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NOUS, NOESIS AND NOETA

The Transcendent Apriorist Tradition in Epistemology

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With this comes what is known as the casting of wings, the enchaining in body: the Soul has lost that innocency of conducting the higher which it knew when it stood with the All-soul, that earlier state to which all its interests would bid it hasten back.

It has fallen: it is at the chain: debarred from expressing itself now through its intellectual phase, it operates through sense; it is a captive; this is the burial, the encavernment, of the Soul.

But in spite of all it has, for ever, something transcendent: by a conversion towards the intellective act, it is loosed from the shackles and soars - when only it makes its memories the starting point of a new vision of essential being.

[Plotinus']
ABSTRACT

There is perhaps no epistemological theory more universally rejected, by modern philosophers and commentators, than transcendent apriorism. In fact, the notion that the pure human intellect, purged of sensory contamination, can somehow transcend the limits of all possible experience is now disdainfully regarded as an obsolete Platonic fantasy. In the latter half of the eighteenth century Immanuel Kant had vilified those who defended such extreme versions of rationalism as, "dogmatic champions of supersensible reason". Regrettably, during more than two centuries of philosophical inquiry, this derogatory attitude has hardened into an obstructive prejudice. It is certain that the process has done much to impede, truly objective, modern research into transcendent apriorism's basic epistemology. In fact, even foundational issues relating to the definition and categorization of the theory have been neglected, or only superficially considered. As a result, numerous misleading "straw man" versions of the doctrine have been promulgated, by the Logical Positivists and others, and then very enthusiastically denigrated. The consequent defective analysis and the prejudice that engendered it have seriously distorted modern appraisals of the theory's epistemological legitimacy. Similarly, contemporary studies of transcendent apriorism's philosophical history have been infected with damaging errors. This contamination is particularly transparent in the flawed theory of K. Ajdukiewicz that "radical apriorism" had adherents "almost entirely among ancient thinkers".

The aim of this thesis is to provide a new and comprehensive analysis of transcendent apriorism that remedies such prevalent misconceptions. The principle objective will be to remove the encrusting layers of prejudice, error and confusion that blight conventional epistemological and historical treatments of the subject. Ultimately, this procedure will function to disclose the doctrine's essential nature, its origins and the true course of its historical development. In the light of this analysis, we will be in a better position to determine whether extant arguments claiming to refute or undermine transcendent apriorism are legitimate or erroneous.
The methodology used, to achieve the specified aim, will attain to a new objectivity by excluding the damaging preconceptions normally associated with transcendent apriorism. The preliminary stage involves an unbiased analysis of Plato's familiar and largely uncontroversial version of the doctrine. Categories will then be established that differentiate the general theory from those epistemologies with which it is so often confused. In addition, an original and much needed essential definition of the doctrine will be posited. The eradication of definitional imprecision permits the question, whether transcendent apriorism originated with Parmenides, to be raised. The doctrine's epistemological elements are then deeply analysed in relation to variants defended by historical philosophers. A corrective methodology operates throughout the thesis that discloses prejudice, rectifies error and eliminates confusion. The progress made will prompt (i) an attempt to solve previously intractable problems in the history of philosophy and (ii) a re-appraisal of the extant arguments concerning the doctrine's legitimacy.

The findings of the analysis confirm the lamentable state of modern research into transcendent apriorism. In fact, the new approach has completely undermined many putative certainties and rendered obsolete superficial contemporary debate. For instance, Christian Wolff is often regarded as a paradigmatic transcendent apriorist, yet he never ascribed to the epistemology. Plato is regularly considered to be the doctrine's originator, but this part is definitely played by Parmenides. In addition, there are newly discovered variants of the doctrine that have previously gone totally unrecognised. In fact, A. J. Ayer and many others completely overlooked the illuminative tradition of transcendent apriorism. There are numerous discoveries of this nature. The most fruitful and original results, that stem from the doctrine's re-examination, occur in the new resolution given to several age-old historical and epistemological problems. The most interesting outcome was the discovery that many arguments, relied upon to undermine or refute the doctrine, are unsound or have fundamentally missed their mark.

The significance of the findings is undeniable. Transcendent apriorism's history and epistemology have been fundamentally remoulded. As a result, during an age in which empiricism enjoys an almost unrivalled predominance, the most extreme form of rationalism is resurrected with a demand for a re-appraisal.
# LIST OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preface</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. PLATO’S TRANSCENDENT APRIORISM</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1. Paradigmatic Transcendent Apriorism</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2. Plato and Apriorism</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.1. Intrinsic Scepticism: Αἰσθησις in Relation to Αληθεία and Δοξα</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.2. Platonic Adequation: That-which-is-not &quot;is&quot;, contra Parmenides</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.3. Plato and Logico-Sensitive cognition</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.4. Pure Notions and Principles</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.5. Plato's Secret Doctrine</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3. Plato and the Issue of Transcendence</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. THE ELEMENTS OF TRANSCENDENT APRIORISM</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1. The Theories Expounded by our Predecessors</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2. A Determinate Designation</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.1. Transcendent Aposteriorism</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.2. Immanent Apriorism</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3. The Mis-Categorization of Wolff, Hegel, Heidegger and Bradley</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4. Further Modern Distinctions</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5. A Determinate Definition-Formulation</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. THE NOETIC FUNCTIONS</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1. The Pure (Human) Intellect</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2. The Pure Intellectual Functions</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.1. Axiomatic Intuition</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.2. Deductive Intuition</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.3. Noetic-Deductive Reasoning</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.4. The Apprehension of Noetic Concepts.</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.5. Noetic Introspection</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.6. Illuminative Intuition</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. ELEATIC INCEPTION</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1. Exegetic Problems with Parmenidean Αἰσθησις</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2. The Evidence of Doxography and Testimonia</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3. The Instructive Error of Theophrastus</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.4. The Correct Location of B16
4.5. The Status of the Way of Δοξα
4.6. What is the Way of Δοξα an Account of?
4.7. Verdenius Notion that Νοος Incorporates Αισθανος
4.8. The Ratiocinative Parmenidean Νοος
4.9. Brahma Satyam, Pagan Mithya, Jivo Brahmaiva Napara

5. THE A PRIORI
5.1. The A Priori (Sensu Stricto)
5.2. The Acquisitive A Priori
   5.2.1. The Technical Sense of Experience
   5.2.2. Categories of Experience
5.3. Immanuel Kant’s *Inaugural Dissertation*
5.4. The Justificatory A Priori
5.5. The Determinate Definition and the A Priori
5.6. The Real Use of the Intellect

6. INNATE IDEAS
6.1 The Innate and the A Priori
6.2 The Downfall of the Alternatives to Innateness
6.3 Requisite Innateness: the Leibnizian Defence

7. THE ILLUMINATIVE TRADITION
7.1. Ratiocination and Immediate Intellectual Intuition
7.2. Discursive and Non-Discursive Intuition
7.3. Illuminative intuition
7.4. Rational and Non-Rational Intuitions
7.5. Illuminative Transcendent Apriorism from
   Plotinus to Bergson
   7.5.1. Philo, Plotinus and Autonomous Illuminative intuition
   7.5.2. St. Augustine and Heteronymous Illuminative intuition
   7.5.3. Influxum Hyperphysicum in Malebranche
   7.5.4. Henry Bergson and Spiritual Auscultation
7.6. Further Confusions in Kant and Ayer

8. THE NOUMENAL WORLD
8.1. Terminological Subversion
   8.1.1. Appearance, Representation and the In-itself
   8.1.2. Phenomenal (world) versus Noumenal (World)
8.2. Squaring the Cartesian Circle

9. SPINOZA AND SCIENTIFIC MODELS
9.1. Immanent Aposteriorism
   9.2.1. Is Science Immanent or Transcendent?
   9.2.2. Is Science Aposteriorist or Apriorist?
9.2. Baruch Spinoza: Scientia Intuitiva

Conclusion
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. “The Four Epistemological Divisions”  
Table 2. “The Contradictions between Parmenides’ Two Ways”  
Table 3. “Epistemological Term Subversion in Transcendent Apriorism”  
Table 4. “Varieties of Transcendent Apriorism”
For many years, I have been interested in the traditional project of building a transcendent metaphysical system upon a pure, a priori, epistemological foundation. According to Kant\(^1\), this extreme rationalist programme, to extend speculative knowledge beyond the limits of experience, was a natural but dangerously misleading disposition of the human mind. In contrast to this view, I have always regarded the cultivation of this proclivity to be a legitimate and important aim of the philosophical reason. I therefore agree with Fichte that engaging the mind in pure thought represents an elevation of human consciousness.\(^2\) I would supplement this notion by endorsing the Platonist claim that the herementioned elevation affords the only viable route to transcendent metaphysical knowledge. Although this currently unfashionable perspective influenced the general research concern of my thesis, the intention was never merely to present an apologetic defence of this view. Instead, the analysis was undertaken as an antidote to all extant prejudicative treatments of the subject. In fact, it was intended as a continuation and furtherance of a long forgotten wholly objective method of enquiry developed by Hegel.\(^3\)

The more specific research undertaking originated from an investigation, prompted by a curious statement made by a philosophical commentator. Some years ago I was reading a brief section on transcendent metaphysics, in *Reason and Experience* by W. H. Walsh, when I came across the following cursory value judgement, “There seems to be little difficulty in showing that metaphysics in this sense is an impossible undertaking”.\(^4\) It struck me that, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant had found it necessary to develop lengthy and complex arguments, to putatively demonstrate the epistemological illegitimacy of this form of metaphysics. It also occurred to me that Hegel, in *The Phenomenology of Spirit* and *The Science of Logic*, had subsequently found powerful reasons to reject Kant’s main conclusions. Naturally, I was aware that the Logical Positivist’s had used their verification principle in an attempt to establish the epistemological impossibility of transcendent metaphysics. However, this argument had
never convinced me and had fallen out of favour more generally. Hence I read on, with eager anticipation, to ascertain the previously undiscovered straightforward refutation.

At this point, it was certainly difficult to envisage the impressive metaphysical monuments of the rationalist tradition collapsing before an argument that presented “little difficulty”. My doubts were soon confirmed when Walsh’s purported refutation was disclosed as an uninspiring repetition of an old Kantian line of reasoning. Puzzled and dissatisfied with Walsh’s superficial analysis, I searched the literature for more profound reflections on the subject. As a result, it was discovered that, subsequent to the brilliant Hegelian study, there was a general sharp decline in the standard of philosophical commentary. The perfunctory opinion had emerged that transcendent metaphysics was impossible because its epistemological foundation was unsound. In fact, this supposedly erroneous epistemology, that I designate transcendent apriorism, rarely seemed to be given serious consideration. Instead, it was found that the negative evaluations of Ayer and Kant were generally just accepted on trust. In exceptional cases, arguments against the epistemological doctrine were actually promulgated, but they were brief and poorly constructed. More normally transcendent apriorism is either ignored or rejected with a cursory remark. The only real exception to this trend was the philosophy of Bergson.

Recognising that ingrained prejudice, rather than reasoned debate, was determining contemporary research, gave me the impetus to provide a totally new account. In order to do this effectively the whole edifice of current understandings would have to be overturned. There would need to be a return to the absolute basics from which the foundations of a more enduring structure could be constructed. The historical origins and development of transcendent apriorism, its essential epistemological nature, and many of the extant arguments that purport to undermine it, must undergo a thorough re-examination. The raison d’être of this thesis is the fulfilment of this reformative programme.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis is dedicated to my parents Anne and Arthur Burgess. I would also like it to be a tribute to the memory of the Hegelian philosopher Hywel Thomas who inspired my interest in traditional metaphysics. Thanks must also go to my long-suffering tutor Pat Shaw and to Kenneth Haycock who persistently solved my computer problems.
INTRODUCTION

There was a time when transcendent apriorism was regarded as the epistemological master doctrine underpinning the most profound metaphysical systems. Indubitably, the vast and enduring philosophical heritage of Platonism was built upon its firm foundations. In that tradition, the doctrine was considered to provide a methodology by which the highest philosophical knowledge could be attained. In both Christian and Pagan Platonism, it had functioned to disclose the existence and nature of God, the immortality of the soul, the eternal archetypes, the true nature of the universe and the moral destiny of man. The discovery of the seminal route to such ultimate wisdom had been the epistemological golden legacy of the Eleatics. It is unsurprising therefore that Parmenides allegorised his discovery of the method as a journey, “far from the steps of men”1 to receive the enlightenment of a divine being. It is testimony to the doctrine’s power, that it was only the growing influence of mediaeval Aristotelianism that eventually displaced the method from its deserved position of prominence. However, when the Cartesian tradition of continental rationalism emerged, a reinvigorated transcendent apriorism was engendered from the ashes of the mediaeval world. It flourished again as the dominant epistemological method in the works of Descartes, Malebranche, Leibniz and Spinoza.

Yet, a moment of crises was looming. Immanuel Kant had brilliantly attempted to bolster and purify the method in his Inaugural Dissertation. However, before this work was complete, an historic volte-face occurred in his thinking. In fact, his next work, The Critique of Pure Reason, was a sustained attack on the doctrine’s pretensions to transcend experience. According to conventional wisdom, this attack was so devastating that it dealt transcendent apriorism its deathblow. In succeeding centuries, the mesmeric rise to prominence of the empirical method coincided with an explosion in scientific progress. Despite the restraining voices of Hegel and Bergson, the old and venerable rationalist methods were ridiculed and swept aside on a tide of enthusiasm. Reflecting this fervour, a young A. J. Ayer confidently enunciated a simple principle2 that putatively rendered the old master doctrine obsolete. Since then it has become the background
assumption of our empiricist age, that the doctrine is false and that this has been proved
the case. In a typical recent article, Norman Swartz\(^3\) has argued that rationalist
methodologies "ought to be defunct" and assures us with conviction that their "total
extinction is assured". Transcendent apriorism cannot even look for support from
Lawrence Bonjour's espousal of rational intuition in his recent book *In Defence of Pure
Reason*. It is symptomatic of our times that even when synthetic a priori knowledge is
granted legitimacy the possibility of it having transcendent claims is just never considered.
The grounds for the disregard of this possibility, by Bonjour and others, are rarely stated.
In fact, it is normally considered that the rationale behind the disregard need not be made
explicit because it is wholly self-evident. Hence, Rudolf Steiner has observed that, "the
thing-in-itself and a transcendent ultimate foundation of things are nothing but illusions. It
is easy to see that this is the case".\(^4\)

Historically speaking, it is undeniable that the reputation of transcendent apriorism
has undergone a radical reversal. The Parmenidean journey of enlightenment, once
viewed with reverential awe, is now derided as an embarrassment to philosophy. It is the
contention of this thesis that, contrary to popular opinion, the dramatic status
transformation is not justified by any of the existing argumentation. In fact, the
judgemental revision results from an unquestioning faith in the ubiquitous use of scientific
method, a misguided adherence to socially constructed common sense and a gross
overestimation of various putative refutations. In other words, the modern derogatory
attitude is founded on prejudice rather than argumentation. Unfortunately, this
unsympathetic treatment has also engendered a complacency that has grossly distorted
post-Hegelian epistemological analysis of transcendent apriorism. Another negative result
has been the false history that has emerged from the disingenuous attempt to prove that
various famous transcendent apriorists were actually empiricists at heart. As a
consequence, this thesis has ridiculously had to demonstrate that transcendent apriorists
like Plotinus do not have secret empiricist agenda. If complacency is the root of the
general corruption of analysis, then simple definitional inaccuracy is a primary branch.
The issue of the essential definition of transcendent apriorism is technical and is dealt with
comprehensively in chapter 2 of this thesis. However, the reader requires a simple general
understanding of the doctrine by way of introduction.

Historically speaking transcendent apriorism seems to emerge as a solution to an
intractable epistemological problem set by the ancient doctrine of universal flux.
Fragments of Heraclitus confirm his central conviction that everything flows (πάντα ρέον), so that like a moving river reality is never at rest but is undergoing continuous transformation. Cratylus, a disciple of Heraclitus, argued cogently that because things are perpetually in a state of flux it was impossible to know them. In fact, true things cannot even be said of that which changes, because as soon as the putative truth is uttered the object of that truth has changed. Hence, the attempt to capture reality in a truth seeking net of words is to introduce a false stability into a world that is essentially impermanent. Cratylus, conscious that he had reached an epistemological dead end, quite consistently refused to say anything further, merely wagging his finger at a reality he could not know.

The radically sceptical consequences that are embedded in the Heraclitean theory present a profound epistemological problem. Knowledge seems to require an immutable object. Undoubtedly, the fundamental characteristic of the few things that we consider ourselves to know, with apodeictic certainty, is fixity or permanence. We do not usually consider that the principle of non-contradiction or simple mathematical equations can be rendered false by the passage of time. In contrast, the objects of our experience do not seem to possess the necessary stability to be known. Hegel states that even the simplest sense statement like “this is night” when applied to a changing world “soon becomes stale”. This incompatibility problem facilitated the inception of transcendent apriorism, for it drove a wedge between epistemological aspiration and the world of experience. The argument developed that the impermanent world, which cannot become an object for knowledge, is revealed to us by the senses. However, our reasoning and truth seeking functions demand a different epistemological object that is stable and unchanging. Therefore, truth cannot reside in the reports of the senses. In fact, an early argument used by Melissus of Samos denies the senses can attain truth, because the objects that are revealed by the senses are impermanent and therefore unknowable. It is necessary then to reject the senses if we are to attain knowledge.

However, for the Eleatics, this is not to revert to Cratylus type scepticism. For them, the arguments do not legitimate a universal scepticism but rather a local scepticism concerning only the senses and the world of experience. The revelation of the goddess to Parmenides had been that, if the senses are rejected and the pure reason engaged, then an intelligible realm of permanence could be attained. The world, as it is presented to the
senses, is rejected and the question is raised concerning how the world necessarily is according to the dictates of pure reason. This is not the application of pure reason to the sensory world, but the transcending of the false sensory world by the pure reason. The transcendent intelligible reality that is attained, unlike its sensory counterpart, is a congenial knowledge object because it is immutable. Parmenides brings home this point when he observes of it, “changeless within the limits of great bonds it exists without beginning or ceasing, since coming to be and perishing have wandered very far away, and true conviction has thrust them off”. Hence, the early transcendent apriorist method in the Eleatic tradition, as it did later in the Platonic, represented a solution to the scepticism induced by the Heraclitean doctrine of flux.

As can be seen from this historical account of the doctrine’s inception, the essential feature of transcendent apriorism is the downgrading of sensory information. Apriorism, as an extreme rationalist doctrine, is a call to eliminate all sensory elements from the knowledge quest, for they corrupt true knowledge and can act as an ignis fatuus to the mind. In the Inaugural Dissertation, Kant blames the failure of metaphysics to attain the progress of science on the recurring contamination of pure a priori knowledge by sensory data. The infecting sensory elements that are to be excluded by apriorism take many forms. For instance, they include not only immediate sensory data but also the developed and often abstract reasoning on the senses typical of the scientific understanding. For the apriorist, it is the epistemological ancestry that counts. If reasoning, no matter how abstract, has its ultimate origins in sensation then it cannot become a legitimate vehicle for transcendent knowledge. This variety of unsuitable knowledge will be designated logico-sensitive cognition because it involves a mixture of sensation and abstract reasoning.

There is a modern trend, post-Frege, to call a proposition a priori if, although it has its origins in sensation, it can be justified independently of the senses. The transcendent apriorist, however, is a purist in these matters and repudiates any knowledge originally acquired from an illegitimate union with the senses. Collectively all knowledge that is intrinsically contaminated with sensation will be designated as emerging from the aesthetic functions of the mind. The term aesthetic is used in direct connection with its etymological root in sensory perception and must not be confused with artistic endeavour. It is certain that the aesthetic functions cannot have any intrinsic role. Yet, many transcendent apriorists do think that they can have an extrinsic role. In Leibniz’
theory of innate ideas sensory experience does have a role in uncovering noetic ideas that are dormant in the soul.

However, these sensory elements are not intrinsic to the ideas formed but function only in the method of their discovery and are therefore tolerated. Hence, not all transcendent apriorists believe that everything the aesthetic functions can achieve is wholly negative. Admittedly, there are many who believe that the sensory acts as a veil of Maya obscuring the true reality with illusion. However, there are others who, although they deny that ultimate knowledge can be attained by experience, admit that there is an inferior realm to which the senses are passably adequate. The former embrace a full sensory scepticism. For the latter it is a matter of adequation; the senses are adequate to their proscribed inferior realm so long as they do not stray into the intelligible realm. These different transcendent apriorist theories of perception are important because they dramatically affect the resulting ontology. If there is a realm to which the senses are adequate as well as an intelligible realm then there is a pull towards an ontological dualism. If sense-objects are merely obstructing illusions then their status as full existents is undermined, so that they could not constitute a realm, and an ontological monism most naturally results.

The repudiation of an intrinsic role for the senses in the attainment of ultimate knowledge is the negative aspect of apriorism. The question remains, which functions of the mind are uncontaminated by sensation and so can lead the apriorist to his goal? It is important to note that historically all answers to this question, within the tradition, have posited some form of intellectual intuition. This is a very broad category and includes, within its range, both the humble intuition, involved in finding the conclusion of a simple syllogism, and the grand intuition that claims a direct acquaintance with the divine being. These intuitions can occur in addition to, during or separate from a pure deductive process. Generally, they fall into two categories and are either discursive or illuminative. The discursive ones are propositional in nature and form an integral part in the building of deductive systems of metaphysics. Many such systems, inspired by the Euclidean model, proceed more geometrico and require both intuitions that grasp the basic axioms (axiomatic intuition) and those that grasp the conclusions of deductive sequences (deductive intuition). In contrast, the illuminative intuition does not mediate knowing through propositions and instead grasps reality directly. It functions to know things, not
to know about things. All such pure intuitions and processes, that constitute the positive aspect of apriorism, will be designated collectively the noetic functions.

It must always be remembered that transcendent apriorism is an epistemological method of attaining philosophical knowledge. Hence, various trans-rational or mystical intuitions, used to obtain transcendent knowledge, are disqualified from the methodology. This does not however mean that certain transcendent apriorists have not engaged with such intuitions. Plotinus, for example, talks of an intuition by which the intellect is "transported" and "drunk with nectar". However, here he is going beyond the transcendent apriorist method in a mystical flight. Such trans-rationalist intuitions will be designated hyper-noetic visions and are always carefully distinguished.

So far, we have merely considered the transcendent apriorist's pure apriorist methodology and it is now time to examine the transcendent goal. The sensory purification of the apriorist method is designed to lead the mind from that which is immanent, within our experience, to the realm that transcends such experience. According to the early Kant the pure intelligence, "is the faculty of the subject through which it is able to represent things which cannot by their own nature come before the senses of that subject". It is usually considered as a journey from the impermanent or illusory phenomena to the ultimate goal of stability and truth, viz. the realm of the in-itself. Hence, to purify yourself from sensory contamination and then take the phenomenal world as your ultimate object of knowledge would have seemed strange and wrong to the early transcendent apriorists.

However, as we shall discover, this immanent rather than transcendent apriorism itself has a long history. It was this type of apriorism that Engels had criticised in Hegel and Düring. It formed the basis of Cartesian science and Husserlian phenomenology. It also has a less distinguished role in Austrian Economics. Unfortunately, because of a deep misunderstanding, this doctrine has often been erroneously associated with transcendent apriorism. However, in distinct contrast, the transcendent apriorist does not set himself up as a rival to the physical or social scientist. He does not see it as his goal to pontificate on the phenomenal world using the apriorist method. In fact, he would regard science, like Plato, as dealing with an inferior realm in which only belief rather than knowledge can apply. Alternatively, he would agree with Parmenides that the scientist deals only with an illusory object unworthy of serious study. If the transcendent apriorist can be described as anything, he is an noumenalist not a phenomenalist or phenomenologist. The
Hegelian method is profound but it has more to do with Aristotelian immanentism than Platonic transcendence. Hegel wrote the *Phenomenology of Spirit* whereas a transcendent apriorist would have to write a noumenology of spirit.

Most philosophers have had their primary and most sustained contact with transcendent apriorism in its Platonic guise. In fact, it is widely accepted, though not universally held, that Plato's epistemology is both transcendent and apriorist. It is for this reason that, although the earlier Parmenidean version marked the doctrine's historical beginnings, this thesis commences with an analysis of Plato. The initial chapter therefore contains a deep analysis of Plato's epistemology, which is designed to expound and clarify at least one version of the transcendent apriorist method. The insights of many years study into extreme rationalist systems have been condensed into this chapter. This has resulted, among other things, in a modern defence of the traditional but very unfashionable Platonic two-world's theory; a new contribution to the debate on whether Plato's notion of ἐπιστήμη meant true belief plus a logos or direct acquaintance with the forms, and the discovery that Plato held a secret doctrine, revealed only to initiates.

This initial analysis introduces the phrase "transcendent apriorism" to Platonic scholarship as if it were an accepted and familiar terminology. The analysis also proceeds from the assumption that the definition of transcendent apriorism is fully understood and therefore serves to distinguish the doctrine from other epistemologies. However, the reality is that the terminology has never been used and, post-Hegel, the understanding of the doctrine's definition, and hence its distinction from other epistemologies, is a lost legacy. In the first part of chapter 2, the confusion that results both from this loss of understanding, from complacent definitions and from the inconsistent use of terminology is considered. As a remedy to this situation a new system for categorising epistemologies is developed and those with which transcendent apriorism is most often confused explained and distinguished. Many commentators have thought that philosophers like Hegel, Wolff, Bradley and Heidegger were transcendent apriorists. In fact, they use the same arguments against them as they would against Plato or Spinoza. The new categories will allow us to determine to what extent this is legitimate. In the second part of the chapter, a new and requisite precise definition of the doctrine is given to entirely end the confusions. At this stage, the amazing fact emerges that no one since Kant and Hegel has fully understood the doctrine.
Having arrived at a better understanding of exactly what transcendent apriorism is, it is time to look more closely at its component parts. We have already seen that it is the noetic functions, or those aspects of cognition uncontaminated by sensation, which are considered the gateway to the transcendent. In the third chapter, the various forms of noetic functions used will be enumerated and analysed. This will be important in the process of distinguishing the various types of transcendent apriorism. There are many paths that lead to the transcendent and different methods place their trust in different noetic functions.

The entire preceding analysis had been an excellent preparation for answering a hotly disputed question in the history of philosophy. It has been assumed until this point that Parmenides, rather than Plato, was the founder of the transcendent apriorist method. However, this is normally seen as a very contentious issue. In fact, there are commentators who deny that Parmenides was an apriorist at all. In order to prove the case it is necessary to fully analyse the Parmenidean epistemology. This analysis will determine both whether Parmenides did hold to the doctrine and, if he did, what version. It is discovered that, whereas Plato’s admits a two-world system, Parmenides will only countenance the existence of one. This difference highlights an important distinction for the whole history of the doctrine. In its progress, the analysis goes some way to resolving the perennial and unanswered question of the status of the Parmenidean “way of opinion”.

Parmenides developed his apriorist method with great confidence and would never have foreseen the interminable modern debates concerning what is to count as a priori knowledge. However, no modern account of transcendent apriorism can ignore this essential debate and it is therefore dealt with in the fifth chapter. It was discovered that transcendent apriorists have a very strict notion of the a priori, which is designed to ensure complete purification from sensory knowledge. Kant’s whole project of rescuing metaphysics, in the Inaugural Dissertation, had been founded upon a concentrated focusing upon this stringent criterion for excluding experience. Yet, this notion of the a priori, in sensu stricto, has caused a lot of confusion to modern philosophers, post-Frege. This is largely because they are accustomed to working with a much less restrictive criterion. Influenced, no doubt, by the apparent epistemological triumph of empiricism they see no need to decontaminate the a priori of all experiential input. In broad terms, for them, a priori knowledge is fundamentally knowledge that can be justified
independently of experience. This understanding does not prevent the senses playing their part in the process of the acquisition of such knowledge. In contrast, for the transcendent apriorist, even the process of acquisition must exclude sensory experience. The confusions that result and those also arising from determining what counts as “experience” whether excluded or not, are then identified and resolved.

The real question, raised by the debate on the a priori, is how is it possible to acquire knowledge without the intrinsic contributions of sensory experience? Traditionally, of course, the main theory that accounts for this possibility is the doctrine of innate ideas. In the sixth chapter, which deals with this theory, it will be argued that innate ideas are definitely the most promising foundation for a certain variety of transcendent apriorism. This may lead the modern philosopher to think that this would constitute a refutation of this version, because the antiquated theory of innate ideas is now defunct. However, again, the theory of innate ideas has generated much prejudice, confusion and failed refutations. In fact, the ignorance concerning a priori knowledge has also affected theories of innatism and the distinction between the a priori and the innate is confused as a result. It is certain that Herbert of Cherbury and Leibniz developed very sophisticated dispositional versions of the theory, the fundamentals of which, even today, Noam Chomsky still endorses.

The theory of innate ideas, however, is not required in the illuminative tradition of transcendent apriorism considered in the seventh chapter. That there is such a tradition, is totally ignored by Ayer in his attack on transcendent metaphysics. The illuminative tradition states that the ultimate transcendent knowledge can be gained directly through a special type of illuminative intuition. In the Seventh Epistle, Plato\(^6\) had stated that, although inexpressible in propositional form, certain knowledge could be attained by acquaintance when the mind is, “flooded with light”. This type of intuition is sui generis and forms the basis of an entire epistemological tradition, of which Augustine, Plotinus, Malebranche and Bergson form an integral part. The nature of the intuition is closely examined and the history of illuminative transcendent apriorism traced. The viability of the theory can be challenged by certain arguments in Kant and Ayer and these are dealt with. As a result of the new understanding, important questions in the history of philosophy can be answered. For example, whether Henri Bergson was in fact an irrationalist and whether Malebranche’s claim to “see all things in God”\(^7\) forms part of the illuminative tradition.
So far, there has been a concentration on various apriorist methods to transcend experience. Chapter 8 deals exclusively with the telos of this method, the goal to which it is striving viz. the transcendent itself. Contrary to a widely held belief, it is disclosed that the transcendent apriorist does not claim to directly know the in-itself. The massive obstacle that Kant and Schopenhauer placed in the path of transcendent apriorism, viz. that the in-itself just cannot be known, in this way, is consequently removed. It is also seen that the perennial problem that has been thrown at transcendent apriorists since Plato, viz. the status of the relationship between the phenomenal and the noumenal, just does not apply to certain varieties of the doctrine. For certain transcendent apriorists, who are also monists like Parmenides and Spinoza, there is simply no relation, because the phenomenal world just doesn’t exist. Hegel’s devastating main criticism of Kant’s critical philosophy is also considered at this point. In the light of all that has been discovered the famous problem of the Cartesian circle is given a new solution.

In the final chapter, consideration is given to the important relationship between the scientist and the transcendent apriorist. There is an initial discussion of the nature of scientific epistemology. Some commentators have suggested that the scientist is going beyond experience and positing noumenal entities of his own. This claim will be considered. Much has been written recently about traditional accounts of the continental rationalists being mere caricature. In fact, it is extremely fashionable to promote the idea that Descartes, Leibniz and Spinoza had scientific interests and empiricist strands to their philosophies. It is discovered that this entire viewpoint stems from a prejudice. Cartesian science which all these philosophers saw as paradigmatic was deductive not inductive, and hence apriorist in nature. It is admitted that the continental rationalists had a function for experience in their epistemologies. However, this type of justification was considered necessary due to the limits of the human mind. It had an inferior status and was only appealed to as a last resort. In terms of the history of philosophy, there is also a serious contribution to the unresolved debate on the status of Spinoza’s scientia intuitiva.

The conclusion examines important contemporary arguments in this research area. The journey through the thesis, in its entirety, will involve a fundamental loosening of assumptions. In fact, it is organised to effect a paradigm shift in our understanding of an epistemological theory of ancient lineage and immense importance. The dominance of empiricism, in contemporary epistemology, must not be allowed to close and prejudice
minds to divergent philosophical approaches. After all, the empire of empiricism, like all empires, is subject to decline and transformation.
CHAPTER 1
PLATO'S TRANSCENDENT APRIORISM

[Q1] Don't you think that the person who is likely to succeed in this attempt most perfectly is the one who approaches each object, as far as possible with the unaided intellect, without taking account of any sense of sight in his thinking, or dragging any other sense into his reckoning - the man who pursues the truth by applying his pure and unadulterated thought to the pure and unadulterated object, cutting himself off as much as possible from his eyes and ears and virtually all the rest of his body, as an impediment which by its presence prevents the soul from attaining to truth and clear thinking? Is not this the person, Simmias, who will reach the goal of reality if anyone can?

[Plato¹]

1.1. Paradigmatic Transcendent Apriorism

Plato is normally adjudged, by commentators, to be the paradigmatic exemplar of transcendent apriorist epistemology.² It is normally considered, firstly, that the positing of entities, i.e. Forms (éfono), which are regarded as (i) the ultimate object of knowledge and (ii) ontologically³ separate (εχωριοσκύν) from the sensory world, demonstrates a clear commitment to epistemological transcendence. With regard to point (i), Plato puts special emphasis on the epistemological importance of the Forms, which are not disclosed to the aesthetic functions, when he observes, "For the existents which have no visible embodiment, the existents which are of the highest value and chief importance, are demonstrable only by reason and are not to be apprehended by any other means".⁴ Dominic J. O' Meara, in his essay 'The Hierarchical Ordering of Reality in Plotinus', states what is accepted by most commentators viz. that, "What is fundamental in Plato is, of course the forms".⁵ The same point actually provides a foundation for an important but controversial interpretation of the Theaetetus. F. M. Cornford, in Plato's Theory of Knowledge, had observed that the aporia that results from the ultimate inadequacy of the presented definitions of knowledge, in the Theaetetus, is induced to emphasize a very specific epistemological issue. The point is that without the forms considered as the true
objects of knowledge no such definitions can actually be given. This, according to Cornford, was the ultimate purpose of the dialogue and explains why Plato is not transparent about his true epistemology, "Plato could not press the argument further in this direction without openly discussing the Forms as the true objects of knowledge".6

The evidence for point (ii) underpins most interpretations, both traditional and modern. It was Aristotle who had used the notion that the Forms are ἔχονται ὑπὲρ ναοῦ to distinguish the Socratic from the Platonist ontologies, "Socrates did not take the universals to be separate, nor the definitions, but they [the Platonists] made them separate, and called such entities Forms".7 There is much debate in contemporary scholarship, as we shall soon discover with regard to establishing the sense in which Aristotle uses the term "separation". However, the orthodox interpretation posits ontological separation and connects it with the notion of transcendence. Hence, G. F. Else in his article “The Terminology of Ideas” understands Aristotle in this way, "The exaltation of the true seat of the ideas to a ‘place beyond heaven’ is the transcendence of which Aristotle speaks".8 Such and other evidence, for this standard picture, leads Hamlyn quite naturally to conclude that Plato is predominantly a metaphysician, "of the transcendent type".9

Secondly, since the rejection of the aesthetic functions in favour of the noetic is conspicuously evident, in dialogues from all periods, Platonism and apriorism are normally closely associated. Aristotle assures us that, "From his early years Plato was familiar with the Heraclitean doctrine of Cratylus, that all sensible things are in a constant state of flux and that we can have no knowledge of them. To the end of his life Plato remained loyal to those tenets".10 More recently J. C. B. Gosling draws attention to Plato's "polemic against sense-perception",11 while A. Ajdukiewicz regards Plato as an "extreme apriorist".12

Notwithstanding, the standard picture is regarded by some commentators as just too simplistic and there are certainly some who have taken issue with it. Few, if any, have denied Plato's apriorism but some have questioned whether his epistemology, particularly in the later dialogues, is truly transcendent. The criticism of the standard interpretation has usually taken the form of a denial of the ontological separation of the Platonic Forms from the world of experience. Naturally, then, the traditional "two worlds" hypothesis is firmly rejected. (This, not just for the standard reason that the forms are truly eternal - not
sempiternal - i.e. outside space and time and therefore cannot have any location in a "world" or anywhere else). A single example of such a separation denial, out of the many that will be discussed subsequently, is evident in what T. Irwin calls the "non-reducibility thesis". This thesis states that the Forms are not independent existents but are merely elements within experience that are not entirely definable in sensible terms alone, "forms...are not definable through sensible properties alone". Certainly, this theory, as Gale Fine observes, involves, "rejecting a version of empiricism according to which everything can ultimately be explained in terms of, or reduced to, sensible features of the world". However the apriorist theory, that results, is obviously going to be immanent rather than transcendent. The interpretation of Plato that underlies the non-reducibility thesis, and other such unorthodoxies is incorrect and the debate surrounding it will be considered. However, the main emphasis in this chapter will be on correctly categorizing Plato's transcendent apriorist epistemology, not on defending the legitimacy of the ascription to Plato of this type of epistemology. This categorization issue certainly throws up more controversy and a proper understanding of it will allow us to correctly locate Plato's contribution, in relation to the tradition.

1.2. Plato and Apriorism

1.2.1. Intrinsic Scepticism: Αισθητικ in Relation to Αληθεια and Δοξa.

Fundamental to the broad consensus on Plato's epistemological apriorism is the analysis of the aesthetic functions. It is certain that Plato conforms to the strict transcendent apriorist criteria for the treatment of these functions. However, the nature of this treatment is open to misreading. Parmenides rejects the aesthetic functions because of certain implicit sceptical considerations. For Plato, in contrast, it is explicit issues of adequation that are fundamental. Indeed the sceptical thesis that the aesthetic functions are deceptive "in themselves" is not the ultimate reason for their rejection in the Platonic epistemology. Instead, it is the fact that these functions just cannot intrinsically deliver knowledge with regard to that which is Truly Real. However, this is not to endorse any view, which might suggest that Plato did not recognize that the aesthetic functions could be distorting, false, deceptive or misleading "in themselves". It is just that this scepticism is subsidiary. It certainly exists, as subsequent examples will prove. However, it is the
inadequacy theory that makes scepticism inevitable, not scepticism that makes the aesthetic functions inadequate.

References to truly sceptical issues do occur but are relatively infrequent. In the *Phaedo*, the aesthetic functions in general are described as "not clear and accurate" and are consequently regarded as a hindrance when used in partnership with the soul in any inquiry. In this dialogue the same functions are regarded as "entirely deceptive" and we are again urged to refrain from using them. In the *Republic* all the senses are considered to be "defective" or subject to error. In fact, with regard to the last mentioned passage and a later passage in the *Theaetetus* there is some prefigurement of the examples used in Cartesian scepticism. The first, [Q2], contains the so-called "argument from illusion" and is the locus classicus for the famous example where the stick appears bent in water. The second [Q3] conclusively demonstrates, using the perceptual mistakes that occur in dreams and madness, that the aesthetic functions can be unreliable in themselves:

[Q2] The same magnitude, I presume, viewed from near and from far does not appear equal, Why no. And the same things appear bent and straight to those who view them in water and out, or concave and convex, owing to similar errors of vision about colours.

[Q3] There remains the question of dreams and disorders, especially madness and all the mistakes madness is said to make in seeing or hearing or otherwise misperceiving.

All such examples, taken together, may seem like a Platonic renewal of Eleatic-type scepticism. However, the Platonic attitude to the aesthetic functions is substantially different. The first point to make is that, despite the evidence to the contrary presented above, Plato's attitude to the aesthetic functions is more positive than that of the Eleatics. For him, sensory information undoubtedly has both an *extrinsic* role to play in attaining to the Truly Real and an *intrinsic* role to play in forming opinions or probable beliefs.

Let us first consider its contribution to the attainment of knowledge (ἐπίστημη) of the Truly Real. It must be emphasized that the role of the aesthetic functions in Plato, as in the Leibnizian apriorism, is entirely extrinsic to the reasoning-function itself. This extrinsic use, as we saw in the introduction, can be the only legitimate function for the senses within any apriorist system. It is worth remembering that if the aesthetic functions
are used to grasp the Truly Real intrinsically, i.e. in terms of knowledge-acquisition or knowledge-justification, then we are not dealing with an apriorist epistemological system.

How then do the aesthetic functions operate extrinsically in Plato? To speak metaphorically they act upon the pure reasoning function as triggers or catalysts for knowledge-acquisition. For example, in the Republic Socrates speaks of a specific group of sensations that "invite the intellect to reflection". He is referring to a range of perceptions that initially provoke a degree of confusion in the soul viz. "those that issue in a contradictory perception". The soul is then motivated to solve the anomaly presented by its sensory experience and is hence stimulated to use its judgement in the "opposite way from sensation". Ironically the positive contribution sensation makes here is to encourage the mind to reject the aesthetic functions. In the Symposium, there is a related function for sensation. Certain primary sensory experiences can initiate in the soul a graduated process of knowledge acquisition. Admittedly, such sensations only function to initiate a long and involved process. However, the process itself is an important one. In this case the visual experience of beautiful young men, can initiate a process in the soul culminating in a vision of the Form of Absolute beauty itself, "And so, when his prescribed devotion to boyish beauties has carried our candidate so far that the universal beauty dawns upon his inward sight, he is almost within reach of the final revelation".

There is no doubt that the Platonic theory of anamnesis, viz. that knowledge is recollection, lies at the back of this sort of theory of sensation. Sensation acts as a trigger that facilitates the remembrance of the pre-natal experience of the Forms. For instance, the experience of the beauty in this world triggers a distant memory of the soul's pre-natal confrontation with absolute beauty. This is certainly the role appointed to sensation in the Phaedrus where Plato observes, "Such a one, as soon as he beholds the beauty of this world, is reminded of true beauty and his wings begin to grow". Again, in this case, the initial sensation is an extrinsic trigger to the development of a more profound understanding that requires the rejection of sensation. This rejection is necessary because the true wisdom sought is of something that lies beyond the aesthetic functions, for "sight is the keenest mode of perception vouchsafed us through the body; wisdom, indeed, we cannot see thereby".

According to Plato, in all these cases, sensation should not be trusted on its own, nor should it be used in partnership with the soul (logico-sensitive cognition) in any inquiry whose object is the Truly Real. A demonstration of why this is so will be given in the next
section. Certainly, such uses would constitute an illegitimate intrinsic use for the aesthetic functions with respect to an apriorist epistemology. Yet, there is no doubt that Plato considered the aesthetic functions as sometimes acting positively as a springboard to a higher understanding. They could do this however only in so far as they were extrinsic to the enquiry.


For the Eleatics any intrinsic role for the aesthetic functions leads immediately to falsehood. In their case, the object-correlate towards which these functions are directed is nothingness or "what is not". This is why the Eleatics solely considered issues of scepticism. The issue of adequation could not even be raised because it would require the existence of some other realm independent of the Truly Real to which the aesthetic functions could be seen as adequate. The existence of such a realm would fundamentally contradict the Eleatic theory of ontological-monism. In this respect, in contrast to the Eleatic, the Platonic epistemology posits just such a second realm. The realm referred to is designated in various ways throughout the dialogues. For example it is called, "the realm of the variable"30, "the realm of opinion"31, "the realm of becoming and passing away",32 "this world of generation"33, or "a sort of moving process of becoming".34

These descriptions may initially function to suggest the characteristics of the Parmenidean "way of opinion". Despite a superficial similarity, there is an absolutely fundamental distinction between the two. It could be said that both Parmenides and Plato regard the so-called "realm" of δοξα as the object-correlate of the sensory functions. It is certainly clear that Plato thought in terms of particular "faculties" functioning only to reveal a particular class of object, "different faculties are naturally related to different objects".35 In this respect the aesthetic functions are specifically related to the "realm of becoming". This "realm" is definitely the relevant object-correlate as the following passage make clear. "Did we not say some time ago that when the soul uses the instrumentality of the body for any inquiry, whether through sight or hearing or any other sense - because using the body implies using the senses - it is drawn away by the body into the realm of the variable".36 Similarly, as we discover later, in chapter 4, the
Parmenidean way of δοξα is, in a corresponding way, directly related to the aesthetic functions.

However, the similarity ends here with the connection between the faculty and the object-corrlelate. The actual nature of the object-corrlelate itself is clearly distinct in the theories of Plato and Parmenides. This is not, however an uncontested claim. For instance, both J. H. H Loenen and D. W. Hamlyn would deny any such distinction in this regard. Their theories merge the Platonic and Parmenidean "realms of opinion". Both think that the Parmenidean Way of δοξα, like its Platonic counter-part, has some form of real existence, i.e. is an actually existing or subsisting realm. This theory concerning the Parmenidean epistemology is false and will be challenged. Although, both are correct with regard to their analysis of the Platonic "way of opinion". However, the appreciation of the differentiating factors, between it and its Parmenidean counterpart, are missed by both commentators. Plato himself certainly saw the difference clearly. In fact both a large part of the Sophist and an important section in the Republic are concerned with delineating it. The Eleatic stranger, in the Sophist finds it necessary, in doing so, to "lay unfilial hands" on one of "father Parmenides"' most important pronouncements. To establish that his "realm of becoming" has some form of being - in contrast to the Parmenidean realm of opinion, which has none - Plato finds it necessary to contest Parmenides' famous prohibition against thinking that-which-is-not. In the Sophist Plato observes, "We shall find it necessary in self-defence to put to the question that pronunciation of father Parmenides, and establish by main force that what is not, in some respect has being, and conversely that what is, in a way is not". Hence, Plato wants to make an existence-claim for the object-correlates of the aesthetic functions but, in order to do so, he must naturally overcome the reasons that Parmenides gave for rejecting any such claim.

Parmenides' position, in denying such existence-claims, is metaphorically treated by Plato with respect to the extreme idealist doctrine held by "the gods" or the "friends of the forms". Now this theory is set out in contrast to that posited by "the giants" or the "lovers of sights and sounds" who hold to an extreme materialist theory which states that, "real existence belongs only to that which can be handled and offers resistance to the touch". The gods reject any form of materialism, "defending their position somewhere in the heights of the unseen maintaining with all their force that true reality consists in
certain intelligible and bodiless forms".45 For the gods, anything else necessarily inhabits the world of becoming and, as a consequence, does not possess real being in any respect. "what those others [the giants] allege to be true reality they [the gods] call. not real being but a sort of moving process of becoming".46

For a proper understanding of what is going on in the gods and giants analogy, it is essential to grasp the real significance of an important section of the Sophist viz. 242a-246c. Denis O' Brian makes an important point when, in an essay entitled "Matter and Evil",47 he draws attention to the frequent misunderstandings of the Eleatic Stranger's project in this passage. He observes, "For the burden of the Stranger's proof of the existence of non-being in the Sophist is commonly misrepresented in modern studies of that dialogue".48 Plato is not, as O' Brian correctly observes, "seeking to refute Parmenides' denial of the very possibility of any conception of 'what is not'".49 Plato, in fact, agrees with Parmenides that we cannot speak or think "of what is not in any way at all".50 The key to what Plato is doing here is a correct understanding of what is really being objected to in the Parmenidean epistemology. If this has nothing to do with Parmenides' denial of "what is absolutely not" then what has it to do with? The answer must lie with the reason Plato gives for associating Parmenides' theories, but not his own, with the position of the "gods" or "friends of the forms".

It is clear to me that Parmenides' system is included in this category, i.e. with the gods, because of his rigid adherence to an epistemological postulate that asserts an inseparable connection between knowing and being "something", i.e. having an instantiation. If x is knowable, then x can exist. If on the other hand x is unknowable then x cannot exist. (It may be that Plato projects back onto Parmenides his own notion of \( \text{epistēmē} \) and his own argument against the knowability of the realm of becoming). Although C. H. Kahn argues51 that Parmenides' meant, "to know", the better and less confusing translation is "to think". This is not only because of linguistic considerations like those given by Kirk et. al.52 When Parmenides talks about that which is thinkable he means that which is logically consistent or involves no contradiction. This would certainly be a characteristic of that which could be described as \( \text{epistēmē} \) in Plato, but the latter term functions in a different way. Parmenides does not really object to the variability of the way of becoming but rather that it involved the contradiction of saying or thinking that-which-is-not. The mind "wanders" in Parmenides because it neglects pure reasoning.
As a consequence, the mortal intelligence mixes up the distinct categories of being and not being and misapplies them. However, inevitably the result is the same with regard to each of these terms viz. knowing or thinking.

Parmenides strongly connects epistemological status with ontological status. If something is epistemologically unknowable (that which is unthinkable is unknowable for Parmenides) then it cannot have any ontological instantiation. It is not just, as Cornford has suggested, that the friends of the Forms are just "extremists who, like the Eleatics, want to make the whole of reality changeless". Although this is certainly a true statement about both parties, it is to miss Plato's point. The Eleatics and the "Gods" or "friends of the forms" want to suggest that there could not be, in any possible world, a form of reality that is not, in every respect, changeless (Plato) or logically consistent (Parmenides). As a consequence - for it is a consequence as we shall discover - knowable (Plato) or thinkable (Parmenides). Their point is not that it is a fact about the existing reality that it is changeless, but rather that any possible reality must be changeless.

Again, at a superficial level, it looks as if, in the passage from the Sophist, the position of the "gods" is similar to that of Plato himself. Is not Plato, for instance, a friend of the forms? Yet, this is true only to the extent that he posits forms. However, he certainly does not agree with what is fundamental about the God's position, viz. the previously mentioned rigid connection between epistemological and any form of ontological status. For Plato, just because something cannot be known does not mean to say that it does not have any form of existence. Hence, the Strangers' need to lay "unfilial" hands on Parmenides' pronouncement denying that-which-is-not. After all, that-which-is-not is the status to which Parmenides relegated anything unknowable (in sensu stricto). This is not just a challenge to the logic of Parmenides' argument concerning that-which-is-not, as the commentators mentioned by O'Brien suggest. Rather the pronouncement needs to be challenged because it is the foundation upon which Parmenides' monism is built. Plato, as we will now demonstrate attempts to prove that another realm exists between being and not being which, although it cannot be known, still exists in some way.

In fact, for Plato, such a realm exists and is identical with the object-correlate of the aesthetic functions. The first thing to say is that this object-correlate is considered to be unknowable in the strict sense. For Plato, there is a strict criterion of what is to count as knowledge (ἐπιστήμη). True knowledge, by definition, is not defeasible. Hence, the object-correlate that corresponds to the faculty of knowledge must be something stable.
eternal, abiding and unchanging or, in Plato's own metaphor in the *Meno*, something that is tethered, "That is why knowledge is something more valuable than right opinion. What distinguishes one from the other is the tether". If we think we know an object of knowledge x and this x were to change in some way (especially, in Plato, into its opposite y) then we could not have had real knowledge of x in the first place. As Schopenhauer correctly says of the Platonic epistemology, "they [the things of this world] are likewise not objects of a real knowledge (ἐπιστήμη), for there can be such a knowledge only of what exists in and for itself, and always in the same way". Evidence that this is the correct interpretation comes from the following passages in the dialogues:

"[Q4] Nor can we reasonably say, Cratylus, that there is knowledge at all, if everything is in a state of transition and there is nothing abiding. For knowledge too cannot continue to be knowledge unless continuing always to abide and exist."

"[Q5] And can we say that any precise and exact truth attaches to things, none of which are at this present, or ever were, or ever will be free from change?...And how can we ever get a permanent grasp on anything that is entirely devoid of permanence."

"[Q6] That we find fixity, purity, truth, and what we have called perfect clarity, either in those things that are always, unchanged, unaltered and free from all admixture, or in what is most akin to them; everything else must be called inferior and of secondary importance."

The realm of becoming revealed by the aesthetic functions, as its name suggests, does not meet this strict criteria for knowledge. For Plato, it has all the features of Cratylus' world of permanent flux and variability. In fact, absolutely nothing in this realm remains constant, everything being subject to the processes of becoming, generation, destruction, movement, mixture and finally change with regard to their location in time. In terms of the entities which are present in this realm, concrete examples from Plato include: beautiful young men who become old and ugly, that which is cold becomes hot, that which is hard becomes soft, that which is living, dies and is again reborn, the mixture and transformations of the four elements earth, air, water, and fire and the motions of the heavenly spheres. According to Aristotle, this was a doctrine Plato maintained to the end of his career. There is certainly clear evidence for it in the dialogues and a couple of substantiating passages are quoted below:
[Q7] And there is another nature of the same name with it, perceived by sense, created always in motion, becoming in place and again vanishing out of place.60

[Q8] Ever to be the same, steadfast and abiding, is the prerogative of the divinest of things only. The nature of the bodily does not entitle it to this rank. Now the heaven, or the universe as we have chosen to call it, has received many blessed gifts from him who brought it into being, but it has also been made to partake of bodily form. Hence, it is impossible that it should abide forever free from change.61

In conclusion, the way of becoming is not a suitable object for the faculty of knowledge (in sensu stricto) only for the faculty of opinion. Opinion is "knowledge" for Plato in only a very loose sense as we shall soon discover. The object-correlate cannot then be known, only opined. Yet, for Plato, contra Parmenides the object-correlate of the way of opinion still exists in some way. Notice how this breaks Parmenides' rigid connection between knowability and any ontological status, as previously mentioned. Certainly, in Plato, the object-correlate of the way of opinion does not fully exist (it is not the Truly Real) like the realm of the forms. However, the ever-changing objects of the aesthetic functions are not condemned, by Plato, to the oblivion of non-existent seemings (as in Parmenides), "Neither that which is nor that which is not is the object of opinion",62 "We must admit that what changes and change itself are real things"63 and "Does not he who opines bring his opinion to bear upon something or shall we reverse ourselves and say that it is possible to opine, yet opine nothing? That is impossible"64. To use a useful term from modern philosophy, the Platonic way of opinion might be said to "subsist" rather than "exist". In the system of Meinong, subsisting entities are "ideal objects" such as mathematical objects or abstractions like similarity and difference. In 'Zur Gegenstandstheorie' Meinong observes that these do not have the same ontological status as "real" (wirklich) objects investigated by the a posteriori sciences. The kind of being that belongs to the latter entities is termed existence (Existenz) rather than subsistence (Bestand). Consider the following quotation:

[Q9] Furthermore, objects are such that their nature either allows them, as it were to exist and to be perceived or prohibits it, so that, if they have being at all, this being cannot be existence, but only subsistence [Bestand] in a sense which has to be explained further. For example, it cannot be doubted that the difference between red and green has being, but this difference does not exist, it merely subsists. Similarly, the number of books in a library does not exist in addition to the books; the number of diagonals of a polygon exists, if that is possible, even
less. However, we must acknowledge, surely, that each of these numbers subsists.\textsuperscript{65}

In contrast, the Platonic epistemology reverses this ontological assessment. The world revealed to the aesthetic functions and investigated by the a posteriori sciences merely subsists while the "ideal objects" truly exist. To sum up, the subsistent realm in Plato lies "between that which purely and absolutely is and that which wholly is not".\textsuperscript{66}

Plato, then wants to place his theory between the two extremes - between the "gods" denial of ontological status to anything that varies and the giants attribution of being only to that, which does vary and change. He wants to assert that there is a reality, of some form, in both the realm of the unchanging and that of the changeable. Only this reality has a different ontological status in each case. Plato then is positing an ontological dualism that contrasts with both the gods and the giants who are ontological monists in the idealist and materialist mode respectively. This connects up with the earlier notion of epistemological adequation. Plato's main criticism of the senses then is not that they are inherently deceptive, as in scepticism. Rather the aesthetic functions are directed to a realm of being that cannot be truly known only opined. Such an object-correlate is not identical with the Truly real but is nonetheless ontologically subsistent. It is not identical with "not being" and hence is something that can be the object of belief and opinions. It is the realm for which the senses prove adequate.

The subsidiary Platonic scepticism analysed earlier, results from factors relating to this adequacy nexus. The aesthetic functions reveal an inferior object-correlate that is constantly changing. In Plato, like is known by like. This is a theory Augustine, in On the Greatness of the Soul, was later to designate the "affinity of realities".\textsuperscript{67} Hence when the soul uses the aesthetic functions it is dragged towards an inferior and inconstant knowledge-object. This has a detrimental effect and its judgements are consequently defeasible and unreliable. The aesthetic functions used by the soul to grasp such an object-correlate could not grasp the Truly Real but instead would inhabit a twilight world between ignorance and knowledge, "the faculty correlated with it would be neither science nor nescience".\textsuperscript{68}

The sensory functions are only unreliable in themselves because of this whole inadequacy nexus. They drag the soul - whose true object correlate is the unchanging, intelligible world - into a realm in which is not its natural element. We shall soon discover
that the variable senses are adequate to their variable object. However, the soul itself is not akin to this variable world. Rather it is consonant with the eternal unchanging reality of the forms, "when it [the soul] investigates by itself, it passes into the realm of the pure and everlasting and immortal and changeless, and being of a kindred nature...".69 Therefore it is most grievously led astray when this route is not followed:

[Q10] When it [the soul] inclines to that region which is mingled with darkness, the world of becoming and passing away, it opines only and its edge is blunted, and it shifts it opinions hither and thither, and again seems as if it lacked reason.70

[Q11] Did we not say some time ago that when the soul uses the instrumentality of the body for any inquiry, whether through sight or hearing or any other sense - because using the body implies using the senses - it is drawn away by the body into the realm of the variable, and loses its way and becomes confused and dizzy, as though it were fuddled, through contact with things of a similar nature?71

It is not the fact that the aesthetic functions may, or may not, be inherently unreliable that really counts against them. In fact, this issue of scepticism is not primary in the Platonic epistemology as it is in Descartes. The important point is that they lead the pure soul to consider the wrong object-correlate. The aesthetic functions cannot, because of their inadequacy, lead the soul to knowledge of the Truly Real. So instead they lead it into their own realm for which it is totally unsuited. Instead of pure reason working independently to attain to the Truly Real, it then makes its judgement on the basis of perception, which corresponds to the realm of appearance rather than reality. This should remind us that Plato is rejecting logico-sensory cognition and not just sensationism, "And suppose judgement occurs, not independently, but by means of perception; the only right name for such a state of mind is 'appearing'...what we mean by 'it appears' a blend of perception and judgement".72 Now remember that this is not to say that the world revealed to the aesthetic functions is ontologically speaking "mere" appearance as in Parmenides. Although it seems that Schopenhauer makes this mistake when he observes, "This world [the Platonic world of δοξα] that appears to the senses has no true being, but only a ceaseless becoming; it is, and it also is not; and its comprehension is not so much a knowledge as an illusion."73 In fact, as we shall discover, the Platonic world of δοξα is not an Eleatic type illusion.

Although Hamlyn is mistaken, in the assessment of Parmenides, his analysis of Plato is correct when he observes, "Plato does not quite say that the so-called sensible world is mere appearance. He does imply that the sensible world is in some sense less real than the
Forms. Plato is doing what J. Moravcsik calls "fundamental" ontology. In other words, he is not just categorising reality as in "inventory" ontology but is trying to discover what is ontologically primary, i.e. being in the truest sense. This όντας οὐν he associates with the forms only. Parmenides, once he had discovered the primary being, viz. the One, denied existence to any other entity. However, there are entities independent of the Truly Real that Plato wants to subject to ontological gradation. Some are closer to the Truly Real than others and, in this respect, there is certainly an intermediary class of object between the forms and sensory experiences. As Aristotle correctly states, "Further, besides sensible things and Forms he says there are the objects of mathematics, which occupy an intermediate position, differing from sensible things in being eternal and unchangeable, from Forms in that there are many alike, while the Form itself is in each case unique." The existence of intermediate entities, however, causes a problem in interpretation that is discussed in the next section.

1.2.3. Plato and Logico-Sensitive Cognition

[Q12] Now does it occur to you, in saying what you have just said, that the majority of arts, as also those who are busied therewith, are in the first place concerned with opinions and pursue their energetic studies in the realm of opinion? And are you aware that those of them who do consider themselves students of reality spend a whole lifetime in studying the universe around us, how it came to be, how it does things, and how things happen to it?...Then the task which such students among us have taken upon themselves has nothing to do with that which always is, but only with what is coming into being, or will come, or has come.

It is interesting to note that, in the true transcendent apriorist tradition, Plato distinguished himself, the project of his philosophy, from the science of his day. Those students mentioned in [Q12] are presumably following the Ionian tradition of studying nature Περὶ Φυσικῆς. Notice that the main criticism brought against them is that the object and foundation of their knowledge is the world of becoming, i.e. the sensory world: the world of entities that are not wholly real. To reason about, and from, the flux of the sensory world is to concern yourself only with things that one can have opinions about. Knowledge requires the absolute stability of the knowledge-object. Those then that attempt to know things with logico-sensitive cognition are pejoratively termed "doxophilists" rather than philosophers.
However, it may seem that there is a problem with the above account. Does not Plato himself give a long and complex account of "the Universe around us, how it came into being, how it does things" i.e. the world as revealed to the senses (the phenomenal world) in the *Timaeus*? Is not this a serious Platonic attempt at scientific understanding, an attempt to pursue an enquiry by reasoning about the deliverances of the senses (logicosensory cognition)? Could it be that Plato had changed his opinion of the senses in the move to the later dialogues? In the *Republic* it had been certain that "if anyone tries to learn about the things of sense, whether gaping up or blinking down, I would never say that he really learns - for nothing of the kind admits of true knowledge". Yet we must not repeat the same mistake of some commentators when they attribute a truly significant content to Parmenides' way of δοξα. The scientific project in the *Timaeus* can, at best, be described as a series of probable beliefs only. As such, it has more status than its Parmenidean counterpart but is still, most definitely, of subsidiary importance. The following quotations make this clear:

**[Q13]** The remaining phenomena of the same kind there will be no difficulty in reasoning out by the method of probabilities. A man may sometimes set aside meditations about eternal things, and for recreation turn to consider the truths of generation, which are probable only; he will thus gain a pleasure not to be repented of, and secure for himself, while he lives, a wise and moderate pastime. Let us grant ourselves this indulgence and go through the probabilities relating to the same subjects which follow next in order.

**[Q14]** Remembering what I said at first about probability, I will do my best to give as probable an explanation as any other - or rather, more probable - and I will first go back to the beginning...I call upon God and beg him to be our saviour out of a strange and unwanted inquiry, and to bring us to the haven of probability.

**[Q15]** And in speaking of the copy and the original we may assume that words are akin to the matter which they describe; when they relate to the lasting and permanent and intelligible, they ought to be lasting and unalterable, and as far as their nature allows, irrefutable and invincible - nothing less. But when they express only the copy or likeness and not the eternal things themselves, they need only be likely and analogous to the former words. As being is to becoming, so is truth to belief. If then, Socrates, amidst the many opinions about the gods and the generation of the universe, we are not able to give notions which are altogether and in every respect exact and consistent with one another, do not be surprised. Enough if we adduce probabilities as likely as any others...

For Plato, scientific research is a rest from the intellectual pursuits that are of primary importance. It is a kind of hobby, something one does to relax. The immanent subject matter, which the scientist investigates, is the object-correlate of the aesthetic functions.
These aesthetic functions are only adequate to their own realm. However, this adequacy is, for Plato, still distant from the truth. Even the most exact material things observed through the senses, although created by the demiurge in the image of the forms, all fall short of truth. In the immanentist philosophy of Aristotle the trans-lunar world is the most perfect thing in creation. In *On the Heavens* he observes, "We must show not only that the heaven is one, but also that more than one heaven is impossible, and, further, that, as exempt from decay and generation, the heaven is eternal". Yet for Plato even the most eternal of visible things are not commensurate with the Truly Real which ultimately transcends them, "These sparks that paint the sky, since they are decorations on a visible surface, we must regard, to be sure, as the fairest and most exact of material things, but we must recognize that they fall far short of the truth". In conclusion, certain knowledge about the Truly Real cannot be attained by the aesthetic functions of the intellect. The sensory functions are unreliable faculties that, when used in conjunction with reason, give us at best probable opinions about the phenomenal world only. Wisdom must be sought independently of their use, "sight is the keenest mode of perception vouchsafed us through the body; wisdom indeed we cannot see thereby".

1.2.4. Pure Notions and Principles

So far, in the discussion of Plato's apriorism, there has been a concentration on establishing exactly what type of critical attitude exists in the dialogues, with respect to the aesthetic functions. For Plato, of course, this critique does not entail a general epistemological scepticism, although certain Platonic schools viz. the Middle Academy of Arcesilaus and the New Academy of Carneades were to do so at a later period. In order to discover why Plato rejects such scepticism, it is necessary to examine the constructive side of his epistemology. What category of noetic functions does he rely on to attain insight into truth? How is knowledge (in sensu stricto) acquired and justified independently of the discredited aesthetic functions? It must be remembered that, for the transcendent apriorist epistemologist, with his rigid exclusion of experience (in sensu stricto) from intrinsic and adequate knowledge acquisition or justification, some special non-empirical theories must be devised.

