstein visited Frege at the University of Jena in 1911, and was strongly influenced by him (Ayer, ibid., p. 108). Frege advised Wittgenstein to work under Bertrand Russell with the result that he spent five terms in 1912-1913 at Trinity College, Cambridge. Carnap was one of the very few students to attend Frege's courses on mathematical logic. From Frege he learned of Russell's and Whitehead's Principia Mathematica, and he went on to study and be greatly influenced by Russell's work on the theory of knowledge. From this study Carnap wrote his Outline of Mathematical Logic (1929). For an introduction to Frege's philosophy, see Translations From the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege (1952), edited by P. Geach and M. Black.

61. Ernst Mach (1838-1916) studied in Vienna and became professor of mathematics at Graz in 1864. In 1867 he was appointed to a chair of physics at Prague, and in 1895 to the chair of The History and Theory of Inductive Science at Vienna. Mach was fiercely criticised by Lenin in Materialism and Empirio-Criticism (1909).

62. Ayer, Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, 1982, pp. 127-129. The manifesto was mainly drafted by Neurath, though Carnap and the mathematician Hans Hahn also signed the preface as editors. The most distinctive doctrine of the logical positivists was that for any sentence to be cognitively meaningful it must express a statement that is either analytic or empirically verifiable. This doctrine - the famous 'verifiability principle' - stands historically in a line of direct descent from the empiricism of Hume, J.S. Mill, and Ernst Mach.

63. Ayer, ibid., p. 130. The appendix to the manifesto lists fourteen members of the Circle: the philosophers Gustav Bergman, Rudolf Carnap, Herbert Feigl, Victor Kraft, Marcel Natkin, Otto Neurath, Theodor Radakovic, Moritz Schlick and Friedrich Waismann; the mathematicians Kurt Gödel, Hans Hahn, Karl Menger and Olga Hahn-Neurath and the physicist Philipp Frank. Ten persons are listed as sympathisers, of whom the most notable were Hans Reichenbach and Kurt Grelling in Berlin, E. Kaila in Finland, and F.P. Ramsey in England (Ayer, ibid., pp. 129-130).

64. In Austria the philosophical movement initiated by Schlick encountered the uncompromising hostility of the state authorities. When Schlick was murdered by a deranged student on the steps of the university, the right-wing press 'duly deplored it, but there was a faint suggestion that this was the sort of fate that radically anti-clerical professors might expect to suffer' (Ayer, ibid., p. 138). Certainly, Neurath, with his strong socio-
political interests, insisted that the circle should act in the manner of a political party, setting out to destroy traditional metaphysics, which he saw as an instrument of social and political reaction. After the Second World War all the official chairs in the Austrian universities were systematically filled by speculative philosophers generally committed to a theological outlook. Only exceptionally was a representative of scientific philosophy able to qualify as a lecturer. In practice, this has resulted in a suppression of scientific philosophy which continues to exist to the present day. Apparently, the state authorities are afraid that logico-mathematical or empirical scientific analysis might endanger the approved ideological positions. It is significant that the Eastern European countries, which profess a Marxist ideology, also bar logical positivism from their universities.

65. Willard Van Orman Quine (b. 1908) graduated from Oberlin in 1930, where he majored in mathematics. He wrote a doctoral thesis in logic under Alfred North Whitehead at Harvard. He visited Vienna, studied mathematical logic at Warsaw, and at Prague met Rudolf Carnap, whose work inspired and influenced him. Quine has been the most important influential empiricist in recent American philosophy. His works include Mathematical Logic (1940), Word and Object (1960), Philosophy of Logic (1970), and The Roots of Reference (1973).

66. Ayer, ibid., Chapter IV. In particular, Wittgenstein was in close contact with Schlick and Waismann.

67. While at Cambridge, Susan Stebbing (1885-1943) was a pupil of the logician William Ernest Johnson. From 1913 to 1915 she lectured in philosophy at King's College, London. She became a lecturer at Bedford College, London, in 1915 and a professor in 1933. In London, Stebbing's philosophical development was stimulated by the meetings of the Aristotelian Society, which were often attended by Whitehead, Moore, and Russell. In Philosophy and the Physicists (1937) Stebbing exposed the fallacies, obscurities and mystifications of Sir James Jeans and Sir Arthur Eddington who had argued for idealist views of physics and, consequently, for theism. The Aristotelian Society collected the material for Philosophical Studies: Essays in Memory of L. Susan Stebbing (1948), a volume of essays that contains an appreciation by John Wisdom and a full bibliography of her writings.

