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The Anglo-Norman Aristocracy under Divided
Lordship, 1087-1106:
A Social and Political Study

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Abstract

This thesis examines the political and social responses of the Anglo-Norman aristocracy between 1087 and 1106 to the issue of divided lordship. The central theme is the importance of the concept of political legitimacy in shaping the political culture and actions of the aristocracy during this period. The exclusion of significant sections of the cross-Channel aristocracy from the consultation process in selecting a king in 1087 and 1100, ran contrary to the accepted political norms and created doubts over the legitimacy of Rufus' and Henry I's regimes that could be revived at moments of crisis. This found expression in the support given to Robert Curthose's challenge for the English throne in 1088 and 1101, but also in open rebellion in 1095. However, the limitations of violence as a means of effecting long-term change necessitated a search for a negotiated political settlement that would open the way for Normandy and England to enjoy co-existence as a permanent solution to the problem of divided lordship. This approach locates the Anglo-Norman aristocracy firmly within the recent scholarship of the early and late medieval aristocracy, where political discourse is analysed primarily in terms of succession and legitimacy. Therefore, at the centre of this analysis are the contemporary and near-contemporary narrative sources, which display a firm understanding of contemporary theories of kingship and the politics. When brought into focus with charter evidence, specific aspects of the wider socio-political culture of the aristocracy, in particular religious patronage, marital strategies and inheritance patterns, can then be read as both responses to the wider question of the succession, and also as a commentary on contemporary politics.
Acknowledgments

The number of people who have helped me in various ways during the course of the last seven years is enormous. I hope that a general expression of thanks will suffice. There are, however, some debts that require specific acknowledgment. To the librarians of the University of Glasgow, particularly the inter-library loan service, the National Library of Scotland and the Institute of Historical Research in London, I offer thanks for speedily responding to requests and queries with unfailing courtesy. This thesis was written while I was registered as a student in the Medieval Area of the Department of History in the University of Glasgow. The University granted me a scholarship for the first three years of research and funded my attendance at the 2003 Battle Conference. Within the Medieval Area, all members of staff have shown an interest in my research and encouraged me. However, special mention should be made of Drs Matthew Strickland and Stuart Airlie, and the late Professor John Thompson, all of whom have been gracious with their time, expertise and encouragement on numerous occasions. The footnotes to this thesis are a record of scholars in Glasgow and beyond who have been kind enough to answer specific queries in emails and letters.

There are other, more personal debts that deserve acknowledgment. Dr Stephen Marritt has been a source of advice, encouragement and friendship. George Hope and Eileen O'Sullivan have been willing sounding boards for many of my ideas. Lucy Marten-Holden of the University of East Anglia has had a profound and decisive influence on many aspects of this thesis. Kevin Bailey has been a constant source of support and encouragement, and together with his wife, a congenial host on research trips to London. My mother and aunt
have helped me financially in funding research trips away from home and the purchase of a laptop.

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<tr>
<td>AN</td>
<td>Annales de Normandie</td>
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<td>ANS</td>
<td>Anglo-Norman Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>BIHR</td>
<td>Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research</td>
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<td>BL</td>
<td>British Library</td>
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<td>BN</td>
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<td>BSAN</td>
<td>Bulletin de la Société des Antiquaires de Normandie</td>
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<td><em>English Historical Documents</em></td>
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<td>EME</td>
<td><em>Early Medieval Europe</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>English Lawsuits</td>
<td><em>English Lawsuits from William I to Richard I</em>, ed. R.C. van Caenegem, 2 vols, Selden Society 56-57 (1990-91)</td>
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<td>EYC</td>
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<td>HR</td>
<td><em>Historical Research</em></td>
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<td>HSJ</td>
<td><em>Haskins Society Journal</em></td>
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<td>JMH</td>
<td><em>Journal of Medieval History</em></td>
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<td>Livre Blanc</td>
<td><em>Cartulaire de L’ Abbaye de Saint-Martin de Sées ou Livre Blanc</em>, Bibliothèque de l’évêché de Sées.</td>
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<td>PBA</td>
<td><em>Proceedings of the British Academy</em></td>
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<td>TRHS</td>
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<td>VCH</td>
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Introduction

This thesis examines the political and social responses of the Anglo-Norman aristocracy between 1087 and 1106 to the problem of divided lordship. An initial justification for a study of this nature is quite simply that despite the enormous amount that has been written on the aristocracy in the last thirty-five years, no systematic and detailed investigation of the aristocracy’s response to the partition of England and Normandy has been attempted since John Le Patourel put forward his arguments for a politically and culturally homogeneous post-Conquest aristocracy. 1 In an article written as part of the novo-centenary celebrations of 1966 he wrote: 'Historians sometimes write as though they were thinking in terms of an English baronage and a Norman baronage......On the contrary, there was one, homogeneous Norman-French baronial society, whose interests extended through the length and breadth of the Norman 'empire'......in such a way that it is impossible to draw lines between them. This is why the Conqueror’s division of his dominions in 1087 created so much difficulty; and the politics of 1087 to 1106 can only be understood against the background of a divided royal family and this ‘one baronial society’.'2

Le Patourel expanded his theme in his Stenton Lecture of 1970 and gave it its fullest expression in 1976 with the publication of The Norman Empire. 3 The essential logic behind the creation of cross-Channel estates meant that the Anglo-Norman aristocracy, ‘with interests actual or potential in kingdom and duchy, must have been every bit as

1 The most recent discussions have been part of a wider analysis and can be found in, Green, Aristocracy, 274-83; R. Bartlett, England Under the Norman and Angevin Kings 1075-1225 (Oxford, 2000), 4-21; Crouch, The Normans, 117-28, 130-5, 165-9.
3 J. Le Patourel, Normandy and England 1066-1144 (Reading, 1971); The Norman Empire, (Oxford, 1976)
much concerned for the continuing unity under one ruler as the royal family itself.\textsuperscript{4}

With these concepts formed, Le Patourel was able to present a systematic and coherent view of the Norman aristocracy's response to partition after 1087 and provided a strong theoretical framework to explore the politics of the late eleventh and twelfth centuries.\textsuperscript{3}

Other scholars, most notably the late Professor C. Warren Hollister, enthusiastically took up Le Patourel's thesis. In a series of important articles in the 1970s and 80s, Hollister provided an extended analysis of the Anglo-Norman aristocracy's relations with the Conqueror's sons, and took the notion of centripetal forces driving the integration of England and Normandy a stage further by arguing for the creation of an Anglo-Norman \textit{regnum}.\textsuperscript{6}

Le Patourel was not alone in seeing the politics of the period between 1087 and 1106 defined primarily by the tension between political loyalty and the distribution of cross-Channel estates. Professor J. C. Holt produced some of the most influential essays on Anglo-Norman politics. Starting with 'Politics and Property' in the early 1970s, and including his Royal Historical Society Presidential Addresses of the early 1980s, Holt produced a corpus of work that examined the political culture of the governing elite from the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries, discussed primarily through the medium of the law and customs that governed the handling of their landed property. For Holt, the inherent instability in English politics after 1066 was largely due to the uncertainties that

\textsuperscript{4} Le Patourel, \textit{Norman Empire}, 197.


\textsuperscript{6} Hollister's articles are readily accessible in an edition of collected essays, \textit{Monarchy, Magnates and Institutions in the Anglo-Norman World}. In particular see, 'Normandy, France and the Anglo-Norman Regnum', 17-57; 'Anglo-Norman Civil War: 1101', 76-96; 'Magnates and "Curiales" in Early Norman England', 97-115.

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surrounded succession to acquired or inherited lands, especially when applied to the succession to England and Normandy. 

Though persuasively written and a major feat of scholarship in terms of the breadth and depth of ideas, Le Patourel recognised that his views would prove controversial. He was at pains to point out that he conceived of The Norman Empire as an ‘essay in reinterpretation’. As such, though Le Patourel’s impact on modern historiography has been profound, it needs to be stressed that he has been more influential in stimulating debate, rather than actually carrying the debate. The general response has been one of dissent. Leading the vanguard have been Professors David Bates and Judith Green. In the late 1980s, Bates gave a comprehensive reassessment of Le Patourel’s ideas, together with those of Hollister, through a detailed critique of The Norman Empire. Among his criticisms, Bates stressed that recent research on regional aristocracies showed that they operated for the most part independently of cross-Channel politics and royal and ducal government. Bates also questioned the notions of ‘Unity’ and ‘Assimilation’; the two chapter headings Le Patourel used to analyse the relationship between England and Normandy, noting a ‘precocious’ administrative development in England and Normandy, but arguing that they were both were built upon significantly different bases.

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7 The essays in question can be found in Colonial England.
8 Le Patourel, Norman Empire, Introduction, 5.
Concurrent with Bates’ critique, Professor Judith Green questioned what she termed the ‘current orthodoxies of the late 1980s; integration and centripetal forces’, though there may be some dispute as to whether integration and centripetal forces were, in fact, the current orthodoxies of the late 1980s. Green concluded her critique by noting that ‘for aristocratic society as a whole, the multi-faceted relationship between England and Normandy was evolving over a longer time scale and was conditioned by factors other than strictly political.’

The wider corpus of historiography in the 1990s saw further erosion of Le Patourel’s vision of a culturally and politically homogeneous aristocracy. A very selective bibliography would highlight Professor David Crouch’s important article on the county societies of Leicestershire and Warwickshire. Crouch concluded that Norman immigration into these two counties had tailed off by the early twelfth century, and that the county elites had rapidly become local in their outlook and aspirations, essentially an embellishment of an argument that he had first advanced in the early 1980s.

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13 J. A. Green, ‘Unity and Disunity in the Anglo-Norman State’, *HR*, 63 (1989), 115-34. While Bates and Green were the first to provide detailed and explicit criticisms of Le Patourel and Hollister’s arguments in the late 1980s, the lineage of these criticisms can be traced in their work to the early 1980s. In *Normandy Before 1066*, Bates noted, ‘despite his immense achievements in governing Normandy...even William [the Conqueror] had not been able to detach the duchy from the political framework which was eventually to be turned into feudal dependence on the French king.’ D. Bates, *Normandy Before 1066* (London, 1982), 251. More explicit criticisms can be found in, D. Bates, ‘The earliest Norman writs’, *EHR*, 100 (1985), 266-84; and a review of Hollister’s collected essays, *Monarchy, Magnates and Institutions, Albion*, 19 (1987), 592-3. Professor Frank Barlow took issue with many of Hollister’s ideas, particularly his view on the nature of the aristocracy and its relationship with William Rufus, Barlow, *Rufus*, 209-213. Arguably, Professor Green had, by 1989, produced enough studies of her own to shake up any supposed orthodoxies. In particular see, ‘Lords of the Norman Vexin’, *War and Government in the Middle Ages: Essays in Honour of J. O. Prestwich*, ed. J.C. Holt and J. Gillingham (Woodbridge, 1984), 47-61; ‘King Henry I and the aristocracy of Normandy’, *La France Anglaise au Moyen Age, Actes de 111e congrès national des sociétés savantes* (Poitiers, 1986), 161-73.

14 Green, ‘Unity and Disunity’, 134.


Cownie looked at the issue of religious patronage and the nature of the honor. She concluded that 'honorial society was by no means entirely centrifugal or centripetal in its nature, both forces were evidently at work.' Analysis of burial practices, the adoption of toponymics and the role of women, have all contributed to a framework of discussion, where the diversity of the Anglo-Norman aristocracy’s experience in England is stressed.

Throughout this activity, there has always been an awareness of the need for further research into the nature of the Anglo-Norman aristocracy, something Le Patourel recognised in 1966, when noting that the subject still awaited its Namier. Nearly forty years on and the work of modern scholars, especially Katharine Keats-Rohan, have arguably gone some way to satisfy this demand. Yet the one striking feature of the way in which the aristocracy has been discussed during the last thirty-five years is the implicit acceptance of an Anglo-Norman aristocratic political culture that was defined in the 1970s and 1980s, and owes it shape and structure to the to the English tradition of administrative, legal and constitutional history. As such, many of the political events that occupy such a central space in contemporary and near-contemporary accounts, such as

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18 Cownie, 'Religious Patronage', 140.
21 See especially, K. S. B. Keats-Rohan, *Domesday People*.
22 Cf. M. Strickland, 'Against the Lord’s anointed: aspects of warfare and baronial rebellion in England and Normandy, 1075-1265', *Law and Government in Medieval England and Normandy*, ed. G. Garnett and J. Hudson (Cambridge, 1994), 54-79. 'Whatever the underlying disputes that led elements of the baronage to resort to arms, be it grievances over land, title or the disbursement of patronage, a desire for enhanced local autonomy, or support for a royal cadet or other dynastic rival, the failure of the political process and reversion to the mechanisms of war confronted opponents of the crown with a formidable series of dilemmas.'
as the rebellion of 1095, struggle to be understood or even accorded the importance that they deserve.

Since the 1970s, the theoretical and methodological framework within which medieval political discourse is viewed has changed radically. The influence of anthropological and cultural studies is all too apparent in the work of scholars who stress the ability of the aristocracy to engage with complex political and legal problems. Nor is the influence of religion in shaping political culture and kingship ignored. This contrasts sharply with the more traditional view of Anglo-Norman politics and political culture, which has been heavily influenced by an administrative ideology of kingship. This influence can be seen to have reached its zenith in the formation of the wider concept of a ‘tenurial crisis’ to explain the apparent instability in English political life in the century after 1066.

Studies on the political behaviour of the wider western European political elite have had a significantly different emphasis to their Anglo-Norman counterparts. On one level, it is important to recognise that the very foundations of political power remained the same: the control of land and office. Property retains its potential for understanding


contemporary politics and political action. Yet analysis of the early and late medieval aristocratic political culture is defined primarily in terms that reflect contemporary sources, where discussions, disagreements and often violence turn on the axis of political legitimacy, and utilise analytical tools drawn from anthropology and sociology to explore the aristocracy as political actors. The dangers of insularity have been recognised, particularly by scholars of Anglo-Saxon England, and many aspects of English political life and kingship before 1066 are now firmly placed within a continental, post-Carolingian political and religious world.

The process of refining the framework of analysis for Anglo-Norman political culture is already under way. The work of George Garnett in relation to the importance of political ideas to pre-Conquest Normandy and post-Conquest England, and the exploration by Mark Philpott of the importance of canon law to the development of the English state, are but two examples of scholarship which could have a potentially dramatic impact on the way that Anglo-Norman aristocratic political behaviour is perceived, especially in stressing the intellectual context in which politics were conducted. Mention should also be made of the work of John Gillingham and Matthew Strickland.

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Viewed from a different angle, David Crouch has recently begun to re-examine the aristocracy’s response to Stephen’s reign. He has argued forcefully that the ruling elite was finding it impossible not to view the issue of the succession to the English throne in intellectual terms. Crouch argued that William of Malmesbury’s *Historia Novella* unambiguously revealed the arguments that circulated amongst the aristocracy on the respective merits of Stephen and Mathilda as rulers. His conclusion stressed that tenurial explanations of rebellion failed to sufficiently explain the actions of the aristocracy in engaging in rebellion. In other words, Crouch has suggested that the Anglo-Norman aristocracy of the mid twelfth century reacted and discussed the issue of succession in a way that the Carolingian or late medieval aristocracy would recognise. The obvious questions to ask therefore, and which this thesis attempts to answer, is how far the aristocracy of the 1090s and early 1100s thought in similar terms over similar issues; how far these concerns influenced their actions; what attempts were made to achieve a lasting political settlement and how the aristocracy adapted to changing political circumstances.

To answer these questions, this thesis is divided into two sections. Part One is a series of largely self-selecting case studies that examine the major political events between 1087 and 1106 through the careers and actions of those men who were the most intimately involved in them and often closest to the centre of political power. The case studies begin with the role of the sheriffs in the rebellions of 1088 and 1101. Chapter Four is devoted to Robert de Mowbray and the revolt of 1095. Chapter Five considers the role of Robert de Bellême in the crisis of 1100-1102. Chapter Six, the last chapter in this section, considers the career of William of Mortain and his relations with Henry up to the Battle of Tinchebray in 1106.

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At this stage it is crucially important to stress that this thesis is not written in opposition to one of the major trends in the historiography of the last thirty years: the notion of heterogeneity. Varied political, tenurial, social and geographical interests and ambitions can define a heterogeneous aristocracy. Many of the factors that underpin the notion of heterogeneity can be seen in influencing the actions of these men at the centre of the case studies. For example, the support for Rufus and Henry I from the men who held the office of sheriff in 1088 and 1101 indicates that they regarded a Curthose kingship and the retrenchment of former lords and patrons as inimical to their interests. Their actions in supporting Rufus and Henry have been variously interpreted within a framework defined by the notion of the Conquest providing unparalleled opportunities for ‘new men’ to rise up the social ladder to previously unimagined levels of power and wealth. Likewise, no one should doubt that calculations of vested self-interest did not influence the actions of Robert de Mowbray, Robert de Bellême or William of Mortain.

The point of departure for this thesis, however, is the contention that a further layer of analysis must be considered to understand the actions of these men and the wider political discourse associated with the dispute for the English throne, which found expression in the accounts of contemporary and near-contemporary chroniclers. Rather than a framework based upon the notion of a tenurial crisis to explain the aspects of the political instability of the 1090s and early 1100s, it might be more appropriate to think in terms of a crisis of political legitimacy. In essence, the argument advanced in this thesis is that the partition of England and Normandy in 1087 created two separate cross-Channel centres of power and legitimacy. Partition was clearly counter to the political

preferences of many members of the cross-Channel elite who for a variety of reasons would have preferred a Curthose kingship. Yet crucially, the means by which Rufus and Henry were chosen as kings saw substantial sections of the senior cross-Channel excluded from that process and ran counter to the accepted values and norms of political behaviour, where consultation was needed if a king could claim to be a legitimate ruler. As such, many members of the aristocracy harboured doubts over the legitimacy of both Rufus' and Henry's kingship. On occasion these doubts expressed themselves in support for Robert Curthose's claim to the throne, but also, and as will be argued in Chapter Four, in political upheaval and violence unconnected to Robert Curthose, but firmly rooted in the politics of legitimacy.

Part One of this thesis therefore begins with a chapter devoted to the aristocracy's attitude towards the English successions of 1087 and 1100 and an exploration of the values that governed the succession. The thrust of current debate has centred upon whether the transmission of the English crown was governed by customary aristocratic inheritance practices, based upon the distinction between acquisitions and patrimonies. Almost certainly this is something of a red herring. For example, Majorie Chibnall has demonstrated how William of Poitiers constructed a detailed legal argument in the *Gesta Guillelmi* to support the Conqueror's claim to the English kingship in 1066, which had to be proved and just 'by every law known to be learned'. William wrote with a firm understanding of the contemporary law and politics. Therefore, the argument presented in Chapter One is that contemporary and twelfth century writers had as firm an understanding of contemporary politics and kingship as William of Poitiers. Their

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accounts of the circumstances of Rufus' and Henry's accession, together with those of the political crises of the 1090s and 1100s, reflect the contemporary disputes over the succession of one of Conqueror's sons to the English kingship, based not upon aristocratic succession customs but legal arguments rooted in canon law that emphasised the role of the aristocracy in the decision making process if a king was to have a claim of political legitimacy.

Part Two of this thesis contains two chapters that are broadly defined as strategies of coping, though in essence they are much more than this. A further point of departure for this thesis is to suggest that those most intimately affected by the political instability generated after 1087 were perfectly capable of contemplating the permanent political division of England and Normandy as a viable and workable solution to that problem. To that end, a key component of analysis will be a reappraisal of the peace settlements of 1091 and 1101, the Treaties of Rouen and Winchester. The terms of these treaties make distinctly uncomfortable reading for those advocating the centripetal relationship between England and Normandy. Le Patourel regarded the settlement of 1091 as an 'interesting experiment, made at the time when the political and social implications of the Norman conquest and colonization of England were only beginning to be understood.' Le Patourel, Norman Empire, 198.

Hollister dismissed the settlement of 1101 as an anti-climactic 'truce'. Hollister, 'Anglo-Norman Civil War', MMII, 77.

Neither judgement gave the settlements their due importance. Both treaties need to be viewed as part of the central narrative for this period and constitute the major effort on the part of the aristocracy to solve the problem of instability, based not upon the preservation of England and Normandy as a single cross-Channel political structure, but upon separation and co-existence. More than this, however, the accounts of the

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35 Le Patourel, Norman Empire, 198.
36 Hollister, 'Anglo-Norman Civil War', MMII, 77.
negotiations surrounding the treaties and the terms of the treaties reflect the very nature of the political problems faced by the aristocracy and the capacity of the cross-Channel aristocracy to engage in a complex political discourse and arrive at potential solutions.

Consideration of this allows the introduction into the debate of a different historiographical theme that has so far not affected the discussion of the Anglo-Norman aristocracy; the concepts of the ‘Feudal Revolution’. At its broadest, this offers an interpretative framework that acknowledges political change and the recourse to violence, yet also the need for conflict resolution and the peaceful co-existence of legitimate centres of power that might exercise overlapping claims on the loyalties of a trans-regional aristocracy. The upheaval of the 1090s and early 1100s, though on occasion dramatic, should therefore not be seen as lying outside the political culture or experience of the aristocracy; or that it necessarily presented problems to the aristocracy that they were not equipped intellectually or with the practical experience to negotiate. Indeed, when all the evidence is combined with the concepts of political ritual and ceremony as a vehicle to explore the issue, a set of expectations on the conduct of politics and the rights and prerogatives of the aristocracy emerge to take centre stage.

The final chapter explores the wider activities of the aristocracy during this period. The evidence suggests that the aristocracy was capable of rapidly adapting to the new political situation created after 1087. The political division of England and Normandy

37 The literature on this topic is vast. However, note should be taken of, T. N. Bisson, "The "Feudal Revolution"", Past and Present, 142 (1994), 6-42. The interplay of aristocratic violence and social change has proved controversial; see D. Barthélémy, S. D. White, T. Reuter, C. Wickham and T. N. Bisson, Debates: The "Feudal Revolution"Past and Present, 152 (1996), 196-223; 155, (1997), 177-225. The wider literature of La mutation de l'an mil is vast. Of particular relevance in this context is, D. Barthélémy, La société dans le comté de Vendôme de l'an mil au XIVe siècle (Paris 1993); La mutation de l'an mil: a-t-elle eu lieu? Servage et chevalerie dans la France des x et Xle siècles (Paris, 1997); P. A. Stafford, "La mutation familiale": a Suitable Case for Caution", ed. J. Hill and M. Swan, The Community, the Family and the Saint (Turnhout, 1998), 103-25. An overview of the existing literature and debate can
did not mean a break in other cross-Channel links. Marriages continued to be contracted and religious patronage also continued, though both need to be integrated into the wider political narrative in order to understand the changes that took place between 1087 and 1106. Moreover, they both serve as a vehicle with the potential to chart the perceptions of contemporary politics by those who gave endowments and contracted marriages, as the varied political and social interests of the aristocratic families involved dictated.

Consideration must also be given to the growing distinction between acquisitions and patrimonies within aristocratic inheritance practices. The proliferation of divided inheritances after 1087 suggests that the Conqueror’s actions may have laid the foundations within which this practice could develop from an evolving customary distinction in Normandy before 1066 into something more tangible. Indeed, the need to mitigate the effects of a divided political structure is likely to have given this process added impetus. The question may not be so much as to when an acquisition became a patrimony, or even the security of title to an acquisition, but under whose authority and on what grounds these changes could apply. However, the picture is at times messy and contradictory, the aristocracy was perfectly able to contemplate the political separation of England and Normandy with a degree of equanimity, while demonstrating no lack of skill in maintaining cultural and familial links and adapting customary practices, all of which also provided the means to develop ‘strategies of coping’ to deal with the pressures created by conflicting centres of authority and legitimacy.

The first chapter describes in detail the methodology and framework of analysis. It is appropriate at this point that the use and meaning of the collective noun ‘aristocracy’ is

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given definition. It is not a noun contemporaries would have recognised, who instead make use of the likes of *nobiles, proceres* or *optimates* to describe those men from leading families who held land and exercised political power.\(^\text{39}\) Due to the nature of the evidence and the social and political importance of the men in question, the focus of this thesis is upon a narrow band of the aristocracy; the cross-Channel elite closest to the ruling family in terms of background, life-style and aspirations. Unlike later usage of the term, the use of aristocracy in the context of this thesis is not based upon notions of lineage.\(^\text{40}\)

Chapter Three attempts to broaden the analysis by considering a particular stratum of the aristocracy, in this case the sheriffs and their response to the rebellion of 1088. To varying degrees, all previous approaches to these men have been influenced by the idea of the Conquest providing ‘unparalleled opportunities for men of humble origins to win land for themselves’.\(^\text{41}\) Many of the prosopographical studies of royal officials can be located in a wider mainstream of historical thought throughout much of the 1980s and early 1990s, where discourse on English political society reflected Orderic’s comments on ‘men raised from the dust’.\(^\text{42}\) Though the importance of royal service as a source of power and patronage and an instrument of social change has long been recognised, Sir Richard Southern having first systematically explored it in the early 1960s, increasingly

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\(^{39}\) For example, *OV*, 2, 74; 3, 126, 178. For a discussion see, Green, *Aristocracy*, 8-19.


concerns have been voiced as to whether historians have fully understood the nature of the aristocratic society they have sought to explain.\textsuperscript{43}

A trend in recent scholarship has been to see the aristocracy in socially conservative terms, largely as a single body, though one defined by enormous variations in the wealth, status and responsibilities of its constituent members.\textsuperscript{44} There has also been a trend of analysing the aristocracy through its office holding and ethos of service, explored most adroitly by Katharine Keats-Rohan with a considerable debt to the seminal work of Karl Ferdinand Werner.\textsuperscript{45} The pleas for greater sensitivity in the analysis of the social and political elite are highly persuasive.\textsuperscript{46} Increasingly, the enterprise of conquest is regarded as an exercise in elitism, undertaken by a social and political elite.

In this context, the question of reconciling new approaches to established frameworks of discussion is one of balance. The inability of many of Curthose's supporters to get their English tenants to support them in \textsuperscript{1088} is noticeable, yet it needs to be remembered that rebels of \textsuperscript{1075} and \textsuperscript{1082} had encountered similar problems. Nearly all the Normans who occupied the office of sheriff chose to support not only Rufus in \textsuperscript{1088}, but also Henry in \textsuperscript{1101}. In many instances this pitted these men against their former lords in whose entourages they had started their careers. The dynamic at work here is one that can only be understood within a context where royal service and office-holding had provided an


\textsuperscript{44} See especially, Green, \textit{Aristocracy}, 126-140; D. Bates, 'Kingship, government and political life to c. \textsuperscript{1160}', \textit{The Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries 1066-c.1280}, ed. B. Harvey (Oxford, 2000), 79; D. Crouch, 'Introduction', \textit{The Image of Aristocracy in Britain, 1000-1300} (London, 1992).


\textsuperscript{46} Keats-Rohan, 'Normans, non-Normans, Nobles and New Men', 38.
alternative form of power and influence to the more established networks of aristocratic power created in Normandy prior to 1066. Yet equally, it is astonishing that until now the question has not been asked as to whether these men supported Henry and Rufus because they accepted the legitimacy of their rule as English kings and not simply because it served their interests to do so. The mechanics of aristocratic power at its widest point may have been more subtle and fluid than simply the preservation or accumulation of complexes of estates and offices.

From the approach outlined above it will come as no surprise that one recent trend in the analysis of the Anglo-Norman aristocracy rejected for this thesis is the concept of colonialism. John Le Patourel was the first to use that particular abstract noun to describe the Norman settlement in England. As such, it represented a profound change in the way the Norman settlement was perceived and has continued to exercise a profound influence. Professor J.C. Holt took up Le Patourel's legacy with some enthusiasm and extended it to areas such as buildings, language and law to produce a highly personal view of the Norman colonisation of England. Holt's conception of colonialism was significantly more developed than Le Patourel's, exemplified by Holt's view that the creation of the common law was a 'response to a colonial situation' whose 'impetus was continental', yet 'the solution in the end was insular.'

As an intellectual thread to link the various aspects of the Norman settlement in England, colonialism is not without its merits. Yet the concepts of colonialism and

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47 Bates, 'Kingship, government, and political life', 79.
imperialism are not value-neutral. These terms are subject to vagaries of interpretation and definition, often becoming pejorative in their usage. This, in turn, has influenced the way in which the Anglo-Norman aristocracy has been perceived. Moreover, the use of colonisation, even if appropriate, has been somewhat inconsistent. England may be thought a too obvious example and it needs to be questioned whether the term is appropriate for Norman expansion in northern France, raising the possibility of a 'colonial' Maine, or 'colonial' Norman ducal ambitions in the Vexin. The activities of great frontier families, such as those of Bellême and Beaumont, sit uneasily in a colonial paradigm. Moreover, the methods and actions of the Normans' northern French rivals would also need to be viewed as 'colonial'. If Brian Golding could be sceptical of the appropriateness of using colonial to describe Norman settlement in England, noting the shared common culture between the two, then it is doubtful that it would be appropriate as a framework to consider Norman expansion and ambitions within northern France itself. It must also be questioned whether the thrust of historiography in dismantling notions of empire can then allow a 'colonial' aristocracy to exist as an intellectual construct. With this in mind, it is doubtful whether the use of colonialism and imperialism actually contribute to historical understanding.

Most critics of Le Patourel and the notion of homogeneity have been careful to stress that from 1066 onwards the aristocracy and their actions can only be readily understood within a cross-Channel context, while at the same time successfully rejecting Le Patourel's notion of 'empire', together with Hollister's view of an Anglo-Norman regnum. In structural terms, and in the context of the notion of heterogeneity, this

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51 West, 'The Colonial History of the Norman Conquest?', 223.
thesis will present an interpretation of the aristocracy that suggests that some sections undoubtedly welcomed the separation of England and Normandy as a means to further augment their careers, and to neutralise powerful competitors for local power and influence. On the other hand, other members of the aristocracy would clearly have welcomed the continuation of a cross-Channel political structure, based upon the ties and obligations already in existence before 1087. In simple terms, there is no doubt that the great cross-Channel families supported Curthose because they believed that a Curthose kingship would be beneficial to their interests.

Yet the central contention is that structural analysis of cross-Channel institutions and organs of government, an administrative ideology of kingship that excludes and reduces ritual and ceremony, and a cross-Channel aristocracy whose political culture is defined by primarily by the laws and customs of landholding and inheritance does not fully appreciate the degree to which contemporaries thought about, discussed and acted upon concepts of political legitimacy. This, after all, might explain why, in the context of a looming succession crisis in the 1120s and 1130s, the problems faced by an earlier generation of the aristocracy in dealing with similar problems merited consideration. On the death of Queen Matilda in 1118, William of Malmesbury re-dedicated his *Gesta Regum* to her daughter, the Empress Matilda, with the hope that: 'In it you can also discover that none of those chronicled in this present book, whether king or queen, has more royal or more glorious claim to the hereditary crown of England than yourself.'

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55 GR, 1, 8. 'In eo etiam experiri potestis quod nullus eorum quorum liber presens continet memoriam, nec rex aliquid nec regina aliqua, regalis uel splendidus uobis Anglorum regni hereditarii iura expectauerit.'

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Chapter 1
Methodology

The methodology of this thesis will be to analyse systematically the surviving evidence that relates to the Anglo-Norman aristocracy between 1087 and 1106 in relation to the profound theoretical and historiographical changes of the last thirty years. In particular, the framework of anthropological, sociological and cultural studies now used to facilitate discussions on the wider medieval aristocracy, the nature of the political discourse they engaged in, and their political culture will be employed in this thesis. The aim is to add an extra dimension to the well-established picture of the Anglo-Norman aristocracy as political actors, with an appreciation of the value and importance of ideas in shaping political culture and action.¹

Definition is crucial in this context. Historians of the later medieval period have attempted to define the concept of political culture to analyse and explain political change and avoid some of the pitfalls of the concept, particularly its tendency to be subsumed into incoherent frameworks of analysis.² One definition of political culture that has found favour with late medievalists is supplied by Dale Hoak in his study of Tudor political culture, who suggested that the difference between politics and political culture is essentially 'the difference between political action and the codes of conduct,

² For a succinct summary of the history and use of the concept see, C. Carpenter, 'Introduction', The Fifteenth Century IV: Political Culture in Late Medieval Britain, ed. L. Clark and C. Carpenter (Woodbridge, 2004), 1-8.
formal and informal, governing these actions’. In this context, mention should be made of John Gillingham, Matthew Strickland and Maurice Keen, all of whom have attempted to ask questions about the ‘codes of conduct’ and the aristocratic thought world that governed political action. Themes of chivalry, knightly values and knightly obligations are not seen as ‘mere tinsel gloss prettifying brutal realities’, but aspects of a ‘fundamental political morality’. The capacity of political culture to provide a wide-ranging framework to encompass many aspects of socio-economic and political change, including governmental and institutional, urban and rural, is beginning to influence approaches to the study of late medieval history. In this context, the entrenched positions, as well as the nuances of the ‘Feudal Revolution’ debate are, in effect, discussions and comparative studies of political cultures across different times and regions, though not expressed in those terms.

The importance of ideas in shaping a political culture cannot be ignored. Therefore, the aspect of political culture that this thesis focuses upon is quite simply the idea of political legitimacy. The effect is to suggest that the actions and motivations of those members of the Anglo-Norman aristocracy who questioned the legitimacy of Rufus’ and Henry’s kingship can thus be placed into the wider spectrum of political discourse, defined by discussions and disagreements over political legitimacy and succession that had been a central feature of political life for generations. Without necessarily underplaying the political instability of the 1090s and early 1100s in any way, it can, nonetheless, be placed in its appropriate context and perhaps seen in terms of the norms of the political process in the early medieval west.

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In any discussion of this nature, contemporary and near contemporary histories must be at the forefront of consideration. John Le Patourel had Orderic's account of the dilemma faced by the senior members of aristocracy after the partition of 1087 at the heart of his argument for a politically and culturally homogeneous cross-Channel aristocracy. Since the 1970s, however, an understanding of the aims, nature and circumstances of historical writing in the twelfth century has grown, partly to address some profoundly entrenched prejudices. The most significant development has been the attempt to place the histories produced in the Anglo-Norman world into a wider intellectual context. In one pertinent example, C. Warren Hollister eloquently argued that the histories produced in the early twelfth century needed integration into the wider world of the twelfth century renaissance. For Hollister, the 'new intellectual vision' of the renaissance propelled contemporary writers into a systematic investigation of theology, law and the human experience. As a result, these texts displayed a new interest in naturalistic cause and effect, with the ideas and assumptions of the twelfth century renaissance affecting and transforming political institutions and political culture.

In many ways, Hollister's conclusions are remarkable. His discussion of political culture rested upon certain assumptions as to how politics and any attendant political culture might be defined. In quintessential fashion, he developed his argument on the basis of an earlier theme in his work, namely the administrative nature of Anglo-Norman kingship and politics. This shaped his interpretation of the political instability of the 1090s, and especially the so-called 'civil war' of 1101, with the cleavage between

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6 Norman Empire, 197-200.
9 Hollister, Anglo-Norman Political Culture, 9-10.
curiales and great magnates defining each side. Tellingly, his discussion of political culture avoided the issue of how the histories under consideration portrayed the causes of dispute and violence, as well as conflict resolution among the political elite.

The interest shown by twelfth century authors in the nineteen years following the Conqueror’s death parallels the period in which many of these works were written, a time when the question of a successor to Henry was gaining momentum. The problems faced by an earlier generation of the aristocracy in dealing with similar problems clearly merited consideration. William of Malmesbury expressed his hope that the Gesta Regum might imitate previous histories, written to provide rulers with ‘a sort of pattern for their own lives, from which they could learn....’

William also recognised the dangers of writing contemporary history, noting that ‘truth is often disastrous and falsehood profitable’. In this context, it is important to observe Alan Cooper’s observation on the public nature of the writing of history in the twelfth century. The views and opinions expressed by these authors were not simply the academic speculations of a remote intellectual elite. They were aware that what they wrote would be discussed and evaluated by the wider political world. Likewise, Elisabeth van Houts has demonstrated how the Norman Conquest prompted continental contemporaries to both criticise the Conqueror and re-evaluate their own situations in the light of his success.

It is axiomatic that the Benedictine monasticism of many writers profoundly shaped their outlook and attitudes. What is also clear is the degree in which they wrote their

10 GR, 1, 6. ‘...ut quasi ad uitas suae exemplum eis instruerentur aliorum...’.
11 GR, 1, 540. ‘..sepe naufragatur veritas et suffragatur falsitas...’.
13 GR, 1, 8; Cooper, ‘Timorous Historians’, 67.
histories with a firm understanding of the contemporary theories of kingship and the practical conduct of politics. A cursory reading of the *Gesta Regum* reveals that William of Malmesbury's discussion of royal rights and responsibilities reflects closely ideas expressed in texts as diverse as the Irish tract on kingship known as Pseudo-Cyprian, the Carolingian capitularies and tracts produced in Germany during the civil war of the 1070s and 1080s, to name but a few. All agreed that a king should maintain the peace, defend the realm, be pious and generous to the Church, and uphold justice.

As was stated in the Introduction, George Garnett has done much to deepen the understanding of the intellectual climate in which politics were discussed and acted upon in the late eleventh century. In particular, his introduction into the discussion of William's claim to the English throne of the Pseudo-Isidorean Decretals, preserved in Trinity College, Cambridge, has opened a whole new vista of analysis for the politics of the late eleventh century and the central question of the English succession. The framework offered by the text of the Fourth Council of Toledo in Pseudo-Isidore on the need for consultation with the political elite for the selection of a king, that any king who is not chosen through consultation is to be regarded as at best illegitimate, if not an actual tyrant, is central to any understanding the actions of the aristocracy profiled in the case studies in Part One. Contextually, the emphasis on consultation was a major feature in many sources who discussed the Conqueror's own succession in 1066.

Despite the dangers apparent in writing contemporary history, William of Malmesbury wrote with a deep awareness of the issue of political legitimacy and the dangers posed to the wider polity when anyone claiming political authority found their legitimacy

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16 *Gesta Guillelmi*, 146-8.
questioned, especially when alternative sources of legitimacy were available. His account of the aristocracy’s motives in attempting to achieve reconciliation between Robert Curthose and Henry I in 1101 has this view at its core. He explained that the baronial negotiators were motivated in seeking peace by the ‘law of natural affection’, which would be broken if brother were to meet brother in battle.\(^\text{17}\)

The depth of William’s classical learning provided him with a paradigm to explore the question of political legitimacy and the process of reconciliation.\(^\text{18}\) The law of filial affection or \textit{pietatis ius} that William refers to is likely to have been known to him through two classical authors with whom he was familiar; Suetonius and Cicero.\(^\text{19}\) The integration of \textit{pietatis ius uiolandum} into Malmesbury’s text follows his standard method, explored by Neil Wright, of imitating a line or part of a line from a classical author into his narrative with a greater or lesser degree of modification. The line in question is from the life of Julius Caesar in Suetonius’s \textit{De Vita Caesarum}, where Suetonius created a speech for Caesar on the necessity of breaking the law only in the interests of fellow citizens.\(^\text{20}\) Suetonius had drawn this speech from Cicero’s \textit{De Officiis}, where Cicero had used a quotation of a speech by Eteocles from the Phoenician Women by Euripides.\(^\text{21}\) Elsewhere, William of Malmesbury quotes the full speech when describing Henry’s motives in intervening in Normandy after the Treaty of Winchester. Henry, William states, subscribed to Caesar’s opinion: ‘If you must break the law, break

\(^{17}\) GR, 1, 716-8, ‘Sed satagentibus sanioris consilii hominibus, qui dicerent pietatis ius uiolandum si fraterna necessitudo prelio concurreret, paci animos accommodauere, reputantes quod, si alter occumberet, alter infirmior remaneret, cum nullus fratrum preter ipso superesset.’


\(^{20}\) Suetonius, Julius, 30, 5. ‘si violandum est ius, regnandi gratia, violandum est: aliis rebus pietates colas’.

it in the interest of your fellow citizens; in every other case, you should mind your
duty’.22

There are two implications arising from Malmesbury’s use of this speech. First, is the
context in which Cicero quotes the speech from Eteocles. Despite Cicero’s apparent
justification of realpolitik his work is, in fact, a critique of unjust actions in the service
of political ambition.23 The overall message Cicero strives to convey is the tendency of
ambitious Romans to succumb to tyranny, and he wants to convince his readers that this
is not the path to glory or happiness. In this context, William of Malmesbury’s use of
this speech in full evidently provides a rationale for Henry’s actions in intervening in
Normandy. Yet the subtext to those who would have known the wider context of
Cicero’s message was possibly that there was a limit to what Henry could and ought to
do in Normandy. Henry’s intervention might even be construed as coming dangerously
close to tyranny: an unjust action in pursuit of political ambition. This certainly was the
case of Louis VI at the Council of Reims in October 1119, where Louis accused Henry
of violently invading Normandy, which was part of his realm, of treating Robert
Curthose, a vassal of Louis, brother and lord of Henry ‘atrociously, without regard to
justice or right’, and keeping him in custody ‘up to this day’.24 Moreover, the concerns
over tyranny expressed by William of Malmesbury also found expression in slightly
later sources, particularly John of Salisbury’s Polericatus.25

...the
tyrant is, therefore, one who oppresses the people by violent domination...'. Ioannis Saresberiensis

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22 GR, 1, 706. ‘Ille Cesarianae sententiae assistens: ‘Si uiolandum est ius, gratia ciuium uiolandum est; aliis rebus pietatem colas.’ The insertion of ciuium by William of Malmesbury was his attempt to deal with the missing gratia in all early copies of Seutonius, GR, 2, 359.
25 John of Salisbury Polericatus. Of the Frivolities of Courtiers and the Footprints of Philosophers, ed. and trans. C. J. Nederman (Cambridge, 1990), Introduction, 24-5; Book 8, Chapter 17, 190-1. '....the tyrant is, therefore, one who oppresses the people by violent domination...' Ioannis Saresberiensis
Malmesbury’s use of *pietatis ius uiolandum* in the context of the negotiations at Alton alludes back to Cicero’s message and suggests a concern for tyranny. Arguably, the object of William’s concern at this stage was Robert Curthose. His claim to the English throne in 1101 was certainly more justified than Henry’s grounds for intervening in Normandy, hence William of Malmesbury does not repeat the speech in full, but a momentum for a Curthose kingship had clearly failed to develop in 1101 and to press his claim further would invite the accusations of tyranny and raise exactly the same issues of legitimacy that had haunted Henry since his ‘election’ and coronation in 1100.

Secondly, though there is no evidence that William ever read Euripides, his confidence in using him at third hand and the context in which he discusses the law of ‘natural’ affection and the dangers of fratricidal conflict, suggests a familiarity with the Oedipal myth and the fates of Oedipus’ two sons, Eteocles and Polynices, who fought over their father’s inheritance and subsequently destroyed one another. This particular set of brothers became proverbial in Roman thought as the most appalling example from antiquity of the dangers of fratricide. Overall, the dangers to the wider polity of fratricidal conflict within the ruling family and the concerns that unjust actions in the pursuit of ambitions led to tyranny, were all contemporary political issues that arose from the partition of 1087 and the contested successions of Rufus and Henry, and which William of Malmesbury chose to explore through an analytical framework informed and shaped by classical authorities.

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26 My thanks are due to Dr Costas Panayotakis of the University of Glasgow for this reference.

27 *Cf. OV*, 4, 122, where Orderic uses the example of Eteocles and Polynices as part of his rhetorical discussion of aristocratic motives for rebellion in 1088.
Gaimar approached the problem from a similar, though far less sophisticated perspective. Like William, he leaves little doubt that the major determining factors in the revolt of 1095 were the continuing questions over the legitimacy of Rufus’s kingship and the nature of the relationship between a king and senior members of his aristocracy, perhaps occasioned by Rufus’s conduct in the early 1090s. Tellingly, Gaimar drew a direct parallel between the aims of the rebels in 1095 and those of 1075, and preceded his discussion of the revolt of 1095 with a reconstruction of Rufus’s court where the main duties of the aristocracy to support the king were made explicit. Those who thought otherwise were described as being of Nero’s lineage, ‘rising today and falling tomorrow’, another Roman example of tyranny and fleeting worldly glory.

Wace’s account of the negotiations at Alton in July 1101 reveals that the search for a negotiated settlement rested upon the ability to construct a political framework that would recognise the legitimacy of Henry’s kingship and also accommodate the claims of Robert Curthose and the concerns of the aristocracy with regard to the succession. The advice given to Curthose by his advisors, once a momentum for his kingship failed to develop, reflected the framework of canon law contained in the Pseudo-Isidorian Decretals, especially the emphasis on the impossibility of any attempt to depose a crowned king. The inviolability of the king resounded in the messages the baronial negotiators relayed to Curthose; that he should not seek from Henry something ‘he

29 See below, Chapter 4.
30 Gaimar, L’Estoire, line, 6138.
should not do or which could not be done’ and that Henry would rather be ‘struck dead than be toppled from the kingdom’.33

The author of the Brevis relatio chose to draw upon St Paul’s Letter to the Romans to justify Henry’s succession in 1100, criticising Robert Curthose for ‘not thinking rightly’ or suggesting that he had not understood the message of the Scripture with regard to his claim to the English throne in that ‘there is no power except from God’.34 In many ways, this passage reflects Orderic’s account of the Conqueror’s death-bed speech, where the Conqueror was unsure of the means to transmit the English throne to his preferred successor, William Rufus, and entrusted it to God alone.35 Read in context, both texts suggest that canon law crucially provided the means to facilitate Rufus’s succession, and a template for the resolution of the crisis of 1101. The appearance of St Paul’s letter in the earliest version of the Brevis relatio, with a possible date of composition as early as 1114-1120, suggests that the text may even have been one of the authorities referred to at Alton.36 The author of the Brevis relatio may well have drawn upon the testimony of Abbot Ralph (1107-24), who knew both the Conqueror and Lanfranc, and who may well have had access to men who had been at Alton.37

It is no coincidence that the author of the Warenne Chronicle used the same text, referring to verses one and two from chapter thirteen of St Paul’s letter.38 The narrative employed in the Warenne Chronicle projected William of Mortain, together with Robert

33 Wace, lines 10413-8. ‘e al rei chose ne quesist que li reis faire ne deist ne que faite estre ne peist, ker pois qu’il esteit coronez ne deveit estre desposez.’
34 Brevis relatio, 37. ‘Audiens itaque quod Henricus frater suus rex Anglorum esset constitutus cepit indignari aduersus illum multumque ei minari quod regnum Anglie suscipere ausus fuisset non recte cogitans neque intelligens quod Scriptura dicit: ‘quia nulla potestas nisi a Deo est.’
35 OV, 4, 90-4.
37 The History of the Norman People, Introduction, 24.
38 Romans, 13, 1-2; Liber Hyda, 304. ‘Non est potest a Domino; qui resistit potestati Del ordinationi resistit.’
de Bellême and William II de Warenne, though the chronicle is at pains to note that the latter’s involvement was only temporary, as refusing to accept the legitimacy of Henry’s kingship, and as a result becoming alienated from him. The most recent editor of the text, Elisabeth van Houts, has suggested that the chronicle stands as a testimony to family memories. Its purpose was to project William I and William II de Warenne as staunch supporters of the Conqueror, Rufus and Henry I during a later crisis for the family under Henry II. Though it is possible to trace the various Anglo-Norman chronicles used by the author, Eustace of Boulogne, chaplain to King Stephen and chancellor to William IV de Warenne, much of his information reflected historical traditions within Normandy in the mid twelfth century. Of greatest significance is the fact that the chronicle contains information on William of Mortain that is unique. It is, for example, the only source to record the offer of Henry’s sister-in-law in marriage. The source of the information on William may well have been the visit of Eustace to southern Normandy in the 1150s, with a visit to Tinchebray itself in 1158.

Orderic used the Old Testament to give a surprisingly sympathetic account of the problems and responsibilities of the aristocracy occasioned by the partition of England and Normandy. His method was to draw a comparison between the events of 1087 and the division that befell the Israelites under Rehoboam, Solomon’s son and designated successor as king of a united kingdom of Israel. In the Old Testament account, Rehoboam had travelled to Shechem to be confirmed as king as a united kingdom of Israel.

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39 Elisabeth van Houts has established that the text known as the ‘Hyde’ Chronicle should now be regarded as the Warenne Chronicle. E. M. C. van Houts, ‘The Warenne View of the Past 1066-1203’, ANS, 26 (2004), 103-121. A new edition and translation of the Warenne Chronicle by Dr van Houts is forthcoming. However, all references in this thesis refer by page number to the Rolls Series edition, Liber de Hyda: Liber Hyda, 304-6. ‘Quidam autem et maxime potentiores superbia elati, nec sicut dominum suum nominant, nec sicut regem suum honorant.’
41 van Houts, ‘Warenne View of the Past’, 113; EYC, 8, nos 11, 12.
Isreal. Before this could happen, delegates from the Ten Tribes of Israel had demanded an end to the levy of forced labour as a condition of accepting Rehoboam, who in turn sought advice from the ‘old men’, as the counsellors who had served his father are described, and the youths he had grown up with. He rejected the advice given to him by his father’s advisers to end the levy, in favour of the advice of the youths who advocated more oppression. On hearing of Rehoboam’s decision, nine of the Ten Tribes of Israel rose in rebellion and elected Jeroboam, one of Solomon’s generals as their king, with the result that the nation of Israel divided in two, with only the tribe of Judah maintaining its loyalty to the Davidic dynasty.  

What is important to recognise is that Rehoboam’s fate, together with that of the united kingdom of Israel, had been sealed by Solomon’s own transgression of God’s law, for which God had judged that he would ‘tear the kingdom...out of the hand of your son.’ Rehoboam’s decision not to follow the advice of his father’s counsellors resulted in the prophesied split, yet as chapter 12, verse 15 states ‘for it was a turn of affairs brought about by the Lord that he might fulfil his word’. It would appear as though Rehoboam is as much a victim of his father’s choices, as he is of his own. Rehoboam’s mistake in listening to ‘youthful counsels’ had compounded his father’s mistakes in transgressing God’s law, by rejecting the advice of those mature counsellors who could foresee the dangers ahead.

The implication from Orderic’s use of the Old Testament in this way is that he felt the Conqueror had made a mistake in dividing England from Normandy, compounded by not listening to those who wanted to maintain a union. As part of his rhetoric in

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43 Kings, 1, 12, 1-15.
44 Kings, 1, 11, 11-13.
45 Kings, 1, 12, 15.
explaining aristocratic motives in 1088, Orderic has members of the cross-Channel aristocracy form an inviolable league to oppose Rufus and avoid being destroyed by ‘youthful counsels’. In 1101, Henry avoids further ‘youthful counsels’ by adhering to the advice of his mature counsellors, especially Robert, count of Meulan. The emphasis Orderic placed on avoiding making a bad decision worse, suggests that he looked to the upper echelons of the aristocracy to deal with the consequences of the Conqueror’s decision and work for a cross-Channel union. With Henry as king, support from members of the cross-Channel aristocracy for Curthose was something of an embarrassment that it had not been under Rufus. However, those members of the aristocracy who supported Henry were still regarded by Orderic as working to mitigate the effects of the Conqueror’s decision. Orderic’s use of this passage suggests that he not only recognised the political role of the upper echelons of the aristocracy in having to deal with the consequences of the Conqueror’s decision to divide England from Normandy, but also the need to guide his sons and successors through largely uncharted political waters.