Let us start with the Platonic analysis of the building blocks of propositional knowledge (knowledge by description). For there are many commentators, like
J.S. Gosling, who assert that such an analysis constitutes a complete picture of the Platonic noetic functions. For them knowledge (in sensu stricto), in Plato's view, is exhaustively characterised by the formulaic definition "true belief plus a logos" (here logos, in its most important sense, is interpreted as an account justifying what one believes). As a consequence, they would reject any higher "acquaintive" mode of knowing in Plato. There are reasons to contest this rejection. What these reasons are and the consequent positing of a higher acquaintive mode of knowing in Plato, will be covered later. Meanwhile this section confines itself to propositional knowledge, which has an important, though not ultimate role, in the Platonic epistemology.

A good place to begin this analysis is with the thorny subject of knowledge acquisition. For here it is that Plato sets out the important noetic theory that knowledge is recollection or anamnesis, "learning is recollection". This theory applies to both the concepts and principles involved in the reasoning process. Although many later transcendent apriorists reject the details of the theory, none of them deny the need to establish a suitable replacement.

One of the most basic elements of propositional knowledge is the concept. So let us first examine its noetic derivation. Plato certainly believes, against the empiricist, that there are pure concepts derived from the noetic functions of the intellect. Those concepts, derived from the aesthetic functions, are of course considered impure and inadequate. However, there are some interpretations of Plato, that suggest that even the noetic concepts are ultimately inadequate to the Truly Real, viz. those who think that knowing (strict sense) in Plato is non-propositional.

Whether they are the ultimate building blocks of knowledge (strict sense) or not, the existence of noetic concepts is confirmed by the discussion of absolute equality in the Phaedo. It will be clear from the following that the analysis is not specific to equality but can be extended to cover all other Forms/absolutes. Socrates makes this point when he observes, "Our present argument applies no more to equality than it does to absolute beauty, goodness, uprightness, holiness, and, as I maintain, all those characteristics which we designate in our discussion by the term 'absolute'". Now, according to Plato, we all possess the concept of absolute equality of which the particular instances of equality we perceive with the senses - i.e. the equality of one stick to another, or the equality in the appearances of twins - fall short, "we admit I suppose that there is such a thing as
equality - not the equality of stick to stick and stone to stone, but something beyond all that and distinct from it - absolute equality".90

However, on an empiricist account of the derivation of concepts we derive our ideas from the aesthetic functions (see, for instance, J. Locke91). In contrast, the aesthetic functions, for Plato, reveal only a phenomenal world that is an imperfect copy of True Reality. There are in this realm no instances of perfect equality, only the close resemblances discussed above. How could we then, given an empiricist account of concept derivation, formulate the concept of perfect equality from a sensory world that contains nothing that corresponds to this concept. The fact is that, for Plato, any such derivation is impossible. This impossibility sets up the problematic discussed above, i.e. if not from the aesthetic functions, from where are our pure concepts derived? Plato's solution is the doctrine that before we were born the soul was separate from the body and was able therefore to apprehend the pure essences with the pure intellect. The concepts derived from this blessed vision are innate in the soul at the moment of birth, "We had knowledge, both before and at the moment of birth, not only of equality and relative magnitudes, but of all absolute standards".92 This knowledge is subsequently forgotten because of the briefness of the vision, our trust in the misleading aesthetic functions or our allurement to the demands of the body:

[Q16] Now, as we have said, every human soul has, by reason of nature, had contemplation of being; else would she never have entered into this human creature; but to be put in mind thereof by things here is not easy for every soul. Some, when they had the vision, had it but for a moment; some when they had fallen to earth consorted unhappily with such as led them to deeds of unrighteousness, wherefore they forgot the holy objects of their vision. Few indeed are left that can still remember much...93

However, the knowledge and the concepts with which it is associated can be recovered. The innate concepts derived from the vision can be "remembered" by various methods; the primary one being the process of catharsis practiced by the true philosopher. The innate concepts take the form of universals and are used in the proper differentiation into classes. of the individual data of perception. However, the concepts cannot be derived intrinsically from the world that the aesthetic functions reveal, although contact with the phenomenal world can prompt a remembrance. This however, as we have seen, is only an extrinsic derivation. Knowledge of the Forms acquired before birth when the
soul was in a disembodied state is the only possible source of the pure concepts. This indirectly confirms that concepts cannot be derived in any way from the aesthetic functions because in a disembodied state there are no aesthetic functions from which to derive them, "So before we began to see and hear and use our other senses we must somewhere have acquired the knowledge that there is such a thing as absolute equality."94 That Plato ascribed to this strange doctrine is evident from many passages in the dialogues, one of which is quoted here and more evidence will follow in the next section:

[Q17] For only the soul that has beheld truth may enter into this our human form seeing that man must needs understand the language of Forms, passing from a plurality of perceptions to a unity gathered together by reasoning and such understanding is a recollection of those things which our souls beheld aforetime as they journeyed with their god, looking down upon the things which now we suppose to be, and gazing up to that which truly is.95

It is not just noetic concepts that are explained by the theory of anamnesis. The existence of the pure principles of propositional reasoning, i.e. those intuitions that constitute axiomatic intuition and deductive intuition, are also accounted for. That there are such pure principles, in the Platonic philosophy, is clear from a particular passage in the Republic that contains the "line" metaphor. In this passage, there is a discussion of the intelligible objects of cognition and their corresponding cognitive states. The intelligible region is divided into two sections representing the different types of knowledge and knowledge-object, the first being διανοητα the second νοησις. The attainment of pure principles is associated with the latter section:

[Q18] By the distinction that there is one section of it which the soul is compelled to investigate by treating as images the things imitated in the former division, and by means of assumptions from which it proceeds not up to a first principle but down to a conclusion, while there is another section in which it advances from its assumption to a beginning or principle that transcends assumption, and in which it makes no use of the images employed by the other section, relying on ideas only and progressing systematically through ideas.96

The images referred to in the above passage are the images of geometric figures used by the geometers to aid their calculations. The implication is that if even these abstract images are to be excluded from the dialectic search for first principles, then other more concrete emanations from the aesthetic functions are also a fortiori excluded from the
process - a process that relies only on pure essences or Forms. Now if the process of attainment is pure, i.e. if nothing is used but the pure intellectual processes in the attainment of the first principles, then the principles themselves must be pure by definition. The first principles are derived exclusively from the noetic functions of the intellect and this is what it means to describe them as "pure". This interpretation is confirmed by the following passage that explicitly rejects any inclusion of the "objects of sense" from the dialectic process that attains to the first principles:

[Q19] Understand then, said I, that by the other section of the intelligible I mean that which the reason itself lays hold of by the power of dialectic, treating its assumptions not as absolute beginnings but literally as hypotheses, underpinnings, footings, and springboards so to speak, to enable it to rise to that which requires no assumption and is the starting point of all, and after attaining to that again taking hold of the first dependencies from it, so to proceed downward to the conclusion, making no use whatever of any object of sense but only of pure ideas moving on through ideas to ideas and ending with ideas. 97

In both passages [Q17, p. 40] and [Q18, p. 40] the exclusion of the senses is understood in terms of using only the pure essences or Forms in the dialectic process. However, as [Q19] suggests, it is not only the dialectic process but also the conclusions of that process, which are connected with the pure essences or Forms, "moving on through ideas to ideas and ending with ideas". Just as the pure concepts are derived from our recollection of the pure essences or Forms, so the pure principles are also derived from an identical source. The recollection of the form provides us with the pure concepts and pure principles of reasoning. This would imply, as the previous section made clear, that the pure principles of reasoning are ultimately derived from the disembodied life of the soul before birth.

However, the connection between principles and Forms may be difficult to comprehend. This connection however can be explained when we consider Plato's notion of the Form of the Good. In the famous cave metaphor in the Republic the ultimate stage in the ascent toward true knowledge is the apprehension of the form of the Good, "In the region of the known the last thing to be seen and hardly seen is the idea of the good". 98 Now such an apprehension, which is achieved by the process of recollecting the Form, gives rise to the principle of sufficient reason and the principle of perfection viz. that there is a specific reason why everything is as it is, rather than having some other being and that
this reason is that it is the best that it possibly can be. The recollection of the form, then, gives us insight into the principles that govern the Truly real.

In conclusion, the pure principles like the pure concepts have their origins in the noetic functions of the intellect. A fact that is accounted for, in Plato, by the strange theory of recollection, which explains how these principles and concepts can be indwelling, that is innate in the soul. As Socrates observes, "It is clear that they have never learned anything from me. The many admirable truths they bring to birth have been discovered by themselves from within. But the delivery is heaven's work and mine".99 The Socratic method is designed to bring that which is innate in the soul but "forgotten" to the forefront of consciousness, i.e. remembrance. It strives to encourage recollection of the Forms. The famous slave boy example in the *Meno* specifically attempts to demonstrate the recovery of geometric principles from someone without any knowledge of geometry:

[Q20] *Socrates*: Either then he has at some time acquired the knowledge, which he now has, or he has always possessed it. If he always possessed it, he must always have known; if on the other hand he acquired it at some previous time, it cannot have been in this life, unless somebody has taught him geometry. He will behave in the same way with all geometric knowledge, and every other subject. Has anyone taught him all these? You ought to know, especially as he has been brought up in your household.

*Meno*. Yes, I know that no one ever taught him.100

Having analysed the building blocks of propositional knowledge in Plato we have uncovered several theories concerning the noetic functions. These theories are the ancient precursors of the much later doctrine of innate ideas. A theory of innate ideas, as we shall discover later, underlies most non-illuminative forms of rationalism. However, there was more to Plato's epistemology than an anticipation of a discursive rationalism.

1.2.5. *Plato's Secret Doctrine*

[Q21] It is indeed no trifling task, but very difficult to realize that there is in every soul an organ or instrument of knowledge that is purified and kindled afresh by such studies when it has been destroyed and blinded by our ordinary pursuits, a faculty whose preservation outweighs ten thousand eyes, for by it only reality is beheld.101
The claims made in this section are somewhat controversial and certainly cannot be said to be fashionable. There is a huge debate in modern scholarship as to whether or not Plato thought that the pure propositional knowledge is the ultimate form of knowing. In the terminology of this thesis the question would be, did Plato, like Parmenides, believe that deductive intuition was the last word in the theory of knowledge. Alternatively, did he, like his successors the neo-Platonists, posit some higher noetic function. Those who seek to limit Plato's epistemology to propositional knowledge ascribe to what shall be termed the "dialectic" theory whereas those who think there is a higher mode of knowing shall be said to ascribe to the "illuminative" theory. The debate on this question is by no means settled. In fact, J.C. Gosling, a commentator who would certainly oppose my version of the illuminative theory given in this section, admits that, "the issue is one of those on which we do not have enough clear evidence for decisive proof to be possible."\(^\text{102}\)

The main things to note about the illuminative position is that (i) it is the traditional doctrine; (ii) while all those who ascribe to the theory are agreed that there is a higher mode of knowing, the characterization and nature of this mode is disputed amongst them and finally (iii) that the theory has many modern defenders.

With regard to point (i) it was Plotinus who first attributed an illuminative theory to Plato. He connects a quote from Plato's *Seventh Epistle* with his own theory of a hyper-noetic vision that transcends reasoning. From the fact that Plato states, in *Seventh Epistle*, that knowledge of "serious realities" cannot be spoken or written, Plotinus concludes quite logically that the Platonic "insight" cannot be discursive but must be illuminative in nature. For if knowledge claim x cannot be spoken or written how can it be propositional. For what proposition cannot be spoken or written? This reasonable conclusion allows Plotinus to assimilate the Platonic theory to his own doctrine:

\[Q22\] It cannot be spoken or written, but we speak and write impelling towards it and wakening from reasonings to the vision of it, as if showing the way to someone who wants to have a view of something. For teaching goes as far as the road and travelling, but the vision is the task of someone who has already resolved to see.\(^\text{103}\)

With respect to point (ii) above. Plotinus' notion of a "vision" that transcends reasoning is fundamentally non-noetic. This is different from many other illuminative interpretations.
Bertrand Russell, while agreeing with Plotinus' notion that truth in Plato is "a kind of vision", states that it is a vision akin to aesthetic vision, a "union of thought and feeling" that "Every one who has done any kind of creative work has experienced". It is also compared by Russell to Spinoza's "intellectual love of god", and the extent to which this is true will be examined later. Another alternative theory is presented by Tarnas in *The Passion of the Western Mind*. Here Plato's vision is seen in noetic rather than hyper-noetic or aesthetic terms. The "vision" is seen as a function of intellect and is acquaintive in nature. Tarnas talks of the "penetrating eye of the soul, the illuminated intellect". He is certainly correct to posit an illumined intellect in Plato. He is only wrong to suggest that this is a universal theory of knowing in the dialogues. In the thesis terminology, Plato's vision would be categorized as illuminative intuition. Alternatively, in Gosling's terminology, it is described correctly as a "quasi-seeing of supra-sensible objects".

With regard to point (iii) Bertrand Russell has already been mentioned, but an important illuminative interpretation has been posited by Cornford who clearly affirms his commitment to an acquaintive rather than descriptive interpretation of Plato's epistemology. In *Plato's Theory of Knowledge* he states "all knowledge of truths, as distinct from immediate acquaintance with sense-data, involves acquaintance with Forms". A view reiterated by Richard Tarnas, "True knowledge [in Plato], by contrast, is possible only from a direct apprehension of the transcendent Forms". This view is echoed by R. S. Bluck, in an article entitled "Knowledge by Acquaintance in Plato's Theaetetus", when he states "It looks, then, as though επιστημή may be knowledge by acquaintance with Forms". It is also enthusiastically endorsed by Cherniss. While D. W. Hamlyn argues that the illuminative theory is true but only until dialogues up to and including the *Republic*. After this Plato presumably, seeing the error of his ways, adopts the propositional theory.

The opposing dialectic theory is defended by many modern commentators. In addition to Ryle's version that will be dealt with in a later chapter, Cooper states that "Cornford's reaffirmation of the doctrine that only the intuition of Forms deserves the name "knowledge" produces a confused and inadequate line of thought". Gosling also states "I hope to have shown that there is as yet no reason to suppose that Plato thought that knowledge consisted of some sort of intellectual perception".

With respect to any attempt to resolve this debate, it must be said that Gosling is correct when he observes that no single piece of evidence is likely to prove decisive for
one side or another. In fact there appears, at first, to be a strange ambiguity in the dialogues themselves. It is possible that this ambivalence may not be accidental. There is one possible solution to the problem that explains Plato's failure to be specific with regard to this point. This solution rejects the extreme views on both sides of the debate. It rejects the view, of the dialectic theory, that there is nothing in Plato that transcends propositional knowing. However, it also rejects the illuminationist view that all true knowledge is of the acquaintance type.

In broad terms, the main epistemological theory espoused by Plato, in the dialogues, is dialectical or propositional in nature. This is the theory Plato wants to present to those in his audience who are not already initiated into the secrets of philosophy. Thus far, there is agreement with those who ascribe to the dialectic theory. However, the illuminative theory is correct in so far as this dialectical or propositional epistemology is not ultimate. We are familiar from the metaphor of the line, that Plato envisages different epistemic levels or modes of knowing. The highest level, the ultimate knowing faculty is of an illuminative nature and this constitutes the secret doctrine. Absolute Truth can be attained through acquaintance knowing only by those who are the truly initiated. Being initiated actually means not only being of the correct philosophical temperament but also being thoroughly practised in dialectic. Hence, dialectic or propositional knowledge has a role to play in the attainment of this ultimate knowing. It helps open and direct the "eye of the soul" (the noetic acquaintive faculty, or illuminative intuition) to its proper object correlate.

[Q23] And it is literally true that when the eye of the soul is sunk in the barbaric slough of the Orphic myth, dialectic gently draws it forth and leads it up. The true analogy for this indwelling power in the soul and the instrument whereby each of us apprehends is that of an eye that could not be converted to the light from the darkness except by turning the whole body. Even so, this organ of knowledge must be turned around from the world of becoming together with the entire soul, like the scene-shifting periactus in the theatre, until the soul is able to endure the contemplation of essence and the brightest region of being.

Plato's metaphorical notion of "the eye of the soul" is akin to illuminative intuition and, although it is a faculty that is latently possessed by every soul, nevertheless it must be developed and properly directed by dialectical reasoning. If the initiate is suitable and has a high degree of proficiency in dialectics, ultimately acquaintance knowing supervenes upon propositional knowing. At the culmination of the whole process the ultimate
revelation occurs spontaneously in the soul, "at last in a flash of understanding of each blazes up, and the mind, as it exerts all its powers to the limit of human capacity, is flooded with light". The illuminative epistemology is the ultimate form of knowing and constitutes Plato's "secret doctrine". The secret doctrine is spoken of metaphorically, disguised or merely hinted at in the dialogues. That Plato had such hidden doctrines, which he thought best only to reveal to the initiated, is certainly confirmed by the following passages:

[Q25] For this reason no serious man will ever think of writing about serious realities for the general public so as to make them a prey to envy and perplexity. [Q26] If I thought it possible to deal adequately with the subject in a treatise or a lecture for the general public, what finer achievement would there have been in my life than to write a work of great benefit to mankind and to bring the nature of things to light for all men? I do not, however, think the attempt to tell mankind of these matters a good thing except in the case of some few who are capable of discovering the truth for themselves.

The uninitiated are not given the secret doctrine for many reasons apart from any possible "envy or perplexity" [Q25]. The first is simple. For Plato, like Plotinus, there is no possibility of attaining the ultimate intuitive insight without the process of dialectic or propositional reasoning. The long process of training for the guardians in the Republic is no accident. They must become competent in mathematics (especially geometry), the sciences (especially astronomy) and dialectics (in particular the method of "severe training" Parmenides recommends). Then only the best, at quite a mature age, go on to discover the ultimate acquaintance knowledge, "At the age of fifty those who have survived the tests and approved themselves altogether the best in every task and form of knowledge must be brought at last to the goal. We shall require them to turn upward the vision of their souls and fix their gaze on that which sheds light on all". Now if the uninitiated thought that the terminus of the knowledge project was just a direct intuition, they may think, like the tyrant Dionysius, that the hard work of preparation is unnecessary. They may even treat philosophy with contempt or think that the possibility of absolute knowledge is within easy reach, "In the case of the rest to do so would excite in some an unjustified contempt in a thoroughly offensive fashion, in others certainly lofty and vain hopes, as if they had acquired some awesome lore".
The initiates are certainly given hints to the existence of a secret doctrine. Cornford is right to say that Socrates' failure to define knowledge in propositional terms, in the *Theaetetus*, definitely points the way towards the inadequacy of propositional knowledge to attain the final revelation. The revelation is the direct acquaintance knowing of the Forms, but of course this is left unstated. In passages, from the *Republic*, there is an indication that the truths revealed by dialectic are not ultimate. Socrates tells Glaucon that it appears that dialectic brings us to the end of philosophical enquiry. However, he then hints that there is a further path to ultimate knowledge that dispenses with images and symbols and attains truth directly. Glaucon is then told that, despite having the will to do so, Socrates is unable to show him this path:

[Q27] Tell me, then, what is the nature of this faculty of dialectic? Into what divisions does it fall? And what are its ways? For it is these, it seems, that would bring us to the place where we may, so to speak, rest on the road and then come to the end of our journeying. You will not be able, dear Glaucon, to follow me further, though on my part there will be no lack of good will. And, if I could, I would show you, no longer an image and symbol of my meaning, but the very truth as it appears to me.\(^\text{124}\)

This evidently hints at the type of intuition Kant denies in the *Inaugural Dissertation* when he observes, "No intuition of things intellectual but only a symbolic [discursive] knowledge of them is given to man".\(^\text{125}\)

The same hint is given at the metaphorical level by the image of "the eye of the soul", a faculty that is often clearly separated from the dialectic process, see [Q21, p. 42]. The images of vision are certainly intimately connected with acquaintive knowing in the later illuminative tradition. For example, Scott MacDonald is correct to say that Augustine, at least, "develops his notion of direct acquaintance in terms of the metaphors of light and vision".\(^\text{126}\) Yet Gosling and Cross think that too much can be read into these metaphors, "I agree with Cross...that too much can be made of Plato's use of visual and actual metaphors".\(^\text{127}\) Rather than suggesting any illuminative theory they think that such imagery is just an indispensable tool for describing the power and clarity of philosophical understanding, "if one wishes to grow lyrical about the illuminating powers of philosophy there is little else to do about it but expand these metaphors".\(^\text{128}\) There is a sense in which they are correct. Both Parmenides and Descartes used the images of illumination but neither believed in any intuition epistemologically higher than deductive intuition.
Grasping the conclusion of a deductive sequence (with deductive intuition) or a primary axiom (axiomatic intuition) are processes that might summon up such metaphors. The separation of the eye of the soul from the dialectic process could just be the distinction between the actual process of noetic deductive reasoning and deductive intuition. However, it is puzzling why, in Plato, a long process of training to the age of fifty is required merely to draw conclusions from deductive chains. It is also puzzling why the metaphor seems so overblown. It is true that Augustine uses the imagery of light or "enlightenment" to delineate elementary noetic functions. However, one does not often encounter drawing a conclusion from a deductive process being described as the mind being "flooded with light" or compared with a spark that is kindled in the soul.

There is also the question of the unpredictable nature of the Platonic intuition. It does not arrive, methodically in stages, like the drawing of conclusions in the noetic deductive process. Rather it arrives after a "long period of instruction" it arrives "suddenly, like a blaze kindled by a leaping spark". The acquaintive nature of the intuition is also hinted at in (i) the eye-witness metaphor. Here those with true belief only are compared with the jury in a trial, while those who have knowledge are compared with the eye-witness - someone immediately acquainted with the facts; and (ii) the road to Larissa argument. Here those with knowledge are compared to a guide who has acquaintive knowledge of the road to a town called Larissa. Both the eye-witness and the guide attain their respective knowledge by acquaintance because the type of knowledge gained is not comparable with drawing conclusions from a deductive process or grasping a simple axiom. Perhaps this is one of Plato's many hints to the initiated that true knowledge transcends the processes of deduction.

Plato's ultimate intuition is certainly not mystical as Plotinus suggests. The pseudo-Areopagite recommends the abandonment of all knowledge in order to become an "unstained mirror, ready to receive the primordially luminous beam of the Thearchy". In Plato there is no conscious abandoning of the intellect in an act of love or for purposes of a union with the one. Plato sometimes refers to this mystical "heaven sent" type of intuition and clearly distinguishes it from his own methods. It is often described as a type of respectable or valuable "madness" that informs the wisdom of the prophetess at Delphi, the priestesses at Dodona and the Sybils. Hence sometimes, "the greatest blessings come by way of madness, indeed of madness that is heaven sent". This is clearly not to be compared with the highest intellective intuition of the philosopher. It is
not this type of intuition to which the guardians in the Republic are supposed to attain after years of intellectual effort. The Platonic intuition, in contrast to the mystic's, supervenes upon a purely intellectual process, a process that is intrinsic to the intuition itself. Certainly, no abandoning of the intellect is required and it is never compared to madness divine or otherwise. It is rather a moment of sane enlightenment. For similar reasons the Platonic intuition cannot be, as Russell suggests, a type of aesthetic intuition or feeling. Plato again clearly distinguishes this type of intuition from his own method. Aesthetic intuition is described in the Phaedrus as the "third form of possession or madness, of which the Muses are the source". 138 It is therefore associated with an abandonment of rationality rather than a culmination of intellectual work. In aesthetics skill and sanity fail before divinely inspired madness, "if any man come to the gates of poetry without the madness of the Muses, persuaded that skill alone will make him a good poet, then shall he and his works of sanity with him be brought to nought by the poetry of madness". 139

If the dialectic theory is correct, all knowledge is true belief plus a logos and this logos is propositional. Yet how does one explain what Plato is talking about in the following passage, where he denies that his own dialogues constitute an insight into the studies to which he devotes himself:

[Q28] I certainly have composed no work in regard to it, nor shall I ever do so in the future, for there is no way of putting it into words like other studies. Acquaintance with it must come rather after a long period of attendance on instruction in the subject itself and of close companionship, when, suddenly, like a blaze kindled by a leaping spark, it is generated in the soul and at once becomes self sustaining. 140

The dialogue cannot express the ultimate truth because such a truth cannot be put into words. How can true knowledge be propositional if language is inadequate to its expression? Plato observes, "Hence no intelligent man will ever be so bold as to put into language those things which his reason has contemplated, especially not into a form that is unalterable - which must be the case with what is expressed in written symbols". 141 Notice also how, in the Seventh Epistle, the four descriptive modes of knowing are considered inadequate to the "fifth entity" i.e. that which is known. These modes viz. (i) a name, e.g. the name circle; (ii) a description, e.g. the definition of circle; (iii) an image, e.g. an instantiation or representation in the world of a circle, and (iv) dialectical
understanding, e.g. justified beliefs in the mind concerning the circle, are the elements of propositional knowing and yet:

[Q29] Each of the four makes the reality that is expressed in words or illustrated in objects liable to easy refutation by the evidence of the senses. The result of this is to make practically every man a prey to complete perplexity and uncertainty.\textsuperscript{142}

Surely, if what has been called the dialectic theory were correct it would certainly imply a scepticism concerning that ultimate object of knowledge, viz. "the fifth entity", that is not born out by the rest of the Epistle. How indeed can Ryle, Gosling et al. restrict the Platonic insight into such an entity, to propositional knowledge (the contents of the dialogues and the theory of knowledge contained therein)? After all, those who attempt to put their ideas about the highest objects in writing, like Dionysius, are described as having their wits "utterly blasted".\textsuperscript{143}

In fact, the whole debate between the dialectic and illuminative theories has been misconceived. Ryle and Gosling have pointed out that, for the Plato of the \textit{Theaetetus}, the acquaintive knowing of the elementary simples is impossible\textsuperscript{144} and have concluded that this implies that Plato rejected all knowledge that was acquaintive. The point is however that Plato is here deliberately inducing aporia. He is giving an account of knowledge in purely propositional terms. He is taking the propositional theory to its ultimate limits and is showing that any attempt to account for knowledge in terms of the propositional theory alone leads to an unresolved paradox. Of course, then the simples cannot be apprehended, but this does not prove that, on any theory, simples cannot be apprehended - this is the point.

The dialogue is meant to point beyond itself. The aporia is designed to induce in us a desire for a more adequate theory of knowledge. It is a hint for the initiated that the sense of knowledge, in purely propositional terms, as true belief plus a logos is inadequate. If knowledge was true belief plus a logos why is the \textit{Theaetetus} an aporetic dialogue? Why are we still left in confusion when we have supposedly found the answer to the problem? Could it be that Plato is saying, "you have not found the answer, there is another stage in knowing, think harder"? However, the full-blooded illumination theory is also incorrect. Theories that rigidly associate true knowing with direct acquaintance with Forms underestimate the fundamental role of propositional knowledge in the Platonic
epistemology. Therefore, the secret doctrine theory is the only argument to make sense of the debate.

However, despite these examples there would have been too few clues to posit a secret doctrine had not Plato been provoked to make some aspects of its nature explicit. He did this in order to distance himself from certain spurious accounts that were circulating, claiming to represent the ultimate meaning of the Platonic philosophy. Ironically we may have the tyrant Dionysius and other unknown pseudo-philosophers to thank for the provocation. The actions of these men certainly made Plato reveal more than he was previously willing to disclose. Plato's rejection of the spurious texts or accounts does not result from the fact that they contain spurious illogical propositions. The rejection occurs for the simple reason that such mediums of information use propositions; whereas, in Plato's view, ultimate knowledge cannot be put into words/texts because it is acquaintive in nature.

1.3. Plato and the Issue of Transcendence

Then those who have no experience of wisdom and virtue but are ever devoted to feastings and that sort of thing are swept downward, it seems, and back again to the centre, and so sway and roam to and fro throughout their lives, but they have never transcended all this and turned their eyes to the upper region nor been wafted there, nor ever been really filled with real things, nor ever tasted stable and pure pleasure, but with eyes ever bent upon the earth and heads bowed down over their tables they feast like cattle, grazing and copulating ever greedy for more of these delights, and in their greed kicking and butting one another with horns and hoofs of iron they slay one another in sate less avidity, because they are vainly striving to satisfy with things that are not real the unreal and incontinent part of their souls.

Let us now move to consider whether Plato was a transcendent apriorist or an immanentist as some have claimed. Since true ἐπιστημή, for Plato is of the Forms (by acquaintance or description) the whole issue revolves around the status of these Forms. Are they immanent to the world of experience, or do they transcend it? The answer to this question of status has come to depend, in contemporary philosophy, on the issue of whether Plato ontologically "separated" the Forms. Gale Fine, in her essay entitled "Separation", distinguishes this notion of ontological separation which entails that the Forms exist "independently of any given F sensible particular" from both local
separation "Here A and B are separate from one another when they are in different places"
and definition separation "A is definitionally separate from B just in case A can be defined
without mention of (the definition) B". So far, particularly in my account of adequation, it has
been have indicated that the Forms are both ontologically and locally separate. However, it
would be foolish to ignore that certain modern commentators oppose this position.

We have already mentioned those commentators who hold to the non-reducibility thesis. Others,
like John Moline, warn us of the putative "danger of suggesting that there are two textures
and two 'realms'. He goes on to suggest that the Forms are "powers" ingredients in the mixtures
which make up sensible bodies, and hence are immanent to the world of experience. This view
entails classification of Plato as an immanentalist and similar theories are espoused by
P.Natorp and J.A. Stewart. Gale Fine gives perhaps the most powerful statement against the
arguments used to defend separation. Although she doesn't argue for a full immanentist position,
she does see a qualified immanentism as a possibility. For she does not think the defenders of
separation have proved their case. Terrance Irwin in an article on Plato's Heracleiteanism,
interprets separation of the Forms in Plato as being on the definitional rather than the ontological
level. A similarly unorthodox position is maintained by Donald Ray Morrison who maintains that
what Aristotle means by separation (choristos) is 'numerical distinctness'.

It must also be said however that the denial of transcendence is a minority viewpoint. Jean
Roberts in a review of John Molines' book calls the immanentist theory a "heterodox understanding
of a Platonic form" and accuses Moline of "an attempt to read Platonism out of Plato". We have
already mentioned Aristotle's theory that the separation of Forms is the essential distinguishing
feature of Platonism; a feature that allows us to distinguish Platonism from the Socratic theory of
ontologically unseparated universals. J. D. Mabbott goes as far as to say that "Chorismos is the only
doctrine we can with certainty attribute to Plato". The transcendent theory is also defended strongly by
Cherniss who states that certain passages in the Timaeus involve "statements of the
transcendence of the ideas that no impartial judge could overlook or sophisticate away. It
would be impossible for the definition to be put more concisely and unambiguously". We have
already mentioned Walsh and Else's similar defence of the theory. Other statements of it occur in
the following small sample: Brian Carr states that "The form is an entity which exists in a special
non-spatiotemporal realm of Forms, and is the Ideal or
Standard of circularity". Similarly R. Tarnas observes of any form that "It is immaterial, beyond spatiotemporal limitation, and transcendent to its many instances". In addition see Ross, Burneyea and Cornford.

The first thing to say about this debate is that even Gale Fine, who fights so heroically to maintain the possibility of an immanentist interpretation, ultimately admits that there are Forms that are transcendent. Despite attempting to counter all the major arguments that close off the possibility, there are some she cannot contend with. For instance, in the Timaeus, the demiurge creates the world of experience on the model of the Forms. This would imply that there is a time t when the Forms existed without any instantiation in the world of experience. For the Forms existed before the world of experience was even created. Hence, the Forms must be ontologically distinct from the sensibles. They can exist when sensibles do not. They are not immanent to the world at time t. Fine does not draw the obvious conclusion that they are not immanent to the world after time t at t1.

Yet this is obvious to me because Plato constantly reminds us that one characteristic of the Forms is that they are unchanging and eternally the same, "one kind of being is the form which is always the same, uncreated and indestructible, never receiving anything into itself from without nor itself going out to any other". But if there were a time t when they were ontologically distinct from creation and then a time t1 when they were immanent to creation, then between t and t1 they have changed quite drastically. Yet, Forms do not change. They do not exist in a world that tolerates any becoming so they cannot become something else. They are not like sensible things that can be beautiful at one time and ugly at another. Now it could be argued that relational change is not really an intrinsic change in the Forms themselves. An all powerful creator god could change their relation to the world of creation without intrinsically altering them. Yet, Plato is famous for regarding relational change as change proper. Consider only the examples used by Socrates, in the Phaedo, when he talks about Simmias possessing the quality of smallness in comparison to Phaedo but having the quality of tallness in relation to himself. Anyway what the demiurge actually does is different, he creates an inferior world on the model of the Forms he does not transform the Forms into principles of immanent nature.

Now Fine only admits that the Timaeus argument is sufficient to prove that some Forms are immanent (at least at time t), "The argument just sketched is a valid argument for the separation of some Forms". In particular she means moral Forms and Forms of
"most natural kinds."\textsuperscript{164} It does not prove that the Form of fire is ontologically independent for fire is said to have traces in the primordial chaos\textsuperscript{165} and is therefore always instantiated. Moreover, it does not prove the transcendence of goodness or justice because these are instantiate in the demiurge himself. This latter point is an interesting non sequitur because Fine should be concerned with whether Forms can exist independently of sensibles. To say that the form of goodness is always instantiated in the demiurge who undoubtedly is not a sense-object, does not prove that goodness cannot exist without a sensible instantiation. Since the demiurge himself transcends the world, any instantiation of a Form in him is irrelevant to make Fine's point. We must therefore conclude that goodness and justice are Forms that exist independently. If we do this, we have an immense number of Forms that have been proved to be ontologically separate. If we do still assume that some, like fire, are immanent, they must be unusual exceptions. In reality it is difficult to imagine there being any real exception to this. Surely, in a dialogue like the \textit{Sophist} where a interweaving of Forms is posited\textsuperscript{166} there would be some mention of a fundamental division between those Forms that were immanent to the world and those that were transcendent.

However, there is a slight doubt that can be raised even against the arguments raised in the \textit{Timaeus} that Fine finds so convincing. The \textit{Timaeus} is a Platonic exercise in scientific enquiry. Plato makes no more claims for his cosmology there than that it contains probable beliefs. Having said this it is unlikely that Plato would make an educated guess at the truth, which involved doctrines that contradicted his theory of Forms. However, evidence that is more significant will be used to back up the theory of the transcendence of Forms. Fine is correct that much of the evidence presented by scholars up to this point has not decisively proved the case. However, consider the following facts viz. (i) there are such a large number of arguments for transcendence, which are logically coherent at least on specific interpretations, and (ii) Fine fails to refute them and only indicates the existence of a possible alternative interpretation. This suggests that the case against transcendence is decidedly tenuous.

The main supporting arguments for transcendence occur in the \textit{Parmenides}, and are not examined by Fine. The first clue to a transcendence doctrine occurs when Socrates is challenging Zeno's treatise. In order to do so he asks Zeno if he accepts that there are Forms which exist \textit{just by themselves}. "Do you recognize that there exists, just by itself, a Form of likeness and again another contrary form, unlikeness itself".\textsuperscript{167} The fact that a
form could exist "just by itself" certainly seems to rule out any necessary instantiation of Forms in the particulars of this world. Is to exist, "just by itself", not to exist independently of anything else, and is this not what is meant by the ontological separation of Forms? However, as it stands the statement does not prove transcendence. However, it does indicate that Forms can exist separately from their instantiations. It therefore counts as an argument against some of Molines' points. Unfortunately, it does not prove that Forms are transcendent to these sensible instantiations. The Forms may be still be immanent in this world but exist in the heavens or some other place, but separate from their sensible instantiations.

Socrates himself actually posits such an immanentist theory. He suggests to Parmenides that the Forms may be thoughts in the mind, "But, Parmenides, said Socrates, may it not be that each of these Forms is a thought, which cannot properly exist anywhere but in a mind".168 This is an early version of a conceptualist theory of universals. Indeed, it is a theory, which suggests that the Forms are immanent to the world in the human mind. Socrates is not speaking here of notions like Geist in Hegel, Nous in Anaxagoras or the Mind of God in Augustine, and even if he were not all of these theories are transcendent. Consider the case of Hegel who believes in just such a universal Mind. However, as was indicated in the introduction, the Hegelian epistemology is most definitely immanentist. In the Parmenides Plato is portraying Socrates as a young naive philosopher and you get the impression, from his remarks, that Socrates is unsure himself of the ontological status of the Forms. Sometimes his choice of expression seems to indicate an immanentist theory that bears out Molines' doctrine, "But Parmenides, the best I can make of the matter is this - that these Forms are as it were patterns fixed in the nature of things".169

Parmenides at this point, presumably because Socrates is wavering tries to bring clarity by fixing the ontological status of the Forms. He does this by introducing a truly philosophical-technical sense to what Socrates means by being "just by itself". We have already explored the ordinary language sense of this phrase. However, the new technical sense excludes the possibility of immanence; "just by itself" is to mean "in its own world". If it exists in its own world then this world cannot be the world that we experience:

[Q31] Parm. Because, Socrates, I imagine that you or anyone else who asserts that each of them has a real being 'just be itself', would admit, to begin with, that
no such real being exists in our world.  

Socr. True, for how could it then be just by itself?  

This passage is the refutation of Fine's point that "auto kath hauta" could mean "different from" sensible particulars rather than ontologically separate from them. It is obvious, against Morrison and Irwin, that in Plato there is a stronger notion of separation than is implied by numerical or definitional distinctness. The Forms are certainly posited as existing in their own world. Remember also that the things in our world are mere subsistents and do not really exist, in the true sense, like the Forms. Hence, if something is Truly Real like the Forms it cannot exist in our world. A fact that Parmenides reiterates, "But as you admit, we do not possess the Forms themselves, nor can they exist in our world". This is another argument against the immanentists. Anyway, Parmenides at this point fixes with certainty the status of the Forms. They are transcendent and do not exist in our world. This rigid ontological separation is then illustrated by many examples.

According to Parmenides, the existence of this ontological separation throws up several important epistemological and theological problems. Such problems would never arise if the Forms were immanent. The first problem that Parmenides mentions is similar to that faced by theologians and philosophers who believe in a transcendent God. It is generally designated the problem of natural theology. This problem will inevitably affect any ontological dualist like Plato. The terms and significances we attribute plus the knowledge we humans possess in our immanent world have reference only to the things in that world. The things in this world are given, by us, the same names as the Forms in that other world. However, the names in our world have reference only to the things in our world not to that which transcends it, "these things in our world which bear the same names as the Forms are related among themselves, not to the Forms, and all the names of that sort that they bear have reference to one another, not to the Forms". The significance of things in this world is similarly incapable of transcending this world, "The significance of things in our world is not with reference to things in that other world, nor have these their significance with reference to us, but, as I say, the things in that world are what they are with reference to one another and toward one another, and so likewise are the things in our world". It is the same with that which counts as human knowledge. This too will have reference only to the immanent world and as a consequence "beauty itself or goodness itself and all the things we take as Forms in themselves are unknowable.
to us". The ontological separation of Forms then sets us substantial epistemological problems. For if they are separate it seems we cannot know them.

According to Plato's Parmenides, it also has an unacceptable theological consequence. The Gods are usually considered to be omniscient and omnipotent. However, ontological separation means that the God's "most perfect knowledge" has reference only to the most perfect realities viz. the Forms. The gods then must be ignorant of the things in our imperfect world. They therefore cannot be omniscient. Not only this, but the god's power and mastership has reference only to the essential slave not to the de facto slave in our immanent world. They do not then have any power over us. They are not therefore omnipotent. Parmenides states these unacceptable consequences in the following terms, "Just as we do not rule over them by virtue of rule as it exists in our world and we know nothing that is divine by our knowledge, so they, on the same principle, being gods, are not our masters, nor do they know anything of human concerns". Socrates at this point interjects saying that a doctrine that had such consequences would be just "too strange". Now these problems can be logically stated only on the assumption that the Forms are transcendent. How can we have problems knowing them if they are in our world? If the gods know the form of the just and this Form exists in our world, how is that a problem for the divine omniscience?

The critic may point out at this stage that ontological separation has still not been proved. Does the fact that Parmenides brings out intolerable consequences in the doctrine of separate Forms not mean that Plato rejects it too? Is the Parmenides an attempt perhaps to reject early immature theories that Plato later discarded? The fact that it is a young Socrates that is presenting the argument may suggest this. However, the fact is that Parmenides does not reject the theory. Contrary to this viewpoint, his purpose is only to suggest that there is more to be considered in stating the theory than Socrates realized. There are more philosophical problems involved in the theory which Socrates would have realized had he subjected himself to Parmenides method of "severer training" in dialectics. This is a method which brings out consequences of assuming a theory and denying it. In fact it is my contention that Parmenides is using this method himself in his criticism of the theory of Forms just as he later uses it on his own theory that all things are one. For Plato's Parmenides never rejects the theory of ontologically separated Forms. His argument that they would be unknowable is only methodological and is qualified in the text. In fact, all Parmenides actually claims is that it would be difficult to
convince someone who thought they were unknowable. To say something is difficult is not to say that it is impossible:

\[Q32\] Suppose someone should say that the Forms, if they are such as we are saying they must be, couldn't even be known. One could not convince him that he was mistaken in that objection, unless he chanced to be a man of wide experience and natural ability, and were willing to follow one through a long and remote chain of argument.\[181\]

The theory of ontologically separate Forms is admittedly difficult to prove in the light of Parmenides' many objections but there is certainly a hint that such a proof could be given by an extraordinary talented philosopher, "Only a man of exceptional gifts will be able to see that a form, or essence just by itself, does exist in each case, and it will require someone still more remarkable to discover it and to instruct another who has thoroughly examined all these difficulties".\[182\] However, Parmenides immediately, at this point, goes on to emphasise the importance of this project. For without a theory of Forms, which are distinct objects of knowledge, we are left with a world of flux that cannot be known. Without the Forms existing distinct from the world of sensibles (remember if they were wholly in our world they too would be in flux) there would be nothing permanent that could be named and this would, "completely destroy the significance of all discourse".\[183\] As a consequence the philosophical project itself would be impossible. Socrates then is not to be faulted for (i) his theory, which Parmenides endorses again\[184\] nor (ii) his philosophical project which is confirmed as important. It is the arguments surrounding the justification of his theory that he has paid inadequate attention to. He wants to define the Forms before he is trained to understand the philosophical consequences of his theory and how to defend it against the sceptic, "you are undertaking to define 'beautiful' 'just' 'good' and other particular Forms, too soon, before you have had a preliminary training".\[185\] The preliminary training provides practice in analysing the multifarious and often hidden consequences of maintaining any philosophical position.\[186\]

This theory is supported by the fact that Plato actually does provide a solution to what the Mediaevals called the problem of natural theology. In doing so, he answers Parmenides criticism on this point. The theory that knowledge is reminiscence provides an explanation of how mortals can attain to the divine wisdom despite the radical separation of worlds. The theory maintains that the soul has a divine nature which is
trapped, in this world, only because it is a prisoner of the body. "the soul is trapped like an oyster in a shell". Before it was imprisoned it was resident in the divine world and there came face to face with the Forms themselves. If we can attain to divine knowledge, in this world, it is only because of a memory of a primordial encounter of the disembodied soul with the other divine world - where the Forms permanently reside. This is why, in order to attain knowledge, it is necessary ultimately to turn the soul around from this world in order to liberate it from this earthly plane.

To conclude this section, Aristotle's analysis of Plato's theory of Forms must be supported. He regarded them as ontologically separate substances that are transcendent to sensory particulars. He makes no reference to any evidence that suggests Plato believed in the immanence of the Forms at any time in his career. This would certainly be a strange omission, because the immanence of the Forms was a major Aristotelian theory (the Medieval's characterized the Aristotelian attitude to the Forms in the phrase universalia in rebus). Surely, he would recognise such an important precursor. There can be no sense in saying that Aristotle wanted to be considered the originator of this particular theory and therefore deliberately ignored its existence in Plato. There is evidence for this point in the fact that Aristotle quite without jealousy attributed the theory to Socrates, "And Socrates gave the impulse to this theory [of Forms], as we said before, by means of his definitions, but he did not separate them from the particulars; and in this he thought rightly, in not separating them". That the Forms existed, transcendent to their sensible instantiation is clear from many passages in the dialogues. To mention but a few: in [Q30, p. 51] from the Phaedrus mortals, in love with the sensory world, are condemned for not "transcending all this" and turning their mind's eye to the "upper region". Similarly in the Theaetetus there is talk of "that other region which is free from evil". In the Phaedrus there is talk of a "place beyond the heavens" and the "earthly likenesses" of the Forms. Now these examples indicate locational separation. Yet, according to Fine, locational separation does not necessarily imply ontological separation. However, it does imply this when combined with a doctrine, which states that the Forms continue to exist when the particulars fade away. A form like beauty, in the upper region continues to exist even when beautiful things disappear. When can this other region really be devoid of Forms? All this supports Plato's conclusion, "We are in fact convinced that if we are ever to have pure knowledge of anything we must get rid of the body and contemplate things by themselves with the soul itself".
CHAPTER 2
THE ELEMENTS OF TRANSCENDENT APRIORISM

[Q33] This science took the determinations of thought to be the fundamental determinations of things. It assumed that to think what is, is to know in itself; to that extent, it occupied higher ground than the critical philosophy that succeeded it.

[Hegel]

2.1. The Theories Expounded by Our Predecessors

The general analysis of Plato gives the misleading impression that transcendent apriorism is already sufficiently defined, with its own established epistemological terminology. However, it is important to understand that the phrase transcendent apriorism refers to an epistemological doctrine with a very determinate nucleus of definitional conditions. In fact, the currently available terminological and definitional formulations of the doctrine do much to obscure this fact. For some reason many such formulations, are intolerably loose when exactitude is so obviously requisite, particularly for purposes of differentiation. There even appears, at times, to be an element of complacency involved. The complacency often results from the acceptance, in modern epistemology, of either or both of the following general assumptions viz. (i) that everyone already understands exactly what the doctrine involves and how it is distinct from related epistemologies, or (ii) that the doctrine is fundamentally untenable in its present form or has, in actual fact, been conclusively refuted. The unfortunate result has been that philosophers are often content to use their own indeterminate designatory terminology. There is also a tendency to promote particular definitional aspects as a substitute for an exhaustive and precising definition. In consequence, no generally agreed terminology or definitional formation has emerged, far less been established, in the field of modern epistemological studies.

The confusing diversity of terms and meanings, which are listed in appendix 1, are culled from modern epistemological texts. There is no doubt that, despite divergence in
content, the authors mentioned are attempting, but unfortunately failing, to designate and define an identical epistemological doctrine. The Kantian-type terminology used suggests that many of them may have in mind, in varying stages of vagueness, the theory of knowledge, which underpins the, so-called, "pre-critical" or "dogmatic" metaphysics. More specifically, the epistemological doctrine, rejected in the *Critique of Pure reason*, which presumes that, "it is possible to make progress with pure knowledge, according to principles, from concepts alone". The object of such pure knowledge is, "a realm beyond the world of the senses where experience can yield neither guidance nor correction". Those definitions that do not contain Kantian-type terminology seem to be confusing conventional textbook definitions of "rationalism" with the Kantian formulation. While this confusion will be exposed later, the accuracy of the Kantian contribution itself is, of course, along with other traditional terms and definitions, also open to question.

Looking back from the standpoint of a whole thesis devoted to the subject of transcendent apriorism the definitions, listed in appendix 1, seem somewhat naïve. This perceived naïvety led to the conclusion that only complacency could have contributed to the lack of determinacy in their present formulation. During the course of this chapter, there will be an attempt to expose the inadequacies in each of these definitions. In addition, it will be discovered that other contemporary attempts at differentiaational accuracy within the field of research, viz. (i) P. F. Strawson's distinction between "revisionary" and "descriptive" metaphysics and (ii) C. S. Peirce's contrast between "ontological" and "scientific" metaphysics, are broad net divisions incapable of differentiating effectively between transcendent apriorism and related epistemological doctrines.

The same complacency that underlies many contemporary formulations cannot, however, be attributed to some of the more traditional definitions. The complacency, stemming from the belief that the doctrine is untenable, certainly cannot be ascribed to them. It is necessary to remember that transcendent apriorism once existed as a living tradition, providing, as it did, a determinate epistemological method for the establishment of some of the greatest systems of metaphysics. The method was considered to possess a unique epistemological veracity and was often explicitly defended against the various attacks of empiricists and sceptics. However, there are systems, within this older tradition, in which the method was not explicitly stated or analysed. A possible reason for this, although not the only one, was that ontology and metaphysical system building were
often given priority over issues in epistemological method. In some instances, this may demonstrate the existence of another type of complacency. Fortunately, it is not complacency evident in the majority of philosophers in the once flourishing "living" tradition. A comparison between the modern and, the more profound, traditional definitions will occur later in this thesis.

A general list of the philosophers and philosophical movements that employ the epistemological methods of transcendent apriorism within the living tradition are given below. The list is presented only as part of a general introduction to the reader and contains many omissions: Parmenides of Elea, Zeno of Elea, Melissus of Samos, the Megarics, Plato, Philo of Alexandria, Plotinus, Porphyry, Iamblichus, St. Augustine, Proclus, Saint Anselm, William of Auxerre, Saint Bonaventure, Henry of Ghent, Marsilio Ficino, Nicolas Malebranche, René Descartes, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Benedict De Spinoza, and the Cambridge Platonists. The tradition then went into terminal decline. Immanuel Kant briefly revived the method in the *Inaugural Dissertation*. However, it was Hegel who gave the doctrine both its most profound statement and its most sophisticated defence, especially against the critical philosophy of Kant. However, for Hegel, the doctrine was, in some ways, limited. Although it was regarded as a positive contribution to the history of philosophical thinking, it was not conceived to be the highest stage of that history. The philosophy of Bergson represents a late and final flowering of the theory.

It may appear strange that Christian Wolff, the philosopher described by Kant as "the greatest of all the dogmatic philosophers" is not present in the above list. In fact, contrary to both Kant's assertion and popular interpretation, Wolff was not a transcendent apriorist at all. In addition, there are other interesting and significant omissions. A. J. Ayer seems to regard F. H. Bradley and M. Heidegger as archetypal transcendent apriorists. Neither of them, in fact, corresponds to this categorization and Ayer would have done better to direct his attacks against those philosophers that are in the above-mentioned list. J. Macquarrie and others would include Hegel but this again is a mistake; despite what has been said concerning his positive attitude towards the doctrine.

It must be understood that it is not the contention of this paper that all the philosophers and philosophical movements, in the living tradition, worked with an identical form of transcendent apriorism. Indeed, we shall discover later that this is not the case. Parmenides' version of transcendent apriorism is different, in some aspects, from
Augustine's. However, those differentia that do exist are non-essential for purposes of definition. Hence, their existence does not warrant or require a separate epistemological designation. There are rather different types of transcendent apriorism, the nucleus of core definitional conditions remaining determinate within all versions. In fact, it was the discovery of these essential conditions that allowed the formation of an improved definition from a mass of data from different periods. Despite this, it is important to remember that, to say that an aspect is non-essential, in definitional terms, is not to contend that it is insignificant and can be ignored. It is these aspects that distinguish the different versions of transcendent apriorism. In fact, the non-recognition of these important distinctions has caused much confusion in the assessment of the doctrine.

In regard to the complacency argument previously mentioned, it is undeniable that the doctrine seems immediately recognizable. For instance, there is an undeniably close connection between transcendent apriorism, as it is subsequently defined, and the epistemology of the "dogmatic" metaphysics Kant tried so hard to discredit in The Critique. The doctrine is also familiar to the modern philosopher as being connected with the epistemology of "transcendent metaphysics" which is the main target of A. J. Ayer's Language Truth and Logic. However, in both cases, even with regard to the issue of recognition, a close connection is all that is admitted at present. The actual relationship is more complicated than it seems and caution is urged. At the level of understanding, the issue is even more involved, as has been already stressed.

As a general consequence, it is necessary to establish both the terminological aspect and the definitional content of the doctrine with some exactitude. The referent doctrine, therefore, is stipulated by a specific set of conditions that are essential to it and directly related to the selected terminology. It is possible that the reader may find the approach in this section over-cautious. It may seem that terminological neologisms with complex meaning contents are redundantly functioning to explain an epistemological position that is already familiar. However, the problems encountered, in a long analysis of transcendent apriorism, are convincing testimony that the determination of its exact meaning-content, on commencement, is fundamentally requisite. The errors and misconceptions that can and do result from a more relaxed attitude to such issues will be disclosed in this section as a warning.
2.2. A Determinate Designation

In order to understand the reasons for the accusation of terminological imprecision, it is first necessary to establish the actual distinctions between transcendent apriorism and other epistemological doctrines. For it is upon this understanding that any correct definition should be based. Unfortunately, this would require the disclosure of more information than is possible at the present moment. However, a simplified version can be presented, instead, that will help the reader understand now, what will be revealed in more detail later. A new categorization system has been devised that is designed to clearly and exactly delineate certain specific epistemological strands that exist within philosophical and scientific systems. The subsequent tabulation, designated table 1., is formulated to be a general and simplified overview of this system, containing concrete examples from the history of philosophy. In the table, point [A] presents a general definition of the category, point [B] lists a few philosophers whose work uncontroversially falls within that particular categorization, and point [C] gives an argument form that exemplifies a particular category:
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<th>APRIORISM</th>
<th>APOSTERIORISM</th>
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<td><strong>TRANSCENDENT</strong></td>
<td><strong>TRANSCENDENT</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>[A] That the intellect can attain to the Truly Real identical, in this case, to the noumenal world by using <em>a priori</em> reasoning or intuition.</td>
<td>[A] That the intellect can attain to the Truly Real identical, in this case, to the noumenal world by <em>a posteriori</em> reasoning or intuition.</td>
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<th><strong>IMMANENT</strong></th>
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<td>[A] That the intellect can attain to the Truly Real identical, in this case, to the phenomenal world by using <em>a priori</em> reasoning or intuition.</td>
<td>[A] That the intellect can attain to the Truly Real identical, in this case, to the phenomenal world by <em>a posteriori</em> reasoning or intuition.</td>
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Table 1. The Four Epistemological Divisions.
Transcendent apriorism, transcendent aposteriorism, immanent apriorism and immanent aposteriorism are distinct epistemological doctrines that underpin various metaphysical systems or arguments. It is the non-recognition of the clear division between them, when it extends to the general epistemological foundations of metaphysical systems, which accounts for some of the abovementioned crudeness in the existing terminology. The following examination, of closely related epistemologies, will highlight that which is essential about transcendent apriorism.

2.2.1. Transcendent Aposteriorism

Transcendent aposteriorism affirms that, although humans can attain to transcendent knowledge, they can do so only through reasoning that is ultimately rooted in experience of phenomena. The main type of "cosmological" proof for the existence of God is, therefore, an archetypal argument in this respect. John Hick defines arguments in this category as "a posteriori theistic proofs" that supposedly "proceed from the world to God". Such arguments begin with postulates ultimately derived from experience and attempt to prove from them the existence of something that, in fact, transcends that experience. As an aside, it must be emphasized at this stage that not all cosmological arguments are a posteriori. As M. W. F. Stone remarks, "The cosmological argument is an argument for a cause or reason for the cosmos. It can take either an a priori or an a posteriori form". This will explain why a rationalist like Leibniz could make use of the argument. His a priori version is based on the principle of sufficient reason and does not contradict his transcendent apriorist epistemology. Having noted this let us return to the a posteriori versions of the argument. The first three ways of Thomas Aquinas, as presented in the *Summa Theologiae*, are just such cosmological proofs. The existence of an object, viz. God, that infinitely transcends all sensory experience, is to be demonstrated from the following axioms, which are derivative of experience:

[Q34] It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. In the world of sensible things we find there is an order of efficient causes. We find in nature things that are possible to be and not be. since they are found to be generated, and to be corrupted.
Now transcendent aposteriorism, as a more general epistemology, was in fact most prevalent in this Medieval Christian Aristotelianism. Biblical reference to the doctrine was often traced to St. Paul's speech to the Romans. The seminal part of this speech is given here, in the translation of John Duns Scotus, "For since the creation of the world, God's invisible attributes are clearly seen being understood through the things that are made".\(^{11}\) In the *Summa Theologiae*, Aquinas also refers to this quotation and reformulates the essence of the epistemological doctrine in his own terms, "Our minds understand material things by abstracting ideas of them from their images, and then use such knowledge to acquire knowledge of immaterial things".\(^ {12}\)

This epistemology is also fundamental to the metaphysics of John Duns Scotus, whose object-cognate (as for Aristotle and Aquinas) was being qua being. However, it has to be said that unlike Aquinas, Scotus thought that, what is now termed transcendent apriorism, was the ideal type of knowing for the natural intellect, "were it not hindered".\(^ {13}\) However, because in this life the natural intellect was "ex infirmitate", due either to original sin or some aspect of the divine order, it can, unfortunately, only found its metaphysics upon transcendent aposteriorism. This was also the position of Robertus Grosseteste in his commentary on Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*, "I say it is possible to have some knowledge without the help of the senses, for in the divine mind all knowledge, not only of universals but also of all particulars, exist eternally...and this would be the case with all human beings, if they were not weighed down under the load of a corrupt body".\(^ {14}\) By the time, in a subsequent period, that the poet John Milton wrote the following clear definition, the doctrine was a well-established epistemological commonplace:

\[
\text{[Q35] But because our understanding cannot in this body found itself but on sensible things nor arrive so clearly to the knowledge of God and things invisible as by orderly conning over the visible and inferior creature, the same method is necessarily to be followed in all discreet teaching.}\(^ {15}\)
\]

Although subsequently falling into decline, the doctrine is revived much later and informs a significant portion of the metaphysics of Christian Wolff and Arthur Schopenhauer. In his *Discursus Praelminaris*, Wolff signals his aposteriorist epistemological stance by stating the requirement that his philosophy must begin with experiential principles, "the principles of philosophy must be derived from experience".\(^ {16}\) It is also clear that, for
Wolff, experience has a role in the corroboration (corroboratio) and falsification of philosophical theories. In his *Psychologia Rationalis*, the argument for the pre-established harmony of body and soul is seen as a "hypothesis" superior in nature to those of Descartes and the Occasionalists. However the hypothesis is to be regarded as falsified as soon as experience is contradictory with it, whereas experiential corroboration increases its probability.\(^{17}\) In the *Philosophia Rationalis sive Logica*, Wolff asserts that the goal of his entire philosophy is the "marriage of reason and experience (connubium rationis et experientiae).\(^{18}\) The method used to facilitate this marriage is unusual and proceeds in two stages starting and founded upon an "ars inveniendi a posteriori", an analysis that proceeds from observations and experiments. The insights of this completed investigation are then incorporated and expanded in an "ars inveniendi a priori" which uses a demonstrative method. In an article entitled "Christian Wolff's Philosophy of Contingent Reality", these facts and others have led C.A. Van Peursenha to speak of the "empiricist character of his metaphysics".\(^{19}\) It is significant also that the method is used, by Wolff, transcendentally to answer all the problems of metaphysics, including the existence of God in natural theology and the immateriality of the soul in rational psychology. Christian Wolff's philosophy is therefore both a posteriori and transcendent.

The following quotation [Q36] from, *The World as Will and Representation*, shows that Schopenhauer also considered that there is a possibility of attaining to knowledge of things-in-themselves with a posteriori methods. This knowledge depended on the fact that we are not merely knowing subjects, but are ourselves identical with the thing-in-itself, "we ourselves are the thing-in-itself".\(^{20}\) Being conscious of oneself (a non-spatial and hence non-perceptual intuition) therefore was considered to be a "subterranean passage" to knowledge of the in-itself. All other noumena we have to approach "from without" whereas with consciousness of self we can penetrate within the in-itself. This knowledge is regarded as a posteriori rather than a priori:

\[Q36\] But as perception can furnish only phenomena, not things-in-themselves, we too have absolutely no knowledge of things-in-themselves. I admit this of everything, but not of the knowledge everyone has of his own willing. This is neither a perception (for all perception is spatial), nor is it empty; on the contrary, it is more real than any other knowledge. Further it is not a priori, like merely formal knowledge, but entirely a posteriori.\(^{21}\)
To sum up, transcendent aposteriorism is the epistemological doctrine that affirms that the intellect can attain to the Truly Real, in this case identical with the noumenal world, by reasoning from experience. In consequence, it is a doctrine that is substantially different from transcendent apriorism - as defined in our as yet non-technical way - that demands, as we shall soon discover, a strictly a priori form of reasoning.

So, bearing this in mind, let us now return with fresh eyes to the existing terminology from appendix 1, which seeks to categorize what is meant by transcendent apriorism. It is now obvious that one of the important functions of the terminology must be to differentiate transcendent apriorism from transcendent aposteriorism. In this respect, it is immediately clear that the term "metaphysics", used by many commentators, does not function in this way. Both epistemological systems are in fact usually embraced by this term. What philosopher would not argue that both Aquinas (a transcendent aposteriorist) and Plato (a transcendent apriorist) were doing metaphysics? Indeed, if the term "metaphysics" applies to both systems it cannot be used to differentiate between them.

Qualificatory terms are therefore required, so let us consider these. Walsh and Ayer use the term "transcendent" to qualify metaphysics. Yet, as we have seen, both epistemological systems are transcendent in nature. Therefore, this qualifying term does not allow us to differentiate between them. We can then reject the phrase transcendent metaphysics as inadequate. That Walsh is loose in his terminology is more surprising because he explicitly identifies the epistemological distinction required and finds it significant. Consider this passage from his book *Metaphysics*:

> [Q37] But it is only fair to point out that there are many supporters of transcendent metaphysics in particular all those who draw their inspiration from Thomas Aquinas, who would regard that view [a view resembling transcendent apriorism] as extravagant and indefensible. That 'there is nothing in the intellect which was not previously in the senses' seems to them axiomatic: the metaphysician, like any other enquirer, has no choice but to start from empirical premises. But though he must begin from experience, it does not follow that his thinking has to remain within the bounds of the experienceable. 22

Hegel's alternative qualifying term "Pre-Kantian" must now be analysed. Immediately this is found to be useless because there are examples of both types of epistemological system in existence before Kant. Plato and Aquinas, for example, are both "pre-Kantian" but, in fact, represent the opposing epistemological polarities. The Solomon and Macquarrie qualifier "speculative" is equally unhelpful. The first disadvantage of the term
for our purpose is that it has had more than one meaning in the history of philosophical usage. Despite this we can, at least, be sure that Solomon and Macquarrie use it in its Kantian, rather than Hegelian or other, sense. In the Kantian usage, "speculative" refers to an object that transcends any possible experience, or a concept that refers to such an object, "theoretical knowledge is speculative if it concerns an object, or those concepts of an object, which cannot be reached in any experience. It is so named to distinguish it from the knowledge of nature, which concerns only those objects or predicates of objects, which can be given in a possible experience". Hence "speculative" is a term identical in meaning to transcendent as used by Walsh and Ayer. It cannot therefore distinguish between transcendent apriorism and transcendent aposteriorism for reasons already given.

Loenen’s qualifier "deductive" also fails in this regard. Consider Charles Sayward’s definition of deduction, "for any sentence S, relative to a set of sentences K, a finite sequence of sentences whose last sentence is S (the one said to be deduced) and which is such that each sentence in the sequence is an axiom or an element of K, or follows from preceding sentences in the sequence by a rule of inference". Now there is no reference to the necessity for any sentence, axiom or element to be derived either a posteriori or a priori. For deduction is a species of argument or inference irrespective of any such consideration. It would be correct to apply the term deduction both to, (i) the method of more geometrico in Spinoza’s Ethics, which proceeds from a priori axioms and is contentually a priori and, (ii) the ideal demonstrative science of Aristotle that proceeds from a posteriori axioms and is contentually a posteriori. In conclusion, again the important distinction is not made by the qualifying term.

