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Becoming-Other in Time: The Deleuzian Subject in Cinema.

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Abstract.

Through an engagement with Gilles Deleuze's philosophy of the cinema, this thesis explores how the notion of labyrinthine time is represented differently in movement- and time-images. Part I contrasts the different types of subject that are created in the narratives of the two types of image. This begins with an exploration of the philosophical conceptions of time behind the two images and the subjects they create. Chapter two focuses on the role of memory in the creation of these subjects, drawing on the works of Henri Bergson, and using films by Hitchcock and Fellini. The third chapter delves into the recent re-emergence of the debate over spectator positioning, and questions what Deleuze can offer this field. Here the thesis most comprehensively negotiates its place within the field of film studies, through its interaction with psychoanalytical theories of the subject, and the debate over what exactly constitutes suture.

Part II focuses on the movement-image. In particular it explores characters' attempts to perform their present identities differently, by falsifying their past and taking a new direction through the labyrinth of time. Chapters four and five analyse the way in which this performativity is represented in, *Sliding Doors, Run Lola Run, The Talented Mr Ripley* and *Memento*. These recent films are seen to draw a broad distinction between female performativity, which is sanctioned, but only for a brief while, and male performativity, which is represented as getting away with murder. Movement-images are thus found to uphold a very traditional gender binary, by reterritorializing the labyrinth's subversive potential into a legitimizing straight line and its marginalized, labyrinthine other. This is a conclusion that had already been suggested in chapter three.

The thesis concludes in chapter six, with a return to concerns that arose in the first chapter. It examines how the historical and metaphysical context in which the movement- and time-image emerge has ensured the continued global dominance of the movement-image.
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Preface: On reservations.

For the Anglo-American film studies scholar, reservations immediately arise when reading Gilles Deleuze's cinema texts. Perhaps the most obvious of these are, their veneration of auteur cinema at the expense of the popular, and their almost complete disregard of the national and social context into which many of the films discussed emerged. Their use of cinema to form an assemblage with philosophy in order to further Deleuze's own conceptual ends will also make them inaccessible texts for many readers. These caveats notwithstanding, however, the 1990s has seen the emergence of a growing body of work on Deleuze in Anglo-American film studies. After Steven Shaviro's *The Cinematic Body* (1993) came D.N. Rodowick's *Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine* (1997), and Laura U. Marks' *The Skin of the Film*, Barbara Kennedy's *Deleuze and Cinema*, and *The Brain Is the Screen* (a collection edited by Gregory Flaxman) all appeared in 2000.

The problem that all these works had to negotiate, to a greater or lesser degree, was how to discuss Deleuze's ideas on cinema, and the ramifications thereof, without first having to explain Deleuze's entire philosophical outlook, and the position held by the cinema texts in his oeuvre. With interest in Deleuze continuing to grow in film studies, however, Deleuzian terminology is slowly beginning to gain a common currency, as the works listed above bare witness. Moreover, the influence of Deleuze on disciplines which have common ground with film studies, in particular, theories of gender and sexuality - such as those of Judith Butler, Elizabeth Grosz, Dorothea Olkowski, Rosi Braidotti et. al. - all ensure that his concepts are becoming recognizable (if such a Deleuzian *faux pas* can be permitted) to film studies. For these reasons, this work will attempt to keep the description of Deleuze's philosophy to a minimum, and concentrate instead on the way in which it can help us to understand cinema.
That said, and although this work remains on a somewhat abstract, or universalized plane - ensuring that, like Deleuze's work, it has difficulty negotiating its conclusions in respect of national and cultural contexts - it is not meant as an all-encompassing theory of cinema. Indeed, the bias towards European art cinema and the Hollywood mainstream which informs the work is obvious. The exploration of the subjectivities that are created in the narratives of these films, then, is typically "western" in orientation. The conclusions that this work draws would not, for instance, be applicable to most third, or diasporic cinemas. Indeed, it could not even be said to represent all the cinemas that are produced in Europe, particularly Southern and Eastern Europe, and is certainly not nuanced enough to be applied to African or Asian cinemas. The rather curious Deleuzian monster¹ that this work creates, then, is an assemblage of Anglo-American film studies, the French philosophies of Deleuze, Lyotard and Foucault, and a range of predominantly American and western European films. The common link between the disparate approaches upon which this thesis draws is their obsession with negotiating the construction of gender, sexuality and subjectivity in relation to the law.

Neither is the discussion of cinema which this work undertakes, whilst it deals in grandiose, universal terms like those of the time- and the movement-image, meant as a replacement for the many different trajectories that already exist in film studies. In fact, it is perhaps best seen as a bifurcation of the direction which the works cited above have already taken within film studies. The discussion which follows utilizes Deleuze's thoughts on time in order to analyse the way in which character subjectivity is constructed in certain types of film narrative. It also attempts to understand the reason why certain constructions of the subject are represented in specific ways by "western" cinema as a whole. It is for this reason that whilst it occasionally rubs up against already existing theories within film studies, such as those informed by psychoanalysis, it is in order to draw parallels and contrasts between the two that this is done. The Deleuzian approach does not replace these already existing positions, then, but rather, provides a slightly different temporal framework within which to re-examine them. It is, partly at least, for this reason that certain areas of film studies will be
approached using the Deleuzian model, but not, by any means, all of them, as only certain areas immediately lend themselves to contrast with such a specific work.

Finally, the work's emphasis on narrative over other, typically cinematic concerns, such as the use of sound, cinematography, mise-en-scene, and editing is determined by its desire to focus most heavily on character subjectivity within the narrative. This is not to suggest that such an analysis of cinema cannot be undertaken from a Deleuzian perspective, just that this one does not.

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1 For Deleuze on the creation of the monstrous, see Deleuze, Gilles, Negotiations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 6.
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Part I.

Both Time and Movement.
1. Ungrounding Cinema.

In the preface to *Cinema 1*, Deleuze clearly states that: 'This study is not a history of the cinema'. Yet, together Deleuze's cinema texts do seem to create a certain kind of history of cinema. Admittedly this view of the texts may be due to the fact that film studies shifted its contextual approach to cinema, incidentally around the time of the publication of Deleuze's texts, from a primarily theoretical, to a predominantly historical model. It may be that Deleuze's statement is to be taken at face value, and that it is the methodological approach to cinema of film studies which insists in seeing the two texts as tracing a history. Whether or not this is the case is not the issue here. Rather, we are concerned with what sort of a history the twin texts can be seen to create.

What is immediately striking about the two texts is their lack of reference to concrete historical events within which to ground the majority of the conclusions. Consequently, they lack the rigour normally associated in film studies with, say, an historical approach to the study of a national cinema. Their lack of a specific context ensures that what they establish as history appears to claim universal applicability for an ill-defined notion of "western" cinema. The reason for this is, at least in part, due to their double movement, between the disciplines of film and philosophy. Their discussion of cinema, seemingly a little out of place in contemporary film studies, needs to be understood as developing in conjunction with a broader discussion of the evolution of the twentieth century's 'image of thought'. The cinema texts, then, chart the history of the changing philosophical understanding of our relation to movement and time, in the last century, as it has been expressed in cinema.

As a consequence of this double movement, Deleuze's categories often seem at odds with those which already exist in film studies. What Deleuze broadly describes as
the distinction between classical and modern cinema for instance (the movement- and the time-image respectively) is a classification meant to explain two types of cinema which express different conceptions of time. His choice of the term classical does not indicate solely those films which are marked by the process of continuity editing that can be found in the Classical Hollywood style. Rather, this term is used to express a range of movement-image cinemas, including those of the French, American, Russian and German pre-war montage styles. Deleuze's term, classical, refers to the cinemas which create the image of thought corresponding to that which has characterized the western conception of time, from antiquity to the present. These are the movement-images in which time remains subordinate to movement through space. This is a movement usually traced through the actions of a unified subject who evolves within a linear time scheme. In these images the link between the subject and the world remains intact. The whole of time is thought to be knowable, and is conceived of as a spatialized totality.

The term modern, on the other hand, refers to the time-images which emerged after WWII, those which correspond to the change in the image of thought that occurs when the notion of truth is put into crisis. These are images marked by a labyrinthine time and a discontinuous subject, in which time is directly visible in the perpetual becoming-actual of its virtual state. In these images the link between subject and world is questionable, due to the way in which time is conceived of as perpetual change, or becoming, an open and expanding, virtual, whole.

Due to the confusion that Deleuze's works can cause, this study will begin by explaining the way in which it conceives of the cinema texts as functioning historically, in order for it to realise its own position in relation to film studies. A more in-depth exploration of the way in which subjectivity is created in the cinemas of the movement- and the time-image will then follow. The two different ways of conceiving of time - as linear evolution, or as labyrinthine falsifying - that
characterize the two cinemas being used to explain the two different types of subjects which emerge therein.

Although this approach to the texts will not solve the problem of their lack of contextual specificity per se, it should at least provide some explanation of how they function in relation to the crack, or interval, between the two cinemas. This is the crack which Deleuze identifies as having emerged around the time of WWII. Using a model which conceives of the two cinemas, and indeed, cinema texts, as interactive, as opposed to progressive or sequential, this study will build upon the already existing meditation on Deleuze and time of D.N. Rodowick's, *Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine*, with which it shares the most common ground.

**Two Histories.**

Numbered sequentially, *Cinema 1* and *Cinema 2* suggest a history of cinema which evolves in a linear movement through time. As András Bálint Kovács has it, in *'The Film History of Thought'*: 'Whether we like it or not, Deleuze's model is linear'. For Kovács:

> The incarnation of the time-image, then, is also the incarnation of a goal (telos) in the broad cinematographic evolution, the point at which cinema arrives at its own consciousness and discovers its "essence".5

When seen in this way, the cinema texts suggest an evolution of cinema as an expression of the way in which we think, which reaches its maturity in the modern cinema of the time-image. There seems to be a particularly telling view of time apparent in Kovács' reasoning, however, in that the teleological aim of cinema is apparently posited by Deleuze in retrospect, and serves as a sort of originary
'essence' of cinema. For Kovács, the time-image was the unstated conclusion to which the two texts were leading, which was already inscribed in the first volume, in its study of the movement-image. In point of fact, this reasoning begs the question of whether Deleuze's history of cinema is itself linear, or whether Kovács' interpretation imposes linearity upon it in retrospect? Although the self-consciousness of cinema certainly did emerge with the reflexivity that characterized so many time-images, was this necessarily part of a linear progression?

In 'Into the Breach', the piece which immediately follows Kovács' in *The Brain is the Screen*, Angelo Restivo suggests another way of looking at the two cinema texts. For Restivo the break that occurs between the movement- and the time-image should be understood in relation to 'Deleuze's own strongly Foucauldian position'. This reading suggests that instead of a linear evolution, the two texts express the same type of shift, or break that occurs between historical epistemes. In this case, what emerges in the time-image is the unthought of the movement-image's thought. This unthought emerges as an image of time which places the truth of the movement-image in crisis, and, by doing so, forces a rethinking of the linear view of time. It also prompts us to question the linear reasoning of Kovács' view.

Restivo also evokes Lyotard's description of postmodernism, as 'actually something which precedes modernism', in order to explain the paradoxical emergence of an 'incipient postmodernity' within certain films which fall in the gap between the classical cinema of the movement-image, and the modern that would later emerge in the time-image. Although this may create some confusion over terminology, Lyotard's idea that:

> A work can become modern only if it is first postmodern. Postmodernism thus understood is not modernism at its end but in the nascent state, and this state is constant.
is in fact a very useful way of understanding the interaction between the cinema texts\textsuperscript{10}. Although Lyotard's model is meant to express a concrete historical development - and one which does not correlate precisely with Deleuze's move from the movement- to the time-image - the ungrounding of the modern that is caused when the postmodern emerges can be seen to be an analogous movement to that created by the emergence of the time-image, as the unthought (or becoming-other) of the movement-image. When Lyotard is read in this slightly ahistorical way the emergent postmodern exists as the ungrounding of the modern, much as the movement-image is ungrounded, its truth and linear time scheme put into crisis, by the falsifying powers of the time-image's labyrinth. It is in this sense, then, that the movement-image can be seen, admittedly in retrospect, as the reterritorialization of the time-image, in much the same way as Lyotard contends that the postmodern has to: 'be understood according to the paradox of the future (post) anterior (modo)\textsuperscript{11}.

The time-image's becoming is that which precedes the movement-image's illusory form of being, it is the future which precedes it, its own memory of the future. Put another way, the time-image is the movement-image in its 'nascent state, and this state is constant'.

It would seem, then, that Kovacs is right to posit a retroactive recovery of the 'essence' of cinema in the time-image, but that this is not an essence in the sense of a ground of cinema. Rather, it is the ungrounding of the cinema of the movement-image. It is the discovery of cinema's emergent unthought, its becoming-other. The time-image should thus be seen as the anterior, as that which precedes the movement-image, despite its emergence after the movement-image was already well established, chronologically speaking. In this way we can see that Deleuze's time scheme is not a linear one, and the time-image does not herald its, or indeed, cinema's, \textit{telos}, even if it is 'the point at which cinema arrives at its own consciousness'. Instead the "evolution" between the two cinemas is one that is
analogous to that of Foucault's epistemic shift, or Lyotard's postmodern ungrounding, into the interval of which emerges the unthought of the time-image.

Already we begin to see that cinema is constantly struggling between the opposing pulls of the active and ungrounding forces which are apparent in the time-image, and the reactive forces of the movement-image. This struggle is, and perhaps always will be, won by the conservative forces of the movement-image, which must always posit a reterritorialized form over any suggestion of a becoming, a straight line over every labyrinth. When viewed in this way the cinema texts begin to make a different type of sense than when viewed as progressing in a linear fashion. In fact, they can now begin to be read as an expression of the crisis of linear thinking that occurs when the labyrinthine temporality which is expressed in the time-image emerges in the cinema of the post-war period. Thus, although Deleuze's work does not situate itself in relation to a context that is immediately recognizable to film studies (in that he does not choose, for instance, to discuss the evolution of cinemas within specific national contexts) his two texts on cinema are thoroughly immersed in the philosophical context in which they were written. How to write a history of cinema when the very idea of history has become ungrounded is the question which the cinema texts attempt to answer in their two part structure.

Deleuze chose the end of WWII as the point at which to situate the break between the two texts as it was amongst the rubble of Europe's major cities that he saw the crisis in truth emerge. The creation of 'any-space-whatevers' in emergent time-images replaced the determined direction through city spaces that had previously distinguished the realist cinema of the movement-image. Connections between spaces became discontinuous, and the ability of the subject to react to what they encountered in these spaces became similarly questionable. 'And thanks to this loosening of the sensory-motor linkage, it is time, 'a little time in the pure state' which rises up to the surface of the screen.' It is this emergence of a new
conception of time, other than its linear form, which puts the idea that there can be one, singular, knowable, "truth" into crisis. With the belief in the realizable objective to the subject's movement through space shattered by the war's disregard of space's teleological purpose, how was the subject to conceive of its own "truth"? What happened to a sensory-motor based truth, when the sensory-motor linkage came apart? Once the subject of the movement-image became disconnected from its continuous progression through a linear time that was subordinate to movement, its contrasting aberrant movement through discontinuous time in the time-image caused it to pass through a series of unconnected spaces (any-space-whatevers). This was much as the survivors of the war appeared to do, in many European films of the immediate post-war period. Truth had suddenly lost its spatial coordinates.

It would be a mistake, however, to think that once Europe's cities were rebuilt, the crisis of truth ended. The return to dominance of the movement-image, and the dying out of the time-image in recent years, moreover, should not be read as signaling an end to the struggle between the two. With the gradual dissipation of the post-war political crisis in western Europe, the crisis of truth may have been eradicated from our immediate perception of its spatial expression. This does not, however, mean that it is not still an ongoing crisis. Truth is always in crisis whenever it encounters its virtual ungrounding, which it does at all times. To suggest that Deleuze's texts do not sit within an historical context that we recognize, then, perhaps says more about the linear, and paradoxically, "western" view of history which film studies employs, than it does about the texts themselves. Truth is not just in crisis when the cities of Europe are in ruins, it is in crisis at all times. The fact that, globally, there is always, somewhere, a city that has been reduced to rubble can only confirm this fact. Indeed, as Laura Marks'15 points, out, the subject's inability to extend its sensory perception into a motor action - that which accompanies the creation of any-space-whatevers in the post-war European, urban landscape - is a crisis that perhaps most strongly effects the post-colonial and diasporic populations who came to dwell in these cities after the war. The official
and indeed, everyday, denial of the continued existence of these smooth spaces expresses perfectly the "western" denial of its culpability in creating them. Truth is always in crisis, then, in any number of ways, and it is the image of "truth", of official history, which obscures this from our view.

The difficulties that Deleuze causes film studies, then, stresses the difficulty in perceiving the universal that film studies now has, due to its tendency towards an over-emphasis on the nation as the chosen site from which to explore difference. At its worst extreme, this type of study could be seen to facilitate the return of a binary reasoning which effaces from academic discourse the perpetual crisis that truth faces. As this is the crisis which truth must constantly work to efface in order to maintain its monolithic identity, this could be seen to make film studies complicit in the re-imposition of the binary reasoning upon which truth is predicated.

The historical context of Deleuze's cinema texts is western history itself. In this context Deleuze's philosophy of the virtual shows that the creation of truth, form, being, and linear history, is always a process which contains its own immanent dissolution. It is always a process of reactive, and indeed retroactive affirmation that ensures linearity and continuity, and this process is always at the point of its own undoing. As we stated previously, the time-image is the movement-image in its 'nascent state, and this state is constant.' In terms of cinema narrative, this process of ungrounding and reterritorialization is most clearly seen when the temporal structures of the two types of image are viewed in relation to the subjectivities which they create.

One Cinema.
The cinemas of the movement- and the time-image are marked by their own, specific temporalities. These, in turn, ensure the creation of two different types of subject. At the start of *Cinema 1*, Deleuze draws upon and expands his previous work on Bergson\textsuperscript{16}, in order to trace the development of Bergson's argument concerning time that leads up to the discovery of the movement-image. In *Creative Evolution*, Bergson argues that the spatializing of time which we enact in the perception of our everyday lives leads to an illusory conception of time as subordinate to movement. In this illusory model, the virtual and open whole of time, of duration, is only visible indirectly. The clearest example of this which Bergson gives is his deconstruction of Zeno's paradox of the arrow\textsuperscript{17}. Using his own conception of time as a duration that endures and which cannot be reduced to spatial segments, Bergson was able to show that the false, or illusionary movement which Zeno discovers is actually only that which is created when we conceive of time as measurable in space, and as subordinate to movement.

Zeno's arrow paradox states that, if an arrow is fired from point A, and traces a flight to point B, then to our perception it would appear to have moved from A to B. Yet, reasoned Zeno, if you subdivide the distance traveled in half, it is possible to fix a point, halfway between A and B, where, if you examine the arrow, it will be at rest. Because this point is fixed, the arrow will also be fixed, at rest, and immobile. Halfway between this point and point A (the point of departure) there will be a similar point where the arrow is, again, at rest. The space travelled by the arrow is, in this way, infinitely divisible into a series of points, each one of which contains the arrow at rest. If the arrow is, then, always at rest (as its position in space will always correspond to one of the points) the paradox is created of a moving arrow that is simultaneously at rest. Despite having covered the ground from A to B, the arrow has never moved.
This is only a paradox, however, when considered from what is seen by Bergson as a common-sensical view of time. This is a view which is caused by the necessary geometrical division of space which accompanies everyday life. Indeed this belief, that movement, as it appears to us to cross space, is actually divisible, is the notion that itself gave rise to (and is given credence by) the oldest of philosophical reterritorializations of time, the Platonic notion of the originary form. In point of fact, Bergson argues, all that Zeno's arrow paradox shows is that you cannot construct movement from the immoveable. An image of the moving whole of time cannot be created out of 'immobile sections'. As Deleuze has it in *Cinema I*:

... you cannot reconstitute movement with positions in space or instants in time: that is, with immobile sections. You can only achieve this reconstitution by adding to the positions, or to the instants, the abstract idea of a succession, of a time which is mechanical, homogeneous, universal and copied from space, identical for all movements.\(^\text{18}\)

All that can be created from this model is an illusion of movement, in which immobile sections are given to appear to move, due to the addition of a time which has been 'copied from space'. This model necessitates the subordination of time to a spatialized model that is mechanical, homogeneous, and universal. For Bergson, the apparatus of cinema functions in the way that is apparent in Zeno's reasoning, hence, in *Creative Evolution*, he described this same false movement as cinematographic. Yet, Deleuze points out, the discovery of the movement-image actually emerged in Bergson's work ten years previously, in *Matter and Memory*. Bergson's condemnation of the cinema, then, Deleuze reasons, was perhaps based upon the infantile state which cinema was in at the time when Bergson wrote *Creative Evolution*. With the development of montage and the moving camera, however, Deleuze argues, cinema: 'immediately gives us a movement-image'\(^\text{19}\). The movement-image is not an illusory image of time, not a series of immobile sections to which an abstract view of time is added, but rather, it is an image of the *mobile section* of the whole of time, of duration, which movement gives us.
Zeno's arrow, as it flies from A to B, can no longer be divided into a succession of states, or forms, but can now be seen as expressive of the mobile section of time that the movement-image captures. As Bergson argues:

The truth is that if the arrow leaves the point A to fall down at the point B, its movement AB is as simple, as indecomposable, in so far as it is movement, as the tension of the bow that shoots it. ... so the arrow which goes from A to B displays with a single stroke, although over a certain extent of duration, its indivisible mobility. Suppose an elastic stretched from A to B, could you divide its extension?20

When viewed temporally the flight of the arrow is 'indecomposable', a 'single stroke' akin to the stretching of elastic. The movement-image of the arrow's flight is thus one in which an indirect image of time is created, the whole of time being expressed as the qualitative (as opposed to the quantitative, measurable) 'change in the whole'21 that is created by the arrow's movement through space. Time here, however, remains subordinate to the movement through space of the arrow, its 'indivisible mobility' showing only 'a certain extent of duration'. The movement-image is not yet a direct image of time. This expression of the virtual movement of time itself, which subordinates movement to its labyrinthine bifurcations, still awaits, in the time-image.

Movement-images illustrate blocs of space-time. They are an indirect expression of the virtual whole of time. They express our desire for a rational continuum, provided by a unifying movement through space. The four types of classical cinemas of the movement-image which Deleuze then classifies, those of the pre-war American, French, German and Soviet cinemas, all have in common their ability to express the whole of time, but in an indirect fashion, through their different uses of
montage. These cinemas all subordinate time to movement, to actions that take place in space. As such they are expressions of already actualized movements, rather than of the virtual movements of duration itself, through which the actual is continually created out of the virtual. Although these four specific types are distinct unto themselves, the classical cinema, if a general view of it is taken, seems to create one specific type of subject in its narrative, due to its need to continually subordinate time to a movement through space.

**Two Subjects.**

Continuing to follow Bergson, Deleuze theorized the subject as an interval, between perception, and the action which they decide to take upon that which is perceived. The subject, in this sense, is a 'centre of indetermination' in which affection occurs. The subject in cinema is a montage of perception, affection and action-images. What marks the representation of the subject of the movement-image out as distinct from the subject represented in the time-image is the way in which perception always leads to action in a continuous, and directly causal, sensory-motor progression. In short, that which is perceived by the subject represented in the movement-image is that which is acted upon, and there is never any question of this sensory-motor continuity being broken. Hence the subject seen in the movement-image is distinguishable by its organic, continuous form, which evolves in a linear fashion, due to its unbroken sensory-motor schema.

As an example of this type of subject, Rodowick discusses the film *Sherlock Jr.* (1924). Of the dream sequence in which Buster Keaton enters the film which he, the projectionist, has fallen asleep watching, Rodowick says:
When Keaton finds himself on a rock by the ocean, he dives, only to land headfirst in a snowbank. Keaton's movements from one shot to the next link incommensurable spaces through what modern mathematics calls a 'rational' division. The interval dividing any two spatial segments serves simultaneously as the end of the first and the beginning of the second. In Keaton's film, every division, no matter how unlikely and nonsensical, is mastered by this figure of rationality where the identification of movement with action assures the continuous unfolding of adjacent spaces. The consequence of this identification is the subordination of time to movement.\(^{23}\)

Time, as an open and changing whole, is expressed indirectly through the movements through space of Keaton, and thus remains subordinate to movement. Moreover, it is the subject's actions which enable the film's indirect expression of time, witness the protagonist's dive which links the shot of the ocean to that of the snowbank. The incommensurable spaces through which he passes (which, in the time-image will attain a virtual movement of their own) are here linked causally by the subject's movement from perception to action. The interval which defines the subject is thus 'rational' in that, despite the changing contexts through which it appears to move, each action is a direct consequence of the subject's perception of the previous situation. The 'identification of movement with action' is thus assured by the subject's unbroken sensory-motor continuity.

The subject that we see pass through the different time-spaces is, moreover, always the same subject, its linear evolution being enabled by its perpetual reappearance as a repetition of the same. In this way does the subject appear to be a unified, homogeneous, singular, and already actualized form. *Sherlock Jr.* illustrates the way in which movement in the movement-image proceeds causally, through the actions of the subject, and in so doing produces an indirect image of time. This subject is not yet seen to be caught up in a process of becoming-other, as a virtual potential
that could actualize in any number of different ways. It is not yet the subject as a
return of difference which emerges in the time-image.

The time-image, by contrast, contains an image of time which produces a different
type of subject. This is a subject whose sensory-motor schema has lost the
unbroken, causal relation previously seen in the movement-image. The reason for
this change Deleuze again identifies in the revelations brought about during and
after WWII. Due to such cataclysmic events as the Stalinist purges, the final
solution perpetrated by the National Socialists, the nuclear holocausts unleashed
upon Japan by America, and growing disillusionment with the American Dream, the
post-war era created a subject who was no longer secure in their ability to react to
the situations in which they found themselves. This was at once a concrete change,
as people experienced the awesome powers of technological destruction which
made their own actions seem futile in comparison, and also, and equally as
important, the change in the image of thought which characterized the initial years
of the cold war era. The second world war saw a shift in the image of thought, as, if
we hear from Lyotard once again; 'the Enlightenment narrative, in which the hero of
knowledge works towards a good ethico-political end - universal peace24 was
destroyed by the destructive ends to which knowledge was turned. The teleology of
the Enlightenment grand narrative was suddenly revealed to be an illusion, with the
consequence that truth was put into crisis.

Beyond the ethos exemplified by the belief encapsulated in the American cinema of
the action-image (the dominant movement-image of the pre-war period25) in which
the individual's ability to alter its situation was beyond doubt, the cinema of the
time-image created an image of thought in which the individual no longer had the
power to influence its situation. The cinema's previous privileging of the subject's
actions through space, its motor reaction to sensory data, were thus replaced by an
emphasis on its movement through time itself. Unable to always react in order to
influence its physical context, the subject became dislocated from the linear continuity of the movement-image's spatializing gesture, and began instead to slip through time itself. From a cinema of the 'agent' to one of 'seers', the expression of time shifted from one in which it was subordinate to action, to the subject's movement through space, to one of 'pure optical situations' in which time appeared in a pure state and the subject could but visually record time's passing.

Thus it was that amongst the rubble of Europe's major cities a cinema emerged which expressed the crisis of truth, in which the reason for movement through space was no longer derived from action, but from the desire to see, to record. The everyday tourism of films such as Rossellini's *Voyage In Italy* expressed, for Deleuze, the way in which the 'stroll, the voyage and the continual return home' through any-space-whatevers had come to replace the decisive, teleological plot of the pre-war action-image. The interval which distinguished this type of subjectivity, in which perception did not-necessarily lead to action, is an irrational, or aberrant interval.

Rodowick uses Chris Marker's *La jetée* (1962) as an example of the direct image of duration's perpetual, virtual shifting that is seen in the time-image, and of the subject that exists therein. Suspended in the interval between perception and action, the seer of the time-image, who lacks the ability to act upon what he sees, is figured in the film as an immobile, post-holocaust prisoner. He travels through time without moving from the hammock in which he is incarcerated:

Movement, drained from the image and divorced from the representation of action, has relinquished its role as the measure of time. In *La jetée*, the image of time is no longer reduced to the thread of chronology where present, past and future are aligned on a continuum. The painful binding of the subject - physically stilled no less than movement is frozen in the image -
liberates him briefly in time just as the imaging of time is released from its subordination to movements linked with physical actions. The chronological continuum is flayed, shaving past, present, and future into distinct series, discontinuous and commensurable. The narrative sections of the film are disconnected spaces, divided into blocks of time linked in a probabilistic manner ... Time no longer derives from movement; 'aberrant' or eccentric movement derives from time.29

Lacking the ability to extend perception into action, due to his suspended sensory-motor condition, the subject begins to travel in time itself, through a series of discontinuous images (of spaces, which are actually times) which are not subordinate to his physical movement. Time flows into the interval, suspending action, and enabling a direct image of the virtual whole of time, of duration. The subject is thus no longer a singular, unified, organic entity, but has become a dispersive, discontinuous traveler through time, perpetually in the process of becoming-other.30

What dominates on screen is no longer movement across space, but rather the movement of time itself. For this reason, the movement of the subject becomes discontinuous, as, with each bifurcation, each labyrinthine fork in time, there emerges a different subject, or rather, the subject as a return of difference. With each emergence of the virtual subject in a new time, the form in which s/he becomes actualized is always different.

Here the need for continuity that characterized the cinema of the movement-image, in line with a retroactive belief in linear history, is replaced by the need for discontinuity, as the irrational cut is employed to express the movement of time, and the shifting nature of the subject's becoming identity. Movement, and indeed, change, is no longer effected in the realm of the actual, as a motor function, but
rather in the gap opened up during the process of the becoming-actual of the virtual. This is the aberrant interval of the time-image's discontinuous subject. The model of time on which this discontinuous, virtual movement is based, is that of the labyrinth.

**Two Times.**

In *Cinema 2*, Deleuze draws on an idea from a short story by Jorge Luis Borges in order to explain the functioning of the labyrinth of time. This is one of the models of time which he effectively maps onto Bergson's duration (of which we shall see more in chapter two) in order to explain the fact that: 'If we take the history of thought, we see that time has always put the notion of truth into crisis'. Deleuze uses Borges' fictional model in order to posit the existence of, what amounts to, multiple worlds. These are parallel worlds which exist (or rather, insist, or subsist) in a virtual state, and become actual, in the present, along a series of infinitely bifurcating pathways. According to Deleuze, Borges' story, *The Garden of Forking Paths* illustrates the fact that:

... nothing prevents us from affirming that incompossibles belong to the same world, that incompossible worlds belong to the same universe. 'Fang, for example, has a secret; a stranger calls at his door ... Fang can kill the intruder, the intruder can kill Fang, they can both escape, they can both die, and so forth ... you arrive at this house, but in one of the possible pasts you are my enemy, in another, my friend...'. This is Borges' reply to Leibniz: the straight line as force of time, as labyrinth of time, is also the line which forks and keeps on forking, passing through incompossible presents, returning to not-necessarily true pasts.

Each bifurcation of the pathway through the labyrinth leads to two 'incompossible presents', two possible, and possibly contradictory, outcomes to any one situation. In
the labyrinth, this is not, however, a paradox (although it had remained so prior to
the emergence of this view of time) as the potential for both outcomes always exists
virtually, and are always both played out, albeit in different worlds, in their
respective becoming-actuals. The past, moreover, becomes 'not-necessarily true' for
at least one of the two outcomes.

If each present moment is a fork in the path of time, then not only are there an
infinite number of equally plausible presents corresponding to every past, but their
simultaneous existence ensures that the present-becoming-past from which they
arose is now not-necessarily true. It is not-necessarily the specific origin of the
particular present in question. Rather than a direct causal chain of development in
linear time, the privileging of one true history, there is the emergence, with each
fork in the path of labyrinthine time, of multiple virtual pasts. These fluctuate in and
out of existence depending upon how they are re-aligned by the subject's existence
in the present. The past is made "true" in the present, looking back, rather than
through the imposition of a false origin from which truth originally stemmed. Time,
labyrinthine time, has thus arrived (as seen in the image of thought typified by the
time-image) in the interval which constitutes subjectivity. It is this which allows the
possibility of discontinuity, or acausal becoming-other which insists as the
ungrounding potential of the linear subjectivity found in the movement-image. This
is why it is labyrinthine time which puts the singular form of truth into crisis, and
suggests a different form of subject, in the time-image, than that which exists in the
movement-image.

The subject of the time-image is the discontinuous force, the repetition of the self as
difference, which ungrounds the unified subject of the movement-image. The
movement-image's subject corresponds to the form of the true, in its perpetual re-
affirmation of its previous past self, through the retroactive positing of a series of
'false', but ultimately legitimizing, origins. This is the process which assures its self-
same identity by always returning in the same form. The continual creation of its actual form in this way is, moreover, necessitated by the common-sense view that its existence is continuous as it crosses space. The subject of the time-image, by contrast, is defined by its ability to grasp the Nietzschean inspired 'powers of the false'\textsuperscript{35} which the labyrinth makes available. Existing in time as a virtual whole, as opposed to in a time that is subordinate to actualized space, this subject is able to perform its identity in such a way as to make the past self that was, that which came before, not-necessarily true. This retroactive destruction of the singular chronology of causality enables their ability to perpetually become-other.

\textbf{Two I's.}

Deleuze credits Kant with the discovery of this schizophrenic subject, and the initial movement towards the realization of the pure form of time. In his deconstruction of Descartes' \textit{Cogito}, Kant illustrated that the 'I' which Descartes describes is split into an I that contemplates (I think) and an I that is (I am).

For Kant, it is a question of the form of time in general, which distinguishes between the act of the I, and the ego to which the act is attributed ... Thus time moves into the subject, in order to distinguish the Ego from the I in it. ... It is in this sense that time as immutable form, which could no longer be defined by simple succession, appeared as the form of interiority (inner sense) whilst space, which could no longer be defined by coexistence, appeared for its part as the form of interiority. 'Form of interiority' means not only that time is internal to us, but that our interiority constantly divides us from ourselves, splits us in two ...\textsuperscript{36}

Time, 'no longer defined by simple succession' or subordinate to a movement through space as chronological time is, is now, instead, the force which splits the
subject in two. The subject is now both an I that acts, and an Ego that both endures and contemplates the I that acts. The implications of this division of the subject by time was explored more fully by Bergson, who conceived of the bifurcation in time (which corresponds to each fork in the labyrinth of time) as the point at which time splits into a present that passes, and a past that is preserved. The subject, then, is at once an actual self that acts, in the present, and a virtual self that insists, or subsists, as the past. Deleuze quotes Bergson to this effect:

Our actual existence, then, whilst it is unrolled in time, duplicates itself along with a virtual existence, a mirror-image. Every moment of our life presents the two aspects, it is actual and virtual, perception on the one side and recollection on the other ... Whoever becomes conscious of the continual duplicating of his present into perception and recollection ... will compare himself to an actor playing his part automatically, listening to himself and beholding himself playing. 37

Anyone gaining intuition of their doubled self as it splits in time will be aware of their becoming-other much as one would who, seeing themselves as other, compares themselves to an actor playing a part, or masquerading a role. In this way are the binaries which are usually upheld by the subordination of time to movement, such as inside/outside, and self/other, disrupted by the pure form of time. In the pure form of time the subject is at once both inside and outside, self and other, virtual and actual, recollection and perception, and indeed, past and present. Thus the masquerade which the subject is now involved in, the falsifying of the self, the forever making contingent of the past, is the action of performativity as a return of difference which destroys the linear causality of the model/copy binary of chronos.

As Deleuze theorized in a much earlier work, *Difference and Repetition*, the repetition which belies the subject's existence 'is truly that which disguises itself in constituting itself, that which constitutes itself only by disguising itself.' 38 This new
subjectivity of the time-image, then, is one which requires a certain amount of
Nietzschean, liberatory forgetting, if it is to succeed. Yet forgetting is only half of
the process, for, in order to make the past that was, not-necessarily true, the
performance of the subject's identity must allow a double movement to occur, a
simultaneous 'liberation and capture' of the self in time. With each split, or fork, in
the labyrinth of time the subject is both captured in its virtual memory, in the past,
and also forgotten (and recreated) for the future, in the actualization of difference
that occurs in the present.

When the masquerading subject returns as difference, its origin, its model, becomes
disconnected from its present becoming, for: 'masks do not hide anything except
other masks. There is no first term which is repeated'. Thus, although the subject
of the time-image is continuous in that it insists, or subsists, virtually, it is only as
this ungrounding force is actualized as the return of difference that this subject is
seen to exist in its actualized form. This is the subjectivity of the aberrant interval
that we find in the time-image, the discontinuous subject who is becoming-other in
time.

The point at which time splits Deleuze terms the 'crystal of time'. This is the point
at which the passing of the actual present, and the preserving of the virtual past,
crystallizes into an image in which the two movements become indiscernible from
one another. Existing within time's labyrinth, without an objective distance (the
inside/outside binary no longer holding) from which to view its fundamental
splitting, it is impossible for us to tell the two movements apart. As Deleuze says:
'there is no virtual which does not become actual in relation to the actual, the latter
becoming virtual through the same relation'. The circuit of exchange that is set up
between the two - the virtual-becoming-actual of the past in its actualization as
present that passes, and the actual-becoming-virtual of the present as it becomes a
past that is preserved - creating an oscillation in which the double movement of the
subject occurs. It is perhaps for this reason that certain theories abound which theorize subjectivity as a \textit{m"obius} spiral. As seen, in particular, in Lyotard's \textit{Libidinal Economy}, Grosz's \textit{Volatile Bodies} and Lingis' \textit{Foreign Bodies}. In Deleuze's crystal it is similarly tempting to theorize the subject as a temporal \textit{m"obius}, or perhaps a temporal 'superfolding' of the virtual whole of time, or the outside.

Although lacking the double helix shape of DNA which Deleuze believed would possibly characterize this type of subjectivity, the \textit{m"obius} spiral nevertheless seems to correspond to the oscillation, or double movement of the subject in time which is to be found in the crystal. This is a subject in which the distinction between outside and inside is constantly scrutinized, due to the way in which they both encounter each other in their \textit{m"obius} superfolding. With every twist of the \textit{m"obius}, every fork in time which structures Deleuze's peculiarly rhizomatic labyrinth, a new, unthought, "face" of the subject is revealed. In this way does its masquerade cause the return of the subject, of its-self, in difference. This is the paradoxical actualization of the subject out of its virtual, subsisting, past, as a memory of the future. Subjectivity in the time-image is definable as the possibility of an immanent ungrounding, and it is this potential which the movement-image has constantly worked to \textit{reterritorialize}, to make subordinate to space and continuity.

\textbf{Two Foucaults.}

The idea of the superfolded outside, and indeed Deleuze's doubling subject, are both greatly influenced by his reading of Foucault's later work, and in particular, Foucault's idea that the subject is involved in a process of self-definition. Deleuze's \textit{Foucault} is a meditation on Foucault's work which contains, amongst other things, his own interpretation of subjectivity as it is found in Foucault's oeuvre. For
Deleuze, Foucault's early and later works expressed two slightly different takes on the process through which subjectivity was defined. According to Deleuze, the theory of the subject to be found in his later works, that of 'subjectivation' was a more nuanced development of Foucault's ideas. Not surprisingly, it is also the one which fits in with his own particular notion of this process.

For Foucault, the subject was formed at the site of interaction between itself and its context, as the product of the relationship between power, the forces of which constructs virtual diagrams, and knowledge, which enabled these virtual diagrams to become actualized as forms. For Deleuze, Foucault's subject was the inside that was formed when the outside (a term Foucault himself took from Blanchot) was folded in a way that was determined by the forces of the outside which characterized its epistemic conditions. Thus Foucault was able to conceive of the subject as formed in a dynamic relation between self and context, which eradicated the space of representation which normally exists between the two. This was a subject without a fixed binary to mark its inside and outside. In line with Foucault's discontinuous, or epistemic view of history, it was also a subject without recourse to a directly causal predecessor.

However, when Foucault initially conceived of the subject in this way, he believed it to be formed in a uni-directional movement, in which knowledge-, or subject-forms were formed solely due to the workings of power. In short, they were subject to power, which positioned them unconditionally. Foucault conceived of power as capable of constructing knowledge-forms, without the individual having the power to resist this process. In *The Order of Things*, for instance, as part of a much broader discussion of his epistemic view of history, Foucault classified the different types of subjects which were created, in the Classical, and the Modern epistemes, by the different forces of the outside which marked each episteme.
In Foucault's later works, by contrast, Deleuze saw a slightly different process at work. Rather than knowledge-forms being created in this rather passive way, they were now conceived of as coming into existence as part of a dynamic interaction between the forces of the outside (power as it attempts to enfold the subject-form) and the subject-form's resistance to said forces. The inside of the outside's fold is actually shaped by the subject-form's resistance to power. Deleuze identified this process as beginning with the writing of 'The Life of Infamous Men', in which this dawning realization becomes apparent:

The most intense point of lives, the one where their energy is concentrated, is precisely there where they clash with power, struggle with it, endeavour to utilize its forces or to escape its traps.46

At this point in his work, rather than power creating passively formed subjects, the subject was only made possible by the resistance that it offered to the forces of the outside. The subject was seen to be an 'encounter with power', leading Deleuze to conclude that, it is not power which is primary in this relationship, but rather that: 'resistance comes first'. Once again this 'resistance' being understood as an ungrounding force that precedes, as opposed to a causal, determining, or originary 'first'.

Deleuze then develops this interpretation of Foucault's work, following it through the final two volumes of *The History of Sexuality*. In his return to Ancient Greek civilization in these texts, Foucault discovers a subjectivity that is based upon a relationship of the self to the self, the process of subjectivation. This was the realization, within the folded inside, that the self had the power to act upon the self, as its own double, in order to affect the possibility of what it could become in the future. This invention of the 'aesthetic existence', or the possibility of performing
one's identity differently was based upon the realization, then, of the self as a double.

But the double is never a projection of the interior; on the contrary, it is an interiorization of the outside. It is not a doubling of the One, but a redoubling of the Other. It is not a reproduction of the Same, but a repetition of the Different. It is not an emanation of an 'I', but something that places in immanence an already other of a Non-self. It is never the other who is the double in the doubling process, it is a self that lives me as the double of the other: I do not encounter myself on the outside, I find the other in me ('it is always concerned with showing how the Other, the Distant, is also the Near and the Same'). It resembles exactly the invagination of a tissue in embryology, or the act of doubling in sewing: twist, fold, stop, and so on.50

The new self that the subject-form has the ability to become, its imminent becoming-other, is the unthought which awaits the next folding of the self, the perpetual ungrounding of the self. The ability to perform its identity differently is only possible for a subject who conceives of themselves in this way, as 'a repetition of the Different' as opposed to a 'reproduction of the Same'. This ability is, in turn, dependent upon the labyrinthine conception of time which is apparent in the time-image. For this reason the crystalline or mobius self is always becoming, always an immanent 'other of a Non-self. The subjectivity expressed by the time-image, then, was one in which style, the perpetual recreation of the self, or a sort of personal anarchy is advocated if the powers of the false are to utilized. In this way does the subject create itself as a 'redoubling of the other', a superfolding of the outside.

Deleuze's use of Foucault, however, is perhaps not so surprising. Amongst the links which can be drawn between their works there is, for instance, the noticeable influence of modernist thought. The modernism inherent in Deleuze's formulation of the subject in time is immediately apparent. Not only is the influence of Bergson
(and also Proust) foregrounded in the cinema texts, he also cites Rimbaud's famous statement, 'I is another' in order to soundbite what is at stake in this philosophical definition of the crystalline subject. Yet it would be a mistake to then condemn this theory to a specific time, in the sense of historical period, as solely representative of the concerns of the first half of the twentieth century. Indeed, the re-emergence of this obsession with time in the post-war European cinemas of the time-image suggests that this is a concern which is ongoing, emerging at different times in different aesthetic forms. Although this concern with existence in time now seems to have been replaced, in the latter half of the last century, with a much stronger desire to understand our existence in space this 'postmodernism is perhaps only actually the return to dominance of the ancient belief that time should remain subordinate to movement through space. In theoretical terms then, as well as in cinema itself, the image of thought of the movement-image has triumphed over the ungrounding danger posed by the time-image. In fact, the time-image could be seen to be nothing more than a passing glitch in the otherwise uncompromised, linear continuum, or history, of the philosophical thought of time. This seeming triumph, however, is perhaps only temporary, and due to the industrial developments that have characterized the production of cinema in the "west" up until now. That this concern will re-emerge, however, despite its recent absence from our cinema screens, is beyond doubt. The crisis of truth which time creates is not period specific, although its different manifestations seem to be, as it is a consequence of the interaction between the two planes upon which the two images of thought exist.

Two Planes.

The interaction between the movement-image and the time-image needs to be understood as that which Deleuze and Guattari describe in A Thousand Plateaus as the struggle between an ungrounding plane of consistency and a reterritorializing plane of transcendence. Drawing on Deleuze's argument in Cinema I, that matter, or
the 'material universe' (when viewed at a molecular level at least) is in actual fact an infinite set of images which constitutes a 'plane of immanence' made entirely of light, Rodowick argues that the cinemas of the movement- and the time-image actually create 'two distinct planes of immanence'. These planes, for Rodowick, are defined by the different way in which each image expresses time, truth and, consequently, we would argue, subjectivity.

The movement-image's plane of immanence, or rather the plane consistency which it creates through its assembling of images, is: 'the open totality in movement that gives rise to the model of the True as totalization' in which 'images are linked or extended according to principles of association and contiguity'. The plane of consistency which the time-image creates, by contrast, is one in which: 'Succession gives way to series' and images are strung together only as 'disconnected spaces'. Indeed, these definitions are very much as we have described the two images so far. Due to the fact, however, that Deleuze's oeuvre contains certain seeming inconsistencies as his ideas develop in different contexts, Rodowick's conclusions can perhaps be viewed in a slightly different light if we draw upon Deleuze and Guattari's definition of the way in which different planes interact, in, *A Thousand Plateaus*. The two planes can now be seen to exist in an oscillating movement between the plane of consistency of the time-image, and the plane of transcendence of the movement-image. Each of these planes actualizes the virtual that is the plane of immanence in a different ways, and together they function as follows.

In its supreme, all-reterritorializing dominance there is the plane of transcendence, or organization, which: 'always concerns the development of forms and the formation of subjects'. This is the plane on which the movement-image creates itself, complete with a continuous subject that evolves in a linear direction through time. This is the plane of the actual, the forms that are created out of the retroactive reterritorialization of virtual becomings. This is the teleological plane that is never
visible in itself, but always at a remove, as an analogy, or as representation. This is the plane upon which the actual is made to appear, as though it were already formed, by a retroactive placing of a series of false causes, as returns of the same.

The plane of consistency, by contrast, is the plane on which time-images emerge, as the becoming-actual of virtual forces of deterritorialization. This is the plane that captures the process of actualization as it occurs, the plane upon which forms do not yet appear, but are seen to be perpetually assembling. The subject that is created on this plane is discontinuous, and uses the powers of the false that are enabled by the labyrinth of time in order to perform their identity differently. This is the plane that is forever falsifying, that on which the crisis of truth becomes evident.

That the movement-image emerges as a reterritorialization of the time-images is evident if we consider Deleuze and Guattari's statement that:

The plane of organization is constantly working away at the plane of consistency, always trying to plug the lines of flight, stop or interrupt the movements of deterritorialization, weigh them down, restratify them, reconstitute forms and subjects in a dimension of depth. Conversely the plane of consistency is constantly extricating itself from the plane of organization ... scrambling forms by dint of speed or slowness, breaking down functions by means of assemblages ...

The discovery of the time-image after the second world war was the ungrounding of the plane of transcendence that the movement-image had previously created. It was not the evolution of cinema to a higher form, but rather, the realization of the need to dissolve cinema's form. Far from cinema reaching its telos, the time-image expressed the deterritorialization of teleology within cinema. In fact, Godard's cinema is discussed by Deleuze and Guattari as an example of this ungrounding of
the totalizing form of representation that is the plane of transcendence, as: 'Godard ...
... effectively carries the fixed plane of cinema to this state where forms dissolve, and all that subsists are tiny variations of speed between movements in composition.'

The two types of cinema interact as contrary but simultaneous movements of de- and re-territorialization towards differing images of thought. On the plane of transcendence, truth is still created through the contiguous succession of images of the movement-image. The subject that appears on this plane is, a form, a molar entity. Both the molar truth, and its corresponding subject are ungrounded, or put into crisis, on the plane of consistency, by the time-image's discontinuous, labyrinthine movement through time. The subject which appears within the disconnected spaces, or any-space-whatevers of the post-war milieu, is a consistency, as opposed to a form. The subject exists as a coming together of speeds, flows and rhythms, in a perpetual feedback loop with its environment. Rather then a molar form, this is a subject that is constantly coming into existence, an assemblage with its context, a body without organs. The movement-image, however, always has the last say, as it constantly struggles to re-impose form upon, to 'restratify', the discontinuous flux that the time-image suggests. It must always stress the subject over subjectivation.

That the time-image has all but died out, or that its themes and processes have been appropriated by the movement-image, however, does not mean that this process of de-and reterritorialization is not continuous. Rather it bears testament to how strong the conservative forces of the movement-image are. For, where there should always exist a mutual interaction, or perhaps even a becoming-indiscernible, between the two planes, the reterritorialization that the movement-image enacts upon the time-image ensures that the immanence of the plane of consistency is perpetually retrenched within the binary reasoning of molar forms. The movement-image's
plane of transcendence takes, to use Brian Massumi's terms, the 'both/and' of the time-image, and reterritorializes it into a binary division, an 'either/or'. To take the machinic couplings, the assemblages through which consistency is created, and to reduce it to the binary of representation is the becoming-reactive of the time-image which the movement-image constantly seeks to enact. In this way is the subject reterritorialized within the binary that ensures the continuation of such divisions as the inside and the outside, the self and the other, male and female, and the line and the labyrinth of time. This retrenchment similarly destroys the possibility of the self as becoming-other. Finally, it is this process which attempts to efface the perpetual crisis of truth by disavowing its own culpability in the maintenance of a politics of exclusion.

Using this model of the two types of images, as they exist on the two planes, we are drawn to the conclusion that - working at the level of the narrative at least, and with the "western" movement-images that we have chosen - in its perpetual ability to reterritorialize molecular becoming into molar form, the cinema of the movement-image is the epitome of Nietzschean ressentiment. In the continued dominance of the movement-image we witness the triumph of the becoming-reactive of forces over the active forces of the falsifying time-image, which attempts to unground, to liberate cinema from its linear trajectory.

Two Pasts.

The way in which the past is aligned on the two different planes is also crucial to an understanding of the way in which the two planes exist. On the plane of transcendence on which we find the movement-image, the past is a linear trajectory, that evolves in a causal fashion, and begins with a first cause. This is the teleological time of history. On the plane of consistency, by contrast, the
labyrinthine time of *Aion* (as opposed to that of *chronos*) effects a past that begins with the present moment and works backwards in order to uncover the previous incarnations in which the present situation has become-actual. It is, once again, the contrast between the past envisaged as a return of the same, and a return of difference. This second way of conceiving the past is analogous with that which belongs to certain types of philosophical thought, especially as it is found in the work of Nietzscbean-inspired philosophers like Deleuze and Foucault. Patrick H. Hutton describes the two different methodological approaches that exist to uncover the past thus:

... the intellectual historian seeks to account for a theoretical viewpoint by fathoming its intellectual sources. His intent is to return to its earliest conceptualization and then to reconstruct the continuous narrative of the modifications that lead to its present formulation. The genealogist, in contrast, traces patterns of intellectual descent from the present backwards without seeking to ascertain their formal beginnings.

The historical recovery of the past which begins with a first cause and works up to the present is a device frequently used by the movement-image, as we shall see further, from chapter three onwards. This is often achieved through the use of a flashback structure which begins with the end of the story to be told, flashes back to the "beginning", thus establishing a teleological progression and a false origin from which the rest of the narrative then stems. The subject in this temporal scheme finds it impossible to become-other, as their identity is, of necessity, pre-determined as a return of the same form. This is the subject which must forever re-appear as a copy of the model which is established at its origin. There is no scope for a bifurcation of the path which it will take through time, as to do so would threaten to change the already established ending. This is the cinema of continuity editing. This is the action-image, the given and knowable whole of time expressed indirectly as subordinate to the singular, unified movement of the subject through space.
The genealogical recovery of the past of the time-image, by contrast, is that which begins in the present, and attempts to trace a path backwards through the labyrinth, 'without seeking to ascertain formal beginnings'. It looks for the past which, from all those which are not-necessarily true, makes the most sense in retrospect. Looking back across time in this way falsifies that which may have previously seemed to be the directly causal relationship with the predecessor of its present form. In the time-travel narratives of the time-image several histories are often offered without any one being specifically given as that which is 'correct'. The virtuality of these possible pasts is emphasized, as we shall see in the cinema of Fellini for instance, by confusing the "real" past with the cinematic past. In this way, the virtual layers of the past which it is possible to uncover archaeologically are shown to be multiple, rather than singular, due to their very existence as virtual memories. Moreover, the transparent linearity created by the flashback is often replaced in the time-image by a confusion over what is present and past as it occurs. Thus the linearity of time's passing is further broken up by the resurgence of time within the aberrant interval, ensuring the subject's discontinuous relation to its own past. This is the subject that has no origin, and returns always as simulacra, a copy of a copy, a mask of a mask.

This ungrounding force of the labyrinth which is expressed in the time-image must be forever reterritorialized into a straight line by the movement-image. This is achieved through the privileging of one past, which thus denies difference itself by excluding all other possible labyrinthine pasts. The singular past of history, the law, the patriarchal order, all that is based upon a singular lineage - which is itself structured upon a binary division which favours the unified, male subject, and which must continually legitimize its own existence through the positing of false origins - is threatened whenever time forces open the subject's sensory-motor interval and separates the self from itself. The ressentiment behind the reterritorializations enacted by the movement-image is thus perpetuated by the need to maintain the binary structure that the ungrounding time-image would dissolve.
Two Cinemas?

Returning to Kovács' argument, with which we started this discussion, Deleuze's texts can only appear to chart a linear progression when seen in retrospect. This is to take one trajectory through the labyrinth of cinema, that which moves from the movement-image to the time-image, and to privilege it, at the expense of all others, as though it were an inevitable evolutionary progression from one to the other. This Deleuze does not do. In fact, the only one history which does emerge in this fashion, is that of the movement-image before the war, to the movement-image after the war, a history in which there is no break, shift, crack, or aberrant interval in sight. Rather, Deleuze's history of the cinema is discontinuous, and charts one route through the labyrinth, which, when seen looking back from the perspective of the new time-image, exposes how not-necessarily true its predecessors (the movement-images of the pre-war period) were. The progression from pre-war movement-image to post-war time-image is far from linear, it is the bifurcation of one line of the labyrinth. As Deleuze says at the very start of his project: 'This study is not a history of the cinema'. Only the movement-image, infused with its binary logic and linear progression can create a singular line of time, a (one) history of cinema. The time-image, by contrast, is that which constantly re-emerges to put this singular history in crisis. As Rodowick has it, in Reading the Figural, 'only the movement-image "evolves"; the time-image "recurs"'.

At the close of Cinema 1, Deleuze discusses the crisis which faced the action-image with the emergence of the time-image. Yet this crisis, he points out, was not something new. Rather, he asks, 'Was this not the constant state of cinema? As we saw earlier, the crisis of the action-image is an ongoing crisis, for the time-image is the movement-image in its 'nascent state, and this state is constant'. In fact, the
possibility of its arousal had always existed, all that had been necessary for it to occur was for cinema to observe itself, as an actor, playing its part automatically, listening to itself, and beholding itself playing. This awareness of itself as other, however, the cinema of the movement-image (and in particular that of the American action-image) was designed specifically to deny. The maintenance of the sensory-motor link between man and world was the most essential element in the continuation of this process, as it helped foster the belief that there was no situation too big for the subject to react to. For this reason alone, the whole of time could be represented, as it was conquered in the subject's sensory-motor movement across space. Even with the contrary revelations brought about by the war, which showed that there were indeed 'limit situations', or 'limit-circumstances' which were too big for the subject, (pure optical and sound situations to which there was no possible motor response) this still did not spell the end of the movement-image, or indeed, the global dominance of the action-image.

In fact, the post-war milieu, that which had so very recently witnessed the culmination of the movement-image's ethos of the knowable whole of time in what Deleuze handily dubs, 'Hitler and Hollywood, Hollywood and Hitler', was to witness only a short lived burst of time-images. In the mainstream, Hitler and Hollywood have never left us. The resistance to its dominance offered by the time-image, that rather elitist, often overly intellectualized product of the modernist bourgeois, liberal, European art-house, and auteur led cinema of the 1960s and 70s, has, in fact, shifted somewhat to the politics of representation offered by third, diasporic and minor cinemas. In this new cinema, it is not the subject which is critiqued in its immediate sensory-motor incapacity, as it was in the time-image, but rather, the inability to represent "the people" as a given whole. This fascism of the whole is replaced, in the minor, or 'modern political cinema', which Deleuze mentions towards the end of Cinema 2, by the need to create a people yet to come. These are a becoming-people who form a community yet to be imagined, rather than an already imagined community.
Yet despite the emergence, and indeed, continued re-emergence of different ungrounding forces which utilize the labyrinth of time in different ways, and with emphases which are beyond the scope of this study of dominant liberal subjectivity in the developed world, the movement-image remains supreme. Attempts to unground it are quickly marginalized, often as cult or art cinemas (time-images) or through unavailability due to an even worse lack of distribution than is available on the independent cinema circuit (third cinemas). The fascism of the given whole, linear temporality, and the sensory-motor continuum remain the norm. Why is it, then, asks Peter Canning, in 'The Imagination of Immanence', that the crisis of truth, and the emergence of the time-image which it prompted, appeared after WWII? After all, Canning points out, the crimes against humanity which arose during the war were no "worse" than those perpetrated during the previous century, with the mass extermination of the native American tribes, and the colonization of much of the rest of globe by military means. Why was it that, at the birth of cinema, it was movement-image that emerged, when its historical context was equally as murderous? Why was the time-image not the first to be seen?

The fact is, the dominant form of cinema, the movement-image, was always predicated upon closing the gap between subject and world through action, and on ensuring that the whole of time remained representable. The movement-image was designed, in its very inception, as a reterritorialization of the ungrounding with which the time-image (amongst other images) threatened to expose cinema to itself. The binary principle upon which the reterritorialization of time into a linear schema rests, that which is enacted by the formation of the plane of transcendence, is that which must constantly work to shore up the temporal division between the subject and its actions upon the world. Should this fail, as it did with the emergence of the time-image, the awareness that we gain is that it is - as Canning states with a particularly Foucauldian rationale - our own binary morality which 'creates the evil
it prosecutes both within the subject and without. The awareness of our actual disconnection from the world (as discontinuous entities existing in time, rather than in space) the morality which we impose upon it, and our naturalization of this through the exclusion of difference, was that which the time-image glimpsed. It is this glimpse of ourselves which the movement-image must ensure never emerges.

The illusion of the connection between the sensory-motor continuum of the subject and the knowable whole is of primary importance to the movement-image, as it denies the possibility that we could, ourselves, be in any way responsible for a reactive willing of the continuation of the very morality which led to the cataclysmic events of the second war. Canning is worth quoting at length in this matter, simply due to the amazing vitriol which he hurls at the tyranny of the image of thought which the movement-image expresses.

It is enough to make one sick with shame, this all too human form of erotic-aggressive temporality providing the link between images in a totalizing narrative of good versus evil and light versus darkness, as all the old stories and heroic clichés and phantoms continue to be revived from the dead and reappear on-screen and in life, to reinforce the signifying fantasy structure that is the sorry basis of human passion; they promptly produce new scapegoats as the condition of harmonious community; and the film industry cynically feeds these moving images to the "people" - to channel their psychic hunger for "passion", their neural receptors' thirst for erotic-aggressive transmitters - in exchange for money to feed back into reproduction. It is a convenient arrangement for the very capital that is organizing and spreading worldwide the misery of cynical psychosis (egotism, paranoia, and distrust) to be itself the purveyor of images of harmony and unanimity following the apocalyptic cleansing action of the latest Top Gun.
It is the sensory-motor regime of the movement-image which keeps us from realizing our own guilt in creating the system of exclusion which we use to perpetrate atrocities in the name of good and evil, the creation of scapegoats in order to foster the notion of a universal truth (or law) to which they are other. The time-image was dangerous in that it showed our capacity for self-creation, that which must, if we follow the reasoning through, have initially led us to this grotesque situation of anti-human *ressentiment* - masquerading as the transcendent struggle between forces of good and evil - in the first place. It also suggested our own ability to change this situation, through an action of creative evolution which would re-link us to the whole, a whole that is not yet given, but grasped only in its becoming. For, on the plane of consistency, the movement is always towards assemblages that would deny the binary between self and other.

In this respect, Kovács was right to assert that the time-image expressed the self-consciousness of cinema. The labyrinthine powers of the false, the ability to care for, or perform, the self, and the artifice of the law was that which the time-image saw when it regarded its own self in time. For a brief moment it became the virtual double, or ungrounding of the movement-image. Hardly surprisingly, this was a short lived and quickly marginalized uprising against the law. The movement-image created on the plane of transcendence is forever one step ahead of its predecessor, its ungrounding double, and plugs its lines of flight, restratifies its molecular becomings into molar forms, and reterritorializes its labyrinthine becoming into the straight line of history: 'an endless search for justice, vindication, or vengeance, a chain of events or linkage of deeds and moral reasons'73.

Just as Deleuze and Guattari's *Anti-Oedipus* showed, the struggle against fascism is an everyday struggle, it occurs all the time, or perhaps, it occurs as time itself. It occurs at the level of the self, "the people" and the whole. That the movement-image continues to win this battle over the representation of the subject in time, however,
is perhaps not that surprising. The creation of form, that which, as Bergson himself admits, is that which we use in the perception of our everyday life, is an invaluable tool for survival. To think actively, as opposed to in this reactive fashion, to think becoming over being, duration over space-time, is therefore a very difficult task to approach.

Indeed, as Philip Goodchild points out, the struggle between the becoming-active and reactive of forces always appears to perception, to consciousness, to have been won by the becoming-reactive of forces, as it can only perceive the forms of the everyday.

Deleuze emphasizes that ressentiment, bad conscience and nihilism are not psychological traits, but the foundation of humanity in man. We are only able to know nihilism, the "becoming-reactive" of forces in which they are separated from what they can do. This is because of the essential link between reactive forces and consciousness as memory and knowledge. Consciousness is merely an effect producing nothing; it represents the relation between reactive forces and the active forces which always escape consciousness. We are only able to know mechanical effects - never spontaneous forces which function as causes. Everything coming to consciousness is already a force which has been separated from its power of action in becoming-reactive.

