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‘Special Relationships’
The Negotiation of an Anglo-American Propaganda ‘War on Terror’

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Thesis Submitted in Fulfilment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Abstract

This doctoral thesis will examine how relations between the United States and Britain, and internal dynamics within each country, affected the nature and development of the two countries’ information strategies in a shared theatre of war. It examines the two governments’ distinct organisational cultures and bureaucratic structures in explaining the shape this took. Going beyond the policy level it considers how cultures and power relationships contributed to propaganda war planning. The research emphasises important changes in policy development and circumstance which, it is argued, despite the obvious power imbalance, situated Britain in a key position in the Anglo-American propaganda effort. The analysis draws on empirical research conducted in both countries. This fieldwork involved elite interviews focussing on the period of the ‘War on Terror’, including policymakers, key bureaucrats, intelligence personnel, contractors and military planners in both Britain and America.
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Author’s Declaration

I declare that, except where explicit reference is made to the contribution of others, that this dissertation is the result of my own work and has not been submitted for any other degree at the University of Glasgow or any other institution.

Signature __________________________

Printed Name Emma Louise Briant
### Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>CIC</td>
<td>Coalition Information Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>United States Central Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCI</td>
<td>Director of Central Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>DI</td>
<td>Directorate of Intelligence</td>
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<td>DIA</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>DNI</td>
<td>Director of National Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>DTIO</td>
<td>Directorate of Targeting &amp; Information Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCO</td>
<td>Foreign &amp; Commonwealth Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>GICS</td>
<td>Government Information and Communications Service</td>
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<td>IPI</td>
<td>International Public Information</td>
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<td>IRA</td>
<td>Irish Republican Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
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<td>MI5</td>
<td>(British Domestic) Security Service</td>
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<td>MI6</td>
<td>(British International) Secret Intelligence Service</td>
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<td>NCS</td>
<td>National Clandestine Service</td>
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<td>NCTC</td>
<td>National Counterterrorism Center</td>
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<td>NEC</td>
<td>Network Enabled Capability</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<td>OGC</td>
<td>Office of Global Communications</td>
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<td>OSI</td>
<td>Office of Strategic Influence</td>
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<td>PA</td>
<td>Public Affairs</td>
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<td>PSYOPS</td>
<td>Psychological Operations</td>
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<td>PR</td>
<td>Public Relations</td>
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<td>SIS</td>
<td>(British International) Secret Intelligence Service</td>
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<td>SOC</td>
<td>Special Operations Command</td>
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<td>SOLIC</td>
<td>Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict</td>
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<td>RAF</td>
<td>Royal Air Force</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>USIA</td>
<td>United States Information Agency</td>
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<td>VOA</td>
<td>Voice of America</td>
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<td>WMD’s</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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Introduction & Theoretical Debates

This doctoral thesis will examine how relations between the United States and Britain, and internal dynamics within each country, affected the nature and development of the two countries’ information strategies in a shared theatre of war. The argument considers the two governments’ distinct organisational cultures and bureaucratic structures in explaining the shape this took. It goes beneath policy itself to consider how cultures and power relationships contributed to propaganda war planning. The research emphasises important changes in policy development and circumstance which, it is argued, despite the obvious power imbalance, situated Britain in a key position in the Anglo-American propaganda effort. The thesis draws on fieldwork including elite interviews in both countries. This focussed on the period of the ‘War on Terror’ and policymakers, key bureaucrats, intelligence personnel, contractors and military planners in both Britain and America were interviewed.

While the post-9/11 invasion of Afghanistan arose with the support of a strong international coalition that included endorsements from the Arab world, its backbone was always Anglo-American. This continued to be so into Iraq, as the complex tissue of ‘coalition’ support withered and fell away. Although the US has many ‘special’ relationships, literature confirms that even when superficially absent, the relationship between the bureaucracies in intelligence and diplomacy has proved deeply rooted, and consultation at many levels has brought regular formal and informal influence on both countries’ policymaking.¹ Since its World War 2 infancy the partnership with Britain has evolved considerably in basis, strength and power-balance. At times the idea of the partnership itself has been considered mere propaganda, with marked differences between these states in policy and its application. Yet a broad consensus has existed in economic objectives and strategic goals; enduring through communist containment to 9/11 responses.

The emergent dangers from an international system in a state of flux challenged the logic on which past conflicts had been fought. This period brought struggle and

¹ See work by Zakheim, (1996) and Reynolds (1985-6) here for instance.
insecurity firmly into a theatre of war in which American dominance had bred complacency; the information realm.

The thesis will examine Anglo-American responses to this changing international environment. It argues that an expansion of the propaganda apparatus (seen as necessary in tackling asymmetric, transnational threats) led to subsequent problems with coordination, particularly in the US. It charts successive attempts by both countries to manage this. While formal solutions faltered, it is argued, from the early stages of the ‘War on Terror’ the coordination problem forced the initiative of certain key decision-makers. The thesis will demonstrate that key British personnel, responding through initiative and informal planning, encouraged the development of informal channels that proved crucial to strategic and operational planning, and even brought more flexible contractors. The research will reveal that from 2005 Britain also managed to contribute, among other things, to the evolution of a ‘strategic communication’ solution to this coordination problem. This is intended to guide policymaking toward more extensive integration of propaganda into strategic cross-government planning. The research will show that this approach required not only substantial restructuring but depended on a (necessarily gradual) change in institutional culture and assumptions regarding propaganda.

This research revealed across the conflicts initiative and increased informality enabled the overall movement towards increased distribution and delegation of propaganda practices, with their effects of distancing from accountable parties and normalisation into culture. Interviews reveal that a culture-change was increasingly seen as necessary to coordination; to break down unhelpful ‘divisions’, once thought necessary to prevent ‘contamination’ of domestic media by more invasive propaganda. The attempts to navigate the coordination problem by each country’s personnel will thus be considered a site of cultural struggle; between those who embraced the cultural change, and other tendencies within the structure which moved more slowly or retained concerns. The thesis will demonstrate how some US planners thus advanced objectives through informal planning and coordination, and it is argued here that at times previously restricted activities and even oppressive
tactics were facilitated by a culture of ‘service’ (and the resulting gap between institutional culture and that of the public).

The developing need for coordination and move toward informal planning will be argued to have provided a niche for Britain at a time when America’s image of British ‘expertise’ was wearing thin. The thesis will show how the British leadership view that Atlanticism was the key to its relative power, culminated in policy that sought to ensure Britain provide capabilities which ‘compliment’ US-military systems. It will detail how the desire to coordinate in the absence of effective formal systems compelled British personnel to shore-up informal Anglo-American ties. The thesis demonstrates that, to some extent the flexibility of British military culture facilitated America in navigating domestic interagency ‘turf-wars’ and continuing function. Flexibility and initiative had become a facilitator to negotiating across the formal apparatus and formed a keystone of British ‘value’ to America.

The chapters demonstrate that relationships, and affinity between the countries’ institutional cultures, thus became increasingly important to maintain for Britain but also greatly benefited US planning. British personnel viewed enduring positive US assessments of British expertise and ‘unique’ capabilities as key to sustaining connections crucial to the propaganda war. In Iraq British kinetic expertise began showing itself to be shallow, but notions of British ‘expertise’ are shown here to have maintained strength through the military’s ‘collective memory’. These notions have been emphasised to unify Britain’s domestic military, and they play also on US sentiment for tradition. Conceptually British ‘expertise’ will be argued to have operated, for its leadership, to demonstrate the value Britain offered, and secured Anglo-American relationships.

The thesis builds the argument that in both countries individuals’ often well-meaning efforts to enable coordination were underpinned by a culture of ‘service’. These cultures have served to nurture detachment from wider society, through which paternalistic notions of ‘public interest’ were framed. Cultures are argued to enable a privileged cultural sense of ‘the real world’ - a basic realism which limited
initiative and informal planning through which action occurred and the boundaries of practise were pushed. This is suggested to provide structures of legitimacy and reference points in tension between individuals and the institutions of government. As the apparatus evolved so too did the ways in which propaganda is understood by its planners and functionaries. In the context of its findings the thesis will discuss the legitimacy of the propaganda war, and elements of the cultures through which its practice has been institutionally defined as legitimate, which are being renegotiated through changing practise.

This research highlights the key role that information now plays in the international system with political analysis influenced conceptually by a reaction to ‘neo-realist’ international relations and critical social and political theory. This locates the research theoretically between the political subfield of Anglo-American relations, a sociological analysis of propaganda and; broadly informed by debates in international relations, it offers insights into defence policy planning and strategic studies. Propaganda, as one aspect of the intelligence, diplomatic and consultative Anglo-American relationship, has been neglected by systematic academic research to date, though on occasion is evidenced in work on Anglo-American relations or propaganda itself. Indeed Scott questions why scholars examining the intelligence agencies largely focus on comparatively well-researched ‘information gathering’, rather than “clandestine diplomacy” and the “secret intervention” function that is crucial to exposing hidden political agendas (2004: 322). Thus following a brief summary of the research questions and aims of the research, the present chapter will introduce key theoretical debates which provide context within which a reader might consider the propaganda ‘War on Terror’.

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2 For instance see the work of Kirby (2000).
Research Questions

To what extent did Anglo-American relations shape the direction of propaganda strategy over the course of the Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts and what form did this take?

Research will explore:

i. The nature and scope (theoretical and practical) of domestic American and British information policies and examples that demonstrate how these evolved.

ii. The extent and form of interaction and co-operation between British and American domestic infrastructures and how this evolved.

What are the perceived and actual outcomes of such co-ordination in propaganda and wider defence policy for Britain and US?

The policymakers perceptions of the role of interconnectivity and its potential benefits have clear policy implications. This will help to build the theoretical framework and will give an insight into whose interests this co-operation served.

What power imbalances exist in this aspect of the relationship?

The study will examine how aspects of culture and economic imbalance impacted the negotiation of information strategy and respective roles.

Asymmetrical Nature of the ‘Special Relationship’

According to Nelson, in terms of defence expenditure, compared to the European NATO allies combined budget of around $159Bn in 2001, the US spent over $1Bn daily in 2002-2003 (2002: 56). Blair saw Britain as a bridge between America and Europe, but many argued that a material imbalance with America cripples British autonomy in foreign policy; Robin Cook sarcastically noted that “a bridge cannot make choices” (2003: 133). Within any examination of Anglo-American relations, the effect an imbalance of power must be considered. While some said Tony Blair was Bush’s ‘poodle’, obediently pandering to the patronage of a stronger power, others conceded Britain can be the ‘brains’ to guide US brawn (Sharp, 2003 & Whitaker, 17th February 2003). The ‘poodle’ theory is certainly an oversimplification (Azubuike 2005: 124 & Riddell, 2004: vi), but, according to
Riddell, opposition such as that of the French (and that demanded by British public opinion), was “inconceivable” given the Anglo-American ties (2004: 290). It would involve the reversal of a culture in foreign policymaking built on “60-year old foundations” and jeopardising Britain’s nuclear power status, which is dependent on its privileged access to US technology and intelligence (Ridell, 2004: 290, Also see Baylis, 1984 & Dumbrell, 2001). Dumbrell pointed out in 2001, that “the end of the Cold War removed much of the security underpinning for the ‘Special Relationship’”; but of course new mutual security interests emerged from the events of 9/11 (224). Riddell points out that committing troops “in such crises has been at the heart of Britain’s relationship with America” since 1950 (2004: 291). Britain still has a permanent seat at the UN Security Council and provides reliable support there. It also provides important, secure military bases, and key sites for intelligence-gathering to the US (Azubuike, 2005: 129). During the Cold War, British intelligence was hugely prized by America³, and was one means to otherwise “fill

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³ The intelligence relationship’s long history can be traced back to WW1 (Beach, 2007), though it was established in earnest with the WW2 sharing of code-breaking knowledge. The 1943 BRUSA Agreement facilitated co-operation between the US War Department and the Code and Cypher School (GCCS) at Britain’s Bletchley Park, and Bradley Smith claims that “Never before had sovereign states revealed their vital intelligence methods and results even to their closest allies” (1992: vii). Britain’s ‘Special Operations Executive’ (SOE) (thought superior to SIS), and its sister propaganda body the Political Warfare Executive, worked closely with the American ‘Office of Strategic Services’ (OSS) during the war (Foot, 2002). Bradley Smith argues that as British intelligence was far more advanced than American systems, “along with acquiring valuable secret information, and learning many tricks of the trade […] the American intelligence partners […] had the benefit of being deeply immersed in a professional and traditional intelligence system and culture for the first time” (1995: 62). The professional culture of the organisations thus has similar roots, and long-established precedent for cooperation, despite their structural dissimilarity. After the war, SOE was absorbed into SIS, under the Foreign Office, and in part inspired by America’s centralised wartime OSS, (a prized facility by this time), so that these capabilities came to the core of British foreign policy (Aldrich, 2002: 74 & 86). British intelligence was not subject to as severe post-war austerity measures as defence; in 1947 the Cabinet Defence Committee stated that “the smaller the armed forces the greater the need for developing our intelligence services in peace” to provide “adequate and timely warning” (quoted in Aldrich, 2002: 74 & 67). OSS was dismantled in 1945, with a few key facilities (including London office) relocated temporarily to other departments; relations continued with difficulty, and in 1946 were formalised in Signals Intelligence for the Cold War, through a secret treaty - the UKUSA Agreement. J Edgar Hoover’s office, who saw MI6 as “basking in the self-generated light of their own brilliance” and “basically unsuccessful”, initially sought a different model for the CIA (Tamm, 6th September 1945). But it finally was agreed that “the British Intelligence Service was the best in the business” (Jimmy Byrnes, US Secretary of State, 16th October 1945) and the new CIA was established in 1947 and immediately began to forge strong ties with SIS (Jeffreys, 2010: 720-721). But this now romantically relationship, according to Aldrich, was kept going after the war “based on carefully calculated realism rather than mawkish sentiment” and could be “prickly” especially when policies clashed (2002: 81). Yet, with serious animosity over Suez, strong Anglo-American exchange/ cooperation continued in intelligence and propaganda (Lucas & Morey, 2000: 96 & 113). Exchanging intelligence was an acceptable way of “spying upon each other, as much as upon common enemies,” giving each an understanding of the other (Aldrich, 2002: 84). This ‘insight’ was subject to craft since both countries doctored documents intended for the other’s eyes especially at the top levels to create the right perception (2002: 85). Aldrich describes how the Cold War brought an ‘intelligence gathering revolution’ and “remarkable expansion” in covert action and propaganda, through which both countries sought influence (2002: 641). He concludes this enabled them “to maintain the liberal fiction that democratic states did not commit aggression against other democratic or popular” states (2002: 641). A loose constructed cooperative structure between the UKUSA Community, a central structure of America’s National Security Agency (NSA), the British Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), with facilities in Australia and Canada forming ECHELON, a global intelligence gathering system (Bomford, 1999). Johnson argues that it enables members such as the NSA to request a partner spy on their domestic population, where this would otherwise be prohibited (2004, 165). UK intelligence officials are driven by concern over the implications for the relationship, should there be an attack on the US by British citizens. Bruce Riedel, a former CIA officer now leading Barack Obama’s Afghan strategy has stated that “The 800,000 or so British citizens of Pakistani origin are regarded by the American intelligence community as perhaps the single biggest threat environment that they have to worry about” (quoted in Shipman, 28 February 2009). UKUSA members are prohibited from spying on each other without agreement but this is often given (Bower, 1996: 90). One writer has stated that about 40% of CIA activities to prevent terrorist attacks on America are focussed in Britain (Shipman, 28 February 2009). While US
the gap” in power, when military capability was reduced something still true today (Aldrich, 2002: 643). Despite the imbalance, one commentator has observed that for America, “Britain remains the indispensable ally for it provides international cover” for an otherwise all-American operation in a globalised world (Dobbs, 2003). While a decision to invade Iraq was heavily opposed, many others besides Tony Blair genuinely believed Iraq to be a threat (Riddell, 2004: 291-292 & Azubuike, 2005: 124). This reflected not only a faith in the general superiority of Anglo-American intelligence, decisions and assumptions that is characteristic of the relationship; but also in ‘sticking together’, which has important cultural underpinnings.

Yet it has been suggested that the Anglo-American relationship is not as ‘special’ as it was (Dumbrell, 2001: 220-221). American ties with states of great strategic import include South Korea, Germany, and Israel; evidence that “common histories, common institutions and ideologies, a common language, and a common enemy can facilitate cooperation, but nations continue to pursue their interests even within a close partnership” (Kimball, 1994: 117). Pursuing a realist analysis, Kimball argues that in close relationships, “when an imbalance occurs, one nation sees opportunities while the other worries more and more about protecting its interests” and notes that “rough equality” in Anglo-American relations occurred “only in the early stages of World War 2” (1994: 117). Certainly, McKercher notes how dominant influence began to move from British to American hands, when they contributed greater assets to the final stages of WW2 (1999: 343). Lundestad agrees that “Anglo-American relations became ‘special’ only when, after 1945, Britain became so clearly inferior” (in Andrews: 2005: 28). While heightened British insecurity in its global position is undoubtedly an element which has impacted greatly on both countries’ conduct of the relationship, a ‘relative gains’ analysis suggested by Kimball fails to fully account for the continued importance, longevity and depth of this tie.

concerns about Britain mean some tension (See Shipman, 28th February 2009) they have also made maintenance of the relationship of crucial security concern for America. According to Stephen Grey, since WW2, “the London chief and his staff [...] serve on some of Whitehall's key intelligence committees” and are granted an advisory role in the British Joint Intelligence Committee (29th September 2003). Grey suggests Britain’s own exclusive broad access to US intelligence is given “in return for preserving the special relationship” (29th September 2003).
Its long history and traditions, combined with commonalities in culture and language, means the Anglo-American relationship goes deeper than hard power politics and has an expectation of permanence in its culture. Unquestionably, Britain could not have “become a ‘reliable’ partner of the United States until it was no longer powerful enough to be a serious rival” (Skidelsky, 2004). Beyond this and crude political interest, the ‘special’ relationship’s culture has been a crucial foundation through which it was renegotiated and sustained. Since WW2, through the participation of successive elites a supporting concept of the relationship developed over time to solidify a privileged ‘community’ that could be engaged as required. The Anglo-American ‘Special Relationship’ has long been an aspect of culture in itself, and an object of propaganda. Indeed it was effectively borne out of propaganda at the end of WW2, and cultural elements have been essential to its maintenance particularly at times of weakness. It is this cultural element that has

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4 There is a fine line between cultural transfer and propaganda and both helped secure cultural bonds since the relationship’s inception. The ‘Wartime Alliance’ emerged out of a historical American ‘Anglophobia’ (Moser, 2002: 55-65) and beyond the pragmatic economic and defence relationship was driven by a persistent British propaganda campaign, which sought to turn American elite neutrality in favour of intervention in WWI (Snow, 2002: 33-34). Propaganda bodies including the Milner Group (a loose, powerful network of relationships) did this primarily by targeting media and intellectual debate (Quigley, 1981: 3-14). Indeed Peterson argues that “As a result American newspapers of those years should be viewed not as a mirror reflecting American reactions to the war, but as the principal medium through which the British influenced Americans.” (1939: 159).

America too began using the ‘Creel Committee’ and an emergent PR industry for propaganda; it continued during the wars during a comparative lull in British efforts (Snow, 2002: 36-38). Yet according to Skidelsky the US clung to isolationism until after WW2, and even then American opinion was seated upon ideals opposed to ‘Great Britain’ and its traditional world position (2004). The British Embassy, the Mol and Milner Group were still building on the Anglo-American link, and later helped bring America into WW2 (Cull, 1994; Quigley, 1981 & Kirby, 2000: 390). Even then, David Reynolds documents extensive concern and progressive attempts by both countries, particularly as war intensified, to ensure the influx of American GI’s in Britain from 1942 left agreeable perceptions on both sides (2000). Also, WW2 reaffirmed the importance to Britain of the close economic tie with America (Nicholas, 1963). Indeed as noted above, this confirmed Britain was no longer a rival. The Lend-Lease agreement, while crucial to Britain’s success in the war, for America, ensured both continued British military involvement and American leverage in all post-war global planning (Skidelsky, 2004). After the war as the varied resources it had taken from its empire and commonwealth declined, so did Britain’s world role, and the power of the Milner Group (Nicholas, 1963 Quigley, 1981). Britain’s world role was renegotiated over subsequent decades; mediated within the ideology, culture, propaganda of a relationship that was now perceived by both to be in mutual interest.

While some in London feared US interventionism provoking conflict with Russia, others feared isolationism and US withdrawal (Aldrich, 2002:65). But after its wartime experiences Britain realised a global position could only be maintained alongside the United States, who were embraced as an essential post-war ally against Russia (Nicholas, 1963). America herself sought multilateral solutions (such as the UN and Bretton Woods institutions) to take responsibility for Europe (Nicholas, 1963). The relationship would always be a public mask for differences in policy, and an agreeable framework where each state saw their national interests could either be guided invisibly, or negotiated quietly. Kirby cites many examples where the image of the relationship was cooperatively constructed during the early Cold War years to allay fears and create the favourable attitudes and approaches on either side of the Atlantic (Kirby, 2000: 391). Meanwhile the relationship externally acted as important propaganda to suit joint interests.

The ability to manage opinion of the alliance, and within the alliance, both domestically and by the partner (propaganda strategy) has thus been crucial to the relationship’s stability from its inception (Cull, 1994). Direct co-ordination of each country’s image and that of the relationship can be evidenced by the relations of Britain and America throughout the Cold War, despite occasional policy differences, in Indo-China/Vietnam for example (See Page, 1996: 158-60 & Parsons, 2002). And the IRD’s work during the Korean War particularly helped to build the relationship between London and Washington; it is clear from this the extent to which it became a relationship with accepted internal parameters and a negotiated external image (Shaw, 1999). For example, when the issue of whether to use nuclear weapons arose, Britain required that it be consulted first. Due to domestic concerns the countries co-operated directly and agreed that the US public statement to this effect would be worded differently. In order to discourage the perception of any threat to US sovereignty it was pledged that Britain would be “informed”, however, an unwritten understanding over consultation was reached and this was noted in British records (Parsons, 2002, 105). The Anglo-American relationship by comparison with other strong US ties, may (arguably) not be ‘special’, and certainly has varied in strength over time. Yet is certainly a ‘unique’ relationship in how it has been maintained despite British decline as a world power. These distinctive elements together have been powerful in each country’s command of international affairs and qualify this relationship as of particular significance in the study of propaganda.
enabled it to survive and thrive while other powerful states have risen also to take positions important to US interest.

_Toward a Theory of Propaganda_

Although this research focuses on propaganda by two particular modern liberal democracies, the use of and indeed the study of propaganda is ancient and global. Much of what was written about its use centuries ago can still have relevance to the contemporary political context. We must take from the past that which will inform current debate, whilst recognising the significance of evolving historical contexts upon political thought. To this end, there follows a historical précis of propaganda theory development, leading into discussion of why the approach to be taken in the present analysis will differ from concepts and definitions prominent in contemporary defence policy.

_PROPAGANDA THEORY: ORIGINS_

From the early democracies of ancient Greece until the early 20\textsuperscript{th} Century the term most commonly used to refer to propaganda was ‘rhetoric’. Plato spoke at length in ‘Republic’ and other writings about rhetoric, which he considered a dangerous tool that could be employed to corrupt ends. Kant later shared similar views to Aristotle about rhetoric, emphasising its ability to delude and mislead (Triadafilopoulos, 1999: 744). His writings have been influential in the evolution of the Idealist school of International relations and formation of international laws embodying principles of morality. Aristotle established the concepts of ‘ethos’, and ‘pathos’ (or emotional appeal) as distinct from the argument and speech, or ‘logos’. As artistic proof or credibility ethos is an image of the rhetorician’s character, which is established through the discourse itself. Aristotle also spoke of ‘enthymeme’, a tool still employed today, where the rhetorician presents their argument in such a way so that the audience completes a line of reasoning implied from the speech. It has the effect of making a proposed conclusion seem common sense or imply presuppositions or premises in speech so as they seem obvious when if they were explicitly stated they would not necessarily be so (Aristotle, 1984). The prescience of the study of political tools like rhetoric has became increasingly apparent into modernity, and some more-contemporary writers continued to refer to the use of
‘rhetoric’ (See Bryant, 1953: 415 & Goodin, 1980). Goodin is critical of rhetoric yet points out that rhetorical tricks do not stand up for long in the face of evidence and so are only really dangerous when tied into a complex propaganda framework (Goodin, 1980: 93-108). This will be developed further below.

**Mid 20th Century to Contemporary Theory: Morality and Democratic Propaganda**

In the post-war period there developed a highly influential school of thought that saw propaganda largely in the behaviourist school of psychology. This saw the propagandist as the stimulus and propaganda as a tool that could be manipulated in order to produce desired responses in the audience. Lasswell and Doob, for instance saw propaganda largely in these terms (Robins, 1987: 3). The study of propaganda revolved around ‘audience effects’, including experimental studies, which have often been denounced, as it problematic to measure such effects empirically (Ellul, 1973: Ch4 & App1). Such theories saw the audience as passively absorbing information, as if injected by a hypodermic syringe. The simplistic nature of such ideas have since led theorists to reject such notions in favour of more sophisticated understandings that account for the wider context; the political and social elements of the use of propaganda, as well as more sophisticated psychological approaches (Robins, 1987: 3-4).

Propaganda was increasingly viewed as a key characteristic of modern democracy. Whilst many still looked at the mechanical aspects of propaganda, thought gradually moved towards the consideration of power and social relations. Discussion stemmed from the Chicago School work on public opinion, which it saw as essentially rational and which required a public sphere characterised by lively debate (drawing on Enlightenment ideas such as those of JS Mill) (Robins, 1987: 16). Habermas was also critical of propaganda which he feared was leading to the destruction of the public sphere, the means whereby public opinion is formed (Webster, 1995: 101-134). Ideas of the nature of public opinion are closely related to a debate that emerged surrounding the use of propaganda by democracies. If we are to believe that public opinion is rational and the only basis for responsible and
legitimate government then propaganda can surely never be justified? This thesis will return to this debate in chapter 5.

However this conception of public opinion emerged alongside another less optimistic current rooted in the ideas of Lasswell, which saw public opinion as irrational, inconsistent and in need of guidance from above (Ellul, 1973: 124). For such commentators public opinion is essentially unpredictable, and susceptible to the influence of external propaganda and interests. Lippmann argued that public opinion is not sovereign, nor should it be for this would create tyranny or failure of government. For him the public are ‘outsiders’; it is important for people to fulfil the role for which they have been educated and not try and delve into the political realm when they lack the expertise (Lippmann, 1954: 51-53). Even if we accept that public opinion is rational, the model of rational ignorance tells us that as the public are unable to know everything and are aware of this they must to some extent trust what is presented to them (Goodin, 1980: 38). For those influenced by such argument, public opinion could be dangerous and cannot be the basis of stable, responsible government. However, since democratic government cannot operate outside the pressure of the electorate public opinion must therefore be seen to be expressed in policy. By such reasoning attempts to adjust opinion to correspond to that of government policy lose their perception of illegitimacy.

However, Goodin argues that the tendency to “deceptively subverting” the recipients’ “powers of reasoning” makes propaganda and manipulatory politics in general more objectionable even than force (Goodin, 1980: 21-22). If a person is suffering oppression, coercion or terror they are aware of this and may be able to take steps to reassert their will, however, the art of propaganda does not allow for this possibility. It attempts to gain willing compliance without awareness. Fraser raises this question of honesty in propaganda and argues that although propaganda is not necessarily lies those who do lie may sometimes be more efficient propagandists. This means that a liberal democracy must on occasion choose between upholding its moral principles and winning a propaganda war (Fraser, 1957: 12-13).
Referring to this choice Merton observes that a propagandist might be driven to cynicism or desperate attempts to justify their actions by the outcome of such a dilemma (Merton, 1995: 270). Fears about its use remained, however, whilst propaganda was commonly associated with dictatorships and totalitarian regimes, in government and political theory it was increasingly recognised as a standard tool of democratic government (Robins, 1987: 6). Qualter, for example, saw propaganda as acceptable as long as there is “greatest possible degree of free competition between propagandists” (Qualter, 1962: 148). However, Fraser has stressed that “propaganda as such is morally neutral”, and it is the surrounding circumstances or the methods applied that are evil or good (Ellul, 1973: 242 & Fraser, 1957: 12). He emphasises that although the use of propaganda by the Nazis was morally repugnant and although there exists a tendency for these methods to be abused these events should not be extended in ultimate judgement of propaganda use (Fraser, 1957: 12). Merton has made a distinction between propaganda that provides facts and that which denies such information, rooting his arguments on morality around this distinction (Merton, 1995). Even Ellul, despite his highly critical stance to propaganda (he articulates concern over pollution of our shared knowledge-base, saying “it is comparable to radium and what happens to radiologists is well-known”) concedes that it is an inevitable part of any democracy (Ellul, 1973: 242-243). Some contend that it is the growth of democracy and mass communication that has confirmed the place of propaganda in politics. Burnell and Reeve argue that “‘democracy’ which many people imagine they presently enjoy, is based, in both classical and modern political mythology, on ‘persuasion’” (Burnell and Reeve, 1984: 394). Today’s governments must live with a political reality that their citizens have some level of political awareness and must come up with a strategy to deal with this. According to Ellul “propaganda is needed in the exercise of power for the simple reason that the masses have come to participate in political affairs” (Ellul, 1973: 121).

Besides considering it important to unite public opinion Ellul states that the democratic ideology itself contributes to the need for propaganda through the primacy of the ideals of ‘truth’ and ‘progress’. He points out that truth is elucidated through history and history is made by the powerful/successful.
Democracy is perceived as truth and therefore it is believed that it must triumph, it is opposed to oppression and is therefore superior (Ellul, 1973: 232-235). He saw it as partly responsible for perpetuating the Cold War and argues that this reality or version of ‘truth’ is created and perpetuated by propaganda (Ellul, 1973: 238). Whilst seeing it as inevitable Ellul highlights this conflict between the principles of democracy and the need for and processes of propaganda (Ellul, 1973: 232-238).

Bringing this debate up to date, Taylor argued for the value and importance of the American propaganda effort but stresses the importance of remaining within the boundaries of certain democratic principles, which he argues evolved during the events of the last Century (Taylor, 2002: 438). This would require an increased consciousness of current and past errors and substantial effort devoted to ensuring the actions of democracies do not contradict the principles being espoused. Taylor argues for an enhanced US propaganda effort during peacetime to attempt to counter rumour, hostility and misunderstanding in the international arena (Taylor, 2002: 438).

It clearly is important for states such as the US to communicate their intentions and values to the rest of the world. However, the history of democracies’ propaganda campaigns during the 20th Century does not support Taylor’s idealistic notion that a “strategy of truth” evolved during this era or can be reasserted now (Taylor, 2002: 438). From Vietnam to Korea, Granada to the Falklands the US and Britain (as well as other democracies) have utilised extensive propaganda campaigns that have bypassed such principles to support foreign policy goals. The conduct of the democracies of Britain and America today should not be seen as exceptional, they are merely a reflection of an increasing perception of tension and corresponding perceived ‘need’ to address this through regeneration of propaganda efforts. Indeed, it is generally accepted that governments need some control of the release of information in order to protect national security. Thus despite insistence on euphemisms such as ‘information’, to demonstrate that they are not abusing their powers, democracies are increasingly open and unapologetic about their use of propaganda. Openness regarding such measures is publicly reassuring and allows some level of legitimacy to develop around its use. For example, the Foreign Policy
Centre think tank published a report entitled “Going Public: Diplomacy for the Information Age” to raise awareness and generate debate on ‘public diplomacy’ (Leonard and Alakeson, 2000). We were no more ethical in our past, yet today the scale of access to information and therefore the growth in its status as a powerful commodity has increased the visibility of propaganda efforts, bringing such issues into the forefront of debate.

Taylor’s arguments, like the earlier warnings of Ellul, recognised the inevitability of propaganda in democratic society. However Ellul made some stark warnings and observations about the corrupting nature of propaganda upon public opinion and the propagandist himself. For him, if democratic values were upheld this would render the propaganda ineffective due to the necessity for total integration and saturation of the message conveyed into the culture and frameworks of understanding of the target audience. A ‘democratic propaganda’ would be essentially truthful and restrained, with a respect for the individual - driven by circumstance. The propagandist will normally believe in what he is promoting, yet democracy recognises that there may be other truths, allowing competing propagandas. Ellul therefore concludes that all this renders democratic propaganda ineffective; respect for the individual denies the propagandist the psychological penetration required (Ellul, 1973: 238-242). For him, the search for an effective propaganda is therefore an essentially corrupting force. Although some have offered guidance on how it might be combated (Chomsky for example) if the propaganda is covert it is difficult to imagine how any individual might secure true freedom of thought. Taylor argues that the use of propaganda and persuasion in the adoption of rules and principles “is not incompatible with toleration of minorities, acceptance of the ‘other’ or respect for law and order” and that what is important in the debate over propaganda is “how this should be done”, he essentially reignites the debate mentioned above surrounding the pursuit of an ‘ethical’ propaganda (Taylor, 2002: 439).

However some would argue that the dominant position inhabited by those in power ensures that it cannot be possible to maintain a true debate. Noam Chomsky, also recognising the key role of propaganda in modern democracies, has provided a
consistent and highly critical stream of work that has inspired many to take a more questioning stance to propaganda, particularly in the late 20\textsuperscript{th} Century. Chomsky gives us a convincing account of how, in democracies, corporate power and the state influence the media and thus the nation. He argues that the model of media organisation that is natural in an advanced capitalist democracy is ‘corporate oligopoly’ (Chomsky, 1991: 21). In this system the public have a minimal level of democratic participation in the media and where participation occurs this is marginalized to areas like listener-supported community radio.\textsuperscript{5} Debate is actually encouraged but only within the boundaries defined by the elite (Chomsky, 1991: 59). Anything that might spread dangerous ideas among the ordinary people excluded from political participation is censored. Chomsky rejects the idea of the irrationality of public opinion which he views as a myth propagated by the elite to serve its interest (Chomsky, 1991: 17-19). The development of this system, Chomsky argues, coincides with societal change generally towards increasing individualism and private enterprise, the decline of political parties and the elimination of unions (Chomsky, 1991: 21). Though his ideas have much relevance and both popularly and in left-wing circles have been highly regarded, Chomsky’s radical work struggles against the mainstream. A similarly critical tone is represented by the work of another contemporary commentator David Miller who utilises a concept of ‘information dominance’ in explaining US and British propaganda strategy as part of a greater US quest to achieve the ‘total spectrum dominance’ (Miller, 2004). Miller recognises the importance of interoperability as part of the US defence strategy and information war, a concept which this thesis will draw on heavily. However, his conspiricist interpretation of this as being US and Britain “intent on ruling the world” is problematic as it does not allow for a nuanced analysis of the motives of planners and propagandists and the challenges of states within the international system (Miller, 2004: 12). It runs the risk of underestimating the complexity of the challenge posed.

\textit{Censorship}

Censorship is the flip side of the propagandist’s coin and is crucial in any propaganda system. According to Goodin, it enables a propagandist to ensure that

\textsuperscript{5} The internet provides some challenge for this.
their audience’s confidence in their own knowledge base is undermined and thereby increases their vulnerability to persuasion (1980: 47-48). The British Government has a long reputation for secrecy underpinned by the Official Secrets Act of 1911, often justified in the name of national security. However, Goodin argues that this is usually a lie to cover up personal advantage and warns that secrecy can be a corrupting force (1980: 51). Goodin’s views echo the earlier writings of Jeremy Bentham who considered accountability and openness to be of utmost importance and wrote at length about the benefits of publicity, which he felt would prevent the abuse of power (Bentham, 1843). John Stuart Mill, similarly, argued that “complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our opinion is the very condition which justifies us in assuming its truth for the purposes of action: and on no other terms can a being with human faculties have any rational assurance of being right” (Mill, 189: 23).

Keane’s work illustrates an inherent contradiction between economic and political liberalism through what he calls ‘market censorship’, a tendency for economic liberalisation to lead to the restriction of the circulation of information, a claim that is also supported by James Curran (Curran and Seaton, 1988 & Keane, 1991).

Arendt has also warned of the dangers of over-classification where those with top clearance remain ignorant of many important facts as they neither have the time nor will to seek them out while those who would benefit most from this information remain ignorant to it (quoted in Goodin, 1980: 21-22). However Goodin sees it as a highly risky activity due to the difficulties associated with limiting access to information (Goodin, 1980: 52). He sees the practice of co-optation as a greater danger, as those privy to certain sources of information can begin to bend their own ethics or moderate their demands in order to retain this privilege. This can degenerate into all kinds of corrupt practices, although should the co-opted party discontinue this status they would be in a better position to challenge the status quo (Goodin, 1980: 52-56).

Information overload can actually have the same effect as secrecy and certainly in the short-term might be considered more effective. This is the practice whereby the audience is flooded with so much information it is unable and/or unwilling to
digest it independently and extract negative information. Today the British government makes a wealth of information available to the public online, Freedom of Information releases for instance, although few people sift through this. The government will at the same time produce press releases that detail those facts which they consider most important for the public to know and a framework for interpreting the data. The propagandist issues a framework for understanding the information that conforms to their own preferences and downplays any negative aspects of the information, any anomalies later discovered by the audience are often put down to personal error. It therefore shifts the responsibility away from the propagandist. However, the propagandist can end up viewing the world through their own interpretive framework (Goodin, 1980: 60). In this case one might question whether they could still be considered any more able to make objective decisions than the audience they manipulate.

**Questions of Ethics and Power**

As Jowett and O’Donnell note, hardly any contributions have been made from totalitarian regimes to the theoretical and analytical history of rhetoric and propaganda due to obvious lack of consideration of ethics in their work.6 Certainly for classical theorists ethics and motives were central to the study of such practices. Aristotle appeared to judge the act of using rhetoric by the ends to which it is directed, surrounding circumstances and methods, much being acceptable if done with good intentions (Jowett & O’Donnell, 1992: 37). Although he was generally unhappy about its use Plato regarded the motives of the propagandist to be of great importance. In ‘Phaedrus’ he argues that rhetoric should not be used unless the rhetorician has good motives and a solid knowledge of the ‘truth’ (Jowett & O’Donnell, 1992: 11-15). Machiavelli famously claimed in “The Prince” that ends justify means and that deception was acceptable as a means for retaining power, his description of The Prince reflects an understanding of the need for a leader to occasionally appear to be what he is not (1961: 55-56). Generally if a strategy successfully achieves a desirable goal the methods employed are quickly overlooked, it is often when the plan backfires that the perpetrator is criticised. If, of course, this becomes public knowledge. Thus contemporary arguments still

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6 See Goebbels’ diaries for instance (Doob, 1950:419-442).
incorporate a modified ends-means analysis, Taylor for instance argues “we need to redirect attention away from the propaganda process itself and more to the intentions and goals of those employing propaganda” (1995: 8).

Into the industrial and post-industrial era, those ‘employing’ propaganda, have indeed become the valued but resilient deposits, that many commentators have attempted to sluice from their own sediment in the centrifuge of social theory. Some have taken a rather different position to Taylor, that focuses more on social systems. Much debt here is owed to Gramsci, the first great Marxist to consider information and power in any depth. Developing Marx’s concept of the ‘superstructure’, in his ‘Prison Notebooks’ he considered the role of intellectuals, a concept he used broadly since, while “all men are intellectuals” in that they are thinking beings, “not all men have in society the function of intellectuals” (1971: 9). He distinguished two, ‘traditional’ and ‘organic’ intellectuals. The former (comprising cultural and philosophical intellectuals), having survived a transition in the mode of production, falsely retained beliefs that their thought somehow transcended social class and had ‘independence’. Organic intellectuals were defined sociologically, according to their position relative to the social class structure and articulated the collective consciousness of that class. This position held a certain autonomy; as “functionaries” of a structure, yet “mediated” by their relation to the rest of society (Gramsci, 1971:12).

This is the root of Gramsci’s concept of ‘hegemony’; intellectuals function as agents who perpetuate and live the ideology that justifies the economic and political power of their class. Whereas ‘the party’ was organically the closest to its class, and intent on its stability in power, Gramsci saw some scope for resistance and ‘will’ in other organic intellectuals (1971: 129). Essentially this is necessary for the coordination of “the dominant group” with “the general interests of the subordinate groups” so that the state can modify any “unstable equilibria” of interests (Gramsci, 1971: 182). This underpinned the appearance that dominant interests were those of society and rule was “based on the consent of the majority” as it is expressed through the media (Gramsci, 1971:80). Gramsci crucially identified the modern concept of ‘horizontal propaganda’ in describing how
intellectuals can “exercise such a power of attraction that” they subjugate “intellectuals of the other social groups; they thereby create a system of solidarity” through psychological and social bonds (1971: 182). McLellan argues this can form an all-pervasive notion of ‘common sense’ and points to how, devoid of ‘feudal’ engagement with a peasantry, America’s ruling class were thus able to exercise strong hegemony of capitalist values (1998: 203).

Another theorist whose contribution is significant here is Raymond Williams. Williams offers a critique of “official English culture” (1979: 316) more widely and highlights the essentially modern abstraction and examination of culture. Provoked by social change, this prompted engagement in a process of “total qualitative assessment” of society (1967: 295). Williams’ project built on Gramsci’s foundations, and translated into a struggle between the agency of cultural creativity and the constraints of a social system, which he saw as destructive to our human potential; themes which resonate with the findings of the present research. While in this thesis care has been taken not to ‘fit’ data into any particular theoretical framework including this one, some of Williams’ insights offer a useful counterpoint for reflecting on considerations of power that emerged during analysis of the interviews. With respect to the present research Williams’ analyses of communication and cultural change offer particular relevance. In order to address the second research question concerning ‘perceived and actual outcomes’ of propaganda coordination, it was important to understand how propaganda is understood by its functionaries and planners. Findings will demonstrate that this ‘cultural’ propaganda apparatus was evolving as structural/functional elements of the apparatus changed. Williams’ work on communication offers a useful comparison for one of the elements identified from the data as a key narrative underpinning planners assumptions - ‘public service’. Williams also offers one way of looking at the patterns of ‘negotiation’ and tension observed in the domestic dynamics of the propaganda apparatus, as it responds to a need to adapt its cultural assumptions and understandings to meet the changing demands of the information war.
**Williams: Culture and Power**

Culture for Williams was “a general state of intellectual development, in a society as a whole”, “a general state or habit of mind” and “a whole way of life, material, intellectual, spiritual” (1967: xvi). This notion of culture as a ‘process’ is important to Williams’ understanding of the term since it is for him an active engagement with experience. He emphasises the necessarily *gradual* nature of the development implied and for him language and communication are central to this (Williams, 1967: xvi & Williams, 1988: 87). A product of his early career, ‘Culture and Society’, saw the interrelations between the evolution of social history (technological, political and economic processes and the development of culture) and language development as “deeply significant” (Williams, 1967: xviii). Williams further expanded this into his concept of ‘structures of feeling’; shared understandings that embody the cultural logic of a particular moment. He argued this was “as firm and definite as ‘structure’ suggests yet it operates in the most delicate and least tangible of our activities” in the coming together of our operations (Williams, 1965: 64). It is notable for the present analysis that Williams’ treatment of culture was marked by increasing engagement with struggles in Marxist theory (Eldridge & Eldridge, 1994: 175 & Higgins, 1983: 145). Like his contemporary E P Thompson, Williams saw structuralist trends as dangerously idealist, and was concerned at their influence (Williams, 1979: 340). He reveals a wide network of actively evolving ties between developments in ‘industry’, ‘democracy’ and culture widely drawn (1967: 296). Through the potential agency he saw expressed within *culture*, Williams progressed his work towards his vision of the future and in so doing provided a framework for looking at the relationship between culture and power, central to our understanding of the propaganda process.

**Williams: Communication & Paternalism**

Williams describes how the experienced emergence of industry and urbanisation brought with it a development of the notion of the ‘masses’, working people

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7 The term is derived from an agricultural term; to cultivate or grow.
8 Bernstein argued in 1899 that the modern capitalist democracy could improve the conditions of the working class; a sign that capitalism had found a way to falsify Marx and overcome its inherent contradictions (Bernstein, 1971: p207-210 & 213). Even before the revelations of Stalinism (1956) sociologists such as Marcuse had come to question the revolutionary potential of the working class (1964). Althusser had taken on these challenges to Marxist theory in 1969 with his contemporarily popular Structuralist attempt to detach Marxism from Stalinism (Althusser, 1969). He succeeded in abstracting it from historical reality, a trend in Marxist theory to which Hobsbawm refers as “Vulgar Marxism” (Thompson, 1978: 201 & 205 & Hobsbawm, 1972: 5).
amongst whom some organisation along social and political lines was emerging (1967: 297-298). However, this expression retained the pejorative meanings of the word ‘mob’ which it supplanted and was thus associated with a threat to culture (Williams, 1967: 298). Thus, within the development of English democracy this was translated into the idea of ‘mob-rule’; since the opinions of the mass were thought of as ill-considered and fickle (See Lippmann above). Williams thought such arguments were anti-democratic and based upon perceived ‘ignorance’ of the working classes, but also on a fear of their ability and intention to change society (Eldridge & Eldridge, 1994: 75 & Williams, 1967: 298-299). It is a fear of the unknown future and the unknown populace; essential state insecurity (Williams, 1967: 299-300). The problem of social relations in industrial society was thus a problem for democracy. Williams points to the significance here of expanding technology and education in the creation of an expanded audience for communication (1967: 302). For democracy government cannot operate outside the pressure of the populous and public opinion must therefore be seen to be expressed in policy. By this reasoning, if policy cannot reflect opinion, then opinion must thus be conditioned to correspond to that of government. This, for Williams, is the essence of ‘mass-communication’ as opposed communication more widely (Williams, 1967: 303). This element of Williams’ theory will be discussed in relation to interviews in Chapter 5.

He stresses the passivity of the recipient in this process and the transmission of messages by ‘agents’ (the frequent detachment of communication from both its source and the experience of the recipient) he sees as damaging to the individual and formation of a common language necessary for democracy (Williams, 1967: 304). These problems, Williams argues, arrive because the principles of democracy have not been met by efforts to create the conditions which could produce its practise, and the general acceptance of this is a problem of culture (Williams, 1967: 304-305). Williams highlights the prejudice towards the ‘masses’ on which this rests for instance critiques of ‘popular culture’, fail to recognise that this rarely was a creation of working people themselves and rely on a culturally determined and narrow definition of skill or intelligence (Williams, 1967: 307-309). Literature, newspapers and other forms of communication technology are thus put
into the service of an ideology that places communication into the realm of social control. Effectively those with power are using culture in order to exclude the masses from cultural products, debate and other benefits at the top of the social hierarchy. Williams rejects each element of this and seeks a redefinition of communication, which places it at the service of ‘community’ instead (Williams, 1967: 312-313). To the same end, he rejects as technological determinism the approach to communication that takes techniques as its subject, whilst arguing the importance of technological impacts on culture and society. What is really important to Williams in focussing on mass-communication is its relationship to social power. The power of the modern mass-communication system makes the media a “major political institution - in its supply of necessary information, in its capacity to select, emphasise or exclude, and in its power to influence and campaign” (Williams, 1968: 63).

Crucially for the present research, his criticism is not merely one of the exploitation of communication by those with power, since a paternalistic motive might also drive instruction (Williams, 1967: 314). Dworkin has defined paternalism as “the interference with a person’s liberty of action justified by reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests or values of the person being coerced” (1971: 108). Williams argument was that “the failure is due to an arrogant preoccupation with transmission, which rests on the assumption that the common answers have been found and need only to be applied” (1967: 314). He observes a human need to learn through experience and this he contrasts with the “impatience” of the governing body, which seeks to create an apparent conformity, retrospectively if necessary (Williams, 1967: 314 & 315). He argues that this dominative approach to communication falls short since the learning process is reliant on the person’s need to learn; it is not a passive process and the need to learn is exactly what is denied through the present social organisation of democracy (Williams, 1967: 315). Williams sees the answer to the problem of dominative democracy as essentially also social or cultural. As Eldridge and Eldridge observe,

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9 He states that, “the new technology is itself a product of a particular social system, and will be developed as an apparently autonomous process of innovation only to the extent that we fail to identify and challenge its real agencies” (Williams, 1990: 135-136). It has interesting implications for more recent advances like Wikileaks since, for him, how we use new technologies is shaped by social forces and their social function could be changed if we made different choices over how we use them. This is echoed by MacKenzie and Wajcman (1985).
Williams believed it “wrong to prescribe what is and is not acceptable in cultural activity from a political party standpoint” (1994: 74).

_Williams: Representation & Debate_

Criticising the illusions of representation, Williams’ later more-pronounced socialism adheres him to more direct forms of democratic organisation ideally based on “new kinds of communal, co-operative and collective institutions” (1983: 111-118, 123 & 110). An argument often made in defence of representative government is the need for decisive government; that the more deliberative and participatory politics becomes, the less swift reactions of policy become (Bobbio, 2006: 86-87). This is a dilemma Williams later acknowledges yet which forms a part of the necessary gradual development of society for him (1967: 334).

Wary of the power of majority rule, de Tocqueville warned of the “tyranny of the majority” as the problem of the reach of public authorities, also fearing its effects upon public opinion (crucial ideas influencing American politics) (1839: 255). He warned that the majority could repress “not only all contest, but all controversy” (De Tocqueville, 1839: 259). Williams on the other hand points out that the “distrust of the majority” which has been dominant in the formation of our political systems is responsible for preventing discussion essential for true democracy (1967: 315).

Similarly, while J S Mill thought public opinion can be oppressive, the ‘masses’ are not viewed as a threat to culture since open discourse is an important condition for intellectual and social development (1859). Indeed,

> “complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our opinion is the very condition which justifies us in assuming its truth for the purposes of action: and on no other terms can a being with human faculties have any rational assurance of being right” (1859: 23).

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10 Parallels can be drawn to the Enlightenment plea of Jean-Jacques Rousseau whose work on direct democracy recognised the need for active participation, both in the practice and discourse of government, as essential for legitimate government (1968).

11 Thus British government has evolved into an “elective dictatorship” since once a party is elected to government its power is extensive and dominative (Lord Hailsham, 1978: 127). John Stuart Mill, a key thinker in modern liberalism, argued in favour of a proportional representative system; he considered public opinion insidious since its social control penetrates “more deeply into the details of life” ... “enslaving the soul itself” (1859: 8).
Without open debate Williams sees us as having a pseudo-democracy marked by political unrest or malaise which are “symptoms of a basic failure in communication” (1967: 315). He places faith in a **decentralised** system growing from a **popular base** where “production and service decisions should be determined by locally agreed needs” and envisaged a key role for trade unions and professional associations (Williams, 1983: 258 & 259). He argues that a system of corporate political consumerism has taken over politics so that it becomes a choice between the different vacant predictions of party manifestos which following the election must be replaced by a system of “crisis-management” to deal with the real tensions, practical problems and relations of society which failed to enter the planning of the political programme (Williams, 1983: 9-11). Strong parallels can be drawn here with the insecurities that have emerged in the dominative international system and crisis-management response of the propaganda apparatus. In the present research this kind of response will also be highlighted in the reaction to emergent internal tensions.

**Williams: Individualism & ‘Service’**

In his discussion of the ideals of ‘community’ and ‘service’ the seeds of the Marxism that mark Williams’ later work are revealed, clearly distinguishing his work from liberal analyses of power. Although embracing democratic arguments, he rejects flatly the ‘individualism’ that results from a liberal analysis of power, which is both dominant in American thinking and significant among the British leadership during this period (Williams, 1967: 325-326). Williams argued that “the positive means for all kinds of development, including individual development” were contained within the basic social and collective ideas of the working class, which expressed values of **community** over those of the individual (Williams, 1967: 326 & 326-327). Although Williams later abandoned the term ‘community’ since its meaning was too broad to denote its use except in rhetoric, here it articulates a well formed argument contrasted alongside individualism (Eldridge & Eldridge, 1994: 70).

In ‘Towards 2000’ Williams argued that industrialism destroyed any sense of community leaving no space for common culture to develop in a society whose
economy was based upon increasing specialisation (1983).\(^{12}\) Williams stresses that education too, has focussed on transmission; a long process of cultural development is required within a political environment of true democracy to nurture an active and responsible “community” (1967: 315-316). His argument was that the culture of industrialism emphasised demand over needs, even in education, which he sees as providing only that necessary for the vocational demands of capitalism (Williams, 1967: 329).\(^{13}\)

Williams saw individualism as bourgeois and it is this, articulated in cultural forms, that is the object of his critique. It is one of power, of community and shared experience over individualism and artificial division. Williams rejects the idea of serving the community contained within bourgeois culture despite acknowledging that it has “done much for the peace and welfare of our society” (1967: 328). Williams’ idea of ‘service’ will be discussed at length in relation to the arguments made in Chapter 5.

This motive is charged by him with maintaining a status quo which denies equality to the working class, and as a product of oppression it could not emerge from the working class itself spontaneously (Williams, 1967: 329-330). Here Williams brings us back to material inequalities arguing that these ensure that no subordinated class can identify with the community that the dominant class serve. Since the idea of service rests on authority Williams argues that the idea of service alienates the individual and fails to encourage joint responsibility (1967: 330). The problem of practical inequality is ever-present and creates differentials in communicative ability and cultural capital (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990). Williams argues that some inequality is inevitable and necessary for a sense of personal value, yet he forthrightly rejects what he calls “inequality of being” that he argues results from individualism (1967: 317). He thus seeks to encourage co-operative principles as a way to bring together the necessarily complex society that results from specialisation, avoiding paternalism through the building of a common culture and a

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\(^{12}\) However, his beliefs about the benefits of technology led him to argue that the advances of ‘industrial society’ itself is of undeniable real value (Williams, 1989: 10). For him “it is not ‘bourgeois to possess objects of utility” (Williams, 1967: 323).

\(^{13}\) This is similar to the conclusions of Paul Willis in his study of working class education as the masses ‘learning to labour’ (1977).
democratic system. For him this all rests on a sense of common value and participation and nurtures a creative, more hopeful and less isolated view of the struggle towards the future than that provided by motives of service (Williams, 1967: 333-336). His engagement with Marxism sought to find an answer to the problem he faced in reconciling the active evolution of culture with the power of a dominant capitalist system.

Williams: Gramsci, Agency and Social Structure

In keeping with Williams’ emphasis on culture as ‘process’, and the “tending of natural growth” much of his later work concerned a broader idea of social change; “the long revolution” (1967: 337 & 1983: 269). It led him in ‘Towards 2000’ to launch a steadfast attack on the British political establishment, especially critical of Thatcher-era Conservative policies for their authoritarian populism which constructed a nationalist discourse of ‘unity’ based on ‘artificialities’ of ‘race’, whilst nurturing excited individualism (Williams, 1983: 180). This spurred on his critical approach and sharpened his focus on Marxist social critique taking his arguments about ‘community’ into conflict with late capitalist individualism. Williams’ main concerns thus came to address the evolutionary struggle of society, and its working population’s attempts, to sustain it or change it.

The beginnings of Williams’ refocusing on Marxism can be seen in his essays on Lucien Goldmann and (crucial here) the base and superstructure (1971 & 1973). In this later essay he praises Gramsci whose emphasis on hegemony he argues “corresponds to the reality of social experience very much more clearly than any notions derived from the formula of base and superstructure” (Williams, 1971). Taking the form of an active process, Williams reacted against the determinism of static structuralist models (Althusser, 1969), which left hegemony and ideological struggle behind (Williams, 1971 & Higgins, 1983: 149).

He seeks to move away from a conception of the ‘base’ as “a fixed economic or technological abstraction, and towards the specific activities of men in real social

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14 In his work on culture Williams felt an “absence of collaborators” and he observes that literary studies “lacked a centre, in any developed philosophy or sociology” (Williams, 1971). At this point Williams was searching for an analytical structure that could help expand and consolidate the problems of power that had been emergent from his early work.
and economic relationships, containing fundamental contradictions and variations and therefore always in a state of dynamic process” [My Emphasis] (Williams, 1971). Similarly to E. P Thompson, Williams emphasizes the importance of experience and the active evolution of culture. A vehement critic of Althusser, Thompson reminds us to keep theory in perspective since by stopping the wheels of time all we can see is individuals’ experiences and without these our theories become meaningless (Thompson, 1991: 10). Williams refers us back to Engels arguing that,

“Engels wrote defensively in his letter to Bloch: ‘we make our history ourselves, but, in the first place, under very definite assumptions and conditions’. What this restores, as against the alternative development, is the idea of direct agency…” (1989: 85).

This we can again draw back to a dialogue between culture and power, since he rejects the determinist structural view that the power resides in the economic base and that this determines culture as contained within the framework of the superstructure, for him the relationship between these is far more dynamic (Williams, 1989). He argues that since the base and superstructure are the product of the activities of “real men” they cannot be discussed as if they were “separable concrete entities” (Williams, 1989: 80-81). This is crucial in our thinking about propaganda as an active system engaged between different cultures.