The influence of canon law on the intellectual climate of the eleventh century and the practical conduct of politics has already been noted. In part, this can be traced through two further sources used in this thesis: the De iniusta vexacione and Eadmer’s Historia Novorum. The De iniusta is a crucial text when attempting to broaden the analysis of this thesis and address the issue of whether the concern over the succession and legitimacy found expression throughout the aristocracy as a whole, and in particular the men who occupied the office of sheriff in 1088 and 1101, where a possible total of nine

46 OV, 4, 122. ‘...prudenter precauere ne per consilium iuvenile pereamus’.
47 OV, 5, 298.
surviving or former sheriffs are identified in the *De iniusta*.\textsuperscript{48} Mark Philpott’s recent examination of the text not only allows it to be used with confidence, but crucially his wider conclusions on the influence of canon law within England provides the context for many of the arguments put forward in this thesis.\textsuperscript{49}

Eadmer’s monasticism has not endeared him to all historians.\textsuperscript{50} Yet equally, there has been an acknowledgement of the complexity of Eadmer’s text and the influences on many of the ideas he expressed, including canon law.\textsuperscript{51} In many ways, Eadmer’s account of the crisis of 1101 is as important for his silences and distortions as what he does say. The interpretation offered in Chapter Seven suggests that Anselm was largely ineffectual in persuading sections of the aristocracy not to oppose Henry in 1101, precisely because the arguments that Anselm are likely to have used at Alton, based upon on Pseudo-Isidore in Lanfranc’s copy, were precisely the arguments used to question Henry’s legitimacy as king and the circumstances of his ‘election’ and coronation. Elsewhere in his history, Eadmer had used the same collection of canon law to demonstrate how Anselm’s arguments at Rockingham in 1095 fully in accordance with canon law.\textsuperscript{52}

By focusing on the question of political legitimacy to explore the politics of the 1090s, an attempt can also be made to reconcile conflicting evidence and reassess its worth. In particular, the *De Obitu Willelmi*, though criticised by L. J. Engels, nevertheless remains

\textsuperscript{48} See below, Chapter 3.
\textsuperscript{50} See, for example, Gillingham, ‘Kingship, Chivalry and Love’, *The English in the Twelfth Century*, 57.
\textsuperscript{52} Eadmer *HN*, 57; Philpott, ‘Eadmer, his Archbishops and the English State’, 105. Full references can be found in n.71.
significant in this context. Elisabeth van Houts has argued that the text is a later piece of propaganda, written after Rufus had retrieved the royal regalia from Saint-Etienne, to make it seem as though the Conqueror had given them to Rufus on his death-bed. Though this has been criticised by Barbara English, Rufus’s motives in retrieving the regalia are self-evident in the context of Rufus being the de facto ruler of England and Normandy in the absence of Robert Curthose, and within a few years of the revolt of 1095, where any attempt to bolster the legitimacy of his kingship would have found favour. Moreover, the possible choice of the texts on which the De obitu Willelmi was based, the Vita Ludovici imperatoris by the so-called Astronomer and the Vita Karoli Magni by Einhard, not only provides, as H. E. J. Cowdrey suggests, a Carolingian context in which to assess William the Conqueror’s life and achievements, but also provides further evidence that contemporaries were well aware of the practical conduct of politics and what was required of a ruler.

Less theoretical perhaps, the ‘E’ version of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle contains the crucial information that allows the Treaties of Rouen and Winchester to be reconstructed. With a point of composition near to the events that they describe, the entries are remarkably fresh and offer a less retrospective analysis of the events in question than many of the histories written in the twelfth century. For that reason alone they are significant. Yet the crucial aspect to the Chronicle is the possible sources of its

54 GND, 1, Introduction, 64; RRAN, 1, no. 397; Les actes de Guillaume de Conquérant et de la reine Mathilde pour les abbayes caennaises, ed. L. Musset, Mémoires de la Société des antiquaires de Normandie, (Caen, 1967), no. 24. The text of the charter reveals that Rufus retrieved the regalia on the advice of the leading magnates and churchmen on both sides of the Channel. ‘...procerum et religiosarum personarum Anglie et Normannie consilio’. See below, Chapter 7.
information. The difficulty in establishing where the entries for before 1121 were written is well known. Christ Church, Canterbury, is the last place for which an archetype of E can be located for before 1080. Yet the claims of a London or Westminster bias are hard to ignore, especially for the period between 1087 and 1106.

What is clear from the entries is that the author or authors of the entries during this period clearly had access to information that must have come through royal conduits, particularly where the Treaties of Rouen and Winchester are concerned. Not only is this evident in the amount of detail that is supplied, but when compared with other sources the Chronicle can be seen to brush over inconvenient facts. For example, under its entry for 1091 the Chronicle is clear that Rufus went to Normandy for his brother’s ‘discomfiture’. The next line in its entry then mentions the reconciliation between the two brothers, which came about while Rufus was in Normandy. However, the evidence from other sources, particularly William of Malmesbury, who had access to other sources of information and based his account of Rufus’s kingship on these sources, not only points toward negotiations having been concluded before Rufus crossed the Channel, but also suggests that a degree of pressure may have been applied to Rufus and Curthose to agree to a settlement.

When discussing the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle it is pertinent to mention Paul Hayward’s recent evaluation of the Acta Lanfranci, and the date of its composition to around 

60 Peterborough Chronicle, Introduction, 22-3.
62 Anglo-Saxon Chronicle: A Collaborative Edition, 7, MS E, 102. ‘Onmang þam þe he þær was, heora sehte togedere eode...’.
63 For a full argument and references, see below, Chapter 7. However, note should be taken of William of Malmesbury’s observation that the negotiators were men of more sense and concerned to protect their own interests in 1091. GR, 1, 548. ‘Pauci quibus sanius consilium, consulentes suis commodis quod utrobique possessiones haberent.’ For William’s sources, GR, 2, 13.
Though Hayward's overall conclusion, that the text was compiled to lend support to the archbishopric's claim to patriarchal authority must be borne in mind, the Acta remains significant in that it supports the interpretation outlined throughout this thesis that the question of succession to the English kingship and the legitimacy of a king was dependent upon consultation with the political elite and the means of selecting a king. In this context, the choice of the verb eligere to describe Lanfranc's actions in 1087 is crucial, whether as an accurate reflection of the events of 1087, or as a later gloss designed to support Canterbury's claims to patriarchal authority.

When viewed as a whole, the texts under discussion constitute a significant body of analysis that point very clearly to the politics between 1087 and 1106 being defined by concerns over the legitimacy of Rufus and Henry's kingship and expressed within a general framework where contemporary theories of kingship were understood. Many amongst the Anglo-Norman political elite were concerned about the criteria and process used to select an English king and the rights of the aristocracy within this process. Many writers reflected these concerns and some, especially Orderic, were also acutely sensitive to the dilemma faced by the senior aristocracy and developed a cross-Channel perspective for their analysis.

Nearly all the sources reflect the attempts made to resolve the issue. This invites engagement with two strands of historiography that have yet to intimately touch upon consideration of the Anglo-Norman aristocracy as political actors. Recourse to violence in 1088 and 1101, coupled with the recognition of the need to accept co-existence

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64 P. Hayward, 'Some reflections on the historical value of the so-called Acta Lanfranci, HR, 77, no.196 (2004), 141-60.
immediately suggests that any study of the Anglo-Norman aristocracy has much to contribute to the concepts and historiography of the so-called ‘Feudal Revolution’. In this context, the attempted settlements of 1091 and 1101 must be seen as a genuine and ongoing attempt by the aristocracy to solve the problems of instability, by seeking to accommodate the rights and responsibilities of all the Conqueror’s sons within a framework that stressed the separate political and legal co-existence of England and Normandy. As such, this approach to the problem has to be located within the practical experience and political culture of the aristocracy.

Further consideration of these themes invites engagement with the historiography of ceremony and ritual. To do so is to largely react against many of the most influential aspects of Anglo-Norman historiography of the last thirty years, which has emphasised a centralised and administrative ideology of power, government and kingship. At the outset, it must be recognised that this is a highly contentious subject. Philippe Buc has led a chorus of criticism centred upon the way historians have applied the anthropological treatments of ritual to early medieval society, choosing to focus his attack upon the functionalist assumptions within this historiography, particularly with regard to the notion that any society is best regarded as an organism that seeks homeostasis, with rituals fulfilling the function of minimising conflict. Historians are charged with seeking an excessively rigid correlation between changes in ritual practice and changes in social or political structures. A further accusation is that historians have underestimated the extent to which medieval authors are best regarded as clerical

66 See below, Introduction, n 39.
polemicists, who used descriptions of rituals as literary conventions to advance their cause. 67

The simple answer to these criticisms is to emphasise that the concept of ritual, when allied to the observations relating to the contemporary theories of kingship and the practical application of politics, which are evident within the texts, locates the disputed successions of 1087 and 1100 within a continuum of change that has to include the Conquest itself. The elevation of the Conqueror to the English kingship profoundly altered his relationships with his sons, the aristocracy, and in turn, their own relationships with the Conqueror’s heirs and successors. The political difficulties of the 1070s and 1080s within the Anglo-Norman polity, explored in Chapter two, can be seen as indicative of this process. Quite simply, the persistence of political rituals in the midst of so much change and disruption indicate a contemporary consensus as to their function.

Ritual offers a legitimate form and medium through which contemporary politics and political culture can be analysed. For example, the histories that recorded the events in the year after Henry had been crowned, when analysed through the medium of ritual and ceremony, offer a more layered history. Chapter seven outlines the arguments in full, but it is noticeable that upon hearing of Henry’s accession Robert Curthose displayed his indignation, while Henry continued and emphasised the ritual practices of English kingship with the ceremony of crownwearing. The negotiations at Alton followed a refusal to offer battle and thus paved the way to a negotiated settlement, with the appointment of negotiators who were trusted and knew how to act in accordance

with contemporary political values. The use of oaths and guarantors to secure the agreement reflected contemporary forms and usage.

Even where sources are in disagreement, ceremony and ritual provide the vehicle to assess conflicting evidence. A prime example comes from Orderic's account of the negotiations at Alton. Unlike other sources, Orderic maintained that neither Henry nor Curthose trusted the baronial negotiators in 1101, preferring to negotiate alone and on a basis that secured peace.\textsuperscript{68} The incidental information Orderic provides, particularly that the peace between the two brothers was sealed with a formal kiss of peace, shows that Orderic displayed an awareness of contemporary political rituals and practices.\textsuperscript{69} As a political symbol, kiss-centred rites had a prominent place in customary practice. Lanfranc's \textit{Monastic Constitutions} set out the ritual by which a layperson was to be admitted to a house, noting that he shall take 'into his hand a book of gospels' and receive the kiss of peace, which is not given when the applicant is a woman.\textsuperscript{70} Significantly, Orderic would not have been unaware of the secular connotations of the kiss, having access to a text where the kiss was noted as a symbol of reconciliation, and where contravention and abuse of its meaning were criticised.\textsuperscript{71}

Emphasising underlying continuity within change is an equally effective way of suggesting that charters still remain central to the study of the Anglo-Norman aristocracy. The approach of this thesis is to bring them into focus with narrative sources and examine them in the context of what the narrative sources reveal about the political and cultural changes of the 1090s and 1100s. In this context, one particularly

\textsuperscript{68} \textit{OV}, 5, 318.
\textsuperscript{69} See, K. Petkov, \textit{The Kiss of Peace. Ritual, Self and Society in the High and Late Medieval West} (Leiden, 2003), esp. 12-79.
\textsuperscript{71} \textit{GND}, 1, 92.
important set of charters is the double confirmations that survive for the period after the Treaties of Rouen and Winchester. In the immediate aftermath of the treaty negotiations of 1091, a double confirmation was drawn up to an exchange of property between abbot Gilbert of Saint-Etienne and William de Tournebu. Confirmation was given in identical documents, with changes to the order in which the names of Rufus and Curthose appear in the appropriate places in each text.\(^2\) A separate document within the cartulary of Saint-Etienne sets out the details of the exchange more fully and shows that the agreement was reached in the presence of some very influential figures, in particular, Robert, count of Meulan, his brother Henry, earl of Warwick, the bishop of Durham and Robert fitz Hamo. The text also mentions that the abbey had the seals of the two brothers as witness to the exchange.\(^3\)

In 1101, a double confirmation reaffirmed grants of Rufus to the abbey of St Peter's Bath and Bishop John, while a confirmation was given to Curthose's grant of a Sunday market and annual fair at Cheux to the abbey of Saint Etienne.\(^4\) As the 1101 confirmation concerned an English religious institution and can be dated to September 1101 while Curthose was still in England, the confirmation may have proved a useful hallmark of Curthose's acceptance of Henry's kingship.\(^5\)

What both of these double confirmations may signal is that the treaties of Rouen and Winchester were each regarded as having settled the issues at stake, with each brother

\(^{72}\) *Saint Etienne*, fol.47 r-v; D. Bates, ‘Four Recently Rediscovered Norman Charters’, *AN*, 45 (1995), Appendix, no.3.
\(^{75}\) On the dating see, Bates, ‘A Neglected Charter’, 121; *ASC*, E, 1101. The Chronicle states that Curthose remained in England until after Michaelmas. A third double confirmation, as in the case of the 1091 preserved at Saint-Etienne, also survives. This time, Henry confirmed a grant of a Sunday market and annual fair at Cheux by Curthose. *Saint Etienne*, fol. 22v. Robert's grant can be dated to 1102, which suggests that Henry's confirmation belongs to the same period. *RRAN*, 2, no.621; Bates, ‘A Neglected Charter’, 122.
assigned their respective rights and responsibilities within a wider cross-Channel polity. It may be supposed that the diplomatic form of a double confirmation was well known and would fit the immediate circumstances of 1091 and 1101, and also the possibility that either brother on each occasion could still inherit each other’s lands until a lawful heir was produced.

Chapter Eight uses charter evidence to show that religious patronage can be read as a commentary upon the political situation. In this way, charters provide the link between the local, regional worlds and wider cross-Channel concerns of the aristocracy. One particular example is the sudden death of Hugh de Montgomery in 1098 and the subsequent claim by his elder brother to his English earldom. In the absence of children from marriage, it is likely that the youngest Montgomery brother, Arnulf, had been regarded as Hugh’s designated heir up to his death. Arnulf was included in Hugh’s grant of the collegiate church of Quatford to the abbey of La Sauve Majeure in 1094. The monks of La Sauve Majeure then had to obtain Robert de Bellême’s confirmation once he became earl. Arnulf also witnessed a charter of Walter of Dunstanville, Hugh’s dapifer, and his wife in favour of La Sauve Majeure. A notice in the cartulary of Saint-Martin de Séé records a gift Arnulf made to the abbey, and contains the dedication that the gift was for his parents, lord, friends and ‘very dear brother Hugh.’ It may be significant that upon hearing of Hugh’s death, Arnulf gave Saint-Martin a gift of the church of St Nicholas at Pembroke and twenty carucates of land from his own resources

78 CDF, no.1237. Grand Cartulaire de La Sauve Majeure, no 1354.
79 CDF, no.1238. For the identification of Walter see K. Thompson, Cross Channel estates of the Montgomery-Bellème family, c. 1050-1112, Unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of Wales (1983), 273, no.72.
and not from the earldom of Shrewsbury itself.\textsuperscript{31} The prominence of Arnulf in these acta suggests that he may have been regarded by the recipients of gifts over the previous four years as Hugh’s heir in the absence of children, but he had to be careful not to gift resources that were not in his power.

It is almost certainly within this context that references to both Robert and Hugh de Montgomery occur in the foundation narrative of Shrewsbury Abbey. Two distinct verbs describe Hugh’s and Robert’s respective successions, succedere and suscipere.\textsuperscript{82} Both brothers are described as succeeding their father as his heirs, yet the compilers of the text may well have been aware of the difference in the nature of Hugh and Robert’s elevation; with Hugh designated as the heir to Shrewsbury long before his father’s death, while Robert’s succession was more political and therefore subject to the use of suscipere. The author of the Brevis relatio uses the same verb to state that Henry had ‘dared to receive the kingdom of England in 1101.\textsuperscript{83} Orderic used the verb requare to describe Robert’s approach to Rufus, perhaps indicating, as J. F. A. Mason pointed out, that Robert could hardly have been expected to succeed Hugh.\textsuperscript{84} The Waverley annalist noted that Robert became his brother’s heir.\textsuperscript{85} Robert de Bellême’s petition originated from the successful relationship he had developed with Rufus, while Rufus was the de

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\textsuperscript{31} Livre Blanc, 105/123r; CDF, no.666.
\textsuperscript{32} U. Rees, The Shrewsbury Cartulary, 2 vols. (Aberystwyth, 1975), 1, no 35. ‘Hugo et Robertus filii eius qui post patrem in hereditate successerunt quisque in tempore suo.’; ‘Robertus de belismo qui post eundem venerabilem hugonem fratrem suum comitatu suscepit honorem....’.
\textsuperscript{33} Brevis relatio, 37, ‘...quod regnum Anglie suscipere ausus fuisset....’
\textsuperscript{34} OV, 5, 224; J. F. A. Mason, ‘Roger de Montgomery and his sons (1067-1102)’, TRHS, 5th Ser., 13 (1963), 1-28, 18. ‘Quo defuncto Robertus Belesmensis frater eius Guillelmu Rufum requisuit....’. The only other instance in which Orderic uses this same verb is in a similar set of circumstances where Richer de L’Aigle petitioned Henry I for his father’s English lands but was refused in favour of his younger brothers Geoffrey and Engenulf, who were then serving in the royal household. OV, 6,196. ‘Securus itaque Richerius curam adit, regem Angliae de haereditate sua iterum requisivit, sed nihil optimun, mestusque recessit’.
\textsuperscript{85} Annales Monastici, ed. H. R. Laud, 5 vols (London, 1864-9), 2, 207. ‘Et Robertus de Belesme frater ejus factus est haeres ejus.’
facto ruler of Normandy and England after 1096. Rufus was able to use the flexibility in the aristocratic inheritance customs to allow Robert to gain his younger brother’s earldom.

As well as the documentary form and language, the question of attestations to charters must be addressed. Debate of the use of witness lists turns upon an axis between empiricists, who analyse the number of attestations any individual may make and argue that this is an indicator of political importance, and those who stress documentary provenance and purpose. In the context of the Anglo-Norman aristocracy and the politics of the 1090s and early 1100s the dominant empiricist has been C. Warren Hollister. In the 1970s and 1980s, Hollister undertook a wide analysis of relations between the Anglo-Norman aristocracy and the sons of the Conqueror. Using a methodology based upon a comparison of witness lists to surviving royal acta from the Conqueror’s reign to that of his son, Hollister concluded that a dangerous schism had been created between the cross-Channel magnates and a newly risen administrative elite, whom Hollister termed curiales. The prominence of these curiales in the surviving texts could only be explained by the gradual eclipse of the great magnates at the heart of the royal entourage and therefore the centre of political power. At the time of Rufus’s death, the split between magnates and curiales was as pronounced as ever, manifesting itself in the decisions made by the aristocracy to support either Henry or Curthose. As Hollister succinctly summarised ‘the war of 1101 pitted the curiales of the previous reign against the non-curial magnates.’

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86 For a detailed argument, see below, Chapter 5.
87 In particular see, ‘Magnates and “Curiales”’, 97-116; ‘Normandy, France and the Anglo-Norman Regnum’, 17-58; ‘Henry I and Robert Malet’, 129-136; ‘The Taming of a Turbulent Earl’, 137-144. All page references are to the collected edition of Hollister’s essays.
88 Hollister, ‘Magnates and “Curiales”’ MMI, 114. For critiques of the statistical approach undertaken by Hollister see, Barlow, Rufus, 210-213; D. Bates, ‘The Prosopographical Study of Anglo-Norman Royal Charters’, in Family Trees and the Roots of Politics. The Prosopography of Britain and France from the
The whole weight of Hollister's concept of a civil war rested upon the statistical analysis of the witness lists to surviving royal acta for Rufus, calendared in the first volume of the Regesta Regum Anglo-Normannorum, and the errata and addenda of volume two. In the context of the late 1080s and 1090s, issues of documentary loss, the overwhelmingly decentralised nature of the production of writs and the preservation policies of religious institutions, makes statistical analysis essentially meaningless. The temptation is to read the texts in a way that confuses form with function, and in the context of witness lists, to confuse those entrusted with supplying documentary authority to a text, with those who may be thought to have exercised an influence on the direction of royal policy.89 Diplomatic scholarship now stresses the social, political and legal context in which texts were produced. There is recognition of the value of reading these texts as narratives, and for the barriers between them and other sources to be broken down.90

Within this framework, it appears as though the beneficiaries of writs in the 1090s valued them as supplying a form of warranty in the preservation of lands, rights and privileges. Many of the concessions granted or confirmed to institutions were extremely minor, and would hardly have come to the attention of royal administration unless it had been for the efforts of the beneficiaries themselves.91 If read as a narrative on the social conditions prevalent in England in the 1090s they reveal a society still struggling to come to terms with the trauma of defeat and conquest. The historiography on the

_Tenth to Twelfth Century_, ed. K.S.B. Keats-Rohan (Woodbridge 1997), 89-102. Especially important is the appendix to _Henry I_, where Hollister maintained the value of his approach. Hollister, _Henry I_, 499-506.
89 Barlow, Rufus, 211.
90 D. Bates, _Re-ordering the Past and Negotiating the Present in Stenton's First Century_ (Reading, 2000), 4.
gradual expansion of royal involvement in local affairs and the link between the
Domesday inquest, writs and royal administration is well established. However, the
language adopted in the drafting of many of the writs suggests a cultural shift in the
perceptions of their beneficiaries’ vis-à-vis royal administration, stimulated by the
Domesday inquest itself.

The abbey of Bury St Edmunds provides the clearest example. Bury had a tradition of
obtaining confirmatory writs on the accession of each new abbot or king, and two writs
early on in Rufus’s reign confirmed Abbot Baldwin in his lands with sake and soke. The
difference from previous writs however, lay in the language of the injunction that
the abbot was to have his lands as they were on the day when the king’s father was alive
and dead, a reflection of the linguistic formula used in the Domesday Book. Nor are
any of the Bury St Edmunds writs exceptional. Other Bury St Edmunds charters display
the influence of Domesday in their drafting, particularly in the use of the clause tempore
patris mei. This undoubtedly reflected a conceptual link to the use of tempore Regis
Edwardi and tempore Regis Willelmi within Domesday, and is often used in conjunction
with these and similar clauses in the Bury texts. Moreover, this language can be found
in writs drawn up at other institutions. Three writs preserved at Abingdon used the same
wording and expressions as Bury St Edmunds to refer to the time of William the

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92 For example see, Fleming, Domesday Book, 68-83; D. Bates, ‘Two Ramsey Abbey Writs and the
Domesday Survey’, *HR*, 63 (1990), 337-9; D. Roffe, Domesday: The Inquest and the Book (Oxford
2000).
93 *Feudal Documents from the Abbey of Bury St Edmunds*, ed. D.C. Douglas, The British Academy,
Records of the Social and Economic History of England and Wales, 8 (London, 1932), nos 12, 13;
calendar, *RRAN*, 1, nos 291, 293; Cf. Bates, *Regesta*, no. 34; F. E. Harmer, Anglo-Saxon Writs
(Stamford, 1988), nos 8, 11, 12.
94 *Feudal Docs.* nos 12, 13. ‘...die qua pater meus vivus et mortuus’; *RRAN*, 1, nos 291, 293.
95 *Feudal Docs.* no.15. ‘...et omnes illos homines quos habuit in tempore Regis Eadwardi at in tempore
Regis patris mei... ’; *RRAN*,1, no. 294.
96 *Feudal Docs.* no. 15. ‘...sic est Edwardus rex et post eum Willelmus rex pater meus sibi concessit’;
*RRAN*, 1, nos 294, 392.
Conqueror and Edward the Confessor. Overall, writs drafted at Lincoln, Ramsey, Westminster and Thorney Abbey use similar terms. The adoption of this language also appears to have been used to express episcopal authority. A writ to Bishop Robert Bloet excused him from pleading for any churches or lands that Bishop Remigius had been in possession of on the day when he was alive and dead.

Undoubtedly this is much more than simply the adoption of a new administrative lingua franca. The language used in the writs emphasised a continuum of legitimacy across the Conquest and two changes of regime. As such, institutions that appear to have had a policy of record keeping under the Conqueror continued to keep records under Rufus and may have increased their rates of preservation. In some instances it is possible to ally the preservation of texts to evidence of sophisticated archival practices. The practice of witnessing writs by prominent members of the king’s entourage had developed slowly over the Conqueror’s reign to convey the impression that the writ in

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98 The list is far from exhaustive. For Lincoln see, Registrum Antiquissimum of the Cathedral Church of Lincoln, ed. C. W. Foster, 12 vols, Lincoln Record Society (Lincoln, 1932), 1, nos 12, 8, 9; calendared, RRAN, 1, nos 406, 305, 467; Ramsey, Cartularium Monasterii de Rameseia, ed., W.H. Hart and P.A. Lyon, 3 vols, RS (London, 1884), nos 146, 148; calendared RRAN, 1, no. 467;
99 Registrum Antiquissimum, no. 9; RRAN, 1, no. 467. ‘....de quibus Remigius episcopis saisitus fuit de sua vivus et mortuus fuit.’
100 For Example, Ramsey abbey has two surviving writs for the Conqueror, while this figure jumps dramatically to nineteen under Rufus. Bates, Regesta, nos 221, 222; RRAN, 1, nos 295, 296, 321, 322, 329, 330, 331, 332, 354, 373, 383, 413, 419, 447, 448, 449, 461, 462, 469.
101 Bury St. Edmunds was an abbey with an incentive to have good records in the years after 1066 given the scale of encroachments on to its estates. See, Cownie, Religious Patronage in Anglo-Norman England, 66-79. Bury appears to have had an active preservation policy across the regimes of both the Conqueror and Rufus. Five Latin and four Old English writs were preserved from the Conqueror’s reign, in comparison to seven writs for Rufus. Bates, Regesta, nos 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41, 42, 43, 54; Feudal Docs. nos 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19; calendared, RRAN, 1, nos. 291, 293, 392, 294, 393, 395, 394 respectively. Bury appears to have developed experience in the use of its archive. The abbey preserved a writ of the Conqueror on the grounds that it confirmed a bilingual diploma that upheld the monastery’s rejection of the claims by bishop Arfast for the abbey to be his see. According to the narrative of the diploma, Arfast lost his claim because he could not produce documents or witnesses in support. This sophisticated bureaucracy continued into Rufus’s reign, with one writ granting sake and soke and all the customs of the abbey. It was drafted with explicit reference to the same grants that were contained in previous writs of Edward the Confessor, William the Conqueror and Rufus. Bates, Regesta, nos 39, 40; Feudal Docs. no. 18; calendared, RRAN, 1, 292.
question reflected the king’s will. Moreover, these writs were drafted in order to be read out in local assemblies and courts, and thus presented a means to articulate increasing royal involvement into a local world, whose structures of law and government were still dominated by great magnates, but also open to abuse by the sheriffs and other royal officials.

In this context it is possible to explain why the majority of royal acta that survive for Rufus’s reign are in the form of writs, which in itself means that the witnesses to these texts have to be seen not only in the context of the diplomatic form of the texts, but also in the context of a local world, where religious institutions were vulnerable to infringements from great magnates and royal officials alike. The response to the Domesday inquest was to adopt its concepts as the means to give an existing policy of seeking writs as a form of warranty added emphasis and impact. Great magnates appeared to attest fewer documents under Rufus, not because they were being systematically excluded from power, but because a far higher number of documents were preserved that would not have ordinarily required their attestation. Overall, and given the conceptual framework in which Hollister viewed the cross-Channel aristocracy and the methodology he employed to interpret surviving royal acta, Hollister’s analysis undoubtedly underplayed the anxieties that contemporaries felt on the issue of succession, an anxiety that continued to be expressed in the texts written in the twelfth century.

By bringing the surviving evidence into focus with each other, and by addressing the profound historiographical changes, it becomes clear that the issues the aristocracy dealt

with during this period were the very stuff of high politics; regime change, succession and political legitimacy. All had been a feature of political life for generations and those who wrote about them knew precisely what the issues were and approached them with sophisticated systems of thought and analysis, even if the circumstances in which they wrote necessitated careful expression. Crucially, this explains the extent to which so many members and families of the political elite felt propelled to oppose the kingships of both Rufus, and then Henry, when the very notion of enjoying estates and political power under divided lordship was something they had experience of and practised for themselves. By placing the texts that discuss these issues at the forefront of any analysis, the actions of the Anglo-Norman aristocracy between 1087 and 1106 can be understood and placed into their appropriate context.

Acceptance of this immediately belies the notion of a homogeneous aristocracy responding to centripetal forces within the Anglo-Norman polity. In this, the historiography of the last twenty years, which has criticised the notions of homogeneity in structural terms, can be brought into focus with a historiography that has attempted to delve into the thought world of the wider western European aristocracy, and in particular, its efforts to deal with such complex concepts such as violence, rights and responsibilities.
PART ONE

CASE STUDIES
Chapter 2

The Cross-Channel Aristocracy and Attitudes to Succession:

1087 and 1100

Any analysis of the political actions of the Anglo-Norman aristocracy between 1087 and 1106 has to have as its starting point a discussion of the politics of succession and the attitudes of the cross-Channel aristocracy to the accessions of William Rufus and Henry I. The resulting themes of succession and legitimacy, power and kingship, loyalty and lordship are hardly new grounds for discussion. Yet examination of these themes within the interpretative framework set out in the Introduction, which seeks to re-define Anglo-Norman political culture primarily in terms that reflect the concerns expressed in contemporary and near contemporary sources, where discussion, disagreements and often violence turn on the axis of political legitimacy, is the essential foundation for the wider analysis undertaken in this thesis. It is also important to recognise that the use of new methodological approaches to the study of Anglo-Norman political discourse, particularly the concepts of ceremony and ritual, offer new insights into the way politics were conducted with clearly defined, but largely unwritten rules.¹ As such, it is crucial to have a wide understanding of the concept of political legitimacy, both in terms of the wider intellectual milieu in which politics were discussed, with clerical theorists looking to canon law, but also in

¹ G. Althoff, *Family, Friends and Followers. Political and Social Bonds in Early Medieval Europe* (Cambridge, 2004), 136-9. However, the dangers voiced by Philippe Buc on the use and interpretation of ritual need to borne in mind. For detailed discussion, see above, Chapter 1.
terms of secular aspects of the concept as it would have been understood by the leading members of the aristocracy and as it governed political relations.²

At the outset it is important to recognise that the issues under consideration are the very essence of medieval politics and this perspective must be maintained.³

Given their often-contentious nature there is an understandable temptation to view the succession politics of the late eleventh century in a retrospective fashion, largely as a series of political ‘crises’.⁴ Yet crisis is undoubtedly too strong an adjective to explain the politics surrounding the successions of 1087 and 1100 and the upheavals in the Anglo-Norman polity that followed, dramatic and violent though they may have been. The simple fact is that many of Rufus’s


³ See especially the comments of John Gillingham on the continuing flow of acquisitions after 1066, he remarked that these were caused by the ‘succession wars of William II’s, Henry I’s and Stephen’s reign, i.e. by the ordinary accidents of medieval politics.’ ‘Some Observations of Social Mobility in England between the Norman Conquest and the Early Thirteenth Century’, English in the Twelfth Century, 264-5.

⁴ For example, N. J. Higham, The Death of Anglo-Saxon England (Stroud, 1997), 152. In much of the literature there is something approaching a tautology in relation to the discussion of succession politics, whether expressed as the ‘crisis’ of 1066, or the ‘protracted’ succession disputes of the late eleventh century or the ‘struggles’ of the tenth century. For example, P. Stafford, Queen Emma and Queen Edith. Queenship and Women’s Power in Eleventh Century England (Oxford, 1997), 87-8; E. John, ‘Edward the Confessor and the Norman Succession’, EHR, 94 (1979), 241-67, who comments: ‘But to be intelligible the Norman Conquest needs to be understood as the climax of a crisis that had been going on for generations.’ One has to ask at what stage an ongoing sense of ‘crisis’ becomes the new norm. However, this is not to deny that issues of succession and injected a degree of urgency into the political process. Stuart Airlie’s definitions of a crisis as the ‘acceleration of the historical process’ and a ‘general sense of emergency’ is significant. S. Airlie, ‘The Nearly Men: Boso of Vienne and Arnulf of Bavaria’, 26. See also, the comments of Santiago Castellanos and Iñaki Martín Viso on the overall dynamism of political power and the opportunities and dangers this presented. ‘The local articulation of central power in the north of the Iberian Peninsula (500-1000)’, EME, 13 (2005), 1-42.
and Henry’s predecessors as English kings, including their own father, had
gained the throne, either through an effective *coup d’état* or with the support of a
faction in the face of opposition from other claimants.\(^5\) Indeed, the example of
the Conqueror’s own accession and that of his father to the ducal title in
Normandy revealed that even relatively stable succession patterns could be
manipulated.\(^6\) Therefore, rather than view the disputed successions of 1087 and
1100 as departures or crises in the ordinary flow of political discourse there is a
strong case for suggesting that both must be viewed as a normal and integral
parts. As such, many of the issues associated with the English succession in the
later eleventh century, and which attracted comment in the Anglo-Norman world,
also resonated in a wider European context.\(^7\) Though many of the issues faced by
the Anglo-Norman aristocracy in 1087 and 1100 had potentially grave
implications, it should not be imagined that the leading members of the
aristocracy were confronted with a situation that presented challenges to them
that could not be met.\(^8\) The choices and decisions made in 1087 and 1100 were
the actions of rational men in difficult, but not unprecedented circumstances.\(^9\)

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Magnificent had to make his accession appear to conform with custom, even if it did not.’ See
also, F. Lifshitz, ‘Dudo’s Historical Narrative and the Norman Succession of 996’, *JMH*, 20
\(^7\) The work of Elisabeth van Houts and Jane Martinedale, cited in the Introduction, remains
seminal in this context. Most recently, see, D. Bates, ‘1066: does the date still matter?’, *HR*, 78,
no. 202 (November, 2005), 460-1.
\(^8\) Marjorie Chibnall’s observations on the Conqueror’s claim to the English throne, particularly
that it had to be proved right and just ‘by every law known to be learnt’, should be juxtaposed
with the simple fact that many of the Conqueror’s most intimate supporters and counsellors in
1066, who would have been exposed to this sort of legal argument while deliberating the merits of
his claim, were also prominent rebels in 1088, including Odo of Bayeux, Robert of Mortain and
Geoffrey of Coutances. Chibnall, ‘Clio’s Legal Cosmetics’, 36. The evidence explored in Chapter
7, on the skill of the aristocratic negotiators in 1091 and 1101, should also be borne in mind.
\(^9\) This, of course, echoes the recent arguments of Professor David Crouch for the aristocracy in
With this in mind, much of the historiography of the last thirty-five years relating to the successions of Rufus and Henry I can be placed in its appropriate context as a preliminary for a new discussion. Much of the existing framework is firmly rooted in the constitutional, administrative and legal traditions of Anglo-Norman historiography and primarily looks to the inheritance practices of the aristocracy and what emanates from this as the source of political dispute. Professor J. C. Holt gave the tide momentum and built upon the initial observations of Génestal by focusing upon the distinction between *acquêts* and *propres*, an analytical framework which treated Normandy as a patrimony and had Curthose succeeding the Conqueror as his eldest son and heir, while England was treated as an acquisition which the Conqueror chose to pass onto his younger son, William Rufus.Emily Zack Tabuteau followed this line of reasoning to produce an important study that massively expanded this argument, weaving a textured analysis of the interplay between political considerations and customary legal constraints that she argued lay behind the Conqueror’s actions in 1087. In a context where most of the sources are perceived to be contradictory and somewhat inconclusive the attraction of this framework is obvious. As such, it continues to exert a profound influence.

Despite Professor Holt’s optimism that not much is left to be debated, there is a compelling argument for the successions of 1087 and 1100 to be explored.

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anew. It should be noted that the emphasis on aristocratic inheritance practices to explain the Anglo-Norman succession has always been questioned. John Le Patourel openly questioned the extent to which the Conqueror would have been influenced by the ‘laws of inheritance’ of those whom he ruled, and thus provided the catalyst for Emily Zack Tabuteau’s study. Professor Holt reflected upon his earlier arguments and questioned the extent to which the distinction influenced the Conqueror’s decision in settling his own succession.

Many scholars remain to be convinced that aristocratic inheritance practices offer a suitable framework to explore the issue, or whether succession to a kingdom or duchy can be seen in the same context as aristocratic succession. Professor David Bates has suggested that the ‘balance of probability’ favours Orderic’s account for 1087, with the underlying assumption being that no arrangements had been made for the English succession. Barbara English reached similar conclusions. Most recently, both Michael Evans and David Crouch have avoided discussing the issue at length, yet both have noted the inventiveness of contemporaries in dealing with the issue of succession, especially when faced with the intertwined problem of sons competing for a share of an inheritance in which the constituent parts are regarded as separate and indivisible units, yet the integrity of the whole is questionable.

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13 Holt, Colonial England, 158.
15 Holt, Colonial England, 149.
16 See especially, Barlow, Rufus, 41-9.
It might be argued that reliance upon inheritance customs to examine the issue of succession is actually a bar to historical understanding.\textsuperscript{20} The fundamental objection in using the framework of *acquêts* and *propres* is its inherent tendency to marginalise the political dimensions of succession and the very real problems and concerns faced by the aristocracy. For example, Emily Zack Tabuteau saw no inherent contradiction in discussing Curthose's claim to Normandy in largely political terms, yet invoked a legal rule 'about patrimony and conquest' to discuss Rufus's succession.\textsuperscript{21} In methodological terms, these discussions have also remained largely immune to wider developments in Anglo-Norman historiography, especially the importance of political ideas and the influence of canon law on the development of the English state; both have stressed the intellectual context in which the politics of the late eleventh and early twelfth century were conducted, and especially the importance of the concept of political legitimacy.\textsuperscript{22}

Of course it is nonsense to suppose that the leading members of the Anglo-Norman political elite needed to look solely to canon law and theoretical pronouncements for a framework of political legitimacy. Arguments about political legitimacy, succession and rule had been a feature of political life for generations throughout much of Europe.\textsuperscript{23} Any analysis of the political conduct

\textsuperscript{20} Strevett, 'Anglo-Norman Civil War', 168.
\textsuperscript{21} Tabuteau, 'Role of Law', 155. Cf. 152, 'It is not impossible that beyond these dynastic considerations, a specific rule of private law operated to require William to leave Normandy to Curthose.'
\textsuperscript{23} For a recent example of the importance of the concept to changing historical perceptions, see, Bates, *Conqueror's Adolescence*, 5.
of the aristocracy between 1087 and 1106 which seeks to argue that leading members of the aristocracy had a view about political legitimacy which ran counter to that held by William Rufus and Henry I and their supporters, therefore has to have at its heart a definition and examination of political legitimacy defined as much by the secular aspects of the concept, as by the religious. Discussions of the whole process by which English kings acceded to the throne in the eleventh century must take centre stage, particularly the crucial importance of designation as a source of political strength and legitimacy. The interaction of designation with considerations of prior obligations of lordship and homage, and the effects these had on the political process must also be integral.

One defining feature of the conduct of the magnates profiled in Part One of this thesis, and whose actions are at heart of the political upheaval of the late 1080s and 1090s, is the strength of their personal or family commitments to Robert Curthose, commitments which informed the conduct of these men and the choices they made as political actors. The consistent support given to Curthose in his two challenges for the English throne testify to the remarkable degree of coherence that had been engendered throughout the cross-Channel aristocracy and which withstood quite remarkable political pressures. Yet this consistency also fits into the wider pattern of succession politics for the eleventh century, identified by Pauline Stafford, where political systems are placed under strain, not by the actions of disputing a succession per se, but by the protracted nature of the dispute and the re-appearance on the political scene of those who challenged
for possession of the throne. To the list of Æthelræd in 1014, Harthacnut in 1040 and Edward the Confessor in 1041 can be added Robert Curthose in 1087 and 1100. Therefore, and what this thesis seeks to argue, is that the concept of political legitimacy is crucial to understanding the politics of the late 1090s and early 1100s. It provides a more coherent framework for exploring the conduct of the aristocracy as political actors. Doubts over the legitimacy of both Rufus’s and Henry’s kingships and, on two occasions, a belief that Robert Curthose had a preferable claim to the English throne lay, behind much of the dynamism and instability that punctuated the nineteen years between 1087 and 1106. It also makes the efforts by the leading members of the cross-Channel elite to achieve lasting peace settlements in 1091 and 1101 even more remarkable and deserving of a central place in any analysis.

Contemporaries and near-contemporaries certainly analysed events in these terms. Those writing in the early twelfth century showed an awareness that the issues faced by an earlier generation were worthy of study in contemporary circumstances, and whose views on contemporary political issues informed their analysis of the past. The most explicit example came from the pen of Orderic. He constructed two rhetorical scenes where the problems associated with royal succession and the partition of England and Normandy was spelt out. In the first scene, Orderic crafted a death-bed speech for the Conqueror where he recorded what he thought were the doubts expressed by the king in relation to the succession to the English throne. William recognised that he had won his crown by violence and not through hereditary succession; being a king was a completely

new departure for the Norman ducal family; and he did not know the means to transmit the kingship, so entrusted it to God alone, though expressing the hope that William Rufus would rule in England if God willed it.26

In a second scene, Orderic presented the arguments he thought had been put forward by sections of a rebellious aristocracy to justify its actions in opposing Rufus in 1088. It was claimed that Curthose was the first born, weaker and more pliable in character, and the aristocracy had already sworn fealty to him for their Norman lands. They doubted whether it was possible to serve two lords who were in the eyes of the conspirators, so different and lived so far apart. The dangers to the aristocracy of this situation were clearly spelt out, both in terms of compromising their oaths to Rufus and Curthose and the material dangers this presented to them.27

In essence, these two scenes sum up the problems faced by the cross-Channel aristocracy. The Conqueror’s death-bed scene, though highly rhetorical and amended over a period of time, reflects the underlying uncertainty behind the succession process.28 Though both in 1087 and at the time Orderic was writing the rules and customs governing the succession process were relatively undefined, a general consensus on the constitutive parts of the process, best described as ‘eligibility by birth, designation by the late king, election or recognition by the secular and ecclesiastical magnates, and consecration by the

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25 For example, M. Chibnall, The World of Orderic Vitalis (Woodbridge, 1996), 182-8; Weiler ‘William of Malmesbury’, 5. For a more detailed analysis see above, Chapter 1.
26 OV, 4, 90-94.
27 OV, 4, 122-6.
28 For Orderic’s various attempts to add to his death-bed scene for the Conqueror, see Cowdrey, ‘Death-bed Testaments’, 722.
church', had emerged. What the successions of 1087 and 1100 reveal quite clearly is the variable weight that could be attached to each of these criteria in changing political circumstances, and the opportunities and problems this presented, both to the aristocracy as a whole and to those claiming or in possession of the throne. When viewed in a longer perspective, these constituent parts can be equated to a process with a series of stages that both shaped and responded to shifting political priorities.

In terms of eligibility, all three sons of the Conqueror had claims to the throne. Significantly, the claims of the youngest son, Henry, appear to have been ignored until the death of Rufus in 1100. It is arguable that in terms of the emerging legal doctrine of porphyrogeniture, the right of having been born of a reigning king and queen, the claim of Henry could have been the strongest of the three brothers in 1087. William of Malmesbury later attempted a retrospective gloss on Henry's kingship by raising the doctrine within his narrative. More recently, attempts have been made to reconcile the claims of Curthose and Henry to the throne in 1101 by juxtaposing primogeniture with porphyrogeniture. However, there is no evidence from any of the sources that porphyrogeniture played any role in the actual successions of 1087 and 1100. The later use of the doctrine smacks of retrospective propaganda by Henry's clerical admirers, who were well aware of the equally uncertain nature of the succession of politics of their own day.

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30 The process of weighing each claim was evident at all levels of political society, as indicated by Orderic's comments on the English not recognising Curthose's claim in 1101. OV, 4, 314. For comments on the attitudes of the English sheriffs in 1088 and 1101, see, below, Chapter 3.
31 Compare Lanfranc's comments in a letter to Queen Margaret, written between 1070 and 1089, where Margaret's status was noted as 'regali stirpe progenita'. Lanfranc's Letters, no. 50.
32 GR, 1, 709.
Henry’s exclusion from consideration in 1087 is hardly surprising. Though doubts hung over the future of a cross-Channel polity, the indivisible nature of England and Normandy meant it could not be partitioned on a three-way basis. Likewise, Maine was not a suitable endowment for a young man in his late teens, given its strategic importance and the fact that Robert Curthose already had long-established rights to the county.34 Both Orderic and William of Malmesbury suggest that Henry had been made heir to his mother’s lands in Gloucestershire and Buckinghamshire, worth roughly £260-£320 per year, in addition to the large sum of money that he had been provided with by his father.35 Henry’s use of his inheritance in 1088 to help fund Curthose’s challenge for the throne in return for the lordship of the Cotentin, suggest a pragmatic acceptance of the settlement, possibly in line with previous ducal successions and the framework of accommodation that allowed for the principatus of Normandy to remain intact across several successions.36

William of Malmesbury included in his narrative a comment that Henry’s ambitions with regard to the kingship were beginning to take shape before 1087.37 However, there is no evidence to suggest that Henry was either in a position to challenge for the throne, or in any way considered a serious contender for the throne in 1087. Henry’s treatment by his two elder brothers, particularly after the Treaty of Rouen in 1091 and their rejection of any claim by Henry to a share of their father’s lands, suggest that his exclusion from consideration in

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33 Hollister, *Henry I*, 105.
34 Frank Barlow neatly sums up the arguments. Barlow, *Rufus*, 49.
35 *OV*, 2 214; *GR*, 1, 510; Hollister, *Henry I*, 40-1; Barlow, *Rufus*, 49.
36 Garnett, “‘Ducal’ Succession”, 94-5.
37 *GR*, 1, 542.
1087 had set the tone for his treatment throughout much of the early 1090s. The aims of the treaty will be examined in Chapter Seven, yet for now it should be noted that its primary aim was to regulate the mechanisms for future successions by recognising Rufus and Curthoese the heirs of their father and of each other in the absence of a legitimate heir from a marriage, and establish a reciprocal political relationship between the two men to take into the effects of Rufus's intervention into Normandy between 1089 and 1091. What is noticeable is that no one felt the need to account for Henry in the terms of the succession to the English throne. Indeed, the very public nature of the agreements further marginalised Henry as a possible claimant to the throne. Overall, there is no reason to think that Henry's bequest from his father in 1087 was not commensurate with his status, yet in terms of the wider succession politics he was something of a marginal figure while Rufus and Curthoese were still alive. For much of the 1090s Henry's chief political asset and his greatest problem was that royal blood flowed through his veins.

Henry's experience in 1087 shows quite clearly that eligibility was merely the pre-requisite for a claim to the throne to be made. A narrowing of those eligible to claim the throne was both desirable for the health and stability of the political system as a whole, as well as the starting point for decisions to be made on the basis of other criteria. No other contender for the throne emerged in 1087, either from within the aristocracy or the wider ducal kin, and no one championed the

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38 OV, 4, 250; Barlow, Rufus, 282-3.
39 Cf. the comments of Hugh the Chantor on the treaties, History of the Church, 16. ‘Qualiter inter fratres conuenit et satis notum est et nostra nichil interest.’
cause of Edgar Ætheling.\textsuperscript{41} This is a potentially significant change if Orderic is to be trusted on the motives of the rebels of 1075. In his account of the revolt, Orderic uses earl Roger of Hereford's motives for participating in the revolt to suggest that the attitude towards the kingship of some senior Norman magnates at this stage appears to have been to treat it as an office that could be assumed or discarded.\textsuperscript{42} Significantly, Rufus's attitude towards his kingship, despite having undergone the process of coronation and his education by Lanfranc, initially appeared to have echoed this perception. William of Malmesbury thought that during the revolt of 1088 Rufus declared that he would gladly resign the crown if it were thought to be the right course of action by the advisors appointed by his father.\textsuperscript{43} These comments by Orderic and William of Malmesbury reflect many of the arguments that circulated in Germany in the struggle between Pope Gregory VII and Henry IV on the nature of kingship.\textsuperscript{44} In contrast, by 1101, Henry was prepared to argue that once he had been crowned that made a resignation of his kingship impossible.\textsuperscript{45} Therefore, in terms of eligibility, the accessions of both Rufus and Henry need to be viewed as part of an ongoing process of refinement and development in deciding who could be considered as having a legitimate claim to the throne. The terms of the treaties of Rouen and Winchester reflect the increasing emphasis within the church on legitimacy and birth.\textsuperscript{46} Yet, though no

\textsuperscript{41} This of course, stands in direct contrast to the events of 1066. Barlow, \textit{Godwins}, 89-92.

\textsuperscript{42} \textit{OV}, 2, 310-22, esp. 314. '\textit{Unus ex nobis sit rex et duo duces; et sic nobis tribus omnes Anglici subicentur honores.}' Cf. the comments in C. P. Lewis, 'The Early Earls of Norman England', \textit{ANS}, 13 (1991), 221.

\textsuperscript{43} \textit{GR}, 1, 546. '\textit{Seorsum enim ducto magnum ingessit inuidiam, dicens libenter se imperio cessurum si illi et alisuideatur quos pater tuiores reliquerat.}'

\textsuperscript{44} Robinson, \textit{Authority and Resistance}, 124-31, particularly his discussion of Manegold of Lautenbach's \textit{Liber ad Gehehardum}.

\textsuperscript{45} \textit{Wace}, lines 10441-3.

claim to the throne could be made without satisfying the criteria of eligibility, the final choice was clearly governed by other considerations.

The designation of the previous ruler cannot be underestimated as a source of political legitimacy and a crucial step in turning eligibility into reality. Indeed, in their respective ways, the examples of both 1087 and 1100 reveal designation to be the central factor in any successful and secure accession. In 1087, Rufus arrived in England carrying a letter to Archbishop Lanfranc, which despite the vagueness of the various accounts that mention the text, reveal that his father had designated him as his successor to the English throne. The arguments of Barbara English, that the Conqueror had 'recommended' Rufus, but fell short of designating him are important, but ultimately unconvincing. There is nothing in the accounts of the letter that Rufus brought with him or in Lanfranc's actions following its receipt to suggest that the Conqueror had not designated Rufus as his successor, and Lanfranc subsequently acted in accordance with the Conqueror's wishes. Unsurprisingly perhaps, two Canterbury sources, the Acta Lanfranci and Eadmer stress the role and suitability of Lanfranc for his task.

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48 OV, 4, 96. '...epistolam de constituenbo rege fecit Lanfranco archiepiscopo....'. The translation by Chibnall as 'a letter to secure the recognition of the new king addressed to Archbishop Lanfranc', should be compared to the translation by Douglas and Greenaway as, 'a letter...on the appointment of a successor to the throne.' EHD, 2 (1981), 312. OV, 5, 202. '...epistolam regis de coronanda prole Lanfranco archiepiscopo...'.

49 English, 'Anglo-Norman Succession', 230-2. Cf. E. Mason, William II. Rufus the Red King (Stroud, 2005), 49, who argues that Rufus's consecration in Westminster abbey was proof that he had been designated as his father's heir. See also, Barlow, Rufus, 56.

50 OV, 4, 110. 'Guillelmus Rufus epistolam patris sui Lanfranco archiepiscopo detulit, qua perlecta idem presul cum eodem iuene Lundoniam properavit, ipsumque ad festiuitatem sancti Michaelis archangeli in ueteri basilica sancti Petri apostoli quae Westmonasterium dicitur regem consecravit.'

