Reinventing Geopolitical Codes in the Post-Cold War World With Special Reference to International Terrorism

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Abstract

Through a study of geopolitical codes, this thesis examines the condition of the Westphalian sovereign state in the post-Cold War world. Focusing primarily on the events of September 11th 2001 and their aftermath, the research questions the sustainability of the state as conceived by (neo)realists in the context of new regional and global actors and the processes underpinning these.

From a critical realist perspective the study uses a comparison between Europe, where regionalization is particularly noticeable, and the hegemonic United States, in order to explore how the non-state global terrorist actor and the regional European actor impact upon responses, characterizations and therefore geopolitical codes relating to terrorism. In so doing the plausibility of emerging common European geopolitical codes is considered.

The thesis is structured around the discussion of the codes of the United States, Britain and France, in addition to a more limited examination of the European Union. This (neo)realist component is complemented by the use of discourse analysis, a technique more common in critical geopolitics. The analysis is applied to government documents from each of the sample states (and the EU).

From this analysis the research determines that each state retains unique geopolitical codes while sharing many components that contribute to their reproduction as sovereign states. Furthermore, although common European codes appear to be unlikely in these circumstances, the European context and imaginations apparent in Britain and France points to a regional dimension. The thesis concludes that the Westphalian sovereign state remains the dominant geopolitical actor, although other actors impinge upon it. This is more apparent in Europe where the regional dimension constitutes an added layer of governance and may signify a move away from the ‘modern’ character of the Westphalian state that continues to be more persistent in hegemonic America.
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Declaration

This thesis embodies the results of original research carried out by the author between October 2002 and May 2007. References to existing works are made as appropriate. Any remaining errors or omissions are the responsibility of the author.

Norman Gregor David Rae.
May 2007
Chapter 1

The End of the Westphalian State? A Critical Realist Analysis of Geopolitical Codes in Hegemonic America and Europe

The Treaty of Westphalia – State Sovereignty

On October 24th 1648 combatants in the Thirty Years’ War met in Münster and Osnabrück, divided along religious lines, and signed a treaty ending the conflict (Darby, 2001, p.82). The Peace of Westphalia concluded five years of negotiations (p.78); it became a defining document and event for the concept of state sovereignty and the system of states that came to dominate in subsequent centuries. While this did not become entrenched immediately, when the Westphalian treaty was signed the sentiments were already apparent:

And to prevent for the future any Differences arising in the Politick State, all and every one of the electors, Princes and States of the Roman Empire, are so establish’d and confirm’d in their ancient Rights, Prerogatives, Libertys, Privileges, free exercise of Territorial Right, as well as Ecclesiastic, as Politick Lordships, Regales, by virtue of this present Transaction: that they never can or ought to be molested therein by any whomsoever upon any manner of pretence. (Treaty of Westphalia, 1648)

Sovereignty, therefore, implies the absolute power of the state over a given territory; the state is the only actor to hold such power and, as the passage suggests, no actor, state or otherwise, has the right to intervene within the boundaries of another state. Agnew (2005) reflects:
The importance of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, for example, lay in the mutual recognition among elites of the new European territorial states as a set of neutral centers of public power in the face of devastating religious wars.’ (p.440).

By accepting each other’s sovereignty this new territoriality was established as the foundation for geopolitics in the modern era.

However:

‘Whereas sovereignty in the Westphalian sense centered on the authority granted to the monarch within a delineated territory, the rise of popular sovereignty through the revolutions of the eighteenth century in the United States and France signalled the rise of the sovereign nation-state.’ (Rudolph, 2005, p.5).

Just as the exclusive authority over territory arising out of the Westphalian treaty reflected the modernist thought emerging from the Enlightenment, so too did this new concept of the nation-state. Together they produced the territoriality and related state based governance that was to become ever more prevalent through the 19th and 20th centuries. With this spacio-political resolution came the discourses that reproduced and privileged it as the natural, and inevitable, culmination of progress, giving sovereign territorial states, and the elites who govern them, a status and power underpinned by the realist geopolitics characteristic of this structure.

The Aims and Scope of the Thesis

Events and changes occurring in the late 20th century and the early 21st century have brought into question the Westphalian order. This thesis examines this period from a critical realist perspective, with the aim of gaining an improved understanding of the changes and developments, and assessing whether it constitutes a defining moment ending the Westphalian state’s pre-eminent position in geopolitics, or if in fact it retains that status while evolving in response to the new conditions. Central to the study will be the analysis of geopolitical codes, and specifically how these have been/are being reinvented since the end of the Cold War, and particularly following September 11th. Given the way in which events the of that day have been used to promote policies of the
hegemonic United States, as well as many other states, geopolitical codes related to terrorism are the subject of the analysis. By looking at these codes the thesis attempts to approach an understanding of how states are representing a non-state actor – the terrorist – through discourse, and therefore how they are responding to the globalizing forces apparent at this time that underpin the international terrorist actor itself.

By researching three states – The United States, Britain and France – a comparison will be made between the construction of codes in Europe and in America. In so doing, the impact of regionalization on European codes, and the possibility of a common European code, can be considered. This brings another non-state actor, regional governance, into focus. Again, the presence of such non-state actors potentially challenges the dominance, and perhaps even the existence, of the sovereign state, thus the way in which they are represented in state codes, and the existence or otherwise of common codes, should offer some indication as to the persistence of the state and the Westphalian order in a world where regionalizing forces appear to be at work, if unevenly. Two major non-state actors are, therefore, considered in this thesis in terms of their effects on the state and its codes; firstly international terrorism, an actor reflecting globalizing forces; and secondly regional (and layered) governance, an actor more closely associated with the state, but arguably with the potential to diminish or even replace it.

This introductory chapter seeks to explain why geopolitical codes are an effective focus when studying the state and its reaction to other actors. Secondly, the post-Cold War/post-September 11th period is identified as an appropriate and interesting

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1 The hegemonic state or the hegemon is used here to refer to the most powerful state in the world at present. Taylor and Flint (2000) say: ‘In world systems theory, a state is hegemonic when it captures the majority of the world-economy’s economic capabilities.’ (p.34). This is true of the United States, and allows it to assume a military dominance (or perhaps the other way round), economic and military power bring with them considerable political power. Thus, the hegemon is dominant and more powerful than any rival in all three spheres, a situation that is likely to sustain for a period of time (possibly several decades, if not longer).

2 The term terrorist is widely used, and is generally assumed to refer to one who engages in terrorism and in so doing causes terror. As will be discussed in more detail in chapter 2, these are problematic terms, the meaning of which tends to depend upon the view of the person using it. Most often ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’ are used as derogatory terms to remove legitimacy from actors and actions opposed to the speaker/writer. This ignores the potential for all actors to cause terror whether they are governments or not. In this thesis the term terrorist is used in this most common understanding as the state elites use it. As such, it is used with a hint of irony as it is this discursive construction of the ‘Other’ that is being researched. However, it is used here, for want of a better term, in order to make clear which constructed ‘Other’ is being referred to, while recognizing that it is not only ‘terrorists’ who cause terror.
time in respect of the role of the state, given the globalizing and regionalizing forces at work, and the events that have punctuated it. This is addressed by briefly reflecting on the Cold War geopolitics that preceded the period in question, before considering the changes that have occurred following the Cold War, and then the impact of September 11th. Thirdly, the argument is made for the comparison of Europe and America and, in particular, the three states that have been selected. Finally, the structure of the thesis will be outlined, discussing the purpose of the subsequent chapters.

**Geopolitical Codes**

Realist theory emerged from the same Enlightenment reasoning as the sovereign state. As such, realists suggest that the state is the most important actor in geopolitics and answers to no higher unit of governance. It is the culmination of political progress, and represents the natural order. Neorealism adds to this the anarchical system of states, the structure through which behaviour and outcomes can be explained (Evans and Newnham, 1998, p.364). Consequently, these theories lack an adequate explanation of change and how states have assumed the powerful positions that they have. There is little consideration of the sub-state processes and no place for present or future non-state actors. Conversely, for critical geopolitics practitioners, the Westphalian order must be understood as a product of discourse rather than being natural and inevitable. However, although this is an effective tool in the analysis of the geopolitical practice\(^3\) of powerful state elites, the research in this thesis also acknowledges the continuing role of the state. It is the most important actor, given that it continues to be the main scale at which governance is practiced, power is held and discourse is (re)produced. Thus, the research is based on a critical realist methodology.

Hence, it is the state that is the subject of the research, and in particular geopolitical codes. The concept of the geopolitical code was originally expressed by Gaddis (1982) in his analysis of post-war security policy in the United States. He says:

‘...I would suggest that there exist for presidential administrations certain “strategic” or “geopolitical” codes, assumptions about American

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\(^3\) Geopolitical practice refers to the actions or the performance of geopolitics. This might include military engagements, signing treaties, passing resolutions or even speaking about geopolitics. It is the practical playing out of geopolitical imaginings and representations, a process by which these representations are themselves normalized and established.
interests in the world, potential threats to them, and feasible responses, that tend to be formed either before or just after an administration takes office, and barring very unusual circumstances tend not to change much thereafter.’ (p.ix).

These codes are therefore relatively stable frameworks for understanding the world, but as Gaddis suggests they are capable of change, spatially depending on assumptions about interests and threats to a given state, and temporally depending on the government and perceived circumstances impinging upon a state.

Thus, applying the concept more widely, Dijkink (1998) notes:

‘The Cold War was an extremely dominant geopolitical model (or world order) but it apparently permitted the emergence of slightly different geopolitical codes not only in the course of time in the US but also simultaneously between members of the Atlantic alliance.’ (p.293).

The codes that are developed, and the policies that these contribute to, are therefore specific to the state, even if they sometimes converge. It is the perception of a state’s interests (or those of the powerful elites in a state) that drives the process of code (re)formation: ‘The key element of such codes is the definition of state interest. (Taylor, 1990, p.13). Furthermore, ‘The differential valuation of places – regions and other states – means that practical geopolitical reasoning in the form of geopolitical codes provides the political geography assumptions informing foreign policy.’ (p.13). Through geopolitical codes, policy and responses to external actors can be generated that conform to the assumptions underlying and constituting those codes.

For Taylor and Flint (2000) geopolitical codes are:

‘…the set of strategic assumptions that a government makes about other states in forming its foreign policy… …Such operational codes involve evaluation of places beyond the state’s boundaries in terms of their strategic importance and as potential threats. Geopolitical codes are not just state-centric; they also involve a particular single state’s view of the world. They are by definition, therefore, highly biased pictures of the world.’ (p.91).

Hence, they are irreducible from discourse relating both to the sovereign state generally and to the construction of the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other(s)’ specifically. The critical realism
adopted here implies that the state is the actor that is most worthy of analysis, and therefore geopolitical codes must be considered crucial in understanding the actions of states and the elites that generate the codes, but at the same time the states themselves, and the codes they produce, must be subjected to critical analysis, taking account of their discursive underpinnings.

Taylor and Flint note that: ‘Geopolitical codes operate at three levels – local, regional and global.’ (p.91). These scales are therefore relevant in the appreciation of post-Cold War geopolitical codes. This research, however, is interested in how codes relate to international terrorism specifically, given the way in which this has come to dominate following September 11th. As a result, when examining codes, it is the strands relating to international terrorism that are under scrutiny; each state may construct codes that influence their relations with other states locally, regionally and globally, but these are not necessarily directly in accordance with the aims of this research. Therefore, the codes discussed in this thesis are those linked to the representation and understanding of international terrorism, and how this intersects the three scales. It is not an analysis of every geopolitical code emanating from the states in the study, rather the research seeks to use the codes as they apply to terrorism to gain an understanding of how states are imagining their roles regionally and globally, in addition to their reproduction of the ‘Self’ nationally, in a world where neorealist assumptions of the state as the only important geopolitical actor are increasingly challenged.

The Cold War

The Cold War demonstrated how dominant neorealism and the sovereign state had become in geopolitics. This was the defining geopolitical conflict that dominated the world in the period prior to that studied in this thesis, and therefore provides the background to the later discourses and geopolitical codes of the post-Cold War period. It was a bi-polar conflict understood through binary discourse, and contested by two powerful states and their assorted allies. Dalby (1990) discusses the American representation of the Soviet ‘Other’: ‘The differences are the key to the danger; “they” are dangerous specifically because of how “they” are different.’ (p.54), and notes: ‘…the construction of a menacing USSR facing a benign USA.’ (p.73). Thus, negativity is assigned to the ‘Other’ state, reinforcing the ‘positive’ identity of the
‘Self’. In a world where the state is understood to be the only relevant actor this reproduction of identity is relatively straightforward; the more complex politics of the inside is contrasted with the simplistic interpretations of state relations on the outside. By dividing the world into two blocks of states Cold War discourse made this even simpler, every event and action could be understood through the prism of the Cold War.

The End of the Cold War, and the Post-Cold War World

When the Soviet Union finally broke up in December 1991, following the collapse of Eastern Europe’s Communist governments in 1989, the Cold War was over. The ‘Other’ against which the United States and the West had been juxtaposed no longer existed. Agnew and Corbridge (1995) reflect:

‘The dissolution of the Cold War, the increased velocity and volatility of the world economy, the emergence of political movements outside the framework of territorial states (arms control, human rights, ecological, etc.), all call into question the established understanding of the spatio-temporal framing of “international relations”.’ (p.80).

Consequently, the end of the Cold War, and the globalizing forces that were increasingly impacting upon states, created a post-Cold War world that, to some, appeared more complex and difficult to understand compared to the apparently straightforward neorealist conflict that had ended. By bringing into question the assumptions of the Westphalian state and the neorealist discourse surrounding it, post-Cold War geopolitics is an appropriate and fascinating area for research.

Where the Cold War world was characterized by conflicting sovereign states, the post-Cold War world has seen the increasing importance, or at least a greater acknowledgement, of other actors, with international terrorism and regional governance the most relevant to this study. McGrew (2005) comments:

‘The Westphalian conception of sovereignty as an indivisible, territorially exclusive form of public power is being displaced by a new sovereignty regime – in which sovereignty is understood as the shared exercise of public power and authority. In this respect we are witnessing the emergence of a post-Westphalian world order.’ (p.33).
At the same time the state continues to be of vital importance, particularly due to the dominance that neorealist discourse has in interpretations. It is through this discourse that inter-state relations are focused. Nevertheless, the role of globalization cannot be ignored as it undermines the neorealist assumptions of state sovereignty, and boundaries between the inside and outside. Goetschel (2000) says: ‘In the field of international security, globalisation has most often been associated with ecological degradation, refugee flows, international crime, uncontrolled proliferation, and religions fundamentalism.’ (p.264). This is not to say that globalization and its effects were absent during the Cold War, but they do appear to have become more noticeable.

Concurrent with globalization has been a process of regionalization. This is most developed in Europe with the emergence of the European Union, and again has accelerated after the Cold War with expansion into Eastern Europe. Acharya (2002a) argues that: ‘Regionalism is becoming, and facing the pressure to become, less sovereignty bound, in the sense of going against the norms of non-interference and non-intervention that had underpinned the Westphalian international system.’ (p.20). Hence, as with globalization, regionalization is a process that undermines neorealism through its challenge to the sovereign state; it is a development that serves to destabilise the territorial fixity and dominance of the state through multi-level rescaling of governance, adding complexity to the territoriality of the Westphalian order.

Post-September 11th

September 11th made the changing circumstances clearer than ever:

‘The events and aftermath of September 11th ineluctably ended the already precarious distinction between domestic space, that within a sovereign state, and more global space where transnational networks, international relations, multinational institutions, and global corporations operate. If it existed, any comfortable distinction between domestic and international, here and there, us and them, ceased to have meaning after that day.’ (Hyndman, 2003, p.1).

All these actors overlap and reveal the reduced relevance of the sovereign state. The confusion in the aftermath of the Cold War was simplified, for many, post-September 11th, yet showed complexities of postmodern warfare. Despite the fact that terrorism is not a state enemy corresponding to the neorealist concept of a system of states, it could
nonetheless be used as a new focus for the reproduction of the ‘Self’, it is a new ‘Other’ in a world of multiple actors. When attempting to understand the post-Cold War world it, therefore, seems appropriate to examine the period following September 11th, as this, and terrorism generally, became projected as a, if not the, principal focus of geopolitics for the hegemon/core.

Europe and America – A Comparison

In the context of the globalizing and regionalizing forces that have been prevalent in the post-Cold War world, and indeed that have contributed to the greater importance of international terrorism in reality and in the representations of state elites, makes a comparison between Europe and the United States an effective vehicle for investigating how geopolitical codes have been reinvented in this period. Europe is the site of the thickest regional layer of governance, and also has a history of global engagements. The United States was one of the super-powers engaged in the Cold War, and remains the most powerful state in the world, it is also the state that has initiated a ‘war on terrorism’. In many ways, therefore, this state is a suitable example of a (neo)realist sovereign state and so can be compared to European states that have been drawn into, and reflect regionalization to varying degrees. Two European states are selected here for study, the United Kingdom and France. Both have a history of global engagement and a tendency to assume the status of major powers, however Britain has followed an Atlanticist course, tending to associate more closely with America, while France has adopted a more independent and distanced relationship with the hegemon, and has been a more enthusiastic advocate of European integration. Comparing all three states, and introducing some European Union material, should facilitate a discussion on the possibilities for common European geopolitical codes undermining the traditional Westphalian model, or the influence the presence of a regional layer might have upon the construction of codes in states.

The Research Questions

Four main research questions will be addressed in the thesis, as shown in Box 1.1 below. These encompass both the individual state codes and the comparison between the states generally and Europe and America in particular. The latter two questions concentrate on how the states have responded to the processes of
regionalization and globalization. These principal questions will be expanded further in the following chapter.

**Box 1.1**

Principal Research Questions

For the United States, the United Kingdom and France, what are the geopolitical codes in relation to international terrorism post-September 11th?

When comparing the three states and the European Union, is there an identifiable European geopolitical code, and how do European codes differ from those of the United States?

In the context of regionalization, and in their responses to the networked and non-state character of international terrorism, is the character of European states undergoing a process of change?

Can it be said that Europe consists of ‘postmodern’ states while the United States remains a ‘modern’ state?

The Structure of the Thesis

This chapter has attempted to set out the foundations on which the subsequent chapters are built. It has placed the present geopolitical situation in the context of the beginnings of the sovereign state and the more recent history of the Cold War, and in so doing has introduced the possibility that change may again be occurring as globalizing and regionalizing forces impinge on the state and allow other non-state actors, like international terrorists and regional governance, to acquire a greater role in geopolitics in contradiction of the neorealist discourse that has dominated thinking on the subject. The events of September 11th have brought these issues into sharper focus and provided a potential new ‘Other’ against which the state ‘Self’ can be reproduced, but in this case it is a non-state ‘Other’. It has been noted that a critical realist methodology allows the state to be accepted as the dominant actor without assuming it to be permanent or inevitable, the critical element enables an understanding of the discourses underpinning the state, and representations of the terrorist ‘Other’, that contribute to the construction of geopolitical codes and hence policies of state elites.

Chapter two develops the theoretical background that was introduced here. Expanding on the roots of the sovereign state in the Enlightenment and modernism, it explains how this is interrelated with (neo)realism as the hegemonic geopolitical theory. This is contrasted with critical geopolitics as an alternative. Combining elements of the
two approaches, the argument is made for critical realism as the most effective way of understanding the state and its actions. Following from this, the consistent reproduction of binary discourse is examined from the origins of the state itself, through colonialism and the Cold War. From this, post-Cold War geopolitics are addressed, noting how the existing discourses continue to evolve in response to new realities. September 11th is discussed in this context, and the discursive construction of a threatening terrorist ‘Other’ is examined. The chapter also expands on theories and effects of globalization. It then looks at governance, firstly at the global scale in relation to the globalizing forces, and then regionally, particularly in Europe, with the possibility of layered governance being identified. A theoretical discussion on the consequences of all these processes for borders, territoriality and citizenship completes the chapter.

The methodology used in the research is set out in chapter three. This explains how the entire study and methods used are derived from the critical realism that underpins it. It is shown that concentrating on state codes is a reflection of this, and furthermore the main method – discourse analysis – comes from the critical element of the philosophy. The choice of states, selection of corpuses, and sampling are all discussed, as is the discourse analysis itself and interpretation of the results. This chapter gives the background to the material presented in the empirical chapters that follow, communicating how they are a product of the methodology adopted by the researcher, and emphasizing that they must be understood in this context.

Chapters four to six exhibit the empirical results of the analysis of material from the United States, Britain and France respectively. In each case, the historical and political factors that influence the construction of geopolitical codes are outlined. These are considered to apply at either the national, regional or global scales where the geopolitical codes operate. The cores of these chapters discuss the results of the discourse analysis, looking at how binary discourse is used in the construction of the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’, and the threat thereof. The particular narratives that each state draws upon in its responses to the terrorist threat that has been constructed are then identified, demonstrating the links between all these discourses and narratives. The chapters also attempt to make connections between these post-Cold War/post-September 11th representations and the historical/political contexts, and also the relationships with the theory of the state, geopolitics and globalization/regionalization.
as discussed in chapter two. This allows conclusions to be reached on the geopolitical
codes of the three states and the scales at which these operate in relation to international
terrorism.

The final empirical chapter – chapter seven – deals with the comparison between
the three states. It examines how the states define themselves at the three scales, if at
all, before looking at how they represent space and the ‘Other’. Differences in the
response to terrorism are then considered in light of these representations. In addition,
this chapter has a section covering the regional layer in Europe, with discourse analysis
results for EU documents. Again, all of this is placed in the context of the theory, most
notably of globalization and regionalization, and the implications for states.
Conclusions are then made on how the state codes are each affected or otherwise by the
processes acting upon them and their particular contexts.

The last chapter (chapter eight) reveals the conclusions. This thesis uses theory
and methods derived from critical geopolitics in a neorealist context, attempting to offer
an insight into how sovereign states are constructing their geopolitical codes in this new
post-Cold War/post-September 11th environment. Accepting that the hegemony of
neorealism in geopolitics has led to states as real and dominant actors, but approaching
these from a critical standpoint, offers an alternative research methodology to the more
common division between neorealist and critical research. The role of the state and its
geopolitical codes, as reproduced through discourse, can therefore be assessed in
relation to global and regional forces. As such, this final chapter puts the findings back
into the context of the wider body of theory with the intention of enhancing, to some
extent, understandings of the role of the Westphalian sovereign state in geopolitics, at a
time when some might question its continuing relevance.
Chapter 2

Philosophical Foundations, Geopolitics and Forces of Change: A Review of the Literature

Introduction

While the purpose of this thesis is to examine geopolitical codes in the post-Cold War world, and particularly post-September 11th, this cannot be detached from geopolitics over the longer duration. Equally, comparing Europe and the United States brings into question particular ways of looking at geopolitics. The point of this chapter is, therefore, firstly to set the research in the context of earlier geopolitics. Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, through this I seek to identify and discuss the principal philosophical positions used to interpret geopolitics, and consequently establish my own standpoint in this respect. In doing so, I intend to create a foundation on which later analysis and critiques can be made. Finally, I aim to set my own research within a wider body of literature, and demonstrate the main subsets of literature and theory that impinge upon the research. These three objectives are not mutually exclusive. In other words they will not be addressed one by one. Instead they should be accomplished in the chapter as a whole.

Building on the background to the sovereign state discussed in the introductory chapter, this chapter begins by looking at understandings of the state, and of geopolitics, as related to the Enlightenment thought from which both emerged. This first section – Realism and Critical Alternatives – therefore starts with a discussion of the modernist roots of the sovereign state. This facilitates a progression to an examination of realism, as the dominant philosophical position for analysing and practicing geopolitics since the establishment of the sovereign state. Contrasting this with critical geopolitics,
demonstrates how theorists adhering to such practices have deconstructed realism and the state system, revealing it to be discursively constructed rather than the ‘natural’ representation claimed by the realists.

The second section takes the theory from the first, and discusses how discourses have been used in constructing worldviews and ultimately geopolitical codes in the past. The focus here is on Temporal Transitions – how discourses, and therefore codes, change over time while drawing upon established discursive structures. This involves introducing the concept of Orientalism as a major colonial discourse. The focus then moves to the Cold War, including how Orientalism could be drawn upon in representations of the ‘Other’ in this conflict. From here I shall proceed to the post-Cold War period. The discussion will address the construction of representations through familiar discourses and the implications of this. In addition, throughout this section, the ways in which the nation/state is reproduced, and the use of discourse in the normalization of particular state policies should also be drawn out. This provides the background for an appreciation of the post-September 11th period.

Post-September 11th Geopolitics examines the way in which terrorism has been constructed as a new threatening ‘Other’. Beginning by exploring various definitions of terrorism, it proceeds to look at the links to the past that are used in such representations, in another example of the progression made apparent in the previous section. The use, once again, of binary discourse and deployment of ‘common sense’ assumptions that were prevalent in the Cold War, are identified here. These provide the basis for justifying particular responses by the state, and the dismissal of alternatives.

A section introducing the process of Globalization begins to explain processes that impinge upon the state and the non-state actors that these may facilitate. The term is defined and its implications pondered. Fluidity and networks are of note given their relevance to international terrorism. The apparent ability of terrorist networks to penetrate state borders raises questions for the sovereign territorial state; this is discussed here.

The penultimate section covers Governance. This is crucial to the question of European geopolitical codes and of Europe as the location for ‘postmodern’ states. It is
also important to consider the global scale when discussing globalization and actors operating outside the neorealist state system. Thus, the potential for understanding governance to operate beyond the state is explored. Regional layers are considered, with the European case being of particular relevance, both for its level of regionalization and due to its relevance to the subject of the thesis. This precedes a discussion of the potential for governance to operate simultaneously at different scales, and also how this may lead to differences between regions and/or states.

The final section focuses on major Implications of these changes or moves away from (neo)realism and its structures. This is essentially divided into two main subsections: Borders and Territoriality. The first of these looks to define what borders are/mean, and then address how changes to borders could be taking effect as a result of processes such as globalization and regionalization; particularly prescient in the light of September 11th. This feeds into territoriality, which is closely related to borders. Thus, the likelihood for changes in territoriality is assessed in the context of the realist forms that have dominated in the sovereign state. Regional governance is also important in this respect, and so the European dimension is brought up again. From here I shall attempt to draw out some conclusions from the chapter as a whole and then to frame the detailed research questions that the thesis will attempt to answer.

Realism and Critical Alternatives

Enlightenment and Modernity

Traditionally geopolitics, both in theory and practice, has been dominated by realist analysis. This emerged as a function of modernism and the sovereign state (a new spatial form developed in line with this philosophy). The Enlightenment brought a new mode of thought to Europe that emphasised progress, science and discovery. In modernism, says Harvey (1989),

‘The idea was to use the accumulation of knowledge generated by many individuals working freely and creatively for the pursuit of human emancipation and the enrichment of daily life. The scientific domination of nature promised freedom from scarcity, want, and the arbitrariness of natural calamity. The development of rational forms of social organization and rational modes of thought promised liberation from the irrationalities of myth, religion, superstition, release from the arbitrary
use of power as well as from the dark side of our own human natures.’ (p.12).

This was the background to an understanding that space and politics could be appreciated scientifically and that rational explanations could be derived from this. Particular spacio-political formations must possess superiority over others and represent evidence of progress.

The Sovereign State

The treaty of Westphalia in 1648 is widely considered to have heralded the birth of the realist ‘nation-state’. Non-interference by each state in another’s internal space was the principle drawn from this treaty, encapsulated in the concept of sovereignty. This involved a binary division between internal and external affairs that is an expression of the modernist resolution of space-time relations (Walker, 1993, p.16). In theory sovereignty, when applied to the state, gives that state absolute authority over a clearly bounded territory (Agnew, 2005, p.439). As such, no other state or actor has the right to interfere in that space. This is usually expressed as a monopoly of violence within the state territory. In the words of McGrew (2005): ‘Sovereignty involved the rightful entitlement to exclusive, unqualified, and supreme rule within a delimited territory.’ (p.30).

While the Treaty of Westphalia may have marked the beginning of the sovereign state it did not immediately, and arguably it never did, become established absolutely other than in core states. It can, however, be argued that this treaty was the start of what became a new world order based upon (ostensibly) sovereign states. Thus: ‘…Westphalia refers to the state-centric character of world order premised on full participatory membership accorded exclusively to territorially based political actors that qualify as sovereign states.’ (Falk, 2004, p.4). In other words, in the Westphalian world order, only states considered to be sovereign over a given territory are accepted as legitimate actors at the global scale.

(Neo)Realism

While idealists advocating the development of international law and world government have also founded their ideas in modernist discourse, it is realism that has
become hegemonic in geopolitical practice. Traditional realism concentrated on the units (states) and, in particular, their relative power. Thus for realists it was necessary to build/reinforce the power of the state, in order to protect it from other states in the anarchy they understand exists beyond/outside the state borders (Beeson and Bellamy, 2003, p.349). This position has been refined by neorealists. Neorealism seeks to introduce an additional structural element. Two separate systems can be identified, that can, indeed must, be studied separately. The internal politics of the state are, they claim, irrelevant at the international scale. Waltz (1986b) stresses that ‘One cannot infer the condition of international politics from the internal composition of states, nor can one arrive at an understanding of international politics by summing the foreign policies and the external behaviours of states.’ (p.51). He advocates a systems approach, the essential elements of the system being the structure and the interacting units (p.94). Therefore, it is the system, not individuals, that is the principal determinant of outcomes at the international level.

The system, however, is said to be anarchical (Bull, 1995), in that it has no overarching authority to enforce rules. Bull distinguishes between order and justice. Order in the state system is, for neorealists, the primary concern, and the consequences of achieving this are unimportant. Bull states: ‘…to pursue the idea of world justice in the context of the system and society of states is to enter into conflict with the devices through which order is at present maintained.’ (p.85). Furthermore, human justice, he contends, is ‘potentially subversive of international society’ (p.79), as this is built around states not individuals. Hence, for the neorealist, analysis involves examining the structure and how the system works, providing explanations of external events and a foundation for policy decisions. Non-state actors are thus irrelevant, as are individuals, who may be adversely affected by the process of maintaining order in the anarchical society.

Diminishing the importance of justice in this way is a significant weakness of the neorealist philosophy, demonstrating the de-humanising nature of such realist analysis. This stems from a focus on structure, relegating agency to a minor or even irrelevant role. Ashley (1986, p.258) refers to this as ‘positivist structuralism’, where

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1 Bull points to five institutions that are used to maintain order in the state system: the balance of power, international law, war, great powers and diplomacy (Bull, 1977).
the state system is presented as the natural order of things. This derives from the modernist foundations of realism and the state system it seeks to explain and reproduce. Removing significance from the actions of particular individuals therefore takes away responsibility for the effects of those actions, perpetuating a belief that the system makes them unavoidable. Thus, a leader may claim to have no choice in a decision to go to war and so imply that they have no responsibility for those that die or suffer as a result.

Furthermore, neorealism, by excluding internal factors, removes the possibility for explanations of change (Keohane, 1986, p.159), and thus for moving beyond the state system: ‘The problem with Waltz’s posture is that in any social system, structural change itself ultimately has no source other than unit level processes’ (Ruggie, 1986, p.152). Consequently, ‘Waltz’s theory of “society” contains only a reproductive logic.’ (p.152). As there is no place for internal state politics and social processes, the agents of structural change are ignored. In doing so, neorealists like Waltz present a structure that is ever present. Therefore, the neorealist state system appears fixed and inevitable.

Critical Geopolitics – A Challenge to Neorealism

As a radical alternative to the hegemony of neorealism, Critical Geopolitics is an attempt to disrupt the positivist discourses of rationality and progress that are central to the idea of the world as ‘naturally’ divided between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, such that ‘scientific’ explanations can be derived. Critical Geopolitics as presented by Ó Tuathail (1996) undermines these arguments by exposing the ‘natural’ and ‘objective’ science of geography and geopolitics. ‘Although often assumed to be innocent, the geography of the world is not a product of nature but a product of histories of struggle between competing authorities over the power to organize, occupy, and administer space.’ (p.1). Therefore, power is introduced as a crucial element in geopolitics. Drawing on the work of Michel Foucault, Ó Tuathail believes that ‘geography is not a natural given but a power-knowledge relationship.’ (p.10), consequently it can be used in the production and reinforcement of particular power relations.

The neorealist geography of sovereign states gives certain states, and individuals in prominent positions within those states, a power that is drawn from the system of
knowledge that has produced that neorealist geography; at the same time their powerful
status allows them to reproduce the knowledge and therefore the geographies
perpetuating their power. This established power structure is problematized by critical
geopolitics. Dodds (1993) argues that: ‘…by drawing attention to the fact that there is
no “natural” or “prediscursive” geography of international; relations, we draw attention
to how policy makers and academic experts through linguistic practices represent places
and peoples in the practice of foreign policy.’ (p.71). Through this critical
understanding of geography and geopolitics, world politics no longer seems so ‘natural’
and easily explained as suggested by neorealists.

Crucial to the ability to ‘geo-graph’ the world is the power of sight that has been
privileged over the other senses (Ó Tuathail, 1996, p.24). This was reflected in the
approach of colonial geographers like Halford Mackinder who considered ‘seeing’ to be
the only way to understand the world in an unsocialised ‘objective’ way. Ó Tuathail
states: ‘“Man,” for those who wrote Geography, was “seeing-man,” a transcendental
European subject who was empowered with the sovereign power to see the world in the
fullness of its positivity.’ (p.80). The European ‘man’ had the power to bring what he
saw into the structures of European knowledge and in so doing exerting power and
control over the non-European spaces. Thus, in saying that ‘sight sited geography by its
power of citation.’ (p.80), Ó Tuathail describes the way in which explorer geographers
like Mackinder could represent places they visited and ‘saw’, in particular ways.
Authority and ‘truth’ are given to such representations due to the ‘authoritative’ source
that ‘cited’ them.

Ó Tuathail considers Foucault's concept of panopticism to be relevant here. ‘A
failure to problematize the panopticism that characterises so much geographical
discourse is ultimately a failure to problematise the conceptual infrastructures that make
geropolitics possible.’ (p.143). The ‘all seeing eye’ of the geographer assumes a position
of power in geopolitics. Problematizing geopolitics is an action Ó Tuathail achieves in
the ‘question’ of the hyphenated ‘Geo-politics’. This:

‘…does not mark a fixed presence but an unstable and indeterminate
problematic; it is not an “is” but a question. The hyphen ruptures the
givenness of geopolitics and opens up the seal of the bonding of the
“geo” and “politics” to critical thought. In undoing the symbolic
functioning of the sign, its semantic instability, ambiguity, and indeterminacy are released.’ (p.67).

He is therefore deconstructing the binary distinctions of geopolitics and the Cartesian Perspectivism\(^2\) on which it has traditionally been based, and which was particularly apparent in the approach of Mackinder with his ‘disembodied earth scanning minds eye’ (p.87).

In order to represent, a person or a group must be seen to have/be in a position of power, and thus their representations are powerful. Dodds reflects:

‘When we discuss something as important as the foreign policy of a state, we clearly need to draw attention to the narrative functions of a state’s privileged story tellers. In this case, we need to consider the role of academic experts, the media and foreign policy professionals themselves (e.g. Foreign Office officials).’ (p.71).

These are the figures who have considerable power over geopolitical representations, those that Ó Tuathail and Agnew (1992) call ‘intellectuals of statecraft’: ‘The notion of “intellectuals of statecraft” refers to a whole community of state bureaucrats, leaders, foreign-policy experts and advisors throughout the world who comment upon, influence and conduct the activities of statecraft.’ (p.193). As such, these people are empowered by their positions and their status within government and within society to (re)produce the representations and discourses that underpin policy-making and the construction of geopolitical codes in their respective states.

Hegemonic power is the ‘rule writer’ in geopolitics according to Ó Tuathail (p.61). In other words it is from here that dominant geopolitical discourses emanate and, as he explains, they are entwined with economic, ideological, political and above all military sources of power (p.255). These sources give particular people the opportunity to construct discourse and hence geo-graph the world in their own interests. Thus, powerful states can act at the expense of the less powerful. Worldviews are heavily imbued with subjectivity and are established through discourse.

\(^2\) This, according to Ó Tuathail, differentiates between the world “out there” and the consciousness of the intellectual. The gaze is neutral and disembodied (Ó Tuathail, 1996, p23).
The geopolitical assumptions underlying these worldviews and which form the basis for policy decisions are referred to by critical geopolitics practitioners as ‘practical geopolitical reasoning’. Dodds (1994) explains: ‘Practical geopolitical reasoning refers to the everyday or commonsense understandings of the political world that foreign-policy elites employ to make sense of events and processes.’ (p.197). These understandings make sense through the discourse that is (re)produced by the elites. This discourse, and the practical geopolitical reasoning that draws upon it, legitimizes the policy responses and practices advocated and enacted by the foreign policy elites. Ó Tuathail and Agnew (1992) determine that:

‘…it is only through discourse that the building up of a navy or the decision to invade a foreign country is made meaningful and justified. It is through discourse that leaders act, through the mobilization of certain simple geographical understandings that foreign-policy actions are explained and through ready-made geographically-infused reasoning that wars are rendered meaningful.’ (p.191).

In so doing, the realist structures and practices such as wars can not only appear to make sense but also seem natural. This is what critical geopolitics attempts to deconstruct revealing the discursive, constructed foundations on which such understandings and practices are based.

In line with this, Dalby (1991) says that:

‘It can be argued that the essential moment of geopolitical discourse is the division of space into “our” place and “their” place; its political function being to incorporate and regulate “us” or “the same” by distinguishing “us” from “them”, the same from “the other”.’ (p.274).

It is this Self/Other binary discourse through which the state makes ‘sense’. From this division, interpretations of threat from the ‘Other’, and responses in accordance with this, can be normalized as the natural and inevitable course of action.

However, Dodds (1996) argues that: ‘Politics and political activity traverse the inside-outside dichotomy of the territorial state.’ (p.574). Essentially, through an understanding of the discursive nature of geopolitics, the binaries and the boundaries between states and between international politics and domestic politics are revealed as
the products of a particular set of discourses and power relations. The realist system and its structures reinforce these power relations and protect the interests of the powerful elites. Thus, Dodds and Sidaway (1994) believe that: ‘The value of geopolitical economy approaches as a complement to critical geopolitics is clear. The former provide some theoretical and empirical opportunities for grounding elite geopolitical reasoning within the material circumstances that elites sought to reproduce.’ (p.519). Critical geopolitics therefore attempts to look beyond the simplistic binaries of (neo)realism and seek explanations inclusive of internal as well as external processes, and particularly the interests of the elites who seek to reproduce the realist system.

Routledge (1996) presents an argument for the analysis, within critical geopolitics, of social movements. He says:

‘Attention to the actions of social movements would contribute to a critical geopolitics in at least two ways. First, it would (de)centre analytical focus away from an exclusive concern with the machinations of the state. Second, it would enable critical geopolitics to investigate how different types of social movements challenge state-centred notions of hegemony, consent and power and contest the colonization of the “political” by the state.’ (p.509).

By resisting a concern solely for the state, critical geopolitics not only problematizes the discourse and structures of (neo)realism, but also shifts the analysis onto other actors such as the social movements that Routledge describes. In doing so the binaries that underpin the state are undermined and the systems of power that support state elites are opened to analysis and critique. Hence, the inside-outside dichotomy, the very basis of the sovereign territorial state, is brought into question.

There are indeed many actors and bodies that might be considered to be contributors to the (re)production of discourse and of geopolitical codes. Some theorists argue that sub-state actors, and those that are unattached or even in conflict with the state, are worth examination in discussions on the formation of geopolitical codes. Routledge (2006) says:
‘...the histories of geopolitics have tended to focus upon the actions of states and their elites, overemphasising statesmanship and understating rebellion. However, the geopolitical policies enacted by states and the discourses articulated by their policy makers have rarely gone without some form of contestation by those who have faced various forms of domination, exploitation and/or subjection which result from such practices.’ (p.233).

This he argues is a form of ‘counter-hegemonic struggle’, such struggles are ‘expressions of what we term “anti-geopolitics.”’ (p.233). Anti-geopolitics: ‘...challenges the material (economic and military) geopolitical power of states and global institutions, and second, it challenges the representations imposed by political elites upon the world and its different peoples, that are deployed to serve their geopolitical interests.’ (p.233). These structures of power within states allow powerful elites to impose their representations and therefore protect their interests and maintain their positions of power. In this way they are crucial to the ultimate formation of geopolitical codes, codes that draw upon such representations and are constructed in the interests of the elites. The challenge posed by anti-geopolitics, of those opposed to the state, and the effects this can have on geopolitical codes cannot be dismissed even if it is the hegemonic structures of power, be they political, economic, ideological and military that are usually dominant in the reproduction of discourse and the generation of geopolitical codes.

Within the state there are several powerful groups that can have influence on policy and who promote their interests, some of these are part of the official state apparatus and some are more removed from this but remain part of the elite. These can include the media, political lobbies and the civil service. In addition, there are many who consider ‘security intellectuals’ to have a powerful role in influencing and creating policy. Politicians may solicit these people for advice, or they may provide it either privately or in public through specialist publications and also the mass media. They may operate in dedicated organizations or as individuals. Dalby’s (1990) work, Creating the Second Cold War: ‘...investigates in detail the writings of a number of intellectuals connected with the influential political lobby organization, the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), many of whose members subsequently held important posts in the first Reagan administration.’ (p.X). This is the sort of relationship that can exist for some such intellectuals, and the CPD is an example of an organization of
‘security intellectuals’ formed to lobby for particular policies. The potential of these intellectuals to influence government policy is demonstrated by the CPD’s links to the Reagan government: ‘The geopolitical concerns of the CPD, and later their presence in the Reagan administration, have fed the state centric military domination of discourse about security.’ (p.172). By impacting upon, or contributing to, discourse as reproduced by state elites these individuals alongside civil servants, media and wider societal influences, can have a great importance on the direction of policy.

Although these individuals and groups can all have a contribution to the discourses and representations of a state the research in this thesis concentrates on the output of the political elites. The assumption here is not that these are the only people who are involved in producing a state’s representations, and the geopolitical codes that these underpin, but rather that it is these elites who present the final versions. They may be influenced by security intellectuals, advisors, media representations and opinions, and by the resistance of groups outside the state apparatus, but it is their policies, their performances, that are generally understood to be the position of the state. The role of many others in the process must be acknowledged, as competing discourses and interests impinge upon the decision making of political elites, and these other actors are worth researching, nevertheless this study focuses on the elites for whom the structures of power give a privileged position as the persons widely viewed as the representatives of a given state, and who have considerable, though certainly not exclusive, power over the policies and geopolitical codes adopted.

As noted above, the discourse of the sovereign state differentiates ‘Inside’ and ‘Outside’, political thought rests with one and international relations with the other (Walker, 1993). International relations do not exist outside discourse and the structure of the sovereign state that this underpins. It is a phenomenon that can only be engaged if the sovereign state is accepted as the organising principle of geopolitics, as it is dependent on the binary division between inside and outside that this implies. Thus, the neorealists can exclude or dismiss alternative interpretations due to their incompatibility with international relations as the established channel of explanation for world events.

Consequently, a rethinking of democracy cannot be achieved, according to Walker, without also rethinking state sovereignty as a political practice. He explains
that: ‘…the key resonance here is less the critique of the grand narrative as such, or the celebration of interdeterminacy, than a radical scepticism towards those resolutions of identities and difference which, as expressed by the principle of state sovereignty have become the primary context in which it has been possible to speak of democracy at all.’ (p.57). Hence, it is not democracy itself that is the problem, but state sovereignty as a construction by which the inside can be universalist and a site of modernity and thus democracy, while the outside - the other (constructed as ‘Other’\(^3\)) - is the negation of this, a space of anarchy and absence. The Enlightenment concepts of modernity and progress behind this construction are, at the same time, undermined by it, as it denies the possibility of a universal democracy.

Binaries are central to modernist thought and therefore to (neo)realism. It is through these discourses that identity is constructed. ‘To possess a true identity is to be false to difference, while to be true to difference is to sacrifice the promise of a true identity.’ (Connolly, 1991, p.67). In this passage Connolly articulates the troublesome nature of identity. If the ‘Self’ is to be ‘true’ or right this does not allow different ‘Selves’ or ‘Others’ to be positive. Without these ‘Others’ though, there can be no negative from which the ‘Self’ can be different, and so there could be no way to define identity (p.64). Therefore, there is a necessity for ‘Others’, as an object against which identity can be defined. Connolly explains: ‘Perhaps the demand to hold the other responsible for defects flows to some degree from the demand to treat oneself as responsible for every virtue attained.’ (p.98). Nationality encapsulates this concept. The nation is defined against other nations. In a logocentric act,\(^4\) these ‘Others’ must be constructed as being negative, in the process of (re)production of national identity.

Hence, what frequently emerges from analysis of discourse in geopolitics is a binary division between positive and negative. Dalby (1990) asserts that Western thought relies on such polarities whether occident and orient, developed and under-developed or democracy and communism (p.23). If an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’ are to

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3 The capitalization of ‘Other’ signifies the establishment of a group of people as an object, or body of sameness, in this case with negative or lesser characteristics in comparison with the ‘Self’. Therefore, while ‘other’ might simply refer to an additional unit of equal or greater value, ‘Other’ specifically defines difference of characteristics as well as of existence. These characteristics are discursively constructed.

4 Ashley (1989) describes the concept as follows: ‘Privileging the one term, a logocentric discourse effects a hierarchy in which the other is rendered as a complication, a negation, a manifestation, an effect, a disruption, a parasitic (mis)representation, or a fall from the graceful presence of the first.’ (p.261).
be maintained in the state system, as implied by neorealism, then state identity must be (re)constructed. Without it, the state could not exist, but this must involve the formation of dangerous ‘Others’, such as other states or terrorists, against which to juxtapose the united ‘Self’. Such binaries are typical of the logocentric practices of modernity. The construction of such binary discourse is consequently a continual process that new ‘Others’ can evolve from, and take the place of previous versions as circumstances change. This change in discourse over time must be emphasised, as it makes room for more extensive structural changes than (neo)realism acknowledges.

As discourse changes, so too can the geopolitical codes established through that discourse. Events and changing realities have the potential to undermine existing geopolitical codes, as well as creating new opportunities to further the interests of elites within states politically and economically. Indeed, for many theorists geopolitical codes are multiple and highly contested. Ó Tuathail and Luke (1994) discuss the change in American codes following the end of the Cold war, with an apparently greater concentration on environmental issues coming to the fore: ‘…a deterritorialization of old alliances that were tied to American containment policies is unfolding even as fresh coalitions maneuver to reterritorialize new alliances around the agendas of an ecological political economy.’ (p.393). This suggests a changing code in a world where the assumptions of the Cold War no longer make ‘sense’, and representations must change to accommodate new events and influences if the American state is to retain its political power and its economic status. Essentially codes are not fixed. The premise on which this research is based is that as discourse evolves in interaction with reality, so do the geopolitical codes. They may at times be contested within a state or contain contradictions, and separate codes could be developed in relation to different issues states and actors. It will be those codes relating to international terrorism, and being constructed in the post-Cold War period particularly post-September 11th, as expressed by political elites within the states in question, that will be the focus.

The state, as a product of the Enlightenment, is therefore exposed as a constructed feature (re)produced by the geo-graphing practice of the (neo)realist. The geopolitician should be recognized as an inextricable part of geopolitics or geo-politics, contributing to the (re)production of discourse while simultaneously understanding reality through that discourse. I argue, however, that given its position as the dominant
philosophy in the practice of world politics, it would be wrong to ignore (neo)realism. At the same time it must not be approached uncritically. Rather, the (neo)realist discourse must be deconstructed if geopolitics is to be understood. This does not mean the role of the structures (e.g. states) is to be dismissed, but that they should be appreciated as products of discourse as opposed to ‘natural’ formations. By adopting a ‘critical realist’ approach, ‘reality’ can be accepted (Yeung, 1997, p.52) (i.e. that states do exist as important actors), while understanding and critiquing the way in which that reality has been made and is reproduced. In other words, the human agency (of powerful actors) and the relevance of other non-state bodies can be included in analysis, as can an explanation of how discourse, and hence structures, can be changed over time, rather than the fixed state system of the (neo)realist vision.

Temporal Transitions

Dynamics for Change

If we understand geopolitics from a critical realist perspective then it is necessary to understand discourse. Explaining changes in structures over time, therefore, requires an appreciation of how discourse evolves temporally. It is also imperative to comprehend the relationship that exists between discourse and reality. When approaching an analysis of geopolitical codes, such understandings are essential as these codes are (re)produced through discourse. Codes are also constructed in the context of real structures (e.g. states), real events and agency (e.g. the decisions of politicians).

These processes are addressed by Agnew and Corbridge (1995), who reflect upon the nature of discourse:

‘Our usage implies a more tenuous practice: that modes of representation are implicit in practice but are subject to revision as practice changes. Spatial practices and representations of space are dialectically interwoven. In other words, the spatial conditions of material life are shaped through their representations as certainly as representations are shaped by the spatial contours of material life.’ (p.47).

Thus, they recognize a reality that is shaped through discourse, but equally accept that discourse is not independent of that reality. Both are influenced by each other, as
practice changes over time it prompts change in discourse too. To this extent Agnew and Corbridge tend towards practice as the dominant component without denying the role of discourse in shaping reality. The discourse impacts upon and reinforces practical changes.

From this perspective, Agnew and Corbridge assert that: ‘...the primacy of “the” territorial state is not a trans-historical given, but is specific to different historical epochs and different world regions.’ (p.5). This challenges the realist position where the state is natural and the final stage of progress. Instead, the state as a spatial practice only exists as a product of particular discursive representations. Both are subject to change in space and time. Consequently: ‘A geopolitical order, therefore, is always partial and precarious, achieved through social practice rather than imposed through a transhistorical logic.’ (p.180). Hence, geopolitical codes are open to change as the practical realities change.

This close relationship between discourse and practice, for Agnew and Corbridge, underpins the connection between political economy and geopolitical orders: ‘Successive discourses of geopolitics take shape – sometimes uneasily and always unevenly – against the backdrop of an international political economy experiencing periodic crises and restructuring.’ (p.7). Geopolitical orders are therefore not some pre-determined reality, but a product of the realities of political economy and practices pertaining to this. As such, geopolitical orders can change as a result of differences in political economy, whether over time, space or both. Agnew and Corbridge point to the ‘uneasy’ and ‘uneven’ relationship; it should not be assumed that there will be a perfect correlation between the two, variations in one may not be transferred perfectly, or immediately to the other.

This is one definition of discourse and its relationship with reality. A very different position is articulated in the work of Jean Baudrillard. In his well-known work ‘The Gulf War Did Not Take Place’, Baudrillard (2001) explores the war as a construction of media and ‘virtual’ models. Baudrillard (2001) argues that: ‘...war, when it has been turned into information, ceases to be a realistic war and becomes a virtual war’ (p.242). This refers to the continual media coverage of the build up to the war, to the point of saturation. His argument is thus not as simple as saying that the war didn’t happen.
appreciation of reality is effectively unachievable, if indeed there is such a thing at all. Poststructural analysis is a useful tool when considering how discourse and narratives are built and used to establish and sustain structures, but it is also necessary to accept, as Agnew and Corbridge do, that there is a reality, that structures do exist and are important in studying geopolitics. These two examples indicate the range of understandings relating to the interaction of discourse and reality, each being expedient in their own ways, but neither articulates precisely the position taken in this thesis, a position that lies somewhere in between.

Critical realism allows both to be accommodated. Reality can only be understood through discourse, and therefore responses to real events and structures are also formed and understood through discourse. This does not imply that nothing is real or that reality can never be perceived. Rather it means that reality can only be appreciated through the mediating discourse. Such a perspective of reality and discourse is essential to the structure and direction of the research in this thesis; analysing discourse is essential to understand the geopolitical codes of states. It is not the only contributing factor as the ‘realities’ of a state’s context, and the human agency of political figures, are also vital, but it is discourse through which geopolitical codes are constructed.

The discourse that underpins these codes should be understood to have a relationship with reality and human agency – it is not permanent, it is changed by reality just as reality is constructed through discourse. Agency is not controlled entirely by discourse any more than are structural realities, however a political actor does view the world, and their state’s place in it, through discourse, and so they are not detached from this, nor from the process of (re)constructing discourse. They do, nevertheless, have choice, and their words and actions cannot be explained entirely by discourse, but also by their real experiences, political motivations and interactions with reality.

and was entirely imagined. He continues: ‘The closer we approach the real time of the event, the more we fall into the illusion of the virtual.’ (p247). War is modelled and pre-presented in the media before it has happened such that he believes that: ‘…the victory of the model is more important than victory on the ground.’ (p.251). It is therefore the manner in which war is presented and modelled, and thus is accepted as the reality, that he views as demonstrating the total construction of war – it is this war that did not take place.
To study geopolitics and analyse geopolitical codes, the relationship between reality and discourse, and the way changes occur over time, must be comprehended. Agnew and Corbridge provide an explanation that introduces the dynamics for change that (neo)realism lacks. However, an overemphasis on practice and political economy ignores the extent to which discourse underpins representations of reality. Without adopting the poststructural approach of theorists like Baudrillard, the essential part that discourse plays in the political practices of geopoliticians should not be dismissed. The geopolitical codes of states are not only dependent on the realities that impinge upon them, but on how those states are constructed through discourse as actors in geopolitics. The worldviews of states, and the construction of a state’s identity, draw on the discourses and narratives that have historically established the state, in addition to the political and economic realities that they experience. Discourse and geopolitical codes are therefore an essential area of study when seeking to understand a state and its geopolitical activities.

Orientalism

The roots of the discourses and geopolitical codes constructed and reproduced in the present therefore lie in their past as products of modernity. As modernist concepts of progress and rationality took hold in the West they impacted upon the outlook and practices of Westerners. Walker explained that realism requires the distinction to be made between ‘Inside’ and ‘Outside’. In logocentric analysis those not conforming must be irrational and subjective, and are assigned negativity; the world beyond the ‘West’ becomes the ‘Other’, a space of irrationality, where the ‘rational’ model of the European state, and modernity itself, is said to be absent. The representation of the non-Western ‘Other’, or ‘Orientalism’ (Said, 1978), is therefore a fundamental part of the construction of the discourse of the sovereign state; by the creation of a particular image of the non-West, the West itself, and in the process its geopolitical projects, can appear as superior and the culmination of progressive development.

Said criticizes Orientalism because: ‘…as a system of thought it approaches a heterogeneous, dynamic, and complex human reality from an uncritically essentialist standpoint; this suggests both an enduring Oriental reality and an opposing but no less

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6 Note the capitalization of ‘West’. Again, this is indicative of identity formation, where the ‘West’ is differentiated as a separate body superior to the non-west.
enduring Western essence, which observes the Orient from afar and, so to speak, from above.’ (p.333). Thus a binary is at work in Orientalism, separating Orient and Occident as two distinctive objects, one negative and one positive. This ‘system of thought’ allows a homogeneous view to be taken of all the people in the Orient assigning certain (negative) characteristics to them. By understanding the Orient in this way it is possible to look at it from afar as Said describes. Through the Orientalist lens, the ‘objective’ observer can analyse and explain the Orient. As an underpinning foundation for all thought and practice related to the Orient, Orientalism, sustains power relations (the Occident dominating the Orient) while not actually defining these relationships. It is a source of meaning from which every description, engagement, and idea connected with the Orient draws from and through.

Said explains the development of subjugation as follows:

‘What we must reckon with is a long and slow process of appropriation by which Europe, or the European awareness of the Orient, transformed itself from being textual and contemplative into being administrative, economic, and even military. The fundamental change was a spatial and geographic one, or rather it was a change in the quality of geographical and spatial apprehension so far as the Orient was concerned.’ (1978, p.210).

Orientalism therefore provided the discursive structure through which the Orient could be viewed as less progressive and dangerous, somewhere that needed to be controlled. Thus, the economic and military intervention that Said talks of increasingly took place in the imperial era. The state was imposed on the Orient (Fromkin, 1990), by military and economic means. This provides the background to continued domination even today, as seen in Iraq.

Bhatia (2005) notes that: ‘Particularly in periods of conflict, one assigns virtue to one’s own identity and decisions, and draws on a series of negative traits to describe an opponent, relating to greed, irrationality, demonic nature or the absence of civilisation.’ (p.15). Likewise, Orientalism provided the discursive framework in which colonisation of the East could be accepted as natural and unproblematic. The Orient is the inferior ‘Other’ of the Western ‘Self’, the process of Orientalising being that of ‘Othering’. If the ‘Self’ is to be superior it must have progressed further than the
inferior ‘Other’ and must therefore be protected from it, and can intervene to assist it to improve. Therefore, the binaries of ‘Self’ and ‘Other’, and those of ‘Inside’ and ‘Outside’, are not only linked but are interchangeable. Outside is the ‘Other’, in contrast to the ‘Inside’ where the positive characteristics of the ‘Self’ are apparent. The binary discourse of Orientalism, once established during colonialism, could then be drawn upon in subsequent geopolitical codes.

The realist geopolitics, upon which the sovereign state and the geopolitical practice of the three states in this study are based, has been influenced by several figures and concepts. Some of these have considerable relevance for all three states, while other traditions are more distinctive.

The work of Halford Mackinder has proven to be particularly influential as a foundation for geopolitical reasoning. Parker (1985) explains that:

‘Mackinder’s central thesis in 1904 was that world history was basically a recurring conflict between the landmen and the seamen. The most powerful centre of land power, he maintained, had always been the heart of Eurasia and it was from here that “the great Asiatic hammer” had steadily struck outwards into the maritime fringes.’ (p.17).

This, Mackinder asserted was the ‘pivot area’ (later the ‘heartland’), control of which would offer domination of Eurasia and thereafter the world. ‘Is not the pivot region of the world’s politics that vast area of Euro-Asia which is inaccessible to ships, but in antiquity lay open to the horse-riding nomads, and is today about to be covered with a network of railways?’ (Mackinder, 1904, p.434). These railways he saw as being crucial, for whereas sea power had offered maritime powers such as Britain an advantage in the ‘Columbian epoch’ the advance of the railways would enable a land power to dominate the pivot area thereby providing an advantage over those states in the inner and outer crescents, which he describes thus: ‘Outside the pivot area, in a great inner crescent, are Germany, Austria, Turkey, India, and China, and in an outer crescent, Britain, South Africa, Australia, the United States, Canada and Japan.’ (p.436).

This representation of the world was in line with realist thinking and influential for policy makers in western states. Parker (1985) notes:
‘The dichotomy of land power and sea power was given a new ideological dimension by the Russian revolution of 1917 and the coming to power of the Bolsheviks. From then on a major preoccupation of the ruling classes in the capitalist countries was preventing the spread of Communism, and Curzon’s [The British Foreign Secretary] foreign policy reflects this.’ (p.48).

A containment policy in respect of Bolshevik Russia was therefore adopted in line with the potential threat it was perceived to pose to British interests given its occupying the ‘pivot area’. For Mackinder however the danger had always been wider than this with the risk that other states could follow a ‘pivot policy’, most notably Germany:

‘The message, loud and clear, was that it was imperative for the maritime world, led by Britain, to gird its loins against the coming dangers. It was also in the interest of the maritime states, with France in the role of continental bridgehead, to ally together and to attempt to wean Germany away from any temptation to engage in a pivot policy.’ (p.19).

This certainly became a pertinent point for policy-makers in the light of the First World War in Britain, but even more so for France which had experienced an invasion by Germany.

Although the eminent French geographer Paul Vidal de la Blache had identified the maritime world as being more dominant than the continental world, citing the British Empire as evidence of this, and facilitating world unity (p.34), French thinking was as recognizably realist as that of the British. The concern, both for political geographers and for politicians, was for solutions to the threat they believed continued to be presented by Germany.

‘Underlying the scholarly and analytic approach of the French there was an appreciation of the very real weakness of France, and in particular of her vulnerability in face of her powerful eastern neighbour. Thus a united Europe, and one in which Britain, her principal ally, formed a part was very much in the international interests of France. French language and culture still retained their pre-eminence from the Channel to the Baltic and the Black Sea, and it was this aspect of international influence, rather than the recourse to brute force, which had the greater appeal to French scholars.’ (Parker, 1985, p.95).
Thus, French geopolitics between the World Wars, while realist, was focused more on the threat of Germany than of Russia. As such, efforts and thinking were concentrated on ways of restraining German expansionism, paralleling to an extent Mackinder’s fears of a German ‘pivot policy’. Given ‘France’s economic and demographic weakness as compared with her powerful eastern neighbour’ (p.97), the French mechanism to achieve this restraint was based on alliances, particularly with Britain.

Another influential figure in the geopolitics of the early 20th century was the American naval officer Alfred Mahan whose writings, similar to Vidal de la Blache, described the importance of sea power based on historical examples. He considered this to be a capability that the United States must develop, both on its own and with allies, in order to protect its interests. Sumida (1999) says: ‘Mahan was not an advocate of a conventional alliance, but rather an informal but nonetheless conscious coordination of efforts that produced a preponderance of force sufficient to achieve the benefits of naval supremacy realized by Britain alone a century before.’ (p.53). Such an approach would involve a move away from America’s more traditional isolationist geopolitical codes towards a greater engagement with the outside world, and an enhancement of the country’s military capabilities to a level equivalent to the economic power that it increasingly held. Mahan’s work resonated with other influential American figures and also with geopolitical thinkers in Britain and in Germany:

‘In the United States, Theodore Roosevelt and other reformers were pushing for the construction of a Great Fleet as an instrument of territorial and commercial expansionism, a cause to which Mahan provided crucial impetus and legitimacy. In Great Britain in 1894 during his last naval command aboard the Chicago, Mahan was wined and dined by the elite of British society, including Queen Victoria and her grandson Kaiser William II.’ (Ó Tuathail, 1996, p.41).

The concept of naval power was therefore significant at this time for the most powerful states, not least the United States which was beginning to assume the status of a great power. This came to the fore in the First World War where the naval fleets of the United States and Britain on one side met that of Germany on the other, and when America participated in geopolitics at a global scale for the first time before temporarily retuning to isolationism.
An alternative strand of American geopolitical thought sought to move away from this isolationism in the 1930s and 40s:

‘...the unifying belief of the realist school of thought was that America should abandon the psychology of apartness and enter the lists as a full protagonist in the global power game. It was only by so doing, they felt, that America could be strong and secure.’ (Parker, 1985, p.113).

Nicholas Spykman was prominent among these thinkers. In contrast to Mackinder, he took the view that the ‘Rimland’ was the most important space and should be protected from domination by a single power (p.124). Parker explains:

‘Since he considered that the central danger to America during World War II arose from the possibility of the Union of the Eurasian power centres against the United States, he believed that it was essential in the future that such a situation should never be allowed to recur.’ (p.113).

Hence, it was Spykman’s view that a three-way alliance between the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union should be maintained after the war. This philosophy was in line with that of the American government at the time:

‘...the cultivation of good Russo-American relations became central to Roosevelt’s thinking right up to his untimely death in April 1945. He had in this respect moved away from vintage Mahan and Mackinder and towards the views of Spykman and those who were of a similar geopolitical persuasion.’ (p.118).

However, it was Mackinder’s theory that would soon come to dominate American and wider Western thinking, and policy-making in the Cold War. With the Soviet Union occupying the ‘pivot area’ or ‘heartland’, following Mackinder implied that this was an advantage that made it particularly threatening to the world. Ó Tuathail (1992) notes that:

‘Certainly among some post-war Western security intellectuals the texts of Halford Mackinder were required reading. Within this community, Mackinder was read as a Cold War geopolitician, an intellectual prophet who first saw the geopolitical realities of international politics and first recognized the great geopolitical significance of control of the heartland.’ (p.101).
The influence that this understanding had upon those defining Cold War policy consequently had considerable impact upon the conduct of the Western protagonists in the conflict:

‘Exhortations about the heartland substituted for real human geography, in its messy complexity. The result, most spectacularly in the case of the United States, was a foreign policy driven by simplistic visions of containment and domino reasoning rather than a comprehensive grasp of the complexity of regions and places.’ (p.116).

Containment became the overriding policy in the West and especially in America; if the Soviet’s could be contained, it was thought, then they could be kept within the heartland and be restrained from invading the rimland (or the inner and outer crescents) as their ‘natural’ expansionist character demanded.

This view of the Soviet Union drew on the assessment of another influential figure – George Kennan. Kennan’s ‘Long Telegram’ and subsequent contributions to American policy development: ‘…expounded his conception of the Soviet Union as an historically and geographically determined power with an unfolding necessity to constantly expand.’ (Ó Tuathail, 2006, p.60). Again this contributed to the apparent need to contain the Soviets with no room for negotiation. As such, this ascribing of ‘natural’ characteristics to the Soviet ‘Other’ was a defining strand of interpretation and policymaking in both American and Western conduct during the Cold War.

Nevertheless, Western states did pursue their own policies within the Western bloc. France is a notable example of a state that attempted to define a distinct approach. It was Charles de Gaulle who expressed this position most clearly and enshrined it in French policy when he came to power in 1958. Parker (1985) describes how:

‘He completely refused to accept the view of the maritime world which emanated from Britain and America. His wartime experiences had led him to believe that les anglo-saxons wished only to entrench their own dominant positions, and was determined that France should in no way be part of this.’ (p.151).

Furthermore:
‘Closer relations were cultivated with the Soviet Union and encouragement was given to the development of a more independent European stance in foreign policy. This stratégie tous azimuts aimed at making France an independent world power between the two superpowers although in practice the country remained nearer to the West than to the Soviets.’ (p.151).

Once more this was an approach that was firmly realist in character still understanding the Soviet Union to be the main threat to France while setting out a distinct policy according to what were considered to be France’s interests.

Thus, in each of the three states considered in this study realism dominates their traditions of geopolitical thinking and consequently the policies that have been adopted. Some of these traditions overlap while others are more closely associated with a particular state, but it is the heritage of realist thought that is the foundation for all three. As has been shown, this realism was a crucial factor in the Cold War, and it is the geopolitics of this period that will now be examined in greater detail.

**Cold War Geopolitics**

Geopolitics after the Second World War was dominated by the Cold War. This binary division of the world between two competing superpowers was constituted by neorealism. In the United States, neorealist discourse underpinned the conflict through its emphasis upon states and its logocentrism, and consequently defined the geopolitical codes of the protagonists. Everything had to be interpreted in the context of the Cold War with its division between ‘Self’ and ‘Other’, ‘good’ and ‘evil’. In his analysis of the writings of figures in the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), Dalby (1990) finds that: ‘…the construction of Self and Other in moral terms is coupled to the discursive practices of foreign policy-making’ (p.28). Moral superiority is assumed for the positive ‘Self’, in this case the USA, over the negative Soviet ‘Other’.

This was a replication of the longstanding Western binary of Occident and Orient, and therefore: ‘The Cold War narrative simply replaced native peoples with Soviets and Communists.’ (Sharp, 2000, p.90). Cold War narratives could be made acceptable and obvious through the discourse that was already ingrained in the Western
psyche. A simple discursive act replaces the Orient with the Soviet Union as the eastern ‘Other’ that is dangerous and threatening.

The American position is ‘obviously’ the most advanced and progressive, because as the ‘Self’ they define what is positive – therefore it makes ‘sense’. Sharp (2000) explains: ‘Common sense appeals through the obviousness of its claims; it makes the world seem simple and manageable through a silencing of complexity, of problems that do not produce “right or wrong” or “true or false” conclusions.’ (p.41). Consequently, it is an ideal concept to invoke when attempting to write a ‘truth’. If people are presented with a simple explanation, that can be easily located intertextually, this will appear to be an unproblematic position to adopt and believe. When that explanation comes from an authoritative source, like an expert or the media, it is all the more convincing. This is the mechanism through which discourses, and ultimately geopolitical codes, can be normalized and made acceptable.

Sharp explains that: ‘…distinct from narratives that wrote Soviet action in deliberate power-political or ideological terms were those that made expansionary and repressive Soviet action seem unavoidable because of the laws of history and geopolitical location.’ (p.92). This is a reference to the characterisation of the Soviet Union, and Russia before it, as being naturally inclined to expand from its heartland fortress, given the environmental and historical conditions acting upon it, which she identifies as: ‘…an environmental determinism that produces the Russian character based on a timeless quality of this part of the world.’ (p.x). Pointing to this, Dalby (1990) claims that: ‘…the overall logic of the discourse of the Other as constructed through texts on nuclear strategy, international relations and Soviet history is structured on the classic geopolitical conceptions of Spykman and Mackinder’ (p.41). Mackinder's (1904) concept of the heartland (or pivot area), of course, coincides with the space in which the Soviet Union was located, and thus necessitated its containment to stop it controlling the world island, and then the world.

Orientalism had already established ‘truths’ about the inferiority of the people of the East and these could easily be assigned to the Soviets. The Soviet Union was a sovereign state in the neorealist mould and thus was essentially modernist in form, Communism itself being a modern philosophy of temporal development. Thus, it was
contradictory to claim that it was both a powerful state and an irrational non-modernist threat. Nevertheless, these two narratives, that of state and irrational inferior, were combined through the threatening and expansionist discourses in the production of a dangerous ‘Other’ for the United States and the West. It was through these discourses that the Cold War geopolitical codes of the United States and, to an extent, other ‘Western’ states were constructed.

Policy Implications

Once the geopolitical codes were established, they provided a framework for all policy decisions. For example, ‘nature’ was used to justify the argument of the irrational Soviet (Sharp, 2000, p.102). Hence, the Soviet system is not the ‘correct’ one, as it is ‘clearly’ irrational compared to the capitalist democracy in America which is founded on rational thinking. The ideology of powerful individuals can be reinforced in this way through the contrast with the ‘Other’, which is understood through discourse to be inferior to the ‘Self’ implying that the ideology of the ‘Other’ is also inferior to that of the ‘Self’.

Deterrence, Dalby (1990) suggests, emerges as a result of this. Those opposing any agreement with the USSR thought that because it was naturally expansionist and aggressive as Kennan had argued, the Soviet Union would simply make use of the process and ‘was not taking arms control and détente seriously’ (p.126). Instead, it made ‘sense’ to accumulate weapons, so as not to be left behind by the Soviets. Discourses of nature underpinned a more aggressive approach by many in the USA, and were drawn upon in their writings of reality.

The ‘discourses of realism, geopolitics, strategy and Sovietology’ (p.155) for Dalby, support militarism, due to the threat that is understood to exist. He continues with the claim that: ‘The totalitarian conceptualisation denies politics and history by creating an Other as perpetual adversary.’ (p.158). Furthermore, discourse established the position that: ‘…the other has a false science, technologically capable, but “possessed” of demonic intentions.’ (p.160). By setting the confrontation up as ‘natural’ due to historical and physical conditions, the ‘Other’ is always going to be a threat irrespective of the particular people involved or changes over time. Emphasis on
the ever-present threat privileges militarism as not only natural, but also vital to the survival of the ‘Self’, and so maintains existing policies and power relations.

Post-Cold War Geopolitics

The end of the Cold War removed the clarity of the ‘Other’ represented by the Soviet Union, however, many of the assumptions and ‘realities’ were left untouched. Sharp (2000) describes the suggestion: ‘…that at the close of the Cold War, America’s new ‘Others’ would be terrorists, especially Islamic fundamentalists, drug traffickers, and with the increasing power of international trade, Japan.’ (p.143). If neorealism was to continue to make sense and sustain the existing power relations, it would require another enemy. This confusing situation drew suggestions of a more complicated and, of course, dangerous world.

As it is impossible to achieve security, threat can be deployed constantly in the ‘othering’ process.

‘…the history is one of individuals seeking an impossible security from the most radical “other” of life, the terror of death, which once generalised and naturalised, triggers a fertile cycle of collective identities seeking security from alien others – who are seeking similarly impossible guarantees.’ (Der Derian, 1992, p.75).

Thus, while the end of the Cold War meant the end of one threat, it did not follow that it was the end of all threats. Sharp (1998) argues that the lack of a clear enemy has resulted in a ‘script of chaos’ where the clear division of good and bad has broken down and thus, in her example, film narratives ‘twist and turn, producing enemies and danger in the most unlikely of places.’ (p.162). The stable, apparently fixed, character of Cold War geopolitics, that had seemed so natural and enduring, therefore posed a potential problem for neorealism as people tried to understand a world that suddenly did not appear so simple and straightforward.

For some theorists like Fukuyama (1989), the ‘victory’ for America and the West in the Cold War represented the ‘end of history’, by finally establishing the modern ideology of liberal democracy and capitalism as the only credible form of governance, and as the final and most superior stage in human progress; other thinkers
believed that it merely marked the transition to a new geopolitical arrangement. Frequently the theme of threat as a result of a declining West, and an East growing in power and potentially challenging for hegemony, is apparent; for example, some cite China as a growing threat in the East (Weede, 1999). Schulz (1999) predicts an alliance between the U.S. and Germany as the centre of a Western alliance, and: ‘Asia will be the “other” against whom this Western alliance is directed.’ (p.227). She perceives the reason for such a development as being the need for a new enemy after the Cold War: ‘…finding new enemies is seen by the military as well as by politicians whose entire careers have been devoted to an anti-communist agenda, as preferable to losing decades of power and privilege.’ (p.238). The neorealist philosophy of the state requires enemies like the Soviet Union, without which power relations are threatened and the state is threatened. Thus, internal unity begins to be weakened as identity cannot be so easily defined, a new threat must therefore be found, and as always, the most obvious way to look is east, as is ‘natural’ given the continually reproduced discourse of East and West, Occident and Orient.