Williams argues that Gramsci’s concept of hegemony encompasses and surpasses the concepts of ‘culture’ and ‘ideology’ since it provides the vital link between culture and power; “relating the ‘whole social process’ to specific distributions of power and influence” (Williams, 1989: 108). The framework for understanding provided by hegemony is one which does not reduce consciousness to dominant class ideology, yet recognises the importance of a wider economic, political and cultural system on “the whole substance of lived identities and relationships” (Williams, 1989: 110). Power as understood within a hegemonic state has a coercive or persuasive dimension; it is the third dimension of power recognised by Lukes in

16 Williams’ interpretation of Marx sees a superstructure with three dimensions: legal and political forms which express existing real relations of production (institutions); forms of consciousness which express a class position; and political and cultural practices, which are related and consequently analysis of these too must be interrelated (Williams, 1989: 76-77).
his seminal 1974 essay on power, which also drew on the work of Gramsci (1974). It is seen not only as manipulating the political agenda but also the ideas of the less powerful to the extent that their real interests become imperceptible as distinct from those of the powerful (1974). Lukes argues that “the most effective and insidious use of power is to prevent...conflict from arising in the first place” (1974: 23). This is the essence of hegemonic control and we can see how Williams’ early position in Culture and Society, which emphasised the discursive foundations of common culture, links into the understanding of power provided by his later adherence to hegemony as an explanatory framework. Although some have pointed to a potential for conceptual overextension in the use of hegemony as a concept, Williams recognised this himself (Rutherford, 2000: 45). As with Gramsci’s analysis of the party (1971: 210-211), Williams’ dominant culture must also react to challenges and avoid becoming anachronistic. It will be argued in chapter 7 that this is occurring in the culture of propaganda which must respond to a changing international and media environment. A tension is argued to be resulting through the transition in assumptions on which individual propaganda decisions and plans are based.

Williams saw the development of culture as resulting from tensions between the established and dominant culture, the new alternatives which challenge it (emergent) and those that remain of the past (residual) which have differential emphasis across time and place so that culture seems at times spontaneous and active as well as domimative and conservative (Williams, 1989: 121-122). The emergent is seen as a product of struggles within the dominant culture, for example Anti-War sentiment emerging despite the US patriotic culture during the Vietnam era. Williams' analysis of the dominant, residual and emergent elements of culture draws heavily on the Gramscian idea (evidenced in his analyses of Italian religion and politics) that alternatives emerge from a struggle between antagonistic groups and further develops the idea of culture as a ‘process’ incorporating all societal elements (Gramsci, 1971 & Williams, 1989: 121-127). Williams’ discussion of the interrelations between them helps us to understand why it is so difficult to identify and define ‘working-class culture’, the culture of the military, bureaucracy, anti-war movement or for that matter the ‘dominant culture’ itself, since these are not
uniform or unitary and retain often conflictual legacies and emerging influences. Although these ideal type elements of culture are problematic to distinguish (often ‘new challenges’ are actually a reshuffling of old challenges with history repeating through similarities in human relations), they provide us with a useful conceptual tool.

Williams stated that the common emerging theme across his career is one of critique of ‘official English culture’. This being true, his writing is also an analysis of the resistance and the mediating relationship between culture and power; a theme that progressively developed across his career and which makes his work more widely relevant (1979: 316). It implies an intimate involvement with how and why and by whom culture is constructed. Thus it is highly relevant to the research and will be discussed in relation to the changing culture of propaganda policymaking in Chapter 7. Williams’ work represents a constant dialogue with agency and structure in the political creation, and manipulation, of culture.

**Security, Propaganda and ‘Counter-terrorism’**

Today the international concept of security has broadened and been redefined by globalisation. Former CENTCOM Commander Adm. Fallon argued that,

> “in Iraq, the economics they know is ‘I have a camel that gives milk and people buy it’ or whatever […] but most people know ‘I want’ and it’s very difficult I’ve found in […] developing countries, to proselytise for […] the long term, ‘you gotta save’, and they look around and they… see particularly the TV and cinema version of things - ‘All we can see is you guys have *everything*, this material stuff and if you can have it why can’t we?’” (21st July 2009).

Security is necessarily defined by material, and locally-defined realities, when survival is at stake. Fallon’s response was that this reaction however, represented “huge disconnects” in understanding; and it all goes “back to messaging. It’s all back to information, and assumptions, and perceptions.” (21st July 2009). Fallon’s response clearly implies that “huge disconnects” in understanding do exist; in the assumption that discontent stemming from material inequalities can be countered through “perceptions” (21st July 2009).
While the media has gone global, people’s concerns have stayed local. Fallon argued that Americans don’t “read” about the world, and its media has sparse “content”; referring to an anecdote he argued “the only reason people look at these things is to find out about local stuff and advertisements” (21st July 2009). With increasing commercialism combined with global media it has become increasingly important to demonstrate that anyone can get a share of the ‘pie’; that the system works. Fallon argued in the West, during the Cold War, that public awareness of threat,

“became part of the culture, [...] the mind-set was it could come [...] at any time. That’s all gone now. Our young people have no clue. [...] One full generation has no experience along these lines. They don’t know. So security is related to ipods... [...] things now that are very, very important to people. They’re all related to economics.” (21st July 2009).

Economic issues, while dominant in security concerns are still not seen as an acceptable motive to war and economic pacification is the only permissible answer within the institutionalised capitalist ideology of the West. Yet images of western opulence cannot be confined, as Fallon notes “You have to play to multiple audiences. You can’t just focus on one” (21st July 2009). America, through its own failures and collaborative efforts with Britain, began to discover that its ‘war on terror’ would need “more tools” (Armitage, 21st July 2009) to counter these insecurities.

The changing international system has dispersed the idea of a threat and enemy beyond the nation-state; state threats are now diffuse and often asymmetric. Yet these state concepts of security are still formulated in terms of sovereignty and global dominance, something which has become harder to justify in itself, in the absence of a clearly definable enemy; and particularly with popular concern elsewhere. Wilkerson, again referring to the Cold War Western audience, described

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17 Mills observed an indifference and uneasiness in his considerations of post-war society, which he sees in essence as stemming from a lack of understanding of the individuals’ position in history and society; this creates a vague un-developed insecurity embodied in the focus on the individual (Mills, 1971: 18-19).

18 Including cross-government efforts and drawing in the economic, informational and political realms, see Chapters 3 and 4.
how he and Secretary of State Colin Powell often discussed how much easier it was when there was a,

“distinct ‘other’ …you always need an enemy, you need an ‘other’ […] we’ve always had a distinct within our own minds, Western minds […] in both our countries, we’ve always had the majority with a very distinct impression of the ‘other’ and it was easy to manipulate… propagandise and so forth” (23rd June 2009).

It was therefore seen as important to defence policy to define this new enemy and capture increasingly ‘distracted’ public opinion through propaganda. Rhetoric followed the need to demonstrate a homogenous ‘other’ and fight a ‘War’ against it, so in 2001 Bush made his battle-cry “either you are with us or you are with the terrorists” (quoted in Kean and Hamilton 2004). Through analysis of discourse van Dijk demonstrates how the word ‘terrorist’ has become synonymous with the Arab as ‘other’ through positive and negative evaluations of ‘us’ and ‘them’ (2000: 39).

Kibbe notes a change in Bush’s rhetoric during the early days in Afghanistan which can be attributed to the conceptual and structural changes in the country’s approach to its foreign policy. Initially following 9/11 Bush referred to the attacks in criminal terms, reflecting existing precedent in dealing with acts of terrorism by non-state actors, however he quickly began referring to acts of war (2004). President Bush first stated in his address to Congress on September 20th 2001 that “Our War on Terror begins with al-Qaida, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated” (Reynolds, 17th April 2007). This broader ‘war on terror’ rhetoric eased Rumsfeld’s efforts to authorise covert action by the military19 (operated with less oversight than the CIA) (Kibbe, 20004).

By brief examination of American conservatives’ usage of the term ‘terrorism’ during the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, terrorism could be assumed to be uncontroversial, a homogenous concept. This unity was demonstrated through support of Israel against Palestine (Held, 2004: 59). Beyond its physical effects, terrorism demonstrates the conditional nature of the sovereign state and

19 See Chapter 3.
interrogates perceptions of its legitimacy, particularly in the eyes of those who with genuine grievances about material inequalities. State security goes beyond the traditional notion of ‘anarchy’ of the state system that has dominated the field of international relations; beyond this it is the fear of the unknown future and the unknown populace the embodiment of which is public opinion (Williams, 1967: 299-300). Governments can use crises such as a war to create a symbolic threat, respond so they are perceived as acting to diffuse the threat, and declare a symbolic victory; demonstrating strong government (Chermak, 2003: 12).

The difficulty associated with defining ‘terrorism’ has resulted in ‘flexibility’ in its usage and thus it been represented as ‘surging’ or ‘falling’ according to political motive (Deutch, 1997: 10). The ‘War on Terror’ depicted in the media bore no relation to the reality of the threat; rather, Lewis suggests that media coverage responded to an increase in politician rhetoric. A massive increase in coverage occurred during a period when, despite occasional peaks, the number of terrorist attacks was the lowest in 20 years (Lewis, 4th August 2004: p19). Yet from 2005 (the time of the London bombings) it has been observed that BBC coverage largely “avoided the dialogue of fear” still common in the US and in much political rhetoric (Oates 2007). By 2007 Tony Blair was trying to move away from Bush’s expression ‘War on Terror’, a move later shadowed by Obama (Reynolds, 17th April 2007). However, this phrase has now so saturated discourse, that it persistently threads through global understanding of 21st Century American, and Anglo-American, foreign policy.

The British government definition of terrorism is contained within Section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000; it encompasses the use or threat of “action” (violence or endangerment, serious damage to property, or serious interference with an electronic system). This, combined with “use of firearms or explosives”, alone is sufficient to constitute terrorism. Otherwise, this “action” must be intended, “to influence the government or an international governmental organisation or to intimidate the public or a section of the public” and “for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause” (Lord Carlile, 2007).
As Philo argues “ideology and the struggle for legitimacy go hand in hand” (2007: 178). Terrorism is, by this official definition, what others do; it has often been defined thus. Since it was first used by the Jacobins to describe the French ‘reign of terror’ the use of the term ‘terrorism’ has always been relative, and politically motivated. All this means that terrorism has been popularly misunderstood. According to Held, terrorism itself “is not always or necessarily more morally unjustifiable than war” (2004: 59). It seems appropriate that instead “debate should focus on the justifiability or lack of it or the aims sought” (Held, 2004: 59). This approach is obviously a helpful guide in our approach to the truly horrific terrorist attacks prompted by Islamic fundamentalism on the American mainland and internationally. However, it should likewise be extended to methods of ‘countering’ terrorism, or insurgency, within a ‘War on Terror’ and doctrine of ‘pre-emptive war’ in Iraq.

Counter-terrorism is defined and organised in relation to the governments’ accepted definition of ‘terrorism’, and rhetorically ‘insurgents’ and ‘terrorists’ become one and the same. Kilcullen’s definition, as many other academic definitions, sees terrorism as a tool; using “politically motivated violence against civilians” and “conducted with the intention to coerce through fear,” (30th November 2004: 15). He pointed to this frequent conflation of the terms arguing that “the current campaign is actually a campaign to counter a globalised Islamist insurgency”; he argued that insurgency is “a popular movement that seeks to change the status quo through violence and subversion” whereas “terrorism is one of its key tactics” (Kilcullen, 30th November 2004: 15). Counter-insurgency (and all components thereof) is thus, by definition, conservative; in that it seeks to ensure the integrity of existing social structures, as well as preventing the violence and ‘terror’ insurgents might bring.

20 This policy of preventive war came to be embraced in the media’s flexible use of the term ‘Bush Doctrine’ which had more widely included a belief in America’s right to secure itself against foreign regimes that support terrorist groups; see Krauthammer (13th September 2008).
Robert Thompson, a prominent theorist in this area, distinguishes 5 ‘Principles of Counter-insurgency’ which define the political nature of this form of conflict and propaganda as a key component:

1) “The government must have a clear political aim: to establish and maintain a free, independent and united country which is politically and economically stable and viable”
2) “The government must function in accordance with law”
3) “The government must have an overall plan”
4) “The government must give priority to defeating the political subversion, not the guerrillas”
5) “In the guerrilla phase of an insurgency, a government must secure its base areas first.” (Thompson, 1972: 50-60).

His fourth ‘principle’ has helped enshrined propaganda, as a form of political warfare, as an important tool for counterinsurgency operations and planning, though he was far from the first to discuss its importance. The increasing prominence of terrorism within contemporary foreign policy has led to an emphasis in defence on this form of asymmetric warfare (Barnett, 2003; Metz & Johnson, 2001). The often elusive and ideological nature of such an enemy has increased the importance of soft power in the international system (Nye, 2000) and made ‘information warfare’ a vital government resource. Galula, in his classic text points argues that

“The insurgent, having no responsibility, is free to use any trick” and “is not obliged to prove; he is judged by his promises, not what he does. Consequently propaganda is a powerful weapon for him. With no positive policy but with good propaganda, the insurgent may still win.” (2006: 9).

Crucially, Galula’s “first law” of Counterinsurgency is therefore that “the support of the population is as necessary for the counterinsurgent as for the insurgent” (2006: 52). Propaganda has thus been incorporated into contemporary US and British counterinsurgency doctrine and the US Army’s recent Counterinsurgency handbook states that

“Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations require synchronized application of military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic
actions” as “the political issues at stake are often rooted in culture, ideology, social tensions and injustice” (Department of Defense, 2007: 5-1)

Operational Considerations and their Analytical Implications

Forms of propaganda, even from the same source, vary significantly depending upon the perceived needs and attitudes of the target audience. As such, it is important to study propaganda that is designed for different audiences in its context. However, there has been a disparity between how this has been considered within academic political and social theory (above), and how it has been considered operationally, and by academics with a background in defence (Tatham, 2006). Within the latter, research distinguishes propaganda and censorship as activities within the wider area of information warfare (or an ‘information campaign’ when speaking more specifically about actions within a particular conflict or time frame). ‘Media Operations’ (British) or ‘Public Affairs’ (American) and ‘Public Diplomacy’ - targeting both British and international propaganda audiences largely through mass media are distinguished from ‘Psychological Operations’ (PSYOPS) - propaganda used for an international, largely enemy, audience during military operations or peacetime. The definition offered by the Institute for the Advanced Study of ‘Information Warfare’ is

“...the offensive and defensive use of information and information systems to exploit, corrupt, or destroy an adversary’s information and information systems, while protecting one’s own. Such actions are designed to achieve advantages over military or business adversaries” (Goldberg, 2004; Taylor, 2002: 437).

It reaches more widely to include interception and re-broadcasting of messages across existing enemy radio stations as well as activities involving infiltration of enemy computer systems and censorship (Tatham, 2006: 7, Taverner, 18th July 2004).

By the Ministry of Defence, Media Operations is defined as

“That line of activity developed to ensure timely, accurate, and effective provision of Public Information (P/Info) and implementation of Public
Relations (PR) policy within the operational environment, whilst maintaining Operational Security (OPSEC)” (MoD, 2002: Glossary-5).

PSYOPS are designed to support military action in the theatre of war. This is defined as “Planned psychological activities designed to influence attitudes and behaviour affecting the achievement of political and military objectives” within British military doctrine (MoD, 2002: Glossary-5). US DoD doctrine similarly defines it more specifically, as

“Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2003: 10). It is the “most aggressive” propaganda form and its diverse methods include “psychological manipulation and direct threats” (Department of Defense, 30 October 2003). As with all such propaganda, “the purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10).

As regards scope of use, PSYOPS is targeted towards affecting political, economic and social structures as well as military targets (Whitley, 2000: 6). The three ordinarily applied ‘levels’ of PSYOPS, as below, will be referred to throughout and such ‘levels of operation’ apply to media operations also. Though drawn from US doctrine, they are also applied readily within British PSYOPS.
Strategic Level PSYOPS (Long-Term Goals) Conducted both during conflict and in peacetime by Government agencies to influence foreign attitudes, perceptions, and behaviour in favour of strategic goals and objectives.

Operational PSYOPS (Intermediate Goals) Campaigns conducted both in peace and war within a geographically defined operational area across the range of military operations to support the campaigns and strategies of the responsible Commander.

Tactical PSYOPS (Near-Term Goals) Conducted within an area assigned to a Commander across the range of military operations to support tactical missions against opposing forces. This form of PSYOPS is conducted on the battlefield to attain tactical objectives to support the campaign.

The scope of this thesis includes strategy in each country concerning all activities defined within the realm of ‘information warfare’, yet recognises that such concepts are institutionally-defined and politically motivated. Information Warfare, as state propaganda, must be examined as an element of the wider goals of the defence strategy of the country, to which it acts as a force multiplier and political tool. As such the thesis examines propaganda strategy through an analysis informed by interview data and insights drawn from debates in the traditions of propaganda theory above.

**Defining Propaganda**

The definition of propaganda has been contested by many and often defined politically; some prefer a more neutral definition, others a more loaded one, some define more broadly and some, narrowly. Some even consider it so complex and contested that it is somehow beyond definition, or too difficult to define (Ellul, 1973; Fraser, 1957: 14). Before it is possible to address the literature relating to
propaganda in practical application, it is important to consider the contested interpretations of the term. Lasswell defines propaganda broadly, as “the technique of influencing human action by the manipulation of representations” which can take “spoken, written, pictorial or musical form” (Lasswell, 1934: 13). This is a fairly neutral definition; however, for many, propaganda has become synonymous with lies.

Goodin considers propaganda to be “the evil core of power” and always contrary to the interests of the recipients (Goodin, 1980: 23). Many define it according to the pejorative connotations it has acquired. Doob for instance considers propaganda to be “the attempt to affect the personalities and to control the behaviours of individuals towards ends considered unscientific or of doubtful value in a society at a particular time” (Doob, 1949: 240). It has generally come to be accepted however, that although propaganda can involve lies it can also be based on fact or ‘truth’, indeed the most effective and persuasive propaganda is based largely, or wholly, on fact.

Because of the value judgements that have come to be associated with propaganda, issues related to ethics have become so intertwined with the study of propaganda so as to become inseparable. In an attempt to make the discussion of propaganda more acceptable other terms have come to be used more widely in academia including ‘information’ and ‘communication’. These are very broad terms that could encompass a wide spectrum of activities, which Doob considers to be one of the benefits of using such terms (Doob, 1949: 231-232). More recently, government propaganda has come to be popularly referred to as ‘spin’; this negatively denotes political information, and the term ‘spin doctor’ has also developed to refer to those advisors who attempt to present information in a favourable light.

It can be argued that the substitution of the word ‘propaganda’ by terms like ‘information’ is propaganda in itself. As Taylor suggests, euphemisms merely obscure the reality of propaganda and are a result of confusion that has developed over what propaganda really is (Taylor, 2002: 437). This is the approach taken by successive British governments and military, so occasionally, where necessary in
discussion of specific policy, this dissertation will draw on official terminology. However, such euphemisms for reasons of academic rigor have been avoided throughout the analysis. Although other authors have used many different terms in speaking of these kinds of communication here the term ‘propaganda’ will be applied as it is the most accurate and appropriate term for the very specific type of communication discussed here. This dissertation is examining a particular kind of deliberate communication, which must be defined broadly enough to encompass both the relatively new term ‘spin’, and the old established concept of ‘rhetoric’. It must also be defined narrowly enough to exclude information and communication that is not manipulated or presented in a way so as to produce a particular audience effect (e.g. action/inaction/change in ideas, values or behaviours). For the purposes of this dissertation propaganda will therefore be defined as the deliberate manipulation of representations (inc. text, pictures, video, speech etc...) with the intention of producing any effect in the audience (e.g. action or inaction; reinforcement or transformation of feelings, ideas, attitudes or behaviours) that is desired by the propagandist.

Categories of Propaganda

Different classifications of propaganda have also been used to aid theoretical analysis and, particularly given the broad definition of propaganda adopted herein, such categories can be helpful to further distinguish between forms and styles of propaganda use.

Black, White and Grey Propaganda

The first classification drawn on here is that between white, black and grey propaganda. White propaganda is that where the use of the propaganda is overt its source being known to the audience and the information is largely accurate. Black propaganda is often lies; it is covert and it may be attributed to a false source. Grey propaganda encompasses the majority of propaganda and occupies the territory between these two extremes of the spectrum. It is characterised by uncertainty either of the source of the information or its accuracy (Jowett and O'Donnell, 1992: 11-15). For this reason the US 4th Army PSYOPs Regimental shield incorporates these colours (Rouse, c.2005).
Internal and External Propaganda

One of the classifications that will occasionally be applied here is that between internal and external propaganda. Internal propaganda is that used within a group or by a country upon its members and is normally used for the purposes of integration or to build morale. External propaganda on the other hand is directed outside of the group or country being examined. For example this would include propaganda used by Britain upon the citizens or administration of another country such as Afghanistan or in wider coalition-building.

Horizontal and Vertical Propaganda

Vertical propaganda is made by a propagandist in a superior position or position of authority who wishes to influence an audience below. For example propaganda produced by a government and used to target its own people or the people of another country or even those in a parallel position in another country who might be placed at a lower level by a lack of knowledge of the propagandist’s subject matter. Horizontal propaganda on the other hand occurs between a propagandist and another person on the same level. Ellul only observed this as occurring between members of a group for example between members of a political party’ or between organs of government who all promote their own activities. To be really effective however groups ideally should be homogenous or this can make horizontal propaganda difficult. Though in principle for this kind of propaganda to be horizontal the parties should be equal, power relations are complex and therefore the whole context must be taken into account when analysing the propaganda (Ellul, 1973: 79-84). This form of propaganda is clearly important in building psychological adherence of the propagandist to the information being distributed and the goals (s)he is pursuing as part of a collective or alliance. Horizontal propaganda is useful in an analytical sense as a theoretical ideal type, where we can distinguish activities as having horizontal characteristics, as such differentials can be applied in most contexts. Promotion within a government agency such as the MoD directed internally amongst staff to reinforce positively the work undertaken might be an example of this. It may originally be instigated from the top of a
hierarchy but the knowledge levels of target audience and production team is sufficient to qualify this as having horizontal elements.

*Agitation and Integration Propaganda*

Propaganda can be agitative, attempting to stir some action in its audience, or prompting change, or likewise it can be integrative in nature attempting to secure consent, or passivity in the audience and avert potential challenges. (Jowett and O'Donnell, 1999: 11-12). As Ellul observes, horizontal propaganda is more often integration propaganda and vertical propaganda is most suited to agitation propaganda, though it can also be applied to integration (Ellul, 1973: 80-81). This latter scenario can be evidenced for example when governments attempt to create a receptive audience prior to releasing a policy, for example through raising an issue to public debate to ensure their stance creates minimal opposition. As Ellul rightly notes “government propaganda suggests that public opinion demand this or that decision; it provokes a will of a people, who spontaneously would say nothing” (Ellul, 1973: 132). There may be no demand amongst a public who are unaware of the issue, until the need for the policy is raised to the public attention by a well organised campaign designed to create an accepting, receptive environment and a ‘need’ to be fulfilled.

*Breakdown by Chapter*

The next chapter will provide a detailed overview of the research design and empirical work. The first 3 substantive chapters (3-5) will explore aspects of each domestic defence and propaganda apparatus and its development; including structures of coordination, cultural factors and policy challenges. Through insights drawn from key interviews, these chapters will demonstrate how wider international politics drove bureaucratic and operational tensions, and change in domestic defence and propaganda planning. Chapter 5 will highlight the role played by certain cultural aspects of the two countries’ military, political and bureaucratic apparatuses which proved to be integral in the facilitation and character of propaganda planning. Chapter 6 will discuss how these changing domestic conditions impacted on the evolution of Anglo-American planning and the countries’ respective roles in the negotiation of a joint propaganda strategy. Finally chapter 7
will give a detailed examination of assumptions underlying the foreign policymaking process, their relationship to propaganda planning, and how these were renegotiated to respond during this period of change.
Design & Methodology

This research involved an empirical analysis of the evolving Anglo-American propaganda strategies that spanned the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. It sought, through a series of interviews and review of relevant literature and key documentary sources, to discover how domestic dynamics, and the current state of diplomatic and power relations between the two countries, shaped the nature and development of British and American information strategies and their planning, in a shared theatre of war. As Croft observes, the construction of a ‘War on Terror’ narrative “was an elite project” involving not just government but “many other social institutions, in the media and in popular culture” (2006: 2). It is thus important to note that this is not a study of media production, media coverage, or the content of propaganda output in either country. Rather it is a study of the interstate and domestic dynamics involved in decision-making and planning of the propaganda strategy of the ‘War on Terror’.

Assumptions & ‘Objectivity’ of the Research

Notions of value are indivisible from research of this nature due to the explicitly political purpose, and power differentials integral to propaganda and censorship. As Weber argues, “No science is absolutely free from presupposition, and no science can prove its fundamental value to the man who rejects these presuppositions” (Weber, 1919a: 153). Mills also rejected the idea of a ‘value free’ social science; arguing that, since they were unavoidable, “judgements should be explicit” for the sake of “self-awareness” and discussion (1971: 28). However, Mills believed that although the questions may be generated from values, the research and analysis should adhere to rigorous standards; theory must be seated the issues that stem from human experience to ensure its historical relevance (1971: 28, 58). He emphasises the necessity of our incorporating each layer from the psychological to the political in our sociological analysis, to see the relevance and linkages between areas of life that superficially appear unrelated and patterns or structures across social forms (Mills, 1971: 12-13). Williams’ belief was that analyses of culture were
inherently political since they dealt with value questions (Eldridge & Eldridge, 1994: 75). These debates all have important research implications.

Habermas asserted, further, that ‘critical’ social science research should be governed by “an interest in emancipation” (May, 1980: 366) to which May responds that a “commitment to the truth” is still paramount (1980: 366). This research takes the critical sociological position that research should interrogate the legitimacy of structures of power (particularly where these impact on public knowledge and debate). This has parallels with the advocacy approach in not “seeking to avoid or resolve the tensions inherent in” the processed examined (Speed, 2006: 66). In this area where there is an inescapable power imbalance, not to do so would be to assume the position of power, and truth would be lost. Yet as May observes “the social order does not tidily divide into the powerful and the powerless, the superordinate and the subordinate” (1980: 367).

Thus the research takes a critical interpretivist rather than positivist approach to qualitative data-gathering which constructs its analysis using the voice of active agents and institutions. As such the work will stand between two bodies of literature both of which make important assumptions about the nature of the world and how it can be studied. The project will draw from the field of political sociology in examining how relationships contribute to the nature of policy and wider power structures. This will enable an analysis that moves beyond formal relationships and crude power relations to explore interaction further down formal hierarchies of power and how this builds international structures of power. These epistemological and ontological considerations will feed into the theoretical analysis of the propaganda policies and practices emerging from empirical work.

**Scope of the Research**

Although restricted to two particular conflicts, for methodological reasons the scope of the research is drawn quite broadly. The difficulties of gaining access to elite sources and in obtaining information freely once in interview has meant selection of appropriate examples was inevitably influenced by opportunity and the interview data obtained. This, and variation in what was recalled by the
interviewees meant that insights were drawn from events between the 9/11 attacks up to 2008, with most accounts falling in the first half of this period. In addition to this, geographically this was a ‘global’ war against Islamic extremism; the media war was fought across international media as well as in the theatre of war. Due to initial findings, I had envisaged separating propaganda ‘forms’ according to how they are conventionally defined by the military and often by other academics by external/internal audience (ie distinguishing psychological operations and media operations). While I had initially intended to focus on ‘defence’ propaganda in a limited way, in restricting scope to the military alone it quickly became apparent that the nature of how the information war was being fought (seeking integration and cross-governmental solutions) rendered this an artificial distinction. Initial research findings demonstrated that globalisation was making target audience an increasingly arbitrary and meaningless distinction. The erosion and maintenance of these understandings of propaganda distinctions became an important element of the analysis. They prompted a critical ‘rethinking’ of:

a. How the structure of government ensures such propaganda concepts retain the strength of their analytical stature.

b. How they can come to be conceptually and institutionally shaped through the agency of those involved in its processes.

The scope of the research was ultimately focussed on demonstrating the often ‘messy’ informal mechanisms and relationships through which the Anglo-American propaganda ‘structures’ - those involved in planning and shaping - operated or faltered. By way of clarification, the term ‘Anglo-American Relations’, as used frequently here, encompasses many forms of interaction ranging among the interpersonal, structural and bureaucratic relationships. It includes that operating informally in friendships, or relationships formally laid down in protocol, yet even these are often sustained despite formal divergence of, often, varied careers. It potentially included all forms of interaction across each country’s structural hierarchy; from military personnel at all levels to intelligence, politicians and bureaucrats who are involved in the cross-government organisation and implementation of the information war.
Methodology and Approach

Detailed Documentary Analysis

From the early stages the research entailed an extensive review of the existing literature, across disciplines including International Relations Theory, Security Studies, Anglo-American Relations, Propaganda Theory and British and US Politics, Social Theory, Sociology and Organisational Culture. A detailed analysis covered a large number of British and American documentary sources. For example, these included the following:

- Civil Service guidelines
- Defence White Papers/Reports
- Political, military and academic papers
- Press Releases and Coalition Information Centre outputs
- Media reports
- Personal Memos and correspondence

All of the above were obtained by request, through online sources, or at the National Security Archive in Washington DC. Some were obtained at interview. These all contributed to examples and informed the analysis of British and US propaganda strategy and the Anglo-American relationship in the contemporary British and US foreign and defence policy. Such documents also contributed to the background of the conflict and helped to inform and direct interviews. I made 15 Freedom of Information requests to the Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence. Most responses claimed the Departments did not hold the information I sought. Two responses were of interest.

The first resulted in a claim the 'Media Group’ Coordination Meeting did not exist prior to November 2008, though I have evidence to the contrary (Read, 23rd September 2010). Another requested information relating to the 'Information Campaign Coordination Group', particularly material relating to dialogue with DoD and CENTCOM. I received many emails claiming approval was being sought and then approved, then finally a U-Turn, saying they didn’t hold the information.
**Primary Method: Elite Interviews**

The primary method for data gathering was elite interviews of which 41 were conducted on-record (24 British, 16 American) both face-to-face and over the telephone. Where this was not possible I gained information by email correspondence (7 contacts). Several further interviews were conducted with high-profile contacts which contributed to depth of understanding and background, but which were off-record so are not included below. They contributed to the empirical core of primary data as an aid to analysis. Interviewees include planners working in the theatre of war as well as at home; drawn from the following areas:

**Figure 2: Table Showing Range of Expertise of Participants**

| STRATEGIC PLANNING: INTELLIGENCE AGENCY | Intelligence Agency Personnel, and Journalists |
| STRATEGIC PLANNING: POLITICAL | Politicians & planners involved with strategic level information strategy planning. |
| STRATEGIC PLANNING: MILITARY/DEFENCE | Civil Servants & Commanders responsible for planning information strategy. |
| DIPLOMATIC/INFORMATION CAMPAIGNS IN THEATRE | Personnel from Embassies/Coalition Provisional Authority |
| OPERATIONAL: MEDIA OPS/PUBLIC AFFAIRS | Personnel from Coalition Information Centres and other Media Management Projects |
| OPERATIONAL/TACTICAL: | Military Commanders |
| OPERATIONAL/TACTICAL: PSYOPS | Military Personnel/PSYOPS Officers |
| OPERATIONAL/TACTICAL: MEDIA OPS/PUBLIC AFFAIRS | Military Media Op’s Officers in Theatre |
| PRIVATE CONTRACTORS | PR Companies and PSYOPS/Media Contractors |
| MEDIA RECEPTION/ANALYSIS | Journalists/Media |

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21 In this thesis, ‘elites’, rather than interpreted narrowly as a political elite in the primary positions of state power, are considered to be multidimensional. The elite includes those communities broadly speaking in whose hands power is concentrated, and often defended, through a restricted formal/informal membership and cultural specificity. Elites are those who have privileged access to information, which often endows an assumption of superior ‘expert’ knowledge. They further have privileged authority in decision-making which may impact on wider society.
This methodology enriched the research by providing examples of both policymaking approach and practise, giving depth to the study. Given that ‘participant observation’ was not an option, in-depth interviews were crucial to building a picture of the more ‘informal’ and indirect ways that Anglo-American relations and propaganda policy development occur. The interviewees were approached about their own experiences of working alongside colleagues from across the Atlantic, their observations of policy and practice from an ‘insider’ perspective during the information operations of the ‘War on Terror’.

**Face-to-Face and Telephone Interviews**

1. 15th Army PSYOPS Group (22nd November 2005) *Group Interview with 3 Personnel*: Chicksands, Bedfordshire
3. Anonymous (2010a) *British Intelligence Contractor recently returned from Baghdad, Telephone Interview on 15th July 2010.*
12. Dorril, Stephen (20th July 2010) Academic, Investigative Journalist and Author of Numerous Key Texts on MI6, Telephone Interview.


16. Fitzpatrick, Sean, K (30th June 2009) Former Chief Creative Officer - McCann-Erickson, Creative Director - National Center For Unconventional Thought at Potomac Institute for Policy Studies - Interview: Williamsburg, VA.


23. McBride, Dennis (5th June 2009) Think Tank Director, Researcher, Contractor and former Naval Captain with 20 years service - Interview: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Washington DC.

24. McFadden, Pat (20th April 2006) MP Wolverhampton North/Former Information Officer - Interview, London.

31. Stelloh, Ren (23rd June 2009) Chief Operating Officer/President PhaseOne Communications & Former CIA Case Officer - Interview: Washington DC.
33. Thorpe, Frank (Rear Adm.) (24th August 2009) Former Special Assistant for Public Affairs, Former First Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Joint Communication) & US Navy Chief of Information (Retired) - Telephone Interview.
35. Weale, Adrian (26th November 2010) Former Chief of Staff for the Coalition Provisional Authority, Deputy Governor of Dhi Qar Province (July - December 2003) and founder member of British Armed Forces Federation - Telephone Interview.
36. Wilkerson, Lawrence (23 June 2009) Former Chief of Staff to Secretary of State Colin Powell, Department of State 2002-2005 - Interview: Georgetown University, Washington DC.
38. Wright, Graham (Air Cdre) (1\textsuperscript{st} June 2009) \textit{Former Director of Targeting and Information Operations - MoD, & British Liaison to Joint Chiefs at Department of Defense - Interview: British Embassy, Washington DC.}
39. Zinni, Anthony (Gen) (2\textsuperscript{nd} June 2009) \textit{Former Commander of CENTCOM 1997-2000, Acting Director BAE Systems - Interview: Washington DC.}

\textbf{Email Correspondence}

1. Anonymous (2010) \textit{RAF Flight Lieutenant - Email Correspondence between 11\textsuperscript{th} August and 4\textsuperscript{th} November 2010.}
2. Bergman, Simon (Maj.) (8\textsuperscript{th} August 2006) \textit{15th Army PSYOPS Group Training Officer - Email Correspondence.}
3. Carroll, Rory (16th August 2004) \textit{Journalist at The Guardian - Email Correspondence.}
4. Naylor, Sean. (23rd August 2004) \textit{Journalist at the Army Times (US) - Email Correspondence.}
5. Paton, Iain (4th October 2010) \textit{RAF Flight Lieutenant - Email Correspondence.}
6. Shadian, Scott (21\textsuperscript{st} July 2007) \textit{State Department: US Embassy Kabul's Counter-Narcotics Public Information Campaign Program Manager - Email Correspondence.}
7. Winters, Jim. (31\textsuperscript{st} July 2006) \textit{US Army Capabilities Integration Centre Staff - Email Correspondence.}
Fieldwork Planning and Process

Elite figures often have demanding schedules; Franklin Miller for instance has been referred to as someone who “doesn’t get out of bed except to reorganize NATO” (‘damien’, 21st January 2007). For this reason, and because the interview discussion could potentially go ‘off record’ and involve matters of security, the venue for each interview was designated by the interviewee. Most of the British interviews took place in London but the 15th British PSYOPS Group personnel were interviewed in an office at the Army base in Chicksands, Bedfordshire where the British PSYOPS capabilities are based. The research involved a 6-month period of fieldwork in Washington DC. Access was a chief concern and I correctly anticipated time would be necessary to build up sufficient contacts and organise interviews.

Sampling & Access

There can be some difficulty with gaining access to military specialists in information warfare22 for reasons of security and the sensitivity of the work. During the course of the earlier British fieldwork, a more direct and formal approach to contacting interviewees was used with some success. Key figures for interview were identified in two ways. Firstly, relevant reading and documentary evidence helped identify figures who had made a significant contribution. This method was important in finding initial interviews but also had limitations. It proved more difficult to contact UK personnel after positions had ended as there was less internet-ready information and many such figures would inevitably be hostile to an unsolicited approach by a researcher. Often I found less was revealed in such interviews because of the ‘formal’ way in which they were obtained, which limited trust. Contacts appeared to stick more closely to the ‘line’ when contacted this way, but a more ‘informal’ approach was difficult studying so far from London. In addition to this, due to the nature of their activities some involved in the information war maintain a very low profile. Certain American interviewees I spoke with would not have been ‘visible’ enough even to contact in this way.

22 Or in maintaining frank, open discussion of some activities.
There has been much media interest in the issue of the War on Terror and Harvey (2010: 7) identifies ‘research fatigue’ as a potential problem. It was a minor issue with some contacts responding ‘just read my book’ or ‘I talked to [-journalist-] about this’. Interviewees did not always understand how it might be important to cover old ground in new ways, from an academic standpoint and with a different focus. There was an important observational element to the data-gathering; manner, choice of language and relaxed responses were important to revealing meanings. For this reason, in quotes interviewees grammar and inflections have not been corrected, in order to preserve the particular nuances of their speech and delivery.

As research progressed I became more confident in my approach and snowball sampling (approaching contacts and interviewees for introductions) became the primary method of generating further interviews. People were more eager to give their time to someone their colleague/friend had spoken with; to please their friend or to put their side of the story. In so doing I had to be aware of possible biases in the sample. I took great care to balance my search following different leads to ensure I was not introduced only to like-minded friends with similar views. I obtained interviews with both liberal and conservative contacts in each country. This also at times acted as a ‘check’ on previous interviews, and sometimes elicited information that was withheld by a previous interviewee. For example, Dennis McBride divulged information regarding a more cautious Sean Fitzpatrick. My method of generating contacts involved a number of ‘gatekeepers’ and introductions; often kind people trying to help me who I met in social situations. This opened doorways that would have been closed but left me with a loyalty to the gatekeepers when I realised some interviewees might be less-than-happy about my analysis. In these situations, the person they were introducing me to sometimes saw the interview as a favour to them as much as to me, and were more trusting. Where I felt this might be a problem I contacted the necessary gatekeepers and explained that I would be critical. I developed a real sense of humility early on in the research and an awareness of how much I cannot know about people’s lives. This made me reluctant to make value judgements about the actions of, often,

good people within life’s inevitable constraints. The power of making value judgments over actions and processes which I ultimately found to be necessary and inevitable, particularly in an area of research such as this, and their repercussions always troubled me.

While I don’t consider myself naive, the ease with which some interviewees discussed activities and expressed opinions I cannot but consider highly immoral in democratic society shocked me. I felt I often didn’t really want to win the trust and respect of potential interviewees whose views and activities concerned me. There was a limit to how much interviewees could be informed on how the analysis would develop, partly as the analysis was developed from the data and partly as this would prejudice responses. While I made effort not to mislead, at times people made assumptions that my friendly nature included implicit agreement with their own beliefs. The inability to express beliefs and disagreement caused some personal conflict with my sense of ‘self’ as others perceive me. I didn’t want anyone to think I agreed with such viewpoints, whoever they were. While I was careful not to pass judgement or express political opinion, some interviews were denied because I was evasive about my own political views when directly asked.

Snowball sampling (perhaps surprisingly given my being less familiar with the place/people) was particularly successful in Washington DC where I obtained accommodation in the centre of a community with a high proportion of residents from politics, public servants, intelligence personnel and defence contractors. Other female researchers have observed that when researching a male-dominated profession,

“Such men enjoy the attention and the captive audience of a woman researcher” (Marshall, 1984: 257).

While I was clear and honest maintaining only friendly academic interest in insights that were offered, I felt that some may have been more willing to speak to me; both as a female researcher, and being British. I felt I was seen by some as somewhat ‘exotic’.
Through a human desire to meet people in my locale and through the needs of the research, it was necessary to fit into social situations with people who had very different values and ways of seeing the world. Spending the majority of my time in social situations without lying, but without disclosing views that would alienate, became second nature to me. Seeking interviews was an important preoccupation. Getting interviews and revealing information became exciting, but I grew very aware of the assumptions they made about what kind of researcher, and person, I am. Through concern with the process I sensed how easy it was to be drawn in deeper through personal connections and as an increasingly accepted member of their world I felt implicated in it. To address these concerns I kept a diary of my experiences and concerns and spoke frequently to friends at home. I ensured I remained focussed on the analysis this way; the meaning of what was revealed. I felt increasingly alienated by life in Washington DC and concerned by the all-pervasive penetration of the military and government bureaucracy throughout everyday cultural life in the city. My ‘outsider’ status made me more aware of taken-for-granted assumptions there and how these conflicted with the assumptions of my own culture. I became aware of assumptions I had made in my own thinking and more critical overall through the analysis.

Of course nuances in the data would clearly be different with a different pool of contacts. Yet, in practise, it was often easier than anticipated to generate a wide network of contacts due to a government desire to ensure a public perception of openness, widespread interest in the area, people’s pride and genuine belief in their vocation. The research secured access to a good range of contacts, whose confidence in the me and research project was reflected in their willingness to provide further contacts and extensive support. Thus I feel the interviews generated much insight into the subject.

There are problems with anonymising data in this area since public figures and public servants in positions of power must be held accountable. Effort was made without using pressure, to encourage participants to go on the record. I also

24 For instance, the support of NATO PSYOPS personnel translated into an invitation to present a paper at their workshop on the media and the War on Terror at the Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism in Ankara.
explained that taping interviews enables more accurate analysis. However, where interviewees were uncomfortable with either I gave anonymity and negotiated with what could be revealed about their position.

My experiences of interviewing 15th PSYOPS Group and other British experts revealed more suspicion, and a number of rejections. Fewer were happy to be taped or be quoted (all but one American was happy to be recorded). Responses seemed to indicate this was due to Britain’s more critical media. Familiarity with the ‘think-tank culture’ of Washington DC, which encourages a more collaborative relationship between academics and government, meant some American interviewees seemed not to anticipate any critical analysis. I believe being a female British student researching defence was also perceived as something of a novelty and that people may have been more keen to speak about themselves. It is important to acknowledge cultural differences between the researcher and the interviewee in many of the interviews (See Hofstede, 2001).

Nagl during research for his seminal work on counterinsurgency noted that interviewees “were willing to talk more openly and of different topics with a serving army officer than they would have with been with a purely academic researcher” (2002: xxiv). Military personnel operate within a relatively closed and masculine working culture, with its own distinct language and practices which can be difficult for an outsider to relate to and penetrate, even or especially in an interview situation. To prevail it was therefore imperative to build up a sense of mutual respect and rapport which enables the free-flowing dialogue necessary. Effective research and extensive planning prior to interview proved essential. It was helpful to adapt to a style of communication which the interviewee found comfortable including adopting similar language where appropriate. For instance, with the PSYOPS personnel preparation to ensure familiarity with many of the acronyms employed casually by personnel enabled discussion to flow with more fluidity.
Unstructured Nature of the Interviews

Efforts were made to thoroughly research the background of all interviewees, as Peabody et al stress, preparation was vital to avoiding embarrassment and building respect (1990). Interview schedules were also prepared with questions that flowed logically as Peabody et al recommend (1990). The nature of elite interviews is such that what can be known about interviewees’ roles in advance and they often had experience which was publicly unreported. There was guesswork in planning for potential interview data and preparing questions prior to interviews. Schedules [See Appendix] were often only a loose memory-jogger that helped make me feel prepared and look professional.

I began by asking the interviewees to speak generally about their own role, and describe their contribution. This I found enabled dialogue to flow in a relaxed manner, revealed much previously unknown information and allowed me to guide conversation into areas I wished to explore. Open-ended questions were used to maximise flexibility and encourage free discussion. These probed subjects specific to the interviewee’s experiences drawn from my research questions or past interviews.

Interviews were therefore loosely structured with emphasis on building interviewee trust and drawing out examples arising from discussion that were often unanticipated/unknown to the researcher. Often examples discussed were determined by interviewee factors other than the research questions/interview schedule - personal/organisational objectives, limited time, variations of memory, pride or shame, desire to entertain/impress. This was a necessary limitation but also a strength of the research which allowed insights into interviewee perceptions and motives. Conti and O’Neil point out that the power dynamics between the interviewer and interviewee have direct implications for the type of knowledge produced (2007). A flexible but informed interview technique was adapted reflexively according to the manner of the interviewee throughout produced the most revealing responses. Each participant had prior experience of being interviewed often were publicly accountable figures and, indeed, controlling information in the public sphere was often their professional role (e.g. Public
Affairs). The power dynamics of such interviews differ from traditional researcher-participant dynamics. It was necessary to seem as disarming as possible and reflexivity was necessary in developing an approach that maximised the openness of powerful participants and approached the data in a fair, yet critical way. To enable this I kept notes on my approach, my own subjective responses, how the interviewee responded and kinds of data produced.25

Interviewee assumptions of what an interview should be differed; some expected a structured approach and seemed almost affronted at being encouraged to talk freely. Such interviews required more work. Often with interviewees who wanted to celebrate their achievements the best approach tended to emphasise student-status; approaching with a little more naïveté about how the Americans managed to handle such an extensive information war. With more careful participants it was more helpful to approach responses nodding knowingly as if an already knowledgeable ‘insider’ - this was possible more often when I had been introduced by a trusted colleague. I found prompting with just enough information for them to develop led to interviewees filling in blanks, treading new ground and often assuming data had already been revealed by others. Likewise interviewees would often pass judgement on each other revealing reactions to other agencies and the nature of relationships or political motives. For instance, Franklin Miller commented derisively on my having spoken to Lawrence Wilkerson openly a critic of Iraq war planning as “hardly impartial…” (3rd August 2009).

The most important skill was in allowing room for interviewees to speak. Harvey argues that “potentially awkward scenarios” where both interviewer and interviewee are “unable or unwilling to disclose certain information” should be handled by changing the subject (5th November 2010: 9). This research dealt with controversial subject matter and potentially secretive yet powerful participants. It was necessary to monitor how far a subject could be pushed without alienating or damaging rapport but it was necessary sometimes to push a little into awkwardness. Being caught off-guard after a number of easy questions sometimes brought revealing responses, ceding data that may not otherwise have been given (eg Miller

25 These notes were also useful in the analysis.
discussing MI6 & CIA, see Chapter 5). It often proved useful to return to a touchy subject more casually, or ask controversial questions at the end so as not to arouse concern. Sometimes interviewees would begin speaking in the hypothetical “let’s say…” and move towards the concrete, giving specifics as they let down their guard due to the rapport that has been created (Stelloh, 23rd June 2009).

**Analysis of the Data**

As Zikmund points out it is crucial to be honest and not selective in how the data is reported and analysed, and in the theoretical conclusions we draw (1999). Therefore, an inductive design was used so as to ensure the connection between theory and empirical reality of policy-making relationships, moving beyond the individual realities of the participants’ experiences to consider wider power structures. Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill argue that the use of an inductive approach “should allow a good ‘fit’ to develop between the social reality of the research participants and the theory that emerges - it will be ‘grounded’ in that reality” (Saunders et al., 2003). It was this need for research to work from a strong empirical grasp of history towards a rigorously developed theoretical framework that includes both micro and macro-level analysis that Mills discussed in his work and it is as important to research design today as in his time (Mills, 1971, 215).

Between particular cases there was great variation in openness and all accounts were assumed as partial; some interviews did feel as though the individual would not stray far from the ‘company line’ (as discussed above). With regard to the interpretation of such data, Heritage observes that on occasion researchers have treated the answers given during interviews at face value and as a direct substitute for actual observed behaviour (1984, 236). That the interviewer relationship was often negotiated quite informally was important to the present analysis. It gave an insight into how informal networks and power relations operated in this field. From the interviews emergent patterns (such as patterns in perceptions like ‘public service’) helped to refine the research questions and the focus of subsequent interview discussion as well as building nascent analysis.
It was possible to make observations in the negotiation of interviews that were consistent with emergent data regarding the differing military and bureaucratic cultures. While British interviewees often declined to comment specifically on American counterparts, US interviewees were less reticent. Often British interviewees were more careful to stick to the official line, whereas American interviewees were more confident. Partly this was as my approach had been more ‘formal’. But societal differences can also account for this; it may be a consequence of the more adversarial media in the UK or a greater ‘openness’ in US society. It may also reflect American bureaucracy’s experience of academic units that play a more collaborative role with US government and industry. Important insights were nonetheless gained by cross-cultural research and critical comparisons that eventually revealed the ways in which ‘interests’ shaped the narrative. This helped move the analysis from the uncritical claims by personnel of ‘we work well together’ toward a more nuanced engagement with their evolving activities, tensions, differing perceptions and historical context. In the interpretation of interview data care was taken in remembering that the day-to-day dynamic reality of each interviewee’s role and their recollection of it or abstract beliefs might at times be inconsistent (Silverman, 2000, 292).

Although this is not a comparative study, it drew on understanding of two different political and military systems and their cultural contexts and this was crucial to informing the analysis and understanding cross-cultural negotiation and transfer as well as direct co-operation. (Almond et al., 1993). The disparity in wealth, power, technology and culture between even these two developed states is sufficient to require a deep engagement with their differing structures and internal cultures throughout the research process. All interviewees were speaking from a particular perspective which shapes their view of their activities and most see their work as playing a positive role in society, thus they often felt comfortable discussing this in their own terms. They often reflect on this critically themselves but it was the researcher’s role in this qualitative study to identify power relationships and interests from these accounts. My notes on the dynamics of the interview, and my

26 For instance although increasingly overlap exists many terms are different in the US and British military, as are the structural hierarchies. The systemic and historical analysis of these develops over chapter 3 and 4.
own subjective responses or reflections were helpful in building this analysis. In all cases, the interview data was examined on its own merits, taking into account the insights gained from other interviews in judging the depth and quality of the content.

It is important to remember the motivations of participants, particularly elites are unlikely to be free from a political or personal agenda. In fact participants here were often professionally trained political spokesmen, and while it is in the institution’s interest to be seen to be ‘open’, political framing is likely to occur. The motives behind information release have been questioned in the case of covert actions of the Clinton Administration, which were released after 9/11, it is thought these might have been at least in part to “protect Clinton Administration officials and/or CIA officers against accusations that they were supine in the face of the terrorist threat” Scott, Len (2004). Personal motivations and an awareness of public perceptions led some to try and explain, morally legitimise their activities, and bring me on side, for example Fallon described:

“some knee-jerk reactions from segments of the population […] those on the left take umbrage at the idea that somebody might be influencing thinking” and “a particular segment of the population, whenever you talk about using information. It’s brainwashing, it’s some kind of nefarious activity. The reality is it goes on all the time at every level and frankly we will in the general public admire people that are effective communicators. Obama’s the darling of the [communications] crowd right now” (21st July 2009).

Language and indicators of unspoken meaning were crucial to the developing analysis and as transcriptions were typed, fieldnotes were reviewed and transcripts were marked with identifiers for the emergent themes. Tags were inserted similar to ‘coding’ used in critical discourse analysis. These were constantly revised throughout the research process. In one example where the use of language divulged hidden assumptions, during one conversation, which cannot be quoted, one interviewee spoke of the media as if they were a military battalion; asserting that they were deployed into a particular area, he quickly corrected this to say the

27 Indeed, concepts and activities are often genuinely understood in narrow, institutionally defined ways.
military merely helped the media to get access to the area. It reflected a general tendency among military personnel for the media to be seen as a resource of the military that built into the wider analysis.

Departmental ethical approval for this research was obtained and all ESRC, University and Departmental guidelines were observed. The main ethical issues that come to bear on this kind of research are issues of consent and attribution. Most of the interviewees were approached for initial consent to interview by email detailing the form the interview will take, and followed up by a telephone call where possible. The interviewee at the beginning of each interview was asked whether they minded being digitally recorded, and the reasons for this (accuracy and comprehensiveness) were explained. A consent form was prepared for this purpose (See Appendix 1). Once consent was obtained assurances were made that they may ask for the recording to be stopped at any time. The interviewee was asked whether they minded being quoted, any concerns they had about attribution were addressed and they were assured that they may go off the record at any point. Both of these points were confirmed again at the end of the interview in case during the course of the discussion information was disclosed that might cause the interviewee to change their mind. At this stage some asked about the subsequent use of the information and its storage. All interviewees were informed that the research might be used for publication and all were happy with this, some requesting to see future articles out of their own interest.

Regarding attribution the biggest problem has been where interviewees wished to go off the record with information and where this was encountered it was respected. Also, the PSYOPS personnel declined to be recorded, thus some information had to be confirmed and crosschecked for accuracy. Note-taking, as it is less comprehensive, has been found to affect reliability and make data more vulnerable to bias and makes it difficult to obtain direct quotes (Saunders et al., 2003, 263-264). Where data has been anonymised herein, this is done by citing the source by their position. Where the information is too sensitive, yet the interviewee is happy for it to be used for the researcher’s background information this has been

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28 For example in the case of some of the PSYOPS personnel.
respected. The subject matter being discussed is of some sensitivity since it deals with matters of national security and with personal working relationships and this has been respected. Therefore information relating to participants is filed securely on the University premises to ensure confidentiality.

Introduction

This chapter will explain how during the ‘War on Terror’, the demands of a globalised information war, and the emergence of a new kind of enemy, fuelled a domestic restructuring of the propaganda apparatus in both Britain and America. While the chapter deals with each country’s domestic political context, it integrates these accounts to develop a thematic argument highlighting emergent trends and difference. The domestic patterns discussed here and in Chapters 4 and 5, will be shown in Chapter 6 to have shaped the relationship and inter-country planning structures that coordinated the information war. The chapter argues that government agencies adapted to the demands of the period by incorporating new propaganda roles. This developed from 2005 into the ‘Strategic Communications’ Approach which will be explored more in Chapter 4. The propaganda apparatus was thus characterised by:

a) An increasingly flexible approach to structural boundaries that had previously restricted propaganda functions, and wider dispersal of the apparatus.

b) A related doctrinal transition towards the erosion of previous distinctions made between the propaganda forms (e.g. Psychological Operations - PSYOPS, Public Affairs etc).

This is argued to have occurred in part to ensure deniability because a diffuse apparatus is less visible. The chapter will begin by discussing the boundaries both imagined and organisational which traditionally characterise British and American propaganda and will progress to discuss aspects of domestic restructuring illustrated through five examples:

1. ‘Consistency’ over ‘Purity’ of defence propaganda
2. The rise of ‘effects-based’ approaches
3. Military ‘Covert Action’
4. Outreach to private contractors
5. Extending into academia

**Traversing “Boundaries” in Propaganda**

*Traditional Boundaries, Cognitive Separation and ‘Ethical Propaganda’*

A natural conflict exists between the principles of openness in a democracy and the invisibility and saturation required for propaganda effects (Ellul, 1973: 9, 238-242). Historically, therefore, both Britain and America have divided their propaganda capabilities according to audience (e.g. PSYOPS and Public Diplomacy), and argue for the practices being considered distinct. The audience divide has been reflected structurally in both countries' propaganda apparatus (e.g. PSYOPS and Public Affairs in wartime are the responsibility of separate military entities, and Department of State, like its UK equivalent, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, has responsibility for Public Diplomacy) (USIA Alumni Association, 2003). While this division conceptually is related to the use of black, white and grey propaganda (See Chapter 1), in practice increasingly there is not a rigid, distinct boundary. America defines ‘Public Diplomacy’ as “engaging, informing, and influencing key international audiences” which “is practiced in harmony with public affairs (outreach to Americans) and traditional diplomacy” (US Department of State, 2004). The phrase ‘practised in harmony’, is veiled recognition that these practices however must not contradict.

Structural divisions served to conceptually sequester domestic propaganda from its foreign equivalents. The reason often cited for this conceptual divide is transparency (domestically and between allies) and ensuring domestic propaganda remains ‘uncontaminated’ by that intended for the enemy. As former National Security Council Director Franklin Miller put it, “first and foremost the US Government cannot, does not and should not propagandize its own people” a rule he quickly qualified, saying “as an administration it is perfectly proper to put your message out” (3rd August 2009). This claim is essential in order to present propaganda as justifiable and necessary within a democracy and structural division has been essential to maintaining its plausibility: distinguishing domestic propaganda as merely ‘honest facts’, from external propaganda, whose legitimacy
hinges ultimately on feelings of insecurity and a fundamental suspicion of ‘foreigners’.

Echoing traditional narratives in propaganda, UK Assistant Director of Media Operations Policy, Col. Paul Brook, giving evidence for the Third Defence Select Committee Report in 2004 insisted that “we are quite clear to separate out media operations from, if you like, information and deception type of work” insisting on the importance of being “accurate and credible” (3rd March 2004: s498). Similarly, in interview British PSYOPS personnel suggested that many of the practices which are routinely carried out by US personnel would violate the principles under which British troops operate to ensure the maintenance of ‘ethical’ PSYOPS practices (15th Army PSYOPS Group, 2005). Prior to Bush’s Presidency, in 2000, a programme was exposed where the US PSYOPS Unit had placed ‘interns’ in CNN and NPR receiving much public criticism (NPR, 10th April 2000). Senior Media Relations Officer Angus Taverner stressed that the Ministry of Defence “only do what we call white psychological operations” (18th July 2004). Brook also suggested that it is an “American doctrine that tends to see the world as a global whole” (3rd March 2004: s498). But Air Cdre Graham Wright, the former Ministry of Defence Director of Targeting and Information Operations stated that, “those boundaries were created [...] by our American colleagues…” having a desire to bring informational capabilities together as tools with military function (1st June 2009). Indeed Article 10 of the US Code approves the American military’s use of PSYOPS, its “most aggressive” form of propaganda, only for targeting external adversaries; doctrine demands care is taken not to ‘manipulate’ or ‘slant’ and only ‘Public Affairs’ is approved to ‘inform’ domestic audiences (Law Revision Counsel, 2006; Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1996: 7; Department of Defense, 30 October 2003: 25-26).