That which appears in the movement-image, on the plane of transcendence, will always prevail as long as we perceive in a common-sensical fashion, through the forms which our consciousness constructs. What is interesting to note, then, as this study will attempt to do in various ways, is just exactly how this reterritorialization is achieved by the movement-image. How are the active forces which the time-image expresses reterritorialized through the movement-image's becoming-reactive of forces? In particular, how are concerns such as those of gender, sexuality, and
indeed, nation, dealt with by the time-image, and how are these concerns then reterritorialized by movement-images, through the creation of different temporal structures?

One Thesis.

The Thesis is in two parts. The first, chapters one to three, deals further with the contrasts between the representations of time found in the movement- and the time-images. The second, chapters four to six, focuses more exclusively on the movement-image. Chapter two provides a more in-depth analysis of the way in which Bergson's theories of time and memory can be used to explain the subject as it is found in the time-image. Initially, the past as it re-emerges in the movement-image is discussed in relation to the recurring livery stables kiss scene in Hitchcock's Vertigo. The model of time derived from Bergson, once modified by Deleuze using Nietzsche, is then illustrated, using Fellini's 8½, in order to describe the different way in which the past is encountered by the subject in the time-image.

Chapter Three deals with the way in which spectator subjectivity is different in the time-image than it is in the movement-image, using Rivette's Céline et Julie vont en bateau. The psychoanalytical model of the spectatorial subject found in Rodowick's The Difficulty of Difference, is seen to correspond to the spectator which the movement-image attempts to posit through its use of the shot/reverse shot structure. This is emphasized through a reading of the same process at work in the more recent movement-image, The Sixth Sense. The subject of the time-image, by contrast, is seen to emerge in a scene which occurs later in Rivette's film to that discussed by Rodowick. Spectating in this sequence is shown to be a movement of Möbius doubling, or becoming-other, creating a model of spectatorship which has elements in common with Laura Marks' definition, in The Skin of the Film.
In part two, chapters four and five work together to discuss more recent examples of movement-images from the 1990s, which explored different temporal narrative structures for male and female characters, and the ramifications thereof. Chapter four begins with an explanation of the difference between Einstein and Bergson's definitions of time, and proceeds to analyse these different conceptions of time as they are to be found in *Sliding Doors*, *Run Lola Run*, and *Romy and Michele's High School Reunion*. These movement-images all suggest a labyrinthine time and a performative becoming-other for their heroines, but ultimately reterritorialize this liberative becoming-active of forces through a binary structure in which these narratives become a passing fancy, or pleasurable matinee daydream. Chapter five illuminates the other half of this binary structure, showing how labyrinthine liberation, or becoming-other, is always shown to be an action which is against the law when applied to men. Using *The Talented Mr Ripley*, *Memento*, *Liar*, and *Possible Worlds*, this chapter will show how male performativity is always reduced to a form of self-deceit which enables man to get away with murder. This murder is, in fact, the murder of the essential self, the morally reprehensible nature of which the movement-image must always uphold in its conclusion. In this way the plane of transcendence of the movement-image maintains its dominance through a privileging of the continuous organic, Cartesian subject of the sensory-motor link. The use of flashback in order to create a singular history for these characters is also discussed.

Finally, chapter six concludes by looking at the differing attitudes of western European and North American national cinema images to the shifts in power of the post-war era. The films, *The Music Box*, *Saving Private Ryan* and *Un Héros très discret* are examined in order to illustrate the different attitudes to the past which different colonial powers have adopted. At this point this study again returns to issues raised in this chapter, questioning exactly what is at stake in the different
ways in which these colonizing, and once colonizing, powers create their histories through cinema images.
This is with the exception of chapter eight of Cinema 2, entitled, 'Cinema, body and brain, thought' in which Deleuze discusses several third, and third world cinemas, in relation to what he terms 'modern political cinema'. See, Deleuze, Gilles, Cinema 2: The Time-Image (London: The Athlone Press, 1985), pp. 189-224. For the purposes of this work the term "western" shall be used to designate the cinemas, predominantly of the Northern European nations and North America, whose films we discuss. This is not to suggest that the cinemas of Australia and New Zealand are not also "western", just that they are not included within this work. The same can be said for the many European nations which do not feature. The term "western" then, is applied with a due sense of reservation, and should be thought of as a specific sort of shorthand term which functions within this work only.

3 ibid., p. 156.
4 Restivo, Angelo, Into the Breach: Between the movement-image and the time-image, Gregory Flaxman (ed.), The Brain is the Screen: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Cinema (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), p. 173.
5 ibid., p. 172.
7 It needs to be made clear that this particular, perhaps eccentric, way of reading Lyotard is very much a Deleuzian reading. It would be more usual to consider Lyotard's statement to refer to the emergence of the modern and the postmodern as specifically historical movements. This interpretation would suggest that the germ of what is postmodernism is seen by Lyotard to already exist in modernism, and reaches a fuller expression of itself in postmodernism. There is however, a recent precedence for the way in which we are using Lyotard. In his most recent work, Reading the Figural, Rodowick uses Lyotard's definition of the postmodern, as the 'future anterior' of the modern, as part of a much broader discussion of the difference between the representational, and the digital arts. Our own work could be seen to be charting a similar direction to Rodowick's. The new digital media could be seen to be the ungrounding force which acts upon the older, representational, or discursive arts - such as cinema before its digitalization - in a very similar way to that in which the time-image ungrounds the movement-image. See, Rodowick, D.N., Reading the Figural, or, Philosophy after the New Media (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2001), p. 19.
As Rodowick has it: 'Deleuze's Nietzschean approach to art presents a profound critique both of questions of hierarchy and of aesthetic disinterest - it is profoundly political in all its dimensions.'


Deleuze, Cinema 1, op. cit., p. 212.

Deleuze, Cinema 2, op. cit., p. xi.


op. cit., p. 1.

Deleuze, Cinema 1, op. cit., p. 2.

Bergson, Creative Evolution, op. cit., p. 309.

ibid., p. 8.

ibid., pp. 62-3.

Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine, op. cit., p. 3.

op. cit., p. xiii-xxiv.

Deleuze, Cinema 1, op. cit., chpts. 9-12.

Deleuze, Cinema 2, op. cit., p. 2.

ibid.

Deleuze, Cinema 1, op. cit., p. 208. In fact, Deleuze lists five ways in which the crisis of the action image can be seen to occur. I have cited only the two which best describe the way in which subjectivity was affected in the interval between the two different types of cinema. For a full list of the five see Cinema 1, pp. 207-211.

Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine, op. cit., pp. 4-5.

In fact, La jetée is perhaps something of a problematic example, as the use of the voiceover on the soundtrack actually serves to create a linear plot from the images. The film becomes, in effect, a huge flashback, which does indeed align time into a continuum. In fact, this is a particularly conservative film in this respect, as it views not only the past, but also the future as pre-determined. Moreover, it could be seen as establishing the linearity of time as male, a time which ultimately leads to his death, in contrast to the woman, who is the one (in the famous eyes opening scene) who has the contrary power to move in time. These are issues which will receive a more thorough investigation in the movement-images discussed in chapters three, four and five.

ibid., p. 130.

In chapters four and five we shall see that these are in fact different universes.

In fact, Borges' labyrinth is perhaps more of an influence on Deleuze's thought than is often acknowledged. It seems to have effected his and Guattari's concept of the rhizome, of chapter one of,
A Thousand Plateaus, with whose dispersive shape it appears to have much in common. In fact, the term 'labyrinth' is perhaps a little misleading, as Borges/Deleuze's labyrinth has no centre. See, Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia II (London: The Athlone Press, 1987), chpt. 1.

34 op. cit., p. 131.
35 op. cit., chpt. 6.
37 Deleuze, Cinema 2, op. cit., p. 79.
38 op. cit., p. 17.
39 Deleuze, Cinema 2, op. cit., p. 68.
40 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, op. cit., p. 17.
41 Deleuze, Cinema 2, op. cit., chpt. 4.
42 ibid., p. 69.
43 Rodowick's work also suggests this conclusion, see, Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine, op. cit., p. 180.
44 For definitions of the way in which the superfold functions, see the appendix, 'On the death of Man and Superman', in, Deleuze, Gilles, Foucault (London: The Athlone Press, 1988).
47 ibid. p. 79.
48 Deleuze, Foucault, op. cit., p. 89.
49 ibid., p. 101.
50 ibid., p. 98.
51 Deleuze, Cinema 2, op. cit., p. 133.
52 David Harvey provides an in-depth exploration of this shift in Part III of, Harvey, David, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), see especially, p. 201 onwards.
54 Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine, op. cit., p. 175.
55 ibid., p. 177.
56 ibid., p. 178.
57 Deleuze's reasoning concerning what the plane of immanence actually proceeds in a rather circuitous way. The plane of immanence in Cinema 1, is figured as a, 'set of movement-images... a series of blocs of space-time' whilst the plane of consistency (itself necessarily a plane of
immanence) which is defined in *A Thousand Plateaus* is thought to be that which enables a 'freeing of time, Aeon'. Aeon and space-time, however, are not compatible as definitions of time. Aeon roughly corresponds to labyrinthine time, as it is found in the time-image, whilst space-time is exactly that which is created by the subordination of time to a movement through space, in the movement-image. This we shall see further in chapter four. Deleuze's thinking of the plane of immanence, then, may have changed slightly in the later work with Guattari. Bringing us back in line with Rodowick's conclusions, Deleuze's conclusions concerning the plane of immanence in *Cinema 1* should be understood as descriptive of the plane of immanence of the universe of the movement-image, but not that of the time-image. In this way can the plane of immanence of the movement-image exist as described in *Cinema 1*, as blocs of space time, and the plane of immanence of *Cinema 2* be that which is described in *A Thousand Plateaus*, that which contains the freeing of time of Aeon. In terms of the development of the character's identity in the narrative of the movement-image, as chapters four and five illustrate, the interactive, or reterritorializing model of *A Thousand Plateaus* is that which best suits this study. See: Deleuze, *Cinema 1*, op. cit., pp. 58-61, and, Deleuze, *A Thousand Plateaus*, op. cit., pp. 265-272.

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58 op. cit., p. 265.  
59 ibid., p. 270.  
60 ibid. p. 267.  
62 With the exception of chapter three, which also delves into spectator subjectivity, this study will concentrate on the way in which character subjectivity is reterritorialized, within the narrative, and, a little indirectly perhaps, by the distribution of films by the industry. The reterritorialization of the movement of the subject in time that occurs through the process of editing will mostly be left for a later date, as the constraints of the length of this work makes it impossible to also accommodate this at the time of writing. Moreover, the concentration on movement-images which this study felt necessary (due to the abundance of films which have recently emerged which play with time, but only indirectly) is itself partly responsible for this narrative driven analysis. In short, Fellini and Rivette aside, the time-image is not a phenomenon that is common to "western" cinema of the 1990s, the decade in which the majority of the films of the last three chapters emerged.  
63 In, *Reading the Figural*, Rodowick shows how the shift in thinking to be found in the break between the movement- and the time-image is analogous to the shift in thinking (in post-68 French philosophy at least) from the Hegelian inspired existentialism of Sartre, to the Nietzschean inspired post-structuralism of Deleuze and Foucault. Chapter six of this work explains in some depth the difference between the two approaches to history which these methodologies define. Rodowick, *Reading the Figural*, op. cit.

65 op. cit., p. 194.

66 op. cit., p. 205.


68 ibid., p. 164.

69 Deleuze doesn't actually classify any cinemas as minor himself, but his work on modern political cinema in chapter eight of Cinema 2 has led to this classification, taken from his work with Guattari on Kafka (in Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari, Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1975)) being given to certain types of cinema. See in particular, Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine. op. cit., chpt. 6. We shall say more about this in connection with Laura Marks' work, in chapter three.

70 op. cit., p. 216.


72 ibid.

73 ibid., p. 348.

2. Remembrance of Film's Past.

This chapter will explore the way in which memory functions differently in the movement-image than it does in the time-image. The subject that each image creates will be seen to be defined by the way in which the past, and its return as memory, is conceived in the respective images.

The subject, as we saw previously, is defined as an interval between perception and action. When memory is encountered in this interval, the subject's sensory-motor continuity is questioned. In the movement-image the recollection of the past remains subordinate to the continuation of an unified subject. Memory does not yet assert itself with enough force to break apart the sensory-motor continuum. Memory in the time-image, by contrast, contains exactly this disruptive ability, and consequently ungrounds the linearity of the subject. This destruction of the sensory-motor continuum frees the subject from its actualized, spatial coordinates, allowing it to travel within time itself. It is for this reason that the past is encountered in a much more complex way in time-images, as a series of slippages between the virtual sheets of past times. In the movement-image, by contrast, it remains, essentially, a flashback, which briefly interrupts the subject's continuum, but which is always followed by a return to linearity.

Deleuze's model of time is drawn from Bergson. In Cinema 2 however, in order to discover the ungrounding of time in the time-image, due to the resurgence of the past as disruptive force, Deleuze creates an assemblage of Bergsonian and Nietzschean theories of time. In fact, it is Nietzsche's eternal return which provides the ungrounding impetus to Bergson's conceptualization of time as a virtual whole, upon which the crystal of time is based. This same assemblage had previously
enabled Deleuze to formulate the three passive syntheses of time in *Difference and Repetition*, drawing, once again, on his work on the post-Cartesian subject, the subject after Kant.

After an initial discussion of Bergson's theory of the past, this chapter will concentrate on the subject in the time-image, as it is here that Deleuze's integration of Nietzsche with Bergson is most apparent. Following an analysis of the way in which memory returns in the movement-image, using a scene from Hitchcock's *Vertigo* (1958), the remainder of the chapter will focus on Fellini's 8½ (1963). This chapter will not, however, attempt to offer original interpretations of the narratives of these already much discussed films. Rather, certain scenes from the films will be used to illustrate the ways in which the past returns differently in the movement-image than it does in the time-image.

**Bergson.**

Deleuze's use of Bergson in the cinema texts is, primarily, a re-working of ideas developed in *Matter and Memory*, in which Bergson isolates two different types of memory. On the one hand there is habit, an empirical form of recollection, based upon a logical, linear, sensory-motor link between the subject and its surroundings. Habit is the instinctual recognition of the everyday, quotidian reality that surrounds the subject. It is a recognition that extends into action, rather like the reflexive closing of the leaves of a Venus Fly Trap plant upon feeling the touch of its prey.

Habit is formed by a building up of repetitions of same actions, the storing up of the past as bodily habit. The example given by Bergson² is that of the student learning a text by heart, in which what is remembered is not each separate reading of the text,
but rather the mechanical operation by which the words gradually come to be linked together through each repetition of the same material. When such learned habits are performed (or, remembered) the interval between perception and action is minimal. In fact, there is almost no time, no interval, in which an attentive recollection can intervene between what is perceived and the mechanical setting into motion of the action that is performed upon it. Thus the continuity of the sensory-motor subject is maintained.

On the other hand, and in contrast to habit, attentive recollection is the return, or rather the becoming-actual, of the past (which exists as a stored, virtual memory image) when it encounters a corresponding image in the present. Attentive recollection is the emergence of the past, of memory, within the interval between perception and action. Rather than the automatic setting in action of a mechanism, of stored bodily actions in response to certain stimuli found in habit, however, recollection involves an active effort of mind. Attentive recollection, moreover, ensures that the subject becomes temporarily suspended in the interval, and is unable to immediately act upon that which it perceives; although this is not yet enough to completely liberate the subject from its sensory-motor continuity. Both habit and recollection, then, serve to prolong the subject's continuous movement through space.

Before the operation of attentive recollection can be described in full we must first examine more closely Bergson's conception of the past. Due to the perpetual splitting of time, into a present that passes, and a past that is preserved, the stored, virtual past is envisaged by Bergson as shaped like a cone.
Bergson's cone represents duration, time as a virtual whole. The point of the cone, S, corresponds to the moment that is the present, which is actually only the most contracted level of the past. The subject at this point exists as the condensed memory of repeated previous bodily attitudes. As time splits, the action of the storing up of pasts creates the cone shape, SAB, each layer of which is a more or less relaxed level of the past. As the present, at S, is the most contracted level of the past, the layer AB is, conversely, the most relaxed plane of the past. Here all of the past exists as distinct and separate images, the antithesis of the condensed memory of habit. The myriad layers in-between, represented here as A'B', and A"B", are infinite in number (and will be discussed in more detail below). The virtual weight of the past serves to push the present moment forward into its point of interaction with the area marked P, the universal plane of images that is our perceived vision of reality, or the 'plane' of 'representation'. Thus the cone ensures a linear direction to
time. At S the subject becomes a centre of indetermination, not only an interval between perception and action, but also as the point of time's splitting into passing present and preserved past.

The question remains of how exactly this virtual past is recalled by attentive recollection? How does memory come to insert itself into the interval? One might expect that, if the subject at S is defined by its sensory-motor continuity, its habits, or rather, the body's physical position, would play an important part in this process. However, our habitual tendency to extend perception into bodily action - which usually serves to block the return of memories by closing off the interval into which time seeks to flow - paradoxically, cannot help but also encourage it. Bergson states that:

... just because the disappearance of former images is due to their inhibition by our present attitude, those whose shape might fit into this attitude encounter less resistance than the others: if, then, any one of them is indeed able to overcome the obstacle, it is the image most similar to the present perception that will actually do so.\(^5\)

The body's physical position, in fact, plays a decisive role in attentive recollection, as it allows the recollection-image from the past that is 'most similar' to the image perceived in the present, to surge forward into the interval. Attentive recollection, we can see, is based upon the same mechanical recognition as those learned, bodily repetitions of habit, but it distinguishes itself from habit by facilitating a much more complex encounter with the past.

It would appear that it is not simply the body's physical posture that calls forth the recollection-image. Memories also force themselves out to meet the image perceived, and with a greater degree of success when the subject's physical posture
creates a shape which they can match. Bergson is drawn to this conclusion because, if movement simply called forth memories, then memory itself would just be a function of the brain. This is, however, a conclusion contrary to his thesis, in which the brain is but one image amongst others upon the plane of representation. The brain, in fact, does not have the agency necessary for such a task. The subject is, we are beginning to see, no longer an organic entity, a body ruled by the mind, but rather a temporal entity, in which the force of time begins to wrestle control from that of the body's movement through space.

An attentive recollection, then, does require an adaptation of the body, a physical positioning that facilitates the entry of the recollection-image, and this in turn requires a certain inhibition of movement of the subject. At the very least, a brief pause in the sensory-motor continuum is needed, a time for reflection upon the past. Accompanying this motor positioning, this stillness in the present, however, there must also be a corresponding movement of the past, pushing forward into the present. The organism, therefore, is not specifically in control of the recall of memory. This conclusion is borne out by Proust’s modification of Bergson's theory, in which he describes involuntary memory recall, due to the sensory recollection brought about by tastes, sounds, smells, and so on. In these instances, time surges forward unsolicited into the interval, bringing forward recollection without an attentive effort of mind on our part. Time, it would seem, has as big a part to play in recollection as the physical movement of the subject's organism does.

In attentive recollection, images from the past are grafted onto perception-images in the present. The return of the past is, effectively, a form of recognition of the past when it creates a match with the present:

... every attentive perception truly involves a reflection, in the etymological sense of the word, that is to say the projection, outside ourselves, of an
actively created image, identical with, or similar to, the object on which it comes to mold itself.7

This is the process of the becoming-actual of a virtual image that comes to abide with the actual image that is perceived. As the virtual image comes forward from memory, in its process of becoming-actual, it enters into a circuit of indiscernibility with the actual image. In this 'circuit' of 'mutual tension'8, the recollection-image overlays itself upon the image of the object perceived (the perception-image) until it is impossible to tell them - the respective past and present images - apart.

For Bergson, the process through which a recollection-image is recovered from its virtual storage in the past, and then brought forward to meet the present, roughly breaks down into three inter-linked stages. These are, the leap into the past in general, the search through the layers of the past, and the bringing forth, through translation-rotation9, of the appropriate layer, as a recollection-image. Firstly there is the leap into the past in general, the purely virtual realm. This ensures that we are detached from the present, and that there is a momentary pause in the sensory-motor continuum. This initial movement, moreover, is accompanied by the search for the particular region of the past which contains an image corresponding to that which is perceived. If we return to Bergson's cone momentarily, this process can be explained a little more clearly. Each section of virtuality, each layer, sheet, or plane of time (A'B', A"B", etc.) contains the entire past, and each exists as a different degree of contraction and/or expansion of the past. Each distinct layer is uniquely divided, with particular starring memories (different for each plane) and a supporting cast of lesser memories. It is for this reason that different associations take us to, and bring forth, different planes of the past, or different ways in which we remember events as having happened. This explains why Proustian, involuntary memories can abruptly return us to planes that we have previously attempted to recover in vain when using the Bergsonian process of attentive recollection. We may have previously been attentively searching on the wrong plane, a plane on
which the memory we sought plays but a minor role and is therefore not immediately apparent. An involuntary memory trigger (a taste, a sound) on the other hand, may leap us directly back to the most appropriate layer, that upon which the memory we seek is to be found playing a starring role.

Finally, once within a particular layer of the past, it remains for the memory found there to be brought forward into the present. This occurs in a two-fold movement of translation-rotation, a movement that Bergson refers to as 'a work of adjustment, something like the focussing of a camera'\textsuperscript{10}. During this process the cone simultaneously contracts the region of the past which contains the recollection-image that we have chosen, and also rotates the cone in order to bring the entire labyrinth pathway of that particular region of the past to bear upon the sensory-motor present. The body, for its part, assumes the posture most likely to receive said memory image, to allow it to become actual. There is, then, a part to be played by the physical positioning of the body in the attentive recollection of memory-images, only it is not, as we have seen, without a corresponding forward movement of the past pushing itself forward into the present.

During the process of recollection the subject is involved in a double movement, always oscillating between AB and S, the virtual and the actual. The subject:

\ldots consists in the double current which goes from the one to the other - always ready either to crystallize into uttered words or evaporate into memories. \ldots This amounts to saying that the sensori-motor mechanism figured by the point S and the totality of the memories disposed in AB there is room \ldots for a thousand repetitions of our physical life, figured by as many sections A' B', A" B", etc., of the same cone.\textsuperscript{11}
With each leap into the past there is an expansion, a dissipation of the self into multiple past selves, 'a thousand repetitions' amongst all the many layers of the past, and with each contraction of the past, a becoming-actual of one particular self. These co-existent past selves, myriad layers of the past, and their relevance for the subject in the present will be further examined in relation to Fellini's time-images. In the cinema of the movement-image, however, the return to the singular self of the present is always retained. The reason why the recollection-image is not quite the same as the time-image can thus be seen through an analysis of a single scene from Hitchcock's *Vertigo*, in which the return of the past as a process of expansion and contraction (translation-rotation) is apparent.

**Hitchcock.**

The scene under discussion takes place in Judy Barton's (Kim Novak) room at the Hotel Empire, in which Scotty (James Stewart), having almost completed his makeover of Judy back into Madelaine, awaits her exit from the bathroom. When Judy/Madelaine enters the room, with hair now blonde once more, and tied back as per Madelaine, Scotty moves towards her, they embrace, and begin to kiss. At this point, the camera moves behind Scotty and begins to pan to the right, circling the couple. Scotty, sensing a change in his surroundings, opens his eyes, as the scenery behind the couple changes. The backdrop moves, as the camera continues to appear to circle, from the interior of the room, to black, and then to the livery stables of the Spanish Mission. This was the original setting for the kiss with which Madelaine parted company with Scotty, before beginning her flight to the bell tower. Recognizing his surroundings, Scotty closes his eyes again, the kiss resumes, and the backdrop rotates back to the room interior. This is a perfect filmic example of the action of translation-rotation whereby the past comes to be overlaid upon the present, entering into a circuit of mutual tension between the actual, perception-image, and the virtual-becoming-actual, recollection-image.
The process starts with the kiss. The position of their bodies creates a certain stillness of Scotty's sensory-motor continuum, and enables the memory-image to push itself into the interval. Yet it is not solely their bodily posture which brings forward the recollection-image. Until Judy had effectively become the image of Madelaine, Scotty remained unable to access the particular layer of the past that would return the memory to him. Indeed, until his transformation of Judy into Madelaine had been completed, he had been unable to adopt this physical position, and to kiss her passionately on the lips. Only with Judy's make-over into the image of Madelaine completed, does Scotty find the correct associative image to also enable the movement of past into present to be completed. Whilst this process is indeed aided by the physical posture they adopt during the kiss, the recollection-image also required a perception-image to match before it could surge forward into the present. With its match found in the present, in the image of Judy, the memory of Madelaine pushes itself forward to create an indiscernibility between the images of the past and the present, a Judy/Madelaine circuit.

When the room begins to circle we see the centrifugal movement of time as it rotates the cone of the past. This simultaneously contracts the layer of the past in which the kiss in the livery stable is the most akin to the kiss Scotty experiences in the hotel, and pushes that particular plane of the past forward into the present. This is the movement of translation-rotation akin to the focusing of a camera of which Bergson talks. The indiscernibility between the actual and the virtual-becoming-actual that this creates - the setting up of the circuit of mutual tension in which the past and present 'careen one behind the other'\textsuperscript{12} - is seen in the way in which the backdrop changes from room to stable, to room again. Scotty's facial recognition, moreover, when he sees the stable around him confirms that the correct image has been found, and that the perception of kissing Judy in the present matches that of kissing Madelaine in the past.
This overlaying of identities continues to deepen as immediately after the kiss, Judy, forgetting herself (as it were) for a moment, makes the mistake of putting on Madelaine's necklace. This was the necklace previously worn by Judy, playing Madelaine, playing Carlotta, when she initially ensnared Scotty. As Scotty is fixing the clasp behind her neck before they go out, he catches sight of the necklace in the mirror, which transforms the image seen into the recollection-image of the necklace worn by Carlotta in the portrait seen earlier in the film. As the camera pulls back from this image of the painting, we discover Madelaine in the art gallery, looking, with her back to Scotty, at the painting. Here, once again, the situation in the present becomes overlaid by the recollection-image of the past. Madelaine, seen from behind by Scotty in the past, is the image brought forward by Scotty's memory to match, to deepen, to enter into a circuit with, the image in the present. The image which matches that of Judy, standing in front of Scotty, looking at the image of Madelaine that she is becoming, is that of Madelaine, looking at the image of Carlotta that she was then becoming.

Clearly Hitchcock's conception of time has much in common with Bergson's. In fact, this similarity suggests that it may not be entirely coincidental that Scotty's moments of vertigo, especially when looking down the stairwell of the bell tower, are actually figured in the shape of a cone. This elongating effect is achieved through Hitchcock's distinctive use of the simultaneous pan and pull back of the camera. The spiralling vortex which emerges from the eye in Saul Bass's opening title sequence, moreover, is again suggestive of the cone shape seen from above. Scotty's vertigo is thus shown to be as much a fear of the past as it is a fear of heights. His is a dizziness brought on by a confrontation with the past, seen whenever he stares into the cone. The fear which haunts him, from the opening death of his colleague, is the fear that the past will repeat itself in the same fashion, and that he will be powerless to stop it doing so. The ultimate irony of the film is
that when he himself artificially recreates the past in order to give himself the opportunity to make it return differently - and at this point he does indeed manage to cure his fear of the past, his vertigo - Madelaine dies, once again, as a result. Ultimately, the image in the present is still the same as that in the past, with Scotty staring down at a figure lying dead on the ground below him. Tampering with the linearity of time's cone, tampering with the match of images of the recollection-image is clearly not something that can be achieved in the cinema of the movement-image.

Indeed, following Bergson's theory, when the past returns in both recollection-images, the stables and the necklace, it creates but a momentary pause to the continuity of Scotty's sensory-motor present. Vertigo illustrates the way in which the past returns in the movement-image, whilst always retaining the primacy of a singular, linear present and a self-same, organic subject. At the conclusion of Cinema I, in fact, Deleuze describes Hitchcock's cinema as illustrative of the crisis which the action-image faced when it neared the realization of its own completion. The subject of Rear Window, for instance, is cited as an example of the problematic cross-over from movement- to time-image. The wheelchair-bound spectator (Stewart once again), exhibiting the same sensor-motor incapacity, and inability to extend perception into action, which would soon come to characterize the subject in the time-image.

The return of the past in the recollection-image, however, is not the same as the return of the past in the time-image. Consequently, Hitchcock can be said to have taken the movement-image to its completion, but not to have created time-images. Ultimately the recollection-image enables the cinema of the movement-image to retain both its linear narrative and subject. In fact, the successful completion of a circuit between a corresponding past and present image is precisely that which, according to Deleuze, enables the 'sensory-motor flux to take up its temporarily
interrupted course again\textsuperscript{13}. As we saw in the scene from \textit{Vertigo}, Scotty pauses momentarily to take in the image of the stable, to witness the overlaying of matching recollection- and perception-images (the Judy/Madelaine match) but then, once again, resumes kissing. The recollection-image functions, essentially, as a flashback, and does not permanently threaten the subject's sensory-motor continuity, or its consequent subordination of time to a movement through space.

By analysing the use of flashback as a cinematic device that actually tends towards a linear unfolding of time, Deleuze comes to the conclusion that what is seen in the recollection-image is merely the return of elements of the past that ultimately ensures the continuation of the unified subject that thus becomes identical to its past self. Scotty would be the classic example here, a man forever struggling to be, as he says, 'free of the past' who never manages to do anything other than repeat it, to confirm its sameness. In fact, \textit{Vertigo} is itself marked by a narrative repetition that tends towards the same with a doomed, entropic, and ultimately cliché finality. A flashback does not sufficiently break up the linear aspect of narrative, because it always returns the narrative to its point of departure. It is a closed loop:

\begin{quote}
... we know very well that the flashback is a conventional, extrinsic device: it is generally indicated by a dissolve link, and the images that it introduces are often superimposed or meshed. It is like a sign with the words: 'watch out! recollection'. It can, therefore, indicate, by convention, a causality which is psychological, but still analogous to a sensory-motor determinism, and, despite its circuits, only confirms the progression of a linear narration.\textsuperscript{14}
\end{quote}

Indeed, the flashback is conventionally employed to give the reason why something happened, the first cause that led up to the current situation. It creates a singular history to the narrative, and retroactively posits the present as the telos to which the past inevitably led. Essentially, it asserts the self-sameness of the subject. Even in the scene chosen from \textit{Vertigo}, which is an exceptional example of a flashback, and
which verges on becoming a time-image in its own right, the linear trajectory of the movement-image is ultimately retained.

What has yet to be seen, even though films like *Vertigo* come close to creating it - for the circuit of mutual tension is indeed a pure optical and sound image - is the direct expression of time that is to be found in the time-image. For this to happen, the breaking of the sensory-motor link must be completed. Only with perception unable to continue into action can the subject, instead, travel within a purely virtual past. The recollection-image, despite the pause which it gives to action, cannot fully sever the sensory-motor connection because, in its return from the past, in order to meet the perception-image in the present, the recollection-image always becomes actual.

... the recollection-image is not virtual, it actualises a virtuality ... on its own account. This is why the recollection-image does not deliver the past to us, but only represents the former present that the past 'was'.

The recollection-image is not quite a direct image of time, for the emergence of the recollection-image always involves the becoming-actual of the recollection-image, as it comes to overlay itself upon the present. By returning in such a way as to explain the present situation, its function is necessarily truth-confirming, and causal. In its becoming-actual it verifies the singularity of the past that 'was', and eliminates the falsifying potential of the virtual past that endures, the past that "is". In this way *the recollection-image effects the reterritorialization of the past that characterizes the movement-image*.

The crystal of time, then, is to be found not in the recollection-image, but rather in 'disturbances of memory and ... failures of recognition' which break up the logical progression of the self in time, and expose the virtual realm that Bergson
distinguished as 'pure-recollection'. The crystal is the mutual coexistence of an actual and a virtual image, of the actual and the purely virtual, of the present and a past that is, rather than the present and a past that was. It is the image of time at the moment of its labyrinthine splitting into a present that passes and a past that is preserved. The crystal is a double sided image, in which neither virtual or actual has yet crystallized, but in which both are caught up in the process of becoming so. It is this lack of finality to the time-image which ensures the total suspension of the subject in the interval. As long as the past remains purely virtual the sensory-motor link remains permanently broken.

Both habit and attentive recollection are ways of recognizing the past, as it returns (as a return of the same) in the present. At either an instinctive, or an attentive level, they make manifest a continuity of past and present. Thus it is that Scotty's image of Judy must match Madelaine before Scotty's flashback can occur. In the crystal of time, by contrast, the past is always misrecognized, it is not-necessarily that which corresponds to the present which it mismatches. The time-image's labyrinthine falsifying of causality ensures that what returns, the memory of the past, is that which can be used to create the memory of the future. This is the falsifying of the past, and the creation of different directions through the labyrinth that is enabled by the realization of time's perpetual forking. This is a cinema in which the possibility of different pasts always ensure the return of difference in the future. This third memory, the memory of the future, however, does not come from Bergson, but from Nietzsche.

Deleuze.

Beyond habit and recollection, there exists the memory of the future which Deleuze draws from Nietzsche's eternal return. This is the pure or 'empty form of time'.

which ungrounds Bergson’s, ultimately linear, cone model of time. It is this that makes visible the simultaneous becoming-actual of the virtual, and corresponding becoming-virtual of the actual, in the crystal of time. The third form of memory emerges in Deleuze’s theorizing of the three syntheses of time, which are, as we began to see in the previous chapter, ultimately derived from his work on Kant:

... Kant explains that the Ego itself is in time, and thus constantly changing: it is a passive, or rather receptive, Ego, which experiences changes in time. But on the other hand, the I is an act which constantly carries out a synthesis of time, and of that which happens in time, by dividing up the present, the past, and the future at every instant. The I and the Ego are thus separated by the line of time which relates them to each other, but under the condition of a fundamental difference. ... I cannot therefore constitute myself as a unique and active subject, but as a passive ego which represents to itself only the activity of its own thought; that is to say, the I, as an other which affects it. 19

The schizophrenic subject, at once a passive Ego, and an active I, is fractured by the straight line, or pure form of time, time which has become unhinged from spatial succession. Its passive aspect, the 'Ego', experiences, or 'receives' time, and in this sense exists 'in time'. The subject's simultaneous existence as an 'I', however, provides the action that synthesizes time. The I is the actual aspect of the subject in time, the point at which time is perceived as passing, and is divided into a past, a present and a future. The Ego is the passive, or virtual form, which is then changed by this interaction of the I with time. In this way Kant deconstructs Descartes' Cogito into its two component selves, the passive Ego who endures in time, virtually, and the active, representative, I, who passes in time, and who appears as the actualized form of the self.
In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze identifies three ways in which time can be synthesized, three ways in which time can be experienced by the subject. The first and second of these roughly correspond to Bergson's ideas concerning the two different types of recognition, habit and recollection. Habit is the first passive synthesis of time. It is the present that passes, the contraction of presents into a habitual action, or actions. Habit is the 'foundation' of time. Yet, if time is a labyrinth created by the splitting of time into both a present that passes and a past that is preserved, then it must be this past that allows for the present to pass in the first place. Beyond the first synthesis, habit, then, is the second passive synthesis, that of the past that is preserved. This is Bergson's pure past, the cone. The present, but the most contracted level of the past, only comes to pass because of the storing away of the virtual past that is effected by the cone. Memory, then, 'grounds' time, even though habit is the foundation of time.

The present can be the most contracted degree of the past which coexists with it only if the past first coexists with itself in an infinity of diverse degrees of relaxation and contraction at an infinity of levels (this is the meaning of the famous Bergsonian metaphor of the cone ...).

Whilst habit is a passive synthesis of many different passing presents, recollection is a passive synthesis of many different layers of the past, 'an infinity of diverse degrees of relaxation and contractions at an infinity of levels'.

The subject can be seen in habit as formed by a contraction, or synthesis, of passing presents, through repetitions of actions that tend towards the same. The subject in recollection, for its part, exists in a more dynamic relation to the past, as a synthesis of several pasts, the action of relaxation and contraction between points SAB of the cone. The second synthesis of time, then, when seen in the subject's actions, or at the level of representation at least, appears as an active synthesis of time. For, with the successful actualization of the recollection-image, the subject's spatial continuity
in the present can, once more, be resumed. The active representation of the second synthesis thus maintains the illusion of both the subject's inevitable extension into action (despite its more fundamental existence as a passive synthesis of time) and its existence as the singular I of Descartes' *Cogito*. This further ensures that, in the movement-image, the positioning of the body still seems of greater importance than the movement of time itself. Hence this synthesis also ultimately tends towards the repetition of the same, just as the overlaying of the past image onto the present that occurs in attentive recollection is brought about by a recognition, or, the creation of a match between, the two images.

Together these first two syntheses constitute a subject who is linear, the subject of the movement-image. Yet the first and second passive syntheses, constitutive of the present and past respectively, are themselves suggestive of an 'ungrounding' of time, a third passive synthesis that belongs to the future. This is the third type of memory, Deleuze's formulation of the eternal return as the pure form of time, time out of joint, or time released from spatial succession. It is the synthesis of time peculiar to the doubled subject of the time-image, who, constantly becoming-other, begins to realize its own existence as a *mōbius*-like entity. The third synthesis of time is a loop:

There is eternal return only in the third time: it is here that ... the straight line of time, as though drawn by its own length, re-forms a strange loop which in no way resembles the earlier cycle, but leads into the formless and operates only for the third time and for that which belongs to it.

Unlike the circular, self-identical loop of the 'earlier cycle' (that which returns in the same form) in the eternal return, the virtual, empty form of time folds itself into a self-reflexive superfold, creating the oscillation peculiar to the crystal of time. Rather than a loop that tends towards the same, as in a conventional flashback loop,
or the actualization of a recollection-image, this is a 'strange loop' which tends towards difference. The 'formless' into which it opens is the labyrinthine whole of time which is created when the linear drive of the memory cone is ungrounded, and the subject's sensory-motor continuum is suspended. Thus what returns in the crystal is always the other face of the Möbius spiral, always the double, always difference, always the memory of the future. The crystal of Cinema 2 expresses exactly the 'hidden ground of time' of the eternal return, the 'terra incognita' which Deleuze previously discovered in Difference and Repetition.

The subject of the time-image is a unique subject who 'belongs' only to that one repetition of itself-as-other. This is a subject who, unable to extend itself into an action through space, instead becomes-other in time. The suspension of its sensory-motor continuum defines the subject as a static (as opposed to active) synthesis of time, the synthesis of time enacted by an immobile spectator. The subject now exists in a time in which change occurs, but a time which does not itself change. Time is now no longer subordinate to movement through space, instead, all movement now exists in time. In the time-images of Fellini this synthesis is evident in the subject's slippages between the different, virtual layers of the not-necessarily true past. Here the time-image creates a somewhat different subject to that which is retained by the return of the matching past, into the present, of Hitchcock's recollection-image.

**Fellini.**

In the time-image, with the subject's sensory-motor extension suspended, the cinema of the agent (the doer of the movement-image) gives way to the cinema of the 'seer'. The subject, its perception unable to extend into movement, is instead extended by a 'movement of world' which takes place around the subject. The subject's becoming-other involves a slipping into, and between, different layers of
the past, a process through which they come to explore the different past selves that exist therein. The subject now exists in time, time in its pure and empty form, and as such, is subject to its movements. The subordination of time to movement through space that occurs in the movement-image has been reversed.

When an image from the past now enters into a circuit with that which is perceived in the present it does not become actual as the recollection-image did. Consequently, the past is not reterritorialized into a singular continuum in the time-image. Rather, the process of crystallization allows the subject to slip into the past in general (the past that is, rather than the past that was) and to explore its myriad, not-necessarily true layers. Moreover, what is virtual and actual is now impossible to discern, for:

... we no longer know what is imaginary or real, physical or mental, in the situation, not because they are confused, but because we do not have to know and there is no longer even a place from which to ask. It is as if the real and the imaginary were running after each other, as if each had become reflected in the other, around a point of indiscernibility.  

Fellini's 8½ provides the perfect example of this movement of world which occurs in the third synthesis of time, and the consequent indiscernibility of virtual and actual which is made manifest in the crystal of time. The film was, after all, made in response to Fellini's own experiences when he found his ability to act (to make the film) suspended by an artistic block. This block is figured in the film's famous opening sequence, as a traffic jam, in which Guido (Marcello Mastroianni) finds himself trapped in his car. His movement through space has been, we are shown literally, stopped. 8½ is a film about the way in which time invades the interval when the subject finds itself unable to extend perception into action. It is a film about the confusion between past and present which occurs once the linearity provided by the subject's reterritorializing sensory-motor continuum is lost, and the
world, instead, begins to move around the incapacitated subject.

The two meetings between Guido and the Cardinal, for instance, provide excellent examples of the passage of time in the time-image. Guido, visiting his mistress, Carla, in The Railway Hotel - she has a fever from drinking the spa water - and exhausted, lies back on the bed and stares at the back of his hands. With his sensory-motor ability suspended, we hear Guido reflect wearily, in a voiceover; 'What shall I tell the Cardinal tomorrow?' This is immediately followed by an abrupt cut to the meeting of Guido with the Cardinal. Already we cannot be sure that this is actually the next day which we are seeing, a dream, or a fantasy on Guido's part. With the subject's linear continuum suspended, the distinction between 'imaginary' and 'real' becomes increasingly difficult to make with any degree of surety.

Guido is walking through the woods where he is to meet the Cardinal to discuss the treatment of religion in the film. He is told by an assistant to the Cardinal that his previous idea for a setting for the meeting won't work because: 'the film's hero and a prince of the church can't meet in a mud bath ... a prelate would have a private cubicle.' Again, this dialogue leaves us none the wiser as to whether this is a genuine meeting, or indeed, Guido's fantasy of this meeting within the film-within-the-film, which has to happen in the woods, because it cannot happen in a mud bath.

As he sits with the Cardinal, listening to the somber, funereal song of the Diomedes bird, Guido - forever the schoolboy, sitting on the edge of the seat, shoulders slumped, hat in hands and knees pointing inwards - is unable to concentrate on the mystical message being imparted. As all around listen reverently, on the Cardinal's insistence, Guido for his part furtively steals glances off to all sides. Finally he catches sight of a large woman walking towards him down the hill, carrying an equally large bag. As she hoists up her dress in order to take special care with her
footing, Guido looks directly at her exposed legs. In a gesture which epitomizes the subject, the seer, of the time-image, he pointedly moves his glasses down his nose, and, staring over the top of them, signals the movement of world that is about to occur.

This movement is effected by another abrupt cut, this time shifting us back through time into the past, where we emerge behind a priest's head, in a schoolyard. The young boy Guido, in black cap and cape (in order to make the point that the boy and the man are co-existent in time Guido is shown wearing a hat and cape as an adult) is being called away by his young friends (the 'vitelloni' to be) in order to see La Saraghina. La Saraghina is a large beach dwelling prostitute who will dance the Rumba for them if they pay her. The young boy makes the choice between church and school, and prostitute, in favour of the prostitute, and runs to join his friends. As was previously the case with the recollection-image, the layer of the past chosen by Guido is that in which a match is to be found for the image he perceives in the present. In this instance, however, this match does not extend into an actualization of the past, but facilitates instead the utilization of the virtual past in order to create the memory of the future.

Initially the match between past and present seems obvious. It is a match between the Cardinal, in whose presence Guido behaves as a naughty schoolboy, and the playground to which he is transported, in which the priest is calling him in to class. However, there is a deeper resonance at work in creating this match. Guido the schoolboy is also seen in the memory of La Saraghina, staring, captivated, at her legs as she dances the Rumba. Thus the sight of the legs of the woman descending the slope, within the context of his conversation with the Cardinal, has enabled Guido to leap back in time to a layer of the past in which the memory of La Saraghina's legs, and his punishment by the priests are both prominent features. Guido finds in this layer of the past the virtual double of the (actual) situation in
which he previously found himself (the meeting with the Cardinal is actual in that even if it is not "actually" happening - i.e. if it is but Guido's dream or fantasy - whether it is the actual or the virtual is impossible to discern, so it effectively becomes actual once it enters into a circuit with another, virtual image). Indeed, this mirroring is compounded by the narrative surrounding La Saraghina, the young Guido/Fellini's early struggle between religion and women. This struggle is itself doubled in the problems religion is causing the director of the film, hence his concerns over what to tell the Cardinal in the first place.

Just as we cannot tell if the meeting that we are witnessing is actually happening, or a fantasy, so the memory that Guido leaps into through the association with the woman's legs may or may not be a memory that is directly linked to the actual present. Unlike the actualization of the past which accompanies the recovery of the recollection-image, here the past remains purely virtual. With the subject's sensory-motor continuity suspended, what we are witnessing is the movement of world in which the real and the imaginary (virtual and actual, past and present) are impossible to separate. Without an actualization of the past in the present there is no longer a linear continuum from which to judge what is past and what present, and instead the subject proceeds through a series of memory "failures" to travel through the past that is, rather than to reterritorialize it into a past that was. The memory Guido experiences, then, may or may not be an actual event from his childhood.

After watching La Saraghina dance the Rumba, Guido is caught by the priests on the beach, a doubling of the resolution to the opening dream of flying, in which he is pulled to earth on the same beach. This doubling of the beach scene points once again to the way in which the past and present are oscillating within the crystal, coexisting as opposing faces of a two-sided image, between which Guido slips imperceptibly. The association of the beach with his own capture, and being brought to earth - tumbling over with the priests as a boy, and being pulled down on a rope
in the dream - is not, however, a causal one. The fact that the dream seemingly occurs before the memory allows the possibility that his capture on the beach may be a misremembrance of the past based upon his present situation. The memory of his boyhood capture may in fact be the settling on, or even, the creation of, a not-necessarily true past that now comes to explain his present situation. The layer of the past in which Guido discovers the image that comes to overlay the present is not-necessarily that which happened, or even the way in which it happened, but it is the image which best fits the situation in the present. Nor is this the positing of a mythological origin, and the subsequent creation of a linear sense of self through the actualization of such an image, but rather, the creation of a memory of the future which enables the renewed performance of the self as other, based upon a past which is not-necessarily true. This is a past which, without reterritorializing into an actual form, retains the possibility of future change in its virtuality.

The end of this sequence that began with the movement from Carla's bedroom to the Cardinal in the woods, abruptly cuts once more to Guido talking with Daumier (the film critic) with the Cardinal and his assistants seen eating at a table in the background. From here we move again, this time to the mud baths in which Guido is to meet the Cardinal. As spectators, we must question whether this scene follows chronologically from Guido's visit to his mistress? If this is a return to the present, then this would seem to place the narrative of 8½ very much within a movement-image schema. If this is the case, Guido's fantasy/recollection is but the actualization of a recollection-image, rather than the crystallizing of a pure fantasy/recollection which retains its virtuality. Is the meeting with the Cardinal that happens in the mud bath, then, the actual meeting which Guido was so nervous about, or could it be yet another fantasy? The reference to the mud bath made by the Cardinal's assistant when Guido went to meet him in the woods earlier adds to our confusion over this matter, for the Cardinal does indeed have a 'private cubicle', when Guido is summoned to meet him. Is this, then, the film within the film? Is it fantasy, is it
reality? We are no longer able to tell, for, subject to the movement of world, we no longer have 'a place from which to ask'.

The second meeting with the Cardinal is not-necessarily the only one, or the "true" one, as Fellini points out by referring to the mud bath meeting in the previous meeting in the woods. Even if we are "wrong" here, and the meeting is meant to be the actual happening that follows once Guido returns to reality from his fantasy, when he next visits the recollection of the meeting with the Cardinal, which will be the one that best fits the situation in which he finds himself? Will the past which best matches the present be the first, or the second meeting? How will the past know if it is a fantasy or a reality? Which was the real meeting is a question that can and will only be answered in the future, a time which will make one of the meetings, not-necessarily true.

How are we, then, to discern the line of flight, or trajectory through the labyrinth on which we find ourselves in this (seemingly second) meeting with the Cardinal? Are we witnessing a scene in the film being made in the film? Is it a fantasy, a fantasy within a fantasy, or perhaps even an actual happening? In fact, the private cubicle and its mystical self-opening window through which Guido communicates with the Cardinal, seems to be in a process of oscillation with the scene in the confessional in Guido's childhood past through which we have just moved. The partitioning of the Cardinal from Guido, then, is perhaps best conceived of as the image that fits most easily with his slippage from the past in which he (as a boy) is partitioned off from the priest within the confessional, into the present in which he is similarly partitioned off from the Cardinal in his 'private cubicle'.

In the scene in which the boy Guido is taken to confess his sin of Rumba fascination, we see most clearly the movement of the subject through time, as it
slips between different layers of the past. When the boy Guido enters the confessional in order to do penance for his visit to La Saraghina, we see him disappear into the central of three monstrously gothic cubicles. When he steps out again, however, he exits one of only two monstrously gothic confessionals. There is no longer a cubicle to the right as we look, and indeed the room has changed shape to such a degree that there is now a wall, which was not there previously, next to the confessional which he leaves. Within the confessional Guido has slipped between two different virtual sheets of the past, and, in doing so, has become-other. The Guido that steps out of the confessional is still the Guido who exists on the new layer that has been accessed, as each layer contains the whole of the past, but Guido in the present has changed in this movement between the different sheets of the past, the change in memory enabling a change in his future, now present, self. Here we can begin to see the way in which the pure and empty form of time provides the conditions for self-creation, the utilization of a not-necessarily true past in order to become-other.

Due to this indiscernibility of the different sheets, not only is there no longer a distinction to be seen between actual and virtual, but also, when Guido slips into the past "initially", we cannot say with any certainty that the layer in which he finds himself is the virtual, or that the present which they left is the actual, because what does that then make the first layer of time from which he slips into the second layer? Where he moves from in the past (the layer which, for all we can tell, is the actual) is the double, the situation which best fits the posture adopted by that with which it oscillates. In becoming indiscernible in this way, the subject slips from an actual situation (even if it may appear to us to be a dream or a fantasy) into a virtual situation (new layer of the past) which in turn becomes the actual from which he will move into the next virtual, and so on. This is why the crystal is akin to the revolution of the Möbius, effecting a shifting from an actual self, to a virtual self, to an actual self once more, and so on and on, with the subject always co-existing with
its emergent double due to the forking of time, and always becoming-other through a movement of world.

There is no necessity, then, as there is in the movement-image, for the subject to always return to the present once the memory sought for has been uncovered in the past. Becoming-other is not the same process as that which culminates in the actualization of a recollection-image. Instead, reasons Deleuze:

... we constitute a continuum with fragments of different ages; we make use of transformations which take place between two sheets to constitute a sheet of transformation. ... which invents a kind of transverse continuity of communication between several sheets, and weaves a network of non-localizable relations between them. In this way we extract non-chronological time. ... at once a past and always to come. 32

The subject's return to the present, once travel begins to occur within 'non-chronological time' in fact, may be due not to the actualization of an appropriate recollection-image at all, but rather to an oscillating doubling, or match, between what is occurring there, and the memory in which we existed previously. In this way, the present remains only one layer of the past (albeit the most condensed) which joins up with all the others through which the sheet of transformation moves. The sensory-motor continuity of the subject is thus undermined by the aberrant circuits of time, as it moves around the subject. For this reason, the second meeting with the Cardinal, we can perhaps now see, is merely the double of the image in which Guido previously existed in the past, in which he was in the confessional. His return to the present moreover, to this fantasy meeting in the mud bath, should be seen as a slippage between sheets of time, rather than an empty-handed return from an aborted attempt to discover a recollection-image.
As we see in 8½, the subject does not obey a sensory-motor, linear scheme of evolution, but rather, slips through time, creating a transformative sheet on which he is at times man, and, at times, boy. The interior of the confessional (in the past containing the three confessionals) which he initially enters becomes the actual present for the boy, Guido, who makes an association with a parallel past to the one in which he finds himself, and slips imperceptibly around the moebius, into this other self that inhabits this double, virtual (but becoming-actual) layer of the past (the past containing the two confessionals). From here he slips into a new image which comes forward to double the new situation, the meeting with the Cardinal in the seeming present (the fantasy of the private cubicle in the mud baths).

Thus, when reviewed under the ungrounding conditions established by the third synthesis of time, the initial leap into the past in general which was thought by Bergson to be the starting point in the search for recollection, is perhaps not so much a leap, as it is a slippage, and rather than this being an originary act, the movement of slippage is in fact immanent to the subject's existence in time. The subject in the interval between perception and action, now seems to exist as a degree of expansion or contraction, or indeed, transformation, which is more random than that theorized by Bergson. Bergson was, after all, actually describing a subject who was still subordinate to a sensory-motor continuum. By infinitely deferring the actualization of the past that occurs in the recollection-image, the time-image struggles instead to ward off the reterritorialization of the past into a linear continuum, by maintaining the virtual nature of the past at all times. It is this which creates, instead, the sheet of transformation, across which the ungrounded subject traverses time.

When the memory cone that is formed by the second passive synthesis of time is ungrounded by the third passive synthesis of time, we see in 8½, it unravels into a labyrinth. At this point time itself becomes the subject:
... the only subjectivity is time, non-chronological time grasped in its foundation, and it is we who are internal to time, not the other way round. … Time is not the interior in us, but just the opposite, the interior in which we are, in which we move, live and change.  

The pure and empty form of time, that in which we change, but which does not itself change, is the subject in which we are but characters, the myriad ages of the subject. This is made explicit in the carousel ending of 8½, in which we are shown the contemporaneous nature of several different stages of the self. As Guido's cast assembles at the scaffolding, his boyhood self appears marching at the tail end of a four-piece clown band. For the first time Guido the adult, and Guido the boy, are placed on the same, transformative, sheet of time.

The child in us, says Fellini, is contemporary with the adult, the old man and the adolescent. Thus it is that the past which is preserved takes on all the virtues of beginning and beginning again…

Guido is at once an actual man becoming a virtual boy, and a virtual boy becoming an actual man. His identity, as he slips between sheets of the past, is a process of perpetual crystallization between different sheets of the past. Moreover, in each oscillation of the möbius, each split that occurs in the crystal of time, it becomes increasingly impossible to determine which is becoming which.

After his (fantastical? we cannot tell) suicide attempt, Guido finally reconciles himself to his sensory-motor suspension, his inability to act and to author the film. As Frank Burke has it, Fellini's film: '…envisions death in terms of integration, creative self-surrender…', as the loss of an authorial self, which makes Guido's existence, instead, 'immanent'. At this point, asking forgiveness of all the characters in his life he admits: 'Now everything's become as it was, confused … but
this confusion is me.' Sitting in his car once again he is, as he was at the film's beginning, the subject unable to extend his perception into movement, who, instead, begins to witness the movement of world around him. From the past, from his interaction with the confusion of selves that he is, Fellini is now finally able to begin his film. It is now that the boy Guido appears with the adult, illustrating the way in which the past, or rather, the confusion of not-necessarily true, virtual pasts, can be used to create the memory of the future. It is this power of transformation which makes the subject immanent, a subject yet to come.

The subject thus ungrounded by time, simultaneously adult and boy, now has the power of 'beginning and beginning again' of the eternal return. This is ultimately figured in the final image of the boy, now in white, in a spotlight in the centre of the circus ring, the power invested in the past to create a memory of the future. This is Guido's temporal, as opposed to sensory-motor self, 'Guido as pure potential, renewal,' the power of the boy co-existent with the man in the past that is, the past of the third synthesis of time. In the final scene of Fellini's 8½ we witness the power of the eternal return to constantly unground the continuum upon which the sensory-motor subject is based. The time-image has ungrounded the movement-image.

If Fellini's crystals are, as Deleuze maintains, 'always in the process of formation', and as such, illustrate 'life as spectacle, and yet in its spontaneity' then this is precisely because of the many, not-necessarily true pasts that he creates for his characters. Fellini's crystal is always concerned with multiplying the entrances to the 'giant Luna Park' spectacle of life, life as it is lived within the open and expanding whole of time. This multiplying process, in fact, he pursued throughout his oeuvre, by constantly creating and recreating different sheets of his past, a trend within his work which exists in, amongst other films, *I Vitelloni, Amarcord*, and *Intervista*. By creating so many virtual, not-necessarily true pasts, Fellini established his oeuvre as a giant world memory, a memory of the future which played upon the confusion
between the real and the virtual inherent in the time-image subject's experience of the past. Fellini's cinema, rather like that of Resnais, which both Deleuze and Rodowick analyse, shows the purely virtual movement of the subject through different sheets of the past. This is the subject in the time-image, who exists as an infinite number of selves which together create the memory of the future, based upon several not-necessarily true pasts.

However, the return of the past in the time-image, and the subject's ability to become-other in a purely virtual time, is always reterritorialized by the return of the past as it is depicted in the mainstream, the movement-image. As we saw in the scene from *Vertigo*, recollection-images (and as we shall see in further chapters, most conventional flashbacks) almost always prolong the subject's sensory-motor continuum and affirm the singular nature of the narrative. Thus the potential for a dispersal of the self into its myriad virtual becomings is always reterritorialized into the continuation of a self-same, causally determined, singular self. The continued subordination of time to a movement through space, moreover, is ensured by this same process of reterritorialization.

The time-image, although illustrating the ungrounding of cinema, is perhaps marginalized because the becoming-other that it offers is not that which is commonly experienced in everyday life. In fact, it illustrates a rare form of temporal displacement, perhaps more akin to dream or fantasy than to "reality", which remains sensory-motor for most people. Its manifestation in memory disturbances, moreover, seems to suggest a kinship with memory as it may be experienced by subjects suffering from dehabilitating medical conditions, such as Alzheimer's disease, or senile dementia. The problem this raises, of course, is the replacement it suggests of the organism's central role in memory recall. These medical conditions are, after all, physical, and most often due to brain deterioration. Deleuze himself alludes to this confusion when he cites Resnais' *Je t'aime je t'aime*, (one of the few
time-images) and Hitchcock's *Vertigo* (as we have seen, a movement-image) as two of: 'perhaps three films which show how we inhabit time, how we move in it, in this form which picks us up and carries us away.'\(^{40}\) Deleuze, at this point of *Cinema 2*, is talking about our existence in the pure and empty form of time, the form which, as he says, 'picks us up and carries us away'. This we have seen in 8½, and it is certainly, as Rodowick has shown, also true of Resnais's film. Yet this is surely not what is seen in *Vertigo*, in which, rather than an ungrounding of time, we witness the actualization of the recollection-image, as part of its broader movement-image structure. Perhaps Deleuze's mistake is actually quite a telling one, however, as, for most people, *Vertigo* is the more accurate expression of how we inhabit time.

The realization of the crisis of truth which is the time-image, then, is not something that we experience in our everyday lives. This fact is itself bolstered by the dominance of the movement-image, which keeps an awareness of the time-image out of the quotidian sphere. Examining the dominance of the movement-image, for this reason, is perhaps more rewarding than analyzing the time-image itself.

Consequently, chapters four, five and six will examine the different ways in which the movement-image maintains its regime of linearity, how it constantly reterritorializes the labyrinthine potential of the time-image. Before we leave our examination of the time-image behind to concentrate on the movement-image, however, we shall continue, in chapter three, with the comparison between the two images. This time the focus will rest on the difference between the spectator that is enabled by each image, and in particular, their experience of the film's temporal narrative.


3 ibid., see p. 162 for the cone diagram.

4 ibid., p. 152. This plane of representation is not to be confused with either plane described in chapter one. This is simply Bergson's term for this particular plane.

5 ibid., p. 96.


8 ibid., pp. 104-5.


10 ibid., p. 134.

11 ibid., p. 162.

12 ibid., p. 103.


14 ibid., p. 48.

15 ibid., p. 54.

16 ibid., p. 55.

17 ibid., p. 79. Deleuze states that: 'Bergson calls the virtual image 'pure recollection', the better to distinguish it from mental images - recollection images, dream or dreaming - with which it might be readily confused.' However, it may be that there is an inconsistency between translations of Deleuze and Bergson's works, as Bergson himself refers, not to the difference between 'pure recollection' and the 'recollection-image' as Deleuze does, but rather between 'pure-memory' and the 'memory-image'. Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, op. cit., p. 133.


20 op. cit., p. 79.

21 ibid.

22 ibid., p. 83.

23 The three syntheses of time are another problematic aspect of Deleuze's work, for there are both active and passive syntheses. For some critics the three syntheses are all passive. Ronald Bogue, for instance, is content to define them as simply 'the three passive syntheses of time'. Indeed, Keith Ansell Pearson would seem to concur with this reading, at least to a certain degree. He draws a distinction between Deleuze's 'material' and 'spiritual' repetitions. Material repetitions do allow for an active synthesis of time to be seen, but this occurs at the level of representation, and does not detract...
from the essentially passive nature of the three syntheses. The quote which he takes from Deleuze's *Difference and Repetition* should help to make this distinction slightly clearer: 'what we live empirically as a succession of different presents from the point of view of active synthesis is also the ever-increasing coexistence of levels of the past within passive synthesis'. Although all three syntheses are passive, certain of them do, it would seem, or at least, can, have an active manifestation. We have drawn upon the way in which the passive synthesis becomes active, in the second, and static, in the third, synthesis - as critics as diverse as Dorothea Olkowski and Timothy S. Murphy have done previously - in order to help clarify how these syntheses relate to the different ways in which the subject is formulated differently in the movement-image (active, second synthesis) and the time-image (static, third synthesis). See, Bogue, Ronald, *Deleuze and Guattari* (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 65, Ansell Pearson, Keith, *Germinal Life: The Difference and Repetition of Deleuze* (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 102, Olkowski, Dorothea, *Gilles Deleuze and the Ruin of Representation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), chpt. 6, and, Murphy, Timothy S., 'Quantum Ontology: A Virtual Mechanics of Becoming.', in, Eleanor Kaufman & Kevin Jon Heller (eds.), *Deleuze & Guattari: New Mappings in Politics, Philosophy and Culture* (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1998), p. 218.

25 ibid., p. 297.
26 op. cit., p. 98.
27 op. cit., p. 136.
28 Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, op. cit., p. 81.
29 ibid., p. 89.
30 ibid., p. 7.
31 Peter Bondanella comments on the transformation of the space which contains the confessionals, but does not do so in the context of Deleuze's theory of time. He also footnotes a pamphlet by Marilyn Fabe, which analyses, specifically, the sequence containing La Saraghina that is under discussion here. Unfortunately, at the time of writing Fabe's piece is not available in the UK, according to the British Library Document Delivery Service. Bondanella, Peter, *The Cinema of Federico Fellini* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 170.
32 Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, op. cit., p. 123.
33 ibid., p. 82.
34 ibid., p. 92.
35 Burke's argument primarily concerns spirituality in the narrative of 8½, and as such, is not wholly consistent with the Deleuzian approach taken by this work. It is interesting, then, how much of a similarity there is between his conclusions and those drawn by this piece. Burke, Frank, 'Modes of Narration and Spiritual Development in Fellini's 8½', *Literature/Film Quarterly*, vol. 14, no. 3 (1986), pp. 164-70. p. 168.
36 ibid., p. 169.
37 Deleuze, Cinema 2, op. cit., p. 89.
38 ibid.
40 op. cit., p. 82. The third film which Deleuze cites is Dovzhenko's Zvenigora. At time of writing we have been unable to see this film.
3. The Incredible Shrinking Spectator.

