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The Military Activities of Bishops, Abbots and other Clergy in England c.900-1200

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Abstract

This thesis examines the evidence for the involvement in warfare of clerks and religious in England between the beginning of the tenth century and the end of the twelfth. It focuses on bishops and abbots, whose military activities were recorded more frequently than lesser clergy, though these too are considered where appropriate.

From the era of Christian conversion until long after the close of the middle ages, clergy were involved in the prosecution of warfare. In this period, they built fortresses and organised communities of warriors in time of peace and war. Some were slain in battle, while others were given promotion or lands for their martial exploits. A series of canonical pronouncements aimed to forbid or restrict the involvement of Christian clergy in organised bloodshed, and some writers branded militant clergy as corrupted by the lure of earthly power or even as having surrendered their sacerdotal status.

This study therefore approaches the military practices of clergy alongside the legal and narrative treatments, and treats the latter as reactions to, not the background of, the former. This requires consideration of a wide range of narrative, diplomatic and legal source material. A broad approach shows that clerics’ military activities cannot be separated from their spiritual powers, that canonical treatment was more fragmented and less influential than has been assumed, and that the condemnations of some authors existed alongside others’ praise for clerics’ valour, loyalty, or commitment to defending their flocks. In consequence, the extended study of clerical participation in warfare is shown to have significant consequences for our conception of the bounds of military history, the construction of the licit and the illicit, and the nature of clerical identity itself.
Pro Genovefe, carissima mea
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I offer my thanks to my family for their unfailing encouragement, support and love, especially my father, Tim, my mother, Heather, and my brother Matthew. Above all, I thank my wife, Genevieve, who has had to live with a medievalist for the better part of a decade and the problem of militant clergy for almost half that time. She has been of great help in preparing the final draft of the manuscript.

Professor Anne Duggan and Dr Andrew Roach examined the thesis and their kind advice has corrected many of my infelicities. The remaining errors, omissions, repetitions, misinterpretations and tedious chapters are entirely my own responsibility.
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<tr>
<td>AHR</td>
<td><em>The American Historical Review</em></td>
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<td>ANS</td>
<td><em>Proceedings of the Battle Conference on Anglo-Norman Studies</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>HSJ</td>
<td>The Haskins Society Journal: Studies in Medieval History</td>
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<td>JH</td>
<td>‘Continuation by John of Hexham’,</td>
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<td>MGH</td>
<td>Monumenta Germaniae Historica</td>
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<tr>
<td>PL</td>
<td>Patrologia Latina, Jacques-Paul Migne (ed), (217 Vols, Cambridge: Chadwyck-Healey (1844-1865); <a href="http://pld.chadwyck.co.uk/">http://pld.chadwyck.co.uk/</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>RH</td>
<td>‘Historia Ricardi, Prioris Ecclesiae Haugustaldensis’</td>
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<td>SMO</td>
<td>Symeonis Monachi Opera</td>
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<td>Transactions of the Royal Historical Society</td>
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Introduction

This thesis is one of the first broad studies of medieval clerical involvement in warfare. It is the first to focus on England. It will deal primarily with bishops and abbots, though will also consider lesser clergy, and will address three principal questions: Which clergy engaged in military activity in England, and when? By what means did they do so? How did others understand and react to these activities?

Militant Clerics and Historians

While it is quite common to refer to the phenomenon of clerics bearing arms, or leading warriors, there has been little work on the military activities of clergy in England as an analytical category. References to individual cases are scattered throughout the scholarship with no large-scale study drawing them together. In the absence of a substantial historiographical tradition on this matter with which to engage, this thesis does not have a dedicated “literature review” chapter. Instead, references from secondary literature are generally integrated into the text. This part of the introduction, therefore aims only to sketch in the general contours and highlight those works which are of substantial importance, while drawing attention to the assumptions and conceptual problems which have become apparent.

Many notices of clerical participation in warfare in the existing literature are in biographies, or studies of individual careers.1 Though these contextualise such behaviour with the cleric’s other activities, they do not generally seek to set the militant behaviour of their subjects against the great mass of material that can be assembled for clergy at war in general. In other words, how typical was it that a particular prelate was involved in a particular siege, wore armour, or brought men to a particular battle?

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There are a few studies that have a more general application to the phenomenon of militant clergy, most notably the work of Helena Chew. This represented the first major attempt to treat one area of prelates’ military activity as an analytical category, and despite its age and narrow focus, remains important. Most of the work that could potentially provide models for the formation of a study such as this, however, is continental in focus. Chambers’ study of the popes and cardinals who became military leaders during the Renaissance emerged around the time this thesis was undertaken. It is primarily an extended narrative account of his subjects’ military adventures, not too different in type (if much larger in scale) from that in Part One of this study. It does have useful retrospectives on the papacy’s earlier involvement in war, a subject which there is little space to discuss here, and neatly summarises some complex canonical material. For the most part, Chambers presented a picture of clerical generalship set against a context of canonical disapproval. Of greater significance for the general study of militant clergy in England is the work on Imperial bishops by Reuter and Arnold. Both addressed a range of important aspects of the phenomenon. Reuter remarked on the (not only canonical) criticism levelled at bishops who became involved in war though he also drew attention to Lucius III’s uncertainty on this. Both commented on Imperial bishops’ leadership of warriors, especially ministeriales, and both considered the difficulties and conflicts that resulted from those relationships. They highlighted the aristocratic complexion of the Imperial episcopate, arguing that this affected the outlook of their subjects, and suggested that the great resources of Imperial sees (generally much greater than their French or Insular counterparts) were the basis of episcopal military power, but compelled bishops to act in the bellicose fashion of lay magnates. Both depicted the military power of bishops in relation to royal power, Arnold suggesting that the military activities of Imperial bishops were compensation for the weakness of royal power, and Reuter that royal military service could be considered part of a general

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4 Ibid, 8.


strategy of Königsnähe. They also confronted circumstances under which clerics could be praised for their military endeavours, either as a theoretical legal position, or in the assessment of a chronicler. A result of having surveyed a wide range of individual cases, both observed that many cases of episcopal military leadership resulted in serious defeat. Reuter was keen to emphasise that even in the Empire, generalisations are often unhelpful, for only a small minority of prelates led men to war.

Reuter and Arnold’s careful, multithematic approach however, is not always paralleled in some of the literature on prelates in England. Far more common is framing the discussion in Roundian terms. While both Reuter and Arnold emphasised aristocratic backgrounds and secular wealth as the fonts of episcopal power, for most scholars, clerical military leadership is not considered an area for exploration, because clerical military service is conceived as the discharge of duties derived from landed possessions. To select one example among many:

Serving the King could mean, literally, fighting on his behalf. In 1075 a baronial revolt broke out... and his kingdom was saved by an alliance of Geoffrey of Coutances, Odo of Bayeux, and Lanfranc himself – all bishops, but acting here as territorial magnates loyal to the king.

This sort of treatment seems somewhat obsolete. The phrase “but acting here as territorial magnates” adds little to the analysis and seems unsupported by evidence. Three conditions would have to be satisfied for it to become admissible: it would have to be clear that the resources used by the bishops were drawn exclusively from their landed possessions, their way of war would have to be indistinguishable from that of closely comparable “territorial magnates”, and some contemporary or near contemporary opinion would have to portray them in this light.

Regarding militant clerics as behaving “as” barons, justiciars, or some other secular rank, can cause theoretical problems. Cheney’s biography of Hubert Walter,

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7 Ibid, 162, 169; Reuter, ‘Episcopi cum sua Militia’, 88.
10 Ibid.
for instance, casts clerical involvement in warfare in general as a product of land tenure, but suggested that Hubert’s own conception of the bounds of his functions was far from clear, and warned against delineating sharply between them. Perhaps nowadays, describing a layman as fighting “as a landholder” or similar, would now smack too much of the tyranny of the feudal construct to be admissible. The same standard should be applied to clergy.

Secular and Spiritual Warfare

The concept of Christian devotion as a form of supernatural battle, militia Christi, is one of the most powerful and enduring forces in Christian thought. Its foundations are in Paul’s letters, but it is a natural product of any theology that emphasises Satan as a living presence and the story of his rebellion as the central narrative of Christian history. Though ubiquitous in mediaeval literature, particularly hagiography, there has not yet been a general survey of this concept in its various intellectual, psychological and artistic manifestations. There has, however, been some important work highlighting how spiritually militarised certain forms of medieval Christian behaviour could become. Rosenwein, for example, emphasising a psychological approach to the study of liturgy, argued that Cluniac monks, most of whom were nobles by birth and early education, were motivated by a rite which provided an outlet for their native aggression, but as a result of the intellectual progress made under Charlemagne, had to be reconciled with Christian pacifism. Following Southern, she emphasised that a serious theological conception also underlay the idea of militia Christi at Cluny. Southern argued that the theological structure was fatally weakened by Anselm in Cur deus homo, Rosenwein that the advent of Crusading provided a new way for warriors to express their aggression in a way beneficial to their salvation, and that in consequence, after 1096, “the day of Cluniac liturgy was over”, though she did revisit the idea of spiritual power being

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12 Cheney, Hubert Walter, 4, 89.
asserted by monks against physical enemies. More recently, much of Damon’s treatment of the links between warfare and sanctity in pre-Conquest English literature has focussed around militia Christi and the translation of warrior-saints from secular to spiritual warfare. This, however, also confines itself to the period before the Conquest.

While Rosenwein and Damon restricted themselves to literary and liturgical practice before the end of the eleventh century, Contamine explored the nexus between battle and devotion in much more general terms, proposing a model of “integrated war”, in which the clerical struggle against the devil constituted only one component. He examined the application of spiritual power to earthly warfare, such as the rites and prayers undertaken by troops before battle, religious war cries, pious benefactions made in gratitude for victory, and the blessing of weapons. He highlighted such dramatic cases as Bishop Bernard, who commanded troops under Otto III, riding into battle with a lance containing nails from the True Cross, yet was concerned only occasionally with clerics themselves.

It might be possible to go further than Rosenwein, Damon or even Contamine by developing a theoretical approach to conflict which imagines war as conducted on spiritual, terrestrial, and cosmic planes, and involves a thorough merging of the psychological, devotional, strategic and economic over a broader thematic range even than Contamine envisaged, and a far broader chronological range than that expected by Rosenwein or Damon. Bede tells us that when Northumbria was invaded by Penda, King Oswiu attempted to appease him with tribute. When that failed, he turned heavenward, offering God the treasure instead. Despite being vastly outnumbered, Oswiu achieved victory on the banks of the Winwaed, and fulfilled his vow, making his daughter a nun. He also “gave twelve small estates on which, as they were freed from any concern about earthly military service, a site and means might be provided for the monks to wage heavenly warfare and to pray with unceasing devotion that the race might win eternal peace” (... donatis insuper xii possessuunculis terrarum, in

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18 Bede, 288-290.
quibus ablato studio militiae terrestris ad exercendam militiam caelestem supplicandumque pro pace gentis eius aeterna devotioni sedulae monachorum locus facultasque suppeteret).19 Oswiu’s temporal resources, though insufficient to achieve victory directly, could be used to call down divine aid in battle. Resources are switched easily between temporal and spiritual warfare, with God appearing as in effect an ally who expected a 

*quid pro quo* for military assistance.

At the other end of our chronological range, William of Newburgh, reflecting on religious foundations made during Stephen’s reign, portrayed them as training camps for *milites Christi*, and placed them in the context, not as we might have expected, of the destruction of churches, but the building of adulterine castles. Newburgh’s depiction is almost of celestial-diabolical arms race, in which the King of Peace was faced with the expansion of the King of Pride’s fortifications and responded in kind.20 At the end of the twelfth century, Newburgh was writing with a conception of equivalence between the resources of temporal and spiritual warfare not dissimilar to that of Bede in the eighth.

The transfer of resources between temporal and spiritual wars is paralleled in that of personnel. A knight entering a monastery, for instance, was often presented as graduation from a lower, to a higher form of warfare.21 Orderic tells us directly that this construction was actually used in recruiting new monks,22 and Gregory VII’s use of this had a major role to play in the establishment of crusading.23 Equally, a number of saints’ pacifism in life was replaced by violence in death. John of Worcester, for instance tells graphically, how the ghost of St Edmund, who had rejected the use of

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19 Bede, 292-293.
21 For example, *OV*, II, 40, 132.
weapons when alive, transfixed the Viking King Swein with a spear,\textsuperscript{24} and it has been suggested that St Cuthbert’s terrifying reputation may have been important in protecting the episcopal city from attack.\textsuperscript{25} There is no space here, unfortunately, to dwell on saintly violence.

Only one scholar, Valerie Ramseyer, has considered the concept of spiritual warfare in depth in relationship to a militant cleric, Archbishop Alfanus I of Salerno (1058-1085).\textsuperscript{26} Erecting no barriers between the areas of her subject’s spiritual and military activity, she observed (partly based on Alfanus’ own writings) that clerical office, the cleric’s spiritual powers, and the intercession of saints could be conceptualised as means of defending the cleric’s flock against threats visible and invisible. \textit{Militia Christi} had the potential to narrow the ideological gulf between warfare and devotion almost to nothing, and could be used to move from one battlefield to the other. It is, however, striking that while there is some literature on aspects of \textit{militia Christi} and an increasing body of work on warfare as a religious experience, there has been little work done on those whose primary function was in spiritual warfare, but who also undertook the warfare of the world.

\textbf{Canonical Scholarship and Theory}

The conception of militant clerics acting “as barons”, has often been juxtaposed with canonical restrictions on clerical arms bearing. Oliver, for instance, noted that:

\begin{quote}
The issue of clerics fighting was problematic throughout the medieval period. In theory, churchmen were barred from practising violence. Canon law laid a proscription against the clergy taking part in warfare or shedding blood, and dictated that severe penalties were to be imposed on those who actively engaged in military duties. In reality there are numerous examples of fighting clerics...
\end{quote}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{24} JWC, II, 476.
\textsuperscript{26} Ramseyer, Valerie (2007). ‘Pastoral Care as Military Action: The Ecclesiology of Archbishop Alfanus I of Salerno (1058-1085)’, in John Ott, Anna Jones (eds), \textit{The Bishop Reformed Studies in Episcopal Power and Culture in the Central Middle Ages} Aldershot: Ashgate, 189-208, 216.
\end{flushright}
Oliver rightly observed that medieval law features repeated canonistic (and very rarely, secular) pronouncements forbidding or restricting involvement in warfare and other violence. The term “canon law”, however, is used as if it were a static, or at least clear, legal framework within which individuals’ behaviour can be assessed. Michael Prestwich was more nuanced when he wrote:

The clergy were forbidden to take up arms. Among the articles promulgated at the council of Westminster in 1138 was an explicit statement that it was “ridiculous and inconvenient” for them to do so, and the authority of Pope Nicholas and even St Paul was cited. The view of canon lawyers was less extreme; bishops could provide soldiers for the army, exhort men to fight a just war, and travel with the army, though they could not themselves fight. In practice they were not automatically excluded by their cloth from military command.

Though Prestwich acknowledged distinctions between canonical materials, he too invoked a static framework, assuming that a reference to a single English council helpfully addresses “Canon Law” for a book with a great chronological range and casts militant clergy as opposed by that framework. This, however, is the approach that specialist scholarship has warned against for over a century. We have been encouraged to recognise in particular that every canon law collection before Peter of Benevento’s *Compilatio Tertia* (1210) was private, and so essentially a product of the resources and caprices of the compiler, that distinguishing genuine texts from forgeries is often a major problem, that not even all texts contained within the same collection were necessarily regarded as having the same authority, that the documents often preserve conciliar legislation without any material relating to its

28 “Ill-matched” would be a closer translation
origins,\textsuperscript{33} that canonistic writing remained stubbornly resistant to attempts to produce a definitive corpus,\textsuperscript{34} and that many of the texts comprising “Canon Law” itself are self-evidently attempts to clarify its uncertainties.\textsuperscript{35} Even if the detailed study demanded by these problems is undertaken, we have the problem of ascertaining how and how far canonical texts reached broader society.\textsuperscript{36} Though Brundage was writing of the period of the barbarian kingdoms and early Mediterranean writing, his observations have a much broader applicability:

The problem did not arise from a shortage of law; if anything there was too much of it – conciliar canons, synodal decrees, papal decisions, and the dicta of the church fathers provided a luxuriant abundance of rules and regulations. But the wealth of canons included numerous rules that were contradictory, obsolete, or unworkable. The canons presented a maze of conflicts and inconsistencies, too numerous and too difficult for most priests or bishops to master. To discover just what rules were supposed to govern a particular situation at a specific time and in a specific place... might demand lengthy research in a well-stocked library.\textsuperscript{37}

“Canon Law” as a discipline was primarily a means of solving specific problems. It was not an intellectual and philosophical system.\textsuperscript{38} More than that, until at least the thirteenth century, it was a highly subjective creation of the composer(s) of the original text, the compiler, and the reader. While there are general trends which can be observed, this must be on the basis of specific knowledge of individual texts. Failure to do so is, in effect, the creation of new “Canon Law” in the mind of the historian. It is not enough to juxtapose an individual’s behaviour with a church council and declare it either canonical or uncanonical.\textsuperscript{39} As Charles Duggan put it, “Whenever the canon law is consulted to elucidate more general problems, it is

\textsuperscript{33} Barthélemy, Dominique (2009). ‘The Peace of God and Bishops at War in the Gallic lands from the Late Tenth to the Early Twelfth Centuries’, in \textit{ANS XXXII}: 1-23 (2).
\textsuperscript{38} Brett, ‘Finding the Law’, 51.
misleading to refer simply to one or two of the most famous codices however great their professional importance.” Duggan, however, was keenly aware that a tendency to divorce canon law from its historical context is not a vice of non-specialists only:

The detailed research... (chiefly by continental scholars) on the work of the medieval canonists, strictly in their professional capacity, has not yet been linked satisfactorily with more general interpretations of ecclesiastical history in its social and political aspects. This is particularly true in English history... 

The proclivity of canonical specialists to separate their discipline from the mainstream of historical debate remains a problem, though the gulf is perhaps now beginning to be closed particularly by Martin Brett.

**Form and Remit of the Study**

As scholarship on medieval warfare has tended to examine an ever-wider set of activities, it seems appropriate that, following the example of Reuter and Arnold, this thesis should examine as many different fields of military activity as possible. It requires a substantial component of narrative, and must address the traditional issues of military historiography, particularly castle-building and knight service, but it must also consider the complex personal, institutional and charismatic relationships of prelate and “their” warriors, including the prelate’s household. As there has been ever-heavier emphasis on war itself as an experience with important religious components, and in light of Ramseyer’s work, there must also be substantial consideration of how the spiritual roles of prelates interacted with their military activities, in particular, of how their spiritual powers were used for military ends. This thesis, while it must introduce ideas long predating the period under discussion, such

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40 Duggan, C. *Decretal Collections*, 3.
41 Ibid, 2. Compare Pollock, Frederick (1893). ‘Anglo-Saxon Law’, in *EHR* 8: 239-271 (239) “They [Laws] are intelligible only when they are taken as part of a whole which they commonly give us little help to conceive.”
42 Dr Brett has been researching the transmission of canonical ideas into non-canonical texts, particularly charters. I am grateful to him for sharing with me a draft copy of his new paper, ‘The Bishop’s Charter and the Law in Twelfth-Century England’ delivered at the Thirteenth International Congress of Medieval Canon Law (Esztergom 2008), which will emerge in print shortly, edited by Anzelm Szuromi. This is the first important study of the appearance of learned law in non-legal texts, establishing that canon law texts began to penetrate English diplomatic documents, particularly from the 1170s on, and opens a new front in the discipline. As yet, there has been no study of the influence of learned law on narrative texts. Even if it established that such influence was minimal, this is sorely needed.

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as the terms of early canonical legislation, generally eschews the idea of cultural “background” against which clerical warfare takes place, and by which it should be judged. Instead, views of contemporaries and later commentators are understood as “reactions” to militant clerical behaviour.

That said, the limited time, and very limited space available for a modern thesis place limits on the range of material that can be discussed. For instance, there is only a little work on archaeology or architecture, the earlier discussion of militia Christi is compressed into a few pages and the great mass of unpublished monastic cartularies is not explored.

Similar problems apply in terms of geographical and chronological remit. The phenomenon of militant clergy could be explored from at least the conversion of Constantine until after the Reformation, both in the Latin west and Byzantium. Yet to expand the thesis to consider even France or Outremer as part of its general discussion would massively increase the available source material and historiography, as would broadening the chronological range into the age of Peter des Roches and Raymond of Penafort. In particular, the volume of canonical material available for the thirteenth century is so vast as to make a discussion of this sort impossible in the time and space allowed. As these limits were imposed by practical, rather than intellectual reasons, they have not been treated as absolute. It would seem perverse to ignore Odo of Bayeux’ campaign in France under Robert Curthose after his second fall in 1088, the involvement of Archbishop Baldwin and Hubert Walter on the Third Crusade, or the capture of Philip of Beauvais in 1196, not least because all were reported by English chroniclers.

In short, the intention here is to present to the reader a consideration of a wide variety of sources relating to a complex sphere of behaviour carried out by a large group of individuals over a long period. The intention is to treat those activities and the discourses that describe them without reducing them to a function of land tenure or criminality. It should at least draw attention to the rich source material available for a potentially vast but somewhat neglected topic.
Introduction II: Canonical Restrictions on Clerical Participation in Warfare from Nicaea (325) to Tribur (895)

The general difficulties of canonical study in historiography outlined above make a systematic approach to these texts and their reception extremely difficult. The advent of several electronic resources in recent years, however, has proven very useful. The online, searchable version of Patrologia Latina, the MGH’s Benedictus Levita project, the publication of Ivo of Chartres’ key writings online, and crucially the 2005 version of Clavis Canonum, make a study far easier than would have been the case using more traditional methods. It remains impossible to treat every text that referred to clerical participation in warfare, or connected issues such as homicide or hunting. What follows intends to be a fairly comprehensive collection of the conciliar pronouncements and papal decrees which found their way into the collections covered in the Clavis, Gratian’s Decretum, English conciliar decrees, or the canonistic writings of English authors. In the absence of a standard corpus of canon law before Gratian, we cannot speak of the “evolution” of this treatment. Compilers made individual decisions as to which source texts to use, meaning that the end product is frequently a complex mixture of texts originating in widely different periods. Moreover, “Canon Law” in every period is largely negative, condemning the illicit more frequently than licensing the licit. A canonist who believed that priests could carry weapons and go to war might make no mention of this in his composition – he would probably simply omit a prohibition, at least until the era of the decretists.

We cannot argue approval from silence, but many collections make no mention whatsoever of militant ecclesiastics, and the matter was not discussed in the decrees of some important church councils. The first three Lateran councils, for instance, although discussing related issues such as the Peace and Truce of God, promulgated

43 http://www.benedictus.mgh.de
44 http://knowledgeforge.net/ivo for the dissemination of manuscripts of Ivo’s Decretum in the Anglo-Norman world, see Brett, ‘The Bishops Charter and the Law’
no canons on clergy who bore arms. Furthermore, we cannot know what has been lost, both in manuscript distribution, and original compositions. Accepting these reservations, it is necessary to provide a brief overview of the relevant passages, identifying the precise content of canons restricting clerical participation in warfare, in order to discuss common themes and variations in the material. For the most part, this has meant identifying relevant canons from their incipits and explicits in *Clavis Canonum*, thence tracing the origins of each canon and discussing them in the order of their first appearance. The notes accompanying *Clavis* have been used to give a brief overview of the extent and distribution of later collections which used the texts.

**Origins of Restriction**

Despite the difficult conditions in which it had to operate, the Primitive church was wholly pacifist in its philosophy, expecting to be persecuted for its beliefs and to offer no physical resistance. The conversion of the warrior emperor Constantine (r.306-337), and his successful efforts to spread his Christianity, radically affected Christian thought on this issue.\(^{47}\) Though pacifist currents in Christian philosophy remained, Christian thinkers now had to find means of accommodating warfare, an important, perennial and socially significant component of life in the Empire within the sphere of legitimate activity.\(^{48}\) From Constantine’s conversion on, therefore, the Christian warrior, and even the militant cleric became a realistic possibility that would need to be addressed. The earliest pronouncements on this conceived of the problem as clergy being seduced away from their sacred duties by the temptations of lay society. Over time, canonists showed increasing awareness of the means by which clergy might be caught up in violence unwillingly, by the command of lay rulers, or by being present in a besieged city for instance, though they also showed a clearer, more exclusive conception of clerical office, sometimes explicitly linked to an inability to legitimately bear arms.

The Council of Nicaea (325) was concerned not only to establish a clear definition of Christian faith, but, as the texts of its canons make clear, to rule on a

\(^{47}\text{This point has been explored by a number of writers, Barber, *Knight and Chivalry*, 249; Keen, Maurice (1984). *Chivalry*. New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 45; Kolbaba, *Byzantine Lists*, esp. 48. See Damon’s summary of historiography, *Soldier Saints*, 4.}\n
number of practical problems that Constantine’s church had already encountered. It therefore dealt with issues such as the proper ordination of bishops, the role of deacons, and aspects of baptism. Canon XI assigned punishment to Christians who had lapsed under the pressure of the most recent persecutions. Canon XII dealt more specifically with those who had returned “to their own vomit”, (vero ad propriam vomitum sunt relapsi), in taking up arms (presumably in the wars between Constantine and Licinius) punishing them with an extended period of penance before they could be readmitted to the Christian community. Nicæa recognised the allure of military activity and assumed an important principle: restrictions on Christian behaviour (implicitly including that of clerics) were to take priority over military ambition. We get closer to a specific prohibition on clergy bearing arms with Canon VIII of the First Council of Toledo (400/401 AD), which declared that “If anyone serves in war after his baptism, let him not be promoted to the honour of deacon”, (si quis post baptismum militaverit, ad diaconatus honorem non promoveatur) but there was still no provision for one who had already attained such orders.

It would be another half-century before the first full-fledged clerical prohibition. The influence of Nicæa’s Canon XII on Canon VII of the Council of Chalcedon (451), however, is clear:

We decree that those who have once joined the ranks of the clergy or have become monks are not to depart on military service or for secular office. Those who dare do this, and do not repent and return to what, in God, they previously chose, are to be anathematised.

Again, the canon links secular office and status with military service, and consequently identifies military activity as tempting clergy away from their religious duties. By now the duty to avoid the snares of political, and particularly military entanglement was no longer applicable to the whole community of the faithful. It had therefore become cause to increase the distinction between clergy and laymen, just as Christians had once been distinguished from pagan Roman society. Failure to repent

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51 Tanner, Decrees, 90. Appendix (Introduction, 1).
of this sin, by which a cleric’s role within a community was defined, was punished by exclusion from that community. Like other Chalcedon canons, Canon VII was highly successful, appearing thirty-five times in thirty Canon Law collections from the sixth to the eleventh century. In slightly adapted form, it was taken up by Gratian.\(^{52}\)

Almost every collection containing Canon VII also contained Pope Leo’s monastic prohibition. Leo the Great (r.440-461) was pleased with the Canons of Chalcedon. He wrote to emperor Marcian in qua gratias ei agit quod per Chalcedonense concilium pax Ecclesiae catholicae reddita sit.\(^{53}\) In a letter to Bishop Rusticus of Narbonne (458/9), he answered a long series of the Bishop’s questions he forbade monks to bear arms:

Once he has taken it up, the way of the monk cannot be deserted by his own decision without sin. For indeed, one who has made a vow to God ought to deliver on it. From which [it follows that] he who has abandoned the profession of solitude and fallen into warfare or marriage ought to be purged by the amends of public penance. Because even though the innocent and the honest can be married or [in] the army, it is a transgression to abandon a better life.\(^{54}\)

Leo’s treatment of this subject seems to owe much to Chalcedon, and it often appeared in the same collections. It continued the theme of warfare drawing the cleric (in this case a monk) off his path, and electio melior is reminiscent of deum prius elegernunt, though Leo applied it here only to monks, and did not specify Chalcedon’s harsh punishment for the unrepentant. His emphasis on the responsibility incumbent on one who has chosen “a better life” is also reminiscent of his insistence that Contrarium est omnino ecclesiasticis regulis post poenitentiae actionem redire ad militiam saeculararem, cum Apostolus dicat: Nemo militans Deo implicat se negotiis saecularibus.\(^{55}\) While Chalcedon had also forbidden monks to marry (Canon XVI) Leo also made a link absent from Canon VII – between warfare and marriage as potential temptations, again showing a concern with properly separating the clerical (here the monastic) from the secular spheres. Leo’s pronouncement was enormously influential. Found thirty-nine times in thirty-seven Clavis collections, from the

\(^{52}\) C.20 q.3 c.3.  
\(^{53}\) *PL* 84, Col. 0765-0768.  
\(^{54}\) Appendix (Introduction, 2), *PL* 84, Col. 0767-0768.  
\(^{55}\) *PL* 84, Col. 0767.
seventh century on, it was particularly popular in eleventh and twelfth-century Italian collections, but appears in the works of influential authors from outside the peninsula such as Fulbert of Chartres and Burchard of Worms.\textsuperscript{56} It was eventually used by Gratian.\textsuperscript{57}

In 546, the Council of Lérida promulgated a series of canons governing clerical behaviour. Canon I was as follows:

Concerning those clerics who were by necessity stationed in sieges:
It is established that those who serve at the altar and handle the body and the blood of Christ, or who are allotted to the office of the holy vessel, should restrain themselves from all human blood, indeed [even] from that of the enemy. If they should fail in this, they should be deprived of both office and communion for two years. For those two years, let them be purged through the vigils, fasts, prayers and alms which the Lord provided, for the men [that they killed?] and at length let them be restored to office and communion. For this reason, however, let them never be promoted to higher office. And if in the aforementioned period they have been any more negligent concerning their salvation, let the time of the vigil of penance itself remain in the power of a priest.\textsuperscript{58}

The Lérida provision is the first conciliar pronouncement to consider clerical involvement in warfare as a product not of vice or secular ambition, but misfortune. In that, it is less severe than was Chalcedon, and provides a flexible mechanism for offending clergy to earn back their position (though again, not to be promoted). The construction, \textit{circa salutem suam} suggests too a serious concern not just with clerical discipline, but also with the cleric’s spiritual health. It is also the first legislation to declare contact with human blood incompatible with handling that of Christ. As we shall see, both elements have important places in future canonical treatments, and despite the specificity of the canon, it circulated fairly widely, and is found with minor variations in eleven \textit{Clavis} collections, from Spain to Germany and from the seventh to the twelfth century, including Ivo’s \textit{Tripartita} and \textit{Collectio Lanfranci}, meaning that it was widely available in England after the Norman Conquest. It was known to Gratian.\textsuperscript{59}

\textsuperscript{56} \textit{Decretum}, VIII, 8.
\textsuperscript{57} C.20 q.3 c.1.
\textsuperscript{58} Appendix (Introduction, 3).
\textsuperscript{59} D.1 c.36; http://www.benedictus.mgh.de/quellen/chga/chga_041t.htm accessed 29/08/10; D.1 c.36
The next restriction to appear was Canon XLV of the Fourth Council of Toledo (633):

Clerics who take up or have taken up arms willingly in whatever insurrection, once discovered, and having lost their grade, are handed over into a monastery of penance.\(^{60}\)

This canon was not disseminated as widely as earlier provisions. It appears in only seven texts – *Collectio Hispana* in the seventh century (though this enjoyed a wide circulation), and later in France and northern Italy. It was, however, taken up into *Collectio Lanfranci*. It represents a considerable departure from earlier developments, which may help explain its restricted success, targeting for the first time the assumption of weapons in rebellion rather than military service more generally. The chronology of events in Visigothic Spain in this period is rather obscure, but it has been observed that the instability of royal succession led the bishops at the council to use spiritual sanctions to protect the legitimate king from rebellion.\(^{61}\) It may therefore be an attempt to close down one potential source of opposition to the monarchy. Its inclusion in the *Collectio Lanfranci* means that if it was a relatively obscure text on the continent, it was certainly known to English bishops in the Norman period. Finally, despite its early obscurity, it was adapted by Gratian.\(^{62}\) It should also be noted that this Council did conceive of a role for the bishop in defending his flock against physical threats, but this was explicitly non-military. This text will henceforth be referred to as the Toledan Requirement:

Bishops should not doubt that the charge of the protection and defence of the people has been placed upon them by God. And therefore, when they see that judges and the powerful arise as oppressors of the poor, they should speak against them with the admonition of the priest. And if they should scorn to be corrected, they [the bishops] should make it known to royal ears, in order that the royal power should control those who will not bend to the justice

\(^{60}\) Appendix (Introdcution, 4); http://www.benedictus.mgh.de/quellen/chga/chga_046t.htm accessed 24/6/08; Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, 19.


\(^{62}\) C.23 q.8 c.5
of the priest. And if anyone should disregard it, he will be [regarded as] a criminal by the council of the bishops.63

This canon occurs on 24 occasions, in 21 collections from 675 onwards from Spain to the Empire. Although originating in the fourth council of Toledo, it does not seem to be held in particular association with the Toledan prohibition. It seems to anticipate the argument that a bishop should be responsible for protecting his flock in all spheres and avoids that problem by confining his role to that of admonisher and courtier. Clearly, the application of the bishop’s power is intended to be entirely moral and spiritual here, with the temporal sword wielded only by the secular power. This supplies evidence for a concern with delineating the boundaries between the secular and spiritual spheres from an early date, and is present in Collectio Lanfranci, though Gratian made no use of it.

63 Appendix (Introduction, 5); http://www.benedictus.mgh.de/quellen/chga/chga_046t.htm accessed 24/6/08
Ninth-Century Prohibitions

It was almost two hundred years before a new prohibition emerged. Canon 18 of the Council of Meaux (845) decreed that:

Anyone who is seen to be of the clergy, should not take up military arms, neither should he walk *armatus*, but they should show the name of their profession through religious habits and their religious habit. But if they should scorn this, as scorners of the sacred canons and profaners of the sanctity of the church, let them be punished by the loss of their grade, because they cannot serve both God and the world at the same time.

This canon appeared in seventeen collections from the tenth to the twelfth centuries, in Italy, Gaul, the Empire and the Iberian Peninsula, including the highly influential texts of Burchard of Worms and Ivo of Chartres before being picked up by Gratian. It seems likely that the council had 2 Timothy 2 (3-5) in mind:

Labour as a good soldier of Christ Jesus. No man, being a soldier to God, entangleth himself with secular businesses: that he may please him to whom he hath engaged himself. For he also that striveth for the mastery is not crowned, except he strive lawfully.

The canon shows a continuation of the concern shown at Toledo for the problem of clergy actually carrying weapons, and involving themselves overmuch in the world, and argues that it is inherently impossible to serve (militare) both God and the world. It also provides an early case of canons referring back to earlier decrees as the canonical tradition expanded. The next text that concerns us is as follows:

Charles by the grace of God, king of the realm of the Franks, ruler and devoted defender of the holy church and its helper in all things. With the encouragement of the Apostolic see, and all our followers,

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64 Unfortunately, Latin usually does not distinguish between “armed” and “armoured”.
65 Appendix (Introduction, 6); http://knowledgeforge.net/ivo/decretum/ivodec_6_1p0.pdf accessed 8/7/08; C. 23 q. 8 c. 6.
66 *Decretum*, II, 211.
67 *Decretum*, VI, 286; *Panormia III*, 168.
68 C.23 q.8 c.6.
69 labora sicut bonus miles Christi Iesu nemo militans implicat se negotiis saecularibus ut ei placeat cui se probavit nam et qui certat in agone non coronatur nisi legitime certaverit
and with a great consultation of the bishops and the other priests, we entirely forbid the slaves of God everywhere and in every way to bear armour or to fight, or to go in the army or the host, except only those [who go] for the divine mystery, namely for the solemn performance of masses and for carrying the defence of the saints; for this they were chosen; that is, let the prince have with him one or two bishops with chapel priests, and every prefect [should have] one priest, who can judge the sins confessed by the men, and to assign a penance.\textsuperscript{70}

This canon purports to be a decree of Charlemagne, drawn from one of his capitularies (and almost always appeared with an inscription to that effect). It sought to limit ecclesiastical participation in the Frankish host. The actual number of clerics (both bishops and lower ranks) present is to be strictly limited, they are forbidden to engage in combat or carry weapons, and they are to confine themselves to caring for the spiritual welfare of the warriors. This canon appears in ten \textit{Clavis} collections, including that of Burchard of Worms. It therefore circulated widely across Europe, particularly in the eleventh century. It cannot, however, be placed in the context of any particular event in Charlemagne’s reign because the earliest appearance of the text is among the forgeries of the \textit{Collectio Capitularium} of “Benedictus Levita”, the famous confection from c.847-852 in the diocese of Rheims which sought to support the independence of the episcopate from secular power.\textsuperscript{71} In that context, it is interesting to note that almost every collection in which it is found also contains the prohibition from the council of Meaux (845). It continues to be of interest because of its wide circulation and certainly emerges from the reforming milieu of the mid ninth century but its origins should be seen in the context of the reign of Charles the Bald, and with particular reference to the letters of Pope Nicholas I (r.858-867). When King Charles excused his absence from the council that Nicholas had summoned at Rome, the pope responded in \textit{Credimus ex Dei} that:

\begin{quote}
What you have added is extremely blameworthy – saying that the greater part of the bishops’ men are day and night standing guard against the maritime pirates with your other \textit{fideles} and that therefore
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{70} Appendix (Introduction, 7); http://www.benedictus.mgh.de/handschriften/p16_3t.htm accessed 7/7/08

\textsuperscript{71} “Benedictus” includes a gloss, apparently in an attempt to support the authenticity of his canon: Omnibus notum esse... firmabimus http://www.benedictus.mgh.de/handschriften/p16_2t.htm accessed 13/08/08. Unlike the canon itself, this was not taken up in subsequent collections.
the bishops are prevented from coming – since Christ’s soldiers serve Christ, while the world’s soldiers should serve the world, as it is written: “No-one fighting for God should involve himself in worldly business.” For if the knights of the world apply themselves to warfare, what is there for the knights of Christ but that they should devote themselves to prayers?\textsuperscript{72}

This text occurs in nine Clavis’ collections, and probably circulated over Gaul, Italy, Catalonia and the Western Empire, particularly in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. It shows how far the practical considerations of the role of the clergy in the Carolingian world have driven the development of papal thinking. In this case, only bishops are discussed, but the old concern with preventing military adventures from distracting from clerical duties is clearly present, and the Pope clearly shares “Benedictus Levita’s” particular concern with royal service. Now, however, it is the use of homines episcopororum that is contentious, not on the basis of an objection about the use of ecclesiastical resources for military purposes, but with the implicit assumption that the involvement of episcopal vassals implied the leadership of the bishops themselves. Nicholas, like “Benedictus” held the view that it is impossible to serve God and the world, but developed the connotations of militare further. In so doing, he began using the language of spiritual warfare to establish distance between the physical and spiritual spheres, apparently being the first canonist to do so. This was not the only occasion on which Pope Nicholas addressed himself to the necessity of separating clergy from worldly warfare. In 867, he wrote in Clericum qui paganum:

It is not proper that any cleric who has killed a pagan should be promoted to a higher grade, he ought to be denied the acquisition. Indeed it is homicide. For let the soldiers of the world be separate from the soldiers of the church, let him not bring the knight of the church to the service of the world, through which it may be necessary to come to the shedding of blood. Furthermore, just as it is shameful and ruinous for a layman to perform the mass, and carry out the sacrament of the body and the blood of Christ, so it is ridiculous and ill-matched that a cleric should take up arms and go to war, just as that outstanding preacher, Paul says: “No one serving God should entangle himself in secular affairs”, and following on from that vice

\textsuperscript{72} Appendix (Introduction, 8); http://project.knowledgeforge.net/ivo/tripartita/trip_a_1_1p2.pdf accessed 12/08/08; C. 23 q. 8 c. 19 ; Full text; PL 119, Col 0921-0924
versa, no one serving the world should involve himself in spiritual business.\textsuperscript{73}

Nicholas’ logic here has something of the sense of the Council of Lérida. Though he did not provide a path to redemption for the offending cleric, he resumed the same basic themes; a link between the sanctification of divine blood and the inability to shed the blood of men, and a ban on promotion for the cleric who violates these terms. In addition, just as in his letter to Charles the Bald, the language of \textit{militia Christi} in used to create an explicit contrast with \textit{militia seculari}. The very authority of the priesthood itself, defined by its immunity to lay interference, is linked to its inability to bear arms. This text only circulated in four collections, but one of these was Ivo’s \textit{Tripartita}, and it was incorporated in Gratian’s \textit{Decretum}. Nicholas’ writings can here only be considered in so far as his words became part of canonical collections, but his attitude may have been hardening in this period. He had written to Archbishop Charles and his suffragans in \textit{Divinorum fulgentes dogmatum} in 863 that, “arma gerere audeant vel sumere \textit{ nisi} contra paganos…”\textsuperscript{74} a stance resembling the provision of the Council of Meaux, that clergy should be restrained from bearing arms as part of other requirements to maintain a suitably humble mode of life. The same year, Nicholas produced another text on clergy killing pagans. He wrote to Osbald, the \textit{chorepiscopus} of Regensburg:

Concerning those clerics about whom you sought counsel, namely those who in defending themselves have killed pagans, if they can return to their original grade after penance or proceed to a higher one. Know that we give them no excuse nor allow them any licence to kill any man in any way. But if it so happens that a cleric of the sacerdotal order kills a pagan, he should ponder very deeply whether he should retire from the office of priest: And it is better for him to serve the Lord blamelessly in this life in a lesser state than to be plunged into the depths by guiltily seeking higher things without just cause.\textsuperscript{75}

Nicholas here seems even more severe than in his letter to Geoffrey, for he required lifelong exclusion from the priesthood for transgressors, and indeed suggested that

\textsuperscript{73} Appendix (Introduction, 9); \textit{PL} 119, Cols 1129-1130A; D1 c.6.  
\textsuperscript{74} \textit{PL} 119, Cols 0810D, 0812A, 0812B.  
\textsuperscript{75} Appendix (Introduction, 10); \textit{PL} 119, Col 1131C; D.1 c.6.
their souls might be jeopardised if they attempted to return to duty. This was not adopted by any Clavis collection, but it was known to Gratian (the Decretum is the only place where the text survives).

Even this does not constitute the sum of Nicholas’ prohibitions on clergy and war, but in this sample, we can see a much more fully developed attitude to the problem than is visible in short, terse texts such as the canon from Chalcedon. For Nicholas, it seems that prohibition on clerical arms bearing was an important part of priestly identity, with particular implications for the mass, and as we have seen, his writings had a wide circulation among canonists. Nevertheless, however sophisticated the intellectual structure underlying his prohibitions, it must be stressed that Nicholas’s work is reactive to clergy who were behaving in a way he found unacceptable, most obviously in Divinorum fulgentes dogmatum and in his letter to the chorepiscopus of Regensburg. The latter in particular explicitly responded to a request for guidance. It is evidence, therefore, not only for a severe and sophisticated strain of canonistic thought in the ninth century, but also of uncertainty on this issue outside the papal circle. Another text known only from a late and highly suspect palea in Gratian’s Decretum is Pope John VIII’s letter to Empress Engelberga, c.873x876. The pope excused bishop John of Ravenna’s withdrawal from military service on the grounds that it was “against the profession of his order”, (contra professionem sui ordinis), even in warfare waged to “defend the land”, (terram defendere). The last prohibition of the ninth century emerged from the council of Tribur (895):

If any cleric whatsoever should be killed, whether in battle or in a brawl, or in the games of the gentiles, let no prayer be claimed for him, but let him fall into the hand of the Judge. He should not, however, be deprived of a funeral.

This canon is found in eighteen Clavis collections of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, distributed over a wide area. It is found in the Excerptiones Pseudo-

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76 The initial survey of the Clavis highlighted two canons with extremely limited circulation, of which we have been unable to obtain full texts; De Clericis arma ferentibus hoc decrevimus... communione privati permaneant; De Clericis arma ferentibus hoc decrevimus... proprio gradu decidant.
77 PL 126, 939 (Jaffé, 386), Decretum, 953.
78 Appendix (Introduction, 11); http://knowledgeforge.net/ivo/decretum/ivodec_6_1p0.pdf; C. 23 q. 8 c. 4.
Egberti. It certainly speaks of a response to a genuine practical problem; what to do with the bodies of clerics killed while participating in violence, (and here clerical warfare is clearly imagined in the context of other violent activities from the secular world). Such a man of course, could not be confined to a monastery for penance, nor could he suffer a demotion or loss of promotion prospects. In allowing him burial, however, the council has not chosen to expel him from the community in the manner of the Chalcedon VII’s anathematization.

Summary

It has often been observed that the choice made by the individual compilers as to which texts to include in canon law collections was essentially arbitrary. It depended not only on his philosophical and intellectual assumptions, but also the availability to him of relevant texts, their relative perceived authority, and above all, their potential utility. On the subject of clerical arms bearing and other involvement in war, the same seems to be true of the councils and popes who contributed the source texts themselves. They show a range of concerns from the distraction of clergy from their calling, to their spiritual health, to how to dispose of the corpses of clerics killed in battle. There is an equally diverse range of severity applied to these provisions. From the Council of Lérida on, we are clearly presented with reactions to very specific, practical problems. This material is not in any sense “the expression of an ideal”, but serious normative instruments. While the earliest material shows an awareness of war as an important, potentially seductive part of lay society, from the ninth century on, we are confronted by increasingly sophisticated ideas of the nature of priesthood as a distinct social “order”. Indeed, it may have been the very sophistication of this concept driving Nicholas in particular to demand greater separation of ecclesiastical and military life.

Despite these important distinctions, and the consequent hazards of generalising about what “Canon Law” said on these issues in any period, this part of the analysis has at least allowed the identification of important texts which will

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79 PL 89, 399 c. 155.
80 One other text found in the Clavis survey seems to require anathema of transgressing clerics; Quicumque clericus monachus ad secularem militiam... fuerit anathema sit, I have been unable to obtain a full text of this canon, but it seems to have had almost no impact, appearing in only the Épitome Hispana.
81 Cheney, Hubert Walter, 9.
subsequently be of relevance to particular English events and writers. By the end of
the ninth century, we can speak of a diverse body of canons in circulation which had
been growing for over five centuries, but which had only recently begun to achieve
anything like conceptual maturity. It often did not frame clerical arms-bearing as an
isolated phenomenon, but sought to separate clerical from lay modes of behaviour, of
which violence and the means to violence are only one aspect and by the end of the
period it had adopted the language of spiritual warfare, and in particular of its
expression in Timothy as a means to this end.
Part 1: Clergy in Battle and on Campaign

There are numerous chronicle accounts of bishops and abbots leading warriors on campaign in England. Some of these have been discussed in secondary literature, but there is no account bringing these together into a single narrative. The following section provides a more comprehensive survey, both permitting discussion of these incidents, and providing context for subsequent detailed analyses in parts 2 and 3.

Before 1066

The history of bishops exercising military command in Britain begins in 429AD, with a story in Constantius’ *Vita S. Germani*, which Bede absorbed into the *Ecclesiastical History*. When the Saxons and Picts marched against them, the Britons took St Germanus of Auxerre as their leader. Dripping from baptism, the Britons gave three shouts of “Alleluia”. Terrified by the sound, which echoed off the surrounding hills, the Saxons and Picts fled without bloodshed. Constantius and Bede heavily stressed the religious character of these events, but even in this portrayal, Germanus nominated himself as leader, picked the soldiers, led them to defensible ground, carried their banner himself, and had them await their enemies in ambush. Whether weapons were ever used (and the story does acknowledge that the Britons carried them) Germanus provided us, even before the mission of Augustine, with the first example of a bishop acting in England as a military commander.

For the sake of concision, rather than relating each event individually, occasions on which clergy appear at war before the Norman Conquest are summarised in the Appendix (1, Table 1). It seems likely that these incidents, almost all of them occasions when bishops and abbots led resistance against Welsh and Norse incursions, represent only a fraction of the total. Even if the compilers had the information, the terse, economical style of the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicles*, almost always the earliest record, does not list the leaders of every engagement. Around half

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83 Bede, 62-64.
84 For bloodless military victories in hagiography, Damon, *Soldier Saints*, 19, 33.
85 The incident is discussed in Wood, Ian (1984). ‘The end of Roman Britain: Continental Evidence and Parallels’, in Michael Lapidge, David Dumville (eds), *Gildas: New Approaches*. Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1-25 (11-12). Wood argues that the didactic purpose of the story is that if the priesthood provide the spiritual weapons, God will provide physical safety.
the prelates whose participation in a campaign is recorded in the *Chronicle* are noticed only because they died there.\textsuperscript{86} Unless the militant prelates of Anglo-Saxon England were extraordinarily vulnerable, there must therefore be a substantial number of instances that have been lost. It is also difficult to ascertain what the character of ecclesiastical leadership was. On several occasions, prelates were described as appointed by the king as leaders for the pursuit of a specific objective, for instance, the conquest of Kent in 823 or the interception of a Norse fleet in 992. On these occasions, and on others such as Bishop Ealhstan’s battle against the Danes at the mouth of the Parrett in 845, command seems to have been shared with a layman. We might assume under such circumstances that the prelates were leading royal troops, but we are told nothing of the composition of these forces or how they were raised.

The *Chronicle* also generally fails to specify whether prelates themselves bore and used arms, but as we have seen, from the point of view of some early canonists, this was a key issue. The description of Leofgar’s campaign into Wales depicts him taking up spear and sword\textsuperscript{87}. While this may be figurative, it seems likely that Anglo-Saxon prelates sometimes carry their own weapons into battle. Several extant Anglo-Saxon texts were intended to either prevent clerics from carrying weapons, or restrict the circumstances in which they did so, suggesting that the practice was common enough to provoke a legal response.\textsuperscript{88} Two Anglo-Saxon episcopal wills include armour and weapons in quantity. Bishop Theodred of London (d.960), left the king four horses, two of his best swords, four shields and four spears.\textsuperscript{89} Archbishop Aelfric (d.1005), left his lord “his best ship and all the sailing tackle with it, and sixty helmets and sixty coats of mail”, and ships for the people of Kent and Wiltshire.\textsuperscript{90} This was the heriot of a King’s thegn and suggests both a similar social standing and a tie to military service to the king.\textsuperscript{91} If some Anglo-Saxon clergy were accustomed to carry weapons, provoking a legal response, and their leaders could bequeath large quantities

\textsuperscript{86} For instance, Bishop Heahmund of Sherborne at the battle of Merton in 871, \textit{ASC}, 72.
\textsuperscript{87} \textit{ASC}, 186, 187; Part Three, Chapter Two.
\textsuperscript{88} Part Three, Chapter One.
\textsuperscript{89} \textit{C&S}, I, 77.
\textsuperscript{91} ‘King Aethelred’s Laws Issued at King’s Enham (1008)’, \textit{C&S}, I, 349.
of weapons and other military equipment, it seems unlikely that they would leave those arms at home when leading men into battle.  

The Defence of England in 1066

England suffered two major invasions in 1066, by King Harald Hardrada of Norway, then by Duke William of Normandy. The Normans might have marched under a papal banner, but English prelates participated in the defence nonetheless. Geoffrey Gaimar, writing in the mid-twelfth century, and following a lost northern source, had Harold entrusting equipment taken from Hardrada’s army after Stamford Bridge to Archbishop Ealdred. Ealdred had fought a battle in 1049, pursued Earl Swein with troops in 1051 and held Hereford in plurality with Worcester after Leofgar’s defeat. With Stamford Bridge so close to his archiepiscopal city, it is no surprise that he was with the king soon after the battle (if indeed, he had not been present at the engagement itself). Ealdred was not the only English churchman who marched with Harold in 1066. Abbot Leofric of Peterborough fell ill during the campaign, and returned to his monastery to die. This is recorded only in the Peterborough version of the Chronicle, and by Hugh Candidus. Again, the presence of a major English ecclesiastic on campaign is only revealed by his death, and then only by chroniclers of his house, suggesting the possibility of the presence of others whose names have not been preserved by the sources. One very late chronicler also alleged that Harold charged Abbot Aelfwold of St Benet’s Holme with defending the south coast against the Norman invasion, *Huic etiam a rege Haraldo marina commitebatur custodia.* While the evidence is not overwhelming, there seems no reason to dispute

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Barlow’s argument that Anglo-Saxon abbots led their thegns to the Battle of Hastings in person.97

After Hastings, Archbishop Stigand may have attempted to intervene. The Gesta Guillelmi tells us he was “threatening battle together with the sons of Ælfgar and other nobles”, (cum filiis Algardi alisque praepotentibus praelium minatur),98 and the fourteenth century Chronicle of William Thorne (a monk of St Augustine’s, Canterbury) says that the Conqueror and his army were surprised and surrounded by an army led by Stigand and Abbot Egelsin of St Augustine’s in woodland in Kent, threatening to derail the whole Conquest until William came to terms with Stigand, who demanded a guarantee of English liberties before he allowed the Conqueror to pass.99 In the form presented, it is certainly apocryphal, yet may contain elements of fact. There was nothing atypical about Anglo-Saxon prelates organising local defence against invasion. Moreover, Thorne was writing of events connected to his own abbey, and may have had sources of information that we do not. It is therefore at least possible that Stigand, and perhaps Egelsin, attempted to exercise military command after Hastings.

The Conquest of England 1066-1087

The involvement of Bishops Odo of Bayeux, and Geoffrey of Coutances in the subjugation of the kingdom is well known. William of Poitiers ascribed only a spiritual role for both bishops at Hastings.100 Orderic’s description of Geoffrey at Hastings is unclear, fautor acer et consolator.101 Odo of Bayeux’s activities during the invasion have left far more evidence, and provoked more comment from historians. His great historical importance, and the academic disagreements that has provoked demand treatment of the question, what was Odo’s role at the Battle of Hastings?

97 Barlow, Frank (1963). The English Church 1000-1066: A History of the Later Anglo-Saxon Church. London: Longman, 170-171. Barlow suggested that the death of Aluric, one of the Abbot of Ramsey’s men in the battle, may indicate that his lord was there also.
101 OVII, 266 Chibnall translates this with the rather strained “he fought in the battle as well as offering up prayers”.
Orderic Vitalis followed William of Poitiers closely on this subject, and Odo is not mentioned in the *Carmen de Hastingae Proelio*, but both were written for the glorification of the king’s achievements, a goal that would hardly be served by emphasising the contribution of his brother. In the absence of a contemporary chronicle account that gives Odo a military role, William of Poitiers’/Orderic’s depiction seems convincing, but there are grounds to question this. Odo was one of the greatest contributors to the invasion in terms of men and ships. He had been a military commander in the Conquest of Le Talou, Bray and the pays de Caux, along with Guy of Ponthieu in 1054, and would be again at a number of engagements later (below). Secondly, Ermenfrid of Sion’s penitential Ordinances are strong evidence that some clerics fought and killed in person. Then there is the famous depiction of Odo in the Bayeux Tapestry, which shows him in armour, intervening at the moment when the Normans believed Duke William slain. For a detailed treatment of Odo’s presentation in the tapestry, see Appendix 1 (*The Portrayal of Bishop Odo in the Bayeux Tapestry*).

Both Poitiers and Orderic made this a moment of critical importance, when the Norman army almost collapsed, as did Wace:

They [Norman warriors] were very much afraid and on the point of leaving; they intended to abandon the equipment, but did not know any means of escape, when Odo, the good priest, who was ordained in Bayeux, spurred his horse, saying to them:

‘Stand still, stand still! Calm down and do not move! Do not fear anything, for, please God, we will win the day.’ In this way they were reassured and did not stir. Odo went spurring back to where the battle was at its fiercest; that day he had truly shown his worth. He had donned a short hauberk over a white shirt. Its body was broad and its sleeves were broad; he sat on an all-white horse and everyone recognised him. He held a club in his hand, made the knights head for where the need was greatest and brought them to a stop there. He often made them attack and often made them strike.

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102 *OV*, II, 172.
104 *OV*, IV, 87
106 *Gesta Guillelmi*, 131; *OV*, II, 174.
107 forment furent espoënté, por poi qu’il ne s’en sunt torné, le harneis voleient guerpir, ne savient quel part garir, quant Odes, li boens coronez, qui de Baieues ert sacrez, posint, si lor dist: “Estez, estez! Seiez en pais, ne vos movez! N’aiez poor de nule rien ker, se Deu plaist, nos vientron bien.” Issi furent asseüré, ne se sunt mie remué. Odes revint poignant arriere ou la bataille esteit plus fiere, forment i a le jor valu; un haubergol aveit vestu desore une chemise blanche, lé fu le cors, *lee* la manche, sor un
Wace’s description accords with the view of Odo’s involvement that the Tapestry suggests. He is armoured, rides into the thick of the fighting and directs warriors in person. Though Wace is a very late source, his account of Hastings is generally detailed and informative. As Round observed, he was almost certainly familiar with the Tapestry, but it was not among his “foremost authorities”. In fact, his description reinforces the key features of the Tapestry’s depiction precisely by diverging from it in detail. Wace’s description of both Odo’s apparel and his horse are clearly derived from another source, and he did not present the Bishop leading “lads”, but full knights, yet the fundamentals agree exactly. Wace seems therefore, to have been working from an unknown source that gave Odo the same historical role but diverged slightly in detail. Bates suggested that the Tapestry, and Wace’s account, both sources with Bayeux connections, may exaggerate Odo’s role, but for the same reason, they may simply have reported in more depth. Poitiers had no need to include such an event to flatter his master, but as Wace makes clear, Odo’s involvement at that moment would have been dramatic and conspicuous. To invent such an anecdote, and claim the credit would be astonishingly impolitic, especially if the Tapestry were indeed Odo’s attempt to regain his brother’s favour. Overall, it seems that Odo rode armoured into battle, directed men personally, carried a visible symbol of command, and stopped the Norman army disintegrating at a critical moment.

It is perhaps easier to identify the involvement of prelates in the Conquest after Hastings than during the battle itself. The Conquest was an extended process, requiring both resistance to foreign invasion and suppression of domestic revolt, sometimes simultaneously in different regions, and now the monarch was often absent on the continent for extended periods. Military command had to some extent to be delegated. Odo and Geoffrey were among the men who fulfilled this role. In autumn 1067, Eustace of Boulogne raided Kent and besieged Dover castle. The king-duke had entrusted Dover to Odo and already returned to France. According to Orderic, Odo

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cheval tot blanc seeit, tote la gent le conoisseit, un baston teneit en son poig; la ou veeit le grant besoig faiseit les chevaliers torner e la les faiseit arrester, sovent les faiseit assaillir e sovent les faiseit ferir.


Bates, ‘Character and Career’, 6. suggested that Wace used the Tapestry for this scene, and interpreted it as Odo encouraging troops from the rear.
and Hugh de Montfort had led much of the castle garrison over the Thames, presumably as part of the process of overawing the region.\textsuperscript{110} The reduced garrison beat Eustace off, and according to Orderic, “the fugitives, imagining that the Bishop of Bayeux had arrived with a strong force, lost their heads” (\textit{fugientes uero Baicensem episcopum cum agmine copioso subito superuenisse rati sunt...}),\textsuperscript{111} in many cases falling to their deaths over the cliff as they fled. This incident shows command apparently shared between a layman and an ecclesiastic. In Anglo-Saxon cases of shared command we cannot judge how leadership was organised. Here it seems likely that Odo was the senior figure, and Orderic emphasised fear of Odo, not Hugh. By now he seems to have had a fearsome military reputation, but disappears from the military narrative between 1067 and 1071.\textsuperscript{112} Other ecclesiastics came to the fore as England dissolved into series of geographically distinct rebellions between 1069 and 1071. While the king was quashing an uprising at Stafford, the men of Dorset and Somerset rose up and besieged the new castle at Montacute. Geoffrey of Coutances broke the siege with a force from London, Winchester and Salisbury, and mutilated his prisoners.\textsuperscript{113} In 1070, the King made Turold abbot of Peterborough. The abbot brought with him one hundred and sixty knights,\textsuperscript{114} whom he led in person against Hereward’s insurgency at Ely. These knights may have been joined later by royal troops, and the abbot also raised a motte. His opponents meanwhile, included Bishop Aethelwine of Durham and some of the Ely monks. Turold’s methods will be discussed in Part 2, Chapter 5.

Prelates came forward again during the crisis of 1075.\textsuperscript{115} John of Worcester described how Bishop Wulfstan, Abbot Aethelwig of Evesham, Sheriff Urse of Worcester and Walter de Lacy brought their forces together to prevent Roger of

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\textsuperscript{110} \textit{OV} II, 204; For Odo’s effective overlordship of much of the home counties, Crouch, David (2002). \textit{The Normans – The History of a Dynasty}. London: Hambledon, 100
\textsuperscript{111} \textit{OV} II 204
\textsuperscript{112} Bates, ‘Character and Career’, 6
\textsuperscript{113} \textit{OV}, II, 228; \textit{OV} makes no mention of other bishops, but a march from London to Montacute would have taken Geoffrey past both Salisbury and Winchester, both of which were episcopal cities. A role on the part of the bishops in assembling the troops is possible, but in 1069 neither Herman at Salisbury, nor Stigand at Winchester had yet been replaced with Norman appointees. For Geoffrey’s relief of Montacute, Le Patourel, ‘Geoffroy de Montray’, 144, 151; Musset, Lucien (1983). ‘Un grand prelat normand du Xie siecle: Geoffroy de Montray, eveque de Coutances (1049-1093)’, in \textit{Revue du department de la Manche}: 3-17 (12); Tara Gale, John Langdon, Natalie Leishman, (2006). ‘Piety and Political Accommodation in Norman England: The Case of the South-west’, in \textit{HSJ} 18: 110-131 (118).
\textsuperscript{115} Gibson, ‘Normans and Angevins’, 39.
Hereford from crossing the Severn.\textsuperscript{116} In John’s account, this, together with large forces of \textit{Angli} and \textit{Normanni} assembled by Odo and Geoffrey caused Earl Ralph to lose his nerve and flee from Cambridge (where his army was camped) back to Norwich.\textsuperscript{117} Ralph was pursued the whole way, and for the second time, prisoners falling into Geoffrey of Coutances’ hands were mutilated.\textsuperscript{118} Orderic’s account is slightly different, including Ralph’s defeat at \textit{Fagaduna}.\textsuperscript{119} Norwich was besieged and eventually taken, though on this occasion the vanquished were allowed to withdraw.\textsuperscript{120} Geoffrey, along with William of Warenne and Robert Malet remained in the castle with a substantial force afterward.\textsuperscript{121} The suppression of the 1075 revolt, therefore, included several major ecclesiastics and has several points of interest. Wulfstan, Aethelwig, Urse and Walter’s intervention to keep the two earls separated shows the cooperation of local ecclesiastical and lay magnates against the rebels. It also shows how quickly after the Conquest those few English prelates who retained their offices could find themselves again commanding troops in royal service. The mutilation of captured rebels on two occasions when Geoffrey of Coutances was a leader suggests that ecclesiastical leadership did nothing to moderate the brutality of contemporary warfare, belying Clover and Gibson’s suggestion that the mercy shown to the defenders of Norwich was perhaps evidence of episcopal lenience seems unnecessary.\textsuperscript{122} Archbishop Lanfranc’s role in suppressing the rebellion is uncertain. Bates described his duties as “basically those of postman and counsellor”,\textsuperscript{123} but Lanfranc saw it as a matter of honour. He told the king that his return “would be offering us a grave insult were you to come to our assistance in subduing such perjured brigands”, (\textit{magnum dedecus nobis faceris si pro talibus periuris et latronibus uincendis ad nos uenireis}).\textsuperscript{124} In 1078, Geoffrey was campaigning with William in Maine.\textsuperscript{125} In 1080, when the populace of Durham murdered Bishop

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{118} JWC, III, 26.
\item \textsuperscript{119} OV, II, 316.
\item \textsuperscript{120} The Letters of Lanfranc Archbishop of Canterbury, Helen Clover and Margaret Gibson (ed/trans). Oxford: Oxford University Press. (1979), 126
\item \textsuperscript{121} Letters of Lanfranc, 124-126; Le Patourel, ‘Geoffrey de Montbray’, 144.
\item \textsuperscript{122} Letters of Lanfranc, 125, n. 1; Particularly given the pragmatic tendency of contemporary commanders to grant generous terms to the defenders of fortresses to ensure a swift surrender.
\item \textsuperscript{123} Bates, ‘Origins of the Justiciarship’, 5.
\item \textsuperscript{124} Letters of Lanfranc, 125.
\item \textsuperscript{125} Le Patourel, ‘Geoffrey de Montbray’, 145.
\end{itemize}
Walcher and his knights, it was Odo who marched north at the head of a punitive expedition. The region was devastated, the population terrorised (again, by summary execution and mutilation), and the Cathedral looted.\textsuperscript{126}

To this period also belongs an oft-quoted writ, first stressed by Round, summoning Abbot Aethelwig of Evesham in person with his quota of five knights to the king’s court at Clarendon.\textsuperscript{127} Bates doubted whether the writ is genuine, and dated it broadly to 1066-1078. Brown and Chibnall put it around 1072\textsuperscript{128}, Gillingham 1068 or 1069\textsuperscript{129}, and Helena Chew long ago pointed out that the existence of writs of summons is hardly proof of the performance of service.\textsuperscript{130} Nonetheless, this is the period in which clerics’ control of military service becomes a major historiographical issue, to which we will return to in Part 2, Chapter 1.

**William Rufus and Henry I (1087-1135)**

The great rebellion which opened Rufus’ reign seems to have consisted of a series of local revolts by individual magnates, and only those which featured named ecclesiastical leaders will be discussed here. Senior clerics led warriors on both sides of the conflict, and Odo, Geoffrey and William of St Calais (Bishop of Durham) were among the most senior rebel leaders.\textsuperscript{131} The rebellion began when Odo fortified Rochester, and urged Robert Curthose to send reinforcements.\textsuperscript{132} Odo used Robert’s men to reinforce Rochester. Though the king took Tonbridge Castle (about eighteen miles south-west of Rochester) from Gilbert fitz Richard and Odo’s knights in only two days,\textsuperscript{133} Odo then went to Pevensey Castle to assure his brother Robert of Mortain that Curthose would soon arrive with an army. In John of Worcester’s


\textsuperscript{127} Bates RRAN, 450.


\textsuperscript{130} Chew, ‘Writs of Military Summons’, 165.

\textsuperscript{131} ASC, E, 222.

\textsuperscript{132} OV, IV, 126; JWC, III, 48-50.