A more difficult case is that of the qualificatory term "dogmatic" used, by Kant, to qualify metaphysics. It is more complex because initially, at least, it seems to meet our criteria of differentiation. In fact, the phrase "dogmatic metaphysics" is indeed used to encompass those systems that absolutely exclude the practice of reasoning from experience. The "sweet dogmatic dreams" of reason actually arise from the "presumption that it is possible to make progress with pure knowledge, according to principles, from concepts alone". And the term pure, in Kant’s philosophy, is formulated in a very determinate sense to exclude the empirical, "A priori modes of knowledge are entitled pure when there is no admixture of anything empirical".

However, this reference is not, implied by the term "dogmatic". In fact, the term, even in Kant himself, is intended to emphasize two aspects of metaphysics of the transcendent
type that are unconnected with this important distinction. In the first, strict sense, the
term is used to describe philosophical systems that do not correspond to Kant's notion of
a "critical" philosophy. In this connection the Critique of Pure Reason, an embodiment of
the critical philosophy, was intended to "clip the wings of dogmatism".\(^ {28} \) and in place of
the dogmatists' enquiry "into things", it proposes a "critical enquiry concerning the limits
of my possible knowledge".\(^ {29} \) Dogmatism then involves a direct system building approach
to metaphysics, without the required epistemological investigation into the possibility of
such a structure.

The second, common language sense of the term dogmatism is also present in Kant.
In the Critique he states that the government of reason "under the administration of the
dogmatists, was at first despotic...".\(^ {30} \) In this sense dogmatism is the negation of the
autonomous intellect with its critical, freethinking and questioning attitude. Again, there
is no sense in which a term with this meaning would significantly qualify "metaphysics" in
the sense required above. The previous rejection of both the terms "dogmatic" and
"transcendent" obviously renders Schopenhauer's phrase "dogmatic transcendent
philosophy" useless. The replacement of the term "metaphysics" with "philosophy" in fact
diminishes rather than enhances the specificity of the terminology - metaphysics, after all,
is actually a specific type of philosophy.

It cannot be denied that, in the definitions quoted earlier, there are qualificatory terms
that do go some way to indicate the distinction required. In particular, Copleston's
qualifiers "rationalist" or "pure" seem to make the appropriate point because they tend to
emphasize the non-a posteriori nature of transcendent apriorism. In this respect,
Copleston's phrase "rationalist or pure metaphysics" has much in common with our
remaining definitions viz. Loenen's, "epistemological rationalism", Mourelatos' "dogmatic
rationalism" and J. Cottingham's, "Apriorism". That this a priori element is emphasized in
the above terminology, however, is simply not sufficient. This is because, as table 1.
makes clear, in addition to the differentiation of transcendent apriorism from transcendent
aposteriorism it is equally important to distinguish the doctrine from immanent apriorism.
Immanent apriorism, as a substratum of various metaphysical and scientific systems, is
most definitely a distinct epistemological doctrine. It is however far more complex and
must be dealt with in detail.
2.2.2. Immanent Apriorism

As defined in table 1, the doctrine of immanent apriorism is distinguished from transcendent apriorism with respect to the selection of an object-correlate for the Truly Real. In immanent apriorism, this object-correlate is the phenomenal rather than the noumenal world. This particular choice of object-correlate can be influenced by several factors. In post-Kantian philosophy, the main reason for the identification of the Truly Real and the phenomenal world was the actual rejection, as unnecessary or incoherent, of the notion of an in-itself or noumenal world. To avoid confusion, and because it is sufficient to make the point here intended, at this point, the phrases "in-itself" and "noumenal world" are regarded as synonymous. In addition, the terms "phenomena", "representations" and "appearances" are not distinguished. However later these same terms and phrases will be given exact meanings that are non-identical. Kant had insisted that "behind appearances we must admit and assume something else which is not appearance - namely things in themselves" because "otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be appearance without anything that appears".

Yet, it is the existence of this "something else" behind or underlying appearance that is strongly denied by the main strand of immanent apriorism. Incidentally, it is also denied by a type of immanent aposteriorism. Nietzsche, in *Beyond Good and Evil*, announces the fundamental idea in aphoristic form, "The apparent world is the only one, the 'real world' is merely added by a lie.". In actively promulgating what, for Kant, is an "absurd conclusion" philosophers must defend themselves against the Kantian argument. They do this by suggesting, contra Kant, that there is a sense in which there can be an appearance "without anything that appears". Consider the following statements:

(i) His appearance was immaculate.
(ii) Appearances can be deceptive.
(iii) It appears to me to be water.
(iv) His appearance was unexpected.

In uses (i), (ii) and (iii) the Kantian argument that demands something behind appearance makes sense. For example in (i) it makes sense to reply "Yes but appearances are deceptive". The consequence of this statement, designated (ii), is that there may be some non-deceptive reality behind the appearances. Considering statement (iii), if it
appears to me, P, that \( x \) is \( G \) and to someone (or something) else, Q, that \( x \) is \( H \) then this might indicate that there is something which \( x \) is, independently of how it appears to P and Q. However, in sense (iv), it would just not make sense to ask for something else that was behind the appearance. Heidegger used the term phenomenon to indicate this latter special meaning of coming-on-the-scene. It was a sense that he traced directly to the Ancient Greek term \( \phi αινουμενον \) and its verbal root \( \phi αινεσθαι \) meaning, "to show itself". This is why Heidegger can say that the word phenomenon "has nothing to do with what is called an 'appearance' or still less a 'mere appearance'".\(^{34}\) A phenomenon is rather "the showing-itself-in-itself"\(^{35}\) and signifies "a distinctive way in which something is encountered".\(^{36}\) Heidegger's definition of phenomenon corresponds to its use in descriptive, existential and Hegelian phenomenology. Although, to indicate the same notion Hegel and Sartre sometimes, but not always, use the additional term "appearing" rather than the ambiguous term "appearance".

The need for the abovementioned usage emerges from a philosophical position that repudiated the notion that the Truly Real was the noumenal world and instead embraced the only world, i.e. the phenomenal, as the Truly Real. This phenomenal world is therefore no longer seen in contrast with the noumenal, for there is nothing at all "behind" the appearances. There is, as Sartre suggests, only the series of phenomena and hence only one existent thing viz. the phenomenal world, "Modern thought has realized considerable progress by reducing the existent to the series of appearances which manifest it. Its aim was to overcome a certain number of dualisms which have embarrassed philosophy and to replace them by the monism of the phenomenon".\(^{37}\) As such it was not seen as a loss to metaphysics, rather it was just a redirection of consciousness toward the true object of knowledge. As long as philosophers had associated the Truly Real with the noumenal world their attitude to appearances was negative, "to the extent that men have believed in noumenal realities, they have presented appearance as a pure negative".\(^{38}\) Sartre's formulation is slightly inaccurate, however, because it is not the fact that men have believed in the existence of noumenal realities that requires them to regard appearances as negative. For instance, Kant certainly believed in the existence of the noumenal world both as the source of the given and as a precondition for the moral law. Yet, as we shall soon discover, he regarded phenomena in a positive way. Rather, it is the actual association of the Truly Real and the noumenal world, a connection denied by Kant, which leads to the negative assessment of appearances.
Appearances are considered illusory, deceptive or just inadequate. In contrast, the association of the Truly Real with the phenomenal world meant a new positive attitude toward appearances.

The association of the Truly Real and the phenomenal world was made in a variety of philosophies. In Appearance and Reality, F. H. Bradley had observed that, "the Absolute is experience" and explained what he meant in the following way:

\[Q38\] All appearance must belong to reality. For what appears is, and whatever is cannot fall outside the real. And we may now say that everything, which appears is somehow real in such a way as to be self-consistent. The character of the real is to possess everything phenomenal in harmonious form.

This is a thought echoed by Sartre, Husserl and Merleau-Ponty when they observe respectively: "the appearance does not hide the essence, it reveals it; it is the essence"; "What things are...they are as things of experience" and "We must not, therefore, wonder whether we really perceive a world, we must instead say: the world is what we perceive". Since this was the generally held belief in post-Kantian immanent apriorism, there was seen to be no longer any point in attempting to transcend experience. Actually there was nothing beyond that-which-is, to be transcended. For that which is to be transcended in transcendent apriorism viz. the phenomenal world was, for immanent apriorism, the only True Reality. In fact, as Husserl informs us, "It is a fundamental error to suppose that perception (and every other type of intuition of things, each after its own manner) fails to come into contact with the thing itself". The phenomenological phrase "thing itself" is not to be confused with the contrasting notion of a "thing-in-itself". Therefore, the identification of the Truly Real and the phenomenal world was considered an escape from an inhibiting illusion. It again opened up the possibility of absolute knowledge of reality that had been denied by the Kantian positing of an unknowable thing-in-itself.

Kant himself did not think that the positing of a thing-in-itself precluded the possibility of such knowledge. However, Hegel had argued that if there were an unknowable thing-in-itself then that same thing-in-itself would inevitably remain the True Reality sought in philosophical enquiry. The fact that we cannot know it would therefore entail the triumph of scepticism. The elimination of the thing-in-itself therefore represented, for the post-Kantian immanentists the defeat of scepticism. Their entire
immanentist programme is therefore summed up by Sartre when has states, in *Being and Nothingness*, that:

\[Q39\] If we once get away from what Nietzsche called "the illusion of worlds-behind-the-scene," and if we no longer believe in the being-behind-the-appearance, then the appearance becomes full positivity: its essence is an "appearing" which is no longer opposed to being but on the contrary is the measure of it. For the being of an existent is exactly what it appears. Thus, we arrive at the idea of the phenomenon such as we can find, for example, in the "phenomenology" of Husserl or of Heidegger - the phenomenon or the relative-absolute. Relative the phenomenon remains, for "to appear" supposes in essence somebody to whom to appear. But it does not have the double relativity of Kant's Erscheinung (appearance). It does not point over its shoulder to a true being that would be, for it absolute. What it is, it is absolutely, for it reveals itself as it is. The phenomenon can be studied and described as such, for it is absolutely indicative of itself.\[45\]

It must be stated at this point that although all the philosophers mentioned in this section had immanentist programmes, not all of them can accurately be described as "apriorists". Sartre, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty are not included in our final list because they cannot be described as such. However, the epistemology of the "existential" phenomenologists (as opposed to the descriptive phenomenology of Husserl and others) is not a significant concern in this thesis. It is sufficient to note that the modes of knowing employed by them, in grasping the phenomena, are not a priori in the sense required by apriorism. As Macquarrie has correctly observed, "Existentialists and empiricists make common cause against the speculative rationalism of earlier times. They distrust all attempts to construct philosophy a priori".\[46\] This association with the aposteriorist is of course complicated by the strange and varied modes of knowing extant within existentialism. Most are experiential based modes of knowing, but some do more resemble a mystical/poetic intuition or insight, whose status is more difficult to assess.

In contrast to the immanentist programmes so far analysed, although Kant is an immanent apriorist, his immanentism is something of a compromise. The existence of the thing-in-itself makes it, in a sense, negative in nature. The denial to human consciousness of (i) an intellectual intuition, "intellectual intuition, forms no part whatsoever of our faculty of knowledge"\[47\] or (ii) a noumenal use for the categories, "the principles of pure understanding can apply only to objects of the senses under the universal conditions of a possible experience, never to things in general without regard to the mode in which we
intuit them"\(^{48}\), means that, unfortunately our cognition is restricted to the phenomenal world.

In the event, Kant makes a virtue of necessity and redefines the Truly Real so that it applies to that which falls within experience, viz. to appearances. This subversion of traditional philosophical usage involves the rejection of a possible transcendent apriorist claim that appearances and representations have a status as illusion. According to Kant, if this were the case then because knowledge of the in-itself is impossible it would be inevitable that all human cognition would have to be interpreted as grasping mere illusion. Kant therefore subverted the terms "Reality" "Truth" and "illusion" so that he could ascribe reality to appearances or representations. This was the epistemological move that Hegel subjected to devastating criticism. Kant's position is formulated as follows:

\[ \text{[Q40] It would be my own fault, if out of that which I ought to reckon as appearance, I made mere illusion. That does not follow as a consequence of our principle of the ideality of all our sensible intuitions - quite the contrary. It is only if we ascribe objective reality to these forms of representation, that it becomes impossible for us to prevent everything being thereby transformed into mere illusion.}^{49} \]

Again, a different type of immanent apriorism occurs in Cartesian science. Here there is neither a denial of the existence nor the possibility of knowing the thing-in-itself. Rather the science of nature must use the method of immanent apriorism because of its chosen special object viz. the phenomenal world. The choice of object-correlate therefore depends on the particular nature of the subject matter. There may be a noumenal world and possibly it can even be known but, through the choice of the investigator, there is a concentration on the phenomenal.

In conclusion, we can now see immediately the inadequacy of the remaining terminological contributions. Copleston's "rationalist" or "pure metaphysics" Loenen's, "epistemological rationalism", Mourelatos' "dogmatic rationalism" and J.Cottingham's, "Apriorism" are patently deficient. This is because the terms "rationalism" "pure" and "apriorism". although emphasizing the a priori nature of our subject-doctrine, fail to mark its transcendent as opposed to immanent nature. Husserl, for instance, refers to his phenomenology as "rationalism". The method is certainly a priori, using as it does what Husserl calls an "essential" or "fidetic" intuition to produce its descriptions. Kockelmanns has even described Husserl's phenomenological psychology as "aprioristic".\(^{50}\) Fidetic
intuition is really identical to Kant's notion of the intellectual intuition that is denied to human consciousness but possessed by God, see [Q42, p. 79]. Yet Husserl uses such an intuition to analyse the things of experience viz. phenomenon, not to transcend them in pursuit of the thing-in-itself or the noumenal world. The following quotation illustrates this point:

[Q41] The pure phenomenology of experience in general...has to do with the experiences that can be grasped and analysed in intuition in their essential generality, but not with empirically apperceived experiences as real matters of fact...The essences grasped in essential intuition and the connections based solely upon the essences, are brought to expression descriptively in concepts of essence and lawful statements of essence. Every such statement is an a priori one in the best sense of the term.51

Hence, Husserl is not a transcendent apriorist but an immanent apriorist and the above mentioned terminology does nothing to mark this fact. It only seeks to establish that he is an apriorist.

The other terms involved in the remaining definitions, viz. "metaphysics" "epistemological" and "dogmatic", also do not function to illustrate the required distinction. The meanings of dogmatic and metaphysics have already been analysed and indicate something entirely different, while epistemology is just a non-specific term for the theory of knowledge in general. It is now clear why the phrase "transcendent apriorism" was invented to specify the subject-doctrine. It rules out the sources of possible confusion. It may be noted at this point that the distinction between transcendent apriorism and immanent aposteriorism has not been considered. It will be considered later but it is best explicated subsequent to its contrary doctrine, viz. transcendent apriorism. being properly defined.

2.3. The Mis-Categorization of Wolff, Hegel, Heidegger and Bradley

Even at the level of preliminary analysis, before a technical definition and explanation have been given of the subject doctrine, some errors in existing categorization are recognizable. The mentioned inaccuracies could even be due just to a lack of attention to terminology. It appears already, at this stage, that Kant and others52 are mistaken in categorizing Christian Wolff as a transcendent apriorist because, as we have seen, his
philosophy is transcendent aposteriorist. Yet, even modern critics, like W. H. Walsh, can make the mistake of attributing to Wolff, not only a transcendent apriorist epistemology, but the most extreme form of this doctrine. In *Reason and Experience* Walsh observes, "the most extreme form of rationalism would be that of Wolff".53

A.J.Ayer and others also are misguided in considering F.H.Bradley and M.Heidegger to be transcendent apriorists. Firstly, because both, as we have seen, follow an immanentist rather than a transcendent epistemological programme. They have therefore no interest in transcending the limits of possible experience. Secondly, although Bradley could be termed an apriorist, because his notion of "feeling above the level of relations" can be interpreted as a species of a priori intellectual intuition (one reminiscent of Kant's notion), Heidegger cannot. In the early philosophy of *Being and Time*, the "disclosure" of phenomena is attained though a type of experiential intuition or "ontological mood" (Befindlichkeit), not through a priori intellectual intuition. In fact, as Calvin Schragin suggests, "Heidegger rejects without qualification any rationalist metaphysical speculation and a priori epistemological construction which focuses upon mental and cognitive processes to the neglect of the phenomena themselves. On this point Heidegger is a radical and consistent empiricist".54 I would agree with this point but to analyse it, at the present moment in detail, would take us too far from our present purpose. Presently, it is sufficient to say that if the analysis is correct then Ayer's assessment of Heidegger as a transcendent apriorist - when, in fact, he is an immanent aposteriorist - is incredibly wide of the mark.

Macquarrie and others are similarly mistaken in considering Hegel to be a transcendent apriorist. Hegel is most definitely an immanent apriorist. His epistemological stance stems from a strand of immanentism that originates in Fichte's rejection of the Kantian noumenal world. For Hegel, the positing of an unknowable thing-in-itself only results from the misleading and undefended presuppositional metaphor i.e. that knowledge is a "tool with which one masters the Absolute".55 If knowledge is a tool then it is natural to conclude that the particular nature of such an instrument will distort the truth, when functioning as a medium between subject and reality. The "fear of falling into error"56 in the Kantian philosophy therefore assumes "certain ideas about cognition as an instrument and as a medium, and assumes that there is a difference between ourselves and this cognition".57 The Hegelian rejection of the unknowable thing-in-itself, as an error based upon such a misleading metaphor, means that like the phenomenological
immanentists there is, for Hegel, only the phenomenal world and the phenomenal world is identical with the Truly Real.

As a consequence of this account, it may seem strange that Hegel defended transcendent apriorism. Hegel certainly did not agree with this doctrine's association of the Truly Real and the noumenal world. To posit such a world was a mistake. However, he recognized that the transcendent apriorist, unlike the Kantian, regarded the thing-in-itself as knowable - see [Q33, p. 60]. Hence, the transcendent apriorist did not make the mistake of the critical philosophy viz. to presuppose "that the Absolute stands on one side and cognition on the other, independent and separated from it and yet is something real". His belief that there was a bridge, a link between that which is thought and how things are in-themselves, prevented this separation. For Hegel, the Truly Real was certainly identical with the phenomenal world. It was the essence of things to be phenomenal. There could not be things that were not for Absolute or finite consciousness, "The things of which we have direct consciousness are mere phenomena, not for us only, but in their own nature". However this phenomenal world was known by a priori means. Experience plays only an extrinsic role in knowledge acquisition. Hence although awakened by experience philosophy does not intrinsically begin from experience. Hence, Hegel was not a transcendent apriorist as some have suggested, rather he just agreed with one aspect of their epistemology - against the critical philosophy of Kant.

2.4. Further Modern Distinctions

In the early part of this chapter, two modern attempts at definitional accuracy that so far we have not considered were mentioned. Strawson's distinction between "descriptive" and "revisionary" metaphysics should be familiar to the reader. In *Individuals* Strawson, make his distinction:

[Q42] Descriptive metaphysics is content to describe the actual structure of our thought about the world, revisionary metaphysics is concerned to produce a better structure...Perhaps no actual metaphysician has ever been, both in intention and effect, wholly the one thing or the other. However, we can distinguish broadly: Descartes, Leibniz, Berkeley are revisionary, Aristotle and Kant descriptive.
Irrespective of the criticisms levelled at this distinction and its applicability to the philosophers mentioned\textsuperscript{61} it is clear it does not help us with the differentiational analysis of transcendent apriorism. There is a distinction to be made between how we ordinarily divide up the world into categories and the transcendent apriorist's attempts to transcend these categories. It seems obvious that Reality, as it normally manifests itself to the human understanding, is plural, changing and temporal - although this is not uncontroversial. Whereas a transcendent apriorist metaphysician, for instance Parmenides, wants us to believe that Reality is one, unchanging and eternal. The "descriptive" metaphysician would merely describe the conceptual scheme that makes the plural, changing, temporal world that we actually experience possible. In contrast, the "revisionary" metaphysician would question whether the world that we actually experience is in fact Real. If she decided - usually the criterion for such a decision would be a noetic analysis - that it was not she would consequently revise her notion of our normal conceptual schema, i.e. would see it as producing falsehood rather than truth. In the latter case, there are various value-judgements that entailed the final revision. In descriptive metaphysics theoretically no evaluation occurs, just a neutral description.

It must be observed that most of what counts as transcendent apriorism is revisionary in nature. It can also be admitted that this is an interesting and important point. However, it cannot be said to be a unique characteristic and hence a determining differential factor in the definition of transcendent apriorism. There is no reason why immanent apriorist, transcendent aposteriorist or even immanent aposteriorist systems cannot be revisionary in this sense. Few of the philosophers in these traditions can be described as conforming to the descriptive model of metaphysics. In fact, Strawson's distinction seems independent of particular epistemological commitment. The modern scientist's world of sub-atomic particles, or the world revealed to us in relativity theory is as much a revision of our ordinary categories as the noumenal world of the transcendent apriorist. Consequently, Strawson's distinction is of little use in uniquely defining transcendent apriorism. Of course, to be fair to Strawson, this was not his specific project in making it.

C. S. Peirce's distinction between ontological metaphysics and scientific metaphysics is more informative. Ontological metaphysics we are told uses an "a priori method" while scientific metaphysics uses the method of the sciences viz. "observation and reasoning". There is also, in scientific metaphysics, a connection between Truth and the perfect understanding of the phenomenal world and, in ontological metaphysics, a connection
between Truth and the noumenal world. The recognition, in Peirce's distinction, of the importance of the a priori method and the noumenal world is correct. However exactly what is meant by such a method and such a world are not really developed. Peirce acknowledges that pragmatism is a kind of 'prope-Positivism', which affirms. "almost every proposition of ontological metaphysics is gibberish".\(^6\) He does not therefore deem it worthy (a common failing) of deep analysis. There is, therefore, almost nothing we can learn from his distinction.

Having analysed now most modern approaches to transcendent apriorism, they are all found, without exception, to be inadequate. This appears to be a strange situation because it is clear, after considerable analysis of the doctrine, that those philosophers who worked in the de facto tradition of transcendent apriorism had a profound understanding of the important distinctions. This understanding is at a high level in Kant's *Inaugural Dissertation*. However, it is the work of G. W. F Hegel which, as we have already seen, manifests the most profound epistemological insight. The opening quotation of this chapter was from Hegel's *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*. Its placement at the head of this chapter was no accident. For it can only be the result of the deepest insight into the transcendent apriorist project. An insight, incidentally, that has subsequently been altogether lost. Hegel, as we have seen, had a high opinion of transcendent apriorism. He often compared it favourably, in certain of its aspects, with the contemporary philosophy of his day, "The older metaphysic had in this respect a loftier conception of thought than that which has become current in more modern times".\(^6\) It is this constructive attitude to the doctrine that seems positively correlated with the level of insight into its nature. In consequence, the weakness of modern interpretations appears to stem from their unqualified negative assessment of the doctrine. To identify such latent prejudices is an important propaedeutic to a future unprejudiced analysis of transcendent apriorism.

### 2.5. A Determinate Definition-Formulation

If the purpose so far has been to provide the referent doctrine with a determinate designation, the next stage is to stipulate a determinate definition-formulation. The definition is designed to be more adequate than the simplified version given in table 1. It
is however much more complex and the rest of the thesis is really an exposition of its terms. The formal definition, designated Def₁, is therefore formulated as follows:

By transcendent apriorism is meant the epistemological doctrine which affirms that, by the exclusive means of a priori (sensu stricto) ratiocination or immediate intellectual intuition, the pure (human) intellect can attain to knowledge of the Truly Real. The Truly Real being understood, in this case, to be identical with the noumenal "world"; defined itself as the undistorted being-for-consciousness of the in-itself.

To conclude this chapter, the new terminology and its corresponding categorization system appears to avoid the ambiguities inherent in the extant designations of the referent doctrine. The determinate referent doctrine required, and is given, a determinate designation.
CHAPTER 3
THE NOETIC FUNCTIONS

3.1. The Pure (Human) Intellect

In the technical definition of transcendent apriorism, Defi, it is the “pure (human) intellect” that grasps the Truly Real. The qualificatory term “pure” indicates the strict exclusion of the aesthetic functions. In fact, the use of the term, in this way, follows philosophical tradition. For example, Meissner in his Philosophisches Lexicon of 1737 defines pure reason as "a completely distinct cognition in which the understanding is separated from the senses and imagination".\textsuperscript{1} Also, for Kant, a representation is termed pure "when there is no mingling of sensation".\textsuperscript{2} It was Parmenides who confidently maintained that the purification, of the human intellect, provided the seminal route by which transcendent enlightenment is finally attained. Before the post-Hegelian decline, the method was held, by many philosophers, to be an ideal to which the human reason dreams of aspiring. However, this does not indicate that they all considered it to be within the scope of the intellect’s power. In fact, the method of complete purification is often perceived to be beyond the limited scope of human cognition. Often, the possibility of fulfilling the method is granted only to intelligences that do not possess our limitations i.e. to angelic intelligence or to the mind of God. It has been asserted that, for Duns Scotus, transcendent apriorism was just such an ideal form of knowing. In fact, Scotus thought that the method was not available to a degenerate human consciousness. He therefore reluctantly contented himself with transcendent aposteriorism. Kant, in the first Critique, denies intellectual intuition to the human "dependent" intellect that is required to incorporate sensibility. However he also recognizes it as an ideal and therefore attributes it to the Godhead or "primordial" being:
[Q42] But however universal this mode of sensibility may be, it does not therefore cease to be sensibility. It is derivative (intuitus derivativus), not original, not original (intuitus originarius), and therefore not an intellectual intuition. For the reason stated above, such intellectual intuition seems to belong solely to the primordial being, and can never be ascribed to a dependent being.3

Any epistemologist with this viewpoint cannot really be classed as a transcendent apriorist. In fact, despite its respectful idealisation the belief necessarily excludes the possibility of transcendent apriorism for any human consciousness. Instead, it is the contrasting belief that the human intellect can attain constructively to such purity, which distinguishes the doctrine.

3.2. The Pure Intellectual Functions

The human intellective processes, that are traditionally considered to conform to such a restrictive criterion of purity, are examined in the next sections. It must be emphasized that there is no commitment made at this point to the existence or viability of the intellective or noetic functions mentioned. However, a commitment to at least a few of them is an indispensable condition for the validity of any transcendent apriorist epistemology. Hence, their importance requires a lengthy and detailed discussion. The following categories represent only an introduction.

3.2.1. Axiomatic Intuition

Axiomatic intuition is the rational/intellectual4 intuition of primary axioms or simple propositions. This species of intuition would involve the immediate, non-inferential and unconditional apprehension of self-evident propositions by the pure intellect. To elucidate this definition, let us start by examining the philosophical notion of intuition itself. Unfortunately, this is a not a simple matter and several epistemological confusions have arisen with respect to it. To begin, let us consider some standard contemporary definitions of intuition:

\[ Q43 \] Bruce Russell - a non-inferential knowledge or grasp, as of a proposition, concept, or entity that is not based upon perception, memory, or introspection.5
Robert Tragesser - Most generally one has intuitive 'knowledge' that p when, (1) One knows that p (2) one's knowledge that p is immediate, and (3) one's knowledge that p is not an instance of the operation of any of the five senses (so that knowledge of the nature of one's own experience is not intuitive).

Alan Lacey - An alleged direct relation, analogous to visual seeing, between the mind and something abstract and so not accessible to the senses.

J. C. B. Gosling - S knows that p intuitively if (a) p is true (b) he is justified in believing that p, and (c) his knowledge that p is not based upon his inferring p from other propositions. The criterion for its being so based is simply that S would deny, for any set of propositions p* from which p follows, that he believes that p because he believes that P*.

Here Tragesser's definition is the most plausible because it successfully identifies the shared characteristic of the various forms of intuition subsequently mentioned in this thesis. Definitional point (2) in Tragesser's definition specifies this essential discriminative as "immediacy". By immediacy is meant a direct apprehension unmediated by any process (e.g. deduction, induction etc.), which involves successive movement or memory.

The term immediate here must not be confused with the "subjective self-evidence" of scholastic philosophy. In other words, to be immediately apprehended propositions need not be evident at the subject's first encounter with them. In fact, the proposition may take some time to reveal its self-evidence. It would then be immediate in the scholastic sense of being "objectively self-evident". To know p by intuition then is to see, grasp or apprehend the truth of p through a form of direct perception that can be either intellective or sensory in nature. The latter, sensory or empirical, type of intuition is present for instance in Kant "That intuition which is in relation to the object through sensation, is entitled empirical". I do not therefore see Tragesser's definitional condition (3) as a characteristic of intuition in general but rather of noetic intuition in particular. For a similar reason it is necessary to reject Lacey's necessary connection between intuition in general and a cognitive object "not accessible to the senses". and Bruce Russell's similar limiting of the scope of intuition to anything "not based upon perception". It must be said that despite the rejection of one of Lacey's points, he is nearer the truth about intuition than Gosling and Russell. With his "direct relation analogous to visual seeing", he has certainly understood the importance of immediacy to intuition.

Gosling and Russell are wrong to make non-inferentiality a necessary condition of intuition in general. In fact, there exists an intuition that is deeply involved with inferentiality viz. deductive intuition. In other words, it is possible - despite a hint of
paradox - for an intuition to be both immediate and inferential. At least this is true to the extent that an intuition can be the re-immediation of an inferential process. This notion of re-immediation will be explained in detail when discussing the Kantian notion of intellectual intuition later in this thesis.

The general notion of intuition given here is always qualified by the terms rational or intellectual. This is to indicate that sensory intuition (à la Kant) or other non-intellectual intuitions (e.g. D. H. Lawrence's "blood knowing" or the various types of mystical intuition) are to be excluded from our list of noetic functions. While sensory intuition is excluded because it is just obviously non-noetic, non-intellectual intuitions are rejected because they do not have any role within transcendent apriorist epistemology.

Having considered intuition in general let us now move to the consideration of axiomatic intuition in particular. We have said that this type of intuition is non-inferential. Now non-inferential intuition was recognized by Aristotle and posited as a solution to the problem of the foundation of knowledge. In fact, the following sceptic directed argument, presented in the Posterior Analytics, is interesting in this respect:

[Q47] They assume that we cannot know the posterior thing because of the prior things, since these lead to no primary things; and their assumption is correct, since it is impossible to go through an infinite series. If on the other hand the regress stops, and there are principles, these are, in their view, unknowable, since they are indemonstrable, and demonstration is the only way of knowing that they recognize.12

Here, for the sceptic (as for the epistemological coherentist) the ability to infer one's belief x from some other belief y is the only true mark of genuine knowledge. However, for Aristotle, first principles are knowable despite being non-inferable. They are grasped by a special faculty of intuition or "nous" without the need for any further inference. This non-inferentiality characterizes any intuition, which can be categorized as an example of axiomatic intuition. However, it does not characterize intuition in general as Gosling has suggested in [Q46, p. 85].

The other definitive feature of axiomatic intuition, mentioned above was unconditionality. Again, this criterion was recognized by Aristotle. Consider the following passage from the Topics:
[Q48] The true and primary things are those that have credence (pistis) not through other things, but through themselves. For in the case of principles of a science, a further reason must not be sought; rather, each principle must be credible itself in its own right. 14

An intuition that is unconditional then is one that does not rely on any further proposition or set of propositions for its epistemic justification. It is considered true or false in itself by the fact of the intuition alone, independently of the truth or falsehood of any other propositions. If the object of the intuition is true then it is true independently of the truth of any further set of propositions. The epistemic credibility of x rests only with the intuition itself, no reference to other propositions is required to establish its truth status. Another essential aspect of axiomatic intuition is that its object-correlate is always a proposition. It has nothing, despite a superficial similarity, to do with non-propositional knowing (or knowing by acquaintance).

Traditionally, and from a rationalist point of view, examples of principles apprehended by axiomatic intuition are often to be found in the axioms of foundationalist systems. The following list is of course contentious and is only presented to provide the reader with some concrete examples with which he is familiar: The first principles of (i) Geometry: examples of which would be Euclid's first postulate viz. "Exactly one straight line can be drawn between any two points" or his fifth common notion viz. "The whole is greater than the part"; (ii) Logic: for example the principle of contradiction, or the principle of identity; (iii) Metaphysics: for example the seminal axiom of Parmenides viz. "Nothing is not"; Descartes famous "cogito ergo sum"; Leibniz's restatement of the foundational principle, "There is no effect without a cause" or, the first axiom of Spinoza's Ethics, "Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in something else". Other simple examples of things grasped by axiomatic intuition are the simple arithmetical equations 1+1=2, 7x7=49 etc. Axiomatic intuition will become clearer when it is contrasted with the second and third items on the intellective function list that we will now move to discuss.

3.2.2. Deductive Intuition

Deductive intuition is the rational intuition of the secondary propositions that result from the process of deduction. This intuition is identical to axiomatic intuition in terms of its
immediacy. However, whereas axiomatic intuition is in no way dependent on deduction, although a deductive system can be founded upon a number of such intuitions, deductive intuition can occur only after deduction has taken place. It acts as the re-immediation of a process of inference. For any deductive process a proposition $p$ is derived from one or more premises $p_1...p_n$. Normally this process would not be considered intuitional. There is, after all, a process. There is definitely a movement from one truth to another and memory is requisite. However, the actual grasping of the conclusion $p$ itself is still undeniably an act of intuition. This is explained, later but the reader may want to look now at [Q100, p. 160] from G. R. G. Mure. What has been called deductive intuition is there described as a "re-immediation of the discursive, mediatory moment". The first thing to notice about this is that deductive intuition, unlike axiomatic intuition, is closely connected with inference. In fact, inference is requisite for deductive intuition to be possible at all. In addition, deductive intuition unlike axiomatic intuition is conditional. In other words, it is dependent on other intuitions being correct. It does not normally stand alone as the full justification of truth. The truth condition of $p_1...p_n$ is relevant to $p$.

An example of deductive intuition would be Spinoza's "third kind of knowledge" viz. scientia intuitiva (a full discussion of which will be given at later). To give an example of such an intuition Spinoza takes the arithmetical problem of finding the fourth proportional given three sequential numbers. This is done with the help of a special kind of inferential intuition viz. deductive intuition, "For instance, one, two, three, being given, everyone can see that the forth proportional is six; and this is much clearer, because we infer the fourth number from an intuitive grasping of the ratio which the first bears to the second". Parkinson, in Spinoza's Theory of Knowledge, recognizes the existence of such an intuition but does not give the correct explanation of it when he observes, "in calling such knowledge 'intuitive' Spinoza does not mean that it is not inferential knowledge. For him, intuitive knowledge is not to be compared to seeing something, as opposed to inferring something". What Parkinson fails to grasp is that, as Mure has pointed out, see again [Q100, p. 160], even such inferential procedures have their intuitional re-immediations. Therefore, intuition can be inferential but still a type of mental seeing. This whole example, however, is a complex case, when any such intuitional re-immediation of an inferential process counts as an example of deductive intuition.
3.2.3. **Noetic-Deductive Reasoning.**

Noetic-deductive reasoning is the process by which the pure intellect attempts to form valid propositions through the linking of data derived from both axiomatic intuition and deductive intuition. Deduction, unlike both axiomatic intuition and deductive intuition, is not an immediate grasp or insight but rather a process that necessarily involves duration. In terms of the Cartesian philosophy what is intuited "must be grasped...at the same time and not successively"\(^{21}\), on the other hand deduction is a process, "which appears not to occur all at the same time, but involves a sort of movement on the part of our mind when it infers one thing from another".\(^{22}\) Because of the presence of duration and movement, a further characteristic distinguishing intuition from deduction is the presence of memory. It is noteworthy that rationalist philosophers like Spinoza and Descartes thought that the durational element and the consequent reliance on memory could be eliminated from the process of deduction. This putative process was entitled enumeration\(^{23}\) and could completely transform argumentation into a form of intuition. As a consequence of our previous analysis, this form of enumerative intuition would be categorized as deductive intuition - not axiomatic intuition). It is clear then that noetic deductive reasoning is, in terms already defined, mediate, inferential and conditional.

3.2.4. **The Apprehension of Noetic Concepts.**

So far, we have limited our analysis to the apprehension of propositional knowledge without considering the concepts out of which this propositional knowledge is composed. Noetic concepts are defined as those concepts possessed by the mind but which are not derived from the senses. The locus classicus for the exemplification of such concepts is the passage in Plato's *Phaedo* where notions such as equality, beauty, goodness, uprightness and others are considered to be of this type. The following passage (one of many) gives an indication of Plato's belief in such concepts, "So before we began to see and hear and use our other senses we must somehow have acquired the knowledge that there is such a thing as absolute equality".\(^{24}\) Of course the Platonic theory of anamnesis soon fell out of favour. However, it was later replaced by other theories of noetic concepts. Just such a theory was the epistemological doctrine of illumination, which had adherents from Augustine to Malebranche. Here certain (or all) ideas/concepts were not
derived, in the normal way, from the senses nor, as in Plato, were they remembered from a previous disembodied state of existence. Instead, it was the pure intellect illuminated by God that could function as the source of concepts and ideas. Hence Malebranche's famous quotation "que nous voyons toutes choses en Dieu".25

It was Descartes' modification of this theory to suggest that clear and distinct ideas, rather than being "seen" in the divine Mind, were rather "implanted in our souls by nature" that gave rise to the doctrine of innate ideas or concepts. Descartes' famous wax example26 was actually intended to prove the existence of noetic concepts. The concept Descartes' considers is the general notion of "body" which, he attempts to demonstrate, comes from the pure intellect. In the example, all the sensory qualities of the wax change when it is heated, yet we do not think that there has been a change of substance. According to Descartes, this is because the essence of the wax has nothing to do with what the senses reveal. The clear and distinct notion of extension, which is found instead to be the essence of wax, is proved to come not from the senses or the imagination as is usually thought, rather it depends on "purely mental scrutiny".27 He concludes that the notion of body itself is derived from the noetic rather than the aesthetic functions of the mind, "I now know that even bodies are not strictly perceived by the senses or the faculty of imagination but by the intellect alone".28 In all these examples the process or faculty that grasps these noetic concepts cannot, by definition, be reliant on experience and therefore has itself a noetic nature. If it did rely on experience in any way then the concepts themselves could no longer be considered noetic.

The notion of a concept that is a priori may seem unusual, because there is an emphasis (in my opinion an overemphasis) in modern philosophy on the notion of a priori truth. Now a proposition can be true a priori but a concept does not seem like something that can be true or false. Yet the notion of an a priori concept is, in fact, coherent because the older notion of a priori concerned itself both with issues of justification and origin. This is why Kant can legitimately state that "Such a priori origin is manifest in certain concepts, no less than in judgements".29 The technical name for such a concept in Kant is a notion, "The pure concept, is so far as it has its origin in the understanding alone (not in the pure image of sensibility), is called a notion".30
3.2.5. Noetic Introspection

Noetic introspection is the capacity of the pure intellect for rational reflection\textsuperscript{31}. that is an awareness that transcends the merely internal sensations of empirical introspection and which can rationally intuit or comprehend the noumenal-self. To posit the existence of noetic introspection would be to deny the empiricist claim that all introspection is a kind of inner sensation and that the results it produces are epistemologically on the same level as those of the five outer senses. As an example of a philosophical doctrine that instantiates the empiricist view consider, for instance, the doctrine of the self in Hume's \textit{Treatise}, "For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself. I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I can never catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception".\textsuperscript{32} For Hume, as this quotation demonstrates, the self was nothing except a bundle of perceptions. Any notion of a self not discoverable by such inner-sense is, as Kenny observes, to be "rejected as a metaphysical monster".\textsuperscript{33} Traditionally the rationalist extension of introspection beyond this inner-sense model had existed within the science \textit{[Wissenschaft]}\textsuperscript{34} of rational psychology. Consider Hegel's explanation of the aims of this science:

\begin{quote}
\begin{footnotesize} 
[Q49] The name 'rational', given to this species of psychology, served to contrast it with empirical modes of observing the phenomena of soul. Rational psychology viewed the soul in its metaphysical nature, and through the categories supplied by abstract thought. The rationalists endeavoured to ascertain the inner nature of soul as it is in itself and as it is for thought.\textsuperscript{35}
\end{footnotesize}
\end{quote}

Despite the fact that this science is now considered to be discredited, largely because of the influence of Kant and Hume, there were rationalists who wanted to assert that although empirical introspection exists, it only gives us knowledge of the phenomenal ego and that this knowledge does not exhaust what we could know about the self. For such a rationalist there was an intellectual intuition, incomparable with external sensation, that can attain to knowledge of the noumenal self. The cognitions involved in self-consciousness (i.e. awareness of a transcendental ego that is the subject to which experiences occur) are often cited as examples of this form of awareness. Plotinus asks
"what precludes the reasoning Soul from observing its own content by some special
faculty?". 36

The most famous introspective intuition of this rationalist type is the "I think" part of
the Cartesian Cogito. As Gary Hatfield observes, "the argument to the conclusion that the
proposition 'I am', 'I exist,' is necessarily true is ultimately founded upon the direct
introspection of the meditator's own thinking". 37 The significance of such an intuition is
demonstrated by the fact that, from it alone, Descartes attempted to prove the soul/mind's
existence (ergo sum), its identity as intellectual substance (res cogitans), its immateriality,
indivisibility, incorruptibility and finally its immortality. As Kant later observed "I think is.
therefore, the sole text of rational psychology, and from it the whole of its teaching has to
be developed". 38 Kant, of course, rejected Descartes conclusions, regarding them as
resulting from the "paralogisms of pure psychology". 39

3.4.6. Illuminative Intuition

Illuminative intuition is an unmediated rational intuition of intelligible objects. It is often
referred to as knowledge by acquaintance (or knowing things) and is often contrasted
with knowledge by description (or knowing about things). It was Grote who first
introduced the distinction by noting that some natural languages distinguish "between
these two applications of the notion of knowledge, the one being γνωσις, noscere,
kennen, connaître, the other being οίδενς, scire, wissen, savoir". 40 For Grote, knowledge
about things is essentially propositional knowledge, where the mental states involved
refer to specific things. In addition, this propositional knowledge can be more or less
complete, can be justified inferentially based on experience and can be communicated. For
some philosophers this experiential knowledge provides an epistemic basis for knowledge
about things and is, in some sense, difficult or impossible to communicate. According to
William James, in The Meaning of Truth: A Sequel to Pragmatism, knowledge by
acquaintance can be of people and things, sensations of colour, flavour, spatial extension,
temporal duration, effort and perceptible difference.

Of course, the transcendent apriorist is concerned with intellective rather than sensory
acquaintive intuition. The direct apprehension of a Platonic Form like absolute beauty
would be a more relevant example. In fact, as has been proved, the illuminative intuition
of the Forms, that constitutes Plato’s secret doctrine, is of the acquaintance type. Much more detail will emerge in chapter 7 so it is sufficient to note that illuminative intuition like axiomatic intuition is immediate, non-inferential, and unconditional. However, unlike axiomatic intuition it is non-propositional.
CHAPTER 4
ELEATIC INCEPTION

[Q50] For never shall this be forcibly maintained, that things that are not are, but you must hold back your thought (νοημα) from this way of enquiry nor let habit born of much experience, force you down this way, by making you use an aimless eye or a sounding ear and tongue: judge by reason the strife-encompassed refutation spoken by me.

[Parmenides of Elea]

4.1. Exegetic Problems with Parmenidean Αἰσθασις

Two distinguished pre-Socratic scholars, viz. A. P. D. Mourelatos and J. H. M. M. Loonen, who have both written entire books specifically devoted to the exposition of Parmenides and the Eleatics respectively, are at least agreed on one substantial conclusion. According to Mourelatos, Parmenides of Elea is the "father of Western rationalism". Similarly, according to Loenen, Parmenides is the "founder of epistemological rationalism". It is, however, not an uncontentious issue. For example, in both John Cottingham's books on the rationalist tradition, viz. Rationalism (1984), The Rationalists (1988), there is not one mention of Parmenides of Elea. In contrast, Plato rather than Parmenides is confidently adjudged to be the "father of rationalism". That the tradition begins from Plato is a not uncommon theory. However, it is a theory against which substantial evidence can be developed. In fact, it is much more logical to contend that the transcendent apriorist methodology was the epistemological legacy, inherited (and modified) by Plato from, that "reverend and awful figure", Parmenides of Elea.

In contrast to the above issue, Mourelatos and Loenen disagree on the question of what type of "rationalism" is represented by the Parmenidean fragments. On the surface, this is largely a technical matter of exegesis but it may betray a more fundamental vagueness in the understanding of what they mean by the terms "rationalism" and "epistemological rationalism" respectively. The consequent misunderstanding, and the
proper categorization of the Eleatic epistemology that helps to eradicate it, will be objects of our investigation. Hence, at the most general level, the two questions to be answered in this section are, (i) was Parmenides the father of Western rationalism or transcendent apriorism? In addition, (ii) if so, what category of rationalism or transcendent apriorism did Parmenides hold to?

The first thing to note is that if Parmenides is to be considered the genuine founder of transcendent apriorism then we would expect, in the light of our previous definitional analysis, firstly a challenge to or downgrading of the epistemological value of the aesthetic functions. Secondly, there would be reliance instead on the noetic functions for the attainment of Truth. It will therefore be wise at this point to consider the epistemology of Parmenides in relation to these points. However, the epistemological value that Parmenides' attributes to the noetic and aesthetic functions is, again, a contested issue. For example, Verdenius has suggested that the Parmenidean voo5, normally accepted as paradigmatically noetic, may mean, "knowing in a wide sense" i.e. may include sense perception. If this were so, we would have to concede that Parmenides' epistemological instrument is non-noetic. Rather it would be part of what Kant would call the logical use of the intellect or, in the terminology of this thesis, logico-sensitive cognition. Parmenides would then have to be considered an aposteriorist rather than an apriorist. If this were the case it would be necessary to re-assess Parmenides' evaluation of the aesthetic functions.

Such a re-evaluation is attempted by Hussey who holds that, for Parmenides, it is not the case that sense perception is necessarily false or inadequate. Rather falsehood only originates from sense-perception used, routinely and without due thought, as an exclusive guide to the Truly Real, "Parmenides does not condemn sense-perception as such...What he attacks is the habit of unthinking reliance on sense perception as the only guide to reality." Like Verdenius, Hussey seems to suggest that, for Parmenides, logico-sensitive cognition (cf. Verdenius' concept of the Parmenidean voo5) is a viable guide to reality.

In addition, in more traditional scholarship, Theophrastus makes the surprising claim that Parmenides considered thought and perception to be the same, "For he speaks of perceiving and thinking to be the same". It is unclear how Theophrastus wants us to understand this. However, if he means to posit an actual identity between thought and perception, then this will be dealt with in our later response to Verdenius. If, in contrast.
Theophrastus wants to suggest that \( \alpha \iota \sigma \theta \alpha \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \) and \( \nu \nu \nu \varsigma \) are the same in respect to being determined by the same physiological mechanisms, for instance, then this will be discussed in our treatment of fragment B16. Either actual identity, or the similarity Theophrastus actually posits both entail an equivalence of epistemological status for \( \alpha \iota \sigma \theta \alpha \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \) and \( \nu \nu \nu \varsigma \). If such an equivalence were accepted it would be obvious that the transcendent apriorist epistemology, viz. to question the aesthetic and trust the noetic, is a non-starter.

Admittedly, this type of analysis is rare. However many scholars have drawn attention to the fact that Parmenides, unlike the later Eleatic philosopher Melissus, does not in fact explicitly present an argument against the senses in the text of his poem. For example, Jonathan Barnes observes, "I do not deny that Parmenides was an enemy of the senses...but that enmity is left implicit in Parmenides' poem: we have no formal argument for scepticism in the text and no explicit statement of scepticism". Von Fritz has suggested that this omission was occasioned by the fact that Parmenides did not consider the senses as the cause of error in mortal thinking, "Parmenides does not refer to the senses as the cause of the erroneous beliefs but speaks only of the \( \nu \nu \nu \varsigma \pi \lambda \alpha \kappa \tau \tau \nu \) [wandering mind] of mortals". However Von Fritz' point is not as extreme as it sounds. He does admit that Parmenides viewed the senses as inadequate, i.e. as "unable to grasp the true reality".

Historically, within transcendent apriorism, there are two main negative categories in terms of which the aesthetic functions are judged, viz. (i) Scepticism - i.e. they are false, deceptive, misleading & etc., or (ii) Inadequacy - i.e. they are inadequate to the thing that is desired to be known. Now whether Parmenides believes (ii) rather than (i) is not to suggest that he is anything other than a transcendent apriorist. To use, for instance, the Medieval claim that adequantio rei et intellectus and then to say that the senses are inadequate to the thing desired to be known, is just to give an alternative reason for rejecting the aesthetic functions. The question as to whether the aesthetic functions, in all their uses, cause error is irrelevant. It may be that there is a level of being to which they are perfectly adequate. The only essential requirement for a system of transcendent apriorism is that the aesthetic functions are, in fact, rejected in the quest for the Truly Real, and this much Von Fritz concedes to the Parmenidean epistemology.
Another similar interpretation, in terms of inadequacy, is given by H. H. Loenen. In fact, Loenen posits a realm in which the senses are absolutely adequate to their "own domain" but, of course, unable to grasp the Truly Real:

[Q51] All this by no means implies an absolute rejection of the senses. Parmenides only wants to keep the senses from overstepping the boundaries of their own domain. The warning of the goddess can thus only be intended to prevent men from applying sense-perception and thought based on it to true reality, the domain of pure thought.13

In conclusion, Verdenius, Hussey and Theophrastus present an important challenge to the view of Parmenides as "the father of rationalism", whereas Von Fritz and Loenen only raise an interesting question about the sub-categories of transcendent apriorism. Both are important points and will be considered in the following sections.

4.2. The Evidence of Doxography and Testimonia

Before moving to consider the more substantial evidence it is worth saying at this point that (i) the main doxographical tradition (Theophrastus excepted) and (ii) testimonia from Aristotle, Plato and Plotinus, clearly state that Parmenides had a negative attitude towards the aesthetic functions. The reasons for this attitude may be slightly different in each case, of course. The following examples illustrate this traditional interpretation:

[Q52] Aëtius - "Parmenides says that the senses are false".14
[Q53] Pseudo-Plutarch - "Parmenides hurled the senses out of truth".15
[Q54] Sextus Empiricus - "He [Parmenides] gave up trust in the senses".16
[Q55] Diogenes Laertius - "Parmenides makes it clear that one should not attend to the senses but to reason".17
[Q56] Aristotle - "The Eleatics pass over perception and disregard it, thinking that one should follow reason...In the light of their arguments this seems to follow; in the light of the facts it is near to madness to hold such opinions".18
[Q57] Plato - Socrates: "My admiration would be much greater if anyone could show that these same perplexities are everywhere involved in the forms themselves - among the objects we apprehend in reflection. just as you and Parmenides have shown them to be involved in the things that we see".19
[Q58] Plotinus - "He [Parmenides] did not locate being in sensible objects."20
In respect to these doxographical quotations, it must be said that there has been much recent research in pre-Socratic studies devoted to questioning the legitimacy of such sources. The hidden agendas of the relevant authors have been uncovered and their intellectual integrity challenged. The most significant work in this area has even suggested that such authors could even alter the texts themselves in order to bring them more into line with their own philosophical agendas. Well this last point, at least, cannot be the case with regard to Parmenides' attitude towards the senses. There is no explicit argument against the senses in Parmenides' poem, so it is obviously impossible for someone to have introduced a spurious one. However, it is wise to accept the more general sceptical attitude and require further substantial evidence to endorse views from this type of source.

It is certain that the testimonia of Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus have more authority. However, the extent of this authority has also been questioned. For example, despite the fact that G. S. Kirk et. al., in The *PreSocratic Philosophers*, accept that these philosophers are, on many points, more reliable than the doxographical commentators, there is still scepticism:

- [Q59] On Plato: his references to Heraclitus, Parmenides and Empedocles are more often than not light-hearted obiter dicta, and one-sided or exaggerated ones at that, rather than sober and objective historical judgements.  
- [Q60] On Aristotle: his judgements are often distorted by his view of earlier philosophy as a stumbling progress towards the truth that Aristotle himself revealed in his physical doctrines.

The first quotation is certainly true, with respect to Plato's treatment of those of his predecessors for whom he had little regard. However, it is not generally the case for those philosophers that he respected. Heraclitus and Parmenides fall into this category as do, for example, Socrates and Zeno. The type of analysis required to prove this however is beyond the scope of this thesis, as is an accurate response to the criticism of Aristotle in [Q60]. It is sufficient to say here that the consensus of views expressed in [Q52-60, p. 97-8] is generally correct and then seek to prove it.
4.3. The Instructive Error of Theophrastus

As mentioned previously Theophrastus thought that, for Parmenides, perceiving (an aesthetic function) and thinking (a noetic function) were "the same". The consequence of either interpretation of this would be that both functions have the same epistemological status for Parmenides; a corollary that Theophrastus endorses. As we have seen, if true, such an interpretation would preclude any transcendent apriorist downgrading of the aesthetic functions in favour of the noetic. It would signal the conclusion that Parmenides was not a transcendent apriorist. The specific arguments Theophrastus uses to establish his interpretation of Parmenides are found in his work *De Sensu*. Because of its importance, it will be quoted at length.

[Q61] The majority of general views about sensation are two: some make it of like by like, others of opposite by opposite. Parmenides, Empedocles and Plato say it is of like by like, the followers of Anaxagoras and of Heraclitus of opposite by opposite. Parmenides gave no clear definition at all but said only that there were two elements and that knowledge depends on the excess of one or the other. Thought varies according to whether the hot or cold prevails, but that which is due to the hot is better and purer; not but what even that needs a certain balance; for, says he, "As is at any moment the mixture of the wandering limbs, so mind is present to men; for that which thinks is the same thing, namely the substance of their limbs, in each and all men; for what preponderates is thought" - for he regards perception and thought as the same. So too memory and forgetfulness arise from these causes, on account of the mixture; but he never made clear whether, if they are equally mixed, there will be thought or not, or if so, what its character will be. But that he regards perception as also due to the opposite as such he makes clear when he says that a corpse does not perceive light, heat or sound owing to its deficiency of fire, but that it does perceive their opposites, cold silence and so on. And he adds that in general everything that exists has some measure of knowledge. 

Supposedly then, Parmenides believes that noetic and aesthetic knowledge is dependent on the changing constitution of the body. The thought (πνευμα) of men (which here may include both aesthetic and noetic elements as used in Verdenius' "broad sense" mentioned previously) depends "at any moment" on "the mixture of wandering limbs". That is to say, on which of the two elements the hot or the cold prevails in the constitution of the body. If the hot dominates the mixture the perceptual and cognitive powers are enhanced - they are "better and purer". Presumably, if the cold dominates they
are diminished. There is a sense in which everything, though, is a possessor of some form of knowledge, determined by the nature of its constitution. Like is known by like, so even the corpse can perceive cold and silence because it possesses these attributes in its own constitution.

For Theophrastus this is a historical summary of Parmenides' views on perception and cognition. The implications for Parmenides' work as a whole are not considered. However, later commentators, who find this passage important for illuminating Parmenides' epistemology, are forced to admit its problematic nature. How can such an ever-changing unreliable form of human cognition, dependent solely on the "wandering" constitution of the body, grasp with "true conviction" (πιστις αληθης) what Parmenides calls elsewhere, in fragment B1, "the unshaken heart of well rounded truth?" If the constitution of the body is constantly changing or "wandering" (the mixture of the elements frequently changes) then the νοος, that depends on it, must also be constantly changing or wandering.

If Parmenides believes that "like is known by like" [Q61. p. 99] how can such a changing faculty grasp a reality that is described in the following terms. "changeless within the limits of great bonds it exists"24, "Justice has never loosed her fetters to allow it to come to be or perish, but holds it fast"25 and "Fixed it will remain. For strong necessity holds it within the bonds of a limit".26 Surely, in this case only a changeless faculty can know such a changeless object of knowledge. Furthermore it is not the wise man but the mortals who "wander knowing nothing"27 for whom "helplessness guides the wandering thought (πλακον νοον) in their breasts".28 Yet, if Theophrastus was correct, we would all, according to Parmenides, be in this epistemological predicament. Our νοος would wander inevitably depending on "the mixture of the wandering limbs".29

Although the previous examples are my own, it is certain that Verdenius, Loenen and Von Fritz all recognize similar difficulties here. In *Parmenides. Melissus. Gorgias* Loenen states:

[Q62] One feels compelled to do this the sooner because of the serious problem, never solved satisfactorily in the traditional interpretations, how the absolute knowledge proclaimed by Parmenides himself is possible if the human νοος varies either from one person to another or even in one and the same individual. In the words of Verdenius: "how it was possible for his πλαγ γνωσις to extricate itself
from this phenomenal world of error and intermingling and to have part in the sphere of real being.\textsuperscript{30}

Loenen also wonders why Parmenides "hurls reproaches"\textsuperscript{31} at the heedless mortals in fragment B8 when, according to B16, their wandering \textit{voo synopsis} is part of their inescapable psychological endowment. Von Fritz finds the problem of reconciling the Theophrastus fragment with the rest of Parmenides' metaphysics and epistemology so difficult that he is "doubtful whether these difficulties can ever be resolved, at least in the realm of human logic".\textsuperscript{32}

In their one brief comment on [Q61, p. 99], which incidentally is not a response to the above difficulties, Kirk et. al. inadvertently suggest an attractive solution to such problems. They see the fragment as a closing comment on the psychology underlying mortal opinion, "DK, B16 gains in point if construed as a final dismissive comment on mortal opinion".\textsuperscript{33} This would connect it directly with the psychology of the mortals who "know nothing" in fragment B6. This connection is also made by G. Vlastos when he observes, "When Parmenides speaks of the thinking frame in fragment 16 as 'much wandering' he links it unmistakably with the 'wandering' mind of the 'know nothings'".\textsuperscript{34}

Fragment B16 can, as a consequence, be seen as describing the psychology of mortal opinion only. Presumably, in this theory, there is nothing written into the epistemological script of human psychology. Hence, having a wandering \textit{voo synopsis} is within the sphere of will, a result of human ignorance rather than human constitution. In this case then it is only ignorant mortals that allow their \textit{voo synopsis} to be determined by the constitutions of their body. Presumably, humans can direct their \textit{voo synopsis} and attain to Truth by an alternative method.

However, there are obvious problems with this view. To be fair to Theophrastus, Verdenius, Loenen and Von Fritz it is certainly evident that Parmenides does not seem to exclude certain enlightened mortals from his analysis. He specifically says that "mind is present to men; for that which thinks is the same thing, namely the substance of their limbs in each and all men".\textsuperscript{35} This would indicate a deterministic psychological epistemology without the possibility of exception. Theophrastus observes that, in addition, memory, forgetfulness and perception are interpreted, by Parmenides, in the light of this theory. It seems then that if we take fragment 16 as a truthful representation of Parmenides' epistemology, then the mutable and heteronymous noetic and aesthetic functions have an identical epistemological status. A status that is inadequate to that
attainment of the Truly Real by an autonomous mortal consciousness. Yet again, we are confronted with the problem that Parmenides' poem is all about this very attainment. The goddess tells the kouros\textsuperscript{36} that "It is proper that you should learn all things"\textsuperscript{37} which includes the "unshaken heart of well-rounded truth".\textsuperscript{38}

The solution to the problem requires the acceptance of two important postulates: (i) Fragment 16 belongs to Parmenides' Way of $\Delta\omicron\omicron\zeta\alpha$ rather than to his Way of $\Lambda\lambda\eta\beta\epsilon\alpha\varsigma$ and (ii) The Way of Opinion is wholly false and has no legitimacy for Parmenides.

4.4. The Correct Location of Fragment 16

Parmenides' poem is divided into two distinct sections. Firstly, there is the Way of Truth represented by fragments B1 to B8 line 49. Secondly, there is the way of opinion represented by B8.62 to B14. There is an obvious linking passage between the two sections B8.50 to B8.61. Some authors, including H. Frankel\textsuperscript{39}, J.Loenen\textsuperscript{40} and J. Bollack\textsuperscript{41}, have noted the similarity of B16 to certain elements within the Way of Truth. However only Loenen draws the conclusion from the correspondence that the fragment actually belongs in this section, "It follows that the fragment belongs to the first part of the poem. The only suitable place for it is undoubtedly the lacuna between frs. 3 and 6".\textsuperscript{42}

This understanding is founded on specific aspects of Loenen's unique and unusual interpretation of Parmenides. Mourelatos is puzzled by it and calls it an "extreme hypothesis"\textsuperscript{43} without giving any reasons for rejecting it. To fill in this lacuna, reasons for rejecting Loenen's suggestion will now be given.

First, consider the notion of "mixture" in B16. Remember it is the $\nu\omicron\omicron\omicron\gamma$ itself that is determined by the mixture of elements in the body. If this is a notion that is important to the account of human epistemology in the Way of Truth, then surely it is strange that in the course of the Way of Truth the very notion of mixture is proved impossible. By definition, if something is a mixture it must contain entities that are distinct in some way. Yet we are told later that the Truly Real is one, all together\textsuperscript{44}; Nor is it divided since it all exists alike\textsuperscript{45}; it is equal to itself on every side\textsuperscript{46}; it is all continuous.\textsuperscript{47} Now if the Truly Real is one thing, undividable and alike in every aspect of itself, i.e. undifferentiated, then mixture is impossible and any psychology based on it does not make sense. It is no accident that all other talk of mixture occurs exclusively in the way of opinion, e.g. (i)
the theory surrounding B16. Therefore, B16 belongs to the way of opinion by association and because of their falsity.

Another reason why B16 cannot be part of the Way of Truth is that if the physiologically deterministic epistemology expressed by it is accepted, then the consequences are in blatant contradiction to the chastisements and commands of the goddess. In order to make sense at all of these chastisements and commands we would require a notion of the autonomy of the intellect denied by B16. Consider, for instance, how the mortals are treated at the beginning of [Q63, p. 103] and in the following quotations:

[Q64] For this is the first way of enquiry from which I hold you back, but then from that on which mortals wander knowing nothing, two headed; for helplessness guides the wandering thought in their breasts, and they are carried along, deaf and blind at once, dazed, undiscriminating hordes, who believe that to be and not to be are the same and not the same; and the path taken by them is backward-turning.\(^\text{60}\)

[Q65] But you must hold back your thought (\(\nu\eta\mu\alpha\)) from this way of enquiry, nor let habit, born of much experience, force you down this way.\(^\text{61}\)

[Q66] Judge by reasoning (\(\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\omega\)) the strife-encompassed refutation spoken by me.\(^\text{62}\)

Now if the pureness and clarity of all men's thoughts are purely determined by what element happens to be dominant in their bodies then it seems pointless to blame the mortals for being "carried along" by or "forced down" a particular line of thought. Their constitution would rigidly determine which path they follow. Hence, if B16 is correct all men must be "carried" and "forced". For in this case, as Homer observes, "the mind (\(\nu\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\alpha\)) of men on this earth is like the day that the father of the gods and men brings to them".\(^\text{63}\) Men's thoughts are heteronymously derived. Again, surely it is strange that the goddess commands the kouros to hold himself back from certain paths. He is in fact specifically told to "hold back your thought (\(\nu\eta\mu\alpha\))" which directly contradicts B16 where "As is at any moment the mixture of the wandering limbs, so mind (\(\nu\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\alpha\)) is present to men" [Q61, p. 99].

Notice the assumption of intellectual autonomy that underlies quotations 63-6. The Kouros is also commanded to judge or discriminate by reasoning (\(\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\omega\))\(^{64}\) yet according to B16 the decision to do this is something out with the control of the human will. The
mortal's initial error, the reason for them going astray, is not the domination of their constitution by the cold. Rather it is to have made an incorrect decision, "they have made up their minds to name two forms" for "that is where they have gone astray" [Q63, p. 103]. It is a "path taken by them" [Q64, P. 104] not a path determined for them. They take this path by following habitual modes of thought "habit born of much experience" [Q65, p. 104] i.e. by not using their judgement; not by being determined in their judgements. The mortals are described as "undiscriminating" because they do not assess the consequence of following certain paths and just choose to follow the one that is habitually followed. It is a matter of will, not compulsion.