One of the most apparent ways in which Deleuze's work on the cinema effects film studies is in the different approaches to spectatorship which it enables. Following initial inroads made by Steven Shaviro, in *The Cinematic Body* (1993) two books have emerged, in 2000, which use approaches informed by Deleuze to readdress the long standing debate around the formation of the spectator, as subject, in the act of viewing a film. These works are, Laura U. Marks' *The Skin of the Film* and Barbara Kennedy's *Deleuze and Cinema: The Aesthetics of Sensation*. In the context created by these emergent works, this chapter will explore how the spectatorial subject experiences time differently when viewing movement-images, than it does when viewing time-images. In order to conceive of this distinction more fully, however, we will engage most comprehensively with D.N. Rodowick's slightly earlier work, *The Difficulty of Difference* (1991) which concentrates on Freud's psychoanalytical theorization of the subject, but which does so in an almost Deleuzian fashion.

Marks's inspirational work describes how the spectators of various post-colonial and diasporic (what she bracket terms, 'intercultural') cinemas encounter time-images which appeal directly to the suspension, during viewing, of the link between the spectator's senses and their motor actions. These cinemas create haptic, or tactile, 'multisensory' images, which are experienced in ways other than the mental comprehension of the stories that films represent. For the spectator experiencing a film multisensorially, as she puts it, it is: 'as though one were touching a film with one's eyes', touching the very skin of the film. These tactile images trigger (Bergsonian/Proustian) involuntary sensory memories in the spectator. The not-necessarily true pre-colonial or pre-diasporic pasts which these sensory memories create, moreover, stand in direct contrast to the visually recorded past of the established colonial, or national, history. Consequently a new, post-colonial, or diasporic memory of the future can be established by these films. This future
potential is created in the spectator, whose motor immobility whilst viewing allows them to travel, sensorially, through time, and therein to recover previously eradicated (not-necessarily true) pasts. Marks's work is thus an in-depth exposé of the way in which Deleuze's modern political cinema creates, as he claims, a people yet to come. We shall further refer to Marks' work, below, in conjunction with Stephen Heath's discussion of the different ways in which suture can be theorized when applied to different types of films.

Kennedy, a little like Marks, also concentrates on the sensation of spectating as it effects both the mind and the body of the subject. This is in contrast to most previously existing theories of the spectator in film studies, which have, albeit understandably, privileged the subject's ocular perception of film, at the level of representation. Kennedy attempts instead to formulate a (neo) aesthetics of sensation. From her Deleuzian perspective, spectating is re-theorized as an 'event', or 'haecceity' in which the spectator is 'subjectless', forming, at a molecular level, an assemblage, or 'mind/body/machine meld' with the film. Thus, Kennedy's analysis shows that all films, regardless of whether they are movement-images or time-images, are actually experienced at a molecular level, as well as at the molar level of representation.

At the molecular level, the spectator experiences the film as an interplay between cinematography, music, décor, lighting, pace of editing, colour, movement in the shot, costume, and so on. Film thus exceeds the bounds of representation, and becomes instead, somewhat akin to a musical symphony, of which we physically experience its tones and rhythms, as well as mentally comprehending the stories it tells. Kennedy offers a micro-politics of film aesthetics, in order to explain why the spectator can experience pleasure when watching films which are politically incorrect (and which should thus seem unpleasurable) when examined solely at the molar level of representation. Certain of Kennedy's conclusions are, however,
problematic, and, for this reason, her work will remain, along with Marks's, as an informing background to this chapter, which will focus primarily on the experience of spectating as it effects the subject at a molar level.

In light of these ground-breaking works, what follows is a reanalysis of spectatorship as an event, but an event which is experienced differently, depending on the type of image with which the subject forms a temporal assemblage. The films used to provide this contrast will be Jacques Rivette's time-image, Céline et Julie vont en bateau (1974) -hereafter Céline et Julie - and the more recent movement-image, The Sixth Sense (1999). In The Difficulty of Difference, Rodowick uses Céline et Julie to provide a psychoanalytical interpretation of spectatorship, but one which re-addresses many of the assumptions about Freud's work made previously in film studies. The contrast between this - an extremely nuanced, and indeed, almost Deleuzian inspired psychoanalytical spectator - and the Deleuzian spectator which this work offers as a contrast, will enable us to show that spectating is a temporal process that is inherently labyrinthine (and which can be seen as such in time-images) but which is reterritorialized into linearity, in movement-images. This is, it will be seen, to draw a similar distinction as that which Stephen Heath does (albeit using a different methodological approach to reach his conclusions) between the different ways in which suture can be seen to work in different types of cinema. In the movement-image or, to be more specific, the action-image, this process is at its most conservative, and is achieved through a heavy emphasis on narrative continuity, and the employment of certain cinematographic and editing techniques, such as the shot/reverse shot procedure. In the time-image, by contrast, suture becomes a process of infinite deferral, in which the spectatorial subject is not constrained through the imposition of the single, linear trajectory of the film's narrative, and is, instead, forever coming into existence, forever becoming-other. This subject position is realized in a variety of ways in different time-images. In Céline et Julie this effect is achieved through the exposure of the spectator to its
labyrinthine self, through a subversion, or ungrounding, of the conventional use of the shot/reverse shot procedure.

**Ungrounding Psychoanalysis.**

*Céline et Julie* is the story of two women, a magician, Céline (Juliet Berto) and a librarian, Julie (Dominique Labourier), who live in present day (1974) Montmartre. After a magical/chance meeting they discover that they share memories of a past in which a little girl, Madlyn, is murdered by one of two women, Camille and Sophie. Which of the two women commits the murder is unknown, and the part played by the father (Olivier) in the child's death is also suspicious, as the two women are both in competition for his attention. This shared memory, Céline and Julie discover, is being continually replayed in a boarded up house, at, 7 bis rue Nadir aux Pommes, as a theatrical, domestic melodrama. This site of the past we shall refer to from now on using Rivette's term, the "House of Fiction". The two women decide to rescue the girl from the past, by entering the House of Fiction, and, both disguised as the nurse, Miss Terre-Angèle (mystery angel) playfully alter the seemingly inevitable repetition of events that take place there, and thereby save Madlyn from her fate.

Rodowick views the interaction between the events in the lives of Céline and Julie in Montmartre, and the interruption caused by the events in the House of Fiction, as illustrative of his reading of Freud's oeuvre, in which he finds a double movement at work. In the process of subject formation there are, according to Rodowick:

... two different vectors in Freud's thought: on one hand, a teleological orientation and a logic of binary division where the theory of phylogeny informs Freud's ideas on bisexuality and the acquisition of sexual identity through the Oedipus and castration complexes; on the other, his intricate
understanding of the nondialectical organization of the drives, and after 1920, an increasing emphasis on their entropic character. These vectors represent two forms of reading and rational explanation that exist side by side in Freud's thought. My point then is not that Freud's writings are falsified by contradiction. On the contrary, his views after 1920 comprise the most replete account of the specific logic of contradiction that generates the complex architecture of phantasy, where one activity of mental life never ceases organizing, systematizing, and building higher unities against an equally powerful force of disintegration.10

Rodowick's first chapter begins with a discussion of Deleuze's attempts to think beyond binary reasoning in Dialogues and Anti-Oedipus. It is perhaps little wonder, then, that his reading of 'the specific logic of contradiction' to be found in Freud's phantasy can be interpreted using the Deleuzian model which we outlined in the first chapter. When seen in this way, Freud's 'two different vectors' illustrate the constant struggle for reterritorialization that is enacted by the teleological, singular, linear direction of the plane of transcendence, against the perpetual ungrounding workings of desire (on the plane of consistency) which constantly attempt to disrupt the teleological line of representation, and its binary logic. The struggle which Rodowick finds in Freud's theory of phantasy is analogous, we contend, to the struggle between the reterritorializing singular straight line of time and history, which creates the self-identical, singular subject; and the labyrinthine time of the pure and empty form of time, which liberates the subject through its becoming-other, its return in difference. The struggle, to reiterate, is between the reterritorializing 'activity of mental life' which 'never ceases organizing, systematizing and building higher unities' and its ungrounding virtual double, the 'equally powerful force of disintegration', which constantly works to disintegrate representation's homogeneity.
Rodowick's critique of the way in which film studies had previously used Freudian psychoanalysis—in a way that actually served to maintain, rather than to question, certain binary divisions—can thus be seen to be Deleuzian in its inspiration. Indeed, Rodowick's use of Freud comes with certain caveats which represent the thrust of the post-structural philosophies of theorists like Foucault, and Deleuze and Guattari. Freud's Oedipus complex, for instance, is reconsidered by Rodowick, and now appears as a 'historically defined regulatory apparatus' rather than an 'archaic memory'. The subject's linear, Oedipal trajectory, is thus still created by a repetition of the same, existing, as it does, as a 'narrative' which 'must repeat, in a certain sequence, the precipitating events of the past'. Yet the veracity of the origin of this past, and in particular, its origin in the primal scene, is now thought to be constructed as 'a narrative and semiotic memory specific to the history of the subject within the material, social context of the family', rather than, as Freud thought, a species memory.

Moreover, the ability which phantasy has to unground the subject's linear trajectory is described in terms which seem to correspond to those used by Bergson that we saw in the previous chapter. The way in which memory returns in phantasy is not so as to retain a linearity to the subject's historical progression, rather, memory returns as 'multiple reinscriptions and transactions between disjunct historical strata where the subject is divided within itself'. This description could as well be applied to describe the way in which multiple selves exist in Bergson's cone of the past. Finally, the constant struggle between the two forces, to reterritorialize, and to unground respectively, are seen by Rodowick to twist the linearity of the subject's phylogenesis into a Möbius strip, the same shape which, as we have seen in previous chapters, as that which characterizes the doubled subject in the pure and empty form of time. The subject which Rodowick takes great pains to tease out of Freud's work, then, is not, as we might expect, linear, male, unified, and dependent upon the exclusion of the female as its defining other. This is only one aspect of Freud's subject. Rather, as Rodowick shows, due to the complex workings of phantasy, the
subject constantly faces its other self, its own ungrounding, its dissipation into many not-necessarily true selves.

The constant struggle for this displacement of the subject's phylogenesis is seen by Rodowick to be illustrative of the 'parable of spectatorship' that is outlined during an early scene in the film. This is the scene in which, whilst watching Céline's magic show in Montmartre, Julie first starts to remember (glimpses of) the past as it occurred in the House of Fiction. At this point, Rodowick states:

This other story bursts into the "first" film as visual scenes that insistently repeat themselves, producing terror and anxiety without submitting themselves to the reassuring organization of conscious memory.

In this parable of spectatorship the subject, as a subject in phantasy, 'is split between two mutually present yet incommensurable scenes, conscious and unconscious.' The logical continuity of the first film is thus fragmented by the sudden insertion of flashes of memories of events in the House of Fiction. The two scenes that coexist at this point, conscious and unconscious respectively, enable Julie's subjectivity to be seen as a mōbius strip, corresponding to the subjectivity which he sees in Freud's work. Julie, watching the magic show, and experiencing at the same time the return of her previously repressed memories, exists as the subject in phantasy does, with the potential to unground the binary positioning of the Oedipal trajectory, that which would position her, as female, as other.

The question which then arises is whether or not Céline and Julie, as spectators, can escape the Oedipal narrative which, they begin to realize, positions them as other? Can they use phantasy to unground its reterritorializing binary, and, moreover, to make stutter its linearity, its perpetual repetition in the same form? This they can only do, Rodowick uses Rivette's film to point out, if they cease to be passive
spectators, and become instead, active intercessors in the family drama that stands in as their, albeit historically and culturally constructed, origin. Only by ‘working through’ the ‘primal phantasy’ of the origin which exists in the House of Fiction can they make their past, not-necessarily true, and by so doing, change their situation in the present, and create a memory of the future. This they eventually do when they enter the House of Fiction together (disguised as Miss Terre-Angèle) and save Madlyn. At this point in the film they utilize the subject's Möbius trajectory, in phantasy, in order to make what returns, difference itself.

Rodowick concludes, however, that the film can only ever ‘dramatize the utopian trajectory that makes readers of spectators’. The spectator cannot experience, or take part in, this process. It is here, however, that the approach to spectating taken by theorists like Shaviro, Kennedy and Marks can allow us to conclude slightly differently, albeit whilst retaining a Deleuzian approach that shares many similarities with that of Rodowick. Rather like Marks, we contend that the spectator is directly involved in an experience of time's passing, when watching a film. This experience is made manifest in different ways when watching different types of images, but it roughly breaks down into the experience of the self as evolving in a continuous, linear direction when viewing most action-images, and as a dissipation into myriad labyrinthine selves, when viewing certain time-images. The different ways in which these images create, or suture, the viewing subject, are responsible for these differences. In Rivette's film, the magic show scene which Rodowick analyses can now be seen as a purposeful deconstruction, on the part of Rivette, of the spectatorial subject that is sutured into existence by the movement-image. In a complementary scene which takes place a little later in the film, in contrast, in which we view the events in the House of Fiction from the point of view of both Céline and Julie, sitting on an old trunk, we will see the subject as it is sutured by the time-image. Before we turn to analyse these sequences, however, we must first provide an alternative interpretation of the film, in which the subjectivity which it portrays can be seen to be illustrative of the subject we find in Deleuze's work, but
in a different way than that which is described by Rodowick. His primary focus, after all, was an analysis of the film as illustrative of his conclusions concerning Freud's work. The reading that follows, then, will be an analysis of the film as an illustration of this work's conception of the Deleuzian subject.

**Julie and Céline, Céline et Julie.**

The main difference between the Deleuzian inspired reading of the film offered by this work, and that previously formulated by Rodowick, is in the way in which the subject is conceived differently by each approach. Following his psychoanalytical approach, Rodowick formulates a subject who, although a *mobius*, is also always a singular entity. There is no question that Céline and Julie are anything other than separate entities, each woman a subject in their own right. Rivette's film can, however, also be used to illustrate a Deleuzian subjectivity in which the subject exists, in the crystal of time, as a doubled entity. In this reading of the film Céline and Julie are both the same subject, together illustrative of its indeterminably oscillating virtual and actual aspects. In contrast to Rodowick's interpretation of the film - which, he argues, begins in a linear fashion, and only becomes a *mobius* spiral with the return of the memories from the House of Fiction during the magic show scene - the film can, instead, be seen to exist as a *mobius* from its very opening scene, in which Julie conjures Céline into existence.

The opening sequence begins with Julie, sitting alone on a park bench, inscribing a magic symbol in the earth from the *Practical Treatise on Magic* that she is reading. She then spies Céline, walking past her with the zany cartoon manner that she adopts for the entirety of the film. The white rabbit chase begins, with its linear spatial and temporal continuity being provided by, as Rodowick observes, a very conventional form of parallel montage. At certain points during this chase we see
Céline drop random items, mostly clothing, which Julie appropriates by dressing up in them. The end of the film, by contrast, after the plot has been worked out and Madlyn saved, "resolves" with the image of Céline, this time, awaking alone on the park bench, having conjured up Julie, who walks past in the jerky manner previously peculiar to Céline. The film closes with Julie dropping her Practical Treatise of Magic, and Céline beginning the chase in order to return it to her. The film's beginning and ending creates, then, a Möbius spiral in which the two characters careen one after the other, winding up, or perhaps more accurately, superfolding, with a return to the opening chase, but in its virtual, doubled form.

From its very beginning the film exists as a crystal that is expressed at both its internal, and its external limit. If we return to Deleuze's definition of the crystal momentarily this should become a little clearer.

The crystal-image has these two aspects: internal limit of all the relative circuits, but also outer-most, variable and reshappable envelope, at the edges of the world. The little crystalline seed, and the vast crystalline universe ... \(^{22}\)

As at once both 'seed' and 'universe', Rivette's film illustrates the way in which time, when encountered in the crystal in its smallest form, the seed, is able to be changed in such a way as to also change the outer limit of the crystal, the universe as 'reshappable envelope', or temporal, Möbius superfold. At its internal limit, the seed is the expression of time's passing that is manifest in the magically doubled subject of Céline and Julie. They are figured as the oscillation between the self and its virtual double that occurs when the subject realizes its own perpetual splitting in time, into a present self that passes, and a past self that is preserved. Consequently, they behave exactly as an actress might, listening to herself and beholding herself playing. Their activity, as seed, is such that, through their falsification of the past, they are able to superfold the universe (seen, in this instance, in the film's Möbius
opening and "closing" sequences) in order to make its very past, not-necessarily true.

The subjectivation of Céline and Julie is a process of simultaneous becoming-(each)-other. It is to Borges that we return, once again, for a fitting analogy. As Rosenbaum says of the film and its characters: 'along with Borges, we can't really say whether its a man dreaming he's a butterfly or a butterfly dreaming he's a man'\textsuperscript{23}. Indeed, their indiscernible oscillation is such that, by the end of the film, we must question whether it is Julie, now the one conjured, that has become Céline, or if it is Céline that has become Julie, the conjuror? Inevitably it is both, the crystal showing the becoming-actual of the virtual at the same time as the becoming-virtual of the actual. In Rivette's film, as was the case in Fellini's, inside and outside, self and self-as-other, dream and reality, all become confused in the oscillation of the \textit{möbius} that is the crystal.

Rodowick makes a very convincing case for the linear, Oedipal logic of the opening chase through the streets of Montmartre, with its 'relatively uninterrupted pattern of spatial and temporal succession and contiguity', beginning with 'the structure of Julie's look, which conjures forth the image of Céline'\textsuperscript{24}. This sequence, however, can be seen in a slightly different way, starting with Julie's look, and its conjuring forth of Céline. As Janine Marchessault has it, admittedly in an article whose thrust is closer to Rodowick's than to our own:

... Julie sits on a park bench reading a book of magic. She reads an incantation aloud and covers her eyes. As she opens her fingers and peeks out, the camera cuts from a medium to a long shot of her. The cut is so abrupt that at first we are not aware that the scene has cut to a shot of the same person. Indeed, for a moment we believe that, from Julie's point of view, we are looking at someone else. This confusion is fundamental, for it
is at this moment that the split occurs, and not long after that Céline skirts across the park. ... Thus it would appear that Céline emerges from Julie as a kind of schizophrenic counterpart ...

Although we are taking certain liberties by placing Marchessault's comments on the schizophrenia of Céline and Julie slightly out of context, her point concerning the way in which the shot structure functions remains pertinent to this discussion. In the film's opening sequence, although, as Rodowick says, a conventional parallel montage style is used to figure the chase sequence, and to keep the spaces which the two women occupy apart, the chase itself is used to illustrate the confusion between the two women. Just as Marchessault describes the confusion created by the abrupt cut which Rivette employs, in which the familiar is made suddenly strange, and the subject suddenly appears as other ('for a moment we believe that, from Julie's point of view, we are looking at someone else') so too in the chase sequence do we see Céline and Julie begin to oscillate, as their becoming-(each)-other creates an indiscernibility between the two women.

When Céline initially drops a pair of sunglasses, Julie, coming across them in her path, stops to pick them up. Next to fall is a headscarf, which Julie also salvages. As the chase progresses Julie continues to disguise herself as Céline, by dressing up in the discarded items. The two women are, literally, becoming-(each)-other, and who is now who, is difficult to tell. The conventional, parallel montage which works to keep the two characters spatially divided, then, is used, as it cuts back and forth between them, to illustrate their growing indiscernibility. Indeed, the fact that, at the end of the film we see this chase begin all over again, in its inverse, or virtually doubled form, only emphasizes their oscillation. Are we now watching Céline chasing Julie, or Julie chasing Céline? Is it a man dreaming he is a butterfly, or vice versa? Eventually, as the chase up the stairs next to the cable car leads Julie to the venue where Céline performs her act, as Mandrakore the magician, their
indiscernibility is confirmed. The magician has conjured the magician, the subject is becoming-other, 'as a kind of schizophrenic counterpart' of itself.

The women continue to become indiscernible in a variety of ways throughout the film, with the coincidences eventually increasing to telepathic proportions. For example, as Julie prepares two Bloody Mary's, in her kitchen, out of sight of Céline, Céline declares her desire for a Bloody Mary. The address of the House of Fiction is remembered by Julie the next morning, even though Céline did not tell it to her the night before. They both share the same fantasy of an American cousin with a pink, heart-shaped swimming pool, and so on. During the tarot reading at the library the doubling of the two heroines is further emphasized. An exchange that takes place between Julie and her librarian colleague is exemplary in this respect:

Librarian: (Interpreting the cards) The past. The hanged man. What is below is above. Your future is behind you and you plunge into the depths of night.

Julie: My future is ... (cut to the 'Luna' card).

Librarian: Your grandfather, the Hermit, protects you. You don't move. You don't advance. You advance but in total immobility.

Julie: Stagnation. Consequently my future is in the present.

That Julie stagnates under the protection of her grandfather is an obvious reference to her position as other within the patriarchal order. That this enables her to advance, but in total immobility, is her linear evolution as a return of the same form, constrained within the Oedipal logic of the patriarchal time of history. There is, however, also a suggestion of the possibility of change in the existence of the present as a time in which to create the future.
If she can bifurcate the line that leads inevitably towards death, then her future can be different, and her past contingent. Her future, as the isolated shot of the 'Luna' card suggests, is available through the intuition of the splitting of time, her doubling with Céline and the recycling of the past that this allows. Deleuze comments on Rivette's work that his concerns are similar to those of the painter, Delaunay, in which case Céline and Julie would seem to correspond to what he calls the 'the solar woman and the lunar woman' of Rivette's cinema. This is not to say that they are binary oppositions however, for:

... there is no struggle between light and darkness, (expressionism) but an alternation and duel of the sun and the moon, which are both light, one constituting a circular, continuous movement of complementary colours, the other a faster and uneven movement of jarring iridescent colours...  

Julie, with her red hair, is the sun, the 'circular, continuous movement', of a 'character with her own inner psychology', as Rosenbaum claims. Céline, for her part, is the moon, with its 'faster and uneven movements' that match her cartoonish behaviour, 'purely exterior' if we hear from Rosenbaum again. Moreover, that the two women are both light, albeit of different sorts, and that neither is a complementary absence, or lack of light, ensures that they are not oppositional binaries (the contrast of light and dark that informs expressionism) but rather, oscillating doubles, both inside and outside, and past and present. It is through an interaction with her Luna self then, her past, Céline, that Julie, the sun, will be able to create her memory of the future.

That Julie's past, embodied in Céline, is the future that is 'behind' her is also illustrated when the camera pans right at this point to reveal Céline sitting behind Julie in the children's section of the library. She is physically behind her, but the shot is somewhat more playful than that, as she is also the past (the virtual "behind" of the cone of time's past/times' past) returning. She is the child that coexists with
the woman. This is emphasized by her jerky cartoon movements and other wayward, but innocent mannerisms. That Julie and Céline are depicted in what is essentially a split-screen image at this point, with Céline sitting behind Julie, also serves to illustrate the simultaneity of their next action. Céline, the embodiment of childhood, traces an outline of her hand in red pen in a children's book, whilst Julie, by contrast, depicts a suggestion of the same image through red fingerprints, expressing a more adult sense of identity. In order to further emphasize this simultaneity, the actions of the two woman are intercut by Rivette, in order to illustrate the coexistence of woman and girl on the same transformative plane of time. Finally, in order to hammer home the message, as Céline bangs the books around to mirror Julie's banging of her fingers on the table, the other librarian is heard to say: 'The children are really noisy'.

The discovery, later in the film, that it is the symbolic red hand print on the bedsheets of the murdered little girl Madlyn that they are both remembering, confirms that the events in the House of Fiction are their doubled (shared) memory of an historically and culturally constructed past of patriarchal repression. It also suggests that they are both Madlyn, the girl that coexists with the woman that Céline and Julie are, especially as both Céline and Julie are similarly marked with a bloody red hand print during their respective visits to the House of Fiction. Consequently both readings of the cards are correct, the future does lie in the present, and in the past, as it is through the oscillation of both, the co-existence of Céline and Julie in the crystal, that the future is created.

When Céline and Julie do eventually enter the House of Fiction, it is noticeable that when they enter alone, neither is able to change the past, to cause it to become not-necessarily true. The fact that only when they enter together is this possible illustrates that it is in the crystal of time that this bifurcating of the line of time, which creates a new future, is made possible. This is also emphasized by Julie's
actions around the two-dimensional picture of the House of Fiction that she draws on her blackboard. Frustrated at her inability to enter this representation of the house (she is trying to draw its internal stairways and passages) she leaves the blackboard and attempts to enter the house itself. She is, however, unable to gain access to the house at this point as her double, Céline, is literally, locked within the house of the past. Separated by a linear view of the time in which subjectivity is singular, and past and present (and child and adult), remain separate, molar entities, Céline and Julie cannot enter into the circuit that is necessary to make time move around them. They cannot create the crystalline seed that will enable them to superfold the universe. At this point the film cuts back to the image on the blackboard in Julie's apartment, over which the noise of the doorbell (rung by Julie at the house itself) is heard. Entry is denied, the image illustrates, as long as the past remains subservient to the binary force exerted by representation. The construction of the straight line of history is, as Céline and Julie discover, at the expense of the excluded desire of the schizophrenic double, which is reduced to the figure of the female as other. Their exclusion from this past is directly figured in Julie's failure to enter the house. When they do gain entry together, through the 'memory potion' and the sweets, their ability to change the events within the House of Fiction is depicted visually through their appearance as the double aspect of Madlyn's nurse, Miss Terre-Angèle. They are now the healing property enabled by the intuition of time, the oscillating of self and self-as-other in the double movement of liberation and capture that is the process of subjectivation, of becoming-other in time.

Before the two women are able to enter the past together, and break up its conspiratorial plot, however, they must also free themselves from their present day entrapment as women within the patriarchal order. This, again, they can only do as a double, in the crystal, through a process of becoming indiscernible from each other. They begin this process of literally becoming-each-other, with the playing out of each other's patriarchally subservient roles to the point at which the notion of their singular, linear and continuous identity becomes ungrounded. When Julie becomes
Céline in the magic show, she portrays the animated off-stage (unthought) Céline, who is usually absent from her stage persona. Céline's own earlier off-stage remark regarding her male audience ('I'll do something like this. I'll attack them ... Think they come for my mug? No way, my ass!') is fulfilled by Julie in her Dietrich-esque cabaret masquerade. Julie's act pastiches the male audience's desire for female objectification. Her proclamation of, 'Naïve, I'm so naïve', is followed by the removal of two apples from her top, to emphasize the sexual padding that the show consists of. Then, weeping, she satirizes the notion of the emotional woman (the other of the rational man) as she begs to be excused for her inability to control her 'irrepressible waves of feeling'. The show culminates with her literally attacking the two male tour agents, calling them 'cosmic twilight pimps. Voyeurs and perverts' and finally throwing her gloves at them, a formal challenge to fight. Conversely, Céline takes on Julie's impassive but determined aspect as she banishes Guilou (Céline's fiancé) into auto-eroticism, breaking off the engagement and telling him to 'go jack off among the roses'. Portraying each other's unthought potential in this way, they strip each other's passive aspect in the face of the patriarchal, dispelling the retained childhood memory of submission, and beginning their mutual becoming-other in the present. Performativity, portraying the self as other, is thus the action which makes stutter their identity as a singular repetition of the same. This liberatory power, that which falsifies time, is, moreover, that which is found in the mobius double of the crystal.

It is now that Julie replaces the picture of her would-be fiancé, Guilou, with that of the House of Fiction at 7 bis rue Nadir aux Pommes. Female subjectivity, that which is denied by the patriarchal economy's Oedipal plot, finds the possibility of its rebirth only after its continued subjection in the present is eliminated, and replaced by a relationship with the past in the present. The male audience of the magic show, and the future of marriage with Guilou, are both eliminated by the realization of the schizoid self as it splits in time. It is for this reason that Laura Mulvey's statement that 'the Céline et Julie story shows little interest in transforming the heroines'
seems somewhat mistaken. In fact, the film is entirely concerned with their transformation. It is not to stasis that the mobius story returns after all, but to difference, and this in itself is only made possible by the doubling and contemporaneous existence of Céline and Julie on the same transformative plane as Madlyn, their childhood past.

When Céline and Julie do enter the House of Fiction together it becomes evident that Rivette conceives of their primal scene as an historical and cultural construction that is similar to what Deleuze and Guattari's describe, in Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus, as the 'theater ... of representation'. This is the theatre created by (amongst other things) the practice of psychoanalysis, in order to Oedipalize the schizophrenic desire (the potential becoming-other) of its patients into the causally determined straight line of patriarchal history. In their post-structuralist critique they find the practice of psychoanalysis guilty of the continued, repeated imposition of a familial origin to desire. This they describe as the reduction of desire's schizophrenic becomings into the Oedipalizing, familial triangle of 'mommy-daddy-me'. It is this process which Céline and Julie confront in order to save Madlyn.

The theatrical nature of the events in the House of Fiction are made evident in a number of ways. These include, the boredom of Céline and Julie as they wait in the wings, the blackout and applause that accompanies the end of act one, Céline's disgust at the cold tea without sugar that she has to drink from her hip flask (the oldest of theatrical props) and Julie's forgetting of their lines and confusion over scenes. The events in the House of Fiction would seem to illustrate that the past, as it is formulated by psychoanalysis, is, in Deleuze and Guattari's terms, a 'dirty little family secret, a private theater'. It would be tempting, then, to interpret Céline and Julie's destruction of the house's Oedipal repetition as an exposition of the illusory theatre that is created by psychoanalysis itself. Thanks to Rodowick's re-reading of Freud, however, the implication that the practice of psychoanalysis is the same as
Freud's theory of the subject (in phantasy at least) cannot be upheld. Instead, we can perhaps now see Deleuze and Guattari's polemic as a criticism of only one aspect of Freud's work, of only one track of the subject. After all, as Rodowick's reading shows, all attempts to reduce subjectivity to a single, linear form, through the imposition of false origins such as the Oedipus complex and the masculine figure (Wolf Man) of the primal scene, will themselves be met by the dispersive, indeed, labyrinthine, movements of the subject in phantasy. Deleuze and Guattari are, then, perhaps, guilty of constructing a straw man in psychoanalysis. Indeed, Alain Badiou has shown, by critiquing Deleuze's privileging of Nietzsche's powers of the false over Plato's form of the true, that Deleuze's interpretation of Plato's truth is perhaps an oversimplification which similarly establishes it as a straw man. Alternatively, Badiou argues, Plato's truth can be interpreted as functioning exactly as the powers of the false do in Deleuze's work. It may be that Rodowick's reading of Freud, and in particular of his work on phantasy, uncovers a similar maneuver on the part of Deleuze and Guattari. They are perhaps guilty of only objecting to those parts of Freud's work which are antithetical to their own, whilst ignoring how similar Freud's approach might actually be to theirs, if they were to read it with a more charitable eye.

This reduction of Deleuze and Guattari's slightly all-encompassing criticism of Freud notwithstanding, when Céline and Julie do enter the House of Fiction it is precisely to debunk the notion of the primal scene as an origin for the subject's phylogenesis. As Céline and Julie declare prior to their entering of the House of Fiction, their action will be one which falsifies the historical and culturally constructed narrative of the patriarchal economy, and thereby allow them to save the little girl that they are:

Céline: Once upon a time.
Julie: Twice upon a time. Thrice upon a time ...
Céline: Only this time it won't be like the other times. We'll get her.
This is seen to be the case whether due to the working through which Rodowick suggests, or indeed, through the re-aligning of the labyrinth of Deleuze, although it is, as we have stated, noticeably only once Céline and Julie enter the House of Fiction together, as a doubled subject, that they are able to effect this falsifying of the past. The singular origin of the fairy story that is at the root of history and linear time is thus reinscribed, in the present, but only through the double movement of becoming that is enacted by the schizophrenic coupling of Céline and Julie. Hence, by saving the little girl, and bringing her to exist on the same temporal plane of transformation as themselves, as adults, Céline and Julie provide themselves with the opportunity for a female subjectivity no longer constrained within the patrilineal tradition.

With each repetition of the story within the House of Fiction, once Céline and Julie's invasive presence has been felt, the repetitious narrative of its Oedipal drama begins to run down to stasis. This is illustrated by the increasing amounts of greasepaint worn by the characters, their increasingly stilted clockwork actions, and their speech which gradually becomes a monotonous drone. In their ghoulish aspect the characters in the drama slowly come to resemble Céline's description of the House of fiction, as a, 'mothball' smelling mortuary of 'stuffed ghosts'. At the very end of the film, Céline and Julie, with the now liberated Madlyn, finally take their boat ride. Floating past them in the other direction comes another boat, on board which are Olivier, Camille and Sophie, the characters from the House of Fiction. Their final appearance is as fixed, statuesque, wax-work figures. As Rosenbaum comments on this sequence: 'The entire intrigue becomes a frozen theatrical tableau' a theatrical tableau that is, we contend, exactly illustrative of the theatre of representation which is the family drama of the Oedipal, primal scene of history.
The similarities between the two approaches, Rodowick's, and our own, then, are apparent. Whether it be phantasy, enabling a working through of the past, or the labyrinth, falsifying the past, the Oedipal trajectory of the straight line of time is depicted as the illusory, primal posturing of a theatre in which all the roles are predetermined, and destined to eternally repeat themselves in the exact same way. In either reading, the entrance of Céline and Julie into the drama is intended to explode the phallogocentric myth of the primal scene that is imposed upon the past, and to expose the repetition of the same which the theatre of representation seeks to impose upon subjectivity, through its theatrical myth of origin.

Despite these similarities, however, the one major difference between the two approaches remains that of the way in which the subject is defined in each. The *möbius* subject of the psychoanalytical approach remains singular, whilst the subject in the Deleuzian crystal appears as a double. For this reason alone the parable of spectatorship which Rodowick draws from the film would seem to be somewhat incongruous with a Deleuzian spectator. A reanalysis of the magic show sequence seems appropriate, therefore, in order to discover how it temporally defines the subject.

**Spectator - Movement-Image.**

If we closely analyse the way in which the shot/reverse shot structure functions in this scene, it is possible to see this parable as only representing one form of spectating. In fact, the sequence actually works to deconstruct the way in which the spectatorial subject is defined by the movement-image in such a way as to constrain it within a linear view of time. The way in which the shot/reverse shot structure works in this sequence can be seen as an exposition, on the part of Rivette, of the workings of the system of suture as it is described by critics like Oudart and Dayan.
Before we continue with this analysis, then, a brief digression into the workings of suture is necessary.

In his seminal article, 'La Suture', Jean-Pierre Oudart configured the process of suture thus. The spectator, watching the film, becomes aware of an absence, the illusory fourth wall which suggests the constructed, fictional nature of the film they are watching. This absence the film sutures over, through the use of a reverse shot, which soothes the spectator's anxiety as to the origin of the shot. The reverse shot places in the frame a character, from whose point of view the previous, anxiety producing shot was supposedly framed. Oudart states that; 'within the framework of a cinematic énoncé constructed on a shot/reverse shot principle, the principle of a lack perceived as a Some One (the Absent One) is followed by its abolition by someone ... placed within the same field'. In this way, the retroactive reverse shot, which follows the shot, is able to suture over the spectator's unease at their realization of a structuring absence ('the Absent One') to the shot. The positioning of a character within the reverse shot, as origin of the look, also serves to suture the spectator within the film's narrative, providing them with a character, a 'someone', with whose gaze they can identify, albeit momentarily. The subject thus continually fluctuates between a position within and without the film, recognizing the Absent One, and feeling anxiety, only to have this anxiety sutured over by the replacement of a character in place of said Absent One. Thus, as Oudart says: 'Suture represents the closure of the cinematic énoncé in line with its relationship with its subject ... which is recognized, and then put in its place as the spectator ...'.

Daniel Dayan, for his part, took this framework and developed it in a piece entitled, 'The Tutor-Code of Classical Cinema'. In this article he realized the ideological subject positioning inherent in classical cinema, which uses false origins to disguise the source of its enunciation. For Dayan, filmic enunciation had an essentially ideological function. It proposed to position the viewing subject through its
imposition of a specific ideological message. This message, however, needed to be naturalized, so as not to appear constructed, and to this end, the system of suture was developed. It is through techniques such as that of shot/reverse shot then, according to Dayan, that the artificially constructed origin of the shot was masked by classical cinema's continuity editing. As he puts it, in this way: 'Classical cinema establishes itself as the ventriloquist of ideology'. Suture thus masks the ideological operation of cinema by positing, with the reverse shot, a character as the origin of each look, each ideologically positioning point of view. For this reason, Heath refers to Dayan's 'tutor-code' theory as one which describes a 'theological cinema', a 'cinema of revelation' in which the gaze of the Absent One is akin to that of an absent, patriarchal, transcendent deity. The deity's divine message functions through its representatives, in this case, its 'someones' in the narrative.

As Stephen Heath shows in his later work, 'On Suture', however, the description of the cinematic process of suture described by Oudart and Dayan betrays a misunderstanding of what is at stake in the idea of suture itself. Returning to Jacques-Alain Miller's original, psychoanalytical, formulation of suture, Heath shows that the theory of suture initially described the way in which the subject was formed as part of a ceaseless dialogue with the other. The subject's unconscious, for Miller, drawing on Lacan, was thought to be constantly brought into existence, created as 'an edge, the junction or division between subject and Other, a process interminably closing' but never closed. The unconscious then, whose coming into existence momentarily "completes" the subject, exists as a movement, a slide in a chain of signifiers that never reaches completion. It ensures instead; 'a constant flickering of the subject, flickering in eclipses'. Thus suture was the relation of the subject to this chain of signifiers, the process in which a temporary stand-in for the subject, which flickers in and out of existence, is constantly created through a perpetual discourse with the other. With this description of suture in mind, Heath went on to illustrate several difficulties with Oudart's translation of suture into cinema. Of most relevance to this discussion he states:
The realization of cinema as discourse is the production at every moment through the film of a subject address, the specification of the play of incompleteness-completion. What suture can serve to name is this specification, variously articulated, but always a function of representation (the play for a subject, its taking place). The difficulty in the Oudart lies in the collapse of the process of specification into the single figure of the absent one, a figure to which Miller's account of suture as necessary concept for the logic of the signifier makes no appeal, referring solely to the Other as site of the distribution-circulation of signifiers. 43

For Heath, when Miller's theory of suture was transferred into cinematic terms by Oudart, the position of the other was replaced by that of the Absent One. Oudart's emphasis on the spectator's realization of a lack (the fourth wall as signifier of the Absent One) when viewing, thus reduces the perpetual 'play of incompleteness-completion' of Miller's suture into the signified lack of a totalized, singular entity. It is for this reason that, when Dayan extends Oudart's reasoning, he inevitably finds the theological gaze of the (absent) father in the Absent One. In fact, Heath concludes, the conceptualization of suture in cinema advanced by Oudart, and expanded upon by Dayan, is but one of many ways in which suture can be 'variously articulated'. It is an interpretation of suture that reterritorializes its infinitely deferring possibilities, its becomings, into a binary.

Oudart's version of suture is seen by Heath as descriptive of one type of suture only, that which works to constantly maintain the 'constancy', or rather, the 'consistency' 44 of the spectatorial subject. This it achieves through the use of certain procedures of continuity editing which work in the service of the film's narrative. It is, ultimately, film's 'narrativization' 45 which enables the privileging, by Oudart and Dayan, of the shot/reverse shot procedure. This technique should not be thought of, however, as directly illustrative of the process of suture itself, as it is only one way in which it
manifests itself. Heath uses as his counter-example, Chantal Akerman's *News From Home*. As it shall come clear shortly, it is perhaps not a coincidence that he chooses for his counter example a time-image. Akerman's is a film which functions without character, or 'fictioning look'\(^46\), and which, therefore, has no recourse to a shot/reverse shot structure. According to Heath, however, it still sutures the subject all the same. The suture which this time-image effects is different from that of the reterritorializing action of Oudart's suture:

> We are placed in the film but that place is not secured, is shifted, and turns, in the meanings the film makes in that insecurity, in those dislocations, on the construction of a central absence - the absence of the daughter ... From that absence, the film refuses to suture, to convert Other to Absent One ... hence to resolve as a sign of something for someone, to fix a unity ... Or rather, it refinds suture effectively as a term of the logic of the signifier ... \(^47\)

In a fashion more akin to Miller's original theory of suture, then, Akerman's film sutures the subject, but without fixing its identity within a linear narrative that maintains the consistency of the subject. Rather, the subject as it perpetually comes into existence when watching *News From Home*, is created exactly as a 'flickering of eclipses', a constant transformation of the subject. The subject's existence in a dialogue with the other is thus not reduced to the need to suture over a realized lack. The other is not converted to Absent One, but rather, the subject's existence is immanent in relation to the shifts in position which it negotiates through its dialogue with the film. Thus it is a manifestation of suture as 'the logic of the signifier', rather than as the signified lack of the Absent One. To imbricate this Lacanian inspired psychoanalytical theory with the Deleuzian thrust of this work, however, would be a difficult undertaking. For our purposes, then, the constant dialogue between self and other (in which the subject is perpetually brought into existence) is replaced by the Deleuzian subject's perpetual becoming-other due to its relation to itself-as-other in the crystal of time. It is this double, after all, existing on the plane of consistency, which has the potential to unground the singularity into which the plane of
transcendence would reterritorialize the subject, the someone who stands in for the Absent One, as seen by Oudart and Dayan.

Heath concludes from the difference between Oudart/Dayan's, and his descriptions of suture, that there are many different types of suture (or perhaps ways of conceiving it) which are made manifest in many different films. The suture that a film describes, then, illustrates its existence on either the plane of transcendence, or consistency. As he says: 'At one extreme, suture then becomes a term for any continuity join, for the matches of classical editing ... it is equated with the system based on shot/reverse shot patterns of 'filling in' across and for the spectator from image to image48. This extreme, as formulated by Oudart and Dayan, is the type of suture that is to be found in the narrative form of the movement-image which, as we saw in chapter one, exists on the plane of transcendence. Time-images, at the other extreme, create a different type, or indeed, different types, of suture, which refuse to establish the subject within the narrative in the conventional manner described by Oudart and Dayan. This difference we can see if we now return to Céline et Julie, and contrast the ways in which spectating is illustrated in the magic show, and the trunk sequences. In particular, by analyzing the different ways in which these scenes configure the spectator's awareness of time, the contrast between the different types of suture which they represent should become apparent.

The magic show sequence exposes, and deconstructs, the workings of suture as defined by Oudart and Dayan. This scene is used by Rivette to show the way in which the movement-image sutures its spectator, temporally, in order to ensure their consistency, their linear evolution through time. In this scene, the way in which the past is shown to return is such that, instead of a character standing in for the Absent One, the past itself, as a single, linear trajectory, fulfils this function. Rivette's film thus figures the consistent subject which is retroactively sutured through the shot/reverse shot structure, as a subject who exists in a linear time-scheme. The
virtual potential of the labyrinthine past, its forever falsifying, eclipsing of the subject due to the infinitely deferring logic of the signifier, is replaced by a signified lack, the past that was, rather than the past that is.

In the scene in question the camera initially cuts twice from the magic show on stage back to Julie's attentive face and, as it comes to rest there, we are twice shown a glimpse of events in the House of Fiction. The reverse shot is thus shown to be analogous to the family drama of the theatre of representation in its positing of a false cause which confirms the narrative's linear trajectory through time, and maintains the singularity of the subject. As the sequence continues and the camera comes to rest on Céline, seen from Julie's point of view, flashes from the House of Fiction now begin to appear without an accompanying shot of Julie's face. These flashes actually serve to replace the reverse shot altogether. We now no longer even need to see Julie's face as origin of the point of view from which we are watching, as the reverse shot is shown to be, in its own right, an origin akin to that of the theatre of representation of the House of Fiction. The someone who comes to stand in for the Absent One is always the same subject, the originary subject of the singular line of history.

Rivette, by replacing the point of view of the reverse shot with an image of the primal scene itself, directly exposes spectator positioning as a temporal placement which is manipulated into linearity through the imposition of the false origin of the reverse shot. It is for this reason that suture, as it is described by Oudart/Dayan, is the ideal theory for describing the subject position created by the classical style of cinema, the cinema described by Deleuze as the movement-image, or, at the very least, its dominant form, the action-image. Time, in these films, retains its linearity in a retrospective reterritorialization with every reverse shot. As Dayan says:
The process of reading the film (perceiving its meaning) is therefore a retroactive one, wherein the present modifies the past. The system of the suture systematically encroaches upon the spectator's freedom by interpreting, indeed, by remodeling his memory.49

The subject's memory, when remodeled, is changed such as to constrain it within a linear trajectory, rather than to leave it open to the suggestion of myriad directions through the labyrinth of time. In this way, suture, as defined by Oudart/Dayan maintains the existence of the singular subject who proceeds to evolve causally and in a linear fashion. What Rodowick has uncovered in the magic show scene, then, is the parable of spectatorship of the movement-image, as it is exposed by Rivette. Whilst this may perfectly express the spectator as it exists from a Freudian, psychoanalytical perspective - which, as Rodowick himself points out: 'can only consider the subject as a singular category whose divisions and complexities are bounded by the interiorized space of an actual or imagined body'50 - it does not, however, account for spectating as it is experienced by the temporally doubled subject when it encounters a time-image.

This distinction is further emphasized by the way in which the flashes of the past are glimpsed in this sequence. As a spectator of the magic show, whose viewing is suddenly interrupted by memory flashes, Julie is analogous to the spectator of a film, who finds that its images call forth associative memories from her past. In the return of the memories from the House of Fiction, Julie is experiencing the return of recollection-images, which push forward in order to match the events she is seeing on stage. The illusion of the cinematic message is foregrounded by Céline's performance of her, necessarily illusionary, magic routine on stage. The memory that emerges in order to disperse this representation is the return of repressed memories from the spectator's childhood, producing 'terror and anxiety' over the fate of the little girl, Madlyn. The linking of the magic show with the memory of the primal scene in which the little girl is murdered (i.e sexually excluded so that the
binary logic of the Oedipal narrative can privilege the male as subject) thus illustrates the match that exists between the two scenes, emphasizing their corresponding states as illusory, socially constructed narratives which serve to objectify the female. The two scenes thus create a circuit of mutual tension, in which the recollection-image actualizes, and thereby validates the singularity of the past. As we saw in the last chapter, recollection-images do not serve to falsify the past, rather, they affirm its linearity, through their emergence as actualized repetitions of the past that was, rather than the past that is. The past, as singular entity, then, is the Absent One that the movement-image establishes in its suturing of the spectator.

The final image which we glimpse from the House of Fiction further confirms this conclusion, as it shows the two women who are trapped therein, Camille and Sophie, struggling together. Their potential to oscillate as a schizophrenic double, the potential that Céline and Julie are themselves able to tap into, is denied them, the image shows, by their struggle to join the patriarchal order. In their attempts to become Olivier's wife, they are both complicit in the symbolic murder of the little girl. Through this act they establish their own position as defining other, and help to maintain the singularity of the patrilineal time of linear history. The virtual past which they could use to their advantage, the perpetually shifting logic of the signifier, is thus excluded by the binary logic of the plane of transcendence upon which the movement-image exists. Even though the spectator in this scene, the spectator of the movement-image, is given access to their past, then, they cannot use its virtual, liberating powers to help change it. The liberatory potential which Marks discovers in the time-image is not apparent in the movement-image.

Spectator - Time-Image.
For the above reasons, we agree with Rodowick's conclusion, that Rivette's film can but *dramatize* the utopian trajectory that makes readers of spectators', but only in this early scene, in which it is the spectator of the movement-image which we see. For, as we have begun to see recently, in the works of theorists like Marks and Kennedy, this is a conclusion which it is perhaps now becoming possible to challenge. Following Marks and Heath, this challenge is perhaps most obvious if we consider the different way in which suture is enacted in time-images. If we look at the trunk scene, as a contrast then, we can see another process at work, another form of suture.

After their several, unsuccessful, separate trips to the House of Fiction, both Céline and Julie sit down together, on the trunk in Julie's flat, and simultaneously suck the magic sweets that grant entrance to their shared past. In the sequence that follows, Rivette goes even further in his deconstruction of the shot/reverse shot structure and the singular, linear subject position it inscribes. This is done in order to suggest a second, different, parable of spectatorship.

Initially, the opening two-shot of Céline and Julie, as they take the magic sweets, establishes the dual point of view of their doubled subjectivity. Then, as the two women begin to watch the film, we see the shot that they see, of Julie (as Miss Terre-Angèle) climbing the stairs in the House of Fiction, and entering the room where Madlyn lies in bed. If we were to follow the conventions of the process of suture as outlined by Oudart/Dayan, at this point the reverse shot that we would expect to see would align us with the gaze of a character (someone) and thereby suture over our spectatorial anxieties concerning the origin of the shot (the Absent One). This reverse shot when it comes, however, is a shot of not one, as you might expect, but two characters, both Céline and Julie. The singular origin that is usually imposed is here destroyed by the existence of a doubled point of view. Moreover, the subject's constant becoming-other, the logic of the perpetually eclipsing subject
of the chain of signifiers, is maintained, as the reverse shot refuses to suture Other into Absent One. There is no one, totalizing lack, as there is at the primal origin of history, but rather, an oscillation of self and self-as-other, as seen in the crystal of time.

The return to the original shot, that which should return us to the narrative safe in the knowledge that we are looking from a certain character's point of view, is then further destroyed by the appearance within the House of Fiction of not Julie, but Céline (as Miss Terre-Angèle) repeating the removal of the flowers previously performed by Julie. The different films seen by both Céline and Julie, both their spectatorial points of view, are shown, as though they were happening simultaneously. Thus through the reflexive stylistics of the film, Rivette is able to show us that the spectatorial subject is not singular, but perpetually doubling. The spectatorial subject's becoming-other is directly exposed in the trunk scene. Here the subject's perpetual dividing in the labyrinth is shown to ensure their experience of an infinite number of different pasts that might have been.

With the subject splitting in time, the number of films seen also multiplies, creating a labyrinth of different films along with the proliferation of labyrinthine selves that is seen in the splitting of Céline and Julie. Unable to identify with any one character's point of view, at this point in the film, the spectator of Rivette's film also oscillates between those of Céline and Julie, similarly experiencing herself as vertiginously splitting in the labyrinth. Like Céline and Julie, the oscillating sun and moon, the spectator is also involved in a flickering of eclipses, a perpetual becoming-other.

Thus the scene shows that there is not necessarily any stability to be found in the shot/reverse structure. Suture does not occur as Oudart/Dayan describe it, simply
through this technique (and others like it) but because of the way in which it ultimately reduces the Other to the Absent One. If this reduction to the theological binary is denied by a film, however, as it is in examples like those of Akerman and Rivette, then suture must be conceived of differently. In the trunk scene, the way in which suture functions is not so much as a dramatization of the parable of spectatorship, as Rodowick's psychoanalytical approach concludes. Rather the spectator has a first hand experience of the process of becoming-other itself. The film as they have seen it up until this point, now becomes not necessarily true, and the linear subject position of the magic show is ungrounded by the new labyrinthine spectator of the time-image.

Rivette's film emphasizes the doubled nature of the spectator's subject position, her becoming-other, by directly involving them in the process of time's labyrinthine splitting. The extreme length of his cinema also adds weight to this phenomena, its excessive duration making the spectator super-aware of her changing self. Rivette's remarkably lengthy cinema utilizes abnormal spectatorial time in order to make an experience, or an event, of viewing. James Monaco sees this technique as one which helps the spectator to enter the fiction more completely. The actions of Céline and Julie as they sit on the trunk sucking the magic sweeties, however, suggests otherwise. As spectators of the film that takes place within the House of Fiction, Céline and Julie illustrate the destruction of any sense of unified subjectivity that happens when a film is viewed. This is in evidence in Céline and Julie's different reactions to the events in the House of Fiction. Céline's rapt attention is contrasted by Julie's intermittent sleeping, startled awakening, and requests for an intermission so that she can smoke. Together the actions of this schizophrenic subject crystallize the simultaneous actual movement through time of a present that passes, as Julie, and the virtual storing of time as a past that is preserved, in Céline.
Moreover, although Rodowick uses Rivette's comments on the 'work' that this inordinate amount of viewing time demands of the spectator (the film's ability to 'transform' the viewer) in order to elaborate upon his notion of Freudian working through that the spectator undertakes when she enters the film; it is just as conceivable that this 'transformation' of the spectator in the interaction between spectator and screen can be taken even further than the utopian dream (the 'joke' of 'forgetting one's place') envisaged from the psychoanalytic viewpoint. The transformation of the viewer, her work when she enters into the film is not a metaphorical, but a literal activity. The excessive length of the film, then, serves to emphasize the changing face of the spectator when she encounters the images on the screen.

When applied to Rivette's film, both the psychoanalytical and the Deleuzian approaches actually render many very similar conclusions. In fact it is striking how clearly Rodowick's Freudian subjectivity corresponds to the same virtual/actual relationship that is to be found in Deleuze's theory of the labyrinth/line of time. The reason for this closeness is not without significance. The cinematic subject, as we saw in the trunk sequence, is inherently labyrinthine and always becoming-other. As both a Deleuzian (and indeed, also a psychoanalytical) reading of the scene in the magic show illustrate, however, this is a process which the cinematic conventions of the movement-image work extremely hard to suture over. This it achieves through the continual, retroactive linearizing of the subject by the imposition of a series of false origins, and the binary logic of the plane of transcendence which perpetually signifies lack through the replacement of Absent One with someone.

Instead of the spectator existing as a subject position, however, we are now able to see the process of spectating as a temporal event. This is the same conception as that on which Marks' theory is predicated. Watching a film which encourages the return of memories which may, or may not, necessarily be true, as Marks shows, enables
the spectator to experience their existence as a process, or temporal event, in which their becoming-other is enabled by the falsifying powers of the labyrinth of time. This labyrinthine possibility of the subject the movement-image constantly struggles to reterritorialize into a straight line, and thus maintain the singular nature of the spectator. It is this process which also ensures the diasporic subject's suturation within the linear time of accepted history. The binary logic which informs this practice, moreover, that which Oudart/Dayan identify in their descriptions of suture, is exactly that which exists on the plane of transcendence. Thus the plane of consistency on which the time-image exists constantly threatens to unground the linear reterritorialization enacted by the movement-image. Yet it is the movement-image which ultimately maintains its dominance, through its narrativizational imposition of first causes, and its reduction of becoming-other to Absent One.

Sadly, and despite all its attempts to the contrary, Rivette's film is pre-destined for reterritorialization. In order to maintain its mainstream dominance over the time-image, that which perpetually threatens to unground it, the movement-image ensures that time-images such as Céline et Julie come to exist only as its corresponding, binary other. The Oedipal trajectory of the movement-image maintains its linearity as mainstream norm through the sheer weight of movement-images produced. This ensures that the time-image is effectively reduced to the minority position of art cinema other. The female spectator becoming-other of Rivette's film is in this way reduced to the figure of the defining (female) other of the linear temporality of the movement-image. Thus the movement-image ensures the dominance of a subject which is unified, continuous, singular, and male.

Haunted House of Fiction.
At this point, a move towards an examination of movement-images seems appropriate, in order to discover exactly how their reterritorializing of the labyrinth of time into a straight line is effected. As a conclusion to this chapter, then - and before we move on to provide in-depth analyses of several other movement-images in the remaining three chapters - the recurrence of Rivette's House of Fiction in the recent movement-image, *The Sixth Sense*, should provide scope for an initial examination of the movement-image's reterritorializing force.

*The Sixth Sense* is the story of a child psychologist, Dr. Crowe (Bruce Willis) who, after being shot by an ex-patient, Vincent Grey (now an adult) spends his afterlife, as a ghost, unable to acknowledge his own death. Believing himself to still be alive, Crowe takes on a case, that of a child, Cole (Haley Joel Osment) the pale and somewhat spooky boy who can see dead people. His posthumous case, it transpires, gives him the answers to what had previously been wrong with Grey, who had the same ability to see ghosts that Cole manifests, and who Crowe feels he failed. The redemption which he gains from this posthumous case also enables him to realize that he is actually dead, and allows him to rest in peace.

This is a pseudo-Christian tale of redemption, and in its major plot twist (the fact that Crowe is a ghost) which is kept from us until the very end of the film, is reminiscent of a technique used several times previously. It occurred in, for instance, *Jacob's Ladder* (1990), *Abre los ojos* (1997) and, to a lesser degree, in the endings of Martin Scorsese's *The Last Temptation of Christ* (1988), and Terry Gilliam's *Brazil* (1985). The death of the film's hero at its start is not an entirely unusual device. In fact, it has several precedents, witness in particular, Billy Wilder's *Sunset Boulevard* (1950). Films like *Sunset Boulevard*, however, as we shall further see in later chapters, often offer themselves as a flashback, in which the events which led up to the death of the protagonist are portrayed chronologically, illustrating the singular, teleological direction through time which the film has
supposedly taken in order to arrive at its end/beginning. The Sixth Sense, for its part, is only a variation on this reterritorializing theme, which stands in such stark contrast to the Möbius becoming-other of the narrative with which Rivette ends his time-image.

Crowe’s redemption comes about when he has a second chance to visit his past, and to change what happened there. It seems, then, that the narrative is about the working through of the past, an action which should, as Rodowick showed using Céline et Julie, help to liberate the subject. In theory, after all, making their past not-necessarily true should help free them from the past that was. In this way the subject’s life ceases to be a repetition of the same, and becomes-other. In a sense, this is achieved by Crowe, who, by managing to help Cole, makes his past failure to help Grey, not-necessarily true. Yet this labyrinthine liberation of the self from the past is reterritorialized by the plot’s use of Cole as a repetition of Grey (not only do they both have the same psychic gift, their similarity is also shown through the use of a single shock of white hair in the same place on their heads) which ensures that Cole’s understanding of his failure with Grey actually realigns the past into its one, true form. Rather than a falsifying of the past, or the recognition of many virtual pasts, the film’s narrative enacts instead a recuperation of the truth of one past, a verifying of its essential validity, as well as its singular trajectory. Crowe’s ability to recognize the truth of what happened in the past, moreover, serves to confirm the binary logic which underlies its linear trajectory. Until his false conception of what happened in the past has been re-aligned, he cannot rest in peace.

Working through the past, in this case, is not something that frees the subject from the past that was, or that enables them to wander within the virtual past that is. In fact, it is exactly the reverse of this process. Crowe’s false view of the past is eradicated, the possibility of there being many possible pasts is debunked, and the validity of the one true version of events is restored. Working through, in this
instance, is not something that makes the past different, but something which makes it the same. It is not something which liberates, but something that confirms in retrospect. It is a movement akin to the retroactive positing of the origin which we saw at work in Oudart/Dayan's description of the shot/reverse shot structure of suture. Moreover, rather like the bookending flashback structure of films like *Sunset Boulevard*, the initial death of Crowe actually only serves to make the film's conclusion a pre-determined point, that to which the narrative must return once all the events in the past have been made sense of. It is in this way that the narrative of *The Sixth Sense* maintains its singular, causal, linear direction through time, its narrativization of history.

The patriarchal message behind *The Sixth Sense* is fairly blatant. Both Grey and Cole, we are told, are from single parent families, and both have 'possible mood disorders'. Crowe, in fact, initially assumes the mood disorder, in both cases, to be the result of the parents' divorce, and the respective father's absence from the family unit of daddy-mommy-me. He thus attempts a cure by at once addressing the issue of absentee patriarchy with the child, whilst simultaneously acting as surrogate father figure himself. Indeed, it is for his failure in this respect that Grey kills him at the start of the film, his failure to be a good enough surrogate father. This is the task through which Crowe can work through his guilt with the case of Cole. The story we are told is of a dead father figure, who discovers in his "son" his own rebirth. It is, as we have said, a particularly Christian parable.

The criticism which we previously leveled at Deleuze and Guattari for their seeming oversimplification of Freudian psychoanalysis would now seem a little harsh. After all, Rodowick's reading of Freud's oeuvre has not been translated into the narrative of *The Sixth Sense*, which concentrates solely on the most conservative aspect of its reterritorializing, binary confirming, phylogensis of the subject. In fact, *The Sixth Sense* is a film which illustrates perfectly the reason for the criticism of the practice
of psychoanalysis outlined by Deleuze and Guattari in *Anti-Oedipus* and *A Thousand Plateaus*, and by Foucault in the first volume of his *History of Sexuality*. The role of the priest, as the one who takes confession, has indeed been transferred to the psychoanalyst in the twentieth century, exactly as they state. The treatment which is offered by their reterritorializing working through is that which Oedipalizes desire into the daddy-mommy-me unit of the family. It is for this reason, in fact, to emphasize the parallel between the role of priest and that of psychologist, that the link between Cole's role as psychic medium, and the religious nature of his 'gift' are made clear in the film.

The spiritual nature of Cole's psychic calling is sledge-hammered home with our first sight of him, as he scurries to hide in a Church. The statue of Jesus that he steals when leaving the Church is one of many that he uses to adorn the shrine he builds in the tent in his bedroom, where he seeks spiritual solace when scared by ghosts. Moreover, his mother, carefully observing family snapshots of Cole notices what appears to be a bright light either surrounding or hovering near Cole's head. This aura/halo marks Cole out to us as spiritually chosen, a notion re-emphasized by his laying on of healing hands in order to quiet his mother in her troubled sleep. Finally, when taken to the hospital, the cause of his not quite seizure simply cannot be explained by medical science, the sixth 'sense' being beyond the bounds of medicine. Science is all very well when it comes to curing the body, we are told, but what about our spiritual well-being, what about treating the soul?

Slowly, as the events in the film's narrative develop, Cole begins to accept his own special powers, but only through the growing acceptance of his father figure, Crowe. When Crowe realizes the truth of Cole's claim, he searches for him in the same church where they first met. At this point, the scene is replayed, only the Cole previously seen seeking sanctuary amongst the pews, after running ahead of Crowe to get to the Church, has become Cole on the balcony, looking down on Crowe and
asking him if he has been 'running around'. The elevated position renders his
spiritual superiority visible, whilst his new-found confidence demonstrates the belief
that he is beginning to feel in his own powers.