\textsuperscript{133} Ibid, 50. Gilbert was Odo’s vassal for Hadlow, part of the “Lowy” of Tonbridge, and other small holdings. ASC, E describes the defenders as “Bishop Odo’s knights and many others”, 224. Malmesbury describes the castle itself as belonging to the bishop., GR, 546. For Gilbert and the Clares in the rebellion, see the forthcoming University of Glasgow PhD thesis by Vanessa Traill, *The Social and Political Networks of the Anglo-Norman Aristocracy: The Clare, Giffard and Tosny Kin-Groups*, c.940-c.1200. I am grateful for Ms Traill sharing her research.
account, the king trapped them both there under siege, while, the garrison Odo had left in Rochester ravaged Kent.\textsuperscript{134} In the Abingdon Chronicle and Orderic’s version, Odo was besieged in Rochester itself.\textsuperscript{135} Meanwhile, Geoffrey of Coutances and his nephew, Robert de Mowbray took Bristol Castle,\textsuperscript{136} which Geoffrey held while Robert sacked Bath and plundered his way through Wiltshire, before being beaten off by the defenders of Gloucester.\textsuperscript{137} Roger de Lucy, Ralph Mortimer, and Earl Roger of Shrewsbury assembled an army of “English, Normans and Welsh” and marched on Worcester, where Bishop Wulfstan led the defence.\textsuperscript{138} The bishop’s small force defeated the besiegers, inflicting heavy casualties.\textsuperscript{139} William of St Calais’ activities are less well documented. The \textit{Chronicle} tells that he “did what harm he could everywhere in the north”,\textsuperscript{140} while Rufus’ later accusations against him turned more on his apparent desertion (with the knights of his \textit{familia}) of the king.\textsuperscript{141} Malmesbury suggests something more serious, that St Calais himself constituted a threat because he had the loyalty of the “outlying counties”.\textsuperscript{142}

Robert Curthose’ promised invasion broke up.\textsuperscript{143} The king starved Odo and his brother into submission, and the bishop relinquished his earldom, effectively ending the rebellion, though William of St Calais was only dislodged from Durham after both the ravaging of his lands, and a complex legal process, not by a short siege of Durham castle as implied by the \textit{Chronicle}.\textsuperscript{144} Odo would continue seeking vengeance on the king by trying to engineer war between Curthose and Rufus from Normandy.\textsuperscript{145} He

\textsuperscript{134} 	extit{JWC}, III, 52.
\textsuperscript{136} \textit{ASC}, E, 223; Chibnall, ‘Geoffroi de Montbray’, 291.
\textsuperscript{137} \textit{JWC}, III, 52.
\textsuperscript{138} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{139} Ibid, 54-6; \textit{ASC}, E, 223; \textit{GR I}, 544-6; \textit{GP}, I, 632-4 Wulfstan’s actions are discussed in more depth in Part Two, Chapter Four. For Geoffrey’s role in 1088, Le Fatourel, ‘Geoffrey de Montbray’, 146-8.
\textsuperscript{140} \textit{ASC}, E, 223.
\textsuperscript{142} \textit{GR}, I, 544.
\textsuperscript{143} \textit{ASC}, E, 224.
\textsuperscript{144} See Part 3, Chapter 3.
\textsuperscript{145} \textit{OV}, IV, 148.
also encouraged Curthose to invade Maine, where Orderic listed him among the commanders.\footnote{Ibid, 154.}

These extraordinary events aside, prelates in command on campaign are far less prominent in the reigns of William Rufus and Henry I than they had been in that of the Conqueror. Only a few such instances are attested. No source for the life of St Anselm gives him a significant military role, but in June 1095 he wrote to the legate Walter (Cardinal Bishop of Albano) that reform of the English church was suspended while he was responsible for defending Canterbury and ready to lead the king’s knights and foot soldiers at a moment’s notice.\footnote{Anselm, \textit{Opera Omnia}, Fransiscus Schmitt (ed). 6 Vols, Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson & Sons. (1946-1951), IV, 77-78.} In 1101, Ranulf Flambard may have encouraged Curthose to invade and persuaded Henry I’s navy to defect, but “The bishops, the ordinary soldiers, and the English stood resolutely with him [Henry], all prepared to do battle on his side” (... \textit{sed episcopi, milites gregarii, et Angli animo constanti cum illo perstitere, unanimiter ad pugnam parati cum ipso descendere}), although in the end no battle was fought.\footnote{\textit{JWC}, III, 98-99.} Crouch wrote that bishops had paid for the king’s mercenaries, but did not attribute the remark.\footnote{\textit{Crouch, The Normans}, 171.} In 1102, during the rebellion of Earl Robert of Shrewsbury, while the king besieged Shrewsbury itself, Bishop Robert Bloet of Lincoln, a former royal Chancellor, was dispatched \textit{cum parte exercitus} to besiege Tickhill castle (Yorkshire).\footnote{\textit{JWC}, III, 100. \textit{OV}, VI, 22 attributes this to the king, not the bishop.} In 1106, Abbot Robert of St-Pierre-sur-Dive tried to trap Henry and deliver him to his brother (for which he was expelled from the abbey and his castle seized),\footnote{\textit{OV}, VI, 80-82.} and Henry’s chancellor Waldric (in minor orders, and later Bishop of Laon) took Curthose prisoner at Tinchbrai.\footnote{Barthélemy, ‘The Peace of God’, 20; Part Three, Chapter Three.}

There are several possible explanations for the fewer cases of prelates as field commanders in this period. The nature of warfare in the Anglo-Norman \textit{regnum} between 1089 and 1135 was substantially different from that of 1066-1088, particularly in the relatively peaceful condition of England from 1102-1135. In consequence it offered less scope for the separate military commands that give the militant prelates of the Conqueror’s reign prominence in the sources. It is interesting to note, therefore that when two sieges needed to be conducted simultaneously on either side of the Pennines, at great
geographical remove from one another, Henry entrusted the job to Robert, who was both an outstanding royal servant and bishop of the nearest episcopal city. In addition, Rufus’ atrocious relations with the English Church would hardly have recommended its prelates to him as military commanders. While Henry did much better on this score, and the English bishops stood behind him on usus atque leges, once Anselm went into his second exile (1103), and tensions over investiture rose, appointing English prelates to military command may have seemed as risky as it was unnecessary.

**Stephen (1135-1154)**

The period of the civil wars saw more military involvement by senior clergy even than that of the Conquest. There are numerous instances where chronicles record bishops in direct command of military forces, and several where such command can be reasonably suggested.

As early as 1136, Bishop Henry of Winchester, the king’s brother, was with him during the siege of Exeter. According to the *Gesta Stephani*, he advised the king that the beleaguered garrison was close to starvation and would soon capitulate. His presence and counsel are not in themselves evidence that he led men during the siege, but the king left him in charge of the castle there after its fall, so he certainly was in a position of command, at least of the garrison from that point. In 1138, after a fight between episcopal and noble retinues, Bishop Nigel of Ely fled royal arrest, and took over leadership of Roger of Salisbury’s castle at Devizes, preparing to defend it against the king, though was swiftly induced to surrender. Richard of Hexham tells that when the Scots took Norham that year, the local population reproached the knights who defended it, and their lord, Bishop Geoffrey of Durham for failing to prepare it adequately or relieve it. Most importantly, 1138 saw the Battle of the Standard. The religious components of the English defence are

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154 GS, 40.
155 GS, 44.
156 JWC, III, 246-248; GS, 78. While Henry of Huntingdon recognizes that it was the arrest of the bishops of Lincoln and Salisbury that caused the collapse of episcopal fortresses at Devizes, Sherborne, Newark and Sleaford (*Huntingdon, 720-722*) he makes no mention of the Bishop of Ely’s flight to Devizes.
discussed in detail in Part Two, Chapter Four. It should be noted that the sources differ very slightly as to the precise role played by clergy before and during the battle. All the major accounts make Archbishop Thurstan of York, assisted by Bishop Ralph of Orkney, the driving force behind the organization of English resistance. Richard of Hexham’s and Aelred’s accounts have the archbishop command parish priests to assemble an army and bring the relics of their churches. 158 No account described parish priests fighting in person, but it is strongly implied by the terms of the prohibition of the legatine council of that year, which will be explored in depth in Part Three, Chapter One. All accounts save one show the archbishop himself remaining at home. 159 If Aelred’s and Richard’s descriptions are accurate, this represents the first evidence of the English parochial organization itself used to raise and organize forces.

Also in 1138, at Bath, knights of Bishop Robert (a protégé of Henry of Blois 160) seized Geoffrey Talbot and his companions, who were reconnoitring around the city. John of Worcester and the Gesta Stephani both describe Robert leading the defence of his city against the garrison of Bristol, though only John described him as assembling a “large force” and leading it out in person. 161 McGurk expressed some doubts over John’s account, on the grounds that one of the bishop’s own knights appears with the empress’s supporters, and he was “unlikely” to have disobeyed his lord. 162 There are, however, numerous instances of great ecclesiastics failing to control their own vassals, sometimes to their acute discomfiture (Part Two, Chapter One).

1139 saw Stephen’s famous arrest of the Bishops on suspicion of preparing their castles for an uprising against him. Less well-remembered, it saw also Henry of


159 Vita Thurstani Auctore Anonymo, James Raine (ed), The Historians of the Church of York and Its Archbishops, 3 Vols, London; Longman. (1879-1894), II, 266. This account of events (in which the archbishop terrifies the Scottish army into flight by creating a great din using hidden musical instruments) differs widely from all other accounts, and is clearly fantastical. It retains some interest, however, in portraying an active leadership role for the archbishop, and describing the whole war as bellum inter David regem Scotiae et Thurstinum archiepiscopum. Dicteo’s description, Ralph Diceto, Abbreviationes Chronicorum, William Stubbs (ed), Radulfi de Diceto Decani Lundoniensis Opera Historica. 2 Vols, London: Longmans. (1876), I, 250, similarly privileges Thurstan’s importance.


161 GS, 58; JWC, III, 248.

162 Ibid, n. 15.
Winchester using his guards to block roads and intercept the earl of Gloucester, and according to the *Gesta Stephani*, undermine the king’s strategy through intentionally poor military advice. In 1140, Bishop Nigel hired mercenaries and used the isle of Ely as a base from which to harass the region and wage war on the king’s supporters. Just as when the Conqueror had fought Hereward there, the royal army had great difficulty with both natural and artificial fortifications, and Ely fell only when the monk Daniel betrayed the defenders (for which he was later made Abbot of Ramsey). Many of Nigel’s knights were captured, and the Bishop fled to Gloucester.

In 1141, Henry defected from his brother’s cause after the Battle of Lincoln, but the rapid unravelling of the Angevin cause in London drove Matilda to Winchester. Henry reverted to Stephen’s party, and hired his own mercenaries to defend his castle and fortified palace in his city against the empress, a defence that saw Winchester itself burned. Finally the bishop proclaimed peace throughout the city, but when the empress withdrew, broke his own truce and attacked her rearguard, forcing her to flee as far as Gloucester. It is interesting to note that Henry’s return to Stephen’s camp earned him the great displeasure of Brian Fitz Count, who went so far as to offer Henry a duel. When the king met the Earl of Gloucester’s army at Wilton, the Bishop of Winchester was there again, “with a strong body of troops” *cum ualida uirorum militarium manu*, though on this occasion it was he who was forced to flee the field with his brother.

The *Liber Eliensis* alleges that the island was seized from its overstretched defenders in 1143 by Geoffrey de Mandeville while the bishop was in Rome and that it was Mandeville who ravaged the area, while the innocent Bishop Nigel took the blame. It also claims that on his return from Rome, Nigel was responsible for making peace with the angry king. 1143 may be said to mark the climax of episcopal military activity. The *Gesta Stephani* provides the most vivid picture of militant

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163 *GS*, 88.
164 *GS*, 102; *JWC*, III, 281.
165 *JWC*, III, 299; *GS*, 128; Greenway, Diana (1977). ‘Two bishops of Winchester’, in *History Today*: 417-425 (420-21). “G”’s version of the story has the enraged bishop fire the city deliberately. The *Gesta* places the blame with the garrison of Henry’s castle, who threw firebrands on their besiegers. Greenway follows the *Gesta*’s account.
166 ‘G’s continuation, *JWC*, III, 301. In *GS*, it is the king’s men who attack the retreating empress. It should be noted that the *Gesta* speaks of the Archbishop of Canterbury and other bishops fleeing the rout, 134, though it tells us nothing of their role in the empress’ army.
168 *GS*, 144-146.
169 Ibid, 328-333.
prelates in its description of that year. The bishops of Winchester, Lincoln and Chester, are singled out for wearing suits of armour (the first time a narrative source definitely puts weapons or armour onto prelates’ persons) and plundering the country with their knights. 170 1143 also saw the extraordinary circumstance of two rival ecclesiastics contending for control of a diocese through armed force. After the death of Bishop Geoffrey of Durham in 1142, William Cumin’s relatives admitted him to Durham castle, 171 where he established himself as the favoured party of the Scots and the empress. 172 Cumin was soon ravaging the surrounding country, a policy he continued into 1144. 173 Meanwhile, William of Ste-Barbe, Dean of York was also elected to the see. 174 This elderly, learned man went to Roger de Conyers’ little stronghold at Bishopton before leading his men to Durham itself, and fortifying the St Giles’ Church. Cumin attacked it, tried to kill the monks, and garrisoned it. 175 Richard of Hexham bemoaned the damage done to this and other churches in the process of fortifying them, but criticised only Cumin, not Ste-Barbe. Indeed, in his version, Cumin came to terms only when the deaths of his son, and the mason fortifying the church at Merrington, convinced him that he had earned divine disfavour. 176 John and Richard of Hexham, and Symeon of Durham condemned Cumin in strong terms. The struggle between Cumin and Ste-Barbe is best seen in the context of both the civil wars, and the long military, cultural and economic battle between England and Scotland for control of the bishopric. 177 Cumin was not the first to use the bishopric as a seat of “tyranny” (See Part Three, Chapter Two) and William of Ste-Barbe, who is generally portrayed as the legitimate claimant, was himself prepared to turn churches into fortresses and attempt to dislodge his enemy with armed force.

After this, prelates recede again as military leaders. The last incident of note (1148-9) is when Bishop Henry of Winchester asked his nephew, Hugh du Puiset, the future Bishop of Durham to hire mercenaries and retake Downton castle when he was called away to Rome, though the fortress was not taken until Henry returned and

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170 GS, 156.
172 Continuatio Prima, Historia Dunelmensis Ecclesiae, 146.
173 JH, 312-314.
174 Ibid, 313.
175 Ibid, 314-315.
176 Ibid, 316.
raised his own forces. According to John of Hexham, Hugh (who at this point was treasurer of York) himself took part in the fighting.

**Henry II (1154-1189)**

Henry’s long reign provides some interesting examples of episcopal military command. Early in the reign, however, bishops appear solely as peacemakers. For a month in 1154, it was the power of Archbishop Theobald of Canterbury that maintained “perfect peace” before the new king could arrive to take up his crown. In the following year, Gilbert Foliot cut short the revolt of Hugh de Mortimer “by his eloquence”. Incidents of bishops acting in military command are confined largely to the rebellion of 1173-4.

When the Earl of Leicester was defeated in October 1173 at Fornham (near Bury), in one of the most important engagements of the war, the royal army, under Humphrey de Bohun, marched with the Banner of Bury St Edmunds. Though the abbot does not seem to have been present, he did have his knights “speedily armed” and sent to the battle under the command of the Earl of Arundel. The banner may have been carried by Roger Bigot (later earl of Norfolk). That winter also saw the most famous instance of a bishop avoiding battle. When William the Lion invaded northern England, Hugh du Puiset of Durham did not oppose his advance, for which he was severely criticised by chroniclers, and punished by the king. Other prelates, however, were more active. Bishop-elect Geoffrey of Lincoln, (the king’s illegitimate son) surprised Roger de Mowbray’s garrison at Kinardeferie castle (Axholm, Lincolnshire), took many prisoners, and levelled it to the ground. At Malseart,

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178 GS, 214.
179 JH, 322.
181 Gervase, 162.
183 Fantosme, 74.
184 Jocelin, 57.
186 Gerald of Wales, *De Vita Galfridi Archiepiscopi Eboracensis: Sive Certamina Galfridi Eboracensis Archiepiscopi*, GCO IV, 364-5.
another Mowbray castle, Archbishop Roger of York joined him. This too fell.188 Gerald’s account tells how the garrison initially destroyed Geoffrey’s siege works, but he eventually reduced the castle, through undermining and artillery, capturing thirty knights and sixty armoured archers.189 Geoffrey turned Malseart over to Archbishop Roger, fortified Topcliffe and entrusted it to William de Stuteville.190 Although the chronology is unclear, while his master was elsewhere (perhaps still besieging Malseart), the constable of Roger’s household was among the leaders that beat William the Lion back from Prudhoe, and captured him.191 It should be noted that occasions on which clerics’ named military office holders can be identified leading their lord’s men into battle are rare (Part Two, Chapter One). Whilst Howden wrote of Roger joining Geoffrey in the siege, he does not mention the archbishop’s knights. Fantosme tells us that the archbishop had raised a company of sixty horsemen192 (the archbishopric’s Servitium Debitum was sixty knights). This too is significant, for it is far more difficult to demonstrate the performance of service owed by religious institutions than their obligations.193 Whilst Roger may have temporarily taken charge of Malseart, it is possible that during this campaign, his knights were led by the Constable.

In 1174, the peace treaty between Henry II and his sons requires that both Henry and the Young King forgive one another’s followers. The two groups, however, are treated slightly differently. Henry II forgave “his barons and liegemen who withdrew from him”, barones et homines sui qui recesserunt ab eo,194 while the Young King pardoned “all, both clerks as well as laymen” omnibus, tam clericis quam laicis.195 The appearance of clerks as well as laymen as the subject of the son’s forgiveness, but not the father’s is striking. While active clerical involvement in the war on the young king’s side did not come to the attention of chroniclers, the activities of archbishop Roger of York and Bishop-elect Geoffrey of Lincoln (the young king’s younger brother) in 1173/4 were decisive. It may well have been them

187 Howden, Gesta, I, 68, Chronica, II, 58.
188 Howden, Gesta, I, 68, Chronica, II, 58; Newburgh, Walsh and Kennedy (eds), II, 133.
189 De Vita Galfridi, 367. Roger is absent from Diceto’s brief mention of the siege, Ralph Diceto, Ymagines Historiarum, William Stubbs (ed), Radulfi de Diceto Decani Lundoniensis Opera Historica. 2 Vols, London: Longmans. (1876), 384.
190 Howden, Gesta, I, 68, Chronica, II, 58.
191 Howden, Gesta, I, 65-6; Chronica, II, 60.
192 Fantosme, 129.
193 Chew, Ecclesiastical Tenants in Chief, esp. 162, 165.
194 Howden, Chronica, II, 68; Gesta, I, 77.
195 Ibid.
and their churches that Henry II took care to protect against future reprisals, which in the case of Geoffrey would have meant another split within the dynasty.

**Richard I (1189-1199)**

Richard’s long absences overseas created the lack of strong central authority that fomented rebellion, but the king’s Chancellor, Bishop William of Ely, led or provoked much of the warfare of 1190-91. The first time he appears in military command is after a massacre of the Jewish population of York, in the wake of the commencement of a new crusade. William gathered an army and marched north to punish the city, though in the end, no more blood was spilt.\(^{196}\) Although the city did not suffer the ravages that Durham had, the echo of Odo of Bayeux’s expedition of 1081, another instance of a viceregal bishop marching north to punish the citizens for a violent act of *Lèse-majesté* should not be missed.

Though William had a duty to maintain order, his military activities soon aroused the anger of his peers and chroniclers alike. Several chroniclers report the disruptive effect that his enormous retinue had on the monasteries from which he demanded hospitality (Part Two, Chapter One; Part Three, Chapter Two), a familiar theme of monastic chroniclers complaining of the tyranny of secular magnates. By the following year, William’s arrogance and rapacity had provoked Count John into rebellion. The bishop’s large forces quickly overran Lincoln and laid siege to its castle while John attacked Tickhill and Nottingham.\(^{197}\) Both castles fell to John, and his overwhelming support from the nobility swiftly frightened the bishop into making peace. The arrival of foreign mercenaries strengthened William, who came close to renewing the war, apparently having decided that England could not accommodate both himself and the count. Nonetheless, he quickly backed down.\(^{198}\) According to the terms of the peace, the Archbishop of Rouen was installed in the castle of Wallingford, the Bishop of London in Bristol Castle and the Bishop of Coventry in the castle of Peak (and possibly Bolsover).\(^{199}\)

Bishop William managed to provoke another war with John and the nobles later that year when John’s half brother Geoffrey (now Archbishop of York) landed at Dover. His landing was unsuccessfully opposed by William’s brother-in-law, the

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\(^{197}\) Newburgh, Howlett (ed), I, 338; Howden, *Gesta*, II, 207; *Chronica*, III, 134; Gervase, 497.

\(^{198}\) Newburgh, Howlett (ed), I, 338.

\(^{199}\) Howden, *Chronica*, III, 135-6.
castellan Matthew of Dover, and William’s soldiers seized Geoffrey from the very altar at the church of St Martin’s where he had taken refuge.\(^{200}\) The army that John summoned in response to this outrage (which must have had uncomfortable echoes of Thomas Becket’s murder) included lay magnates, and contingents raised by the bishops of Winchester, Bath and Coventry.\(^{201}\) William assembled his forces at Windsor, but lost his nerve before battle could be joined and fled to the White Tower.\(^{202}\) On the way there was a sharp skirmish between the knights of his retinue, and those of Count John.\(^{203}\) Roger de Planis, one of John’s knights, was killed, but William’s men were defeated. William quickly abandoned the Tower and fled the country.

Bishop Hugh de Nonant’s description of William’s flight, and its rebuttal by Peter of Blois were recorded by Howden. Nonant described how William, who had donned a woman’s dress, was accosted by an amorous fisherman, before being humiliated and almost stoned to death by a mob for his transvestism. Although Nonant’s description is clearly satirical, it is valuable, not least because of its statement, framed as if common knowledge, that William had divested himself of his accustomed armour to don female apparel.\(^{204}\) Without the comedy fisherman and assorted peasants, the story of the bishop’s transvestism was borrowed by William of Newburgh.\(^{205}\) If the assertion that the bishop habitually wore armour is considered reliable, it is interesting indeed that Newburgh’s more sober account of events tells that William was briefly apprehended but released by the bishops accompanying John’s army on the grounds of clerical immunity (Part Three, Chapter Three).

Just as in 1190-91, narrative accounts of the war between Count John and the king’s agents in 1193-4 are dominated by churchmen. In 1193, Walter de Coutances (Justiciar and Archbishop of Rouen) besieged John’s castle of Windsor “with an innumerable force of knights and infantry”.\(^{206}\) In Gervase’s version, he took the castle. In Howden’s, Walter came close but did not do so, but came to an agreement with John that the castles of Windsor, Wallingford and the Peak should be held by

\(^{200}\) Gervase, 506; Wendover, 190; Newburgh, Howlett (ed), I, 340; Howden, Gesta, II, 211; Chronica, III, 139.
\(^{201}\) Newburgh, Howlett (ed), I, 340.
\(^{202}\) Ibid, 342; Gervase, 507; Wendover, I, 204-5.
\(^{203}\) Gesta, II, 212-3; Chronica, III, 140.
\(^{204}\) Howden, Gesta, II, 219; Chronica, III, 146.
\(^{205}\) Newburgh Howlet ed I, 343
\(^{206}\) Gervase, 515.
Queen Eleanor, whilst John should retain Nottingham and Tickhill. 207 This agreement forced Hugh du Puiset to abandon his siege of Tickhill. 208 It seems probable that Gervase, who was generally less well informed than Howden, misinterpreted events at Windsor. According to Jocelin:

When there was war in all England after the capture of King Richard, the Abbot with the whole Convent solemnly excommunicated all makers of war and disturbers of the peace, fearing not Earl John, the King’s brother nor any other; for which men called the Abbot a man of high spirit. And after doing this he went to the siege of Windsor, at which, with certain other Abbots of England, he carried arms having his own standard and leading a number of knights at great expense, though shining rather in counsel than in prowess. But we cloister monks judged that such conduct was hazardous, for we feared that in consequence some future Abbot might perchance be constrained to go forth in person on some warlike expedition. 209

The passage raises concerns of method, particularly regarding the usefulness of evidence. Other than Thurstan in 1138, however, it is perhaps the only attested instance of an English prelate using the church machine to raise troops, for we are told that Samson was at Windsor cum quibusdam aliis abbatibus Anglie, yet these are not named. We cannot know how significant was their leadership, how large were their contingents or of what sort of troops they were composed, and other chroniclers (including Howden) do not mention any of the archbishop’s subordinates, or even the presence of contingents from any monastery. The survival of this piece of information is due entirely to the interest of a house chronicler in the deeds of his abbot (indeed, Jocelin does not mention the archbishop). Even at the end of the twelfth century, we are faced with the likelihood that much clerical participation in warfare went unreported by chroniclers.

The extract also raises crucial issues of military practice. Excommunication is the abbot’s first move, before he goes to the siege armatus. Jocelin’s comment that

207 Howden, Chronica, III, 206.
208 Ibid.
209 Cum esset werra in tota Anglia, capto rege Ricardo, abbas cum toto conuentu sollemniter excommunicavit omnes factores werre et pacis turbatores, non timens comitem Johannis fratrem regis nec alium, unde abbas magnanimus dicebatur. Post quod factum iuit ad obsidionem de Windleshor, ubi armatus cum quibusdam aliis abbatibus Anglie, uexillium proprium habens, et plures milites ducens ad multas expensas, plus imb consilio quam probitate nitens. Nos vero claustrales tale factum periculosum judicauimus, timentes consequentiam, ne forte futurus abbas cogatur in propria persona ire in expeditionem bellicam. Jocelin, 54-5.
the knights were there *ad multas expensas* is suggestive of a concern with the financial health of the monastery but also that at least some of Samson’s warriors were mercenaries, and in consequence that the abbots of Bury (and indeed other clergy) may have had greater number of warriors at their command than tenurial evidence or *Servitia Debita* suggest. While Jocelin’s comment that the abbot “shone more in counsel than in prowess” may be an ironic reflection on Samson’s military abilities, we should also recall the considerable distance that separates Bury from Windsor. Samson was not acting as a figure of only regional importance. The reappearance of the banner of Bury must also be noted, and will be discussed at greater length in Part Two, Chapter Four.

When the war restarted in 1194, Archbishop Roger enjoyed the most notable victories of the campaign – all successful sieges. Though Hugh Bardolf and Gilbert de Stuteville withdrew their support, preventing Geoffrey Plantagenet from besieging Tickhill, he took St Michael’s Mount, which had been fortified by Henry de La Pomeroy and Marlborough before marching with his army to Nottingham. Meanwhile, Hugh du Puiset, who raised a large force in “Yorkshire, Northumberland and his other lands” (perhaps a reference to forces drawn from his earldom of Northumbria) again besieged to Tickhill, although the stronghold did not fall until the garrison heard of King Richard’s return. Hugh led his prisoners along with his army (perhaps a gesture of triumphalism) to join Archbishop Geoffrey at the siege of Nottingham. There he also met the king and Archbishop Hubert of Canterbury (who arrived with his cross carried before him, much to Geoffrey’s irritation). When John’s rebellion was finally quelled, therefore, there were three archbishops present, two of them squabbling over their respective rights, and one of whom had been appointed as a result of his record on Crusade, a crusader king, and the bishop who seems to foreshadow the later prince-bishops of Durham.

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211 Howden, *Chronica*, III, 237-8; For the substantial efforts required to subdue Marlborough, Strickland, ‘Bones of the Kingdom’, 159.
213 Ibid, 237.
214 Ibid, 238.
215 Ibid, 239.
216 Howden, *Chronica*, III, 239.
This period saw the last bursts of ecclesiastical military leadership of the reign. With the king again overseas, Hubert Walter was left to deal with the “revolt of the poor” in London, led by William Longbeard. When the demagogue fled to the Church of St. Mary-le-Bow, the archbishop responded with brutal efficiency, besieging it non modica armata militia before burning it to force William out. The archbishop executed the rebel, and again used troops to disperse the heretical cult coalescing around his memory. Not long after, Hubert hurried to Wales to deal with an uprising which attacked and took the Castle of Pole but melted away at the approach of his avenging army. While Hubert was thus engaged, Bishop William of Ely was serving the king as a commander in France, his military activities having for so long eclipsed the ecclesiastical, that according to William of Newburgh, few remembered to call him by the name of bishop. The opprobrium of having burnt the church of St. Mary-le-Bow, however, continued to follow Hubert. In 1198, he fought another Welsh campaign, leaving five thousand dead behind him, but was stripped of his justiciarship for the crime of having burned the church two years before.

The circumstances of the capture and imprisonment of Philip of Dreux, bishop of Beauvais and brother of Philip Augustus are described by Gervase of Canterbury, Roger of Howden, Roger of Wendover (whose account follows Howden), William of Newburgh, and the History of William the Marshal. John of Mortaine, and the Brabanter captain Marchades were ravaging the country around Beauvais. The Bishop, armatus, and accompanied by William de Merle sallied to attack the Angevin army. He was defeated and captured. John and Marchades used this opportunity to force the surrender of the episcopal castle at Milli, and sent the bishop to King Richard in chains. Philip appealed unsuccessfully to Pope Celestine, and two years later, when he offered Richard a ransom of one thousand marks of

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217 Newburgh, Howlett (ed), II, 466.
218 Gervase, 533; Newburgh, Howlett (ed), II, 470.
219 Ibid, 473.
220 Gervase, 543.
221 Newburgh Howlett (ed), II, 490.
222 Gervase, 572; Howden, Chronica, IV, 48.
223 544.
224 Chronica, IV, 16, 21-22.
225 245-6.
silver, this too was apparently refused. He was not released until 1200, when John exchanged him with Philip Augustus for the captured Bishop-elect of Cambrai.\footnote{Bradbury, Philip Augustus, 133.} His imprisonment, punctuated by at least one escape attempt, did not dampen the Bishop’s martial energy, and at Bouvines, he beat the Earl of Salisbury into submission with a mace.\footnote{Ibid, 307.} For the most part, as a French prelate, Philip’s activities fall outside our remit. They are included here because the bishop was imprisoned by the English monarch, and was subsequently written about by English chroniclers.

**English Prelates on Crusade**

Since this thesis confines itself largely to militant clergy in England, with occasional sallies into France when armies in the service of English kings were involved, the role of Anglo-Norman clergy on Crusade is discussed here only briefly.

Odo of Bayeux was the first bishop of the Anglo-Norman realm to go on Crusade. He had been at the Council of Clermont, where the Crusade was proclaimed.\footnote{OV, V, 24.} There is no evidence that Odo preached the Crusade himself, and Orderic tells us that he joined the expedition rather than submit to William Rufus.\footnote{OV, V, 210. Orderic, confusingly, elides Odo going on Crusade with the end of the 1088 rebellion, but presumably he means Rufus’ assumption of Curthose’ functions in Robert’s absence.} After meeting the pope, Odo wintered at Apulia, before moving to Palermo, where he died before reaching the east.\footnote{OV, IV, 118; V, 210; Brown, Shirley (1989). ‘The Bayeux Tapestry: Why Eustace, Odo and William?’, in ANS XII: 7-28 (24).}

Lichfield chronicler, Bishop Roger de Clinton died at Acre in 1148, but there is neither contemporary record of this, nor any detail as to his activities on crusade.237

Hugh du Puiset took the cross in 1185, but never embarked, instead spending the money raised for the expedition on the earldom of Northumberland.238 Neither did Gerald of Wales, who had taken the cross in 1188,239 nor Bishop John of Norwich, nor Hugh of Lincoln.240

Two English bishops on the Third Crusade, however, finally had significant military roles. Archbishop Baldwin of Canterbury was energetically involved in preaching the Crusade241, and though Gerald stressed his contribution to the morale of the expedition, he seems to have been frustrated by the dissolute behaviour of the crusaders, which he felt was the cause of the army showing too little aggression.242 He played a crucial role in the Crusader victory by sallying from Alexandria (12th November 1190). Though elderly, he is believed to have led his contingent of two hundred knights and five hundred men at arms in person, and had carried before him a banner bearing the image of St Thomas.243 Despite the success of his own contribution, Baldwin’s disillusion with the behaviour of the crusader continued, and is said to hastened his death at the siege of Acre.244 The Bishop of Salisbury was left as the most senior surviving Englishman in the camp.245 Hubert Walter, we are told, was of great help to King Richard,246 and exercised the roles of knight, general and pastor on the campaign.247 The author of the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum* approved of his presence in person at an attack on Acre, of the way he was handsomely equipped

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238 Howden, *Chronica*, II, 302; Wendover, 168; Newburgh, Howlett (ed), I, 304-5C; Cheney, *Hubert Walter* suggested that Hubert took the cross in 1188.
240 Gervase, 410.
244 *Itinerarium Peregrinorum*, 123-4.
245 Cheney, *Hubert Walter*, 33.
246 Newburgh, Howlett (ed), I, 78.
(decentissime instructus), and of how his timely intervention with his men prevented a rout of the Crusaders attacking a Muslim camp at Bretnoble (Beit-nuba) in June 1192. He is even said to have had a diplomatic meeting with Saladin himself, inspired by Saladin’s respect for the bishop’s high reputation and dignity, but also his valour.

**Summary**

Bishops and abbots, both Norman and English, were military commanders across the whole period under study. Some of the most striking examples were members of the royal family, chancellors or justiciars, but others, like Bishop Leofgar were men of obscure background, or their behaviour as commanders is not noticeably different from those who were not. They fought under diverse circumstances, rebelling, suppressing rebellion in their own regions and punishing it farther afield, conducting and resisting invasions. They acted in concert with one another, with lay commanders or independently, and they fought with the same pragmatic ferocity as their lay counterparts, devastating regions, executing or mutilating prisoners, and despoiling churches. Though clerics may have supplied the Conqueror with ships in 1066, there is no evidence for them commanding naval operations after the Anglo-Saxon period. Under the Normans, clerical control of castles became an important part of the military narrative and remained so. We might suggest that they went into battle in person before the Conquest, but they certainly did so afterwards.

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Part 2: Military Power and Practice

Chapter 1: Prelates, Knights and Constables

Of the many potential areas for research suggested by clerical involvement in warfare, by far the most extensively treated in secondary literature has been the possession by churches and churchmen of lands burdened by military obligation. This scholarship underpins the tendency to describe militant prelates as acting “as” lords. Ironically, the reason that there has been such extensive discussion of ecclesiastical knight service is that much of the evidence for knight service in general is ecclesiastical in origin.

The main questions under discussion were established by Round over a century ago. By collation of the 1166 *Cartae Baronum* with early Pipe Rolls of Henry II, he was the first to produce a list of the *Servitia Debita* of twelfth-century English dioceses and monasteries. The “system”, which he argued was imposed by William the Conqueror, was primarily a relationship between the tenant-in-chief and the king. How the quotas were met was deemed an incidental detail. He also insisted that *Servitia Debita* were based on *constabularia* as the basic unit of the “feudal host”, but offered those of Bury St Edmunds as the sole example of such units appearing in actual documents. Substantial change to this model only began in the 1960s, since when the tendency has been to emphasise “mixed” composition in royal armies both before and after the Conquest. Now the tendency is to mark the presence not only of warriors raised by land tenure, but household knights supported with cash, mercenaries hired for short periods, light cavalry, and the continuation of Old English traditions of heavy infantry. Historians seem increasingly comfortable with the absence of a national military “system” at all, particularly in the Anglo-

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253 Ibid, 249.
254 Ibid, 251.
256 Ibid, 259, fn. 99. Usually, Round discussed his evidence in the main text. That he did so in footnote here seems to warrant the suspicion that he was aware of just how fragile was the evidential basis of this part of his argument.
Norman period,\textsuperscript{258} and increasingly willing to depart from the twin obsessions of earlier treatment – the numbers of knights raised, and the changes to knights’ social standing.\textsuperscript{259} Feudalism’s dominance of social and military discussion has been decisively challenged.\textsuperscript{260}

The extent of change becomes visible by comparing Galbraith’s study of “an episcopal land-grant of 1085” with Purser’s recent reassessment.\textsuperscript{261} Galbraith’s piece acknowledged that, particularly at Hereford and Worcester, the process of “subinfeudation” was slower on ecclesiastical than on lay estates, but still took the royal \textit{Servitium Debitum} as the overriding cause and purpose of ecclesiastical grants to knights, and ecclesiastical involvement in warfare in general.\textsuperscript{262} The fact, therefore, that Bishop Robert Losinga enfeoffed Robert de Lacy when he could already meet his obligation for fifteen knights could only mean that the system was being corrupted by aristocratic pressure.\textsuperscript{263} Purser, however, alive to the recent tendency to stress the ambiguities of military service suggested that the bishop may have had reasons unrelated to \textit{Servitium Debitum} for enfeoffing warriors:

\begin{quote}
We should not be misled into thinking that \textit{miles} automatically means ‘professional soldier’ and that these men had to form part of the bishop’s quota for the servitium debitum; they may well have formed part of the bishop’s entourage as escorts, outriders or armed messengers, performing a relatively lowly service on a low income.\textsuperscript{264}
\end{quote}

Though the bishop may have been availing himself of the services of more fully-fledged knights for his own purposes, Purser’s essential point is important. There is little reason to consider this document with reference to \textit{Servitium Debitum} at all. The concept of “over-enfeoffment”, first stressed by Chew\textsuperscript{265} is useful, but assumes that the quota is the baseline from which analysis must proceed. Such an assumption has little justification. Showing that a particular prelate led or sent the “right” number of

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{258} Beeler, ‘The Composition of Anglo-Norman Armies’, esp. 400-401.
\item \textsuperscript{260} Gillingham, ‘Introduction of knight service’. The first version of this paper appeared in \textit{AN} 6 (1983), but the 2000 version is to be preferred because of its useful historiographical postscript.
\item \textsuperscript{262} Galbraith, ‘An Episcopalian Land-Grant’, 353-354.
\item \textsuperscript{263} Ibid, 369.
\item \textsuperscript{264} Purser, ‘The Origins of English Feudalism?’, 85-6.
\item \textsuperscript{265} Chew, \textit{Ecclesiastical Tenants in Chief}, 17.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
knights to battle is a difficult task. Servitium Debitum itself is an important fiscal concept, but it is almost absent from narrative sources, and has assumed far greater import in the literature on knight service than it warrants.

If the primacy of Servitium Debitum as principal cause, effect and manifestation of prelates’ military power is no longer accepted, several new fields open for enquiry. In particular, the personal and institutional relationships between prelates and knights become much more significant. We will turn first to the question of how prelates organised and restrained their followers. In the next chapter, we will discuss the evidence from mid and late twelfth century sources relating to the expansion of ecclesiastical military households. Either a large military following, or a prelate’s knights going on campaign without his presence would require delegation of command to a subordinate officer, whether a permanent or ad hoc appointment. In the royal military household, constables and marshals fulfilled these roles. Mason found that three or four lay honours worth over £1000 p.a. showed evidence of constables even before the end of the eleventh century, begging the question of whether similar arrangements prevailed in the establishments of prelates.

Only Chew has examined this issue in detail, drawing particular attention to Peterborough, where Abbot John de Sais (1114-25) created the office of abbot’s constable, hereditary in the de la Mare family. This office included various rights and ceremonial functions, but apparently lapsed in 1227. Most notable, and emphasising his closeness to the abbot, was the constable’s right to serve the abbot at his inaugural banquet. He may also have had a role, with the seneschal, in

266 HEA, II, 15.
269 Chew, Ecclesiastical Tenants in Chief, 84.
270 King has since pointed out that the office of Constable was only officially extinguished with the payment of sixty marks in 1296, King, Edmund, (1973). Peterborough Abbey 1086-1320 – A Study in the Land Market. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 34. This is about the same time that the honoral court of Peterborough also fell into abeyance (36). Brand found that a significant proportion of hereditary stewardships also disappeared in the thirteenth century, Brand, Paul (1992). ‘The Rise and Fall of the Hereditary Steward in English Ecclesiastical Institutions, 1066-1300’ in Tim Reuter (ed), Warriors and Churchmen in the High Middle Ages: Essays presented to Karl Leyser. London and Rio Grande: Hambledon, 145-162.
271 See the constable’s charter in Chronicon Petroburgense, Thomas Stapleton (ed). London: Camden Society. (1849), 130-132 and Chew’s summary, Ecclesiastical Tenants in Chief, 85. For other Peterbourgh offices created in the mid twelfth century, King, Peterborough Abbey, 92.
accounting for Peterborough to the Exchequer.\textsuperscript{272} For Chew, Peterborough’s constable was probably unique among twelfth-century English foundations, contrasted with \textit{ad hoc} arrangements at St Albans.\textsuperscript{273} She saw this derived from Peterborough’s high \textit{Servitium Debitum}, but acknowledged a possible parallel in the marshals of the thirteenth century bishops of Winchester.\textsuperscript{274} King added important details to Chew’s picture of Peterborough.\textsuperscript{275} Neither Chew nor King, however, discussed the \textit{Chronicon Petroburgense}’s contention that the constable was intended to protect the abbot from royal retribution, should his knights fail to properly appear (\textit{ita quod Abbas de Burgo versus Regem omnino conservetur indemnis}).\textsuperscript{276} Several historians have drawn attention to individual prelate’s constables,\textsuperscript{277} and others have emphasised the abbots of Bury St Edmunds’ apparent division of the \textit{Servitium Debitum} into four \textit{constabularia}.\textsuperscript{278} Nonetheless, it is only occasionally that the sources give us a glimpse of a subordinate military officer as a leader in war.

The title of \textit{Archiductor} of Oswaldslow, given to the bishops of Worcester in the mid tenth century, implies a subordinate \textit{ductor}, but it is not until after the Conquest that direct evidence for him appears.\textsuperscript{279} Both Barlow and Giandrea have noted a post-Conquest legal case recorded by Hemming when Bishop Wulfstan’s right to military service from the abbot of Evesham was upheld.\textsuperscript{280} Expert witnesses were called, ‘One of whom was Eadric, who in the time of King Edward was Steersman of the bishop’s ship, and \textit{ductor} of the same bishop’s army in the service of

\textsuperscript{272} King, \textit{Peterborough Abbey}, 32-33.
\textsuperscript{273} Chew, \textit{Ecclesiastical Tenants in Chief}, 84-87.
\textsuperscript{274} For the military-fiscal organisation of Winchester in the twelfth and thirteenth century, Greenway, ‘Two bishops’, 425.
\textsuperscript{275} King, \textit{Peterborough Abbey}, 32-34.
\textsuperscript{276} \textit{Chronicon Petroburgense}, 131.
\textsuperscript{279} As the sixty thegn \textit{scipsoen} was described as such on sea or on land, it is possible that the expression “Steersman” is in this context the English equivalent of the Latin \textit{Ductor}.
\textsuperscript{280} Barlow, \textit{The English Church 1000-1066}, 170; Giandrea, Mary \textit{Episcopal Culture in Late Anglo-Saxon England}. Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 186.
the king...’ (Quarum unus fuit Edricus, qui fuit, tempore Regis Edwardi, Stermannus navis episcopi, (et) dductor exercitus eiusdem episcopi ad servitium Regis...).281

This is the earliest document that explicitly attests the duty of a subordinate officer to lead a prelate’s men. Doubtless it was this experience that qualified him to attest to the diocese’s military arrangements at the court. Eadric (who held the archetypal warrior’s five hides in Domesday) may no longer have held office when called to testify, but he need not be assumed a casualty of the purging of Anglo-Saxon landholders after the Conquest. In 1093, Wulfstan (long the last surviving English bishop) was served by a constable with the English name, Alstan. The bishop may, therefore, have been able to keep some of his own countrymen in such posts.282 Perhaps, at Worcester, a constable who carried out similar functions replaced the bishop’s dductor. There are few obviously insular names among the constables, and by 1087 (when the first are recorded at Canterbury and at Ely), they bore continental names.

After Eadric’s appearance, the sources are silent on the roles of such men for decades. In August 1114, Roger of Salisbury gave land at Kidwelly (where he had built a castle) to the convent and prior of Sherborne.283 The document was witnessed by Edmund, ‘who was then defending the castle of Kidwelly’ (qui tunc castellum de Caduelli custodiebat).284 When, in 1136, Princess Gwenllian attacked the castle, her son Morgan was killed by Geoffrey, ‘that outstanding man, the constable of the bishop’ viro egregio, praesulis constabulario.285 Geoffrey’s deeds are discussed only in passing, and only because Gerald happened to travel through Kidwelly and opine on local history. The next occasion on which such a person appears, and does come to the attention of a national chronicler, is when Ralph de Tilly, ‘constable of the household of Archbishop Roger of York’ (Constabularius familiae Rogeri


282 Mason found that on lay estates, officials were sometimes the kinsmen of the incoming landowner, but invariably French, ‘Barons and their Officials’, 256.


284 Itinerarium Kambriae, 79; Kealey, Roger of Salisbury, 237.
Eboracensis archiepiscopi\textsuperscript{286} is named by Howden in a list of leaders who prevented King William of Scots from taking Prudhoe in 1174, and who shortly afterwards captured him.\textsuperscript{287} It seems that only under remarkable circumstances would a prelate’s constable capture the attention of the chroniclers of national events.

There are also difficulties identifying these men in diplomatic sources,\textsuperscript{288} in particular in ascertaining whether a constabularius who appears as a witness is the prelate’s own and only constable, one of several, or one holding this title by virtue of another honour. Great Domesday records no Constable, Marshal or Ductor holding of an ecclesiastic. For instance, no-one called Geoffrey holds of the abbot of Ely. Inquisitio Eleriensis and Inquisitio Comitatus Cantabrigensis, however, both record as a juror, Geoffrey ‘the abbot of Ely’s constable’.\textsuperscript{289} Domesday Monachorum, meanwhile, records Richard constabularius holding land in Lanfranc’s terra militum. It seems that for the Canterbury monks and the archbishop, Richard was their constable, while Geoffrey was of no interest to the commissioners in Cambridgeshire, holding no lands directly of the abbot, but was of interest in the Ely Inquiry as both juror and the abbot’s constable. This perhaps helps explain the infrequency with which such men appear in narrative sources, their importance was local to the community or diocese they served. They went unregarded by the survey of 1086 and were given their titles infrequently in that of 1166. Similarly, they went almost unnoticed by chroniclers writing national history unless their deeds commanded special attention.

We must therefore turn to the acta and estate surveys of individual prelates, supplemented only infrequently by narrative sources. The Appendix (2, Table 2) lists the names of individuals who appear to be bishops’ and abbots’ constables and marshals in available printed sources.\textsuperscript{290} Such a compilation cannot be comprehensive, and may include misidentified individuals. Lack of secure dates for

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Howden, Chronica, II, 60; Gesta, 65.
\item Ralph would later appear in an attempt to scale the walls of Acre. Gesta, 144.
\item For the great difficulties posed by the sources to any attempt to approach Episcopal households. See e.g., EEA 30: Carlisle 1133-1292, David Smith (ed) Oxford: Oxford University Press. (2005), xliii-xliv. For the absence of prelates’ knights from witness lists, Tim Reuter, ‘Episcopi et sua militia’, 90.
\item Domesday Book, John Morris (ed/trans), 18 – Cambridgeshire. Chichester: Phillimore. (1981), Appendix P. Mason, too was struck by the usefulness of Domesday’s satellites, and the problems posed by the loss of titles when the returns were condensed. ‘Barons and their Officials’, 244 and 248.
\item The dates given for charters and other documents are taken from the collections footnoted. In cases where an individual appears in repeatedly, the dates I have given span the first and last appearance of the individual. For Rochester, in the absence of published, edited acta, I have provided approximate dates.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
many documents makes it generally impossible to say whether a prelate had one or more than one constable or marshal at the same time,\textsuperscript{291} except where multiples appear in a single document.\textsuperscript{292} Despite these difficulties, the appearance of episcopal and abbatial constables and marshals is so regular that Chew’s contention that Peterborough’s arrangements were unique needs reconsideration. Constables appear to be high status figures, often appearing first among witnessing knights,\textsuperscript{293} and in most cases there seems to have been only one at a time. They were sometimes specifically associated with the prelate as \textit{constabularius episcopi} or \textit{constabularius familiae}, and in one Lincoln Obituary list, the bishop’s Constable was included along with his mother. Some constables were themselves clergy, such as Robert, constable of the bishop of Lincoln. Some constableships may have been hereditary.\textsuperscript{294} In addition to the de la Mares at Peterborough, the Bishop of Norwich’s constable, Geoffrey, apparently took over from his father Peter.\textsuperscript{295} At Lincoln, the evidence is strong for the replacement of Bishop Alexander of Lincoln’s constable William by his son Hugh, and then by Hugh’s son Robert, (already called \textit{constabularius} in his father’s lifetime).

No case for such an important and common office can be advanced for those described as ‘marshal’ on the basis of the evidence assembled. Marshals were often last or penultimate in witness lists, suggesting that, just as in the king’s household, they were men of lower rank than constables. There is no evidence for heredity, and the only formal association with the ecclesiastical office (in the sense of \textit{marescallus episcopi}), is in Hugh du Puisset’s reference to Gerard as \textit{marescallus noster}. No chronicle refers to the exercise of this period. In fact, there is little to distinguish it as indicative of a formal office in this period. On the other hand, the constables of the Bishop of Lincoln vanish from his documents at the very end of the period under discussion here, while men called marshal begin to appear frequently, and both Carlisle and Durham (neither of which provide evidence of constables) appear to have

\textsuperscript{291} Mason encountered the same difficulty in his investigation, ‘Barons and their Officials’, 252.
\textsuperscript{294} Mason declined to judge on this issue. ‘Barons and their Officials, 257’, though Brand, considering a longer period suggested that lay ministerial posts (most importantly the Steward) in ecclesiastical institutions tended towards heredity. ‘Rise and Fall’, 146.
\textsuperscript{295} The Inquest of 1166 was little concerned with the organization of barons’ knights. Peter, however, despite not holding the largest number of fees appears at the top of the list of the bishop’s men. He is also the most frequent constable to appear in the acta of any prelate here considered.
marshals. The possibility of a constableship giving way to a marshalcy at about this
time should not be discounted.

The evidence of a permanent office that could be inherited is not found
everywhere. The Liber Henrici de Soliaco Abbatis Glaston’ (1189) records the
disputed holding of Richard Cotel, ‘He holds the whole of this through the service of
one knight, and if his lord wishes it, he may be constable.’ (Totum hoc tenet per
servitium unius militis et, si dominus voluerit, erit constabulus). At Glastonbury,
the constableship, attested in only one document, seems to be a temporary
responsibility rather than a permanent rank, and relations between the abbot and the
Cotels could be acrimonious. It seems likely, therefore, that arrangements occupied
a spectrum of organisation from a formal system of hereditary officers, to an ad hoc
or at best customary delegation of power to a knight of local standing. Due to its
importance in the historiography, it is necessary to consider the evidence relating to
the constables of Bury in more depth.

The Bury St Edmunds Evidence

In the estate survey of c.1200, four men appear in the same text described as
‘constable’. After each name is a list of ten knights’ fees in their constabularium.
These constitute the best-known occurrences of what appear to be abbatial constables
in the period, and were critical to Round’s thesis. The evidence suggests, however,
that none of these men was the abbot’s constable in the sense of a high official.

Each individual must be considered in the light of Abbot Samson’s other
acta. Robert de St Clare appears nowhere else in the collection. Robert son of
Ralph appears just once, Reginald de Brockley three times, and Thomas de
Mendham once in Samson’s Kalendar, and in five other documents. On none of

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University Press. (2001), 86; Poole, Austin (1946). Obligations of Society in the XII and XIII
298 Harl. MS. 645, fol. 25.
299 Gillingham observed that while many historians retained Round’s thesis in outline, they had rejected
his constabularia, without appreciating the centrality of that idea, ‘Introduction of Knight Service’, 189.
300 The Kalendar of Abbot Samson of Bury St. Edmunds and Related Documents, R.H. C. Davis (ed).
301 As beneficiary of no. 69.
302 Nos. 14, 23 and 93.
303 Kalendar, 6.
304 Nos. 1, 100, 109, 130 and 138.
these occasions are any of them called constable. Conversely, Richard de Cosfield (not mentioned in the survey) is called constable in ten abbatial charters, always appears either first among lay witnesses, or second only to the seneschal. Even more compellingly, in Davis’ documents 100 and 130, he appears in the witness list along with Thomas de Mendham, who is not given the title. In Richard de Cosfield, Bury does provide some of the best evidence for Constables, but it is the Harley survey that is unusual in its application of the title. It is substantially different from another survey of the abbey’s knights compiled in 1200, and incorporated into Jocelin’s chronicle. Galbraith suggested that the survey ‘has every appearance of being a return to some royal enquiry regarding knight-service’. The word constable is again apparently applied differently for royal and local purposes.

The activities of military subordinates came to the attention of chroniclers only when their activities were of unusual importance. It seems possible, therefore, that their roles were executed far more often than appears, though ironically, the evidence is weak at the church where we might expect it to be strongest. At Canterbury, despite the publication in the EEA of 764 archiepiscopal acta, and in Saltman’s study, an additional 311, from 1070 to 1205, there is little evidence for archiepiscopal constables. Only in Domesday Monachorum does Richard occur as Lanfranc’s constable. Du Boulay suggested that the witness list (in a later hand) appended to a Charter of Archbishop Theobald (Saltman’s charter 255) represented ‘a comprehensive gathering of household officers at work together’ from the Seneschal to the master cook (including Marshal Baylehache, at the end), but there is no constable. After Richard, in the whole corpus, only Ralph Picot could plausibly be considered an archbishop’s constable. Picot (Sheriff of Kent) appears in many of Archbishop Theobald’s documents. His frequent attestations, often between members of Theobald’s household, suggest that he was of the archbishop’s familia, but only once was he called Constable, and that during the intense early period of the civil war. It seems that the archbishops of Canterbury had no permanent military lieutenant. The only two occurrences of the title at Canterbury are associated with the most extreme

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305 Mason found that in terms of estate value, the seneschal was usually the most significant honorial baron, rarely surpassed by the constable or the sheriff, ‘Barons and their Officials’.
306 Jocelin, 120-122.
crises in the whole period – the Conquest and the civil wars of Stephen’s reign. Given
the role outlined above for the constables of Peterborough, we might speculate that
this omission was the cause for St Anselm’s famous failure to exercise quality control
over his knights and the subsequent displeasure of William Rufus in 1097. 309 The
uneven distribution of references to constables appears to represent more than merely
the different concentration of surviving documentation.

**Personal Relationships**

A great deal of non-military scholarship on individual dioceses and
monasteries has situated them within networks of piety, power, and wealth. Such
approaches tend to stress complex relationships between the prelate 310 , the monastic
community or cathedral chapter 311 , the prelate’s vassals; other local interests 312 , and
the king. In particular, they emphasise that good relations between prelate and
monarch were essential for both parties. 313 There has been a good deal of work on the
smooth functioning of the lord-vassal relationship in terms of religious patronage. 314 It
is natural, however, that the smooth working of relationships creates less ‘noise’ in
the narrative sources than disorder and confusion. Monastic chronicles frequently
portray these relationships breaking down, and the results could be disastrous. As
early as 1070, during the struggle against the rebels at Ely, Abbot Ealdred of
Abingdon’s men defected to the king’s enemies, supposedly without the abbot’s
knowledge or connivance. 315 The unhappy case of Walcher of Durham is discussed in
Part 2, Chapter 5. There are even cases where clergy used military force against their

309 It has been suggested that the inadequacy of these troops was due to their ineffective conversion
from Anglo-Saxon thegns to Anglo-Norman knights, Stenton, Frank (1932). *The First Century of
English Feudalism 1066-1166*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 147-148. If we suggest that Canterbury’s
military arrangements were poorly developed, the two interpretations are compatible.


Saxon Community of St Cuthbert’, in *HSJ* 4: 83-95 (91).

313 Giandrea, *Episcopal Culture*, 145. For the advantages accrued to Henry of Blois as abbot of
Glastonbury and Roger of Salisbury as Abbot of Sherborne from their access to royal favour, Stacy,
‘Henry of Blois’, 10-11. Sidney Packard suggested that King John’s lack of good relations with
Norman churchmen was a key factor in the loss of Normandy in 1204, ‘King John’, 24; For the idea of
lords caught between the demands of kings and retainers, Green, ‘Kingship, Lordship and Community’,
11.

Honour’ in K.S.B. Keats-Rohan (ed), *Family Trees and the Roots of Politics: The Prosopography of
Britain and France from the tenth to the Twelfth Century*. Woodbridge: Boydell, 133-146 (134-135).

315 HEA, I, 226.
own communities. When in 1083 the monks of Glastonbury refused to accept liturgical changes made by their new abbot, he ordered his ‘Frenchmen’ into the church, where they wounded three and killed eighteen, ‘so that the blood came down from the altar onto the steps, and from the steps onto the floor’. Though loath to discuss such unedifying stories, Orderic informs us that there were ‘many’ such events, and later examples can also be cited. Most illuminating of all, we have Jocelin of Brakelond’s record of how Abbot Samson reacted angrily to murmurings within the monastic community as he tried to reconcile his leadership of the monks and his temporal responsibilities to the king. The sense both of his burden, and of his frustration with those who did not understand his policy is palpable.

Even apart from questions of military utility, therefore, a prelate’s relationships with his armed followers were among his most important. It is easy to see why the constables of Peterborough explicitly accepting liability for important parts of the abbot’s military role might have seemed attractive to the abbots. Nonetheless, too little attention has been given to non-tenurial aspects of the relationship between prelate and knight in the historiography of England. It plays a more significant role in Reuter and Arnold’s work on Imperial bishoprics. Arnold was even able to point to the *Iura Ministerialum* of Archbishop Rainald of Cologne in the mid 1160s, which laid out the terms of service his knights owed and their rules of discipline. Unfortunately, there is no equivalent English or Anglo-Norman document. The English evidence is far more fragmentary.

**Disputed Service and Resistance**

The problem of tenants failing to perform service, and so of lands passing into private ownership must have been obvious, especially during periods of disorder or weak ecclesiastical leadership. Anglo-Saxon three-life leases were an early instrument

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317 *OV II*, 270.
320 *Jocelin*, 74.
by which lands could be resumed after a manageable length of time. Nonetheless, it is clear that English prelates encountered difficulties controlling their ‘followers’ from a early date, and the failure of church vassals to perform service was coming to the attention of the crown even as early as the Conqueror’s reign.\textsuperscript{322}

In two surviving acta, the Conqueror commanded that church vassals in dispute with their masters should come to terms.\textsuperscript{323} Twice he demanded that ecclesiastical rights over their vassals (\textit{hominies}) be reasserted.\textsuperscript{324} Although there is only one extant example of such a command in Rufus’ shorter reign,\textsuperscript{325} these may be the first rumblings of what was to become a serious problem later. Henry I’s reign saw numerous precepts commanding that prelates be allowed to exercise their rights against external aggressors (sometimes other churchmen).\textsuperscript{326} It also saw a series commanding that specific individuals who were not suitably obedient must be so.\textsuperscript{327} The emphasis of royal intervention shifted under Stephen. A long series of commands were issued that lands and rights be restored to churches by various aggressors who had actually taken them.\textsuperscript{328} Despite this flurry of activity to protect the church from aggressors it is striking that no instrument of Stephen survives in the style of previous Norman kings commanding disobedient vassals to perform military service to their churches. Henry II, however, while issuing writs demanding the return of church property, both in England, and on the continent, resumed the practice of commanding church vassals to be obedient, and in very similar language to the precepts of Henry I.\textsuperscript{329} Abbot William de Waterville (1155-75) of Peterborough, meanwhile, paid the king a hundred marks for his intervention.\textsuperscript{330}

It seems that by the end of the Conqueror’s reign, the monarch sometimes had to intervene to ensure that prelates’ knights actually performed service, this became more frequent under Henry I and ceased, or substantially lessened under Stephen,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{322} The irregularity of tenurial structures has been used to suggest that successive monarchs did not care \textit{how} the quotas of knights were raised, Hollister, \textit{Military Institutions}, 97-98.
\item \textsuperscript{323} \textit{Bates RRAN} nos. 120 (Ely), and 311 (Westminster Abbey).
\item \textsuperscript{324} \textit{Bates RRAN} nos. 337 (Canterbury Cathedral), and 191 (St Paul’s Cathedral, London).
\item \textsuperscript{325} \textit{RRAN}, I, no. 334.
\item \textsuperscript{326} \textit{RRAN}, II, nos. 724, 726, 814, 815, 854, 856, 993, 1168, 1193, 1314, 1283, and 1800.
\item \textsuperscript{327} \textit{RRAN}, II, nos. 553, 697, 789, 1065, 1434, 1865, 1900. Note that No 789 refers to service owed for building bridges and enclosures and 1865 refers to attendance at the abbot’s court.
\item \textsuperscript{328} \textit{RRAN}, III, Examples include but are certainly not limited to Nos. 135 239c, 239d, 239e, 297, 355, 470, 471, 713, 870, 885, 886, 887, and 888.
\item \textsuperscript{329} \textit{Receuil des Actes de Henri II Roi Angleterre et Duc de Normandie concernant les provinces Francaises et les affaires de France} Ed. M.L. Delisle, (Paris, 1920) \textit{Tome II}, Suppl. XXV, 447; \textit{HEA}, II, 306. The former was issued by the king at Caen (hence its inclusion by Delisle). The latter was issued by Queen Eleanor, while her husband was overseas.
\item \textsuperscript{330} \textit{Candidus}, 128.
\end{itemize}
whose ineffectual efforts were directed more at reversing outright seizure of church lands by outsiders, and resumed under Henry II.

Almost half of royal precepts enjoining obedience on vassals, however, are recorded in the Abingdon Chronicle. This may be an accident of preservation or a product of the close relationship between Henry I and Abbot Faritius (his doctor). Abingdon’s chronicler was particularly concerned with the relationship between abbot and knight. Indeed, the extensive portrayal of Faritius’ abbacy (1100-1117) is much concerned with the abbot’s attempts to bring his knights to heel. For example, the *Historia* tells how the king’s chamberlain, William, held the manor of Bessels Leigh from the abbey for one knight’s service,331 and that when Faritius became abbot, William refused to do him homage or perform that service. In 1101, with king Henry and Robert Curthosie at war, the abbot was required to summon his knights, but William refused and the abbot was forced to substitute another. The abbot waited for the end of the war (when presumably the king had time to deal with the case) before pressing his claim and producing witnesses. William was forced to back down.332 In Faritius’ struggle against his tenants and his neighbours, two features are of particular importance; firstly, the abbot was most vulnerable to his tenants’ contumacy early on, getting a grip on his tenants over time, secondly, royal support could be key to success. This was recognised by Peter Moraount, who wrote Faritius’ eulogy, and by William of Malmesbury, who preserved it.333

Faritius’ dealings with Abingdon’s knights should be compared with those of Abbot Samson of Bury St Edmunds (1182-1211). When, in 1197, King Richard summoned knights from his tenants in chief,334 the knights claimed that they had no obligation to serve abroad (just as St Hugh claimed for his own followers335), and the abbot was forced to hire four stipendiaries, and though he consulted Hubert Walter for advice, he accepted a lesser financial contribution from them than was needed to pay for the mercenaries. Though Samson’s difficulties in 1197 resemble those of Faritius

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331 *HEA*, II, 186-188.
332 Henry may have had his own reasons to support churchmen’s military rights. The bishops had stood with him in the war of 1102-2, *JWC*, II, 98-100. For Faritius’ other successes over his contumacious knights, *HEA*, II, 188, 194, 196-198.
333 It has been suggested by both Gillingham and Stenton, that Faritius seems also to have been much involved in producing forged charters. Gillingham, ‘Introduction of knight service’, 204.
334 For this story *Jocelin*, 85-87. Jocelin’s account of the mechanism for this is at variance with that of Howden. See Butler’s commentary in *Jocelin, Appendix Q*.
in 1101, he achieved less success. Jocelin depicts Samson as masterful to a fault, not unlike Faritius, and records a vision of the St Edmunds monk William of Hastings in which Samson appeared as a fist fighter, beating off royal demands and fighting for the payment of full scutage from unwilling knights. In fact, his struggles were ended more often by negotiation than the masterful exercise of lordly power. Samson’s triumphs were less those of overwhelming lordship than of a dogged and bureaucratic mentality. Early on, he tried to solidify his claims with documentation, compiling a list of dues despite St Edmund’s previous lack of systematic record keeping. Samson’s creation was a single, totemic document, his Kalendar, which summarised his rights. The Kalendar itself reflects Samson’s determination to extract all revenue and every service to which he was entitled. Samson’s great practical achievement, however, was in eventually compelling his knights to perform the service of fifty knights rather than the forty required by Servitium Debitum. Jocelin incorporated a detailed record of the new arrangements, whereby the abbot could make considerable profit from scutage. Indeed, perhaps the detail of Samson’s manoeuvrings and arrangements recorded in his account is intended partly as a reference for future disputes. Also, we have seen that the four constables of Bury seem to have been anomalies. If Samson’s difficulties were worsened by solidarity of the knights of Bury against their lord, the replacement of a single military official with four may be a very sensible measure. All of this should be seen in the context of Samson’s efforts to restore and develop his house’s parlous finances, but it also represents a new emphasis of documentation and law as the means to extract his due military service, with the support of Hubert Walter taking the place of Henry I’s support for Faritius. Samson’s approach consisted of extracting service more reliably through individual accounting of fiefs and systematic documentation. Other monastic estate surveys may have had similar underlying problems and intentions.

336 Jocelin, 19-20.
337 Jocelin claimed that the Kalendar was a creation of the first four years of Samson’s Abbacy (1182-1186). This was challenged by, who argued that it was produced in two parts – the first c.1186-1188 and the second c.1186-1188, Kalendar, xii.
338 xxxv-xxxvi.
339 Jocelin, 65-68.
341 For the rapidly growing importance of a knowledge of the learned law for churchmen in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, Boureau, ‘How Law Came to the Monks’, 35-39. Boureau also stresses the importance of maintaining a network of contacts to obtain papal justice, 73.
Why then, were there such problems in prelates securing their military services? Hudson has suggested that the absence of large military retinues was an important factor in clerics’ difficulties, but the Abingdon chronicler regarded all lay (especially knightly) possession of church estates in peacetime as inherently corrupt. There was a natural tendency for tenants to resist performance of services that did not benefit themselves, if possible detaching lands from churches altogether. It is striking, however, that in the early Norman period there are comparatively few cases recorded of knights avoiding their services to prelates, despite the fact that in both England and Normandy, many prelates ended up with at least some vassals forced upon them either by aggression, or by royal/ducal fiat. It may be that the Abingdon Chronicler’s views on the corrupting effect of peace are accurate. Immediately after the Conquest, perhaps few knights would risk undermining the new regime by eroding the military arrangements that underpinned it. Some prelates brought their own knights with them when they took up post, and such men may have felt a more personal bond of loyalty, as well as the solidarity of outnumbered conquerors. This may explain why there is little evidence for these difficulties before the comparatively peaceful reign of Henry I, when a new generation felt secure enough to dispute its rights and duties. Stenton also noted the correlation between periods of crisis and the emergence of stipendiary, landless knights. He associated it “with feudal anarchy rather than feudal order”, though the close dependence of stipendiaries on their paymaster may be less a direct symptom of disorder than a strategy for containing it. A mentality of emergency may also explain why despite the extensive evidence of violence against churches in Stephen’s reign, there is no evidence of royal intervention to secure service in that period. Vacancies could also cause problems. After the death of Bishop William of Durham in 1153,

343 HEA, II, 218-221. See also II, 6-7.
346 Stenton, First Century, 145.
Roger de Conyers (who held the castle) used it as a base from which to impose exactions on the whole northern archdiocese. Some of Faritius’ difficulties at Abingdon may be attributable to the fact that his abbacy followed a vacancy of three years.

The monks of Peterborough may have found a novel way of encouraging loyalty. The Conqueror had commanded that all who held knights’ fees should have the appropriate arms, and that those arms should be inherited along with the fee. A later addition to Hugh Candidus’ Chronicle, however, explains, that at Peterborough, Abbot Ernulph (1107-1114) instituted the custom whereby on the death of a knight, his weapons and horses were ‘offered to God and St Peter’. The mortuary custom (apparently repaid by performing the office of the dead for the knight) appears alongside comments about Ernulph’s extension of demands for revenue from the knights of Peterborough. Such a heriot, especially if the weapons were subsequently bestowed by the monks upon the heirs, may have entangled the knights of Peterborough in a deeper web of obligation to the house by ritually controlling the weapons that conferred knightly status.