51 Eadmer HN, 24. Eadmer described Lanfranc as a 'vir divinae simul et humanae legis perillissimus', whose advice the Conqueror always relied upon.
William of Malmesbury echoed this when describing Lanfranc as the ‘moving spirit’ in Rufus’s coronation and ‘the most powerful influence in affairs’.\(^\text{52}\)

Though Eadmer portrayed Lanfranc as somewhat reluctant to crown Rufus, his views are jaundiced and somewhat unreliable.\(^\text{53}\) In contrast, the *Acta Lanfranci* is much more straightforward and the most explicit source, noting that Lanfranc chose Rufus to succeed as king as his father had desired.\(^\text{54}\)

Unlike the situation in Normandy, where Robert Curthose had been designated as his father’s successor years before his death, the Conqueror may have left the question of the English succession to his death-bed, but equally there is no reason to suppose that his designation of Rufus in this way was any less binding than Edward the Confessor’s designation of Harold in 1066. Indeed, by leaving his designation to his death-bed, the Conqueror can be seen to conform to the precedent set under the Confessor, both in style and substance; a very English way of designating a future successor that takes into account the rulers wishes and the will of God.\(^\text{55}\) Note too, should also be taken of the circumstances surrounding Henry I’s final days and the succession in England.\(^\text{56}\) The author of the *Brevis Relatio* was succinct in discussing both the ducal and royal accessions

\(^\text{52}\) *GR*, 1, 542-4.
\(^\text{53}\) Eadmer *HN*, 25; Barlow, *Rufus*, 56.
\(^\text{55}\) In general, see, Cowdrey, ‘Death-bed Testaments’, 720-1. The evidence from both the *Vita Æwardi* and Orderic, appear to suggest a lack of precision and possibly a degree of ambiguity on both occasions. The wording of the *Vita Æwardi* for 1066 reveals that Edward merely ‘commended’ Edith and the kingdom of England to the protection of Harold. Barlow, *Vita Æwardi*, 79. Orderic notes that the Conqueror’s sins were such that he dare not entrust the fæces...huíus regni to anyone but God, but expressed the hope that Rufus would reign if God willed it. *OV*, 4, 92. However, both Orderic and Edith had reasons to want an ambiguous text and there is no reason to suspect that both designations did not carry full weight, which is the implication of other sources which mention them. For Edith, see E. Mason, *The House of Godwine* (London, 2004), 135. For Oderic, Chibnall, *World of Orderic Vitalis*, 186-7; Cowdrey, ‘Death-bed Testaments’, 722.

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of 1087 in the same sentence and using the same term, which suggests that he did not regard the difference in the circumstances or timing of Curthose’s and Rufus’s respective designations to have affected its impact.\footnote{Crouch, \textit{Reign of Stephen}, 30-1; Hollister, \textit{Henry I}, 473-84.}

It is, however, William of Malmesbury who provides the strongest evidence of the importance of the Conqueror’s designation. It appears as though some sort of framework was established to oversee the transfer of power, with Roger de Montgomery described by Malmesbury as a \textit{tutor} to Rufus, appointed by the Conqueror to advise his son. References to a tutor in the narrative sources usually occur in the context of a ducal minority, clearly not applicable to Rufus in 1087. However, a quality associated with being a tutor is a degree of ‘wisdom’.\footnote{Brevis Relatio, 35. \textit{Antequam vero finiret fécit heredem de Normannia, Rodbertum filium suum de Anglia autem Willelum alterum filium suum.}} The need for mature and sound advice to ensure a smooth restructuring of the cross-Channel polity is reflected in Orderic’s use of biblical paradigms.\footnote{GR, 1, 546. William of Jumièges uses the term when commentating on the Conqueror’s minority. \textit{GND}, 2, 92. \textit{Is itaque dux in puellibus annis patre orbatus, sagaci tutorum providentia liberalium morum instituebatur ad increuenta.}’ William also noted that duke Robert entrusted his son to his tutors and guardians. \textit{...dux sub tutoribus et actoribus sapientia uigenitibus illum aduasque legitimam etatem subegit...} GND, 2, 80. William’s guardians are listed by Orderic as count Alan III of Brittany, Gilbert of Brionne and Osbern the steward, \textit{OV}, 3, 86; 4, 82. The tutors are mentioned as Turold, Ralph the monk and Master William. Fauroux, nos 220, 259, 262; \textit{GND}, 2, 92. Orderic also mentions a Thurkill as \textit{nutricium} to William, \textit{OV}, 4, 82. The deliberate use of two separate terms by William of Jumièges, suggests a division in responsibilities, with \textit{actors} fulfilling a more public role in the exercise of power and \textit{tutors} exercising a more pastoral role.} It hardly seems credible that any sort of framework would have been established had Rufus not been intended as the Conqueror’s successor, and his chances of becoming king not judged to be good. Yet, Malmesbury also provides direct and unambiguous evidence of the importance of designation. As part of his narrative, he constructed a rhetorical dialogue between Rufus and Roger de Montgomery during the course of the rebellion of 1088. Questioning his kingship reflected
badly upon the rebels, Rufus argued, because the ‘same man who made me king chose you as magnates’.

The lack of a clearly designated successor in 1100 almost certainly accounts for the hurried nature of Henry’s coronation. It may also account for the stronger terms in which Robert Curthose’s reactions to Henry’s accession are recorded, and a factor in the far more effective campaign that Robert and his supporters waged in 1101. Unlike the situation in 1087-8, there is no evidence of debate or equivocation among his supporters in England, no accusations of Curthose being overcautious. Whereas opposition to Rufus grew after his coronation, Henry immediately encountered opposition from within the aristocracy to his plans. Moreover, the choice in language in some of the narrative sources suggests a degree of uncertainty around the circumstances of his accession. The author of the *Brevis relatio* used the verb *suscipere* to state that Henry had ‘dared to receive the kingdom of England’, a verb generally used in a context of aristocratic succession when there were more than contender for an inheritance and the eventual heir may not have been the obvious choice. Arguably, the most revealing evidence of all is that once the Robert Curthose had landed in England he was received as king by his supporters.

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60 *GR*, 1, 546. ‘...idem enim se regem qui illos duces fecerti.’
61 *GND*, 2, 218-20; Wace, lines, 10322-3.
62 *GND*, 2, 204.
63 *Brevis relatio*, 37, ‘...quod regnum Anglie suscipere ausus fuisse...’. Cf., below, Chapter 1 and the use of *sucedere* and *suscipere* in the foundation narrative of Shrewsbury Abbey to describe the respective accessions of Hugh de Montgomery and Robert de Bellême to the earldom of Shrewsbury. The compilers of the text may well have been aware of the difference in the nature of Hugh and Robert’s elevation; with Hugh designated as the heir to Shrewsbury long before his father’s death, while Robert’s succession was a political decision and therefore subject to the use of *suscipere*. 

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The importance of designation also needs to be seen in the context of its effects on the next stage of the succession process, the ‘election’ of the king by the secular and ecclesiastical elite. At this point, the discussion becomes more complex, particularly in terms of the interaction between the theoretical concepts of legitimacy and the secular aspects of the concept. Also of crucial importance is a deeper, underlying problem, namely that on each occasion when the English succession was considered, Robert Curthose was already the legitimate ruler of Normandy with the full legal and political implications of this role realised in his relations with the cross-Channel aristocracy. Orderic’s reflections on the aristocratic motives in rebelling 1088 probably captures the flavour of the types of discussion that took place, mixing an assessment of Curthose as a potential English king with the underlying problems faced by the aristocracy, particularly the existing bonds of obligation and lordship that may have compelled many in the political elite to see Curthose as the natural heir to the Conqueror in England and obliged them to support him.64 For the aristocracy, the decision to partition England and Normandy in 1087, and the de facto continuation of that partition in 1100, cut across these ties and placed them in an impossible position, something Orderic, despite his views on the aristocracy as a whole, was ready to recognise.65

64 OV, 5, 314. ‘...et ab illustribus et opulentis qui confederati eum prestolabantur susceptus in regem bellum parauit.’
65 This would also help to account for the involvement of Robert de Bellême. See below, Chapter 5.
66 On Orderic’s use of biblical paradigms to explore this dilemma see, Strevett, ‘Anglo-Norman Civil War’, 172-3; above, Chapter 1. William of Malmesbury also offers a narrative where assessments on the nature of Rufus and Robert as rulers are presented as part of the reasoning behind Odo of Bayeux’s agitation against his nephew. GR, 1, 544. ‘Rotberto regnum competere, qui sit et remisitoris animi et iuueniles stultitias multis iam laboribus decoxerit; hunc delicate nutritum, animi ferotia quam uultus ipse demonstret pretumidum, omnia contra fas et ius ausurum...’.
There is no need to re-examine the evidence relating to Curthose having been designated as his father’s successor in Normandy well before 1087. Both Ralph Davis and Elisabeth van Houts have discussed the implications of this at some length, and especially the possibility that Curthose had exercised power in Normandy as duke before 1087. Whether Curthose had actually exercised power within Normandy before 1087 is not the crucial issue in this context. What is crucial is that by designating his successor the Conqueror had created a cross-Channel dimension to a traditional Norman political framework where, in the words of Orderic, once the ‘honor’ had been granted and homage given by the aristocracy for its lands, it could not be taken away, despite the deterioration in relations between father and son and Conqueror’s own wishes in 1087. The strength of these ties is reflected in William of Malmesbury’s account for 1087, where he noted the pressure that was applied to the Conqueror to ensure that Curthose succeeded him as duke in 1087.

If, as argued above, succession politics are best regarded, as part and parcel of the normal political discourse, then there is an urgent need to view the motives behind those members of the aristocracy who refused to let the Conqueror ‘disinherit’ Curthose within the longer perspective of the impact on Norman politics of the Conquest of England. It may not be too much of an exaggeration to suggest that the successful creation of cross-Channel complexes of estates after

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69 See also, Cowdrey, ‘Death-bed Testaments’, 716-24. OV, 4, 92. ‘Ducatum Normanniae antequam in epitimio Senlac contra Heraldum certassem Roberto filio meo concessit, cui quia primogenitus est et hominim pene omnium huius patriae baronum iam recepit concessus honor nequit abstrahi.’ See also, GND, 2, 202. Robert of Torigni supports Orderic in noting that Curthose had been designated heir for a ‘long time previously’. ‘Alterius enim dudum heres designatus fuerat...’

70 GR, 1, 510. ‘Normanniam invitus et coactus Rotbero, Anglian Willelmo, possessiones maternas Henrico delegavit.’
1066 introduced the issue of the succession into political discourse long before the Conqueror's death. There is sufficient evidence to suggest that fairly rapidly after 1066 the Conqueror may have had doubts over the feasibility of one individual being both duke of Normandy and king of England. The example of the Conqueror's involvement in the inheritance to the lands of William Fitz Osbern in 1071 is often taken as evidence of the development of aristocratic inheritance practices based upon the distinction between acquisitions and patrimonies, and for these to have had an influence on the Conqueror's thoughts in relation to 1087. Yet Orderic recorded that the initiative in settling the inheritance appeared to have come from the Conqueror himself. 'King William' wrote Orderic, divided his inheritance amongst his sons: William the elder received Breteuil and Pacy and the remainder of the paternal inheritance in Normandy...But Roger the younger brother...received the county of Hereford and all of his father's estates in England.\(^1\) There is essentially nothing in William's actions to suggest that by effectively dividing the family into Norman and English branches William was not using convenient aristocratic customs in order to improvise on the developing structures of the cross-Channel polity. Equally, given that most of the examples of a division of inheritance along the lines of acquisitions and patrimonies occur after 1087, there is nothing to suggest that the aristocracy could not improvise and adapt to changing political circumstances.\(^2\) William's intervention is likely to be a reflection of his own attitudes five years after his victory at Hastings, and possibly indicative of some uncertainty over the shape the future would take.

\(^{1}\) *OV*, 2, 282-4. Cf. Le Patourel, 'Norman Succession', 234, that there was 'no distinction in the Conqueror's mind between *propres* and *acquêts*'.

67
In political terms, the very process of elevating the Conqueror to the English kingship had created tensions throughout the body politic. Without repeating a well known narrative of events, the revolt of 1075, the arrest of Odo of Bayeux in 1082 or even the aristocratic dismay at Rufus’s apparent willingness to contemplate the hanging of the rebels besieged in Rochester in 1088, are but three examples which suggest the potential and limitations of royal power were being consciously worked out after 1066, and resulted in a few aristocratic casualties along the way.73 In this context, the continuation of a cross-Channel political complex after the Conqueror’s death was clearly open to question.

Nor should one assume that either the Conqueror or those around him had a clear conception of how the future should be planned for. Over a twenty-year period, and as relations between the Conqueror and his sons’ developed, different succession arrangements may have been considered. It would have been remarkable had the Conqueror not considered the possibility of allowing Curthose to succeed to England. In part, this might explain the apparently puzzling comments of William of Malmesbury and Robert of Torigni, both of whom, using the language of twelfth century inheritance practices, commented that Robert had been deprived of the ‘inheritance’ of England.74 Suger used similar language in his narrative to suggest that Rufus had disinherited Robert.75 Yet this must be contrasted with other terms. William of Malmesbury suggested

72 For a detailed discussion see, Chapter 8.
74 GR, 1, 502. ‘...quae et genitoris benedictione et hereditate frustratus, Anglia post mortem eis caruit, comitatu Normanniae uix retento.’; GND, 2, 202. ‘Alterius enim dudum heres designatus fuerat....’.
that Curthose had ‘abdicated’, with Rufus coveting the English throne as a result.\textsuperscript{76} Robert of Torigni uses the verb \textit{restituere} to imply that Curthose was urged to ‘re-conquer by force’ the kingdom of England, ‘taken away from him by his brother.’\textsuperscript{77}

Whether these comments amount to an actual suggestion that at some stage Curthose may have been designated by the Conqueror as his successor in England is difficult to gauge. As Professor Holt rightly points out, there is no evidence that Robert ever argued that he had been recognised as heir to the kingdom.\textsuperscript{78} William of Malmesbury, though writing to illustrate the inevitability of Henry’s kingship, expanded his comment on Curthose ‘abdicating’ his claim to the kingship and Rufus’s ambition to include a comment that Henry’s ambitions with regard to the kingship were also beginning to take shape and cause Rufus some concern.\textsuperscript{79} Perhaps the most sensible way to interpret these comments, which appear to suggest that Rufus and Henry somehow deprived Curthose of his inheritance of the English throne, is to recognise that no claim to the throne could be expected to stand on its own merits, irrespective of the changing political tides that flowed around it.\textsuperscript{80} However, for the many among the cross-Channel political elite the comments of the chroniclers suggest that even in the absence of a formal designation, there was clearly a desire if not an actual expectation that Curthose would succeed to England.

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{76} GR, 1, 542. ‘Spe sensim scaturiente iam successioni inhians, maxime post abdicationem fratr\textit{i} maioris, cum et tirocinium minoris nonnihil suspiceret.’
\textsuperscript{77} GND, 2, 204. ‘Cumque suifideles eum exhortarentur ut regnum Anglie sibi a fratre prereptum velocius armis sibimet restitueret...’
\textsuperscript{78} Holt, \textit{Colonial England}, 149.
\textsuperscript{79} GR, 1, 542.
\end{flushright}
In addition to the comments of the chroniclers, evidence of this can be seen in the politics of the 1070s and 1080s, and the growing estrangement between the wishes and intentions of the Conqueror to exclude Curthose from the English throne, and the preference of leading members of the aristocracy for a Curthose kingship, based in part on the simple fact that many in the aristocracy had already entered into a binding relationship with Curthose by giving prior homage for their lands in Normandy. One measure of this is the support given to Curthose in his rebellion against his father. Once in open conflict with his father, Curthose attracted a coterie of aristocratic youths from some very influential Norman families, including Robert de Bellême, Robert de Mowbray, Roger, son of Richard de Beinfaite and William de Bréteuil, many of whom would retain a loyalty to Curthose after 1087. Under the influence of these men, Curthose appears to have made two demands on his father. The first was for Curthose to have real power and influence within Normandy. According to Orderic, Curthose was not prepared to be William’s ‘hireling’. He was encouraged by his supporters to ask for the duchy, which had already been granted to him publicly before a great body of magnates who were able to testify to the fact. A second demand centred on England. Orderic is emphatic that Curthose was advised by his followers to, ‘rise up boldly’ and claim a share of the realm of England. It was alleged that his father was denying him the riches of his inheritance. In response, both the Conqueror and, significantly, Rufus thought it ‘shameful’ that

\[\text{\textsuperscript{81}} \text{OV, 3, 96-100. For Robert de Bellême, see below Chapter 5. For a provocative, but questionable interpretation of Robert’s rebellion, see W. M. Aird, ‘Frustrated Masculinity: The Relationship between William the Conqueror and his Eldest Son’, \textit{Masculinity in Medieval Europe} (London, 1999), 39-55.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{82}} \text{OV, 3, 98}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{83}} \text{OV, 3, 98.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{84}} \text{OV, 3, 96.}\]
Curthose should aim at the whole inheritance and considered himself equal to his father.\textsuperscript{85} William of Malmesbury commented that as a result of the dispute, Curthose forfeited both his father's blessing and his inheritance, failing to secure England and only just retaining Normandy.\textsuperscript{86}

It must be doubted whether Curthose could have attracted the support of such notable, if young figures in Norman politics, unless they had the tacit approval of their families for their actions.\textsuperscript{87} The examples of Robert de Mowbray and Robert de Bellême, discussed below, reveal that this was merely the start of their public association with Robert Curthose, an association that would help to significantly define their careers. Yet the episode is redolent with paradoxes. As William of Malmesbury makes clear, by engaging in rebellion, Curthose and his supporters ensured that the grounds were laid for permanent damage to be inflicted on relations with his father and, perhaps more importantly, as a consequence he forwent the Conqueror's designation as his successor to the English throne in 1087. In rebelling against his father and lord, Curthose had flouted the norms and conventions governing political conduct.\textsuperscript{88} Overall, there is a strong argument to regard the homage given to Curthose before 1087 as part of the structural instability built into the cross-Channel complex after 1066, and which would continue to play itself out during the 1090s and early 1100s.

In such circumstances, it is hardly surprising that clerical theorists turned their attention to potential solutions. George Garnett first drew attention to the

\textsuperscript{85} Ov, 2, 356-8.
\textsuperscript{86} GR, 1, 502.
importance of Lanfranc’s own copy of the Pseudo-Isidorian Decretals, brought from Bec to Canterbury and now in Trinity College Cambridge, to the whole question of succession and political legitimacy. The manuscript contains several marginal annotations that have direct relevance to many of the issues. One is beside canon 75 from the Fourth Council of Toledo in 633, which laid out the mechanisms by which ‘the bishops and the head men of the people’ would decide who should succeed to a kingdom. The inviolability of the king was reinforced by the stress placed upon the effect of anointing by the primate. The canon goes on to condemn anyone who disrupts the process through a tyrannical presumption, with threats of excommunication. Another marginal note appears in the manuscript beside a section from the first canon from the Seventh Council of Toledo, which states that anyone speaking or conspiring against a king would be liable to excommunication.

These annotations could have been made at any point from at least 1075 onwards when the manuscript was certainly at Canterbury, and possibly from the early 1060s when the manuscript was compiled, with the palaeographical evidence pointing towards a Le Bec origin. However, the suitability of these canons to

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88 This is expressed most clearly by Orderic’s use of biblical imagery to describe how Curthose was flouting God’s law and infringing upon the natural order of things. OV, 5, 300-2.
90 Garnett, ‘Coronation and Propaganda’, 108-9; Trinity MS B.16. 44, 328. ‘...aut praesumptione tyrannical regni fastigium usurpaverit, anathema sit in conspectu dei patris et angelorum, atque ab ecclesia catholica quam perfurio profanaverit efficiatur extraneus et ab omni coetu christianorum alienus...’.
91 Trinity MS B.16. 44, 336.
the circumstances of 1087 seems more than coincidental. Indeed, the emphasis within the text to the need for widespread consultation and the emphasis that a king who is not chosen by the ‘people’ is not only illegitimate, but also a tyrant, parallels the comments of other clerical writers in similar circumstances. William of Poitiers’ text suggests that extensive consultations took place between both the French and English before the Conqueror agreed to be crowned in 1066. In turn, the extensive consultations before the Conqueror’s own coronation parallels Wipo’s account of the coronation of the Emperor Conrad II in 1024.

The evidence from Lanfranc’s surviving letters suggests that this collection of canon law texts was used as a source of guidance in settling practical issues. But this may have been the exception rather than the rule. Unlike the fruitful corpus of polemical literature to emerge from the debate between the empire and papacy, the crucial point in this discussion is not whether these canon law collections actually influenced the political discourse in 1087 or 1100, or whether they provided a blueprint for the political elite to follow, but that the issues which concerned the political community as a whole found expression in these texts. Given Lanfranc’s gloomy prediction on the future after the Conqueror’s death, it would have been extremely surprising if the issues and problems associated with the English succession, and the restructuring of the cross-Channel polity, had not been thought about and discussed well before 1087,

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93 Gesta Guillelmi, 146-8.
95 Lanfranc’s Letters, no. 47.
97 Cf. Kantorocwicz, King’s Two Bodies, 51-2.
especially by the clerical theorists. In this, the question of the succession can be seen to be part of the wider intellectual milieu in which politics and many other aspects of secular life were discussed and debated.

To a degree, however, these texts are somewhat deceptive, particularly in their emphasis on the consultative role of the aristocracy. The part that any formal election played in the succession to the English kingship is difficult to determine. Many of the sources for 1087 stress the fact that Rufus was widely accepted as king. The Acta Lanfraci notes that Rufus was crowned after he had been 'elected'. The evidence for 1100 hints at more dubious 'elections'. The author of the Brevis Relatio could note that Henry had received the crown with the consent of all the French and English. In contrast, William of Malmesbury's account of 1100 is notable in that Henry's actions had generated some 'preliminary disputes' that had to be settled, and the haste with which Henry was crowned was out of fear that many magnates would repent of their choice. Henry's seizure of the treasury at Winchester had encountered opposition from William de Bretueil, who argued that an oath of loyalty that had been taken to Curthose and ought to be maintained. Overall, Orderic preferred

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98 Lanfranc's Letters, no. 1. 'Eo enim uiuente pacem qualemcunque habemus; post mortem uero elus nec pacem nec aliquod bonum nos habitores speramus.'
99 The obvious parallel here is Marcus Bull's discussion of knightly piety and the First Crusade, particularly the interplay between religiously inspired ideology and overtly secular values. M. Bull, Knightly Piety and the Lay Response to the First Crusade (Oxford, 1993).
100 Barlow, Godwins, 91.
101 GR, 1, 542; Brevis Relatio, 35; ASC, 1087.
102 Acta Lanfranci, 87. '...mortuo rege Willelmo trans mare, filium eius Willelmum, sicut pater constituit, Lanfrancus in regem elegit et.....sacravat et coronavit.'
103 Brevis Relatio, 37.
104 GR, 1, 714.
105 OV, 5, 290. Cf. Louis VI's accusations against Henry at the Council of Reims in October 1119 on his treatement of Robert Curthose. OV, 6, 256; above, Chapter 1.
to brush over the issue, yet he could not deny that Henry was merely the heir who was on the spot.\textsuperscript{106}

There are several observations that can be made in this context and contribute to an understanding of why many would question Rufus’s and Henry’s kingship after their consecration. The use of \textit{eligere} by contemporaries and references to consent suggest, as Christopher Brooke has argued, that this clearly played a significant part in their thinking.\textsuperscript{107} The evidence from the annotations in Lanfranc’s canon law collection suggests that wider consultations may have been envisaged in the circumstances of 1087. This emphasis on consent and consultation is reflected in the wider polemical literature from the dispute between Henry IV and the papacy, where the logical extension of regarding kingship as an office is to regard its holder as established in power by a \textit{pactum} with his subjects.\textsuperscript{108} Moreover, the power of kingship made the choice of the right man crucial.\textsuperscript{109}

Therefore, at first sight, much of the evidence for both 1087 and 1100 suggest that these theories of consultation were flouted, with substantial sections of the aristocracy excluded from the decision making process, with the result that question marks were raised over the legitimacy of both Rufus’s and Henry’s kingship. The two-week delay between Rufus arriving in England in September 1087 and his coronation by Lanfranc, could, if the injunctions in Pseudo-Isidore were followed, have involved the English bishops and the leading magnates in

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\item[\textsuperscript{106}] \textit{OV}, 5, 290.
\item[\textsuperscript{107}] Brooke, \textit{Saxon and Norman Kings}, 30.
\item[\textsuperscript{108}] Robinson, \textit{Authority and Resistance}, 125.
\item[\textsuperscript{109}] \textit{Ælfric Sermones Catholici}, ed. B. Thorpe (London, 1844-6), 1, 212.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
discussions. However, just who might be thought to comprise 'the head men of the people' in the circumstances of 1087 is open to question. Crucially, the Conqueror's half brothers and uncles to Rufus were in Normandy at this point, together with Bishop Geoffrey of Coutances. Not only were they senior members of the ruling elite, in the case of Odo of Bayeux and Robert of Mortain they were the senior surviving members of the ducal kin who might have been expected to play a significant role in the change of regime following the Conqueror's death. William of Malmesbury alludes to this in his comment that on release from prison, Odo confirmed his nephew in possession of his duchy. 

In 1101, a similar situation presented itself. Henry had been 'elected' and crowned before the news of Rufus's death and Henry's accession reached Hugh, earl of Chester, Robert de Bellême and 'many other magnates' all of whom, according to Orderic, were in Normandy at this point, most probably awaiting the imminent return of Robert Curthose. The crucial point connecting the successions of 1087 and 1100 is that on both occasions when an English king was elected, many members of the senior aristocracy who were most affected by the decision were unable to express their views and preferences.

In these circumstances the concerns expressed by many of the chroniclers were perfectly understandable. Robert of Torigini suggests that Curthose's first reaction on hearing of his brother's coronation in 1087 was with his usual 'simplicity', behaving 'almost as a fool'. "By the angels of God, if I were in

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10 For the chronology of events see, Barlow, Rufus, 55-7.
11 OV, 4, 104; Barlow, Rufus, 56.
12 GR, 1, 544. 'Namque cum ille, ut dixi, solitus a vinculis Rotbertum nepotem in comitatu Normanniae confirmasset....'
Alexandria, the English would have waited for me and they would never have dared to make him king before my arrival. Even my brother William, whom you say has dared to aspire to the kingship, would never risk his head without my permission.\textsuperscript{114} Torigni’s portrait of Curthose’s response is clearly a rhetorical device, but expresses quite clearly that avenues of consultation were not being followed in 1087. In 1101, Torigni noted Curthose’s response was merely anger at Henry’s seizure of the kingdom.\textsuperscript{115} Chapter seven discusses these responses in much more detail and in the context of political ritual, where expressions of anger act as a preliminary for a political settlement. Yet in the context of this chapter the crucial point is that Curthose, and many of his supporters, clearly felt excluded from the king-making process.

Yet equally, if the use of ‘election’ is restricted to a formal process of acknowledgement and acclamation, then the emphasis in 1087 and 1100 is somewhat different, though the sense of exclusion from the king making process remains.\textsuperscript{116} A parallel can be drawn with Harold’s coronation in 1066. The account in John of Worcester’s narrative suggest that Harold had been chosen by the magnates who had gathered at Edward’s bedside.\textsuperscript{117} However, it seems clear that Harold’s ‘election’ and acceptance had its base in the careful manoeuvring

\textsuperscript{113} OV, 5, 298. ‘Hugo Cestrensis comes et Rodbertus Belesmensis ac alii optimates qui erant in Normannia...’
\textsuperscript{114} GND, 2, 204. ‘Cumque sui fideles eum exhortarentur ut regnum Anglie sibi a fratre prereptum velocius armis sibimet restitueret, simplicitate solita et, ut ita dicam, imprudentie proxima, repondisse fertur: ‘Per angelos Dei, si ego essem in Alexandria, expectarent me Angli, nec ante adventum meum regem sibi facere auderent. Ipse etiam Willelmus, frater meus, quod eum presumisse dictis, pro capite suo sine mea permissione minime attentaret.”
\textsuperscript{115} GND, 2, 218.
\textsuperscript{116} Cf. Brooke, Saxon and Norman Kings, 30.
\textsuperscript{117} John of Worcester, 2, 600. ‘Quo tumulato, sub regulus Haroldus, Goduuni ducis filius, quem rex ante suam deceessionem regni successorum elegerat, a totius Anglie primatibus ad regale culmen electus die eodem ab Aldredo Eboracensi archiepiscopo in regem est honorifice consecratus.’
by Harold and his supporters once it was clear that Edward was dying.\textsuperscript{118} At the very least Harold's accession was unopposed and it could be argued that he could be the choice of the witan.\textsuperscript{119} Harold’s ‘election’ is best regarded as a formal acceptance his status as Edward’s designated successor and the man best placed to see off other contenders. Yet even in the staged managed circumstances of 1066, the sources reveal that Harold had faced opposition from the Northumbrians, who refused to accept him as king.\textsuperscript{120} The earliest and only example of what might be arguably called a formal assembly and election is in the aftermath of Cnut’s death and the contest between Harthacnut and Harold.\textsuperscript{121} Yet even here the situation is far from straightforward and as Frank Barlow remarked, the meeting at Oxford was a confrontation.\textsuperscript{122}

In this context, there is a need to make a subtle distinction between election and acclamation, and the more general rights of the aristocracy to offer counsel and be consulted on issues.\textsuperscript{122} The observations in the many of the canon law texts relating to consultation are clearly not statements of democratic principles, but do reflect the need to ensure that the political community accepted the choice of a new king, particularly when there may have been multiple claimants for the throne. In 1066, Bishop Geoffrey of Coutances presided over a joint ceremony

\textsuperscript{119} Barlow, \textit{Godwins}, 91. Cf. Althoff, \textit{Family, Friends and Followers}, 145. ‘Decision making within a small group of confidants was therefore a reality of medieval politics, but these consultations were not necessarily happy affairs.’
\textsuperscript{121} \textit{ASC}, 1035. Williams, ‘Some Notes and Considerations on Problems Connected with the English Royal Succession’, 161-2.
\textsuperscript{122} Barlow, \textit{Godwins}, 30.
with Archbishop Ealdred of York, ensuring that when the Conqueror was
presented to the assembly within Westminster abbey as king, both French and
English speakers could acclaim the new king.\textsuperscript{124} In terms of ritual and theology,
the acclamation of a new ruler also expressed the manifestation of God's divine
will through the participation of the people.\textsuperscript{125} By designating Rufus as his
successor and trusting in the judgement of God, it appears as though the
Conqueror fully understood and subscribed to this view. The danger is to read the
'elective' aspect of the king-making process in isolation.

Returning to the narrative of 1087, and using this revised definition of 'election',
the two-week delay between Rufus arriving in England and his coronation by
Lanfranc need not be thought of as a period of negotiation as such, with many of
the great cross-Channel magnates excluded. If any such negotiations did take
place, there is no reason why the voice of the great cross-channel magnates could
not have been heard through intermediaries. If anything, once Lanfranc had
received the Conqueror's letter confirming his designation of Rufus as his
successor, the two-week delay before his coronation reads as a statement of
intent, giving the aristocracy an opportunity to travel to be present at Rufus's
coronation and give homage to him. There is no inherent contradiction between
the haste shown by Rufus in leaving Normandy before his father had died, and a
subsequent delay of a few weeks once Lanfranc had agreed to carry out the
Conqueror's instructions. With the conditions of eligibility and designation met,
the keys to the treasury secured and the acceptance of Lanfranc and the

\textsuperscript{123} J. Hudson, 'Henry I and Counsel', \textit{The Medieval State,} ed. J. R. Maddicott and D. M. Palliser
\textsuperscript{124} \textit{Gesta Guillelmi,} 150.
\textsuperscript{125} See, for example, Nelson, 'Hincmar of Reims', 24.
arrangements for the coronation in place, there was an need for the coronation to be attended by as many magnates as possible in order for it to have full impact.\textsuperscript{126} It seems likely that individual magnates, if not present at Rufus's coronation, would have travelled to England to give homage for their lands.\textsuperscript{127} The Christmas court of 1087 would have provided the first formal occasion for a crown wearing following Rufus's coronation. In fact, Rufus's actions after his coronation, particularly in making extensive donations to churches and the poor for his father's soul, suggest that he fully understood the need to act in a recognised manner that conformed to contemporary perceptions of kingship.\textsuperscript{128}

In contrast, Henry’s ‘election’ by his supporters who were with him at Winchester, reveal the other side of the acceptance process. This, together with his hurried coronation only three days later, had all the characteristics of a palace \textit{coup}, and was regarded as such by Robert Curthose.\textsuperscript{129} The crucial difference between 1087 and 1100 lay in the absence of any sort of designation by the previous ruler, and any sort of wide-spread acclamation for Henry within the cross-Channel elite. As both Curthose and Henry had initially been passed over for consideration in 1087, it is arguable that the emphasis on consultation and election in the canon law texts might have had greater relevance in 1100.

Nevertheless, the implications of William of Malmesbury’s comments on the

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\item[126] This certainly is the implication of the chronology set out by William of Malmesbury. \textit{GR}, 1, 542. However, the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle suggests that Rufus did not have custody of the treasury until after his coronation. \textit{ASC}, 1087. It seems likely that the Chronicle is referring the customary final audit of accounts, rather than a delay in taking possession. Barlow, \textit{Rufus}, 63. Overall, the comments of Frank Barlow appear to capture the balance of considerations, though I would emphasise that the hazard might be overstated, \textit{Rufus}, 57. ‘Lanfranc steered the right course between an indecorous and private coronation, which could have been challenged as unlawful, and unnecessary and hazardous delay.’
\item[127] This certainly was the case for the restoration of Odo of Bayeux to the earldom of Kent. \textit{GR}, 1, 542.
\item[128] For Rufus's actions after his coronation, see most recently, Mason, \textit{Rufus, the Red King}, 51.
\item[129] \textit{GND}, 2, 220; \textit{OV}, 5, 300, 306-8.
\end{itemize}
haste for Henry's coronation out of a fear that the aristocracy would change its mind, shows that any argument that Henry might have advanced for his 'election' to be regarded as valid could be challenged in these circumstances.\(^{130}\) To many in the aristocracy, Henry provided to be an unacceptable choice, reflected in their mocking of him and in the actions of many individuals, including William of Mortain, in making extravagant demands on Henry that could not be met.\(^{131}\) Indeed, Henry's near collapse with nervous exhaustion in 1101 reveals the precariousness of his position and the very real danger that Curthose's challenge for the throne presented.\(^{132}\) Unlike the relatively smooth transfer of power in 1087, Henry's coronation charter hints at more troubled circumstances, a reflection perhaps of the greater degree of uncertainty surrounding his claim to the throne.\(^{133}\)

Henry's haste in arranging his coronation testifies to its importance as the last stage in the king making process in transforming a designated and elected claimant to the throne into the *christus domini*, the Lord's Anointed, the divinely sanctioned receptacle of legitimate political authority.\(^{134}\) Frank Barlow's observation that consecration by the church was not absolutely essential must be challenged.\(^{135}\) The coronation publicly and ritually sealed the constitutive elements of the king making process, whereby the claimant to the throne had been designated, elected and granted possession of throne and kingdom. Most importantly of all, the coronation publicly vindicated the victor of a political


\(^{131}\) See below, Chapter 5.

\(^{132}\) Eadmer *HN*, 126.

\(^{133}\) Garnett, 'Coronation and Propaganda', 114.


\(^{135}\) Barlow, *Godwins*, 91.
struggle and provided testament of God's will. By setting the king above and apart from other men, two sources of fundamental authority were fused into the person of the monarch, that of feudal lordship and sacral kingship. Kingship served a traditional role as a force to contain, harness and institutionalise aristocratic interests that could tear the polity apart if left unchecked.

However, in the circumstances of both 1087 and 1100, the coronation of Rufus and Henry I created a further conditional factor in the already complex process of succession, namely in the king's ability to command fealty for lands in England. Rather than counteract the effects of the homage given to Curthose in a Norman context, Orderic's account for aristocratic motives in 1088 reveal that this merely complicated matters further for the cross-Channel aristocracy. Nor was this the first time that homage given in England had a cross-Channel dimension. As Professor Holt has rightly remarked, the oath given at Salisbury in 1086 was 'not intended to sustain liege lordship in England but to shatter liege lordship in France'.

Contemporary sources repeatedly stress that rebellion against the king was a violation of sworn fealty and homage. In a letter to the Conqueror in 1075, Lanfranc described the rebels of that year as 'oath-breakers'. In 1101, those who had aided Curthose were fined, disinherited or banished after being charged

140 For example, the comments Orderic attributes to Waltheof. OV, 11, 314; Leges Henrici Primi, 10.1, 12.1a, 13.1.
141 Lanfranc's Letters, no. 34.
with violating ‘their pledged faith in many ways’. Yet, Rufus’s treatment towards the rebels of 1088 was characterised by its restraint. In between, the rebellion of 1095 saw the selective application of extreme judicial penalties and Robert de Mowbray imprisoned for life. As Paul Hyams has remarked, no loyalty was absolute. One reading of the challenges faced by Rufus and Henry between 1087 and 1106 would be a gradual hardening of their attitudes towards rebellion as political circumstances changed, and as it became clear that giving homage for English lands would not substantially alter the effects of earlier obligations in Normandy. One possible explanation of this degree of differentiation lay in William of Malmesbury’s account of the revolt of 1088. Apart from Odo of Bayeux and Geoffrey of Coutances, once the rebellion had been defeated all the rebels were ‘admitted to take the oath of allegiance’. In effect, the rebels were invited to renew their homage to the king. As a consequence of this any future rebellion against Rufus, as in 1095, was likely to encounter more extreme counter measures and penalties. Though, as will be argued in Chapter Four, the rebels of 1095 may have harboured continuing doubts over the legitimacy of Rufus’s kingship, their actions in rebelling after being given the opportunity to renew their homage in 1088 invited the strongest possible response. In this context, Gaimar’s observation that Robert de Mowbray was guilty of the same crime as Waltheof, takes on a slightly different perspective if juxtaposed to Orderic’s rhetoric on Waltheof’s reluctance to be

142 OV, 12.
143 Sharp, ‘William II and the Rebels’, 156.
144 See below, Chapter 4.
145 P. Hyams, Rancor and Reconciliation in Medieval England (Cornell, 2003), 75.
146 GR, 1, 548.
147 Barlow, Rufus, 85. The symbolic importance of this act may also explain why the cathedral priory of Rochester appeared to have been regarded by many members of the king’s entourage, particularly his sheriffs, as worthy of limited patronage. See below, Chapter 8.
unfaithful to his lord and 'utterly desecrate' his faith. This context may also explain why the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle consistently refers to the rebels of 1088 as 'Frenchmen'.

Arguably one factor in influencing Rufus's attitude in 1088, apart from the intercessions of friends and relatives of the rebels, lay in the fact that their behaviour was understandable given their prior homage to Curthose. The advice given to Rufus that 'the man who does an injury today may perhaps serve as a friend in the future' suggests a recognition for flexibility. The actions of William de Breteuil in 1100 in opposing Henry on the grounds that an oath had been taken to Curthose, testifies to the power of prior obligations in shaping political action, perhaps explaining why the *Leges Henrici* consistently link together rebellion and infidelity. Moreover, it should be noted that in 1088, Lanfranc made no effort to excommunicate the rebels unlike in 1075, when he excommunicated earl Roger of Hereford and his supporters. In 1101, ecclesiastical sanctions are hinted at, but only in so far that Eadmer records that Anselm impressed on the king's supporters that any desertion of Henry would incur God's curse. Arguably, these facts alone suggest that contemporaries regarded the disputes occasioned by the accession of Rufus and Henry as qualitatively different to earlier rebellions, and in the context of 1088, elicited a suitably complex response.

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149 *ASC*, E, 1088.
150 *Leges Henrici Primi*, 10.1, 12.1a, 13.1.
151 Lanfranc's Letters, 33A.
152 Eadmer *HN*, 127-8.
With this in mind, the salient and most puzzling feature of the instability that occurred between the Conqueror’s death and Henry’s victory at Tinchebray can be explored. The degree of consistency in the support given to Rufus, Henry and Curthose by many individuals and families, has posed problems for modern historians. Significantly, apart from Odo of Bayeux, many of those who were to initiate so much instability in 1087 had unblemished records of loyalty to Conqueror’s regime. In 1088, Curthose could count on the support of his uncles, the Conqueror’s half brothers Robert of Mortain and Odo of Bayeux. In addition, support initially came from Bishop Geoffrey of Coutances and his nephew Robert de Mowbray, earl of Northumberland, Roger de Montgomery, earl of Shrewsbury and his son Robert de Bellême, Gilbert de Clare, William, son of Robert, count of Eu. Also involved was Eustace, count of Boulogne. 153

Significantly, all of these men were members of the ducal kin or part of the ruling elite that had governed Normandy before 1066. In his second challenge, Curthose was supported by essentially the same coalition of magnates and families who had supported him in 1088. In some instances the intervening years had seen several deaths among the major nobility, with sons inheriting their fathers’ titles and cross-Channel estates. Robert de Bellême had succeeded to his father’s earldom of Shrewsbury, and was joined by his brothers Roger and Arnulf, while William of Mortain had succeeded to his father’s lands and title. 154 In addition, William II de Warenne followed a different course from his father and joined the ducal party, together

154 For details, see below, Chapters 5 and 6 respectively.
with Walter II Giffard, earl of Buckingham, Ivo de Grandmesnil, Robert de Lacy, lord of Pontefract and Eustace III, count of Boulogne.\textsuperscript{155}

In contrast, both Rufus and Henry owed their survival to those members of the aristocracy whose interests and lands were predominately based in England. Especially prominent were those Normans who had prospered in royal service, and in particular, those who had assumed the office of sheriff.\textsuperscript{156} Support also came from those members of the cross-Channel aristocracy whose Norman lands lay on the fringes of the duchy, where ducal power had always been difficult to enforce, in particular, Hugh d'Avranches, earl of Chester.\textsuperscript{157} However, William de Warenne's involvement in 1088 is also notable, as his lands lay close to the heartlands of ducal power.\textsuperscript{158} Nor were the sides static. Henry found supporters from those to whom he had developed close personal ties, stretching back to the late 1080s, when he attempted to establish himself in western Normandy, including Richard de Redvers; or came from families whose lands were concentrated mainly in England or lay outside of Normandy, as was the case of the Beaumont brothers, Robert count of Meulan and Henry, earl of Warwick. Also listed as partisans of Henry in 1101 were Roger Bigod, and Robert fitz Hamon.\textsuperscript{159}

\textsuperscript{155} OV, 5, 308; ASC, E 1101; Hollister, 'Anglo-Norman Civil War', 79-80; Henry I, 132. 
\textsuperscript{156} For a full appraisal of the role of the sheriffs in the events of 1088 and 1101, see below Chapter 3; Barlow, Rufus, 73.
\textsuperscript{158} Hollister, 'The Taming of a Turbulent Earl: Henry I and William of Warenne', MMI, 137-44; Green, Aristocracy, 31; Loyd, Origins, 111; idem, 'The Origin of the Family of Warenne', Yorkshire Archaeological Journal, 31 (1934), 97-113.
\textsuperscript{159} OV, 5, 298; GR, 1, 716.
Previous attempts to explain this support have been unnecessarily complex. C. Warren Hollister sought to explain the choices made by the aristocracy through a complex argument that focused upon the changed nature of politics under Rufus, which allegedly saw the development of a cleavage between the great landed magnates and those who made their careers in the service of the king. 160 Paradoxically, the reality is much more straightforward. The actions of the Conqueror and the ambitions of his sons had placed them in conflict with many of the most senior members of the cross-Channel aristocracy. The Conqueror’s decision to have Rufus as his preferred successor in England, his designation of him in 1087, and Henry’s coup in 1100 effectively marginalised many members of the senior aristocracy, and provided the environment where many members of the ruling elite and their families could question the legitimacy of Rufus’s and Henry’s kingship. As the remaining case studies will demonstrate, these doubts found expression through support for a Curthose kingship in 1088 and 1100 and in open rebellion in 1095.

160 'Magnates and “Curiales”', MMI, 97-116.
Chapter 3

The Sheriffs and the Crises of 1088 and 1101

It was Frank Barlow who first commented on how the loyalty of the sheriffs in general, and that of the sheriff of Kent in particular, was crucial in suppressing the revolt of 1088.¹ The political importance of royal officials has long been recognised, with its strongest articulation expressed through the development of the concept of curiales in the 1970s by Professor C. Warren Hollister. His interpretation of the crisis of 1101 as a civil war fought out by factions that had formed in Rufus’s reign, and based upon the seeming division between great landed magnates and royal officials was both provocative and also the first real attempt to chart the political importance of royal officials in the major political crises of the 1090s and early 1100s.²

Though Hollister’s interpretation of the events of 1101 as a civil war must be rejected, and the validity of viewing the aristocracy through the artificial division of curial and non-curai questionned, the central problem remains of explaining why, on two occasions, royal officials apparently regarded a Curthose kingship as inimical to their interests. The majority of discussions have been located within a framework of analysis that rightly stresses the diversity of aristocratic interests, ambitions and responsibilities. Frank Barlow identified motivation in the need to ensure a continuity of office-holding where the foundations could be laid for their families to enjoy enduring local prominence. Both Judith Green and Richard Abels have produced important studies that

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¹ Barlow, Rufus, 72-3, 187-90.
² Hollister, 'Magnates and “Curiales”', MIII, 97-115; 76-96. For a critique of Hollister see, N. Strevett, 'The Anglo-Norman Civil War of 1101 Reconsidered', ANS, 26 (2004), 159-75.
have explored the careers of many of the most important sheriffs and the various benefits to them of office-holding.  

The Introduction to this thesis charted the changes in the way the aristocracy is now viewed, and the implications of this for any reappraisal of the political culture of the Anglo-Norman aristocracy. Implicit within this is the challenge to reassess the motives and actions of the sheriffs in choosing to support Rufus and Henry in 1088 and 1101. The prosopography of the last twenty years have produced studies which has stressed the origins of office holders in both 1088 and 1101 as tenants of those closest to the centre of power in pre-1066 Normandy. In broad terms, the development of extensive cross-Channel estates often facilitated their introduction into England as tenants of their Norman lords. However, the opportunity for royal service in England acted as a counter-weight to these ties, and gave these men an independent power base from which they were able to construct careers of local importance. Service to the English king was an engine of social change and advancement, as indeed had been service to the Norman duke, though the scale of the process was radically different by the twelfth century. Accumulation of land and estates remained the motor behind social advancement, and on a wider scale, the exercise of serious political power and lordship on a local and trans-regional basis. Therefore, for many of the sheriffs in 1088 and again in 1101, the prospects of a Curthose kingship and a retrenchment of former lords and patrons were distinctly unappealing.

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4 The detailed prosopography on individual sheriffs will be listed in the footnotes that follow as appropriate. However, for comments on this approach in general see David Bates' comments on Hugh de Port in, 'Kingship, government and political life', 79.
There is, however, an urgent need to place this prosopography within a definitive narrative framework for the events of 1088 and 1101. The decisive military role played by the sheriffs in 1088 and 1101 suggests that the power of acting as the king’s representative in the localities not only provided a vehicle for personal and family advancement, all of which can be interpreted in a traditional manner, but may also constitute a further centrifugal force that at times of political crisis inevitably drew the sheriffs away from the very people whose connections provided the means for them to initially access office and begin their careers. This is thrown into sharp relief when it is recognised that many of the issues faced by the most prominent sheriffs in 1088 and 1101 were hardly new. As early as 1075 the response of sheriffs to the revolt of the earls Roger of Hereford, Waltheof and Ralph de Gael, point towards a situation where the sheriffs who were in office in 1088 and 1101 may not have had to think too deeply about the choices they were asked to make.

It is somewhat surprising, given the importance of both campaigns, that neither has been subjected to close scrutiny by specialist military historians, with the battle of Tinchebray generally regarded as the first major engagement of note to follow the battle of Hastings. In strategic terms, Rufus’s success in suppressing the rebellion was due to the speed with which individuals and groups of rebels could be isolated and defeated, or an agreement reached with them before the rebellion as a whole had time to coalesce.

Thirteen years later and Henry I was able to gather sufficient forces not only to guard the

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6 For modern narratives of the campaigns of 1088 and 1101 see, Barlow, Rufus, 74-85; Hollister, Henry I, 134-42. The rebellion in the West Country is likely to have been settled by agreement before the siege of Rochester. See below, Chapter 4, for a full argument and references.
south coast, but also retain the initiative to react quickly to a rapidly changing and
dangerous situation. Curthose’s success in 1101 in avoiding an English fleet sent to
intercept him and his eventual landing at Portsmouth effectively outmanoeuvred Henry,
yet he retained sufficient military strength to deter Curthose and his advisers from
seeking a decisive military engagement and ensured that a negotiated settlement could
secure him his throne. In both cases, without the rapid and effective deployment of
forces that could be counted upon to remain loyal, it is doubtful whether either Rufus or
Henry could have prevented a Curthose kingship.

Many aspects of each campaign remain unclear, especially the nature and composition
of the forces recruited by Rufus and Henry. Contemporary and near-contemporary
accounts place an emphasis on the willingness of the English to fight for both kings.
This is a notable thread connecting all the major narrative sources and a prominent
patriotic note among the accusations of treachery and betrayal. In the most recent
discussion, Professor David Crouch has suggested that Rufus appealed to the ‘still
powerful’ constituency of ‘free’ English landowners for support in 1088. Without
deﬁning his terms or addressing the question of the composition of Henry’s army in
1101, what appears to have led Professor Crouch to conclude that the free English
landowners rallied to Rufus was the emphasis in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle on Rufus’s
promises to lift many restrictions and financial constraints.

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7 Wace, lines, 10359-96. See above, Chapter 7.
8 OV, 4, 124, 5, 314; GR, 1, 362, 716; ASC, E, 1088; John of Worcester, 3, 48.
9 Crouch, The Normans, 133.
The obvious point to make in this context is that Rufus's promises, together with Henry's coronation charter in 1100, should be read more as general promises of good government that inevitably follow a coronation, rather than a specific set of negotiations aimed at securing support. The repeated emphasis in the sources on the loyalty of the English to Rufus and Henry in itself suggests that those who used the noun either had no idea of the composition of each army, or knew the composition perfectly well and wrote in terms that would be widely understood. The suspicion has to be that the use of English in this way is more likely to be a reflection of a rather loose phraseology on the part of the chroniclers. One means of demonstrating this is to draw a parallel between the descriptions of the royal forces in the campaigns of 1088 and 1101 and the English forces used in the campaign of 1016 against Cnut. The army recruited to face Cnut is reported to have come from the 'entire English nation', as opposed to specific shires, with penalties for those who disobeyed the summons. Richard Abels has conclusively demonstrated that the logistics of that particular campaign militates against a literal reading and would suggest that the use of 'entire English nation' served as a shorthand for a summons issued by Edmund throughout all the English shires, aimed at those who were trained and eligible for service, in particular members of the fyrd. Moreover, the account of the campaigns in the 'D' version of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle specifically uses fyrd as the noun to describe the English army raised by Edmund.