Eventually, Cole realizes his calling, and begins to take confession. His first words
to a ghost other than Crowe are 'Do you wanna tell me something?'. This, on his
father/psychologist's instigation, he addresses to the vomiting ghost of the little girl,
Kyra, who visits him for help. The train of events that follow, in which Cole realizes
his potential as confessor, his revelation on the road to Damascus, is, by now,
somewhat familiar. It is a domestic drama in which a little girl has been murdered,
and in which her life is saved, after the fact, by the film's detective duo. It is the
story from the House of Fiction once again, only told this time with a few telling
differences. The liberation of the little girl that took place in Céline et Julie, is now
not the liberation of the little girl of the past upon a plane of transformation, but is
figured instead as a little girl whose life they must save in the present, Kyra's
younger sister. In The Sixth Sense, the past is not something that can be changed in
the way which a labyrinthine view of time would allow.

Rather than the liberation of the female from the patriarchal plot of the House of
Fiction, in The Sixth Sense the story is retrenched in such a way as to uphold the
masculine linearity of the patriarchal economy. Cole and his (literally) dead father
figure, Crowe, arrive at the funeral of the little girl, Kyra, in order to prove, to
Kyra's father, the guilt of the mother in her murder. Their father/son presence
effectively reimposes the patriarchal law that the mother has transgressed. This
time, in fact, the mother's crime is worse than that seen in Céline et Julie, as the
motive for the murder is not the, patriarchally acceptable, female desire to marry the
father of the girl. After all, Kyra's mother is already married, and has two daughters.
The woman is not guilty of attempting to propagate the destruction of her own
subjectivity by placing herself in the family - the crime which Rivette shows to be
inherent within the patriarchal - rather, she is attempting to destroy the family unit itself. Destroying the familial unit of mommy-daddy-me is shown to be the worst of all crimes against the patriarchal order, as it suggests the ungrounding of the plane of transcendence upon which the patriarchal's representative binary is predicated.

The female, here, is not shown to be positioned as other in such a way as to suggest that an escape from such a positioning may be possible if its culturally and historically constructed nature is realized. Instead she is shown as a threat to the patriarchal order itself. Not just the other which confirms the authority of the male within the patriarchal order, she is now the defining other of the patriarchal itself, the supposed threat which it constantly uses to uphold its own legitimacy. Moreover, Rivette used the poisoning of candies and flowers, in his House of Fiction, to illustrate the way in which the domestic sphere can become a trap for women, despite its seemingly nurturing, and beautiful image. The Sixth Sense, by contrast, uses the fact that the mother of the little girl killed her by poisoning her food to illustrate the paranoid fear of a destruction of the woman's role as nurturing mother in the domestic sphere, a transgression against the law which must not go unpunished.

Crowe and Cole fulfill their lawful duty when they deliver the video of the mother poisoning her daughter's food. The contents of this video we see, in a conventional shot/reverse shot schema, from the point of view of the father. In this climactic scene, with the murdered little girl's patriarch standing in for the Absent One, The Sixth Sense sutures the spectator within a singular timeline, through its narrativization, exactly in the manner described by Oudart and Dayan. In the movement-image, then, the origin of the shot, the Absent One, is always the father. Solving the crime, effecting the cure, either way, classical cinema sutures over any anxieties its viewer may have as to its validity. In Céline et Julie, Rivette illustrated and deconstructed, in the magic show sequence, the way in which the past functions
in the movement-image to suture the spectator within a linear narrative. *The Sixth Sense*, for its part, blatantly manifests this very practice in its use of the shot/reverse shot structure.

When Cole has become accustomed to his role as confessor, one who allows troubled souls to rest in peace, we see him act in the school play. Cole plays the stable boy, the one who cleans out the horses. Yet before we see him attired in rags, a literal rendition of a stable boy, we hear the backstage call for the 'stable boy'. The shot that follows of Cole evidences the most blatant of scriptwriting, giving the visual suggestion of the utmost normality, nay, stability, to his priest-like calling. Cole is taking confession from the ghost of a woman who died in a fire at the school several years previous. When Cole does take the stage, he draws the sword out of the anvil and reveals that he is King Arthur, the chosen one with the mystical power needed to save a nation, much as he is in life, as priest/psychologist. Although his mother is unable to attend the play, Crowe is seen glowing with paternal pride in the audience. Cole has a family once more, and is, consequently, the stable boy, the chosen one.

Crowe, for his part, having worked through his guilt at failing to father Vincent Grey, has now reinstated the belief in the power of the dead patriarch, through Cole. His final act is to atone to his wife, Anna, for, as she claimed at the beginning, putting her - his family - second. This realization comes to him slightly earlier in the film when he says to Cole: 'I haven't paid enough attention to my own family. Bad things happen when you do that'. Entering the room where his wife sleeps, Crowe is accompanied by the bride's father's speech on the wedding video, as he gives away Anna. This is yet another device used by the film to affirm the legitimacy of the patriarchal. As Crowe then says, 'You were never second, ever, I love you' the family is returned to its rightful place, as the father's primary concern.
Since Crowe's death, Anna was herself caught in a perpetuating loop, seen in her haunting of the Italian restaurant where Crowe proposed to her, and the continual replaying of the wedding video. She is now freed by Crowe's confession to her, in which the past is, once again, re-aligned in such a way as to then allow it to continue on its way safe in its retroactively verified singularity. Crowe's own haunting (repetition of the same events) of his past life is now also released, as the process of working through is reterritorialized in the form of the primal myth which Freud posited. It is the death and return of God, which ensures his internalization in the son, the continuity of patriarchy, and his immanent return. As Cole asks when he realizes that he won't see Dr Crowe again: 'Maybe we can pretend like we're gonna see each other tomorrow, just for pretend?' To which Crowe replies; 'O.K., I'm gonna go now. I'll see you tomorrow, Cole'. The Sixth Sense is a family drama, an image of people who are caught in an unhappy family situation, and who must seek advice from a priest/psychoanalyst in order to rest in peace. The father is not entirely absent, we are reassured, for his continued presence, although Absent One, is made flesh in the priest/psychologist (someone) and through him the family is restored to health, and the binary lack which defines the plane of transcendence, sutured over by history.

The action-image uses narrative in order to reterritorialize the subject's labyrinthine becoming-other into a singular, linear timeline. Thus, a film which initially seems to be about freeing ghosts from their inevitable haunting of the same places (their interminable repetition of previous actions) a film which should suggest a liberatory, Nietzschean falsifying of the past, in fact only serves to bolster the legitimacy of one, singular interpretation of the past. The return of the repressed, which Freud privileged in his theorizing of the entropic death drive as belying existence, is thus upheld by the movement-image, despite Deleuze's critique of Freud in both his work with Guattari, and his earlier work, Difference and Repetition. Moreover Deleuze's replacement of the eternal return as the
The ungrounding of this repetition of the same is thus reterritorialized by the movement-image, which constantly works to replace the plane of consistency's both/and with a binary either/or, on the plane of transcendence. The work which Rivette illustrates in his cinema, and which Rodowick does to find a more subtle form of subjectivity in Freud, is thus effectively erased by the movement-image, which seeks to posit its spectator in a limited, shrunken, singular position. As Rodowick concludes, in the final chapter of *The Difficulty of Difference*:

... films ... do not produce subjects but symbolic positions of subjectivity, and these positions are virtual, not actual. ... Indeed, many historical individuals may accept and reconfirm their sense of gender and social position by identifying with these positions. But the possibilities of resistance, reconfiguration, re-reading and, in fact, a whole range of eccentric and non-contingent responses are equally possible.56

In the film's discourse with the spectator, the process of suturing in which the subject perpetually negotiates its existence, the virtual subject position which is made available to the subject, by the movement-image, is an extremely limited one. It is one which seeks to establish a linear, continuous subject, through the use of a narrative which effects the same process in its characterization, and its continuity editing. In this way it leaves very little room for a resistance to this position through an aberrant movement through time, or a falsifying of the past, as there is in the time-image: witness Marks' theory with which this chapter started. For the spectator of the time-image, however, this type of resistance is made available precisely through the film's refusal to reterritorialize the film's narrative past into a singular trajectory, as we saw in the trunk scene of Rivette's film. The Absent One, the binary of lack and its completion, is thus ungrounded by the time-image, which, in its recurrence, offers some small resistance to the monolithic power of the movement-image.
The movement-image's reterritorialization of the time-image, however, remains dominant, and is achieved through the use of a patriarchal (often father/son, as we see in *The Sixth Sense*) narrativization which uncovers the truth, which is also the law, and by so doing, verifies the singular past that was. It is not a coincidence that the liberatory spectating of the time-image is experienced by two women in Rivette's film, but is reterritorialized into the single figure of the father in the movement-image. This is yet another way in which the sexual binary of Freud's phylogenesis is maintained by the movement-image, over the ungrounding which the time-image would enact upon it.

Indeed, this creation of a sexual division in the theorization of time is a topic which we shall refer to in the next two chapters. The ungrounding of the subject's phylogenesis through the use of phantasy, as seen in Rodowick's reading of the Freudian subject, will be seen to be reterritorialized into a distinct binary by the movement-image. Upholding the legitimacy of the patriarchal, fantasy now becomes the defining other of phylogenesis, an other, moreover, which is also gendered as female. Thus, once again, do we see the transformation of a both/and into an either/or.

The plane of transcendence which the movement-image creates through its distributional dominance, ensures that the ungrounding of its linearity which the time-image could enact, is forever sutured over by the movement-image's replacement of becoming-other, with a character who stands in for the Absent One. The binary force of the movement-image, then, is always that which has the power to reterritorialize the time-image. The ways in which this is achieved through its narrativization will be the subject of analysis in the final three chapters of this thesis.
1 Shaviro is critical of the notion that cinema is experienced purely at the level of representation. Drawing on, amongst others, Bergson's work on perception, he states that: 'We neglect the basic tactility and viscerality of cinematic experience when we describe material processes and effects, such as the persistence of vision, merely as mental illusions. Cinema produces real effects in the viewer, rather than merely presenting phantasmic reflections to the viewer. The cinematic image is not an object for some (actual or ideal) spectator; instead, the spectator is drawn into the fragmented materiality ... of the image. See, Shaviro, Steven, The Cinematic Body (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), pp. 51-5.


3 ibid., p. 23.

4 ibid., p. xi.


6 ibid., p. 30.

7 ibid., p. 31.

8 ibid., p. 5.

9 Kennedy's conclusion, that at a molecular level the spectator experiences the 'becoming-woman of cinema', is drawn from Deleuze and Guattari's contentious statement in A Thousand Plateaus, that, in their flight form the molar binary: 'all becomings begin with and pass through becoming-woman'. This, however, presents a difficulty for the future of Deleuze in film studies. If Kennedy's conclusion is allowed to stand, at such an early point in the inception of Deleuze's work into the field, then we may risk an almost immediate reterritorialization of this micro-political line of flight back into a, particularly heterosexual, macro-political binary. Deleuze and Guattari's statement was made at a time when the strength of the feminist movement seemed to position "woman" as the strongest of the forces excluded by the orthodox powers of representation, those who created the image of "truth". As Elizabeth Grosz says, in Volatile Bodies, in defense of Deleuze and Guattari: 'It is woman's subordinated or minoritarian status in patriarchal power relations that dictates the significance of the movements of becoming-woman, nothing else - not inherent qualities of women per se or their metaphoric resonances.' Yet, if the (epistemic) contextual rationale behind their statement is already this readily apparent, then how can this conclusion hold as universally applicable? It cannot. Its appeal to universality is too broad. Were it made a decade later, during the mid 90s, would this statement not have emerged with 'becoming-queer' privileged above all others, with the hetero/homo binary being given centre stage, or perhaps, 'becoming-diasporic' or 'becoming-post-colonial', placing the stress on the "black/white" divide? Indeed, would it now be 'becoming-anti-capitalist', or, 'becoming-anti-globalization'? The danger of imposing Kennedy's conclusion upon the field is that it reduces the possibilities which becoming could otherwise offer, that, for instance, which Marks' has
already shown is available to post-colonial and diasporic spectators. Thus, whilst calling the
diasporic or post-colonial experience of cinema its 'becoming-woman' makes sense from a certain
standpoint, it is a particularly problematic conclusion when applied to spectating as it is experienced
by the men and women of diasporic and post-colonial cultures. Kennedy's work thus exposes a
particularly "western", as well as a heterosexual bias in her privileging of 'becoming-woman' as he
idée fixe. Moreover, Kennedy does not distinguish (as Deleuze and Guattari also did not) between
gay and straight men in the suggestion that they must first pass through a becoming-woman. This is
surely not the same process for both. Indeed, the privileging of becoming-woman stereotypes all men
(gay and straight) as "men" and therefore, constructive of the orthodox norm. This division is
obviously too general. A gay man's negotiation of his 'becoming-woman', for instance, is perhaps not
always a movement which liberates, even if it enables a flight from the binary. It is a process which
is similarly problematic for a butch lesbian, for who becoming-woman might not spell liberation
either. For these reasons, Kennedy's conclusion that the molecular perception of cinema should be
termed its 'becoming-woman' reterritorializes what could, and indeed, should, be the creation of a
new, micro-politics of spectating without gender, into what could become a heterosexually biased,
macro-politics, which masquerades as apolitical. In a worst case scenario Kennedy's work could
produce a situation analogous to that which Laura Mulvey's seminal, but heterosexually biased,
work, Visual Pleasures in Narrative Cinema did, which, despite all the avenues it opened up for film
studies, excluded the possibility of desire for the on-screen female as object, in the lesbian spectator.
As shown by Jackie Stacey in, Star Gazing: Hollywood Cinema and Female Spectatorship. See,
Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia II (London:
The Athlone Press, 1987), pp. 277, Grosz, Elizabeth, Volatile Bodies: Towards a Corporeal
Feminism (Bloomington: Indian University Press, 1994), p. 177, and Stacey, Jackie, Star Gazing:
10 Rodowick, D.N. The Difficulty of Difference: Psychoanalysis, Sexual Difference & Film Theory
11 Indeed, Rodowick's statement that: '... blocked by a formal conception of text, spectator, and the
relation between them, Anglo-American film theory has been unable to comprehend historically of
theoretically the implications of these reading practices. Despite the gains they have enabled, neither
semiology, psychoanalysis, nor feminist theory have entirely eluded the logic of the binary machine
in their theoretical language, and in their formal conceptualization of film text and spectators.'
appears in Kennedy's work, (albeit in a bastardized form) as evidence for the defining rationale
behind her own attempt to theorize the spectator beyond the binary, using Deleuze. See Rodowick,
12 Rodowick, op. cit., p. 96.
13 ibid., p. 98.
14 ibid., p. 102.
15 ibid., p. 99.
16 ibid., p. 101.
17 ibid.
18 ibid.


20 Rodowick, op. cit., p. 103.
21 ibid., p. 110.

24 Rodowick, op. cit., p. 98.
26 Deleuze, Cinema 2, op. cit., p. 11
27 ibid.
28 op. cit., p. 198.
31 Deleuze and Guattari do not conceive of desire as Lacan does, as desirous of fulfilling a lack, but rather as a productive force, which is formed through the creation of assemblages. See Deleuze, Anti-Oedipus, op. cit., and Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia II (London: The Athlone Press, 1987).
32 Deleuze, Anti-Oedipus, op. cit., p. 23.
33 ibid., p. 49
34 Badiou, Alain, Deleuze: The Clamour of Being (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), pp. 55-9. We should make it clear at this point that we do not wish to advocate Badiou's overall critique of Deleuze's philosophy. This debate is one which must be postponed for another time, as its magnitude is too vast to be contained within this work. Badiou's criticism, however, raises several pertinent points concerning Deleuze's philosophy, the more so because they are engaged with from within philosophy, and are not merely oppositional displays of distaste, or out-of-context misunderstanding.
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35 op. cit., p. 194

37 ibid., p. 45.


40 ibid., chpt. 3.

41 ibid., p. 77.

42 ibid., p. 79.

43 ibid., p. 94.

44 ibid., p. 95.

45 ibid., p. 43. Heath provides an in-depth analysis of the way in which film narrative is created - through the use of such devices as the 180, and 30, degree rules, use of off-screen space, sound, and so on - in such a way that the spectator becomes the one who welds together the spatial unity of the film's narrative, turning space into place through a narrative that is assimilated by the spectator. As he says: '... film makes space, takes place as narrative, and the subject too, set - sutured - in the conversion of the one to the other.' (p. 62) As Deleuze shows with his analysis of the movement-image, and as we have seen in chapter one, through Rodowick's use of Buster Keaton in Sherlock Jr., however, it may be that the role played by the character, in subordinating time to a movement through space may leave room for a reconsideration of Heath's conclusions.

46 ibid., p. 98.

47 ibid., p. 99.

48 ibid., p. 101.

49 op. cit., p. 450.

50 op. cit., p. 130.

51 Janine Marchessault also comes close to this temporal interpretation of spectating in the film, when she says: 'As spectators, they embrace the present - a position (sitting together, facing the camera as if it were a screen, predicting the outcome of the plot) which mirrors our own. In this reflection - a refraction - the 'unifying instance' of the camera is undone ... the hidden spectatorial zone is unsealed from any notion of textual unity, and is produced as another circuit in the specular labyrinth.' However, and perhaps more in line with Rodowick's interpretation than our own, the doubled nature of Céline and Julie's subjectivity is conceived as that of the conscious and the unconscious. It remains the temporally singular subject of psychoanalytical thought, and linear time. See, Marchessault, op. cit., p. 88.


54 op. cit., p. 106.

55 Deleuze, Gilles, *Difference & Repetition* (London: The Athlone Press, 1968), see especially the introduction, 'Repetition and Difference'.

56 op. cit., p. 134.
Part II.

Either Movement or Time.

The next two chapters provide evidence of the movement-image's 'certain tendency' to reterritorialize performative changes of identity within an essentialist gender binary. This is especially evident in contemporary films which manipulate time in their narratives. Whilst the late 1990s has seen a mainstream fascination with the manipulation of time similar to that which occurred in the 1960s and 70s, this fascination has ultimately remained a narrative concern. This is very much in line with the previous resurgence in interest in this phenomenon as it manifested itself in the mid 1980s, in films like, *The Terminator* (1984) and *Back to the Future* (1985). In these films, the time-image's overt concern with editing and the manipulation of the representation of time - that which characterized the works of Godard, Fellini, Resnais, Rivette, (et al.) in the 60s and 70s - was reterritorialized through the process of narrativization. For this reason we will now move away from the analysis of editing practices, and focus instead on narrative representations of the labyrinth in 90s movement-images.

This chapter concentrates on the way this certain tendency expresses itself in films which have a female lead, using in particular, Peter Howitt's *Sliding Doors* (1997) and Tomas Tykwer's *Lola Rennt* (1998). These two films initially suggest a narrative realization of female identity as becoming-other. They appear to take the concerns of the time-image and bring them into the mainstream. In actual fact, they demonstrate the reterritorialization of the labyrinthine becoming-other manifest in the time-image into the singular, linear, continuous subject of the movement-image. These films illustrate how narrativization ensures that the potential for women to perform their identities differently, to make use of time's labyrinthine powers in order to falsify their past, is reduced to a passing fantasy, or dream, of liberation. Ultimately it is to their continuous, apparently unchanging, essential self that these women must return.
The model of time with which movement-image narratives reterritorialize time's labyrinth corresponds to Einstein's conception of the relative, local times found in his special theory of relativity. Drawing this parallel necessitates an initial exploration of the legacy of the debate between Einstein and Bergson which began in 1922. This will enable us to then show how, with recent advances made in quantum theory, a scientific rethinking of Einstein's model of time has been enabled. This is, moreover, a rethought model which suggests parallels with Deleuze's Bergsonian-inspired metaphysics of time.

After initially establishing the difference between the scientific and the philosophical models of time, we will provide readings of both films as exemplars of the philosophical model. The reading we provide of Tykwer's film will then be questioned, revealing an Einsteinian temporal model underlying and reterritorializing what otherwise appears to be a Bergsonian/Deleuzian inspired use of time in its narrative. It will be seen how the film's linear temporal model positions it at the contemporary end of a historical trend in female led narratives, a trend evident in such classics as Hitchcock's *Marnie* (1964). Both films will then be briefly re-examined as expressions of national identity in the emergent situation created by the global economy. This will illustrate how other narrative concerns also reterritorialize any suggestion of the possibility of liberating identity through labyrinthine performativity.

Finally, the equating of female performativity with a dream state, or fantasy, will be shown to effectively marginalize its labyrinthine potential. The movement-image thus creates a binary of line and labyrinth, of male reality and female dream, that hides the labyrinth's real, ungrounding force. This is the same movement we uncovered in the previous chapter through our concentration on the different spectators suggested by the movement- and the time-image. In both *Pretty Woman* (1990) and *Romy and Michele's High School Reunion* (1997) the binary is re-affirmed within a narrative of ownership that re-establishes male purchasing power as that upon which female performativity is predicated. In this
way the linearity of male law establishes itself against the female, labyrinthine performativity that it simultaneously sanctions and marginalizes.

This will provide the first half of an argument that will then be concluded in the following chapter, where the emphasis will be placed on the possibilities available for masculine performativity within the linear narrative temporality of the movement-image. It will illustrate the retrenchment, once again, of the both/and of the time-image's plane of consistency into the either/or of the movement-image's plane of transcendence.

**Science and Philosophy.**

The debate between science and philosophy is not a new one. Lyotard, for instance, in *The Postmodern Condition*[^3], traces how, prior to its present day manifestation, science's search for legitimization through narrative was inextricably linked to the development of western philosophy. This is not the place, however, for an in-depth re-examination of this history. The purpose of this discussion is not to reconvene the science/philosophy debate in favour of either side, but rather to uncover the way in which Einstein's conception of time functions philosophically, so that the same functioning can be subsequently uncovered when it occurs in cinema.

Deleuze says of Bergson's work, that he: 'ultimately aims ... to give modern science the metaphysics which corresponds to it, which it lacks as one half lacks the other.'[^4] An understanding of how this metaphysics operates is thus essential to any understanding of the gender politics behind the way time is represented in the movement-image. As we shall see, the reasoning which leads to the creation of the concept of space-time has much in common with that which helps create this gender binary. Movement-images are, after all, blocs of space-time, mobile sections, or indirect images, of time's virtual whole. It is perhaps no surprise,
then, that these illustrations of time's subordination to a character's movement through space should share the same metaphysics as is evident in Einstein's conception of space-time.

The debate between the scientific and the philosophical models of time, those of Bergson and Einstein, can be seen to be a matter of perspective. In *Duration and Simultaneity*, Bergson clashed with both science and received wisdom, by critiquing Einstein's special theory of relativity. This was not, however, a criticism of the special theory of relativity itself. Bergson's disagreement, rather, was with the methodology employed by Einstein's approach, and the conclusions that it (almost inevitably) prefigured through its reasoning. Interpreted differently, specifically from the perspective provided by his own philosophy, Bergson felt that the special theory of relativity actually offered the evidence needed to make sense of his own previous work on time.

Bergson reasoned that the notion of space-time was a badly analysed composite. He argued that space was not the fourth dimension of time, but rather, that space was the deposit left behind by the passing of time. Einstein's space-time, then, was but another example of the measurement of time in spatial terms which produced paradoxes such as that of Zeno's arrow. As Bergson showed with his explanation of Zeno's arrow, however, paradoxes like this really only suggest that the theoretical framework employed to analyse concepts like space and time needs revising. When seen from a slightly different perspective such cases as that of Zeno's arrow will cease to appear paradoxical. This style of reasoning also informed his criticism of Einstein's conclusions.

Einstein's radical move in formulating the special theory of relativity was to attempt to break from the Newtonian model of the universe, a universe existing within an absolute, homogenous, or reversible time. In order to do so he theorized instead the existence of many local times, relative to the observer within them. As Durie has it, Einstein's theory:
... famously recasts the physical universe as a multiplicity of physical systems of reference in motion relative to each other without absolute frame of reference. Yet it maintains a fundamental role for observation and measurement.6

Although managing a break of sorts, then, Einstein's approach contained a theoretical stumbling block in its over-privileging of the observer involved in the scientific contemplation of time. Although the observer had now been placed within time by Einstein, he still retained the Newtonian, apparently objective gaze, that which took in the whole of time as it passed around him. Einstein's observer, although no longer detached from, or situated outwith time, was still somehow thought to be able to fix his own position in relation to all others. Einstein's conclusion, that separate local times exist for separate observers, was, in fact, a direct consequence of this approach. Durie continues:

... classical dynamics is constrained to posit a system of reference as being absolutely at rest. But if multiple times are derived from within classical dynamics, then it is of necessity impossible to interpret these as indicating shifts in the system of reference deemed to be motionless. Thus, if one were to interpret the findings of the special theory of relativity from within a philosophical world-view determined by classical dynamics, one would be forced to admit the reality of multiple lived times.7

It is only because the 'system of reference' of the observer is believed to be thus fixed, or 'at rest', in relation to those which it observes, that time can be conceived of as relative in this way. Ironically, for Bergson, Einstein's special theory of relativity - that which is usually heralded as enabling the break from the Newtonian model of the universe through its rejection of an absolute time, in favour of relative times - was really the abortive reterritorialization, by Einstein, of the almost glimpsed existence of duration. Thus it was that, from the classical perspective which Einstein retained, in which the observer is fixed, one is 'forced to admit' the relative times of his theory. For Bergson, on the other hand, not
only was duration the single time in which all observers were positioned, but it was also an expanding time in which the observer was unable to arbitrarily fix their own position as one from which others could be measured.

According to Bergson, all our individual consciousnesses exist within time, and expand along with it. Duration is our lived experience of time, our consciousness of it. The fact that we are conscious of time in this lived way effects the way in which we are able to measure time. This single time of duration, then, is not the absolute, homogeneous, reversible time of Newton, nor does it allow for the relative experiences of time of Einstein's theory. Instead it is a singular multiplicity, made up of all our individual experiences of time's passing, experiences which occur simultaneously even though we seem to experience them as passing relative to the times of others. As time, for both observer and observed, is perpetually becoming, the observer's own experience of time's passing makes it impossible for them to quantify, or measure, the passing of time for another, as though from a fixed perspective within time. Within this expanding whole of duration, the separate experiences of time that individuals live, even though they are spatially separate, must actually be occurring simultaneously, as we exist contemporaneously within the single time of duration. Hence: 'Simultaneity thus depends upon contemporaneity, and more fundamentally still, upon duration.' This simultaneity makes it impossible for Einstein's local times to exist as there can be no fixed perspective which would make another's time move relative to it. Perhaps the easiest way to understand the distinction between the two theories is through the famous example of the twins and the rocket.

The example of the rocket and the twins provided one of the seeming paradoxes that Einstein used to strengthen the case for his interpretation of time as passing at relative speeds for different individuals. There are two twins, Peter and Paul. Peter takes off in a rocket ship, travels for a year at just under light speed (faster than light speed in the vacuum of space not being possible, in the Einsteinian universe), turns around, and returns to earth. On his return, although Peter has
aged two years, Paul, resident on earth, has aged two hundred years. The mathematical equations behind this example are based upon the Lorentz transformations⁹, and deal primarily with the difficulty of observing time for observers within the local times that they experience. For Bergson, however, this theory failed to take into account the actual lived experiences of time that would have occurred in the lives of Peter and Paul. Both Peter and Paul, he argues, because of their respective expanding consciousnesses within duration, would have aged simultaneously, and, consequently, would both be the same age with Peter's return to earth. How then does this apparent paradox emerge, of time moving more slowly, for Peter, relative to Paul, in Einstein's interpretation?

In order to believe that the time of another passes at a speed that is relative to that of oneself, it is necessary to believe that your own perspective is somehow fixed. It is this belief that allows that you have the ability to measure the speed of another, relative to yourself. All that is actually being measured in this case, however, is a 'representation'¹⁰ of the time of another, a time which, as it is not actually the lived experience of that person, is, in Bergson's words, the 'unreal, auxiliary, imaginary time'¹¹ of the physicist. For the observer on earth, imagining the time of the other, this other is now reduced to the status of a 'puppet'¹², on the rocket, a manikin who is unaware of the experience of time's passing. In order to measure Peter's lived experience of time passing, Bergson maintained, it is not enough for Paul to simply imagine or represent him, he must actually become him, and experience time as he does.

If the paradox is viewed in this way, Bergson continues, were we to privilege not the position of Paul on earth, but instead, the position of Peter on the rocket ship, this would now have to become our fixed point of measurement. It would now seem to Peter as though two hundred years have passed for him on his arrival back on earth, and only two for Paul. Moreover, the earth will seem to have carried away, and returned to him, Paul, at a speed just less than that of light. This reasoning led Bergson to the conclusion that Einstein's interpretation of relativity failed to take into consideration the simultaneous experience of lived
time, of both Peter and Paul. If you reason as Einstein does, whichever system of reference you privilege, be it Peter's or Paul's, becomes an illusory, fixed position from which to view the movement of the other. By doing so, moreover, you theoretically position the observer which you privilege outside of time. It is this detachment from duration which enables Einstein to hypothesize that multiple, relative, or local experiences of time can exist.

The theory of relativity, when taken up by Bergson from his philosophical perspective, can now be interpreted differently. Bergson's view of relativity allows for the coexistence of many systems of reference, simultaneously, within the same, singular system. It allows for, 'multiple, lived simultaneities'.

Bergson's already existing mediations on time (including those found in *Matter and Memory* and *Creative Evolution*) were for this reason, he felt, strengthened, and to a certain degree, completed by Einstein's special theory of relativity. Rather than the local times of Einstein, which also still retain the reversibility of time found in the Newtonian model of a single, absolute time, we now have the irreversible, perpetually becoming duration of Bergson.

In his confrontation with science, however, Bergson came out the immediate loser. Little attempt was made by the scientists involved in the ensuing debates to address the radical critique of scientific thinking provided by Bergson. Instead, criticism focused on his misunderstanding of certain elements of the special theory of relativity. In particular, it became clear that he had made mistakes in his interpretations of the Lorentz equations. For this reason it seemed that Einstein's interpretation was still the more likely of the two, judging by the scientific facts in evidence at the time. Sadly, this conclusion negated any need for the scientific community to regard its findings as being merely interpretations determined by the scientific perspective (the arbitrarily fixed position of judgement) from which events were observed. The "facts" of the matter remained, seemingly, unchallenged.
What was important about the confrontation, however, was that it enabled Bergson to complete his formulation of time as duration, as a singular multiplicity. Deleuze took up and expanded upon this idea in several of his own works, in particular in *Difference and Repetition* and *The Logic of Sense*. In these texts he drew upon Bergson's duration in order to show that time was a *virtual* multiplicity. Time, as Deleuze saw it in Bergson's works, was a virtual whole. This whole was perpetually becoming-actual, in and through the multiple, lived simultaneities of the lives of Peter, Paul, and indeed, the "being" of everyone else. The virtual, he states in *Difference and Repetition*, 'is not opposed to the real; it possesses a full reality by itself. The process it undergoes is that of actualisation.' Furthermore, 'to be actualised is to create divergent lines which correspond to - without resembling - a virtual multiplicity.'. The lives of the different observers, with their independent rhythms of becoming, all coexist within the same singular time (duration) as differing actualizations of its virtual potential. The divergent lines that they create through their actualization, however, although contemporaneous, bear no resemblance to the virtual states from which they derive. They exist, rather, as spatialized expressions of time, as forms fashioned from the flux of becoming.

For Deleuze, Einstein's theory of space-time resulted from his inability to distinguish the existence of the actual forms that he studied, from the virtual flux out of which they emerged. Thus it was that, due to his need to revise Newton's absolute time from within the same framework of classical dynamics, Einstein fell victim to the badly analysed composite of space-time. In *Bergsonism*, Deleuze states: 'By confusing the two types - actual spatial multiplicity and virtual temporal multiplicity - Einstein has merely invented a new way of spatializing time. Einstein, although conscious of his place within a universe that is becoming (hence his reworking of Newton's absolute time in the first place), continues to reason at the level of being. For this reason he pushes the spatialization of time further, providing the actual with a fourth, temporal dimension, but fails to realize time's existence as a singular, virtual, multiplicity. Essentially, he theorizes multiple, relative times in place of the multiple nature of time itself.
In *The Logic of Sense* the reason for Einstein's confusion becomes apparent if we consider Deleuze's description of the becoming-actual of the virtual time of *Aion*. The virtual multiplicity of *Aion*, the third synthesis of time, is at once thought to be the; 'straight line and empty form' of time. Although time is immediately perceived as a straight line, as actual, as spatialised form, it also virtually subsists in its perpetual becoming-actual, as virtuality, or 'empty form'.

The respective theories of Einstein and Bergson, then, are direct expressions of the apprehension of time as either space-time (in fact the misapprehension of *Aion as Chronos*, as the actual form taken by the virtual), or as duration, the virtual itself.

Deleuze continues to develop upon Bergson's re-reading of Einstein when, in *Cinema 2*, he maps Borges' idea of the labyrinth onto the process of the actualization of time. Duration is now seen to actualize not only into the lived experiences of time of Peter, Paul et al., but also, time actualizes into an infinite number of personal labyrinths. These are the possible worlds created by the multiple lived simultaneities of Peter's, Paul's (and everybody else's) possible other selves. The existence, however, of these parallel worlds, or in fact, universes, is not immediately evident to the perception of the person involved. The individual experiences only one of these lived durations, the straight line of time along which their life appears to progress. The actual experience of any one lifeline ensures that the other lives which exist and become actual in other universes (the infinite bifurcations of any one person's labyrinthine becomings) remain virtual. Thus they remain seemingly unknown to the individual in the universe in question. It is the dawning intuition of the labyrinth, then, that enables the liberation of identity which is performed when the powers of the false are evoked in order to falsify time.

What is most interesting about the debate between Einstein and Bergson is the way in which it has begun to resurface, not only in the philosophical work of
Deleuze, but also in certain areas of science. Most noticeable was its effect upon *Order out of Chaos* (1979) a collaborative work between scientist Ilya Prigogine and philosopher Isabelle Stengers. This work attempted to formulate a theory of the universe as both being *and* becoming, when seen from a perspective different from that of the Classical, Newtonian model. They take as their starting point the fact that the irreversibility of time suggested by the second law of thermodynamics refutes the reversible notion of time of Newton: that which was so tellingly employed by Einstein in his theory of relativity.

Prigogine and Stengers question how, if the universe is running down towards its inevitable, entropic, heat death, we can explain the continual expansion and movement towards ever-greater complexity of the theory of evolution? The pessimistic conclusion to the second law of thermodynamics, the equilibrium state of heat death to which the universe is thought to be heading, is really only a consequence of its being formulated within a closed system (i.e within the Newtonian model). Once the same irreversible arrow of time is seen from a different perspective, however, within an open system (one which relies upon its interaction with its external context to create assemblages) a different model can be formulated. This is a model in which the universe is expanding and multiplying towards irreversible complexity. This new theory sits in line with evolution, and maintains the irreversible arrow of time of the second law of thermodynamics. The universe it describes need no longer end in heat death, as it no longer exists in a closed system.

The seemingly indisputable fact of the second law of thermodynamics is thus refined through an examination of the framework of reasoning which prefigured the necessity for such a conclusion. At this point, once outside the parameters of the closed system imposed by Newton, the law of thermodynamics becomes simply an interpretation relevant to a certain, specific set of conditions. It is, in short, no longer a fact, merely an interpretation drawn from a certain perspective. As they say: 'Whatever we call reality, it is revealed to us only through the active construction in which we participate.' The influence of Bergson on this
statement is evident. Not only does this apply to our existence in time, and our inability to objectively study the universe, as if from outside of time, but it also applies to the theoretical frameworks which we employ in order to explain the workings of time, the universe, and so on.

For Prigogine and Stengers, Bergson's theoretical direction is 'a program that is beginning to be implemented by the metamorphosis science is now undertaking'. This is a metamorphosis shown in their own move away from the Newtonian model, which saw its final death throws in Einstein's local times, and towards a notion of becoming without predetermined end. This movement within scientific thinking, towards the position initially outlined by Bergson, is also foregrounded by Timothy S. Murphy. Murphy draws parallels between the works of quantum physicists David Bohm and Basil Hiley, and that of Deleuze. As Bohm (et al) has shown, at a quantum level, faster than light communication is now thought to be possible within our universe. The theory of 'non-locality' which this new information enables (i.e that all parts of the universe can be in touch with all other parts, without needing to be spatially contiguous) 'undoes the reduction of time to space performed by relativity theory and establishes an irreducibly privileged frame of temporal reference for physical experiments.' This, Murphy notes, allows Bohm and Hiley to suggest a new temporal model of the universe, in contrast to that of Einstein's space-time. This model, interestingly, bears a remarkable resemblance to that of Bergson's duration, and indeed, to Deleuze's *Aion*.

In his piece, *Quantum Ontology*, moreover, Murphy shows how correlations between the works of Deleuze and Bohm enable us to think differently about the existence of matter than has been previously attempted by Bohr, Heisenberg, and Neumann. The paradoxical discovery of the existence of matter as both wave and particle need not, contrary to the beliefs of the aforementioned scientists, be explained away as merely 'a metaphysical gesture that has no measurable effects, since the object only exhibits properties when it interacts with the experimental apparatus'. This explanation, Murphy shows, says more about the theoretical
frameworks from which they approach the problem, their methods of measuring and explaining the existence of matter, than it does about matter itself. Instead, the different approach taken by Bohm points towards the conclusion that matter exists in both virtual and actual states. The particle can now be seen to exist as the flickering in and out of existence of the actual along the wave front of the virtual; that is, as virtual wave constantly in the process of becoming-actual-particle. Once again, with a different theoretical approach, a theory is proposed which can account for the seeming inconsistencies encountered by Bohr, et al.

That both Bohm and Deleuze, as Murphy points out, view matter as the enfolding of the virtual in the creation of the actual, ensures that they both 'treat the universe as origami'\textsuperscript{26}. Time, when conceived at a quantum level, would seem to bear a striking resemblance to Deleuze's \textit{Aion}, the virtual time out of which the actual takes form in its different foldings. The similarities between the theories of Bohm, and Deleuze's ideas concerning time, themselves so heavily influenced by Bergson, would thus seem to support Prigogine and Stengers' judgement concerning the direction, or metamorphosis, that some areas of science are now undertaking towards Bergson's position.

Seemingly the loser in the immediate aftermath of his confrontation with Einstein, Bergson's work on time is now being reassessed. It is, after all, able to provide previously unthought of explanations for the findings of physics once it reaches a quantum level. David Deutsch's idea, in \textit{The Fabric of Reality}\textsuperscript{27} (1997) that at a quantum level we may benefit from thinking of the universe as a multiverse, could also be considered in this light. Certainly his idea that quantum theory can quite reasonably account for the seemingly staggering findings of chaos theory would appear to support the Deleuzian conception of the labyrinth of \textit{Cinema 2}.

According to chaos theory, based upon the model of classical dynamics, as the measurement of the initial state of a system is never perfect, any prediction
concerning the future state of said system will tend to be unreliable. The effects of the inaccuracy of the initial measurements, after exponentially multiplying over a period of time are, in fact, immeasurably huge. This effect is often expressed in the slightly misleading example of the flapping of a butterfly's wings which causes a hurricane several thousand miles away.

This is not, however, thought to be the case under the rules established by quantum theory. Should the occurrence of a hurricane be somehow attributed to the flapping of a butterfly's wings, this seemingly random happening will only appear to be random when seen from the classical viewpoint. From the theoretical perspective of the multiverse, by contrast, we will be aware that the flapping of a butterfly's wings will actually cause a hurricane in some universes, but not in others. As Deutsch has it:

Subjectively we perceive this as a single unpredictable or 'random' outcome, through the multiverse point of view all the outcomes have actually happened.\(^{28}\)

The chain of events that leads from the flapping of the wings to the hurricane, when it does happen, will not, in this case, appear random. We will be aware that this is but one of the occasions when it does happen, and that there are also occasions, in other universes, where (or we should really say, \textit{when}) it does not happen. For every flap of the wings, we will be aware that all the possible ramifications of this action will take place somewhere, or rather, \textit{somewhere}, amongst the infinite labyrinthine pathways through the multiverse.

Again we see that the classical model is destined to reach certain conclusions due to its privileging of its own frame of reference over all others. The unpredictability of the effect of the flapping wings is not, however, as Deutsch's work shows, solely attributable to events that occur in our universe, in our particular frame of reference. Rather, it is a consequence of the unpredictability of the motion of the multiverse, or, in Deleuzian terms, of the splitting of time in
the labyrinth. Once again, changing the frame of reference has provided a different conclusion, and potentially cleared up another seeming paradox, that of the butterfly and the hurricane. Although Deutsch's theory differs radically from Deleuze's in many respects, it is in these small convergences that a pattern begins to appear that concurs with the philosophical view of time previously theorized by Bergson.

However, despite this movement within science towards the previously discarded Bergsonian view of time, there is still a great deal of resistance towards the suggestion that the theoretical framework which science employs is responsible for the conclusions it draws. Not to at least acknowledge this resistance would make the above evidence seem questionable. Perhaps the most pertinent example for this discussion would be the controversial Intellectual Impostures: Postmodern Philosophers' Abuse of Science (1997) in which two professors of physics, Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont, criticized the use, or as they saw it, 'abuse', of scientific concepts by several post-structuralists, philosophers, psychoanalysts, and feminists. The accused range from Lacan, Kristeva and Irigaray, to Baudrillard and Virilio. The works of Deleuze, and Deleuze and Guattari, also warranted a chapter. The disputes caused by this book, and the positions taken for and against it are too many to be rehearsed here. The approach taken by Sokal and Bricmont, however, is of interest if we examine it in relation to the difference between the theoretical frameworks respectively utilized by Einstein and Bergson.

In their introduction Sokal and Bricmont state their concern for American academia, which they perceive to be threatened by the doctrine which they blanket term, 'postmodernism'. This they define as doctrine which rejects Enlightenment rationalism, and which is marked by; 'a cognitive and cultural relativism that regards science as nothing more than a 'narration', a 'myth' or a social construction among many others.' Indeed, they maintain, the authors they discuss: 'display a profound indifference, if not a disdain, for facts and logic.' Obviously, for anyone wishing to advocate the work of any of these so called
'postmodern' authors, it would be very easy to state that this is exactly the stance taken by certain amongst them, and that Sokal and Bricmont, whilst correct in this respect, are tilting at windmills. Deleuze, for instance, states that, ‘no special status should be assigned to any particular field, whether philosophy, science, art, or literature.' What, then, can be gained from a work which argues against postmodernism’s Bergsonian, simultaneous relativism between disciplines, and advocates instead a binary logic of scientifically proven truth vs error?

What is interesting about this book is the way in which Sokal and Bricmont take their own frame of reference, that of science, and privilege it as the fixed perspective from which they can judge every other, as relative. As was the case with Einstein’s rebuttal of Bergson (‘There is … no philosopher’s time’), by privileging their own frame of reference in this way, they inevitably predetermine the conclusion that any other discipline which attempts to utilize scientific concepts will be "wrong". The alien framework into which these concepts are transported will, of necessity, falsify the conclusions already drawn by science, and from the fixed point taken by science, these will appear incorrect. However - as the work of Bohm and to a lesser degree, Deutsch show (through their respective theorizing of the move from the classical to the quantum model) as indeed does that of Prigogine and Stengers in chemistry - even if the work of philosophers like Bergson in the 1920s seems to disregard scientific "facts", it may be that new "facts" will emerge in the future which will make those previous "facts", not necessarily true. In retrospect, as is the case with Bergson’s work, the falsified conclusions of philosophers may become useful once the scientific framework shifts. Indeed, every time the metaphysical framework of science alters different conclusions are enabled. This ensures the invalidity of the very belief in facts which began with the fixed model of the Classical, Enlightenment rationale. If time is no longer reversible, if everything must and does change (becoming, not being) then what is a "fact", after all, but an arbitrarily fixed, and therefore temporary, point in time?
It must be acknowledged that Sokal and Bricmont’s critique of the work of Deleuze, and Deleuze and Guattari, does indeed show evidence of their misunderstanding of certain scientific concepts. In much the same way that Bergson made errors concerning the Lorentz transformations, errors have here again been made, with the result that the philosophers often draw what appear to be incorrect conclusions. Whether or not this is an ‘abuse’ of science, however, is a different matter. As was the case with Bergson’s initial failure at the hurdle of the special theory of relativity, the way in which a misunderstood scientific concept can lead the philosopher to conclusions that may have wide-ranging repercussions is surely of great importance in itself. Perhaps more important than the accuracy employed by the philosopher in their application and discussion of scientific concepts, is their ability to create new concepts by using them.

From as early as 1968, in Difference and Repetition, Deleuze has maintained that: ‘A book of philosophy should be in part a particular species of detective novel, in part a kind of science fiction.’33 He continues:

How else can one write but of those things which one doesn’t know, or knows badly? ... We write only at the frontiers of our knowledge, at the border which separates our knowledge from our brilliance and transforms the one into the other. ... We are therefore well aware, unfortunately, that we have spoken about science in a manner that was not scientific.34

This explicitly stated intent, of taking scientific concepts out of their scientific context in order to make them resonate with those of philosophy (exactly as Bergson did in 1922) is somehow missed by Sokal and Bricmont, even though Difference and Repetition is one of the texts they analyse. Their argument then, that Deleuze, applies ‘a great concentration of scientific terms, employed out of context and without any apparent logic...’35 now seems redundant, as to write ‘about science in a manner that was not scientific’ was exactly his intention.
The fact that Sokal and Bricmont fail to identify the 'logic' behind Deleuze's use of these scientific concepts (even though it is expressly stated by Deleuze) is perhaps a result of their expectations concerning the already determined conclusions drawn by science. When they find, instead, different conclusions to those which they expect, they conclude that philosophy lacks logic. What is evident, however, is a different kind of logic. Following this logic, the transformation of the initial concept, through its placement in a new context, does not produce the incorrect answer, but simply a different answer. What is the point, after all, of a repetition of the same conclusion? Surely a repetition of difference, created through a new assemblage, is infinitely preferable? For this reason, philosophy's misunderstanding of a concept is not of so much importance as where the misunderstood concept takes the philosopher. Bergson, for instance, certainly understood the Lorentz equations 'badly', but his own theory of time could not have been developed without it. The effect of this work on Deleuze, moreover, would not have been felt, had he not made such a misunderstanding.

It is perhaps ultimately ironic that Sokal and Bricmont, taking passages from Deleuze's works, quoting them out of their avowed, philosophical context, and then stating that they are 'utterly meaningless', are actually working in much the same way that Deleuze does in his creation of science fictions. Being clear on how these two approaches do differ, then, is important. The positive outcomes to the fictionalizing process which Deleuze undertakes by using scientific concepts out of context are only realized because of his refusal to privilege not only science, but also his own discipline, as though it were a fixed perspective against which to judge the movement of all others. It is for this reason that Deleuze so often works between disciplines, be they philosophy and science, philosophy and cinema, philosophy and art, philosophy and literature, and so on. To embark upon this same task of fictionalizing from within a fixed perspective which believes itself to be the judge of all others will, as the conclusions of Sokal and Bricmont show, inevitably result in an Einsteinian relativizing of any other discipline's use of these concepts. Rather than allowing them to create assemblages with other, new concepts, to work at the 'frontiers of knowledge', this methodology simply asserts the invalidity of the other, relative
perspectives. In essence it restores the binary of true and false, and is as much as to hear Einstein say that Peter's watch is fast compared to his.

The difference between the two approaches can be summarised as follows. Deleuze's science fiction asserts *one possible science*. Sokal and Bricmont's adherence to science as fact, in contrast, asserts that there is only *one science possible*. It is, once again, a manifestation of the difference in thinking that characterizes Bergson/Deleuze's labyrinth on the one hand - in which experiences of time's passing are simultaneous - and Einstein's space-time on the other - in which all other times can be seen as relative from one privileged, fixed perspective. It is this difference which stops this debate from being merely the Sokal and Bricmont pot calling the Deleuzian kettle, black.

What we are left with in this debate, then, is a matter of perspective similar to that which separated Einstein and Bergson's positions on time. For the scientific position held by Sokal and Bricmont, privileging itself above all others, the positions of these respective others will seem false by their standards. For the philosophical position held by Deleuze, by contrast, the position of the scientist will appear as that of one who, reasoning at the level of the actual, misses the virtual from which the actual takes its form.

Despite the implication of Sokal and Bricmont's book, however, science does not simply occupy a plane of transcendence which reterritorializes the plane of consistency of philosophy. If this was the case, the resonances that Murphy finds between Deleuze and Bohm, and indeed, that which this work offers, between Deleuze and Deutsch could surely not exist. It is not simply a matter, then, of correlating the gender binary of the movement-image with a binary logic particular to science. As the movement from the classical, to the Einsteinian, to the emergent quantum view of time illustrates, after all, science has a marked capacity for change. This is a capacity, in fact, which problematizes the binary logic evidenced by Sokal and Bricmont's reasoning. There does remain,
however, a correlation between the movement-image's plane of transcendence,
and science's privileging of the actual, that same reasoning which creates the
idea that time is but a fourth dimension of space.

In *What Is Philosophy?*, Deleuze and Guattari define the relationship between
the two disciplines as that between the plane of consistency of philosophy, and
the plane of reference of science. Their claim is that, whilst philosophy examines
the becoming-actual of the virtual, creating concepts, science determines what
the actual is, by creating functions. As they have it:

... through concepts, philosophy continually extracts a consistent event
from the state of affairs - a smile without a cat, as it were - whereas
through functions, science continually actualizes the event in a state of
affairs, thing or body that can be referred to.\(^{37}\)

Whereas for philosophy, the being of the cat vanishes in the event, or becoming,
of the cat's smiling, for science there is no smile without a cat that first smiles.
For science it is the cat that is important, the 'thing, or body that actualizes the
virtual on a plane of reference and in a system of coordinates\(^{38}\). Science's
reasoning at the level of the actual, of forms, however, is the same practice
which creates the paradoxes of Zeno, and the conclusion that time is a fourth
dimension of space. Thus space-time is a function that is almost pre-determined
by the metaphysical approach to reality taken by science. Under the conditions
of space-time the event of time's passing is not judged to be as important as the
actualized form that it takes. Just as there can be no smile without a cat that
smiles, there is no time without a space across which to measure its passing. It is
this conclusion which leads to the conflation of space with time. They continue:

*Concepts and functions thus appear as two types of multiplicities or
varieties whose natures are different.* Although scientific types of
multiplicity are themselves extremely diverse, they do not include the
properly philosophical multiplicities, for which Bergson claimed a
particular status defined by duration, "multiplicity of fusion", which
expressed the inseparability of variations, in contrast to multiplicities of space, number and time, which ordered mixtures and referred to the variable or to independent variables. 39

Science's focus on the actual, on 'multiplicities of space, number and time' is what creates the theory of space-time, the ordering, or measuring of these entities in their actualized forms. Science takes the measure of the smile across the cat's face. Philosophy's concentration on the virtual, by contrast, leads to its intuition of duration, and the 'inseparability of variations' encountered in the becoming of assemblages. Philosophy charts the event of smiling, of the smiling/cat assemblage.

It should now be clear exactly what is at stake in the recent representations of labyrinthine time in cinema. Are we seeing the falsifying powers of the labyrinth of Deleuze, or are Sliding Doors and Run Lola Run merely 'impostures', masquerading a belief in the virtual whole of time whilst all the time upholding the actualized, straight line of time? Are these films Bergsonian-inspired expressions of a virtual, labyrinthine conception of duration's many, simultaneous times, or are they relative, local views of time, as seen from a fixed, Einsteinian position?

**Running and Sliding.**

Both Sliding Doors and Run Lola Run are immediately striking in their use of multiple plot lines, and their centering of the narrative around a female protagonist. Whilst Sliding Doors maintains two simultaneous plot lines by alternating between two parallel universes, Lola Rennt for its part plays three alternative versions of the same events in series. Both these films can be read as representing a Bergsonian/Deleuzian model of time. In order to do this most effectively the films will be examined one at a time, beginning with Sliding Doors.
Peter Howitt's film is the story, or stories, of Helen (Gwyneth Paltrow) a young woman living in London, whose identity splits into two separate paths through the labyrinth of time. After arriving one morning at work to discover that she has been fired from her job in Public Relations, Helen attempts to return home on the underground. In one story she catches the train, but in the other, she misses it, her way being barred by the closing of its sliding doors, hence the name of the film. The rest of the drama is concerned with her two simultaneous existences, in which are played out what can best be described as the "happy" and the "sad" consequences of her encounter with the train doors.

In the happy incarnation, the Helen that catches the train returns home to find that her boyfriend Jerry (John Lynch) has been cheating on her. She leaves him, and resolves to rebuild her life without him. She is aided in this by her close friend Anna, and James (John Hannah) who now becomes her love interest. Helen meets James, in fact, on the very tube which sad Helen failed to catch. After an initial makeover in which she has her hair cut short and dyed blonde, happy Helen becomes a successful business woman, running her own PR company. In her sad incarnation, by contrast, the Helen that misses the train remains ignorant of Jerry's infidelity, and is forced to work in two rather menial jobs (sandwich delivery and waitressing) in order to support him as a writer. She remains completely unaware of the existence of James. For brevity I shall refer to the happy incarnation as 'blonde Helen' and the unhappy incarnation as 'brunette Helen' from this point onwards.

In *Sliding Doors*, the ramifications of a few seconds of measurable time (the difference between catching, or missing a train) are played out across the labyrinth of time much in the way which Deutsch suggests in his multiverse interpretation of chaos theory. In some universes, the flapping of the butterfly's wings causes a hurricane, in others it does not. Similarly, in some universes Helen's life leads, from an initial small event, the catching of the train, to a full
blown love affair with James (as is the case with blonde Helen's life), and in another, after missing the train, it does not (witness the unhappy life of brunette Helen). The film would, at its most obvious level, seem to correspond to both Deutsch's quantum reformulation of time as the multiverse, and indeed, with Deleuze's labyrinth. Were this not enough evidence that Sliding Doors expresses the movement towards Bergson's idea of time as it has been taken up by contemporary films, several other important events occur in the narrative which by themselves do not appear to be of great significance, but which actually make this film particularly Deleuzian in its use of time to create identity.

Most obvious of these is the intuition of her multiple existence which Helen gains during the film. At one point in the narrative we see blonde Helen, on a boat on the Thames, cheering James on as he takes part in a rowing race. With nothing to indicate the shift between universes other than a panning shot, a slight change in the music, and a view which enables the viewer to see the space from which blonde Helen is now absent, the film then moves slickly into the story line of brunette Helen. Walking along beside the Thames with Anna, and pondering the possibility that Jerry may be having an affair, she says: 'It's really weird. I knew there'd be a boat race going by, with purple and white shirts'. This sequence can help us develop an idea which Deleuze himself takes from Bergson, in order to explain the phenomena of *déjà-vu*.

Whilst discussing the splitting of time which occurs in the crystal, and the ability that the subject has to then realise their own doubled existence - much as an actor does, listening to himself and beholding himself playing - Deleuze states:

> The present is the actual image, and *its* contemporaneous past is the virtual image, the image in a mirror. According to Bergson, 'paramnesia' (the illusion of *déjà-vu* or already having been there) simply makes this obvious point perceptible: there is a recollection of the present, contemporaneous with the present, as closely coupled as a role to an actor.⁴⁰
In this case, however, Helen's feeling of *déjà-vu* is not exactly the realization of the splitting of the self, but rather, the realization of the already split self, the contemporaneous lived experiences which are created by the labyrinth of time. It is not so much the immediate realization of the self as having been there before (in the instant at which you split) but rather, the realization of the simultaneous existence in time of an other self that is there at the same time, but in a different manifestation.

This effect is accentuated by the camera's discrete pan which moves, not across the unified space of one universe, but rather, through labyrinthine time, or across duration, as it passes from one universe to another. In fact, when Helen's life is first seen to split the film uses a brief parallel montage sequence in order to emphasize exactly what is happening in the narrative. As Helen simultaneously misses and catches the tube the camera rapidly, and repeatedly, cuts back and forth across temporal dimensions, showing the parallel routes taken by the now split Helen. In one universe we see Helen taking her seat on the train, before cutting back to Helen, in another universe, standing outside the train, and looking annoyed at having just missed it. That only one Helen is ever seen to be evident in the shot at any one time makes it clear that we are seeing not one single space, unified by the movement of the editing, but rather, the many pathways, or universes of labyrinthine time. Here the film edits together not a single, actual, homogeneous space, but the singular multiplicity of labyrinthine time, its actualizations of the virtual.

Another seemingly unimportant incident which occurs in the life of brunette Helen can also be regarded as containing an importance greater than solely that of its narrative function. Growing increasingly suspicious that Jerry is having an affair, one night she finds her eye caught by a couple arguing in the restaurant where she works. The woman, obviously suspicious of her partner, accuses him of only ever buying her flowers when he has done something wrong, to which he stutters and bluffs his innocence, very much in the style of Jerry. The camera
lingers for a moment on Helen's quizzical face, in order to drive home the point that she is seeing her own suspicions in the accusations made by the other woman. On her return home that night she finds that Jerry has bought her flowers. Again, the camera lingers on her face suggesting that he has just confirmed her suspicions. This incident illustrates the way in which Helen begins to grow aware of her life as something that she is somehow watching unfold in front of her, rather like a drama in which she is an actor playing a role. This is the knowledge gained by one who has intuition of duration, of the myriad other selves in which they exist in the labyrinth of time. Although not directly an expression of the existence of labyrinthine selves, what this incident does show is the intuition Helen is gaining of her existence as other.

More important than either of these minor glimpses of herself as multiple Helens, however, is the conclusion to the film, in which both Helens (who are by now both pregnant, brunette Helen to Jerry, and blonde Helen to James) are involved in serious accidents and taken to hospital. The film ends with the death of blonde Helen, and the survival of brunette Helen, but only at the cost of the loss of her baby. As blonde Helen dies in hospital, with James weeping over her, brunette Helen awakens to find Jerry waiting by her bedside. At this point, brunette Helen has a flashback in which she sees: the bridge on which she and James made-up just prior to the accident, the American style diner where they first went on a date, and, finally, the train on which they first met. The existence of these displaced memories within the universe of the brunette Helen suggests a very peculiar action that is taking place concerning the construction of identity in time, in the film's narrative.

The memories of blonde Helen's life which brunette Helen experiences are a representation of the past that she 'might have had'. The appearance of these memories allows her to make decisions for her future based upon a past which now becomes contingent, or not necessarily true. At this point she sends Jerry away, armed with a new resolve based upon memories from the past of her blonde self, and becomes determined to make the past a different story. What has
happened here is interesting because it suggests a labyrinthine realigning of time for brunette Helen, from the present, backwards. This is evident in the order in which the places occur in the flashback she receives (from bridge, to diner, to train) as though blonde Helen's story line was running backwards to the point at which they initially split when boarding the tube. Thus brunette Helen's past is re-aligned with that of blonde Helen with the arrival of her memories. The past can be falsified, we are shown in the present actions of brunette Helen, in order to ensure that the future is different from what it might have been. This is a cinematic illustration of the labyrinthine powers of the false which are activated in the third synthesis of time.

This ability to falsify the past of her unhappy self, to make it not necessarily the cause of her present state, is reinforced by the events that accompany her departure from the hospital. As she meets Hannah for the first time in her brunette incarnation, she correctly finishes his Monty Python catchphrase for him; that which, in her blonde incarnation she had incorrectly presumed would be: 'Always look on the bright side of life'. In the quirky world of James, however, it turned out to be: 'Nobody expects the Spanish inquisition'. The uncanny sense of *déjà-vu* created by her knowledge of James' quirk illustrates that she is now fully in touch with her other past. She has become aware of her labyrinthine self, and has gained intuition of duration. Helen, moreover, has learned to use this intuition of time in order to will a return of difference. She has become an eternally recurring entity who has the ability to manufacture, or perform her future in such a way as to make the past that was, not necessarily true. The past at any one time, Howitt's film shows, is not necessarily the past that leads up to, and causes, the present situation. You have the opportunity to change the past, in the present, at any moment, due to the continual splitting of time that constructs the labyrinth. Rather like the end of *Céline et Julie* - in which the temporal coexistence of Céline, Julie and Madlyn illustrates the continual possibility of rewriting the past in the present - the ending to *Sliding Doors* similarly portrays the ability of Helen to falsify the past in the present. It is only this action, after all, which provides liberation in the future.
The beginning and the end of the film are also important in this respect. When brunette Helen finally does meet James (although he has existed in many of the same spaces as her throughout the film) it is in a replay of their first crossing of paths with which the film begins. As Helen initially left work after being fired she took the lift down to street level. When she dropped an earring in the lift, James helpfully picked it up for her. As she leaves the hospital after her miscarriage, brunette Helen, momentarily stopped in her attempt to get an earlier lift by the closing of its sliding doors, waits for the next one. Its opening doors reveal, James. She, once again, drops her earring, only to have James retrieve it for her, and the conversation concerning the Monty Python catchphrase ensues. We are left in no doubt at this point that the course of blonde Helen's life with James will now happen to brunette Helen, and a happy ending is expected in the future. Again in a very similar manner to the way in which Rivette's film ends by creating a Möbius spiral, here again the film's end begins in a manner evocative of the eternal return. Brunette Helen's future will assuredly turn out to be a return, in difference, of blonde Helen's past.

This replaying of the beginning of the narrative at the end, this apparent return of difference so evocative of eternal recurrence, is, however, a little problematic. Could it, alternatively, be viewed as the re-inscription of a singular linear direction to the narrative at the very last? After all, at this point, the labyrinthine difference in the lives of the Helens has been erased by the death of blonde Helen. What we are finally left with is the single story of brunette Helen, and her new lover-to-be, James. This could be seen as a return to a linear storyline, as if the other story had been but a temporary aberration, rather than one example of the myriad coexisting labyrinthine lives which accompany those of the Helens we are watching. Ultimately, however, the film's ability to sway between the labyrinth and the line of time makes it an almost perfect expression of the actualization of one line of time from out of the virtual labyrinth, without solely denying the other possibilities that accompany this actualization. It is a story of the process of actualization of the virtual, rather than a story of the actual.
Kieslowski's *La Double Vie de Véronique* (1991) by contrast - in which Irene Jacobs plays the part of two identical women living separate lives - contains a similar narrative to that of *Sliding Doors* but retained throughout within a single, linear timeline. This is the film which, although it does come close to a realization of its full labyrinthine potential, ultimately privileges the actual over the virtual. Like *Sliding Doors*, the film explores the consequences of the transference of the memories of one woman, Veronika, to her double, Véronique, when Veronika dies of a heart attack whilst singing. Rather than a flashback, however, the transference is achieved through a sudden and inexplicable feeling of grief for Veronika suffered by Véronique. This prompts Véronique to immediately quit singing herself, and to go to hospital for a heart scan. When Véronique becomes aware of what has happened to her at the end of the film, she even begins to see Veronika's memories in her dreams.