The values articulated in such legislation are those of Britain, of America, and of many of those charged with driving each country’s policy in propaganda; who have a desire to do the ‘right thing’ and a genuinely held belief in what they are doing. However, this is not a full picture of the structures of propaganda, nor is it a full picture of humanity. People and systems both ‘compartmentalise’ in order to allow for effective operations. Each countries’ perceptions presented the other as being
less open and less well-regulated, with real or imagined differences condensing into stereotypes. Horizontal propaganda, and institutional and societal cultures confirm faith in the processes to which an individual contributes and dissenting views become systemically manageable (see Chapter 4).

The reality has often been that organisational boundaries are not so strict. Historically US public diplomacy was modelled on CIA covert propaganda under the lead of William J Casey and Walter Raymond Jr within Reagan’s National Security Council (Parry, 1996). The Office of Public Diplomacy staffed by CIA and Pentagon propagandists was used to target domestic American perceptions during Iran-Contra (Roff & Chapin, 2001)\(^{29}\). Likewise Dorril observed how

> “One of the things that’s come out of the Bloody Sunday Enquiry is the fact that the British […] establishment hates the idea of psychological operations. That term. Because it suggests that it involves domestic operations, and they’re very, very careful to be seen not to be involved in domestic […] psychological operations. Strangely enough the operators in Northern Ireland deny that they were ever involved in psychological operations which is fairly absurd” (20\(^{th}\) July 2010).

He stated, “it’s clear from the Irish example they fear being found-out if they’re involved in domestic stuff. So they’re very careful about it” (Dorril 20\(^{th}\) July 2010). Regarding the military distinction of propaganda forms Wright observed that “in truth, all of that is in my view semantics” conceding that “conceptually we all know what we’re talking about” (Wright, 1st June 2009). Indeed it becomes increasingly difficult to see any substance in these claims as the pressures of the contemporary global information environment prompt America and Britain to develop a more integrated and flexible approach. However these boundaries contribute to internal cultures and ease the cognitive separation that ensures the values of openness/legitimacy and necessity of propaganda do not conflict.

**The Global Challenge to Boundaries in Propaganda**

The increasing immediacy of communication and globalised media environment precludes a full monopoly over audiences. This means audiences cannot be treated

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\(^{29}\) It was headed by Otto Reich; he and Richard Armitage were among several of those implicated in the Iran-Contra scandal returned to government by Bush (Roff & Chapin, 2001).
An American preference of isolationism in foreign policy was deeply rooted in ideology from its earliest history. This only nations against interfering (Quigley, 2007: 385). Yet true to isolationist fear dominated American pub... alongside them in their fight against the Nazis, on which the US economy now depended. These first contracts also United States'" (Adler, 1957: 282). These economic ties with the British and French established an American position...defense article' or any 'defense information' to states 'whose defense the President deems vital...Then the Lend...in 1939, allowed America to trade arms with 'belligerent nations', if they traded in c...could be seen economically benefitting but staying politically non...relations committee dominated by isolationists, economic fears remained; Roosevelt established a compromise where the US...occupying the Philippines. After pursuit of various interests in Latin America, the 1823 Monroe Doctrine defined it an...German' if he had not acted as he did." (1939: 180). Interventionism was not new, in truth, the U.S. had been interventionist...of his friendships or enmities" (in De Toqueville, 1838: 21). And President Thomas Jefferson...it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities" (Adler, 1957: 204). As Britain and France declared war on Germany, Roosevelt reassured America he would try and avoid any role, but warned, "...Peaceably though we may desire detachment, we are forced to realize that every word that comes through the air, every ship that sails the sea, every battle that is fought, does affect the Americana future" (Fromkin, 1970).

The first challenge to its dominance US foreign policy thinking can be seen in the actions of President Woodrow Wilson, who, after winning re-election with the slogan "He kept us out of war" promptly, but reluctantly, intervened in World War I (Conlin, 2008: 612). This is attributed largely to the British. Peterson argues that Wilson, "like most other articulate Americans of that time, believed so many of the British propaganda arguments that he would have regarded himself ‘pro-German’ if he had not acted as he did." (1939: 180). Interventionism was not new, in truth, the U.S. had been interventionist...fears remained; Roosevelt established a compromise where the US could be seen economically benefitting but staying politically non-committal (Guinsburg, 1982: p.218). A fourth Neutrality Act in 1939, allowed America to trade arms with ‘belligerent nations’, if they traded in cash on home soil (Adler, 1957: 257). Then the Lend-Lease Act of 1941, allowed the President, "...to lend, lease, sell, or barter arms, ammunition, food, or any ‘defense article’ or any ‘defense information’ to states ‘whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United States’" (Adler, 1957: 282). These economic ties with the British and French established an American position alongside them in their fight against the Nazis, on which the US economy now depended. These first contracts also established a US military industrial complex that eventually became a powerful and independent political force. Any remaining debate over intervention decisively ended in 1941 with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour; inevitable fear dominated American public opinion and focused it on the defence of American pacific interests, especially the

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30 An American preference of isolationism in foreign policy was deeply rooted in ideology from its earliest history. This only received real challenge as a policy as a result of the Second World War. George Washington's farewell address laid the foundation for this tradition, “Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none, or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities" (De Toqueville, 1838: 21). And President Thomas Jefferson further entrenched these ideas in his inaugural address, stressing "peace, commerce, and honest friendship" internationally and "entangling alliances with none" (Fromkin, 1970).

The first challenge to its dominance US foreign policy thinking can be seen in the actions of President Woodrow Wilson, who, after winning re-election with the slogan "He kept us out of war" promptly, but reluctantly, intervened in World War I (Conlin, 2008: 612). This is attributed largely to the British. Peterson argues that Wilson, “like most other articulate Americans of that time, believed so many of the British propaganda arguments that he would have regarded himself ‘pro-German’ if he had not acted as he did.” (1939: 180). Interventionism was not new, in truth, the U.S. had been interventionist where it suited its interests to do so. It seized land in Texas, California, Hawaii, and the Spanish-American War saw it occupying the Philippines. After pursuit of various interests in Latin America, the 1823 Monroe Doctrine defined it an American sphere of influence and warned European nations against interfering (Quigley, 2007: 385). Yet true to isolationist roots US Congress rejected Wilson’s Treaty of Versailles commitment to enter into a 1920 ‘League of Nations’ (predecessor to UN) (Adler, 1957). It was seen as a threat to US sovereignty to have foreign policy decisions taken in alliance with other states. Despite this national policy, some diplomats observed the League, but public sentiment was strong (Adler, 1957: 204-209). America’s economic crash in led to a public climate of resistance to foreign political concerns and ensured political focus on the domestic needs of Americans.

As Europe neared WW2, while President Roosevelt was sympathetic to British concerns, congress fought US involvement, passing 1936/1937 Neutrality Acts. Gallup polls revealed over 60% of the public favoured isolationist policies (Lindburgh, 2005: 253). As Britain and France declared war on Germany, Roosevelt reassured America he would try and avoid any role, but warned, “Passionately though we may desire detachment, we are forced to realize that every word that comes through the air, every ship that sails the sea, every battle that is fought, does affect the Americana future” (3rd September 1939). Once France fell, Britain was the only remaining democracy between Germany and the US. America divided between isolationists, and interventionists who feared German invasion (or coexistence with a fascist European bloc). Despite a foreign relations committee dominated by isolationists, economic fears remained; Roosevelt established a compromise where the US could be seen economically benefitting but staying politically non-committal (Guinsburg, 1982: p.218). A fourth Neutrality Act in 1939, allowed America to trade arms with ‘belligerent nations’, if they traded in cash on home soil (Adler, 1957: 257). Then the Lend-Lease Act of 1941, allowed the President, “…to lend, lease, sell, or barter arms, ammunition, food, or any ‘defense article’ or any ‘defense information’ to states ‘whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United States’” (Adler, 1957: 282). These economic ties with the British and French established an American position alongside them in their fight against the Nazis, on which the US economy now depended. These first contracts also established a US military industrial complex that eventually became a powerful and independent political force. Any remaining debate over intervention decisively ended in 1941 with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour; inevitable fear dominated American public opinion and focused it on the defence of American pacific interests, especially the
scale of bureaucracy now needed to manage its affairs means one body could not perform the propaganda function\(^{31}\). Dedicated ‘media relations’ and informational capabilities were seen as a necessity for all government departments in both countries particularly from the mid-1990’s. As Britain’s former Ministry of Defence Director of Targeting and Information Operations Graham Wright pointed out, having a centralised propaganda entity also “makes it sound sort-of suspicious” (Wright, 1st June 2009). Most US Information Agency functions were integrated into the State Department\(^{32}\), and while the Defense Department remains the main player in US propaganda, all agencies began to take responsibility for international public information.

Effectively, cross-government integration allowed the propaganda apparatus to be normalised within the structures of government, while disarming the audience to its function. While UK global reach has diminished, its informational efforts have been similarly dispersed cross-government for reasons of coherence and cost. Cross-government integration is perhaps a logical consequence of the increasing scale of the propaganda operation; it provides a more responsive solution honed to departmental requirements. The evolution of propaganda into a cross-government activity seemed to be accepted as inevitable and necessary across my interviews with military and public servants in both countries. Moving away from a notion of defence propaganda as being an activity of just the military, the ‘message’ is being more overtly woven into the actions of other government bodies, with the focus increasingly on a wide, cross-government objective. Arguably, in Britain, this is to a degree not seen since World War Two.

The problems posed by a global media environment were of course magnified by 9/11, which was often blamed on propaganda failure. Taylor, for instance, an

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31 US Information Agency functions were absorbed into a new ‘Office of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs’ in the DoS in 1999.

32 Headed between 2001 and 2005 by Secretary of State Colin Powell (succeeded by Condoleeza Rice).
academic described by Simon Bergman of UK’s 15th PSYOPS Group as ‘the Ministry of Defence’s propaganda expert’ (Bergman, 22nd November 2005) links increases in hostility in the Middle East, and a worsening terrorist threat on a perceived down-grading of the US propaganda apparatus (Taylor, 2002: 439). By 2002, the State Department argued that $1Bn annually allocated to public diplomacy missions alone, was insufficient to deal with this problem (US Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, 2002: 9-10). Another Report stressed that that the US “lacks the capabilities in public diplomacy to meet the national security threat emanating from political instability, economic deprivation, and extremism, especially in the Arab and Muslim world” (Djerejian, 1st October 2003: 13). The nature of the new enemy without borders meant a new focus on fighting insurgency, and a new approach to warfare that prioritised flexible responses in an expanded theatre of war. The Ministry of Defence’s ‘Delivering Security...’ white paper identified a need for a strategy for dealing with the causes of problems like global terrorism through non-operational international activities intended to stabilise a region and prevent the conditions for terrorist activity from arising (MoD, 2003b, p8). This greater primacy given to peace support, counter-terrorism and stabilisation had implications for strategic information warfare. It of course meant corresponding changes to the defence infrastructure of both countries both in the narrow military sense and in how war is fought, which can be seen reflected in the examples below. Yet Nagl identified a historic resistance to this in American warfighting and the US military’s inability to learn as an institution (2002). Its ‘War on Terror’ is thus characterised by pragmatic attempts to overcome this systemic inertia.

Concerns shared by military and government sources in both countries translated into resources ploughed into further extending capabilities and reach as the War on Terror developed. With increasing distribution of the propaganda function cross-government and military, propaganda forms refuse to fall neatly into traditional categories, if they ever did. According to Wright, in America it is the National Security Council who “are [...] supposed to oversee that interagency piece to ensure that the right departments are tasked with the right things” for instance covert strategic propaganda operations would traditionally be CIA responsibilities, not Defense Department (1st June 2009). But as Scott observes of bureaucracy often
“the relationship between organisation and function varies over time” (2004: 332). The following examples move beyond the simple adoption of dedicated ‘media relations’ teams by agencies not formerly charged with propaganda duties. They are not claimed to represent one coherent strategic plan\textsuperscript{33}, however, in response to changes in the global environment, policy and formal organisation have effectively extended propaganda functions where they were once restricted. The examples seek to show how during the course of the ‘War on Terror’:

1. The propaganda functions of the agencies discussed broadened illustrating an increasing emptiness of traditional propaganda divisions.
2. Propaganda responsibilities were delegated further from centralised power thus enhancing deniability and flexibility of response.

The first example will present the traditional territory of ‘covert operations’ in propaganda - intelligence - and the development of this into a US Defense function.

**The Functional Integration of Propaganda 1: ‘Purity’ vs ‘Consistency’ of Message**

As discussed above, traditionally PSYOPS (intended for foreign audiences) was kept distinct from Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy to ensure the purity of domestic messages. Personnel involved strongly defended these divisions, particularly those involved in Public Affairs. Yet boundaries and functions were renegotiated within defence by both countries during this period as a way of increasing consistency between covert and overt PSYOPS, and Public Affairs messages. Boundaries were consistently massaged by US policy in a strategy that was increasingly accepted and formalised after 2005 into a ‘Strategic Communications’ approach to coordinate all activities cross-government. This section will show how, while traditional conceptual labels and divisions have been nominally retained, the implied conceptual differences, suggested substance, and indeed any actual functional differentiation of propaganda structures, were being eclipsed during this period.

One early example of Rumsfeld crossing boundaries between PSYOPS and Public Affairs was the Office of Strategic Influence established in late October 2001. Now popularly derided among my interview base, the Office of Strategic Influence was

\textsuperscript{33} Though strategic coordination is a clearly stated goal of both governments as the next chapter will discuss.
disbanded in February 2002 due to fatal public exposure of its use of covert black
and grey propaganda for targeting global media, which “damaged the reputation
and effectiveness of the office” (CRS Report for Congress, 19th July 2004).
According to the New York Times “a subsequent Pentagon review found no evidence
of plans to use disinformation” (Gerth, 11th December 2005). While the media
reported some activities and speculated about contractors involved, little detail
was really made public. It is now dismissed as an early short-lived ‘mistake’ but I
would argue it remains of interest. Director of the think-tank ‘The Potomac
Institute for Policy Studies’34, Dennis McBride, was contracted during the Office’s
short life. He described how “the original idea [was] that [stories] would be written
by locals but picked up and published by us or publishing houses and redistributed”
(McBride, 5th June 2009). But he said that the project Potomac were hired for
developed along an “interesting administrative trajectory” (McBride, 5th June
2009). After “tearing walls down at the Pentagon, ordering experts in” McBride
argues that Public Affairs began stirring (5th June 2009); ultimately Rumsfeld
“killed it” (Thorp, 24th August 2009).

By July it was publicly replaced with the more acceptable face of the Office of
Global Communications, centralised at the White House and responsible for
distributing “truthful and accurate messages” (The White House, 21st January 2003 &
Wilson, 14 September 2006: 15). As a visible entity this dealt with the short-term
news cycle rather than long-term goals of persuasion (Gough, 2003: 30). The LA
Times argued that the Office of Strategic Influence was absorbed deep in the
Pentagon into the Information Operation Task Force, while Conservative periodical
‘US News’ asserts that it actually was replaced quietly with a Tampa-based “70-
person unit called the Joint Psyop Support Element” (US News, 17th April 2005). In
November 2002 Rumsfeld stated in a press briefing that “You can have the name,
but I’m gonna keep doing every single thing that needs to be done and I have” (18th
November 2002). Interviews supported the notion that redistribution occurred.
When questioned about this Lawrence Wilkerson laughed,

“Rumsfeld never stopped anything when someone told him to... I was

34 The Institute was extremely important in instigating ideas in the information war; McBride recalled that “The first idea
that I remember came up [...] at a conference at Potomac and uh John Bosnell was the man [...] that we could get gazillions of
wind-up [...] radios and parachute them in” (5th June 2009).
told by the person he’d put in charge of it, who was an old friend of mine, I was told ‘we took the name off the door and the door was just blank!’ [...] He had a placard made up for his door. He said, ‘I was told by Rumsfeld to take it off, but to keep doing what I was doing’” (23rd June 2009).

McBride agreed work was relocated within the Defense Department, but crucially, he described how when “Karen Hughes [...] showed up again as number 2 under Secretary Rice” in the State Department, Potomac were hired back for the same project there (McBride, 5th June 2009). They did the preparatory work, but this time for State. Although this was the limit of their involvement in the ongoing project, McBride said it was “pursuing the same idea [...] and I think what happened is that the idea has merits [...] targeting the female networks is just ideal” (5th June 2009). McBride said “Potomac [Institute] was [approached], to exploit our contacts in Universities all over [the Muslim world]” and expertise in exploiting “female networks” (McBride, 5th June 2009). 35

It clearly was not McBride’s project planting stories in the press that the administration took exception to. Anecdotal evidence suggests that political ‘sponsorship’ of this kind by domestic political parties is common practise in Iraq (Anonymous, 2010a) and invariably it may be perceived as ‘working the system’ to US planners. The Potomac project’s “interesting administrative trajectory” (McBride, 5th June 2009) further demonstrates propaganda activities being redistributed cross-government, institutional functions becoming more flexible. Even in the State Department whose remit has previously been guarded and distanced from the appearance of lies.

35 Tawfik Hamid was not involved in the Office of Strategic Influence, but McBride spoke highly of him as a present contributor to academic life at Potomac. Hamid similarly advocates variously targeting the “woman issue” and claimed, “if you showed [Muslims] that prostitution increased in Iraq or in Afghanistan as a consequence of Bin Laden attack on September 11th. [...] you have to link it to Bin Laden. [...] you have to create the link not just say- because they can take it and link it to the war... [...] because of this man, now Muslim woman are into prostitution. So big for them, they can hate Bin Laden for this” (26th June 2009). He explained that at, “the ideological level there are ways through education, reformation, brainwashing tactics can be dealt through the media for example... to encourage critical thinking [...] hijab phenomenon can be weakened through [...] certain... [...] I just can’t say how exactly but it can be weakened [...] by certain techniques. Psychological techniques and using the media.” (26th June 2009).
This movement has served to displace the propaganda functions from view. But in his efforts to coordinate the information war, Rumsfeld had blundered *publicly* across the Defense Department’s traditional institutional stigma separating ‘psyops’ from ‘public affairs’. In early 2002 the Pentagon drafted an amendment to Directive 3600.1 which guides military Information Operations. It merged conceptual boundaries further by revising ‘PSYOPS targeting’, from “adversary” targets to “foreign” targets (Information Systems Security Association, 7 February 2003). Though it is not widely known, friendly and neutral countries are targeted by PSYOPS overtly through the Overt Peacetime Psychological Operations Program (discussed in Chapter 4). But Rumsfeld’s amendment allowed PSYOPS funds to be extended to “covert operations that would influence public opinion in friendly and neutral countries” and

“publish stories favourable to American policies, or hire outside contractors without obvious ties to the Pentagon to organise rallies in support of Administration policies” (CRS Report for Congress, 19th July 2004).

According to Rumsfeld’s biographer Bradley Graham, 2002 was the height of the “impasse” between information operations and public affairs, and Rumsfeld’s “Information Operations Roadmap” was “a first stab at this problem” (24th July 2009). Acknowledging in that globalised media mean PSYOPS/covertly-planted stories increasingly leach into US media (Department of Defense, 2003), the Pentagon it seems accepted that clear boundaries were no longer realistic. In Iraq, covert operations involved journalists being paid off by the Pentagon (Gerth and Shane, 1 December 2005). A 2004 Congressional Report also confirmed the ongoing process to provide stories “and possibly false ones” to foreign journalists and “influence public sentiment abroad” an issue that again raised media attention (CRS Report for Congress, 19th July 2004). The Pentagon distanced itself from the media criticism and according to one report this resulted in the State Department and CIA taking over more responsibility for strategic PSYOPS (CRS Report for Congress, 19th July 2004).
During this time resistance had continued to come from Public Affairs who objected to coordination with PSYOPS. Indeed Miller expressed frustration that, in the US, “...when we try to get somebody in the Pentagon to look at making sure that overt and covert work together, the Public Affairs people in Gen. Myers Office said, ‘oh no... those are lines we can’t cross’. The people who do whiteworld stuff cannot talk to the people who do blackworld stuff because then they’ll be corrupted. And so, it always proved impossible to get unity of effort.” (3rd August 2009).

According to Miller, the source of resistance, supported by the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Public Affairs team, was “the Chairman’s [Myers] Public Affairs people […] and I think it was a one-star” (3rd August 2009). Miller claimed Gen. Myres took a “very firm stand based on the advice of staff” (3rd August 2009). The ‘one-star’ in charge of Public Affairs under Gen. Myers at this time was Thorp who apparently “wrote every single statement he ever made to the press” and “prepared him for every interview he ever did”, thus acting as a powerful gatekeeper controlling the message and ensuring there was “never ever a psychological operations input in anything he said” (Thorp, 24th August 2009).

Thorp succeeded “[Adm. Terry] T. McCreary” in this position and as Chief of Information and both were “extremely sensitive, and vocal” in the impasse with information operations according to Graham (24th July 2009). From 2004-2006 America’s ‘Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Effects’ and coalition Iraq Spokesman Gen. Caldwell, though his attempts reportedly failed according to Hastings, fought to rewrite official Information Operations doctrine to lessen this boundary (23rd February 2011).

Similar tensions emerged in Britain, where politicians’ focus on the domestic media feeds political pressure to bend the ‘boundaries’ of information operations (IO) by encouraging them to dabble in media issues. Wright recalled how, politicians “look to the IO guys sometimes” with media problems, as the Director of Information Operations and Targeting, “I’m like ‘no, no... this is nothing to do with me’” (1st June 2009). Mackay and Tatham argue that the Ministry of Defence has been “stovepiped” internally by bureaucratically insular divisions separating information operations, “psychological operations, media operations, consent-winning
activities, profile and posture activities” which they saw as “key enablers of what is effectively one and the same thing” - influence (2009: 16). Tensions surrounding the conceptual division between PSYOPS and media operations can be seen emerging to challenge Brook’s view mentioned above, within that same Select Committee Report. The former Director of Targeting and Information Operations in Iraq, AVM Mike Heath, advocated the breakdown of such barriers as essential to effective campaigning. He insisted that, under directions of the Secretary of State, Information Operations must be “truthful at all times” with the “very specific exception of that bit where we would try and lie and dissuade or persuade military commanders” [my emphasis] (Heath, 3rd March 2004, s498). Heath was Senior British Military Adviser to US Central Command, Qatar, from 2003 until his death in 2007. His less rigid approach is now echoed by Thorp, who asserts that during his five months in Qatar as Special Assistant on Public Affairs for the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

“When it came to the British, I never saw one set of psychological operations talking points and another set of public affairs talking points. I always saw... It was always coordinated. It oughtta be.” (24th August 2009)

As the US has publicly blundered post-9/11 in its efforts at building a ‘dialogue’ between these propaganda functions some in Washington looked to the UK as an example of the successful breakdown of those traditional barriers. Where efforts to change the apparatus have been publicly discussed they have still generated hostility, even within the military’s propaganda ‘streams’ where some personnel resisted change to the established rules of separation (Thorp, 24th August 2009).

According to the American former Head of Media at Central Command Rear Adm. Frank Thorp, it wasn’t until 2005 that “the public affairs folks saw what the psychological operations folks were doing on the battlefield in Iraq” and formed the “perception that, hey - they're saying one thing, the public affairs people are saying another thing and the United States is looking pretty silly” (24th August 2009). He observed during his 5 months working alongside them that British PSYOPS and media operations “weren’t totally different cultures” their relationship “was more
coordinated and more together, and more homogenised…” in goals and messages (Thorp, 24th August 2009). This was something Thorp considered “very healthy” and borrowed from (24th August 2009). When I pointed out that British officials often stress the separation he responded that “…it’s separated, but it’s homogenised” (Thorp: 24th August 2009). As Wright observed, sheer scale made it easier for British Information Operations to be more “joined-up,” (Wright, 1st June 2009).

Things changed from 2005, Myres retired and Thorp himself sought this operational and cultural shift in the American military. He regarded the total separation of Public Affairs from PSYOPS as counterproductive and said he played a lead in reshaping American propaganda into a more sophisticated vision; the ‘Strategic Communication’ approach which was clearly rooted in this earlier experience of working alongside British troops - this will be developed in Chapter 4 (Thorp, 24th August 2009).

The Functional Integration of Propaganda 2: Effects-based Approaches

Effects-based planning emerged in America and then Britain, partly from the failures of a rigid formal military apparatus in marrying policy with action and the messages on the ground. It is a whole-of-military approach but in propaganda it moves to integrate information warfare into policy and military planning processes. It is claimed to address the perceived contradictions between US foreign policy action and coalition propaganda messages. Thorp described this problem,

“a very recent example, which we’re dealing with, is, the United States has said [and] your country […], that we want to eliminate civilian casualties on the battlefield. […] The problem though with that message is, that’s an internal message, for ourselves […] But when you’re in combat in war, there will be civilian casualties. And the enemy is able to take advantage of what we’re saying there, in order to use it against us.” (24th August 2009)

Thorp advocates an effects-based approach where the end goal shapes all policy so that “both actions and words communicated the same thing in order to create the desired effect” (24th August 2009). Effects-based operations placed an enhanced
emphasis on media and information operations in an effort to produce a more consistent holistic image, and, ultimately, a more effective outcome (MoD, 2003b). It entails an increased military focus on \textit{behavioural change}, a concept “increasingly being referred to as influence” (Tatham & Mackay, 2009: 5-6). In an effects-based approach “the idea of truth is more than just not telling a lie, [it is] ensuring it is consistent with the actions and the policies of the commander” so that the message is shaped into a carefully formed truth that is consistent with the sought outcome (Thorp, 24th August 2009). Thorp’s preferred effects-based approach would prioritise reducing support of the Taleban through a combined strategy, propaganda would “put the heat of these civilian casualties on the Taleban” and emphasise that “we are ridding the country of this disease of the Taleban” (Thorp, 24th August 2009). By this standard “whether an Afghan likes ISAF soldiers is irrelevant [...] to the influence campaign which simply seeks to change behaviour not opinion” (Rowland & Tatham, 2010: 2). This echoes Hamid’s postion (above) - not to emphasise arguments about US policy being ‘just’, rather to find ways to attribute poor social conditions (ie prostitution) to support of the Taleban.

Behavioural economic approaches have been used in planning, including Sunstein and Thaler’s approach ‘libertarian paternalism’ applied to Afghanistan’s ‘National Solidarity Programme’ in 2004. Their idea assumes people’s preferences are often ‘ill-formed’ and can be changed by shaping the way choices are presented (Sunstein & Thaler, 2003). This involved changing small conditions in the community that might affect choices - changing the “Architecture of Choice” - to “nudge” people toward “beneficial action” (Mackay & Tatham, 2009: 22). These “nudges” were chosen to be locally specific and not explicitly linked to a narrow military objective (Mackay & Tatham, 2009: 22).

Effects-based planning has translated into a paternalistic approach which withholds its purpose from those whose behaviour it seeks to shape. It can potentially engage a wide range of informational and other activities superficially unrelated to the desired outcome in order to create this effect. This can obscure the \textit{entirety} of the process from observers, as well as withholding true intentions from the propagandised population. Effects-based approaches necessitate a greater level of flexibility and enhanced knowledge of the localised audience.
Mackay & Tatham say that “not only are Whitehall messages a diluted and distant memory by the time they reach the tactical level but they might actually have no relevance at ground level anyway” (2009: 15). They argue that messages must be “tuned to local events, local perceptions” while also complimentary to the wider operational and strategic context (Mackay & Tatham, 2009: 15). In order to achieve really “dynamic influence” like this, Mackay’s Brigade prioritised “delegating to the lowest levels” (Mackay & Tatham, 2009: 15). Graham Wright argued that sometimes seniority breeds a reluctance to listen to advice, or know who to ask, but as a quick decision at the top is sometimes required many companies were flattening command chains to empower lower ranks (1st June 2009). He told how Gen. Cartwright when he was Commander established a website where personnel could ask direct questions, though it was limited by time constraints (Wright, 1st June 2009).

Mackay and Tatham argue that the Commander must “place [influence] at the core of his thinking” (2009: 14) and be proactive in developing these abilities. In their view the Ministry of Defence was not adequate “philosophically, culturally and organisationally” to assist them (2009: 12). This need for initiative is what resulted in Mackay seeking solutions in American behavioural economic approaches. Mackay and Tatham argue that the British Military must “empower” its people delegating influence even below the Commander “to as low as possible” to gain this flexibility (Mackay & Tatham, 2009: 17). Effects-based operations of this kind increase the role of individuals in propaganda planning, ensuring a more diffuse and integrated propaganda apparatus. This ‘flexible’ approach contributes to the breakdown of traditional divisions by extending access, and widening the range of propaganda ‘tools’ that might be employed and, crucially, leaves the underlying purpose undeclared.
The Functional Integration of Propaganda 3: Intelligence, Rumsfeld and ‘Covert Action’

More than HUMINT: Covert Action and Propaganda

The resources the CIA command in the propaganda war are at a smaller scale than Defense, not even “anywhere near the level of the State Department” (Thorp, 24th August 2009). In stark terms, “You’ve got a $50Bn intelligence budget, $40Bn is under Rumsfeld” (Wilkerson, 23rd June 2009). However, MI6 expert Dorril claimed that even by this standard, on “our side it’s more small-scale” (20th July 2010). Yet the relative import of intelligence agencies’ contribution to the propaganda war cannot be interpreted as equal to this resource differential, as illustrated by this exchange:

Miller: “CIA was a junior partner to DoD in what was going on out there, doesn’t mean they were not influential [...] they may have been guiding things if they had helped develop the strategic…”
Briant: “They were doing the strategic level?”
Miller: “Yes.” (Miller, 3rd August 2009)

CIA propaganda operates at the strategic level, that of perception management; “PSYOPS, [...] for the DoD is generally tactically in nature. Fallujah campaign or something. Where CIA would be trying to be involved in a more strategic, nationwide…” effort (Armitage, 21st July 2009). Wilkerson stated that “I know the CIA was running [...] what we call black programs, secret propaganda programs aimed at you know in some cases err… on the far extreme destabilising a particular political leader or even a government and on the lesser extreme maybe just making a couple of local leaders that they had suspicions were Taliban-affiliated or Al Qaeda-affiliated seem less than they were or maybe more than they were, among the populous around them, in order to try and discredit them or so forth” (Wilkerson, 23rd June 2009).

Likewise, Britain was always good at keeping secrets; MI6’s Information Operations (‘I/OPS’) remit goes beyond propaganda in its “attempt to influence events in another country or organisation in a direction favourable to Britain” (Dorril & Anonymous, 2004). Efforts in Britain are, likewise, broad and political and even CIA
propaganda activities are subject to comparatively open debate compared to those of MI6.

CIA activities in pursuit of these long-term strategic goals, are “much more tactical, in a smaller area” (Thorpe, 24th August 2009). Dorril likewise pointed out the tactical/operational nature of a lot of MI6’s work as “tied to operations;” it sometimes involves “using the press as a central part of what we call disruptive actions” (Dorril, 20th July 2010). Americans don’t use the term ‘disruptive action’ but for Britain, Scott observes “lack of clarity about the term [...] reflects the determination of the British government to avoid disclosure of the activities involved” (2004: 325). Such work being hidden from view in MI6 of course enables senior MoD Media Operations officials like Angus Taverner to claim that “we specifically do not use the media for deception” (18th July 2004). The Contractor Sean Fitzpatrick argued that “England has solved [strategic control of the information war] pretty well by having an MI5 and an MI6. Um and I don’t know how much the military gets involved in intellectual warfare... but I would think that MI6 does most of it.” (30th June 2009)

Fitzpatrick asserted MI6’s role was providing strategic direction; 15th PSYOPS Group’s role was “more about implementation... they’re probably working to some guidelines whereas we’re all over the place...” (30th June 2009).

As in Britain, Wright commented that, “because it’s a covert organisation. [The CIA] can do things in other countries under the banner of information operations which other [agencies] couldn’t do” (1st June 2009) and MI6 I/Ops doesn’t “require ministerial sanction” (Dorril & Anonymous, 2004). In terms of coordination, while MI5 is under the Home Office and MI6, responds to the FCO they both answer to Downing Street via the Joint Intelligence Committee (Nugent, 2008: 54). Alistair Campbell collaborated closely with Joint Intelligence Committee Chief John Scarlett who later became MI6 Chief, on the so-called ‘dodgy dossier’ (Powell, 2002). He “made it clear to Scarlett” that 10 Downing Street wanted the dossier “to be worded to make as strong a case as possible in relation to the threat posed by
Saddam Hussein’s WMD” (Hutton, 2004: Ch12). Lord Hutton stated that this could have “subconsciously influenced Mr Scarlett and the other members of the [Joint Intelligence Committee] to make the wording of the document somewhat stronger” (Lord Hutton, 2004: Ch12). Michael Pakenham the former Joint Intelligence Committee head set up a large committee to exert pressure on the media (Leppard, 21st May 2000) and according to Dorril the Joint Intelligence Committee gives a direct briefing to the Office of the Director General of the BBC on “what line to take in terms of what would and would not be in the national and operational interest to broadcast” (Dorril quoted in Nugent, 2008: 53).

The scope of each country’s intelligence agency activities is however, quite different. Due to domestic propaganda restrictions CIA propaganda was thought to have had “much greater” influence internationally where it was considered “relatively unrestrained” (Crewdson, 27th December 1977). Former Case Officer Ren Stelloh recalled the CIA being called in when “the President determines, ‘well we can’t invade the country but we still wanna... keep it boiling around the edges, so we oughta engage in non-attributable activities...’” (23rd June 2009). Dorril didn’t think MI6’s I/Ops facility were “involved in what would be called traditional psychological operations” like the CIA are (20th July 2010). It seems MI6 see their activities “in terms of political warfare” distinguishing that from the American PSYOPS approach; this “came across in the early 70’s when it was discovered [MI6] had so few psychological warfare operatives” (Dorril, 20th July 2010).

Instead, Dorril believed they had “about 25 officers employed in their information section, which is a lot” all dedicated to media relations (20th July 2010). Richard Keeble, citing numerous cases, contemporary and historical, of journalists “on the payroll” for MI5 or MI6, argues that the impact of British Intelligence in shaping media “from the limited evidence [...] looks to be enormous” (2nd July 2008). Gordon Thomas describes the practise in relation to former MI5 Director-General Eliza Manningham-Buller who would “dine a carefully chosen National Newspaper Editor or the BBC Security Correspondent” giving them “just enough detail to give a favourable spin” to an operation (2009: 75). Richard Norton-Taylor has revealed CIA
activities involving powerful influence with 500 Britons in business and media (Nugent, 2008). However, Dorril observed that

“it’s quite interesting over the last 10 years there hasn’t been many cases come out of British journalists […] as foreign correspondents working for MI6 and the CIA… I mean it must’ve happened but there aren’t many incidences where you can say ah that guy was… it’s easy when you get to some of the domestic stuff, Con Coughlin on the Telegraph or whatever” (Dorril 20th July 2010).

He argued that “it’s just become a bit more difficult to identify foreign correspondents in the field. One assumes that um a fair number who’ve gone to Afghanistan will be… you know, contacts…” (Dorril, 20th July 2010). Dorril argued that MI6 activities in Iraq and Afghanistan will be predominantly the setting up of newspapers, “radio stations, all that kind of stuff…” (20th July 2010). But also they “will be recruiting Iraqi, Afghanistan journalists… [and] photographers”; photographers were significant targets for MI6 recruitment in the 80’s (Dorril, 20th July 2010).

Richard Tomlinson has confirmed that “I/OPS looks after MI6’s media contacts” they “provide cover facilities” and also “spin MI6 propaganda” (Tomlinson, 2001: 73). It is reported

“before postings and missions abroad, officers receive a briefing from the Information Operations (I/OPs) unit, which provides them with a list of sympathetic journalists who can be trusted to give them help and information” (Dorril & Anonymous, 2004).

Former Weapons Inspector Scott Ritter claims to have been recruited in 1997 for an MI6 propaganda campaign called “Operation Mass Appeal” to plant stories in the media; it sought to “shake up public opinion” and exaggerate claims of Iraq’s WMD’s (Goodman, 30th December 2003). MI6 confirmed this campaign existed and Ritter alleges that similar campaigns continued up to the invasion of Iraq (Rufford, 28th December 2003). He recounts being told by MI6 black propaganda specialists

“We have some outlets in Foreign Newspapers - some editors and writers who work with us from time to time - where we can spread some material. We just need to be informed on what you are doing and when,
so we can time the press releases accordingly.” (Ritter, 2005: 281).

David Rose, a journalist who claims he was cut off for being critical, claims that editors in particular are courted to ensure “every national paper and broadcasting outlet has one - and usually, only one - reporter to whom each agency will speak, provided they observe the niceties”; (Rose, 27th September 2007). Rose argues that MI5 & MI6 ensure a channel for release that permits ‘plausible deniability’ were the content of the briefings to be contested (27th September 2007). Scott Ritter was asked to provide “information on Iraq that could be planted in newspapers in India, Poland and South Africa from where it would ‘feed back’ to Britain and America” (Rufford, 28th December 2003). It clearly provides a distant, and deniable, route to leach propaganda into Western media. Former CIA Station Chief Milton Bearden showed how similar recruits are fostered by the CIA (Rose, 27th September 2007). Gordon Thomas says “placing false stories in the media” is referred to by the agencies as “playback” (2009: 24).

The CIA component responsible for propaganda is the National Clandestine Service (NCS) which Former CIA Station Chief Stelloh stated was responsible for “selective engagement in activities which are designed to influence an outcome. That aint collection. That’s influence. And by definition, because the Agency does it, it’s covert influence.” (23rd June 2009). It has always been controversial and can “try to manipulate policies by influencing popular thinking about an issue or it can focus on a single key official or on a few key individuals” (Le Gallo, 2005: 38). The following section will illustrate how in America Rumsfeld sought to integrate similar covert action capabilities within the Department of Defense.

**Rumsfeld: Co-opting ‘Covert Action’**

America faced some resistance in the approaches it’s taken to this new information environment where messages bleed together freely and a growing trend saw breaking down bureaucratic and conceptual barriers as essential. Former CENTCOM Commander (2007-8) Adm. Fallon expressed frustration over how pragmatic military efforts to tackle the problem are met,

“...it’s this black and this white, it’s this idiotic media obsession with it’s
either right or wrong. It’s war, it’s peace. It’s fight, or love. [...] The world’s much more complex” (21st July 2009).

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld greatly expanded the capabilities of his Defense Department particularly into intelligence activities. *Military* practices evolved to give an enhanced role to ‘Covert Action’, a trend that enhanced animosity between the CIA and Defense. In US law Covert Action is activity meant to “influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly” (National Security Act, 1947). His reinterpretation of Title 10 of the US Code for Iraq set a new precedent in US defence; Rumsfeld significantly increased the authority of Special Operations Command, bringing them to the forefront of his ‘War on Terrorism’ (Kibbe, 2004).

Covert action by the military’s Special Forces, traditionally a CIA activity or one conducted jointly with the CIA, became Rumsfeld’s preferred option during Afghanistan (Kibbe, 2004). They are responsible for military covert actions, predominantly kinetic, yet also including Civil Affairs and PSYOPS “one of the most effective weapons in the arsenal of a commander” (Stiner, 1993: 3). ‘Military Information Support Teams’ were deployed to U.S. Embassies and according to Rumsfeld’s biographer special forces “contributed all together with these teams to the military becoming much more assertive and dominant [...] overshadowing our diplomatic efforts” (Graham, 24th July 2009). Special Operations Command epitomised Rumsfeld’s “leaner, more flexible” military (Kibbe, 2004). He rejected the US war-planning bible, the ‘tip-fiddle’ (TPFDL), and insisted that he, not the Joint Staff would control timing and flow of troops36. He joked that the Clinton-appointed Generals had the “slows”, wanting “too big” an operation, they were swiftly replaced in a move that divided the military (Hersh, 2004: 251-252). Rumsfeld brought in Gen. Franks, a commander who it’s claimed “will do what he’s told” to head Central Command (CENTCOM) and Gen. Myres as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs (Hersh, 2004: 253). Kibbe asserts that Rumsfeld’s staff changes further strengthened the presence of Special Operations officers in a military crafted to be loyal to Rumsfeld (Kibbe, 2004).

36 Rumsfeld denied this publicly at the Army Commander’s Conference in February 2003 (Hersh, 2004)
Advocates of ‘covert action’ like Former CIA National Intelligence Officer for Counterterrorism, Le Gallo would bring propaganda further in the activities of the private sector, civil society and other government agencies to increase deniability. Retired Senior CIA Officer Andre Le Gallo argues that strategic, long-range needs of the US, in battling the root causes of Radical Islam, can be met through Covert Action, particularly within the media and education, with an emphasis on the “offense” (2005: 38-40). He sees America’s challenge as

“reversing beliefs apparently accepted by mostly young, underemployed populations that their problems are of ‘foreign’, mostly American and capitalist (dating back to Cold War propaganda), origins and by an allegedly continuing Christian crusade against Islam” (Le Gallo, 2005: 39).

Le Gallo sees Covert Action as being the key, when such beliefs might render the American message “dead on arrival” (2005: 39). He cites the examples Al-Hurra TV and Radio Sawa which he argues lose credibility by being overtly US-sponsored and argues that “covertly sponsoring private media outlets to reflect the voice of moderate mainstream Islam should not be out of the question” (Le Gallo, 2005: 39).

Hersh quotes a former advisor who claimed that, as Iraq brought increased demands for troops, “so you invent a force that won’t be counted” (2004: 284). Thus Special Operations allowed Rumsfeld to distance the reality from the public image of low troop numbers. Special Operations Command, once a “supported command” and only able to contribute to other combatant command’s missions, now became a “supporting command” enabling it to plan and execute its own operations, reporting directly to Rumsfeld (Billingslea, 2004: 10). According to Hersh a Pentagon memo moved away from a ‘paralysing’ reliance on ‘actionable intelligence’ choosing instead to “be willing to accept the risks associated with a smaller footprint”- clandestine activities only loosely controlled, for purposes of agility (Hersh, 2004: 267). Centralised control limited the number of people reviewing missions; ‘Gray Fox’ and other elite forces were used as part of an assassinations policy that has continued under Obama (Hersh, 2004 & Dorril, 20th July 2010).
Expansion of the military’s role in covert operations is opposed by both CIA and Special Operations Operatives (Kibbe, 2004). One told Hersh in 2002 that “the perception of a global vigilante force knocking off the enemies of the United States cannot be controlled by any strategic deception plan” (2004: 261). But Rumsfeld almost doubled the budget of Special Operations Command in two years, among other things, to enable the “establishment of a unit to coordinate trans-regional PSYOP activities” and realise plans for new regional PSYOPS and Civil Affairs units during 2004-2005 (Lobe, 2004 & Billingslea, 2004: 10-11). It funded a “new authority to pay foreign agents” (Gellman, 2005).

While the Pentagon wields more intelligence resources than the CIA, the CIA is seen by some as less bureaucratic, more flexible and more accountable than the military (Kibbe, 2004). As Kibbe points out one of the main problems is the different ways the CIA and military plan covert missions. According to her “because its primary mission is combat, [DoD] has full authority to make its own operational decisions with no outside input or oversight” (2004). Steven Aftergood, Director for the Federation of American Scientists Project on Government Secrecy argues that ultimately “there may be a temptation to opt for a purely military action to take advantage of the loophole in congressional notification requirements” (Aftergood and quoted in Alexandrovna, 4th June 2007). There are some indications that while the CIA operated its ‘pro-democracy’ propaganda campaign in Iran, the Pentagon took care of more aggressive black operations there in a campaign that began at the beginning of the Iraq War and therefore is deemed part of a military campaign (Alexandrovna, 4th June 2007). The Pentagon can conduct covert operations abroad without congressional oversight or recourse, during wartime or if military action is “anticipated” (Kibbe, 2004). This allows great scope for interpretation particularly in an open-ended ‘War on Terror’; the Pentagon has resisted all attempts to tighten the law (Kibbe, 2004). Senate Joint Resolution 23 authorised the use of “all necessary and appropriate force […] in order to prevent any further acts of international terrorism against the United States” (2001). Some legal experts have argued that it grants “the president virtually unlimited authority as long as he
‘determines’ that a particular target has some connection to Al Qaeda” (Kibbe, 2004).

The Defense Department likewise sought to reduce the proof required to justify covert operations. As the former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations & Low Intensity Conflict put it, to “recalibrate our expectations for what was actionable intelligence […] lower that threshold” and increase “tolerance for pain in the event we miscalculate or things go wrong…” (Billingslea, 2003 quoted in Kibbe 2004). Kibbe points to the potential for corruption and abuse when combined with a “doctrine of aggressive pre-emption” (2004).

Dorril has argued that Obama has “let the military off the leash” in covert operations, where normally

“the CIA carry out this kind of operations, the military do clandestine, militarised things” but now “Obama signed this order that had allowed the military to expand, at a massive rate, its covert activities. And so a lot of stuff is going on in the military rather than CIA” (20th July 2010).

Rumsfeld started this process, “but not to the extent that it’s now happening” (Dorril, 20th July 2010). With this Obama established a US Cyber Command in 2009 to “conduct full-spectrum military cyberspace operations in order to enable actions in all domains, ensure US/Allied freedom of action in cyberspace and deny the same to our adversaries” (US Strategic Command, 2010). Obama’s defence plans are an attempt to stay ‘in the game’ using the military for crossing borders like ‘terrorists’ and other non-state actors. Thiessen from the conservative think tank the ‘American Enterprise Institute’ has suggested that this could be used to control Wikileaks, until now protected by Icelandic Laws (3rd August 2010). If this is possible, through the globalised potential of their structural censorship they threaten to weaken other states sovereignty (allies and enemies alike) at a level crucial to the maintenance of trust and credibility. Although, of course, they may not find out.

Covert actions hinge on deniability, hence they are hidden from the public even after action has occurred. This gives the military an ability to act even where
actions may be publicly unacceptable and limits the scope for debate. Enhancing the role for ‘Special Forces’ covert action has effectively established a structural silence over military efforts and increased their scope in all areas including propaganda in which it erodes an important barrier. This example shows the migration of once restricted propaganda functions into other government bodies. Beyond covert action, the planting of stories to ‘feed back’ into domestic press, taking advantage of plausible deniability and the payment of ‘agents’ in the press are all tactics used by intelligence agency propaganda, increasingly used by other US agencies during the War on Terror. Primarily this has been the Pentagon, but has involved even the State Department, as in the case of the McBride project described above. It is crucial to note the increasing role of contractors also in this trend. The next two sections will show how with access to a full range of capabilities, for these profit-driven innovators boundaries can be seen as more ‘flexible’. Contractors and academics extend capabilities to government entities some of which traditionally lacked real infrastructure in propaganda. They form an extension of the apparatus; further from accountable parties and public awareness.

**The Functional Integration of Propaganda 4: Involving Private Contractors**

Wilkerson argues that the problem of credibility of conflicting messages delivered in the modern media environment has increased reliance on “the secret message” (23rd June 2009). Credibility still often requires the relative invisibility of campaigns within the global media environment. Just as cross-government integration reduces the visibility of the propaganda apparatus, so too does subcontracting to private sector companies. In both cases ‘distancing’ methods seem to help ensure the credibility of the message, making its source less ‘visible’ or “suspicious” (Wright, 1st June 2009). This section will show how the explosion of outside contracting of propaganda allowed both:

1) For propaganda to be distanced from accountable parties.

2) For more flexibility of function enabling boundaries (e.g. ‘PSYOPS’ and ‘public affairs’) to be easily eroded as contracts are placed cross-government with contractors who offer the full gamut of capabilities.
While this is not a new phenomenon, it became increasingly central to the administration of the War on Terror, and the propaganda war. According to Farsetta, “Over the first Bush term (calendar years 2001 through 2004), PR spending averaged $62.5 million annually” and 2003 to 2005 “an average of $78.8 million went to private PR firms per year - from just seven federal departments” (2006). This slimming down of bureaucracy also reflects a general dislike of ‘big government’ in the US, a trend that has been more cautiously adopted in the UK drive to privatisation throughout the 1990’s and through Private Public Partnerships and Private Finance Initiatives.

Department of State pulled in private sector expertise in October 2001 with the appointment of Charlotte Beers, an advertising executive, as Under-Secretary for Public Diplomacy & Public Affairs. She spearheaded a ‘branding’ campaign known as ‘Shared Values’ in the Muslim world. PhaseOne, who were contracted to do impact analysis, found the content highly inappropriate, its President Ren Stelloh stated that,

“Part of the problem was those were public service announcements done by committee, lawyers had a big role in it, and I think [...] they kinda already knew that they had blown it. When you can’t even broadcast that in AMAN…! [Asian Muslim Action Network] The friendly king, he says no, no, no… you’ve gone an’ crossed the line! That’s a wake-up call. They had $15M allocated to that effort. They spent 10, they were gonna go to a second stage, but, I believe in part due to our analysis it was [...] stopped” (23rd June 2009).

On resigning in 2003 Beers admitted that “the gap between who we are and how we wish to be seen, and how we are in fact seen, is frighteningly wide” (Beers, 2003). But, undeterred, a 2003 Government Accountability report recommended that the “Secretary of State develops a strategy that considers private sector public relations techniques in integrating its public diplomacy efforts and directing them toward common and measurable objectives” (Government Accountability Office, September 2003).

State, of course, agreed - in line with a growing trend in US propaganda strategy which is also becoming significant within British policy. Britain’s Foreign Office is
also making efforts to ensure private sector “coordination” (Carter, Lord. 2005: 30-31).

From a military point of view UK’s Graham Wright saw contracting as “a good thing. [...] My view is as DTIO in London there wasn’t enough money available in Defence for me to do all of the things I would like to contract” (Wright, 1st June 2009). Likewise America’s Frank Thorp, thought that “there’s clearly a role for contract support” in “military psychological operations function and the public affairs function” (24th August 2009). He said, “as the Chief of Public Affairs, that’s where I took the Navy […] we had not used contract support in the past. But I changed it…” (24th August 2009). Contracting this way allows the military to scale down the investment in infrastructure and cutting edge resources required to run a competitive modern propaganda war. According to Wright, part of the efforts to decentralise, are intended to speed up process, and bring in experts through outside contracting (Wright, 1st June 2009).

Wright argued that contractors like John Rendon provided “continuity and experience”, lacking in the British military where people are reposted every 2½ years (Wright, 1st June 2009). It is a career path in the US, but there is still a limit to career progression; personnel move on. Wright saw it as logical since “98% of the occupation of the information space is civilian anyway” and there was “this massive band of expertise out there that actually we should capitalise on rather than trying to grow it ourselves” (Wright, 1st June 2009). This appraisal was echoed by American interviewees including Former CENTCOM Commander, Adm. Fallon who argued that “Rumsfeld actually got this! It’s money. Rumsfeld said [...] I wanna pay big money to have an army that’s trained for military, I want em to do military things… [not] these other things” (21st July 2009).

But it wasn’t just Rumsfeld who knew the power of money, Tenet had agreed with Bush that CIA funds would be distributed to “establish relationships and demonstrate seriousness”; demonstrating the general view that support could and would be bought (Woodward, 2004: 117). Since the 1980’s the CIA has begun outsourcing much of its work in the area of propaganda to private contractors.
PhaseOne, a commercial company once tasked with marketing dog food, were drawn into government contracting after 9-11. Contracted to both Defense Department and CIA, PhaseOne forecast the psychological persuasiveness of communications and make subsequent recommendations for content. Former CIA Station Chief Ren Stelloh recounted how after 9/11,

“within a few weeks uh... our then [Deputy Director of Operations] Jim Pavitt sent a back-channel to the domestic chiefs asking that we redouble and if we hadn’t started, start right now, scrubbing the commercial world, the private sector world for tools that we could bring to bear on the war on terrorism” (23rd June 2009).

Stelloh recalled asking a friend for advice, Jeff Baxter, a key government advisor to “Members of Congress on Ballistic Missile Defense” perhaps better known as a former member of Steeley Dan (Stelloh, 23rd June 2009). He is son to the late Loy Baxter once Snr Vice-President to J Walter Thompson and the first President of PhaseOne (Stelloh, 23rd June 2009). Stelloh contacted them in his CIA capacity and saw a good fit for them “in the phase that involved the hearts and minds, attitudes and behaviours” (Stelloh, 23rd June 2009).

Another major contractor, The Rendon Group, quickly secured a $100,000 a month contract with the CIA and enjoy an extraordinary level of security clearance (Stephens, 2003 & Bamford, 17th November 2005). They helped set up the Coalition Information Centres (Gough, 2003: 29), advise the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and work with the Pentagon Offices of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict who approve PSYOP plans there (Hedges, 13th November 2005 & Pugmire: 2002: 13). John Rendon describes their activities as “helping foreign governments to correct things that are bad or wrong in the news cycle, and amplify those things that are not bad” (Hedges, 13th November 2005).

Rendon were apparently contracted to the Office of Strategic Influence before it was scrapped. The latter’s Director Pete Worden stated in 2005 that another contractor, Science Applications International Corp, did most of Rendon’s work (Hedges, 13th November 2005). However, Rendon since denied involvement in the controversial planting of stories in foreign media. Rendon remains a consistent
force in this area, he held five defence contracts with the Pentagon in 2005 (Hedges, 13th November 2005). These included a $6.4M contract to track media coverage in Iraq, contracts advising Afghan Prime Minister Hamid Karzai; and the Afghan Interior Ministry counternarcotics campaign (Hedges, 13th November 2005). This last campaign was previously British-operated (Reeve, 20th April 2006).

Graham Wright confirmed that Rendon used to “pop in and see me every month or so” when in the UK but refused to discuss him specifically (Wright, 1st June 2009). My own attempts to secure an interview were futile, but Rendon has claimed contract experience in 91 countries; in nearly every war since the US operation in Panama (Bamford, 17th November 2005). Rendon claims an experiential edge - “nobody else has done this” (Hedges, 13th November 2005 & The New Yorker, 4th March 2002). And Wright emphasised the importance to the military of identifying the “niche capabilities that there is no point you paying for full-time, when a company can do it better” (Wright, 1st June 2009).

Some would argue, however, that contractors ‘niche capabilities’ are securing profit, and whether this produces propaganda campaigns that are by anyone’s evaluation ‘better’ is highly debatable. (15th February 2011). McBride argued that the “use of contractors makes a lot of sense because you can also incentivise…” (McBride, 5th June 2009). This leaves a financial imperative driving the campaign and favours short-term, measurable effects. What contractors seem to do is enable spillover of PSYOPS and Public Affairs to occur less visibly. Some examples have been made public, however.

In June 2004, Special Operations Command in Tampa (where US NEWS asserts that the Office of Strategic Influence’s former activities were transplanted) awarded another contractor; the Lincoln Group, and two other companies, a huge contract for PSYOPS, including prepared newsreels for media use (Gerth and Shane, 1st December 2005). Again media backlash followed ‘Office of Strategic Influence’-style revelations in 2005, that they paid Iraqi Newspapers to publish stories written by US Military Officials, designed to look Iraqi-originated and authentic (Londoño, 7th June 2009). For example, once such article read “Western press and frequently those self-styled ‘objective’ observers of Iraq are often critics of how we, the
people of Iraq are proceeding down the path in determining what is best for our nation” and went on to quote the Prophet Mohammad and plead non-violence (Gerth and Shane, 1st December 2005). While some were marked as advertising, the original source was not revealed to be American (Gerth and Shane, 1st December 2005). Pentagon Officials argued that these campaigns are necessary to tackle insurgent groups, who they say are making the media their key battleground (Londoño, 7th June 2009). But unlike government agencies private contractors are not accountable directly to Congress (Bamford, 17th November 2005). Of course, Gen. Pace and other Pentagon officials retrospectively expressed concern that this could have happened.

At interview former CENTCOM Commander Gen. Zinni thought that the Pentagon understand “how to do monitoring” however; he considered them “excellent contractors” through extensive experience (2nd June 2009). Adm. Fallon cited one example where he considered contracting to have worked, from during his tenure as Commander (2007-8). He closely positioned contractors alongside his uniformed personnel; and

“was able to have very effective use of uniformed people doing things that had little to do with guns and …I mean, they were… had an image […] they looked like very competent security personnel but the things they were doing […] had little to do with guns… but all of it was designed to engender support from the people” (21st July 2009).

Zinni observed that the “State Department’s been overwhelmed with the number of contracts they have” (2nd June 2009). He concluded that most problems arose from contracts being badly drawn up, and that State “write poor contracts […] don’t manage them well” and even “get victimised by some contractors” he argued (Zinni, 2nd June 2009). Wilkerson on the other hand concluded that Rumsfeld was overextending and taking on too much “…and essentially doing it through outsourcing… Rendon, Lincoln… different people like that. And no real oversight of what they were doing. Just a release of them to do it.” (Wilkerson, 23rd June 2009). It was Lincoln which Thorp argued was a catalyst for seeking a new strategy, one of ‘Strategic Communication’, they realised that “you can't have one set of rules in the military for public affairs folks and another set of rules for everybody
else” (24th August 2009). Graham echoed this, saying Rumsfeld began calling for a “meeting of the minds of the different communities in the Department” (24th July 2009).

All of this is of course, adding to the multitude of ‘voices’ at work in the propaganda war. As mentioned above, the internet complicates targeting; it seems to have produced a ‘grey area’ which potentially allows online propaganda much liberty. Contractor Ren Stelloh mused on his own experiences, describing how even among foreign audiences “the lingua franca of the internet is English!” (Stelloh, 23rd June 2009). Stelloh continues, so

“then the lawyers will [...] say obviously you’re targeting English speakers... and we say ‘well, yeh... but they’re not Americans!’ ...well how can you ensure that? ...so you go through things ...to try to make that case” (23rd June 2009).