A close reading of the narrative sources for the campaigns of 1088 and 1101 suggests that the bulk of the forces deployed by Rufus and Henry was similarly composed of

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11 ASC, C, D, E, 1016.
members of the *fyrd*, and in the specific context of this chapter, almost certainly organised and led by the local sheriff. Unlike the earlier campaign of Edmund, the term used by the ‘E’ version of the Chronicle to describe the army raised by Rufus in 1088 was *here*, though *fyrd* was used to describe the army of 1101. The mobilisation and deployment of the *fyrd* was consistent with the other attempts made by Rufus and Henry to call upon all the resources at their disposal to meet the challenge of their elder brother. Moreover, the nature of the two campaigns in 1088 and 1101 reveal that those men who served in the royal forces were members of a sophisticated military body, drawn from the ranks of those who had military training and were eligible for military service, and who could be rapidly mobilised and deployed in the areas of greatest threat.

Twelfth-century Latin historians supplied further information that confirms the role of the *fyrd* in both campaigns. John of Worcester recorded that Rufus initially based himself in London where, ‘confident in his royal rights’ he sent envoys summoning those he believed loyal to his side and requisitioning provisions. The response to his summons enabled Rufus to field an army that was described as being of a moderate size, composed largely of foot soldiers and horsemen, with the latter possibly a reference to the members of the *familia regis* in the king’s company, many of whom were also serving sheriffs. Later in the campaign, Rufus was able to call upon further men to

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14 ASC, E, 1087 (1088), 1101. *The Anglo Saxon Chronicle: A Collaborative Edition*, 7, MS E, 100, 111. Under its entry for 1088, the Chronicle records Rufus marching with his army towards Rochester and on hearing that Bishop Odo had made for Pevensey, pursued him there. ‘Se cyng mid his here ferde toweard Hrofeceastre.....se cyng mid here ferde after.’. In 1101, Henry and his army awaited Curthose at Pevensey. ‘Da to midde sume ran ferde se cyng ut to Pefenesse mid eall his yrde togeanes his broder...’. Michael Swanton has discussed the use of both terms and noted that by the eleventh century, both terms were synonymous and are used on different versions of the Chronicle to describe the same force. *The Anglo-Saxon Chronicles*, ed. and trans. M. Swanton (London, 2000), Introduction, 33-4.

15 Liber Eliensis, 218; Eadmer HN, 126; Hollister, *Henry I*, 137.

16 John of Worcester, 3, 50. ‘...iure autem regio, militari, ut impiger, fretus audacia, mitted legatos, vocat quos sibi credit fidos, vadit Lundoniam, belli tractaturus negotia, expeditionis prouisurus necessaria’.

17 On the links between the royal household and the sheriffs, see Green, ‘Sheriffs’, 135-6.
relieve those troops who had served from the start, together with the craftsman and labourers needed to construct two siege castles and maintain the infrastructure necessary for a blockade at Rochester. Failure to meet the royal summons ran the risk of incurring penalties, and in particular, to have been declared a ‘Nithing’. As Rufus rightly judged the main theatre of military operations to be Kent and the south-east, and given the timescale between the initial report of the outbreak of hostilities in March and their escalation after Easter, a period of four weeks at most, it would appear as though John of Worcester’s statement regarding London as Rufus’s base of operations was correct. A likely chronology for 1088 would therefore have Rufus initially deploying elements of the local fyrd from the counties surrounding London and then issuing a general summons for further men.

In 1101, Henry adopted a strategy that bore a remarkable similarity too that of Harold in 1066. Henry’s movements in the summer of 1101 suggest that he could not be sure of exactly where or when Robert Curthose would land, but eventually judged that Pevensey Bay either offered the most likely spot, or was a convenient staging post. Henry’s dispositions were essentially defensive. Yet during this period, Henry and the forces he had with him were far from idle. In a memorable passage from the Gesta Regum, William of Malmesbury described how Henry personally oversaw the training of the English, demonstrating how to withstand cavalry attacks and thus raising the

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18 GR, 1, 548; Ov, 4, 126, 5, 210; Barlow, Rufus, 80-1.
19 GR, 1, 548. ‘...Anglos suo appellat, iubet ut compatriotas aduocent ad obsidionem venire, nisi si qui velit sub nomine Nithing, quod negquam sonat, remanere’. The use of nithing would appear to suggest that failure to respond to the royal summons would lead to a loss of legal status and the protection of the law. See N. Hooper, ‘The Housecarls in the Eleventh Century’, Anglo-Norman Warfare, 4-5.
20 De iniusta, 91-2. Bishop William was deprived of his property on 12 March, after rebellions had collapsed in Dover, Hastings and London. Easter fell on 16 April. Barlow, Rufus, 74-7.
21 J. Gillingham, ‘William the Bastard at War’, Anglo-Norman Warfare, 159; Hollister, Henry I, 137. RRAN, 2, nos. 529, 530, which suggest that Henry may have encamped at Wartling in Sussex,
combat effectiveness and morale of his army. Despite Malmesbury’s undoubted rhetorical portrayal of Henry as a warrior king, this passage would appear to confirm that the royal forces were composed mainly of foot soldiers, and though unused to dealing with a cavalry charge were, nonetheless, able to assimilate ad hoc training while in the field.

In his account for the campaign in England of 1101, as well as stressing the loyalty of the English, Orderic also hinted at what may have motivated them. He suggested that the English supported Henry because they did not recognise the ‘rights of the other prince’. It is probably stretching the evidence too far to suggest that vibrant political discussions must have taken place at a local level before any royal summons was answered yet the implication of Orderic’s comment does suggest that any discussions that did take place mirrored the arguments that were circulating among the upper echelons of the nobility concerning the legitimacy of Henry’s kingship and the merits of Curthoe’s claim to the English throne. Orderic’s statement is clear that Henry, and it is probably safe to assume that Rufus before him, held a legal and political status, which in the eyes of the English did not negate, but certainly outweighed any claims exercised by Robert Curthoe to the English throne. The evidence from Orderic, though sparse, does suggest that the status of Henry as an anointed king had transformed his legal and political standing. This is an idea that is articulated to a greater degree in Orderic’s

approximately eleven miles west of Hastings and three miles north of Pevensey Bay. On the possible symbolic importance of Pevensey, see below, Chapter 7.
22 GR, 1, 716; Hollister, Henry I, 137.
23 Ov, 5, 314. ‘...omnes quoque Angli alterius principis iura nescientes in sui regis fidelitate perstiterunt, pro qua certamen satis optauerunt’.
24 Cf. the comments of Robin Fleming on the Domesday jurors, whose legal knowledge was also distinctly political in that they could supply information on the winners and losers in the process of Norman colonisation, R. Fleming, Domesday Book and the Law (Cambridge, 1998), 17-28, 37; J. Gillingham, ‘Thegns and Knights in Eleventh Century England: Who then was the Gentleman’, TRHS, 6th Ser., 5 (1995), 129-153, esp. 134-5.

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account of Waltheof’s response to the approaches of the conspirators of 1075 and reflected in William of Poitiers.25

There is a strong suspicion that the anointing of Rufus and Henry must also have had a similar effect on their standing with the sheriffs. The decision of the sheriffs to support Rufus in 1088 and Henry in 1101 was not unusual or a break in any established pattern of political behaviour. It is noticeable that on all previous occasions when dissension between the king and members of the political elite had surfaced, royal sheriffs had chosen to support the king. Apart from a reference to Eadnoth the Staller having organised resistance in the West Country to Harold’s sons in 1068, all of the evidence that can be interpreted as the sheriff leading the fyrd in military operations between 1066 and before the revolt of 1088, comes in the context of the rebellion of 1075 and the attempt to usurp the English throne and effect a tri-partite division of power.26

In political terms, the actions of the sheriffs in 1075, 1088 and 1101 can be read as a growing appreciation and respect for the status and inherent power of English kingship, linked perhaps to a cool appreciation of the benefits of office holding. To these examples can also be added the arrest of Odo of Bayeux in 1082, which had raised similar dilemmas as in 1088 for many individuals, especially Haimo dapifer and Hugh

25 OV, 2, 314; Gesta Guillelmi, 142-6.
26 Orderic referred to the widespread opposition to the king’s servants throughout England. OV, 2, 316. John of Worcester, 3, 24. ‘Wlstanus Wigornensis episcopus cum magna militari manu et Aegelusimus Eoueshamnensis. Abbas cum suis asscitis sibi in auditortium Ursone vicecomite Wigorniae et Waltero de Laco, cum copulis suis, et cetera multiudine plebis.’ Archbishop Lanfranc wrote to the Conqueror in 1075 and noted that a ‘countless host of French and English’ pursued the rebels, Lanfranc’s Letters, no.34. Eadnoth the Staller raised a force to oppose the sons of Harold in 1068. Though not specified in the text, the balance of probability suggests that Eadnoth relied upon the local fyrd. ‘Eadnothus.....occurrat cum exercitu, et cum eis proelio commisso, cum multis alis occissus est...’ John of Worcester, 3, 6. The obvious example of a sheriff following his lord into rebellion in 1075 was that of Ralph de Bernay. Ralph had been the sheriff of William fitz Osbern and served his son and successor, Roger, earl of Hereford, A. Williams, The English and the Norman Conquest (Woodbridge, 1995)
de Port, though on a much reduced scale. If the political crises of the 1070s and 1080s are read as a process where the potential and limitations of royal power were being consciously explored, with numerous aristocratic casualties along the way, by the time of the Treaty of Winchester in 1101, the process had reached a stage where a greater respect for sacral kingship appears to be evident among the upper reaches of the aristocracy, though not at the expense of the perceived rights and prerogatives of the aristocracy. The support given by the sheriffs to the king on numerous occasions during this period was clearly advantageous to them. Yet the crucial question is whether the sheriffs also chose to support the king against those who challenged his position because, and like Earl Waltheof in 1075, they recognised his legitimacy over his challengers.

This question is worth posing, but is ultimately unanswerable. The best that can be done is to argue that there is some circumstantial evidence that points in that direction. The work of Mark Philpott and George Garnett has done much to reveal the impact of Pseudo-Isidorian canon law on the shaping of the English state in the late eleventh century and the development of abstract political theory, especially the concept of the crown. The question is whether the sheriffs were untouched by these developments. Quite clearly, one should not doubt that many of the most important sheriffs were capable on an intellectual level to follow and possibly participate in complex legal and political discussions. Hugh de Port attested a diploma on behalf of the Conqueror, which detailed an agreement between Gilbert d'Auffay and the abbey of Fécamp in 1085, where Hugh was listed as a testis and iudex. The evidence from the De inuistia vexacione records that Hugh managed the transition of regime in 1087 and was sent into

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27 See above, Introduction and Chapter 1.
Northumbria as one of the new king's emissaries, along with the Bishop of Winchester, to investigate accusations that one of William's monks had sold off the bishop's cattle and reduced the fortifications of his castle. The intervention of Roger Bigod at the trial of Bishop William de St Calais at Salisbury in November 1088, may be indicative of his relative rehabilitation with the royal court in the aftermath of the rebellion, but the nature of his intervention and his advocacy of the right of Bishop William to know the charges laid against him also suggests that Roger was intellectually able enough to intervene in proceedings that were rooted in sophisticated legal arguments. Though speculative, these are unlikely to be men who remained untouched by the intellectual developments taking place around them.

The information in the narrative sources about the role of individual sheriffs in 1088 and 1101 is patchy. A single reference to Roger Bigod as one of Henry's closest advisers is the sum total for 1101. Fortunately, considerably more sheriffs can be identified in relation to 1088. The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle identified Roger Bigod and Hugh de Grandmesnil within its narrative for the rebellion, yet its terms of reference are ambiguous, and it is far from clear that both men actually held office in 1088. Any uncertainty was removed from the mind of William of Malmesbury, who unequivocally identified both men as rebels. The *De iniusta vexacione Willelmi episcopi pri
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though primarily concerned with the events that took place at the trial of Bishop William in November 1088, is the chief source that identifies by name serving or former sheriffs within the overall context of the rebellion.

Among the sheriffs identified within the *De iniusta* is Ralph Paynel, sheriff of Yorkshire, for his refusal to allow Bishop William a safe conduct to Salisbury, and with accusations that he invaded and seized the bishop's land during the course of the rebellion.³⁴ Urse d'Abetot, sheriff of Worcestershire, received Bishop William for his trial and may have had responsibility for his custody during the trial.³⁵ Hugh de Port, sheriff of Hampshire, acted as an emissary for the king, together with an unidentified Geoffrey de Traileio and the bishop of Winchester, all of whom were sent north to investigate accusations that one of William's monks had sold off the bishop's cattle and reduced the fortifications of his castles while William was on trial at Salisbury.³⁶ It is possible that Hugh de Beauchamp, sheriff of Buckinghamshire and possibly Bedfordshire in 1088, testified at the trial that he had personally heard bishop William urge Rufus to attack the rebels in March 1088.³⁷ A man identified solely as sheriff Gilbert, possibly Gilbert de Bretteville, sheriff of Berkshire, received an order to deliver ships to Bishop William for his exile to Normandy.³⁸ Two men identifiable as sheriffs

³⁴ *De iniusta*, 75-6; EYC. 6, 2-5.
³⁵ *De iniusta*, 81. The shrievalties of Worcester and Gloucester came to be associated with the constableship at court. J. A. Green, *English Sheriffs to 1154*, PRO (London, 1990), 16.
³⁶ *De iniusta*, 98.
³⁷ *De iniusta*, 83-4; *RRAN*, 2, no. 314 b; *DB*, 1, 213; G. H. Fowler, 'The Beauchamps, barons of Bedfordshire', *Bedfordshire Historical Record Society*, 1 (1913), 1-24. It should be noted that the *De iniusta* records the presence of a Hugo Bellomonte in 1088. Frank Barlow suggested this represented a scribal error in the text, with Hugo inserted for Henricus, thus identifying Henry de Beaumont. Barlow, *Rufus*, 75, 77. H.S. Offer suggested an alternative form of scribal error, this time focusing upon the toponymic, with Bellomonte a mistake for Bellocampo, *De iniusta*, 83, n. 45. It should also be noted that Stephen of Whiby's account of the founding of St Mary's abbey, York, lists Henry de Beaumont as accompanying Rufus on his journey north in the early part of 1088. BL MS Add 38816 33r.
³⁸ *De iniusta*, 98, 94. The only known Gilbert to have held office under William Rufus was Gilbert de Bretteville, sheriff of Berkshire, between 1090 and 1094, *RRAN*, 1, no. 359. Aiulf, sheriff of Dorset is recorded as having farmed the royal revenues in Berkshire in 1086. *DB*, 1, 63.
before 1086 also appear in the text, Ivo Taillebois and Erneis de Burun, former sheriffs
of Lincolnshire and Yorkshire respectively.39 Both men appear to have had a crucial role
to play in taking custody of Bishop William’s castle and arranging a safe conduct for the
bishop’s men. Finally, Roger Bigod’s conduct at the start of the rebellion does not
appear to have excluded him from the proceedings at Salisbury, where he intervened to
argue for Bishop William’s right to know the charges made against him.40

Roger Bigod may be one of the few examples outside of Robert of Mortain’s Sussex
rapes where the ties to former lords and patrons may have retained a significant
influence on his political behaviour. Roger occurs as sheriff of Suffolk and Norfolk in
1086, and could have been replaced as sheriff by either Godric dapijer, or Humphrey the
Chamberlain by 1087.41 It may well be that Roger was replaced as a matter of course,
having possibly alternated office with Robert Malet previously. Roger was certainly no
different from any other sheriff in using his office to acquire property and men,
activities that brought him into conflict with other royal officials.42 Likewise, he still
retained links to many of the great cross-Channel magnates, especially Odo of Bayeux,
holding nearly twenty manors in Suffolk and may have started his career in England
under the patronage of Odo.43 Roger also retained strong cross-Channel links, appearing
on several Norman acta before 1087.44 Overall, it is not entirely clear what motivated
Roger in 1088 and the scale of disturbance in East Anglia at that time is difficult to
quantify, though Roger’s tenant, Robert de Curzun, seized the manor of Southwold from

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39 De in iust a, 95; DB, 1, 376; RRAN, 1, no.406. For Erneis, Bates, Regesta, nos 273, 277.
40 De in iust a, 83.
41 For Roger see, DB, 2, 179, 282, 292b, 393; VCH, Suffolk, 1, 389. For Humphrey see, RRAN, 1, nos
448, 449. For Godric see RRAN, 1, nos 291, 392.
42 DB, 1, 173a, 174b, 177a.
43 Roger was the brother of Hugh Bigot, who was a tenant of Odo at Savenaye and Loges. van Houts,
‘Wace as Historian’, 125; Loyd, Origins, 15; H. Navel, ‘L’enquête de 1133 sur les fiefs de l’évêché de
Bayeux’ BSAN, (1935), 18.
Bury St Edmunds. Roger’s actions in 1088 suggest that he may have initially misread the strength of the rebellion and subsequently came to terms with Rufus fairly quickly. Although never trusted by Rufus to hold office, Roger does figure prominently in the acta from Rufus’s reign and eventually regained office under Henry.

Into this framework can be inserted much of the well known prosopography on many of the sheriffs who are likely to have played a prominent role in both campaigns, especially Haimo dapifer, sheriff of Kent and Hugh de Port, sheriff of Hampshire. These men enjoyed careers that saw them maintain a continuity of office-holding, only matched by a continuous search for alternative sources of patronage and reward. The careers of some of the lesser-known sheriffs also fit the framework. A prime example comes from the largely unexamined career of Aiulf, sheriff of Dorset in 1088. His career reveals a man who rose to local, and possible national prominence on the back of consistent royal service. Aiulf’s career can be shown to have successfully encompassed the reigns of both Rufus and Henry, and therefore the upheaval of both 1088 and 1101.

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44 Bates, Regesta, nos 30, 50, 175, 264, 267, 266.
45 Memorials of Bury St Edmunds, ed. T. Arnold, RS (London, 1890), 1, 79.
46 RAN, 1, nos 290. 291, 295, 296, 306, 319, 320, 361, 371, 397, 400, 426, 427, 431, 449, 450, 454, 456, 458, 466. RAN, 2, nos 290a, 348a, 414a, 459a. For office under Henry see, RAN, 2, no.509. Wareham has suggested that Roger was reappointed sheriff in 1092, citing RAN, 1, nos. 373 and 461 as evidence. Wareham, ‘Bigod Family’, ANS 17 (1995), 226. RAN, 1, no.373 is a writ from Rufus to Herbert, bishop of Thetford, Roger, Humphrey the Chamberlain and William Albini, notifying them that Abbot Aldwin of Ramsey was to have his rights at Ringstead and Brancaster, as his predecessors had had them in the time of William I. Roger is more likely to be addressed, not in the capacity as sheriff, but on account of the land he held at Ringstead, over which Ramsey Abbey claimed jurisdiction. DB, 1, 173b. Moreover, as a former sheriff of Norfolk, it is likely that Roger would have knowledge of the rights enjoyed by Ramsey under the Conqueror.
47 Individual sheriffs can be traced through their entries in Keats-Rohan, Domesday People, as well as the comments in Barlow, Rufus, 187-91; Green, ‘Sheriffs’, 129-45; Abels, ‘Lord Seeking’, 19-50. For Haimo, see also the introduction to the Domesday Monachorum of Christ Church, Canterbury, ed. D. C. Douglas, Royal Historical Society (London, 1944).
48 DB, 1, 83; Bates, Regesta, no.207.
49 In Dorset, Aiulf appears as sheriff under Henry. RAN, 2, nos 544, 573, 754, 896, 1018. In Somerset, Aiulf may have alternated office with William Capra. RAN, 2, nos 386a. Aiulf appears to be the only sheriff for the first years of Henry’s reign. RAN, 2, nos 622, 735, 763, 896. It would appear that Aiulf was dead by the time of his grant to Shaftesbury abbey in 1121, RAN, 2, no.1347. However, Aiulf’s debt
As sheriff of Dorset in 1088, one would have expected Aiulf to be in the forefront of efforts to contain the rebellion in the south-west, a region where many of the most prominent rebels held land. Though there is no direct evidence for Aiulf's actions in 1088, a prominent role is surely suggested by the fact that he was addressed as sheriff in a writ addressed to the barons of Wiltshire and Somerset between 1089 and 1091, thus raising the possibility that he added Somerset and Wiltshire to his portfolio of offices, possibly replacing the incumbent office holders in the aftermath of 1088. Aiulf's probable promotion was almost certainly part of a wider re-organisation of royal government in the south-west, which saw the appointment of Bishop John to the diocese of Bath and Wells together with the reorganisation of his see, and the promotion of another prominent royal supporter, Robert fitz Hamon, son of Haimo dapifer, to the newly created lordship of Glamorgan.

Aiulf's background and experience was of a kind that would have made him the natural choice as the new sheriff of Somerset and Wiltshire after 1088. His brother, Humphrey
the Chamberlain, had successfully carved out a career for himself in the ducal and royal households; he is listed as a chamberlain in the foundation charter for the abbey of La Trinité, Caen, and may have been chamberlain to Queen Mathilda; evidence from Domesday suggests that he profited directly from his connections to her, holding the manor of Combe in Surrey and two manors in Gloucestershire as gifts from the queen. After Mathilda's death, Humphrey appears to have sought out alternative sources of patronage, possibly acting as dapifer to Guy, count of Ponthieu, in the early 1080s. 

Humphrey's next appearance in England is after the death of the Conqueror as a possible sheriff of Norfolk under the new regime of William Rufus. It is impossible to date when Aiulf began his career; the first references to him serving as a sheriff are contained within Domesday, though he may have been in office in Dorset from the early 1080s. Like his brother, Aiulf appears to been a chamberlain to the royal household, since the returns for his lands in the Domesday Book are listed under the two titles of camerarius and vicecomes. An entry in the Dorset Geld Rolls records that the hundred of Albreiseberge had been granted remission from geld as Aiulf was able to testify that Queen Mathilda granted a remission for the soul of her son Richard, perhaps indicating that Aiulf was initially camerarius to Mathilda, and may

Charter 3. My thanks are due to the cathedral archivist, Mrs Francis Neal, for allowing me to examine the original charter.

51 For the identification of Humphrey as Aiulf's brother see, DB, 1, 52a; VCH Somerset, 1, 416.

52 Actes Caennaises, no. 2. An extended confirmation charter for La Trinité reveals that Humphrey held land at Bénouville, with his son Roger. Bates, Regesta, no. 59. The information contained within this charter and the fact that Humphrey's career appears to pre-date 1066, suggests that Humphrey was the elder of the two brothers. DB, 1, 36b, 170.

53 Bates, Regesta, no.341.

54 RRAN, I, nos 448, 449.

55 Aiulf is listed as the sheriff of Dorset in a record of gifts given by Robert, count of Mortain, compiled between 1087 and 1094, but recording gifts originally granted around 1082. Bates, Regesta, no. 207.

56 DB, 1, 82b, 63, 73, 83.
have followed his brother into that position before her death. Whether Aiulf served on as chamberlain to the royal household after Mathilda's death is unclear, but nevertheless, he continued to retain the title. A charter of Henry I was drawn up between 1107 and 1120 and addressed jointly to Roger, Bishop of Salisbury, and Aiulf the Chamberlain, where both men were notified that Henry had confirmed the grant of Lodres to the abbey of Montebourg.

The significance of Aiulf's career is complicated by the fact that different opinions, largely based on onomastic grounds, have been developed over Aiulf's ethnic origins. Judith Green noted the possibility that Aiulf may have been of English descent. Brian Golding identified Aiulf as an English survivor, following the editors of the Phillimore edition of the Domesday Book who identified Aiulfus as a Latinised version of the Old English Ædélwulf. Cecily Clark explored the Domesday evidence in detail and suggested that Aiulf the sheriff could have been a Norman pre-Conquest incomer, married and domiciled in England, ready to trade his local knowledge to incoming Normans after 1066.

Despite the efforts of Cecily Clark, the Domesday entries for Aiulf remain problematic. Apart from the references to Aiulf camerarius and vicecomes, further references to an

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57 VCH, Dorset, 3, 128. 'Aiulfus dicit reginam perdonme pro anima Ricardi filii sui.' Cf. VCH Dorset, 3, 47, where Eadgifu, an Englishwoman holding land at farm in Edmonds ofwm from Humphrey, had been freed of geld by Mathilda in memory of her son. See also, Williams, The English and the Norman Conquest, 79-80. Of course, if there was a written record of the gift, Aiulf may have been able to testify in his capacity as sheriff.
58 CDF, no. 876.
59 Green, English Government, 155. See also, n.74.
60 B. Golding, Conquest and Colonisation (London, 2000), 105, 183; DB, Dorset, 8, n.1; Olof von Feilitzen, Pre-Conquest Personal Names of the Domesday Book (Uppsala, 1937), 191; W. G. Searle, Onomasticon Anglo-Saxonicum (Cambridge, 1897), 64. von Feilitzen suggested that Aiulf was also a derivation of the Old Norse Eileifr/Eillfr or the Old Danish Elef, Elif. See also, C. Clark, 'Starting from Youlthorpe (East Riding of Yorkshire) An Onomastic Circular Tour', Journal of the English Place Name Society, 16 (1983-4), 25-37.
individual or individuals named Aiulf occur. In Cornwall, an Aiulf held Tremail tempore regis Edwardi from St Petroc, along with Carworgie. In Devon, an Aiulf is listed holding Lidmere from Judhael of Totnes, land that this Aiulf had held tempore regis Edwardi, as well as a further entry for an Aiulf who held his land in 1086 as a tenant-in-chief. In Somerset, the same or a different Aiulf held Exford tempore regis Edwardi, but which was held in 1086 by Roger de Courseulles. In Wiltshire, a man described as Edmund, son of Aiulf, held land in 1086 that his father had held tempore regis Edwardi.

Beyond Domesday, the only reference to an Aiulf in an English source is in the Liber Vitae of New Minster and Hyde Abbey. The entry for Aiulf is one of a number of later additions to the list, in a hand identified by Professor Simon Keynes as belonging to scribes working in the late eleventh or early twelfth century. In contrast, Norman acta identify three men with the name Aiulf, all in acta associated with the ducal abbeys in Caen. The conclusion to draw from this evidence is that an individual or a number of individuals named Aiulf had held land in the West Country before 1066 and continued to do so afterwards, though not without variations in their fortunes. Whether these individuals were of English descent, or Norman settlers domiciled in England before the Conquest, is impossible to tell. As Cecily Clark recognised, it is unwise to rely upon a

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61 Clark, 'An Onomastic Circular Tour', 30.
62 DB, I, 121a, 123d.
63 DB, I, 109a, 116b.
64 DB, I, 94a.
65 DB, I, 74.
66 The Liber Vitae of the New Minster and Hyde Abbey Winchester, ed. Simon Keynes (Copenhagen, 1996), fo. 25v, 96. See also, S. Keynes, 'The Liber Vitae of the New Minster, Winchester', The Durham Liber Vitae and its Context, ed. D. Rollason, A. J. Piper, M. Harvey and L. Rollason (Woodbridge, 2004), 149-64.
67 Actes Caennaises, no. 1; Bates, Regesta, nos 46, 49.
single etymology for all the names recorded as *Aiulfus, Alofus, Ælulfus* and *Eiulfus* within Domesday.⁶⁹

There can be little doubt, however, that the Aiulf who is listed in the three counties of Berkshire, Wiltshire and Dorset as *vicecomes* and *camerarius* was different from the Aiulf or Aiulfs recorded for pre-Conquest Somerset, Wiltshire, Devon and Cornwall.⁷⁰ The appearance of an Aiulf and his brother Humphrey in charters associated with the Caen abbeys may well indicate that his Norman origins lay in association with this great centre of Norman ducal power. Aiulf the sheriff was therefore someone who had profited from the Conquest. All the land he held in 1086 had been held previously by English land holders and there is no evidence of continuity in terms of the same man holding land in Berkshire, Wiltshire and Dorset before 1086 and holding office after 1086. As well as the possible additions of Somerset and Wiltshire to his portfolio of offices after 1088, Aiulf appears to have been drawn close to royal power. Aiulf occurs in the company of many of the most important sheriffs, including Urse d’Abetot, Haimo *dapifer* and Hugh de Port, in the witness list to a charter dated to January 1091, confirmed while Rufus waited to cross to Normandy.⁷¹ The reward for his loyalty in 1088 and 1101 was expressed through the continued enjoyment of office, which almost certainly enabled him to consolidate his position as figure of local importance. In 1086, Aiulf held one hide of land at Farnham in Dorset, jointly with the wife of Hugh fitz Grip, the previous sheriff. It appears that at some point between 1086 and 1121 Aiulf gained permanent control of the land, as he was able to grant it to Shaftesbury Abbey for

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⁷⁰ The Aiulf recorded as a tenant-in-chief in Devon, is, on the balance of evidence, likely to be Aiulf the sheriff. *DB*, 1, 116b.
⁷¹ *RRAN*, 1, no. 315; Wells Cathedral Archives, no. 3. My thanks are due to the Cathedral archivists for allowing me to see the original.
the sake of his daughter who had become a nun at the abbey, together with one and a half hides he had held at Blandford.\textsuperscript{72}

Like Aiulf's, Urse d'Abetot's career is likely to have been facilitated by his eldest brother, Robert the Dispenser, who made a career based upon service in the royal household and was a sufficiently respected figure to have come to the attention of Orderic.\textsuperscript{73} Hugh de Port's origins are well attested and it is probable that Hugh was the first Norman sheriff of Kent under the influence of Odo of Bayeux.\textsuperscript{74} Durand de Pitres followed his brother, Roger, as sheriff of Gloucester, and may have been initially settled in England as a follower of William fitz Osbern.\textsuperscript{75} It is possible that Durand may have alternated office with his brother before 1086.\textsuperscript{76} Haimo dapi\oe f's earliest recorded appearance in England is in 1069, on a diploma of the Conqueror, which granted the church of Deerhurst in Gloucestershire to the abbey of Saint Denis. Haimo attests with the title of dapi\oe fer, which would seem to indicate that his initial career in England was as a member of the Conqueror's household, and would indicate a remarkable revival in the fortunes of the family from the low point of opposing Duke William at Val-\'es Dunes in 1047.\textsuperscript{77} Peter de Valognes, sheriff of Hertfordshire, is perhaps somewhat unusual as one of the few sheriffs to originate from western Normandy. In Peter's case, his marriage to Albreda, a sister of Eudo, vicomte of the Cotentin, was indicative of his status and standing with the ruling elite.\textsuperscript{78}

\textsuperscript{72}DB, 1, 78, 82d; RRAN, 2, no. 1347.
\textsuperscript{73}OV, 4, 172.
\textsuperscript{74}Livre Noir, nos 1, 5. The family owed five knights fee to the bishopric of Bayeux. Loyd, Origins, 79.
\textsuperscript{75}Bates, Regesta, no 4; DB, 1, 169a; D. Walker, "The "Honour" of the Earls of Hereford in the Twelfth Century", Transactions of the Bristol and Gloucestershire Archaeological Society, 69 (1960), 174-211, 178; Green, 'Sheriffs', 136.
\textsuperscript{76}Green, Aristocracy, 61. Bates, Regesta, no.135.
\textsuperscript{77}Bates, Regesta, no. 254.
\textsuperscript{78}Keats-Rohan, Domesday People, 322; Monasticon, 3, 345-7. Eudo held office in Normandy from the early 1060s, possibly in conjunction with Nigel, and was certainly a familiar enough figure to appear as a
Ralph Paynel's career also owed much to his father's connections with the ducal family and ruling Norman elite. The first reference to his father, William Paynel, occurs as a party to an agreement with the abbot of Mont Saint-Michel concerning the terms of military service William had to perform for the abbey. The evidence of this text points towards William being of sufficient status and importance for lands to be given to him on his marriage by the Conqueror. William further appeared on a ducal charter in favour of the church of Bayeux in 1074, a charter for the abbey of Grestain in 1082, where he witnessed a settlement of a dispute between Robert of Mortain and Ralph Cardon, along with other Mortain tenants, and confirmations by the Conqueror of grants by William de la Ferté-Macé to the abbey of Saint Julien of Tours, and by Roger de Montgomery to the abbey of Saint-Etienne, Caen. William is listed as a 'man' of Robert de Bellême in the grant to Saint Etienne and attests the act with other Montgomery/Bellême tenants.

Ralph Paynel appears to have retained strong cross-Channel links. He must have crossed to Normandy fairly rapidly after the conclusion of hostilities in 1088, as he attests a


Bates, *Normandy*, 259. The existence of a charter of Hugh, William's son, refers to his mother's *maritagium*. The lands granted by the Conqueror to William on his marriage may have been around Fontenay-le-Pesnel, as a charter of Hugh Paynel gave to Saint-Etienne a gift of two thirds of the tithe at Fontenay, with the consent of his mother Lesceline, *'de cuiss maridagio ipsa decima est'*. *Cartulaire Saint Etienne*, fo. 49v-50r.


grant of Robert Curthose to Mont Saint-Michel, in 1088. Links to the Counts of Mortain also survived the collapse of Curthose's challenge to Henry in 1101. However, the degree of independence Ralph enjoyed counter balanced these ties. Though the Paynel family had strong ties to the counts of Mortain and held land in Devon, Somerset, Gloucestershire, Northamptonshire, Lincolnshire and Yorkshire, counties with a strong Mortain presence, the majority of Ralph's lands came from the estates of Merlesvein, sheriff of Lincolnshire in 1066. It was ultimately the rewards of royal service that determined his political behaviour, even if he remained to a notable degree a cross-Channel magnate.

Other examples show that the cross-Channel elite continued to provide a valuable conduit for those aspiring to office during the early part of Rufus's reign. William de Cahagnes, sheriff of Northamptonshire, may well represent one of Rufus's earliest appointments as sheriff. William is first mentioned as sheriff in two writs addressed to Ramsey abbey that date from the first weeks of his reign. He was a substantial tenant of Robert of Mortain in Northamptonshire and Sussex, and had almost certainly followed Robert to England as one of his Norman tenants. It is possible that William may also have been a tenant of Odo of Bayeux and deliberately sought out Robert of Mortain as an alternative source of patronage after Odo's arrest in 1082.
Another early appointment may have been that of Hugh de Beauchamp as sheriff of Bedfordshire, and later in Rufus's reign, sheriff of Buckinghamshire. Hugh appears on a writ addressed to himself and Peter de Valognes as sheriff of Hertfordshire confirming the abbey of St Albans in its lands, churches and tithes, and ordering that the abbey was to enjoy its property and privileges, as they had been on the day that William became king. Hugh does not appear in any of the Conqueror's acta, while the abbey of St Albans might have had good reason to seek out a writ from the new king to protect its rights and privileges, as it maintained a claim to land in Bedfordshire that Hugh himself held in 1086.

Hugh almost certainly replaced Ralph Taillebois as sheriff in Bedfordshire. The writ addressed to Hugh may have supplemented an earlier writ addressed to Peter de Valognes and Ralph Taillebois. This writ had confirmed a grant to St Albans sake and soke, toll and team and all its customs. The abbey was to enjoy its privileges, as they had been when Stigand had held them, on the day that King Edward was 'alive and dead'. The language used in this writ is an echo of the language and concepts expressed in the Domesday inquest, and suggests that the writ itself was drawn up while the survey was in process, with the scribes at St Alban's influenced by the forms of the Domesday inquest. Ralph was certainly dead by the time the Domesday returns for Bedfordshire were being compiled as his widow, Ascelina, is listed as accounting for his

90 For Buckinghamshire see, RAN, 1, no. 370. Cf. Westminster Abbey Charters, no. 51 alternative date of 1091 x 1095. RAN, 2, no. 390.
91 Matthew Paris, Chronica Majora, RS (London, 1882), 34, no. 17; RAN, 2, no. 314b. 'Volo ut sciat is quod ego conceido et concedendo praecepio ut ecclesia Sancti Albani habeat firmiterque teneat et sine calumnia terras, ecclesias, decimas, et omnia quae habebat illo die quando rex effectus sum.'
92 DB, 1, 213a.
93 Bates, Regesta, no. 249. '...Stigandus habuit illo die quo rex Æwardus mortuus est'.

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lands in the Domesday Book. At this stage, Ralph's younger brother, Ivo, accounted for the royal lands in Bedfordshire.

The most likely hypothesis is that Ralph died while the survey was in progress and his brother Ivo represented a natural choice as temporary custodian of the royal lands in Bedfordshire, with Hugh de Beauchamp appointed as sheriff in the early months of Rufus's reign. Given the geographical proximity of their respective holdings in Normandy, both families are likely to have been well known to each other, as well as the ruling elite. Ralph had links to the ducal abbey of Saint-Etienne, where he occurs in a record of purchases by the abbey, exchanging eight acres of land 'in front' of the abbey for land at Villers. Ivo Taillebois occurs as a royal steward in a writ issued in the first months of Rufus's reign. The links between the families were strengthened by Hugh's marriage to Ralph Taillebois's daughter.

Once in office, these men continued to use it for their own advantage in precisely the same way as their established colleagues did. The lands inherited in Bedfordshire by Hugh de Beauchamp from Ralph Taillebois, reveal that Ralph had been active in using his office to attract large numbers of sokemen, a policy Hugh was content to continue. In Hertfordshire, Peter de Valognes was using his office in much the same way as a means to acquire land and tenants. In some form or another, all the sheriffs were using

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94 Liber Eliensis, 196; DB, 1, 213.
95 DB, 1, 209b.
96 Loyd, Origins, 20-1; Green, English Sheriffs, 133.
97 Bates, Regesta, 53. "Rodulfo Taillebosc octo iugera terrae que ipse habebat ante monasterium et ad mensuram tantumdem dedit sibi in territorio Villariensi....".
99 Abels, 'Lord Seeking', 136; Keats-Rohan, Domesday People, 260
100 Abels, 'Lord Seeking', 138.
their office as a means to accumulate land. In case of William de Cahagnes, holding office was important as a means of consolidating his family’s position in Northamptonshire, where William appears to have held office continuously until the early years of Henry I’s reign. The amount of land William held in chief in Northamptonshire was minimal, just £1 compared with a total of £29 held from Robert of Mortain. By the twelfth century, however, five of the manors held by William from Robert of Mortain in 1086, were subsequently held in chief by the Cahagnes family, almost certainly coming to William in the wake of William of Mortain’s permanent loss of his English estates after 1104. The patterns of monastic patronage by William further suggest a loosening of ties to the counts of Mortain, as William patronised none of the Mortain foundations.

The mechanics behind the promotion of both Hugh de Beauchamp and William de Cahagnes suggest a continuity of personnel and procedure, across not only a change of regime, but also between ducal government before 1066 and royal government after 1066. The evidence explored in the previous chapter suggested that the Conqueror was well aware of the need to create a stable framework to oversee the smooth transition of

101 For example, the activities of Haimo dapifer may be traced through the archives of St Augustine’s. Haimo appears to have actively engaged in the illegal appropriation of church lands. A writ from the Conqueror ordered Archbishop Lanfranc, Geoffrey of Coutances, Robert, count of Eu, and Hugh de Montfort to reseise abbot Scotland, with the manor Fordwich, which was currently held by Haimo. The writ was part of a wider examination into sheriffs’ abuses, and explicitly castigated the previous abbot Æthelsige for allowing land to be alienated through carelessness, fear or greed. Bates, *Regesta*, nos 83, 129. According to the chronicle of St Augustine’s, Æthelsige attempted to win the backing from the Normans by granting them land ‘against the will of his brethren.’ *William Thorne’s Chronicle of St Augustine’s Abbey, Canterbury*, ed. A. H. Davis (Oxford, 1934), 49-50. A further writ notified Lanfranc, together with counts Robert and Roger that William I had restored eight prebends in Newington to the abbey as a result of an inquiry through the shire court. Though Haimo was not named in the Conqueror’s writ, a further writ of William Rufus ordered Haimo to restore to St Augustine’s the rights held in Newington, as they had been proved in the shire court in the time of the William I. Bates, *Regesta*, no.88; *RRAN*, 1, no. 464.

102 *RRAN*, 1, no. 476; 2, nos. 694, 732, 770.

103 Soulsby, *Fiefs of the counts of Mortain*, 145; Green, ‘Sheriffs’, 141.

104 *VCH*, Northamptonshire, 1, 357-92; *OV*, 6, 286.
power in England; one that would bind those elements of the aristocracy who might have had serious objections to Rufus's elevation firmly into the governmental and decision making process. The promotions of Hugh de Beauchamp and William de Cahagnes suggest that in the early months of Rufus's reign the transition was managed smoothly and with the minimum of disruption, with Rufus recruiting his sheriffs from among the same pool of talent as his father.

The first conclusion to draw from a discussion on the role of the sheriffs in 1088 and 1101 is quite simply that without the support of these men, organising and leading the fyrd, both Rufus and Henry would have lost the English throne to Robert Curthose. Beyond this general observation, the details for the campaigns of 1088 and 1101 have much contribute to any understanding on the continuity and resilience of the Old English administrative structures and the continuity in the role of the sheriffs themselves. A second conclusion is that, in attempting to understand why, on two occasions over a thirteen-year period, the men who occupied the office of sheriff regarded a Curthose kingship as potentially damaging to their interests is, paradoxically, less easy. On one level, the discussions of Frank Barlow, Judith Green and Richard Abels provide a ready explanation; the need to ensure continuity of office and the benefits of office-holding, particularly the opportunities to acquire land and the means for individuals and families to gain local prominence and create their own networks of patronage and power. The benefits were, however, symptomatic of the structural instability that permeated so many aspects of the relationship between England and Normandy following 1066. At moments of crisis and tension within the cross-Channel political elite, despite past and present links to the major landholders on both sides of

105 B. Golding, 'The Religious Patronage of Robert and William of Mortain', Belief and Culture in the
the Channel, the predominant concern of the sheriffs to protect their English interests and to retain administrative office, would have been a further centrifugal factor in preventing any continuation of a single cross-Channel polity under Robert Curthose.

What is less apparent is the extent to which sheriffs chose to support Rufus and Henry because they had little difficulty in accepting their legitimacy as kings. What evidence there is can be marshalled to suggest that the sheriffs were part of a wider aristocratic world that operated in an environment where complex legal and political issues were discussed and had a profound impact on the conduct of contemporary politics. In a specifically English context, John Gillingham has presented a compelling case for the success of the 'county community' in finding a voice in national politics and shaping political discourse.106 There must, at least, be a _prima facie_ case for suggesting that the complex arguments that swirled around the upper echelons of the cross-Channel aristocracy impinged on the consciousness of the sheriffs. The implications of Orderic's remark, that the English 'did not recognise the rights of the other prince', suggest that the issue of Henry's kingship, and by implication that of Rufus's before him, together with Curthose's claim to the throne, were debated by all levels of society, including the sheriffs.

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Chapter 4

Robert de Mowbray and the Revolt of 1095

Contemporary and near-contemporary accounts of the rebellion of 1095 have two defining characteristics; the prominence they assign to Robert de Mowbray in formulating the revolt and the absence of any sort of evidence to suggest that it was a repeat of 1088. What makes this rebellion especially noteworthy is that Robert de Mowbray had, by 1095, enjoyed a career that was remarkable even by the standards of the eleventh century. He could claim to be one of the greatest Anglo-Norman magnates, with interests that stretched from the Scottish border to the Cotentin. Understandably therefore, both near contemporaries and modern historians have struggled to make sense of Robert's career before 1095 and his part in the revolt.

For those near-contemporary writers who chose to interpret political instability through the prism of aristocratic failings and the destabilising effect these could have on the body politic, both the career of Robert de Mowbray and the revolt of 1095 provided a ready example. The most influential of these accounts came from the pen of Orderic. Physically powerful, austere, melancholic, contemptuous of authority and full of vanity, Orderic’s description of Robert provides a near caricature of his views on the turbulent nature of the Anglo-Norman aristocracy as a whole and the need for an effective secular restraint. Orderic was clear that the rebellion of 1095 arose from Robert’s greed and the desire to ‘extend his territories on all sides’. There is no reason to doubt Orderic’s claim, yet modern discussions have wrestled with the problem of reconciling Robert’s

\[1\] *OV*, 4, 278-86. Significantly, Orderic qualifies his description with the observation that Robert was more ‘given to thought than speech’. On Orderic’s view of the aristocracy in general see, K. Thompson, ‘Orderic Vitalis and Robert of Bellême’, *JMH*, 20 (1994), 133-41.

\[2\] *OV*, 4, 278. ‘Robertus autem ut fines suos undique dilataret...’.
career before 1095 and his prominence in the revolt with a general paucity of evidence for the causes of the revolt. 3 Somewhat surprisingly, given his wealth and the strategic position of his lands on both sides of the Channel, by the mid 1090s Robert has been seen by many historians as a marginal figure in political terms, perceived as estranged from Rufus, with a series of grievances and unfulfilled ambitions. 4 Questions have also been raised about Robert’s status and authority within Northumbria itself, with a history of conflict with Bishop William de St Calais and the monks of Durham cited as evidence of insecurity and thus necessitating royal intervention within Northumbria, interpreted as proof of instability and even of hostile royal attitudes towards Robert. 5 The causes of the revolt have even been sought beyond the borders of the Anglo-Norman world, with the death of the Scots king Malcolm III in 1093 at Robert’s hands seen as giving Rufus the opportunity to intervene directly in the Scottish succession, with the result that as the threat to the north of England from Scotland lessened, so the need for a powerful earl in Northumbria receded, thus paradoxically undermining Robert’s position, yet also providing the conditions necessary for revolt. 6

The cumulative effect of these discussions has been for the rebellion of 1095 to be regarded as a revolt of the disappointed, the politically marginalised and the overly ambitious. It may be doubted, however, that this represents the whole picture, or even a substantial part of it. A close reading of all the narrative accounts from the early twelfth century suggests that those writers who concerned themselves with the revolt recognised that it went beyond the boundary of regional politics. The surprise to emerge from these sources is that of a man often described by modern historians as an

4 Barlow, Rufus, 346; Hollister, ‘Magnates and “Curiales”’, MMI, 97-115; Crouch, The Normans, 148.
6 Kapelle, Norman Conquest of the North, 154-5.
unattractive and seemingly a marginal figure in political terms, yet nonetheless able to attract many members of the Anglo-Norman political elite into a wider conspiracy that in its more extreme manifestations aimed at regicide.

There is, therefore, an urgent need to re-examine the established evidence for Robert de Mowbray’s career before 1095 and reassess the origins of the revolt. The contemplation of regicide by the conspirators raises the possibility that the revolt was a manifestation of wider instability within royal and aristocratic relationships that was a legacy of the political upheaval of 1088 and, therefore, part of the wider problem of divided lordship and a disputed English succession.7 The absence of any evidence to suggest that the rebels of 1095 were revisiting the ground of 1088, and sought to replace Rufus on the English throne with his elder brother, should not necessarily be taken as proof that Robert de Mowbray and his fellow conspirators did not question the legitimacy of Rufus’s kingship; John of Worcester noted that the aim of the conspirators was to replace Rufus with his cousin, Stephen of Aumale.8 If anything, the revolt of 1095 points towards the issue of the legitimacy of Rufus’s kingship continuing to be far from settled for many within the cross-Channel aristocracy. Despite the failure of the revolt of 1088 and attempts by the aristocracy to provide a permanent solution to the wider problem of divided lordship through the Treaty of Rouen in 1091, questions and doubts over Rufus’s political legitimacy could be revived at moments of crisis and political tension.

7 Cf. Barlow, Rufus, 317, especially his observation that Robert de Mowbray’s killing of Malcolm III in 1093 was an act of lèse majesté.
8 John of Worcester, 3, 76.
The actual events of 1095 have been well rehearsed and need not be repeated in any detail. Though the ground had evidently been laid for a widespread uprising, ultimately only Robert de Mowbray was prepared to oppose Rufus militarily, who in turn executed a characteristically well-planned campaign, quickly overcoming resistance at Newcastle and Morpeth and laying siege to Robert at his castle of Bamburgh. The conspiracy is notable for the significant degree of violence that was planned and aimed specifically at the king. At some point during this period, Orderic suggests while the king was approaching Northumbria, a plot to commit regicide was revealed by Gilbert fitz Richard, lord of Tonbridge, with the effect of convincing most of the conspirators that their best course of action was to seek reconciliation with Rufus. Orderic is the chief authority for both the revolts of 1088 and 1095. As such, his accounts provide a useful barometer of a change in attitudes towards Rufus on the part of sections of the aristocracy. Orderic is explicit in stating that the rebels besieged in Rochester in 1088, though numerous and well supplied with money and arms, were nonetheless reluctant to engage the king in open battle in his own kingdom. By 1095 such restraints on conduct were largely absent. Despite their ultimate rejection of regicide, many members of the aristocracy had, nonetheless, been prepared to join a conspiracy against Rufus where regicide had been discussed openly and an oath sworn to achieve his death. In response, Rufus was prepared to resort to a degree of violence not seen in 1088, threatening to maim Robert in order to pressurise his wife and nephew to surrender Bamburgh castle to the besieging royal forces.

9 In general see, Barlow, Rufus, 346-59; Crouch, The Normans, 148-9.
10 OV, 4, 280-2.
11 OV, 4, 126-8. In general see, Strickland, 'Against the Lord's anointed', 56-79.
12 OV, 4, 280.
13 John of Worcester, 3, 78.
The aftermath of the revolt was equally characterised by the selective application of judicial violence.\textsuperscript{14} Though spared his life, Robert de Mowbray remained in captivity until his death, a period of between twenty or thirty years, possibly entering St Albans as a monk shortly before his death.\textsuperscript{15} Besides Robert de Mowbray, the most prominent rebels in 1095 were William, count of Eu, and Gilbert fitz Richard. Gilbert's reward for revealing the plan to ambush and kill Rufus was largely to escape royal retribution.

William of Eu was less fortunate. Charged with treason and defeated in a judicial duel, he was blinded and castrated, dying of his injuries shortly afterwards.\textsuperscript{16} Others implicated in the revolt included members of the powerful Montgomery family, with Hugh de Montgomery, earl of Shrewsbury, privately reproached by Rufus and received back into royal favour on the payment of three thousand pounds.\textsuperscript{17} His younger brother Philip suffered imprisonment.\textsuperscript{18} Roger de Lacy saw his lands confiscated and was also exiled, his lordship of Weobley passing to his younger brother, who had remained loyal to the king.\textsuperscript{19} Odo of Champagne, lord of Holderness, also suffered confiscation and imprisonment.\textsuperscript{20} Ernulf de Hesdin successfully defended himself in a judicial duel, but judged it prudent to depart on crusade and died at Antioch.\textsuperscript{21}

The actions of Gilbert fitz Richard on route to Northumbria set the tone for much of the subsequent investigations into the rebellion. Behind the list of those involved in the conspiracy, there are hints of a complex web of court intrigue and family politics, which appear to have exploded into life in the aftermath of the failure of the revolt. William of

\textsuperscript{14} For a comparison with the reconciliation process following the revolt of 1088 see, R. Sharpe, '1088-William Rufus and the Rebels', \textit{ANS}, 26 (2004), 139-57.
\textsuperscript{16} \textit{OV}, 4, 284; \textit{GR}, 1, 564.
\textsuperscript{17} \textit{OV}, 4, 284.
\textsuperscript{18} \textit{John of Worcester}, 3, 82.
\textsuperscript{19} \textit{OV}, 4, 284.
\textsuperscript{20} \textit{John of Worcester}, 3, 82.
\textsuperscript{21} \textit{Liber Hydra}, 301-2.
Eu had earned the enmity of his brother-in-law, Hugh d’Avranches, earl of Chester, on account of his flagrant infidelities and neglect of his wife, Hugh’s sister.\(^{22}\) William’s sentence was carried out at the instigation of his brother-in-law. Indicative of the degree of pressure Rufus exercised on the rebels, Morel, Robert de Mowbray’s nephew and sheriff, broke ranks from his family and fellow conspirators and only saved himself by turning informer, but died in exile, a broken and reviled figure according to Orderic.\(^{23}\)

Unsurprisingly in these circumstances, some writers noted how many of those implicated in the conspiracy appeared to have been innocent, or at the very least were guilty only of association with known conspirators. One such individual was William of Eu’s cousin and steward, William d’Audrieu, who was accused of treason and subsequently hanged.\(^{24}\) William of Malmesbury’s account of the revolt has the execution of William d’Audrieu at its centre, and though careful not to pass judgement directly, William leaves little doubt that he regarded many of Rufus’s actions as unjust.\(^{25}\) Ernulf de Hesdin’s disgust at the nature of what was taking place was such, that although his innocence had been proved through a judicial duel, he decided to leave England completely.\(^{26}\) The Anglo-Saxon Chronicler laconically noted that some conspirators were taken to London ‘and there destroyed’.\(^{27}\) Overall, the aftermath of the revolt appears to have had a quality that impressed itself into the consciousness of many of those who wrote about it at nearly a generation removed. Significantly, the nearest

\(^{22}\) *OV*, 4, 284.
\(^{23}\) *OV*, 4, 284.
\(^{24}\) *ASC*, E, 1096; *GR*, 1, 564.
\(^{25}\) *GR*, 1, 564. Indicating that he felt that Rufus might have gone too far in punishing William, Malmesbury began his next passage in the *Gesta Regum*, ‘*Veruntamen sunt quaedem de rege preclarae magnanimitatis exempla, quae posteris non inuidebo.*’ Significantly, William of Malmesbury may have had access to good sources of information in relation to William d’Audrieu, as his monastery was close to two manors held by William in Wiltshire, Littleton Pannell and Compton Basset. *DB*, 1, 71 c-d; Barlow, *Rufus*, 358.
\(^{26}\) *Liber Hyda*, 301-2.
\(^{27}\) *ASC*, E, 1096.