However, even though the idea of the passing on of lessons learnt with which *Sliding Doors* ends is also to be found here, especially in the unprompted heart scan, this time the reduction of the doubled subject to the single lifeline takes place in the same time-space. Veronika dies in Krakow, Poland, and Véronique lives in Paris, France. There is no possible suggestion that a multiverse, or labyrinth exists, or that it is being utilized by either character. The two characters are even shown to inhabit the same space-time when Véronique's tour bus passes through Krakow, and she is spotted by Veronika. The falsifying of the past which the new memories provide is shown as the story of a linear life, rather than of labyrinthine lives. Indeed, the transformation of Veronika into Véronique is related by the puppeteer/stalker who becomes Véronique's lover, as the story of the metamorphosis of a caterpillar into a butterfly. The linearity of the narrative in this case retains an Einsteinian view of space-time through its focus on the actual, unlike that of *Sliding Doors* which delves into the process through which the virtual labyrinth comes to be actualized.
Despite the difference between the two types of ending, however, the need for the narrative structure of *Sliding Doors* to return to a point of linearity right at the last is undoubtedly due to the need for narrative closure that marks the movement-image. Despite its labyrinthine narrative, *Sliding Doors* is still a movement-image which links together spaces through the movement of its characters, the two Helens. It is they that provide the spatial measure of the times through which they pass. Whether or not this should detract from the labyrinthine possibilities of the film, however is a different matter, and is best regarded in conjunction with several other films.

Tom Tykwer's *Lola Rennt* is the story, or rather, the three stories, of Lola (Franka Potente) who, at the start of the narrative, receives a frantic phone call from her boyfriend Manni (Moritz Bleibtreu) a small time courier for a particularly violent, drug smuggling gangster, Ronni. Manni, whilst on an errand for his boss, has managed to successfully deliver his cargo, but on his return, (due to a series of mishaps that begin with Lola's failure to pick him up as arranged) has managed to lose the payment. With no way of knowing where the money is Lola has to find a replacement 100,000 Deutschmarks and get it to Manni in twenty minutes. Should she fail, Manni, knowing that Ronni will kill him for his failure, will attempt to hold up a supermarket. The three stories that follow chart her three slightly different attempts to get the money from her father. The first ends in her and Manni's capture by the police after bungling the robbery of the supermarket, and the accidental shooting of Lola. The second ends with the accidental death of Manni after Lola has successfully managed to obtain the money by robbing the bank where her father works, and the third (the happy ending) with Manni recovering his own money, Lola winning the same amount at roulette, and with both characters alive at the end.

This is another film which at first glance would seem to illustrate Deutsch's multiverse reworking of chaos theory, in which a difference in seconds can have vast repercussions within the many universes in which the consequences are played out. In each of the three stories, Lola begins her mad dash across town
with a flight (initially shown in animation) down the stairs of the block of flats
where she and her parents live. In each of the three stories, however, something
slightly different happens when she runs past a young boy and his dog, who are
loitering on the stairs. The first time she passes the growling dog without
incident and runs straight on. The second time she passes the boy trips her, the
resulting fall down the stairs causing her to limp slightly and marginally slowing
her run. On the third pass she leaps over the approaching dog, thus gaining a few
moments on both of her previous incarnations.

The exponentially increasing knock-on effect of this difference is made manifest
in each case, when, on turning a corner she passes a woman with a baby in a
push chair. This is the first of many such incidences in the film when a freeze
frame of an incidental character's face is shown, over which we see the caption
'AND THEN' and the whine of a photographic flash is heard. This is followed by
the appearance of a series of photographic snapshots showing the future of the
incidental character's story. The ramifications for the minor character of the
different points at which the path of Lola's life crosses her own are shown to be
radically different in each of the three stories. In the first instance, the woman is
found unfit to keep her baby, which is taken from her by the authorities, and,
desperate, she eventually steals another. On the second occasion, Lola arrives a
few seconds later due to her limp, and as she brushes past the woman we
discover that in this future the woman will win the lottery and find happiness in
a palatial home. In the third and final story, Lola's earlier arrival will push the
path of the woman's life into religion. These three different destinies would seem
to express, in a similar way to that used in Sliding Doors, the way in which the
exponential, seemingly 'chaotic' increase in differences between events caused
by a few seconds of measurable time can spread out across the labyrinth of time.

This knock-on effect is noticed not only in this most obvious way, however, but
also in the way in which the paths of the characters involved in the main
narrative do or don't interact. At one point, for instance, after running through a
crowd of nuns, Lola encounters a man riding a bicycle. On the first two
occasions the whine of the camera flash is heard and we see the man firstly mugged and badly beaten only to meet his future wife in the guise of his nurse, and then, the second time, becoming destitute, and eventually dying of a drug overdose. On the third occasion, Lola swerves around the nuns, her change of course slightly altering that of the man on the bike who also swerves to avoid her. This time we follow his narrative for a little while longer without seeing the snapshots, only to witness him sell the bicycle to the hobo who has picked up Manni's money. This chance occurrence, itself a consequence of Lola's change of direction, is what finally brings the hobo on the bike within range of Manni, who then retrieves his money.

The other instances which the film shows of the myriad possible directions events are shown to take through time are too numerous to be recounted here. Suffice it to say that the number of incidental characters that Lola Rennt brings into its narrative enables it to foreground the infinite number of possible directions through the labyrinth that occur with every splitting of time. The number of actualized pathways through the virtual that exist, we can infer from this, is truly incomprehensible.

The expression of the passing of time in this way is kept to a minimum in Sliding Doors. Mostly it is hinted at by the number of sliding doors through which the lives of the two Helens pass. The number of possibilities which pass with each sliding open and shut are perhaps at their most obvious when blonde Helen, attempting to track down James in order to tell him that she is carrying his baby, is told by his secretary that he is with his wife. Shocked at finding out that he is married, she leans her head against the wall for a moment, her position there causes the automatic, sliding doors to repeatedly open and close. With each slide, we have by this point in the film become aware, a portal into a different, parallel, universe is passing by. The sliding doors motif also recurs in the first two stories of Lola Rennt, as Manni awaits Lola's arrival outside the supermarket. As the clock nears noon, and Lola's time runs out, the screen splits, initially into two, with Manni waiting on the left, and Lola, as yet out of Manni's
sight, running to him on the right. The bottom of the screen is then raised, creating a three way split-screen image with the ticking hands of the clock completing the trio. Behind Manni, punctuating the movement of the hands of the clock, the sliding doors of the supermarket repeatedly open and close in slow motion.

*Lola Rennt* seems to show that the number of possible entrances to the labyrinth are not only multiple, due to all the Peters and Pauls whose intersecting lives create a labyrinth within any one universe, but so too are they temporally infinite, due to the infinite number of labyrinths created by the infinite splittings of every Peter, every Paul, etc. It is this which separates *Lola Rennt* from a film like Robert Altman's *Short Cuts* (1993). The labyrinth as it is seen in Tykwer's film is no longer just the spatial crossing of paths of people's lives in one universe (as it is in Altman's representation of Los Angeles as spatial labyrinth) it now also has infinite variations at a temporal level, even if all we see of it is the events in the one universe within which we have consciousness of time's passing.

Lola, as was the case with brunette Helen's experience of *déjà-vu*, also seems to gain intuition of the multiple incarnations of herself in which she exists. The lessons that Lola learns in some universes seem to be transmitted across time into others. In the first story, reaching Manni too late to stop his attempted robbery, she joins him in the supermarket where she disarms the security guard and takes his gun. Never having used one before she asks Manni how the safety works. He shows her and, in her nervousness, she fires off a shot. In the second story, after having died and been resurrected at the end of the first, she decides to rob the Deutsche Transfer Bank where her father works. This time she takes the security guard's gun, and to show her father that she means business, she expertly flicks the safety off and fires two bullets into the wall. It would appear that she has received the knowledge of the, now dead, first Lola. Her memories have been transferred across to the second Lola, just as those of the dead blonde
Helen did to brunette Helen. These enable her to act accordingly. How else could she have known how to use the safety?

The ability to falsify the past which Lola would seem to have is also illustrated in the flashback sequence which follows the end of the first story. In this sequence, as Lola lies dying on the road after the failed supermarket heist, she remembers a previous conversation she had with Manni over a post-coital cigarette. In response to Manni's declaration that he loves her, she says:

'I could be some other girl. ... What if you never met me ... You'd be telling the same thing to someone else. ... I think I have to make a decision.'

At this point we cut back to Lola dying in the road. She continues:

'But I don't want to leave. Stop.'

Lola's actions when the story begins again, especially the things that she seems to have learned which give her enough of an advantage to successfully complete the robbery and get away with the money, would seem to reinforce the idea that she has managed to make her previous past not necessarily true. Realizing, as Helen did with the incident over the flowers, that she is herself the 'someone else' that Manni is talking to in many incarnations (i.e that she herself exists as other) she makes the decision to connect herself to a new past in the replaying of the story, and by so doing, to create a future that is yet to come.

Despite the similarities that exist between the two films on first glance, however, they are in fact very different in one respect. Although seeming to maintain a similar focus on the actualization of the virtual that occurs through the labyrinth of time, on closer examination, the narrative of Lola Rennt is actually theoretically inconsistent with the Bergsonian model. The above interpretation,
seemingly evidence of a Bergsonian/Deleuzian view of time, now begins to appear somewhat doubtful.

The major difficulty is caused by the way in which the succession of the stories destroys the notion of the irreversible 'arrow of time' that is maintained by Deleuze's labyrinth. The labyrinth of parallel universes which creates the simultaneous happenings which we saw so clearly in *Sliding Doors* is absent from Tykwer's film. In *Sliding Doors*, the ungrounding of time, its return in difference, was figured as part of the irreversible progression of time (the arrow of time) with the transference of blonde Helen's memories to brunette Helen at the end of the film. There was no question of brunette Helen's story starting over again with her departure from the PR firm. The return of difference is thus not shown to be the return to a first cause. Rather, it is the creation of the future that is yet to come, based upon a past that this future will make contingent. The paradoxical return of the new of the eternal return thus necessitates an irreversible continuation through the expanding whole of the labyrinth. The events in the three stories of Lola, however, do not occur simultaneously, and so the transference of memory cannot occur at a point which would ensure continuation in the direction of the irreversible arrow. If Lola really had received the memories of her dying double, her life would have been changed from then onwards, as brunette Helen's is, it would not have reverted back to an arbitrary origin, as Lola's does. The eternal return of *Sliding Doors* falsifies time backwards, in order to open up possibilities for the future. The return to the origin (Lola's red telephone) enacted by *Lola Rennt*, by contrast, illustrates instead a causal model of time which is more Einsteinian than Bergsonian.

*Lola Rennt* expresses a belief in time concurrent with that of Einstein's special theory of relativity. It shows three relative, or local, experiences of time's passing. Recourse to a full blown labyrinth is not achieved, as these stories, or universes, do not coexist simultaneously. Nor are they connected to each other, as the two parallel worlds in *Sliding Doors* are. Rather, the linear way in which the stories are ordered ensures that the passing of time in the three stories is seen
from a privileged perspective which is created during our viewing of the first story. From this point of view, the second and third replayings of this story seem to be either slightly slower (in the first instance, due to Lola's limp) or slightly faster (with her leap over the dog) but this is only relative to the first example. We are witnessing an Einsteinian conception of relative times from a privileged, fixed position. *Lola Rennt* shows many possible presents, all moving relatively to each other, as seen from the privileged perspective of the spectator who has a fore-knowledge of the first story. From this arbitrarily fixed position we can say that Lola is running slightly ahead of, or behind, time, depending on the story.

The three way split-screen image of Manni waiting, Lola running, and the clock ticking can also be re-interpreted in this light. This shot illustrates how the spectator is given the illusion of objective, spectatorial mastery over the relative experiences of time lived by the characters. As Manni waits on his fate, time passes slowly for him. For Lola running to beat the clock, time passes almost too quickly. For the spectator, however, their relative movements appear to be seen objectively, due to the presence of the hands of the clock, as measure of time. This image positions us as the Einsteinian observer, who believes himself able to judge the relative passing of time for others against his own measure of time's passing. This, as the paradox of Peter and Paul showed, however, is an illusory objectivity which fails to take into account the simultaneous nature of our own experience of time's passing.

When seen as an expression of Einsteinian time, the snapshot narratives of the film's incidental characters become, fittingly, much as chaos theory would suggest when viewed from within the model of classical dynamics. This is not the parallel expansion outwards of the ripple effect that we see in the two stories of *Sliding Doors*. If this was the case, for each of the three encounters with the woman and baby, several possible futures would have had to have been shown in the snapshots of 'AND THEN'. Rather, with each different story we see the replaying of events which might happen in one particular system, thus illustrating perfectly the difficulty that chaos theory finds of ever accurately
predicting the future of a system whose initial conditions are unstable. This is why, in each case it seems as though the flapping of the butterfly's wings does indeed create a hurricane. Were we shown several other possible outcomes, however, these events would in no way seem so unlikely in their ramifications. Whilst *Lola Rennt* might initially seem to illustrate the same labyrinth we see in *Sliding Doors*, then, it is in its need to show the three occasions in order which ensures that it only actually shows a straight line of time, one possible path through the labyrinth, but in three different variations. These are the same events occurring three times, not in three parallel universes, but in the same one, each time starting from scratch.\(^{41}\)

If the events in the three retellings of *Lola Rennt* are not actually happening in an ever expanding multiverse, it might be pertinent to inquire as to how we are to account for the things that Lola learns from each previous replaying of events? The answer to this question can be seen if we draw on Deleuze's comment concerning the labyrinthine universe as it is figured in the later works of Buñuel. Here there exists:

... a plurality of simultaneous worlds. These are not subjective (imaginary) points of view in one and the same world, but one and the same event in different objective worlds, all implicated in the event, inexplicable universe.\(^{42}\)

If the three stories of *Lola Rennt* are not 'a plurality of simultaneous worlds', as we find in Buñuel, then they may very well be 'subjective (imaginary) points of view in one and the same world'. In this case, the pillow-talk flashback which occurs at the end of the first story, and indeed, the second incidence of this, at the end of the second (this time apparently from Manni's point of view) may not be flashbacks at all. They suggest rather that the three stories are actually the fantasies, the 'subjective' and 'imaginary' outcomes to a basic story which the two protagonists have invented together.
The red dissolve to the pillow talk sequence, which occurs as Manni lies dying at the end of the second story, tells a very different story to that of Lola's concern that she 'could be some other girl' with which the first story ended. In this instance, Manni's concern is for whether or not Lola would find another man if he died. 'You'd forget me', he concludes. Unhappy with the ending to the second story, in which he dies, Manni then reconstructs the story the third time, ensuring that he retrieves his own money himself. Lola's story, the second one, can now be seen to be her projection of the need to 'make a decision', which she does when she robs her father. This is the different action that saves her life at the end of the second story. Manni's story, for its part, is his re-assertion of his own ability to save himself in times of trouble. This is partly due, we learn at the start of the film, to his belief that one day there will arise a situation in which Lola cannot save him. It is for this reason that he must save himself. This story is also marked by Manni's insecurity that he could be replaced by another man in Lola's life, that she would forget him if he did die. This is reiterated in the final shot of the film, a freeze frame on his face as he asks Lola, 'What's in the bag?' As the flash whines over this image we are left to wonder what Manni's 'AND THEN' will be? Will Lola actually tell him that she has 100 000 Deutschmarks, or will she keep it a secret and leave him?

If the stories are simply this, the replaying of fantasies by the couple, then they now become the privileged, fixed viewpoint from which the times of the different versions become relative. It is as if Lola says; 'In this one I am late', or; 'In this one I am early'. The other man and the other woman which they both fear is, in this case, not a Deleuzian themselves-as-other, but simply any lover's worry, that of another person altogether. Far from being a different film to Altman's Short Cuts, then, Lola Rennt is a little like watching Short Cuts three times, back to back, and slightly changing the scenario each time. The labyrinth is still spatial, single, and made up of the lives of people within one universe. The fact that these stories do not exist within the lived time of duration is also made clear in the opening shot of the clock, whose pendulum stops moving, but whose hands whir round faster and faster. Outside of the real passing of time, the lived experience of duration, these are fantasy times, inventions which pass in a
moment out of time, seen from the fixed perspective of the fantasists Lola and Manni. *Lola Rennt* is not, as *Sliding Doors* is, an image of the process of the labyrinthine actualization of the virtual. Rather, it is the playing out of several possible, different actualizations until the correct one is found. In this respect it is a little like the moral fable, *Groundhog Day* (1993). It is, however, slightly more nuanced than this earlier film as it at least allows that the lives which cross the path of the protagonist will be different each time, and not simply a repetition of the exact same events.

It is because the narrative is searching for the happy ending in this way, as though as a solution to a puzzle, or the single correct way through a spatial labyrinth, that things which are learnt in one story are carried over into the other. Lola's knowledge of firearms, for instance, which she acquires between the first and second stories, is no longer a very complex matter. The second time a gun enters the fantasy Lola will already be aware of how to use it. It is also in its linear progression that the film reveals itself to be most like the computer games that it so resembles. Again in the opening image of the clock we are shown that this is not real time, it is playtime, or gametime. This is emphasized by the security guard in the opening scene, who states: 'The game lasts ninety minutes. That's a fact. Everything else is just theory.'

The characters themselves are introduced in true games console style, as small inserts, head and shoulder shots which spin through a series of mug shot poses accompanied by camera flashes. The fact that at this point you would normally select a player to represent you in the world generated by the computer game further reinforces the fact that the playing out of the scenarios is itself a fantasy. The opening phone call that Lola receives from Manni informing her of prior events, her mission, and the consequences should she fail, is also a standard feature of computer console games. The three stories, in linear succession, are now simply the events as they might occur if the film was a game that somebody was playing, learning how to use firearms, never pursuing the same dead-end
twice, and so on. Of course, once you are killed in a computer game, the only thing to do is start again at the beginning.

As Claudia Mesch says, in 'Racing Berlin: The Games of Run Lola Run', the Berlin depicted in Lola Rennt is: 'a cyberspace obstacle course or environment usually associated with interactive video and computer games.' Indeed, comparing Lola to Lara Croft (the heroine of the computer console game, Tomb Raider) as Mesch does, we can now begin to see the fixed perspective on time as something that lies not with either the viewer of the film, or with its fantasists Lola and Manni. Instead this position now appears to be occupied by both viewer and characters, as we identify with them just as we would with the character in whose body we act when playing on a games console. Maurice Yacowar's interpretation of the film (in 'Run Lola Run: Renn for your life'), as 'a contemporary individualists Triumph of the Will' due to what he sees as Lola's attempt to write her own will upon history, to defeat chance and destroy fate, can also be explained as a consequence of its games console style.

Lola Rennt is a film which ultimately maintains its unity through the movement of Lola's body as it runs through the frame. In this respect it is a contemporary equivalent of Keaton's, Sherlock Jr. Not only does her twenty minute journey through Berlin impossibly unify discontinuous, or incommensurable parts of the city (much as Keaton's movements do the fantastical spaces through which he passes) the film's potentially incommensurable media are similarly unified by the figure of Lola running. For this reason we remain focused on the narrative as we pass through a changing landscape made up of both animation and live action footage that has been shot in colour, black and white, and on comparatively grainy video. It is her unified movement, then, that finally ensures the continuous, linear unfolding of the film's virtual reality, games console narrative. In this respect, Lola Rennt is the movement-image par excellence, the indirect expression of time measured across space that is created through the movement of the protagonist's singular, actualized form.
The recourse to computer game analogy to 'explain' a triple narrative is echoed in a third recent film with a very similar narrative structure. This is the French film, *Epouse-moi* (2000). The most lighthearted of the three films, *Epouse-moi* is a romantic comedy in which a woman called Oriane (Michèle Laroque) approaches a fortune teller in order to find out what her future has in store. He gives her three possible alternatives, three views which he finds in his crystal ball. Again the narrative reaches its resolution in the third of the magical storylines. In this case, the possibility of alternatives to reality are not seen as games you can play, but as magical daydreams, and the inevitability of actualized linearity is maintained in the film's third narrative, its happy ending. The same could also be said for Tom DiCillo's film, *Living in Oblivion* (1995) in which the three separate stories are excused as dreams within dreams, and the linear narrative drive maintained by the filmmaker, Nick's (Steve Buscemi) need to get the shot on film. Indeed, perhaps it is this need to get the shot, to get the film made, which is the most obvious reason why all these films, even the apparently Bergsonian/Deleuzian, *Sliding Doors*, ultimately have such a recourse to linearity. The simplest of all reasons why there are not more films like Resnais' classic time-image, *L'année dernière à Marienbad* (1961) is that clear, linear narratives sell, whilst convoluted, labyrinthine time-images do not. This is obvious from the development of the linear narrative form as dominant over all others within the short history of cinema, witness the classical Hollywood style of cinema based upon continuity editing, the action-image.

Despite the recent advances in scientific thinking towards the Bergsonian conception of time, the movement-image's maintenance of the Einsteinian view of time in the majority of these films would seem to suggest that, whilst the labyrinth now exists and is depicted in more films than ever before, our growing intuition of the labyrinth has provided an equally strong urge to reterritorialize this potential within a manageable, linear time frame. This is an urge to reterritorialize that is as evident in Einstein's science as it is in the narrative's of contemporary films. These films with female leads, in fact, show the ability to use the suggestion of the labyrinth in order to marginalize it as binary other,
before ultimately returning to the straight line of the narrative. In this way they uphold the linear narrative as norm, and represent labyrinthine deviations from it as temporary departures from this norm. The labyrinth becomes a sort of carnival inversion of the straight line of time.

As Dentith has it, when describing Bakhtin's interpretation of the carnival: 'it is best seen as a safety-valve, which in some overall functional way reinforces the bonds of authority by allowing for their temporary suspension.' Acting as a temporary release, or 'safety-valve' after which we return to the linearity of the everyday, these films reduce the movement of the actualization of the virtual back to a binary choice between the actual and the virtual, the line and the labyrinth. Moreover, by making the actual, reality, and the virtual, fantasy, they ensure the continuation of the actual at the expense of the possibilities which the virtual could offer, it is was seen to be something which could effect reality. Although it initially seemed that there was a move afoot to conceive time in a Bergsonian fashion, *Sliding Doors* begins to seem increasingly like an isolated exception to a more conservative rule.

In fact all these movement-images - whether Bergsonian, like *Sliding Doors*, or Einsteinian, like *Lola Rennt* - which self-consciously explore different conceptions of time are themselves merely aberrations from the single, linear temporal norm of "reality" itself. These films provide a glimpse of the possibilities that could exist if we were to consider time differently, but which are really only, we are told, games, fantasies, magical fortunes, or dreams. Again it is the image of the clock at the beginning of *Lola Rennt* to which we return, the pendulum which says that real time has stopped, and that although the hands continue to move, this is only really play time, carnival time, fantasy, or dream time. It is only a movie.

In fact, these temporary glimpses of the carnival are the legally sanctioned expression of a deviation from the norm which has a long history in cinema.
There would appear to be a minor tradition of films which champion the female lead's seeming ability to utilize the labyrinth in order to make the past a different story. This includes, Maya Deren's *Meshes of the Afternoon* (1943-59), Céline et Julie vont en bateau, Sally Potter's *Orlando* (1992) and now also *Sliding Doors*, *Lola Rennt* and *Epouse-moi*. We could add to this list makeover movies which explore femininity as a role that is performed, such as *Sabrina* (1954) and *Pretty Woman*, and also films in which makeovers play a lesser role, perhaps as part of a broader exposition of clothing and identity. Examples of this type of film include, *Grease* (1978), *Dirty Dancing* (1987) and *Clueless* (1995). However, with the possible exceptions of Rivette's film, which we have already discussed at length, and also both *Meshes of the Afternoon*, and *Orlando* - which are somewhat more complicated, and require a much deeper analysis - in many of these films the falsifying powers of the labyrinth which we are initially shown, are ultimately reterritorialized. In a variety of ways, as we have already seen with the computer game analogy of *Lola Rennt*, and the magical fantasy of *Epouse-moi*, all these films in fact fall within the much broader tradition of films in which attempts by women to change their past are exposed as fraudulent, and are eventually punished by their reterritorialization within the straight line of time.

The classic example of this type of film is Hitchcock's *Marnie*. In Hitchcock's misogynistic parable, Marnie, (Tippi Hedren) is a woman who performs her identity differently in order to falsify her past. To gain employment in respectable firms, without proper references, she creates a series of fictional pasts. Once employed on the strength of this, she proceeds to clean out the safe of her employers. As a professional thief she carries a set of fake identity cards, and regularly changes her appearance and the roles she performs by varying her costume, and dying her hair. The film concludes that this woman who breaks the law must be brought back to the realization of her essential self, and the reality of her past, by the masculine law imposed by her husband, Mark Rutland (Sean Connery). This is an action which both re-imposes linear time, and also secures an origin from which history can be seen to stem. The origin of her difficulty (which is shown to be psychological) is figured as the inevitable primal scene, in
which it is revealed that she is responsible for taking a man's life. Through her working through of the primal scene, typically, the past is realigned from the origin onwards, and her attempts to falsify time are seen to be the workings of a psychologically damaged child whose loss of memory is due to the trauma caused by a murderous act. At the end of the film, realizing the fraudulent life that she has been living, she says: 'I want it all cleared up'. Thus, once 'cured' of her mental condition she desires that the past be realigned, from its proper origin onwards. This will allow her to accept her place within a heterosexual couple, giving the appropriate respect to the linearity of the patriarchal law, that which she is guilty of having broken with her initial flight into the labyrinth. Here a loss of memory, or indeed, a traumatic denial of memory, is seen as the origin of her attempt to perform her identity. In this way the labyrinth's power to falsify the past is reterritorialized as the loss of an essential self, which becomes disguised, as opposed to the performing of an identity which has no essential origin.

II

Please Step Back in Line, Ma'am.

The reterritorialization of the labyrinth into the line is the inevitable nemesis inscribed within any film which attempts to represent the positive potential for femininity of the powers of the false. In one form or another it must be othered, if the linear, masculine time of the law is to retain its control. Notably, even Sliding Doors, which, until this point, we have saved from criticism in this respect, is also marked by a reterritorializing force. In the abstract, if we concentrate our analysis solely on the film's representation of narrative time, brunette Helen's fate at the end of the film seems extremely positive. If we analyse Howitt's film in its national context, however, then this no longer appears to be the case. Moya Luckett, for instance, has shown that Sliding Doors is a New-Labour PR image of a post-devolutionary Britain which:
... attempts to find the truth of the nation rest on supporting characters who all have strong regional identities (James is Scottish; Helen's best friend Anna is Irish; and her two-timing fiancé, Jerry, is played by Irishman, John Lynch). This leaves a vacuum at the centre of the nation: in a London where there are no native Londoners. This suggests that national identity is always elsewhere ...

The host of 'British' characters, coupled with the nationality of Helen, played by the American, Paltrow, thus expresses the 'elsewhere' of English national identity as it is figured in the film. This is the reterritorialization which the film enacts upon its protagonists. It exists as an image of a Blairite belief in both post-devolutionary, and Transatlantic harmony, within Britain, in the wake of the swing from an industrial manufacturing, to a services economy. In this way is the central importance of London, in a nation whose regional industries and populations have suffered directly as a consequence of the recent centralizing of wealth in the capital, disavowed. The nation now appears in miniature, its regional differences seemingly eradicated by an image of economic unity and parity within the services industry. Moreover, *Sliding Doors* stresses the central position of London as the major centre for the nation's services industry through its representation of the happy life of blonde Helen as a self-employed PR consultant.

Blonde Helen's self-creation, in fact, is shown to be at once at its most potentially Deleuzian, and, simultaneously, its most reterritorialized, when seen within this Blairite image of London. Having received a small business bank loan, blonde Helen is shown decorating her new premises. In this scene we are shown a very clear expression of the influence of the individual on the city spaces they inhabit. Painting the walls of the offices a light blue, blonde Helen is dressed in sweaters that match the emerging décor, ensuring that she seems to blend in with, or become along with the spaces she interacts with. She creates a Helen-office assemblage, as she makes herself over into a new role, a new identity within the city. She is performing the role of the self-employed Blairite
ideal, and in so doing, helping to maintain the city of London of which she is a part. She begins to oscillate with the city, merging, or, becoming-indiscernible from it, as it from does from her. The performance of identity within the city is thus coupled to the performance that is the city itself, its own identity within time.

This is an approach to identity in the city which as informed the work of both Jonathan Raban, in his book, *Soft City*, and Elizabeth Grosz, in *Space, Time and Perversion*. Raban theorized the city as a space in which it was possible to become-other, and by so doing, create the city anew. He says:

... at moments like this, the city goes soft; it awaits the imprint of an identity. For better or worse, it invites you to remake it, to consolidate it into a shape you can live in. You too, decide who you are and the city will again assume a fixed form around you. ... Cities ... are plastic by nature. We mould them in our own images: they in their turn, shape us by the resistance they offer when we try to impose our own personal form on them. In this sense it seems that living in cities is an art, and we need the vocabulary of art, of style, to describe the peculiar relationship between man and the material that exists in the continual creative play of urban living.47

There is a clear double movement evident here, between city and individual, both of which are formed in this process of mutual becoming. The amount of primacy which Raban grants to the individual is striking, as he reasons in his particularly Foucauldian way, that cities are the points of 'resistance' to our self-creations. Having much in common with Foucault and Deleuze's ideas of life lived as a work of art, identity as performance, and style as all important, Raban's work, as Paul Patton has it, ensures that, 'the inhabitant of the (post)modern city is no longer a subject apart from his or her performances'. Consequently, 'the border between self and city has become fluid'48. At the point of time's splitting, the point at which you conceive of yourself as a stranger, the city similarly splits, its virtual potential becoming visible as it awaits
actualization along with the individual, depending on the path through the temporal labyrinth which their life will now take. Along with the myriad labyrinthine selves personified by the Helens, there also exists an expanding multiverse of cities within which are played out the infinite possibilities of Deutsch's quantum conclusions concerning chaos theory.

Elizabeth Grosz has a similarly Deleuzian conclusion concerning the city. In her piece, 'Bodies-Cities' she formulates the body of the individual in a similarly reciprocal relationship with the city. She states:

... there is a two-way linkage that could be defined as an interface. What I am suggesting is a model of the relations between bodies and cities that sees them, not as megalithic total entities, but as assemblages or collections of parts, capable of crossing the thresholds between substances to form linkages, machines, provisional and often temporary sub- or micro-groupings. This model is practical, based on the productivity of bodies and cities in defining and establishing each other. It is not a holistic view, one that would stress the unity and integration of city and body, their "ecological balance". Rather, their interrelations involve a fundamentally disunified series of systems, a series of disparate flows, energies, events or entities, bringing together or drawing apart their more or less temporary alignments.

For Grosz, the body and the city are involved in a process of mutual becoming in which they are constantly 'defining and establishing each other'. They create a mutually-forming assemblage, an interface between subject and city, as seen in Helen and the office environment she creates for herself.

Indeed, in the flashback in which brunette Helen gains intuition of her multiple existence it is, noticeably, city spaces that she sees: the bridge, the diner, and the subway. These city spaces are the memories that define blonde Helen's character, they are the places in which her flow through the city intersected with
that of James. That these spaces are used by the film to represent blonde Helen at this point, illustrates the way in which she has formed as an assemblage with these city spaces as she passed through them. Moreover, the way in which the powers of the false are utilized by brunette Helen at the conclusion of the film, in order to falsify her past, and ensure that her own future will be different, also ensures that the same action is performed upon, and by, the city itself. In *Sliding Doors* the city is shown to be a temporal entity that, due to its assembling along with its inhabitants, contains the same labyrinthine possibilities as that of its peoples. The life of the inhabitants of the city is represented as a temporal event, in which there exists a double becoming, both the becoming-city of the Helens, and the simultaneous becoming-Helen of the cities.

Yet despite the particularly Deleuzian view of identity, performativity, and mutually becoming assemblages which are evident in Howitt's film, it remains a carefully constructed, Blairite image of a hip and happening 90s London in which services are the rightful domain of the successful middle classes. Performative self-creation is advocated, then, only as long as it is in the service of private enterprise. Moreover, this is sanctioned only as a performance which also enables London to grow. The reward for this specific type of performativity is seen in the gentrified lifestyles which are then enabled by the city, those which we see being led by the film's protagonists. The film thus creates an unreal image of London life, set amidst a gloriously gentrified city, by the side of a river Thames which has become the site of weekend leisure activities - witness James' rowing and good hearted, tipsy communal singing. It is a nightmare of blandness which lacks the satirical edge, or telling scenic contrasts employed in previous images which explored London's changing economic situation, such as *The Long Good Friday* (1979). Noticeably, the inverse, dark side of the London services based economy is played out in the narrative of the unhappy, brunette Helen, who, without the necessary financial support of those in private enterprise, is doomed to a life of waitressing and sandwich delivery.
This reterritorialization of female performativity in the service of the services industry also stretches to the global level. The two narratives are in fact representative of the two lifestyles prevalent in London, the global city. As Saskia Sassen has it, in *The Global City*, there is a new economic disparity evident amongst the population of London:

> Major growth industries show a greater incidence of jobs at the high- and low-paying ends of the scale than do the older industries now in decline. Almost half the jobs in the producer services are lower-income jobs, and half are in the two highest earnings classes. 51

This is exactly the polarity between the high and the low paid sectors of the producer services economy which is explored in the double narrative structure of *Sliding Doors*. On the one hand, blonde Helen maintains her position within the higher end of the income bracket. With a start-up loan from Lloyds bank, as part of the Business Expansion Scheme, she sets up her own PR consultancy firm, and thus establishes herself as a self-employed member of the global economy. She provides a lucrative producer service. Brunette Helen, by contrast, is reduced to a position of subservience to the more highly paid producer services industry. Unable to find a job which she is qualified to do her only option is to take a lower level wage, as a waitress. In order to make ends meet moreover, she finds that she needs two jobs, as the cost of living in the global city is so high. To this end she takes the position of sandwich deliverer.

The double narrative, then, makes it quite clear that the life lived by blonde Helen is the one which will bring happiness in the global city. Blonde Helen is her own boss, has a makeover, attends the opening of a new restaurant, dates a charming 90s man, and spends her weekends in gentrified parts of London. In general she enjoys the leisure that her new life in the global city offers her. She and London create a mutually beneficial assemblage. Brunette Helen, for her part, is not so lucky. We do not see her creating such assemblages with the city. She has to take two jobs in order to make ends meet, supports an idle two-timing boyfriend, and has to suffer the indignity of being chatted up by restaurant
punters who are not even attractive. This particular northerner is delivered by Howitt, who sends up his previous smooth, womanizing alter ego, Joey, from the TV series, *Bread*. She even has to face the ultimate humiliation of being told off by her boyfriend's mistress, who fabricates a food poisoning scare. The gentrified bridge, diner and tube station of blonde Helen's memory, then, are the map of directions which the film provides for anyone wishing to live in London, global city. This is the right route to take, the consequences if you don't are not worth thinking about!

*Lola Rennt* also evidences a tendency towards the creation of an image of Berlin as an emergent global city. As Claudia Mesch states:

*Run Lola Run* recasts Berlin as a network of fast connections, lines of uninterrupted movement, and productive output. It is therefore perhaps not surprising that Twyker's idealised and embodied representation of Berlin as Lola has been politically appropriated as a convenient icon by the city's status quo: an icon of the successful reconstruction and rewiring of a united Berlin into a fast global broadband digital telecommunications network. 52

The city which has been, as Mesch also points out, described as 'the single biggest construction site in Europe'53 is thus re-envisioned by Tykwer's film, as a rewired city, ready for trade with the global 'digital telecommunications network'. As Manni's smuggling across the border into Poland illustrates, Berlin is a city that stands as a frontier post between the east and west. In order to facilitate trade between the old and the new world, the rewired Berlin has the ability to facilitate communication between old and new technologies. Much as Lola unifies the different media through which she runs, both old and new (black and white and colour) and high and low quality (film and video) are similarly brought together by the film's imagining of an already unified, post-wall city.
There is much more that could be said of both London and Berlin's representations as global cities. Suffice it to say that, as expressions of contemporary urban life they show how our daily movements through incongruous city spaces are provided with continuity by our bodily forms. How else, as we are ferried from place to place by tube, bus, car, and plane, can our continuous, daily lives be made sense of than as a measure of time across space? They are also films which show us how to best survive in this era of multi-tasking, in which we daily deal with various different types of media, and are often forced to juggle several different modes of employment. In spite of all our becomings, we are shown, we must retain, a sense of linear progression, a sense of singularity and continuity to our identity. It is through our reterritorializations within the Einsteinian model of time, and such political narratives as those of the nation and the global city, that this is achieved.

The one exception which proves the somewhat harsh rule of these films is Pedro Almodóvar's *Todo Sobre Mi Madre* (1999) in which the roles performed by the heroine, Manuela (Cecelia Roth) constantly refuse reterritorialization. At times nurse, cook, prostitute, actress, sister, personal assistant, and mother, her chameleon-like metamorphoses illustrate her ability to become-other interminably. It is only the film's concentration of the narrative on her personal life, however, which saves her from reterritorialization within a meta-narrative of the national, or the global city. Rather, her performativity is used by Almodóvar to debunk the unsavory, manipulative, cuckoo representation of performativity given by the earlier film he references, Joseph Mankiewicz's *All About Eve* (1950). In Almodóvar's film, female performativity is not reduced to the disguising of an essential self (in the style of *Marnie* and *All About Eve*) but is rather shown to be a liberatory, positive venture. In fact, the film also explores the transgressions of performativity enacted by transexuality, and its blurring of the essentialist, biologically determined roles usually ascribed by compulsory heterosexuality. Its narrative, moreover, with its harrowing deaths being matched by subsequent (re)births (witness Esteban the third) also seems illustrative of the eternal return. That said, this is a very unusual film in this respect. As *Sliding Doors* and *Lola Rennt* show, by contrast, labyrinthine performativa identity is
usually only shown in relation to some form of guiding (reterritorializing) political subtext.

It Was All a Dream.

The heterosexual coupling with which Sliding Doors ends - that which is seen even more obviously in Epouse-moi whose very title suggests its third narrative's culmination in marriage - is the clearest way in which a labyrinthine film will finally return to a straight line. The major reterritorializing force is always the final reimposition of the patriarchal law. In particular, this is seen in the age-old re-affirmation of a heterosexual union, and the object ownership of the female. In recent films this reterritorialization of female performativity has often occurred in narratives which initially seem to champion the consumption of clothing in the service of feminine performativity. The controlling hand on the purse strings which allow this performativity, however, is nearly always shown to be male. Although not as obvious as Hitchcock's now laughably kitsch Marnie, a recent example of this is found in, Romy and Michele's High School Reunion.

Romy White and Michele Lineberger (Mira Sorvino and Lisa Kudrow) are two hapless but happy inhabitants of Los Angeles's Venice Beach community. Returning to their old high school for their ten year reunion, they, in the style of Marnie, decide to invent a falsifying past to replace their not so impressive real lives. Dressing in matching little black dresses, and giving the initial appearance of being the epitome of sophisticated L.A. career-woman chic, they attempt to recreate themselves as the inventors of Post-It notes. Their inability to pull off such a hoax, however, enables the film to highlight its moral, that performative identity does not work, and the true route to happiness is through that old, essentialist cliché of, "just being yourself".
As they drive to the reunion, Romy and Michele quarrel over who was the inventor of Post-It notes, and who the designer of their yellow colour. Michele then falls asleep, and dreams a version of the reunion, in which they manage to pull off the hoax. Michele intellectually dismisses their old school rivals, the cheerleaders of 'The A Group', Romy gets the man of her dreams, as indeed does Michele, and they are both lauded by everyone there in an inverse 'King and Queen of the Prom' ceremony. They jointly win the vote for: 'The person most changed for the better since High School'. The rift in their friendship which the argument over who invented and who designed Post-Its caused, however, widens in the dream, and in a flash forward to '70 years later' we see the two women apart and unhappy, with their differences left unresolved. On waking, Michele realizes that falsifying their past is not worth the cost of friendship, and it is she who explains to the upset Romy (whose cover has been blown, embarrassingly, in front of 'The A Group') that they will be better off "just being themselves". When they begin to behave as themselves, they do, of course, have a marvelous time, gain one over 'The A Group', and enjoy a terrifically happy ending.

The message is clear, performing your identity and falsifying the past may be alright as a dream, but it won't work in reality. Moreover, it is even flawed as a dream, and will most certainly lead to the dissolution of friendships as you will no longer be the people who were friends in the first place. That it is shown to be better to be yourself is the affirmation which the film provides of the continuous, actual, selfsame I of the straight line of time. Becoming-other, then, is not an option that will bring happiness, it is just a hapless daydream, a safety valve release mechanism, a film. The happy ending which Romy and Michele find once they return to themselves is the return to normality after the dream is over, and its lessons learned. It is the reterritorialization of performativity, and becoming, back within the coherence and continuity of being. Furthermore, through Michele's alternative vision of the future of her dream, the two possible endings to the drama are evoked in order to reinforce the legitimacy of the singular line of time when the narrative finally returns to its singular trajectory, and provides them with the obligatory happy ending.
That the labyrinth is thus equated with a dream is perhaps not all that surprising. Dreaming is, after all, conditioned upon the temporary sensory-motor suspension of the sleeper. The dream state, that which threatens to enable the emergence of the time-image, then, is quickly reterritorialized by the movement-image into its binary other. Any possible ungrounding of the plane of transcendence by its plane of consistency is thus effectively marginalized. This was already true of the dream sequence of *Sherlock Jr.* cited by Rodowick as a prime example of the movement-image's unification of spaces through subject. This sequence Deleuze also described as evidence of the actualization of the virtual, in a specific type of image (the 'dream-image') that worked similarly to the recollection-image. Whilst, as we saw in chapter two, the recollection-image is actualized in the present, in a circuit with the perception-image; the dream-image: 'becomes actual in a different image, which itself plays the role of virtual image being actualized in the third, and so on to infinity; the dream is not a metaphor but a series of anomorphoses which sketch out a very large circuit.'54 He further notes:

In the dream in *Sherlock Junior*, the image of the unbalanced chair in the garden gives way to the somersault in the street, then to the precipice at the edge of which the hero leans, but in the jaws of a lion, then to the desert and the cactus on which he sits down, then to the little hill which gives birth to an island battered by the waves, where he dives into an already snowy expanse, from which he emerges to find himself back in the garden.55

In the dream sequence in *Romy and Michele's*, similarly, Michele and Sandy Frink's journey passes effortlessly through a series of impossible spaces, most noticeably from incredibly large limousine interior, through the sunroof, straight to their entrance through the doors to the school hall. In both instances the movement-image links together incommensurable spaces through the unifying figure of the continuous, sensory-motor character, ensuring that the image remains at the level of the actual, and that any danger of a virtual slippage between the sheets of time are negated.
Perhaps most surprisingly of all, David Lynch's recent offering, *Mulholland Drive* (2002) whilst appearing to play with issues surrounding female performativity and the labyrinthine model of time, and whilst apparently avoiding the perils of reterritorialization, can also be seen to illustrate the clichéd format that, "it was all just a dream". Initially confusing, the film is actually deceptively simple, and predictably linear. If we follow the interpretation given by critic Vicky Allen, in 'Driven Round the Twist', beginning with the shot of a head hitting a pillow, signifying sleep, the first two thirds of the film is one long dream sequence. After this Diane awakes, and experiences a series of flashbacks as she remembers her breakup with her lesbian lover, Camilla, and her resulting decision to have her killed. Her dreams then begin to invade her waking life, specifically in the guise of two tiny versions of an old couple, who gain entrance under her apartment door, wave their arms in the air, scream maniacally and run toward her. At this point she goes insane, and commits suicide. For Diane, performing her identity differently, in this case being happy with her lesbian lover, is all a dream. In reality, Camilla chooses a heterosexual romance, noticeably with a film director, and Diane's only solution is to kill both her ex-lover and herself.

The best we can hope for is that Lynch is consciously playing with this clichéd dream format, and knowingly exposing the movement-image's reterritorialization of female performativity. If not, then we have yet another example to add to an ever growing list which also includes: *Vertigo* (1958), *Heathers* (1988), *Thelma and Louise* (1991), *Single White Female* (1992), *The Net* (1995), *Stella Does Tricks* (1996), *Kiss or Kill* (1997), *Road Kill* (2000), *The Man Who Cried* (2001), *Heartbreakers* (200) and *Me Myself, I* (2002). All of these are films in which female performativity is seen to create a temporary flight from, or disguise of, the essential self (the core self to which the protagonist must eventually return): or which state that suicide is an inevitable consequence for anyone attempting to "lose themselves" in this way.
We can easily see that the same reterritorialization has been enacted upon the
two Helens of Sliding Doors, who, at the end, are reduced back to one Helen,
whose alternative life seems but a dream. In fact, the story of the two Helens is
equated more to a childish fairy tale than to a dream, through the appearance, as
the reason for her inability to catch the train, of a little girl playing with a doll.
As the girl blocks Helen's path a tinkling sound reminiscent of a fairy
godmother's magic wand is heard on the soundtrack. The fantastical nature of
events is further emphasized by the film's replaying of Helen's encounter with
the girl, backwards. As we see her impossible run back up the tube station stairs
in reverse, there can be little doubt that we are seeing a magical happening.
Rather than a serious exploration of the labyrinth, then, what follows is prefaced
by these signifiers of fantasy to warn us that we are about to enter a realm of
magic. Sliding Doors is a Cinderella story in which Helen gets her prince only
once she returns to where she started, as poor old brunette Cinders/Helen. Her
other existence, as alter-ego, blonde Helen, is thus shown to be a temporary role.
Her makeover establishes that she is the one who "shall go to the ball" and her
death ensures that at midnight she turns back into a pumpkin, brunette Helen.
With the final dropped earring, the film's magic slipper, its happy ending is
ensured through her meeting with her handsome prince, James.

These films' reterritorialization of female performativity through the
dream/fantasy motif also links their narratives to a larger theme, that of male
ownership. When we first see Romy and Michele they are watching a
remarkably edited version of Pretty Woman on the television, which they are
laughing at and generally deriding. This scene is of great importance in the film,
however, as it provides the first hint of their ultimate reterritorialization with
which the film ends. The two friends discuss the scenes in which Julia Roberts' 
character, Vivian, is first refused service in L.A.'s finest clothes boutiques on
Rodeo Drive. The film is then cut to enable us to immediately see the radical
change in her fortunes once Edward (Richard Gere) accompanies her on her next
shopping expedition with Gold Card in hand. In spite of herself, Michele is
slightly overcome with emotion at this point, and blubs: 'I just get really happy
when they finally let her shop'. Both the film and the film within the film are
reterritorialized in a way that is alluded to in this brief opening, and also recapitulated at the end. As part of her analysis of the use of fashion in cinema, Stella Bruzzi points out that the Cinderella tale found in films like Sabrina and Pretty Woman, is one in which the falsifying of a woman's past through the changing of her appearance and behaviour (i.e. through performativity) is ultimately reterritorialized through the commodification of the woman that this also enacts. In Pretty Woman, although Vivian is able, through the changing of her appearance, to falsify her past as a hooker, and become a refined lady, she is effectively bought by Edward in the process. Bruzzi states:

... what really makes Vivian 'pretty' (and this is the film's most potentially interesting comment on femininity) is her capacity to spend copious amounts of money on clothes. It is significant though that the money she spends is Edward's. The traditional economic exchange between men and women when clothes are the currency is characterised by the man spending on behalf of the woman in order to buy her. ... The supposed attraction of this commodification of women through clothes is exemplified by the Rodeo Drive spending spree sequence ...

Romy and Michele's own film ends with a similar reterritorialization, as they are funded in their ownership of the boutique, 'Romy and Michele's', by Michele's new millionaire boyfriend, ex-High School dweeb, Sandy Frink. The heterosexual coupling with which Pretty Woman, and to a lesser degree, Romy and Michele's ends, emphasizes the ownership of the woman which is used in order to reterritorialize her brief liberation through labyrinthine performativity, bringing her safely back within the patriarchal law of the straight line of time. The ownership of the boutique is only made possible through the wealth of the man, ensuring that the site of the potential for female performativity is a site sanctioned by the law. The law which, as Bakhtin knew so well, is able to control the people much more effectively, if it gives them a little play time, a little time to dream.
The struggle which all these films enact, then, is over the ultimate end to which female performativity should lead. As Charlotte Brunsdon has shown in *Screen Tastes: Soap Operas to Satellite Dishes*, whether filmic representations of female performativity which have earned the ambiguous label 'post-feminist' are actually positive or negative is a difficult question to answer. In the two 1980s 'girls films'\(^58\) that she analyses, *Working Girl* (1987) and *Pretty Woman*, Brunsdon finds evidence not of a 'post-feminist' backlash, or return to pre-feminist ideals, but rather, representations of a post-feminist woman who is seen to be:

... much more like the postmodern feminist, for she is neither trapped in femininity (pre-feminist), nor rejecting of it (feminist). She can use it. However, although this may mean apparently inhabiting a very similar terrain to the pre-feminist woman, who manipulates her appearance to get her man, the post-feminist woman also has ideas about her life and being in control which clearly come from feminism. She may manipulate her appearance, but she doesn't do it just to get a man on the old terms. She wants it all. ... Exactly to the extent to which this persona is constituted through a desire to make it individually, it is a persona that can be accommodated within familiar ... western narratives of individual success.\(^59\)

However, whilst these films advocate a knowing performance of femininity, only so long as it is in order to obtain both man *and* 'individual success', this is with the proviso that the heroine is shown to have an essential core to their being that deserves the rewards garnered by its performances. Performance is fine as long as it is in the service of the success of the essential, core female. Characters whose performances are shown to hide nothing substantial, nothing essential, Brunsdon shows, do not fare so well. Thus she illustrates how these films utilize certain aspects of their feminist heritage, but are 'post'-feminist in their ability to disavow this very heritage.
As befits the movement-image, the most obvious reterritorialization of female performativity in these films, then, is in the essentialism of their characters. The organic form remains a strong unifying characteristic. In the 90s films we have examined, a similar movement is evident in the privileging of the singular entity to which the labyrinthine narratives ultimately return. The Helen with which *Sliding Doors'* narrative concludes, after all, is the same Helen as that of the film's beginning. The film remains, for this reason, one, singular, continuous narrative (that of brunette Helen) with an additional, temporary variation in the plot line of blonde Helen. As the film comes full circle in its ending, an essential, continuous, sensory-motor Helen is retained. Although temporarily deviating from herself she is finally reconciled in her return to her point of departure, her return to her essential self. Similarly, in *Lola Rennt*, despite its seeming labyrinthine narrative, the film's Einsteinian times are there to enable Lola's essentialist self to remain true to itself, whilst she tries out (or tries on) different identity roles in a series of fantasy scenarios.

The "working girls" of the 80s films analysed by Brunsdon are replayed in the 90s as expressions of the urban, national, and global ends to which female performativity can legitimately be applied. Certainly, with the exception of Almodóvar's film, in these 90s films post-feminist performativity is seen to be directed towards the positive outcome of obtaining both man and individual success. These aims are themselves, however, reterritorialized within their respective urban, national and global contexts. Performing femininity in order to attain both individual success and a man do seem to be the aim, but to what end are these goals then represented? In *Sliding Doors*, for instance, as was the case with Edward's Gold Card in *Pretty Woman*, the role of the man in underwriting individual success is again emphasized. Helen, after all, only decides to become a self-employed PR consultant due to the prompting of James. In her case, a little like in *Romy and Michele's*, the right man for the post-feminist woman is thought to be the one who can help her to get the individual success she wants. This is what marks out the narrative with James as so different from that with Jerry. Perhaps *Lola Rennt* offers a contrast, the ambiguous final 'AND THEN' created by Lola's bag of money suggesting that she may not need Manni after all,
now that she has the financial means to decide her own future. Even here, however, the goal could still be said to remain, man and individual success, reducing the ending to a question of whether or not Manni is the right man for her now that she has gained individual success.

No matter how seductive the image of the liberated woman may initially appear, there always seems to be some way in which the labyrinthine powers which she evokes in the performance of her identity are reterritorialized within the straight line of time. The past is never falsified for long before a return to an essential self is ensured. Moreover, the retrenchment of the performance of femininity that the process of narrativization highlights also works on a variety of other levels. As we have seen it is strongly effected through the Einsteinian model of time, but even when it is not (e.g. Sliding Doors) the national political, and global concerns of the narrative still restrain female performativity to the obtaining of certain legally sanctioned ends. In a similar fashion, the heterosexual narrative of ownership ensures that the use of clothing to perform a range of different feminine roles is finally controlled by the man who own the clothes boutique. It is only a male sanction which enables female performance to deviate from the norm, and so it is never likely to be more than a temporary, controlled deviation. The movement-image equates female labyrinthine becoming with a dream state, a game fantasy, or film, in order to marginalize it in relation to masculine reality. This binary process, this reterritorialization of a both/and into an either/or, is also something which works upon masculinity in a similar way. It is therefore necessary to turn to an analysis of the recent portrayal of men, in relation to time, in order to add another dimension to this study.

2 Einstein and Bergson met on April 6th, 1922, at a meeting of the Philosophical Society of Paris entitled, ‘Reception for Einstein: The Theory of Relativity’. A transcript of Bergson’s question, and Einstein’s response can be found in, Bergson, Henri, Duration and Simultaneity (Manchester: Clinamen Press, 1999), Appendix V, pp. 155-9.


5 op. cit.

6 Bergson, Duration and Simultaneity, op. cit., p. vi. The quote is actually taken from Robin Durie’s introduction to this recent republication of Bergson’s work.

7 ibid., p. xiii.

8 ibid., p. vii.

9 See Bergson, Duration and Simultaneity, op. cit., for a full explanation of this seeming paradox, and for Bergson’s argument concerning the evidence given by the Lorentz equations.


11 Bergson, Duration and Simultaneity, op. cit., p. 56.

12 ibid., pp. 57-8.

13 Mullarkey, op. cit., p. 115.

14 ‘One of the most surprising results of Einstein's special theory of relativity, published in 1905, was the introduction of a local time associated with each observer. However, this local time remained a reversible time.’ Prigogine, Ilya & Stengers, Isabelle, Order out of Chaos: Man's New Dialogue with Nature (London: Heinemann, 1984), p. 17.


16 ibid., p. 212.


19 op. cit.

20 ibid., p. 293.

21 ibid., p. 93.


23 ibid., p. 75.

ibid., p. 215.

ibid., p. 221.

Deutsch, David, *The Fabric of Reality* (London: Allen Lane: The Penguin Press, 1997). In actual fact, this is an extremely problematic text, and the use of an isolated example from it should not be seen as positioning this work alongside, or within the same frame of reference used by Deutsch. Certainly his conclusions are noticeably different to those approached in this text, and his presence is really to show the confluence within philosophy and science of the general trend towards thinking in terms of labyrinthine possible worlds.


Responses range from Derrida's rather sueve, 'le pouver Sokal', which inspired John Sturrock's critical review of that name (see, Sturrock, John, 'Le pouver Sokal', *London Review of Books*, Vol. 20, no. 14 (1998)), to articles which, whilst critical of Sokal and Bricmont's conflation of certain philosophical approaches, are in favour of the return to Enlightenment rationalism that their approach seems to propose. For instance in, Miller, David, *Sokal and Bricmont: Back to the Frying Pan* (http://www.warwick.ac.uk/philosophy/miller/sokal.html).


Bergson, *Duration and Simultaneity*, op. cit., p. 159.

op. cit., p. xx.

ibid., p. xdi.

ibid., p. 145.

ibid., p. 149.


ibid., p. 133.

ibid., p. 127.


*Lola Rennt* does not actually go as far towards reconceiving time as a labyrinth as Hal Hartley's *Flirt* (1995) already did, with its replaying of the same story three times, in three different locations, each time with a different conclusion. Even in this film, however, although the straight line of time is seen at work (as the stories are set in New York, in 1993, Berlin, in 1994, and Tokyo, in 1995) it remains reterritorialized within a singular linear timeline, and there is no indication that the three stories exist in parallel universes.

Deleuze, Gilles, *Cinema 2*, op. cit., p. 103.


50 ibid., p. 108.


52 op. cit., p. 7.

53 ibid., p. 1.

54 Deleuze, Cinema 2, op. cit., p. 56.

55 ibid., p. 57.

56 Allan, Vicky, 'Driven Round the Twist', Scotland on Sunday: At Play Magazine (20/01/02), p. 7.


59 ibid., pp. 85-6.
5. Don't Mess With Mr. In-between.

The labyrinth of time should be a neutral force in terms of both gender and sexuality. It should provide the potential for both men and women to falsify their pasts, and, therefore, to perform their identities differently. Yet this is manifestly not the case in contemporary cinema. As we saw in the previous chapter, in films which seem to illustrate a labyrinthine existence for women, the liberatory possibilities made available through this type of temporal existence are rapidly reterritorialized. This is usually achieved through the narrative's final return to the straight line of time. The very idea of the labyrinth of time is thus immediately discredited as a passing fantasy, game, or dream. This chapter will concentrate on how this same tendency can be seen in relation to the cinematic representation of men. It focuses on several films, emerging in the last decade, which foreground the functioning of time in their narratives. These include, *The Talented Mr Ripley* (1999), *Memento* (2000), *Possible Worlds* (2001) and *Liar* (1997). The focus will be placed upon representations of the labyrinthine performativity of masculinity and their almost inevitable correlation with the act of murder.

Initially this chapter explores how attempts made by the protagonist of Anthony Minghella's *The Talented My Ripley*, to assume the identity of another, are equated with the closeting of homosexuality. It will be seen to be in this way that the film retains the belief in an essential self that exists beneath all the masks of performativity. The film thus marginalizes both the labyrinth, and transgressive sexual performativity, as defining others of the heterosexual norm. The flashback structure to the narrative, moreover, creates a straight line of time which ensures that, although Ripley gets away with murder, his punishment is his inability to ever return to the lawful straight line of history. Forever locked in the labyrinth, his essential self is doomed to eternal misery. Christopher Nolan's *Memento*, for its part, initially appears to provide a contrast to this negative representation of transgressive performativity. Ultimately, however, it is yet
another noir narrative in which the male protagonist's desire to become-other is
shown to be tantamount to getting away with the murder of the essential self.
Moreover, through its use of flashback, this film also maintains a linear narrative
time-scheme. Thus the binary reasoning evidenced by both films negate all
possibility that labyrinthine performativity could be used positively by men.

Finally, two other exceptional films will be examined, Possible Worlds, and
Liar. Both seem to set out to critique the narrative reterritorializations evident in
the above films. However, it will be shown, they too are unable to extricate
themselves from the reactive forces of the straight line of time. The reason why
this is will be examined in the following chapter, which examines the political
context within which these images are created. In particular, the difference
between the movement- and the time-image's representations of history will be
discussed in relation to the changing global balance of power after WWII.

Getting Away With Murder.

For Judith Butler, both gender and sexuality are social constructs. Male and
female gender roles are not the effect of an original sexual divide (man/woman),
but rather, this illusionary origin is retroactively created through the continuous
repetitions of gender roles. Gender is a performance that, when its roles are
repeated in the exact same manner, constantly re-establishes the accepted norms
of heterosexuality. In Imitation and Gender Insubordination she says:

... heterosexuality must be understood as a compulsive and compulsory
repetition that can only produce the effect of its own originality; in other
words, compulsory heterosexual identities, those ontologically
 consolidated phantasms of 'man' and 'woman', are theatrically produced
effects that posture as grounds, origins, the normative measure of the
real.\(^1\)
Our sexual identity is but the continual re-imposition of a seemingly originary but actually illusory biological division, through the repeated playing out of established heterosexual gender roles. The creation and maintenance of compulsory heterosexuality is a causal process, with establishes an illusory first cause in the organism. It maintains its hegemony by ensuring its perpetual return in the same form. All attempts to perform these roles differently are immediately marginalized as other. The single, linear timeline immediately apparent in the construction of the heterosexual division of 'man' and 'woman' ensures its contribution to chronological views of history, and patrilineal reproduction, as the norm.

Yet this construction of gender, and indeed, sexual roles through a 'compulsory repetition' contains within it its own possible ungrounding. Just as the labyrinth exists as the ungrounding of the straight line, so too does the repetition of difference perpetually haunt the repetition of the same that is compulsory heterosexuality. Butler continues:

... if heterosexuality is compelled to repeat itself in order to establish the illusion of its own uniformity and identity, then this is an identity permanently at risk, for what if it fails to repeat, or if the very exercise of repetition is redeployed for a very different performative purpose? If there is, as it were, always a compulsion to repeat, repetition never fully accomplishes identity. That there is a need for repetition at all is a sign that identity is not self-identical. It requires to be instituted again and again, which is to say that it runs the risk of being de-instituted at every interval.²

Should the repetition of the same which informs the straight line ever be made to stutter, to branch off into a repetition of difference, then the straight line would begin to become a labyrinth. Consequently, the self would now no longer be 'self-identical', but becoming-other. The potential for the de-institution of identity Butler sees in willful attempts to perform identity differently. For, if sexual and gender roles are but theatrical roles that are legitimized through the
repetition of the same, then to play one of these roles differently, is to unground the illusion of the continuous, evolving self. The most obvious examples of such a practice would be drag. For Butler, however, various homosexual 'styles' which function as stutterings of heterosexual roles also qualify. These include, she argues: 'lesbian butch and femme gender stylization'. In fact, the labyrinth of time whose powers of the false these practices utilize in order to create a new personality, should, in theory at least, enable anybody to perform their identity differently, to take a new path in time, to return in difference. A heterosexual who performs their role differently can thus also be seen to begin to create a becoming-queer of their identity.

The performance of the self as becoming-other should be open to everybody, regardless of their sexuality. As the singular line of time contains the potential for its own un grounding, that of the labyrinth, performing one's identity differently should provide a possible new direction, for literally anyone, at any point in time. This view of identity, however, as a Nietzschean copy of a copy, without recourse to origin, seems to be a utopian dream. Undoubtedly this owes much to the strength of the reterritorializing form of the true, against whose reactive forces the powers of the false must continuously struggle. Whether identity can be seen to be perpetually in the process of actualization in this way, or as already actualized in a straight line, is the point of contention which we will examine in relation to formations of masculinity in the movement-image.

Within cinema there is a long tradition of films which examine the problems which arise when men attempt to perform their identity differently. More often than not this general tendency is situated around the uneasy line drawn by the law. On the one side lies the man involved in illegitimate operations. These include: the confidence trick, short or long term grifting, the sting, the scam, contract killing, all manner of gangster activities, robbery and drug trafficking. On the other side there is the upholder of the law, he who performs his identity differently only in an attempt to mingle in the underworld. This type is usually epitomized by the undercover cop, but could also extend to include the
government backed spy or assassin, the one officially "licensed to kill". In Cinema 2, Deleuze argues that, with the time-image's realization of the powers of the false: 'the forger becomes the character of the cinema.' His power to perform his identity comes directly from the labyrinth. He is:

... the man of pure descriptions and the maker of the crystal-image, the indiscernibility of the real and the imaginary ... he provokes undecidable alternatives and inexplicable differences between the true and the false, and thereby imposes a power of the false as adequate to time, in contrast to any form of the true which would control time.