This clearly leaves a wide berth for subjectivity and interpretation and Stelloh’s account demonstrates the nonchalant response of Congress to occurrences of ‘spillover’:

“There is a requirement however that, if anything spilled... there is always a foreign focus, [...] whatever activities undertaken should never be designed to influence an internal audience, [...] and if there is inadvertent spill-over, say the New York Times picks it up and replays it and you, ‘Oh Shit.’ We go tell congress and say... And, 9 times out of 10, they say... ‘ok!’” (23rd June 2009).

In fact, Wilkerson was critical of the close relationship such companies foster with Congress, he said contractors “come back in, create their congressional lobby group you know, contribute a little money... and suddenly you’ve got Mitch McCall on your side... or whomever...” (Wilkerson, 23rd June 2009). It is not unusual to find a close relationship with defence contractors; former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage informed me he was

“on the board of a company called MANTECH International. We do a lot of work for Defense Department, for NSA, for CIA, etc... so, Justice... FBI... we’re involved in a lot of it. So we’re contractors. We’re in 47
countries including Iraq.” (21st July 2009).

The wide permissible remit for influence and extent of this closeness can be seen in the account of Ren Stelloh, who while still CIA Station Chief became increasingly involved with the work of PhaseOne, a company who keep a very low-profile. Their CEO Jody Moxham:

“asked me a question in February 2002 saying well what comes next for you? [...] Well she said you got it quicker than anybody else we’ve talked to. I can see you playing a role in the growth of the company - so I said that’s really interesting let me take that onboard... and we started this kabooky dance and all of a sudden I said oh shit, oh dear, I need to call the office of general council - the ethics guys - have I crossed the line from ethics perspective? ...and they said you’re in a position to influence the [...] potential contract? I said ‘no, I aint gonna write a contract I’m just a field rep, the senior guy in the field’ and they say well, as long as you relegate your behavior, sort of, in that channel, facilitate communication between the headquarters elements and this company, you’re ok.” (23rd June 2009).

These ‘limits’ of course allow a wide remit for private contractors to develop privileged interests with particular high-placed government employees. For Stelloh this was profitable, “Long story short, June 3rd 2003 [...] I retired and June 4th I started working for PhaseOne.” (23rd June 2009). He is now their Chief Operating Officer and President.

The Rendon Group have also built their powerful connections with US Government through drawing staff from its ranks. Linda Flohr for example left the CIA after working on Iraqi Clandestine Operations supporting the Iraqi National Congress to join the Rendon Group 1994. She returned to government as Director of Security for the Office of Homeland Security and Director of Counter-Terrorism for the NSC in 2002 (The New Yorker, 4th March 2002). Pentagon military personnel may be particularly sought-after targets within the bureaucracy. Kambrod, in his ‘how to’ guide to defense contracting suggests lobbying “young Majors and Lieutenant Colonels” who he sees as driven by promotion and receptive to technology (Kambrod, 2007: 18). Kambrod argues in contrast that Pentagon civilians may not
have the “fire in their belly” for developing combat systems (2007: 18). He states that civilians with long tenure are the “hardest people with whom to do business” arguing that greater “job security” means efficiency is not their overriding priority (Kambrod, 2007: 18).

As Gen. Zinni put it “I think that the problem with contractors is the whole business of contracting exploded too fast. So nobody understood it” (2nd June 2009). But Armitage argues that “no one’s got a handle on how much [contractors] do” and warned that any change would need to be “carefully done” (21st July 2009). He argued that in America’s military and “it’s true in the British armed forces as well, that [...] we’re less expeditionary on our own, than we used to be. We, depend more on contractors” (Armitage, 21st July 2009). He went on to say that “…there’s no question […] unless we dramatically increase the size of our own forces, we’re gonna have to depend” on them (21st July 2009). Armitage emphasised “hidden costs” explaining that if you take an

“actuarial approach to a soldier coming in the army these days during a war, you find the cost of adding a soldier is astronomical compared to adding a contractor” (21st July 2009).

Armitage argued this is because there are “health benefits, there are veterans if they get hurt, benefits…” and contractors might

“work for KBR… or Haliburton or whatever… for a set period of time… but the health benefits, the 41K’s… you know, all these kinda ESOP, Employee stock option plans are not part of their contract. So in the longer run it’s cheaper for everybody!” (21st July 2009).

Apart from the costs to the contractor’s employees perhaps. Miles Pennett, a Media contractor himself, was critical of how much corruption he encountered in Iraq,

“A lot of people subcontracted beyond belief, say for example, when you pay a security guard, you put in the initial quote $1000 a day… then someone would go ‘cool’, they then employ someone for $600 a day, they’d employ someone for $400 a day and at the end of the day you have… it happened out there… you’d get South Africans’d come out to work on a contract and they’re on a $150 a day as a security guard, but you know three chains up they’re getting a grand…” (15th February
2011).
Of course, Armitage said, “a contract to go to war is always gonna want a lot of money. My brother’s there now, and he gets paid very well.” (21st July 2009). Despite the problems some contractors have posed Armitage did not see a need to pull back. He argues that,

“Where it got out of control... I think were some of these like CACI and others, who got involved in interrogations [...] previously I was on the board of CACI, years ago, and I couldn’t understand what they were doing so far afield from their field of expertise!” (21st July 2009).

He argued for contractors sticking to their “core competencies” (Armitage, 21st July 2009). Yet, of course often the commercial drive is to do just the opposite; to find new ways to expand.

One key issue here is the role that these contractors play and which functions should only be performed by military personnel or bureaucrats. Opinions on this varied. Former CENTCOM commander Adm. Fallon argued that “contractors can help in anything... there’s isn’t any specific, they do this and I do that! Whoever can help, I don’t care, I’m not biased. I’ll take anybody that has a brain who can help me.” (21st July 2009). Wright argues that the responsibility of the military should be “military planning... what are the objectives we are trying to achieve, and then you outsource, you go to where the pools of expertise are to do things” (Wright, 1st June 2009). Pools that might include “media analysis, cultural understanding, [...] polling, all sorts of stuff in that sort of open domain” (Wright, 1st June 2009).

Thorp on the other hand, referring to Lincoln Group, argues for perhaps stricter limits, for him

“there is a role for them to create product not content. Public Service Announcements things like that, leaflets and websites. [...] But when it comes to content that is an area that is strictly the purview of [uniformed personnel] or government civilians...” (24th August 2009).

Of course, this is precisely where PhaseOne’s ‘niche capabilities’ lie. Stelloh summarises it thus,
“demographically, and more importantly psychographically we can
determine based on what we know from all of the social sciences and the
hard science what that group’s hopes, fears, aspirations, wants, desires
so that when you focus a particular communication to them - will it
resonate? Or not? And if not, what do you do to fix it?” [my emphasis]
(23rd June 2009).

Multiple bilingual researchers perform a complex form of discourse analysis applied
across all forms of communication to work out “how do you influence, how do you
create value…” factoring in “the demographics and the psychographics of your
target audience” (Stelloh, 23rd June 2009). They claim to be able to do this even if
it is not possible to visit the target population. Stelloh explains,

“Let’s say that we have a client that isn’t able to talk to the inhabitants
of Waziristan… the Federally Administered Tribal Area! Let’s say the
tribe are remote and they’re not a friendly lot to begin with! What you
can do is use surrogates that allow you to establish a reliable
psychological profile. We will buy whatever research is available, we will
talk to cultural experts […] and we’ll get down into a granularity that’s
painfully detailed. […] So you look at the education and how are they
taught to think. You look at the system of justice and morality…” (23rd
June 2009).

Ultimately they were asking “what makes a character believable? What are the
behaviours that you see that allow you to suspend disbelief?” (Stelloh, 23rd June
2009). While Stelloh initially implied that this was a ‘theoretical example’, saying
“let’s say…” it quickly became clear that PhaseOne had worked there, Stelloh
went on to say, “The Waziristan example is a really interesting model. Some of our
research indicated the issue of honor and how honor is perceived.” (23rd June
2009).

Yet, impressive as their ‘niche capabilities’ sound, despite having been working
abroad commercially with AT&T and other companies since 1987, PhaseOne were
cutting their teeth with this project. Stelloh explains,

“when the government gave us an assignment and we said ‘ok, where’s
your market research, where’s your demographic, psychographic data
that allows us to calibrate tools that has a fidelity, validity?’ they said, ‘we don’t have it - you go figure it out’ ...So that’s when we did the reverse engineering of the analytical process. The education, the morality, values, justice system, the... what makes the character...” (23rd June 2009).

They are of course doing this to create messages, not simply manufacturing products. As Stelloh recounts,
“once you have that understanding it allows you to develop [...] an informed strategy and once you have [that], that’s the backbone of the foundation for the development of courses of action, which can be communications and activities, designed to influence that group [...] to move them toward a behavior or an attitude [...] You disseminate your messaging and then the important piece is you track and monitor. [...] And then it’s this continuous loop.” (23rd June 2009).

That PhaseOne should be allowed to tread new ground the way they were, not only in creating messages but in developing their technique for targeting groups remotely, indicates how desperate the CIA and Defense had become. Thorp argues that it is problematic when,
“...somebody develops themes and messages [...] in isolation of the policymakers, isolation of the people who are planning the military mission... [...] they're not true, even if they intend to be true, they are developed in isolation of the policy or the plan and they've become what an individual thinks people want to hear as opposed to what the truth is. And that's a problem.” (24th August 2009).

Thorp was Chief of Public Affairs and also coordinated PSYOPS; he said that when he brought contracting to the Navy he ensured it was “for product, not content” (24th August 2009). Similarly, Adm. Fallon, stated that he cautioned staff that, “...you better be doing your own thinking. You can hire people to get information for you and to help you, but [...] you have the responsibility for making decisions, you better make ‘em.” (21st July 2009).

But Fallon’s experience told him, “that, unfortunately, isn’t the way it works, particularly round Washington, there’s far too much stuff that’s handed off to
somebody else” (Fallon, 21st July 2009). He later acknowledged, “There are trade-offs, frankly.” (21st July 2009). A friend of Ren Stelloh, fellow contractor Sean Fitzpatrick, argued that contractors need to be creating the messages;

“if they could tell them what to do then they wouldn’t have to hire ‘em
[...] people in the military and the intelligence community don’t really have that ability” (30th June 2009).

But there certainly does not seem to be any reduction of interest in PhaseOne’s ‘niche capabilities’. They use profiling and forecasting techniques initially developed by MI6 and CIA during World War 2 then perfected in commercial and academic applications afterwards. 37 As mentioned above, they are now contracted to the Defense Department and this can be seen as a further mechanism by which Defense has obtained access to intelligence-originated capabilities.

In each quarter of 2008 the Bush Administration held four Round Tables, quizzing “leading personalities in philanthropy, academics, IT [unclear] from the silicon valley, and CEO’s” about what should be done in the war of ideas (Stelloh, 23rd June 2009). This “well-developed, and incredibly narrow in focus” series of Round Tables bridged the two administrations, culminating in a fifth Round Table of global marketers (Stelloh, 23rd June 2009). PhaseOne’s CEO Jody Moxham put the group together with “global marketing organizers from some of the biggest corporations around” (Stelloh, 23rd June 2009). Stelloh recounted how,

“it was very interesting talking to some of the leading figures... briefing some of the leading personalities from ODNI [Office of the Director of National Intelligence], DoD, State Department... on how the private sector does it” (23rd June 2009).

He told me that “the outgrowth of that activity was an understanding that there is something of value in the commercial world that the government can learn from” (Stelloh, 23rd June 2009). Fellow contractor Sean Fitzpatrick said “I’ve taken

37 Stelloh spoke of these origins in detail, and identified two key figures significant to PhaseOne’s history as “Peter Zeoellner and Dr John Dollard” (23rd June 2009). During 1941, in Lincolnshire, they worked for the “Political Warfare Executive” which was headed by Sefton Delmer (Stelloh, 23rd June 2009). Stelloh argued that “the group had 3 objectives: develop demoralising propaganda targeting Nazi troops; measuring the effectiveness of the propaganda” and “using some interesting tools, forecasting the course of the war” (23rd June 2009). Stelloh claimed that the original work and content analysis, “was incredibly effective, considered a top secret capability on par with the enigma machine and so people just didn’t talk about it. They were accurate, anecdotally what I’ve heard is, they forecast within a 36 hour window when Germany would march into Poland” (23rd June 2009).
groups of majors and lieutenant colonels to study at advertising agencies and banks and investment firms” (30th June 2009). The State Department’s ‘Office of Private Sector Outreach for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs’ opened in 2007, tasked to “develop and coordinate innovative ways for the State Department to engage the private sector in our public diplomacy initiatives” (2007). It began by conducting the first ever ‘US Marketing College’ jointly with these corporations. Hosted by the Foreign Service Institute, it “equipped officials from across the interagency with relevant marketing strategies to employ in the war of ideas and for other public diplomacy programs” according to organisers (Midura, 23rd September 2008).

Thorp recognised a key issue regarding the sanctity of the message, he said “if I'm paying somebody and I'm measuring their ability to change somebody's mind then truth might not become a limiting factor” (24th August 2009). But according to Franklin Miller in getting America’s message out “there was so very little being done down range... it was contracted out to some group of Americans who were trying to broadcast from Jordan as I recall. And it just didn't work very well at all. They finally set up Al Arabia as a TV station but for the longest time Al Jazeera was what people were watching in Iraq” (3rd August 2009).

Wilkerson recalled the information warfare campaign “in the Phillipines, in Indonesia, in Malaysia, in Singapore...” to build “a Muslim reaction” to radical Islam, which he said used “such a clumsy, unsophisticated message that you wondered who was developing this” he thought it was “probably contractors” (Wilkerson, 23rd June 2009).

The expansion of contracting has encouraged some unlikely characters to try and capitalise on American insecurities in the information war. Dr Tawfik Hamid (psychologist and former Al Qaeda recruit who knew senior Al Qaeda figures) is Chair in Islamic Radicalism at the Potomac Institute. Hamid claims he “predicted the attack of September 11th itself, two years before and no one believed” (26th June 2009). He is a self-professed specialist in “psychological warfare” with “a complete strategic plan to defeat radical Islam” (Hamid, 26th June 2009). Hamid
described several “educational techniques” he developed for children which use behavioural and “cognitive psychology” intended to target “the root of the problem” (26th June 2009). He said he was “working on a product [...] an educational method using psychology” (Hamid, 26th June 2009).

While I believe he had not yet been contracted he was reluctant to discuss specific projects but spoke of engagement in high-profile advisory activities in psychological counter-terrorism (Hamid, 26th June 2009). These began

“when I came here to speak at the intelligence summit. And the Director of National Intelligence. Then people were impressed. I was invite to speak at the Pentagon. The White House. The CI-. [...] I give lectures to huge variety. I met with Presidents, I met with the President of Italy and recently with the former President of England”

- by which I believe he means Tony Blair, though he has not visited Britain (Hamid, 26th June 2009).

I asked Hamid to comment on British domestic tensions following 9/11, and he said,

“Just imagine if [...] these people manage to have more control. [...] So the UK would be like Somalia. The woman would be in the houses and have to wear that [unclear] and the hijab, man can beat you... stoning of woman can happen. So we are talking about here an inevitable confrontation. It’s just a number issue. Muslims behave very well as long as they are a minority. Weak. [does a squeaky voice] ‘Oh we are peaceful’” ...but I don’t care about the words” (26th June 2009).

Hamid argues that

“The hijab phenomena give [Muslims] a feeling of superiority and this by itself is like Hitler was [in] the beginning [...] You can justify violence later on. The hijab make the child have a distorted mind in judging who’s good and who’s bad. [...] that’s why young kids in UK they terrorist- cause they judge the whole society as bad, they don’t wear the hijab.” (26th June 2009).

He went on to describe how “cognitive psychology tactics” can be used including

“what I call rumours [...] sense of defeat [...] some of the rumours were
that the top jihadists was a-a-a-homosexual [...] sense of defeat [...] can be by military and non-military approaches. There are other psychological tactics that can be used in the media that can make them feel that what they are doing, for example is bringing misery to the Muslim World in a specific way [...] Aversion techniques. [...] and woman issue is very important in Muslim mind so playing around it in certain way can really devastate” (Hamid, 26th June 2009).

Hamid has also spoken to Congress and (being staunchly pro-Israeli) was invited to Israel “by [Ariel] Sharon’s personally to speak at the Presidents summit” (26th June 2009). He recently toured with the ‘Institute for Monitoring Peace and Cultural Tolerance in School Education’ (IMPACT-SE), an organisation who seek to promote “the true nature of Hamas and its anti-Western, anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic ideology” and seek to achieve educational change in the Arab World (November 2009). IMPACT-SE presented its findings at the British House of Commons in 2009 (November 2009). Hamid promotes ‘educational techniques’ for children which in themselves sound initially innocuous, even progressive in favouring ‘critical thinking’; but they are put in the service of a philosophy at the heart of which lies a horrific lack of respect for Islamic people, and a pro-Israeli rewriting of history.

Contracting does not always seem to have close ownership and this is now affecting the industry. In America some defense contractors “are turning their backs on the ‘soft power’ market” and becoming “fearful” of the “political backlash against the expanding presence of wartime contractors” (Erwin, August 2010). But it is the high-profile firms like Lockheed Martin, “top defense contractors that obsessively protect their corporate image” that shy away; their “CEOs don’t want to risk ending up on the witness stand on Capitol Hill or being grilled in the media” like Blackwater (Erwin, August 2010). In the 6 years since Ren Stelloh joined in 2003, low-profile government contractor PhaseOne, had quadrupled its expert staff, “and we’re hiring like nobodies business... simply because the demand is there” (Stelloh, 23rd June 2009). Jones in 2005 argued that propaganda resources were still inadequate “by a factor of ten” reflecting a tendency by the US of injecting money into attempts to solve problems primarily rooted in strategic planning and organisation (Jones: 109). Meanwhile the British government has recently put
forward a proposal to allow self-regulation of security contractors (Norton-Taylor, 24th April 2009).

Despite the problems it raises, Gen. Zinni said “I think contracting is inevitable” (2nd June 2009). The Defense Science Board recommended in a report on Strategic Communications that more use be made of the Private Sector, claiming it had “a built-in agility, credibility and even deniability” (Defense Science Board, quoted in Gerth and Shane, 1st December 2005). While this means surrendering some of the centralised grip that the government once enjoyed over propaganda, it brings in a powerful tool which distances by process the policymakers from implementation and audience effects. In addition, the pragmatic commercial desire to secure future contracts could result in a more immediate effects-based approach favouring particular immediate ends over wider strategic concerns, ethical foreign policy and long-term effectiveness. Apparent ‘rule-breaking’ resulting from delegated planning and decision-making, may be being conducted with the tacit approval of those at the top, who are now able to look away; distancing, and delegating authority to profit-based entities. In his classic theory originally applied to the holocaust Bauman argues that physical/psychic distancing between an act and its consequences “quashes the moral significance of the act and thereby preempts all conflict between personal standards of moral decency and immorality of the social consequences of the act” (1988: 484). Bauman’s observations were of modernity, and help our understanding, even in a contemporary democracy, of how ‘nice’ people might enable functioning systems responsible for odious acts.38

The Functional Integration of Propaganda 5: Involving Academia

It is not just private companies who are being used as an extension of the military propaganda apparatus. Robert Thompson has criticised how the traditional American military had been “undiluted by civilian brains not bound by the rigid orthodoxy of the book” and welcomed the increased initiative this might bring (quoted in Nagl, 2002: 203). McBride told how “when 9/11 happened we were getting calls from sociology professors and so forth saying well ‘what do I do?’, ‘how do I help?’ So things’ve

38 See also Chapter 5 where this theme will be developed further.
changed a little bit but there’s still this attitude that [...] we get from academic social science in particular that comes across as they’re above, they’re better than soldiers and [...] they’re not gonna participate in what we call here ‘baby-killing”’ (5th June 2009).

Similarly, Jones has seen academics and Think Tanks as crucial to coordinating information strategy, he said regional centres of study at NDU and others “institutionalize the self-help process through sharing the ideas and experiences of Western democracies and their free market economies” and “new centers of this type should be proposed to meet theatre needs” (Jones, 2005: 110). As part of the above-mentioned preference for ‘covert action’ Le Gallo advocates using American Universities, or “any institution” to set up and run educational programmes that would offer an alternative to religious schools and teach in a framework “emphasising the personal freedoms and free enterprise” (2005: 39). This would be done covertly when “US or Western sponsorship would negate the effectiveness of the program” and filters US propaganda through civil society (Le Gallo, 2005: 39).

McBride at the Potomac Institute told me about a meeting he arranged “a few years ago”, between key figures from Social Science Discipline Associations including “the American Anthropological Association, [...] Executive Director; had Lee Herring, who’s the Executive Director of the American Sociological Association” and he got himself “deputised by the American Psychological Society to be in this meeting” (5th June 2009). As the father of PR Edward Bernays said “If you can influence the leaders, either with or without their conscious cooperation, you automatically influence the group which they sway” (2004: 73). This was not a meeting of objective academics, it was led by McBride, whose use of language (‘we’) clearly reveals that his allegiances were always firmly with the US military. He recounted the discussion as follows,

“I basically said, look, [...] the Pentagon’s [...] number 1 mission, is to prevent war, by being so damn strong, so smart, that no one would dare, mission number 2 is that if we fail that one, to get it over with, ok? I said, your communities have a role to play in mission number 1. [...] The Pentagon is engineering, it doesn’t understand other cultures. [...] We’re not good at that. We wanna be good at it and we don’t know how, absent
your help. And I went through this and they said, absolutely, you know what? We’re changing our minds, we’re gonna support this” (McBride, 5th June 2009).

He recalled that one sociologist said they would be “very uncomfortable helping with targeting...” at which McBride smirked, “I said, I have to be honest with you, the military services don’t need sociologists to determine a target sequence” (McBride, 5th June 2009).

Mackay & Tatham have similarly argued that the networking of “civilian and military” in US research is “urgently required” in Britain (2009: 33). Graham Wright argued that,

“Academia can provide really deep understanding. I mean if you want someone to go and analyse the deep relationship between […] Taliban and Al Qaeda in Pakistan, why not commission a few universities to begin studying this in-depth and grow departments that really understand this?” (Wright, 1st June 2009).

He favoured the (highly partisan) American “think tank culture...” which he thought was lacking “back home”, citing NESA at NDU as examples (Wright, 1st June 2009). Wright had a sideline working with one while in Washington, a “sort of virtual think tank” and was “thinking about setting something up back home...” (Wright, 1st June 2009). This exemplifies how subtly and organically the influence of one countries’ mechanisms on another’s occurs. One my interviewees even offered me paid employment producing reports on media coverage for a private Government contract; they then failed to respond when I asked for specifics of would it be contributing to.39

Concern has been raised over the affects of military-sponsored research on academic freedom, curriculum and possible clashes of professional values and interests (Kirby, 7th September 2009). McFate shows how anthropological writings have also used to engineer oppression, blackmail and psychological techniques in Abu Ghraib (2005: 37). Since 2007 the US Army ‘Human Terrain System’ has

39 Occasionally I noted interviewees tendency to see me as ‘one of them’ and assume some level of agreement existed over their basic assumptions about propaganda. I did not encourage this perception, and attempted not to introduce my personal or political beliefs into the interviews. See Chapter 2.
embedded civilian social scientists in the field of war to provide cultural awareness and aid information-gathering. Researchers are attributed much public credibility. Their contributions assist in, among other things, psychological warfare. Hired through contractors like ‘CareerStone’ they are being targeted by insurgents; Stanton cited an example of $1200 a day being paid out to recruits who “hardly understand the US military culture they are embedded in” (7th February 2010). Academics themselves have resisted this trend. A recent report stated that it places “potentially conflicting demands” upon researchers torn “between serving occupied, studied populations, and serving the needs of the military” which it felt could “undermine basic ethical principles that govern research” (American Anthropological Association, 14th October 2009). Mackay and Tatham have recommended the idea be adapted for trial by the British Military (2009: 32).

**Conclusion**

As Nagl points out “if the only tool in your toolbox is a hammer, all problems begin to resemble nails” (2002: 203). This chapter detailed how structural limitations of the propaganda apparatus in both Britain and America to approaching their ‘War on Terror’ prompted a drive toward more ‘flexibility’ and the weakening of unhelpful conventions. The accelerated efforts to deal with the demands of a modern propaganda war, led to a sometimes piecemeal, sometimes systematic diffusion of the propaganda apparatus, which posed challenges to the conceptual basis of traditional audience divisions. Rather than the increasing openness implied by a break-down of centralised power, this trend is hoped to further normalise propaganda processes, and disarm an intended audience. This is seen as an arrangement for making propaganda more ‘credible’ both through distancing and deniability, and by ensuring the same messages are consistently woven into the informational landscape. Ellul’s analysis from 1973, still applies here; a “combination of covert and overt propaganda is increasingly conducted so that white propaganda becomes a cover and mask for black propaganda” (16). In contrast to the image of openness traditionally used to justify propaganda, an undeclared function of the conceptual and structural division and broader distribution of propaganda ensures it is less visible in the apparatus of government. It is functionally distributed cross-government and normalised as ‘communication’
within its processes, rather than visibly concentrated in a Ministry of Information. As Wright acknowledged this nullifies the “suspicious” connotations that a centralised entity can have (Wright, 1st June 2009). Each individual process attracts less critical attention among the media cacophony and where one activity becomes visible it serves to distract critical attention away from the rest.

Thorp was careful in advocating contracting, he agreed that distancing sometimes occurs but stressed the answer was ensuring in PSYOPS or Public Affairs “content has to be pure” - derived from those accountable (not contractors) - and essentially truth (24th August 2009). Thorp himself claimed to have been addressing the “good, bad and the ugly” (24th August 2009). However, Hersh quotes another Pentagon official’s claim that Public Affairs “always want to delay the release of bad news - in the hope that something good will break” (2004, p285). When, on March 28th 2003, the Army’s senior ground commander Lt Gen Wallace told reporters that war-plans were insufficient both Rumsfeld and Myres defended them vigorously (Hersh, 2004). Even if a propaganda message has truth; whether the message formulation is mediated by commercial practise, or by well-meaning bureaucrats, its structurally institutionalised production means it necessarily endeavours to restrict and narrow public debate to serve powerful interests.40

This chapter shows how responses to the changing security environment allowed access to a wider range of capabilities, implemented across a broadening personnel base. These trends can be seen in the extension of covert action in the US Defense Department; both countries’ use of ‘effects-based’ approaches; contracting and the movement towards a more coordinated propaganda apparatus. With greater flexibility in how these could work together came a weakening of propaganda boundaries. This extension of capabilities and agents brought a domestic need to control those loaded with new responsibilities, broader capabilities and coordinate their efforts. Formal changes posed problems for coordination within each bureaucracy, and implementation was mediated by different institutional cultures and informal systems. The next chapter will show how efforts were made by both countries towards formalised strategic control over propaganda systems. It will

40 This will be developed further in Chapter 5.
demonstrate how America in particular was hampered in these efforts by ‘turf wars’ and insular agencies creating conditions where informal processes would need to be relied upon.
Chapter 4: Formal Cross-Government (Mis-) Coordination

Introduction

The above-mentioned attempts to adapt each country’s formal propaganda apparatus to the changing international context through expanded distribution of a broader range of capabilities raised demands for strategic coordination. The coordination needed to ensure consistent propaganda, proved challenging to impose on the existing formal structures, particularly in the American example. The American bureaucracy has traditionally been regarded as a loose sprawling mass and more prone to ‘operational weaknesses’ than the British system which is seen by contrast as small, close-knit and relatively more disciplined (Nicholas, 1963: 173). This chapter will argue that formal attempts to coordinate the processes of each country’s more extensive apparatus failed due to insular agencies with strong institutional cultures. These impaired formal inter-agency cooperation and made strategic direction difficult. The chapter deals with the two countries’ domestic political contexts and integrates these accounts to develop a thematic argument highlighting trends crucial to propaganda policymaking. These domestic patterns and the responses to them (to be detailed in the next chapter) will be shown in Chapter 6 to have shaped the relationship between the countries and inter-country planning structures that coordinated joint propaganda efforts.

Formal Attempts to Coordinate Cross-Government Propaganda

This first section of the chapter will demonstrate the strategic attempts by both countries to coordinate their cross-government propaganda activities through formal structures. Subtle integration of the propaganda apparatus across defence and cross-government does not erode a pressing bureaucratic need for centralised control at the strategic level. The globalised media precludes any ability for targeting different audiences with different messages while remaining credible and convincing. As former Department of State Chief of Staff Lawrence Wilkerson puts it, the propaganda message “can’t be the same for the Indian Muslims, as it is for the Indonesian Muslims, as it is for the Malaysian Muslims” (23rd June 2009). Equally, “you can’t send the same signals to the 1.5bn Muslims, as you’re sending to your own people to Ra-Ra them up for the conflict” (Wilkerson, 23rd June 2009). The traditional approach to propaganda results in
multiple messages being refined for separate audiences; but today they mingle in the melting pot of the mass media and emerge as the soup of something “absolutely non-effective” (Wilkerson, 23rd June 2009). Agencies cannot be seen to contradict each other. Jeffrey Jones argued in 2005 that the activities of government agencies were “distinct” from defence “although some of the means are the same”; for him “synergy [of message] is impossible without coordination” (2005: 109). Jowett and O’Donnell argue that “successful propaganda campaigns tend to originate from a strong, centralized, and decision-making authority that produces a consistent message throughout its structure” (1992: 216). Thus in Britain and America many attempts have been made - through formal hierarchical relationships, coordination meetings and organising structures - to exert consistency of voice through strategic control of the apparatus.

American planners anticipated back in 1999 that coordination would be required if messages were not to conflict. Under a secret presidential directive, President Clinton ordered a formal International Public Information Core Group be established, in which the State Department was to be lead. It was chaired by its Under Secretary and drew top officials from Departments of Defense, State, Justice, Commerce and the Treasury, the CIA and FBI. The International Public Information group’s role in this was crucially; “to synchronize the informational objectives, themes and messages that will be projected overseas […] to prevent and mitigate crises and to influence foreign audiences in ways favorable to the achievement of U.S. foreign policy objectives” (30th April 1999). Their control over “international military information” was intended to “influence the emotions, motives, objective reasoning and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups and individuals” (30th April 1999). This would be done “to enhance U.S. security, bolster America’s economic prosperity and to promote democracy abroad” (International Public Information, 30th April 1999).

While their activities were marked only for foreign audiences the International Public Information Group charter stated that Public Affairs should be “coordinated, integrated, deconflicted and synchronized” with PSYOPS to avoid contradictory messages it is thus a precursor to efforts detailed above to weaken
this partitioning of propaganda (International Public Information, 30th April 1999). While ‘Public Information’ functions continued to be incorporated cross-government, according to Pugmire, President Bush made another Presidential Directive that let this order lapse “consequently, there has been a great deal of political manoeuvring to keep this organization, and the progress it made, alive” (Pugmire: 2002).

Clinton’s directive did not of course predict the events of 9-11, and, with further evolutions of the structure, this issue of strategic level inadequacies has returned time and again. Bradley Graham, Rumsfeld’s biographer spoke of, “an effort […] by Rumsfeld and Feith to draft a interagency strategic plan for the War on Terrorism and they kept groping all the way through 2002, 3, 4, 5 & 6 to try to get a document or […] blueprint for […] the larger war and the Pentagon took the lead in that, largely because they didn’t see anyone else doing it. And there are several briefings with Bush where Bush seemed to sort-of ‘buy into’ the Pentagon pitch and order a National security directive to be drafted and then the process would bog down again. I think one finally did get signed and drafted in 2005-6” of which, a “major pillar” was “strategic communications” (24th July 2009).

Importantly, the issue of decisive strategic control can be seen as increasingly urgent, both as an integrating force and one which ensures consistency, the more widely the apparatus of propaganda are spread. Counterinsurgency expert, John Nagl argues that a level of trust and autonomy can be found in British military culture that is absent from the US military, its military encourages “junior officers” to “seek out organizational performance gaps and alternative organizational paths of action” (2002: 191); he argues “It is a mark of British government’s trust in the capability of her army that a single army general was given political and military authority” in Malaya (2002: 198). Rear Adm. Thorp, former Public Affairs chief explained how coordination across formerly strict military propaganda boundaries must necessitate a re-think of the strategic level,

“…in the 21st Century what we really need is a reaffirmation of who has the lead for the communication element because as big as we are in the US, and I think it really applies to the UK, […] there has to be
someone who is singularly responsible and accountable for public communication. And you can’t have two different entities [PSYOPS and Public Affairs] doing that” (24th August 2009).

This strategic role was filled early on by Col. Jeffrey B. Jones who having run the PSYOPS Group from Fort Bragg now was recruited by the White House to coordinate their information war (Gerth, 11th December 2005). It was revealed in 2005, after he left his position as ‘Director for Strategic Communications and Information’ on the National Security Council, that Jones had headed the secret committee later named the “Counter Terrorism Information Strategy Policy Coordinating Committee” (Gerth, 11th December 2005). Committee members included representatives from the State Department, Pentagon and intelligence agencies, and contractors including Rendon and Lincoln working with a subgroup (Gerth, 11th December 2005). It coordinated “everything from public diplomacy, which includes education, aid and exchange programs, to covert information operations” (Gerth, 11th December 2005).

After Charlotte Beers’ resignation (see Chapter 3), a report to the House on Public Diplomacy again linked Arab and Muslim resentment to American policies, calling for a new US ‘Strategic Direction’ (Djerejian, 1st October 2003). Similarly, the Government Accountability Office stated that, post-9-11 “[Department of] State acknowledged the lack of, and the need for, a comprehensive strategy that integrates all of its diverse public diplomacy activities” (Government Accountability Office, September 2003). The Strategic Direction report stressed the need for a new White House office charged with wide reaching strategic-level coordination of Public Diplomacy across government (Djerejian, 1st October 2003: 14). The State Department would remain lead in Public Diplomacy, but they too would follow the centralised “unified strategic direction” (Djerejian, 1st October 2003: 14). Astutely, however, when I asked US Government contractor Sean Fitzpatrick “You’re saying it’s really uncoordinated - the way they’re going about this?”, he replied that the problem was that “There isn’t a ‘they’” (30th June 2009). Fitzpatrick identified a lack of strategic control and ownership.
Similar concerns were emerging in Britain whose Foreign Office in 2002, found British Public Diplomacy, worth “£340 million of direct expenditure”, was being conducted “without any clear over-arching guidance on the core messages that we wish to put across to our target audiences” and lacked “strategic direction” (Foreign and Commonwealth Office Review Team, 22nd March 2002: 3-4). It too called for centralisation - under a Director of Communications to ensure “a closer alignment of our domestic and our overseas-targeted public diplomacy work” (Foreign and Commonwealth Office Review Team, 22nd March 2002: 5). This resulted in establishment of the Public Diplomacy Strategy Board, who “agreed and finalised” a 10-year Public Diplomacy Strategy in May 2003 (Foreign & Commonwealth Office, April 2004: 35). The Foreign Office had not before agreed such a strategy across government, to “further improve [...] coordination”; it extended the processes detailed in Chapter 3 and increasingly involved “people outside Government - parliamentarians, business, the media, trades unions, NGOs and interest groups” (Foreign & Commonwealth Office, April 2004: 146-7). However, in December 2005, despite “recent improvements” and “collaborative working”, it was reported to still need “central control” with a Minister at the helm to “focus the activity of its various partners in a systematic way” (Carter, 2005: 4-5).

By 2003 a parallel Ministry of Defence-originated cross-governmental strategy was developing, making links particularly with the Foreign Office and Department for International Development - to ensure “effects-based planning compliment wider strategic planning”, and tying the tactical and operational into the strategic (MoD, 2003a). Senior bureaucracy at the Ministry of Defence provided strategic shape and direction, and advice to ministers and the chain of command particularly through the Defence Crisis Management Centre (Taverner, 18th July 2004). Located at MoD, within this a ‘Current Commitment Team’ is assigned to a crisis, for Afghanistan for example and world events are monitored through media, diplomatic and intelligence sources (Taverner, 18th July 2004 & MoD, 2004). Within this Centre the Information Campaign Coordination Group was held to achieve agreement on the broad themes and messages (Taverner, 18th July 2004). This brought together key figures across government including:

The Foreign Office who represented the Cabinet Office
Director General of Media and Communication Ian Lee
His two staff officers (Angus Taverner and Paul Brook) Director of Targeting and Information Operations (representing Information Operations/PSYOPS) The Permanent Joint Headquarters (Taverner, 18th July 2004).

Direction from this coordinating meeting would then guide discussion at their lower level weekly Media Group meeting\(^{41}\) also attended by Permanent Joint Headquarters to decide the specific guidance to be given to the latter (Taverner, 18th July 2004).\(^{42}\) When details were requested through Freedom of Information, the group was claimed not to have existed prior to November 2008 (Read, 23rd September 2010). Yet this strategic level apparently operated above the Permanent Joint Headquarters of the Chief of Joint Operations and his 600 staff officers who command all UK overseas operations (Taverner, 18\(^{th}\) July 2004). The Chief of Defense Staff and his staff officers decide the shape and form of the mission, yet, rather than plan things in detail they assign resources to Joint Operations and give guidance on whether the military’s approach to information should be passive, semi-active or active (Taverner, 18th July 2004).\(^{43}\)

Former Director of Targeting and Information Operations Graham Wright pointed out that the Ministry of Defence generally do not do pre-emptive influence work, leaving this to the Foreign Office who, likewise, “don’t have the capabilities that [MoD] do in terms of doing things on the ground in other places” (1st June 2009). They had complimentary functions if they could manage to work together. Taverner’s job at Ministry of Defence was to operationally coordinate and instigate the Ministry’s media communications with that of the government to achieve their own particular ends (18th July 2004). His role therefore involved organisation at the cross-departmental and Ministry of Defence levels (Taverner, 18th July 2004). Wright was the lead in the Ministry of Defence organising Information Operations capabilities and ensuring this “strategic direction” (1st June 2009). He coordinated with those outside defense, including diplomats, and claimed “it’s not information operations but it’s the same sort of thing... it’s about influence” (Wright, 1st June 2009). Wright met with resistance from the

\(^{41}\) Chaired by the Director News Pam Tier (Taverner, 18th July 2004).
\(^{42}\) Minutes and correspondence relating to these meetings was not attainable through FOI.
\(^{43}\) Passive is only answering questions when asked and acknowledging things if necessary, active is engaging every possible communication means, and semi-active is somewhere in-between (Taverner, 18th July 2004).
diplomats who held traditional concerns about Information Operations and found “trying to join all that up in Whitehall is actually quite difficult” (1st June 2009). Their answer was the Afghan Information Strategy Group, where a strategy was agreed between leads in each area who then implemented their particular area (Wright, 1st June 2009).

The Ministry of Defence’s strategy gained cross-government support and in 2005 Lord Carter’s Foreign Office review acknowledged that already there was “close contact at operational level” between the Ministry of Defence and Foreign Office public diplomacy efforts (2005: 35). But Carter recommended that “there could be more contact at strategic level between the FCO and MoD [my emphasis]”, and that a future ‘Public Diplomacy Strategy’ might consider ways the Ministry of Defence and Foreign Office could be mutually supportive and contribute to each others efforts (2005: 35). Essentially the top level coordination was not being accomplished.

**The Failure of Formal Coordination: ‘Stovepipes’ and Institutional Cultures**

This section will argue that despite some change of attitude to the traditional dividing lines separating propaganda forms, systemically, unifying the message was a long way off. British and American military and political cultures differ markedly with different cultures within subgroups. Nagl argues that “The varying strategic and organizational cultures of different organizations play a critical role in the organizations’ abilities to adapt their structure and functions to the demands placed on them” (2002:6). This section will show how cultural factors contributed to institutional conditions that both maintain a cohesive functioning bureaucratic units and build insularity and competitiveness of government departments.

The above-mentioned efforts to coordinate the cross-government propaganda apparatus proved problematic for both countries. Particularly for America, where the necessary structural changes required for coordinating the propaganda apparatus lagged far behind the US Information Agency’s dissolution. What is effectively a dispersal of propaganda functions throughout the huge bureaucracy of the US administration was never going to be easy. This section
will show how persistent challenges of inter-agency communication produced levels of discord between programmes and allowed conflicting messages. This was exacerbated by an aggressively protectionist Department of Defense. Efforts to coordinate cross-government in America created tensions in the large bureaucratic system with its traditional rivalries. Hamid, provided an outsider’s point of view on working with this structure and seemed frustrated at dealing with “separate systems” in US government which he said “cannot play chess together” (26th June 2009).

Coordination of American formal structures has been historically lacking, exacerbated by the insular and protectionist ethos of Agencies of the Federal Government, often called “stove-pipes” (Anonymous, 1st June 2009). Wilkerson described propaganda responsibilities as increasingly divided between “multiple prongs” often each of whom produces work which is unknown to the others, and who create effects which “are surprises to those who started them” (23rd June 2009). The solution to the latter problem has been envisioned in an ‘effects-based’ approach (beginning from the desired outcome then working out how to achieve it) as detailed above. This section will focus on the main propaganda players with reference to those ‘multiple prongs’ not working together, a problem which to a lesser extent may have affected Britain too and which hampered success of the efforts detailed in the last chapter. In many ways the problems seem to be reinforced by the very cultures that hold the bureaucracy together and these cultures are most easily identified with reference to the problems they caused in the course of the period.

This section will draw occasionally on insights gained from studies into organisational culture. However, many studies of organisational culture have been focussed on effectively managing it for the benefit of the institution, a problematic stance for sociology which underestimates its complexity and contradictions (Parker, 2000). This knowledge will inform any insights drawn from such studies and in developing the empirical data continuity will be maintained with the goals of the overall analysis.

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44 This term is used widely to describe Federal Government, a Select Committee Report on the US Intelligence Community defined it for that field saying “The most common criticism of the current collection management process, and one in which we concur, is that it is dominated by ‘stovepipes,’ i.e., types of collection that are managed so as to be largely distinct from one another” (1996).
American ‘Stovepipes’: Coordinating Rumsfeld’s Pentagon

This section will begin the discussion of American difficulties in formal coordination of its propaganda apparatus by looking at Rumsfeld’s Pentagon and its attempts to dominate the information arena. It will argue that in particular the Pentagon resisted coordination with other agencies and prevented ‘strategic control’ by the National Security Council.

Defense Department culture was seen as distinct and conflictual with the CIA and State Department. But as former National Security Council Director Franklin Miller observes “you shouldn’t get the impression that these kinds of battles are unique to Iraq. I watched it for 25 years [through] the Soviet nuclear threat”; he observed how Department of State always took the soft position, whereas Airforce took the hardline, and CIA fell somewhere between (3rd August 2009).

At the strategic/interagency level there was a tendency to see the information war as “almost fell in the too-hard category” and Franklin Miller (who was in charge of coordination at this level) said “I did have an extremely competent person on my staff [Col. Jeffrey Jones] who was dealing with that and I left them alone” to concentrate on traditional security concerns (Miller, 3rd August 2009). A similar tension also existed in the Department of Defense between the desire to control information, and the wish to delegate away an impossible task.

This tension was observed at the operational level by Franklin Miller in 2003-2004 when Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez commanded coalition forces in Iraq (something explored further in Chapter 5) but it can also be seen in the bureaucracy. Part of the coordination problem was clearly due to leadership and personality factors, which contributed to both tensions, and ad-libbed solutions in all agencies of Federal Government. Some actors managing the war took on a monopolistic approach to coordination. According to Wilkerson, Rumsfeld regarded the sprawling Defense apparatus “...like a businessman running a company, that he could get his arms around most of the essential people and resources and he could manage them, if not lead them, he could manage them” (Wilkerson, 23rd June 2009). Though leadership styles vary greatly individually, aspects of the military’s organisational culture encourage these qualities. Pierce claims US Army organisational culture emphasises,
• An overarching desire for stability and control,
• Formal rules and policies,
• Coordination and efficiency,
• Goal and results oriented, and
• Hard-driving competitiveness (Lovelace in Pierce, September 2010: iv).

A central factor of the inter-agency coordination problem that evolved from this was that essentially the Pentagon delegated their portion of the information campaign away; to the Combatant Commanders between whom US military responsibility around the globe is divided.

Central Command, who are responsible for this region, established three Coalition Information Centres (CICs) in London, Washington and Islamabad that became crucial to the infrastructure of the coalition media campaign in Afghanistan. They were predominantly operated by Anglo-American personnel (Macintyre 2002). Coalition Information Centres were designed for counter-propaganda and to maintain consistency of message, with a sharing of ideas, material and personnel as well as constant communication (Walker 2001). But Coalition Information Centres did not coordinate well with the Embassies, who answered to the Foreign Office & State Department, according to Graham Wright “CENTCOM can have a plan but that does not lock the Diplomats in. So the Diplomats can go and say things to congress and they can talk on the radio and completely screw around what they’re trying to get done” (1st June 2009).

In PSYOPS strategic approval would be by “State for the US and FCO for UK” through this “Operational Command” (15th Army PSYOPS Group, 22nd November 2005). The US State Department enjoys much strategic responsibility for American propaganda so their coordination with Defense was therefore crucial to consistency in the information war. Thorp claimed “sometimes when you have psychological operations folks [...] coordinating with diplomats about what is going to be said publicly, and the public affairs folks aren’t in the room, you’re destined for disaster”; likewise if Public Affairs coordinate without involvement of PSYOPS (24th August 2009).
Important strategic State Department roles were played by Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage (until 2005) and Chief of Staff Lawrence Wilkerson (August 2002 - 2005) both interviewed here. The State Department’s remit goes far deeper than Public Diplomacy, and its relationship with Defense is often unclear and confused; even sharing some strategic PSYOPS planning. The Pentagon is responsible for, “establishing national objectives, developing policies, and approving strategic plans for PSYOP” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1996: vi). However, the State Department can also restrict PSYOPS themes or messages, something the Commander is meant to be responsible for (Pugmire: 2002). During peacetime the second stage of PSYOPS approval ‘Product Level Authority’ becomes the responsibility of the State Department, who provide “overall direction, coordination and supervision” until an execute order is approved (Pugmire: 2002: 5).

The Overt Peacetime Psychological Operations Program is a Combatant Command-developed programme involving the Embassies in planning, supporting and conducting PSYOPS (Department of Defense, 2009). It is operated through a ‘Country Team Member’ designated by the Ambassador (Pugmire: 2002). While, technically, under this Directive, State has authority over all PSYOPS, in practise it does not. Even within Defense, product approval authority has not remained consistent. Again, function varied; where normally authority is at Presidential level, in Iraq the authority came direct from Defense Secretary Rumsfeld (Pugmire: 2002). According to Pugmire the process is contradictory, and “divisive” he argues “the vagueness and sometimes loosely defined use of key terminology in the documents can lead to misinterpretation of who is actually the approving authority for PSYOP” (2002: 5). This all has clear implications for operational coordination, let alone accountability. From 2005 communication began to be facilitated by the Joint Staff’s information management portal, an idea conceived during the Afghanistan conflict, but even then didn’t integrate with the State Department (Jones, 2005: 109).

One British Flight Lieutenant argued that in Iraq Central Command “became almost a separate branch of the US military, reporting to the Secretary for Defense and bypassing the normal chiefs-of-staff route” (Anonymous, 2010b). As Rumsfeld’s new Special Operations ‘Military Information Support Teams’ grew in
prominence they left Ambassadors unaware of in-country military activities and "overwhelmed" some embassies with a "growing presence of military personnel and insistent requests from combatant Commanders" that turned embassies into command posts (Committee on Foreign Relations, 2006). Apparently "in several cases, embassy staff saw their role as limited to a review of choices already made by ‘the military side of the house’" (Committee on Foreign Relations, 2006). Having delegated out, Britain’s Graham Wright notes a subsequent refusal to engage with matters of the information war at the Pentagon. Even within the Department of Defense, and across its forces, a lack of horizontal integration in the apparatus left the US information campaign not being delivered consistently (Miracle, 2003: 41). McBride commented that

"the administration lost an opportunity to prepare a [...] thorough strategic communication plan, and [...] instead [...] relied on CENTCOM because that was the model that had been set up in Desert Storm" (McBride, 5th June 2009).

To compound this, according to British PSYOPS officers, the Americans had to get approval all the way up the cumbersome command chain (15th Army PSYOPS Group, 2005). They argued that this contrasted with the British military who devolve decision-making to allow more flexibility and autonomy in the field of combat (15th Army PSYOPS Group, 2005). This is particularly problematic when we consider US bureaucracy and its military as having quite different cultures. The Flight Lieutenant described the Battle for Fallujah in 2004 as offering “insight into the US mindset (soldiers vs politicians)” (Anonymous, 2010b). He recalled that,

“This two operations were kicked off by a Bloody Sunday type incident where a number of protesters were shot by over-reacting US troops. This led to the infamous kidnap and killing of the security contractors. What is significant is that the US Marine Corps commanders45 ‘on the ground’ emphatically did not want to ‘take’ Fallujah; instead they wanted to mount intelligence-led raids (as in Somalia), to kill and capture insurgents. But they were overruled at the political level and the costly and destructive battles followed..."

45 This refers to the critical comments made by Lt. Gen. James T. Conway, who was ordered to attack Fallujah by Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, the overall commander of U.S. forces in Iraq at the time (See: Chandrasekaran, 13th September 2004).
almost the same casualties (military and civilian) as the Battle of Hue in the Vietnam War” (Anonymous, 2010b).

Adm. Fallon who commanded CENTCOM from January 2007 said “I had [...] challenges in communication with my own bosses sometimes who merely looked through a certain lens and made assumptions that were usually wrong” (21st July 2009). Miller claimed coordination between Commanders and the strategic level did improve in time “We’d get on a video conference once a day, once a week, as time went on [...] eventually [...] it changes where we do the surge” (3rd August 2009). But prior to the 2007 surge in Iraq direction was left “to Rumsfeld and the Commanders” and “less interaction between, those Commanders [...] and President/Vice-President…” (3rd August 2009). The insularity of the Defense Department and its resistance to interagency coordination will be shown in the next section to have compounded its traditional rivalry with the similarly insular CIA, who share responsibility for propaganda.

*American ‘Stovepipes’: The CIA and The Pentagon*

Wilkerson described how due to a perhaps-inevitable problem of coordination, secret CIA ‘black’ propaganda operations conflict with other agencies in a global media environment. This section will explore how this was problematic for trends highlighted in the previous chapter and discussing the ‘turf-war’ over Rumsfeld’s desire to ring-fence CIA capabilities for Defense. This will be shown to have contributed to an excessively protectionist CIA.

The Pentagon, who have greatest responsibility for propaganda, were also having difficulty coordinating with the CIA. The CIA and Pentagon have a long-standing, conflictual relationship which began to feed on changing events. Perhaps it’s unsurprising that Rumsfeld’s attempts to broaden Defense Department functions through encroachment into ‘covert action’ - CIA territory - were resisted by such a closed organisation. Drogin described how “the Pentagon did not have a ready-to-go plan to kick out the Taleban so the CIA went in [...] got the credit for it really” according to him this aggravated Rumsfeld and contributed to the “dramatically increased use of Special Operations forces from the Pentagon” (22nd August 2009).

Former Department of State Chief of Staff Wilkerson who spent 31 years in the Pentagon observed at times a “bureaucratic hatred, and real visceral personal
hatred” which was mediated by leadership and personality (23rd June 2009). As Plame Wilson recalled “on working level sometimes […] the relationship is very good but obviously there are cultural differences and they have different missions” (23rd June 2007). It seems “different chains of command” (Drogin, 22nd August 2009) structurally sustained such cultural differences, which then formed the basis of inter-agency relationships. This is typified by how the CIA see the Defense Intelligence Agency “as military”; the CIA perception was reported to be dismissive and “…sort of shoot-first, salute, you know… go by the rules…” (Drogin, 22nd August 2009). Drogin described how, “the CIA […] think they are the hot-shots and they’re trained […] civilians” (22nd August 2009). The Defense Intelligence Agency were perceived as “basically people who couldn’t get into the CIA; which isn’t really the case. So that they really look down their noses at them…” (Drogin, 22nd August 2009).

Pincus suggests that Rumsfeld’s covert operations enflamed the CIA rift when “Pentagon operatives allegedly […] visited countries without prior CIA knowledge, although the local CIA Station Chief was supposed to have been told” (4th July 2005). If the military pursue covert missions independent from the CIA, this raises further problems for coordination of covert missions, which could end up operating at cross purposes (Kibbe, 2004). Wilkerson provided an example of this occurring from the State Department demonstrating how poor the CIA’s own coordination attempts were. He described a

“problem with the CIA running a black program, let’s say, out of Islamabad… and the Station Chief […], the CIA’s representative in-country, in Pakistan not telling the Ambassador, in whose Embassy he works, what he’s doing […] the CIA will say, that’s because what we’re doing is all lies, or semi-lies and we don’t want the Ambassador to be a liar. […] What should happen is when the Ambassador is asked questions about what we have disseminated he should say well as far as I know that’s incorrect or […] I don’t know or something like that… out of sheer honesty… But that doesn’t make for good, coordinated policy within a country [laughs]. And yet, I know that was happening…” (Wilkerson, 23rd June 2009).

The Embassy risked making policy on false information and unwittingly became conduits for lies.
“So you have this huge um... continuum of black stuff that they're putting out and the Ambassador's there tryin to figure out what's true and what's not true... and he doesn't even know his own people are putting it out! And when I say putting it out... [...] when they concentrate resources I mean, they'll buy newspaper editors, they'll buy newspapers, they'll put [...] stories in newspapers and so forth... it's pretty powerful!” (Wilkerson, 23rd June 2009).

As the CIA didn’t inform the other agency about its programmes, messages became conflicted.

Yet according to Gellman, new guidelines stated the DoD “reserves the right to bypass the [CIA’s] Langley headquarters, consulting CIA officers in the field instead. The Pentagon will deem a mission "coordinated" after giving 72 hours’ notice to the CIA” (2005). Miller concluded that “That’s the way this government functioned back then” (3rd August 2009). He described,

“...something called the synchronisation conference where once a week the senior people from the CIA and senior people in central command came together to talk about how the war, [...] was gonna begin, [...] and what would CIA's assets do [...] when the military force would actually get engaged. [...] Rumsfeld found out that this [...] was going on and pulled the plug on it. Said to [Tommy] Franks - you will not meet with [George] Tenet or his people. Until I approve it.” (Miller, 3rd August 2009).

As Wilkerson’s example infers, blame for mis-coordination cannot solely be placed at Rumsfeld’s feet, apparently he and Tenet “got on quite well” (Graham, 24th July 2009). When Goss took over from Tenet in 2004 this increased tension in the agency and led to key staff resignations; Goss became resistant to any encroachment on CIA functions from Negroponte in his new role of Director of National Intelligence (Thomas, 2009: 452). The role has been weaker than intended, with key agencies staying under the Pentagon, and a CIA that reasserts its dominance whenever issues over its responsibilities are raised (Anonymous, 1st June 2009). But in 2005 CIA Director Porter Goss and Rumsfeld made a written agreement designed to “‘deconflict’ the operations” and “co-ordinate them as closely as possible” (Negroponte in Pincus, 4 July 2005). Rumsfeld
vehemently opposed the subordination of intelligence under a new National Director of Intelligence (Kibbe, 2004). His creation of an Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence was widely viewed as a plan to deflate these efforts. According to one Defense Department Official the CIA, and was believed to be encouraging the negative media attention against Rumsfeld to support its own interests against the establishment of a Director of National Intelligence (Anonymous, 1st June 2009). Congress and the national media reportedly became targets of a CIA negative campaign against Rumsfeld, manipulating opinion that he was trying to ‘take over intelligence’ and centralise power within the Pentagon (Anonymous, 1st June 2009). This is a powerful example of how a pragmatic CIA may have used populist tactics in a self-serving way to influence domestic media and power structures, and structurally destabilised the interagency effort (Anonymous, 1st June 2009).

But even early on, the CIA looked to throw blame anywhere to protect itself. As American journalist Bob Drogin recalled,

“After 9-11, one of the things that came up was that [...] two of the hijackers were out on the West Coast Al Hazmi and Al Midar and I get a call from [...] the seventh floor in the CIA, the directors floor, telling me how absolutely outrageous it was that these hijackers had been in the country and the FBI hadn’t caught them. Hadn’t done anything about them. And, basically, I was being fed information about how the FBI had screwed up.” (22nd August 2009).

Drogin described how “…it came out that [...] the CIA had not told the FBI that the guys were in the country until a day before the attack [...] They’d sat on that information for months” (Drogin, 22nd August 2009). This reveals the importance of bureaucratic interests and domestic tensions in determining how propaganda often functioned, as Drogin argued,

“the enemy in the real world [...] was Al Qaeda but their enemy in terms of Washington, in terms of bureaucratic politics was to go after [...] point the finger at the FBI.” (22nd August 2009).

The CIA felt threatened by the potential disclosure of a questionable activity something known in intelligence as “flap potential” (Thomas, 2009: 24). This demonstrates a cultural attribute which Drogin described as “a nature of secrecy
used to conceal incompetence and ineptitude. Rather than simply to protect vital secrets” (22nd August 2009). CIA propaganda was put in service of limited Agency interests during a period when it felt its unique functions beginning to be usurped. It demonstrates how this is sometimes relative to institutional interests not just national strategic goals. In this profession an informer might sometimes be exposed (becoming a “discard”) to protect another, more important, asset - the culture and operation of intelligence is highly pragmatic (Thomas, 2009: 24). The significance of Scott’s claim (2004: 325) can be seen in that function was not static within the organisation; it adapted to continually redefined needs. The CIA should not be seen as especially weakened, its role and identity are being renegotiated. Gordon Thomson argues that following 9/11 the CIA transformed “from being primarily an intelligence-gathering organisation to a worldwide military police service” (2009: 412).

British ‘Stovepipes’?