As such, Samuel Huntington (1996) asserts that whereas the Cold War was a battle between ideologies, it will be followed by a ‘clash of civilizations’.7 While realism is still an underlying principle for Huntington (p.34), at the same time he accepts that changes are occurring in terms of ‘sovereignty, functions, and power.’ (p.35). Huntington’s thesis appears to be an attempt to reinterpret the post-Cold War world in a realist way (Aysha, 2003, p.118), still asserting the role of states but placing it in the context of practical changes. Binaries remain central to his thinking.

Huntington asserts that: ‘At the macro level, the dominant division is between “the West and the rest,” with the most intense conflicts occurring between Muslim and Asian societies on the one hand, and the west on the other.’ (p.183). From a set of eight civilizations the argument comes down to a binary division of the West and the rest, with the East being the main place of threat. Realist logocentrism and Orientalism are entangled in the ‘clash of civilizations’. The previous discourse lets it appear to make a degree of sense, and thus makes it a powerful argument for policy-makers besides

7 He depicts as many as eight civilizations, and believes that states will be clustered into these; the main conflicts will take place between states and groups of states of different civilizations (Huntington, 1996, p.29).
having popular appeal. His thesis is constructed to support a defence of the West, not only spatially, but also culturally, from the threat of the ‘Other’.

In an examination of the domestic implications of Huntington’s work in the United States, Aysha (2003) reflects on Huntington’s fears for America given ‘its lack of cultural and historical rootedness.’ (p.121). Thus, from Huntington’s perspective, America is particularly vulnerable in a clash of civilisations, and more dependent on enemies for identity formation due to the lack of unity and ‘anti-federalism’ (p.122) that he believes has been apparent since the Cold War ended. In short: ‘Fomenting a clash of civilizations abroad prevents a clash of civilizations at home.’ (p.124). Aysha is pointing here to the way in which the ‘Clash of Civilizations’ thesis acts as a realist narrative, drawing on the longstanding discourse of ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ to continue the hegemony of the state in a changed post-Cold War world, and creating a new enemy, or threat, for America, to sustain it as a unified and powerful hegemonic state.

Reactions to the Oklahoma bombing demonstrated how the ‘enemy’ can turn out to be different from that expected, given the discursive construction of the ‘Other’. Oklahoma City, where the bombing took place, can be described as: ‘a common popular geopolitical construction of a “heartland” space.’ (Sparke, 1998, p.199). Thus it is understood in the popular imagination as representing America - the heart of America. Consequently it is not surprising that an attack here should trigger a considerable reaction. In the context of the reality constructed, such an attack on the ‘inside’ must come from the dangerous ‘outside’. However, the discovery that the bomb was planted by a white, American Gulf War veteran, did not fit with the way people understood the world. The event was real and people did die, there was indeed a threat, but the discursive construct initially led people to misinterpret it. This demonstrates the power and limits of discourse. Discourse does not always lead to what powerful interests require, it is not an all powerful tool or a single clearly defined structure. The same discourses were invoked after September 11th. On this occasion the events were of a larger scale and, with the terrorists apparently originating outside America, they could be more easily understood as representative of an external threatening ‘Other’. The initial representations of the Oklahoma bombing were therefore a foretaste of what was to come post-September 11th, except this time the powerful actors would be more successful in harnessing the events to support the (re)production of the binary
discourses and narratives of the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’ and the responses that they wished to enact.

**Post-September 11th Geopolitics**

**Defining Terrorism**

The period after the Cold War was therefore a time of change. Neorealist interpretations were undermined by the sudden breakdown of the stable East/West binary prompting the search for new explanations that could restore the order, simplicity and, crucially, the power relations, which appeared to be threatened by the unknown. September 11th marked the point at which the confused and muddled world of the post-Cold War period was suddenly made clear and simple again for neorealists. While terrorism had been one of the threats identified previously, it was not, until then, a clear enemy like the Soviet Union.

To the extent that terrorism can cause death and destruction, often with little clear warning of location or time, it seems perfect as a threat for galvanizing U.S. and Western identities in the way that the Soviet Union did. Terrorism though is a phenomenon rather than a clearly identifiable state, and one that is not easy to define, changing depending on the perspective of the individual. The ability of this practice to replace a state as the ‘Other’ and still leave neorealism intact consequently depends on how terrorism is constructed; it is after all not terrorism generally, but Islamic terrorism and al Qaeda that have been identified as the danger since September 11th. In general terms, as defined by Corlett (2003):

‘Terrorism is the attempt to achieve (or prevent) political, social, economic, or religious change by the actual or threatened use of violence against other persons or other persons’ property; the violence (or threat thereof) employed therein is aimed partly at destabilizing (or maintaining) an existing political or social order, but mainly at publicizing the goals or causes espoused by the agents or by those on whose behalf their agents act; often, though not always, terrorism is aimed at provoking extreme counter-measures which will win public support for the terrorists and their goals or causes.’ (p.119).

This definition is useful in as much as it sums up what might generally be assumed to be a terrorist act, that is, it is an act of violence perpetrated in support of
some sort of political aim. Although prominent discourses support the view that terrorism is a practice of non-state actors, and is at odds with the state’s monopoly on the right to use violence within its borders, this definition leaves open the possibility that terrorism can also be used by states to achieve their objectives.

In respect of terrorists who are separate actors from the state, Corlett believes that, on occasions, they may be morally justified in taking particular actions.

‘For understanding that there are indeed circumstances in which political violence of various kinds are morally justified better enables a government to realise that it has a responsibility to everyone (not simply to its own citizens) to ensure against its creating such conditions, and it better enables its citizens to serve as guardians against their own governments perpetration of deeds that would deserve retributive political violence against their own government and its influential and controlling business interests.’ (p.161).

This analysis is founded on a specific system of morality. Terrorism (or at least acts of violence causing terror, given the discursive construction of the term terrorism) is acceptable in situations where there is an injustice, but this is judged on Western definitions of right and wrong. Any terrorist is likely to be thoroughly convinced of the righteousness of the act being perpetrated; for example if, as is said, al Qaeda regard Westerners as infidels, any Westerner killed is not only acceptable but the fulfilment of a goal. Who then is to specify what is and is not justified, is it the terrorist, the victim or some other ‘objective’ observer?

Terror is an emotion that is the most extreme level of fear, caused by a sense of danger. Therefore, there is no reason why it should only be ‘terrorists’ that cause terror; governments or individuals, such as ‘ordinary’ criminals could, and do, also cause terror. Indeed, Smith (2006) contends that: ““Terrorism” was in fact first coined in the wake of the French revolution and it then referred to the process of governing through terror. Terrorism was originally defined as a state practice, rather than a practice aimed at toppling states, and the reversal of the term’s meaning over more than two centuries

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8 It is important to be careful when using such examples that one does not follow uncritically the dominant representation of a terrorist group. Although al Qaeda may see Westerners as infidels, through their own discourses and narratives of the evil ‘Other’, these representations should nevertheless be treated with caution. This is after all the very issue that I am examining here.
speaks to the power of ruling classes to bend discourses for their own ideological purposes.’ (p.6). As Price (2002) comments: ‘The idiom of power dictates that the violence of the state is legitimised as peace-keeping, while that of the dispossessed becomes terrorism.’ (p.4). By issuing threats of violence and being in possession of the means for violence, any organization can potentially cause terror; this is enhanced by demonstrating the ability to carry out attacks. However, governing elites construct the terms ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’ through discourse, leading to their being differentiated and ‘othered’ from the states themselves.

As such, terrorism is represented as only applying to acts against ‘us’ and not what ‘we’ do to ‘them’ (Chomsky, 2002, p.131). These acts are instead identified as being counterterrorism (Townshend, 2002, p.114). A binary division is created between terrorism and counterterrorism, between what ‘they’ do and what ‘we’ do. Thus, while terror may be induced by the actions of the state, as much if not more than the actions of some other group, they are separated into two different categories.

Perhaps then terrorism should be understood to encompass all who cause terror. As defined by Ettlinger and Bosco (2004), terrorism is: ‘…violence to invoke fear that can be performed by networks such as Al-Qaeda as much as by urban gangs, and by nation states such as Iraq as much as by the United States.’ (p.252). Such a definition allows us to appreciate how responses to ‘threats’ can be legitimised through discourse. Terror that may be caused by powerful actors can be represented as necessary and justified. The ‘terrorist’ is constructed as the threatening ‘Other’ and is the only actor understood to engage in terrorism. In accordance with this, subsequent discussions in this thesis of the construction/representation of terrorism by states inevitably refer to terrorists and terrorism as a non-state activity. The potential for state actors to cause terror is not removed by these representations.

Historic Foundations

As with Cold War geopolitical codes, those constructed post-September 11th cannot be separated from the discourses and discursive structures that preceded them. The pre-eminent role of states in responses to September 11th could be said to show that neorealism is as relevant as ever (Acharya, 2002b). This, some argue, is proof that there
has been no great change in world politics (Gray, 2002, p.231), that states and thus realism are as central now to the production of events as they have been since Westphalia. Fukuyama (2002) comments: ‘The September 11 attacks represent a desperate backlash against the modern world, which appears to be a speeding freight train to those unwilling to get on board.’ (p.28). Representing terrorism as an evil ‘Other’ is the continuation of the modernist doctrine of progress. Modernity and development are bound up with realism and the sovereign state, in contrast with Islam and the East. Many of the same discourses are therefore being drawn upon that have been apparent in Cold War geopolitics, earlier in colonialism, and in the Enlightenment thought that gave rise to the sovereign state.

(Islamic) Terrorism was able to fill the gap left by the USSR, relatively easily being adopted and accepted given the discursive framework of ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ that is already in place, both from the Cold War and in a wider sense (e.g. in Orientalism). Thornton (2003) describes how:

‘…the Islamic resistance that gave us that stupendous event was interpreted as evil personified – a case of antiglobalist criminality, rather than geopolitical opposition. Muslims who say “no” to globalisation are treated much as American Indians were when they refused to stay on the reservation: not as armys of resistance but as loathsome heathens who had the gall to obstruct manifest destiny.’ (p.207).

The notion of the enemy being ‘evil’ and not really human concurs with Cold War discourse, and America’s ‘Manifest Destiny’ to which Thornton refers.

For the United States, the ‘values’ upon which the state has been constructed, and the narrative of an ‘exceptional’ country, are once again deployed in understanding the new situation. The contrast that is made between America, with these ‘positive’ attributes, and the terrorist ‘Other’ replicates the imperialist binaries in its close conformity with Orientalism. Dalby (2003) argues that: ‘…the connections between such enlightenment, republican virtues, and the construction of geopolitical views of the United States as exceptional, reprise numerous imperial tropes even if these are widely ignored.’ (p.77). Although these discourses of the United States were reproduced during the Cold War, the new ‘enemy’ is not another state that can simply slot into the
discursive structure. Instead, the representations and actions of the geopolitical actors reconstruct the discourses more in line with colonial worldviews.

Thus, in ‘The Colonial Present’ Gregory (2004) reflects:

‘This is more than the rehabilitation of the Cold War and its paranoid silencing of difference and dissent, however, because the permanent state of emergency institutionalized through these imaginative geographies of the alien “other” also reactivates the dispositions of a colonial imaginary. Its spacings are the mirror image of the “wild zones” of colonial imagination.’ (p.260).

Just as colonials represented the ‘Other’ as inferior and lacking in the progress encapsulated by the sovereign state, so today representations of the terrorist conform to this Orientalist discourse. Terrorists act outside the neorealist state system, as such they appear to make less ‘sense’ when interpreted through neorealist discourse, they are consequently more threatening. Therefore, while discourses and geopolitical codes emerging after September 11th owe much to Cold War versions preceding them, geopolitical actors appear to be reverting more to earlier versions of the binary representations from colonialism, and in the case of the United States, from the frontier. Manifest destiny is reasserted yet again as America looks to tackle another ‘Other’ threatening its expansion and progress.

Reproducing Binary Discourse

In the state system, a network outside that framework, the complicated forces behind its formation and the reasons for the support it may have, are beyond the scope of comprehension. Hence: ‘Binary narratives displaced any complex or critical analysis of what happened and why.’ (Der Derian, 2002, p.102). Terrorism provides a convenient ‘Other’ for such a binary narrative, and so for the reassertion of American identity and of the neorealist sovereign state, not least because this particular attack was from a terrorist organization claiming to follow Islam.

Religious overtones have been prevalent in narratives relating to September 11th and al Qaeda. The West is presented as the forces of ‘good’ with God on their side fighting the ‘evil’ of terrorism. The terrorists too present a similar argument in their
favour. In the narratives of the U.S. government: ‘…this demonstration of an unequivocally evil act set a base mark for a permanent scale of moral values.’ (Maddox, 2003, p.399). Western morality is defined by the West as the pinnacle of progress and all that is good, the terrorists are evil because they are not modern. They are from the East and Muslim, as opposed to the Christian West. This strengthens the discourse of East and West as a basis on which to interpret the world and reduces an entire area, an entire religion, and many people with many diversities and complexities, into a homogenous body representing a straightforward threat like the Soviet Union.

Reducing representations and interpretations to binaries leads to simple explanations and reinforces identities. This process was used in the Cold War to vilify the Soviet Union and strengthen the ‘Self’ in a simple East/West conflict; it was present in colonial times when Orientalist discourses were constructed; once again it has been used since September 11\textsuperscript{th} in the construction of the new terrorist ‘Other’. Thus: ‘Such binary thinking has become part of the dominant geopolitical narrative, garnering support for both sides, and leaving little space in between for those who fail to identify with either side.’ (Hyndman, 2003, p.5). In (neo)realist geopolitics this is an ‘obvious’ way to view the world, given that (neo)realism is itself founded on binary discourse. The same Enlightenment thought is applied to interpretations of events and provides a useful tool for policy-makers looking to legitimize their actions.

Authority, Power and Common Sense

Using normative arguments, terrorism can be established as an evil ‘Other’ which the states must fight. Keohane (2002) refers to the ‘public delegitimation of terrorism’ (p.141), since September 11\textsuperscript{th}. He describes how a ‘normative argument’ stressing ‘universality’ is used to create a divide between the world of states and civilization, and the dangerous terrorists. Building on established discourse, such a binary is easy to accept, as it is terrorists, not states that cause terror. As Keohane says: ‘The delegitimation of terrorism and effective war against it will strengthen powerful states.’ (p.149). According to neorealists, it is the states that have legitimacy to determine when violence can be used, to decide what is terrorism and wrong, and what is not and right. In this way, powerful actors have reproduced discourses and narratives
to support their own worldviews and beliefs. This is achieved by drawing upon the discourses of the nation-state.

In forming a ‘public’ through a particular interpretation and representation of events, those with the power to construct representations generate an increased level of patriotism that reinforces notions of ‘common sense’ as in the Cold War, and thus marginalises alternative interpretations as not only wrong but also dangerous. ‘Patriotism establishes that only external forces pose threats to the nation. It excludes the possibility of internal actors interested in disrupting a seemingly unified community.’ (Waisbord, 2002, p.213). Terms like ‘homeland’, which have come into common usage (Williams, 2002, p.338), reinforce this inside/outside distinction. By creating an external threat and declaring war upon it, the U.S. government has been able to whip up patriotism, which allows arguments to be simplified to the extent that these are either for or against the national interest.

Constructing Responses – Militarism

Policy-makers can therefore formulate policies that are presented through, and reproduce, the discourses that construct terrorism as the new, threatening, ‘Other’. For example, Goh (2003) reflects that:

‘At the domestic level, the neo-isolationism that one might have expected as a consequence of the September 11 attacks has so far been kept in check by nationalist reactions, and by a discourse which has played down the relationship between terrorism and American foreign policy.’ (p.91).

An alternative response, that of isolationism, that could make sense in line with aspects of historic American geopolitical codes, has therefore been dismissed in favour of the ‘war’ approach, and a series of representations that isolate foreign policy from the causes of terrorism.

American nationalism instead can be invoked, and the ‘public’ drawn on, to support a ‘war on terrorism’.
‘The resort to war as an “analog” is a common one in American history: war against depression, war against drugs, war against poverty, war against a whole range of ills, amounting to nothing less than a homespun sort of metaphorical bellicism.’ (Stephanson, 1998, p.77).

War is consequently something that can be used to unite a country together and encourage patriotism. Dalby (2003) notes that: ‘The script of a violent attack requiring a violent response was assumed even if there was no obvious assailant with a territorial base that could be attacked in response.’ (p.63). If those in authoritative positions had presented a different interpretation, other responses could have been justified and made ‘sense’: ‘…the events could have been specified as a disaster, an act of madness or perhaps most obviously as a crime, an act that required careful police work internationally and in the United States.’ (p.65). The response to real events can be seen as subject to the agency of individuals. Thus, the declaration of a ‘war on terrorism’ is not an inevitable response but it is one that can make sense in the context of the familiar binary discourses of the United States and other Western states.

The development of new geopolitical representations in the aftermath of September 11th is thus a demonstration of how real events can be represented in particular ways by powerful actors, such that they can use this adapted discursive structure, and the rhetoric of common sense, to normalise a set of actions in response. Chomsky (2003) comments that: ‘…governments throughout the world seized upon 9/11 as a “window of opportunity” to institute or escalate harsh and repressive programs.’ (p.126). The process is not isolated to the United States, but is a feature in many sovereign states who reproduce these discourses, assisted by their use in the hegemonic state. By creating such a threat these governments, especially the United States, have been able to institute a new period of militarization – ‘It is an unfolding scenario that is best understood as a deadly cycle of militarization and terrorism – twin expressions of the same New World Order…’ (Boggs, 2002, p.241) – their construction of the terrorist allows a military response to make sense, and an increase in militarization, just as during the Cold War, is the logical extension of this.

Silencing Alternative Interpretations

By creating this relationship between threat and militarism, terrorism becomes reduced to a set of simplistic binaries – self and other, good and evil, inside and outside
– a process that ignores complexity. Smith (2002) points out that: ‘There has been little interest in trying to understand just why the U.S. is so unpopular in the world, and much more interest in reasserting the superiority of “the American way”.’ (p.57). The problem with this approach is not only its unjust and even terrorizing implications, but that it does not actually address the real causes of terrorism, and therefore could undermine the very states who think they are fighting it: ‘If we are to tackle the roots of terrorism, we need to enter their world of thought, understand their grievances and explore why they think we bear responsibility for these.’ (Parekh, 2002, p.274). Without this, it is questionable how successful the United States and others will be in their aim of eliminating terrorism.

Furthermore, by representing the threat through these discourses, and the responses as a ‘common sense’ reaction to that threat as it is then understood, debate can be silenced, eliminating the possibility of alternative responses being discussed. Dalby (2003) comments:

‘…discussing the causes, and inevitably the complex geographies of these, was sometimes dismissed as nigh on unpatriotic in the United States. War talk frequently silenced careful reflection, but did so on the basis of a complicit geography, a geography that specified matters as a simple spatial violation, an external attack on an innocent, supposedly safe interior.’ (p.64).

The manner in which the terrorist attacks had been represented and understood promoted a sense of patriotism that vilified alternative interpretations. If arguments did not conform to these discourses they could only be understood to be in support of the terrorists and were therefore, in themselves, threatening.

Consequently, discussions and responses can only be accepted in this environment, if they draw on the modernist thought and the binary discourses that have emerged from it. They can only make ‘sense’ if they are set in the context of the sovereign state. Dalby adds:

‘The suggestion is that the modern geopolitical reasoning of political elites in America in particular, but in other states as well, constrains the interpretation of the politics precisely because they operate in terms of a
political ontology of states whether understood as autonomous actors, or in a more sophisticated sociology, as a society of states. (p.64).

In conditions where the powerful actors are reproducing the binary discourses of the state, and where they use these to construct the terrorist threat, it is difficult, or even impossible for alternative understandings to be accepted or even discussed. However, a terrorist is a non-state actor, and furthermore is not the only one to have significance in the post-Cold War world, rather changes as a result of globalizing and regionalizing forces are threatening the simplicity implied in the discourses of the Westphalian sovereign state.

Globalization
Definitions and Perspectives

Globalization, while itself not a new process, has deepened to become a more potent factor for change in the world during recent years, and particularly since the end of the Cold War. Nevertheless, there is no consensus about globalization. Opinions range from those who do not accept the process (Scruton, 2002) to those who regard it as an all consuming, rendering states irrelevant (Ohmae, 1995) and consequently confining realism to history. For Goetschel (2000): ‘Globalisation is characterised by the weakening of existing mediating political institutions such as states, and the strengthening of the influence on international affairs of other political actors such as supranational organisations, transnational organisations, and individuals.’ (p.260). This implies a move away from a purely realist model, towards a more complex system that involves other governmental as well as non-governmental organizations. As Goetschel notes: ‘In an era of globalisation, realism especially cannot explain the role of non-state actors in the realm of international security.’ (p.266). These non-state actors can, of course, encompass ‘terrorists’, who can take advantage of the globalizing forces, and act across states rather than being restricted within their borders. Rostoványi (2002) points out that: ‘Terrorist targets – even if they may be connected to a particular country – can be found scattered practically all over the world in any country’ (p.74). This prompts Mansbach (2003) to reflect that: ‘The essence of a globalising world consists of increasingly porous political boundaries and the declining relevance of physical distance and the growing autonomy capacity of non-state groups.’ (p.20).
However, there are many interpretations of globalization that accept its existence without necessarily concluding that it means the end of the state. Held and McGrew (2002), identify several positions within the globalization/anti-globalization debate. It is regarded favourably by Neoliberals\(^9\) and Liberal Internationalists\(^{10}\), while Statists/Protectionists\(^{11}\) and Radicals\(^{12}\) are more sceptical. The first two offer a vision of a world that is increasingly borderless; the significance of the state is reduced in favour of a particular Western model of liberal economics and democracy. The other two standpoints concentrate on the state (statists/protectionists), and on the local, seeing little role for regional and global actors. To an extent statists/protectionists are compatible with critical realism due to their belief in the continuing power of the state, but by rejecting globalization they leave little room for change and for non-state actors globally or regionally.

As an alternative, Institutional Reformers, who are classed by Held and McGrew as ‘globalisers’, argue for ‘radical institutional reform’ of organizations like the UN. They believe that these can provide some public goods that are more suited to delivery at a global level (Held and McGrew, 2002, p.104). In order to provide public goods that meet global challenges, three gaps must be closed: the difference between the scale of the issues and the states, bringing into question what governmental body is responsible for global problems when states only have sovereignty over their individual territories; the lack of participation of important actors in the current system; and the lack of incentive for states to participate when they can obtain the same benefits from the efforts of others (p.105). Institutional Reformers promote greater cooperation and responsibility for international organizations like the UN. Thus, while accepting that

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\(^9\) Neoliberals seek the removal of barriers to trade and rely on market forces as the principal means of governance, with only limited intervention by other agents, aimed at supporting the free market (p.100).

\(^{10}\) A more cooperative world order is sought by liberal internationalists. This will come through the growing economic interdependence favoured by the neoliberals but also as a result of the spread of democracy and the peace that this allegedly brings, and of international law and institutions (p.102).

\(^{11}\) Statists and Protectionists believe in strong state government and reject globalization as a misconception. For these people, state governments still have considerable power, and it is desirable to strengthen the state so as to keep order and regulate the economy (p.110).

\(^{12}\) This more localised concept: ‘…represents a normative theory of “humane governance” which is grounded in the existence of a multiplicity of communities and social movements, as opposed to the individualism and appeals to rational self-interest of neoliberalism and related political projects.’ (p.113). Radicals therefore reject the structured governance of states or larger regional and global organizations as well as the power of capital, though by concentrating on communities and movements they do not exclude possibilities for global networks.
the sovereign state is still important, Institutional Reformers advocate the use of other organizations at different scales to cope with global problems.

Global Transformers fall under the general heading of anti-globalization in Held and McGrew’s analysis. This is slightly misleading, as the argument is not against globalization per se, but against it in its current manifestation. They reject it as a neoliberal project (p.107), and also the arguments of the Institutional Reformers who see possibilities for change. There is, however, still a commitment to global governance of a different kind:

‘The core of this project involves reconceiving legitimate political activity in a manner which emancipates it from its traditional anchor in fixed borders and delimited territories and instead articulates it as an attribute of basic democratic arrangements or basic democratic law which can, in principle, be entrenched and drawn on in diverse self-regulating associations – from cities and subnational regions to nation-states, supranational regions and wider global networks.’ (p.108).

Thus, global transformers are attempting to make fundamental changes to global politics by reducing the importance of borders and territory, and so of the state, allowing democracy to operate at a number of scales. I take a position that lies between that of the Institutional Reformers and Global Transformers combined with some elements from the statists/protectionists argument. This might be defined as ‘global reform’, in that I accept that no great transformation is likely, the state remains the most important actor, but reform as a consequence of globalization is in progress and primarily centred on existing institutions.

Fluidity

Globalization involves increase in speed (e.g. transport and communications) and consequent reduction of distance, or space-time compression (Urry, 2000). Virilio (1977) contends that space itself is eliminated by speed: ‘The reduction of distances has become a strategic reality bearing incalculable economic and political consequences, since it corresponds to the negation of space.’ (p.133). Without space, the territorial state is not possible as it is founded on the principle of designating a space by means of boundaries. Thus, if Virilio is correct, then the speed, as implicit in globalization, can
only lead to the demise or transformation of the state and any other territorial formations.

Technology and practice combine to create the globalization phenomenon, and hence it is part of, and a reinforcement of, power. Those who have power are empowered even further by the technology and the ability to use it, and thus globalization is driven by ever increasing power. ‘Very logically – and inexorably – the increase in the power of power heightens the will to destroy it.’ says Baudrillard (2002, p.6). He goes on: ‘This is not then, a clash of civilisations or religions, and it reaches far beyond Islam and America.’ (p.11). He is arguing that the particulars of Islam and America are not especially important in generating acts/events such as September 11th: ‘…if Islam dominated the world, terrorism would rise against Islam for it is the world, the globe itself, which resists globalization.’ (p.12). It is the growth of power, in this case concentrated in America, but as a function of globalization, that leads to a desire to attack it.

Technology and speed offer the potential for ‘absolute destruction’:

‘The fact of having increasingly sophisticated weaponry deters the enemy more and more. At that point war is no longer in its execution, but in its preparation. The perpetuation of war is what I call pure war, war which isn’t acted out in repetition, but in infinite preparation.’ (Virilio, 1997, p.91).

Accumulation of power allows the military to develop ever more sophisticated weapons to defend against a potential enemy. In doing so they further enhance their power and the ability to deter. Deterrence requires an enemy (like terrorism) and the assumption is that the enemy is deterred more as weaponry is accumulated. Hence, the condition of pure war is established.

Despite this more fluid world, terrorist acts still occur in space and in state territories, and it is states that are the primary actors in the military responses. A more fluid world does not, therefore, mean a space-less world completely conquered by speed. Der Derian (2002) suggests:
‘...9-11 is a combination of new and old forms of conflict, including: the rhetoric of holy war from both sides; a virtual network war in the media and on the internet; a high-tech surveillance war overseas but also in our airports, our cities, and even our homes; and a dirty war of counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, using an air campaign and limited special operations to kill the leadership and to intimidate the supporters of al Qaeda and the Taliban.’ (p.2).

This ‘virtuous war’, ‘a war of networks’ is, as Der Derian says, a combination of the old and the new. The realist concept of clearly bounded states engaging in conflict in an anarchical world is challenged by the terrorist networks, encouraging responses which do not necessarily stop at the boundaries of states.

Networks

Networks are a defining feature of a more globalized world. They connect across borders and produce more complicated territorialities. Castells (1996) explains how ‘spaces of flows’ (p.398) are the organizing structure as opposed to the ‘spaces of place’ that previously dominated, but argues that: ‘The space of flows is not placeless, although its structural logic is. It is based on an electronic network, but this network links up specific places, with well-defined social, cultural, physical, and functional characteristics.’ (p.413). Therefore, networks can exist without eliminating place. Spaces of flows characterize the fluid world of networks where places are linked and moulded by their interaction with networks but retain their differences. Hence, states can continue to exist as a territorial structure while being transformed in the spaces of flows, where networks impose a greater interconnectivity between places.

States are not rendered obsolete by increased interdependence; on the contrary they remain an essential part of the global system while changing in response to the new circumstances. Starr (1997) reflects that: ‘...an argument proposing the existence of other consequential actors is quite different from arguing that territorial states are no longer important, are becoming irrelevant or are in the process of disappearing.’ (p.77). Furthermore: ‘...the opportunities of international actors are constrained (or enabled) in various ways at various levels of analysis and that these constraints affect the willingness of decision makers to act.’ (p.16). Interdependency acts as an important

13 A place being: ‘a locale whose form, function and meaning are self-contained within the boundaries of physical capacity.’ (Castells, 1996, p.423).
influence upon states, in terms of the decisions that are made by the actors representing them. It is more a contextual environment than a factor that must be weighed up along with others, but allows some actions to be taken while precluding other practices. All actors must contend with the way in which their own decisions have wider consequences and, likewise, that the decisions of others will impact upon them.

In this way networks have the effect of disrupting, though not destroying, the realist system of sovereign states. While in response to the September 11th attacks, some argue that ‘networks could be the spatiality of the future’ (Flint, 2001, p. unknown), the state continues to be relevant. Al Qaeda has used communications networks like the internet (Bull, D., 2002) and raised funds to sustain it around the world from businesses and investments (Biersteker, 2002, p.76). Hence, the arrival of an actor – the terrorist – that does not conform to neorealist interpretations, but is instead part of a network, must impact, to an extent, upon how states respond and how geopolitics is understood. Falk (2004) says:

‘Modern geopolitics was framed to cope with conflict and relations among sovereign states; the capacity of a network with modest traditional financial and military resources to mount a major attack and wage a devastating type of war on a global scale against the largest state does require an acknowledgement of a different structure of security that will need to be constructed by a postmodern geopolitics, reinforced by responsive adjustments in legal doctrines pertaining to the use of force and self-defence.’ (p.193).

This suggests a need for a revision of geopolitical interpretations and the discourses that underpin them.

However, the response of the United States, in particular, has been to construct the terrorist ‘Other’ through these familiar discourses and act in a conventional realist way: ‘The difficulty of dealing with “shadowy networks” rendered traditional locational targeting of a (“rogue”) nation-state a logical solution.’ (Ettlinger and Bosco, 2004, p.253). Debrix (2005) describes the ‘war on terror’ as:

‘…a revulsion that cannot be identified as a traditional object of geopolitics (a network, fleeting enemies whose leaders may or may not be dead, insurgent groups with multiple affiliations, masters of terror, a
religion, a whole civilisation perhaps), and that is nonetheless necessary for America to ‘establish’ itself.’ (p.1159).

Although the terrorist ‘threat’ has been represented through existing neorealist discourse, underpinning responses against other states, the character of the ‘threat’ as a network problematizes these kind of responses. While this is necessary to reinforce the identity of the ‘Self’, it is simultaneously undermining to existing geopolitical interpretations.

Nevertheless, there are links between the terrorist network and states (Freedman, 2002), as the terrorists cannot avoid this. Non-state networks and states are interconnected and, consequently, affect each other: ‘…a complex multilayer international structure is being established characterized not only by states but also by interactions between societies and also between state and social actors.’ (Kiss, 2002, p.40). Hence, there can be no simple distinction between a new world of global networks and an old world of states. The two exist together in a symbiotic relationship where states are changed by the networks, and the networks are constrained by state control14.

Governance

Global Governance

Globalizing forces inevitably have implications for governance. A more fluid and networked world brings into question the extent to which states can continue to be seen as, or indeed should be, the dominant, if not the only, scales at which governance is practiced. From a critical realist perspective it is important to recognize the continuing relevance and dominance of states in the realm of governance and thus in geopolitics, but at the same time to accept that other actors of various types, and operating at different scales, also have a role to play. As such, consideration must be made of possible developments in global, and also regional, governance.

14 While the state has been considered the main, or only, actor in global politics in the past, this is interpreted through neorealist discourse and therefore must not be taken to mean that no other actors were relevant, as neorealism maintains. Nevertheless, the dominance of realism has constructed a reality that did put the state in a pre-eminent role and globalizing forces were not always as strong as they have become.
The Neorealist Perspective

The neorealist interpretation requires the sovereign state to be at the centre of any new concepts of governance in a more interconnected world. Cooper (2003) develops a reformed neorealism in response to the new conditions. He defines three categories of state. These are ‘pre-modern’, ‘modern’ and ‘postmodern’. The first, he says, are chaotic. Most states are modern, in that they operate in the traditional realist way of competition between one another. Finally, the postmodern states are epitomised by those in Europe where ‘Borders are increasingly irrelevant’ (p.30). Cooper, while positive towards ‘postmodern’ Europe, focuses on states as the primary players in geopolitics.

Responses to September 11th, especially in the United States, have followed the path of neorealism; they have been essentially state centred and unilateralist, though willing to make use of coalitions when they are useful, but ignoring them when they are not. Thus: ‘…the Europeans had been sidelined almost completely in an American war fought for largely American ends by American military personnel.’ (Cox, 2002, p.156). Nevertheless, the conflict that is currently occurring between international terrorism and (neo)realist states is of a different nature to that between states, as the spatialities are juxtaposed and intertwined. Hence, Ramphal (2003) argues that in tackling global problems that are currently presenting themselves: ‘…we can only achieve success by working together consensually, by acting multi-laterally using the tools of global governance.’ (p.215). Global governance, an anathema to neorealists, is therefore a way to resolve the conflicting spatialities thrown up by global networks like al Qaeda and sovereign states.

Alternative Interpretations

World government, as a means to deliver peace, is not a new objective (Ewing, 1947). Although world government is rarely mentioned now, possibilities for multi-layered governance are being discussed in the context of globalization and regionalization. By deconstructing neorealist discourse, it is possible to recognise the potential for change in geopolitics in a way that neorealism cannot. Mansbach (2003) reflects that a ‘postinternational’ perspective:
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‘...breaks sharply and self-consciously with static models, which according to adherents, view global phenomena like states as timeless and universal. Change, we see, is the product of simultaneous and related processes of fusion and fission of authority, and consequent political forms are contingent rather than universal.’ (p.19).

Consequently, states should not be thought of as permanent, but rather they are subject to change, possibly breaking up (e.g. the former Yugoslavia), or coming together to create other layers of governance.

McGrew’s (2000) Transformationalism accounts for the changes brought about by globalization. Very much in line with the Institutional Reform and Global Transformation strands of globalization theory, and thus with my ‘global reform’ position, it allows networks to be included alongside territorial states in geopolitical analysis. He explains that: ‘The transformationalist account seeks to acknowledge the significance of both the changing structure or context of politics and governance, brought about by globalization, and the importance of political agents in shaping the conduct and content of global governance.’ (p.154). Borders and territory are still ascribed a degree of importance in this account, but only as regards administration (p.162).

The world is now a heterarchy in which reflexive states are merely one part of a complex system of governance dominated by networks, experts and administration (p.163). Governance can therefore be understood to operate at a number of scales, although unevenly across space. McGrew identifies four layers or scales of governance: supra-state bodies, the national layer, the transnational layer and the sub-


16 This is defined as: ‘A system in which political authority is shared and divided between different layers of governance and in which many agencies share in the task of governance.’ (McGrew, 2000, p.163).

17 A reflexive state: ‘seeks to constitute its power at the intersection of global, regional, transnational and local systems of rule and governance.’ (McGrew, 2000, p.164).

18 This leads to what he calls an ‘epistemic community’ which is a community of experts (McGrew, 2000, p.159).
state layer (p.143). However, state representatives, such as politicians, still hold considerable power, hence states remain the most important actors. Transformationism, with an enhanced position for the state, therefore forms a robust starting point for discussing global governance.

Regional/Supra-State Governance

The region is a scale at which governance is increasingly operating. Regionalization is not an even process, with Europe being the most advanced example of the formation of a regional layer (Van der Wusten, 2000, p.87). A regional actor like the European Union cannot be dismissed as irrelevant as in neorealist interpretations. Instead the role it might play vis-a-vis the member states must be considered. This demands reflection on the nature of regional governance and layered governance more generally.

Regional governance could take a number of forms. For example, Ohmae (1995), as a hyper-globalist, claims ‘region states’ are the inevitable result of globalization. These are economically based units that may cross sovereign state boundaries (p.5). Trade blocs, another regional form, are based on a coalition of states working together on economic issues (Junne, 1999).19 Regionalizing forces that bring about economic cooperation can also, and perhaps must also, bring with them a level of political power.

Adopting a political dimension, Gamble (2001) contends that a ‘new medievalism’ is a more useful theory for examining new layers of governance, a term that suggests territories that overlap and are contested with no clear ruler (p.29). Hedley Bull (2002) describes it in the following terms:

‘If modern states were to come to share their authority over their citizens, and their ability to command their loyalties, on the one hand with regional and world authorities, and on the other hand with sub-state or sub-national authorities, to such an extent that the concept of sovereignty ceased to be applicable, then a neo-mediaeval form of universal political order might be said to have emerged.’ (p.246).

19 This could include a variety of formations with different competences over economic matters.
This approach recognizes the changes in state sovereignty that globalization has brought about and includes other actors, while dismissing (neo)realist conceptions of international relations that: ‘…for too long have obscured the fact that there have always been rival and overlapping sources of authority and order.’ (Gamble, 2001, p.36). Despite this, new medievalism remains a project for a fragmented world similar to that of (neo)realism, and therefore leaves power in the hands of particular units or alliances, and stresses the anarchical nature of the system.

Europe

In the case of Europe, the extent to which regionalization has developed allows an argument to be made that there is a genuine regional layer of governance, and a regional actor with the potential to play a role in geopolitics. Telõ, (2001) describes a ‘European regionalism’. This: ‘…does not only refer to deepening integration policies but also to giving an active contribution – as a single entity and not only as a sum of member states – to filtering and sharing more autonomous international and political relations.’ (p.250). Therefore, Telõ’s ‘new regionalism’ provides a theory that can include both states and regional governance as closely linked layers of a complex system developing in Europe. The layers of governance overlap and are entangled, and so influence and constrain without controlling each other.

It is important to note, however, that the region has not replaced, or become more powerful/influential than, the state in terms of foreign policy, though perhaps less so in some other policy fields. Although there must be an acknowledgement of the process of regionalization, particularly in Europe, the state remains the single most dominant geopolitical actor, even here. As Van der Wusten (2000) points out: ‘We have not got European government, but a situation of governance.’ (p.88). Hence, to understand geopolitics in Europe requires an appreciation of the impact of regionalization on the state, as much as to identify the role, if any, of the regional body itself. Hettne and Söderbaum (2000) contend that: ‘Rising regionness does not mean that the so-called nation-states are becoming obsolete or disappearing, but rather that they are undergoing major restructuring in the context of regionalisation (and globalisation) and the complex interplay of state-market-society relations.’ (p.465). The state is, therefore, going through a process of change as it meets the challenge of globalization and regionalization, but perhaps also of localization:
‘Rather than replacing – or “hollowing out” – nation-states, sub-national empowerment and supra-nationalisation are in fact seen as part of a broader dynamic of “power dispersion” in the European Union, in which national states have lost political control to European and sub-national institutions, while retaining significant control over resources and building upon this in introducing measures of institutional restructuring.’ (Gualini, 2004, p.552).

Thus, the state could be understood to be one layer in multi-layered governance, which increasingly includes both sub-state and supra-national levels.

However, the very complexity of the system of layered governance that appears to be evolving in Europe is such that it cannot be assumed that all competencies have undergone the same degree of dispersion to regional and/or sub-state layers. As Smith (2003) says: ‘The growth of the European Community as an economic power has not been accompanied by as profound a development of its internal or external political dimension.’ (p.29). The economic policy sphere is perhaps the most notable to have been regionalized to a considerable extent, though certainly not in its entirety. In contrast, foreign and defence policy has been treated by the states as primarily their responsibility. These policy areas are often considered to represent the fundamental features of state sovereignty and therefore of the Westphalian state. The extent to which they may be regionalized is consequently of greater relevance to this thesis than, for example, economic policy, as foreign and defence policy is most closely linked to the construction of geopolitical codes, and so the question of possible common European geopolitical codes. Hence, the existence of regional or layered governance for one (or more) competencies does not necessarily imply that the same is true for all competencies; following from this, integration in some areas does not automatically lead to equal integration in all areas and to a regional body that can be a geopolitical actor of equal weight to, or even replacing, its component states and with clearly defined geopolitical codes of its own.

**Layered Governance**

The precise balance between layers is the subject of debate, but in terms of critical realism, must be considered to remain in favour of the states. Hooghe and Marks (2001) differentiate the ‘State-Centric Model’, which privileges the state in the EU (p.3), and ‘Multi-Level governance’, where decision making is shared by different
levels allowing EU institutions some independent control (p.3), and through collective
decision making, diminishing the power of the states (p.4). Both of these views appear
to have some validity. It is difficult to define exactly where the balance of power lies,
as it is a complex and variable system.

Given that the processes are on going and the role of agency must be
acknowledged, an exact model of European governance may be impossible to produce.
Hooghe and Marks reflect this: ‘Multi-level governance may not be a stable
equilibrium. There is no explicit constitutional framework. There is little consensus on
the goals of integration. As a result, the allocation of competences between national and
supranational actors is contested.’ (p.28). What is clear is that regionalization in Europe
(and possibly to a lesser extent elsewhere) has had an impact on the power and the
sovereignty of the state. While the state may continue to be the most powerful actor in
geopolitics, the effect of multi-layered governance cannot be ignored.

Multi-layered governance is expressed in Held’s (1995) ‘cosmopolitan
democracy’: ‘…a cosmopolitan community, it needs to be emphasized, does not require
political and cultural integration in the form of a consensus about a wide range of
beliefs, values and norms.’ (p.115), but he adds: ‘Nevertheless, what clearly is required
is a “precommitment” to democracy, for without this there can be no sustained dialogue,
and democracy cannot function as a decision making process.’ (p.116). This removes
the problem of a common identity, but as democracy is a precondition for participation
and the successful working of the system, this privileges what is sometimes considered
a Western concept. It does though, move beyond the neorealist state system.

The state must still be appreciated, as the most important actor in geopolitics.
The need is for a model that can also accommodate the other actors that neorealism
excludes. Held’s is a vision of the world that allows for change, and can encompass
layers of governance, but lacks non-governmental actors. Writing in 1996, he describes
how:

‘A cosmopolitan democracy would not call for a diminution per se of
state capacity across the globe. Rather it would seek to entrench and
develop democratic institutions at regional and global levels as a
necessary compliment to those at the level of the nation-state.’ (Held, 1996, p.354).

Regional parliaments would, he says, be the first component to be introduced, with the European parliament being enhanced (p.354). Eventually the objective would be: ‘...the formation of an authoritative assembly of all democratic states and societies – a re-formed UN, or a compliment to it’ (p.355). Essentially, cosmopolitan democracy would not be a unitary global system built from the top down, but instead would be built up gradually, involving existing institutions like the EU and the UN, and adding other regional and global bodies over time. States would not be abolished, although Held clearly sees them as having a declining relevance.

Diverging Regions/States?

If regions are to form a site of governance, and a coherent political power structure in addition too, rather than purely as an agent of states, then there will be aspects of policy where they will define positions in opposition to other regions or states, and thus create a new source of potential conflict (Boswell, 1999, p.280). Writing towards the end of the Cold War, John Palmer (1987) contends that Europe and America had been diverging for a number of years, with growing economic conflict, and resentment in the US that Europe did not contribute enough to its own defence. Kagan (2003) adds: ‘On the all-important question of power – the efficacy of power, the morality of power, the durability of power – American and European perspectives are diverging.’ (p.3). Kagan attributes this divergence to relative power. Without any clear rival, America has been able to exercise its power without contest. Europe, being militarily weak, he says, has an interest in moving out of an anarchic world into one governed by law (p.37) – ‘Europeans have stepped out of the Hobbesian world of anarchy into the Kantian World of perpetual peace.’ (p.57). As a result, he suggests, Europeans have built up institutions like the European Union and press for more powerful international institutions while Americans are inclined to use military power and act unilaterally.
Consequences

Borders

Definitions

The delineation of borders is an essential component of the sovereign state, identifying what is inside and what is outside. Anderson and O’Dowd (1999) describe borders as follows: ‘They are at once gateways and barriers to the “outside world”, protective and imprisoning, areas of opportunity and/or insecurity, zones of contact and/or conflict, of co-operation and/or competition, of ambivalent identities and/or the aggressive assertion of difference.’(p.595). In realist terms, all state borders act in the same way, as the territoriality of the state is indivisible; a state has complete control over its delimited territory. O’Dowd (2002) explains this: ‘Borders are integral to human behaviour – they are a product of the need for order, control and protection in human life and they reflect our contending desires for sameness and difference, for a marker between “us” and “them”.’(p.14). However, borders do not operate in this simplistic way that the realists represent, they are not always so clear, uncontested, or equally applied. Increasingly globalization, regionalization, and the geopolitical actors facilitated by these processes, problematize the state boundary.

Changing Meanings of Borders

That is not to say that borders have disappeared or become irrelevant, on the contrary they continue to be extremely important, not least in neorealist constructions. In fact some would argue that their importance has even increased in the light of globalization (Rudolph, 2005, p.14). Borders are, though, more complex than the neorealist would suggest. They still play a major role in global politics, not least in the construction of Self/Other identities (Wright, 2004). Despite this, changes have been taking place that, for some people and purposes, have altered the meaning of borders, leading to a more complex system.

Some borders now apply differently to several groups, e.g. national citizens, European citizens and non-Europeans. Anderson and O’Dowd comment:

‘In a contradictory world where increasing transnationalization co-exists with increasing stress on ethnic, regional and national identities, there is a long term shift away from the relatively simple, monopolistic and
absolute sovereignty claims of national states towards a reality of multiple or overlapping jurisdictions and partial or qualified sovereignties.’ (1999, p.602).

State borders are still there, and their porosity is variable not only across space but also from person to person. Rich westerners are likely to have access to the benefits of globalization that, combined with their Western identity, allow them to traverse boundaries more easily than poor and non-Western people.

Europe is perhaps the most obvious example of this: ‘A putative Europe Without Frontiers – the European version of the “borderless” ideology – coexists with tendencies towards a Fortress Europe;’ (Anderson and O’Dowd, 1999, p.602). This paradox, of de-bordering within Europe lies at the heart of the debate over what form of governance is developing in the region. ‘The lines demarcating the territory of the state may still retain political significance, but this, at least as far as Western Europeans are concerned, is diminishing in the face of new political, economic and information trends.’ (Newman, 2003, p.133). Interpretations that stress a greater porosity of borders argue, to various extents, that state power is being weakened, whether by capital crossing borders, higher levels of migration, transfer of powers to organisations like the WTO or the EU, or even international terrorism.

It is wrong to suggest that borders are disappearing in Europe: ‘European borders are in the process of being re-scripted as key nodes and gate-way points within an expanded Europe of cross-border regions…’ (Kramsch, Mamadouh and Van Der Velde, 2004, p.535). Hence, they are being transformed internally while being reinforced externally. Thus:

‘…for some observers, the EU evokes a post-Westphalian and postmodern polity which is moving away from a strong emphasis on bounded territory. Instead, it is characterised by multiple, fluid spaces of regions, markets and cities connected by networks of communication, transportation and traversed by flows of goods, people, information and capital. (Walters, 2004, p.676).

This does not spell the end for borders, even within Europe. Globalization and Regionalization are reconstructing borders in such a way as to increase their porosity for
some people in some places while they may remain, or become more rigid, in other cases.

**September 11**

September 11, as the act of a global terrorist network, was a dramatic demonstration of the porosity of borders and thus a challenge to the neorealist state that is based upon them. Smith (2001) points out that: ‘The intense connections between local and global events expressed in this tragedy also suggest the limits to national geographies. The 19 hijackers lived multinational lives between Florida and Riyadh, Boston and Beirut.’ (p.3). Consequently, Anderson (2002) admits that ‘My instant response was that 11 September would in fact spell the final demise of the “borderless world”’ (p.227). ‘However, the more fundamental border transformations, intrinsic to contemporary globalization, have been the very substantial but selective increases in the porosity of existing borders and in cross-border traffic of all sorts’ (p.231). He notes the trend towards greater cross border activities while still emphasising that this is *selective*. Places are linked in networks in ways that it is difficult for state authorities to cope with as they contend with actors outside the scope of neorealism.

In such a world Beeson and Bellamy (2003) argue for security based not on states, but on humans – ‘human security’. This encompasses issues of poverty, malnutrition and states themselves (p.346). They emphasise the need to look beyond state boundaries:

‘Neo-realist security practices are predicated upon a conceptualisation of international order that remains centred on sovereign boundaries and clear distinctions between “self” and “other”. What 11 September demonstrated is that not only are those boundaries theoretically and practically insecure, so too is the security politics that is based on them.’ (p.353).

This assessment allows for analysis that accepts the porosity of boundaries. The constraints of neorealist discourse, through which borders are singular and simplistic, are reduced in favour of a complicated system of actors and geographies. Borders are now revealed to be multiple and complex, and undergoing a process of change. Traditional neorealist discourses of security are consequently disrupted by this evolution in singular state borders and the territoriality that they define.
Territoriality

Territoriality and Realism

A territory is a space that is under the control of those in power (Paasi, 2003, p.116), no particular functions must be specified as within its jurisdiction. In neorealism, the discourse of territoriality makes it obvious that a government controls all that is inside its territory. Territoriality is therefore a power strategy using space to assert authority and naturalise a particular structure of governance. Sack (1986) defines territoriality thus: ‘Territoriality in humans is best understood as a spatial strategy to affect, influence, or control resources and people, by controlling area; and, as a strategy, territoriality can be turned on and off.’ (p.1). He describes how modernity brought three territorial effects: ‘emptiable space’, ‘impersonal/bureaucratic relationships’ and ‘the possibility of obfuscation’ (p.172). Mapping based on cartesian perspectivism was the foundation for these representations of space. Once space could be ‘emptied’, new divisions and territories could be defined. Spatial differentiation could be practiced at any scale in the interests of capitalism and of those in power. By drawing boundaries, authority and power over a space could be assumed.

Territoriality is therefore constructed in the context of particular discourses. The incarnation described by Sack, in respect of modernity, was the foundation for the sovereign state, and its accompanying realist philosophy. Sovereignty came to be associated, in realist discourse, with a particular delimited territory:

‘The conception of sovereignty that has predominated in modern political theory relies on the idea of exclusive political authority exercised by a state over a given territory. This idea reflects the concept of sovereignty that emerged from Westphalia and then developed along with Enlightenment and Romantic ideals of popular rule and patriotism.’ (Agnew, 2005, p.456).

Hence, the territoriality of the sovereign state should be understood to be a function of Enlightenment thought. The binary discourse that this produced underpins the construction of territorialities that draw borders around exclusive spaces, and ascribe power or sovereignty to a single authority in that territory.
The impact of global change, particularly post-September 11th, is consequently troubling for neorealists who continue to see this territorial architecture, in modernist terms, as the culmination of human progress. For example Scruton (2002) argues that territoriality, as the principal source of identity, is confined to the ‘West’, but is under threat: ‘Whatever hope there might have been that people would come to define their loyalties in terms of territory rather than faith has been obliterated by the impact of Western technology, which seems to believe in neither.’ (p.131). Technology is linked to globalization and the diminishing of borders and sovereignty. This challenges the simple (neo)realist territoriality. In an Orientalist binary, the ‘West’ is represented as superior in its territorial arrangements, but these are threatened. For Scruton, September 11th demonstrates the effect of an absence of Westphalian territoriality:

‘And with the emergence of territorial jurisdictions and genuinely accountable governments, the terrorist threat would almost certainly dwindle, as people learn to attach their loyalties to real fragments of earth rather than imagining vistas of heaven and thereby to see human life for what it is – namely, a process of accommodation with one’s neighbours.’ (p.145).

This represents the neorealist perception of the pre-eminence and necessity of the territorial state – states create order through unity, without them there can only be disorder.

Potential for Change

What the neorealist position does, is deny any possibility for alternative territorialities. This excludes the potential for change and for other forms of governance, such as the layered governance discussed above. Agnew (2005) states that: ‘What is clear, however, if not widely recognized within contemporary debates about state sovereignty, is that political authority is not necessarily predicated on and defined by strict and fixed territorial boundaries.’ (p.441). In addition, Ruggie (1998) points out that mutual exclusion is not a precondition. He describes the medieval system where there were large zones of transition rather than clearly defined borders (p.179). The reasons for the transformation into what we know as a state lie, according to Ruggie, in changes in domains of social life. These are material environments, the matrix of

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20 Ecodemographics, relations of production, and relations of force (p.193).
constraints and opportunities within which social actors interacted,\textsuperscript{21} and social epistemes\textsuperscript{22} (p.193). If changes to these conditions led to a transformation in territoriality then this spatial form is neither fixed nor inevitable. Just as territoriality changed from the medieval system, to the Westphalian state, it could transform with the current developments in geopolitics.

Ruggie argues that global change is producing the ‘unbundling of territoriality’ (p.190), that is, the international organizations, common markets and multi-national political communities that have become more prevalent with globalization are producing overlapping territorialities. While it should not be assumed that this encourages a process of ‘deterritorialization’ (Luke, 1998, p.279), ‘unbundling’ is a useful concept to take forward. Contrary to (neo)realism, it provides a basis on which to develop understandings of the implications of globalization and regionalization. Some contend that layers of society cannot easily be held together under a single identity where more than one layer of territoriality exists (Taylor, 1994, p.160) and so unbundling is a dangerous development in the eyes of the neorealist. If these processes have an effect on governance and borders, as appears to be possible, then they must by implication change the nature of territoriality. That is not to say that state territory is defunct as a spatial form, but rather that it must be understood to operate alongside other territorialities of greater or lesser importance.

**European Territoriality**

The European example is especially relevant when discussing evolving territorialities, given the extent of regionalization. Berezin (2003) reflects that: ‘Forms of deterrioralization and reterritorialization, from globalization to Europeanization, are producing the postmodern era.’ (p.28). However, Mamadouh (2001) calls the EU’s territory ‘secondary territory’ due to its being formed from a combination of the territories of the member states rather than being defined as an entity in itself (p.425), it has no predetermined claims as sovereign states do (p.426). Furthermore: ‘The size of the territory controlled by the EU varies from one policy domain to the other.’ (p.427). This refers to the policy areas for which only some member states have, so far, agreed to

\textsuperscript{21}The structure of property rights, divergences between private and social rates of return, and coalitional possibilities among major social actors (p.193).

\textsuperscript{22}Political doctrines, political metaphysics, and spatial constructs (p.193).
pass control to the EU. Consequently, the organization’s policy competence varies across its ‘territory’. In this interpretation, the EU would appear to be a body which does not have territory beyond that of its member states, it is ever dependant on the states which retain their traditional territoriality.

Where Europe differs, however, is that it has an identifiable regional layer of governance, for all that the states may still be dominant. The question remains whether the regional dimension in Europe is one that can be manipulated to engender a European identity alongside those of the states? Agnew (2003) argues that: ‘National identities never just happen. Their intellectual and popular strength has been particularly reliant on the privileged status accorded to the modern territorial state as a moral equivalent of the individual person with its own identity and interests.’ (p.223). A European territoriality would have to encapsulate a similar set of characteristics before it could form the basis of a European identity to compete with, or at least sit alongside, those of the states.

The difference between states and the EU is described by Wallace (1999): ‘The post-sovereign European order is characterized by disintegrated policy networks and disjointed and opaque policy-making processes, without any of the symbols, myths or rituals through which modernizing national governments built up a sense of national solidarity and virtual representation.’ (p.520). The use of territoriality in identity formation is therefore absent according to Wallace. Instead, the regional layer is one of bureaucratic administration. He stresses that: ‘…no coherent European narrative is emerging, sufficient to generate a legitimizing community of shared identity at this new, diffuse, level of governance.’ (p.521). This has implications for geopolitical codes. While policy-making in some areas can be achieved at the regional level without a clear European identity, drawn from a European territoriality, foreign policy and geopolitical codes demand a coherent common outlook separate from the states. If a region is to hold together at all as a separate entity, there must be some form of common identity, even if this is in the shadow of, and closely connected to, that of the states. New territorialities underpinning a regional geopolitical actor, in addition to state actors, would require a regional dimension going beyond the singular state territoriality apparent in the Westphalian system.
Conclusions and Research Questions

The foundations of the sovereign state have been shown to lie in the Westphalian treaty. This spatial resolution is representative of the Enlightenment thought that characterized modernity. From these same origins comes (neo)realism, a geopolitical philosophy that privileges the sovereign state as the only actor of consequence in world politics. Central to this philosophy is the application of binary discourse through which representations are made. Thus, the differentiation of the inside and the outside can be normalized in respect of the state, where the inside is ordered while the outside is anarchic.

It is by adopting a critical geopolitics that (neo)realism can be deconstructed in this way. An appreciation can be gained of the importance of power, powerful actors and their use of discourse in constructing representations of the world. The critical approach allows an understanding to be acquired of the discursive mechanisms for the (re)production of identity. Through binary discourse the ‘Self’ is separated from the ‘Other’, which is shown to be inferior, privileging the ‘Self’. It is this binary discourse that has played a central role in the construction of the (neo)realist state system and in the reinforcement of state/national identities.

However, I have also emphasised that although the critical approach is vital to gaining an understanding of geopolitics as it is practiced through (neo)realism, and how it might be re-made, this does not diminish the importance that (neo)realism and the sovereign state have had and continue to have. While discourse is essential in the creation of states, these states are then real and important actors in world politics. The position I have adopted in this chapter, and will do in this thesis, is one that can be termed ‘critical realism’; in that I accept the influence that (neo)realism has, and the structures that it has underpinned, but unlike the neorealists, I do not see these as being the fixed and inevitable result of post-Enlightenment progress. I recognize that they are constructed through discourse, and are subject to change and challenge by other actors.

Discourse has been shown to have a close relationship with reality, driving its potential for change. Though not a simple or direct connection, changes in reality do have an impact on discourse, even if this is delayed or limited at times. Equally, as in
the construction of the state, reality is constructed through discourse, and real decisions are made in the context of understandings made through discourse. Hence, despite what the neorealists may argue, change is possible. It has been demonstrated how discourses and discursive structures are drawn upon repeatedly over time in changing circumstances of reality. Orientalism, formulated in a colonial context could be reproduced in the Cold War environment in the process of ‘othering’ the Soviet Union. Likewise the Cold War discourse remained in the post-Cold War period, underpinning a confused situation and a search for new enemies. In each situation, earlier discourses remain, but the real events lead to their adaptation to suit the changed reality. In turn, responses to that reality are formed through discourses, and so reality itself is, in part, constructed through discourse.

It has also become clear that geopolitics, post-September 11th, have continued this pattern. The discursive structure of the Cold War has been remade to understand the new ‘threat’ from terrorism. Thus, terrorism is represented in a particular way when understood through the inherited discursive reasoning. An imagining of terrorism is made by historical references and established discourse. Once again binaries differentiate a ‘good’ ‘Self’ and an ‘evil’ ‘Other’. The same practices used by the powerful in the Cold War are repeated in respect of terrorism; applying ‘common sense’, and the assurance of authority and power, established a set of representations that are ‘obvious’ when interpreted through discourse. This makes the responses of the state ‘obvious’ too, and is the foundation for militarism, again as in the Cold War. This process silences other possible interpretations, as they do not make ‘sense’ and are characterized as threatening to the state and consequently beneficial to the terrorist.

Potentially undermining to these neorealist interpretations, not least due to the terrorist networks themselves, is the process of globalization. In my position of ‘global reform’, I accept that non-state or multi-state organizations are changing the role of the state, but that this is relatively limited in that the states remain predominant, and will do so for some time to come at least. Nevertheless, the greater fluidity that globalization brings makes it more difficult for states to control their sovereign territory as they might have done in the past (though not always completely). It is this fluidity that allows networks to form across borders and creates actors that are less easily controlled by states, but are nonetheless not absolutely independent of them either.
This brings me to global governance. Here again I look to move beyond the neorealist perspective that sees this as only associations or coalitions of states, and instead to envisage that a more independent layer or layers of governance may be possible. The transformationalist view, that I take, retains the state as the most powerful actor, but leaves room for governance to take place at more than one scale given the impacts of globalization and also of regionalization. Regional governance is a feature particularly noticeable in Europe. Again the degree to which this can operate independently of states is debatable and in critical realism must be approached from the assumption that states are likely to be more powerful. This does not, though, preclude a relatively powerful regional layer, which may even be part of a developing complex multi-layered governance. The depth of this development is greater in Europe, prompting questions of what this means for the practice of geopolitics here as opposed to for example, the United States.

All of these processes have, as I have said above, significant implications for borders. Borders, as constructed in (neo)realist discourse, are simple lines delineating a sovereign state’s territory; when global networks, multi-layered governance and regionalization are introduced, this changes the very nature of borders, problematizing them and increasing their complexity. In turn this impacts upon the territoriality that is closely related to the borders that define it in the state system. Suddenly possibilities emerge for multiple territorialities overlapping and meaning different things in different places. If this is so, then the state is no longer the same, even if it remains the most important actor in geopolitics. Furthermore, if these processes are more intense in Europe, for example, this could mean a different territoriality in Europe from other parts of the world.

This chapter has shown how geopolitics has been dominated by (neo)realism both in theory and in practice. This is the philosophy that has underpinned the making of, and reactions to, realities in changing world circumstances. Yet by approaching geopolitics critically it has been revealed how these understandings are constructed through discourse. Accepting that states have been established in this way does not mean they must be dismissed, it does though allow other actors to be given their appropriate places in world politics, and offers a better way of understanding how new
realities and processes at work post-Cold War, and especially post-September 11\textsuperscript{th}, are influencing events and also the construction of worldviews in different states.

The position of each state in space and time is relevant to the worldviews that the powerful actors construct and the geopolitical codes that emerge from these. Each state has a historical and political context in which discourses have been reproduced and are now available again for representations of terrorism. The extent, and way in which, global and regional processes are at work also varies from place to place, and is therefore also relevant in the formation of geopolitical codes. This makes a comparison between states such as Britain and France in Europe, and the United States where such deep regionalization is absent, particularly pertinent at this time.

Research Questions

From these conclusions a number of research questions emerge:

For the United States, the United Kingdom and France, what are the geopolitical codes in relation to international terrorism post-September 11\textsuperscript{th}?

a) What historical discourses and narratives are drawn on?  
b) How is international terrorism imagined?  
c) To what extent does terrorism represent a new ‘Other’ in the discursive structure?  
d) Is there evidence of competing or alternative representations?  
e) How are the representations given authority?  
f) To what extent is international terrorism imagined in a postmodern way but reacted to in a modern way?

When comparing the three states and the European Union, is there an identifiable European geopolitical code, and how do European codes differ from those of the United States?

a) Comparing the three state representations of international terrorism, what similarities and differences can be found between them?  
b) When comparing the state European representations to those of the European Union, is there evidence of a common imaging of international terrorism?  
c) Are there any clear divisions in the way international terrorism is imagined and reacted to in Europe?  
a) What differences are there between the American and European imaginings of international terrorism?
In the context of regionalization and in their responses to the networked and non-state character of international terrorism, is the character of European states undergoing a process of change?

a) Is terrorism represented and responded to as a problem of regional significance?
b) Are borders (both internal and external of the EU) represented as important barriers in defending against international terrorism?
c) Are the responses to international terrorist networks based on state territory as in a ‘modern’ state, or do they suggest a more complex territoriality in Europe where responses are regional and global?

Can it be said that Europe consists of ‘postmodern’ states while the United States remains a ‘modern’ state?

a) Do American responses to terrorism emphasise the defence of state borders to a greater extent than those of Europe?
b) Are territorialities implicit in European responses more complex than those of the United States’ responses?
c) How is citizenship addressed in the United States in comparison with Europe?
d) Does the American code represent a more unilateralist (‘modernist’) approach than the European codes?
e) Are neorealism and the sovereign state reinforced by the hegemonic American representations to a greater extent than by those of Europe?
A Critical Realist Methodology: The Foundations for State Centred Discourse Analysis

Introduction

In the last chapter the dominance of neorealism in geopolitics was discussed. In addition, the critical challenge to this philosophy was also examined, and elements of this were identified as effective for use in this study. This does not mean that neorealism is dismissed altogether; its very importance in the (re)production of the state, and in the geopolitical practices of powerful actors, suggests that it cannot be ignored when researching the geopolitics of these same actors. Consequently, critical realism was presented as an approach that can encompass the structures and practices underpinned by neorealism, and a critical analysis and recognition of how these are constructed through discourse, and are not natural or necessarily constant.

It is therefore a critical realist perspective that runs through this methodology. The research is fundamentally conceptualized in a neorealist way; it looks at geopolitical codes, codes that are generated by states, and is for that reason directed towards an analysis of states. Despite this, the attractions of critical geopolitics were noted in the previous chapter, and this is also influential in the methodology through the critical realism underpinning it. This chapter will demonstrate how these two, in many ways contradictory, approaches are brought together, discussing the theory itself and then how this affects the choices made, in terms of methods used and the interpretation of results. Finally, it will argue that critical realism, and the methodology that this
produces, is the most effective way to look at geopolitics in the post-Cold War and post-September 11th world, given the existence and relative influence of the actors involved.

**Critical Realism: The Foundation for a Methodology**

Yeung (1997) argues that: ‘…critical realism makes its strongest claims at the ontological level: the independent existence of reality and causal powers ascribed to human reasons strengthen the possibility of reclaiming reality and an emancipatory social science.’ (p.55). Critical realism is thus a philosophy that accepts reality. In terms of geopolitics the state, as a realist structure, can therefore be understood to be real. Furthermore, it can be considered to be the primary context in which geopolitics is practiced. In researching geopolitics, and geopolitical codes, it is difficult to avoid the state as the main focus for that research, given the influence of this formation on geopolitics. Indeed: ‘One of the appeals of realist thinking is its applicability to practical problems of international relations…’ (Keohane, 1986, p.7). Hence, to approach an understanding of geopolitical codes in the post-Cold War world the acceptance of a neorealist perspective of that world is a useful starting point. The research can focus upon the state as the main unit in world politics, and the structure through which most of the relevant actors operate.

Despite this attraction of neorealism the criticisms discussed in the previous chapter are still relevant. It is a philosophy that does not provide space for actors outside the state system. In a study that aims to evaluate geopolitical codes in relation to terrorism, and to investigate common European codes, this is a particularly weak point, but even in general terms, it is a limited appreciation of geopolitics and the influences upon this. If geopolitics is: ‘…the analysis of the interaction between geographical settings and perspectives, and international politics.’ (Cohen, 2003, p.3), then it is essential to include all actors, both state and non-state, this may incorporate international terrorists and regional layers of governance as much as states.

This is where a critical approach has clear advantages over neorealism. Following this thinking, the relevance of a whole range of actors can be noted. Fundamentally, it provides the tools to deconstruct established neorealist worldviews, revealing these to be constructions created through discourse. The significance of
power in this process also becomes conspicuous when undertaking such an analysis. Ó Tuathail (1994) says: ‘“Critical geopolities”, as I understand it, is a question not an answer, an approach not a theory, which opens up the messy problematic of geography/global politics to rigorous problematization and investigation.’ (p.527). Critical geopolitics helps to reveal the hidden meanings behind the dominant geopolitics. Where neorealism presents a simplistic vision, critical geopolitics contributes to a methodology that seeks to uncover the way that states are ‘made’ and how they, and those who represent them, ‘geo-graph’ the world by virtue of their powerful positions and the discourses that this allows them to (re)produce.

Despite these attributes, it is difficult, or even impossible, to adopt a purely critical geopolitics; and, given the pre-eminence of neorealism, it is arguably misguided to assume that the state is only a construction. Ó Tuathail (2000) reflects that: ‘In seeking to engage certain discourses in order to displace them, one invariably is dependent to a certain degree upon the organizing terms of these discourses, a dependence that can re-invent that which one seeks to problematize.’ (p.387). This is certainly an issue when looking at geopolitics centered on the state. To determine the discourses and narratives of a given state, and of the representations of that state (e.g. of terrorism), requires a methodology that takes the state as the principal unit of analysis. As such, the neorealist discourse is reinforced.

However, to reduce geopolitics, and the constructions that contribute to it, to a formation where only discourse is relevant is to deny the existence of reality outside the ‘text’. Critical realism allows elements of both approaches to be brought together. In critiquing Kenneth Waltz’s neorealism Ruggie (1986) remarks: ‘The problem with Waltz’s posture is that in any social system, structural change itself ultimately has no source other than unit level processes…’ (p.152). By carrying out a critical analysis of the state and its geopolitics it becomes possible to understand how discourse affects policy production and geopolitical codes as well as the very existence of the state itself. The critical approach removes the notion that the state system is fixed and so introduces an understanding of the potential for change, both temporal and spatial.

While methods of analysis derived from critical geopolitics are effective in deconstructing neorealist geopolitics, it must also be recognized that the very supremacy
of neorealism in geopolitics produces structures, such as the state, that then influence
the way in which geopolitics is practiced and understood. Waltz (1986a) notes that:
‘Structures cause actions to have consequences they were not intended to have.’ (p.104).
This hints at the role of structures as real constraints or influences. Waltz would not
recognize these as having been constructed through discourse in the way that a critical
or critical realist theorist might, nevertheless he makes an important point; once the
construction is complete and the structures are accepted, they are real and are therefore
a component that should not be dismissed.

The state is one such structure. It has extensive consequences for geopolitics by
providing the main organizing structure, and acting as an influence and constraint on
actors in global politics. The state and its representatives remain the most important,
though not the only, actors in geopolitics. Recognition of this, combined with a critical
form of analysis, allows an understanding of the construction of the state to be
approached, and hence a deeper appreciation of how geopolitical codes are constructed
in a neorealist context can be achieved.

Critical realism therefore underpins a methodology that places the state at the
centre of the analysis. However, this analysis is carried out by utilizing methods that
are more common in critical geopolitics than in the neorealism that has dominated the
discipline. While the state is accepted as a structure that is not only real but also the
most important unit or actor, the permanence and naturalness of this is disputed.
Instead, the critical realism adopted here recognizes the role of discourse in
representations, and thus in the construction of the sovereign state. Consequently,
discourse is also considered relevant in the formation of geopolitical codes; actors such
as terrorists are represented through discourse in a process that constructs them as
‘Others’ and reproduces the ‘Self’, that is the state. By challenging the, supposedly,
fixed character of the state system, this critical realism allows for change in the
structures and so can leave room for other actors to play a part in geopolitics (e.g.
terrorists or regional layers of governance). Furthermore, individual agency becomes
relevant as the structures are not considered to be completely dominant; although these
actors operate through discourse they are not controlled by it, rather they have their own
influence on geopolitical outcomes in the same way as discourse and structures do. The
methodology is therefore one which brings neorealism and critical geopolitics together, using critical methods and approaches in a neorealist context.

Nonetheless, while this particular methodology has been selected for the research, it should be noted that there are many ways in which the study could be approached and many methodologies that could be applied. The critical geographer Gearóid Ó Tuathail presents just such an alternative for geopolitical discourse analysis in his (2002) work on American responses to the war in Bosnia. Ó Tuathail sets out what he describes as ‘a framework for analyzing practical geopolitical reasoning’ (p.607). This framework consists of four principal parts: categorization and particularization, storyline construction, performative geopolitical script and foreign policy process.

As a means of categorization and particularization, Ó Tuathail defines five questions that must be answered as to how statespersons ‘reason about daily dramas (p.609). Firstly he asks where? ‘The activity of specifying location is central to geopolitical reasoning yet often appears unexceptional and obvious.’ (p.610). Secondly, the question is what? This refers to what the statesperson is claiming is actually happening in a particular situation. Thirdly, who? This involves ‘actor typification’, representing the role or character of the actors involved in the event(s)/situation. The fourth question is why? This is what Ó Tuathail describes as ‘attributions and imputations of causality’, he reflects: ‘Attribution refers to ways in which actors construct causal relations and explanations of events and imputation is a form of attribution referring to how certain intentions, psychological states and motivations are imputed to the protagonists.’ (p.614). The last question is so what? This is a ‘strategic calculation’: ‘In considering new foreign policy crises, politicians and officials inevitably engage in rough and ready calculations of the geostrategic significance of the crisis to their state.’ (p.616).

The answers to these questions provide the basis for the next part of the framework, the assemblage of storylines. Ó Tuathail says:

‘The social process of categorization and particularization produces a knowledge specific to the policy challenge under consideration. From
these building blocks higher-level storylines are constructed and refined. Storylines are sense-making organizational devices tying the different elements of a policy challenge together into a reasonably coherent and convincing narrative.’ (p.617).

These storylines may not be shared by all parts or members of the policy making process, on occasions there may be contested and alternative versions. However, they can be considered to be a means of bringing together different parts of the representations of a situation and its protagonists into a narrative based upon which policy decisions can be made and justified.

The third part of the framework is the ‘performative geopolitical script’. On this Ó Tuathail states:

‘A geopolitical script refers to the directions and manner in which foreign policy leaders perform geopolitics in public, to the political strategies of coping that leaders develop in order to navigate through certain foreign policy challenges and crises. It is a way of performing whereas a storyline is a set of arguments.’ (p.619).

The arguments made in the storylines are set within the geopolitical scripts that are then performed by the foreign policy leaders; these storylines are the narratives that underpin the geopolitical scripts. A script may draw upon more than one storyline allowing alternatives to be acknowledged according to the circumstances and the audience: ‘It is a tacit set of rules for how foreign policy actors are to perform in certain speech situations, and how they are to articulate responses to policy challenges and problems.’ (p.619).