If it is accepted that the management of relationships with knights, monarch and community was both essential and difficult, there is perhaps cause to re-examine the behaviour of some clerics in this light. Giandrea has drawn attention to Archbishop Wulfstan’s invectives against his episcopal colleagues’ tendency to engage in excessively ‘worldly’ behaviour such as hunting, hawking and drunkenness. ‘Worldliness’ on the part of prelates has traditionally been seen as a function of either the aristocratic origins of high mediaeval churchmen, or their great wealth and secular responsibilities. Reuter suggested that the notorious militarism of German bishops could be partly explained because they ‘undoubtedly more locked into their aristocratic environment than English or French ones’, and cited the fact that the major vassals of German bishops more often appeared in witness lists than those of their English counterparts. If English bishops were less ‘locked in’ to networks of the high aristocracy, however, perhaps they were more locked in to the local networks of petty nobility and knights. Malmesbury’s description of St Wulfstan

347 JH, 30.
348 Candidus, 90-91.
349 Giandrea, Episcopal Culture, 40-41.
350 This point has been made many times. For an eloquent restatement, Barber, Knight and Chivalry, 250.
351 Reuter, ‘Episcopi cum sua Militia’, 90.
in the *Vita Wulfstani* is well known, that the bishop was forced to retain knights in his household because of the likelihood of invasion, ‘appeased with plenty of pay and glutted with luxurious meals’ *affluentibus mulcebat stipendiis et delicatis saturabat obsoniis.* Malmesbury’s other treatment of Wulfstan at table more effectively captures the tension in his behaviour:

He would sit up with the rest meditating on the psalms, and pretend to be taking a drink when his turn came round. While others were draining their foaming tankards, he would have a tiny cup in his hand, and encourage them to enjoy themselves, though he was following the custom of the country rather than his own judgement. Not that he flouted Norman customs either: he took around with him an array of knights, whose yearly stipend and daily food were a tremendous drain on his resources.

In this depiction, Wulfstan engages with the behaviour of the knights around him as a conscious strategy for managing his followers. Nonetheless, there were outbreaks of drunken violence among the knights, but it is worth reflecting that Wulfstan was highly successful. When he had to mobilize his *familia* in 1088, it fought effectively.

These early cases can be compared to Gerald of Wales and Adam of Eynsham’s accounts of St Hugh, a bishop of Lincoln from Burgundian knightly stock. In Gerald’s *Vita*, Hugh participates happily in his well-fed knights’ hard drinking. Adam of Eynsham’s version, however, is somewhat closer to Malmesbury’s depiction of Wulfstan. His Hugh is moderately jovial at his well-supplied table, and like Wulfstan, in his attempts to be ‘all things to all men’, he abandons his own natural behaviour and drinks wine. He also averts his eyes from acting or dancing. Adam is not afraid to point out that Hugh on occasion struggled to deal with the seculars in his retinue. Even in old age he sometimes had to compel them to behave by personal

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353 *Cum quibus ipse assidens psalmos ruminabat, ordine tamen suo se bibere simulabat. Hauriebant alii spumantes pateras, ipse vasculum minutissimum tenens eos ad hilaritatem inuitabat, magis consuetudini patriae quam iuditio satisfatisens animi. Nam de consuetudinibus Normannorum non omittetab, Pompeam militum secum ducens, qui stipendiis annuis cotidianisque cibis immae quantum populabantur GP, I, 426.*
354 *Vita Wulfstani*, 56.
356 *Magna Vita Sancti Hugonis*, I, 104.
357 *omnibus omnia fieret*, 125.
358 Ibid.
violence.\textsuperscript{359} It has been suggested, that Hugh’s intimate understanding of how to deal with the manners of his knightly and aristocratic peers was a significant part of his success,\textsuperscript{360} an interpretation that may be applicable to his own household as much as to outsiders.

Malmesbury’s knowledge of Wulfstan was partly derived from Coleman, Wulfstan’s chaplain. Adam was Hugh’s companion and confidant. It is therefore noteworthy that in these most personal accounts, based on intimate knowledge, apparently ‘worldly’ behaviour (public drinking and even violence) emerges as strategy. Wulfstan’s tiny cup, and Hugh’s averted eyes are parts of being indeed all things to all men, including a knight to the knights.\textsuperscript{361} This interpretation can, of course be overextended, and it would be wrong to apply it to every incident, but offers a different interpretive framework for incidents of apparently ‘knightly’ behaviour on the part of ecclesiastics, and of the customary reluctance in hagiography of some clergy to become prelates.

**Conclusion**

It is difficult to be certain whether prelates should be conceived as acting “as lords” because they owed and were owed knight-service. Certainly, prelates had to account for the knights that held of them, and in exercises like *Cartae Baronum*, they were regarded in this light by the king and his ministers. When we investigate the means by which they were controlled, we find earlier and stronger evidence for formal office-holders (some of whom were themselves clerics), countless incidents of defiance by the knights themselves and involvement of royal justice, and even cases of clerics deliberately crafting their own image to give the impression of greater solidarity with their followers. It is perhaps accurate to say that they functioned “as lords” from the point of view of the exchequer, but an overdependence on the idea of “systems” could lead us to neglect the complexities of their relationships with their warriors. Even before the Norman Conquest, there is a little evidence to suggest that the leadership of ecclesiastics’ warriors was sometimes carried out by an office-holder appointed for that purpose. Between 1066 and 1200, there is evidence at some

\textsuperscript{359} Ibid, 128.
\textsuperscript{361} Compare *Itinerarium Peregrinorum*, 116.
monasteries and almost every diocese, for the presence of a prelate’s constable. This position may have been one of considerable respect (at least in the community itself), and could be held by clergy, implying that we should draw a less sharp distinction between the lay and clerical components of the household. It was hereditary in some cases, though in other cases the office was less formally established, and appointments more *ad hoc.* The constable seems to have been generally a solitary officer, probably exercising military leadership over all of the prelate’s knights, not a ten-knight unit. There is little evidence for division of ecclesiastical forces into constabularia during the period, and almost none for the use of ‘marshal’ in a similar sense.

If it was natural that vassals should endeavour to avoid their obligations, and lords to compel them to comply, there are specific problems with the exaction of military service to ecclesiastical lords. Prelates exercised various strategies to reduce that contumacy, from ritualised control over the weapons that conferred knighthood, to the invocation of royal power and even personal physical violence. From this, two main points emerge: It is not enough to say that a prelate was entitled to so much knight service from his lands, we must look at how the knights were encouraged, persuaded or compelled to serve – and the possession of military authority, regarded in some canonical texts as a temptation to clergy, could also be a difficult, complex and chaotic burden.
Chapter 2: Warriors in Attendance

It has long been recognized that a full understanding of the military arrangements and practices of the Anglo-Norman and Angevin kings must include treatment of the knights of the royal familia. Church’s study of the knights of King John begins with a full survey of this historiography.362 Chibnall, Prestwich and others have made a strong case that the royal household, perhaps even before 1066, served as the nucleus of royal military power; a substantial body of professional warriors in the royal presence capable of rapid deployment in the event of crisis. These developments, suggest the question of whether ecclesiastical households had a similar function. This is a task made problematic by major difficulties with the evidence. Using the narrative accounts, however, it is possible to make some general and tentative forays into this area.

Late Anglo-Saxon England

There is no account in any source of an English prelate’s warriors either living in his household, or travelling with him before 1066. Eadmer’s Vita Sancti Oswaldii for instance, portrays the Saint enjoying the king’s favour at court, and travelling to Rome for him, but there is no mention of an episcopal retinue.363 Stenton wrote that, “by 1066 it had long ceased to be the custom that a housecarle should be his lord’s companion in time of peace.”364 We would not naturally expect men as prosperous as late Anglo-Saxon thegns365 to be in constant attendance upon their lords as their less prosperous (therefore more dependent) predecessors had been. In short, there is no positive evidence that the prelates of late Anglo-Saxon England habitually maintained warriors in their households. Presumably though, they would not have risked the dangers of long journeys without some sort of escort. That duty was perhaps fulfilled by the “Riding-Men”.366 Men described as Radman or as Radchenistre (any

362 Church, Household Knights, 1-15.
distinction is unknown) are found holding lands of Archbishop Thomas of York, the king, and others in the Domesday survey in Cheshire, Herefordshire, Shropshire, Worcestershire, Lincolnshire, Berkshire, Gloucestershire and Hampshire. Whether such men existed outside this area is uncertain (their confinement to these counties could be simply a quirk of the recording of the data), but the lands of two dioceses lie entirely within this area, Hereford and Worcester. The bishop of Worcester could call on the services of thirteen riders from Gloucestershire,\textsuperscript{367} and ten from Worcestershire (eleven TRE),\textsuperscript{368} totalling twenty-three in 1082, while the bishop of Hereford had eleven riders in Herefordshire,\textsuperscript{369} eight in Shropshire,\textsuperscript{370} and two in Worcestershire,\textsuperscript{371} a total of twenty-one. Perhaps the Riders’ duties included acting as bodyguard to the bishops when they ventured abroad. If so, they probably did not live permanently in their households. Worcester’s material resources were far greater than those of Hereford. As a result, the concurrence of numbers is remarkable. It is possible that around twenty or twenty-five horsemen was deemed enough to cover this function when need arose. Although the prelates of this period may, therefore, have had arrangements under which it was understood who ought to defend him when he travelled, these men are certainly not confused in Domesday with thegns or knights. Their holdings in Domesday were tiny, and presumably their equipment was light. In the turbulent conditions after the Conquest, something more substantial was needed.

**Early Norman England**

The evidence for the sustained presence of knights in the households of English prelates during the Conqueror’s reign suggests strongly that this was a novelty, responding to rebellion or threats of invasion. The first glimpse of an English prelate with a retinue of knights is Abbot Adelelm of Abingdon, c.1071.\textsuperscript{372} The Abingdon Chronicler was clear that Adelelm’s retinue was a new feature for Abingdon’s abbots, requiring explanation, but that the state of disorder forced everyone, (universi) to acquire a retinue, (manus militum). Adelelm is portrayed as defending his monastery, and himself when he travelled using mercenaries, (stipendarii). When the immediate threat had abated, however, Adelelm granted them

\textsuperscript{367} *Domesday*, 164d, 165a.
\textsuperscript{368} Ibid, 173b.
\textsuperscript{369} Ibid, 181c, 182a-c.
\textsuperscript{370} Ibid, 252b.
\textsuperscript{371} Ibid, 174b.
\textsuperscript{372} *HEA*, II, 4-6.
the manors of the abbey’s thegns killed at Hastings. The presence of household warriors is portrayed as an inconvenient necessity abandoned when conditions allowed, and the status quo ante 1066 was restored as soon as possible.

The next time such men appear in the narrative is in the household of St Wulfstan, during the invasion scare of 1085. John of Worcester and the Abingdon Chronicle tell that English prelates were compelled by royal command to retain supplies for mercenaries effectively billeted upon them in 1085.\textsuperscript{373} The \textit{Vita Wulfstani}, however, described the households of great men as forces that could be brought together quickly to resist the predicted Danish invasion.\textsuperscript{374} Madicott recently discussed these issues, but did not consider the Abingdon evidence for a similar approach pursued in 1071.\textsuperscript{375} If the rapid assembly of mobile forces for defence was indeed the intention, then these men fit very well into the Prestwich/Chibnall model for the significance of the royal household in arms. The Ely Chronicle also speaks of knights living in the ecclesiastical household. Though the Danish threat is not mentioned, the context in which the following passage appears strongly suggests that it too belongs to around 1085.\textsuperscript{376} The Ely Chronicler depicted the abbot taking into his household men who were already his retainers, (clientes), and others, whom he had to arm. All are portrayed as living in the hall, \textit{infra aulam ecclesie}, receiving victuals from the cellarer. The Chronicler heavily emphasised the strain this put on the monastery’s resources, and the abbot did not long maintain this policy. Instead he soon gave lands to usurpers, (invasores), though not in full lordship, (\textit{nullam vero penitus ut dominio}), and recorded the grants in \textit{Inquisitio Eliensis}.\textsuperscript{377} It will be recalled that it is this document which records the presence of the abbot’s constable. There is ample reason to question the Ely Chronicler’s probity regarding the military history of his monastery (Part 3, Chapter 2). His statement here, however, accords so closely with those of the other sources that it seems credible. We might doubt the degree to which the abbot was really so unwilling to give benefices to his clientes, but the knights’ presence in the abbatial household, and their support in cash rather than land in the short term only, are probably reliable.

\textsuperscript{373} JWC, III, 42, HEA, II, 16.
\textsuperscript{374} \textit{Vita Wulfstani}, 55-6.
\textsuperscript{376} \textit{Liber Eliensis}, 217. It should be noted how similar these intolerable conditions were to the \textit{Gesta Herewardi}’s depiction of the resistance fighters’ life in the monastery in 1070, depictions with the chronicler substantially modified (Part 3, Chapter 2).
\textsuperscript{377} Ibid.
Whatever clergy’s discomfort with their militarized households, and the modifications they were compelled to make to their own conduct, the wisdom of the policy was demonstrated during the rebellion of 1088. Descriptions of Wulfstan’s defence of the city generally focus primarily on his spiritual actions (Part 2 Chapter 4). John of Worcester, and Symeon (who used his account) were clear, however, that along with the regis fideles defending the city, Wulfstan despatched his own retinue, (episcopalis familia or pontificis familia) to fight the rebels.378 Whilst John may have privileged the divine aspect, the effectiveness of the force (which apparently suffered no losses while inflicting significant casualties) is clear.379

The Reigns of Henry I and Stephen

In the following reigns, substantial changes occurred. The Liber Eliensis claims that by Henry I’s reign, the king’s wrath was unjustly roused by Abbot Richard of Ely’s following.380 According to the fifteenth century Chronicler, John Flete, Innocent II wrote angrily to Abbot Gervase of Westminster (the king’s son) in 1139, militarem praeterea manum et laicorum conventum procul a limitibus monasticae areas disciplinae.381 When Henry of Huntingdon reminisced about the follies of his youth, he recalled his awe of the opulent train of his patron, Bishop Robert Bloet of Lincoln, composed of knights and servants.382 The older Henry was apparently less impressed by such sights. The attitude that he displays, however, is markedly different to that of the previous generation. The bishop’s equites are his gloria, a fixed component of his household, not a temporary burden imposed by emergency or royal fiat, and it was not the presence of these men that Huntingdon depicted as remarkable, but the magnificence of their array.383

A similar attitude is visible in the Gesta Stephani. The undignified, brawl that took place between the king’s knights and those of the bishops of Salisbury, Ely and Lincoln in 1139 is well known.384 The author is blasting, however, on the subject of

379 Ibid, 54-57.
380 Liber Eliensis, 227.
382 Huntingdon (De contemptu mundi), 586-7.
383 For the statement that wasting the diocese’ resources on his knights was among the charges levelled at Bishop Nigel, Liber Eliensis, 324.
384 GS, 76. JWC, III, 246.
those bishops’ worldly display, and their retinues.\textsuperscript{385} It is clearly no longer bishops’ accompaniment by knights that creates a stir. It is the scale of the retinues – the \textit{mira militantium}, seen as so extreme that it undermines their claim to sacerdotal status. This is given a further sinister connotation by the author’s assertion that Bishop Roger had intended to use his household to support an Angevin invasion.\textsuperscript{386} Here, the retinue is to be the bishop’s instrument of betrayal, all the more effective because the king was pleased by an apparently loyal military force. It is interesting to note, however, the echoes of 1085 and the Prestwich/Chibnall paradigm. Though not in royal service, the retinue is once again seen as a rapid reaction force.

\textbf{Ecclesiastical Retinues in Angevin England}

Through Jocelin of Brakelond’s Chronicle, it is possible to approach in more detail the arrangements of Abbot Samson of Bury St Edmunds (r. 1182-1211). Jocelin described how just after his appointment, the new abbot was approached by a “multitude of new kinsmen”, seeking to enter his service. Samson, however, dismissed them, with the exception of one (unnamed) knight, whom he retained for his skill at law and administration to assist him in the secular affairs of his new office\textsuperscript{387} until he could consult with the convent. The chronicler’s interest in Samson’s attitude towards his relatives occurs again later, suggesting that this may well have been unusual.\textsuperscript{388} Jocelin’s description of Samson’s various new household arrangements, include him deciding to maintain twenty-six horses \textit{in curia sua}.\textsuperscript{389} He may well have been providing himself with horses for a retinue of a little over twenty men, something comparable to the riding-men apparently provided for the bishops of Hereford and Worcester a hundred years previously.

A number of sources describe the magnificence of Thomas Becket’s household before his flight in October 1164, and there are even stories of the archbishop’s personal moderation set against the gluttony of his companions that are reminiscent of the depiction of St Wulfstan and his household knights. It has been suggested that Becket claimed the service of the second sons of the nobility just as the

\begin{footnotes}
\item \textsuperscript{385} GS, 72.
\item \textsuperscript{386} Ibid, 72.
\item \textsuperscript{387} \textit{Jocelin}, 24.
\item \textsuperscript{388} Ibid, 43.
\item \textsuperscript{389} Ibid, 26.
\end{footnotes}
king claimed the first.  

If so, the archbishop’s following would have been huge. In Fitz Stephen’s *Vita*, a detachment of Becket’s retinue, composed not just of knights, but clerks, stewards, servants, squires and sons of nobles, travelling in magnificent style was enough to astonish French visitors. Becket supposedly arrived on the Toulouse campaign with seven hundred “hand picked” knights. Though Fitz Stephen does not make the connection, it should be noted that this is same number of horsemen who supposedly accompanied King David into battle.

As for the performance of ecclesiastical households in warfare, the evidence in the Angevin period is scarcer than for the Norman. The swift response and arming of the knights of Bury St Edmunds in 1174 might suggest that some had been in attendance on the abbot when they were summoned. Much more substantially, it was Ralph de Tilly, constable of the Archbishop of York’s *familia*, who intervened in the same year at Prudhoe, and knights of Bishop William of Ely’s household that fought John’s household knights in 1191. In addition to this, there are a series of minor incidents in which English prelates deployed small groups of armed men to inflict violence on defiant members of the local community, occasionally even their own clergy, or when the prelate’s relations turned to plunder of the church. Such incidents go back to the reign of William the Conqueror, and Abbot Thurstan of Glastonbury’s massacre of his own monks, but these incidents do seem to have become more common from around the middle of the twelfth century. John of Hexham described how in 1147, with the archbishop away in Sicily, soldiers related to *milites consanguinei ejus*, (Jocelin’s remarks on Samson’s relations should again be borne in mind) the Archbishop of York, plundered a manor of the monastery of Fountains, and the Chronicle of Battle Abbey tells that some of Abbot Walter’s (r.1139-1171) own liegemen forgot their allegiance and tried to extort the church of Mendlesham. Gervase relates that his convent was actually besieged from 11th to

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391 *VST*, 39.
393 II Samuel 8:4.
394 Fantosme, 74.
396 Howden, *Gesta*, II, 213; *Chronica*, III, 139.
397 ASC, 215. This is also described by John of Worcester, William of Malmesbury and Orderic Vitalis.
398 *JH*, 318-319.
14th November 1189 by an armed force of Archbishop Baldwin’s men, and the Evesham Chronicle records that abbot Roger used his ministri, the “sons of Belial” to loot the monks’ property in 1191, and how a repeat of the incident was only prevented in 1206 by the monks, who manfully resisted the attempt, though armed only with sticks. Cases such as these perhaps refer to the mobilisation of a retinue for nefarious ends, but it is clear that the prelates of this period could command the power of organised violence in peacetime, and against the very churches they were supposed to serve. More difficult to judge is the Gesta Stephani’s assessment. The assertion that though the bishops “themselves were the source of this monstrous crime and outrage [plundering the country] they were wont to ascribe such impiety not to themselves but to their knights”, et dum ipsi tanti sceleris tantique flagitii caput essent et causa, non ibi solebant, sed suis militibus tantum nefas ascribere may be problematic. Shockingly large retinues may have only recently emerged, but how much control prelates were able to exercise over their conduct is uncertain.

Councils, Ius Novum and Acceptance

As we have seen, after the initial period of the Norman Conquest, it seems that the extravagance of an excessive ecclesiastical retinue was more likely to be the source of comment than its existence, and this may have been set against an understanding that about twenty followers was perhaps seen as appropriate. Howden records that the expense of maintaining William of Ely’s enormous retinue was enough to bankrupt any monastery at which the bishop stayed. By the mid-twelfth century, the burden posed by retinues seems to have become a problem significant enough to attract the attention of canonists and the papal curia. Eugenius III put an end to an undignified squabble between Cardinals Jordan and Octavian by commanding that they be accompanied by not less than fifteen and not more than twenty respectively, remarkably close to what we have suggested was the English norm. In 1179, the Third Lateran Council (Canon IV) decreed a scale of retinue of

400 Gervase, 472.
401 Evesham Chronicle, 103.
402 Ibid, 203-204.
403 GS, 156.
404 Gesta, II, 143; Chronica, III, 72.
405 John of Salisbury, 75-6.
horsemen that should be allowed to accompany prelates of various ranks. Archbishops visiting their provinces were not to exceed forty or fifty horses in their evectio, bishops twenty or thirty, cardinals twenty or twenty five, archdeacons five or seven, and deans two. In addition to this, it was specified that this train should not travel with hounds or hawks, that poorly endowed houses should have special provision that their poverty be taken into account, and all this explicitly to save those that entertained prelates’ followings from hardship. This canon was repeated in the Council of London (1200), complete with the elaborate explanations. The canon said nothing of travelling abbots, but it should be recalled that Samson of Bury St Edmund (who assumed his office just three years after Lateran III, whose office entitled him to a mitre, and who insisted on his depiction as such on his own seal) may have created a retinue of the number licensed to bishops by Lateran III. It appears therefore, that whilst a rough norm of a little over twenty retainers may have been deemed appropriate at an early date, by the end of the twelfth century, this had hardened into a canonical restriction that demanded limits on the numbers and paraphernalia of the men involved for practical economic reasons. In a little over a hundred years, whilst apparently maintaining military significance, the ecclesiastical retinue in England had been transformed from an emergency response to military exigencies to an accepted, canonically regulated part of prelate’s behaviour.

Conclusion

There is strong evidence that for periods of the Conqueror’s reign, and perhaps shortly afterwards, a number of English prelates retained stipendiary knights in their households by royal command, in case of insurrection or invasion. Although there may have been an Anglo-Saxon precedent in the provision of light horsemen for prelates, the presence of knights in the household was largely seen by later writers as a Norman importation.

Every source which discusses this, however, suggests that before long, stipendiaries vanished and new fees were carved out of ecclesiastical estates to provide for knights, sometimes the same men. Military familiae, however, did not vanish. There is occasional notice of them acting as an effective military force. By

406 Tanner, Ecumenical Councils, 212.
407 Howden, Chronica, IV, 493.
408 Jocelin, 26.
Stephen’s reign, the presence of knights in the household was no longer remarkable, and tolerable only as a result of crisis. Instead, the attendance of large numbers of knights becomes the subject of criticism and canonical restriction, apparently as part of the pattern of prestige activity. There is, however, little indication of a formal institutional distinction between “household” knights and others. Equally importantly, they have become a source of military power in the hands of clergy themselves, capable of being used even against the king. Perhaps unlike the royal household, the ecclesiastical household in arms rarely gives sign of becoming an institution, but may nonetheless on occasion have had an important military role.
Chapter 3: Prelates and Fortresses

Identifying clerics’ castles

In the Appendix (Part 2, Table 3) is a list of castles that were controlled by prelates, based initially on extracts from that published by Brown.\(^{409}\) His includes well over three hundred castles, but only nineteen appear in the hands of bishops or abbots (and only one of the latter), though there were major disagreements as to the total number of castles in England even then.\(^{410}\) It retains Brown’s organisation, but has been modified to include entries where Brown either did not discuss the site, or (more commonly) when the castle is recorded as being in the possession of a bishop or bishops for only a short time.

Like knight-service, possession of castles by clergy is thought of almost invariably as either a function of land tenure, or an expression of an overwhelmingly “worldly” mindset, but this is unsatisfactory. It immediately becomes apparent that by expanding the survey to include castles controlled only temporarily by ecclesiastics, and sites missed by Brown, the number of fortifications we must consider more than doubles. We must think in terms not just of those castles permanently attached to sees (Norham, Bishop’s Stortford and the like), but also those seized during rebellion, temporarily entrusted to a bishop during a campaign, or which existed as fortresses at all for only a short time. Of such sites there has been almost no discussion, yet they loom large in the military narrative.

Anglo-Saxon prelates, and the debate around pre-conquest fortifications

There is only a little evidence to suggest that some Anglo-Saxon prelates may have had private fortresses, or at least private residences that were defensible. The use of the word *burh* (and variants) seems to suggest this in some circumstances. A memorandum of 822-3 between the Bishop of Worcester and the thegn Wulfheard concerns the *byrig* that the thegn held of him.\(^{411}\) Breaking into the *burh* of a bishop or


\(^{410}\) Beeler, ‘Castles and Strategy’. For the many difficulties of this subject, 582-3.

archbishop was a crime under the law codes of Ine and Alfred\textsuperscript{412}. There is also some circumstantial evidence. Castellation was proceeding in Herefordshire under Edward the Confessor’s Norman favourites before 1066,\textsuperscript{413} and the dangerous position of the diocese of Hereford in this period will be considered in Part 2, Chapter 5. The Archbishop of York’s manor house at Ilkley was built within the old Roman fort, the walls of which were still standing until well past the Middle Ages, suggesting that the site may have been chosen for its defensive potential. Meanwhile, Archbishop Wulfhere’s flight to his house at Addingham when evicted from York in 867 suggests that he may have felt able to defend it.\textsuperscript{414} Tenants of Bath Abbey at Tidenham (an estate close to the Welsh border) had an obligation to maintain the \textit{burheges}.\textsuperscript{415}

Whilst the possession of private fortifications by Anglo-Saxon prelates is therefore possible, the evidence is not strong, and has been attacked by several historians.\textsuperscript{416} Not least problematic are the elastic definitions of \textit{burh}, and even of \textit{castellum}.\textsuperscript{417} Furthermore, as Armitage observed, the general lack of evidence for the use of private fortresses in, for example, Godwine’s battle against Edward the Confessor is surely significant.\textsuperscript{418} If Godwine did not have private fortifications of noteworthy scale at his disposal, it seems unlikely that any lesser lord (or indeed any ecclesiastic) did.

If the issue of prelates’ fortifications is somewhat ambiguous, a brief consideration of the episcopal site at North Elmham provides a useful case study. The


\textsuperscript{413} Chibnall, \textit{Anglo-Norman England}, 27.


\textsuperscript{415} Anglo-Saxon Charters, 204-207. The document also makes note of the obligation “to ride”. See Part 2, Chapter 2); Williams, ‘Bell-House and Burh-geat’, 29.


\textsuperscript{417} Armitage, Ella and Pryce, T. (1905). ‘The Alleged Norman Origin of “Castles” in England’, in \textit{EHR} 20: 703-718 (707, 713). As a result, when King Edward granted Wulfric the abbacy of Ely (1044-5) “with everything within boroughs and without” it is all but impossible to know precisely what was meant, C&S, I, 521; Armitage, Ella (1912). \textit{The Earliest Norman Castles of the British Isle}. London: John Murray, 23, 25. This sort of linguistic imprecision is why we do not accept as evidence the letter from Pope Nicholas II confirming the Lotharingian Bishop Giso of Wells’ property, including his \textit{castri}, C&S, I, 549, we cannot be certain how Giso understood the term, let alone what the Pope knew about English fortifications.

site has had extensive archaeological examination, revealing a high level of development in the Anglo-Saxon remains. Its may originally have been chosen for its strategic location, close by the crossing of the Roman road over the river Wensum. There are the remains of a large tenth or eleventh century timber hall, believed to have been the bishop’s palace. If there is any rural episcopal site where one might expect to find evidence of fortification, it is North Elmham. It has been suggested that the boat-shaped plan of the bishop’s hall may have been influenced by Scandinavian fortress design. The defence of the hall emerges as a theme of some Old English poetry, suggesting that even if such events were not common, the basic idea was at least plausible. The bishop’s hall, therefore, may have been defensible, but no archaeological study of the site has suggested substantial evidence of fortification. Armitage exploded Pryce’s contention that earthworks at the site were contemporary with the Anglo-Saxon phase, demonstrating that they were later structures. The North Elmham evidence therefore, conforms to the more general pattern. It is possible, but unprovable that the bishop’s residence may have been defensible. There is no evidence, however, for substantial fortification in the bishop’s hands in the Anglo-Saxon period.

**Castles and Bishops, 1066-1200**

While evidence for private fortifications controlled by prelates before the Conquest is scattered and weak, the Norman period produces more useful material. Indeed, the classic statement of the imposition of the “Norman yoke” unites a bishop with castle building:

And Bishop Odo and Earl William were left behind here, and they built castles widely throughout this nation, and

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oppressed the wretched people; and afterwards it always
grew very much worse.\textsuperscript{426}

While it is customary to point out that the advancement of Norman rule proceeded
partly through the construction of new castles and cathedrals, one can overestimate
the importance of prelates’ possession of castles in peacetime in the early Norman
period. Harfield’s list of castles in Domesday Book does not mention a single one in
the hands of a bishop or abbot.\textsuperscript{427} Indeed, the Conqueror would not trust the Bishop of
London with a castle within the city walls, though he was allowed to build one at
Stortford in Hertfordshire.\textsuperscript{428} While Orderic describes the construction of castles in
the immediate post-Conquest period at episcopal cities such as Winchester\textsuperscript{429}, York
and Lincoln\textsuperscript{430}, there is no mention of involvement by the relevant prelates. Indeed,
while most episcopal seats acquired castles, they were generally royal possessions.\textsuperscript{431}

It has long been known that Bishop Gundulf of Rochester (r. 1077-1108) had
some sort of role as a military architect.\textsuperscript{432} The \textit{Textus Roffensis} portrays the bishop as
bullied by William Rufus into his role as architect, but noted his considerable
practical skill: \textit{in opere cementarii plurimum sciens et efficax erat}.\textsuperscript{433} Gundulf, it is
generally reckoned, was involved in the construction of a number of important castles,
including the White Tower.\textsuperscript{434} It should, however, be noted that while most castles
built before the thirteenth century lacked purpose-built castle chapels,\textsuperscript{435} at both
Colchester Castle and the White tower, the chapels are large and very prominent in
the overall design. The similarities of minor details such as the early use of the

\textsuperscript{426} ASC, D, 200; Gleason, Sarell (1936). \textit{An Ecclesiastical Barony of the Middle Ages ; the bishopric of
\textsuperscript{427} Though it does repeatedly make the point that there were without doubt many castles which were
106}: 371-392.
\textsuperscript{428} Taylor, Pamela (1991). ‘The endowment and military obligations of the see of London: a
\textsuperscript{429} That the new castle is a defensive measure for the conquerors distinct from the defences of the city
itself is emphasised by Orderic’s insistence that the city is already well fortified.
\textsuperscript{430} \textit{OV}, II, 195-7, 219.
\textsuperscript{431} Thompson, Michael (1994). ‘The palace of Durham among Norman episcopal palaces and castles’,
in \textit{AND}: 425-436.
\textsuperscript{433} \textit{Textus Roffensis,} II fo. 173v. Rodney Thomson, \textit{The Life of Gundulf Bishop of Rochester} (Toronto,
1977), 79.
\textsuperscript{434} Colvin, H.M. (1963-1982). ‘The Norman Kings 1066-1154’ in Colvin (ed), \textit{The History of the
King’s Works} (3 Vols) London: HM Stationery Office, I, 19-50 (29); Edward Impey, Geoffrey Parnell,
\textsuperscript{435} Pounds, Norman (1990). \textit{The Medieval Castle in England and Wales: A social and political history.}
stepped glacis, a feature derived from church architecture, are occasionally described.\footnote{Gardner, Stephen (1984). ‘Two Campaigns in Suger's Western Block at St.-Denis’, in \textit{The Art Bulletin} \textbf{66}: 574-587 (582 (note 27)).} This implies a degree of architectural control counting against Colvin’s view that Gundulf’s responsibilities were chiefly financial and administrative.\footnote{Colvin, ‘The Norman Kings’, 31.}

It should, however, be observed, that other specialists have questioned Gundulf’s role. The tower sometimes reckoned to be Gundulf’s fortification at Rochester, may have been a belfry.\footnote{Thompson, ‘Palace of Durham’, 425.} It has also been suggested that it may slightly predate Gundulf’s appointment in 1077.\footnote{Flight, Colin and Harrison, A.C. (1968). ‘The Roman and medieval defences of Rochester in the light of recent excavations’, in \textit{Archaeologia Cantiana}: 55-104 (esp. 77).} Even Livett’s view that he was involved in extending the old Roman defences of Rochester has been attacked,\footnote{Brett, Martin (2004). ‘Gundulf (1023/4–1108)’, in \textit{Oxford Dictionary of National Biography}, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/11738, accessed 25 Jan 2010].} though Brett has recently argued that he was responsible for the castle’s outer walls.\footnote{RRAN II, No. 1042, 114.}

In short, while Gundulf may be the best-known military architect of the Norman period, his legacy is also highly disputed.

It was not until the early twelfth century that permanent possession of castles by prelates becomes prominent in the sources, initially in Wales and on the marches. Bishop Roger of Salisbury’s castle at Kidwelly was noted in part one (and Roger witnessed there in 1114).\footnote{Bernard was also given the honour of Carmarthen in 1130, \textit{RRAN}, II, No. 1650, 240. Llawhaden began as a Norman ringwork. A round tower and curtain wall were added around 1200. Turner, Rick (1997). ‘The Medieval Palaces of the Bishops of St Davids, Wales’, in \textit{Military Studies in Medieval Europe: Papers of the ‘Medieval Europe Brugge 1997’ Conference Volume II}: 217-225 (220-221). For the importance of Llawhaden to the bishop’s estates, 221.} Alongside this should be considered Bishop Bernard of St Davids, appointed by Henry I in 1115, and who erected the castle of Llawhaden.\footnote{Turner, ‘The Medieval Palaces’, 217.} It has also been observed, however, that an early list of the “palaces” of the bishopric included a number of sites later occupied by earthwork castles, including Llawhaden itself, New Moat, Wolfs castle, Poyntz Castle and St Davids.\footnote{Turner, ‘The Medieval Palaces’, 217.} With Kidwelly, these sites represent a potential grouping of six fortresses in an area of Pembrokeshire and
Carmarthenshire just forty-five or so miles wide, all under the control of bishops loyal to the English king.\textsuperscript{445}

The situation is less clear regarding Bishop Richard de Belmeis I of London. As discussed in Chapter Five, Richard seems to have wielded great authority in Shropshire first under Roger de Montgomery, and later as a royal functionary. In such circumstances, it seems likely that a number of Shropshire’s castles (Brown’s list includes sixteen, but not Shrewsbury itself) were at least temporarily under de Belmeis’ control, in addition to his own castle at Bishop’s Stortford.\textsuperscript{446}

In Stephen’s reign, episcopal control of castles had come to the fore of national political and military events.\textsuperscript{447} In Part One it was shown that the minor war fought between William of Ste-Barbe and William Cumin for possession of the Episcopal chair of Durham was almost entirely an affair of siege and counter-siege of permanent and temporary castles. In this period, too, the purpose of castle building by prelates begins to be described with precision in the source material, and by scholars. Symeon described a considerable building programme by Ranulph Flambard (r.1096-1128) at Durham and Norham, to deter “thieves” and as a defence against Scottish invasion.\textsuperscript{448}

It would be artificial to separate the efflorescence of episcopal castles in the first years of Stephen’s reign from either the deteriorating political condition of the country, or from the rash of adulterine castles built in the same period. There has been much interest on Henry of Blois’ castle-building projects,\textsuperscript{449} and Franklin has suggested that we can be even more specific with Henry’s motives for the castles of Meredon (in Hursley), Farnham, Bishop’s Waltham, Downton and Taunton\textsuperscript{450}, as well

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{445} Bernard initially declared for Stephen, but defected to the empress c.1141. There may be some evidence for fortified churches in this corner of Wales that is lacking for England. Fisher, E.A. (1969). \textit{Anglo-Saxon Towers – an Architectural and Historical Study}. Newton Abbot: Clark Doble and Brendon Ltd. 22.
\item \textsuperscript{447} Reuter drew attention to the importance of Imperial bishops’ castle building in this period, ‘Episcopi cum sua militia’, 85. Also Reuter, Timothy (1982). ‘The Imperial Church System of the Ottonian and Salian Rulers: A Reconsideration’, in \textit{Journal of Ecclesiastical History 33}: 347-374 (364).
\item \textsuperscript{448} Symeon, \textit{Historia Dunelmensis Ecclesiae}, 140.
\item \textsuperscript{449} Pounds, \textit{The Medieval Castle}, 227-228.
\end{itemize}
as at Winchester itself, suggesting that these were the product of the period of the bishop’s alienation from Stephen’s court in favour of the Beaumont twins. Thompson suggested that the bishop’s castles were part of a broader strategy to encourage borough development. He thought that the bishop may have built further strongholds at Bitterne and Witney. As Brown pointed out, it is difficult to be certain whether the bishop’s castles were entirely new entities in 1138, or indeed whether all were demolished in 1155. Wolvesey, Farnham, Downton and Taunton were in use later on, but Bishop’s Waltham and Meredon vanish from the record at that point. The *Gesta Stephani* relates that Henry of Blois built Lidlea “to ward off various raids of plunderers and especially to protect the lands of his church, which he owned in the neighbourhood”, *(quod quidem in illis partibus et ad varios raptorum arcendos incursus et ad suae specialiter ecclesiae terras tuendas)*. Brown noted with interest the quadrangular range of accommodation at Wolvesey, pointing out the similarity of layout to Roger of Salisbury’s works at Old Sarum and Sherborne, and Henry II’s later building in the upper bailey at Windsor. Thompson suggested that the quadrangular arrangement at Roger’s Castleton and Old Sarum were clearly modelled on the plan of a Benedictine monastery, and that this might have been intended to appear a more appropriate building style for a prelate, though he had thought it unique to Roger.

Stephen’s reign was also the period in which sources began to expect more of episcopal castles. When the knights of Bishop Geoffrey, despite being heavily outnumbered, failed to defend or relieve Norham effectively against David of Scots in 1138, both the warriors and their lord became subjects of derision to the people of the region.
Meanwhile, Roger of Salisbury had been engaged in his own programme of castle building. The new fortresses at Sherborne and Devizes were exceptional. According to Henry of Huntingdon, Devizes was the finest castle in Europe. The *Gesta Stephani* summed up Roger’s building as *castella sua, quae ornatissime construxerat*, and called Sherborne *totius regni clavis*. Roger had built these during the years of his ascendancy under Henry I. Now a castle was begun in the churchyard at Malmesbury, and the bishop built an additional wall around the former royal castle at Salisbury, Roger’s nephew, bishop Alexander of Lincoln, was busy with his own great fortifications at Newark, Sleaford and Banbury. Though the latter two sites have perished, they all seem to have been built on the regular, symmetrical plan associated with later castle building. Even as late as the 1640s, Newark was a formidable military obstacle.

Stephen’s arrest of the bishops, and confiscation of their castles in 1139, has attracted a great deal of comment. He was roundly condemned by contemporary and later chroniclers for this act of tyranny against mother church, though recent scholarship has tended to move away from the seeing the arrest as a political catastrophe. Stephen’s actions should be considered as a strategic problem rather than a political one. In the event of Bishop Roger’s ecclesiastical family openly joining the empress, their possession of castles would represent a strategic disaster.
Bishop Nigel held Aldreth, as well as Ely itself, which had repeatedly proven to be highly defensible. Roger’s control of Devizes and Malmesbury (not apparently a major fortification, but in an important position) would effectively cut the Roman road to Bristol, while Sherborne and Salisbury together would make a campaign into the south-western peninsula extremely difficult. Even without controlling Lincoln castle itself, Bishop Alexander’s control of Newark and Sleaford would make impossible passage up Ermine Street, and hence sever communications with York and the north-east. The bishops may have seen their castles in 1139 as the ornaments of their dioceses. Stephen would more likely have seen an arc of fortresses extending from Dorset to Cambridgeshire, encircling his own power-base in the South-East, controlling all of the major lines of communication in the country, under the control of an ecclesiastical dynasty with reason to support the empress. His actions may have been politically dangerous, but strategically essential.

The importance of Devizes, in particular, was recognised by the Angevins. The empress restored Bishops Cannings and Poterne to the bishopric in 1148, but when this was confirmed by her son in April 1149, he made the caveat, excepto castro de Devys(is). In 1153, the duke made an agreement with the bishop that he would continue to hold the fortress for another three years. Even then, however, he could not let this critical fortress go, and though he finally came to an agreement with Bishop Jocelin in 1157, in which the king could retain Devizes castle in exchange for other lands, bad blood may have remained on both sides.

At the same time there is an increased awareness of the importance of military supply. The author of the Gesta Stephani emphasizes that it was not just Roger of Salisbury’s construction of castles that provoked the king’s move against him and his nephews, but the stockpiling of military supplies there. He also puts filling “their castles full of provisions and stocks of arms, knights and archers” into his long

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466 Part Three Chapter II.
467 RAN, III, Nos 794-5 (292-3) See Kemp’s commentary, EEA 18, xlv.
468 RAN, III, No. 796 (292-3).
469 For Devizes in the context of other castles the king felt obliged to retain, Brown, R.A. ‘A List of Castles’, 250.
470 Kemp suggests that continued tension over Devizes was responsible for Jocelin’s alienation from Henry at the beginning of the Becket crisis. EEA 18, xlv.
471 For the role of castles as bases of support for offensive campaigning, see Strickland, ‘Securing the North’, esp. 186-7 and 189.
472 GS, 72.
description of the militant behaviour of bishops at the worst periods of the Anarchy.\textsuperscript{473} Similarly, in his penetrating analysis of Henry of Blois, \textit{in angustia positus} in 1141, the author of the \textit{Gesta Stephani} remarks that while the empress was persuaded of his great military power, the bishop was unable to restore his brother’s military fortunes because he had failed to properly supply and garrison his castles.\textsuperscript{474}

After the Anarchy, the castle continued to dominate warfare in England. The struggles between the Bishop of Ely and Count John revolved almost entirely around control of key royal castles,\textsuperscript{475} and as a result, most of the later twelfth century incidents of clerics in military command which were discussed in Part One involved sieges. The treaty of 1191, which temporarily ended the war between John and Bishop William of Ely, saw the count surrender several of his castles into the hands of bishops, though it is uncertain for how long these were held.

\textbf{Fortified Churches}

It is a commonplace of medieval military historiography that churches, often provided with towers and perhaps the only stone buildings in a region, were natural choices as refuges or temporary fortifications.\textsuperscript{476} There is also good continental evidence for purpose-built fortress-churches.\textsuperscript{477} England boasts the material remains of a great number of these sites, but almost all of that evidence is of late thirteenth, or fourteenth century building.\textsuperscript{478} The evidence from earlier periods, however, is more equivocal.

\textsuperscript{473} GS, 156.
\textsuperscript{474} GS, 118.
\textsuperscript{475} Strickland, ‘Bones of the Kingdom’, 145.
\textsuperscript{477} Ramseyer, ‘Pastoral Care’, 190.
Anglo-Saxon Evidence

No written source speaks of the use of churches as either temporary or permanent fortification of churches before the Conquest. The vulnerability of the see of Crediton to attack by piratici was acknowledged by Edward the Confessor in 1050, but the solution was not to fortify the church, but to move it behind the walls of Exeter. The debate has therefore been almost entirely architectural and archaeological. Taylor exploded the notion that the square west towers of Anglo-Saxon churches in the Danelaw suggests a network of look-out towers, pointing out the unsuitability of many of the sites. Fisher described fourteen churches where the nave lacked the fire-protection of vaulting, but where the tower at least had no external openings at ground level. In his view, however, Wickham in Berkshire is the only Anglo-Saxon rural church which shows evidence of serious defensive intent in its design. The tower may indeed have been built before the rest of the church as a free-standing refuge, with the nave added later. The tower’s windows are extremely narrow, and the (now sealed) doorway some eight feet above ground level. Some churches may also have absorbed pre-existing secular defence towers, complicating an architectural analysis further, and it is possible that there are other examples whose significance is unappreciated, but for the moment, Fisher’s view is unchallenged.

There is also only one known English example of an urban church involved in the city’s defensive architecture, the Church tower of St Michael at the Northgate in Oxford. Again, there are numerous continental parallels, but this is insufficient to posit that St Michael at the Northgate was anything but exceptional. In short, the pre-Conquest evidence for fortified churches, whether rural or urban, is minimal.

Fortified Churches, 1066-1200

Table 4 arranges chronologically, every incident we have identified in which the fortification of churches (both permanent and temporary) is described or implied in

479 C&S, 1, 530.
481 Fisher, Anglo-Saxon Towers, 85.
482 Ibid.
484 Ibid, especially Parson’s appendix. Various possible configurations of the structure are discussed.
485 Ramseyer, ‘Pastoral Care’, 189.
written sources. It does not include incidents in which churches were used spontaneously as personal refuges from arrest, or sites from which military action was coordinated, for instance when St Wulfstan organised the defence of his city from the cathedral (1088).\textsuperscript{486} Refuges were generally undertaken in desperation, and may have had more to do with the mystical protection of the saints than the physical protection of the stones, such as when the population of Worcester hurried their goods into the cathedral to place them under the protection of Oswald and Wulfstan (1139).\textsuperscript{487} Again, these incidents are deserving of detailed discussion, but there is insufficient space for this here.

On the basis of this information, three observations seem justified: When churches were fortified, it was as often by laymen in pursuit of their own military objectives as by the prelate or religious community seeking the protection of static defences; The fortifications thus undertaken were generally temporary. The fortification of churches is a phenomenon confined almost entirely to the Anarchy, and in particular to before 1145.\textsuperscript{488}

The supposed fortification of the west end of Bishop Remigius’ new cathedral (consecrated shortly after his death in 1092) is probably the best-known, and most discussed example of a religious fortification in the Norman period. It therefore requires special attention. This theory was first advanced by Richard Gem\textsuperscript{489} and a growing body of scholarship agrees.\textsuperscript{490} Gem’s evidence was both literary and archaeological. The literary component was supplied by Henry of Huntingdon:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{Huntingdon}, 412.
\item \textit{JWC}, III, 273. Military relics and banners were also stored in several churches, Keen, \textit{Chivalry}, 54; Part Two Chapter Four.
\item See also Beeler, ‘Castles and Strategy’, 584; Brett, ‘Warfare and its restraints’, 135-6.
\item Cowdrey, H.E.J. (Sept 2004). ‘Remigius (d. 1092)’, in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, (online edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press. [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/23361, Accessed 9 Aug 2007]; Stocker, David (2004). ‘The Two Early Castles at Lincoln’, in Philip Lindley (ed), \textit{The Early History of Lincoln Castle}. Lincoln: The Society for Lincolnshire History and Archaeology, 14. Here Stocker went even further than Gem, suggesting that the west end’s function as an entrance to the main body of the Cathedral was merely incidental. Though he drew attention to the strategic importance of the bishopric’s possessions, Bates was not wholly convinced of the idea of the fortified Cathedral but allowed that it may have been “intended as a place of refuge in uncertain times, or as a secure store for valuables. Its appearance may point to an aloofness and an anxiety about the safety and security of the new bishop and his foreign companions within the city of Lincoln”. Bates, David (1992). \textit{Bishop Remigius of Lincoln 1067-1092}. Lincoln: Honywood Press, 19, 23. This distinction surely is one of how much resistance the structure was expected to offer, not its basic
\end{itemize}
Having, therefore, bought lands in the upper city itself, next to the castle which was distinguished by its very strong towers, he [Remigius] constructed a strong church in that strong place, a beautiful church in that beautiful place, dedicated to the Virgin of Virgins; it was to be both agreeable to the servants of God and also, as suited the times\textsuperscript{491}, invincible to enemies.\textsuperscript{492}

Gem noted that the Cathedral was used as a siegework to beleaguer the castle in 1140, but not in 1144 after it had been partially rebuilt, suggesting that Remigius’ defensive features still stood during the 1140 siege but were a casualty of the redesign.\textsuperscript{493} Although he encountered difficulties in fully establishing the relationship of the west end defensive structures with the rest of the cathedral building, Gem reconstructed a plan of the west end of the cathedral as a massive, “easily defensible”, rectangular stone block with architectural similarities with the Tower of London, Lincoln Castle itself and Exeter Castle.\textsuperscript{494} Remigius’ cathedral seems almost a second keep complementing the castle, surrounded to east and south by the defences of the bailey.\textsuperscript{495} Gem also considered the spatial relationship between castle and church at other sites, suggesting that “Gundulf’s tower” had a similar relationship to his cathedral as Lincoln Castle to Remigius’.\textsuperscript{496} Stocker, meanwhile suggested parallels with Peterborough, suggesting that the castle at Lincoln may have been a product of Hereward’s rebellion just as Turold’s motte at Peterborough was.\textsuperscript{497} If that is the case, the prospect of future dangers from the fens may have influenced the design of Lincoln cathedral too.

There are, however, problems with Gem’s thesis. Martindale has shown that the study of the spatial relationships between fortifications and monasteries should be

\textsuperscript{491} “as suited the times” is an interesting comment in light of our discussion of the reasons for maintaining stipendiary troops in ecclesiastical households in the years immediately after the Conquest.

\textsuperscript{492} Gem, ‘Ecclesia Pulchra’, 9; \textit{Huntingdon}, 408.


\textsuperscript{494} Gem, ‘Ecclesia Pulchra’, 22.

\textsuperscript{495} Ibid, 20.

\textsuperscript{496} Ibid, 25.

\textsuperscript{497} Stocker, ‘Two Early Castles’, 16.
undertaken against a continental background, and if Gem’s view is accurate, it stands in sharp contrast to Maureen Miller’s work on Italy. Despite the location of Lincoln (the historiography has repeatedly pointed out Lincoln’s role in protecting the road to the north) and its consequent strategic significance, the Conqueror’s notice of the relocation of the diocese from Dorchester makes no mention of making the see defensible (an interesting contrast to Edward the Confessor’s removal of the see of Crediton to Exeter). Nor is Remigius’ cathedral ascribed any defensive character by Gerald of Wales, an author who was quite comfortable with Remigius’ role in the Norman Conquest (Part 3, Chapter 2) Gem himself noted William of Malmesbury’s assessment that during the siege of Lincoln castle in 1141 the king a strange expression for using extant fortifications. Furthermore as we have seen, it is difficult to securely ascribe defensive functions to church buildings even when the architecture has survived relatively unchanged. Given the substantial reconstruction of the west end, therefore, Gem’s assessment that it was necessarily defensible on the basis of a heavy, “blocklike” architecture seems overstated. Finally, his use of Henry of Huntingdon is questionable. Henry’s description is far from explicit, and seems to emphasise the security of the cathedral site, and the protective presence of the castle, rather than defensibility of the building itself. It is possible that Gem’s suggestion has had such traction partly because Remigius is one of those Norman ecclesiastics whose military

500 For example Chibnall, Anglo-Norman England, 34. Bates stressed the importance of the site as a secure base south of the Humber when the Danes sailed up the river to support English rebels in 1069, 12; Pamela Marshall has suggested that the large bailey of Lincoln castle indicates that it was intended as a base for cavalry operations as much as defence, Marshall, (2004). ‘Lincoln Castle: The Architectural Context of the Medieval Defences’, in Philip Lindley (ed), The Early History of Lincoln Castle. Lincoln: The Society for Lincolnshire History and Archaeology, 54.
501 Bates RAN, 588-589.
502 For a continental parallel, compare to the movement of the see of Paestum to a new, fortified site at Capaccio in the tenth century. Ramseyer, ‘Pastoral Care’, 190.
503 For the movement of the bishopric, Vita S. Remigii, GCO, VII, 18-19.
adventures dominate their historical memory. Gem’s reconstruction of Lincoln’s architecture and function may well be accurate, but the evidence marshalled seems insufficient.

**Prelates, Defence and Conflicted Spaces**

Some churches were part of castle buildings, within their outer walls, or built in their shadow. In 1114, probably while accompanying the king on campaign, Bishop Roger of Salisbury created a further layer of complexity of lordship to his possessions at Kidwelly, when he founded a priory of Sherborne there, which remained a dependency of his see until 1122. Roger’s castle at Sherborne had three chapels, and he conducted at least one ordination in the chapel of Devizes. Salisbury castle church was dedicated by at least three bishops. Castle chapel and other churches built within castle walls were part of the normal ecclesiastical organisation, subject to the diocesan jurisdiction and so party to its disputes and conflicts. The Conqueror reached a compromise with the abbey of Saint-Benoît-sur-Loire (April 1067) over their rights in the church of Saint-James-de-Beuvron, around which he had built a castle. A century later, Bishop Gilbert Foliot of London asserted the parochial rights of Gloucester Abbey in the castle there as well as the tradition that the castellan be buried within the abbey. Unfortunately, we cannot discuss at length the history of disputes between prelates and lay powers in cases where the construction or extension of castles infringed on a church’s lands or privileges, though the impact of incidents such as Richard I’s construction of a new castle at Les Andeleys in 1197, was considerable. Finally, it should be pointed out that possession of castles by bishops was complicated, both legally and psychologically by the overlap of secular

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505 Bates has pointed out that the narrative sources for Remigius’ involvement in warfare are confined entirely to the invasion itself. After 1066, there is no evidence for a continued military career at all. Bates, *Bishop Remigius*, 12.


508 *JWC*, III, 62.


511 *EEA* 15, 72, No. 108.

and ecclesiastical administration. A castle like Barnstaple in the hands of Geoffrey de Coutances, or Roger of Salisbury’s Kidwelly, was outside the borders of the diocese, and so could easily be regarded as a secular possession of an ecclesiastic. The same could not necessarily be said of Winchester or Durham.\textsuperscript{513} When his castle of Downton was seized (1148-9), Henry of Blois pursued the offenders with the spiritual sword before bringing military force to bear.\textsuperscript{514} Gilbert Foliot granted an indulgence of twenty days in support of raising funds for the restoration of the church in Bishop’s Stortford castle. The personal importance of the castle was not merely a chronicler’s fancy. When Hugh du Puiset died in November 1195, in a gesture both poignant and redolent of the Peterborough mortuary tradition regarding knights’ weapons, the community mourned his passing by hanging the keys of Durham Castle over the shrine of St Cuthbert.\textsuperscript{515}

Just as castle churches provided added controversies to ecclesiastical politics, a castle could become a politically complicating element in its own right. Becket, authorised to resume wrongly alienated lands of his archbishopric, found himself involved in disputes in 1163 when he demanded the castles of Rochester, Saltwood\textsuperscript{516} and Hythe, and the homage of Earl Roger de Clare for Tunbridge Castle.\textsuperscript{517} More consistently complicating, however, were the problems caused by castle-guard. For a prelate’s knights to be effectively seconded to serve in a castle not in his own possession necessarily complicated the loyalties of the knights in question, and made maintaining control over them potentially even more difficult. Most notably, the Abbot of Abingdon was presented with serious difficulties by Walter, constable of the royal castle at Windsor, and therefore the leader of some of Abingdon’s knights when they carried out castle guard there. As a rival focus of the loyalty of his knights, the abbot found it impossible to act against Walter when he appropriated the community’s lands.\textsuperscript{518} The duty of castle-guard therefore disrupted normal relationships, to the detriment of the church. There are several twelfth-century examples of prelates seeking to move the location where their knights were to serve, into their own

\textsuperscript{513} De Iniusta, 179-180.  
\textsuperscript{514} GS, 214.  
\textsuperscript{515} Howden, Chronicle, III, 353-354. Matthew suggested that the bishop’s castles were “not at all in the tradition of the Cuthbertine church”, Matthew, Donald (1994). ‘Durham and the Anglo-Norman world’, in AND 1-22, 12, a view evidently not shared by the monks themselves.  
\textsuperscript{516} For Saltwood Beeler, ‘Castles and Strategy’, 595.  
\textsuperscript{517} Gervase, Chronicle, 174; Barlow, Thomas Becket, 104.  
\textsuperscript{518} HEA, II, 9-11.
jurisdiction, perhaps to avoid such complications. The Abbot of Ely (1081x1087) was allowed to withdraw his knights from castle-guard at the royal castle at Norwich, called *graves operationes* by the *Liber Eliensis*, on condition that he build a new fortification in the town where they could serve. His successor, Bishop Hervey, was finally allowed to withdraw his knights from Norwich completely in 1130, in exchange for taking charge of the defence of the Isle, apparently greatly strengthening his power there, for he was able to expel from it all who did not acknowledge his lordship. Slightly later (1139x1146), Abbot Anselm of Bury St Edmunds was quitclaimed by Stephen of the duty of castle-guard, also at Norwich, on condition that he transfer their service to the town of Bury itself.

Both of these withdrawals from royal castle-guard are well known, as are the changes made by bishops Robert and Alexander of Lincoln to their involvement with royal castles. Just as at Old Sarum, the position of the cathedral within the castle walls must have been a cause of annoyance and disruption to the normal operation of cathedral life, not just in terms of the two competing jurisdictions which occupied the same geographical space, but also in terms of the practicalities of running a religious community in a military installation, whatever the attractiveness of a defended location. Robert was allowed to make his own exit in the wall of the king’s castle in (1100x1115), but with the stern proviso that in doing so, it was not to be weakened. Alexander was permitted to withdraw twenty knights from Lincoln to Newark in 1133.

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523 Though there may be some evidence that Remigius and Robert were allowed to live in the castle, and that there was an intent to create some sort of processional way between the two. Thompson, *Bishops’ Houses*, 20.
524 Stocker’s analysis of the bishop’s separation of the royal and episcopal spaces is extremely useful, ‘Two Castles’, 16-17.
527 *RRAN*, II, 268, no. 1791. Thompson thought that these were royal knights rather than episcopal knights doing royal castle guard. Thompson, Michael (2004). ‘The Early Topography of Lincoln Castle’, in Philip Lindley (ed), *The Early History of Lincoln Castle*. Lincoln: The Society for Lincolnshire History and Archaeology, 24. This seems to be an error, but he was right to emphasise the issue of personal relationships between bishop and knights.
Conclusion

Even on the basis of this short foray, it seems that there are certain historiographical assumptions, both explicit and implicit, which should be reconsidered. Like knight service, the possession of fortifications by clerics in this period is generally thought of as a function of landholding, an aspect of the church’s “entanglement” in secular affairs and the province of prelates acting “in their capacity” as secular lords.\(^{528}\) Whilst this aspect is important, the most militarily noteworthy aspect of such control across the period is the temporary construction or possession of castles in the course of campaigning. Rather than regarding possession of castles as primarily a tenurial issue, it was more commonly ad hoc, and derived from military command. This does not mean that architectural details should be neglected. As has been pointed out, there are some interesting cases where the prelates’ experience of ecclesiastical architecture apparently influenced elements of castle design. Even the concentric plan beloved of thirteenth century military architects may have been pioneered in episcopal castles. Nor should we lose sight of the fact that castles were also in part sacred spaces, with chapels subject to diocesan administration, and part of the religious life of the prelate and his church.

The evidence for fortified churches is also difficult. While there is a great wealth of material remains for later church fortification, and there are important continental cases, the evidence for permanent fortification of churches in England before 1200 is scattered and often weak, and there is little overlap between the literary and physical evidence. The rural church may have been a tempting place to flee in time of danger,\(^{529}\) but a number of writers have commented on the vulnerability of such structures to destruction by fire,\(^{530}\) the fate that befell Wherwell Abbey in 1141. In such circumstances, a refuge would quickly become a trap. On the other hand, the addition of fortifications to a church or to conventual buildings, quite apart from the expense of construction and upkeep, would endow them with a strategic significance beyond that which they would ordinarily possess, as Earl Miles of Hereford warned

\(^{528}\) Pounds, *The Medieval Castle*, 222.

\(^{529}\) This behaviour earned Orderic Vitalis’ disapproval in Normandy, *OV*, III, 62. Perhaps the insistence that “nothing be placed in the church which is unfitting for it” in the so-called ‘Canons of Edgar’ derives from the practice. *C&S*, I, 323.

his brother, Abbot Reginald of Evesham, when he began fortifying the abbey. As such, they might become more, rather than less liable to seizure or attack. The fortification of churches even on a temporary basis was carried out by laymen as often as clerics, but this was confined almost entirely to the first years of Stephen’s reign. Finally, it is clear that ecclesiastical lords expended considerable effort trying to resolve the tensions and contradictions that resulted from competing and overlapping jurisdictions, both politically and regarding the interactions between spiritual and secular spaces.

In short, the study of prelates’ involvement with fortifications cannot be either a footnote to castle studies, or the study of lordship or land tenure. It should place heavier emphasis on temporary fortifications and \textit{ad hoc} delegations of command, and should embrace architectural developments, strategic and political analysis, the study of local networks and lordships, problems of jurisdiction, and consideration of the prelate’s religious life.

\footnote{Evesham Chronicle, 98.}
Chapter 4: Spiritual Weapons in Secular Warfare

Despite growing interest in medieval warfare as a religious experience, there has been almost no work on the use by prelates of their sacred powers in battle. The prevailing view is that such behaviour, in so far as it is relevant to warfare qualify at most as “soft” power. While a modern analyst may doubt their efficacy, however, prayer, excommunication, benediction or the presence of relics on the battlefield were often intended to alter the physical course of warfare, and therefore must be discussed in this study. Nonetheless, this material must be handled differently to other areas of military power and practice because it is almost impossible to separate the supernatural elements of the narrative discourse from clerics’ historical behaviour. As a result, while the inclusion of spiritual elements in narrative accounts will be discussed in Part Three, Chapter Two, here the discussion must proceed as if the spiritual measures taken by clerics had the effects ascribed to them by chroniclers. Clergy certainly travelled with Carolingian and crusading armies to care for the souls of warriors. We have already seen how “Benedictus” licensed this practice, and Archbishop Turpin, though dying, was said to have twice blessed the dead peers of France. There are, however, only a handful of occasions on which we are told specifically that this was the reason for a cleric’s presence. On almost every instance on which there are depictions of clerics’ spiritual powers used in warfare, the stated purpose was to achieve victory.

Anglo-Saxon England

The history of clerics using spiritual power for military ends is as long as clerical involvement in war in itself. The textual afterlife of Bede’s description of the


535 JWC, II, 492; Liber Eliensis, 141-2; RH, 162.
battle fought in 605 between the Welsh and the Northumbrians is discussed in Part Three, Chapter Four. Subsequent authors’ alterations (including the Chronicle) tended to obscure the fact, but Bede’s description is specific. Bede has Aethelfryth declare that the British monks present should be killed because they fought him with their prayers (pugnant inprecationibus). In the Chronicle, Paulinus was asked to pray for King Edwin’s victory, and after his bloody conquest of five kings, Paulinus received his bishopric. At least one author, therefore, viewed the foundation of the archdiocese of York itself as a royal reward for the spiritual power of a cleric used as a weapon of war. The late tenth-century Old English “Blickling Homily” tells how when the people of Benevento and Sepontus were attacked by heathen Neapolitans, their bishop led them in prayer, and called down the archangel Michael, and a divine lightning storm to help his people to victory. Malmesbury tells a story about a naval battle between the South Saxons and the men of Archbishop Wilfrid of York, portrayed partly as a spiritual struggle between Christian and pagan priests, in which the pagans tried to crush the Christians by “fanatical incantations” while the tide literally turned early due to the Christian priests’ prayers, bringing a miraculous victory to the archbishop’s forces.

The Norman Conquest

The Normans brought with them a conception of the power of clerics to intervene in battle using spiritual powers very similar to that of the Anglo-Saxons. Rollo himself was said to have been defeated at Chartres by spiritual power, as Bishop Antelmus organised liturgies and himself carried the relics of his church (including a shift belonging to the Virgin) as a banner, por gonfanon. Rollo’s army fled in terror, and he was even temporarily blinded. In the duke’s absence, Normans expected the power of prayer and of relics to hold back raiders, and when Duke William went to war, he paid the Norman monasteries for their prayers. The Duke’s

536 Bede, 140-142; Abels, Lordship and Military Obligation, 51. For Bishop Aidan of Lindisfarne’s miraculous rescue of Bamburgh from Penda’s army, Bede, 262.
537 ASC, 25; Bede’s version is slightly different, focussing on Paulinus’ sucessful prayers for the king’s fertility.
539 GP, I, 334.
540 Roman de Rou, 30; For a less elaborate version of the story, Torigni, 12.
541 Gesta Guillelmi, 46, 86.
preparations for the Battle of Hastings included substantial religious components.⁵⁴² Even Duchess’ Matilda’s pious benefactions were supposed to bring her husband aid in battle.⁵⁴³ William himself heard a mass, and carried relics on his person,⁵⁴⁴ while the clergy and monks accompanying the army (led by Bishops Odo and Geoffrey) prepared to fight with prayers (precibus pugnare)⁵⁴⁵ through the previous night, or even “fought with prayers and counsel”,⁵⁴⁶ language extraordinarily similar to Aethelthryth’s supposed words in 605.

After Hastings, William was in no doubt about the nature of the power that had swept him to victory, against considerable odds. The founding of Battle Abbey itself is only the most famous example of the massive programme of benefactions to churches undertaken by the new king.⁵⁴⁷ Like Edwin’s invasion of Wessex, the Norman Conquest of England was a military operation conducted with the supernatural help of the clergy. Victory was obtained using both temporal and spiritual weapons. Little distinction is made between them by the sources, and the victor rewarded both spiritual and temporal warriors generously.

By far the best-known instrument of divine power mobilised by Duke William for his campaign was the papal banner said to have been carried before him at Hastings.⁵⁴⁸ We might speculate about the likely psychological impact of such a banner, especially given the importance of the cult of St Peter in England,⁵⁴⁹ but in the Gesta Guillelmi’s description, the banner was given so that “by following which he might attack the enemy with greater confidence and safety” (quo primo confidentius ac tutius inuaderet adversarium).⁵⁵⁰ Orderic (who knew the Gesta Guillelmi) wrote that the banner was sent so that “by his [St Peter’s] merits he [William] might be

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⁵⁴³ O.V., II, 224.
⁵⁴⁴ In Gesta Guillelmi, these are the relics “whose protection Harold had forfeited by breaking the oath that he had sworn on them”. 124. Orderic took the same view (OV, II, 174).
⁵⁴⁵ Gesta Guillelmi, 124 ; Wace depicts elaborate liturgical preparations, Roman de Rou, 256.
⁵⁴⁶ O.V., II, 174. Chibnall’s excellent translation often softens Orderic’s stark emphasis on spiritual violence. She translates “pugnare precibus et consiliis” as “to support the fight with prayers and counsel”. This seems to overcomplicate “pugnare”.
⁵⁴⁷ Gesta Guillelmi, 154.
⁵⁵⁰ Gesta Guillelmi, 104-5.
defended from every danger, (cuius meritis ab omni periculo defenderetur).

Pope Alexander’s banner was intended to have a literal effect, guarding the duke and his men against physical harm and increasing the likelihood of victory. Also, like the other instances of spiritual warfare, William rewarded this assistance, sending the Pope some of his captured booty.