This section will show how to a lesser extent Britain too has had bureaucratic difficulties in inter-agency propaganda coordination. Ultimately, Former British Ambassador Meyer has argued that “there has been scant joined-up government between the soldier, the aid worker and the diplomat” (18th October 2008). Mackay & Tatham argue that this is due to “each department having different aims, different cultures, applying alternative solutions” and further argued that the Ministry of Defence itself was internally “stovepiped” in propaganda (See Chapter 3) (2009: 11 & 16).

British PSYOPS said they “keep in touch with FCO on all our Ops” though they respond to the Commander (15th Army PSYOPS Group, 22nd November 2005). Also, the London Coalition Information Centre46, in the Foreign Office media suite, was overseen by Campbell “very actively” at times (FCO, 2008). It integrated structurally with links to policy formers and

“from an early stage in the run-up to conflict, those involved with the CIC were regularly at [omitted] daily meetings on Iraq and were on the key distribution lists” (FCO, 2008).

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46 Later renamed ‘Communication and Information Centre’ (FCO, 2008)
However, recognition of a disparity between formal appearances, and the actuality of cross-government formal coordination of influence, can be seen in Rowland & Tatham’s argument that,

“For the UK, where doctrine appears to suggest that only the military conduct influence, it is important that the cumulative efforts of all government departments and NGOs are recognised as contributing to the influence effect” (2010: 6-7).

Functions lagged behind the formal doctrinal changes. According to Graham Wright this resulted behind conflicting propaganda messages,

“...other departments, like State Department and Foreign Office - they don’t tend to plan. And so a diplomat will just be asked something when he’s visiting somewhere [...] and he’ll shoot from the hip and say something. Now [...] if you’ve gotta sort of cross-government plan that helps” (1st June 2009).

It was Wright’s perception that even Ministers needed to be reminded of the “script of why we’re there” (an example involving Margaret Beckett will follow in the chapter 5) (1st June 2009). Wright argued that in the Directorate of Targeting and Information Operations he tried to ensure,

“if there’s a piece of paper that explains [...] the core narrative, or the script of why we’re there, that it’s sent to all the departments. So if any minister is asked, they’ve all got access to the same thing” (1st June 2009).

Britain’s Ministry of Defence is a department of state and senior military headquarters. It is the home not only of the Secretary of State and civil servants but also the Chief of Defence staff and his staff officers. Originally these were intended to be quite widely separated but increasingly civilian and military works extremely closely together since media operations were placed under the civilian Directorate General Media and Communications (Taverner, 18th July 2004). In Britain, Mackay & Tatham identify a disparity between Ministry of Defence rhetoric about reducing ‘kinetic over-reliance’ and the lack of a real infrastructure (2009: 14). In Britain Kirke identifies four separate Service cultures prompting particular behaviours, many cultures within the Services, and Regimental cultures (2010). Kirke observed how military groupings provided
“fertile ground for stereotyping” and rivalry; a sense that “we (at whatever the relevant level) are better than you (at a comparable level)” (Kirke, 2010: 99).

Mackay & Tatham argue that “all Departments of State have an interest in influence and it might be seen as a tool for unifying cross government activity” one they see as “far less intimidating” to the public (2009:11). Integration is the often-stated goal, but one officer observed how “every level up to the highest level information operations is not part of the planning process” (Corcoran, 8th June 2006).

This difficulty can be demonstrated by the example of then-Brigadier Mackay taking British troops into Helmand in 2006; he felt operational success depended on “influence-led deployment” (Mackay & Tatham, 2009: 5). Mackay eventually got assistance from visiting researcher at the Defense Academy and its small ‘Advanced Research and Assessment Group’ (now closed) (Mackay & Tatham, 2009: 14). But he had previously approached the Directorate of Targeting and Information Operations; they just offered “generic strategic messaging” which was too inflexible for localised, tactical operations (Mackay & Tatham, 2009: 14). According to Mackay they viewed the assistance the Defense Academy gave as encroachment on their area/functions and put up “ardent resistence” to it (Mackay & Tatham, 2009: 14). Still, Graham Wright thought that “everybody on the information operations side of things [in Washington] would recognise that we’re more joined-up in the UK than they are” (1st June 2009). This partly because “we could walk out of the [US] Embassy and into the Cabinet Office and the FCO and back again in the space of 15 minutes” (Wright, 1st June 2009).

**2005 Onwards: Strategic Communications and SMART Approaches**

According to Jeffrey Jones, US leadership and strategic control was an unfulfilled task from Bush’s first term; “several attempts” to implement it had fallen short of a Presidential Directive (2005: 110-111). Nagl argues that “the strategic vision […] to put the military component of a counterinsurgency campaign in proper perspective vis-a-vis the economic and political actions necessary to defeat the insurgents” is crucial (2002: 195). According to Jones America possessed “no overarching […] information strategy at the national level” so any attempt to find a “focussed and effective mechanism for coordinating dissemination to all prospective audiences around the world” was
bound to fail (Jones, 2005: 109). Attempts to create this strategic focus culminated around 2005 in debate about a formal Strategic Communication approach. This has driven structure and planning in both countries.

Thorp says that “In the United States it used to be thought that psychological operations” and Public Affairs “should [...] never talk to each other or anything like that, and we’ve evolved from that” he saw 2005 as “a turning point where we really recognised that we needed to coordinate it” (24th August 2009). Thorp argues that “Psychological Operations folks [...] are now succeeding in working in a more collaborative environment” alongside Public Affairs and other propaganda forms (24th August 2009). He told how in 2008 “I was the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Joint Communications [...] the first guy in the job...” he said that this “really was strategic communication, we just didn’t want to call it that [...] because it was too controversial [laughs]” (24th August 2009). But even Rumsfeld recognised by 2006 that it was vital that the US make “a strategic communications framework” central to America’s approach with “new institutions to engage people across the world” and “develop the institutional capability to anticipate and act within the same news cycle” (Rumsfeld, 17th February 2006).

Taylor argued that the discrepancy between the practice of US foreign policy and its propaganda efforts left them open to accusations of hypocrisy (2002: 438). America levelled criticism at Al Jazeera for airing dissenting views and footage of terrorists such as the Bin Laden tapes, whilst arguing for freedom of speech and a free and independent media. This was considered highly hypocritical among media outlets where Al Jazeera is accorded high respect for its journalistic standards, particularly in the Arab world, and Britain as many of its staff were BBC trained (Reeve, 20th April 2006). Strategic Communications sought not just to coordinate military propaganda like PSYOPS and Public Affairs, but to coordinate all government activities in the information sphere with all other government activity to create truly system-wide continuity. Key theorists of propaganda have observed how economic liberalisation can assist the restriction of free information flow, and ensure the stability of basic assumptions supportive to the state (Curran and Seaton, 1988; Keane, 1991 &
Chomsky, 1991: 59). Jones another advocate of ‘Strategic Communication’ defined the term as:

“the effective integration of statecraft, public affairs, public diplomacy, and military information operations, reinforced by political, economic, and military actions” (Jones, 2005: 114).

Apparently “after leaving the government in 2005, Jeff [Jones] continued to be involved in developing concepts and approaches for strategic communications as a Senior Associate at the consulting firm Booz Allen Hamilton” (Armstrong, 11th February 2010). He underscored the need for a mechanism to coordinate inter-agency “informational efforts” at the national level to “shape the informational and intellectual environment long before hostilities” (Jones, 2005: 108). Jones emphasised that it would be a pre-emptive, permanent entity, and even suggested it should be “coequal” with the national political, economic and military strategies (Jones, 2005: 108).

Thorp described how he was “the creator of the doctrine for strategic communication for [America’s] military” and defined it as “ensuring that both actions and words communicated the same thing to create the desired effect” (24th August 2009). This was “very different” and

“although it sounds very innocent […] it was a little controversial because […] what it was saying was you can’t just say anything you want to try to achieve what you’re trying to achieve more importantly your words have to match your actions, your actions have to match your words, they both have to be focussed on the desired effect and the idea of truth is more than just not telling a lie, it’s ensuring that it is consistent with the actions and the policies of the commander” (Thorp, 24th August 2009).

This essentially puts propaganda desires and finding the right truth to support goals at the centre of policymaking and war planning. It politically embodies the ‘effects-based’ approach to military planning.

Jones described Defense as playing the central role in shaping information activities cross-government. He said that “members of such an interagency structure would also work together to implement strategic information plans proposed by the affected geographic Combatant Commanders to both the
Rumsfeld predicted that:

“Improving our efforts will likely mean embracing new institutions to engage people around the world. [...] We need to consider the possibility of new organizations and programs that can serve a similarly valuable role in the war on terror” (Rumsfeld, 2006).

All public information would essentially be defence-led. Yet, Commanders would even be expected to shape information activities beyond the interagency; encouraging allied partners and multinational organisations in “development and implementation of such an information strategy” (Jones, 2005: 111). To ensure messages were complimentary, theatre planning would then be derived from the national strategy and would be “proactive, influential and shaping (rather than reactive)” (Jones, 2005: 110). Since Kosovo, peacetime PSYOPS has been recognised as a key way to ensure the credibility of propaganda when it is used during a crisis (Mackenzie, 2001). A ‘crisis’ campaign will be less noticeable to an audience that’s used to similar ‘peacetime’ messages; another way of ensuring ‘invisibility’. This “pre-propaganda” Ellul considers essential for successful propaganda (Ellul, 1973:15). An important element of the strategic communication model is the requirement that it would be structurally integral and permanent; active during peacetime as well as crisis (Jones, 2005: 110).

While Britain’s issues with being ‘joined-up’ were less acute, the latest American import for its Ministry of Defence is the ‘Strategic Communication’ approach. This is detailed in an influential paper by Steve Tatham (2008), who led British Media Operations in Iraq. Again it moves towards a “whole-of-government effort” and has informed new Counter-Insurgency doctrine (2008: 1). Tatham reproduces a rhetorical American orchestra metaphor and diagram to explain Strategic Communication:

“The orchestra’s conductor is the British government, the musical score is the Strategic Communication plan and the orchestra itself the various communities of practice &/or lines of operation. The music is the narrative. Depending on the effect you seek to achieve, different sections of the orchestra will be used at different times, or with different emphasis. The tempo of the music will also vary, depending on what effect the conductor desires.” (2008: 3-4).
Tatham goes on to describe how, since strategic communication “typically overarches traditional civilian public diplomacy activities and traditional military effects”, it creates “increasing blurring as the UK evolves its policy” (2008: 4).

Bolstering the transition to this strategy in America is ‘smart power’. This latest buzz-word of Joseph Nye goes beyond ‘soft power’; working in partnership with practitioners and policy advisors like Richard Armitage to theoretically unite defense with economic and communicative forms of power. It seeks to ensure “American influence” through an “integrated grand strategy” to “match our strategies and structures at home to the challenges that face us abroad” utilising “civilian instruments” (Armitage & Nye, 24th April 2008: 3). They made recommendations on how to go ahead and tie policy to message and in 2008 Joe Biden as head of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee chaired a series of hearings to discuss its utility.

Republicans proposed new legislation to bring about change. The Smith-Thornberry amendment (H.A. 5) to the 2009 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 5658) sought to tighten leadership and strengthen interagency coordination. It called for a “comprehensive interagency strategy for strategic communications” specifying the roles of the Departments of Defense and State, and introduced the idea of a new “Center for Strategic Communication” (Blankley & Horn, 29th May 2008). The intention was to centralise everything (inc. “information, educational and cultural activities”) under this Center as a result of the Strategic Communications Act of 2008 (S. 3546) and “comprehensively transform, rather than reform, the nation’s strategic communications framework” (Dale, 5th March 2009). Some conservatives don’t think it goes far enough and would centralise control still further (Dale, 5th March 2009). Yet many of these ideas receive bipartisan endorsement; everyone from Hilary Clinton and Madeline Albright, to military leaders such as Gen. Zinni, Adm. Smith and Gen. Abizaid, voiced their support (Armitage & Nye, 24th April 2008: 6). This process led to the initial creation of Thorp’s position as lead in Strategic Communications, though it was still controversial, he was given an imprecise title “Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Joint Communications” to avoid inflaming concern about changes (24th August 2009).
Rather than being set back by the change of Administration, the approach was embraced and even gained ideological momentum into the Obama Administration. This can be seen in the example of the Round Tables mentioned in Chapter 3. Zinni stated he thought that with “SMART power, you’re gonna see more contracting” (2nd June 2009). While some high-profile contractors are in the midst of PR recoil, it seems unlikely the industry will be allowed to collapse. In the UK, last year the Ministry of Defence reported “to be considering a large increase in the number of support contracts it outsources to industry” (Defense Management, 2009). The maintenance of an open international economy is a crucial element of the ‘whole of government’ plan (Armitage & Nye, 24th April 2008: 3). The drive to SMART power identifies a clear goal of creating a “free trade” core in the WTO and demands the Obama Administration “lock in a minimum measure of global trade liberalisation” (Armitage & Nye, 24th April 2008: 10). One function of this will be to strengthen government relationships with “nonofficial generators of soft power” which according to Nye and Armitage include “everything from Hollywood to the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation” a private actor they describe as having “the throw-weight of a government” (Armitage & Nye, 24th April 2008: 4).

It is an idea with a strong history; George F Kennan’s plans for the post-war reconstruction of Europe. In a secret document Kennan delineated that “...we must recognize that much of the value of a European recovery program will lie not so much in its direct economic effects, which are difficult to calculate with any degree of accuracy, as in its psychological and political by-products. To state this publicly however would be a self-defeating act. For the Europeans themselves, the restoration of confidence must be an unconscious - not a conscious - process. This would only confuse them and undermine in advance precisely the psychological reaction which we aim to produce” (1947: 3).

With the ‘whole of government’ plan, America’s desired global effects would also be ‘unconscious’; American policy would bring about its desired outcomes not by force, these would apparently be freely chosen. Kennan’s was not simply an economic plan - nor was it a propaganda strategy, this plan required policy (involving various elements of governmental apparatus - economic, political and
civlian) being coordinated behind a desired psychological goal (Kennan, 1947). It represents the supreme institutionalised ‘secret message’. Insisting that “the Europeans come up with their own ideas”, he sought to create the conditions whereby the target populations would make the ‘right’ decisions and support the strategy that was in American interests themselves (Kennan, 1967: 15). The idea behind Strategic Communication mirrors Kennan’s in that its “political effects would have to be indirect, not direct” orchestrated through economic, military, political and informational spheres (Kennan, 1967: 15). It bears a striking resemblance to the current idea of an ‘effects-based’ approach to communication mentioned above. In interview Dorril argued that “Obama’s getting an incredibly soft ride on all this. It’s accelerated under Obama... [he’s] far worse I think” (20th July 2010). This all represents a continuation in the trend toward increasing flexibility of function cross-government and integration of the propaganda apparatus discussed in the last chapter.

**Conclusion**

There is some recent concern from industry officials that “the ‘whole of government’ strategy advocated in the National Security Strategy hasn’t materialized” (Erwin, August 2010). With a troubled economy it has proved harder than anticipated to wrest control from the military and invest in a coordinating infrastructure for cross-government efforts. Figures for the State Department civilian surge in 2010 for Afghanistan were $6bn which compares with $65bn just in emergency funding for the Pentagon, an amount which doesn’t include “war-related expenses that are already embedded in the baseline budget” (Erwin, August 2010). According to Adams the continuing “weakness of [American] civilian institutions of statecraft” is making “the expansion of the DoD role a self-fulfilling prophecy” (23rd June 2010). Despite the continuing efforts to engineer a ‘whole of government’ approach, in an ongoing recession budgets have been drawn toward Americas powerful defense lobby.

In the US this has bolstered traditional rivalries between the agencies of government and a defence-led system seems intractable. All sides were asserting that this ‘War on Terrorism’ created a need for flexible responses but the formal systems (particularly the Pentagon) have failed to coordinate. The extension of
capabilities has often progressed in both countries into a great many hands without adequate guidance and a supportive infrastructure. Meanwhile operations have continued, and practise has evolved conceptually into the ‘strategic communication’ approach. This raises the important question of how practise did function. In America, across the interagency Rumsfeld’s attempts at formal control were being resisted and others’ were advanced through struggles of influence or coercion. According to Nagl, for organisational change “The crucial first step” is “identifying a need to learn by recognizing that the institution is not accomplishing its objectives in the situation”; the problem for America was its failure to “achieve organizational consensus on required changes” (2002: 192 & 221). While Rumsfeld sought to impose formal transition through Special Operations, contracting and greater flexibility of propaganda use the form this transition took was at times navigated informally. The trends noted in Chapter 3 were facilitated to some extent in both countries through initiative, using informal structures. According to Nagl, “the key to organizational learning is getting the decision-making authority to allow such innovation, monitor its effectiveness, and then transmit new doctrine with strict requirements that it be followed throughout the organisation” but this strategic leadership was just what was lacking (202: 195). The next chapter will explore these institutional responses to the problematic formal apparatus’. It will argue that constrained formal mechanisms created conditions where aspects of the institutional cultures resulted in a more informal approach. This was characterised by a growth in initiative limited by institutional interests. The chapter argues that this enabled individuals to operate across the inter-agency, contributing to the greater flexibility of systems of propaganda including those discussed in Chapter 3.

47 Mackay’s problems in Helmand, detailed in chapter 3, exemplify this in the British example.
Chapter 5: Culture & the Role of Informal Structures for Britain and America

Introduction

As detailed above, the more widely-drawn apparatuses proved challenging to coordinate between the existing formal structures, and attempts to formally give them strategic direction were laboured. Yet as chapter 3 showed, function in the extensive propaganda apparatus continued. One of the chief theoretical concerns for the present chapter is how practical propaganda functions were maintained by each country. This was especially a problem for America given the rigidity of its formal structures. Inconsistently, some coordination did occur between the agents handling the propaganda war (who were required somehow to fulfil their duties) and the wider apparatuses of each government. This chapter discusses two aspects which were shared by the institutional cultures and articulated through the interviews. These appeared particularly relevant to the propaganda war in directing particular responses and framing solutions:

- The ‘service motive’
- An increase in individual initiative/pragmatism

The chapter will present the argument that informal interactions and informal ways of addressing problems were favoured, to enable the navigation of formal barriers, and continue pursuit of institutional goals. It will show a rise in the importance of informal structures in coordinating defence planning in the information war and discuss the implications of this informality for accountability.

This chapter again deals with the domestic political contexts of both countries and integrates these accounts to develop a thematic argument highlighting trends crucial to propaganda policymaking. These domestic patterns will be shown in Chapter 6 to have shaped the relationship between the countries and inter-country planning structures that coordinated joint propaganda efforts.

Institutional Culture & the Navigation of Formal Barriers

The chapter seeks to address how practical propaganda functions were maintained despite the failings of formal structures. It builds on the argument
above; that insular, inflexible governmental structures restricted attempts to formally coordinate both countries’ information campaigns, especially America’s. As Drogin rightly asserted the “institutional systems and bureaucracies that are always feeding material upwards, not sideways” were the product of “cultural differences that are hard to overemphasise” between government agencies (22nd August 2009). Yet parallels between cultures also allowed for the surreptitious and pragmatic navigation of the formal structures in both countries. Personnel took measures to navigate the institutional barriers and fulfil functions for which they were responsible; solutions and priorities were guided by cultural boundaries. The chapter will show this process and consider how shared understandings were regulated and maintained as part of a culture and system of relations that would support the continuation of practical propaganda functions.

Wilson defines organisational culture as a “persistent, patterned way of thinking about the central tasks of and human relationships within an organisation” (1989: 91). The scope of this thesis cannot extend to a comprehensive examination of the many diverse cultures that comprise the two countries’ governmental structures but this chapter draws attention to two characteristics, highlighted in interviews to be relevant in both militaries and bureaucracies:

- Public Service Motive
- Initiative

These were in tension and existing to a greater or lesser extent across government and military in each country. They were significant in shaping responses and framing how an evolving propaganda ‘problem’ was seen. It is important at this stage to remind the reader that the sample necessarily could not be representative of the military or bureaucracy as a whole. However, it represents a selection of key planners and decision-formers involved in the information war, and a diversity of opinion through which such cultural attributes were mediated.

Through informal processes of resistance and change we can see how “organisation” and its “function” varied over time with function being often contingent upon an evolving relationship between the individuals and the
organisation (Scott, 2004: 332). Nagl argues that “the varying strategic and organisational cultures of different organisations play a critical role in the organisations’ abilities to adapt their structure and function to the demands placed on them” (2002: 6). As practice changed institutional cultures began to evolve and the function of the agencies of government subtly changed shape.

‘Service’ Motives, Propaganda and the ‘Real’ World: the Rise of Initiative

This section will introduce the ‘public service’ motive as an aspect of the culture of public bodies which discourages critical judgement in favour of internal cohesion (Williams, 1958). Its paternalistic culture confirms institutional goals and encourages dismissal and detachment from wider values, even those of other government bodies. In this way it supports the tendency toward ‘stovepipes’. The section will show how, as inflexible formal conditions constrained individuals' actions institutional perceptions often embodied a ‘real world’ perceived as misunderstood by outsiders and public. The cultures display a tendency to self-contained, self-justifying systems whose interests are seen as by definition in the ‘public service’. This provides a legitimacy for propaganda and wider governmental and military action. It is argued that the cultures can act as an enabler for ad-hoc solutions that reach beyond circumscribed formal roles. Bureaucratic momentum and professional ambitions drove pressure to ‘get the job done’ and prioritised pragmatism and initiative by often well-intentioned individuals with a strong belief in what they were doing. This was advanced by “goal displacement”, where functionaries’ original purposes are extended to new initiatives (Bauman, 1988: 484). The legitimacy of ‘public service’ became permissibility for informal solutions and thus could not be seen as apart from intervening interests. Ultimately it will be argued that personal and institutional priorities, brought this into tension with the declared service motive of the ‘larger good’ and may have fuelled increased ‘politicisation’, competition and the suppression of dissent.

The notion of public service is rooted in established ideas of the state derived from classical social contract theory and translated in contemporary society into the idea of a representative government in the service of citizens. In the

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48 As Chapter 6 will discuss, this also applies to the Anglo-American relationship, which changed over time. Informal relationships helped Britain’s leadership to sustain a prominent role.
49 Discussion of this will be extended in Chapter 7 to consider the work of Raymond Williams and aspects of the cultural change in propaganda.
50 Especially Hobbes (1651), Locke (1690) and Rousseau (1762)
contemporary system of representative democracy public administration draws its legitimacy from the idea that decisions of elected policymakers embody the wishes of citizens and they delegate responsibility for their enactment to administrators, clearly defining their roles through a hierarchy. This way “complex missions could be separated into their individual components, each component could be assigned to individual administrators, and administrators would know what they were - and were not - charged with doing. The principle of authority would hold everyone in the system accountable. Policymakers delegated authority to the bureaucracy, and higher-level bureaucrats could use authority to control what their subordinates did. The application of these two principles - hierarchy and authority - would promote efficiency by allowing the creation of sophisticated bureaucracies full of highly skilled workers. It would promote accountability by specifying the relationship of each worker to policymakers. And it would do all of these things by carefully structuring the work within clear boundaries” (Kettl, 2002: 8).

Yet people are not automatons; they have conflicting views. Raymond Williams argued that the administrator or ‘servant’ is expected to subordinate “his own interests” to “a larger good” of society or national security (Williams, 1958: 329). This ensures people with divergent political views can be relied upon to maintain a cohesive functioning institution. Some level of initiative is expected, desirable\textsuperscript{51} and simultaneously dangerous to this system. Combined with training in ‘government’; in skills to “supervise and direct” this ‘service’ motive embodies an essential conservatism in tension with individual initiative and in support of a self-contained belief-system (Williams, 1958: 329).

\textit{Initiative & Informal Relationships}

Strategic coordination laboured at the planning table. This chapter will argue that where the frustration of barriers prevented function, individuals sought solutions. Where successful coordination \textit{did} occur it appeared to be largely due to the operation/intervention of informal factors. Organisation proceeded in an ad-hoc way across and between formal structures. While formal cooperative

\footnote{51 Though the extent to which it is encouraged/tolerated differs according to culture (see below for British and US historical differences).}
structures produced the conditions for informal ties, and informal relationships supported and drove those formal structures, the two were often mutually antagonistic.

Initiative has been usefully defined by Occupational Psychologist Michael Frese as “an active behaviour of employees, who show a high degree of proactivity (preparing for future problems and opportunities now), are self-starting” and persist in overcoming barriers (Frese, et al, 1996 & Frese, c.2009). The British military has historically been considered flexible and adaptable for problem-solving, a past suited to counterinsurgency (including propaganda and political warfare); yet evidence of a rise in initiative in US defense is surprising considering scholarly literature in this area (Nagl, 2002). According to Nagl, “Barry Posen argued that fundamental change in military organisations occurs as a result of the efforts of external civilian reformers, often with the assistance of individual military officers he called ‘mavericks’” who were responding to a gap between doctrine and the emergent security threat (2002: 3).

The enhanced role played by initiative and pragmatism by people trying to ‘get things done’ in ‘real world’ circumstances fed an increasing reliance on informal relationships. The next section will examine more thoroughly how pragmatism and the ‘service’ motive translated into the form and prominence of informal relationships for both countries. Significantly, these will be shown to have moved beyond the routine amicable relations necessary for maintaining ordinary function of a formal apparatus. Informal and formal pressures challenged the extent to which the ‘service’ motive was a limiting factor in actions and saw it becoming increasingly visible as a tool of suppression. Although whether military innovation can happen independently of civilian pressures is still in debate, some have suggested the importance of the relationship between them (Waddell, 1993). Avant argues that the civilian American leadership have more “institutional incentives to act separately” which traditionally made it “harder to agree on policy goals and often chose more complex oversight mechanisms” that discouraged innovation (1994: 130-131).
The Office of Strategic Influence (set up in October 2001 to tackle the Pentagon’s propaganda campaign) provides an early example of how a rigid American formal defence structure began to be resisted and informally navigated. The Potomac Institute’s Director, Dennis McBride, who was contracted to work for this Office stated that “the President himself ordered that a special office be created within the [Office of] Secretary of Defense” recalling Karen Hughes, “a very close ally of President Bush” established it (McBride, 5th June 2009). According to US News, its Director was to be Simon ‘Pete’ Worden, who was given $100 million of Pentagon emergency funds. The chief weapon was to be hi-tech radio and internet operation to open up information channels in the Middle East and, according to Worden, ”The target was the kids [...] Information is the atomic bomb” (Worden, in US News, 17th April 2005). Wilkerson argued that, in an attempt to improve its ineffective but plentiful propaganda soup, America resorted to “the secret message [my emphasis] and we have this forlorn hope [...] that it will never get out” (23rd June 2009).

Chapter 3 discussed the Potomac Institute project to plant stories in the media for the Office of Strategic Influence, which was then disbanded. Though the Office’s activities were publicly decried (as mentioned) McBride’s evidence shows that after the highly-controlled Office was scrapped, the apparatus of government was flexible enough for this project to be pragmatically poached by the State Department. Former Head of Public Affairs, Thorp argued that Office of Strategic Influence was created because “there were people in the policy division of the Department of Defense, who objected to the free flow of communication that was coming out” (24th August 2009). It was the centralised structural form of the Pentagon-controlled Office of Strategic Influence that was rejected by the administration as too rigid. Thorp claimed that “Tori Clark who was the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, vehemently objected to it. You know... there's one voice of the [Department of Defense] and that is the Assistant Secretary of Public Affairs. And her point was, ‘Thank you very much, I'm very capable of coordinating that message across Government of the United States’ as

52 Wilkerson said the Office of Strategic Influence was set up by Rumsfeld (23rd June 2009); Thorp denied this (24th August 2009).
53 Worden has since compiled a database of “210 million publicly available Facebook profiles” for research and social profiling (http://petewarden.typepad.com/searchbrowser/2010/02/how-to-split-up-the-us.html).
well as with her counterpart in the UK.” (24th August 2009).

Apparently Jeffrey Jones’ attempts to coordinate the interagency information war were thrown at this early point by media attention over the Pentagon’s Office. It caused the White House to become “skittish” and the panel suffered when “some agencies dropped out” and “panel members soon were distracted” dealing with Iraq (Gerth, 11th December 2005). The Office of Strategic Influence was a means to control the formal functions of propaganda; staff would not coordinate with outside bodies and this created internal conflict. Its failure marks an early point in the rise of informal structures bypassing and rejecting formal structures. It lacked the flexible, inter-personal pragmatism that was to become so crucial to successful execution of propaganda functions in both military and bureaucracy.

While structurally change was laboured, we can see from Chapter 3 and 4 that the culture change was beginning in how the information war was seen as needing to be handled. In a notoriously rigid military the rise in ‘effects-based’ planning had begun to widen possible solutions. The very nature of ‘effects-based’ propaganda favours initiative, as discussed in chapter 3. Not all embraced coordination across propaganda forms - it required a gradual culture change. Thorp pragmatically sought a solution to the problem of formal boundaries preventing coordination. He began to encourage Psychological Operations and Public Affairs teams to work together. He sought to enable a more collaborative working environment with more flexibility in how staffs were working together. During interview he seemed pleased that now,

“The Public Affairs folks have also recognised the value of what psychological operations do, and recognised the value of coordinating with them” (Thorp: 24th August 2009).

Interestingly, pragmatic solutions were becoming so important that by 2003 the British Army’s Adrian Weale, who worked for the CPA in Southern Iraq described how when communications came from the Americans at the CPA in Baghdad “it was often difficult to work out what was the official order, and what was just somebody’s bright idea...” (26th November 2010). Weale argued that, “what
there wasn’t a clear chain of command. From Baghdad to us, or Baghdad to Basra and then on to us.” (26th November 2010).54

Frustrating as this was, for those concerned it offered its own means of evasion. Through pragmatism and initiative, personnel could utilise informal relationships with American officers to get things done. In one example, Weale described how a British bureaucrat, Charles McFadden in CPA Basra was supposed to approve all “reconstruction projects and we’d feed project after project in to him to get his approval [...] Nothing ever came back...” (26th November 2010). McFadden had been overwhelmed, Weale

“went to see him on one occasion and his desk was just piled up with these things [...] not just from us but from all across the South and he didn’t seem to have done any of it” (26th November 2010).

The CPA had been badly coordinated, and responded defensively to unrealistic outsider expectations. In response to McFadden’s uncooperative, “jobsworths” approach, Weale navigated away informally,

“we found [...] a US Air Force contracting officer who could also approve these projects if they were you-know, handled in the right way... and so we just short-cut and went to them” (26th November 2010).

Such informal Anglo-American interaction will be explored further in the next chapter.

While it does not necessarily follow that America’s military would respond in the same way, in Britain, initiative and peoples’ attempts to work through informal channels were accelerated by the barriers obstructing their fulfilment of public service functions. It may be the result of tension between this and wider American individualism. Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry shows how initiative was enhanced as a necessary response to enhanced restrictions placed on British Officers in Iraq war planning. In one example, officers had to make arrangements themselves for organising US-UK data communications capability leading them to establish informal planning structures (Paton, 19th November 2009). Adrian Weale described how the information warfare function had been

54 A direction came from Baghdad in this way for a ‘Clean-up Nasirya’ campaign, “a sort of a crude info op”; CPA staff “had about 5 days notice [...] to set up a recruitment process and buy overalls for these guys to work [and] be identifiable as working for the CPA and this would be great” (Weale, 26th November 2010). Apparently, when it was announced “about 20,000 people turned up” leading to a riot (Weale, 26th November 2010).
assigned to the Italians whose capabilities were weak in this area. Getting little strategic coordination from the Americans in Baghdad Weale’s own proactive team “did what we could” through speaking with local and international journalists, even though this was not in their remit, he said “we ended up doing it all” (26th November 2010). Likewise, one PSYOPS officer thought information operations had such little prominence in formal British planning, he sought to achieve it “by sheer force of personality”, ensuring he was present at “most planning meetings” in 2004 (Corcoran, 8th June 2006).

Likewise Graham Wright asserted that the Ministry of Defence had greatly reduced its endlessly circulating paperchains; now preferring verbal communication (1st June 2009). Yet this increased informality may also be due to “panic” about Freedom of Information changes (Sumption quoted in Wheeler, 1st July 2010). Jonathan Sumption QC (who represented the British government in the Hutton Enquiry) reported that civil servants “omitted significant information from internal documents, which in earlier times would have been included” and, “in some departments it was quite common for politically sensitive matters to be omitted from documentary records” (Sumption quoted in Wheeler, 1st July 2010). It seems civil servants therefore “communicated [...] informally instead, so that they would not be recorded in writing” (Sumption quoted in Wheeler, 1st July 2010). This censorship response is being used as an argument against extending Freedom of Information further. One Flight Lieutenant observed how, in Britain, “there was almost certainly a culture change with more political considerations than in the past”55 (Anonymous, 2010b).

Examples of formal close-down can also be seen in the American bureaucracy where Rumsfeld apparently shouted at people in meetings for taking notes, and restricted the circulation of information to senior figures including Miller and Rice (Woodward, 2007). Franklin Miller from the National Security Council was responsible for coordinating the inter-agency at the strategic level. His description of this sits in stark contrast to Bradley Graham’s account of Rumsfeld as taking “the lead” in interagency coordination cited in the previous chapter (24th July 2009). Miller revealed in interview how the cultures of the Pentagon and military became so insular they became impossible to influence,

55 This can be seen in the possible increase in distrust regarding the Ministry of Defence’s treatment of personnel following membership of the International Criminal Court - see below.
“Sec. Rumsfeld had made clear that he held the rest of the inter-agency in general contempt and that attitude was transferred to all his Lieutenants [...] it was more difficult to get information and to get people to be interested in doing things that they hadn't thought of themselves” (3rd August 2009).

He asserted “that was not the case on the military side…” (Miller, 3rd August 2009). His and the military’s reaction to the situation was one of pragmatism; they had a job to do and sought solutions. As Adm. Fallon argued “Whoever can help, I don’t care, I’m not biased. I’ll take anybody that has a brain who can help me.” (21st July 2009). We have seen through Ren Stelloh and other accounts in Chapter 3 how this initiative-drive drove an increase in ‘flexible’ private sector solutions (23rd June 2009).

Initiative meant while “there was a great deal of interaction between Rumsfeld and his commanders in the field” this communication was not always effective; initiative was an intervening factor (Miller, 3rd August 2009). Miller noted “cases where Rumsfeld was clearly not cognoscente of what was going on” (3rd August 2009). To compound this Miller found

“there wasn’t that much coming out of the political authorities, by which I mean President, Vice-President, Sec. Of State [...] National Security Advisor, in terms of direction to the ground Commanders. There was fretting, there was a feeling things aren’t not going right. The Communications campaign was floundering, that we were taking casualties and not obviously responding in the right way” (Miller, 3rd August 2009).

This tendency in the Pentagon bureaucracy led to dissatisfaction and a growing tendency for individuals in the military and wider bureaucracy to seek pragmatic solutions. This way, informal relationships became increasingly important, beyond maintaining institutional integrity through shared culture, they enabled interaction between and within formal structures. Rumsfeld apparently believed the reason he’d failed in strategic communication was “he just couldn’t get the bureaucracy to sort-of engage”; Rumsfeld found, “he could rant and rave [...] but the bureaucracy had a way of even confounding and resisting him.” (Graham, 24th July 2009).
At the US strategic level even the closest senior relationships were subject to an organising principle of pragmatism, carrying out functions by whatever means necessary. Private interests also shaping some individuals’ interplay with the structure. Rumsfeld rendered any attempt at strategic coordination impotent according to Miller who apparently chose to bypass him and rely on relationships;

“...four-stars in the Pentagon [...] calling [about] things that they thought I needed to know and [Condoleezza] Rice, [Stephen] Hadley and indeed the President needed to know that would never have gotten out of the Pentagon on a front channel” (3rd August 2009).

This was a practise encouraged by Condoleezza Rice who Woodward argues ordered “if you can't do it through the front channels, call someone you know, and use the back channel” (2007). This worked internally too, one former Pentagon official recently claimed in a popular military blog,

“Colonels are always trying to manoeuvre generals into promoting their agendas. This is the way the real world operates, and the name of the game in this kind of staff work is always the same: remove all reasonable alternatives to your agenda to insure the decision goes your way” (Spinney, 2nd October 2010).

Ultimately Miller had his people “all over their internal networks” so that he “had at least as much” information (3rd August 2009). Cheney too was a pragmatist, and Miller worked this; Cheney was “getting a lot less information from DoD” than via him (3rd August 2009).

Miller recalled things working similarly with the CIA (3rd August 2009). Case Officer Stelloh described during interview, the crucial instruction of the Deputy Director of Operations Jim Pavitt after 9/11 to the Domestic Chiefs, to “redouble” and immediately begin “scrubbing the [...] private sector for tools” to use in the war, as also having gone through a “back-channel” (23rd June 2009). Scott points out that initiative may be an important element of the culture of operations in all intelligence agencies (2004). Across the inter-agency and with “Her Majesty’s Government” things proceeded through similar channels; informal relations were becoming crucial to operations56 (Miller, 3rd August 2009). A move towards an enhanced pragmatic emphasis on initiative

56 This will be developed in the next chapter.
aimed at achieving particular goals was accompanied by cultural changes and tensions.

Dahrendorf observed that the confidence of “members of socially homogenous elites” can make them more likely to take “unorthodox” decisions (1988: 53). Nagl links this to the British Military (2002: 195) but the opposite seems to be true of the ‘stovepiped’ American bureaucracy. Initiative was enhanced by a more individualistic, competitive culture in the military and beyond; it became more politicised. Kambrod’s claims, that Pentagon civilians don’t have the “fire in their belly” of the “young Majors and Lieutenant Colonels” who are more driven by promotion and receptive to the efficiency claims of new technologies, by implication say a lot about military culture (2007: 18). He states that civilians with long tenure are the “hardest people with whom to do business” arguing that greater “job security” means efficiency is not their overriding priority (Kambrod, 2007: 18). This of course makes the claims that job security became more tenuous, political and competitive in Rumsfeld’s Pentagon highly significant; its transitional nature may actually accelerate pragmatic solutions, risk-taking and private contracting. Miller, a military man, argued that “in the Department of Defense, when there’s an election, probably 400 people change [...] then you get it in each of the Services [...] and they’re all at the top” he said “the culture” is “imported” through a large number of “political appointees” (3rd August 2009). Discussing the political manoeuvring within the US military, a former Pentagon official recently claimed in a popular military blog that,

“The Pentagon is a rat’s nest of military-industrial factions, factions inside factions, and ever shifting alliances - all competing with each other. The information game is easily played at all levels - which is one reason why this behaviour is so intractable.” (Spinney, 2nd October 2010).

This complicates the rigid formal structure. According to Plame Wilson, after 9/11 the traditional service motive was increasingly in tension with more individualist and political forces in the bureaucracy (23rd June 2007).

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57 Politicisation is perceived also as a growing problem in Britain, as Blair imported American-style Public Relations approaches, buying in ‘spin’ professionals like Campbell and ‘political advisors’; yet this faced resistance unlike the long-established individualism and private sector approach of the US (Jones, 2001).
According to Miller, Cheney and Rumsfeld are often considered to have had an “unholy dark power that... if Cheney knew something, Rumsfeld knew it...” (3rd August 2009). It was a key relationship and Wilkerson recalled how “when you saw those two together. Their body language, you didn’t know which one was Vice-President and which one was Secretary of Defense” (Wilkerson, 23rd June 2009). Cheney’s significance has been likened to a co-Presidency (Warshaw, 2009). Rumsfeld used to be Cheney’s boss, in a relationship that dated from the 1960’s. Many of these relationships were long-standing but their functional significance here was according to need. Miller argued that, “Cheney, through Libby was getting once a day, twice a day copies of these Pentagon slides that I stole. [...] And any time, Cheney, who knew where they were coming from, could’ve said to Rumsfeld, ‘Boy you better tighten up your computer networks, cause Miller’s and his people are all over you’. Not once, not him, not ever. So I’m not quite so sure that this monolithic Cheney-Rumsfeld front relationship was an entirely accurate description of what the situation was.” (3rd August 2009).

Official doctrine and formal organisation appear to have moved too slowly as individuals sought to tackle problems that presented themselves via informal channels. Relationships were crucial with everything being arranged informally. Miller claimed to have organised a ‘virtual team’ “where various different people in the NSC would gather in my office twice a week to kinda talk about what else they were doing, humanitarian stuff and people who were doing the intel stuff [...] the guys who did WMD’s just didn’t come...” (3rd August 2009).

The ability to draw on informal contacts seemed limited more by circumstance. The military on the ground found differences in coordination very much depended on the divisional commander. And for instance, the CPA in Nasiriya “were in a building in the middle of the town so we continuously interacted [...] whereas for example in Maysan our equivalent group were constantly living under mortar fire in the civic house. And in Basra [the Americans] were all locked behind the palace walls” (26th November 2010).

58 It was often the strength of relationships, between people who no longer worked alongside each other, that helped me as a researcher to navigate closed networks and obtain interviews.
Just as in Nagl’s Malaya example “Not all members of the British Army were so open to innovation”, initiative in the both countries’ political and military systems was subject to variation in circumstances, personalities and institutional differences. While the Defense Department was certainly insular during this period, informal dynamics at times appear to have powerfully broken through the autonomy of formal structures, utilising pressure and initiative to ‘get things done’. A clear tension emerged between existing ‘service’ motives, and the tactics and resultant politicisation inspired by the pragmatism of individuals and the pressures of circumstance.

Momentum, Suppression and Dissent

It appeared particularly in the American case that this enhanced individual pragmatism and informality in carrying out functions was characterised by the suppression of dissent through coercive means. Former CIA Division Chief Tyler Drumheller claims there is pressure in Federal Government and an ethic discourages questioning and dissent (Drumheller, 1st February 2008). This was backed up by Wilkerson who described the pressure to ‘get things done’;

“You’ve still got people somewhere in there who are critical to the decision who are not gonna agree with the decision and who are going to be trying to undermine you or ignore you and their ignoring you is gonna hurt you. [...] So it’s sometimes formidable [...] even when you’ve got most of the bureaucracy you need to support, you may not have the kind of support you need in other elements of the government.” (23rd June 2009).

Intimidation, coercion and other forms of informal pressure seem to have played a key role in the internal power dynamics that informally sustained American operations. Miller stated that he “had no direct authority over” his “virtual team” but claimed “I could push them in certain directions and they would, by virtue of what it was uh, listen” (Miller, 3rd August 2009). Wilkerson also recalls how Vice President

“Dick Cheney went into the Republican caucuses, he went into the committee meetings he went into the sub-committee meetings, and he strong-armed people [...] more than any other Vice-President in our history. And the Congress was so feckless and so spineless they never kicked him out” (23rd June 2009).
Similarly, when asked to comment on how dissenting voices were received, Armitage said,

“Oh it got through to Rumsfeld and then he’d fire people, remove them, and whatnot, and so I think to some extent senior leadership was cowed. In my personal view, [...] I can’t prove it to you, [...] Mr Rumsfeld bullied Tommy Franks and others into having a very low number on the invasion force because he wanted to disenfranchise the so-called Powell Doctrine” (21st July 2009).

Miller asserted that an unstable bureaucracy produces an environment unsympathetic to dissent. He said when,

“you bring in people from the outside who have strong political views, [...] they only wanna hear about certain kinds of things and if [...] you get in the way you’re dead. [...] They sideline you. Reassign you a job fetching a glass of water and there’s nothing you can do about it. There is no recourse, no court of appeal” (3rd August 2009).

This most acutely affects the Pentagon, since unlike the CIA there are limited career professionals in the leadership positions of the Defense bureaucracy.

This extract from Miller’s interview shows how formal and informal worked increasingly in tandem,

“In the [...] inter-agency system, NSC staff is not empowered to make a decision that binds a cabinet government. So [...] you bring people together and you try to convince them that it’s the right thing to do. Or coerce them that it’s the right thing to do. Or to embarrass them that it’s the right thing to do! ...And if things aren’t happening then you would generally, in prior administrations forward the issue for decision to the Deputies’ Committee which could [...] make a ruling. And if that failed then it would go to the Principals, the Secretaries of Department, and if necessary the President. In the Bush 43 administration that was much more difficult because Rumsfeld did not recognise the Deputies as a decision-making body [...] a really tough issue that needed to be decided [...] had to go all the way up to the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defence... And even [...] if the President signs something [...] Pentagon staff wouldn’t necessarily

59 US officials often refer to an administration by the number of Presidents - Bush was the 43rd.
follow it. [...] Rumsfeld said [...] if I haven’t heard it personally from the President it’s not important [...] So it was much more challenging to get things done [...] you had to be more wiley and just try and convince and coerce, jolly people along, etc, etc…” (3rd August 2009).

This also demonstrates how informality was a response to rigidity which led to pressure and coercion as ‘real world’ tactics in pursuit of institutional goals. Dissent was dealt with and such activities were legitimized by the notion of public service. While pragmatism and initiative had led to personnel having ‘bright ideas’ (Weale, 26th November 2010) enabling function in a ‘real world’ constrained by formal structures, bureaucratic momentum and the mindset of the ‘public servant’ accorded a means of suppression to enact such ideas. Others might have their own agenda, their ‘bright ideas’ may not fall-in with your decision-making; and “every day they’re gonna undermine it” so according to Wilkerson, “you discount that [Public Service mentality] at your peril” (23rd June 2009).

Other methods attempted to sidestep dissent; Wilkerson stated that, thankfully, when under pressure to use oppressive methods and torture, many of America’s military personnel refused. Interestingly, their leaders did not force them to obey, but according to Wilkerson their lenience was motivated by pragmatism not compassion. Leaders “knew, from past experience, that when that happens, then you get whistleblowers, you get people who write to their congressman […] take pictures and so forth” (Wilkerson in Worthington, 24th August 2009). It was overlooked because of the pragmatism of their leaders, who, fearing public opinion, sought to secure the silence necessary to allow others to continue as normal with oppressive procedures. Documents recently appeared on Wikileaks showing claims of torture were “sent up the chain of command marked ‘no further investigation’” by the US military on the ground (BBC News, 23rd October 2010). Two documents that implicated British Officers were also covered up in Britain (Cusick, 24th October 2010). Rumsfeld’s lack of control over what appears to be a defensive Army institutional culture, was echoed by his biographer; “on key issues like Abu Ghraib, it was very much in his interest and in the Pentagon’s interest to investigate the hell outta that as quickly as possible, take action […] jail em or fire em” (Graham, 24th July
Rumsfeld assigned the army to oversee the investigation, who “Took months... years! [...] it drove Rumsfeld nuts! To the extent, he really didn’t wanna give the army any more important tasks if he could avoid it.” (Graham, 24th July 2009).

Later, when Rumsfeld wanted someone to build “a plan [...] to do reconstruction and stabilization more efficiently”; the Army was the “natural place in the Pentagon” to be “executive agent”, but “Rumsfeld did not want to give oversight to the Army, he wanted to give it to the Policy branch [...] because he just felt so burned by the Army on Abu Ghraib” (Graham, 24th July 2009).

Bureaucracy has a momentum in which people are swept up to enable continued function. Britain’s Adrian Weale described how CPA Dhi Qar “ran elections from September 2003 onwards [...] and at times we were told to carry on with them and at times we were ordered to halt” by the Americans at CPA Baghdad, but “The fact was that they’d taken on a momentum of their own and we couldn’t stop doing them so we sort-of cracked on regardless” (26th November 2010).

Bureaucratic momentum can be seen in Armitage’s statement that, “I understand the shock to the nervous system of 3,000 of our citizens being killed [...] by such a tremendous act of aggression, and we’d always been staying behind our two great oceans in the past. But for most soldiers, and most people who’ve been at war... I tell you, for Powell and me it was a day in the office. Bad day, but it was another day at the office” (21st July 2009).

While not always problematic, a sense of momentum at times helped to ensure dissent was not forthcoming; as in the ‘Curveball’ case.

Much of the justifications for the Iraq war were built on analysis of the evidence of German Intelligence’s ‘Curveball’ informant. It was the European Division of the Clandestine Service, operated by Drumheller who began investigating ‘Curveball’ in late 2002 and voicing concern. When Powell visited the CIA with concerns prior to speaking to the UN, he was assured it was a “100% completely reliable source” and wasn’t told about a “furious heated debate” between the Directorate of Intelligence and Directorate of Operations concerning the
evidence (Drumheller, 1st February 2008). The Clandestine Service was not present, though the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, John MacLaughlan, was; Drumheller had told MacLaughlan “just the Wednesday before” warning them “that we thought this case might be a fabricator” (Drumheller, 1st February 2008). When these much later were revealed to be foundationless, this exacerbated existing problems of consistency. CIA analysts had already built the case for war on the basis of this information by autumn 2002 (Drumheller, 1st February 2008). Pressure may have been heightened by Dick Cheney and Scooter Libby’s visiting CIA analysts (Wilkerson, 23rd June 2009); though Miller, who worked closely with Cheney, argued he was simply trying to deepen his understanding (3rd August 2009). Ultimately an individualistic and pragmatic desire to “please the principals” in Government contributed to a momentum in which “people were caught up,” and it became hard to back-pedal (Drumheller, 1st February 2008).

Drogin points out that “The curveball case is a fascinating case because […] it’s not a single bad guy, it’s about a system that, at every possible stage you have people going along, saying ‘well shit I don’t know if this is right but he must know, or she must know’ so you know they gonna pass it on” (22nd August 2009). He stated in this case that

“the analysts […] were very sceptical about the intelligence until they began seeing these […] classified reports from the bio-weapon people. And the bio-weapons people were relying internally on the curveball reports. So the chemical weapons people simply changed their analysis. They didn’t wanna be left behind.” (22nd August 2009). To some extent the momentum of occupational pressures allowed this to culminate in Powell’s notorious 2003 speech. Plame Wilson said,

“For me personally, it wasn’t until Colin Powell’s speech before the United Nations in late February 2003 that I realised the extent to which the Administration was twisting and turning intelligence. Because what he was talking about in his speech had no bearing on reality […] until that point […] I had been just working so hard making sure that my intelligence operations were secure, they were efficient, effective […] There was just so much coming over the [unclear] […] and Chalabi’s shovelling leaves at us […] and you’ve gotta go through
It takes time to validate an asset and to corroborate their information. Time. We ran out of time.” (23rd June 2007).

Bureaucracy operates in an atmosphere of inevitability where a sense of inertia can be generated in personnel caught in its momentum, a sense of a larger system of which people are a small part.

The ideological neo-conservative elements of the US military were a powerful proactive minority in tension with other elements in the senior bureaucracy and military. Others embodied a more traditionally cautious, less activist, pragmatic tradition of American Foreign Policy; that of Henry Kissinger and George F Kennan’s Containment policies, which is rooted in the ‘Structural Realism’ or ‘Neo-realism’ of Waltz and his successors (Waltz, 1979). In claiming “You can’t predict the future […] Once shooting starts a lot of bets are off…” Fallon articulated the widely-held perception which personnel take into account in assessing the impacts of an institution/organisation (21st July 2009). Allowances are sometimes made based on a ‘realist’ understanding of the international system as unpredictable and anarchic, to excuse institutional failure. Fallon himself identified a responsibility of the commander to “set up some bounds”, attempting to limit this (21st July 2009).

Drumheller asserted that the CIA, “is still a bureaucracy and people are still looking for ways to get ahead” (1st February 2008). According to an anonymous source, and confirmed by Miller (3rd August 2009) the world of the analysts works similarly to academia; progression is based upon publishing, and your work being read. So a reversal, as Drumheller recollects, was “not something that was gonna be done in this White House […] the atmosphere was not conducive to that” (1st February 2008).

This led to the CIA responding to pressure by “cherry-picking” intelligence that supported the popular ideas about Iraq, and drove messages in the propaganda war (Drumheller, 1st February 2008). Ultimately, the CIA worked bureaucratically to give the ‘principals’ the justifications they had asked for to

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60 Realism begins from a Hobbesian starting point seeing ‘human nature’ as leading to an international system characterised by power-hungry states (See Morgenthau, 2006). Neo-realism later abandoned this essentialism. Its adherents often begin from a ‘structural’ analysis; they too view actors in the international system as essentially self-interested, see Waltz for example (1979).

61 This has also been argued to have occurred in Britain, with Alastair Campbell (See Chapter 6).
support the war; the problem lay in the inflexible, unapproachable form of the strategic level coordination, which left a gulf between the image and the reality on the ground. Drumheller mentions “another source” which was “ignored” and now acknowledges that “maybe I should’ve gone to Powell directly, that’s what he said” however, he argues that “it’s still a disciplined organisation and it’s hard to go around that” (1st February 2008). Ultimately the internal pressures ensured that dissenting views did not escape the Agency.

However, Drogin also recalled how

“The DO guys - Tyler Drumheller, Margaret Henoch […] were making a stink about this, taking it all the way up to John MacLaughlen, then the number two guy at CIA, until they were essentially ordered to stop by their [unclear] at the Clandestine service who said this isn’t our case” (22nd August 2009).

He claimed “the head of the clandestine service […] Jim Pavitt” told him “at the time it wouldn’t have mattered. […] he said I could’ve tap-danced nude on top of the White House and it wasn’t going to stop the war” an irresponsible attitude according to Drogin that was not uncommon (22nd August 2009). As Miller states “After the fact, a lot of people came up and ‘see, I told you they never had it’ but these people were not obviously in evidence during the run-up to war” (3rd August 2009). The repression of dissent eventually culminated in the name of Valerie ‘Plame’ Wilson, a CIA operative, being leaked to discredit her husband Joe’s claim that Iraq had not obtained WMD from Niger. She recalled how “right before my husband’s op-ed piece came out” a number of anonymous “analysts” had been in the press “talking about the pressure that they had felt in the run-up to the war” (Plame Wilson, 23rd June 2007). Plame Wilson told how

“both Joe and I feel strongly that [her exposure] was in fact a very clear signal. Those that would speak out, that - look what we can do to you. We’ll not only take you down we’ll take your family.” (23rd June 2007).

**Public Service and Dissent**

Williams spoke of the close relationship between the idea of ‘service’ and individualism, a defining value of American culture which he defines as, “an idea of society as a neutral area within which each individual is free to pursue his
own development and his own advantage as a natural right” (1958: 328). While he examines the British cultural context, service is also fundamental to American bureaucratic and military service in a culture marked by its patriotism. Indeed Croft observes how representations of service and duty became a focus for remembrance and were one basis for delivering a ‘shared’ meaning for the ‘War on Terror’ response alongside with an “absence of blame within” (2006: 95 & 101). Valerie Plame Wilson often references strong values of ‘public service’ within her family preceding her CIA career and describes the traditional public service ethic. She argued

“I was at the working level and at the working level you don’t think about policies, you’re thinking about getting the best intelligence. Our mission is to get it to um, the senior policymakers who were going to make these decisions” (Plame Wilson, 23rd June 2007).

Plame Wilson demonstrates clearly how political beliefs and personal conscience can be subordinated to the role of servant.

“you certainly don’t serve overseas whether you are in an intelligence capacity or a military capacity or whatever, as a Republican. Or as a Democrat. You serve as an American. You are representing American interests and policy to the best ability” (23rd June 2007).

In ‘Politics as a Vocation’ Weber argues that the honour of the civil servant is “vested in his ability to execute conscientiously the order of superior authorities, exactly as if the order agreed with his own conviction”; it involves “moral discipline and self-denial in the highest sense” (in Gerth & Mills, 2005: 95). But Williams points out that “few men can give the best of themselves as servants; it is the reduction of man to a function” (1958: 330). Gramsci argued in his prison notebooks that “patriotism” or “nationalism” was the “link by means of which the unity of leaders and led is effected” (Mouffe, 1979: 194). It is also crucial that this ‘unity’ with leadership is extended through to decision-makers in propaganda, and wider defence planners; to reinforce ‘value’ in their actions and frame their interpretation of situations and information to which they will be required to respond.62

The suppression of dissent and a culture of non-questioning in US government agencies emerged within a ‘public service’ mindset of this kind; personnel were

expected to follow decisions not question them. Miller described President Bush’s “tendency to be somewhat impulsive” but that “had someone thrown themselves in front of that train and said - Mr President, we need 48 hours to sort this out” he would have trusted that (3rd August 2009). Yet Miller recalled a sense that culturally it couldn’t happen;

“the way Hadley and Rice were, I mean, when I went to Hadley after that meeting ended and said - oh my god! [Hadley] said ‘Decision’s been made. It’s done.’” (3rd August 2009).

In many ways the ‘service’ motive serves primarily to bind public servants commitment to the organisation’s goals and to its other members.

Compared with the British system, the US military has been notoriously inflexible and resistant to individual initiative and adaptation, having failed to learn from Vietnam experience (Nagl, 2002). Throughout British colonial history its military evolved to see their function as “the use of limited force” in the “pacification” of potential British subjects whereas it was the American belief that counterinsurgency was “not the army’s true business” (Nagl, 2002: 36 & 46). Historically Britain’s military was characterised by pragmatic expansions and contractions, forming ad-hoc expeditionary forces to “meet particular emergencies” (Barnett, 1970: xix). Post-war, its approach to warfare valued minimal manpower; a flexible, political warfare that recognised the constraints “set by public opinion” (Nagl, 2002: 41). According to Nagl American history instilled a notion that “politics ceases when war begins”; an overwhelming emphasis on hard power allowed no shades of grey (2002: 43). Rumsfeld’s biographer described how much of the Pentagon’s internal struggles were “rooted in a fundamental clash […] of views about what was the proper” mission “for US military” particularly in “the grey area […] countering Al Qaeda in friendly regions […] and the internet” because “you can’t isolate operations anymore” (Graham, 24th July 2009). Pierce’s characteristics of the inflexible US Army (see Chapter 4) contrast with values the officers considered would be desirable for the institution’s culture, including flexibility, participation, innovation and emphasis on professional growth (Lovelace in Pierce, September 2010: iv).
Nagl argues that US society historically “felt a sense of ownership of its national army” (2002: 43). Uncritical media organisations play an important role in ‘manufacturing consent’ (Chomsky, 1988) and both patriotism and the military permeated cultural life in Washington DC; the highest honour being to ‘serve’ the country. In Nagl’s words; American warfare is characterised by “faith in the uniqueness and the moral mission of the United States” (2002: 43). The view that questioning was disrespectful to those who give their lives was not unusual in the area in which I stayed, an affluent area popular with public servants, military and politicians. British personnel interviewed seemed far more cynical about the idea of ‘service’ and the goals of their institution, something reflective of wider societal critique in that country.