68. At the age of eighteen, Frank P. Ramsey (1903-1930) had helped to translate Wittgenstein's Tractatus, and had reviewed the book for Mind. Wishing to meet the author, Ramsey found Wittgenstein in 1923 teaching in a small village school in Lower Austria, and persuaded him to return to Cambridge. As noted, Ramsey is mentioned approvingly in the appendix to the manifesto of the Vienna Circle. References to Ramsey - and his psychoanalysis with Theodor Reik (1888-1969) in Vienna - can be found in Bloomsbury/Freud (1986) edited by P. Meisel and W. Kendrick, a collection of letters written between James and Alix Strachey, during the period of Alix's analysis with Karl Abraham in Berlin, 1924-1925. A collection of Ramsay's papers was published posthumously as The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays (1931), edited by R.B. Braithwaite.
69. John Wisdom (b. 1904) graduated from Cambridge in 1924 and taught philosophy for some years at the University of St. Andrews in Scotland. He returned to Cambridge in 1934 where he was strongly influenced by Wittgenstein. Wisdom accepted the chair of philosophy at Cambridge in 1952. His works include Problems of Mind and Matter (1934), Other Minds (1952), Philosophy and Psychoanalysis (1953), and Paradox and Discovery (1965).

70. Gilbert Ryle (1900-1976) spent the whole of his philosophical career at Oxford. He was editor of Mind from 1947 until 1971. His essays and reviews were published in two volumes in 1971, and are regarded as important contributions to the history of philosophy and the philosophy of logic. His works include Locke on the Human Understanding (1933), The Concept of Mind (1949), and Dilemmas (1954).

71. Hans Reichenbach (1891-1953) attended the universities of Berlin, Munich and Göttingen. In 1915 he obtained his doctorate in philosophy at the University of Erlangen. From 1920 to 1926 he taught at the Technische Hochschule in Stuttgart, from 1926 to 1933 at the University of Berlin, from 1933 to 1938 at the University of Istanbul, and from 1938 to 1953 at the University of California. Reichenbach made important contributions to the study of probability and induction, space, time, geometry, relativity, the foundations of quantum mechanics, scientific laws, and meaning and verifiability. His works include Experience and Prediction (1938), Elements of Symbolic Logic (1947), The Rise of Scientific Philosophy (1951), and Modern Philosophy of Science (1958).

72. The most important members of the Polish group besides Alfred Tarski were Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz (1890-1963), Herbert Feigl (b. 1902), Stanislaw Lesniewski (1886-1939), and Jan Łukasiewicz (1878-1956).

73. The pragmatist movement, founded by Charles Sanders Pierce (1839-1914) includes William James (1842-1910), John Dewey (1859-1952), Clarence Irving Lewis (1883-1964), Ernest Nagel (b. 1901), Nelson Goodman (b. 1906) and Willard Van Orman Quine (b. 1903). It became international in scope and influenced Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller (1864-1937) in England, and Giovanni Papini (1881-1956) in Italy. The close connection between American pragmatism and Viennese positivism is shown by the fact that C.I. Lewis's conception of meaning can be adequately expressed by the Viennese slogan that the meaning of a proposition is its method of verification. This principle is no more than implicit in the manifesto, but it occurs explicitly in Schlick's lectures and in more than one article in Erkenntnis, the journal of the positivists.