The papal banner should not be seen in isolation from other papal involvement. There are the penitential articles issued by the Papal Legate Ermenfrid of Sion (Part Three, Chapter One). These constitute the exertion of papal authority to wipe out the moral stain of the Conquest and set the seal on its legitimacy (and significantly do not extend the same privilege to English survivors). In exchange for this, Alexander II expected some sort of enhanced political relationship with England, though there has been debate as to whether this went so far as demanding that England become a papal fief. Use of high-prestige banners to control and channel Norman military power may have been part of a more general papal policy. William of Montreuil “became commander of the papal army and carried the banner of St Peter to victory in fertile Campania”, (Romani exercitus princeps militiae factus uexillium sancti Petri gestans uberem Campaniam subiugauit) and the papacy used similar methods to support the early Commune of Milan, and both the Pisan invasion of Sardinia and Roger Guiscard’s conquest of Sicily.

The papal banner at Hastings is the first well-known religious battle emblem in England, but they were is evidence of their presence far earlier. St Germanus had carried a banner. Nennius believed that Arthur’s victories over the Saxons were partly attributable to the divine power mobilized by bearing an image of the Virgin on his shield, a story recycled by Wace. King Oswald of Northumbria had set up a great cross on a battlefield with his own hands before he defeated Caedwalla. Even in

551 OV, III, 142.
552 Gesta Guillelmi, 152.
554 OV, II 58-59. Chibnall’s analysis (fn.4) shows that he did not hold a banner fief, but was the literal recipient of a Papal Banner. Later (98), he is called signifer papae.
555 Barber, Knight and Chivalry, 298.
556 Keen, Chivalry, 48.
557 Bede, 62.
Henry of Huntingdon’s day the site was still venerated. The young St Wulfstan had prayed before a “Banner of our Lord” by the altar to all saints. Orderic’s description of the great jubilation among the Normans who captured the Byzantine emperor’s cross certainly suggests that the Normans held holy battle-totems in the highest regard.

Unfortunately, we have almost no idea what the papal banner might have looked like. Attempts to positively identify it in the Bayeux Tapestry run into the general difficulties in interpreting the Tapestry’s banners. In fact, we know little about the physical forms of most of the ecclesiastical vexilla discussed here, a situation made more difficult by problems of vocabulary. Vexillum is most naturally understood as “flag” or “banner”, the meaning consistently applied in this chapter to avoid unnecessary digression, but as Caldwell observed, vexillum can be applied to almost any representative object, including crosses or relics. Huntingdon called Augustine’s silver cross his vexillum.

The Gesta Herewardi sometimes casts the struggle between the Normans and the fenland resistance as a conflict of spiritual forces. In Hereward’s view, it is alleged, the very bestowal of weapons on a warrior by a monk or abbot would improve that man’s fighting qualities, but it also alleges more direct involvement of spiritual power. Frustrated that Ely was “naturally fortified by the power of God”, William looked to a witch to use her powers to overwhelm the mystical defences of the Isle. Her magic could not match the monastery’s divine protection, and the Conqueror’s army was again beaten off. The Liber Eliensis removes most of the Gesta Herewardi’s discussion of the role of the monks also places less emphasis on the spiritual dimensions of the conflict. Nonetheless, it does still hint that the power of the saint had helped sustain the resistance. In this depiction, the Conqueror, despite

559 Huntingdon, 628; Roman de Brut, 362-364; On Oswald’s cross, Damon, Soldier Saints, 45.
560 OV, IV, 19.
561 Jones, R. ‘What Banner Thine?’, 102. His important point is slightly obscured by the odd notion that this particular banner is visually emphasised by its curling streamers, 104.
563 Huntingdon, 142.
564 De Gestis Herewardii Saxonis, S.H. Miller, W.D. Sweeting (ed/trans). Peterborough: Palgrave, (1895), 36-7. Regenwald, the steward of Ramsey was given the task of carrying Hereward’s standard, 61. For cases in which mass knightings occurred on the eve of battle or storm to increase the strength and virtue of the combatants, Keen, Chivalry, 79.
565 Liber Eliensis, 74-8.
his victory and rapacious treatment of the house, remains so afraid of Saint Aethelthryth’s vengeance that he cannot even approach her altar.\footnote{Ibid, 199.}

1071-1135

After the Conquest, the prelates of the Anglo-Norman realm continued to wield spiritual weapons in wartime.\footnote{In Flanders too, excommunication continued to be a weapon of war. So many of these thunderbolts were hurled during the war of the 1120s for control of the countship that the conflict has become known as the “War of Anathemas”, Helmholz, Richard (1994-5). ‘Excommunication in Twelfth Century England’, in Journal of Law and Religion 11: 235-253 (238).} In 1088, when Earl Roger of Montgomery’s rebel troops were besieging Worcester, Bishop Wulfstan’s response was two-fold. There was certainly a sally of the defenders including the bishop’s \textit{familia} and possibly royal troops (Part 2, Chapter 1), but accounts of the siege stress Wulfstan’s spiritual power, and that this achieved great slaughter of the besiegers. The \textit{Chronicle} left this relatively vague, “through God’s mercy and the bishop’s merits”.\footnote{ASC, E, 223.} In John of Worcester’s more detailed account, the bishop promised the defenders, that through his blessing and God’s, they would be invulnerable in battle. The rebels’ destruction of ecclesiastical property outside the city prompted the bishop to intervene further, and he anathematised them. While the defenders were “invigorated” by the bishop’s and God’s blessing, the enemy suffered some malady which struck them blind, and robbed them of their strength, helping precipitate the subsequent rout.\footnote{JWC, III, 52-56.} Henry of Huntingdon’s version is less elaborate, and changes some details, but retains the central role of the bishop’s spiritual power. Though he mentioned both the few soldiers that Wulfstan was able to send out, and that he acted using God’s assistance, Henry still used the third person singular to describe the victory (cepit... occidit... fugauit), emphasising Wulfstan’s power rather than his knights’.\footnote{\textit{Huntingdon}, 414.} Though Malmesbury’s account in the \textit{Gesta Pontificum} is similarly brief, he too privileged spiritual elements. The men of Worcester were ordered to “avenge the wrongs done to God and his church” and the bishop “hurled the thunderbolt of excommunication” at the rebels. Blindness is a punishment inflicted on enemies of God several times in
Though John of Worcester casts Wulfstan as “a second Moses”, none of the chronicle accounts reference the biblical precedents, and while Malmesbury acknowledges the extraordinary nature of the events, he too recounts a story of confusion and blindness among the rebel host, and claims that this was derived from the testimony of eyewitnesses.\footnote{572}

In c.1101-1103, Anselm responded to a request for troops to fight the Saracens from Diacus, Bishop of Saint James of Compostella that he was unable to help, given the current disorder within England, but instead offered to try, however, “with the help of God to bring about by prayers what we are not able to achieve by a muster of soldiers”, \textit{(deo annuente hoc efficere orationem devotione, quod non valemus militum collectione)}.\footnote{573} In 1118, when Henry I was hard-pressed by the forces of France, Flanders and Anjou, the Warenne Chronicle (formerly known as the Hyde Chronicle) alleges that Abbot Pons of Cluny (whose house had benefitted a good deal from Henry’s largesse) fasted, said prayers, and even applied “the most devout mortifications” to bring about divine intervention on the king’s behalf.\footnote{574}

Though there is no chronicle attestation for it, this period may also have continued the use of powerful religious banners, and of rewards granted by laymen for their use. A problematic charter of Mont-Saint Michel (supposedly 1075x1080) has Count Robert of Mortain making a grant to the monastery, grateful to the monks for allowing him use of their banner \textit{(habens in bello Sancti Michelis Vexillum)}.\footnote{575} Bates has discussed the problems of this charter in depth,\footnote{576} and suggested that the banner element is the most suspect portion. Even if it is a twelfth-century interpolation, however, for the forgery to be plausible still requires an enduring sense of the military utility of religious banners.

\footnote{571}{The closest parallel is when the Syrian army besieged Dothan, Eliseus first stiffened the resolve of the city’s defenders and then prayed for the army outside to be afflicted with blindness. 2 Kings 6; 13-18.}
\footnote{GP, I, 434.}
\footnote{Anselm, \textit{Opera}, IV, 178.}
\footnote{\textit{Liber Monasterii de Hyda}, Edward Edwards (ed), London: Longman. (1886).}
\footnote{Bates \textit{RRAN}, 668 (no. 213).}
\footnote{RRAN, 665-668.}
The disorders of Stephen’s reign saw some of the best documented use of the implements of spiritual warfare on an earthly battlefield in the whole period, but also significant changes to the impact of those implements.

The roles of Archbishop Thurstan of York, Bishop Ralph of Orkney, and the possible presence of lesser northern clergy at Northallerton in 1138 is discussed in Part One. The canonical reaction to this is discussed in Part Three, Chapter One. Thurstan’s strategy for resistance appears to have had several components; use of his high status and moral power to encourage the northern nobility to fight, use of the ecclesiastical machinery to bring priests and their parishioners to the battlefield, and use of spiritual instruments – benediction to strengthen the English defenders, and the assembly and deployment of “the Standard” itself to channel divine power against the enemy.577

There are several good accounts of the Battle of the Standard which strongly emphasise the importance of spiritual weapons, though there are some substantial differences between them which have not previously been explored. Aelred of Rievaulx emphasised that the attending priests brought “crosses, banners and the relics of the saints”, 578 and in his version, Walter Espec’s speech lists the sources of supernatural help the English would receive in the battle: Michael and the angels, “ready to avenge the injury of him whose church they have defiled” with human blood, whose altar they have desecrated by placing on it a human head”; St Peter and the Apostles “whose basilicas they turned into stables and then into brothels”; the Holy Martyrs, “whose memorials they have burned, whose halls they have filed with slaughter”; the Holy Virgins “although they are reluctant to fight – will fight for us by prayer”; even Christ himself, who would “take up arms and shield and will rise to our aid”. 579 This list represents a pantheon of Catholic supernatural powers, arrayed in defence of the northern church and preparing to do violence against mortals alongside the clergy who “ceremoniously strengthened the people by word and prayer.” 580 Ralph of Orkney is portrayed as leading the army’s prayers, granting them

578 Aelred, Relatio, PL 195, Col. 0703B.
579 Relatio, PL 195, Col. 0706D-0707A A reference to Psalm 34, 2.
580 Relatio, PL 195, Col. 0708 D.
benediction, and even declaring that they would receive remission of sins for fighting.\textsuperscript{581}

Henry of Huntingdon also emphasised Scottish crimes against the church and the English as instruments of divine vengeance, though the speech was given by Ralph of Orkney.\textsuperscript{582} Again, the sins of the English fighters are remitted (this time it is an explicit “grant” by the bishop).\textsuperscript{583} The whole tone, however, is less supernatural than Aelred’s version, with heavier emphasis on the material advantages of the English, their superior armour and training, and the glorious history of Norman conquests. There is no specific mobilisation of the saints, or of Christ, and the Standard itself is cast as a “royal banner”.\textsuperscript{584} This apparent secularisation of the narrative is all the more surprising given that like Aelred, Henry had earlier cast Christ as a “dux” in battle.\textsuperscript{585} He even specifically stated that the Scots were not intimidated by English banners.\textsuperscript{586}

It is John and Richard of Hexham who provided the most detail about the physical nature and origins of the standard itself. John’s account begins with Thurstan blessing the defenders he has roused, and imposing a three-day fast.\textsuperscript{587} John seems more interested, however, in the Standard itself. We are told that it was sited on lands belonging to St Cuthbert, that it consisted of a ship’s mast, bearing the banners of Saints Peter, John of Beverley and Wilfrid of Ripon. At the top was mounted a host, to be signifer et dux praelii (indicating Christ again as Dux belli).\textsuperscript{588} Though the whole assemblage may sound so awkward as to be implausible, it is similar to the standard that would be wheeled on a cart before the army of the Third Crusade.\textsuperscript{589} The apparent promise of remission of sins, however is blurred somewhat, into a statement that Ralph and the other clergy were there to hear confession and stiffen their resolve

\textsuperscript{581} Aelred, \textit{Relatio}, PL 195, Col. 0707D; Bachrach, D, \textit{Religion and Conduct}, 160. For the major importance of such declarations in crusader battle orations, Bachrach, David (2004). ‘Conforming with the rhetorical tradition of plausibility: clerical representation of battlefield orations against Muslims, 1080-1170’, in \textit{International History Review}: 1-19 (esp. 4, 9, 18).\textsuperscript{582} \textit{Huntingdon}, 715.\textsuperscript{583} Ibid, 716.\textsuperscript{584} Ibid, 713.\textsuperscript{585} Ibid, 96.\textsuperscript{586} Ibid, 714.\textsuperscript{587} \textit{JH}, 292.\textsuperscript{588} Ibid, 293.\textsuperscript{589} \textit{Itinerarium Peregrinorum}, 249-50.
through hope in the next life. It is also noted that on the advice of the secular leaders, Thurstan remained in York to pray.\textsuperscript{590}

Richard of Hexham’s account is similar to John’s. He too emphasised that the battle was fought on the lands of St Cuthbert,\textsuperscript{591} and his description of the Standard itself is similar (he adds the detail that the Host, again \textit{Dux Belli} was contained in a silver pyx),\textsuperscript{592} though he also stressed the efficacy of the Standard as a rally point.\textsuperscript{593} He referred to Thurstan remaining at home on the advice of the lay warriors, but described how he sent both the banner of St Peter and his own retainers, and that the archbishop’s prayers were themselves a contribution to the fight.\textsuperscript{594} Like John, Richard’s description of the spiritual benefits promised is vague, implying remission of sins without stating it explicitly.\textsuperscript{595} Richard also noted the presence of the cross-bearing priests.\textsuperscript{596} Unlike Huntingdon, Richard tells that the Standard terrified the Scots (including King David), and emphasised the gratitude of the English to the churches which had lent them when the banners were returned.\textsuperscript{597}

Despite the differences between accounts, it seems that the English defenders’ strategy in 1138 had a substantial spiritual component. Some sort of spiritual reward was probably offered for combatants, and every northern source depicts a deliberate casting by local leaders of the Scots as enemies of the church whom divine power would destroy. The saints involved have been of surprisingly little interest to historians, though the selection is itself interesting. All of the named saints (Peter, Wilfrid, John and Cuthbert) were bishops and evangelists. Wilfrid, John and Cuthbert were significant historical figures for the northern church, and Cuthbert had a long tradition of violent military intervention. There was also good reason to suppose that they would be particularly efficacious in battle.

Peter, obviously, as Prince of the Apostles had a special status, and was the patron of the Archdiocese itself. A banner of St Peter may also have had particular resonance if, as Huntingdon suggests Norman “national” pride were being evoked, because of the association with the papal banner at Hastings. Also, the (incorrect)

\textsuperscript{590} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{591} \textit{RH}, 165.
\textsuperscript{592} Ibid, 163.
\textsuperscript{593} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{594} Ibid, 161.
\textsuperscript{595} Ibid, 160.
\textsuperscript{596} Ibid, 160-1.
\textsuperscript{597} Ibid, 163-4.
belief may have been circulating that the famous Oriflamme had originally been St Peter’s banner.598 There was also a tradition that Peter had appeared in a vision to King Edwin and in exchange for his conversion, granted him victory in battle over his pagan foes.599 Finally, given the extraordinary spiritual measures Thurstan was taking, evoking the power of the Holy See itself cannot but have seemed a good idea.

Some sort of special status may also have attached to St John of Beverley’s banner. St John was accredited with granting military victory over the Scots to King Aethelstan in exchange for his devotion.600 Furthermore, St John’s banner continued to be used by English kings for centuries. It was carried by the armies of Edward I, Edward II, Edward III and Henry IV, and when Henry V won the battle of Agincourt on the feast of John’s translation (25th October) it began a new phase of late medieval association of John’s cult with the English monarchy.601

St Wilfrid did not perhaps have the same aura of military invincibility, but his spiritual power in battle against “barbarians” in life (above) may have been an appropriate precedent. The Hexham connection may explain the particular interest of the two Hexham chroniclers in the Standard itself.

There is also some interesting charter evidence that can be brought to bear. In February 1136, King Stephen granted a charter that required the canons of York Minster to serve the monarch in war by sending one man, as dux et signifer, with the banner of St Peter.602 This charter emphasises the importance of the banner in royal service (perhaps explaining how Huntingdon could call the Standard a royal ensign). It is also, however, the first source that places an English ecclesiastical banner into a context of local society, a focus for the loyalties of the burgesses of York. Other evidence shows that the churches which sent banners were among those exempted from military service. A charter of 1115x22 by Henry I granted immunity from fyrd


602 *RRAN*, III, 360-361 (No. 975); Brett, “Warfare and its restraints”, 138-139.
service and castle work for the canons of St Peter, St Wilfrid and St John of Ripon and Hexham (also those of St Mary of Southwell), and the charter claimed that this arrangement dated back to the reigns of William I and William II.  

After the battle, Stephen renewed Henry’s exemptions, perhaps grateful for the support of the northern saints against the Scots. If this interpretation is correct, Stephen placed himself into the long-established role of English kings making grants to churches in recognition of their military assistance through spiritual power. A charter of Richard I, known through an inspeximus of 1308, and reconfirming the terms of an even earlier grant by William II, reveals that the monks of St Mary of York were entitled to the same privileges as those of St Peter and of St John of Beverley, (phrased in very similar language to the St Peter’s charter), including the right to send just one man to the royal army, carrying the banner of St Mary, a privilege they continued to exercise into the fourteenth century. Nor was Thurstan’s Standard or its royal connection forgotten. The choir screen of Ripon Cathedral (a sister to the screen at York Minster), executed in c.1490, depicts a series of kings and clerics. The other archbishops, however, are depicted carrying processional crosses, while Thurstan holds a banner of St Peter, surmounted by a spear point and crown.

Much about the Battle of the Standard conformed to the pattern of previous spiritual weapons used on the battlefield. Sins were expunged, relics focussed sacred power against the enemy, prayers and benedictions were offered. These steps, however, were not unthinking ritual. The banners chosen represented saints who had granted victory in battle to English kings over Scots or pagans. There was an element of spiritual strategic planning at work just as surely as there was of the temporal. Though the battle may represent the most elaborate, well-documented intervention of sacred power in battle in the whole of English history, there are signs of major change afoot. The bishops granted spiritual benefits, made benedictions and prayed, but no chronicle explicitly stated that these contributed to victory. Instead, the

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603 RRAN, II, 183 (No. 1382)
604 RRAN, III, 363 (No. 981). Beverley’s were again renewed by him later, 36-37 (No. 100), again emphasising John’s special status.
606 Compare the service of the Abbey of Arbroath’s tenants at Forglen, who from the thirteenth until the seventeenth century did service by carrying St Columba’s Breccbennach. Caldwell, ‘Monymusk Reliquary’, esp. 270. For the banner of St Cuthbert, 274.
607 St Cuthbert, of course, also conforms to this pattern, Historia de Sancto Cuthberto, 54 Aelred, Genealogia, PL 195, Cols. 0720D-0721A, stands as evidence that his banner did not yet exist (for it would presumably have been present and remarked upon at Northallerton).
focus is on sacred objects (particularly banners, but also crosses and the Host) which mobilise a power belonging to Christ, angels and militarily-significant saints. There is no sign of a Wulfstan-style thunderbolt of excommunication, or “weighty anathema” emanating from the personal spiritual power of a cleric. Even the intervention of celestial powers is described indirectly – it is related as the purpose behind action, or envisioned in the battle orations beforehand. Descriptions of the archbishop’s prayers are vague at best. There are no dramatic evidences of clerical spiritual power in the battle itself.

The blunting of the Spiritual Sword

Perhaps the most famous assessment of the disorders of Stephen’s reign is a statement in the *Chronicle* that the land was ravaged while men “said openly that Christ and his Saints slept”. The context of this remark, however, is less well remembered. The section immediately preceding it describes with horror the cruelties inflicted on the English population, and on their churches in particular. It concludes, “The bishops and the clergy always cursed them [looters and bandits] but that was nothing to them, because they were all accursed and forsworn and lost.” The *Chronicle* passage is generally interpreted as an expression of anguish at the horrors of the period, but it also addresses a specific failure of clerical spiritual power to offer protection against the ravages of temporal warfare. As we shall see, this sentiment was by no means unique, and suggests a crisis of the ability of clergy to command spiritual power.

There is no particular shortage of stories of celestial intervention during the civil wars, but its form is almost always vengeance wreaked retrospectively for crimes committed against the church, especially the transformation of churches into fortresses (which as we saw is particularly associated with this period). These accounts make little or no reference to clerics bringing such interventions to pass. *Chronicle* accounts generally depict the target of spiritual attack by a cleric simply ignoring it, forcing him to take other steps. The *Abingdon Chronicle* tells how William Boterel, Constable of Wallingford, accepted protection money from the abbey, but plundered its vill of Culham. The abbot’s response was to humbly request restitution, and eventually compelled (*coactus*) by Archbishop Theobald of

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608 ASC, E, 265.
609 For instance, *JH*, 316.
Canterbury and Bishop Jocelin of Salisbury, to anathematise William. Boterel made no move to seek forgiveness or absolution. Though he was at last (tandem) felled by a war wound, regarded as just divine judgement by the chronicler, there is no implication at all that the anathema itself did Boterel physical harm. John of Worcester remarked that in 1141 the Papal Legate (presumably Henry of Blois) extended his spiritual power to help the empress. These measures were, however, conspicuously ineffective. The Gesta Stephani tells us that John the Marshal ignored “the sword that the church’s warfare uses” and that Henry of Blois’ excommunication was of no help in recovering his castle of Downton in 1148-9, forcing him to fall back on hiring mercenaries. Bishops Alexander and Nigel had no more luck in using excommunication to recover their castles. Excommunication, though it resulted in the suspension of normal ecclesiastical life at Durham, had little effect on William Cumin, but William Ste-Barbe tried it before he made war against him with physical arms.

Like the Chronicle, the Gesta Stephani recognised a general pattern in the ineffectiveness of spiritual weapons during the period. The famous passage on the bishops who went to war wearing magnificent armour is framed by their failure to properly use their spiritual weapons. Though spiritual measures were still described as the “sword of God’s word, which devours flesh” (gladius uerbi Dei, qui deuorant carnes), shortly afterwards comes the only story from the Anarchy which shows it used effectively. When Miles of Hereford angered Bishop Robert by his maltreatment of the region’s churches, Roger placed the whole area under interdict until Miles backed down. When he did not make full restitution, Miles was killed by an arrow while hunting, and many others (unnamed) were suitably terrified into respecting the church’s property. Even this example is markedly weaker than the earlier material: the effect of the bishop’s wrath is slow. It is the judicial aspect (the disruption caused

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610 His presence dates the incident to 1142 or later.  
611 HEA, II, 314-316.  
612 JWC, III, 294.  
613 GS, 168.  
614 GS, 214.  
616 Simeon, Historia Dunelmensis Ecclesie, 150.  
617 GS, 156  
618 GS, 160. Reparations were sometimes made by violators of churches after the restoration of peace, but the most detailed study found that only 32 per cent of identifiable despoilers can be shown to have made restitution. Callahan, James (1978). ‘Ecclesiastical Reparations and the Soldiers of the Anarchy’, in Albion 10: 262-282.
by suspending all ecclesiastical activity) which brings Miles to capitulate. The contrast with the visceral physicality of the spiritual sword in the Blickling homily or Wulfstan’s defence of Worcester in 1088 is marked.

To find a similar apparent failure of English churchmen to defend themselves by supernatural means, we must go back to the era of the Viking invasions. In 793, Alcuin of York wrote to Bishop Higebald of Lindisfarne. Alcuin seems almost angry at the saints for failing to hold back the enemy:

... the heathen have polluted the sanctuaries of God, and shed the blood of the saints around the altar, and trampled the bodies of the saints in the temple like dung in the street. Where can the churches of Britain place their trust if St Cuthbert and so great a company of saints do not defend their own church?  

If a lack of celestial power is a feature common to the church in the era of Viking invasions and the Anarchy, it is worth reflecting on their other similarities. Both were periods of long, sustained warfare which put English society under great strain, and which the central authority seemed powerless to suppress. Both saw extensive destruction of church property and humiliation of its leading clergy. We might reflect that if the prelates of Stephen’s reign accepted the narrative history of England provided by chroniclers since the conversion, they may have been quite shocked to discover how ineffective their powers proved to be when tested.

1154-1200: Partial Recovery?

If the Anarchy saw the absolute nadir of spiritual weapons as instruments of physical violence, and consequently as tools of secular warfare, there may be some evidence of a recovery of those powers in the last decades of the twelfth century. The Magna Vita Sancti Hugonis tells often of the power of St Hugh of Lincoln (r.1186-1200) to physically harm offenders by his excommunication, which caused at least two deaths and one case of leprosy. We are told repeatedly that the terror of

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619 ... pagani contaminauerunt sanctuaria Dei, et fuderunt sanguinem sanctorum in circuitu altaris, calcauerunt corpora sanctorum in templo quasi sterquilinium in platea. Que est fidutia aecclesiis Britanniae, si sanctus Cuthbertus cum tanto sanctorum numero suam non defendit ecclesiam? GP, I, 406-407.

620 Magna Vita II, 23, 32, 84.
Hugh’s curses was enough to protect him, his church, and his goods against even hardened mercenary captains and royal officials. The character of Hugh’s excommunications, however, is quite unlike the raw spiritual power of eleventh century curses. In both descriptions of Hugh’s lethal excommunications, the result is theologically precise. Both individuals die because their souls are seized by the devil and dragged to hell. Excommunication is seen as deadly not as a pure expression of Hugh’s own power, but as a result of removing the protection of belonging to the Christian community. It is diabolical power that actually kills.

There is a little evidence of recovery in wartime too. Abbot Samson excommunicated “all makers of war and disturbers of the peace” before marching off to the siege of Windsor, and though there is no mention of the sentence’s effect, neither does Jocelin described it as scorned. Samson was also able to use the terror of St Edmund’s wrath to dissuade royal agents from looting the gold feretory. The spiritual sword, therefore, may have again become a viable tool for prelates, but its character was very different to the terrifying expression of personal spiritual power of the pre-Anarchy period. Perhaps the most dramatic effect of the change is that despite the extensive involvement of clergy in the rebellions of Henry II’s reign, and in the wars during the Lionheart’s absence, Samson may have been the only English prelate to excommunicate his opponents in late twelfth-century England as part of a military campaign. It should be noted that in the long term, the spiritual sword was not abandoned in English warfare. By the late thirteenth century, Edward I was using the ecclesiastical machine both to disseminate war propaganda and to organise prayers for victory on a large scale.

The Banner of Bury St Edmunds

While the spiritual powers of clergy in warfare may have seemed significantly weakened, banners and other totems of power, both sacred and secular, continued to be invested with major significance. When Henry of Essex dropped the royal standard

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622 Jocelin, 54-55.
623 Ibid, 56, 97.
624 Though bishops did excommunicate disturbers of the peace, Howden, Gesta, I, 300. Chronica, II, 278.
while on campaign in Wales in 1157, it brought down opprobrium not only on him, but on his whole line.  

Both English and French armies were thrown into panic in 1187 when an image of the Madonna and Child was accidentally broken during a gambling session.  

Howden described the undignified spat between the Archbishops of York and Canterbury over the carrying of processional crosses at the siege of Nottingham in 1194.  

On the continent, meanwhile, both Bishops Albero II and Hugh of Liège used the relics of Saint Lambert to great military effect, and in 1196 the charter of Liège testifies to the high status of the bishop’s standard-bearer.  

There are even examples of images of the figure of Ecclesia depicted carrying a banner herself. In England there is also the first contemporary mention of the vexillum of St Cuthbert. Reginald of Durham has the banner used to extinguish flames that threatened to consume the church, but provided little detail about its origins or form. It would not reappear or acquire its later significance until the late thirteenth century. It is possible to speak in far more depth, however, about the banner of Bury-St-Edmunds.

Jocelin first refers to this object in reference to the abbot joining the siege of Windsor in 1193. It is not at first depicted as having special significance. Indeed, the description uexillium proprium habens suggests that this was the abbot’s personal

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626 Gervase, Major Chronicle, 165 Strickland, ‘Bones of the Kingdom’, 167. Note that deserting the banner was deemed by the Teutonic Knights to be one of the most severe crimes a brother could commit, along with simony and sodomy, Sterns, Indrikis (1982). ‘Crime and Punishment among the Teutonic Knights’, in Speculum 57: 84-111.
627 Gervase, Major Chronicle, 370.
628 Howden, Chronicle, III, 239.
632 The date of this event is uncertain, but Battiscombe, ‘Introduction’, 69 argues convincingly that it belongs to the early days of Hugh du Puiset.
633 Battiscombe, ‘Introduction’. 69 argues convincingly that it belongs to the early days of Hugh du Puiset.
634 There is one suggestion that the banner was extant and working military miracles as early as 1097, but this, comes from the second half of the fourteenth century. John of Fordun, Chronica Gentis Scotorum, William F. Skene (ed). Edinburgh: Edmonston and Douglas. (1871), 224. Given the subsequent absence of the banner from the historical record and the extremely later date of this source, it seems safest to reject it; Battiscombe, ‘Introduction’, 68.
636 Jocelin, 55.
banner. A little later, however, he records a dispute between Samson and Earl Roger Bigot, who claimed the right to carry the banner on the grounds that “he carried it when the Earl of Leicester was taken and the Flemings destroyed”, twenty years earlier, and before Samson’s abbacy. More detail was given for this incident by Fantosme, who showed the importance of the banner by defining the knights of St Edmund as “the company that has the standard of St Edmund at its head”. The Earl then invokes the aid of God and St Edmund before launching his successful attack. In Howden’s version, the supernatural element is far more marked. We are told that the astonishingly swift victory was obtained “by virtue of the aid of God and of his glorious Martyr Saint Edmund”, (virtute Dei et gloriissimi martyris Sui Eadmundi).

On Christmas Eve 1433, King Henry VI arrived at Bury, where he was ceremoniously presented with John Lydgate’s English verse translation of the Life of St Edmund, King and Martyr. This manuscript (Harley 2278) includes a verse prefix describing two banners supposedly borne by the royal saint into battle. Both are depicted with large facing illustrations (Appendix 2, Fig 1). The second banner (which apparently no longer existed) was said to bear three crowns, representing Edmund’s virtues (royalty, martyrdom and virginity), prefiguring the three crowns of Henry VI (England, France, and the heavenly crown he would enjoy in the next world). More interesting, however, is the first banner, strongly implied to be still at Bury. The banner is said to defend England, and Lydgate imagined Henry VI himself carrying it into battle:

This vertuous baner shal keppe and conserve
This lond from enimyes dau(n)te ther cruel pryde
Off syxte Herry the noblesse to preserve
It shal be born in werrys be his syde

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637 Jocelin, 70.
638 Fantosme, 74. It should be noted that Johnston’s translation refers to the abbot’s knights. The French, however, does not mention the abbot, only Edmund himself. Saint Edmund aveit chevaliers...
639 Howden, Gesta, I, 61-2, Chronica, II, 55.
640 A superb facsimile edition was published by the BL in 2004 with a commentary by A.S.G. Edwards
641 My thanks to Miss Laura Crombie for her kind help with several difficult points of transcription.
642 Fo. 2v.
It also channels the Saint’s virtues derived from his successful resistance to the flames of lust, and in consequence, its presence (like that of the Banner of St Cuthbert three centuries earlier) extinguishes actual flames:

Which be influence off our lord Jh(es)u
As it hath been preued ofte in deede
This hooly standard hath power and vertu
To stanche fyres and stoppe flawmys rede
By myracle and who that kan tak heede
God grantyd it hym for a prerogatyff
Be cause al heete off lust and flesshly heede
Were queynt in hym duryng al his lyff

The fifteenth-century banner therefore seems to possess something of the same supernatural status of the papal banner in 1066 and the banners of the northern saints, and like the latter, its supernatural qualities are derived from the spiritual qualities of the saint with whom it was associated. St Edmund can also be compared to St John in his proclivity for supernatural violence. Edmund returned from the grave to slay the Viking leader, Sweyn, and appeared armoured in a vision to Henry of Essex, distracting him during a judicial duel to such an extent that he was nearly killed. When the banner itself appears in an illustration of King Edmund advancing into battle (Fo.50), it seems to drive three sword-wielding angels before it (Appendix 2, Fig 2). Whatever the monks of Bury in the fifteenth century may have thought, their banner is unlikely to have belonged to the historical Edmund. It seems plausible, however, that it could have been the late twelfth century banner. Perhaps the fifteenth century monks of Bury had among their relics a visibly very old banner, which they supposed to be much older than it actually was. At the very least a banner, believed to channel the virtues of the saint was at Bury from the 1170s until the end of the century, and two hundred years later an object with very similar characteristics was described there. Given the endurance into the late Middle Ages of

643 Ibid.
644 JWC, II, 477.
645 Jocelin, 70-71.
646 It has been suggested that the Banner of St Cuthbert must have decayed and been replaced several times, with the saint’s power being transferred into each new incarnation, Caldwell, ‘Monymusk Reliquary’, 74. Battiscombe, ‘Introduction’, 70.
647 Monasteries losing track of the exact origin of parts of their relic collection was a consistent problem. Ibid, 65.
both the banner of St John of Beverley and of the Oriflamme, there seems no reason why it could not have lasted. If the twelfth-century and the fifteenth century banners of Bury-St-Edmunds were the same artefact, as seems possible, it had a series of features similar to the religious banners that played important roles in the earlier military history of England. It is unique, however, in that we may have a good idea of what it actually looked like.

Conclusions

The evidence discussed in this chapter has implications for our conception both of the bounds of military history and of the wider nature of sacerdotal power in the period. We suggest that from the period of Christian conversion on, clergy in England had not only been regularly involved in warfare, but had repeatedly invoked supernatural power derived from their clerical status to alter the course of that warfare, and this was understood to be literally lethally and sometimes gruesomely effective. As a result, the study of those powers belongs to the field of military as much as to ecclesiastical history. Sometime around 1140, however, possibly due to the unusual conditions of the Anarchy, these ceased to be viewed as physically effective, or at least not sufficiently to be militarily significant. Though there may have been some limited recovery in the perceived military utility of spiritual power in the second half of the twelfth century, this did not approach a restoration of the eleventh-century status quo, and while prelates in the Anarchy deployed spiritual weapons that had no effect in warfare, their successors did not even attempt this. Though he was only tangentially interested in military affairs, Helmholz’ study, “Excommunication in Twelfth Century England” provides some useful context for these developments. Helmholz’ view is that over the course of the twelfth century, excommunication in particular underwent a transformation from a “spell” which could be hurled against enemies, animals, and even objects, into a regularised judicial instrument. As this process occurred, terrible anathemas vanished from both episcopal and monastic charter forms, and though there were occasional examples of excommunication in the old style in the later middle ages, these were anomalies.

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649 Helmholz, ‘Excommunication’, esp. 239, 240, 246, 249. The change in Bishop Robert of Lewes’ chancery from “liturgical” to “bureaucratic” implements has been studied in detail, and has the right
has also been suggested that we should think in terms of a roughly eleventh century transition from supernatural to natural means of guarding public order. The evidence assembled here is largely compatible with Helmholz’ interpretation, and though suggesting a transition rather later and rather more partial than Murray, the latter’s point that the scholarly barriers between what he called “inner” and “outer” history are unhelpful seems particularly appropriate with these issues.

The use of religious banners was just as much a constant of warfare in the period as clerical participation itself, and like the practice of blessing weapons, can trace its origin to pagan tradition. The power of the first standard to be described in any depth was the papal banner in 1066, part of a broader approach to warfare characterised by religious preparations as meticulous as the physical. There is, however, a major difference between Alexander II’s banner and those that appeared later. The papal banner, though partly supernatural, was also symbolic in the usual sense, representing a delegation of authority which in turn may have established a papal claim to overlordship of England, perhaps as part of a broader papal policy to use banners to control Norman military power. The banners that emerge in the twelfth century, while retaining their power on the battlefield, were less associated with the authority of the cleric possessing them, and more with the spiritual power of the saint to which they were dedicated. This is perhaps ironic given that it was exactly the sort of highly effective spiritual power wielded by saints like Cuthbert, Wilfrid and John of Beverley which so eluded their successors. The widening gulf between the spiritual weakness of English prelates in the face of military problems and the spiritual power of these manufactured or actual relics is visible in the argument between Abbot Samson and Earl Roger. By Samson’s tenure (1182-1211), the abbot of Bury St Edmunds could neither wield divine power in anger, nor channel that of the saint. He could only threaten his enemies with the saint’s wrath without implying his own agency. The banner, however, had retained its power, as it and others would do until long after the period, and that power represented a prize that could be sought, independent of the abbot’s approval.


Ibid, 51, 81.

Keen, Chivalry, 53.
All of this has serious implications for our understanding of prelacy, which is seen to lose much of its miraculous power, as well as for the particular role of prelates in warfare. The idea that militant clergy in the Anglo-Saxon or early Norman periods went to war “as barons” is unsustainable when the military tools of English prelates included the capacity to strike enemy armies blind with a curse. Even during the Anarchy the idea makes little sense, because these instruments were still being used, however ineffectively. By the end of the twelfth century, however, when prelates seem rarely to have tried to use spiritual power to crush their opponents, it seems more plausible.
Chapter 5: Delegated Powers and Local Defence

Many examples of clerical military leadership, such as Ealhstan of Sherborne’s battle at the mouth of the Parret in 845, Wulfstan’s defence of Worcester in 1088, and Robert’s defence of and operations around Bath in 1138, are of prelates defending the locations of their churches, or fighting invaders only a short distance from them. This section will discuss prelates’ defence of their localities and the provisions they made to carry out this function.

Anglo-Saxon England and Wales

Worcester was the greatest see on the Welsh march, and though several scholars have pointed out the dangers of over-reliance on Worcester evidence, it was also the only religious house with an extant body of pre-Conquest charter material large enough for quantitative study of its military establishment. The navigability of the Severn to Norse ships put the region, and the episcopal city at risk. Bishop Oswald in particular, enjoyed a close relationship with the king. In 964, Edgar apparently granted him the Altitonantis charter. The authenticity of this difficult document has been much disputed, and is sometimes considered at best as a twelfth-century reconstruction of tenth century arrangements. The most thorough analysis, however (by Eric John), concluded that the interpolations are confined to those passages affecting Worcester’s monastic community (which do not concern us here). Though RHC Davis’ review had criticisms of John’s work, he accepted this interpretation of Altitonantis. It conferred on the bishop almost all royal rights in three Hundreds (one scipsoen) of Worcestershire, an assembly of estates reorganised into the triple hundred of Oswaldslow. The charter requires that when the men of the county are assembled to serve, they are to be led by the bishop, their archiductor. This term itself, perhaps “commander-in-chief” is of great interest. Altitonantis, appears to be the first recorded usage of the word. It does not appear in other Anglo-

653 Viking ships had sailed up the Severn wreaking destruction in 894, 910, and 914 when they captured the bishop of Archenfield ASC, 87, 95, 98, 99.
654 Vita Sancti Oswaldii, esp. 246.
657 Economic History Review (1961), 481.
658 Cam, ‘Early Groups’, 100.
Saxon royal charters, or indeed any other source save Oswald’s *Indiculum*. Even if the whole passage were forged, the *Indiculum* at least would strongly suggest that Oswald was describing himself as the *archiductor* of the men of Oswaldslow. There are continental usages of *archidux*, several times applied to Oswald’s contemporary Archbishop Bruno of Cologne (953-965) who was also duke of Lotharingia. If the form represents a mangled attempt to use an imperial epithet (one already used to describe an ecclesiastic with great temporal power), it would fit well with the overblown royal style and imperial pretensions of the charter.

By his own statement, Oswald fulfilled his office. His *Indiculum* reported to the king his arrangements for discharging his responsibilities and recorded them for his successors. This time, the bishop called himself *Archiductor*, and it was reaffirmed that this role includes responsibility for royal military service of these *equites* (*sive ad suum servitium, sive ad regale explendum*). The *Indiculum* also states that service was to be performed in relation to the amount of land each tenant possessed, (*terrarum... possidet quantitatem*).

*Altitonantis*, however need not be placed directly into the context of the body of charter evidence from Oswald’s episcopate. There are 74 extant charters, benefiting some 47 individuals, 26 of whom hold lands in Worcestershire. The vast majority are three-life leases, only some of which require the recipient to shoulder the Three Common Burdens, and none of which mention the bishop’s role as *Archiductor*. It is clear that the burden was imposed on the land, not its holder. The social status of the tenant was irrelevant. For instance, the “matron” Wulflaed was required to undertake the Burdens under the terms of the grant which in 984 conferred on her an estate of 4 hides in Inkberrow. In contrast, Aethelnoth the thegn was not required to perform service for his estate at Smite (Hindlip, Oswaldslow) in 978, yet it is unlikely that in time of war, he was less inclined to personally take up arms than Wulflaed. Nor is there any clear geographical pattern to the distribution of burdens. Estates bearing the Three Common Burdens were distributed from Hartlebury in the north to Bredon’s

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660 Note that in subsequent royal writs, the Anglo-Saxon monarchs continued to refer to the “ministri” of Worcestershire as “my” thegns, with only one exception (a writ of Edward the Confessor in which they are merely “the” thanes, No. 96). *Anglo-Saxon Writs*, Florence Harmer (ed). Manchester: Manchester University Press. (1952).
662 *Hemming*, No. 129.
663 *Hemming*, No. 103.
Norton in the South. They are certainly not confined to Oswaldslow. There is, however, a chronological pattern. The Appendix (2, Table 5) lists the charters of Oswald’s making in order of their dates of issue.\textsuperscript{664} The formula “3CB” indicates that the Three Common Burdens have been imposed on the estate (these are also highlighted in red). “NSM” indicates “no service mentioned” (i.e. the terms of the charter do not make specific reference to the performance of military service (either to confirm it or exempt the estate), and “Church dues” indicate that the only burden imposed is that of church-scot.

When the data is presented in this way, it is clear that the issuing of \textit{Altitonantis} in 964 had no noticeable effect on whether Oswald was specifying service in his charters.\textsuperscript{665} Elsewhere, it had become almost universal to impose the Three Common Burdens in the first half of the tenth Century,\textsuperscript{666} but though there were occasional instances where the charters specified the Three Common Burdens, this did not become common until 983. At this point, a broader context becomes necessary. The Viking raids had resumed in 980,\textsuperscript{667} with a rising tempo of attacks on religious houses on both sides of the Welsh border.\textsuperscript{668} Although the bishop could lead the men of Oswaldslow at royal command, perhaps he felt the need for his own military resources. Indeed, it would seem that in that last uncertain century of Anglo-Saxon England, his successors felt the same way. Oswald’s charters impose the Three Common Burdens on some 52.5 hides of land. According to Domesday Book, military service \textit{tempore regis Edwardi} was extracted by the bishops from lands totalling some 91 Hides, despite the fact that the lands of the see had contracted considerably since Oswald’s day. Although Domesday does not tell us exactly how much service the bishop extracted from each estate, it does tell us that it was an individual agreement (presumably derived from personal negotiation). For instance in

\begin{enumerate}
\item In circumstances where this is uncertain, it has been given in line with the assessment published in \textit{The Electronic Sawyer}, at www.trin.cam.ac.uk/chartwww/eSawyer.99/eSawyer2.html
\item It is possible that the grant to Aelfwold in 962 was an aberration. It has been suggested that the imposition of the 3 Common Burdens may occasionally have been used symbolically as an assertion of lordship, Alan Cooper, \textit{Bridges, Law and Power in Medieval England 700-1400} (Woodbridge 2006), 37. Aelfwold was a \textit{Minister Regis}, who might therefore have been supposed to represent a higher risk of independence. If this is assumed, it is still possible to argue that in general charters do not begin to specify military service until after \textit{Altitonantis}, but this would be stretching the evidence.
\item Cooper, \textit{Bridges} 60, 64.
\end{enumerate}
1066, Kenward and Godric had held eleven Hides at Cropthorne and Netherton, and “gave service on the terms they could beg from the bishop.”

The bishops of Worcester therefore seem to have exercised two distinct forms of military leadership. The first was their role as the Archiductores of the seipsoen of Oswaldslow. This was a royal office responsible to the King, in which the bishop was assisted by a Ductor. That office may originally have been conferred because of the close personal relationship between King Edgar and bishop Oswald, but continued to be held by Oswald’s successors at least until the Norman Conquest. It had no direct relationship to the other lands of the see of Worcester, and was discharged for the king’s benefit. The second was a series of private agreements in which Oswald (and his successors) granted an ever-greater proportion of the bishopric’s lands in exchange for military service to be performed for the bishop’s own purposes. This was undertaken after the breakdown of the royal capacity to defend the bishopric and in the context of an elevated threat of Viking attack beginning in the reign of Aethelred II. It reflects the bishops’ need to build an independent military capacity. A dual military role for the lands of a religious foundation would not be unheard of – Hollister, after all considered that the military obligations of the monastery of Peterborough in the Anglo-Saxon period were transformed afterwards not into the Servitium Debitum of knights, but into the need to provide foot soldiers for the Anglo-Norman fyrd. However tentative the assessment must be, it does seem that the late Anglo-Saxon bishops of Worcester had military resources partly by delegated royal authority, and partly of their own creation. The diocese of Worcester before 1066 can be thought of as an ecclesiastical marcher lordship.

The Bishop of Winchester’s great manor of Taunton (Somerset, well outside the boundaries of the diocese) included a complex array of royal rights similar to

669 Domeday, 174a.
671 Oswald charting an increasingly independent course in military affairs accords with Abels’ assessment that failure to properly integrate ecclesiastical forces into royal armies was central to the military decline (possibly even the eventual defeat) of Anglo-Saxon England, Lordship and Military Obligation 28-29; (2001), ‘From Alfred to Harold II: the Military failure of the late Anglo-Saxon State’, in C. Warren Hollister (ed), The Normans and their adversaries at war, Boydell Press: Woodbridge, 15-30 (22). Friedrich Prinz suggested that it was the decline of state authority at the end of the Roman Empire that first forced continental bishops into a military role. ‘King, Clergy and War’. Hollister, C.W. (1962), ‘The Knights of Peterborough and the Anglo-Norman Fyrd’, in EHR 77: 417-436 (426).
673 The renewal charter which survives from Edgar’s reign (Sawyer 806) may not be genuine, and is certainly misdated. There may, however, have been a genuine renewal behind it; Robertson, Anglo-Saxon Charters, 237.
those of the bishop of Worcester at Oswaldslow, including the right to fines for non performance of military service. Service in war is not directly specified, but as John pointed out, Domesday Book shows that the bishop was certainly in control of the fyrd service of the manor - the men of Taunton were obliged to go “in exercitum cum hominibus episcopi”. It should also be noted, that Taunton, unlike Oswaldslow is a good distance from the episcopal see. Taylor drew attention to Bishop Aethelric of Sherborne’s letter (c1001-1012) referring to “three hundred hides” which earlier bishops “had for their scyre” and used a careful analysis of the “St Paul’s Ship List” to suggest that the Bishop of London around 1000 was also probably responsible for a quota of sixty men, though probably without the independent hundredal control of the bishops of Worcester at Oswaldslow and Winchester at Taunton. So many of the “private hundreds” in Anglo-Saxon England, units of military organisation often predating the monasteries or dioceses that held them, were in the hands of ecclesiastical foundations, that the position of the bishop or abbot responsible not just for estates assessed for service, but whole units of royal administration may have been quite common. The evidence, however, is far weaker than for Worcester. There is no evidence for the bestowal of Archiductor or any similar title on other bishops, even those responsible for a shipsocn. Abels’ suggestion that this was usual therefore seems unsafe.

**Leofgar of Hereford**

Bishop Leofgar’s invasion of Wales was a military disaster which left the bishop, a number of his priests, sheriff Aelfnoth, and many others dead, and had considerable strategic implications. Whilst his brief episcopate left little other documentary trace, it has been suggested that he was appointed with the goal of defending the region against Welsh predation. Although the construction of Ewyas Harold and Richard’s Castle seem to have taken place by 1052, Clifford Castle (the

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675 Taylor, Pamela ‘Endowment and Military Obligations’, 300.
676 Ibid, 298, 302.
major fortification of the Wye valley between Hereford and Wales) would not be built until after the Conquest.681 The city, therefore, remained vulnerable. Gryffydd ap Llewelyn had sacked Hereford, destroying its cathedral, and its previous bishop in 1055. It would seem likely that defence was Hereford’s primary need at that time, and Earl Harold immediately surrounded it with a ditch.682 Nevertheless, by 1056 Harold’s earldom had grown so large, that delegating leadership of local defence of may have become necessary, and may also have given Harold the chance to relieve the see of some of its assets.683 An ecclesiastic personally loyal to the earl (Leofgar had been Harold’s chaplain), may have seemed an ideal choice to handle both the defence, and the dispute regarding ecclesiastical jurisdiction over Erging. 684 Nevertheless, no source claims explicitly that Leofgar was appointed for military purposes, and Sheriff Aelfnoth of Herefordshire was also on the campaign. The introduction to Herefordshire in Domesday tells that the men of Hereford were to follow the Sheriff into Wales on any expedition he might make, or pay a fine of 40s, that the men of Archenfield (who were by custom to make up the vanguard on the advance and the rearguard on the retreat) were bound to go only when the Sheriff was present.685 It seems likely, therefore, that Leofgar and the Sheriff co-operated on organising the invasion, just as they appear to have led it together.

After the débâcle, Bishop Ealdred of Worcester (later Archbishop of York) temporarily took over the management of the diocese. As he already ruled the diocese of Ramsbury while its bishop, Hermann was abroad, the result was the creation, for two years, of a vast ecclesiastical bloc combining three dioceses,686 and presumably (especially in the light of Worcester’s resources) far more imposing to potential enemies.687 At the same time, it seems that Erging was made temporarily into a bishopric, held by Bishop Herewald and consecrated by Ealdred, which Brooke has

682 ASC, 186.
683 Baxter, Earls, 66-67; Giandrea, Episcopal Culture, 179.
685 Domesday, 179b.
687 A similar approach may have been followed in Aquitaine. The bestowal of the abbacy of Micy on Abbot Robert to help defend Tours against Fulk Nerra, Head, ‘Peace of God’, 674. Worcester was held in plurality on a number of occasions before the Conquest. Barlow, The English Church 1000-1066, 170. For the development of the dioceses of southern Italy as bulwarks against the Normans, Ramseyer, ‘Pastoral Care’, 193.
argued was intended to form an ecclesiastical “buffer zone”. The resources of the bishoppic were a fraction of those of Worcester, but like Worcester, the diocese was a strategic element. It should, be noted that Fleming has discussed the acquisition by the late Anglo-Saxon kings of church lands in key strategic areas, suggesting perhaps that they had had little faith in the church to fulfil defensive functions, but the important part that dioceses could play in the defence of England may have been well established before 1066, especially on the Welsh March.

Anglo-Norman England

The strategic value of appointments to the episcopate was not lost on the invaders. Several historians have stressed the contribution of the Conqueror’s bishops in establishing his power in Normandy. Nonetheless, William’s policy in England did depart from that of his predecessors. Secular Marcher Earldoms were created in the west, supplanting the dioceses of Worcester and Hereford as major powers in the region. If their defensive role became less important, however, the bishops remained visible agents of Anglo-Norman conquest and domination, to the detriment of their success in the spiritual sphere. Indeed, it has been argued that the abortive movement of the see of Lichfield to Chester in the 1070s was part of the process of assimilating north Wales into the Anglo-Norman regnum, and it is conspicuous that the bishops quickly turned their backs on the city after the military reverses of the 1090s.

Abbot Turolde of Peterborough is the best-known militant abbot of the Conqueror’s reign. Though absent from the account of Hereward’s revolt in the Liber Eliensis, but clearly played an important role in those events. It is perhaps unfortunate that Malmesbury’s brief sketch of Turolde has become so influential (Part 3, Chapter 2), for no other source makes the appointment of Turolde a direct response to Hereward’s uprising, or makes his military activities gratuitous. In the Chronicle, the

691 For the establishment of these new entities, Stenton, Anglo-Saxon England, 615.
693 Ibid,11-12; For the suggestion that the attractions of Chester were chiefly economic, EEA 14: Coventry and Lichfield 1072-1159, M.J. Franklin (ed). Oxford: Oxford University Press. (1997), xxx.
monks of Peterborough with their treasures, intercept Turold at Stamford (a few miles to the northwest of Peterborough) “with his eight times twenty French men... all fully armed”, to beg for his protection. The monastery, however, was attacked before Turold could arrive. The monks’ defence of the Bolhithegate was insufficient to stop the rebels, and Turold arrived to find his new charge in ruins.

While Malmesbury’s vignette is problematic, Turold did seem to have undertaken pacification of the region as circumstances required, though with more energy than success. Malmesbury abbey could not have sustained Turold’s knights if the number given is even approximately accurate (and the Peterborough chronicler was presumably well informed on this matter). His “Frenchmen” were presumably mercenaries supplied by the king. Nevertheless, Turold could not defeat Hereward, even after the king had subdued Ely itself, and the abbot found himself leading the exercitum regis against him. Only after he had been captured by Hereward and ransomed did Turold undertake more permanent measures for defence, establishing a castle and enfeoffing many of the knights with monastery estates with the requirement that they help him conquer Hereward. This must have involved considerable sacrifice on the part of the monks. According to Candidus, so much of the monastery’s land was granted away that the value of the demesne fell from fifteen hundred to five hundred pounds, producing an honour of extremely small fees, and causing the abbots long-term difficulties, though the fees themselves were carefully arranged. King called Peterborough “the nearest the monastic order ever got to a marcher barony”, though his suggestion that it was “mustered against a threat which never came” seems to excessively downplay the threat that Hereward’s rebellion constituted.

The Lotharingian monk, Walcher became Bishop of Durham in 1071 after the rebellion and flight of Aethelwine. The potentially dangerous nature of this assignment may have been obvious from the outset, and he was accompanied by the leading men of the region on his journey north. There is no reason to suppose that

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694 ASC, E, 205, 207; Different recensions of Hugh Candidus, Chronicle, 80 give the figure as 140 or 160 men respectively.
695 ASC, E, 207.
696 De Gestis Herewardi, 61.
697 Ibid, 63; Candidus, 84-5.
698 King, Peterborough Abbey, 15-17, 23, 26.
699 Ibid, 16.
700 Symeon, Gesta Regum, 195.
at this point the Conqueror had any intention of extending Walcher’s responsibilities, but he did have to replace Earl Gospatric, whose personal power he may have perceived as a threat, and who was implicated in the murder of Robert Cumin.\textsuperscript{701} It was only when Gospatrick’s successor, Waltheof had rebelled that the Conqueror gave Waltham and the Earldom of Northumberland to Walcher, making the bishop, as Aird has observed, the master of a great Marcher Lordship,\textsuperscript{702} but doing so, it seems, may have been an act of desperation.

The military threat in the region was considerable. Malcolm III had raided across the border in 1070, and in 1072 had married his daughter Margaret to Edgar Aetheling. Meanwhile, though the idea of Durham as a natural focus of opposition to Norman rule has been challenged,\textsuperscript{703} there was still the prospect of yet another northern revolt, in an area that retaining much of its native aristocracy.\textsuperscript{704} No English prelate had ever held an earldom, though there were Norman precedents for the combination in the persons of Archbishop Robert of Rouen and Bishop Hugh of Bayeux. To William, the appointment of a bishop, who by now had been established in the region for some years, to the earldom had its advantages.\textsuperscript{705} William of Malmesbury certainly understood his combined role as remarkable, designed “to rein in the revolts of the people by his sword and shape its morals by his eloquence”, \((frenaretque rebellionem gentis gladio et formaret mores eloquio)\).\textsuperscript{706}

The best known event of Walcher’s life is his murder, and that of a large number of his knights\textsuperscript{707} at the hands of a Durham mob in 1080, and will not be rehearsed in full.\textsuperscript{708} Though the murder of the nobleman Ligulf was the catalyst, the background was prepared by Walcher’s failure to control his knights, who decisively alienated the townsfolk with their increasingly high-handed and rapacious behaviour.\textsuperscript{709} As we have seen, Walcher’s murder triggered yet another devastation of the battered region, this time by Bishop Odo of Bayeux. It is conspicuous that the


\textsuperscript{702} Aird, William (1993). ‘St Cuthbert, the Scots and the Normans’ in \textit{ANS XVI}, 1-20 (14).

\textsuperscript{703} Ibid, post 7.


\textsuperscript{705} Compare Fichtenau, \textit{Living in the Tenth Century}, 203.

\textsuperscript{706} GP, I, 412.

\textsuperscript{707} A hundred according to the ASC, 214.

\textsuperscript{708} Stenton, \textit{Anglo-Saxon England}, 613-614.

\textsuperscript{709} Symeon, \textit{Historia Dunelmensis Ecclesiae}, 114.
earldom was not passed on with the episcopate to Walcher’s successor, William of St Calais, but went instead to Aubrey de Coucy, who himself resigned it in short order. The earldom was not reunited with the bishopric again until the reign of Hugh du Puiset, the nephew of Henry of Blois.

There is little evidence there for the activities of Richard de Belmeis I of London in English narrative sources. Nonetheless, Mason has recently described his service in Shropshire and within Wales for Robert de Bellême, and then, after the latter’s fall in 1102, for Henry I, where he seems to have taken over administration of the Bellême lands.\(^7\) As Mason pointed out, Richard’s title is unclear, given variously as *dapifer* or *vicecomes* of Shropshire, seneschal to the king at Shrewsbury, or variants. It is clear, however that he was deeply involved in the political manoeuvrings of marcher lords and Welsh Princes. As we have suggested (Part 2, Chapter 3), Richard’s position implied military responsibilities. There is no evidence, that he ever undertook military command, but showed knowledge of local military custom, when he wrote to Pain Fitz John, who took over as Sheriff, c.1123x26, informing him that the monks of Shropshire had never paid an *auxilium* of knights.\(^7\) Richard seems to occupy a role of delegated royal temporal authority with repeated precedents in English history. Like the pre-Conquest bishops of Worcester, or Bishop Walcher of Durham, he took charge of extensive authority, including military authority, in a dangerous area.

In Part 2, Chapter 3, we considered Roger of Salisbury’s activities at Kidwelly, and Bishop Bernard of St Davids castle building and possession of the honour of Carmarthen. While Henry I clearly made use of three bishops in defensive roles in Wales and the marches, it would be wrong to oversystematise these examples. De Belmeis held his secular position before his bishopric (see Part 3, Chapter 3), and in an area geographically remote from his diocese, as was Kidwelly from Roger of Salisbury’s see. Bernard, however, held a secular honour quite close to his cathedral. Episcopal involvement on the march under Henry I was important, but also heterogeneous and personal.

The brief period in which a bishop of Bath became a figure of military significance was during 1138, when Robert of Lewes led some unsuccessful military

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\(^7\) EEA 15, 23-24.
operations between Bath and Bristol. His knights captured Geoffrey Talbot and some companions, who were scouting the area around Bath. In John of Worcester’s account (unlike that of the *Gesta Stephani*), the knights are personally led by the bishop. John relates that the garrison of Bath approached the city and threatened to hang the bishop if Geoffrey were not released. The bishop, afraid “like a hireling” *uice mercenarii* capitulated. The more elaborate *Gesta Stephani* version, has the honourable but naive prelate tricked and captured by the men of Bristol, and only agrees to release Talbot after unspecified rough and degrading treatment. Both accounts have King Stephen angry at the bishop for his failure, John more so than the *Gesta*, alleging, extraordinarily, that the king even threatened to take his pastoral staff. In both accounts, Stephen reinforced the town with a royal garrison (and in the *Gesta* made substantial additions to the city’s fortifications). It is not clear from either whether Robert continued to be trusted with military responsibility for the area. What is clear is that wielding relatively small resources, the bishop, (a Cluniac monk and client of Henry of Blois) appointed in 1136 before the strategic shifts of the Civil War effectively transformed Bath into a border city, in a region being devastated by the empress’ supporters, made some unsuccessful efforts at local defence, a role for which the king held him responsible.

**Hugh du Puiset and Northumberland**

In 1174, William the Lion invaded northern England in support of the rebellion against Henry II. Fantosme alleged that William was unsure how to proceed until a messenger from Hugh du Puiset informed him that the bishop’s forces would not oppose his advance. William continued his campaign with renewed confidence. This passage, though dramatised, suggests that Hugh’s military strength was such that his ability to defend the region was a major strategic concern. His failure to oppose William certainly roused the ire of Henry II, and in 1177 he had to pay two thousand silver marks to the king to redeem his castles and regain Henry’s favour.

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712 *JWC*, III, 248; *GS*, 58.
713 *GS*, 58.
714 *GS*, 64; *JWC*, III, 249.
716 Fantosme, 40.
717 Howden, *Gesta*, I, 160-161; *Chronica*, II, 133.
observed that Hugh’s behaviour has aroused “suspicion of collusion” between Hugh and William among historians, but also noted that the massive reconstruction of Norham Castle by Hugh reflects the poor relations between the bishop and the Scots.  

Crucially, we should not forget Howden’s information that Hugh paid William three hundred marks for a truce to last from the Feast of St Hilary until the end of Easter (about three months), nor the damage done by the last major Scottish invasion in 1138. In this light, Hugh’s agreement with William looks rather less like “collaboration” than Danegeld. Even in such desperate straits, the bishop still fortified Alvertone Castle (Leicestershire) and sent his nephew Count Hugh to recruit forty knights and 500 Flemings, who landed at Hartlepool shortly after William’s capture. Barrow has pointed out that this too has led to suspicions that Hugh was plotting to help overthrow Henry, but Hartlepool is where one would expect them to land if they were indeed coming to support Durham. In the event, they were no longer required, and Hugh dismissed the Flemings with forty days pay, but retained his nephew and the knights a little longer to garrison Northallerton. There are interesting echoes of Henry of Blois here; it should be recalled that in 1148-9 when the Bishop of Winchester’s castle of Downton was besieged, Henry had sent his own nephew, the young Hugh du Puiset to raise a mercenary force to relieve it.

In September 1189, Hugh abandoned his crusading vow and bought the earldom of Northumberland for six hundred marks, earning the opprobrium of chroniclers (Part 3, Chapter 2), but just as with his actions in 1174, the context is significant. No bishop of Durham had held the earldom since Walcher. No attempt by Hugh to acquire the earldom (which had lain vacant for many years) is known before the death of Henry II, but on the accession of Richard, Hugh moved quickly to secure it. Hugh assumed the earldom just weeks before Richard overturned the Treaty of Falaise, with a charter that Hugh witnessed. It seems extremely unlikely that when

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719 Howden, Gesta, I, 64; Chronica, II, 56-7.
720 Howden, Gesta, I, 67; Chronica, II, 63.
721 Barrow, G, Puiset (DNB)
722 Howden, Gesta, I, 67; Chronica, II, 63.
723 Howden, Gesta, II, 90; Chronica, III, 15.
724 Howden, Gesta, II, 103; Chronica, III, 26.
he bought the earldom, Hugh was ignorant of the fact that the Lionheart was about to undertake a Crusade to Outremer, having just restored the kingdom of the Scots to its military strength. With Richard gone and William the Lion (whose claims on the north of England were hardly secret) resurgent, the experience of 1138 and 1174 must have suggested that an attack from the north, with its attendant horrors was too likely to be ignored. If he failed to oppose it effectively, Hugh himself would be blamed. Richard’s special grant of the justiciarship from the Humber to the Scottish border in his absence may reflect a similar concern. As it happens, no invasion occurred, though the bishop may still have made use of his new resources to besiege Prince John’s castle at Tickhill when he rebelled against his brother in 1194.

We might suspect that his Blois heritage counted hard against him after 1154, for Hugh du Puiset has been greatly misserved by the chroniclers, by Henry II, and by Richard the Lionheart, who quickly resumed control of Northumberland on his return. He was excoriated by Jordan Fantosme for “collaboration” with the Scots in 1174 when his only alternative would have been a hopeless resistance. He earned worse calumny from William of Newburgh and Roger of Wendover for apparently trying to remedy the deficiency of resources that had placed him in the dire position of 1174. He was punished by Henry II for failing to give adequate service, and his lands were seized by Richard I when he did so. The diocese of Durham was always a major force in the north and Hugh du Puiset was one of the great magnates of northern England for decades, but Hugh found himself in a position where his responsibilities greatly exceeded his resources. He nevertheless served Stephen, Henry II and Richard I in war, but his reward from the Angevins was poor.

**Carlisle: The Marcher Lordship that never was.**

It is generally understood that the foundation of the castle, town, and eventually diocese of Carlisle represent an attempt on the part of William Rufus after 1092 to establish a new, stable frontier in the North West on the Solway, a process continued and consolidated by Henry I. While in the north-east, the bishop of Durham was never negligible, and sometimes a major military force, the new diocese of Carlisle, finally founded in 1133 can make no such claims. The endowment was so

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725 Howden, *Gesta*, II, 106; *Chronica*, III, 32.
726 Ibid, III, 237.
meagre that the throne was left vacant after the death of its first bishop, Aethelwold, for some fifty years. The city and cathedral were repeatedly occupied by the Scots, and the cathedral canons apparently co-operated to the extent of choosing a Scottish bishop during the occupation of August 1216 to April 1217. On only one occasion between 1133 and 1292 was an episcopal charter of Carlisle witnessed by a *miles*, and that a charter of Aethelwold. Carlisle provides no evidence of a constable. Around 1224, Bishop Walter Mauclerc, wrote to the Justiciar Hubert de Burgh to complain that the bishop of Durham had actually stolen the churches of his diocese. In short, the history of the diocese of Carlisle is one of consistent economic and military unimportance leading to its exploitation. It is perhaps surprising, but no effort seems to have been expended by any king during the period to make the diocese of Carlisle a significant lordship in its own right, but this very lack of military significance raises an important point. Not all prelates were major figures in the defence of their regions. The establishment of the diocese at Carlisle was a product of English military advance, but not an agent of that advance.

**Conclusion**

It is tempting to draw a straight conceptual line between King Edgar’s donation to St Oswald, Turold’s abbacy at Peterborough, and the emergence of the Durham Palatinate after the end of our period, and conclude that the resources of great churches made them into lordships important for the defence of the kingdom. Analysis of the role of individual prelates, however, suggests a rather more complex picture. The factors that gave a prelate a defensive role were far from static. Some churches (most notably Durham) had a greater inherent strategic significance than others, as a result of their location, static defences or resources. A number of prelates, however, found themselves defending vulnerable areas because they had useful skills, because their see had been thrust into an unaccustomed position of military significance, or as the only available leader. The idea of the church as the seat of a defensive lordship is useful, but this could take the form of delegated royal powers in an area contiguous with the church’s estates, the donation of lands or powers in distant regions, or simply being the only significant leader present at a time of crisis.

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728 Ibid, xxxviii.
729 Ibid, 6, No. 7.
730 Ibid, 53, No. 70.
The personality and individual circumstances of the prelate in question were of critical importance, and it is perhaps too easy to disregard the major challenges that clerics like Abbot Turold of Peterborough, or Hugh du Puiset faced, challenges that sometimes overwhelmed them. For every St Oswald, Roger of Salisbury or Richard de Belmeis, there is a Leofgar, a Walcher, or a Robert of Lewes.
Part 3: Responses

Chapter 1: Canonical Responses

Between the Council of Tribur (now Trebur) in 895 and the pontificate of Alexander II, there is no extant continental evidence relevant to England for new legislation regarding clerical involvement in warfare. Texts already produced were circulated and collated in canonical collections of varying importance, but for composition of new canonical restrictions, we must look to the era of the Reform papacy. There are also some Anglo-Saxon texts which bear on the problem, only some of which can technically be described as “legislative” or “canonical”, but the content of which is clearly intended to be normative. The sources are therefore diverse in terms of their origin, form and objective. The contention advanced here is that some, particularly the acts of church councils in the Norman and Angevin periods, were reactions to specific incidents. Others, notably the decretals of Alexander III, must be discussed as continental texts, but also in terms of the extent to which they circulated within England.