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parallel for such political violence had occurred some twenty years earlier, in the aftermath of the revolt of 1075.

Previous discussions of the nature of Rufus's response to the revolt have suggested the king was concerned mainly with personal retribution, or using the aftermath of the revolt as an opportunity to terrorise the aristocracy into submission.28 This argument is somewhat undermined by the fact that the punishments appear to have been carefully thought out, selective and the result of close consultation between Rufus and his advisers.29 Those who suffered most appear to have been the ones closest to the centre of the rebellion and most implacably opposed to Rufus. Unlike the rebels of 1075, the conspirators of 1095 had conspired to kill Rufus, with Robert de Mowbray and William of Eu both specifically named in this context.30

Nor was 1095 the first occasion when both these men had opposed the king. Robert and William, together with Robert's uncle, Geoffrey of Coutances, had participated in the rebellion of 1088 where their activities in Somerset, Wiltshire and Gloucestershire had seriously endangered royal control of the region. Robert had campaigned through Wiltshire and sacked the royal city of Bath, while William was credited with the destruction of Berkeley in Gloucestershire.31 Their combined activities came to an end only after Robert attacked and failed to take another royal city, Gloucester, which effectively signalled the end of the rebellion in the West Country.32 As Orderic listed Robert among the royalist forces at the siege of Rochester, it would appear as though

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29 *OV*, 4, 284.
31 *John of Worcester*, 3, 52; *GR*, 1, 544.
32 *John of Worcester*, 3, 52.
Rufus moved quickly to isolate Robert and his uncle from the rebel cause and reached a settlement with them before the rebellion had been concluded in the southeast.\textsuperscript{33}

The link to the revolt of 1088 carries significant implications for any understanding of the conspiracy of 1095. The involvement of Robert and his uncle in the rebellion of 1088 needs to be located within the general framework of aristocratic attitudes towards succession explored in Chapter Two, and represented a manifestation of the deep unease that the partition of England and Normandy and the means by which Rufus had secured the English throne had generated within substantial sections of the senior aristocracy. Consideration of Robert's career before 1088 suggests a strong attachment to Robert Curthose that shaped his thinking in 1088. Robert's reluctance to see the claims of Robert Curthose to the English throne bypassed was also shaped by a pragmatic appreciation of the future difficulties that would be engendered by a separation of England and Normandy. Yet in the context of the rebellion of 1095, support for Curthose's claim to the throne in 1088 may have been of more importance in that it created an atmosphere in which doubts over Rufus's legitimacy could fester and be revived in the right set of circumstances.

Robert appears to have been in Normandy between the Conqueror's death and the outbreak of hostilities in England after Easter 1088, as he was listed as one of the despoilers of La Trinité 'in the year after the king's death', and did not cross to Normandy again until after the conclusion of Bishop William's trial at Salisbury in November 1088.\textsuperscript{34} At this stage Robert was both a significant figure in his own right,

\textsuperscript{33} OF, 4, 128. Cf. the comments of Barlow, Rufus, 92, n.186.
but also the heir to a career of great potential. As the son of Roger de Mowbray and
descended from a family related to Nigel, the vicomte of the Cotentin, Robert was also
the heir to the lands of his uncle, and thus a potentially enormous cross-Channel
complex of estates. In political terms, Robert’s inheritance was no less significant.
Robert’s father had attended the council of Lillebonne in 1066 and was described by
Orderic as one of the illustrious laymen who were busy making Normandy great.
Robert’s early and close association with Robert Curthose suggests that he was
earmarked to follow his father into the Norman political elite.

Despite this political importance, the Mowbray lands in Normandy appear to have been
modest and centred largely on Montbray itself. Several neighbouring villages were
included in the later Mowbray fee including Beaumesnil, Belson, Étouvy, Coulonces,
Margueray, and possibly Landelles, Saint-Vigor and Pontfarcy. Orderic recorded a
confirmation by Robert of the gift of the church of Étouvy to Saint-Evroult by Richard
de Coulances, where Robert is described as the ‘chief lord’. Although no statement on
the wealth of the family can be arrived at before the death of Bishop Geoffrey in 1093,
the patronage of his uncle was crucial in lifting Robert into the very highest levels of
wealth and power. Credited with over two hundred and eighty manors by Orderic,
Geoffrey is recorded in Domesday as holding two hundred and sixty five manors in
Berkshire, Gloucestershire, Somerset, Hampshire, Huntingdonshire, Northamptonshire
and Lincolnshire.

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(1944), 129-61.
36OV, 2,140.
38 OV, 3, 230.
39 OV, 4, 278. This figure obviously excludes Northumbria. The estimated revenue of all these estates was
£750 per annum, W. J. Corbett, Cambridge Medieval History, v (Cambridge, 1926), 510-11. For a
complete list of Domesday references to Geoffrey’s holdings see, Domesday People, 228-229; COEL,
person no, 837
As the heir to a great cross-Channel complex of estates, Robert’s support for Curthose in 1088 was therefore entirely predictable. Orderic listed him, along with Robert de Bellême, Roger, son of Richard de Bienfaite and William de Breteuil, as among those men who supported Curthose in his rebellion against his father in 1077 and implied that Robert then accompanied Curthose on his exile from Normandy. As was discussed in Chapter Two, all of Curthose’s supporters at this stage are identifiable as direct heirs to some potentially enormous cross-Channel complexes. Orderic is emphatic that Curthose was advised by these men to ‘rise up boldly’ and claim a share of the realm of England. Yet the actions of these individuals must also be seen as a representation of the views of the senior aristocracy in terms of its preference for the Conqueror’s successor. In this context, Robert’s actions in 1088 would represent the logical outcome of a strand of thought first developed in the 1070s, which saw Curthose as having the preferred and strongest claim to the English throne, and whose kingship would continue the cross-Channel polity created after 1066, and thus present few practical difficulties.

Robert’s identification with Curthose and his involvement in the difficulties of the 1070s do not appear to have hindered his career. A charter confirmed at Bonneville-sur-Touques and dated 14 July 1080 lists both Robert Curthose and Robert de Mowbray among the witnesses, almost certainly before both men crossed the Channel en route to Scotland. Robert also appears in the company of some high status witnesses for two confirmation charters drawn up for the ducal abbey of Saint Etienne between 1080 and

\[\text{\textsuperscript{40}}\]OV, 3, 100-2. Orderic also lists Joel fitzAlfred, William de Moulins-la-Marche and William de Rupierre, and many others of ‘noble birth and knightly prowess’.
\[\text{\textsuperscript{41}}\]OV, 3, 98.
\[\text{\textsuperscript{42}}\]Bates, Regesta, no.175 (II).
It may also be significant that during the same period the last recorded act of Robert's father, Roger de Mowbray, occurs in the confirmation pancarte drawn up for the abbey of La Trinité between 1080 and 1082, where Roger gave to the abbey his land at Grainville-sur-Odon, on behalf of his daughter who had become a nun there. Therefore, by the time of the outbreak of the revolt of 1088, the evidence points towards Robert having been a significant figure in Norman politics for at least a decade.

Robert's relationship with Curthose after 1088 does not appear to have suffered from any agreement he had reached with Rufus in the aftermath of the revolt, which almost certainly centred upon the recognition of Rufus's claim to the throne. To a degree, however, the dynamics of that relationship meant that Robert and his uncle were less successful in reaching an accord with Henry in his new position as count of the Cotentin in the late 1080s. Orderic could recount how in 1090 Henry had support from Hugh d'Avranches and Richard de Reviers and, 'the other barons of the Cotentin except Robert de Mowbray'. Nearly all the local contemporary accounts also create the impression that Bishop Geoffrey was in his diocese and actively resisting Henry's attempts to enforce his rule within the Cotentin. Orderic's account is significant in that it provides the latest date by which Robert's father had died and Robert had inherited his father's Norman estates. Therefore, given the history of the relationships between Robert and Bishop Geoffrey with the Conqueror's three sons, and the strategic importance of both men on both sides of the Channel, it is possible that they may have been involved in the joint campaign of Curthose and Rufus to remove Henry from the

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43 Bates, Regesta, nos 50, 53.
44 Bates, Regesta, no. 59.
45 See also, Sharpe, '1088-William II and the Rebels', 139-57.
46 O'V, 4, 148; GND, 2, 206-8.
47 O'V, 4, 220. ‘..aliasque munitiones possidebat, et Hugonem comitem et Ricardum de Radueriis aliosque Constantiniensis preter Robertum de Molbraio secum habebat.’
Cotentin in 1091. More importantly, they may also have been involved in the negotiations surrounding the treaty of Rouen in 1091. Geoffrey of Coutances was included among the witnesses to a charter drawn up at Dover in January 1091, while Rufus waited to cross to Normandy.\textsuperscript{49} Geoffrey’s presence may be significant in that most of the hard negotiations preceding the treaty of Rouen had been completed by this stage and Rufus was crossing to Normandy in order to ratify the agreement.\textsuperscript{50}

By equal measure, both Robert and his uncle appear to have been regarded as too powerful to let the revolt of 1088 undermine any future relationship with Rufus. Signs of reconciliation were immediate. At the trial of William de St Calais in 1088, Geoffrey of Coutances had been sufficiently reconciled to Rufus to bring his experience to bear in the proceedings against Bishop William.\textsuperscript{51} Geoffrey’s steward, William de Merlay, also claimed damages against Bishop William on behalf of his lord for the alleged seizure of two hundred of Geoffrey’s cattle by William’s men during the revolt.\textsuperscript{52} Bishop William’s request at the end of his trial to travel into exile in the company of Robert de Mowbray suggests that Robert was regarded as enjoying favourable status with Curthose, and thus might have afforded William some protection and status in the face of a possible hostile reception.\textsuperscript{53} Robert’s motives in crossing to Normandy at this stage can be guessed at with some confidence, and were almost certainly to ensure that his relationship with Robert Curthose remained intact following 1088, as well as to facilitate relations with Henry as the new count of Cotentin.

\textsuperscript{49} RRAN, 1, no. 315.
\textsuperscript{50} See below, Chapter Seven.
\textsuperscript{51} De iniustia, 84-5.
\textsuperscript{52} De iniustia, 93-4.
\textsuperscript{53} De iniustia, 95-6. The text of the De iniustia reads Roger instead of Robert. For an explanation see, Barlow, Rufus, 89, n.171.
Therefore, in seeking to understand the breakdown in relations with Rufus it is crucial to recognise that, far from being a marginal figure, Robert de Mowbray was, by 1095, at the very centre of the Anglo-Norman political elite. By 1093 at the latest, and following the deaths of his father and uncle, Robert had immense landed interests in the very heartlands of English royal power, and in a politically sensitive region of the duchy. Laying aside the prejudicial views of Orderic, there is no evidence in Robert’s career before 1095 to suggest a degree of recklessness or a lack of political finesse. His support for Curthose in the 1070s, as with so many other leading members of the next generation of Norman leaders, appears to have been calculated, but did not damage his reputation and standing with the ruling elite to any extent that would necessitate his exclusion from power and promotion. What evidence there is suggests that Robert had successfully negotiated the troubled period following the death of the Conqueror. His participation in the revolt of 1088 had been successfully mitigated and Robert had fulfilled his potential and inherited a cross-Channel complex of estates that elevated his status to be one of the leading members of the Anglo-Norman aristocracy.

The date and circumstances of Robert’s appointment in Northumbria have been seen as a possible source of dispute with Rufus. Dates ranging from 1085 through to 1094 have been suggested for Robert’s appointment, with Rufus’s reluctance to recognise Robert as earl suggested as a source of dispute in 1087 and precipitating Robert’s participation in the revolt of 1088.54 Robert’s predecessor, Aubrey de Coucy, resigned his office at some point between 31 May 1081 and the death of the bishop Robert of Sées in 1082.55 Symeon of Durham implies that Robert directly succeeded earl Aubrey.56

54 Barlow, Rufus, 167; Green, Aristocracy, 112; Aird, DNB, ‘Robert de Mowbray’, 586.
55 Bates, Regesta, 231.
56 Symeon, Opera, 2, 199. ‘Inde rex dedit illum honorem Albrico. Quo in rebus difficilibus parum valente, patriamque reverso, idem Rodberto de Mulbreio dedit comitatam Northymbrensem...’
this, however, Stephen of Whitby's account of the foundation of St Mary's, York, in 1088 contains a reference to Geoffrey of Coutances exercising authority in Northumbria at that date.\textsuperscript{57} Given the difficulties and dangers of administering the north, it is unlikely that the Conqueror would have wanted to repeat past mistakes. That he would have appointed someone soon after Aubrey de Coucy's resignation appears likely. As well as preventing destabilisation in the region, the separation of Robert de Mowbray and Robert Curthose may have been judged a politically prudent move after the political upheaval of Curthose's first rebellion against his father.\textsuperscript{58} Stephen of Whitby's account suggests that it is likely that Robert's initial foothold in Northumbria may have been in partnership with his uncle Geoffrey. Although the absence of Domesday evidence makes it difficult to link Geoffrey with the administration of Northumbria before 1088, there are several reasons to think that Geoffrey had resources in Northumbria that may have provided Robert with the power base needed to establish his authority. It has already been noted that charges were brought against William de St Calais at his trial relating to the seizure of Geoffrey's cattle by William's men. As William had retreated to Durham at the outbreak of the revolt in 1088, it is likely that any seizure took place within the Durham area, with William de Merlay possibly acting as Geoffrey's steward in the north. On the death of his uncle, William de Merlay is likely to have served Robert in a similar capacity; Gaimar recorded William de Merlay being besieged at Morpeth in 1095.\textsuperscript{59}

\textsuperscript{57} BL, MS Add. 38816, fol. 33r-v. \textit{'....Gosfridus Constantiensis episcopus qui eo quoque tempore Northahimbrorum consulatum regebat...'} The specific reference to Geoffrey exercising authority within Northumbria at that particular time could imply that it was a temporary situation, rather than the normal state of affairs.
\textsuperscript{58} Orderic displays a degree of contradiction when discussing this episode, both blaming Curthose's companions for leading him astray with evil counsel, yet at the same time creating a speech for the Conqueror where he complained that Curthose had lured away the Conqueror's young knights. \textit{OV}, 4, 100-2, 110-12.
\textsuperscript{59} Gaimar, \textit{L'Estoire}, lines, 6144-8.
Other connections point towards the importance of familial links to the establishment of Robert's power in Northumbria. The family connection between Morel, Robert de Mowbray and Geoffrey of Coutances was well known. A further relative, an unnamed brother of Robert, had custody of Newcastle at the start of the rebellion. William de Merlay gave the monks of Durham land at Morwick, Warkworth and a fishery in the Tyne. The gift was given for the souls of William, his wife Meinalda and their sons Rannulf, Goffrid and Morel, and was confirmed by William's son Rannulf in 1129 and later by his grandson, Roger. Given that William de Merlay named one of his sons Morel, this too would point towards a strong connection with Robert's family on William's part. Ultimately, though patchy and conjectural, the evidence does seem to point towards a situation where Robert de Mowbray had been established in Northumbria relatively soon after the resignation of Earl Aubrey, and may have looked to his wider family and uncle for support.

In this context, Bishop Geoffrey was the obvious candidate to administer Northumbria in any absence, as was perhaps the case between September 1087 and Easter 1088, and thus reflected in Stephen of Whitby's account. Whether de Mowbray's absence at such a critical juncture and his ties to Curthose caused Rufus to hesitate in confirming him in his earldom is a matter of speculation. Crucially, however, no source mentions this in connection with the revolt of 1088, or as a long-term cause of any discord between the two men. The balance of evidence for Robert de Mowbray's involvement in the revolt of 1088 suggests that it was the claim of Robert Curthose to the English throne that motivated his and his uncle's involvement, rather than any reluctance on the part of

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60 ASC, E, 1095.
61 John of Worcester, 3, 76.
63 W. Percy Hedley, Northumbrian Families (Newcastle, 1968), 196; Sanders, Baronies, 65.
Rufus to recognise Robert’s status. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, Robert’s likely presence in Normandy in September 1087 meant that he was excluded from the selection process in choosing a new English king.

Royal intervention within Northumbria in the relationship between Robert de Mowbray and Bishop William de St Calais has been cited as evidence of insecurity and royal hostility towards Robert, and therefore grounds for rebellion.64 Robert certainly displayed an opportunistic attitude towards ecclesiastics and there is little doubt that his relationship with the bishop and monks of Durham was poor, reflected in Robert’s seizure of the priory of Tynemouth.65 Symeon of Durham suggests that Robert’s actions were a result of his hatred for Bishop William, implying that relations between the two men had already deteriorated before the seizure.66 A local context for Robert’s actions may have been a dispute with Bishop William over the ownership of twelve vills at Aycliffe in Northumbria.67 A notification of a concord made by Rufus between William and Robert, shows Robert surrendering his claims to Aycliffe in consideration of a payment of one hundred pounds.68 The origins of the dispute are unclear, but may be indicative of competition between the two men for followers in an area that had limited Norman settlement into the 1090s.69 Apart from Morel and William de Merlay, only one further man of any significance can be identified in Northumbria before 1095, Hubert de la Val, at Callerton.70 Symeon records the names of two of Robert de Mowbray’s men,

\[\text{\textsuperscript{64}}\text{ Kapelle, }\textit{Norman Conquest of the North}, \text{154.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{65}}\text{ For a detailed discussion see below, Chapter 8.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{66}}\text{ Symeon, }\textit{Opera}, \text{2, 124. ‘...propter inimicitias quae inter episcopum et ipsum agitabatur.’}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{67}}\text{ Symeon of Durham, }\textit{Libellus de Exordi\'a atque Procursu istivs, hoc est Dunhelmensis Ecclesie}, \text{ed. and trans. D. Rollason (Oxford, 2000), 236-8, 238, n. 31 where the properties in question are listed.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{68}}\text{ RR4N, 1, no. 349. Questions over the authenticity of this writ remain. For comments concerning the background to it see, H. S. Offler, }\textit{Durham Episcopal Charters, 1071-1152}, \text{Surtees Society, vol 197 (1968), 3; D. Bates, ‘The Forged Charters of William the Conqueror and Bishop William of St Calais’, }\textit{Anglo-Norman Durham, 122.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{69}}\text{ See M. Strickland, ‘Securing the North: Invasion and the Strategy of Defence in Twelfth Century Anglo-Scottish warfare’, }\textit{Anglo-Norman Warfare} \text{(Woodbridge, 1994), 210.}\]
Gumer and Robert Taca, in relation to the forcible removal of Tuchil from St Oswin’s church in 1090.\textsuperscript{71}

In the context of Northumbrian regional politics the witness list attached to a charter of Edgar, Malcolm III’s son and claimant to the Scottish throne in 1095 may be significant.\textsuperscript{72} The suggestion that the Normans listed in the witness list were either part of Rufus’s army or more importantly, already settled in the north-east, possibly as part of the bishop’s patrimony, could be significant as another source of tension.\textsuperscript{73} Certain families listed in Edgar’s charter rose to prominence in the early twelfth century including the Humet, Amundeville, Audrey and Valognes families.\textsuperscript{74} It has even been suggested that Edgar had seized Lothian as part of the campaign of 1095 and was met by Bishop William at Norham where the original charter was drawn up.\textsuperscript{75}

Other families whose settlement in Northumbria can be dated more generally to the 1090s include the Umfravilles, established at Prudhoe, and the Balliols, established at Bywell.\textsuperscript{76} There are, however, grounds for thinking that Guy de Balliol was attracted to Northumbria under royal patronage. Guy’s lands were made up from various sources including land from the royal demesne, the former lands of Hugh fitz Baldric, a casualty of the 1088 revolt, and also, eventually, from Robert de Mowbray’s lands.\textsuperscript{77} Various dates have been advanced for the establishment of Guy de Balliol, ranging from 1093 to after 1095.\textsuperscript{78} No conclusive evidence for either period exists and it is unlikely, given

\textsuperscript{71} Symeon, \textit{Opera}, 2, 261.
\textsuperscript{72} \textit{Early Scottish Charters Prior to A.D.1153}, ed. A. C. Lawrie (Glasgow, 1905), no. 15.
\textsuperscript{73} W. M. Aird, \textit{St. Cuthbert and the Normans} (Woodbridge, 1998), 201.
\textsuperscript{75} Duncan, ‘Yes, The Earliest Scottish Charters’, 33.
\textsuperscript{78} J. C. Hodgson, \textit{A History of Northumbria} (Newcastle, 1893-1940) 6,19; Dalton, \textit{Conquest}, 83.
their composition, that Guy de Balliol received all of his lands at the same time. James Spearman, writing in the early eighteenth century, quoted an earlier, unnamed writer who claimed that Guy had been given Bywell in the seventh year of Rufus’s reign together with the forests of Teesdale and Marwood on account of his ‘good and faithful services’. Eventually, Rufus also gave to Guy Aubrey de Courcy’s Yorkshire fee.

Where these strands come together is in Robert of Torigni’s account of the rebellion in 1095, which started with Robert de Mowbray attacking unnamed fortresses on the border of his earldom, a possible reference to Bywell and Prudhoe. Orderic believed that one the motivating factors for the rebellion was the desire of Robert de Mowbray to extend his territories ‘on all sides’. Given the strategic importance of both Bywell and Prudhoe in controlling the upper Tyne valley and the route to Bamburgh and if Spearman’s original unnamed source is to be believed, the presence of these men and the evident ties between Balliol and Rufus may have been a provocation for Robert de Mowbray.

Torigni’s statement suggests that a wider context for concern might have been the policy initiated by Rufus in the early 1090s that saw the advancement of men with strong ties to Rufus into northern lordships. Robert I de Stuteville was a beneficiary of Hugh fitz Baldric’s fall after 1088, being granted land around Thirsk, augmented by demesne land from the North Riding and eventually elements of the Mortain fee. In Cumbria, Ivo Taillebois was advanced into the Upper Eden valley by 1094, and

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80 *EYC*, 1, 438.
81 *GND*, 2, 214.
82 *OV*, 4, 278.
following his death in 1094 the lordship of Burton passed to Robert I de Stuteville.

The lordship of Kirkby Malzeard in the eastern Pennines passed into possession of Erneis de Burun and later to Robert de Stuteville. The men who were initially advanced into the north in the 1090s were not possessed of large estates elsewhere in England and were clearly of moderate social status. Ivo Taillebois and Erneis de Burun had proved themselves loyal in the rebellion of 1088 and were important to royal administration. All owed their status and lordships to Rufus. Yet to follow the line of reasoning suggested by Orderic, and to argue that these men in any way posed a threat to the interests of Robert is largely unconvincing. At worst, Robert may have viewed the advancement of these men as evidence of creeping royal interests in the north, but hardly the grounds for rebellion on the scale envisaged in 1095.

Ultimately, the evidence that points to a strained relationship between Rufus and Robert de Mowbray is equivocal and occurs in a context where Rufus had to seemingly intervene to prevent relations between the two major powers in Northumbria seriously compromising each other. The evidence for supposed royal hostility needs to be placed in its proper context. A writ addressed to Geoffrey Bainard, sheriff of Yorkshire, between 1089 and 1091, notified him that the monks of Durham had been granted the monastery of Bellingham with a grant of all customs pertaining to this and other lands of St Cuthbert between the Tyne and Tees. The specific demarcation between the Tyne and Tees might point towards a situation where Robert was confined to beyond the Tyne and was specifically excluded from administering the lands of Bishop William de St Calais during his exile. Likewise, the two loyalists of 1088, Ivo Taillebois and

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86 T. A. M. Bishop & P. Chaplais, *Facsimiles of English Royal Writs to A.D. 1100* (Oxford, 1957), plate 7 (a); *RRAN*, 1, no. 344. The land between the Tees and the Tyne had been granted to the Church of Lindisfarne and formed the core of the Patrimony of St Cuthbert. W. M. Aird, 'St Cuthbert, the Scots and the Normans', *ANS*, 16 (1993), 3.
Emeis de Burun, were given possession of Durham castle during Bishop William’s exile. However, given Rufus’s determination to secure the castle during William’s trial, it would have been remarkable had Rufus entrusted it to Robert in the immediate aftermath of 1088, especially if Robert had permission to travel to Normandy at that point, and the absence of Robert and Bishop William would have probably left Norman power in Northumbria in the hands of Bishop Geoffrey, another rebel from 1088.

Rufus was clearly prepared to act to uphold royal interests and prevent instability within a strategically important earldom, yet there is nothing in these actions that points towards a wider deterioration in his relations with Robert. The diplomatic evidence can be misleading and needs to be treated with care. The monks of Durham appear to have been particularly well organised administratively and had a tradition of seeking writs to preserve their liberties. In terms of the advancement of men into the north who owed their status to Rufus, there is no evidence that this advancement contributed to the revolt. The earliest possible date for Guy de Balliol’s advancement into Northumbria is 1093, by which point relations between Rufus and Robert de Mowbray were already beginning to break down. Therefore, assuming that Robert of Torigni and Orderic were indeed referring in 1095 to attacks by Robert on lands and castles controlled by men loyal to Rufus, all the available evidence suggests that these men were advanced into the north after relations between Rufus and Robert began to deteriorate. They were symptomatic of a breakdown in relations, not the cause.

Overall, there is nothing to suggest that the damning caricatures of Robert presented in the sources, and especially by Orderic, were anything more than the selective

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87 De iniustia, 95.
application of rhetoric and prejudice. His conduct in 1088 and loyalty to Robert Curthose was perfectly understandable and presented no obstacle to the development of an effective working relationship with Rufus. Though relations between Robert and Bishop William de St Calais and the monks of Durham were poor, this in itself does not suggest a motive for rebellion on the scale envisaged in 1095. Nor does it explain why so many members of the elite were attracted to the rebellion.

Ultimately, and as in 1088, the origins of Robert's hostility to Rufus lay in questions over the legitimacy of his kingship. The narrative sources convey the impression of a sudden outbreak of discontent and violence. Yet quite clearly the ground had been laid for an extensive rebellion that must have taken time to organise and any framework of analysis must consider the issues that would attract a geographically diverse group of Anglo-Norman magnates into a conspiracy where regicide was openly discussed and promoted.

One connecting thread unifying a rather diverse group of conspirators is that most of them were former opponents of Rufus. William of Eu was, after Robert de Mowbray, the most prominent of the rebels. A major landholder in the West Country, it is certain that any agreement reached between Rufus, Robert and Geoffrey of Coutances in 1088 is likely to have included William. Like Robert, William was also the heir to a potentially significant cross-Channel complex of estates. Prior to the Conqueror's death it appears as though William administered the family's lands in England, with his father concentrating on Normandy. The death of William's father, Robert, count of Eu, at

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89 \textit{Domesday People}, 477. William was listed as a tenant-in-chief in nine counties in 1086. (Insert)
90 Bates, \textit{Regesta}, no. 158.
some point between 1089 and 1093 saw him inherit these lands. Rufus was able to convince William to align more openly with him. John of Worcester dates this to 1093, noting that he ‘abandoned’ Curthose for Rufus, with promises of honours and on account of his greed for gold. No evidence of any such grants or gifts exists and William’s personal conduct during this period had created enemies from within his own extended family, who would prove instrumental in his downfall. Given this set of circumstances, William may have been open to suggestions of revolt.

The extent of Hugh de Montgomery’s involvement in the revolt is unclear. Although privately reproached by Rufus and returned to royal favour with a £3,000 fine, Symeon records that it was his younger brother Philip who was actually involved in the revolt. By 1095, Philip was the only Montgomery brother not to have any substantial land holdings and this may well have made the revolt of 1095 an attractive prospect. There is a strong suggestion within the sources that Philip was acting alone and the Montgomerys reflected the Lacy family in dividing over its involvement in the conspiracy. In the aftermath of the revolt, Rufus granted Arnulf, the youngest Montgomery brother, the lands of Odo of Champagne in Holderness and Lincolnshire, almost certainly as a reward for remaining loyal. Given that the Welsh stormed Montgomery castle during the course of the rebellion and it was a royal army that intervened to retake it, it seems unlikely that Hugh would have had much to gain from any involvement in the conspiracy. It is noticeable that the fine levied on Hugh matches the same figure offered by his elder brother, Robert de Belléme, for the earldom of Shrewsbury in 1098, and

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91 For a list of Robert’s lands see, Domesday People, 373.
92 John of Worcester, 3, 68.
93 OV, 4, 284.
94 OV, 4, 285; Symeon, Opera, 1, 171-94; John of Worcester, 3, 82.
95 Barlow, Rufus, 358.
this may have been the relief set in 1094 too. It is unlikely that Hugh would have paid the debt by 1095 and the complicity of his younger brother in the revolt would hardly have passed unnoticed by Rufus, who probably took the opportunity to remind Hugh of his indebtedness. A combination of his younger brother’s involvement in the conspiracy, and the support given by his family to Curthose in 1088, may have made Hugh an obvious, but unfounded, target of suspicion in 1095.

Odo of Champagne, lord of Holderness and the father of Stephen of Aumale, emerged as a prominent figure in the aftermath of 1088 when he escorted William de St Calais to his trial, with Alan of Brittany and Roger of Poitou. In the wake of Bishop William’s exile, some of his estates in Yorkshire were divided between Odo and Alan of Brittany. Odo was also named as one of those present at the foundation of St Mary’s, York, in 1088, and gave the abbey the manor of Hornsea. Odo’s main landed interests lay in northern England, with the Norman lands of his wife, passing first to his stepdaughter from his wife’s first marriage, and only then to his son, Stephen of Aumale. There is no evidence to suggest that Odo held any grievances against Rufus, or had ambitions in the north that were not met. Nor is there any evidence to suggest that the involvement of William of Eu and Odo in the revolt of 1095 was a reaction to the events in Normandy, and in particular the tendency for the counties of Eu and Aumale to serve as a staging post for Rufus’s forces within Normandy.

A more significant step in understanding Odo’s involvement, and the origins of the revolt as a whole, is to appreciate his family ties to Rufus through his marriage to

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96 OV, 5, 225.
97 Symeon, Opera, 1, 176.
98 EYC, 1, no. 354.
Adelaide, a half-sister of the Conqueror and aunt to Rufus. John of Worcester was explicit in stating that the aim of the rebels was to replace Rufus as king with his cousin, Stephen of Aumale. Stephen’s actual involvement appears slight, and if David Crouch is right to suggest that Odo may have been instrumental in nominating his son as a replacement for Rufus, it may signal that by 1095 Odo was receptive to individuals such as Robert de Mowbray who might have suggested to him that the legitimacy of Rufus’s rule was open to question. Overall, the only obvious link between Robert de Mowbray, William of Eu, Gilbert fitz Richard and the Montgomery family, is that they had opposed Rufus in 1088.

The chronology of the revolt suggests a gradual unravelling of a long-planned conspiracy. Robert de Mowbray’s plundering of four Norwegian canards in late 1094 or early 1095 was the signal for a wider revolt to begin, rather than the cause of the revolt itself. After the merchants had complained to Rufus, Robert refused a summons to the king’s court. The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle dates Rufus’s summons to after Easter 1095, though without giving any reason for the summons. The possibility that the conspiracy was in trouble before it had begun is suggested by the refusal of Rufus to grant Robert a safe conduct or deliver hostages to him. It is possible that Robert’s strike against the unnamed royal fortresses bordering his earldom represented a planned second stage in the revolt. John of Worcester’s account points towards a situation where the details of the revolt and the plot to replace Rufus as king were known before

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100 John of Worcester, 3, 76.
101 Crouch, The Normans, 148; Barlow, Rufus, 348.
102 Barlow, Rufus, 348.
103 OV, 4, 280; Barlow, Rufus, 347; Cf. Green, Aristocracy, 112-3.
104 OV, 4, 280; Barlow, Rufus, 347, suggests that Robert must have refused to come to court on at least three occasions to make him legally contumacious.
105 ASC, E, 1095.
106 GND, 2, 214.
Rufus began his march north.\textsuperscript{107} The conspiracy to commit regicide was revealed to Rufus as he approached Northumbria.\textsuperscript{108}

The chronology outlined above and the amount of time necessary to formulate the conspiracy against Rufus, suggests that the breakdown in relations between Rufus and Robert de Mowbray must have started by 1094 at the latest if not earlier. The most significant event that might have precipitated such a breakdown was the death of the Scots king, Malcolm III, at the hands of Robert's men in November 1093. There can be no doubt that the death of Malcolm and his eldest son registered as a major political event throughout the Celtic and Anglo-Norman worlds.\textsuperscript{109} Though Rufus had been brusque in his treatment of Malcolm in 1093, news of Malcolm's death was both unexpected and unwelcome from Rufus's point of view.\textsuperscript{110} The Scots raised Malcolm's brother Donald to the throne, while Rufus took the opportunity to attempt to interfere in the Scottish succession by supporting the claim of Malcolm's surviving eldest son, Duncan. The haste and ill-prepared nature of Duncan's expedition suggest that Rufus was completely taken aback by events.\textsuperscript{111} Duncan's reign was short-lived, being powerless to prevent the return of his uncle, and was subsequently killed in 1094 after promising not to call upon any further assistance from outside of Scotland.\textsuperscript{112} Rufus, for his part, was clearly not in a position to have helped Duncan in 1094, as he crossed the Channel on 19 March and spent the rest of 1094 in Normandy.\textsuperscript{113}

\textsuperscript{107} John of Worcester, 3, 76.
\textsuperscript{108} OV, 4, 280.
\textsuperscript{110} OV, 4, 271; Gaimar, L’Estoire, lines, 6124-8.
\textsuperscript{111} ASC, E, 1094.
\textsuperscript{112} Kapelle, Norman Conquest of the North, 154; G.W.S Barrow, ‘Companions of the Atheling’, ANS, 25 (2003), 38; ASC, 1094.
\textsuperscript{113} Barlow, Rufus, 328-321.
The Durham *Historia Regum Anglorum* saw Malcolm's death as divine punishment for his attacks upon Northumbria. Sources from the Celtic and Anglo-Norman worlds leave little doubt that Malcolm's death was the initiative of Robert de Mowbray alone.\(^{114}\) It is unlikely that Robert would have been caught unaware by Malcolm's raid. It was politically prudent for him to have ties to the Scottish court, and though the strength of these ties is uncertain, Morel is described by the Anglo-Saxon Chronicler as being a 'gossip' or god-relative to Malcolm.\(^{115}\) Later writers were ambivalent about Robert's motives in killing Malcolm. Gaimar could not decide 'whether it was right or wrong'.\(^{116}\) Orderic telescoped the events of 1091 with those of 1093 to suggest that Malcolm was killed while returning home under a truce. Continuing with this theme, Orderic suggested that when news of Malcolm's 'murder' reached Rufus, he felt a 'deep shame' that a Norman should have committed such a deed.\(^{117}\)

What prompted Robert to kill Malcolm can only be subject to speculation, and it would be dangerous to see Malcolm's death as a precursor to the revolt. The continuing claim of the Scots kings to Northumbria, fostered enthusiastically by the monks of St Cuthbert, must have been a source of irritation and destabilisation within Northumbria. Malcolm's presence at the foundation of Durham cathedral while on his way to meet Rufus in 1093 was a direct challenge to Robert, who is not mentioned in any of the sources as being present at the foundation.\(^{118}\) The wider context for the breakdown in relations between Rufus and Malcolm may have centred upon Rufus's desire to enforce

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\(^{114}\) *Early Sources of Scottish History, 500-1286*, ed. A. O. Anderson, 2 vols, (Edinburgh, 1922), 50, 51; *ASC, E*, 1093; *GND*, 2, 212.

\(^{115}\) *ASC, E*, 1093.


\(^{117}\) *OV*, 4, 270.

\(^{118}\) For a discussion and full set of references, see below, Chapter 8.
a stricter interpretation of his lordship over Malcolm.\textsuperscript{119} Recently, Professor Duncan has plausibly suggested that Rufus's refusal to honour the 1091 agreement between himself and Malcolm lay at the heart of the dispute, not least because Robert Curthose and Edgar Ætheling may have brokered it.\textsuperscript{120} A further factor in relations between the two kings may have been a possible marriage alliance between Rufus and Malcolm's daughter.\textsuperscript{121}

It is possible that Orderic may have been aware of the diplomatic difficulties Rufus's actions engendered. His analysis of the events of 1093 drew upon the Second Book of Samuel and the slaying of Abner by Joab.\textsuperscript{122} In the Old Testament account, Joab had killed Abner while returning from a meeting with David in which David's lordship over a united Israel was at issue. Joab appears to have been kept away from the meeting as Abner had killed his younger brother Asahel. On learning of the meeting, Joab overtook Abner and killed him. Joab's actions are described as a blood revenge and David is careful to avoid any blame for Abner's death, even going so far as to call down a curse on Joab's house. As Orderic remarks, the 'crime of a former age was repeated in our own time'.\textsuperscript{123} The inference from Orderic's use of the Old Testament would be that Malcolm's death was the fault of Robert de Mowbray alone, and may have had its origins in some unrecorded dispute. The crucial point that Orderic may have been trying to draw upon is that just as David was restrained in acting against Joab because of the nature of Abner's death as a blood feud, so Rufus may have been restricted in his reaction to Malcolm's death. For his part, Robert de Mowbray may have felt that

\textsuperscript{119} For a full discussion of all the issues that have relevance and a detailed appraisal of recent literature see, D. Broun, 'The Church and the origins of Scottish independence in the twelfth century', \textit{Records of the Scottish Church History Society}, 31, 2001 (2003), 10-11, n.25.
\textsuperscript{120} Duncan, \textit{Kingship of the Scots}, 47-9.
\textsuperscript{121} Barlow, \textit{Rufus}, 310-17.
\textsuperscript{122} \textit{OV}, 4, 270; 2 Samuel, 3, 22-7.
\textsuperscript{123} \textit{OV}, 4, 270.
Rufus’s actions in 1093 had created the atmosphere where any incursion into Northumbria by Malcolm could be met with legitimate and lethal force.

If so, it appears that Robert had seriously misjudged Rufus’s mood. Whatever Robert’s motives, there is no doubt the effect the killing had. In terms of Robert’s wider reputation there is a palpable sense in the sources, even those less hostile to Robert than Orderic, of Robert going beyond the pale. William of Malmesbury was most the explicit. Malcolm, according to William, was done to death ‘more by fraud than force’, a criticism perhaps of Rufus as much as Robert.124 The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle understandably focused on the reactions of Malcolm’s wife, but noted that she felt her husband and son had been betrayed.125 Henry of Huntingdon thought that Robert had became ‘puffed up with pride’ at having killed Malcolm and refused to attend Rufus’s court for this reason.126 Robert may have felt a sense of grievance at the reaction to Malcolm’s death and particularly at having to come to court to justify his actions before Rufus.127 From Rufus’s point of view, and despite the setback to any plans he may have had to enforce his over lordship, to renegotiate the agreement of 1091 or even to marry Malcolm’s daughter, one cannot underestimate how the deliberate act of regicide by one of his most powerful magnates would have affected Rufus. The memory of 1088 must have been fresh in Rufus’s mind and he may well have regarded Robert’s actions as lèse majesté.128 Rather than provide the circumstances in which Robert could seemingly plot a rebellion against Rufus without any apparent concern as to the reaction from the Scots, the killing of Malcolm III and Robert’s treatment by Rufus marks the point at

124 GR, 1, 554.
125 ASC, E, 1093.
126 HA, 420. ‘Cum autem Robertus consul Nordhymbre in superbiam elatus, quia regem Scotorum strauerat, curiam Regis adire repudiaret...’.
127 Gaimar, L’Estoire, lines, 6127-8.
128 The point was first made by Frank Barlow see, Rufus, 317.

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which relations between the two men began to deteriorate and Robert started to question Rufus's legitimacy once more.\textsuperscript{129}

Some of the sources certainly reflect these concerns. Gaimar is the most obvious. Though writing in the late 1130s, it seems likely that the audience he wrote for would have well understood what had been at issue in the 1090s and its bearing on contemporary political concerns.\textsuperscript{130} Gaimar drew a comparison between the events of 1095 and those of 1075, and in particular, drew parallels between the aims of the conspirators in 1095 and those in 1075, remarking that they were guilty of the treason 'for which Waltheof was put to death'.\textsuperscript{131} Significantly, Gaimar places this scene after a discourse on the ideal relations between a king and his aristocracy. In Gaimar's reconstruction of Rufus's court, Hugh d'Avranches had taken exception to being asked to serve as a 'noble porter' to the king.\textsuperscript{132} Through an exercise of good humour and generosity, an ugly scene was avoided and Hugh willingly volunteered to serve the king and was rewarded with high authority in Wales. The points that Gaimar appears to have been making were the folly of challenging the king and the duty incumbent upon the senior aristocracy to support a king, who in turn labours under the great weight of mantle, sceptre and crown. In Gaimar's text, the actions and generosity of Rufus was what was expected and would be talked about forever, while those who challenged the authority and legitimacy of a king were described as being of 'Nero's lineage', 'rising today and falling tomorrow'.

\textsuperscript{130} Gillingham, 'Kingship, Chivalry and Love', \textit{The English in the Twelfth Century}, 233-58.
\textsuperscript{131} Gaimar, \textit{L'Estoire}, lines, 6138.
\textsuperscript{132} Gaimar, \textit{L'Estoire}, lines, 6011-46.
It must also be remembered that the period between 1093 and 1095 saw Rufus in a great deal of trouble with the wider cross-Channel aristocracy. In particular, the guarantors of the Treaty of Rouen had found Rufus guilty of breaking its terms, accusations that Rufus angrily rejected. Retreating to Eu, Rufus began to recruit mercenaries and once more resorted to violence in Normandy. The importance and impact of Rufus’s actions cannot be under-estimated. The framework of separate legal and political co-existence envisaged within the treaty was threatened by Rufus’s contravention of its terms and ultimate rejection. In his diplomatic conduct with his elder brother and fellow king, Rufus may have inadvertently revived questions about his own suitability to the throne. Added to this mix was the trouble Rufus found himself in with his new archbishop. The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle recorded that the conspiracy against Rufus in 1095 included many clerics, though this might be more a reflection of royal prejudices than fact. Though no evidence connects the conspiracy against Rufus with the dispute with Anselm, it may have added further doubts to those who questioned Rufus’s suitability for the throne. Rufus’s treatment of Anselm at a difficult period for his regime certainly contrasted with Henry’s efforts in 1100 to soothe any ruffled archiepiscopal feathers over his quick coronation.

Even William of Malmesbury, whose account of 1095 centred upon the execution of William d'Audrieu, and has a chronology for the revolt that is different to other sources, hints at the underlying causes of the revolt. William suggested that the quarrel between Rufus and Robert began after ‘high words had passed’ between them, stating that Robert then left the king’s court in order to prepare for rebellion. Rufus then chased

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133 John of Worcester, 3, 68-70; Barlow, Rufus, 331-332.
134 For a more detailed discussion of the treaty, see below Chapter 7.
135 ASC, E, 1095.
after Robert and placed him in captivity. At this point William of Eu was accused of treason. As every source other than William suggests that Robert would not come to court, it is tempting to think that the ‘high words’ that passed between Robert and Rufus may have connected to the Rufus’s difficulties before 1095, with Robert criticising Rufus’s conduct and his kingship.

Despite his prejudicial views, it appears that even Orderic had to acknowledge the wider issues and could not wholly reduce the revolt to the actions and ambitions of one individual. Towards the end of his account, Orderic noted the widespread nature of the conspiracy and that Rufus had to be somewhat restrained in dealing with those who may have been on the margins of the conspiracy rather than at the centre for ‘fear of goading them into another unlawful insurrection against the state’. Orderic’s use of *res publica* in the context of the revolt of 1095 appears to be deliberate and, as such, places it firmly within the wider discourse of succession and political legitimacy that had been part of the politics of the eleventh century. Robert Curthose may not have been involved in the rebellion of 1095, but the rebellion certainly had its origins in many of the issues that had been highlighted in 1088. Only this framework adequately explains why a man such as Robert de Mowbray, who had enjoyed a career of quite remarkable achievements, and who had no easily identifiable grievance against Rufus, should have been prepared to risk his life and liberty in formulating a conspiracy that could attract widespread support and have regicide at its centre.

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137 *GR*, 1, 564.
138 *OV*, 4, 284. ‘Porro haec subtiliter rex competit, et consultu sapientum huiusmodi uiris pepercit, nec eos ad judicium palam prouocavit, ne furor in peius augmentaretur, iterumque in generale facinus contra rem publicam laceserentur....’. 145
Chapter 5

Robert de Bellême and the Crisis of 1100-1102

In Orderic’s search for examples of the dangers posed to the wider polity by unchecked aristocratic ambition, Robert de Bellême offered an even better example than Robert de Mowbray. Orderic’s choice of language to describe Robert paralleled directly that used to describe Robert de Mowbray. Where de Mowbray was described as being puffed up with empty vanity and anxious to extend his territories, so Robert de Bellême was swollen with overwhelming pride, challenging his peers, guilty of criminal and cruel deeds and not allowing any man to be his equal.1

If laymen in the twelfth century found Orderic’s views on the aristocracy unsympathetic, modern historians, with few notable exceptions, have readily followed Orderic’s footsteps when discussing Robert de Bellême.2 Discussions of his career and the Montgomery family have made it among the best known of Anglo-Norman aristocratic families, accurately reflecting their power, wealth and status.3 Within this historiography, their involvement in the crisis of 1101 and the conflict with Henry the following year is seen as the defining point in their fortunes.4 Over forty years ago, J. F.

1 OV, 5, 224-8, 232-4.
2 On the reception of Orderic’s views in the twelfth century, see the comments of John Gillingham, ‘Gaimar, the Prose Brut and the Making of English History’, The English in the Twelfth Century, 113-122.
4 The main narrative for the events of 1100 can be found in Freeman, William Rufus, 2, 392-415; David, Robert Curthose, 137; Hollister, ‘Anglo-Norman Civil War’, MMI, 76-96; Strevett, ‘Anglo-Norman Civil War Reconsidered’, 159-175.
A. Mason chose to end his account of the family with the conflict of 1102, commenting that by that point 'the Montgomeries had reached the topmost level of the west-European aristocracy; they could only maintain themselves...by risking complete destruction in an attempt to procure a king who would maintain the flow of patronage as Robert was already doing in Normandy'.

The emphasis on the need to secure the flow of patronage has been influential in shaping views of Robert de Bellême. C. Warren Hollister went from regarding Robert as 'one of the best known and least liked of Anglo-Norman magnates', to seeing the whole family as constituting a 'dangerously potent and refractory force in Anglo-Norman and French politics'. Kathleen Thompson has done much to redress the prejudicial views held of Robert. In particular, extensive and exhaustive use of much unpublished material allowed a greater degree of sensitivity in her analysis, yet her discussion of Robert's political career remains firmly located within a traditional framework, and in particular, the need to preserve a cross-Channel complex of estates that apparently explained Robert de Bellême's 'apparently lawless' behaviour. For Thompson, though an able administrator and professional in his approach to soldiering, Robert's eventual downfall was almost entirely due to a lack of foresight and political astuteness in negotiating the problems he faced because of the conflicting ambitions and rivalries of the Conqueror's sons.

Robert's supposed lack of political foresight is somewhat surprising, given his status as one of the leading members of the Anglo-Norman aristocracy. He was, following the

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5 Mason, 'Roger de Montgomery', 26-7.
6 Hollister, 'The Campaign of 1102', 193; Henry I, 156.
7 Thompson, 'Orderic Vitalis and Robert de Bellême', 133-41.
8 Thompson, 'Robert de Bellême Reconsidered', 263. Cf. Le Patourel, Norman Empire, 192-3: 'The succession of Robert de Bellême to the English lands of his younger brother Hugh in 1098 meant, among other things, that the inheritance of his father, Roger de Montgomery, had been reunited after the partition of four years earlier.'
9 Thompson, 'Robert de Bellême Reconsidered', 286; 'Robert de Bellême', 6.
death of Earl Hugh of Chester in July 1101, its most senior member in terms of experience, although perhaps somewhat eclipsed by William of Mortain in terms of social status. By this point, Robert had amassed a significant cross-Channel complex of estates, and had emulated his father's place in the Anglo-Norman polity. More significantly, both Orderic and Wace assigned him a prominence in their narratives for 1101 that reflected his status; Wace identified Robert as one of the baronial negotiators at Alton, along with William of Mortain and Robert fitz Hamon. Tellingly, there appeared to have been no doubt in Henry's mind as to his most dangerous opponent. From the early summer of 1101 onwards, Henry put in motion the process of compiling the charges used against Robert in the following year.

The traditional emphasis on Robert's support for Curthose in 1101 being based solely upon a flawed assessment of the relative merits of Henry and Curthose as sources of future patronage ignores, or more accurately misinterprets, the evidence that points to a long-standing and profound relationship between Robert de Bellême and Robert Curthose; a relationship which appears to have deeply influenced Robert's conduct. Events at both the start and end of Robert's career signalled a deep attachment to Robert Curthose, whether in joining Curthose in rebellion against his father or resisting Henry's attempts to gain custody of his nephew and Curthose's son, William Clito. Understanding the nature of this relationship remains one of the crucial keys to understanding Robert's actions between 1100 and 1102 and his career as a whole.

On one level, the actions of Robert and his family, as with Robert de Mowbray in 1095, actually suggest a cavalier disregard for the preservation of their cross-Channel estates.