These last points also seem to rule out the previously mentioned Kirk/Vlastnos theory that B16 is a description of mortal thought processes in the Way of Truth. For B16 posits the theory that all men's thoughts are heteronymously determined i.e. outside the sphere of will. In contrast, in The Way of Truth, the mortals' thoughts are autonomous and their errors arise from the mistaken judgments of the will, or at least from not actualizing the possibilities for judgement open to them. To conclude, Loenen must be wrong to place B16 in the Way of Truth. It is correctly situated in the Way of Opinion. This is the first postulate of the interpretation. Let us now move to consider the second.

4.5. The Status of the Way of $\Delta\omicron\xi\alpha$

The status of the way of $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$ is a contested issue. A. A. Long, in "The Principles of Parmenides' Cosmology"\textsuperscript{65}, has listed many different ancient and modern interpretative trends and classified the main categories\textsuperscript{66}. To resolve the problems of interpretation that surround this issue is important to many issues in the Parmenidean epistemology. Although immediate concerns locate the analysis here, it must always be born in mind that there are later arguments in mind. For example if (i) the Way of $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$ has no epistemological credibility and (ii) it can be established that the way of opinion represents the world revealed by or interpreted through the aesthetic functions, then (iii) the aesthetic functions necessarily give wholly false testimony. This shall be termed the aesthetic credibility argument.

If the placing of B16 is correct then Theophrastus' interpretation depends finally on attributing a credible epistemological status to the way of $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$. This status must be
substantial enough that we would consider it relevant to the epistemology of the Way of Truth. There are many philosophers who are willing to attribute this status. For example, if they are to be consistent, such a substantial status must be attributed to the way of \( \delta \alpha \varepsilon \alpha \) by Theophrastus, Kirk, Verdenius and Vlastos. This is because they all treat B16 as an important part of the Parmenidean epistemology generally, yet unlike Loenen locate B16 in the Way of Opinion. Theophrastus gives the most extreme statement of this view when he observes that Parmenides "followed both ways" and "tried to give an account of the origin of things". In addition, Loenen thinks that the way of opinion, although not suitable as a vehicle for necessary knowledge about immutable things, is certainly important for contingent knowledge of mutable things. "Way A does not refuse to accept the real existence of concrete things, but it merely denies (1) that it is exclusively mutable things which exist (this is implied) and (2) that these can be the object of knowledge (in the strict sense, i.e. of immutable or necessary knowledge".

Plutarch, Aristotle, Theophrastus and many others have treated elements from the Way of opinion as important, viz. as a serious attempt to rival the cosmologies and cosmogonies of Ionia. As Plutarch observes, "For he has said much about the earth and about the heavens and sun and moon, and he recounts the coming into being of men; and as befits an ancient natural philosopher, who put together his own book, not pulling apart someone else's, he has left none of the important topics undiscovered". In all these authors there seems to be the feeling that Parmenides would not have devoted so much space to the way of opinion without attributing to it any real significance.

In contrast to the above authors Mourelatos specifically warns us against "treating the epistemology and metaphysics of 'Doxa' as the next best thing to the epistemology and metaphysics of 'Truth' against Parmenides' express warning to the contrary". This thesis strongly endorses the latter viewpoint. Parmenides explicitly and consistently refers to the status he attributes to the way of mortal opinion. These references are all extremely negative:

[Q67] Here I end my trustworthy discourse and thought concerning truth: Henceforth learn the beliefs of mortal men, listening to the deceitful ordering of my words.

[Q68] It is proper that you should learn all things, both the unshaken heart of well-rounded truth, and the opinions of mortals in which there is no true reliance. But nonetheless you shall learn these things too, how what is believed would have to be assuredly pervading all things throughout.
For never shall this be forcibly maintained, that things that are not are. but you must hold back your thought from this way of enquiry, nor let habit, born of much experience, force you down this way, by making you use an aimless eye or an ear and tongue full of meaningless sound: judge by reason the strife-encompassed refutation spoken by me.\textsuperscript{74}

There is really no mystery attached to the fact that Parmenides devotes a substantial part of his poem to an account of supposedly false mortal opinions. The explanation for it is explicitly given in the text of the poem. Although the goddess warns the kouros against actually following the false path of mortal opinion [Q64, p. 104], [Q69], he is nevertheless instructed to learn about it [Q67, p. 106]. The Goddess explains that it is proper that he should "learn all things" both the True and the false [Q68, p. 106]. The goddess even gives the reason why he should learn something that is false, "The whole ordering of these [the elements within δοξα] I tell you as it seems fitting, for so no thought of mortal men shall ever outstrip you".\textsuperscript{75} What this means will be explained presently.

It may seem paradoxical when I say that Plutarch and others were (i) correct to assume that the way of δοξα was an attempt to rival the work of the nature philosophers of Ionia (in fact it was meant to be the most convincing account that it was possible to give) and (ii) wrong to attribute to such an account a credible status. However, the apparent paradox is resolved when we consider that Parmenides' ultimate intention is to prove that any path of mortal opinion no matter how superficially appealing, cannot have the least credibility. The mortal path is used by those who, by carelessly not discriminating between being and not being [Q69], end up saying and thinking that-which-is-not, i.e. not-being. For Parmenides, to do this is to think illogically and, as such, is not permissible. "I shall not allow you to say nor to think from not being: for it is not to be said nor thought that it is not"\textsuperscript{76}. Yet confronted with the task of refuting the sheer diversity of mortal opinions that make that illegitimate step Parmenides decides on an ingenious time-saving strategy. If the most convincing and universal of all possible accounts can be presented and shown to be false then all the rest (past, present or future) could a fortiori, be dismissed. This strategy will ensure, as Parmenides observes, that "no thought of mortal men shall ever outstrip you".\textsuperscript{77}

The way of δοξα then is not an account of the views of ordinary mortals [Zeller\textsuperscript{78}, Hamlyn\textsuperscript{79}] nor is it a critique of Heraclitus' cosmology [Bernays\textsuperscript{80}] or of Pythagoreanism
Rather it is Pannenides' own unique product, "he put together his own book, not pulling apart someone else's". It is intended to be the most universal, (hence its length), best and most persuasive account possible considering that the underlying logic is flawed. The account therefore, because plurality is denied in \( \alpha \lambda \eta \theta \varepsilon \iota \alpha \), postulates a minimum of just two forms to explain everything.\(^8\) The extreme contrast here would be with Anaxagoras' cosmogony, which posits an infinity of homoeomerous principles, see Aristotle\(^8\). The account also satisfies the pervasiveness criterion that is, in B1, extended even to a convincing account of "what is believed", i.e. to \( \delta \circ \xi \alpha \). Light and night pervade "all things throughout" because "all is full of light and obscure night at once, both equal, since neither has any share of nothing".\(^8\)

The account also, as B9 suggests, possesses the least possible share of non-being. Individually not being divisible - remember divisibility is rejected in \( \alpha \lambda \eta \theta \varepsilon \iota \alpha \), "Nor is it divided, since it all exists alike"\(^8\) - night and light have no share in it. It may be no accident that, in Plato's "Parmenides", Socrates mentions this "non-divisible" characteristic of day - "if it were like one and the same day, which is in many places at the same time and nevertheless is not separate from itself".\(^8\) Not-being is only admitted in the division between them, i.e. as a consequence of the mistaken positing of two forms. However, any such admission is enough to invalidate the entire Way of \( \delta \circ \xi \alpha \), "for they need not have named so much as one" [Q63, p. 103].

The Ionian cosmogonical/cosmological principles, viz. water (Thales) Air (Anaximenes) or Fire (Heraclitus) seem, at first, to satisfy the pervasiveness criterion. Such accounts, after all, posit only one principle as both the \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \) and \( \sigma \tau \omega \iota \chi \varepsilon \iota \nu \) of all things. If this were true, Parmenides could not claim to have given the most convincing of all accounts. However, the problem with the Ionian principles is that unlike night and day they can be divided or separated from themselves infinitely; compare B4 for Parmenides worry concerning the notion of "separability". Water, for instance, can be divided into smaller portions infinitely. Parmenides' way of opinion is superior because only one division is possible and hence posited. Night for example is "in every direction identical with itself. but not with the other, i.e. light.\(^8\)

The next major argument against the legitimate epistemological status of the way of opinion involves a consideration of Parmenides' main method in the Way of Truth. The following represents a brief summary of Parmenides' arguments in this section of his
poem: (i) Either a possible object of thought is and it is impossible for it not to be or it is not and it is needful that it not exist; (ii) You cannot logically think about an object of thought that does not exist, therefore (iii) Any possible object of thought must necessarily exist. The conclusion (iii) constitutes Parmenides' primary axiom and it may seem like an unpromising starting point.

Many modern philosophers would deny even that "existence" is a predicate at all. Instead, they would affirm that the term existence adds absolutely nothing contentual to the phrase "possible object of thought". Yet, for Parmenides, this was not the case. The term "existence" was most definitely a synthetic predicate and was, in fact, pregnant with contentual implications. The reason for this was that, for Parmenides, existence did not just register the bare fact of "being". It was not a portmanteau term i.e. the "most universal concept" or "highest genus" covering men, trees, ideas, pains, etc.; rather it was used, in a strict sense, to connote: that which does not, in any consideration applicable to it, involve or incorporate any aspect of not-being.

To give a simple example, we would normally consider a plurality of things to exist in the world. However, for Parmenides, this notion would involve the illegitimate positing of not-being. Not-being would be necessary to spatially separate two or more things from each other. (Remember this was the fundamental problem with the positing of light and night in δοξα and why "they have named two forms when the needs must not name so much as one"). Hence, a plurality of objects cannot exist (in sensu stricto). However, this is not just to be an approach of via negativa to what is implied by the term existence. From information concerning the attributes which any object of knowledge that "exists (strict sense)" cannot possess, it is also possible to derive knowledge about what qualities it actually does and must possess. For example, from the fact that plurality involves not-being and the object of thought that exists (in sensu stricto) cannot involve any aspect of not-being, we can derive the fact that the object of thought must be non-plural or one. The oneness of being, according to Plato at least, was Parmenides' most significant doctrine.

The additional qualities that Parmenides manages to derive by this method are given in column A of Table 2 below. Now the arguments presented here in The Way of Αλπηθεία demonstrate the actual nature of that which exists. For the way of Αλπηθεία is the only path that is not false "there still remains [after the others are rejected] just one
account of a way, that it is".90 As such it is described in the following terms (i) "my trustworthy discourse and thought concerning truth"91; (ii) "the unshaken heart of well-rounded truth"92; (iii) "a path of persuasion for she attends upon truth"93; (iv) the way "is genuine".94 Hence, that-which-is incontrovertibly possesses all the qualities mentioned in column A, (a) - (m) and this is identical with the truth. In what remains of the Way of δοξα the qualities that are attributed to the object of knowledge - see column B in table 2. - directly contradict those mentioned in Αληθεία. Hence, they necessarily must be false and hence the explanatory account that includes them must be false.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>(a) One [B8,5-9&amp;29]</td>
<td>(a) Plurality [B8,53]</td>
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<tr>
<td>(b) Fixed [B8,30]</td>
<td>(b) Wandering [B10,4; B14; B15]</td>
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<tr>
<td>(c) Does not perish [B8,1-4;21&amp;27]</td>
<td>(c) Perishing [B19,2]</td>
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<tr>
<td>(d) Does not come into being [B8,21&amp;26]</td>
<td>(d) Coming into being [B10,3; B17]</td>
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<tr>
<td>(e) It never will be [B8,5-9]</td>
<td>(e) Will be after [B19,2]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f) Of a single kind [B8,1-4]</td>
<td>(f) Opposite [B8,55]</td>
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<tr>
<td>(g) Uncreated [B8,1-4]</td>
<td>(g) Birth [B12,4; B17,1]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(h) Perfect [B8,1-4&amp;32]</td>
<td>(h) Hateful [B12,4]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i) Remaining the same [B8,30]</td>
<td>(i) Difference [B8,56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All exists alike [B8,22-5]</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>All together [B8,5-9]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(j) Not more here or less there [B8,22-5]</td>
<td>(j) What preponderates is [B16]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equally balanced [B8,43]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(k) Changeless [B8,26&amp;37 &amp; C.F. 55]</td>
<td>(k) Growth [B10,6; B19]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(l) Inviolate [B8,49]</td>
<td>(l) Destruction [B10,2]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Imperishable [B8,1-4]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(m) Whole [B8,1-4&amp;37]</td>
<td>(m) Mingling [B12,4-5]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not divided [B8,22-5]</td>
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Table 2. The Contradictions between Parmenides’ Two Ways.
This argument in combination with those stated previously makes a strong case against those who attribute legitimacy to the way of $\delta\sigma\xi\alpha$. Yet, the conclusion concerning the way of opinion in general and B16 in particular is not unique to this analysis. Commenting on the deterministic psychology of B16 Michael Frede observes that "not only is this not Parmenides' own view of reality, it is a picture that is extremely primitive and schematic in its conception of cognition". However, Frede gives no justification for this view. Instead, he refers the reader to arguments given in a paper by A. A. Long. In the referred to paper Long himself categorically concludes, "the cosmogony gives a totally false picture of reality". However, Long's arguments for establishing this conclusion are weak. Hence, it was found necessary to develop arguments to properly back up this position.

If the account is correct, then there can be no evidence concerning the legitimacy of the senses that can be derived from the way of opinion. In summary, we have shown that (i) Loenen and Verdenius were right to find problems of consistency when incorporating elements of the epistemology of $\delta\sigma\xi\alpha$ into the Way of Truth. (ii) Loenen was consequently wrong to actually place such elements within that Way of Truth. (iii) Plutarch and Aristotle are mistaken when they attribute to the method, in the Way of opinion, significant philosophical credibility. In fact, the whole point of $\delta\sigma\xi\alpha$ is to undermine the credibility of just such a method and (iv) Theophrastus' argument concerning the positive epistemological status of the senses is not legitimate, for it is based on a misunderstanding. We have now shown that the way of opinion is false. Is it now possible to establish the "aesthetic credibility argument" by connecting the way of $\delta\sigma\xi\alpha$ with the aesthetic functions themselves?

4.6. What is the Way of $\Delta\sigma\xi\alpha$ an Account of?

Barnes is correct to say that Parmenides, unlike Melissus, probably never presented an explicit argument against the senses. This is certainly directly stated in the tradition by Theophrastus. However, there is plenty of evidence from within the text that he considered them false. As we have discovered, the way of opinion is a plausible but ultimately logically fallacious account. What then is $\delta\sigma\xi\alpha$ an account of? Traditional commentators are agreed that it is an account of the sensible world. This is certainly the
main function of δοξα. In the fragments that remain there is a cosmological account. "And you shall know the nature of aither and all the signs in it and the destructive works of the pure torch of the shining sun, and whence they came into being; and you shall hear of the wandering works of the round-eyed moon..."\(^9\); a psychological epistemology as in fragment B16, which we have already considered; an embryology from which Galen quotes, "On the right [side of the womb] boys on the left girls"\(^10\) and an anthropology "the coming into being of men" according to Plutarch.\(^1\)

The indications are that this whole section is similar in content to the tradition of writing Ionian and later cosmologies, the tradition of Περὶ Φυσικῶν. Note its similarity in style and content to the cosmology presented by Empedocles\(^2\). Plutarch refers to Parmenides directly as a writer in this tradition when he observes "As befits an ancient natural philosopher".\(^3\) The revolutionary aspect of Parmenides account, that which radically distinguishes it from the tradition of Περὶ Φυσικῶν, is that ultimately the whole account is considered to be completely false by the author himself. At the level of sensation, for Parmenides, things appear to be plural, to change, to be born and to die, to wander, to exist and not exist, to move position, to be hateful. It is this world as revealed to the aesthetic functions that δοξα is attempting to give some rational explanation of.

Aristotle observes that Parmenides is here "constrained to fall in with obvious appearances".\(^4\) Yet for Parmenides the categorization or, in his terms, the naming of things that are a transparent description of sensations results in an empty nominalism. That which the aesthetic functions naturally make one believe, is completely false. Mortals have trust that these things and qualities describe that-which-is but really they are just uttering empty names that have no correlation to reality. The goddess utters divine wisdom in Ἀληθεία whereas she utters mortal truth in δοξα. In addition to [Q63, p. 103], consider the following in this respect:

\[Q70\] In this way, according to opinion, these things have grown and now are and afterwards after growing up will come to an end. And upon the humans have established a name to distinguish each one.\(^5\)

\[Q71\] Therefore it has been named all the names which mortals have laid down believing them to be true - coming to be and perishing, being and not being, changing place and altering bright colour.\(^6\)
The mortal, through his aesthetic functions, experiences change, birth, death, alteration of colour and all the qualities mentioned in column B in table 2. That is our everyday sensory experience even today. However, according to Parmenides, reality necessarily must be changeless and possess all the qualities in column A. Therefore, that which is revealed by the aesthetic functions has no reference in reality. It is a mere name. Now we could say that this proves Hussey's point that the problem is not sense perception per se but sense-perception "used routinely and without thought". Yet, for Parmenides, the problem with the aesthetic functions does not exist at the simple level only i.e. with what is routinely revealed by them.

Even quite sophisticated analysis of that which is revealed by the aesthetic functions is false. The way of mortal opinion itself proves this. It is not, after all, just an unsophisticated reliance on the senses, but rather includes sophisticated logico-sensitive cognition. Only consider Parmenides astronomical knowledge when he refers, in δοξα, to the moon as a "night shining, foreign light, wandering around the earth, always looking towards the rays of the sun". The insight that the moon shines with a borrowed light is also present in the truth-claiming cosmology of Anaxagoras, "the sun induces the moon with brightness". It is difficult to know Parmenides' or Anaxagoras' reason for believing that the moon is not self-luminating. It may have nothing at all to do with our modern scientific reasoning on this matter.

However, what it does indicate is that the way of δοξα does not merely catalogue the results of an unthinking attitude towards the senses. The senses immediately suggest that the moon shines in its own right. This immediate assessment is false. Only a more sophisticated interpretation of sensory information can conclude that unlike the sun, it in itself is non-luminous while it "borrows" its light from the sun. This sophisticated account is not merely sensation based but involves what has been defined as logico-sensitive cognition. It is clear that the way of δοξα is not just a summation of routine views about the existing world as it appears to the senses. Rather there is an attempted account of how the existing universe came into existence "how earth and sun and moon and the aither which is common to all and the Milky Way and furthest Olympus and the hot force of the stars surged forth and came to be". Such a theory would surely require more than Hussey's use of sense perception "without thought". Yet, this theory too, according to Parmenides, is false.
It is safe to conclude here that Hussey makes an incorrect assessment of Parmenides' attitude to the senses. For Parmenides, even quite sophisticated accounts of sense-perception are ultimately false. Pure reasoning, if exercised would soon discover that there was no difference between, or plurality of moon and sun, light and dark. In addition, to assert even the existence of such entities involves the contradiction of thinking that non-being exists. Such notions are just empty names without reference and to give an account of them (like the way of δοξα) whether sophisticated or not is to "go astray", to "give a deceitful ordering" or to follow a path in which there is "no true reliance".

The path of δοξα then is a sophisticated account of the world as revealed to the aesthetic functions. Remember, in this respect, that it is meant to "outstrip" all other mortal accounts. As such when we fit the argument into the aesthetic credibility argument-format we discover that it now represents a challenge to all accounts based on the aesthetic functions, no matter how sophisticated these aesthetic functions are.

4.7. Verdenius Notion that Νοος Incorporates Αισθασις

Let us now turn to Verdenius' notion that the Parmenidean νοος - normally regarded as the Parmenidean noetic function - may mean, "knowing in a wide sense"\textsuperscript{110}, i.e. may include sense-perception. Certainly, the importance of the terms νοος, νοειν and their derivatives to the Parmenidean epistemology is indisputable. Such terms are used consistently throughout the poem\textsuperscript{111} and always with epistemological resonances. Yet the connection with sense-perception, that Verdenius posits, is difficult to detect both in Parmenides himself and within the whole tradition of the use of such terms before and after Parmenides. The most influential study made of these important terms is the trilogy of papers, published in \textit{Classical Philology}, by Kurt von Fritz viz. (i) "Νοος and Noein in the Homeric Poems"\textsuperscript{112}; (ii) "Νοος, Noein, and their Derivatives in Pre-Socratic Philosophy (Excluding Anaxagoras) Part 1: From the Beginnings to Parmenides"\textsuperscript{113} and (iii) "Part 2: The Post-Parmenidean Period"\textsuperscript{114}. This impressive analysis of ancient Greek linguistic usage attempts to catalogue the many different senses of νοος and νοειν over a substantial historical period, viz. from Homer to Democritus. The closest Von Fritz gets to the interpretation Verdenius gives of the Parmenidean use of νοος and νοειν is in respect to an analysis of their Homeric use. He observes in separate passages that "In
Homer also the voos is closely related to sense-perception and "But in the stage of semantic development represented by the Homeric poems, the concept of voev is more closely related to the sense of vision."

Yet, significantly what he does not say is that, in Homer (or anyone else for that matter), voos itself incorporates sense-perception as an intrinsic function. Or, in Verdenius terms, that the meaning of voos is wide enough to include sense-perception. For Von Fritz, it is "related to" sense-perception only in the sense that the word and its derivatives are normally used simultaneously with sensory, usually visual, stimuli. According to this account, in Homer, the terms voos and voev are used in a very precise way to connote a type of immediate recognition. In particular, it is used when, through the sight of a concrete object, someone realises the full meaning of a situation. For instance, in the Iliad, Aphrodite appears to Helen disguised as an old woman. Now the verb voev is only used when Helen suddenly recognises that she is dealing with a goddess. When Paris sees Menelaus voev is used when he recognizes that Menelaus has nothing else on his mind but to kill him. Similarly voev is used when Odysseus sees the smoke from his own house recognising that he is finally home after his long travels and other examples of an identical nature.

No process of discursive (used in the Kantian sense i.e. non-sensitive) reasoning is involved in these examples. Neither is it the case that it is a sensory datum that is of particular importance to the knower. It is not the fact of a change in the old women's appearance, in itself, that strikes Helen but rather the sudden realization that she is in the presence of the divine. It is not the sight of Menelaus that strikes Paris, rather it is the recognition of his intent. Again, it is not the smoke, as a sensory datum, that strikes Odysseus but the sudden realization that he is really home after years of wandering. The sense-perception of a particular object, the old woman, Menelaus' outward appearance and the smoke from Odysseus' home only triggers the insight or recognition and is completely extrinsic to that insight or recognition. The insight or recognition itself is purely noetic and is only externally triggered by experience. In this limited sense Von Fritz accepts that sense-perception and voos are related.

However, he correctly does not conclude from this that senses-perception is included within the intrinsic function of voos. It is, therefore, in fact "always distinguished from sense-perception". As a consequence he would not claim that voos was non-noetic in
any sense. In this point, at least, he is in agreement with Boehme who states that νοος in Homer always means something "purely intellectual or rather purely mental (rein intellektuell)." From our previous chapter we can easily identify the strange Homeric insight as a naïve and primitive form of illuminative intuition i.e. as a prototype for a form of acquaintance knowing that can transcend the phenomenal. Von Fritz is struggling towards this conclusion in the following passage:

[Q72] While, therefore, νοειν is always distinguished from purely sensual perception, it is not conceived of as the result of a process of reasoning, much less as this process itself, but rather as a kind of mental perception. if this expression is allowable. In other words, it may, in some way, appear as a kind of sixth sense which penetrates deeper into the nature of the objects perceived than the other senses...and in Homer, νοος never means "reason" and νοειν never "to reason" whether deductively or inductively.

The insight then is acquaintance rather than discursive, a type of seeing with the "mind's eye". Von Fritz calls its elsewhere a "mental vision" or a "sudden intuition". While Shirley Darcus, who traces forward this exact sense of νοος to Empedocles, has observed that νοος, "serves primarily as an inner organ of sight that grasps the reality of a situation". According to Darcus, when Empedocles is referring to actual sense-perception he uses the term "phrenes" rather than "nous". Against Verdenius then, νοος and νοειν are still noetic (the etymological link between the terms, in this case, is a good guide to their meaning), as illuminative intuition of which this is a primitive precursor is, in fact, itself a noetic function. Notwithstanding, there are problems with many points in Von Fritz' analysis of νοος and νοειν in Parmenides. Certainly, historically speaking, there is no known precedent for a philosophical use of νοος and νοειν in Verdenius' "wide sense". However it could still be the case that, contra Von Fritz, Parmenides was the first to use it in this sense.

The first thing that we can definitely say about the Parmenidean notion of νοος is that it is under the control of the will. Evidence has already been provided for this fact. The deterministic psychology entailed by [Q61, p. 99]. which presents itself as a challenge to this view, has been shown to be part of a deliberately false account. The second thing that can be said of Parmenides' use of νοος is that it can be deceived. The castigation of mortal intelligence in [Q64, p. 104] and elsewhere demonstrates how the νοος when
undirected (i.e. "wandering") or misdirected (i.e. not "held back") can be deceived into thinking "that which is not", a logical error according to Parmenides. This fact has puzzled many commentators. Frankel, for instance observes that, in [Q64, p. 104]. Parmenides must be being "ironical and deliberately paradoxical" when associating terms like ἰθηκεὶ and νοος with their apparent contradictories viz. αἰσχρόν and πλαγκλός. Similarly Guthrie explains that the phrase "πλαγκτόν νοος" must have been a novelty and "carried a flavour of paradox or oxymoron".129

Their difficulties arise because, in the tradition up to this point, the terms νοος and νοειν are used as, so called, "success" or "achievement" words. For instance, we have seen that, in Homer, the term is only used when an insight into the true nature of a certain situation is gained. It could in this sense never be linked to failure. It retains this meaning throughout the pre-Socratic tradition. It even appears with this meaning in more advance philosophical uses, in much later texts, where it is associated with intuitive certainty. Consider the following quote from Aristotle, "Of the thinking states by which we grasp the truth, some are unfailingly true, others admit of error - opinion for instance and calculation - whereas scientific knowing and νοος are always true".130 So how against this tradition can the νοος be deceived in Parmenides?

To answer this question let us first examine the potential errors possible for the Parmenidean νοος. The first danger mentioned, a path from which he must hold back his νοος [Q64, p. 104], is that on which the νοος makes an error of logic. The possibility is that the νοος will choose the wrong path in the mutually exclusive roads of enquiry. If it does this it states, with Gorgias of Leonti131, that the subject of any enquiry is non-existent, or in Parmenides' terms, "that it is not and that it is needful that it not be".132 Now, according to Parmenides, there is a sense in which a path of enquiry that states that "that-which-is", "is not" cannot even be thought with the νοος, it is an "altogether indiscernible track"133, or "no true way".134 The reason for this is given in fragment B6, "What is there to be said and thought (νοειν) must needs be". Any object of enquiry if it is to be known, thought about, or delineated must exist. If our object of enquiry does not in fact exist then there simply cannot be any imaginable enquiry at all. There is no "object" to be enquired into. To take the path of Gorgias when he asserts that "What is
thought of is not existent" is, for Parmenides, a logically incoherent position. Therefore, the \( \text{\textit{voo}} \) is to be restrained from this potential logical error [Q64, p. 104].

Despite this, von Fritz is still mistaken when he says, that error in Parmenides does not stem from the senses but from the \( \text{\textit{voo}} \) itself. This would only be true if the only possible potential error for the \( \text{\textit{voo}} \) is the Gorgias path, but this is plainly not the case. There is a second path of error from which the \( \text{\textit{voo}} \) is to be withheld [Q64, p. 104]. This potential path of error is actualised when the \( \text{\textit{voo}} \) is distracted by the world that is habitually revealed to the senses. This world of seeming discloses to consciousness all the illusory attributes mentioned in table 2, column B. For Parmenides this world, unlike the Gorgias path, which is identical with a universe of not-being, includes both being and not-being. In line with what the senses reveal, things are certainly posited as existing, contra Gorgias, but at the level of pure thought or logical reasoning, these same things involve contradiction. They involve contradiction because the posited existents all logically involve not-being and, according to Parmenides' strict criterion, what-is-not cannot exist. "it is not to be said or nor thought that it is not".

At the level of logic, or pure reasoning the categories of what-is and what-is-not are clearly distinct and only existents or attributes that have no share in what is not can exist. Yet, on the path on which mortals wander, led by "habit born of much experience", there is no such clear discrimination. The \( \text{\textit{voo}} \) of mortals, lazily distracted by the senses, accepts a world in which the two categories coalesce at one moment and are distinct at another. There is no rigid demarcation which pure reasoning would uncover. The "undiscriminating hordes" deceived by what they discover through their aesthetic functions posit a world that can only exist if the logical categories of being and not-being are blurred and confused. This world requires a false indiscriminate logic in which "to be and not to be are the same and not the same". Von Fritz is correct to say that the cause of error is the "wandering \( \text{\textit{voo}} \)" but only in this second mortal path. The first Gorgias path involves the \( \text{\textit{voo}} \) making the wrong choice, i.e. not-being rather than being, with regard to these mutually exclusive alternatives. On the Gorgias path the \( \text{\textit{voo}} \) is discriminatory but wrong. On the mortal path the \( \text{\textit{voo}} \) is wrong because it is non-discriminatory.
Von Fritz is certainly wrong to say that the wandering νοος is the cause of error rather than the senses. The νοος only wanders because it is distracted from pure logical reasoning by the deception of the world revealed by the senses. Now if this is the mechanism for error, in Parmenides’ mortal path, is it likely that Verdenius is correct that σοφος is part of the very functioning of νοος; that part of the insight gained by νοος involves sensation? If this were so, would it not be the case that νοος would be permanently subject to error? Surely, that which causes the errors for νοος is unlikely to be part of its function. This would entail that Parmenides’ main repository of intellectual insight contained within itself the seeds of error.

If this were true and Parmenides were still to attain to the "unwavering heart of well rounded truth" then surely he would require some other more reliable faculty than the νοος to determine whether the νοος is using its aesthetic false insight or its noetic true insight. This brings us back to the problem mentioned by Frankel and Guthrie viz. how the νοος, the instrument of epistemological insight, can possibly err. The fact is that there is a precedent in the use of the terms νοεω and νοος for this possibility. A tradition in which νοος and νοεω are not "success" or "achievement" words. Consider the following quotations from Hesiod which demonstrate that within traditional texts there is the possibility of a νοος that is deceived or wrong:

[Q73] Trust and mistrust have ruined men. No arse-rigged women must deceive your mind [νοος] with her wily twitterings when she pokes into your granary; he who believes a woman believes cheaters.

[Q74] Prometheus pitted his wits against the mighty son of Kronos. For he had carved up a big ox and served it in such a way as to deceive the mind [νοος] of Zeus.

[Q75] Greed (κερδος) deceives the minds [νοος] of men.

The νοος in Hesiod can be deceived by lust [Q73], greed [Q75] or false appearances [Q74]. The first two conative modes are traditionally seen as clouding a person’s reasoning capacity or judgement. The third demonstrates that the νοος could be fallible if it does not look beneath the surface appearances. The νοος is most vulnerable to error, in Parmenides, when it is not exclusively directed by the λογος or reasoning process using the method of ελεγχου and allows itself to be caught up in distraction. The
distraction that most often lures νοος astray is the world of the senses. The person who trusts the world habitually revealed to the senses has relaxed his discriminatory powers. (A similar relaxation occurs in Hesiod when lust or greed has the same effect). For an analysis of the important Parmenidean, metaphors of control, in relation to this point, see J. H. Lesher Parmenides' Critique of Thinking. That is why the mortals are accused of being "undiscriminating hordes" [Q64, p. 104] and why Parmenides is commanded by the goddess to "judge/discriminate by reasoning" [Q66, p. 104]. Parmenides' νοος, as a capacity for insight, must use the pure reasoning process to avoid falling into error, must test alternatives by the method of ελέγχων. If it relaxes in any way, then the two false paths are waiting to trap it into forming false beliefs.

On the positive side, however, if the νοος is not distracted and follows the method of ελέγχων it is immune from doubt. So much so that it is not required of Parmenides to say why the senses are false. Parmenides does not include an explicit argument against the senses, like Melissus, because for Parmenides sense perception is already discredited by the fact that it tells us that things that cannot possibly exist according to our reason, actually do exist. This is the real answer to Barnes' point concerning the absence of an explicit argument. Pure reason presents the world as it must be. The senses present the world differently from pure reason therefore the senses do not present the world as it is and are hence deceptive. This is the implicit argument against the senses in Parmenides.

Significantly when Melissus, whose philosophy is always closely associated with Parmenides, does give his explicit argument against the senses it takes the form of, what I contend is, the Parmenidean implicit argument: (i) pure reason demands a universal criterion of unchangeabilty, "if these things exist as we see and hear correctly, then each of them must be as it seemed to us at first, and they cannot change or come to be different, but each must always be just as it is"; (ii) The senses reveal change of various types, "But what is hot seems to us to become cold, and what is cold hot and what is hard soft..."; (iii) The senses are false, "So it is clear that we do not see correctly and that those many things do not correctly seem to exist". Hence, there is a sense in which Simplicius is correct to observe that, "Melissus clearly explains why they [i.e. Parmenides and Melissus] say that perceptible objects do not exist but seem to exist".
To conclude this section it has been established beyond reasonable doubt that Parmenides was an apriorist. In fact, the course of pre-Socratic philosophy, post-Parmenides, cannot really be understood without this assumption. The Ionian type cosmologies, epistemologically based as they were on what is revealed to the aesthetic functions\textsuperscript{152}, had to meet new stringent criteria derived from pure reasoning. To re-institute cosmogony as a legitimate field of enquiry, in the post-Parmenidean period, Empedocles found it necessary to restore our trust in the aesthetic functions. The following passage (with its Parmenidean echoes) seems a direct reaction to Parmenides' challenge to the senses:

\textbf{[Q76]} Come now observe with all your powers how each thing is clear, neither holding sight in greater trust compared with hearing, nor noisy hearing above the passages of the tongue,\textit{ nor withhold trust} from any of the other limbs by whatever way there is a channel to understanding but grasp each thing in the way which it is clear.\textsuperscript{153}

Having established apriorism let us now move to consider what category of apriorism, illuminative or ratiocinative, is represented by the Parmenidean epistemology.

4.8. The Ratiocinative Parmenidean Νοώς

It was mentioned earlier that certain Homeric uses of νοώς or νοείω naively anticipated illuminative intuition. This is the specific form of intuition characteristic of illuminative knowing. Now it is Von Fritz' view that this form of intuition is still present in the Parmenidean fragments. He states that in Parmenides, prior to any form of discursive reasoning, there is a direct intuitive knowing of το ΕΟΥ:

\textbf{[Q77]} It is still the primary function of the νοώς to be in direct touch with ultimate reality. It reaches this ultimate reality not only at the end and as a result of the logical process, but in a way is in touch with it from the very beginning, since, as Parmenides again and again points out, there is no νοώς without the ΕΟΥ, in which it unfolds itself.\textsuperscript{154}

This is a view which merits a seriously challenge. We have already discovered that the Parmenidean νοώς, as an intuitive faculty, can be deceived about το ΕΟΥ. This surely could not happen if the nature of that-which-is was acquaintively known from the start,
unless there was some kind of dual consciousness\textsuperscript{155} that can know something and not
know something at the same time. In addition, if the nature of reality could be
acquaintively known before the reasoning process it is strange that Parmenides would
present so much argumentation subsequently. We will discover later that, in Plotinus.
iluminative intuition supervenes upon a process of discursive reason. Discursive reason
advances the mind to the point where it can attain the acquaintive knowing. This process
is certainly common in the illuminative tradition.

However, to have an acquaintive apodeictic insight from the start and then to get
involved in a process of argumentation that involves many potential pitfalls, and this just
to establish what is already known seems absurd. The evidence, from Parmenides, that
Von Fritz points to in order to justify his theory is, "For not without what is, in which it
unfolds itself will you find thinking".\textsuperscript{156} Yet I have already explained Parmenides meaning
here. There cannot be \textit{voo}s without \textit{to eov} because if there is just nothingness how can
thought emerge? What is there for thought to emerge into? There is nothing for thinking
into which to "unfold/express itself". The quotation has, therefore nothing to do with
acquaintance knowing. Ironically, for Von Fritz, the argument it contains is
paradigmatically discursive (the non-Kantian meaning i.e. propositional). It certainly
cannot justify the positing of a noetic function like illuminative intuition.

Notwithstanding the above argument, Von Fritz asserts that Parmenides was
historically the first to include discursive reasoning in the function of \textit{voo}s, "His
[Parmenides] work marks the most decisive turning-point in the history of the terms
\textit{voo}s, \textit{voeiv}, etc.; for he was the first consciously to include logical reasoning in the
function of \textit{voo}s".\textsuperscript{157} However, this inclusion sits uneasily with Von Fritz' commitment to
\textit{voo}s as illuminative intuition. He is correct to suggest that there is an intuitional aspect to
the Parmenides use of \textit{voo}s. However, Parmenides' notion of \textit{voo}s corresponds, more
naturally, to what has been termed deductive intuition in chapter 3. If we look forward to
Mure's point [Q100, p. 160], this intuition is the one most intimately connected with
discursive reasoning. Now consider that the Parmenidean \textit{voo}s is a faculty of insight that
can be incorrigible but can also be deceived. However, it is deceived only where it
neglects the process of \textit{eleyxo} or \textit{logos}, the pure deductive reasoning process. It is
infallible when it uses these processes, so it is asked to direct itself towards them. Its
proper function therefore is to judge between the argumentative possibilities. If an
argument stands up after being subject to this intuitive grasping then and only then do we have truth. Parmenides would have accepted Muir's point that ultimately all discursive reasoning is ultimately founded upon intuition. However, contra Von Fritz, this intuition is not of the acquaintive but rather of the ratiocinative type. In conclusion, Parmenides was most definitely a ratiocinative rather than an illuminative apriorist.

4.9. Brahma satyam, pagan mithya, jivo brahmaiva napara

Having established that Parmenides' epistemology is apriorist and that his apriorism is of a ratiocinative nature it is important now to establish whether his system is transcendent rather than immanent and, if so, whether it follows the one or two ontological realm model. The first point to make is that, from the previous analysis, it seems straightforward that Parmenides' epistemology is transcendent. Remember, for an epistemology to be transcendent it must seek to go beyond experience (in sensu stricto), and associate the Truly Real exclusively with the noumenal world, i.e. the world as revealed to the noetic functions. With respect to Parmenides, it seems evident that our ordinary experience of the world (represented in table 2, column B) is to be rejected in favour of an account of the world acceptable to \( \text{voos} \) (represented by table 2, column A).

The qualities that describe the contents of the two realms illustrated by table 2, (p. 111). The phenomenal and the noumenal in a later terminology cannot exist together in any single possible world - unless we deny the principle of non-contradiction. This is because they are so clearly contradictories. The qualities must therefore either (i) exist separately in two distinct ontological realms or (ii) one of the two realms must have no in actu existence. The first alternative, as we shall discover is Plato's solution to this contradictory qualities problem. In fact, in the Republic there is an attempt to claim actual existence for an object correlate of the cognitive state of opinion. It is a posited realm that lies between "that which absolutely and unqualifiedly is and that which is no way is".

It seems that this "two worlds hypothesis" cannot be the Parmenidean solution. His metaphysical monism, unlike Plato's pluralism, cannot tolerate the existence of two separate ontological realms. Instead, Parmenides embraces the second alternative whereby one of the worlds is rejected as only having the mere appearance of existing. The way of opinion, in Plato, reveals an existing (or subsisting) world, which despite its
imperfections is, according to the *Timaeus*, created by the demiurge and modelled on the forms. In contrast, for Parmenides, the way of opinion is a complete illusion. The names by which we refer to it are empty because they refer to nothing that actually exists. The eyes by which we see it are "aimless" [Q69, p. 107] because they have no in actu target to hit; the ear and tongue are "sounding" because there is nothing, in fact to hear or to speak of. Parmenides rejects the qualities ascribed to the phenomenal in favour of the qualities ascribed to the noumenal. As we saw in [Q63, p. 103] the phenomenal qualities are described as *mere names*. Therefore, the phenomenal world is condemned to an empty nominalism. This is the reason why the νοός is to be directed beyond the illusory mortal world of phenomena in which mortals trust. This transcendence is the reason for the Goddess telling the kouros of the path of divine truth, "far indeed does it lie from the steps of men".160 He is also commanded to "look at that which, though far off, is securely present to the mind (νοος)".161 The argument that Parmenides subscribed to an ontological monism will be developed further in the discussion of the Hamlyn point below. It is certainly the most natural and convincing interpretation of Parmenides' epistemology.

Yet, this whole interpretation is again a contested issue. Both J. H. H. Loenen and D. W. Hamlyn dispute the point, for two very different reasons. Loenen incredibly denies Parmenidean monism, claiming that the way of truth is a description of a transcendent Being, whereas the way of opinion is an account of an actually existing world as revealed by the senses. To build an entire case against Loenen's eccentric interpretation of Parmenides is beyond the scope of this essay. However, the main point against Loenen is that any such account presumes that Parmenides is not a metaphysical monist. Yet, metaphysical monism is the theory for which he is best known and for which substantial evidence has already been provided. Because the textual evidence is so strongly against his interpretation, to establish it, Loenen finds it necessary to attribute an error of textual transcription162 to both Plato and Melissus. This point seems strange when copies of Parmenides poem were available as late as Simplicius163.

Hamlyn's criticism is different. In his book *Metaphysics* (1990), he states that "It would be tempting to say that what he [Parmenides] is arguing for is the thesis that what the senses tell us is mere appearance and that reason tells us quite otherwise. At no point does he actually say that. If we think such a gloss is reasonable all the same it is because..."
we see Parmenides in the context of later ways of thinking. Hamlyn doesn't think that it was possible, before Descartes, for philosophers to condemn a whole realm of, mainly sensory experience, to what he calls "mere appearance" i.e. to the status of dreams or hallucinations. The claim being made by Hamlyn is that, until a Cartesian representation theory of perception, philosophers could not make such a strong distinction between appearance and reality. Only when there is a theory in place, which suggests that what we have access to in perception is merely the representations of things in our minds, can the strong dichotomy exist. Hamlyn suggests that Plato is nearer to making this strong distinction than Parmenides. However, for him, only after Descartes is it possible for philosophers to conceive of a "realm" of mere appearances (i.e. with no existence claim whatsoever) as distinct from a realm of reality. The corollary to this claim is that true rationalism or more specifically transcendent apriorism was only possible with Descartes. This position is difficult to accept. It is not surprising that Hamlyn doesn't attribute much philosophical status to his account, beginning as he does with the words "It is a least arguable that".

The first simple point to make is that, historically speaking, there are undeniably, particularly in ancient religious texts, examples of the distinction that Hamlyn denies is possible. In fact, the distinction is made clearly, in the strongest possible sense in the following quotations (and many others) from the Vedas and the Bhagavadgita. In fact, it is particularly prevalent in all expositions of the classic notion of Indian philosophy viz. the Veil of Maya:

[Q78] It is Maya, the veil of deception, which covers the eyes of mortals, and causes them to see a world of which one cannot say either than it is or that it is not; for it is like a dream, like the sunshine on the sand which the traveller from a distance takes to be water, or like the piece of rope on the ground which he regards as a snake.

[Q79] Blind are the eyes Which deem th'Unmanifested manifest. Not comprehending Me in my true self! Imperishable, viewless, undeclared, Hidden behind my magic veil of shows, I am not seen by all: I am not known unborn and changeless - to the idle world.

[Q80] The mind that gives itself to follow the shows of sense seeth its helm of wisdom rent away...The world of sense pours streams of witchery.

This religious notion of the veil of Maya should not be possible according to Hamlyn. The quotation translated by Schopenhauer [Q78] even directly connects the realm of
appearance with dreams and illusions. The second point to be made is that Parmenides from his metaphysical postulates must and does, if he is to be consistent at all, posit a strong distinction. Firstly, Parmenides, as we have already established, is saying more than that our senses sometimes, in certain individual cases, deceive us. The senses, that reveal the world whose attributes are listed in table 2 column B, must be considered to constitute a "realm" of seemings.

Secondly, how can Parmenides logically posit the existence of seemings that have a claim to any existence other than that of dreams and hallucinations. How can any seemings, whether considered as a realm or not, exist separately from that-which-is? That-which-is, in Parmenides, is a plenum and it exhausts the ontological possibilities. The mortals who go astray in the Way of opinion are blamed for naming two forms instead of one. For Parmenides that-which-is has no parts; is of a single kind; is "all together"; is not "more here or less there"; and "all exists alike" and hence no divisions or distinctions can actually be made within it. That is why, also, even being and thinking must be identical "For thinking (νοεῖν) and being (εἶναι) are the same" for, as Parmenides explains, there can be no separation within the plenitude of that which is, "For you will not cut off for yourself what is from holding to what is, neither scattering everywhere in every way in order nor drawing together".

How then could there possibly be any conception of a weak distinction between appearance and reality in Parmenides. From his metaphysical postulates, he is forced by logical necessity to conclude that the world revealed to the senses cannot exist. A later follower of Parmenides, Eukleides of Megara, explicitly encapsulates this doctrine when he states, "What is, is one and the other is not". Aristotle accurately summarises Parmenides position in book one of the Metaphysics when he observed, "he thought that the existent is of necessity one and that nothing else exists". Although he spoils this insight by declaring, as we have already shown, that Parmenides was subsequently, in the way of opinion, "forced to follow the phenomena" and admit two principles.

This conclusion, established by several arguments presented throughout this section, finally refutes the adequatio theory of Loenen and Von Fritz. For if the world as revealed to the senses does not actually exist, then there is nothing for the senses to be adequate to. There is only the one ontological realm and that is identical with the truth. If the senses are adequate but not to this ultimate realm, what is left for them to be adequate to?
There is nothing else. We can conclude from this that Parmenides must have embraced the sceptical rather than the adequation position with regard to the senses.

The title quotation that begins this section is taken from Indian philosophy, the system of Shankara (788-822, AD), and is translated "Brahman is real, the world is false, the self is not different from Brahman". If we replace, in this quotation, Shankara's term Brahma with the notion of \( \tau \sigma \varepsilon \omicron \upsilon \) then we are close to the meaning of the Parmenidean philosophy. In comparison Parmenides fundamental propositions are (i) \( \tau \sigma \varepsilon \omicron \upsilon \) is all that exists, (ii) the world presented to perception is false and (iii) Thinking is not different from being.

To conclude this whole section on Parmenides it has been proved that Parmenides' epistemology is (i) apriorist (ii) transcendent (iii) ratiocinative (iv) onto-monistic and (v) sceptical. By establishing epistemological qualities (i) and (ii) it has been demonstrated that Mourelatos and Loenen were correct to describe Parmenides as the "father of western rationalism". The discovery of the other qualities viz. (iii), (iv) and (v) allow us to identify the exact category of transcendent apriorism which Parmenides ascribes to.
CHAPTER 5
THE A PRIORI

5.1. The A Priori (Sensu Stricto)

Within the definitional formulation Def₁ (p. 82), the term a priori is qualified by the phrase in sensu stricto. It is important to recognize that, in transcendent apriorism, the term a priori functions in a technical sense that is clearly differentiable from ordinary philosophical usage. In the loose ordinary usage, the term can function to designate a process of understanding that is independent of immediate experience only. In this sense the use of a general law, though derived from experience, to predict a course of events prior to their actual happening is often considered an a priori procedure. This usage of a priori tolerates the conjunction of something that is in a sense both empirical and a priori. Kant recognized this sense of the term in *The Critique*:

[Q81] "For it has been customary to say, even of much knowledge that is derived from empirical sources, that we have it or are capable of having it a priori, meaning thereby that we do not derive it immediately from experience, but from a universal rule - a rule which is itself, however borrowed by us from experience. Thus, we would say of a man who undermined the foundations of his house, that he might have known a priori that it would fall, that is, that he need not have waited for the experience of its actual falling. But still he could not know this completely a priori. For he had first to learn through experience that bodies are heavy, and therefore fall when their supports are withdrawn.¹"

In contrast, in transcendent apriorism's strict sense of a priori, anything that is empirical is totally excluded. Within the procedure of knowing a priori, there is a complete independence from experience in general, not just from immediate experience. Kant endorses this sense when he observes. "In what follows therefore we shall understand by a priori knowledge, not knowledge independent of this or that experience,
but knowledge absolutely independent of all experience". Although his endorsement, as we shall discover later, is not quite as complete as this quotation suggests.

In some philosophical usages, the term a priori is associated with a type of knowledge that is justified independently of experience, but not necessarily originated/acquired from within that experience. In this sense, a priori knowledge is sometimes contrasted with "innate" knowledge. Here the term innate functions to indicate the non-empirical origination/acquisition of knowledge. Hence, in this understanding, knowledge can be a priori but not necessarily innate. E. J. Lowe, for example accepts this usage of the terms a priori and innate, "Whether knowledge is a priori is quite a different question from whether it is innate. Mathematics provides the most often cited examples of a priori knowledge, but most of our mathematical knowledge is no doubt acquired through experience even though it is justifiable independently of experience".  

In contrast, the strict philosophical sense of a priori used in transcendent apriorism, in addition to indicating justificatory status, incorporates a definite epistemological position with regard to issues of origination/acquisition. Hence, in this case, the term a priori includes, as a meaning content, the broad category notion of a non-empirical derivation of knowledge. The term innate can then be used in its proper function to indicate a specific theory about such knowledge types. The use of the term, by Laurence BonJour, illustrates this second philosophical sense of a priori, "an a priori concept or idea is one that is not derived from experience in this way and thus presumably does not require any particular experience to be realized...The main historical account of such concepts, again held by rationalists, construes them as innate".

5.2. The Acquisitive A Priori.

Since the term a priori functions here in two distinct ways let us now move to consider both senses in more detail. Firstly, in sense (i) the acquisitive, the principle concern is with the ultimate derivation of the concepts and propositions involved in the reasoning process. If all the aforementioned concepts and propositions are discovered to originate from the intellect in its purely noetic function then ratiocination is deemed a priori. The term noetic is mostly used in its normal philosophical usage. An idea of this usage is given by Frederick Crosson when he defines noetic in broad terms as "(from
Greek noetikos, from noetos, 'perceiving') of or relating to apprehension by the intellect". A better definition is given however in the Dictionary of Philosophy edited by Anthony Flew "In contrast to empirical and sensuous, pertaining to that which can be apprehended by the intellect alone". As we discovered in chapter 3, the noetic functions are therefore comprised by those pure intellective processes that exclude any element found to be derived from experience.

5.2.1. The Technical Sense of Experience

If the noetic is defined by its exclusion of experience then what exactly is meant by the term experience. At first, the answer may appear straightforward. However, Bertrand Russell in My Philosophical Development made an important point in this respect. "I found, when I began to think about theory of knowledge, that none of the philosophers who emphasise 'experience' tell us what they mean by the word. They seem willing to accept it as an indefinable of which the significance should be obvious". The first thing to notice about the use of the word experience, in its proper technical sense, is that it can only be used meaningfully if it is not considered to be inclusive of the full range of phenomenological cognitions. The actual inclusion of such cognitions would certainly be part of the ordinary language sense of experience. In this loose sense, sudden insights, mystical intuitions, or even the most pure intellectual apprehensions can certainly be considered "experiences", i.e. things that are undergone by a conscious subject. In fact, this is the case irrespective of whether, epistemologically speaking, they contain elements contentually derived from or justified by experience in its philosophical sense.

If the philosophical sense were so inclusive, it would have to be admitted that there would be a sense in which the intellective processes involved in the noetic functions are themselves experiences. This in turn would render the definition of the noetic functions in terms of the exclusion of elements derived from experience incoherent. It may seem that no philosopher could confuse the two senses of experience and fall into a significant mistake by doing so. However, it is perhaps Loenen's failure to appreciate the abovementioned ambiguity in the term experience that causes problems in his interpretation of Parmenides. In part (i) of his definition of epistemological rationalism [A3. p. 252], he clearly states that Parmenides is the first to have recognized that, "true
knowledge does not spring from experience". What then are we to make of the statement in part (ii) that Parmenides' metaphysics is "based on experience". These two statements, after all, occur in the same book. In the part (i) statement, it is clear that the strict philosophical use of the term experience is being used.

However, let us consider the part (ii) statement. According to Loenen, Parmenides' thought that metaphysics is based on experience because he "started from a definite reality (thought) present in his own mind, and by means of a description of the idea of being established that thought is" [A3, p. 225]. There is no evidence here of Loenen establishing that Parmenides' thought (νοείν) of being and its description is derived and/or justified through empirical means. A procedure that is essential if experience, in its philosophical sense, was to be used correctly. The fact is that Parmenides' thought (νοείν) of being is purely a priori in nature. However, at this point, it is sufficient to say that it is a revolutionary theory indeed to suggest that Parmenides' metaphysics is based on experience in its strict philosophical meaning. It is even contrary to Loenen's own earlier statement in (i). Hence, Loenen in statement (ii) is using the term experience in its loose sense whereby even Parmenides' νοείν is a phenomenological cognition and hence experiential.

Loenen is not alone in this confusion. The philosopher Henri Bergson similarly falls into the trap. It seems the only explanation for the contradiction between (i) the fact that the epistemology that underlies his metaphysics is based on noetic intuition and (ii) that he refers to his metaphysics as a form of empiricism, "true empiricism is true metaphysics". Now nobody is denying that noetic intuition is a form of "experience". However, only in the loose non-philosophical sense of that term as already explained. It is important not to confuse this limited claim with the assertion that noetic intuition is experiential in the strict philosophical sense, i.e. necessarily empirical in nature.

Similarly, W. H. Walsh sometimes uses the term experience in a confusing way. Consider the following quotation from *Reason and Experience*, "The only form of immediate experience in which rationalists are specifically interested is intellectual intuition". Here, again, a fundamentally noetic function of the intellect, viz. intellectual intuition, is considered as a form of experience. Again, this must be the loose non-philosophical sense of experience, because it is obvious that the noetic functions can only be defined by the very fact that they exclude experience. In addition, if Walsh used
experience in its strict sense, how could he later make the Kantian distinction between an intellectual and a sensory intuition? It is an identical mistake, discussed later in this thesis, that allows one commentator to refer to Plotinus as an empiricist. To conclude this section, it is sufficient to say that the dual usage has and could result in a variety of confusions.

5.2.2. Categories of Experience

For this reason the notion of experience used here always corresponds to the strict sense associated with normal philosophical usage. This strict usage is normally limited to certain categories of cognitions that are identical with or intrinsically dependent upon sensory data. In the latter case, the extent of dependence is immaterial; if such dependence exists at all then it is defined as an experiential cognition. The following list enumerates the main historical conceptions of just what such cognitions are inclusive of:

(i) *Sensation*, here defined as an immediate and passively received sensory intuition considered prior to the cognitive activity of imagination or the understanding. This intuition would incorporate the exteroceptive elements, which include all visual, auditory, olfactory, tactile and gustatory stimuli. In addition, it would involve the interoceptive elements comprising the various kinaesthetic stimuli; (ii) *logico-sensitive cognition*, here defined as that category of cognition whose content has an intellective component but is ultimately derived from sensation. The sensation involved in sense-perception provides the basic unconceptualized raw material, which an active intellectual element relates and interprets. The intellective component involved in this process is traditionally termed the understanding. The totality of judgements that result from the understanding have their source not immediately but ultimately in sensation; (iii) *imago-sensitive cognition* here defined as that category of cognition whose total content is derived by composition, association, or abstraction from sensation. The imagination rather than the intellect relates and interprets the raw material of sensation; (iv) *empirical introspection* here defined as necessarily involving both the attention the mind gives to itself or to its own operations or occurrences and this attention understood as an internal sensation or internal sense-perception that precisely parallels external sensation and external sense-perception (through this attention I am aware of such things as pain, boredom, pleasure and anger just as I know by sensation that this is hard or tastes sour). The technical term, in Kant
and Locke, for this type of introspective attention is "inner sense". It is defined by Quassim Cassamas as "a faculty of mind whereby it is introspectively aware of its own contents in a manner which is analogous to the perception of external objects".  

The abovementioned components of experience, viz. (i) to (iv), are together categorized as part of the conscious subject's aesthetic functions. The term "aesthetic" originates from the ancient Greek word ἀιτείς meaning perception or sensation in general. This is the sense in which Aristotle uses it in the *De Anima* where it is used in contrast with νοείς or pure intellection in general. Hence, in this thesis it must be remembered that the term aesthetic, unless otherwise specified, does not refer to the theory of taste or the philosophy of art - a sense that only became popular in the 18th century with the publication of Baumgarten's *Reflections on Poetry* (1735). Therefore, the "aesthetic functions" is, as we have seen, a general phrase for any experiential function that either directly intuits the sensory data or intrinsically uses sensory data in its operation.

5.3. Immanuel Kant's Inaugural Dissertation

[Intellectual concepts have two functions. In their first, elenctic, use they perform the negative service of keeping sensitive concepts from being applied to noumena. Though they do not advance knowledge a single step, they keep it from the contagion of errors. In their second, or dogmatic use, the general principles of the pure intellect, such as are dealt with in ontology or rational psychology, issue in some exemplar conceivable only by the pure intellect, and is the common measure of all other things so far as real. This exemplar - Perfectio Noumenon - is perfection in either a theoretical or in a practical sense. In the former, it is the Supreme Being, God; in the latter, moral perfection.]

In the *Inaugural Dissertation*, Kant thought that by dedicatedly excluding experience by concentrating on the acquisitional purity of a priori knowledge he could rescue traditional metaphysics. That Kant felt the attraction of traditional metaphysics based upon transcendent apriorism is undeniable. He felt that the theory was inherently attractive to the human mind. In the *Inaugural Dissertation* he praises traditional metaphysics, but hints at its lack of progress, "Everyone knows how much labour metaphysics devotes to dispersing the clouds of confusion which darken the common intellect, though its work does not always have as happy an issue as that of Geometry". There is no doubt that the
Inaugural Dissertation is a work in which Kant seeks to remedy the epistemological faults which have hindered such development in transcendent apriorist systems.

Certainly, throughout his development as a philosopher, Kant saw traditional metaphysics in transcendent apriorist terms. In the Critique the ultimate knowledge-objects to which metaphysics aspires certainly transcend experience. "These unavoidable problems set by pure reason itself are God, Freedom, and Immortality. The science which, with all its preparations, is in its final intention directed solely at their solution is metaphysics".14 There is also no doubt that he saw this type of metaphysics as absolutely apriorist in nature, "no empirical principles are to be found in metaphysics, the concepts there met with are not to be looked for in the senses, but in the very nature of the pure intellect".15

It is also true that Kant, in the Inaugural Dissertation, rejected illuminative transcendent apriorism because even at this early stage he did not think that intellectual intuition was possible for human consciousness, "No intuition of things intellectual but only a symbolic [discursive] knowledge of them is given to man. Intellection is possible to us only through universal concepts in the abstract, not through a singular concept in the concrete".16 In a subsequent letter to Marcus Hertz he criticises Malebranche whom he suggests makes spurious use of an illuminative intuition, "Plato assumed a previous intuition of Divinity as the primary source of the pure concepts of the understanding and of first principles. Mallebranche (sic) believed in a still effective eternal intuition of this primary being".17 Kant then accuses them both of absurdly introducing a divine intervention to illegitimately prop up their epistemologies, "But the deus ex machina in the determination of the origin and validity of our knowledge is the greatest absurdity one could hit upon".18 I was careful to say that Kant thought that such an intellectual intuition was impossible only for human consciousness. He certainly believed however that God could know things through intellectual intuition:

[Q83] Thus for our minds, intuition is always passive, and is possible only as far as something is able to affect our senses. But the divine intuition, which is the ground, not the consequence, of its objects, is owing to its independence, archetypal and so is completely intellectual.19

So accepting that Kant thinks that objects of the intellect can only be grasped through discursive knowing, how does he plan to rescue traditional metaphysics? Well the reason
why metaphysicians "seem to have accomplished scarcely anything at all" is that they have not been using a methodology, which ought to be a necessary propaedeutic to their discipline. This important method is Kant's own discovery and philosophers are completely unaware that it is requisite for sound metaphysics, "At present the method of this science [metaphysics] is not well known; though logic prescribes a method to all sciences in general, that which is suited to the special nature of metaphysics is completely ignored". What then does this method consist in? In reality, the method consists in detecting when knowledge, derived from the aesthetic functions, has corrupted the purity of noetic understanding. Kant takes very seriously the important notion that transcendent apriorists must have a very strict sense of what counts as a priori knowledge, in terms of both origination and justification. The unwary metaphysician can end up with principles or axioms that he thinks are derived from the pure intellect when in fact they are useless because contaminated with sensory elements:

[Q84] I shall briefly expound one point that constitutes an important part of this method, namely [preventing] the contamination of intellectual knowledge by the sensitive. This contamination not only misleads the unwary in the application of principles, but even introduces spurious principles in the guise of axioms.

Now in the process of building a system of metaphysics without proper investigation into these matters it would be easy to fall into error. Often a metaphysician is convinced that his principles are absolutely pure, but his intellect is playing tricks on him and he has fallen into a logical fallacy. In Kant's terms this particular mistake is termed the fallacy of subreption, "The tricks of the intellect in decking out sensitive concepts as intellectual marks may be called a fallacy of subreption".

Why is the purity of the axioms so important to Kant? The reason is that the Inaugural Dissertation is written against the continuity thesis of Leibniz and Wolff. In order to counter this thesis, Kant makes a very strong distinction between the intellect and the senses. The aesthetic functions, including the highest logical form of the intellect, can tell us only of "appearances". Whereas the pure noetic functions act to reveal things as they really are, i.e. the noumenal, "It is clear therefore, that representations of things as they appear are sensitively thought, while intellectual concepts are representation of things as they are". It is now clear why the purity of intellectual principles is so important. With such a strong dichotomy any principle in one's system, which is rooted in
the sensitive, can only apply to the world as it reveals itself to consciousness. This is not
the world that the metaphysician wants to reveal. He wants to discover what the world is
like independently of its relation to consciousness. This does not mean that Kant thinks
that the metaphysician can know the in-itself directly. Remember he does not say that
intellectual concepts are identical with the in-itself; he specifically says that they are
"representations" of things as they are.

In conclusion, then, if the axioms of the metaphysicians are kept clear from
contamination they can become a perfect mirror for the in-itself. The harm done to
metaphysics had largely occurred because of the subreption axiom:

\[ \text{An axiom thus hybrid (hybrid in that it proffers what is sensitive as being necessarily bound up with an intellectual concept) I call a subreptive axiom. Those principles of intellectual error, which have most harmfully infested metaphysics, have proceeded from these spurious axioms.} \]

The method that has the power to eliminate these false axioms therefore is "to the
immense benefit of all those who would explore the innermost recesses of metaphysics". For Kant then, the methodology against subreption is meant to correct and revivify
metaphysical systems that are based on a transcendent apriorist epistemology.

5.4. The Justificatory A Priori

There is a second sense in which the a priori functions in the definition. In this sense,
the justificatory, the principle concern is with the criterion used in the legitimation of the
propositions used in, and resulting from the reasoning process. A proposition is a priori if
its epistemic justification, the reason or warrant for thinking it to be true depends on the
noetic functions of the intellect alone. The pure intellect must be the only criterion of
legitimacy. A positive account of the processes involved in such a priori justification is
given by Pollock in *Knowledge and Justification* (1974) and by Butcharov in *The Concept of Knowledge* (1970). However, at this point, we shall be content with the
negative characterization of the processes in terms of their exclusion of any possible
reliance on intrinsic experience as defined in the previous section. If justification were to
depend, at least in part, on such experience, it will be considered to be justified a
posteriori or empirically. This specific distinction has to do only with the justification of
the propositions and not at all, with how they and their constituent concepts are acquired. Thus, it is no objection to a claim of a priori justificatory status, for a particular proposition, that intrinsic experience is required for its acquisition, or for the acquisition of some of its constituent concepts.