Papal Decretals before Gratian (1061-1089)

Between 1062 and 1071, Alexander II wrote in *Poenitens praesentium portitor*, to the clergy of the Italian monastery of San Vincenzo a Vulturno, laying a heavy burden of penance, fasting and temporary withdrawal from communion, on an unnamed porter, who was attacked by a *presbyter armatus*, and who had killed the latter. He cited unspecified canons for his authority, and the text survives in just three collections, *Collectio Britannica* (post 1090), Ivo of Chartres’ *Decretum* (c. 1110), and the *Collectio canonum* of the Ms Paris Bibliothèque de l’Arsenal 713 (which emerged between 1108 and the second quarter of the twelfth century). It was used neither by Gratian, nor for the *Decretales Gregorii IX*. Nonetheless, it shows the pope grappling with a problem raised by clerical violence, the endangering of souls by placing Christians in a position where they might kill a cleric. The case referred to does not seem to have been in warfare, and the decade of penance imposed by Alexander even in this case of self-defence is severe. Nonetheless, the fact that the

731 Jaffé 4531; PL 146, Col. 1405; Appendix (3, *Before Gratian*, 1).
732 X, 16.
slain cleric was *armatus* was key to reducing his legal protection, suggesting that a cleric’s canonical status could be significantly changed by his bearing of arms or armour.

Two letters of Urban II in 1089 regarding the church of Elne in south-east France demonstrate that cases of provincial minor clergy bearing weapons⁷³³ *adversus discipline decreta canonice / contra canonicam disciplinam* continued to be referred to Rome, though neither was taken up into decretal collections other than *Britannica*. In both cases, however, this was seen as part of a general lack of discipline and effective control by the diocesan, and the pope did not impose a punishment. Bearing weapons is linked to improper succession to benefices, and in particular, to a lack of episcopal control. Indeed, it is reminiscent of Orderic Vitalis’ comments concerning the decadent state of the Norman clergy in the years immediately following the foundation of the duchy, and may reflect a general papal concern with ecclesiastical discipline in France in this period.⁷³⁴

**The Anglo-Saxon texts**

England did not produce a large body of early writing or conciliar legislation on the legitimacy of clerical participation in warfare comparable to that from the continent, and knowledge of the canonical collections circulating in England before the Conquest is limited.⁷³⁵ The first English writings on the subject date from the late tenth century, by which time the texts discussed in the Introduction had long been in circulation. In some cases it is possible to show the influence of these on English writing, by direct comparison of the language used. In others it is possible at least to identify very similar ideas.

Aelfric “Grammaticus” of Eynsham was the first and most important English writer on the problem of the military cleric. His first extant foray into this area is in his pastoral letter (c.993-995) to Bishop Wulfisige III, of Sherborne.⁷³⁶ It states that a priest should eschew trade, secular lawsuits, carrying weapons, drinking in taverns,

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⁷³⁴ OV, III, 120.


⁷³⁶ Appendix (3, Anglo-Saxon, 1); C&S, I, 212. Compare ‘An Ecclesiastical Code of King Aethelred’: “And no cloistered monk anywhere need by rights demand compensation in a feud nor pay compensation in a feud; he leaves the obligations of kin-ship when he submits to the monastic rule.” C&S, I, 396.
and other practices. It is the simplest of Aelfric’s treatments of this subject. Like some of his continental predecessors and like Urban II, Aelfric was concerned with priests carrying weapons themselves and saw this in the context of improving them by distancing them from important social and legal activities of the secular world. His letter to Wulfstan (c.1003-1005) shows some of the same thinking, but includes a longer and more complex treatment in which his debt to earlier continental writers is clear. This letter is probably the most elaborate surviving treatment of the issue.

Aelfric begins with a consideration of the three orders of society in which, like Pope Nicholas, he used spiritual warfare to argue for a greater separation of the ecclesiastical and the secular. Aelfric used the damning adjective apostata to describe clergy who have deserted their post in the divine militia. Aelfric then changed tack, working through the more technical reasons why clerics must not bear arms or go to war. First he alleged that the hands that have shed human blood cannot be used to bless the chalice, nor is it licit for a bishop to strike a layman, while Christ himself commanded Peter in the Garden of Gethsemane to put away his sword. He also noted that “Canons” required masses not to be said for priests killed in battle. Presumably he meant the canon of Tribur, but he made changes. The original assurance that burial is permitted is lost, increasing the harshness of the provision, and missa is substituted for oblatio, creating a closer thematic link with the non-violation.

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737 C&S, I, 252; Appendix (3, Anglo-Saxon, 2).
738 While the edition of this passage in C&S usefully references the biblical origins of several phrases, it does not discuss the canonical foundations of the passage.
740 Aelfric seems perilously close to donatism here. Such views were regarded as near-heretical by Vacarius, and vigorously assaulted by Gratian, Taliadoros, John (2006). Law and Theology in Twelfth-Century England: The Works of Master Vacarius (c.1115/20-c.1200). Turnhout: Brepols, 230, 246, 247. He also apparently contradicted himself on this point. Around 1006, he argued that “The evil priest cannot by his evil, even if he is a homicide and criminal in his deeds, defile God’s service, neither baptism nor the mass.” C&S, I, 289. Nevertheless, the argument that the shedding of blood defiled the performance of the mass resurfaced occasionally, and was used to bar some clerics in late mediaeval Scotland from altar service for life, or a defined period. See McDonald, Jennifer (2005). The Papal Penitentiary and Ecclesiastical Careers: The Requests of Scottish Clergy in the Registers of the Sacra Apostolica Penitenzieria, 1449-1542. (Unpublished PhD thesis: University of Aberdeen).
741 As the notes in C&S suggest, Aelfric has almost certainly taken this directly from its biblical prototypes in Timothy, but there is an interesting parallel to this canon, originally from the Canones Apostolorum, which circulated widely: Episcopum aut presbiterum aut diaconum percutientem fideles delinuentes, aut infideles inique agentes, et per huismodi volentem timeri deici ab officio suo praeципimus, quia nusquam nos hoc dominus docuit. Econtrario vero ipse cum percūteretur ne repercūtiebat, cum maledicīretur non remaledicēbat cum patēretur non commīnabatur. http://www.benedictus.mgh.de/quellen/chga/chga_008t.htm Accessed 8/7/08.
of the mass. Probably using the Canon of the Council of Meaux, Aelfric adds that canons require that priests who uses weapons be demoted.

He picked up some of the same themes again c.1006 in a letter to Wulfstan. This time he translated the text of the canon of Tribur directly into English, omitting only the phrase “aut gentilium ludis”. He stated directly that some priests cite Peter carrying a sword in the Garden of Gethsemane as authority to do so, but argued that this sword must have been seized from one of the soldiers who arrested Christ, and that Christ commanded him to sheath his sword and healed the ear of the soldier whom Peter had wounded. This passage is crucial to the context of Aelfric’s writing, because it shows him engaged in detailed biblical exegesis explicitly to deal with a body of clerical opinion which, in a period of invasion and danger, regarded the carrying of weapons as acceptable, and was itself marshalling biblical sanction in its defence. It has been pointed out that Aelfric made extensive use of the Excerptiones Pseudo-Egberti in his letters, and that while the Excerptiones are in fact a collection of extracts from Charlemagne’s capitularies, Aelfric was almost certainly unaware of this, regarding the text as of English provenance. We might argue, as Powell has, that this was the source of Aelfric’s material regarding clerical use of weapons. The organisation of the text encourages this view, discussing the issue along with other problems of clerical discipline. Indeed, we add to Powell’s argument the observation that Aelfric even juxtaposed Canon XVII, *Ut nemo sacerdotum ex numero arma pugnantium unquam portet, nec litem contra proximum ullam excitet*, with Canon XVIII, *Ut nullus presbiter aut bibendi causa gradiatur in tabernas*, a structure so strikingly similar to the terms of Aelfric’s letter to Wulfsgie that it seems certain that this was his source.

It might be argued that Aelfric was being rhetorical, engaging with a straw man to further his argument, but Wulfstan I’s “Canons of Edgar” (c.1005-1008) stated that “it is right that no mass-priest come armed inside the church-doors, or in the

742 C&S, I, 296-297.
744 For Aelfric’s struggle against what he thought were erroneous doctrines circulating in England, Godden, Malcolm (Sept 2004). ‘Ælfric of Eynsham (c.950–c.1010)’, in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, (online edn), Oxford University Press. [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/187, accessed 14 June 2010]. Henry-Mayr Harting recently argued in a similar vein that Ruotgar of Cologne was engaged with a serious view that he should not have been engaged in his secular and military activities, Mayr-Harting, Church and Cosmos, 6.
746 Ancient Laws and Statutes of England, PRO (1840), 327.
sanctuary without his surplice” (oferslop). This shows a concern with the proper forms of clerical behaviour, but seems to regard even the “mass-priest” carrying weapons into his own church as a crime comparable to neglecting to wear his surplice. In his “Northumbrian Priests’ Law”, Wulfstan seemed to take a similarly relaxed line. “If a priest comes with weapons into the church, he is to compensate for it.” It is possible that both the “Northumbrian Priests’ Law” and the “Canons of Edgar” were more concerned with generally keeping weapons out of churches than disarming clergy, bearing a similarity to some continental legislation. In his own canonical collection, Wulfstan was clear that clerics should not carry weapons or go to war: He referred to the matter twice, to declare that clergy were neither to carry the “weapons of fighters”, (arma pugnantium), nor to begin squabbles with their neighbours. The formulation that Wulstan used here, Ut nemo sacerdotum ex numero arma pugnantium unquam portet, nec litem contra proximum ullam excitet was again that of Excerptiones Pseudo-Egberti c. XVII. His precise quotation of the text, however, implies that he was not retranslating from Aelfric’s Anglo-Saxon letter to Wulfsige. Wulftsan too must have been making use of the Excerptiones directly. The second time, he forbade clerics to use those weapons or go to war, (non bellum armis uti, nec ad bellum procedere). Wulfstan, like Aelfric referenced the Council of Tribur, the quotation from Timothy which had influenced the Council of Meaux and Nicholas I. As we have seen, Aelfric’s letter had omitted that part of the Tribur canon that refers to clerics killed in brawls, but Wulfstan retained this clause in his treatment. He must, therefore, have known the canon from some other source than Aelfric’s letter. He also included a maxim found in two forms in some fifteen Clavis collections from c.906 onwards, Omnimodis dicendum est presbiteris et diaconibus ut arma non portent, sed magis confidant in defensione Dei quam in armis. The last

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749 Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, Pal. lat. 583 Canon CCLXXVIII.
751 Wulfstan’s Canon Law Collection, J.E. Cross and Andrew Hamer (eds). Cambridge: D.S. Brewer. (1999), 120. Cross and Hamer give the source for this canon as Gerbald of Liège.
752 http://knowledgeforge.net/ivo/decretum/ivodec_6_1p0.pdf Accessed 8/7/08.
Anglo-Saxon comment on this issue comes from King Aethelred’s law code of 1014, another instrument drafted by Wulfstan:

Let him [the priest] know, if he will, that he has no concern with a wife or with worldly warfare, if he wishes rightly to obey God and keep God’s laws, as it becomes his orders by rights.\(^{753}\)

This last text is reminiscent of Pope Leo’s pronouncement, linking warfare with marriage as representative of a secular life. Like Wulfstan’s writing, it is clear, but far less severe than Aelfric.

It has recently been argued that Aelfric of Eynsham’s writing embodied late Anglo-Saxon canonical consensus on the issue of armed clerics.\(^{754}\) There are, however, problems with this view. Aelfric’s writings (and those of Wulfstan to whom he was personally connected and with whom he shared source materials) constitute the majority, and by far the most sophisticated, extant material on this issue. Moreover, Aelfric’s language is far stronger on some occasions than that of Wulfstan, who agreed that clerics should not carry weapons, but regarded it as a far lesser sin.\(^{755}\)

Finally, Aelfric himself claimed to be responding to the contemporary view held by priests that carrying weapons was legitimate and had biblical sanction. It does seem that the surviving Anglo-Saxon texts attempted to either forbid or regulate clerical bearing and use of weapons, as part of a larger emphasis on the separation of clerical and lay spheres, sometimes through use of spiritual warfare imagery. Aelfric may have been one of the most important thinkers of the late Anglo-Saxon period, but his work represents just one amongst several ideals of Christian conduct.\(^{756}\)

**Early Anglo-Norman Texts**

The Norman Conquest provoked a unique and complex canonical response. Following the invasion, the papal legate Ermenfrid of Sion confirmed a collection of penitential ordinances issued by the Norman bishops for the victors. These dealt with practical matters, such as the difficulty an archer would encounter in performing

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\(^{753}\) C&S, I, 397-8.

\(^{754}\) Giandrea, *Episcopal Culture*, 35. She does also discuss Nightingale’s view that in continental literature, monastic opposition to episcopal warfare was generally a product of personal antipathy, 36.

\(^{755}\) Powell came to similar conclusions, ‘Three Orders’, 120.

\(^{756}\) Ibid, 129.
pensation for an unknown number of slain enemies. The clauses requiring penance of clerics who had fought is therefore strong evidence for the presence of such churchmen among the Conqueror’s army. It required that they “do penance following the custom of the established canons as if they had sinned in their own land”, (secundum instituta canonum acsi in patria sua peccassent peniteant). There has been some debate regarding exactly when the Penitential Ordinances were composed, but Cowdrey’s suggested date of Easter 1067 at Fécamp seems likely. He interpreted the Ordinances as representing a move back towards the stringency of Carolingian canonical views on warfare, and they do at least make clear that killing in battle still required penance, but Cowdrey’s interpretation is debateable. We have already seen that canonical treatments of arms-bearing varied widely. In not imposing a uniform penance, therefore, Ermenfrid perhaps acknowledged the lack of consensus on the issue, allowing the clerics who had fought a degree of leeway.

Early Anglo-Norman church also interested themselves in clerics involved in warfare. At the Legatine Council of Winchester (7th-11th April 1070), Ermenfrid and the council forbade monks who had laid aside their habits to be received either into the army, or into the secular priesthood, (neque in militia neque in conventu clericorum recipiantur). This canon seems to echo both Leo’s monastic prohibition and Chalcedon canon VII, and includes the latter’s specification of excommunication. It was not until the next Legatine Council (24th May 1070), however, that there probably emerged what seems to be a specific Anglo-Norman prohibition on clergy bearing arms. “Ut nullus clericus secularia arma ferat”. Unfortunately, only the capitula of the canons survive, without elaboration or any specified punishment. It is impossible, therefore, to tell whether this was an original composition, or reused from an earlier council or collection, though the closest formal similarity to the capitulum is Ut nullus clericus arma militaria portet, the rubric under

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757 C&S, II, 583.Appendix (3, Anglo-Norman 1). For a discussion of these articles in the context of limitations imposed by the church on the conduct of warfare, Brett, ‘Warfare and its restraints’, 130. 758 Cowdrey, H.E.J. (1969). ‘Bishop Ermenfrid of Sion and the Penitential Ordinance following the Battle of Hastings’, in The Journal of Ecclesiastical History 20: 225-242 (233). 759 It has been observed that allowing offenders to do pence as if they were “at home” was also applied to those who had raped or plundered, Ibid, 235-6. Perhaps all three; clerical arms bearing, rape and plunder were regarded as inevitable consequences of war itself. For the more general point that as papal interference in local affairs extended and canon law was elaborated, Rome maintained a respect for local customs and favoured locally administered judgement where practical, Cheney, Hubert Walter, 2; Gilchrist, John (1967). ‘Gregory VII and the Juristic Sources of his Ideology’, in Studia Gratiana XIII: 3-37 (20-21). 760 C&S, II, 576. 761 Ibid, 581.
which the *Collectio Burdegalensis* (an abbreviation of Burchard’s *Decretum*, c.1080) gave the Council of Meaux prohibition. It seems plausible, therefore, to suggest that the council reissued that canon, but this is highly conjectural.

There is insufficient space here to discuss at length the issue of clerical involvement in blood judgement, and the other canonical problems that surround prelates’ engagement in secular business unless they relate to a specifically military problem. It is worth, however, briefly considering a canon of the Council of London:

> That no bishop, nor abbot, nor anyone from the clergy judge that a man should be killed, or that limbs be cut off, or grant his support of his authority to such judgements.\(^62\)

Geoffrey of Coutances, a cleric little involved in reforming councils\(^63\) is among the witnesses to the council’s pronouncements. He was the only witness not a bishop or abbot of an English church, and as such his presence at the council is difficult to explain.\(^64\) It should also be noted that this is the first occasion on which an English council specifically forbade clerics to pass blood judgements.\(^65\) Unfortunately, the chronological relationship of the rebellion of 1075 and the council (25\(^{th}\) Dec 1074 x 28\(^{th}\) Aug 1075) are unclear, but it is possible that Geoffrey’s mutilation of rebel prisoners on two occasions served as the precipitating factor for this canon. There was French precedent for councils reacting to the military adventures of specific clergy. The Council of Rheims in 1049, which condemned the bishop of Langres for bearing arms also forbade the practice more generally.\(^66\)

### 1070-1125: Norman abbots and dubbing to knighthood

The evidence for the years 1070 to 1125 appears to suggest that the Normans regarded as illegitimate the existing Anglo-Saxon practice of abbots bestowing

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\(^62\) *Ut nullus episcopus, vel abbas, seu quilibet ex clero, hominem occidendum, vel menbris truncandum iudicet, vel iudicantibus sue auctoritatis favorem commodet.* C&S, II, 614.  
\(^63\) Le Patourel, ‘Geoffrey de Montbray’, 143.  
\(^64\) The formula of Geoffrey’s subscription, *Ego Gaufridus Constantiniensis episcopus et unus de Anglice terre primati us subscripti* also seems odd.  
\(^65\) The Council of Winchester (1072) had made the provision (taken from the Council of Lisieux), “*Ut presbiter nullius sit prepositus episcopi...*” C&S, II, 606. By the Council of Westminster in 1102, the treatment was apparently more elaborate. The surviving capitulum reads, “*Ne quilibet clericis sinit securarium prepositi vel procuratores, aut iudices sanguinis.*”  
knighthood. The *Gesta Herewardi* claims that in traditional English style (*Anglico more*), Hereward a tenant of the abbey in Witham on the Hill and Stowe,\(^767\) received knighthood (*militari gladio et balteo praecingeret*) from Abbot Brand of Peterborough, a practice repudiated by the invaders.\(^768\) In 1102, the council of Westminster decreed that abbots should not make knights,\(^769\) while in 1125, Henry I’s foundation charter for Reading Abbey forbade the abbot to dub knights.\(^770\) The picture of Norman disapproval for this “English tradition”, however, is far more equivocal than first appears.

As Keen observed, the earliest account of a knighting is that of Geoffrey the Fair of Anjou by Henry I in 1128, and continental examples of clerical lords explicitly described bestowing knighthood are rare.\(^771\) We know nothing of the process by which Englishmen before the Conquest became cnlhts or thegns, though the high social status of the late Anglo-Saxon thegnage is being increasingly emphasised.\(^772\) Stenton called the performance of military service by thegns “the expression of the traditions of an order”.\(^773\) Taken with the custom of the heriot, therefore, it seems highly likely that there was a ceremonial process by which an individual ascended to this order and received his weapons. Keen’s reassessment of the predominately secular origins of this process makes it reasonable to suggest that this was a secular rite performed by the lord, though liturgical antecedents for the dubbing ceremony have also been emphasised.\(^774\) This need not, however, imply that Anglo-Saxon abbots were not competent to perform the ceremony. No pre-Conquest English source described such an event as either licit or illicit. There is, moreover, reason to be cautious with the *Gesta Herewardi* evidence. While large portions of the *Gesta Herewardi* are clearly based on an Old English prototype,\(^775\) the author’s approach to knighthood may not be so. Descriptions of tournaments and shattering lances seem to


\(^{768}\) *De Gestis Herewardi*, 36-7.

\(^{769}\) *C&S*, II, 676-7.


\(^{771}\) Keen, *Chivalry*, 64-5, 74-5. There is, however, the charter of 1154 by which William I of Sicily specifically granted to the abbot of La Cava the right to promote his vassals to knighthood, Loud, G.A. (1983). ‘The Church, warfare and military obligation in Norman Italy’, in *Studies in Church History* 20: 31-45 (42).

\(^{772}\) Fleming, ‘Lords and Labour’.

\(^{773}\) Stenton, *First Century*, 118.


\(^{775}\) *Three Lives of the Last Englishmen*, xxvi.
belong more in the twelfth than the eleventh century. Nevertheless, the *Gesta Herewardi* may well preserve a tradition that Hereward received his arms from Abbot Brand and that his followers received theirs from Prior Wulfwine. This leaves the idea that the Normans found such behaviour unacceptable.

Thomas argued persuasively that Hereward’s portrayal as a chivalric paragon is anachronistic, but that it is intended to demonstrate not the inferiority, but the equality or superiority of English to Norman martial practice and ethos and that the author was arguing for an increased degree of clerical involvement in dubbing ceremonies.  Thomas argued persuasively that Hereward’s portrayal as a chivalric paragon is anachronistic, but that it is intended to demonstrate not the inferiority, but the equality or superiority of English to Norman martial practice and ethos and that the author was arguing for an increased degree of clerical involvement in dubbing ceremonies. 776 Hereward’s knightly qualities in the text are indeed outstanding. In addition, the author elaborates Hereward’s logic, but does not explain the case for forbidding monastic dubbing, ascribing it vaguely to a French decree, not a canonical, scriptural or other ecclesiastical authority and does not imply his own disapproval, or even that the practice continued to be long forbidden.

Canon XVIII from the A/B recensions 777 of the Council of Westminster (29th September 1102), commanded “Let abbots not make knights, nor may they eat and sleep in the same house as the monks, unless prevented from doing otherwise by necessity”, *(Ne abbates faciant milites, et ut in eadem domo cum monachis suis manducent et dormiant nisi necessitate aliqua prohibente).* 778 The canon seems wholly original. No English or continental text from before 1102 forbade abbots to make knights. Nor indeed are there precedents for forbidding military activity to only the regular clergy (with the exception of Pope Leo’s prohibition). There is nothing like it in the canons of the Council of Clermont, though this had sought to prevent clergy from taking up arms, 779 and there is no such provision in the Canons of the Council of Rome. 780 It should therefore probably not be ascribed to Anselm’s sojourn at the papal curia. Nevertheless, it must be recalled that the version of the canons that survives was not intended to be final. Anselm had hoped to convene the council again to produce a final version, and these canons were probably never distributed 781. What the final version would have been, cannot be known.

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777 Recension C is shortened to “Ne abbates adobbent aut faciant milites” C&S, II, 680.
778 C&S II, 676-677; Brett, ‘Warfare and its restraints’, 139.
780 *Mansi nova collectio*, XX, 961-4. This is despite other canons (XVI and XVII, 964) aimed at ensuring the proper behaviour of abbots.
781 C&S, II, 670.
Henry I’s foundation charter for the abbey of Reading (1125) includes the following provision:

He [the abbot] should not give rented lands in fee, nor should he make knights, except in the holy garb of Christ, in which he should take care to receive small children in moderate numbers, but he may with discernment receive mature and prudent men, whether cleric or lay.\(^\text{782}\)

As it stands, the charter is certainly spurious, but that need not invalidate the usefulness of the text. Kemp dated “improvements” to 1189-93, but this passage is replicated in King Stephen’s confirmation (1135-54), regarded as largely authentic.\(^\text{783}\) The provision was therefore most likely in the original version of King Henry’s charter which lies behind the extant forgery. This is easier to explain than the regulation from 1102. Succeeding clauses (in both versions) forbid lay possession of the house’s lands and offices from becoming hereditary. The primary concern therefore seems to have been to prevent the renting of monastery lands from turning into alienation.\(^\text{784}\) We should also note that while this may have limited the abbot’s capacity to bestow patronage on his lay relatives, it need not have been a problem from the king’s point of view. Both versions of the foundation charter exempt the monastery from military service, and the house was not recorded as having a servitium debitum in 1166. Furthermore, it should be noted that the only other place a provision of this sort is found is in the foundation charter of Battle Abbey, a forgery, which reproduced the Reading provision.\(^\text{785}\)

It is possible that the Norman conquerors of England felt that there was something inappropriate about abbots dubbing their men to knighthood, but the evidence for this is weaker that it first appears. The Gesta Herewardi is problematic, and the conciliar and charter provisions suggest more concern with territorial alienation than preventing abbots from dubbing their followers.

\textbf{1138-9: A Change in Tone}

\(^{782}\) \textit{Reading Abbey Cartularies}, I, 34; Appendix (3, Anglo-Norman 2).

\(^{783}\) \textit{Reading Abbey Cartularies}, I, 36, 42; \textit{RAN}, III, 250.


\(^{785}\) Bates \textit{RAN}, 142.
The Legatine Council at Westminster in December 1138 promulgated a provision quite different to earlier Anglo-Norman treatments: 786 For the first time since 1070, an English council explicitly forbade clerics to take up arms, and for the first time since Wulfstan, a continental text was directly cited as the requisite authority. The canon is a slightly modified version of the extract from Pope Nicholas’ letter of 867, *Clericum qui paganum*. In the original, the prohibition on clerics bearing arms is preceded by “Clericum autem qui paganum occiderit non oportet ad gradum maiorem prouehi qui carere debet etiam acquisito, homicida enim est. Nam...” 787 This sentence is discarded, expanding the application of the text to clerics who had killed Christians. Coming so soon after the remarkable events of August 1138, it seems likely that the Battle of the Standard precipitated the pronouncement. The Standard saw the central involvement of Archbishop Thurstan of York and Bishop Ralph of Orkney, as well as the capture of at least one Scottish cleric, William Cumin. As we have seen, Thurstan’s use of individual local clergy of his province as banner-carriers was without English precedent. No source describes these priests actually fighting, but this pronouncement makes it appear very likely that some did. There are other reasons to suppose that the 1138 prohibition was a response to the incursion. Richard of Hexham’s account portrays the new papal legate, Alberic (who presided at the council) as travelling around the north, liberating William Cumin, comforting the monks of Hexham in their distress, releasing enslaved women and ultimately making peace with King David. 788 The council of 1138, the canons of which emphasised the protection of churches and churchmen from violence of the kind that for which the Scottish invasion was noted, therefore, should be viewed part of Alberic’s activities to resolve issues arising from the wars in the north. 789

Gratian’s *Decretum*

It has long been recognized that the impact of the *Concordantia discordantium canonum* was swift and massive, becoming almost immediately the central text for

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786 *C&S*, II, 777; Appendix (3, Anglo-Norman, 3).
787 Note that this first, omitted part was included in Gratian, but not the section beginning “Cum discreti”.
788 *RH*, 169-171.
789 Brett noticed that canonical priorities had changed in a slightly different area due to the civil war. The councils of 1138, 1143 and 1151 were all much concerned with protecting the church from attack, “Warfare and its restraints”, 133-134; for a more traditional view of the council, emphasising it as restating “Reform decrees” including the prohibition of clerical warfare, Kealey, *Roger of Salisbury*, 171.
teachers of canon law in both England and an the continent. Copies were circulating in England by about 1150. Because of the critical importance of this text, and the space Gratian devoted in C.23 q.8 to dealing with the problem of the militant cleric, it is necessary to discuss its provisions at length. The Causa is a classic defence of Christian warfare, but Gratian’s general argument in q.8 was that only the lay power could wield the secular sword. The source texts he cited are only summarised here, but his own commentary will be discussed in more depth. Gratian’s introduction to this part of his compilation is a mixture of the new and the familiar. Like Aelfric, Gratian’s primary authority was Christ’s chastisement of Peter in the Garden of Gethsemane, and he made it explicit that this command is applicable to all priests as Peter’s successors. Priests were not even to raise a sword against inimici dei, closing down any opportunity for clerics to legitimise their military behaviour by framing it as militia Christi. Whilst he did not go so far as to deny the right of the church to grant the authority to go to war, he did deny the right of priests to fight on their own, or even on the pope’s authority, (nec sua auctoritate, nec auctoritate Romani Pontificis). He explicitly stated that the duty of protecting the flock did not extend into the physical sphere, but enjoined prelatis specialiter to remember that “the weapons of bishops are tears and prayers”, (arma episcopi lacrimae sunt et orationes).

It should be noted that c.1-3 are all Paleae, and therefore should not be taken as part of Gratian’s dialectic. C.1 quoted John VIII’s letter, stating that bishops could not fight even terram defendere. C.2, cited Pope Innocent’s gloss on the Gethsemane

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791 Stringer, The reign of Stephen, 64. There has been some discussion of exactly how the Decretum became known in England, with some scholars attributing its introduction to John of Salisbury. For the competing views of this, Boureau, ‘How Law Came to the Monks’, 39.

792 It should be noted that Gratian also quoted several other papal letters that we have discussed as part of his analysis of other problems. For instance, in D.1 c.5 he quoted Clericum qui paganum as ar as pervenire as part of his discussion of the crimes that could lead to deposition from office. Similarly, he quoted our extract from Divinorum fulgentes dogmatumin D.1 c.6.

incident, and emphasised the point that as Peter was the prototype of the priesthood itself, *forma omnia sacerdotum*, Christ’s commands to him are applicable to all his successors. C.3 adopted Ambrosius Alexandrinus’ use of the discourse of spiritual warfare to counter the potential criticism that if a priest would not fight to defend his church, he might be considered negligent, that the priest should not abandon his church, but should continue to “fight” through his tears and prayers, and trust in God. In c.4, when Gratian’s own text resumes, we are given the provision of the Council of Tribur, which despite the great chronological gulf that separates the origins of the texts is made to flow smoothly on from the previous passage. If the priest fought with temporal rather than spiritual weapons, the use of those instruments for his own salvation was denied him. In c.5, he quoted the provision from the Toledan Prohibition, but made important modifications. *Factio* replaced *seditione*, expanding the reach of the canon to not fall only on rebels, but on any clerics who took up arms in warfare, and the undefined time a penitent must spend in a monastery in the original text is clarified: *perhenniter*. In c.6 Gratian quoted the provision from the council of Meaux verbatim. His own “voice” then intrudes again in *dictum post* c.6 which neatly summarises the substance of the Tribur, Meaux and Toledo prohibitions as he had cited them, defining the role of the priest as to encourage others to take up arms, because they themselves could not do so but only against oppressors or the enemies of God, *Sacerdotes propria manu arma arripere non debent; sed alios ad arripiendum, ad oppressorum defensionem, atque ad inimicorum Dei oppugnationem eis licet hortari*. He then proceeded to note examples of warfare undertaken under clerical exhortation, such as against Saracens (c.7.) and Charlemagne’s war against the Lombards (c.10.). This second phase culminates in the *Dictum post* c.18, when Gratian summarised his material on exhortation by repeating that personal arms bearing is illicit, but acknowledging that a logical problem is posed by the issue of ecclesiastical *command*, rather than mere exhortation. As a result, another level of sophistication is added to his argument. “In the register indeed, it is read, that the blessed Gregory decreed a tax for knights and ordered the citizens of Tuscany to prepare weapons against the Lombards. This, therefore, by example and by the aforesaid authorities shows, that although priests may not take up weapons with their own hands, however, either by these [methods], they have the power to persuade certain [men] entrusted with such office, or they have the power to command anyone by their own authority to take them up.”, *In registro etiam legitur,*
quod B. Gregorius ciuibus Tusciae, ut contra Longobardos arma pararent, mandauit, et militantibus stipendia decreuit. Hoc igitur exemplo er premissis auctoribus claret, quod sacerdotes, etsi propria manu arma arripere non debeant, tamen uel his, quibus huiusmodi officia commissa sunt, persuadere, uel quibuslibet, ut ea arripiant, sua auctoritate ualeant imperare. Gratian, however, understood that a position in which military command was acceptable had not yet resolved the discord between authorities, noting that an objection could be mounted by reference to ‘Nicholas’ letter to the Emperor Charles (actually the passage from the Benedictus Levita forgery Reprehensibile ulde esse constat (c.19). Gratian inserted serviant between secoli and seculo, clarifying the sentence slightly, but otherwise the text is unchanged. Gratian acknowledged that ‘Nicholas’ railing against Carolingian use of bishops and their retainers against Vikings could not be reconciled with the employment of papal funds to defeat the Lombards in battle. He developed this fully in the Dictum post c.20:

Behold, how Pope Nicholas forbade bishops from involving themselves in secular warfare. He did not even allow them to enter the battle against the maritime pirates. It what manner, therefore, does Pope Leo come out of the city against the Saracens, and from a distance hold them off from the shore, call the people together from everywhere, and in person avenge their injuries, and also, with Gregory, summon knights to arms?

He offered a potential solution, however, with the argument that some bishoprics had only small endowments, and argued that they were in consequence, free of both the snares of the devil, and the demands and the secular law of princes. It was those “not content with tithes and first-fruits, they possess estates, villas, castles and cities, from which tribute is owed to Caesar” (qui non contenti decimis et primiciis, predia, uillas, et castella, et ciuitates possident, ex quibus Cesari debent tributa) who were at risk of excessive entanglement in secular affairs, including warfare. Gratian continues the

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794 Ecce quod Nycolaus Papa prohibet episcopos seculari milicia occupari, nec etiam contra maritimos piratas permittit eos ad pugnam accedere. Quomodo ergo Leo Papa aduersus Sarracenos urbem egreditur, et, ut procul eos a littore arceat, populum undique conuocat, et suorum iniurias presencialiter uindicat, atque cum Gregorio milites ad arma inuitat?

795 This passage was noted in Benson, Robert (1963). ‘The Obligations of Bishops with Regalia’, in Monumenta Iuris Canonici: Proceedings of the Second International Congress on Medieval Canon Law: 123-137 (125-126). Benson states that in the dictum, following C.XXV (962) permitted some military service by bishops who hold particular secular honours in the Empire, if licensed by the pope. This, however, seems out of step with the rest of Gratian’s treatment. Profiscatur ad castra, which Benson interprets as going on campaign probably means only leading warriors to muster.
theme of the entanglement in secular jurisdiction that results from possession of *temporalia* for some time, and much of the later part of the *Quaestio* revolves around the problem of clerical involvement in blood judgement. For our purposes, however, Gratian’s argument is resolved in the *Dictum post* c. 28:

> Therefore it is licit for prelates, by the example of the blessed Gregory, to demand the defence of the faithful from emperors or any other leaders. It was also licit when the Blessed Leo encouraged anyone to his defence against the enemies of the holy faith and to rouse them, from a distance, to halt the power of the unfaithful. To command the shedding of blood, however, is not allowed either by the authority of bishops, or that of emperors.

Though more severe, and certainly more detailed than most writers, Gratian’s resolution of the problem of militant clergy, therefore, is not simply a matter of the combined weight of material he has gathered creating the impression of unusual rigour. It hinged on fine distinctions. He was very clear that clerics could never take up arms themselves. He accepted that prelates had a role in exhorting lay leaders to undertake their defensive duties. If the enemy was conceptualized as an enemy of the faith, a prelate could go a little further, rousing lesser men to action. Even if the enemy were an enemy of the faith, however, a prelate still had to remain *procul*. For Gratian, there were circumstances when prelates could legitimately *encourage* the faithful to war, but they could never *lead* them. 796 Whilst he engaged with the argument that possession of temporal resources could drag clergy into warfare, he rejected the notion that a prelate could undertake military leadership on behalf of a lay ruler. It appears that Gratian would have had little patience that prelates could lead men to war “as” barons.

It is not possible in the constraints of this study to address in detail the work of the Decretists. Brundage, however, summarized several masters’ positions on clerics in warfare. These ranged from Piacapalea (fl. 1140-1148), Gratian’s first pupil to attempt a *summa*, who confined the clerical role to exhortation, holding that not even the pope had the authority to declare war, 797 to the anonymous glossator who wrote that bishops should defend their sees and be punished for failure to do so (though this

796 He would accept that bishops could accompany armies to pray for the emperor and his soldiers, Brundage, ‘Holy War’, 11.
797 Brundage, ‘Holy War’, 110.
last statement was later erased in the manuscript). It is worth, however, taking the space to discuss the treatment of one example in detail. The *Summa Magistri Rolandi*, which was once attributed to the young Rolandus Blandinelli (later Alexander III) had much in common with Gratian. The structure of his argument, however, was rather simpler. Rolandus stated that military service was “illegitimate to those who are in sacred orders, or who have undertaken the journey of perfection”, (*Illicitum ut his, quos in sacris ordibibus constat existere vel perfectionis iter arripuisse*). He also argued that a ban on bearing arms necessarily made it illegitimate for clergy to act as military leaders, “It is not licit for those who are forbidden from bearing arms to resist injury with the arms of their friends” (*Quibus inhibitum est arma movere, sociorum iniuriam arms propulsare non licet*).

Nonetheless, unlike Gratian Rolandus allowed that a powerful case could be mounted that clerics should indeed be allowed to carry and use weapons. He cited a series of biblical examples of prophets and priests; Moses, who slew an Egyptian soldier and ordered his followers to bear arms and kill idolators, Phineas, the priest who ran through two adulterers, Elias who killed priests of Baal, Samuel, who killed King Agag with a sword, and Peter himself, who also had a sword. Astonishingly, he continues his list, “In likeness of which, we do not doubt that Archbishop Turpin fought the Saracens with the physical sword, just as the history of the Franks has it.” (*Ad cuius instar archiepiscopum Turpinum, prout Francorum habet historia, materiali gladio Sarracenos impugnasse non dubitamus*).

He also pointed out that “when the evil are pursued to judgement by the command of a praiseworthy judge it is not doubted, so it does not seem illicit for clerics to carry weapons by the command of a prince, because we know that both the

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798 Ibid, 112.
801 Ibid, 88; Brundage, ‘Holy War’, 110. Note that this is a reworking of a passage in Gratian’s decretum applied more widely than to clergy, *Quod uero sociorum armis propulsanda non sit, exemplis et auctoritatis probatur*, 895.
802 Note that 3 Kings describes the destruction of the priests of Baal as by Elias’ command, not by his own hand.
803 *Summa Magistri Rolandi*, 96.
804 Ibid, 96-7.
blessed Maurice and George did this. The same is proven by the authority of Leo...” (Item cum malos persequi iudici vel ex mandato iudicis laudabile fore non dubitetur, clericis arma ex mandato principis ferre non videtur illicitum, quod et beatum Mauritium atque Georgium fecisse cognoscimus. Idem quoque probatur auctoritate Leonis...) All of this comes before Alexander even began to cite textual authorities in detail. Eventually, he acknowledged Gratian’s authorities against clerical violence as overwhelming, “By the said authorities, it is made clearer than daylight, that it is permitted to no cleric to bear arms, either by himself or by another, or to urge for a judgement of blood.” (His praedictis auctoritatibus luce clarius constat, quod nulli clericorum licet vel per se vel per alium arma movere, vel iudicium sanguinis agitare). At the very end of his discussion, however, he took a new tack, introducing a distinction that Gratian had not made:

To this we say, that some of the clergy are regulars, like monks, hermits, canons regular and professi; none of these may bear weapons by their own authority or that of another. Some of the others are in sacred orders, others are not. To those constituted in sacred orders it should always be illicit to carry arms, to others though, although they may not bear them by their own authority, it cannot be doubted that it is licit to carry them, when commanded by a prince or ordinary judge. For when it should be allowed to them to contract marriage and return to secular life, it is not in doubt that by the command of a prince or the highest pontiff, it is licit indeed for them to bear arms.

In Rolandus’ estimation, therefore, Gratian’s special category of enemies of the faith is lost, while the key distinction is not between the precise nature of authority recognized (exhortation or command) but between those in sacred orders and others. While he established that clergy cannot declare war, he granted the papacy a special privilege in this regard, while the liminal and flexible status of clerics in minor orders (i.e. below the subdiaconate) means that they were allowed to bear arms by papal or

805 Ibid, 98.
806 Ad hoc dicimus, quod clericorum alii sunt regulares ut monachi, heremitae, canonici regulares atque professi; horum nulli sua auctoritate vel alterioris licet arma movere. Aliorum vero alii sunt in sacris ordinibus constituti, alii vero minime. Constitutis in sacris ordinibus arma movere semper erit illicitum, alii vero etsi sua auctoritate movere non liceat, mandante principe vel ordinario iudice etsi licere non dubitatur. Nam cum eis liceat matrimonium contrahere atque ad saecularem conversationem redire, non est dubium, quod mandante principe vel summum pontifice liceat eis etiam arma movere. Ibid.
royal command. While accepting Gratian’s basic contention that clergy should neither declare nor make war, Rolandus introduces those in minor orders as a special case, specifically when papal authority was being used to mobilise military power. He also adopted a very different tone. His examples of militant prelates are deliberately chosen to represent a range of enemies and means of participation, and are treated with the reverence appropriate to saints, holy warriors, and prophets. It should be noted that Rolandus’ distinction was itself rejected by Rufinus as absurd. However revolutionary the Decretum may have been in terms of the teaching of canon law, it did not impose a single standard on this issue, either in terms of technical law, or in terms of underling attitudes even among the learned continental lawyers and glossators.

**The *Ius Novum* and its Reception in England**

Though the papacy did not promulgate a collection until 1234, the decretals of Alexander III (1159-81) dominate this period, partly due to his long reign, but more importantly because of his vast output of material, and because Alexandrine decretals, both genuine and forged, soon began to eat away at the influence of older authorities. The first case we must address, however, is a *responsum* of Eugenius III (1145-53) to the chapter of Bordeaux, regarding a cleric who had killed a colleague during a wrestling match, allowing him to be promoted to holy orders. This is of interest because of the terms of the Tribur provision. Presumably “P” was in minor orders at the time. The Pope, unfortunately, tells us nothing of the fate of the soul of the dead man, who, were the canon of the Council of Tribur to be applied, should be denied prayers, though not burial. We are therefore robbed of an opportunity to learn something of the application of *Ius antiquum* measures by the papacy in this period, though it is clear that clergy had not been restrained by the Tribur prohibition, despite its inclusion in Gratian’s Decretum. It represents precisely the sort of event the delegates at Tribur had sought to avoid.

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807 See also Brundage, ‘Holy War’, 111; Note the late mediaeval case of Robert Montgomery, a clerk of the diocese of Glasgow, who had killed several people in wars and who sought papal absolution and dispensation because he wished to be promoted to major orders, McDonald, *The Papal Penitentiary*, 139.
809 For the expansion of papal government as a product of the explosion of new case law and the merging of Roman and Canon law as sources of authority under Alexander, Winroth, *Gratian’s Decretum*, 145.
810 Brundage, ‘Teaching and Study’, 103.
The first Alexandrine text that we must discuss is a long and complex responsum (Licet preter) of 1177 to the archbishop of Salerno, probably Romuald II,\(^8\) \(De\) presbytero autem Campanniae...\).\(^8\) The pope was asked whether the unnamed “priest of the Campagna” who had engaged in trial by battle and who lost part of his finger, was still qualified to say mass. His reply was that he was now disqualified, though the archbishop was permitted to allow him to resume his functions after a penance had been performed. It is noteworthy, however, that Alexander needed to specify that the damage to the priest’s hand was immaterial. There may be shades here of engagement with an Lérida-type construction in which clerical violence was inappropriate partly because blood defiled the hands that performed the mass, but Alexander’s primary question was the competence of the cleric – whether he could actually hold the chalice safely and without scandalising the public.\(^8\) In the next part, however, (Porro si clericus...)\(^8\) he developed this as a general principle. Clergy who had taken part in trial by battle must be removed from post. They may be granted mercy \(si\) \(cum\) ipso \(suus\) episcopus misericorditer dispensandum, but only if the duel itself did not result in serious injury to the limbs of either party. He also condemned, (Presbyterem autem qui...)\(^8\) a priest who may have killed a boy accidentally by striking him intuitu disciplinae. If military conflict is considered as trial by battle writ large, or as the corrective chastisement of error, these passages have considerable implications for the legitimacy of clerical military service.\(^8\) Through the limits imposed on episcopal mercy, Alexander established that the personal infliction of violence was incompatible with performing of the mass, and that this is a product of the infliction of violence itself, not necessarily participation in the judicial process, or contamination of the hands. The theoretical basis of the judgement, therefore, for the first time has become unambiguously moral/theological.\(^8\)

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\(^8\) Jaffé 14091; X. 1.20.1.

\(^8\) Compare Literas fraternitatis tue (1146), X. 3. 6. 2.

\(^8\) Jaffé 14091; X. 5.14.1.

\(^8\) Jaffé 14091; X. 5.12.7.

\(^8\) See Henry I’s speech in Orderic Vitalis, OV, V, 230: Ensibus et lanceis innumerisque missilibus tecum pacitabo. Note that Alexander also dealt with deacons who committed homicide (Jaffé 14005)

\(^8\) He also, in (1171-3), [clericos autem quos] condemned clergy who had been involved in the events leading up to Becket’s murder as guilty not by their actions, but by their counsel. Jaffé 12180, X. 5.12.6
On only one occasion did Alexander address the problem of clerics in warfare directly. In *Quoniam a nobis sollicitudo* (1159-81). He instructed Bishop John of Poitiers, to “diligently warn those clerics who have been appointed to the subdiaconate who presume to cross over to the army,” (*clericos qui in subdiaconatu constitui ad militiam transire presumunt, diligentius moneas*) that they should instead “faithfully and devotedly observe the order that they have accepted”, (*susceptum ordinem fideliter et deuote obseruent*), unless something should occur so that “he cannot legally serve in his order”, (*in ordine illo de iure ministrare non possunt*). The emphasis on the subdiaconate is interesting, suggesting perhaps that Alexander accepted something of Rolandus’ position that the distinction between the subdiaconate and lower ranks was key, but Alexander is frustratingly vague as to what he meant by the ‘something that might occur’ *aliquid emerserit*.

Finally, there is the case of *Latorem presentium Radulfum* (1159-83), which may have come from the *curia* of either Alexander, or Lucius. Holtzmann believed the former, and though not from the hand of the Pope’s himself, it certainly represented his views. Alexander sent back Ranulf absolved from excommunication by papal authority, but commanded the recipients to investigate his claim that in the night he had wounded a cleric who was armed with a bow and arrow, and if the claims were true, to impose a penance as if he had wounded a layman. Though the circumstances were different (no-one had been killed in this case), this letter is reminiscent of Alexander II’s letter to San Vincenzo, in accepting that a cleric when armed had essentially renounced the legal protections of his cloth, but is if anything, more generous.

Clement III, (1187) judged in *Continentia literaum* that the acolyte P, who had taken up arms *ad resistendum praedonibus*, but who had himself killed, neither in person, nor by his counsel, (*neque facto eius neque consilio*) and who had lived praiseworthily in a monastery for eight years could be promoted to the subdiaconate. Clement showed his continuing concern with violence both by deed

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819 Holtzmann, 55 (VIII/32).
820 Holtzmann, 54 VIII/31 .
821 Jaffé 17676.
822 X 5.25.4. This had been erroneously ascribed to Celestine III, W.Holtzmann, ‘La “Collectio Seguntina” et les décrétales de Clément III et de Célestin III’, *Rèvue d’histoire ecclésiastique*, 50 (1955), 400-453.
823 Three of the attackers had been killed, but not by P.
824 X. 5.25.4
and by counsel, and the letter shows that these restrictions were extended to the very bottom of the hierarchy, at least on occasion. Celestine III’s letter of 1191-2, *Cum non ab homine* to Archbishop Erik of Trondheim allowed that laymen who had killed clergy because they were outraged that they could act, *contemptu clericali habitu et ministerio laicali* ought to be given penance more severe than if they had slain laymen but not the automatic excommunication that should befall the killer of a cleric under normal circumstances. In 1193, he wrote *Henricus presbyter lator praesentium* to the Bishop of Krakow concerned a cleric who had, ‘according to the bad custom of the region’ *secum pravam terrae consuetudinem* been involved in judicial duel without committing violence himself, but through a champion. Celestine found Henricus (Ulricus) the priest guilty of homicide, by counsel, a judgement reminiscent both of Gratian’s insistence that clerics could not command blood to be shed in war, and Master Rolandus’ argument that for clerics *sociorum iniuriam armis propulsare non licet*. Both popes show some similarity with the intellectual position of the Council of Lérida in a concern with rehabilitation of clerics forced by external invaders to defend themselves.

The decretals of the period c.1150-1200 potentially have considerable significance for the problem of the militant cleric in this period. The material is not extensive, nor as elaborate as Gratian’s discussion. They do, however, share a common intellectual core with Gratian’s treatment - a continued concern at the *curia* for clergy who had been morally culpable for violence. In the context of Celestine’s, Alexander and Clement’s thought, William of Poitiers’ declaration that Odo of Bayeux “was greatly feared by men at arms, for when need arose he helped in war by his most practical counsels as far as his religion allowed” (*Bellum nampque utilissimo consilio, cum necessitas postularet, iuuabat, quantum potuit religione salute*), would be grounds for condemnation and punishment. The Augustinian concept of homicide by counsel or command was rejuvenated and applied in such a manner that for a clergyman to kill or wound even by proxy was unacceptable. A cleric who had borne arms in combat might no longer be protected by his cloth, while another who had taken up weapons but not actually committed violence, might eventually be


826 Jaffé 17662 X.5.14.2.

827 *Gesta Guillelmi*, 166.
forgiven. This was a problem of moral rather than one of ritual or even of clerical discipline *per se*. This may not have wholly displaced old notions of the polluting effect of contact with weapons or blood, and clergy who had sustained wounds caused a specific problem of competence, but by the end of the twelfth century, Gratian’s insistence that military *command* was a significant problem had apparently been accepted by canonists, giving rise to the first explicit condemnation of military leadership in original legislation. Canon XVIII of the Fourth Lateran Council (1215), explicitly fused the two approaches, reaffirming the ban on clerical blood judgement alongside the act of physically shedding blood even for medical purposes and linked it to command of military forces:

Moreover no cleric may be put in command of mercenaries or crossbowmen or suchlike men of blood; nor may a subdeacon, deacon or priest practise the art of surgery, which involves cauterizing and making incisions; nor may anyone confer a rite of blessing or consecration on a purgation by ordeal of boiling or cold water or of the red-hot iron, saving nevertheless the previously promulgated prohibitions regarding single combats and duels.  

Despite continued differences between authors, as a whole Gratian’s treatment and that of the decretals seem to embody a shift to a legal approach based on the practical application of moral, rather than ritual or even scriptural principles. There remain, however, serious dangers involved in such collation. There was, after all, no definitive decretal collection available in our period. Whatever the common threads in the material, we cannot assume either that these specific *responsa* created a general theoretical consensus on how to approach this issue. In an assessment of the legitimacy of prelates’ behaviour, the issue is not what a collection of canons or decretals that we have compiled might say, but rather, what those collections compiled by contemporaries said, and to what extent those ideas were disseminated beyond the circle of scholars of the learned law. A potential opportunity for further research, therefore, would be a consideration of all the surviving manuscripts of decretal collections from Anglo-Norman and Angevin England. Whilst it has not been

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828...Nullus quoque clericus rottariis aut balistariis aut huiusmodi viris sanguinum praeponatur, nec illam chirurgiae artem subdiaconus, diaconus vel sacerdos exercerant, quae ad ustionem vel incisionem inducit, nec quisquam purgationi aquae ferventis vel frigidae seu ferri candentis ritum cuiuslibet benedictionis aut consecrationis impendat, salvis nihilominus prohibitionibus de monomachiis sive duellis antea promulgatis. Tanner, *Decrees*, 244
possible to survey every manuscript, initial investigation has shown that there was certainly uptake of some of the relevant passages in English collections. *Quoniam a nobis*, for instance, is recorded in *Collectio Cottoniana. De presbytero Campanie* is in at least the *Fontanensis, Royal, Claudiana and Cheltenhamensis* collections.

Duggan observed that despite their unique thoroughness in collecting materials relating to England, it was the scholars at Bologna that showed real zeal in collecting decretals from a geographically diffuse areas and in consequence, there was a far greater uptake in English decretal material on the continent than vice-versa. Nonetheless, English canonists of the late twelfth century must certainly have been aware that the thinkers of Rome and Bologna were more concerned in this period with culpability for violence than with physical arms-bearing by clergy. Nevertheless, the set of *notabilia* on Gratian which is in British Museum MS Royal 11BII alongside *Wigorniensis Altera* and other legal and theological treatises, *Quibus casibus cutiuslibet honoris clericus honore spoiletur, beneficio priuetur et communione suspendatur*, addresses militant clerics on f.95r.:

Having lost grade of their order as defilers of the holy canons, let clerics who have taken up military weapons be consigned to a monastery forever. As c. xxiii. q. viii And there it is “Let anyone of...”

*Quibus casibus*’ naturally that the reader will identify “c. xxiii q. viii” correctly as Causa XXIII Quaestio VIII of that text without further prompting, and that the *Quicumque ex* will help him easily find the relevant passage (the prohibition of the council of Meaux). While this is evidence for interest in England in Gratian’s view on this problem, it hardly reflects the sophistication of his position or the tone of recent decretals.

A deeper connection between English and continental thought can perhaps be found in the decrees of the Council of Westminster (May 1175). Indeed, Duggan has

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830 Ordinis sui gradu amisso tanqua(m) sacrorum canonum (con)tempores clerici qui [arma] militaria su(m)perint i(n) monasterio p(er)petuo tradant(ur). vt. c. xxiii q. viii Et ici. q(uod). Quicumq(ue) ex
shown that the drafter of the canons was Master Gerard Pucelle, a learned scholar of both Roman and Canon Law, who had taught at both Paris and Cologne before his appointment to Richard of Canterbury’s household in 1174 and that while Gratian was the main source for its authorities, Alexander II’s recent decretals to England were cited in cc. 1, 2, 12, and 13. 831 Nine of the first ten canons are concerned with restricting excessively secular behaviour by clerics. Gratian was a major source for the decrees. Canon III, *Hiis qui in sacris ordinibus constituti sunt judicium sanguinis...* 832 condemns clerical participation in blood judgement, and forbids clerics to exercise the office of sheriff for that reason. It can therefore be thought of as a forerunner of Canon XII of Lateran III. The text is primarily of interest here because possession of a territorial secular office like sheriff implied the potential a military role (Part 2, Chapter 5). Canon VI, *cum ecclesia dei...* 833 forbade secular causes to be tried in churchyards, Canon X, however, is a reiteration of the prohibition from the council of Meaux. 834 To find the Meaux prohibition in both *Quibus Casibus* and the Canons of 1175 perhaps suggests that Gratian’s text was far more influential on this matter among English canonists than the flood of “New Law”, though it should be recalled this canon may have also influenced Aelfric and the council of 1070. Perhaps that provision had a particular tenacity in England. What is clear, however, is that whilst the council’s emphasis on the standards of clerical behaviour fitted neatly with the terms of the Meaux prohibition, this extended to a concern that clergy should avoid moral culpability for violence that was characteristic of the continental thought of the mid and tale twelfth-century. However closely Westminster fits into contemporary intellectual trends, we should also note that yet again an English church council dealt with the problem of clerical participation in warfare shortly after some high-profile clerical involvement in the war against the Young King.

The continued theme that canonical thought in England was reactive to specific instances is highlighted by the *Quaestiones Londoniensis*. There has been a

833 Ibid, 253.
834 Gervase, 254; Howden, *Gesta*, I, 87; *Chronica*, II, 75.
good deal of work on the Quaestiones, (which includes a Quaestio regarding the imprisonment of Philip of Beauvais)\textsuperscript{835} identifying the Oxford masters whose work they represent, and a there has been both an edition and a useful, detailed commentary on both.\textsuperscript{836} The second Quaestio addresses the arrest of Bishop Philip of Beauvais, and asks whether his appeal to the Pope was justifiable. It first lays out the events leading up to the bishop’s capture (including his own involvement in Richard’s imprisonment), very much as they are recorded in the narrative sources. The argument that an appeal could be justified has seven components:

(1) That war is not an evil in itself\textsuperscript{837}
(2) That force may be legitimately repulsed by force\textsuperscript{838}
(3) That the bishop fought to defend his patria and the goods of his church\textsuperscript{839}
(4) That the bishop was required by the terms of the Third Lateran Council to oppose Brabancons\textsuperscript{840}
(5) That the bishop had two roles, and that he fought, not as a bishop, but as a count and a knight (without ever renouncing his status) and that his temporal possessions were bound to temporal service.
(6) That the Pope had known that bishops were engaged in this activity.\textsuperscript{841}
(7) That a bishop cannot ever be enslaved (i.e. made a prisoner of war), and that a bishop is even more precious to his church than its goods.\textsuperscript{842}

The argument against the appeal had four components:

(1) That as a Crusader, Richard’s lands were themselves under the protection of Rome, and that, having been attacked Richard had the “right of recovery”.\textsuperscript{843}
(2) That as the bishop is bound by the injunction to “turn the other cheek”, he ought not to defend himself even when attacked. As Philip had participated in homicide, he ought to be deposed.\textsuperscript{844}

\textsuperscript{835} This is discussed here, rather than in Chapter 3 (where the Lionheart’s treatment of Philip is explored) because it is a theoretical academic text, composed c.1200.
\textsuperscript{837} Iste episcopus militauit et milicia in se mala non est... (449)
\textsuperscript{838} vi vim repellere. Note that this is among the quaestio’s references to Roman Law (vi vim repellere licet), 449. The same phrase was used in Philip of Beauvais’s supposed letter quoted by Howden, Chronicle, IV, 22, and in the reply, “non vim, sicut allegas, sed virtutem vi repellere volens”, Chronica, IV, 23.
\textsuperscript{839} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{840} Item precipiuntur episcopi insurgere <in> brebanciones, vt in concilio lateranensi, Sicut <ait> Beatus leo...
\textsuperscript{841} Item summus pontifex scit ita episcopos in exercitu armari.
\textsuperscript{842} 450.
\textsuperscript{843} Ibid.
(3) That in taking up arms, the bishop had laid aside his clerical status, and so as a lay functionary captured by a layman, the pope neither could nor should restore him to office.

(4) Having broken the law, the bishop may not then use the law to redress his wrongs.

Brundage’ summary is extremely useful, for the text itself is crowded with highly compressed references to various authorities, making its arguments very difficult to follow. It does, however, neglect the argument relating to Lateran III (c. 27) and the Brabancons. This is significant, for it shows that Lateran III were being used at the turn of the century to make arguments in support of some clerical participation in warfare. Furthermore, it should be noted that though Causa 23 is the most commonly used source both cases make citations not just from Gratian, but also from the Digest and Code. The Quaestio is therefore dependent on Roman, as well as canon, law sources, with the Decretum used, just as the compiler of Quibus Casibus and the delegates to Westminster in 1175 used it; as a bank of texts not an authority in itself. The argument that a bishop ought to avoid any participation in violence is only one of the four components of the case against him and the fact that he had borne arms himself was still deemed significant. Furthermore, the precise details of the Quaestio are perhaps not as interesting as the fact that it could be posed at all. Even at the dawn of the thirteenth century, the Bishop of Beauvais’ behaviour was seen as ambiguous enough to be a worthy subject for disputation. He could be defended or attacked with detailed reference to the learned law and the concerns of the Ius novum had not entirely carried the field.

844 Item degradari debet quia eius auxilio homicidia erant perpetrata vel saltem causa ipsius, 450
845 445-7
Chapter 2: Narrative Responses

This chapter will consider narrative depictions of clerics in military roles, firstly by establishing the range of approaches taken by authors as a group, secondly by considering the use of these strategies by individuals. Depictions of militant clergy can, in almost all cases, be divided into seven categories of narrative approach. There are some cases where two, or even several strategies are expressed in the same passage, but the same seven elements can almost always be found.

1) Incorporation

By incorporation, we simply mean the reuse by an author of text taken from an earlier work by another. This represents the most common, and least useful appearance of militant clergy in narrative, particularly in mid and late-twelfth century narratives, which often absorbed earlier work verbatim, or with only minor alterations. Take, for instance, the depiction of Bishop Ealhstan’s involvement in the conquest of Kent in 823. The earliest incarnation of this description is in the A version of the Chronicle. Translated almost word-for-word into Latin, the same passage appears in John of Worcester’s Chronicle, the E version of the Chronicle, and Henry of Huntingdon’s Historia Anglorum. Roger of Howden, who was heavily dependent on Huntingdon for his early material, recycled it yet again in his Chronicle. We should not, however, assume that because an author was dependent on a predecessor for information that he necessarily absorbed his source’s opinions of that information. Robert of Torigni, for instance, was often dependent on Henry of Huntingdon, but while Huntingdon regarded Henry of Blois with extreme disapproval, especially his involvement in secular affairs, Robert’s summary of the bishop’s life makes no mention of his important secular role, emphasising instead his generosity to the poor and his enrichment of his see, even though he had earlier noted his role in the

846 ASC, 60.
848 ASC, 61.
849 Huntingdon, 262.
850 Howden, Chronica, I, 28-9.
851 Huntingdon, 608-610.
Dissemination and even repetition of a text tells us more about the transmission of its factual content than about the subjective judgements attached to it. It is for this reason that “incorporation”, though common, is treated only in outline here. Instead, the focus will be on the narrative strategies which are more informative regarding authorial intent.

2) Redaction and Reconstruction

By this we mean the incorporation of material from an earlier work while omitting important information, or recasting the event to significantly alter its meaning. There are three particularly striking instances of this, all regarding the behaviour of Anglo-Saxon clergy reinterpreted by Anglo-Norman writers: Bishop Leofgar’s invasion of Wales in 1056, the Battle of Ashingdon in 1016, and Hereward the Wake’s insurgency in 1070. These passages were selected for discussion largely because the working of the adaptive process seemed quite clear. There are many other occasions where chroniclers have omitted incidents from their source material, but the intention is unclear. For instance, in “G”’s continuation of John of Worcester’s Chronicle, Henry of Blois’ anger is an important element of the battle against Matilda for control of Winchester in 1141 and led to the firing of the city. It is difficult to know whether this represents a deliberate attempt to obscure Henry’s misbehaviour, or simply a loss of detail considered unimportant as Gervase condensed his material. Instead, this discussion will focus on those cases where the editorial process and objectives seem clearer.

The earliest description of Leofgar of Hereford’s campaign of 1056 is explicit. We are told that Harold’s moustachioed mass-priest “abandoned his chrism and his cross, his spiritual weapons, after his ordination as bishop, and took up his spear and his sword, and went thus to the campaign against Gruffydd”, and are given a dolorous picture of the suffering and destruction of his army, including Leofgar’s death, and that of many of his priests and Sheriff Aelfnoth.

853 *JWC*, III, 298.
854 Gervase, 120.
855 *ASC*, C, 186. The *D* version (187) is identical in the early part, but omits the description of the suffering of English forces and condenses the epilogue about Bishop Aldred.
For both C and D versions of the *Chronicle*, the description of this affair constitutes the whole entry for 1056, but in no twelfth-century source does it appear in anything like its original form. Mostly, this is by omission. Henry of Huntingdon, for instance, though having access to a version of the *Chronicle* based on MS C, and while recording the destruction of the church of Hereford in 1055, did not record Leofgar’s campaign of reprisal. The compiler of E omitted an entry for 1056 entirely. Other authors, however, significantly reworked the passage. In John of Worcester’s version, Leofgar “was killed... on 16 June by the Welsh in a place called Glasbury, with his clerks and Aelfnoth the Sheriff and many others” (*Kalend. Iul. A Griffino Walanorum rege in loco qui Clasbyrig uocatur, cum clericis suis et vicecomite Agelnotho et multus aliis, occisus est*). John must have had access to sources of information now lost, for he supplied the name of the place where Leofgar actually died, but equally, the textual similarities mean that there can be little doubt that he was working from an C or D *Chronicle* prototype. While the deaths of the priests and Aelfgar are retained, however, Leofgar’s campaign is omitted, as is the passage on the destruction of the English army. Malmesbury went even further, folding his death into the sack of the city and the death of the previous bishop, Aethelstan, making Leofgar a victim of unexplained aggression, “This last [Leofgar], in the time of King Edward, Gruffydd king of the Welsh robbed of his see and his life, after burning the city”. (*Hunc tempore regis Eduardi Griffin rex Walensium, urbe cremata, expulit sede et uita*).

Similar approaches were taken to the Battle of Ashingdon. Again, the *Chronicle* is straightforward. Bishop Eadnoth of Dorchester and Abbot Wulfsige of Ramsey appear at the top of a list of “the chief men of the English race” killed in the battle. There is no implication that the prelates died any differently to their secular comrades. Malmesbury refers vaguely to *abbates et episcopi*. Henry of Huntingdon pursued a different course, omitting Wulfsige entirely, and transforming Eadnoth into an Ealdorman. As a result, no reference to clerical

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856 Huntingdon, xciii.
857 ASC, 381.
858 JWC, 580-581.
859 GP, 456-7.
860 ASC, D, 152. E and F omit Eadnoth’s title, but no version omits that of Wulfsige.
861 GR, 316.
862 Huntingdon, 358-360.
participation remains in his account. John of Worcester’s alterations were more sophisticated, “Also Eadnoth, bishop of Lincoln, formerly prior of Ramsey, and Abbot Wulfsige, who had come to pray to God for the soldiers fighting the battle were killed” (Eadnothus quoque Lincolniensis episcopus Romesigenis quondam prepositus et Wulsius abbás, qui ad exorandum Deum pro milite bellum agente conuenerant, interfeci sunt). John has reached back to Bede’s description of the massacre of the British priests in 605 to lift the phrase qui ad exorandum Deum pro milite bellum agente conuenerant. In doing so, he confined the clerics to spiritual warfare. The Liber Eliensis’ (which used John’s chronicle) tells that brothers of the monastery were killed, and relics which they had carried to the battle were lost. It goes further, however, elaborating on John of Worcester’s approach:

In the end, indeed, Eadnoth became worthy of being adorned with the glory of martyrdom for his glorious conduct: he was killed, with Abbot Wulfsige, by Danish comrades of Cnut, in the battle between Edmund and Cnut at Ashingdon, while he was chanting mass. First Eadnoth’s right hand was cut off for the sake of a ring, then his whole body was cut to pieces. According to the chronicle, Bishop Eadnoth and Abbot Wulfsige had come together to pray to God on behalf of the army waging war.

In passing through the hands of two redactors, the Chronicle account has been transformed. Far from including the deaths among those of secular leaders, in a secular battle narrative, the text has arrived at the point where those deaths have become themselves a religious event.