As regards the final part of the framework, Ó Tuathail comments: ‘…geopolitical discourse is also a problem-solving discourse with regulatory aspirations.’ (p.621). This problem solving can be subdivided into a further four components. The first of these is ‘problem definition’, a process that involves inclusion and exclusion when defining a policy challenge or: ‘…the translation of complex foreign policy challenges into extant geopolitical categories, conceptions, and recipes.’ (p.622). ‘The second concept, emanating from the act of “problem definition” and distinct to geopolitics is the conscious development of geopolitical strategy and policy line by an administration.’ (p.622). This strategy, according to Ó Tuathail, may be
based on previous strategies for similar situations and is developed in meetings between ‘authoritative and influential parties’. Following this is the process of ‘geopolitical accommodation’, this is: ‘…how policy-making tries to accommodate the interests, concerns and political needs of the various parties to a conflict.’ (p.622). At the end of all that is ‘problem closure’: ‘…the identification, development and promotion of a perceived solution to the defined problem.’ (p.622). This completes the foreign policy process as problem solving, and therefore Ó Tuathail’s framework for analyzing practical geopolitical reasoning.

This is a critical geopolitics methodology and represents one possible way of approaching and enacting discourse analysis in this area. Discourse analysis is a method that is used in a wide variety of ways, in fact Ó Tuathail comments that: “‘discourse analysis’ is a misnomer for there is no agreed and paradigmatic “discourse analysis” but a heterogeneous mix of approaches, perspectives and strategies.” (p.605). In terms of the critical realist methodology adopted here, the geopolitical codes of sovereign states and their discursive foundations are the principal focus of the study. It therefore necessitates the application of a form of discourse analysis of selected documents set within the (neo)realist framework of sample states. The (neo)realist and critical elements are consequently combined in the methodology as explained below.

Country Selection

The neorealist element of the methodology demands that the research should be focused upon the state and more specifically the construction of geopolitical codes of the state, but one of the first decisions was to determine which states would be the subject of the analysis. The research sought to make use of a comparative analysis, principally between Europe and America, and more specifically between three states – the United States, the United Kingdom and France. Hettne and Söderbaum (2000) comment: ‘…we believe that comparative analysis helps to guard against the ethnocentric bias and culture-bound interpretations that can arise in too contextualised a specialisation.’ (p.461). Its application here allows the European states, where regional processes have been noticeably more prevalent, to be understood in relation to the United States, where the neorealist concept of the sovereign state arguably remains
unchallenged. By comparing all three states the impact of context on discourse, and ultimately on codes and policy, is also better understood.

The selection of the United States is a consequence of the critical realist philosophy; America dominates the post-Cold War period as the only remaining ‘superpower’ and the hegemonic state. Furthermore, it is central to issues of terrorism, particularly after September 11th, and has attempted to lead a ‘war on terrorism’. This state is, consequently, very important regarding the issues being examined, and is central to neorealist representations, and the reinforcing of this theory. An American and European comparison is one that has been deployed by many theorists, de Tocqueville being one of the best known (Walters, 2004, p.687). However, in this case it is reversed, rather than looking for difference in America when juxtaposed with Europe, the research places greater emphasis on finding how the European states differ from America, and what conclusions can be drawn from what they may share with each other but not with the United States. The extent to which processes of regionalization in Europe are driving changes in the state can be assessed through this comparison with America as the hegemonic state where regionalization is less of a factor.

Determining which European states would form the focus of the comparison required consideration of their likely utility in demonstrating potential common European codes, or alternatively distinct codes within Europe. Britain and France were chosen as the most effective examples for these purposes. Both states are among the largest and most powerful in Europe. Larger states can have greater influence in international politics, and in the structures of the EU. A further factor, which recommends Britain and France over other European states, is their historical backgrounds as global and imperial powers. The legacy of this is a tendency to seek a prominent role in the world for the given state as a geopolitical actor, although this may be achieved in different ways. Furthermore, the colonial history has created connections between these states and other parts of the world, whether it is immigrant communities, close relationships with former colonies, or commercial interests in these now independent states. This gives them a particular perspective on world politics, with perceived interests and relationships in many parts of the world that not all European states have, or not to the same extent. In addition, France was a founding member of
the EC and has always considered itself to be at the centre of the European project, while Britain has tended to be more sceptical.

These positions are apparent in levels of public support for the European Union. Figure 3.1 shows the support for membership of the Union in France, Britain and the EU as a whole, as found by the European Commission’s Eurobarometer survey in the autumn of 2004, approximately the end of the period under study in this thesis. The difference between Britain and France is clear from the graph; whereas France is almost identical to the EU average with 56% saying that membership of the EU is a good thing, in Britain only 38% hold this opinion. The same is true for those that consider it to be a bad thing, fewer than 15% agreeing in France and the EU compared to more than 20% in Britain.

Figure 3.1

[Image: Support to Membership of the European Union in Autumn 2004]

Data from The European Commission, 2005, p.68

Figure 3.2 also depicts this relative scepticism in the United Kingdom towards European integration; this time it shows support for a common defence and security policy in the same period. Security and defence is of course particularly relevant to possible common geopolitical codes. In this case France shows an even more positive view than the EU average with 81% thinking developments in these policy competencies would be a good thing and only 12% a bad thing. For Britain the support is again much lower, though perhaps higher than might be expected, 60% believe it to
be a good thing with 27% saying it is a bad thing. The populations of the two states therefore show a marked difference in enthusiasm for the European project.

*Figure 3.2*

![Support to a Common Defence and Security Policy in Autumn 2004](image)

*Data from The European Commission, 2005, p.117*

While British governments have tended to follow these sceptical views of their population they have also taken a more Atlanticist position than their French counterparts. These two approaches are perhaps not unrelated; by associating more closely with the United States Britain is less inclined to be integrated in Europe, and France attempts to deepen integration in Europe and is consequently less Atlanticist in outlook. This is indicative of clear contextual variations between the two states, a feature that is valuable when assessing the extent to which convergence of codes may be occurring, if two states that are so distinctive in terms of public perceptions of Europe were to share codes it would indicate a significant impact of regionalization processes.

An additional site for the research was the European Union. This is, of course, not a state and thus reflects the critical realist position that sees a role for other actors, in this case a regional organization of member states. As such, its inclusion in the study makes it possible to challenge neorealist assumptions about the predominance of the state in geopolitics, enhancing the critical element of the research. The European Union is the most important organization in terms of regionalization in Europe, and therefore cannot be ignored when looking for common geopolitical codes. Specifically, in this research, the focus is on those parts, and individuals, in the Union that are most closely
associated with developing foreign and defence policy competencies. This includes the Commission, as represented by the President and the Commissioner for External Relations, and the separate High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, who acts on behalf of the Council of the European Union.

Two main constraints influenced the selection of states for the study. The first of these was the issue of language. It was necessary for the documents chosen for analysis to be produced in English (either originally or in translations), in order that I could understand these as an English speaker. Therefore, the states chosen must provide such documents; the United States, Britain and France fulfilled this criterion. Secondly, time was a constraint, thus while initially five states appeared to be a manageable number, this changed through engagement with the research process.

Corpus Selection

For each of the chosen states, and the European Union, it was necessary to compile a corpus\(^1\) of documents from which a sample could be analysed (Ryan and Bernard, 2000, p.780). This method of analysis derives from the critical realist methodology. Taking a critical approach to researching the neorealist geopolitics of sovereign states involves discourse analysis; for this to be carried out, material must be sought for the analysis that is the product of the governing elites of these states. The compilation of a corpus of such material is, therefore, the first step towards critically deconstructing the representations and geopolitical codes of a state.

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\(^1\) Discussing the corpus, Bauer and Aarts (2000) say: '…while older meanings of “text corpus” imply the complete collection of texts according to some common theme, more recent meanings stress the purposive nature of selection, and not only of texts but also of any material with symbolic functions. This selection is inevitably arbitrary to some degree: comprehensive analysis has priority over scrutiny of selection.' (p.23). The corpus contained many types and subjects of documents from state sources. Later, sampling provided suitable examples for detailed analysis.
### Table 3.1

**Corpus and Sample Sizes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>EU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001 (Pre Sep.11)</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001 (Post Sep.11)</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>938</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>543</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>827</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4284</td>
<td>1488</td>
<td>1888</td>
<td>791</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sourcing the documents varies from country to country. Table 3.1 gives a breakdown of the number of documents in each corpus for every year in the study, and how many of these were included in the samples. In all cases they were collected from government websites, the method of searching depending on how the websites were organised. In the United States it was possible to choose a list of documents covering a particular subject. It was therefore relatively easy to produce comprehensive lists of documents that were likely to include the subject of terrorism. The lists produced for the British corpus came from a combination of pre-prepared collections on the websites,

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2 These numbers may not be exact as they are based on the number of documents in the lists provided on websites and produced from searches; it is possible that a document may appear on more than one of these lists or even more than once on the same list.

3 Except those of President Clinton’s speeches (see Footnote 8 below).

4 The details varied from site to site. On the White House website it was possible to look at a list of speeches on the subject of National Security, Homeland Security, Defense etc. For the Department of State they tended to be organized by genre and time, e.g. Statements in 2001 or Press Releases in 2003. The Department of Defense used a similar format.
and use of the site’s search facility. The lists tended to be of ‘speeches’ in general or ‘press releases’; the searches were usually for terrorism, which rendered a considerable number of documents. The French documents came from two sources: The Ministère Des Affaires Étrangéres (Foreign Ministry) and the Permanent Mission of France to the UN. Like Britain, the result was a combination of lists and searches, but in this case with an even greater emphasis on the searches.

The final corpus was for the European Union. Here again it was constructed from the outcome of searches in addition to lists available on the EU websites. The EU is not a state, and is still developing its Foreign and Security Policy dimension, and therefore the range of documents on these matters is more limited than for the states. Thus, the EU corpus is smaller than those of the states.

It is evident from Table 3.1 that the number of documents in each of the samples, and the proportion of the corpuses selected, varies from country to country. Although this creates the possibility that comparing arguments and discourses over time, and between countries, might be difficult due to the unequal samples, there are several reasons why this issue does not seriously diminish the analysis. The discourse analysis carried out on the documents is a qualitative technique that involves in-depth reading of the material, and so some documents may provide more evidence than others, and a small number could provide a considerable amount of evidence; the overall number is not as important as it may be in a quantitative study. The quantitative analysis that is used is limited, and does not seek precise results but general trends. While more limited numbers were available from before September 11th, this is

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5 Two websites were used here, Downing Street and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Downing Street provided a list of the Prime Minister’s speeches categorized by month and year, as well as a search facility used to find any other useful documents. The Foreign Office also provided an extensive collection of speeches and releases categorized by time in a similar way, but again the search facility gave greater coverage.

6 Most of the documents came from the French Foreign Ministry; the lists from this source were generated exclusively by searching, as this was the only possible method when dealing with the English language version of the site. It still produced a considerable number of documents in English post-September 11th, and these constitute the majority of the corpus. The Mission site was presented as lists archived along subject lines and by time. It was this source that gave most of the documents pre-September 11th.

7 The main searches were of the External Relations section of the EU website, and this produced a large number of documents. Limited lists of speeches (sorted by time) of figures such as External Relations Commissioner, Chris Patten were also available here. A separate, and extensive, speech and article archive was available on the website of The High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, this was again arranged by date.
reflected in the emphasis of the research primarily on the three years following this event; documents from the earlier period are treated as a single subset rather than individual years, and also contribute to the overall analysis.

For all four corpuses a timescale for which documents would be collected had to be decided upon. The research is focused on the post-Cold War period; this implied a stating point no earlier than the end of the Cold War. An end to the research period required a more arbitrary limit. The most significant instance of international terrorism, in terms of its impact on geopolitics, has arguably been September 11th and therefore this, and its aftermath, had to be included in, and indeed be the main focus of, the research. Based upon this, the limit was determined as the 11th September 2004, three years after the attacks.

Access is a constraint addressed by some authors (Phillips and Hardy, 2002; Silverman, 2000). Silverman notes that: ‘In independent, unfunded research, you are likely to choose any setting which, while demonstrating the phenomenon in which you are interested, is accessible and will provide appropriate data reasonably readily and quickly.’ (p.106). For an individual researcher without funding for travel, the most useful source of documents is the Internet. Here government websites make available a wide range of documents, from publications to press releases and speech transcripts. While this is a valuable source of material, it is also a recently created, and still developing, source, and one that differs from country to country.

The United States was probably the most exhaustive in its provision of material, as was reflected in the greater number of documents in the American corpus (Table 3.1). For all the corpuses it is unlikely to be clear if any documents are missing.

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8 For the current President, the White House website appeared to give a full archive of material, but the State Department was the source for other material related to terrorism, as well as for the Secretary of State of course. The Department of Defense site was the source for speeches etc. by the Secretary for Defense. Finally, a complication was that past President’s material is unavailable from the White House and therefore it was necessary to find the site of President Clinton’s library for material generated during his presidency.

9 A good example of this is Tony Blair’s speeches. The Downing Street website directs users to the Labour party for political speeches (e.g. those made at party conferences), but the Labour party website includes only a small selection of recent speeches. Therefore, the ‘political’ speeches of the past are apparently unavailable. In this example I am aware that these speeches are not included in the collection even if I do not know exactly how many of them there are or what they contain, however there could be other gaps that there is no obvious indication of.
While documents going back to the early 1990s were acquired for the United States, these were not always as plentiful as for more recent years (see Table 3.1). The European sources were more limited going back in time, as the table reveals. While a few documents were available prior to the late 1990s, particularly in the EU website, the greatest concentration came from the late 1990s onwards. In the British case the turning point appeared to be the arrival of the Labour government in 1997 when documents began to be archived; for France some were available earlier but here a language issue arose. English translations only began on a large-scale post-September 11th. That is not to say that some documents in English could not be sourced from earlier, but these are largely limited to documents from the UN.

**Sampling**

The treatment of the corpuses relates directly to the philosophical starting point of the research. Given that neorealism underpins the study, to the extent that it is focused on states and their geopolitical codes, this impacts upon the sort of documents that were selected for analysis. Likewise, the critical element that drives the application of discourse analysis also affects the way in which these are chosen. These factors are encapsulated in the process of sampling.

As Phillips and Hardy (2002) argue ‘...we inevitably have to select a subset of texts for the purpose of manageability.’ (p.10). According to Mason (2002): ‘The aim is to produce, through sampling, a relevant range of contexts or phenomena, which will enable you to make strategic and possibly cross-contextual comparisons, and hence build a well founded argument.’ (p.123). As this research aims to determine the geopolitical codes of certain states in relation to international terrorism, and to do so critically through a process of discourse analysis, sampling demanded a method that would find documents most likely to show evidence of the discourses and representations underpinning these codes.

This implied the use of purposive sampling (Richie and Lewis, 2003; Silverman, 2000). For this it was necessary to identify a set of criteria that would determine the

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10 A particular problem arose in accessing Madeline Albright’s speeches for example; although they appeared to be available they could never be accessed.
best documents to go forward into discourse analysis. Four criteria were applied to a state’s corpus: relevance to the focus of the research; authorship (that is a favouring of documents produced by or on behalf of elite figures); apparent significance, in terms of events surrounding terrorism, or political occasions; and genre or type.

To some extent relevance had already been considered when constructing the corpus; searches had been for key terms such as terrorism, and lists of documents had been chosen, where possible, for their subject matter or for their authors post. Despite this, there were many that had little or no relevance to terrorism or geopolitics. When sampling, this criterion was applied to filter out these irrelevant documents leaving those dealing with the subject under examination, and that would provide the best material for the discourse analysis. This required a judgement to be made rather than following a clear formula.

Secondly, in relation to authorship, the speeches and articles of key political figures were sought. Mason (2002) argues that:

‘Underlying all of this must be a concern to identify who it is that has, does or is the experiences, perspectives, behaviours, practices, identities, personalities, and so on, that your research questions will require you to

---

11 Although documents that had this as their principal subject were sought, this was not necessarily borne out on every occasion. If a document appeared to cover a more vaguely related issue then it would be considered for inclusion, as important connections may be made with terrorism and geopolitics that reinforce the relevant discourses. However, to include all such documents would essentially mean including all documents, with most having no such connections, therefore these choices were limited and only a selection of those most likely to make these linkages were included.

12 The particular figures and their positions varied slightly from state to state. In the United States the President was an obvious choice, as was the Secretary of State. Some speeches were also included from the Vice President, given the particular influence that the current incumbent has on policy and particularly foreign policy. Finally, substantial numbers of documents from the Defense Secretary were used, another influential figure in the administration, and also some from the deputy to Donald Rumsfelt, Paul Wolfavitz, given his influence on policy.

For Britain, the selection was more limited: The Prime Minister, again the most obvious choice, and the Foreign Secretary, occasionally another senior politician was included when a relevant speech appeared. However, the lack of an archive of documents from the Ministry of Defence meant that the Defence Secretary was not included. No other figure appeared influential enough in the British system to warrant particular attention.

France was limited somewhat by documents available in English, but by including the President, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister as the main figures, the most important individuals in relation to foreign policy were covered.

Finally, for the EU the selection was restricted to the officials directly involved in the new foreign policy: The President of the Commission, The External Affairs Commissioner and the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy.
investigate. The question is therefore not only what is the best data source from which to sample, but who or which?” (p.129).

A country’s political elite is considered by most people to represent that state, and its views and positions in international politics. Consequently, it is the representations made by these individuals, and the discourses through which these are constructed that contribute to the defining of geopolitical codes. Van der Wusten and Dijkink (2002) say: ‘There may be rivalry over the terms of each discourse in each polity, but in fact these geopolitics are, in our view, as a rule remarkably broadly supported in most countries most of the time.’ (p.21). Thus, while it is possible for a more junior member of a state apparatus or a media source to represent an alternative vision, when a leader or other senior figure speaks their representations are widely understood to be those of that state, as they are the key representatives of that state (Ensink, 1997, p.9).

The use of events in sampling is discussed by Mason (2002):

‘Just as with settings, you will need to decide what are the dimensions, and boundaries, which constitute the event, and how you should select them for study (strategically, representationally, illustratively). This will involve decisions about what constitutes the event – where does it begin and end, in time and space?’ (p.131).

Documents relating to a particularly important event in terms of terrorism are therefore worthy of inclusion in the sample. The most obvious example is September 11th itself, but other particular bombings, or the Iraq war would also qualify through this criterion. The aim here was to capture documents that most clearly and specifically encapsulated the way in which a government was viewing and constructing the events and their participants as they unfolded.

However, the importance of a document cannot be judged by its relationship to an event alone, some documents have significance due to the issues they discuss, or the influence they have. Phillips and Hardy (2002) explain that: ‘…researchers can try to capture “important” texts, for example, those that are widely distributed, that are associated with changes in practices, or that were produced in reaction to a particular event.’ (p.73). An excellent example would be the annual state of the union address by the President of the United States. These are set piece speeches that take place every
year and will always be likely to include some discussion of foreign policy and, since 2001, terrorism.

Table 3.2
Genre of Documents Within Samples

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Documents</th>
<th>Percentage of Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speeches</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articles</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letters</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Testimony</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publication</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Press Release</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown(^{13})</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The genre of the documents differentiates speeches, articles,\(^{14}\) letters,\(^{15}\) testimonies,\(^{16}\) interviews,\(^{17}\) publications\(^{18}\) and press releases.\(^{19}\) Table 3.2 shows the number of documents of each genre in the four samples. Mason (2002) argues that:

‘Questions about what the sources might be able to tell you will lead you to engage with the question of method, that is, how you can generate data from your sources, and what limitations might be imposed by the nature of the data source or the method.’ (p.54).

Since the research was attempting to identify the geopolitical discourses reproduced by elites, the source most amenable for this purpose was the speech, consequently this was by far the most common genre in all four samples (Table 3.2). Ensink (1997)

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\(^{13}\) These are documents where the genre is not clearly identifiable.

\(^{14}\) Articles are documents that have been written by (or at least appear to have been written by) a politician for publication in the press. As such, for the purposes of this research they are similar to speeches in the sense that they are the words of the elites that represent the state. They are not, however, as frequently produced.

\(^{15}\) Letters are communications written by the elite figures under study.

\(^{16}\) A testimony is a written or transcribed document submitted to an official body.

\(^{17}\) These are transcripts of interviews given to the media.

\(^{18}\) ‘Publications’ include a range of government documents such as reports or policy documents. They often do not specify an author as they are allegedly produced on behalf of the government as a whole. Sometimes they may be more technical and be aimed at a more limited audience than a speech. Consequently, the representations made are not always as obvious.

\(^{19}\) Press releases are (usually short) statements issued by a government, or a government department, giving a response to a particular event. As they supposedly represent the view/position of the state or department as a whole there is no author specified.
comments: ‘The words of the incumbent of the function are not perceived as those of a private person, but in relation to the function and what this function represents.’ (p.9). To approach an understanding of a state’s geopolitical codes through discourse analysis consequently requires the study of the words of the elites. A ‘speech’ encapsulates these words.

As with all documents and other discursive practices, when speeches are enacted performativity emerges. Bialasiewicz et al comment:

‘Performativity is a discursive mode through which ontological effects (the idea of the autonomous subject or the notion of the pre-existing state) are established. Performativity thereby challenges the notion of the naturally existing subject. But it does not eradicate the appearance of the subject or the idea of agency. Performance presumes a subject and occurs within the conditions of possibility brought into being by the infrastructure of performativity.’ (p.408).

Also, when a speech, for example, is performed the ‘nature’ of the ‘Other’ becomes fixed and ‘known’. It is therefore possible to comprehend the importance of performance in the (re)production of discourse and in the manifestation of subjects, these being constituted within the ‘infrastructure of performativity’. Consequently, speeches must be understood to be a form of performance, a discursive practice combining ‘the ideal and the material’ (p.406). In so doing they refer to real events, structures and people in addition to imagined characteristics, motivations, relationships and geographies. Essential elements of the performance are where it takes place, who enacts it and to whom it is made. These features affect the outcome of the performance, for example a speech by a President to a global audience can have a greater effect than the same speech by an anonymous official to a small group.

The political speech displays specific characteristics differentiating it from the other sources drawn on here. Due to its being delivered by a politician and its nature as an oral communication, possibly to an audience in the same location and/or through the broadcast media, the speech tends to be more prone to the use of rhetoric. The politician uses the speech to attempt to convince the audience of particular arguments or to gain support personally and for policies. Paine (1981) says: ‘A politician wishes to put a claim on his audience through his speeches by making what he says appear
relevant and useful, just and necessary.’ (p.10). The subject matter, the material used and the presentation of the speech are therefore important in achieving these objectives; the speaker must engage the audience in order to be convincing. In the case of politicians, they will generally be speaking to a wide public audience, even if those in the same room are from a more specialised constituency; the result is that their speeches are usually aimed at that wider audience giving rise to their rhetorical nature, as they must attempt to capture the interest and agreement of a range of people. The political speech is consequently inclined towards a limited technical content and has a greater focus upon dramatic impact.

It is these characteristics that make the speech an effective subject for discourse analysis in this research, but also give it the potential to exaggerate the presence of discourses and narratives given the rhetorical element. The politician constructs an argument through discourse in an attempt to normalise the assumptions behind it and make policies acceptable and ‘obvious’ to the audience. Thus, when analysing political speeches it is relatively straightforward to uncover discourses through which the state or threatening ‘others’ are reproduced, but these are found in a genre that is also dominated by rhetoric; the analysis and interpretation must recognize this characteristic as a factor in the production of speeches that is not as important for other genres such as publications or press releases, which are not performed in the same way and are therefore not so widely consumed by a lay audience.

The proportion of speeches in each sample is therefore potentially influential for the analysis and the subsequent comparison. Table 3.2 shows that while the samples for the United States and Britain have almost identical percentages of speeches (about 82%), France has 66.4% and the EU only 54%. However, the last two still have substantial proportions of speeches in their samples, far more than any other genre, speeches still dominate the analysis. Furthermore, although discourse may be more obvious in political speeches it is certainly not absent in other documents. Since the method of analysis used here does not involve counting the occurrence of a discourse or narrative within a document, but rather finding how each one is constructed across the sample as a whole, and noting how many documents they are present in, the fact they may be repeated more often or be less subtle in the speeches is not crucial. Where it does affect the thesis is that the quotes selected to demonstrate the use of a discourse or
narrative are more likely to come from speeches because of their being a larger proportion of the samples and also as a result of the nature of the speech presenting them in a more obvious and quotable way.

Although a particular person makes the speech and is attributed the authorship, political speeches are frequently partly or wholly written by one or more speechwriters. As these people are never identified as being the authors it was impossible to separate their contributions from those of the speaker. However, although the speaker may not have written the speech, when they say the words and allow their name to be attached to them, they are effectively adopting and endorsing it, making it unlikely that they would willingly give a speech with which they did not largely agree. As figures representative of the state, the words that they endorse become the representations of that state.

Sauer (1997) argues that: ‘The singular speech is a small part in a large mosaic. It can be characterized as a strategic move in an overarching communicative plan, and it can be assessed properly only if the larger context is taken into account.’ (p.36). Each speech can only be analysed in the wider context of the other speeches in the sample, but also the other documents that were included. These other genres are not always so directly attributable to the relevant elites; they do, though, usually have their explicit or implicit endorsement, and so can be taken as part of that ‘large mosaic’. When few if any relevant speeches were available for an event, or where a document appeared to have ‘importance’ to the subject matter, other genres were included in the sample.

Transcription and Translation

Since all the material was from archival sources on the Internet there was no need to carry out transcription. However, this is not to say that other unknown individuals have not transcribed many of the documents. In the case of articles and other publications, the assumption must be that the authors have written these themselves, although there may have been some editing by others. Someone, though, has obviously transcribed the speeches. A few speeches were texts issued in advance of the speech actually being made, and therefore the transcription issues do not necessarily apply as these will have come directly from the author or speechwriter. This does raise another issue; that is the question of whether the planned speech is the same as the
speech that was actually made. Again this is an issue that affects speeches due to the characteristics of the genre. Since the speech is performed rather than simply published it is possible for it to change in the process of that performance, perhaps in response to the audience. Nevertheless, the assumption was made that while slight changes are possible, the general thrust, and especially the discourses and narratives drawn on and reproduced, are unlikely to change much.

Whether the transcription is carried out by the researcher or, as in this case, by someone else, the process always has the potential to change in some way, most likely accidentally, but possibly deliberately, the material originally presented. As such, Hoggart, Lees and Davies (2002) reflect that: ‘Reliance on published accounts of whatever form, implies that the researcher accepts a limited and biased data set – a data set that has often been “tarted up” for public consumption, so precise wording cannot be relied upon.’ (p.132). Lapadat (2000) emphasises the fact that transcriptions are not neutral representations’ (p.208). She points out that: ‘The person transcribing, whether a researcher or hired assistant, will be making interpretative decisions while transcribing, which can range from deliberately “tidying up” sentence structures to omitting or mishearing (or at least hearing differently from the researcher).’ (p.216). When it is the researcher that is transcribing, it is possible at least to consider the likely effects of the way in which the task has been carried out, and the perspective from which it was approached. In contrast, when the transcriber is not known, it is unclear whether the transcript may have been deliberately written to vary from the original for some unknown reason, and the procedures for doing the task are also a mystery and may vary from text to text.

The issues related to translation bear a similarity to those of transcription; the translation is carried out by unspecified individuals, to procedures that are equally uncertain, any deliberate changes are not identified. In addition, translating a document from one language into another will always result in some changes from the original (Steiner, 2001, p.181). Hoggart, Lees and Davies (2002) say:

‘…there is little doubt that translation often does not convey original meaning… …because manner of expression can be as important as words themselves, literal translations can “distort” intended meanings,
with the translator imposing a lens between the expressions in original and translated texts.’ (p.133).

There may not be identical words or sentence structures in both languages, and so the translator will be attempting to achieve a close approximation to the original meaning. The result is that the translations might not be exactly the same as the intended document produced in the original language (Smith, 1996, p.161). Nevertheless, all the documents came from government websites, and therefore it is reasonable to assume that they are the work of official government translators. Consequently, these documents are taken to be endorsed by the state. Smith concludes that: ‘…the problematisation of language and meaning applies to research in “home” and “foreign” languages since both involve interpretation and appropriation.’ (p.163). Thus, the interpretation of any material is always going to be influenced by the person interpreting, the difference here is that a number of other unknown individuals are also involved in interpreting in addition to the researcher.

Language also had some relevance in the choice of countries and of documents. Phillips and Hardy (2002) reflect that: ‘Very simple considerations such as geographic proximity and language makes certain sites that might be theoretically interesting impractical.’ (p.68). It was necessary that any documents should be available in English, either in their original form or as translations. Obviously, this was not an issue for the United States or the United Kingdom; for France, however, only translated documents were included in the analysis, although these were plentiful, particularly post-September 11th. Likewise the EU, being a multi-state organisation, translates most documents into many languages.

Discourse Analysis

Various definitions are available for discourse and discourse analysis (Hoggart, Lees and Davies, 2002, p.163; Gill, 2000, p.178; Phillips and Hardy, 2002, p.3; Fairclough, 2003, p.206). The assumption underlying this research is that states, and their geopolitical codes, are constructed through discourses, the method of discourse analysis applied must therefore accord with this understanding. Gee (1999) says:
‘A discourse analysis is based on the details of speech (and gaze and gesture and action) or writing that are arguably deemed relevant in the situation and that are relevant to the arguments the analyst is attempting to make. A discourse analysis is not based on all the physical features present, not even all those that might, in some conceivable context, be meaningful, or might be meaningful in analyses with different purposes.’ (p.88).

As such, critical discourse analysis was practiced, which: ‘...focuses on the role of discourse activity in constituting and sustaining unequal power relations.’ (Phillips and Hardy, 2002, p.25). This conforms to the critical geopolitics approach discussed in the previous chapter and therefore to critical realism.

In addition, the positionality of the researcher must be recognized as influencing the analysis. Fairclough (2003) comments: ‘...there is no such thing as an “objective” analysis of a text, if by that we mean an analysis which simply describes what is “there” in the text without being “biased” by the “subjectivity” of the analyst.’ (p.14). The way in which the representations of others are identified, represented and explained is consequently a subjective and reflexive (Phillips and Hardy, 2002, p.10) process that may differ from how another researcher would analyse and understand the discourses. In this thesis, for example, the position of the researcher existing within the United Kingdom, and therefore exposed to the very discourses being studied in that state, in addition to those of the other states filtered through the British discourse, may lead to a different analysis from that performed by a researcher in another country. An additional factor is the disciplinary perspective; in this case the research is carried out from a geographical starting point, a different researcher from another discipline may look at the material in an alternative way. The purpose or aim of the research could also affect the way a researcher looks at the material, so in this case the concentration on geopolitical codes and terrorism might lead to interpreting data as relating primarily to these phenomena rather than anything else. Hence, all aspects of the researchers experience and that of their research can impinge upon the analysis.

The analysis began with a pilot study of the country in question. This involved critically reading several documents, looking for discourses and narratives that were drawn on and reproduced within them. Determination of discourses and narratives occurred at this stage. The choice was made through an iterative process in the pilot
study. An appreciation of the geopolitics and context of each state was a component in the understanding of what discourses and narratives might exist, and for identifying the presence and significance of those that occurred. This was enhanced by background reading on each state and geopolitics more generally. Once again, the fundamentals of the research are important here. Agnew and Corbridge (1995) define a discourse as: ‘…equivalent to a theory about how the world works assumed implicitly in practice by a politician, writer, academic or “ordinary person”.’ (p.47). Based on the idea that the state is a reality constructed through discourse, discourses inherent in this process were central to the analysis. To find such discourses, therefore, required a reading of the texts that looked for the assumptions behind what was said, crucially those that were repeated not only in one document but several.

A similar process was adopted for narratives. Ashley (1989) explains that: ‘A narrative is a representation that arrests ambiguity and controls the proliferation of meaning by imposing a standard and standpoint of interpretation that is taken to be fixed and independent of the time it represents.’ (p.263). The narratives taken to be important in this research were those that established a status or role for a state and the wider state system, and those that contributed to the characterization of the ‘Other’, particularly terrorists. Identifying a narrative is consequently an action that cannot be removed from the wider methodology; the underlying thinking on the existence and construction of the state, and on its role in geopolitics affects the type of narratives sought. Within a study that is based on the principle that the state is the main actor in geopolitics, and that codes are developed through discourse, attention must be focused on narratives, and discourses, that are drawn from that state’s context, and represent its role or place in the world, as well as those that represent the terrorist ‘Other’.

In both cases the choice could vary as the selection process progressed, and the significance of each discourse and narrative became clearer. This applied within the pilot study and continued in the extended analysis. While some selections could prove of little importance to the sample, others may become apparent when more documents are studied. Furthermore, in some cases those that initially appear separate can, after more consideration, be reassigned as the same discourse or narrative. Once the discourses and narratives of interest for the research were established they were assigned relevant names and codes for use in the analysis of the sample as a whole.
All the discourses and narratives discussed in the following chapters are presented in Table 3.3. In each case the code used to identify them, the corpus of documents in which they were found and a short description/definition of the discourse/narrative is given. As all of these discourses and narratives were drawn from the documents that were analysed, it is important to note that where one was present in more than one corpus this does not necessarily mean that it was identical in each. For example, the use of a discourse in one country may be slightly different from its use in another country. Such variations are the result of the different contexts and the different narratives that exist within these; each state has a self-image constructed over a long period of time, and drawing on particular historical experiences; all the discourses and narratives interact with one another in a discursive structure producing place specific versions that are ostensibly the same as in another state. Hence, the descriptions are generalised, the nuances are identified and more expansive explanations are provided in the subsequent chapters, chapter 7 giving a comparison between those that are shared by more than one state.

The discourses and narratives were selected due to their relevance to the subject of the research, and are not necessarily the only ones present in the documents. Many of the binary discourses are similar to those that were discussed in the previous chapter, a reflection of the history of binary discourses in colonialism and in Cold War geopolitics. Of course, just as they may not be reproduced identically in each state they may also change over time. It should be noted, however, that as the discourses and narratives in the table are taken from the analysis of the documents, their identification, definition and naming are the product of this process.20 Historical resonances and foundations are discussed in the empirical chapters and the relationships between the different discourses and narratives in each country are explored.

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20 The naming of discourses and narratives was motivated as much by convenience and easy identification as it was an expression of what the discourse/narrative is/does. Thus, a binary discourse like Order/Disorder underpins the division of space into ordered and disordered spaces but the language used does not always involve these words. Indeed, in some cases a name may rarely reflect the actual words used, such as the Crusade narrative; the word ‘crusade’ was only occasionally said by American elites who often talked more about war, but it appears to sum up the understandings and assumptions underlying and driving America’s ‘war on terrorism’. 
Table 3.3
Discourses and Narratives Identified in the Documents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Corpus in Which it Appears</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discourses</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity/Difference</td>
<td>ID</td>
<td>U.S. U.K. France E.U.</td>
<td>A binary underpinning the other binary discourses, constructing difference and thereby allowing identity to be established.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self/Other</td>
<td>SO</td>
<td>U.S. U.K. France E.U.</td>
<td>Building on Identity/Difference, this differentiates the identity and character of the ‘Self’ relative to the ‘Other’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive/Negative</td>
<td>PN</td>
<td>U.S. U.K. France E.U.</td>
<td>This binary attributes positive characteristics to the ‘Self’ and negative characteristics to the ‘Other’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good/Evil</td>
<td>GE</td>
<td>U.S. U.K. France E.U.</td>
<td>Generally a more extreme version of Positive/Negative with certain religious connotations, especially in America.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inside/Outside</td>
<td>IO</td>
<td>U.S. U.K. France E.U.</td>
<td>An essential discourse of the sovereign state, it underpins the territorialization characteristic of the state system in which borders differentiate the inside from the outside.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Order/Disorder</td>
<td>OD</td>
<td>U.S. U.K. France E.U.</td>
<td>Another spatial binary, marking the difference between ordered space (on the inside) and disordered space (on the outside) where the ‘Other’ comes from.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East/West</td>
<td>EW</td>
<td>U.S. U.K. France E.U.</td>
<td>Closely related to Orientalism, this binary is familiar from colonial and Cold War representations. It characterizes an inferior East and a superior West.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat</td>
<td>TH</td>
<td>U.S. U.K. France E.U.</td>
<td>This is a discourse through which the ‘Other’ is represented as posing a danger to the ‘Self’. It is invoked using the word ‘threat’, or other words and phrases indicating the potential to cause such a danger in the character, capability or actions of the ‘Other’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narratives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exceptionalism</td>
<td>EX</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>A narrative suggesting a unique and positive, even divinely inspired character of the ‘Self’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom</td>
<td>FR</td>
<td>U.S. U.K. E.U.</td>
<td>This is a value or attribute that is represented as belonging to the countries and people of the ‘Self’ and needing to be given to ‘Others’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>A narrative of an idealist historical experience giving the state and its people certain advantages and positive characteristics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narratives (Continued)</td>
<td>Global Player</td>
<td>GP</td>
<td>U.K.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanist Values</td>
<td>HV</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>These are values that are positive, embodied by the state but universal, and as such require to be spread regionally and globally.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values</td>
<td>VU</td>
<td>E.U.</td>
<td>These are values common to all European states and peoples; they are supposedly a positive shared feature around which Europeans can unite.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organic</td>
<td>OG</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>U.K.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)</td>
<td>WD</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>U.K.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rogue State</td>
<td>RS</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>U.K.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Narratives (Continued)  | Coalition | CL  | U.S.  | U.K.  | E.U.  | A Coalition suggests some form of unstructured alliance, varying from a well-established and close association to a looser and task specific arrangement.
---|---|---|---|---|---|
American Alliance | AA  | U.K.  | E.U.  | A narrative that established the idea of a long term Coalition with America based on common interests/values and/or historical foundations.
---|---|---|---|---|---|
European Unity | EU  | U.K.  | France  | E.U.  | Versions of this narrative tend to construct an image of a structured and united Europe, one which may share certain values or interests and be governed by some degree of collective or cooperative decision making. This Europe may be a ‘Self’ with its own identity, up to a point.
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Collective Responsibility | CR  | France  | A narrative that envisages and demands a strong level of cooperation between states whether at regional or even global scales. Decisions and strategies internationally should be discussed and agreed collectively.
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Collectivity | CY  | E.U.  | Similar to the French Collective Responsibility narrative, this implies the need and values of collective decision making in the E.U.
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Multipolarity | MP  | France  | A narrative that invokes ideas of a world organized around a series of powerful ‘poles’ of which Europe would be one.
---|---|---|---|---|---|
World Democracy | WD  | France  | Expresses the perceived need for democratic decision making at the global scale where states such as France have a greater say.
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Global Community | GC  | U.K.  | France  | E.U.  | A narrative underpinning representations of a more structured system of states where there is greater cooperation and potentially some from of collective decision making and rules governing the activities of states.
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Law | LW  | U.S.  | Supports legalistic interpretations of geopolitical situations including Threats and responses to these.
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Crusade Against Terrorism | CT  | U.S.  | An American narrative of response to the Threat of terrorism, it gives a certain divine motivation and moral certainty to the actions taken.
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Inevitability of Victory | IV  | U.S.  | Linked to the Crusade, this narrative presents the idea that any actions taken against the ‘evil’ ‘Other’ will inevitability be successful due to their being taken on the side of God and by the Exceptional United States.
---|---|---|---|---|---|
War Against - | WT  | U.K.  | Equivalent to the American Crusade but without
Terrorism the same divine connotations giving scope for some non-military solutions alongside the generally more dominant militarism.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Narratives (Continued)</th>
<th>Battle Against Terrorism</th>
<th>BT France</th>
<th>The French version of the response narrative, Battle Against Terrorism can encompass militarism but underpins arguments against war in many cases pointing instead to social and political measures.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fight Against Terrorism</td>
<td>FT E.U.</td>
<td>The European response narrative is restricted by the differences between member states, and is thus a compromise reflecting this and the limited ability of the EU to act itself. It is therefore a narrative underpinning mostly non-military policies and a collective approach.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Gee (1999) notes that: ‘…any discourse analysis needs, at least to give some consideration, if only as background, to the whole picture.’ (p.92). Hodder (2000) adds: ‘…different types of texts have to be understood in the contexts of their conditions of production and reading.’ (p.704). The context of a document is important for understanding why particular themes, discourses and narratives might be emphasised over others. Thus, it was necessary to note contextual information for each document.21

The full sample could then be analysed.

Coding was not a purely mechanical process.22 As Dey (1993) describes: ‘Analysis often proceeds in tandem with data collection, rather than commencing on its completion.’ (p.37). Indeed, on reading a document it is impossible not to develop a sense of how the discourses and narratives are related and how they are used in the representations. It is also possible to get a feeling for developments over time when working through the documents. This sense of connections and themes running through the sample is effective for building towards later analyses of the material as a whole.

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21 This included the date it was published or that the speech was made, the type or genre of the document, the author, the location (of a speech) or place of publication (of an article), the title, and the intended audience. Not every document has all of this information. For example, some press releases or publications give no author; some even have no exact date. In addition the intended audience may be vague, however it is assumed that a speech made in a politician’s country is intended for a domestic audience, while one made elsewhere is for an international audience, unless there is an obvious reason why this should not be the case.

22 An explanation of the coding process and four sample documents are shown in Appendix A. Appendix B shows a sample cover sheet for contextual and coding information, including an explanation of the sheet.
The completion of discourse analysis is not necessarily accomplished at an absolute point given the iterative nature of the process. Phillips and Hardy (2002) say: ‘The end point comes not because the researcher stops finding anything new, but because the researcher judges that the data are sufficient to make and justify an interesting argument.’ (p.74). Thus, when the documents had yielded enough material to explain the construction of the state and the terrorist, providing convincing evidence of the presence and importance of the relevant discourses, the process could be brought to an end.

Quantitative Analysis

The use of quantitative techniques can be effective when working with some qualitative data (Kitchin and Tate, 2000, p.253; Silverman, 2000, p.185). Silverman identifies counting techniques as being an appropriate use of quantitative methods in qualitative research:

‘Simple counting techniques, theoretically derived and ideally based on members’ own categories, can offer a means to survey the whole corpus of data ordinarily lost in intensive, qualitative research. Instead of taking a researcher’s word for it, the reader has a chance to gain a sense of the flavour of the data as a whole.’ (p.185).

Quantitative data can be derived which highlights the relative frequency of different discourses and narratives in terms of their usage in the documents, and identifies changes in that frequency over time. It was used to augment the conclusions being drawn from the qualitative analysis and provide a framework in which these could be discussed. No quantitative analysis was carried out as part of the textual analysis; it was all applied to the documents as a whole, counting how many contained a given discourse or narrative.23

In order to produce data for given time periods it was first of all necessary to decide what these should be.24 September 11th is a key point in terms of terrorism. As fewer documents from before the event existed in the sample (Table 3.1), this was taken as one period. It had the advantage of accounting for the differences in starting point

23 Data for the given country were entered on an Excel spreadsheet, creating a table of the data for all the documents.
24 The EU sample, being smaller, was treated as a single period for the purposes of quantitative analysis.
between the countries if any comparisons were to be made. Following this, terrorism became a more prominent issue, making it useful to break this period down further. To gauge the initial impact of September 11th on the discourses and narratives, a second period was delineated from September 11th, 2001 to the end of that year. Three further time periods: 2002, 2003 and 2004 up to September 11th were then adopted. 2002 was the year in which arguments were emerging about Iraq and weapons of mass destruction, a development from the focus on September 11th and Afghanistan in late 2001. By 2003 the Iraq war was coming closer and eventually began in March. Finally 2004, at the end of the study period, saw the continuation of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan and the ‘war on terror’ more generally. Although these divisions loosely relate to unfolding events post-September 11th, they were divided according to the three years (or up to September 11th in 2004) following 2001. No other single event or day had the same impact to the issues relevant to the research as September 11th 2001, so this reduces the subjective choice of which events are suitable to mark the divisions and which are not, while still producing three periods that relate to the general evolution of events.

The percentages calculated from each period were those of the proportion of documents out of the total in which a discourse/narrative appeared. It was then possible to generate graphs. This allowed for a comparison of each discourse and narrative over time, and secondly of different discourses and narratives in a given time period. From the graphs it was possible to assess whether any of the discourses or narratives were so infrequent over the entire sample that they were not influential enough for inclusion in the discussion.25

There is a certain problematic element in using quantitative analysis on data that has originally been derived from qualitative analysis, but in this case the subject of the counting is definable enough to be counted and the quantitative analysis is basic enough to avoid interpretations that exaggerate the robustness of the data. It is important though to be aware of the way in which the data was generated and the limitations of the results when interpreting it. It is always necessary to be careful in the interpretation of

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25 In practice this only applied to a small number of narratives. This does not mean that any narrative that was relatively infrequently used was eliminated, the assessment involved more than just looking at the numbers as represented in the graphs, it also included drawing on interpretations from the discourse analysis.
quantitative results, but in this case they are to be treated as a guide to assist in understanding the qualitative data rather than an end in themselves.

Relationships, Patterns and Themes

When analysing documents it is possible to see particular patterns developing. Ideas are often repeated; at times they are built on over time, or are adapted in response to events. Some discourses and narratives are barely noticeable, and then come to the fore at another time. The interpretation and coding of the data can be thought of as an iterative process. Links and patterns in the discourses, narratives, and the representations and constructions that these underpin, emerge subconsciously at first then become clearer as more documents are subjected to the analytical process, and others are re-assessed. Placing this in the context of the graphs generated from quantitative data offers further clarity to the patterns by revealing how often each discourse/narrative occurs relative to each other in a given period.

The next component of the process was to identify the key themes in the data. Beginning by sorting the documents according to the discourses and narratives that they contained, the aim was to find quotes demonstrating how they were used in the given state.26 Fairclough (2001) reflects: ‘…if one’s concern is with the social values associated with texts and their elements, and more generally with the social significance of texts, description needs to be complimented with interpretation and explanation.’ (p.118). This stage of interpretation involved reading each quote, often several times, and considering what the common themes and linkages were, bearing in mind the contextual information about the document.27 Some quotes gave a particular insight into how a discourse was drawn upon, or how it contributed to the main themes; others contributed to the construction of the themes (for example, over time).

26 The first step in finding the quotes was to select a discourse or a narrative, or sometimes more than one where they were closely tied up with each other and therefore could be connected as part of a single theme. Where a document showed the existence of the discourse/narrative in question it was put aside. Then these documents were searched for any quotes identified at the discourse analysis stage. Those with such quotes were retained, and those without were discarded. This process was repeated for each discourse/narrative, starting again with the full sample each time.

27 Of particular significance was the date of the documents, as this could allow the quote to be set in the context of the trends identified in the graph.
To be able to focus on the central points, and produce an explanation, it was essential to select quotes. Those that reflected the same themes were grouped together, and a decision taken on which one did so most succinctly and clearly. Where one could encapsulate a number of points, this was also an advantage. By gradually reducing the selection of quotes, a small number covering all the important points related to the discourse/narrative were identified.28

The representativeness of these quotes was triangulated in two principal ways. Firstly, they were selected as the best examples from a larger number of quotes that showed similar features, and these in turn had been identified as examples of the way the given discourse/narrative was drawn upon. Secondly, they were triangulated with the quantitative analysis. Using the graphs it is clear how frequently the discourse/narrative being discussed occurs, and how it changes over time, it is consequently apparent how important each one is to the representations.

The final task was to organise the quotes to support the arguments and explanations. The quotes were re-read and considered in terms of the themes. For Fairclough (2001):

‘The objective of the stage of explanation is to portray a discourse as part of a social process, as a social practice, showing how it is determined by social structures, and what reproductive effects discourses can cumulatively have on those structures, sustaining them or changing them.’ (p.135).

Hence, in the explanation, the discourses and narratives, and how they are related, are discussed, as are the ways in which they are used to construct representations, and ultimately to underpin geopolitical codes.

In doing so, it was necessary to make connections with the relevant political and historical context of the given state. This context provides an important background for

28 It is worth noting that many quotes show evidence of a number of discourses and narratives, some of which may not be directly relevant to the particular point being discussed in relation to the quote. They may however have relevance in terms of how they are connected to the discourses/narratives in focus. A potential effect of this is that a quote may be identified in two or more of the searches, and obviously if used once cannot be used again. It was, therefore, necessary when deciding which quotes to use, to assess whether such a quote should be included at that stage, or kept for later where it might be more representative or offer greater insight on another point.
understanding and interpreting the (re)construction of discourses and narratives. They
are not produced in a vacuum, instead evolving from earlier versions and related to the
historical representation of the relevant state, its supposed characteristics, and its place
in the world. These historical and political imperatives impinge on the (re)production of
discourses and on the actions of powerful actors in the state, and so must be appreciated
as part of any explanation. The process of writing gives a further insight into the
importance of themes and how everything is connected. Thus, further reflection led in
many cases to an additional narrowing of the quote selection where some appeared to
stray too far from the important points, or to be overly repetitive in their representations.

Caveats

Certain caveats inevitably exist for any methodology, and that is true for this
thesis. The critical realist starting point and the concentration on the state, and in
particular state elites, as the focus for the analysis and the source of evidence of
geopolitical codes, offers useful boundaries for the research and allows for a discussion
of the neorealist discourses underlying state codes. At the same time it must be
recognised that there are other scales and actors with relevance that such a methodology
does not encompass. In essence the subject could be approached in a variety of ways
depending on the perspective taken.

As was noted above, there is a risk, perhaps even a necessity, that the mythology
applied and the understandings upon which this is based contribute to the reproduction
of the very discourses and narratives that are being critiqued in the research. In this
case, the application of a critical realist methodology seeks to uncover the realist
discourses that underpin the state and the geopolitical codes of individual states, and yet
by taking the state as the unit of analysis, and furthermore elite figures as representative
of the state, the study does not entirely move beyond the confines of neorealism.
Consequently, the binary discourses that are subjected to analysis can themselves
become the structures through which reality is interpreted and explained, and in so
doing these binaries are reinforced. An analysis of this type, while providing some
understanding of how discourses are reproduced by elites, and how these contribute to
geopolitical codes, does involve a degree of simplification even accounting for its more
critical elements when compared to straightforward neorealist analysis.
Alternative approaches might provide different interpretations by shifting the focus away from the state elites and their binary discourses, and instead looking at sub-state processes and actors. Examining the power relations, the economic and social processes at work within states and between states, and how this impinges upon geopolitics is an area that could potentially generate understandings less constrained by binary discourse and the state structures. However, the choice was made to concentrate in this case upon the state and its elites.

A second caveat of the methodology is the rhetorical nature of the speeches that formed the majority of the material analysed, and the extent to which the methods used can fully account for it. This rhetoric was referred to above and should be appreciated when interpreting the results of discourse analysis on such material. Ó Tuathail (2002) discusses political leaders and foreign policy officials as: ‘…professionally skilled rhetoricians whose job it is to construct arguments that resonate with popular common sense and to create social consensus through persuasion, enabling policy decision-making and action.’ (p.607). In other words rhetoric is deployed with the intention of making an argument acceptable to the intended audience and, through the application of ‘common sense’, to make their conclusions ‘obvious’ and ‘natural’. In so doing, the chosen policies of the speaker can be enacted with the general support of the audience; at least that is the intention. Ó Tuathail continues: ‘Statespersons are on a very public stage and act out certain roles and perform in expected ways before mass audiences.’ (p.608). The performance and the relationship with the audience are therefore crucial in a speech to a greater degree than for other sources. A politician is performing a speech to an audience lacing it with rhetoric to engage and convince.

The consideration of audience, and the potential of this to impact upon a speech is articulated by Ó Tuathail (2003) in relation to the American government’s efforts to make the case for the Iraq war:

‘A central challenge for the White House was that every time the president or a senior official made the pitch for the war, they were addressing multiple audiences: the US political class, the US public, the international community’s political class, and international public opinion, not to mention Saddam Hussein’s regime itself. The Bush administration concentrated on its core audience – the US electorate…’ (p.866).
This choice of audience therefore affects the way in which arguments are expressed, the sort of rhetoric used and how the speech is performed. Although discourse analysis as practiced in this research has advantages, as has been discussed here, the methodology is arguably less suited to determining the effect that the performance of geopolitical texts has on the representations and geopolitical codes that are being (re)constructed. Again, this is acknowledged and forms part of the context in which the study should be interpreted.

Conclusion

When researching geopolitical codes there is, from the beginning, a realist assumption underlying the discussion; geopolitical codes are generally associated with states, and therefore the state is the focus of the research. This is true for this research. However, while the state was the main unit of study, the methodology followed a critical realist path. Such an approach impacts upon the choices made throughout the research and how each element is understood.

A critical realist methodology offers the advantage of accepting that the state and the state system have been, and continue to be, the dominant organising theory and structure in geopolitics, without agreeing with the neorealist doctrine that privileges these as natural and unchanging. The state, and its powerful elites, can consequently be critiqued deploying critical methods, most notably discourse analysis. Furthermore, critical realism allows the neorealist structures to be understood as real, and yet to be so through their discursive construction. Likewise, and following from this, the geopolitical codes that the states adopt are also constructed through discourse as are the representations of the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’ made by elites as they (re)produce their policies.

Neorealist research would be constrained by the implicit assumption that the state system is an ever present structure and the superior product of modernity. Hence, the possibility of other actors gaining importance, and potentially disrupting the simplistic territorialities of the state is absent. As such, to approach an understanding of how regional governance might influence geopolitical codes, or even the full
implications, for these codes, of terrorists crossing state borders is impossible. Change
is not something that neorealism is comfortable with.

Thus, critical geopolitics appears to provide a mode of thought that can
overcome the strictures of neorealism and achieve an appreciation of how the state
actually comes into being, and how it is then continually reinforced. However, a purely
critical methodology is also deficient through its underestimation of the importance of
the state. Assuming that because discourse is vital to the construction of the state and
its geopolitical codes, at the expense of other actors, that it is not entirely real, ignores
the importance that the state has in international politics. The state remains a powerful
organizing principal, if a contested one. By virtue of the fact that it has been
constructed through neorealist discourse to hold this status and influence, it is worth
studying as the central unit in geopolitics.

The introduction of this critical aspect to a study that can be thought of as
(neo)realist in focus therefore offers significant advantages. It takes attributes from
both the neorealist and the critical geopolitics philosophies, combining them into a
methodology that can deconstruct that state and its codes, while still accepting that it is
an essential and real part of geopolitics in the post-Cold War world. It is not, though, a
methodology that is normally applied in a critical study, and so it is worth considering
the potential disadvantages of doing so. Given that, by definition, a critical approach
aims to move beyond an unquestioning acceptance of neorealism, there is arguably a
danger that by taking a neorealist starting point that very critical function is undermined.
The methods that have been prompted by the (neo)realist element might lend validity to
this argument. For example, by choosing states, and indeed three powerful states, the
neorealist discourse in question is reproduced. Nevertheless, it is impossible to truly
understand how such states and their elites achieve this power without studying them,
and the critical realist methodology creates an opportunity to do this in a critical way.
Hence, discourse analysis is the chosen method as the main tool in the research.
Although there may be a reproduction of the discourse, the de-construction that is
achieved through this methodology is arguably of greater worth. Essentially, the
principle on which the methodology and the research is built is that there cannot be an
effective analysis of geopolitics that does not acknowledge the impact of neorealism and
the state; if this is to be critically examined it is unavoidable that the state will have to be the focus.

This critical realist methodology is, therefore, one that holds advantages over either neorealism or critical geopolitics. The changes that have been occurring in the world since the end of the Cold War, and even more so after September 11th, make it essential that a methodology in geopolitical research such as this should be capable of accomplishing an investigation that will provide answers to questions on more than just the actions of states in relation to each other. The influence of other non-state or multi-state actors must also be considered, and yet it is still the states that dominate. Critical realism accepts that dominance, but does not give it a permanent or unchallenged status. The methodology outlined here points to a concentration on the state, but one that is critical of the way this is formed, and the dominance it has achieved; it promotes discourse analysis while accepting that this has limitations; the role of individual actors and context is also acknowledged. This methodology lies behind the results and discussion presented in the following chapters.
Chapter 4

Isolationism and Interventionism: the Geopolitical Codes of America’s Crusade for Freedom

Introduction

Underpinning this study is the assumption, implicit in the critical realist approach, that each state has its own codes. Fundamental to this is the acceptance that codes change over time and space. Consequently, it is the attributes of the place, in this case the United States, that lead to the development of its codes. The historical and political factors that impinge upon the state combine with discourse and narratives, producing geopolitical codes that are contextually sensitive.

Geopolitical codes, like the narratives and discourses that contribute to them, are not stable, but are instead continually evolving in response to events and the agency of influential actors. This process cannot be removed from the scales at which it occurs; in the American case they develop where national and global scales meet, being the product of factors active at these scales. As I have indicated, these factors are irreducible from temporal change, and therefore the codes are located in the context of long-term representations and policies of the state.

The place of the United States as the hegemon, both at present and as one of two superpowers in the Cold War, means that much of the geopolitics literature is about, or written from the perspective of, that state. As a consequence, many of the factors
impinging on America’s foreign policy, and hence contributing to its codes, have already been discussed in chapter two. Therefore, although I will begin by identifying what the principal factors are, my discussion will be relatively brief, concentrating more on the beginnings of the country, and the ideologies that emerged from these foundations.

Having shown what differentiates America from other states, the discussion proceeds to the discourses and narratives as revealed by discourse analysis. There were eight discourses identified in the American documents. These were Identity/Difference, Order/Disorder, Inside/Outside, East/West, Self/Other, Positive/Negative, Good/Evil and Threat. The dominance of binary discourses gives interpretations of the American political elites a strong binary character. Each of the discourses interacts with and reinforces the others; Identity/Difference is the discourse that underpins the rest supporting the division between the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’, the ‘Self’ being ‘positive’ and ‘good’, the ‘Other’ being ‘negative’ and ‘evil’. The ‘Self’, the American state, is on the ‘inside’ where there is ‘order’, while the ‘Other’ is ‘outside’ the state’s borders where ‘disorder’ exists. Furthermore, the Orientalist and Cold War binary of East/West relates to these binaries making the East the domain of the ‘Other’ and the ‘West that of the ‘Self’. Given these divisions, Threat is associated with the negative ‘Other’, which poses a danger to the ‘Self’. Binary discourse underpins the very idea of the sovereign state and has therefore also been central to geopolitical understandings in the United States, it is consequently unsurprising that similar binaries should be reproduced in post-Cold War and post-September 11th representations driving the formation of geopolitical codes at this time.

In addition, nine narratives found in the American documents will be discussed: Organic, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Rogue State, Law, Crusade, Inevitability of Victory, Coalition, Exceptionalism and Freedom. As with the discourses, these relate to one another and to the discourses; no single discourse or narrative can be considered entirely in isolation as they all influence each other making them place specific, not withstanding close similarities that some might have with those of other states. Due to this relationship, some narratives reinforce the positive image of the ‘Self’ and others the negative and threatening image of the ‘Other’, conforming to the structures established through the binary discourses, at the same time these narratives are
themselves crucial in the reproduction of the discourses as a result of the ideas that they make real. Again, the narratives are rooted historically, underpinned by state discourse as well as that specific to the United States. The relationships between the narratives, the discourses and their historical resonances are explored in the analysis.

Firstly, I will discuss how binary discourse has been used to divide the world into a disordered outside, from where Threats can emerge, and an ordered inside. Following this assessment of spatial discourses, the construction of the terrorist ‘Other’ as a negative for the reproduction of the ‘Self’ is addressed, before revealing how this Threat was widened to include Rogue States and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). I move on to look at the American response, focusing mainly on the establishment of a Crusade Against Terrorism, and how other states are accommodated within this. An attempt is then made to reconnect this Crusade with long-term American geopolitical influences by revealing the role of narratives of Exceptionalism and Freedom in this new, and yet familiar, worldview. Combining this with the historical and political context should allow a definition of the geopolitical code(s). In conclusion I will relate these to the context from which they emerged, emphasizing how it is these foundations that precipitate unique codes.

Construction of Geopolitical Codes: The American Context

The values and historical experiences that contributed to the formation of the United States as a state-nation have also come to define a national ‘Self’. This ‘Self’, and the values that it embodies, are represented as a model when America is engaging globally, and are defended from contamination during periods of disengagement. Two scales, the national and the global, are therefore those at which the factors influencing American geopolitical codes can be grouped (Table 4.1). This is only an approximation as they are in fact closely interrelated, overlapping and influencing each other.
Isolationism and Interventionism: the Geopolitical Codes of America’s Crusade for Freedom

Table 4.1

Factors Influencing American Geopolitical Codes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National</th>
<th>Global</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manifest Destiny</td>
<td>Expansionism/Interventionism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individualism</td>
<td>Isolationism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicanism</td>
<td>German/Japanese Threat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberty</td>
<td>Soviet Threat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exceptionalism</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The construction of the American ‘Self’ has its roots in the history and ideology of the colonizers. This was drawn from the Puritans. Bercovitch (1978) explains:

‘The American Puritan jeremiad was the ritual of a culture on an errand – which is to say, a culture based on a faith in process. Substituting teleology for hierarchy, it discarded the Old World ideal of stasis for a New World vision of the future.’ (p.23).

From these early foundations arose the notion that Americans were chosen by God and had a mission, America itself being a ‘holy land’. Bercovitch notes: ‘The significance of “holy land” depends on other lands not being holy… Moreover sacred history means the gradual conquest of the profane by the sacred.’ (p.178). This gave the colonization of North America, and the advance of the frontier, a meaning, the colonizers working towards their destiny as designed by the creator. The North American continent was being ‘geo-graphed’ as a wilderness, a space to be tamed by God’s ‘chosen’ people.

It is from this historical legacy that the concept of Manifest Destiny emerged. Manifest Destiny encompasses a belief in America’s God-given position as a people, and a country, whose role it is to spread the virtues that it (supposedly) embodies, firstly by the expansion of the country itself, and then to the wider world. Hook and Spanier (2004) reflect: ‘From the beginning, Americans professed a strong belief in what they considered to be their destiny – to spread, by example, freedom and social justice and to lead humankind away from its wicked ways to the New Jerusalem on earth.’ (p.12). Manifest Destiny is, therefore, not only a representation of Americans as a superior people, but involves the construction of America as a place that is itself superior (the New Jerusalem), and created by God for his chosen people to live in. Agnew (1983)
comments: ‘Up to and beyond continental boundaries, then, the political definition of the United States has been viewed in exceptionalist terms as the outcome of a unique often providential place “under the sun”.’ (p.154). This powerful concept brings together a people and the space they inhabit; its reproduction is itself a powerful tool to support, first the colonization and expansion across the North American continent, and thereafter to underpin American foreign policy.

Closely related to Manifest Destiny is individualism. Again, this is a factor predominantly operating at the national scale (Table 4.1) given its importance in constructions of American identity. The experience of the frontier, where individual colonialists progressively ‘tamed’ the wilderness, allowed this attribute to be written into the idea, or myth, of America, and reinforced it as a practical expression of how Americans were expected to behave and how governance should operate (with individual rights emphasized over collective rights). This is discussed by Perkins (1993):

‘Unlike French Republicans after 1789, the Americans seldom talked of a “national will” transcending the views of individuals. Although government intervened in economic matters much more than is suggested by polemicists expressing reverence for the policies of the Founding Fathers, and although, too, cooperative economic efforts became increasingly important, individual free enterprise was the model form, as befitted the nation of farms and farmers that America was at its birth.’ (p.11).

This reveals the way in which individualism became even more significant as an idea than it was in reality.

These factors in the construction of America cannot be separated from Enlightenment thought, also crucial in the emergence of the sovereign state. Hence, it was essential for the formation of the United States as an independent state, and in the construction of the identity that allowed that state to be differentiated from the ‘Other’, particularly the European ‘Other’, from which many colonists had escaped (e.g. the Puritans), and which they looked upon as inferior to the ‘new world’ they were creating. Thus: ‘Only America achieved a true synthesis of the philosophy of the Enlightenment. The belief in the perfectibility of man and the progressive nature of voluntary social
cooperation reconciled nature and history, individual rights and social justice.’ (Arieli, 1964, p.124). Manifest Destiny and American individualism sit within Enlightenment thought; the construction of America can appear to support a view of this country as the only true Enlightenment society. The foundations of Manifest Destiny in the Puritan vision of progress, corresponds with Enlightenment philosophy. Hence, it is America that is represented as a societal and governance model at its most advanced, an achievement allegedly unequalled in Europe.

From individualism and the model of society developed by the colonizers, comes the commitment to republicanism. Again this is discursively rooted in Enlightenment philosophy, while drawing on the Puritan tradition. Republicanism also lies in the first column of the table (4.1). It is another component of the American ‘Self’, the model of government, and of society, which is supposedly unique to the (chosen) American people, and to an imagined America ‘sited’ in the ‘empty’ space that the colonizers found on the North American continent. Perkins (1993) points to republicanism as a strand of an American ideology arising in the embryonic stages of the American state and identity: ‘The most important belief was a commitment to republicanism, a striking departure from an otherwise nearly universal commitment to monarchy.’ (p.10). This, once more, reflects an understanding by Americans that they were different from Europeans; only they could sustain a republican government true to Enlightenment ideals. In this narrative, the ‘chosen people’ were free of the constraints of the Old World and could therefore build the most progressive form of state, drawing on their individualism, and supporting the liberty that they had supposedly gained by settling in the New World.

Liberty is the next national factor (Table 4.1), and is closely connected with those already discussed. Indeed, Arieli (1964) argues: ‘Self-government and civil liberty, constitutionalism and republicanism, were derived not from the philosophy of natural rights but from the civil and religious traditions of the colonists. The polity of New England was the offspring of the Puritan way of life.’ (p.247). Liberty, as a component of the American idea, combines and is entangled with these other features all of which go back to the original Puritan beginnings of colonial America. The representation of America as an ‘empty space’ in which the colonizers were free to settle and live as individuals, unconstrained by hierarchical societies and oppression,
underpins the notion of America as ‘the land of the free’, the one place where liberty is possible.

This view was reinforced by the failure of the French Revolution, initially supported by Americans, to deliver the same degree of liberty that Americans saw as being available in their own country. Thus: ‘America was left as the bulwark of the rights of humanity, the sanctuary, the asylum and stronghold, of human liberty and human decency.’ (p.130). Human liberty is consequently a crucial feature in the construction of the American ‘Self’ and the ‘siteing’ of America as a space in which humanity could be truly free. The French example could be used as evidence reinforcing this. By, apparently, proving that the values enshrined in the American state could only be realized absolutely in America, the sense of uniqueness given by Manifest Destiny was reinforced.

This leads to the final factor in the national column of the table – Exceptionalism. Perkins says: ‘The exceptionalist interpretation stresses the view that the United States is unique, that its history is to a large degree not compatible with that of other nations.’ (p.232). Exceptionalism draws on the other factors in its assertion of the difference of America from the rest of the world – the ‘Others’. It is not merely different however, but unique, exceptional, in its qualities and in its nature. It is the American mission to spread human values around the world, just as they advanced across the North American continent with the colonists. This mission is unique to the Americans, as they are the only nation ‘chosen’ to accomplish it.

Two opposing trajectories operating at the global scale emerge directly from the national factors – expansionism and isolationism. These define the main approaches in American foreign policy and are essentially opposites. Hook and Spanier (2004) comment: ‘American foreign policy remains a story of pendulum-like swings between two contradictory impulses, both products of the nation’s self-image as an exceptional world power: morally inspired activism to save the world, and detachment from a sinful world.’ (p.353). Exceptionalism allows Americans to perceive their country to be the only power capable of saving the world, furthermore following Manifest Destiny, this is a role that they must fill. As God’s chosen people, it is the ‘right’ thing to do, and is therefore a moral duty. Simultaneously, given the inferiority that they attribute to the
outside world, there is a tendency to hold back from engagement with the ‘sinful world’ in order to protect the values and liberty that they believe the country allows.

There is, therefore, a strong basis for expansionism or interventionism within the founding principles of America: ‘America’s core values of political liberty, spiritual tolerance, and economic opportunity were meant for export. Their adoption overseas represented the fulfillment of America’s historic mission,’ (p.348). Manifest Destiny was not accomplished at the borders of the American state, but instead requires the spread of what are considered to be universal values to all parts of the world. This is the mission that America has been given by God. The world is therefore spatialised in a binary fashion by the discourse constructing the American ‘Self’; America is the space that is free, where human values have been adopted; the rest of the world is a space that requires America to act to spread those values, saving humanity. This, though, applies more to some spaces than to others.

The isolationist tendency stems from this binary depiction of the world. For the United States to become involved with other states would, through this discourse, leave it open to being dragged into the immoral practices that the colonizers left behind in Europe. This view pervaded American foreign policy from the beginning. As Perkins (1993) notes: ‘…involvement in the sordid politics of Europe could be and was regarded by the Americans as contaminating, a descent to the level of court intrigues and amoral national selfishness contrary to the principles of republicanism.’ (p.16). Therefore, for much of the 19th century, American involvement outside the Western hemisphere was limited.

Isolationism was also notable at the start of the two World Wars. Nevertheless, this factor has never entirely stopped the United States acting on a global scale, the expansionist tendency rarely being completely dormant. While the narrative underlying this suggests a righteous motive, differing from the ‘sordid’ practices of the Europeans, this is a reflection of the evolving American discursive structure through which it is represented as different and unique. The United States has, in fact, not always been restrained in its global engagements as became increasingly apparent in the 20th century, when it had become more powerful, ultimately achieving hegemonic status after the
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Second World War. Figures such as Alfred Mahan were influential in promoting greater external engagement and expansion of military power.

The country’s involvement in the World Wars was, however, a response to a perceived threat to America itself, if not necessarily an immediate or direct threat. As such, the country was forced to take a decision on whether to get involved, by the activities of Germany, and in the Second World War Japan, though thereafter the expansionist zeal underpinned the responses in terms of a representation, and belief, that America could fight evil and reform the world. Hook and Spanier (2004) reflect:

‘The German threat during World War I was not one of immediate invasion, nor was an invasion the main threat even after the defeat of France early in World War II. But the United States twice forsook its “splendid isolation” from foreign entanglements because American security was threatened. Just as in World War I, any state – especially an antidemocratic state – that controlled all the resources of Eurasia, the Middle East, and Africa, and then converted those resources into military power, might someday be able to attack North America.’ (p.10).

Thus, from the American perspective, the prospect of an evil ‘Other’ taking control of the rest of the (less pure) world posed a threat to America itself. This has a certain resonance with Mackinder’s ‘Pivot’ and ‘Heartland’ theories, and demonstrates the extent to which these ideas have continued to inform geopolitical thinking throughout the 20th century and beyond, despite so many changes in world politics (Ó Tuathail, 1992, p.101). Therefore, in order to protect America and its values, Americans felt it necessary to fight this ‘Other’ as part of their ongoing mission as assigned by God. Following this interpretation, it is they who represent good while the ‘Other’, in this case German or Japanese, represents evil.

Binary representations went on to underpin America’s Cold War discourse, as was discussed in chapter two. Orientalism could be extended to characterize the Soviet Union in the east as the negative ‘Other’ threatening the West and the United States in particular (Sharp, 2000). This newly constructed threat, together with the hegemonic role that the United States had acquired, gave the country a new reason for executing its expansionism in the wider world, at least when understood through the discourse of American identity, and in the context of Mackinder’s ‘pivot area’. The perceived threat
of the Soviet Union became absolutely central to American geopolitics; this threat therefore lies in the column of global factors (Table 4.1). Its implications were obviously considerable during the Cold War but have continued, as has also been discussed, in the post-Cold War period. Hence, it is of more consistent relevance to foreign policy than the relatively short lived German and Japanese threats; for all that they fitted into the evolving discourse and had an impact upon this.

**After the Cold War: New Threats in a Disordered World**

The end of the Cold War, and of the Soviet Union, did not mean that the discursive structure, developed in relation to this, suddenly disappeared. Instead, following Agnew and Corbridge (1995), the Cold War discursive structure remained, but was now exposed to a changed reality and would need to adapt to this. Running through the whole discursive structure, and underpinning the rest of the discourses and narratives, is the binary discourse of Identity/Difference. This is the discourse that Connolly (1991) identified as central to the establishment of an identity; in this case the identity being established is that of the state – the United States – made real through the binary discourse and continual (re)emphasis of the difference from inferior ‘Others’.

Identity/Difference is the basic binary through which the other binary discourses are constructed, therefore its presence is not specifically identified in the documents, but it is necessarily drawn upon when these other discourses and the related narratives are reproduced.

A binary characterization of an ordered inside and a disordered outside is apparent. This corresponds with the longstanding American understanding of the outside world as being less enlightened than America itself: ‘…America’s version of enlightenment, exceptionalism, was premised on being able to escape and abolish the ambiguity of European freedom.’ (Burke, 2005, p.322). Given that the, apparently stable, Cold War order had evaporated; there was a need to understand the new situation. Threats such as the Soviets and the Germans came from the outside, and therefore any new enemy could also be assumed to be external, such as in the case of the Oklahoma bombing (Sparke, 1998).
Although not one of the most common discourses, Order/Disorder does appear in almost 30% of documents analysed, similar in number to the East/West discourse, but Inside/Outside is more frequent, occurring in over 40% of documents (Figure 4.1). Prior to September 11th Order/Disorder was relatively infrequent compared to the other discourses (Figure 4.2), a relationship becoming more distinct after the attacks (Figure 4.3). The focus was on the character of the terrorists rather than where they had come from, and why. Consequently, the trend is apparent for East/West and Inside/Outside, the latter changing from the third most common discourse before September 11th to the fifth afterwards (Figures 4.2 and 4.3).