In modern philosophy, it is fair to say that the notion of the a priori is dominated by the issue of justification. The question of acquisition is often pushed into the background as irrelevant. The definition of a priori given by Albert Casullo is representative of this new consensus:

[Q86] Our primary concern will be with the epistemic distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge. The most common way of marking the distinction is by reference to Kant's claim that a priori knowledge is absolutely independent of all experience. It is generally agreed that S's knowledge that p is independent of experience just in case S's belief that p is justified independently of experience.27

Now the passage in Kant's Critique, which Calluso refers to, does seem to indicate the close connection between a priori and justificational issues. There is even a distinction made between: (i) a wide sense of a priori that seems only to require noetic justification, "Such universal modes of knowledge, which at the same time possess the character of inner necessity, must in themselves, independently of experience, be clear and certain. They are therefore entitled knowledge a priori".28 Being clear and certain independently of experience means that their truth-value is determined noetically. Such determination of truth-value concerns the justification of knowledge claims independently of experience, and has nothing to do with the noetic origin of the elements of such knowledge. In addition, (ii) the stricter sense of a priori qualified by the term "pure" which demands noetic derivation as well. "A priori modes of knowledge are entitled pure when there is no admixture of anything empirical. Thus for instance, the proposition, 'every alteration has its cause', while an a priori proposition, is not a pure proposition, because alteration is a concept which can be derived only from experience".29

However, Kant quickly abandons this distinction between a priori and pure a priori. Within a page of making it he contradicts himself by giving the proposition, "every alteration must have a cause", as an example of a pure a priori proposition.30 Subsequently, he becomes as stringent, on the issue of noetic derivation as a requisite for any a priori knowledge, as he was in the Inaugural Dissertation. Knowledge that is
derived from experience, by definition, is not a priori. "But the elements of all modes of a priori knowledge, even if capricious and incongruous fictions, though they cannot, indeed, be derived from experience, since in that case they would not be knowledge a priori. There is, at times, more emphasis placed on issues of origination than upon those of justification. The categories of the understanding and the forms of intuition are a priori, insofar as they cannot be derived or acquired from experience. They are, in fact, the very condition of the possibility of such experience and hence cannot be derived from it.

Furthermore, Kant's postulation of a priori concepts (notions) would not make sense if the term a priori were used solely to refer to the justification of the elements of knowledge. Concepts, unlike propositions, are just not the sort of things of which it would make sense to say that they can be "justified independently of experience". It is an obvious category mistake to utter such a statement and Kant was just too sophisticated a philosopher to make it. Kant even invented a specific word viz. "noologist" for those philosophers who thought that knowledge was acquired/originated/derived independently of experience i.e. from the (noe)tic functions of the intellect. Kant then would not consider a postulated example that conformed to Calluso's "generally agreed" definition to be a priori unless, in its mode of origination/derivation/acquisition, there was no intrinsic "admixture of experience". Such an issue was certainly of substantial importance.

Although Calluso is wrong in his interpretation of Kant, it is important to understand that his definition of the a priori, in terms of justificatory considerations alone, is typical of the modern analysis of the subject. Prior to the modern period, issues of origination were just as important and were included as definitionally requisite for the categorization of propositions as a priori.

5.5 The Determinate Definition and the A Priori

Having explained the two principle ways in which the term a priori can function it is important now to determine how it actually functions in the definition of transcendent apriorism. In fact a priori is used, in sensu stricto, in order to completely exclude intrinsic experience from the reasoning process. Ratiocination is a priori, if and only if (i) the propositions involved in its process are derived from and justified by the intellect's noetic
functions and (ii) the concepts involved in the process are derived from the noetic functions. In other words, the strict sense of a priori used in the definition of transcendent apriorism must involve a conjunction of the way a priori functions in its acquisitional sense with the way it functions in its justificatory sense. If, for example, only the justificatory sense were included in the definition of a priori, intrinsic experience would not be entirely excluded from the reasoning process. It has already been noted that a proposition can be a priori in this sense and yet be acquired through experience.

There is an important reason for this strict definition of a priori. Historically speaking the transcendent apriorist systems actually establish strict criterion as to what is to be included as pure a priori knowledge. Although the actual term a priori is, of course, rarely used. In fact, the criterion involves both stipulations (i) and (ii) above. It may seem strange for the modern philosopher that, for the transcendent apriorist, even the concepts out of which propositions are constructed must be noetically derived. Yet, historically speaking, this was the general view even in the most advanced systems.

John Locke had insisted in his criticism of innate knowledge (innate knowledge is a type of a priori knowledge so the criticism is relevant here) that the principles of knowledge cannot be noetically derived. This was because their constituent concepts are derived from experience, "Since, if the ideas which made up those truths were not, it was impossible that the propositions made up of them should be innate". Leibniz's answer was to assert that the only thing wrong with Locke's argument was that the most important concepts or ideas, used in the highest metaphysics, were indeed noetically derived. In fact, the element concepts of all necessary propositions are derived independently of intrinsic experience:

[Q87] Phil. But truths are subsequent to the ideas from which they arise, are they not? And ideas all come from the senses.
Theo. Intellectual ideas, from which necessary truths arise, do not come from the senses...But the ideas that come from the senses are confused; and so too, at least in part, are the truths which depend on them; whereas intellectual ideas, and the truths depending on them, are distinct, and neither the ideas nor the truths originate in the senses; though it is true that without the senses we would never think of them.  

Suffice it to say, at this point, that a looser sense of a priori either fails to distinguish transcendent apriorism from other related epistemologies or leads to incoherence within
the statement of the doctrine. Presumably, it was for the latter reason that, historically speaking, pure knowledge for the transcendent apriorist involved the stricter definition.

It is relevant, at this point, to consider the vagueness and inaccuracy of many of the modern definitions with respect to the strict sense of a priori. A. P. D. Mourelatos is content merely to talk about "a priori projections" [A1, p. 252] without giving any further clues in the text as to the sense of a priori he might be referring to. It is not clear whether (i) he is referring to the acquisitive a priori, the justificatory a priori or some combination of them both, or (ii) whether there is the additional qualification of the acquisitive a priori that stipulates that even the concepts involved in the reasoning process must be noetic. J. H. M. M. Loenen and F. Copleston seem to connect (against the modern trend) pure knowledge solely with a priori acquisition. The former's reference to knowledge that "does not spring from experience" [A3, p. 252] and latter's notion of "pure" rationalism whereby a system of reality is deduced "simply from the resources of the mind itself without recourse to experience" [A4, p. 252] seem to confirm this viewpoint. However, both statements are ambiguous (an ambiguity that is not resolved through further reading of the texts involved) and could conceivably refer to the justificatory sense of a priori.

Although there is in both quotations an indication of the exclusion of experience from acquisition, this is often no guarantee that the author extends the exclusion to concepts as in (ii) above. Just consider Kant's confusing account of a priori concepts mentioned previously. The confusion of the acquisitive with the justificatory a priori is more marked in Cottingham [A5, p. 251] where both senses are mentioned, without being clearly differentiated. At some points in his text Cottingham sees the essence of "apriorism" in terms of Bacon's famous quote in Cogitata et Visa (1607) viz.:

\[Q88\] Empiricists are like ants; they collect and put to use but rationalists (rationales) are like spiders; they spin threads out of themselves.35

A quote, which he mostly interprets in terms of the acquisition of knowledge. The empiricist acquiring ("collecting") his knowledge from "careful observation" i.e. from experience. The rationalist derives it from the resources of his own mind ("pure thought") i.e. from the noetic functions of the intellect. Yet, in the same paragraph, in which this is explained, there is also reference made, by Cottingham, to the justificatory sense of the a priori. The apriorist is caricatured as a man who wants to justify his knowledge "from the
armchair" instead of allowing his knowledge to be "determined by scientific experiment". This latter notion of the a priori seems to have little to do with the sense of Bacon's quote, which exclusively deals with issues of acquisition. Cottingham just does not seem to realize that he is making a different point. Furthermore, there is again no specification within Cottingham's text with respect to the status of a priori concepts, i.e. whether they are requisite for a priori ratiocination.

This vagueness with regard to the issue of the a priori can lead to many confusions. These become particularly important when comparing the epistemology of science with the epistemology of transcendent apriorism. As we shall discover later, there are many modern scientists and philosophers of science who would accept a priori projections as possible sources for hypotheses. These hypotheses would subsequently be justified or falsified by empirical methods. Yet, to associate their methods with the apriorist's would be a mistake. The apriorist requires the justification as well as origination to be noetic. Many philosophers who do not understand that, in transcendent apriorism, a proposition is a priori only when it is specified that the terms or concepts involved in its statement must originate noetically, are prone to confusion. The truth is that if there are any empirical elements at all in a proposition, the necessity, which the transcendent apriorist wishes to attribute to his propositions, disappears. He is left only with probabilities and his system collapses. Not to recognize this could lead us to think the argument constructed by Locke and reiterated by Leibniz's interlocutor Philalethes [Q87, p. 140] is fatal to transcendent apriorism for it denies to such a philosopher the purity of knowledge required by his system.

5.6. The Real Use of the Intellect

The existence of both, (i) the processes that constitute the intellect's noetic function and (ii) the pure concepts and propositions that are derived from the exercise of this noetic function, are a precondition for the acquisitive a priori. In this respect, to consider that the processes mentioned, in the list of noetic functions, actually exist as part of the capacities of the human intellect, is to ascribe to the theory that the intellect has, in the terminology of Kant, a "real use". That is to say, it has the capacity to be an independent non-discursive source of the concepts and principles of reasoning. The term discursive is
used here in its specifically Kantian sense to indicate the intellect's reliance on the passive or receptive aspect of human experience for its content, "thoughts without content are empty".37

The intellect is described as "non-discursive" if and only if its functioning is not in any manner (whether immediately or ultimately) intrinsically38 dependent upon the intuitions of experience, that is internal or external sensations. Hence, the designation non-discursive would even exclude those apparently abstract intellective processes postulated by Kant, whose function is to bring intuitions under concepts or, in other words, to intellectualize the data of sense. The constituent parts of this process would, for Kant, include the formation of universals; their application to the given39 in judgement; the subordinating of logically inferior to logically superior universals and judgements and finally the drawing of formal inferences. These cognitive functions would be characterized, by Kant, as part of the logical rather than the real use of the intellect. The reason being that the original cognitions upon which the intellect works are in the final analysis derived from sensation. As Kant observes in the *Inaugural Dissertation* of 1770, "But here it is of the greatest moment to note that these cognitions, no matter to what extent the logical use of the intellect has been exercised upon them, are still to be considered sensitive. For they are called sensitive on account of their origin, not on any comparison as to identity or difference. Hence the most general empirical laws are none the less sensual".40 The logical function of the intellect would correspond to the notion of logico-sensitive cognition. Therefore, it is part of the aesthetic functions of the intellect. In contrast, the real use of the intellect is, by its exclusion of such functions (being non-discursive), noetic in nature. As Kant himself affirms, "In pure philosophy, such as metaphysics, the use of the intellect in dealing with principles is real, i.e., the primary concepts of things and relations, and the axioms themselves, are first given by the pure intellect itself".41.

To consider that pure concepts and propositions actually exist involves, either (i) an adherence to some version, either dispositional or otherwise, of the rationalist doctrine of innate ideas, or (ii) an "enlightenment" theory of axiomatic intuition and deductive intuition. This is the conclusion of an argument that is demonstrated in a much later section of this thesis. However, some preliminary remarks may be useful at this stage. If certain concepts or principles are generated in the non-discursive intellect, that is to say experience played absolutely no intrinsic role in their generation (not even as the raw
materials of intellective cognition) then it follows that either: (i) such cognitive objects must be in some way innate to that faculty. They are in other words either consciously present to the intellect prior to experience (the non-dispositional sense) or rather there exists an inborn disposition to form them on the occasion of experience or otherwise - the dispositional form. The only alternative to innate ideas that could function noetically in this way would be Kant's notion of "Abstracted ideas".42 Later however, this notion will be demonstrated to be incoherent and hence logically no real alternative to innate ideas, or (ii) they are derived in some way from a source of enlightenment intuition. A full discussion of this special intuition will occur much later.

Let us consider here an important point which relates to alternative (i): the dispositional doctrine of innate concepts and principles can incorporate an element of experience without infringing upon the necessary qualifying condition for the a priori viz. generation from the intellect's noetic function. The theory determines that experience has only an extrinsic role in the generation of concepts and principles. Leibniz forms an implicit distinction between the intrinsic and extrinsic function of experience in the New Essays on Human Understanding, "intellectual ideas, and the truths depending on them, are distinct, and neither the ideas nor the truths originate in the senses; though it is true that without the senses we would never think of them".43 Despite the fact that experience may be necessary for certain concepts and principles to be possible at all (acting merely as a extrinsic agent of activation in the process of their formation) it has absolutely no input into the contentual aspect that results from this formation.

In contrast, if these concepts and propositions originate ultimately from forms of experience that exclude noetic experience then ratiocination is not a priori in the acquisitive sense, but is rather a posteriori. This notion of the a posteriori would be inclusive of those concepts and propositions that derive ultimately from internal or external sensation or empirical introspection considered as forms of experience.
6.1. The Innate and the A Priori

There is the question whether the soul itself is completely blank like a writing tablet on which nothing has yet been written - a tabula rasa - as Aristotle and the author of the Essay maintain, and whether everything which is inscribed there comes solely from the senses and experience; or whether the soul inherently contains the sources of various notions and doctrines, which external objects merely rouse up on suitable occasions, as I believe and as do Plato and even the schoolmen. The Stoics call these sources Prolepses, that is fundamental assumptions or things taken for granted in advance. Mathematicians call them common notions. Julius Scalinger used to call them the 'seeds of eternity' and also 'zopyra' - meaning living fires or flashes of light hidden inside us but made visible by the stimulation of the senses, as sparks can be struck from steel. And we have reason to believe that these flashes reveal something divine and eternal.

It has already been suggested that the ratiocinative model of transcendent apriorism requires that the concepts and principles of reasoning are not only justified independently of experience, but are also generated in the mind without the intrinsic involvement of the aesthetic functions. If the concepts and principles are so generated then we have an instance of what Kant called the real use of the intellect. An important question therefore, for the transcendent apriorist, was how such a real use was possible. In most cases of ratiocinative transcendent apriorism the answer to this question was to posit some variant of the theory of innate ideas. There was good reason for this particular answer and Leibniz's version of the answer was certainly the most sophisticated. It is the contention of this thesis that, if the real use of the intellect is to be an epistemologically credible function then an adherence to some theory of innate ideas is necessitated.
This is not to affirm the stronger thesis that the theory of innate ideas is a logically essential precondition for any possibility of a real use for the intellect. That the theory was indeed logically essential was a position adopted by Copleston when he observed, "Rejection of the theory of innate ideas, must, of course, entail rejection of the rationalist ideal if this is taken to be the ideal of deducing a system of reality simply from the resources of the mind itself without recourse to experience". This stronger theory can be rejected because logically it is possible to conceive of the intellect having a real use without possessing any innate ideas. It is logically possible to conceive of forms of a priori knowledge that are not either dispositionally or occurently innate. Augustine's posited the notion of a version of axiomatic intuition that is, at any time, dependent on the "eternal light of the divine reason". Such an intuition is not of necessity ever innate in the mind and requires to be re-immediated by a divine enlightenment every time it is thought. Certainly, Augustine maintained, in direct contrast to Copleston, that there were such non-innate intuitions that could form the basis of a priori deductive systems like geometry.

Another theory, that presents itself as a form of a priori knowledge, which is not innate is Kant's theory that the forms of intuition and the pure categories of the understanding are acquired in an act of "original acquisition". It must be understood however that this theory was developed in response to Eberhard's attack on the Critique of Pure Reason. At this time, Kant had abandoned the contention that the real use of the intellect could provide us with transcendent truth. A theory he had maintained in a modified form in the Inaugural Dissertation (the real use could provide us with only "symbolic" knowledge of the noumenal world). However, there is no reason why a doctrine could not be posited that combined the theory of original acquisition and transcendent truth. This would then act as an exception to Copleston's strong thesis. It is interesting to note that Copleston, presumably to maintain his strong thesis, interprets the Kantian theory of the a priori as a development of the Leibnizian dispositional theory of innate ideas, "the Kantian theory of the a priori can be represented as, in some sense, a development of Leibniz' theory of virtually innate ideas, with the difference that the ideas became innate categorical functions'.

However, this seems a historically inaccurate interpretation of Kant's thesis. It ignores the fact that Kant wrote a whole work, entitled On a Discovery According to which any New Critique of Pure Reason has been made Superfluous by an Earlier One.
separating his theory from the Leibnizian theory of innate ideas. This is a work in which Kant unambiguously claims that the categories are not innate in the sense required. However, it is the contention of this thesis that Kant’s theory of original acquisition is incoherent, and there is an attempt to demonstrate this below. Hence, Copleston’s theory, although not historically accurate, is at least a logically more convincing explanation for the categories. In the above discussion, it is clear that there is some distinction between ideas that are innate, and those that are a priori. Kant for instance would affirm that his categories are a priori but not innate. Before moving to consider the wider debate in more detail, it is important at this point to make the terminology clear.

Stephen P. Stich highlights terminological confusion as a source of error in the examination of innate ideas:

[Q90] Advocates of the doctrines of innate ideas and innate knowledge commonly take the notion of innateness itself as unproblematic. They explain it with a few near synonyms, "inborn" or "unlearned", or a metaphor or an allegory, and leave it at that. The doctrine's opponents often begin by puzzling over just what the doctrine could possibly mean. They go on to construct a variety of accounts, arguing against each in turn. The advocate's rejoinder, as often as not, is that he has been misunderstood. 6

This is certainly the case. However, when Stich attempts to unravel his definitions he makes some fundamental errors. According to him, the distinction between innate and a priori knowledge is "passably clear"7 and takes the following form: "To say that a bit of knowledge is a priori, then, is to say something about its justification, while to say that a belief is innate is to say something about its cause or genesis".8 He then accuses Leibniz of being unaware of this difference between the a priori and the innate. However, the notions involved here are far more complex than Stich suggests. In fact, historically speaking, the meaning of the term a priori has changed significantly and, because of this meaning shift, the term innate has also needed to be modified.

The meaning Stich attaches to a priori is certainly the prevalent one in modern analytic philosophy. As the last chapter made clear a proposition is often considered a priori, if it is justified independently of experience. This usage will be designated the justificatory definition. The alternative historical interpretation of the a priori is that of the transcendent apriorist, who believes that matters of origination are just as important as those of justification. This usage will be designated the double criteria definition. Given
these historical interpretations it will be natural for someone who accepts the justificatory definition to contrast the a priori justificatory process with the innatist derivation process. However, the acceptance of the double criteria definition must give rise to a different concept of innateness. The distinction between the a priori and the innate cannot, in this case, coherently encapsulate the difference between the justification of knowledge and the origination of concepts and knowledge. It cannot do this because its definition includes the originative process in the very notion of the a priori.

Rather, in the tradition of the double criteria definition, the distinction between the a priori and the innate marks off two special types of pure derivation process. On the one hand there are those concepts and principles that are derived either occurently or as dispositions from that which is implanted in or given by the mind prior to experience. These concepts and principles are called innate. On the other hand, there are those concepts and principles that are derived from some function of the pure intellect but are not within that intellect prior to experience. Innate concepts and principles are always present in the mind in some form (latently or actually) prior to experience whereas a priori concepts and principles, although also not in any way derived from experience, are not implanted by, or given in, the mind in advance of experience. That such a concept of the a priori exists is illustrated by the following quotation from the *Inaugural Dissertation* and by the reply to Eberhard mentioned above:

> [Q91] Since no empirical principles are to be found in metaphysics, the concepts there met with are not to be looked for in the senses, but in the very nature of the pure intellect, not as concepts connate to it but as concepts abstracted (by attention to its actions on the occasion of experience) from laws inborn in the mind and to this extent as acquired concepts. Concepts of this sort are: possibility, existence, necessity, substance, cause, etc. with their opposites or correlates. These never enter into any sensual representations as parts of it, and could not, therefore, in any way be abstracted from it.⁹

In consequence, the transcendent apriorist, who accepts the dual criteria definition, considers the origination process a fundamental part of what it means for something to be a priori. In fact, a proposition cannot be described as a priori, in their opinion, if it were derived from experience in any way. They cannot also therefore accept the corresponding definitions of innateness and a priori that derive from the justificatory definition. They do, in fact, accept the definitions that arise from their dual criteria. Firstly, that *a priori*
propositions, knowledge or concepts are derived independently of all experience but are
not in the mind prior to experience. Secondly, that innate propositions, knowledge or
concepts are derived independently of all experience and are in the mind occurrently or
dispositionally prior to experience. To answer Stich's terminological problem of the
vagueness of the attribution of the terms "unlearned" and "inborn" to innate ideas it is
now clear that innate ideas, in the transcendent apriorists' definition are all "inborn". What
this means is defined above. However, innate ideas are certainly not all unlearned. As
Leibniz observed in his response to Locke:

[Q92] I cannot admit this proposition; all that one learns is not innate. The truths
of numbers are in us yet nonetheless one learns them either by drawing them from
their source when we learn them through demonstrative proof (which shows they
are innate), or by testing them in examples, as do ordinary arithmeticians.10

In fact, all dispositional theories of innate ideas incorporate some learning process, by
which that which is at first only latent becomes manifest on the occasion of experience.
Certainly, occurrent versions of connatistm specify that there is no need to "learn" the
innate ideas. As we have already discovered, Plato's theory of anamnesis only requires the
ideas to be remembered rather than learned. The different attitudes toward the learning
process in the various forms of the theory indicate that the notion of learning is not
something that can define the meaning essence of innateness, as applied to ideas. In
conclusion, innate ideas in the transcendent apriorist's definition (a definition that
corresponds with Kant's) are essentially inborn but only contingently unlearned.

6.2. The Downfall of the Alternatives to Innateness

Having clarified the meaning content of the doctrine of innate ideas it is time now to
return to the issue of whether the theory is required to give credibility to a real use for the
intellect. Consider Kant's theory of a priori intuitions and categories that are "originally
acquired", in order to determine whether they can function to provide a credible
alternative to the innate ideas doctrine. As we have seen the intuitions and categories, for
Kant, are a priori rather than innate (in the sense of being known independently of
experience without being in the mind dispositionally or occurently before experience). In
his reply to Eberhard, Kant insists that the forms of intuition and the categories are
"acquired and not innate" and presuppose "nothing innate except the subjective conditions of the spontaneity of thought (in accordance with the unity of apperception). The act of "original acquisition" itself gives rise to the forms of intuition and the categories of the understanding. They are not in the mind either occurrently or as latent ideas prior to the spontaneous act of generation. The act itself is an "original acquisition of that which previously did not exist, and therefore did not pertain to anything before the act".

The possibility of such an act presupposes the freedom of the will, something for which Kant, because of the nature of his critical philosophy, could not provide a scientific [Wissenschaft] proof. Phenomenally we are determined by natural laws, noumenally we may be free but we do not possess the intellectual intuition required to go beyond the phenomenal. That the will was free however was the first postulate of Kant's practical philosophy. A lesser "transcendental" proof could, however, be given. The freedom of the will was requisite for the moral life and the a priori origination of the intuitions and categories (accepted by Kant as givens) to be possible at all. Consider the following quotations that demonstrate the necessary connection between the a priori and the freedom of the will, the latter is required for the former to be possible:

[Q93] All our and other beings' actions are necessitated, only the understanding (and the will in so far as it can be determined by the understanding is free and a pure self-activity that is determined through nothing else but itself. Without this originary and unchangeable spontaneity, we would know nothing a priori. 14
[Q94] intuitions are original acquisitions, whose ground is receptivity; while the concepts of the understanding are original acquisitions, whose ground is the spontaneity of thought (in accordance with the unity of apperception. 15

When these quotations are taken in conjunction with [Q91, p. 148] the following theory emerges. There are in fact permanent innate laws in the mind that coordinate that which is sensed. The concepts and principles of the understanding are derived by the mind using its own spontaneous self-activity from these permanent innate laws on the occasion of experience (experience plays only an extrinsic role in the process). As Kant observes, in the Inaugural Dissertation, "each of the concepts has, without any doubt, been acquired, not, indeed by abstraction from the sensing of objects (for sensation gives the matter and not the form of human cognition) but from the very action of the mind, which coordinates what is sensed by it, doing so in accordance with permanent laws". 16
The innate laws are not therefore identical with the pure principles of the understanding, as Copleston's theory seems to entail. Rather the pure principles are derived from them by a spontaneous act of origination. Before the act of origination, the result-content of the act did not exist and hence this result-content is a priori rather than innate. It is noetically derived but does not exist in the mind prior to experience. Copleston is therefore wrong when he observes that, "the Kantian theory of the a priori can be represented as in some sense a development of Leibniz' theory of virtually innate ideas, with the difference that the ideas became innate categorical functions".17 The categories and forms of intuition are derived from innate functions but are not identical with them. They are a priori not innate.

This is, in many ways, a problematic doctrine. Supposedly, the innate structure of the mind organizes experience in a certain way. For example, it may divide the given matter of experience and structure the manifold into things like subjects and qualities. Over this, the "spontaneity of thought" has no control. It is one of the permanent laws of the mind. Yet recognizing this organizing principle within its experience the mind (on the occasion of experience) originates from it a notion of substance. This is to concede a lot to the innatist. The entire structuring function of the mind with regard to experience is confirmed as innate. Hence, the innate contentual elements determine the concepts and principles that are actually formed. In real terms, the only process that is not innate, but a priori is the linguistic one of actually giving names to the contentual elements. It is not, as Kant seems to suggest, that there is a process of derivation or origination in terms of content. The contentual elements are already there prior to experience awaiting discovery. Once discovered the innate contents are designated by the terms that Kant mentions viz. possibility, existence, necessity, substance, cause etc.

However, it is difficult to attribute to this process terms like "origination" or "the spontaneity of thought". The point is that the concepts and principles formed in the process are determined by the innate permanent laws. They are not freely created or originated at all. Only the process of naming is original in this sense. There is in fact no real sense of the "derivation" of concepts and principles at all in the process. The notion of substance is not really "derived" from the way the innate structures of the mind divide up experience. Rather it instantiates, in concept form, the existing division. In conclusion, although Copleston's attribution of a theory of virtually innate ideas to Kant is mistaken, in the sense that clearly this was not what Kant thought his theory entailed (or was not
what he intended it to entail), there is a sense in which the theory does collapse into just such a doctrine. It is certain that Kant's theory would become more philosophically coherent if it were to accept and incorporate this collapse.

Notwithstanding the above, there are certain alternatives to the Kantian theory of a priori origination. However, the scope of such alternatives is limited by the necessity of finding a sense of derivation or origination that meets the following requirements: (i) experience must have no intrinsic role in the process; (ii) the process must occur subsequent to experience, and (iii) the process must be truly originative, i.e. it must not be just an instantiation or fixing in language of ideas that exist prior to experience. It is impossible to find such a theory that is philosophically coherent. The only viable alternatives therefore that can be suggested are those that reject the whole notion of origination/derivation and rely instead on the content ideas being supplied by sources outside the autonomous intellect. For instance, the possibility still exists that concepts and principles exist neither actually nor potentially in the mind prior to experience. They may be either put in our minds subsequently, perhaps by God, nature, or some other mechanism of this sort, or occur in our minds subsequently by chance. If, for example, St Bonaventure can hold to the theory that the notion that God exists or the Supreme Good exists is naturally implanted in the soul before birth there seems to be no reason to suppose that it is any more illogical to implant such knowledge subsequent to experience. Such knowledge would have to be considered a priori rather than innate.

That it is a chance occurrence that such ideas suddenly occur subsequent to experience (and not before) seems similarly difficult to believe, however the possibility cannot be entirely eliminated. The notion that sheer chance can give rise to such a priori knowledge materials is different in nature. An active use of the pure intellect occurs and by pure chance, the principles and concepts of reasoning just appear on the scene. This is a theory, incredible though it is, that just cannot be refuted. Even a strong argument for the universality of such concepts and principles would only affect the theory in a probabilistic way. That is to say, that it would make it less likely that the theory was true when so many different individuals have apparently, by sheer accident, acquired the same concepts and principles. This would not however refute the theory. To speak pragmatically the theory does have considerable disadvantages. It does not really provide any sort of explanation. It is similar to the meteorologist who might explain the occurrence of the rotation of a whirlwind on pure chance events - it just happens that
way. The explanation has no value. It forces us to admit however that the real use of the intellect requires the theory of innate ideas for credibility and explanatory reasons rather than strictly necessary ones.


It is the contention of this thesis then that those transcendent apriorists who rejected the illuminative or enlightenment variants of the doctrine must find another credible explanation for the real use of the intellect. The only credible explanation can be in terms of innate ideas. It is no surprise then that historically speaking, from Plato onwards, the theory of innate ideas has a seminal place in ratiocinative transcendent apriorist epistemology. One of the most significant contributions Leibniz made to this epistemology was his development of a more sophisticated and convincing theory of innate ideas. This in turn would give a more credible psychological mechanism that would underlie the notion of a real use for the intellect. Most previous attempts to provide such a mechanism, with the notable exception of Descartes' proto-dispositional theory of innate ideas, had been poorly developed, crude or implausible. In Leibniz's lifetime previously established versions of the theory had come under severe attack from the English empiricist John Locke and the theory required reassessment if it was to survive. In terms of epistemological credibility, it was essential that it did survive.

Descartes had made only limited progress since Plato's postulated his occurent version of the theory, i.e. the doctrine of anamnesis. In Descartes' third Meditation, the meditator lists those categories of ideas that he discovers within himself. He observes that some seem to be innate, some adventitious (coming from an outside source) and some fictitious (or imaginatively constructed). The first class includes the idea we have of ourselves as thinking things, the idea of God, and basic mathematical concepts like that of triangularity. Also included, are certain fundamental truths of logic such as, "that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be at the same time". John Locke objected to innate ideas on the ground that many people (idiots and children for example) seem quite unaware of the abovementioned truths. Yet, "to imprint anything on the Mind without the Mind's perceiving it" he wrote, "seems to me hardly intelligible".
Yet, in the case of Locke's "idiot", Herbert of Cherbury had already given a more than adequate reason why this was a spurious case against innate ideas. Herbert, when defending the universal consent argument for innate ideas, states that he is only talking about universal consent among "normal men". The term universal then is sensibly qualified to exclude cases where the mind is defective, fuddled, drugged, immature &. etc. (Although Herbert does assert that occasionally, even in these extreme cases, the innate ideas are not entirely absent). For, he observes, we must put aside "persons who are out of their minds or mentally incapable" and those who are "headstrong, foolish, weak-minded and imprudent". And although the faculty for being or becoming aware of innate ideas (for Herbert "Natural Instinct") "may not ever be entirely absent" and "even in madmen, drunkards, and infants extraordinary internal powers may be detected which minister to their safety". We can expect to find universal consent to common notions only among the normal, rational and clearheaded. This is a sensible qualification and makes Locke's mention of "idiots", whatever he means by this term, irrelevant. If the brain is defective or drugged in some way, for example, then it is logical to suggest that this process of recognition or knowing may be suppressed, or may not occur at all.

In the case of Locke's child example, the answer Descartes' would have given would be that the ideas under consideration, although not presently perceived by the mind are still there in the mind at a "preconscious" level. The term preconscious is a Freudian term but, it best explains the conscious phenomena to which Descartes is referring. The innate ideas are not, as in Plato, "forgotten" by the mind because of its attachment to the world of the senses. They are not buried in the depths of the soul (or unconscious). Rather the ideas, although available immediately to the mind, are just not being attended to at the moment in question: "The child has within itself the idea of God, itself and all such truths as are called self-evident, in the same way as adult humans have when they are not attending to them; it does not acquire them later on as it grows older". But if these truths are ever-present just waiting to be discovered, what is it that prevents everyone discovering them? Descartes' reply is that we are distracted by two things (i) by urgent bodily stimuli which dominate the mind in childhood, and (ii) by a body of inherited "preconceived opinions" i.e. obscure and confused judgements heteronymously derived that obstruct our perception of the truth. However, if the intellect could be distanced from the immediate sensory input or prevented from taking on false opinion then it would
easily recognize its inheritance of innate truths. Certainly, the soul, if removed from the body, would perceive at all times the ideas present within it.\textsuperscript{27}

Leibniz's answer to Locke's criticism is a lot more sophisticated. He does not think that the ideas exist at the pre-conscious level, like Descartes. He concedes more to Locke when he observes that it is wrong "to think that we can easily read these eternal laws of reason in the soul as the Praetor's edict can be read on his notice board, without effort or inquiry; but it is enough that they can be discovered within us by dint of attention."\textsuperscript{28} However why is it "enough" to make this point against Locke? In what sense are the ideas in the mind if we do not always perceive them? The answer is that innate ideas are not "in us" occurrently but rather as dispositions. Just as families have dispositions to develop certain illnesses, so the human mind has a disposition to form certain ideas rather than others. It only actually does so, however, if the conditions are right and these conditions cannot just become right through our natural development. As Leibniz' suggests specific labour is required to bring the ideas to the level of explicit consciousness:

\begin{quote}
\textbf{[Q95]} For if the soul were like such a blank tablet then truths would be in us as the shape of Hercules is in a piece of marble when the marble is entirely neutral as to whether it assumes this shape or some other. However, if there were veins in the block which marked out the shape of Hercules rather than other shapes then that block would be more determined to that shape and Hercules would be innate in it, in a way, even though labour would be required to expose the veins and to polish them into clarity, removing everything that prevents their being seen. This is how ideas and truths are innate in us as inclinations, dispositions, tendencies or natural potentialities.\textsuperscript{29}
\end{quote}

This is a good answer to Locke for it implies that ideas can be "in us", in potentia, at any stage of human development without ever being perceived by us. Just as saying that a family is prone to certain illnesses does not imply that these illnesses will necessarily develop in any particular individual. At this point, Locke's argument is in trouble. We would not normally argue, for instance, that there could not be any innate dispositions to form diseases because the diseases cannot be within us in any way with out our actually being aware of them.

The arguments for and against this dispositional theory of innate ideas are continuing in modern philosophy. For, example Noam Chomsky sees his own linguistic theory, that children possess an innate grammar that is the foundation of language acquisition, as
"fully in accord with the doctrine of innate ideas, so understood, [by Leibniz] and can be regarded as providing a kind of substantiation and further development of this doctrine". Although the arguments have changed and those ideas considered to be innate are usually different. However, these debates are beyond the scope of this thesis, which acts only as a propaedeutic to such questions in so far as the transcendent apriorist has to consider them.

Let us move then to consider Leibniz' theory in terms of its support for the real use of the intellect. Copleston seems to think that Leibniz is using the term innate in a unique way for he talks of a "technical" or "special" sense of innateness. This, according to Copleston, allows Leibniz to exclude certain truths from the category of innate ideas. The example given is the proposition "the sweet is not the bitter" which is certainly not an innate idea for Leibniz. It cannot be innate simply because it contains particular notions that are derived intrinsically from experience. Of course all notions for Leibniz, including "intellectual ideas" are extrinsically experiential because, "without the senses we would never think of them". However intrinsically experiential notions would render the proposition uncertain, "truths involving ideas which come from the senses are themselves at least partly dependent on the senses. But the ideas that come from the senses are confused; and so too, at least in part, are the truths which depend upon them". Consequently, if a proposition contains these sense notions then it cannot be indubitable and therefore cannot be innate.

In connection with the relationship between innateness and indubitability, J. L. Mackie has pointed out that only if Descartes and Leibniz could demonstrate the existence of a "benevolently veracious God" could innate ideas be connected with authoritative knowledge. According to him, such items of knowledge are not authoritative "merely because they are innate". Yet, Leibniz is not using an argument which categorically states that all innate propositions are necessarily indubitable. Rather he is suggesting that if a proposition is already proved indubitable then it must be innate. Samuel Parker had observed that there was certainly no guarantee that our innate ideas were not false:

[Q96] But suppose that we were born with these congenite Anticipations, and that they take Root in our very Faculties, yet how can I be certain of their Truth and Veracity? For 'tis not impossible but the seeds of Error might have been the natural Results of my Faculties, as Weeds are the first and natural Issues of the
best Soyles, how then shall we be sure that these spontaneous Notions are not false and spurious.\textsuperscript{38}

Now Leibniz would accept this possibility and recognized that the epistemological status of innate ideas was something open to debate:

[Q97] "He [Locke] will have wanted to fight the laziness and shallowness of thought of those who use the specious pretext of innate ideas and truths, naturally engraved on the mind and readily assented to, to avoid serious inquiry into where our items of knowledge come from, how they are connected, and what certainty they have. I am entirely on his side about that.\textsuperscript{39}

Returning now to the relation between sensory notions and innate principles, it can be said that Leibniz does not accept as truly innate those propositions that contain sensory notions. This is, in fact, a classic transcendent position regarding a priori knowledge. Leibniz is not using the notion of innateness in a "technical" or "special" sense as Copleston suggests but in the traditional sense which is commensurate with the dual criterion a priori. In this tradition, the exclusion of intrinsic sensation is part of the meaning of the a priori in general and innateness in particular. Leibniz correctly recognizes that there are "Intellectual ideas from which necessary truths arise"\textsuperscript{40} that "do not come from the senses"\textsuperscript{41}. These intellectual ideas will form the basis of truly innate principles, "the soul comprises being, substance, unity, identity, cause, perception, reason and many other notions which the senses cannot give"\textsuperscript{42} so that "neither the ideas nor the truths originate in the senses"\textsuperscript{43}. It is these innate notions that ultimately form the foundation for the real use of the intellect.
CHAPTER 7
THE ILLUMINATIVE TRADITION

7.1. Ratiocination and Immediate Intellectual Intuition

Historically speaking, the actual processes that must conform to the strict a priori criterion within transcendent apriorism are ratiocination and direct intellectual intuition. Both are definitionally important, and hence included in Defi (p. 82), because they represent two distinct epistemological methods by which transcendent apriorists have attempted to attain to the Truly Real. We have already seen, in our analysis of the noetic functions, that there is a distinction between knowledge by description and knowledge by acquaintance. The distinction between ratiocination and direct intellectual intuition is actually of a similar nature. It must be specified however that, in transcendent apriorism, both descriptive and acquaintive knowing are noetic processes functioning to attain to the noumenal. There are, after all, other epistemological doctrines employing empirical versions of these processes. We are of course not interested in those here.

It must be said, however, that there is much confusion in this area of epistemological analysis. The distinctions are sometimes confused and there are many issues that are still controversial. The main problems occur: (i) with the careless introduction of the further distinction between discursive and intuitional knowing into the discussion. The term discursive has previously been used, but only in a sense that is specific to the Kantian epistemology. The alternative meaning corresponds with its more familiar philosophical use. A discursive element, therefore, would involve a composite durational intellectual process, one that involves the movement from one truth to another, as in deduction. This is usually contrasted with the unitary, static and immediate character of intuitive cognition. This distinction, despite superficial similarities has nothing to do with the contrast between ratiocination and direct intellectual intuition; (ii) when there is only a
vague differentiation made between the modes of intuition inherent in these distinctions and (iii) when intellectual intuition is confused with its non-rational counterpart.

7.2. Discursive and Non-Discursive Intuition

In an attempt to unravel the meaning of the above distinctions let us start with an analysis of what Kant meant by his denial of intellectual intuition to human consciousness. Consider in this respect the following quotation from the *Inaugural Dissertation*:

>[Q98] No intuition of things intellectual but only symbolic [discursive] knowledge of them is given to man. Intellection is only possible to us through universal concepts in the abstract, not through singular concepts in the concrete. For all our intuition is bound to a certain formal principle under which alone anything can be perceived by the mind immediately, that is, as singular and not as conceived merely discursively through general concepts. But this formal principle of intuition (space and time) is the condition under which anything can be an object of the senses, and being thus the condition of sensitive knowledge it is not a means to intellectual intuition.¹

Kant, in this passage, is interested in distinguishing two possible ways in which the human mind can attain to knowledge of the noumenal world. The first involves an immediate apprehension of the noumenal through an intellectual intuition. In this sense, it is an intuitional or non-discursive method. In contrast, the second involves a durational reasoning process making use of abstract universal concepts. This is putatively a non-intuitional or discursive process. It is noticeable that, for human consciousness, the intuitional method, according to Kant, is not regarded as a viable option. This is because human intuitions are exclusively, for him, either sensory in nature or merely function as pre-conditions for the sensory world's appearing to consciousness as it in fact does. Hence, an intellectual intuition, that takes one beyond the sensory to grasp the noumenal world, just doesn't exist for human consciousness. A point that is re-iterated in the *Critique*:

>[Q99] If by 'noumenon', we mean a thing as far as it is not an object of our sensible intuition, and so abstract from our mode of intuiting it, this is a noumenon in the negative sense of the term. But if we understand by it an object of a non-sensible intuition, we thereby presuppose a special mode of intuition, namely the
intellectual, which is not that which we possess and of which we cannot comprehend even the possibility.²

In contrast, the so-called discursive method, in the *Inaugural Dissertation*, is a difficult but not impossible, option for attaining to the noumenal. However later, in the *Critique*, Kant was to deny even this possibility to human consciousness, putting an unbridgeable gap between the human intellect and the noumenal world.

Yet there are, as we have already mentioned in point (i) above, problems with this division between the discursive and the intuitional. The main difficulty is that there seems to be a non-sensuous intuitive element (an intellectual intuition) that forms an essential part of the discursive process itself. What is being referred to, in particular, is what we have already referred to as deductive intuition. We have noted the close relationship between deductive intuition and the discursive deductive method. In fact, it is so much a part of deduction that deduction could not take place without the constant re-immediation of the whole process in intuition. (Dr. A. C. Ewing in his British Academy Lecture³ even suggests that intellectual intuition forms an important part of inductive reasoning). The necessity of this type of intellectual intuition within deduction is problematic for Kant, as G. R. G. Mure has recognized in his *Introduction to Hegel*:

[Q100] Had Kant paid more attention to the nature of inference he might have found it less easy to deny to thought its native moment of intuition. The discursive factor in thought is not revealed only in the dispersion of an identical concept through a multiplicity of sensuous intuitions which instantiate it, but also in the movement of inference from premises to conclusion; and in the grasping of a conclusion a complementary factor of intellectual intuition is plainly manifest, not as an act separate from discursion but as the re-immediation of the discursive, mediatory moment.⁴

If Ewing and Mure are correct, then the Kantian denial to human consciousness of any form of intellectual intuition not only puts an end to the possibility of dogmatic metaphysics (Kant's actual intention) but also would render the whole reasoning process itself inconceivable. For they would ask, what reasoning process does not contain an intellectually intuitive element? It is true that Walsh⁵, in *Reason and Experience*, tries to discredit this argument by claiming that Kant only denies the existence of a human intellectual intuition that has reference to any possible real use for the intellect. In the
logical use of the intellect then, presumably, intellectual intuition has a role for Kant according to Walsh.

This would certainly make Kant's theory more coherent. However, there is evidence to suggest that Kant, against the Walsh interpretation, denied to human consciousness any form of non-sensuous intuition, "Thus for our minds, intuition is always passive and is possible only so far as something is able to affect our senses". Without getting into the complexities of this debate it is at least obvious that the question of what counts as discursive and what counts as intuitive is problematic. That the distinction between the two categories is far from rigid is demonstrated further by the existence of a transformation procedure that can exist between them. In fact, previously we discovered that certain rationalist philosophers saw the possibility of transforming discursive methods into intuitive one's. I refer of course to the so called process of "enumeration" in which, as Descartes suggested, it is possible to intuit a chain of connections "in a continuous and wholly uninterrupted sweep of thought...so swiftly that memory is left with practically no role to play, and I seem to intuit the whole thing practically at once". If this is possible then the clear differentiation, at one level, breaks down.

So far, we have only discussed deductive intuition, but what about axiomatic intuition? It is certainly required to grasp the axioms of the deductive method in foundationalist systems, for example in geometry and certain systems of metaphysics. This is surely a species of intellectual intuition, yet to deny it to human consciousness is a drastic step. To conclude, the introduction of the distinction between the discursive and intuitive, in this instance, creates more problems than it solves. It is certainly clear that it has little to do with our distinction. For ratiocination, as used in a technical sense in Defi., is inclusive of both discursive and some intuitional elements. Although it must be admitted that intellectual acquaintance intuition is certainly non-discursive in nature.

The real question is just what sort of intuitional elements belong to which side of the distinction. This was problem (ii) mentioned above. The solution to this problem will reveal the two main historical strands of transcendent apriorism. Let us start then with ratiocination. In its technical sense in Defi., this would include, all those intuitional processes required by and involved in a durational reasoning process. Many of which have already been mentioned and explained in our discussion of noetic concepts, in particular: (i) the intuitional re-immediation of a discursive process mentioned by Ewing and Mure, and designated by me deductive intuition; (ii) the intellectual intuition of the
axioms upon which the reasoning process is based, previously designated axiomatic intuition. Although not durational in itself this form of intuition never functions outside the durational reasoning process; (iii) noetic introspection and (iv) the apprehension of noetic concepts. In addition, it would, of course, include a discursive element, viz. (v) the actual process of noetic-deductive reasoning. The term ratiocination therefore is inclusive of the first five noetic processes and is a term synonymous with knowledge by description. It is knowledge by description but not purely discursive knowledge. In fact, four out of the five processes involved are intuitional in nature.

7.3. Illuminative intuition

The only noetic process not included in the category of ratiocination is unmediated rational intuition. This is an intuitional process that is sui generis. It has therefore been designated illuminative intuition. It is the only noetic process, which represents knowledge by acquaintance rather than by description. It is this putative intellective process that creates the possibility of a second form of transcendent apriorism. This form involves the ability of the intellect to grasp the noumenal directly without mediation through a durational reasoning process. We have already seen in our discussion of The Seventh Epistle, how Plato attempts to distance ultimate knowing (direct acquaintance with the forms) and knowing by description (even his own works are of this nature). In this interpretation of Plato, knowledge by description is only a preparatory exercise; a means of concentrating the mind on the true objects of knowledge so that the soul is ignited and acquaintance knowing occurs. R. S. Bluck sees the latter type of knowing as already present with Plato's use of the term ἐπιστημή in the Republic, "In the Republic, at least, ἐπιστημή is certainly a matter of 'knowledge by acquaintance' with forms".8 Hamlyn9 agrees and adds that later in the Theaetetus ἐπιστημή represents knowledge by description while γνώσις is knowledge by acquaintance - a distinction Bluck denies.

We have already noted that in Grote and Russell the model for knowledge by acquaintance was visual perception. In a transcendent apriorist epistemology, of the acquaintance type, the model for acquaintance knowing is similarly often perceptual in nature. However, it is usually a mental perception rather than a visual perception that is indicated. Certainly, mental perception is sometimes explained through metaphors of
visual perception, but is not identical with it. In fact, according to Plato, mental perception is "a faculty whose preservation outweighs ten thousand eyes, for by it only is reality beheld".\(^\text{10}\) It is certain that images of mental seeing, often with the so-called "eye of the soul" are present throughout the *Republic*.\(^\text{11}\) In particular, Plato's metaphors for knowing the intelligible realm i.e. the line and the cave are obviously based on this model.

For a much later Platonist like Plotinus there also exists a form of mental seeing, a knowledge by acquaintance with the Forms. However, this form of intellective seeing was to be carefully distinguished from the non-intellective or mystical seeing of "the One" to which, in Plotinus, it was only a prelude. (The distinction between direct intellectual intuition and mystical or other non-intellective intuitions will be discussed presently). For Plotinus, direct intellectual intuition was certainly of major importance in gaining knowledge of the intelligible world. Yet, it was not the ultimate form of knowing as it had been for Plato. Ultimate knowledge of the Truly Real could only be attained through what Eyjolfur Emilsson calls "hyper-intellectual vision" or "hyper-noesis".\(^\text{12}\) This was a non-intellective intuition that took the soul beyond the vision of the forms to the vision of "the One" or "the Good". The following passage from the *Enneads* makes this important distinction:

\[
\text{[Q101] She [the soul] declares that the object of her vision [hyper-noesis] does not think, even though she attains the vision by becoming intellect herself, essentially intellective, and established in the intelligible realm: for although on her arrival and in her lingering she is a thinking intellect, yet when she sees that God she discards all else. It is as if someone were to enter a richly appointed house of intricate beauty, and gaze in wonder at every ornate feature, before seeing the master of the house; but at the splendid sight of him, no mere adornment but reality and worthy object of attention, he would ignore those images and now fix his eyes on him alone.}\(^\text{13}\)
\]

However, it was the intellective rather than the hyper-noetic version of mental seeing developed in Plato, Philo of Alexandria and Plotinus that gave birth to the important epistemological doctrine of illumination. The reference is, of course, to the intellective illumination of Augustine et. al. as opposed to the mystical or religious illumination found, for example, in the Islamic "Ishraqiyah" tradition of Ibn Sina or Suhrawadi. This is an important point because the two traditions of illumination, viz. the philosophical and the mystical must be kept separate. They are based on the fundamentally different categories of intuition discussed by Plotinus. For example the 14th century mystic John
Ruysbroeck, although influenced by Augustine, has a very different notion of what illumination means. In fact, in *Revelations of Divine Love* he associates it with the hypernoesis type intuition, "Illuminated men are caught up, above the reason into naked vision. There the Divine Unity dwells and calls them. Hence their bare vision, cleansed and free, penetrates the activity of all created things...."\(^{14}\)

The epistemology of the early medieval period was, however, dominated by the other category of intuition viz. intellective illuminative knowing. With regard to this fact, it could be argued that, in the main tradition of Western epistemology, the noetic triumphed over the gnostic. The origins of this intellective notion of illumination are not easy to trace but Plato had described how, in the mental seeing of the noumenal, the mind was suddenly illuminated "at last in a flash understanding of each blazes up, and the mind, as it exerts all its powers to the limit of human capacity, is flooded with light".\(^{15}\) For Plato, the mental seeing occurred as a relation between the human intellect and the intelligible world of the Forms. Later Middle Platonist philosophers, such as Albinus, located these forms in the divine mind which, in effect, identified the intelligible world with the mind of God. The illuminative process was now a relation between the human soul and the divine Mind. An idea that secured for the doctrine a long future in the body of Christian thought. In fact, it was the Christian philosopher Augustine who made the most substantial use of the theory. The details of the story of the acquaintance type of transcendent apriorism from Augustine onwards will be given in detail later. At this point, it is sufficient to point out two things. Firstly, Scott MacDonald's interpretation of Augustine, given below, is correct for it draws attention to the acquaintance knowing involved in illumination:

> [Q102] We discern intelligible objects directly by turning within the immaterial soul and away from sense perception and the material world. He [Augustine] develops his notion of direct acquaintance in terms of the metaphors of light and vision. Just as our seeing material objects depends on their being illuminated by the light of the sun, our intellectual vision of intelligible objects on their being illuminated by an intelligible light, truth itself.\(^{16}\)

Secondly, there was a long tradition of acquaintive transcendent apriorism that used the doctrine of intellective illumination, largely because of the influence of Augustine. Philosophers such as Avincenna, William of Auvergne, Bonaventure, Henry of Ghent, Malebranche and Bergson. Kant, in the *Inaugural Dissertation*, admits the existence of a direct intellectual intuition of noumenal objects for, at least, the divine mind:
Thus for our minds intuition is always passive and is possible only so far as something is able to affect our senses. But the divine intuition, which is the ground, not the consequence, of its objects, is, owing to its independence, archetypal and so is completely intellectual.  

7.4. Rational and Non-Rational Intuitions

It is of further importance to stress that both ratiocination and direct intellectual intuition are processes that exclude any form of non-intellectual intuition. The discursive part of ratiocination is by definition not an intuition, so can easily be distinguished from non-intellectual intuition. But some may have a problem differentiating the intellectual-intuitionist elements, of (i) ratiocination and (ii) acquaintance knowing (in particular), from their non-intellectual counterparts. Can a clear distinction be made, for instance, between the intellectual intuition in Plotinus, which grasps the forms, and the non-intellectual intuition that apprehends the One? Is intellectual intuition in some way distinguishable from mystical insight? Commentators like Walsh have certainly noted their similarity, "There is no question of the mystic's first having certain experiences and then reflecting on their significance: what he has is rather immediately significant experience. In this respect mystical experience is akin to the knowing of an intuitive understanding rather than to anything with which we are familiar in every day life". When Walsh speaks of an intuitive understanding he is, of course referring to illuminative intuition, which he classes as an intuition in the "full-blooded sense". However his categories of intuition are somewhat confused and deductive intuition is also classed as "full-blooded".

We are concerned, of course, purely with the distinction, if there is one, between illuminative intuition and mystical intuition. Unfortunately, this could be the subject for a thesis in itself. Despite this, there are some remarks to be made on the issue, which are significant. The fact is, that mystics themselves are often at great pains to stress the difference. They are aware, at least at the phenomenological level, of transcending their intellectual intuitions. The two types of intuition are in this sense different experiences. The intellective intuition involves a focussing and concentration of the mind and it mainly occurs subsequent to a period of intense discursive reasoning. It is noteworthy, in contrast, that mystical intuition is usually, but not always, seen as supervening upon an emptying of the mind of intellectual and other content. This process is perhaps familiar to us from the practices of Buddhist meditation but it also plays a significant role in Western
mysticism. Master Eckhart, for instance, observes "where all the powers are withdrawn from their work and images, there is this word spoken...the more thou canst draw in all thy powers and forget the creature the nearer art thou to this, and the more receptive". Consider also the views of Dionysius the pseudo-Areopagite as typical in this respect. "...united to the Unknown by the most noble part of herself and because of her renouncement of knowledge; finally drawing from this absolute ignorance a knowledge which the understanding knows not how to attain".

The intellective intuition, in contrast, is a controlled process that is never linked with the suppression, abandonment or transcending of reason and learning. It rather functions as an extension that is continuous with the reasoning process. Whereas mystical intuition is often associated with a loss of control of the intellective faculties. In fact, this abandonment of intellect is seen as positive. Even if the intellect plays a role in the preparations for mystical insight, as it does in Plotinus, the intellect must still be left behind and abandoned in order that the illumination may replace it. Consider Plotinus' own attempts to make the distinction between the two intuitions clear:

|Q104| The first way of seeing belongs to intellect when sane, but the second is intellect in love, transported and "drunk with nectar" when sated with the object of desire it dissolves in contentment - and better for it to be drunk than too solemn for such drunkenness. 
|Q105| It is here that he abandons every kind of learning. He has been guided so far and established in Beauty, and until this moment is a thinking intellect; but now, swept away on the wave of Intellect itself and lifted on high by its swell, he suddenly sees - yet sees not how, for the vision fills his eyes with light, a light not the medium of sight but itself the vision.

The mystic intuition is also not so much seen as the result of a process of dialectics but rather as a consequence of the process of loving. The intuition itself, as in [Q104], is often regarded as a process of loving rather than knowing. Hence, in this case the mystic intuition itself is conative rather than cognitive. Certainly, in all cases, conative loving is essential to the mystical path to knowledge. As Berger has observed love and desire are "the fundamental necessities; and where they are absent man, even though he be a visionary, cannot be called a mystic". We can also say that, in mysticism, the love for the transcendent being is seen as possessing an epistemological role. In fact a superior epistemological role to the so-called, dry science of dialectics. In qualification, it is not that the mystic seeks knowledge of the noumenal through loving God. Loving God is an
end in itself. It just so happens that love brings with it an unsought knowledge of the noumenal. A knowledge that understanding itself cannot reach. The mystic himself would regard those who search for noumenal wisdom through the medium of love as mere magicians. Some quotations culled from the mystical tradition will now be given that demonstrate the role of love in the epistemology of mysticism:

[Q106] Anonymous - By Love He may be gotten and holden, but by thought of understanding never.
[Q107] Gertrude More - Out of this true love between a soul and thee, there ariseth such a knowledge in the soul that it loatheth all that is an impediment to her further proceeding in the Love of thee. O Love, Love...
[Q108] Ruysbroeck - For I would dwell with you today. And this hasty descent to which he is summoned by God is simply a descent by love and desire in to that abyss of the Godhead which the intellect cannot understand. But where intelligence must rest without, love and desire can enter in.
[Q109] Anonymous - He may not be known by reason, He may not be gotten by thought, nor concluded by understanding; but he may be loved and chosen with the true lovely will of thine heart. Such a blind shot with the sharp dart of longing love may never fail to prick, the which is God.

There is actually an active engagement between the knower and the thing known that brings with it intense emotions like love, adoration and ecstasy. In contrast, the illumination in the intellectual intuition is a passive reception of knowledge. In addition, although the intellectual intuition is often described in metaphors of light, the mystic is more likely to see actual lights or the light. As [Q105, p. 166] makes clear the light is not just the medium through which the eye of the soul can see the truth, rather the light, for the mystic, is the truth - it is the content of the revelation. Some of the above points are made by Evelyn Underhill in her famous study of the mystical consciousness:

[Q110] But there is no sense in which it can be said that the desire of love is merely a part of the desire of perfect knowledge: for that strictly intellectual ambition includes no adoration, no self-spending, no reciprocity of feeling between Knower and known. Mere knowledge, taken alone, is a matter of receiving, not of acting: of eyes, not wings: a dead alive business of knowing.

Mystical intuition was given as an important example of a non-rational intuition but it was not the intention to suggest that it was the only one.
7.5. Illuminative Transcendent Apriorism from Plotinus to Bergson

Along with it [discursive intelligence], however, we find the existence of another way of gaining knowledge. And so, we have on the one side science and mechanical art, which derives from pure intelligence, and, on the other, the metaphysics that appeals to intuition.

To separate out the illuminative and the ratiocinative versions, is extremely important for the accuracy of any assessment of transcendent apriorism. Much confusion in categorization and errors in criticism occur as the result of a misunderstanding of this most fundamental epistemological dichotomy. To clear up these errors and confusions and to thereby prepare the ground for a more accurate assessment is the aim of this chapter. To do this there will be a concentration on the essence and history of illuminative apriorism.

In the various histories of philosophy, the term "illumination" has been used in an extremely loose way to describe an incredibly wide variety of philosophical and mystical doctrines. This indiscriminatory use of the term has resulted in certain important distinctions, between such "illuminative" phenomena, being overlooked. For this reason I want to significantly narrow the meaning of the term and restrict its function to those epistemological doctrines that make use of a specific rational/intellectual intuition - viz. illuminative intuition. This would exclude the following meanings that are confusingly embraced by the current terminology: (i) any non-noetic intuitions, like mystical insights which instead of being called illuminations will now be termed "hyper-noetic visions", (ii) any noetic intuitions other than illuminative intuition that are attained through divine intervention. Such intuitions will be termed enlightenment rather than illuminative intuitions. Examples of both types of excluded intuition will be given subsequently in this section.

Historically this strictly defined form of illuminative intellectual intuition, which functions to transcend experience (in sensu stricto) first emerged in the "secret doctrine" of Plato. To speak at a very general level, it then only fully re-appeared, with any significant role, in Philo of Alexandria and subsequently with the Neo-Platonism of Plotinus and Porphyry. Although, as will be explained, in Neo-Platonism, at least, this
role did not constitute the absolutely highest level of cognition as it had done in Plato. As we already discovered, the Neo-Platonists' posited a non-intellective intuition, or hyper-noetic vision, as the culminating epistemological stage. In the subsequent historical period, illuminative apriorism had a long and distinguished existence in Muslim and Christian Platonism, where again it was important, but often subordinate to theological revelation. In this regard, versions of the theory were defended, in the medieval period, by important philosophers and theologians like Augustine, Avenccna, William of Auvergne, Bonaventure and Henry of Ghent. This represented the golden age of the theory.

However, the growing influence of Aristotle in the Medieval Universities came to supplant the Platonic legacy (which for Christians had been mediated through Augustine). The illuminative theory of transcendent apriorism then fell into neglect until it was re-discovered by Malebranche. Joseph Owens, in his article *Faith, Ideas, Illumination and Experience*, observes that "the doctrine of divine illumination becoming attenuated and finally disappearing for centuries till the seeing of "all things in God" was revitalised by Malebranche". With the demise of Malebranche the illuminative tradition seemed to have reached its terminus; with all other important philosophers in the transcendent apriorist tradition adopting a ratiocinative rather than an illuminative version of the theory. However, the modern philosopher Henri Bergson seems to defend a hybrid version of it - but this is controversial.

Before moving to consider the specifics of this doctrine, it is necessary to confirm, at a very general level that, according to this interpretation the philosophers mentioned in this tradition are not only apriorists but also "transcendent" apriorists. In Philo of Alexandria it is the highest knowledge of God that is attained by illuminative intuition. In Plotinus the objects of dianoia and noesis are the transcendent forms and ultimately the form of the Good, otherwise known as the One. Plotinus definitely defended the ontological separation of the Forms. Even directly countering arguments made by the Platonic Parmenides against the philosophical viability of ontological separation. This implies the transcendence of the knowledge-object in the onto-dualistic mode. The human soul can certainly grasp this transcendent object, "He will see an intellect that sees no object of sense nor any of these mortal things, but by its own eternity has apprehension of eternity, the entire content of the Intelligible". Similarly some of the most important interpretations of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, have stressed the transcendence of
God. As the anthropologist Joseph Campbell observes, in *The Masks of God*, "There can therefore be no question, in either Jewish, Christian or Islamic orthodoxy, of seeking God and finding God either in the world or in oneself".\(^37\) Not only does orthodoxy demand a transcendent destiny for the soul, but also the denigration of the corporeal world in comparison with the incorporeal realm of the divine, which transcends it.

Now for the philosophers and theologians who embraced these "revealed doctrines" it was natural to direct their philosophies towards the most important transcendent realm of Being. For here lay the objects of their veneration. Augustine set the tone for the whole medieval period when he associated the only true philosophy with the study of the intelligible world. In the post-Medieval period, the epistemology of Malebranche is deeply influenced by the Augustinian model. Some modern commentators are wary of attributing to Augustine the theory that the human soul can transcend experience to such an extent that it can see the divine mind. For example, Copleston calls this doctrine "ontologism" and denies that Augustine ever ascribed to it, "to the present writer at any rate it seems clear that Augustine is not talking either about a special mystical enlightenment or about an illumination which enables us to see God himself or the contents, so to speak, of the divine mind".\(^38\) However it is certain to me that Malebranche interprets Augustine in this ontologistic way and, as we will discover shortly, adopts this extreme transcendence theory himself.

Finally, according to Bergson, in *The Introduction to Metaphysics*, the discursive intellect is confined to the realm of appearance and only intuition can attain to the truths of metaphysics, which are concerned with the "domain of spirit". This is an onto-monistic version of transcendence. The version of reality given by appearance is constructed by those categories of mind that function to maintain the bodily organism. The true reality, what Bergson means by the "spiritual realm" can only be grasped by a form of illuminative intuition.

Now considering the specifics of the illuminative intuition, illuminative intuition, there are two main types. In the invented terminology of this thesis, there is autonomous illuminative intuition and heteronymous illuminative intuition. A passage from Grosseteste is illustrative of this division, "pure intellects receive direct irradiation from the divine light; generally human intellects are not directly irradiated by the light of the divine ideas, but by the created light of their minds".\(^39\) The distinction involves the extent to which the intellect can attain to transcendent knowledge by it own devices. If the
process of attainment is open to the intellect directly or on the completion of an intellectual methodology then it is described as autonomous. This is certainly the case with the Platonic "secret doctrine". It is also the Plotinian view that, "in the souls within ourselves there is true knowing; and these attributes are no images or copies from the Supreme, as in the sense world, but are actually those very originals in a mode peculiar to this sphere".40

If on the other hand the final intuition can only be attained by God's grace then it is described as heteronymous. Classic statements of the heteronymous version occur in these quotations from Augustine and Henry of Ghent respectively:

[Q112] For no creature, howsoever rational and intellectual, is lighted of itself, but is lighted by participation of eternal Truth".41
[Q113] Man can know pure truth about no thing by acquiring its knowledge through purely natural means, but only by an illumination of the divine light; even when he attains this light in his purely natural condition man does not attain it by purely natural means, because it freely offers itself to whom it wills.42

The heteronymous theory, as can be seen from [Q113], naturally emphasizes the weakness of the human mind, as Augustine laments, "if truth were equal to our minds, it would be mutable".43 Whereas the autonomous version emphasizes the great potential of the self-enlightened human mind. For example, as Plotinus observes:

[Q114] But there is a third order - those godlike men who, in their mightier power, in the keenness of their sight, have a clear vision of the splendour above and rise to it from among the cloud and fog of earth and hold firmly to that other world, looking beyond all here, delighted in the place of reality, their native land, like a man returning after long wanderings to the pleasant ways of his own country.44
[Q115] If this is the soul, when it returns to itself, it is surely of the nature that we ascribe to all divine and eternal Being. Wisdom and true virtue are godly possessions which could not be found in something mean and mortal; their possessor must be of divine nature, endowed with divine attributes by it kinship and identity of substance. Any one of us, therefore who attains to this state will differ little as to his soul from the gods above, and fall short of them only in being embodied.45

Now, whether it is of the autonomous or heteronymous variety. illuminative intuition is sui generis. It must conform to certain strict criteria before it can be correctly identified. Although certain criteria only logically apply to either the autonomous or
heteronymous variety specifically. Firstly, if the intuition is to qualify as illuminative intuition it must be a strictly a priori intuition. It must be what Kant called a pure intuition. There must be no admixture of experience. It is understood that it must be immediate, like all intuitions, to distinguish it from the process of noetic-deductive reasoning. It must be totally unconnected with the inferential process, i.e. it cannot be the re-immediation of a deductive sequence. Non-inferentiality distinguishes it from deductive intuition. Most importantly of all, however, it must be acquaintance rather than discursive i.e., it must be the grasping of a truth, which is not in propositional form. This distinguishes it clearly from axiomatic intuition. It is the great mistake of Augustine and some of his successors not to make an evident distinction between axiomatic intuition and illuminative intuition. They confuse the intuition of the primary axioms (which are propositions) with a purely acquaintance intuition of the noumenal.