863 It should be noted that Aelfric had characterised St Eustace as an “Ealdorman.” MacGregor, ‘Ministry of Gerold d’Avranches’, 230. There seems, however to have been no attempt to make Eadnoth a military saint in the same vein.
864 JWC, 492.
866 Liber Eliensis, 148.
867 Tandem vero martirii gloria pro gloriosa conversatione decorandus in bello, quod fuit inter Aedmundum regem et Canutem apud Assandun, dum missam cantaret, a Danis Canuti sociis, prius dextera propter anulum amputata, deinde toto corpore scisso interfectus est cum abbatte Wlrio qui, secundum chronicam, ad orandum Deum pro milite bellum agente conuenerant; Liber Eliensis, 141. For the concept of clergy slain while praying for victory as martyrs, Cowdrey, ‘Martyrdom and the First Crusade’, 52.
Similar approaches were taken by the Ely Chronicler, in his depictions of Hereward’s insurgency. It is well known that the chronicler used a version of the *Gesta Herewardi* to compile his text. While the *Gesta* places considerable emphasis on the involvement of the monks, however, all suggestion of direct participation is removed from the *Liber Eliensis* version. For instance, in the *Gesta Herewardi*, the village of Burwell is destroyed by “several men coming out of the Isle – not many, only seven, but dressed for battle and girt with proper war equipment – all but two of whom were manifestly monks, and like the others well-versed in warfare”, *(ex insula egressos vidi, et tamen non multos, nisi septem militari habitu et procinctu belli insigne armati, quos omnes monachos esse praeter duos, qui emilitiam sibi sicut ceteri milites eos bene noverant).* In the *Liber Eliensis*, this is changed to “I saw some men who had come out of the Isle in military garb, just seven of them, tall in stature, unrivalled in courage”, *(aliquos de insula egressos septem tantum vidi in militari habitu, corpore sullimes, animo incomparabile).* The presence of five well-armed, militarily skilled monks on the raiding party in the *Gesta* has been expunged. More extensive are the revisions to the *Gesta’s* depiction of Ely’s refectory. Both accounts portray the warriors and monks living and dining amply together, and both describe how weapons and armour were stored in the hall to be used at a moment’s notice. Again there are such strong linguistic similarities that it is clear the Ely Chronicler was working from the *Gesta Herewardi*. While in the *Gesta*, however, the Norman knight Deda again emphasises how the Ely monks take part in military patrols, and expresses astonishment at their prowess, the *Liber Eliensis* omits this, adding instead the comment that “the choir of monks there, living in accordance with their rule under the discipline of St Benedict, nearly all the time sing praises together so sweetly that you would think the songs were resonating to the Lord in vocal sounds of every variety,” *(Chorum autem monachorum illic, sub beati Benedicti magisterio regulariter degens, ferme omni tempore tam dulciter laudes concinit ut omnigenis vocibus odas Domino reboare putares).* The strategy of redaction and reconstruction, as applied to the incidents discussed here served to eliminate particular

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868 There has been some doubt as to whether the Ely chronicler had *Gesta Herewardi* itself, or a very similar text (perhaps an earlier redaction) by the same author, Thomas, *‘Gesta Herewardi’*, 215, though the linguistic similarities between the *Gesta* and *Liber* are clear.

869 *De Gestis Herewardi*, 49-50.

870 *Liber Eliensis*, 182.

871 *De Gestis Herewardi*, 49.

872 *Liber Eliensis*, 181.
cases of clerics’ physical involvement in warfare from the historical record, through loss of significant details, by converting the ecclesiastical into a secular title on one occasion, or by recasting examples of clerical behaviours from physically militant to sacred forms.

3) The Pastoral Role

By this, we mean the casting of an incident of a cleric’s military activity as an expression or extension of their sacred functions, just as in some instances of the Redaction and Reconstruction strategy. These depictions are not common, but are significant nonetheless.\(^\text{873}\) As discussed above (Part 2, Chapter 4), accounts of Archbishop Thurstan organising resistance to the Scottish invasion of 1138 stress that this involved the mobilisation of the archdiocese’s clergy. John of Hexham, however, went further, declaring that by the “watchfulness of his pastoral care, he stirred them up to a steady resistance” (\textit{ad instantiam resistendi pastoralis prudentiae providentia animavit}).\(^\text{874}\) Richard’s depiction is even more elaborate:

For, being the shepherd of their souls, he would not, like a hireling on the approach of the wolf, seek safety in flight but rather, pierced with the deepest emotions of pity at the dispersion and ruin of his flock, he applied all his energy and labours to counteract these great evils. Wherefore, by the authority of his divine commission, and the royal warrant with which on that occasion he was provided, he boldly urged them, by their loyalty and honour, not to allow themselves to be prostrated at one blow by utter savages; but that rather they all, with their dependents, should seek God’s favour by true repentance, and turning with all their heart to Him whose wrath these many and heavy evils proved that they deserved, they should then act with the confidence and courage demanded in so pressing an emergency. If they acted thus devotedly, trusting in God’s mercy, he assured them of victory.\(^\text{875}\)

\(^{873}\) For a bishop’s own interpretation of this, Ramseyer, ‘Pastoral Care’, esp. 206.
\(^{874}\) \textit{JH}, 292.
\(^{875}\) Quippe cum esset pastor animarum illorum non more mercennarii infestante lupon de fuga sibi praeedium sperabat, sed potius super gregis sui dispersione ac pernicie, atque patriae sue destructione, gravissimo compassionis dolore saucitius, omni studio et conatu tantis malis remedium quaerabat. Unde et rex divina auctoritate, quae ei commissa fuerat, et ex regia potestate, quae illi tunc in hoc negotio tradita erat, et de illorum fidelitate ac probitate eos fideliter admonuit, ne a pessima barbarie per ignaviam se omnes una die prosterni sinerent; sed cuncti pariter cum suis per veram poenitentiam Deo reconciliati, et ad eum toto corde conversi, cujus iram se promeruisse tot ac tanta necessitate agerent. Quod si devote fecerent, de misericordia Dei praesumens, eos victores fore praenunciabat. \textit{RH}, 160.
In addition, Richard asserted that Thurstan had also the delegated authority of the secular arm (though it is unclear what exactly was meant by “the royal warrant with which on that occasion he was provided”), and he depicted an attempt negotiate a settlement with King David before battle was joined, but John and Richard did something substantively new for English writers here. This is not merely the depiction of ecclesiastical authority mobilised for military ends but an explicit conceptualisation of Thurstan’s behaviour as military organiser and spiritual warrior being derived from his pastoral functions. It is a major step over the line drawn by the canons of Toledo, extending his responsibility to care for his flock into the military sphere. Serving under his direction becomes a form of devotion. It should be noted that this process is made easier by casting the Scots as a barbarian “other” and enemy of the church.

This treatment of Thurstan is comparable to Gerald of Wales’ depiction of bishop-elect Geoffrey Plantagenet in one incident in his *Vita Galfridi*. Responding to Glanville’s request for urgent help against the Scottish invasion of 1174, Geoffrey hurriedly assembled a large force of knights and marched to York, where he was met by the archbishop, and made a flamboyant entry into the city. Gerald depicted his heroic Geoffrey greeted as both liberator and conqueror, and astonishingly, some people even kissed the bishop’s shield (clipeum), a subversion of the usual greeting afforded a bishop. The religious pageantry of the event is emphasised by the supposed cries of the people, “Blessed are the feet bearing peace” (Beati pedes pacem portantes) and “Blessed is he who comes in the name of the Lord” (Benedictus qui venit in nomine Dei). The first abbreviates Isaiah 52, 7, and is therefore a carefully chosen epithet for the pious, or even the priest. The second part of the acclamation appears several times in Scripture, and is used in the mass itself. Most importantly, however, it is the cry with which the population greeted Christ’s triumphal entry into Jerusalem. His greeting by the crowd, therefore, elides his role as a conqueror into his sacerdotal status, evoking Christ himself. Geoffrey’s campaign is portrayed as in

RH, 162.


*RH* 366

quam pulchri super montes pedes adnuntiantis et praedicantis pacem adnuntiantis bonum praedicantis salutem dicentis Sion regnavit Deus tuus

Psalms 117, 26; Matthew 23, 29; Mark 11, 9; Luke 19, 38.

Matthew 21, 9; John, 12, 13.
some sense a religious event, in which the protagonist’s priestly identity is highlighted.

4) Identity Crisis

This is the most common technique employed to cast opprobrium on the military activities of a cleric. It may be seen as an inversion of “Pastoral Role” depictions, for it was used to delegitimize clergy by asserting that sacral status was lost or compromised when the cleric undertook militant behaviour. The only occasion on which the Chronicle appears to take a dim view of the militant cleric is in the case of Bishop Leofgar:

... Leofgar, who was Earl Harold’s mass-priest, was set as bishop; [of Hereford] he wore his moustaches during his priesthood until he was a bishop. He abandoned his chrism and his cross, his spiritual weapons, after his ordination as bishop, and took up his spear and his sword...  

This depiction, which, as we have seen, apparently offended the sensibilities of twelfth century chroniclers, rejected Leofgar’s spiritual credentials. Leofgar’s abandonment of spiritual for material weapons stands for rejection of his identity as cleric. The emphasis on his moustache (a symbol of the secular warrior nobility) is used to suggest that even before his episcopate, his clerical status was compromised.

The vividness of transformation as a rhetorical device suggesting “monstrosity” (in the literary sense) makes these depictions both powerful and memorable. The Gesta Stephani’s short sketch of Bishop Nigel of Ely in 1140 is very reminiscent of Bishop Leofgar almost a hundred years previously:

So, entirely abandoning the weapons of the Gospel and the mode of warfare proper to a churchman, he [The bishop of Ely] put on the man of blood, and after hiring in Ely, at his own expense, knights who were prepared for any crime, ready in hand and mind, he molested all

882 For a continental parallel see Flodard’s description of Archbishop Bruno as ex praesule ducem, Mayr-Harting, Church and Cosmos, 25.  
883 ASC, C, 186. D (187) omits “after his ordination as bishop”.
his neighbours, and especially those who supported the king.\textsuperscript{884}

With the Leofgar incident, this passage shares the exchange of spiritual for temporal weapons. It contrasts with Gerald’s description of Geoffrey Plantagenet, using scriptural allusion not to buttress, but to subvert sacred status. “Man of blood”, (\textit{vir sanguinum, homo sanguinis}) is an image that appears twice in Scripture. It is used to condemn David’s rebellion against Saul, condemn impiety, particularly in one who observes the outward forms of divine obedience, without showing charity.\textsuperscript{885} The image is therefore loaded with senses of religious hypocrisy and usurpation.

Similarly, the \textit{Gesta Stephani}’s description of the bishops’ “pursuits so irreligious” (\textit{tantae irreligionis studiis}),\textsuperscript{886} is closely tied up with both the abandonment of the weapons of spiritual warfare and the adoption of armour and large, unruly retinues. More gently implying the compromising rather than outright loss of sacral status, but for similar reasons, is Orderic Vitalis’ famous assessment of Geoffrey of Coutances that he was “devoted more to knightly than to clerical activities, and so better able to instruct knights in hauberks to fight than clerks in vestments to sing psalms.”\textsuperscript{887} The motif of a loss of clerical identity is linked in several places not to the actual prosecution of war, but to the assumption by clerics of military symbols or offices with military responsibility. In Part 2, Chapter 5, we discussed Bishop Walcher of Durham’s brief tenure of the earldom of Northumbria, and William of Malmesbury’s explicit comment that the bishop would “rein in the revolts of the people with his sword and shape its morals by his eloquence”, \textit{frenaretque rebellionem gentis gladio et formaret mores eloquio}.\textsuperscript{888} It is therefore striking how Hugh du Puiset was not accorded the same respect by chroniclers. In fact, some depictions of his assumption of the same title were

\textsuperscript{884} Armis igitur euangelicis militiisque ecclesiasticae disciplinae prorsus derelicta, uirum sanguinum induit, miliibusque ad quodlibet facinus promptis, operre et animo expeditis, in Eli sua pecunia conductis, confines omnes, et eos maxime qui regi consentiebantur, turbabat. \textit{GS}, 98.
\textsuperscript{885} 2 Samuel, 7-8 Ecclesiasticus 34, 25.
\textsuperscript{886} \textit{GS}, 156.
\textsuperscript{887} ... magisque peritia militari quam clericali uigebat, ideoque loricatos milites ad bellandum quam reuestitos clericos ad psallendum magis erudire nouerat. \textit{OV}, IV, 278-9. While this criticism is very moderate, Chibnall’s argument that it was not intended critically, but as a mere statement of fact seems a little extreme, Chibnall, ‘Geoffroi de Montbray’, 292.
\textsuperscript{888} \textit{GP}, I, 412.
treated as representing a crisis or even a complete transformation of the bishop’s identity. In Wendover’s version, this construction is relatively simple:

He [Hugh] who was girded with a sword by the king, usurped to himself the name of Count; when the king had girded him with the sword he said with a chuckle to those present, “I have made a young earl from an old bishop”. 889

This passage is almost the mirror image of Gilbert Foliot’s supposed objections to Becket’s elevation to the archiepiscopate. While several Lives note that Foliot opposed the promotion, William Fitz Stephen is the only one to have Gilbert declare, that “the king had performed a miracle, for he had made an archbishop out of a knight and a layman” [dixit] mirum fecisse regem, qui de homine seculari et de milite quodam fecerat archiepiscopum. 890 Newburgh’s account of Hugh’s acquisition of the earldom is more complex. He began with an assertion reminiscent of Malmesbury’s depiction of Walcher, that Hugh, intended “that he might become at once a bishop and the earl of that province, by annexing the earldom to the bishopric” essetque ejusdem provinciae episcopus simul et comes, annexo episcopatui comitatu. 891 He at once, however, began to evade this by casting Richard I not just as the primary agent of transformation (the King’s joke is included in his text too892), but as a cynical tempter and an exploiter of the bishop’s wealth and acquisitiveness. Newburgh introduced a sense of tension by insisting that Hugh could not maintain his two roles adequately, quoting Isaiah 5, 8, “Woe unto them that join house to house and field to field” and stating that “he joined the earldom to the bishopric without caring which was the greater”, ... ut comitatum ad episcopatum conjungere, quod utique majus est non curaret, 893 and while Wendover 894 gave the bishop a vision of a wrathful St Godric, and noted that Hugh abandoned his crusading vow at the same time as he assumed the earldom, Newburgh developed the latter into a major theme, alleging that the treasure he had set aside to pay for his participation in the Crusade was

890 FitzStephen, 36; Barlow, Thomas Becket, 88.
891 Howlett (ed), I, 304.
892 Ibid, 305.
893 Ibid.
894 Wendover, 168.
instead spent on the earldom, necessitating a mendacious letter of excuse to the Pope. The climax of the passage is reached when Hugh “weakly and irreverently cast away the sacred emblem of devotion [his crusader cross], and rested in the possession of that precious pearl which he had found in the king [the earldom], and for which he had given so much”, illico signum sacrum sollemni devotione susceper t et infrunite abjecit, et inventae apud regem pretiosae margarite, pro qua tanta dederat, possidendae incubuit. Howden’s approach to the knighting and bestowal of a county on bishop-elect Peter of Flanders in 1173 bears marked similarities to Newburgh’s treatment of Hugh du Puiset’s earldom, a sense that the assumption of military symbols and office, necessarily meant abandonment of heavenly for earthly warfare. Torigni was particularly harsh, attributing Peter’s early death to this decision:

Peter, brother of Count Philip of Flanders, having taken the Countess of Nivers, she who had been wife of the lord of the castle of Issoldune, died, and perhaps this is why; for he had abandoned spiritual warfare (namely his cloth), inasmuch as he was elected to the see of Cambrai, but having left spiritual warfare behind, he was made a secular knight.

The image of lost clerical identity reached the fullest possible stage of its development in depictions of Bishop William of Ely and Bishop Philip of Beauvais. Howden, Gervase and Newburgh were united in their distaste of Philip’s activities, particularly his wearing of armour, and used this to construct a depiction of compromised or lost clerical identity. Gervase was perhaps the mildest proponent of this technique, alleging that, “the bishop of Beauvais... on behalf of the king of France, and among the knights and arms-bearers, himself rushed about, I think, forgetful of his reverence and dignity, in arms... and was captured’’, (Episcopus Belvacensis, cum pro rege Franciae inter milites et armigers, episcopalem, ut reor, oblitus reverentiam et gravitatem, et ipse discurreret armatus... captus est).

895 Howlett (ed), I, 305.
896 Gesta, I, 49. The considerably condensed version of the same passage in the Chronica (II, 49) is less clear.
897 Petrus, frater Philippi comitis Flandrensiurn, accepta comitissa Nivernensi, quae fuerat uxor domini Issoldunensis castri, mortuus est, et ideo forsitan, quia militia[m spiritualem, id est clericatum, dimiserat, utpote qui fuerat electus ad episcopatum Cameracensem, relicta spirituali militia, miles seculi factus fuerat. Torigni, 272.
898 Gervase, 544.
Newburgh and Howden also depicted the bishop divesting himself of the paraphernalia of episcopacy for a new, secular identity, but both attributed the construct to Pope Celestine III. Newburgh did this in summary,899 Howden by incorporating the whole text. The Pope’s letter is blasting:

He deserves the hatred of all men who shows himself to be the common enemy of all.’ For, throwing aside the peaceful bishop, you have assumed the warlike knight, - in your rashness perverting the order and course of things, you have borne the shield in place of the chasuble, the sword in place of the stole, the hauberk for the alb, the helmet for the mitre, and the banner for the pastoral staff; not wishing as you allege, to repel violence by violence but valour by violence; not fighting for your country but against your country.”900

The authenticity of the letter has recently been accepted by Bradbury,901 but the aggressively partisan tone of the Pope’s supposed letter to Philip suggest strongly that it was a fabrication902 and Gillingham has seen it as part of the black propaganda of the English court.903 While Newburgh, who was dependent on Howden, gave only a summary of the letter, it includes these images of lost identity, and unlike Howden, he added his own short comments on the bishop’s military adventures. For Newburgh, the bishop, whom he had earlier called “pseudo-bishop”904 was being judged by God for his role in the King of France’s illegitimate divorce, “a man of fierce disposition” homo ferocis animi905 (apparently a borrowing from Bede906), he was “like a leader of war rather than religion” (bellicosus magis pontifex quam religiosus apparuit,)907 who “hastily took up arms – not those, indeed of his own calling, but belonging to a

900 Cunctorum enim meretur odium, qui omnium se in commune approbat inimicum. Praesulem namque pacificum exuens, militem bellicosum induisti: clypeum pro infula, gladium pro stola, loricam pro alba, galeam pro mitra, lanceam pro baculo pastorali, ordinem rerum et seriem pervertens temerarius bajulasti; non vim, sicut allegas, sed virtutem vi repellere volens, non pro patria, sed contra patriam pugnans. Howden, Chronica, IV, 23; Jaffé 17601.
901 Philip Augustus, 122-3.
904 Howlett (ed), I, 370.
905 Howlett (ed), II, 493.
906 Bede, 296.
907 Howlett (ed), II, 493.
secular, and not a spiritual warfare”, *(sumptis propere armis non suis, id est, militiae secularis non spiritualis).*

William de Longchamp, bishop of Ely was the subject of an elaborate use of the identity crisis construct by another bishop (Hugh de Nonant of Coventry), in a letter which will be discussed here because of its inclusion in Howden’s *Gesta* and *Chronica*, and its influence on Gerald of Wales. Nonant’s letter (which was condemned by Peter of Blois), describes William’s fall by stripping him in stages of the components of his textual identity. Hugh began by establishing a depiction of mixed identities, emphasising the power and overlapping functions afforded William by his status as Bishop, Chancellor and Legate. His condemnation takes William’s enormous and expensive household and subverts this symbol of aristocratic power by emphasising that his violent, boorish management of that household was a product of his peasant origins. Having attacked his nobility, Hugh attacked his cloth directly, opposing archbishop Geoffrey’s arrival “with his pastoral staff and mitre and ring, and superhumeral, which in later times has been styled the pall,” *cum baculo pastorali, cum mitra et annulo, et superhumerali, quod novis temporibus pallium nunupatur* against William’s flight to London in armour (*loricatus*).

Nonant then attacks the legateship, informing his readers that William had used it against the church, but also that pope Clement had been dead for a year and a half. Hugh then undermined his chancellorship, alleging that William’s retinue had bankrupted the country; his loyalty to his family, by claiming that he had forgotten his brothers (who were hostages for his good conduct); his masculinity, by depicting him disguising himself in a woman’s dress; even his fashion sense (it was an ugly dress). Hugh further humiliated William with a scene in which he was accosted by a lusty fisherman, and a woman wishing to buy cloth from him, a situation he finds himself unable to deal with because of his inability to speak English, before being imprisoned by the local mob for his transvestism. Parts of this story found their way into other chroniclers’ accounts. Gerald of Wales’ *Vita Galfridi* uses much of the

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908 Ibid.
909 Howden, *Chronica*, III, 142.
911 *Chronica*, III, 144.
912 Ibid.
913 Ibid, 145. Stubbs pointed out that this was a serious exaggeration. The pontiff had been dead only a few months (fn. 4).
914 *Chronica*, III, 145.
content, and on occasion, exact phrases from Hugh’s text. Franklin has called the letter “a masterpiece of sheer spite”. Even as a propaganda piece and unreliable in its details, the narrative technique is interesting. For behaviour as egregious as William’s, even asserting that the bishop had abandoned one role for another would not do. Instead, William’s various attributes are explicitly stripped from him one by one.

5) Duty, Necessity and Failure

There are several incidents in which the roles of clergy are expressed using the language of duty or necessity. There are a few cases where authors praised clergy for their military role, and there are others where failure to take appropriate or decisive military action is criticised as dereliction of duty. Wace, for instance, could emphasise Odo of Bayeux’s personal intervention when his brother faltered in battle without compromising his religious identity, and could write of how keen the bishop of Le Mans was to send ships in the Conqueror’s service. Gerald of Wales, however, struggled to deal with Remigius of Fécamp’s involvement in the invasion of England in the Vita Sancti Remigii. He could hardly praise him too fulsomely for leading Fécamp’s knights, considering his suspension for simony. Nonetheless, Gerald tried to give his Remigius the lustre of close association with the Conqueror. His rhetoric twists uncomfortably under the strain:

He was, of course, a man both careful, and cautious, and highly educated, brought up in Normandy, and professed a monk at Fécamp, and although “to have pleased a prince is not the highest praise”, he was well known to the king, having as much familiarity with him as favour, for instance, when he came with him into the kingdom, and ten knights, whom his abbot had sent in aid and indulgence, as if appointed a noble Decurion in this necessary service.

\[916\] Vita Galfridi, 410-411, 418, 429
\[918\] Compare Otto I’s supposed view of warrior-bishops, Mayr-Harting, Church and Cosmos, 29.
\[919\] Roman de Rou, 232.
Several passages relating to the Civil War of 1135-54 describe clerical military failure in a context which emphasises the author’s expectations of clerical service. As we have already seen, unlike the Gesta Stephani, John of Worcester had little patience for Bishop Robert of Bath’s lack of martial virtue. Richard of Hexham was equally unimpressed with the failure of both Bishop Geoffrey of Durham’s knights to defend Norham in 1138, and their master’s failure either to sufficiently secure the site, or to relieve them. For the author of the Gesta Stephani, meanwhile, Henry of Blois’ clerical status was no justification for neglecting his duty to his brother’s cause by, when in a strong position, to “greet the invader of his brother’s kingdom with a kiss and let him go uninjured from his sight to rouse the kingdom to more violent rebellion against his brother” ut frater regni fraterni inuasorem cum osculo susciperet, eumque a suo prospectu ad regnum in fratrem grauius permouendum illæsum dimitteret.

The same assumption that a bishop of the royal family should be a dependable military ally is found in sources relating to Geoffrey Plantagenet. Fantosme described a scene in 1175, in which Henry II is told that only ten of his magnates remain loyal, but that Geoffrey “was showing himself to be in very truth your friend and kinsman, he has many knights and stout Borderer soldiers”, vostre charneus amis, Asez ad chevaliers e bons serjanz marchis. In Gerald’s Vita, this is much more elaborate. The prologue begins the process of casting Geoffrey as an essential military ally of Henry, both at home and abroad.

Concerning, a certain man of our times, namely Geoffrey archbishop of York, the present tract will show therefore, how honour did not respond justly to his merits: how when he was still bishop elect of Lincoln, he delivered the northern bounds of the kingdom from a barbaric attack of the Scots by his courage; how he served against the French and against [his] brothers, for his father, surrounded by terrible difficulties which loomed over him; how when he was chancellor he fought with distinction; when his

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921 JWC, III, 248. See Part 2, Chapter 3.
924 Fantosme, 116-117.
father had died he faced great and undeserved difficulty in his election.\textsuperscript{925}

Gerald soon picked this thread up again, and began developing the idea of Geoffrey as a loyal military servant, not just of the king, but of the kingdom and population:

But because it was easier to squeeze burning ashes out of gold than to hide the boldness of natural courage at a moment of imminent necessity; when almost everyone had wavered and either secretly or publicly renounced their fidelity, against the warnings of all his men, he hastened to armed warfare, and decided to fight both for his father and for the country at the same time, and to set himself as a shield for the people with laudable courage.\textsuperscript{926}

Gerald approved of Geoffrey’s bold strategy, emphasising his sudden seizure of the supposedly impregnable castle of \textit{Insula} (Axholm) from Roger de Mowbray’s overconfident troops before the latter could even prepare its defences.\textsuperscript{927} The construction of Geoffrey as selfless military titan continues to develop. There is a series of scenes in which an exhausted Ralph de Glanville (then Sheriff of York) comes to the elect, literally on bended knee to beg that he save the north from King William of Scots’ barbarian invasion.\textsuperscript{928} Glanville’s own credentials, his exhaustion and grovelling tone all develop the image of the all-powerful Geoffrey, who immediately assembles an army and rushes north, only to be met by the almost equally desperate Archbishop of York, who has come out from the city to meet him (again, an image of subordination of status). Geoffrey then makes his triumphal entry into York. Gerald described how the King of Scots, unnerved by the approach of the bishop-elect had already begun to withdraw, but Geoffrey is relentless, first besieging and subduing Malseart, another Mowbray castle, and

\textsuperscript{925} De quodam igitur nostri temporis viro, Gaufrido scilicet Eboracensi archiepiscopo, in quo pro meritorum exigentia retributionis honor non respondit, praesens tractatus exemplificat. Unde et quaeammodum a barabarico Scotorum impetu boreales regni fines Lincolniensis adhuc electus strenua virtute liberavit; qualiter [359] contra Francos, contraque fratres, pro patre, circa extrema quae ei imminebat incommoda, jam cancellarius egregie militavit; quantam, patre extincto, difficultatem in electione et circa electionem indebite sustinuit... \textit{Vita Galfridi}, 358.

\textsuperscript{926} Sed quoniam facilius est ardentis favillias ore comprimere, quam innatae strenuitatis audaciam imminente necessitatis articulo dissimulare; vacillantibus jam fere cunctis, et a fidelitate vel clam vel palam reddentibus contra suorum omnium monita ad armatum militiam se proripiens, pro patre simul et patria dimicare, seque pro populo cliceum opponere, laudabili animositate, decrevit. \textit{Vita Galfridi}, 364.

\textsuperscript{927} 365.

\textsuperscript{928} Ibid.
forcing Hugh du Puiset, who in sharp contrast to Geoffrey, “had already wavered and appeared to turn from his faith and fidelity to the king and to turn to his adversary, although unwilling, to come to him and to remain in his faith and fidelity” fide jam vacillare et fidelitate regis in partem adversam declinare videbatur, quamquam invitum, ad se venire, fideique pariter ac fidelitati stare, coegit. After a further list of swift victories, the elect comes to his father at Huntingdon, bringing with him one hundred and forty knights, “and the delighted king, it is remembered, said in the earshot of many: “My other sons have turned themselves to bastards. This one alone has turned himself legitimate and proven himself to be true.” rex gavisus in multorum audientia dixisse memoratur: “Alii filii mei se reversa bastardos, iste vero solus se legitimum et verum esse probavit.

6) Magnificence and Pride

In some ways an inversion of the image of devoted royal service, this represents a spectrum that certain depictions of military activity occupy, defined by the relationship between the ego of the prelate and basis of military power. At one extreme are the examples of Saints Wulfstan and Hugh, portrayed as almost forced into a state of magnificence by the necessity of maintaining a military household. Gerald’s depiction of Geoffrey Plantagenet had some similarities with this approach, for although Geoffrey was portrayed as possessing martial virtues and wielding great military power, the context is always one of service to others, never to his own interests or image. The same pattern is followed in FitzStephen’s life of Becket. Throughout the first part of the work, we are told repeatedly of the Chancellor’s military magnificence; his largesse to his knights at table, and the splendid panoply of the familia on the move, which astonished foreign observers, leading them to assume that the king himself must have been even more magnificent. We are told of his bold strategy and personal valour at Toulouse, and that “in all the army of the king of England the chancellor’s

929 366-7.
930 Ibid, 368.
931 Part 2, Chapter 2.
932 VST, 20, 23, 29.
933 VST, 33-4.
knights were always first, always the most daring, always performed excellently, as he himself taught, led, and urged them on...” (Et in toto regis Anglorum exercitu semper primi erant milites cancellarii, semper majora audebant, semper praeclare faciebant, eo docente, ducente, eo hortante).934 Indeed, FitzStephen suggested his high reputation chivalry and prowess earned him the king of France’s favour in his later need.935 The best-known part of this construction is the description of the role of young knights trained in Thomas’ household. This, however, is followed by a description of how Becket secretly arranged “in the midst of these glories of secular honour” in qua tantum saecularium honorum pompa to be scourged by particular local clergy depending on where he happened to be.936 This depiction, which foreshadows the posthumous revelation of the saint’s mortifications, undercuts the descriptions of the pomp of Becket’s military array. More dramatic than Wulfstan’s tiny cup, or Hugh’s averted gaze, Becket’s arrangements to mortify his flesh, distance the inner humble sanctity of the prelate from his necessary outward show of power. By making the idea that his retinue reflected personal pride absurd, this also sets up the later passage, in which the archbishop, having recently returned from exile and fearing for his own life, travels accompanied by just five knights (an escort described to the king as a marauding army about to devastate his realm).937 Less positive is Henry of Huntingdon’s attitude towards the retinue of Robert Bloet, in which the archdeacon expressed admiration for the splendour of the episcopal familia as a young man, but that his opinion had changed, as he had grown older.938 While Huntingdon’s criticism of his old master was a gentle corrective, however, the Gesta Stephani was much more severe:

[Roger of Salisbury’s] nephews too, who bore the titles of Bishop of Lincoln and Bishop of Ely, men who loved display and were rash in their reckless presumption, agreed with this policy, and disregarding the holy and simple manner of life that befits a

934 VST, 35. Hosler pointed out that the emphasis on aggression and daring found in Fitz Stephen’s account (We would also add, in Gerald’s Vita of Geoffrey Plantagenet) is somewhat against contemporary military doctrine, Hosler, ‘Military Career’, 97-8; For the “courtliness” of Becket, Hahn, Cynthia (1990). ‘Proper Behaviour for Knights and Kings: the Hagiography of Matthew Paris, Monk of St Albans’, in HSJ 2: 237-248 (243).

935 VST, 35.

936 VST, 22.

937 VST, 124.

938 Part 2, Chapter 2.
Christian priest they devoted themselves so utterly to warfare and the vanities of the world that whenever they attended court by appointment they too aroused general astonishment on account of the extraordinary concourse of knights by which they were surrounded on all sides.  

At this point, the expression of the chronicler’s disapproval has become so strong, that the description has become almost as “identity crisis” depiction. Alexander and Nigel are titular bishops only, whose conduct is incompatible with their cloth. Indeed, though he disapproved strongly of Stephen’s behaviour in 1139, he portrayed the arrest of the bishops, and the loss of their castles as having at least corrected the bishops’ vanity, “humble and downcast and stripped of all their empty and ostentatious splendour, to hold their church property in the simple fashion that befits a churchman...”

The same notion of the bishop’s castle as a manifestation of an excessive desire for secular glory is found throughout the twelfth century. William of Malmesbury claimed that both Alexander of Lincoln and Roger of Salisbury publicly claimed their castle building was for the good and honour of their sees, but that Roger’s in particular, were constructed so that he could attain a reputation as a great builder. John of Worcester’s obituary of Roger grants him that, but at the cost of his other achievements. Newburgh described his castles as expressions of Roger’s vanity. He went even further with Hugh du Puiset’s building. Again, the distracting or corrupting effect of pride in military activity borders on an “identity crisis” depiction:

As a bishop, he was not content with spiritual power or excellence, but he went about seeking secular influence;

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939 Huic autem sententiae et nepotes illius, alter Lincolnensis alter Eiensis dicti episcopi, uiri pompatici tementariatitique non audenda praesumpitores, assentiebantur; puramque et simplicem Christianae religionis conversationem neglectui habentes, militiae prorsus et pompea seculare studium adeo accommodabat, ut quotiens ex condicu curiae interestent, propter miram, quia undique stipabantur, militantium secum frequentiam admirabiles et ipsi cunctis probarentur. GS, 72.

940 humiles postmodum et depressi omnesque inanis gloriae pompositatatem exuti, ad res ecclesiasticas simpliciter et ecclesiastice possidendas... GS, 78; Continental criticism of bishops’ excessive retinues goes back much further, Nelson, Janet (1983). ‘The Church’s military service in the ninth century: a contemporary comparative view?’, in Studies in Church History 20: 15-30 (23).

941 HN, 44 and 49. Kealey found this argument weak, Kealey, Roger of Salisbury, 175.

942 JWC, III, 258.

and with great loss of money that belonged to the church, and which ought rather to have been applied to religious uses, he sought for himself a great name, like that of the lofty ones of the earth. He delighted in the construction of castles, and the erection of noble buildings in many places; but the more he studied to build upon the earth, the more remiss was he to build in heaven.  

7) Oppression

Casting certain areas of clerical military activity in the mould of oppression of a religious house, or of the church in general is a common narrative technique. This took three distinct, though sometimes associated forms; the imposition of military demands upon a church by the monarch or local potentate (external oppression); damaging actions taken either by the leader of a religious community against that community using armed force, or by knights holding of the church (internal oppression); and cases in which a cleric’s military power is portrayed as damaging the wider country (tyranny). The first of these sub-classes, external oppression, is common, has exercised a profound influence on the historiography, especially in terms of the supposed imposition of the servitium debitum by William the Conqueror. The outraged tone of sources like the Liber Eliensis, which at times would have us believe that such burdens were almost enough to bring the monastery down, is perhaps too influential. For instance the Abingdon Chronicler found William Rufus’ punishment of the monastery for the misbehaviour of one of its tenants, the knight Rainbald outrageous, but calmly explained the reasons for billeting troops on ecclesiastical houses during the invasion scare of 1085. He also voiced no objections to either the summoning of knights from the monastery or the abbot’s own attendance on the king’s Welsh and Scottish campaigns. Nonetheless, royal, external oppression for military

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944 Spirituali potentia sive excellentia episcopus non contentus, secularem ambivit; et multa ecclesiasticae pecuniae, religiosis potius usibus applicandae jactura, quaesivit sibi nomen grande juxta nomen magnorum qui sunt in terra. Castellorum instructioni atque insignium in locis plurimis aedificiorum fabricae deditus, quo plus studuit aedificare in terra, eo remissius aedificare curavit in coelo. Howlett (ed), II, 437.
945 Liber Eliensis, 216-7.
946 HEA, II, 54.
947 HEA, II, 16.
948 HEA, II, 12-14.
ends is an important component of several narratives. Eadmer, in the *Historia Novorum* was little interested in military narrative. He was, however, interested in the precise details of William Rufus’ dispute with Anselm over the quality of Canterbury’s knights, for it provided material for his broader theme – the abuse of Anselm by the king, and the saint’s forbearance.\(^{949}\)

Far more common is to cast of the behaviour of a prelate or his knights as internal oppression, most particularly low-level incidents of knights appropriating church estates or refusing to perform service, and excessive alienations by bishops and abbots to provide for them. There are also occasional incidents of prelates using knights to crush opposition from their communities by force. Key examples of this “internal” oppression were discussed in Part 2, Chapter 1, and there is little that can be added at this stage without excessive repetition. Perhaps more can be said about the militant behaviour of clerics cast as tyranny in the wider country. There two most significant cases of clergy cast as tyrants were Odo of Bayeux and William of Ely.\(^{950}\) Odo’s militant “tyranny” was first expressed in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle’s description of his castle-building.\(^{951}\) The complexities of Odo’s presentation as perhaps the quintessential agent of Norman tyranny have been discussed by David Bates, and in particular Orderic Vitalis’ depiction.\(^{952}\) A minor distinction, however, should be made between the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle’s assertions of Odo’s tyranny, or Symeon’s lament for the bishop’s destruction of Durham\(^{953}\) and those of Orderic. Orderic’s supposed deathbed speech of William the Conqueror has the king describe Odo as “non antistitem sed tirranem”,\(^{954}\) a merging of the “tyranny” and “identity crisis” threads. The historical William, would hardly have regarded Odo’s castle building or involvement in the suppression of the repeated rebellions of the reign as way tyrannical, and Orderic

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\(^{950}\) John of Hexham also speaks of William Cumin’s tyranny from his base in the see of Durham, 312, and Robert of Torigni uses similar language for Archbishop Christian of Mainz’s oppression of the holy see itself, 306.
\(^{953}\) Symeon, *Historia Dunelmensis Ecclesie*, 118.
\(^{954}\) *OV*, IV, 101.
did not write his William into such a position. His tyranny is defined by power that has become out of control, and crucially, is wielded in self-interest. The same could be said of the *Gesta Stephani*’s depiction of the bishops raiding the countryside during the anarchy, that “were supposed to be warding off the evil-doers who were plundering the goods of the Church showed themselves always more cruel and more merciless than their neighbours and plundering their goods” *dumque maleficios rerumque ecclesiasticarum direptores arcere putarentur, ipsis maleficis in uicinis suis opprimendis, in rebus eorum diripiendis crudeliores semper et magis immisericordes exitterant.* The final, fullest image of clerical, military tyranny, is in depictions of Bishop William of Ely’s disastrous period as chancellor of England during Richard I’s absence on Crusade. Various sources describe the bishop’s behaviour in similar ways. Howden, Newburgh and Wendover, all make the massive, splendid retinue that accompanied him (estimated at either one thousand or fifteen hundred knights) from religious house to religious house, bankrupting them as he went, the centrepiece of their accusations against him. In Newburgh’s hands, this comes close to an identity crisis depiction:

"His pomp in almost everything exceeded that of a king. After the manner of Eastern princes, as if perpetually on the watch, he was desirous of having guards about his chamber. His progresses were attended by a thousand horse, and sometimes more; under pretence of his legation he extorted entertainment from all the monasteries throughout England: and from such small ones as could not support the burden of his reception, he exacted a certain sum, that is to say, eight or five marks, with which they were to buy off the charge of his entertainment. As for the larger ones, he preyed upon them like a locust."

956 *GS*, 156.
957 Howden, *Gesta*, II, 143; *Chronica*, III, 72; Newburgh, Howlett (ed), I, 333-334; Wendover, 190-191
958 Fastus ejus fere in omnibus plusquam regius erat. Orientalium more regum tanquam in expeditione jugiter positus, armatorum circa cubiculum suum habere excubias voluit. Procedebat cum mille equis et plerumque etiam numerositus. Legationis suae nomine hospitia a cunctis per Angliam exegit monasteriis; et a minoribus quidem, quae pondus hospitii ferre non poterant, certa, id est, octo vel quinque marcarum summa remidi hospitia censuit: majoribus vero incumbebat velut locusta. Howlett (ed), I, 333-4.
Wendover developed this image of the huge retinue devouring the wealth of the English church slightly differently. After a passage comparable to Newburgh’s treatment, he explored the internal arrangement of the household, portraying it as a vehicle for arranging the marriage of nobles into his own family, set in the context of the bishop’s own programme of acquiring lands and castles. Wendover’s depiction of the bishop’s household resembles a twisted version of FitzStephen’s depiction of that of Becket. One clerical chancellor had maintained a vast military household of the sons of noblemen for their education and the king’s service, scourging himself in secret to ward off the sin of pride. The other used the sons of nobles to extend the tentacles of his power for its own sake, a particularly interesting point in light of the role played by Matthew de Clare in the arrest of Geoffrey Plantagenet.

Authors and Narrative Texts

Having considered the narrative devices employed by authors in general, we will now consider how those strategies were used in a selection of individual texts. The aim is to show how various authors regarded clerical involvement in war. Numerous narratives that have been used in this thesis are not included because they contained too little relevant material for meaningful analysis, and consideration of every narrative source relevant to English history in this period would, of course, be impractical here. Nevertheless, the sample size seems to be sufficiently large to suggest tentative conclusions. There is also no consideration below of the various recensions of the Chronicle. As composite works involving multiple authors, and engaged in complex interactions with one another, identifying individual authorial “voices” in this tradition is often impossible. Furthermore, the terseness of the annalists’ prose is often such that no opinion of the author can be discerned.

\[959\] Wendover, 190-191.
\[960\] It should be noted that Wendover does not quite go as far as Hugh de Nonant on this. Both emphasise the nefarious uses of the familia in a similar manner, but in Hugh’s version, the sons of nobles are held in a miserable condition literally by the bishop’s whip, and there are also a number of corrupt Franks, who are absent from other accounts. Howden, Chronica, III, 142; Gesta, II, 216.
Simeon of Durham – the *Historia Dunelmensis Ecclesie*

As seen in Part 2, Chapter 1, Simeon’s text, written between 1104 and 1109,\[961\] is the main source for the involvement of Bishop Walcher’s knights in antagonising the population of the city in the days before the bishop’s murder in 1080, though he did not extend this into polemic. He is also the best source for the vengeance that was wrought upon the city by Odo of Bayeux.\[962\] He described how “almost the whole land was turned to a desert”, *terram pene totam in solitudinem redegerunt,* and depicted the occupation of the city by Odo’s army as involving a series of lethal miscarriages of justice, while Odo himself “carried off certain of the ornaments of the church, among which was a pastoral staff of marvellous substance and workmanship, which was indeed made from sapphires”, *(Quaedam etiam ex ornamentis ecclesiae, inter quae et baculum pastoralem materia et arte mirandum, erat enim de saphiro factus, praefatus episcopus abstulit, qui, posito in castello militum praedidio, protinus abscessit).* There is no doubt that Simeon rejected Odo of Bayeux’s savage treatment of the town, and his looting of the cathedral treasures as unacceptable. Both cases of clerical entanglement in military affairs are seen profoundly negatively, the knights of Bishop Walcher and the expedition of Bishop Odo conform to oppression patterns – one internal, the other external.

John of Worcester – the *Chronicon ex Chronicis*

John of Worcester’s Chronicle was begun at the request of St Wulfstan (d. 1095) and continued up to 1140.\[963\] He expressed revulsion for the rebels of 1088, and Bishop William of Durham in particular, but seems more outraged by his betrayal of the king’s trust than for compromising his clerical status.\[964\] He described Wulfstan’s defence of his city in the same year in miraculous terms, criticised Robert of Lewes for cowardice in his defence of Bath (1138), and noted without comment Earl Ralph and Bishops Odo and Geoffrey’s mutilation of their captured prisoners in 1074. He

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\[962\] Simeon, 118.


\[964\] *JWC*, III, 48.
also described without criticism an incident in 1064, when the bishop of Bamberg beat a Muslim assailant to death with his bare hands whilst on pilgrimage. His use of pre-Conquest material from the *Chronicle*, however, is more problematic. He incorporated numerous passages, such as Ealhstan’s involvement in the conquest of Kent in 823, his battle at the mouth of the Parret in 845, and Aelfstan and Aescwig’s role as naval commanders in 992. The death of bishop Heahmund at the battle of Meretun (871), however, is not included, nor is the slightly ambiguous passage about Herefrith and Wigthegn at Carhampton (833). As we saw, John has reconstructed the *ASC* account for 1016 with material from Bede to sanctify the roles of Eadnoth and Wulfsgis, and redacted the entry on Bishop Leofgar’s campaign in 1056 to make him a victim of aggression. It seems that for John, while there was no inherent problem with clergy acting as military leaders, but incidents of clergy dying in battle had to be omitted, or redacted, or reconstructed so substantially that their original character was lost. John of Worcester’s Chronicle is one of the most extensive and important narrative sources for this study, but in his whole narrative, no cleric dies fighting in battle with physical weapons. This might express an attitude in which military leadership was deemed acceptable, but physical combat against any but Muslims was not.

**Henry of Huntingdon – the *Historia Anglorum***

Considering the great chronological range of Henry’s work, composed between 1129 and 1154, there are comparatively few useful passages addressing the military activities of clergy. We have already discussed his gentle disapproval of Robert Bloet’s retinue, which fits in with his general edificatory approach, and his redaction of material for the Battle of Ashingdon, but there are cases where he incorporated Anglo-Saxon Chronicle descriptions without redaction, such as the deaths of bishops Herefrith and Wigthegn in battle against the Danes at Carhampton, and Heahmund at Meretun. He included Abbot Thurstan of

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965 *JWC*, II, 594. Unfortunately, John’s account of the First Crusade is so compressed that we can learn little of his views of Adhemar.
967 Gransden, *Historical Writing*, 194.
968 Ibid, 196.
969 *Huntingdon*, 262. Actually, Henry may have misinterpreted the unclear *ASC* entry. The bishops probably the same year, but perhaps not in the battle.
Glastonbury’s infamous massacre of his own monks in 1082. He also included descriptions of Bishops Odo and Geoffre in the rebellion of 1088, Wulfstan’s miraculous defence of his city, and Bishop Adhemar of Le Puy’s involvement as a commander in the first Crusade, when he and Count Raymond were “protected by the divine power and gleaming with earthly weapons”. Nonetheless, there are striking omissions. There is no mention of Leofgar’s invasion of Wales, and though he acknowledged that Remigius was present at the Battle of Hastings, he made no other mention of clerical involvement in the invasion campaign. He recorded Bishop Aethelwine’s flight to Ely, but neither the bishop’s, nor the monks’ involvement in Hereward’s rising. Neither does he mention the clerical commanders in the 1075 revolt. As we have seen, Henry’s account of the Battle of the Standard is the least clerically-focussed substantial version of those events, and makes the object itself a royal emblem. Henry noted the seizure of the bishops’ castles in 1139, but not the charge that they were being prepared for Roger of Salisbury’s family to support the empress. It is telling that the first case of Henry seriously redacting his material is in his description of the Battle of Ashingdon. In short, in Henry’s Chronicle, no English prelate ever makes war against another Christian, with the exception of Wulfstan’s defence of Worcester, in which the knights are hardly mentioned beside the efficacy of the bishop’s prayer. Henry it seems, had no problem with clergy who led warfare against heathens, and clearly admired Adhemar. He disapproved of excessive military pomp in clergy, but without venom. Some Norman newcomers could be rebels or psychopaths, but he attempted to redact every example of prelates making war against other Christians out of history.

970 Huntingdon, 284.
971 Huntingdon, 400.
972 Huntingdon, 412-414.
973 ... diuina uirtute protecti, et armis terrenis fulgidi Huntingdon, 424. Greenway identified an epitome of the Gesta Francorum as among Henry’s sources. Huntingdon, xciii.
974 Huntingdon, 588.
975 Huntingdon, 396.
976 Huntingdon, 712. There are clear distinctions to be drawn between the techniques of southern chroniclers (Orderic, Henry of Huntingdon, John of Worcester and ASC, E) and the northern chroniclers (John and RH, and Aelred of Rievaulx) and their implications for the conceptualisation of English national identity in this period, but there is insufficient space to discuss these here. Huntingdon, 720.
977 Greenway, Huntingdon, 359 fn. 65 suggests that Henry’s treatment of Ashingdon was a product of his personal connections to Ramsey, and speculates “Was he deliberately suppressing the information that these local ecclesiastics were present at the battle?” This may be a contributing factor, but does not explain the other omissions.
Hugh Candidus – Chronicle

Hugh’s house chronicle of Peterborough, closely related to the “E” version of the ASC, was composed in the middle of the twelfth century.\(^979\) Its range only occasionally extends beyond the neighbourhood of Peterborough, and it is useful primarily in the context of Hereward’s revolt. The chronicler does not seem to have had a particularly strong disapproval of violent clerical participation in warfare. He gave a vivid account of the monks’ heroic, doomed defence of the abbey’s Bolhithegate.\(^980\) He did, however, seriously object to the damage done to his monastery by military adventures and priorities, and his most common narrative strategy is internal oppression. Early on he quoted a supposed bull of Pope Agatho, permanently exempting the monastery from all military service.\(^981\) He was dismayed that abbot Turold granted two thirds of the abbey demesne to his knights and relatives, resulting in permanent financial damage,\(^982\) and recorded the payments totalling two hundred marks that abbot William de Waterville made to the king to recover the fiefs of his constable, Geoffrey de la Mare and Earl Simon.\(^983\) Candidus’ narrative is one in which the monks of Peterborough are repeatedly beset by enemies. Rebels, the monastery’s own tenants, and even one of its abbots fit this role.

The Gesta Stephani

Howlett once suggested that the author of the Gesta Stephani was a chaplain of Henry of Blois, though this notion has been rejected.\(^984\) It has also been suggested that the author of the Gesta Stephani was Bishop Robert of Bath.\(^985\) If it were so, the implications for this study would be considerable, but this too has been rejected as incorrect or at best tenuous.\(^986\) The most plausible interpretation is that the author was a secular clerk, writing in two phases (c.1148 and after 1153).\(^987\) The chronicler used

\(^980\) Candidus, 78-9.
\(^981\) Candidus, 17.
\(^982\) Candidus, 84-5; King, Peterborough Abbey), 15.
\(^983\) Candidus, 128.
\(^984\) Gransden, Historical Writing, 189.
\(^986\) Gransden, Historical Writing, 189-190; King, ‘The Gesta Stephani’, 200.
\(^987\) Gransden, Historical Writing, 188-9.
several narrative strategies, he seems to have been somewhat ambiguous. We have seen how he cast Roger of Salisbury as plotting treason against the king, and his nephews as corrupted by pride, and that while perhaps disapproving of the arrest of the bishops in 1139, the chronicler took some satisfaction at Roger and his dynasty’s forced return to humility. We have also seen expressed as “identity crisis”, the chronicler’s venom for churchmen who failed to rely on their spiritual weapons, and instead, wore armour and pillaged the country with their knights. All of this, together with casting Robert of Bath’s capture during his parley with Talbot’s troops in 1138 as sacrilege, the “man of blood” appellation for Nigel of Ely, and his outrage at the conversion of churches to military use, could be used to suggest that the chronicler decisively rejected clerical involvement in warfare. Nonetheless, there is no criticism for Bishop Robert’s capture of Talbot in the first place, nor for most of Henry of Blois’ military involvement, and as we have seen, the chronicler criticised Henry on one occasion for not fighting hard enough against his brother’s enemies. It is perhaps tempting to ascribe this to the own changing allegiance. This would explains his apparent hypocrisy over Robert of Lewes in 1138, his attitude towards Henry of Blois’ failure to capture Earl Robert in 1139, and also why the bishops of Salisbury, Lincoln and Ely are blasted with pride and identity crisis depictions for involvement in warfare early on, but the emphasis moves later to the bishops of Winchester, Lincoln (Alexander had changed sides) and Chester. Unfortunately, this change takes place too early in the text. The chronicler’s own views on the matter may simply not have been particularly carefully thought out, dealing with one incident at a time without holding an overarching position on the matter.

Richard of Hexham - The Acts of King Stephen and the Battle of the Standard

Richard of Hexham’s account (which must predate Aelred’s use of it in 1155-7) of the defeat of the Scottish invasion of 1138 provides some of the strongest depictions of clerical military leadership as an extension of the pastoral role. Once could hardly miss Richard’s presentation of the conflict as both a holy war fought to defend the church and a forum for the intervention of Christ and the Saints. Richard approved of this including extensive involvement in military affairs. He regarded

988 GS, 60.
Bishop Geoffrey of Durham’s wealth, and the disorderly condition of the kingdom as sufficient reason to expect a more substantial commitment to the defence of Norham castle than he provided. There is also the presentation of Thurstan himself as having some sort of royal commission to organise the resistance. Richard also had no criticism for Thurstan’s intention to “be present with his men in the engagement,” though he was prevented from doing so by his physical decrepitude. Richard was keen to shore up the basis of Thurstan’s authority to make war, was prepared to accept an extended personal role for him in battle itself, and found a bishop insufficiently committed to defending his lands to be negligent.

The Abingdon Chronicle

The chronicle spans the period of the abbey’s foundation to 1154, and was completed before 1164. The chronicler’s interest was not confined entirely to his house (he mentions, for instance, Bishop Odo’s defence of Rochester against William Rufus), but the monastery was the main focus, and it was never a site of great military importance, nor did it produce abbots with known military careers. Much of the chronicle is spent discussing the contumacies of the monastery’s knights, and the struggles of successive abbots (in particular Faritius) to restrain them. Indeed, the chronicler regarded the whole nature of knights holding monastery land as an extremely damaging custom in peacetime. The chronicler’s ire was often roused by the internal oppression of the monastery by its knights, which was portrayed as a consistent problem. Unlike some monastic house chronicles, there is no sense of the abbot himself an internal oppressor. The king, meanwhile, is often seen as the ally of the abbot against the knights, and the chronicler was relatively sanguine about occasional royal demands for service. Nor did he necessarily disapprove of violence in the resistance of oppression. The abbot beating a royal official off his lands with a stick is one of the chronicle’s most lively and memorable episodes. He does not seem to have disapproved of either occasional violence by abbots in the house’s interest, or the monastery’s occasional contribution to the defence of the realm in time of need.

990 RH, 157.
991 RH, 161; Bachrach, D, Religion and Conduct, 155; Kaeuper, Holy Warriors 154.
992 Gransden, Historical Writing, 270; HEA, I, xvi.
993 HEA, II, 20.
994 HEA, I, 218-221.
995 HEA, II, 14.
John of Hexham – the Continuation of Symeon of Durham’s *Gesta Regum*

John’s continuation, composed around 1170, is a relatively short text, but it is possible to get some idea of his views on clergy and warfare. The two incidents of interest to us that John’s account deals with in depth – the Scottish invasion of 1138 and the battle between William Ste-Barbe and William Cumin for the episcopal throne of Durham, are struggles in which John was clear whose position was legitimate. This leads to occasional double-standards. We are told, for instance, that Ste-Barbe tried “to surround the church of St Giles with a trench, in order that he might hold the place for his defence” (*ad Dunelmum ecclesiam Sancti Aegidii vallo circumcingere elaborans ut haberet locum illum ad munimen sui*) but that Geoffrey de Mandeville “desecrated [Ramsby Abbey] by converting it into a castle” (*monasterio de Ramesbi abusus est vice castri*) John may have had an attitude to military retinues similar to that of Henry of Huntingdon, picturing criticising Roger de Conyers’ military array as a youthful folly, though he did not criticise Ste-Barbe for his own *multitudo.* This favour to both Thurstan’s cause in 1138 and Ste-Barbe’s in 1144 may stand behind it, but John’s presentation of both bishops’ behaviour is an expression of their pastoral role. This is stronger in the case of Thurstan, but we are also told that when he reached Bishopton, Ste-Barbe “was plunged into grief because he saw the people and affairs of the bishopric thus harassed”. Only then did William attack Cumin’s position. John was describing extraordinary events, and his position on them was hardly neutral, but he could accommodate a view of clerical military command as an extension of pastoral care.

Wace – the *Roman de Rou* and the *Roman de Brut*

Despite the heroic quality of his Romance, Master Wace’s depictions of earlier warfare c.1155 (*Roman de Brut*) and 1160-1174 (*Roman de Rou*) is often as

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997 JH, 314.
998 JH, 315.
999 JH, 328.
1000 JH, 314.
a substantially religious force, in which spiritual powers play both a physical and moral role. He retold the story of the image of the virgin painted onto King Arthur’s shield, and the cross that King Oswald set up to attract divine intervention in battle, though in his version, King Oswiu’s devotion to God earned His assistance in battle, without making grants to monastic foundations.\(^\text{1002}\) He also told how bishop Antelmus stiffened the resistance of the people of Chartres to Rollo’s siege by bringing out relics and absolving them of their sins, and how Edward the Confessor killed Godwine by making the sign of the cross over the earl’s food.\(^\text{1003}\) We have already discussed the role of religious relics and the papal banner in Wace’s account of the Norman Conquest (Part 2, Chapter 4), and establishing the superior religiosity of the Norman invaders is an important part of how Wace conferred legitimacy on the Conquest itself.\(^\text{1004}\) When Odo of Bayeux rides into the battle of Hastings to rally the wavering Normans, he is described with approval as “the good priest, who was ordained at Bayeux”.\(^\text{1005}\) Wace both emphasised the major spiritual elements of warfare in the period he addresses, and accommodated clergy in the heroic narrative without stripping them of their sacerdotal status. We should note, however, that while there is a good deal of divine involvement in warfare in Wace’s works, much of it is mobilised by kings, not clergy.

The \textit{Liber Eliensis}

The \textit{Liber Eliensis}, completed between 1169 and 1174, is the most useful of the monastic house chronicles considered here, but in some ways also the most difficult, and not just because it drew material from several earlier sources and “lacks unity and has errors and confusing repetitions”.\(^\text{1006}\) Whatever the high-minded claims of the prologue for its purpose,\(^\text{1007}\) it has four overlapping principal objectives: to commemorate and legitimise the house’s possessions and position, to delegitimise its losses in rights and possessions and burdens acquired, to highlight the glory of the house since its foundation, and to suppress any blame or blemish that might attach to either the community or its prelate. There is hardly anything in the text which does

\(^{1002}\) \textit{Roman de Brut}, 234, 362-4.  
\(^{1003}\) \textit{Roman de Rou}, 218.  
\(^{1004}\) He also told a story in which Pope Sulpicius bestowed armour on Arthur’s knight Walwein, \textit{Roman de Brut}, 248.  
\(^{1005}\) \textit{Roman de Rou}, 272.  
\(^{1006}\) Gransden, \textit{Historical Writing}, 270.  
\(^{1007}\) \textit{LE}, 1.
not fulfil one of those objectives, and every occasion on which the house is seen involved in warfare is best interpreted with one (or more) of those criteria. The attempt to maintain all four objectives introduces tensions, which are in turn revealing of the chronicler’s underlying views (or lack thereof). The passage in which the Conqueror imposes a burden of knight service, and requires the abbot to garrison the isle, for instance is a straightforward external oppression depiction.\textsuperscript{1008} The house groans under the burden of military service illegitimately laid upon it, and the religious life is disrupted. The prologue, however, which includes a full-blown encomium on the natural wonders and joys of the island, lauds the “garrison of strong and warlike men, prepared to resist their enemies with courage and armed force” (valida virorum premunita manu atque bellica, animis et armis resistendum parata)\textsuperscript{1009} These can only be the bishop’s own garrison, the successors of men the chronicler complained about with such bitterness. The contradiction might be soluble as one of frustrated agency – that the abbot or bishop could justly maintain a garrison on the island, but the king could not. This hardly seems likely, however, for the chronicler was much concerned with the burden that was placed on the community, and it certainly cannot be reconciled with a supposed papal privilege from Stephen’s reign, sternly forbidding the bishop from using his own lands or those of the monks for any military purpose.\textsuperscript{1010} The latter, meanwhile is difficult to reconcile with the Chronicler’s assertions that accusations levelled at Abbot Richard and Bishop Nigel\textsuperscript{1011} over the excessive size of their retinues were false. A more plausible explanation is that the chronicler uses the garrison and the papal privilege in pursuit of three of his objectives – delegitimizing a loss, developing the glory of the house, and removing a stain upon its honour without revealing any sincere view of his own on the matter of the garrison or the prelate’s retinue. Similarly, the chronicler’s heavy reconstruction of the Battle of Ashingdon, even from the already sacralised account of John of Worcester, need not reveal any particular view about the morality of clergy in wartime, for he also tells a story about Bishop Eadnoth’s body being stolen from its drunken guards en route to Ramsey and hidden at Ely by the former bishop Aelfgar, because of Eadnoth’s devotion to St Aethelthryth.\textsuperscript{1012} The result is that

\textsuperscript{1008} Ibid. 217.
\textsuperscript{1009} Ibid, 2.
\textsuperscript{1010} Ibid, 303.
\textsuperscript{1011} Ibid, 226-7, 324.
\textsuperscript{1012} Ibid, 142.
English history seems to have lost a militant prelate, but more importantly from the chronicler’s point of view, Ely gained the relics of a martyr.

There is another use of Eadnoth’s “martyrdom” a little later. We are told that a group of Ely monks had accompanied Eadnoth and Wulfsige to the battle bearing the relics of the virgin Wendreth ut mos est ecclesie, and that after the battle these were seized by Cnut and given to Canterbury.\footnote{Ibid, 148.} As a result of this passage, not only is the legitimacy of Ely’s claim to Eadnoth’s remains extended by involving Ely monks in his martyrdom, it also establishes Ely’s claim to the relics of another saint, which were still at Canterbury when the Chronicle was composed. In similar fashion, we have the story of Byrtnoth’s sojourn on his way to glorious defeat at the Battle of Maldon. The chronicler relates that Byrtnoth visited Abbot Wulfsige of Ramsey, who could not provide for such a host, while Abbot Aelsfise of Ely dined him and his men in magnificent style.\footnote{Ibid, 135.} This seems an odd story to include – complaints about kings or nobles imposing an intolerable strain on monasteries by visiting them with their retinues of knights are common. In this case, however, it has several functions; it emphasises the magnificence of Aelsfise at Wulfsige’s expense, associates Ely with Byrtnoth’s heroism at Maldon, and crucially provides an acquisition narrative for a long list of estates donated by the warrior in gratitude for the abbot’s largesse, as well a series of costly objects. Furthermore, it claims that Byrtnoth entered the fraternity of the monastery, specifically providing for his burial there, and so justifies the monastery’s claim to his remains (which, the chronicler tells us have only recently been rediscovered). The primacy of justifying claims can hardly be overestimated.\footnote{Brett, ‘John of Worcester’, 125.}

This interpretation can also be used to explain the Chronicler’s reconstruction of \textit{Gesta Herewardi} material. As we have seen, this was extensive and elaborate. There is some evidence that the chronicler regarded the monks’ military endeavours as constituting a blemish on his house’s record – hence the comments about the preservation of monastic routine in the refectory/mess hall. It is possible, however, that the primary objective was not to legitimise the monks’ behaviour, but to delegitimise that of the Conqueror.\footnote{For similar arguments regarding St Albans, Hagger, Mark (2007). ‘The \textit{Gesta Abbatum Monasterii Sancti Albani}: Litigation and History at St Albans’, in \textit{Historical Research}, esp. 9, 12.} The chronicler complained at length about losses the house had suffered at William’s hands, sometimes bemoaning the loss of
specific precious objects.\textsuperscript{1017} In rendering the monks passive observers of Hereward’s revolt, however, the chronicler removed the justification for the sack. Ely is transformed from a fortress looted by its conqueror, into a victim of unprovoked rapacity by the secular power. The monastery did suffer a loss of estates and other assets after the siege, but for the Conqueror’s punishment to become part of the narrative, it had to first be rendered unjust, an objective was pursued with the same determination as the establishment of positive claims.

\textbf{William FitzStephen – The \textit{Vita Sancti Thomae}}

FitzStephen’s \textit{Vita} (c.1173-4\textsuperscript{1018}) is divided into two halves, the first being the period of Becket’s achievements in the world, the second his period of persecution and spiritual triumph. Nevertheless, the hagiographer hinted that even as chancellor, his readers should regard Becket also as cleric and proto-saint. Hossler observed that of fifteen Lives concerned with his martyrdom, only FitzStephen’s “deigns” to discuss Becket’s military career.\textsuperscript{1019} He correctly observed that this makes it difficult to assess the veracity of FitzStephen’s claims in detail, but “deign” seems an inappropriate word. Becket’s military activities are not held in tension with his sacred status, they are part of it.\textsuperscript{1020} We have already seen how FitzStephen juxtaposed Becket’s magnificent retinue with his secret self-mortification. Even at his deepest involvement in warfare, we cannot forget his clerical status:

He, although he was a clerk, with lowered lance and galloping steed he himself engaged Engelram of Trie, a powerful, armed knight who came spurring his horse directly at him, he cast [Engelram] from his horse and claimed the charger as spoil.\textsuperscript{1021}

\textsuperscript{1017} Ibid, 78-9, 132, 168.
\textsuperscript{1019} Hossler, ‘Brief Military Career’, 89.
\textsuperscript{1020} For a different interpretation, highlighting Becket’s transformation from Chancellor to Archbishop, Staunton, \textit{Thomas Becket}, 59.
\textsuperscript{1021} Ipsemet, clericus cum esset cum valente milite Franco, Engelramno de Tria e regione subditis equo calcaribus veniente armato, lancea demissa et equo admissus congressus, ipsum equo deject, et dextrarium lucrifecit. \textit{VST}, 34.
The magnificence of Becket’s military household, the huge scale on which he mobilised warriors on campaign, his sound military judgement, and his personal valour in battle, are all presented in the context of devoted royal service. FitzStephen may have had a personal interest in such a view of legitimate clerical military activity, for it has been suggested that at the time of writing (about 1173) he was himself sheriff of Gloucester, though this argument has been dismissed by Duggan. William provides a coherent picture of a powerful militant cleric involved at all levels from training knights, to planning sieges, to striking down enemies in battle and taking the spoils, and all of this is seen as positively praiseworthy in the service of the king.

**Jordan Fantosme – Chronicle**

The account of the wars of 1173-4, composed in late 1174 or 1175, perhaps by a former clerk of Henry of Blois, has a very different tone and form to most of the sources discussed here. It is, first and foremost, a secular narrative of deeds of chivalry. The various magnates are, in consequence, cast as figures of great military power and energy. Hugh du Puiset’s decision not to oppose King William’s march into his territory is seen as a major boost to the Scots’ campaign. The knights of Bury St Edmunds are men “of the greatest prowess” (forment le grant puissance), and as we saw above, Bishop-elect Geoffrey is a major power, a staunch supporter of his father, and a champion of the people. Even the archbishop of York’s *servitium debitum* is inserted into the same context of prowess and frantic martial energy. Appearances of military power (or even failure of that power) are expressed in terms of duty. In Jordan’s chronicle, clerical military command, when discharged competently and seen as royal service, is commendable.

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1025 Fantosme, 74-5.
1026 Fantosme, 128.
Gervase of Canterbury – the *Chronica Majora*

The *Chronica* was begun in or soon after 1188, its composition overlapping with the author’s priorship at Christ Church, Canterbury (c.1193-1197). Gervase’s opinion on the problem of clergy in warfare is often obscure, because he was so often dependent on a strategy of incorporation and because he greatly condensed his material. It is therefore difficult to tell whether he deliberately redacted details such as Henry of Blois’ rage and role in the firing of Winchester in 1141. It seems strange that he made no mention of the role of the bishops in the 1173-4 rebellion in repulsing King William’s invasion of northern England, though the Scots’ incursion is only briefly described, and Gervase’ general antipathy to Henry II was noted by Stubbs. He recorded how in his dispute with the convent in 1189, the archbishop actually besieged the monks with his knights, and came close to an “identity crisis” depiction when he called the Archbishop of Rouen, *malefidus* for his attack on Windsor castle in 1193. As we have seen, Gervase was particularly blasting on the subject of Philip of Beauvais. All of this, however, need not suggest that Gervase was always hostile to clerical leadership in war. His assessment of Hubert Walter, *venerabilis*, campaigning against the Welsh in 1196 was glowing, a clear example of a “duty” depiction. He described Hubert’s second campaign against the Welsh (1198) in very similar terms, though this time adding that his forces killed almost five thousand of the enemy. Gervase, therefore, used a range of narrative strategies, but seems to have had no consistently applied view of the matter. Philip of Beauvais may perhaps be taken as a special case, but both the archbishop of Rouen and Hubert Walter both held the office of Justiciar and successfully led troops against rebel forces. Gervase’s assessment seems much more the result of his opinion of the prelates themselves than a general one about the military activity of clergy.