In 2002 these three discourses remained the most infrequent but were closer to the rest (Figure 4.4) as the terrorist’s location, a disordered, eastern outside, became more important in representations and responses. The trend continued in 2003 when East/West became the most frequently occurring of the three (Figure 4.5), and in 2004 when it was the third most common, while Order/Disorder was more limited again (Figure 4.6). These changes accompanied the build up to, and then the execution of, the invasion of Iraq, a country in the ‘east’. In addition, once the Threat had been located in the disordered outside, there was, perhaps, less need to draw so heavily on these discourses.

Figure 4.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discourses</th>
<th>Occurrence of Discourses in all American Documents (1993-2004)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IO – Inside/Outside</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO – Self/Other</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GE – Good/Evil</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OD – Order/Disorder</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EW – East/West</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TH – Threat</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PN – Positive/Negative</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 4.2

Occurrence of Discourses Pre-September 11 (U.S.)

- IO - Inside/Outside
- SO - Self/Other
- GE - Good/Evil
- OD - Order/Disorder
- EW - East/West
- TH - Threat
- PN - Positive/Negative

Figure 4.3

Occurrence of Discourses in 2001 Post-September 11 (U.S.)

- IO - Inside/Outside
- SO - Self/Other
- GE - Good/Evil
- OD - Order/Disorder
- EW - East/West
- TH - Threat
- PN - Positive/Negative
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**Figure 4.4**

Occurrence of Discourses in 2002 (U.S.)

- IO – Inside/Outside
- OD – Order/Disorder
- PN – Positive/Negative
- SO – Self/Other
- EW – East/West
- GE – Good/Evil
- TH – Threat

**Figure 4.5**

Occurrence of Discourses in 2003 (U.S.)
Figure 4.6

Occurrence of Discourses in 2004 (U.S.)

Figure 4.7

The Inside/Outside, Order/Disorder and East/West Discourses Over Time (U.S.)

Figure 4.7 provides a comparison of these discourses over time. Inside/Outside and Order/Disorder are fairly consistent with dips after September 11th, particularly in the case of Order/Disorder. East/West also has a low point following the attacks, where character is more important than spatial origin, but apart from that, there is a steady increase in frequency. This reflects the change in focus of the Threat from the outside
in general after the Cold War, to the Middle East, and countries like Afghanistan and Iraq, as responses to September 11th were formulated.

Through the Cold War discursive structure it was ‘obvious’ for Americans to see the outside world as chaotic and potentially threatening. Debrix (2005) identifies this tendency: ‘The USA, with its embracing of terror, must always measure itself against new opponents, new enemies, new warrior classes, new insurgencies, and new forms of tyranny.’ (p.1170). The Coordinator for Counterterrorism in the Department of State reflects this in the following description in 1996 when speaking to the Denver Council on Foreign Relations:¹

The fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War did not, alas, bring forth the “End of History” or a new dawn of world peace and harmony. Instead, this change brought into sharper focus serious global problems and threats. You’ve heard the list before: as ethnic conflict, weapons proliferation, environmental degradation, untenable population growth, international crime, and terrorism. (Wilcox, 1996)

This is a description of a disordered world, and a world that is dangerous for that disorder. There is a list of problems or Threats all of which compound a sense of turmoil, terrorism is among them, but no more prominent than others such as weapons proliferation. The passage demonstrates an increasing unease by the mid-1990s, but one that has not yet formulated into a single Threat or enemy. Wilcox refers to the ‘end of history’ argument made by Fukayama (1989), who suggested that America’s Cold War victory represented a victory of the American ideology and system of government. For Wilcox this is clearly not the case, which follows the historical American view of the world, in which they stand alone as the most enlightened people and country. If this is so, a continuing struggle makes ‘sense’, diminishing Fukayama’s argument.

Order/Disorder works with Inside/Outside, which is often drawn on with words like ‘home’ and ‘abroad’. As Walker (1993) notes, this discourse is central to realism, where there is a clear distinction between the domestic and the international, and where it is ‘natural’ for boundaries to be drawn around states, and for the world to be divided

¹ ‘Founded in 1938 as a committee of the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, the Denver Council on Foreign Relations (DCFR) is incorporated as an independent, non-partisan, non-profit organization. Since 1993 it has been located at the Graduate School of International Studies (GSIS), University of Denver.’ (DCFR, 2007).
up into distinct territorial units.  As Walker argues, this binary separates political thought and international relations.  It therefore allows the values of the American state to be distinguished from the disorder and lack of values that are said to exist outside, and in turn for terrorism to be distinguished between its international and domestic varieties.

Hence, in 1996, the year after the Oklahoma bombing, Defense Secretary, William Perry notes in a speech to the American Bar Association that:

Domestic Terrorism is a crime against the order and tranquility of our nation. International terrorism is an assault on the peace and stability of the world. (Perry, 1996)

The inside and outside are clearly differentiated and order and disorder are highlighted, terrorism being associated with the later. At this point there is recognition that terrorism can originate on the inside as well as the outside, but it is not the same.

However, this hint at greater complexity does not last. In 2000 The National Commission on Terrorism\(^2\) again draws on the Inside/Outside discourse:

International terrorism once threatened Americans only when they were outside the country. Today international terrorists attack us on our own soil. (National Commission on Terrorism, 2000)

This, from an apparently authoritative source, helps to embellish the Threat provided by terrorism by showing how it no longer exists only on the outside where there is disorder. Consequently, it is all the more dangerous. Within this, there is a sense in which the fluidity of borders may have increased allowing the Threat from outside to come in to the homeland. According to O’Dowd (2002), borders help to define ‘us’ and ‘them’, they are a component in the reproduction of the Self/Other discourse that is also apparent in the passage. Anderson and O’Dowd (1999) accept that the role of state borders is changing and becoming more complex, but still maintain that they are relevant. The American example appears to demonstrate this, as there is still a repeated

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\(^2\) The Commission on Terrorism was created in 1999 to ‘…review the laws, regulations, directives, policies and practices for preventing and punishing international terrorism directed against the United States…’ (The National Commission on Terrorism, 2000). The Commissioners were chosen by the leaders of the parties in the Senate and House of Representatives.
differentiation of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ drawing on binary discourse that also helps in
the reproduction of ‘Self’ and ‘Other’. New threats are constructed through this binary,
ignoring the implications of globalization.

During the Cold War, an East/West binary owed much to Orientalist
representations. Given that the discursive structure evolved from that of the Cold War,
it would therefore be unsurprising if this were to continue. Often the discourse is drawn
on in reference to ‘The West’, which by implication distinguishes it from ‘the East’.
Thus, we might see references to ‘western military superiority’ (Hughes, 1999), where,
as expected, the West is ‘better’ than the East.

President Clinton, speaking at the OSCE summit in 1999, suggests that the
Middle East is a region that marks a division between the ordered West and the
disordered East.

So much of the future of the 21st century will turn on developments in
the vast region that lies between traditional notions of Asia and Europe,
between the Muslim world and the West, between the parts of our
community that are stable and prosperous and democratic, and those still
struggling to build basic human security and freedom. (Clinton, 1999)

In line with Said’s (1978) Orientalism, and with Cold War discourses of East and West,
he is representing the East as disordered and inferior to the West, which is ‘stable’,
‘prosperous’ and ‘democratic’. The East is, in comparison, ‘struggling’ and lacking
‘freedom’. It is noticeable that the East is described as the ‘Muslim world’, a
connection that is relevant to the association between terrorism, Islam, and the East, that
is increasingly developed. The binary of Occident and Orient that Said identifies,
comfortably correlates with the American identity and could easily be written into
discourses of the Cold War where East and West was an important binary (Sharp,
2000), and now influences the post-Cold War world. Clinton can therefore represent
the Middle East as lacking in the virtues of America, such as Freedom (liberty), and
therefore it is disordered and threatening. To do so also reinforces the argument for
American intervention in the region in furtherance of American economic and political
interests. Therefore, the significance of the rhetoric cannot be ignored.
A narrative worth noting is the Organic character of terrorism. This is at its peak before September 11th, occurring in more than a quarter of documents, but is never particularly frequent (*Figure 4.8*). The attacks led to a reduction and thereafter it fluctuated. When a range of Threats was being represented, this was a useful narrative to support the vague sense of disorder, but September 11th focused the Threat on terrorism, reducing the need for such emphasis. Where there is no Freedom, the Organic narrative appears to suggest conditions are right for terrorism to ‘breed’ like some sort of weed or cancer. Philip Wilcox says (to the DCFR): ‘Terrorism often emerges from the breeding grounds of political, economic and ideologic conflict.’ (1996). Here again is a link between the production of terrorism and disordered spaces. The places where terrorism comes from are represented using the Organic narrative:

> We have often seen terrorists take advantage of countries where they can do their training, do their planning, do their equipping in safety. Now, a lot of those swamps as we call them, have been drained over time. (Hull, 2001)\(^3\)

These ‘disordered’ places are described as ‘swamps’ suggesting a murky and distasteful place where one might find dangerous creatures. By ‘draining’ these metaphorical ‘swamps’, the conditions for the development of terrorism are, supposedly, removed.

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\(^3\) This quotation comes from a press briefing by the acting Coordinator for Counterterrorism, following the release of the annual ‘Patterns of Global Terrorism’ report.
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and so the world becomes safer. The phrase ‘breeding grounds’ draws on the imagery of terrorism as some sort of disease or monster. Such conditions are found, it is said, in the East, an ‘obvious’ assertion given the historical context.

September 11th and the Characterization of the ‘Other’

September 11th had a dramatic effect on American (geo)politics:

‘It might be argued that the Cold War finally ended on 11 September 2001. The US has entered into a new realm of geopolitics, still dedicated to the expansion of the New World Order but with drastic alterations in the role of military power.’ (Boggs, 2002, p.247).

However, representations and responses made in the aftermath cannot be separated from earlier post-Cold War understandings, and of course longer-term worldviews. What the attacks did do was to focus the sense of Threat upon terrorism. It also prompted a clearer characterization of terrorism as a negative ‘Other’, reinforcing the positive representation of the ‘Self’, and of the American values, and vision for the world.

In line with the self-image of America as superior and detached from the ‘sordid’ activities of less enlightened parts of the world, the United States is repeatedly represented as essentially peaceful and working for the good of the world: ‘While other countries have interests, the United States has sustained the pretension that it additionally embodies, unlike other great powers of the past, values of benefit to all…’ (Falk, 2004, p.248). This correlates with its supposed exceptional role assigned by God.

In accordance, Bill Clinton told the UN General Assembly in 1998:

…we are no threat to any peaceful nation and we believe the best way to disprove these claims is to continue our work for peace and prosperity around the world. For us to pull back from the world’s trouble spots, to turn our backs on those taking risks for peace, to weaken our own opposition to terrorism, would hand the enemies of peace a victory they must never have. (Clinton, 1998b)

Noticeable in this extract is the use of words like ‘we’, ‘our’ and ‘us’, against ‘they’ and ‘enemies’. In terms of Connolly’s (1991) ‘identity/difference’, for the American ‘Self’ to be positive ‘others’ cannot be the same, a negative ‘Other’ is essential to create the difference that defines the positive ‘Self’. This logocentrism has been a feature of
American identity from the beginning; the ‘Other’ may have varied from Europe and Native Americans in the early days, to Germany and then the Soviet Union. The United States view understands peace as a virtue ascribed to America that is absent elsewhere in the disordered world, only by engaging with that world can ‘they’ be challenged and peace delivered.

The terrorist ‘Other’ is, therefore, attributed a whole range of negative characteristics to produce a clear division from the ‘Self’ and, in so doing, construct that ‘Self’ in a more positive light. As such: ‘Terrorists also use violence in a less focused way to express protest and rage, to advance messianic and fanatic religious agendas, and for even more obscure pathological reasons.’ (Wilcox, 1996). They: ‘…share a hatred for democracy, a fanatical glorification of violence, and a horrible distortion of their religion to justify the murder of innocents.’ (Clinton, 1998a). Furthermore, they are ‘barbaric’ and ‘indiscriminate’ (Holbrooke, 1999), and ‘cowardly merchants of terror’ (Cohen, 1998). The terrorist is apparently unstable, shown by their lack of focus, their ‘rage’, ‘fanaticism’, ‘hatred’, not to mention ‘pathological reasons’, ‘barbarism’ and ‘indiscriminate’ actions.

Each of these terms acts to reinforce the idea of a crazed lunatic who cannot be predicted or reasoned with. They appear completely at odds with ‘normal’, ‘civilized’ people and are therefore all the more dangerous and threatening. In addition, there is a religious dimension to the terrorists’ character, but one that does not conform to that of America. It is ‘their religion’ – Islam – which comes from the outside, from the east, but to make matters worse, it is ‘horribly distorted’ by these ‘cowards’. This conforms to Corlett’s (2003) definition of terrorism, which places it outside the realm of the state, as an act carried out by non-state actors. As such it is anathema in a neorealist worldview and can therefore always be wrong, mad, and consequently dangerous. Thus, the binary discourses of Self/Other and Positive/Negative are reproduced and fused together, along with that of Threat, as terrorism is built up piece by piece as a worthy replacement for the Soviet Union in the discursive structure.

Being contrary to the rules of neorealism makes terrorism a particularly ‘threatening’ enemy. Dalby (2003) reflects:
‘The suggestion is that the modern geopolitical reasoning of political elites in America in particular, but in other states as well, constrains the interpretation of the politics precisely because they operate in terms of a political ontology of states whether understood as autonomous actors, or in a more sophisticated sociology, as a society of states.’ (p.64).

Terrorists can act in ways that states cannot, as they do not follow the same territoriality and have a different spatial logic. These characteristics can be used in the imagery of terrorism generated by policy-makers to reinforce the sense of menace, and therefore provide a discursive logic for their policy decisions. This is apparent in discussions by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in 2004, firstly at the Greater Miami Chamber of Commerce and then at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in Singapore, when the impact of September 11th is firmly established in the (re)construction of terrorism. In an election year, the re-emphasis on the ‘Other’ and the Threat posed by it should be expected. The unpredictability of this modern enemy, and the resulting danger, remains at the centre of the discussion:

The central fact of terrorism is this. It is that a terrorist can attack at any time at any place using any technique and it is absolutely impossible to defend that every time of the day or night in every place against every conceivable technique. (Rumsfeld, 2004a)

And furthermore:

Future dangers will less likely be from battles between great powers, and more likely from enemies that work in small cells, that are fluid and strike without warning anywhere, anytime – enemies that have access to increasingly formidable technology and weapons. (Rumsfeld, 2004b)

Increasing fluidity, a component of globalization, appears to underpin Rumsfeld’s thinking. Virilio’s (1997) concept of ‘pure war’ suggests that power is related to speed. Rumsfeld is constructing a terrorist Threat that is dangerous because it has power derived from fluidity, hence it can ‘strike’ ‘anywhere, anytime’. For Virilio, technology and speed create a situation where war is in the preparation, this is ‘pure war’. The military must continue to develop and accumulate sophisticated weapons in response to an alleged Threat. However, Luke and Ó Tuathail (2000) point out that: ‘The significance of geopolitics may appear to be fading for some; yet, as Bosnia, Rwanda, Taiwan, Kashmir and numerous other places remind us, its heavy hand still shapes life.
and death across the planet.’ (p.378). While Virilio’s contention that space is eliminated by speed may not be completely true, representation of the terrorist Threat as being more fluid than those in the past, allows Rumsfeld to justify a greater militarism in response, similar to Virilio’s argument.

The Threat discourse was the most frequent before September 11th, and the need to characterize a negative ‘Other’ meant that Positive/Negative was the second most common, in terms of numbers of documents in which it appeared (Figure 4.2). Immediately after September 11th Threat is overtaken by Positive/Negative (and Good/Evil) (Figure 4.3). This reflects the fact that the focus is on characterizing the terrorists in a negative way to emphasize the difference from the ‘Self’, the Threat now being more singular than before. In Figure 4.9 this change is noticeable as Threat, which was previously in almost 90% of documents, falls back to around 60%, while Positive/Negative is more consistent, rising only slightly.

Figure 4.9

The Threat and Positive/Negative Discourses Over Time (U.S.)

Threat recovers from 2002 onwards, while Positive/Negative is a little more variable but remains fairly consistent. The importance of these two discourses is more apparent when comparing them to others in 2002 (Figure 4.4), 2003 (Figure 4.5) and 2004 (Figure 4.6). Threat returns to being the dominant discourse with Positive/Negative not far behind. Having established the idea of the negative nature of terrorists, and the risk they ‘must’ pose to the ‘Self’, by drawing on real events, this could be continually reproduced as responses are formulated and enacted. The addition
of further Threats (e.g. Iraq) allowed this process to continue, and the negativity and consequent Threat could continue to be reproduced. The result is that these two discourses appear in more documents than any other over the study period (Figure 4.1).

Good/Evil is a closely related discourse. It is familiar from Cold War representations where, for example, Ronald Reagan described the Soviet Union as ‘the Evil Empire’. The discourse helps to reinforce the separation of ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ by removing any possibility of nuance. Bhatia (2005) describes how the background to a terrorist attack becomes irrelevant when approached through this discourse: ‘Once a terror attack occurs, it is held that all such historiography should be consigned to the proverbial scrap heap. It now becomes a matter of pure “evil”, with no history or reason.’ (p.17). If something is evil then it cannot be accepted or tolerated in any way, it is totally wrong and extremely dangerous and threatening. Hence, there can only be one response to it, and that response is ‘good’. This allows America, and the American government’s actions, to be portrayed as ‘right’ and ‘unavoidable’, and prevents any questioning of those actions.

Figure 4.10

The Good/Evil Discourse Over Time (U.S.)

Good/Evil is the third most common discourse overall (Figure 4.1), but before September 11\textsuperscript{th} it had occurred in approximately the same number of documents as Inside/Outside and Self/Other, and fewer than Threat and Positive/Negative (Figure 4.2). With no single ‘Other’, such a strong characterization was difficult.
11th led to this discourse combining with Positive/Negative in the negative representations of terrorism, and so they were the most frequent discourses (Figure 4.3). This was the peak of the Good/Evil discourse (Figure 4.10). Thereafter it declined, relatively (Figures 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6), and absolutely (Figure 4.10) as the image had been established, it was now ‘obvious’ that the terrorist was ‘evil’.

Consequently, following September 11th, it made ‘sense’ that such an act could be carried out, and in turn the evidence of the attack could be used to prove that the terrorists were ‘evil’ and reinforced the discourse. This discourse become dominant immediately, as is apparent from Bush’s address on the evening of September 11th: ‘Today our nation saw evil, the very worst of human nature.’ And then: ‘…we go forward to defend freedom and all that is good and just in our world.’ (Bush, 2001a). He not only uses the term ‘evil’ itself, but also constructs a binary division between Americans and the terrorists. While ‘they’ are the ‘worst of human nature’ and therefore beyond salvation, ‘we’ are ‘good’ and ‘just’ and will ‘defend freedom’.

Repetition of the term ‘evil’ reinforces the discourse, and its effect is to remove the terrorists and their behavior from normal humanity and debate. They are not ‘civilized’, they are ‘evil’, and there is therefore no justification or argument that can be made for them. Boggs (2002) comments: ‘Terrorism in the official wisdom winds up reduced to an evil act, pure and simple, although virtually any form of US military intervention – no matter how ill conceived or destructive – becomes a regrettably necessary instrument of progress.’ (p.243). Bush reiterates the distinction between the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’ in this statement at the FBI Headquarters:

The people who did this act on America, and who may be planning further acts, are evil people. They don’t represent an ideology, they don’t represent a legitimate political group of people. They’re flat evil. That’s all they think about, is evil. And as a nation of good folks, we’re going to hunt them down, and were going to find them, and we will bring them to justice. (Bush, 2001e)

There is a strong rhetorical tone to statements such as this, as Bush tries to encourage Americans, his principal intended audience, to support himself, his government and his policies in response to September 11th. In addition, we can see what Keohane (2002) describes as the ‘public delegitimation of terrorism’ (p.141). This involves ‘normative
arguments’ that divide civilized states and dangerous terrorists. It is this difference that definitions of terrorism, such as that of Corlett, often represent, and Keohane argues that by delegitimizing terrorism, strengthens states through the war that is waged against it. Therefore, Bush and others laid the ground for the ‘war against terrorism’ by reinforcing the division between terrorist and state, and the comparative legitimacy of the two actors.

This distinct contrast between terrorist and American is starkly drawn in the following passage, where Bush is addressing the American nation:

We value life; the terrorists ruthlessly destroy it. We value education; the terrorists do not believe women should be educated or should have health care; or should leave their homes. We value the right to speak our minds; for the terrorists, free expression can be grounds for execution. We respect people of all faiths and welcome the free practice of religion; our enemy wants to dictate how to think and how to worship even to their fellow Muslims. (Bush, 2001f)

Chomsky (2002) identifies that, as constructed by powerful actors, terrorism includes only acts against ‘us’ and excludes what we do to ‘them’, which is counterterrorism and is therefore justified. The real events of September 11th are drawn on in the construction of a terrorist ‘Other’ that is dangerous and threatening due to negative characteristics assigned to it. This reproduces earlier discourse and the sense of Threat developed after the Cold War; the dramatic events are invoked, allowing the construction of the terrorist to be reinforced. If the terrorist is ‘evil’ then something must be done; this conforms to the logic of Manifest Destiny.

Developing the Threat: ‘An Axis of Evil’

A general threat from ‘evil’ terrorists was therefore an accepted ‘reality’ following September 11th, but in 2002 it was developed further with the introduction of new elements – Rogue States and Weapons of Mass Destruction. This stems from the incompatibility of the (neo)realist discourse underpinning the state, and the non-state terrorist networks that now had to be comprehended: ‘The difficulty of dealing with “shadowy networks” rendered traditional locational targeting of a (“rogue”) nation-state a logical solution.’ (Ettlinger and Bosco, 2004, p.253). If there is one point when this
change occurs it is the State of the Union Address on the 29\textsuperscript{th} of January. Firstly Bush argues that:

\begin{quote}
We must prevent the terrorists and regimes who seek chemical, biological or nuclear weapons from threatening the United States and the world.
\end{quote}

Then he continues by coining a famous phrase that embodies this new combined Threat:

\begin{quote}
States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. (Bush, 2002b)
\end{quote}

In these passages Threat still underpins references to terrorism, but is now joined by the narratives of Rogue States and WMD. These have been seen before as part of the selection of Threats after the Cold War, but not directly linked to terrorism in most cases. Now a rhetorical link is made – they are, he says, ‘allies’ and ‘could provide these arms to terrorists’. By using the term ‘axis’ he draws parallels with the Second World War, when America’s enemies (e.g. Germany, Italy, Japan) were known as the ‘axis powers’. This historical reference adds to the negative and threatening image that is being constructed. Bush claims that the danger is ‘growing’ and the Threat is becoming greater. Since the terrorists are now firmly established, through discourse, as ‘evil’ and unrestrained, they would ‘obviously’ use these weapons if provided with them by the Rogue States. Given his position of power, the President speaks with authority on these matters in this widely observed annual speech, and the connections made appear to make ‘sense’ in the context of the discourses and narratives that have been developed both before and after September 11\textsuperscript{th}.

Weapons of Mass Destruction and Rogue State are the fourth and sixth most widely occurring narratives overall (Figure 4.11), but this masks some important variations over time. Before September 11\textsuperscript{th}, they were two of the most frequent (Figure 4.12), part of the selection of vague dangers. The attacks on America briefly changed this as the attention moved to terrorism. Hence, they are comparatively minor at this time (Figure 4.13). The graph in Figure 4.17 demonstrates this dramatic fall in
both narratives, but also that they recover again in 2002. Figure 4.14 shows how they now compare favorably with most other narratives. This is a time when the ‘axis of evil’\(^4\) is being identified and the case for a war with Iraq is being constructed. Thus, in 2003 both narratives reach their peak, WMD at over 70% and Rogue State at over 50% (Figure 4.17). Consequently, WMD is the second most frequent narrative and Rogue State is the fourth (Figure 4.15). This corresponds with the war in Iraq where such representations are at their peak in order to justify this action. By 2004 the attention on Iraq has, unsurprisingly, declined somewhat and so these narratives are no longer so widely used relative to the others (Figure 4.16) or in absolute terms, falling considerably from the previous year (Figure 4.17).

\(^4\) This was a phrase and a concept made famous by George Bush’s 2002 State of the Union Address, from which the passage above is drawn. It was an attempt to discursively connect a number of states that the American government considered to be enemies, together with terrorists as one ‘evil’ ‘Other’. In the Address, the states referred to were North Korea, Iran and Iraq, but subsequently this ‘axis’ varied with other states such as Syria or Cuba potentially being part of it, depending on who was using it and when. The key feature of this phrase is its flexibility as a convenient means of bundling any state or group together as one enemy, this also makes it ill-defined and unclear as to what it actually means in practice.
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**Figure 4.12**

Occurrence of Narratives Pre-September 11 (U.S.)

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<th>Narratives</th>
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CT – Crusade Against Terrorism  
EX – Exceptionalism  
CI – Coalition  
IV – Inevitability of Victory  
OG – Organic  
LW – Law  
WD – Weapons of Mass Destruction  
FR – Freedom

**Figure 4.13**

Occurrence of Narratives in 2001 Post-September 11 (U.S.)

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**Figure 4.14**

![Occurrence of Narratives in 2002 (U.S.)](image1)

**Figure 4.15**

![Occurrence of Narratives in 2003 (U.S.)](image2)
While initially the new Threat was presented as a general one, a number of Rogue States that might now provide WMD to terrorists – an axis of evil – once this was established in public consciousness, policy-makers focused the Threat on a single state – Iraq. This conformed to their strategic and policy interests in the Middle East generally and the specific antagonistic relationship that had existed between America
and Iraq since 1991. The ideas of Rogue States and an axis of evil have a strong spatial character. By assigning some states as ‘Rogue’ this contributes to a spatialization of the ordered and disordered parts of the world. The state involves the territorialization of a specific bounded space where that state’s authorities have a theoretical sovereignty, if a state is said to be rogue then by extension this applies to the space, the territory that it controls. By grouping such states, no matter how unlikely the connections, together with the description of an axis of evil, the presence of evil is itself spatialized through the territories of these states and the suggestion that there is a linkage between them. The spaces are no longer just ‘rogue’, however, they have moved a stage further and become the territories of ‘evil’; they are ‘evil’ spaces.

Despite the fact that the September 11th attacks were not connected to Iraq, and that they did not involve WMD, Bush could use the ‘evil’ character of terrorists that had been reinforced after the attacks, and the Threat that that implied, to associate them with the other Threats that were already believed to exist. Iraq was an enemy, a Rogue State, and so if Rogue States were part of an ‘axis of evil’, Iraq was ‘obviously’ one of them. Thus, Iraq was now implicitly connected to September 11th.

Such an alleged connection became increasingly specific, and use of examples appeared to give added authority to the claims. In October 2002, Bush made a speech on the subject in Cincinnati Museum Center, asserting that:

We know that Iraq and the al Qaeda terrorist network share a common enemy – the United States of America. We know that Iraq and al Qaeda have had high-level contacts that go back a decade. Some al Qaeda leaders who fled Afghanistan went to Iraq. These include one very senior al Qaeda leader who received medical treatment in Baghdad this year, and who has been associated with planning for chemical and biological attacks. We’ve learned that Iraq has trained al Qaeda members in bomb-making and poisons and deadly gases. And we know that after September the 11th, Saddam Hussein’s regime gleefully celebrated the terrorist attacks on America. (Bush, 2002f)

The two enemies are said to share common negative characteristics, and are therefore supposed to be on the same side, that of evil. In a binary relationship there can only be friends or enemies. This is indicative of a process of bundling Threats into one more threatening Threat; or, as Putzel (2006) puts it: ‘…establishing an unbroken thread
between terrorist attacks and states the US deems to be “rogues”.’ (p.73). By doing so policy-makers build more solid foundations on which to base the justifications for their actions.

This discursive construction continues as the argument is made for a war in Iraq. Ettlinger and Bosco (2004) reflect: ‘Al-Qaeda was a catalyst in the war against Iraq, used, as it were, to focus US attention on a more familiar foe, as well as on a more spatially concise set of targets.’ (p.250). By linking Iraq directly to al-Qaeda it becomes easier to make a convincing case to the American public, as the effect of September 11th is harnessed, placing Iraq on the opposite side of the binary from America, and assigning it a level of responsibility for the attacks:

Or worse, if we find a post-9/11 nexus between Iraq and terrorist organizations that are looking for just such weapons – and I would submit and will provide more evidence that such connections are now emerging and we can establish that they exist – we cannot wait for one of these terrible weapons to show up in one of our cities and wonder where it came from after its been detonated by al-Qaida or somebody else. (Powell, 2003)5

The placing of a hypothetical attack in an American city draws on the real events of September 11th by evoking the idea of future more lethal attacks. This allows the ‘nexus’ to be made more real and dangerous, and thus makes the need for it to be challenged appear more urgent and ‘obvious’. As Falah, Flint and Mamadouh (2006) note: ‘The United States of America, acting as hegemonic power, constructed its 2003 war on Iraq as just with rhetorical tools unavailable to nonhegemonic states.’ (p.142). It was now ‘common sense’ that Rogue States, and in particular Iraq, were part of the same threatening ‘Other’, if one had WMD then the logic followed that they would all have WMD.

Common sense is an important part of writing a ‘truth’. As Sharp (2000) identified, it was drawn on in the Cold War to simplify the world and make particular points seem ‘obvious’. Thus, if terrorists and Rogue States can be constructed as negative ‘Others’, then it is ‘common sense’ that they are working together in a nexus. Furthermore, if this is so, then it is also ‘common sense’ that America must fight them

5 This is a passage from a speech to the UN Security Council.
given the Threat they apparently pose. With the new, more deadly, Threat constructed, it is possible to argue for a war that would remove the Threat, and form part of a wider Crusade Against Terror and against ‘evil’.

Responding to the Threat

In Cold War America, as has been shown, the discourses constructed in relation to the ‘Other’, and the representations that these underpinned, supported a tendency for militarism and established ‘an Other as perpetual adversary’ (Dalby, 1990, p.158). Militarism and deterrence was ‘common sense’ given the Threat that was believed to exist and consequently this response was easily justifiable by those in power. Likewise, in the post-Cold War world, the construction of a terrorist ‘Other’ makes some sort of response ‘obvious’. For the United States that response is a ‘war on terrorism’:

‘The declaration of a “war on terror” – on an act rather than one specific group – left the enterprise tantalizingly open to any number of interpretations or appropriations, with the terminology used by the Bush administration so polarizing that contradictory information was discarded as irrelevant.’ (Bhatia, 2005, p.16).

As with the existence of a threatening ‘Other’ itself, this sort of response is not new to the American experience; a resort to war is a frequent solution to any Threat in American history (Stephenson, 1998, p.77). The founding ideals of the American ‘Self’ are, of course, irreducible from the concept of fighting evil, and so this approach makes ‘sense’ through discourse, when presented with an ‘evil’ ‘Other’.

Legal Measures

However, war is not the only response that has been proposed for terrorism by American policy-makers. Another narrative that is used on occasions is that of Law. For example in 2000 The National Commission on Terrorism claimed in their report that:

Diplomacy is an important instrument, both in gaining the assistance of other nations in particular cases and convincing the international community to condemn and outlaw egregious terrorist practices. Law enforcement is often invaluable in the investigation and apprehension of terrorists. (The National Commission on Terrorism, 2000)
While Law is not the only means discussed in this document, and in others, the repeated mention of legal methods suggests that terrorism is still considered in terms of the (neo)realist state system, where military force is reserved primarily for inter-state conflict, while non-state actors are generally controlled through legal means.

Nevertheless, while the Law narrative appeared in more documents than any other before September 11th (Figure 4.12), once the attacks had taken place it is relegated to insignificance at around 10% or less (Figures 4.13, 4.14, 4.15 and 4.16). As we have seen, September 11th allowed the negativity and Threat of the terrorist to be clarified and reinforced. Once it had been constructed in this way the ‘obvious’ response, in line with the historical context, was one focused on militarism.

A Crusade Against Terrorism

Accordingly a narrative that might be described as Crusade Against Terrorism is identifiable. The foundations are laid before September 11th for its later application. It appears in the following passage by Bill Clinton:

In this day, no campaign for peace can succeed without a determination to fight terrorism. Let our actions today send this message loud and clear: There are no expendable American targets. There will be no sanctuary for terrorists. We will defend our people, our interests and our values. We will help all faiths, in all parts of the world, who want to live free of fear and violence. We will persist and we will prevail. (Clinton, 1998a)

This is his address to the nation following the U.S. attacks on Afghanistan and Sudan in response to the bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. It is a time where terrorism is emerging in representations as a more prominent Threat, and where al Qaeda is being more widely discussed. The Crusade narrative, in combination with the various discourses, allowed the military action to be given added credibility.

Another important narrative also comes through here - Inevitability of Victory. This appears in the final sentence where the phrase ‘we will prevail’, which becomes common post-September 11th, demonstrates a confidence in the ultimate success of this war, or Crusade Against Terrorism. This is closely related to Exceptionalism. In this interpretation, the God given superiority of America, and all that it represents, must
surely be destined to succeed, just as in the Second World War and in the Cold War. All these links become relevant in supporting this narrative, which in turn reinforces them.

The Crusade narrative is extremely important, occurring in more documents than any other (60%) (Figure 4.11). Although it starts off relatively moderately in relation to the others before September 11th (Figure 4.12), this event leads to it being the most common narrative thereafter (apart from 2002 when it is slightly behind Freedom) (Figures 4.13, 4.14, 4.15 and 4.16).

Inevitability of Victory also follows this pattern, unsurprising given the close connection between the two. It starts off being the least common narrative (Figure 4.12), and then after September 11th becomes the third most common (Figure 4.13), after that, it is generally the fifth (Figures 4.14, 4.15 and 4.16). These changes in relative position reflect a dramatic increase in both narratives after September 11th.

Figure 4.18

This is shown in the comparative graph in Figure 4.18. From little over 30% Crusade increases to over 60%; at the same time Inevitability of Victory changes from around 10% to over 50%. This demonstrates how the negativity and Threat constructed after the attacks leads to a great concentration on a crusading response, one that will ‘naturally’ be successful given America’s God given role on the side of ‘good’. Once established this need for a Crusade continues to be reinforced as the Iraq war
approaches and thereafter, the narrative showing a steady increase (Figure 4.18). Inevitability of Victory stabilizes over the same period (Figure 4.18), given that it is more implicit being derived from the American identity.

When the supposed Threat is realized so dramatically it requires a response, not now to challenge and reduce the Threat, but as an act of justice or revenge for the attack. Thus:

Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated. (Bush, 2001d)6

As the narrative of Crusade7 appears to make ‘sense’, it supports a military response. Hence, the Afghanistan conflict could be easily justified and understood as part of the ‘necessary’ and ‘legitimate’ Crusade against terrorism and against ‘evil’. Gregory (2004) encapsulates the process as follows: ‘The first move was to identify al-Qaeda with Afghanistan – to fold the one into the other – so that it could become the object of a conventional military campaign.’ (p.49). This corresponds with the spatial characterization of the outside and the East: ‘Afghanistan is clearly a wild zone, a source of terror and danger beyond the fringes of civilization where wanted terrorists seek refuge and friends among warriors lurking beyond the reach of law and order.’ (Dalby, 2003, p.73). The military action would constitute revenge for the attacks and, it was argued, at the same time reduce the remaining Threat.

The narrative of Crusade was also applied when talking about Iraq, once it had been bundled into the general Threat alongside terrorism. The Crusade in Iraq is, though, only part of the wider Crusade Against Terrorism, focused on the whole of the Middle East. Bush again makes the argument through the East/West discourse when talking to a military audience in California:

A free and peaceful Iraq is an important part of winning the war on terror. A free Iraq will no longer be a training ground for terrorists, will

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6 Bush is addressing a joint session of Congress.
7 This was a controversial term when used after September 11th, given its connections with the Christian crusades. Its use was therefore abandoned, but the implications of the narrative still apply even if the word itself is not often used.
no longer supply them with money or weapons. A free Iraq will help to rid the Middle East of resentment and violence, and radicalism. A free Iraq will show all nations of the region that human freedom brings progress and prosperity. By working for peace and stability in the Middle East we’re making America, and future generations of Americans, more secure. (Bush, 2003)

There are elements, in this representation, of Huntington’s (1996) ‘Clash of Civilizations’. Huntington asserts that Muslim countries are becoming destabilized, and identifies the East as the principal Threat to the West, in an Orientalist manner. This Threat from the East – the Muslim East – that Huntington points to is replicated in the representations of American policy-makers.

Aysha (2003) has argued that Huntington’s concept reflects his realist concern for the coherence of the United States. By constructing an Eastern enemy, through a clash of civilizations, an internal clash is avoided as the ‘Self’ becomes united against the threatening ‘Other’. Boggs (2002) argues that:

‘In order to justify wartime mobilization for a period of many years or even decades, moreover, the system demands ongoing patriotic and militaristic legitimation – a dynamic that, for the US, was already well under way in the aftermath of 11 September.’ (p.250).

In the logic disseminated by the American leadership, a Crusade on the outside must be waged to protect the inside from suffering the same disorder and absence of Freedom that they claim is characteristic beyond their borders, and in the East in particular. These ideas connect with earlier geopolitical concepts like ‘rimlands’ and ‘shatterbelts’, the Middle East being widely represented in the West as an unstable and violent region (Sidaway, 1994, p.358). This conforms to the American propensity for expansionism/interventionism, their Manifest Destiny, and drives a trend towards militarism.

A Coalition?

The Coalition Against Terrorism narrative is important in that it reveals the nature of the relationship between the United States and other states in the American worldview. This relationship is essentially a neorealist one. While cooperation may be useful, or necessary, to achieve some aims of American policy, it is only carried out
through alliances of states, and may be restricted to single operations. Such alliances only occur when the aims of the United States converge with those of another state, as each is attempting to further its own interests in an anarchical society (Bull, 1977). Given that America sees itself as holding a unique role as a leader for the world, guiding it to a better future, replicating America itself, it is inclined to work with other states, but only when these states are ‘following’ America.

Since before September 11th, the Coalition narrative has been apparent in a substantial number of documents. Indeed, it is the second most widely used narrative overall (Figure 4.11). This reflects its persistent presence in the background where it is written into discussions of responses to Threats. The graph in Figure 4.19 shows how the trend is actually for an increase in the proportion of documents in which the narrative occurs. Beginning at over 40%, by 2004 it is in well of 60% of documents. The only exception is 2003, when it returns almost to pre-September 11th levels. This is a time when the Iraq war has detached America from most of its main allies, and feelings of isolationism and unilateralism may be increased. Nevertheless even at that time nearly half of the documents showed evidence of the Coalition narrative.

Figure 4.19

It is clear though that, according to this narrative, the United States must be the leader of the Coalition. This is not an arrangement in which a consensus is reached, as the people ‘chosen’ by God to lead the world and fight on behalf of ‘good’, there is only
one way of doing things, and that is the American way. On the 13th of September 2001, a national day of prayer and remembrance, Bush says:

We will use all the resources of the United States and our cooperating friends and allies to pursue those responsible for this evil, until justice is done. (Bush, 2001b)

This is an American Crusade, continuing its long-term mission. Consequently, while the Coalition may be mentioned frequently, and form an important component in constructing the ‘good’ opposition to the terrorists, it is the American role, and American virtues, that are always emphasized. Adopting such a position also allows the powerful position that America has in geopolitics to be utilized in the pursuit of American interests globally, reinforcing that power.

American Exceptionalism and the Crusade for Freedom

Exceptionalism has underpinned the whole American response to September 11th. America has a self-image that ascribes to it a unique historical role in the world. It is this role, coupled with the strategic concerns of the state, that drives it to expansionism in the post-Cold War world and particularly post-September 11th. This is presented once again by Wolfowitz in a speech to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Asia Security Conference in Singapore, about the Threat of terrorism:

At the beginning of our nation, our founding fathers understood that a new nation purchased with toil and blood would have lasting meaning only if the character of the nation matched the sacrifice of those who fought for its independence. Only if the independence of that new nation were secured on the pillars of justice and freedom. America is a place where people can live free from persecution and fear, where religion is a matter of personal conscience, where people may enjoy peace and prosperity, safety and security, where they may find God and worship him in their own way. That is what the United States stands for. (Wolfowitz, 2002)

Exceptionalism and Freedom narratives are combined here as he sets the United States up as the example to the world of what is ‘good’. Historical references make a discursive link to America’s past, and to its founding values. Wolfowitz alludes to it being a country chosen by God to be different from others, to be better. This gives it an historic mission, a Manifest Destiny to follow. The Crusade Against Terrorism offers
another opportunity to advance this cause by bringing Freedom to the world (e.g. in Iraq the following year).

Exceptionalism was never a narrative that dominated in the documents, being one of the less frequent before September 11\textsuperscript{th} (Figure 4.12), at a rather low level of under 30\% (Figure 4.20). The attacks did have the effect of increasing its use, which peaked in 2002 at nearly 50\%. This does not mean it lacks importance, as it is crucial to the rationale behind the Crusade Against Terrorism, hence the increase after September 11\textsuperscript{th}. At that time it was one of the top five narratives (Figure 4.13), whereas by 2003 (Figure 4.15) and 2004 (Figure 4.16), it was the third least frequent. By that time the Crusade appeared to make ‘sense’, and no longer needed to be regularly built into the American mission, and the narrative returns to earlier levels again (Figure 4.20).

Figure 4.20

![The Exceptionalism and Freedom Narratives Over Time (U.S.)](image)

Freedom on the other hand, rises dramatically after September 11\textsuperscript{th}, peaking in 2002, and subsequently stabilizing at a high level (Figure 4.20). This is closely related to the American value of liberty. It is the main feature that is said to separate America from less enlightened and threatening countries. Therefore, as the ‘Other’ is reproduced, and the argument for a Crusade built, Freedom is emphasized as the solution that will bring order and security. It is ‘good’ as it is part of the American state’s character. Consequently, it becomes the second most common narrative following September 11\textsuperscript{th}, then the most common in 2002 (Figure 4.14), when it is used
to underpin the argument for war in Iraq, before being third and second in 2003 (Figure 4.15) and 2004 (Figure 4.16) respectively.

The Freedom narrative is the main component in constructing a fundamentally spatial mission. According to this mission, Freedom must be introduced to the ‘Muslim world’ if change is to be achieved, and it is to become ‘better’ like America. Burke (2005) argues that, from the American perspective: ‘Freedom is something America brings to the world, for itself and from within itself. It is not a space in the world to which it submits, which binds it or presents any limits, moral, political or ethical.’ (p.328). Freedom, then, is the prerequisite for order, which in turn removes the ‘breeding ground’ for terrorism. America represents ‘civilization’ whereas the terrorists represent ‘chaos’. Thus:

‘The strategy of the Bush administration was, once again, to present the United States as the world – the “universal nation” articulating universal values – and the war on Iraq became another front in its continuing fight against “enemies of civilization”: terrorists, tyrants, barbarians.’ (Gregory, 2004, p.195).

Such representations provided the lens through which Iraq and the war were seen by American policy-makers. President Bush reflects:

We’ll defeat people there so we don’t have to face them here, but a free Iraq in the midst of the Middle East is going to be a transforming event. This is a part of the world where people – the people are desperate for freedom. This is a part of the world where people – they’re frustrated, the deep resentments because they’re not free. We, in America, believe everybody deserves to be free. We believe it’s the Almighty God’s gift to every man and woman on Earth – freedom. (Bush, 2004)\(^8\)

In an Orientalist fashion, the narrative of Freedom runs through every discussion of the East, and the need for change there. From this passage we can also see elements of the Exceptionalism narrative, in that Freedom is defined as a gift from God. It is a gift that America has been given that is inextricably linked with its unique position. The implication is that by making the East free, America is doing God’s work, which is reinforced by the idea that America is ‘good’ and the terrorists are ‘evil’.

\(^8\) This speech was given to the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America in Las Vegas.
The roots of this concept in Enlightenment thought, and Orientalism, are explained by Burke (2005) who notes a:

‘…crucial feature of freedom in the American enlightenment: its Eurocentric and Orientalist nature. Freedom is something the East lacks, and it will be achieved not by the agency of its own people, or by the upwelling of some genuinely universal; human aspiration, but by the particular application of American pressure and force.’ (p.333).

Therefore, through the American worldview, the Middle East is lacking in Freedom. By helping the people of the East to achieve Freedom like America, the United States can fulfill its destiny (and strengthen its power in the region). The development of these narratives consequently supports the Crusade narrative. Not only is it necessary for the reduction of Threat, but also to continue the longstanding mission of America to deliver Freedom to the world.

Conclusion

The geopolitical codes of the United States are engaged in a process of continual change responding to, and influencing reality and powerful actors. They are not independent from factors that have influenced American worldviews in the past. Although in the early stages of the formation of the United States, policy-makers perceived that their country would not operate as European states did, the United States is nevertheless a (neo)realist state. The values on which it was built, and the self-image that was forged from these, grew out of Enlightenment thinking just as the (neo)realist state did.

During the Cold War the United States was locked in a neorealist conflict with the Soviet Union. The geopolitical codes formed in response to the realities of this situation and through which interpretations of events were made, did not immediately disappear at the end of the Cold War. They were instead part of a continuing evolution built upon earlier experiences such as the foundation of the nation and two World Wars. Consequently, the post-Cold War world was understood not through a completely new discursive structure, but through discourses already constructed during the Cold War and earlier. The outside was represented as disordered, reinforcing the idea of the
ordered inside. This gave credence to the construction of a range of new Threats that would ‘obviously’ ‘grow’ amidst the disorder.

The terrorist attacks of September 11th allowed the Threat to be clarified and enhanced. Drawing on familiar discourses of Positive/Negative and Good/Evil, the terrorists were separated from the good ‘Self’ in a process of othering that made them completely repugnant and dehumanized. Again this was a familiar process that had been applied to previous enemies, and indeed involved discursive links to these enemies to reinforce the idea. In so doing the new terrorist Threat became part of a long-term series of Threats to the American ‘Self’ that had to be challenged as part of America’s God-given mission. All the Threats came from the same source and had the same negative characteristics; they were in effect all part of the same evil ‘Other’.

In this context, the introduction of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Rogue State narratives back into the discussion of Threats, alongside terrorism, allowed these to be linked discursively into the single Threat. Adding these new elements to terrorism made the Threat even more threatening and gave policy-makers an opportunity to draw states into the discussion in an ‘axis of evil’. In particular, Iraq became prominent in discussions of the Threat, and an implied link to terrorism became an ‘obvious’, and established, connection between al-Qaeda, Iraq and WMD.

The response to the ‘Threat’ made ‘sense’ when understood through this discourse, and also when taken in the context of the factors influencing American foreign policy. That response was a Crusade Against Terrorism. Although, particularly before September 11th, legal measures were often discussed as a solution, after the attacks the Threat was constructed in such a way as military responses and militarism could be justified, including the Iraq war. Throughout, the implication, through a narrative of Inevitability of Victory, was that America would ultimately defeat the ‘evil’ ‘Other’ just as it had its previous incarnations. This made ‘sense’, as the United States was on the side of God; it could not fail to succeed.

While it was possible to work with others on occasions to achieve their aims, Coalitions must be led by America and follow American values as it represents ‘good’ and its purity must not be threatened. The isolationist element of the ‘Self’ advocates
America acting unilaterally so as not to be swayed from the ‘right’ course and from fulfilling its destiny. Thus, the coalition is a loose, and fundamentally neorealist, one based on state self-interest.

At the root of all of this is the belief that America is Exceptional and unique. It is different from any other state in the role it has, and the mission God has given it. This has impacted on foreign policy since the beginning of the state, and an Exceptionalism narrative continued to be written into representations of terrorism and the responses to it. This supported the Crusade as part of America’s effort to spread its superior values around the world. What the United States supposedly represents, both as a state, and as a space within its boundaries, is liberty. By expanding this through the introduction of Freedom to more of the world, it is argued that, the conditions for Threat to develop are removed. Order is brought to the disorder and the breeding grounds are eliminated.

From this we can identify an American discursive structure in relation to terrorism. At the bottom of the structure are the narratives. These have a two-way relationship with discourse and with each other (Figure 4.21). Thus, Exceptionalism and Freedom are closely associated as has been shown, but in turn these make sense through binary discourse as the positive side reinforces the idea that these are virtues. Likewise the emphasis on such virtues in the narratives reproduces the binary discourse. Narratives relating to the negativity of terrorists (Organic, WMD, and Rogue State) achieve the same effect for the other side of binary discourse and support the positive narratives in this way. Similarly narratives of responses (Law, Coalition, Crusade and Inevitability of Victory) make sense only in the context of Threat, but their repetition reinforces this discourse.
The discourses themselves can be thought of as nested, in that they operate on different layers. Immediately above the narratives lie the discourses most closely associated with terrorism. The next layer is slightly more distant though no less important. Here the binary discourses are very closely related. Each reinforces the other while also linking with the layers below. They are more widely applied but no less relevant, and can connect to other historic structures and events, and so make ‘sense’ of new events in the context of earlier occurrences.

The top layer is the most general. Identity/Difference is the binary that runs through the whole structure. Each of the binaries below is ultimately understood through this. The identity of the ‘Self’ is established in comparison to, the construction of, a negative ‘Other’. All other binaries make the same comparison and reproduce the difference between a positive side and a negative side, which goes on to underpin the narratives that are directly discussing people and events. This diagram may oversimplify the relationships between different discourses and narratives, but it is
worth considering if only to emphasize that they are all related and cannot be considered in isolation.

Through this structure, the American geopolitical codes are constructed and ‘make sense’, understandings of terrorism are produced, and responses generated. The geopolitical code operates at the national and global scale in the same way as the factors influencing it. At the national scale it requires that America be protected from dangerous ‘Others’ originating on the outside. This is not a purely physical protection but one that defends the space as well as the people from contamination. The values of liberty, republicanism and individualism that were spread across North America by the colonizers must not be threatened. There is, therefore, an isolationist tendency that is focused on the national scale; America’s Exceptionalism demands that it keep apart from those on the inferior outside in order to protect the national ‘Self’.

The logic of the geopolitical code at the global scale is that there should be another wave of expansionism. While this combines with isolationism in terms of rejecting deep, restricting alliances, it nevertheless demands an engagement in the disordered world to deliver Freedom and the values of America, and in turn remove the grounds for new Threats like terrorism. Doing so is part of America’s mission and of its Manifest Destiny as it continues to fight ‘evil’ and eliminate the Threats to the ‘Self’. Hence, this geopolitical code simultaneously achieves both the aim of protecting the chosen homeland of America, and allows the American people to fulfill their historic mission of leading the world to a ‘better’ future.
Chapter 5

Atlanticism and Europeanism? Competing Codes in Post-Cold War Britain

Introduction

Britain is often considered to be the European country closest to the United States, and yet at the same time it is a member of the European Union and therefore a part, if reluctantly at times, of the integration and regionalization processes that have been occurring in Europe. The unique place that Britain has, attempting to be both European and to have a ‘special relationship’ with the United States, makes it an interesting example, and one that will be crucial in exploring the connections between regionalization and the construction of codes in the post-Cold War world. This state-centred focus is again a function of the critical realist approach. As I discussed in relation to the United States, this allows spatial and temporal changes in codes to be included in the analysis. Thus, the historical and political factors that make the British state unique cannot be separated from the discourses and narratives.

The evolution of geopolitical codes that was identified in the previous chapter is also apparent in the British case. However, whereas in America this is a process that can be said to occur at two scales – the national and the global – in the British case a third scale must be considered – the regional. The possibility must be researched of geopolitical codes developing at the intersection of these three scales as a result of the factors present at each of them. Geopolitical codes are the subject of change over time in response to changes in the factors at each scale at which they are applied.
Consequently, I shall begin the chapter by discussing the historical and political factors that define the British context, and contribute to its evolving codes. This will start with the factors present at the national scale, those that have historically contributed to the idea of what Britain represents. The next set of factors is at the global scale and has, and continues to, influence British representations of its place/role in the world. Finally, I address the intermediate regional scale, identifying the main factors providing a context for code formation at this level, potentially setting it apart from the American example.

This historical and political context will provide the starting point for discussing the discourses that emerge from an analysis of contemporary material as produced by important political actors. As with the United States, these discourses were Identity/Difference, Self/Other, Order/Disorder, Inside/Outside, East/West, Positive/Negative, Good/Evil and Threat. While they have been given the same names and are very similar to those of the United States, they are not identical, demonstrating nuances produced by the British context in which they are reproduced, and the related British narratives with which they are interconnected. These will be examined in this chapter. As with America, the defining of binary discourse is an essential part of the construction of the sovereign state and specifically of the British state as different from, and superior to, other states and especially its enemies. As a territorial sovereign state the differentiation of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ is essential to the territoriality that defines it. Thus, these discourses are not new so much as (re)formed in the context of new events and new ‘Others’, they are nevertheless repeatedly invoked in the continual establishment of Britain as a sovereign state. The geopolitical codes constructed through these discourses are therefore made in the context of such binary understandings.

Eleven narratives have been identified in the British documents and are discussed in this chapter. These are as follows: Freedom, Organic, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Rogue State, War Against Terrorism, History, Global Player, Coalition, European Unity, American Alliance and Global Community. As with the discourses, some demonstrate similarities with American narratives but are subtly different in line with the British context, others that were found in British documents are new reflecting the particular construction of the British ‘Self’, including its regional experience in the
European Union and its historic experiences as a major power. The weaving together of these narratives impacts upon the reproduction of discourse and underpins particular British representations and ultimately the construction of geopolitical codes. Again, this helps to ground the positive image of the (British) ‘Self’ and the negative and threatening image of the ‘Other’ in the present situation, and in so doing reproduces the binary divisions that define the very idea of the state.

Beginning in a similar way to the American chapter, the first discourse analysis section looks at the use of binary discourse to (re)produce the idea of a threatening ‘Other’ in the post-Cold War period. This involves a clear spatial construct, reemphasising the distinction between the inside and the outside, order and disorder, East and West, separating the ‘Self’ from the dangerous ‘Other’. I then discuss the focus on terrorism after September 11th, and how this was constructed as a specific and dangerous Threat, particularly through a British Good/Evil binary. Following from this is the same bundling of Threats from terrorism, Weapons of Mass Destruction and Rogue States that was seen in America, but in a British context.

Moving on to the British response, I define a narrative of ‘War against Terrorism’. The remaining sections deal with how British policy-makers envision this ‘war’ being carried out, and the British place in this. The British self-image of its historical and global status is examined, before a discussion of the British perspective of a Coalition. This leads on to an analysis of the place of Europe in British representations, and then a section on the attempts to reconcile this with the state-to-state Atlantic Alliance. Finally, the narrative of a ‘Global Community’ is identified as a central component of British attempts to meet the challenges posed by new non-state actors, and to retain a role for the country in the post-Cold War world.

The combination of the factors that separate Britain from its American allies, and from its fellow European Union members, and the results of the discourse analysis, should facilitate the definition of its geopolitical codes. Concluding the chapter, I will make connections from these codes back to the British historical and political context in which they are formed, demonstrating how this leads to codes that are separate from those of other states, even those that have much in common.
Construction of Geopolitical Codes: The British Context

The construction of Britain as a state-nation has been a difficult and often contested process, due to its creation from the fusion of four component parts. The state lacks a single constitutional document or founding revolution around which an idea of the ‘self’ can be constructed.\(^1\) It is, as Colley (1992) puts it, ‘an invented nation’ (p.5). However, certain values and historical events can, nevertheless, be identified that contribute to the concept of a unique British ‘Self’. In terms of the national mythology, these have been applied through colonialism in the British Empire at a global scale, and continue to be championed by Britain as a global actor, while at a regional scale they are put forward as an ideal model for the operation of the European Union. Hence, it is possible to loosely divide the factors that influence the construction of geopolitical codes into three scales at which they act upon/with the representations (Table 5.1). It should be noted that these are not exclusive; the factors combine and connect with each other across, and within scales.

\(^1\) The act of union between Scotland and England in 1707 might be considered to be an appropriate event/document in these terms; however it had already been preceded by the union of the crowns and was not a constitution as such. Furthermore, Wales had already been conquered by England, and Ireland would not join the Union for nearly another hundred years. It was therefore a rather convoluted process that formed the new British state.
As such, Murdoch (1998) argues that:

‘…there was a British Enlightenment, because it was a movement about the expansion of culture and realisation of human achievement, founded on an admiration of the personal liberty and security possible in the commercial societies of Holland and England by the late seventeenth century, re-exported and revised a generation later by continental intellectuals as part of their own struggle against absolutist government.’ (p.104).

The Enlightenment in Britain, therefore, produced a society presented as enshrining greater freedoms than the feudal order it had replaced. While the monarchy remained in Britain, government came to be increasingly dominated by parliament while, as Murdoch points out, personal freedoms and economic freedoms grew, for some at least, as the country entered the industrial revolution.

These ‘British values’ can be placed under the general heading of Liberalism; this is the first factor at the national scale (Table 5.1). Mandler (2005) describes what this meant for the state:

‘Liberalism did involve a distinctive configuration of power, one in which power was more widely diffused throughout society, and not concentrated in the state. It also entailed, partly as a consequence, a distinctive pattern of national belonging, one which was not so attached to or generated by the state.’ (p.354).

While this diffusion of power should not be exaggerated, or used to produce an idealized picture of British society at this time, it is the role in the production of national belonging, and therefore in the imagining of the ‘Self’, which is of particular importance. This contributes to how British geopolitical codes and foreign policies developed through the creation of the Empire onwards.

In this regard, Barker (1994) comments:

‘When a commanding position in Europe was combined with a command of empire across and around the world, Britain could appear to itself as the source rather than destination of political thought, exporting liberalism, progressivism, or constitutionalism in intellectual free trade or free benefaction.’ (p.5).
Perhaps few of the subjects of the British Empire would agree that it was liberal and progressive, however from the perspective of Britain, and its construction of national identity, this concept could be combined with the realities of power and Empire to create a sense of the ‘Self’, as Barker says, it ‘could appear to itself’.

In common with liberalism, freedom and liberty (Table 5.1), acted as components of the emerging British ‘Self’. May (1999) argues that: ‘War, religion, empire, prosperity and parliamentary “freedom” combined to forge a widespread and active “British” patriotism, which defined itself largely by opposition to the culture of continental Europe.’ (p.1). Freedom is expressed here in terms of parliament, and it was noted by Barker that constitutionalism was a feature of the British self-image. This is a crucial part of the construction of the British ‘Self’. It was of course far from democratic at this time, but it is the idea that has greater importance in the construction of the British state-nation rather than the reality.

Economic liberalism was also a feature of the British approach to the world. The primary aim was to enrich Britain itself, even if it was represented as more widely beneficial. Smellie (1962) says:

‘With the fact of sea power went a complex system of ideas about the economic and political facts of life – what one may call the liberal philosophy of life, at once the glory and the ruin of the British peace. It had two main elements, the doctrine of free trade and the aim of self-government for all people on earth.’ (p.252).

Free trade and economic liberalism, were therefore seen by powerful actors as being beneficial to Britain. In turn economic liberalism could be written into the national mythology as part of the liberalism that Britain supposedly represented, alongside political liberalism, which included the notion of self-government. However, this was more conditional than Smellie’s passage indicates, as only those whom Britain deemed to be ready were to be given such a privilege.

This liberal concept of free trade is a central component of commercialism, or commercial spirit (Table 5.1). So important was it, that it was a major determinant for British geopolitical codes in the 19th century, underpinning a determination not to
become embroiled in conflict on the European continent in order to protect British commercial and trading interests around the world. Porter (1987) argues: ‘In the 1840s and 1850s as well as in the 1860s, and despite appearances to the contrary, Britain was never likely to become involved in a European conflict, unless she was attacked directly herself or on her commercial frontiers.’ (p.27). Understood through these codes, commercial interests were a reality that had to be protected for the continued prosperity of the country. However this also fed into the representations that made commercialism a defining British characteristic.

Vital to the construction of separation or difference from continental Europeans is the physical barrier that the sea provides between ‘them’ and ‘us’. Yet again reality and representations are inextricably linked. Reynolds (1991) puts it thus:

‘…the Channel is a psychological as much as a physical barrier. In an era of seapower the “moat defensive” permitted greater security at lower cost than that enjoyed by continental states. In 1940 it was of critical importance for Britain’s survival, and the experience divided Britain from continental Europe for a generation. In the post-seapower era the Channel has become progressively irrelevant to security, while at the same time proving a major obstacle to economic integration within the emerging European economy.’ (p.304).

The lack of land borders with other states allowed Britain to stand apart from many conflicts in Europe and concentrate instead on developing commercial links around the world. The idea of Britain as an island, rather than just a state, is therefore extremely important in defining the ‘Self’, and is closely linked with idealized notions of a maritime nation. It is part of a constructed image of the ‘Self’, which maps the channel as a boundary defining the difference from the continental ‘Other’. This has roots in reality drawing upon particular experiences, the most recent of which was the Second World War. The ‘Island Nation’ concept completes the set of factors operating at the national scale (*Table 5.1*).

At the global scale the first factor is the colonial legacy (*Table 5.1*). Colonialism has been closely interwoven with the construction of the British ‘Self’, and of British geopolitics in the past, and continues to have resonance in the present. The process of colonization ‘sited’ large parts of the world as colonies, formal or otherwise,
of Britain, represented as the liberal power ‘improving’ the world. This application of power to ‘geo-graph’ the world through colonization is demonstrated by the practices of the colonial geographer Halford Mackinder. Ó Tuathail (1996) explains that: ‘To the British Foreign Office, The Royal Geographical Society (RGS), and aspirant professional geographers, the interior of “British East Africa” was a territory in need of in-sight/site/cite-ment.’ (p.81). In line with this: ‘The purpose of Mackinder’s expedition to Mount Kenya was to write on this blank page, to focus a British scientific and imperial eye on the region and thereby in-sight/site/cite it.’ (p.81). Hence, colonialism was a means by which the, supposedly superior, British ‘Self’ could apply the progress of the Enlightenment to a wider world, simultaneously exploiting it in British interests.

Influential individuals like Mackinder reproduced the discourses of imperialism in the public consciousness to reinforce and normalize the practices of Empire. Thus, Ó Tuathail argues that Mackinder’s geography was: ‘…an incitement of an imperial imagination, a challenge to ordinary people to think of their interests in global terms.’ (p.109). Colonialism could become accepted as a ‘natural’ practice for a country that was understood to encapsulate liberal values, and seek commercial opportunities. For Britain, Empire was an ‘obvious’ extension of its values and interests.

The Empire did not unravel completely following the Second World War, allowing British imperialists to retain a sense that Britain could continue to have a global role through this mechanism. Porter (1987) explains:

‘It was in any case perfectly possible to regard India (and Ceylon and Burma, who left at about the same time) as being quite apart from any dominant trend, and not at all the forerunner of an overall imperial decline. Many imperialists had already cut their Indian losses some time before, and centred their imperial ambitions in Africa, where most of the dynamic imperialism of the 1940s and the 1950s was taking place.’ (p.116).

The implication is that despite the loss of some colonies, British geopolitical codes still retained an imperial focus. As Said (1978) showed in his discussion of Orientalism, discourses of imperialism allowed the process of colonization to be understood as one in which the ‘Other’ was inferior and in need of improvement. For Britain, if this could be
accomplished to a sufficient level, it made ‘sense’ that they should be given a degree of self-government, while remaining within the British sphere of influence.

The impact of the Suez crisis was considerable in terms of the perception of Britain’s place in the world, and how geopolitical codes would be adapted and constructed in the future. Reynolds (1991) notes that:

‘British policymakers had known for years of their underlying weaknesses, but the public image, accentuated by 1940, 1945 and post-war recovery, was of a country that was still a major power. For an Egyptian ex-colonel to twist the lion’s tail and get away with it, was a palpable and lasting blow to national self-esteem and international prestige.’ (p.205).

By the time of Suez the reality of decline was already becoming apparent even if the codes had not fully adapted to the circumstances. This is a reflection of the relationship between discourse and reality that Agnew and Corbridge (1995) identified. The representation of Britain as a major power persisted despite the changing realities, only when events undermined these interpretations were the discourses and geopolitical codes reinterpreted to accommodate the country’s weakened position. The rapid decolonization that followed in the years after Suez, while not necessarily a consequence, can perhaps be taken as evidence of these changes finally affecting policy.

The components of the British ‘Self’ underpinned a belief by many that Britain should have a global role (Table 5.1, column 3). Globalism became enshrined in dominant understandings of what Britain was, and its role in the world, such that in the post-War world:

‘The conviction that Britain should maintain a world role, independent of the United States, was exhibited by an imperial determination to remain ensconced in the Middle East, Africa and Asia. At the same time, Churchill and Eden instinctively distanced themselves from European integration and refused to become fully constrained by membership of NATO.’ (White, 1999, p.29).

Even with a decline in Britain’s relative power at this time, the influence of globalism was still important in the evolution of geopolitical codes. A regional role in Europe was not considered by the powerful actors to be fitting of Britain’s supposed status. Policies
developed that continued with colonialism and distanced the country from Europe, and American domination, as much as the reality of the circumstances would allow. Therefore, the relevance of the global role goes beyond the purposes of trade, important as this was, and encompasses the discourses underlying colonialism and the geopolitical codes of the time.

Nevertheless the image of Britain as a Great Power (Table 5.1) was a persistent one. Thus, the transition to an acceptance of diminished influence and power during the Cold War was not easy. Sanders (1990) points out:

‘That a country which by the early 1980s had slipped to twenty-first position in the world economic league could still exhibit undiminished “Great Power” aspirations was testimony to the hold which “Great Power syndrome” continued to exercise over the British government’s collective imagination.’ (p.291).

Hence, for Britain, despite the end of empire in a formal sense, the ‘global role’ continued as far as the construction of geopolitical codes were concerned.

Attempts to characterize a post-War/post-imperial role have given rise to the ‘geo-graphing’ of Britain as a link or bridge (Table 5.1) between different world actors. Imagining such a role ‘…Churchill observed that there were “three great circles among the free nations and democracies”: the British Empire, the “English speaking world”, and “United Europe”.’ (May, 1999, p.9). Most prominent in the English speaking world is of course the United States, while United Europe was not at this time represented as including Britain, which, in Churchill’s view, stood apart from each of the three, providing the connection between them all. From the dilemma of positioning Britain comes this apparently positive representation of the country as a bridge between the three circles: ‘…Churchill’s notion that the British “have the opportunity of joining them (the three circles) all together” suggests a sort of freewheeling “bridge building” role for Britain, which has been a powerful self-image throughout the postwar period.’ (White, 1992, p.9). It is an attempt to make a virtue out of the difficult situation in which the country had found itself, as reality changed, while the influences that drove its geopolitical codes in the past remain strong.
Accompanying the bridging role was the Atlantic Alliance (Table 5.1), or ‘special relationship’. It was constructed as a central plank of British Cold War, and increasingly post-Cold War, geopolitics. NATO was the structure upon which this alliance was based, and one to which Britain was completely committed: ‘NATO confirmed America’s commitment to the defense of western Europe, but it also symbolized Britain’s preference for “Atlantic” rather than purely west European solutions to the problem of international organization.’ (May, 1999, p.15). These policies were formulated in the context of British discourses of globalism, privileging global engagements rather than being restricted to the European scale.

While relations with the United States were not always smooth, there was nevertheless an absolute commitment in British policy to keep the Americans involved in the defence of Europe in light of the perceived threat from the Soviet ‘Other’ occupying Mackinder’s ‘pivot area’. White (1992) explains:

‘To the extent that the United States had “saved” Britain, it was crucially necessary to postwar British security to retain that relationship at the centre of policy. Growing perceptions of a major Soviet threat after 1946 only served to underline this imperative.’ (p.13).

Furthermore, Bartlett (1989) emphasizes just how central the Atlantic Alliance had become for the post-War Labour government: ‘By 1950 Bevin was arguing that Britain’s policy in Europe should be guided essentially by what she needed to do in order to satisfy the United States. The American connection had become the “kernel” of British foreign policy.’ (p.81). British policy was guided by its long-term geopolitics that pointed to global engagements and staying apart from Europe. Great Power status continued to be an objective that, in the context of the discourses of the state, may be understood to have been threatened by integrating with Europe. America, on the other hand, appeared to policy-makers to offer an association protecting Britain’s position, and conforming to its liberal and commercial heritage.

The first of the regional factors (Table 5.1) is the ‘threat’ thought to emanate from the continent, particularly in the form of Germany in the two World Wars, but prior to that from France. In the 18th and 19th centuries, it was France that was the principal ‘threat’ in the construction of British geopolitical codes. This, Colley (1992)
argues, was vital in the ‘invention’ of the British ‘Self’: ‘Time and time again, war with France brought Britons, whether they hailed from Wales or Scotland or England, into confrontation with an obviously hostile Other and encouraged them to define themselves collectively against it.’ (p.5). This was the first continental ‘Other;’ threatening the British ‘Self’, but in the early to mid 20th century it was rapidly superseded by Germany.

Germany was the focus for the construction of an intermittent sense of threat. Referring to the period following the First World War, Reynolds (1991) says:

‘With Germany defeated, re-establishing Britain’s global position was more important than commitments across the channel. Here geography was fundamental: France had only a land border with Germany – a country with 50 per cent more people and four times France’s heavy industry. For island Britain, by contrast, once the German fleet had been eliminated, Germany posed very little threat.’ (p.116).

The idea of the ‘island nation’ was therefore crucial to the way in which the German threat was understood in British geopolitics; as long as the sea could be controlled by Britain, Germany was of relatively little importance. This changed with the arrival of aircraft in the Second World War but the sense of isolation still gave Britain a physiological, and indeed practical, protection. After the Second World War the significance of the German threat was restricted to the historical legacy of holding out against invasion. Instead, the Soviet Union appeared to British policy-makers to be a far more urgent focus for their attention.

Representations of the Soviet threat (Table 5.1) encompassed not only invasion, but also the new menace of nuclear weapons, and was consequently less restricted by the sea barrier, and potentially more destructive. Britain had been weakened by the war with Germany and, while it still sought Great Power status, was no longer in a position to contemplate engaging with this apparently new threat alone. Hence: ‘As a direct response to this perceived threat Britain sought both to strengthen its political and military ties with Western Europe and to convince the United States that it should join the Europeans and underwrite their collective defence.’ (Sanders, 1990, p.71). The reality of Britain’s weakened position necessitated policy changes that involved closer cooperation with other European states and attempts to use the United States to provide
protection to Britain and protect the ‘Rimland’, continuing the close alliance of the war, as already discussed.

By tying itself closely to the United States in this way, Britain became locked into the Western side of the Cold War binary identified by Sharp (2000) and Dalby (1990). The positive West was understood, through this discourse, to be threatened by the negative Soviet ‘Other’. Given these circumstances it made ‘sense’ for the Western states to stick together. This was helpful to Britain given its own declining power. Indeed, Britain was itself a crucial player in the geopolitical relations that led to the Cold War. Taylor (1990) notes that: ‘At the end of the war, therefore, there were three superpowers, not our familiar two… …the Cold War resulted from post-war interactions between all three of the wartime Grand Alliance.’ (p.25). The influence of globalism and great power pretensions, and the attraction of an Atlantic Alliance for British policy-makers in this respect, was therefore important in driving Britain’s part in the evolution of the Cold War, and especially the attempt to move closer to the Americans in this.

Although Britain was very close to the United States, adopting a similar East/West binary in constructions of the Soviet ‘Other’, British policy included greater involvement in Europe as well, representing a continuation of the long-term feature of British geopolitics – the dilemma of how much engagement is appropriate on the continent. This, and Britain’s continued global ambitions, independent of the United States, means that a picture of Britain as part of a homogeneous West, under the influence of America, and in opposition to the Soviets, is too simplistic. Indeed, European integration (Table 5.1) has had an increasingly important part to play in British geopolitics. Simultaneously, Britain’s close relationship with the United States, or at least the mythology of the ‘special relationship’, has an effect on its production of geopolitical codes.

Although post-War British governments were prepared to commit to European cooperation to a limited extent, this did not extend to an enthusiasm for integration of the sort envisioned by the founders of the European Communities.
‘…Britain was unwilling to forge closer links with Western Europe because a close identification with the continent was not consistent with the prevailing conception of Britain as a global power, and, moreover, policymakers feared that it would damage relations with the Empire and Commonwealth.’ (White, 1992, p.14).

British globalism tended to guide policy away from the regional scale, the global scale being where a great power ‘should’ be operating, according to these interpretations. The Empire and Commonwealth demonstrated to policy-makers, what they believed to be, Britain’s continuing ‘greatness’ and global role, therefore, from their perspective, these could not be undermined by over-involvement in Europe.

However, the reality of Britain’s relative post-War decline economically, and in terms of its power to operate globally, and sustain its Empire, inevitably caught up, and the regional option became more attractive as a result. Accordingly:

‘It seemed to imply a fundamental and permanent reorientation of the British conception of “community”, away from the former imperial conception of Britain’s world role and towards a new basis for great power status as a leading player in an economically dynamic and politically united Europe.’ (Ward, 2001, p.158).

The reconstruction of geopolitical codes could not be removed from its historical context, and therefore Britain could not be suddenly re-imagined as a purely regional actor. Instead, a more active regional role in Europe could be understood through the existing discourses as a means for sustaining the supposed global role, and the status of a great power, by gaining influence in a new powerful regional body.