74. John Dewey (1857-1952) was born in Burlington, Vermont. He graduated from the University of Vermont and, after a brief period teaching high school, entered Johns Hopkins University in 1882 to read philosophy. Three teachers there had a profound influence on Dewey: Charles S. Pierce, with whom he studied logic; Stanley Hall, with whom he studied experimental psychology; and G.S. Morris, who converted Dewey to Hegelian idealism. The discovery of Hegel came as a kind of deliverance to Dewey: 'Hegel's synthesis of subject and object, matter and spirit, the divine and
the human . . . operated as an immense release, a liberation' (quoted in American Philosophy, edited by M.G. Singer, 1985, p. 70). But the most important period in Dewey's life, educationally, came when he was appointed head of Department of Philosophy and head of the Department of Pedagogy at the University of Chicago. Dewey founded a 'Laboratory School', an elementary school in which he applied his philosophical and educational theories. The 'Laboratory School' became famous and served as a model for educators throughout America. Indeed, the school was a forerunner of the movement known as 'progressive education'. In The School and Society (1900), Dewey presented the theory and aim of the school. During these years in Chicago there was a transition in Dewey's thought from Hegelian idealism to a naturalism and, as he called it, 'instrumentalism'. In 1904, Dewey moved to Columbia University, New York, where he spent the rest of his professional career, renowned throughout the world as a leading representative of pragmatism and 'progressive' education. For a critique of Dewey's philosophy see Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy (1946), Chapter 30. For educational elucidations, see J. Bowen, A History of Western Education (1981) pp. 416-430; W. Boyd, The History of Western Education (1972), tenth edition, pp. 398-407; and L.A. Cremin, The Transformation of the School: Progressivism in American Education, 1876-1957 (1964), pp. 115-126, 135-142, 234-239.

75. Despite the murder of Schlick, Neurath tried to keep the movement in being. He took over Erkenntnis and renamed it The Journal of Unified Science; but only a few numbers appeared. A final congress 'For the unity of science' was held at Girton College, Cambridge, in the summer of 1938. Of the original members of the Circle, only Neurath, Waismann, Frank, and Feigl were present. This was the last occasion on which it made an attempt to function as a group, though individual members, notably Carnap and Godel, continued to produce important work.

76. Feigl, Frank, Menger, Godel and Carnap escaped to America. Neurath, Waismann, Bergmann, Natkin and Radakovic fled to England. The Berlin group also escaped: Reichenbach, Van Mises and Carl Hempel to the U.S.A. Of the Poles, Kotarbinski and Ajdukiewicz remained in Poland and survived the war, Lukasiewicz was sheltered by his pupil Scholz at Munster, and subsequently became a professor in Dublin, and Tarski settled in America (Ayer, Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, pp. 139-140).

77. There is an unpublished biography of Edmond Holmes by E. Sharwood-Smith (see Gordon and White, Philosophers as Educational Reformers, p. 195 and p. 287, note 6).


79. Ibid., p. 147.

80. Holmes 'retired' early as a result of the resentment caused by the Holmes-Morant Circular of 1911. This Circular deplored the fact that local education authorities had appointed 123 inspectors of their own, of whom 'not more than two or three have had the antecedents which were usually looked for in candidates for Junior Inspectorships - namely that they had been educated first at a public school, then at Oxford or Cambridge' (quoted in G.S.
Osborne, *Scottish and English Schools*, 1966, p. 39). These local inspectors were promoted from the ranks of elementary school teachers who were 'as a rule uncultured and imperfectly educated', and 'creatures of tradition and routine' (ibid., p. 39). See also P. Gordon, 'The Holmes–Morant Circular of 1911: A Note', in *Journal of Educational Administration and History*, volume 10, No. 1, January 1978.

81. In 1910 Beatrice Ensor became the first woman inspector appointed by the Glamorgan County Council. A few years later she was appointed His Majesty's Inspector of Schools, concerned mainly with Domestic Science. During the years 1910–1915 she became sharply critical of the practices in many schools. She read Edmond Holmes' writings with appreciation, knowing that his model school of 'what might be' was to be found in Sompting, Sussex. Mrs. Ensor formed a group of teachers within the Theosophical Society to study the changes required in education. This group became the Theosophical Fraternity in Education with a basic belief in the goodness and spirituality of human nature. From the Theosophical Fraternity emerged the New Education Fellowship. In 1925 Mrs. Ensor resigned as director of the Theosophical Educational Trust after differences on policy and, with her friend, Miss King, founded a new school, Frensham Heights.

82. Norman MacMunn (d. 1925) was a teacher of modern languages who developed a partnership system between pairs of pupils learning French. MacMunn was inspired by Homer Lane's *Little Commonwealth*: 'Surely every logical and progressive teacher should be tempted by such victories of the principle of liberty to remark: "Either these young criminals are better than my boys, or my boys are not quite so incapable of self-direction as I have been taught to believe"' (MacMunn, *A Path to Freedom in the School*, 1914, pp. 7–8). MacMunn practised many of Lane's principles at Tiptree Hall in Essex, and although the school did not last long, he never lost faith in the universal validity of Lane's ideas: 'From the commonwealth colony for young delinquents to the commonwealth school for normal boys is scarcely a step at all' (MacMunn, *A Child's Path to Freedom*, 1926, p. 149).