Certain epistemological considerations lead some philosophers to a theory, which requires an intuition that transcends experience, in order to grasp a primary axiom or a simple mathematical truth. In this way, an illuminative intuition was seen by Augustine as a solution to a problem raised by the slave boy example in Plato's *Meno*. How can we explain the slave boy's eventual understanding of some of the primary axioms of geometry if he had never previously been taught them? Now Plato posited his theory of reminiscence or anamnesis to explain this phenomenon. However, this solution conflicted with the orthodox Christian rejection of any theory that posited the pre-existence of the soul. Hence, Augustine instead posited his own theory of illumination. A heteronymous illuminative intuition was, supposedly, required to explain knowledge of the "multitude of principles and laws of arithmetic and geometry, none of them derived from any sense impressions". It is more credible, as he puts it in one place, to account for the kind of knowledge displayed by Plato's slave-boy, in the *Meno* by saying that "the light of the eternal reason is present to them, in whatever measure they are able to perceive it, in which they can see the unchanging truths; not because they once knew them and have forgotten them, as Plato and others have held".

However, we are still dealing here with an intuition that functions to grasp propositional knowledge, hence it cannot be illuminative in the special sense and is still correctly considered as axiomatic intuition rather than illuminative intuition. It is just a special case of axiomatic intuition that requires the intervention of god. In our terminology, this intuition would be a heteronymous "enlightenment" intuition. It should
therefore be kept separate from Augustine's true theory of illuminative intuition, which involves the acquaintive intuition of the ultimate standards or Forms. This would be correctly termed a heteronomous illuminative intuition. Although, in this case, both forms of intuition are heteronomous. However, grasping a primary axiom or mathematical equation is fundamentally different from apprehending the absolute standard of beauty, goodness etc.

7.5.1. Philo, Plotinus and Autonomous Illuminative Intuition

Let us now move to a more detailed historical analysis. It is certain that Philo of Alexandria defended the autonomous version of the theory. His argument was that the human mind, despite its limited nature, was created in the image of the divine logos or Reason. The human mind is, therefore, akin to God. It must consequently share the characteristics of the divine mind to some extent. Now the divine mind knows the realities beyond time and space, so the human mind must also have some capacity to know such truths. According to Philo, if we are to attain to God-like knowledge we must learn to ignore the pull of the sensible world. For when the senses awake the mind sleeps and vice versa.\textsuperscript{49} The highest knowledge however cannot be attained by inferential knowledge\textsuperscript{50} and is only grasped by an intellectual intuition.\textsuperscript{51}

There is little dispute that Plotinus was a transcendent apriorist in the illuminative mould. However, this lack of contention can only be considered the case if the term illumination is used in its loose sense. It is not the case if we are to consider illuminative transcendent apriorism to be restricted to those versions of the theory, which use illuminative intuition. In this instance, there is a great deal of dispute. It seems that there is frequently looseness in the way the term illumination is used in Plotinus' scholarship. There is a lack of an awareness of the distinction between intellection and mystical experience. We have already seen that illuminative intuition is not the ultimate form of knowing in Plotinus. There is a hyper-noetic or mystical vision that supervenes upon the intellectual. This is certainly true, but it is not the case that there is a straightforward dichotomy between discursive intellection and intuitive mystical experience.
In fact, in order to support this dichotomy certain commentators find it necessary to reduce Plotinus' notion of intellective vision, or illuminative intuition, to discursive internal thinking. For example, Eyjolfur Kjalar Emilsson states:

[Q116] What Plotinus describes as Intellect's actualized vision and identifies with Intellect's self-thinking is not a direct apprehension of the One, but the thoughts Intellect ends up with internal to itself when trying to apprehend the One.\(^{52}\)

Yet, as was the case with Plato, Plotinus posits an intellective intuitional faculty between discursive reasoning and the "madness" of divine inspiration. We will discover later that Henry of Ghent similarly posits an intermediate intuition between "intelligentia" and the "supernatural light" which he calls, appropriately, the "middle light".\(^{53}\) For Plotinus, there is an intellectual intuition when the soul is drunk and when it is sober.

Before discussing this in detail, it is important to clear up a related error in discussing Plotinus. The fact that the ultimate form of knowing is a form of mystical vision has led John Bussanich to conclude bizarrely that Plotinus was a type of empiricist. This seems to militate against the categorization of Plotinus as a transcendent apriorist. Yet, when we check the actual passage from Bussanich, in which this assertion is made, we find a familiar confusion:

[Q117] We should think of Plotinus as a 'mystical empiricist' that is, a thinker who is committed to the view that ultimate reality can be grasped in itself, in mystical experience that transcends the duality of subject and object and all familiar cognitive and affective states. The transformative type of philosophy works towards an experiential goal.\(^{54}\)

Again, there is the confusion of the strict sense of the term experience used by the empiricist and the loose sense of experience used in ordinary language. The mystical vision of Plotinus is certainly an experience, just as even a priori cognition is also an experience in this loose sense. It is something that is undergone by consciousness, it is a conscious experience. However, this does not mean that Plotinus' philosophy has anything to do with empiricism whatsoever. In fact, empiricists are naturally sceptical of mystic vision precisely because it transcends what can be known in experience (in sensu stricto). Although an a priori cognition like grasping a deductive sequence is undeniable an experience (loose sense) it is actually defined by its rejection of experience (strict
sense). It is a non sequitur to derive a commitment to a version of empiricism from the fact that a particular philosophy has an "experiential goal".

In fact, far from being an empiricist of any type, Plotinus is a strict transcendent apriorist. He rigidly excludes the intrinsic use of the aesthetic functions from his quest for authentic knowledge. Consider the following quotations:

[Q118] It must be our care to bring over nothing whatever from sense, to allow nothing from that source to enter into Intellectual-Principle: with Intellect pure, and with the summit of Intellect, we are to see the All-Pure.55
[Q119] On the other hand, there is the knowledge handling the intellectual objects and this is the authentic knowledge; it enters the reasoning soul from the Intellectual-Principle and has no dealing with anything in sense.56

The exclusion even extends to the highest forms of sensory knowledge, what has been called logico-sensory cognition or in Kant's terms the logical use of the intellect:

[Q120] If the quester has the impression of extension or shape or mass attaching to That Nature he has not been led by Intellectual-Principle which is not of the order to see such things; the activity has been of sense and of the judgement following upon sense: only Intellectual-Principle can inform us of the things of its scope; it competence is upon its priors, its content, and its issue: but even its content is outside of sense; and still purer, still less touched by multiplicity, are its priors, or rather its prior.57

Plotinus follows Plato rather than Parmenides in his view of the senses as inadequate rather than false. The aesthetic functions are adequate to their particular epistemological object-correlate, viz. the sensory world. However, the objects in this world are for Plotinus images, copies of the authentic existences, viz. the intelligibles, "these attributes are no images or copies from the Supreme, as in the sense-world".58 These objects, because of the Platonic flux argument59, cannot be known in any true sense only opined, "Knowledge in the reasoning soul is on the one side concerned with objects of sense, though indeed this can scarcely be called knowledge and is better indicated as opinion or surface-knowing".60 Plotinus is certainly not an idealist, like Parmenides, with regard to the sensory world. However, when Emilsson observes that, "Plotinus normally speaks as a non-representational realist about the objects of sense perception"61 he goes too far. There may be a world out there, which corresponds to the aesthetic functions, but it is a subsisting world, as we saw with Plato, to which Plotinus is referring. This world does
not, in Plotinus' terms, have "authentic existence" like the intelligibles. For only things which are forever themselves, never changing or degenerating are entitled to be considered authentic existents, "in space they remain forever in themselves, accepting no change, no decay, and by that are they authentically existent". The sensibles themselves are mere images cast upon matter, "for in things of sense the Idea (Form) is but an image of the authentic, an image thrown upon Matter".

However, the purpose of this chapter is not to examine Plotinus' theory of the senses but rather to investigate his use of illuminative intuition. The first thing to note, in this respect, is that direct intellectual acquaintance with the intelligible is introduced by the traditional metaphors of the "eye of the soul" or "mental perception" that we found in Plato. Talking of the "higher" and "lower" world Plotinus states that "perceptions here are Intellections of the dimmer order, and the Intellections There are vivid perceptions". Similarly the godlike men, the philosophers, "in the keenness of their sight, have a clear vision of the splendour above and rise to it from among the cloud and fog of earth and hold firmly to that other world". Of course the parallels between sensory and intellectual vision are not exact because the intellectual vision is not directed toward some subsisting entity external to it, "in the intellectual, the vision sees not through some medium but by and through itself alone, for its object is not external: by one light it sees another...".

Notice the obvious contrast between Plotinus' descriptions of this "sober" intuition and the mystical intuition when the soul is described as "drunk". The sober intuition is still described as a "contact purely intellective", whereas the hyper-noetic vision is non-intellective and "sees by a kind of confusing and annulling of the intellect which abides within it", for "the Supreme is not known intellectively". There is even a distinct terminology that distinguishes between the noetic and hyper-noetic functions in Plotinus. Everything up to and including deductive intuition, including noetic deductive reasoning, is episteme, dianoia or, as H. Blumenthal suggests, "nous qualified by the terms logizomenon or merzizon". While illuminative intuition is nous or noesis unqualified. The hyper-noetic vision of the One is termed parousia.

[Q121] The perplexity (aporia) arises especially because our awareness (sunesis) of that One is not by way of reasoned knowledge (episteme) or of intellectual perception (noesis), as with other intelligible beings, but by way of a presence (parousia) superior to knowledge.
According to Plotinus, this first form of knowing up to deductive intuition cannot grasp the intelligible world. Such discursive reasoning is completely inadequate because the process itself lacks any affinity with intelligible reality. The doctrine is reminiscent of Plato's dictum that "like is known by like". Now the intelligible is, by its nature, without movement, progression and variation yet the discursive reason moves and progresses and varies:

[Q122] All our effort may well skim over every truth, and through all the verities in which we have part, and yet the reality escape us when we hope to affirm, to understand: for the understanding, in order to its affirmation, must possess itself of item after item; only so does it traverse all the field: but how can there be any such peregrination of that in which there is no variety?72

There is, therefore, an "absence of discursiveness in the intellectual realm".73 From this stems the requirement that the intellectual realm be grasped by an intuitional faculty, which attains knowledge all at once and as a whole. Hence, the requirement for the second form of knowing, illuminative intuition, which, as in Plato, supervenes upon dialectic.

However, unlike Plato, for Plotinus, there is the third stage of mystical union that supervenes upon illuminative intuition. This is because Plotinus thinks that the in-itself rather then the noumenal can be grasped directly. This seems to contradict an argument used later in this thesis (p. 192) concerning the impossibility of a subject directly knowing the in-iself. In fact, this is not the case. Plotinus recognises that any grasping of the in-itself would require the unification of the subject-consciousness with the object. The concept of knowledge itself assumes a distinction between knower and known and yet, as Plotinus observes, "the simplex cannot be thus divided into knower and known".74 There could, however, be a union where the distinction between subject and object breaks down and it is certainly true that both Plotinus75 and Porphyry76 have claimed to have experienced this phenomenon. Yet, this is a mystical experience rather than anything that comes within the bounds of transcendent apriorism.

It is to Plotinus' credit that he recognised that the in-itself could not be "known" in the sense that transcendent apriorists use the term. That a wholly different type of "mystical" knowing was required for this to be possible. This mystical intuition transcends the noumenal and attains to the in-itself by supervening upon illuminative intuition. The soul "is carried out of it [the noumenal] by the surge of the wave of intellect itself".77 It is to
be noted that, for Plotinus illuminative intuition is autonomous whereas mystical experience is heteronymous. Plotinus, unlike Augustine, thinks that the human mind can possess knowledge derived from its own intellective processes and intellectual intuitions without the intervention of God. The human mind has illuminative intuition when "the soul suddenly takes light" whereas the soul experiences parousia when God brings the light himself to the mind "we may believe in the Presence when, like that other God on the call of a certain man, He comes bringing light". Plotinus can have an autonomous theory largely because he accepts Plato's theory of reminiscence.

Having described all this it is difficult to understand how some commentators, like Eyjolfur Kjalar Emilsson in [Q116, p. 174], can deny illuminative intuition in Plotinus. Emilsson states that the "intellect's actualized vision" is not to be identified with illuminative intuition but rather with certain discursive thoughts that occur when trying to apprehend the One. However, as Plotinus himself makes clear, the soul has its vision in immediacy and only afterwards can reason upon it:

\[Q123\] Yet, All the need is met by a contact purely intellective. At the moment of touch there is no power whatever to make affirmation; there is no leisure; reasoning upon the vision is for afterwards. We may know we have had the vision when the Soul has suddenly taken light. This light is from the Supreme.

The discursive reasoning process can only take place after the vision and hence cannot, as Emilsson suggests, be identical with it.

7.5.2. St. Augustine and Heteronymous Illuminative Intuition

\[Q124\] The interest medieval philosophers showed in the doctrine of illumination is testimony...to Augustine's authority.

Whereas Plotinus had substantial confidence in the natural power of the human mind to attain at least the ultimate "intellectual" knowing unaided, Augustine was more conscious of the mind's weakness. The human mind, corrupted by the fall of Adam, was now somewhat limited in scope, and consequently Truth is assessed as being "superior and more excellent" than our minds. The human mind still had its natural potential. "God hath created man's mind rational and intellectual, whereby he may take in His light". However, the eternal wisdom was beyond it without the intervention of God to
make this potential actual. Having said this, with the help of God (the epistemological counterpart of divine grace), the human mind could grasp the Truth, "He so enlighteneth it of Himself, that not only those things which are displayed by the truth, but even truth itself may be perceived by the mind's eye". Here again we have the notion of the "eye of the soul" that we found in Plotinus and Plato. However, with Augustine the interior and intelligible eye (oculo suo interiore atque intelligibili) is not activated autonomously as a permanent interaction with the Form of the Good or the One. Rather a divine intervention is required by the father of the intelligible light (pater intelligibilis lucis). An act of grace that rescues the soul from the ignorance belonging to corporeal knowledge.

What then is the mechanism by which the intelligible eye functions? The first thing to remember is that he uses the term indifferently of axiomatic intuition and illuminative intuition respectively. The grasping of primary axioms is described in terms of the same mechanism as the direct acquaintance with the archetypal forms. Firstly, Augustine asks, in the Contra Academicos, "How does the finite, changing human mind attain certain knowledge of eternal truths, truths which rule and govern the mind and so transcend it?". His first investigation with regard to finding an answer to this question involves him in an attempt to justify propositional knowledge of the primary axioms of reasoning and mathematics. Much of his work on this question anticipates Descartes in this respect.

To counter the sceptics he notes that there are several forms of propositional knowing that we can be certain of. These are: (i) the principle of contradiction, "there is one world or it is not the case that there is one world"; (ii) what Husserl was later to call the cogitations, "I know that this seems white to me, I know that this sound gives me pleasure..."; (iii) that he can be certain of his own existence because to doubt is to exist in some way, "if you did not exist you could not be deceived in anything"; (iv) he can be certain further that he lives; (v) that he understands and finally (vi) of simple mathematical propositions. Although many of these arguments or equations recur in the Cartesian project, the explanation that Augustine gives for our knowledge of these truths is very different. He does not say with Descartes that these truths are grasped by the autonomous light of reason. Nor does he state with Plato that the truths are remembered from a previous life (despite a confusing terminology that may suggest this). No, these truths are grasped only because God lights the mind with knowledge.
However, as D. Furley correctly states of Augustine's epistemology, "knowledge is not just of propositions; it is also direct acquaintance with entities that correspond to the Forms of Plato".\textsuperscript{95} The Forms of Augustine exist not separate from the divine mind, as in Plato's \textit{Timaeus}, but in the divine mind, "The ideas are certain archetypal Forms or stable and immutable essences of things, which have not themselves been formed but existing eternally and without change, are contained in the divine intelligence".\textsuperscript{96} This is where we move beyond discursive knowing to the Augustinian version of illuminative intuition, which he considers unique and which results from the interaction between the intelligible eye of the soul and a direct illumination from God. The intelligible eye alone could not attain to the vision and is reliant on the "disposition" of the creator to provide the light by which it can see the eternal, "According to the disposition of the Creator, it sees them [intelligible things] in a certain incorporeal light which is sui generis, just as the corporeal eye sees adjacent objects in the corporeal light".\textsuperscript{97}

It is important to realize that despite similarities between the role of God in Augustine and the Form of the Good in Plato, there is an important distinction to be made. The Form of the Good, in certain metaphors in the \textit{Republic}, illuminates the intelligible world so that the eye of the soul can see the Forms. Yet, even if we take these metaphors seriously the point is that the whole process of knowing the eternal, in Plato, is open to the autonomous intellect. The Good cannot just withdraw its light. However, in Augustine the knowing of the eternal depends on a free act of God's grace. It is interesting to note that this epistemological heteronomy is mirrored in Augustine's notion of ethics. Here a human being, because of original sin, cannot attain true virtue without the intervention of divine grace. Consider only Augustine's vehement opposition to Pelagius\textsuperscript{98} who saw an important role for autonomous volition in human salvation.

However, returning to epistemology, there is certainly something the mind can do to put itself in a position to receive illumination. The first stage is to direct our minds away from the temporal things revealed by the senses. The senses are useful in their own way and true in so far as sensation does not form the basis of judgements. The objects of sensation, the mutable and corporeal things are also not to be despised and are requisite for practical life, without them "life does not go on".\textsuperscript{99} However the mind must reject the senses and turn away from the world they reveal if we are to grasp the important things. Even rational cognition of the temporal world revealed to the senses (immanent
apriorism) must be rejected as mere knowledge rather than true wisdom. All attention must be directed on the eternal things, which are of primary importance:

[Q125] If this is the correct distinction between wisdom and knowledge, that intellectual cognition of eternal things should pertain to wisdom, but rational cognition of temporal things to knowledge, then it is not hard to judge which is to be ranked above and which below. 100

The epistemological ascent to illuminative intuition in Augustine requires a contemplative inwardness. A direction of the mind away from the external temporal world to an inward contemplation of that which is eternal. In this state, which closely resembles the predicament of the Cartesian meditator, the eternal truths are attainable, but only through divine intervention, "Concerning universals of which we have knowledge, we do not listen to anyone speaking and making sounds outside ourselves. We listen to the truth within us which presides over our minds...Our real teacher is Christ." 101 It was Augustine’s influence that kept the illuminative theory of transcendent apriorism alive throughout the medieval period.

7.5.3 Influxum Hyperphysicum 102 in Malebranche

There is no better way to see the confusions, that result from a careless approach to the differentiation of types of noetic function, than to read much of the commentary on the works of Nicolas Malebranche. The most quoted line in such commentary, "que nous voyons toutes choses en Dieu" 103 is often depicted as an example of the doctrine of illumination. This was certainly a suggestion made by Joseph Owens, as quoted earlier. However, this is a mistake. It is important to make a distinction between "illuminations" that facilitate axiomatic and deductive intuitions and those that facilitate illuminative intuition. Malebranche's famous quote is concerned with the former and is therefore reliant upon divine enlightenment rather than divine illumination. Malebranche's quote relates entirely to propositional knowledge and has nothing to do with direct acquaintance knowing of the noumenal.

That God helped enlighten the mind of the primary axioms and concepts (Malebranche used the vague term "ideas" to cover both) is an important development in the history of ratiocinative transcendent apriorism. It has its origin in Augustine and was
further developed by Malebranche as an alternative to Descartes theory that ideas are implanted in our souls by nature. Although Malebranche was a great admirer of Descartes, "in thirty years Descartes discovered more truths than all other philosophers" he nevertheless thought that there was a fault in the foundations of the Cartesian epistemology: "this great philosopher has not at all probed to the bottom of the nature of ideas". It was this epistemological weakness that led Malebranche to re-invent Augustine's theory of divine enlightenment. Instead of the Cartesian notion of autonomous axiomatic intuition, Malebranche substitutes a heteronymous alternative that relies on the divine will to intervene. This is a very extreme theory, a type of occasionalism applied to epistemology,

[Q126] Thus, the mind can see God's works in Him, provided that God wills to reveal to it what in him represent them. This view places created minds in a position of complete dependence on God - the most complete there can be. For on this view, not only could we see nothing but what He will that we see, but we could see nothing but what He makes us see.

However, all this has nothing to do with the illuminative tradition of illuminative intuition that we are discussing in this section. In this aspect of Malebranche's philosophy, there is no direct acquaintance knowing of the noumenal, i.e. illumination. Instead, there is just an intuitive knowing, of propositions and equations, which is dependent on divine intervention, i.e. enlightenment. It is a part of the tradition of divine enlightenment rather than of divine illumination. In fact, according to Malebranche, far from seeing all things by divine illumination we can only see one thing in this way. The one epistemological object-correlate of illuminative intuition in Malebranche is God and God alone. "Only God do we perceive by a direct and immediate perception". By perception, of course, Malebranche means intellectual perception; he is not of course suggesting that we can see God with the senses. C. J. McCracken is therefore correct to refer to Malebranche's theory as a "doctrine of a direct acquaintance with or perception of God".

The reason that we must have illuminative intuition of God is defended by Malebranche with the following argument: Finite minds know the nature of God. Yet, to know God, through discursive reasoning, a finite mind would have to have an idea or representation of the infinite. This idea of the infinite being different from God (it is the idea through which the mind grasps God) must be an individual created being. Yet how
could such a limited created being give us knowledge of universal uncreated being. It is not therefore reasonable to think that God is known indirectly through ideas. Hence, there must be a direct way of knowing God:

[Q128] We cannot conceive how a created thing can represent the infinite, how being that is without restriction, immense and universal, can be perceived through an idea, we are forced to conclude that we know God through himself.\(^{110}\)

The great advantage of this theory, according to Malebranche, was that it avoided the famous Cartesian circle argument. Some commentators have suggested that Descartes found a solution to this particular counter-argument within his own frame of reference. The arguments surrounding this theory are considered later. However, even today there are commentators who think that the circle argument is a refutation of the Cartesian epistemology. The argument starts from the fact that Descartes provides a demonstrative proof of God's existence. He then uses God to guarantee the ultimate validity of demonstration. This argument is clearly circular. Malebranche by making knowledge of God's nature purely acquaintive avoids the problem of circularity. We can know that God is not a deceiver intuitively and demonstration is therefore justified in a non-circular way, "It is necessary to know by simple perception and not by inference that God is not a deceiver, because reasoning can always be mistaken if we assume God to be a deceiver".\(^ {111}\)

7.5.4. Henry Bergson and Spiritual Auscultation

Rather than the illuminative type of transcendent apriorism it was the ratiocinative version of transcendent apriorism that Bergson rejected. In fact, Bergson's whole philosophical project seems to have begun with a critical analysis of the Eleatic version of ratiocinative transcendent apriorism. As Leszek Kolakowski observes, "Bergson's early philosophical development was occasioned by his attempt to understand properly what was wrong with Zeno's paradoxes".\(^{112}\) The paradoxes, according to Bergson in his Essay, arise because we impose an abstract notion of time that involves infinite divisibility (properly a spatial concept) and quantifiability onto our real experience of time (durée). Our real experience of time, gained in an attitude of disinterested contemplation, is of something that is revealed to consciousness as non-divisible and qualitative. It is this sense in which the
Eleatic project is wrong. Our abstractive discursive intelligence, according to Bergson, has its proper function. It is our evolutionary inheritance and it allows us to deal, interact with and manipulate the material world.

[Q129] What is intelligence? The human way of thinking. It has been given to us as instinct to a bee, to direct our conduct. Since nature designed us to use and to master matter, intelligence develops easily only in space and feels itself at ease only in the unorganized world. It directs itself from the outset towards manufacturing, it reveals itself in an activity that anticipated the mechanical arts and in a language that announced science.\textsuperscript{113}

However, when this sort of thinking is introduced into metaphysics, errors inevitably arise. It misrepresents our actual experience. For one thing our experience is particular whereas abstract discursive intelligence can only tell us of that which is general, of what things have in common with other things rather than what makes them unique. "Analysis...is an operation which reduces the object to elements that are known and that the object has in common with others".\textsuperscript{114} This is also a fault of our language, which underlies such abstract thinking, and can only express things by unnaturally arresting the flux of experience, "language cannot grasp it without immobilizing its mobility".\textsuperscript{115}

If we are not to be locked into pessimistic scepticism here, then we can see the pressure to develop a non-propositional understanding of reality. This is certainly what Bergson does and he founds his metaphysics upon a particular form of intuition. This intuition is described as "a sympathy whereby one carries oneself into the interior of an object to coincide with what is unique and therefore inexpressible in it."\textsuperscript{116} Intuition is non-utilitarian and can therefore give us insight into how the world really is. However, what does Bergson mean when he says that our real experience can only be described intuitively? It is certain to me that when Bergson talks of experience he is not referring to empirical experience but rather that loose sense of experience which would include mystical, aesthetic or indeed a priori experience. This point has already been discussed and it was suggested there that Bergson himself seems confused. He makes a similar mistake to Emilsson who termed Plotinus a "mystical empiricist". Bergson also makes strange use of the term empiricism. This is because he appears to make the old blunder of confusing, what has been termed elsewhere, experience (strict sense), and experience (loose sense). Consider the following passage:
But what true empiricism aims at is to follow as closely as possible the original itself, to deepen its life and, by a kind of 'spiritual auscultation' to feel its soul pulsate, and this true empiricism is true metaphysics.\textsuperscript{117}

It is difficult to imagine, personally, too many empiricists being happy with a metaphysics based on an intuition that is compared to a "spiritual auscultation" one that seeks to feel a pulsating soul. In fact, the language would immediately suggest mystical rather than empirical intuition. Certainly, in Bergson's later work, he refers to mysticism as the universal religion. Incidentally, such experience has often been approached in an extremely sceptical manner by most empiricists. However there are problems here. Firstly, there is the paradoxical phrase in [Q130, p. 184] "true empiricism is true metaphysics". Now certainly it has been a perennial critique of empiricism by rationalists that empiricism itself is nothing but a metaphysical position. However, many empiricists would take issue with the whole project of metaphysics. Consider also [Q111, p. 168], which contrasts "science and mechanical art" which are associated with intelligence, i.e. discursive reason and "the metaphysics that appeals to intuition".

Secondly, if we are talking about a mystical insight it is difficult to imagine such insights together forming what could be described as metaphysics. In fact, Bergson is trying to establish not an empirical intuition, nor a mystical intuition, but a noetic intuition, i.e. illuminative intuition. Although Bergson sometimes criticises our "inborn Platonism" he would not have objected to what has been called Plato's "secret doctrine". He is trying to establish metaphysical truth both about the world and, more importantly for transcendent apriorism, about the immortal soul and God. In fact, his project only makes sense if we see him in the tradition of Plato, Plotinus, Augustine and Malebranche. His intuition is not qualified by the term intellectual because, for Bergson, the term is always associated with discursive abstract reason.

7.6. Further Confusions in Kant and Ayer

To conclude this section let us consider some more examples of how the blurring of the distinctions, made in this section, has caused confusion and how a more exact treatment helps us assess the doctrine correctly. It is obvious now that Kant is wrong to categorize Plato's theory of reminiscence with Malebranche's notion of the intuition of Divinity. In
the *Letter to Marcus Hertz* Kant groups together types of intuition under the general heading *influxum hyperphysicum*, "Plato assumed a previous intuition of Divinity as the primary source of the pure concepts of the understanding and of first principles. Mallebranche (sic) believed in a still effective eternal intuition of this Primary Being".\(^{118}\) Yet, as we have seen, there is a great difference between the direct grasp of the noumenal by the illuminative intuition (Malebranche's intellectual intuition) and what I have termed enlightenment intuition of concepts, axioms and principles. The latter may reveal certain notions with respect to the nature of the noumenal. However, they are obviously distinct from an immediate acquaintive cognition with it. Kant mistakenly thinks that both are examples of the posited intellectual intuition of the noumenal, which he denies in the *Inaugural Dissertation*, "No intuition of things intellectual but only a symbolic [discursive] knowledge of them is given to man".\(^ {119}\)

Yet, in our section on Plato we saw that the theory of reminiscence was part of the ratiocinative (i.e. discursive) stage in Plato's epistemology, as opposed to the illuminative secret doctrine. We saw also in chapter 2 that the intuition of "pure concepts and principles" is intimately bound up with discursive knowledge. Remember it was Mure's criticism of Kant [Q100, p. 160] that he had not considered the important role of intuition in the discursive process. This certainly may be true, because Kant does not always seem to correctly distinguish between enlightenment intuition, which is propositional, and illuminative intuition that is acquaintive. At least Kant's criticism of illuminative transcendent apriorism makes sense when he takes the type of intuition discussed by Malebranche as his model. However, the criticism relies heavily on an acceptance of the Kantian epistemology as a whole.

Ayer is similarly confused. We saw in [A7, p. 252] that metaphysical rationalism is described as positing a "purely intellectual intuition" whose object is the "supra-sensible world". This sounds like a clear reference to illuminative intuition. However, Ayer almost immediately moves to talking about how such a rationalist intuition has the function of validating propositions. This role however has nothing to do with an intuition of the noumenal (acquaintance type), which is separate from discursive knowing. Instead, it has everything to do with the grasping of propositions and concepts that may or may not apply to the noumenal. In fact, Ayer, in his criticism of transcendent apriorism, does not even consider the illuminative variety. For him there seems to be no middle ground (or "middle light" in Henry of Ghent's terminology) between the ratiocinative philosopher,
who uses discursive reasoning, and the mystic who uses hyper-noetic vision. He only considers the actual distinction between the two to be irrelevant. "As far as we are concerned, the distinction between the kind of metaphysics that is produced by a philosopher who has been duped by grammar, and the kind that is produced by a mystic...is of no great importance".120

However, Ayer does cover himself, perhaps unintentionally, by saying that his arguments work against any form of intuitional knowing that claims to be synthetic. Being a solid "justification" empiricist he does not even deny that knowledge can be attained by any such variety of intuition, "We do not in any way deny that a synthetic truth may be discovered by purely intuitive methods as well as by the rational method of induction".121 Ayer is interested not in the origination but in the justification of knowledge claims. His response to the transcendent apriorist who uses illuminative intuition would probably be the same as his response to the mystic, "We do not deny a priori that the mystic is able to discover truth by his own special methods. We wait to hear what are the propositions which embody his discoveries, in order to see whether they are verified or confuted by our empirical observations".122 Yet, as Desmonde Clarke correctly observes, "An intuitus is not a judgement".123 Remember, in Plato's secret doctrine, the propositional form is often just considered inadequate to convey the intuition. Unlike the mystics' vision, which Ayer mentions and fails to distinguish, illuminative intuition is not ineffable. It can be expressed only just not in propositional form; for this particular medium would distort its meaning. This important point will be developed further in the conclusion to this thesis.

Finally, we have seen that many of the transcendent apriorist philosophers, subsequent to Parmenides, attempted to extend the frontiers of their knowledge of the noumenal through illuminative intuitions. The illuminative tradition of transcendent apriorism extended up to and, if our interpretation of Bergson is correct, beyond the great revival of a purely discursive rationalism. Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza and Kant (in the Inaugural Dissertation) rejected all aspects of illuminative transcendent apriorism in favour of its ratiocinative counter-part. That this is the case is admittedly not uncontroversial. Howard Caygil, for instance, observes. "Descartes and Spinoza lean towards a Platonic view of intuitive knowledge which prefers the immediate knowledge of the intelligible realm to the mediated knowledge of the senses".124 However, I hope to prove, in opposition to this view, that the philosophers considered had an absolute commitment to the ratiocinative
version and were not tempted to import any instances of illuminative intuition. In this respect their work marks a return to purity of Parmenides' deductive method.
In transcendent apriorism the Truly Real is identical with the noumenal world. So far two definitions of what is meant by "noumenal world" have been given. In Def. (p. 82) it was legitimately defined as the "undistorted being-for-consciousness of the in-itself". This is the correct (strict) definition explicated in this section. However, in the majority of this paper, so far, there has been an acceptance of a much looser definition, that was only adequate for epistemological differentiation. This loose definition was based upon Kant's "negative" sense of the term noumenal as presented in the Critique. To remind the reader I will quote it again here, "if by 'noumenon' we mean a thing so far as it is not an object of our sensible intuition, and so abstract from our mode of intuiting it, this is a noumenon in the negative sense of the term".\textsuperscript{1} It is important to deepen the definitional analysis beyond this Kantian template. In order to do this it is necessary to subvert and redefine the currently existing terminology that is relevant to the question of the noumenal world. The existing epistemologies were again found to be loose and riddled with confusions.

The true meaning, within transcendent apriorism, of the following terms: in-itself, noumenal (world), appearance, illusion, phenomenal (world) and representation will now be considered. In the new definition, the distinction made between the in-itself and its contraries, viz. representation and appearance, is of a separate nature to that made between either the noumenal and phenomenal, or the transcendent and immanent. The terminological subversion is intended to capture this distinction in meaning and fix it at the level of language. This is important because the non-recognition of the distinction is the source of much modern epistemological confusion in this area of research.
8.1.1. Appearance, Representation and the In-Itself

Firstly, let us consider the trilogy of related terms viz. "in-itself", "representation" and "appearance". These terms are strictly used, in this thesis, only to indicate whether or not there is a relation between a specific object and a subject consciousness. If x has some relation to a subject-consciousness p of any type (including a subject-consciousness that does not recognise itself as a subject) then x is an appearance or representation to that subject p. In contrast, if x is out with the parameters of any possible experiencing, including noetic experience of subject p, then x is in-itself. Note carefully that the definitions given of representation or appearances are, in epistemological terms, non-pejorative. From the proposition that x has a relation with, or is filtered through a subject consciousness p there is no necessary inference that p in some way distorts x and makes it unreal or illusory. Yet this is an inference made by many Kantian philosophers in their criticism of transcendent apriorism.

Consider, in this respect, the following passages about representation from Arthur Schopenhauer's The World as Will and Representation:

[Q131] What is knowledge? It is above all else and essentially representation. What is representation? A very complicated physiological occurrence in an animal's brain, whose result is the consciousness of a picture or image at that very spot. Obviously the relation of such a picture to something entirely different from the animal in whose brain it exists can only be a very indirect one. This is perhaps the simplest and most intelligible way of disclosing the deep gulf between the ideal and the real.2

[Q132] The world is my representation: this is a truth valid with reference to every living and knowing being, although man alone can bring it into reflective, abstract consciousness. If he really does so, philosophical discernment has dawned upon him, it then becomes clear and certain to him that he does not know a sun and an earth, but only an eye that sees a sun, a hand that feels an earth...3

[Q133] Because our knowledge consists only in the framing of representations by means of subjective forms, such knowledge always furnishes mere phenomena, not the being-in-itself of things.4

The dangerous word in [Q131] is "obviously". The way in which something "appears to" or is "represented" to consciousness is not necessarily a distortion i.e. something that creates a gap between the ideal and the real. For instance it would be meaningful to suggest that the manner in which things appear to us (their mode of appearance) is actually the only true reality. This was the position, as we have discovered, of certain
immanentist epistemological theories like descriptive and existential phenomenology. These epistemologies, as we have already demonstrated totally rejected the notion of an in-itself. Yet there in not, with them, any sense of a reduction of the world to some subjective phantasm. A consequence that for Schopenhauer would inevitably follow on such a rejection:

[Q134] Yet the perceived object must be something in-itself, and not merely something for others; for otherwise it would be positively only representation and we should have an absolute idealism that in the end would become theoretical egoism, in which all reality disappears, and the world becomes a subjective phantasm.5

In contrast to Schopenhauer appearances or representations, for the immanentist epistemologists, are identical with the True Reality. The phrase "only representation" in [Q134] would make no sense to them. For them, as in transcendent apriorism, the terms representation and appearance are epistemologically value neutral.

A further argument is that to creatures with a different perceptual or cognitive apparatus and to some aspects of our own perceptual or cognitive apparatus, the appearances might be different and hence illusory. Yet one very specific use of our consciousness gives us transparent access to the world as it is independently of our consciousness. This would be the transcendent apriorist's contention. Hence, Schopenhauer is wrong to infer that because a representation of x, i.e. Rx, is of a different nature from x itself (Rx being in relation to consciousness rather than something in-itself) then Rx must always misrepresent x. As [Q133, p. 190] makes clear, Rx instead of grasping "the being-in-itself of things" furnishes the mind with "mere phenomena". Why should this be so? Surely a further argument is required to establish that the very fact of relation necessarily entails misrepresentation.

Indeed, if there is such a distortion of x then we are dealing with a special type of appearance or representation, viz. what will be designated a "seeming". This type of appearance would only occur if both the following conditions were fulfilled: (i) x were filtered through a subject-consciousness p (the only required qualification for its designation as an appearance) and (ii) that the constitution of the subject-consciousness p in some way distorted x. From this point on, this second condition will be designated the distortion qualification. The notion of appearance or representation, in contrast with a
seeming, does not necessarily possess a distortion qualification and is therefore non-
identical and not even necessarily connected with the concept of illusion.

To be consistent with the above, the designation (being-, thing-) "in-itself" needs to be re-defined. Normally (although not always) the term is used by philosophers as interchangeable with the phrase "the noumenal world". However, in this thesis, it is to be given a unique designation and indicates only that which exists independently of any possible relation with any subject-consciousness. This definition has an important consequence, viz. that the in-itself, thing-in-itself or being-in-itself is, unlike the noumenal as we shall soon discover, absolutely unknowable - by definition. The demonstration is as follows: (i) x if it is a thing-in-itself must remain unrelated to any type of subject consciousness p. (ii) if x is knowable it is related to a subject consciousness p in respect of being known by p. Hence (iii) if x is a thing-in-itself then x is unknowable. Schopenhauer grasped the force of this argument when he observed that "being-known of itself contradicts being-in-itself". However, he makes the mistake of thinking that because the in-itself cannot be known directly transcendent apriorism is impossible.

It may seem that this contradicts what was said about Schopenhauer on p. 68. There it was said that he legitimized a special method, viz. an introspective intuition, by which consciousness could grasp the in-itself. However, this would require a special non-noetic intuition that could unite that which knows with that which is known. In Schopenhauer's case the knower, in this special case, just is the known. Plotinus similarly posits a special "hyper-noetic" intuition that involves a union of knower and known. This again is because noetic intuitions cannot perform this feat, so direct intuition of the in-itself is denied them.

In an essay entitled "On the Antithesis of Thing in Itself and Appearance" Schopenhauer makes a seemingly pertinent criticism viz., "Every dogmatic transcendent philosophy is an attempt to construe the thing-in-itself according to the laws of appearance". Schopenhauer's proposition could be interpreted in different ways depending on the meaning of the phrase "laws of appearance". The apparent strength of the statement relies on this ambiguity. If by appearance Schopenhauer really means seeming, then it can simply be said that it is the transcendent apriorist's belief that there are aspects of consciousness which are undistorting with regard to the representation of the thing-in-itself. It may be that he is wrong and, in fact, human consciousness is trapped in the world of seeming. However, to prove this would require a further argument and does not follow from Schopenhauer's belief that the world is representation. For
representations, as we have seen, are neutral as to truth value and, unlike seemings, are not necessarily distorting in the special sense required here.

Alternatively, if Schopenhauer is using the term appearance in the sense attributed to it above, then he is misinterpreting the transcendent apriorist's position. The transcendent apriorist confronted with Schopenhauer's proposition, in this sense, would totally agree with it. He would probably ask the further question, viz. is this meant to be a criticism of my position when you seem just to be re-stating it? The transcendent apriorist actually maintains that the world as it is in relation to a specific aspect of consciousness, namely the noetic, is just identical with the in-itself; that noetic consciousness directly corresponds to the actuality of the thing-in-itself. In the Inaugural Dissertation, Kant affirms this important connection, "intellectual concepts are representations of things as they are". 8

Now the noetic consciousness is a relation between consciousness and the object of consciousness. It is therefore an appearance. However, for the transcendent apriorist, it is not a seeming. The transcendent apriorist does not embark on the impossible task of directly knowing the in-itself. He merely identifies the in-itself with his noetic representations or appearances. In fact, as will become clear, the transcendent apriorist does not aspire to knowledge of the in-itself but rather of the noumenal world. He just assumes, perhaps mistakenly that this noumenal world is identical with the in-itself. Solomon identifies this underlying assumption when he observes:

[Q135] "How can we know whether our ideas of what the world is like correspond to what the world is really like"? Underlying this question was a host of assumptions concerning the nature of human understanding, most importantly, that our ideas if correct, conform to the real objects to which they correspond. 9

According to Hegel, it was a fundamental unlegitimized Kantian assumption that, even though our ideas may be logically correct, because they are representations, there is an unbridgeable gap between them and the in-itself. Schopenhauer had argued that this putative assumption was Kant's great contribution to epistemology, "The real side must be something toto genere different from the world as representation, namely that which things are in themselves; and it is this complete diversity between the ideal and the real that Kant has demonstrated most thoroughly". 10
In contrast, Hegel saw it as a backward step. The Kantian epistemology just accepts this un-argued for view because, according to Hegel, it takes too seriously the metaphor of knowledge as a tool or medium. If there is a medium or tool that attempts to grasp the in-itself, must not this tool/medium distort what it sets out to know? It is this fear of distortion that inhibits the whole metaphysical project, "It [the fear of error in Kantian philosophy] starts with ideas of knowledge as an instrument, and as a medium; and presupposes a distinction of ourselves from this knowledge". This presupposition, for Hegel, is just that which cannot be established by philosophy; because in order to establish whether the intellect is a distorting tool or not, the only method of validation available to us is the intellect itself; the very intellect that we are questioning. This would seem to be a self-defeating project.

As a consequence of the impossibility of this Kantian project, Hegel admires instead the fearlessness of the transcendent apriorist metaphysical project. Its assumption that our noetic representation is identical with the in-itself, is superior to the Kantian inhibiting fear of error:

[Q136] The older metaphysic [pre-Kantian] had in this respect a loftier conception of thought than that which has become current in more modern times. For the older metaphysic laid down as fundamental that which by thinking is known of and in things, that alone is really true of them...Thus this older metaphysic stands for the view that thinking and the determination of thinking are not something foreign to the objects of thought, but are rather of the very essence of those objects.

8.1.2. Phenomenal (world) versus Noumenal (world)

[Q137] Intelligence is the faculty of the subject through which it is able to represent things, which cannot by their own nature come before the senses of that subject. The object of sensibility is the sensible; that which contains nothing save what must be known through intelligence is the intelligible. The former was called, in the ancient school, phenomenon; the latter noumenon.

Let us move now to the second of our sets of contrary terms, viz. noumenal (world) and phenomenal (world). This first thing to note is that the terms involved do not distinguish between that which is related to a subject-consciousness p and that which is not so related. They do not repeat therefore the in-itself versus representation or
appearance dichotomy. As we shall soon discover both the noumenal (world) and the phenomenal (world) are always related to a subject consciousness. They are both therefore, in the terminology established above, representations or appearances.

Secondly, unlike the in-itself/representation dichotomy the phenomenal/noumenal distinction will not be epistemologically value neutral. In Def 1 we established that the noumenal world is the goal of the transcendent apriorist's quest for knowledge. It is considered the true representation/appearance of the in-itself. This is what is meant by the phrase "being-for-consciousness of the in-itself" in Def 1. The phenomenal world, in contrast, is the realm of illusion and falsehood. It is therefore associated with false representations of the in-itself. In the terminology established above it is a particular type of representation/appearance, viz. a "seeming".

Hamyln has suggested that the etymology of the word phenomenon gives us a clue to its meaning in epistemology. In his book *Metaphysics* he observes, "the Greek phrase which might be thought to be appropriately translated as 'appearances' - ta phainomena - literally means 'the things that seem'".14 For reasons given above I think that it is better to translate ta phainomena simply as "the phenomena" rather than introducing the confusing term "appearances". However, the phrase "the things that seem" correctly connects phenomena with the concept of "seeming". Unfortunately, this could still be confusing. In transcendent apriorism, phenomena are not actually identical with "seemings". They are rather a particular category of seeming. Indeed, they are a category of seeming exclusively connected with experience (in sensu stricto) or the aesthetic functions of the intellect.

The distortion qualification above, specified a condition for when an appearance was classified as a seeming, viz. when the constitution of the subject-consciousness p in some way affected or distorted the object of knowing. For the transcendent apriorist it is experience (in sensu stricto) or the aesthetic function of the intellect, which is the element in the constitution of the subject consciousness that does the distorting. To put it crudely, the transcendent apriorist would agree with the following quotation from the Bhagavadgita: "The mind that gives itself to follow the shows of sense seeth its helm of wisdom rent away...The world of sense pours streams of witchery".15

From the standpoint of transcendent apriorism, knowledge that is founded upon the distorting aesthetic elements within consciousness (the "shows of sense") is designated phenomenal. Hence, phenomena are aesthetic function seemings. The phrase phenomenal
world, which is common in philosophical discussion, may be confusing as a designator. Although, in certain philosophers, the phenomenal may be an actually existing world (I have tried to prove that such "ontological separation" is present in Plato) this is not always the case. The phenomenal world for many transcendent apriorists is just a phantasm. In this case, the aesthetic functions do not just lead us into knowledge of a created world inferior, for example, to the perfect world of the Forms. In contrast, they lead into a world of illusion where what seems to be, is not. Again, to be crude, we could compare their notion of the phenomenal world, with the veil of Maya in Indian philosophy:

[Q138] It is Maya, the veil of deception, which covers the eyes of mortals, and causes them to see a world of which one cannot say either that it is or that it is not; for it is like a dream, like the sunshine on the sand which the traveller from a distance takes to be water, or like the piece of rope on the ground which he regards as a snake.¹⁶

Note that it is still appropriate to talk about a phenomenal world here. Admittedly, the world is a subjective/intersubjective idealist's world-for-consciousness. In addition, such a phenomenal world is, according to the transcendent apriorist, entirely deceptive.

The phenomenal (world) is in direct opposition to the so-called noumenal (world). The doctrine of transcendent apriorism postulates the identity of the Truly Real and the noumenal world. The phrase noumenal world within the context of this doctrine has two substantial meaning components. The first distinguishing feature of the noumenal world concerns the manner in which it is known. As the etymology suggests¹⁷, it is a realm knowable by nous, or the pure intellect which is the subject-correlate of noesis the pure intellectual processes. Now this is important because it means that, in transcendent apriorism, the noumenal world, by definition, is not grasped by the aesthetic functions of the intellect, or by nous in combination with these aesthetic functions.

This last clause may seem strange because, in transcendent apriorism, nous is the pure intellect out of combination with the aesthetic functions. Remember, however, that this is not its meaning for all philosophical uses of the term. Of course in other doctrines, like transcendent aposteriorism, the noumenal world does not, by definition, exclude the possibility of being known by non-noetic functions. In fact, with respect to the natural theology of philosophers like Aquinas and Duns Scotus, it is the aesthetic functions that
are an indispensable condition of attaining to the noumenal. The divine invisibles, among which Aquinas included the "eternal types" of Augustine and Plato could be approached only through the empirical - the observation of the visible and particular. Limited knowledge of the noumenal can be obtained by "natural reason" which "depends on images drawn from the world of the senses and on the natural light of our intelligence abstracting concepts from these images".18

In the case of transcendent aposteriorism then the etymology of the word noumenal does not help us understand its meaning. For nous alone does not exclusively grasp the noumenal. In fact, some claim it can be grasped by nous plus aisthesis. This non-exclusive use of noumenal is common and requires the transcendent apriorist to observe, in qualification, that his is an "apriorist" attempt to grasp the noumenal.

The second distinguishing feature of the noumenal concerns the nature of that which is known. The noumenal world is an intelligible realm that contains the object-correlates of the entire noetic process, viz. noumena. To emphasize the etymological connection, the noumenal world is that which is known by nous through the agency of noesis or the noetic process. This realm is posited as existing but is regarded as transcendent, that is located beyond the realms of experience.

The fact of knowability (being known by nous) establishes the noumenal world as non-identical with the thing-in-itself. In the doctrine of transcendent apriorism the noumenal world unlike the thing-in-itself is related to a subject-consciousness p, although this relation is of a very specific type. That is to say, the noumenal realm is a particular type of appearance, namely one that is related to a subject-consciousness p in a categorically non-distorting form. The distorting qualification discussed earlier forms no part of that relation. The implication is that the subject-consciousness p can, through some specific method or intuition, grasp the nature of the noumenal world in a form undistorted by the particular nature or constitution of p. In transcendent apriorism the noetic function of the intellect is considered to be that which has the capacity to know the noumenal world in this specific manner. How the world appears through the use of the noetic function of the intellect, if this noetic function is used in the correct way and is functioning correctly, can be an undistorted or transparent picture of the noumenal.

In contrast the aesthetic functions of the mind which include sensation, logico-sensitive cognition, imago-sensitive cognition and empirical introspection can grasp only the world of seemings. That is the world distorted by factors in the nature or constitution
of the subject-consciousness p. The assumption that the involvement of the aesthetic
function of the mind at any level necessarily affects or distorts our apprehension of the
noumenal world is unique to transcendent apriorism. Other doctrines that associate the
Truly Real with the noumenal world, like transcendent aposteriorism, assume that the
 logical use (in the previously discussed Kantian sense) of the intellect can attain to a
transparent link with the noumenal world.

The second meaning component, which concerns itself with the object of knowledge
rather than the manner of knowing is also important. The nature of this object viz. the
noumenal "world" is not as simple to understand, as it seems. The term "world" is given
scare quotes because, as we shall soon discover, it may be misleading to think of the
noumenal world as exclusively a realm of transcendent entities existing separately from
another realm of phenomenal entities. Although this is what the term seems to suggest. In
fact, in transcendent apriorism the noumenal can be transcendent in two ways. It can
transcend both the phenomenal world as a distinct realm of entities, and the phenomenal
world as a false or inadequate representation of the noumenal.

For the transcendent apriorist, the noumenal world is not necessarily a world that lies
behind or beyond the more familiar world of experience. Of course, in Plato's case, the
noumenal world is most definitely a separate realm, ontologically distinct from the
phenomenal realm. In the Timaeus the Demiurge creates the phenomenal world, i.e. the
imperfect realm of entities that we experience through our sensory equipment, by
reference to the perfect world of the forms that exist wholly beyond the phenomenal.
Therefore, this world is only an imperfect copy of the world of the Forms. Now this is
certainly a notion of the noumenal world that is found within transcendent apriorist
epistemology. When Plotinus observes, "As one wishing to contemplate the Intellectual
Nature will lay aside all the representations of sense and so may see what transcends the
sense-realm" he uses the term "realm" deliberately to indicate a world of existing
entities. This doctrine fitted in well with the Christian notion of condemnation of "the
things of this world" and is expressed in this form by Augustine:

[Q139]...after many generations and many conflicts there is strained our at last. I
should say, one system of really true philosophy. For that philosophy is not of this
world - such a philosophy our sacred mysteries most justly detest - but of the
other, intelligible world. **20**
However, it would be false to say that this is the only notion of the noumenal world or that it is the solely legitimate notion. In fact, particularly in post-Medieval philosophy, the noumenal world is more often just the one existing world as grasped by the pure intellect as opposed to the world of phenomena or appearance. The so-called phenomenal world in this case is just an illusory version of the Truly Real that results from the filtration of the noumenal through distorting aesthetic elements within human consciousness. The noumenal world certainly transcends experience, but it is not consequently necessary to posit any two worlds hypothesis that erects a sharp ontological boundary between it and the phenomenal.

There is a sense in which, for some transcendent apriorists, the phenomenal world does not have any separate existence at all, at least in the sense that dream objects are not usually considered to possess true existence. However, a more philosophical comparison might be made between the existence-sense of phenomenal objects and the existence sense of Locke's secondary qualities. In the Scholastic terminology the phenomenal world would possess esse ut verum (existence in the sense of the true) but not actus essendi (actual existence). With this notion of the noumenal it would be wrong to ask the question "what is the relation between the noumenal and phenomenal worlds?" when taking issue with the transcendent apriorist in general. The question would, in fact, only be relevant to the Platonist type theory of the noumenal world. In fact, it is a question often directed by modern philosophers at Platonism. Plato of course would say that the phenomenal world "partakes" or "shares" in the noumenal and this may be an inadequate answer.

However, the same question could not legitimately be asked for instance of Spinoza for whom the phenomenal order is imaginary: "We have now perceived, that all the explanations commonly given of nature are mere modes of imagining, and do not indicate the true nature of anything, but only the constitution of the imagination; and. although they have names, as though they were entities, existing externally to the imagination, I call them entities imaginary rather than real". There can be no relation between the "world" of noumena and the "world" of phenomena because in actuality there is only one world, viz. the noumenal, the world of phenomena being just an illusion. In both conceptions of the noumenal the notion of transcendence refers only to the transcendence of experience. It does not refer to the notion of a realm of entities over and above the
existing realm of entities. For as we have seen, in at least one case, this would constitute an illegitimate postulation.

In conclusion, we can say that the noumenal (world) is for the transcendent apriorist an undistorted appearance/representation of a world beyond experience that is identified with the in-itself. It is a world in relation to noetic consciousness, which is seen as identical with the world independent of any relation to consciousness. There is no gulf between the Ideal and the Real. Hence it is appropriately defined, in Def., as the being for noetic consciousness of the in-itself, because, for the transcendent apriorist, the noumenal world is the in-itself as disclosed by the noetic consciousness.

Before moving to consider potential errors that can result from the misunderstanding of the transcendent apriorist position on these matters, let us summarize the conclusions reached in this section in diagrammatic form:
Relations that are epistemologically neutral with regard to distortion.

- Appearance.
- Representation.

Relations that are positively distorting.

- Seemings.
- Phenomenal (world).

Relations that are completely undistorting.

- Noumenal (world)

The noetic object as related, or filtered, through human consciousness.

That-which-is unrelated to and hence unfiltered by human consciousness.

| Assumed identity of. |

Table 3. Epistemological Term Subversion in Transcendent Apriorism.
Let us now return to our modern definitions. It is immediately obvious that they are surface definitions, which miss most of the important points. Mourelatos [A1, p. 252] is correct to say that the transcendent apriorist makes "projections into a transcendent noumenal world". R. C. Solomon [A8, p. 253] is equally correct to affirm that transcendent apriorism is concerned with "noumena". However, what they mean by the terms noumena or noumenal world is not explained. It could be that they associate these terms with the in-itself. Although this is unclear because of their lack of explanation it is certainly a connection often made. Consider the following quote from H. Caygill, "Intellectual intuition consists in a direct, intellectual knowledge of things in themselves rather than as appearances in space and time".\(^{22}\)

If in their statements, what they mean by noumenal is in-itself, as strictly defined, then they are committing a serious error. For the transcendent apriorist himself recognizes such a projection would be an impossibility. It is accepted that the in-itself simply cannot be directly known - noetically at least. To indicate that a transcendent apriorist could, (i) make a priori projections into the in-itself; (ii) have the in-itself as his epistemological object, or (iii) reach it with intellectual intuition, is - as we have seen - to accuse him of an unbelievably simple logical error which he does not make. Unfortunately, much actual analysis uses the fact that the transcendent apriorist has made such an error as a starting point for a putative refutation.

Another serious potential error that can arise from the definitions is to consider the noumenal, *solely*, as a de facto world existing independently of another de facto world viz. the phenomenal world. In this respect, Walsh [A2, p. 252] talks of the "intelligible sphere" as existing "beyond" or "behind" the "commonsense world known in sense-perception"; Macquarrie [A9, p. 253] envisages a supersensible reality as underlying the "empirical phenomena of the world", and Ayer [A7, p. 252] asserts that the transcendent apriorist attains to, "knowledge of a reality transcending the world of science and common sense". These authors certainly regard the phenomenal world as existing in actu. It is considered a world that somehow the transcendent apriorist must get behind in order to discover the only reality he regards as Real.

We have already mentioned that there is a strain of transcendent apriorism that holds to this "two worlds" viewpoint. However, most post-Medieval transcendent apriorism takes a different form. The phenomenal (world) is no longer considered a de facto existing "world" that something else can exist behind. Rather, the phenomenal is
considered a total illusion. From this viewpoint therefore there is only one de facto world viz. the noumenal. It is wrong to associate transcendent apriorism with one particular tradition of that doctrine. It is certain that attempted refutations have often been founded on this association. The consequence is that, even if true, the criticism could only apply to a small part of the tradition.

8.2. Squaring the Cartesian Circle

[Q140] If the Being of the world, its presence and the meaning of its Being, revealed itself only in illegibility, in a radical illegibility which would not be the accomplice of a lost or sought after legibility, of a page not yet cut from some divine encyclopaedia? If the world were not even, according to Jaspers's expression, "the manuscript of another," but primarily the other of every possible manuscript.

[Derrida²³]

In the last section we observed that the transcendent apriorist just assumes the identity of the noumenal and the in-itself. As we have demonstrated, the in-itself cannot be known directly unless we posit a non-noetic intuition that unites knower and known. Hence, the transcendent apriorist, committed as she is to work within the limits of the noetic, must presuppose an identity between what his noetic functions reveal, viz. the noumenal, and that-which-is, viz. the in-itself. This pre-supposition involves two further assumptions viz. (i) that the in-itself is a logos, and (ii) that the in-itself is a logos accessible to our noetic functions. Here, by logos, is meant a rational structure, which corresponds to the mind's rationality. That the identity of the noumenal and the in-itself is an unargued for assumption is not often understood or made explicit by those in the living tradition of transcendent apriorism and this, as I previously mentioned, is a definite epistemological weakness.

Now Descartes, unlike his predecessors, is certainly aware of the problem. (In fact many commentators have tried to suggest that the problem of the Cartesian circle arises through a failed attempt to solve it). In an article entitled 'Descartes' Validation of Reason', Harry G. Frankfurt observes that, "Descartes' metaphysical doubt is precisely a doubt whether being false is compatible with being indubitable. His position is that as long as the demon remains a possibility, we must acknowledge that what we intuit may be
false". Similarly, Boyce Gibson thinks that the "evil genius", introduced as a cause for doubt in Meditation I, represents "the enemy of the principle of reason in the universe". In other words the evil genius is introduced to pose the important question, how can we be certain that what we know indubitably with our reason is true of the universe?

If a malicious demon was deceiving us constantly there would be no guarantee that even our clear and distinct perceptions corresponded to how the universe actually is, in-itself. It could even be the case, as a modern philosopher like Derrida suggests as a possibility, that the universe just does not conform to our rationality in any respect. It may be that Being is not, in Derrida's terms, a cryptogram to be deciphered by the logo-centric mind. Whether Being is, or is not compatible with human reason is, for Derrida a "non-question". For it is a question that is never seriously posed by philosophers, whose point of departure is always the assumption that Being is a logos, i.e. that the noumenal transparently mirrors the in-itself.

Alan Gerwith and Henri Gouhier have suggested that, according to Descartes, this gulf between the noumenal and the in-itself can only be bridged if it can be proved that there is an omnipotent God who is no deceiver. God would then act as a guarantor that our clear and distinct perceptions are true of reality in-itself. As Nagel observes, "Descartes' God is a personification of the fit between ourselves and the world for which we have no explanation but which is necessary for thought to yield knowledge". The argument is that a beneficent God would surely not design us so that he gave us a faculty of reason such that when we thought we had grasped something with absolute certainty we were, in fact, wholly in error. If we could prove that such a God existed it would certainly solve one of the seminal problems of a transcendent apriorist epistemology. That the noumenal was identical with the in-itself would no longer just be a pre-supposition of the system.

However, it is immediately clear that there is a problem with this argument. How can we prove the existence of such a God? Surely we can only prove the existence of such a God by using our rationality. Hence, that very mind function whose ultimate legitimacy for the exegesis of Being is currently open to question. We cannot logically demonstrate that our clear and distinct perceptions correspond to reality by using these very perceptions (whose legitimacy is not proven) to establish that there is a God who is no deceiver. We would then clearly be arguing in a circle and the circle would certainly be
vicious. Consider Gassendi's explanation of the problem in his objections to the *Meditations*:

\[Q141\] I note that a circular argument appears to have its beginning at this point, according to which you are certain that there must be a God and that he is not a deceiver on the ground that you have a clear and distinct idea of him, and you are certain that a clear and distinct idea must be true on the ground that you know that there is a God who cannot be a deceiver.\(^32\)

Here we have a classic statement of what was originally designated Arnauld's circle but is now generally referred to as the Cartesian circle.

Notwithstanding, this whole difficulty has arisen because of a fundamental misunderstanding of some elements within the Cartesian epistemology. It is certain that Descartes recognized the problem of just assuming an identity between the noumenal and the in-itself. He did not na"ively believe he could solve the problem by rationally demonstrating the existence of a non-deceiving God. His actual response to the problem, is to suggest that the possibility of the noumenal not corresponding to the in-itself, is so remote and unlikely that we can safely ignore it. According to Descartes, when we are, in a strict sense, strongly convinced of something, it is then futile to ask whether it might still be false. We cannot, at that moment, believe it to be false nor do we have any reason at all to suspect that it might be false. Consider the following passage in this respect:

\[Q142\] What is it to us if someone should feign that the very thing of whose truth we are so firmly persuaded appears false to the eyes of God or of the Angels and that hence, speaking absolutely, it is false? Why should we concern ourselves with this absolute falsity, since we by no means believe in it or even have the least suspicion of it? For we are supposing a belief or a conviction so strong that nothing can remove it, and this conviction is in every respect the same a perfect certitude.\(^33\)

This may seem an unsatisfactory response. Just because we find it hard to believe something does not guarantee that it does not exist. For example, just because the atheist finds it extremely difficult to believe that there can exist anything corresponding to the notion of God does not necessarily imply that God does not exist. Similarly, not to have any suspicion that there is such a thing as absolute falsity does not prove that the possibility of absolute falsity does not exist. However, at least Descartes sees the problem and comments upon it, which is more than can always, be said for his predecessors.
In Descartes' defence it can be argued that the doubt, which remains, is only a very high level epistemological doubt. If we could attain to an indubitable system of truths and only this problem remained it would be a major achievement. Certainly, no other system of knowledge puts before itself such a rigid epistemological criteria of certainty. Notwithstanding, it must be remembered that the absolute legitimacy of transcendent apriorism must always depend on providing an argument for this assumption. If the very act of proving such an argument is self-refuting then it will always remain a mere presupposition. In fact, we could say that it is the foundational assumption of any transcendent apriorist epistemology.

It has been said that certain commentators are wrong in suggesting that the proof of a non-deceiving God, in Descartes, represents a solution to the problem of absolute falsity. It has also been said that they have misunderstood elements within Cartesian epistemology. We must now move to establish what the Cartesian epistemology is really about. Willis Doney has stated that, for Descartes, "Present clear and distinct perceptions were never subject to doubt. Anything so perceived did not depend on God as guarantor of its truth". This is a correct statement, with the single reservation about the phrase "never subject to doubt" which would ignore the high level epistemological doubt already discussed. Yet, Doney is correct to suggest that, for Descartes, there is an element in man's epistemological make-up, which is fully autonomous. That is, an element which does not require the existence of a non-deceiving God to guarantee the certainty of its truth-claims. There is an element that survives the doubt introduced by the evil demon. That such a rational function survives the doubt would confute Boyce Gibson's claim that the evil demon represented the "enemy of the spirit of reason in the universe".