A smooth transition from the earlier vision of Britain’s global role was never going to be straightforward given the deeply rooted part that it played in the reproduction of the British ‘Self’. The emerging geopolitical codes were consequently troubled by contradictions that impacted negatively upon relations with Europe. Thus:

‘A consistent pattern has emerged since 1945, however, of British governments initially standing aloof from the latest thrust of integration, then finding themselves on the sidelines, then being forced to join in when the mould has been set and it has been difficult to shape the emergent institutions and policies in a form more compatible with British interests.’ (May, 1999, p.93).
Global influences underpinning constructions of British geopolitics, and policies of European integration are consequently difficult to reconcile.

The narrative of American Alliance continues to pull British actors the other way as a feature of the global role and difference from Europe that they understand the country to have, given the longstanding representations of the British ‘Self’ and the continental ‘Other’. As integration has deepened in the post-Cold War period this friction with the geopolitical aspirations of continental neighbours has, if anything, intensified, and is apparent in relation to the creation of a Common Foreign and Defense Policy:

‘Minimalists, including the United Kingdom (UK) and Denmark, favour keeping a strong US presence in Europe. At the other extreme, federalists, headed by France and Benelux, favour supranational CESDP [Common European Security and Defence Policy] that excludes the US from European security arrangements.’ (Winn, 2003, p.49).

Nevertheless, British policy-makers continue with their attempts to forge geopolitical codes that encompass both globalism/Atlanticism and European integration. This uneasy balance is the ultimate product of so many competing forces in British geopolitics. The relative decline of British power has destabilized many of the foundations on which earlier codes were built, without removing the assumptions and representations of the ‘Self’ to which they contributed. As Britain has sought to be a bridge, particularly between Europe and America, in the post-War period, it continues to find it difficult to choose between a global role acting as a sovereign state that its self-image and mythology suggest is its right, and a regional role that requires a pooling of sovereignty and potentially less independence of action globally.

**Post-Cold War: Seeking a New ‘Other’**

The sudden disappearance of the Soviet enemy in 1989/1990 inevitably had consequences for Britain. Agnew (2001) argues that:

‘It is inadequate to claim, therefore, that world politics can be simply understood as “out there”; independent of human thought and practice, or as textually driven by perpetually recycled tropes and metaphors. It is the outcome of sociological praxis based on rules, practices, and ideas
(including geopolitical discourses) that are not set for all time but change as a result of the contingencies of world history.’ (p.45).

Consequently, the discursive structure that had developed to support interpretations of the Cold War world was insufficient to cope with the realities of post-Cold War geopolitics, and had to evolve and be re-made in response.

Given that Threat was an important Cold War discourse, it persisted, conforming to the time lag between changes in reality and discourse identified by Agnew and Corbridge (1995). Following Connolly’s concept of Identity/Difference, a requirement exists for an ‘Other’ against which the ‘Self’ can be positively compared. As in America, Identity/Difference is therefore the main discourse that underpins all the other binaries in British representations. Connolly speaks of: ‘…the wish of the self to believe that its identity is intrinsically true, therefore to treat those who deviate from it as false, hence to look at the other as the source of evil…’ (p.151). This discourse remains from earlier constructions stretching as far back as the emergence of the sovereign state. To construct a British identity, a negative ‘Other’ is created; the presence of this binary leads to interpretations suggesting the continuing existence of a Threat. In a similar way to America, it is presented as coming from an array of sources:

Britain must be a key player on major transnational issues; the environment, drugs, terrorism, crime, human rights and development. Human rights may sometimes seem an abstraction in the comfort of the West, but when they are ignored human misery and political instability all, too easily follow. (Blair, 1997)

The imprecise nature of these multiple Threats reinforces their threatening character. Drawing on the British liberal and free self-image, through the Order/Disorder binary and a narrative of Freedom (this narrative, if less important than in the United States, does make a connection with the influential idea of freedom and liberty); the West represents order and progress through development and human rights, compared to the ‘outside’, which is disordered, unstable and inferior. Said (1978) reflects: ‘In the system of knowledge about the Orient, the Orient is less a place than a topos, a set of references, a congeries of characteristics…’ (p.177). Thus, Orientalism, a familiar

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2 This quotation comes from a speech by Tony Blair – ‘The Principles of a Modern British Foreign Policy’ – at the Lord Mayor’s Banquet.
discourse of the Cold War era, and of colonialism, is reproduced again. Britain, of course, has a long history of intervention in the Middle East, both in colonialism and more recently, for example in the Gulf War of 1991. There is thus an established Orientalist representation of this part of the world, the very term ‘Middle East’ itself being discursively constructed to represent a space of instability, violence and indeed terrorism (Sidaway, 1994, p.357). The binaries of Self/Other, Order/Disorder, Inside/Outside and East/West combine and reinforce each other in the construction of the new Threats.

Terrorism, is one of the potential Threats. Britain has had previous experience of groups assigned the term ‘terrorist’, groups that have indeed cased terror. Most recently, and perhaps most notably, has been the conflict in Northern Ireland, where for around 30 years groups such as the IRA and other republican and loyalist organisations carried out attacks in Northern Ireland itself and also on occasions in Britain. Representations of terrorist Threats are therefore not unfamiliar in the British context, although these terrorists are more closely associated with the ‘inside’ than the newer incarnation being discussed here.

The terrorist is represented through the discourse of Positive/Negative. This emphasizes the negativity of the ‘Other’ compared to the positive attributes of the British, and Western, ‘Self’. Blair discussed the terrorist Threat in 1998, at the UN General Assembly, as follows:

The past year’s global roll call of terror includes Luxor, Dar es Salaam, Nairobi, Omagh and many others. Each one is a reminder that terrorism is a uniquely barbaric and cowardly crime. Each one is a reminder terrorists are no respecters of borders. Each one is a reminder that terrorism should have no hiding place, no opportunity to raise funds, no let-up in our determination to bring its perpetrators to justice. This applies to the new phenomenon of stateless terrorism as much as to its more familiar forms. (Blair, 1998)

Blair uses real and horrific events to root the Threat from the terrorists in reality, making it seem more dangerous. Terrorists are identified as ‘barbarians’ and ‘cowards’, separating them from the ‘good’ British and Western people. Furthermore, they do not respect borders and are increasingly ‘stateless’. Anderson and O’ Dowd (1999) note
that: ‘Territoriality, therefore, necessarily produces and focuses attention on borders. It is embodied in the modern, sovereign, “territorial nation-state” and provides the basis of the states system in which states claim sovereignty and immunity from outside interference within their own borders.’ (p.598). For terrorists to operate an alternative territorial form that does not respect state borders, consequently disrupts the foundations of the sovereign state itself. It is at odds with neorealism, and therefore they are potentially undermining and threatening to the state, not just for the acts they carry out, but for the way they operate spatially.

Over the period of the study Threat is the most common discourse, as is shown in Figure 5.1. The Positive/Negative discourse also appears in more than half the documents. Order/Disorder is the third most frequent, however Inside/Outside, Self/Other, Good/Evil and East/West are also apparent at a moderate level. This reflects the strong sense of Threat that is constructed, particularly after September 11th.

Breaking the documents down into five periods reveals more.

Figure 5.2 shows the discourses prior to September 11th. At that time the dominant discourse was Inside/Outside, with Threat and Order/Disorder also in over 40% of documents. This results from the relatively vague Threat being constructed. Immediately after September 11th this changes with a significant increase in Threat, but also in Positive/Negative and Good/Evil (Figure 5.3). The emphasis is on negativity at this time, and is therefore more prominent than the source of the danger; consequently the binaries that underpin the former dominate. By 2002 (Figure 5.4) Good/Evil has fallen away as the immediate shock has passed, and the Threat begins to be widened.

Moving into 2003 (Figure 5.5) and 2004 (Figure 5.6), most binaries are reduced, though still present to a moderate extent, underpinning the construction of the threatening ‘Other’. This is a reflection of the continued reproduction of the Threat from terrorists and Rogue States with WMD, but one that is now more established as a product of the disordered outside; the focus by that time was on removing the supposed ‘danger’. In 2003 (Figure 5.5), Threat was more frequent than Positive/Negative with the positions being reversed in 2004 (Figure 5.6). 2003 was the year when the Iraq war began and a Threat from this state was being constructed, by the following year the emphasis had moved back to the more general negativity of the terrorist ‘Other’ including in Iraq.
Atlanticism or Europeanism? Competing Codes in Post-Cold War Britain

Figure 5.1

Occurrence of Discourses in all Documents (U.K.)
(1997-2004)

- IO – Inside/Outside
- OD – Order/Disorder
- PN – Positive/Negative
- SO – Self/Other
- EW – East/West
- GE – Good/Evil
- TH – Threat

Figure 5.2

Occurrence of Discourses Pre-September 11 (U.K.)

- IO – Inside/Outside
- OD – Order/Disorder
- PN – Positive/Negative
- SO – Self/Other
- EW – East/West
- GE – Good/Evil
- TH – Threat
**Figure 5.3**

Occurrence of Discourses in 2001 Post-September 11 (U.K.)

**Figure 5.4**

Occurrence of Discourses in 2002 (U.K.)
Figure 5.5

Occurrence of Discourses in 2003 (U.K.)

- IO – Inside/Outside
- OD – Order/Disorder
- PN – Positive/Negative
- SO – Self/Other
- EW – East/West
- GE – Good/Evil
- TH – Threat

Figure 5.6

Occurrence of Discourses in 2004 (U.K.)

- IO – Inside/Outside
- OD – Order/Disorder
- PN – Positive/Negative
- SO – Self/Other
- EW – East/West
- GE – Good/Evil
- TH – Threat
Refining the Threat

September 11\textsuperscript{th} immediately made terrorism the focus of constructions of Threat in British geopolitics. The dramatic images and the significance of an attack on the American hegemon added substance to the representations. As in the United States, this was a time in which the Threat was made specific to terrorism, and the danger that this was alleged to pose was built up. Powerful individuals made use of the events of September 11\textsuperscript{th} to support their negative characterization of terrorists through the same binary discourses that were familiar from the past. As such, the image they constructed and warnings of danger they gave, could appear reasonable in the context of the discourse, and the real events that were being interpreted through it. Tony Blair’s statement on September 11\textsuperscript{th} is representative of this:

… this mass terrorism is the new evil in our world. The people who perpetrate it have no regard whatever for the sanctity or value of human life, and we the democracies of the world, must come together to defeat it and eradicate it. This is not a battle between the United States of America and terrorism, but between the free and democratic world and terrorism. We, therefore, here in Britain stand shoulder to shoulder with our American friends in this hour of tragedy, and we, like them, will not rest until this evil is driven from our world. (Blair, 2001a)

There is no room for ambiguity; the terrorists are ‘evil’ while ‘we’, in the democratic world, are ‘good’. Good/Evil is an extremely powerful discourse that makes the ‘Other’ repugnant and completely at odds with the ‘Self’, but crucially it makes the ‘Other’ particularly threatening. The Positive/Negative discourse works closely with the Good/Evil and Self/Other binaries here to reinforce the division. An American Alliance narrative is drawn on to link Britain to the victim and build the idea that ‘we’ have been attacked too. In this regard, the historic notion of a ‘special relationship’ in British geopolitics is relevant. It allows Blair to construct an understanding of the events that suggests Britain is effectively under Threat itself; such an association prepares the ground for subsequent responses and reaffirms the close political relationship that Blair wishes to maintain with the United States.

The Good/Evil discourse is not one of the most common overall (Figure 5.1). Figure 5.7 shows how it only appears in a fifth of documents before September 11\textsuperscript{th}, but following the attacks it suddenly rises to around 60%. This is the period when attempts
are being made to characterize the terrorists. However, by 2002 it falls away dramatically, and by 2003 and 2004 has returned to the levels of pre-September 11th. This is related to the way in which the Good/Evil discourse is constructed in British geopolitics. While terrorism is clearly seen as a negative, and indeed threatening, activity, carried out by people who are reprehensible and unpredictable, the use of the word ‘evil’ has a largely descriptive function. It is not, as in the United States, representing terrorists as in some way agents of the devil with the British on the side of God. This results from the lack of a divinely inspired narrative relating to the ‘Self’.

Figure 5.7

Nonetheless, this process of ‘Othering’ is not new in British geopolitics. Bhatia (2005) comments: ‘From the Romans to the British Empire and the present period of United Nations-sanctioned territorial administration, the construction of a savage, lawless or unordered subject is a noted prerequisite of intervention.’ (p.14). Indeed, the construction of terrorism as a new Threat and ‘Other’ relies on the reproduction of these existing discourses and the rhetorical connection with past ‘enemies’. This creates a sense of a continuing impinging ‘evil’ through time. For example, Peter Hain, then Minister of State at the Foreign Office, writes in the Guardian newspaper on the 24th of September 2001, that:

The values that the terrorists attacked last week were human rights, democracy and the rule of law – values that are not western but universal. They are the same values that inspired the British left in the
1930s to fight fascism in Spain and oppose appeasement of the Nazis, and in the 1970s and 1980s to back liberation struggles in southern Africa. (Hain, 2001a)

Britain is presented as being part of a good force that has continually battled against the Threats of ‘evil’. It is a force that is underpinned by the values of liberalism that it has supposedly defended over the years. Hence, this latest Threat from terrorism must, in terms of binary discourse, be in the same category as these other enemies from the past. The corollary of this negative construction of the terrorist is the (re)construction of the positive British ‘Self’. Ó Tuathail and Dalby (1998) discuss the ‘practices of nationhood’ that: ‘…involve ensembles of acts to create nation-space and nation-time, the projection of imaginary community, the homogenization of nation-space and pedagogization of history.’ (p.3). Hain draws on a narrative of History that represents a positive British past characterized by supposedly great achievement, and a prominent role in the world. This is closely related to the images of greatness and globalism in British geopolitics, in addition to the promotion of liberalism that he highlights here. It is worth noting that Hain seems to focus more on the values that he believes Britain stands for than Tony Blair who places greater emphasis on the negativity of the ‘Other’, a nuance that may reflect differences of individual approach to the issue even within the British state’s government, but perhaps also the more ‘left leaning’ audience for whom he is writing in this instance.

Despite many examples to the contrary, terrorism is characterized as a non-state actor. Describing this construction, Walters (2004) says that: ‘The enemy is the networks, gangs, terrorists which cut across/under borders… …the logic is to unite the police agencies and authorities across borders in the name of a perpetual struggle or war against a postnational (and postpolitical) enemy.’ (p.682). The terrorist sits outside the neorealist state system and the discourses thereof; in so doing it becomes incomprehensible and endangers the ‘order’ of the system. During a visit to Moscow, Jack Straw elaborates:

No one can now doubt that a primary threat to our security comes from groups which act outside states and the rules of the international community, or from places where the state and the rule of law do not function. No longer can any of us afford to ignore distant and misgoverned parts of the world. (Straw, 2001a)
This reinforces the binary between the ordered inside and the disordered, and hence threatening, outside. It also underpins the Threat, as by exporting terrorism, disorder is also transferred. Thus, if terrorism is allowed to penetrate the inside, the result will be disorder and instability and the ‘Self’ will be corrupted just like the ‘Other’. Accordingly, he points to groups that do not follow the neorealist ‘rules of the international community’ as being threatening. These groups represent, and emerge from, disorder, places that are ‘misgoverned’. Through neorealist discourse this is troubling, as the primary purpose of the state system, according to Bull (1977), is the maintenance of order. For Britain, which has a history of geopolitical codes that enshrine a mission to impose a particular order upon supposedly disordered parts of the world, the need to do so again is not out of step with that geopolitical history, making it more easy to develop and promote policies with this objective.

**Bundling Threats: Rogue States and WMD**

In 2002, as the events of September 11\textsuperscript{th} became more firmly established within geopolitical representations, the focus and characterization of the Threat changed. The narratives of Rogue State and Weapons of Mass Destruction now became associated with terrorism. *Figure 5.8* tracks the change over time of both narratives, and reveals that while they appeared in a fifth or fewer of documents before, and immediately after, September 11\textsuperscript{th}, in 2002 there was a dramatic change. The focus increasingly widened to other Threats. This formed the basis for the arguments in favour of invading Iraq in 2003, when the narratives remained common, although the link had now been constructed and therefore there was a slight reduction that continued in 2004.

These changes are repeated in the relative position of the narratives. *Figures 5.9* and 5.10 demonstrate that they were among the least frequently occurring, before, and just after, September 11\textsuperscript{th}; they were after all only two of a range of Threats. In 2002 WMD, and to a lesser extent Rogue State, suddenly became the leading narratives (*Figure 5.11*). This was a time when these Threats began to be connected to terrorism in representations, such as the potential risk of terrorists using WMD. In 2003 (*Figure 5.12*), the year when the Iraq war began, partly justified on the basis of these connections, the narratives were still among the most widely used; even in 2004 (*Figure
5.13) this remained the case as the conflict continued in Iraq and required a perpetual reemphasis of its underlying ‘logic’.

Figure 5.8

![The WMD and Rogue State Narratives Over Time (U.K.)](image)

Figure 5.9

![Occurrence of Narratives Pre-September 11 (U.K.)](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Narratives</th>
<th>Percentage of Documents in Which Narratives Occur</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WT – War Against Terrorism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CL – Coalition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OG – Organic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WD – Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RS – Rogue State</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR – Freedom</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H – History</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GP – Global Player</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU – European Unity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AA – American Alliance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GC – Global Community</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend:
- Pre 9/11
- 01 Post 9/11
- 2002
- 2003
- 2004
Atlanticism or Europeanism? Competing Codes in Post-Cold War Britain

Figure 5.10

Occurrence of Narratives in 2001 Post-September 11 (U.K.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Narratives</th>
<th>Percentage of Documents in Which Narratives Occur</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WT – War Against Terrorism</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RS – Rogue State</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU – European Unity</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CL – Coalition</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR – Freedom</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AA – American Alliance</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OG – Organic</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H – History</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GC – Global Community</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WD – Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GP – Global Player</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5.11

Occurrence of Narratives in 2002 (U.K.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Narratives</th>
<th>Percentage of Documents in Which Narratives Occur</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WT – War Against Terrorism</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RS – Rogue State</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU – European Unity</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CL – Coalition</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR – Freedom</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AA – American Alliance</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>OG – Organic</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H – History</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GC – Global Community</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WD – Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GP – Global Player</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 5.12

Occurrence of Narratives in 2003 (U.K.)

Figure 5.13

Occurrence of Narratives in 2004 (U.K.)
This was not simply a revival of the selection of Threats that existed before September 11th; it is part of an accelerating process to bundle these separate Threats into one common enemy. Putzel (2006) argues that connected to the reasons given for the Iraq War:

‘…have been moves by both the US and British authorities to join together threats (especially of the use of weapons of mass destruction) from non-state radical organizations pursuing terror politics with those represented by so-called “rogue regimes” operating outside of international law.’ (p.73).

Beginning with a less specific process of linking terrorism with Rogue States and Weapons of Mass Destruction, the governments of Britain and the United States started to construct a context for war based on this premise. In November 2002, at the Lord Mayor’s Banquet, Tony Blair claimed that:

Terrorism and WMD are linked dangers. States which are failed, which repress their people brutally, in which notions of democracy and the rule of law are alien, share the same absence of rational boundaries to their actions as the terrorist. (Blair, 2002)

This representation implies that if the ‘Others’ are irrational they could strike at any time – and use WMD. In Britain the debate surrounding WMD and Iraq was notable for the prominent claim that the weapons could be delivered in 45 minutes. While the specifics of what this referred to (what types of weapons and where they could reach within 45 minutes) were not made particularly clear it nevertheless relates to theories of space-time compression; the WMD technology reducing the effect of distance by making an attack possible within a very short period of time accentuating the Threat posed by such weapons and by Iraq.

Blair also argues that democracy and the rule of law are ‘alien’ to Rogue States, reinforcing the difference from the ‘Self’, for which these are supposedly part of the defining liberal principles. The implication is that since Rogue States and terrorists are of similarly ‘evil’ and ‘irrational’ character they are likely to cooperate. The relationship is simplified to one in which the Rogue States provide territorial bases and WMD, while the terrorists offer their abilities to operate outside the state system, creating a Threat that appears greater than the state enemies of the past.
Atlanticism or Europeanism? Competing Codes in Post-Cold War Britain

The link that has been constructed between the three Threats provides the opportunity to deploy the discursive practice of ‘common sense’ in presenting a Threat from Iraq. Dalby (1990) demonstrates how this was used to show that what was good for America was good for everyone during the Cold War. It allows, as Sharp (2000) points out, ‘a silencing of complexity’ such that true or false conclusions can be reached. Accordingly, in the build up to the Iraq War, Iraq and al Qaeda are presented as the major Threats to Britain:

The two greatest threats facing Britain in the next decade are terrorists and rogue states with WMD. The most dangerous terrorist organization is Al Qa’ida. The most aggressive rogue state is Iraq. (Straw, 2003b)

Through the single Threat formed by bundling of terrorism, Rogue States and WMD, it seems ‘common sense’ that Iraq and al Qaeda, should be allied. Following these assumptions, the possibility appears to be made real that Iraq will supply al Qaeda with WMD. When appreciated through this discursive construction, the ability to penetrate borders that the terrorists have shown makes Iraq a direct Threat to Britain. Taking such a position allows Britain, and Tony Blair personally, to sustain its links with the United States where a similar set of assumptions were made.

A ‘War On Terrorism’

Having constructed the terrorist Threat as a distinct ‘Other’ compared to the positive ‘Self’, Britain’s geopolitics post-September 11th would almost inevitably require an active response. Furthermore, in the context of the representations, that response must include a military element. The discourses through which the Soviet Union was represented, argues Dalby (1990), supported militarism as a natural response, given the nature of the Threat. A dangerous ‘Other’ made it ‘obvious’ that the only solution was one based on military means. A similar process can be seen in post-September 11th Britain. Boggs (2002) depicts the relationship that has been created between terrorism and state responses and describes it as: ‘…an unfolding scenario that is best understood as a deadly cycle of militarism and terrorism – twin expressions of the same New World Order…’ (p.241). In such circumstances it becomes ‘common sense’ that terrorists need to be challenged before it is too late.

3 This passage is taken from a statement to the House of Commons on the 21st of January 2003.
It is therefore unsurprising that the narrative of War on Terrorism which barely registered before (Figure 5.9), should have become the most frequently occurring after September 11th (Figure 5.10). The dramatic change is made clear by examining its occurrence over time in Figure 5.14. Peaking at about 60% in late 2001, the narrative fits comfortably into the representations at this time, when the negative characterization is also at its height. The decline in the following years, that the graph shows, is precipitated by the reduction of the negative characterization. The narrative is established, providing the context in which government responses citing terrorism can be given a veneer of ‘common sense’.

Figure 5.14

The War Against Terrorism Narrative Over Time (U.K.)

Given the way in which the Threat has been constructed, the method of removing it must be focused on the disordered spaces from which it is said to emerge. This appears to fit into the long history of British engagement on a global scale, allegedly bringing ‘order’ to the world by applying political and economic liberalism. Through these discourses, Britain must act once again to order the disorder beyond its boundaries:

By engaging with the world, and driving back the boundaries of chaos, we are helping to prevent instability and insecurity, in order to stop conflict, tyranny and terrorism. (Straw, 2002b)\(^4\)

\(^4\) Straw was talking about relations between Europe and the United States at the Brookings Institution in Washington D.C.
This is apparently beneficial to the countries in question and to the ‘Self’, which will no longer be threatened as a result. Underlying these arguments is the familiar discourse of Orientalism, where the Occident intervenes to help and ‘improve’ the inferior Orient (Said, 1978). Hence, the Orientalist discourse that underpinned British colonialism is reproduced and adapted to the present realities in order to justify British engagement on the outside.

However, the form that the engagement should take is more complicated than may first appear. Although militarism is certainly a possibility that the representations allow (for example in Afghanistan and Iraq), the British ‘War Against Terrorism’ is a more diverse concept than the American equivalent with its crusading character. The implications of a war on terrorism, are expressed by Tony Blair at the Mansion House in November 2001:

The war against terrorism is not just a police action to root out the networks and those who protect them, although it is certainly that. It needs to be a series of political actions designed to remove the conditions under which such acts of evil can flourish and be tolerated. The dragon’s teeth are planted in fertile soil of wrongs unrighted, of disputes left to fester for years or even decades, of failed states, of poverty and deprivation. (Blair, 2001e)

There is a clear use of the Organic narrative here (this is never a common narrative, but reinforces the negativity of the ‘Other’), which operates through the Good/Evil discourse, terrorism is a weed that needs to be ‘rooted out’, but more than that it is associated with the image of a dragon, demonstrating how dangerous it is. Such dramatic rhetoric contrasts with the more moderate, though still negative, threatening characterization, in the previous quote from Jack Straw. Again, there is an element of variation between different British political leaders; the general representation is the same, but the more aggressive tone of Blair’s speeches tends to be muted in those of Foreign Office figures like Straw, pointing to the possibility of an alternative slightly less conflictive, militaristic or even Atlanticist course. Nevertheless, although there is an acceptance of the use of military action, there is also a subtler dimension to the War narrative; the ‘fertile soil’ in which terrorism grows requires political actions to remove it. This corresponds with the British colonial vision in which imperialism was understood to be as much a means of exporting British liberal values in support of
British interests as it was about conquering via military action. Similarly, by spreading those same values, removing the chaos from which it is meant to grow, terrorism can, it is said, be eliminated, and British political interests are protected and furthered in the process.

Placing British Responses in Historical Context

What has begun to emerge is that Britain’s historical participation at a global scale, and the legacy this has left in terms of the construction of geopolitical codes, are central to how responses to terrorism have been developed. Hence, one important narrative in these constructions is History. This is drawn primarily from the national scale, and it supports another narrative that is relevant here, that is the Global Player. Although this obviously places Britain in a global context, it can again be traced back to the national scale as a narrative encapsulating the supposed glory and greatness of Britain, entitling it to an influential place in the world.

*Figure 5.15*

Use of the History narrative was most frequent before September 11th, when almost 50% of documents showed evidence of it (*Figure 5.15*); the Global Player narrative matched this. A considerable reduction is apparent thereafter, particularly for History, which was not drawn on at all in those documents analysed from 2002. Following this it appears again at a lower level, while the Global Player narrative
stabilizes at around 20% of documents. The need to reproduce these narratives is greatest when the new Threat has not been fully established in the representations, that is when the ‘enemies’ are multiple and indistinct. As the terrorists were (re)constructed after September 11th, History could help to bind the new Threat with a succession of vanquished enemies, while the need for British involvement in the global response was also emphasized. Once this understanding had been constructed, the Threat was established, and required less historical contextualization as this was now ‘obvious’. However, Britain’s ‘global role’ is an ever present theme that must be repeated, if less frequently than before.

Both narratives are evident when Tony Blair discusses Foreign Policy early in his Premiership:

We also enjoy a unique set of relationships through the Security Council, NATO, the G8, Europe and the Commonwealth, not to mention our close alliance with America. We hold the presidency of the European Union and the G8 next year, and are hosting the second Asia-Europe Meeting. By virtue of our geography, our history and the strengths of our people, Britain is a global player. As an island nation, Britain looks outward naturally. The British are inveterate travelers. (Blair, 1997)

By virtue of its ‘geography’ and ‘history’, Blair claims that Britain is in a position of influence. The idea of Britain as an ‘island nation’, that has been so repetitive in its self-image, is drawn on again as the basis for its global role. Van der Wusten and Dijkink (2002) identify the most central concern of British geopolitical discourse as: ‘…the space of flows that make up the global system.’ (p.34). By pointing to the links that the country has, Blair continues this pattern and reproduces the Global Player narrative in the modern context, using the History narrative to draw parallels with the past, in which Britain was a ‘great power’ operating at the global scale.

A ‘Coalition Against Terrorism’

For the United States a Coalition Against Terrorism provides political and practical support to a primarily unilateral ‘war’; for Britain it implies a deeper commitment and a closer alliance. The historical experience of the Second World War,

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3 Tony Blair was speaking at the Lord Mayor’s Banquet.
Atlanticism or Europeanism? Competing Codes in Post-Cold War Britain

and the Cold War, was of a close alliance with America for the purposes of security, and of sustaining an element of global influence as a component in its continuing great power ambitions. The new Threat offered an opportunity to renew this alliance with America and, where appropriate, the other historical connections that Britain claimed to have as a Global Player. In an interview with CNN on the 16th September 2001, Tony Blair commented:

And I think you will find there is enormous support for the idea that we must put together a broad-based coalition, to hound these people down and bring them to justice. (Blair, 2001c)

This is an early reaction to the September 11th attacks, demonstrating the importance of Coalition in Britain’s immediate response. There is no question that America should be left to act alone. Therefore, the British Coalition narrative conforms to neorealism up to a point as it underpins the formation of policies of cooperation between sovereign states. In that regard it is aligned with the American vision. On the other hand, the narrative is moulded by the influence of Britain’s historical experience, the global position that this has supposedly provided, and also British experience of deeper integration in Europe. Blair wanted to have influence on, and participate in, the response to the September 11th attacks; a Coalition would allow this strategy to be pursued.

Britain and Europe

The same reluctance to be too involved in Europe, that influenced policy decisions in the post-War period, remains prominent in British geopolitics today. This generates a dilemma, reflected in the way Europe is imagined in British geopolitical codes; there is an element of cooperation and pooling sovereignty, alongside a stubborn determination to protect the Westphalian model of the sovereign state.

These competing concepts are supported by the simultaneous use of different narratives. Figure 5.16 reveals that Coalition was drawn upon in around 75% of documents after September 11th, before becoming relatively insignificant at around 10%. Conversely, the European Unity narrative, which represents a deeper level of cooperation, is consistently present in between 40 and 60% of documents. However, a
more detailed examination shows that there is a reduction in use of the narrative after September 11th when Coalition is most frequent.

*Figure 5.16*

The American Alliance narrative always occurs less often than European Unity, but in many ways follows a similar pattern. One noticeable difference is that it is lower in 2002 and 2003 than in 2001. This is despite the war in Iraq, but may reflect attempts to reconcile the European dimension with this more neorealist conflict being pursued in close alliance with the United States. These two, in many ways contradictory, narratives are therefore fairly consistent in comparison with Coalition, which is used mainly in the aftermath of September 11th as a less specific and neorealist construction of cooperation.

The European Union is not presented as a replacement for the British state, which continues to have pre-eminence in representations. Instead, it is discussed in terms of a regional organization of growing importance, but ultimately subservient to the state. In a speech on Europe during the Kosovo conflict, Blair describes it as follows:

> It will be a new and different sort of entity. Power will be diffuse with decisions taken at the European level when they need to be and taken at the local or national level when they can be. In reforming our European structures, we should not imitate the constitutional theory of a sovereign state, but rather build the structures
we need to achieve our objectives, recognizing the unique nature of the Union. (Blair, 1999b)

Then in his 2000 Mansion House speech, he adds:

We have now entered the debate about Europe’s political future, arguing that Europe can be a superpower, but should not be a superstate in which national identity is subsumed. (Blair, 2000)

Although Blair is trying to avoid antagonizing his domestic Euro-sceptic audience by attributing too much power to the region over the state, and therefore gives little detail as to the roles of each layer, these passages appear to characterize multi-layered governance not entirely removed from that proposed by Held (1995). The crucial difference is that the state is still considered, on the surface at least, to be in control. The State-Centric Model described by Hooghe and Marks (2001) appears to come closer to the British outlook: ‘This model poses states (or, more precisely, national governments) as ultimate decision makers, devolving limited authority to supranational institutions to achieve specific policy goals.’ (p.2). This reflects the continuing requirement in British geopolitics for a global role for Britain as a state, separate from the Europeans. Indeed, corresponding with Blair’s assessment of European structures, Goetschel (2000) says: ‘…Europe is not constituted security-wise as yet another state or nation.’ (p.270). Yet simultaneously Britain needs closer relations with Europe, in a world in which it no longer has the power it once did, if it is to continue to have influence regionally and globally.

Europe is constructed as an ordered space with the power to spread its positive influence, bringing order to the disorder of the outside. This is significant as it shows how the narrative of European Unity is working with discourse to construct a positive ‘Self’ – a European ‘Self’ – beyond that of the British ‘Self’. It does not replace Britain but is representative of a shift towards a regional perspective in British geopolitics in combination or even competing with the state centric vision. To an extent, this is also indicative of differences within British representations as constructed by individuals within government. The agency of each political figure plays a part in the overall representations and ultimately policies of the state, but contrary to neorealism, the state is not a single unit and its agents can present subtly varying visions. The following
passage from Jack Straw suggests a slightly more integrated Europe with a greater geopolitical role than the vague layered model that Tony Blair described:

…Europe must play an increasingly influential role in international affairs. Enlargement in 2004 should be an opportunity for the Union to broaden its horizons beyond central Europe, and to focus on the challenges of spreading democracy and prosperity on its southern and eastern frontiers. (Straw, 2003a)6

European Unity has brought order to the continent, and it is this ability to eliminate the perceived sources of Threats that, it is argued, must now be used outside the European borders. Ward (2002) argues that: ‘The nation-state represents a mythical epitome, and the European Union, as the ultimate nation-state, is the ultimate mythology; the complete market sealed against the destabilizing effects of the barbarian “other”.’ (p.225). By expanding the space within its boundaries – the inside – order and stability are also spread. As such, it is reminiscent of the British approach to Empire, an expansion of the EU is believed to deliver liberal values and stability, but only if accompanied by order. British policy generally promotes an enlarged Europe over a deeper Europe, and therefore representing it in this way helps to underpin these policy objectives.

With the European Unity narrative now embedded in British discursive structures, Europe has become central to Britain’s vision of cooperation. Hettne and Söderbaum (2000) comment: ‘The unbundling of state functions forms part of a new structure of multilevel governance where the region constitutes one level.’ (p.465). Consequently, Europe can act at a global scale to improve security, and at the same time strengthen Britain’s position in the world:

The EU makes us stronger at home, and stronger abroad. The same logic applies. It would be foolish to waste the potential of the EU as a force for good in the world. It is time we all recognized that the EU allows us to magnify and strengthen our influence as a nation on the world stage. (Straw, 2001b)7

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6 Jack Straw was speaking at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Leadership Conference in London.
7 This passage was taken from Jack Straw’s speech at the Royal United Services Institute in London on the 11th of December 2001.
Again, Straw sees an important role for Europe without ignoring the continuing position of Britain as an actor globally. Britain can no longer hold a dominant position in the world; so close cooperation with others, particularly in Europe, is required. This continues the practice of using connections with other states to enhance British influence. With the construction of a new cross border Threat, it appears an even more appropriate means of responding. For British policy-makers the European Union acts as a model for bringing order and Freedom to the world, even if their views of how this might be achieved are not always identical.

**Europe and America: A Bridge or A Contradiction?**

The alleged ‘special relationship’ with America is central to British attempts to maintain its global role. For British policy-makers the challenge has been to combine a state-to-state alliance of this sort with participation in a deeper regional organization that demands more consensual decision-making. Thus, Tank (1998) points out that in Europe:

‘...there is the divide between the Atlanticists who maintain that intergovernmental cooperation within already established security organizations such as NATO is the best option available, and the Europeanists who see the eventual development of a unified European approach in security and foreign affairs, independent of American involvement.’ (p.14).

Speaking at the Lord Mayor’s Banquet in November 2001, with the Afghanistan conflict underway, Tony Blair attempts to reconcile the potential contradictions:

I hope, too, we have buried the myth that Britain has to choose between being strong in Europe or strong with the United States. Afghanistan has shown vividly how the relationships reinforce each other; and that both the United States and our European partners value our role with the other. So let us play our full part in Europe not retreat to its margins; and let us proclaim our closeness to the United States and use it to bring Europe closer to America. (Blair, 2001e)

Blair is returning to the classic idea of Britain acting as a bridge to link Churchill’s circles. The problem remains that Britain is part of Europe whereas it has a bilateral relationship with the United States. These relationships operate differently, and can produce policy conflicts as a result (e.g. Iraq). Putzel (2006) says: ‘The debate at the
United Nations over US-Anglo intervention in Iraq demonstrated the green shoots of an emerging divergence between some of the strongest members of the European Union and the United States.’ (p.81). However, as far as the British state is concerned, to protect the country’s interests, particularly in the realm of security, it must continue to be closely involved in European integration and simultaneously retain strong links with others, most of all America:

…That means our strong network of alliances and cooperation around the world, combined with the global connections which our history and language provide, are more important today than ever.

Our membership of the European Union and our relationship with the United States are central to almost everything we do internationally. It is also of paramount importance to our future prosperity and security that the relationship between Europe and the US continues to be strong. (Straw, 2004)8

The imperial legacy of Britain as a global power is once again influential for British geopolitics when supposedly confronted by new Threats. Europe and America are the two ‘circles’ that are most prominent today. Hence, the assumption is, that they must both be retained and used to further British and global interests. British geopolitics is therefore constructed to include both Atlanticist and Europeanist perspectives at the same time, reproducing a contradiction at the centre of the British worldview.

The Global Community

For British policy-makers, seeking to establish an influential role for the country in the post-Cold War world, the logic of the Coalition retains its attraction. Despite this, the limited idea of state-to-state alliances has been increasingly augmented by representations of a global or international community. In the narrative of Global Community the state system is far more structured and regulated than the realist world identified by Bull (1977). Instead of an anarchic world of states, the model being represented appears closer to the European Union, where states follow rules and participate in collective decision-making, creating interdependency between states. This vision was already well developed before September 11th, but the reality of the

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8 Jack Straw was speaking to the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London on the 12th of February 2004.
attacks made it appear even more appropriate in the context of constructions of a non-state terrorist Threat. It is also a convenient rhetorical device when attempting to gain support for a ‘War on Terrorism’ and measures associated with this; by suggesting that ‘terrorism’ is contrary to the interests of a Global Community other states could be pressurised to participate in and support such measures, as indeed could the public who constitute part of the audience for the speeches.

Figure 5.17 charts the occurrence of this narrative over time. The most noticeable feature of the graph is the change from pre-September 11th to post-September 11th. While it was not insignificant before the attacks, thereafter it appears in 50% or more of documents. Referring back to the graphs comparing the narratives in given time periods, demonstrates how the Global Community narrative becomes increasingly more important relative to the others. Prior to September 11th it is comparatively low (Figure 5.9), the increase following this (Figure 5.10) contributes to the narrative becoming the third most frequent in terms of the number of documents in which it appears. While the concentration on WMD and Rogue States in 2002 (Figure 5.11) and 2003 (Figure 5.12) means that it is only one of a number of prominent narratives, by 2004 Global Community occurs in more documents than any other.

Figure 5.17
A speech made by Tony Blair in Chicago in April 1999, at the time of the Kosovo conflict, was extremely important in defining the idea, and role of the Global Community, from a British perspective:

We are witnessing the beginnings of a new doctrine of international community. By this I mean the explicit recognition that today more than ever before we are mutually dependent, that national interest is to a significant extent governed by international collaboration and that we need a clear and coherent debate as to the direction this doctrine takes us in each field of international endeavour. Just as within domestic politics the notion of community – the belief that partnership and co-operation are essential to advance self-interest – is coming into its own; so it needs to find its own international echo. Global financial markets, the global environment, global security and disarmament issues: none of these can be solved without intense international co-operation. (Blair, 1999a)

The argument that Blair puts forward is that the interdependent nature of the modern world, and the range of Threats, make it necessary for states to work together to a far greater degree than ever before. While some sovereignty is lost, the greater goal of promoting the states’ interests is achieved. However, the British Global Community does not transcend the neorealist discourse, it is an attempt to re-construct the discursive structure through which the post-Cold War world, and Britain’s place in it, is understood.

Nevertheless, the introduction of this narrative has implications for the reproduction of the sovereign state. Neorealist interpretations are disrupted by the imagining of some form, however limited, of global structure that reduces the supposed anarchical nature of the state system. In respect of Europe, Gualini (2004) states that: ‘At stake in building multi-level governance is hence a qualitative change in processes of state formation, challenging conceptions of state sovereignty intimately connected to its territoriality, as the mutually reinforcing source of both its power and identity.’ (p.553). It changes the nature of the state, and allows global and regional layers of governance to make ‘sense’. In March 2004, Tony Blair directly challenges the principles of the Westphalia treaty on which realism is founded:

So, for me, before September 11th, I was already reaching for a different philosophy in international relations from the traditional one that has held sway since the treaty of Westphalia in 1648; namely that a country’s
internal affairs are for it and you don’t interfere unless it threatens you, or breaches a treaty, or triggers an obligation of alliance. (Blair, 2004)

No longer is the inside beyond the scope of international relations, now states forming the Global Community have the right to intervene where they perceive certain rules or standards are not being met. Mansbach (2005) argues that:

‘A postinternational lens de-emphasises the distinction between “domestic” and “foreign,” although not between “inside” and “outside.” The former refers to the impact of sovereign boundaries, whereas the latter delineates the borders between moral communities, often rooted in dramatically contrasting definitions of the “self” and “other.”’ (p.30).

While this may go further than the British understanding, that Britain should adopt such a position is not entirely surprising for a state that has already become part of a regional body with substantial powers of intervention in internal matters. A Global Community appears to provide a structure through which political solutions can be sought to potential Threats, bringing order to the disorder just as European integration is said to have done. Conversely, it also provides a basis for military interventions such as an invasion of Iraq, where a state considers another to be a potential Threat (though only where the intervening state has power and influence).

Hence, a Global Community, when understood through the lens of British geopolitics, is a structure that offers the opportunity to enshrine British influence in the post-Cold War world. In the same 2004 speech on the ‘Global Terror Threat’, Tony Blair states:

The doctrine of international community is no longer a vision of idealism. It is a practical recognition that just as within a country citizens who are free, well educated and prosperous tend to be responsible, to feel solidarity with a society in which they have a stake; so do nations that are free, democratic and benefiting from economic progress, tend to be stable and solid partners in the advance of humankind. The best defence of our security lies in the spread of our values. (Blair, 2004)

Blair holds up the values of the ‘Self’ as superior, reproducing the Freedom narrative to emphasise this. These values have delivered peace on the European continent and therefore, it is argued, they must be spread further if order is to be brought to the
outside. Creating a Global Community gives Britain a chance to be at the centre of efforts to re-order the world in this way, something that would be impossible without a system of close cooperation. Elden (2005) comments:

‘The Blair doctrine of international community is – at least in its ideal form – a multilateral strategy, whereas the US policy… …is avowedly unilateral. Blair’s attempts to provide multilateral support for the USA’s unilateralism failed to deliver the second Security Council resolution on Iraq, and yet he still went along with the USA. This is the unresolved tension at the heart of Blair’s foreign policy.’ (p.2095).

By acting in a European Union, and in a similarly structured Global Community, Britain can achieve more and fulfil its globalist and great power ambitions in a way that it could not in the anarchic state-system. Through the British discursive structure this makes ‘sense’ as a system for dealing with the new Threats, as it appears to be the best way to introduce British liberal values to the rest of the world. At the same time the contradiction in British geopolitics continues to impact upon policy-making. As Elden describes, the multilateralist vision may be undermined when the demands of Atlanticism require it. This, of course, is as much an implication of individual agency on the part of politicians such as Tony Blair, as of the two competing worldviews that provide the context for geopolitical policy-making in Britain.

Conclusions

There is therefore a continuing process taking place in which British geopolitical codes are being re-moulded in response to the new post-Cold War and post-September 11th circumstances. This does not take place outside the historical and political influences that have driven the long-term worldviews of the country. These codes are developed in a world in which neorealism is being challenged; but as a state that is itself built upon neorealist philosophy, Britain cannot completely remove itself from the confines of this. Instead, codes are being adapted, in the British case the realities that it faces are leading to competing but entangled codes, as it struggles to come to terms with a diminished role in the world, while retaining a long-established self-image as a global actor and great power. This image is drawn from the philosophies of liberalism that have been crucial to the construction of the British state. The source of these ideas is of course the same Enlightenment thinking that underpinned the formation of the realist
sovereign state itself, and therefore British post-Cold War geopolitical codes cannot be removed from this context.

Prior to September 11\(^{th}\) a range of Threats were constructed through established binary discourses, as the need for an ‘Other’ against which the ‘Self’ could be reproduced was undiminished. Hence, the outside remained a space that was imagined to be disordered. It was from the disorder that Threats were supposed to come, even if these were not yet clearly specified. In the discursive structure that had evolved over time, British identity as a neorealist state required such a threatening ‘Other’ for its reproduction. New threats could therefore be understood as part of a long line of menaces of similar negative character.

September 11\(^{th}\) allowed the Threat to be focused on terrorism, and the terrorist could be characterized in the wake of this event. Discourses of Good/Evil and Positive/Negative were used here, though not in the same religious sense as in America. The addition of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Rogue State narratives enhanced the sense of danger even further. These formerly separate Threats were now bound together, firstly by implication, and then by specific linkage. Drawing on the logic of ‘common sense’, arguments could then be made for action to eliminate the Threats that were supposedly growing in the disorder.

The British response was to support an American led ‘war on terrorism’. However this did not follow the same crusading zeal as the American’s, given the different historical background to the state. As was apparent from some of the quotations, there is also a sense in which British interpretations of the situation, and visions of how it might be tackled, lack the homogeneity that (neo)realists attribute to the state. The various actors within a state all have agency and therefore influence over the (re)production of discourse and the generation of policies and geopolitical codes, although this influence will differ from person to person.

In the British case this difference in approach appears more noticeable than was true of the American material, nevertheless there remains a certain conformity to the representations; it would be extremely difficult for politicians to remain in government together if they diverged to a great extent. However, the nuances apparent between the
Prime Minister and the Foreign Office on several occasions are a complexity that neorealist accounts lack; critical realist analysis can include these, and the agency that they represent, as part of the process that ultimately forms geopolitical codes and, in the British example, policies that mix militarism with alternative measures.

For British policy-makers military action was an option, but political solutions were also important. This followed the long-term pattern of British policy, stretching back to imperialism, where the country’s interests were thought to be best served by avoiding war and using economic and political means to gain power and influence. The history of globalism and search for great power status that was encapsulated in imperialism also meant that there was no question about Britain’s role in this ‘war’; it should be at the centre of the action working closely with its Cold War ally America. Thus, narratives of History and Global Player were used in representations of Britain.

For Britain, the best way to tackle terrorism and the other ‘related’ Threats was as part of a Coalition. Relying on such relationships had become ever more important with the decline of its power. The Atlantic Alliance or special relationship could be renewed giving Britain influence, and its alleged historic links around the world could be utilized, making the country feel invaluable in the ‘war on terrorism’.

The experience of pooling sovereignty in Europe to gain global influence and cope with cross border challenges is therefore influential in reconstructing British geopolitics as a whole. For Britain there is now a European ‘Self’ in addition to, if subservient to, the British ‘Self’. Europe is an example of how cooperation can deliver the much sought after order and liberalism without resorting to war. Nevertheless, the old image of the island nation with a global role persists. The dilemma is most apparent in attempts to reconcile an Alliance with America, and be an active regional player in European Unity. The American Alliance has been central to British geopolitics since the Second World War, as it is believed to give security and influence. It is essentially a (neo)realist relationship between two sovereign states and is the model that America’s Coalition Against Terrorism would be closest to. Europe, with its deeper integration and sovereignty pooling, begins to move away from neorealism, and yet is also represented as crucial for Britain’s influence, not only at the regional scale, but globally, including with America. Indeed, both these relationships are presented as being
essential for the maintenance of the other, and thus for Britain’s role in meeting the new Threats. The fundamental differences and the historical vision of Britain’s global role create a constant tension between the two worldviews, generating a pair of competing geopolitical codes.

British policy-makers imagine the world in terms of a Global Community. This applies many of the features of the European Union at the global scale and therefore represents deeper cooperation than a mere neorealist Coalition. This narrative suggests a more structured system in which sovereignty is pooled to match the cross border, non-state Threats of the post-Cold War world. It is compatible with British globalism as it gives the country a position where it can influence decisions and participate in responses in a way that is not possible in a purely neorealist system, and therefore offers the opportunity to achieve ‘great power’ status. Britain is imagined as a crucial player in such a community – a Global Player – given its historic links around the world forged through Empire and alliances with the United States and Europe. The idea of a British bridging role, joining Churchill’s three circles, once again underpins this new Global Community vision. The Global Community is, therefore, a vision that in many ways moves beyond the neorealist state system in the same way that the European Union has at the regional scale, but from a British perspective it still retains many of the features and discourses of neorealism, as the British state remains paramount. Hence, it contains elements of Britain’s two competing worldviews and geopolitical codes that are so difficult to reconcile and yet are always entangled.

From here we can draw out a British discursive structure (Figure 5.18). As discussed, the structure includes discourses and narratives that, while similar to those of America in some cases, are particular to Britain. Through this discursive structure, the two competing British geopolitical codes can make ‘sense’. The factors influencing geopolitical codes operate at three scales, and likewise the codes themselves can be considered in this way. The national scale is where the codes demand a reinforcement of national unity, and the protection of the ‘Self’. British values of liberalism must be defended and this cannot be removed from the continuation of Britain’s independent global role. These factors are common to both codes. At the regional scale Britain has an interest in integration, particularly in terms of its post realist code. Even the realist code requires close cooperation with Europe as a means of sustaining influence, and
spreading British values, but the need for separation from Europe and engagement with America also encourages policies of detachment when applying this realist code.

*Figure 5.18*

Diagram of the British Discursive Structure

This brings us to the global scale where Britain’s self-image implies that it should be a major actor. The realist code still requires close cooperation with other states, most notably the United States, but also Europe and the rest of the world. This is a necessity for sustaining British influence and tackling non-state Threats, and is a function of the vision of a British bridging role. At the same time, through the post-realist code, these engagements are represented as more rigid and deeper. This code determines that British global influence, as a state, is only possible by pooling sovereignty as in Europe, and this is also the best way to challenge Threats that contradict realism. By acting through Europe and as part of a Global Community it is argued that British values can be spread as order is introduced to the disordered spaces of the world from where Threats emerge. The two codes, therefore, draw on the same discursive structure and seek similar outcomes, but with subtly different worldviews, neither being completely removed from the other.
Chapter 6

Cooperation and Independence: Geopolitical Codes of French ‘Greatness’ in the Post-Cold War World

Introduction

France is a state that has been at the forefront of regionalization in Europe, and is therefore a useful example to compare with the more ‘Euro-reluctant’ United Kingdom and the hegemonic United States. Understanding how geopolitical codes have developed in France can help to reveal how the specific context in which a state’s codes develop affects the nature of the codes, and the policies of different states. The historical and political context acts in combination with discourse, narratives and the agency of powerful individuals, changing with time as noted by Agnew and Corbridge (1995), and establishing geopolitical codes unique to that country and the circumstances of the time.

As I have argued previously, a geopolitical code is the product of an evolving set of discourses and narratives, political realities and individual agency, both past and present, that are understood through this discursive structure. In the case of France, the codes are developed at the intersection of three scales and are therefore the product of local, regional and global factors. These factors are processed historically, resulting in geopolitical codes that are set within long term national representations and policy stances, positioning the codes as part of an unbroken line that is adapted to meet present circumstances while retaining grounding in the country’s past.
Thus, as in the examples of the United States and Britain, the earlier foreign policy of France forms a crucial part of the discussion. It will allow me to explore the essential characteristics that differentiate France from other states, and provide a context for discussing the discourses and narratives that have been identified through discourse analysis. In the French case the discourses are, on the surface, the same as those in the United States and Britain – Identity/Difference, Threat, Inside/Outside, Order/Disorder, East/West, Self/Other, Positive/Negative, Good/Evil – but again these are French versions (re)produced in the French context in interaction with French narratives and each other. As before, the binaries support and strengthen one another, and underpin representations of the positive French ‘Self’ and the negative threatening ‘Other’ in a situation in which the sovereign state and associated realist interpretations are understood, through discourse, to be ‘normal’. As such, it is a repetition of longstanding binary discourse separating the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, territory being an essential component of the state.

France also has a set of narratives relating to its history, political circumstances and experiences. These ten narratives – Organic, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Battle Against Terrorism, Humanist Values, Collective Responsibility, Global Player, European Unity, Multipolarity, World Democracy, and Global Community – support and mould each other as they interconnect, and do the same in interaction with the discourses. France’s self-image is reproduced through these narratives in relation to events in the present, while drawing on historical experience. In turn, the binary discourse dividing this ‘Self’ from the current ‘Other’ is also reproduced, as it has been in earlier periods when the ‘Other’ may have been different but the assumptions were essentially the same. French geopolitical codes are therefore developed through these discourses and narratives, contextualizing them in particular imaginings of the French sovereign state.

Each of these discourses and narratives will be discussed, analyzing how they operate and relate to one another. This will form the core of the chapter. As in the other two chapters, it begins with an examination of the construction of a dangerous ‘outside’, a place from which Threats emerge, reproducing familiar binary discourse. The French characterization of the terrorist ‘Other’ is then assessed and, continuing the pattern from the other chapters, the third section looks at Weapons of Mass Destruction,
and how France understood the likelihood of a Threat from Iraq. From here the responses of the French government are analysed, starting with the French ‘Battle Against Terrorism’ narrative. The values that French policy-makers hope to spread and defend are then discussed, before moving on to their emphasis on collective responses. Connections are made from this to the European experience, and then to attempts to expand this type of approach to a global scale through Multipolarity and Global Community. The chapter will conclude by relating this analysis to the context, demonstrating how the factors that define the French state provide a foundation for the construction of geopolitical codes that operate at three discernable scales.

Construction of Geopolitical Codes: The French Context

French values and history created the state-nation, and defined the national ‘Self’. This ‘Self’ became a model, which has been projected regionally in Europe and globally, firstly through colonialism, and now through policies of multipolarity and cooperation. The factors influencing French geopolitical codes can be grouped approximately under the three scales from which they operate (*Table 6.1*). However, they overlap and connect with each other across scales and cannot be considered to be isolated.

*Table 6.1*

Factors Influencing French Geopolitical Codes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National</th>
<th>Regional</th>
<th>Global</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republican Values</td>
<td>German Threat</td>
<td>Greatness/World Power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secular State</td>
<td>Soviet Threat</td>
<td>Independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘One France’</td>
<td>European Integration</td>
<td>Nuclear Deterrent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superiority</td>
<td>French Leadership in Europe</td>
<td>Atlantic Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>European Europe</td>
<td>Multipolar Ambition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Colonialism/Worldwide Presence</td>
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</tbody>
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The French Revolution continues to be a defining period, not just in the history of the country, but as a source of inspiration for the reproduction of the nation. In this regard the values established in the revolution are the most persistent elements of it in the construction of the national ‘Self’ and, by extension, in the production of geopolitical codes (Republican Values is the first factor acting at the national scale as
shown in Table 6.1). The principal source of these values is the Declaration of the Rights of Man of August 1789, encompassing rights to liberty, property, security and resistance to oppression (Stevens, 2003, p.5). The values are, however, most commonly repeated as liberty, equality and fraternity.

Perhaps the most important implication is that all citizens are considered equal. Hargreaves (1995) argues that The Rights of Man:

‘…were held to be valid not only for every individual in France but also for the whole of humanity. Within republican tradition the nation, including its political incarnation in the form of the state, is indivisible: no intermediary orders are recognized between the individual and the unitary state of which he or she is a member.’ (p.160).

This emphasis on the rights of the individual, and of humanity, appears to correspond with the modernist ideas arising from the Enlightenment, discussed in chapter two. The state was, of course, also a product of Enlightenment rationality and was enshrined in the Treaty of Westphalia. Hargreaves’ argument is underpinned by this discourse of the state. The binary division of inside and outside identified by Walker (1993) manifests itself here in the form of the indivisible nation within a unitary state.

However, as was argued by Connolly (1991), to define identity requires the existence of ‘Others’ who are negative in comparison to the ‘Self’. Ward (2002) reflects that: ‘…the same cultural politics which provides the fuel for nation self-determination also marginalizes the “other” as alien, and supports the pretence of the nation-state as the political refraction of uniformity and homogeneity.’ (p.227). Applying this logic to France must imply that those on the outside cannot have values of equal worth to those that define France. While the Rights of Man may apply to every individual, through this discourse, it must be exclusively the French state that encapsulates these values in their pure form.

The revolution also provided France with the impetus to move towards an entirely secular state (the second national factor in Table 6.1). The secular state has not always been absolute, with periods when the church has had greater influence, and others when ties to the state are removed (McMillan, 1992), neither does it mean the
abandonment of religion within France. However, in the fifth republic there is a clear separation of church and state extending to the exclusion of religion from state schools.¹ Secularism is a requirement that has emerged from an interpretation of the Republican Values that deemed religion to be an alternative source of identity and loyalty that would impinge on equality, and on the unity of the state. Hence, Enlightenment reasoning led to the assessment that religion would only disrupt this ‘natural’ order. Hargreaves (1995) explains that:

‘The principle of laïcité (secularism), a term which entered currency only in the later part of the nineteenth century, includes both freedom of conscience, already proclaimed during the revolution of 1789, and the formal separation of the state from any religious order.’ (p.160).

It is, therefore, not that religion itself is unacceptable in the republican context, rather such orders must be kept strictly separate from the state if the unity of the nation is to be maintained.

In a similar vein, the concept of ‘one France’ (Table 6.1) is an essential part of the mythology of the national ‘Self‘. Safran (1989) comments:

‘For many years, French politics and society were viewed in the context of a myth about “France: one and indivisible”. That myth was reflected in the political structures and regnant ideologies of the country from the Revolution of 1789 to the Fifth Republic.’ (p.176).

The unitary state is, by definition, a single whole that cannot be divided without destruction. Thus, in this interpretation, for the continuation of the Republican Values, and of France, no divisions must be introduced. This was applied in terms of religion, and has also been followed in the Jacobin approach to governance and society.

This set of French values and their related political constructions feed into a sense of the supposedly superior position of France in relation to the rest of the world (superiority is the fourth national factor in Table 6.1). This is enhanced not only by the revolutionary history, but also by past experience, and has been a persistent feature driving French foreign policy:

¹ While there are no state run religious schools allowed in France, private church schools are not illegal and the Catholic Church has long supported many of these (McMillan, 1992).
‘For more than two hundred years, (since the French Revolution, if not since the time of Louis XIV) the idea of playing the role of nation phare had tempted the French, and history had given them a sense of national importance in international affairs. Expressed in the famous mission civilisatrice of colonialism, this particular French feeling of national eminence, if not superiority, was carried through into the Fourth Republic and remained embedded in the country’s consciousness notwithstanding the experience of World War II.’ (Gordon, 1993, p.16).

Thus, the French state uses selective historical examples to reproduce its own image of superiority. When this is applied as a factor in foreign policy it has the effect of normalizing the search for power and influence for France by diminishing the relative, imagined, status of others.

Therefore, central to the outlook of France is its belief in its right, or even destiny, to achieve ‘greatness’ and the status of a ‘world power’, this is the first of the factors operating at the global scale (Table 6.1). Both these terms are constructed through binary discourse and assume the existence of an inferior ‘Other’, compared to which France is ‘greater’ and more important in world politics. After the Second World War, this status was no longer so easily achieved by a country that had been devastated by occupation, and now had to adjust to a world in which there were two competing superpowers. Macridis (1992) describes the problem:

‘Thus the dilemma confronting France’s post-World War II governments and political elites was either to accept the situation as it developed after World War II or to continue to seek “greatness” and “rank” without the physical, military and economic resources to implement it.’ (p.34).

French values and the sense of superiority that they generated would not allow an easy acceptance of the situation; instead they implied the need for the continued search for ‘greatness’ and ‘rank’.

This was sought more determinedly after the return of De Gaulle and the formation of the Fifth Republic in 1958. Under the leadership of ‘The General’ France became the only country to withdraw from the military structures of NATO in 1966 (Stevens, 2003, p.19), a policy resulting from the geopolitical code that defined France as an independent actor in charge of its own relations with the superpowers.
Independence is the second factor in the global column (Table 6.1). Nevertheless, France did remain within NATO, and continued to be aligned closely with the West, attempting to sustain its independence while still achieving security. Moïsi (1989) describes the activities of France during the Cold War:

‘Whenever the global East-West crisis assumed a character of urgency, the French rallied behind the United States (as in the Berlin, Cuban or Euromissile crises). Whenever East-West tensions receded, the French played their own cards toward Moscow in a dual effort of differentiation from the United States and of competition with respect to West Germany.’ (p.212).

Despite the longstanding geopolitical codes, French policy-makers could not ignore the reality of the changed situation. As Agnew and Corbridge (1995) described, a relationship exists between reality and discourse. Policy-makers had to work within the constraints of the Cold War conflict, and consequently construct discourses through their representations that made ‘sense’ of the Cold War world, and the actions they were taking within it. However, their agency was not completely detached from the discourse through which they understood the world. Therefore, where the circumstances allowed, the French code prioritizing independence was accommodated within the confines of the binary conflict, allowing France to follow policies of engagement with the USSR separate from the Americans.

Perhaps the most notable policy application of French independence was the acquisition of an independent nuclear deterrent (Table 6.1). So important was this that it became symbolic as a representation of the ‘greatness’ of France as well as of its independence from the United States in the realm of security. Macridis (1992) says of the ‘force de frappe’:

‘Their atomic and nuclear weapons – the force de frappe, the French have insisted, should not be counted as part of the allied nuclear force – irrespective of whether it relates to European deployment involving intermediary missiles, INF, or strategic talks involving intercontinental ballistic missiles. Their force is not integrated; it is independently targeted. It can come into play only when vital French interests are involved.’ (p.53).
Once again, in this passage, the distinctive French discourses and geopolitical codes are made apparent. France did not conform to the American code that represented the world as two blocs led by superpowers; the French code placed France in the role of a ‘world power’ that could act independently within this conflict. It therefore required its own nuclear weapons as the ‘ultimate discriminants of “superpower” or “great power”’ (Luke, 1989, p.222), and these must be under its full control rather than considered part of a Western bloc.

In neorealist terms, and with an identity based on difference from the ‘Other’, French geopolitical codes are heavily influenced by the supposed Threat from external ‘Others’. Most prominent in this regard over the last century are Germany and the Soviet Union. Sharing a border with Germany and the experience of invasion and occupation, made this Threat prescient in the construction of French codes and dominated geopolitical thought in the country, this is the first of the factors operating at the regional scale (Table 6.1). Post-War codes were driven primarily by the need to eliminate the potential for future invasion by Germany. Thus: ‘The fact that the Soviet Union had gained a foothold in the heart of Europe did not alter the traditional French reflexes; Germany was the enemy of France.’ (Macridis, 1992, p.35). Furthermore, he adds:

‘Among the French political elite (even when public opinion seemed in favor of unification), the realization that a united Germany – with over 75 million people and economic and financial resources far superior to those of France – was again to emerge in Europe aroused anxiety and fear.’ (p.62).

This suggests a continuation of the influence of the German Threat discourse upon geopolitical codes from the immediate post-War period right up to the end of the Cold War. Despite the fact that France and Germany had become close allies, the fear of the German ‘Other’ was still present for some, with the potential for influencing the construction of post-Cold War geopolitical codes.

Although France did not immediately view the USSR as the main Threat, the reality of the Cold War could hardly be ignored (it is the second regional factor in Table 6.1). Macridis discusses the positioning of France between the Soviet Union and the
Cooperation and Independence: Geopolitical Codes of French ‘Greatness’ in the Post-Cold War World

United States in the 1980s: ‘The Soviet menace appeared far worse to the French than the American presence, and perhaps for the first time since the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 did a president of France come so close to the American strategic concerns.’ (p.55), and: ‘…under Mitterrand the French military posture became increasingly Atlanticist.’ (p.55). While this statement reproduces negative representations of the Soviets, it also demonstrates the role of the Atlantic Alliance in French thinking, particularly under Mitterrand. This alliance was always important in terms of security, first from Germany and then from the Soviets. It was, however, an alliance that France wished to maintain on its own terms, in common with the demands for independence and ‘greatness’, but also given the direct experience of invasion that highlighted the reality of the Threat (Atlantic Alliance is in the global column of Table 6.1).

It is the search for ‘greatness’ and independence, added to the imperative to neutralize the German Threat, which underpins the French position on European integration (Table 6.1). Through the vehicle of Europe, France can maintain a detachment from America, and also adopt a leadership role that its ‘superiority’ demands. Gordon (1993) lists the main reasons for France’s adoption of European integration:

‘…a federal Europe would (1) prevent European nations from resuming the internecine warfare that had destroyed them twice in three decades; (2) provide a means for controlling Germany, the country seen as most responsible for this bloodshed; and (3) help create a counter-weight on the Eurasian continent to the newly threatening Soviet Union.’ (p.13).

The historical experience of war, and in particular the Threat of Germany, was central to the emergence of European integration, but so too was the perceived Threat of the USSR and the determination to have an independent means of security resisting the binary division of the world.

A European entity, in the vision of French policy-makers, gave France an opportunity to achieve the ‘greatness’ and ‘world role’ that it craved. France, they believed, had a ‘natural’ right to be a leader in the new Europe (Table 6.1). Thus: ‘The common market suggested the possibility that a larger European “whole” could be placed under the leadership of France, armed with atomic weapons that were denied to
Germany by virtue of the Paris accords.’ (Macridis, 1992, p.44). The Common Market, later to become the European Union, consequently provided a mechanism through which France could potentially gain greater influence in the world, as its national mythology suggested it deserved. To accomplish this it required a leadership role in the developing organization, and indeed that same mythology implied that this was a right that France would inevitably obtain.

It follows from this that the Europe France attempted to create was one that was independent from the super-powers. If Europe were to be the means by which France could establish itself as a ‘world power’, then it would also have to adopt the French demand for independence. Defarges (1989) points out that: ‘France has always promoted the idea of a European Europe, with its own voice, particularly in East-West relations.’ (p.233). Furthermore, Moïsi (1989) remarks: ‘In a famous and ambiguous statement about a Europe that would stretch from the Atlantic to the Urals, de Gaulle constituted a perfect negation of the enduring ideological nature of the East-West divide.’ (p.218). The notion of a European Europe is an extension of French attempts to break out of the binary Cold War world by creating a third pole, and resisting attempts by the super-powers to carve up Europe. Thus, the Cold War representations, familiar in American geopolitics, are disrupted in France by the introduction of a third actor with France at its head. This is not to say that binary representations are absent, as a (neo)realist state, France is built upon such discourse. However, in the French perspective, there is more than one ‘Other’, even if some seem more ‘threatening’ then others. A European Europe is thus a vital factor in post-War French geopolitics, and constitutes the final factor at the regional scale (Table 6.1).

Resistance to the division of the world in binary terms also informs the French commitment to multipolarity (Table 6.1, column 3) that developed in the Gaullist years. French policy-makers, in line with their world power ambitions, and their determination to maintain French independence, envisioned a world in which countries, and groups of states, would be able to act outside the control of the super-powers. Smouts (1989) refers to this multipolar strand in French geopolitics: ‘The efforts of the developing countries to organize themselves into a non-aligned political force coincided with the Gaullist ambition of a multi-polar world in which middle-range powers would have a margin of maneuver next to the two superpowers.’ (p.239). Underlying this statement
are the French geopolitical codes of the time, constructing a vision of a world in which a number of potential ‘middle-range powers’ might emerge as poles with influence. This conditioned the reactions, and policies, of France towards the creation of the non-aligned movement and the developing world generally. However, it cannot be understood without taking account of the important part that French colonial history (Table 6.1) has in relations with developing countries.

Until its breakup in the post-War years, France had one of the largest empires of the European states, demonstrating, in the minds of powerful French actors, France’s position as a ‘world power’, by reinforcing the perception of ‘greatness’. Thus, decolonization was not an easy process, nor was it the end of the close connections with former colonies, particularly in the Middle East and Africa. Smouts argues that: ‘She is probably the least successful in integrating the psychological consequences of decolonization. Her ambitions of grandeur still feed on the dreams of distant horizons. She cannot imagine herself powerful without a presence beyond her borders and an influence overseas.’ (p.235). The imperial past is crucial for the French sense of ‘greatness’ and this, supposedly positive, history can still be drawn upon today in the construction of geopolitical codes, reproducing the self-image of a ‘world power’ requiring a global role.

While France is not alone in having an imperial past that impinges upon its present geopolitics, it does have circumstances that make the relationship unique. The way in which France administered its colonies had huge implications for decolonization, but also for the relationship with immigrants from its former colonies. Macridis (1992) explains that:

‘Its cementing ideology was that of “assimilation” – the notion that ultimately every inhabitant would become a French citizen to be represented in the French Parliament – a notion at marked variance with the Anglo-Saxon conception, according to which political and cultural evolution of the colonial peoples would ultimately bring about political autonomy and self-government.’ (p.38).

This concept encapsulates the binary of Occident and Orient that Said (1978) discusses. When interpreted through such discourse, France was considered to be superior due to its Republican values; the inferior Oriental ‘Other’ was colonized to help it to
‘improve’. In accordance with the principle of ‘one France’, when the ‘Other’ reached the level of advancement supposedly achieved by France, the colonies would become part of France rather than governing themselves. In practice there was considerable variation in the extent to which this occurred. Algeria, in contrast with most other colonies, became a department of France. However, the Algerians then fought a war for independence. This war had an enormous impact on France, precipitating the end of the Fourth Republic and bringing De Gaulle to power in 1958 (McMillan, 1992, p.162), and only ending in 1962 (p.161).

Where possible, France has continued to take a close and active interest in its ex-colonies in Africa. This is symptomatic of the belief that ‘greatness’ comes only through a world presence and furthermore, through the French worldview, it justifies such a presence. Macridis (1992) says:

‘Without much publicity and with little rhetoric, France has maintained a military presence in her former colonies and especially in Equatorial and Western Africa… …Of all Western powers, France has been the only one to manage a continuing oversight over the former colonies in the African continent and beyond.’ (pp.54-55)².

In addition, France has attempted to retain close ties and influence with the Middle East:

‘Franco-Iraq ties in the late 20th century rest on the twin foundations of oil and trade. Iraq is the principal country of the Arab Mashreq and the Gulf with which France has had strong economic ties throughout the 20th century. This is due to the roots of the French oil industry originally lying in the 22.5 per cent stake in oil concessions in Mesopotamia, sequestered from Germany and awarded to France at the end of the 1914-1918 war.’ (Styan, 2004, p.373).

Thus, the presence and connections that France has maintained, even after the apparent end of its Empire, are important, not only in economic terms, and in their contribution to the reproduction of France’s self-perception as a world power, but also in the impact that these relationships have on the geopolitical codes that France has constructed during the Cold War, and since.

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² France still retains three military bases in Africa at Abidjan, Dakar, and Djibouti, although there were previously more (Howorth, 2001, p.170).
I have already pointed to the alternative position that France took in the Cold War, where it engaged with the non-aligned movement. The impact of the colonial relationships contributed to this code, as French policy-makers believed that the country had an interest in the developing world, one that they could continue to derive benefit from, especially in Africa and the Middle East. Thus:

‘France has become particularly sensitive to the need for dialogue between the industrialized and the developing countries, thanks to the precariousness of her sphere of influence, the increasing tensions in the Middle East and along the shores of the Mediterranean, the vulnerability of her overseas territories to the convulsions around them, and the co-existence at home between French and North Africans, epitomizing many of the aspects of North-South relations.’ (Smouts, 1989, p.241).

French foreign policy towards the developing world is written through geopolitical codes that are constructed in the context of various factors including the delicate position it finds itself in as regards its remaining colonies and presence in Africa and the Middle East – particularly the area around the Mediterranean, given its proximity to France. This area is also prominent in French thinking, as Smouts points out, due to the large number of immigrants who originate there, and have settled in France.

The last factor is immigration (*Table 6.1*). While the countries of origin in the past tended to be in Europe, since the Second World War, and particularly since the end of the Empire, immigrants have come from former colonies. Large numbers of people have arrived from North Africa, especially Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco. Thus, they have different cultures and also religion, with most being Muslims, from the majority population in France. In response to this substantial North African immigration, which has contributed to France having the largest Muslim population in Europe, and also Islam being the second largest religion in France (Hargreaves, 1995, p.118), there has been a reaction against immigration and the granting of citizenship. This has been led by the far right, particularly the National Front, but has also permeated more widely into French politics and society (Weil, 2001, p.211). Driving the animosity towards the immigrant population is the question of assimilation that underpinned the colonial project itself. The argument put forward by those opposing immigration is that the North Africans are too different culturally to assimilate as the Europeans have
supposedly done in the past; this, they argue, is at odds with the principles of the French ‘Self’.

The concepts of secularism and ‘One France’, derived from the Republican values, construct a unique context for the relationship with immigrant communities. Thus: ‘In the assimilationist view, French policy towards these immigrants has been an attempt to integrate them into society by translating into practice the ideal of the French nation-state, as derived from the Enlightenment and the Revolution.’ (Weil, 2001, p.221). As such: ‘It implied the idea of unilateral adaptation of the immigrant to the laws and customs of France and of the French. It also implied the idea of the superiority of French culture and national identity and the need for a sort of cultural excision of the immigrant’s own identity and culture to permit adaptation into French society.’ (p.222). As France, when understood through the discourses and narratives underpinning the ‘Self’, is said to be indivisible, it is difficult to reconcile this with the existence of a number of distinct cultures and groups. In addition, the sense of superiority that exists around French values and culture produces a belief that those wanting to live in France and become citizens should change to become ‘French’ rather than retain their own identity.