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1028 *Gervase*, 247
1029 *Gervase*, xlvi
1030 *Gervase*, 472
1031 *Gervase*, 515. He appears to have disliked the archbishop, referring elsewhere to his *malitia*, 564. Walter was also Justiciar.
1033 *Gervase*, 572
Roger of Howden (the *Gesta Henrici* and the *Chronica*)

Howden’s *Gesta Henrici Secundi*, was apparently written in stages between c.1169 and 1192. His *Chronica* (c.1192-1201) reused much of this material. He was perhaps the most important chronicler of late twelfth century English affairs, and provided a great deal of useful material for this subject, but his great strengths as a chronicler are a barrier to his usefulness in this chapter. His very lack of partiality makes it often impossible to assess Howden’s own views. Until the end of Stephen’s reign, the *Chronica* is an almost entirely composite text, amalgamating Simeon of Durham, John of Worcester, and Henry of Huntingdon’s works. It is only for the reign of Henry II that Howden began to produce original material in quantity, but even this can be difficult to assess. As we saw, Howden disapproved of Peter of Cambrai’s assumption of the county of Boulogne in 1173, and in the *Gesta* he hints at an identity crisis depiction of the former elect, “preferring to make war in the world than for God”, *malens saeculo militare quam Deo*. He does not seem, however, to have regarded this as particularly important to his depiction. In the *Chronica*, which condenses this passage, the phrase is lost. He seems to have been sure of the efficacy of the banner of St Edmund, writing in both narratives that it was through the power of the saint that Humphrey de Bohun defeated the Earl of Leicester in 1173 while carrying that standard. After this, assessing Howden’s views becomes even harder. He provided a wealth of detailed narrative, for example, on the sieges of Axholm and Malseart, Hugh du Puiset’s apparent collaboration with the Scots and subsequent military intervention, yet there is little expression of personal opinion. Gransden described the later stages as “more like a register than a literary work”.

He incorporated a number of texts of importance to this subject, such as the peace treaty of 1174, the canons of 1175, and Geoffrey Plantagenet’s letter resigning his

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1036 For the difficulties in identifying the chronicler amongst several Rogers of the period see Gransden, *Historical Writing*, 226.
1037 *Gesta*, I, 49.
1038 *Chronica*, II, 49.
1039 *Gesta*, I, 61-2; *Chronica*, II, 55.
1040 *Gesta*, I, 68, 64, 67; *Chronica*, II, 58, 56-57, 63.
election to Lincoln, without commenting on their content.\footnote{1042} He even incorporated both Hugh de Nonant’s blasting assessment of the fall of William of Ely, and Peter of Blois’ reply, without judging between them. Similarly, the issue of Philip of Beauvais’ capture is dealt with primarily in (apparently forged) letters exchanged between the bishop and Pope Celestine. Unfortunately, we cannot be certain whether Howden connived at the forgery, but it seems unlikely.\footnote{1043}

Gillingham has recently argued that Howden was both more opinionated and a more engaging author than has been traditionally understood.\footnote{1044} Howden expressed the disapproval of the monks of Holy Trinity for Hubert Walter’s destruction of the church of St Mary le Bow, because the archbishop “although a servant of the king, ought still to have kept the rights of the church inviolate” (\textit{quamvis regi serviret, tamen ecclesiastica jura deberet servare illaes}).\footnote{1045} Indeed, Howden was the only chronicler to record that this transgression was removing Hubert from the Justiciarship,\footnote{1046} but these are presented as the monks’ views, not Howden’s own. He disapproved of Hubert Walter’s failure to resign the chancellorship (symbolised by possession of royal castles) in 1196, claiming that “he chose to neglect his avowed priestly duty rather than desert his earthly king”, (\textit{praeelegit tamen officium sacerdotale postponere, quam regi terreneo non adhaerere}).\footnote{1047} This is probably the clearest expression of Howden’s views, and suggests that he perceived some clerics’ secular activities as conflicting with their spiritual office, and that he would prefer a cleric to prioritise his spiritual over his secular (including military) functions. On the whole, Howden provides much useful information on how militant clergy were seen in the last decades of our period, but surprisingly little on how he himself saw them.

William of Newburgh – The History of English Affairs

William of Newburgh, who composed his chronicle c.1196-8, could be the most strident critic of clerical military activity among the “national” chroniclers. The castles of Roger of Salisbury, Alexander of Lincoln, and Hugh du Puiset of Durham were portrayed as manifestations of their pride. Hugh’s earldom of Northumberland, even more than his castle building, was articulated as a pride and an identity crisis construction, as was William of Ely’s military pomp. All of this was part of a larger concern on William’s part; the pride and competition for status that he regarded as a general problem among bishops. William also interpreted Geoffrey Plantagenet’s assaults on Roger de Mowbray’s castles, not as his duty to the king, or in defence of good order, but as unwarranted aggression, with Roger as the wounded party. Walsh and Kennedy observed that while William showed no preoccupation with Newburgh priory itself, Roger was its founder. There may, therefore have been a little pro-Mowbray bias in his account.

There are three exceptions to Newburgh’s general dislike of militant clergy. Though he only described Archbishop Thurstan’s involvement in 1138 briefly, he did call him Bonae memoriae. He condemned with an identity crisis description the activities of Bishop Wimund of Man, who ravaged the islands and the mainland of south-western Scotland in pursuit of claims to temporal power, but did not criticise the unnamed bishop who rallied his flock to halt Wimund’s advance, and struck him down with a small throwing axe. He had no criticism for Hubert Walter’s support of Richard I on crusade or for his violent suppression of William Longbeard’s revolt and posthumous cult. There may therefore be an important distinction to make in Newburgh’s writing. There were military roles for prelates that he could accept, in exhorting seculars to the defence of their lands, in suppressing revolt, in

1050 Howlett (ed), I, 204
1051 Walsh and Kennedy (eds), II, 132
1052 Ibid, I, 3.
1053 Ibid, 54.
1054 Ibid, 104.
1055 Howlett (ed), I, 378, II, 470-473. For his generally positive attitude to Hubert Walter’s secular activities (unlike those of other prelates), Gillingham, John (2004). ‘The Historian as Judge: William of Newburgh and Hubert Walter’, in EHR 119: 1275-1287 (1277, 1279). Gillingham suggested (1283) that Hubert’s role in the Crusade (an enterprise to which Newburgh was devoted) was an important part of Newburgh’s positive attitude towards that prelate.
assisting a king on Crusade, even wielding weapons in battle when dire necessity demanded. Newburgh’s objection was to clergy whom regarded as acting from pride or ambition.

**Jocelin of Brakelond’s Chronicle**

As we saw in Part 2, Chapter 1, Jocelin’s chronicle, completed around 1203, is dominated by the struggle between the abbot and a community of determinedly contumacious knights of St Edmund, whose transgressions ranged from seeking to avoid performing service, to seizure of monastery lands. We have also seen how, on the one occasion that the abbot led the knights to war in person, the community worried that a precedent might be created, and the king expect such service in the future. The dominant strategy is “internal oppression.” The knights of St Edmund are the major villains, with occasional worries that the king or other actors might become external oppressors. In his depiction of Samson’s role at the siege of Windsor, Samson moves swiftly from excommunicating the enemies of the king’s peace, to taking the field, armed, against them. Jocelin could easily have omitted *armatus* if he had felt that this fact besmirched the reputation of Samson or his monastery in any way. There is no evidence that Jocelin regarded clerical participation in warfare, or even his abbot *armatus* as illicit, but a great deal that he deemed the need for men to meet military demands a terrible burden.

**Thomas of Marlborough – the Chronicon Abbatiae de Evesham**

The house chronicle of Evesham was compiled by its prior, Thomas of Marlborough in the early thirteenth century, and incorporated an earlier (now lost) history of the abbey down to 1104 and a biography of Abbot Aethelwig. The wider purpose of the chronicle has been seen as an emphatic restatement of the abbey’s independence from the see of Worcester, recently confirmed in Rome. Marlborough, though educated in canon law, had little interest in military events

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1057 Gransden, *Historical Writing*, 89-90, 111-112. For the difficulties of separating Thomas’ contribution from the other material, Bourreau, ‘How Law Came to the Monks’, 35.


except those impinging on his house. Unsurprisingly, his favoured narrative strategy is “oppression”. Both internal and external oppression are cast in similar terms, suggesting that the chronicler viewed the history of his community as primarily a struggle against enemies on all fronts. When Abbot Reginald reorganised his knights’ estates and fortified the buildings so that “it was as if the abbey were besieged,”( ... quasi obsessa fuit abbatis),\textsuperscript{1060} he was persuaded to stop by his kinsman, Miles of Hereford, not out of regard for the monks, but because the king might become jealous of the new fortifications.\textsuperscript{1061} We are told (1149-60) how Reginald manfully resisted the ravaging of William de Beauchamps and his accomplices by excommunicating them, “an unarmed man in the face of the armed”, ... in facie inermis armatos.\textsuperscript{1062} Half a century later, the abbot sent his knights to kill or capture defiant monks, who beat them, Thomas used almost identical language, “and we were brought together, having faith in the Lord, the unarmed against the armed” ... congressi sumum habentes fiduciam in Domino, inermes contra armatos.\textsuperscript{1063} It should also be noted that all of this proceeds against a background of heavy use of the discourse of militia Christi, especially in the early parts of the chronicle, which concern St. Egwin.\textsuperscript{1064} We are indeed, told of St Egwin’s posthumous wrath against two who tried to detach lands from the monastery,\textsuperscript{1065} and the effectiveness of Sir William Thorney’s invocation of the saint in battle.\textsuperscript{1066} The overall tone, therefore, is one of struggle, first of the saint against various tribulations, then of his monks against internal and external oppressors.

**Gerald of Wales – De Vita Galfridi Archiepiscopi Eboracensis, the Vita Sancti Remigii, and the Vita Sancti Hugonis**

Of Gerald’s three vitae, one is of a plausible saint – Hugh (written c.1213), one is an attempt to manufacture a saint – Remigius (written c.1196x1200, revised c.1210x1214), and one is of a prelate who was hardly saint material, but the structure of the narrative invites comparison with hagiography – Geoffrey Plantagenet

\textsuperscript{1060} Evesham Chronicle, 98.
\textsuperscript{1061} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1062} Ibid, 100.
\textsuperscript{1063} Ibid, 203.
\textsuperscript{1064} Ibid, 4, 5, 9, 12.
\textsuperscript{1065} Ibid, 42, 43.
\textsuperscript{1066} Ibid, 58.
It is interesting, therefore, that all three stress the protagonists’ close connexions to the monarch. We have already discussed the difficult passage in which Gerald addressed Remigius’ contribution to the Norman Conquest. Establishing Remigius’ proximity to the Conqueror at least emphasises Remigius’ prestige, but likening this leader of ten knights to a Decurion is a much more direct statement of his status as a warrior. Gerald’s Vita of Hugh emphasises without embarrassment that Hugh owed his position to the favour of his friend, Henry II, and while historiography tends to highlight his clash with Hubert Walter over Richard I’s military demands in 1197, Gerald’s depiction emphasised more his knightly origins, and his close relationships with his own knights and with others. He may not be a leader in war, but he is nonetheless, an effective leader of warriors. The Vita Galfridi emphasises Geoffrey Plantagenet’s military role, expressed particularly in terms of his duty to his father, and the northern secular and ecclesiastical leadership. As the prologue promises, the Vita divides the subject’s life into two parts; the first focussing on his triumphs over temporal adversity, the second on his maltreatment by William of Ely. Geoffrey’s military career fit this structure well. The war against the Young King, and Geoffrey’s tenure as Chancellor, including his military activities in France, all belong to the early period when Geoffrey was in minor orders, and include Henry II’s exclamation that Geoffrey had legitimised himself through faithful military service. Geoffrey’s struggles with Hugh du Puiset against Prince John in late 1193 lie outside the scope of Gerald’s work, but also after the date of the composition itself. It is difficult to see how Gerald would have accommodated Geoffrey’s renewed military activity, both politically and in terms of narrative structure, had the Vita Galfridi been composed just a year later. Nevertheless, Gerald left us with a view from the end of the period, in which military leadership by a monk was seen as a subject fit for hagiography, in which there was no need to distance St Hugh from his knights, and in


I do not think that the strong linguistic connections between the brief summary of Geoffrey’s life attached to the Vita S. Remigii and the prologue of the Vita Galfridi have been noticed before, but they are marked. Compare Vita Sancti Remigii 37 and Vita Galfridi, 358. The latter may be considered a far more developed version of the former.

Vita Sancti Hugonis.
which the military career of a current archbishop was not only legitimate, but a source of legitimacy.

Adam of Eynsham – The *Magna Vita Sancti Hugonis*

There are some marked tensions at work in Adam’s view of St Hugh, which was completed soon before 1214. We are reminded repeatedly of Hugh’s origins in the chivalry of Burgundy, and knights figure in scenes of Hugh’s youth. The transfer of Hugh’s attentions from *militia saeculari* to *militia Christi* is an important theme, and the whole *vita* is steeped in the language of spiritual warfare. So much so, in fact, that some of the narrative is unclear, or even contradictory. For instance, we are told that “he had won the palm of virtue in both warfares, first in the world and later in the cloister”, *prius scilicet in mundana ac deinceps in spirituali optinuerat militia uirtutis palmam.* We are not told anything of the “palms of victory” won by Hugh in earthly warfare, but that Hugh entered a monastery at the age of eight. It seems likely that the hagiographic theme of migration from secular to spiritual warfare was so influential that it overrode narrative consistency. In the light of this, depictions of Hugh’s careful management of his knightly followers are particularly surprising. We have discussed elsewhere Hugh’s careful use of magnanimity and even alcohol to keep his household knights under control, and while the heavy emphasis placed on the simplicity and humility of his travel arrangements is striking, we are also told of how even in old age, when his lay *ministri* abused others, he would beat them to make them behave. Hugh never led his knights to war. His most famous endeavour was to prevent the extension of the terms of military service. Adam’s *vita*, however, does, however, show how a hagiographer could seek not to minimise, but to exaggerate his subject’s involvement in war in his youth, and could show his knights as an important part of Hugh’s life, managed with charisma, largesse and occasionally violence. This depiction of St Hugh could be a reply to those chroniclers who portray the prelate’s *familia* as a source and a symptom of corrupting pride. For Adam, who endlessly stressed his subject’s humility, they were neither.

1070 Gransden, *Historical Writing*, 313.
1072 Ibid, 1, 12; compare I, 6-7.
1073 Ibid, I, 5.
1074 Ibid, I, 102; II, 80, 178, 194.
Roger of Wendover – the *Flores Historiarum*

Wendover began writing his *Flores* after 1204 (possibly as late as 1231) and continued until 1234. His terse narrative style often makes him difficult to assess. There are occasions on which he seems to deliberately omit important details. His description of the siege of Axholm in 1174, for instance, mentions the *multitudo Lincolniensium*, but not their leader, Geoffrey Plantagenet. In such passages, it is uncertain exactly what Wendover’s intention was. Excluding the bishop-elect from the narrative seems artificial, but the description is so compressed that it is difficult to be certain whether this is a matter of deliberate omission. What is certain is that there is no mention of the clerical leadership in the war of 1173-4. In effect, there are only three militant-prelates in Roger’s text. Hugh du Puiset’s role in allowing the Scots passage through his lands is not mentioned, but he is criticised severely with an identity crisis construction for buying the earldom of Northumberland, being girded with a sword and abandoning his crusading vow. William of Ely’s huge military establishment is blasted, but his treatment of Philip of Beauvais was extremely brief and without invective. A truly definitive exposition of Wendover’s views may be impossible because of his sheer brevity, but he was damning of bishops who took up military roles in circumstances which made it easy to condemn them while not mentioning the more ambiguous cases of those acting out of duty to the king or dire necessity.

*La Geste des Engleis en Yrlande*

The Geste, formerly known as *The Song of Dermot and the Earl*, a composition of the second quarter of the thirteenth century, has little to say regarding militant clergy (though the several religious battle cries that the author included are interesting), but one incident is worth consideration here:

Nicholas, a monk in a religious habit,  
was also much praised that day,  
for he killed the lord of Uí Dróna

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1076 *Wendover I*, 97  
with an arrow.\textsuperscript{1078}

The author expressed neither surprise nor discomfort at this turn of events, nor did he dissent from the views of the soldiers who praised Nicholas. Even leaving aside militant clergy \textit{per se}, Nicholas clearly also violated his vow of stability and the ban on projectile weapons.\textsuperscript{1079} He, however, is depicted very much as among the noteworthy warriors of the conflict, singled out for his deed of arms, not his clerical status, with which the chronicler apparently had no difficulty and for which he gave no special treatment.

**William of Malmesbury**

Malmesbury’s work represents the richest seam of material on militant clergy to be considered in this study, and he will be treated at greater length than the other authors. There are three major narratives featuring clergy at war over a broad chronological range, a hagiography (his translation of Coleman’s \textit{Vita Wulfstani}) and even a canon law tract (a version of \textit{Collectio Quesnelliana}). In addition, Malmesbury’s exceptionally high degree of sophistication as a writer, and his marked tendency to editorialise make possible more detailed analysis of his views than those of other authors. One of the great advantages of using Malmesbury’s work is that collation of his historical narratives allows for a more nuanced understanding of the priorities underlying his narrative strategies. For instance, his description of the conquest of Kent in 823 (based on the \textit{ Chronicle}) and the flight of the tyrant Baldred in the \textit{Gesta Regum} eliminates the participation of Bishop Ealhstan of Sherborne, making the conquest king Egberht’s victory alone.\textsuperscript{1080} Removal of the bishop’s role, however, need not represent disapproval on Malmesbury’s part. The \textit{Gesta Regum} gives a substantial passage in praise of the bishop for inspiring King Athulf to take up arms against the Danes, and for both assembling an army and supplying it with funds from his own treasury. It also refers us back to the \textit{ Chronicle}, where we are told we can read more of the specifics.\textsuperscript{1081} Furthermore, this passage was reworked slightly

\begin{footnotes}
\item[1078] E mult esteit le jor preisé
Nichol, un moine achapé,
Kar de une sete oscist le jor
De [o] Drone le seygnor, 104.
\item[1079] For the ineffectiveness of the ban, Brundage, ‘Holy War’, 115.
\item[1080] \textit{ GR I}, 36
\item[1081] \textit{ GR I}, 157
\end{footnotes}
when Malmesbury wrote the *Gesta Pontificum*, and Ealhstan’s role in the subjugation
of Kent was reinserted, forming a short panegyric of the bishop, praising him for “his
martial exploits that brought the people of Kent and the East Angles under Ecgberht’s
rule”, (*Egbirhto regi Cantuaritas et Orientales Anglos bellicos subegit laboribus*), and
for his rousing of King Athulf to resist the Danes, “himself providing the treasury
with money and putting an army together”, (*ipse pecunias fisco suffitiens, ipse
exercitum componens*).\(^{1082}\) Ealhstan’s only flaw, without which, Malmesbury noted,
his praise would be unqualified, was his seizure and oppression of Malmesbury abbey
itself, which for the chronicler was rather too reminiscent of Roger of Salisbury’s
more recent oppression of the house. His military exploits in the service of kings
represent an especially praiseworthy part of Ealhstan’s career. The omission of some
elements in the *Gesta Regum* therefore probably represents more a desire to
emphasise the exploits of kings than an actual determination to remove evidence of
clerical involvement in war. The same probably applies to the miracle of king
Aethelstan’s sword. In the *Gesta Regum*, the king was unable to find his sword before
battle, but praying to God and St Adelelm, it miraculously reappeared.\(^{1083}\) In the
*Gesta Pontificum*, however, Archbishop Oda has accompanied the king’s army, and it
is *his* prayers that restore the king’s sword.\(^{1084}\) Again, the agency is transferred from
king to prelate. Perhaps most importantly, this concern affects Malmesbury’s two
depictions of Wulfstan’s defence of Worcester in 1088. In the *Gesta Regum*, the royal
knights defending the city are “inspired by the blessing of Bishop Wulfstan, who had
been entrusted with the command of the castle” (*freti benedictione Wlstani episcopi
cui custodia castelli commissa erat...*).\(^{1085}\) In the *Gesta Pontificum*, however, the
knights act at the bishop’s command, and there is the story about Wulfstan causing
mass blindness in the besiegers with his excommunication.\(^{1086}\)

Malmesbury’s antipathy to Roger of Salisbury is an important but complex
factor in the *Historia Novella*. His obituary of the bishop is relatively moderate in its
criticisms.\(^{1087}\) On the other hand, while several chroniclers speak of the famous brawl
between Roger’s knights and those of Count Alan as a key moment in the run-up to
the arrest of the bishops in 1139, only in Malmesbury’s work are they presented as

\(^{1082}\) *GP*, I, 276-8.
\(^{1083}\) *GR*, I, 208. Gervase of Canterbury’s *Gesta Regum* follows this version (47).
\(^{1084}\) *GP*, I, 27.
\(^{1085}\) *GR*, I, 546-7.
\(^{1086}\) This difference between the two accounts was also noted in Fenton, ‘Question of Masculinity’, 131.
\(^{1087}\) *HN*, 64-68.
the instigators of the fight. Later on, King Stephen alleges also the involvement of his nephew, Bishop Alexander, in stirring up the trouble, and that this was not the first occasion on which the episcopal knights had created such disorder. While generally positive about Roger’s building programme, and tending to present hostility to episcopal castle building as symptomatic of aristocratic envy, the chronicler also described the castle he had built at Malmesbury as “begun under an evil star” (infausto auspicio inchoauerat). Similarly, the oft-quoted pen-portrait of Turold, the “tyrant” appointed by William the Conqueror to “practise his fighting” as abbot of Peterborough dominates historical perception of the abbot. It should be remembered, however, that the militant abbot was being translated from Malmesbury abbey.

While Malmesbury approved of some clerical leadership in royal service, he was without sympathy for clerical rebels. William of St Calais’ involvement in the revolt of 1088 is presented as an unjustifiable betrayal of Rufus’ trust, and both Abbot Sihtricius of Tavistock and Bishop Aethelric of Durham are accused of no less than piracy, to the detriment of their churches. His portrayal of the rebellions of Wulfstan of York is extreme (the bishop supposedly died of rage at being granted mercy through King Edmund’s respect for his cloth) and by making Edmund, with his “placid and kindly soul” rather than the cleric, a font of forgiveness, he further undermined the bishop’s own sacred status.

Most significant of all, however, is Malmesbury’s digression on the pontificate of Gregory VI (1045-6). The Pope had bought the papacy from his spectacularly corrupt godson, Benedict IX, but was highly regarded by reformers, including the future Gregory VII. Malmesbury called him “a man of holy life and high standards”...magnae religionis et seueritatis. He described how the recently installed but elderly pontiff, faced with collapsing order within Rome and rampant brigandage in the surrounding countryside he restored order. First he exhorted the

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1089 HN, 54.
1090 HN, 62-3.
1091 GP, I, 628.
1092 GR, I, 544; GP, I, 414. It should be noted that Malmesbury had a poor opinion of St Calais as a result of his involvement in the dispute between Rufus and Anselm, regarding him as a ruthless, ambitious and dangerous. GP, I, 136-8.
1093 GP, I, 142, 318 412.
1094 GP, I, 376.
1095 GR, I, 364-5.
disorderly to desist, then he excommunicated them. Finally, he hired a force of mercenary cavalry, and crushed the rebels.\textsuperscript{1096} After his deposition for simony, Malmesbury gives him a long, deathbed speech in which he discusses the legitimacy of his actions in war.\textsuperscript{1097} Gregory acknowledges that some will criticise him for his military activities, on the grounds that “It is no part of a bishop’s duty to join battle himself or to command that it be joined” \textit{Non est episcopi offitium ut ipse committat uel committi iubeat prelium},\textsuperscript{1098} but came close to a pastoral role justification, “but it certainly is a bishop’s business, if he sees innocence in trouble, to bring it aid in deed and word” \textit{ceterum spectat ad munus episcopi et, si uideat naufragari innocentiam, et manu et lingua occurrat},\textsuperscript{1099} and cited Ezekiel’s berating of Israelite priests for failing to fight for Israel. Then the argument changes focus, acknowledging the distinct roles of the “two swords”, but restating that “as long as [he] hoped to do any good, [he] fought with words” \textit{Quoad sperauit proficere, armaui linguam},\textsuperscript{1100} and then turned to the secular power (the emperor), who, distracted by his war with the Wends, was unable to help, but instead delegated the power of the temporal sword to the Pope, and offered to bear the expense of the campaign. Furthermore, the pope claims, he would have been accountable to God for the lives destroyed by the continuing state of disorder, and the damage to the souls of rebels if he had allowed them to continue their transgressions. The argument therefore becomes a spiritual one, that the destruction of the rebels was praiseworthy in itself, as the most effective way to save their souls from damnation. This exposition, which appears to be Malmesbury working through the theoretical problem of clerical authority to wage war, concludes with the ideal of \textit{militia Christi}, uniting the struggle against vice with struggle against the vicious to an extraordinary degree. While the majority of the argument emphasises the Pope’s spiritual obligation to fight, however, the careful emphasis on the exhaustion of alternatives is also important. The secular power is absent and unable to carry out its functions, but has specifically delegated the authority to make war to the pontiff. In its full elaboration the later stages of the logic are shocking, reminiscent of Aranaud-Amaury’s famous declaration at Bezières, but it is worth noting that the elements of this justification, the absence of the secular power, some

\textsuperscript{1096} \textit{GR}, I, 366-8.  
\textsuperscript{1097} \textit{GR}, I, 372.  
\textsuperscript{1098} \textit{GR}, I, 372-3.  
\textsuperscript{1099} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{1100} \textit{GR}, I, 373-5.
sort of delegation, the exhaustion of other means, and the duty to protect the flock, are all elements in Richard of Hexham’s depiction of Archbishop Thurstan’s behaviour in 1138. Malmesbury also wrote admiringly, clearly influenced by the *Gesta Francorum* of Bishop Adhemar on the First Crusade.\(^{1101}\)

In the absence of the old English exemplar, we cannot know how much of the extant *Vita Wulfstani* is William of Malmesbury’s narrative “voice”. It is noteworthy, however, that the justification for the presence of Wulfstan’s knights in the episcopal household has some similarities to this position. The bishop is commanded to maintain a military household by the king, and this is presented as both a defensive move, justified by necessity, not a permanent, or even desired abrogation of lay powers. If the *Vita Wulfstani* does not reflect Malmesbury’s views, it seems at least compatible with them.

Malmesbury seems to have had a relatively relaxed attitude to most of the incidents of clerical military activity that he described. Like other twelfth-century chroniclers, he redacted Bishop Leofgar into an innocent victim in 1056, and Eadnoth is mentioned only as a name in an episcopal succession list.\(^ {1102}\) Nonetheless, he generally reported the military activities of clergy in his own day and the distant past with equanimity, criticising only excessive pride or damage to his own monastery. He seems to have accepted a role for clergy as military leaders against Muslims or heathen Vikings. In warfare against Christians, he perhaps required a delegation of military power by the monarch, but accepted that a bishop’s duty to protect his flock could extend as far as using armed force, even to protect the souls of his enemies.

**Chroniclers and Canon Law**

The unique level of detail with which we can examine William of Malmesbury’s attitudes as a chronicler extends into canon law. Malmesbury’s attitude to the place of canon law in both his own day and previous history is highly pragmatic and aware of changing historical context.\(^ {1103}\) For instance, he argued that while Stigand had conducted his ecclesiastical affairs in too secular a manner, the same could be said of other late Anglo-Saxon bishops, and that this was a product of

\(^{1101}\) *GR*, I, 638.

\(^{1102}\) *GP*, I, 456, 473.

the poor education of English clergy in that period. Even more startling is his assertion, again placed in the mouth of the dying Gregory VI, that lay investiture was not a violation of an essential legal principle. It had been appropriate under the virtuous rule of Charlemagne but not under corrupt contemporaries. His frank description of Remigius of Fécamp’s simony in his acquisition of his diocese is immediately followed by a glowing assessment of the latter’s personality. He also wrote bitterly of what he saw as the corrupt ecclesiastical courts in Rome. Malmesbury nevertheless maintained an interest in this rapidly developing discipline. His view of it as imperfect but intimately connected to contemporary needs makes his own canon law collection of especial interest. Oxford, Oriel College MS42 is a version of *Collectio Quesnelliana* in Malmesbury’s own hand. It is the basis of the *Patrologia Latina* edition of the text, but includes content not found in other MSS. To an accurate, probably German exemplar of this Roman collection from the turn of the fifth and sixth centuries, Malmesbury added the text of several of Pope Leo’s letters taken from *Collectio Lanfranci*. He did not, however, take the opportunity to import the Toledan prohibition on clergy taking up arms in rebellion, in spite of his clear distaste for clerical rebels, or the canon of Lérida. *Collectio Quesnelliana*, including Malmesbury’s expansions, contains no provision whatsoever on clerical involvement in warfare. Though his work addressed instances of clerical involvement in warfare, he never used canonical material in his narrative depictions of militant clerics, nor indeed for other problems, even when they directly concerned him or his interests as a chronicler. For instance, he included the canons of the Council of Clermont in the *Gesta Regum*, including the prohibition of any individual holding both a bishopric and an abbacy at the same time, and a pronouncement of anathema against anyone presuming to imprison a cleric and outlawry against anyone imprisoning a bishop. The obvious applicability of these texts to the distress of Malmesbury Abbey and the arrest of the bishops in 1139 makes the fact that he did not draw upon them in his depictions seem surprising. He is not, however, alone in

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1104 *GP*, I, 46. See also *GR*, I, 458. For the inadequacies of late Anglo-Saxon clergy as a justification for the Norman Conquest in Malmesbury’s writing, see Gransden, *Historical Writing*, 173.
1105 *GR*, I, 372.
1106 *GP*, I, 472.
1107 *GR*, I, 612.
1108 *HN*, xxiii.
1109 *PL* 56, Col. 353-746.
1111 *GR*, I, 594-6.
Most of our knowledge of ecclesiastical councils is derived from chronicle accounts. In some cases they were summarised, but chroniclers often gave in full the canons of councils, particularly those held in England, but also some major continental ones. The 1102 prohibition on abbots “making” knights, for instance, is recorded by Eadmer.\(^{1112}\) The prohibition of 1138 was recorded by Richard of Hexham and Gervase of Canterbury.\(^{1113}\) Gervase and Howden both recorded the prohibition of 1175.\(^{1114}\) In none of these accounts, however, can we point to the direct application of a specific canonical text to a specific problem. When chroniclers referred to canon law, it was usually in abstract terms. John of Worcester, for instance, describes Ranulf Flambard as a simoniac, holding abbeys and bishoprics, contra ius ecclesiasticum, without citing any specific text.\(^{1115}\) Howden, Wendover, and Newburgh\(^{1116}\) all include versions of the canons of Lateran III, which laid down firm rules on the subject of how large episcopal retinues could be, but while all criticised William of Ely severely for having a retinue inappropriately large for a bishop, none of them invoked the canon. Gillingham was pointed out that Newburgh was aware of the canons of Lateran III, but does not seem to have noticed that Newburgh was not alone in quoting canons to which he himself apparently paid little attention.\(^{1117}\) There are of course, plenty of occasions on which similar concepts emerge in canonical and literary texts. Pope Urban’s decretals to the clergy of Elne for instance, show the same concern with clerical status becoming ambiguous or illegitimate through arms-bearing that is shown by the writers of “Identity Crisis” depictions. The same could be said of Ermenfrid’s penitential ordinances, castigating monks for the loss of their habits, or for Alexander III pardoning “Ranulf” for slaying an armoured priest. Showing conceptual similarities, however, is a different matter from showing that these ideas were diffused by canonical texts. In general, scholars have only recently begun to investigate the links between canonical texts and other literary forms.\(^{1118}\) The apparent immunity of narrative texts to input from canonical material, even when some of that material is embedded within them, does not seem to have been noticed.

\(^{1112}\) *Historia Novorum*, 143.

\(^{1113}\) *RH*, 174-5; Gervase, 108.

\(^{1114}\) Gervase, 254; Howden, *Gesta*, I, 86; *Chronica*, II, 75.

\(^{1115}\) *JWC*, II, 94.


\(^{1117}\) Gillingham, ‘The Historian as Judge’, 1276.

\(^{1118}\) Brett, ‘The Bishop’s Charter and the Law’. 
It must, however, condition our understanding of how canonical collections in particular, were actually regarded and used, even by those familiar with their contents.

Conclusion

There is no evidence among narrative authors of the period for a consensus as to how clergy should act in war. They were viewed as everything from pastors protecting their flocks in the name of God and King, to corrupt megalomaniacs. There was a common selection of narrative techniques used in depictions of clerical military activity, and analysis of the choice of narrative tools can in some cases be used to give us an insight into the author’s views. Twelfth century reinterpretations of the Anglo-Saxon past and the Conquest, sufficiently remote to maximise narrative freedom and based on easily identifiable source materials are particularly useful in this regard. On some occasions, similar treatment of several incidents suggests a coherent individual opinion on the subject. Genre, the broader objectives of the text, and the author’s opinion of individual clerics or individual incidents, however, played an important role in influencing these depictions, and only William of Malmesbury gives us detailed exposition. Perhaps the most surprising feature of these texts is that even when authors show personal knowledge of canonical treatments of the problem, this does not seem to have informed their descriptions. The depictions of narrative sources, therefore, offer a picture of divided and fluid opinion, influenced by literary form but not dominated by it and absorbing (and occasionally even fabricating) canonical material without being substantially influenced by it. It is a picture which is more interesting, more complex, and more difficult than has previously been understood.

Chapter 3: Political and Judicial Responses

Royal Favour

This section will outline occasions on which clerics were rewarded by the monarch for their deeds in war. This process had a long history. As we have seen, King Edwin allowed Paulinus to found the first church at York (in 625/6) in gratitude for supernatural help in his war against Wessex. This tendency for English monarchs to bestow favour on militarily useful churchmen should be seen in the context of royal service being a generally recognised path to ecclesiastical office.\footnote{1120}

Unfortunately, in a world where military command was neither professional, nor separate from civil government, it is generally impossible to say with certainty that a particular cleric was rewarded for his military endeavours, even when we might strongly suspect it. Orderic for instance, mentioned Geoffrey of Coutances’ service at the Battle of Hastings, in the same passage as the estates that the Conqueror bestowed upon him in England.\footnote{1121} Neither he, nor any other chronicler, however, explicitly stated that one was a reward for the other. It may be too crude to reduce Geoffrey’s English lands to a simple \textit{quid pro quo} for help in 1066 rather than as part of a long-term relationship between the King-duke and the bishop.\footnote{1122} Similarly, Waldric, Henry I’s chancellor, became bishop of Laon in 1106.\footnote{1123} The canons had chosen him for his famed wealth,\footnote{1124} but we are also told that Henry had sought his election.\footnote{1125} How much Waldric’s deeds at Tinchebrai that year, as opposed to his other work in his service, had counted towards obtaining the king’s influence, could only be known to the king himself.


\footnote{1122} For his initial appointment to Coutances as a difficult posting, Le Patourel, ‘Geoffrey de Montbray’, 135.


\footnote{1124} Guibert of Nogent, \textit{De Vita Sua}, PL 156, Cols. 0837-0962 (col. 912).

On only a few occasions was the monarch’s favour explicitly portrayed as gratitude for military activity. Malmesbury was clear that Remigius of Fécamp “had been made bishop in return for help he had given William on his coming to England, thus paying for a religious post by exertions in war” (... secundus pro auxili Willelmo uenienti Angliam prebitis factus esset episcopus, diuinum munus bellicososis laboribus nudinatus...). He even alleged that this had been agreed in advance of the invasion. The origins of his preferment, and his consecration by Stigand resulted in his suspension and necessitated a voyage to Rome with Lanfranc and Archbishop Thomas of York to have the suspension lifted. His success as a bishop means that we should not think of his appointment as a simple quid pro quo, for the king and the church of Dorchester/Lincoln also gained an excellent bishop.

Hubert Walter had the most distinguished Crusading record of any Anglo-Norman bishop. Richard I wrote to the justices of England to justify his elevation to Canterbury:

The whole world well knows to what pains and perils the venerable Hubert, bishop of Salisbury, exposed himself and his men in the land overseas, for the sake of God’s name and the relief of the East, and how many services he performed pleasing to God and all Christendom and ourselves.

Hubert’s valour, had impressed the king, Ambroise, and if he is to be believed, Saladin himself. When Richard wrote on the appointment to his mother, queen Eleanor that same day, he also mentioned the fame of the bishop’s service in the east, but in vaguer terms, and when the king wrote to the chapter of Canterbury, again extolling Hubert’s qualities, he made no mention of his military activities at all. The military adventures of Peter des Roches fall largely outside the chronological limits of this thesis, but it has been argued that his career was launched largely by his

1126 GP, I, 90-91.
1127 GP, I, 472-3; Bates, Bishop Remigius, 5; Cowdrey, ‘Remigius (d. 1092)’.
1128 Bates, Bishop Remigius, 12.
1130 Ibid, 362-3, Letter CCXCIX.
1131 Ibid, 364, Letter CCCCC.
impressing Richard as a mercenary knight in Poitou, and was rewarded with the bishopric of Winchester for his military exploits under John in 1204. There are also continental and later parallels.

Rewarding militant clergy, however, could cause the king difficulties. Remigius’ installation resulted in his suspension for simony. Hugh du Puiset’s election was opposed by Henry Murdac and others at York, with the support of Bernard of Clairvaux, which again produced an appeal to Rome. Odo of Bayeux’ possessions in Kent helped turn the region into a warzone while Geoffrey of Coutances’ English possessions gave him a reason to rebel in favour of a united Anglo-Norman Regnum in 1088. Bishop Waldric of Laon was murdered by a mob in 1112. Becket’s promotion, of course, was a disaster for Henry II.

Individual churchmen profited from their military activities as they did from their involvement in government generally, across the period, and those rewards could grant the cleric greater power to employ in the service of God and king. It is striking, however, how little consistency there is in the form that those rewards took. The rewards given for services rendered, like those services themselves, depended on the personalities of the individuals involved, and the demands and opportunities of the moment.

**Treason, Trial and Punishment**

Across the period, a number of prelates were defeated and captured by English kings, usually during rebellions. It is possible to be more certain of our material regarding clerics punished for military misdemeanours than those rewarded for their military support. The first dark hints of prelates plotting rebellion relate to Ealhstan of Sherborne around 855. This becomes a little clearer in the case of Archbishop

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Wulfstan of York around 952. Wulfstan was a persistent offender. He had marched to war in the midlands with Olaf Guthfrithson against King Edmund, and held Leicester with Olaf against Edmund in 943. He was among the Northumbrian magnates who recognised Eric Bloodaxe in 947/8 and in 952 King Eadred imprisoned him at Jedburgh “because he was frequently accused.” Although effective management of the archdiocese was taken over by Oscytel, Wulfstan was not officially deposed, and after his release in 954, witnessed royal charters as archbishop. Malmesbury thought that Wulfstan was released from prison by King Edmund out of respect for his clerical status, and that this caused the bishop to die immediately, but his account is confused. It seems more likely that after the final defeat of Erik Bloodaxe, he was no longer considered a substantial threat.

Though this thesis is not generally concerned with pre-Conquest Normandy, it is necessary at this point to consider recent cases of clerical rebellion in the Duchy that could have provided precedents for the famous clerical trials of the 1080s. In 1027, an unknown dispute between Archbishop Robert of Rouen and Duke Robert I had spilled over into open rebellion when he fortified Évreux against the duke. The cases of Robert and Odo are similar in important respects. Like Odo, Archbishop Robert was a member of the ducal family, and a count as well as a bishop, who fortified his comital lands against the ruler. At the end of the siege, the archbishop was allowed to leave with his followers, and was exiled from the duchy. Robert’s exile was not universally accepted. Indeed, he was encouraged by no less than Fulbert of Chartres to behave as a wronged cleric and use spiritual sanctions. The archbishop laid the whole duchy under anathema. The duke soon backed down, and allowed the archbishop to return home and resume his place as Duke Robert’s principal adviser. The Gesta Normannorum Ducum presents the duke’s surrender, not

1137 ASC, D, 111.
1138 Ibid, 112; Symeon, Historia Regum, 127.
1140 GP, I, 376.
1141 ASC, 113, fn. 11.
as a pardon, but as an act of “penance”. Lanfranc and the kings also had another case to guide them, even more recent than that of Robert of Rouen; the deposition of Archbishop Mauger of Rouen in 1054. The circumstances of Mauger’s crimes and fall are somewhat obscure. Most scholars, however, accept the account of Orderic Vitalis, who accuses Mauger of involvement in William of Arques’ revolt in 1053. Although they differ on other matters, the *Gesta Normannorum Ducum*, the *Historia Ecclesiastica*, and the *Gesta Guillelmi*, all associate the deposition and replacement of the archbishop with the Council of Lisieux. Though Duke William seems to have been the driving force behind the deposition, the council and legate are presented as an important part of the method of Mauger’s removal. In Orderic’s account William declares that “I deposed him from the archbishopric by papal decree” *de pontificali sede per decretum papae deposuit*, and the *Gesta Guillelmi*, says that William “deposed his uncle in the public forum of a holy synod, with the apostolic vicar and all the bishops of Normandy giving their consent by the authority of the canons” *deposuit patrum in publico sanctae sinodi, apostolici uicario cunctisque Normanniae episcopis, iuxta canonum auctoritatem sententiam dantibus unanimi consensu*. The “apostolic vicar” in question was the Burgundian Cardinal, Ermenfrid of Sion. According to Wace and to the *Gesta Normannorum Ducum*, after the council, the archbishop retired (or was exiled) to Guernsey. We have already suggested that the papacy, often represented by Cardinal Ermenfrid, exerted its developing legal, spiritual and political powers for William’s benefit, most notably in the matter of the papal banner, the authority to invade England, and the Penitential Ordinances issued afterwards, but it seems that Ermenfrid was never criticised for his involvement in Anglo-Norman politics, and no writer condemned Mauger’s removal.

Three English clerics were arrested between 1069 and 1071 for involvement in Hereward’s rebellion. Bishop Aethelwine of Durham was one of the leaders of English resistance, and the king’s troops found him among their prisoners when the

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1145 Ibid.
1146 On Mauger and his deposition, Allen, *The Norman Episcopate* esp. 322-324
1147 *Gesta Normannorum Ducum*, II, 142; *OV*, IV, 85-861; *Gesta Guillelmi*, 88.
1148 *OV*, IV, 84.
1149 *Gesta Guillelmi*, 88.
1150 For Ermenfrid’s important role in William the Bastard’s affairs, see Cowdrey, ‘Bishop Ermenfrid of Sion’.
1151 *Roman de Rou*, 200.
1152 *Gesta Normannorum Ducum*, II, 142.
island of Ely was finally conquered. The king imprisoned the bishop in the monastery at Abingdon, where he died. The Conqueror also seized Aethelwine’s brother, the monk Aethelric (himself formerly bishop of Durham) from Peterborough Abbey and imprisoned him, at Westminster. Because some of his men had joined the rebels (apparently without the knowledge of the abbot), Abbot Ealdred of Abingdon was incarcerated, first at Wallingford, but later he too was moved to Westminster. In none of these cases is there record of a formal judicial process, but two points are key, that there is no record of protest from any source at their treatment, and that confinement in a monastery is the punishment prescribed by the Council of Toledo, and consequently, by Collectio Lanfranci.

In 1082, the Conqueror seized his half brother, Bishop Odo and imprisoned him at Rouen for plotting treason. Orderic claimed that Odo was plotting to take advantage of his brother’s absence to lead the kingdom’s knights to Italy, where he intended to conquer Rome and seize the papacy, yet Odo declared that as a priest he could not be condemned without papal judgement. Malmesbury tells that the king himself had doubted whether he could arrest the bishop, but Archbishop Lanfranc had encouraged him to do so on the grounds that as Odo was earl of Kent, the king could arrest his brother, not as a bishop, but as an earl. Pope Gregory VII, however, protested. He wrote to William the following year, accusing the king of not showing the proper respect toward the priesthood. Only a fragment survives of Gregory’s letter to Archbishop Hugh of Lyons on the same subject, but its language is much stronger, saying that William had behaved shamefully.

Nor indeed did Lanfranc’s argument in 1082 establish a decisive precedent with laymen. Orderic related that after William Rufus had crushed Odo’s rebellion in 1088, he had intended to punish him severely, but his magnates persuaded him that he would suffer divine wrath if he laid hands on a priest. Rufus was persuaded from

\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{HEA}, II, 226.
\item \textit{ASC}, 202.
\item \textit{HEA}, II, 226.
\item \textit{OV}, IV, 42.
\item \textit{GP}, II, 544.
\item \textit{OV}, IV, 130-132.
\end{itemize}
more drastic measures, and banished Odo overseas.1161 This second defiance of royal power had also involved William of St Calais, Bishop of Durham (though the exact nature of his involvement is obscure) and Rufus seized his lands. Again, a rebel bishop demanded to be treated as a cleric and threatened to appeal to Rome.1162 Again Lanfranc came forward to manage events, arguing on Rufus’ behalf that like Odo, the bishop held a barony of the king, and was therefore subject to the authority of the curia regis.1163 These events seem to fit well into a narrative of emerging distinctions between Temporalia and Spiritualia. We would suggest, however, that Lanfranc and the kings had other precedents for how to proceed against rebel ecclesiastics. William of St Calais was certainly aware of this. It has long been established that Bishop William actually used a copy of Collectio Lanfranci to challenge his arrest.1164 Apart from insisting on his innocence of the charges made against him, he argued that only an ecclesiastical council had the authority to try him, that no charges could be made until he had been restored to his lands anyway (Exceptio spolii), that the bishops present should be dressed in their ecclesiastical vestments, and so on. All of these points were apparently taken from Lanfranc’s text. Lanfranc could not avoid these problems completely, and even when justifying why William’s trial had to be non-canonical, he sometimes found himself using canonical ideas from his collection.1165 Other ecclesiastics were troubled by these proceedings. Geoffrey of Coutances, himself only recently forgiven for his part in the rebellion, dared to challenge Lanfranc and the king’s methods, suggesting that this was a difficult matter which should be referred to a committee to decide what sort of court was competent to hear the case.1166 Pope Urban II too, was not convinced of the legitimacy of the proceedings, writing to William Rufus in abrupt language that the king had arrested the bishop without any just cause, and condemned the proceedings against him as

1162 De Iniusta, 184.
1164 Cowdrey, ‘Gregorian Reform’, 341 (fn. 84).
1165 For instance, in insisting that William of St Calais was not entitled to the advice of his fellow bishops. Philpott, ‘De Iniuista’, 133.
1166 De Injusta Vexatione, 182.
“against the Lord and the decrees of the holy fathers” ... contra Dominum et contra sanctorum decreta patrum.\textsuperscript{1167} Urban’s words themselves became part of Collectio Britannica.\textsuperscript{1168}

Given that there were three models available for proceeding against rebellious clerks, one based on application of canonical material that Lanfranc himself had sanctioned, one based on papal authority, and one based on treating rebel clergy as laymen, it seems curious that the Conqueror, Rufus and the archbishop would choose the latter course in 1082, 1088 and 1089, when this strategy that consistently provoked opposition and criticism, and had failed utterly in 1027. The change is probably explained by the shifting relationship between the Anglo-Norman court and the papacy, which by the 1080s was far less well-disposed than that of Alexander II had been. Lanfranc wrote to Gregory in 1080, complaining that the pope was constantly and unjustly critical of him.\textsuperscript{1169} Most of the surviving texts of Gregory VII’s letters to Lanfranc are indeed critical of the archbishop.\textsuperscript{1170} Cowdrey attributed the apparent deterioration of relations between Lanfranc and the papacy in the 1080s to Gregory VII’s failure to decisively settle the primacy question in Lanfranc’s favour.\textsuperscript{1171} It is also possible that Rome had expected a greater degree of subordination from England as a result of its support in 1066.\textsuperscript{1172} Moreover, when William of St Calais’ trial was conducted, Rufus had not yet recognised Gregory VII’s successor.\textsuperscript{1173} What is certain is that the papacy had become both less essential, and less helpful to Norman rule by the 1080s. There would be no more legatine councils in England until 1125.\textsuperscript{1174}

This left the possibility of confining William and Odo in monasteries, as the English rebel clergy had been, and as Collectio Lanfranci would require, though there were practical problems with this. In 1082, Odo was perhaps too dangerous for any punishment but close imprisonment in a ducal fortress. In 1088, there was the added complication that William Rufus could not depose a Norman cleric from a duchy under his brother’s rule. In the case of William of St Calais, legal principle was

\textsuperscript{1167} Epistolae Pontificum Romanorum Ineditae, S. Lowenfeld (ed). Leipzig: Veit. (1885), 63 (No. 129).
\textsuperscript{1168} This is Jaffé 5397.
\textsuperscript{1169} On Collectio Britannica, Fowler-Magerl, Clavis Canonum, 184-7.
\textsuperscript{1170} Letters of Lanfranc, 128-130.
\textsuperscript{1171} Register of Pope Gregory VII, 36-37, 312-313, 419-420.
\textsuperscript{1172} Cowdrey, ‘Gregorian Reform’, 341.
\textsuperscript{1173} Letters of Lanfranc, 130-132. Brooke, Z.N. ‘Demand for Fealty’.
\textsuperscript{1174} Cowdrey, ‘Gregorian Reform’, 340, 343.
probably less important than control of Durham castle.\footnote{1175} The *De Injusta Vexatione*, depicts the battle over legal competencies between the bishop and the archbishop, but also describes the king interjecting to demand that the fortress be handed over.\footnote{1176} Given the strategic importance of Durham, William Rufus could hardly leave a supporter of Robert Curthose in control of it, especially if he were already plotting the invasion of Normandy. But unlike Odo, William of St Calais held no secular honour. Durham castle was part of the diocese’s vast *temporalia*. Deposing and replacing William of St Calais would not have put the castle into the king’s hands, but into those of the next bishop.\footnote{1177} The strategic necessity of controlling the castle also goes some way toward explaining why king, hardly known for his magnanimity to vacant or vulnerable dioceses, treated Durham so well in the bishop’s absence, especially if he was truly filled with wrath towards the bishop,\footnote{1178} as well as his swift forgiveness of the bishop after Robert Curthose’ defeat in 1091. The agenda here was practical and strategic, and Lanfranc’s arguments reveal not a sincere legal theory, nor even a legal cloak for the king’s vengeance, but at best the “illusion of due process” in pursuit of a strategic objective.\footnote{1179} The Bishop’s surrender was not to superior legal argument, but to *force majeure*.\footnote{1180} As a result, once the Rufus and Curthose were reconciled, William of St Calais could be swiftly restored and continue his role as an important royal servant.

**Stephen and the Bishops (1139)**

King Stephen’s arrest of the bishops of Lincoln and Salisbury, and his attempted arrest of the bishop of Ely on 24\textsuperscript{th} June 1139 constitute perhaps the best-known incident of his reign, though it is no longer considered the political cataclysm

\footnote{1175} For the strategic importance of Durham, Aird, ‘St Cuthbert’
\footnote{1176} *De Injusta Vexatione*, 186, 188; Barlow, *William Rufus*, 88-89
\footnote{1177} Much has been written about the “rendability” of castles in Normandy and Anglo-Norman England, Haskins, Charles (1918). *Norman Institutions*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 278; Coulson, Charles (1973). ‘Rendability and Castellation in Medieval France’, in *Chateau Gaillard: Études de Castellologie Médiévale VI*: 59-67; Coulson also observed however, ‘Castles of the Anarchy’, 184 that this was never a straightforward matter, and even when accepted, it was intended only as a short-term measure for defensive warfare.
\footnote{1178} Aird, ‘An absent friend’, 292.
\footnote{1180} Barlow, *William Rufus*, 88.
it once was.\textsuperscript{1181} There are five significant accounts of the proceedings.\textsuperscript{1182} In her gloss, Greenway asserted that the “narratives are all in substantial agreement with one another.”\textsuperscript{1183} This observation is only accurate insofar as the major political and military effects of the arrest are considered. As a legal process, however, there are very substantial differences between the accounts.\textsuperscript{1184} Three elements constitute the reasons for the arrest itself – envy on the part of the secular magnates of the court for the bishops’ magnificent castles and entourages, a suspicion that the bishops were preparing to use their castles to support the empress, and a brawl between the bishops’ retainers and those of secular court magnates (with different victors in different versions). These appear in various combinations and with different emphases. In Malmesbury’s version, the arrest is blamed on the magnates’ envy and the brawl. The threat that the bishops might support the empress is advanced by them as an argument, but that is all. In John of Worcester’s version, the only cause is presented as the brawl. In Huntingdon’s version, none of these elements are present. The king acts apparently without provocation. In the Gesta Stephani, the envy of the magnates is the major reason, with the brawl taking place only after the coup had been launched, and the ambitions of the bishops to support Mathilda are presented as secret. Orderic gives all three reasons as contributing factors. Neither he, nor Huntingdon describe the trial process itself, though Huntingdon tells us that the bishops, rather than avoiding the court were keen to defend themselves.

We shall now turn to the charges advanced, and the arguments deployed. John of Worcester tells us that the bishops were arrested \textit{quasi regie corone insidatores}, and that afterwards a council was convened that decreed that bishops should commit themselves totally to their spiritual role. The Gesta Stephani that they were arrested \textit{ut episcopalis mansuetudinis transgressores suspexitque pacis suae et regni tranquillandi peruersores}. In addition, it also relates the argument that the bishops’ castles were royal possessions, \textit{Caesaris Caesari}, and that resumption of them into royal control was necessary for the maintenance of the king’s peace. Although he rehearsed all of these arguments, the author of the Gesta Stephani rejected them. In this version, even Stephen is not truly convinced of the legitimacy of his case, the

\textsuperscript{1181} Stringer, \textit{The Reign of Stephen}, 64; Matthew, \textit{King Stephen}, 91-93; Crouch, \textit{The Reign of King Stephen}, 97.
\textsuperscript{1182} \textit{HN}, 46-58; JWC, III, 245-249, 266-268; Huntingdon, 718-720; GS, 72-78; OV, VI, 530-532.
\textsuperscript{1183} Huntingdon, 720, fn.62.
\textsuperscript{1184} Gervase of Canterbury’s account (104) is not considered here because it is identical with that of JWC.
charges described as in mentis positus angustia plurimum secum anxiabatur, and the author cites a stream of biblical quotations establishing the inviolability of the lord’s anointed and the divine wrath that falls upon kings for such crimes.

In some respects, Malmesbury’s treatment is similar to that of the Gesta Stephani. He too heaped opprobrium on Stephen, suggesting the arrest was a reflection of his own malice, and his weakness before his magnates. His structure for unfolding the legal manoeuvre, however, is more elaborate. He presented it in two phases, the first the formation of two opposing camps around Archbishop Hugh of Rouen and Bishop Henry of Winchester. The second phase was a church council summoned by Henry, where he elaborated his arguments formally and was opposed first by Aubrey de Vere, and afterwards by Hugh.

In the first phase, Hugh’s case is that canon law forbade bishops to build castles. Henry’s is that only a church council could make such a judgement. Malmesbury’s sympathies were with Henry. The archbishop is presented as the king’s partisan, while Henry would be swayed by nec fraterna necessitudo, nec periculi metus. Malmesbury also reminded us that Henry was papal legate. As such, it was surely his prerogative to make such judgements.

In the second phase, Henry’s argument is that the king had committed both a secular and an ecclesiastical crime; he had violated the peace of his own court by the arrest, he had seized the goods of a defendant before trial was conducted (again, Exceptio Spolii) and he had robbed churches of their goods. Henry also pointed out the church’s role in assuring Stephen’s accession and suggested that this too entitled it to additional favour. Aubrey’s case is primarily concerned with the brawling of the episcopal knights, and the rumour that the bishop intended to desert to Matilda, to which he adds that the castles (and Bishop Roger’s gold) had been surrendered willingly, and that Rogerius itaque captus sit non ut episcopus, set ut regis serviens,

\[1185\] GS, 74.
\[1186\] 48-50; Richard Gem drew attention to Canon XII of Lateran I (1123), though he mistakenly labelled it Canon XIV (Tanner, Decrees, 192), “We prohibit with the apostolic authority the incastellation of churches by laymen, or their reduction to lay service.” Ecclesias a laicis incastellari, aut in servitutem redigi, auctoritate apostolica prohibemus, Gem, ‘Ecclesia Pulchra’, 24. He correctly commented that Stephen was in violation of these terms during his siege of Lincoln castle in 1141, and suggested that this prohibition was a result of the frequency with which churches were temporarily fortified by laymen in this period. As was shown in Part 2, Chapter 3, however, there is little record of this practice in England outside the period of the Civil Wars.
\[1187\] HN, 48-50.
**qui et procurationes eius administraret et solidatas acciperet.** This last part was flatly contradicted by Roger, who denies ever having been the king’s servant. Henry responded again that only a church council was competent to try bishops. Hugh then arrived and repeated his earlier assertion that episcopal castles were contrary to canon law, and that even if they were permitted in such times, castles ought to be surrendered to the king anyway. To this Aubrey adds that any bishop who appeals the judgement to Rome faces exile. In the face of this threat, and in the presence of armed men, drawing their weapons, the council broke up.

In this second phase, Malmesbury’s sympathies were with Henry again. His authority as legate is again emphasised, as is his Latin learning, and his willingness to suffer for truth. The argument about the brawling knights had already been shown as a pretext. Finally, the canonical arguments that “Hugh” advanced are problematic. His position that “he would allow the bishops to have their castles if...” is that of a man overstepping his authority, in the presence of a papal legate. “Hugh” cited no text to support the assertion that canon law was incompatible with castle holding. Furthermore, his argument had moved subtly from the first phase. Initially he argued that canon law forbade episcopal castle construction. In the second, he argues that canon law provides no authority for the construction of episcopal castles. He also offered no response to Henry’s observations about Stephen’s violation of secular law. The echoes of William of St Calais are clear – a desperate attempt on the part of a cooperative archbishop to justify on quasi-legal grounds the seizure of a bishop’s castles for politico-military purposes.

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1188 Ibid, 56.
1189 Ibid, 50.
1190 Ibid, 48.
1191 dixit se concedere ut episcopi castella haberent si... Ibid, 56.
1192 In marked contrast, in 1145/6, Pope Eugenius III would write to Bishop Bernard of Hildesheim, commanding him and his successors not to alienate the castle of Wincenburg (Jaffé 8817), repeated by antipope Victor IV in 1181-5 (Jaffé 14429). Waldman made the suggestion that Hugh’s “defence of the king is perhaps an interpretation of this phrase from the *Decretum*, ‘Bishops should not be placed in castles’.” Waldman, Thomas (1990). ‘Hugh of Amiens, Archbishop of Rouen (1130-64), the Norman Abbots, and the Papacy: the Foundation of a “Textual Community”’, in *HSJ* 2: 139-153 (147). There are difficulties with this. Though Hugh had a reputation as a canonical scholar, the *Decretum* was probably not even finished at this date. Even if he had the canon from another source, the canon itself, “Episcopi non in castellis neque in modicis ciuitatibus debent constitui, sed presbiteri per castella et modicas ciuitates atque uillias debent ab episcopis ordinari et ponii, singuli tamen per singulos titulos suos...” (280) is clearly concerned with the siting of bishoprics in small or rural sites, not with bishops owning fortifications. Hugh is not in fact described as referring to any canon law text at all. Callahan deals with the case, Callahan, T. ‘The arrest of the bishops’, 99, but does not appear to share my view about the solidity of Hugh’s case as presented by Malmesbury, but Kealey, *Roger of Salisbury*, 195 describes Hugh’s argument as good, but “tricky”.

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The overall impression given is of an elaborate *quaestio*, in which the correct opinion is heavily signposted, given a narrative framework and inserted into the text of the Chronicle. Malmesbury’s elaborate two-phase structure for the proceedings are unique to his account, as indeed is the presence of Hugh of Rouen. Though this has been universally accepted by scholars, its absence from other accounts and especially from the *Gesta Stephani* is reason for caution. Whether Malmesbury’s version is accepted or not, both it and the *Gesta Stephani* state that the bishops were tried by the king as laymen, and Malmesbury casts all this in the context of the seizure of unnamed laymen’s castles. The striking difference between this incident as Malmesbury presents it, and the trials of Odo and William of St Calais is the amount of legal resistance offered.

1177-1196

Howden briefly noted the capture in battle of the bishop of Down in Ulster by John de Courcy in 1177, when John defeated king Roderic, shortly after the capture of Down itself. Howden relates that the papal legate, Cardinal Vivianus persuaded de Courcy to release the bishop. The intervention of the cardinal, and Gerald’s assessment of John de Courcy as *ecclesiae Christi debitam reverentiam praestans* make it seem more likely that this was a product of his respect for the bishop’s cloth, and de Courcy charters (which include the bishops of Armagh, Connor, and indeed Down), have been used to argue that he swiftly gained clerical support for his conquests. If this is so, the contrast between de Courcy’s treatment of the Bishop of Dun, and Stephen’s of the bishops of Salisbury, Ely and Lincoln, could hardly be more marked.

Hugh de Nonant was a key figure in persuading Count John to rebel against his brother in 1192. Hugh was released in 1195, and bought back his bishopric for five thousand marks of silver. It is unfortunate that Howden provided few details of Hugh’s trial, for Richard may have adopted a new approach to the problem of the

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1194 25.
1198 Newburgh, Howlett (ed), I, 395.
1199 Ibid, 287.
rebel prelate. In the early stages of the king’s financing of his crusade, Hugh had purchased the shrievalties of Warwickshire, Leicestershire, and Staffordshire. Richard therefore decreed that the bishop of Coventry would be subjected to the judgement of the bishops, because he himself was a bishop, and of the laity, because he had been a sheriff under the king, an approach reminiscent of Geoffrey of Coutances’ suggestions for the trial of St Calais, but never employed as a legal instrument. A combined ecclesiastical-secular trial could, presumably have caught the bishop on canonical grounds. Holding sheriffdoms, after all, was not compatible with Canon XII of Lateran III, even if the lay component of the court exonerated him. It is striking, however, that even at this late date, the same difficulty of prosecuting a treasonous prelate with secular powers was still producing novel legal responses.

Bishop Philip of Beauvais was the last rebel prelate captured in our period. Every description of the bishop’s attack on John and Machades emphasises that the bishop himself was armatus, an accusation never made against previously captured clerics. The royal argument, however tenuous, in those earlier cases was that the bishops had offended in their capacities as lords, earls or sheriffs, but no source describes Philip as behaving as a secular lord. Indeed, the (probably forged) letter of Celestine III apparently reproduced verbatim in Howden scolds the Bishop on the grounds that he had “assumed the warlike knight”, militem bellicosum induisti (Part 3, Chapter 2). The History of William the Marshal puts similar words into the mouth of Richard the Lionheart, exploding at a Cardinal who denied his right to hold Philip that “... He’s been deconsecrated...It was not as a bishop that he was taken captive, but as a knight of great reputation, fully armed and with his helmet laced...” eiz est dessacre... Ne fu pas comme avesque pris, Toz armez, li hielme lacié. The insistence both by Celestine and by “Richard” that Philip is not seen as an enemy lord, but as a knight must in part reflect the considerable rise in social status that both the milites and the idea of miles had undergone over the course of the twelfth century. It may also, however, finally represent evidence that the separation of militia saeculari and militia Christi pursued as an intellectual construct by canonical authors of the ninth century was finally having an impact on policy.

1200 Franklin, ‘Nonant, Hugh de (d. 1198)’.
1201 Howden, Chronica, III, 211. Note the echoes (in the matter of royal service) of the accusation brought by De Vere against Roger of Salisbury.
1202 Howden, Chronica, IV, 23.
1203 History of William the Marshal, 80, 81.
Conclusions

As the scholarship on medieval warfare in general has advanced, it has developed a view of war as a complex association of social, economic and strategic issues. Militant clergy, however, have largely been left behind. Their status continues to be seen as derived from a combination of aristocratic birth, the obligations imposed by servitium debitum, and defiance of canon law. Some evidence does indeed point in this direction; Some of the clergy who have featured prominently in this thesis, such as Odo of Bayeux and Hugh du Puiset were drawn from the royal family or high aristocracy. Others, like Thomas Becket, held high secular office while they were most militarily active. Geoffrey of Coutances, Henry of Blois and Geoffrey Plantagenet are easily portrayed as examples of militant prince-bishops, part of an “energetic, warlike and prolific baronage”. They did indeed control wide lands and great wealth. Land tenure by military service, and possession of fortresses built on church lands are significant, and there are a number of condemnations of militant clergy by canon lawyers and chroniclers alike. Indeed, some historians have been surprised to discover that clergy who were involved in warfare were knowledgeable in that law, or committed to their spiritual activities.

Nevertheless, clerical involvement in war is a more complex field than this implies. A survey of clerical involvement on campaign established that the clergy who became involved in warfare were men of diverse origin. “Militant clergy” comprised not only men born to wealth and high office, but those of obscure background, like Leofgar of Hereford, and the parish priests who rallied to Thurstan’s Standard. This group of diverse men fought under equally diverse circumstances. They led men on campaigns of conquest, and in resistance to invasion. They fought on opposing sides of civil wars and rebellions. They joined royal and ducal campaigns into France, and followed the banners of crusade. Their voices carried in high military council, and some fought in person. Though there are often parallels that can be drawn between the circumstances of one militant cleric and those of another, for instance between Odo of Bayeux’s campaign into the north in 1080 and that of William de Longchamps in 1190-91, there was no archetypal militant prelate. The

1205 Barthélémy, ‘The Peace of God’, 5 “Was Stephen II [of Clermont] a warrior bishop? We cannot exclude the possibility, even though he attracts our attention having a reliquary statue made for his new cathedral at Clermont”; Gleason, Ecclesiastical Barony, 14-15; Philpott, ‘De inusta’, 133.
phrase ‘warrior prelate’, should only be used with great care. It is only acceptable when either the prelate in question or a (near) contemporary used military attributes as part of the construction of his identity.

While land tenure by military service is significant, it has often obscured other aspects of prelates’ relationships with their followers. Clergy can often be seen in conflict with their tenants, but they pursued a range of strategies for retaining control of them both in war and peace. The evidence for military lieutenants, particularly constables, is fragmented, but widespread, and suggestive of different degrees of formal development in different houses. The personal means of control could range from pursuing claims in the curia regis, to the use of alcohol or even violence. Ecclesiastical retinues perhaps began with Anglo-Saxon traditions of riding service, but became militarily significant in times of crisis after the Conquest, and by the mid-twelfth century were an expression of prestige. Clerical control of fortresses was essentially a post-Conquest phenomenon, but temporary control of castles during campaigns may have been more significant than the permanent possession of fortifications on ecclesiastical lands, and the castle itself could be a contested, sometimes religious, space. Full analysis of clerical military power, moreover, must include spiritual weapons, the perceived effectiveness of which declined greatly over the period while religious banners became more prominent. While clerics became responsible for organising local defence under a variety of circumstances, this was often an ad hoc response to dire need, and sometimes resulted in disaster. Though there were common problems and resources, there was no standard clerical approach to prosecuting warfare, and their sources of power were far more diverse than just landed wealth.

The most striking features of canonical treatments of militant clergy are their lack of consistency, and their reactive formation. Most continental treatments dealt with specific practical problems, as they emerged. English conciliar productions such as the Penitential Ordinances of 1067, and the Canons of the Council of Westminster (1138), had a continental context, but should be understood as reactions to specific incidents within England. This sense of ideological heterogeneity is also found in the lack of consistency between, and even within narratives. There is a common stock of techniques used by Anglo-Norman and Angevin writers to describe militant clergy, but individual authors apply those techniques very differently, showing a range of reactions from adulation to consistent suppression. There is, moreover, little evidence
of influence by canonical texts on narratives, even by authors who were well informed on the matter. Royal policy toward clergy who had merited either reward or punishment from the crown seems to have been consistently pragmatic but without intellectual continuity or even sincerity. There was no standard aesthetic, legislative or judicial reaction to militant clergy.