83. Percy Nunn (1870–1944) was Vice-Principal of London Day Training College from 1905–1922, when he became its Director. It became the University of London Institute of Education in 1935. Nunn's major work is *Education: Its Data and First Principles* (1920).

84. For an account of the New Education Fellowship see W. Boyd and W. Rawson *The Story of the New Education* (1965). For a comprehensive record of the Fifth World Conference of the New Education Fellowship held at Elsinore, Denmark, in August 1929, see *Towards A New Education* (1930), edited by W. Boyd.

85. 'New Realism' arose at the turn of the twentieth century in opposition to the Idealist doctrines that the known or perceived object is dependent for its existence on the act of knowing, and that the immediately perceived object is a state of the perceiving mind. The Austrian philosophers, Franz Brentano and Alexius Meinong first enunciated the cardinal tenet of this new realism: that what the mind knows or perceives exists independently of the acts of knowing and perceiving. Developing mainly as a polemic against Idealism, this new realism was represented in the works of

86. Percy Nunn, *Education: Its Data and First Principles* (1920), p. 3. The references to Hegel here and in note 79 appeared in the first edition only; they were deleted from subsequent editions.

87. Ibid., p. 3 (first edition only).

88. Ibid., p. 252 (footnote).

89. Ibid., p. 40.

90. Ibid., p. 18.

91. Ibid., p. 249.

92. Ibid., p. 249.

93. Ibid., p. 274.

94. Ibid., p. 263.

95. Ibid., p. 223.

96. Ibid., p. 99.


98. Russell left the school in 1932, but Dora continued to run it until 1943 when war-time stringencies and evacuations made its existence impossible. Because of the world-wide fame of Russell, the importance of Dora's role in running Beacon Hill has been seriously underestimated. For her account of the school see her autobiography, *The Tamarisk Tree*, volume 1, 1975, chapter 10, and volume 2, 1980, passim. For Bertrand Russell's account of the school see his *Autobiography* (1978 edition), pp. 387-391.


104. Homer Lane wrote to J. H. Simpson (who later became head of Rendcomb) in 1916: 'If you care to follow this idea up further get a book *Papers on Psychoanalysis* by Ernest Jones published by Bailliere, Tindall and Cox . . . You will find the gist of Freud's psychology in this very readable book, and see much in it that justifies the Commonwealth' (quoted in David Wills, *Homer Lane: A Biography*, 1964, p. 158). Lane's confidence in
psychoanalysis as an educational panacea remained undiminished. In a paper read to the Little Commonwealth Committee after the Rawlinson Enquiry of 1918 into his alleged misconduct with pupils, Lane said: 'Does your boy hate arithmetic? He can be made to love it by analytical pedagogy. Is he rude and ungracious? It is conflict easily removable. Is he purposely annoying? He is suffering from an inferiority complex. His libido can be detached from its unwholesome goal. Does he bite his nails? Fidget in his chair? . . . (quoted in Wills, ibid., p. 262). Homer Lane's *Talks to Parents and Teachers* (1928) contains many examples of Freudian explanations used to justify his educational philosophy.

105. MacMunn's techniques, largely intuitive and pragmatic, were later rationalised in pseudo-Freudian terms: 'Psychic sickness is always more complicated than physical, and always dates further back. It is all traceable to early suppressions. X first tries the shock of extreme gentleness and generally this is enough' (*A Path to Freedom in the School*, 1914, p. 115). Although there is no evidence that MacMunn attempted to analyse the boys himself, he believed strongly in the value of psychoanalysis: 'The believers in a great extension of freedom for the child owe much gratitude to the new study of psychoanalysis. Not only have the evils of repression been traced and relieved by the removal in a clinic of nearly all the suppressions which nearly all of the old-time and many of the present-time schoolmasters have considered it their duty to encompass, but we are probably on the eve of discoveries which will help to provide a rational analytical technique which can be passed on for use by teachers' (ibid., p. 7).