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11 *OV*, 6, 20.
12 Cf. Mason, 'Roger de Montgomery', 27; Thompson, 'Robert de Bellême Reconsidered', 286.
13 *OV*, 6, 178-82; Thompson, 'Robert de Bellême Reconsidered', 278.
The activities of Robert and his fellow magnates during this period provided ammunition for their enemies and rivals within the wider polity and the grounds for Orderic to justify, in John Gillingham's judgement, Henry's 'often dishonourable actions' after 1101.\textsuperscript{14} The apparent inconsistencies in Robert's conduct led Kathleen Thompson to suggest that there were four distinct phases to Robert's career; stability under the Conqueror, disorder under Robert Curthose until 1096, comparative stability under William Rufus between 1096 and 1100 and finally the years after 1100.\textsuperscript{15} Dealing with many of the same issues, Judith Green has remarked that Robert de Bellême was both a natural ally to Curthose and dangerously powerful.\textsuperscript{16}

The qualification to this statement may be that he was a natural ally when the question of the English succession was discussed, yet dangerously powerful when looking after his family's interests in Normandy. The two need not be mutually exclusive. The most recent analysis of Robert's career noted that he always attempted to maintain a loyalty to Curthose.\textsuperscript{17} The crucial question of what 'loyalty' precisely meant within the wider context of the disputed English succession or the narrower context of regional, northern French politics has not received any significant exploration. There is a tension within the existing historiography between Robert's consistent support for Curthose's claim to the English throne and his actions within Normandy and the surrounding regions; the latter often perceived as detrimental to the interests of Robert Curthose.

In simple terms, the current discussions of Robert's conduct and career ignore the evidence that suggests Robert's actions between 1100 and 1102 were part of the unfolding discourse on succession and legitimacy and took a specific form in the shape of discussions centred upon the legitimacy of Henry's kingship after 1100. Rather than

\textsuperscript{15} Thompson, 'Robert de Bellême Reconsidered', 266.
\textsuperscript{17} Thompson, 'Robert de Bellême Reconsidered', 266.
a lack of political judgement, Robert’s conduct, indeed his whole career, suggests a high degree of political awareness, which led him to support Robert Curthose’s challenge for the English throne, and inevitably brought him into conflict with Henry.

Chapter Seven lays out in greater depth the argument to suggest that rather than a lack of political astuteness, Robert, together with his fellow negotiators at Alton, displayed a great deal of political acumen as architects of the peace settlement of 1101. The role assigned to Robert in the negotiations of 1101 points to a deep appreciation on his part not only of the political and legal problems presented by Henry’s accession, but also the sheer scale of disturbance in the political process that his actions had engendered. In response, Robert and his colleagues acted within the mainstream of contemporary political thought. They sought to resuscitate the Treaty of Rouen as the means to restore and evolve further a framework of political separation for England and Normandy that would finally settle the issue of the English succession, and remove the conflicting claims exercised by the Conqueror’s sons on the loyalties of a trans-regional aristocracy.

The purpose of this chapter is to place Robert’s actions between 1100 and 1102 in context. The abilities displayed by Robert in the events of 1101 presented a major obstacle to Henry’s ambitions to reconstitute his father’s cross-Channel dominions, hinted at as early as March 1101 in the terms of the treaty negotiated with count Robert of Flanders.\textsuperscript{18} Preference for Curthose as a single cross-Channel ruler in 1088 did not prevent Robert constructing and exploiting a good working relationship with William Rufus, the fruits of which were seen in Robert’s succession to his father’s earldom ten years later. The failure to achieve a similar modus operandi with Henry is notable. In

\textsuperscript{18} For the terms of the treaty, E.M.C. van Houts, ‘The Anglo-Flemish Treaty of 1101’, \textit{ANS}, 21 (1999), 169-74. Henry’s attitude towards Normandy also created significant problems for William of Mortain, and will be explored in the following chapter.
short, Henry’s campaign against Robert de Bellême in 1102 was a rejection of the political framework that emphasised co-existence. Robert de Bellême’s isolation in 1102 owed less to a lack of political astuteness, or an alleged reputation for sadism and brutality, than to the reluctance of the cross-Channel aristocracy as a whole to uphold the Treaty of Winchester and come into conflict with Henry in the process.19

The identification by Orderic and Wace of Robert de Bellême as one of the leading baronial negotiators in 1101 is of great significance. Irrespective of the intellectual abilities of the negotiators, which the evidence, explored in Chapter Seven, suggests was formidable, in practical terms only men of sufficient stature and standing could have had the prestige and power necessary to negotiate with both Henry and Curthose, and impose a settlement upon them. By the time of Rufus’s death, Robert de Bellême had clearly reached such a position.20 In addition to his inheritance of the Montgomery-Bellême lands straddling the southern Norman March, in 1098 Robert had paid a relief of £3,000 to Rufus for his father’s English earldom. His marriage to Agnes, daughter and heir of Guy, count of Ponthieu brought Robert further lands on the northeastern frontier of Normandy.21 In practical terms, the effect of the accumulation of these lands was to give Robert a political profile beyond the borders of England and Normandy, expressed in part through the patronage of abbeys as geographically diverse as Shrewsbury, Saint-Martin de Sées, Saint-Vincent du Mans and La Sauve Majeure.22 A further aspect of this political profile is that Robert, his father Roger, and his brother Roger all made marriage alliances beyond the borders of Normandy, while Arnulf de Montgomery attempted to go one step further by marrying the daughter of the Irish king

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20 Thompson, ‘Robert de Bellême Reconsidered’, 276.
21 Though the date of Robert’s marriage to Agnes is unclear, by 1100 Robert had succeeded his father-in-law as count of Ponthieu. Recueil des actes des comtes de Ponthieu, ed. C. Brunel (Paris, 1930), nos 7, 11, 12.
22 Shrewsbury Cartulary, no. 35, Grand Cartulaire de La Sauge Majeure, no. 1354; Livre Blanc, fos.79, 93v; Cartulaire de L’Abbaye de Saint-Vincent du Mans, ed. R. Charles and le vicomte Menjot d’Elbenne (Le Mans, 1913), no. 630.
Murchertach. Significantly, following his expulsion from England, Robert’s activities within northern France focused upon Maine as much as Normandy. Robert’s stature was significant enough for both the pope and Louis VI to comment upon his arrest by Henry, and for the incident to have possibly influenced Suger’s construction of the deathbed scene of Louis VI.

Robert’s stature as a magnate of cross-Channel importance, and his interests beyond the Anglo-Norman world, is a reminder to view the events taking place in England in the year between Rufus’s death and the Treaty of Winchester, and the individuals most intimately involved, within a wider European context. The wider issues of the potential deposition of a consecrated king, the nature of political legitimacy and the transmission of the throne were ones that had a resonance throughout much of Western Europe, and would continue to do so for much of the twelfth century. Both Robert Curthose and Henry were aware of the need to act in a way that would hold meaning for a wider audience. Robert complained to Pope Paschal II that his brother had seized the throne by force, while in turn, Henry looked beyond Normandy for practical support and negotiated a treaty with Robert II, count of Flanders, in March 1101, in the presence of his chief advisers, including Robert, count of Meulan. Robert of Meulan may even have been active in the French court on behalf of Henry after his coronation. It is no coincidence, therefore, that the two most significant advisers and negotiators during the

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23 OV, 6, 30. Arnulf was also listed as a friend of Archbishop Anselm, along with many other members of the aristocratic elite, R.W. Southern, Saint Anselm: A Portrait in a Landscape (Cambridge, 1990), 188; Vaughn, Anselm, 63-6, 75, 123-5, 333.
24 Thompson, ‘Robert de Bellême Reconsidered’, 277
criterion of 1101, Robert de Bellême and Robert of Meulan, were important figures beyond
the confines of the Anglo-Norman world.29

Robert's support for Curthose in 1101 was part of an established pattern of behaviour.
Before 1087, Robert had close ties to Curthose and his participation in Curthose's
rebellion against his father was a carefully crafted expression of political dissent and
represented the Montgomery family view on the preferred choice of successor for the
English throne after the Conqueror's death. As with Robert de Mowbray, Robert's
participation in Curthose's rebellion did not result in his exclusion from the ruling
political elite.30 This context explains why Orderic chose to include Robert in his great
rhetorical scene to explain aristocratic motives in the rebellion against Rufus in 1088,
along with Robert of Mortain and Odo of Bayeux.31

Very little has been made of why Robert should have been involved in the rebellion
against Rufus in 1088, other than beyond the obvious attractions of king-making.32 Why
Orderic would have included Robert de Bellême in the same dialogue as the most senior
members of the ducal kin is something of a puzzle, unless a strong relationship between
Curthose and Robert de Bellême already existed and his views, together with those of
his family, on the future of the English succession were not already well known.
Orderic's discussion on aristocratic motives chose to concentrate on the legal and
political implications of division, and more broadly, the grounds for the selection of an
English king. The emphasis placed by Orderic was on the legal and political ties that
existed between Curthose and the aristocracy, though expressed in the language of
twelfth century aristocratic inheritance customs. The crucial point, considering

29 For Robert of Meulan see, OV, 5, 298, 310, 314-16. It is noticeable that Orderic's descriptions of
Robert usually contain references not only to his loyalty, but also to his sagacity.
31 OV, 4, 122.
32 Thompson, 'Robert de Bellême Reconsidered', 269.
Orderic's views on the nature of the aristocratic ambition, is that Robert de Bellême, Odo of Bayeux and Robert of Mortain are presented as discussing their motives for rebellion in terms that go beyond those of a diminution in wealth and power that a split in the Anglo-Norman polity would entail.\(^{33}\)

William of Malmesbury is even more explicit. Using a similar rhetorical method to Orderic, he constructed a dialogue set during the revolt of 1088 between Rufus and Robert's father, Roger de Montgomery, where Rufus complained that it was a puzzle to him why the aristocracy were so ungovernable, adding that if money and lands were what they sought, then they should take them. In Malmesbury's dialogue, Rufus only persuaded Roger de Montgomery to desert Curthose when he changed tack and turned the argument towards the mechanism by which he was chosen as king and Roger elevated to power; namely the judgement of the Conqueror.\(^{34}\) Robert's participation in the revolt of 1088 was, therefore, perfectly consistent with the tenor of his relationship with Curthose before that point. His own view, together with that of his family and many other Anglo-Norman magnates on the English succession, found expression in Orderic's and William of Malmesbury's rhetoric.

Robert's actions in Normandy during 1087 provide a prime example of the way in which local and regional concerns interacted with wider cross-Channel ones. Robert heard of the Conqueror's death while at Brionne, upon which he promptly turned his horse around and galloped to Alençon, where he immediately expelled the ducal garrison.\(^{35}\) The traditional interpretation of this episode is to see it as a reassertion of

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\(^{33}\) For full references, see below, Chapter 2.

\(^{34}\) GR, 1, 546. ‘Non se intelligere quid ita effrenes sint; si velint pecunias, accipiant pro libito; si augmentum patrimoniorum, eodem modo prorsus quae velint habeant. Tantum videant ne iuditium genitoris periclitetur, quod si de se putauerint asperandum, de se ipsis caueant exemplum; idem enim se regem qui illos duces fecerit’.

\(^{35}\) OV, 4, 114-16. Even the very circumstances of Robert de Bellême's actions in 1087 are significant. There is no discussion in the secondary literature of the possible reasons for Robert wishing to see the
local power and a move away from support and co-operation with Curthose.\textsuperscript{36} It is important to stress, however, that Robert was not alone in his actions, nor in the wider context of regime change, were his actions and concern to regain control of familial property in any way unusual.\textsuperscript{37} William de Breteuil, Ralph de Tosny and William of Evreux all similarly expelled ducal garrisons in 1087.\textsuperscript{38} Perhaps as a response, it is noticeable that two of the clauses of the inquest into ducal rights in 1091, not only forbade the building of castles and strongholds without permission, but also reasserted the ducal right to garrison non-ducal castles and take hostages as a guarantee of good conduct.\textsuperscript{39} William of Evreux continued to make claims for the restitution of family property, in one case, refusing to give his consent for the marriage of his niece to Count Fulk of Anjou, unless there was a restoration of disputed property to him and his nephew, William de Breteuil.\textsuperscript{40}

The crucial point is that Curthose had enjoyed good relationships with all of these men and generally continued to do so. William of Evreux, William de Breteuil and Ralph de Tosny commanded the ducal forces on expedition into Maine in 1088, attracting commendations from Orderic for their martial qualities.\textsuperscript{41} Perhaps even more significantly, William de Breteuil was the first magnate to oppose Henry in 1100, forcefully arguing that he ought to observe the oath he had taken to Curthose and wait

\textsuperscript{36} Thompson, 'Robert de Belleme Reconsidered', 269.
\textsuperscript{38} Haskins, NI, 283, nos. 3, 4.
\textsuperscript{39} OV, 3, 112-4.
\textsuperscript{40} OV, 4, 184, n. 2.
\textsuperscript{41} OV, 4, 154.
for his return before the issue of the succession was discussed. Only the threat of physical violence against William allowed Henry access to the treasury.

In the interplay of local and cross-Channel interests many of the difficulties in the relationship between Curthose and Robert in the immediate aftermath of 1088 stemmed from the need for the Montgomery family as a whole to renegotiate their relationship with Rufus. In doing so, they thus exposed their position to rivals within the Norman polity. In the aftermath of the failure of the revolt of 1088, Robert left England only after the intercession of powerful ‘friends’ who engineered a rapprochement with Rufus. The unsettled nature of Norman politics allowed ‘mischief makers’, and in particular, Bishop Odo of Bayeux, to suggest that the reconciliation negotiated between Robert and Rufus had included provisions for a confederation between Henry and Robert aimed at Curthose. The subsequent events are well known; the arrest of Henry and Robert, Curthose’s campaign into Maine, the siege of the Montgomery-Bellême castle at Saint-Céneri, the restoration of the castle to Robert Giroie and the reconciliation arranged by Roger de Montgomery. Orderic thought that Curthose should have gone further and banished Earl Roger and his ‘seed’ from Normandy. Yet, almost immediately on his release, Robert resumed his position as one of Curthose’s chief counsellors, whose views on the proposed marriage between Count Fulk and the niece of William of Evreux evidently carried some weight.

The granting of Saint-Céneri to Robert Giroie suggests that ducal trust in Robert may have waned, though Robert’s overall relationship with Curthose and the importance to

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42 OV, 5, 290.
43 OV, 4, 148. ‘Deinde peractis pro quibus ierat in autumno regi ualefecit et cum Roberto Belemensi qui iam per amicos potentes cum rege pacificatus erat in Normanniam remeare disposit.’
44 OV, 4, 148.
46 OV, 4, 152.
47 OV, 4, 186.
both men of Norman influence in Maine provided a strong motivation to make their relationship work. In 1090, Robert was conspicuous among the ducal supporters in suppressing the rebellion against Curthose at Rouen. In return, Curthose gave Robert his support against local neighbours and rivals for control of the Hiémois, and in particular, the Grandmesnils and Courcy families, who in turn vigorously protested their loyalty to Curthose. Perhaps as a result, Curthose’s support was ultimately more symbolic and he refused to press the siege of Courcy too closely. The danger for all sides was the exploitation of local rivalries by Rufus, which appears to have been the case with Richard de Courcy, whom Orderic listed as a supporter of Rufus.

Robert’s inheritance of his father’s English earldom in 1098 can also be located in this interplay between the local and trans-regional concerns. His actions in pursuing his father and younger brother’s English estates appear opportunistic. The customs of aristocratic inheritance gave Rufus and Robert scope in negotiating for the earldom of Shrewsbury. From Rufus’s point of view, allowing Robert to succeed to his brother’s earldom was an effective exploitation of Robert’s ambitions on order to help secure his own French interests. As the heir to the county of Ponthieu, Robert could probably be counted on to provide a secure communications route to the continent, especially in the event of Robert Curthose re-establishing control in Normandy on his return from the crusade and relations between the two brothers deteriorating once more. A friendly Count of Ponthieu would also secure Rufus’s domination of northeast Normandy around Aumale and Eu, and would allow him to exercise pressure on the next layer of Anglo-Norman magnates in northeast Normandy, especially the Warennes.

48 OV, 4, 226.
49 OV, 4, 230-6.
50 OV, 4, 232.
51 OV, 5, 26.
52 For a discussion of the sources that support this interpretation see above, Chapter 1.
From Robert's point of view, closer ties to Rufus centred upon the determination to restore Norman power in Maine. Robert had first commanded Rufus's knights in his Vexin campaign of 1097-8 where, according to Orderic, he surpassed all others in his devotion and duty.\(^{53}\) The construction of a castle at Danguel by Helias, which covered the Sarthe valley and directly blocked the route south from Bellême, posed a threat to Robert's interests. The extent to which both men worked in close harmony is obvious. Once the war in Maine had been concluded, Rufus paid for the fortifications of his castles and he appointed Robert castellan of Ballon and provided three hundred knights.\(^{54}\) This is also reflected in Orderic's hostile prose, and in particular, his suggestion that Rufus was easily deceived by Robert, whom Orderic believed had a clear expansionist policy within Maine.\(^{55}\)

The crucial point to emerge from this evidence is that Robert’s elevation to cross-Channel 'super magnate' status did not alter his priorities. Both Robert and Rufus saw the consolidation of Norman power in Maine as the priority; each was locked into a symbiotic relationship with the other, where the fortunes of one were linked to the fortunes of the other. On resumption of hostilities with Helias in July 1099, Robert was besieged at Ballon and immediately sought assistance from Rufus, who did not hesitate in supporting Robert.\(^{56}\) By contrast, though Orderic suggested that Robert was particularly brutal in his treatment of the Welsh, the Brut y Tywysogion reveals that Robert had no impact in comparison to his father and brother, and suggests that expansion into Wales from his English lands were of secondary concern, in comparison to securing his interests in northern France.\(^{57}\)

\(^{53}\) OV, 5, 214.  
\(^{54}\) OV, 4, 232, 234.  
\(^{55}\) OV, 5, 232; Barlow, Rufus, 382.  
\(^{56}\) OV, 5, 254-6.  
\(^{57}\) Brut y Tywysogion or the Chronicle of the Princes, Peniarth, MS 20 Version, trans. T. Jones (Cardiff, 1952), 22.
Overall, there is no evidence to suggest that in 1101 Robert’s primary motive in supporting Curthose was to preserve and protect his newly acquired English lands, or that these acquisitions brought him into conflict with Henry.58 His successful acquisition of the earldom of Shrewsbury represented the cross-Channel fruits of a successful regional relationship, but his interests in northern France remained his overwhelming priority. It is notable that during the period immediately before Curthose landed in England in 1101, Robert’s activities centred upon Normandy as he received the bishopric of Sées, Argentan and the forest of Gouffern from Curthose, areas crucial to Robert’s long term aim of acquiring control of the vicomté of the Hiémois, Argentan and Exmes.59 The accession of Henry in August 1100 may have left Robert with the uncomfortable option of having to deal with a man with whom he may have clashed at an earlier point and who had been in possession of Domfront, a former Bellême family holding, since 1092.60 Yet no record of any dispute between the two men exists before July 1101 and Robert gave Henry homage and received his English estates from him, probably at a council summoned to London shortly after Henry’s coronation.61

The grounds for Robert’s opposition to Henry in 1101 centred upon a long-held belief in the claim of Robert Curthose to the English throne and Robert’s exclusion from the whole process of selecting a king. In simple terms, the evidence suggests that when Robert became aware of Curthose’s intention to challenge for the throne he supported his claim because he believed that it was right. The circumstances of Henry’s succession contravened the framework laid out in Pseudo-Isidore, and for the second time in thirteen years the rights and prerogatives of the senior aristocracy to be involved in the decision-making process had been contravened. However, once it became clear

59 OV, 5, 308; Louise, La Seigneurie, 2, 392.
60 OV, 4, 256-8.
that an overwhelming momentum in favour of a Curthose kingship had failed to
develop, Robert and his fellow negotiators aimed for a negotiated settlement. The only
discernible difference that Robert’s expanded interests may have made to his attitude in
1101 lay in the contemplation of the complete political separation of England and
Normandy, building on the framework laid out in 1091 with the Treaty of Rouen, and
the need for co-existence as a permanent solution to the problem of divided lordship.\textsuperscript{62}

Robert’s expulsion from England in 1102 was Henry’s rejection of the idea of co-
existence.\textsuperscript{63} In doing so, Henry rejected a political solution that had apparently found
acceptance in the world at large.\textsuperscript{64} Robert de Bellême witnessed a charter of Henry’s at
Windsor on 3 September but left England before Robert Curthose, and was in
Normandy by 5 November.\textsuperscript{65} Nor was Robert alone in feeling it safe to leave England.
When Curthose left England, William de Warenne also accompanied him, witnessing a
charter of Robert Curthose at Caen in 1102.\textsuperscript{66} Other Curthose supporters also appear to
have shared the same sense of security, most notably Rannulf Flambard, who began to
administer the diocese of Lisieux from January 1102.\textsuperscript{67}

Once Robert de Bellême and Robert Curthose were out of England, Henry moved
swiftly. Charges against Robert Malet, Ivo of Grandmesnil and Robert de Lacy were
pressed.\textsuperscript{68} William de Warenne approached Curthose in ‘great distress’ over his
forfeiture in early 1102.\textsuperscript{69} It seems as though Robert returned to England shortly before

\textsuperscript{62} This, of course, goes against the heart of Le Patourel’s thesis. See,\textit{ Norman Empire}, 195. ‘All men who
at any time had interests in England and Normandy would be concerned for the political union of the two
countries.’
\textsuperscript{63} For the narrative of Henry’s campaign see, C.W. Hollister,\textit{ Henry I}, 156-63.
\textsuperscript{64} See above, Chapter 1, for a discussion of the importance of double confirmations.
\textsuperscript{65} \textit{RRAN}, 2, no.544, 548; \textit{Recueil des actes des comtes de Ponthieu}, no.15
\textsuperscript{66} \textit{OV}, 6, 320; \textit{RRAN}, 2. nos 544, 548, 621.
\textsuperscript{67} Hollister, ‘Anglo-Norman Civil War’, 95; \textit{OV}, 5, 322.
\textsuperscript{68} \textit{OV}, 6, 12.
\textsuperscript{69} \textit{OV}, 6, 12.
Easter and Henry made his move against him. The author of the *Brut* thought that one of the charges laid against Robert was his rebuilding of Bridgnorth without royal permission, and that his brother, Arnulf, was also summoned to answer charges.

Though Henry had been assiduous in building a case against Robert and his brothers, his actions initially drew opposition from among the political elite who, according to Orderic, feared that they 'would be trampled on like slave girls' if Henry were to succeed in disinheriting Robert.

Henry also appealed to Robert Curthose to move against Robert, under the terms of the Treaty of Winchester. Curthose began to besiege Vignats, yet as in England, his actions were unacceptable to many in his entourage, who created a diversion that forced the ducal army to retreat and allowed Robert's men to defend the fortresses of Château-Gontier, Fourches and Argentan. Curthose may also have attempted to confiscate Robert's lands. Once Henry had subdued Robert and his brothers he expelled them from England. Though Orderic indulged himself with his rhetoric, suggesting that Henry could now begin to rule freely after driving Robert out of England, William of Malmesbury thought that enough room had been left for manoeuvre between Henry and Robert. The implication is that Henry rejected the notion.

As far the issue of Henry's kingship was concerned, Robert's expulsion in 1102 brought to an end the crisis in political relationships created by Rufus's death, though quite clearly Henry's ambitions with regard to Normandy still had to be played out. Any

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70 *ASC*, E, 1102
71 *Brut*, 22-3.
72 *OV*, 6, 26. 'Si rex magnificum comitem violenter subegerit, nimiaque pertinacia ut conatur eum exhaereditaauerit omnes nos ut imbelles ancillas amodo conculcabit.'
73 *OV*, 6, 24.
74 *OV*, 6, 24.
75 *OV*, 6, 46. Orderic describes the reconciliation between Robert and Curthose, where Robert was granted his father's lordship.
76 *OV*, 6, 30: *GR*, 1, 718. 'Rotbertus cum fratibus Ernulfo....et Rogerio Pictauensi...Angliam perpetuo abjuravit, sed uigorem sacramentui temperavit adiectio, nisi regi placito quandoque satisfecisset obsequio.'
appraisal of Robert de Bellême’s career during this period needs to have at its heart the recognition of his intellect and political skills. Robert’s opposition to Henry’s kingship in 1101 stemmed not from the promise of further patronage from Curthose, or even from the need to preserve his newly created cross-Channel complex of estates, but from a profound questioning of the legitimacy of Henry’s kingship. Yet, unlike Robert de Mowbray, Robert’s doubts did not form themselves into the contemplation of regicide, but found expression in support for Robert Curthose’s claim to the English throne; support Robert de Bellême had consistently espoused since the earliest association of the two men. Robert’s conduct in the negotiations at Alton belies the notion that he lacked political astuteness or ability. Together with his fellow negotiators, he recognised that times had changed. As well as a pragmatic appraisal of the lack of support for Curthose, attitudes towards the concept of kingship had clearly evolved from the days of the rebellion of 1075, where those involved regarded it as an office to be assumed or discarded. The question was one of striking the right balance between respect for sacral kingship and respect for the rights and preferences of the senior aristocracy.

The attitude of the aristocracy had also changed from 1088. For a man of renowned martial qualities, Robert recognised that violence in the circumstances of 1101 offered a limited means to effect long lasting political change. The experience of 1088 and the bitter aftermath of Curthose’s failure represented a grievous threat to Robert’s interests within northern France and as a result bred caution. His conduct in the early 1090s and the degree of local violence, which so disgusted Orderic, is in part explained by the need to restore and defend his position within Normandy. The importance of Robert’s local interests lay behind his elevation to the status of cross-of Channel magnate after 1098 and was the expression of a political relationship with Rufus that suited the needs of both men in a local, northern French context.
Robert's support for Curthose's claim to the English throne led him to a position where the emphasis of negotiations at Alton and the terms of the eventual settlement stressed co-existence and permanent separation of England and Normandy as the solution to divided lordship. In this, the negotiators at Alton had the framework of the Treaty of Rouen in 1091 to guide them. The evidence points to Robert being one of the architects of the agreement, and having the skills, experience and power necessary to broker an agreement. Arguably, if Robert did display a lack of foresight during this period, then it is surely in thinking that Henry would abide by the terms of the agreement. However, if Symeon of Durham and John of Worcester are correct in locating Robert's rebuilding of Bridgenorth castle in the context of the events of 1101, then Robert may have also have accurately judged Henry, but clearly holding Henry to the treaty could not be achieved by Robert or the Montgomerys alone.77

77 Symeon, Opera, 2, 234; John of Worcester, 3, 100.
Chapter 6

William of Mortain 1100-06

In comparison to Robert de Mowbray and Robert de Bellême, and to paraphrase Marc Bloch, William of Mortain is the one member of the Anglo-Norman political elite for whom our direct evidence of his character and conduct is so inadequate that we are likely to despair of scenting human flesh. Unlike the career of his father, or those of his uncles and cousins, William’s prominence at the apex of the cross-Channel political elite was short-lived, with a public career that lasted barely more than a decade, and with over half of this period spent in conflict with Henry I. After his capture at the battle of Tinchebray in 1106, he spent the remaining years of his life as Henry’s prisoner.

Despite this brevity, William’s relationship with Henry has attracted considerable attention. Nearly all expressed ambivalence towards him. Unlike Robert de Mowbray and Robert de Bellême, they generally admired William’s character and personality, yet this did not prevent them from criticising his political judgement. The first and most influential study came from the pen of William of Malmesbury. No admirer of either father or son, William suggested that the origins of William of Mortain’s conflict with Henry lay in his jealousy of Henry since boyhood. Malmesbury presented William as a man who could not control his ambitions. His seemingly ill-judged claim to his paternal uncle, Odo of Bayeux’s, former earldom of Kent released such ‘bitterness and obstinacy that with hideous arrogance he vowed that he would not wear a cloak, until he was

\[1\] M. Bloch, The Historian’s Craft (Manchester, 1954), 22.
\[2\] GR, 1, 720.
allowed to inherit what he asserted passed to him from his uncle'. By contrast, Henry is portrayed by Malmesbury as the very model of regal self-control, who succeeded in postponing the issue until, and following the judgement of the royal court, he refused William's request and went a step further and demanded the return of land that William was alleged to have 'wrongfully' held. The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle added that having lost the verdict of the court, William left England for Normandy, after which Henry confiscated his English lands.

On a personal level, William of Malmesbury was prepared to concede that William of Mortain possessed a lively mind and youthful energy, noting that he had many good points, but ultimately deserved his fate because of his treachery. Orderic admired William's military prowess and described him in the context of the campaign of 1106 as an enterprising young man. Orderic's use of iuuenis is interesting in that it may reflect on William's status as an unmarried man, yet it should also be noted that Orderic was not shy of using iuuenis to describe any individual he felt lacked more prudent qualities and whose military prowess could not, in his opinion, mask their political failings.

Other writers continued with the theme of youthful impetuosity. Henry of Huntingdon described William as a 'most upright man, righteous in spirit, but impetuous in action'. The author of the Warenne Chronicler noted William to be 'young in age, but vigorous

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3 GR, 1, 720. '...infestus et improbus adeo ut infami arrogantia se deuotaret non induturum clamidem nisi a patruo...'.
4 ASC, E, 1104.
5 GR, 1, 724.
6 OV, 6, 84. 'Tantae nimirum strenuitatis prefatus iuuenis erat....'.
7 In particular, Orderic uses iuuenis to describe Robert Curthose. See, W. M. Aird, 'Frustrated Masculinity: The Relationship between William the Conqueror and his Eldest Son', Masculinity in Medieval Europe, ed. D. M. Hadley (London, 1999), 43.
8 HA, 452. '...animo perfecto et exercito furenti, uir probissimus indixit et infixit regalibus turmis werram calamitate refertam.'
in strength and fierce in spirit, stubborn and just, very rich in his possessions on both sides of the Channel'.

Modern commentaries on William have been no less equivocal in criticising his political judgement. Brian Golding has done much to reassess the reputations of both William and his father. However, this did not stop him from concluding his recent study of both men’s monastic patronage with the suggestion that William's opposition to Henry was a ‘fatal blunder for which he paid with his liberty and estates’. There has been a disturbing tendency within some recent historiography to regard William as something of a comic figure. Commentating on his refusal to wear a cloak after the judgement of the royal court, C. Warren Hollister, or more probably the editor of his posthumous study of Henry I, commented that Henry ‘seems to have taken this dire threat in his stride’. The most recent translation of the Gesta Regum has William's reaction to losing the judgement of the royal court as one where he ‘flounced’ off to France in a ‘passion’. These are two examples where it is surely more correct to think of William’s refusal to wear a cloak as a symbolic act, a constant and visible reminder of a perceived injustice, which found expression in William of Malmesbury’s choice of verbs to describe William’s reaction in 1104. Set in this context, William’s vow is possibly an early example of the kind of chivalric vow Maurice Keen has highlighted as being common in the later middle ages.

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9 Liber Hyda, 306. ‘...juvenis quidem aetate sed viribus strenuus et animo ferus, justitiaeque tenax possessionum quae ultraque citraque mare ditissimus superbia elatus implacabiliter...’.


12 Hollister, Henry I, 182.

13 GR, 1, 720. ‘Tunc uero Willelmus, sententia iuditii expunctus, indignabundus et fremens Normanniam abit.’

14 Keen, Chivalry, 212-6.
The presentation of a personally appealing man who displayed such poor political judgement so as to lose both his status and freedom suggests close parallels to the behaviour of Robert de Mowbray and Robert de Bellême. There is strong evidence to suggest that the rupture in the relationship between Henry I and William had its origins not in William’s claim to Odo’s earldom, as William of Malmesbury suggests, but in his opposition to Henry’s accession to the English throne. William displayed doubts over the legitimacy of Henry’s actions and the validity of his kingship that mirrored those of his uncle and other members of the political elite. The question of William’s claim to Kent does, however, occupy such a prominent place in the narrative of William of Malmesbury that it cannot be ignored.

The most direct evidence for William’s attitudes towards Henry’s kingship comes from two relatively late sources, which are, nonetheless, of central importance because both have Norman oral traditions as their bases. The first source, the Warenne Chronicle, projected William of Mortain, together with Robert de Bellême and William II de Warenne, as refusing to accept his Henry’s kingship and as a result alienated from him.\textsuperscript{13} The second source is Wace’s account of the events of 1101 and the negotiations leading to the Treaty of Winchester, which gives William equal prominence as one of the leading baronial negotiators, along with his more experienced uncle, Robert de Bellême.\textsuperscript{16} Overall, Wace’s narrative unequivocally locates William of Mortain as the leading figure behind Robert Curthose’s challenge for the English throne in 1101. There is no hint of any longstanding enmity or jealousy between William and Henry; rather it was William’s support for Curthose that caused the breakdown in relations.\textsuperscript{17} The structure of Wace’s narrative appears to give Robert de Bellême a secondary role to his

\textsuperscript{13} Liber Hydra, 304-6. ‘Quidam autem et maxime potentiores superbia elati, nec sicut dominum suum nominant, nec sicut regem suum honorant.’
\textsuperscript{16} Wace, lines, 10397-400.
\textsuperscript{17} Wace, lines, 10475-80.
nephew; immediately after noting that Curthose had followed the advice of William, Wace recorded that Robert de Bellême was also on bad terms with Henry because he too had supported Robert Curthose. His account inverts the emphasis of many writers for this period, especially Orderic, but also William of Malmesbury, who noted that it was Robert de Bellême who recruited William to his side following his expulsion from England in 1102.

It is impossible to construct a detailed biography of William’s early life and career, or to outline what practical military and political experience he may have brought to Curthose’s cause in 1101. The geo-political importance of the Counts of Mortain, combined with William’s family background and parentage, also gave him a regional, and more importantly, a cross-Channel importance at an earlier stage in his career than that of his uncle. An indication of William’s importance is reflected in the proposed marriage between William and the daughter of Walter de Mayenne, until bishop Hildebert of Le Mans objected on the grounds of consanguinity. Given that William’s sisters both had cross-border marriages arranged for them to Andrew de Vitré and Guy II de Laval, the projected marriage suggests a process of consolidation in south-west Normandy, with the new count of Mortain fulfilling his family’s strategic role in the region.

These factors alone would almost certainly explain the effort expended by Henry in an attempt to bind William closer to him, particularly with the offer of his sister-in-law, Mary of Scotland, in marriage. Yet the evidence from Wace and the Warenne

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18 Wace, lines, 10478-9.
19 GR, 1, 720.
Chronicle suggest that Henry’s efforts had greater basis in the effect that William’s support would have had in conferring a greater degree of legitimacy upon Henry’s regime, perhaps even going as far as making it acceptable to those who believed both that they been excluded from the political process in 1100 and that Curthose held the stronger claim to England. To a degree, William of Mortain’s prominence in the politics of the early 1100s was inevitable given his position within the cross-Channel aristocracy in 1101.

However, the very factors that made William so important and so influential ensured that by questioning the foundations and legitimacy of Henry’s kingship, William had sealed his fate in the event of the collapse of the Treaty of Winchester. It seems as though the author of the Warenne Chronicle sought to rationalise or even justify Henry’s subsequent actions in imprisoning him for the remainder of his life. In doing so, Eustace drew upon the Book of Proverbs, and in particular, verse 2 of Proverb 20, where it was said that those who provoke a king to anger were to forfeit their own lives in return. 22 Despite this, however, it is interesting to note that the fates of those captured at Tinchebray along with William of Mortain and Robert Curthose differed, which in itself points towards a situation where differences of involvement in the revolt determined the severity of punishment was inflicted.

After Tinchebray, Henry wrote to Archbishop Anselm, to inform him of his victory. In his letter, Henry listed his named captives as Robert I de Stuteville, William de Ferrers

22 Proverbs, 20, 2; Liber Hyda, 304. ‘...et per Salomonem: Sicut rugitus ira regis; qui provocat illum peccat in animam suam.’ The full verse reads ‘The dread wrath of a king is like the growling of a lion; he who provokes him to anger forfeits his life’. It is noticeable that, given Henry’s later epithet as the ‘Lion of Justice’, Eustace chose to draw this parallel. It should also be noted that David Crouch has suggested that the lion might have been adopted in the twelfth century as the Norman dynastic symbol, Crouch, The Normans, 291.
and William Crispin. Other sources reveal the capture of Edgar Ætheling and Walter de Mayenne. In addition, Henry had custody of Robert II de Stuteville and Reginald de Warenne, both of whom were captured at Saint-Pierre-sur-Dives shortly before the battle. This suggests that Henry of Huntingdon’s observation on the support given to Henry by ‘all the nobility of Normandy and the flower of England’ may contain a kernel of truth in that the majority of the aristocracy either supported Henry or avoided involvement. Beyond the fact that much of the aristocracy on both sides of the Channel probably realised the inevitable outcome of any conflict, there are few obvious connections between those captured by Henry to suggest why they would choose to support Curthose. Significantly, the majority obtained freedom within a relatively short period of time.

William de Ferrers was the second of three sons of Henry de Ferrers, castellan of Tutbury in Staffordshire and an important landowner in Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire. No obvious connection between de Ferrers and William of Mortain exists, other than a possible family link through his younger brother’s wife Hawise. She may have been the daughter of Andrew de Vitré through his marriage to Agnes of Mortain, and therefore William’s niece. Likewise, William Crispin’s involvement is equally difficult to judge, as is which William Crispin was actually involved. The hostility of the family towards the efforts of Robert of Meulan to bring the abbey of Bec under his control suggests that his close alignment with Henry may have influenced

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23 Anselm’s Letters, no. 401.
24 ASC, E, 1101; Cartulaire manceau de Marmoutier, ed. E. Laurain (Laval, 1911-1945), 2, no. 7.
25 OV, 4, 72-4, 80-2; Hollister, Henry I, 199.
26 HA, 452. ‘Rex vero secum omnes proceres Normanniae, et robur Anglie....’
27 OV, 2, 264, 4, 84, 232; Loyd, Origins, 42; Domesday People, 247-8. William was succeeded in England by his youngest son Robert in 1101, while the eldest son, Ingenuulf, succeeded in Normandy. Domesday Descendants, 459; Domesday People, 247.
their decision to support Curthose. The support given by William Crispin to Curthose is noticeably different from the family's policy of generally trying to remain outside of Norman affairs, despite having land within the borders of the duchy.\(^{30}\)

An obvious geographical connection exists between Robert I de Stuteville and William of Mortain, in that both men held estates in Yorkshire that were used to restructure the Norman settlement of the county following 1106.\(^{31}\) Henry eventually released Robert's son, along with Reginald de Warenne, but as with William of Mortain, Robert I de Stuteville spent the remainder of his life as Henry's prisoner, possibly dying in the late 1120s.\(^{32}\) One possible reason why Robert I de Stuteville remained in prison lies within the narrative of the Warenne Chronicle. Robert, together with Reginald de Warenne, had vehemently opposed Henry in his attempt to expel Robert de Belleme from England in 1102 and effectively overturn the settlement negotiated in the previous year. The implication from the Warenne Chronicle is that Robert left England after the exile of Robert de Bellême.\(^{33}\) The actions of Robert I de Stuteville in 1102, together with his fate after his capture, suggest that he had been among those members of the aristocracy who questioned the legality of Henry's kingship. The way in which the Warenne Chronicle records the tenor of his protests against Henry's attempts to expel Robert de Bellême suggests that he may have been involved in the negotiations of 1101, and was possibly

\(^{30}\) Green, ‘Lords of the Norman Vexin’, 55-6.


\(^{32}\) Liber Vitae Ecclesiae Dunelmensis, ed. A. H. Thompson, Surtees Society, 136 (1923), fol. 44.

\(^{33}\) Liber Hyda, 306-7. After the text notes the expulsion of Robert de Bellême from England it continues: ‘Hunc quoque securi sunt duo fratres sui, comites Ernulfus et Rogerus, utque commoti propter fratris expulsionem Anglia discesserunt. Post hos autem Robertus de Stuteville et Reginaldus de Warenna allique plures suam tandem dejectionem contra regem Henricum furentes, qui pariter cum Roberto Comite foederati, Henricum regen quanto majori odio tanto amplioribus conviciis potius quam damnis impediebant.’ The Count Robert referred to in the last sentence could refer to Robert de Bellême, but it could also refer to Robert Curthose, who is always referred to as count and not duke by the author of the text. The tense of the sentence would then imply that Robert I de Stuteville was already allied with Robert Curthose, and attempted to hinder Henry in 1102 through protests. My thanks are due to Dr Elisabeth van Houts for a discussing this with me.
one of the guarantors to the Treaty of Winchester on Curthose’s side. Certainly, Henry’s refusal to release Robert from his custody after 1106 suggests that he regarded the grounds for his opposition in much the same way as he did William of Mortain.

While both Wace and the Warenne Chronicle unequivocally present William as the leading influence on Robert Curthose, there is a major difference in their chronology. Wace saw William as the driving force behind Curthose’s challenge for the English throne, but Eustace of Boulogne located William’s greatest impact after the treaty and just before the expulsion of Robert de Bellême. It may well be that William’s influence on Curthose remained constant before and after the negotiations at Alton. Yet, the impact of William’s actions on the relations he enjoyed with Henry is difficult to judge. Unlike Henry’s relationship with Robert de Bellême, there are nearly three years to account for before William left England and it is noticeable that Henry only confiscated William’s estates after he had arrived in Normandy and began to agitate against him. In this context, William of Malmesbury’s assertion that the dispute between Henry and William originated over William’s claim to the earldom of Kent requires examination.

William of Malmesbury is the only source to state explicitly that William made a claim to his uncle’s former earldom. Though impossible to date this claim accurately, there is no evidence to suggest that William made his claim before Rufus’s death. William of Malmesbury locates the specific details of William’s claim within the Gesta Regum after a more general assertion that many individuals made claims to lands as a pretext.

34 Liber Hyda, 306. ‘Veniens autem ad Robertum comitem Normanniae, stimulavit eum contra regem Henricum, multisque modis concitavit.’
35 ASC, E, 1104.
36 GR, 1, 720.
for throwing off the homage that they had given to Henry in 1100. Therefore, the most likely period for William to have made a claim was that immediately following Henry’s coronation. Throughout September and October 1100, William was present at court and it is in this period that Henry probably made the offer of marriage to his sister-in-law.

It is possible that Orderic refers to the issue within the rhetorical dialogue he creates for count Robert of Meulan at Alton, where he advises Henry to satisfy all demands for lands and riches as a short-term strategy to gain the political and military initiative in 1101.

William’s motives in raising the claim are unclear. Odo’s earldom was composed of land in some twenty-two counties and valued at £3,050 in 1086 which, when combined with the earldom of Cornwall, would have given William a total income of £4,530. The lands lay in two closely related blocks and largely south-east of a line drawn from the Humber to the Severn; it included Kent itself and an arc of lands running west to east around London. Claiming the earldom made good business and strategic sense, with the acquisition of further lands in the south-east and around London balancing the economic focus of William’s English lands from their preponderance in the south-west. In strategic terms, William would have also controlled many of the regions through which the most important communications routes to the Continent lay, in themselves valuable assets in any cross-Channel polity that envisaged the political separation of England and Normandy. In addition, William’s father had created a reputation

37 GR, 1, 716.
38 Liber Hyda, 306; RRAN, 2, no. 492. Mary was married to Eustace III of Boulogne in 1102, Hollister, Henry I, 183.
39 OV, 6, 316.
40 Hollister, Henry I, 182.
throughout his career as an aggressive commercial expansionist. A successful claim would have emulated his father’s achievements and appeared to offer a potentially great prize for relatively little effort.

Yet, set against this are the circumstances within the former earldom itself that would have made the introduction of William as a new patron very unwelcome to many of Odo’s former tenants and vassals, something William must have been aware of. The immediate fate of Odo’s lands after 1088 is unclear and it is possible that no one single method of administering the lands was adopted. In Kent itself, a precedent for administering the lands through royal administrators may have been set after Odo’s arrest in 1082, which in turn may have followed the pattern of administration used for Ralph de Gael’s lands in East Anglia following the revolt of 1075. In Sussex and Gloucestershire, Odo’s lands were included in the returns for the king’s lands in the Domesday survey, while in Berkshire, Cambridgeshire and Warwickshire his lands were included with those of the sitting tenant. In addition, the survival and prosperity of many of Odo’s former vassals and tenants after 1088, especially those who held local office and whose conduct in 1088 and 1101 was examined in Chapter Three, created a large vested interest in keeping William out of the former earldom. The motivation of these men in supporting Rufus and Henry against their elder brother did not lend itself to the re-establishment of ties with the new representative of a former lord and patron. This extended to the failure of many of the more important tenants of the Counts of Mortain, men such as William de Cahagnes and Ralph Paynel, to support their lords in 1088 and again in 1101. It is improbable that William would not have recognised the

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42 Golding, ‘Robert of Mortain’, 133.
43 My thanks are due to Lucy Marten of the University of East Anglia for this point. See, ‘The Impact of Rebellion on the Making of Little Domesday’, ANS, 27, forthcoming.
45 Above, Chapter Three.
difficulties this would have created for his claim to succeed. Henry’s ability to stall
William’s request in 1100, by ‘a skilful and temporising reply’, must have centred upon
the practical difficulties of granting William’s request and the ostensible need to
investigate the circumstances and fate of Odo’s lands in each county.46

This set of circumstances suggests that William’s claim may have been purely
speculative, if indeed it was serious at all. Henry’s position in the period following his
coronation was precarious, with the king isolated from many members of the Anglo-
Norman political elite. Ridicule of Henry was widespread.47 In these circumstances,
William of Mortain may have made his claim to Kent as a piece of elaborate mockery of
Henry’s royal powers. Equally, however, William may have been attempting a simple
piece of political opportunism. Robert de Bellême had been able to use favourable
political circumstances in 1098 to reconstitute his father’s cross-Channel complex of
estates, while Robert de Mowbray had successfully succeeded to his uncle’s English
estates in 1093. The apparent vulnerability of Henry in the autumn of 1100 may have
tempted William into believing that he could make an outrageous demand on Henry,
perhaps with only a slight chance of success, yet equally with seemingly very little to
lose.48

It is possible that Henry’s ability to stall William may actually have encouraged him to
believe that a claim to Kent would have a good chance of succeeding. Robert of Meulan
had, after all, advised a policy of open deception before entering into negotiations at
Alton. The prospect of William gaining Kent may have been a tempting enough prize to
persuade William not to support Robert de Bellême in 1102. One interpretation of the

46 GR, 1, 720.
47 Wace, lines, 10513-74; GR, 1, 716.
48 William’s monastic patronage acts as a commentary upon this process. See, below, Chapter 8.
entry in the Warenne Chronicle, where William approached Curthose before Robert had been expelled and attempted to goad Curthose into action against Henry, is that both nephew and uncle recognised that Henry had no intention of honouring the agreement negotiated at Alton. Yet, it is Robert I de Stuteville, Reginald de Warenne and Robert’s brothers who are most vocal in attempting to hinder Henry in 1102.

It is probable that the underlying causes of the breakdown in relations between William and Henry during the period 1102 and 1104 rested on a merger of public and private interests, though the distinction is somewhat artificial. The conflict between Henry and William escalated beyond the issue of Kent and may have revolved around Henry’s attitude towards Normandy and his elder brother. Orderic suggested that William and Robert de Bellême adhered to Curthose because they feared Henry and were utterly unwilling to submit to his rule. If Henry’s expulsion of Robert de Bellême in 1102 signalled a rejection of the principle of co-existence, by the time of William’s departure from England Henry’s intentions towards Normandy posed a direct threat to Curthose and his supporters. Henry’s rejection of Curthose’s conciliatory overtures in 1103 was followed by a consistent attempt to undermine Curthose’s rule and the remaining support Curthose he enjoyed in Normandy. By 1104, Henry was able to dictate terms to Curthose, whom Orderic described as ‘foolish and friendless’ at this point, and Curthose was forced to transfer to Henry the homage of William, count of Evreux. By the time of Henry’s return to England in the autumn of 1104, he could count on the support of the lords of Evreux, Breteuil, Eu, Beaumont, Montfort and Tosny, to name the most important.

49 Liber Hyda, 306. ‘Quare secutus est Robertus comes de Belemia, Anglia depulsus a rege Henrico causa rebellionis quam tam occulte quam studiose in Anglia parabat.’
50 Liber Hyda, 307.
51 OV, 6, 84.
53 OV, 6, 56-8. ‘Sensu quippe e amicis destitutus erat...’.
In all of this, it is noticeable that William’s political importance and status meant that Henry was more circumspect in his attitude towards him than he had been in his attitude to Robert de Bellême in 1102. In his dealings with William, Henry always left room for manoeuvre. William of Malmesbury’s account of the break down in relations is the chief source for this process and contains a chronology that suggests a careful escalation of pressure on William.54 After postponing a decision on William’s claim to Kent, Henry then claimed the return of land that William was accused of holding ‘wrongfully’. There is, however, no indication or evidence that would point towards the identity of the lands that were the subject of Henry’s accusation.55 It is at this point that William left England, vowing not to wear a cloak, with Henry only confiscating William’s English lands after he had started to attack Henry’s castles and supporters in Normandy.56

The dramatic nature of William’s response to Henry’s rejection of his claim to Kent had important connotations in the messages that it conveyed to the wider political community. It is worth remembering that the political community as a whole would have been well aware of the nature of Rufus’s diplomatic double standards in the early 1090s; William’s actions would have brought attention to Henry’s actions in the aftermath of the Treaty of Winchester. An interesting parallel occurs in Wace’s description of how the Conqueror, on hearing that Harold had been crowned king in 1066, spoke to no one and covered his face with his cloak.57 The fact that both men used their cloaks as dramatic and visible reminders of what was felt to be great injustices may not have been lost on the wider political community, though equally it may be a

54 GR, 1, 720.
55 Cf. Hollister, Henry I, 183, who suggests lands in the vicinity of the earldom of Cornwall, yet provides no reference.
56 GR, 1, 720.
57 Wace, lines, 5860.
measure of Henry's success in detaching support from Curthose in this period, that
dramatic and symbolic gestures were some of the few avenues left open for William to
express his views.

William emerges from the sources as the most implacable opponent to Henry during the
final stages of the campaign of 1106, urging Robert Curthose to strike against Henry
when it was clearly imprudent to do so.\textsuperscript{58} Henry recalled the extent of William's
grievance against him some sixteen years later. When confronted with another rebellion
he reflected on the events of 1106 and noted that Curthose was persuaded to fight at
Tinchebray only through William's advice.\textsuperscript{59} As in 1101, it seems as though William
may have overshadowed his more experienced uncle and remained the dominant voice
in advising Robert Curthose.\textsuperscript{60} In contrast, Robert de Bellême attempted to negotiate
with Henry late in 1105 and his conduct at Tinchebray points towards an
accommodation having been reached beforehand.\textsuperscript{61}

Under its entry for 1106, the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle recorded that William of Mortain
and Robert Curthose were returned to England for immediate imprisonment.\textsuperscript{62} Both
John of Worcester and Henry Huntingdon implied that both men returned to England
with Henry in 1107.\textsuperscript{63} Robert of Torigni stated explicitly that Henry returned to England
in 1107 with both captives and kept them in free custody until the end of their lives.\textsuperscript{64}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{58} \textit{OV}, 4, 84-6; Wace, lines, 11337-80.
  \item \textsuperscript{59} \textit{OV}, 4, 286.
  \item \textsuperscript{60} \textit{ASC}, E, 1105; \textit{GR}, 1, 722.
  \item \textsuperscript{61} \textit{ASC}, E, 1105; \textit{OV}, 4, 84-6.
  \item \textsuperscript{62} \textit{ASC}, E, 1106.
  \item \textsuperscript{63} John of Worcester, 110; \textit{HA}, 454.
  \item \textsuperscript{64} \textit{GND}, 2, 222. '....in libera custodia usque ad terminum uite eorum tenuit'.
\end{itemize}

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There may have been some attempt to negotiate the release of the prisoners, but as Wace noted 'no one could bring about a reconciliation and they could not escape'.