Consequently, there have been considerable internal strains, as some sections of society perceive the Muslim population to be resisting integration to the French whole. This was particularly apparent in the debate over the wearing of headscarves by Muslim girls at school\(^3\). Tensions have also arisen in relation to events outside France, for example the occurrence of a number of bombings connected to the conflict in Algeria. There is, therefore, a connection between these internal strains and relations on a global scale. The challenge posed to the traditional view of the national ‘Self’ by the different cultural practices of immigrant populations are replicated on the global scale when engaging with former colonies, and indeed North Africa and the Middle East generally. Hence, these internal experiences are an important factor in the construction of geopolitical codes, particularly in the post-Cold War period. The factors set out in Table 6.1 that have been discussed here, therefore continue to be relevant to the

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\(^3\) This issue first came to prominence in 1989, but has persisted since (Weil, 2001, p.224). The argument that has been made is that this religious symbol contravenes the secularism of state schools despite the fact other religious items have been permitted.
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construction of geopolitical codes today as they have been in the past, impacting, as they do, on the three scales at which French geopolitical codes are defined. Consequently, they must be considered as the context for the following discussion of the post-Cold War/post-September 11th period.

After the Cold War – A Disordered World

A notable feature of French post-Cold War representations is the repeated identification of a range of unrelated Threats. This is, of course, familiar from Britain and America. These representations depict instability, a world where it is unclear where Threats come from or what they might be, the common denominator is the disorder from which they apparently emerge. Mansbach (2003) argues that: ‘The essence of a globalising world consists of increasingly porous political boundaries and the declining relevance of physical distance and the growing autonomy capacity of non-state groups.’ (p.20). Therefore, when understood through neorealist discourse, the new non-state Threats are considered to be all the more threatening because of their networked nature. They are threatening to the ‘inside’ in a way that states are not, as boundaries are not guaranteed to stop them. When opening the Tenth Ambassador’s Conference in 2002, Foreign Minister Dominique De Villepin offers an assessment of the nature of the Threats, and how they operate:

On top of these long-existing problems, we now have new threats fuelled by the world’s instability: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and organized crime. These are leading to the emergence of new players taking advantage of the deficiencies in the world order: States, Mafias, terrorist groups. All these changes are working in their favour; the new law of the world, the network, is familiar to them. The Silk Road of ancient times has become a maze of open routes: not just trade routes, information highways and migration trials, but also drug dealing, arms trafficking and terrorism routes. Finally, the globalized economy, lacking rules and law enforcers, provides them with many entry points. (De Villepin, 2002a)

Presenting all these actors and networks through the discourse of Threat, he constructs the idea of an incredibly complex world of threatening actors all being supported by globalization, and the trans-national networking that it facilitates. The lack of order, and thus the instability that this represents, are the perfect conditions, he argues, for this tangle of Threats to thrive. France has, of course, a persistent perception of Threat
coming from the outside, firstly from Germany and then from the USSR, there is therefore an assumption that some new Threat will emerge, but this cannot be specified, leading to the vague sense of a threatening disordered world. Rostoványi (2002) claims that: ‘The rapid increase in the number of non-state players and their explicit aspiration for direct participation in international relations is an obvious “threat” to the state violence monopoly.’ (p.76). These Threats can pass through borders and appear on the inside, as was shown by September 11th, and therefore the discourse of Threat is reinforced by the danger made obvious by this unpredictable, un-realist nature.

*Figure 6.1* shows a comparison of discourses pre-September 11th, and demonstrates how Threat is second only to Order/Disorder during this period. Order/Disorder is consistently in the background informing representations of a world lacking in order and predictability, and therefore dangerous, hence the Threat discourse. While Positive/Negative is apparent, the other discourses are negligible.

After September 11th the Threat becomes more specific, and so it is the Positive/Negative binary that dominates (*Figure 6.2*). Order/Disorder and Threat do not become the leading discourses again until 2002 (*Figure 6.3*) when the immediate impact of the attacks has subsided, and the focus has moved from characterizing the actions of the terrorists back to the general sense of a dangerous outside. In 2003 (*Figure 6.4*), and 2004 (*Figure 6.5*) Order/Disorder, Threat and Positive/Negative remain the most common discourses, although there is a tendency for these to be in fewer documents than previously. The passage of time since September 11th is a likely explanation for this, but their continued relative prominence is a result of the importance of the terrorist Threat, and the supposed Threat from the disordered outside generally.
**Figure 6.1**

Occurrence of Discourses Pre-September 11 (France)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discourses</th>
<th>Percentage of Documents in Which Discourses Occur</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IO – Inside/Outside</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO – Self/Other</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GE – Good/Evil</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OD – Order/Disorder</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EW – East/West</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TH – Threat</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PN – Positive/Negative</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 6.2**

Occurrence of Discourses in 2001 Post-September 11 (France)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discourses</th>
<th>Percentage of Documents in Which Discourses Occur</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IO – Inside/Outside</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO – Self/Other</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GE – Good/Evil</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OD – Order/Disorder</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EW – East/West</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TH – Threat</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PN – Positive/Negative</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 6.3

Occurrence of Discourses in 2002 (France)

Figure 6.4

Occurrence of Discourses in 2003 (France)
In light of this representation of the post-Cold War world, in French foreign policy, it falls to the West to bring order to those parts of the world that lack it and constitute a Threat. A sentiment emphasised by Jacques Chirac during President Bush’s visit to France in May 2002, when unity of purpose is stressed:

Strengthened by their long-standing endeavour to achieve peace, democracy and prosperity, the United States and France, the United States and Europe, must undertake together, as partners, to eradicate the scourges that form the breeding ground of wars and hatred. Our enemies today, let us make no mistake about it, include poverty and oppression and entrenched conflicts. They include the unconscionable ravages of AIDS and the serious harm that is being done to the ecological heritage of our planet. (Chirac, 2002b)

An Organic narrative appears here. It never dominates (See Figure 6.6), but is important nonetheless. The Threats are presented as being able to ‘breed’, like weeds or diseases in an environment of disorder. The conditions identified in the French vision are focused on poverty and actual disease, in addition to the oppression more familiar in American representations. This should be considered in the context of the French colonial experience. Then, as now, French policy-makers saw France’s role as going into disordered parts of the world, improving them, and bringing order. Thus, in French
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rhetoric, mere military solutions to the ‘breeding grounds’ are insufficient as the nature of the problem is to a great extent tied up with poverty. Talking in such terms allows the French government to seek support from developing countries and in so doing differentiate it from the American position. This could be used to reinforce French interests and influence in these countries as a distinct European state pursuing independent policies from those of America.

Figure 6.6

A Comparison of all French Narratives Over Time (1997-2004)

To an extent, it is the East that these problems are focused on, although it would be wrong to overemphasise this, as the East/West binary is not prominent compared to the other discourses (see Figure 6.7). This is particularly so prior to September 11th, however there is little change after this point either (Figure 6.8). It does rise to more than 15% of documents in 2002, reflecting the characterization of the September 11th terrorists as coming from the East. Given the tendency in French representations to resist the bi-polar Cold War world, it is, perhaps, not surprising that this East/West binary remains relatively weak. In addition, France has interests in the Middle East that it wished to protect, and also its own substantial Muslim population originating primarily from North Africa. To continually emphasise a negative image of the East would be contrary to these interests and to internal stability. However, the discourse is still present, for example, in the following passage from an interview of President Chirac in the L’Orient Le-Jour newspaper in October 2002:
The Middle East is at the heart of an arc of crisis stretching from the Eastern Mediterranean to South-West Asia: an area rife with political divisions and with rich and poor countries and the haves and have-nots in society living side by side. We all remember the large number of domestic and international conflicts which have shaken that region for over fifty years. (Chirac, 2002d)

The ‘arc of crisis’ appears to epitomize the sort of dangerous and disordered space that is represented in the French vision of the world, and again resonates with the concepts of ‘shatterbelts’ and ‘rimlands’. The Order/Disorder binary is combined with Inside/Outside and, to a lesser extent, East/West, familiar from colonial and Cold War discourses, to construct an unstable and dangerous space. This corresponds with Said’s (1978) Orientalism where the Orient is inferior to the Occident, a characterization central to colonial understandings; here again it runs through Chirac’s representations of the East. Instability in developing countries also has particular resonance for France, given its continuing presence, and connections with its former colonies. From the French perspective, only by intervening to improve the conditions in these countries can the Threat be diminished.

*Figure 6.7*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discourses</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>EW – East/West</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TH – Threat</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PN – Positive/Negative</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
September 11th and Refining the ‘Other’

As in other countries, in the immediate aftermath of September 11th, the discourse of Threat became less evident, Positive/Negative dominating instead (Figure 6.2). The terrorist ‘Other’ could be distinguished from the ‘Self’, drawing upon the apparent evidence of such a dramatic event to justify representations. Figure 6.9 compares Threat and Positive/Negative over time, showing how Threat is reduced as Positive/Negative increases. After 2001 Threat again becomes more prominent as the September 11th attacks now provide a dramatic example around which the danger of terrorism can be constructed. At the same time Positive/Negative gradually falls away, the passage of time after September 11th reduces the prominence of the events, and those responsible, in representations, affecting the frequency of the discourse. Nevertheless, the clearer characterization that is now possible based on the events means it never reaches the low levels of before.

There is also an increased use of the Good/Evil binary in the months following September 11th, a discourse that had not previously been apparent. Figure 6.10 shows the change in Good/Evil over time, clearly depicting the concentration after September 11th. By referring to Figure 6.2 it is shown that Good/Evil is also one of the more notable discourses at this time, but compare this to Figures 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5 and the
change in relative position in later years is clear, Good/Evil reverts to being a very minor discourse. It is therefore not central to the French construction of the terrorist Threat, but merely a minor contributor to the general theme of negativity.

*Figure 6.9*

The negative image of the terrorist is built by making connections with the Threats of the past. Chirac deploys this technique in an interview with the International Herald Tribune in 2002:
Bin Laden founded an organization whose aim is to impose his idea of Islam: an idea that also happens to be very perverse, false, aggressive and very far from what Islam is in reality – a religion of peace, like all religions – but the idea that that man wanted to impose is his own idea of it. We’ve seen this process in other, very different circumstances – think of Hitler, for example. (Chirac, 2002a)

These characteristics are emphasised to put the terrorist beyond any acceptability, and then the link is made to Hitler, a vanquished enemy of the past, and a figure that has come to represent ‘evil’. By linking Bin Laden and Hitler the former takes on the depraved characteristics of the latter. Germany has relevance for France due to its wartime experience, and as I have noted, this has been an influential force behind French post-War geopolitics. Thus, the hatred felt for Hitler is linked to the new Threat, creating a sense that they come from the same source; they are ‘negative’, ‘threatening’ and even ‘evil’.

The historic link also allows a contrast to be constructed between the values of the ‘Self’ and the lack of values of the ‘Other’ which, in this logic, threatens those values:

The century which has just ended had already revealed to us the monstrous nature of the demons which can lurk in the human soul. We now have dreadful confirmation that people still exist who are capable of perpetrating crimes against humanity, against the universal conscience of mankind – quite simply against life itself. (Chirac, 2001b)

In this case the Threat is not merely physical, but one to more abstract concepts of life and humanity, consequently the terrorists are de-humanized, as it is they who threaten humanity so they cannot be thought of as part of it. This in turn adds to the sense of their menace. It is worth reflecting again on the definition of terrorism given by Corlett (2003, p.119). Definitions tend to work through neorealist discourse, allowing only the state to use violence and requiring a prior moral code that may not be accepted by the terrorist. By implying that there is some universal code, as Chirac does, it is possible to place the terrorist outside it. This is entirely compatible with the French privileging of

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4 This passage comes from a speech by President Chirac shortly after September 11th, on the 19th of September 2001. He was speaking in Washington D.C. to ‘The French Community’. 
Republican values. As the terrorists do not follow these values they are assumed to be opposed to life and threatening to the ‘Self’.

This is apparent in speeches in the immediate aftermath of September 11th. On a visit to the United States on the 18th of September, Chirac proclaims that:

…we are determined, utterly determined, to do everything necessary to wage an effective battle against this new type of absolute evil which the President talked about a moment ago: terrorism.

And I also wanted to tell them, that France is ready and waiting to discuss all the ways and means of making the fight against terrorism effective and enabling us really to eradicate this evil of our time. (Chirac, 2001a)

By characterizing terrorists as being ‘evil’ the ‘Self’ is reinforced as being ‘good’, this supports the more frequent Positive/Negative binary (Figure 6.2), and therefore the construction of the concept of the ‘evil’ and threatening terrorist, who is completely the opposite of the ‘Self’. If the terrorist is ‘evil’ then they are completely beyond acceptability. Gilbert (1994) points out that: ‘The innocence claimed for the terrorist’s targets underlies the fact that they, unlike the terrorists, are following out the “accepted codes of behaviour” within a legitimate political system.’ (p.50). Applying the logic of Dalby (1990) in respect of the Cold war, the construction of the terrorist in this way implies that the Threat must be eliminated, justifying practically any response. However, France today and Cold War America are very different, and ‘The identities and interests of actors arise out of historically-specific contexts of action.’ (Agnew, 2001, p.44). Consequently, the circumstances do not necessarily provoke a French drive towards a military response.

Reviving Other Threats: Iraq and WMD

By 2002 the events of September 11th were more distant and another Threat came to prominence, combining with terrorism to create a greater danger – that Threat was Weapons of Mass Destruction. Given that France opposed the war with Iraq, this may seem surprising, but in the build up to the war WMD became a major narrative.

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5 This may be important in terms of his use of similar language and representations as the Americans, hence his use of the Good/Evil binary.
The French opposition to the war was not in fact absolute, coming instead from the different perspective from which France approached the situation compared to America and Britain. Styan (2004) argues that:

‘While France rejected any automatic link between Iraqi concealment of weaponry and military invasion, it should be stressed that a key plank in the French position was refusal to rule out participation in military action if Iraq did not comply with new weapons strictures.’ (p.380).

Thus, France was prepared to consider war under certain circumstances, as it had done in 1991, but it was a course of action that the French government wanted to avoid as it did not conform to its interests and strategy in Iraq and the region more generally.

As was noted above, France has historic economic ties with Iraq, a relationship that has impinged on its policies towards the country, added to this was its wider policy of building good relations with Arab states:

‘While France’s historic relationship with Iraq, a legacy of close oil and trade ties in the 1970s and 1980s, does in part explain the manner in which Paris, uniquely among OECD states, did shift against sanctions in the later 1990s, such bilateral ties with Baghdad were not the primary reason for the French stance against military action in 2002-2003. Yet broader considerations linked to the long-standing and nebulous notions of a “Gaullist” French “Arab policy”, with which Jacques Chirac identifies, including notions of self-respect and sovereignty for Arab states, did play a role.’ (Styan, 2004, p.383).

This variation in policy from that adopted by Britain and America conforms to the French tendency to take an independent line from that of the hegemon, and to characterize itself as an alternative world power more in tune with the interests of developing states. It is therefore this vision, alongside economic interests in the region that drove the anti-war policy of the French government in 2003 rather than any aversion to war. France shared the concerns about WMD, but its historic associations with Iraq and other Arab states shaped its policy of promoting weapons inspections over military action for as long as possible.

*Figure 6.11* shows the Weapons of Mass Destruction narrative over time. It is relatively rare before September 11th, and immediately afterwards is even less
noticeable. However, from 2002 it becomes one of the most dominant narratives as the build up to the Iraq war begins, and the Threat of the terrorist is widened and embellished. After the war, there is a slight drop, but it remains a major narrative. Figure 6.12 compares it to other narratives in 2001, post September 11th, contrasting this with Figure 6.13 shows that whereas it was barely noticeable in 2001 it became one of the most important in 2002. In Figure 6.14 it is shown that this trend continues in 2003 – the year of the war – when it is the second most common narrative, and it is still the fourth most frequent in 2004 (Figure 6.15).

Figure 6.11

![The Weapons of Mass Destruction Narrative Over Time (France)](image1)

Figure 6.12

![Occurrence of Narratives in 2001 Post-September 11 (France)](image2)

BT – Battle Against Terrorism  EU – European Unity  CR – Collective Responsibility
OG – Organic  GC – Global Community  WY – World Democracy
WD – Weapons of Mass Destruction  HV – Humanist Values
GP – Global Player  MP – Multipolarity
**Figure 6.13**

Occurrence of Narratives in 2002 (France)

- BT – Battle Against Terrorism
- OG – Organic
- WD – Weapons of Mass Destruction
- GP – Global Player
- EU – European Unity
- GC – Global Community
- HV – Humanist Values
- MP – Multipolarity
- CR – Collective Responsibility
- WY – World Democracy

**Figure 6.14**

Occurrence of Narratives in 2003 (France)
This was not simply a response to the messages from America; France too represented Iraq as a part of the Threat. For example in September 2002 De Villepin spoke to the UN General Assembly:

Here is a country that has defied the authority of the Security Council and flouted international law for several years. Here is a regime that is a grave threat to security, especially the security of the peoples in the region because of the risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and whose conduct is the direct cause of the great suffering endured by its people. (De Villepin, 2002b)

Furthermore, this was not just for the UN audience, as he wrote the following in the French newspaper *Le Monde* on the 1st of October:

Yes, Iraq is a potential threat to the region’s and international security. Yes, the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction presents an essential challenge for the future of every one of us. Yes, Iraq has defied the international community by concealing programmes concerning these weapons: if she does not yet have nuclear capabilities, all the indications make us think that she has reconstituted biological and chemical capacities. (De Villepin, 2002c)
Iraq’s supposed WMD capabilities are presented primarily as a Threat to stability in the region. Given the French determination to have a presence in the Middle East and around the Mediterranean, they are likely to be concerned about the implications of states acquiring WMD, but also of the impact of a war, and its effects on their influence relative to that of America. This is of particular relevance in the case of Iraq a country that, as we have seen, France has had close ties with. Van der Wusten and Dijkink (2002) comment: ‘The French have always been active players in two arenas simultaneously, the European and the global…’ (p.34), a situation that France’s leaders attempt to maintain. The French worldview is influenced by considerations of influence and presence, as well as attempting to maintain stability. Thus, a military approach is not the first choice for France in this case.

Responding to the Threat: A Battle Against Terrorism

Whereas in America the ‘obvious’, ‘common sense’ response to September 11th was to begin a war, in line with historic patterns (Stephanson, 1998), in France the context is different, and so the reaction to terrorism also varies. At first glance the representation and narratives are very similar. Figure 6.12 above, shows the narratives in 2001, post-September 11th; it is clear that Battle Against Terrorism (I have given it this name to emphasise the differences in this French narrative from those of The United States and Britain) is the dominant narrative at this time. Figure 6.16 shows that before the attacks it is a very minor narrative, but immediately afterwards it peaks, before declining to around 40% in the following years. This is indicative of the impact of the event, allowing the government to develop its responses in the knowledge that these are likely to be accepted. This effect continues to a lesser degree with the passage of time.

On the 12th of September 2001 the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hubert Vedrine spoke at an Extraordinary E.U. General Affairs Council in Brussels:

We are all determined to be firm, resolute, in a relentless fight against terrorism, against everything that fuels it, and determined to eradicate it.
(Vedrine, 2001)

Emphasising the positive characteristics of the ‘Self’ in the ‘fight’, he leaves no room for doubt that there will be a major campaign against this ‘enemy’. Thus, the narrative
is close to that of the United States. This might be expected so soon after the event and to this international audience, when an effort is being made to show international unity, and when the impact is still fresh, however it should be noted that the term ‘war’ is not used here, instead it is a ‘fight’.

*Figure 6.16*

![The Battle Against Terrorism Narrative Over Time (France)](chart.png)

This is of great significance; clearly ‘war’ does not sit easily with the French version of this narrative. Hence, on the 18th of September, on a visit to the United States, President Chirac addresses the point directly:

I don’t know if we should use the word “war”. What is certain is that we are dealing with a new kind of conflict, one which is critically important for upholding human rights, freedom, human dignity, and that everything must be done to protect these essential values which are those of our civilization. (Chirac, 2001a)

The term ‘conflict’ is used instead of ‘war’. Although a war is a conflict, a conflict is not necessarily a war; the fact that Chirac makes this distinction suggests that he does not think, or does not want, this conflict to be a war. For Chirac to say this in the United States demonstrates how clearly France diverges on this matter. As in the Cold War, he is trying to mark out a distinctive position for France rather than become subservient to the American policy. Winn (2003) notes that: ‘France, one of the most ardent proponents of a European identity separate from America, has often been the most assertive of its own foreign policy autonomy, even when this insistence contradicts
the positions of its European partners.’ (p.54). For France, it may be a ‘conflict’ and a ‘fight’, but it is not a ‘war’, and therefore the nature of the actions involved is potentially different. By bringing in the narrative of Humanist Values, Chirac develops this difference by tying the conflict to a set of values said to be under attack. This connects with France’s Republican values. By suggesting these are under Threat, it becomes easier for policy-makers to argue for a particular form of response.

These are the foundations on which the French ‘Battle Against Terrorism’ is built. By 2003 it can be more clearly articulated by Dominique de Villepin:

Because in recent years it has taken on a strategic dimension, the terrorist threat calls for a global response. We have to tackle it head-on, with all the resources at our disposal: military, police, judicial, financial and intelligence. Then we have to fight the scourges on which terrorism battens, from regional crises to chronic poverty. For terrorism breeds on the running sores of the world. It feeds on feelings of injustice, humiliation and incomprehension. This is why there can be no lasting solution without resolute action against these hotbeds of crisis, and a tough and courageous dialogue between the parties concerned. In the long term, there is no more solid bulwark against fanaticism than a genuine sharing among peoples and religions. (De Villepin, 2003e)

De Villepin places Battle Against Terrorism alongside Humanist Values that must be adopted if order is to be restored. Terrorism ‘breeds’ in the disorder that is caused by poverty and injustice, and therefore any Battle Against Terrorism, according to the argument, must encompass an effort to resolve these problems. This cannot be read in purely altruistic terms, it must be remembered that France is conscious of its world presence in developing countries, and also of its large Muslim population.

‘France’s ambivalent relationship to her ex-colonies, particularly Algeria, and her fear of the spread of Islamic fundamentalism or intégrisme, has created tension within French society, with immigrants of Islamic origin being stereotyped as “fundamentalists” or “terrorists”. The global political context even before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 gave support to those who saw Islam as a threat to the security of Western countries, with events such as the Gulf War and the rise of fundamentalism in Iran, Algeria, and elsewhere only adding to

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6 De Villepin was speaking to the Eleventh Ambassadors’ Conference in Paris, on the 28th of August 2003.
the fears of the French concerning the dangers that Islam posed to their country.’ (Freedman, 2004, p.6).

Therefore, the French government does not want the American ‘war on terrorism’ to destabilize parts of the world that it considers itself to have a special role in, nor does it want unrest at home by being associated with unpopular actions in Muslim countries, particularly in North Africa, having already experienced bombings connected with events in Algeria. Add to that the economic interests of France in the Middle East and North Africa, and there is a further imperative for avoiding destabilising or unnecessarily antagonising governments in the region. The subtly different narrative from that in America or Britain leads to an emphasis on different methods and to less war-like language, while still following the same broad objective. France could, therefore, participate alongside the United States in Afghanistan, while representing the wider conflict in its own unique way, just as in the Cold War.

Defending French Values

The Republican values, at the foundation of the French ‘Self’, are assumed to be universally positive and suitable for adoption at the global scale. These values are rooted in positive historical references of the French nation, most notably the revolution:

As you know, the French Revolution at the end of the 18th century was a great source of strength for France – people still talk about it today. It made France the first country to say that the imperatives of equality and fraternity were essential imperatives for the organization of the world, and that liberty – liberty, equality, fraternity – were vital imperatives for a modern world and the respect of human rights. Today, I believe, that message must be brought to the international level: liberty, equality, fraternity. Adapting it, of course, to the modern world. (Chirac, 2002a)7

Given that the values of ‘liberty’, ‘equality’ and ‘fraternity’ play such a central role in the representation of France as a nation and as a state, in as much as the state is supposed to encapsulate these, then they will be constructed as positive attributes. France is defined as separate from the ‘Other’ by virtue of the Republican values. The effort to apply these values externally appears to make sense in a (neo)realist state

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7 This quotation comes from an interview in the International Herald Tribune on the 28th March 2002.
where, following Connolly (1991), the positive identity of the ‘Self’ is dependent on the negative characterization of the ‘Other’.

These values are believed to be under Threat from terrorism, and thus they are invoked as a justification for fighting terrorism:

In the present circumstances, we must ensure more than ever before that we maintain our national unity by upholding the values of the republican pact. It’s precisely these values which terrorism wants to repudiate by causing chaos, doubt and division in our democratic societies.

In the battle against terrorism, our commitment to our founding principles – those of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen and of our republican motto – is our greatest strength. (Jospin, 2001b)

Before a domestic audience, the Prime Minister is contrasting the positive values, which France represents, and the chaos that the terrorists allegedly want. Huntington (1996) recommends that the unique Western civilization must be protected from the non-West. For Jospin, it is French civilization, as it is unique and superior, according to the national mythology. He draws on the Humanist Values narrative to support the continued reproduction of the nation by constructing a Threat to these values. If the values are threatened then so is the ‘Self’, and perhaps even civilization.

Consequently, it is not enough for France to protect these values; it must act to have them enshrined at the global scale. Hence, Dominique de Villepin declared to the United Nations in March 2003:

Regardless of the example you take, be it the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen or the abolition of slavery by Victor Schoelcher, France has been guided by an ideal. She has long placed civil and political rights at the very heart of her action. Because these constitute mankind’s common heritage, they must be recognized by everyone. (De Villepin, 2003b)

The Humanist Values that have guided France since the revolution are not unique; they are ‘mankind’s common heritage’ and therefore are for the whole world to adopt. In line with the history of French foreign policy, France must actively pursue their

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8 This is a passage from a speech to the National Assembly on the 3rd of October 2001.
adoption by continuing its search for ‘greatness’ in a post-September 11th world. A focus on these values is a convenient and effective means of re-emphasising the contrast with America that French elites wish to draw, especially at the time de Villepin is speaking. It can be used as a means of strengthening national unity and, as a useful product of this, support for government policy. Furthermore, for a global audience it reinforces the idea of France as a non-hegemonic alternative to which they can align. France can further the promotion of its Humanist Values through the principle of collectivity.

Collective Responses

Collective Responsibility is the narrative that encapsulates this. As is evident from Figure 6.17, the narrative is limited before and immediately after September 11th. However, as the response to the attacks is developed, Collective Responsibility appears consistently in about a third of documents. This corresponds with Humanist Values, which also became more apparent at this time. They are related, in that the French can only bring their influence and values to the world if a collective approach is adopted. It is also a result of the belief that this is a way in which the new Threat can be combated without destabilising the developing world, in which France wishes to retain its influence.

Figure 6.17
Thus, France insisted on a collective approach to Iraq, agreeing that it posed a Threat, but not supporting a war. At the beginning of the war, on the 20th of March, President Chirac says the following in a broadcast:

…France, true to her principles – primacy of the law, fairness, dialogue between peoples and respect for others, - will continue to do what she can to ensure that fair, long-term solutions are found to the crises bathing the world in blood or threatening it, through collective action, i.e. in the framework of the United Nations, the only legitimate framework for building peace, in Iraq as elsewhere. (Chirac, 2003)

Collective action, agreed through the United Nations and underpinned by a set of rules and principles, is the only ‘obvious’ way, through the French worldview, of resolving the world’s problems, such as the question of Iraq. France could not accept an American dominated solution, as this would deny it the influence that its ‘greatness’ demands; only a collective response would meet these requirements. In addition, there was the complication of close French relations with Iraq, and the opportunity to rhetorically position France apart from the Americans, sustaining the relationships that it has nurtured in the Middle East, North Africa and the developing world generally. By insisting on collective action these relationships could be protected and the French desire to pursue an independent path from America could be met.

The Collective Response has developed from the perceived need for France to forge an independent foreign policy, with influence and ‘greatness’ in a world in which French values are enshrined. Hence, the Humanist Values and Collective Responsibility narratives are frequently found together. Following the Iraq War, de Villepin sets out this combination of values and collectivity:

Our country embodies an original and determined vision founded on three objectives: the primacy of the political; the demand for action guided by the principles of solidarity, justice and respect for the Other; the necessity, finally, of an international order based on collective responsibility. (De Villepin, 2003e)

In an earlier article in Le Monde, on a similar theme he said:

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9 De Villepin was speaking to the Eleventh Ambassadors’ Conference in Paris on the 29th of August 2003.
...Collective responsibility is a moral and political necessity. Moral, because democracies become totally meaningless if they fail to honour abroad the principles underpinning them at home. Political, because only collective decisions secure the legitimacy necessary for far-reaching, coherent and effective action. Force can be only a last resort. (De Villepin, 2002c)

Political solutions and their collective application can bring order to the world according to De Villepin. This French vision does not preclude force, as in Afghanistan, but it is ‘a last resort’, and can only be taken collectively if it is to have any legitimacy. Inside and outside are blurred by expanding the values of the inside to actions on the outside, but neorealism is not abandoned; France, as a state, is still at the heart of considerations and must not be subsumed into some collective whole. It was the French imperial aim to ‘improve’ ‘Others’ until they could be part of France – an indivisible France. The application of Collective Responsibility as a means of influence is not new to France either, as it has been adopted in the process of European integration. Therefore, by insisting on collective decision-making, France can play a part in global decisions, just as they have in Europe.

The European Pole

In the post-War period, France has been involved in the European project from the start, and therefore considers itself to be a central part of the Union, not just as an organization, but also in the philosophy and reasons underpinning its existence. There is a clear vision of what Europe is and what it means. This follows from France’s rationale for European integration – constraining the German Threat and creating a vehicle through which France can acquire greater influence globally, thus guaranteeing its independence from the superpowers. Boyer (1998) says:

‘For the French, the European construction is far more than a free market agreement. It is, above all, a political project whose objective is the creation of an unprecedented historical union between countries which have been at war so many times in the past and which are now confronted with many challenges requiring common, integrated and unified policies, particularly in defence and foreign affairs.’ (p.99).

The French vision of Europe puts the values that they wish to instil in a Global Community at the foundations of the regional community. Furthermore, for France,
Europe does not simply begin with the formation of an organization through the Treaty of Rome; it stretches as far back as the Enlightenment, and is an idea as much as a practical arrangement.

This is evident when Dominique de Villepin reflected on the past and future of Europe, in the Senate in November 2002:

Above all there was the emergence of a European humanism, enriched by dialogue and interchange built of tolerance and openness, which is the hallmark of the European spirit. And it is the same spirit which must inspire us today in the enlargement process. We shall thereby be doing nothing other than returning to the noblest springs of European thought, the source of our honour and our originality, of what impels us to keep faith with our illustrious ancestors, what makes ours a continent of liberty and solidarity. (De Villepin, 2002d)

De Villepin presents Europe as an idea and a formation built on Humanist Values, and as such it is understood through the Positive/Negative discourse as a positive body. Consequently, a European ‘Self’ is constructed that embodies this European humanism and has a European spirit. Scott (2002) notes that: ‘Both the definition of Europe as a “region” and of “Europeanness” as an element of identity-formation are subject to very different interpretations, often influenced by national and local experience.’ (p.149).

Hence, these, supposedly, European values show an extraordinary similarity to those attributed to France.

This is demonstrated by the references to historical participation of France and French statesmen in Europe’s foundations:

The Royal jurists have bequeathed to us the concept of general interest; the Revolution proclaimed the idea of human rights; Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet founded the European dream; since time immemorial, our country has been called upon to work for the universal, the defence of values today essential for world peace and stability.

Haunted by centuries of fratricidal wars and two self-destructive world wars, we have learned the lessons of these tragedies by creating a united Europe. Within it, countries which, too often, had waged war against one another, such as France and Germany, now enjoy relations of deep and sincere friendship. Their cohesion is generating a stability which is spreading throughout a whole continent. This unique experience has
taught us the extent to which the emergence of strong regional entities is conducive to stability and peace. (De Villepin, 2002a)\textsuperscript{10}

A link is made from French history, and the values it bestowed on the country, the founding of European integration by French statesmen, and the Europe of today. In essence, the Humanist Values of France are considered, in French representations, to have been adopted and replicated at the European scale. Europe’s historical experiences of war have prompted it to seek this unity and it has in turn brought peace by following humanist principles. Regional unity has, it is suggested, led to order spreading across Europe, and therefore this provides a suitable model for the world, but it is French values that are at the root of this project.

If the benefits that Europe has gained from integration are to be offered to the wider world then it is essential, according to the French position, that Europe as an entity plays a greater role in the world, just as France did in Europe. This will in turn provide France with greater influence in the world.

Hence, Dominique de Villepin said on a visit to Ireland in January 2004:

We want Europe to be a pillar of tomorrow's world, to wield genuine influence over the course of events and to shoulder its responsibilities wherever its presence is desired and required. Therefore, it must imperatively establish a fully-fledged foreign policy and an autonomous defence capability. That is essential if we are to respond, in our interventions, to the demands of today's world and the new threats it harbours with the requisite flexibility and transparency vis-à-vis each of the member States. (De Villepin, 2004)

The need for Europe to be an independent regional pole necessitates its development as a Global Player, hence the use of this narrative. Schnapper (2002) claims that: ‘The European nations are too small and too weak to assert themselves alone in world affairs. Together and united, they can retrieve some of their power.’ (p.7). As such, and in the French view, Europe must develop Foreign and defence policies and capabilities consummate with such a power. This will give it, and through it France, far greater influence at the global scale.

\textsuperscript{10} This passage comes from de Villepin’s speech to the Tenth Ambassadors’ Conference, in Paris on the 27\textsuperscript{th} of August 2002.
Therefore, European integration has remained relevant after the Cold War. The European Unity narrative has been occurring with considerable regularity since before September 11th (see Figure 6.18). The September 11th attacks have caused a further increase in the occurrence of the narrative as responses were developed, indicating the importance that Europe held for France in solving the terrorist problem, and in meeting the perceived Threats of the post-Cold War world generally. The focus on the Threat of WMD in 2003, and the divisions over this, may explain the drop in that year, but by 2004 the narrative was once again dominant by a substantial margin (see Figure 6.15). The demand for Europe to develop a more influential role in the world precipitates the Global Player narrative. It is not unusual in relation to Europe, if relatively limited overall, and follows approximately the same pattern as the other narrative (Figure 6.18).

For France, this reflects the purpose of Europe – a formation through which France can continue to have a world role. Thus, when sovereignty is shared at regional level, when Europe takes on powers on the international stage, these are not powers lost to France, but rather an increased influence for France, and of French values, in the world.

A Multipolar World

In the French vision, the European pole is one of several in a multipolar world. This is not a new concept, as multipolarity was an aim for France during the Cold War. Such a system would, it is thought, provide the mechanism through which French
influence could achieve practical results, and provide an alternative to the bi-polar world of the Cold War, or the post-Cold War uni-polar world. A multipolar vision does have the potential of undermining or contradicting the concept of Collective Responses to global problems like international terrorism.

The narrative of Multipolarity can be related closely to a second – World Democracy. As democracy is closely associated with the values that France allegedly seeks to proselytise, World Democracy also has an important role to play in the representations. These narratives are, however, relatively limited (see Figure 6.6), although Multipolarity becomes more widely identifiable as time goes on (Figure 6.19). Again, this reflects the developing policies of France on the terrorist Threat. As the country resists the tendency for America to dictate the responses, it continues to construct an alternative vision that would give France greater influence.

The divisions over Iraq were symptomatic of this French interest in responses based around a Multipolar World Democracy. Speaking to the UN Security Council prior to the war in March 2003, Dominique de Villepin argues:

Yes, we too want more democracy in the world. But we will achieve this objective only within the framework of a true global democracy based on respect, sharing, the awareness of a true community of values and a common destiny. And its heart is here at the United Nations. (De Villepin, 2003a)
The Humanist Values and Collective Responsibility narratives are drawn on here to support the narrative of World Democracy as a non-military alternative and, they would argue, more effective means of delivering democracy to the disordered parts of the world. The institution through which this can be achieved is, De Villepin claims, the United Nations. This connection between World Democracy and the UN demonstrates how De Villepin attempts to use this idealistic vision to gain support for, and ultimately deliver, French policies, in this case with respect to Iraq.

The United Nations is after all only an organization through which issues can be discussed and agreements made, and thus the French vision does not ignore the practicalities of (neo)realist states, even if it does re-work the (neo)realist interpretations of their relationships. Consequently, there is an acceptance that there will be fewer major actors or ‘poles’; it is around these, that the new system of organizing the world would be structured. In a speech to the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, on the 27th March 2003, de Villepin says:

To be truly stable, this new world must be based on a number of regional poles, structured to face current threats. These poles should not compete against one another, but complement each other. They are the cornerstones of an international community built on solidarity and unity in the face of new challenges. (De Villepin, 2003c)

The worldview is, therefore, of a number of regional poles, working collectively in a World Democracy, following rules and principles, and tackling the disorder that leads to Threats. In a similar manner, Held (1996) argues that: ‘Globalization denotes a shift in the spatial form of human organization and activity to transcontinental or inter-regional patterns of activity, interaction and the exercise of power.’ (p.340). However, despite the similarities of a Multipolar system to that of the Great Powers of the past, the elements of Humanist Values, Collectivity and Democracy would, the French suggest, make this a very different formation and remove any contradictions in the system. Actually fulfilling this goal of Multipolar World Democracy through the UN or any other avenue is unlikely in the near future, if ever, a fact politicians like De Villepin will be aware of. This points to a certain rhetorical and opportunistic motive behind such remarks; at the time of the Iraq war, presenting an alternative vision of the world could
reinforce the image of France as different from, and even superior to, the United States when speaking to both domestic and international audiences opposed to the war.

A Global Community

The Multipolar system is encapsulated in the concept of a Global Community. Such a community could extend many of the principles that France has found so attractive in Europe to the global scale, and introduces a more structured system for tackling global issues such as terrorism. Crucially it allows countries like France to play an active part, rather than being dominated by the American superpower. America’s simple view of coalitions of convenience is far removed from the French position, which envisages a more permanent structured system of states working together and governed by rules. In this respect it has parallels with the British Global Community concept.

*Figure 6.20*

The Global Community narrative appears consistently throughout, even before September 11th (*Figure 6.20*). It reaches a peak in 2003, the year of the Iraq war, when the greatest divisions are apparent in the world, threatening the prospects for this community. At that time America appeared to be acting unilaterally without consideration of what other countries thought, and therefore France’s need for
‘greatness’ required that it push for a more influential role, one that could be found in a Global Community.

Prior to the Iraq War the Prime Minister, Jean-Pierre Raffarin, in a speech to the National Assembly, warned of the dangers of acting unilaterally:

The war, obviously, would weaken the coalition against terrorism. This is a major consideration for us. An international community was created against terrorism in the wake of 11 September. A war would weaken that coalition. It would provoke – and this must give everyone food for thought – an upsurge in terrorism at the very time when we need precisely to fight this scourge which threatens us all, over there as here.

Over and above that, a war would rock the international order by undermining collective security and multilateralism, by the primacy accorded to the doctrine of pre-emptive action over the principle of legitimate defence. (Raffarin, 2003)

The coalition, in this representation, is essentially a product of a Global Community of rules and values, thus to break those rules is to undermine the foundations on which the coalition is built. It is not, as in the American understanding, a coalition which can be sustained for one purpose but ignored for another; all the actions of states are thought to be within the context of the Global Community and therefore breaking its rules damages the whole structure.

Dominique de Villepin expressed the vision of a Global Community to a domestic audience in August 2002:

In a complex environment, where everything hangs together, everything interacts, where states are no longer alone, a safer world has to be one which is at peace. In an international society, which, increasingly, forms a real community, its use must integrate the new demands for democracy, freedom and respect for the law. In open societies, aspiring to total control increasingly appears an illusionary ambition, as costly as it is dangerous. Power now flows through channels of influence rather than those of authority. (De Villepin, 2002a)11

11 This extract comes from a speech to the Tenth Ambassadors’ Conference in Paris, on the 27th of August 2002.
Once again it is entwined with Humanist Values. These values form part of the image of a different kind of world in which states are not the only actors, but are joined by actors that cross borders and form networks making them less easy for states to control. In such a world it is not possible for states to act alone without destabilizing the whole system. As McGrew (2005) says: ‘The sovereign power and authority of national government – the entitlement of states to rule within their own territorial space – is being transformed but by no means eroded.’ (p.33). By maintaining rules in a community, French policy-makers believe a level of control can be achieved, and values protected. As such, it gives France a greater role both in itself, and through a European pole.

**Conclusions**

France is, therefore, attempting to forge geopolitical codes appropriate for the new circumstances that it is faced with, but in doing so it cannot be detached from the influences that have driven its worldviews over a much longer period of time. Simple (neo)realist models are increasingly insufficient to explain events, and yet France cannot abandon (neo)realism; as a state itself, to deny (neo)realism is to deny its own continued existence. It can however adapt its codes, as it has done in the past. Enlightenment thinking was at the foundations of realism, and it has also been shown to be at the roots of the modern French nation. French post-Cold War geopolitics is set firmly in this context.

As the Soviet Union no longer posed a Threat, discourse changed, but the binary division between the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’ remained. This was reflected in the (neo)realist division between Inside and Outside, and the Order/Disorder binary to which it is related. Thus, the end of one Threat did not mean that all Threats were eliminated in French interpretations. However, initially the sense of Threat was vague and multiple, the only common feature being that it came from the ‘outside’ as with the German and Soviet Threats of the past.

September 11th was the event that allowed the Threat to become more specific. Although this was not a state enemy it could nevertheless be characterized in a negative way, just as those in the past had been. Indeed, historical references to past enemies
allow the characterization to make ‘sense’ and become acceptable. Despite this, terrorism was still not the only Threat; significantly Weapons of Mass Destruction came increasingly to the fore, but by being discussed alongside terrorism an implied link could be developed. This too was a Threat from the ‘disordered’ ‘outside’ and was therefore linked by its common source.

France responded to the September 11th attacks by arguing that a Battle Against Terrorism was necessary. This narrative allowed for a variety of policies including military action, but focused more upon political methods. Such an approach corresponds with French concerns for its own internal stability given its large Muslim population, its interest in the stability of the Mediterranean region, and its determination to retain influence over events in the Middle East. This in turn is connected to French sensibilities about ‘greatness’ and independence of foreign policy. An alternative policy would have to be founded upon French Republican values that are so central to French identity. This is important as the terrorists were represented as being a Threat to these values, and consequently they must be a Threat to the unity of the French nation. In these circumstances it becomes possible to justify particular policies, be they military or otherwise. These must involve the spread of French values to the rest of the world, as in the colonial period. From this is derived the Humanist Values narrative that was so common in the representations.

It has also become clear that a narrative of Collective Responsibility is used when discussing solutions to terrorism. It applies, not only to the political methods that France promotes, but also to decisions regarding military action, as in the example of Iraq. France considers it necessary for states to act collectively and to take decisions in this way when confronted by Threats rather than follow the neorealist approach. This goes beyond the American Coalition Against Terrorism. However, France is acting in a neorealist manner here; by enshrining collectivity in world politics, France can gain greater influence. It can, therefore, more easily sustain its own independent foreign policy, achieving ‘greatness’, while retaining an alliance with America. In essence France is trying to introduce the collective decision making to the global scale that it has found so rewarding at the European scale.
European integration has been a central part of French geopolitical codes since the Second World War. Thus, a narrative of European Unity is very common in discussions in the post-Cold War period. Europe has given France the opportunity to assume leadership at the regional scale through its structured, collective decision making. It has also brought peace to the continent, removing the Threat of Germany. France believes its values have been encapsulated within the European Union, allowing it to gain more power and expand its influence beyond its own borders to a wider European ‘Self’. Hence, France wants to see Europe gain more power in the world by adopting foreign and defence capabilities, becoming a Global Player. This will guarantee Europe’s independence from America, a fixation of France since the Cold War, and through it the independence of France.

This European pole would be one component of a multipolar world, hence the narrative of Multipolarity. This is a principle that has again been driving French geopolitics since the Cold War. The loss of power that France felt in the bi-polar Cold War world is replicated in the uni-polar post-Cold War world, thus the solution remains the same, to develop other poles of power. Between these poles, France believes the world can be ordered, and Threats that now cross borders can be more easily tackled by adopting the collective approach at the global scale. France itself gains, both in the common good of a less threatening world, and by having more influence over events.

From Multipolarity comes the concept of the Global Community. This goes beyond neorealist states working together in coalitions and alliances, and suggests a more permanent and structured world. It does not mean the end of states and conflicts, as these are the components of the community, however it does involve a far greater level of collective decision making. France considers that such a community would embrace the values that it believes are universal, and create a democratic and collective system for managing global problems. It could achieve at the global scale what European integration has at the regional scale. Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, France could play a central role, its tendency to ‘greatness’ could be fulfilled and its independence guaranteed.

A French discursive structure can therefore be identified (Figure 6.21), that follows the familiar layered pattern of those from the United States and Britain.
However, as has emerged, it includes French narratives that, when combined with the agency of influential actors, engage with and adapt the discourses and each other. It is through this structure that the French geopolitical code is constructed and ‘makes sense’.

**Figure 6.21**

Diagram of the French Discursive Structure

As with the factors that influence it, the geopolitical code can be framed in terms of three scales – national, regional and global. At the national scale the code requires that national unity be protected from the Threat of terrorism, and the potential for religious and cultural divisions that this could bring. Protecting the ‘Self’ also involves protecting the Republican values on which the nation is built, this cannot be separated from the unity of France; the defence of the former provides the grounds for the latter. Integration continues to lie at the heart of France’s geopolitical code at the regional scale. This is essential for France’s influence in Europe, for the continuation of order and peace on the continent, and it provides the basis for the pole that acts as a vehicle for France’s projection of influence and values at the global scale. This third scale is where the French code determines that policies of Multipolarity and, Global Community should be followed. Thus, Europe must act as a powerful pole, but in a Global
Community of rules, democracy and values. Hence, through this geopolitical code, France believes that the world can become more ordered and safer by eliminating the non-state and state actors that provide Threats in the post-Cold War world. At the same time such policies would guarantee France the independence and ‘greatness’ that it has sought over a far longer period.
Chapter 7

Comparing Europe and America: the Regional Experience as a Context for Distinctive Sovereign States

Introduction

The last three chapters have each examined the construction of geopolitical codes in a specific state. In so doing, they have offered little reflection on the similarities and differences between these codes and how they have been produced. In this chapter I intend to rectify this by comparing the discourses and narratives that underpin representations of terrorism in the United States, Britain and France, and the geopolitical codes to which these contribute. This will be approached with the principal aim of advancing the discussion regarding the questions of whether there are common European codes, and what differences exist between Europe and America.

The United States, Britain and France have been shown to have distinct, though not completely unrelated, geopolitical codes. America’s codes operate at national and global scales. Isolationism is combined with expansionism to spread American values and eliminate Threats. Britain is torn between two competing codes, encompassing three scales. The contradiction is between integration and pooling of sovereignty at regional and global scales, or more limited cooperation that leaves Britain free to act independently to spread liberal values around the world. France has a more singular code that again operates at three scales. Integration is central to French codes regionally and globally, as a vehicle for spreading French values and influence, and bringing order to the world.
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There are, therefore, clear variations between each of the state’s codes, but also parallels. To analyse and explain these it will be necessary to consider the three states from a critical realist perspective. In other words, they are sovereign states constructed through neorealist, and therefore modernist, discourse, but at the same time the relevance of discourse in their construction and representations, and the impacts of other actors cannot be dismissed. Regionalization, and possible layered governance, in Europe is of particular interest in terms of this research, and the aims of the chapter. For example, Held (1996) argues that: ‘…within the EU sovereignty is now also clearly divided: any conception of sovereignty which assumes that it is an indivisible, illimitable, exclusive and perpetual form of public power – embodied within an undivided state – is defunct.’ (p.347). If this is so, the implications for the formation of geopolitical codes may be considerable. The comparison should therefore help to reveal the extent to which these changes are encouraging a common European geopolitics derived from the shared experience of regional governance, with the caveat that only two states are included in the analysis.

As was discussed in chapter two, the effects of regionalization cannot be assumed to be even across all competencies. In other words, the existence of common policies and integration in some areas, such as the economy or environmental policy, do not automatically produce or indicate the presence of similar layered governance in foreign and defence policy. Thus, while regional governance exists in Europe and there have been attempts to expand into the generation of a common foreign and defence policy, these are considered important to the sovereignty of the state and are more limited and contested in terms of their adoption by the regional layer. This is a reflection of the complexity of layered governance, where the boundaries between layers are often indistinct. To question the existence of common geopolitical codes is therefore predicated on there first of all being a geopolitical presence of note of Europe as a region, as opposed to the states alone. This could also have implications for the way in which regionalization impinges on the states and their geopolitical codes.

In light of this, the comparison should allow conclusions to be reached as to the effect or otherwise that regional or multi-layered governance has on the geopolitics of the state. Hettne and Söderbaum (2002) reflect:
‘One helpful way of conceiving the ongoing restructuring of the nation-state and the new governance structures is to understand the Westphalian state as a “bundle” of functions, loyalties and identities, some of which in the new global situation are becoming delinked from the state level and associated with other political levels shaping a multilayered political landscape in which other actors than the state are also gaining strength.’ (p.42).

Whether or not there are common European codes, an evolving layered governance in Europe potentially changes the way in which state codes are constructed. Therefore, comparing Britain and France with the United States should provide an insight, not only into how the specific historical and political contexts of these states affect the geopolitical codes that are constructed, but also into the effect that regionalization, as exists in Europe, has had on the representations made at state level, and ultimately on how geopolitical codes are constructed.

In addition, this chapter attempts to reflect on how effective the codes adopted by the United States, Britain and France have in fact been. As was noted in chapter three, the enacting of discourses can be considered to be performative:

‘Performative means that discourses constitute the objects of which they speak. For example, states are made possible by a wide range of discursive practices that include immigration policies, military deployments and strategies, cultural debates about normal social behaviour, political speeches and economic investments. The meanings, identities, social relations and political assemblages that are enacted in these performances combine the ideal and the material.’ (Bialasiewicz et al, 2007, p.406).

The speeches and other documents that are discussed in this thesis can therefore be considered to be performances that invoke, and make meaningful and ‘known’, discourses in the respective states. Following Bialasiewicz et al, the ideal of the state is combined with the real or the material in terms of events, institutions and structures, and so constituting the state (the ‘Self’) and the ‘Other’, whether it be other states or non-state actors like ‘terrorists’. Therefore, the ‘state does not pre-exist those performances’ (p.407). Rather, it is the result of performativity that reality and representation are brought together through discourse.
Hence, the discourses that underpin the sovereign state, and those that form the basis of understandings of specific states, such as America, Britain and France, ‘constitute’ these states and the characteristics they are understood to embody and represent; it is only through performances that the states become real. Equally, the ‘Other(s)’, and the relationship of the ‘Self’ to this, emerge from the discursive practices that give them meanings and identities. Again, the material realities are combined with ideals or imaginings. These representations then inform the geopolitical codes that are constructed through discourse. Geopolitical codes are therefore closely related to performativity; they are irreducible from the discourses through which they are constructed, and the objects that these discourses make ‘real’ are established through performance dependant upon by whom, where and to whom this performance is given.

When the state or the ‘Other’ is constituted certain realities are written into the discourses, alongside these are the imaginings or assumptions that help to give the ‘Self’ a positive character and the ‘Other’ a negative character. Consequently, the likelihood is that the codes underpinned by such discourses and images of the state, and those of the ‘Other(s)’ to which they relate, may not always produce the expected results when applied to real situations. In order to assess the success or otherwise of the geopolitical codes discussed in this thesis the performativity of the discourses and narratives of the states will be discussed as they are compared; in doing so it should be possible to offer some analysis on how aspects of the codes of each state have been applied in practice, and how effective these have been when compared with the understandings of that state, the ‘Other’ and the relationships between the two, as encapsulated in the discourses and narratives.

The chapter begins with a discussion of the defining visions of each of the states. This is split into three sections focusing on the national, regional and global scales. The purpose is to compare the narratives of each state that are used to define an idea of the ‘Self’ and its place/role in the world, and for Britain and France – the region. These are closely linked to the historical and political context, which has been shown in previous chapters to be so important in the construction of geopolitical codes, and as an influence on the political actors who make policy decisions. Addressing these narratives at the start is a reversal of the structure of the three chapters dedicated to the individual states. The reason for this is that, having established how each state’s discursive structure
operates, in this chapter I now wish to demonstrate the way in which the different visions each state has (including the existence or otherwise of a regional dimension) affects the construction of the terrorist ‘Other’ and the responses to this, as much as these representations (re)produce the worldviews and self-images.

The second section addresses the spatialization of the ‘Self’ and ‘Other’, a process identified in all three state’s representations, and based on a similar selection of binary discourses. However, the analyses will reveal how the same discourses are used and constructed in slightly different ways in each country. Similarly, the characterization of the threatening ‘Other’ displays variations in the construction and use of the discourses. Analysis of this is covered in the third section. A fourth section compares the responses of each state, in terms of the narrative used to underpin these, and how policy is affected. By comparing the discourses and narratives, both where they are similar, and where a narrative is either unique or shared by only two of the states, it should become clearer where elements are common to all, and where the context is important in the construction of discourse and narratives, and therefore on geopolitical codes and government policy.

A further section, looking at representations of terrorism by leading figures in the European Union foreign policy structures, will augment the assessment of possible European geopolitical codes. This includes a brief outline of the history of the Foreign and Defence Policy element in the EU, and then an analysis of the discourses and narratives present in a sample of documents produced by the individuals involved. It will then be possible to draw conclusions; firstly about the differences and similarities between the three states; secondly about whether the comparison between Britain and France, combined with the examination of the EU representations, provides evidence of common geopolitical codes; thirdly on the question of any divergence between Europe and the United States, and finally on the overall success or failure of the geopolitical codes.
Defining Visions – A Comparison

The National Scale

Each of the states that I have studied has been shown to have narratives that policy-makers use in the construction of the ‘Self’. The first is Exceptionalism, an exclusively American narrative. As was explained in chapter four, this is closely tied up with Manifest Destiny, with its roots in the colonization of America. As with the sovereign state itself, it draws from Enlightenment thought, and is central to the construction of a positive American ‘Self’. Smith (2006) argues that: ‘If the Enlightenment promise of liberalism gestated a certain sense of manifest destiny in the United States, Woodrow Wilson was the first to make it truly global – to ground such an ambition explicitly in global and not simply international power.’ (p.7). The expansionism and interventionism that became apparent in the First World War and increasingly after the Second World War, is therefore grounded in representations of the United States as Exceptional, with a divine mission to ‘improve’ the world, spreading the virtues that it supposedly embodies, as in the advance of the frontier. Elazar (2001) says:

‘American federal unity was built upon an indigenous American ideology which properly may be termed federal democracy, derived from the synthesis of the Reformed Protestant and Scottish Enlightenment experiences of the colonial period, and the western frontier encounter with American geography and the settlement of an open and extensive territory.’ (p.31).

Exceptionalism is consequently a vital narrative in America’s construction of its ‘Self’ and underpinning the development of foreign policy.

For Americans, Freedom is a virtue that is not only necessary for the defeat of ‘evil’, but is only possible with American leadership. It is, therefore, an important narrative in American responses to terrorism, and connects these representations and actions into the longer-term understandings of America’s ‘unique’ role in the world:

‘While one factor in the emergence of the Bush doctrine at this time was the severe sense of uncertainty and insecurity occasioned by the 9/11 strikes, its roots in fact lie further in the Administration’s past and,
beyond that, in some of the fundamental desires of European modernity.' (Burke, 2005, p.320).

Thus, while the Freedom narrative in America takes great importance post-September 11\textsuperscript{th}, and is given a divine association through its connection to Exceptionalism, there is also a link with the European roots of the colonialists, in terms of the Enlightenment thought that gave rise to the sovereign state.

The Freedom narrative is, therefore, also present in British representations. However, in this case it is neither as frequently used, nor as important in the construction of the ‘Self’ and its responses to terrorism. Figure 7.1 shows a comparison between the British and American versions of the narrative over the study period. Before September 11\textsuperscript{th} it occurs in a slightly higher proportion of British documents, but following the attacks it becomes far more prominent in America. As the narrative becomes widely used in American representations, it declines to become extremely limited in British equivalents.

In Britain the narrative is different, it does not have the accompanying Exceptionalism with its religious implications; instead it is more in tune with the principles of liberalism that form an important component of the idea of British identity. Again these concepts are drawn from the Enlightenment, and are used to reinforce the sovereign territorial state. The subtle difference between the two versions of the
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narrative is shown in the following passages. In the first, George Bush, speaking to Mayors and County Officials at the White House on the 24th of January, contrasts the ‘evil’ of the ‘Other’ with the Freedom that, he argues, the American ‘Self’ represents:

These are evil people that are relentless in their desire to hurt those who love freedom. And since we’re the bastion of freedom, the beacon of freedom, we’re their target. (Bush, 2002a)

Compare this with Tony Blair’s statement at the Foreign Office Conference in January 2003, where he classes Freedom alongside other ‘values’; while these are being advocated as belonging to the ‘Self’, they are not exclusive or embodied in the ‘Self’:

The values we stand for: freedom, human rights, the rule of law, democracy, are all universal values. (Blair, 2003)

Freedom, in British terms, is represented as a positive feature of the British state; nevertheless it is not an attribute that only Britain can bestow on others (or ‘Others’), although it can play a part in this process. The role of audience is also important in these extracts. When Bush spoke, he did so to a largely supportive audience, whereas Blair had a sceptical public and members of his own government who were not convinced of his arguments. Consequently, he may have felt the need to make a link to ‘universal values’ in an effort to convince the sceptics of the validity of his policies. The rhetoric used in these statements therefore relates to the political position that the individuals find themselves in within their own states. In order to strengthen their arguments they find it necessary to frame these in language that will be appropriate for the domestic audience, while also presenting the vision to a wider global audience.

The reproduction of ‘shared’ values such as Freedom is vital in attempts to hold the state together. Paasi (2003) notes that: ‘Whereas most places do not, territories – especially states – require perpetual public effort to establish and to maintain.’ (p.111). The use of historical experiences is also vital for reinforcing British identity. For this reason the History narrative was apparent in British representations of the ‘Self’ and the responses to terrorism. Although this was not used regularly over most of the period studied, it was deployed in support of an image of the country as an important actor at the global scale. It therefore supports, as was demonstrated in chapter five, the more
frequent narrative – Global Player. While History is only noticeable in the British example, this accompanying narrative is also present in the French representations.

Again, the narrative differs between the two countries; in Britain it is entwined with the British state, its history as a ‘global power’, and the ambitions of policy-makers who want this to continue (and who make the assumption that it is still the case); for powerful French actors, as emerged in the previous chapter, the narrative is most commonly used in conjunction with European Unity when discussing the prospects of Europe as a whole being a Global Player. This corresponds with the French strategy of pursuing a Europe that is clearly differentiated from, and independent of, the American hegemon, a Europe that offers an enhanced status and geopolitical power for France itself. The two extracts below demonstrate the alternative versions of the narrative.

Firstly, the British Prime Minister says:

What are our strengths? Part of the EU; and G8; permanent members of the UN Security Council; the closest ally of the US; our brilliant armed forces; membership of NATO; the reach given by our past; the Commonwealth; the links with Japan, China, Russia and ties of history with virtually every nation in Asia and Latin America; our diplomacy – I do believe our Foreign Service is the best there is; our language. (Blair, 2003)¹

In contrast the French President, addressing the Twelfth Ambassadors’ Conference in Paris in August 2004, promotes the European dimension:

A Europe I would wish capable of making its voice heard on the international stage and of assuming its responsibilities, including in the military field, in the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy and of NATO.

A Europe that must be at the forefront of global economic competition and enjoy growth as strong as that in other regions of the world. A Europe that must strengthen its social model that is founded on justice and solidarity and which sets a worldwide example in this respect. (Chirac, 2004)

For France the regional dimension is essentially an extension of France itself, ‘greatness’ can be achieved if Europe is a Global Player. Blair makes an argument for

¹ This also comes from Tony Blair’s Foreign Office Conference speech.
Britain as a ‘power’ that retains links around the world, and that therefore continues to have influence. The more Euro-sceptic domestic audience that he must satisfy is a restraint on following the French approach, and thus contributes to the construction of the Global Player narrative as focused on the state. Figure 7.2 reveals that with the exception of 2002,\(^2\) the narrative is always more frequent in Britain than in France, emphasising its greater importance in the construction of British geopolitical codes. For the United States the assumption of an Exceptional nation, and its dominance in world politics, avoids any need for such a narrative.

![Figure 7.2](image)

At the core of representations of the French ‘Self’ are, as was discussed in chapter six, Humanist Values. It encapsulates the Enlightenment values associated with the Revolution, in particular ‘liberty’, ‘equality’ and ‘fraternity’. Therefore, in France Humanist Values cannot be removed from the Republican and revolutionary context. At the same time France, like Britain, must, according to its self-image, act to help ‘Others’ to gain these values too, not to mention the strategic advantages that are considered by French elites to stem from this. It is a narrative that is drawn from the same philosophical foundations as Freedom and, of course, the fundamentals of the sovereign state. The context in each state is crucial to the construction of the narratives, and from these an identity for the ‘Self’. Schnapper (2002) comments:

\(^2\) This is the period before the Iraq War when France is attempting to have influence on this matter, and so the need for France and Europe to be a ‘Global Player’ may seem more prescient.
‘The Glorious Revolution of 1688 is not the French Revolution of 1789. The liberal British citizen is not the French Republican citizen. The practical consequences and character of a particular conception of citizenship has always been and, for the moment, remains national.’ (p.9).

In essence, while all three Western states developed out of modernism, and Enlightenment ideals of liberty and liberalism, each has a different history, and their own powerful figures with agency to influence events and the production of discourse and narratives.

The idea of each state becomes possible through the discursive practices repeatedly performed by their elite actors: ‘Instead of there being a singular moment of constitution or invention that brings subjects into being, there is a process of recitation and repetition.’ (Bialasiewicz et al, 2007, p.407). Repetition of Enlightenment ideals over a long period of time has underpinned the existence of these states and continues to do so in the present context. At the same time the unique idea of each state’s identity has also been formed from this repetitive invocation of the discourses and narratives that define it. Thus, the Exceptional United States embodying Freedom is a self-image that continues to be reproduced in the performance of speeches and of policies in relation to the terrorist ‘Other’. For example, military interventions abroad in Afghanistan and Iraq conform to the American geopolitical code that seeks to follow an interventionist path in order to fulfil the manifest destiny of the Exceptional American people.

This is of course an ideal vision of America and of its capabilities. In performance this ideal is combined with realities of oppressive governments abroad and attacks such as those of September 11th to (re)establish this identity, and yet given the performative nature of such an identity and of assumptions of the relationship America has with the rest of the world, the practical results do not necessarily correspond with the performances. The American invasion of Iraq for example does not entirely fit with this ideal, either in its conduct or in the achievement of the stated ambition of a free democratic country in the American mould. In addition, there is a strong likelihood that actions such as this and the failure to deliver the promised benefits could increase the Threat to the ‘Self’ and Freedom inside America by provoking more hatred of the
country. Furthermore, the very existence of such an idealistic Freedom in America must also be questioned, even more so since September 11th following which more restrictive practices and legislation (e.g. the ‘Patriot Act’) has been adopted.

As with the United States, British performances involve considerable idealistic elements bound together with real historic relationships and real problems in today’s world. Discursive practice, through performativity, materializes a state that has a unique position and ability to influence and improve the world as a Global Player. Again, however the practical results are not always what is expected from the geopolitical code(s).

The extent to which Britain really does have influence, particularly with America, is doubtful; where the United States wishes to act it is likely to do so irrespective of the British policy on the matter. Similarly for other states, the British influence may exist to varying degrees but not generally to the extent imagined in the self-image. This was demonstrated in the build up to the Iraq War when attempts were made to gain wider support, but these largely resulted in failure. As with the American case the British efforts to spread values often appear to be more imagined than real when applied in countries such as Iraq; the Freedom and liberal values appeared not much closer after the invasion than they had been before. Perhaps the reduction in occurrence of this narrative after the Iraq War is not unrelated to this contradiction of the ideal by real events (Figure 7.1).

The French self-image is repeated in the performance of speeches by French political elites. However, the ability of France to operate as a Global Player with influence enough to promote Humanist Values has been shown to be limited where they are in disagreement with others, particularly the United States. This was clear when France opposed the Iraq War but failed to stop it. At the same time these Humanist Values are again more a discursive construction of a positive ‘Self’, made real through repeated performance, than an unbroken reality; France, like other states, adopts policies through self-interest as much as for the furtherance of a set of universal values. Its code aims to enhance the country’s interests, and yet the alienation from America and Britain over Iraq, and the inability to stop the war going ahead suggests that these objectives
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were not particularly successful, although greater influence with others who opposed the war may be a possible gain from this policy.

The Regional Scale

Collective Responsibility is a French narrative that underpins arguments for more structured, rule-based, international governance, firstly at the regional scale and ultimately at the global scale. French post-War European policy has followed this approach, the aim being to increase France’s influence and extend its Humanist Values beyond the state itself, sacrificing some sovereignty for these advantages. Although it may be argued that: ‘…collective decision making among states involves a significant loss of control for individual national governments.’ (Hooghe and Marks, 2001, p.4), in the French worldview it offers greater influence both regionally and globally, and is therefore worth pursuing. For French policy-makers, Collective Responsibility does not mean the end of the state, there is still a clear idea of French identity separate from any European identity, and focused around its values and a determination to seek ‘greatness’ and independence, especially from the United States.

Figure 7.3

French representations of Europe, therefore, envisage a formation that is firmly based on collective principles. This leads to a frequent reproduction of the European Unity narrative, one that is shared with Britain. As Figure 7.3 demonstrates, it is consistently identifiable in the documents of both countries, varying more in France
French policy-makers understand the Union to be a strong actor that can operate in geopolitics alongside the states. Crucially the EU is, for France, a body that enshrines what they see as their own values, values that ‘should’ be universal. It is consequently a vital part of French geopolitical codes; a structure that can play a role in tackling Threats that cross borders, and can therefore be a model for global collective governance. The following quote from a speech in Malta in October 2001 by Pierre Moscovici, the Minister Delegate for European affairs, uses this French European Unity narrative:

… while no disorder could possibly explain, and still less justify terrorism, post 11 September it is more necessary than ever before to find solutions to the planet's problems. It is the natural role of the EU, whose primary purpose is to overcome the age-old conflicts which were tearing the European continent apart, to work for peace in the world. Built on a societal model based on solidarity, it is in the best position to promote the reduction of inequality as part of a process of globalization with a human face. To get this message of peace and solidarity across, the EU must, however, give itself the means to speak with a single voice on the international stage. It must become the "Europe-power" which France has been calling for. (Moscovici, 2001)

The emphasis is clearly on a more powerful Europe, one that can, according to the narrative, deliver peace to the world. French policy tends to favour European integration to a greater extent than Britain does. Emphasising the advantages of European unity and the supposed shared values that Europeans have, indeed the very existence of a European identity, are crucial in the furtherance of this French geopolitical strategy. This strategy of European integration as a means to enhance French interests and influence regionally and globally is distinct from how British political actors approach Europe. The British narrative, while promoting regional cooperation and the advantages of this in terms of terrorism, suggests a more limited relationship:

Co-operation with our European partners, under the EU umbrella, is a key element in guaranteeing our security against terrorism. The EU allows us, uniquely, to combine and co-ordinate a joint response to
terrorism in fields as varied as foreign affairs, law enforcement, terrorist financing and aviation security. In future, the EU will also assume a limited military role, complementary to NATO, too. (Hain, 2001c)³

This alternative incarnation of the narrative derives from the different historical policies and worldviews adopted by the British state. Britain has tended to view relations with Europe as one of a number of global contacts that can give it influence and a unique role in the world. The dilemma in the post-War period has been how to sustain this global outlook, and develop influence in a more integrated Europe. When discussing Europe and formulating policies British policy-makers must be aware of, and respond to, the considerable Euro-sceptic sentiments of their domestic audience. Politicians must be able to convince this audience of the validity of their arguments and the policies that they wish to pursue, and therefore these must fit into the longstanding vision of British detachment from the continent. British strategy, in contrast to France, aims to act within Europe but simultaneously remain outside it, sustaining a close alliance with the United States. The benefits and influence that both can bring are sought, and discussions of Europe and cooperation therein reflect these aims. Thus, the advantages of cooperation in terms of non-state Threats are accepted by policy-makers without the same commitment to collective decision-making and shared sovereignty as in France.

This perspective on integration has contributed to a restriction on the extent to which Europe has been able to acquire the attributes of a state, particularly in the realm of geopolitics:

‘For post-World War II Europe, on the other hand, it soon became apparent that federation was too great a step. Instead, there was a pragmatic withdrawal to “functionalism”, which would avoid explicit expression of the higher purposes of the unification effort. In place of the use of terms like “federal” or “confederal”, terms like “supranational” and “political community” became the relevant political buzzwords.’ (Elazar, 2001, p.31).

Britain and its representatives, operating through the worldviews discussed in chapter five, are among those who have been most resistant to deeper integration.

³ Peter Hain was speaking at a meeting of the European-Atlantic Group in London on the 12th of December 2001.
Consequently, while the presence of the EU is of enormous significance for Britain as it is for France, the narrative that is constructed in response displays some divergence.

British imaginings of European unity are performed both in speeches on the matter and in the approaches taken by government on moves to greater integration. In both cases the relationship enacted is one of close cooperation while simultaneously retaining a detachment and independence. Such a contradictory scenario is only really possible in these representations. The practical results of policies underpinned by this British European Unity narrative, and reproduced in the performance of political elites, is a restraint on the influence that Britain has with other European states that doubt the commitment of Britain to European integration. The unity that is sought through this narrative can be effective when all states agree such as in the general aim of fighting terrorism, but it is abandoned when disagreement exists, as in the case of the invasion of Iraq. In this example European Unity was sacrificed for individual state interests.

Again, for France, it is through performativity that the vision of Europe becomes established; in the speeches of political leaders and in the more active engagement in European projects, France becomes discursively located at the heart of Europe, and as one of its leading states pushing forward integration. In the past this leadership role was indeed a real one, but in the context of a larger European Union it is somewhat diluted, the views of many new members favouring a less integrationist model with less Collective Responsibility than French governments have traditionally promoted. Once again, the divisions over Iraq were the most obvious example of this, the French ability to lead Europe and drive deeper integration, moulding the Union in its own image, being brought in to question. Indeed, in Figure 7.3 the graph shows the lowest frequency of use of the European Unity narrative was in 2003, the year of the Iraq War, a result perhaps of this more challenging time for presenting an ideal of unity when the reality was of deep division.

The Global Scale

The experiences of regional integration appear to have an effect on British and French geopolitical codes in respect of the global scale, when compared to the United States. This becomes apparent when comparing the use of narratives primarily of
global focus. Two such narratives are Coalition and Global Community. The first of these is shared by the United States and Britain, the second by Britain and France. Figure 7.4 shows the change over time of these narratives in the three states. Coalition is revealed to be far more prevalent over all in the United States than in Britain, except for the period immediately following September 11th when British policy-makers are attempting to align themselves as closely as possible with America as part of the ‘coalition against terrorism’. Global Community on the other hand, while absent in American representations becomes far more common in Britain after the attacks. This is a similar pattern to France, at least from 2002 onwards. France, of course does not have a noticeable Coalition narrative.

As I discussed in chapter four, the Coalition narrative in the United States is essentially realist, in that it underpins understandings of state-to-state relationships that are largely formed to achieve a given purpose where the interests of the states converge. Given that America is constructed through narratives of Exceptionalism, and virtues that the country supposedly embodies (e.g. Freedom), their can be no compromise in respect of American policy; hence Coalitions are formed only when they are convenient, when another state follows America’s ‘righteous’ leadership:

At the same time, every nation in our coalition must take seriously the growing threat of terror on a catastrophic scale – terror armed with biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons. America is now consulting
with friends and allies about this greatest of dangers, and we’re determined to confront it. (Bush, 2002c)\textsuperscript{4}

It is ‘our’ Coalition, and it is America that takes the initiative to ‘consult’, but this is not part of a structured system of collective decision making; as became increasingly apparent in the events surrounding the war in Iraq, if members of the ‘Coalition’ do not agree, the United States acts unilaterally. Thus, to speak of a Coalition, for American policy-makers is to a certain extent rhetorical; it would be helpful if other countries supported the American policy, but it is not essential for that policy to be put into practice. A Coalition also gives American policies a certain respectability that helps to sell them to the domestic audience and to the wider global audience, but the power that the United States possesses as the hegemon provides the capability to enact interventions, military or otherwise, without being overly constrained by the interests and sensibilities of other states.