Deleuze charts the emergence of the 'forger' in post WWII cinema as the hero par excellence. This emergent figure is used to support his belief that truth has been placed in crisis by the powers of the false due to his use of the labyrinth's powers in order to falsify the straight line of time. The positioning of the role-playing activities of the forger around the question of the law, however, ensures that even when a masquerading male is valorized, it is very often a character who is performing their identity in order to get away with murder. This is the case even though many of these films specifically examine the hero's struggles as he tries to avoid crossing the line of the law. The forger's emergence may illustrate the crisis of truth felt on the movement-image's plane of transcendence, but it is soon reterritorialized in order to suture over this crisis. The Talented Mr Ripley is no exception.

Minghella's film is the story of a man who deliberately and willfully self-creates himself as another. The protagonist, Tom Ripley (Matt Damon) murders one Dickie Greenleaf (Jude Law) the son of a rich American shipbuilder. He then proceeds to impersonate Dickie, using his passport, clothes, and bank account, in order to live the life of a rich, young man of leisure in 1950s Europe. It is, in short, the story of a man who, by performing his identity differently, gets away with murder.
The film also contains a queer subtext, that Ripley not only envies Dickie his wealth and status, but that he also desires him sexually. This desire for Dickie, who is himself engaged to Marge Sherwood (Gwyneth Paltrow) remains unfulfilled. Instead, Ripley's chance at happiness in a homosexual relationship is provided by the character Peter Smith Kingsley (Jack Davenport) who, sadly, Ripley is forced to murder in order to maintain his assumed, false identity. It is with this blow to Ripley that the film ends. Its final image is that of Ripley sitting alone on his ship's bunk, with the closet door yawning open towards him with the movement of the ship, as though beckoning to him to enter its confines.

A charitable interpretation of this film would be that it sets out to illustrate the way in which the social context, the rather conservative 1950s Europe through which Ripley travels, is the root cause of his final unhappiness. During the investigation into the murder of Dickie's friend, Freddie Miles (Philip Seymour Hoffman), for instance, Ripley is questioned by the police. One of the questions he is asked is whether he is a homosexual. This incident enables Smith Kingsley to comment that: 'Officially, there are no Italian homosexuals... makes Leonardo and Michelangelo very inconvenient.' The final image of the closet then, would seem to suggest that it is the official denial of homosexuality, that which necessitates the closeting of Ripley's true feelings, and his consequent inability to be "out", which are to blame for his murderous actions. Smith Kingsley's comment about the denial of homosexuality from official versions of history would also seem to support this view.

There is a degree, then, to which the film deliberately works as an exposition of the problems that arise when homosexuality is repressed. This charitable interpretation, however, seems somewhat problematic, as this is a film which, despite its possible merits, readily maintains the equation between homosexual desire and murder. There is a sense in which, although Minghella attempts to show that it is the sexual repression enforced by compulsory heterosexuality which leads to violence, Ripley still fits the Hollywood stereotype of the homicidal queer. Like so many before him, he is represented as preying upon the
heterosexual populace. Thus, whilst the film deliberately addresses this exclusion of homosexuality from official history, and the repression of homosexuality which this entails, in doing so, it actually becomes complicit in the same processes. This occurs in a number of ways.

In terms of adaptation, although we do not wish to raise Patricia Highsmith's novel to the status of an origin from which this, the second adaptation of the film somehow deviates, the difference between the two texts is quite noticeable. The suggestion of Ripley's queerness is only an undercurrent in the book. It features as an insinuation from Marge, something that the reader is left to consider as a possibility that Tom is perhaps denying to himself. Even this, however, seems doubtful, as Dickie is depicted by Highsmith as a rather dull and untalented person who it would be difficult to fall in love with. This is in stark contrast to the steely attractiveness of Minghella's Dickie, Jude Law providing a much more plausible object of desire. Certain events in the film, moreover, do not take place at all in Highsmith's story. Most noticeably, Tom's attempt to get into the bath with Dickie, his most overt sexual advance in the film, is added by Minghella. So too is the affair with, and murder of, Smith-Kingsley. He is a minor character in the novel and there seems to be little indication that he is anything other than heterosexual. The reterritorialization of Patricia Highsmith's Ripley which the film enacts is symptomatic of the way in which movement-image narratives work to maintain the legality of the straight line of time. The equation of the homosexual with the murderer, then, has broad ramifications when seen in conjunction with the time scheme used by the film.

The film's narrative is linear, and posits its own first cause retroactively. It takes a device often found in film noir, including Billy Wilder's classics, *Double Indemnity* (1944) and *Sunset Boulevard*, but which is also found in more recent films with noir characteristics such as *Shallow Grave* (1994) and *American Beauty* (1999). The film begins at the end, with the image of Ripley on the ship's bunk, after killing Smith-Kingsley. It then jumps to the "beginning", to the party in New York at which Ripley first met Mr Greenleaf, whilst playing the piano.
This particular narrative device posits a first cause from which all the events that then followed (the story as we watch it unfold) seem to have occurred inevitably. It is as though no other possible future could have been created, no other path through the labyrinth being open for Ripley to take. This plot structure works to create a singular, linear history that begins with a very definite first cause, albeit a falsely posited one. Ripley's fate is sealed from the opening shot of the film. We already know how the film will end, it is now just a case of getting there. It is, as we saw in chapter two, the conventional use of the flashback in order to maintain linearity, causality, and indeed, the chronological view of time upon which both history and the movement-image are based. It is also, as we saw in chapter three, the device used to re-align the correct, causal past with the present in *The Sixth Sense*. It works, moreover, in the same way as Butler describes the ontological consolidation of 'man' and 'woman' that is achieved by the compulsory, heterosexual repetition of roles. By firmly establishing itself as a repetition of the same, the narrative disavows any possibility that it could be ungrounded by the labyrinth's virtual becoming-others.

The path of Ripley's life is not something that ever contained the same labyrinthine possibilities that were available to the Helens of *Sliding Doors*. Even though he is a person whose identity does seem to be the effect of a performance in which he willfully becomes-other; in a particularly reactionary fashion the narrative structure condemns his desire to leave his allotted social and sexual role as the act of getting away with murder. Although Ripley initially seems to be a good example of performative identity, the positivity of such a view of the subject has its own negation inscribed within the film's very opening shot. The narrative forms a loop that closes on Ripley, rather like a trap set by destiny. As opposed to the joyful *mobius* in which Céline and Julie oscillate at the close and opening of their film, Ripley is encircled by the film's bookended narrative, which becomes his closet. It is not the 1950s that causes Ripley's unhappy fate, then, but the film itself, which throws up the sumptuous 1950s leisured lifestyle of the nouveau riches as a smokescreen to cover its own reactionary intent. In short, the flashback makes the unhappy ending that awaits the homosexual seem inevitable.
Both Ripley's performance of his identity, and (as it becomes conflated with this) his homosexual desire, are shown to be against the "law". His actions are crimes against the patriarchal order. Director Minghella himself states:

I was charmed by the idea of a central character who could commit murder and get away with it. It's not that I enjoy the amorality of that, I wanted to say that getting away with it is his punishment.9

The law that Ripley transgresses is precisely that of linear time upon which, as Butler shows, heterosexuality is based. By attempting to become-other than he is, he creates a stuttering in the repetition of the same which functions to maintain linear time, and ultimately he is punished for it. The murder that he gets away with, however, is not just that of Dickie (and indeed, Freddie) but the murder of his essential self. Instead of the loss of self in becoming-other being seen as the liberatory loss of the self into selves, it is instead seen to be the murder of an original self. The mask of false Dickie which he then dons becomes a mask which it is impossible for him to remove. There remains, however, an original identity beneath this mask, that of the ever suffering Ripley, the essential self that he has murdered through masquerade. Thus, Ripley's leaving of his allotted sexual and social position, his attempt to become-other, will create its own punishment, and ensure his eventual incarceration as binary other, as false Dickie. This will also ensure, the film's moral informs us, his inability to live a life that may have brought him happiness, with gay lover, Smith Kingsley.

The homophobia of Minghella's take on Highsmith's novel, then, is evident in its formal construction. Minghella's film implies that to stray from the original self is not to become-other, but to create a bad copy. This is the case whether it is a murderer who assumes the identity of another, or a homosexual, both of which are now, ultimately, the same "act". To willfully perform so as to create a repetition in difference is to murder the singular, unchanging (i.e. repetition of the same) form on which heterosexual identity is based. This is the case whether
the deviation from the singular path of time, into the labyrinth, is through homosexual transgression, or the masquerade of innocence adopted by the murderer. The potential of the ungrounding labyrinth is thus reterritorialized as illegal other by, and to, the straight line of time. The Nietzschean character created by Highsmith, the man who can quite literally get away with murder, here has his amorality retrenched within a seemingly sympathetic, but ultimately negative allegory for homosexuality. As Charlotte O'Sullivan\textsuperscript{10} notes in her review of the film, the work of the author who gave us \textit{The Price of Salt} (1952) - perhaps the first novel in which a gay couple are allowed a happy ending - is recreated for the cinema as the moral tale of a transgressor who finds himself punished by his very act of transgression. For this reason, whatever good intention Minghella may have had seems negated by the opening and closing of the film's narrative. This is a film which expresses perfectly the fear of a heterosexual culture facing the possibilities that lie at its own heart, its own queer unthought, its own becoming-queer.

The soundtrack which accompanies the opening shot of Ripley adds a Biblical dimension to his murder by equating it with the story of Cain and Abel. Over the image of Ripley on his bunk we hear:

\begin{verbatim}
From the silence, from the night,  
Comes a distant lullaby.  
So surrendering your soul,  
The heart of you not whole,  
For love, for love,  
Walk tall.  
Cast into the dark,  
Branded with the mark,  
Of shame, Of Cain.
\end{verbatim}

The song firmly places Ripley as an outsider to social, legal norms. He is the binary other, the criminal, the sinner. It also aids the conflation of the murderer with the homosexual. The song signals that, as murderer, committing crimes
against civil law, Ripley is excluded, cast out into the 'silence', and the 'night'.
These are also the states which serve to justify the existence of the divine Word,
and the divine ("let there be" day-) light, as norm. The surrendering of his soul
further places his project on the side of evil, the selling of one's soul to the devil
in order to gain life. In this case, of course, life as another. Finally, his likeness
with Cain is his mark of eternal wandering without punishment, his getting away
with murder. The song's subtext, moreover, adds that as homosexual, his phallic
act of killing his brother is also a sin against divine law. The divine punishment
which this sodomy entails is his wandering forever as an outcast from society,
branded with the mark of shame. It is this which must be forever disguised, or
closeted, his sin against the heterosexual brotherhood.

In fact, in a grotesque parody of the love which dare not speak its name (or in
this case, show its marked face) when Ripley eventually strangles Smith
Kingsley he is lying face downwards beneath Ripley. This is the only murder in
the film which we are not shown, although its violence is far less disturbing than
that of the other two murders. Both Dickie and Freddie, by contrast, are shown
being beaten about the head until they are dead. It is not the violence which
makes this image taboo, it would seem, but rather the position in which it is
committed, that of anal penetration. Indeed, the image which immediately
follows further conflates homosexuality with murder and divine retribution.
Ripley is finally pictured sitting alone on his ship's bunk. His sex life as a
homosexual is shown as ultimately unfulfilled, his punishment for straying from
the heterosexual path being that his bed contains only himself, 'silence' and
'night'. In this way his preferred sexual practice is seen to be the reason for his
downfall. Moreover, it is a bed that is not his own, his transitory wanderings
adding to the image of his damnation. Once again, a potentially positive,
nomadic wandering appears instead as a punishment, his casting out into the
dark of night.

Either way, as murderer, or homosexual, within the binary reasoning of
compulsory heterosexuality Ripley's is one of the oldest sins. It is the murder of
the essential, heterosexual notion of the self. This he commits through attempting to become-other, and thus murdering the singular form of being. Symbolically, the homosexual Ripley, positioned outside of linear history through his exclusion from patrilineal reproduction, acts as the destroyer of the 'Greenleaf' family tree. The pun on the family name, seemingly with satirical intention from Highsmith, thus becomes literal in Minghella's film. It both warns us of the loss of history should such devious actions of sexuality go unpunished, whilst also stressing the guilt inherent within deviations from accepted heterosexual, male, performances. Mr Greenleaf's occupation, that of shipbuilder, further emphasizes what is at stake in the loss of patrilineal progression, the loss of western history itself. The tradition of shipbuilding, with its roots in mercantile trade, and its use in the maintenance of colonialism, is itself complicit in the creation and maintenance of the luxurious lifestyle in which Dickie and friends all indulge. Indeed, the scene in which Ripley meets Mr Greenleaf in his shipyard firmly conflates his trade and his family line, as in the background to the meeting we see, in huge letters, the word, 'Greenleaf' emblazoned on his firm's buildings. Both family name and company name, its lineage and its capitalist heritage are shown to be threatened by the actions of patrilineal cuckoo, Ripley.

The appearance of the closet in the closing sequence also deserves close attention. Yawning and beckoning to Tom, its steel hangers clanking in a way that can only be meant to suggest chains, the image of the closet illustrates the punishment which awaits the transgressor. As Minghella states, Ripley's crime is also his punishment, and, guilty of donning the mask of hetero-Dickie, he must remain forever closeted within his false identity. The closet provides what Eve Sedgwick calls the 'double bind' from which Ripley can never escape. His attempt to escape its clutches when he takes on the role of false Dickie merely ensures that he enters an even bigger closet. As Butler further comments, there is a Kafka-esque inevitability to the guilt of the homosexual:

... one comes out of the closet ... but into what? ... the room, the den, the attic, the basement ... some new enclosure whose door, like Kafka's
door, produces the expectation of a fresh air and a light of illumination that never arrives? Curiously it is the figure of the closet that produces this expectation, and which guarantees its dissatisfaction. For being "out" always depends to some extent on being "in"; it gains its meaning only within that polarity. Hence being "out" must produce the closet again and again in order to maintain itself as "out." In this sense, outness can only produce a new opacity; and the closet produces the promise of a disclosure that can, by definition, never come.¹²

Whilst performativity should be concerned with taking clothes out of the closet and trying them on, as potentially role defining, in Minghella's film it becomes instead the donning of the closet itself. This is the process through which we watch Ripley proceed, in which, instead of a metamorphosis of self, we see his attempt to escape create an even bigger closet. From queer Ripley inside seemingly normal Ripley, we move to Ripley (now all the way queer) within seemingly normal Dickie. It is at this point, of course, that the sticky situation with Meredith Logue (Cate Blanchett) occurs, in which his hetero-impersonation demands that he kill Smith Kingsley if he is to maintain his mismatch disguise. In this way the binary of inside and outside is also maintained by the film, ensuring Ripley's inability to ever escape through the performance of the self-as-other.

If we return to our charitable interpretation, in this way the film could be seen as an allegory for the way in which the closet works to perpetually isolate Ripley. However, the fact that it also works to ensure that male attempts to perform identity differently are seen as both disguise and perpetual incarceration, rather than as escape, detracts somewhat from this interpretation. Through the binary reasoning of the law, to be "out" is dependent upon still being "in", ensuring that Ripley is constantly on the run from his guilt before the law. Essentially he can never get away with murder, even when he does get away with it. Thus the image of the closet in Minghella's film illustrates the 'disclosure that can ... never come' when performative identity is reterritorialized within a heterosexual binary of model and false copy.
The closet also foregrounds the role of clothing in the theatrical game of performing identity differently. At the very start of the film, Ripley, sitting alone in his cabin and facing the closet, is heard to say: 'If I could just go back, if I could rub everything out, starting with myself, starting with borrowing a jacket...'. Immediately after this we cut to the first cause of the narrative, his meeting with Dickie Greenleaf's father, whilst wearing the borrowed jacket of a Princeton graduate. Ripley's wish, that he can eradicate the past, is exactly what performative identity should enable you to do. In fact, using the labyrinth to make the past that was not-necessarily true, to rub everything out, to rub out the past self as direct cause of the present self, was exactly what Highsmith's novel enabled Ripley to do. Yet this act of self-creation through falsifying the past is seen instead by Minghella's film in Ripley's wish to annihilate the past, different, performance of the self, rather than end up where he is now. Better to go back to the smaller closet, the film argues, than break the law, wear the jacket of another, and enter an even bigger one.

Instead of becoming liberated from the previous self, it is the maintenance of this self behind the performative mask which depresses Ripley so. In Minghella's terms, Ripley's punishment is that: 'He can never be like he is'\(^ {13} \). This is an almost tautological statement which, although seemingly sympathetic to the necessity for Ripley to live in the closet, is also illuminating in that it is predicated upon the seemingly indisputable fact that beneath every mask, every borrowed jacket, there remains an original self. If this is the case, masquerading, or becoming-other is simply the creation of a prison for the self, from which it is impossible to escape. It is to create a mismatch between the essential self and its appearance. Indeed, for Minghella, it would seem that it is better never to have existed than to live like this. The idea that all a person is, is determined by their performance, is thus dismissed. When seen from within the binary reasoning of the movement-image, the 'disclo(the)sure' that can never come is a torment, rather than a possible route to freedom through becoming-other.
The distinction between the real and the bad copy which the film upholds is further evident in the sequence in which Ripley is caught by Dickie whilst trying on one of his jackets. Ripley, seemingly 'like he is' for once, cuts a particularly effeminate figure, in dress jacket without trousers, dancing with hat and cane to a popular song. Caught in the act of being himself (of course, we know this to be not an "act", but Ripley actually being "himself") Ripley hides behind a full length mirror, his head peeking over the top, but the rest of him hidden. Dickie, however, is reflected in full in the mirror, trousers and all. In contrast, Ripley appears a partial man, a bad copy of the real thing, whose sexuality is also seen, by comparison, to be that of one caught, guiltily enjoying the pleasures of another's identity, whilst being unable to fully fill his heterosexual trousers.

Dressing up, or masquerading should be one of the positive ways in which the obliteration of the self into a procession of simulacras, of copies without originals, is made possible. In this case, however, Ripley's regret over the jacket, as well as over the past, is something that he is morally burdened with due to the constraints of linear time. Donning the jacket of someone else, attempting to become-other, the noir temporality illustrates, was both the first cause of his downfall, and his final punishment. It is for this reason that Minghella's statement concerning Ripley, that; 'He can never be like he is', stands in such stark contrast to Rimbaud's statement; 'Je est un autre',⁴ that is appropriated by Deleuze in order to explain his theory of becoming-other. Minghella clearly assumes an essentialist self, what Ripley is, the disguising of which causes his terrible punishment. To be like he is, is now impossible due to the mismatch of disguise and essential self. Becoming is here not shown to be the liberatory loss of the self in the labyrinth, the 'I is another' of Rimbaud, but rather the loss, or lack (in a binary sense) of being and originality. Ripley's unhappiness is due to his masquerade's obscuring of his essential self.

As Ripley says to Smith Kingsley, just prior to murdering him, 'I'm lost'. The Biblical damnation which he faces is that of a man who has lost his I, his
essential self, his surrendered soul. In line with Butler, and to bring the film back, once more, to its start, he further states:

'I'm gonna be stuck in the basement aren't I, aren't I? That's my terrible ... all alone in the dark, and I've lied, about who I am and where I am and now no one'll ever find me. I always thought it'd be better to be a fake somebody than a real nobody.'

The 'fake somebody' that he has become leaving the 'real' Ripley to his unmentionable ('my terrible ...') fate, that which literally cannot speak its name! The basement, the darkest of subterranean closets is where we first find Ripley at the start of the film, creating himself, as he listens to jazz records, polishing his shoes and dressing in shirt and jacket to travel to Italy. A dream or passing fantasy for femininity, for homosexuality the labyrinth is a closet, a basement, a prison. When he returns to the closet at the end of the film, its door swinging shut on him, he has come full circle, and despite all his attempts to become-other, he has never really left the closet. Earlier in the film, in conversation with Smith Kingsley, Ripley evoked the image of the basement, this time as a locked and dark place in which the past is stored; complete with demons and the truth of all his evil doings. In this film, the past is not something from which you can be liberated, it cannot be made contingent, it is the cause of everything that you are now, in the present. The past of linear time is, for the man who tries to cheat time by performing his identity and evoking the powers of the false, also the closet into which he will repeatedly be closed. There is no escaping it, no getting away with this "act" of murder.

Finally, a typical noir use of voice over hammers home the final nail in the homosexual's coffin. As Richard Dyer points out of voice over in film noir, it serves to illustrate the inevitable fate of the film's protagonist:

The end is known to the voice-over from the beginning even if not always to us, and all the events can be seen as leading inevitably, inexorably, and gratuitously to it.15
In Minghella's film, Ripley's voiceover is also instrumental in its maintaining of the binary between the real and the simulacra. It enables us to hear his "inner" thoughts, and thus stresses the existence of a "real" Ripley under the mask of false Dickie. Charlotte O'Sullivan states succinctly:

By combining sex with an unhappy ending and a contrite beginning ("If I could just go back..." intones Tom) Minghella more than satisfies mainstream requirements. 16

Through its combined use of flashback, images of the closet, and its binary maintaining voiceover, the film effectively reterritorializes Ripley's becomings into a trapped form of being. It now seems extremely doubtful that Minghella's film is, as we could previously hope, a purposeful deconstruction of the stereotypical, "punish the homosexual" ending. Straight lines of time, we are shown, are for straight men. The homosexual cuckoo who tries to live in this time cannot help but be unhappy.

*The Talented Mr Ripley* shows how the potential for change created by the becoming-active of forces which queerness puts into play is always prey to the reactive forces of homophobia, racism and heterosexism. The movement-image's narrative reterritorializations illustrate the way in which the agency of the homosexual subject is always placed under erasure. As Elizabeth Grosz points out:

Where active forces affirm, produce, and stretch, reactive forces judge, pontificate, produce ideologies and modes of explanation, devise ingenious theories, compromise. They can be identified with the production of religion, morality and law, with the systems constrained to endless reproduction of the same, without affirming the infinite nature of chance, change and transformation. 17
Guilty of crimes against 'religion, morality and law', Ripley's attempt to utilize the labyrinthine powers of the false, is 'judged' by Minghella, and reterritorialized within the repetition of the same of the movement-image's linear narrative. Any queer stuttering of the heterosexual norm is thus denied. The reactionary move of punishment which is performed upon Highsmith's novel illustrates perfectly the way in which the struggle over the past is played out between the ability to creatively falsify, to create a future yet to come by making the past contingent; and the policing of this action which the movement-image enacts. In this process, moreover, history establishes the validity of the singular, non-contingent past, through the placement of a retroactive origin. This becomes the cause from which all proceeding events are deemed to have followed.  

Although the figure of the forger is evident in Ripley, his positive action, the creation of the self in difference, is easily reterritorialized by the movement-image. It becomes instead a binary negative, a loss of self. From the creation of the self, as a copy of a copy, or multiple self, we inevitably return to the loss of self, self-deceit, and the bad copy of the essential original. Thus the ungrounding force of the labyrinth, the powers of the false, constantly emerge in cinema only to be reterritorialized by the reactive forces of the movement-image. It is this same process, after all, which maintains history, compulsory heterosexuality, and patriarchal dominance. This is a theme that is given a slightly different spin in Memento.

**Habitual Criminal.**

*Memento* is the story of Leonard Shelby (Guy Pearce) a man obsessed with finding and killing the murderer of his wife. The only problem is, he has a chronic case of short-term memory loss. Being unable to make any new memories, Shelby can only retain information concerning the present for a very brief time. As he is unable to recall anything that has happened since his wife's
death he lives much of his life following clues that he has left for himself in the past.

Again we are faced with a film that on the surface appears to be about the potential for masquerading, for performing identity differently, and, again, it is a film in which this positive trajectory is represented as getting away with murder. Credited by *Sight and Sound* reviewer, Chris Darke as 'A new spin on noir'19 *Memento* is a film which initially appears to have broken out of the mould of the bookending flashback tradition, but which, on closer inspection, actually affirms the straight line of time through its narrative construction. On first viewing, the film appears to be the story of a man who falsifies the past, and who, by making it not necessarily true, lives his life through the performance of a series of roles. Shelby's life appears labyrinthine, and his identity, self-consciously performative. The narrative of the film, moreover, appears to work in the same way, starting at the end, and then realigning events backwards across time, in order to explain how we reached the film's beginning, and the narrative's end. Neither the time of the narrative, nor that of Shelby, however, is quite what it at first seems.

Although initially appearing to be a film which realigns time from the present backwards, it is actually a film which only appears to be different on first viewing, as it is so confusing. In point of fact it still works within the loose parameters of the traditional noir flashback structure, creating a retroactively posited false origin in order to reterritorialize identity within the singular, continuous being of the movement-image. It is, exactly as Darke says, a new spin on noir, but it is *only* that. It is a new way of illustrating the same process which we saw at work in Minghella's film; a novel way of exposing the liberatory possibilities made possible by the labyrinth of time, whilst simultaneously reterritorializing them so as to privilege the straight line of time and the essential self.
We shall examine Shelby first. Shelby's persistently recurring lapses of concentration ensure that his past appears to be constantly in the process of being palimpsestically overwritten. In order to cope with his inability to make new memories, and to enable him to deal with both day to day life, and the investigation of his wife's death, Shelby leaves a series of messages for himself. These concern the identities of the people around him, and the facts of his investigation as it proceeds. They take the form of notes on paper, on the backs of photographs of people and places, and as tattoos on his body. Due to his constant lapses of attention, everytime he reads one of these notes, it is as though for the first time. It is rather like he is receiving a time-capsule message from an altogether different person from the past, which is, of course, exactly what is happening. In effect, each time he reads a message he has become a different person, due to his loss of memory, and the consequent falsifying of the past this enacts.

The film uses this bizarre situation in order to show the impossibility of either recording or representing truth, or facts, historically. In the black and white sequence which dominates much of the first half of the film we see Shelby tattooing FACT 5 onto his leg. In the process of doing so, however, he receives a number of misleading phone calls. As a result, he changes his initial tattoo of; 'Access to drugs' to, 'Drug Dealer'. The misinformation which leads him to this conclusion, however, will be forgotten the next time he reads the tattoo, which will seem to be an undeniable, historical fact. In this way the film foregrounds the fact that all history is an illusion which can only be legitimized, or falsified, in retrospect. All pasts are, we are shown, not-necessarily true.

Shelby also constructs, often on the spur of the moment, probable causes which seem to him to be extremely plausible reasons for the present situations he finds himself in. The validity of the narratives that he spins in order to explain his present situation however, is something which he has no way of knowing. He has become extremely adept at lying to himself in this way, having mastered the creative forgetting that enables becoming-other. For instance, after the murder of
drug dealer Jimmy Grants, Shelby adorns himself in Jimmy’s clothes and drives away in his expensive looking Jaguar. Then, slightly later in the narrative, having lost all memory of killing Grants, it becomes evident that Shelby has no idea that he is wearing a dead man’s clothes, or that his sudden appearance in designer clothes is out of the ordinary. When Teddy, who knows exactly what has happened, asks him where he thinks he has got the money from for such an expensive lifestyle, he immediately creates a fictional cause: 'I have money ... from my wife’s death, I used to work in insurance, we were well covered.' Shelby instinctively creates a time line which explains his present situation, thereby making the events that actually led to his current situation, not-necessarily true. Even though the falsifying of the past in this film is seen, as it was in *The Talented Mr Ripley*, as something that ultimately enables the protagonist to get away with murder, it does still seem to be a very clear expression of the ability to falsify the past that the labyrinth ensures. In this respect the film might be said to have more in common with *Sliding Doors* than it does with Minghella’s film.

The film also appears more positive in its seeming denial of the existence of an essentialist self, and its continuity of being as a repetition of the same. One of the tattoos on Shelby’s arm, containing information about the killer, reads: ‘FACT 3: FIRST NAME: JOHN’. This seemingly irrefutable fact, however, is something that has become, at some point in the past, subject to scrutiny. Consequently, it has been revised. Underneath, in Shelby’s own amateur hand, a tattoo has been added that reads, 'OR JAMES'. In the labyrinthine life of Shelby, even facts as irrefutable as someone’s name are changeable. More importantly, the changed tattoos show that the organic form is also capable of lying. There is no longer a belief in a fixed, essential, continuous organism, just a perpetually shifting flux of matter. The body is a becoming *surface* that changes through time, being palimpsestically rewritten in the process.

Again, this is illustrated by the incident in which the femme fatale, Natalie (Carrie-Ann Moss) deliberately provokes Shelby to the point where he punches
her in the face. She is then able, once Shelby's memory has lapsed, to use the scars he has given her to manipulate the unsuspecting Shelby into ridding her of Dodd. It is he that she says is to blame for her bruised and cut face. In *Memento*, the body appears to be theorized as a boundary, forever in the process of becoming as it is written upon, and palimpsestically falsified. The primacy of the biological organism, so beloved of the movement-image due to its capacity to create and maintain the binary of a separate inside and outside, subject and world, is here seen to have lost its currency in its encounter with labyrinthine time.

The film also deliberately foregrounds the belief that there is no singular, identical identity to the subject, only becoming-other, the self as a repetition in difference. Responding to Shelby's repeated attempts to assert the fixity of his identity; 'I'm Leonard Shelby, I'm from San Francisco', Teddy replies; 'That's who you *were*. You do not know who you *are*, what you have become ...'. As Shelby himself realizes when he begins to willfully deceive his future self by dressing in the clothes of the murdered drug dealer, Jimmy Grants (and again as he substitutes his picture of his pick-up truck for that of his newly acquired Jaguar, which he marks, 'MY CAR'), identity is in fact, a process of becoming-other, of masquerading. In this process, the past, and indeed, the past self, both become contingent. Who you are is who you are becoming, not who you were. From this reading of the film, it would seem that, despite the murders which Shelby uses his becoming-other to get away with, *Memento* at least allows the protagonist the liberty which is not given to Ripley. Shelby appears to have access to the positive aspects of the labyrinth of time. If this is the case, one could almost forgive the clichéd getting away with murder narrative. However, in the true spirit of the noir, on closer examination it becomes clear that everything is not as rosy as may at first appear.

The film's narrative also works to reterritorialize Shelby's labyrinthine performance of his identity, within its linear schema. Although it initially seems to mirror Shelby's ability to falsify the past, it is in fact one of the many ways in
which the film acts to retrench the events of the narrative within a binary logic, and a linear view of time.

The film begins with the fading out of development of the photograph Shelby takes of Teddy's body, after killing him. This is the end of the film's narrative. The film then begins to play backwards, the photo sliding back into the camera, blood off the walls back into Teddy's head, the bullet back into the gun, and finally, Teddy back to life. The opening sequence is used in order to acclimatize us to the way in which the narrative will now proceed, the film playing backwards in a series of colour episodes, each one of which ends with the same event as that which began the previous episode. The narrative thus unfolds before us as a sequence of events played in reverse order. It would seem as though the line of time which the narrative constructs is, as Shelby's memories are, always realigning itself, from the present backwards. However, this is patently not what is happening, and this novel way of showing the narrative is actually only the continual retroactive imposition of a series of causes for the events which we have just seen occur. Thus the narrative gains its consistency from its retroactive linearity, in which the past is definitely that which causes the present which we have already witnessed. For this reason, any possibility of a contingent past to the film's narrative is also negated. In effect, the film is constructed as the playing out of a series of flashbacks that provide the narrative with its retroactive logic. Again, unlike the mōbius looping with which Rivette's film concludes, with the narrative's circle beginning again in difference, the cycle of each narrative episode in Memento always completes itself by beginning again in an identical manner. The film's narrative creates a single, continuous, linear timeline, which is established through the repetition of the same events, only, due to its new spin, backwards.

Furthermore, each of these narrative episodes is interspersed by a small part of the black and white sequence in which Shelby, in his motel room, talks to Teddy on the telephone about Sammy Jenkis. This sequence is the originary moment of the narrative, the point at which the story begins. It is also this
sequence which provides the noir bookending to the narrative as the colour episodes play backwards until they meet the black and white sequence. The point at which they overlap is the murder of Jimmy Grants, the drug dealer that Teddy has manipulated Shelby into believing to be his wife's killer. Here the black and white becomes colour, with the developing of the photo Shelby takes of Grants' corpse. The two directions through time in which the narrative simultaneously moves, when they meet and correspond so exactly in this way, emphasize the way in which the film that we see is, typically of a noir, one singular, linear timeline. The flashback plays forwards through time, from its origin, in order to explain, retroactively, the events which we witness at the start of the film. The events that led up to and caused the first event that we saw are thus shown, albeit in a broken up and fragmented fashion, as though the final event to which they lead is one which is inevitable. It is destined to occur in the self same way that we initially saw it happen.

The film's underlying chronological order becomes much easier to detect after a few viewings. In the black and white sequence Shelby is busy tattooing a clue onto his body, this is 'FACT 5'. The colour narrative for its part, that which the black and white sequence (literally) "develops" into, is concerned with what happens as a consequence of the tattoo 'FACT 6'. The film's overall linear schema proceeds, then, by the numbers. Although it does not exactly follow the pattern of films like *Sunset Boulevard* - of starting at the narrative's end, jumping to its beginning, and then replaying events until they reach their inevitable end - the mutually reinforcing directions that it does take serves solely to create a new spin on this old technique. The narrative progression of the film is, in noir terms, although slightly disorientating in its originality, still predetermined by the linearity of its narrative. This time it is a narrative which begins at either end of a straight line and runs until they meet in the middle. By stopping at this point we are left with the knowledge that Teddy's death is now inevitable, and that the end cannot be changed.
What is different about this film, however, is that the death of the protagonist usually inscribed within the bookended noir narrative (the body in the pool that begins *Sunset Boulevard*, or in the morgue in *Shallow Grave*) is not evident. In fact, from the film's very opening we know that Shelby is alive at the end. Even the mitigated death of Ripley, his life sentence of perpetual closeting, is absent. Is there some hope, then, that this film could be seen as providing a more positive representation of labyrinthine performativity for a man? Does Shelby somehow manage to escape the hermeneutic trap of the straight line of time established by the narrative? Perhaps so, for, as we have shown, even though the actions of Shelby are definitely those of someone who is willing to deliberately deceive himself in order to get away with murder, he does seem to be a character who is in touch with the labyrinth of time. Is the linear construction of the narrative alone enough to reterritorialize this transgressive performativity?

Not surprisingly, the answer to this question is no. The point at which the two narratives meet, the murder of Jimmy Grants, enables the film to reterritorialize Shelby's attempts to perform his identity through a masquerade of the self as other. It is no coincidence that when Shelby takes the photo of Grants' corpse he is busily changing into the dead man's clothes. Although he is not assuming Grants' identity per se (as Ripley did, using Dickie's passport) Shelby is, rather like Ripley, exploring the idea that it is the clothes that make the man. In this way the film stresses the process of becoming-other as an "act" that is the equivalent to the loss of the self. Shelby himself tells Teddy; 'I think I'd rather be mistaken for a dead guy than a killer.' The murder that Ripley and Shelby are guilty of committing, is here again formulated as the loss of an essential self. Like Ripley, Shelby's masquerade is now only a disguise, that which hides the killer beneath the veneer of another. His loss of self ensures that he is now, quite literally, a 'dead guy'.

The film also seems to be deliberately punning on the fact that this change of costume brings colour to his life, as the drab black and white existence develops into colour at this juncture. Becoming-other is seen as a way of creating a more
exciting life, but it is ultimately gained at the cost of the self. In a manner reminiscent of characters which express a very binary styled presence of evil (e.g. George Lucas' Darth Vader) both Ripley and Shelby are figured as the walking dead. They have sold their souls and turned to the dark side, by attempting to struggle against the inevitability of their manifest destinies. Like Vader, they are dead men, walking around inside a disguise of pure evil. Becoming-other than they should have been they express the movement-image's belief that the labyrinth, which constantly poses the threat of ungrounding the stability of the straight line, is really only its binary opposite, the lurking evil, that defines the line of time as good. Once again, the potentially positive idea of metamorphosis as the becoming-other of the self is equated with murder and the loss of the essential self, by the binary logic enacted by the reactive forces of the movement-image. The idea that the self is constantly becoming, as a procession of simulacra without origin, is thus seen to be a naïve dream with which evil doers fool themselves in order to excuse their breaking of the law.

The sad fact is that Shelby's amorality, so beguilingly attractive in its seeming innocence, is actually figured in the film as a complete con. It is Shelby who is finally shown to be deliberately deceiving himself in order to get away with murder. In this case the endurance of a continuous, unified self beneath all the masks is much more cleverly figured than it was in Minghella's film, but it is still there, and is seen in Shelby's habits. In fact, the film goes out of its way to emphasize the underlying continuity to Shelby's being. Its overall message is that he is lying to himself in order to be happy. He even says as much at the end, when he deliberately leaves the clue that the tattoo of 'FACT 6' entails, Teddy's license plate number. It is this which will enable him to kill Teddy with a clear conscience, acting on what he believes are facts. He says: 'Do I lie to myself to be happy? In your case Teddy, yes I will'. This statement itself is interesting, as, rather like in Deleuze's deconstruction of Descartes' cogito, there is a split I in evidence. The I that contemplates (I think) and the I that endures (I am) are here equated with the I that lies (I lie) and the I that is happy (to myself). This split I, however, is figured as a controlling I, the lying I that is manipulating its other half, the I that endures, which is seen as unknowing victim to the I that
contemplates. If the I that endures is also the I which corresponds to the past that is preserved, in the labyrinthine splitting of time, then so too is the I that lies the I that corresponds to the present that passes. It follows, then, that the I that endures, the preserved I of Shelby is the I that is constantly being lied to, and manipulated, by the I that passes, in the present. Thus, despite the labyrinthine deceits perpetrated by the passing I of Shelby, there is always an underlying, linear, forward moving I in existence. Rather like the narrative, then, Shelby's life moves in two directions, both forwards and backwards through time.

This manipulation of the self, this deliberate setting up of his future self (the I which endures) by the manipulative I of the present, in such a way that he will unknowingly falsify the past through actions based upon false information, is explained away through most of the film as a consequence of his condition, and his subsequent gullibility. This is established, for instance, in the long black and white sequence in which, influenced by his phone conversation with Teddy, he changes the tattoo of 'FACT 5' to 'Drug Dealer'. Moreover, we are led to believe that he is mostly manipulated by other people. Teddy would appear to be the master manipulator in Shelby's life, but so too does Natalie manipulate him for her own ends, when she uses him to rid her of both Dodd and Teddy. Even the motel receptionist, the crazily bearded Bert, gets in on the act by renting him several rooms at once. Yet these incidences are really only part of the smokescreen which Shelby is actually creating around himself. They are all part of his cover. Beneath it all there is a master manipulator at work, Shelby himself. At several points in the film, however, he is deliberately uncovered by Nolan, who slips inconsistencies into the narrative. These inconsistencies, due to our normal expectancies of linearity, initially pass unnoticed, especially with the confusion which the episodic plot also creates.

After finding himself in a motel room with Dodd, and being unable to remember why this is, he confronts Natalie, and asks her why he has found a note in his pocket which tells him he has to get rid of Dodd for her. More succinctly, he shows her the picture of the bound and gagged Dodd, and says: 'Who the fuck is
Dodd? As she explains to him her perspective on the events, Natalie, attempting to cover her own tracks, tries to tear up the photograph of Dodd. In a very brief aside to their discussion, Shelby snaps: 'You have to burn them'. How does he know this? As the film further unravels, and we witness his conversation with Teddy, just after having killed Grants, we see Shelby burn the photos of his actions, the picture of Grants' corpse, and that of his own smiling face after the previous murder he committed, killing his wife's killer. As this event preceded the conversation with Natalie, our minds will retroactively posit this as the origin of his knowledge. Yet if Shelby's memory is constantly being erased, or as he has it, fading (like the photograph with which the film opens) how can he possibly "remember" that the photos must be burnt if they are to be properly destroyed? The fact is, Shelby's memory loss is a con which he is working on himself, the mask of which occasionally slips under stress, revealing his ability to remember information when he really needs to.

Other incidents also occur. Again concerning Dodd, when hiding in wait in the bathroom of Dodd's motel room in order to jump him, Shelby's concentration slips, and he forgets why he is there. Looking at the bottle with which he had planned to brain Dodd he says; 'I don't feel drunk', signaling his forgetting of his previous intent. Being in a bathroom, he innocently decides to take a shower. Yet when Dodd arrives home, and Shelby is in the shower, supposedly blissfully unaware of why he is there, whose room he is in, or what his purpose is, he immediately jumps Dodd, struggles with him, and knocks him out. Why does he do this? For all he knows, Dodd could be his friend, or even a roommate. Admittedly this may not be such a strange reaction to finding an unknown man in your bathroom, especially after the attack on his wife in his own bathroom. Yet to Shelby, everybody is unknown. This does not, however, make them potentially hostile. For the viewer, however, the completion of what was a linear narrative is thus achieved, and we, knowing that Shelby was lying in wait all along, think nothing of this minor inconsistency.
Certain other slight slips also stand out. After killing Jimmy Grants, Shelby is taken by surprise when Teddy arrives on the scene. Finding a picture of the smiling Teddy in his pocket, on which nothing is yet written except his name and number, he decides, on the spur of the moment, to trick him. He fools him into coming downstairs with him, where he witnesses the dead body of Grants (again the evidence of the murder is hidden in the symbolic closet that is the basement) and jumps him. Why? We are to find out, as the story continues to unravel backwards, that it is because he had been sent to his rendezvous with Grants by Teddy. Yet Shelby does not know, or rather, remember this fact. In truth, he has no idea who the smiling Teddy is at all, or else why look at the picture in his pocket in the first place? As far as he knows, Teddy could, as was also the case with Dodd, be his friend.

It begins to become obvious that Shelby is someone who automatically assumes that he can trust nobody, and that he has no real friends. If he is a complete innocent, however, we have to wonder why this is. The noir alienation of his Los Angeles milieu is used by the film to suggest that his underlying suspicion is caused by the way in which people are constantly taking advantage of his condition. Yet this is not a satisfactory answer, for, when Shelby happens to discover that he is being conned into renting two rooms, and says; 'Well, at least you're being honest about ripping me off' Bert the receptionist replies; 'You're not gonna remember anyway.' How, then, is it possible for Shelby to remember that people are taking advantage of him? If it is impossible for him to make new memories, where does this suspicion constantly reappear from? Perhaps another explanation for his behaviour would have to be that Shelby assumes he has no friends because he knows that he is a wanted man, a man who is attempting to get away with murder. Shelby feels guilt, and behaves as one who is constantly on the run. Yet this is also strange when we consider that he has managed to make no new memories since the death of his wife. How can he possibly know that he is anything other than the innocent which his condition allows him to pretend to be? The fact is, he does know, as it is his condition that is the fake, and because he is constantly in the process of setting himself up. It is through these slight inconsistencies, then, that Nolan's film begins to equate the
becoming-other of the self, the falsifying of one's own past, with the manipulation of the self, for evil ends.

Shelby himself knows that the person who is trying to take advantage of him is himself. In an early monologue he states: 'You have to be wary of people writing stuff for you that's not gonna make sense, or is gonna lead you astray, I mean, I dunno why these people try to take advantage of somebody with this condition'. In point of fact, however, Shelby is aware that this is exactly what he is doing to himself. He again confesses to Natalie: 'I think someone's fucking with me, trying to get me to kill the wrong person'. We wonder if it is Teddy or Natalie that he is beginning to suspect, yet it can be neither, as there is no way for him to have remembered this. It is himself, the I that lies in the present, that he is becoming suspicious of. It is himself, the present self, who is prearranging ways in which his future self will act as though on misinformation, left by a past self, believing it to be fact. Not only is performative identity, and utilizing the powers of the false, once again equated with the act of murder, its harmful consequences are also shown here as capable of creating the illusion of a causal, linear, and singularly coherent timeline. The advice on which the present Shelby acts, then, is always validated, in retrospect, ensuring that an illusory, but seemingly factual, origin for his actions is always posited. In this way a causal linearity is maintained by his life. Shelby's use of the powers of the false, rather than falsifying backwards, creates a series of false origins to his actions in the same way that the plot does, with its series of sequences which end with the beginning of their predecessor. Shelby's life cannot deviate from the path that he ultimately predetermines for it, as he will not let it do so.

The faking of his condition is explained, mostly through the Sammy Jenkis anecdote, in a way which also serves to maintain a binary between the body and the mind. This explains the manipulation of the self as an action of mind over body. As a consequence, both Descartes' primacy of the cogito over the body is maintained, and also, the falsifying of the organic form through time which we
examined previously, is effectively reterritorialized by being shown to be the effect of the action of the mind.

Shelby's assessment of Jenkis' condition was that his inability to make new memories was a psychological, rather than a physical condition. Jenkis' failure of the serious of lab rat style tests to which he was subjected suggested to Shelby that his condition could not be physical. If it was he would have learned to avoid the electrified objects through conditioning. Believing his own condition to be real (i.e. physical) however, he should, he reasons, be able to live his own life through conditioning. 'Habit and routine make my life possible, conditioning, acting on instinct.' Shelby is attempting to live purely as a physical presence, a body that acts according to its conditioning through routines and habits, a body that is a repetition of the same. Indeed, the validity of this technique would seem to be borne out by Laura Marks' criticism of Bergson for his diminishing of the importance of habit.20 As Marks illustrates, after all, habit is telling in its acknowledgement of socially learned, or conditioned, cultural responses to a range of stimuli. For this reason, if Shelby's life were purely physical, and controlled by conditioned instinct, this would go a long way towards explaining his violent reaction when surprised by Dodd and Teddy. As we begin to believe that Shelby is actually faking, however, this view begins to seem a little unlikely. If his condition is in fact psychological, the realization strikes us, this habitual body is actually being manipulated by his mind. In this way is the mind/body dualism reinforced, the primacy of mind over body maintained, and the falsifying of the organic form reterritorialized as an effect of the manipulations of Shelby's mind.

In Bergsonian terms, what the film actually shows is the way in which habit, the quotidian repetitions of our day to day life which occur in the passing present (that which, as we saw in chapter two, is the first synthesis, or, 'foundation' of time) is positioned as one half of a physical instinct/mind split by the film's narrative. When we initially believe Shelby's condition to be a physical one, then habit, the passing present, is shown to be a purely physical existence which has
been freed from its connection with recollection (the second synthesis of time as seen in Bergson's memory cone) due to Shelby's inability to create new memories. His ability to live without memories also ensures his seeming ability to utilize the third synthesis of time, the labyrinthine powers of the false which enable the ungrounding of time that is the eternal return. It would thus seem that the film shows mind and body acting as one in this eternally recurring present, continually falsifying time, and palimpsestically rewriting the body and indeed the entire "self". This self, moreover, now appears to be without inside/outside binary, existing instead in a constant fluxing in and out of being, a continual becoming-other.

Yet when the film begins to hint that his condition is not actually physical at all, but that he is, in fact, faking it, this positive, Bergsonian-inspired interpretation begins to appear unlikely. As a psychological problem, the physical being of Shelby - formed through his eccentric habits such as the tattooing, leaving of messages to himself, writing on the back of photographs, etc - begins to appear as the actions of a puppet, or shell, which is controlled, in retrospect, by his mind. The linearity which the self reinscribes through its knowing manipulation of the predictable repetition of the same which habit demands - i.e through Shelby's positing of false clues that will lead to murder - makes this a much more negative take on the possibilities that could exist in this bizarre situation.

Habit, the repetition of the same, in fact, is used by Shelby in order to ensure that he never forgets his quest for his wife's killer. The tattoo on his left hand, which reads, 'remember Sammy Jenkis' is the most persistent evidence of this. It denotes Shelby's conditioning of himself to remember a false past in order that he can commit future murders. Teddy stresses to Shelby that he is: 'Conditioning yourself to remember, learning through repetition', as though ontologically consolidating himself in retrospect. Each retelling of the Sammy Jenkis story in the same way, each repetition of the same tale, retroactively re-positis the false origin that validates his own condition. If this tattoo lies, by triggering the same false memory each time it is read, if the organic form is not to be trusted, it is
because, ultimately, it has been manipulated by the mind, which predicts in advance the future consequences of its actions. Moreover, it ensures that Shelby can in fact condition himself to make new memories, to 'remember' things which have happened since the incident with his wife, (i.e to remember the fictional story of Jenkis). The I that lies, the mental I of the present, is now the manipulator of a separate I, the bodily I that endures through its repetition of the same. We are back in the realms of a conscious and an unconscious, an ego and an id.

Shelby utilizes the creative power of forgetting only if and when it suits him to do so. After hiring a prostitute in order to help him to re-stage his discovery of his wife's attack, he takes several of his wife's personal belongings (which he had instructed the prostitute to scatter around the room) and burns them. Sitting by the fire and pondering the number of times he must have done this, he says: 'I can't remember to forget you', even though it is obviously himself who has just manipulated him into this act of remembering. This action of remembrance, moreover, stands in direct contrast to the action of burning the photographs of Jimmy Grants' body, and himself, which he did previously in order to forget the murders he had committed.

Shelby desires the glamorous life of one who gets away with murder (falsifies time backwards), but who believes himself to be a righteous avenger (moving through time, forwards). It is for this reason that he conditions himself to act upon false evidence, removing pages from his police report in order to create what Teddy calls: 'A puzzle you could never solve'. Living the life of the wounded and vengeful detective, very much in the noir style of Dave Bannion (Glenn Ford) in Fritz Lang's The Big Heat (1953) he describes himself as living: 'only for revenge'. His use of the labyrinthine powers of the false are always in the service of a linear purpose which he follows, the quest for his wife's killer. He is, as Teddy tells him: '....living a dream ... a dead wife to pine for, a sense of purpose to your life, a romantic quest ...'. In Memento, the life of the protagonist is seen to be a repetition of the same, which uses the repetition of difference (that
which so threatens to unground it) to actually reinforce its legitimacy. Thus it is that the film is able to provide us with a glimpse of the powers of the false at work, but to also show that both the act of performing identity, and the ungrounding of time which it enables, is tantamount to getting away with murder.

Like Minghella's film, it is almost tempting to see this as an intentional exposition of the way in which the ungrounding powers of the labyrinth are manipulated by the straight line of time. Shelby even has his own false origin to provide his quest with its purpose and drive, the death of his wife. The loss of his place as one half of a heterosexual coupling is seen as reason enough for his unquenchable but somewhat twisted quest for justice, outside of the bounds normally ascribed by the law.

In the film's final episode, however, when Teddy begins to question Shelby's memory of what happened to his wife, we are shown that Shelby's real crime is his own complicity in his wife's murder. Teddy suggests that Shelby himself is to blame for her death, through his administering of an overdose of insulin. This is an event which Shelby had previously maintained was the fate of Sammy Jenkis' wife. At this point the flashback we had previously witnessed of Shelby pinching his wife's thigh is replayed. This time, however, we see that her small exclamation of 'Ow' is not due to his pinching her, but to his injecting of her. Shelby blankly refuses to accept this alternative truth. Thus, the same realization which brunette Helen uses positively in Sliding Doors, is here immediately reterritorialized by Shelby, in order for him to maintain his linear existence, and his murderous quest for revenge.

As Dion Tubrett states in; "So Where Are You"? Shelby also uses his wife's murderer, John G, as an other against which he positions his own righteous life and quest for vengeance. Tubrett states:
John G ... is a kind of mirror for Leonard: a mirror image, the inverse of Leonard; and a double, an external embodiment of his own negative attributes. ... John G fills a role for Leonard: he is the embodiment of his motivation to live.21

The binary that this type of double allows Shelby to maintain - between self and external other - enables his avoidance of his own status as an entity with the capacity to double, to become-other in time. Rather than having to admit the possibility of multiple pasts, and the fact that he could have been his wife's killer in some past or other, this internal/external, good/bad, doubling with John G enables his single-minded quest for the murderer as other.

At the film's close, driving along in his car, having made the decision to fool his future self into killing Teddy by having his license plate number tattooed on as 'FACT 6', Shelby closes his eyes at the wheel. He sees himself, lying on a bed with his wife, and on his chest we see the 'I'VE DONE IT' tattoo, which he previously told Natalie he would have done once he had found and killed his wife's killer. At this point, the future is open to him, and, like brunette Helen, there are at least two directions that it could take. Either he could allow himself to forget his false cause, his wife's death and his quest for vengeance, or he could continue on his way, and knowingly murder Teddy. It is a choice between two tattoos, either 'I'VE DONE IT' or, 'FACT 6'. He decides to kill Teddy, and gets 'FACT 6'. He denies the real powers of the false, which are an active power of falsifying which allow the past to be forgotten (in the sense of, made contingent, or not necessarily true) and opts instead to maintain the linear timeline of his unending quest. His self-falsifying act, then, is a retroactive positing of a first cause, the tattooed 'FACT 6' which will legitimize his future act of murder.

Rather like the repetition of the same that is his constructed memory of Sammy Jenkis, so too must his memory of the outcome of his quest be kept the same (i.e he must never allow himself to think that he has done it) if he is to maintain his cover, his linear self, and his capacity to murder. The realization supplied by the labyrinth, that in the ungrounding of Chronos the telos itself becomes the quest, is here made to appear as the manipulation of time by the murderer.
Moreover, Shelby's denial of Nietzschean forgetting as a liberatory device actually reinforces the inevitability of the linear narrative. There was, after all, little likelihood of any other conclusion once we witnessed Teddy's death at the start. The linear trajectory of the narrative is thus upheld, and the film which seems at first glance to represent the labyrinth, in fact, works to deny its possibility as anything other than a tool for self deception which, no matter how seductive it may appear, is against the law. The best that can be said about the film is that it illustrates a character who uses the falsifying powers of the labyrinth in order to get away with murder. Over and above this, the film constructs both its narrative and Shelby's identity in such a way as to reterritorialize any liberatory potential it may have gleaned from the labyrinth's un grounding of time, back within the linear time frame of the movement-image, and uses a traditional binary logic in order to do so.

II

His and Hers Watches.

The murder that these men are enacting, it would seem, is actually more specific than is represented in either film. It is the murder of Enlightenment man, the illusory, essential self of Descartes' cogito. Without this, the binary reasoning upon which the heterosexual divisions of man and woman are based, history cannot function. Consequently, labyrinthine performativity cannot be shown as something that has a positive outcome for men, who must remain on the side of singularity, causality and form, if the legality of the heterosexual structure is to remain in force.
The reason why there are so many films which deal with the identity of those who live on either side of the binary created by the law, is now perhaps a little clearer. The movement-image's certain tendency towards the binary creates the debate seen in so many gangster and undercover cop films over the identity of the hero. These films very often conclude in one of two ways. On the one hand there is a return to an original state, an essential identity, with the stripping away of all masks. Examples from either side of the tracks include, *Goodfellas* (1990) and *Deep Cover* (1992). This return to the self, when figured on the side of righteousness, is also a common trait in many superhero films, such as *Superman* (1978). We can also include in this category "laying to rest of the disguise" films, in which the actions committed whilst masked are such that a return to the origin becomes impossible. This is usually because an undercover cop has crossed the line and committed murders. In these films some sort of alternative release is proffered instead, often that of a sacrificial death as form of atonement. Examples of this type of film include: *City on Fire* (1987), *State of Grace* (1990), *Reservoir Dogs* (1991) and *Hard Boiled* (1991). Alternatively, a period of incarceration can be offered as penance for transgressing the law through performativity. This occurs in *Plein Soleil* (1959), for murder, *American Gigolo* (1980), for prostitution, and *Light Sleeper* (1991), for drug dealing.

On the other hand, there are films in which the essential self gets lost beneath the mask. Instead of this being seen as a liberatory becoming, however, this is depicted as a warning of the dangers that can occur when masquerading is taken too far. Loss of self films include: *Psycho* (1960), *Shock Corridor* (1963), *i.d.* (1994) and now also *The Talented Mr Ripley*. Loss of self can also be figured, symbolically, as death of self, as it is in the "undercover investigative journalist" formula, for instance, *The Parallax View* (1974) and *The Passenger* (1975).

This is not intended as an exhaustive list, or a universal law, but rather as a very general pattern which many films seem to follow. Slight variations on this tendency occur in such films as: *Detour* (1945), *It's a Wonderful Life* (1946), *Out of the Past* (1947), *Grip of the Strangler* (1958), *Le Samourai* (1967),
Performance (1970), Day of the Jackal (1973), Taxi Driver (1976), Quadrophenia (1979), An American Werewolf in London (1981), Bladerunner (1982), Europa, Europa (1991), Suture (1993), The Madness of King George III (1994), Face/Off (1997), The Assignment (1997), The Man in the Iron Mask (1998), Ghost Dog (1999), Fight Club (1999), Boys Don't Cry (1999), The Limey (1999), Family Man (2001), Bedazzled (2001) and Comédie de l'innocence (2002). These variations point to the important role that genre conventions play in determining these outcomes. For instance, the undercover journalist, the urban samurai, the costume drama, the psychological thriller and the teen movie, all provide variations on the noir conclusions found in undercover cop and gangster movies. In all of the above films, despite the specific variations that their genres provide, there is a more general pattern at work. They all enact some reterritorialization, back within the binary of good and evil, upon male, labyrinthine performativity. Even in the rare instances where he does get away with performing his identity, like Memento, The Usual Suspects (1995), Liar (1997), Grosse Point Blank (1997) and Fallen (1998) the male character is seen to be, at the very least, guilty of getting away with murder.

The films that I have analysed in the last two chapters would seem to suggest that within our binary informed way of thinking, labyrinthine falsifying of identity is something that is allowed to be associated with women (but only as a brief, sanctioned fantasy) and which is seen as illegal for men, the upholders of the law. The prevalence of positive images of performativity in films about women (despite its inevitable reterritorialization) perpetuates the myth that this positive potential is only something available to women, and thereby reinforces the binary. The illusion is, to be clear on this, that cinema shows us becoming-other as something that is only positively available to women, and only for a finite period of time, thus making it a binary opposite to being, the state of man. This negates the labyrinth's liberatory potential for men, and ensures its continual status as outlawed time.
This reterritorialization that is enacted by the movement-image is in no way a new thing. As Julia Kristeva shows in her piece, *Women's Time*, it is always tempting to oppose the linear time of the patriarchal order with the appropriation of eternal recurrence for the female. This is, she shows, a move which has occurred throughout history - 'one is reminded of the various myths of resurrection which, in all religious beliefs, perpetuate the vestige of an anterior or concomitant maternal cult' - and it is one which has served to bolster the patriarchal order. By making women's time 'anterior', the legitimacy of the linear, masculine time is upheld. It is the order, being, or actualized form, that is built upon the chaos, becoming, or labyrinthine virtuality of the feminine. By othering the female in this way, by casting her into the eternal return as though into a primordial, and now lost, time, the labyrinth's potential for ungrounding the straight line of time is again undermined. Rosi Braidotti's assertion, that Deleuze's philosophy of time is, 'naively undifferentiated' in terms of gender is thus borne out by the movement-image's marginalization of *Aion*. It is the political ends to which the labyrinth is used, after all, which effect exactly how liberatory it appears. In fact, the labyrinth becomes a place of incarceration for the female, a time in which she becomes lost, existing as one who is subject to the linear time of the masculine law. This prison, much as Foucault critiqued in the operation of the penal system, a place which both contains and maintains the notion of duplicitous femininity. Even Almodóvar's, *Todo Sobre Mi Madre*, which we saved from criticism in the previous chapter, does not escape positioning within this binary schema of gendered times. The film's emphasis on the all female community to which labyrinthine time is ascribed is again suggestive of its status as a gendered time which is available only to women. This ensures that it remains the binary opposite of the straight line of time, which is, subsequently, masculine. In this sense the film has much in common with the Bette Davis classic, *Now Voyager* (1942) another film of liberatory performativity which is reterritorialized in the same way.

The films analysed so far seem to suggest that the binary which is so often created (loosely speaking, that of the straight line or time for men, and the labyrinth for women) is used by cinema to negate the potential for queering that
the labyrinth actually makes available to both sexes. Not only does this work to reterritorialize women as binary other, but so too does it repress men. This is most easily seen in its treatment of homosexual men, but it actually applies to all men, who must be channeled into a legal, straight line at all costs. The existence of the seductively attractive illegality represented in the getting away with murder plot acts much as the women's labyrinth films do. They are an escapist fantasy that it is nice to contemplate briefly, before our inevitable return to reality, our reterritorialization. They too are used as a safety valve mechanism. In this way are movements which may initially appear to express the becoming-woman, or the becoming-queer of the use of time in movement-image narratives, reterritorialized. The plane of transcendence's binary thought allows them to surface, but only for a brief period of time, before it disavows them with illegality.

The difficulty which we face when trying to conceive of the labyrinth of time from within a binary image of thought has recently been explored by Robert Lepage, in the Canadian film, *Possible Worlds* (2000). This is a film which, again like *Memento*, is initially quite confusing to watch. This fact itself says much about how used we are to straightforward, linear narratives, and indeed, how heavily marginalized art cinema films which experiment with time have become, as a result of mainstream expectations of linearity. Whether intended or not, Lepage's film illustrates the way in which the labyrinth, as a topic for film narrative itself, is reterritorialized into the art cinema other by the cinematic mainstream. It is for this reason that the selling out to overall linearity to which *Sliding Doors, Lola Rennt* and *Epouse-moi* all succumbed ensured that they were all reterritorialized in their very inception.

*Possible Worlds* follows the journeys of George Barber (Tom McManus) as he travels through several parallel universes. In all of them he searches out and is drawn to - in a self-consciously mannered reference towards both *La jetée* and Alain Resnais', *Je t'aime, je t'aime* (1967) - his wife, Joyce (Tilda Swinton). Barber's ability to move in this way is explained in a completely Bergsonian
manner as being due to an early intuition of his multiple existence, whilst sitting a maths test, aged 7. Barber describes having a sudden realization that he could complete the maths equation in one of two ways. Suddenly seeing himself as another, simultaneously completing the equation in two ways, he also begins to see through the eyes of himself-as-other. This other Barber is a boy who has a memory that he does not have, of being bitten by a dog. He also has a corresponding bite scar on his hand. Barber is a little like Bergson's actor, beholding himself playing in the splitting of time. He is aware of himself as existing in many different parallel universes, and suddenly, gaining the power to slip between them, he begins to make the past of each self that he becomes, not necessarily true.

The Bergsonian/Deleuzian image of a temporal subject continues to be established through some slick special effects and editing. When Barber slips through time, everything around him begins to becomes fluid. It seems that his movements are occurring at a molecular level. He is, as Joyce tells him, insubstantial, rather like 'smoke'. Thus the film avoids privileging the molar, organic form of the body. This is reinforced when, in a particularly Fellinian manner, Barber states that he does not so much have a memory, but rather that: 'In the collection of people I call me a memory occurs.' Barber is not a single, organic entity whose memories are stored in his brain, he is a multiple entity which moves aberrantly through a giant world memory. As he further says; 'I am everybody', and; 'I know everything', a realization which, as we saw in chapter two, occurs only once we conceive of the self as existing within labyrinthine time. At the film's end, moreover, Barber denies that there is anything constant beneath; 'All the changes'. A soul, an essential self, he argues, leaves you; 'Imprisoned'. Barber has realised that time is now the subject, and we are but characters in time. Thus Lepage's film seems to be an exposition of the labyrinth that could have emerged straight from the pages of Deleuze's *Cinema 2*.