Unlike Robert Curthose, the circumstances of William's incarceration are not well known. Robert of Torigni's stress on 'free custody' suggests a degree of comfort and privilege appropriate to his rank and status. However, rumours circulated in the twelfth century to suggest that Henry had had William blinded while imprisoned in the Tower of London which, if true, might suggest that Henry consciously imitated the punishment inflicted by his father on many of the rebels of 1075 who had questioned the Conqueror's kingship. What evidence there is suggests that William spent nearly all of his remaining years in the Tower. Wace refers to William living in 'King Henry's prison' until the king's death. The Annals of Bermondsey Priory recorded that in 1118 William was freed from the Tower by a miracle of the Holy Cross. However, if William was temporarily released from custody, he was back in the Tower by the late 1120s. A further entry in the Annals of Bermondsey recorded that William became a monk there in 1140.

According to Leland, William was buried at Bermondsey, though the abbey of Grestain maintained a tradition that he was buried there. Though it is impossible to pinpoint the exact date of William's death, a date on or near 1140 seems probable. William's age in

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65 Wace, lines, 11408-9.
67 Wace, lines, 11417.
68 The most reliable text can be found in the appendix to, M. Brett, 'The annals of Bermondsey, Southwark and Merton', Church and City 1000-1500 Essays in Honour of Christopher Brooke, ed. D. Abulafia, M. Franklin and M. Rubin (Cambridge, 1992), 298. 'Et eodem anno miraculae virtute sancta crucis liberatur Willelmus Comes Moritoni de turri Londonie.'
70 Brett, Appendix, 299. 'Hoc anno Willelmus comes Moritoni venit Bermundeseye et suscepit habitum monachulem.'
1140 could have been anywhere from the mid sixties through to early seventies. His date of birth is likewise impossible to establish exactly as is the date of his parent’s marriage. Yet, if Robert of Mortain was born around 1040, William’s mother could not have been born until after her father’s marriage between 1050 and 1054. As there is no indication of any minority on the death of his father in 1095, William’s date of birth must have been 1074 at the latest. Equally, as he began to attest his father’s acta shortly before the death of his mother in 1082, a date of birth of circa 1070 might also be possible, with his mother in her mid to late teens at this point.

The suggestion that William entered Bermondsey in 1140 and may have done so shortly before his death would fit with what other sources have to say on William’s last years. Wace recorded that William remained in custody until Henry’s death in 1135. The first version of the Brevis relatio, composed between 1114 and 1120, noted that William, together with Robert Curthose and some unnamed prisoners were in custody ‘to this day’. When the text was revised after 1140, the scribe omitted the word adhuc, which would imply that William of Mortain had either died by this point or had been released from prison.

The fact that Henry kept William in custody until his death belies the notion that the conflict between the two men centred on William’s claim to Odo’s earldom. To see

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73 An entry in the cartulary for Mont Saint-Michel, dated to between 1087 and 1091, records that William had a younger brother, the product of his father’s second marriage to Almodis. Avranches, Bibliothèque Municipale, ms 210, Cartulaire du Mont Saint Michel, fo. 34r-34v. The charter in question records a grant by Count Robert to the monastery, with the consent of Robert, his son by his second marriage. William, described as ‘eius alter filius’, promised to grant the land in question should it return to custody. Bates, Regesta, nos 204, 215.
74 Wace, lines, 11418.
75 Brevis Relatio, 38. ‘Atque ita omni terra sedata reidiis in Angliam Rodbertum comitem fratrem suum et comitem Moritonii et quosdam alios quos ei placuit secum adduxit coeque adhuc in capitone tenere decernit.’
76 Brevis Relatio, Introduction, 13.
William’s conflict with Henry in these terms is to miss the essence of the dispute, as William of Malmesbury undoubtedly knew. At the centre of relations between the two men lay William’s opposition to Henry’s kingship. Like many members of the Anglo-Norman political elite, William had questioned Henry’s legitimacy and expressed a preference for a Curthose kingship, displaying powers of persuasion and ability that saw him appointed as one of the negotiators at Alton and one of the architects of the Treaty of Winchester. His claim to Odo’s earldom most probably received encouragement from Henry and provided a pretext for Henry to detach William from Robert de Bellême’s side in 1102, as a crucial step in overturning the treaty. The reaction of William to Henry’s refusal to grant his request in 1104 points towards a recognition that William had been deceived, and precipitated the complete collapse in relations that ultimately ensured that William would spend the remainder of his life as Henry’s prisoner. Many of the twelfth-century writers who expressed ambivalence towards William, recognised that by the time of his capture in 1106 Henry had completely outmanoeuvred him, as indeed he had outmanoeuvred Robert Curthose.
PART TWO

ANALYSIS
Chapter 7

The Treaties of Rouen and Winchester

The Treaties of Rouen and Winchester represented the major effort on the part of the cross-Channel aristocracy to find a solution to the problem of divided lordship. At the heart of both treaties lay recognition that all three of the Conqueror’s sons had both claims to the English throne and responsibilities within the wider Anglo-Norman polity that needed to be accommodated within existing cross-Channel political structures. The envisaged outcomes of each treaty also reflected the views of the senior aristocracy on the limitation of violence to effect long-term political change, and the hope that a negotiated settlement would open the way to co-existence as a permanent solution to the problems of divided lordship.¹

Previous discussions of the treaties have been located within longer narratives and have tended to regard them as diplomatic interludes. The comments of Frank Barlow on the Treaty of Rouen encapsulate this approach, with Barlow suggesting that the treaty was ‘shrewdly negotiated and left the game nicely balanced’.² C. Warren Hollister's initial judgement of the Treaty of Winchester was that it was an anti-climactic truce.³ Christopher Holdsworth was kinder in his appraisal, but primarily concerned himself

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² Barlow, Rufus, 283.
³ Hollister, ‘Anglo-Norman Civil War’ MMI, 77; Henry I, 139-145.

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with the mechanics of how treaties in general governed relations between neighbouring powers.⁴

Overall, no reappraisal of the treaties has been attempted within the context of recent historiographical trends that have dealt with aristocratic political behaviour and, in particular, have emphasised activities that can be characterised as dispute settlement and conflict resolution. This omission is surprising, not least because in both the wider context of the debate over the nature of the 'Feudal Revolution' and in the narrow context of individual studies centred upon diplomatic solutions to disputed successions, the potential inherent in this approach has received much exploration during the 1990s, especially for Stephen's reign.⁵ Professor Edmund King summed the situation up rather well when he remarked that the aristocratic convencio becomes the key to what might be termed 'high politics'.⁶

An important caveat to this approach is that peacemaking and conflict resolution, however broadly defined, do not in themselves solely convey the aims of the aristocracy in 1091 and 1101. The treaties certainly aimed at peace in the present, short-term, yet it is clear that the treaties also attempted to remove future sources of conflict by addressing the root causes of the instability engendered in political relations by the accessions of Rufus and Henry I to the English throne. In his discussion of peacemaking in Anglo-Saxon England, Ryan Lavelle noted: 'Political peace could be as complex as the philosophical concepts of peace, and was defined with similar complexity by those

⁴ Holdsworth, 'Peacemaking', 3.
⁵ For example, Crouch, The Reign of King Stephen, 234-9, 270-80.
involved." The emphasis upon complexity is crucial in understanding the actions of the aristocracy as a whole between 1087 and 1106. Recognition of this immediately invites engagement with a wider framework of discussion that stresses the centrality of political ritual to any analysis of early medieval politics. In arguing for the treaties to be regarded as the direct responses to the problems created by the separation of England and Normandy in 1087 and the subsequent actions of the Conqueror’s sons and their supporters, so the final link in understanding the motives of those members of the aristocracy who rejected or questioned the legality of Rufus’s and Henry’s kingship can be revealed.

Contemporaries and those writing in the first half of the twelfth century knew the general contours of each treaty. Many of the most important terms in each settlement can be recovered from these accounts, beginning with the Treaty of Rouen. The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle provided the most comprehensive account. Reflecting the extent of the territorial incursions by Rufus within Normandy before 1091, the Chronicle recorded that Rufus received the monastery of Fécamp, the county of Eu and the port of Cherbourg. His men were to be left unchallenged in the castles that they had taken within Normandy while, in return, Rufus promised to bring Maine back under Norman control. All those who had lost lands in the revolt of 1088 were to have them restored, with Curthose also to receive land in England. The treaty also attempted to regulate the future succession to the English throne, with each brother designated as the heir of the

8 Cf. History of the Church of York, 16. ‘Qualiter inter fratres conuenit et satis notum est et nostra nichil interest.’
9 ASC, E, 1091.
other, should either die without a legitimate heir from a lawful marriage. Finally, twelve of the ‘best’ men on either side guaranteed the treaty. Significantly, the Chronicle also located the stripping of Norman lands from Edgar Ætheling as part of the treaty negotiations.

Other writers recorded further details. Orderic suggested that in addition to the lordship of Eu, Rufus was also granted that of Aumale and the whole territory of Gerard de Gournay and Ralph de Tosny, together with all the castles held by them. Rufus was then to use his royal authority to pacify ‘those insurgents ready to listen to him’. 10 Henry of Huntingdon noted that Rufus had occupied Aumale together with Saint-Valéry in 1090, the obvious implication being that Saint-Valéry was also ceded to Rufus under the 1091 agreement. Henry also stated that Rufus was to receive back into his custody those castles taken from him, suggesting that Curthose might have enjoyed an upswing in fortunes late in 1090 and actually re-established control over some of the castles Rufus had detached from his control during the course of the year. 11 John of Worcester included the abbey of Mont Saint-Michel in the lands ceded to Rufus. Furthermore, his account of the nature of the obligations placed upon Rufus to help restore order in Normandy explicitly stated that Rufus was to subdue those castles within Normandy that were resisting the duke. 12 William of Malmesbury’s account is clear in that Rufus’s projected campaign in Maine was to be undertaken on behalf of Robert Curthose. 13

Wace appears to have confused the events of 1088, with the treaty negotiations of 1091

10 OV, 4, 250. ‘...et dissidentes qui eidem adquiescere voluerunt regali auctoritate pacuit.’
11 HA, 414-6.
12 John of Worcester, 3, 58. On the veracity of John’s statement regarding Mont Saint-Michel see, Barlow, Rufus, 282, n.84; Hollister, Henry I, 78, n.216.
13 GR, 1, 548.
and the terms of the later treaty. He located the negotiations in England and suggested that Curthose was to receive a payment of five thousand pounds each year.\textsuperscript{14}

The Treaty of Winchester repeated many of these terms, but contained some crucial differences. As with the earlier treaty, the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle provides the most comprehensive account.\textsuperscript{15} Unlike the situation in 1091, where Rufus was allowed to retain control of substantial territories and a number of castles within Normandy, under the terms of the 1101 agreement Henry was to give up all that he was described as ‘forcibly’ holding in Normandy. Those who had lost lands in England in support of Curthose’s challenge to Henry were to have them restored, with Eustace of Boulogne specifically mentioned in that he was to have his father’s lands. In return, Henry undertook to pay Robert three thousand marks annually. The treaty also addressed the question of the English succession and repeated the same terms as were applied a decade earlier, with each brother designated the other’s heir in the absence of a legitimate heir from a lawful marriage. Another repeat from 1091 was that the treaty was guaranteed by twelve men ‘of the highest rank’ on each side. Orderic adds the crucial information that Curthose renounced his claim to England and released Henry from an oath of homage he had taken to him. In return, Henry gave up the Cotentin and everything he held within Normandy apart from Domfront.\textsuperscript{16} Orderic’s information on Curthose’s renunciation appears to be supported by Wace, whose account of Curthose’s attempt to meet with Henry in 1103 contained a scene where Robert of Meulan is presented as confronting Curthose, asking him why he was in England, having

\textsuperscript{14} Wace, lines 9421-48.
\textsuperscript{15} ASC, E, 1101.
\textsuperscript{16} OV, 5, 318. ‘In primis Rodbertus dux calumniam quam in regno Angliae ingesserat fratri dimisit, ipsumque de homagio quod sibi iam dudum fecerat pro regali dignitate absoluit.’
previously 'forsworn' it and handed 'freely' to Henry.\textsuperscript{17} John of Worcester recorded that Curthose undertook to restore lands in Normandy to those who had supported Henry and suffered confiscation as a result.\textsuperscript{18} Finally, Robert of Torigni suggested that the annual amount due to Curthose was four thousand marks.\textsuperscript{19}

The terms for both treaties leave little doubt that the prevailing mood among the aristocracy was to find a lasting political settlement to the problem of divided lordship. Yet, the outcomes of the treaties were only part of the process of reconciliation. The actual process of negotiating the treaties reveals an awareness by the participants of the need to engage in a ritual discourse to effect reconciliation. The preliminaries to the Treaty of Rouen are the less well documented. William of Malmesbury records that men of 'more sense' looked to their own cross-Channel interests and negotiated a settlement before Rufus had crossed the Channel.\textsuperscript{20} The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle noted Rufus's hostile intent towards his brother on departing for Normandy, yet Orderic is quite clear that the brothers met amicably at Rouen.\textsuperscript{21} Robert of Torigni believed that peace between the two men was established at Caen.\textsuperscript{22} Taken together, the evidence would point towards a situation whereby negotiations, conducted by intermediaries, took place before Rufus crossed the Channel, with a formal ratification ceremony at which both brothers were present, most likely in Rouen. It is probable that Robert of Torigni's identification of Caen as the site of the treaty was, in fact, the site of the negotiations.

\bibliography{\textsuperscript{17} Wace, lines 10575-628. \textsuperscript{18} John of Worcester, 3, 98. \textsuperscript{19} GND, 2, 220. \textsuperscript{20} GR, 1, 548. 'Pauci quibus sanius consilium, consulentes suis commodis quod utroboque possessiones haberent, mediators pacis fuere....'. Rufus was in Dover on the 27 January and crossed the Channel at Candlemas, RRAN, 1, no 315; John of Worcester, 56; OV, 4, 236; ASC, E 1091. \textsuperscript{21} OV, 4, 236; ASC, E, 1091. \textsuperscript{22} GND, 2, 204-6. Caen was accepted by Freeman as the site of negotiations, William Rufus, 2, 522.}
between the intermediaries. Those who negotiated the treaty may have remained in Caen to begin preparations for the inquest into judicial rights of the Conqueror, the Consuetudines et Iusticie, formally ratified in Caen on the 18 July 1091.

Accounts of the negotiations at Alton in 1101 are much fuller. Much of what took place at Alton can be seen as a ritual discourse, designed to prevent further conflict and bloodshed. All the sources, though contradictory in places, play a variation on a theme of reconciliation and stress the role of negotiators. Eadmer noted the appointment of Archbishop Anselm as a mediator between the aristocracy and the king, before Curthose had landed in England and during the period just after Whitsuntide when members of the aristocracy were beginning to openly desert Henry. Once in England, negotiations between the two sides continued. The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle succinctly noted that 'the chief men' went between Curthose and Henry and reconciled them. William of Malmesbury recorded that 'wiser heads' among the aristocracy were keen not to break the 'law of natural affection' between brothers. Wace identified three of the leading baronial negotiators in Robert de Bellême, William of Mortain, and presumably for Henry, Robert fitz Hamon. Orderic inverted the order of events by suggesting that the aristocracy actively sought war and it was the intervention of Henry, who negotiated

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23 Cf. the apparent confusion over the chronology and place of Harold's oath to Duke William in 1064/65, Bates, Conqueror, 97.
25 Eadmer HN, 127.
26 ASC, E, 1101.
27 GR, 1, 716-8, 'Sed satagentibus sanioris consilii hominibus, qui dicerent pietatis ius uiolandum si fraterna necessitudo prelio concurreret, paci animos accommodauere, reputantes quod, si alter occumberet, alter infirmior remaineret, cum nullus fratrum preter ipsos superesset.'
28 Wace, lines, 10397-8
with his brother on a face to face basis, that avoided this calamity, sealing their agreement with a kiss of peace.\textsuperscript{29}

In addition to naming some of the participants at Alton, Wace also provides the most detailed account of the negotiations.\textsuperscript{30} This deserves greater prominence in discussions than has been accorded it.\textsuperscript{31} Not only does he build upon the wider analysis offered by monastic writers, but in drawing upon a secular, oral tradition for much of his information, he also provides additional insights into the actual arguments used by the aristocracy during these negotiations. Wace emphasised that conflict between the two brothers would tear families apart, with the awful possibility of relatives forced to fight and kill each other. His stress on a fear of battle among the aristocracy and its potential cost in terms of bloodshed suggests that violence was a serious prospect in 1101, and the implications of any such violence were feared to a greater extent than the actual violence of 1088.\textsuperscript{32} Yet, it also points towards a situation where Robert Curthose's principal advisors had recognised that an overwhelming momentum in favour of a Curthose kingship had failed to develop. As a result, the arguments put to Curthose to persuade him to pull back from the brink went beyond military calculations and attempted to address the concerns of each side. It was emphasised by the negotiators that Curthose should not seek to depose a crowned king. As with William of Malmesbury, Wace also records that the negotiators stressed the need for good fraternal relations and the dangers to the wider polity if relations between Curthose and Henry remained strained.

\textsuperscript{29} \textit{OV}, 5, 318.  
\textsuperscript{30} \textit{Wace}, lines 10397-472.  
\textsuperscript{31} In particular, this was not discussed by Strevett, see, ‘Anglo-Norman Civil War’, 161-2.  
The most significant aspect of Wace’s account of these negotiations is the evidence that points towards the framework used in 1087 to facilitate the succession of Rufus being used once more as a means to guide the baronial negotiators in 1101. The general tenor of the advice given to Curthose, and especially the emphasis on the impossibility of any attempt to depose a crowned king, reflected directly the text of the Fourth Council of Toledo within Pseudo-Isidore, and the effects on the person of a king of anointing by a primate with holy oil.\(^{33}\) The inviolability of the king resounded in the messages the baronial negotiators relayed to Curthose; that he should not seek from Henry something ‘he should not do or which could not be done’ and that Henry would rather be ‘struck dead than be toppled from the kingdom’.\(^{34}\) It also seems clear that Anselm acted in accordance with the same framework.\(^{35}\) Eadmer’s account of Anselm’s ‘unanswerable reasoning’ being in operation at Alton suggests that its foundations lay in this canon law collection.\(^{36}\) In addition to the effects on the king of anointing, the texts in question also stressed the necessity for preserving oaths of fidelity, while further canons from the Sixth Council of Toledo prohibited usurpation while the king was still alive. Anselm stressed the need for those who might be tempted to join the ducal party to maintain their fidelity to Henry, and how accursed in the sight of God they would be should they fail to do so. The first canon of the Seventh Council of Toledo threatened excommunication against all those who conspired against the king.\(^{37}\) Though there is no evidence for the application of excommunication, Eadmer hints this sanction was actively considered by Anselm and had an effect on Robert Curthose.\(^{38}\)

\(^{34}\) Wace, lines 10413-8. ‘Al duc dient que pais feist, e l rei faire ne deüst ne que faite estre ne peüst, ker pois qu’il esteit coronez; meilz voldreit ester a mort feruz que del regne just abatuz.’
\(^{35}\) Cf. Mark Philpott, ‘...pseudo-Isidorian canon law may have been one of the forces that shaped the English state under its Norman kings’. Philpott, ‘Eadmer, his Archbishops and the English State’, 107.
\(^{36}\) Eadmer \textit{HN}, 127-8.
\(^{37}\) Trinity MS B.16.44, 336.
\(^{38}\) Eadmer \textit{HN}, 127-8.
The fact that Maurice, bishop of London, had crowned Henry appeared to have mattered little once Anselm had decided to support Henry, though at an earlier stage Henry was afraid of Anselm approaching Curthose with an offer of the throne.\textsuperscript{39} Overall, it is notable that unlike Rufus in similar circumstances in 1088, Henry and his advisors, especially Anselm, did not see his kingship as an office from which he could resign, nor did Curthose's supporters see themselves in the same light as the rebels of 1075, namely treating kingship as an office to be assumed or discarded. Taken as a whole, there is a \textit{prima facie} case for suggesting that attitudes toward the concept of sacral kingship had changed among the aristocracy over the preceding twenty-five years.\textsuperscript{40}

Increasing respect for kingship did not, however, permit a diminution in the perceived rights and prerogatives of the aristocracy. Despite his `unanswerable reason', Eadmer stated that Anselm initially hesitated at Alton, displaying a reluctance to openly accuse anyone of treason, yet unwilling to allow anyone to perjure himself.\textsuperscript{41} One interpretation of Anselm's confusion is to suggest that the same framework used to argue for the inviolability of the king also stressed the rights of senior aristocracy to be involved in the decision-making process; rights which had been ignored or circumvented in August 1100. The text of the Fourth Council of Toledo laid great emphasis on the need for consultation in the process of choosing a king. Many of the most senior members of the cross-Channel elite, had been excluded from the decision-making process in the immediate aftermath of Rufus's death. News Henry's coronation reached Robert de Bellême and `many other magnates', including Hugh of Chester, all of whom were in

\textsuperscript{39} Eadmer \textit{HN}, 120, 127-8; \textit{GR}, 1, 716; \textit{OV}, 5, 314. Thomas, archbishop of York, had expressed concerns that Henry had infringed his rights by being crowned by Maurice, \textit{History of the Church of York}, 18. `Nec auditum habebat nec ecclesiastice consuetudinis erat regem nisi ab aliquo regni sui archiepiscopo consecrari debere'.

\textsuperscript{40} See also, Garnett, 'The Origins of the Crown', 171-214.
Normandy, no doubt awaiting the return of Robert Curthose, who of course, was also excluded from the process.\textsuperscript{42} Other sources hint that this was the major concern of the aristocracy in 1101 and very different form the elaborate consultations of 1066.\textsuperscript{43}

A feature of many of the accounts that deal with Henry's relationship with the aristocracy during the period between his coronation and Curthose’s landing in England is the emphasis on the aristocracy breaking the promises that it had made to Henry, allegedly without good reason.\textsuperscript{44} The allegations of bad faith on both sides signalled a significant break in the political relationship between the king and substantial sections of the senior aristocracy. The accusations levelled against the aristocracy of making outrageous demands on Henry point towards a situation where the aristocracy were looking for the means to circumnavigate whatever promises had been made to Henry in the immediate aftermath of his coronation. In response, the apparent mockery of Henry and his wife by the aristocracy, who called them Godric and Godgifu, stands in contrast to the degree of respect accorded to Henry's kingship at Alton. The mockery can be regarded as a further reflection of what the senior aristocracy thought of Henry's actions and the search for a means to justify the circumstances of his kingship, and in particular, his marriage and the possible use of the doctrine of porphyrogeniture.\textsuperscript{45}

Given the importance of the role of the negotiators and the canon law texts used to frame the arguments each side put forward at Alton, it rapidly becomes obvious that they were at home in a world that required serious intellectual ability. The implication

\begin{footnotes}
41 Eadmer \textit{HN}, 127.
42 \textit{OV}, 5, 298. 'Hugo Cestrensis comes et Rodbertus Belesmensis ac alii optimates qui erant in Normannia....'.
43 \textit{Brevis relatio}, 37; \textit{OV}, 5, 290.
44 \textit{GR}, 1, 714.
\end{footnotes}
from Eadmer’s account is that the arguments put to potential rebels by Anselm had little effect on them. The narratives of Wace and William of Malmesbury point towards the negotiators bringing their own rationale to proceedings. They recognised the urgent need to restore relations between the two brothers and to repair their relations with the wider cross-Channel aristocracy. This sprang not merely from a practical standpoint of avoiding great bloodshed, but also as the means to underpin future political and legal relationships. The arguments put to Curthose repeatedly emphasised the dangers of instability if a lasting settlement could not be reached.

Despite the ability of the negotiators to work within a complex theoretical framework, there was also an urgent need to be seen to effect a wider reconciliation and restore political equilibrium.46 The reluctance of either side to engage in battle, portrayed vividly by Wace, suggests a political discourse at Alton heavily reliant on ritual to prevent a potentially dangerous situation escalating and to provide the means to transmit to the wider political body the message of peace and reconciliation.47 Supporters of Curthose urged him to offer a challenge to Henry to meet him in battle or renounce the crown.48 The advice given to Curthose to offer battle undoubtedly sprung from a recognition that it provided a mechanism to postpone bloodshed and open up renewed avenues of dialogue.49 Henry’s behaviour before Alton suggests that he was not slow to recognise the need to observe correct forms and rituals. One of Henry’s first writs after his coronation granted the abbeys at traditional crown wearing locations full livery and an ounce of gold for their chantries on each occasion the king wore his crown at those

45 GR, I, 708.
46 Wace, lines 10435-439.
47 Wace, lines 10397-472.
48 OV, 5, 314.
49 Cf. Strickland, ‘Provoking or Avoiding Battle’, 325.
Henry continued the practice of crown wearing, first at Gloucester for Christmas 1100 and then at Winchester for the following Easter. Even his decision to base his forces at Pevensey Bay in the summer of 1101, while awaiting his brother, suggests a possible ritual link to the events of 1066 and a desire to prevent his brother landing in the place his father had come ashore when pursing his claim to the English throne some thirty-five years earlier.

The response of Robert Curthose to Henry's action and his seizure of the English throne, his *indignari*, can also be located within a ritual framework and a distinctive political culture that emphasised the anger of one or both parties to a dispute as a necessary prerequisite for a restructuring of social and political relationships. Such a display is not a purely emotional response, but a public expression of a political dissatisfaction. Curthose's *indignari* signalled the beginning of the public process of reconciliation or satisfaction. Examples of such responses are found in similar circumstances. The *Vita Æwardi Regis*, for example, recorded that Edward the Confessor's response to the negotiations at Southwark and reluctance of his men to fight the Godwins in 1052 was to be mad with anger.

Torigni's characterisation of Curthose's indignation has to be set against his earlier rhetorical scene, where Curthose response to William Rufus's succession is set out in

50 *RRAN*, 2, no. 490.
51 *ASC*, E, 1101.
52 Hollister, *Henry I*, 137; *RRAN*, 2, nos. 529, 530. Cf. Crouch, *The Normans*, 171, where Henry's decision to base himself at Pevensey is characterised by Crouch as a 'lack of originality'.
54 White, 'Politics of Anger', 139-40.
some detail. There would have been no need to emphasise the implicit message in each scene. Avenues of expected consultation had been ignored and the political balance upset. Despite or perhaps because of this, both sides displayed a behaviour that signalled their belief in their legitimate rights to the wider political community. Likewise, once events had reached the stage where violence was a distinct possibility, the urgent need for a visible process of reconciliation found expression through ritual political behaviour.

Wace’s use of ‘covenant’ to describe the agreement reached at Alton suggests an atmosphere redolent in political ritual. If ritual in itself maintains the belief in order, then the negotiations at Alton were clearly an elaborate piece of political theatre aimed at restoring order. They were stage managed and conducted by intermediaries who understood the nuance of protracted and complex negotiations and would have been trusted by both sides. This almost certainly accounts for the emphasis on negotiators in nearly all of the sources. In the cases of Orderic and Eadmer, their respective stress on Henry and Robert settling the dispute personally or through the effort of Archbishop

56 GND, 2, 204;
57 Wace, line 10451. The Anglo Saxon Chronicle: A Collaborative Edition, MS E, 102; The Peterborough Chronicle Early English Manuscripts in Facsimile, ed. D. Whitelock, vol. 4 (Copenhagen, 1954), 135. Professor Michael Swanton used ‘covenant’ to describe the agreement of 1091 in his recent translation of the Peterborough recension of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle. The Anglo-Saxon Chronicles, ed. and trans. M. Swanton, revised ed. (London, 2000) 226. The Old English noun used to describe the agreement of 1091 is forwarde. The most recent English translations of forwarde, have rendered the noun as agreement, compact or treaty, A Thesaurus of Old English, ed. J. Roberts, C. King, L. Grundy (London, 1995), 1, 630. This reflects the usage of the noun in all previous translations of the Chronicle, for example, The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, trans. G. N. Garmonsway (London, 1955), 221. Unless Swanton thought that the swearing of oaths significantly changed the meaning and interpretation of forwarde, it is difficult to see how his rendering of ‘covenant’ can be sustained in this context. Wace’s use of the term to describe the agreement of 1101 is unambiguous and in the context of the information he provides concerning negotiations at Alton, carries connotations of ritual political activity. By contrast, the noun used in the Chronicle is, gesehtodian, meaning reconciliation, ASC, Swanton, 237. My thanks are due to Dr. Katie Lowe of the University of Glasgow for discussing this with me.
58 Buc, ‘Political Rituals and Political Imagination’, 204.
Anselm, were a convenient way to side-step some tricky issues; notably the framework of separation for England and Normandy, something which Orderic thought was wrong, and Anselm's ineffectiveness. The evidence reveals that the agreement negotiated at Alton was the work of men with considerable political experience, who were deeply aware of the issues at stake, who knew precisely what was expected of them and how best to achieve their objectives.

Nor should one imagine that the process was smooth. Wace’s account leaves little doubt that both brothers were pressurised into accepting a settlement, a sentiment reflected in most sources. Eadmer suggested that Curthose lost confidence in the ‘princes’ who had supported him. Alternatively, Orderic’s emphasis on the somewhat machiavellian advice of Robert of Meulan, not only covers Henry’s duplicity in agreeing to an agreement he clearly had no intention of honouring, but also points to the pressure he must have been under to accept an agreement that would guarantee his crown. Only men of sufficient stature and standing could have had the prestige and power necessary to negotiate with both Henry and Curthose.

Though both treaties contain similarities in many of their provisions, the aims of each treaty were fundamentally different. The essential difference between the two treaties lay in the circumstances of their negotiation. In 1091, account had to be taken of the unprecedented nature of Rufus’s intervention into Normandy and the territorial gains he had made. Consequently, many of the provisions of the Treaty of Rouen were concerned

59 See the comments of Timothy Reuter, ‘Assembly Politics in Western Europe from the Eighth Century to the Twelfth’, Medieval World, 432-450.
61 Eadmer HN, 128.
with dealing with this, as well as with the wider issue of the disputed English succession. The framework thus devised by the negotiators was one that stressed the reciprocal nature of the relationship between the two brothers, and sought to accommodate the legacy of their actions over the previous four years in a cross-Channel framework, though one that ultimately had a permanent separation of England and Normandy as the ultimate long-term aim. By contrast, the aims of the Treaty of Winchester were far more definite in seeking the permanent separation of England and Normandy from the start. Apart from Henry’s reluctance to relinquish Domfront, there was no attempt to tie Curthose or Henry into any sort of cross-Channel political structure.

The crucial question in 1091 was the effects and impact of Rufus’s intervention into Normandy during the previous year, and in particular, the terms on which the lordships and castles ceded to him were to remain in his possession. The extent of the lands granted to Rufus would seem to have included Aumale and possibly Saint Valéry, and support the assertion that Rufus exercised a wide lordship over many of those who lived north of the Seine and who had joined with Rufus in 1090 and received gifts in return. One such individual, Gerard de Gournay, had handed Rufus custody of his castles of Gournay, La Ferté-en-Bray and Gaillefontaine, all of which occupied the high ground between the Epte and Bresle.

The immediacy of Rufus to some of their most important lordships may have encouraged the likes of Gerard de Gournay and Ralph de Tosny in their loyalty to

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62 OV, 5, 316.
63 GND, 2, 206; OV, 4, 182.
64 OV, 4, 182.
Rufus, and stimulated the search for a framework to establish peace. During the fighting between Ralph and William, count of Evreux, in 1090, Ralph appealed to Rufus for help, who then ordered Stephen of Aumale, Gerard de Gournay and the ‘other military leaders who were in charge of his retainers in Normandy’ to lend Ralph full support. The obvious threat to any lasting prospect of peace would be the mixing of private, localised warfare with the wider struggle between Rufus and Curthose. An attempt to forestall this was built into the treaty with the stipulation that those lands and castles held by Rufus and his supporters were to remain in their hands, without interference.

Whether this had any bearing on Orderic’s observation that under the terms of the 1091 treaty the whole lands of Gerard and Ralph were granted to Rufus is a moot point.

Gerard had interests in lower Normandy around Ecouché and Exmes, while Ralph de Tosny held lands around Conches itself and in the strategically important Eure valley. Orderic was certainly the most detailed observer when analysing the extent of Rufus’s inroads into Normandy. At one stage, Orderic suggested that Rufus controlled twenty castra within Normandy and had the support of many important members of the political elite, particularly the frontier and cross border magnates, including Robert, count of Eu, Stephen of Aumale, Robert, count of Meulan, Walter Giffard, Philip de...
Briouze and Richard de Courcy. If Orderic's assertion is taken seriously, then the greatest extent of the lands and castles granted to Rufus may have exceeded the areas he directly controlled in the north-east of Normandy and around Cherbourg.

Even a moderate assessment of the extent of Rufus's inroads suggests that the keystone to any future relationship between Rufus and Curthose lay in the degree of reciprocity and trust in the relations between the two men created by the Treaty of Rouen. Despite Rufus's success, the majority of the aristocracy within upper Normandy had remained loyal to Robert Curthose. In these circumstances, the most ambitious aim of the treaty was to create a legal and political framework that acknowledged the changed circumstances and relations between the two brothers, yet would allow future relations to be stable and peaceful. The means to do this was that Rufus probably had to accept and acknowledge his status, as Curthose's subordinate for the lands he held in Normandy.

The nature of this new relationship found immediate expression in a number of ways. One was the judicial inquest into the ducal rights held under the Conqueror. In the documentation, Curthose is consistently referred to as 'count' and always precedes Rufus, who is addressed as king of England. Both brothers are jointly styled the sons and heirs of King William. The participation of Rufus in this process, and his appearance by name in the clause which safeguards all the rights of interested parties not recorded in the document, reveal that a very real effort was made to give him a lasting

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68 OV, 4, 236; Barlow, Rufus, 282.
69 Barlow, Rufus, 282-3.
70 Haskins, NI, 277.
71 Haskins, NI, 281.
political role. Though Rufus had done much to undermine Curthose's rule, the timing and wording of the inquest into ducal rights suggest an attempt to give further clarity to Curthose's rights as duke, not necessarily because they had been undermined per se, but also to take account of the new relationship that had emerged between the two brothers within Normandy. The explicit investigation into ducal rights as they stood under the Conqueror suggests a conscious attempt to create a template of conduct in order to prevent further disruption and dispute.

If the Consuetudines et Iusticie looked to the past to redress present wrongs and secure the future, the key short-term obligation placed upon Rufus in the treaty was to campaign against all challenges to ducal authority within Normandy. The earliest manifestation of this came in the joint campaign by both brothers against their younger sibling at Mont Saint-Michel. John of Worcester is the only source to suggest that Rufus was to have possession of Mont Saint-Michel under the terms of the Treaty of Rouen, but it seems unlikely that Rufus actually gained possession of Mont Saint-Michel, given that Rufus subsequently departed from Normandy 'unappeased' after a long siege. Yet, in the context of the relationship between Rufus and Curthose created by the treaty, it seems highly likely that Rufus campaigned against Henry as a subordinate of Curthose.

William of Malmesbury's account of the siege of Mont Saint-Michel contains a story traditionally used to interpret Curthose's 'compassion'. According to William of Malmesbury, during the course of the siege, Henry complained of a growing water

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72 Haskins, NI, 284; Barlow, Rufus, 283.
73 John of Worcester, 3, 58. The implication from John of Worcester is that Rufus departed without gaining possession of Mont Saint-Michel. This would depend upon the translation of impacatus as 'unappeased'. However, Barlow suggested alternative meanings for impacatus including, 'unpeacefully', 'without having settled the matter' or even, 'angrily', Barlow, Rufus, 285, n. 96.
shortage among the defenders. Henry reminded Curthose of how access to water was a common right of all people. In turn, Curthose ordered that the besiegers relax their guard and Henry’s men be allowed to bring water through the blockade. Rufus was furious and questioned the conduct of the war. Curthose’s reply was that if Henry was allowed to die of thirst, where would they find another brother. The various sources for this story all contain a degree of consistency and plausibility. Robert of Torigni stated that Rufus and Curthose quarrelled during the siege, enabling Henry to evacuate the Mount unchallenged. Orderic states that with water running short, Henry negotiated the surrender of the Mount on honourable terms.

The crucial factor is that Curthose’s supposed clemency needs to be seen within the context of the relationship between the two elder brothers created by the Treaty of Rouen, and the wider relationship enjoyed by all three brothers. It is significant that Henry appealed to Curthose over the lack of water. Though the traditional interpretation has always been that Curthose was the weaker of Henry’s two elder brothers, it might equally be true that the terms of Henry’s appeal were those of a subordinate to his lord, a relationship created by the grant of the Cotentin, if not an earlier oath. Charter evidence from the year after the death of the Conqueror reveals that both Curthose and Henry had close collaborative relations. Curthose’s apparent clemency in allowing Henry water was an effective demonstration of lordship over both his younger siblings. Rufus’s response to this episode can be interpreted as that of the commander in the field seeing his efforts undone, but also an expression of the genuine animosity he felt

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24 GR, 1, 552  
25 GND, 2, 206.  
76 OV, 4, 250.  
77 Davis, ‘Norman Succession’, 131-40; OV, 5, 318.
towards Henry.79 Wace went so far as to suggest Rufus hated Henry, largely due to the money he had supplied to Curthose in 1088.80 Though the campaign against Henry may have suited both brothers, Rufus may have felt that Curthose lacked a sense of urgency.

Curthose’s participation in Rufus’s campaign to Scotland in 1091 only makes sense when seen within the context of the collaboration enjoined by the Treaty of Rouen. Robert had previously commanded an expedition into Scotland in 1080 as a representative of the Conqueror, when he and Malcolm III had met.81 By participating in Rufus’s expedition eleven years later, Curthose was not only recognising the legitimacy of Rufus’s kingship in an extremely practical and forceful way, but also providing service as a subordinate of Rufus, almost certainly in anticipation of a grant of lands to Curthose within England, as stipulated in the treaty. In essence, the actions of both brothers were public recognition of their respective rights and tied them into a relationship that balanced itself in terms of their obligations to one another.

The creation of a subordinate relationship between Rufus and Curthose within Normandy ensured that those Norman lords who had defected to Rufus in the course of 1090 would not be penalised. This framework would help to explain the role of the French king Philip I in the peace process. Robert of Torigni is clear in his account that peace was established in 1091 through the intervention of Philip.82 The importance of

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78 Both Henry and Curthose appear on several charters in the aftermath of the Conqueror’s death. See, D. Bates, ‘A Charter of William the Conqueror and Two of His Sons’, Tabularia, forthcoming. My thanks are due to Professor Bates for allowing me to see a copy of the article prior to publication.
79 The differentiation in roles may explain why Rufus established his headquarters at Avranches, with another body of knights at Ardevon, close to the abbey, while Curthose established himself at the village of Genêts, some ten kilometres from the abbey, on the north shore of the Baie de Mont Saint-Michel. Wace, lines, 9535; Barlow, Rufus, 284; Hollister, Henry I, 80.
80 Wace, lines, 9449-94.
81 On Curthose’s status in 1080, see Holt, Colonial England, Appendix 2, 150.
82 GND, 2, 206.
Philip's intervention was not so much in its military value to Curthose, but in the legal status of the duchy of Normandy as a county within the wider *regnum Francorum*, and the theoretically subordinate relationship between the Norman duke and the French king. This made it possible to get around the problem of previous homage having been given to Curthose by all of the Norman aristocracy, including, almost certainly, Curthose's younger brothers.  

The Treaty of Rouen also addressed the question on the English succession. In stark terms, unlike the situation in 1101, there is no evidence that Curthose renounced his claim to the English throne in 1091. Despite this, it appears that the treaty dealt with many of the outstanding issues relating to the succession. The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle noted that 'during the course of the reconciliation' between Rufus and Curthose, Edgar Ætheling was deprived of the Norman lands that had been given to him. Afterwards, Edgar found refuge in Scotland for a second time, with his sister Margaret and her husband Malcolm III. Edgar's status as one of Curthose's chief counsellors in 1090 suggests that the exile of Edgar was a concession granted by Curthose to his brother. John of Worcester certainly implies this, noting that action against Edgar took place after the campaign against Henry at Mont Saint-Michel, and at the instigation of Rufus.  

Orderic offers the most convincing motive for depriving Edgar of his lands. In addition to acting as a counsellor to Curthose, Orderic suggests that the two men enjoyed a close personal relationship to the extent that they were considered to be akin to foster
brothers. Rufus’s concerns over Edgar appear therefore not to be motivated out of a fear that Edgar might lay claim to the English throne with Curthose’s support, but rather that any future claim by Curthose could attract support from Edgar. In practical terms, Edgar’s status as the last legitimate ‘native’ claimant to the English throne was potentially important in two ways. First, the framework for selecting a king, contained in Pseudo-Isidore and used to crown Rufus in 1087, stressed the consultative role of the ‘headmen of the people’ to be involved in the process, a role Edgar fulfilled. Second, though there is no evidence that Edgar had been involved in the selection of Rufus in 1087, the legacy of the English support in 1088 suggests that his status vis-à-vis the native English could prove crucial in guaranteeing the legitimacy of any future Curthose kingship. It is noticeable that when Curthose and Rufus quarrelled at the end of 1091, Curthose ensured that Edgar returned to Normandy with him. In this context, Frank Barlow’s argument for a proposed marriage between Rufus and Malcolm III’s daughter Mathilda, takes on an added significance and suggests that as late as the autumn of 1093, Rufus was open to suggestions to further secure his throne.

The hostility of Rufus and Curthose towards their younger brother is an intrinsic part of the treaty negotiations. According to William of Malmesbury, Henry was left almost destitute by the greed of the two brothers in dividing up their paternal inheritance and occupied Mont Saint-Michel as a result. Orderic puts things differently, noting that Henry brought ‘important pleas’ against both brothers and demanded a share in the

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88 OV, 5, 272.
89 Barlow, Rufus, 296.
90 Barlow, Rufus, 310-17.
91 GND, 2, 206.
92 GR, 1, 550.
possessions of his father.\textsuperscript{93} No source suggests that Rufus and Curthose thought that Henry had any designs on the English throne, and Henry had been completely excluded from consideration in 1087; porphyrogeniture was not a factor in anyone’s thinking. The emphasis in 1091 appears to have been on Henry’s position within the cross-Channel polity as the youngest son of the Conqueror. Robert of Torigni certainly phrases his account in that context, noting that instead of providing Henry with an ‘honourable’ life as befitting the son of a king, Rufus and Curthose tried to drive Henry from all of his father’s lands.\textsuperscript{94}

By way of contrast, the provisions of the Treaty of Winchester present a simplified situation. Both Warren Hollister and Judith Green have noted some of the difficulties and contradictory provisions within the treaty.\textsuperscript{95} Unlike the treaty of 1091, there was no attempt to create any sort of reciprocal relationship. The emphasis was very much on creating a framework that achieved short-term peace and security, but aimed to sustain the long-term separation of England and Normandy as political units. The crucial clause is not so much Curthose’s repudiation of his claim to the English throne, but the provision that related to future succession. Christopher Holdsworth has suggested that this ‘represented no very significant concession’ for either brother.\textsuperscript{96} However, Henry’s wife was approaching her fourth month of pregnancy at the time the treaty was negotiated, while Curthose had been married for a year and could probably expect to

\textsuperscript{93} \textit{OV}, 5, 250.
\textsuperscript{94} \textit{GND}, 2, 206. ‘\textit{Cum igitur fratrem suum Henricum debuisserant adiuuare eique prouidere, ut sicut frater eorum et filius regis honorabiliter posset uiuere, de tota terra patris sui eum expellere conati sunt’.
\textit{Brevis Relatio}, 36. According to the \textit{Brevis}, ‘...Henry remained in Normandy with his brother Robert who gave him some land in Normandy, but he did not enjoy it for long. For shortly afterwards on some despicable pretext Robert took it away from him.’
\textsuperscript{95} Hollister, ‘Anglo-Norman Civil War’, \textit{MMI}, 92-3; Green, ‘Robert Curthose Reassessed’, 112.
\textsuperscript{96} Holdsworth, ‘Peace Making’, 3.
produce a child in the near future. It seems incredible, therefore, that the negotiators would insert this particular provision, and in these circumstances, unless their intention had been to achieve what the Conqueror had attempted to do in 1087, namely to separate England and Normandy and to establish the future means to transmit the English crown as smoothly as possible.

Contemporaries, near-contemporaries, and modern historians have all struggled to understand the aims and importance of the two treaties. In part, no doubt, this is due to the fact that neither treaty achieved its aims. Many of those involved in the negotiations, such as Robert de Bellême and William of Mortain, paid a heavy price for their failure to create a lasting peace. The Anglo-Saxon Chronicler contented himself with the single comment that the Treaty of Rouen did not last for long. Orderic concluded that though Robert Curthose had ceded a great part of Normandy to Rufus for nearly two years, during that time Normandy was free from war and disturbance, a statement that can only be interpreted in the context of relations between Curthose and Rufus, and not the general state of peace within Normandy.

Robert of Torigni thought the treaty was 'shameful' and 'injurious' to Curthose. Yet Torigni’s comments are perhaps a little unfair. It must be remembered that Rufus's actions were a departure from previous conflict among the ducal kin precisely because he was the king of England. He had achieved an extraordinary and unprecedented

99 *OV*, 4, 252. ‘Nunc Robertus dux magnam partem Normanniae Guillelmo regis concessit fereque duobus annis a bellis Normannia quieuit.’

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situation within the Norman polity. Sailing in what were uncharted waters, the Treaty of
Rouen sought to ‘normalise’ the situation by reducing Rufus’s status in Normandy to
that of a ducal vassal, albeit an extraordinarily powerful one. What is even more
remarkable is that Curthose apparently made a concerted attempt to make the settlement
work. It not until the Christmas of 1093 that messengers arrived from Robert at
Gloucester where Rufus was holding court to inform him that unless he fulfilled his part
of the agreement Curthose would repudiate it.101 Though it is far from clear precisely
what terms Rufus had failed to fulfil, there is no record of any grant of lands to Curthose
within England. Moreover, John of Worcester provides reason to believe that Rufus may
have continued to undermine, rather than support, Curthose’s rule within Normandy,
noting that in 1093, the new count of Mortain abandoned ‘his natural lord’ in favour of
Rufus’s promises of gold and honours.102

The recruitment of the new Count of Mortain may also be evidence that would suggest
that Rufus had not entirely given up any ambitions to reconstitute his father’s cross-
Channel realm and actively sought support within Normandy.103 Significantly, at some
point between the summer of 1096 and January 1098 Rufus gave Saint-Etienne in Caen
an English manor in exchange for the monastery relinquishing to him his father’s
regalia.104 Whether this is conclusive evidence of Rufus’s ambitions is a moot point.
Rufus’s protectorate of the duchy after 1096 meant that for the first time since 1087 a
single ruler was the de facto ruler of England and Normandy.105 More importantly, his

100 GND, 2, 206. ‘...probrosa atque damnosa’.
101 ASC, E, 1094; John of Worcester, 3, 68.
102 John of Worcester, ‘...a naturali domno suo Roberto.....defecit...’.
103 If so, this appears to have been the only significant recruitment and must be set against Rufus’s
inactivity in recruiting supporters late in his protectorate of Normandy, once it was clear that Curthose
was returning home from the Crusade. Barlow, Rufus, 413-6
104 RAN, 1, no. 397; Musset, Abbayes Canaisses, no. 24.
decision to petition for the regalia was done with the advice of the senior members of
the aristocracy and Church on both sides of the Channel.\textsuperscript{106}

In 1094, however, the guarantors of the treaty judged Rufus to be at fault, a decision he
refused to accept.\textsuperscript{107} The judgement was not without significance. For Rufus, though
able to ignore the judgement and resume hostilities against Curthosse, the decision added
to his growing difficulties and contributed to the revolt of 1095. Even more remarkable
perhaps, was that the guarantors of the treaty had actually judged Rufus to be at fault in
the first place, acting as impartial judges, rather than partisans to each side.\textsuperscript{108} Though
ultimately unable to hold Rufus to the treaty, the role and decisions of the guarantors at
least suggest that the aristocracy had little wish to see the uncertainty and instability of
the previous five years.

Unsurprisingly therefore, the Treaty of Winchester envisaged a much simpler
relationship between Curthosse and Henry than had been the case with Rufus. The treaty
itself reflected the awareness of the limitations of violence to effect long-term political
change, but also the sheer intractability of the conflicting ambitions of the Conqueror's
sons. Arguably, what the treaty did not account for was the determination of Henry to
reconstitute his father's cross-Channel dominions, though the evidence explored in
Chapters Five and Six, suggest that the two greatest Anglo-Norman magnates doubted
that Henry would honour the agreement. There is no mention within the sources of any

\textsuperscript{106} Musset, Abbayes Cannaises, no.24. 'procerum et religiosarum personarum Anglie et Normannie
consilio..'.
\textsuperscript{107} ASC, E, 1094.
\textsuperscript{108} Tabuteau, 'Transfers of Property', 165.
repeat of the guarantors of the treaty judging Henry to be at fault for its failure.\textsuperscript{109}

Professor Edmund King concluded his discussion on dispute settlement in Anglo-Norman England with the observation that in the context of medieval disputes, ‘nineteen long winters’ was not a particularly long time. The evidence from the Treaties of Rouen and Winchester suggests that for those among the Anglo-Norman aristocracy who were most intimately affected by the issue of divided lordship ‘nineteen long winters’ could indeed be a very long time.\textsuperscript{110}

\textsuperscript{109} See below, Chapter 6, for the actions of Robert I de Stuteville and Reginald de Warenne in 1102.
\textsuperscript{110} King, ‘Dispute Settlement’, 150.
Chapter 8

Religious Patronage, Marriage and Inheritance

The purpose of this chapter is to examine specific aspects of the religious patronage, marital strategies and inheritance patterns of the Anglo-Norman aristocracy for the period between 1087-1106. The effect will be to suggest that these patterns of activity, when analysed within the broader context of the political framework advanced throughout this thesis, can be read not only as a response to the wider politics of the 1090s and early 1100s, but also as a commentary on them. As such, it is crucial to stress that the material handled in this chapter will be selective rather than comprehensive and an attempt to open up new insights on an already well defined corpus of work that relates to these areas. In terms of inheritance practices, the rejection of the framework of acquêts and propres to explain the partition of 1087 shifts the thrust of analysis towards understanding how partition provided an impetus for their further development. In all areas, there is an urgent need for further in-depth study that will fully integrate these aspects of the wider social and political culture of the aristocracy into a wider narrative, something that is quite clearly beyond the scope of a single chapter in a thesis.

The work of Emma Cownie on Anglo-Norman religious patronage is notable starting point for any analysis. Her recent and important study has done much to illuminate the plurality of the Anglo-Norman aristocracy's experience and motivation in founding and patronising religious institutions. In particular, Cownie identified some general patterns of activity between 1087 and 1106, the character of which she attributed to the political

\[1\] Cf. J.C. Holt, 'Notions of Patrimony', reprinted Colonial England, 215. 'The rule, like the acquisitions themselves, was probably a product of the Conquest.'