There was also some cynicism about possible Ministry of Defence responses to the Human Rights Act and UK membership of the International Criminal Court. One British Officer expressed concern that “legal mechanisms will be applied to the fullest level” where it is in the interests of the Ministry to pursue infractions (Anonymous, 2010b). The US, having avoided being a signatory to the International Criminal Court has refused to allow US personnel “to co-operate with inquests into so-called ‘friendly fire’ incidents” involving British personnel (Anonymous, 2010b). While criminal prosecutions were rightly pursued in prisoner abuse cases, one officer observed that personnel expressed dismay at how the Ministry then “fought hard to limit its own exposure” when responsibility for service casualties was under question “by successfully appealing the ruling that human rights obligations applied to British soldiers on the battlefield” (Anonymous, 2010b). In one example the “loss of an F-15 over [...] Scotland [...] the air traffic controller was court-martialled (although acquitted) despite concerns within the RAF air traffic control community that” responsibility lay elsewhere (Anonymous, 2010b). Recent reports indicate that “charges could be brought against British military interrogators who may have committed acts of ‘torture’ that are not defined as ‘torture’ by the United States, which is not a signatory to the International Criminal Court” (Anonymous, 2010b). One Flight Lieutenant argued that “it is inconceivable that any interrogations [...] would have been spontaneous or unauthorized by the chain of

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63 See also BBC News (29 August 2007).
64 See BBC News (30th June 2010).
65 See Prune (2010).
66 See Cobain (9th November 2010).
command, including the Ministry of Defence and United States” (Anonymous, 2010b). Therefore it seems likely that prosecutions would impact more widely on officer perceptions of the Ministry if seen relative to American handling of personnel. British cynicism may also be attributed to Charters’ point that unlike the Americans,

“Historical experience has taught [Officers] not to expect a flood of assistance from Britain - there was usually little to be spared - nor to look to some sacrosanct body of ‘doctrine’ for advice; there was none. Instead he must make do… In short, he must adapt.” (1989: 182).

All this means the relationship between notions of ‘public service’ and initiative is distinctive in Britain’s military system; loyalties are to the Battalion first (Weale, 26th November 2010). Wider concerns and a public service motive provided underlying legitimacy for this but loyalties were horizontally attributed because of a sense of being ‘on your own’ in carrying out the operation. The cynicism feeds into a particular conceptualised ‘real world’ which is distinct from the US sense of the ‘real world’ - where faith in the institution and its goals is strong.

This appears to be supplanted by faith in British military experience, shared difficulties and residual perceptions of military pre-eminence, all elements of its strong ‘institutional memory’ explored further in the next chapter. The British imperial example shows how collective memory, institutional assumptions and propaganda become increasingly important systemically the further authority over propaganda is delegated. It adheres the regimental system which provided a “surrogate family” strong enough to sustain the morale of soldiers in far-flung stations when colonial administration largely involved “a thin veneer of British officers” (Nagl, 2002: 37-38). The delegation, increase of trust and reduction of ‘middle management’, discussed in Chapter 3 in relation to Mackay’s ‘influence-led’ operations, is argued by Nagl to be a crucial step in ensuring American defence has the same flexibility to fight counterinsurgency operations (Nagl, 2002: 218 & Mackay & Tatham, 2009: 15).
To conclude that cynicism assumes British critical awareness or reflexivity would be complacent, though this belief was common among personnel. Propaganda is seen today as reducing casualties, and as democratically acceptable (Mackay & Tatham, December 2009: 34). While problems were acknowledged, these were couched in terms of the difficult circumstances, in which personnel lacked necessary support. Solutions were often seen in terms of improved training, integrated planning, or target audience analysis (15th Army PSYOPS Group, 22nd November 2005; Corcoran, 8th June 2006; Wright, 1st June 2009). Officers prized their cynicism, and often distinguished their British worldliness from American self-belief and cultural subjectivity.

One function of the elaborate command process is not just to communicate orders, but to ensure people understand why they’re doing something, and ensure that they feel that it’s right (Taverner, 18th July 2004). It thus supports this sense of service. Adrian Weale claimed “that sort of established culture and tradition and so on means you have a short-cut to great cohesion within the unit, which contributes to welfare and tactical efficiency” (Weale, 26th November 2010). What this means is members of an institution come to assist in maintaining the dominant ethos of their institution and in pursuit of its ends initiative is enabled. Weale compared Britain’s military to a “feudal” system;

“individual commanders feel they own bits of the army. So if you become the Commanding Officer of an Infantry Battalion that is your Battalion. And although of course, it’s supposed to be working towards the greater good, it’s also working towards your good” (26th November 2010).

Everything is motivated by service, but this is linked to the battalion, its history, and those who went before. This shapes the behaviour of personnel who “want at some point to [...] command their Battalion [and] don’t therefore want to be too critical particularly of someone who they’ve worked with for a long time” (Weale, 26th November 2010).

The Ministry of Defence’s internal rivalries make it “natural to want the maximum share of available resources”; in a similar way to US government agencies competition over resources, something said to inhibit cooperation and communication (Kirke, 2010: 99). British institutional priorities and its
necessarily ‘self-reliant’ military culture may have hindered attempts at interagency cooperation. When the military were pressing to send troops to Helmand in 2006; concerns about being inadequately prepared were not emphasised upwards to ministers (Haynes et. al. 9th June 2010). This has been blamed on a “confused command and control structure” in Afghanistan by senior military and civil service figures (Haynes et. al. 9th June 2010). But it shows some element of autonomy. Battalions are tight-knit units and initiative is particularly strong in the institutional memory (Anonymous, 16th August 2010). Nagl notes that British warfare was founded on sea power, and naturally favoured the “principles of mobility and surprise” (2002: 36).

Flexibility is enhanced further still among non-conventional troops (Weale, 26th November 2010). British PSYOPS in Afghanistan were supporting “mostly [special forces] and specialised units” (15th Army PSYOPS Group, 22nd November 2005). Unconventional forces “are not soldiers who’ve served together all their lives” in one Battalion; likewise British “intelligence and psyops and so on groups, they’re slightly more ad-hoc than the […] established parts of the army” so tend to be less “insular” and even more adaptable, though still driven by notions of service (Weale, 26th November 2010). In one 2004 British example initiatives can be shown crossing departments and penetrating civil society; privately contracting the local student body to assist the propaganda effort. Initially, “guys were used by Information Operations at Division […] the [Measures of Effectiveness] gurus, […] using them in soft effects to try and find out if opinion had changed. […] They designed interview sheets that UK forces were initially using […] very early on, and by the time I got there you know, we’re getting pretty much the same results all the time. […] the results of these were going all the way to Downing Street. […] someone eventually thought… hold on, we’ve got a British guy with an interpreter asking an Iraqi what they think of the British. […] maybe we should just get Iraqis to ask this question. […] they formed, you know, a commercial… with some direct, I think FCO funding… not military funding […] to train, and it was through the military apparatus […] to train students to interview people. […] the consensus rating was 70% pro-UK military activity, it fell to 30-40% overnight. Purely because, opinion hadn’t changed, a guy wasn’t
asking a question with a rifle on his back.” (Corcoran, 8th June 2006).

One British Information Operations Captain (20 Armour Brigade in Iraq) who found troops not “clued-up” enough on how his role could help them, initiated a horizontal propaganda campaign and “spent the first third of my operational tour educating the brigade that I worked for about what I could achieve for them” (Corcoran, 8th June 2006). He said,

“So I had a war, an information war to win... so I started by PSYOP-ing my own, conducting psychological operations on the Brigade, which is perfectly legitimate and within the doctrine” (Corcoran, 8th June 2006).

For both countries, horizontal propaganda communicates the value of ‘service’ and contributes to a shared identity which is then reproduced informally; both militaries prioritise internal communication to support bureaucratic cohesion. Doctrinal forms such as the presence of propaganda divisions and new doctrine favouring flexibility are also designed to shape the culture of the institution by demonstrating the basis of legitimacy and communicating communities and allegiances. Doctrinal changes can be seen as embodying this intent, communicating to the interagency a new value of ‘working together’, to replace one that has become outdated and unresponsive. Thus Armitage stated in interview that for the US “by using terms like Smart Power it’s more signalling that we’re gonna try and use everything in our power” and “signalling to the bureaucracies that everyone has a role to play” (21st July 2009). This implies that concepts like SMART power are designed to act as much as institutional propaganda, to ready the culture of this future bureaucracy, as they are to produce formal changes.

**Democratic Propaganda ‘Service’**

The notion of a democratic propaganda has a modern history; expertise developed throughout the 20th Century into what Taylor argues is a more-credible “democratic” tradition (2003: 322). Yet as propaganda sits in conflict with democratic values embodied in the culture, any changes to its operation are reconciled in someway with the notion of service. Chapter 3 discussed how

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68 Horizontal Propaganda is defined and discussed in Chapter 1.  
69 The ‘Pentagon Channel’ and AmericaSupportsYou.mil are just two American examples. 63% of staff surveyed by the Ministry of Defence said they read its internal magazine ‘Focus’ and its ‘The Sandy Times’ newspaper targets troops in Iraq (MoD, 2004).
propaganda boundaries have contributed to this sense of legitimacy for the propagandist. They descend from a traditional institutional culture to provide a cognitive separation between democratic values of openness and debate, and belief in the necessity of the propaganda function. This belief is also tied to the ‘public service’ motive; propaganda often operates paternalistically. According to Williams, public service ensures the necessary divide between public servants and a public viewed passively (1958); it appears to endow the former with the sense of authority, the ‘insider’ superior knowledge necessary to justify paternalistic propaganda. On the basic underlying assumptions of ‘service’, a broad consensus appeared across liberals and conservatives interviewed, and between institutions.

During interview Adm. Fallon described succinctly an attitude that formed an underlying perception articulated in other interviews:

“the business of messaging to influence people to make decisions; critically important and in my book, influencing people to do the things that I’d like them to do, assuming that they’re in our own best interests for mankind, is the way we ought to be going” (21st July 2009).

This frequently-used justification for individual actors’ roles in the continuation of paternalistic propaganda is built on values not dissimilar to Lasswell’s conception of public opinion (1934). It demonstrates a fear of ‘majoritarian democracy’ which is perceived as dangerous ‘mob-rule’ (Williams, 1958: p298). The public is there to support decisions that have already been made. Similarly, in terms of morale, it was perceived as more crucial that British troops feel their loved-ones support their actions, than to believe they are just themselves (Taverner, 18th July 2004). Yet British research points to a public not prone to ‘panic’ (Sheppard et al, 2006 & Oates, 2007). Raymond Williams notes that systems of mass communication are paternalistic based on “an

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70 Often the motivation compelling individuals to use their initiative in propaganda planning beyond the formal structures was, either the admirable concern with ‘understanding’ and communication with the theatre audience (Reeve, 20th April 2006; Weale, 26th November 2010); or concern with ensuring the message was sufficiently culturally appropriate to be ‘received’ (McBride, 5th June 2009; Stelloh, 23rd June 2009; Fallon, 21st July 2009; Armitage, 21st July 2009), and very often involved a confusion of the two (Wilkerson, 23 June 2009; Thorp, 24th August 2009; Corcoran, 8th June 2006).

71 In interview Mike Berry of the Glasgow Media Group commented that “Research carried out in June 2005 showed that insurgents attacks in Iraq did not necessarily lead members of the public to support withdrawal of British troops. For some people insurgent attacks actually had the opposite effect of strengthening their conviction that troops should remain until stability was achieved” (30 May 2006). Apparently “The relationship here was complex and it is not possible to say that reports of atrocities carried out by insurgents would necessarily erode support for the occupation forces” (Berry, 30 May 2006).
arrogant preoccupation with transmission” by ‘agents’ like Fallon who assume the position that “the common answers have been found and need only to be applied” by those in power (1958: 314).

In interview Former Commander Fallon expressed the importance of ‘debate’ in Britain and America, echoing commonly expressed values of democracy:

“Pretty much everybody in this country, in your country, will [agree] yes we gotta have a strong economy, yes we gotta be vibrant and growing […] but the fundamentals of how you get there […] huge debates about… but at least there’s debate here. Many other countries around the world there’s no debate at all. And one guy calls the shots…” (21st July 2009)

Clearly this idea contradicts Fallon’s earlier statement - the accepted ‘reality’ of his institutional position - that “influencing people to do the things that I’d like them to do […] is the way we ought to be going” justified by reference to the service motive (21st July 2009). Fallon proceeded to lament the difficulties of knowing what could be trusted in the internet age, before returning to say “you’ve gotta start figuring out how you’re gonna get in the people’s heads to get them to do what you want them to do” (21st July 2009). Similarly, Franklin Miller asserted that “first and foremost the US government cannot, does not and should not propagandize its own people” a clearly contradictory position alongside his frustration at Public Affairs’ concern about the message becoming corrupted and lines that could not be crossed72 (3rd August 2009).

Regardless of whether he may feel it to be in the interests of mankind, Fallon’s ideas were clearly compartmentalised. According to Garratt, most people “get into such a routine with their work that” within a particular “context” they “view all problems in a similar way” (1994: 42-43). Switching between contexts occurred with ease of habit and did not arouse observable conflict between Fallon’s values. It seemed important for Fallon to believe both of these are true. It allowed him to define public interest in terms of the goals of the institution and public service as what action served those goals. This potentially allows for much flexibility of action and initiative in ‘service’. As Ellul evocatively argued, propaganda “is comparable to radium and what happens to radiologists is well-

72 See Chapter 3.
known” (1973: 242-243). E P Thompson was dedicated to building into his theoretical analysis the experiences of the people who constitute the social structure and their experience of it; in so doing his detailed empirical attention revealed evidence of active engagement with their position (1991). He argued that these tendencies to see people as passive passengers on the boat of capitalist history “obscure the agency of working people” (Thompson, 1991: 12). Fallon and others are occupying key positions within a dynamic class process of relationships engaged in wider society and it is important to highlight how institutional cultures and decision-making are mediated within an active process, often by well-intentioned people.

In many ways, an outlet to air dissent in controlled circumstances was seen by some as a useful way of operating and securing conformity, loyalty and belief in ‘service’. Wilkerson argued that,

“If the leader understands what the dissent is about and accepts some of the dissent or all of the dissent and changes and does so publicly and with an explanation for why in the […] group, let’s say it’s a meeting of the principals or a meeting of the National Security Council, formal meeting, it can be very salutary, it can be very helpful. And you can count on that person who dissented to be your strongest disciple thereafter. […] If on the other hand you don’t listen to him, you build a chief of staff as George W Bush did, Andy Card, or you build an apparatus in your Vice-President’s office […] so you never hear the dissent or through your own arrogance you refuse the dissent, or even as JFK did several times, you listen to it, you ponder it, you bring a person back, you listen to it again and you ponder it some more… […] and then you still refuse then at least you’ve attenuated some of the person’s ability now or desire to block you, because he […] or she feels like she’s got her hour, and the President still didn’t buy it” (23rd June 2009).

In a democratic state, separate identity need not be obliterated by “total identification with the organisation” the way Bauman argues it is in a totalitarian state (1988: 488). The ideals of pluralism and ‘freedom' become a crucial factor in securing observance. All public servants implement policies which may not be of their choosing, but motivations are not simply deference to
authority. Personnel are free to disagree personally with actions and policies of their Department, and do. Belief is negotiated. Dissent reconciles a concern that freedom and plurality are embodied in the society and its government. The ‘inclusive’ principle of their government, as embodying a plurality of views means dissent is dealt with, without a personal responsibility to act. Dissent is for the election box.

The service motive clearly creates a gulf of understanding between the motives of those putting out government messages and those on the receiving end. The British Army’s Adrian Weale discussed recognition of an inherent institutional motive in even the most ‘safety’-oriented campaigns;

“material about unexploded ordinance that they were circulating, which, apart from the [...] public health and safety message, is also good for getting people on-side and making them think that you’re looking after their interests” (26th November 2010).

Williams argues that “those who are ruled by the idea of service are genuinely dismayed when the workers do not fully respond” (1958: 330); or in Fallon’s case, when the people do not appreciate that the public servant’s activities are “in our own best interests for mankind” (21st July 2009). But Williams argues that, if the audience “cannot feel that this is their community” being served, then “education in their responsibilities to” that community will fail (1958: 330). When I asked about how PSYOPS messages were increasingly filtering through to American audiences Fallon expressed frustration. The reasonableness of military understandings (of external audiences needing more aggressive propaganda and resulting inevitability of cross-over) seemed irrelevant to the reactions of the public it was meant to be in the ‘service’ of, who should, it seems, be more discerning;

“people they see something, hear something and they assume, this message was intended for them. And they take affront, they’re offended. That wasn’t aimed at you at all!” (Fallon, 21st July 2009).

73 This notion is related to Ellul’s argument that democracy is ideologically linked to ‘truth’ and ‘progress’ and must be seen to triumph (1973: 232-235).
74 Rousseau once claimed that “the people of England think they are free. They are gravely mistaken. They are only free during the election of Members of Parliament” (Rousseau, 1968: 141).
‘The Real World’

Williams argues that any respect we accord to people submitting to admirable public service motivations should not prevent us recognising the inherent error in a system which operates to sustain wider social division (1958: 329). Enhanced by the divide it creates, in many ways the perceived need to influence opinion becomes seen as living in the ‘real world’. In justifying a paternalistic propaganda approach the values of civilians and social science were sometimes ridiculed or resented for being unrealistic and too liberal if their views departed from an institutionalised ‘common sense’ world-view. For instance Former US Navy Captain, Military Contractor, Georgetown University Professor and the Director of the ‘independent’ think-tank the Potomac Institute; Dennis McBride noted,

“this attitude that [...] we get from academic social science in particular [...] comes across as they’re above, they’re better than soldiers and [...] they’re not gonna participate in what we call here ‘baby-killing’” (5th June 2009).

When America and Britain’s propaganda apparatus make claims about ‘truth’ and ‘facts’ it is crucial that we remember that this is ‘truth’ is negotiated within ideological boundaries influenced by the institutions and wider society. As a clear ‘insider’ McBride dismissed the notion that anyone outside the relevant systemic position can make sound value judgements, since only those on the military’s ‘list’ are officially sanctioned:

McBride: “My fellow military understand the role of, at least, military interrogation and enhanced techniques and so on... not letting someone sleep for days at a time... and so forth. So it becomes....”

Briant: So they’re better judging at these...?

McBride: “I don’t know about better but um, as I said before, the fastidiousness of the five sided building is... rather than, ‘oh this feels like it’s torture’... Well, we don’t do that, we have a list of things. This is the list allowed, and this is not allowed. And it’s over with. And they’re obeying those laws. [...] That doctrine.”

Briant: A kind of scientific approach to it?

McBride: “Yes. Whereas civilian reaction has been all about being judgemental as opposed to critical” (5th June 2009).
An unquestioning faith in the “fastidiousness of the five-sided building” and a commitment to totally submit to the authority of written rules over personal responsibility and moral judgement, demonstrate a belief that the Defense Department is somehow above morality. Again, McBride, this time discussing public distrust of the military:

“A lot of that is all about so-called torture... this is I think the most overblown thing I think I have experienced. People need to do their research and find out that enhanced interrogation techniques, as they are being called, are done as any coercion, or any interrogation is done, with the presence of the Inspector General. The IG’s job is to catch people misbehaving and turn them in and get promoted. Ok, IG is very motivated to catch someone disobeying the law. And I have to tell you just in terms of doctrine and law that no nation can stand next to the United States in terms of its torture rules and regulations. Do you honestly think in Somalia when one faction grabs another they don’t torture the hell out of em...? I mean I’m not justifying it, I’m just saying... We’ve got a process of self-inspection that is, is errr so motivated and everything is on video [...] at Guantanamo and so the [laughs] I’ve talked to people a lot who do that and... the [chuckles] waterboarding... I’m sure you know what it is... and noone’s ever drowned, there’s never been any tissue damage but I guess it could scare the hell out of them ...but I’m told that the mode number of dunks is one [...] mmm ok whaddya wanna know...!” (5th June 2009).

This flies in the face of massive international, independent evidence, and international legal judgements condemning torture practices. Of course, as a former military public servant, McBride was confident that “it’s not my job to evaluate that sort of thing” but in his view it did mean that “it’s important the strategic communication thing here is very big” (5th June 2009).

It would be naive to think that such judgements would not bias the ‘facts’ within even a white propaganda campaign under his control. According to Jackson within the confines of their

“rhetorically constructed reality, or discourse, the ‘war on terrorism’ appears as a rational and reasonable response; more importantly, to

75 McBride disclosed that “Dan Gallant - yet another Potomac person was working for Rumsfeld” came up with the idea for Guantanamo Bay (5th June 2009).
many people it feels like the right thing to do” (2005: 2).

Despite earlier claiming to be “fiercely objective”, McBride’s views, expressed in good faith, betray his blind belief in the infallibility of the American system, and military bias (5th June 2009). It is clear that for McBride these claims are ‘fact’ and ‘truth’ - it is others who have not ‘done their research’. As McBride’s statement shows, the problem with propaganda is not simply about lies. Systemic position and the value judgements connected with it shape the ‘fact’ and ‘truth’ honestly perceived, and likewise could shape propaganda from policymaking to pamphlet.

Ideological perspectives obviously differ between individuals, not all military personnel or contractors would agree with McBride’s defence of techniques that many would consider torture. Yet American interviews did reveal great personal belief in its systems of democracy and government. Dissent is discouraged within both countries’ military and bureaucracy. An adherence and faith in its validity and value is demanded of personnel, and this value judgement is a systemic characteristic. This strength of belief in institutional frames of understanding as ‘common sense’ was particularly heightened within a context of paranoia over the vulnerability of the American and British infrastructure to ‘enemies within’. Wilkerson described how,

“Powell and I have had this discussion a number of times... you have a distinct ‘other’ ...you always need an enemy, you need an ‘other’ [...] in both our countries, we’ve always had the majority with a very distinct impression of the ‘other’ and it was easy to manipulate... propagandise and so forth” (23rd June 2009).

Social prejudice is an easy pragmatic tool manipulated divisively against groups targeted as the present leadership’s ‘enemies within’, which is seen as realistic as a way to meet occupational objectives in ‘service’ of the country.

Nagl also identifies a historic “general mistrust of theory” characteristic to British warfighting, which was borne out of the colonial experience, where there was rarely procedure relevant to an arising situation and emphasis was on finding a ‘real world’ solution, or “hitting hard” (2002: 36-37). In Britain some accounts also observed this ‘we know best’ attitude - a PSYOPS officer reported the paternalism of how intervention was perceived as officers slipped into
“colonial mode” helping these “poor blighted states”, something that was reflected in propaganda (Anonymous, 16th August 2010). Likewise founder member of the British Armed Forces Federation Adrian Weale argued that British officers were “arrogant” in their dealings with the Americans - something to be developed further in the next chapter (26th November 2010).

A direct result of the service motive is therefore the acceptance that the public don’t know what’s best for them and a tendency to understand a situation through the institutional frame. It can embody a strong sense of self-belief not uncommon in the military. According to one angry PSYOPS operative who commented on a ‘Small Wars Journal’ blog about a recent terminology change to neutralise PSYOPS into ‘Military Information Support Operations’ - MISO; “some of us joined Psychological Operations because it sounded awesome” and the “intimidation factor brought on by the words alone are what attracts many recruits” (24th June 2011).

As mentioned above, these cultures can also feed the tendency for government agencies to be insular and form stovepipes. Bureaucratic cultures and priorities are negotiated in a tension between institutional expectations and the bounds placed by external structures and expectations. There was pressure from above; Mark Etherington who helped write Britain’s cross-governmental plan for Helmand argued that “there was a real sense of the clock ticking, that ‘the Minister is jolly keen to get into Helmand - don’t bring me bad news, bring me good news!’” (in Haynes et. al. 9th June 2010). As inflexible formal structures constrained individuals’ actions, institutional perceptions often embodied a ‘real world’ perceived as misunderstood by both outsiders and public. Perceived alternatives are determined by the practice and shared ideology of the institution to leave just two polarised extremes: force or top-down manipulation with propaganda. Alternative approaches to communication were not conceptualised as a possibility. These would require systemic overhaul that is impossible to comprehend within the boundaries of the military institution. We can see this in Fallon’s account:

“there are ways to do it otherwise... you can do the Saddam Hussein method; put a boot on people’s throat and shoot em in the head if they don’t do exactly as you tell them... once you amass that kind of
influence by gun-barrel diplomacy. That’s still a way to do it. We can
force people to do stuff. In Baghdad we had to do that for a while.
2007. But, is that how you... is that really the best way to do it?
Answer’s probably not.” (21st July 2010).

Graham described too how the expanding information burden “was sometimes
seen in the Pentagon as yet another example of how cutbacks […] at State [like
the USIA], left a gap” and resulted in them being put-upon in something that
wasn’t their role (24th July 2009). Individuals had a great deal of belief in the
importance of their own role in the ‘war on terror’. Weale described a perennial
sense that they are “on the right path towards truth and justice and everyone
else is wrong” (26th November 2010). In some cases individuals began embodying
the service motive where cooperation was lacking; a sense of ‘we know best’
was sometimes replaced by a sense of ‘I know best’. Wilkerson went on to
explain that others’ competing pragmatic interests left out the ‘big picture’ of
gaining agreement of staff in favour of coercion; apparently Cheney,
“understood that George Bush could be that way if you rubbed him
right, and Cheney knew how to rub him. And George Bush could be
that way. ‘I’m right... that’s the end of the discussion. Period’” (23rd
June 2009).

In a competitive military this attitude can become seen as operating in the ‘real
world’, formal systems can be dismissed in favour of informal mechanisms and
even manipulation. The reality starkly contrasts with the idea that policymakers
divide responsibility “carefully structuring the work within clear boundaries”
according to strict principles of authority and hierarchy to ensure efficiency and
accountability (Kettl, 2002: 8). With constrained formal structures that served to
prevent effective operation, in both countries it seems in many cases that
initiative and a pragmatic drive to do what is necessary to ‘get the job done’
enabled function, all legitimised by the idea of ‘service’.

Conclusion
This chapter presented an analysis of the role of the institutional cultures in
shaping responses to the problems of the formal structure detailed in chapter 4.
It showed how within these constrained conditions of operation the paternalistic
‘public service’ motive operates in distancing the public servant from the public
itself, allowing institutionally-specific understandings to come to be seen as the ‘real world’ in which personnel must operate. The divergence between the goals of the institution and the misinformed outsider become unproblematic to activities which are seen as necessary to function effectively and ‘serve’. Flexibility became the military buzz-word of the ‘war on terror’, yet flexible planning was based on limited interests, goals and assumptions defined by an institutional culture which produces a defensive, divisive and self-justifying perception of the ‘real world’. The service motive is used to legitimise ad-hoc planning and, often well-intentioned, initiative; more widely employing the full range of propaganda capabilities as one of many tools in the counter-insurgency kit-bag. While in Britain some sense of initiative and flexibility has traditionally characterised the military, America’s system is very different. America’s service motive has more closely been tied to patriotic ideals and with its competitive individualism, a rise in the role of initiative has been witnessed as increased ‘ politicisation’. Where exercised, it seems likely that initiative failed to translate into widespread policy as a “consensus” (Nagl, 2002: 202) on strategy was absent and formal divisions were too severe. Nagl points out how institutional assumptions can lead to such system paralysis and viewing military engagement through a “lens” (2002, 198). Engaged in a vacuum of strategic control and accountability, efforts at informal organisation and planning could at times see well-intentioned individuals using their institution’s integral mechanisms of authority to limit dissent, advance decisions, and enable continued propaganda function.
Chapter 6: Consistency and Relative Utility: Anglo-American Co-ordination of the Information ‘War on Terror’

Introduction

Despite their historic differences in institutional culture, Anglo-American defence cooperation has a long history. This chapter will examine the joint coordination of the propaganda ‘War on Terror’. It will briefly demonstrate how differing histories, and positioning within the international system, shaped leadership definitions of national interest. The chapter will argue that this and necessarily distinctive American and British defence propaganda systems (discussed in chapters 3-5) meant probable divergent responses were recognised as a potential obstacle for allied propaganda activity. The analysis will examine the strategies adopted within the mechanisms of Anglo-American relations to manage conflicting interests in the information realm, during the American-led conflicts. This process will then be demonstrated through the example of Iraq.

The chapter will proceed by showing how the propaganda ‘War on Terror’ compelled both countries to shore-up Anglo-American coordination in the pursuit of a consistent propaganda message and will outline their approaches. The chapter will go beyond formal structures to consider informal forms of coordination, and take account of the two governments’ distinct organisational cultures and characteristic bureaucracies in explaining the shape this took. It will explore how despite having divergent national interests, filtered through self-justifying institutional cultures during the conflicts the Anglo-American institutional community emphasised ‘shared needs’. These are argued to be a product of this community itself which served to play down differences and bind the relationship. The analysis will return to arguments made in chapter 5 to assert that perceived ‘interests’ were therefore elite-defined. As they emerge within the assumptions of institutional cultures (cultures defined by their position relative to the public) such interests are argued to both define and are shaped by the paternalistic ‘service’ motive. This discourages identification with target audiences and public, and creates a perceived ‘real world’ for personnel through which assumptions and possible solutions are filtered.
During the conflicts the countries’ leaderships sought to ensure each country’s different capabilities were utilised in a way that harnessed national advantage/expertise. For both partners this was hoped to maximise overall resource applied to meeting coalition objectives, as well as being perceived by Britain as a means of achieving relative power. With its limited capabilities, British utility to America often depended on providing unique or complimentary provision, and closing potential capability gaps for the coalition. This increased British emphasis on ‘interoperability’, converging doctrine, and providing unique capabilities in an attempt to secure power vis-a-vis America. One such example where ‘unique’ capabilities were offered to the alliance was propaganda; it’s argued that the relationship could, where necessary, perform a ‘distancing’ function similar to that described in chapter 3 regarding the cross-government integration of the propaganda apparatus. Where activities might be publicly unacceptable if attributed to a country’s domestic apparatus, these might be undertaken by its ally ensuring the ‘invisibility’ of such activities.

The structural dynamics that prevented coordination within the American bureaucracy (see Chapter 4), also shaped coordination with its ally, at times hindering formal exchange. Initiative drove the use of informal systems; a necessary solution, particularly where formal mechanisms made operating difficult. Institutional cultures native to each country both sustained cohesive insular systems and, through initiative, navigated function against this independent structure. The chapter will show how as formal channels with America became laboured, the Anglo-American dialogue and planning necessary to ensure function often proceeded on an ad-hoc or informal basis. Nicholas’ observation still rings true; that the Anglo-American relationship “is to be found in the generally informal, frequently unofficial co-operation that has grown up as a kind of second nature between civil servants and diplomats on each side of the Atlantic” (Nicholas, 1963, 172). As sites of coordination were erratic and America’s campaign lacked strategic oversight, overall joint output was inconsistent. Nonetheless, the joint campaign will be shown to have become crucially dependent on the informal Anglo-American coordination which became
important for facilitating desired outcomes at the strategic, operational and
tactical levels.\footnote{These ‘levels’ are explained further in Chapter 1.}

This chapter will demonstrate that by the invasion of Iraq, British ‘expertise’
was showing itself to be shallow in some areas; but flexibility and initiative had
become crucial to negotiating across the formal apparatus and formed a
keystone of British ‘value’. The informal approach dependent on initiative had a
natural affinity to its political and military cultures, and the chapter will
demonstrate how this performed an assistive function enabling a new route by
which US personnel could operate and navigate closed systems. To some extent
British flexibility in the relationship allowed to help America navigate domestic
interagency ‘turf-wars’ and continue propaganda function. The chapter will
argue that ‘shared’ interests and cultivated perceptions served to further adhere
these relationships, which proved so crucial to enabling the international
coordination of propaganda message. The internal ideologies of the distinct
systems discussed in the last chapter, and the ideology of a historic ‘special
relationship’ (of which an Anglo-American community becomes a part);
contributed a horizontal propaganda element.

‘National’ Security Interests & Converging Policy

This section will explore how the post-9/11 security environment was perceived
by each leadership as favouring a strengthening of the relationship. This very
broad introductory overview in no way seeks to encompass the significant
political differences within the membership of each leadership. Instead it seeks
to underscore certain underlying assumptions and dominant arguments which
drove the course of planning.

The international system which permitted the emergence of a predominantly
Anglo-American ‘War on Terror’ was a security environment in transition. Former
adversaries competed in the marketplace of capitalism, with China becoming the
rising economic competitor to the US. However, the period was also
characterised by the emerging international position of non-state actors; both as
factors causing perceptions of insecurity (ie. international
terrorism/environment) and as mediating forces (e.g. international institutions). The nature of threat was changing to one that slipped by established boundaries and rendered states sterile of solutions. As some contemplated tackling an uneasy ‘multi-polarity’, the idea of ‘collective security’ became frequent Western rhetoric. Yet the threat and promise of America’s ‘unipolar’ hegemony still dominated perceptions in much of the world.

To a large extent every state’s interpretation of ‘threats’ and ‘needs’ is shaped by material factors of history such as these; social and historical factors as well as traditional economic, political and military security concerns. Yet also crucial in determining such ‘needs’ assessments and responses are the principles and ideological standpoints dominant in a societies’ leadership, and the nature of its bureaucracy and armed forces (explored above). Here we will begin by tracing how such factors fed developing patterns of divergence and convergence in perceived interests dominant in each country’s leadership.

A once isolationist country, America has historically been afflicted with a tension between its need to prioritise the domestic political context and, increasingly post-WW2, a need to ensure its international dominance. Through and beyond the cold war, a heightened sense of insecurity at the shifting security environment saw America increasingly compelled into ideologically-driven interventionist foreign policy (Zakheim, 1996: 5). Its foreign and defence policy came to be structured around the core objective to create a global security environment dominated by the American values of “freedom, democracy and free enterprise” (Office of the President of the United States, 2002). Only states which allied their political and economic system with the principles at the core of US political interest could be tolerated. The systematic pursuit of these goals is confirmed by the military’s ‘Joint Vision’; that ‘America’ might be “persuasive in peace, decisive in war, pre-eminent in any form of conflict” and increasingly of course in the information realm (Defense Technical Information Centre, 2000). Propaganda operations were intended “to advance U.S. interests and security and to provide the moral basis for U.S. leadership in the world” (US Department of State, 2004).
The processes of media globalisation and the growth of trans-national issues blurred traditional borders, drawing international politics beyond mere state to state relations. By 2001 the question had been raised of whether the US was suffering imperial overstretch. Its rates of defence spending were seen as unsustainable, leading some to advocate cuts to America’s readiness to fight; from 2.5 wars to 1.5 wars (Denoon, 2001). While escalating costs left America’s economy increasingly strained, its ideological objectives and security concerns continued to sculpt interventionism into the heart of American policy (Coker, 1992: 409). Consequently we have seen an increase in the use of economic policy, multilateral resolutions, propaganda and diplomacy over military means (less costly financially and politically) as America has been forced to broaden its approach, and in turn engagement with its allies (Vickers, 2004). Gradually America’s military has moved from a position where it was “too heavily relying on hard power” to a post-Iraq realisation “that we had a lot more tools” even if it has sometimes struggled to coordinate them (Armitage, 21st July 2009).

Likewise, American assessments of its external security environment have historically been in promoting a Europe that can protect its own interests (Nye Jr, 2002). Larger political frameworks such as the EU have played an increasing role in its vision of a stable Europe. European support for US ideological/strategic goals has not always been forthcoming and as Douglas Hurd observed during the Gulf War, Britain’s relative independence from Europe enabled it to “give a lead to Europe” which was “an enormous help to United States policy” (Hennessy and Anstey, 1990: 27-28). As former White House adviser, Robert Blackwill has noted the US would rather deal with one coordinated body (a united Europe), than individual governments (Hennessy and Anstey, 1990: 28). The American vision for Britain to be a gatekeeper to this Europe has at times however, conflicted with British political priorities; to swing the US’ interests from its Pacific to its Atlantic shore.

Of course, the Anglo-American relationship has seen many changes in administration, and occasions where differing British and US interests led to diverging security needs and policies. Notably, despite reluctant US support for the Falklands Britain did not reciprocate in supporting Grenada (Hennessy and Anstey, 1990). No international arrangement, even one this close, is ever viewed
as irreversible and concrete by the states concerned. Leaderships change; as do geo-political, social, political, environmental and military conditions. Where cooperation occurs ultimately states back collective agreements with unilateral defence strategies. While cultures change more slowly, and states seek to maintain the image internally and externally that they are peaceful and committed to any agreement, if the leadership perceive it as no longer suiting their needs they will pursue other means to achieve their security goals, as America did in Iraq. The quest to gain power and influence that drives much of each country’s foreign policy is thus coupled with attempts to neutralise or nurture other interests and actors.

Under Blair, the reformist ideology of ‘New Labour’ blamed the British Labour Party’s former image and ideology for perceived domestic and international failures. With Germany the lead economy in Europe, Britain as a state has balanced its interests carefully in order to maximise its respective power and influence in the world. Since alienating Europe could prove extremely damaging economically and strategically, Blair maintained relationships pragmatically. And although Labour had traditionally embraced Anglo-American relations, New Labour challenged what they saw as a move away from the US (Morgan, 2002: 182). There were more ideological differences with Bush than Clinton, who had shared Blair’s vision of a ‘third way’; something that caused Chris Meyer, the British Ambassador in Washington “massive anxiety” at first (Meyer; 26th November 2009). But Blair’s transformation led to an acceptance of Thatcherite economic principles; embracing business and the role of the market, which brought Britain closer to the US in ideological terms. So much so, that the claim of dominant American neo-liberal theorists that an open international economy would promote stability (Nye Jr, 2002) was accepted as a strong element of Coalition strategy for post-conflict ‘reconstruction’. Ultimately, one of the most fundamental UK defence policy aims in 2003 was “maintenance of the transatlantic relationship” and Europe’s strategic importance was defined in relation to global threats to British and “wider Western interests” (MoD, 2003a: 4 & MoD, 2003b: 5). The Prime Minister did not encounter the indecisiveness in foreign policy that frustrated him in Clinton (Sharp, 2003: 60) and shared Bush’s tendency to see situations in a simplistic, ideological way. As Roy Jenkins put it they saw “matters in stark terms of good and evil... and with a consequent belief
that if evil is cast down good will inevitably follow” (Jenkins, 2002, quoted in Sharp, 2003: 63).

Britain found 9/11 brought mutual insecurity; as such a close American ally, it now saw itself as a possible target for Islamic extremists. Beyond its physical effects, terrorism demonstrates the conditional nature of the sovereign state and interrogates perceptions of its unquestioned permanence. Tony Blair perceived the emergence of an international perception of Britain that ran counter to his government’s foreign policy goals (Vickers, 2004, 188-189). Its stance on Afghanistan was also influenced by the country sourcing 90% of Britain’s burgeoning domestic heroin use with the glut opium crop of 1999 (Travis: 2001). Britain’s large Muslim population meant policy decisions would have unique implications for domestic stability. And with ties to Pakistan, the Middle East, ongoing involvement in Iraq, Iran and even Afghanistan itself, Britain had historic interests in the region. According to one Iraq expert, in Basra “there is a perception that the British, before the invasion, back in the 50’s and 60’s contributed toward the local infrastructure, and the running of local oil companies. So [...] the British have a good reputation” (Anonymous 2010a).

While Geoff Hoon considered Iran of greater British concern than Iraq, with a 21st Century reduced-capability Britain unable to respond to all perceived security interests, even post-Afghanistan, the leadership saw diplomatic links (particularly American ties) as of crucial importance (MoD, 2003a: 10, 11 & 19). As late as 2006 it was predicted that “The US will remain the most influential global actor;” this assumption (an increasingly unlikely prediction) shaped, and legitimised planning throughout (Foreign & Commonwealth Office: 2006). British propaganda capabilities, like wider defence resource, are dwarfed by American capabilities and Blair sought Britain’s response to its concrete and informational insecurities, in Anglo-American emphasis. If a state risks more by going it alone, even if this means maximising gains, then committing trust to a co-operative agreement can often be seen as the most advantageous and economical way to provide for its security (Glaser, 1994/1995). While the leaders’ bond was not immediate, Bush and Blair were brought closer by the events of 9/11; the American people finding Blair a reassuring ally (Ashton, 2004: 119). Elite perceptions sought propaganda and wider security solutions in a closer
cooperation; both to limit potential harm to their own national priorities, and ensure their concerns fed into coalition outcomes. The key to this for each country was raising the prominence of its own status in the other’s concerns.

**The Need for ‘Mutual’ Interests**

Concerns arose over the potential interference of national priorities and cultures in these converging elite goals in the conflict. This section suggests that in order to navigate key differences that could potentially destabilise the coalition or create an inconsistent message, it became important to emphasise ‘mutuality’ in perceived interests. Culture was used as a way to nurture increased openness and the prominence of the country within its partner’s thought process and planning. The section argues that the continuation of the ‘special relationship’ (as supporting the working alliance itself) operates as an easy focal point with ready discourse. Supported through wider societal propaganda, this functions conceptually; as part of national institutional cultures and the ‘community’ of close Anglo-American relationships. It feeds into the domestic institutional cultures and performs two functions:

- It contributes to the generation and prominence of definitions/perceptions of ‘mutual interest’
- In constructing perceptions of ‘mutual interest’, it solidifies trust and forms a framework for ongoing relations based around these commitments

It is somewhat contentious whether the oft-cited ‘special relationship’ has really been ‘special’, particularly at certain points since the decline of British Empire (and compared to US relations with Israel or Saudi Arabia for instance). In practical outcomes the contemporary relationship could be said to be rather one-sided and there has been a marked change in perceptions of it. Commentators used to question ‘what was in it for the Americans?’, now more often commentators speculate ‘what is in it for Britain?’ (Hennessy and Anstey, 1990: 23). In its weaker position, Britain to a greater or lesser degree has attempted to balance US perceptions with wider international perceptions of its actions. At times the material basis of the partnership has been doubted for any worth beyond propaganda. However, there has undoubtedly been a sustained relationship that varied considerably in basis, strength, power balance and role in domestic and international politics over the course of history. Self-interest sat
side by side with a long established Anglo-American amity that was arguably at its deepest for many years. Intelligence, military co-operation and diplomatic consultation are areas of the Anglo-American relationship that have managed to sustain close ties regardless of short term leadership and policy differences (Zakheim, 1996: 77 & Lucas and Morey, 2000: 110-111). The partners do not always support each other in policy; yet the relationship’s strength remained tangible into this century. Crucially, in many ways this is because both countries valued co-operation (or to avoid contradiction) in the way the alliance is perceived by each partner and the rest of the world.

Going into conflict, Blair’s support was decisive. His government brought its own challenges and respective ‘needs’ (detailed above) to the table. Distinct strategic priorities shape each state’s respective ‘propaganda needs’, harbouring a potential for conflicts of interest in the information realm (Thorp, 24th August 2009). Continuity of the alliance’s message was crucial; national conflicts of interest would inevitably affect messages the propaganda war, creating a constant tension between the domestic and international context, and between the partners. As Former US Navy Chief of Media, Rear Adm. Frank Thorp observed, “different countries out of an alliance have different priorities” (24th August 2009). Their political and military elites claim unique insight into these ‘needs’. However, each country’s divergent national priorities, are constructed within, and serve to limit supportive belief systems and cultures, such as those described in the last chapter.

As chapter 5 demonstrated, informal relationships are concurrently subject to the systemic operation of ideology and culture both domestically within each country and in respect of each other. Kier argues that “the organizational culture is the intervening variable between civilian decisions and military doctrine” (Kier, Spring 1995: 66). Therefore, for cooperation, it is thus essential for an alliance to be strongly woven into the institutional culture of each country and its discourse. Just as the media can be seen as ‘contested space’ (Eldridge, 1995: 25), so too can the discourse of the bureaucracy and military. Elaborating a concept derived from Foucault, Stuart Hall argues that discourses are “ways of talking, thinking, or representing a particular subject” and “this knowledge influences social practices, and so has real consequences and effects” (1996:
They “always operate in relation to power” and discourses “are part of the way power circulates and is contested” effectively “organizing and regulating relations of power” (Hall, 1996: 205).

The domestic operation of horizontal propaganda, discussed in the previous chapter, includes elements which resonate internationally, and can either impair relations or prepare its institutional audience to support international functions. In efforts to shape this institutionalised culture, governments seek to exploit the pejoratively-named ‘herd instinct’; the tendency for people to “go along with the group even when the group makes a decision contrary to privately held beliefs and values” (Jowett and O’Donnell, 1992: 224). Effectively propaganda has become institutionalised through the Anglo-American military command structures and bureaucratic culture, and becomes self-sustaining through practise. Jowett and O’Donnell describe how rituals, sanctions, language, in-group references, clothing, activities and shared historical conditions contribute to the social practices and values that sustain institutional cultures (1992: 217).

Chomsky has argued that for the educated “political class” with “some kind of role in decision-making” and who will “play some role in the way economic and political and cultural life goes on [...] consent is crucial” he argues that “that's one group that has to be deeply indoctrinated” (1992). Likewise, State Department Chief of Staff Lawrence Wilkerson described how in the bureaucracy,

“You’ve gotta identify those portions [that may undermine you] and [...] you gotta use them from the moment you begin arbitration over what you’re goin a do, to the point at which you make a decision and you then oversee the execution of that decision, to how ever long it takes. You’ve got to have them. And you’ve got to be leading them not just managing them. You know, you’ve got to have them buy-in. And the only way you get them to buy-in is to make them at least think …or even better make them a part of your decisionmaking [...] feel like it’s their decision they’re implementing, or at least a part of it” (23rd June 2009).

Propaganda has helped to cement the relationship between the two countries through co-operative strategies to maintain ‘consistency’ (see below) as well as
by each state targeting propaganda towards the other, covertly and through public diplomacy. This analysis will address both. Just as this occurred in the ‘War on Terror’, historically, within the Anglo-American alliance, each country sought the other to share a sympathetic world view. The propagandised image of the ‘special relationship’ and real-life co-operation hid a struggle for influence. Kirby observes that Americans were seen as afraid to stand alone as post-war world leaders and Bevin took steps to provide a reassuring image and to ensure policy co-ordination eased any concern (Kirby, 2000). Both Britain and America historically targeted propaganda within each other’s borders sometimes with agreement sometimes not. Britain’s US propaganda sometimes involved deception, but was at times ‘approved’ by their ally (Kirby, 2000), performing an assistive function. Apparently “British officials had been advised by their US counterparts to persuade Americans that the way of life in which they placed so much faith was in all fundamental aspects ‘much the same as the British Way of life’” (Anstey quoted in Kirby, 2000: 396).

In a cooperative alliance, propaganda and other forms of diplomacy work in tandem with efforts to discover the intentions of the other state; through intelligence, formal structures and informal relationships. Ultimately, for the alliance to be seen as credible both countries must be perceived internationally, and within the alliance, to be committed to co-operation. The trust necessary to give such alliances strength through adversity often stems from such a history of co-operation or through the perception of mutual needs that cannot be met more effectively without commitment. They must visibly and sustainably gain more by co-operating, relative to their own needs, than by not, and this makes communication of this central to both countries’ interests.

As the leaderships’ strategic goals converged on cooperation it became necessary for each country to consider the impact their intervening particular interests and demographics might have. For trust to be maintained on an ongoing basis it thus becomes vital that each state know the intentions of the other state, and communicate assurance of mutual needs and its intended commitment to them. As Jones puts it, in an information context there is an “enduring requirement” to “assess ground truth and the resonance of our messages” and to do this they need to ensure effective “feedback loops” (Jones,
Intelligence is crucial to “get a notion of what’s working” and this also applies to the information realm (McBride, 5th June 2009). Intelligence and diplomatic sources contribute to a country’s awareness of other states perceptions and intent, highlighting such that might run counter to its interests. It allows the country to form strategic policy and actions in response, including propaganda to ensure the relationship. The intelligence agencies themselves also have a crucial role in adjusting perceptions according to strategic, long-term goals. While national interests remained very real; history, ideology, horizontal propaganda and converging doctrine served to frame these within an image of unity bridging differences and solidifying mutual perceptions of Anglo-American commitment.

For example, each country’s domestic political structures, tensions and indeed its different media culture, created demands that necessitate a different geographical focus for the propaganda war. Former Ministry of Defence Director of Targeting and Information Operations Air Cdre Graham Wright observes how America’s culture “of the media, is not as critical and probing as ours tends to be. So over [there], it’s [...] more driven by what needs to be done in operational theatres” (1st June 2009). Conversely in Britain, Wright, argued, “what worries ministers [...] is how the media portrays them back home. They don’t care about what’s happening in theatre, I mean they should do ‘cause they should care about winning, but the thing that actually influences them most is how they’re being portrayed in the media” (1st June 2009).

For instance, for Britain with its multicultural population, a war which was directed at ‘radical’ Islam had to be handled delicately and the domestic population were a priority. Correspondingly media image became of greater concern to the bureaucracy, since if the government feels that it has the full weight of public support behind what it’s doing then departments are more likely get the resources and go-ahead they need (Taverner, 18th July 2004). While Blair was sceptical of the neo-conservative elements influencing Bush there was some continuity in the Christian ideals which helped drive their world views; yet Blair was highly cautious of the alliance being perceived as a crusade against Islam, as was Bush, once off US soil. The concerns of the British political

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77 Hence, Rowland & Tatham argue Afghanistan has “the most polled population on earth” (2010: 2).
elite came to be split, between the global influence it gained whilst warming itself on American afterburners, and a growing awareness it was riding on a rapidly dissipating vapour trail of public opinion. Diverging interests such as these had to be mediated within relations.

A priority placed on parallel ‘shared’ needs and emphasising similarities in accepted ‘reality’ judgements and judgements of ‘threat’ proved a solid basis from which to do this. Given the gulf between those who ‘serve’ and a public perceived as ignorant propaganda becomes the acceptable solution to winning domestic public support. The account of Former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage recalled the form US sympathy with this domestic priority took as it began to influence American concerns and planning,

“We were aware there were places in London where police won’t go. And we were aware that foreign Secretary Jack Straw had a constituency that was largely Pakistani and some Indian, [...] very familiar with all these things. And back in the day I could tell you which areas the police wouldn’t go into.” (21st July 2009).

These understandings were, on each side, framed by individuals’ nationally-specific institutionalised assumptions. Armitage felt that,

“Great Britain and Europe at large had not been successful in, what we’d been historically successful in, [...] bringing foreigners into our national values while allowing them to keep their national cultures” (21st July 2009).

Yet through this an underlying acceptance of common interest was reinforced on both sides. By Armitage’s account, “We shared a general value and a general enemy. So that’s a pretty good basis to start. We’d consult constantly about how we’d determine the outcome” (21st July 2009). Conceptually it is useful to think of this as attempts to build into national institutional definitions of ‘service’ (described in chapter 5) a broader notion of service in terms of ‘shared needs’, based on each country’s ‘collective memory’. The anti-war protests in the UK can be seen in these terms, as the non-recognition of the “community” being served by this ‘Anglo-American’ notion of service (Williams, 1958: 330).

Propaganda and diplomacy communicate the image of its intentions that each state wishes to transmit to its partner and globally; to redress any perceptions
that do not compliment its security arrangements. They provide a reassuring counterbalance, with which each country is able to act according to its own foreign policy goals, whilst also serenading those of its partner. Jeffrey Jones has said to build “enduring bridges of understanding” America needs an integrated strategy, to include “reassurance for friends” and “persuasion of friends, allies, adversaries and neutrals” (Jones, 2005: 111). Britain was demonstrably the weaker partner and US attentions were widely drawn, so for the British leadership this subtle negotiation over basic values was the natural bedrock of any coordination. The negotiation of ‘shared’ interests, so necessary for agreement of coalition propaganda goals and approaches to achieving them, would still depend, however, on the coordination of an Anglo-American community.

_Whose Line is it Anyway? Formal propaganda coordination around ‘Mutual’ Interests_

An ongoing discourse which proposed the ‘mutual’ importance of these, often particular, interests, was crucial in communicating through each bureaucracy understandings of ‘what line to take’ in the propaganda war. Strategic dialogue and coordination was a priority for the states to ensure underlying national interests and bureaucratic differences didn’t cause conflicting messages. This section will detail mechanisms that were hoped to avoid political discontinuity and embarrassments in the relationship before moving into a discussion of how in reality persistent barriers to progress were often encountered.

According to Wright, after 9/11 the starting point for Britain’s strategic message was finding an answer to, “Why are we in Afghanistan?” (1st June 2009). At first an observer might expect this to be a simple question for the Ministry of Defence to answer. Yet, with an effects-based approach, their aims extended beyond simply answering this question, to ensuring that the answer chosen would bolster the wartime goals of Britain’s leadership, of ‘shared’ coalition goals, and at each level of the campaign. Following from this, Wright stated that if they had found a line to take, “the question was, had the Americans got to the same point?” (1st June 2009). He found that “often they did” but stressed the need for continuity between these answers (1st June 2009).
Having established the Afghan Information Strategy Group to manage Britain’s message cross-government, Wright observed “…the logical extension of that joining up Whitehall is, we’re in a coalition, […] how do we join that up and meanwhile back here [Washington] you’ve got people doing the same sort of thing?” (1st June 2009). A message formulated independently, filtered through different leaderships’ objectives, would be inconsistent in the information realm. It was clear to Wright that “it would be helpful if we were both saying the same thing” (1st June 2009).

According to Wright for the overall message to be consistent, “where it needs to be joined up is at the strategic level” (1st June 2009). Mechanisms of Anglo-American relations began organising around this function. Solidified by a desire to promote ‘mutual’ Western interests in the face of new common enemy, between the British and American executives information exchange was regular and cooperative. Richard Armitage recalled the close leadership tie feeding into wider bureaucratic relations, “we had understanding that our President got along with Mr Blair […] so that always helps the bureaucracy” (Armitage, 21st July 2009).

Jeremy Greenstock (UK’s Special Representative in Iraq, September 2003-March 2004) observed that they consulted more often than any of their predecessors throughout history (Foreign & Commonwealth Office, April 2004: 37). According to Former National Security Council (NSC) Director Franklin Miller, in Iraq coordination was maintained through “video conferences starting in the summer 03” between Bush and Blair, initially every 4 weeks then “regular two week meetings or three week meetings” (3rd August 2009). Miller said this coordination “at the macro level” extended “between 10 Downing Street, David Manning, Condi Rice, Jack Straw, Secretary of State or me, and Blair and the President” (3rd August 2009). So while Blair and Bush were the faces of strategic-level relations, their meetings were complimented by other major points of intersect, between ‘less senior’ officials (Miller, 3rd August 2009).

Despite a boisterous Defense Department, given the close relationship George Tenet had with President Bush himself and his senior advisor Karl Rove, it seems likely the CIA’s strategic role was of import in coordinating the campaign at this
level (Woodward, 2004, 66-67). Having once said “Everything is mano-a-mano, everything”, Tenet believed in forging personal relationships both at home, and with heads of intelligence abroad (Woodward, 2004, 67). It is no accident MI6’s leadership is peppered with Anglo-American ties. According to Risen, the “American and British intelligence services are so close that under normal circumstances, they hold an annual summit to discuss a wide range of issues” (Risen, 2006: 113). MI6 Chief Richard Dearlove, a neo-Conservative, was head of its Washington DC Station in the 1990’s. Woodward writes that in early February 2002 Tenet had retorted to his Iraq Operations Chief, “How come all the good reporting I get is from SIS?” (Tenet in Woodward, 2004: 107). One CIA official reported to Risen that “the MI6 station chief in Washington was in CIA headquarters all the time, with just about complete access to everything, and I am sure he was talking to a lot of people” (Risen, 2006: 114-5).

The level of intelligence agency involvement in strategic planning and coordination is clear from the Downing Street Memo sent to David Manning on 23rd July 2002 containing minutes of a meeting about Dearlove’s discussions with Tenet regarding the decision to go to war in Iraq (Rycroft, 23rd July 2002). Risen reports that it was written 3 days after “candid” discussions at a “CIA-MI6 summit meeting held at CIA headquarters” that was called “at the urgent request of the British” who had put great pressure on the Americans to meet (Risen, 2006: 113). According to Risen, “Tenet had an especially good personal relationship with Dearlove” and spent most of that day talking including 1½ hours spent ‘mano-a-mano’ (Risen, 2006: 114). Dearlove had observed that military action was seen as “inevitable” and would be “justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD”; his report to Downing Street hinted at the nascent propaganda campaign, that “the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy” (Rycroft, 23rd July 2002). On probing whether propaganda coordination took place at the strategic level, I found Franklin Miller’s cagey initial response interesting,

“I’m aware that GCHQ [UK Government Communications Headquarters] and NSA [US National Security Agency] talk... [...] I think what you say is fair... I d-...let me rephrase that... I don’t think ...that CIA and SIS were operating completely independently in Iraq. I think that there was some sort of overall game plan. [...] so I think
that is a fruitful area for some discussion. And it was coordinated to some degree or another [...] while parts of it may have been uncoordinated there were parts that were coordinated” (Miller, 3rd August 2009).

Miller acknowledged that the agreed ‘game plan’ then was coordinated “with the military, and with the embassies” (3rd August 2009). At this strategic level of planning and coordination, Dorril argued “it’s pretty apparent that it was fairly flimsy”, though certainly evidence exists (20th July 2010). An email sent by Frank Koza at NSA revealed by a whistleblower also shows cooperation between GCHQ and Rumsfeld’s NSA (see below).