106. When A. S. Neill was in the army in Wiltshire in 1916 he visited the Little Commonwealth: 'That weekend was probably the most important milestone of my life. Lane sat up till the early morning telling me of his cases. I had been groping for some philosophy of education but had no knowledge of psychology. Lane introduced me to Freud' (A. S. Neill, 'My Scholastic Life - 2', *Id, Journal of Summerhill Society*, October 1960). Neill's introduction to Freudian theory had a crucial influence on the subsequent educational philosophy of Summerhill: 'Freud showed that every neurosis is founded on sex repression. I said, "I'll have a school in which there will be no sex repression". Freud said that the unconscious was infinitely more important and more powerful than the conscious. I said, "In my school we won't censurate, punish, moralise. We will allow every child to live according to his deep impulses" (A. S. Neill, *Summerhill*, 1968, p. 257). Two new publications appeared recently: Jonathan Croall, *Neill of Summerhill, The Permanent Rebel*, 1983, and Jonathan Croall (ed.), *All The Best, Neill: Letters from Summerhill*, 1983.

107. Percy Nunn used psychoanalysis to support his 'hormic' psychology: '... we must note that psychological investigations, conducted by the method called psychoanalysis, have thrown a flood of light upon the whole question of hormic organisation. They have shown, on the one hand, how large a part is played in our conscious behaviour by hormic factors of which we may be at the time utterly unconscious - that is, that our conative processes are rarely purely conative, but almost always embrace important components belonging to the lower strata of our bafflingly complex organism. On the other hand, they have illuminated in a striking way the continuity of our conative development, showing that the adult
mind is, so to speak, but the visible surface of a living structure whose deeper layers are hormic elements dating from infancy or even beyond, and liable in certain circumstances still to break free from the systems into which they have become merged and to claim unfettered expression' (Educational Data and First Principles, 1920, p. 40). Nunn warned, however, that psychoanalysis is too 'scientific' to be used by amateurs: "Psychoanalysis is by no means an instrument for a layman. Nevertheless, it is to the results of psychoanalysis that we must look to find methods, at once truly scientific and truly humane, of dealing with the moral lapses of young people' (ibid., p. 252 footnote).

108. In her autobiography, The Tamarisk Tree, Dora Russell recalled the 'liberating effect' of Freud's theories: 'Although going to your psychiatrist may now have become common in the United States, it is still not easy to explain fully the liberating effect of Freud's theories when they first became known. There was a good deal of amateur psychoanalysing; doctors and others went through a long and arduous analysis at great financial expense, in order to understand and/or treat patients. People would urge their friends to get 'analysed' in order to recover from traumas of their childhood; it became the fashion at least to get rid of your inhibitions and persuade others to do likewise' (ibid., 1980, volume 2, pp. 21-22). Dora continued that Freudian doctrine led her to 'consider what were the primary biological motives of human beings and how far these were suppressed or distorted by the highly intellectual concepts that dominated our education of individuals, and regulated our increasingly mechanical society' (ibid., p. 23). Bertrand Russell, too, was influenced by Freud and admitted: 'There is much in the detail of psychoanalysis which I find fantastic, and not supported by adequate evidence. But the general method appears to me very important, and essential to the creation of right methods of moral training' (On Education: Especially in Early Childhood, 1926, p. 35).

109. Ernest Jones and other British psychoanalysts did not approve of Homer Lane's 'wild' Freudianism (see Chapter 1, note 173) and they challenged him at public meetings (D. Wills, Homer Lane, 1964, pp. 200-201).

110. Neill reviewed Freud's Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis for New Society (April 8, 1971) and rejected Freud's suggestion that the child 'must learn to control his instincts... accordingly education must inhibit, forbid and suppress'. The solution Neill preferred was Reichian prophylaxis and an education based on the motto 'Thou shall not obey', a method and a motto which he admitted 'old Sigmund would not have accepted'. Neill met Wilhelm Reich in 1935 and his admiration remained constant for the rest of his life. Neill wrote to the editor of Freedom in December 1966: 'Those who were nearest to him thought him a great psychologist, an absolutely honest scientist, a wonderful sexologist; we thought him the only successor to Freud' (quoted in All the Best, Neill: Letters from Summerhill, edited by J. Croall, 1983, p. 110). But Neill finally had to admit that Reichian therapy, too, did not have all the answers to the problem of delinquent behaviour: 'Reich did not have the whole truth. I told him I knew oldish men and women who never had sex in their lives, but were happy and charitable and doing good work. And I can't see
the connection between genital suppression and a boy of ten breaking 32 of my windows. Meaning that at the end of my life I know bugger-all...'(Croall, ibid., p. 117).