For Britain, the Coalition is different, and tied up closely with the idea of a Global Community, the more important narrative. There remains a strong neorealist dimension; Britain continues to aspire to the status of a major power, given its history. Policy-makers therefore attempt to sustain global connections in line with this worldview. Britain continues to act as a sovereign state, forging neorealist relationships, while the cooperative structure, inherent in the regional dimension, impinges upon representations at the global scale. Depicting a Global Community assists the policy agenda of the British government as they try to establish the conditions in which Britain can gain power and influence in the world beyond what it may be able to achieve in an anarchical state system. This does not mean the abandonment of neorealist principles, but rather a strategy for the successful adoption of the state’s policies that accepts a degree of reduced sovereignty as the price for influence. The following passage reproduces the British Global Community narrative, and demonstrates how this depicts a deeper relationship than the Coalition envisioned in American representations:

This evening I suggest that there are four principles which need to underpin the modern idea of global community, if our world is to be

\textsuperscript{4} This passage is from a speech by President Bush at the White House six months after September 11\textsuperscript{th}, on the 11\textsuperscript{th} of March 2002.
more peaceful and prosperous: First, that international relations must be founded on the idea that every nation has an obligation properly to meet its global responsibilities; Second, that the global community has the right to make judgments about countries’ internal affairs, where they flout or fail to abide by these global values; Third, that because our interests as nation states are now more entwined than ever, the global community must make renewed efforts to resolve those persistent conflicts which threaten the security of us all; And fourth, that the global community must play a more active role in dealing with conflicts within states, which in the past have been overlooked until too late. (Straw, 2002a)

The narrative helps to construct a vision of a more structured international system where the increased porosity of state borders caused by globalization is acknowledged, and where Threats from non-state, as well as state, actors can be challenged. At the same time the existence of the Coalition narrative does not allow policy to move towards a point where such a structured system is completely acceptable. Britain also has an American Alliance narrative. This reproduces a neorealist relationship with another state, an alliance that is alleged to enhance the country’s status as a ‘great power’ and a Global Player. These narratives undermine the communitarian elements of a Global Community, and indeed of a European Union, in British representations, making engagement in such structures problematic and attractive at the same time. This contradiction lies at the heart of the competing, overlapping British geopolitical codes.

Just as France constructs the European Union as a regional extension of its(Self), so too is a potential Global Community imagined in this way. In French representations the narratives of Multipolarity and World Democracy are also closely connected with Global Community. As I argued in the previous chapter, these two narratives work together in a French worldview that envisages poles such as Europe acting in a collective decision making system, enshrining French or universal values at the global scale. This for French policy-makers is the basis for a Global Community, and is apparent in the extract below:

Our era is torn between proliferating threats and historic opportunity: the chance for the international community to come together at last. A modern vision is gaining ground, based on collective responsibility and

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3 Jack Straw was speaking at the Mansion House in London on the 10th of April 2002.
global democracy. A new organization of the world is taking shape…

(De Villepin, 2003e)\(^6\)

This vision responds to the regionalizing and globalizing processes of the post-Cold War world, as well as to the diminished status of France. By accepting the existence of a regional, and a potential global layer of governance in their codes, French geopoliticians appear to be moving towards multilayered governance. However, De Villepin’s statement and the sentiments expressed within it should not be read as a vision that moves beyond the neorealist state. France is still central both regionally and globally. The Global Community does allow states like France to cope with the changing circumstances brought about by globalization, but it also allows France to present an alternative vision of the world to that of America. In such a world the hegemon does not dominate to such an extent, giving states like France greater power. This is a vision that is expressed so as to be attractive to others, such that they might be more amenable to French policies and interests, and with the objective of reducing the power of America. It is therefore in the interests of France that this Global Community is depicted, more than it is a belief in a likely move away from sovereign states.

Greater multi-layered governance does not mean that the state is defunct, rather that the geopoliticians represent France as an important component of these layers. Van der Wusten (2000) notes that: ‘The state system in Western Europe is not in terminal decline, but it has lost the selfevident (sic) and ever growing importance that it had acquired in earlier generations…’ (p.90). For France and Britain the regional dimension, and the search for influence and status at the global scale, has prompted the production of narratives that have a more collective or cooperative character than those of the United States. The regionalizing and globalizing forces that have created non-state actors have forced the two European states to develop codes acknowledging changes to borders and territoriality. However, as a product of its competing codes, and the choices made by political actors, British policy is less committed to the collective vision espoused by France.

The interests of the two countries are different and they follow alternative strategies for advancing those interests and increasing their power. Both make use of

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\(^6\) Dominique de Villepin addressed the Eleventh Ambassadors’ Conference on the 28\(^{th}\) of August 2003.
cooperative systems in the hope of institutionalizing an influence in regional and global decision-making, but France is notably different in that its policy-makers are inclined to seek a separate vision from America. While Britain keeps a close relationship with the United States, France tries to define an independent line and is troubled by the power of the hegemon. Hence, the French worldview represents a vision of Multipolarity and cooperation globally, a vision that aims to attract others to its way of thinking without diminishing the role and the status of France as a sovereign state. Discussions of Global Communities and Multipolarity must therefore be understood to be part of the strategic manoeuvrings of the representatives of sovereign states as much as an indication of the effects that regionalizing and globalizing forces are having on those states, their discursive structures and their geopolitical codes.

While in performance French elites repeatedly identify a Global Community, one which enshrines a Multipolar system of World Democracy, the reality suggests that this is an aspiration that is a long way from fulfilment. Although this may be an ambition, and one in which French interests and views could gain greater influence, in actuality events appear to have demonstrated that a unipolar model is closer to reality, especially since September 11th. French practice has been to act in many ways as if the Global Community is closer than it is, attempting to cooperate with the United States after September 11th, and trying to wield influence through the United Nations and the European Union over the question of Iraq. However, the Americans have followed a unilateralist path making use of support when it is offered but ignoring opposition where it exists and continuing with its policies in a fundamentally realist way. French visions of cooperation in a Global Community therefore lie within the realms of performative ideals rather than having a material existence. The codes drawing upon these discursive foundations are consequently unable to deliver the level of influence that might be expected on the direction of the ‘war on terrorism’.

The British Global Community is in some ways less clearly defined than the French version given the contested nature of British geopolitical codes, but it too is undermined in the same way. Despite its repeated appearance in performance, particularly in speeches, perhaps less so in policy and strategy, it remains an imagined concept of an ideal system. The Coalition, that is also a feature of British representations, is enacted not only as an ideal but also materially through actual
relationships with other states. One of the most important of these is of course the American Alliance and this was prominent following September 11th. This alliance has been continually constituted in performance over a long period of time going as far back as the two World Wars, through the Cold War, and was then reinforced in speeches, policy, personal relationships between leaders and joint military actions as part of the ‘war on terror’. As such, there is evidence to suggest that the American Alliance and the concept of the Coalition generally has been a relatively successful part of British geopolitical codes, in as much as the relationship with the hegemon appears to have been reinforced. At the same time, relationships with some other states, both in Europe and in the Middle East, may have been damaged or strained by such a close association with America and its policies. Furthermore, the degree of influence that Britain actually has with America may be less than is presented. In essence, while in performance Britain can be understood to have a very close and influential relationship with the United States as part of a wider Coalition this may be more of an appearance that conforms to the ideals of British and also American ideals.

The American ideal of a Coalition was reiterated frequently after September 11th as shown in Figure 7.4. Its realist implications are, however, undermining to its practical potential when faced with the reality of varying interests and policies of Coalition partners. The ideal vision of a Coalition led by America, and conforming unquestioningly to America’s worldview, might acquire meaning through performance in speeches, but ignores the differences that exist between states and the alternative worldviews and geopolitical codes that these states have. Thus, while initially it was relatively easy for America to take a leadership role and gain support from others in the wake of September 11th, once it started to adopt more aggressive policies that conflicted with the outlook and interests of those in the supposed Coalition this was increasingly undermined and difficult to sustain. This was to present difficulties for the furtherance of American aims; in Iraq, for example, the limited support for the war undermined the authority of the invasion and diminished the potential for success of American policy there, in turn this has damaged the reputation of the American government both externally and, increasingly, internally.
Spatial Constructions

Neorealism draws on binaries to reinforce the sovereign state as the main, indeed the only, unit of importance in geopolitics. All states are, to an extent, drawn from such neorealist discourse, and the Enlightenment reasoning from which it emerged. Therefore, the binary discourse apparent in one (Western) state is likely to be close to that of another. However, the spatial context in which that discourse is reproduced differs from state to state, producing subtle differences in the discourses.

In the last three chapters it has emerged that the United States, Britain and France all, in their own ways, construct a disordered ‘outside’ in contrast to an ordered ‘inside’. Furthermore, the ‘outside’ is often associated with the East, while the ‘inside’ represents the West. Berezin (2003) reflects that: ‘The modern nation-state is also the territorial state and it owes its institutional durability plus its hold on the popular imagination to precisely its intersection of power, nature, and culture.’ (p.4). By continually (re)constructing a spatialization of the ‘Self’ as separate from the ‘Other’ the territory of the state is re-emphasised and the nation can be reinforced. The definition of territory through binary discourse is, therefore, essential for the reproduction of the positive ‘Self’. This applies to any sovereign territorial state; hence it is common to all three examples here.

Nevertheless, it is possible to discern variations in the use of the spatializing binary discourses. Figure 7.5 compares Inside/Outside in the three states. The most obvious difference is that the discourse is far less frequent in France, where the regional and global dimensions are emphasised more. Secondly it is revealing how similar the trend is in America and Britain. In both cases the discourse is most frequent before September 11th, falling afterwards before recovering slightly in 2002. It then drops further, but more so in Britain than in America. This may reflect the strong emphasis in U.S. geopolitical codes on the Exceptional ‘Self’, a (neo)realist state acting alone in the world. For Britain, the distinction between ‘inside’ the state and ‘outside’ also remains prominent.

Order/Disorder presents a different pattern (Figure 7.6). Again it is a fairly important discourse in all three states, but in this case it is generally less frequent in the
United States. In all three states it appears in more documents in 2002 than before September 11th, despite a noticeable drop in the United States and France immediately after the attacks, this is not repeated in Britain. Thereafter it is reduced to a lower level than before September 11th, although the peak is later in America (2003). Given that representations in all three states follow a similar pattern of differentiating the negative outside from the positive inside, the many similarities in the pattern of use are not entirely surprising. It becomes emphasised most as they seek locations from which the terrorist ‘Other’ might have come. For the European states, historical experience of more direct ‘Threats’, and perception of these, may help to explain their greater emphasis on this ‘dangerous’ disorder.

Drawing on historical parallels, the East is often the place from which such Threats supposedly come. This conforms to discourses reproduced in colonialism and more recently in the Cold War. Hence, the East/West discourse is present in all three state’s documents, though significantly less so in France (Figure 7.7). As the graph shows, this is a discourse that generally becomes more frequent after September 11th (though in the United States it briefly declines to a much lower level). However, while in Britain and France it begins to decline again after 2002 when arguments have been made for the war in Afghanistan, and in Britain – Iraq, in the United States it continues to increase in frequency. This could perhaps reflect the greater clarity in binary American representations. In Europe other actors such as the EU complicate matters, while not removing East/West, particularly in Britain where Cold War policy conformed to this binary thinking more than in France.

In addition the Organic narrative is common to all three states. This runs through representations of the ‘outside’ and also of the ‘Other’. It helps to characterize terrorists as a Threat that can ‘grow’ in ‘disordered’ spaces. However, although it is a distinctive part of the constructions, it is never particularly common, as the graph in Figure 7.8 shows. It is most frequent pre-September 11th in the United States, but still only appears in just over a quarter of documents. Generally, it increases at times when Threat is emphasised, although the pattern is quite variable in all the states.
Figure 7.5

Comparison Over Time of the American, British and French Inside/Outside Discourses

Figure 7.6

Comparison Over Time of the American, British and French Order/Disorder Discourses
Policy-makers in the United States are operating in the context of the discourse of the (neo)realist state and the assumption that the state is the only important actor in geopolitics. They, therefore, reproduce binaries that define territory, of the state and of the ‘outside’ – the ‘disordered’ spaces that Threats are said to develop in. Gregory (2004) argues that: ‘If global capitalism is aggressively de-territorializing, moving ever outwards in a process of ceaseless expansion and furiously tearing down barriers to capital accumulation, then colonial modernity is intrinsically territorializing, forever
installing partitions between “us” and “them”.’ (p.253). Thus, while America may engage with some elements of globalization, this does not appear to extend to an understanding of the world in terms of a multitude of actors, state or non-state, including potential layered governance. Instead, representations continue to emphasise the difference between the ‘ordered’ ‘inside’, the ‘Self’; and the ‘disordered’ ‘outside’, the ‘Other’. For example, when speaking to military personnel in California in August 2003, President Bush said:

A free Iraq will help to rid the Middle East of resentment and violence, and radicalism. A free Iraq will show all nations of the region that human freedom brings progress and prosperity. By working for peace and stability in the Middle East we’re making America, and future generations of Americans, more secure. (Bush, 2003)

In this passage he draws on the East/West discourse, alongside Order/Disorder and Inside/Outside, as he attempts to make a connection between disorder in the East and a Threat to the American ‘Self’, and it is the American ‘Self’. The security of America is, according to Bush, directly connected to the advance of Freedom in the East, this is part of America’s mission. The rhetoric that appears in passages like this makes the case for the interventionist policies that the American government has adopted. This is particularly effective, and most important as far as the politicians are concerned, as regards the domestic American audience, but also has relevance globally as the United States attempts to gain acceptance of its actions as a world leader. Drawing on binary discourse allows Bush to provide an appearance of ‘common sense’ to these rather dramatic statements, and further his and America’s policy goals in the Middle East and elsewhere.

Similarly, in Britain, these ‘disordered’ spaces are represented as the source of a Threat to the ‘Self’, but this time there is a more specific acknowledgement of non-state actors, all be it as potentially dangerous. On a visit to Moscow in October 2001, Jack Straw claimed that:

No one can now doubt that a primary threat to our security comes from groups which act outside states and the rules of the international community, or from places where the state and the rule of law do not function. No longer can any of us afford to ignore distant misgoverned parts of the world. (Straw, 2001a)
While the Threat is still clearly from the ‘outside’ there is a subtle difference identifiable in the greater emphasis on ‘the rules of the international community’ as opposed to a focus on Britain as a state alone. In this way the Global Community narrative is entwined with notions of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, and ‘order’ and ‘disorder’, the community is ordered and the ‘Other’ is a Threat to this. As a consequence it is also a Threat to Britain as a state within this community. The variation is only slight and should not be over-emphasised, but does point to the effect that the context of each state, and the resulting narratives, have on the discourses that they share.

This, arguably, becomes even more noticeable when assessing the use of these discourses in France:

We must increasingly take a global view when planning security. It’s no longer just a matter of responding to a threat against our borders, which has faded, but above all of preventing, ending crises which may directly or indirectly affect us. And it’s normal for us to act more and more in a European framework. (Chirac, 2002c)\textsuperscript{7}

Chirac places the ‘Threat’ of disorder in both a global and regional context. As such, narratives of Collective Responsibility and Global Community, in addition to European Unity, underpin the French understanding. The ‘inside’ is not only France but also Europe, order can only, through these narratives, be spread by collective means regionally and globally. This does not mean that France as a state is irrelevant, only that it acts with others to achieve security. The desire of French geopoliticians like Chirac to avoid conflict in parts of the world where it has economic interests, in addition to the concern for stability internally, must be appreciated when considering such statements. Preventing Threats is consequently not simply a move away from the traditional methods of sovereign states but a crucial strategy followed for the perceived benefit of French interests. The regional layer is one element of governance through which France believes this can be achieved.

Hence, in France, and to a lesser extent Britain, worldviews that have sought a more structured and collective geopolitics, first regionally, and increasingly globally,
are impacting upon the (neo)realist division of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’. Agnew (2001) explains that:

‘Ever since the 17th century the claim to Europeanness, particularly at the borders of Europe, has involved commitment to and advertisement of the accoutrements of European statehood as defined by the dominant states, above all the clear demarcation of the state’s geographical limits and the associated matching of nation with state.’ (p.22).

This remains the case, but the situation has been complicated by the establishment of a regional layer of governance and sovereignty sharing. Borders are no longer the simplistic lines, demarcating the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of states, that they once were. Globalization and regionalization have brought new actors that are not constrained within individual states.

Yet, at the same time, states still dominate and borders remain important: ‘…while we cannot assume that state borders are fixed or settled, neither can we assume that they have become so porous as to be irrelevant, nor that their significance has been lost in a proliferation of other boundaries.’ (Anderson and O’Dowd, 1999, p.602). In all three states examined here (neo)realist binaries remain central to representations that spatialize the location of the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’. Borders, and state territoriality, are still fundamental to the geopolitical codes of all three states when it comes to imagining the terrorist Threat.

Each of the states therefore shares the binary division of space through their discursive practices. As with all such practices, this division, these binaries, are established through performance. When political elites speak or write about disorder abroad and in the East, contrasting this with an allegedly ordered peaceful and democratic ‘Self’, whether that be a state or even Europe, they contribute to the manifestation of this binary division of the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’. Equally, the policies and actions of the states reproduce the binary discourses. Military action in Afghanistan or in Iraq or political/social interventions in supposedly disordered parts of the world are also performative in their effect of materializing difference; in the outside, where the ‘Other’ resides, solutions must be found for the disorder and the Threat that this poses to the ‘Self’, on the inside there is order and so such measures are unnecessary. Thus,
the binary spatialization is made real through the performance of these discursive practices, combining imagined geographies of ordered and disordered territories with real problems and Threats that do exist but may be more complex than such binary interpretations suggest.

All three states seek in their own ways to bring order to the disorder that they see on the outside. The geopolitical codes that they have developed strongly reflect this ambition, but their implementation in terms of policy has, for all of them, produced mixed results in terms of meeting the expectations enshrined in the codes and the understandings of a binary world on which these are based. The United States, Britain and France have all, to varying extents, been part of the military action in Afghanistan; in some respects it could be argued that this has made progress towards their objectives of introducing the kind of order that they desire in that country, and particularly reducing the ability of al Qaeda to operate there. On the other hand, there is still no end in sight for their involvement in the country on a military as well as on a political level, and it still has no stable system of government. Indeed, it may be argued that it was more stable under the Taliban, however objectionable they may have been in other ways. Hence, to argue that order has been introduced to Afghanistan, and the Threat of terrorism has been significantly reduced as a result of these actions, would seem to be questionable. The same could be said (possibly even more so) for American and British efforts in Iraq.

These types of actions actually risk increasing the Threat, and the level of disorder as viewed through binary discourse, by increasing resentment and anger towards ‘Western’ states. Alternatives to military action discussed by French, and to a lesser extent British, political figures are less obvious in terms of actual policy, often appearing to be more in the realms rhetoric and ambition. Overall the progress towards the ordered world envisioned as the ideal by each of the states, and forming a central objective (if understood in slightly different ways) of their geopolitical codes, appears to have been slow in the years following September 11th, in fact there is some indication that the codes have been counterproductive in this regard.
Characterizing the Terrorist ‘Other’

Constructing ‘Threat(s)’

As was discussed in previous chapters, the construction of an ‘Other’ is an essential component of the establishment of the identity of the ‘Self’ in modernist thought, and specifically in neorealism as regards geopolitics. Consequently, for the three (neo)realist sovereign states studied here, the reproduction of an inferior ‘Other’ is a necessity when understood through discourse. In order to construct a national identity and hold the state together the ‘Other’ must be not only inferior, but also potentially threatening. For this reason, terrorism and terrorists are suitable for this role and are represented appropriately.

Figure 7.9

Some variation can be identified in the frequency of use of the Threat discourse in the three states, however as the graph in Figure 7.9 demonstrates it is an important discourse in all of them. The United States is where the documents show the widest use of the discourse, and is the only country where the highest level is found before September 11th, when policy-makers envisage a dangerous and disordered world with many possible Threats. For Britain and France, the general trend is towards an increase after September 11th. Over time this declines, as the attacks become more distant and the focus moves to responses. For the Americans, though, the discourse returns near to the previous level after the initial concentration on the actual events of September 11th, and characterizing those responsible.
Figure 7.10 depicts the use of the Weapons of Mass Destruction narrative. Again this is common to all three states and, given its specificity, is used in a fairly similar way. While all three show a frequent use of the narrative, it is less widespread in the French documents. This is unsurprising as France was opposed to the Iraq War, a conflict for which the arguments made were heavily focused upon the Threat of WMD. As emerged in chapter six, although France also made connections between Iraq and WMD, French geopoliticians were not trying to argue for a war, and would therefore not find it necessary to emphasise this so much. Nevertheless, in all the states the patterns of use are very similar. Prior to September 11th, when WMD was one of a number of supposed Threats, it was at a higher level. In 2002 the narrative became more frequent as the debate on Iraq came to the forefront, and WMD began to be bundled together with terrorism and, in America and Britain, Rogue States. This second narrative is not clearly identifiable in France where political figures attempt to encourage a more collective geopolitics that would not involve unilateral actions by the United States against particular ‘Rogue States’. After the Iraq War the WMD narrative declines again, but remains more frequent than it had originally been in Britain and France.
In order for the ‘Other’ to be threatening, it has to be constructed as embodying negative characteristics. In all three cases this involved the regular use of a Positive/Negative binary discourse in their representations. This is shown in Figure 7.11. Once more the United States displays the greatest use of this discourse, and it also tends to be used more frequently with the passage of time, peaking in 2004. Britain and France differ in this respect; initially the discourse appears in relatively few documents, increasing dramatically after September 11th, then gradually declining thereafter, more so in the French case.

Closely associated with the Positive/Negative binary is the Good/Evil discourse. It too characterizes the terrorist ‘Other’ as ‘inferior’ and ‘wrong’ in contrast to the ‘Self’ which is ‘positive’ and ‘right’. However, it is more specific and displays a greater difference in terms of frequency of use and in how it is constructed. Figure 7.12 shows the use of this discourse. It is clear from this graph that the discourse appears far more often in American documents than in British, or in French documents where it occurs least often. Despite this, the trends are almost identical; in each case it increases from a lower level before September 11th as the characterization intensifies (although in America it already appears in over 50% of documents, while in France it did not occur at all until after the attacks), declines in 2002 and 2003, and then increases slightly in 2004.
Behind these differences in use of the Good/Evil discourse and, by extension, Positive/Negative and Threat discourses, are the context, and related narratives that define each of the states’ self perceptions and worldviews. Although they share the same discourses it is evident that the frequency, both relative and absolute, is not always the same; equally the precise construction of these discourses can vary from state to state. This is most apparent in the Good/Evil discourse. As explained in chapter four, it has a meaning in the United States that connects with the idea of America as superior and assigned a mission by God. Thus, when someone is said to be ‘evil’ this is, when understood through the discourse, an assertion that they are the opposite of God and of America. This very simple division comes across in this June 2002 ‘Critical Infrastructure’ statement by George Bush in Kansas City:

> And when we see evil, I know it may hurt some people’s feelings, it may not be what they call, diplomatically correct, but I’m calling evil for what it is. Evil is evil, and we will fight it with all our might. (Bush, 2002e)

By frequently reproducing this discourse the negativity of the terrorist can be reinforced, and therefore the Positive/Negative discourse can be strengthened and is also regularly reproduced. Combining these discourses constructs the ‘Other’ in a menacing way, as it is not only inferior to America, but also the opposite of everything that
America stands for ‘God’s chosen people’. As such, these discourses support the Threat discourse. This is clearly apparent in the following quotation from a speech by Bush to the German Bundestag in May 2002:

"Our generation faces new and grave threats to liberty, to the safety of our people, and to civilization, itself. We face an aggressive force that glorifies death, that targets the innocent, and seeks the means to matter – murder (sic) on a massive scale. (Bush, 2002d)"

The negative and ‘evil’ characteristics are contrasted with the positive virtues (liberty) that are threatened making the magnitude of the Threat seem ‘obvious’.

For Britain the Threat is certainly prescient, however there is some sense in which it is slightly less starkly drawn. For example, Jack Straw said the following in October 2002:

"These threats, which have emerged since the Cold War, are more unpredictable than the challenge we faced in the Soviet era. They come from rogue regimes and terrorist organizations which despise universal values and which cannot be contained by classic deterrence. We must face up to these threats with the same resolve and determination we showed in the Cold War. (Straw, 2002c)"

Entwined with the Threat discourse and reinforcing it is the Rogue State narrative; the Threat is claimed to come from multiple sources and is unpredictable making it more dangerous than the apparently clearer and simpler Cold War Threat. Nevertheless, the language used to define the Threat in America is not apparent in this passage; the ‘Other’ does ‘despise universal values’ but does not threaten ‘civilization itself’. This difference is related to the variation in how the negativity of the ‘Other’ is characterized in the two states, and specifically the Good/Evil binary.

The British Good/Evil discourse is more descriptive, lacking the divine connotations provided by an Exceptional narrative. Here it is used more to support characterizations of the ‘Other’ as ‘wrong’ or ‘bad’, these are the inferior implications of the Positive/Negative binary, it is therefore very closely tied up with this. For

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8 Jack Straw was speaking at the Chicago Council for Foreign Relations on the 15th of October 2002.
example, in his statement to the House of Commons after September 11th, Blair claimed that:

…what happened in the United States on Tuesday was an act of wickedness for which there can never be justification. Whatever the cause, whatever the perversion of religious feeling, whatever the political belief, to inflict such terror on the world; to take the lives of so many innocent and defenceless men, women, and children, can never ever be justified. (Blair, 2001b)

He concentrates on the lack of ‘justification’ for the acts of the terrorists rather than ‘evil’ as a phenomenon. These acts are contrasted with the ‘innocence’ of the victims as part of the binary construction of positive and negative characteristics; the Good/Evil binary is a more extreme version of this, creating an ‘Other’ that is not simply negative but ‘wicked’ or ‘evil’. The use of similar language to that of American politicians assists in the efforts of Blair to reinforce the close relationship between Britain and the United States without the depth of meaning that the Good/Evil discourse has in America. It was an important part of British policy post-September 11th to reaffirm this longstanding alliance in order to be as intimately involved as possible in subsequent responses and continue to hold the status of America’s closest ally. This can be contrasted with the French who wish to define a clear distinction and independence of policy from the hegemon.

Drawing on the French Threat discourse, Prime Minister Lionel Jospin said:

Terrorism is the enemy of mankind, but we won’t be supported for any length of time by everyone in the fight against terrorism if we appear to tolerate conflicts, injustices and frustrations, the sources of violence. (Jospin, 2001c) 9

While there is a clear identification of a Threat from terrorism it is not attributed the same menace and dehumanized character as the American version or even the British equivalent; it is certainly an enemy and so is apart from, and opposed to, the ‘Self’, but there is also some reference to reasons (‘conflicts, injustices and frustrations’) behind the Threat more than simply an ‘evil’ character.

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9 This speech was made on the 21st of November 2001, to the National Assembly, and concerned the Afghanistan situation.
For French geopoliticians, Good/Evil is not a discourse that is central to their characterizations of terrorists. Like Britain, the divine element is lacking and it becomes a vehement expression of negativity. Chirac makes the following statement through this discourse:

The century which has just ended had already revealed to us the monstrous nature of the demons which can lurk in the human soul. We now have dreadful confirmation that people still exist who are capable of perpetrating crimes against humanity, against the universal conscience of mankind – quite simply against life itself. (Chirac, 2001b)\(^{10}\)

In contrast to the statement by Bush, ‘evil’ is not presented as a concept in itself by Chirac, but as something that people do or are. This is opposed to the Humanist Values of France and is therefore negative and constitutes a Threat, however it remains a Threat embodied in certain individuals and their actions, not part of a wider contest between ‘good’ and ‘evil’. For this reason it is not necessary for the discourse to be so frequent in representations. Neither would it seem appropriate to Chirac to use identical language to the Americans, whom he wants to remain apart from, while agreeing with the characterization of terrorism and that it poses a Threat. For France, an alliance with the United States regarding terrorism and more generally is not one that demands France to follow the American policy as a matter of course. France must be distinctive.

Constructing the ‘Self’ in a Regional Context

Driving these different discourses is a variation in the representation of the ‘Self’. While the same processes are at work, the particulars are different. Not only do the European states not have the Exceptionalism narrative, they have a regional dimension to their geopolitical codes, and to their real experiences, that impacts upon the understanding of the ‘Self’. The effect can be seen when looking at how the European Unity narrative and the Threat discourses come together in the words of British and French actors. Firstly, Tony Blair, in his October 2001 statement on military action in Afghanistan, said:

We know the al-Qaeda network threaten (sic) Europe, including Britain, and, indeed, any nation throughout the world that does not share their

\(^{10}\) President Chirac spoke to the ‘French Community’ in Washington D.C. on the 19\(^{th}\) of September 2001.
fanatical views. So we have a direct interest in acting in our own self
defence to protect British lives. (Blair, 2001d)

The French Foreign Minister, Dominique De Villepin, constructed the relationship as follows:

Meaning must be given to Europe. We are heirs to the same history.
We belong to the same continent. Nothing that happens to one of our
neighbours can leave us indifferent. Defence Europe is part of this
profound reality. We must be capable of together assessing the threats
hanging over our fellow citizens, of together forging the instruments of
an effective common response. (De Villepin, 2002d)

In both cases there is a very obvious attempt to suggest that Europe as a whole, not just
the relevant state, is threatened by terrorism. No such feature can be found in the
American material. The second point of note is that there is some difference between
Britain and France in this regard. Blair focuses primarily on Britain only briefly
locating it in the wider European context; for De Villepin, defence against the Threat
cannot be removed from Europe, and his concern is for a ‘common response’.

Yet again this reflects the more European oriented nature of French geopolitics,
and thus French policy. Nevertheless, the presence of these European elements in the
representations of both states is indicative of the construction of a European ‘Self’ in
addition to the national ‘Self’. This is more distinct in France due to the historical and
political background that has led it to be more enthusiastic about European integration,
and hence to privilege collective approaches in its geopolitical codes. European
‘values’ are presented as being the same as French Humanist Values, so Europe can be
thought of as an extension of France creating congruence between the French ‘Self’ and
the European ‘Self’. To further the French policy of European integration it is therefore
important for De Villepin to emphasise what Europeans have in common and the need
for acting together on security matters. Britain continues to seek a global role on its
own, based on its supposed historical status, Europe is only part of this and integration
is less attractive. In accordance with this objective, and the less favourable attitudes to
Europe in Britain, Blair’s focus remains on Britain even when talking of Europe.

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11 Dominique de Villepin was speaking in a debate on Europe, in the Senate on the 12th of November 2002.
The Self/Other binary is, therefore, constructed differently in each of the states. Britain and France still seek to identify and construct ‘Others’ to reinforce their own identities, but this also includes (in different ways) a European identity, although the states are still dominant. For the United States, the sovereign state, and its self-image as a people and country chosen by God, are unchallenged. The American binary discourse has clarity not so evident in the two European states. It is a straightforward neorealist construction of the ‘Self’ – the American state – and the ‘Other’, which is inferior and, being non-American, ‘evil’. The different defining narratives of the British and French ‘Selves’, combined with the regional layer of governance, and their individual interpretations of this, make binaries such as Good/Evil and Positive/Negative slightly less absolute and clear. The ‘Self’ is not necessarily singular and the ‘Other’ can also be constructed in a more complex way.

As noted above, American efforts to bring order to the outside and so reduce the Threat to the self have had somewhat mixed results. The evil ‘Other’ that is the terrorist was repeatedly established in the performance of speeches in the post-September 11th period as embodying entirely negative characteristics. This performative process brought together the imagined notion of an inferior evil ‘Other’, that was well rehearsed in American discourse, with the actual, events of September 11th. In addition, the WMD connection along with Iraq, an existing enemy of America, gave added menace to the ‘Other’ that was constituted through these performances. Only in performance could such a link be made, and America’s interventionist code then made a military response to the Threats ‘obvious’ and ‘natural’. While the practice of militarism reinforces this identity of the ‘Other’ and, through the binary discourse, the positive identity of the Exceptional ‘Self’, it has also undermined the geopolitical code by its failure to achieve all the objectives expected. There was a failure to find the Weapons of Mass Destruction that had been alleged to belong to Iraq and formed the central component of the discursive link between that state and al Qaeda. The idea of the Threat therefore has proven to be rather different from the reality. The geopolitical code for which this was a crucial element was consequently driving policies of military action that have been damaging to America’s interests and those of its government when in fact the Threat was not of the nature that was supposed.
In many ways the same could be said of Britain and its geopolitical codes, which also led it to participate in the invasion of Iraq alongside America. Weapons of Mass Destruction from sources such as Iraq were part of the wider Threat from the negative ‘Other’. However, in Britain the difference in the discourses, and lack of an Exceptionalist and religious basis for the ‘Self’, made the connection more difficult to enact and make acceptable in public understanding. Thus, it was also more quickly diminished by the failure to discover the Weapons that had been repeatedly spoken of in the build up to the conflict.

Most notably, this was cited in the ‘dossier’ produced by the British government in 2002 to support the argument for action against Iraq. Returning to the graph in Figure 7.10, 2002 was the year in which the WMD narrative appeared most often in British documents, and it continued to be so the following year when the war began and the assertion was still that the WMD would be found. To continue to maintain such a position obviously became increasingly difficult when no weapons were uncovered. The British government position was further damaged by the revelations that the ‘dossier’ may have been ‘sexed up’ and by the subsequent death of David Kelly in July 2003. To continue to maintain that Iraq had WMD in the light of all these events and revelations was extremely difficult, as the reality no longer supported the idea of the Threat that had previously been made real through discourse. In 2004 the occurrence of the WMD narrative was much reduced, the Hutton report into the events surrounding David Kelly’s death having been published in January, and the weapons themselves being as illusive as ever. These events, and the apparent efforts of the British government to manipulate the evidence to give greater justification for war, caused considerable damage to the government in general and the Prime Minister in particular, some may argue, hastening his eventual departure.

This provides a demonstration of the way in which performance can make manifest a dangerous ‘Other’ reinforcing particular geopolitical codes and forming the basis for policy responses; but when the results of these actions do not conform to the original interpretations the imagined strands of the performances, whether they are speeches or documents like the ‘dossier’, are exposed damaging the political elites. This failure of policy points to an inability of the British geopolitical code, on this occasion, to fulfil its ambitions of spreading liberal values and enhancing the security of
the ‘Self’ by reducing Threats. Arguably, in this case, the American Alliance did damage to these aspirations rather than assisting them, while relations with Europe were also strained as a result.

France was less affected by these issues, in as much as they did not adopt the policy of military invasion. However, as has been noted, they did represent Iraq as being a Threat in relation to WMD. For France, though, the ultimate discovery that this was not the case had little impact on the reputation of the government due to its clear opposition to the war. It may be said that this policy was itself damaging at the time, and in some ways contrary to its own geopolitical code, in that it contributed to the divisions in Europe and the world and diminished French influence with countries such as the United States, and yet in the longer term the failure of the policy for America and Britain was more likely to strengthen the position of France who had opposed it in the first place. Therefore, paradoxically, despite adopting a similar negative characterization of the ‘Other’, including WMD, France and French politicians did not suffer the same effects when the unfolding of events undermined this connection. It can be said, therefore, that the French geopolitical code promoting cooperation and less encouraging of militarism was ultimately relatively successful in advancing the status of France in respect of Iraq. Speeches were not matched by military responses in constituting the WMD armed ‘Other’.

Responding to Terrorism

By constructing a Threat from terrorism, and when understood through the combination of binary discourses, it becomes an ‘obvious’ or ‘common sense’ implication that there should be some sort of active response. This is true of all three states studied here as all of them have, as has been shown, represented the Threat in a similar way. However, it is the variations that become important when it comes to the detail of their responses. I have already outlined in previous chapters the ways in which each government developed a response commensurate with the historical context, and the narratives reproduced within the discursive structure, through which their geopolitical codes were made and interpreted. Hence, while each state has a narrative that underpins a challenge to the terrorists, and/or the reasons for terrorism, it is not identical, and contributes to the production of different policies.
In order to differentiate these narratives I have given each a different name: for the United States it is Crusade Against Terrorism, for Britain it is War Against Terrorism and for France Battle against Terrorism. These names relate loosely to the vision of the response that they are associated with, as outlined below. Figure 7.13 offers a comparison of the use of these narratives over the period of the study. The one feature that is common to all three is that the narrative is least frequent before September 11th, and suddenly increases afterwards. This is unsurprising as it is a narrative of response, and so the attacks prompt a much greater use when discussing real events rather than theoretical Threats. After this point, there is a clear distinction between the two European states and America. Whereas in the documents from the United States the Crusade narrative continues to become more frequent, in Britain and France the frequency declines, though not returning to its previous low levels. Again this can be connected to the way in which the narratives are constructed.

In the United States the Crusade narrative is underpinned by Exceptionalism, and the Manifest Destiny that is so central to the American self-image. If terrorism represents ‘evil’ and America ‘good’, then a Crusade is necessary, as it has been against other enemies in the past. This also leads to another closely related narrative – Inevitability of Victory. As God’s chosen people, it is ‘obvious’ that America will ultimately succeed in its Crusade, again as in previous conflicts. Although a Law narrative was an important part of the American response to Threats like terrorism
before September 11th, the representation of the attacks and those responsible not only led to a strong emphasis on the need to act, it also privileged the role of militarism and placed the ‘war on terror’ in the binary of America’s historic Crusade against ‘evil’. On the 16th of September 2001, at the White House, Bush drew on the Good/Evil discourse as he discusses the Crusade that he is planning:

This is a new kind of – a new kind of evil. And we understand. And the American people are beginning to understand. This crusade, this war on terrorism is going to take a while. (Bush, 2001c)

There is a considerable rhetorical character to statements such as this; Bush is directing his assertions to a domestic audience, which he is trying to convince with dramatic language and consequently gain support for his Crusade. American policy is framed through the clear binary of the ‘Self’ and the threatening ‘Other’. The Crusade that is promoted in response to this new ‘threat’ is one that makes ‘sense’ within the American construction of Threat. Burke (2005) says:

‘Real and imaginary threats coalesce, and their worlds are inevitably drawn more starkly distinguished and opposed, so that one may be crushed and the other be ever fearful of being crushed as it crushes. This is how the obvious threat of terrorist violence to Americans and Westerners posed by Al-Qaeda and its affiliates could be expanded into a threat to “civilization” and “freedom” itself, how anti-terrorist action could be expanded into a theoretically limitless “war on terror”…’ (p.328).

Through binary discourse, America can be considered to represent Freedom and all that is ‘good’, if America is threatened so are the virtues that it embodies. Thus, confronting terrorism can be made into a Crusade that increasingly becomes focused on bringing ‘Freedom’ to the world and can therefore be used to support policies of intervention in other states such as Iraq, as these are steadily bundled into the same homogeneous ‘evil’ Threat. Consequently, as the individuals involved propose this wider purpose, the Crusade narrative is drawn on more and more.

Britain does not have the Exceptionalism narrative and the self-image that this generates. However, it does have an imperial past in which militarism was one tool in its efforts to spread ‘liberal’ values around the world. Closeness to the United States, as
implied by the American Alliance narrative, gives the country an inclination to follow the American lead. In line with this, the British War on Terrorism narrative suggests the need for measures to eliminate terrorism, but also includes the need to spread values and bring ‘order’ to the ‘chaos’ of the ‘outside’. This comes through in this statement by Peter Hain:

The war against terrorism is unlike other wars, because we cannot wait until the war is over to win the peace. Winning the peace is part of winning the war. We must not only uproot and destroy the bin Laden network and its allies and analogues around the world. We must also remove the fertile soil of disaffection and distress in which the seeds of terror grow. (Hain, 2001b)

For British policy-makers it is important to bring ‘order’ to the ‘disordered’ parts of the world that they perceive to be the source of terrorism. The ambitions of Britain to be a Global Player, and to be close to the United States, support the development of policies that see the country working with the Americans. Promoting a War on Terrorism is therefore not only inspired by a belief that this is a necessity in confronting a terrorist Threat, but also as a means of attaining the policy objectives regarding the American Alliance. Simultaneously the cooperative element of British geopolitics, encapsulated in the Global Community narrative, leads representations, and therefore policies, away from the crusading unilateralism of America. The dilemma at the centre of British geopolitical codes is thus apparent again

For France, the divergence from America is even starker. Although the construction of the ‘Other’, and of the Threat, necessitates a response, French policy is often different from America, and indeed Britain. Winn (2003) comments that: ‘Europe will not, and cannot, always share a “common vision” with Washington.’ (p.48). This is only partially true for Britain but it is more noticeable for France. The French Battle Against Terrorism narrative does not exclude military action, but it focuses to a far greater extent on alternative measures. Prime minister Lionel Jospin depicts a vision of such a ‘Battle’ when addressing the Institute of Higher Defence Studies shortly after September 11th:

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12 This is part of a speech made at the Royal United Services Institute in London on the 30th of October 2001.
This battle must be waged collectively, systematically, and over the long term, with the utmost determination, but without seeing everything in black and white, and avoiding any amalgam. This is not a conflict between civilizations. We haven’t got to conduct a “crusade”. The battle we’re joining against fanaticism and terrorist violence is being waged in the name of respect for life, human rights and democratic values. To my mind, it should also include a huge international effort to promote peace, development and the fight against inequality, since conflicts, poverty and injustice are all conducive to the development of terrorism. (Jospin, 2001a)

He specifically dismisses the idea of a Crusade, which George Bush is arguing for, and instead focuses on what he believes to be the causes of terrorism. France has a history of defining a separate policy from America, and also puts a strong emphasis on French Republican values. Jospin’s statement suggests that France may again be trying to forge a separate approach lead by France as an alternative to the American hegemon, encapsulating a different way of tackling terrorism. While the French do not rule out military action, this is not the first option. France has interests and connections in the Middle East and North Africa that it wishes to maintain and thus avoids war in favour of social measures with the same objective of ordering the ‘disorder’ and so removing the ‘Threat’. As such, the Battle Against Terrorism is not a move away from neorealism, but an alternative means of practicing it.

Hence, France and Britain both show some tendency to seek non-military solutions where this aides their interests, and yet they still participated in the Afghanistan conflict, and the British government, notwithstanding internal differences, was an enthusiastic part of the Iraq War. So when Van der Wusten (2000) claims that: ‘Europe has become a good example of a security community, a set of states where the notion that military action is one of the possibilities to sort out difficulties has waned.’ (p.91), he is only partially correct. Certainly within the European Union itself there is no resort to war, but these two states still display varying propensities to follow a militarist path. Both look to project values into the ‘disordered’ spaces that they consider to exist outside Europe, but for France, collectivity has a greater priority as they seek an independent global role for the state and for Europe. British geopolitical codes are driven by the American Alliance, influencing policies that are often closer to the militarist and unilateralist American Crusade, while at the same time displaying elements of the social measures that are more dominant in France.
All of the states have, to an extent, found a gap existing between the vision of their response to terrorism in performance and the results of their actions when it comes to applying their policies in line with their individual geopolitical codes. It has already been shown how America’s self-image has been undermined when encountering the reality of circumstances in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Crusade launched by President Bush after September 11th was made manifest through performance in speech and in these military activities, the assumption being that, given America’s status, there was an Inevitability of Victory; in fact such victory has not come so easily, it has proven to be far from inevitable. Instead, a geopolitical code that drove Americans to intervene globally has in reality led the state into difficult conflicts with no clear end in sight and no obvious definition of what victory might actually mean. In addition, there is a possibility that this Crusade could have increased the Threat rather than diminishing it. The difference between the ideal (the virtuous nation with a manifest destiny to rescue the world) and the reality is therefore apparent in the enaction of America’s post-September 11th geopolitical code.

Similarly Britain has also had a less than successful experience in its ‘War on Terrorism’. Here, the contradictions within the code have played an important part in undermining the results of policy. Britain has been drawn into the same conflicts with the same problems as America. Although these have not been inspired by a divine self-image, the impact of the subsequent experience was significant for the government, and has also been damaging to British influence at the regional scale. British military interventions have seemingly generated more antagonism towards the country both externally and internally in the British Muslim population. This has led to greater risk of terrorist attacks as demonstrated, for example, by those in London in July 2005. Again the complex realities of terrorist networks have proven more difficult to counter than the more simplistic discursive practices played out by British political elites.

As has been discussed, France also saw a necessity to respond to a terrorist Threat, and did not dismiss the military option in doing so. In their performances French elites have, though, attempted to define a different vision of a solution to terrorism. This forms part of the performance that discursively draws the line between France (and Europe) on one side, and America on the other, as separate poles in a Multipolar system where cooperation is essential. Thus, France’s Battle Against
Terrorism, while no less focused on eliminating this supposedly threatening ‘Other’,
does not have the same Crusading character of the American equivalent, nor does it
need a close association with America. Nevertheless, it is still open to question whether
this has been any more successful in practice. As with the other two states, the response
has not removed the potential Threat from al Qaeda, although it might be said that by
opposing the war in Iraq it has become less of a focus for such a Threat than Britain and
America. Nonetheless, the ideal of a response, a Battle Against Terrorism, that would
successfully remove this Threat has not, so far, been matched by the reality of results,
when played out in performance in the supposedly disordered world.

The European Layer

A Common Foreign Policy?

Considering the possibility of common European geopolitical codes must
include the European scale, and in particular the European Union and its embryonic
foreign and defence policy structures, in addition to the analysis of the sample European
states. At the same time as the European communities were being formulated there was
also a move towards cooperation on defence and, by implication, foreign policy. The
European Defence Community (EDC) was proposed by the French government in 1950,
but was finally abandoned in 1954 when the French parliament rejected it (McCormick,
2005, p.210). Such features of integration conform to the underlying aims of European
integration in the early days. The restraining of Germany to stop it being able to
threaten further wars was a concern for France, hence its central role in integration. At
the same time this level of shared sovereignty is at odds with neorealist notions of the
primacy of the state, it has therefore been difficult to construct common policies in these
areas, but integration in economic and other policy matters has created a continued
pressure for cooperation on wider foreign policy.

An intergovernmental mechanism for foreign policy cooperation, European
Political Cooperation (EPC), was first adopted in 1970. This, though, operated
separately from the Commission through the Council of Ministers, taking decisions
unanimously (McCormick, 2005, p.210). Possibly the most significant development
occurred after the end of the Cold War as the ‘West’ became more divided in the
absence of the Soviet ‘Other’. The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 created the Common
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Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) replacing the EPC. This formed the second of three pillars of the new European Union (EU) and created a link for the first time with the Western European Union (WEU)\(^\text{13}\). The pillar system allowed decision making to remain separate from the Commission.

Smith (2003) draws out five objectives that she considers to underpin the EU’s foreign policy, these are:

1. The encouragement of regional cooperation and integration;
2. The promotion of human rights;
3. The promotion of democracy and good governance;
4. The prevention of violent conflicts;
5. The fight against international crime.

(p.2)

They are objectives that are compatible with the outlook of all states. Essentially, these principles reflect not only a shared vision of European integration, but also values that it can promote in the wider world. By doing so, the interests of the Union, and by extension the member states, can be advanced, while being general enough not to restrict the states themselves.

The CFSP was enhanced further in the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1999. These reforms tightened the link with the WEU as the ‘operational arm’, the Council could establish policy and members agreed to participate when necessary in military action (Van Oudenarem, 2005, p.304), this would allow them to fulfil the requirements of the Petersberg Tasks\(^\text{14}\). Additionally a new post of High Representative for the CFSP was created, although this individual still had to work alongside the foreign minister from the rotating presidency and the EU commissioner for external policy (Van Oudenarem, 2005, p.305). Again, while on one hand steps were being taken towards a more integrated Europe with a foreign policy and defence capability of its own, on the other

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\(^{13}\) The Western European Union is a defence association founded in 1948, but largely sidelined by developments in NATO (Van Oudenarem, 2005, p.296). It did not include all EU members (p.301), and still has only 10, with various other associates and observers.

\(^{14}\) The Petersberg Tasks are: ‘humanitarian, rescue, peacekeeping, and other crisis management jobs (including peacemaking).’ (McCormick, 2005, p.217).
this vision clashed with the neorealist view that these areas should be reserved for sovereign states.

It is arguably this conflict between the (neo)realist concept of the sovereign state and the transfer of powers from the state to the regional layer that has made the CFSP a more difficult and contested policy sphere/structure to create and put into practice than many of the other competencies adopted or encroached on by the European Union. As such: ‘The conclusion that the CFSP is a myth is consistent with realist assumptions.’ (Peterson and Sjursen, 1998, p.177).

Consequently, the early stages of the CFSP have been marked by limited success in achieving a common foreign policy, with security policy proving to be even more difficult to detach from the state. Burghardt (1997) reflects:

‘Although CFSP can build on the major achievements of the European communities’ external relations and those – admittedly less significant because largely declaratory – of EPC, foreign policy has not become more unified and security policy has not even entered its embryonic stage...’ (p.326).

It is, Burghardt argues, the bigger more powerful states in the Union that present the greatest obstacles to the CFSP: ‘The larger states are not prepared to trust the EU to represent and implement their foreign policies, hence they create ad hoc coalitions – which, in turn, makes it more difficult to achieve EU visibility, responsibility, and coherence.’ (p.326). It is these larger states that have the most to lose in terms of their power and influence, and their sovereignty when understood through neorealism. Their reluctance highlights the difficulties in bringing a collection of (neo)realist sovereign states together to cooperate in foreign and security policy. These policy domains are perceived by (neo)realists to represent the essence of state sovereignty and so integration is resisted more here than on any other matter.

However, the limited progress made so far, and the barriers posed by the sovereign state, do not necessarily mean that the CFSP is irrelevant or has been a complete failure. Peterson and Sjursen (1998) comment:
‘…the lack of a single, “common” EU foreign policy is hardly unexpected given the old dilemmas and the new challenges the Union and its member states face in a post-Cold War world. But the inadequacies of EU foreign policy coordination, and the limitations of traditional theories, do not render the CFSP a myth.’ (p.170).

Indeed, there is evidence that the CFSP has impacted on the process of foreign policy making in Europe. Smith (2004) says:

‘…a closer examination of both the treaty-based provisions of the CFSP and its early performance suggests that European foreign policy has in fact reached a new level of institutionalization. In particular, we can describe this evolution as moves toward a system of governance, broadly defined for the moment as the authority to make, implement, and enforce rules in a specified policy domain.’ (p.176).

Through the introduction of the institutions of foreign policy making, this ‘system of governance’ has come into existence.

It is, of course, not a European government controlling foreign policy, but governance in the sense that the regional layer and its structures have an input into foreign policy. In this regard, Peterson and Sjursen (1998) claim that: ‘The point is that the CFSP constitutes a pivotal dimension in all EU states’ foreign policies.’ (p.178). Thus, while a common foreign policy constructed and applied at the regional scale may not be a reality, the CFSP does play a role in how European states form their own individual foreign policies; there is a European dimension to their foreign policy-making. Nevertheless, the state remains the primary scale at which foreign and security policy is formulated in Europe.

**Constructing a ‘Threat’**

With foreign and defence policy still centred primarily on the state, the European Union, as an organisation distinct from the member states, cannot formulate policies and worldviews that are contradictory to, or incompatible with, those constructed by the governments of the member states. Furthermore, since each state has its own policies and geopolitical codes, the ability of the Union to define a set of policies, and perhaps geopolitical codes, that are acceptable to all is restricted.
Europe does not have the historical interests in the Middle East that the states have, and it does not have a military capacity separate from the states (particularly Britain and France). This has implications for the construction of responses to terrorism; the states were moulding their responses in relation to a bundled Threat involving terrorism, WMD, and perhaps Rogue States; for the EU the construction of Threat depended upon a compromise that would be acceptable to all member states. Therefore, the EU is not independent of state worldviews. Representations of the ‘Other’, the Threat this allegedly poses, and the response, are dependent on the positions taken by member states. It is these actors that retain the power in geopolitics, and that still have considerable control over the Union – it is not a completely independent regional actor.

Inevitably, therefore, the discourses that were apparent in the representations of the states are also used in the representations of the key figures in European Union foreign policy. Figure 7.14 presents the percentage of documents from the EU sample that each of the discourses appears in. It reveals that again Inside/Outside and Order/Disorder are both prominent discourses, and are found in more than a third of documents. Hence, the same spatialization of terrorism is repeated at the regional scale, with East/West also present, all be it at a lower level. Once again it is a collection of Threats that is assumed to come from the outside. For example Javier Solana, the High Representative for the CFSP, commented to the Danish Institute of International Affairs in May 2002:

The scourges of our age – terrorism, drug trafficking, the exploitation of women and children, environmental challenges, and the proliferation of weapons – show little respect for national frontiers. And can only be addressed through transnational, global efforts. (Solana, 2002a)

New Threats are characterized as having an ability to cross the state borders given the greater fluidity produced by the processes of globalization. This is not unique to the EU representations, but is perhaps a feature that attracts greater focus for actors at this scale, where they are not framing their discussions in a national context. At the same time, it is not alien to, nor undermining of, the representations of the member states.
As in the other three cases, Threat is one of the most frequently used discourses in the EU documents (*Figure 7.14*). It is reinforced by the binary discourses that characterize a dangerous ‘Other’ threatening the ‘Self’. Once more the Positive/Negative discourse features strongly, as shown in the graph. The representations of September 11th are, therefore, very similar to those of Britain, France, and even the United States. This commonality is demonstrated by the fact that all governments in the EU, and representatives of the EU’s institutions, could agree a shared statement three days after September 11th. They said:

This assault on humanity struck at the heart of a close friend, a country with which the European Union is striving to build a better world. But these terrible terrorist attacks were also directed against us all, against open, democratic, multicultural and tolerant societies. We call on all countries that share these universal ideals and values to join together in the battle against terrorist acts perpetrated by faceless killers who claim the lives of innocent victims. Nothing can justify the utter disregard for ethical values and human rights. Global solidarity is at stake. Together, irrespective of our origins, race or religion, we must work tirelessly to find solutions to the conflicts that all too often serve as a pretext for savagery. (Heads of State and Government of the EU et al, 2001)
On the surface this is a repetition of the sort of language used in the United States itself, but the notable difference here is that positive values of the ‘Self’ are emphasised as universal and that solidarity is needed in response to the Threat. The Good/Evil discourse is used to support the Positive/Negative binary. However, while Positive/Negative is the most frequent discourse, appearing in over 45% of documents, Good/Evil only occurs in just over 10%. As in Britain and France, for European policymakers, dangerous terrorists present a practical problem; there is no Crusade on behalf of God. This derives from the requirement to balance the needs of all member states; a representation at regional level that was at odds with those of a state would be unsustainable.

One crucial difference between European Union constructions of the Threat and those of Britain and France is the limited use of the Weapons of Mass Destruction narrative (*Figure 7.15* shows that it appears in around 15% of documents). Where WMD does appear it is in terms of the selection of Threats rather than, for example, Iraq. In addition, there is no Rogue State narrative. This was also absent from French representations, and so could not be used regionally. For Europe as a whole, it was not possible to take a position on Iraq given the deep divisions on this matter. This is a likely reason for Iraq itself being barely mentioned in the EU documents.

*Figure 7.15*
Responding to the ‘Threat’

The European response narrative is one that privileges the non-military aspects identified in the British and French narratives. As before, I have given it a different name – Fight Against Terrorism – to emphasise the variation in its construction. The narrative is the second most commonly occurring (Figure 7.14). Due to the construction of Threat, it can make ‘sense’, as it does from the perspective of the state actors. There is a concentration on ‘political’, ‘diplomatic’ and ‘social’ measures. This is a central part of the Union’s response; a conviction that terrorism can be best tackled by working together, particularly in these non-military areas. The then Commissioner for External Relations, Chris Patten expands on this when speaking to the European Parliament in October 2002:

To prosecute the campaign against terrorism will require international cooperation of unprecedented breadth and depth: political cooperation, economic cooperation and security cooperation. The European Union must play its part in those efforts – vigorously, generously and creatively – a key partner, I hope, in a well-planned and resolutely pursued campaign of multilateral engagement. (Patten, 2002)

This ‘multilateral’ campaign is one that uses cooperation at the global scale in the political and economic spheres, as well as in security, but this is not necessarily manifested in military action. The primarily non-military responses underpinned by Fight Against Terrorism is perhaps inevitable given the continued lack of a concrete European defence capability, this being controlled largely by the states. The cooperative element is of course a familiar part of the European Union and it is now being applied globally with the EU as a single actor within that, according to Patten. Representatives of the EU bureaucracy are also liable to focus on solutions that they can have some influence on, and therefore attempt to promote the status of the organisation to which they belong.

A narrative of European values dominates representations. A parallel can be drawn between this and the French narrative of Humanist Values, although they are not identical. Freedom on the other hand is a narrative that is used in British constructions of the ‘Self’. In European representations Values are necessarily universal in nature, corresponding with the regionalized character of the Union. The narrative is
constructed through reference to allegedly shared historical experiences. For example Romano Prodi reflects:

In the age of enlightenment European philosophers battled in their own countries against the actions of absolute monarchs, and against atrocities which were committed in God’s name. They took great risks to argue for tolerance, in the face of the dominant thinking of the day.

At the same time, the United States was proclaiming its independence in terms which were just as universal: “all men are created equal...with certain inalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”

I would call on everyone, believers and atheists alike, to spread tolerance and moderation in their cultural and religious lives. (Prodi, 2001) (Italics original)

By drawing on the history of the Enlightenment, policy-makers in the European layer can use something that all have in common, and that provides a set of Values they can all agree with. They are comfortably acceptable to all member states without contradicting the narratives of Britain and France, for example. According to Prodi, the Values that are deployed in the reproduction of a single European ‘Self’ are not only common to the states of Europe; they are also familiar in the United States. The idea that Europe and America should be held together by these shared Values resonates to an extent with the argument of Huntington (1996). Fundamentally, the importance of these Values is their ability to be adopted in the construction of a regional ‘Self’ as a basis for regional unity, a quality of interest to powerful regional figures like Prodi.

Actors at the regional scale emphasize cooperative responses to terrorism. As such, three narratives are important here: Coalition, Collectivity and European Unity. The graph in Figure 7.15 shows that Coalition is one of the least frequent narratives, but Collectivity is found in more than a third of documents. It is therefore the latter that seems to have more importance in the representations. The European Unity narrative is easily reproduced given its association with the very existence of regional cooperation. It is the most frequently occurring narrative, the only one present in more than half of the documents (Figure 7.15). None of these narratives are at odds with the

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15 Romano Prodi was speaking to the European Trade Union Confederation in Brussels on the 11th of October 2001.
representations made by states, as membership of the Union requires a degree of acceptance of cooperation and regional unity, as demonstrated in the British and French examples.

Through European integration and Collectivity, the Values that are supposedly shared by all member states can be reinforced and promoted. The political figures speaking on behalf of the EU use these narratives to underpin their arguments for similar cooperative approaches at the global scale. In an, October 2002, presentation organized by NATO at the Transatlantic Center of the German Marshall Fund of the United States (in Brussels), Javier Solana discussed a European role in a transatlantic security partnership:

But it is true that for us Europeans multilateralism is our life. We are not multilaterally (sic) because we are naïve, we are multilaterally (sic) because we had to choose between multilateralism or war. Europe in the last century was at war, and when the war was over, the Second World War, we decided to do multilateralism with the umbrella of the United States, and it worked very well, and today it is impossible to imagine that France and Germany are going to fight, and we are going to have good relations with Russia because we have the European Union which is a fantastic example of a multilateral effort. (Solana, 2002b)

What is presented in this passage is that Collectivity is appropriate to wider global relationships given its success at the regional scale. The establishment of a regional layer of governance, with the narratives attached to this, has encouraged ambitions among some for a global role for the Union. This is reflected in the gradual creation of a foreign and defence policy. Hence, a narrative of Global Player is evident at the regional scale. This can be found in almost 30% of documents (Figure 7.15). It was of course also part of the British and French discursive structures, with varying emphasis on the state and region; in regional documents it refers only to Europe as a whole. By drawing on this narrative, policy-makers in the European Union are perhaps following an agenda to gain a more powerful position for their organisation.

A global cooperative system is represented through the Global Community narrative. This appears to be a fairly important narrative, occurring in about a third of the documents (Figure 7.15). In addition, an American Alliance is a component of European visions. Again, it is a narrative that appeared in nearly a third of the
documents analysed (Figure 7.15). The relationship envisaged is region-to-state rather than state-to-state, resulting in repeated emphasis on the need to work with the United States. This vision seeks to lock states, such as the U.S. into a rule based system in which unilateralism becomes impossible. In November 2003 Javier Solana, speaking in Berlin, set out a strategy for EU security and the Union’s role in the world. He said:

…we must help create a world both fairer and more secure. To do so, we require an effective multilateral approach to international order with well-functioning international institutions and rules that are enforced. That means that the international order is based on agreed rules, and that we are prepared to ensure the respect of these rules when they are broken. As a Union based on the rule of law we carry a particular responsibility to ensure a rule-based international order, the cornerstone of which is the United Nations Charter.

He adds to this:

Threats are never more dangerous than when the international community is divided. For this reason in particular, the transatlantic link is irreplaceable. Our security and the effectiveness of the common fight against threats depend on the strength and balance of that relationship. (Solana, 2003)

A Global Community, for Europe, is therefore very similar to the visions of Britain and France; it is a rule-based order where multilateralism dominates over unilateralism. Solana makes the link with the European experience, where a Union has been constructed through the application of rules. This is what European policy-makers want to bring to the global scale. In the second passage he warns against a divided international community and emphasizes the importance of the ‘transatlantic link’. This reflects the disagreements over the Iraq war, and attempts to bind the United States into a Global Community, (re)constructing an alliance with America. As such, it is not contrary to French representations where there is no American Alliance narrative.

Placing these European representations in the context of Smith’s five principles of European foreign policy, it becomes clear how they relate to each other. The first principle, encouraging regional cooperation, echoes the emphasis on cooperative approaches to tackle terrorism, and the second on human rights has some parallels with the non-military Value based measures of the EU’s Fight Against Terrorism. Promoting
democracy is aligned with the political and diplomatic solutions proposed as an alternative to violent conflict that the fourth principle opposes. Finally, the fight against international crime can be closely associated with the Fight Against Terrorism as another non-state actor.

Just as the principles themselves are general enough to be acceptable as a compromise between all member states, so too are the discourses and narratives that are used in European Union representations. As the individuals that define Europe’s limited foreign policy are speaking on behalf of all the members of the Union, they cannot make policies and construct worldviews that are controversial and in opposition to those of any member states. Consequently, all the discourses and narratives, and the representations that they underpin, are acceptable to any sovereign state. They include the binaries and Threat that are ‘obvious’ for any state when discussing terrorism, and use collective and value based narratives that are likely to be compatible with those of any state that is part of a regional body like the EU.

Conclusions

This chapter has compared the construction of the geopolitical codes of the United States, Britain and France, and analysed the differences and similarities that have emerged. The main conclusion that might be drawn from all these combinations of narratives and discourses is that each state is different and this explains their different geopolitical codes. From a critical realist perspective this is not surprising, each state has its own history, and its own political imperatives, so inevitably, although as Western states they will share the basic discourses that define the sovereign state, they must also produce their own spatially rooted discourses and narratives upon which geopolitical codes are built. Furthermore, each has its own strategic concerns that underlie their policy decisions and relate to the geopolitical codes that are produced.

The narratives that help to define the ‘Self’ are especially important in differentiating each of the states, and ultimately their geopolitical codes. American representations reproduce the Exceptionalism narrative, which is crucial to their codes. This narrative, perhaps more than any other, sets the United States apart from Britain and France. Freedom on the other hand, is shared with Britain, but while it is closely
connected to Exceptionalism for Americans, the British version relates to the liberalism that is supposedly part of British history. Indeed a History narrative also helps to define the British ‘Self’, drawing on images of past ‘greatness’ as a global power. As such Britain shares another narrative with France – Global Player. The difference here is that while British policy-makers apply the narrative primarily to their own state, their French counterparts do so more in relation to Europe. This is the structure through which they believe they can gain influence in the world and project their Humanist Values regionally and globally. Humanist Values is a vital narrative in the construction of the French ‘Self’.

The main narrative at the regional scale, for both Britain and France, is European Unity. French representations are supported by the Collective Responsibility narrative that, when combined with France’s historically more positive approach to integration, produces images of a deeper Europe operating as a distinct actor in the world, enhancing rather than diminishing the status of France. British representations are influenced by the more detached approach that has generally been adopted, and see it more as a cooperative organization.

Finally, at the global scale, the Coalition narrative appears in the discursive structures of America and Britain, but is more important in the United States where it is the sole narrative referring to relations with other states. In Britain this narrative is compatible with that of American Alliance and the image of the country as an independent global operator. At the same time the Global Community narrative, that is also reproduced by French actors, is far more frequent and important to geopolitical codes. This projects the structured cooperation familiar in Europe on to a global scale as a means for bringing order to the world. French geopolitical codes are even more committed to this vision, given their focus on Collective Responsibility. They use the narratives of Multipolarity and World Democracy to underpin this collective worldview.

All three states seek to interpret the world through the basic binary discourse of Identity/Difference. From this, a positive ‘Self’ is contrasted and reinforced by comparison with a negative ‘Other’. They share the binary discourses that spatialize the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’. Inside/Outside and Order/Disorder conform to long-term (neo)realist constructions of the State, and East/West is familiar from colonialism,
through the Cold War, to the present day. Nevertheless, although on the surface they are the same, there are nuances in their use. A European ‘inside’ is also present in representations by British and French policy-makers, though again this is more a feature of French discussions. The simple binary distinction is therefore complicated somewhat, even if the emphasis remains primarily on the state.

The same Self/Other, Positive/Negative and Good/Evil discourses are reproduced, and the negativity of the ‘Other’, in this case the terrorist, supports a discourse of Threat. The Good/Evil discourse is notable for its deeper more religious construction in the United States than for the two European countries. Furthermore, it has emerged that in France, and to a lesser extent Britain, a European ‘Self’ is defined alongside the state ‘Self’. This is a complexity that does not exist in the United States. In addition, while French geopoliticians bundle Threats as their American and British counterparts do, the emphasis on Rogue States and the pressure for military action in Iraq is not the same.

The way in which the three states have responded to terrorism gives an important insight into how the construction of their codes differs. In each case it has been shown that a narrative of active response exists within the discursive structures, but subtle differences can be identified between them. American policy-makers envision a divinely inspired Crusade that promotes militarism as the principal means of accomplishing the aims. In Britain, this is only one way of achieving success, with some acknowledgement that more social solutions are necessary. For France these are even more prominent in representations, without dismissing military action completely. However, the solutions promoted in representations by each state are in fact a function of variations that run through all the discourses and narratives that underpin these.

It has been shown here that the discourses and narratives at the regional level do not present a particularly distinct position from any of the states. Haseler (2004) argues that a superstate is developing in Europe, and therefore: ‘In the long run, though, a European superpower, in order to act in the world, needs more than just cooperation from its component nationalities. It needs, no matter how weakly held, a common, integrated identity, that “sixth sense” of being European, and of belonging.’ (p.118). Although there is evidence that a European ‘Self’ is constructed alongside or as part of
the national ‘Selves’ in Britain and France, it is the nation-states that continue to dominate in this regard. Furthermore, it is these state’s founding mythologies and historical contexts that dominate in the reproduction of narratives and the determination of policies. Indeed, the fact that foreign policy continues to be dominated by state governments gives little flexibility and freedom for the actors at Union level. Allen (2002) reflects that: ‘No leadership, individual or collective, has yet emerged which can lay credible claim to be the spokesperson of Europe.’ (p.38). The representations, and the policies adopted by EU officials, cannot conflict with those of any member states, and therefore tend to be limited to constructions that are acceptable to all. Although they may attempt to privilege the role of the Union in these representations, this is still restricted by the extent to which the state governments allow them to act as a separate entity. The result is that the Union can speak and act only where all member states agree, and cannot define clear geopolitical codes of its own. Hence, it can be concluded that there is not (at the moment at least) a separate European layer of governance developed enough to produce recognizably distinct geopolitical codes.

Nevertheless, for neorealists like Kagan (2003) there is a divergence between Europe and America that is centred on relative power, and results in alternative strategies for coping with threats. He says: ‘One of the things that most clearly divides Europeans and Americans today is a philosophical, even metaphysical disagreement over where exactly mankind stands on the continuum between the laws of the jungle and the laws of reason.’ (p.91), and he claims that: ‘Europeans have stepped out of the Hobbesian world of anarchy into the Kantian world of perpetual peace.’ (p.57). However, this over simplifies the differences between Europe and America, and indeed suggests that a single European approach exists. To group European states together as a single entity comparable to the United States ignores the distinctiveness of each state’s geopolitical codes that derives from the contexts in which they are constructed. Elazar (2001) explains that: ‘The difference between partnership American – style and EU community is that the former is based upon a common sense of single nationhood, while the latter is based on the idea that separate countries have many elements in common.’ (p.39). When comparing the states it is clear that Britain and France do not take an identical approach and the search for power and influence is still a vital part of their geopolitical codes.
Regionalization has an impact on the fundamentals of the sovereign state. The pooling of sovereignty and the construction of a new layer of governance above the state leads to more complex borders and territoriality. As Ruggie (1998) pointed out, changes in the domains of social life can produce changes in territoriality. Particularly relevant here are what he terms ‘social epistemes’ which includes spatial constructs (p.193). He contends that territoriality is being ‘unbundled’ by global change, and that overlapping territorialities are replacing the single territoriality of the realist state system. Consequently, he considers that: ‘…the EU may constitute the first “multiperspectival polity” to emerge since the advent of the modern era.’ (p.195). Thus, the construction of Europe, both in real terms through institutions, and in discursive terms at state and regional scales, leads to a transformation in territoriality.

Regionalization, and for that matter globalization, do lead to changes in outlook for the European states studied here. These changes do not amount to a fundamental shift away from the sovereign state as the most important unit of global politics, rather the Global Community narrative of Britain and France is in line with ‘global reform’, in that it seeks to use existing institutions to gain greater influence for non-hegemonic states at the global scale. Hence, this conforms to transformationalism, and the layered governance that it involves. The European states are more accepting of such governance in their worldviews, as they are part of a regional layer and envision some degree of global cooperation in a way that the United States does not.

Thus, the regional context alters the way in which these states operate in global politics. Experience of regionalization, and the effect this has on discourse, underpins policies that see close, structured cooperation as facilitating not only better solutions, but also acting as a vehicle for power and influence, attributes that in their own ways, Britain and France have both long sought. As has been shown, in contrast to the United States, they tend towards social solutions to terrorism: ‘Where actual violent terrorist threats could clearly be identified, Europeans tended to rely on economic social and diplomatic solutions as well as military ones.’ (Haseler, 2004, p.147). Again, France is more inclined to this approach. Nevertheless, militarism is far from alien to Europeans, where policy-makers deem this to be in their interests, both as a tool for security and, arguably, in their pursuit of power.
It can, therefore, be concluded that while Europe as a whole may not have common geopolitical codes, and European states have not abandoned neorealism and militarism, the existence of layered governance in Europe, or the experience of cooperation and interaction as far as it has gone, has had an impact on the construction of geopolitical codes in the member states. This is part of the context for those states, and is therefore an experience that is shared by Britain and France. The way in which this acts on the discursive structures, and then the geopolitical codes, is a product of the interaction with the other contextual factors, and of course the agency of the geopoliticians who are constructing the representations and making policy. Britain and France are thus set apart from the United States by the European/regional strand in their geopolitical codes, while retaining their own individual codes as sovereign states.

At the same time, there is a distinctiveness in the codes of each of the three states, a difference that highlights the continuing relevance of neorealism and state sovereignty in the construction of representations, and of geopolitical codes, even for Britain and France where a European dimension has a far greater importance than for the United States. Therefore, the strategic concerns of each of these sovereign states also plays a role, interpreted through discourse, in the formulation of policy and the construction of their geopolitical codes. Equally, within each state the individuals who influence policy have agency, and use rhetoric that they hope will appeal to a particular audience or audiences, whether inside the state or beyond. These individuals and the strategies that they pursue on behalf of their states are consequently as relevant to the differentiation of states from each other as the discursive structures through which they interpret the reality of the world.

Hence, this interaction of discourse, agency and strategy defines an American hegemon that acts unilaterally, with militarism the main form of response to perceived Threats. The British state attempts to make use of alliances and organizations like the EU to further its interests but is inclined to follow the lead of the United States in the hope of retaining influence with the hegemon ahead of any other states. For Britain, the EU is a mechanism for influence as part of a larger organization, but must not threaten British independence or its relationship with America. France is arguably more distinct. French strategy is focused on the necessity to be independent from America and the need to protect French interests abroad and cohesion at home. Thus, European
integration and greater structures and rules at the global scale are promoted, and an alternative vision of the world in contrast to American hegemonic dominance is portrayed.

The success of the American, British and French geopolitical codes has been mixed in the years following September 11th. This points to the gap that exists between the ideals of performance where the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’ are defined, and the material complexities that belie these simplistic binaries. America’s code, implying a need to intervene in foreign disordered spaces, if Freedom and Order are to be delivered and manifest destiny fulfilled, depends upon the self-image of Exceptionalism. Responding to a terrorist ‘Other’ provokes a code familiar from the Cold War and earlier, America must fight and destroy ‘evil’. This is based upon an ideal view of America; an imagined geography of the ‘ordered’ and ‘free’ ‘inside’, and the ‘disordered’ ‘ungodly’ ‘outside’ where Freedom is absent, ignores the complexities of the world in which America intervenes, and the terrorist networks (non-state actors) which they attempt to destroy; hence the unexpected difficulties in applying these policies. Although there may have been some military successes in the ‘war on terror’, the subsequent circumstances in Afghanistan and Iraq have not been favourable towards America and damage has been done to the reputation of the state and its government. In this respect the geopolitical code has not been successful so far.