However, what exactly could such an element be? Doney suggests that all "clear and distinct perceptions" are autonomous. There is certainly evidence for this view in Descartes'; when, for example, he clearly states that, "the light of nature, or the faculty of knowledge...can never disclose to us any object which is not true, inasmuch as it comprehends it, that is, inasmuch as it apprehends it clearly and distinctly". This fact, that whenever I clearly and distinctly perceive x, x is true, is designated, by Louis E. Loeb "the truth rule". However, although I agree that Descartes held to the truth rule, the proposition, as formulated, is a bit vague. For instance what is it exactly that constitutes a clear and distinct perception.
In an impressive article, entitled 'Descartes and the Autonomy of Reason', Peter. A. Schouls makes a more incisive analysis of what Descartes meant by such a perception. He suggests that Descartes' notion of reason contains various distinct functions. He even correctly suggests that Descartes' distinguished between what has been termed axiomatic intuition and deductive intuition, both of these standing in contrast to deduction. Consider how Schouls makes the distinction:

[Q143] Intuition₁ and intuition₂ have in common that the act of intuition occurs instantaneously and hence excludes successive movement and memory. They differ in that whereas the object of intuition₁ is simple and hence not subject to division and analysis, the object of intuition₂ is compound and can be divided and analysed. Intuition₂ is more closely related to deduction than is intuition₁. In fact, whereas intuition₁ is in no way dependent on deduction, intuition₂ can occur only after deduction has taken place. ³⁷

There is certainly evidence that Descartes understood the distinctions involved and at quite a deep level. This is quite surprising because as we have seen, later, Kant and Ayer still seem a bit confused. Of intuition in general, which is immediate, in its contrast to deduction, which is a process, Descartes writes:

[Q144] Whereas the act of intuition occurs instantaneously, i.e. what is intuited "must be grasped...at the same time and not successively", deduction is a process which "appears not to occur all at the same time, but involves a sort of movement on the part of our mind when it infers one thing from another." ³⁸

Unlike intuition which "occurs instantaneously" it is important to stress the role of memory in deduction "deduction does not require an immediately presented evidence such as intuition possesses; its certitude is rather conferred upon it in some way by memory". ³⁹ Descartes also understands that first principles or axioms are "known per se"⁴⁰ and he distinguishes this type of intuition i.e. axiomatic intuition from the re-immediation of a deductive sequence, i.e. deductive intuition. This latter intuition can only occur, for Descartes, in a deductive sequence linking propositions. Clarcke correctly observes that, in Descartes, "intuitus" can be "the act of understanding...the evidentiary connections between propositions". ⁴¹

If the conclusions are very distant from the first principles then they can be known only by deduction "the remote conclusions are furnished only by deduction". ⁴² However, if the linkage does not involve a long chain then intuition has a role in re-immediation.
Hence, the propositions which are derived (in a discursive process) from those primary axioms grasped by axiomatic intuition are, in some circumstances, known by deductive intuition. In others by noetic deductive reasoning, "propositions...which are immediately deduced from first principles are known now by intuition, now by deduction. i.e. in a way that differs according to our point of view. But the first principles are given by intuition alone". Hence, according to Descartes, intuition can function to draw necessary conclusions from a process of discursive reasoning, as long as these conclusions are not too distant. A clear statement of Descartes commitment to this notion of deductive intuition is given in the *Regulae*:

[Q145] This evidence and certitude, however, which belongs to intuition, is required not only in the enunciation of propositions, but also in discursive reasoning of whatever sort. For example consider this consequence: 2 and 2 amount to the same as 3 and 1. Now we need to see intuitively not only that 2 and 2 make 4, and that likewise 3 and 1, but further that the third of the above statements is a necessary conclusion from these two. That deductive intuition is understood by Descartes is also evident from his notion of enumeration which will be discussed presently. Remember, the fact that Kant did not see the role of intuition in deduction "from first principles" was Mure's criticism of him.

Now it is by axiomatic intuition, in Descartes, that one grasps the cogito, "I think therefore I am" for this is the primary axiom or first principle of his metaphysics. It is the "Archimedean point" which is grasped with absolute clearness and distinctness, and that survives all the doubts raised even by the postulation of the evil demon: "I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind". It survives the demonic doubt even before the proof of a beneficent God is given in *Meditation III*. Therefore, according to Descartes, we can surely discover, at least, some truth by axiomatic intuition, before God is proved to exist and to be beneficent. This cannot be seriously challenged, for it is clearly stated by Descartes in *Meditation II*, "But there is some deceiver or other, very powerful and very cunning, who ever employs his ingenuity in deceiving me. Then without doubt I exist also if he deceives me, and let him deceive me as much as he will, he can never cause me to be nothing so long as I think I am something". Yet, if it is accepted, it certainly refutes, once and for all, the Boyce Gibson position. If the demon was the enemy of reason. as he suggests, then it is certain
that no rational intuition could ever establish anything with certainty. However, as we have seen, the cogito definitely does survive the postulation of the malicious demon.

Notwithstanding, Schouls goes wrong in his assessment of how Descartes used his distinctions. Schouls argues correctly that, "when, in the Meditations, metaphysical doubt is introduced, there is no indication that it does, and there are many indications that it does not affect intuition. Because we know the simple objects of intuition either completely or not at all, the evil genius cannot trick us with respect to them". He then observes that Descartes uses axiomatic intuition to establish the other primary axiom needed for the proof of God's existence, "It is manifest by the natural light that there must be at least as much reality in the efficient and total cause as in the effect of that cause". This is the so-called causal axiom.

Yet, the autonomy of the intellect is considered limited to axiomatic intuition with deduction and deductive intuition, in contrast, remaining doubtful. In fact, according to Schouls, deductive intuition and deduction must wait on the proof of a beneficent God for their legitimacy to be confirmed, "Specifically, he [Descartes] must have held at least intuition to be trustworthy, and must have considered at most deduction and deductive intuition to stand in need of a justification".

Yet what Schouls fails to explain is how the existence of God can be proved using axiomatic intuition alone. Earlier it was suggested that, in order to avoid the Cartesian circle, Malebranche had formulated the theory that illuminative intuition acquaintively grasped the existence of God. In this case, it can be seen how axiomatic intuition, deductive intuition and noetic-deductive reasoning can then be logically justified. They would, in that case, not be required to prove the existence of a beneficent God and hence legitimize themselves, for God would be known to exist by illuminative intuition. Yet, if Schouls' interpretation of Descartes is correct, how can the existence of God be proved from an intuition, i.e. axiomatic intuition that exclusively grasps first principles or simple propositions.

The proof of God's existence in Meditation III requires the joining of these primary axioms, i.e. what Descartes would term "succession", and hence the proof requires at least deductive intuition, if not noetic-deductive reasoning. In fact, noetic-deductive reasoning is defined as having this very function. "Knowing by deduction, by which we understand all necessary inference from other facts that are known with certainty". Hence, we would be back in the same Cartesian circle that Schouls is trying to deny an
application in Descartes. We would need to justify deductive intuition and deduction by proving that God exists and is no deceiver. Yet, to prove this we must actually use these questionable processes.

The problem of the Cartesian circle can only be properly understood by close attention to Descartes discussion of it in his replies to this specific objection. When we consider these replies we find that he is surprised that his critics think that God is required to guarantee clear and distinct ideas as presently conceived. Whereas, his point was that the existence of a beneficent God, is only required to guarantee the legitimacy of reasoning from clear and distinct ideas not presently conceived, but retained in memory as having been previously conceived. Bernard Williams and others also consider that Descartes' God acts as guarantor for chains of reasoning, which rely on memory because the conclusion is very distant. However, in the actual passages referred to, this latter point is never mentioned. Why this is so will be considered later. In the meantime consider the passages in question:

[Q146] There I distinguished those matters that in actual truth we clearly perceive from those we remember to have formerly perceived. For first, we are sure that God exists because we have attended to the proofs that established this fact; but afterwards it was enough for us to remember that we have perceived something clearly, in order to be sure that it is true; but this would not suffice, unless we knew that God existed and that he did not deceive us.52

[Q147] I announced in express terms that I referred only to the knowledge of those conclusions, the memory of which can recur when we are no longer attending to the reasons from which we deduced them.53

[Q148] But I was dealing only with those things which we remember having clearly perceived earlier, not the things which we clearly perceive at the present moment.54

Descartes is sure that God exists because he has, "attended to the proofs that established this fact". These proofs, as we have said, involve a "successive" reasoning process. This reasoning process certainly involves axiomatic intuition to grasp simple clear and distinct ideas like the cogito and the causal axiom. However, from these separate axioms, or first principles, Descartes recognizes, unlike Schouls, that he cannot prove God's existence. The linking of these axioms must, as we noted earlier, involve propositions, "which are immediately deduced from first principles" and are "known now by intuition now by deduction", i.e. either by deductive intuition or noetic-deductive
reasoning. The former, if the chain of reasonings is short enough to grasp in a single intuition. The latter if the conclusion is too distant.

Now it is necessary to argue against Schouls that deductive intuition, like axiomatic intuition, is fully autonomous in Descartes. It does not stand in need of justification by a beneficent God. For Descartes God, is only required, as the above passages make clear, to guarantee the legitimacy of our memory of previously conceived clear and distinct ideas. This theory is a version then of what Bernard Williams calls, "the memory answer\(^5\)\(^5\), but a version that firstly incorporates many of Descartes' sophisticated distinctions. Secondly, it denies Descartes thought that God could guarantee the memory required in noetic-deductive reasoning.

Before considering specifics, it must be pointed out that the memory answer has had its critics. Bernard Williams, in agreement with Frankfurt, observes that the memory answer, "does not adequately represent what Descartes wants to say is suggested by his insistence, on several occasions...that it is not just memories of clear and distinct perceptions but clear and distinct perceptions themselves that require validation by God".\(^5\)\(^6\) It certainly cannot be denied that there are some Cartesian passages that do suggest that clear and distinct ideas require God's guarantee. The following quotation seems unambiguous, in this respect, and there are others with a similar content, "that which I have just taken as a rule...that all things which we very clearly and very distinctly conceive of are true, is certain only because God is or exists".\(^5\)\(^7\) I am certainly not suggesting that the critics who raised the Cartesian circle argument had no evidence to point to. However, it counts as more conclusive evidence that, when Descartes is confronted explicitly with this notion, he denies it consistently. There is a constant objection throughout his Replies that he is not talking about clear and distinct ideas but about our memory of them. Consider again [Q146, p. 210] and [Q147, p. 210] and the clear distinction made between those matters we "clearly perceive" and those we "remember that we formerly perceived" in [Q148,. P. 210]. This and other evidence has led Nakhnikian to designate those quotations which imply that the clear and distinct ideas themselves require the existence of God, "Descartes' Aberrant view".\(^5\)\(^8\) The alternative suggested in the Replies may indeed be a later development of Descartes' view, worked out in reaction to a legitimate objection. However, it is certainly his mature response to the problem, and as we shall soon discover prevents circular reasoning.
Another much cruder objection is made by Anthony Kenny who denies that Descartes ever doubted the memory, "Descartes never seriously raises sceptical doubts about the reliability of memory". 59 As a consequence, it would have been pointless for him to posit God as a guarantor for its reliability. It is difficult to accept this argument against the memory answer because the process which Descartes terms enumeration 60 , is specifically designed to eliminate the need for any reliance on our doubtful memories.

Let us now consider this enumerative process in greater detail. The first thing to say about this process is that it is an attempt to convert noetic-deductive reasoning into deductive intuition. Why is it that this should be an advantage? Descartes observes that it is necessary if our judgements are to be true and certain, "For resolving most problems other precepts are profitable, but enumeration alone will secure our always passing a true and certain judgement on whatsoever engages our attention". 61 Yet, why should transforming a deductive process into one that is purely intuitive make any difference to the certainty of our judgements? The answer to this question is clear. The deductive process being "successive" rather than "immediate" involves, as we have seen, the processes of memory. Memory, as a function of mind, is according to Descartes liable to error. It is described in the Regulae as "weak and liable to deceive us". 62 We certainly cannot guarantee our memories are immune from the process of doubt. Hence, any conclusions arrived at by a process that involves memory necessarily become doubtful. The process of enumeration seeks to remedy this situation by eliminating the involvement of memory in the quest for knowledge:

[149] To remedy this I would run them over from time to time, keeping the imagination moving continuously in such a way that while it is intuitively perceiving each fact it simultaneously passes on to the next; and this I would do until I had learned to pass from the first to the last so quickly, that no stage in the process was left to the care of the memory, but I seem to have the whole in intuition before me at the same time. 63

It is the process of enumeration that transforms, for Descartes, doubtful deductions reliant on memory into certain truths grasped by intuition. Against Schouls, God is not required as guarantor at any stage in this process for deductive intuition is autonomous. Yet, what if the conclusions are so remote or so many facts are involved that the process of enumeration is impossible for our limited intellects. Here we have a situation where deduction cannot be transformed into enumeration. Is God required here to guarantee our
memories? Certainly, many commentators' versions of the memory answer have suggested that this is the case. Margaret Wilson, for example observes, "As is now fairly widely acknowledged, Descartes seeks to limit the scope of the Deceiver Hypothesis, in the Replies and even in later parts of the Meditations, to, in effect, non-self-evident 'conclusions'". Hence, God would be required to guarantee these distant conclusions, which inevitably involve memory.

For Descartes, it is true that in order to grasp these distant conclusions it is requisite to use the unreliable memory, "In fact the memory, on which we have said depends the certainty of the conclusions which embrace more than we can grasp in a single act of intuition". Yet strangely the 'certainty of the conclusions', in this case, is not considered to be of the same magnitude as that in examples of the grasping of first principles (axiomatic intuition) or intuiting deductive sequences (deductive intuition). Noetic-deductive reasoning, which cannot be "enumerated" and hence must be dependent on memory, is considered to involve an inferior grade of certainty, a type of certainty that the mind because of its limitations, must just resign itself to, "But if we infer any single thing from various and disconnected facts, often our intellectual capacity is not so great as to be able to embrace them all in a single intuition; in which case our mind should be content with the certitude attaching to this operation". Simple intuition and enumeration provide the only truly certain knowledge, "We must note that by adequate enumeration or induction is only meant that method by which we may attain surer conclusions than by any other type of proof, with the exception of simple intuition".

Yet if Wilson and others are correct then God's main function is to guarantee the memory in this very case. Surely then our memory would be secure from doubt. We would not have to settle for an inferior grade of certainty. Is it not also strange that when Descartes discusses memory extensively in the replies he never mentions the type of memory that extends beyond the process of enumeration? He, in fact, only discusses the memory of clear and distinct propositions. Descartes does this because memory cannot guarantee a process that has not been clearly and distinctly conceived already. God functions only to guarantee that the memory of previously intuited clear and distinct axioms or non-remote conclusions can be enumerated. Those that have never and cannot be brought under a clear and distinct perception, viz. remote conclusions, cannot be guaranteed by God. Only if a long deductive sequence can be enumerated, and most
can\textsuperscript{68}, can we attain to a full certainty that evades the doubt introduced by the malicious demon:

[Q150] Here we maintain that an enumeration [of the steps in a proof] is required as well, if we wish to make our science complete. For resolving most problems other precepts are profitable, but enumeration alone will secure our always passing a true and certain judgement on whatsoever engages our attention: by means of it nothing at all will escape us, but we shall evidently have some knowledge of every step.\textsuperscript{69}

Let us return now to the Cartesian circle argument. We have already established that, for Descartes, all intuitions are distinguished from deductions because of their immediacy or instantaneousness and hence their non-reliance on memory. The only thing then that still requires argument is whether Descartes' proof of God's existence involves a deductive process that must rely on the memory of remote conclusions. If it does require such reliance then the existence of God would not be able to be grasped clearly and distinctly. God's existence would not be beyond all doubt but only beyond the highly metaphysical one already recognized. The consequence would be that we could not guarantee our clear and distinct ideas beyond the moment on which we actually grasped them. We could only say that they were true at \(t_1\) not at any future time \(t_2\), for between \(t_1\) and \(t_2\) is a period of time \(t_x\) which the memory must guarantee. Yet, in the third Meditation, Descartes indicates that the existence of God is a clear and distinct idea, "this idea [of God] is very clear and distinct and contains within it more objective reality than any other".\textsuperscript{70} The proof therefore cannot contain any remote conclusions and must be receptive to the process of enumeration. The whole argument avoids any suggestion of circularity because the existence of God is proved through forms of intuition that, by their nature as immediate, do not require memory. Remember, even in enumeration "no stage in the process [is] left to the care of memory".\textsuperscript{71} God is used, not to guarantee the so intuited clear and distinct ideas that are used to prove his own existence. God only guarantees that our potentially unreliable memories of these clear and distinct ideas are not subject to error. God's beneficence precludes the unreliability of memory over period \(t_x\). In addition, memory period \(t_x\) has no impute to the proof of God's existence.

In conclusion, Descartes' mature position in contrast to the so-called "aberrant view" avoids the Cartesian circle objection. Axiomatic intuition and deductive intuition which supply clear and distinct ideas are autonomous and outside the influence of the malicious
demon. The memory of this type of proposition is not autonomous and theoretically can be subject to the tricks of the malicious demon. However, the proof of the existence of a beneficent God that is clear and distinct, guarantees that the malicious demon cannot be allowed to tamper with such memories. For, in the forth Meditation, Descartes observes. "He [God] could not desire to deceive me, it is clear that He has not given me a faculty that will lead me to err if I use it aright".72

Notwithstanding, certain remote conclusions cannot entirely survive the introduction of the evil demon and are consequently not completely certain. Yet, as Descartes observes, this doubt is only a high level metaphysical doubt, "the reason for doubt which depends on this opinion alone is very slight, and so to speak metaphysical".73 It relies on the remote possibility that there is an evil power in the universe tampering with our memory. If we cannot achieve absolute certainty here against the sceptic it must just be accepted that our propositions are only highly probable. It might be objected here that if there is a beneficent God why has he given us any faculty of memory that can err in any way; for surely he does not want to deceive us. Descartes answer to this is simple. The error is not in the faculty supplied by God but in the human will which wants to extend its use beyond its proper function. Remember a beneficent God only guarantees that a faculty is immune from error if it is "used aright". If we use our memories to attain to remote conclusions, which move beyond the scope of our certain intuitions, i.e. what is guaranteed by our reason then of course we will err. We must just curb our will to prevent it outstripping the intellect's powers, "in the matters to be examined we come to a step in the series of which our understanding is not sufficiently well able to have an intuitive cognition, we must stop short there. We must make no attempt to examine what follows".74

Notwithstanding, this Cartesian mature position still does not bridge the epistemological gap between the noumenal and the in-itself. Descartes assurances on the absence of "absolute falsity" are certainly not convincing. This possibility ensures that the stubborn sceptic is not entirely defeated. Descartes convincingly counters the sceptic's malicious demon argument but the absolute falsity argument still looms large. The Cartesian circle is squared, but the sceptic's doubt is not entirely eliminated.
CHAPTER 9
SPINOZA AND SCIENTIFIC MODELS

9.1. Immanent Aposteriorism

We have already touched on the distinction between transcendent apriorism and immanent aposteriorism in our earlier discussion on the epistemology of existentialism. However, the most important aspect of the distinction has yet to be addressed. This concerns the determination of the exact nature of the contrast between transcendent apriorism and the methodological epistemology of science. The most common understanding of the epistemology of science puts transcendent apriorism and science at opposite scales of the epistemological spectrum. The epistemology of science, according to this view, is immanent and a posteriori rather than transcendent and a priori.

However, there are problems with this simple view. Firstly, it is certain, that deductive and other a priori processes have had a role in the history of scientific discovery. In fact, in extreme cases, like Cartesian science, such forms of reasoning which imply varieties of apriorism, are epistemologically dominant. In addition, it is not the case, as we shall discover, that synthetic a priori forms of reasoning are necessarily extruded by philosophers of science from contributing to scientific methodology. Secondly, there is the further confusion concerning whether the postulation of unobservable entities within scientific theories constitutes a commitment to a transcendent rather an immanent epistemology. These are important questions, which raise further issues that are relevant to the exact nature of transcendent apriorism.

9.1.1. Is Science Immanent or Transcendent?

The doctrine that scientific theories should concern themselves purely with that which is immanent, with that which is not beyond actual or possible experience, is a view shared by scientific epistemologies such as reductionism, operationalism, verificationalism.
instrumentalism and internal realism. It is also the view of science that we are being pushed towards if we accept the under-determination thesis. All the abovementioned scientific epistemologies attempt to eliminate any theories that make reference to posited unobservable features of the world in their explanatory apparatus. Some assert that the full cognitive content of a theory is exhausted by its observational consequences reported by its observational sentences. While the under-determination thesis is the scientific equivalent of Kant's theory that any attempt to comprehend the noumenal will result in antinomies. The thesis, as defined by Daniel E. Little (1995), states that any theory that makes reference to unobservable features will "always encounter rival theories incompatible with the original theory but equally compatible with all possible observational data that might be taken as confirmatory of the original theory".¹

However, let us now consider the sense in which the scientist, in this epistemological reading of his project, is attaining to the noumenal world. Now it is certain that the transcendent apriorist and the scientist largely reject the "ordinary" man's common-sense notions of the world. The world picture of the scientist, for instance, does not reveal a world of solid objects in three dimensions existing through linear time, rather it involves a world of invisible particles in curved space-time. Yet this is not enough to instantiate a strong distinction between the world as it appears to aesthetic consciousness, identified as false or illusory and the world as it revealed to the noetic functions identified as the True Reality. Certainly, for the scientist, the ordinary person is wrong in his understanding of the world for he trusts to, (i) the naive interpretations of his senses (i.e. aesthesis not consciously structured and interpreted by the mind using a strict methodological procedure with proper testing of conclusions); (ii) arguments from authority; (iii) superstition; (iv) the constructs of his imagination, or (v) experience that is not mechanically heightened.

However, the scientist and the ordinary person use and start from the same experiential materials that are not considered illusory. The aim of both is to understand the world of phenomena not to attain to the noumenal. Of course there are more or less adequate ways of interpreting the phenomenal and the scientist considers that his way is the correct one and the ordinary person's way is incorrect. Yet, there is no rejection by the scientist of the phenomenal in favour of the noumenal. In both cases, that of the scientist and of the ordinary person, this project of understanding the phenomenal may involve the positing of putative noumenal entities. For the ordinary person the
supernatural world is sometimes invoked, whereas for the scientist it is quarks, black holes and neutron stars that are considered to be beyond experience.

However, even if we can consider the latter scientific knowledge to attain to the noumenal (a question considered subsequently), knowledge of the noumenal world is, for the scientist, still subsidiary to the interpretation of the phenomenal. Any such insight into the noumenal being defeasible if it does not correspond with experiential data. The intention of the scientist is to create a hypothesis that best explains the phenomenal world. In contrast, for the transcendent apriorist, the phenomenal world is a form of seeming only. She therefore seeks a higher form of understanding, i.e. insights into the noumenal world and this knowledge, when attained, is not defeasible with reference to experiential data. The scientist, in one epistemological understanding, seems to transcend the phenomenal and attain to the noumenal. However, the distinction between this process and the metaphysics of transcendent apriorism is still clear and substantial.

Now the attempt to connect all scientific statements with down-to-earth observation statements, would obviously connect science with the phenomenal world as its epistemic object. However, the other view of the epistemology of science, usually identified as scientific realism, tolerates unobservables in its explanatory systems. The view of unobservables in this type of scientific epistemology is radically different, "the terms of theories that putatively refer to unobservables ought to be taken at their referential face value and not reinterpreted in some instrumentalist manner".2 As we have seen, this could be interpreted as a severance of the strict ties of science to the world of phenomena. It is certain that the modern scientist presents a picture of the world that appears very different from the one encountered in experience. The world of neutrons, protons, electrons, quarks and other sub-atomic particles plus empty space, according to the scientist, are the true fabric of reality that underlies the solid material objects like chairs and tables that we encounter in our everyday experience. Bertrand Russell, from an empiricist standpoint, observed that the truth about material objects must be strange.

Is it not, after all, possible to contend that the epistemological object of the modern scientist is the noumenal world rather than the phenomenal? The answer is no, because it is not just the willingness to state that the world is different from what it appears in our "ordinary" experience that marks out a commitment to the noumenal. Rather it is the willingness to state that (i) the world is different from ordinary and "heightened" or "mechanically enhanced" experience: (ii) such intrinsic experience in general is
unnecessary for the origination and justification of one's theory, and (iii) such experience cannot falsify one's theory. The modern scientist cannot make all of these commitments. His theories are consequently rooted in the phenomenal world.

With regard to point (i) above, the object of the modern scientist's enquiry is to explain the world as it appears with regard to a certain form of experience. This particular form referred to is "heightened" or "mechanically enhanced" experience. It is often not our "everyday" experience of the world that is relevant. We have seen that our apparently solid chairs and tables are not as we perceive them. However, it is experience heightened by and filtered through sophisticated pieces of equipment, viz. the instruments of science that extend the range of our senses. There is reference to the electron microscope, the radio telescope, the mass spectrometer, the infrared or gamma ray detector, the atomic clock, the seismometer, the voltmeter, the gigacounter etc. We must be careful then not to see some modern science as transcending experience when it is in fact merely transcending "everyday experience" or "unaided observational experience". For such transcendence has nothing to do with the attainment of the noumenal world. This is a common error. To give one example, John Worrall suggests that the scientist is successful because he has grasped the truth about the noumenal world.

[Q151] How else can we account for the success [of science] except by assuming that what our theories say is going on 'beneath' the phenomena is 'essentially' or very largely correct? If so the argument goes, what the theories say about 'transempirical' reality is true or 'close to the truth'.

Yet, what he means by the noumenal world here is revealed by his examples, viz. electromagnetic waves and the subatomic particles underlying nuclear physics. The theories that posit these entities are described as transempirical. They grasp what is going on "beneath the phenomena". Yet such entities are not beyond experience per se. They only transcend unaided, non-heightened experience. In this respect they are not noumenal entities at all.

It would be premature to conclude from this, however, that scientists never posit entities that are beyond everyday and even heightened experience. Robert Oppenheimer posited the existence of Black holes for instance despite the fact that there could be no observational consequences of their existence that could be detected by the telescopes of his day. Now, if any such entities were posited because of a priori mathematical reasoning
then they could certainly be described as noumenal objects. This has certainly happened, although only in a very small number of instances. That it is the case with the theory of black holes is confirmed by Stephen Hawking when he observes that, "Black holes are one of only a fairly small number of cases in the history of science in which a theory was developed in great detail as a mathematical model before there was any evidence from observations that it was correct".4

Despite this, the main epistemological object of such a scientific procedure is still the phenomenal world. Whereas in transcendent apriorism the noumenal is the end point of philosophical enquiry, for the scientist it is the means to further explanation of the phenomenal. The scientist posits a noumenal entity often only to explain an anomaly in the phenomenal data. The noumenal is posited therefore only in order to better explain the data provided by the aesthetic functions.

The fact is that the scientist, even if he regarded the noumenal entity as the end-in-itself of his enquiry, would not be doing transcendent apriorism but rather transcendent aposteriorism. This may not seem obvious but it becomes evident when we consider that observational experience is still fundamentally relevant in the justification, verification, or falsification of scientific theories. John Mitchel, in the *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London* of 1783, had first posited the existence of black holes. Yet it is only in the latter part of this century that their existence has been established and accepted by scientists.

This acceptance was largely due to the invention of the radio telescope and the extension in power of the conventional telescope and their subsequent combined use by Maarten Schmidt and Jocelyn Bell. Schmidt needed to observe red-shift (the reddening of light from a star that is moving away from us) of a faint star like object in the direction of the source of radio waves called 3C273. Whereas Bell's discovery depended on observing an object in the sky that emitted regular pulses of radio waves. Although a black hole itself does not emit light it can exert a gravitational force on nearby objects and this is observable. The scientific acceptance of black holes was due therefore to the extended possibilities for observational data provided by heightened experience as defined above. Until this evidence came there was only a priori justification of their existence. Now a priori justification would be the most adequate justification of all for the transcendent apriorist. However the fact that the evidence for Black holes was a priori counted against it for the scientist. As Hawking suggested, "this used to be the main argument of
opponents of black holes: how could one believe in objects for which the only evidence was calculations based on the dubious theory of relativity?". The question of the a posteriori nature of the scientific method will now be dealt with in more detail.

9.1.2. Is Science A posteriorist or A priorist?

The doctrine that scientific theories should be established by a posteriori means is almost universal in "modern" science. However, it should always be remembered that much of what constitutes "traditional" science has a more apriorist approach. There is even an important traditional science that proceeds entirely a priori. The latter, still being a science, has the phenomenal (world) as its epistemological-object. However, there is a noetic justification and origination of its fundamental concepts and propositions. In table 1., this pure enquiry was designated, "Cartesian" science and with respect to its underlying epistemology categorized it as immanent apriorist. This designatory qualifying term "Cartesian" is chosen purely because of its familiarity. There is no suggestion that such a scientific project originated with René Descartes. In fact, it could more accurately be attributed to the Pre-Socratics and Plato, Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo used it before Descartes. However, it is certain that Descartes is the philosopher usually associated with this type of science.

Science, in the apriorist tradition, had a mathematical-type epistemology and one that was considered synthetic a priori in nature. It had a distrust of empirical content or justification. And had reliance upon clear and distinct ideas attained through intellectual intuition and deduction (rather than induction). The ideal model for all knowledge in this tradition was mathematics and, in consequence, natural science was to adopt the mathematical-type methodology. As Parkinson argues, "such a methodology, as is clear, is strongly a priori in nature. The mathematician does not proceed by experiment and induction, but works out the consequences of his definitions and axioms without reference to sense-experience".

There is an important distinction to be made within this mathematical method. Modern science also views the role of mathematics as the indispensable tool for its methodology. However, at the level of epistemology this mathematics is reduced to a series of contentless tautologies. They can, in themselves, establish no contentual truth concerning the Truly Real. A representative view in this regard is that of A. J. Ayer when
he observes, "a priori propositions of logic and pure mathematics...these I allow to be necessary and certain only because they are analytic". The view that Mathematics and a priori thought give us synthetic a priori scientific knowledge cannot be said now (as it previously was) to be the dominant view, although its still has its defenders. The mathematician H. Poincaré, for example, in *La Science et l'Hypothèse* states the case for mathematics being synthetic a priori.

Modern science therefore requires the a posteriori to provide the contentual aspects of the enquiry. The a priori only provides purely formal elements. In contrast, in traditional science, a priori ratiocination proved synthetic, contentual and hence gave rise to necessary propositions about the world that left no room for observation and experimentation. Cohen has connected the rise of a priori science with the success of the mathematical method in the new mechanics of Kepler, Galileo and Newton:

> [Q152] It was probably at least in part because of the important part played by mathematics in the new mechanics of Kepler, Galileo and Newton, that some philosophers thought it plausible to suppose that rationality was just as much the touchstone of scientific truth as of mathematical truth. At any rate that supposition seems to underlie the epistemologies of Descartes and Spinoza, for example, in which observation and experiment are assigned relatively little importance.8

It is clear that the justification of beliefs by experiment and observation are of little importance (although, not of no importance) to Cartesian science. Let us consider the issue of justification with regard to the modern scientist.

Now for the modern scientist, unlike the transcendent apriorist or Cartesian scientist, the justification or falsification of his beliefs depends ultimately on the aesthetic functions. It is therefore a posteriori. There is even much concentration on finding the "crucial experiment" that either justifies or falsifies a particular hypothesis. The hypothetico-deductive method is often seen as the essence of scientific method. It is the view that theories are first arrived at as creative hypotheses of the scientist's imagination and then confronted, for justificatory or falsificatory purposes, with the observational predictions deduced from them. Of course there are other criteria of justification, sometimes used, like the simplicity of a theorem (enshrined in Occam's razor); the authority of tradition as in methodological conservatism; part or even coherence within the total theory, as in conformational holism. Those philosophers cynical of the scientific method, like Kuhn
he observes, "a priori propositions of logic and pure mathematics...these I allow to be necessary and certain only because they are analytic". The view that Mathematics and a priori thought give us synthetic a priori scientific knowledge cannot be said now (as it previously was) to be the dominant view, although its still has its defenders. The mathematician H. Poincaré, for example, in *La Science et l'Hypothèse* states the case for mathematics being synthetic a priori.

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and Feyerebend, find numerous others that provide a dubious foundation for knowledge. Despite all this, the ultimate justificatory criterion is still the data of experience. Even mathematical cosmologists like Stephen Hawking admit the need for such confirmation. Of course there is a mathematical, and therefore a priori, element that is the bedrock of a sound theory, a theory cannot be mathematically inconsistent. However, there is still the need for observational confirmation or justification of the theory's content. As Hawking's observes:

[Q153] What would it mean if we actually did discover the ultimate theory of the universe? As was explained in Chapter 1, we could never be quite sure that we had indeed found the correct theory, since theories can't be proved. However, if the theory was mathematically consistent and always gave predictions that agreed with observations, we could be reasonably confident that it was the right one.9

The first thing to note is that the aesthetic functions of the intellect are relevant to the justification of the hypothesis. For instance, if there is the actual possibility of detecting previously undetectable neutron stars with the senses (enhanced by sophisticated equipment of course) then this observation acts as the ultimate judgement upon its validity. This type of justification would not be legitimate within the epistemology of transcendent apriorism where all true justification is noetic. Of course, it is impossible to deny that philosophers, who work within the epistemology of transcendent apriorism, are often interested in science. They even sometimes talk of experiential justification of certain propositions. However, as we shall see later in discussing Spinoza, this type of justification is only found at all relevant when the limitations of the human pure reason is most strongly felt. It is a form of argument, but a last resort argument that does not establish anything as necessarily true. In conclusion, no theory which fails to "save the appearances" (which for the transcendent apriorist would be like saving the mere "seemings") can establish itself permanently and securely within the scientific community.

Now as for the origination of the scientist's beliefs the case is just as clear. If the scientific object is the immanent phenomenal world accessible to the senses, then it seems that theories relevant to this world are going to emerge from patterns or regularities in the data available about this world, i.e. sensory data. Accordingly the inductivist states that theories are somehow generated out of accumulated observational data. However, those who hold to the hypothetico-deductive or falsifiability thesis often observe that the
hypotheses are generated in the mind of the scientist and then only justified or falsified by experience. The truth is that even if this could be proved a noetic process of hypothesis generation it would not blur the distinction between the scientist and the transcendent apriorist. For in apriorism, the propositions involved must be both derived from and justified by the intellect's noetic function. It is true that some methodologists, like Karl Popper, deny that theories can be justified by observational experience. However, this does not represent a rejection of observational experience. It is just the epistemological claim of fallibilism that epistemological certainty cannot be achieved through induction. Hence a non-inductive procedure should replace it. This non-inductive procedure still involves observational experience but this time used to falsify experience rather than confirm it. To use Popper's own example, the observation of a black swan would falsify the universal proposition that, "all swans are white".10

Hence, the fact that the scientist justifies his belief a posteriori is enough to distinguish him from the transcendent apriorist. However, philosophers of science often ascribe to the theory that the imagination generates the hypothesis, which are then testable by experience. The imagination functions in the scientific understanding to generate a theory with captures all the various sense data in a particular way or under a particular model. Hence the scientific imagination has its source and foundation in the aesthetic functions only.

Modern science exclusively sees an important role for experience in its epistemology. It can be considered, in Kenneth Winkler's terms, to be "content" empiricism or "justification" empiricism and it can be both. We have already considered the implications of these terms in our definition of experience. However, to give an example that will trigger our memories; the following quotations from W. V. Quine could be considered as examples of both (i) extreme justification empiricism that, "no statement is immune to revision in response to recalcitrant experience"11 and (ii) content empiricism when he quotes with approval in Pursuit of Truth (1992) the slogan "nihil in mente quod non prius sensu".12 It is important to note that I am not suggesting here that this is Quine's actual view of the role of experience in science. Such a topic is extremely complex and beyond the scope of this thesis.

Within other epistemologies of science experience plays a more limited less pervasive role. Karl Popper, for instance could be considered a justification empiricist but not necessarily a content empiricist. However, it is the emphasis on the epistemological value
of experience that defines our "modern" science. Now it is sometimes argued that some modern scientific work is closer to the Cartesian model because it is only tenuously linked to experience. However, firstly it is important to remember not to confuse the trans-experiential, i.e. the noumenal, with heightened experience. If this confusion is avoided then the abovementioned link may seem anything but tenuous. Secondly, any link in justificatory terms with intrinsic experience marks science off from transcendent apriorism. Some modern scientists may not endorse the extreme "contrite fallibilism" of C. S. Peirce, who expressed his willingness to, "dump the whole cartload of his beliefs, the moment experience is against them". However, there is no determination on his part, as there is with the Cartesian scientist whose ideal is, to dispense with it altogether. I qualify by saying that this is their "ideal" because some practitioners of Cartesian science have a secondary inferior use for experience as providing various unprovable conjectures when, because of the limits of the human mind, they cannot proceed a priori. Scientists who are willing to sever their link with experience completely (or in the above sense exclusively) would be either transcendent apriorists or immanent apriorists.

9.2. Baruch Spinoza: Scientia Intuitiva


[Spinoza14]

This section represents a defence of a traditional interpretation of Spinoza, which goes against the grain of much contemporary opinion. It is the contention of this thesis that Spinoza was a transcendent apriorist in the classic sense, and instantiated in his work one of the highest achievement of that epistemology. However, the modern interpretation denies that Spinoza was a transcendent apriorist at all. Largely the traditional interpretation of Spinoza is at the point of falling out of favour and a new "tradition" established. The new interpretation is concerned with the re-assessment of rationalist philosophers in general and accuses the old tradition of misrepresenting them or "caricaturing" them for various non-philosophical reasons.

The traditional interpretations, in contrast, have a long history beginning perhaps - as Curley, the great enemy of this exegetic tradition, surprisingly admits - with the
rationalists themselves, "to some extent it [the traditional interpretation] may represent the way Kant's predecessors thought of themselves". The clearest self-assessment of the rationalist project in this mould comes in Leibniz' Preface to the New Essays. The interpretation was further re-enforced by Kant in particular. Curley also admits that it probably represents Kant's view of his relation to his predecessors. It has subsequently been, as he himself suggests, a huge influence on "the construction of university curricula, anthologies and general histories of philosophy". All this is not to suggest, however, that the traditional interpretation is without modern defenders.

It will be interesting to note at this point how the defenders of the modern interpretation view the position from which they are rebelling. In appendix 2 (p. 254) quotations from some of the staunchest defenders of the modern position are listed. If all this is correct then the philosophers who defend the traditional interpretation, including Descartes, Leibniz and Spinoza themselves (on Curley's admission) are motivated not by consideration of the evidence or by what they intend in their own epistemologies, but rather by various non-philosophical criteria. These include aesthetic pleasure, neatness and organizational simplicity, the urge to think that philosophy is progressive, the urge to tell a story, the need for edification and finally the need to provide interest or drama to a dull subject through caricature.

It is certainly difficult to accept this view. However, such motivational issues are a side issue which represent ad hominem arguments against the philosophers involved without proving or disproving the issue at stake. At best the arguments draw attention to a prejudice that could underlie a particular interpretation and of course it is wise to bare this in mind. It can be noted at this point that we have already identified a prejudice that could just as easily be said to underlie the motivation for the modern interpretation. That is the desire to distance major philosophers of the past from the supposedly unacceptable epistemological position of transcendent apriorism. However, the real question can only be answered, in this section with respect to the case of Spinoza, with reference to the arguments involved and the textual evidence available.

Although Curley cites Copleston as one of the defenders of the traditional view, there is a sense in which he is wrong to do so. Copleston, with regard to Spinoza at least, incorporates both interpretations into one exegesis by bifurcating Spinoza's philosophy into contrasting aspects. Certainly, Copleston does not countenance an extreme modern position, which promotes (i) the role of experience in Spinoza and (ii) his abandonment of
final causality to such an extent as to see him as a precursor to the modern scientist. In fact Copleston admits that a large part of Spinoza's philosophy conforms to the traditional interpretation. However, there is also, according to him, an aspect of Spinoza's philosophy, "the naturalistic aspect\(^\text{19}\), that conforms to the modern interpretation and is described as being a "sketch of a programme for scientific research".\(^\text{20}\) We are warned that this aspect is not to be viewed as Spinoza's exclusive interest but it is certainly accepted as an important part of his philosophical project. To prove that Copleston does not have the one-dimensional view, with regard to Spinoza, which Curley attributes to him, the following passage in which the above points are made is quoted:

[155] The system of Spinoza is thus I suggest, two faced. The metaphysic of infinite being manifesting itself in finite beings looks back to the metaphysical systems of the past. The theory that all finite beings and their modifications can be explained in terms of causal connections which are in principle ascertainable, looks forward to those empirical sciences which do in fact omit consideration of final causality and try to explain their data in terms of efficient causality. If one stresses the metaphysical aspect, one will tend to see Spinoza primarily as a "pantheist", as one who endeavoured to develop consistently, even if not successfully, the implications of the concept of God as infinite and completely non-dependent being if one stresses what I may perhaps call the "naturalistic aspect, one will tend to concentrate on Natura naturata, to question the propriety of calling Nature "God" and of describing it as "substance", and to see in the philosophical system the sketch of a programme for scientific research. But one must not forget that Spinoza himself was a metaphysician with the ambitious aim of explaining reality or making the universe intelligible. He may have anticipated hypotheses, which have commended themselves to many scientists; but he concerned himself with metaphysical problems with which the scientist as scientist is not concerned.\(^\text{21}\)

Copleston's division of Spinoza's philosophy into two parts viz. (i) traditional metaphysics ("the metaphysical systems of the past") and (ii) the "naturalistic aspect" or "the sketch of a programme for scientific research" attempts to strike a balance between the two types of interpretation. Yet, there is little evidence to substantiate a division of this nature. In fact, this thesis denies any such dualist position that provides room for an empirical aspect. It is one of the contentions that there is an overemphasis, in modern scholarship, on the process of "rescuing" rationalist philosophers from their supposedly dubious epistemology. This is a case in point. There seems to be desperation, on the part of modern exegetes, to find something approaching modern science in the writings of
Spinoza. Even Copleston, who is otherwise sympathetic to the traditional approach, feels compelled to do so, and yet it is pure anachronism.

For one thing Spinoza's view of the epistemology of science contrasts quite strongly with our modern conception. The fundamental feature of modern science was found to be its aposteriorism, not exclusively in the acquisition, but always in the justification of knowledge claims. There is a need for a distinction here because, as Cohen has suggested, science itself, in the Cartesian tradition that influenced Spinoza, was considered to have a mathematical-type epistemology viz. one that was a priori in nature:

[Q156] It was probably at least in part because of the important part played by mathematics in the new mechanics of Kepler, Galileo and Newton, that some philosophers thought it plausible to suppose that rationality was just as much the touchstone of scientific truth as of mathematical truth. At any rate that supposition seems to underlie the epistemologies of Descartes and Spinoza, for example, in which observation and experiment are assigned relatively little importance.  

Our "modern" science therefore is defined as one that sees an important role for experience in its epistemology. In its epistemological aspect it can be considered, in Kenneth Winkler's terms, to be "content" empiricism or "justification" empiricism and it can be both. This is in direct contrast to Cartesian Science with its distrust of empirical content or justification and its reliance on clear and distinct ideas attained through intellectual intuition and deduction (rather than induction). The ideal model for all knowledge, in this tradition, was mathematics and as a consequence natural science was to adopt the mathematical methodology. As Parkinson argues, "such a methodology, as is clear, is strongly a priori in nature. The mathematician does not proceed by experiment and induction, but works out the consequences of his definitions and axioms without reference to sense-experience; and it is the mathematician's method of procedure which Spinoza, like Descartes, wishes to extend to all branches of knowledge". In this respect, it is the ideal of Cartesian science to dispense with experience altogether. I say that this is their ideal because some practitioners of Cartesian science have a secondary inferior use for experience as providing various unprovable conjectures when, because of the limits of the human mind, they cannot proceed a priori. Scientists who sever their link with experience completely would be transcendent apriorists or immanent apriorists. Consequently they would be indistinguishable from either the rationalist metaphysician or
the Cartesian type scientists respectively. To say therefore that Spinoza had "scientific" interests will not prove the modernist exegetes' point. He must prove, more specifically, a commitment to a particular scientific epistemology.

It is certainly true that Spinoza was extremely interested in such scientific understanding in the experimental tradition. His English correspondent Oldenburg was secretary of the Royal Society and kept Spinoza informed about the new experimental methods. Through Oldenburg Spinoza was able to conduct an argument with the chemist Boyle concerning the latter's chemical experiments. Oldenburg even sent Spinoza Boyle's recently published volume of *Physiological Essays* and Spinoza made many observations and criticisms concerning the nature of the "43 experiments used to establish Boyle's conclusions". Oldenburg also frequently discusses with Spinoza the theories of the Dutch physicist and astronomer Huygens with particular reference to his theory of comets. Furthermore, Spinoza's own occupation as a lens grinder gave him an interest in optics and it was this interest that encouraged Leibniz to send Spinoza his own paper on this subject, to which Spinoza replied with criticism. The letters of Spinoza even reveal that he actually conducted some experiments particularly on pressure. He wrote a small pamphlet on the rainbow and, at one point, had intended to write a treatise on physics. Although to what extent the latter would have followed the experimental method is another question.

So far we have just been discussing Spinoza's interests and if this were all the evidence available it might just be possible to admit that Spinoza had a passing interest in the experimental methodology but never embraced it enthusiastically as the great new method in science. In fact his attitude to the methodology is usually very critical. Hall and Hall in "Philosophy and Natural Philosophy: Boyle and Spinoza" (1964) present the Boyle correspondence as a classic confrontation between a rationalist and an empiricist. They highlight the fact that Spinoza's main criticism of Boyle was that his experiments were largely unnecessary. This point is also made by McKeon and most clearly by Parkinson when he observes that, "Spinoza, in his correspondence with Boyle, seems unable to understand the stress which Boyle laid on experiment. His view was that since physical Nature follows mechanical laws which can be known in advance, and since the implications of these can be deduced mathematically, any experiment is practically as good as any other". In fact, Leibniz in the New Essays made a similar criticism of Boyle where the rationalist point is made clearly:
Spinoza offered a similar reflection in one of his letters. He was commenting on a work of Mr Boyles, who, it must be said, does spend rather too long on drawing from countless fine experiments no conclusion except one which he could have adopted as a principle, namely that everything in nature takes place mechanically - a principle which can be made certain by reason alone, and never by experiments, however many of them one conducts.29

Spinoza's attitude to experimentation was negative because for him, as for Leibniz, the necessity of experimentation was bound up with the limitations of the human mind. All attempts must be made to prove something a priori before we must accept the uncertainty of any experimental method. The experimental method is uncertain because the conclusions that can be drawn from it, as Leibniz informs us above, by their very nature as inductive inferences, do not possess necessity. Necessity and hence certainty can only be provided by pure reason. As Spinoza observes "Reason perceives things truly as they are in themselves, i.e. not as contingent but as necessary"30, and "The object aimed at is the acquisition of clear and distinct ideas, such as are produced by the pure intellect, and not by chance physical motions".31 Of course when human reason fails due to its own limitations, unfortunately, experimentation is all that remains. However, experimentation can only deliver unprovable conjectures, never metaphysical truth. The model to be aspired to was divine reason because all things are understood by God a priori, as eternal truths. However, that this is the correct interpretation of Spinoza's attitude to experimentation will have to await proof until we discuss Spinoza's concept of imagination.

In the seventeenth century, there was not the huge prejudice against traditional metaphysics that exists today. Although Kant, almost a century later, bemoans that "the changed fashion of the times brings metaphysics nothing but scorn"32, it must be remembered that Kant's Inaugural Dissertation was, in fact, a work of traditional metaphysics. The disparagement of metaphysics even in the late 18th century was considered a "fashion", i.e. a passing fad arising recently from contemporary taste. With regard to Spinoza and Leibniz's assessment of metaphysics in the 17th century, they not only found such metaphysics respectable, but also rather considered it more respectable and important than the scientific endeavour (of the Cartesian or the experimental type). This fact still requires proving, but it can be noted at this point that this attitude to metaphysics is consistent with the Cartesian legacy expressed in the famous passage
where Descartes had compared philosophy to a tree; "the roots are metaphysics, the trunk is physics, and the branches emerging from the trunk are all the other sciences".33

The corollary to this attitude to metaphysic is the rejection of the idea that Spinoza was an immanent apriorist. It could, after all, be accepted that Spinoza was an apriorist without the further commitment that his metaphysics was transcendent. Admittedly, there is one sense in which the metaphysics of Spinoza is not transcendent but immanentist. There is no Platonic insistence on the existence of a supersensible realm that exists independently of an actually realm of phenomena. The metaphysical monism of Spinoza precludes the existence of two separate realms of being. As a consequence of this God or nature is described by Spinoza as, "the indwelling and not the transient cause of things" because, "besides God there can be no substance, that is nothing in itself external to God"35. However, as we have noted before, this is not the sense of "transcendent" that is necessarily required by transcendent apriorism. The only requirement instead being that there is an epistemological rather than an ontological transcending of experience. The noumenal, in the former case, would be "that which is" as it is known by the pure intellect, in contrast to "that which is" as revealed through phenomenal representations. The noumenal would "transcend" the phenomenal not to the extent that it is necessarily a separate ontological realm "beyond" phenomenal representations. Rather just from the fact that it is, in epistemological terms, "beyond" phenomenal representations in the sense that it disregards them and posits a new criteria for judgement. The epistemological object of transcendent apriorism can be the noumenal (Spinoza's onto-monism) or a noumenal world (Plato's onto-dualism). In contrast the immanent apriorist has, as his epistemological object, the phenomenal world that he interprets through pure reason. The methodology of the Cartesian science can be classed as immanent apriorism in this sense.

It seems certain that if Spinoza did plan to write a book on physics it would be in this Cartesian tradition not in the immanent aposteriorist experimental methodology. For Spinoza clearly identifies empiricist philosophy with his epistemologically vague "second mode of perception".36 In a footnote relating to his section on this vague cognition he observes, "I shall here treat a little more in detail of experience, and shall examine the method adopted by the Empirics, and by recent philosophers".37 The second mode of cognition, on which these "empirics" rely is designated "Perception arising from mere experience"38 and is further described, in the section to which the footnote refers, as follows:
[Q158] The second mode of perception cannot be said to give us the proportion of which we are in search. Moreover its results are very uncertain and indefinite, for we shall never discover anything in natural phenomena by its means, except accidental properties, which are never clearly understood, unless the essence of things in question be known first. Wherefore this mode also must be rejected. 39

Spinoza then clearly states that nothing except "accidental" (rather than essential) properties can be discovered of natural phenomena through the empirics' method. Is it then likely that he would use this method in his scientific work?

It is clear anyway that metaphysics is more important to Spinoza than physics. The most important epistemological object, for him, is the noumenal not the phenomenal. To think differently, like the empiricists, is to fall into error, "The nature of God, which should be reflected on first, inasmuch as it is prior both in the order of knowledge and the order of nature, they have taken to be last in the order of knowledge, and have put into the first place what they call the objects of sensation...So it is hardly to be wondered at, that these persons contradict themselves freely". 40 It seems strange to say but there is, as a consequence, a remarkable resemblance between Parmenides and Spinoza both in terms of epistemology and the metaphysical conclusions derivative of this epistemology. Both in fact stand out as extreme examples of philosophers who transcend the phenomenal without compromise. The noumenal, in Parmenides, as we have seen, contradicted in an extravagant way all our phenomenal experience. The most common phenomena revealed by experience viz. motion, change, imperfection, duration, plurality, diversity, divisibility, separateness, generation and destruction were all denied by Parmenides as mere representations.

The noumenal world of Spinoza is equally distant from phenomenal representations. In the examples given below the fact that God is presented as possessing certain attributes may appear confusing. However, for Spinoza, the principle of all-inclusiveness, "Whatsoever is, is in God" 41 follows from his monistic view of substance. This meant a commitment to the pantheist doctrine that God was in fact identical with the universe. This identity is manifest is Spinoza's term for the supreme deity, viz. Deus seu Natura (God or nature). Hence Spinoza's God has the same meaning content as Parmenides' "that which is".

With regard to this referent then there is, in Spinoza, a denial of: (i) finiteness: "Every substance is necessarily infinite." 42; (ii) duration: "God and all the attributes of God are
eternal" (cf. Parmenides); (iii) *contingency*: "Nothing in the universe is contingent, but all things are conditioned to exist and operate in a particular manner by the necessity of the divine nature"; (iv) *divisibility*: "No attribute of substance can be conceived from which it would follow that substance can be divided"; "Substance absolutely infinite is indivisible"; (v) *change*: "it follows that God, and all the attributes of God, are unchangeable"; (vi) *imperfection*: It clearly follows from what we have said, that things have been brought into being by God in the highest perfection." "Reality and Perfection I use as synonymous terms"; (vii) *plurality*, "There cannot be granted several substances, but one substance only"; (viii) *generation*: "Substance cannot be produced or created".

The distinction between the noumenal and phenomenal in Spinoza is, as we have stated, not that they exist ontologically as two separate worlds. Rather it is that the noumenal world is the world as it is conceived, in epistemological terms, by the noetic functions, whereas the phenomenal world is the world as conceived by the aesthetic functions. In the following quotation Spinoza's use of the term imagination is equivalent to sense perception or experience. The exact meaning of the term in Spinoza will be discussed in the following paragraphs. It is sufficient here to note that it is only distinct from sense perception or experience and hence non-interchangeable with them because it is more inclusive. The following quotation demonstrates Spinoza's attitude to the epistemological objects and his commitment to the noumenal world (in the above sense):

[Q159] If anyone asks me the further question, why are we naturally so prone to divide quantity? I answer, that quantity is conceived by us in two ways; in the abstract and superficially, as we imagine it; or as substance, as we conceive it solely by the intellect. If, then, we regard quantity as it is represented in our imagination, which we often and more easily do, we shall find that it is finite, divisible, and compounded of parts; but if we regard it as it is represented in our intellect, and conceive it as substance, which it is very difficult to do, we shall then, as I have sufficiently proved, find that it is infinite, one, and indivisible. This will be plain enough to all, who make a distinction between the intellect and the imagination.

For Spinoza, in contrast to the modern scientist, justificatory experiments in the phenomenal were considered unreliable and deceptive. Knowledge derived from them was termed, "knowledge from vague experience" (cognitio ab experientia vaga) and it
could not justify or falsify a truth concerning the noumenal world. In fact, to rely on this
data instead of the data supplied by the pure intellect was the source of serious error. It
could give you a totally distorted picture of reality, i.e. the phenomenal one. Such an
error usually resulted from a hazy distinction between understanding and imagination.
This meant non-recognition that reliance should not be placed in the objects of the
imagination.

[Q160] We now know that the operations, whereby the effects of imagination are
produced, take place under other laws quite different from the laws of the
understanding, and that mind is entirely passive with regard to them. Whence we
may also see how easily men may fall into grave errors through not distinguishing
accurately between the imagination and the understanding; such as believing
extension must be localized, that it must be finite, that its parts are different from
one another, that it is the primary and single foundation of all things, that it
occupies more space at one time than at another, and other similar doctrines
entirely opposed to truth.56

It will be noted that the grave errors mentioned are also made by Cartesian science whose
object, though not its epistemological instrument, is the phenomenal world revealed to
the imagination. True and certain knowledge, in contrast, results from a priori deduction
from the nature of God as defined and characterized above, "The highest endeavour of
the mind, and the highest virtue is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge.
The third kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of certain attributes of God
to an adequate knowledge of the essence of things".57

The above point will become clear when we now discuss Spinoza's attitude towards
experience. This attitude to experience must be seen in the context of Spinoza's overall
aim. For Spinoza, the highest aim in life is to attain to the perfect understanding of the
noumenal world, knowledge available, in its entirety, only to the divine intellect. The
mind must be directed away from perishable phenomenon that cause mental confusion
and disturbance: "All these [disturbances of mind] arise from the love of what is
perishable, such as the objects already mentioned. But love towards a thing eternal and
infinite feeds the mind wholly with joy".58 The mind must be re-directed towards things
eternal and infinite, towards that, as yet, unknown something "the discovery and
attainment of which would enable me to enjoy continuous, supreme, and unending
happiness".59 This however is not the renunciation of the world, considered as a vale of
tears, for the transcendent realm of angels, spirits, and God that is familiar in mysticism.
As we have seen, Spinoza will not allow two separate ontological realms, rather there is only one realm differently conceived depending on the epistemological instruments engaged.

For Spinoza then that which guarantees happiness and blessedness is not the translocation of the soul in death or life to the realm of spirit but rather the attainment of an epistemological state in which one sees the world in its true light, i.e. not as perishable and finite but as eternal and infinite. The world in its true light is the noumenal world and the noumenal world is attained by the development of the pure understanding:

[Q161] Thus in life it is before all things useful to perfect the understanding, or reason, as far as we can, and in this alone man's highest happiness or blessedness consists, indeed blessedness is nothing else but the contentment of spirit, which arises from the intuitive knowledge of God: now, to perfect the understanding is nothing else but to understand God, God's attributes, and the actions which follow from the necessity of his nature. Wherefore of a man, who is led by reason, the ultimate aim or highest desire, whereby he seeks to govern all his fellows, is that whereby he is brought to the adequate conception of himself and of all things within the scope of his intelligence.60

It is just this knowledge that science, with its epistemological reliance on the phenomenal world revealed to the senses, could not deliver, for "the first principle of nature... has no likeness to mutable things"61. Things are mutable only under the aspect of the imagination. Only transcendent apriorism with its rejection of the aesthetic functions in favour of pure reason can attain to knowledge of the noumenal. Pure reason is fundamental; "I shall first set forth the object aimed at, and next the means for its attainment. The object aimed at is the acquisition of clear and distinct ideas, such as are produced by the pure intellect, and not by chance physical motions"62, because it is that which sees the world correctly, i.e. as noumenal in nature. There is for Spinoza, a path whereby the intellect, according to its capacity, may attain knowledge of eternal things.63

Certainly Science, if it relies on sensory experience for its primary data or its epistemological justification, can never attain to more than the contingent.

So far this is quite general and it is important now to give a more detailed picture of Spinoza's epistemology. Let us first examine Spinoza's epistemological assessment of sensory experience because this is an area in which the modern scientist and the transcendent apriorist can be seen to disagree most strongly. For the modern scientist sensory experience is used as the source, the justification for, or the falsification of
knowledge claims. For the transcendent apriorist sensory experience normally only plays an extrinsic role in knowledge origination and none at all in knowledge justification or falsification. Spinoza uses the term "imagination" to encompass all that is meant today by sensory perception, although it is more inclusive. For it designates what Spinoza calls "knowledge from symbols", i.e. knowledge that does not come directly from the senses but rather from heteronymous sources:

\[Q162\] From all that has been said above it is clear, that we, in many cases, perceive the form our general notions: - (1) From particular things represented to our intellect fragmentarily, confusedly, and without order through our senses; I have settled to call such perceptions by the name of knowledge from the mere suggestions of experience. (2) From symbols, e.g., from the fact of having read or heard certain words we remember things and form ideas concerning them, similar to those through which we imagine things. I shall call both these ways of regarding things knowledge of the first kind, opinion or imagination.\

Of course the term imagination used by a modern philosopher would have a completely different sense, a sense not included in Spinoza's definition. In the light of this discrepancy Spinoza's sense will be designated by writing imagination\textsubscript{1}. The modern use of the term is designated imagination\textsubscript{2}. The connection between imagination and sensory perception in Spinoza is discussed by Parkinson:

\[Q163\] It is clear that what has been described in the foregoing account of "imagination" is sense perception, and the physical processes which correspond to it. That Spinoza uses "imagination" in this sense was also noted at §6.5 when the example of the distance of the sun was cited. This differs from the most modern sense of the word, in which it roughly means thinking of things, which are not present.\

Of course Spinoza uses the more traditional terms like the senses, sensation, and experience with an almost identical reference. However, his use of the term perception is the exception and requires to be understood as equivalent to cognition.

Spinoza's attitude towards imagination\textsubscript{1} or sense perception is, with the exception of one peculiar case, totally negative. Ideas that have their genesis in imagination\textsubscript{1} are considered to be a primary source of error, "Thus, then, we have distinguished between a true idea and other perceptions, and shown that ideas fictitious, false, and the rest, originate in the imagination"\textsuperscript{66} and "Everyone judges of things according to the state of
his brain, or rather mistakes for things the forms of his imagination." Consider also the relevance of the following quotation:

[Q164] We have now perceived, that all the explanations commonly given of nature are mere modes of imagining, and do not indicate the true nature of anything, but only the constitution of the imagination; and although they have names, as though they were entities, existing externally to the imagination, I call them entities imaginary rather than real; and, therefore, all arguments against us drawn from such abstractions are easily rebutted.

Notice how Parmenidean this last quotation is. We have seen that in the "Way of Truth" the "dazed undiscriminating hordes" mistakenly assign names to those things revealed by their sense experience and hence posit the existence of things which are not. For Spinoza imagination gives rise to an army of entities that have names but no existence in reality. Spinoza observes that men were, "bound to form abstract notions for the explanation of the nature of things". These included, "goodness, badness, order, confusion, warmth, cold, beauty, deformity, and so on". Such abstract notions are, "nothing but modes of imagining, in which the imagination is differently affected". Yet they are, "considered by the ignorant as the chief attributes of things".

For Spinoza then that which is represented to us by the senses gives rise to one of the two lowest forms of cognition possible. Any knowledge claim derived from these cognitions is perhaps superior, in terms of its truthfulness, only to those insubstantial claims derived from second hand opinion. Included in this category would be the scholastic "argument from authority" as defended by Aquinas and other more simple cases that Spinoza mentions, viz. knowledge passed down from one's parents e.g. the belief that I was born on such and such a day. Also included are the so called, "perceptions arising from signs" viz. those acquired, "from the fact that having read certain words we form certain ideas of them through which we imagine the things". It is said that, for Spinoza, cognitions that have their genesis in sense perception are "perhaps" superior to the abovementioned types, because this is uncertain. In the Ethics there are only three categories of cognition with knowledge from second hand opinion and from sense-experience classed together. However, in the earlier On the Improvement of the Understanding, there are four categories, sense experience being in the third while second hand opinion is in the forth.
What is certain is that, whatever the exact order, knowledge claims derived from sense experience are fallacious. In the *Ethics* it is referred to in the following terms:

[Q165] From single things, which are represented to us by the senses in a mutilated and confused form, and without order to the intellect (see ii. 29 Cor), and so I have been accustomed to call such perceptions "knowledge from vague experience" (cognitio ab experientia vaga).75

Firstly, this talk of sensory representation as "confused" calls to mind Descartes' revival of the well-known "argument from illusion" which makes much of cases such as that of the stick that appears bent in water, where the information provided by the senses can be misleading. Secondly, the labelling of sensory experience as vaga (fleeting, inconstant) might recall Plato's argument that claims based on the senses that count as true at a certain time, or from a certain point of view, may turn out to be false later, or from a different point of view. All these lines of argument may have indirectly influenced Spinoza's attitude to inconstant experience,76 but the argument that is most characteristic of his thinking about sensory experience depends on his distinction between adequate perception, "All ideas are in God and in so far as they are referred to God are true and adequate; therefore there are no ideas confused or inadequate, except in respect to a particular mind"77, and "inadequate" perception, "Falsity consists in the privation of knowledge, which inadequate, fragmentary or confused ideas involve".78

An adequate perception involves not merely a perception that something is actually the case, but an understanding of the necessity for its being true. Now an isolated sensory perception will merely convey the information that something is the case. However, no series of perceptions, however extended, can of itself be sufficient to establish that something must be the case. It follows that one who is in search of necessary truth must go beyond the data of the senses. For Spinoza there are three kinds of knowledge. The first kind is inclusive of the imagination and is the source of falsity and cannot be established with certainty the other two kinds correspond to the understanding and are necessarily true.

For Spinoza, as for all transcendent apriorists, the aesthetic functions of the intellect have the epistemologically degenerate role of bringing a confused apprehension of phenomena. As Spinoza clearly states, "Imagination is the idea wherewith the mind contemplates a thing as present; yet this idea indicates rather the present disposition of
the human body rather than the nature of the external thing". For Spinoza, it is the noetic functions that bring knowledge of the noumenal world which is seen as mirroring the thing-in-itself.