111. By 1981 the total overseas born population in Great Britain was 3,359,825 which represents 6.27% of the total resident population (1981 Census, London, 1983). In Strathclyde Region alone the numbers of immigrant pupils have grown from 3,698 in 1981 to 5,156 in 1985 (figures from Trevor Corner, International and Multicultural Educational Unit, Department of Education, University of Glasgow).

112. The recognition of the necessity to plan a curriculum which would incorporate the needs of a multi-cultural British society is evinced by three major Reports of recent years - The Plowden Report: Children and their Primary Schools (1967); The Bullock Report: A Language for Life (1975); and The Warnock Report: Special Educational Needs (1978). Indeed, Plowden devotes an entire chapter to this problem (Chapter 6: 'Children of Immigrants').

113. Ayer, Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, p. 140.

114. Ibid., p. 140.

115. Ibid., p. 140.


117. Ibid., p. 148.

118. My contention of a similarity of philosophical outlook between psychoanalysis and idealism has been fortified - to my surprise - by a paper written by Richard Wollheim, Professor of Philosophy at Columbia University, New York, in a recent publication, Rationalism, Empiricism and Idealism (1986), edited by Anthony Kenny. In his paper, 'The Good Self and the Bad Self: The Moral Psychology of British Idealism and the English School of Psychoanalysis Compared', Wollheim argued that F.H. Bradley and Melanie Klein made a joint contribution to the understanding of moral phenomena.
EPILOGUE

And so I have reached the end, the end of a personal search which began with the appearance of the Scottish Memorandum in 1965; a search, always exhilarating and illuminating, which probed the puzzling anonymity of the Scottish 'revolution', crossed educational frontiers to follow a few, scattered clues from Lady Plowden and her committee of savants, entered the strange, complex and fascinating world of psychoanalysis in an attempt to capture the educational essence of its therapeutic appeal, and ended with the philosophical lineage of idealism stretching back in time from the present day to the mists of Hellenic antiquity.

What are my feelings now? A mixture of emotions to be sure; but, above all else, surprise, disappointment and anger. Surprise and disappointment that British teachers who, for the most part, do care about what they are doing, should become so easily, and so effectively, unreflecting agents of a new kind of mystification. But anger, above all; anger that young children, intelligent, sentient, trusting, inquisitive, helpless, human beings, should be treated as if they are no better than primitive organisms to be 'conditioned' by a 'superior', invisible authority into preordained ways of feeling, behaving and thinking. For make no mistake about it, the educational and social philosophy of the Scottish Primary Memorandum sets out to do precisely that:

The school routine, the organisation of the classroom, the teachers' methods, the content of the programme of work, the conduct of school meals and other social occasions, and particularly the outlook and example of the head teacher and the teachers, all help to condition the attitudes and behaviour of the pupils.¹

This is disquieting, indeed, and a complete negation of the warning issued by the Scottish Advisory Council in 1946:

The danger of imposing an artificial pattern of life applies with equal force to the State. Pupils must not be 'conditioned' to any set and predetermined ways of thinking and acting. They will have to live their own lives in circumstances we can but dimly guess. They should therefore by the encouragement of sturdiness of body and mind be made fit for any emergency.²
The Advisory Council, of course, was writing one year after the final defeat of Hitler's Third Reich, and the memory of his evil was still fresh in people's minds. The 1965 Memorandum was published twenty years after the holocaust had ended, and perhaps the lesson of how Hitler and his 'educators' had manipulated the minds of an entire nation had been forgotten. This is not to suggest, of course, that the Scottish Education Department has any such evil intention for Scottish schoolchildren. But its advocacy of 'conditioning' as an educational strategy to be used by teachers does suggest a view of education which regards children as bits of plasticine to be patterned to suit the wishes of adults, and is sinister in its implications.

The Scottish Education Department reifies society and the values of adults, that is, regards them in non-human terms as if they are facts of nature. It is not, of course, being argued that an objective world does not exist; rather, that the reification of this social world is not always recognised. This kind of mystification implies that we are able to forget our own authorship of the human world, and the Marxian dialectic between us, as producers, and our products are reversed in consciousness. We, the producers of our world, come to regard ourselves as the products, and we lose the awareness that, however objectivated, our social world was made by us, and can be remade by us.
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