This lack of consensus is perhaps the most surprising finding of this thesis, for some important thinkers, such as Aelfric, William of Malmesbury, and Gratian treated this issue at length. Indeed, it appears that asking what was “considered licit” on this subject either assumes intellectual and moral homogeneity, or privileges one contemporary view over others. Kaeuper has recently addressed the work of authors who aimed to reconcile the practical demands of secular power with devotion to a deity who was both Prince of Peace and God of Battles. Nevertheless:

“The resolution of such paradoxes was not universal: There was more than one opinion. Inconveniently, clerics did not speak with one voice on so complex or troubling a set of topics as war and violence. Canonists, scholastic theologians, crusade preachers, priests hearing confessions – all could sustain their own arguments based on deep principles or informed by pragmatism. What we so readily term “the church” scarcely represented a monolithic body of thought...”

Indeed, if we accept that there was no archetypal militant cleric, there is no reason to expect to find a standard response to him. One of the possible cases that Gratian had advanced for condemning militant clergy cast the problem as one of lust for power and wealth entangling ecclesiastics in service to kings. Perhaps such an assessment might apply to William de Longchamps. It seems both strange and unjust to apply it to Anselm in 1095, Thurstan in 1138, or indeed Turold in 1070. If involvement in warfare did not change clerics’ opinion of themselves, some other matters become clearer. While clerical arms-bearing was sometimes associated in canonical treatments with clerical sexual relations or simony, it was quite a different practical problem. The very intractability of simony and clerical incontinence made them perpetual concerns, and they were almost always revisited when ecclesiastical councils convened. Direct involvement leading campaigns, or bearing arms in battle however, is particularly associated with periods of extraordinary social and political stress, and even then was often confined to the upper hierarchy. After the Council of Rheims (1049) forbade

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clergy from bearing arms or marrying, the priests were supposedly happy to give up bearing arms but would not be parted from their wives or mistresses. These men bore arms and were married, but while they were husbands, they were not *milites*. Sacrificing their weapons was a small matter compared with sacrificing their women.

If it is accepted that the reactions of contemporaries to militant clergy were as varied as their circumstances and their forms of military practice, it becomes possible to view specific incidents without overemphasising land tenure or canonical pronouncements. We can therefore reintegrate the questions of circumstances, means and identity, as in this example. In c.1148, Bishop Henry of Winchester’s castle of Downton was seized by Earl Patrick of Salisbury, who used it as a base to pillage the region. According to the *Gesta Stephani*, therefore (*itaque*) the bishop “boldly taking up the weapons of the church’s warfare smote these brutal plunderers of his possessions with the adamantine sword of excommunication”, (...*arma ecclesiasticae militiae uiriliter arripiens, infestos rerum suarum epilatores rigidissimo anathematis percult gladio*). When this failed to induce the return of his stronghold, he “opened his treasury” (*thesauros aperuit*), and sent his nephew, Hugh du Puiset to hire mercenaries to besiege the castle, while he himself was called away to Rome. On his return, Henry summoned a countless “host of fighters” (*multitudine militantium*), built a counter-castle, and finally reclaimed his fortress. Henry’s motive for action seems straightforward – the loss of his castle and devastation of the region. His means of action, however, included the use of spiritual weapons, the contents of a treasury which drew revenues from ecclesiastical and secular sources, and the services as lieutenant of a man who was both his kinsman and a cleric. The origins of his “host of fighters” who finally overcame Downton’s defences are unknown. Henry’s way of war, however, comprised secular and spiritual elements, and sources of military power left ambiguous by the chronicler. The question of identity is more complex. Did such activities change Henry’s identity, making him a “warrior” rather than a bishop at war? Huntingdon alleged this. For him, Henry was a “new kind of monster, composed part pure and part corrupt... part monk and part knight” (*nouum quoddam

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1207: *OV*, III, 120.
1208: Archbishop John of Rouen would later be stoned out of his own Cathedral for trying to compel clerics to give up their wives, *OV*, IV, 200.
monstrum ex integro et corrupto compositum, scilicet monachus et miles).\textsuperscript{1209} While Huntingdon’s assessment of Henry’s personality may be memorable, it had little impact even on Robert of Torigni. It seems most unlikely that Henry would apply such definitions to himself, or that we should. Take, for instance, the fragmentary letter exchange between Henry and Brien fitz Count. In those letters, the ecclesiastical identity Henry invoked to coerce Brien was contested. Henry addressed Brien, “Henry by the grace of God bishop of Winchester and Legate of the Apostolic See to Brien fitz Count,” (\textit{Henricus dei gratia Wintonie episcopus et sedis apostolice legatus Briento filio Comitis}). Brien, however, denied him his ecclesiastical titles, replying “Brien fitz Count to Henry, nephew of King Henry, greetings”, (\textit{Henrico nepoti Henrici Regis Brientius filius Comitis salutem}).\textsuperscript{1210} Brien’s letter sought to strip Henry of his spiritual authority, dragging him down into the world of secular nobility and trial by battle. By the time he finally did use the full episcopal and legate’s title, it was to challenge Henry to a duel. Davis, while interested in “the myths [men] make about themselves” allowed Brien’s mocking rhetorical strategy to succeed when he called Henry “a bishop, but a bishop of the political kind”.\textsuperscript{1211} Using political and military activity to classify clerics into types,\textsuperscript{1212} should be discarded.

By considering a wide range of individuals in widely differing circumstances, the study of militant clergy perhaps suggests a new approach to clerical biography. Clerical behaviour should be approached without introducing divisions between their secular and spiritual activities just as they themselves should not be classified into types. It should consider the discourses that described them, both as examples of particular techniques, and as reactions to specific individuals and behaviours. It must not, however, allow polemicists or apologists to frame the terms of investigation alone. Where possible, the cleric’s role in the construction of his own identity should also be examined. Henry of Blois would be an ideal candidate for the extended application of such an approach.

\textsuperscript{1209} Huntingdon, 608.
\textsuperscript{1210} Davis, ‘Henry of Blois’, 300-301.
\textsuperscript{1211} Ibid, 297, 298.
Appendices

Introduction

Early Canonical Prohibitions and Restrictions

(1) Council of Chalcedon (451 AD) Canon VII

Qui semel in clero deputati sunt aut monachorum vitam expetiverunt, statuimus, neque ad militiam neque ad dignitatem aliquam venire mundanam aut, hoc temptantes et non agentes poenitentiam, ut redeant ad hoc, quod propter Deum prius elegerunt, anathematizari.\textsuperscript{1213}

(2) Letter of Pope Leo the Great (458/9 AD)

Propositum monachi proprio arbitrio ac voluntate suscipsum deseri non potest absque peccato. Quod enim quis voxit Deo debet et reddere. Unde qui relictia singularitatis professione ad militiam vel ad nuptias devolutus est, publicae poenitentiae satisfactione purgandus est. Quia etsi innocens militia et honestum potest esse conjugium, electionem meliorem deseruisset transgressio est.\textsuperscript{1214}

(3) Council of Lérida (546 AD) Canon I

De his clericis qui in obsessionibus necessitate positi fuerint, id statutum est ut qui altario ministrant, et Christi corpus et sanguinem tradunt, vel vasa sacro offitio deputata contractant, ut ab omni humano sanguine, etiam hostili se abstineant. Quod si in hoc inciderint, duobus annis tam offitio quam communione priventur. Ita ut duobus annis, vigiliis, ieiuniis, orationibus, et elemosinis pro viribus quas dominus donaverit expientur, et ita demum offitio vel communione reddantur. Ea tamen ratione, ne ulterius ad offitia pociora promoveantur. Quod si in praefinito tempore neglegentiores circa salutem suam extiterint, prestolandi ipsius paenitentiae tempus in potestate maneat sacerdotis.\textsuperscript{1215}

(4) Fourth Council of Toledo (633 AD) Canon XLV

Clerici in quacumque seditione arma volentes sumpserint aut sumpserunt, reperti amissi ordinis sui gradu, in monasterium paenitentiae contradantur.\textsuperscript{1216}

(5) Fourth Council of Toledo (633 AD) Canon XXXII

Episcopi in protegendis populis ac defendendis, inpositam a Deo sibi curam non ambigant. Ideoque dum conspiciunt iudices ac potentes pauperum obpressores existere, prius eos sacerdotali ammonitione redarguant. Et si contempserint emendari, eorum insolentiam regis auribus intiment, ut quos sacerdotalis ammonitio non flectit ad iustitiam, regalis potestas ab improbitate coerceat. Si quis autem episcoporum id neglexerit concilio reus erit.\textsuperscript{1217}

\textsuperscript{1213} Tanner (1990), 90.
\textsuperscript{1214} PL 84, Col.0767-0768; C.20 q.3 c.1.
\textsuperscript{1215} http://www.benedictus.mgh.de/quellen/chga/chga_041t.htm accessed 29/08/10; D.1 c.36.
\textsuperscript{1216} http://www.benedictus.mgh.de/quellen/chga/chga_046t.htm accessed 24/6/08.
\textsuperscript{1217} Ibid.
(6) Council of Meaux (845 AD) Canon XVIII
Quicumque ex clero esse videntur, arma militaria non sumant, nec armati incedant, sed professionis sue vocabulum religiosis moribus et religioso habitu prebeant. Quod si contemperisent, tanquam sacrum canonum contemptores et ecclesiasticum sanctitatis profanatores, proprii gradus amissione multentur, quia non possunt simul Deo et seculo militare.\textsuperscript{1218}

(7) Forged Decree attributed to Charlemagne in “Benedictus Levita”

Carolus gratia dei rex regnique Francorum rector et devotus sanctae ecclesiae defensor atque adiutor in omnibus. Apostolice sedis hortatu, omniumque fidelium nostrorum, et maxime episcoporum ac reliquorum sacerdotum consultu, servis dei per omnia omnis armaturam portare vel pugnare aut in exercitum et in hostem pergere omnino prohibemus, nisi illa tantummodo qui propter divinum misterium, missarum scilicet solemnia adinplenda et sanctorum patrocinia portanda, ad hoc electi sunt; id est, unum vel duos episcopos cum capellanis presbyteris princeps secum habeat, et unusquisque praefectus unum presbyterum, qui hominibus peccata condictibus iudicare et indicare penitentiam possit.\textsuperscript{1219}

(8) Letter of Pope Nicholas I to King Louis the German and Charles the Bald

Reprehensibile ualde esse constat quod subintulisti, dicendo maiorem partem hominum episcoporum die noctuque cum aliis fidelibus tuis contra pyratas maritimos inuigilare, ob idque episcopi impediantur uenire, cum militia Christi sit Christo servire. militibus uero seculo seculo, sicut scriptum est. Nemo militans Deo implicat se negociis secularibus. Quod si seculi milites militie student, quid ad episcopos et milites Christi, nisi ut uacent orationibus?\textsuperscript{1220}

(9) Letter of Pope Nicholas to Bishop Geoffrey of Thérouanne (867)

Clericum qui paganum occiderit non oportet ad gradum majorem provehi, qui carere debet etiam acquisito. Homicida enim est. Nam cum discreti sint milites saeculi a milites Ecclesiae, non convenit militem Ecclesiae saeculo militare, per quod ad effusionem sanguinis necesse sit pervenire. Denique sicut turpe ac perniciosum est laicum missas facere, sacramenta corporis et sanguinis Christi conficere, ita ridiculum est et inconveniens clericum arma sustollere et ad bella procedere, cum Paulus egregius praedicator dicat: Nemo militans Deo implicit se negotiis saecularibus; ac sic liquido versa vice, nemo militans mundo implicat se negotiis spiritualibus.\textsuperscript{1221}

(10) Letter of Pope Nicholas to Osbald, chorepiscopus of Regensburg (867)

De his clericis pro quibus consulstistis, scilicet qui se defendendo paganum occiderunt, si postea per poenitentiam emendati possint ad gradum pristinum redire,

\textsuperscript{1218} http://knowledgeforge.net/ivo/decretum/ivodec_6_1p0.pdf accessed 8/7/08; C. 23 q. 8 c. 6.
\textsuperscript{1219} http://www.benedictus.mgh.de/handschriften/p16_3t.htm accessed 7/7/08 (3.123 - 3.115 in Bnf lat. 4635).
\textsuperscript{1220} http://project.knowledgeforge.net/ivo/tripartita/trip_a_1_1p2.pdf accessed 12/08/08; C. 23 q. 8 c. 19; Full text; PL 119, Col 0921-0924.
\textsuperscript{1221} PL 119, Cols 1129-1130A; D1 c.5.
aut ad altiorem conscendere: scito nos nullam occasionem dare, nec ullam tribuere eis licentiam quemlibet hominem quolibet modo occidendi. Verum si contigerit, ut clericus sacerdotalis ordinis saltem paganum occiderit, multum sibi consulit, si ab officio sacerdotali recesserit: satiusque est, illi in hac vita Domino sub inferiori habitu irreprehensibili famulari, quam alte indebite appetendo damnabiliter in profundum demergi.\footnote{PL 119, Col 131C; D.I c.6.}

\footnote{(11) Canon of the Council of Tribur (895)} Quicumque clericus aut in bello, aut in rixa, aut gentilium ludis mortuus fuerit, neque oblatione pro eo postuletur, sed in manus incidat iudicis. Sepultura tantum non privetur.\footnote{http://knowledgeforge.net/ivo/decretum/ivodec_6_1p0.pdf; C. 23 q. 8 c. 4.}

\section*{Part 1}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Year & Cleric(s) & Engagement/Campaign & Earliest Source & Comment/Supplementary sources \\
\hline
Lent 429 & Germanus of Auxerre & Battle against Saxons and Picts & The \textit{Vita S. Germani} (154-158) & \\
\hline
613x 616 & 200 Priests from the Monastery of Bangor & Battle at Chester & \textit{Bede, the Historia Ecclesiastica} (140) & Killed for praying for Welsh victory. \\
\hline
823 & Bishop Ealhstan (Sherborne) & Conquest of Kent & \textit{ASC A} (60) & Named as one of three expedition leaders. Malmesbury adds some detail.\footnote{GP, I, 276-8; GR, I, 156-8.}
\hline
833 & Bishops Herefrith and Wigthegn (Winchester) & Battle at Carhampton & \textit{ASC A} (62) & Ambiguous whether the bishops were killed in battle or just died that year. Some 12C chroniclers read the \textit{ASC} as stating the former. \\
\hline
848 & Bishop Ealhstan (Sherborne) & Battle at the mouth of the River Parret & \textit{ASC A} (64) & Led the men of Dorset, with Ealdorman Osric. \\
\hline
871 & Bishop Heahmund (Sherborne) & Battle of Merton & \textit{ASC A} (72) & Killed fighting under Aethelred and Alfred. \\
\hline
c.90 9x925 & Bishop Waerstan (Sherborne) & Battle against Analvus & \textit{WMGPA} (280)/\textit{Gesta Regum} (208) & Killed with his men in an ambush after King Aethelstan had withdrawn. \\
\hline
943 & Archbishop Wulfstan (York) & On campaign with Olaf Guthrithson, Siege of Leicester & \textit{ASC D} (111) & Captured by King Edmund when the city fell. \\
\hline
992 & Bishops Aelfstan (London or Rochester) and Bishop Aescwig (Dorchester)\footnote{Hollister, \textit{Military Institutions}, 110.} & Naval expedition & \textit{ASC C}\footnote{Swanton`s translation omits these years in MSS C and D, though gives E (which includes this incident), 127. Other editions have this event in both C and D., English Historical Documents I, Dorothy Whitelock (ed). London: Eyre Methuen. (1979), 234; The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle: A} & Named as leaders of the fleet along with Ealdorman Aelfric and Earl Thored. \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Clerics present in battles and sieges in England before 1066}
\end{table}
The Portrayal of Bishop Odo in the Bayeux Tapestry

The Tapestry is the only near-contemporary piece of evidence that indicates Odo had a leadership role in the battle itself. There has, however, been a good deal of discussion, mostly regarding minute analysis of the bishop’s clothing as to what is actually depicted, and especially whether the Tapestry portrays Odo as equipped to fight in person.

Some commentators have said that Odo is depicted as “not armoured”, or not wearing a hauberk. Legge said that a deliberate attempt was made to show Odo as a non-combatant wearing only a “mail shirt” and “cap”. Owen-Crocker suggested that the unusual garment covering Odo’s mail is of leather. Conversely, Bates described Odo as in “full armour”, and Gibbs-Smith wrote that he wore a (possibly quilted) tunic over a hauberk “the coif and sleeves of which can be clearly seen emerging”. There has been a similar level of disagreement as to the proper identification of the instrument held in Odo’s hand. Bates has surveyed the spectrum

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Hollister, Military Institutions, 93.

Abels, Lordship and Military Obligation, 180; Giandrea, Episcopa Culture, 35.

JWC, II, 580.

Shirley Brown incorrectly thought that Odo’s military reputation may be entirely derived from this image. ‘Why Eustace!’, 21.

Wilson, Bayeux Tapestry, 195.

Chibnall, ‘Geoffroi de Montbray’, 286.


of opinion from mace to baton, and favoured a command symbol similar to the Conqueror's own.\textsuperscript{1239} Thorne's analysis, however, drew attention to William of Poitiers' comment that Odo \textit{Arma neque movit unquam, neque voluit moveri},\textsuperscript{1240} suggesting that it may represent an authority symbol of Viking origin, and even that Odo has picked up William's.\textsuperscript{1241} Musset and Bradbury follow Freeman's view that Odo carried a mace in order to fight without shedding blood.\textsuperscript{1242} Any interpretation of Odo’s image, from unarmoured and gesturing with a command baton to fully armoured and swinging a mace, is therefore possible without departing from modern scholarship.

Gibbs-Smith's conclusion, and his reasoning regarding Odo’s apparel seem unarguable. The links in Odo’s mail are clearly visible at both neck and wrist, with nothing to indicate that it is anything different from the hauberks worn by the other Norman knights nearby. His headgear is clearly a helmet. Although Gale Owen-Crocker has pointed out that the knob at the apex is apparently unique, this seems a very minor detail.\textsuperscript{1243} Otherwise, it is a standard Norman helmet with nasal, almost identical to many in the tapestry and similar to extant examples.\textsuperscript{1244} The problem of whatever garment covers Odo’s mail is more difficult. Owen-Crocker thought that this too was unique, but Lewis pointed out both that Duke William seems to wear something similar, which he calls a “padded coat” on the ride to Mont Saint Michel, and that examples of similar garments appear as armour in French Romanesque illustrations, but also observed the lack of consistency in representation of Odo’s appearance.\textsuperscript{1245} The precise nature of the triangular-patterned garment may be beyond certain identification, in the absence of surviving examples. Whether intended to provide additional protection, an expression of Odo’s flamboyance, either at the time, or during the Tapestry’s design, or a flight of the designer’s fancy, the essential point, is that it is worn \textit{in addition to}, rather than instead of what seems to be standard

\textsuperscript{1239} Bates, ‘Character and Career’, 6.
\textsuperscript{1241} Ibid, 50.
\textsuperscript{1243} Owen-Crocker, ‘Brothers, Rivals and Geometry’, 110.
\textsuperscript{1244} See for instance, Stone, George (1999), \textit{A Glossary of the Construction, Decoration and Use of Arms and Armour in all Countries and in all Times}. New York: Jack Brussel, 24.
\textsuperscript{1245} Lewis, Michael (2005). \textit{The Archaeological Authority of the Bayeux Tapestry}. Oxford: Archaeopress, 50, 128. See Wilson, pl. 18-19. Unfortunately, whilst this helps to suggest a high-status garment, this is no help as regards to its practical function. The knights accompanying the Duke here are some armed but unarmoured, while others wear full armour. We therefore cannot conclude from this whether Odo’s garment is just clothing, light armour, or something more substantial.
Norman armour. Odo is depicted as being as heavily armoured as the knights around him. The only question is whether he is even more so.

The identification of the baculus is more challenging, but is only a serious problem if the example carried by Odo is taken in isolation. In fact, an instrument of this type, between two and three feet in length, thickening towards the end and with two or more knobs projecting from the shaft, is more often associated with William than Odo. William carries one on the ride to Mont Saint Michel, when questioning Vitalis, when preparing his knights to attack, and when casting back his helmet to show his men that he has not been killed. In fact, this is the only instrument that William is ever seen to carry into battle. He is only depicted with a sword at council meetings, when he is seated and not about to wield the weapon in anger. Despite this, no historian has argued that the Duke was a non-combatant, or that he was anxious to avoid shedding blood. As it is associated with both brothers, it seems likely that the baculus is indeed an authority symbol associated with military command. This does not mean that it could not also be a weapon for disciplining troops, akin to a Roman centurion’s virga, or that the two brothers did not also carry edged weapons. It may mean simply that the designer emphasized symbols of command over edged weapons. In this light, the caption Odo Episcopus baculum tenens confortat pueros does not downplay Odo’s violence but emphasizes his leadership, as perhaps does the inclusion of a covering garment of similar design to that associated earlier with William.

Even in the Tapestry, this is the only point at which Odo is depicted as playing a role in the battle. The phrase “confortat pueros” is therefore of great interest. In the circumstances, confortare seems a curious choice of verb, over say, hortari, or ordinem revocare, perhaps because of the ecclesiastical connotations that cling to the word. Writers who have addressed the question of the identity of the pueri have

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1247 Wilson, pls. 18, 55, 57, 68.
1248 This interpretation, which both emphasizes Odo’s authority, and his connexions to his brother would add weight to Brown’s suggestion that the Tapestry was commissioned during Odo’s incarceration as an appeal for clemency, ‘Why Eustace?’, 26.
1249 Omnia possum in eo qui me confortat, Phillipians, 4:13.
come to the conclusion that they represent youths who had not yet attained knighthood.1250

Part 2

Table 2: ‘Constables’ and ‘Marshals’ in the service of English prelates

**Diocese of Bath (1061-1205)**1251

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<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
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<td>Gocewine</td>
<td>Constable</td>
<td>11351252</td>
<td>Godfrey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William</td>
<td>Marshal</td>
<td>11661253</td>
<td>Robert of Lewes</td>
</tr>
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<td>Richard</td>
<td>Marshal</td>
<td>1174x84, 1189x911254</td>
<td>Reginald de Bohun</td>
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<tr>
<td>Walter</td>
<td>Marshal</td>
<td>1195x12051255</td>
<td>Savaric</td>
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**Archdiocese of Canterbury**1256

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<tr>
<td>Richard</td>
<td>Constable</td>
<td>c.10871257</td>
<td>Lanfranc</td>
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<td>Ralph Picot</td>
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<td>1139x401258</td>
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<td>Marshal</td>
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<td>Osbert</td>
<td>Marshal</td>
<td>?1260</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Robert</td>
<td>Marshal</td>
<td>1155-11771261</td>
<td>Theobald and Richard of Dover</td>
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**Diocese of Carlisle (1133-1292)**1262

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<tr>
<td>Richard</td>
<td>Marshal</td>
<td>1219x231263</td>
<td>Hugh of Beaulieu</td>
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1251 *EEA X*.
1252 Doc 7.
1253 Doc 35.
1254 Docs 68, 80, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 161, 164, 168 and 169.
1255 Docs 182 and 229.
1257 *Domesday Monachorum*, 85, 93.
1258 Ralph appears several times in Theobald’s Acta (Saltman’s docs. 44, 51, 55, 60, 86, 146, 155, 161, 174, 225, supp. A., Supp. C. Whilst these may span the years 1139x82, only in one document (161) is he called constable, and so that is the date that has been given here.
1259 Saltman, Doc 255.
1260 *EEA II*, Doc 138. A donation of tithes to Horton priory by Osbert the Marshal is referred to in a confirmation (1182 x 1184) by King Henry II.
1262 *EEA 30*. Note that after the death of the first bishop, Adelulf (1156/7), there was a vacancy of almost fifty years.
1263 Doc 60.
<table>
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<td>Gerard</td>
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<td>c.1170x1174</td>
<td>Hugh le Puiset</td>
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<tr>
<td>Henry</td>
<td>Marshal</td>
<td>c.1180x1189</td>
<td>Hugh le Puiset</td>
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**Diocese of Ely (1109-1197)**

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<td>Constable</td>
<td>1110x31</td>
<td>Hervey</td>
</tr>
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<td>Adam</td>
<td>Constable</td>
<td>1133x58</td>
<td>Nigel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John</td>
<td>Marshal</td>
<td>1155x58</td>
<td>Nigel</td>
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<tr>
<td>John</td>
<td>Marshal</td>
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<td>William de Longchamp</td>
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**Diocese of Exeter (1046-1184)**

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<td>Robert I or II</td>
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<td>Gilbert</td>
<td>Marshal</td>
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<td>Bartholomew</td>
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**Diocese of Hereford (1079-1234)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Bishop Served</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Henry</td>
<td>Marshal</td>
<td>1174x86</td>
<td>Robert Foliot</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

1265 Doc 124, 105. Hugh described Gerard as “Marescallus noster”.
1266 Doc 158, 135. Note that while Snape (xiv) assumed that Henry was a layman, he appears part way through the clerical component of the witness list.
1268 Doc 9.
1269 Doc 3.
1270 Adam unfortunately aroused the vengeance of the saint, died and was the subject of horrible visions afterwards. *Liber Eliensis*, 386.
1271 Docs 38 and 41.
1272 39 (John witnessed this document *ex parte episcopi*, while another marshal, Hervey, witnessed *ex parte vero comitis*, 94).
1273 Doc 133. Lest matters become too easy, the popularity of the name John complicates matters further. There are three John Marshals in the Ely acta. This John is identified as the bishop’s own Marshal by Karn (cxxii), and should therefore be distinguished from the John Marshal who appears in doc. 168 among others in a list of those whom Longchamp would anathematise, and Bishop Nigel’s Constable.
1274 *EEA XI*.
1275 This individual appears only once, in a witness list as Philipus Const’. Barlow, who edited this volume, expanded the abbreviation as Constantiensis, i.e. that the individual named is Philip of Coutances. It is at least possible, however, that ‘const’ should be expanded as ‘constabularius’.
1276 Doc 53.
1277 Doc 110.
1279 Docs 150, 160, 173, 258. Henry only appears in charters of Foliot and de Braose. Whether he continued to act as Marshal under de Vere is uncertain. He may have done so and simply left no documentary trace, or he may have lost his position under de Vere and resumed it under de Braose. Given the appearance of Marshal Richard under de Vere only, the latter explanation seems probable.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Bishop Served</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>William</td>
<td>Constable</td>
<td>1132-1135x42</td>
<td>Alexander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hugh</td>
<td>Constable</td>
<td>1139x47-1151x61</td>
<td>Alexander/Robert Chesney?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unnamed</td>
<td>Constable</td>
<td>1140x47</td>
<td>Alexander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert</td>
<td>Constable</td>
<td>c.1150-1180</td>
<td>Robert Chesney</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alan</td>
<td>Marshal</td>
<td>c.1160</td>
<td>Robert Chesney</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard</td>
<td>Constable</td>
<td>c.1161</td>
<td>Robert Chesney</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walter</td>
<td>Constable</td>
<td>1189x91</td>
<td>Hugh of Avallon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hubert</td>
<td>Constable</td>
<td>c.1200</td>
<td>Hugh of Avallon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William</td>
<td>Constable (Newark)</td>
<td>c.1210x1220</td>
<td>Hugh of Wells</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert</td>
<td>Constable (Newark)</td>
<td>c.1210x1220</td>
<td>Hugh of Wells</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Diocese of Lincoln (1067-1250)**

No charter of Alexander is witnessed by his constable(s), but before 1140, William, describing himself as constabularius Alexandri episcopi Linc gave the churches of South Carlton and Thurlby to Lincoln cathedral (Reg. Ant. Add. 552). William confirmed the grant in augmentation of the prebend of his son Robert (Reg. Ant. Add. 553). See David Smith’s Introduction to *EEA I*, xli. Hugh also appears as a witness in 1147 (Reg. Ant. Add. 921), along with a Robert (presumably the same individual), identified as filius constabularii. William appears with bishop Alexander’s mother, Ada in a twelfth-century Lincoln Obituary (II Kalends. Jan). *GCO*, VII, 154, the only constable to do so. The only other figure in the obit identified by a military title is Berengarius, miles, 156.

Reg. Ant. Add. 552 was witnessed by Constable William’s son, Hugh. Smith therefore suggests that the later appearances of Constable Hugh indicated that the latter was the same person.


Reg. Ant. Add. 1018, Reg. Ant. Add. 1247, Reg. Ant. 372 and 423 (1514), Reg. Ant. 807 (2474) and Reg. Ant. Add. 2608. In the context of Constable Hugh’s grants, it seems almost certain that this Robert is both Constable Hugh’s son, and canon of the cathedral. He was certainly deceased by 1190/91, when Reg. Ant. Add. 2926 refers to Robertus Constabularius bone memorie. It is worth noting therefore, that his memory was preserved as constable rather than canon, and also that his tenure as constable apparently overlaps with that of his father.

Reg. Ant. 292 (1296).


Reg. Ant. Add. 924.


Reg. Ant. Add. 917.

Reg. Ant. Add. 918. Robert is described as Robertus rector ecclesie de Estwelle tunc constabularius de Bannebiria.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Bishop Served</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>J. Marshal</td>
<td></td>
<td>1214x1215</td>
<td>Hugh of Wells</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Marshal</td>
<td></td>
<td>c.1210x1220-</td>
<td>Hugh of Wells /Robert Grosseteste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1245x1250</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard</td>
<td>Marshal</td>
<td>1220x1230</td>
<td>Robert Grosseteste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas</td>
<td>Marshal</td>
<td>1233</td>
<td>Hugh of Wells</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roger</td>
<td>Marshal</td>
<td>c.1215-1239x1245</td>
<td>Hugh of Wells</td>
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<tr>
<td>William</td>
<td>Marshal</td>
<td>1239x1245</td>
<td>Robert Grosseteste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert</td>
<td>Marshal</td>
<td>1235x1254</td>
<td>Robert Grosseteste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walter</td>
<td>Marshal</td>
<td>Query 1240</td>
<td>Robert Grosseteste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David</td>
<td>Marshal</td>
<td>1260x1262</td>
<td>Henry de Lexington/Richard of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gravesend</td>
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**Diocese of London (1076-1187)\(^{1303}\)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Bishop Served</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hugh</td>
<td>Marshal</td>
<td>1141x48</td>
<td>Robert de Sigillo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unnamed</td>
<td>Constable</td>
<td>1163x84</td>
<td>Gilbert Foliot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William</td>
<td>Marshal</td>
<td>1163x84</td>
<td>Gilbert Foliot</td>
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</table>

**Diocese of Norwich (1070-1204)\(^{1308}\)**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Dates</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nigel</td>
<td>Constable</td>
<td>1101x2 -1107x3</td>
<td>Herbert Losinga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alan</td>
<td>Constable</td>
<td>1107x16</td>
<td>Herbert Losinga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walter</td>
<td>Constable</td>
<td>1121x35</td>
<td>Everard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter</td>
<td>Constable(^{1312})</td>
<td>1136x73</td>
<td>Everard and William Turbe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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\(^{1294}\) Reg. Ant. 164 (205).
\(^{1295}\) Reg. Ant. Add. 917, Add. 2299, 823 (2633), Add. 2541.
\(^{1296}\) Reg. Ant. Add. 2295, 823 (2633).
\(^{1297}\) Reg. Ant. Add. 372.
\(^{1299}\) Reg. Ant. Add. 712. He appears here as a witness, associated with Roger, ‘Willelmo et Rogero Marescallo’.
\(^{1300}\) Reg. Ant. Add. 589, Add. 1242.
\(^{1301}\) Reg. Ant. Add. 1229.
\(^{1302}\) Reg. Ant. Add. 2551.
\(^{1303}\) EEA 15.
\(^{1304}\) Docs 49 and 50.
\(^{1305}\) Doc 69 refers to Richard ‘filius constabularii’, suggesting a constable who has left no other documentary trace.
\(^{1306}\) Docs 69.
\(^{1307}\) Docs 69.
\(^{1309}\) Docs 5, 11, 12.
\(^{1310}\) Docs 15, 16, 19.
\(^{1311}\) Doc 35.
\(^{1312}\) Peter, *dapiaer*, witnessed doc. 36 (1121x43). It is uncertain whether this is the same individual.
\(^{1313}\) Docs 35, 43, 55, 94, 109, 121, 128, 129, 131, 135.
Diocese of Rochester

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Dates</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ralph</td>
<td>Constable</td>
<td>c.1115x1124</td>
<td>Ernulf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roger</td>
<td>Marshal</td>
<td>1185x1214</td>
<td>Gilbert de</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walter</td>
<td>Marshal</td>
<td>1185x1214</td>
<td>Gilbert de</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Diocese of Salisbury (1079-1217)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Dates</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>William</td>
<td>Constable</td>
<td>1114-1226</td>
<td>Roger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geoffrey</td>
<td>Constable</td>
<td>1116x39-1137</td>
<td>Roger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Segar</td>
<td>Marshal</td>
<td>1155x84</td>
<td>Jocelin de</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walter</td>
<td>Marshal</td>
<td>1202</td>
<td>Herbert Poore</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1314 Doc 94.
1315 Doc 135 (Cartae Baronum). Osmund is assessed at only ½ knight, as opposed to the Constable Peter (3½ knights), and the Seneschal (5 knights).
1316 Geoffrey, filius constabularii witnessed doc. 129, 1150x1166, when Peter was still evidently constable. Peter appears first among laymen in the witness list. Geoffrey appears third, after Adam dapifer. If this is the same Geoffrey, the office apparently passed from father to son after Peter’s long tenure.
1317 Note that after this, though many documents are witnessed by the bishop’s seneschal, no further constabularii or mareschelii appear.
1318 The Rochester EEA is still in preparation. I am grateful to Dr Martin Brett for references from the forthcoming volume.
1319 It should be noted that Ralph is the only individual entitled ‘Constable’ in the whole Textus Roffensis.
1320 Textus Roffensis, (199-v, 202 r., and 217 r.). Of these three documents, Ralph appears in the first as a witness (and appears first among the witnessing knights). It is an actum of bishop Ernulf (1114-22), also witnessed by archdeacon Hervey, whose name appears in Rochester documents with the spelling Heruisus, 1115-24 (Fasiti II, 81). The third document is a list of the knights of the bishop. Like the first leaf of the list of churches from which payments for chrism were due (f. 220v.- 222), the list of knights is not in the main hand. Perhaps these additions represent a Samson-of-Bury-type attempt to tighten up the services extracted from secular and spiritual resources. The extremely small size of the Rochester fees becomes apparent here. Almost all the fees are fractional, the smallest being Roger Harag, responsible for just 1/8 knight.
1321 Both Marshals appear toward the end of witness lists.
1322 Registrum Roffense, 257. Neither this document, nor the next carry dates. In the absence of other dateable events or witnesses, we have dated them only by the bishop.
1323 Registrum Roffense, 288.
1324 EEA 18.
1325 Doc 18.
1326 Doc 8.
1327 Geoffrey the Constable also witnesses an 1137 charter of Rahere, prior of St Bartholomew’s Smithfield, Kealey, Roger of Salisbury, 237.
1328 Doc 61. A Segar also appears in Doc 132 (dated 1155x84) without the title. Kemp (who edited the volume) suggests that they are the same person, due to the rarity of the name, lxviii.
## Diocese of Winchester (1070-1204)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Bishop Served</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ralph de Vedues</td>
<td>Constable 'Wintoniensis'</td>
<td>1129x71</td>
<td>Henry of Blois</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ralph</td>
<td>Marshal</td>
<td>1174x5</td>
<td>Richard of Ilchester</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John</td>
<td>Marshal</td>
<td>1166-1200</td>
<td>Godfrey de Lucy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Diocese of Worcester (1062-1212)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<th>Dates</th>
<th>Bishop Served</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alstan</td>
<td>Constable</td>
<td>1093</td>
<td>Wulfstan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hugh</td>
<td>Marshal</td>
<td>1151</td>
<td>John of Pagham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert</td>
<td>Marshal</td>
<td>1178</td>
<td>Roger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert</td>
<td>'Constable' (deceased)</td>
<td>1190x91</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexander</td>
<td>Marshal</td>
<td>1193x5</td>
<td>Henry de Sully</td>
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</table>

## Archdiocese of York (1070-1154)

<table>
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<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Archbishop Served</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>William</td>
<td>Marshal</td>
<td>1109x12</td>
<td>Thomas II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert</td>
<td>Constable of the household of the archbishop</td>
<td>1135x39</td>
<td>Thurstan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ralph de Tilly</td>
<td></td>
<td>1174</td>
<td>Roger of Pont L'Eveque</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1330 **EEA VIII.**

1331 Franklin, the foremost authority on Henry and his *acta*, who edited this volume of the EEA described Ralph as *presumably hereditary constable of the see*, but we have been unable to identify other constables of the bishopric in this period.

1332 Doc 30.

1333 It is uncertain whether this is another appearance of Ralph de Vedues with a new title, or a different individual.

1334 Doc 166.

1335 John appears described as Marshal in the survey of 1166. *Red Book I*, 300. Unlike some other vols of the EEA, Franklin did not include the returns from the survey. From 1190 until the fall of Longchamps, John de Rebez was apparently the chancellor’s constable of Winchester. Heiser, ‘Sheriffs of Richard I’, 115.

1336 Doc 231 (A).


1338 Doc 11.

1339 Doc 145.

1340 Doc 157.

1341 Doc 43.

1342 Doc 43 refers to Robert as already dead. This is possibly the same Robert elsewhere called Marshal. If so, this could represent either a lack of care at Worcester with these titles, or that Robert became constable after 1178. If so, he may have served any or all of bishops Roger, Baldwin, William of Northolt and Robert.

1343 Docs 63, 70, 72. This is probably the same person as Alexander ‘Pasturell’ who witnessed docs. 46, 51, 57, 73 and 77.


1345 Doc 15.

1346 Doc 44.

1347 Howden, *Gesta*, I, 65-6; *Chronica*, II, 60.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Abbot Served</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Geoffrey</td>
<td>Constable</td>
<td>c.1087-11349</td>
<td>Simeon</td>
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</table>

### Monastery of Ely

### Abbey of Bury St Edmunds

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Abbot Served</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>John Marshall</td>
<td>Marshal</td>
<td>1129-1133</td>
<td>Anselm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ralph Constable</td>
<td>Constable</td>
<td>1121-1148</td>
<td>Anselm and Ording</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernard Constable</td>
<td>Constable</td>
<td>1148-1156</td>
<td>Ording</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Constable</td>
<td>Constable</td>
<td>1156-1180</td>
<td>Hugh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ernald</td>
<td>Constable de Herlau</td>
<td>1156-1180</td>
<td>Hugh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas de Mendham</td>
<td>Constable</td>
<td>1200-1200</td>
<td>Samson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert son of Ralph</td>
<td>Constable</td>
<td>1200-1200</td>
<td>Samson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reginald de Brocley</td>
<td>Constable</td>
<td>1200-1200</td>
<td>Samson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert de Saint Clare</td>
<td>Constable</td>
<td>1200-1200</td>
<td>Samson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard de Cosfield (or Gosfield)</td>
<td>Constable</td>
<td>1200-1211</td>
<td>Samson</td>
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### Abbey of Glastonbury (1135-1201)

<table>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Richard Cotel</td>
<td>Constable</td>
<td>1189-1199</td>
<td>Henry de Sully</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Abbey of Shaftesbury (1089-1216)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Abbess Served</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

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1348 Inquisitio Eiensis and Inquisitio Comitatus Cantabrigensis
1349 Domesday 18, Appendix P
1350 Feudal Documents from the Abbey of Bury St. Edmunds
1351 Writ of Henry I, Feudal Documents 77
1352 Charters of Abbot Anselm, Feudal Documents 115 and 120. Charter of Abbot Ording, 131
1353 Charters of Abbot Ording, Feudal Documents 129 and 133 and Agreement with knights Templar, 130. A Bernard (possibly the same individual though not called 'constable') also witnessed the notification by Abbot Hugh I (136).
1354 Notification of abbot Hugh, Feudal Documents 80 and Quitclaim of a pool by William and Weston, 166.
1356 Charter of Abbot Hugh I, Feudal Documents 137
1357 All four constables recorded in 1200, are in the list of the abbey’s knights drawn up in that year according to the enfeoffment of 1135, but with their contemporary holders. Harl. MS. 645, fol. 25. This document is edited in Feudal Documents from the Abbey of Bury St. Edmunds, lxxxvi-lxxxvii
1358 Richard appears in Harl. MS. 645, fol. 25 in guardianship of half a knights fee (held by Walter de Riseby). He is not called ‘Constable’ there, or in Charters 19, 125 or 153 of Davis’ collection. He is, however, called Constable in documents 48, 58, 80, 100, 105, 122, 124, 130, and 150. In each case, he appears second among lay witnesses, always after the seneschal (of whom there were four in quick succession). He is called Constable also in document 156, where he is the only layman in the abbreviated witness list.
1359 Surveys of Glastonbury
1359 ‘Liber Henrici de Soliaco Abbatis Glaston’ in Surveys of Glastonbury, 86
In his gloss Stacey speculates that the presence of constable Robert may be an early appearance of the village constables required by the king in 1242 to assist in the view of arms and in keeping the peace. Constables Robert and Ralph's holdings do appear in different vills. It does seem unlikely, however, that Shaftesbury would need two constables for military purposes. If Stacey's explanation is correct, it seems strange that these responsibilities are not recorded among their duties, and that only the vills of Cheselbourne and Liddington seem to have had these officers.

Succession to the abbacy is unknown at this date. Emma was abbess in October 1136. By 1201, she was described as former abbess. Mary, half sister of Henry II appears 1174x88. Whether Emma was approaching the end of a long tenure in 1170, or Mary had not long taken up the office is therefore uncertain. Ed. David Knowles, C.N.L. Brooke, and Vera London, *The Heads of Religious Houses: England and Wales, Second Edition* (2 Vols, Cambridge, 2001), I, 219.

Survey B, in *Charters and Custumals*, 131.

The place-name Aldreth appears several times in *Liber Eliensis* account of Hereward’s rebellion. When the isle finally fell to the king, it records that castello de Aldrethethe fidelibus Gallis munito, 194. The fortress does not reappear until Bishop Nigel and Baldwin de Revers co-operated for the fortification of the church’s lands against the king, when the fortress is described as being restored, Ibid, 314. Nigel retook it along with the rest of the see, when he was restored with the help of the empress, Ibid, 322, though it was later seized again by Geoffrey de Mandeville, Ibid, 328.

Howden, *Chronica*, II, 56-57. Alvertone was fortified by Hugh du Puiset at the same time as he agreed to allow the Scots to pass his more northerly possessions unopposed.

Established by Geoffrey as *caput* honors for his English possessions, Chibnall, ‘Geoffroi de Montbray’, 288.

Brown was unsure about the reconstruction, but this was confirmed by King, *Castellarium Anglicanum* I, 219.


In the peace treaty of that year, many of the fortresses held by John, were surrendered to a series of specified custodians, including bishops. It is unclear in this instance whether Hugh, or Richard de Pec received it. Howden, *Chronica*, III, 136.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Bishop</th>
<th>Year(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bristol</td>
<td>Bishop Geoffrey of Coutances</td>
<td>1088&lt;sup&gt;1372&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bishop Richard of London</td>
<td>1191&lt;sup&gt;1373&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crayke/Creake&lt;sup&gt;1374&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Yorks Bishops of Durham</td>
<td>1191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bishop Richard of Salisbury</td>
<td>1217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devizes</td>
<td>Wilts Bishops of Salisbury&lt;sup&gt;1375&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>C. 1139</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dover</td>
<td>Kent Bishop Odo of Bayeux</td>
<td>C 1082&lt;sup&gt;1376&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>held against William Rufus in 1088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Downton&lt;sup&gt;1377&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Wilts Bishop of Winchester</td>
<td>D 1155&lt;sup&gt;R?1378&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durham&lt;sup&gt;1379&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Dur Bishop of Durham</td>
<td>C 1174-89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ely</td>
<td>Cams Bishop of Ely</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exeter</td>
<td>Dev Bishop Henry of Winchester</td>
<td>1136&lt;sup&gt;1380&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farnham</td>
<td>Sur Bishop of Winchester</td>
<td>D 1155 R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At Glastonbury Abbey</td>
<td>Somerset Bishop Henry of Winchester&lt;sup&gt;1381&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inkberrow</td>
<td>Worcs 1174x1176 on Marshal [cr. Earl Pembroke 1189] (sub bishop Hereford, sub bishop Worcs.)</td>
<td>C c.1210-1213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kidwelly</td>
<td>Carmarthenshire Bishop Roger of Salisbury</td>
<td>c.1106- ante 1135&lt;sup&gt;1382&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lidgate</td>
<td>Suff Hastings (sub abbot Bury)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lidlea</td>
<td>Unknown. Possibly in Hampshire</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bishop Henry of Winchester&lt;sup&gt;1384&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Llawhaden</td>
<td>Pemb Bishop of St Davids</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>1372</sup> JWC, III, 53. It is uncertain whether Geoffrey was already Castellan of Bristol before the rebellion. Le Patourel, ‘Geoffrey de Montbray’, 154.
<sup>1373</sup> Another fortress from the treaty of 1191. Howden, Chronica, III, 136.
<sup>1374</sup> Brown was unable to identify this site, but King resolved the problem, Castellarium Anglicanum II, 360.
<sup>1375</sup> There was probably an earthwork from c.1080, King, Castellarium Anglicanum II, 498. Kealey attributes this to Bishop Osmund, Roger of Salisbury, 89.
<sup>1376</sup> Gesta Guillelmi, 164.
<sup>1377</sup> Downton survives only as an earthwork, Thompson, Bishops’ Houses, 96.
<sup>1378</sup> King does not support a reconstruction, Castellarium Anglicanum II, 498.
<sup>1379</sup> There is an extensive historiography on Durham castle and its role in defending the north from Scottish predation. Dalton, ‘Scottish influence’, esp. 339 and 348. Thompson has suggested that the inspiration of its design is drawn from episcopal palaces of the same period rather than conventional castle design, Thompson, ‘Palace of Durham’, esp. 433-4.
<sup>1380</sup> The king left Henry of Blois in charge of the castle while he advanced against Southampton, GS, 44.
<sup>1381</sup> The Abbey itself was not fortified, but Henry (who was also abbot) apparently had a fortified residence within the abbey precincts. Stacy, ‘Henry of Blois’, 9.
<sup>1382</sup> Kealey, Roger of Salisbury, 21.
<sup>1383</sup> GS, 209, fn.4.
<sup>1384</sup> Taken by Brien fitz Count in 1147, Lidlea was besieged by Henry, using both knights and infantry, from two temporary castles. Though the rebel earls tried to break through, the arrival of the king was enough to overwhelm the defenders, and the bishop retook his stronghold. GS, 208.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>County</th>
<th>Bishop</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lydbury North</td>
<td>Salop</td>
<td>Bishop of Hereford</td>
<td>C 1208-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malseart</td>
<td>Salop</td>
<td>Archbishop Roger of York</td>
<td>1174(^{1385})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malmsbury</td>
<td>Wilts</td>
<td>Bishop Roger of Salisbury</td>
<td>C 1139(^{1386})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meregon (Hursley)</td>
<td>Hants</td>
<td>Bishop Henry of Winchester</td>
<td>1387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newark</td>
<td>Notts</td>
<td>Bishop of Lincoln</td>
<td>C 1209-1213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northallerton</td>
<td>Yorks</td>
<td>Bishop of Durham</td>
<td>C 1174-89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northallerton</td>
<td>Yorks</td>
<td>Bishop of Durham</td>
<td>D 1176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwich</td>
<td>Norf</td>
<td>Bishop Geoffrey of Coutances</td>
<td>1075(^{1389})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peak (Castleton)</td>
<td>Derby</td>
<td>Bishop Hugh of Coventry</td>
<td>1191(^{1390})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peterborough (Tout Hill/Mount Thurold)</td>
<td>Hunts</td>
<td>Abbot Turold of Peterborough</td>
<td>c.1070(^{1391})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rochester</td>
<td>Kent</td>
<td>Bishop Odo of Bayeux</td>
<td>C 1082/3(^{1393}), held against William Rufus in 1088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salisbury</td>
<td>Wilts</td>
<td>Bishop Roger of Salisbury</td>
<td>Granted by Henry I(^{1395}), C 1139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sherborne</td>
<td>Dors</td>
<td>Bishop Roger of Salisbury</td>
<td>C 1139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sleaford (sometimes called “old castle” or “castleton”)</td>
<td>Linc</td>
<td>Bishop of Lincoln</td>
<td>C 1209-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taunton</td>
<td>Som</td>
<td>Bishop Winchester</td>
<td>D 1156 R?(^{1396})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topcliffe</td>
<td>Yorks</td>
<td>Bishop-elect Geoffrey</td>
<td>1174(^{1397})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{1385}\) The archbishop was given custody of Malasert after its capture from Roger de Mowbray by Bishop-elect Geoffrey, Howden, *Chronica*, II, 58; *Gesta*, I, 68.

\(^{1386}\) The new castle was erected in the churchyard. *HN*, 44; Thompson, *Bishops’ Houses*, 88; Kealey, *Roger of Salisbury*, 89.


\(^{1388}\) For the unusually early vaulting of Norham’s basement, see Brown, R.A., *English Castles*, 73.

\(^{1389}\) Bishop Geoffrey, along with William of Warenne and Robert Malet remained in the castle with a substantial garrison for a time after their capture of it from the rebels.

\(^{1390}\) Another fortress from the treaty of 1191, Howden, *Chronica*, III, 136.

\(^{1391}\) Turold raised the motte and castle at Peterborough as part of his campaign against Hereward, *Candidus* 84-5.


\(^{1393}\) For the central role played by Odo’s control of Rochester castle in his strategy for the 1088 rebellion, *JWC*, III, 48-50.

\(^{1394}\) *JWC*, III, 167.

\(^{1395}\) *HN*, 44.

\(^{1396}\) King notes that the castle must have been reconstructed, because it is mentioned in 1205, and was besieged in 1455, *Castellarium Anglicanum*, II, 444.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Church</th>
<th>County</th>
<th>Fortified by</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lincoln Cathedral (West End)</td>
<td>Lincs</td>
<td>Bishop Remigius</td>
<td>1072-1141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priory of Hartburn</td>
<td>Yorks</td>
<td>Monks</td>
<td>“Early Twelfth Century”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>According to Dodds (who does not cite his source), the monks built a free-standing fortified tower against thieves and raiders. The church was soon extended to join onto it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lichfield</td>
<td>Staffs</td>
<td>Bishop Roger</td>
<td>c.1129-1148</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|                               |        |                         | In the fourteenth century, bishop Roger was supposed to have fortified the town, and the close (which was

1397 Geoffrey fortified Topcliffe before handing it over to William de Stuteville, Howden, 378.
1398 For the central role played by Henry of Blois’ control of Winchester castle in his attack on the city in 1141, HN 102; GS, 128; JWC, III, 298.
1399 Another fortress from the treaty of 1191, Howden, Chronica, III, 136.
1400 GS, 118.
1401 King notes that the castle must have been rebuilt, because it was taken in 1216 and 1217.
1402 ASC, E, 223 states that when Worcester was attacked by Earl Roger’s rebels, the bishop was “very troubled in his mind, because the castle had been entrusted to him to hold”.
1403 Castellarium Anglicanum I, 194.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>County</th>
<th>Founder/Leader</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>St Augustine’s, Canterbury</td>
<td>Kent</td>
<td>Monks</td>
<td>c.1135-40</td>
<td>A license to crenellate apparently issued by the king, but this appears to be a much later forgery.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wallingford</td>
<td>Oxon</td>
<td>King Stephen</td>
<td>1139</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hereford Cathedral</td>
<td>Herf</td>
<td>Geoffrey Talbot</td>
<td>1140</td>
<td>The cathedral was fortified as a temporary base from which to besiege the royal garrison. Catapults were mounted on the cathedral towers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbey of Evesham</td>
<td>Worcs</td>
<td>Abbot Reginald</td>
<td>c.1140-1143</td>
<td>The abbot built a defensive wall around the monastery and graveyard, and a moat around the town itself, but these were soon dismantled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wherwell Abbey</td>
<td>Hants</td>
<td>Empress Matilda’s troops</td>
<td>1141</td>
<td>Matilda’s supporters attempted to fortify the nunnery to improve their defences against the royal army besieging Winchester. The abbey church was defended against the king’s men, who burned it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bampton Church</td>
<td>Dev</td>
<td>Empress Mathilda</td>
<td>1142</td>
<td>This appears in a description of the empress’ campaign of fortification.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwell</td>
<td>Notts</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>1142</td>
<td>William Painel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1405 EEA 14, xlii.
1406 RRAN, III, 590 (No. 160).
1407 GS, 94.
1408 GS, 108.
1409 Evesham Chronicle, 98.
1410 GS, 132.
1411 GS, 138.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minster</th>
<th>(presumably by the community)</th>
<th>attacked the minster’s protective wall in the hope of pillaging the church. His assault was beaten off, and one of his knights killed by an arrow&lt;sup&gt;1412&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ramsey Abbey</td>
<td>Hunts Geoffrey de Mandeville</td>
<td>1144&lt;sup&gt;1413&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church of Coventry</td>
<td>Warw Robert Marmion</td>
<td>1144&lt;sup&gt;1414&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church of St Giles, Durham</td>
<td>Dur Bishop William of Ste-Barbe (of Durham)</td>
<td>1144 The fortification of the church was incomplete when it was attacked by William Cumin, who afterwards garrisoned it.&lt;sup&gt;1415&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priory of St Mary, Bridlington&lt;sup&gt;1416&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Yorks Earl William of York</td>
<td>1144 This was a response to the threat posed by Earl Ranulph of Chester and Gilbert de Ghent.&lt;sup&gt;1417&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church of St John the Evangelist, Merrington</td>
<td>Durham William, son of William Cumin</td>
<td>1145 Shortly after the construction of the ramparts, both the mason responsible, and William died. In John of Hexham’s account, this act of divine vengeance forced his father to surrender and seek absolution.&lt;sup&gt;1418&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beverley</td>
<td>Yorks King Stephen</td>
<td>1150 [Aborted] John of Hexham alleged that King Stephen had intended</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>1412</sup> *JH*, 311-312; King, *Castellarium Anglicanum*, II, 383.  
<sup>1414</sup> *Huntingdon*, 745.  
<sup>1415</sup> *JH*, 314-315.  
<sup>1416</sup> Called a monastery by John of Hexham, Bridlington (or Brellington) was actually a house of Austin Canons.  
<sup>1417</sup> *JH*, 315. See also Callahan, J. ‘Ecclesiastical Reparations’, 302.  
<sup>1418</sup> *JH*, 316.
to fortify Beverley in 1150, but was prevented from doing so by an intimidating apparition of St John.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cathedral church, Saintes</td>
<td>Richard</td>
<td>1174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monastery of St Michael’s Mount</td>
<td>Henry de la Pomeroy</td>
<td>1194</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite the strong fortifications and garrison added to the cathedral, it fell along with a series of other fortresses to Henry II. Ninety archers and four hundred knights were captured.  

---

1149 Ibid, 323.
1150 Howden, *Chronica*, II, 61; *Gesta*, I, 71; Wendover I, 97; Diceto, *Ymagnes Historiarum*, 380; Gillingham, *Richard I*, 49-50. In Diceto’s version, the defenders claimed that they could not be captured because they were attending divine service. Henry’s reply was that those who had broken the law could not invoke it, and took them prisoner anyway.
Fig. 1. Harley 2278 fo. Iv – The Banner of St Edmund
Fig. 2 Harley 2278 fo. 50r: St Edmund Advances into Battle behind his Banner
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hemming Number</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Hides</th>
<th>Service</th>
<th>County</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>110</td>
<td>943</td>
<td>Cynethegn</td>
<td></td>
<td>Oddingley and Laughern</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>NSM</td>
<td>Worcestershire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102</td>
<td>961x972</td>
<td>Osulf</td>
<td>&quot;Brother&quot;</td>
<td>Mosley (in Grimley) &amp; Wick Episcopi</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>NSM</td>
<td>Worcestershire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85</td>
<td>962</td>
<td>Aethelm</td>
<td></td>
<td>Elmstree</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>Church Dues</td>
<td>Gloucestershire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>962</td>
<td>Eadmaer</td>
<td>Minister</td>
<td>Bentley</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Church Dues</td>
<td>Worcestershire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101</td>
<td>962</td>
<td>Cynelm</td>
<td>Minister</td>
<td>Upton-on-Severn</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>NSM</td>
<td>Worcestershire</td>
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<tr>
<td>151</td>
<td>962</td>
<td>Aelfwold</td>
<td>Minister (Regis)</td>
<td>Cungle</td>
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<td>3CB</td>
<td>Gloucestershire</td>
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<tr>
<td>165</td>
<td>962</td>
<td>Ealferth</td>
<td>Levitus</td>
<td>Compton</td>
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<td>NSM</td>
<td>Gloucestershire</td>
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<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>963</td>
<td>Aethelnoth</td>
<td>Minister</td>
<td>Harford</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Gloucestershire</td>
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<tr>
<td>93</td>
<td>963</td>
<td>Aelfric</td>
<td>Minister</td>
<td>Cotheridge</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>NSM</td>
<td>Worcestershire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>124</td>
<td>963</td>
<td>Eadmaer</td>
<td>Minister</td>
<td>Redmarley</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>NSM</td>
<td>Gloucestershire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>131</td>
<td>963</td>
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<td>Thane</td>
<td>Thorne (in Inkberrow)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>NSM</td>
<td>Worcestershire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>152</td>
<td>963</td>
<td>Wulftric</td>
<td></td>
<td>Teodecess leage &amp; Apsley</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>Warwickshire</td>
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<tr>
<td>160</td>
<td>965</td>
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<td>Southam &amp; Mitton</td>
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<tr>
<td>117</td>
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<td>Woman</td>
<td>Hindlip</td>
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<td>3CB</td>
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<td>Wilhelm</td>
<td>Minister</td>
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<td>Church Dues</td>
<td>Worcestershire</td>
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<tr>
<td>144</td>
<td>966</td>
<td>Eadric</td>
<td>&quot;Brother&quot;</td>
<td>Alveston</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>Warwickshire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87</td>
<td>967</td>
<td>Aethelwerd</td>
<td>Minister</td>
<td>Itchington</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Church Dues</td>
<td>Gloucestershire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88</td>
<td>967</td>
<td>Wulfgar</td>
<td>Minister</td>
<td>Itchington</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Church Dues</td>
<td>Gloucestershire</td>
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<tr>
<td>127</td>
<td>967</td>
<td>Haehstan</td>
<td>Minister</td>
<td>Pendock &amp; Didcot</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3CB</td>
<td>Worcestershire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>161</td>
<td>967</td>
<td>Eadmaer</td>
<td>Minister</td>
<td>Stoke</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>NSM</td>
<td>Gloucestershire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83</td>
<td>969</td>
<td>Aethelwerd</td>
<td>Minister</td>
<td>Stoke</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>NSM</td>
<td>Gloucestershire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92</td>
<td>969</td>
<td>Eadric</td>
<td>Minister</td>
<td>Saberton</td>
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<td>Church Dues</td>
<td>Gloucestershire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95</td>
<td>969</td>
<td>Wulfgar</td>
<td>Clericus</td>
<td>Battenhall, Perry, and St Martin's</td>
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<td>NSM</td>
<td>Worcestershire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>109</td>
<td>969</td>
<td>Eadmaer</td>
<td>Minister</td>
<td>Witley</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>NSM</td>
<td>Worcestershire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111</td>
<td>969</td>
<td>Aelfwerd</td>
<td>Fidelus</td>
<td>Theofcan Hyl</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>NSM</td>
<td>Unmapped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>118</td>
<td>969</td>
<td>Brihtmaer</td>
<td>Minister</td>
<td>Whittinge (in Hartlebury)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>NSM</td>
<td>Worcestershire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>123</td>
<td>969</td>
<td>Osulf</td>
<td>Minister</td>
<td>Teddington Blank</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>Church Dues</td>
<td>Worcestershire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>126</td>
<td>969</td>
<td>Cynelm</td>
<td>Minister</td>
<td>Croome</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>NSM</td>
<td>Worcestershire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>969</td>
<td>Aethelwerd</td>
<td>Fidelus</td>
<td>Tidmington &amp; Faccanlea</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>Church Dues</td>
<td>Warwickshire</td>
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<tr>
<td>147</td>
<td>969</td>
<td>Byrhric</td>
<td>Fidelus</td>
<td>Longdon</td>
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<tr>
<td>150</td>
<td>969</td>
<td>Ealhstan</td>
<td>Fidelus</td>
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Part 3

Papal Decretals before Gratian (1061-1089)

1. Letter of Alexander II to the clergy of San Vincenzo a Volturno (1061-73 AD) Jaffé 4531 (3501)

Poenitens praesentium portitor ad nos veniens, retulit se instinctu diaboli quemdam presbyterum, armatum super se irruentem ictumque ferentem, occidisse. Unde, quia in canonibus habetur pro interfectione armati presbyteri simplicem poenitentiam esse dandam, injunximus poenitentiam decem annorum, ita ut hinc usque ad Pascha jejunet tribus diebus per septimanam in pane et aqua, et non utatur calceamentis neque lino. Ab octava Pentecostes usque ad festivitatem sancti Martini jejunet duobus diebus per septimanam, et a festivitate sancti Martini usque ad natalem Domini aut faciat carcerem, jejunans quotidian in pane et aqua, aut eat exsul et jejunet tribus diebus in pane et aqua. Ab octava Epiphaniae usque ad Quadragesimam jejunet duobus diebus. A Quadragesima usque in Pascha jejunet tribus diebus in pane et aqua; et haec faciat usque ad annos quinque. Ab ingressu autem ecclesiae et communione septem annos abstineat.1422

2. Letter of Pope Urban II to Archbishop Dalmace of Narbonne (1089) Jaffé 5407

Dalmatio N(arbonensi) archiepiscopo.
Quod vero Alanensis ecclesie clericos adversus discipline decreta canonice armis uti, et ecclesie beneficiis quasi per hereditarium successionem frui violenter sine episcopi sui concessione, accepimus, strenuitatem tuam in hoc elaborare volumus et rogamus quatinus inordinate ambulantes cohibeantur et pontificis sui preseptis non rennuant.1423

3. Letter of Pope Urban II to the clergy of Elne (1089) Jaffé 5408

Clero Alano.
(C)leris igitur, qui in vobis sunt contra canonicam disciplinam arma militaria baiulantes, et possessiones aut honores ecclesiasticos sine concessione antigentes, denunciamus in nomine domini Ihesu quatinus ab huiusmodi flagicis desinant et sui antiquis preceptis custodiant.1424

The Anglo-Saxon Texts

1. Aelfric’s Pastoral Letter to Wulfsige III, bishop of Sherborne (c.993-995)

Ne preost ne beo mangere ne gitsigende massere; ne he ne forlæte his godcundynysse, ne fo to woruldspræcum; ne he wæþna ne werige, ne ne wirce sace; ne he ne drince æt

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1422 PL 146, Col. 1405.
1424 Ibid, 168, Ep. 46.
wintunnum, swa swa woroldmenn doð; ne he aðas ne swerige, ac mid anfealdnyss
sprece æfre unleasliscæ, swa swa gelæred Godes þeowa. 1425

(2) Aelfric’s Letter to Wulfstan (c.1003-1005)
De bellico aparatu. Suspicor non latare almitatem tuam tres ordines fore in ecclesia
Dei: laboratores, bellatores, oratores. Ordo laboratorum adquirit nobis victum, et ordo
bellatorum debent armis nostram ab incursibus hostium defendere, et ordo
oratorum, id sunt clerici et monachi et episcopi, qui electi sunt ad spiritualum
militiam, debent orare pro omnibus et servitiis seu officiis Dei semper insistere et
fidem catholicam predicare et sancta charismata dare fidelibus. Et omnis qui ad
istam militiam ordinatur, etsi antea secularia arma habuit, debent ea deponere tempore
ordinationis et assumere spiritualia arma, loricam iustitiae et scutum fidei et galeam
salutis et gladium spritus, quod est verbum Dei, et bellare viriliter contra spiritualia
nequità. Qui ad istam militiam pervenit et vult postea secularibus armis uti contra
hostes carnales, nonne erit apostata, recedens a militia Dei ad militiam secularem?
Ergo non potest in ambabus militiis simul stare, quia illa manus quę humanum
sanguinem effuderit non potest digne Domini calicem sanctificare. Nec saltim baculo
licet episcopum quemquam percutere, sicut in ipsius electione dicit apostolus “non
percussorem”, nec litigare, sicut idem dicit: “Servum Dei non oportet litigare, sed
meansuetam esse ad omnes.” Et Dominus dixit Petro carnaliter adhuc sapienti: “Mitre
gladium in vaginam. Omnes qui acceperint gladium, gladio peribunt.” Non dixit
gladio occiduntur sed gladio peribunt. Nam et canones docent, si clericos in bello
cecederint, ut nullus pro eo missam faciat. Iterum dicent canones ut clericus armis
utens degradetur. 1426

(3) From Wulfstan’s Canon Law Collection
Vt nemo sacerdotum ex numero arma pugnantium unquam portet, nec litem contra
proximum ullam excitet. 1427

Clericus quoque non debet armis uti, nec ad bellum procedere, quia canones docent ut
quicumque clericus in bello aut in rixa mortuus fuerit neque oblatione neque oratione
postuletur pro eo; sepultra tamen non priuetur. Apostolus quoque dicit: Nemo militans
Deo implicet se negotiis secularibus. Vnde non est liber a laqueis diaboli, que se
militie mundane uoluerit implicare. Et ideo omnimodi dicendum est presbiteris et
diconibus ut arma non portent, sed magis confidant in defensione Dei quam in
armis. 1428

The Anglo-Norman Texts

(1) Penitential Ordinance (1067?)
De clericis qui pugnaverunt aut pugnandi gratia armati fuerunt, quia pugnare eis
illicitum erat, secundum instituta canonum acsi in patria sua peccassent peniteant. 1429

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1425 C&S, I, 212.
1426 C&S, I, 252.
1427 Wulfstan’s Canon Law Collection, 120. Cross and Hamer give the source for this canon as Gerbald
of Liège.
1428 Wulfstan’s Canon Law Collection, 167.
1429 C&S, II, 583.
(2) Charter of Reading (1125)
Terras censuales non ad feudum donet nec faciat milites nisi in sacra veste Christi, in qua parvulos suscipere modeste caveat, maturos autem seu discretos tam clericos quam laicos provide suscipiat.1430

(3) Legatine Council of Westminster (Dec 1138)
His subiungimus quoque auctoritatem Nicholai pape dicentis: “Cum discreti sint milites Christi a militibus seculi, non convenit militem ecclesie seculo militare, per quod ad effusionem sanguinis necesse sit pervenire. Denique sicut turpe est laicum missas facere sacramenta corporis et sanguinis Christi conficere, ita ridiculum et inconveniens est clericum arma sustollere et ad bella procedere, cum Paulus apostolus dicat “Nemo militans Deo implicat, etc.”1431

(4) Council of Westminster (1175)
Hiis qui in sacris ordinibus constituti sunt iudicium sanguinis agitare licet. Unde prohibemus ne aut per se membrorum truncations faciant aut inferendas iudicent. Quod si quis tale fecerit concessi ordinis privetur officio et loco. Inhibemus etiam sub interimatione anathematis ne quis sacerdos officium habeat vicecomitis aut prepositi secularis.1432

1430 Reading Abbey Cartularies, I, 34.
1431 C&S, II, 777.
1432 C&S, II, 985.
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