It is interesting to note how this is tied in with the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. In Plato the understanding is best able to contemplate the truth concerning the noumenal world when divorced from the body, i.e. in death. Now Spinoza is sometimes considered to reject the immortality of the soul. Yet this is just not the case, although there is no indication that the soul after death improves its epistemological position. In Spinoza's theory the understanding survives death whereas the imagination and the memory are destroyed:

[166] The mind can only imagine anything, or remember what is past, while the body endures.  
[167] The mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body, but there remains of it something which is eternal.  
[168] Hence it follows that the part of the mind which endures, be it great or small, is more perfect than the rest. For the eternal part of the mind is the understanding, through which alone we are said to act the part we have shown to perish is the imagination through which only we are said to be passive.

The truth is that one can grasp the truth equally well when one is still living as long as one ignores the promptings of the imagination, which is described as "passive". The imagination is passive because forces interacting with the human body determine it from without. The understanding is active because with its use, the truth is determined by the autonomous intellect working with its own innate (rather than acquired by experience) instruments of truth:

[169] Hence it follows that the human mind, when it perceives things after the common order of nature, has not an adequate but only a confused and fragmentary knowledge of itself, of its own body, and of external bodies. For the mind does not know itself, except in so far as it perceives the ideas of the modifications of body. It only perceives its own body through the ideas of the modifications, and only perceives external bodies through the same means; thus, in so far as it has such ideas of modification, it has not an adequate knowledge of itself, but only a fragmentary and confused knowledge thereof I say expressly, that the mind has not an adequate but only a confused knowledge of itself, its own body, and external bodies, whenever it perceives things after the common order of nature; that is, whenever it is determined from without, namely, by the fortuitous play of circumstance, to regard this or that; not at such times as it is determined
from within, that is by the fact of regarding several things at once, to understand their points of agreement, difference and contrast. Whenever it is determined from within, it regards things clearly and distinctly. 83

Curley has suggested that there is no theory of innate ideas in Spinoza. Again this is clearly a mistake 84. If truth is to be brought forth deductively (Spinoza's More Geometrico method in addition to what we have said before is evidence of this) from the active part of the mind, viz. the understanding, without recourse to the passive elements of experience; if it is to be "determined from within" then the mind must have its own intellectual tools underived from experience. In our chapter on Leibniz we discovered that most usually the theory of innate ideas is given as an explanation of how this process is to be possible. For the transcendent apriorist this is most coherent theory and Spinoza clearly adheres to it:

[Q170] Just as men in the beginning were able to make the easiest things with the tools they were born with [innatis intrumentis]...so the intellect, by its own inborn power [vi nativa] makes intellectual tools for itself by which it acquires other powers for other intellectual works... and so proceeds by stages to the pinnacle of wisdom. 85

[Q171] Let us, then, enumerate here the properties of the understanding, let us examine them, and begin by discussing the instruments for research, which we find innate in us. 86

All the elements are now in place for categorizing Spinoza as a classic transcendent apriorist. The modern theory must find other arguments. Anyway, is it likely that Spinoza was not working within the Cartesian tradition of transcendent apriorism?
CONCLUSION

There is undoubtedly more to transcendent apriorism than one is normally led to expect. It has been demonstrated that, even the epistemological definition of the doctrine, is extremely complex and great care is required in its statement. The errors and misconceptions, exposed in the course of this thesis, are testimony to an unwarranted simplistic approach. In fact, transcendent apriorism has a rich diversity of forms, an almost Byzantine epistemology and an extensive historical tradition. It has been defended by some of the greatest minds in the philosophical tradition. Even Kant, the man who supposedly refuted the doctrine, defended an important variant of it in the *Inaugural Dissertation*. Subsequent to the publication of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, it is regrettable that philosophers did not follow Hegel’s objective methodology in their assessments. Instead, a new dark age for the understanding of the doctrine emerged.

Unfortunately, modern analytic philosophy, with its inception as a rebellion against Hegelianism, encouraged philosophers to ignore Hegel’s important legacy. If there had been an awareness of the powerful arguments that Hegel had mustered against the Kantian refutation of transcendent apriorism, then the damaging attitude of contempt would never have emerged. Due to this attitude, that has been engendered in current debate, this thesis has had to completely redefine the doctrine and reformulate its history and epistemology from scratch. However, progress has been made and the thesis has fulfilled a propaedeutic function in clearing the way for an overdue reappraisal. Before, there was merely a blank canvas, but now at least the basic outlines have been drawn in.

Hence, it is now possible to determine whether the arguments that have been used against transcendent apriorism actually apply to it, only to part of it, or just entirely miss the mark. For example, the criticism of the two world’s aspect of transcendent apriorism, by the phenomenologist, does not impact upon the doctrine in toto. Parmenides and Spinoza were transcendent apriorists, who because of their rigid onto-monism, could not logically posit another world. For them, there was only one world, viz. the noumenal. Similarly, the new distinction between ratiocinative and illuminative variants means that
an attack, for instance, on Descartes' circular ratiocination would not impact on an illuminative theorist like Malebranche. These seminal divisions between transcendent apriorist philosophers are illustrated, in summary form, in Appendix 3 (p. 255).

It is certainly testimony to the strength of the analysis that many historical problems connected with transcendent apriorist epistemology have been resolved. Even perennial difficulties like the status of the Parmenidean way of opinion and the Cartesian circle have been taken forward by the new more intricate epistemological analysis. This conclusion will be used to build further upon this newly established epistemological foundation. Substantial arguments have already been given against epistemological attacks on transcendent apriorism. Hence, much of the material given here is supplemental. However, many of the most recent articles relating to the questions involved will be examined, including a profound puzzle set by Derrida. One of the strongest arguments against the putative refutation of transcendent apriorism was developed in chapter 8. A wide range of philosophers, including Kant, have thought that a special intuition capable of grasping the in-itself, was required for transcendent apriorism to be possible. Yet, this argument was found to be misdirected because the transcendent apriorist himself admits that such an intuition would require a mystical union with the knowledge object. It is a fundamental revelation that the transcendent apriorist claims only an indirect knowledge of the in-itself, through its parity with the noumenal. However, it is undoubtedly true that the issue of rational intuition is essential to any reappraisal of the doctrine.

Let us begin then with the illuminative version of transcendent apriorism, which never seems to be directly considered in modern critical assessments. The type of intuition upon which this version of rationalism is founded, viz. illuminative intuition, is rarely, if ever, properly distinguished or understood and is only dealt with obliquely. It is not wise just to ignore an epistemological theory that has played an important part in the development of transcendent apriorism. Let us therefore consider its legitimacy. The only correct way to test this form of intuition seems to be in experiential terms. In fact, illuminative intuition is a form of cognitive experience that must be undergone in order to be assessed at all. It is important to recognize that it is not a judgement of any sort and consequently it does not take a propositional form. It can putatively supervene upon (Plato, Plotinus) or function to legitimize (Malebranche) propositional understanding. The insight gained can even be written down as a sequence of words that have the appearance of propositional form (Wittgenstein¹). Yet, in this latter case, Rudolf Carnap would call such a sequence of
words a "pseudo-proposition" because, although "such a sequence of words looks like a statement at first glance", it does not articulate some truth in the form of a statement. However, Carnap's argument does not refute the illuminative transcendent apriorist's position, for the simple reason that an epistemologist of this type does not think that truths can only be conveyed in propositional form. Although often closely connected in a variety of ways with propositional knowing, illuminative intuition is always extrinsic to it; as has already been maintained, illuminative intuition is completely sui generis.

Let us develop this point further. It has been stated that, although A. J. Ayer fails to properly distinguish illuminative intuition from hyper-noetic vision, his arguments against mystical intuitions could, nevertheless, be used against illuminative intuition. Ayer would certainly not deny the possibility of the intuitions mentioned; rather, he stipulates that those who claim to have them must transform them into propositional form so that the verifiability criteria can properly function, "We wait to hear what are the propositions which embody his [the mystics'] discoveries, in order to see whether they are verified or confuted by our empirical observations". It is here that, in my opinion, Ayer goes wrong and it is this mistake, which marks the point of separation between the logical-positivist doctrines of the Vienna circle and the views of Ludwig Wittgenstein in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. For Wittgenstein rightly recognized that, although certain things could not be said to be true, they could, at least, be shown to be true. Hence, to categorize something as unsayable, for Wittgenstein, is not to affirm that it is completely inexpressible in any form. Rather, it is only to say that it is inexpressible as a proposition. Hence, informative cognitions are postulated that can be disclosed to us, but just not in propositional form, "What can be shown cannot be said".

In fact, for Wittgenstein, that which could be intrinsically expressed in propositional form was limited and philosophically unimportant. Facts about how the world is, the propositions of natural science, could certainly be expressed as propositions, "The totality of true propositions is the total natural science (or the totality of the natural sciences)". However, these propositions are irrelevant for providing answers to "higher" philosophical questions which constitute what is fundamentally important. "How the world is, is completely indifferent for what is higher" and "The solution of the riddle of life in space and time lies outside space and time (it is not problems of natural science which have to be solved)". For Wittgenstein then all philosophically important matters, the meaning of existence, whether the soul is immortal, whether God exists, and all religious, ethical and
aesthetic questions are inexpressible in propositional form because "Propositions cannot express anything higher"\textsuperscript{10}. As a consequence, "We feel that even if all possible scientific questions be answered, the problems of life have still not been touched at all".\textsuperscript{11}

To answer then the really important questions is to transcend the limits of what is expressible as a proposition. Now Ayer\textsuperscript{12} and Carnap both have the prejudice that what cannot be intrinsically expressed as a proposition must be just gibberish. Wittgenstein would certainly not agree. That which cannot be expressed as a proposition, for Wittgenstein, can still disclose itself to consciousness - it can show itself, "There is indeed the inexpressible. This shows itself".\textsuperscript{13} This notion of "showing" is closely related to what has been termed illuminative intuition. It is certainly not an irrational hyper-noetic vision. Wittgenstein does sometimes use the term Das Mystische in relation to "showing". However, as H. O. Mounce correctly explains, "This word [mystical] has unfortunate connotations, which perhaps the German equivalent lacks; it suggests a revelation of extraordinary events by extra ordinary means. But this is not at all what Wittgenstein had in mind".\textsuperscript{14} For Wittgenstein it is philosophical puzzles that are mystical, not revelations from the beyond, "It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists".\textsuperscript{15} Having said this, there may be still a suspicion here of Bergson's error\textsuperscript{16} of confusing the non-discursive with some form of mysticism.

We have seen, in our discussion of the secret doctrine, that Plato also considers that the ultimate philosophical insight cannot be expressed in propositional form. In fact, because of the complete inadequacy of language for this function anyone who tries to express it in this way has "utterly blasted his wits".\textsuperscript{17} Similarly, we saw that Bergson thinks that because language can only express those universals, which function to aid our biological survival, it is useless for attaining to metaphysical insight. In both these cases as with Wittgenstein's, it would be a mistake for Ayer to "wait" for these philosophers to "embody their insights" in propositional form. Ayer's position would only make sense if what ultimately counted as a rational intuition were limited to non-acquaintive examples. Yet, this thesis has attempted to identify and distinguish all types of rational intuition. Failure to do this has resulted in many confusions that are exemplified even in contemporary debate.

Those who wish to defend some contemporary form of "rational intuition", usually as an explanation for a priori knowledge, restrict themselves to the non-acquaintive deductive and axiomatic intuitions. In a recent work, Laurence BonJour, has defined
rational intuition as "intuitive insight into necessity".\textsuperscript{18} The term necessity, as BonJour uses it, is a qualifier that applies to propositions. Now, as we have seen, an insight that a proposition, or sequence of propositions, is necessary is very different from an acquaintance insight into reality, which is not mediated through propositions. It is not, for example, the proposition that "God exists" that Malebranche grasped with illuminative intuition. In fact, illuminative intuition cannot grasp propositions at all for the simple reason that it is acquaintance in nature and consequently connects with reality directly. If, for Malebranche, the knowledge that God exists were propositional, how could he say that it guarantees knowledge in a way that avoids the problem with the Cartesian circle? If Malebranche had a rational intuition in BonJour's sense, viz. one that grasped the necessity of the proposition "God exists", then he would be using propositional intuitions to legitimize other propositional intuitions. This would inevitably lead us back into circular forms of argument.

In conclusion, the Ayer argument projected from mysticism to illuminative transcendent apriorism misses its target. The verifiability argument is set up on an unargued for prejudice viz. that all knowledge is propositional. Ayer's only response to those that posit a form of illuminative intuition is to commit a category mistake by asking them to transform what is essentially non-propositional into propositional form so that it can be assessed. Illuminative transcendent apriorism therefore survives criticism that arises from Ayer's supposed comprehensive refutation of metaphysics.

Like Ayer, most modern commentators just ignore, or are unaware of illuminative transcendent apriorism and its sui generis insight, illuminative intuition. It is almost as if there is a consensus only to examine those rational intuitions connected with the necessity of propositions. In a recent article entitled "Rationalism, Empiricism, and the A Priori" Quassim Cassas, in stating the "standard" account of BonJour makes an instructive error. In this respect, when he observes:

\[Q172\] According to the standard account...rationalism is then said to be committed to the principle that the source of some or all of our a priori knowledge is what is variously described as 'rational intuition', 'clear and distinct perception', or 'rational insight'. For one's knowledge of p to count as a priori, one's justification for believing this proposition must be a priori, and the rationalist claims that rational intuition or one of its variants is the source of one's a priori justification.\textsuperscript{19}
Here then, there is a seamless epistemological leap from talking about rational intuition as the source of a priori knowledge, to the assumption that this knowledge must be propositional. This is because, although Cassam disagrees with BonJour's defence of pure reason, he unquestioning accepts BonJour's definition of rational intuition as only concerned with necessary propositions. This unargued for assumption is all the more strange because, as we have seen, Kant certainly recognised the need to counter the non-propositional version of a priori knowledge presented by Malebranche. Why do modern philosophers not feel this need?

One possible reason stems from their attitude to what J. L. Mackie, with reference to any defence of moral propositions which involve an appeal to rational intuition, has called "the argument from queerness". Quassim Cassam has extended the scope of this argument to include any epistemological appeals to rational intuition. The argument is that rational intuition - which, as Christopher Peacocke observes with obvious reservations, has been associated with some of the "headier forms of rationalism" - is just too strange an explanation for our a priori epistemological knowledge. The explanation, in effect, would require us to posit a special faculty, described by some as "occult" "mysterious" or "exotic", which is at variance with our ordinary modes of knowledge acquisition. This is a common argument directed not against non-propositional illuminative intuition but rather against any form of rational intuition of propositions. It could be used to counter defences of aprioristic knowledge claims - in the ratiocinative model of transcendent apriorism (Parmenides, Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza) or within another tradition (K. Gödel, R. Penrose) - that appeal to a form of rational intuition into the necessity of a proposition. It is obvious that the queerness argument could be used, a fortiori, against illuminative intuition and the illuminative tradition.

The argument has been taken so seriously that it has forced Christopher Peacocke to develop a more "sober" explanation of epistemological phenomena. He has consequently developed a "programme for moderate rationalism". However, if such an alternative, to positing rational intuition, is not found then the normal response to the queerness argument is to say that a form of intuitionism is even accepted as legitimate by sober minded empiricists, in respect to analytic a priori knowledge. I accept Cassam's definition of intuitionism, which involves the view, "that our a priori knowledge of some proposition p rests upon our ability to 'see' that p is necessarily true". A. J. Ayer has certainly stated, of such analytic truths, that "independent of experience" we "see that
they are necessarily true".28 Even quite recently Michael Ayers has defended a "qualified form of intuitionism".29 If this is the case, it is argued, why is it that when the rationalist posits such an intuition it is considered bizarre? The response to this argument is usually that the intuitions involved in the empiricist doctrine are "merely linguistic intuitions" not "intuitions of reason". As A. J. Ayer would say they only "enlighten us by illustrating the way in which we use certain symbols".30 The debate is unresolved as to whether this claim is actually coherent.

It is important to take a totally different approach here. The argument, developed from a point made by Spinoza, has the advantage of defending both propositional and non-propositional rational intuitions. It starts from a defence of the simple rationalist contention that "queerness" is a predicate with no epistemological value. We have discovered already that Parmenides, in particular, is a philosopher who follows his rational intuitions without concern for whether his results are "queer" or not. He makes no attempt whatsoever to "save the appearances" (not even, as we have shown, in the "Way of Opinion"). This is surely the correct attitude for any philosopher. In saying this, there is an admission of advocating an extreme anti-common sense approach to philosophy. Philosophers should be completely unconcerned with the question of the strangeness or otherwise of a particular doctrine. In contrast, their only concern should be the doctrine's viability. Modern quantum physics is certainly weird, with theories governing the behaviour of sub-atomic particles playing fast and loose with our normal logical categories but surely no-one, not even an empiricist, would advocate that this somehow lessens the epistemological validity of the theories involved.

However, perhaps it might be said that if a less strange explanation of the behaviour of sub-atomic particles were available then a theory that avoided queerness was preferable. Yet, this would be to attribute epistemological value to a purely subjective psychological quality. As Spinoza observes of similar psychological qualities "As for the terms good and bad, they indicate no positive quality in things regarded in themselves, but are merely modes of thinking, or notions which we form from the comparison of things one with another".31 The fact that we consider some things to be less queer than others can often be explained merely by the fact that familiarity has destroyed our sense of strangeness. That we have a faculty of physical seeing or that we are self-conscious beings should be no less "queer" to a philosopher than the rationalist's claim that we have a faculty of "mental" seeing. The argument from queerness, therefore, is no threat to
any form of theory based on rational intuition. The defender of rational intuition can safely admit, to his critic, that the theory is queer but then add that whether it is or not is irrelevant. The only important epistemological question to be asked is "is it true?"

However, there has been a genuine misunderstanding about how the whole debate concerning a priori knowledge has been conceived by modern commentators. We have already remarked that modern philosophers post-Frege (and in contrast to traditional accounts) have conceived knowledge to be a priori only in relation to issues of justification and without regard to the previously significant issue of genesis. The Frege passage which announced this new conception begins, "These distinctions between a priori and a posteriori, synthetic and analytic, concern, as I see it, not the content of the judgement but the justification for the judgement-pronouncement". That this conception of the a priori is definitive seems to be the pre-supposition underlying most modern debates on the issue of a priori knowledge. However, it is never explained why the old conception, of the importance of concept genesis, was abandoned. Why did it suddenly become irrelevant? This is definitely a significant issue.

Philip Kitchner, in his essay "A Priori Knowledge Revisited", states that "most apriorists have allowed for the possibility that we could have a priori knowledge of propositions containing concepts that could only be garnered from experience". This would certainly be true if we were to ignore all apriorists before Kant.

This represents a rejection of Tyler Burge's claim, in his essay "Frege on the Apriori", that Leibniz gave the first modern account of the a priori, "Since Leibniz explicitly indicates that one might depend psychologically on sense experience in order to come to know any truth, he means that a truth is a priori if the justificational force involved in the knowledge's justification is independent of experience". However, the issue of genesis was absolutely central to Leibniz. For instance, Theophilus takes Philalethes' criticism that if the ideas in propositions are empirical then the truths that contain these propositions must be empirical, very seriously. For, contra Tyler Burge, the genesis of ideas within a priori propositions is fundamental to Leibniz. For if these ideas are intrinsically derived from the senses then the propositions that result are confused, irrespective of how they are justified:

[Q173] Truths involving ideas, which come from the senses, are themselves at least partly dependent on the senses. But the ideas that come from the senses are
confused; and so too, at least in part are the truths which depend on them: whereas intellectual ideas, and the truths depending on them are distinct, and neither the ideas nor the truths originate in the senses.36

It is for the same reason the Burge type error occurs that the whole subject of a priori concept genesis is ignored in modern accounts. Again, this reason involves the premature rejection of the transcendent apriorist programme. Modern "rationalist" accounts just assume that the most that could be claimed for synthetic a priori knowledge is that it can (rarely and under very specific circumstances) attain to truths concerning the empirical world. This is the explicit claim of Bill Brewer in his article ‘Externalism and A Priori Knowledge of Empirical Facts’37, but there is a general assumption within the debate that, at most, only some limited form of immanent apriorism is possible. As a result of this assumption, there is no concern with concept genesis. Whether the concepts contained in propositions are sensible, or not, is unimportant because there is no longer any ambition to transcend the phenomenal. Kant’s original concern to prevent "the contamination of intellectual knowledge by the sensitive"38 has no function in the modern debate.

A transcendent apriorist, like Leibniz, would recognize that if we use empirically derived concepts to attain transcendent knowledge, i.e. of the noumenal, then we would be immediately confronted with the great problem of Aristotelian Medieval metaphysics, viz. the problem of natural theology. This problem consists in questioning how our empirically derived concepts can legitimately apply to trans-empirical reality. Surely, we cannot just assume that our putatively experience-based concepts are univocal between empirical and trans-empirical reality. It is easy to see that there is no danger of such equivocation in the modern debate on the a priori, for it has no trans-empirical ambitions. The problem rather is how knowledge attained independently of experience can pertain to experience. For example, Brewer talks of, "a problematic non-empirical source of new empirical knowledge".39 In contrast, Kant sums up the transcendent apriorist’s position when he states, "It is clear therefore, that representations of things as they appear are sensitively thought, while intellectual concepts are representations of things as they are".40

However, because the modern debate has no concern with such putatively fanciful flights into the noumenal, it need not concern itself with the purity of the concepts involved in its propositions. The definition of the a priori therefore is analysed in terms of issues of justification alone. It is important to recognize that the modern definition of the a priori is not determined upon for legitimate philosophical grounds but is determined by
a prejudice with regard to "moderation" (another term of no epistemological value) in setting the limits of reason. It would be no argument against the transcendent apriorist to suggest that his notion of the a priori was illegitimate in the light of modern developments.

We saw earlier, that even if the transcendent apriorist, using only pure concepts constituting truly a priori propositions, established noumenal conclusions there was no guarantee that these applied to the in-itself. We said there that Jacques Derrida had suggested that philosophers had no guarantee that Being-in-itself is in fact logos-structured, that they had no choice but just assume that Being is isomorphic with logos. As Derrida makes clear, in [Q140, p. 202], this assumption may be an initial and fundamental error. We saw that, at a much earlier period, Descartes had understood the problem but had not found an adequate solution. Yet, it is possible to go a little further than Descartes. However, the answer to Derrida's problem is not entirely satisfactory. Derrida's statement that there is the possibility that Being is not a logos is a strange claim in many ways. The first thing to note is that the term "Being" is used, by Derrida, in its most universal metaphysical sense. Hence, "Being" does not mean "being alive" or being a particular substance but rather indicates only the bare fact of existence. Secondly, Derrida admits that our thinking is "logos-structured" and it is this feature of thought that is illegitimately imposed by metaphysicians on a universe that might not be, in any sense, a "cryptogram" to be deciphered by reason.

Now it is obvious that from this we can conclude that at least one aspect of Being is, in fact, logos-structured - viz. thinking itself. For, as Descartes cogito makes clear, thinking implies, at least, existence of some sort. Even against the extreme Derridean sceptic or Descartes' malicious demon we can be sure that some aspect of Being, viz. thinking, is logos-structured. We can be certain that the universe in Derrida's terms is not "the other of every possible manuscript" [Q140, p. 202] but instead that there is some portion of it that is isomorphic with logos. From this it can be inferred that there is at least nothing about Being which is essentially anti logo-centric. The transcendent apriorist as we have discovered just assumes the identity of Logos and Being, of noumenal knowledge and in-itself. This assumption still certainly requires some proof. However at least we can prove that there is some isomorphic connection between the two sides of this epistemological abyss and that there is nothing intrinsically non-rational about Being.
Finally, it will be remembered that we concluded earlier that modern debates concerning innate ideas, so essential to ratiocinative theories of transcendent apriorism, are still open-ended. Hence, we can conclude overall that even these, state of the art, arguments in contemporary epistemology do not refute transcendent apriorism. In reality, the most common response has been to completely ignore the doctrine. The arguments that are formulated only usually apply to the doctrine by chance rather than by design. However, all the evidence so far considered plus the fact that these contemporary objections are, at the very least, not conclusive indicates that there is scope for a fundamental re-appraisal of transcendent apriorism. However, there is a recognition that this thesis represents a lone voice, crying in the wilderness, in asking for one.
APPENDIX 1

1. A. P. D. Mourelatos, dogmatic rationalism is defined as, "the kind of view that makes a priori projections into a 'transcendent' noumenal world".1

2. W. H. Walsh, "It [transcendent metaphysics] was accordingly a doctrine which professes to take its adherents beyond the common-sense world known in sense-perception altogether, giving them insight into the general nature at least of the supersensible or intelligible sphere which lay behind it".2

3. J. H. M. M. Loenen, (i) "On the other hand he [Parmenides] may be called the founder of epistemological rationalism, since he is the first to have assumed that true knowledge does not spring from experience".3 (ii) deductive metaphysics - "the latter [Parmenides] started from a definite reality (thought) present in his own mind, and by means of a description of the idea of being, established that thought is. This is a form of metaphysics based on experience. Melissus on the contrary, starting from the existence of something that is, from the predicate infers the further attributes of the subject in a deductive way. This is deductive metaphysics in its purest form".4

4. F. Copleston, ideal rationalism or pure rationalism defined as "deducing a system of reality simply from the resources of the mind itself without recourse to experience".5

5. J. Cottingham, apriorism - (i) "the belief in the possibility of arriving at knowledge independently of sense"6 and (ii) "The ants and spiders model suggests contrasting schools of philosophy, one based on careful observation, the other based on 'pure thought'. In the past, this contrast has worked to the detriment of the rationalists. implying that they were nothing but a priori web-spinners, building elaborate metaphysical systems 'from the armchair', and trying to settle by abstract theorizing questions about the nature of reality which ought properly to be determined by scientific experiment".7

6. D. W. Hamlyn, metaphysics - "Among philosophers, from Descartes onwards, it [the term metaphysical] has come to have the distinct sense of having to do with what lies beyond what is available to the senses - with what is not merely abstract but in some sense transcendent also".8

7. A. J. Ayer, transcendent metaphysics - (i) "The metaphysical doctrine which is upheld by rationalists, and rejected by empiricists, is that there exists a suprasensible world which is the object of a purely intellectual intuition and is alone wholly real".9 (ii) "We may begin by criticizing the metaphysical thesis that
philosophy affords us knowledge of a reality transcending the world of science and common sense".10

8. R. C. Solomon, speculative metaphysics - "This is most often interpreted as a return to speculative metaphysics - the fare of Spinoza and Leibniz - the investigation of transcendent objects or noumena".11

9. J. Macquarrie, speculative metaphysics - "Speculative metaphysics of the traditional sort may be regarded as an attempt to extend reason beyond the empirical phenomena of the world so as to grasp the supposedly supersensible reality underlying these phenomena".12
APPENDIX 2

1. The most significant use of the concept of epistemological rationalism is to organize the textual data from Descartes to Kant so that they tell a coherent story with an edifying moral. Modern philosophy, it is often said, begins with a rationalist reaction against scholastic Aristotelianism, a reaction that privileges mathematics as a model of human knowledge. Ideally, our knowledge of ourselves, of God and of the world ought to be organized into a deductive system, in which all truths are derived from a relatively small number of axioms and definitions, whose truth is guaranteed by their self-evidence. Only if our starting points are absolutely certain, and we proceed by careful, certainty-preserving, deductive steps from them, can we achieve knowledge, for genuine knowledge requires certainty. On this picture of knowledge, experience is essentially irrelevant; it is not needed and cannot provide the certainty we require. This is the textbook rationalist programme in epistemology, to which Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz are all supposed to subscribe.\(^\text{13}\)

2. So understood, rationalism is an exercise in extravagant optimism, as might be argued by considering the mutually inconsistent (and often bizarre) metaphysical systems the rationalists advocated, or by noting the crucial role arguments from experience play in the development of the sciences. It was only natural, the story goes that there should develop in opposition to rationalism a school of philosophy which would (over-) emphasize the importance of experience... This way of telling the story of philosophy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is aesthetically pleasing, and gratifies our desire to think of philosophy as a progressive discipline.\(^\text{14}\)

3. The 'ants and spiders' model, suggests contrasting schools of philosophy, one based on careful observation, the other based on "pure thought". In the past, this contrast has worked to the detriment of the rationalists, implying that they were nothing but a priori web-spinners, building elaborate metaphysical systems 'from the armchair', and trying to settle by abstract theorizing questions about the nature of reality which ought properly to be determined by scientific experiment. This caricature of "philosophical rationalism involves more distortions than can conveniently be exposed in this brief introduction..."\(^\text{15}\)
APPENDIX 3

Table 4. Varieties of Transcendent Apriorism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ratiocinative.</th>
<th>Illuminative.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positing two ontological realms.</td>
<td>Plato (i), St. Anselm, St. Bonaventure.</td>
<td>Plato (ii), Plotinus, Porphyry Iamblichus, Proclus, Augustine, Philo of Alexandria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positing one ontological realm.</td>
<td>Parmenides, Zeno, Melissus, The Megarics, Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza, Kant (Inaugural Dissertation)</td>
<td>Malebranche, Bergson</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NOTES

OPENING QUOTATION.


ABSTRACT.

2. This has occurred despite Hegel’s influence, see p.194 of this thesis.

PREFACE.

1. Kant, Abstract - ref 1, B21.
3. The objective Hegelian attitude to the history of philosophy is summed up in the Science of Logic, “Thus the history of philosophy, in its true meaning, deals not with a past but with an eternal and veritable present: and, in its results, resembles not a museum of the aberrations of the human intellect, but a Pantheon of godlike figures”. Found in, Hegel, G. W. F., The Science of Logic (1816), trans. Wallace, W., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975, § 86.

INTRODUCTION.

1. Parmenides, DK, B1, the Parmenidean poem is divided into fragments numerated by Diels, H. & Kranz, W. Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, Berlin, 1952. Hereafter abbreviated DK as in common practice. The numbers used refer to the B section in this work. Any numbers appearing after the B reference are to the line number(s) of the fragment. The translations I have used, unless otherwise stated, are from Kirk, G. S., et al., The Presocratic Philosophers, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp.239-262.
2. The verification principle
5. Plato, Cratylus 401d. The numbers and letters in all Plato citations hereafter refer to the Stephanus [1578] pages and page sections. The translations are from Hamilton, E. & Cairns, H. (eds.) Plato: Collected Dialogues, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1961. From this point forward only the dialogue will be named, that the author is Plato is assumed.
8. For a more detailed account of Melissus’ argument, see p. 121 of this thesis.
12. This change, that is inaugurated by Frege is discussed in detail starting on p. 248 of this thesis.
13. See p.166 of this thesis for the full quotation [Q104] and further discussion.
14. Kant, ref. 11, § II, 392, p. 54.
15. Engels observes, “Herr Dühring thinks he can produce it a priori that is, without making use of the experience offered us by the external world, can construct it in his head”. This quotation is from Engels, F. *Anti-Dühring* (1877), Marx-Engels Archive, at website: http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1877/anti-duhring/ch01.htm, p.3
16. *Seventh Epistle*, 344b

**CHAPTER 1.**

2. Just one example is given from what would otherwise be a dull and lengthy catalogue: Ajdukiewicz states, "Plato was an extreme apriorist." Ajdukiewicz K. *Problems and Theories of Philosophy*, trans. Skolimowski, H. & Quinton, A., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973, p. 82.
14. Ibid.
17. Ibid. 65a.
18. Ibid. 82e.
19. Ibid.
21. Ibid. 602c.
22. Ibid.
25. Ibid. 523c.
26. Ibid. 524c.
29. Ibid. 250d.
30. Phaedo, 79c.
32. Republic, 508d.
33. Timaeus, 29e.
34. Sophist, 246c.
36. Phaedo, 79c; Timaeus, 27d and Sophist, 248a.
38. Ibid. 241d.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid. 246b.
41. Ibid. 248a.
42. Ibid. 246a.
43. Republic 476b.
44. Sophist, 246a.
45. Ibid. 246b
46. Ibid. 246c.
47. Gerson, L. P., ref. 5, pp. 171-195.
48. Ibid. p. 172.
49. Ibid.
50. Sophist, 237b, 7-8; cf. 238c, 9.
53. Cornford F. M., ref. 6, p. 244.
54. Meno, 98a.
55. Schopenhauer A. The World as Will and Representation (1818), vol.1, trans. Payne E. F. J.,
56. Cratylus, 440a-b.
57. Philebus, 58b.
58. Ibid. 59c.
60. Timaeus, 52a.
61. Statesman, 269d-e.
62. Republic, 478c.
63. Sophist, 249b.
64. Republic, 478b.
66. Republic, 478d.
67. Augustine St., On the Greatness of the Soul, 97.
68. Republic, 478d.
69. Phaedo, 79d.
70. Republic, 508d.
71. Phaedo, 79c.
72. Sophist, 264a-b.
73. Schopenhauer, ref. 57, p. 419.
74. Hamlyn, ref. 9, p. 13.
76. Metaphysics, 987b10-17.
77. Philebus, 59a.
78. Republic, 480a.
79. Ibid, 529c.
80. Timeus, 59d.
81. Ibid, 48d-e.
82. Ibid, 29a-d.
84. Republic, 529c-d.
85. Phaedrus, 250d.
86. Gosling certainly categorically rejects the alternative, "To sum up, I hope to have shown that there is as yet no reason to suppose that Plato thought that knowledge consisted of some sort of intellectual perception." Gosling, ref. 11, p. 139.

87. Id est, "a right notion about a thing" and grasping its "difference from other things", see Theaetetus, 208e.

88. Phaedo, 76a.
89. Ibid, 75d.
90. Ibid, 74b.
91. Locke J. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, A.D. Woozley (ed.). Glasgow: Collins. 1964, 2,1,II.
92. Phaedo, 75d.
93. Phaedrus, 249e-250b.
94. Phaedo, 75b.
95. Phaedrus, 248c-d.
96. Republic, 510b.
97. Ibid. 511b-d.
98. Ibid. 517b.
99. Theaetetus, 150d.
100. Meno, 85d-e.
101. Republic, 527e.
102. Gosling, J. C. B. "Δόξα and Δύναμις in Plato's Republic", Phronesis, 13(2), 1968, p. 120.
103. Plotinus, Opening Quotation – ref. 1, VI.9.4.11-16.
106. Gosling, ref. 102, p. 102.
114. Republic, 509d, ff.
115. Ibid., 533d.
116. Ibid., 518d.
117. Ibid.
118. Seventh Epistle, 344b.
119. Ibid., 344c.
120. Ibid., 341e.
121. Parmenides, 135d.
122. Republic, 540a.
123. Seventh Epistle, 341e-342a.
124. Republic, 533a.
127. Gosling, ref. 102, p. 119.
128. Ibid., p.120.
129. Seventh Epistle, 344b.
130. Ibid., 341d.
131. Ibid., 341c.
132. Theaetetus, 201b.
133. Meno, 97a
135. Phaedrus, 244d.
136. Ibid. 244b.
137. Ibid. 244a.
138. Ibid. 245a.
139. Ibid.
140. Seventh Epistle, 342c-d.
141. Ibid., 343a.
142. Ibid., 343c.
143. Ibid., 344d.
144. Theaetetus, 202a.
145. Seventh Epistle, 341a-c.
146. Republic, 586a-b.
147. Fine, ref. 3, p. 31
148. Ibid, p. 35.
149. Ibid.
156. Ibid.
158. Cherniss, ref. 110, p. 209.
161. Ross observes, "to distinguish the universal from its particulars is in a sense to 'separate' it. It is to think of it separately, and if the thought is not merely mistaken, this implies that the universal is a different entity from the particulars." (Ross, W. D. Aristotle's Metaphysics vol. 1, Oxford: University Press, 1924, XLIII). Burneyeat argues that Anamnesis implies separation (Burneyeat. M.F. review of Irwin, New York Review of Books, 27th September 1979, pp. 56-60). Cornford argues that Anamnesis implies separation (Cornford, F. M. Plato and Parmenides, Library of Liberal Arts, 1939).
162. Timaeus, 52a.
163. Phaedrus, 102b-d.
164. Fine, ref. 3, p. 80.
165. Timaeus, 53b
166. Sophist, 260a, “Any discourse we can have owes its existence to the weaving together of Forms”.
168. Ibid. 132b.
169. Ibid. 132c-d.
170. Ibid. 133c.
171. Fine, ref. 3, p. 58.
172. Parmenides 134b.
173. Ibid. 133c, ff.
174. Ibid. 133d.
175. Ibid. 134a.
176. Ibid. 134c.
177. Ibid. 134e.
178. Ibid.
179. Ibid. 135d.
180. Ibid. 137b.
181. Ibid. 133b.
182. Ibid. 135b.
183. Ibid. 135c.
184. Ibid. 136c.
185. Ibid. 135d.
CHAPTER 2

3. Kant, Abstract - ref. 1, Bxxv.
4. Ibid. A3.
5. Ibid. Bxxxvi.
7. Macquarrie implies that Kierkegaard reacted against the speculative metaphysics of Hegel. Speculative metaphysic is earlier defined by Macquarrie as an attempt "to extend reason beyond the empirical phenomena of the world so as to grasp the supposedly supersensible reality underlying these phenomena". These point are made in Macquarrie, J. Existentialism. London: Penguin, 1973, pp. 240-1.
13. Scotus J, D., ref. 11, 2, 3, 8, no. 13.
18. Wolff, ref. 16, § 1232, p. 476.
21. Ibid. p. 196.
23. Kant, Abstract - ref. 1, A634/B662.
25. Kant, Abstract - ref. 1, A758/B786.
26. Ibid. Bxxv.
27. Ibid. B3
29. Kant, ref. 25.
30. Kant, Abstract - ref. 1, Aiiix.
32. Kant, Abstract - ref. 1, Bxxvii.
35. Ibid. §31.
36. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
40. Ibid. §123.
41. Sartre, ref. 37, Iv.
44. Husserl, ref. 42, p. 122.
45. Sartre, ref. 37, Iv.
47. Kant, Abstract - ref. 1, A252
48. Ibid. B303
49. Ibid. B69-70
52. In addition to Walsh, who is discussed subsequently, Copleston is also guilty of underestimating the role of experience in Wolff's metaphysics. He describes Wolff's philosophy as a "thorough-going rationalism". Quote in Copleston, F. A. *History of Philosophy*, vol.6, London: Search Press, 1960, p. 105.
53. Walsh, Preface - ref. 3, p. 17.
54. Kockelman, ref. 50, p.278.
55. Hegel, Introduction - ref. 7, §76.
56. Ibid. §74.
57. Ibid. §74.
58. Ibid.
59. Hegel, Preface ref. 3, §45.
60. Strawson, P. F. *Individuals*, London: Methuen, 1959, p. 1
61. Hamlyn, Chap. 1 – ref. 9., pp. 4-9 & Carr, Chap. 1 – ref. 159, pp. 9-14.
63. Hegel, Preface – ref. 3, I

CHAPTER 3

2. Kant, Abstract 1 – ref. 1., A50/B74.
3. Ibid. B72.
4. The terms "rational intuition" and "intellectual intuition" are used in different philosophical text books in reference to an identical meaning-content. The combination of the two terms here suggests that they are completely interchangeable.
5. Audi, Chap. 2 – ref. 24, p. 382.
6. Dancy, Chap. 1 – ref. 126, p. 222.
9. Descartes makes the contrast between instant and successive cognition clear in the *Discourse on Method* when he states that whereas the act of intuition occurs instantaneously, i.e. what is intuited "must be grasped at the same time and not successively", deduction is a process, which "appears not to occur all at the same time, but involves a sort of movement on the part of our mind when it infers one thing from another". Found in Haldane E. and Ross G. R. T. (eds.) *The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, New York, 1955, I, 33.

11. "There is another seat of consciousness than the brain and the nerve system: there is a blood consciousness...One lives, knows, and has one's being in the blood, without any reference to nerves and brain". Quote from, Lawrence, D. H. Letter to Bertrand Russell, 8th Dec. 1915. Found in David Herbert Lawrence Information, Letters, Doctrine, and located at the following website: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/AnS/english/mwollaeger/DHL-handl.htm.

14. Ibid. 100a
15. Parmenides, DK, B 6
19. Ibid. II, XL, ii.
21. Haldane, ref. 8, I, 33.
23. This process is described clearly in Descartes' *Regulae* (1627) when he observes that it is possible to intuit a chain of connections "in a continuous and wholly uninterrupted sweep of thought...so swiftly that memory is left with practically no role to play, and I seem to intuit the whole thing practically at once". Found in *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, trans. Cottingham, J.; Stoothoff, R. & Murdoch, D., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, I, 25.
24. Phaedo, 75d.
27. Ibid. 31.
28. Ibid. 34.
29. Kant, Abstract 1 – ref. 1, B5.
30. Ibid. B337.
31. Rational reflection is the term for this phenomenon of consciousness used by Walsh in *Reason and Experience*. In the chapter on self-knowledge he observes "The problem of self-knowledge is thus...in essentials a problem about the knowledge of the self provided by psychology and the self-knowledge, if any, which philosophy provides. It can be put, if we like in the question how far we can draw a legitimate distinction between introspection, where that term is taken to signify a kind of internal sense perception, and what might be called rational reflection". In, Walsh, Preface – ref. 4, p. 211.
34. The term science here is used in the sense of a rigorous methodological enquiry. The German word Wissenschaft conveys this meaning, but there seems to be no convenient English equivalent.
35. Hegel, Preface – ref. 3, §34.
36. Plotinus, Opening Quotation – ref. 1, V, 3, 3.
38. Kant, Abstract 1 – ref. 1, A343.
39. Ibid. A348.

CHAPTER 4

1. Parmenides, DK, B6, 2-6
5. Theaetetus, 183e
8. Theophrastus De Sensu, I
11. Ibid.
12. See, for instance, Bonaventure St., Opera Omnia, vol I, Collegium S, Bonaventurae: 1882-1902. (Sen.,resp.), ad. 1, 2, 3.
13. Loenen, ref. 6., p. 96, f.
16. Empiricus, S. Against the Mathematicians, VII, iii.
19. Parmenides, 130a
20. Plotinus, Opening Quotation - ref. 1., V, I, 8.
22. Ibid.
23. Theophrastus, ref. 8, DKA46.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Parmenides, DK, B6, 4.
28. Parmenides, DK, B6, 5.
29. Parmenides, DK, B16.
30. Loenen, ref. 3, p. 52.
31. Ibid.
32. Fritz, K. V. "Noos, Noein, and their Derivatives in Presocratic Philosophy (Excluding Anaxagoras)”, part 1, Classical Philology, 40, 1945, p. 239.
35. Parmenides, DK, B16.
36. The Greek term is κουρήτες meaning young man.
38. Ibid.
40. Loenen. ref. 3. pp. 50-60.
42. Loenen. ref. 3, p. 55.
43. Mourelatos, ref. 2, p. 251.
44. Parmenides, DK, B8, 5.
45. Parmenides, DK, B8, 22.
46. Parmenides, DK, B8, 48.
47. Parmenides, DK, B8, 25.
49. Parmenides, DK, B12.
50. Parmenides, DK, B18.
51. Parmenides, DK, B12.
52. Ibid.
53. Parmenides, DK, B18.
54. Parmenides, DK, B8, 6.
55. Parmenides, DK, B8, 26.
56. Parmenides, DK, B8, 29-30.
57. The authenticity of this, the Cornford fragment, is defended in, "A New Fragment of Parmenides", Classical Review, 9, 1935, p. 22-3.
60. Parmenides, DK, B6, 1-9.
61. Parmenides, DK, B7, 3-4.
64. The meaning of ἀγωγ, as given here, in [DK, B136], is given by Liddel and Scott under the general heading "inward debate of the soul" which is further specified in a subsection as "reflection, deliberation or reasoning". Guthrie also refers to this fragment in his analysis of "logos in the Fifth century" and observes that as early as Parmenides thinking out or reasoning is opposed to mere sensation. See, Guthrie, W. K. C. A History of Greek Philosophy. vol.1. Cambridge: University Press, 1969, p. 421.
66. Long's main categories are as follows "(i) The cosmogony is not Parmenides' own but a systematized account of contemporary beliefs. (ii) The cosmogony is an extension of The Way of Truth (iii) The cosmogony has relative validity as a second best explanation of the world (iv) Parmenides claims no truth for the cosmogony". Found in, Phronesis, 8, 1963, p. 90.
67. Theophrastus, Opinions of the Physicists, 482.
68. Loenon, ref. 3, p. 82.
69. Including Kirk, Verdenius and Vlastos above.
70. Plutarch adv. Colotem, 1114B.
71. Mourelatos, ref. 2, p. 256.
72. Parmenides, DK, B8, 50.
73. Parmenides, DK, B1.
74. Ibid.
75. Parmenides, DK, B8, 60-1.
76. Parmenides, DK, B8, 7-8.
77. Parmenides, DK, B8, 61.
79. He says that, in the way of opinion, "he [Parmenides] offers an account of what ordinary men believe and what is implied by that". Found in Hamlyn, Chap. 1 – ref. 9, p. 12.
82. DK, 28, B10.
83. Ibid.
84. Aristotle Physics, 187a23.
85. Parmenides, DK, B9
86. Parmenides, DK, B8, 22.
87. Parmenides, 131b.
88. Parmenides, DK, B8, 61.
"Would you like me [Parmenides], since we are committed to play out this laborious game, to begin with myself and my own original supposition? Shall I take the one itself and consider the consequences of assuming that there is, or is not, a one? Parmenides, 137b.

Parmenides, DK, B8, 1.
Parmenides, DK, B8, 5.
Parmenides, DK, B1, 29.
Parmenides, DK, B2, 4-5.
Parmenides, DK, B8, 18.

C.F. = Cornford Fragment, see ref. 57,
Long A.A., ref. 65, p. 91.
Theophrastus, DK, 28A46
Parmenides, DK, B10-15.
Parmenides, DK, B17.
Plutarch, ref. 70, III,
Empedocles, DK, B38.
Plutarch, DK, 28B10.
Aristotle, Metaphysics, 986b28.
Parmenides, DK, B19.
Parmenides, DK, B8, 37-9.
Parmenides, DK, B14-15.
Parmenides, DK, B18.
Parmenides, DK, B11.
Loenen, ref. 3, p. 37.
Parmenides, DK, B3.1, 3.2, 2.2, 3.1, 4.1, 6.1, 6.6, 7.2, 8.8, 8.17, 8.34, 8.35. 8.50, 16.
Fritz, ref. 32, pp. 223-242.
Fritz, ref. 10, pp. 12-34.
Fritz, ref. 32, p. 228.
Ibid. p.223.
Homer, ref. 63, I, 58.
Ibid. p. 90.
Fritz, ref. 112, p. 90.
Ibid. p. 91.
Fritz, ref. 32, p. 225.
Fränkel, Parmenidesstudien, 1930, K1.
Parmenides, DK, B6, 5.
Guthrie, ref. 64, 19n.
Aristotle, Topics, 110b5.
The status of Gorgias account is still not settled. As Barnes notes "Some scholars make Gorgias a profound thinker, a nihilist and a sceptic; others treat What Is Not as a serious and witty reductio of Eleatic metaphysics; others again take it for a rhetorical tour de force or a sophisticated joke". Found in Barnes, ref. 9, p. 173.
Parmenides, DK, B2, 7.
Parmenides, DK, B2, 8.
Parmenides, DK, B8, 17.
DK82, B3, 78.
Fritz, ref. 10, p. 12.
Parmenides, DK, B8, 8.
138. Pannenides, DK, B6, 8.
139. Ibid.
140. Pannenides, DK, B1.
143. Hesiod *Eoiae* 323.
144. Pannenides, DK, B7, 5.
145. Ibid.
148. Pannenides, DK, B7, 5.
149. Ibid.
151. As Simplicius observes, "Melissus, inasmuch as he wrote in prose, gave a clearer account [than Parmenides] of his own views on [perceptible objects] both implicitly throughout his argument and explicitly in the following passage..." In Simplicius, ref. 150, 558. 17f.
152. The Ionian cosmologists interpreted the phenomenal world not as a realm of "seemings" but as the fundamental object-correlate of knowing. Technically speaking they made use of logico-sensitive cognition to determine the nature of reality.
155. Sartre draws attention to such a phenomenon of consciousness in his attempt to explain the possibility of bad faith, "I must know in my capacity as deceiver the truth which is hidden from me in my capacity as the one deceived...and this not at two different moments, which at a pinch would allow us to re-establish a semblance of duality - but in the unitary structure of the single project". In Sartre, Chap. 2 – ref. 37, P49.
156. Pannenides, DK, B8, 35.
158. "Brahman is real, the world is false, the self is not different from Brahman".
159. *Republic* 476c.
162. As Loenen observes, "This probably means that in Plato's copy the false reading [the corruption of το] already occurred". Found in Loenen, ref. 3, p. 49.
163. Simplicius reports that copies were becoming rare, "I would like to transcribe in this commentary Parmenides verses...because of the rarity of Parmenides' treatise". Found in Simplicius *Commentary on the Physics* 144.25-146.27. However, Simplicius is extremely late 500-540AD.
164. Hamlyn, Chap. 1 – ref. 9, p. 13.
165. Ibid.
166. Ibid. p. 14
169. Ibid, p. 15.
170. Parmenides, DK, B7, 2.
171. Parmenides, DK, B8, 22.
172. Parmenides, DK, B8, 1-4, 21 & 27.
173. Parmenides, DK, B8, 58.
174. Parmenides, DK, B8, 22-5.
175. Ibid.
176. Parmenides, DK, B3, 1.
177. Parmenides, DK, B4.
180. Ibid. 986b30.
CHAPTER 5

2. Ibid.
5. Ibid. p. 536.
10. Ibid. p. 223.
16. Ibid. II, 396, 10.
18. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
28. Kant, Abstract – ref. 1, A2,
29. Ibid. B3.
30. Ibid. B5.
31. Ibid. A96.
32. Ibid. A854/B882.
36. Locke, ref. 36, i, iv, i.
37. Kant, Abstract – ref. 1, A51, B75.
38. The qualifying term “intrinsically” is necessary to allow for the inclusion of dispositional theories of innatism. The reason for this will become clear in the following paragraph.
39. The given is the putative raw data of experience uncontaminated by the cognitive activity of the imagination or the understanding.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid. §8.
43. Leibniz, ref. 34, 81.

CHAPTER 6

1. Leibniz, Chap. 5 - ref. 34, pp. 48-9.
6. Stich, S. Chap. 6 – ref. 30, Chapter II, P3.
8. Ibid.
9. Kant, Introduction - ref. 11, II, §8
10. Leibniz, Chap. 5 - ref. 34, 75.
11. Kant, ref. 4, p. 223.
13. Ibid, p. 221
14. Cottingham Chap. 4 - ref. 4, 5441
15. Kant, ref. 4, p. 223.
18. See *De Mysterio Trinitatis*, i, i, 7.
20. Locke, Chap. 5 – ref. 33, I, ii, 5.
22. Ibid. p. 139.
23. Ibid. p. 125.
24. Ibid. p. 139.
25. Ibid. p. 125.
26. Descartes, Chap. 2 – ref. 23, x, 424.
27. Ibid.
28. Leibniz, Chap. 5 - ref. 34, 51.
29. Ibid. 50-2.
32. Ibid, p. 316.
33. Leibniz, Chap. 5 - ref. 34, I, i, 81.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
37. Ibid, p. 221.
39. Leibniz, Chap. 5 - ref. 34, I, i, 74.
40. Ibid. I, i, 81.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid. II, i, 2.
43. Ibid.

**CHAPTER 7.**

1. Kant, Introduction - ref. 11, §10.
3. Ewing Dr. British Academy Lecture.
7. Descartes, Chap. 2 – ref. 23, x, 387-8.
10. Republic, 527e.
11. Ibid. 508c, 518, 527e, 533d.
12. Gerson, Chap. 1, ref. 5.
13. Plotinus, Opening Quotation – ref. 1, VI, 7, xxxv.
15. Seventh Epistle, 344b.
17. Kant, Introduction - ref. 11, §10.
18. Walsh, Preface – ref. 4, p. 224.
19. Ibid. P52.
20. It is not the case, for example, in Plotinus.
22. Dionysius (pseudo-Areopagite), De Mystica Theologia, i, 3.
23. Plotinus, Opening Quotation – ref. 1, VI, 7, xxxv.
24. Ibid. VI, 7, xxxvi.
26. As Evelyn Underhill observes, "the fundamental difference between the two is this: magic wants to get, mysticism wants to give". In Underhill E. Mysticism: The Nature and Development of Spiritual Consciousness, Oxford: Oneworld Publications. 1993, p. 70.
29. Ruysbroeck John, De Omatu Spiritualium Nuptiarum, 1, I, cap xxvi.
31. Underhill, ref. 26, p. 46.
35. Plotinus, Opening Quotation – ref. 1, IV, 4-5.
36. Ibid. iv, 7, x.
39. Grosseteste Posterior Analytics, I, 7, fB.
40. Plotinus, Opening Quotation – ref. 1, V, 9, 13.
41. Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, 119.
42. Henry of Ghent, Summa quaestionum, I, 2, f, 7, v.
43. Augustine, De libero arbitrio 2, 13, 35.
44. Plotinus, Opening Quotation – ref. 1, v, 9, 1.
45. Ibid. IV, 7, x.
46. Kant, Abstract – ref. 1, A20.
47. Augustine, Chap. 6 – ref. 3, x, 12, 19.
48. Augustine, De Trinitate, xii, 15, 4.
49. Philo, ref. 38, 11, 30.
50. Ibid. III, 97-9.
51. Philo, De posteritate Caini, 167
52. Gerson, Chap. 1 – ref. 5, p. 230.
54. Gerson, Chap. 1 – ref. 5, p. 42.
55. Plotinus, Opening Quotation – ref. 1, VI, 9, 3.
56. Ibid. V, 9, 7.
57. Ibid. VI, 9, 3.
58. Ibid. V, 9, 13.
60. Ibid. V, 9.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid. VI, 7, 8.
65. Ibid. V, 9, 1.
66. Ibid. VI, 3, 8.
67. Ibid. V, 3.
68. Ibid. VI, 7, 35.
69. Ibid.
70. Gerson, Chap. 1 – ref. 5, p. 93.
71. Plotinus, Opening Quotation – ref. 1, VI, 9, 4, 1-3.
72. Ibid. V, 3, 17, 21f.
73. Ibid. IV, 4, 1.
74. Ibid. V, 3, 13.
75. Ibid. IV, 8, 6, 1.
77. Plotinus, Opening Quotation – ref. 1, VI, 7, 36, 17-18.
78. Ibid. V, 3, 17.
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid. VI, 5.
81. Kretzmann, ref. 37, p. 462.
82. Augustine, ref. 47, 2, 13, 38.
83. Augustine, ref. 45, 118.
84. Ibid.
85. Augustine De diversis, LXXXIII, 46.
86. Augustine Contra Academicos, 3, 10, 20.
87. Clerselier in his preface to Descartes' Treatise on Man states that Augustine's De Trinitate seemed to have, "furnished to M. Descartes everything that his reflections about the mind require". Found in Clerselier, L'Homme de René Descartes; Paris, 1664, preface.
88. Augustine, ref. 90.
89. Husserl cogit
90. Augustine, ref. 47, II, 8, 8, 3.
91. Ibid. 2, 3, 7.
92. Ibid.
93. Ibid.
94. Ibid. 12, 34.
96. Augustine, De. Id. 2.
97. Augustine, ref. 52, 12, 15, 24.
98. The following texts by Augustine contain his anti-Pelagius polemics: De peccatorum meritis et remissione, de baptismo parvulorum ad Marcellinum; De spiritu et littera; De fide et operibus; De natura et gratia contra Pelagium and De perfectione iustitiae hominis.
99. Augustine, ref. 52, XII, 14, 22.
100. Ibid. XII, 15, 25.
101. Augustine De Magistro §38.
104. Ibid. 1, 3, 2.
105. Recueil de toutes les responses a M. Arnauld, Chap.3 – ref. 22, vol 6, 214
107. Ibid. III, 2, 6.
CHAPTER 8.

2. Schopenhauer, Chap. 2 - ref. 20, p. 191-2.
3. Schopenhauer, Chap. 1 - ref. 57, p. 3.
4. Schopenhauer, Chap. 2 - ref. 20, p. 194.
5. Ibid. p. 193.
6. Ibid. p. 198.
7. Schopenhauer, Chap. 5 - ref 44, p.55.
10. Schopenhauer, Chap. 2 - ref. 20, p. 193.
11. Solomon, ref. 9, p. 50.
15. Chap. 4 - ref. 168, p. 15
17. Gr. nooumenon from nooein, i.e. what is thought by the nous.
18. Aquinas, Chap. 2 - ref. 10, ST, I, i, xi.
19. Plotinus, Opening Quotation - ref. 1, VI, iii.
20. Kretzmann, Chap. 7 - ref. 37, p. 441.
21. Spinoza, Chap. 3 - ref. 18, I, Appendix.
22. Caygill, Chap. 7 - ref. 128, p. 264.
25. The malicious demon is introduced in Meditation I, "I will suppose, then, not that Deity, who is sovereignly good and the fountain of truth, but that some malignant demon, who is at once exceedingly potent and deceitful, has employed all his artifice to deceive me". Found in Descartes, chap. 3 - ref. 16, p. 84.
27. Derrida, ref. 34, p. 76.
28. Ibid.
33. Descartes, Chap. 3 - ref. 9, II, 41.
CHAPTER 9.

1. Audi, Chap. 2 — ref. 24, p. 613. However, the theory originated with Quine & Duhem.
2. Ibid. p. 617.
5. Ibid. p. 92.
7. Ayer, Chap. 2 — ref. 6, p. 9.
8. Dancy, Chap. 1 — ref. 126, p. 417
9. Hawking, ref. 4, p. 167.
14. "The mind's highest good is the knowledge of God, and the mind's highest virtue is to know God". In Spinoza, Chap. 3 – ref 18, IV, prop. 28.
15. Dancy, Chap. 1 – ref. 126, p. 412.
17. Dancy, Chap. 1 – ref. 126, p. 441.
18. Defenders of the traditional position include: G. H. R. Parkinson in his book *Spinoza's Theory of Knowledge* (1954); Copleston in his *History of Philosophy*, vol. IV (1958); Hall in "Philosophy and Natural Philosophy: Boyle and Spinoza" (1964); Maull in "Spinoza in the Century of Science" (1986) and J. Cohen in both *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Induction and Probability* (1989) and his article on "rationality" in Dancy, Chap. 1 – ref. 126, pp. 415-419.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Dancy, Chap. 1 – ref. 126, p. 417.
25. Ibid. 59, 60.
26. Hall, ref. 18.
28. Parkinson, ref. 6, p. 161.
29. Leibniz, Chap. 5 - ref. 34, 445.
30. Spinoza, Chap. 3 – ref. 18, II, prop. 44.
31. Spinoza, B. *On the Improvement of the Understanding* found in Spinoza, Chap. 3 – ref. 18, p. 34.
32. Kant, Abstract – ref. 1, A188.
33. Descartes, Chap. 3 - ref. 22., Ixb, 14.
34. Spinoza, Chap. 3 – ref. 18, I, prop. XVIII.
35. Ibid.
36. Spinoza, ref. 34, p. 11.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid. p. 8.
39. Ibid. p. 11.
40. Spinoza, Chap. 3 – ref. 18, II, prop. X, cor.
41. Ibid. I, prop. XV.
42. Ibid. I, prop. VIII.
43. Ibid, I, prop. XIX.
44. Ibid. I, prop. XXXIII, note II.
45. Ibid. I, prop. XXIX.
46. Ibid. I, prop. XII.
47. Ibid. I, prop. XIII.
48. Ibid. I, prop. XX, cor. II.
49. Ibid. I, prop. XXXIII, note II.
50. Ibid. II, def. VI.
51. Ibid. I, prop. V.
52. Ibid. I, prop. XV, proof.
53. Spinoza, ref. 28, p. 277.
54. Spinoza, Chap. 3 – ref. 18, I, prop. XV note.
55. Ibid. I, prop. XV, note.
56. Spinoza, ref. 34, p. 33.
57. Spinoza, Chap. 3 – ref. 18, V, prop. XXV, proof.
58. Spinoza, ref. 34, p. 5.
CONCLUSION

1. The propositions of the Tractatus have this status. They are not promulgated to make statements of fact but rather to show how the world is. As Wittgenstein himself observes, "My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognises them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.) He must surmount these propositions—then he sees the world rightly". Found in Wittgenstein, L. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. Ogden C. K., London: Routledge, 1922, 6.54.


3. Ibid.

4. As Carnap has observed in reference to this point, "In the strict sense...a sequence of words is meaningless if it does not, within a specified language, constitute a statement. It may happen that such a sequence of words looks like a statement at first glance: in that case we call it a pseudo-statement". In Carnap, ref. 132, p. 30.

5. Ayer, Chap. 2 - ref. 6, p. 125.


7. Ibid. 4.11.

8. Ibid. 6.432.

9. Ibid. 6.4312.

10. Ibid. 6.42.

11. Ibid. 6.52

12. As Ayer observes "no act of intuition can be said to reveal a truth about any matter of fact unless it issues in verifiable propositions" and "if a mystic admits that the object of his vision is
something which cannot be described, then he must also admit that he is bound to talk nonsense when he describes it”. In Ayer, Chap. 2 - ref. 6, pp. 126 & 124 respectively.

15. Wittgenstein, Chap. 7 - ref. 131, 6.44.
16. See the section on Henri Bergson.
17. Seventh Epistle, 344d.
19. Boghossian, Chap. 5 - ref. 37, p. 44.
21. Boghossian, Chap. 5 - ref. 37, p. 44.
22. Ibid. p.235.
23. It is important to recognise that the postulation of such a faculty theory is not really required for a theory of rational intuition. Bonjour observes that it is “anything but obvious” that rational intuition involves “a distinct psychology faculty”. The only faculty involved would be “the ability to think and understand”. In Bonjour, Chap. 7 - ref. 148, p. 109.
24. Kurt Gödel thinks we need to posit some form of rational intuition to explain the fact that we can discover new axioms which do not follow from those previously understood. In the thesis terminology Gödel is defending a version of axiomatic intuition. For an illustration of this, see Gödel’s essay entitled “Some Basic Theorems on the Foundations of Mathematics and their implications” in Gödel, K. Kurt Gödel Collected Works, III: Unpublished Lectures and Essays. (ed.) Feferman S. et. al., New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, 305, 309.
25. Roger Penrose claims that it is rational intuition that explains our knowledge that the Gödel sentence is true. For an illustration of this defence of deductive intuition see Penrose, R. "Précis", in Behavioural and Brain Sciences 13 (1990). p. 648.
27. Ibid., p. 55, fn
28. Ayer, Chap. 2 – ref. 6, p. 100.
30. Ayer, Chap. 2 – ref. 6, p. 106.
31. Spinoza, Chap. 3 – ref. 18, IV, Preface.
33. Boghossian, ref. 37, p. 66.
34. Burge observes that Leibniz holds that we may “depend psychologically on sense experience in order to come to know any truth”. In Ibid. p. 13. Yet, this is only true if he understands that Leibniz means extrinsic rather than intrinsic dependence on sense experience. Yet to accept extrinsic dependence would not prove Burge’s point about a priori knowledge in Leibniz.
35. Theophilus is the mouthpiece of Leibnizian ideas in the New Essays.
36. Leibniz, ref. 34, I, I, 81.
37. Boghossian, ref. 37, pp. 415 –432.

APPENDIX 1

1. Mourelatos, Chap. 4 – ref. 2, xiii.#
2. Walsh, Preface – ref. 4, p. 239.
3. Loenen, Chap. 4 – ref. 3, p. 48.
4. Ibid. p.137.
6. Cottingham, Chap. 4 – ref. 4, p. 12.
8. Hamlyn, Chap 1 – ref. 9, p. 2.
9. Ayer, Chap. 2 - ref. 6, p. 146.
10. Ibid. p. 13.
11. Solomon, Chap. 8 - ref. 9, p. 49.

APPENDIX 2

14. Ibid.
15. Cottingham, Appendix 1, ref. 7. p. 3


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