'crises' of the 1090s and early 1100s. In broad terms, Cownie traced a shift in activity away from establishing alien priories by founders of Norman origins, to a situation where new foundations were largely without continental connections and generally regarded as expressions of loyalty and commitment to the new regime, often founded by men who had remained loyal to Rufus in 1088. Thus, before 1096 only two alien priories were established as the cells of Norman institutions; Roger de Bully's foundation of Blyth as a cell of La Trinité-du-Mont, Rouen, in 1088 and Lancaster, founded as a cell of Saint Martin de Séès by Roger Le Poitevin in 1094. In contrast, founders from other regions in France were still active, establishing the seven remaining alien priories for this period. Under Henry I, founders of Norman origin resumed their activities and the balance swung back in favour of establishing cells of Norman houses, though the founders active in this period were not among the elite of the Anglo-Norman aristocracy. Cownie concluded by suggesting that under Rufus, potential founders with Norman interests adopted a wait-and-see stance, whereas under Henry, there was a recognition among sections of the aristocracy of the need to buttress the bonds that existed between their holdings on the one hand and those on the other side of the Channel.

As Cownie freely admitted, it is not easy to pinpoint the changes between 1087-96 and 1100-06 that explain these patterns of activity within England. Her comment on the aristocracy adopting a 'wait-and-see' attitude can, however, be refined much further. There is little doubt that among the aristocracy many men continued to think in cross-Channel terms in the years immediately after partition. The most obvious example is

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3 For example, William II de Warenne founded Castle Acre as a cell of his father's Cluniac foundation of Lewes, while Hugh, earl of Chester, re-founded St Werburgh abbey in Chester.
4 Cownie, Religious Patronage in Anglo-Norman England, 188.
5 The mother-houses of new cells in England were the abbeys of La Charité-sur-Loire, Marmoutier, Saint-Vincent of Le Mans, Saints Sergius and Bacchus, Angers.
7 Cownie, Religious Patronage in Anglo-Norman England, 190.
Roger de Bully’s foundation of Blyth in Nottinghamshire, as a cell of La Trinité-du-Mont, Rouen, in 1088. There are several aspects to this grant that are of significance. Fortunately, and somewhat unusually, the actual dating of the foundation can be established with some certainty. The pro anima clause of the foundation charter stated that the priory was founded ‘pro stabilitate regis Anglorum Willelmi successorumque eius nec non et pro anime regine Matildis’. A writ of Henry I to the sheriffs of Suffolk, Lincolnshire and Nottinghamshire, ordered that the monks of Blyth should have their tithes and customs ‘...tempore patris mei et fratris mei et Rogeri de Bulli’. As there is no record of the priory in Domesday, these two statements suggest that the priory must have been founded between 1086 and September 1087, with the charter recording in 1088 what had been done earlier. Though impossible to date further, to either before or after the rebellion of 1088, the significant point is that during a period where tensions must have been building or in the immediate aftermath of the revolt, Roger was still thinking in cross-Channel terms and patronising an institution which had previously been under the Norman dukes’ special protection.

Though the largest landholder in Nottinghamshire, whose honour may well have been based upon the lordship of the pre-Conquest earl, Edwin, Roger de Bully’s Norman connections were pronounced. His association with La Trinité had begun before the Conquest. Significantly, despite gaining the honour of Tickhill, Roger retained the

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9 *Cartulary of Blyth Priory*, no. 295.


Norman toponymic of Bully. Orderic suggested that Roger was a kinsman of Robert de Bellême, though, as Majorie Chibnall has suggested, probably no more than a distant cousin, and he held Blackburn as a gift from Roger the Poitevin. Links to the counts of Eu also existed, as Roger’s daughter or possibly sister, Beatrice, was the first wife of William, the son of Robert, count of Eu. In addition, Roger’s wife, Muriel, had belonged to the entourage of Queen Mathilda, and may have been a relative since Mathilda gave the manor of Sandford in Devon to Roger and his wife on their marriage. During 1088, Roger was in the company of Rufus, and his allegiances appeared to have been confirmed by his patronage of St Peter’s, Gloucester, along with other notable loyalists. He also appears on Rufus’s charter for Bath abbey in 1091, and may have been part of the negotiations that preceded the Treaty of Rouen in 1091.

Though the crucial point about Blyth is the date of the foundation, there are several aspects to its foundation charter that warrant close attention and may, in part, hint towards the difficulties of this period. Roger’s foundation must have had the sanction of Rufus, though no record of any confirmation survives. The implication from Henry’s writ is that Rufus did at some point confirm the monks with tithes and privileges and may have confirmed the actual foundation. However, given the date at which the charter was drawn up, the text is somewhat ambiguous in noting that Blyth was to confer spiritual benefits on the ‘successors’ of the Conqueror, rather than explicitly naming

15 Of, 5, 224-6; DB, 1, 270a; Chibnall, ‘Robert of Bellême and the Castle of Tickhill’, 151-2.
16 Domesday People, 404. COEL, Person no. 605. Under the entry for William of Eu, Beatrice is identified as Roger’s sister. COEL, Person no. 2150. This undoubtedly reflects the entry in the Complete Peerage, 5, 151-6. Judith Green favours regarding Beatrice as Roger’s daughter. Green, Aristocracy, 90.
17 DB, 1, 113a; Chibnall, ‘Robert of Bellême and the Castle of Tickhill’, 152.
19 RRAN, 1, no. 315; Above, Chapter 7.
20 Cownie, Religious Patronage in Anglo-Norman England, 188.
William Rufus. This is reinforced if the Blyth charter is compared to the charter of Ilbert de Lacy, who gave La Trinité the manor of Tingewick in Buckinghamshire, and where the donation was made explicitly for the soul of ‘his lord king William’, and may date from the same period as the Blyth charter. Ilbert is recorded in Domesday holding Tingewick from Odo of Bayeux with no mention of La Trinité. Ilbert’s ability to grant Tingewick to La Trinité undoubtedly reflected his loyalty to Rufus in 1088, where the manor must have been given to Ilbert as a reward, who subsequently deemed it a suitable donation to give to La Trinité. Though conjectural, the difference between the two texts may reflect the strength of Roger de Bully’s Norman ties, with the Blyth charter the slightly earlier of the two and Rufus perhaps reluctant to confirm the foundation of Blyth, until Roger had proved his loyalty in 1088.

Earl Hugh of Chester’s re-foundation of the abbey of abbey of St Werburgh in 1092 has been interpreted as a sign of political commitment to the regime of William Rufus. Analyses of the donations made by Hugh’s tenants to St Werburgh reinforce the sense of honorial integrity. Yet the foundation charter for St Werburgh also suggests that Hugh was fully aware of the cross-Channel dimension to politics in the early 1090s and this was reflected in the vast list of individuals and groups of individuals whose souls

21 Cartulary of Blyth Priory, no. 361, ‘pro stabilitate regis Anglorum Wilhelmi successorumque eius nec non et pro anime regina Matildis’. 22 The MS is Winchester College Muniments 1134 and reads: ‘Notum sit omnibus Christianis tam viventibus quam uturis quod ego Hilbertus de Laceio una cum Haduide uxore meae do mansionem Tinsuicz Sancte Trinitati de Monte Rotomagensi, terram scilicet cum aqua & pratis & siluis omnibusque ad ipsam mansionem attinentibus pro anima mea atque domini mei Willelmi Regis & animabus parentum & amicorum meorum necnon & uxoris mei filiique mei Hughonis pro eo quod atque ipse supradictus filius meus in loco requiescit & decimam de Fraiteuilla’. Printed in Mortimer, ‘Anglo-Norman Lay Charters’, 157, n. 17. A facsimile and commentary can be found in, M. Clanchy, Memory to Written Record, 2nd Edition (Oxford, 1993), Plate I.

the monastery was meant to benefit, namely ‘King William, and William his father the
most noble king, and his mother Mathilda the queen, and his brothers and sisters, and
King Edward, that for the salvation of their souls, and for the souls of his father, mother,
and antecessores, and heirs, and kin, and the barons and all the Christians alive and
deceased’. 26

The significant part of this list is the specific linking together of Rufus, the Conqueror
and Edward the Confessor, as if to emphasise the continuity in English kingship, and
may be further evidence of the wider cultural changes brought about by Domesday, and
which are so prevalent in the writs from this period. 27 Significantly, also listed in the pro
anima clause was a mention of Rufus’s brothers. Given the date at which this charter
was drawn up, the wording of this clause may reflect the immediate aftermath of the
Treaty of Rouen, and the first attempt to establish a separate co-existence of England
and Normandy. With substantial estates in western Normandy, it may have been
politically prudent for Hugh to make reference to the Conqueror’s heirs, even in the
most general of forms, in a foundation charter for a specifically English institution. In
this context, Hugh’s foundation charter ought to be included in a wider array of texts,
including the double confirmations that reflect the wider perceptions of the political
process during this period.

In the case of Robert de Mowbray, evidence of cross-Channel or extensive patronage
within England is non-existent. However, Robert’s relations with Bishop William de St
Calais and the monks of St Cuthbert in Durham, provide an effective commentary on

26 Anglo-Norman Charters, no. 3, ‘..pro utilitate anime Regis Willelmi et Willelmi patris regis nobilissimi
regis et atris eius Mathildis regine fratrumque et sororum eius atque regis Eadwardi, quam pro
animarum suarum salute et pro animarum suarum salute et pro animabus patrum et matrum et
anteccessorum heredamque et parentum et baronum suorum, omniumque Christianiorum tam vivorum
quam defunctorum’.
27 See above, Chapter 2.
the politics of the early 1090s and reinforce the argument that the break-down in
relations with Rufus was precipitated by the events of 1093. The impression gained of
Robert is of a despoiler of church property rather than a benefactor. The only
substantive evidence for his attitude towards the Church is a mention as one of the
despoilers of La Trinité, Caen, in 1088, and his seizure of the priory of Tynemouth and
subsequent expulsion of the monks from their, probably between 1089 and 1090.
Perhaps because of its strategic prominence in controlling access to the Tyne, Robert
was unable to keep hold of Tynemouth and was persuaded to grant it to St Albans with
the good wishes of the King and Archbishop Lanfranc. Abbot Paul of St Albans,
contrary to the wishes of the Durham community and prior Turgot, sent monks from St
Albans to occupy the priory and visited it in 1093, only to be taken ill in November of
that year and die while trying to return to St Albans.

Despite his reputation as a despoiler of church property, Robert had apparently given
gifts to Tynemouth while in possession of it. Rufus notified Thomas, Archbishop of
York, and Bishop William de St Calais, that he was confirming Tynemouth’s
subordination to St Albans in the aftermath of the 1095 rebellion, and also confirming
the gifts made by Robert and his men before their rebellion. Further links to St Albans’s
cannot be rule out as Robert possibly became a monk there shortly before his death.
However, for a magnate of Robert’s importance, the relative lack of religious patronage
that can be traced is noticeable, and in a Northumbrian context, is suggestive of a

28 My thanks are due to Dr. Emma Mason for discussing aspects of Robert de Mowbray’s relationship
with the Church with me.
29 For Normandy see, Charters and Custumals of the Abbey of Holy Trinity, 2, 126. For the background
and date of Robert’s seizure of Tynemouth see, Libellus de Exordio, 234-236, n.29-30; Symeon, Opera,
2, 261.
archiepiscopi Lanfranci benevolentia’.
31 Symeon, Opera, 2, 261; Libellus de Exordio, 236.
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33 Chronica Majora, 6, 372.
relative lack of resources with which to patronise the church in that region. Added to this is the dispute with Bishop William de St Calais concerning Aycliffe, which once again not only points to a lack of settlement and resources with which to found or endow local institutions, but also suggest that the traditional mechanics of religious patronage as a vehicle for political consolidation and settlement had somehow become unstable in the unique religious and political atmosphere of Northumbria. It is therefore hardly surprising that Rufus intervened in Northumbria in settle the dispute between bishop and earl.

In part, what made Northumbria unique was the potency of the cult of St Cuthbert and the willingness of the monks of Durham to look for patrons outside of Northumbria, and in particular, to the king of Scots. In 1093, the opportunity arose for the monks to recruit Malcolm III as a royal patron. His presence at the foundation of the new cathedral at Durham while on the way south to meet with Rufus was highly provocative and tantamount to making a general announcement that he claimed authority in the region, and an expression of his ambition to reunite Lothian with the rest of Northumbria. For their part, the monks at Durham pledged to remember Malcolm, his wife and their family. Taken together, all of these factors, along with Rufus’s treatment of Malcolm at Gloucester, may have encouraged Robert to believe that he could defend his interests with lethal force in the event of Malcolm launching any cross-

34 Libellus de Exordio, 236-8, 238, n. 31 where the properties in question are listed. On the role of religious patronage as source of ‘colonisation’ and control, Cownie, Religious Patronage in Anglo-Norman England, 173-84.
36 Aird, ‘St Cuthbert’, 18.
border incursion. It is noticeable in the light of the events of 1093 that Malcolm’s body was initially taken for burial to Tynemouth, before being transferred to Dunfermline.38

What is also noticeable is that it is in 1093 that Abbot Paul of St Albans chose to visit the priory of Tynemouth. It is not clear whether he was present at the foundation of Durham cathedral, but his presence in the Northumbria appears to have unsettled the monks.39 The presence of Abbot Paul was clearly a not so subtle reminder by Rufus to the community at Durham not to seek alternative royal patrons. Though there is no evidence that Abbot Paul was particularly close to Rufus or that St Albans received favourable treatment from the king, nonetheless, Paul’s status as a kinsman of Lanfranc ensured that he was not without a degree of influence, and he was able to secure a confirmation of the abbey’s rights ‘as on the day of Lanfranc’s death’.40 The pattern of royal writs issued after the rebellion of 1095, where the monks of Durham received various judicial liberties, including the right to hold a court, were balanced with the writ that confirmed Tynemouth to the authority of St Albans.41 Overall, the evidence of Robert de Mowbray’s relationship with the Church and the religious and political atmosphere of Northumbria, reinforces the argument advanced in Chapter Four that it was the events of 1093 that precipitated the period that lead to the rebellion of 1095.

Robert de Bellême’s religious patronage reveals that his elevation to cross-Channel status in 1098 did not alter his priorities, which continued to be focused upon northern France. In comparison to his father and younger brothers, Robert was not an

38 Symeon, Opera, 2, 222.
39 Symeon, Opera, 2, 261; Libellus de Exordio, 236.
40 Gesta Abbatum, 1, 56; William of Malmesbury, De gestis pontificum Anglorum libri quinque, ed. N. E. S. A. Hamilton, RS, 90 (1870), 72; RRAN, 2, no. 314c.
41 RRAN, 1, nos 366-8.
enthusiastic religious benefactor.42 Within England, Robert contented himself with tidying up the existing grants of his younger brothers Hugh and Arnulf to Shrewsbury.43 However, it is noticeable that Hugh de Montgomery’s religious patronage was also limited in comparison to his father and younger brothers, with Hugh content to confirm Shrewsbury’s foundation charter and charter of liberties.44 The lack of activity on the part of Earls Hugh and Robert may have reflected the rather uncertain political circumstances during the period in which they held the earldom. In both cases the large relief of £3,000 set on the earldom may have been a further disincentive to be generous in the early years of their tenure. In general, both men were content to confirm what had been granted previously, yet did not feel the need to go beyond this.

Robert’s activities within Normandy are of a different dimension. His reputation for appropriating monastic and episcopal property is well-documented, affecting a wide number of institutions including the abbeys of Saint-Vincent-du-Mans, Saint-Pierre de Solesmes and the monastery of Saint-Evroult.45 Unlike in England, Robert did feel the need to make relatively liberal endowments, including Saint-Vincent-du-Mans, granting the abbey property throughout the Sarthe region and possibly including a restoration of the churches at Saosnes, which he may have appropriated at an earlier date.46 Robert’s overall relationship with the Church was complicated by the pressure he was under in

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42 For a succinct summary of Roger de Montgomery’s activities see, Green, Aristocracy, 399-402. Arnulf founded a cell of Saint Martin de Sées at Pembroke. Livre Blanc, fo.123r, CDF. No.666. Arnulf also granted Barrow and Bytham in Lincolnshire to the abbey of La Sauve Majeure, Grand Cartulaire de La Sauve Majuere, no. 1360. For Rufus’s confirmation, no. 1354, calendared, Rran, 1, no. 483, CDF, no. 1236. Roger the Poitevin granted Saint Martin de Sées the church of Lancaster, CDF, nos 664, 665.
43 Shrewsbury Cartulary, no. 35; Grand Cartulaire de La Sauve Majuere, no. 1354.
44 Shrewsbury Cartulary, nos 3, 4.
45 Cartulaire de Saint-Vincent du Mans, ed. R. Charles and S. Menjot d’Elbenne (Le Mans, 1886-1913), no. 587; Cartulaire des abbayes de Saint-Pierre de la Couture et de Saint-Pierre de Solesmes, (Le Mans, 1881), 8; OV, vi, 180. There is also evidence to suggest that Robert appropriated the property of the Abbey of Troarn to provide for his men. L’abbaye Saint-Martin de Troarn au diocese de Bayeux des Origines au seizième siècle, ed. R. N. Sauvage, MSAN, 34 (Caen, 1911), 22-3.
46 Cartulaire de Saint-Vincent du Mans, no. 630. For the churches at Saosnes see no. 587 and Thompson, ‘Robert de Bellême Reconsidered’, 280, n. 82.
southern Normandy from rivals, and his determination to uphold rights and position of his family, a potentially de-stabilising feature of his conduct that played into the hands of his enemies, and by extension undermined what remained of ducal authority in the region. In this context Robert pressed his claims to exercise authority over the bishopric of Sées, granted to him by Robert Curthose in 1101, possibly the subject of a letter from Paschal II to Robert Curthose in 1102 where he complained of the tutelage and defence of the church being entrusted to secular powers. Robert’s activities led Bishop Serlo to excommunicate him in 1104, the second such excommunication in Robert’s career. Yet Robert displayed the confidence one would expect from one of the architects of the Treaty of Winchester by appealing to Ivo of Chartres.

Though clearly not as religiously inclined as his father and younger brothers, Robert’s attitude to the Church was undoubtedly conditioned by the circumstances which confronted him throughout much of the 1090s and early 1100s, namely the mixing of private, localised warfare with wider question of the English succession, and later, Henry’s desire to rule both England and Normandy. The departure of Bishop Serlo and Ralph, abbot of Sées, who subsequently found favour under Henry and eventually became archbishop of Canterbury, for England in 1104, exemplified the polarisation of the rival parties in southern Normandy, with the Church aligning itself with Henry. Most assessments of Robert’s career emphasise his religious failings, yet the simpler question is whether Robert de Bellême was in a position to make endowments to the Church throughout much of the 1090s and early 1100s.

47 OV, 4, 296, n. 4.
48 OV, 4, 296; 6, 46.
49 Thompson, ‘Robert de Bellême Reconsidered’, 281.
50 OV, 6, 48; Thompson, ‘Robert de Bellême Reconsidered’, 281.
William of Mortain's religious patronage, together with that of his father, has been the subject of recent study. What makes William especially valuable is that his patronage can be interpreted as a commentary on his relationship with Henry I, and in particular, his motives in claiming his uncle's earldom of Kent. In the context of his religious patronage, there is strong evidence to suggest that William continued to think in cross-Channel terms up until his expulsion from England and that his claim to Odo's earldom of Kent was purely opportunistic in the circumstances of 1100.

Overall, the pattern of William's patronage closely followed that of his father, with the abbeys of Grestain and Marmoutier well provided for. This included an attempt to found a cell of Marmoutier at Wingale in Lincolnshire, on condition that Marmoutier provided twenty monks for the establishment. As the earliest record to survive for many of these grants is the confirmation charter of Richard I for Grestain, it is impossible to accurately date them. However, as majority of William's other grants have been dated to between 1100 and 1104, this appears to have been the period in which William was most active and it is likely that the grants to Grestain and Marmoutier can be placed in this period.

The geographical pattern of these endowments within England suggests a concern for itineration, both within England and across the Channel. Many of William's endowments to the abbey of Grestain were concentrated near Watling Street in Hertfordshire, Northamptonshire and Buckinghamshire. In Sussex, many of his grants were located along the route of the Eastbourne and Lewes road. Therefore, the explicit

52 *CDF*, no. 1210; Golding, 'Religious Patronage', 220.
pattern of William's patronage might indicate a heightened awareness of the need to cope with the possibility of a permanent political separation of England and Normandy as envisaged in the Treaty of Winchester.

Unlike Robert de Bellême or even Robert de Mowbray, the scale and extent of William's patronage is notable, possibly a reflection of deeper religious convictions, but it may also indicate a situation where William did not appear to anticipate any problems in his future relationship with Henry I. Moreover, there is nothing in any of William's patronage to suggest that he venerated the memory of his uncle, and that his claim to Kent was anything other than opportunistic. This stands in contrast to two confirmations in favour of Marmoutier and his gift of Grenested to Lewes, where the pro anima clauses frequently list his parents, the Conqueror and Queen Mathilda. By contrast, the only visible connection to Odo is the presence of William's attestation to Odo's former tenant, Eudo dapifer's, foundation charter for Colchester in 1104. William's gifts to Marmoutier are also noticeable in that those whom the monks were to pray for included 'all the heirs' of the Conqueror and Mathilda; Henry and his wife Mathilda confirmed both gifts.

William's preference for Cluniac monasticism is a noticeable trait. Most of William's giving in England was concentrated on his foundation of the Cluniac priory of Montacute, possibly founded as late as 1102. The choice of Bermondsey as William's last place of refuge before his death undoubtedly reflected the close association between William of Mortain and the Cluniac order. The alleged release of William from custody

56 RRAN, ii, 677.
57 CDF, no. 1209.
in 1118 through the miracle of Holy Cross would seem to indicate a tradition of an especial attachment to the Cluniacs by William, since Montacute was the site of the discovery during Cnut's reign of the relic of the Holy Cross.\textsuperscript{59} The entries relating to William's final years in the Bermondsey annals are not without their problems. Martin Brett's reconstruction of the annals reveal them to be a composite text, probably derived from a series of now lost London annals and based on material collected at Bermondsey which ended by the mid 1220s.\textsuperscript{60} However, much of the information on William of Mortain is unique to Bermondsey, and probably reflects a tradition specific to the priory from the early thirteenth century, perhaps earlier.\textsuperscript{61}

Religious patronage serves as a vehicle to explore the impact of national politics on local politics and suggests that the ability of religious patronage to act as a factor in honorial integrity could be limited by other interests at moments of political tension. In the case of William of Mortain, the failure of his tenants to support him in 1104 is noticeable. In the aftermath, however, William's relationships with some of his tenants clearly survived, especially those with strong cross-Channel interests. For example, Ralph Paynel attested a grant of William's, for the abbey of Marmoutier, at some point between 1103 and 1106.\textsuperscript{62} Ralph's appearance on this grant suggests that he may have had custody of the family's Norman lands at this stage before passing them on to his son, William. The most likely hypothesis being that Ralph assumed control after the death of his elder brother Hugh, who had custody before this period. Other links are reflected in Ralph's second marriage to a daughter of Richard de Sourdeval, a major tenant of Robert of Mortain, and through whom he gained a share of the lands held by

\textsuperscript{59} Golding, 'Religious Patronage', 225.
\textsuperscript{60} Brett, \textit{Annals of Bermondsey}, 296.
\textsuperscript{61} My thanks are due to Dr Brett for discussing this with me in a personal communication.
\textsuperscript{62} CDF, no. 1210; EYC, 6, 3-4. For Hugh Paynel, \textit{Cartulaire Saint-Etienne}, fo.49r-50r, no. CLIII.
Richard de Sourdeval as a tenant of Robert of Mortain in Yorkshire.\textsuperscript{63} Between 1089 and 1100, Ralph re-founded the priory of Holy Trinity, York, as a cell of Marmoutier.\textsuperscript{64}

In terms of religious patronage providing a focus for honorial integrity, the activities of some of the Mortain tenants suggest a certain degree of detachment, particularly in Sussex where the focus of giving was William I de Warenne’s Cluniac foundation of Lewes. The priory gave the local political community a great deal of stability, and received patronage from the tenants of both the rapes of Arundel and Pevensey, after the removal of Robert de Bellême and William of Mortain in 1102 and 1104 respectively.\textsuperscript{65} Yet in the case of William of Mortain, the scale of patronage before and after his exile is significantly different. Prior to 1104, nine Mortain tenants patronised Lewes, whereas in the period up to 1134 that figure rose to thirty former tenants. By contrast, figures for the former Montgomery rape of Arundel remained fairly constant, with ten gifts before 1120 and twelve in the period between 1120 and 1140.\textsuperscript{66}

Before 1104, William was happy to confirm the gifts of some of his more prominent Sussex tenants to the priory of Lewes, including Alvred pincerna, William de Cahagnes, Herbert Fitz Rannulf and Hugh de Dives, as well as giving the priory demesne lands at Ripe in Surrey and one virgate at Laughton in Sussex.\textsuperscript{67} Yet it should be noted that several important Mortain tenants did not patronise religious institutions associated with the counts. In Cornwall, for example, Richard Fitz Turold and his

\textsuperscript{64} \textit{EYC}, 6, 2; \textit{CDF}, no.1180; Golding, ‘Religious Patronage’, 219-20.
\textsuperscript{67} \textit{Cartulary of the Priory of Saint Pancras}, 1, 75, 119-20; \textit{CDF}, no. 391
descendants chose not to patronise the counts' Cornish institutions. 68 William de Cahagnes is further striking example. A major tenant of the William of Mortain in Sussex and Northamptonshire, William was also sheriff of Northamptonshire until the early years of Henry I's reign. 69 The pattern of the de Cahagnes family's gifts to Lewes suggests that Northamptonshire was the focus of their power within England. 70 Of the four grants to Lewes, all the land in question was in Sussex. 71 Overall, it might be possible to interpret the actions of William de Cahagnes as one of loose association with the counts of Mortain, and William of Mortain in particular. William of Mortain's preference for Cluniac monasticism and his patronage of institutions such as Lewes, provided a vehicle for his tenants to identify with him, yet remain sufficiently detached to steer a different course from their lord in the crisis of 1104, and probably during that of 1101 before it. Indeed, the popularity of the Cluniac monasticism in general during this period may owe much to its perceived political 'neutrality'. 72

One noteworthy change is the increased patronage of selected English houses after 1087 by sheriffs and royal officials. The most striking example is St Peter's Abbey, Gloucester, which, as Emma Cowdie has explored in some detail, attracted gifts from men who were prominent figures at court. 73 Unsurprisingly, the sheriffs of Gloucestershire figure prominently. Roger de Pitres, his brother Durand, their sons,
Walter and Roger, and Roger's wife Adeliza, all made regular grants.74 Gloucester also received gifts from those Normans at the forefront of the penetration into Wales, including, Bernard de Neufmarché and Robert Fitz Haimo.75 Yet the sporadic visitations of the royal court to Gloucester gave many individuals the opportunity to patronise an institution that they had little or no connection too including, Hugh de port, Roger Bigod, William d'Aubigny and the royal constables, Robert and Nigel d'Oilly.76 Indeed, Hugh de Port entered Gloucester as a monk shortly before his death in 1096, and was subsequently buried at the abbey.77 It is interesting that Hugh was styled as vicarious Wyntoniae on his entry into Gloucester, reflecting his local power base in Hampshire. Though a tenant of the bishop of Winchester, New Minster and Chertsey abbeys, the evidence for Hugh's relationship with the Church in Hampshire indicate a business like approach, with any religious or spiritual leanings finding expression elsewhere.78

It is possible that the patronage of Gloucester was a variation on Christopher Harper-Bill's observation on the patterns of Anglo-Norman piety in general, that 'the support of a particular house was frequently the expression of corporate solidarity with a feudal grouping'.79 In the context of the argument advanced in this thesis, patronage of Gloucester by royal officials may also be an indication of their acceptance of the legitimacy of Rufus's kingship. Though Gloucester was only one site associated with royal power and crown wearing its success in attracting patronage on a large scale suggests that it was perceived as special.80

74 Sancti Petri Gloucestrae, 1, 69, 112, 118, 235.
75 Sancti Petri Gloucestrae, 1, 64-5, 80, 93, 122, 314-5; Cownie, Religious Patronage in Anglo-Norman England, 58.
76 Sancti Petri Gloucestrae, 1, 65, 74, 93, 123.
77 Sancti Petri Gloucestrae, 1, 93.
78 DB, 1, 40d, 41a, 42a, b, c, d, 43a, 43c, 49c; D. Bates, Odo of Bayeux, Unpublished University of Exeter Ph.D. (1970), 123-5.
80 Cownie, St Peter's Abbey, 153-4.
Likewise, the cathedral priory of Rochester received gifts from many of the same men including, Roger Bigod, Hugh and Henry de Port, alongside grants from Eudo dapifer, William d'Aubigny and Haimo dapifer. Connections to former lords and patrons, in particular Odo of Bayeux, may play a part in explaining this pattern of behaviour, as well as the influence of local geography. Yet this patronage of Rochester by this group of individuals is likely to have been connected to the events of 1088 and the successful defeat of the rebellion. Rufus' success set the seal on his kingship and the process of reconciliation between the king and the major rebels, except Odo of Bayeux, began almost immediately. William of Malmesbury displayed sensitivity to the significance of this process when he noted that many rebels 'were admitted to take the oath of allegiance'. Underpinning this process was the knowledge that the rebels had been confronted with a display of the powers available to an English king, particularly the ability to summon an effective and loyal military force in the fyrd, and the potential to condemn to death those judged guilty of treason. This might explain Orderic's comment that some of those implicated in the revolt served Rufus with devotion in the years that followed. For many connected to the royal court, patronage of Rochester, even if mainly in the form of tithes, undoubtedly resonated in much the same way that patronage of Gloucester did.

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83 GR, 1, 548. 'Ceteri omnes in fudem recepti.'
84 OV, 4, 134. It is interesting to speculate as to whether the events at Rochester may have influenced Bishop Gundulf. The implication from the Vita Gundulfi episcopi is that Gundulf went freely between the two sides in 1088, perhaps as a negotiator. However, in 1101 there is no suggestion of this and Gundulf supported Henry. Vita Gundulfi episcopi, ed. R. M. Thomson (Toronto, 1977), 50, 58.
Patterns of religious patronage are not the only vehicle through which to comment on contemporary politics. Before considering the evidence of inheritance patterns it is appropriate that something is said on the nature of marriage patterns. The purpose here is not to add to the abundant material on the marital strategies of the aristocracy, but merely to chart some of the marriages that are relevant to the case studies outlined in Part One and offer some observations on what these reveal about contemporary politics.

The uneven nature of the evidence means that the marriages in question largely belong to the elite members of the aristocracy. Perhaps the most striking marriage of this period is that of Robert de Mowbray to Mathilda de L'Aigle in 1095. The coronation charter of Henry I stated that he expected to be consulted in relation to the marriages of his barons and tenants. It seems unlikely that Rufus would not have demanded similar consultation. In these circumstances, it is striking, therefore, that Mathilda came from a family based in southern Normandy, and whose political allegiances had firmly been with Robert Curthose in the early 1090s. Moreover, Robert de Mowbray's connections with the family may have stretched back to the 1080 and participation of Richer de L'Aigle, Mathilda's father, on the expedition into Scotland in that year, alongside Robert and Curthose. Given these factors, either Rufus was completely unaware of what Robert was planning in 1095, or more likely, he was aware of growing difficulties in his relationship with one of his most important magnates, but judged that these were not a serious long-term danger. The simple fact that Robert's bride came from a family closely associated with Robert Curthose reinforces the analysis offered above, that by 1095 Robert Curthose's claim to the English throne appeared to have been settled, yet for many within the aristocracy continuing questions over the legitimacy of Rufus's kingship remained under the surface.

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85 OV, 4, 282. Orderic states that Robert married Mathilda shortly before the outbreak of the revolt.
86 EHD, 2, 433.
Orderic believed that Robert’s marriage was prelude to expansion within the north of England. Given the prominence of the L’Aigle’s within southern Normandy this is a somewhat curious statement. Yet it must be remembered that there was an important English dimension to Robert’s marriage, which merely reinforces the observations made on Robert’s status within the wider polity made in Chapter Four. His bride was the niece of Earl Hugh of Chester through his sister’s marriage to Mathilda’s father. Connections between the de Mowbray family and Earl Hugh may have also existed independently of the proposed marriage and may have actually facilitated the union. Hugh gave an estate he held at Montbray to his abbey of Saint-Sever, most probably on the foundation of the abbey in 1085. Yet when it is remembered that another of Hugh’s sisters was married to Rannulf, vicomte of Bayeux, and their son was given the lordship of Carlisle, possibly as early as 1092, then Orderic’s statement appears to make sense, in that Robert was marrying the niece of the earl of Chester and the cousin of the lord of Carlisle.

In part, the notable differences between the aftermaths of the revolt of 1088 and that of 1095 can be seen in the failure of family and cross-Channel connections to save the rebels. Robert de Mowbray’s wife presented an opportunity for Rufus to exert pressure on him to surrender Bamburgh castle in 1095. It is noticeable that another rebel from 1095, William of Eu, had earned the enmity of his brother-in-law, Hugh d’Avranches,
earl of Chester, on account of his flagrant infidelities and neglect of his second wife, Hugh's sister. Both William d'Audrieu and Hugh de Montgomery were unfortunate in that their close associations with relatives involved in the conspiracy threw suspicion onto them. Whereas the politics of 1088, and in particular its cross-Channel dimension, constrained Rufus his treatment of the rebels captured in Rochester, in 1095, the nature of the conspiracy against the king removed these constraints. In part, this must account for Orderic's comment, that in 1102, when Henry I had defeated Robert de Bellême, the other magnates attempted to negotiate a settlement, fearing that they would be trodden underfoot by royal power.

The aristocracy pursued what might be termed normal marital strategies during this period. At one stage, a marriage was planned between William of Mortain and the daughter of Walter de Mayenne, until bishop Hildebert of Le Mans objected on the grounds of consanguinity. The strategic importance of Robert de Bellême's marriage to Agnes, daughter and heir of Guy, count of Ponthieu has already been noted. It is notable that many of those who rebelled or were implicated in rebellion contracted cross-Channel and trans-regional marriages. Paradoxically, though this is undoubtedly a reflection of wider geo-political interests, it might also suggest that the political events in which these men were caught up in were not regarded as anything outside of the normal discourse of high politics. The marriage patterns of the upper echelons of the aristocracy indicate a situation that was defined by underlying continuity in terms of the mechanisms that might facilitate a marriage, punctuated by occasional political crises.

92 OV, 4, 284.
93 OV, 4, 128-32.
94 OV, 4, 26-32.
96 See above, Chapter 5.
In terms of the inheritance laws and customs of the aristocracy, the rejection of *acquêts* and *propres* to explain the partition of 1087, together with an emphasis upon the concept of political legitimacy to explain the politics of the 1090s and early 1100s, necessitates a reappraisal of the importance of the distinction within the wider socio-political culture of the cross-Channel aristocracy. Quite clearly, this is a study that is beyond scope of this current chapter or indeed this thesis. Yet there are certain observations that can be raised in this context, and provide the basis for future enquiries. In particular, it must be questioned, whether the politics of the period between 1087 and 1106 gave impetus to the development of this distinction.\(^7\) The evidence from the *Leges Henrici Primi*, though perhaps not quite as clear-cut as it appears, suggests that within little more than a generation the firm distinction between acquisitions and patrimonies had been accepted and an attempt made to give it clarity.\(^8\)

Perhaps the most significant point to make is the sheer weight of evidence for the period between 1087 and 1106, which suggests the political circumstances of this period gave families an incentive to divide their lands along customary lines that they would have been familiar with. Most of the examples are well known, but when listed in a rough chronological order give a sense of momentum. Hugh de Montfort-sur-Risle became a monk at Bec around 1088, with his two sons from his second marriage succeeding to his lands; the elder son, Robert, taking over his Norman lands, while his younger son, Hugh II, gained the English lands.\(^9\) Richard fitz Gilbert retired to the priory he established at St Neots and was dead by 1089 or 1090.\(^10\) His son, Roger, succeeded his father as lord

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\(^9\) *Domesday Monachorum*, 68-70; COEL, Person no. 682; *Domesday People*, 265-6.

of Bienfaite and Orbec in Normandy, while Gilbert succeeded to the lordships of Clare and Tonbridge in England. Richard’s brother, Baldwin fitz Gilbert, was succeeded by his son, Robert, in the lordship of Meules and Le Sap in Normandy and William in England. The estates of Roger de Montgomery divided along clear lines, with the eldest son, Robert de Bellême, receiving the Norman lands and Roger’s second son Hugh receiving the English lands. Gilbert de Gand was succeeded by his eldest son, Hugh, in Normandy, and by his younger son, Walter, in England. The death of Hugh de Grandmesnil in 1098 saw his eldest son, Robert, received the Norman lands, while the next eldest son, Ivo, received the English lands. At some point between 1086 and 1101, Henry de Ferrières’ eldest son, William, succeeded to his Norman lands, while his second son, Engenulf, received the English lands. Richard de Courcy divided his lands between his sons at some time between 1086 and 1105, possibly before 1089.

In addition to these cases are further examples of division, based upon the distinction between acquisitions and patrimonies, though with variation in terms of which son received what. On the death of William I de Warrenne in 1088, his English lands went to his eldest son, William II, while the family’s Flemish lands went to his younger son, Rainald. Eventually, the Norman lands of William I de Warenne came into the possession of William II, possibly because Rainald died without heirs, though it is far from certain that the Norman lands went to Rainald on the death of his father. Emily Tabuteau identified further partitions in the families of Abetot, Bacon, Burdet, Harcourt,
Marshal, Paynel and Talbot.\textsuperscript{108} Division appears to have been contemplated by Robert, count of Mortain.\textsuperscript{109} The scale of the evidence appears to indicate that once the Conquest generation began to die, the disturbed contemporary political circumstances gave the impetus to division.

The evidence from the literary sources reveals that later writers were almost certainly aware of this dynamic. Orderic’s rhetorical set piece on aristocratic motives for rebellion in 1088, particularly the dilemma of having to serve two lords who were ‘so different and lived so far apart’ suggests that the aristocracy may have actively looked to the distinction between acquisitions and patrimonies as the means to mitigate their entanglement in the politics of the English succession. Orderic explored the dilemma further: ‘If we serve Robert duke of Normandy as we ought we will offend his brother William, who will then strip us of great revenues and mighty honours in England. Again, if we obey King William dutifully, Duke Robert will confiscate our inherited estates in Normandy.’\textsuperscript{110}

This was an analysis shared by William of Malmesbury, who observed that the negotiators of the Treaty of Rouen were motivated by their own interests as they had possessions on both sides of the Channel’.\textsuperscript{111} The central obligations the treaty sought to place on Rufus and Curthose and the attempt to create a reciprocal relationship between the two brothers, suggest the baronial negotiators were constructing the treaty in the light of their own experiences of the previous four years. Likewise, the stipulation

\textsuperscript{108} Tabuteau, ‘Role of Law’, 161-3, n. 91-102.
\textsuperscript{109} Bibliothèque municipale d’Avranches, MS, 210, fol. 34. Discussed in, Tabuteau, ‘Role of Law’, 162, n.90
\textsuperscript{110} \textit{OV}, 4, 122. ‘\textit{Si Roberto duci Normannorum digne seruiermus, Guillelmmum fratem eius offendemus. Unde ab ipso spoiliabimur in Anglia magnis redditibus et precipuis honoribus. Rursus si regi Guillelmo congrue paruerimus. Robertus dix in Normannia penitus priuabit nos paternis hereditatibus.}’
\textsuperscript{111} \textit{GR}, 1, 548. ‘\textit{...consultentes suis commodes quod utrobiq\-que possessiones haberent...}’
within the treaty that each brother was to be the other’s heir in the absence of children from a marriage, reflected the later chapter within the *Leges Henrici Primi*, where in the absence of children on the death of a landholder, the brother of the deceased would have the strongest claim to the inheritance in the absence of a living relative.\(^\text{112}\) However, the Montgomery inheritance of 1098 reveals that where more than one brother was alive the success of any claim would depend upon political considerations. The same is true also of William of Mortain’s claim to his uncle’s former earldom of Kent, where Henry’s ability to temporise and delay flouted his own laws.\(^\text{113}\)

In this context, therefore, one would expect partition to act as a centrifugal force driving the partition of England and Normandy. Yet for many of the elite of the Anglo-Norman aristocracy this does not appear to have been the case. The comments of William of Malmesbury and Orderic are clearly applicable to Odo of Bayeux, Robert of Mortain, Bishop Geoffrey of Coutances, Robert de Mowbray and Roger de Montgomery. Yet it is noticeable that many of those who were implicated in the revolt of 1095, or who supported Curthose in 1101, most notably Gilbert fitz Richard, William II de Warenne, Robert de Bellême, Ivo Grandmesnil and Eustace III, count of Boulogne, were the beneficiaries of inheritance practices whereby they came into possession of huge estates that had once been acquisitions.\(^\text{114}\) Therefore, the fact that these men imperilled their gains by opposing Rufus and Henry I point towards deep-seated concerns and motivations. The career pattern of these men and their ability to construct cross-Channel complexes necessitates a modification of Professor’s Holt observation on the structure

\(^{112}\) *Leges Henrici Primi*, C. 70, 20. ‘If anyone dies without children, his father or mother shall succeed to the inheritance, or his brother or sister, if neither father nor mother is living.’

\(^{113}\) *Leges Henrici Primi*, C. 70, 20a. ‘If he does not possess these relatives then his father’s or mother’s sister and relatives up to the fifth ‘joint’, whoever are the nearest in relationship, shall succeed by the law of inheritance’.

\(^{114}\) Strevett, ‘Anglo-Norman Civil War’, 160-61. See below, Chapter 4, for an assessment of Hugh de Montgomery’s role in the conspiracy of 1095.
of inheritance requiring a single feudal lord.\textsuperscript{115} In the case of Roger de Mowbray and William of Eu, their preference for Stephen of Aumale as a replacement for Rufus in 1095 would not have made a complex cross-Channel framework of landholding any less complicated.

Given this behaviour, a significant question is whether the questions and doubts expressed over the legitimacy of Rufus's and Henry's kingships raised reciprocal questions over landholding and lordship within England. The evidence from Orderic for aristocratic motives for rebelling against Rufus in 1088, and particularly his distinction between the English acquisitions, termed by Orderic as 'great revenues and mighty honours', and the 'inherited' Norman lands implies that this might have been a consideration.\textsuperscript{116} Likewise, William of Malmesbury created a scene in his \textit{Gesta Regum} where Rufus persuades Roger de Montgomery to accept his kingship in 1088 by not calling into question the judgement of the Conqueror who had made Rufus king, the same man who had made Roger de Montgomery a magnate.\textsuperscript{117} The implication of Malmesbury's observation was just as Rufus was dependent upon his father's designation in 1087 for much of his legitimacy, so the magnates who held English estates were dependent upon the Conqueror's own legitimacy for the rights to their English estates. The 'E' version of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle stated the Normandy was the Conqueror's birthright, and equated England with Maine.\textsuperscript{118} In this context, William of Poitiers' description of the initial distribution of estates after 1066, where 'nothing was given to any Frenchman, which had been unjustly taken from any

\textsuperscript{116} Cf. Jane Martindale's observation: 'Inheritance and doubts over succession in a county, principality or still more, a kingdom, could have repercussions which would destroy political equilibrium and endanger the conduct of government'. Matindale, 'Succession and Politics', 40.
\textsuperscript{117} \textit{GR}, 1, 546; Garnett, 'Coronation and Propaganda', 95.
\textsuperscript{118} \textit{ASC}, E, 1086.
Englishman', reinforces the sense that the Normans' titles only had legitimacy if the
Conqueror's kingship had legitimacy.\footnote{Gesta Guilleimi, ‘Nulli tamen Gallo datum est quod Anglo cuiquam injuste fuerit oblatum.’ Quoted in Garnett, 'Coronation and Propaganda', 95.}

The emphasis upon the links between political legitimacy and landholding was a theme
that also ran through Orderic's treatment of the rebellion of 1075. Though much of what
Orderic says needs to be treated with care, especially his comments that one of the
factors conditioning the rebellion was William's illegitimacy, the rhetorical complaints
about the distribution of English estates in the aftermath of 1066 at the very least reveals
a recognition that political legitimacy and lawful entitlement to acquired lands went
hand-in-hand.\footnote{For the question of illegitimacy, see Bates, ‘The Conqueror’s Adolescence’, 12.}
The rebels of 1075, Roger of Hereford and Ralph de Gael, when
attempting to recruit Waltheof to the conspiracy, recognised that when one of them was
created king and the other two 'dukes', 'all the honors of England' would be subject to
the three of them.\footnote{OV, 2, 314. ‘Unus ex nobis sit rex et duo duces, et sic nobis tribus omnes Anglici subiciuntur honores’.}
To reinforce his analysis, Orderic drew upon the Book of Judges
and the rebellion of the men of Shechem against Abimelech, an illegitimate son of a
concubine by Jerubaal and the former ruler of Shechem, who was crowned king after
slaying Jerubaal's seventy sons.\footnote{Judges, 9; OV, 2, 320.}
At the heart of the Old Testament account is the fable
told by Jotham, the surviving son of Jerubaal, who warns the people of Shechem of the
need to serve Abimelech faithfully otherwise destruction will fall upon them all,
including Abimelech.

Professor Holt made the point that that for the first generation after the Conquest, all the
land held in England was an acquisition.\footnote{Holt, ‘Notions of Patrimony’, Colonial England, 216.} The proliferation of inheritances outlined
above suggest that the crucial stage for many families, where an acquisition was

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textit{Gesta Guilleimi, ‘Nulli tamen Gallo datum est quod Anglo cuiquam injuste fuerit oblatum.’} Quoted in Garnett, 'Coronation and Propaganda', 95.
\item For the question of illegitimacy, see Bates, ‘The Conqueror’s Adolescence’, 12.
\item \textit{OV, 2, 314. ‘Unus ex nobis sit rex et duo duces, et sic nobis tribus omnes Anglici subiciuntur honores’.}
\item Judges, 9; \textit{OV, 2, 320.}
\end{enumerate}
transformed into an inheritance by the first succession, coincided with a period of political turbulence where doubts were expressed over the legitimacy of the kings under whose lordship the land in question was to be held. John Hudson has traced the growth of inheritance language in charters. Though he has emphasised the influence of the Church reform movement and usefulness of confirming inheritance with stricter language, his observation on the doubts over royal succession provoking a more general discussion of succession needs further investigation and may yield important results in the light of the observations made in this chapter, and the framework of analysis advanced throughout this thesis.124

This chapter was not intended as a comprehensive examination of religious patronage, marital strategies or inheritance patterns. In terms of religious patronage, though the broad conclusions of Emma Cownie's study remain valid, the nuances of religious patronage are of particular importance in acting as a commentary on wider political events. The wider political narrative of the period must be central to any analysis of the religious activity of the aristocracy. The same is true of the marital strategies pursued by the cross-Channel aristocracy. One striking feature is sheer adaptability of the aristocracy in relation to the broader crosscurrents of succession politics. In terms of inheritance patterns, the evidence points towards the period between 1087 and 1106 as being of supreme importance in the hardening of the distinction between acquisitions and patrimonies and providing the impetus for their embodiment in written legal codes. The basis for this was undoubtedly the wider discussions on the nature of royal succession and royal legitimacy.

124 Hudson, 'Land, Law and Lordship', 101-06, esp.103.
Conclusion

The dominant theme within this thesis has been the importance of the concept of political legitimacy as one of the defining influences in shaping the political culture of the Anglo-Norman aristocracy between 1087 and 1106, and its role as the central dynamic in determining how the cross-Channel elite responded to the issue of divided lordship and a disputed English succession. This emphasis has been a deliberate reaction to the widespread acceptance of an Anglo-Norman political culture that owes its shape and structure to the historical traditions of constitutional, administrative and legal history. This has resulted in a historiography that has not considered to any great degree the ability of the aristocracy to think, discuss and act upon the central political issues of the day. As such, the Anglo-Norman aristocracy have come to occupy a peculiar situation, where political instability is perceived to be part of a wider ‘tenurial crisis’, and causes of political disputes and actions are seen primarily in terms of protecting family lands and cross-Channel estates, ensuring continuity of office holding across a change of regime or engaging in aggressive expansion.

As the examples of Robert de Mowbray, William of Mortain and Robert de Bellême have shown, this framework does not provide the means to understand fully the actions of these men in opposing both Rufus and Henry I. Nor does it necessarily provide the means to explain the consistent support given to Rufus and Henry by their royal officials and sheriffs. The paradox, exemplified by Robert de Mowbray and the revolt of 1095, is why so many of the central events of this period have such a prominent place in contemporary and near-contemporary sources, yet struggle to be understood in modern analyses.
The question is one of balance. As such, the concept of heterogeneity and the political conduct of the aristocracy being determined by opportunities for material advancement must remain central. Yet as David Crouch has begun to suggest was the case in the mid-twelfth century, a further layer of interpretation is needed in order to understand the events and complexity of the problems faced by contemporaries. In short, questions of political legitimacy and fears of tyranny were fundamental to the accepted norms of political behaviour and values. In this context, those sections of the Anglo-Norman aristocracy who felt that their rights to be consulted in the selection of a new king had twice been ignored, and who also felt marginalised in the restructuring of the Anglo-Norman polity after 1087, were thus prepared to mix self-interest with more fundamental concerns and resort to violence on three occasions to effect political change.

The failure of violence to bring about decisive change by 1091, and once more in 1101, ensured that a fully detailed settlement would be devised on each occasion, which not only dealt with the short-term effects of instability, but also addressed the more fundamental and deep-rooted problems. Crucially, the means by which political stability was to be achieved and these problems addressed was through the concept of co-existence for England and Normandy as separate political and legal units. A caveat is that in 1091, provision had to be made for Rufus' relatively successful intervention into Normandy during the previous two years. In this context, the complexity of the Treaty of Rouen in attempting to create a reciprocal relationship between the two brothers was notable, and suggests that the cross-Channel framework in which the aristocracy moved and acted was far more subtle than the notion of a homogeneous aristocracy responding to centripetal forces allows for. Many of the problems faced by Rufus in the mid 1090s arose directly from his contravention of its terms. Yet it is also clear from the terms of the Treaties of Rouen and Winchester, that the problems faced by the aristocracy and
their responses to them were nothing that they were not equipped to tackle, both intellectually and in terms of pragmatic political experience. Likewise, the evidence explored in Chapter Eight suggests that the aristocracy as a whole could adapt to changing political circumstances with alacrity. Overall, it must be thought that though the politics of the 1090s and early 1100s retained the capacity to engender relatively widespread human suffering and misery, they were, nonetheless, not alien to the experiences of the Anglo-Norman political elite.

Central to this analysis is the narrative histories written by contemporaries, near contemporaries and those in the latter half of the twelfth century. The concern of later writers to explore the issues that had relevance to the problems their contemporary societies faced gave their writing an urgency and found expression in the framework of analysis used to explore these issues in drawing upon classical and biblical paradigms. Allied to this, is the need to fully utilise the analytical tools employed by scholars who study the early and late medieval aristocracies, especially ritual and ceremony, in order to understand just how deeply contemporaries felt about the issues they faced. Patterns of religious patronage, marital strategies and inheritance provide the means to chart contemporary perceptions. These activities, when analysed within the broader context of the political framework advanced throughout this thesis, can be read not only as a response to the wider politics of the 1090s and early 1100s, but also as a commentary on them.

The effect of this study is to allow the politics and events of the years between 1087 and 1106 to be placed in their historical context, both in terms of the effects of the Conquest on cross-Channel political life and also the wider process of politics in the early Medieval West. The Anglo-Norman aristocracy to emerge from this study is one that sits more easily with the Carolingian, post Carolingian and late medieval aristocracy. Its
political culture continues to be defined by opportunities for material advancement. Control of land and offices remain the basis of the exercise of serious political power. However, the power of ideas and principles as sources of motivation in shaping political action must be central to any analysis.
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