Indeed, to the Deleuzian fanatic watching this film, there even seems to be a homage to Deleuze's description of Ozu's use of the vase in *Late Spring* (1949).
Although it is unlikely that this is deliberately so, Barber stares at the vase for an extended period of time, before explaining that he was: 'Comparing it ... to itself'. Barber, aware of the existence of myriad such vases in the labyrinth of time, was slipping between universes, comparing the many different existences in which the vase manifested itself. Indeed, as there are an infinite number of universes, and as all possibilities must inevitably be played out across them, in some universes, Barber informs us, the vase is also actually a beach. The point is, the vase not only endures in time in one universe, as Deleuze describes the becoming of Ozu's vase, but so too does it become-other in the labyrinth. The metamorphoses through which it passes is much more evident in this much wider arena and in some universes, as a consequence, the vase manifests itself as a beach.

The film further expresses its Bergsonian/Deleuzian conclusions when Joyce, in the final conversation of the film, discusses the flaws inherent in binary thinking. She says:

'The word 'not' is really magical ... but it's not that, it's something more ... it's a way of getting round our ignorance... everything we cannot conceive of .... but there's really nothing behind it, just a bunch of ghostly possibilities ... everything simply is ...'

Joyce argues that there should not be 'not' something, just a lot of everything that 'is'. Rather than a lack of something, many somethings. Rather than a straight line or a labyrinth, many straight lines that is a labyrinth. The very idea that there can be an origin, is thus decried. Rather than a something or a nothing (a 'not' something) at the origin, there are many somethings. Rather then an either/or, a both/and.

Yet Lepage's film ultimately, and very deliberately, pulls the ungrounding rug of the labyrinth out from under the spectator's feet, by reterritorializing Barber's narrative within a binary-informed meta-narrative. Barber's brain is actually
being kept alive in a sensory deprivation tank, by the evil Frankenstein figure, the scientist, Dr Kepler. Through this conceit, Lepage highlights the way in which the ungrounding of the straight line of time performed by the labyrinth is always reterritorialized by the movement-image's narrative, by making it a dream labyrinth within a linear reality. Barber's movements are seen to be the disembodied delusions of a brain in a jar, yet another variation on the "its all a dream" theme. Moreover, the narrative in which it is situated is the most linear of plots, that of a police investigation into Barber's murder, and the removal of his brain. Indeed, in the true noir style of Sunset Boulevard (et al) the narrative begins and ends with the death of the protagonist, trapping him in the moment of death, and making the rest of the film the dreams of an already dead man. This "brain in a vat" formula is effectively the same as that which we previously saw in The Sixth Sense. Admittedly this technique enables the film to show that Barber's labyrinthine slippages between the virtual sheets of time occurs only with his complete sensory-motor suspension. However, this also reterritorializes this notion back within a Cartesian body/mind binary. Unlike, say, the time-images of Fellini, there is no possibility that both body and brain can become-other in time.

We are now shown that the fluidity Barber experiences between worlds is really caused by Kepler's dunking of his brain into, and taking it out of, the sensory deprivation tank. He is a virtual traveler within time, its true, but only outside of his normal bodily existence. It is no coincidence that Barber's condition, as brain in a jar being manipulated by an evil genius, is so reminiscent of Descartes' own reasoning in his Meditations. As Descartes argued, even if some malignant demon should attempt to manipulate all that you perceive, the one thing that you can be sure of, is your intellect, your thought. Time travel is now a fantasy, a dream, not something that is actually possible as a way of life. In this way time travel is reduced to something which exists within the organism, in its brain, rather than time being something through which the subject moves, dispersing as it does so. Time is thus reterritorialized back within the linear movement through time of the organic form, rather than existing as a virtual whole that is forever becoming-actual. Thus the Enlightenment, scientific worldview brings us back
within the binary of inside and outside, and once more privileges the rationality of the mind over all else.

The scientist, Kepler, acting as Frankenstein, illustrates the impossibility of labyrinthine subjectivity due to the strength of the plane of transcendence's reterritorializing forces. As he tells Barber: 'I'm going to kill you in every world.' The murder of Barber is a symbolic death, describing science's reduction of the virtual event to the actual state, the act which reterritorializes the labyrinthine, singular multiplicity of *Aion* into the straight line of *Chronos*. Consequently, Barber's myriad, virtual, becoming-other selves are all "killed" in their reduction to the singular, actual self. Again through its oblique references to *La jetée* and *Je t'aime, je t'aime*, Lepage's film points to the role of the scientist as one who maintains the linearity we saw enacted by Einstein in the previous chapter, through his privileging of a certain fixed perspective from which to judge all others. As Rodowick has shown of *Je t'aime, je t'aime*, it is the scientist's inability to conceive of time as the labyrinth that ensures his failure to understand, to gain intuition of, the virtual time travel undertaken by the labyrinthine subject.

As a result of the binary reasoning through which the meta-narrative enacts its reterritorialization of the labyrinth, Barber's appearance, although he is supposedly becoming-other throughout the film, remains ostensibly the same throughout his different incarnations. Joyce's appearance, however, changes radically each time. Tilda Swinton, who, as a star, we associate with a female becoming-other, due to her portrayal of Orlando in Sally Potter's film, seems the natural choice for this role. Yet Barber should also change as he slips between universes. The fact that he doesn't shows once again the binary into which labyrinthine films are reterritorialized, that of a multiple female role, and a singular male. Moreover, in the many recurring beach sequences Joyce also becomes equated with the sea, and Barber, the land. It is he, after all, who emerges from the phallic lighthouse to witness the men who can only speak the words; 'slab' and; 'block'. These terms are themselves symbolic, describing the
building blocks from which form is constructed. Joyce, for her part, is the underwater swimmer who could hold her breath for the longest as a child, and who wishes that she had gills. The binary that is maintained, to be clear, is between the fluid, molecular becomings of the sea, which are multiple, and female, and the solid, singular, male, form of the land.

Lepage's point seems to be that it is impossible for Deleuze's conception of time to exist as anything other than a dream if you exist in a universe ordered in such a way as to keep the man as the singular form (one brain, one rationality, one linear identity) and the woman, the multiple (labyrinthine identity). Indeed, this Barber himself realizes at the film's conclusion, when he states: 'There's only one world, I have been dreaming.' In the singular world of form, the labyrinth is all "just a dream". Finally, as the film ends, Barber speaks the final words; 'Thank God', when the light stops flashing out to sea. In the film's meta-narrative of "reality" this signifies that his wife has turned the vat's life-support system off. The linear narrative thus ending with recourse to a singular deity, and the end of the teleological male trajectory of the narrative (as it is also figured in the flashbacks of Wilder) is, predictably, Barber's death. Either this is a film which completely conforms to type, or, to give it the benefit of the doubt, Lepage's film uses its meta-fictional structure specifically in order to critique the movement-image's need to reterritorialize the labyrinth by positioning it as binary other, whenever it appears on film.

A Total Lack of Respect for the Law.

One film which perhaps goes even further than Lepage's is the little known independent noir, Liar (1997) directed by Josh and Jonas Pate. This film exposes the law as the force which attempts to get away with murder. The narrative involves the interrogation of James Wayland (Tim Roth) over the murder of a prostitute, Elizabeth Loftis (Renee Zellweger) by police officers Phillip Braxton (Chris Penn) and Edward Kennesaw (Michael Rooker). The film's gambit is that
Wayland, a habitual liar, can lie his way through a series of lie detector tests. His ability to beat the polygraph machine is shown to be due to his medical condition - he suffers from Temporal Lobe Epilepsy (T.L.E.) - and the medication which he takes as a result. The reason for his lying is that he believes Kennesaw to be guilty of the crime, and wants to blow the cover of the law as the one who gets away with murder.

As Wayland lies his way through the interrogation we begin to see the events of the night in question, replayed as a series of flashbacks. During this sequence, his ability to lie so effectively is shown to be due to his ability to falsify the past. Believing himself to be telling the truth he can defeat the polygraph, so long as he can falsify the past in such a way as to make the "false" answers he gives in the present, "true". This he does by matching a false past to his false answers. Wayland is a labyrinthine entity who utilizes the powers of the false. Hardly surprising, perhaps, in a film called 'Liar', Wayland is exactly the forger that Deleuze identified in post-war cinema. In contrast to the one past, the one truth which the police seek, with all their scientific methods, Wayland opposes the multiple pasts of the labyrinth, the multiple selves of Wayland.

After his first polygraph test, left alone in the room by Braxton and Kennesaw, Wayland repeats to himself: 'I believe in me, I believe in me, I believe in me'. During this scene we see a glimpse of the park where he falsely claims to have first met Loftis on the night of her death. As it eventually turns out, he knew her much better than he says, but by making himself believe his own story, his false past, he is able to convince the police otherwise. In this way we are shown that his present self, and how truthful it is, depends upon the version of the past that he creates using the powers of the false. That Wayland is aware of his multiple existence is shown in one of the flashbacks to a previous conversation with Loftis. This is conducted, Paris/Texas style, on a telephone, through the window of a stripper's booth. In response to his philosophical croakings on the absence of any; 'Thinker behind the thought', she asks him; 'You always talk like this, don't you?'. He replies; 'No, I sometimes imitate people ... like myself. Watch, this is
my best Wayland ... like myself, like myself, like myself.' Wayland is well aware that the self is a performance, and that beneath each mask there is but another mask, making the self but a repetition which it is possible to either ontologically consolidate, by repeating it in the same way, or falsify, by repeating it differently. In contrast to the patrilineal cuckoo of Ripley, then, who initially imitates Dickie's father - an expression of his ability to validate his inauthentic impostoring through the retroactive positioning of himself as a false cause - Wayland understands his own identity to be a matter of self-performance without first cause. He is a series of masks which are, 'like myself, like myself, like myself'. Moreover, as this flashback is played, Wayland is denying ever having met Loftis before the night of the murder, thus emphasizing the way in which he falsifies the past through his performance of the self, his "lies".

This ability is shown most clearly in his testimony concerning his fictional meeting with Loftis. At this point, the noir technique of the voiceover is also falsified. As we saw with The Talented Mr Ripley, the voiceover is usually used in order to make the past a single, inevitable linear trajectory. As Ripley muses; 'If I could just go back ...' we are flashed back to the start of his story, and then watch as it is retold just as it happened. Thus the noir voiceover usually serves to legitimize the singular nature of what happened, one person's flashback serving as definitive evidence for the way in which the past occurred. In Liar, this technique is made to stutter, as Wayland relates the events of his supposed chance meeting with Loftis in the park.

In Wayland's case, instead of one person's memory legitimizing the singular occurrence of the past, the opposite happens, and one person's memory becomes multiple, as the past is falsified. Initially, his retelling of the meeting in the voiceover fits exactly with the conversation we see as it is played out in the flashback. Then things slowly begin to change. Wayland, creating a reason why his phone number was found in the dead Loftis' pocket, begins to falsify the past. 'Do you have a cigarette?' we see Loftis ask in the past. 'Do you wanna go get a drink? she says' we hear Wayland say in the present. He then extrapolates as we
watch Loftis searching her handbag for a cigarette: 'I'll have to raincheck I tell her, I'm not in the mood'. The stuttering of the past continues as we see her say; 'Oh God I'm dying for a cigarette' in the past, whilst Wayland simultaneously says, 'Well how can I reach you to cash it in? she says', in the present. Finally the past has been altered enough for him to posit his explanation: 'I pull out a piece of paper and give her my number'. With a new, contingent past, Wayland's story becomes "true", even through we know from the inconsistencies between the past (image) and the present (voiceover) that he is lying.

Eventually, Wayland and Kennesaw change places, and as Wayland asks Kennesaw questions, Kennesaw, hooked up to the polygraph machine, appears to implicate himself in the murder of Loftis. It transpires that he knew her, and was using her in order to execute violent role-playing fantasies in which she stood in for his wife. Although Kennesaw says he didn't kill Loftis, and the machine remains stable, when Wayland asks him if he killed his wife, the machine goes haywire. Kennesaw (the law) is thus implicated as the one who commits murder, through the othering (murdering) of women upon which the linearity of the patriarchal order is based. The ease of his substitution of women is thus explained, due to their object status (Loftis is a prostitute) as is his manipulation of all women into the role of the wife. The law is guilty of the binary division of men and women that is created through the playing out of gender roles as a perpetual repetition of the same.

The use of linear time in the establishing of this "truth" is also condemned by Wayland, who tells Kennesaw: 'Your whole life is a lie, from beginning to end.' Linear time is the beginning to the end of the lie that there is a singular truth, the patriarchal order. The fact that Wayland is aided in his quest against the law by an aging underworld matriarch, anatomically named 'Mook', further emphasizes the ungrounding of the masculine law that Wayland is attempting by using the usually feminine powers of the labyrinth.
For once, it seems, an attempt to unground the straight line with the labyrinth has been figured not as the protagonist's transgression against the law. Rather the transgression against the many possibilities that the labyrinth offers, which the law enacts, is shown to make it the guilty party. It is this reterritorialization which creates the binary which excludes women, represses men into a straight line, a linear narrative and singular past, and which thus gets away with murder. However, as usual, the Deleuzian scholar, searching in vain for an exception even if it is only to prove the rule, finds the story reterritorialized in a number of the usual ways.

It is Wayland's condition that provides him with the ability to falsify the past. Time travel and the falsifying of the past are here shown to be due to a chemical condition, in which the brain is able to black out deeds, to fool itself. It is thus Wayland's epilepsy which is used as an explanation for his ability to change personality. Once more, it is the mind which is privileged as the controlling force over all else, and the organism in which time moves, and not the reverse. Moreover, Wayland's false testimony, concerning his meeting with Loftis, can almost as easily be seen as the creation of a false origin, from which the "truth" of his statement in the present is validated. Most importantly, we are left unsure at the end as to exactly who did kill Loftis, as some small doubt still remains as to whether or not it was really Kennesaw. In the final twist, after Wayland has successfully faked his own death, we see him, once again, out stalking young women in the park. Perhaps, after all, it was he, the labyrinthine man, who was the one guilty of getting away with murder. Indeed, as Wayland's power to falsify time is equated with his inability to have sex (sex being shown to be a stressful act which brings on his epilepsy) we are left with the representation of a mentally ill, possibly murderous liar, who is not seen as potent enough to take part in history, in the regeneration of the species, and the heterosexual law of the patriarchal order. Moreover, Wayland is also "deceased", in the sense of having lost his essential self through the performing of his identity.
Once again, the implications of the ungrounding of time are too vast for us to grasp in a way that is not at least reterritorialized to some small degree. Furthermore, despite the film's acknowledgement of who it is who is really getting away with murder, and its portrayal of the guilt of the law, the minor league cult status of the film ensures that it merely exists as the exception which proves the general tendency of the movement-image to be the rule. The one trend that we do seem to be seeing here, despite the pessimism of the conclusions we have drawn so far, is a greater preponderance of films, especially in the 1990s, in which labyrinthine time and performativity are expressed as being mutually dependent. Despite the reterritorializations enacted upon these films by the movement-image, the fact is that more and more of them are emerging. Before *Lola Rennt*, for instance, Tomas Tykwer's *Winterschläfer* (1997) explored the actions of a character, René, who suffered from a physical condition very similar to that of Shelby's in *Memento*. As we might expect, René is yet another character who gets away with murder through the forgetting of the past. Despite the usual reterritorializations, there does seem to be a much greater degree of self-consciousness about these films. It is almost as though the clichéd reterritorializations of pat morality have been piling up for so long that the ungrounding force of the labyrinth needs a greater release each time. Indeed, the reterritorializations needed to bring this new unthought monster under control each time are such that films about time are having to become more and more convoluted, as we saw was the case with *Memento*.

As a possible, solitary exception, David Lynch's *Lost Highway* (1996) goes out of its way to avoid such reterritorializations. It is a film which is almost impossible to interpret in any one way as it is, simultaneously, eternally returning Möbius, a labyrinth between whose universes characters slip, and an exploration of male performativity through difference. Yet, adopting such a strategy of convolution in order to avoid reterritorialization is itself almost certain to lead to the film's reterritorialization as art cinema, or cult other. Moreover, *Lost Highway's* success in this respect also makes his more recent treatment of feminine masquerade, *Mulholland Drive*, seem all the more conservative by contrast.
The question which the movement-image's constant need to reterritorialize seems to beg is, why must we always do this? Why must the binary always be privileged, why the linearity of time always restored, and why such pessimism towards labyrinthine performativity? The answer to these questions returns us to the point at which we began this project, WWII and the shifts of power, especially between Europe and America, that occurred in its aftermath. How can we advocate labyrinthine performativity, and becoming-other, when our lives, our pasts, are marked by national, collective, and individual, culpability in the events of the past? History, truth, the maintenance of the nation, and the global balance of power, are all at stake in the "amoral" claims to falsification performed by the characters in these films. In order to conclude this thesis, then, the final chapter will initially analyse Costa-Gavras' *The Music Box* (1989) before turning to examine the struggle for reterritorialization of the labyrinth at work in two 90s films about the second world war, from a French and an American perspective. These are, *Un Héros très discret* (1995) and *Saving Private Ryan* (1998).

2 Ibid., p. 24.

3 Ibid., p. 25.

4 Once again we are making a direct reference to Deleuze and Guattari's notion of 'becoming-woman'. By referring to it as 'becoming-queer' we are attempting to mitigate the privileged status given to this becoming by Deleuze and Guattari, who maintained that it was the first becoming through which all flights from being must pass. This assumption is, as we showed in the previous chapter (see endnote 9) heterosexually biased. Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia II (London: The Athlone Press, 1987), p. 277.


6 Ibid.

7 The history of Hollywood's portrayal of the homosexual as murderer is charted (amongst other debates) by Vito Russo, in his book, The Celluloid Closet. Discussing the outrage caused by William Friedkin's Cruising (1980), for instance, Russo states: 'The audience is left with the message that homosexuality is not only contagious but inescapably brutal.' In this film, violence is seen to be inherent to homosexuality itself. In contrast, Russo posits Penelope Spheeris' The Boys Next Door (1986), in which the violence of the homosexual is seen to be a consequence of his need to repress his desires. See, Russo, Vito, The Celluloid Closet: Homosexuality in the Movies (New York: Harper & Row, 1985), p. 259. Admittedly, Minghella's film does make explicit the link that he is drawing between sexual repression and violence. Interestingly, it is the heterosexual lifestyle that is here contagious and seductive, and to which the homosexual eventually succumbs. In this way, the film stands as something of an inverse mirror to the undercover cop film, Cruising. In this film, Pacino's character falls into the mire of homosexuality through the performance of a queer identity. Minghella's film, by contrast, shows how easy it is to fall in love with the heterosexual lifestyle through the playing out of its roles, even to the point of committing murder in order to maintain said lifestyle. As an illustration of the traps set by the closet, then, the film functions admirably. This does not detract, however, from its use of linear time, and its binary representation of sexuality (in which Ripley's actions must ultimately stand as the failure of a homosexual to perform his identity without losing his essential self) in order to disavow the possibilities inherent within the labyrinth.

8 Deleuze, Cinema 2, op. cit., p. 48. Deleuze's approach, in fact, points to a contradiction inherent in Richard Dyer's argument, that whilst voiceover in film noir points to the fated nature of the narrative, flashback suggests the opposite. For Dyer, flashback in film noir 'casts into doubt the status-as-truth of the events presented.' In fact, when voiceover and flashback accompany each other, as they do in Minghella's film, the voiceover simply serves to consolidate the 'status-as-truth' of the events which take place in the flashback. This we shall discuss further in our analysis of Liar. See, Dyer, Richard, 'Homosexuality and Film Noir', Jump Cut Vol. 16, November (1977), pp. 18-21, p. 15.
11 As Eve Sedgwick notes, this is a practice which the law actively contributes to. She says: 'The most obvious fact about this historical formulation is that it codifies an excruciating system of double binds, systematically oppressing gay people, identities and acts by undermining through contradictory constraints on discourse the grounds of their very being. In Sedgwick, Eve, *The Epistemology of the Closet* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), p. 70.
12 op. cit., p. 16.
13 James, 'My Bloody Valentine', op. cit., p. 16.
14 Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, op. cit., p. 123.
15 op. cit., p. 19.
16 op. cit., p. 54.
18 It should be noted that what we have argued for sexuality and homophobia, Krin Gabbard has gone a long way towards showing for race. Although a much less obvious subtext to the film, Minghella's film is also historically revisionist in its depiction, and use, of music. The way in which the film uses jazz, both in its narrative and on its soundtrack, retroactively appropriates the origins of this musical form for the white, European, upper classes. The history of an underground movement which actually has Afro-American roots is here rewritten, with 1950s Europe posited as the official, white origin of the history of jazz. At time of writing this is a working paper entitled: 'Pomo-crypto-Afro: White Racial Politics in *Pleasantville* and The Talented Mr Ripley'. Given at: *Screen* conference, Glasgow University, Glasgow, Scotland, 29 June - 1 July 2001. In email conversation with the author, 22/02/02, he added:

The film version of *The Talented Mr. Ripley* clearly draws on narratives about closeted gay characters, but it also recalls the genre of 'passing' novels. The best known example, of course, is Nella Larsen's *Passing*, but the list of novels in which African American characters pass for white also includes Charles Chesnutt's *The House Behind the Cedars*, James Weldon Johnson's *Autobiography of an Ex-Colored Man*, Walter White's *Flight*, Jessie Fauset's *Plum Bun*, and Charles Johnson's *Oxherding Tale*. In *The Talented Mr. Ripley*, however, a white protagonist seeks to pass as a White Negro. The film denies the African American aspect of this identity, just as it almost completely refuses to represent the black jazz artists who inspired it.

20 Marks states:
Bergson diminishes such "impulsive" bodily memory as inferior to a more selective memory that actualizes only what is useful. In arguing for the value of mimetic knowledge I am giving greater value to what Bergson called "habit", which I will argue is a knowledge of the body more highly cultivated than he acknowledges.


23 Braidotti, Rosi, 'How to Endure Intensity: Towards a Sustainable Nomadic Subject', in, Patricia Pisters (ed.), *Micropolitics of Media Culture: Reading the Rhizomes of Deleuze and Guattari* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2001), pp. 177-201, p. 182.


25 At time of writing, *Possible Worlds* has yet to be released on video, and has only enjoyed a limited distribution in independent cinemas specializing in 'art house' films. It is hoped that factual inaccuracies on the part of the author will be forgiven due to his inability to check the source material again.

26 Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, op. cit., p. 17.


In light of the conclusions drawn in the previous two chapters we will now turn our attention to the context within which these movement-images emerged. This will enable us to offer new directions for future exploration by situating the 90s films discussed and the "history" of cinema offered by Deleuze's cinema texts within its global context. This chapter, then, whilst offering certain, general conclusions, is in fact also intended as a reflection of an area yet to be explored by film studies. Using Deleuze's models of the movement- and the time-image, what can be said of the differences between the continental, or perhaps rather, the global context in which these images emerged? What can "Europe" and "America" tell us about the "western" films we have discussed so far?

Firstly, through an analysis of Costa-Gavras' *The Music Box* (1989) we will illustrate the way in which the lawful linearity of national history is itself based upon the simultaneous utilization and disavowal of the labyrinth. This analysis will allow us to demonstrate how the powers of the false which are utilized in order to establish the narrative of the nation are marginalized through their conflation with an inherently evil other. We will then proceed to draw a very broad distinction between the different representations of the past found in American movement-images, and European time-images. In particular we will contrast Steven Spielberg's *Saving Private Ryan* (1998) as expression of the straight line of time of American national history, and Jacques Audiard's *Un Héros très discret* (1995) as representative of European cinema's self-consciousness in regard to the use and disavowal of the labyrinth. America and Europe will be examined as contexts whose histories and populations inform the emergence of the different views of time seen in the movement- and the time-image.
As we saw in chapters four and five, the main reason for the conservative, becoming-reactive of the labyrinth's forces is the need to uphold the single time of history. This official, truthful account of the past retains its legitimacy through the exclusion, or marginalization, of all potentially ungrounding forces. Consequently, instead of a line ungrounded by a labyrinth, we have a line opposed by its binary other, the labyrinth. The movement-image, moreover, reterritorializes the labyrinthine performativity of its characters within a binary which upholds the straight line of time as male, and the labyrinth as its female other. In this way, the danger which the labyrinth affords the line of time, its potential ungrounding force when harnessed by either gender, is reduced to either an illegal act when performed by men, or a legally sanctioned but extremely temporary act, when performed by women. This conclusion, however, needs to be placed within a more specific context. As we saw with the films with female leads, for instance, the urban, national, or global context in which they emerge also effects the way in which they are reterritorialized. Thus, although the gender binary which we uncovered in these narratives draws us towards the conclusion that it is history that is at stake, exactly whose history are we talking about? Is this a phenomenon that is nationally specific, or is there a broader movement at work in these 90s films?

Deleuze's privileging of WWII as the site of transition at which the time-image emerged would suggest that this is actually a global question. The atrocities that occurred during the war, after all, enabled the realization that the entire world was culpable for the crimes committed on all sides. The Final Solution, for instance, was an act which, economically speaking, flew in the face of all reason in time of war. Unjustifiable in the usual respects, how could this type of genocide be understood? As Peter Canning states as part of his discussion of the ethics of cinema evident in Claude Lanzmann's Shoah (1985):

... no commonplace explanation for the holocaust has been found that could be agreed upon by educated men and women to serve as moral lesson: the thing just refuses to fit into any intelligible category. The mass extermination of a "race" that was serving a useful economic
function just does not make economic sense - the only kind of sense that democratic capitalist democracy is equipped to recognize. Taking Jews off war-production assembly lines (where there were shortages of workers, and when the war machine was desperate for supplies) and feeding them into incinerators is evidence of economic self-destruction, of insanity.¹

This unjustifiable military and economic lunacy could only be understood as an exposition of the way in which the binary of exclusion works when taken to its n'th degree. As this binary reasoning tempers all thinking, it should have been impossible for anyone, globally, to deny their involvement in this atrocity. The singular narrative of history, that which had previously been maintained by both the nations of the victors and the vanquished, was, after all, also based upon this same binary. How was it possible, then, for the continuity of this narrative to remain uninterrupted in the post-war years? It is for this reason that Deleuze believes the time-image to have emerged when it did, signifying a global recognition of the crisis of truth, and the subsequent crisis of the movement-image's truth-seeking narrative.

Yet, despite this realization, and despite the brief emergence of the ungrounding force of the time-image, the movement-image maintained its dominance in the post-war years. Moreover, it still does so today. Why is it that, even with the self-awareness caused by the war, that very awareness which called the falsifying time-image into existence, we still hold true to the binary? Why is it still: 'Hitler and Hollywood, Hollywood and Hitler'?²

Perhaps the realization is simply too much to bear. Perhaps for this reason whenever a labyrinthine performance of identity threatens to unground the straight line of time we refuse to countenance the crisis of truth which it will inevitably bring to light. Hiding behind our seemingly consistent belief in the "truth", we posit that the mass extermination of the Jews was but the act of an innately evil other. In this way we maintain the straight line of time, and negate
the necessity of having to face our own culpability in the maintenance of this system of thought. But this is not the answer. The reason is much less forgiving than simply human frailty. The reason is human "strength". In point of fact, we uphold the line of time, history, and the singularity of truth, by deliberately representing labyrinthine performativity as the most dangerous, or innately evil, force known to man. We do this because we need, or rather, we want, the law. This is the case even though we know that the law is to blame for atrocities such as the holocaust, atrocities, moreover, committed in our name.

As Deleuze and Guattari showed in *Anti-Oedipus*, it is the fascism in all of us, our desire to become-reactive which ensures that desire ultimately desires its own repression. It was for this reason that the post-war realization of our collective guilt was immediately reterritorialized, and the binary retained. As Canning further states, we:

... hang on to illusion by repressing the truth (awareness of its false condition) and sustaining a disciplinary-subjective position torn between fantasies of transgression, with occasional peccadilloes, and its own bad conscience (the "normal neurotic" position represented by the "Name of the Father").

This is the real reason why the movement-image, with its linear narrative, and its binary structure maintains its dominance today. Through its reterritorializations, the lawful, patrilineal heritage which history maintains (the ... "Name of the Father")) is maintained as the upholder of a truth. According to our binary reasoning, it is against this truth which the wartime losers must have, we retroactively judge, transgressed.

It is for this reason that so many post-war representations of the Nazis have emphasized both their tendency towards homosexuality, their inherent evilness, and their duplicitousness. In Roberto Rossellini's, *Roma Città Aperta* (1945) for instance, the female Nazi, Ingrid (Giovanna Galletti) is a preying lesbian who
seduces Italian women with the promise of drugs and fine clothing. The homosexuality of the effete Major Bergmann, moreover, is suggested through his effeminate mannerisms. Rossellini famously cast the dancer Harry Feist in this role as he felt his gestures evoked the decadence befitting a Nazi. The duplicitousness of the Nazis is also stressed by the layout of the rooms in Gestapo Headquarters. From torture chamber, Bergmann passes easily through a door to his office, and then through another to the sitting room where he and his friends drink and chat amiably. The layout of the rooms is used to show that behind the façade of cultured respectability there lies an inherent evil, that which the Nazis practise upon the bodies of their enemies.

Through this type of representation, the Nazi, as marginalized other, takes on the collective guilt of the victorious allied powers. Hence the holocaust becomes simply the action of an inherently evil, degenerate, other nation. This effectively erases the memory of the myriad, equally heinous colonial acts of mass genocide previously committed by the victorious powers, Britain, America, and so on. In terms of time this mechanism also works to ensure that the labyrinth, and indeed, the notion of a discontinuous history, is a force equated with evil. Legally, its powers allow, as Canning says, only temporary ‘fantasies of transgression’ such as those of Sliding Doors, and Lola Rennt. Illegally, or rather, essentially, however, it is a force for pure evil, the force that gets away with murder. The reasons behind this maintenance of the exclusive binary which perpetuates the myth of a singular, continuous history in the west, in spite of the realizations made during the war, is figured in The Music Box.

Musical Heirs.

The Music Box is the story of a female lawyer, Ann Talbot (Jessica Lange) whose elderly father, Mike Laszlo (Armin Müller-Stahl) is accused of war crimes. It is alleged that, during the latter stages of WWII, whilst serving as part of the Hungarian Special Section (a Gestapo-organized death squad, locally
named the 'Arrow Cross') Laszlo personally tortured and murdered a number of Hungarian Jews. With the conclusion to the war he fled Hungary as a refugee. On arrival in the US, he gained citizenship by claiming to have previously been employed as a farmer. He then worked in a steel mill for thirty years, raised an all-American family, and took part in anti-communist demonstrations. The story centres on Ann's defense of her father, during which she discovers that he was in fact the barbarous monster, 'Mishka' who committed the crimes of which all-American Mike Laszlo is accused. The film's conclusion, as Laszlo is legally acquitted, follows her own personal investigation into the patriarchal conspiracy to cover up his transformation (from Mishka to Mike) at both a personal, and a nation level. Eventually she blows the whistle on both her father and the patriarchal order, primarily to stop her own son, named Mikey, after his Grandfather, from following in his footsteps.

In this respect The Music Box appears to be a film which acknowledges the dangers of labyrinthine performativity, when the past is falsified in order to cover up crimes against humanity. As well as obvious parallels with real war criminals, Laszlo's character can thus be read as a stand-in for historical revisionists like the pro-Nazi author, David Irving. Bringing Laszlo to justice rightfully maintains the legitimacy of "truth" in relation to one single past, one single history. Yet the film is by no means this simplistic.

Actually, it is the story of two fathers. In counterpoint to Laszlo, Costa-Gavras offers Ann Talbot's father-in-law (Mikey's other grandfather) from whose son, Dean, Ann is now divorced. Harry Talbot is a highly successful, right-wing lawyer. Together, Ann's two fathers, Talbot and Laszlo, are depicted in the film as the same force, in both its American, and its European incarnation. They are the patriarchal law which maintains its power through the illusion of its unchanging continuity. This is so even though its constantly shifting political alliances, especially those evident at the end of WWII and the start of the cold war, ensure that it is actually a discontinuous force. The law, we are shown, utilizes the labyrinth, but hides its inherent duplicitousness beneath the façade of
maintained respectability, the straight line of national history. Thus the case to determine Laszlo's guilt as the labyrinthine, duplicitous Nazi hiding behind the legality of American history becomes, through the conflation of these two father figures, an exposé of the law itself. The film illustrates how, in order to maintain the dominant, global position which it achieved at the end of WWII, America's historical, righteous, and legal entitlement to the position of "good" must be maintained at all costs. Furthermore, complicity with the fallen Nazi regime in the immediate post-war, and the ensuing cold war, years must be sutured over by a consistent, continuous historical narrative. This is why it is so important that Laszlo's guilt be not proven, and the law's utilization of the labyrinth disavowed.

At first glance, this film seems extremely conventional. Laszlo is, once again, the perfect expression of the forger. He is a man with two histories, both an Hungarian and an American past. These respective pasts, moreover, are associated with his two names; Mishka, in Hungary, and Mike, in America. Laszlo is thus a character who uses his epistemic, discontinuous history to enable him to perform his identity differently in different contexts. As usual, the labyrinth is shown to be duplicitous, and used by the man who attempts to get away with murder. Laszlo's forgery of himself as all-American citizen, moreover, hides an essential self that is, as the Federal Prosecutor, Burke (Frederic Forrest) has it; 'Pure evil.' In his opening courtroom address, Burke states:

'Mr Laszlo committed crimes so heinous that the mind boggles trying to comprehend them. We are not speaking here of the banality of evil, of an anonymous bureaucrat sitting in an office giving orders, or a gendarme executing orders. We are speaking of a man who committed these heinous crimes with his own hands. We are speaking of evil incarnate.'

For Burke, crimes committed by those in the system, or by extension, the bureaucratic system of the law itself, are not really crimes. It is only the inherently evil nature of Mishka that makes him guilty. Thus the complicity of everyone in the extermination of the Jews is denied, and the new scapegoat that
is offered for our communal guilt is the labyrinthine, sadistic, Nazi pervert. In a perfect expression of binary justice, the guilt of otherness with which the Jews were lumbered by the Nazi's, here switches to the ex-Nazi.

Were it not for the conflation of Laszlo with Talbot, then, we would be looking at yet another plot of the type we saw in the previous chapter, in which an essential, murderous, evil, self was to be seen hiding beneath a performative masquerade. In fact, if the film upheld Burke's (Federal) opinion as its dominant narrative voice, then the guilt of everyone who participates in the same bureaucratic war machine would be, effectively, negated. It would be as though it were saying that is not "we" who are to blame for upholding the law, that same law which caused the holocaust. Rather, it is the few bad apples who actually enjoy killing, these are the guilty ones. There is still evil, Burke's statement would suggest, and because of this we know that we are not it.

Alongside Laszlo, however, and ensuring that Burke's interpretation is not the dominant voice in the film, there is Talbot. Talbot also has a discontinuous history. In fact, he has a history as part of the secret service which is continuous, but which, in contrast to the officially sanctioned view of American history, appears duplicitous, labyrinthine, and dishonourable. In point of fact, Talbot, symbol of American law, and American history, is temporally the same labyrinthine character as Laszlo. The trial of Laszlo, then, is also the trial of Talbot. The threat of ungrounding which the straight line of time faces is not so much a threat in terms of the disintegration of its power, but rather, the discovery of its own use, and disavowal, of the labyrinth which lies beneath the façade of history.

Early on in the film, Sandy, one of Ann's colleagues, tells her what the 'word' is on Talbot. He says:
'Harry was in the O.S.S. during the war y'know, then the O.S.S. becomes the C.I.A. then the C.I.A. sets up its first little spy apparatus in Europe by putting a bunch of Gestapo guys on the payroll. Word is, Harry used to sip bourbon with Klaus Barbie.'

To which Ann replies:

'Well, the word I heard was that he sipped bourbon with senators. He even sipped bourbon in The Whitehouse a couple of times. I never heard anything about Klaus Barbie.'

The two stories concerning Talbot are telling. The 'word' given by Sandy is the story of a discontinuous history, in which America shifts from being the enemy of Nazism, to the ally of ex-Nazis. This is due, we are told on numerous occasions throughout the film, to the need for allies against the new threat of evil in the post-war world, the Communists. As the threat changed, the binary also shifted. From America, good, vs Nazism, bad, to America, good, vs Communism, bad. It would not be too cynical to see this as a very little shift in allegiances. In fact, it is a continuous history of sorts for the Americans, and the Nazi's, both of whom retain a certain amount of control of western Europe after the war. What is important, however, is that whether this is much of a political shift or not, the official smokescreen of continuity remains in place. This is evidenced in the 'word' heard by Ann. Despite Talbot's chequered past - first in the O.S.S., fighting Nazism, and then in the C.I.A using ex-Nazis to fight Communism - he has remained officially sanctioned through his links with the government. Here we see how the straight line of his official American history is used to cover his labyrinthine shifts of identity in relation to Europe. The global dominance of American history, then, is seen to be based upon the maintenance of the effacement of its own duplicitousness, the realization of which would threaten to unground its stability.

In counterpoint to Laszlo, post-war cinema's forger, Talbot represents the 'truthful man'. Drawing on Nietzsche, Deleuze shows how the destiny of the
forger in post-war cinema is always shown to be based upon that of the truthful man. The truthful man is he who establishes the normative standard of the good.

The truthful man in the end wants nothing other than to judge life; he holds up a superior value, the good, in the name of which he will be able to judge, he is craving to judge, he sees in life an evil, a fault which is to atoned for, the moral origin of the notion of truth. 5

Yet the forger and the truthful man are inextricably linked, for how can the forger forge without a model upon which to create his forgery? Indeed, as this process is a double movement, how can the truthful man establish the good without an evil against which to oppose himself. As Deleuze has it:

Behind the truthful man there is the forger ... and the one constantly refers back to the other. ... In short, the forger cannot be reduced to a simple copier, nor to a liar, because what is false is not simply a copy, but already the model. 6

The very idea of a model, of a normative measure of the true, of one official history, is but a fiction based upon the workings of the labyrinth. In a rather circuitous process, a labyrinthine forgery of time creates the illusory model of the straight line of time. Using this model the truthful man establishes the legality of history, and gives birth to the good. From the good then stems the notion that the labyrinth is the bad copy. It is for this reason that, as our analysis of the forger in the previous chapter showed, he is forever unable to break free of the binary. His transgressive actions themselves only help to maintain the system which he hopes to unground. The truthful man, he of the law, actually predicates his legitimacy upon a labyrinthine falsifying of the past, but maintains his authority by disavowing this process. Laszlo and Talbot are effectively shown to be the same: the forger and the truthful man who constantly refer one 'back to the other'.
Admittedly, Laszlo's attempts to perform his identity differently in order to evade punishment for his war crimes illustrate the extreme dangers to which labyrinthine performativity can lead. How can we be sure of anyone's guilt for their past actions, after all, if they can willfully become-other? For this reason, illustrating the disguise of the essential self that Laszlo undertakes no longer seems to be quite such a reactionary move as it was seen to be in the previous chapter. Surely we should unmask such perpetrators, their disguises should be seen through? Whilst this is beyond question, what this film is trying to show us, rather like Liar does, is that the very law which sits in judgement upon such performativity is itself guilty of the exact same crimes. It is for this reason that Talbot also has so much to lose in this case, for if one forger is uncovered, so too is the truthful man, his ally.

Laszlo's guilt is established in the film narrative in ways which are by now becoming easy to recognize. In particular, beneath all the masks the film goes to great lengths to establish the continuity of his essential self. This technique, however, is here also used by the film to foreground the artificially constructed nature of US national identity. Since coming to America, Laszlo has built himself a cover in order to hide his past. He has adopted American values and become, as he says; 'A citizen, a good American'. He worked in a steel mill for thirty years. He has two children. His son, Karchi, (Michael Rooker) is a blue-collar steel-worker like Laszlo himself. Moreover, as a veteran of the Vietnam war he has risked his life for his country. Ann for her part, is a lawyer, and, whilst she slowly sheds her political naiveté during the film, she is initially shown to be "in bed" with the law. Although having divorced Talbot's son, Dean, she has kept her married name.

Laszlo has also made an exhibition of himself on television, protesting against the visit of the Hungarian National Folk Dancers, a Communist organized dancing group. This action was, as Burke comments, perpetrated both to create an alibi as to why the Hungarian government might wish to dirty his name, and also to establish him as an enemy of Communism; 'a good American' in the
strictly oppositional sense. He has effectively created a new life for himself, he
has become-other, but this is seen by the film to be but a smokescreen; 'the
perfect camouflage' as Burke has it. This interpretation of his actions is
highlighted over the incident in which protestors attack his house and a picture
of Laszlo, defending his home with baseball bat in hand, is printed in the paper.
Talbot congratulates Ann on this publicity saying:

'You must be elated this morning! Old man in a [Chicago] Bears' cap, his
arm round his grandson, being threatened by a screaming mob. The
jury'll love it.'

Mikey's presence, pictured at Laszlo's side, along with the all-American ideal of
the right to defend the family homestead (the legitimization of violence against
all evil doers) makes this an image that is the epitome of American family
values. In Laszlo's use of his citizenship as a cover, becoming-other is figured as
a charade which covers an essential self in whom an originary evil exists.
National identity, moreover, is here seen to be an image that can be abused by
the cuckoo, Laszlo. His actions, consequently, force us to question just how
authentic this national identity is in the first place. American history, the film
suggests through this analogy, is constructed in a way similar to Laszlo's auto­
biographical identity. Behind the façade of American values, after all, is the
disguising of a European led mass genocide, that of the native Americans. By
focusing on the essential self and its European origins, the film questions
whether it is ever possible to escape this heritage through labyrinthine
performativity, or whether the present is ever anything but a continuation of the
murderous, exclusive past?

There are several ways in which the film establishes the body as a continuous
organism in which the truth of identity is maintained. Most importantly, Laszlo's
constant obsession with press-ups is used to provide a continuity between the
murderous Mishka and the all-American Mike. From the torture of Mishka's
victims, by press-ups over bayonet, to bedtime exercises with grandson Mikey,
Laszlo's habit physically evidences the "real" man behind the imagery of the all-
American mask. Again, in the courtroom, just prior to his heart attack, Laszlo protests against accusations of barbarism, shouting: 'This man didn't do this. It's not me'. His body, however, as his heart gives out at this moment, gives the lie to his words. Behind all his protestations of performative identity change, of; 'It's not me', his body tells another truth. Indeed, both Laszlo and Ann evidence their Hungarian heritage in mistakes, or slips, when speaking English. Here, once again, the organism betrays their essential otherness, their European origins, and foregrounds the disguise that is national identity. The labyrinthine, European roots of American national identity are thus hinted at in order to draw attention to the historical construction of an apparently continuous set of American values. These are values, moreover, which are themselves based upon the genocidal extraction (like the holocaust, the ultimate marginalization of the other) of the native American. Laszlo and Talbot, as Europe and America, are conflated in order to show their complicity in the marginalization of the other (at its extreme, mass genocide) upon which the law establishes its legitimacy. Moreover, it shows how this cover up is only made possible through a strategic use of the labyrinth to create a singular, continuous linear narrative of the nation.

Finally, the guilt of Laszlo's originary self is unmasked in the courtroom, in which all the witnesses are asked to identify not Laszlo, as he is now, but rather his picture from 1944. Whatever has happened to him since then, whatever becomings he has attempted (and in a sense, the film offers that he could have already served a life sentence, having worked for 30 years in a steel mill) it is his essential, European self to which the guilt is attributed. In addition to this, when Ann finally realizes the truth it is through seeing an old picture of Tibor Zoltan's scarred face whilst on her visit to Hungary. His face having been corrected through plastic surgery, no one had previously been able to link Laszlo's blackmailer to his past as Mishka. Once Zoltan's essential self is uncovered by Ann, however, the body is, once again, seen to be something which cannot legitimately become-other. Rather, it can only be disguised in order to get away with murder, the same action with which American national identity was born.
The case ultimately hangs on whether or not Laszlo's Arrow Cross identity card is real, or a forgery which the Hungarian Communists were using to persecute him. As her star witness, Talbot provides Ann with an ex-KGB agent who has defected to the west. He describes the workings of 'Operation Harlequin', a policy pursued by the Communists, of creating forged documents to sully the name of those who had left Eastern Europe after the war. This witness ensures that it is the Communists who now appear labyrinthine, willing to falsify the past and create dishonourable personal histories for their enemies. Identity finally boils down to a question of whether or not Laszlo's past has been falsified by himself, or by others. Who is the evil labyrinthine power? With Laszlo's guilt 'not proven', it is the Communists who are finally found guilty, guilty of hoisting a false, brightly coloured, harlequin's façade, a disguise, behind which to falsify identity. Once again, by making the powers of the false a technique peculiar to the other, the American nation retains the illusion of legitimacy for its own national narrative, and disavows the labyrinthine discontinuities which it contains.

Costa-Gavras's film shows how, in the post-war years, America united with old enemies in Western Europe against Communism. In order to achieve this discontinuous shift it created a false, seemingly continuous history in which it was retroactively seen to be the singular, truthful power. The conflation of Ann's two fathers makes this an international conspiracy of the right-wing, patriarchal, bureaucratic, war-machine. With his guilt not proven, Laszlo joins the side of the law once again, with his false past in Hungary, as policeman, apparently vindicated. Like Harry, his labyrinthine falsifying of his identity now appears as a lawful straight line from which he has never deviated. In *The Music Box*, the masculine, linear history of national tradition is shown to be the cause of an evil in which we are all caught. As Jan Epstein has it of the film's dominant symbol:

> At the heart of Costa-Gavras' film is the powerful metaphor of the folksy, charming old European music box churning out murderous and obscene images to the accompaniment of tinkling music.
This patriarchal use of nation as a façade beneath which to hide the guilt of exclusion is shown to be universal. Both Laszlo, in Hungary, and Talbot, in America are guilty of upholding the same process. It is not by accident that when Ann visits Talbot in his office he also has a music box. The murderous past of both man and nation is thus shown to be hidden beneath a façade of history. This is Ann's discovery when she finds the pictures of the murderous Mishka in the music box. Indeed, when Ann is given vital (although entirely uncorroborated) evidence by an unknown source in Hungary, it is yet another seemingly charming old man who delivers the documents to her. He states: 'There are some people here too. We believe your father innocent. This trial is bad for everybody, both here and there.' In this way the film shows that not only is there a universal risk to the law, for, if one labyrinthine forger is illuminated, so too are all truthful men, but so too is there a danger to the international patriarchal conspiracy which exists behind all national façades.

The maintenance of the façade of history is further attributed to the two fathers when Mikey's admits to having been told by his grandpa that the holocaust was; 'all a big exaggeration ... all made up'. When Ann confronts Laszlo with this, however, he denies it, and Mikey, distressed, says that it was grandpa Talbot who said it. Talbot, however, also denies it. He goes so far as to say; 'Mikey and I never discuss politics'. Obviously, one of them is lying. Moreover, if it is Laszlo who is lying, which seems more likely, then so too is Mikey learning to lie in order to maintain a patriarchal façade. In the scene in which Ann, returning from Hungary, finally confronts her father, this confusion over the two is deliberately left unresolved. Although our suspicions rest with Laszlo, the forger, we also here see Talbot, the truthful man, telling the press how the country should concentrate less on its grandfathers, and more on its grandsons. It is the national heritage, and its continuation through male lineage which is foregrounded. Servant of the law, Talbot is equally as adept at establishing a political smokescreen as Laszlo is, equally as good a liar. As he tells Ann, of the Gestapo intelligence agents who he did sip bourbon with: 'None of the men I knew were monsters. They were all salt of the earth types, like your old man'. When it is politically expedient to do so, the truthful man will sip bourbon with
Klaus Barbie, and provide him with a 'salt of the earth' identity cover, so long as this enables him to maintain power. Legitimizing his actions, and perhaps also attempting to convince himself through his own binary rhetoric, he argues that in the immediate post-war years the Communists were: 'Satan's army on earth'. For this reason, he says, they were; 'Right' to use the ex-Gestapo intelligence against this inherently evil, even satanic enemy. Thus the forger and the truthful man refer the one back to the other, through the truthful man's use of the labyrinth, paradoxically, to establish his seemingly continuous authority.

The final straw for Ann comes when Laszlo claims Mikey for himself ('He's my boy, he's my son') and for his violent heritage. Shouting to Mikey, in front of the press cameras, to sit up in the saddle, 'Like a General', Laszlo expresses his wish to pass on his patriarchal, militaristic tradition to his grandson. The image of manhood into which he would mould Mikey is equated at this point with that of himself - the uniformed Arrow Cross killer, captured committing murders during the war - in the photos which Ann finds in the music box. The binary workings of the upholder of the law are also evident at this point, in his reaction to her threat of exposure. 'What did the Communists do to you?' he asks, shifting her to the side of the marginalized other. Then, with; 'They are going to say that you are crazy' and; 'Something happened to your mind' he finally exiles her as duplicitous, feeble minded woman, to the side of his enemies.

Sadly, and in fact, inevitably for the movement-image, when Ann exposes her two fathers to the world, she herself only upholds the line of time. As guilty parties, they have simply transgressed the law. Their labyrinthine crimes will now work to uphold the more general legitimacy of the law which finds them guilty. Far from everyone being implicated, the guilt will fall on the few who have seemingly deceived the righteous many. Moreover, pictured at the film's end, with her son, looking out to sea, in her opposition to the law of her fathers, Ann herself becomes marginalized to the position of the labyrinthine other. As was the case with Possible Worlds, although supposedly a positive image, gazing out to sea, the woman is here again equated with the flux and becoming
of water, thus opposing her to the male form of the land. Saving her son, and thereby ensuring that he does not continue the patriarchal smokescreen of his grandfathers, creates a discontinuous line of history for Mikey. Yet this is ultimately seen to be a women's time which stands in opposition to the male time of continuous history. In spite of all her efforts to the contrary, Ann has become the labyrinthine other which legitimizes the male law.

The context into which the movement-images discussed in the previous two chapters emerged is that of a post-war milieu conscious that any attempt to unground the law will inevitably result in a re-affirming of the legitimacy of the law. As the time-image's recurrence constantly illustrates, the movement-image can never be ungrounded by the labyrinth, as it bases its own existence upon a reterritorialization of its powers of the false. Thus the time-image, the forger, and the movement-image, the truthful man, are caught up in a mutually re-enforcing process. When this binary process is played out solely within a movement-image, moreover, its linear narrative inevitably ensures that any exposure of the law's dishonesty will simply serve to maintain its position as law. Contemplating the notion of getting away with murder is, in fact, the most legal of all procedures. It is perfect practice for the next generation of grandsons who will need to maintain the patriarchal smokescreen. It is this disavowal of the labyrinth, after all, on which the straight line of national history is established. The actions of Shelby in Memento, can now be seen to represent, in microcosm, the same actions which create a national history. Like Shelby, America uses the repetition of difference if and when it suits it, whilst all the time maintaining the illusion that it has never truly departed from its identical (repetition of the same) identity. Shelby's split I is at once, Machiavellian politician, and the national populace, those complicit in the act of their own self-fooling.

Furthermore, if we return to the quote from Rodowick of chapter one, we can now begin to see why and how it is that; whilst 'the movement-image "evolves"; the time-image "recurs". The straight line of time of the movement-image's narrative creates an evolving, continuous history of the American nation. The
discontinuous history of cinema of the post-war time-images of European cinema, by contrast, suggested the labyrinthine view of history whose eternal recurrence threatened to unground the normative narrative of the movement-image. In much the same way as the movement-image establishes its global dominance against the time-image which it marginalizes as other (but which is actually the very plane of consistency which it reterritorializes by constructing a plane of transcendence) so too does the official American view of history establish itself through the othering of a labyrinthine, discontinuous European past to which it is itself party.

The maintenance of America's national history is inextricably linked to the movement-image's plane of transcendence. It is due to its binary logic that, in the post-war years, Europe comes to be represented as the falsifying site of the labyrinth against which American linear history gains its legitimacy. It is for this reason that Minghella's treatise on the dangers of labyrinthine performativity, *The Talented Mr Ripley* works so well. Ripley travels, after all, through an American elsewhere, post-war Europe, a place well known in American cinema for its duplicitousness. What is perhaps even more interesting is the way in which European cinema begins to adopt the labyrinth somewhat self-consciously. This is true not only in the time-images which emerged with the different European New Waves, but also in European movement-images. Emir Kusturica's dark, epic-burlesque, *Underground* (1995) for instance, whilst exploding the myth of the nation aboveground, represents the underground pathways of the European war machine as a labyrinth of interweaving tunnels. A general tendency can also be seen, then, between an American cinema which establishes a single, national history through the exclusion of the labyrinth as other, and a European art cinema which maintains the law in a more self-reflexive way, by deliberately exposing the way in which history is built upon the labyrinth.

*All A-Ryan, All Ame-Ryan.*
If we analyse the different way in which the past is represented in *Saving Private Ryan* and *Un Héros très discret* the general tendency evident in these two different representations of post-war history should become apparent. On the one hand there is American cinema, which upholds the legitimacy of its history by denying its complicity in the alien, labyrinthine events of wartime Europe. Here Europe is figured as the labyrinthine other upon the reterritorialization of which America's national history is established. On the other hand, there is European art cinema, which aimed to explore the process in which all of Europe is complicit, that of establishing and maintaining a historical continuity where all that really exists is a labyrinth. Here the concept of the nation is deliberately shown to rest on the maintenance of an exclusive binary which determines national boundaries (us/them). This argument is not intended, however, to once again implicitly raise European art cinema over American cinema. It is not a re-imposition of the culture over commodity debate which perhaps structures Deleuze's texts. These generalized models, rather, will be explored in order to help us understand why different types of images emerged after the war in America, than they did in Europe. Why do we still have Hitler and Hollywood?

In *Flashbacks in Cinema*, Maureen Turim charts the evolution of the flashback as it developed in both European and American cinemas. The representation of the past that is achieved in these different cinemas is broadly divided into two different systems. The American cinema's use of flashback emerges around the time of D. W. Griffith, and is a device which makes a subjective memory stand in for that of a nation. It is the passing off of the subjective flashback as representative of supposedly objective, national truth. As she says:

... flashbacks are central to Griffith's version of history, saturated with emotional identification and symbolism. We can see his films as one of the formative stages of the massive effort in American films to subjectivize history. ... The theme of collective memory as determinant of history and individuals as exemplars of collective memories in their most personalized and subjective form is developed in *Birth of a Nation*
(1915) through the use of one of Griffith's melodramatic strategies, the interweaving of personal tragedy and love stories with epic narratives of major historical events.  

As an example of such a flashback in *Birth of a Nation*, Turim describes the incident in which Elsie Stoneman (Lillian Gish) is amorously pursued by Yankee, Ben Cameron. Just when she seems about to succumb to his advances the intertitles declare: 'Bitter memories will not allow the Poor Bruised South to forget'. Soon after this the film cuts from Elsie's face, to a shot, with red filter, of her brother dying during the Civil War. This image, which we had previously seen as part of the film's narrative development, was not one to which Elsie herself was privileged. What appears to be a personal recollection, then, due to the cut from her face to the image of the dead, is in fact an image of a 'collective' past through which the film attempts to 'subjectivize' history. It is, as Turim says, the conflation of historical events with personal tragedies in order to raise an emotional response in the viewer. This is a process which, as we shall see in our analysis of *Saving Private Ryan*, continues in 90s cinema.

In contrast to this specific manipulation of the past in American cinema, Turim charts the rather different way in which flashback developed in European art cinema of the same period. Influenced by the philosophy of Bergson, and its more popular expression, and critique, in Proust, French art cinema began to use the flashback in order to make a different point concerning the past. Rather than focusing on the collective past, through the subject, it attempted instead to explore the ambiguity of the subjective experience of the past. Turim argues that this concentration on the individual, subjective experience of the past, in its own right, is also evident in the flashbacks used in early Swedish and German art cinemas. With the New Waves of the post-war years, moreover, the European flashback began to represent subjective memory as a fragmented, patchwork puzzle of the past. Turim's suggests that these cinemas force the spectator to become aware of, and, ultimately, to partake in, 'the formation of the text'. By extension, it would then seem possible to argue, through its Brechtian focus on
the individual's narrative, European art cinema questions our ability to objectively represent both national and historical events.

Put succinctly, the difference being drawn between what are primarily American movement-images and European time-images is as follows. In American cinema the flashback is used to represent a single national history, and to emotionally involve the audience in the playing out of its epic destiny. In European art cinema, by contrast, there is a tendency to use flashback to illustrate the recognition that history is a labyrinth of uncertain pasts. For this reason, the spectator confronts the realization that any one, privileged, national past must be a fiction. Rather than emotionally involving the spectator, these films instead invite a more cerebral involvement in the construction of a potentially ambiguous narrative. Again this foregrounds the artificially constructed and ultimately falsifying process in which we are all implicated when we construct a national history. This is not to oppose the American line to the European labyrinth, exactly, but rather, the American construction of a linear history of the victor at the expense of the marginalized labyrinthine other (often figured as Europe itself) and the European exposure of the way in which the line of history is itself only predicated upon the labyrinth which it both utilizes and reterritorializes. At this point, the terms "American" and "European" have effectively become conflated with "movement-image" and "time-image". The strategies that these types of image offer for the creation of national histories, however, is still illuminating. In fact, the question which this conflation raises is why these distinct types of cinema came to typify their historical and geographical origins?

The way in which history is represented in these two types of cinema can be seen to mirror the way in which history has been experienced by the old and the new worlds. The European nations, with chequered pasts witnessing innumerable shifts of power over the centuries, have discontinuous histories. Any semblance of a continuous national history must, for this reason, be seen to exist as an imposition upon a labyrinthine, perpetually falsified past. America, for its part,
since its eradication of its native population, has built a history which maintains its legitimacy by disavowing its labyrinthine, discontinuous shifts. In this sense, the links drawn between Europe and America by Costa-Gavras' film makes it appear as an allegory for the way in which American history establishes itself upon the denial of its own act of genocide when the land was initially settled by European settlers.

American history is an immigrant history which, a little like the personal history of all-American Mike Laszlo, has also utilized the labyrinth in order to falsify its various national heritages, its various 'Mishkas'. The paternal figure in America, after all, is not the national, father figure, but rather, "Uncle" Sam, the displaced patriarch who unites a diaspora of nationalities orphaned from their original, national fathers. As Turim's work on flashbacks shows, American cinema unifies its diaspora through the use of individuals as representative of collective, national history. It creates what Canning calls a 'warrior theater' in which the lives of a small group of people, usually a small group of white people, are used to represent the one, true, official view of history. This fact is borne out by Jude Davies' discussion of Falling Down (1992) and Groundhog Day, in which he shows how even very recent attempts by American films to deal with contemporary crises concerning family values, masculinity, post-cold war economic recession, and racial segregation, only manage to do so through a narrative which focuses on the heroic white male. Whilst documenting the crisis experienced by this racially dominant power, these narratives ultimately uphold the supremacy of the white male and his official version of national history. America cinema's development of the movement-image was used to cover the labyrinth of national pasts of its immigrant diaspora with a particular singular history, that of the white European colonizer. The linear narrative of American cinema perpetrates the, to use Virilio's term, 'endo-colonialism' of its national history. Its narrative, turned on its own people by the movement-image, denies all other alternatives to the official view of the nation's history. The potential, myriad, labyrinthine histories of its multi-cultural population are thus disavowed.
This is in contrast to the European art cinema's concentration on the subjective nature of memory, a focus which presupposes an acknowledgement of the labyrinthine nature of the past. Just as there are the many views of the past of the many individuals who experience it, so too are there as many national pasts that can be constructed. This is the case both within each nation, and also between nations whose identity is constantly being rethought around its borders. As Andrew Higson has noted, after all: 'national identity is by no means a fixed phenomenon, but constantly shifting, constantly in the process of becoming.'\(^{15}\) Indeed, the struggle for a clear definition of national boundaries indicates the role of occupation, or indeed, colonialism, in the different conceptions of history which characterize the two types of cinema.

It is for this reason that WWII was an event that was instrumental in giving birth to the time-image. The national history that was written during the wartime occupation of the many nations of Fortress Europe was subsequently re-examined in the post-war cinemas of these countries. If this was too taboo a topic to immediately surface as a narrative concern, it was certainly one of the reasons behind the emergence of the time-image's fixation on the falsifying of time in the labyrinth. Alain Resnais' \textit{Hiroshima, Mon Amour} (1959) one of the films on which Turim bases her argument, provides ample evidence of the use of both narrative and montage in order to explore the labyrinthine nature of the national past. If we briefly consider Her (Emmanuele Riva) story, the flashback to post-war Nevers symbolically describes the cellar into which French national history banished any acknowledgement of its discontinuous past, its past as collaborator, with the withdrawal of the colonizing German army. Imprisoned there by her father, Her life demonstrates the European cinema's foregrounding of the way in which national history both marginalizes the labyrinthine, duplicitous other, whilst itself creating a history that is discontinuous, although giving the illusion of continuity. With liberation, Europe's post-war past had to be rethought, and for this to happen, the entire nation was required to use the powers of the false. For a continuous, linear history of the nation to be constructed, paradoxically, the labyrinth would have to be used. Coming to
terms with this post-colonial realization has marked the way European art cinemas conceive of the national past.

With this distinction in mind, the remainder of this chapter will demonstrate how for American cinema - representative of a nation whose colonial power, both internally and as global police force, still remains supreme - being the single, normative judge of its own history remains paramount. For the European countries of the post-war years, by contrast, the process of having to, once more, re-write national identity with the departure of a colonial army of occupation, led to a greater meditation on the very process upon which it is established, the labyrinth of time itself. In short, the America cinema's prioritizing of the movement-image ensures its tendency towards the singular history of the plane of transcendence. The European emergent time-image, in contrast, expresses its realization of the labyrinth on which the line of history is predicated. This difference will become more apparent through a comparison of the different depictions of the wartime past seen in Saving Private Ryan and Un Héros très discret.