The permanent structures of government quickly gave birth to formally organised ad-hoc groups or meetings, with informal relationships easing coordination and communicating ‘interest’. From an early stage in Afghanistan, Britain’s executive engaged the propaganda apparatus and its formal and informal Anglo-American channels in building international and domestic support. Alistair Campbell was crucial in communicating British leadership concerns as ‘shared’ needs to the Americans. Taverner attributes the idea of Coalition Information Centres to Campbell who after Kosovo was aware of time-zones creating dysfunctional operations between NATO headquarters in Brussels, Ministry of Defence in London, and Washington (18th July 2004). It aimed to aid coordination and understanding between the countries. The Americans gave Campbell’s Coalition Information Centres idea an enthusiastic reception (Taverner, 18th July 2004) and, significantly, Britain was the “first nation to send military representatives and campaign planners” there on 18th September 2001 (Coalition Information Centre, 2002?). The Centres were “linked directly to the [Office of Global Communication] in Washington, mainly through daily conference calls and e-mail” (FCO, 2008: 1) and effectively fed into Britain’s Information Campaign Coordination Group, through Non-Commissioned Officers and the Cabinet Office into the Ministry of Defence (Taverner, 18th July 2004).

In terms of the intersects between bureaucracy and military planning, the Foreign Office/Ministry of Defence co-operation78 aided co-ordination with the US through the Ministry’s Information Campaign Coordination Group (MoD, 2003:

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78 Described in chapter 3 above.
34). They talked with America’s Pentagon, CENTCOM and other governments (Taverner, 18th July 2004). Coming from a military rather than political background, Dennis McBride of the prominent think-tank ‘The Potomac Institute’, said that, operationally, since, “the world is divided up into Combatant Commander Areas of Responsibility” with CENTCOM engaged in these conflicts

“it’s not our US Army that’s fighting a war, and it’s not the British Army [...] but rather, that Commander. And he has NATO support, and UN support and so the coordination in theory starts with the four-star. And trickles down to the 0-1’s, 2’s and 3’s...” (McBride, 5th June 2009).

Former Director for Strategic Communications and Information on the National Security Council Jeffrey Jones argued that an operational level “theatre communications strategy” should be “derived from” America’s strategic level “national communication strategy” by the Commander but argued often this didn’t happen (2005: 110). However, critical of the Pentagon’s efforts, Jones has sketched demands for a “proactive” far-reaching information strategy for America where its Defense Department would coordinate information activities cross-government and beyond - not only PSYOPS, intelligence, IO, USAID etc... but America’s “allied representatives” too (2005: 110). 79

**Structural Interaction and Persistent Disunity**

Despite such efforts to coordinate process, the insularity of the Pentagon and other American agencies impinged on formal Anglo-American cooperation. John Sattler, former Director of Strategic Plans and Policy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Commander of US Troops in Iraq, has argued that allies were not treated as “members of the team” (in Erwin, 2009). Speaking about America’s Defense Department Graham Wright argued that,

“we end up with some good ideas and some good thoughts, which we plug in with [the Americans, and] their machine is just so cumbersome that we can’t actually influence” (Wright, 1st June 2009).

This will be shown to be a constant problem which is only likely to have worsened as turf-wars were waged within the US defense structure.

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79 He has suggested that multinational organisations could be encouraged to “participate in developing and implementing” America’s “information strategy and to accept an increasing role” (Jones, 2005: 111).
The Americans may not always have even been aware of this British discontent. Having had a strategic level vantage-point and involvement in “pre-war meetings”, Franklin Miller said,

“I don’t know that every piece of advice the UK offered was followed. But [...] I was close enough to my British colleagues that I believe I would’ve gotten blow-back from people saying ‘why do you keep ignoring us...’ or after the fact, you know, ‘well... if you guys had listened to us in the first place it would’ve been better...’ Nobody ever said that to me and so I would crawl out on that limb and assert that in large measure [...] the British voice was heard” (3rd August 2009).

Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage observed that the British “had access everywhere, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, National Security Advisors. They knew fully what was going on” (21st July 2009).

However, British personnel reported that additional security clearance was required on top of that normally demanded when working with Americans. Importantly, Former Flight Lieutenant Iain Paton at the Iraq Inquiry described the level of security in Iraq planning as greater than during “Operation VERITAS [Afghanistan] and [...] other military tasks during my career”; a level “rarely employed or encountered except for extremely sensitive matters such as intelligence, cryptography or strategic nuclear defense” (11th March 2010). He described how he,

“was granted enhanced security clearance and cleared for access during late 2002, although I was not ‘read in’ to the main operational war planning, which indicates the extent of the ‘need to know’ principle.” (Paton, 19th October 2009).

Paton provided me with a ‘Senior Officers Approvals Database’ which shows British ministerial approvals were required for contact with the media; he recalled being surprised “at any level of ministerial scrutiny or approval for two-star officers and their speeches, as they are very senior with enormous responsibility and professional knowledge” (4th October 2010). One commentator has stated that

“allies are being asked to participate in coalitions that exist only on paper. In the real world of military operations — where the United
States is the dominant force [...] allies play on the sidelines, if at all” (Erwin, 2009).

An RAF Flight Lieutenant involved in planning observed how “speeches and social visits (dinners etc) by 2 star and 3 star officers required ministerial level clearance” (Anonymous, 2010b). He was “surprised at any level of ministerial scrutiny or approval [at this level] as they are very senior” but thought this might have occurred as late as 2004 (Anonymous, 2010b). In guidance sent to CENTCOM around the beginning of August 2002, for distribution to propaganda planners, senior Pentagon officials had plans for an ultimatum to Baghdad. But the document, described as “an update of work done months ago,” warned that “we should aim to delay Saddam’s recognition of the imminence of his downfall for as long as possible” (DoD, August 2002). It is likely this thinking limited US defence openness both with the public and allies during the run-up to war and restrictions became institutionalised by Pentagon insularity and momentum. Bureaucrats were seen as over-cautious if pushed for time and unsure of the security status, stamping documents with ‘noforn’ (no foreign) by default, to restrict distribution (Anonymous, 1st June 2009).

Miller thought that cooperation “probably happens more at the State Department” (3rd August 2009). As Armitage recalled, State Department dialogue was “always very in-depth and uh... what’s the word to describe - more than frank - [...] when they came in to us they got the queen’s jewels. As we felt they were engaged in this endeavour and they deserved it” (21st July 2009). He recalled that “even before the decision that we made... I pretty proud of being part of it... to give the British and Australians much more access up to about 99% of our intelligence... they were probably about 92-93% before... There were very few secrets, that’s the one thing about the, quote, ‘Special Relationship’ that is true.” (Armitage, 21st July 2009).

But Miller’s recollections of the Pentagon contrasted with this assertion; “just after the first phase of combat ended” in Iraq a bureaucratic trend towards over-classification and “US only communications and US only intelligence began to reappear” becoming obstructive to the alliance (3rd August 2009). Miller stated that, “we took steps to get an inter-agency agreement, which the President signed that knocked all those barriers down only to have bureaucrats
in the Pentagon refuse to carry out the order” (3rd August 2009). His recollections of the White House contrasted with his experience of the Pentagon where he “was never aware of a significant outreach by the Defense Department civilians to the leadership in UK” (Miller, 3rd August 2009). This undoubtedly affected formal processes yet interviews suggested that such lack of openness may not have been navigated through other contacts. When questioned about whether a lack of dialogue with the Pentagon made the British relationship more difficult Miller responded “Definitely not. I think that the informal contacts facilitated that” (3rd August 2009).

The diagrams below highlight some key areas of formal intersect and poor coordination highlighted within the text; in addition they indicate some of the informal interaction between the two countries. The apparatus of both countries changed significantly during the period of study and the below diagrams are not intended to be comprehensive, or to illustrate this change, however, certain key developments are represented (eg. Coalition Provisional Authority). Private sector, target audiences and media role were excluded from the diagrams for simplicity. They do not detail full command chains within the US/UK forces.

**Key:**

- Coalition Activities
- Foreign Office/SIS
- Ministry of Defence
- UK Military
- Executive/Downing Street
- Formal Anglo-American Cooperation
- Informal Anglo-American Cooperation
- Breakdowns in Coordination

**Abbreviations:**

- DCDC: Defence Crisis Management Centre
- DCMO: Defence Crisis Management Organisation (‘virtually’ links staff & some input from allies and other agencies like DfID and FCO. It is the conduit for briefings to Ministers and ensuring strategic direction for Defence)
- DTIO: Directorate Targeting and Information Operations
- SIS: Secret Intelligence Service
- JIC: Joint Intelligence Committee
- PGHQ: Permanent Joint Headquarters
Figure 3: Diagram showing Key UK Propaganda Processes & US-UK interaction
The following diagram shows some key elements of the US propaganda system, again focusing on some key areas of formal intersect and poor coordination highlighted here; in addition it indicates some of the Anglo-American informal interaction. As the thesis focussed primarily on the bureaucratic structures, the military structures and the relationship with the executive level, therefore due to over-complexity Congressional approval and oversight could not be included in the diagram. The diagram concentrates on showing the strategic and operational levels and is heavily simplified; it thus does not aim to show all interaction either formal or informal. It aims to be illustrative of certain patterns discussed in this thesis and show the overcontrolling nature of the US Defense Department. Tactical level organisation would be hard to represent accurately in a diagram as it is complex and adapted according to the needs of the Commander. Joint task forces can comprise PSYOPS, Civil Affairs or Special Operations among others.

**Key:**

- **Coalition Activities**
- **National Security Council**
- **Presidential Staff**
- **Department of Defence**
- **US Military**
- **CIA**
- **State Department**
- **Formal Anglo-American Cooperation**
- **Informal Anglo-American Cooperation**
- **Breakdowns in Coordination**

**Abbreviations:**

- NSC: National Security Council
- DCI: Director of Central Intelligence
- DNI: Director National Intelligence
- CJCS: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- JCS: Joint Chiefs of Staff
- PA: Public Affairs
- PD: Public Diplomacy
Figure 4: Diagram showing Key US Propaganda Processes & US-UK Formal Interaction (Partially drawn using: DoS, 2011).
Informal Channels and the ‘Assistive’ Relationship

The systemic disunity between British and American propaganda apparatus’ made planning difficult. Interviews with Miller and others indicated, however, that the insularity of the above-mentioned closed systems began to be resisted and navigated by individuals, realising occupational demands as best they could through informal channels (3rd August 2009). Significantly, (and possibly as a result of the historic differences in institutional culture mentioned in chapter 5) there appears to have been British primacy in facilitating these channels with receptive Americans, and performing an essential function for its allies’ executive.

This section argues that this can be best understood as part of the wider power imbalance that fed evolution of an ‘assistive’ function in Anglo-American propaganda, and the wider defence relationship. This has shaped negotiation at the political level, emerged as a function of the bureaucracy and drawn the countries toward complimentary planning to optimise combined resource. As opposed to ensuring consistent operations it specifically involves processes in which the partner is able to offer a capability which their partner lacks or which would be otherwise inconvenient. It embodies a need perceived by Britain’s leadership, to demonstrate continued British ‘value’ in the relationship, which shaped defence doctrine and military planning, and emerged within intelligence agency propaganda relations. The section will begin by discussing these trends, before moving on to consider how informal relationships can be seen as having had a dual function for Britain:

1. Its ability to work informal relationships and spin notions of ‘value’ through conceptual relationship, enabled the UK to maintain avenues of dialogue which could raise its prominence in US planning and thinking.

2. In so doing it rendered links which performed the assistive function of opening channels that enabled operation enhancing perceptions of British relative value to America.

Interoperability, Relative ‘Value’ and the ‘Assistive’ Relationship

Here, Britain’s defence strategy will be shown to have been demonstrably shaped by leadership perceptions that the Anglo-American relationship was
crucial to securing its interests during the War on Terror. Britain’s capabilities were limited, particularly those traditionally ascribed ‘value’ in US defence. While both partners attempted to coordinate capabilities through ‘assistive’ functioning, British utility to America often depended on:

- Providing unique capabilities
- Complimentary provision
- Closing potential capability gaps with its ally

This increased British emphasis on ‘interoperability’, converging doctrine, and providing unique capabilities in an attempt to secure ‘fit’ and relative value to America, all factors which shaped the information war.

As a pro-Europe leader Blair snubbed European allies particularly on the issue of Iraq (Sharp, 2003: 63-64). Despite claims of a desire to juggle relationships with both Europe and the US, the decisiveness of British policy shows this to be a hollow image, with America solidly at the forefront of his leadership’s foreign policy (Gamble and Wright, 2004). In Iraq Britain’s official foreign policy position was

“The USA has achieved unequalled power. It is an indispensable partner for our security and it shares our values. A close relationship with Washington that serves and protects UK interests will remain a vital asset for this country” (Foreign & Commonwealth Office, April 2004: 147).

In 2007 David Miliband still maintained America to be “the single most important bilateral relationship” (quoted in Black, 20th July 2007). Consequently, Britain’s PSYOPS team regarded Iraq as crucial to British credibility with the Americans; for them it was what the relationship with the US depended on (Maj. Bergman, 2005). A significant military contribution was perceived by the leadership to be the way to secure influence with America, but British resource was limited.

In terms of fire-power and net resource, much of the British contribution was of negligible comparative value. PSYOPS Officer Peter Corcoran pointed out that that Britain was dependent in many aspects of warfighting besides propaganda resource, including “logistical support” (Corcoran, 8th June 2006). Both countries’ leaderships sought to maximise overall resource to meeting coalition objectives and thus sought to ensure each country’s capabilities were utilised to
best effect. This resulted in a security strategy where Britain was increasingly focussed on ensuring it could provide unique capabilities to *compliment* its key ally’s abilities rather than provide comparative forces. The maintenance of a division of labour was intended to meet the leaderships’ ‘shared’ goals in the conflicts. Britain strove to “provide those capabilities that deliver the greatest impact when operating alongside the US” (MoD, 2003a: 8). While this is generally concerned with formal kinetic military systems, similar trends can be observed in the information realm. The power of information and communication can arguably allow a militarily inferior country such as Britain to punch above its weight (Keohane and Nye, 1998). While America certainly performed this assistive function, for Britain it was a deeply rooted defence strategy.

The political goals translated into a British defence doctrine that prioritised complimentary planning and assistive functioning. Furthermore, Nagl points out that,

“The demands of conventional and unconventional warfare differ so greatly” that an “organisational culture that makes it effective in achieving one is counter-productive in accomplishing the other” therefore “organisations should focus on achieving one critical mission” (2002: 219).

His arguments appear to favour an assistive, complimentary relationship between the two countries. Yet it brought homogenisation of doctrine as, particularly following the Iraq invasion, British defense doctrine increasingly reflected US trends. To have utility it was considered necessary for British expertise to compliment American expertise and for British forces to be interoperable in command and control as well as operationally (MoD, 2003a). Doctrine emphasised interconnectivity as crucial to coordinating the fight against terrorism so that the countries could work together with fluidity (MoD, 2003a & MoD, 2003b). Interconnectivity rests in large part on forces ensuring interoperability – the ability to ‘fit’ together and function in a complimentary way.

For instance, ‘Delivering Security’ underscored a move towards adapting British capabilities into an American-centric system (MoD, 2003a). The Ministry of Defence now considered it crucial to ensure “doctrine is coherent and relevant
to US-led operations” (MoD, 2003b: 36). Trans-national organisations such as NATO play a powerful role in cementing the kinds of commitments we are looking at here, as well as bringing policies, and interests, closer together. Britain has a privileged role in NATO. The role of propaganda and diplomatic relations is crucial here too in drawing working relationships across an often fragmentary collection of states. Britain’s positions relative to America and relative to NATO are inter-dependent and are operated likewise. Accordingly, its NATO contingent, the “Allied Rapid Reaction Corps lead for NATO when the ISAF operation was ramped up in 2005” (Anonymous, 2010b). But Britain was granted privileged American access in Iraq that went beyond that of other NATO members (Anonymous, 2010b). This has relevance too in the information realm. Interoperability and the homogenisation of doctrine have been assisted through NATO and increasing multilateral force participation. Jones has envisioned key role for “encouraging” multinational organisations like NATO in the development and implementation of American information strategy (Jones, 2005: 111).

The speculation over whether a ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ (RMA) was occurring might be said to have triggered a homogenisation of doctrine as it

80 Codename “HERRICK” (Anonymous, 2010).
81 An accepted definition of a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is that of Andrew Marshall, US Defense Secretary’s Office; “a major change in the nature of warfare brought about by the innovative application of new technologies which, combined with dramatic changes in military doctrine and operational and conceptual ideas, fundamentally alters the character and conduct of military operations” (Quoted in McKitrick, 1995). Though it is sometimes used to discuss technologies, RMA is a theory about future warfare in which organisational change and strategy are key elements; it has been embraced in the US as a discourse of ‘Transformation’. It is argued that economic, political and social changes affecting the position of the nation-state in the international system are changing the ways its military must be organised and equipped (See RAND’s Zanini & Edwards for example on counter-terrorism and ‘netwar’, 2001). Emerging out of post-Cold War IT boom and the birth of the internet in the early 90’s (O’Hanlon, 2000: 7), RMA aims at utilising/responding to developments in information, communications, and space technology and has provided specific prescriptions for military & defence policy. Some, such as Michael O’Hanlon (2000) deny the emergence of RMA, and argue that these technological developments began long before the 1990’s, yet RMA has clearly been influential in shaping US, and subsequently UK, defence policy.

One of the key elements of RMA is the concept of ‘system of systems’; increased ability for computers, communication systems and networking to enable coordination of existing weapons systems (O’Hanlon, 2000: 11-12). Some however, see RMA as going beyond this; expanding intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance until America can “see almost everything worth seeing in real or near-real time” (Libicki & Johnson, 1995: i). With RMA Information Warfare is also seen as of increased importance, especially “Disrupting or defending the decision-making process” (Quille, 1998), particularly significant advocates include John Arquilla. He perceives an information age in its infancy in which America needs to gain an advantage (2007: 1-2). The US Air Force has a further vision, to reduce dependence on fixed bases and enable ever faster deployment of increasingly sophisticated weapons systems (O’Hanlon, 2000: 14-15). With overwhelming US dominance through satellites and weapons-guidance systems, as well as communications technologies, the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq was held up as an example of success in RMA investment (O’Hanlon, 2000: 9-10). It demonstrated an enormous relative power advantage the US gained through technological advances against a (then) well-equipped Iraqi military.

With RMA, the focus came to be upon efficiency; “minimal bloodshed and short battles” (O’Hanlon, 2000: 9). The clinical nature of their technological approach to war has come to epitomise for some an arrogant US “detachment” in their foreign policy or propaganda to a misleading public image of ‘bloodless war’ (See Jenkins, 7th February 2007). Maj. Gen. Cordingley wrote of his command in the Gulf, “The reporting of the very clinical nature of modern weapon systems and their effects on the bunkers and buildings in Baghdad led the public, especially the American public, to lose touch with the reality of war; a grim, ghastly and bloody affair” (1996). Gerard Quille of the International Security Information Service also warned against focus on technology over “civil-military relations and other approaches to conflicts i.e. conflict resolution and third party initiatives” (1998). During the ‘war on terror’ difficulties both in capturing Osama bin Laden and countering insurgency led some military experts to question RMA as a solution. Christopher ‘Ryan’ Henry, the Principal Undersecretary of Defense for Policy presented a briefing to Rumsfeld in 2004 emphasising the need for America to prepare to meet “irregular challenges” (Ricks, 2004). His plans favoured troop strength over hi-tech weaponry, and
brought a redefined image of the future of defense; as exploitation of information advantage. It centred on technology such as ‘smart missiles’ and stealth, but extended to ‘Network Enabled Capacity’; optimising links between allies, decision-makers, weapon systems and forces. A Congressional Report issued in 2004 stated that planners were shifting strategy to reflect an analysis that “combat power can be enhanced by communications networks and technologies that control access to, and directly manipulate, information. As a result, information itself is now both a tool and a target of warfare” (Wilson, 2006). RMA built on conventional forms of military action, and going into Iraq it influenced the 2003 Ministry of Defence White Paper “Delivering Security in a Changing World” (MoD, 2003a). The Ministry of Defence invested heavily in a network of communications personnel and computer systems to integrate Britain with its allies (MoD, 2003a). However, Cohen has pointed out that its preference for technological advances would always be surpassed by the innovation of an unconventional enemy (Cohen, 1996:51). 82

Similarly, out of the US Marine Corp came the ‘4th Generation Warfare’ debate, which saw a need to address new, unconventional adversaries with unconventional, asymmetrical and innovative responses (Benbow, 2006). This was seen as providing an ‘agility’ that became the cornerstone of the Ministry of Defence’s new doctrine (MoD, 2003a, MoD, 2003b). The RMA/4th Generation debate influenced the new ‘effects-based’ approaches that the US and Britain started to develop out of the early failures of the ‘war on terror’ (Benbow, 2006). ‘Effects-based’ approaches prioritise a need for systems to be flexible, with responses tailored to specific outcomes. This contrasted with the notoriously inflexible and cumbersome American bureaucracy and the increased emphasis on informal mechanisms helped to bypass the formal structures in some cases.

82 As Britain has moved towards ‘interoperability’ with the US, its own doctrine has increasingly become written (Nagl, 2002); conversely this weakens one of the qualities that ensures its ‘flexibility’.
One such example where ‘unique’ capabilities were offered to the alliance was propaganda; this was highly influential on American practise. The Times argued America’s anthrax scandal had made Washington more receptive to strategic assistance from British Officials (Watson and Webster 2001). Despite Britain’s smaller resource, Blair demonstrated from the outset a clear desire to be a leader in the information realm. This was also of course, crucial to his own leadership’s interests. He was the first world leader to give a coherent public response to the terrorist threat, within an hour and twenty minutes of the attack he articulated a need for democracies to stand up to the threat and “fight it together”, at a time when Bush had only stated a need to find those responsible (Blair 2001; Bush 2001). As Jones points out “it was Blair who led the way in calling in Al Jazeera to No. 10 for an interview. It was days before the US followed Blair’s path…” (Jones 2001a).

However, initially a hostile stance was taken towards the Muslim media. Culture Secretary Tessa Jowell cautioned British media against using Al-Jazeera footage in their broadcasts on 29th October, for example, and announced that the ITC had been monitoring it for signs of incitement of racial hatred (Jowell, 2001). The Ad-hoc Coalition Information Centres which came to play an important role in Afghanistan’s media management were borne out of, the Downing Street Director of Communications and Strategy, Alistair Campbell’s visit to Washington in early October 2001, to meet with Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Karen Hughes and Director of the Office of Media Affairs, Tucker Eskew (Macintyre 2002). He emphasised the responsibility Britain had in handling the news, before Washington had even risen, that had become established hours before at Taleban press conferences in Pakistan (Macintyre 2002). What resulted, Macintyre refers to as “a joint media and propaganda operation, little publicised in Britain and unprecedented, even in the Second World War” (Macintyre 2002). Campbell’s former employee Alan Percival, then working as a civil servant in the Lord Chancellor’s office, helped

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83 The White House also based its Office of Global Communications on this design (Meade, 2005).
84 With his colleague Phil Basset.
to set up the Islamabad Centre, allowing Campbell to have significant influence in the co-ordination of the whole operation (Dillon 2001).

An instrumental role was played by co-ordination and planning between Campbell and his American counterparts, Karen Hughes and Tucker Eskew. During Campbell’s trip he was shown a copy of Bush’s speech to Congress before it was delivered (Macintyre 2002). Likewise, an article in the Independent reported that “Eskew was shown the Prime Minister’s statement to the Commons after the Taliban lines had finally been breeched; after consulting Washington he succeeded in having a few of the more triumphalist lines toned down, and Blair referred to the Taliban ‘collapse’ rather than to an allied ‘victory’” (Macintyre 2002). This is indicative of an informal ‘consideration’ where messages can be included which assist the partner, and which performs an important role both in solidifying the sense of alliance and in ensuring consistent (credible) propaganda. Importantly, from early November, Tucker Eskew was quietly based at the Foreign Office in London for five months, and began meeting daily with Alistair Campbell to plan the coalition’s media strategy (Macintyre 2002). Campbell headed a team there charged with monitoring the Islamic media and daily London briefings began to engage more with muslim journalists (Dillon 2001). Campbell discussed the appearance of Blair on the ‘Larry King Live’ show (November 6th) with the White House, and this gesture was reciprocated by Colin Powell when he spoke to the London Information Centre before his BBC interview (Macintyre 2002). Campbell was concerned to ensure consistent adherence to certain “key messages” was maintained which centred on ‘mutual’ goals, though censorship remained a key policy (Dillon 2001). Early publicity was considered to have failed in some areas, for instance in publicising the level of support gained internationally, so four aims emerged for the strategy:

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85 Pat McFadden a No. 10 Special Advisor, based in a team run by Coalition Spokesman, (former USIA Foreign Service Officer) Kenton Keith in the Islamabad Coalition Information Centre. The staff was hugely varied; analysts, experts, civil servants, speech writers and political advisors from No 10, the Ministry of Defence, Treasury, Lord Chancellors Department, US State Department officials, Republican White House political appointees, and US and British forces personnel doing (McFadden 2006). Keith took a lead role in organising all their activities to counter negative stories in the media and give journalists’ briefings, issue statements, anticipate negative coverage and generally manage media operations (McFadden 2006).
1) To emphasise generally that September 11 lies behind the current bombing campaign.
2) To publicise that the breadth of support for the campaign is greater than usually credited.
3) To challenge arguments that the strategy is not working.
4) To publicise negative arguments relating to Bin Laden and the evidence against him within the Islamic world. (Watson and Webster 2001)

In correspondence with Richard Sambrook (Former BBC Director of News) at the time, BBC Correspondent Nicholas Jones noted a change in Campbell’s strategy, “a charm offensive with the foreign media” (Jones, 30th November 2001). Likewise in the US, Bush toned down his rhetoric to emphasise that “we have much more in common than people might think” (Watson and Webster 2001). Their approach changed from the demoralising agitation propaganda of an ‘enemy’ to integration propaganda from a long lost ‘friend’. The assistive propaganda relationship was also underscored. According to Dillon, Campbell wished to ensure central figures involved in the conflict timed key speeches and trips so as not to detract from each others’ publicity, thus maximising the overall profile of the coalition side of the campaign (2001).

To facilitate this there was a “swapping of ideas, material and possibly staff between Downing Street and The White House in what officials describe as a “constant co-operation and co-ordination at every level” between the two governments since September 11” (Watson and Webster 2001). Eskew was highly critical of the critical press in Britain, especially in response to Guantanamo Bay; yet considered the Information Centre to have been highly successful in managing an exercise to “impede great lies and propel great truths” including “rebutting” Taliban stories about civilian casualties (Macintyre 2002).86 Influence was imposed with a heavy hand; one particular article, written for the Prime Minister for Remembrance Sunday and reproduced by the Mail on Sunday was taken over suddenly and “Campbellised”; rewritten with its message strictly

86 These activities were viewed as crucial to Anglo-American relations and staff at the Islamabad Information Centre were keen on a more proactive role in media management (McFadden, 2006). McFadden got frustrated at being unable to provide information until it was confirmed as this left an information vacuum and discontent among the press. He thought that the team was established too slowly and fed his concerns back to No. 10 in time for Iraq (McFadden, 2006).
controlled (Jones, 15th November 2001). Nicholas Jones said they “hijacked Remembrance Sunday” and pushed the wearing of poppies “as a way of showing support for British forces at risk in Afghanistan” (Jones, 15th November 2001). He stated that his contact “said this was a typical example of Campbell, I mean Campbell would’ve taken the article and used Remembrance Sunday as a way of promoting the need [...] for solidarity” (Jones, 14th March 2006). The government press office put out a statement that “This year there will be added poignancy as we remember not only those who died in the service of their country in the First and Second World Wars, but also those who lost their lives on 11 September in tragic circumstances as a result of terrorism” (10 Downing Street, 2001).

On his departure from London, Eskew underlined how formative his experience had been stating that it had increased his appreciation of the need to address Arab and Muslim media, many of whom were London-based (Macintyre 2002). The leaderships began to emphasise the Muslim death-toll from 9-11 and that this was not a war on Islam (Watson and Webster 2001) but within two years of 9/11 Arab sentiment around the world had become decidedly hostile to US foreign policy (Tatham, 2006). As the Iraq invasion became likely, a key element of the ‘coalition-building’ process was gaining access to the region. Britain therefore increasingly cultivated its relationships in “emerging trouble spots”, courting unlikely friends that might prove Britain’s value (MoD, 2003b: 34).

Later, British information warfare expertise also influenced doctrinal moves towards America’s ‘strategic communication’ approach (see Chapter 3) in American doctrine through collaboration at CENTCOM. As Special Assistant for Public Affairs Thorp was “responsible for both coordinating psychological operations at the strategic level” and “in charge of policy for the coordination of psychological operations and public affairs, from the public affairs standpoint” (24th August 2009). In Qatar Thorp observed how British PSYOPS and media operations “weren’t totally different cultures” having a relationship that “was more coordinated and more together, and more homogenised...” in its goals and messages (24th August 2009). Thorp considered this “very healthy” and “briefed the Joint Chief of Staff on how it should be combined and coordinated” in the US

87 It is worth noting that focus groups have shown the British public were far less sympathetic to the message, for example see Oates, S; Kaid, L, and Berry, M. (2009).
88 And therefore public diplomacy efforts.

In an early failure of Rumsfeld’s Special Forces-centred approach on 20th October 2001 he had dramatically misjudged the level of resistance at Mullah Omar’s residence near Kandahar, and 12 Delta Force members were injured (Hersh, 2004). Gen. Myres reported in a Pentagon briefing the ease with which Special Operations Forces were able to operate with only “light” resistance in this “successful” mission, a stance the military supported with selective television footage (Hersh, 2004: 122). Neither Myres nor Rumsfeld subsequently acknowledged the near-failure but the following day it was reported that America had requested Britain’s entire SAS regiment to deploy (Hersh, 2004).

This said, while the SAS became seen by many as a model for US capabilities, a former military intelligence officer criticised how they had been pulled in to support a very American strategy. Adrian Weale described how the strategic intelligence set-up meant “SIS and Special Forces were focussed almost entirely on” the Americans’ “pack of cards” to the detriment of counterinsurgency operations especially in the first year after the Iraq invasion (26th November 2010). Propaganda concerns were criticised for likewise reflecting this focus on high-profile cases,

“the effort that was being expended on information campaigns on tracking down Saddam [...] would’ve been more better focussed on more relevant things like potential insurgents, what Muqtada Al-Sadr was doing…” (Weale, 26th November 2010).

American concerns often seem to have been made central to Britain’s approach in a ‘joint’ strategy. This meant “the agencies which had the funding and the capability to start dealing with the insurgency were focussed on something else entirely” (Weale, 26th November 2010). 89

British expertise was sought as the intelligence agencies of the two countries worked together, and attempts were made to draw on any propaganda

89 He expanded on this marked a difference of approach to counterinsurgency, “In Nasiriya we were talking to Muqtada Al-Sadr’s number 2, who was a moderately reasonable Shia cleric. [...] He was certainly open to reason and would pass messages back to Muqtada.” It was an important “channel of communication. But the Americans wanted to [...] sweep him out of the way and deal with” Saddam as this would demonstrate the public image of American strength (Weale, 26th November 2010). Weale said he “personally discussed this with Graham Lamb the General who’s in Command in Basra who came to see us in Nasiriya” and “The Brits opposed it generally” because “Muqtada was the real problem. Saddam was just hiding low” (Weale, 26th November 2010).
capabilities that might compliment each others’ objectives. Britain has provided the CIA with certain expertise in propaganda, enabling the filtration of strategic messages into the public domain. According to US journalist and author of ‘Curveball’ Bob Drogin,

“The CIA was designed... built on the model of British Intelligence, so there’s a lot of um... [...] the early days they worked hand-in-glove, and still to a certain extent do.” (22nd August 2009).

Since MI6’s budget limits its use of contractors, a distancing function is obtained through its “classic technique” known to Dorril as “surfacing” (20th July 2010). He argues the Americans had “been taught it by us... they’ve been taught it by MI6 probably” (Dorril, 20th July 2010). The technique functions to distance the propagandist from the propaganda, again reducing accountability and giving the message some wider credibility. An MI6 agent would first

“plant a story in a third country, you tell the journalist who’s your contact that there’s an interesting story in Poland. He gets the story [...] he comes back to you [the agent] and you say yeh it’s true, they can build a... nuclear weapon in 6 months. Then he puts the story in the press that intelligence sources confirm that...” (Dorril, 20th July 2010).

This ‘double-sourcing’ adds credibility to the story, yet “the person who usually backs it up is also the person who planted the story in the first place” (Dorril, 20th July 2010). Dorril claims “they started the same process with Iran about 2 years ago [...] people on the Telegraph, they were running a lot of stuff...” (20th July 2010). Dorril observed how in the run-up to the Gulf War then again for War in Iraq the CIA were engaged in these activities, he said “it happens quite a lot” (20th July 2010). However, Dorril observed that “some of it wasn’t by them. It’s pretty clear that some of it was done by surrogates. [...] Chalabi... he did a lot” and “nobody’s quite sorted out his relationship to MI6 or CIA” (Dorril, 20th July 2010). Clandestine activity’s inherent deniability allows governments to negotiate in this way with insurgent or terrorist groups outside public scrutiny (Scott, 2004: 331).

The CIA’s use of such ‘surrogates’ and, of course contractors, functions to distance activities still further, and it is possible its relationship with MI6 operates in a similar way. Hersh has reported on an MI6 I/Ops program during
the Clinton years. It was “known to a few senior officials in Washington” one of whom commented that “We were getting ready for action in Iraq, and we wanted the Brits to prepare” (31st March 2003). Hersh notes “a series of clandestine meetings with MI6, at which documents were provided” by CIA containing highly unreliable

“inactionable intelligence to be funneled to MI6 operatives and quietly passed along to newspapers in London and elsewhere ‘It was intelligence that was crap, and that we couldn’t move on, but the Brits wanted to plant stories in England and around the world’” (31st March 2003).

This could be argued to provide a complimentary and ‘unique’ capability within the alliance. CIA-MI6 coordination is significant in the light of McBrides comment in interview, that “the British are very clever, and [...] don’t have the restrictions we do” (5th June 2009). Contractor Sean Fitzpatrick echoed this claim saying “I think your country has it better handled” (counter-terrorism) (30th June 2009). MI5 for instance, is not bound by the constraints of being a law enforcement agency, and is perceived to have more flexibility, not having to prove a criminal act as the FBI must,

“And if you screw up they’ll lock you up. Well you know, you’re in much more dangerous territory. [as a government] But [...] nothing sharpens the mind like the prospect of hanging in the morning.” (Fitzpatrick, 30th June 2009).

Intelligence expert Drogin related the same argument to propaganda,

“it’s certainly my understanding that in the UK, MI6 has fewer of those kinds of restrictions about operating in-country, and that there are... I’m told... [...] the British Intelligence services do in fact have British correspondents working for major [...] organisations [...] operating on their behalf” (22nd August 2009).

It is often claimed that “it’s illegal for the CIA to run operations in [America]” (Drogin, 22nd August 2009). Restrictions placed upon American propaganda are frequently referenced; former MI6 Agent Richard Tomlinson noted that the CIA, “are constitutionally prevented from manipulating the press” (2001: 73). Different ‘capabilities’ of this kind could clearly prove the Anglo-American relationship advantageous in wartime, especially if CIA propaganda restrictions are as robust as is claimed.
While it’s argued that “no citizen would ever be spied upon by an intelligence agency” of the US (Risen, 2006: 40), it is known that Britain’s Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) works collaboratively with the National Security Agency (NSA) eavesdropping programme ‘Echelon’. McBride, in commenting on such geographical boundaries, said

“the British were less concerned with that kind of problem [...] no matter where the perpetrator is in the world the same intelligence gathering machine can be put to use” (5th June 2009).

In intelligence-gathering, legal restrictions on method are also massaged, as McBride demonstrated in referring to rendition,

“here again, when we’re trying to be too good, if we pick up a foreign agent and he’s suspected of conspiracy for terrorism or has committed a terrorist act there are many mechanisms which, it’s claimed, that US forces can use which is - well we picked him up, [...] in say India, and we could turn him over to the Indians for interrogation, they don’t have the restrictions we do, and guess what, they get their answers! And [...] um, we have to be very careful that it doesn’t look like we’re goin - you know, here’s this bad guy, give us your answer once you get done torturing him. Because we’re against torture. Exactly, like we can blow you up with a hundred shots to the head but we can’t make you feel uncomfortable. If we capture you” (5th June 2009).

If propaganda campaigns are located under the department of least public scrutiny or legal restriction (as we saw in the case of McBride’s project in chapter 3) or shipped out to surrogates (contractors or political/insurgent groups); then it is unsurprising that allies cooperative arrangements seem to be established to function in the same way. This certainly happens in defence, as Wright confirmed,

“if we wanted to do something in the Maghreb, because our military say look we’re worried about [Al Qaeda from Mesopotamia] Our policy people in the MoD would say [...] We’re not doing military operations

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90 McBride’s response to public opinion and accepted ethics is to emphasise the importance of separating the image of these acts from the mechanisms themselves in terms of operational activity, so that each becomes a separate task necessary for battlefield success.
leaving only Foreign Office diplomats (1st June 2009). So America’s wider reach was mutually beneficial where a military propaganda response was deemed necessary; “doing influence activity, in its broadest sense, in Africa to prevent operations ever happening” (1st June 2009).

On this Miller nervously said, “If it’s influencing our own people, which is I know, forbidden by law... uh, then you wouldn’t really want your ally to be doing for you what you’re not allowed to do yourself...” externally, however, he acknowledged, “if it’s operational... yeh I mean, maybe” (3rd August 2010). Tomlinson has confirmed this takes place, citing as example the 1992 UN election coverage of Boutros-Ghali. The CIA, apparently “asked MI6 to help” using their British and American media contacts, as the US considered him “dangerously Francophile” (Tomlinson, 2001: 73).

However, research showed that the CIA may now face fewer restrictions than Tomlinson, Miller, Risen and Drogin (and others) thought, which leaves MI6’s utility and the extent of this particular form of assistive cooperation unclear. When I asked whether the British sometimes played this role Miller observed that during wartime “I don’t know that we’ve had that many operations... actually... denied” (Miller, 3rd August 2009). Drogin also advised that “I wouldn’t place so much emphasis on the oversight, cause there’s very little evidence that Congress has ever denied them” (22nd August 2009). Dorril argued that “They do it... They do it... but um probably not as necessarily as much as they had to” (20th July 2010). In other words it could be lessening due to weak American restrictions. Dorril at one point “did think that the CIA couldn’t [...] use American journalists, that that was illegal” (20th July 2010). Apparently, “when the thing went through about non-recruiting American Journalists, actually there was a secret get-out clause, for the CIA. So uh... it didn’t mean a great deal” (Dorril, 20th July 2010).

When in 1996 a Council for Foreign Relations independent task force recommended taking a “fresh look...at limits on the use of non-official ‘covers’ for hiding and protecting those involved in clandestine activities” including journalists, John Deutch, then Director of Central Intelligence responded that
there was “no need to change U.S. policy as Haass had advocated, since the CIA already had the power to use U.S. reporters as spies” (Houghton, 1996). The revelation had lead Dorril to conclude that “they don’t really need us” (20th July 2010).

As mentioned above as part of an overall war effort, coalitions account for differing skill-sets and capabilities of their members in producing a division of labour that will allow members to perform an assistive, complimentary role, and optimise their overall resource in meeting operational objectives. To this effect operationally the Americans “only need us in areas where they’re not well covered” (Dorril, 20th July 2010). While the states’ power within the coalition is certainly imbalanced, engagement at this level is inevitably going to be restricted by both sides. Close ties are drawn upon pragmatically according to need. Therefore, American ties did not stop John Scarlett distancing MI6 from CIA publicly when evidence of US torture became public, stressing that “we are our own service” and “working to our own laws” (2009). This act was crucial to public perceptions and would likely have been discussed at length with American intelligence. Gordon Thomas argues that John Scarlett ate regularly with the CIA London Station Chief with whom he shared similar views (2009: 24). And when the unpopular Porter Goss was replaced by Michael Hayden in 2006 the CIA Director cultivated a close relationship with Scarlett (Thomas, 2009: 452). CIA use of covers in US domestic media is clearly a carefully protected ability known to few, and would probably be cautiously exercised. Whereas activities performed by British intelligence would likely be subject to no US scrutiny, and indeed little domestically.

Certainly, Dorril acknowledged that MI6 and the CIA do try to compliment each other’s abilities (20th July 2010). MI6’s respective role is unclear largely because of its secrecy. According to Thorp the tactical, focussed nature of the intelligence agencies activities in the propaganda war (as opposed to their strategic-level aims) mean that “the coordination there is much more at the tactical level” (Thorp, 24th August 2009). Significantly, the intelligence operatives’ activities, rely on networks of informal contacts and resourcefulness. Their autonomous approach can create a tension at the tactical level with
overall Anglo-American cooperation, at the same time as crucially building the wide-reaching connections.

By example, Adrian Weale, whose wide contacts as a former intelligence officer helped greatly in his position as CPA Deputy Governor of Dhi Qar Province recalled how an “American Intelligence guy was appointed to CPA South to be intelligence link-man with CPA Baghdad and CIA… […] from NCIS…” (26th November 2010). Apparently “the Americans perceived that the guys who […] I’d been talking to were British assets […] they didn’t have access to” (Weale, 26th November 2010). Weale argued that he

“basically came up to Nasiriya, […] and he wanted to take over all my sources […] somebody’d obviously put him up to do this… and there was lots of sort-of offers of we can do this for you and we can do that for you […] didn’t quite offer me money, but it seemed that way” (26th November 2010).

The officer made unsuccessful appeals to Weale’s notion of public service to gain acquiescence; “couching it in terms of ‘it’s all for the good of the CPA…’” (Weale, 26th November 2010). Yet this breached Weale’s understanding of what was appropriate to expect from British cooperation. The expectation exemplifies in an extreme example how boundaries of ‘shared’ interests and correspondingly, British ‘value’, were subject to negotiation between the Anglo-American institutional cultures by individuals in pursuit of optimising their own occupational outcomes in the service of their state.

Scott makes the argument that intelligence officers “may be more than just a conduit” for deniability of governmental actions, that “their own initiative may be an important element” and he emphasises the “role of the individual” (2004: 336). Furthermore McBride’s statement above also highlights how easily a notion of what is acceptable can be extended conceptually by the individual (as discussed in Chapter 5) through interaction with distinctive organisational interests and cultures (that feed a sense of the ‘real world’ of operations), to rationalise and incrementally legitimise controlled or unethical acts.

91 And vis-a-vis parallel organisations.
An assistive necessity for British policy of course meant strategic-level dialogue did not always produce tangible victories for Britain’s particular national interests, which were at times subordinated in ‘service’ to wider ‘mutual’ interests, Anglo-American-influenced goals. For instance a tangible rift existed concerning potential targets in Afghanistan following the 9/11 attacks; the CIA suggested a number of drug-related facilities. According to Risen’s CIA source the British “were screaming” for these targets to be bombed since most of the heroin in Britain originated there (Risen, 2006: 154). The State Department argued for armed forces to tackle opium production. Risen equates the Pentagon and White House’s refusal with early disinterest in long-term nation-building (Risen, 2006: 154-5). But this was not allowed to disrupt the image of the alliance. Thus following the American refusal to bomb drug-related Afghan targets, Britain took on much of the initial anti-narcotics campaign (including propaganda initiatives) despite limited military and intelligence resource to do so (Risen, 2006: 154-5). In Afghanistan, the running of some diplomatic ‘reconstruction’ programmes, set up by Britain, was reportedly co-opted by American control. An official stated; 

“...they wait until some project is, you know, being seen to work... and then they pour in, and this is on the information side, they pour in with promises of millions of dollars for the Afghan government and lots of consultants and they want to take it over. They want to control information programmes” (Western Diplomatic Official Based in Afghanistan 2006).

While dominant national interests could still cause dispute, the perception of a stable Anglo-American campaign remained a priority. Thus in terms of perceptions, at times an ‘effects based’ approach prioritised strategic outcomes over the leadership’s particular perception of ‘national’ interests. The maintenance of an effective alliance, and the uncomplicated perception of this, necessarily relies upon effective dialogue and coordination of message, even where interests diverged. Several British interviewees expressed great concern not to be quoted saying anything negative about the Americans they had worked with, and thus damaging crucial Anglo-American propaganda working relationships.
British Experience as Propaganda: Creating ‘Value’ and ‘Shared’ Interests

Workable cooperative arrangements were necessary to secure avenues by which British leadership’s interests could be raised in American prominence,. Formal cooperation has been shown to have been limited by the structural insularity of American defence planning. Here, however, British institutional cultures are argued to have produced a facilitating, proactive approach in which informal connections with receptive American personnel and leadership were utilised. The British viewed enduring positive American assessments of British ‘unique’ capabilities and ‘expertise’ as key to sustaining these connections. Indeed, Sir John Reith argued in his Iraq Testimony that Iraq expertise added crucial credibility with the Americans, who “very much work on […] do they trust somebody, is he of the right calibre for him to work with” (15th January 2010). Perhaps surprisingly, American sentimentality for the conceptual ‘relationship’ contrasted with British cynicism toward the Americans in interviews. Indeed, Chris Mayer described in his Iraq Testimony how as Ambassador in Washington “wherever you went - you didn't have to do anything, just walk through a door - people would rise to their feet and give you a sort of storming round of applause. So you had to - you know, you had to be careful not to be swept away by this stuff” (26th November 2009).

But its continuation through a sense of British ‘expertise’ and history helped sustain perceptions, and restrict the basis for decision-making vis-a-vis Britain through assumed truth. This helped sustain connections, keeping prominence in US planning and thinking where materially British utility was questionable.

Increased informality necessarily heightened the importance that favourable, ‘mutual’ interests were communicated and understood within each bureaucracy; to ensure a receptive bureaucracy and coordinate action. A sense of agreement over histories; ‘shared’ interests; and the cultivation of perceptions of each country and the alliance itself helped adhere the informal relationships which became so important to coordination. Given the power differential, ensuring influence over perceived ‘shared’ interests that will shape policy and planning is a function of the relationship which was of greatest significance to Britain’s leadership. Both in terms of ‘selling’ this notion to its own public, and in terms of ensuring continued American value through the maintenance of the relationships that were helping to sustain function. Notions of British ‘expertise’
were emphasised during the ‘War on Terror’ as a means to unify Britain’s
domestic military, and played also on American sentiment for tradition.
Conceptually British ‘expertise’ within the wider notion of a ‘special
relationship’ was a means for Britain’s leadership to demonstrate the value
Britain offered in providing capabilities that complimented those of its partner.
Through its connections and the value placed on them by American partners it
could negotiate a notion of ‘shared’ interests with America that conformed to
contemporary leadership interests. Nagl argues that,

“Changes that conflict with the dominant group’s ideas on preferred
roles and missions - the essence of the organisation - will not be
adopted. Leaders of the organisation, conditioned by the culture they
have absorbed through years of service in that organisation, will
prevent changes in the core mission and goals” (2002: 216).

Moves toward complimentary ‘systems’ and strategy such as RMA, 4th Generation
Warfare and a striving towards interoperability in general should be seen in this
context as they have functioned to secure American preference, formed the
basis of a working relationship and demonstrated commitment.

In demonstrating British expertise, historically there has been plenty to build
and past experience, (that of David Lloyd Owen for example; “my generation
and above have spent so much of their career doing colonial policing that we’d
better bloody well be good at it” (quoted in Nagl, 2002: 205)) has left residual
pride, confidence and expectation. British geography and “freedom from foreign
conquest” built-in an historic “astonishing confidence in victory” into its military
culture (Woodward, 1947: 530-547). However, as Heginbotham observes that
traditionally “reliance on a combination of single-arm regimental standards and
on ad-hoc guidelines issued by theatre commander permitted continued
innovation” for the British military, “but little accumulation of knowledge”
(1996: 1-2). Britain’s historic relationship in the region and having “had a bad
experience in Iraq” mean the British were still seen, militarily and
bureaucratically, as having valuable expertise; in the State Department Armitage
said he found “some of [Britain’s] Iraq-watchers to be extraordinary” (Armitage,
21st July 2009). Similarly Miller argued that

“in some places... [British] regional and country expertise is much
better than ours and I think that’s true even today. [...] And in part
because you’ve got relations with Iran, so you have Diplomats who’ve been on the ground in Iran, whereas we have not since 1979. So I think in many areas your talents and capabilities are deeper than ours yes [...] And I’ve done what I can to try to get people, even [...] at your Embassy here, with these kind of backgrounds to be more well-known to their American colleagues.” (Miller, Franklin, 3rd August 2009).

This was common throughout the diplomatic and bureaucratic realm, and militarily Britain’s experience in Ireland was referenced often as an example of greatly respected counterinsurgency skills (see Iraq Example below).

This research showed found British experience from Ireland provided a unique contribution that assisted the US efforts during the War on Terror; but this came indirectly, via private contracting. Contractors offered a more stable concept of experience than British forces due to their ability to specialise. The central $293M contract in Iraq was controversially granted to Aegis, a UK company established by former British Col. Tim Spicer whose troops in Ireland were implicated in a human rights violation. Aegis was to act as a coordinating interface between the US military and its other contractors (Smith, 2006). One key player, originally hired by the UK “to run their Counter-IRA advertising campaign” was US advertising executive Sean Fitzpatrick (McBride, 5th June 2009). Apparently, it was imperative the anti-IRA message got “a life of its own” and continued beyond the campaign in a self-sustaining way (McBride, 5th June 2009). Following a belief that women are “very good at communicating” Fitzpatrick chose to exploit female networks, targeting commercials at women; “his objective was to get to a tipping point where it was not only ok to snitch it was your duty [...] even if it was your brother” (McBride, 5th June 2009). McBride, who has worked with Fitzpatrick on the ‘War on Terror’ at the Washington-based Potomac Institute argued that “you couldn’t have a more successful campaign” (5th June 2009). Fitzpatrick has since then been engaged in a number of contracts across US Government. He “had the Privilege of being with [Peggy Noonan] when I worked for George H W Bush” (Fitzpatrick, 30th June 2009) and the Department of Defense and Office of President Bush are listed on his website ‘www.seandotcom.com’. Fitzpatrick stated on-record that,

“Trying to persuade Islamic Militants to do anything [...] is probably a
fruitless exercise. But, there are segments of that society, and sub-segments that can be spoken to. The first would be youth and the second would be women. Because they exist [...] outside the corridors of power. But those outside influences [...] accumulate…” (Fitzpatrick, 30th June 2009).

While Fitzpatrick declined to comment on non-commercial projects himself, McBride confirmed that he worked with Fitzpatrick at Potomac on a contract with the Office of Strategic Influence describing him as “the world’s best artist in the world of persuasion” (McBride, 5th June 2009). They began looking at whether “the UK approach [would] work for the US and UK in another part of the world?” and with an “Arab-Muslim” population; and apparently the State Department continued this project when the Office of Strategic Influence was terminated (McBride, 5th June 2009).

It is true to say however, that the more experience the Americans get, the fewer the capability gaps, and less vital British expertise becomes (15th Army PSYOPS Group, 22nd November 2005). British military personnel change post frequently compared to America’s career officers, British PSYOPS personnel are largely reservists but from related civilian positions. The British military however, have “a strong sense of institutional memory” that serves to sustain this sense of British ‘experience’ (Anonymous, 16th August 2010). Maintaining this kind of preference for British expertise was one way in which Britain would be able to maintain the connections it needed to enhance its position vis-a-vis America. It did this partly through policy and partly with propaganda and cultural dialogue; maintaining this ‘collective memory’ which contributed to the informal relationships. As Shy points out, in military organisational culture beyond power and interest “a remembered past has always more or less constricted both action in the present and thinking about the future” (1971: 210). Therefore Nagl argues that “understanding how it is remembered by those who direct an organisation’s present and future, is essential to understanding how that organisation will adapt to changes in its environment” (2002: 216).

Language reflects wider domestic military relations, and functions to solidify perceptions, bonds and status in relation to the partner. Cultural perceptions of Media Operations personnel - nicknamed “Luvvies” (Anonymous, 16th August
2010) - are shaped by the fact that “successful military careers [...] are laid on hard power” (Mackay & Tatham, 2009: 25). Cultural stereotypes such as these which underpin relationships (both within the same institutional culture and between each country’s personnel), and can preserve consistency in understandings and assumptions in a fast-changing, unsettling world. Likewise, the Anglo-American military culture generated often paternalistic “cynicism and amusement” about “the ‘spams’ and the ‘septics’ (from Septic Tank = Yank)” from the British side (Anonymous, 2010b). References to the affinity between the cultures was frequently apparent in interview and interviewees seemed to use these as a way to build a relationship and rapport. While the history of the ‘special relationship’ was not referred to in my questions, American interviewees were keen to reference history and personal or societal ‘roots’ often talking about what ‘we’ do, to include me. The language of the relationship slipped easily from tongues. And it is this ease of usage that sustains the discourse in which discussion of the two countries’ dealings are invariably shackled. For example, Miller, referred to the “grand relationship” (3rd August 2009) and former Deputy Secretary of State Armitage mused, that there were “No more Yalta moments. If you’re familiar with the history? No more Yalta moments for the Brits...” (Armitage, 21st July 2009)92. Similarly, when interview discussions probed Anglo-American cooperation in intelligence agency propaganda, and responses became vague it proved an easy non-confrontational way to dispel difficult questions. Having diverted the subject from intelligence agency propaganda collaboration, Miller continued through the ease of historical cliché,

“But, broadly put... the symbiotic relationship between the American and British intelligence communities is terribly, terribly important. We each bring something to that game, which is unique, even if it’s only perspectives, and so it’s an area which has been fundamental to the special relationship” (3rd August 2009).

As Gorman and MacLean have noted, propaganda’s effectiveness to a great extent “depends on its success in tapping into people’s existing beliefs and direct experience” (Gorman and MacLean, 2003). The notion of British

92 Armitage refers to the Yalta Conference between Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin in 1945. As Anthony Eden recalled, “The President shared a widespread American suspicion of the British Empire as it had once been and, despite his knowledge of world affairs, he was always anxious to make it plain to Stalin that the United States was not ‘ganging up’ with Britain against Russia. The outcome of this was some confusion in Anglo-American relations which profited the Soviets” (1965: 593).
experience, realised through ‘collective memory’, thus also provides a horizontal propaganda function which could be built on. ‘Unique’ capabilities and cultures and British ‘experience’ functioned domestically as a source of pride, but also functioned within the relationship, playing on the predilections toward history and tradition of an often ex-military American leadership.

Williams argues that the ‘residual’ or received cultures of the past are “always easier to understand”; that culture can often default back to “meanings and values which were created in actual societies and actual situations in the past, and which still seem to have significance because they represent areas of human experience, aspiration and achievement which the dominant culture neglects, undervalues, opposes, represses, or even cannot recognise” (1989: 123-4).

British history and tradition were reported to be a source of great respect for US personnel and Britain’s PSYOPS Officers said this meant in real terms, that people listened to them and clear dialogue was enabled between the US and UK at all levels (15th Army PSYOPS Group, 22nd November 2005). American perceptions of free thinking, wider experience and flexibility of British personnel translated into greater powers with British PSYOPS personnel routinely being given a higher rank than normal when posted to work with US troops (15th Army PSYOPS Group 2005). British assistance in the “planning component” was said to be given “considerable weight” (15th Army PSYOPS Group, 22nd November 2005). With PSYOPS “on the ground” there was considerable Anglo-American “co-operation with Liaison Officers in both national” headquarters (15th Army PSYOPS Group, 22nd November 2005). American respect served to boost British personnel’s view of the American troops and confirm their sense of pride. A British Flight Lieutenant perceived Americans he encountered as “very courteous and usually well educated, certainly at the NCO and officer level. Highly professional as well… their word is their bond” (Anonymous, 2010b). US personnel were generally highly regarded by British personnel, reportedly far from the “gung-ho” stereotype; the Flight Lieutenant joked that this was more at a political level (Anonymous, 2010b). He observed that “US/UK relationships tended to be excellent at the operational level” (Anonymous, 2010b).

Correspondingly the British military’s institutional memory is argued to be very conservative (Anonymous, 16th August 2010); based on a strategic culture still
influenced by the “legacy of great power status” and a “political culture that values evolutionary change, continuity and tradition” (Macmillan, 1995: 34-36). This has shaped its engagement both with American allies and within the theatre of war.

Class remains a persistent issue within the British military, and one former PSYOPS Officer described how certain reservists were “excused certain types of duties and have certain types of privileges” despite only an “absolute minimum” of military skills (Anonymous, 16th August 2010). My interviewee argued that “basically the difference between the two is your accent, and the school you went to. There’s still an awful lot of that” (Anonymous, 16th August 2010). This ingrained sense of class made lunch in the Officers Mess at the PSYOPS base in Chicksands feel like high tea at an Oxford college. This PSYOPS officer painted a vivid caricature of ‘British experience’ impacting approaches in the field, as something apart from actual “practical experience”, more a “collective memory, self identity and understanding within the British Armed Forces that they are good at Colonial warfare, that they are good at turning out in Nyasaland, talking to the Chiefs, getting the natives in-line, lining people up with a picture of Queen Victoria, and giving them all a Martini-Henry rifle” (Anonymous, 16th August 2010).