Likewise, British efforts to fight terrorism have met the problem of reality contrasting with idealism. In addition, Britain’s contradictory codes have proven to be impossible to reconcile when attempting to be a European operator and simultaneously sustain a close alliance with a crusading America. By trying to keep multiple relationships going at once, both in a structured post-realist way and in a traditional realist Coalition, relations with Europe have ended up damaged. Like America, Britain has tried to deliver order and reduce the Threat of terrorism by military intervention, and encountered the same difficulties and antagonisms as a result of this simplistic policy. The idea of Britain as a Global Player, with good relations around the world and at different scales, has not been a plausible one when met by events; the ability to be a bridge between Europe and America is impossible when the gap becomes too wide and when British policy moves too close to one side. Essentially, the performances in speeches and in political practice that constitute this unique role for Britain rely on
idealistic visions of the country and real relationships forged in different ways over
time, but when a controversial issue is at stake such a role is revealed as the product of
performance, the repetition of which has damaged Britain’s reputation, influence, and
these very prized relationships. The result is a geopolitical code that has not yet
achieved a significant reduction in terrorism, and possibly put the country more at risk
from this.

France too has a geopolitical code that was based upon binary representations of
the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’, and as such required the confronting of terrorism and
ordering of the world through the spread of Humanist Values. However, the French
vision of a Europe and a world built upon Collective Responsibility, Multipolar in
character and structured so as to establish and reinforce the status and influence of
France, regionally and globally, has been somewhat exposed as little more than an ideal
in the post-September 11th context. Again, through a process of peformativity, this idea
of France as a vital and influential component in European and global affairs can be
made real, and a geopolitical code aimed at the furtherance of such a situation as a
means for tackling the Threat of terrorism could be forged. In reality, the world has
proven to be more uni-polar than Multipolar with America adopting the policies it
chooses, irrespective of the views of France or any other state. This has left the French
ideal looking far more difficult to achieve, and the state less influential than its self-
image might imply. The geopolitical code, in this respect, appears to have been less
successful than might have been imagined when understood through French discourse
as performed by the country’s political elites.

The three states have therefore all encountered a gap between the expectations of
their geopolitical codes and the reality when policies are enacted. They display
considerable differences in strategy and policy, as they do in their construction of
discourses and narratives, and yet each suffers the same consequences of simplistic
idealistic interpretations/assumptions. All, are however, Western sovereign states, and
share many features that contribute to their geopolitical codes, not least the experience
of international terrorism as a global actor and, for Britain and France, the layer of
regional governance that provides a more complex contextual factor influencing, if not
driving, the construction of their codes.
Chapter 8

Reinventing Geopolitical Codes: The Changing Nature of the Westphalian State

Introduction

When the Westphalian Treaty was signed in 1648 it began, or perhaps reflected, a transition, driven by modernist Enlightenment thought, to a geopolitics dominated by the sovereign state. Elazar (2001) explains how: ‘Statism became the accepted world standard for political organization – that is, the standard in Western Europe – through the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, as part of the arrangement that ended the Thirty Years’ War.’ (p.33). State sovereignty as initially enshrined in the Westphalian treaty implied, in theory at least, an exclusive state authority over a given territory defined by clear borders.

‘It was exclusive in so far as no ruler had the right to intervene in the sovereign affairs of other nations; unqualified in that within their territories rulers had complete authority over their subjects; and supreme in that there was no legal or political authority beyond the state.’ (McGrew, 2005, p.30).

This territorial resolution has therefore been crucial to the state system, and as a result the (neo)realist geopolitics that has accompanied it. ‘This Westphalian world was juridically structured through the agency of such foundational norms of international law as the equality of states, sovereign immunity, and the doctrine of non-intervention.’ (Falk, 2004, p.5). Non-state actors offer a potential challenge to the hegemony of the state, or even the very existence of the state. In this respect the international terrorist is a notable example of an actor that displays an alternative territoriality, crossing state
borders and yet not always entirely removed from states. Existing as a function of
globalizing forces, it challenges the fundamental norms of the Westphalian world.
Similarly, regionalizing forces have also brought into question state territoriality,
particularly in Europe. Through the introduction of possible layered governance the
singular nature of the territoriality as described in the Westphalian Treaty may be given
added complexity.

The Westphalian Treaty, though, did not create the modern state overnight. It
was not intended as a definition of the sovereign state; rather it was an important
moment in the development of the state as a product of modernist thought.

‘The state, in its contemporary realization, is understood as a territorial
entity, even though it has a history of emergence, having gradually or
rapidly, as the case may be, expanded its political, legal, and
administrative control by monopolizing violence and incorporating – by
statute, by force, and/or by other means – various subunits into a legal
and administrative entity with definitive boundaries.’ (Shapiro, 2003,
p.278).

Likewise September 11th, nor even the end of the Cold War itself, should necessarily be
thought of as a defining moment that brings to an end the sovereign state. The post-
Cold War period, and more specifically the post-September 11th period, do nonetheless
present an opportunity to consider whether there is once again a process of change
acting upon the sovereign state, one that might significantly alter the spatial resolution
through which geopolitics is practiced. In this regard, this chapter aims to examine
whether new structures are superseding the state and/or if there is a process of reform of
the state. The possible emergence of ‘postmodern’ states in response to the processes
acting upon them is one way in which such reform might be conceptualized.

As such, the chapter returns to the literature, re-evaluating the issues raised in
chapter two in the light of the analysis of the empirical material. First of all, the
reproduction of the state in the representations discussed in this thesis will be placed in
the long-term context of evolving neorealist discourse. Proceeding from here, the
characterization of post-Cold War and post-September 11th geopolitics is discussed
again, focusing on the construction of the terrorist ‘Other’ and how this exists within
neorealist discourse. The next section examines global and regional processes and
actors and the implications these, and the processes underpinning them, have for states and their geopolitical codes. Finally, the critical geopolitics perspective that the thesis has offered to the study of post-Cold War and post-September 11th geopolitics is discussed. Geopolitical codes are problematized, and the sovereign Westphalian state is re-assessed in the context of new actors, and the globalizing and regionalizing forces driving them.

Reproduction of the State

When discourse is understood as the textual context through which reality is engaged while simultaneously being responsive to that reality, it suggests that discourses can undergo change through evolution rather than abrupt metamorphosis. September 11th, like all real events, could only be understood through discourse, and the existing discursive structure was deployed in the interpretation of a very different reality. Fortin (1989) says:

‘The text silences in one stroke not only any possible alternative approaches to understanding politics, but also any awareness that the nature of politics is in the nature of the qualities and understandings, culturally and historically situated as they always are, that participants bring to it.’ (p.193).

Interpretations of September 11th were therefore restricted and guided by the discursive structures through which they were read in each state. However, the reality of the events necessarily produces an evolution of discourse given the incompatibility of neorealist state-centric interpretation for non-state terrorist actors. This period of evolution therefore constitutes a time lag following the real event to which discourse is forced to respond. The examples in this thesis offer a demonstration of the way in which discourse and discursive structures cannot be removed from the long term context in which they have developed; they go through a temporal transition moulded by events and by the agency of the individuals who continually (re)produce them. Hence, post-September 11th discourses and narratives draw on their earlier incarnations, and on past events, when representations are made regarding international terrorism.

Invoking past experiences, and in particular past enemies, is a notable feature in the process of drawing a new ‘Threat’ into the discursive structure and, in so doing,
reconciling this existing structure with a new ‘Other’. This was evident, for example, in France where terrorists were compared to Hitler, a figure that has come to represent the very opposite of what the ‘Self’ supposedly stands for. Discourses through which terrorism was represented following September 11th had already been established, most recently in relation to the Cold War, but also over a far longer period. These are generally binaries, and as such construct the identity of the ‘Self’ as the corollary of the negative ‘Other’. As Ashley (1989) explains:

‘Given an undecidable diversity of contesting interpretive possibilities, a logocentric discourse is inclined to impose closure by resorting to one or another fixed standard of interpretation that is itself accorded the status of a pure and identical presence – a standpoint and standard supposedly occupying a place outside of history and beyond politics from which it is possible to give voice to a singular interpretation of the historical and political differences perceived.’ (p.262).

The logocentric discourses, and the narratives deployed in constructing the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’, make intertextual links to the past and continue the reproduction of these discourses and narratives in the new context. Reproducing such discourse assumes an unchanging, ever-present, ‘inferior’, threatening ‘Other’ and a contrasting ‘virtuous’ ‘Self’.

Thus, the terrorists can be constructed in an Orientalist fashion – a Threat emanating from the ‘inferior’ East. This correlates with colonial constructions in Britain and France, as well as those of the Cold War where the Soviet Union was represented as a negative and inferior Eastern ‘Other’ posing a Threat to the West, this binary being most stark for the United States. When discussing Orientalism, Said (1978) says:

‘Objective structure (designation of Orient) and subjective restructure (representation of Orient by Orientalist) become interchangeable. The Orient is overlaid with the Orientalist’s rationality; its principles become his. From being distant, it becomes available; from being unsustainable on its own, it becomes pedagogically useful; from being lost, it is found, even if its missing parts have been made to drop away from it in the process.’ (p.129).
The construction of the terrorist draws on such representations and simplifications of the Orient. Where previously the ‘Other’ may have been Native Americans or less enlightened Europeans, colonized Eastern peoples, Germany or the Soviet Union, depending which state the representations are made in, it is now international, and most significantly Islamic, terrorists. The fact that they are identified as ‘Islamic’ is crucial in locking them more easily into the discourses, as this allows them to be portrayed as Eastern. Just as in Cold War discourse, the ‘easterliness’ of the terrorists makes them ‘irrational’ and ‘unpredictable’ enhancing the Threat. Consequently, when the new terrorist enemy is represented through the existing discursive structure it is wrapped into these wider understandings of the state, the ‘Self’ and the ‘obvious’ Threat posed by the ‘Other’. Thus, despite the fact that, unlike the Soviet Union, international terrorism is not another state, it can be brought into this discursive structure on the negative side as an ‘Other’.

Post-September 11th Geopolitics

The post-September 11th period has therefore been characterized by the (re)construction of terrorism and the terrorist as the principal ‘Other’ in the discursive structures of the states that have been examined here. It has become the focus of geopolitics, the ‘war on terrorism’ being used to justify various actions, most notably wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, although each state maintains its own position on any individual engagement.

However, as far as causing terror is concerned, this emotion could be provoked by the actions of any person or organization, including states. It is worth repeating the definition of Ettlinger and Bosco (2004) for whom terrorism is: ‘…violence to invoke fear that can be performed by networks such as Al-Qaeda as much as by urban gangs, and by nation states such as Iraq as much as by the United States.’ (p.252). Thinking of terrorism in this way is very different from how it is generally represented by states, questioning the concept of a homogenous terrorist body or character that can be clearly differentiated and ‘othered’ from the state. In addition, according to Booth and Dunne (2002): ‘Terrorism is an act not an ideology.’ (p.8). If terrorism is an activity that any person or group can participate in, and if it is recognized as an action more than the
definition of a group or type of person, then the clear binary constructed in state discourses is disrupted and the assumptions made through this are undermined.

The process of becoming the ‘Other’ is dependent on the construction of the terrorist as ‘other’ than or to the state. It has become assumed to be the opposite of what the state represents. ‘It is important for the state to insist that no question of justification can be raised: terrorist acts, though politically motivated are to be regarded as never politically justified because they are merely criminal.’ (Gilbert, 1994, p.49). As such, the state appears to be justified in what actions it takes, whereas the actions of the terrorist are wrong.

Groups or networks such as al-Qaeda are described as terrorists not only because they create terror, as this could be said of most or even all states at some time, they are ascribed this status because they are not states, they do not fit into the discourse of the state and conform to the state system, their structures and practices are alien to those of the Westphalian state with its singular bounded territoriality. Giddens (1985) notes ‘the legitimate monopoly of control of the means of violence’ (p.18) as an attribute of the state. This principle is undermined by the ‘terrorist’. Such a fundamental contradiction makes them more threatening to a state than a state enemy, but equally that very incomprehensible character, through state discourse, makes such groups effective ‘Others’, slotting into the established binary discourse and reinforcing the state by the Threat to its principles of operation, and therefore to its very existence, that they are said to constitute. Its more amorphous nature, as a practice rather than a identifiable organization, makes it more threatening and also more malleable as the basis for responses.

In the American representations this is most starkly defined through the Good/Evil discourse and its religious overtones rooted in the founding mythology of the state. Gregory (2004) notes: ‘Faced with the sudden irruption of jihad in the heart of America – “the homeland” – America declared its own holy war. This is no exaggeration. The sanctuary, even the sanctity of the Republic had been breached by the terrorist attacks.’ (p.47). Interpreting and constructing terrorism through such discourse can derive ‘common sense’ responses such as a Crusade Against Terrorism and the militarism that follows from this.
Perhaps not surprisingly, each of the states in this study has constructed the ‘terrorist’ in a very similar way, as has already been discussed. Despite the fact that all three states are as capable of causing terror as any other, terrorism becomes the exclusive practice of the ‘terrorist’. In so doing the ‘terrorist’ is created as a non-state actor not simply because of the actions that they take, which may well be wrong, but because those actions are not sanctioned by any state, or at least not directly.

Although France, and to a lesser extent Britain, have shown a greater, if limited, tendency to look for alternative solutions to the terrorist problem, these are still based upon the assumption that there is a binary division between the state and the terrorist. Political actors in these states seek positions that will enhance their influence and status in the world, and sustain the unity and fabric of their states. Notwithstanding the regional dimension, and the limited common policies that may be adopted here, solutions that the states advocate are, therefore, still primarily constructed and understood through the neorealist discourse of the state. The constraint that this discourse imposes on the responses of the state is consequently one that limits the space for alternatives to be discussed and put into practice. Kiss (2002) claims that:

‘In the traditional sense there is no single territorially or geographically locatable enemy in this war and it is waged on several internal and external fronts simultaneously. Actions against global terrorism require “globalization” of foreign policy exceeding the frameworks of traditional allied systems.’ (p.50).

As the state is continually being reproduced through discourse it is not possible to fully understand non-state actors like al-Qaeda outside this structure, rather they are always placed within the discursive structure that underpins each state’s worldview. Thus, while the state acknowledges the existence of non-state actors, understandings are limited by their being filtered through the discourse of the state; they are always considered as part of a single and continuing inferior ‘Other’.
Global and Regional Processes: Geopolitical Codes in the Post-September 11th World

Global Actors: Representations and Implications

Terrorist Networks

Terrorism is therefore now represented as one of the primary Threats to the states that have been studied here; enhancing this threatening nature is the belief that it is now *global* or *international* terrorism. Whereas previously groups that were ascribed the term ‘terrorist’ were usually localised within a state or limited region, this new construction of terrorism is globalized making it more troubling for the state and giving it an appearance of being more powerful and dangerous. Of course, there is also a globalized reality that impinges on ‘terrorist’ groups. Der Derian (2002) says: ‘From the start, it was apparent that 9/11 was and would continue to be a war of networks.’ (p.106). Globalizing forces drive the networks linking places, crossing state borders, and contradicting the logic of the state. ‘Terrorist targets – even if they may be connected to a particular country – can be found scattered practically all over the world in any country (see attacks against American and Israeli Embassies or other facilities).’ (Rostoványi, 2002, p.74). Terrorist networks are therefore enabled and underpinned by these forces giving them a global, or at least an international, character in reality as well as in representation.

However, these representations give a singularity and a unity to the terrorist ‘Other’ that is not necessarily the reality. The groups and individuals involved are often disparate and loosely connected. There are, nevertheless, links between groups, and they do cross borders clandestinely, but the complexities are simplified when understood through the neorealist discourse of the state. Hence, the reality is one of complex and often ill-defined networks.

These ‘terrorist networks’ with their roots in reality, have been shown to be crucial to the construction of the terrorist ‘Other’, and its Threat to the ‘Self’, in all the states in the study. Rudolph (2005) notes that: ‘Borders, together with the institution of citizenship, designate both inclusion and exclusion and define the socio-political community both in terms of “who we are” as well as “who we are not”.’ (p.14). For the United States this is of particular relevance when placed in the context of the
construction of the ‘Self’ as a country chosen by God, and with a history of isolation and relative safety from Threats emerging from the less virtuous outside. For a Threat to be able to pass, apparently easily, through the state’s borders and attack Americans inside America makes it all the more real and dangerous; as such it is effective in reproducing the binary discourse that defines the ‘Self’ and the idea of the state. Paasi (2003) says: ‘Nationalist discourses introduced expressions like “homeland,” fatherland, and motherland that included a distinct territorial dimension between “us” and “the Other”.’ (p.116). The protection of the ‘homeland’ has therefore become central to American representations of terrorism and the rhetoric surrounding this.

America has a history of relative isolation from Threats, and the reality of the porosity of borders, and challenge to territoriality that the September 11th attacks represented, was consequently more traumatic there. The response of the elites was to use this shock in the construction of the ‘Other’ and the related Threat, re-emphasising the binary of the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’, of ‘order’ and ‘disorder’, and of ‘East’ and ‘West’. Paasi (2003) explains that: ‘Hegemonic groups may use space, boundaries, and various definitions of membership (or citizenship) effectively to maintain their position and to control others inside the territory.’ (p.116). By spatially differentiating the source of the Threat from the God-given territory of the American ‘Self’ they could (re)define the boundaries of that territory and strengthen the territoriality of the state, the Threat giving them justification for responses of militarism externally and legal confirmations of power internally.

For the European states, the national space and the borders that define this are less divinely inspired, and yet the Threat of sudden attacks within the state’s borders is still an effective basis for construction of the terrorist ‘Other’. O’Dowd (2002) comments: ‘While borders are expressions of identity, they also limit the acknowledgement of shared identities beyond borders.’ (p.32). Through the representation of a wider regional space, and reproducing narratives of unity within Europe, British and French policy-makers also suggest that this wider ‘Self’ is under Threat, that its borders too can be penetrated. It is this idea that supports arguments for cooperation regionally in the face of the terrorist Threat.
Interdependence

The interdependence created by global networks is a context that produces constraints on the activities of sovereign states. Starr (1997) asserts that: ‘The “Westphalian trade-off” stressed independence and autonomy; interdependence stresses collective problems and solutions.’ (p.19). Issues pertaining to one part of the world can, through interdependence, pose a problem for a state in another part of the world, diminishing the extent to which a state can act in a truly autonomous way. France, for example, is ‘constrained’ not only by its economic interests in the Middle East but also by its large Muslim population of North African origin, when considering what policies to adopt in Iraq and in response to terrorism. It might be argued that interdependence constrains weaker states like Britain and France, who struggle to maintain influence globally, more than it does the United States as the hegemonic power, but even this state cannot ignore the outside world, September 11th being a dramatic example of this.

While some states cope with interdependency and globalizing processes by seeking new ways of acting globally through deeper cooperation others, most notably the United States, are more inclined to continue to follow a unilateralist path. Beeson and Bellamy (2003) state:

‘Neo-realist logic is also sceptical about the benefits of international cooperation and multilateralism, a perspective that has directly influenced the approach of the Bush administration on a number of issues. Because states only ever pursue a narrowly conceived notion of self-interest, cooperation is possible only in the short term and in relation to particular issues, neorealism implies.’ (p.350).

American representations of Coalitions conform to this pattern. Nevertheless, the evidence from this study still shows that whichever of these approaches a state adopts it is still envisaged through the lens of the state; the interests of the state and its elites remain paramount even if the individual contexts might point to cooperation as more effective in gaining influence and furthering these interests.

Organizations such as the UN or the World Trade Organization have been formed by states, and are promoted to varying extents to cope with the more globalized world. The invasion of Iraq without UN agreement is an example of how states, particularly powerful states like America, will act without the authority of such
institutions where they deem it to be in their interests. Yet authority was sought before these actions, indicating that such institutions do have some place in the thinking and worldviews of states. Of course how states role play in global institutions varies. For example, the United States represents itself most clearly as a state acting alone. Britain has competing geopolitical codes, one more cooperative and one true to neorealism and in alliance with the United States. While the latter drove the entry into the Iraq War it was the former that demanded an attempt first of all to gain UN authorisation. France stood apart on this issue, its code requiring cooperation to diffuse its Values globally, and its self-interest promoting a policy separating it from America as an alternative to uni-polar hegemonic power, and protecting its influence in the Middle East and domestic stability.

Layered Governance

Mansbach (2003) speaks of: ‘…a complex world of overlapping local, regional, and global authority structures that sometimes cooperate, sometimes coexist, and sometimes clash.’ (p.19), while Held (2002) describes ‘effective power’ being ‘shared, bartered and struggled over by diverse forces and agencies at national, regional and international levels.’ (p.97). This vision of layered governance does not entirely correspond with the present structures and representations as uncovered in this research. There are regional and global strands of governance, and the terrorist non-state actor has become a central feature of state representations; the state though has proven to be the actor and the scale at which most power, authority and control of geopolitical discourse resides.

Indeed, Archibugi (1995) reflecting on ‘cosmopolitan democracy’ says: ‘The perspective of cosmopolitan democracy requires us, in the first instance, to recognize the state as the central figure in international relations.’ (p.128). It can also be concluded from the current research that the uneven and complex character of the layers prompts variable responses from the states in terms of how they imagine their roles and in their reproduction of the ‘Self’. The discursive structures through which a state’s identity is reproduced are changed by the multi-layered realities, and these discursive structures themselves allow such realities to be (re)constructed and accepted.
The repeated emphasis in both European states on a Global Community, enshrining an increased level of cooperation at the global scale, is a response to the globalizing processes that bring problems and new non-state actors to challenge the place of the state. Although a Global Community may have a certain idealistic veneer, the repetition of this narrative in Britain and France is not necessarily a move away from neorealism and militarism to a world of political and cooperative solutions. Axtmann (2002) contends that: ‘…it is inconceivable that the rich states of the North are willing to submit to any political will that is counter to their core political interests.’ (p.105). Attempts to find more cooperative means of governance at the global scale for Britain and France must therefore be considered in the context of their pasts as ‘great powers’ and the desire to continue to have influence. A Global Community, whether in British or French terms, is as much a strategy for building and sustaining influence in the world as it is of an alternative or new form of governance. The state is still the main component. For the more powerful United States this is not such an imperative and so cooperation is less important and is only used when convenient to do so.

However, the presence of non-state actors such as terrorist networks cannot be ignored, neither can the range of multi-state organizations, whether at regional or global scales, that have varying degrees of influence on geopolitics. These actors are those that McGrew’s (2000) transformationalism places in a complex system operating unevenly at different scales. At the same time, the state continues to be the location of greatest power, and it is the hegemonic discursive context through which the world continues to be understood. Global governance is thus encapsulated in transformationalism to the extent that a variety of governmental and independent actors are now operating within, and influencing, geopolitics, but it is the state that is at the centre of this stratification.

Regional Governance

At the regional scale governance has also been regrouped around new institutions, nowhere is this more apparent than in Europe. European integration inevitably questions the continuing role and status of the state, and it is a phenomenon that the two examples here – Britain and France – have responded to in different ways in accordance with their historical and political contexts, and the discourses and narratives that define their respective ‘selves’. Nonetheless, while there are differences
there are also similarities that were shown in the previous chapter to set these states apart from the United States in their discursive structures, and their construction of geopolitical codes. The shared experience of regionalization is also a shared contextual element and a shared reality that influences the reproduction of discourses and narratives, as it in turn shapes that reality from a sovereign state perspective.

Despite the creation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy as a result of the Maastricht Treaty, foreign policy and defence policy are still primarily controlled by member states. O’Dowd (2002) explains that:

‘The founders of the EEC had emphasized political and security objectives while adopting market integration as the means to these ends. However, from the early 1980s, and more especially after the Maastricht Treaty (1992), economic integration appeared to become the overriding objective of European integration, in the form of the Single Market and European Monetary Union.’ (p.19).

This contrast between economic integration and the political and security spheres reflects the complexity of European integration, and the uneven application and effects of the regionalization process. Foreign and defence policy are essential parts of Westphalian state sovereignty, ultimately encapsulating protection of the borders and territory that define a state, and enshrining the relationship between the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’.

However, through their construction of a European ‘Self’, policy-makers in Britain and France create an additional regional border enclosing the European space. Anderson (2002) says: “‘networked space’ is becoming more important but it is perhaps overemphasised and co-exists with territorial identities and national units; bounded spaces still abound; and the EU is itself a bounded space – a case of re- rather than de-territorialisation.’ (p.227). Where Europe should extend to, and what states it should ultimately encompass, are though contested and depend upon what idea of Europe prevails.¹ Each governmental organization or function of Europe can include different

¹ While the borders of the EU are fixed at any given time according to the borders of the member states there is some debate over where ‘Europe’ extends to and what its borders might be. This is relevant to the future expansion of the EU and which countries might be eligible for membership. Britain and France tend to take a different view on this, with Turkey a prospective member over which debate has been intense. Park (2005) says: ‘Many in Europe remain opposed to Turkish entry on “civilisational” as well
states resulting in multiple borders. This applies even within the European Union where the Schengen agreement, for example, does not cover every member state, a fact that has a very direct impact upon borders given that it involves the removal of border controls and free movement of people between member states. To argue that there is a single European border, and a set of internal borders of identical type, is therefore erroneous.

The complex pattern of borders points to an equally complex territoriality. Increased freedom of movement for trade and for individuals, added to variable authority over different policy competencies for the European layer of governance, diminishes the exclusive authority over a defined territory of the member states. Of course, freedom of movement is variable depending on whether a person originates within or outside the Union. Furthermore, it is still the states that control the borders. Authority over European territory is still very much concentrated in the state rather than the region. In the representations, European territory is far less important, even in France where integration is a more acceptable, and indeed desirable, process. European territoriality is not therefore displacing state territoriality; rather it is more a process of adding layers of territory. Primary authority remains with the state; it is the state that joins regional organizations and has direct control over the space within its boundaries, and yet there is an element of power at regional level acting through the states. This is acknowledged in the representations of state policy-makers through their narratives of European Unity and suggestions of Threats to Europe and the need to cooperate against these. Through their representations of a European ‘Self’ above that of the states, British and French elites effectively construct a form of European territory, a European ‘inside’ threatened from the ‘outside’ by the terrorist ‘Other’. However, since the boundaries of Europe are multiple, at times rather vague, and disputed, the territory is equally so. The question of membership, and the idea of where Europe extends to, is

as economic, political, and security grounds.’ (p.135). France understands Europe to be based on shared values and culture, conforming to those of France. Deeper integration is an objective, with French leadership, providing a tool for French influence in the wider world. Therefore, a larger membership with more diverse states threatens to dilute this French idea of Europe, and so Turkey’s membership is treated with scepticism. In the British idea of Europe the EU should be an organization of states through which influence can be gained without sacrificing other alliances, and so Turkey appears to be a possible member as there are no obvious limits. Nevertheless, both states do have a ‘European imagination’ informing their representations.
entangled with perceptions of what Europe is and what it represents, a concept for which a clear division exists between Britain and France.

Regional government is a structure that is perhaps unachievable in these circumstances; the evidence suggests that there is indeed a ‘situation of governance’ (Van der Wusten, 2000, p.88) rather than a government. Discourses and narratives reproduced by representatives of the Union can largely be identified as conforming to those that are also common to both states studied here. While the rhetoric of these individuals is of a united Europe and the benefits this will bring, including in the field of security, their freedom to construct a European ‘Self’ and to define regional policies that collectively represent member states, and expressed in geopolitical terms, is severely limited. Only where representations, and the policies that these underpin, are uncontroversial as regards the sensibilities of the states can these representatives establish a position for the Union on a given issue. At the same time, there are structures in place for a Common Foreign and Security Policy, and in many other competencies there is far deeper cooperation and greater power for Union institutions. Regional governance is therefore a reality in Europe.

Such regional governance, and the extent to which the states are tied up with it, means they cannot ignore it even if they still retain a dominance in foreign and defence policy. ‘States have been obliged to share authority with other actors, and their ability to command the exclusive loyalty of their citizens in some areas has diminished.’ (Gamble, 2001, p.30). Given the presence of a regional actor in Europe it is unsurprising that a narrative of European Unity was present in both British and French representations (and of course those of EU representatives), the differences between these were explored in chapter seven, but the fact they both draw on such a narrative is an indication of the importance that European Unity and the regional scale have in the worldviews and geopolitical codes of these countries, even if the visions are distinctive. For Britain to imagine Europe in this way, even to a limited extent, given its reluctance for the European project, is testament to the way in which regional governance impinges upon the sovereign state.

It may be no coincidence that these representations of a European ‘Self’ come in a period in which terrorism is being constructed as the new ‘Other’ and Threat to the
‘Self’. It is a Threat to each state and also, in the representations of the two European states, a Threat to Europe. When terrorism is understood through the discourse as a network that can penetrate state borders (and yet can be located in certain Eastern states) the cross border cooperation of the EU might appear to be an effective vehicle for combating a non-state actor that does not conform to the rules of the state system. Indeed, this is an indication of how states like Britain and France can, in their own ways, envisage a regional layer of governance as a tool for protecting their own interests, and their very existence, in a world in which globalization is impinging upon them. Terrorism is just one product of the global processes, but by engaging in regional cooperation they can, as is emphasised by the political actors of both countries, strengthen their own influence globally.

Hence, it can be said that there is neither a transition to a European regional actor that can construct its own geopolitical codes distinct from, and even contrary to, those of the member states, nor a neorealist scenario where states are the only relevant actors with no significant regional dimension. Instead, this research suggests that regional forces in Europe are bringing about a greater complexity that cannot be described in binary terms of state or region. In this sense the binary of inside/outside that is central to the sovereign state and its discourses of security is no longer so simplistic (Hyndman, 2003). For states like Britain and France responses to terrorism are produced at the state level but also at the regional level, a threatened ‘Self’ being imagined for both scales but never entirely separated from one another. The existence of Common Foreign and Security Policy structures in the EU allows for regional responses to be formulated that complement and support those of the states, while control over these competencies is principally exercised by state authorities. Despite the distinctive visions of Europe and its role promoted by Britain and France both represent Europe as an essential component of their worldviews; the regional dimension is vital to the representations of the world, and of the terrorist Threat, that policy-makers in these countries create, and it is a central component of the geopolitical codes that are constructed in each state. Thus, while the states forge their own codes these cannot be separated from the participation in a shared regional experience and the, arguably, increasing European response to security issues such as international terrorism.
Postmodern States?

For Cooper (2003) European states are ‘postmodern states’ in contrast to ‘modern states’ like America: ‘The postmodern system does not rely on balance; nor does it emphasize sovereignty or the separation of domestic and foreign affairs.’ (p.27). He explains:

‘Among themselves, the postmodern states operate on the basis of laws and open co-operative security. But when dealing with more old-fashioned kinds of state outside the postmodern limits, Europeans need to revert to the rougher methods of an earlier era – force, pre-emptive attack, deception, whatever is necessary for those who still live in the nineteenth-century world of every state for itself.’ (p.61).

This definition of a ‘postmodern’ state has some parallels with the British and French examples in this thesis, and yet to suggest that a state can be simultaneously ‘modern’ and ‘postmodern’ implies that it is not a fundamental change in the nature of the state from the neorealist sovereignty that might be found in a ‘modern’ state. In other words it is a definition of behaviour rather than character. What this research has shown is that there is some evidence of a deeper change to states in Europe when compared to the United States that might be termed ‘postmodern’, this may be related to the behaviour that Cooper describes, but is more than a surface feature. In contrast the ‘modern’ United States represents a singular vision of the ‘Self’, a state acting alone in a world of states. For American policy-makers there are no regional or global layers of governance of great consequence, there are no regional ‘selves’, territoriality remains singular.

Differences in policy cannot, of course, be explained by this contrast alone. Kagan (2003) comments that: ‘Because they are relatively weak, Europeans have a deep interest in devaluing and eventually eradicating the brutal laws of an anarchic Hobbesian world where power is the ultimate determinant of national security and success.’ (p.37). Each state does indeed seek to preserve and further its own interests, to that extent they act in a neorealist fashion. The discourse of the state still dominates their representations, and the construction of the terrorist ‘Other’ is used in the reproduction of these binaries. Policies of cooperation either at regional or global scales can be, or appear to be, effective in achieving the policy aims of European states when they lack the power to act in other ways like the United States. The contrast here is
perhaps most distinctive when looking at France; it seeks an independent course for itself and by extension for Europe, it is also more inclined to press for cooperation at the global scale and for deeper regional integration. Thus: ‘Realism is a necessary component in a coherent analysis of world politics because its focus on power, interests, and rationality is crucial to any understanding of the subject.’ (Keohane, 1986, p.159). National interests and the quest for influence are therefore an important component in the development of geopolitical codes, and the rhetoric and policy development of state elites; neorealism persists in ‘postmodern’ European states just as in the ‘modern’ United States.

Reassessing the State and its Geopolitical Codes

Thus, a confused picture is emerging of states sharing space and geopolitical influence with other actors, some of which derive their existence from state membership (like the EU) and others emerging outside and opposed to the state (such as terrorist groups/networks like al Qaeda). Whether these really constitute a threat to the very existence of the state as the dominant spacio-political form, representing a shift away from the Westphalian order, is another matter. Walker (1993) reflected on the end of the Cold War, saying: ‘An old order may be giving way to the new but, it might be said, we are likely to see the emergence of a new order that looks suspiciously like the old.’ (p.2). Following the Cold War, and particularly after September 11th, the temptation to conclude that the world had changed, that the state was being critically undermined was great. There is little doubt that changes are occurring; globalizing and regionalizing processes are impinging upon the state; the events of September 11th and the rise of regional structures like the European Union are manifestations of this, but analysis of geopolitical codes and how they are constructed suggests that writing the obituary of the sovereign state may be premature.

This thesis has examined the issue from a critical realist perspective and as such differs from neorealist and critical geopolitics equivalents, and it is irreducible from the understanding of the relationship between discourse and reality on which the research is based. As explained in chapter two, reality in terms of structures and events is considered to exist, but it can only be interpreted and understood through discourse. For individuals making decisions this implies that discourse impacts upon their
decisions as it is through discourse that they see the world and the events occurring within it. However, decisions are not governed by discourse, agency is also relevant. Simultaneously discourse is also shaped by reality; events like the end of the Cold War or September 11th prompt changes in the discourses that have been reproduced in accordance with the previous conditions. This takes time as people try to understand events through the established discourses, and in so doing adapt these discourses to encompass the changed reality. By understanding discourse and reality to have a two-way relationship of this kind a critical realist philosophy of geopolitics appears appropriate.

Critical realism accounts for the reality of the state as the main structure around which world politics is practiced, and therefore upon which the study of geopolitics should primarily be based. Equally, by examining geopolitics critically it is possible to account for the role of discourse, both in the construction and reproduction of the state as the main actor in geopolitics and also in the (re)construction of individual states. In so doing, this research has offered an alternative understanding of the way in which states have responded to the events of September 11th, and in particular the non-state global actors that were involved in these events.

Furthermore, by selecting the United States, Britain and France as the states on which the study was focused, a comparison between the construction of responses in these states has allowed the wider implications of global and regional forces in the post-Cold War period to be considered. Global and regional actors can be assessed as relevant to geopolitics in a critical realist study where the potential for change is acknowledged, without assuming that the state is no longer the main actor. The comparison, and the possibility for change, has given this study an opportunity to determine spatial variations between Europe and America, and between each of the three states individually, in terms of how they are responding and reacting to global and regional forces as manifested in international terrorism and European integration respectively. Only by taking this critical realist approach, and understanding reality and discourse in this way, is it possible to accomplish this state centred study inclusive of new actors, and the ability of states to change through their encounters/relationships with these.
The findings of this research suggest that, although the state is still at the centre of representations, the regional dimension for Britain and France does contribute to their representations, and to the geopolitical codes that they construct, in a way that is not apparent in the hegemonic United States. The shared experience of regional governance, and especially the moves towards Common Foreign and Security Policy, provide a contextual component for these two states that America does not share. While there are limitations in comparing a relatively small number of states, the contrasting historical and political factors of Britain and France, particularly in their attitudes towards Europe, make these states indicators of the extent to which regionalization is impacting upon representations and geopolitical codes in relation to international terrorism. By demonstrating a tendency to include a shared regional response to terrorism, notwithstanding the distinct visions of Europe that each state holds, the analysis of Britain, France and the EU points to changes in the way in which these states, and the elites representing them, view the world and practice geopolitics.

This does not mean that they do not still act as states or are subservient to the regional organization of which they are members, but that their membership and participation is a regional reality that acts to adapt the discourses and narratives through which geopoliticians understand the world. Thus, they develop policies and construct geopolitical codes that are accepting of that regional dimension. However, this brings into question the very concept of the geopolitical code upon which this thesis has been based. Geopolitical codes are a phenomenon that is closely linked to the neorealist idea of the state as the principal actor in geopolitics, states forming codes that guide their geopolitical practice. If it were the case that a European regional actor was forming its own codes separate from the states this would conform to a similar definition of a geopolitical code as constructed by a distinct actor. Instead, the research indicates that such a scenario is unlikely, but that regionalization is relevant for geopolitical codes where common responses are being developed, without displacing the state as the main location and actor through which geopolitics is practiced. The geopolitical code, however, can perhaps no longer be taken as entirely the property of an individual state. In a world of multiple actors and layers of governance the notion is problematized by the complexity of territoriality and entanglements between these actors.
Nevertheless, the need to rethink what a geopolitical code is and how it is formed does not equate to a move away from geopolitical codes altogether, any more than a regional layer of governance in Europe should mean the end of the sovereign state. It is more an openness to the possibilities for change that regional and indeed global forces bring for the state and the way in which states operate in the world. In so doing, it is necessary to accept the possible variations that might exist in the nature of states and in how their geopolitical codes are characterized, in addition to the neorealist understandings of differences in state codes and policies.

The contrast between the ‘modern’ United States and the more ‘postmodern’ European states is perhaps an effective example of these variations in the nature of states. All remain sovereign states, but in Europe regionalization has a major influence on worldviews and geopolitical codes. However, the United States experiences the impact of global forces as September 11th demonstrated, just as much as Europe does, and any consideration of the geopolitical code and of the state more generally cannot ignore the implications this has. In this regard, critical realist analysis is suited to this more complex world, it allows for the possibility that non-state actors not only exist but also impact upon the assumptions that are made about the nature of the state and geopolitics, without ignoring the reality of the state’s position and status.

To conclude that the end of the Cold War or the dramatic events of September 11th mark the end of the Westphalian sovereign state is therefore overly simplistic, but neither can it be said, as a (neo)realist may do, that the state is permanent, unchanging and constitutes the perfect and exclusive structure for the spatial organization of the world, and through which geopolitics can be properly practiced. Falk (2004) claims that: ‘What endures to give world order its Westphalian shape over the centuries is the primacy of the territorial state as political actor on a global level, the centrality of international warfare, the autonomy of the sovereign state to govern affairs within recognized international boundaries, the generalized tolerance of “human wrongs” committed within the scope of sovereign authority, the special leadership role in geopolitics claimed by and assigned to leading state(s), the weakness of the rule of law, and the absence of strong institutions of regional and global governance.’ (p.12). Each of these features can still be identified in the post-September 11th world. Nevertheless, globalization and regionalization have also been shown to impinge upon the states and
their Westphalian character. However, this is neither equal nor even. Each state responds to the processes acting upon it according to its own contextual factors and the idea of the ‘Self’ that is continually reproduced through discourse, and each experiences the effects of regionalizing and globalizing forces differently.

Thus, while new actors are real and important elements in geopolitics, states remain pre-eminent but not unchanged. Through their encounters with other actors, and the processes underpinning these, the nature of the state as described by Falk cannot endure unaltered. Borders are shown to be more porous, diminishing the exclusive control of territory, while in some places new boundaries are emerging. As a consequence territoriality is made complex. The transition from ‘modern’ to ‘postmodern’ states is therefore not a process that can be explained by variations in power alone, nor by the eclipse of the state as the principal geopolitical actor, it is rather an indication of how states are evolving to meet the circumstances of the more globalized post-Cold War world. When the Treaty of Westphalia was signed in 1648 it was not intended to herald the ascendance of the sovereign state, but in retrospect it did encapsulate the principles that would be enshrined in this new spatial resolution; the reformed state of today is thus not necessarily an end point as neorealists would argue, but the significance of the end of the Cold War and September 11th for the state may only become apparent when considered in the future as part of its long-term evolution.
Appendix A
Discourse Analysis: Process and Examples

As was discussed in chapter three, the discourse analysis was applied to a sample of documents from the United States, Britain, France and the European Union. Following a discussion of the process applied to the samples, and to each individual document, one sample from each is presented here. Firstly there is a testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from Colin Powell (The United States); secondly a speech to the House of Commons by Tony Blair (The United Kingdom); thirdly a letter to the Brazilian Minister for External Affairs from Dominique De Villepin (France); and finally an article by Javier Solana (EU). This offers an impression of how the analysis was carried out in practice on different types of document.

When carrying out the discourse analysis, the process was one of reading and coding. Beginning with the oldest documents, progress was made to the end of the sample. This revealed how patterns developed over time in relation to different events. The discourses identified in the pilot study were now given appropriate codes. When analysing each document, words, phrases and passages were identified that seemed to draw upon/contribute to the construction of, or are representative of, particular discourses or narratives. Brackets\(^1\) were used to mark these, the relevant code being

\(^1\) First of all square brackets were used to identify the complete word/phrase/passage of interest, and then if there was a further word/phrase/passage of particular interest within this, curved brackets were used. Thus, in the American example, the first passage to be bracketed identifies the Crusade Against Terrorism discourse, it has square brackets, however within it the phrase ‘go after’ is used and this has curved brackets.
noted in the margin. Each of the samples here displays a variety of these codes in the left margin. In addition, any particularly important point with relevance to the way in which interpretations or representations were being made, was also noted in the margin (none of the four sample documents contained such notes). While coding, it was also possible that a new discourse or narrative that had not come to light in the pilot study would suddenly appear relevant and be added to the list. This of course requires some repeated reading of earlier documents to determine if any instances of it have been missed.

Given that only a limited number of quotes would ultimately be able to be included in the thesis, it was important to identify good examples at an early stage from which to build later analyses and explanations. Mason (2002) describes the process of ‘deriving data’: ‘This may mean taking, or copying, whole documents or images for subsequent analysis, but it may also mean that you will select elements of them, record specific things about them (for example, this might be literal quotations from a document, or it might be written or visual notes about form, style and structure in visual images).’ (p.116-117). Hence, during the process of reading and coding, those passages that would be useful in this way were highlighted for future use. The British example contains three such passages. It would be pointless to do this for all the bracketed passages because they do not all demonstrate the use of discourses as clearly as each other. It is necessary to code all discourses and narratives, but when seeking limited examples the choice must be made more carefully.

The four sample documents are not all of similar length, but this reflects the range that were analysed. Some have more discourses and narratives identified within them than others. Again this is representative of the wider samples where some had no relevant discourses or narratives at all. Nevertheless, the following four samples are intended to offer an impression of how the discourse analysis was actually undertaken.

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2 In some cases a word/phrase/passage may contribute to the reproduction of more than one discourse or narrative, and so all the relevant codes were added to the margin. There are examples of this in all but the French sample document.
The Campaign Against Terrorism

Secretary Colin L. Powell
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Washington, DC
October 25, 2001

2:30 P.M. EDT

As Delivered

SECRETARY POWELL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for welcoming me back to appear before the Committee. And let me also say that I happened to read the same newspaper articles that Senator Helms did this morning, and when I saw the glaring headline, I said whoa, wait a minute, this can't be right. So I immediately asked my staff to get the transcript of what you had said. And I saw that it was not right, that it was clear that you were speaking in a stereotypical, what other people think. And then, at the tail end of that sentence that was taken out of context, your final words were, "And that's not right."

And so I was much relieved, because I knew that couldn't have been your view, and appreciative, as I have been, for these past weeks, and since I became Secretary, of the support, Mr. Chairman, that you have provided to the Department, that you have provided to me on a personal basis. And I express to you, and to Chairman Helms and to the other members of the Committee the same sentiment: thank you for your support, and especially, thank you for the solid bipartisan support that the Administration has enjoyed from the Committee during this crisis that began on the 11th of September. It means a lot to us, it shows a lot to the world about what kind of a nation we are, what kind of a people we are. And in the midst of all the anthrax scares and other things that are going on, we are here on Capitol Hill to conduct the people's business. We will not be frightened, we will not be scared. We will get on with the people's business, and I am pleased to be here today to participate in that solid, historic, democratic process that we enjoy and that we believe in to the depth of our hearts.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you for your comment and your confidence. I appreciate it.

SECRETARY POWELL: Mr. Chairman, if I may, I'd like to provide a written testimony for the record, and I'd like to summarize it very briefly.

THE CHAIRMAN: Let it be placed in the record.

SECRETARY POWELL: Mr. Chairman, we will always remember the 11th of September, where we all happened to be on that day, it's seared into our individual memories, it's seared into our individual souls. I was in Lima, Peru at breakfast with the President of Peru, President Toledo, when the notes were handed to me, two notes in a quick row, making it clear that it wasn't an accident, but my country had been hit by the worst terrorist act that we had seen in our history.

And it was a long day for me, as I got in my plane and flew all the way back from Peru, unable to communicate with anybody in Washington until I arrived and joined the President in the White House with the other national security advisors to the President.

And when I walked into the Situation Room and joined the President, I found a President who was seized with the mission that had been handed him that day, a President who had already seen that a challenge had been presented to him that would change the entire nature of his presidency and his administration. And a President who took up that challenge, I think, in a bold way, a way that history will long remember.

He knew right away that he not only had to (go after) the perpetrators of these terrible attacks against us; he knew also that we had to (go after) terrorism. It wouldn't be enough just to deal with these perpetrators, who were soon identified as the al-Qaida network and Usama bin Laden. But in order to be the kind of leader that he is, in order to show leadership to the world, we had to undertake (a campaign) that goes after terrorism in all of its many forms around the world.
And it's a campaign that has many dimensions to it. It's a campaign that some days involves financial attacks, other days law enforcement attacks, intelligence attacks, and sometimes, as we see now in Afghanistan, military attacks. We have to secure our borders. We have to do a better job of talking to other nations about who travels across our borders. We have to make sure we go after the financial networks that support terrorist activity.

And to do that, we built a broad coalition, a coalition of nations that came together to respond to this attack, not just against America, but against civilization. Hundreds and hundreds of people who were not Americans died in the World Trade Center. Five hundred Muslims died in the World Trade Center. Usama bin Laden and al-Qaida killed Muslims on the 11th of September 2001 in New York City, as well as men and women representing every race, color and creed on the face of the earth, and a large number of American citizens.

Are we're going after them with this broad coalition to make sure that they are brought to justice or justice is brought to them. It was an attack against civilization; civilization must respond.

People have said, well, you know, it was an attack against America, really not civilization. No, it wasn't. It was the action of an evil man, and it was an evil act. There is no connection or relationship to any faith; there is no faith on the face of the earth that would sanction such an evil strike against innocent people. And we cannot let Usama bin Laden pretend that he is doing it in the name of helping the Iraqi people or the Palestinian people. He doesn't care one whit about them. He has never given a dollar toward them. He has never spoken out for them. He has used them as a cover for his evil, criminal, murderous, terrorist acts. And he has to be seen in that light.

We have put together a grand coalition, and people have said, well, coalitions sometimes come with problems. When you bring all these people together, don't you have to take into account all of their interests, and don't these kinds of coalitions sometimes hamstring the President and his ability to do what he thinks he has to do.

The answer to the question is: the President has not given up any of his authority. There are no arrangements within this coalition which in any way, shape, fashion or form constrain the President and the exercise of his constitutional responsibilities to defend the United States of America and to defend the people of the United States. So that should not be a concern in anyone's mind.

At the same time, without this coalition, the President couldn't do what needs to be done. Without this coalition, we couldn't be cooperating with 100 nations around the world on going after financial networks of terrorist organizations. Without this coalition, we wouldn't have countries that were supporting us in the prosecution of our military campaign, giving us over-flight, giving us basing rights and contributing military forces to fight alongside American forces.

So this is a coalition that is of enormous value, and what is unique about this coalition that makes it different than any other coalition anyone has ever put together is that, except for about three or four countries, every other country on the face of the Earth has signed up. They have signed up in many ways, whether it was NATO, 19 nations invoking Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the NATO Treaty, for the first time in history, saying that an attack on one is an attack on all, and that attack in New York City and Washington and Pennsylvania was an attack on one and was an attack on all of us, and NATO has responded.

The United Nations Security Council, the United Nations General Assembly, the OAS, the Rio Treaty was invoked, the ANZUS Treaty was invoked. The Organization of Islamic Conference had a meeting earlier this month, and 56 Muslim nations came forward and said this was a dastardly attack which does not
represent Islam; it's a disgrace; the United States is right to see it as an attack on civilization and an attack on America.

One more point I would make about the coalition is that, whether we wanted it or not, it showed up. Within 24 hours, NATO acted. Before I could really get on the phone and ask them, they were there. The UN showed up within 48 hours. A lot of people pat me on the back and said, "Good job with the coalition." I have to sort of drop my head slightly. They all showed up. Our friends showed up when we needed them.

People have also said, "Well, this coalition will start to come apart after a while. They won't stick together." Well, they've stuck together. It's now six weeks. The President just returned from an important meeting in Shanghai, the APEC conference, where 21 Asian and Pacific nations all came together to talk about economic issues, to talk about the world trading system, to talk about breaking down barriers to trade. But the first thing they talked about was terrorism, and all 21 of these nations reaffirmed their support for what we are doing.

As my colleague Don Rumsfeld often says, "It's not just a single coalition. It's a shifting set of coalitions, really, that come together." And members will do different things at different times in the life of this coalition. Some member-nations have said, look, all we can do really is give you political and diplomacy support. We don't have the wherewithal, or because of our political situation, we can't do much more than that. Others have said we'll participate fully on intelligence-sharing and financial digging-up of terrorist organizations, and we'll provide military assets as well.

We have said let each contribute according to your ability to contribute, your willingness to contribute, and the situation you face within your country. And so far, [after six weeks, this coalition is gaining strength, not getting weaker. ]

Our attention now is focused on the military campaign in Afghanistan. I am so proud of the men and women in uniform that I used to be so closely associated with, as they once again go in harm's way in such a professional manner to serve the American people, and in this case to serve the cause of civilization. They are doing a fine job. But, as the Chairman noted, it is going to be a tough campaign. It's a tough campaign, tough in the air and even tougher on the ground, as we use not American forces directly, but other forces who are like-minded in recognizing that the Taliban must be removed. It's quite difficult to coordinate them, but we are working on that very hard, and with each passing day the coordination links between the air campaign and what is happening on the ground become tighter, become more direct, and are moving in the right direction.

Our work in Afghanistan, though, is not just of a military nature. We recognize that when the al-Qaeda organization has been destroyed in Afghanistan and as we continue to try to destroy it in all the nations in which it exists around the world, and when the Taliban regime has gone to its final reward, we need to put in place a new government in Afghanistan, one that represents all the people of Afghanistan and one that is not dominated by any single powerful neighbor, but instead is dominated by the will of the people of Afghanistan.

We are working hard at that. Ambassador Richard Haass, the Director of Policy Planning at the State Department, is my personal representative, working with the United Nations, Ambassador Brahimi, the King and others to try to help Afghan leaders around the world find the proper model for the future Afghanistan.

But we have got to do more than that. We also have to make sure that when the Taliban regime is gone, we remain committed to helping Afghanistan finally find a place in the world, by helping its people build a better life for themselves, by making sure they get the food aid and other aid they will need to start building decent lives for themselves and for their children.

And while we are going through this conflict period now and thinking about the future, we also have to make sure that we are pumping as much humanitarian aid into the country now as winter approaches so that we don't leave anybody at risk of starvation. There are lots of reports about that, but I can say that the reports I have this morning suggest that we have got quite a bit of food going in, blankets going in. It is still a tenuous situation, but the situation has improved in recent days, and I think it will improve in the days ahead.
We are giving it the highest priority, working with our friends in Pakistan and Uzbekistan, and I was pleased to see the Foreign Minister of Uzbekistan in the hearing room today, and it gives me the opportunity to thank him and his government for the terrific support that they have provided to us.

The Chairman mentioned that new strategic opportunities may come out of this crisis. I think that is absolutely right. We have seen Russia do things in the last six weeks that would have been unthought-of five or six years ago even, long after the Soviet Union was gone. We are working with the Russians to take advantage of these new opportunities.

At the APEC meeting in China, Mr. Chairman, you would be pleased to know that while we were talking about trade and economic development with the People's Republic, we made sure that they understood that even though we want to move in that direction, we are not forgetting about human rights, we are not forgetting about religious freedom. The President talked about the Dalai Lama. He talked about relations with the Vatican. And we have seen improvement already with respect to dialogue between the Vatican and Beijing, just within the last 24 hours.

We talked about proliferation. We told them what we don't like about what they do with respect to rogue nations. So Senator Helms, I can assure you and assure all the other members of the Committee that we are clear-eyed about this coalition building. We are clear-eyed about the campaign we have embarked upon. We understand the nature of some of the regimes that we are having some opening discussions with. And they are not going to get in on the cheap. "We are against the Taliban, but you've got to tolerate our actions with respect to other terrorist organizations that we like" -- it won't work. The President says you've got to choose now to move into a new world, where you no longer support those kinds of activities if you want a better shot at good relations with the United States of America.

And so I think we are off on a (noble cause). I think it is (a cause that is just). It is a cause that we (will prevail) in, because we are doing the (right thing).]

Let me close by once again thanking the Committee for the support that they have provided to us. I know how much it means to the President for you all to visit with him every week or so. And let me once again express my admiration for the men and women in uniform who are doing such a great job. And let me also express my admiration for the men and women of the State Department, and the other civilian agencies of the United States Government, who are serving in missions all around the world, sometimes in great danger, sometimes at the risk of their lives. They are doing a terrific job, and I know that you share my admiration and pride in the men and women of our diplomatic service.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

(2:45 p.m. EDT)

[End]
Prime Minister's statement to the House of Commons following the September 11 attacks

14 September 2001

Mr Speaker, I am grateful that you agreed to the recall of Parliament to debate the hideous and foul events in New York, Washington and Pennsylvania that took place on Tuesday 11 September.

I thought it particularly important in view of the fact that these attacks were not just attacks upon people and buildings; nor even merely upon the USA; these were attacks on the basic democratic values in which we all believe so passionately and on the civilised world. It is therefore right that Parliament, the fount of our own democracy, makes its democratic voice heard.

There will be different shades of opinion heard today. That again is as it should be.

But let us unite in agreeing this: what happened in the United States on Tuesday was an act of wickedness for which there can never be justification. Whatever the cause, whatever the perversion of religious feeling, whatever the political belief, to inflict such terror on the world; to take the lives of so many innocent and defenceless men, women, and children, can never ever be justified.

Let us unite too, with the vast majority of decent people throughout the world, in sending our condolences to the government and the people of America. They are our friends and allies. We the British are a people that stand by our friends in time of need, trial and tragedy, and we do so without hesitation now.

The events are now sickeningly familiar to us. Starting at 08.45 US time, two hijacked planes were flown straight into the twin towers of the World Trade Centre in New York. Shortly afterwards at 09.43, another hijacked plane was flown into the Pentagon in Washington.

At 10.05 the first tower collapsed; at 10.28 the second; later another building at the World Trade Center. The heart of New York's financial district was devastated, carnage, death and injury everywhere.

Around 10.30 we heard reports that a fourth hijacked aircraft had crashed south of Pittsburgh.

I would like on behalf of the British people to express our admiration for the selfless bravery of the New York and American emergency services, many of whom lost their lives.

As we speak, the total death toll is still unclear, but it amounts to several thousands.

Because the World Trade Center was the home of many big financial firms, and because many of their employees are British, whoever committed these acts of terrorism will have murdered at least a hundred British citizens, maybe many more. Murder of British people in New York is no
different in nature from their murder in the heart of Britain itself. In the most direct sense, therefore, we have not just an interest but an obligation to bring those responsible to account.

To underline the scale of the loss we are talking about we can think back to some of the appalling tragedies this House has spoken of in the recent past. We can recall the grief aroused by the tragedy at Lockerbie, in which 270 people were killed, 44 of them British. In Omagh, the last terrorist incident to lead to a recall of Parliament, 29 people lost their lives. Each life lost a tragedy. Each one of these events a nightmare for our country. But the death toll we are confronting here is of a different order.

In the Falklands War 255 British Service men perished. During the Gulf War we lost 47.

In this case, we are talking here about a tragedy of epoch making proportions.

And as the scale of this calamity becomes clearer, I fear that there will be many a community in our country where heart-broken families are grieving the loss of a loved one. I have asked the Secretary of State to ensure that everything they need by way of practical support for them is being done.

Here in Britain, we have instituted certain precautionary measures of security. We have tightened security measures at all British airports, and ensured that no plane can take off unless their security is assured. We have temporarily redirected air traffic so that planes do not fly over central London. City Airport is reopening this morning.

We have also been conscious of the possibility of economic disruption. Some sectors like the airlines and insurance industry will be badly affected. But financial markets have quickly stabilised. The oil producers have helped keep the oil price steady. Business is proceeding as far as possible, as normal.

There are three things we must now take forward urgently.

First, we must bring to justice those responsible. Rightly, President Bush and the US Government have proceeded with care. They did not lash out. They did not strike first and think afterwards. Their very deliberation is a measure of the seriousness of their intent.

They, together with allies, will want to identify, with care, those responsible. This is a judgement that must and will be based on hard evidence.

Once that judgement is made, the appropriate action can be taken. It will be determined, it will take time, it will continue over time until this menace is properly dealt with and its machinery of terror destroyed.

But one thing should be very clear. By their acts, these terrorists and those behind them have made themselves the enemies of the civilised world.

The objective will be to bring to account those who have organised, aided, abetted and incited this act of infamy; and those that harbour or help them have a choice: either to cease their protection of our enemies; or be treated as an enemy themselves.

Secondly, this is a moment when every difference between nations, every divergence of interest, every irritant in our relations, are put to one side in one common endeavour. The world should stand together against this outrage.

NATO has already, for the first time since it was founded in 1949, invoked Article 5 and determined that this attack in America will be considered as an attack against the Alliance as a whole.
The UN Security Council on Wednesday passed a resolution which set out its readiness to take all necessary steps to combat terrorism.

From Russia, China, the EU, from Arab states, from Asia and the Americas, from every continent of the world has come united condemnation. This solidarity should be maintained and translated into support for action.

We do not yet know the exact origin of (this evil). But, if, as appears likely, it is so-called Islamic fundamentalists, we know they do not speak or act for the vast majority of decent law-abiding Muslims throughout the world. I say to our Arab and Muslim friends: neither you nor Islam is responsible for this; on the contrary, we know you share our shock at this terrorism; and we ask you as friends to make common cause with us in defeating (this barbarism) that is (totally foreign) to the true spirit and teachings of Islam.

And I would add that, now more than ever, we have reason not to let the Middle East Peace Process slip still further but if at all possible to reinvigorate it and move it forward.

Thirdly, whatever the nature of the immediate response to these terrible events in America, we need to re-think dramatically the scale and nature of the action the world takes to combat terrorism.

We know a good deal about many of these terror groups. But as a world we have not been effective at dealing with them.

And of course it is difficult. We are democratic. They are not. We have respect for human life. They do not. We hold essentially liberal values. They do not. As we look into these issues it is important that we never lose sight of our basic values. We have to understand the nature of the enemy and act accordingly.

Civil liberties are a vital part of our country, and of our world. But the most basic liberty of all is the right of the ordinary citizen to go about their business free from fear or terror. That liberty has been denied, in the cruelest way imaginable, to the passengers aboard the hijacked planes, to those who perished in the trade towers and the Pentagon, to the hundreds of rescue workers killed as they tried to help.

So we need to look once more: (nationally and internationally) at (extradition laws), and the mechanisms for international justice; at how these terrorist groups are financed and their money laundered; and the links between terror and crime and we need to frame a response that will work, and hold internationally.

For this form of terror knows (no mercy); (no pity), and it (knows no boundaries).

And let us make this reflection. A week ago, anyone suggesting terrorists would kill thousands of innocent people in downtown New York would have been dismissed as alarmist. It happened. We know that these groups are (fanatics), (capable of killing without discrimination). The limits on the numbers they kill and their methods of killing are (not governed by morality). The limits are only practical or technical. We know, that they would, if they could, go further and (use chemical or biological or even nuclear weapons of mass destruction). We know, also, that there are groups or people, occasionally states, who trade the technology and capability for such weapons.

It is time this trade was exposed, disrupted, and stamped out. We have been warned by the events of 11 September. We should act on the warning.
So there is a great deal to do and many details to be filled in, much careful work to be undertaken over the coming days, weeks and months.

We need to mourn the dead; and then act to protect the living.

Terrorism has taken on a new and frightening aspect.

The people perpetrating it wear the ultimate badge of the fanatic: they are prepared to commit suicide in pursuit of their beliefs.

Our beliefs are the very opposite of the fanatics. We believe in reason, democracy and tolerance.

These beliefs are the foundation of our civilised world. They are enduring, they have served us well and as history has shown we have been prepared to fight, when necessary to defend them. But the fanatics should know: we hold these beliefs every bit as strongly as they hold theirs.

Now is the time to show it.

http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page1598.asp
Minister,

The tragic death of that great Brazilian, Sergio Vieira de Mello, is a terrible loss for the international community and for all those who, across the world, are working together to ensure the triumph of peace, justice and respect for human rights.

In a succession of posts and on every continent, he put his incomparable talents, his courage, his intelligence and the power of his conviction at the service of those fundamental values. He was the embodiment of what was most noble in the work of the United Nations and was a credit to his country of origin, to which he remained deeply attached.

Today, in these painful circumstances, the United Nations and the whole international community stand side by side with Brazil and share her grief.

In this time of cruel trial, I want to express to you my profound sorrow, my deepest sympathy, and the entire solidarity of the French authorities.

(complimentary close).

"Three ways for Europe to prevail against the terrorists"
by JAVIER SOLANA

The Madrid attacks have reminded us of how potent the threat of terrorism is to Europe. How can we as policymakers and as citizens respond? Today the European Council will consider this issue. I see three sets of responses.

First, we must make European counter-terrorism more effective. Governments have improved coordination since the September 11 2001 attacks on the US. Useful initiatives have been launched, transatlantic co-operation has been bolstered and some excellent police and intelligence work has been done. We must build on this.

Europe lacks neither the will nor the capabilities - judicial, financial and in intelligence and police work - to fight terrorism. The immediate focus is not to create new capabilities but to make better use of those already available. Improving coherence and co-ordination must not become a bureaucratic exercise. That is why the European Council focused on producing practical results.

One priority is better intelligence-sharing. More information must be exchanged more quickly. I suggested before Madrid that we reinforce the capacity we have in the Council to analyse intelligence in the field of terrorism, and I welcome member states’ agreement to this. I do not believe we need a European CIA, but I will be reporting to the next European Council in June 2004 on the sharing of operational intelligence. If we were to go down this road, we would have to show that it would enhance already extensive co-operation while guaranteeing speed and security.

In addition, we must implement fully and without delay legislative measures such as the European arrest warrant. These are vital tools in the fight against terror. We must accelerate the strengthening of border controls and document security. And we must look again at our existing curbs on the financing of terrorism. To make our actions as coherent and comprehensive as possible I have appointed a counter-terrorism co-ordinator: Mr Gijs de Vries, he will be in charge of coordinating the work currently being done in the European Union in this field..

Outside Europe we need to look again at how we can work with other countries. Where we can help our partners in bolstering their counter-terrorist capacities, we should do so. If they are unwilling to help, this will call into question the basis for our partnership.

Second, we must maintain our determination to understand and tackle the factors behind terrorism. No cause justifies terrorism, but nothing justifies
ignoring the causes of terrorism. Clearly, there is a [fanatical fringe] who are beyond political discourse. But it is nourished by a pool of disaffection and grievance. Where these grievances are legitimate they must be addressed, not just because this is a matter of justice but also because ["draining the swamp"] depends on it.

Terrorism will not - and should not - advance the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people. But a determined effort by [the international community] to address such aspirations with those Palestinians who reject violence would deal a heavy blow to terrorism. That is why the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the wider sense of despair in parts of the [Arab world] cannot be deferred until the fight against terrorism is won. At the same time, we must fight for (regional stability), good governance and the rule of law.

Third, all of us, as European citizens, can and must defend our democracies by exercising and defending the rights that we hold dear. A climate of fear and repression is what the terrorists seek. Faith in democracy is the best weapon in our defence.

Those who detect a new climate of appeasement in Europe towards terrorism are wrong. I marched together with more than 2million others in the streets of Madrid the day after the bombings. The mood was not one of fear. It was of quiet resolve - to honour the dead, [to (prevail) in the face of terrorism], to defend the democracy that Spaniards hold so dear.

In Spain, as throughout Europe, people are united in their determination to fight terror. At the same time, there is also a legitimate political debate about how best to proceed in that fight. To suspend that debate would be a betrayal of democracy.

Europeans know the [fight against terrorism] will not be easily won. There will be many silent successes but there will also be setbacks. Our successes must not breed complacency, just as our setbacks must not provoke despair. We must harness all our energies to fight for the rule of law, within the rule of law.

Terrorism attacks (the values) on which the European Union is founded. It will be overcome by adherence to those (same values). ]
Appendix B
Document Cover Sheet: Sample and Explanation

The annotated cover sheet on the following page demonstrates what information was gathered and recorded for each document. This sample is the cover sheet for the French documents but is almost identical to those used for the other countries. The top section records general information about the document such as the title and the date; below this is the section for data resulting from the discourse analysis; at the bottom of the sheet is a section for additional comments.

The discourse/narrative section was completed as follows. After coding each document an assessment of the relative frequency of the discourses and narratives was made. This was achieved firstly by considering general impressions of what discourses had been more dominant in the document; the number of times each code appeared in the margins was then counted. Counting alone is insufficient as some codes may be attached to a single word while others may be next to a lengthy passage that is central to the whole text. It is therefore by combining the count with an impression of the significance of the discourses and narratives to the whole document that a decision of whether a discourse was frequent, medium or occasional was reached, and the relevant box ticked next to each discourse or narrative in the table on the cover sheet. Nonetheless, this technique is rather unreliable and can only be used as a guide of what is important in a particular document.

Having produced initial graphs for some of the countries discourses and narratives based upon these three categories, their effectiveness for analysis was reassessed. When reflecting on how this original assessment had been made it was
decided that to process it quantitatively in this way gave the results a certainty that they could not possess. These variable frequencies were therefore abandoned at this point. This left figures and graphs for the basic numbers (for which percentages were calculated) of documents in which particular discourses/narratives appeared. These were determined by counting a document as containing a discourse or narrative no matter which of the three categories was ticked on the cover sheet. This can be treated quantitatively as a document either contains a discourse/narrative or it does not.
### Table: Document Information

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- **Title**: The box contains the title of the document. In many cases the document does not have a particular title, particularly speeches. In such cases the title may be a description of the speaker and the occasion or audience.
- **Code**: The code is in the form of a letter to denote the country, two digits to represent the year, two digits for the order number of the document and a letter also to individually identify it and allow for extra documents to be inserted later on. Thus, the code F0214C represents a French document from 2002, which is the 16th of that year (14+2). These codes are extremely useful when trying to keep track of references for quotes, and also give an immediate indication of what year the quote has come from.
- **Year**: This is the year of publication of the document.
- **Date**: This is the year of publication of a document, or of a speech being made, is entered.
- **Period**: This was usually completed with an entry like ‘pre-9/11’ or ‘post-9/11’, although on occasions it was more specific, such as identifying a particular American Presidency. However, while it seemed a useful addition at the beginning later on the exact dates were more convenient for working with.
- **Author**: The Author is the individual(s) to whom the document has been attributed authorship. Therefore the speaker of a speech is considered the author rather than an anonymous speechwriter. In some cases no author is identifiable and a U is entered in the box denoting unknown author. This was most often the case for press releases that are issued on behalf of a government or department rather than an individual.
- **Status**: The status attempts to identify the importance of the author within the state bureaucracy and is defined by one of three codes: H for high status such as Presidents, L for low status when it is not a senior minister, and U for unknown. In practice most of my authors were high status as it is these people that the research was concentrating on.
- **Discourses**: The Document Type is recorded as follows: S for a speech, I for an interview, L for a letter, T for a testimony, P for a publication, A for an article, and R for a release.
- **Narratives**: The Audience is recorded as follows: I for international, D for domestic, UN for United Nations, and OD for official domestic (where the intended audience is not really the general public).
- **Comments**: The comments section is available for any additional information. This may draw on the points noted in the margins of the document, or may be notes of general impressions. If a document appears to be very important in terms of the overall themes then this could also be added here. All of this information could be of use in later analysis.
Appendix C
Biographies of the Authors of Primary Documents

The following is a list of those authors of primary documents who are quoted in the text. It does not include all the authors of documents that were analysed. The biographies are short. They concentrate on the positions that the individuals held at the time the quoted material was produced, rather than an exhaustive description of their lives. However, where a person has previously or subsequently held an important post this has often been noted. In addition, a brief summary of the role(s) occupied at the relevant time has often been included in the biographies where this is not immediately obvious from the title.

**Tony Blair**

Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 2nd May 1997. The Prime Minister is head of the British government.

**George W. Bush**

Republican President of the United States of America from 20th January 2001. The President is the Head of State and of Government.

**Jacques Chirac**
President of the Republic (France) since 17th May 1995, having previously held a variety of political positions including Prime Minister. The President is the Head of State but also leads the government alongside the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister and government are appointed by the President who presides over meetings of the Council of Ministers or Cabinet (The Office of the French President, 2007).

William (Bill) Jefferson Clinton


William S. Cohen

Secretary of Defence of the United States from 24th January 1997 until January 2001. Cohen served in both the House of Representatives and the Senate as a Republican before becoming Secretary of Defence in a Democrat administration.

Dominique De Villepin


Peter Hain

Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office from 1999 until 24th January 2001, then at the Department for Trade and Industry. He took up the post of Minister for Europe at the FCO from 11th June 2001 until 24th October 2002. Since then he has
been Leader of the House of Commons, the Secretary of State for Wales and for Northern Ireland.

**Heads of State, Governments and EU Officials**

This encompasses the heads of state and government of the European Union member states, the President of the European Parliament, the President of the European Commission, and the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

**Richard C. Holbrooke**


**Patrick M. Hughes**

Lieutenant General in the U.S Army until retiring in October 1999. He was the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency from February 1996 – July 1999, an organization that claims to: ‘Provide timely, objective, and cogent military intelligence to warfighters, defense planners, and defense and national security policymakers.’ (Defense Intelligence Agency, 2007). The Director advises the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

**Edmund J. Hull**

The Deputy Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the U.S Department of State, from 1999 until 2001.
Lionel Jospin

Prime Minister of France from June 1997 until May 2002. The Prime Minister is responsible for government policy, working with the President.

Pierre Moscouici

Following a spell as an MEP he was Minister for European Affairs from 1997 until 2002. In 2004 he returned to the European Parliament.

Chris Patten

A former British Conservative politician and Cabinet Minister and also Governor of Hong Kong, Patten was European Commissioner for External Relations from 1999 until 2004. The Commissioner for External Relations is responsible for: ‘relations with all countries except those covered by Development and Enlargement directorate-generals; relations with international organizations; Commissions participation in the CFSP; administration of delegations in third countries’ (Smith, 2003, p.37). In 2005 he was given a peerage.

William J. Perry


Colin Powell

Secretary of State from 20th January 2001 until 23rd January 2005. Previously a General in the U.S. Army and also National Security Advisor and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Romano Prodi

Prime Minister of Italy from 1996 until 1998, Prodi became President of the European Commission in 1999 continuing until 2004. ‘The President must try to provide forward movement for the European Union and to give a sense of direction both to his fellow Commissioners and, more broadly, to the Commission as a whole... …He calls and chairs meetings of the Members of the Commission, and can assign responsibility for specific activities to them or set up working groups. Lastly, he represents the Commission.’ (European Commission, 2007). Prodi returned as Italian Prime Minister in 2006.

Jean-Pierre Raffarin

Prime Minister of France from 6th May 2002 until 31st May 2005. The Prime Minister is responsible for government policy, working with the President.

Donald H. Rumsfeld

Secretary of Defense in the United States from 20th January 2001 until 18th December 2006. He had held the same position between 1975 and 1977.

Javier Solana

A Minister in the Spanish Cabinet between 1982 and 1995, latterly as Minister for Foreign Affairs. He was Secretary General of NATO from 1995 until 1999, when on the 18th of October he took up the positions of Secretary General of the Council of the European Union and High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, on the 25th of November 1999 he added the post of Secretary General of the Western European Union. The WEU is a defence association that constitutes the defence component of the CFSP. ‘Mr Solana assists the Council in foreign policy matters, through contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of European

Jack Straw

Following a spell as Home Secretary, Straw was the Secretary of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office from 8th June 2001 until 8th May 2006. Since 2006 he has been the Leader of the House of Commons.

The National Commission on Terrorism

This Commission was established by the U.S. Congress in 1999 and reported in 2000. ‘Congress gave the Commission six months to review the laws, regulations, directives, policies and practices for preventing and punishing international terrorism directed against the United States, assess their effectiveness, and recommend changes.’ (The National Commission on Terrorism, 2000). It was composed of 10 commissioners selected by the party leaders in the House of Representatives and the Senate.

Hubert Vedrine


Phillip C. Wilcox

A diplomat who served as Coordinator for Counterterrorism in the U.S. Department of State between 1994 and 1997. ‘The primary mission of the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) is to forge partnerships with non-state actors, multilateral
organizations, and foreign governments to advance the counterterrorism objectives and national security of the United States.’ (Department of State, 2007).

**Paul Wolfowitz**

Deputy Secretary of Defense in the United States from 2001 until 2005. He had previously held a variety of government appointments, and was President of the World Bank from 2005 until 2007.
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