Saving Private Ryan follows the fortunes of an eight man squad of US troops from the Second Rangers, led by Captain John H. Miller (Tom Hanks). Initially we are immersed in the slaughter of the D-Day, as we follow their landing at Omaha Beach and the breaching of the beachhead. From then on the story becomes a "Boy's Own" adventure through no-man's land. The squad is sent on a special mission, by none other than General George C. Marshall, the Chief of Staff himself, to retrieve James Francis Ryan (Matt Damon) whose three brothers have all been recently killed in combat. When Ryan is finally found, however, he refuses to be sent home to his mother, and decides instead to stay and help defend a tactically vital bridge. Although he survives, all but two of the squad are killed.
As this plot synopsis suggests, this is, exactly as Turim describes the process when seen in Griffith's cinema, the story of a nation's struggle told through the actions of a few individuals. The film is, in fact, one huge flashback. It is recounted, we are initially led to believe, from the point of view of the elderly Ryan. The flashback begins, after all, with a very conventional close up on the aging Ryan's face, over which the sound of the sea is heard, helping to situate us in the past to which we then cut. If we watch closely, however, it becomes evident that this cannot be Ryan's memory that we are seeing, as he himself did not witness much of the narrative which we initially see. As a private in the 101st Airborne division he parachuted into France, and consequently, did not witness the bloody landings with which the flashback begins. The heroic struggle which we see, then, this piece of warrior theatre, is actually the passing off of an objective account of the national past, through a narrative which initially suggests itself to be a legitimate, veteran's account of real events. Rather like Elsie Stoneman's supposed flashback in *Birth of a Nation*, here again a collective memory is shown as though it were personal. It is also, again in the style of Griffith's film, a nation's past told through the struggles of a handful of white individuals. Once again we are seeing, as Turim says, 'the interweaving of personal tragedy' with an epic narrative of 'major historical events'.

Very much in American national cinema tradition, the film is also 'saturated with emotional identification and symbolism' in its attempt to 'subjectivize history'. Despite the horrific realism of the beach landing sequences, the film suffers from the incredibly thick slices of ham and jack cheese which Steven Spielberg serves up at the film's beginning, and the second helping which he forces down the spectator's throat at the end. Once again, in the style of *Sunset Boulevard*, the film's narrative is bookended by opening and closing images which take place in the present. This time the image is of national significance, the US flag waving in the breeze, over a cemetery for US servicemen, in Normandy. This image is also accompanied by the soft, mournful tones of trumpets, to whose beat the aged, wearisome, shuffling but proud feet of Ryan march. The narrative, then, is blatantly linear, with an inevitable ending already inscribed in history, which is used to seemingly legitimize the fictional representation of events that then
follows. If ever there was an origin to America's contemporary national history, this war, we are shown, is it. As the camera moves in on Ryan's face just prior to the flashback, we focus in on his blue eyes, shining, wet with tears. Although the colour blue and the salt water image functions primarily as a graphic match with which to transport us back in time to the coastal waters off France in 1944, it also illustrates how the Aryan history which follows is that of the American master race.

The film also sets out to re-assure the nation that the family is its top priority. For this reason, we are shown, the Chief of Staff will personally take time out in the middle of the invasion of Europe to see to it that mother Ryan's last boy will be returned to her alive. If this costs another six lives, then so be it. In fact, as we see mother Ryan receiving the telegrams telling her that her other three sons are dead, her geographical position in the nation's heartland, Iowa, serves to conflate her identity with that of the nation. Her house, amidst vast, crop-laden fields, suggests the bountiful, natural goodness of the mother country in the service of which these men die. The national heritage which the dead fought for, moreover, is figured in Ryan's family who accompany him to the cemetery. Followed by his wife, son, and grandchildren, the family values which America holds so proud are shown to be built upon the sacrifices of the soldiers who died during the war. Thus the national narrative is used, once again, to uphold patriarchal history.

Throughout the film, Europe is shown as a deadly, duplicitous other world, the labyrinth. For America to gain entry it must, quite literally, be invaded, and this action itself costs many lives. Moreover, on arrival, all sense of order is immediately lost, as the American forces are scattered to the wind, without leadership or backup. Here identity also becomes confused. The initial search for Ryan, for instance, uncovers a man with the same name, but who is not the one true Ryan. This is a land, the film shows, in which the soldiers must struggle to maintain their own identities if they are to save the true Ryan, and the one true America. This struggle over identity is demonstrated through Miller's (Cartesian)
split personality, as evidenced by his battle traumatized body. Miller's right hand has developed an intermittently recurring shake. Behind the mask of Captain which he wears in the war, we find out, exists a sensitive, High School teacher, an educated and cultured family man. His essential self shows through in the uncontrollable motor actions of his hand, the fear and emotion which he hides in leadership being retained, we are thus reassured, in this land where all identities are uncertain. Becoming-other is just a temporary disguise beneath which he retains his essential American self.

In fact, when a command decision made by Miller leads to the death of the squad's medic, Lieutenant Wade (Giovanni Ribisi) we see Miller break down and cry. As he battles his emotions he clenches and unclenches his hand, to try to stop it from shaking. In an impassioned speech to his men immediately after this revelation of the continuous self he states:

    Back home I tell people what I do for a living, they think, well, now that figures. But over here, it's a big mystery. So I guess I've changed some. Sometimes I wonder if I've changed so much my wife is even gonna recognize me whenever it is I get back to her. And how I'll ever be able to tell her about days like today. ... I just know that every man I kill, the further away from home I feel.

Recognizing that he has changed since his arrival in Europe, Miller acknowledges the way in which identity can be different in different contexts. This acknowledgement, however, is immediately followed by a disavowal of its legitimacy, ensuring that the wife (family) to which he hopes to return is the truly legitimate, essential identity. Becoming-other, performing your identity differently, is something the soldier does, but beneath this legitimized getting away with murder he struggles to retain his American innocence. As the story reaches its final destination, the bridge which they must hold, Miller again sums up the dangers of becoming-other to which Europe has exposed them. He says: 'It's like we've crossed some strange boundary here. The world has taken a turn for the surreal.' Europe is thus shown to be a strange, surreal non-place, whose
duplicitous, labyrinthine ways the American national narrative must negotiate if it is to survive.

The battle-torn landscape through which they journey, moreover, literally depicts the 'any-spaces-whatever' of Europe which Deleuze describes as characteristic of the post-war time-image. When reterritorialized in the narrative of the movement-image, however, these spaces are seen to exist specifically to be mapped, taken, and fixed. Most obviously this is shown through the movement of the men as they try to find their way across the country, to Ryan. The whole invasion, moreover, is a narrative of mapping. This becomes evident when Miller discusses military strategy with Captain Hamill (Ted Danson) of the symbolically named, 'Pathfinders'.

Hamill: You gotta take Caen so you can take St Lô.
Miller: You gotta take St Lô to take Boulogne.
Hamill: Boulogne you got Cherbourg.

The invasion is represented as the taking of Europe's any-space-whatevers (the cities in ruin through which the time-image's inhabitants wandered aimlessly) and the re-imposition of meaning upon them. Their physical mapping of the spaces through which they pass re-imposes the sensory-motor continuity of the war machine upon them. We are seeing the American national narrative being writ large upon Europe, reterritorializing its labyrinth of space through the linear narrative of military invasion ('Cherbourg, you got Paris', Paris, you got Berlin'). It is for this reason that the bridge is deemed to be of such strategic importance, for without it the whole invasion could fizzle out, and with it the linear trajectory of the nation's history. The film's representation of the invasion serves to reterritorialize the trip/balled formula of the time-image, the everyday tourism of the 'stroll, the voyage and the continual return home\textsuperscript{16}. There is now a purpose and a direction to the lives of the men who traverse Europe's any-space-
whatevers. These men of action are doers, not seers, imposing form upon the land.

This mapping, moreover, is a colonial action, a reclaiming of the land with a specific purpose in mind. It is not coincidental that everytime they take a position, or breach a beachhead, the grizzly veteran Sergeant Mike Horrack (Tom Sizemore) is heard to say: 'We're in business'. The Americans invaded Europe in the war, we are told, in retrospect, not only to rid the world of Nazism, and other such high-sounding ideals, but to impose its capitalist, free-market narrative upon the post-war world.

Indeed, through the strategic use of one particular character, the greenhorn Corporal, Timothy Upham (Jeremy Davies) we are shown the lessons which America is supposed to have learned during this war. Through Upham the film is held up as the story of the nation's loss of innocence in the foreign lands of Europe. Its military actions since the war are therefore justified in retrospect, as being due to lessons learned during the push on Berlin.

Upham is initially shown to be a clumsy, type-writer toting, behind-the-lines administrator. He has never been in combat, not fired a rifle since basic training, and describes himself by saying: 'I make maps and I translate'. Yet into battle this innocent, well-mannered choreographer has to go, as retroactive representative of so many essentially good Americans. He also stands in for the bureaucratic machine, that which, as Canning argues, is the guilty party in the process of marginalization that caused the holocaust, but which is here (through its anthropomorphization in Upham) seen to be an essentially innocent entity. It is only through the corrupting influence of wartime Europe, we are led to believe, that this machine becomes a killer. Our collective innocence is further illustrated through our association with Upham's gaze. At certain points, in fact, we witness action directly from his point of view. The charge of the machine-gun post which leads to the loss of Wade, for instance, is seen from a distance
through his rifle scope. Gradually the greenhorn Upham is initiated into battle, and from his position as observer, he gradually becomes involved, as ammunition carrier, until he himself is finally inspired to kill. Thus the innocent's slide into the war is used to illustrate the moral rectitude of the nation's struggle.

His actions, moreover, are also used to represent the justification for post-war US foreign policy. The first lesson that America is seen to learn through Upham is that there is no point trying to help the indigenous population of the land in which you are fighting. This will only lead to the death of your men. This parable is demonstrated over the French child who inadvertently causes the death of Private Caparzo (Vin Diesel). It was Upham's mistake - when, acting as translator, he assured the French family that their children would be looked after if they went with the troops - that led to this death. As Caparzo lies dead from a sniper's bullet, Miller says: 'That’s why we can't take children.' The first lesson is that, as a military peace-keeping force, even the innocent populations who you are trying to help will only harm you. Do not get involved with them. This supports a policy of non-integration between the colonial army and the indigenous population, a policy set to maintain racial superiority. Hence this is not a film that is primarily about the liberation of Europe, or its peoples, but rather, the dangers awaiting colonial soldiers in a foreign land.

The second lesson learned through Upham is that of the legitimacy of the preemptive strike. When the squad captures a German POW at the machine-gun post it is (partly at least) through Upham's intercession that Miller spares his life and frees him. When this same German soldier re-appears in the final battle, he kills at least one member of the squad in hand-to-hand combat, before fatally wounding Miller. He then surrenders to Upham, who he believes to be either his friend, or at the very least, a coward who will not kill him in cold blood. Upham, however, does just this. The second lesson that we are taught through Upham's actions is that the mistreatment, torture, and even the murder of a POW is justified, in order to save lives in the long run. In short, kill them first, before
they kill you. The others that you may encounter in foreign lands, the Nazis in this case, are not to be trusted, as they are inherently duplicitous. As the German POW shows, whilst begging for his life he will readily declare, 'I like American' and, 'Fuck Hitler', but when his true colours are seen he is a brutal killer. Together the lessons which we experience along with Upham suggest that were it not for innocent America's encounter with duplicitous Nazis, these measures would not have been adopted. WWII here becomes an origin which legitimizes, in retrospect, the actions of America since then, as though without their involvement in the labyrinthine lands of Europe there they would have forever remained at home, a peace-loving nation of teachers and farmers.

Finally, the film conlates its final scene with several important battles in American history, battles which were instrumental in the construction of a national consciousness. The film's final sequences around the defense of the bridge are perhaps more reminiscent of an episode of The A-Team than a war film, as we witness the horrendously outnumbered, rag-tag band of troops fight tanks with bombs made from socks, before falling back in a last-ditch attempt to blow the bridge. The final point to which they return, they have named, 'The Alamo'. In this version of the 1836 defense of the Texas Mission, however, the Davy Crockett style squad of Rangers ultimately wins out, and The Alamo does not fall. More to the point, the bridge, symbol of the continuous sensory-motor mapping of the US national narrative upon Europe, is saved. Spielberg's historical revisionist narrative rewrites an originary loss with a more recent victory which comes to take its place in retrospect. American history, with this false origin standing in for The Alamo, is now retroactively seen to be based upon the successful repelling of the invasive outsider. The American national narrative thus rewrites its history upon the labyrinthine, any-space-whatevers of post-war Europe.

As was the case with George Lucas' Star Wars (1977) the film's finale also replays the American war of independence in miniature. This is enabled by the film's focus on a band of plucky scavengers who miraculously defeat the might
of a previously all-conquering, evil, military Empire. This also ensures that we
are not shown images of America's mighty war machine rolling through the
streets of Europe, a slight omission which attempts to disavow the nation's
colonial ambitions. The last minute arrival of the cavalry to save The Alamo, the
US Airforce's P51 'Tank Busters', thus appear not as a symbol of US
expansionism, but rather the heavenly sanctioned, 'Angels on our shoulders'
which Miller dubs them.

If this all wasn't enough, the letter which the Chief of Staff reads at the
beginning of the film, in his emotive argument for the retrieval of Ryan, and
which he is again heard piously quoting in his letter to the bereaved Mrs Ryan at
the end, is from none other than "Honest" Abe Lincoln himself. Lincoln's letter,
to the mother of five brothers lost during the American Civil War, positions the
film's WWII context on a level of national importance comparable with that of
the war which unified the North and the South. Both wars become equated,
through this voiceover, with the birth of the nation. Lincoln's presence as divine
logos, the word of the nation's deceased father, also legitimizes America's post­
war colonial ambitions. His abolitionist stance gives credence to both the US
expansionism which followed the war, and also the film's narrative, in which
black servicemen are conspicuously absent, even as extras. The white narrative
of the nation's history is thus given a sense of continuity, from the war of
independence, through The Alamo, the civil war, and finally, to WWII. The
situating of the war as the reason for, and supposed origin of, US post-war
involvement in lands beyond its own borders, moreover, pushes the guilt for
their expansionist militarism onto the duplicitous other of Europe. The legitimate
continuation of this very history is ultimately provided in Miller's dying words to
Ryan, that he has to: 'Earn this ... earn it.' The retrospectively situated origin
must be lived up to in the present, we are told by our now deceased patriarch,
Miller. The nationalism which the film advocates can only be earned in
retrospect, through its repetition in the same way. This we see in the two
generations of Ryan's family who accompany him to the cemetery, the
expression of his commitment to maintain both the patriarchal order and
American family values.
Spielberg's movement-image is an endo-colonialist image. It is specifically designed in order to reterritorialize desire in the service of the nation and its continuous history. Fulfilling Massumi's words to the letter it illustrates the way in which:

The plane of transcendence, in order to accomplish its mission of containment, must swoop back down on bodies, dirty itself with their decay and impermanence. It cannot do that by itself. Before a category will take, its code must be applied, the target body must be prepared, made receptive in overcoding. Openings must be cut into its perception, to provide entryways for generality; it must be coaxed into acquiescence or punished into docility, to give its habits of thought and behavior in consonance with society's overall automatic desire for stable equilibrium; it must be kneaded into shape, to make it physically able to fulfil the productive, reproductive and destructive duties it will be assigned in the central molar domains of Work, Family, War; its desire must be turned to glory ... 17

The movement-image's plane of transcendence is itself part of a much larger plane of transcendence, that of endo-colonialism. It is this reterritorializing narrative which overcodes the populace into a molar narrative of 'Work, Family' and 'War', and thus turns desire into glory. Saving Private Ryan's narrative illustrates the way in which the straight line of national history is, and must continue to be, imposed upon the labyrinthine other, Europe. This seeming eradication of the European labyrinth, through the imposition of an American global order, moreover, works to disavow the film's own use of the labyrinth in its revisionist falsifyings of the past on which it bases its seemingly legitimate history. Due to the movement-image's reterritorializing powers, The Alamo is now seen to have never been lost. The truthful man of history exists, once again, on the discontinuity of the forger, ensuring that the nation's loss at The Alamo is never forgotten, by replaying it as contemporary, continuous, victory.
The movement-image has thrived in America because it is the perfect tool for the representation of the national history of a globally dominant superpower, the maintenance of whose power necessitates the continued illusion of a singular, unchanging narrative of victory. This illusion, however, can only exist through the use of the labyrinth's historically falsifying powers to turn every initial loss into a gain. The bookended narrative of the epic war film is the perfect expression of the process of disavowal through which American national history maintained its legitimizing image in spite of its discontinuous heritage. Ulf Hedetoft's comment, that; 'Hollywood' as a rule, produces national cinema is thus supported by the creation of the national narrative of American history that we see in films like Saving Private Ryan. Despite the movement-image's globalizing, 'Hollywood' aesthetic, it is primarily the product of the plane of transcendence which it inhabits, and for this reason, the medium best able to express American history.

In fact, in American movement-images of the war and immediate post-war years in general, there was a marked tendency to disavow the labyrinth, by representing it as an inherently evil, outside, force. This was done, at least in part, in order to encourage ex-servicemen to give up the murderous ways they had learned in Europe, and return to the family values fold. In her discussion of Frank Capra's perennial Christmas stocking-filler, It's a Wonderful Life (1946) for instance, Kaja Silverman describes the way in which the film: 'attempts to neutralize the historical trauma of civilian reentry.' In his discussion of the noir sequences of the film, Frank Krutnik goes one further, describing the way in which the parallel universe of 'Pottersville' is used as negative other against which to posit the legitimacy of a by-then long-departed American small-town life. Drawing on Dyer, Krutnik shows how the seedy noir town in which George Bailey (Jimmy Stewart) symbolically loses all identity, expresses the loss of the essential self that occurs once the subject enters the labyrinth. Bailey's unlawful suicide, once again, illustrates the murder of the self which comes with performativity. Returning history to its rightful, small-town trajectory,
marginalizes the labyrinth as defining other, and upholds the legitimacy of the 'dominant fiction' of American history.

Post-war film noir often contained an American labyrinth, then, but one whose purpose was to express the dangers of straying from the straight and narrow. The narrative of Edgar G. Ulmer's *Detour* (1945) for instance, only takes its 'detour' when Al Roberts (Tom Neal) morally bifurcates from the linear course that otherwise looked set to lead him to his wife-to-be in Los Angeles. Once he enters the labyrinth by taking on the identity of a dead man, the film's conclusion becomes inevitable. Once again this conclusion is prompted by the film's use of a bookended flashback to frame the narrative. After playing out the past up until the point at which the film began, the final scene shows his inevitable capture by the Highway Patrol. Of course, as Krutnik also points out, this was not a device which occurred simply because of the war. It already existed, for instance, in the gangster films of the 1930s. That said, there was often a conflation of labyrinth, performativity, murder, and the European immigrant even in these earlier films. Howard Hawks' Italian-phobic, *Scarface* (1932) being the perfect example. In fact, the war remains a prime concern in American cinema, as the point at which dangerous outside values attempted to slip in under the guise of returning servicemen.

Alan Parker's *Angel Heart* (1987) for instance, situates the war as the primal scene for the cuckoo-performativity of its protagonist, jazz singer, Johnny Favourite (Mickey Rourke). Having previously sold his soul to the devil, it is, significantly, in the body of on-leave serviceman, Harry Angel, that the murderous Favourite chooses to hide out. Drafted before he can make good his escape, Favourite/Angel is wounded during the war, and returns to America with no memory of his past. Thus the potentially positive Nietzschean forgetting of performativity is yet again figured as the masquerading of identity of one who attempts to get away with murder. In addition, and once again very much in the manner of *Birth of a Nation*, Favourite's occultism is also associated with the Afro-American diaspora of the South. This ensures that the film is yet another
parable which represents white American fears of a labyrinthine other (conflating Europe, the occult, and racial difference) masquerading as a seemingly legitimate, self-employed, businessman. Ultimately, Favourite's inability to escape the devil (Robert de Niro) ensures that his labyrinthine identity leads him to hell, after his arrest (and subsequent execution) at the hands of the police. Getting away with murder through the labyrinthine performance of the self is, once again, marginalized as the action of the evil other that simply serves to uphold the legitimacy of the law. In American cinema, American history is predicated upon the marginalizing of the labyrinth in order to maintain the legitimacy of the singular history of the European colonizer, the very immigrant culture which, paradoxically, brought the labyrinth to America in the first place.

**Nothing to Kill or Die for.**

In *Un héros très discret*, by contrast, the use of the labyrinth is foregrounded in order to highlight both the illusion that is linear history, and the disavowal of its utilization of the labyrinth. Again WWII is the site of contest over national history, this time in France. This is a film which deals explicitly with the performance of identity of its protagonist, Albert Dehousse (Matthieu Kassowitz). Growing up in Lambersart, a small village in the north of France, Dehousse initially believes his mother's story that his father died a war hero. At the age of twelve, however, he is told by a childhood friend that his father was actually a drunk, who died of liver cirrhosis. When the Germans occupy Lambersart in 1940, Dehousse is in danger of being relocated to work in Germany. Saving him from this fate, his father-in-law, a member of the Resistance, teaches him to be a salesman, and secures him a job. With the liberation of France, however, the naïve Dehousse, shocked at accusations of his mother's collaboration, and of his wife's family's involvement in the Resistance, abandons Lambersart for Paris. There he reinvents himself as a member of the Resistance, and through bluff and good fortune, rises to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. In the post-war years he is dispatched to occupied Germany as head of
the military's 'Intelligence and Propaganda' section. He is charged with weeding out the Frenchmen who voluntarily departed for Germany, from those taken there by force. Finally, after taking the decision to shoot seven Frenchmen who, during the final stages of the war, had volunteered for the German SS, he takes off his mask, and voluntarily gives himself to, 'the mercy of the law'. In order to avoid a scandal, he is given a token three year prison sentence for bigamy.

The film shows all the studied self-reflexivity of French art cinema. A mix of archive footage of the war and fictional material, it establishes itself as false documentary, an effect compounded by its use of fictional characters portraying eye-witnesses and archivists of Dehousse's supposed real life. In this respect it is a time-image which expresses only the possible truth of the history it portrays. The musicians playing the soundtrack are also shown at several points during the film, whilst Dehousse's fantasy sequences of himself (as a boy) flying, and his father's talking portrait, all further distance the viewer from any too real an attachment to the narrative. These Brechtian techniques are used to conflate the creation of the fictional history that the film is undertaking with the fictional self Dehousse makes of himself. The cinematic creation of a seemingly legitimate national history that is perpetrated by films like Saving Private Ryan is here deliberately exposed as being a fictional process.

Dehousse's many self-creations are by now all too obvious expressions of the labyrinthine powers of the false. We see him learn to act a variety of roles, including: writer, salesman, lover, dignified beggar, doorman, receptionist, resistance veteran, soldier, and husband. Most of these, moreover, we see him being taught by a string of patriarchs who initiate him into the way in which identity is a falsification of the self. His first lie, in fact, comes with his acknowledgement of his mother's deceit concerning his father's death. Dehousse learns to lie in order to maintain the illusion of his father's supposed heroism, the legitimacy of which establishes both the patriarchal order and national history. Thus the myth of the heroic nation/father is shown to be a fiction in which the whole population is complicit in maintaining. This is the case even though the
"truth" which it hides is known by all, as Dehousse discovers when his friend reveals his father's true nature to him. Dehousse's behaviour from then on can be seen to be an attempt to become the image of his father, the war hero. This image however, as we are shown in its sudden animated, drunken, 'Vive la France', covers a labyrinthine identity which is at odds with its illusory, proud, military heritage.

*Un héros très discret* is a film which directly acknowledges the nation’s use of the labyrinth to uphold its patriarchal tradition. It is through the labyrinthine falsifying of the past, we are shown, that the legitimacy of the resistance movement comes to create an illusion of continuity which ensures that the collaborations of the wartime years appear a temporary aberration from an otherwise continuous history. This is the case even though the identities of those working for the resistance during the war were, of necessity, labyrinthine. Captain Dionnet (Albert Dupontel) for instance, who teaches Dehousse the dignity and bearing of the soldier, admits to having had at least six identities to enable him to move between the occupied north and the south during the war. Rather like Talbot in *The Music Box*, the labyrinthine techniques which the resistance fighters developed during the war are used, in the post-war years, whilst at the same time being disavowed. In this way, the resistance comes to represent national continuity, whilst the collaborator is seen as the dissembler.

The film's focus on this fictionalizing of national history is due to the recent acknowledgement of the revisionist binary that was created in the immediate post-war years in order to mask national, collective, culpability. As Chris Darke describes the film:

... it is .. a troubling parable of the still-unresolved French guilt about its wartime and immediate post-war record, a guilt that came into sharp focus around the time of former president François Mitterrand's death. The myth that France was neatly and comfortably divided into two camps during and after the German occupation - on the one hand those who
supported Marshal Pétain's collaborationist Vichy government, and on the other those who resisted the Nazis and their Vichy puppets - has been steadily undermined. The result has been an uncomfortable, ongoing reckoning with both the national mythology of the Resistance and the history of France's deeply ingrained anti-semitism.\textsuperscript{23}

It is the creation of these two camps which Dehousse is given the task of achieving, through his ability to judge who is a collaborator, and who a legitimate, press-ganged, Frenchman. The irony of the film's "set a thief to catch a thief" plot is again deliberate, as it expresses the way in which the labyrinthine dissembler of the wartime Resistance later becomes the judge who creates the binary of historical legitimacy, in retrospect. In effect, by becoming the judge, and maintainer of the law, France's labyrinthine national identity is disavowed, through the use of this labyrinth to recreate a straight line. The punishment of the collaborator turns the war years into a temporary blip in national history, throughout which the Resistance is seen to have retained France's true national identity. The fact that this was itself achieved through the cultivation of multiple, labyrinthine identities is thus sutured over by the nation's maintenance of a seemingly continuous history. Here again we see the truthful man and the forger as one in the same character. Dehousse, again like Talbot in The Music Box, although appearing to be the law, the truthful man, is in fact the labyrinth, the forger. This ambiguity surrounding the identity of the man responsible for the separation of the "innocent" from the "guilty", of de Gaulle from Pétain, of true-French from pro-German, illustrates how arbitrary the creation of national boundaries are through the binary process of exclusion.

One question, however, remains to be answered. Exactly why is this depiction of national history so different from that found in American cinema? The answer lies in the film's subtext of colonialism. As we saw in our discussion of Saving Private Ryan, the singular image of history created by American national cinema is both colonizing and endo-colonizing. It is the strong, unchallenged image of national superiority of a nation at the height of its power. \textit{Un héros très discret},
by contrast, is the exploration of national history in a country which is re-assessing its status after the loss of its previous colonial power.

The one person who suspects Dehousse's charade to be a fake is Captain Boutin (Yves Verhoeven). In fact, if this were simply an oppositional role in relation to the forger, Boutin could be seen to be the truthful man. Boutin's attempts to expose the forger Dehousse, after all, illustrate his commitment to a continuous, legitimate national history. Symbolically, however, Boutin does not succeed in unmasking Dehousse. In fact, in an amusing direct address to the camera, the character states:

'I had to earn all I got, including the women. Its unfair. I shall die in Indo-China, in '53. In the Col-de-Nuages ambush. I was never lucky.'

As Boutin represents the legitimate heritage of French national identity, the site of his death is telling. He falls in the former French colony of Indo-China, now Vietnam. The reason for this European film's meta-fictional emphasis on the labyrinthine falsifying that enables the creation of a singular national history, as opposed to the singular history of American cinema, is here shown to be France's loss of colonial power. With the gradual loss of the colonies, of national strength, went also the legitimate, national history of the victor.

It is for this reason also that Jean-Louis Trintignant is so prominent in the film, playing the role of the present-day, elderly Dehousse. Famous for many film roles in the past, the one which is surely being referenced here is his portrayal of Marcello Clerici in Bernardo Bertolucci's, Il Conformista (1969). As Bertolucci's film's representation of the conformist dissembler shows, it is the realization of the loss of national identity which enables representations of the labyrinth to emerge. Unlike America, and American cinema, whose economic and military superpower status remains globally unchallenged (singular acts of terrorism notwithstanding) the European art cinemas of the post-war years, by contrast, slowly began to face their culpability in the use of the labyrinth in order to
maintain their national identity. It is perhaps for this reason as much as anything else, that the time-image first emerged in European (and indeed Japanese) art cinemas. It was the losers who were forced to face their new status as labyrinthine other to the new colonial superpower, America.

Trintignant's presence in Audiard's film also expresses the same movement to realign national identity with a singular past that we see in Il Conformista. It is the conservative becoming-reactive of the fascist in all of us that is represented by Clerici after all, that same day-to-day fascism of the binary which creates the need for mass slaughters on the scale of the holocaust. The collective guilt of the nation in the maintenance of its national past at the expense of an excluded scapegoat (in this case the Pétain regime and all associated collaborators) is deliberately foregrounded by the film. It is for this reason that when Dehousse confesses his crime of national hero-impersonator there is a consensus decision to whitewash his guilt. To acknowledge his individual culpability in the fictionalizing of the past, after all, would be to also acknowledge the gullibility, and more importantly, culpability of everyone else concerned. This would in turn cast a shadow of doubt over the legitimacy of the Resistance. As there is a collective getting away with murder involved in the creation of a national history, the executions of those arbitrarily excluded scapegoats upon which its legitimacy is established must be upheld if the truly labyrinthine aspect of national identity is to remain hidden.

The national disavowal of Dehousse's crime is the perfect expression of the collective complicity in which we are all involved. This is the same process which also ensures our complicity in the massacre of the Jews, yet another guilt which we disavow through the creation of a scapegoat and the re-establishing of the binary. Trintignant's final speech illustrates the way in which this very process is established upon the disavowal of the labyrinth when he says:

'... and we should keep inventing. And when death comes we'll cheat it. We'll say it's the wrong time, the wrong guy ... You know what? We'll
direct him to some vile bastard instead. And that's that. In the end only human beings will be left, real human beings. Only good guys. Our kind of people.'

Performativity is here seen to be the force which creates the binaries of good/bad and us/them, or as he has it, 'good guys', or 'real human beings' vs 'vile bastards'. Falsifying the past also provides immortality to those on the right side of the law, whose ability to cheat death is provided by their national history. Sadly, however, at the last, Audiard's film advocates this type of performativity in the service of the nation. In fact, the sympathy which we feel for Dehousse throughout furthers the film's conservative message. Audiard himself also draws a distinction between the collective everybody and the marginalized scapegoat evildoer when he says of Dehousse:

'I don't judge him in the film because, like a lot of my generation, I can identify with him. I wouldn't, however, like to see myself in the character of a real bastard; a torturer or a collaborator in the deportation of the Jews. This is something unpardonable. But I would not necessarily have been a hero, no, I could have been a dirty little dissembler.'

In this way, rather then Dehousse standing in as representative of the collective guilt of all humanity in the politics of exclusion, his naivety and understandable cowardice during wartime are shown to be collective offences which are extremely minor. They stand in contrast to those of the real bastard, the inherent, other, the evildoer, the essential Nazi. Whilst Audiard's film certainly foregrounds the use and disavowal of the labyrinth in the maintenance of national history, and our collective culpability in its maintenance, it is ultimately unable to critique it. It betrays the same binary reasoning that informs the law. In this respect, it may be that it is a very heavily reterritorialized time-image, or perhaps even a movement-image.

In fact, there are a number of other ways in which the film's conservatism is evident. In spite of its art cinema self-consciousness this is a film which
subjectivizes history, very much in the style of American cinema. It tells the story of a national past through the eyes of a subject with whom we come to identify. Although this process itself becomes the meta-fictional topic of the film’s narrative in the way that Turim describes, in a sense it also drives the film’s narrative. This is also true of the noir bookending flashback technique with which the film opens and closes. Here again, although it attempts to deconstruct this very technique - Trintignant’s first words, ‘Let me tell you a story’, foregrounding the fictionalizing of the past that will follow - it still utilizes this technique to good effect. Indeed, within the narrative itself, the essential self remains the test of the protagonist’s true identity. It is the lack of a convincing scar (from a bullet in the lung) which eventually gives Dehousse away to both Boutin and his wife. Moreover, it is immediately after the execution of the seven pro-German SS that Dehousse gives himself up. Yet again the character who initially appears to be getting away with the murder of his essential self is finally returned to the right side of the law. Finally, the crime for which he is incarcerated, bigamy, is offered as an almost laughable offence, for which his three years inside are a token sentence. The collection of wives, after all, maintains the very same practice of patriarchal ownership which we saw in the conclusion to chapter four. Labyrinthine performativity is again reterritorialized in the film’s moral message. It may expose the labyrinth, upon the disavowal of which the straight line of national history is established, but it does so with a knowing wink. Our complicity in the maintenance of the binary is shown to be entirely innocent.

In contrast to American cinema’s need to unify a diasporic culture under the generalizing banner of one white history, such European art cinema instead illustrates the labyrinth of histories which exist on a continent where national borders have historically been a matter of much contest. Moreover, at a time of supposed European Union, previous national identities (established upon the difference between nations) are now in need of re-definition. The notion of a national identity, for this reason, begins to appear suspect. Recent European art films like Underdog and Un héros très discret evidence Europe’s new self-consciousness concerning the labyrinthine shifts which it must make if its
identity is to be established in relation to a collective future that lies beyond the traditional concept of the nation.

Thus we see how, in the post-war world, the realization of our own culpability in the binary which caused the holocaust was immediately reterritorialized. In order to consolidate its power, the narrative of the colonial victor made the labyrinth other, and conflated it with an evil inherent to Nazism. This was done in order to maintain the dominance of the law exercised by the allied powers. In this way, similar past crimes committed by the victors were eradicated from history, in order that they should appear to maintain a continuous position on the side of the good. This disavowal of a labyrinthine, discontinuous, national history through the imposition of a linear smokescreen is exactly that which is critiqued in *The Music Box*, through the conflation of Mishka/Mike Laszlo, with Harry Talbot. As forger and truthful man are co-dependent for their existence, so too are the labyrinth and the straight line of time. America's history, moreover, is also shown by this film to be based upon the marginalization of the European labyrinthine powers of both self- and national-creation. These are the very powers which were used in order to clear and settle the land in the first place.

Furthermore, this is the same logic which posits the normative existence of the American movement-image over the marginalized other of the European time-image. In order to maintain its narrative of colonial victor, American cinema developed the movement-image. This was a process which continued unchecked after the war, in order to perpetuate the illusion of America's continued moral legitimacy, despite its strategic shifts of allegiance. Europe saw the birth of the time-image, by contrast, due to its labyrinthine past as perpetually contested site of shifting national identities. For the nations forced to rethink their immediate, occupied past, the acknowledgement of their national, historical, labyrinthine nature was too obvious a process to be completely disavowed. It was for this reason that the crisis of truth that took place amongst Europe's any-spaces-whatever created the time-image. This difference between the two continents is seen in the contrasts between the linear history of the victor portrayed in the
American movement-image, Saving Private Ryan, and the French acknowledgement of its labyrinthine national pasts in Un héro très discret. Sadly, however, neither procedure for the establishing of national history is able to escape the reterritorializing forces of the binary. The reason for this is simple. We desire the becoming-reactive of its forces. The European time-image, consequently, was unable to unground cinema.

It is the utilization and disavowal of its labyrinthine techniques, after all, which enable the movement-image to exist in the first place. This is the lesson of Un héro très discret, a potential time-image, which is in actual fact, a movement-image which uses and disavows the plane of consistency upon the dismantled bones of which it constructs its plane of transcendence. It is for this reason, moreover, that the 90s has seen so many movement-images which self-consciously play with time, but which, ultimately, disavow this manipulation of the labyrinth, reterritorializing it as other in order to uphold their linear, normative narrative legitimacy. It is in this way, we have seen, that the movement-image continues to get away with murder.
3 ibid., p. 334.
4 Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, op. cit., p. 137.
5 ibid., p. 137.
6 ibid., p. 146.
10 ibid., p. 214.
22 Silverman, op. cit., p. 91. Indeed, the conflation of the labyrinth with the criminal world of the noir continues to be used as a commonplace device in mainstream American cinema. When the future goes "wrong" in Zemeckis' *Back to the Future II* (1989) for instance, Capra's 'Pottersville' once again re-emerges, this time as the *Bladerunner*-esque dystopian nightmare noir of the
future. Here the small town is replaced by the sleepy suburb of Hill Valley, whose righteous existence McFly must ensure through his re-inscription of the straight line of time.

23 Darke, Chris, 'Monsieur Memory', Sight and Sound, Vol. 7, no. 4 (1997), pp. 24-26. It should be noted that Chris Darke's power of invention knows no bounds when it comes to writing titles. 'Monsieur Memory' becoming 'Mr Memory' just three years later, when he writes on Memento. See, Darke, Chris, 'Mr Memory', Sight and Sound, Vol. 10, no. 11 November (2000) pp. 42-43. If nothing else, this illustrates the similarities between the two films.
Conclusion: On Problems encountered.

Several difficulties have arisen during this work. The somewhat general conclusions to which we are drawn in part two, in the final chapter in particular, are at least partly due to the methodological framework we have applied to the films studied. Deleuze's philosophical approach lends itself very easily to the study of apparently universal concepts, such as "gender", "sexuality", "time", "history" and "nation". These do not always, however, fit specific representations of these concepts as they are to be found in different national, or indeed, popular cinemas. Rather, and perhaps a little like psychoanalysis in this respect, Deleuze's ideas need to be examined in more specific contexts if less sweeping conclusions are to be garnered than those offered here. In short, by focusing on such universalizing concepts in their abstracted "western" forms, this study has reached conclusions which are perhaps a little too generalized to be applied to any specific context other than that of Deleuze, and its own devising.

Deleuze's cinema texts, despite the sections in Cinema 2 pertaining to modern political cinemas, manifest a specific understanding of exactly what constitutes cinema worthy of study. Deleuze's intention, especially in Cinema 2, appears to be the perpetuation of a Hollywood (movement-image) vs European art cinema (time-image) binary. For this reason, his texts are symptomatic of the time in which they emerged. In 1992, Richard Dyer and Ginette Vincendeau commented on the state of development of Anglo-American film studies, stating:

Part of the existing map of cinema is coloured in quite clearly: there is America, which is Hollywood, which is popular entertainment, and there is Europe, which is art.¹

Whilst it is not possible to directly map this distinction onto Deleuze's work - after all, Cinema 1 discusses the growth of the European movement-image in
several national cinemas, and *Cinema 2*, the development of American independent cinema *in general*, the tendency which Dyer and Vincendeau identify in Anglo-American film studies is also true of Deleuze's cinema texts of the mid 80s.

Deleuze's texts appear to chart the post-war resistance of European art cinema to the colonialism of the Hollywood movement-image. In point of fact, however, they are an expression of difference from Hollywood which Deleuze himself *creates*, but which he gives the impression of having *discovered*. Essentially, the cinema texts offer a third way of categorizing art cinema's resistance of the Hollywood aesthetic. In addition to David Bordwell's, 'Art Cinema as Mode of Film Practice' (1979), and Steve Neale's 'Art Cinema as Institution' (1981), with Deleuze's work we have a definition of art cinema as a category based around the use of different temporal narratives to create a different type of subject. Perhaps the cinema texts could be subtitled, 'Art Cinema as a Temporal Narrative' (1983/1985). This particular image of a unified ungrounding force within European cinema, however, is only evident if we look through Deleuze's philosophical filter. This is a filter, moreover, which not only helps perpetuate the Hollywood/European art cinema distinction, but which also ensures the continuation of the assumption that Hollywood cinema is the structuring norm from which all other cinemas derive their existence.

The extremely general conclusions which we reached in chapter six are a product of this tacitly assumed binary. Due to its structuring rationale, the distinction between the European temporal labyrinth (as seen in the time-image) and the American straight line of time (movement-image) emerged as a seemingly inevitable conclusion. To the scholar of the cinema/s of any one specific European nation (or indeed, of American cinemas) this conclusion must seem extremely universalizing. In our defence it is worth stating that, attempting to tie Deleuze's categories to a specific historical context inevitably led the work back to the few, brief, passing references he makes, in *Cinema 2*, to the effect of WWII on the emergence of the time-image in Europe. Such ambiguous contexts
as "Europe" and "WWII" themselves suggest the need for a sizable study dedicated to exploring the validity of Deleuze's distinctions in such vast contexts. There is much more to be said of European cinema, after all, than is to be found in its internationally accepted art cinema forms. The many popular European cinemas which Deleuze's work fails to address would certainly necessitate a rethinking of his categories, if not his entire argument. The very general tendencies which we have alluded to in chapter six, then, should perhaps be seen as illustrative of one of the drawbacks of Deleuze's work. This is, explicitly, its lack of detailed context specificity, such as that provided by the study of one nation, and its different cinemas.

In addition to this it is worth noting that, with the growth of studies of popular cinemas, it is now no longer possible to assert, as Deleuze did (or to assume, as we have) that the Hollywood action-image is the movement-image's most dominant manifestation. In fact, the global dominance of Hollywood's action-image form is itself a questionable phenomena, depending upon the part of the world studied. Bollywood cinema, for instance, whilst it does not follow the same SAS' pattern evident in the Hollywood action-image^4 - the movement from situation (S) to changed situation (S') through the action (A) of a character - is still the dominant movement-image form in many parts of Asia. This fact in itself is enough to question, if not unground, Deleuze's implicit binary. Even in Europe, the art cinema model of the time-image cannot simply be equated with the national cinema of any country. The number of different popular movement-images which exist in Europe alone illustrate just how universalizing the conclusions of this thesis would be, if universally applied.

This is not meant, however, as a dismissal of Deleuze's work. The movement/time-image distinction offered by Deleuze is undoubtedly a unique way of classifying different cinemas. The way in which it has enabled Laura Marks to discuss multi-cultural, and diasporic cinemas, for instance, is exemplary. Yet it has been a constant struggle to keep this work from simply maintaining the hierarchy that is implicit in Deleuze's cinema texts. It is all to easy, after all, to
use Deleuze's work in order to venerate the time-image over the movement-image. It was partly in order to avoid this moral snobbery that, in part two, the focus shifted to the movement-image. This was done specifically in order to draw out just why, if it is so morally inferior to the time-image, the movement-image is so widespread. As we have attempted to show, the reason for this is not simply a lack of education, or "taste", on the part of the viewer, but rather, our human desire for reterritorialization, and molar order. That this is the same process that perpetuates colonialism and acts of mass genocide is perhaps the reason why the time-image must ultimately seem so ineffective to this study. However, as Marks' work shows, through its focus on the transgressions of dominant colonial fictions made available to the viewer through multi-cultural time-images, a different approach than ours can offer much more optimistic conclusions. Deleuze's binary is itself not wholly to blame for the pessimism of our conclusions, then, but rather the combination of it and the mainstream American and European movement-images we have explored.

Pursuing this work, we have found that Deleuze's philosophical approach is a double-edged sword. On the one hand it provides a unique and fascinating tool for the study of cinema. On the other, its Hollywood/European art cinema framework can presuppose the drawing of extremely general distinctions between national cinemas which are infinitely more complex than the cinema texts suppose. We offer this work, then, with the proviso that the conclusions which we have drawn be understood as limited to certain types of cinema. The reasons why they should not be universally applied will be made clear before we finish, in order to highlight some of the dangers inherent in such a move.

The *histories* of cinema which Deleuze's texts create, even though they follow, as we have shown, an epistemic model, still represent a specifically western view of cinema's development. For this reason, to impose the conclusions that this study draws on other, world cinemas, would be little short of cultural imperialism. This is the case, we shall now briefly show, whether they be art cinema or popular cinemas.
Studies of popular cinemas world-wide illustrate just how the different aesthetic and cultural traditions on which these cinemas can be shown to draw - once they are viewed in specific national and cultural contexts - problematize the subject Deleuze uncovers in both the Hollywood movement-, and the European time-image. Moreover, recent studies of different art cinemas have also begun to question certain of the assumptions that structure Deleuze's work. Within the internationally accepted art cinema movement in which Deleuze discovers the time-image, we also find evidence of the dangers inherent in universally applying western frameworks within non-western contexts. Darius Cooper's recent book (2000) on the films of Satyajit Ray (the internationally accepted Indian - or rather, Bengali - art cinema auteur) for instance, re-appraises the way in which certain critics have, in the past, applied western theories of subjectivity to Ray's characters. This is most obvious in Robin Wood's liberal humanist appraisal of Ray, in his book, *The Apu Trilogy* (1972). In this earlier work, Cooper shows, Wood betrays his ignorance of aesthetic forms specific to India. Unmasking the Aristotelian bias of Wood's decision to approach Ray's films through their characters, and his psychoanalytically informed study of their psyches', Cooper's work thus critiques the tendency to universalize, and, effectively, to *naturalize*, through a westernized interpretation, the poorly understood other.

Wood, Cooper shows, is not the only critic guilty of this universalizing application of western theories of the subject onto characters who exist in a different national and cultural aesthetic. He is also critical of Ben Nyce's conception of the character of Apu, in *Apur Sansar* (1959). The passage which Cooper quotes from Nyce is meant as a description of the transformations of Apu when his character is read as allegorically representative of the Hindu God, Krishna. In fact, the concluding section of the passage describes perfectly the becoming-other of the Deleuzian subject.
He is the same Apu throughout the trilogy, and yet he is in the process of becoming different from his prior selves - or, more accurately, of becoming more and more himself.⁸

Cooper states, however, that this interpretation is 'completely erroneous'⁹. As he goes on to demonstrate, there is a becoming-other evident in Apu, but it should not be understood in the way Nyce suggests. Instead, it can be more fully understood as part of the Classical Indian aesthetic form of the *rasa* (roughly speaking, the blending of flavours/moods). Ray's character, Apu, whilst developing through the course of The Apu Trilogy actually remains constant to himself throughout. He displays, Cooper demonstrates, the 'constancy of character'¹⁰ typical of the *rasa* form. His "becoming-other" (if we persist in understanding this term in the fashion prescribed by a western metaphysics like that of Deleuze) is figured, rather, through his contrast with other characters. In this way, Cooper explains, does the *rasa* aesthetic develop its characters. Thus, whilst Apu can be seen to manifest the same becoming-other as Deleuze discovered in the subject of the time-image (especially if we go looking for this interpretation of his character) when seen in a different light - when viewed, for instance, as part of a distinctly Indian aesthetic - the way in which his becoming-other is made manifest is seen to be extremely different. Here we see how a character who could be classified as a subject typical of the time-image, can instead be seen to exist in a form whose aesthetic characteristics problematize this western definition of character.

Ray, however, is in no way typical of popular Indian cinema. After all, his work is received with little enthusiasm by mainstream audiences throughout India's different States. In Indian cinema's popular forms, different manifestations of the subject of the movement-image also arise. Once again, this is due to the specific aesthetic concerns of these cinemas. Bombay cinema, for instance, as Rosie Thomas cautioned in the same year that saw the publication of *Cinema 2*, must not be seen as an industry that produces bad copies of mainstream western cinemas like Hollywood. Whilst they may borrow elements from western cinemas, through an aesthetic 'Indianisation'¹¹ these borrowed elements become
part of films which are culturally specific entities unto themselves. As Thomas' work illustrates, the Hollywood action-image's movement from situation (S) to changed situation (S') through the action (A) of the character, is not retained by the Hindi cinema aesthetic, even in cases when a Hollywood narrative is transplanted into a Hindi film. In fact, Hindi cinema displays distinctly different priorities to those of western cinema.

What seems to emerge in Hindi cinema is an emphasis on emotion and spectacle rather than on tight narrative, on *how* things will happen rather than *what* will happen next, on a succession of modes rather than linear denouement ...\(^{12}\)

This ensures that the agency of the character in the development of a recognizable linear narrative takes second place to the creation of spectacles through which the changing situation is seen to develop. It is a matter of *how*, not *why*, the situation changes from S to S'. For this reason, the subject of the movement-image that we find in *Sherlock Jr.* is not quite the same subject that we find in Hindi cinema. Its sensory-motor continuity remains, but its actions are not given the same primacy in the linking together of situations as is the case in the Hollywood model. In films like *Naseeb* (1981, *Destiny*) Thomas shows, the role of fate, or destiny, plays a much stronger role than in the Hollywood action-image, the representative of the American ideology of performative self-creation.

In a film in which; 'Order, or equilibrium is presented as a state in which humans live in harmony with fate', and in which; 'Disruption of this order is the result of selfish greed'\(^{13}\), the subject's ability to perform their identity in such a way as to change the situation in which they find themselves (from S to S') is contrary to necessity. Deleuze's distinctions simply do not apply to this aesthetic context.

In fact, it becomes extremely difficult to sustain Deleuze's exclusive categories of movement- and time-image in relation to the non-Aristotelian aesthetic of the *rasa* employed by Hindi cinema. Here, the succession of events that take place across a series of unified spaces in the movement-image becomes, instead, the 'succession of modes of affect (*rasa*), by means of highly stylised devices.'\(^{14}\)
The narrative's progression through a series of discontinuous spectacles problematizes the broad distinction which Deleuze draws between movement- and time-images. Neither category seems entirely adequate to describe the Hindi cinema narrative, which rejects the 'unities of time and place' of the Aristotelian (movement-image) aesthetic on the one hand, but which does not quite slip into the convoluted passage through time of the time-image on the other. Deleuze's binary categories must, for this reason alone, be applied with great caution to texts whose logic is not the same as that which structures Deleuze's image of thought.

Perhaps a little like a Proppian analysis of narrative, a semiological critique of shot structures, or a psychoanalytically defined subject, Deleuze's work should be understood as offering one more way of regarding cinema. His methodology is not a film studies panacea, it is an epistemology. Indeed, it is one of many. Consequently, it must be utilized with great care, and, for the reasons we have alluded to above, more than a few caveats. Whilst we began this work with a criticism of film studies' retreat into the nation (and whilst we still maintain that the very concept of the nation is itself an arbitrary framework of reasoning from within which to view films) the recourse to a specific context, as we have briefly seen with some different Indian cinemas, illuminates the difficulties which face any attempt to utilize Deleuze's concepts universally. Although there are, admittedly, almost as many complementary difficulties involved in any recourse to causal aesthetic origins in national and cultural texts and contexts (especially the dangers of essentialism and racist exclusion which they bring to the multicultural histories which nearly all "nations" enjoy) the questions which the contrasting conclusions ask of Deleuze cannot simply be ignored.

The somewhat unresolved endings of both chapters five and six of this thesis also suggest other limitations inherent to the Deleuzian study of cinema. These are, in part at least, created by this work's inevitable finitude. As it drew towards its conclusion we realized with desperate frustration the new territories opening up before us which we no longer had the words, or the time, left to map. Some of
the questions which remain include: How do our conclusions concerning film noirs like *Memento*, *The Talented Mr Ripley*, and *Liar* fare, when examined in relation to the contextual framework of their genre's conventions and history? Would such an approach strengthen or diminish the validity of the conclusions drawn so far? Moreover, how would a study of the effect of American film noir on the French New Wave influence what we have said about *Un héros très discret*? Furthermore, how would such a generic/national cinema context further problematize the distinctions between the two types of cinema that we have drawn, and indeed, Deleuze's movement-/time-image binary?

This is, of course, in addition to the necessarily over-simplistic Europe/America distinction of chapter six, which cannot help but be problematized by any study that concentrates on the specifics of the regional cinemas that exist within these continental contexts. What are we to make, for instance, of the conclusions we have drawn concerning the narrative representations of performative subjectivity in relation to the political and institutional contexts in which these films emerged? Although we touched on this question in chapter four, through an analysis of the urban, national, and global economical contests that produced *Sliding Doors* and *Lola Rennt*, much work still remains to be done in this respect. Finally, as we noted in the preface, the focus on character subjectivity has led to a marked absence of any critical appreciation of the role of mise-en-scene, lighting, soundtrack, music, subtitles (and so on) in the films we have studied. Any one of these factors could problematize the conclusions we have drawn.

The above notwithstanding, it may be that, as the notion of the nation becomes increasingly more problematic - due to the growth of globally determined networks like the two-tier global economy, a European superstate, or indeed, terrorism that is not (contrary to current military maneuvers) nation specific - Deleuze's universalizing framework can still offer new ways of thinking about cinema. Marks' work, once more, expresses exactly how a Deleuzian focus on concepts like memory and the senses, when used in relation to contexts that
transgress that of the nation, can help to locate general trends that are prevalent within multi-cultural and diasporic cinemas. In this way, its potentially universalizing stance can be used in an extremely positive fashion. For this reason at least, it is hoped that the initial conclusions that this work offers - concerning the narrative expression of our western view of time in the movement-image - may also be useful.

Despite the above reservations, there is much of positive worth to be gained from a study of Deleuze. Perhaps as a contrast to Marks' focus on multi-cultural time-images, this work can be seen as an uncovering of some of the generalizing binary reterritorializations behind certain western movement-images. After all, as the global dominance of the colonizing (and increasingly, the endo-colonizing) western image of thought attempts to grow stronger throughout the globe, might realizing its tyrannical, linear narrative temporality not be one of the first steps towards ungrounding its reterritorializing power? If so, we must also be wary of simply perpetuating the same colonization through our choice of methodological filter with which to view different cinemas. For these reasons we must always keep one eye on the way in which we are utilizing Deleuze's exclusive image of thought.

2 Bordwell, David, 'Art Cinema as a Mode of Film Practice', *Film Criticism*, Vol. 4, no. 1 (1979), pp. 56-64.


8 ibid., p. 30, quoted in Cooper, op. cit., p. 8.

9 Cooper, op. cit., p. 8.

10 Cooper, op. cit., p. 25.


12 ibid., p. 130.

13 ibid., p. 126.

14 ibid., p. 130.

15 ibid.
Select Filmography.

*All About Eve*
Country: US
Year: 1950
**Running Time:** 138 min.
**Director:** Joseph L. Mankiewicz
**Producer/s:** Darryl F. Zanuck
**Script:** Joseph L. Mankiewicz

*Angel Heart*
Country: US
Year: 1987
**Running Time:** 113 min.
**Director:** Alan Parker
**Producer/s:** Alan Marshall
**Script:** Alan Parker

*Année dernière à Marienbad, L'*
Country: Fr/It
Year: 1961
**Running Time:** 94 min.
**Director:** Alain Resnais
**Producer/s:** Pierre Courau, Raymond Froment
**Script:** Alain Robbe-Grillet

*Apur Sansar*
Country: India
Year: 1959
**Running Time:** 106 min.
**Director:** Satyajit Ray
**Producer/s:** Satyajit Ray
**Script:** Satyajit Ray
*Big Heat, The*

**Country:** US  
**Year:** 1953  
**Running Time:** 90 min.  
**Director:** Fritz Lang  
**Producer/s:** Robert Arthur  
**Script:** Sydney Boehm

*BIRTH OF A NATION*

**Country:** US  
**Year:** 1915  
**Length:** 13 058 ft.  
**Director:** D. W. Griffith  
**Producer/s:** D. W. Griffith, Harry E. Aitkin  
**Script:** D. W. Griffith, Frank E. Woods

*Céline et Julie vont en bateau*

**Country:** France  
**Year:** 1974  
**Running Time:** 192 min.  
**Director:** Jacques Rivette  
**Producer/s:** Barbet Schroeder  
**Script:** Juliet Berto, Dominique Labourier, Bulle Ogier, Marie-France Pisier, Jacques Rivette

*Conformista, II*

**Country:** It/Fr/WGer  
**Year:** 1969  
**Running Time:** 108 min.  
**Director:** Bernardo Bertolucci  
**Producer/s:** Maurizio Lodi-Fé  
**Script:** Bernardo Bertolucci
Deep Cover
Country: US
Year: 1992
Running Time: 112 min.
Director: Bill Duke
Producer/s: Pierre David
Script: Michael Tolkin, Henry Bean

Detour
Country: US
Year: 1945
Running Time: 68 min.
Director: Edgar G. Ulmer
Producer/s: Leon Fromkess
Script: Martin Goldsmith

Double Vie de Véronique, La
Country: Poland
Year: 1991
Running Time: 98 min.
Director: Krzysztof Kieslowski
Producer/s: Leonardo De La Fuente
Script: Krzysztof Kieslowski, Krzysztof Piesiewicz

8½
Country: Italy
Year: 1963
Running Time: 138 min.
Director: Federico Fellini
Producer/s: Angelo Rizzoli
Script: Federico Fellini

Epouse-moi
Country: France
Year: 2000
Running Time: 90 min.
Director: Harriet Marin
Producer/s: Jean-Claude Fleury
Script: Harriet Marin, Laurent Couchan

*Flirt*
Country: US/GB/Jap
Year: 1995
Running Time: 84 min.
Director: Hal Hartley
Producer/s: Ted Hope
Script: Hal Hartley

*Goodfellas*
Country: US
Year: 1990
Running Time: 145 min.
Director: Martin Scorcese
Producer/s: Irwin Winkler
Script: Nicholas Pileggi, Martin Scorcese

*Héros très discret, Un*
Country: France
Year: 1995
Running Time: 106 min.
Director: Jacques Audiard
Producer/s: Patrick Godeau
Script: Alain Le Henry, Jacques Audiard

*Hiroshima, Mon Amour*
Country: France
Year: 1959
Running Time: 91 min.
Director: Alain Resnais
Script: Marguerite Duras

*It's a Wonderful Life*
Country: US
Year: 1946
Running Time: 129 min.
Director: Frank Capra
Producer/s: Frank Capra
Script: Frances Goodrich

*Je t'aime, je t'aime*
Country: France
Year: 1967
Running Time: 94 min.
Director: Alain Resnais
Producer/s: Mag Bodard
Script: Jacques Sternberg

*Jétee, La*
Country: France
Year: 1962
Running Time: 29 min.
Director: Chris Marker
Script: Chris Marker

*Liar*
Country: US
Year: 1997
Running Time: 102 min.
Director: Josh and Jonas Pate
Producer/s: Peter Glatzer
Script: Jonas Pate, Josh Pate
Living in Oblivion
Country: US
Year: 1995
Running Time: 90 min.
Director: Tom de Cillo
Producer/s: Michael Griffiths, Marcus Viscidi
Script: Tom DiCillo

Lola Rennt
Country: Germany
Year: 1998
Running Time: 80 min.
Director: Tomas Tykwer
Producer/s: Stefan Arndt
Script: Tomas Tykwer

Lost Highway
Country: US
Year: 1996
Running Time: 134 min.
Director: David Lynch
Producer/s: Deepak Nayar, Tom Sternberg, Mary Sweeney
Script: David Lynch, Barry Gifford

Marnie
Country: US
Year: 1964
Running Time: 130 min.
Director: Alfred Hitchcock
Producer/s: Alfred Hitchcock
Script: Jay Presson Allen

Memento
Country: US
Year: 2000
Running Time: 109 min.
Director: Christopher Nolan
Producer/s: Suzanne Todd, Jennifer Todd
Script: Christopher Nolan

*Mulholland Drive*
Country: US
Year: 2002
Running Time: 146 min.
Director: David Lynch
Producer/s: Mary Sweeney, Alain Sarde, Neal Edelstein, Michael Polaire, Tony Krantz, and Pierre Edelman
Script: David Lynch

*The Music Box*
Country: US
Year: 1989
Running Time: 126 min.
Director: Costa-Gavras
Producer/s: Irwin Winkler
Script: Joe Eszterhas

*Possible Worlds*
Country: Canada
Year: 2001
Running Time: 93 min.
Director: Robert Lepage
Producer/s: Sandra Cunningham
Script: Robert Lepage, John Mighton

*Pretty Woman*
Country: US
Year: 1990
Running Time: 119 min.
**Director:** Garry Marshall
**Producer/s:** Arnon Milchan, Steven Reuther
**Script:** J. F. Lawton

*Roma Città Aperta*
**Country:** Italy
**Year:** 1945
**Running Time:** 101 min.
**Director:** Roberto Rosselini
**Script:** Sergio Amidei, Federico Fellini, Roberto Rossellini

*Romy and Michele's High School Reunion*
**Country:** US
**Year:** 1997
**Running Time:** 91 min.
**Director:** David Mirkin
**Producer/s:** Laurence Mark
**Script:** Robin Schiff

*Saving Private Ryan*
**Country:** US
**Year:** 1998
**Running Time:** 170 min.
**Director:** Steven Spielberg
**Producer/s:** Steven Spielberg, Ian Bruce, Mark Gordon, Gary Levinsohn
**Script:** Robert Rodat

*Scarface*
**Country:** US
**Year:** 1932
**Running Time:** 90 min.
**Director:** Howard Hawks
**Producer/s:** Howard Hawks
**Sherlock Jr.**
*Country:* US  
*Year:* 1924  
*Length:* 4,065 ft.  
*Director:* Buster Keaton  
*Producer/s:* Joseph M. Schenck  
*Script:* Jean Havez, Joseph Mitchell, Clyde Bruckmann

**Shoah**
*Country:* France  
*Year:* 1985  
*Running Time:* 566 min.  
*Director:* Claude Lanzmann

**Short Cuts**
*Country:* US  
*Year:* 1993  
*Running Time:* 188 min.  
*Director:* Robert Altman  
*Producer/s:* Cary Brokaw  
*Script:* Robert Altman, Frank Barhydt

**Sixth Sense, The**
*Country:* US  
*Year:* 1999  
*Running Time:* 107 min.  
*Director:* M. Night Shyamalan  
*Producer/s:* Frank Marshall, Kathleen Kennedy, Barry Mendel  
*Script:* M. Night Shyamalan

**Sliding Doors**
*Country:* US/GB
Year: 1997  
**Running Time:** 99 min.  
**Director:** Peter Howitt  
**Producer/s:** Sydney Pollack, Philippa Braithwaite, William Horberg  
**Script:** Peter Howitt

*Star Wars*  
**Country:** US  
**Year:** 1977  
**Running Time:** 121 min.  
**Director:** George Lucas  
**Producer/s:** Gary Kurtz  
**Script:** George Lucas

*Sunset Boulevard*  
**Country:** US  
**Year:** 1950  
**Running Time:** 111 min.  
**Director:** Billy Wilder  
**Producer/s:** Charles Brackett  
**Script:** Charles Brackett, Billy Wilder, D. M. Marshman Jr.

*Talented Mr Ripley, The*  
**Country:** US  
**Year:** 1999  
**Running Time:** 139 min.  
**Director:** Anthony Minghella  
**Producer/s:** William Horberg, Tom Sternberg  
**Script:** Anthony Minghella

*Todo Sobre Mi Madre*  
**Country:** Sp/Fr  
**Year:** 1999  
**Running Time:** 101 min.
**Underground**

**Country:** Fr/Ger/Hun  
**Year:** 1995  
**Running Time:** 192 min.  
**Director:** Emir Kusturica  
**Producer/s:** Pierre Spengler  
**Script:** Dusan Kovacevic, Emir Kusturica

**Vertigo**

**Country:** US  
**Year:** 1958  
**Running Time:** 128 min.  
**Director:** Alfred Hitchcock  
**Producer/s:** Alfred Hitchcock  
**Script:** Alec Coppel, Samuel Taylor

**Winterschläfer**

**Country:** Ger/Fr  
**Year:** 1997  
**Running Time:** 124 min.  
**Director:** Tomas Tykwer  
**Producer/s:** Stefan Arndt  
**Script:** Tomas Tykwer, Anne-Françoise Pyszora
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