This supports the contention by human rights lawyer Phil Shiner that British abuse of Iraqis could not be dismissed as “one-offs” but was “colonial savagery” reflective of a wider systemic problem (Cusick, 24th October 2010). The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Deputy Governor of Dhi Qar province Adrian Weale argued that in reality

“There was a problem certainly among the British [...] a lot of British Officers had read Lawrence of Arabia and [...] they had a rather romantic idea about [...] the social structures within modern Iraqi society which didn’t quite fit in” there (26th November 2010).

Thus Weale argued that “Iraqi society had changed a lot under Saddam Hussein” and now

“many Iraqis that I spoke to felt that this was [...] an anachronistic process that we were encouraging [...] that they’d been happy to get rid of the tribal influence over the years and the British Army [...] were trying to engage [tribal leaders] and giving them a sort of power
and status which they hadn’t had” (26th November 2010).

This contrasted with perceptions of American personnel; a PSYOPS Officer shared Miller’s impression of Sanchez but in terms of a general American attitude of “Why can’t these bloody Iraqis be more like us!”; it translated into a PSYOPS policy on the ground of “Liberating means turning into Americans” (16th August 2010). He observed that “at the officer level, it was that failure to” recognise that

“other countries exist [...] are not just behind on a path to reaching the American ideal they are actually different and I think the British had a much greater sense of that but the British went into Colonial mode. It’s all about ‘how you treat the natives’. So the Americans were all brash and [...] the British approach was basically to treat them a bit like [...] poor blighted states” (16th August 2010).

The PSYOPS Officer observed that the both approaches embodied the notion of superiority; for the British, that “we’re better and we’re different, and we acknowledge the difference, whereas the American approach is we’re better and there is no difference and you’re going to be like us” (Anonymous, 16th August 2010). However, attitudes toward Americans were seen to be embodying a certain arrogance that emerged from a British institutional culture which emphasised its own ‘expertise’ (Weale, 26th November 2010). This was presented in interviews as a sense of paternalism; that we might not like what ‘they’ (the Americans) are doing, but it would be a lot worse if ‘we’ weren’t there. Both allies and enemies alike have an evolving relationship relative to the British ‘institutional memory’.

Weale agreed, that “they do tend to listen to our suggestions, though I think less so now than 10 years ago” at the start of the conflicts (26th November 2010). As America has become more experienced Weale thought this “introduced a degree of uncertainty and unhappiness about British self image and what they’re doing it for” (26th November 2010). Cynicism directed at the Ministry appears to have been enhanced by the recent conflicts, particularly in relation to the enquiries into ‘friendly fire’ incidents and prosecutions mentioned in the last chapter. This may mean today, the maintenance of this ‘collective memory’ is more
significant to the robustness of Britain’s internal military culture, and in how it relates to its American partner, as ‘real’ expertise dwindles.

A combination of horizontal propaganda, complimentary systems and doctrine thus helped demonstrate commitment and solidified the informal relationships on which Anglo-American cooperation and the assistive function depended. Shared indulgence in communicative activities such as those detailed above have allowed Britain to sustain the dominant image of its historic expertise with its ally despite US infrastructure instability. They were essential to maintaining a workable dialogue and the joint planning necessary for accommodating inevitable differences in interests and structural discontinuity. Hopkins has observed how open to foreign influence and particularly British influence, the American system has traditionally been (1998). Yet ‘expertise’ as a notion underpinning the faith of the American bureaucracy was ultimately not realised by experience in theatre.

**Assistive Function of Informal Channels**

Here it is argued that Anglo-American links, nurtured to enable British in-roads into American planning, dually functioned for sections of the American government and military, as crucial channels enabling navigation of the American system. Britain acted as a necessary enabler with a US system that still struggled with insularity, despite isolated avenues of informal operations breaking through domestic barriers. These performed the assistive function by facilitating operations and in turn enhanced perceptions of British relative ‘value’ to America, among those who saw these immediate benefits. These arguments will be developed through the example of Iraq.

As mentioned in chapter 5, US military and bureaucratic initiative to navigate formal systems was inconsistent; as Nagl points out the ‘resistence’ of a minority in this way is not enough for systemic institutional change (Nagl, 2002: 202). However, it appears to have been enhanced where there was contact with British working practises which acted as an enabler. In contrast with the American approach for the British military the British attitude has traditionally been in favour of breaking rules and considering boundaries flexible

“Doctrine is prepared in order that the Army should have some basis
for training and equipping itself. You certainly don’t fight based on your doctrine! If you actually do fight based on your doctrine you’re letting yourself in for disaster” (quoted in Nagl, 2002: 204).

A respect for initiative was communicated through American interviews with key central civilian and military figures. Even Rumsfeld had sought a more flexible military through his drive toward special forces, though more widely he had sought to control.

Yet, as established above, the nature of the American bureaucracy was institutionally not easily open to Anglo-American ties. Miller argued that a lack of outreach by the Pentagon to British counterparts was exacerbated by huge purge of staff from the Pentagon after each election and

“the people coming in don’t necessarily know the people they’re dealing with. […] Two weeks wouldn’t go by without me talking to one of my British counterparts about something. But unless that’s in your bloodstream you don’t know that” (3rd August 2009). Miller observed that Obama’s Defense Department was better but “their experience is not with allies it’s with US Force Structure Issues” having come in after the coalition assault (Miller, 3rd August 2009). Despite these issues, an America where elements were becoming more receptive to informal ways of operating was a crucial inlet for British planners. Miller observed that the Ministry of Defence had a more constant culture, a crucial factor in securing relationships; that Britain would be forced to do the outreach “until the relationship was an equal one” (3rd August 2009).

Experiences were not uniform though, due to the informality at the heart of the coordination. This variation left informal information ‘priority channels’ between the countries where organs of government were most receptive. At a strategic level often bureaucratic coordination was more strongly focussed on maintaining consistency. It is through these inlets that informal coordination and consideration between the countries took shape. This enabled “slight modulation” (Armitage, 21st July 2009) of statements to facilitate the partnership and propaganda, an approach which could make a big difference in
mediating perceptions both of the alliance internationally and of each ally by the other.\textsuperscript{93}

\textit{The Example of Iraq...}

With US military and Pentagon separated by a bureaucratic and cultural divide, it seems that, as Chapter 5 argued, to some degree military command relationships gradually took over defence planning, and informal channels were enhanced through other quarters of the bureaucracy. Often military planning still depended on “Rumsfeld not vetoing it” as he did in the 2004 Fallujah example described in Chapter 4 (Miller, 3rd August 2009). However, this seems significant, despite divisions within the military between Rumsfeld’s supporters and critics (Hersh, 2004). At times it’s clear even the often rigid, formal structures of the military began to bypass Rumsfeld in planning. By summer 2004, Rumsfeld’s authority was being seriously undermined by the navigation of informal channels within and without the American system, as in Franklin Miller’s account,

“where [Gen.] Casey\textsuperscript{94} says I’m gonna bring Iraqi units to patrol with US units and Rumsfeld said No - No - that’s not happening yet, I haven’t approved it. Well it was happening [...] right then and there, I knew it was happening. I’d seen it.” (3rd August 2009).

With its traditionally flexible institutional cultures Britain’s administration often responded in an ad-hoc way. It met the emergent role of informal coordination within America’s government and military by operating through these channels. In Britain initiative appears to have been enhanced by the restrictions in Iraq planning, which fed the establishment of informal planning structures. British Flight Lieutenant Iain Paton described how in Iraq planning was “so restricted” that “we had to make our own arrangements for data network planning with US Coalition partners” which was “organised at our own initiative independent of any direction from the chain of command” (19th October 2009).

The Ministry of Defence’s London-centred bureaucratic links with America (mentioned above) became crucial once the Coalition Information Centres were disbanded in 2003 (Taverner, 18th July 2004). As America’s Iraq information war was delegated by the Pentagon to CENTCOM in Qatar (Taverner, 18th July 2004)

\textsuperscript{93} All these tensions can be seen in the example of Iraq to follow.
\textsuperscript{94} Iraq Commanding General, Multi-National Force, June 2004 to February 2007.
British personnel found a subsequent close-down on engagement within the Pentagon bureaucracy (see chapter 3); both with the British, and the information campaign in general (Wright, 1st June 2009). What contacts they had there were crucial in operational/tactical efforts to coordinate practises and messages. This is where Thorp worked alongside a British “senior individual” who was running the information campaign in Qatar, saying “he was tremendous and he ran a great operation” (24th August 2009). In planning of messaging, according to Thorp

“...it goes right down to the unit commanders on the ground, you know the coalition forces commander in Iraq or forces commander in Afghanistan, and in both cases the organisation, they have tried to put together an organisation where there is better coordination and better oversight so that everybody is working together.” (24th August 2009).

He came to prefer his British colleagues’ style of media management; asserting that,

“I think there was actually a freer flow of communication with the Brits. […] And [British media] were more focused on context rather than individual sound bites […] the openness was tremendous” (Thorp 24th August 2009).

Thorp saw his role as “definitely trying to encourage” American troops to take a similar approach and among the forces he asserted that “there was not resistance where I was. There was very little tension between what I was doing and the Brits were doing” (24th August 2009).

**Basra…**

We can see channels of military operational control taking over early in Basra, planning had begun moving beyond the bureaucracy and beyond Rumsfeld. According to Adrian Weale, the Chief of Staff and Deputy Governor and Coordinator of Dhi Qar Province (Southern Iraq) coordination differed according to military Commander. For ‘Multinational Division South East’ (including Basra) the Commander was British Major-General Graeme Lamb who Weale described as a “dynamic sort of person” who favoured a ‘softer’ approach (26th November 2010). Miller recalled effective links with “people like” Rumsfeld’s CENTCOM Commander Tommy “Franks and others [...] clearly interacting with
counterparts in the UK” hence “the US marines who went into Basra went in under British command…” (3rd August 2009).

American and British forces were of course operating in different areas in Iraq but with initial successes in the military’s coordination. In Basra during July 2003 the British and American PSYOPS teams “all lived together and worked together as one unit”, and a British team visited the American area in Baghdad (Anonymous, 16th August 2010). Working with the Americans in a joint PSYOPS unit engaged in Basra early on, the British officers found the American attitude of “we’re better” and “why can’t these bloody Iraqis be more like us?” came across in their products, which were poorly researched and aggressive in tone (Anonymous, 16th August 2010 & 15th Army PSYOPS Group, 22nd November 2005). Basra-based Americans ultimately rejected these and followed the British example assisting their tactical level in-theatre production of PSYOPS products, following observations that mass-produced American ones were inappropriate (Anonymous, 16th August 2010).

After July 2003 this cooperation broke down, through a high-level decision, and they went their separate ways. The Americans reverted back to flying in products designed in America (Anonymous, 16th August 2010). After this British PSYOPS “were based at the Divisional Headquarters […] at Basra Airport. The Americans were based in Saddams Palace in Basra” doing “tactical psyops” (Anonymous, 16th August 2010).

One Iraq expert said this led to a perception that “America had simply replaced the dictatorship by installing itself in its old palaces and putting a wall around preventing Iraqis from gaining access”; he linked this decision to America’s Chief Administrator in Iraq, Paul ‘Jerry’ Bremer (Anonymous, 2010a). After the split, one PSYOPS Officer claimed,

“as far as I could see they didn’t actually do much from that point on. […] Maybe that reflects the fact that from that point on our organisations became more separate and we would still go and meet with them from time to time […] But it wasn’t very effective coordination. It was about once a week […] we’d say ‘we’ve done this’ and they’d go ‘we’ve done that’ and ‘that’s nice’…” (Anonymous, 16th
August 2010).

Another account reflected some building resentment,

“we all got a culture shock when we went to CPA Baghdad because [...] they were in the Palace, they had a swimming pool and they were eating lobster... [...] all they could get to us was chicken nuggets and yellow jelly... that’s all we had for three weeks!”

(Pennett, 15th February 2011).

...and Baghdad

In US-controlled Baghdad, it seems acute coordination problems occurred and between June 2003 and July 2004, tactical coordination faltered. Miller argued that,

“from [...] May ’03 for far too long, it was no coordinated effort. If you were the division commander in Tekrit you did it one way, if you were the Division Commander in Basra you did it another way, if you’re the Division Commander in Baghdad you did it another way.”

(3rd August 2009).

He stated that Commander Lt. Gen. Sanchez

“tended to treat the multinational division South as if it [...] was the British zone of Berlin”, seeing events as “the UK’s responsibility not his, as opposed to taking a holistic approach to Iraq. That was Sanchez’s fault” (Miller, 3rd August 2009).

As a result “each of Sanchez’s Division Commanders was essentially on his own. There was not a coordinated message coming out of Baghdad” (Miller, 3rd August 2009).

Tensions between British and American bureaucracies culminated in 2004’s Fallujah debacle where Rumsfeld vetoed against military planning (see Chapter 4 and above). At this time, a British diplomat, Hilary Synnott, was in charge of the Coalition Provisional Authority but responded to Bremer in Baghdad (Foreign & Commonwealth Office, April 2004) who in turn responded directly to Rumsfeld. Synnott and Lamb, during the Iraq Enquiry, ultimately both described the lack of coordination in the Coalition Provisional Authority (Iraq Enquiry, 2010) and Hersh blames Bremer for mid-ranking Baathists rising “to control the insurgency” (2004: 281). Adrian Weale said the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad was operating as a “self-licking lollypop” and apparently
“there were […] twenty-odd government teams around the country and Baghdad just focussed on […] the ones immediately around Baghdad. […] For all the thousands of people who were working [there] we heard virtually nothing from them. We got the odd email […] or phone call telling us to do something. But they were never based on any kind of analysis of the local situation and they were utterly unrealistic.” (26th November 2010).

Another British IO Officer who arrived in Basra in September 2003 said that although concurrent American messages were being transmitted in their area via “TV and Radio Stations”, he did not encounter them himself (Corcoran, 8th June 2006). This meant that while there was awareness of strategic objectives and attempts “never [to] contradict the strategic message” specific coordination of messages didn’t occur at the level of production:

“So the strategic messages were reaching the area that I was responsible for. But it’s ironic that even though I was public well for the messages, I wasn’t aware of what the [American] products were [without] that ability to monitor them” (Corcoran, 8th June 2006).

Though some variation was inevitable due to logistical difficulties and regional necessity, the US bureaucracy and military’s inherent coordination problems, clearly inhibited some operational-level coordination with British forces. According to Pennett “Their [Iraqi Media Network] IMN studio was inside the green zone and they were just pumping out utter crap. And that’s why it was seen as Bremer TV, Bremer was on all the time” (15th February 2011).

Demonstrating ‘Unique’ Capabilities and British Value

The outcomes of the British leadership’s attempts to demonstrate unique capabilities and experience were inconsistent. In Iraq it became glaringly obvious that British unique capabilities and thus ‘expertise’ could not be defined by its kinetic activities. The American rise of initiative conflicted with formal structures and was thus inconsistent across its military and political infrastructure. But moves began to crystallise in 2007 with the rise of Gen. David Petraeus, a fan of the British Special Forces flexible approach, who collaborated with ‘Military Initiative’ expert John Nagl on Americas new Counterinsurgency Doctrine. It was Petraeus’ surge-and-soft-power that brought in ‘Human Terrain Systems’ and the “whole government” approach to warfare (Schaub, 11th
Increasingly American troops were brought in to support Helmand in Iraq, as British regular troops were seen as *kinetically* “not up to the task” (Gates, 9th December 2008). An Embassy cable from 2008 suggests that the counterinsurgency was achieving “progress” but the Afghans agreed that American troops were necessary to secure Helmand (Gates, 9th December 2008). Though, as Robert Fox observes “much of the new Petraeus thinking comes from British experience” in counterinsurgency, its regular forces have slowly been devalued in American eyes (24th April 2008). In 2008 the Daily Mail quoted a Whitehall anecdote; when prompted to justify what makes Britain’s military unique a serving chief of staff reportedly said “We’re the only nation in the world that doesn’t make military ceremonial ridiculous - and we have the SAS” (Hastings, 22nd April 2008).

Corcoran warned that while “intelligent influencing activity” was “much lauded” as “an area of historical strength”, officers “shouldn’t take it too much for granted” (8th June 2006). British counterinsurgency in Ireland is even referenced as an example in the US Army guide (Department of Defense, 2007: 3-18). Regarding British experience of insurgency and fighting terrorism in Ireland, Armitage noted that

> “Originally, around 2003, British were sayin’ look, we had the Northern Ireland experience, this is why we don’t walk around in hard hats and helmets, we walk around with our berets. Well, you can guess what happened... pretty soon they start to get picked off [...] and Muqtada Al-Sadr started acting up. And the next thing you know we’re not only wearing full body armour and helmets, but they’re hunkered down in the airfield! Which caused us to say [...] what about the Northern Ireland experience? It didn’t work. So what’re you gonna do now? So you have those discussions, but they weren’t personal, and they weren’t neuralgic...” (21st July 2009).

In a restrained evaluation of the British approach he concluded, “I don’t think it was wildly more successful than ours” (Armitage, 21st July 2009). In interview British personnel indicated how they prided themselves on a soft approach, soft berets, talking to the Mullahs etc and boasted of its success relative to US heavy-handedness (15th Army PSYOPS Group, 22nd November 2005 & Taverner, 18th July 2004). To this Armitage responded, “Great, and at the end of the day -
what happened? How’s Basra now? It’s controlled by gangs” (Armitage, 21st July 2009). This contrasts with the impression created by the Anglo-American propaganda campaign which accompanied the step-down. In reality personnel “assumed that it was going to be much like our experience in Northern Ireland” (Weale 26th November 2010).

Britain’s Adrian Weale confirmed it as a wider issue; while

“British Special Forces have a very high reputation with the Americans… [...] with conventional forces [an American perception developed] in the first year or so of the campaign that the British were very arrogant and patronising [...] There was all this bollocks about [...] British troops are patrolling in soft hats in Basra so they didn’t seem threatening and the Americans quite rightly pointed out that the Brits were able to patrol in soft hats because nobody was attacking them at the time. [When they did] there was all helmets on and body armour and shoot back. I think the Americans deeply resented all that crap. Because a lot of British officers were encouraging it and the British media ops people in Basra were [...] using this as our unique selling point.” (26th November 2010).

A rift developed “to the extent that [...] a lot of Americans were secretly rather pleased when we did wind up getting our arses kicked in Basra.” (Weale, 26th November 2010). One British Flight Lieutenant described a more extreme account of the “attitude of ‘US first and sod everyone else’” among troops, something more prevalent among American personnel than other nations, that he argued contributed to incidents of fratricide (Anonymous, 2010b). Recent leaks imply that British forces were attacked by US forces so often that it was seen as an occupational hazard and in one 2005 friendly-fire incident British “convoys continued on their journey without stopping” (Meek, 24th October 2010). According to him with the British “there’s a great deal of reluctance to admit how badly it all went wrong” (Weale, 26th November 2010). This reluctance to recognise that British ‘expertise’ had not been wholly helpful, related back to themes discussed in chapter 4; “normal careerism and so on within the military”; it seems the mythology continues because, “if you start getting too critical about it all then you’re not going any further” (Weale, 26th November 2010).
However, this did not mean British efforts did not add value to the campaign, ‘value’ was to be found elsewhere, in facilitating coordination. As a result of the problems posed to coordination Baghdad and Southern Iraq personnel began to seek informal solutions, often facilitated by contacts and initiative. Weale observed that “it was a long time since we’d invaded a country and tried to rule it and I think everyone was feeling their way” (26th November 2010). In one such example, when told by Coalition Provisional Authority Baghdad to halt election preparations (see chapter 4) the Authority in Nasiriya “cracked on regardless” (Weale, 26th November 2010). Many officers used informal contacts where information was not forthcoming. Weale recalled these informal relationships and connections;

“Yeh... we spoke a lot with um... my background is in military intelligence, so I had good connections with our intelligence set-up in Basra and generally go down there once a week and just get myself briefed up on what was going on” (Weale, 26th November 2010).

Weale recalled how “The [Coalition Provisional Authority] eventually got some security and intelligence people [...] so I would talk with them” and “the Iraqi Police [...] various Iraqi Political Parties [with] informers and ears on the ground” even “Muqtada Al-Sadr’s people” the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (Weale, 26th November 2010).

Baghdad’s Coalition Provisional Authority was also being navigated informally at the strategic level, where Armitage found his British relationships crucial,

“whenever I went [...] I went 8 times to Baghdad, I always walked right under Bremer’s office and right over to Jeremy [Greenstock]’s office to get his appreciation [...] So I benefited much from [the British]” (21st July 2009).

This was crucial to political-level understandings of the position on the ground, and there was of course resistance from the Defense Department to this British prosthetic communication channel to the top. Greenstock being a preferred Iraq contact may have helped secure the UK political position with State Department, a pragmatic necessity for navigating US in-roads, but it seems likely that it enflamed British enmity with Bremer and the Defense Department. Armitage recounted tactical-level difficulties “primarily in Baghdad...” with “Jeremy
Greenstock\textsuperscript{95} and [Paul] Jerry Bremer” who “didn’t get along at all” (21st July 2009). Though their staffs worked closely Greenstock stated that Bremer (who was in “the office next door” but responded to Rumsfeld) would not take advice or keep him briefed (Greenstock, Jeremy, 15th December 2009 & Foreign & Commonwealth Office, April 2004: 37).

A need for Britain to maintain communication channels with the receptive State Department, whilst not alienating an insular Defense department, may have contributed alongside the internal structural factors to variation in what sections of government/military coordinated with the UK. Whereas Blair was admired in the State Department\textsuperscript{96}, in many ways this involved opposition to Rumsfeld’s approach in the Defense Department, and just before the invasion Rumsfeld described Britain’s role as ‘unclear’ (BBC News, 20\textsuperscript{th} April 2004). His biographer said “others in the administration had to say, you know, don’t mind Rumsfeld…” and said “he didn’t treat the allies any differently than he treated Congress, or the Joint Chiefs, or the Press”; he was “undiplomatic” (Graham, 24\textsuperscript{th} July 2009). Blair attempted to act to strengthen more liberal elements in the US administration like Colin Powell and modify public outcomes, was crucial to his leadership’s domestic interests to nurture international perceptions of legitimacy (Gamble and Wright, 2004, Sharp, 2003). In fact Armitage argued that British efforts hadn’t gone far enough, when it came to Iraq War planning the State Department struggled to get their support vis-a-vis the Defense Department, even though “some in the [British] defence establishment thought that the [...] operational plan was not as it should be” (Armitage, 21st July 2009). Armitage said that

“The Foreign Office was a little worried we hadn’t done complete planning, same thing that Powell and I worried about. But we [...] failed to get sufficient attention by our President and we couldn’t get Mr Blair to raise it with the President” (21st July 2009).

In many ways Blair could be said to have been attempting to compliment perceived American weakness of capabilities at the political level to achieve coalition objectives, in which he of course had a vested interest. Franklin Miller

\textsuperscript{95} Greenstock ultimately criticised the invasion calling it “of questionable legitimacy” at the Chilcot Enquiry (Greenstock, Jeremy, 15th December 2009).

\textsuperscript{96} Wilkerson had “a lot of respect and admiration for him” (23rd June 2009).
saw Bush’s confidence both in Blair and in British propaganda capabilities, stating that

“...at one point the President who was frustrated by the US Government’s inability to get the message out, said that ‘if I haven’t fixed it by Christmas Tony [Blair], I’m gonna give it to you’ … but he never did fix it and the responsibility never was given to the UK. So in that sense there was discussion.” (3rd August 2009).

However, Miller asserted that the problems of the US government’s information campaign were “a point the Prime Minister raised repeatedly with the President during the summer and fall of 2003” - perhaps trying to fire-fight public opinion in the wake of a poorly planned invasion (3rd August 2009).

While Armitage concluded that British influence during the period overall amounted to “not much” (21st July 2009), in the White House, Miller perceived British strategic influence as crucial;

“I don’t think the President would’ve gone back to the UN in the fall of 02... if not for Tony Blair. Absolutely. The President was inclined to say, ‘damn the torpedoes, full speed ahead’. And I think the Prime Minister convinced him to do that and gave Powell an opportunity to jump on the bandwagon. But I think the Prime Minister absolutely was significant in driving Bush back to the UN.” (3rd August 2009).

Just as Bevin once had calmed US concern and provided a reassuring image through assistive propaganda (2000); Blair’s administration ultimately played a role in addressing US concern, and dealt with American perceptions of UN scrutiny as a threat through its assistive function. The NSA’s Frank Koza requested a “surge” in intelligence gathering at the UN Headquarters in New York, to gain “insights” into country reactions to the ongoing debate and voting intentions (2003). The scope was huge; highlighting priority countries but, Koza said, “minus US and GBR of course” (Koza, 2003). Koza stated he was seeking information across “the full gamut of information that could give US policymakers the edge in obtaining results favourable to US goals or to head off surprises [my emphasis]” including communications with both Security Council members and non-members (2003). For Blair’s administration political support hinged on domestic public perceptions of the war and strategic objectives were seen as dependent on the Anglo-American alliance. Any strategic gains in
relative influence that might have been made by Blair vis-a-vis America may have been constrained by the domestic political cost, however, as any influence was not immediately apparent to the public.

Rumsfeld may have been ‘unclear’ about Britain’s role, but with formal planning structures failing under his command of the Pentagon, Britain’s utility was palpable to the White House. Miller denied a lack of dialogue made the British relationship more difficult with the Pentagon since the informal links were still open; he “was able to do a great deal” through informal relations (3rd August 2009). Miller laughed that “you use the informal processes to make the decision and you use the formal processes to announce it” (23rd June 2009).

A British joint planner based at CENTCOM, Sir John Reith, described how an information vacuum emerged in Washington which meant Ministry of Defence official channels also dried up (15th January 2010). He stated that he had a ‘close relationship’ with Commander Tommy Franks who “jokingly used to call me his deputy commander” (Reith, 15th January 2010). Reith stated his role had to be “dynamic” and he compared it to playing on an ever-changing sports field (15th January 2010). But his initiative enabled him to become “the conduit” back to the Ministry of Defence through Permanent Joint Headquarters for “a flow of information as to what the Americans were doing” (Reith, 15th January 2010). Problems within the Pentagon were feeding US military frustration and accordingly, the importance of British dialogue at the political level to daily war-planning in Washington. This appears to be significant to how Iraq operated and this will be developed further below.

In planning and policy-making, interactions were often free-form and informal. Richard Armitage described how discussion enabled them to coordinate the message at the strategic-level:

“So they’d be talking [...] all the time. Yeh, here’s what we’re gonna say here, here’s what gonna say there, or if there was a question... we saw you said X yesterday, is this indicating change of policy...? That kinda... slight modulation ...we all have different ...audiences. We’re not contradicting... I don’t think we ever contradicted each other. And that’s the way you do that. It wasn’t just settling down
and say here’s exactly the day flying... it was more a general thing...

‘Ah I’m gonna save Napoleon today, X or Y. It wasn’t a daily thing, but it could be if we needed it.” (Armitage, 21st July 2009) [My Emphasis].

In the bureaucracy, Lawrence Wilkerson observed how “the informal relationships are very often far more important than the formal relationships” (23rd June 2009). This was echoed by Thorp (24th August 2009) and Miller said that he was in regular contact with “friends of at least a decade, sometimes many decades” in the senior Ministry of Defence bureaucracy and British military (3rd August 2009). For Wilkerson small differences in working practises made “all the difference in the world” (23rd June 2009). At the political level, the State Department’s Richard Armitage described having a “relaxed, sometimes ribald relationship” with the Foreign Office and gave examples of that which I am obliged to omit (21st July 2009). Personal, longstanding relationships seem to have contributed fluid ties between what might otherwise be a rather frustrated formal structure with two potentially discordant bureaucracies with idiosyncratic internal dynamics. Strategic level relations were reported to have been smooth and Armitage couldn’t “remember a major difference” occurring before he left in 2005 (21st July 2009). He believed rapport “was a little less, 2006-7-8…” and Armitage thought this change in dynamics was due to different “…personalities. Dr Rice… and [...] people changed [Britain] changed Foreign Ministers [...] it certainly wasn’t a conscious policy choice.” (Armitage, 21st July 2009). Miller described his own “very close relations with the senior staff in the main building [Ministry of Defence]” and recalled being in “almost daily touch, at least comparing information and talking about what’s happening and what wasn’t” (3rd August 2009).

Perceiving Rumsfeld’s information clampdown as the centrality of CENTCOM and the Pentagon within the information war, led Dennis McBride to challenge the importance of the Embassies (5th June 2009). While exchanges of people occurred, McBride argued that they had limited power, and that the most significant communications happened at the top, and within the Pentagon (5th June 2009). Col. Jeffrey Jones considers the Embassies to be crucial to “reinforce perceptions of American engagement and outreach” in a properly coordinated communications strategy (Jones, 2005: 114). In fact, the Pentagon
was so highly controlled that information links with the White House and State Department were effectively shut down, but the break-down of coordination made informal information exchange essential to daily functioning.

Richard Armitage remembered much dialogue with the UK who “were right with us at CENTCOM headquarters” and “Chris Meyer and David Manning - the two Ambassadors the time I was there, now Nigel [Sheinwald] - I nearly every day was on the phone or in person with them” (21st July 2009). Miller recalled that the crucial relationship was, “David Manning, or later Nigel Sheinwald to [Condoleezza] Rice…” meeting one-to-one (3rd August 2009). Though Manning declined to comment, his importance was echoed by Richard Armitage along with “Ambassador Mayer” both of whom “were damn good. Energetic” (21st July 2009). He said that,

“All of us in the bureaucracy had pretty long standing relations with Manning when he was in 10 Downing, and […] Chris Meyer […] In cases some 30 years of relationship. So, for a bunch of reasons beyond… I mean the personal reasons, beyond the special relationship. I don’t have any complaints” (Armitage, 21st July 2009).

Thorp also agreed that “first and foremost [was] the diplomatic communication” (24th August 2009). The embassies and proactive British Ambassadors performed an enhanced role in the coordination of information under these pressured circumstances,

“There was nothing that I knew […] which I did not share promptly with my friends at the Embassy. […] absolutely nothing that I had that didn’t get passed on immediately, and I believe the same is true from them” (Miller, 3rd August 2009).

Historically, Hopkins notes “the embassies have proved a major locus of influence and dialogue appears to be welcomed in both directions, bolstered by more than frequent visits by officials and ministers (Vivekanandan, 1990, 372). During the ‘War on Terror’ informal relationships and a need for flexible responses led to ad-hoc functioning in many aspects of the alliance. The role of the embassies extended beyond the normal functionality, as Scott notes, “the relationship between organisation and function varies over time and place” (2004: 322).
The flexible nature of informal relationships helped facilitate an assistive and complimentary role for Britain as Miller recalls, even before Paul Bremer, got to Baghdad in May 2003, “the White House was getting no reporting from any source on what was happening on the ground” (Miller, 3rd August 2009). And for some time after, their only source was UK Special Representative to Iraq (now MI6 chief, Sir)

“John Sawyers [...] sending reports to the Foreign Office [...] the Embassy here would share those reports with me and Rich Armitage. And then I would obviously send them up the line” (Miller, 3rd August 2009).

Crucially, this meant that for the President and White House,

“situational awareness of what was going on in Baghdad for the first 4 or 5 weeks after Saddam fell came from Her Majesty’s Government. And again, this is all, you know, this is through informal channels and communication. You won’t find this in a front channel” (Miller, 3rd August 2009).

Informal Anglo-American relations effectively acted as a prosthetic channel bypassing formal systems at the Pentagon to facilitate strategic-level awareness and planning necessary for success in the information war. According to Miller, “its people who make things happen. You’ve got lined up diagrams and boxes but at the end of the day it’s how the people interact one with another that makes the difference” (3rd August 2009).

**An Iraqi Network?**

One of the largest U.S. intelligence contractors and a major provider of private sector analysts to both the CIA and the National Security Agency is SAIC. It became so significant during the Iraq conflict that Vanity Fair recently referred to it as a “shadow government” (Bartlett & Steele, March 2007). Yet through the account of British Reservist and Media Contractor Miles Pennett it provides an interesting example to illustrate this Anglo-American propaganda relationship. Having been put in the position of Minister of Culture, Pennett quickly discovered “terrorist groups had taken over the theatres and there was no actual culture that we could impose upon” so Janet Rogan of Basra CPA Senior Staff

97 And of course, these informal ties are likely to have been carried to Sawyers next post as political director of the FCO.

98 Who according to Tomlinson’s evidence has worked for MI6; Pennett described her as “British Top Floor” (Pennett, 15th February 2011).
“directed” him to “have a look at the media side” (15th February 2011). SAIC had been contracted to work on Radio Nahrain (Iraqi Media Network - IMN), a former British PSYOPS station that the Americans sought to turn into an Iraqi station (15th February 2011). A wider national network was planned, and Pennett began as “liaison” for these projects; SAIC had apparently been promising equipment and Pennett said, “They win the contract and then go ‘oh my God how we gonna do this?’” (15th February 2011). He went to “find out why nothing was happening” with SAIC (Pennett, 15th February 2011). Various contractors had been identified as not following through including Brechtel and CPA Communications Director at the time Lt Col Iain Picard, who “just turned round to the Washington Post and said they’re not doing it. […] Front Page and then he got removed the next day. No MBE for him” (Pennett, 15th February 2011).

SAIC hired John Watson, a British consultant who had been working for the Pentagon “on the best way to initiate emergency radio and TV broadcasts” (Watson, 21/02/2011) and Pennett began working very closely with him (15th February 2011). Pennett reported that “SAIC were obviously trying to get their own transmitters out” and inaction continued from “June 2003 to December and eventually [...] on my leave, I had to go to the Foreign Office [London] and we said well how much is it gonna cost to put some sort of comms into the South?” (15th February 2011).

So Pennett said “we brought around a cheap option [about £300K] the Foreign Office turned around said we’ll pay for it. [so they went ahead] that was our self-help really as a British point of view” (15th February 2011). Pennett said he “sat down with John and said, we’re gonna do this from a British point of view. I can get Foreign Office sponsors here. The problem was they were buying all [...] the latest digital... [...] the Iraqis didn’t want that they wanted all 1980’s big handheld cameras that you can’t break that they know how to edit.” (15th February 2011).

SAIC were eventually “binned from the contract” around the time Pennett left the British Military in December 2003, when “Harris Corporation” were brought in (15th February 2011). Pennet used his ground knowledge to help Harris “put a proper studio” together and issue a “shopping list” which took “another 10 or 11
months to go to America to their Division and back” (15th February 2011). Crucially, he argued that

“The basic camera equipment we’d ordered from the FCO came out fairly quickly” and “that 12 months would’ve been a gapfill of no broadcasting had that FCO kit not come in. [...] It actually kept the south on-air for that extra year and a half until our stuff with Harris came in” (15th February 2011).

Harris approached him to “run Southern Iraq” as “the programme manager” and he stayed managing the network until April 2005 (Pennett, 15th February 2011). Apparently lines of communication in the UK were strong. Pennett reported that, Tony Rowlands, Head Information Operations, Iraq Directorate, UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office “was brilliant, because I think they were sensing the frustration on the home turf and the problem was, in a way, we could have just gone straight to the PM’s office...” (15th February 2011). Pennett put many of the problems down to the rigidity of the America system,

“America had the umbrella over everything and I think this was a problem from square one in Iraq [...] there was obviously no policy that you can’t go do your own thing but [FCO] eventually turned around and said well we’re going to have to do our own thing. Because if we’re not seen to be doing anything, it’s getting labelled, ‘well the British aren’t doing anything either’ ... ‘well hang on a minute, no, we’re actually-' and we can’t actually turn around and say ‘well we’ve got to do what America says’, and we’d hate to say that! And so for £350,000 or whatever it was we got to not say that and took care of the South” (15th February 2011).

At the same time this of course enabled British personnel in CPA South to continue propaganda function without being abrasive in their relationship with the Americans.

Pennett himself differed with information operations personnel in his approach to running the station however. He said “when Harris took over they rebranded, basically IMN went, Al Iraqiya became the new television station [...] stamping the Iraqi logo on it” (15th February 2011). But he recalled that his very useful connections “made it very difficult” in other ways;
“while I was still connected to the British Army in terms of I knew them and the British Ambassador knew that I was running it now. They still maintain it was a psyops station, and that’s why they wanted Nahrain to put out the messages and I really just wanted to see the back of Nahrain because it was actually making my network a target.”
(Pennett 15th February 2011).

Pennett did a “land grab” and strove to remove Al Iraqiya network’s army connections with the help of money “they took from Saddam” which meant they could say “the Iraqi people” were funding it (15th February 2011). When I enquired about the strategic guidance Pennett was getting from British PSYOPS he responded that “I completely ignored them…” (15th February 2011). Indeed, Information Operations Officer Corcoran reported that he “didn’t appreciate his work”, that “the guy didn’t do anything” (8th June 2006). Pennett therefore apparently said “I’ll help you put out what you want to put out but […] at the end of the day I was there to set up an Iraqi network…” (15th February 2011). This was largely about credibility, as he argued “psyops, you know, if it’s good, you don’t actually know you’re being psyopsed… it can be done” (15th February 2011).

Indeed as a contractor, Pennett was able to take a lot of delegated responsibility for decision-making; “When my country director came in, he […] would let me make […] at times […] big decisions” (15th February 2011). In one example, Pennett claimed he “wasn’t allowed to do” advertising at the newspapers he was running, “Bremer wouldn’t allow it” as “they wanted this BBC-type format…” but had been using US money so had no claim to independence (15th February 2011). Pennett said he was able to navigate this; “I got my regional people advertising” this meant that although “when we handed over in April, the Finance Minister refused to let the pay go out” and “the people didn’t get paid for 3 months” he said “I got emails saying, you know, good job you were advertising in the south otherwise you would have to shut down” (15th February 2011). Pennett essentially enabled propaganda going by working with those he trusted and navigating the US policies he found unhelpful. Pennett was working closely with US CPA Baghdad’s “Gary Thatcher” who had been brought in as CPA Communications Director for the whole of Iraq by this point and provided a much-needed point of influence with CPA Baghdad (15th
February 2011). He was “very approachable [...] I started getting ordering with him about stuff and he was always very on kind to hear what could be changed what could be shaped...” (Pennett, 15th February 2011). It was apparently “a case of him being much more worker/user-friendly with [Strategic Command]. That link didn’t seem to happen before” (15th February 2011).

**Draw-down in Basra**

American Lt Col Tammy Miracle observed how media coverage also became more positive with the strict measures and embedding imposed during the Iraq conflict (2003: 41). The MoD also considered Media Operations in Iraq significantly improved since Afghanistan, a positive attitude that reflects the fact that around 700 journalists were embedded with coalition forces, 153 of whom were war correspondents assigned to British Units (2003b: 59). The “slight modulation” (Armitage, 21st July 2009) of public statements by personnel, in pursuit of their institutionally-negotiated ‘shared’ interests, was also important and is evidenced in the example of Britain pulling out of Basra in 2007. Tony Blair claimed the operation had been “successful” (Blair, quoted in Tempest, 11th January 2007) and despite US concerns about British handling of the campaign, it was taken for granted that the perception would be managed together to maximise gains. Coordination would achieve the optimal information outcome for both leaderships by balancing announcements and producing an agreed, consistent message.

Graham Wright described how, “when the surge in Iraq was announced, America was to announce [it] at about the same time as the UK was going to start drawing down in Basra...” (1st June 2009). They determined that this would create the perception of incompetence or disconnect. People would ask since they’re “here as a coalition, why are the Americans putting more in and the Brits are taking stuff out?” (1st June 2009). The answer they decided they needed to convey was “Basra is fixed and we’ve gotta go home [...] Baghdad’s not fixed and it needs to be fixed and it needs more people” (Wright, 1st June 2009). The concern was that the British voice would not be the most credible; the perception would be “they’re bound to say that aren’t they?” - it would seem like an excuse for pulling out (Wright, 1st June 2009). So for Britain it was, “really helpful [...] for an American to say [...] the Brits are going home because they fixed Basra and actually we want to get to that
position ourselves and we’re not there yet so we’ve had to bring some more people in” (Wright, 1st June 2009).

The feeling was that the perception of the UK position “would be much stronger if it was an American saying it about us” and so “sometimes joining up is about trying to do that” (Wright, 1st June 2009). In this case, the assistive US announcement was planned and a speech by Blair delayed until after it, but (Foreign Minister) Margaret Becket “happened to be in-country” and “said something earlier than the announcement was due” (Wright, 1st June 2009). This created a perception-management situation where,

“…our General, who [was] in Baghdad working with the Americans, spent the next three days rushing around […] saying ‘look, this is not what’s happening, this is the deal and it wasn’t quite as she portrayed…” (Wright, 1st June 2009).

The public opinion contexts of Britain and America’s differing national propaganda channels, functioned as differing ‘capabilities’ which they used to complement each other, and optimise the outcome through effects-based planning. The example99 clearly shows a willingness of the Americans to assist Britain to ensure the message conveyed does not contradict British domestic interests, and meets institutionally-defined ‘shared’ interests indicating a propaganda relationship that could be mutually beneficial. It also emphasises how negotiation and “slight modulation” (Armitage, 21st July 2009) in how the countries handle information can make or break the consistency of perceptions within and of the alliance. Where formal structures have been imposed to perform this function, they have been shown at times to prove effective, yet these are still highly dependent on informal relations and domestic understandings of the other play an important intervening role.

While American society offers great rewards for the powerful, there remains an unsatisfied desire for history and ceremonial tradition. Its pragmatic ally’s leadership seeks to exploit this void and provide symbolic fulfilment.100 Armitage explained

“Well I’m very, very proud… and perhaps the biggest surprise in my

99 This demonstrates the process using an unsuccessful attempt, successful coordination attempts would be unlikely to be revealed publicly as this would expose the enduring perception.
100 Miller also received a knighthood in 2006 for “services to UK-US relations” and CENTCOM Commander Tommy Franks the year before (House of Commons, 2006).
professional life was receiving a knighthood. And the reason I was so surprised, I think it happened […] And I’ve determined my own mind, […] it was all about communication. It was a great appreciation that both Powell and I went out of our way to ensure that our key ally in this endeavour never got surprised. And that is not the reason listed in the KCMG, but I am quite sure that happened. As... we never got caught out.” (Armitage, 21st July 2009).

The implication was that Armitage’s Knighthood may have been conferred on an unwritten understanding that it represented British gratitude for American efforts in coordination of information release and the “subtle modulation” mentioned above (21st July 2009).

Despite Britain being demonstrably the junior partner with US attentions so widely drawn, the nature of the two states’ institutional cultures allowed diplomatic initiative and the cultivation of ‘Anglo-American’ ideology between them which sustained increasingly hollow notions of British ‘expertise’. This ensured as they retained key channels of influence which advanced both leaderships' perceived interests.

**Atlantic Futures**

While this thesis has a limited focus, for context it is helpful to mention in brief recent administration changes. The British military experience in Iraq led to the emergence of a “degree of uncertainty and unhappiness about British self image and what they’re doing it for” according to Weale (26th November 2010). His comments demonstrate how the British Officers’ shared military history (important to justifying action) was shaken. With loss of British military credibility, came damage to pride and the basis for self-belief; on which Chapter 5 argued the British sense of ‘service’ is closely tied. Despite this, and increased public mistrust; this defence relationship does not show signs of being tangibly weakened by the public Inquiry over Iraq. Public attentions have been overtaken by the economic crisis and it seems the relationship is likely to be strengthened by the combination of a Conservative-dominated coalition and the popular face of Obama.
Back in April 2008 the US Embassy in London’s ‘Deputy Chief of Mission’ Richard LeBaron relayed the contents of a conversation with William Hague back to the National Security Council. After confirming a Conservative replacement for Gordon Brown was likely, the Americans were keen to press the question “whether the relationship between the UK and the U.S. was ‘still special’” in Tory eyes (LeBaron, 1st April 2008). Hague reportedly “said he, David Cameron and George Osborne were ‘children of Thatcher’ and staunch Atlanticists” - importantly, he recognised that this contrasted with the British public but Hague felt that politicians “sit at the top of the pyramid” (LeBaron, 1st April 2008). LeBaron recounted that Hague reassured him whatever public opinion says, the relationship was “essential”, that “we want a pro-American regime. We need it. The world needs it.” (LeBaron, 1st April 2008). Indeed in a later cable, the US Embassy reported back favourably that “the relationship will be especially close in the defense sphere under Tory leadership” according to him Liam Fox (now Defence Secretary) reaffirmed a desire to increase “joint defense procurement” (Susman, 10th December 2009). The US Ambassador confirmed that Fox recognised “increasing US-UK ‘interoperability is the key’ since the U.S. and UK will continue to fight together in the future” (Susman, 10th December 2009).

In terms of the imbalance, the implications of further integration are enormous. It is important to note that for an effects-based approach to propaganda to generate complimentary messaging, then an overriding strategic message must be agreed; not only cross-government, but across governments. It seems likely that such a strategic message would be driven by the dominant country. NATO was previously restricted from strategic level PSYOPs; they were considered a national responsibility (Collins, 2002). Yet there has been debate about whether the contemporary merging of boundaries between these ‘levels’ of PSYOPs makes it “nearly impossible to localise” PSYOPS tactically (Collins, 2002). This raises the possibility of conflict with the strategic PSYOPS plans of the NATO members. As adversaries were increasingly using asymmetric methods the importance of being able to synchronise lower level activities with the strategic level has been stressed (Collins, 2002 & Dietz, 18th May 2010). And, especially post-Iraq, multinational security forces are essential to build appearance of legitimate power. Though this later period is not the focus, Chapters 3-5 indicate that the drive toward Strategic Communication continued under Obama.
Thus, both for NATO, and within an Anglo-American relationship embodying great power differentials, it is important to ask how any ‘strategic message’ will be defined and delivered.

**Conclusion**

This chapter discussed how the long history of Anglo-American cooperation fed into the planning of a joint coordination of the propaganda ‘War on Terror’. It demonstrated how positioning within the international system shaped leaderships’ definitions of national interest which fed into distinctive American and British defence propaganda systems (discussed in chapters 3-5) and threatened divergent responses. The analysis examined the strategies adopted within the mechanisms of Anglo-American relations to manage these conflicting interests in the information realm, during the American-led conflicts through attempts to create consistency of outcome. Also crucial were attempts to shape this desired ‘consistent outcome’ into one which minimised compromise for dominant interests within the leadership. The analysis argued that this made British ‘value’ in American eyes extremely important to the British leadership and made ‘assistive’ relationship crucial. This is particularly evident in interviews from the example of Iraq. The contacts that maintained this relationship were supported, particularly where British resources were lacking, by propagandistic emphasis on the cultural tradition of British ‘expertise’ in American eyes. In enabling prosthetic routes of informal planning and communication Britain was shown here to have made itself extremely useful to American strategic planners, and increased its perceived value.
Chapter 7: Conclusion

At its outset, this research sought to examine the extent and manner in which Anglo-American relations shaped the direction of propaganda strategy, and the form that took over the course of the ‘War on Terror’. This required an engagement with the domestic structures of each country’s bureaucracy, its wider propaganda apparatus and cultural idiosyncrasies; themes which dominated chapters 3-5. This was followed by the exploration in the last chapter, of the nature and scope of the developing interaction between the two states, and how this coordination was internally perceived. An underlying consideration of power balance (particularly US superiority in ‘hard power’ and British history in counter-insurgency) was drawn into this analysis. This was crucial to perceived and actual roles in the conflicts as well as cooperative structures of negotiation. From the evidence it presents, this research emphasises important elements of British policy development which have situated Britain in a crucial position in the Anglo-American propaganda effort. Finally, the present chapter will return to consider the ideas of Raymond Williams introduced in Chapter 1, and situate research findings within a wider discussion of legitimacy. In so doing it will comment on dominant ways of thinking about the international system, the shape of change, and the future of British Atlanticism.

Raymond Williams: Culture and Power in a Propaganda Context

One of the central research questions (Chapter 1) concerned ‘perceived and actual outcomes’ of propaganda coordination, and in addressing this it was important to understand how propaganda is understood and perceived by its functionaries and planners, and the relationship between these understandings and propaganda systems. It was necessary to consider these perceptions and understandings also in the context of structural and cultural change within the propaganda apparatus, and in relation to wider notions of democracy and social accountability. The writings of Raymond Williams offer insight into these aspects of the interviews, and in this section will return to aspects of his theory first detailed in Chapter 1, considering these in relation to the interview data generated by the present research.
Chapter 5 demonstrated how the ‘public service’ motive identified by Williams in his seminal *Culture and Society* (1967), is as divisive today as it was at time of writing, and its paternalism can be shown to have a very close relationship to propaganda. Practitioners in government institutions often argue that *propaganda* should not be viewed in terms of absolute good and absolute evil, that it is a neutral tool of foreign policy and limited war which is used (when used by us) to serve public interest. Popular understandings of propaganda are quite different. Responding to the negative way in which propaganda is popularly seen, pragmatic propaganda theorist Phil Taylor supported the institutional view of many practitioners, that “we need to redirect attention away from the propaganda process itself and more to the intentions and goals of those employing propaganda” (1995: 8). Arguments like Taylor's that imagine a democratic tradition in propaganda, focussing on the desired ‘end’ of public-interest - of protecting and ‘serving’ the public, preventing conflict and countering enemy lies. His is, therefore, a paternalistic argument for propaganda, putting it in the realms of bureaucratic and military ‘service’ for the common good. Williams' work on communication offers a useful insight into this ‘service’ motive, which was a key narrative found to underpin propaganda planners’ assumptions of legitimacy.

Here it is important to discuss what ‘ends’ are served in the public’s name. The declared goals being served by the ‘hearts and minds’ campaign were nominally to end ‘terrorism’ and ensure domestic and global security. The introduction discussed how this 'War on Terror', whilst being geographically unlimited, is also theoretically unlimited in its duration; its ultimate goal (to end ‘terrorism’) being an essentially unachievable end. \(^{101}\) This leaves the goal of ‘ensuring domestic and global security’. Around 3000 people were killed on 9/11, and subsequent terrorist attacks have repeatedly brought great loss, the state of global security is clearly of great contemporary concern. It is thus important to consider both the implications of negative perceptions of the West, and subsequent military beliefs that, in serving ‘national interest’ viewed as global prevention/control of insurgency and asymmetric threats, propaganda is justified.

\(^{101}\) While there is a state whose monopoly of power is questioned, there will likely be insurgents. While there is a state whose legitimacy is questioned there will likely be propaganda.
Werner Levi once argued that “the nation-state system compels statesmen to place national interests above morality, so that in most cases moral norms serve rather than determine interests” (1965: 226). Institutionally, ‘national interest’ is often equated with achieving operational effectiveness, and increasingly propaganda is recognised as a powerful tool of limited war. This claim of efficiency and effectiveness seems increasingly dominant in justifying ‘effects-based’ approaches and gradual weakening of ‘boundaries’ restricting coordination between propaganda forms. For example Adm. Fallon spoke of “influence” as one positive way to “save yourself incredible waste of human life and treasure” (21st July 2009). Likewise, Wright observed this in the negative, in military concern that discussing Abu Ghraib might “enflame” criticism and “put soldiers at risk on the ground” (1st June 2009). One British PSYOPS officer noted that “information operations needs to be in the planning process and it can even drive the planning process. And in somewhere like Iraq in the current situation it needs to” (Corcoran, 8th June 2006). By virtue of their privileged knowledge and position, censorship and propaganda are justified by those in public service, as a means to prevent a greater public harm. This is the case in effects-based planning which prioritises ends, not only in terms of those being the justifying factor for means, but also in terms of their being the very determiner of the means - and of the most effective and quietest means to achieve those ends. Similarly SMART Power and Strategic Communication seek to integrate influence into wider policy planning, beyond defence, to ensure the development of cultural assumptions even more closely tied to the state’s stability.

Williams saw that in representative democracy government cannot operate outside the pressure of the populous; yet still today viewed as ignorant and unstable, public opinion is not seen as a basis for policy (1967: 303). Opinion must thus be conditioned to correspond to that of a privileged elite with exclusive authority over knowledge and the decision-making behind its release. He stresses the passivity of the recipient in this process of ‘mass-communication’ and the transmission of messages by ‘agents’ (the frequent detachment of communication from both its source and the experience of the recipient) (Williams, 1967: 304). He rejects the possibility that the recipient’s interests are represented where this divide exists and sees this as damaging to the individual and cultural basis of democracy (Williams, 1967: 304). This crucial element of
Williams’ theory highlights the relationship between paternalism and a communication style he sees as dominative; he argued that it represents “an arrogant preoccupation with transmission, which rests on the assumption that the common answers have been found and need only to be applied” (1967: 314).

Thus while many practitioners emphasise the role of truth in modern propaganda, it is the essential paternalism and framing of debate that is problematic for Williams (1967). It has been recognised that “transparency is of tremendous value” in building credibility (Thorp, 24th August 2009). With a focus on transmission, Graham Wright observed, “It’s not about lying it’s about - how is this going to come across better?” (1st June 2009). Similarly, the notion of truth is not necessarily incompatible with either of Fallon’s statements “influencing people to do the things that I’d like them to do, assuming that they’re in our own best interests for mankind, is the way we ought to be going” or “you’ve gotta start figuring out how you’re gonna get in the people’s heads to get them to do what you want them to do” (21st July 2009) which were examined in Chapter 5 but the passivity of the audience is problematic (1967: 314). Issues of morality, communication and the means of persuasion cannot be reduced to a question of truth. Regardless of whether propaganda is devised by private expertise or is implemented by well-meaning bureaucrats; whether they apply audience ‘targeting’ restrictions, or indeed even if it operates under ‘limits’ of truth, or not; once it is structurally institutionalised propaganda necessarily endeavours to restrict and narrow public debate to serve powerful interests. How these interests define their goals is as crucial as the means through which they exert influence in society and this will be discussed further in the next section.

Williams sees this paternalistic relationship as resting on authority and therefore argues that the idea of service alienates the individual and fails to encourage joint responsibility (1967: 330). This question of paternalism as a form of power has been raised more recently by Lukes, who identifies it as whether “power can be exercised by A over B in B’s real interests” where these conflict with B’s subjective interests (as in paternalistic propaganda) (2005:37). This is essential
to the idea of ‘service’. Lukes concludes that either there is an initial conflict of subjective interests, a power relation which ends “if and when B realises his real interests”; or that B’s real interests are “in his own autonomy” and any violation of this is an act of power (2005: 37). Williams’ arguments seem to fit with the latter belief that B’s real interests must favour his own autonomy, due to his belief that learning and development must occur through personal experience (1967), an anti-paternalist conclusion which Lukes argues “collapses all or most cases of influence into power” (2005: 37). Far from an individualist, however, Williams advocates his position as a means to ensure the development of a non-dominative ‘common culture’ wherein real interests can emerge through active, democratic organisation. Lukes on the other hand, recognises the former might license paternalistic “tyranny” yet argues that B must identify his own real interests “independently” and “empirically” - through democratic participation for example (2005: 37). This is clearly problematic in cases where A’s exercise of power involves the restriction of B’s channels for information and debate (Lukes’ third dimension of power) thus obscuring B’s real interests from emerging, and it is unclear how Lukes sees their “relative autonomy” being secured (2005: 37).

This divide will be explored further in relation to Williams in due course.

Applying William’s arguments to Taylor’s position (one often proffered by practitioners), the real question is not just the moral or immoral intentions of the propagandist, but whether we can really know the intentions and goals of those employing propaganda, if propaganda forms the knowledge-base through which we judge them.

Philo & Berry of the Glasgow University Media Group have shown how ‘official’ messages ultimately dominate media output, and come to influence “whether the use of force is understood to be legitimate” by the media audience (2004: 257). The flip side of this is that many of the ‘lessons’ the MoD identified in Iraq, they keep in a database in Shrivenham, “overclassified, to prevent criticism becoming public” (Mackay and Tatham, 2009: 27). In many ways Taylor was right in drawing our attention to the intentions and goals of the propagandist - the interests served; yet, any ideal of ‘democratic’ propaganda for the public good seems hollow when we consider on what the wider public must base their

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102 Lukes uses influence broadly to include activities beyond exercise of power including “cooperative activity, where individuals or groups significantly affect one another in the absence of a conflict of interests between them” (2005: 35).

judgement. Since it is in this way that conflicts of interest remain unseen, the suffocation of differing agendas in propaganda, and in the decision-making process itself, is at least as significant as the nurture of a dominant message; more so. Lukes observes how nondecision-making is a crucial element of any analysis of power (2005: 22-23).

Williams offers a nuanced analysis of social change and adaptation which will be explored in relation to the research findings later in the chapter (1989). Through insights derived from his work, we can see that the focus should be on a process in which the means of shaping information and ordering relationships around this, are as much a part of the lived experience of propaganda’s effects, as the decisions that might result from its reception. Means and ends are thus not separable measurable entities. There is no propaganda ‘end’ which exists separately from the process, its actors and its continuation. It is the collective experience of that process and dominative systems and divisions it supports - that is the ‘end’ with which we must concern ourselves and the source of its illegitimacy.

**Williams: Representation & Debate**

The whole notion of ‘public service’ rests on the idea that the public’s interests are embodied by the state. Williams considers the notion of representation illusory, he argues that it is underpinned by a “distrust of the majority” which prevents the debate necessary for true democracy (1967: 315). Propaganda was legitimised by the ‘service’ motive in both British and American institutional...

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104 Conflict is not simply what is observable, or distilled in decisions-made, it is to be found in what decisions have not been made or even appeared on the agenda (Lukes, 2005). Effects-based planning in propaganda centralised around this premise as its key objective and battleground. Authority is not simply “agreement based upon reason” as Bachrach and Baratz argue (Lukes 2005: 27), indeed it can often be ‘excluding reason’ due to the importance of ritual and traditional rules. And as Lukes argues power can be exercised over a person “by influencing, shaping and determining his very wants” as in effects-based propaganda and the wider Strategic Communication approach (2005: 27). Effects-based propaganda is often asserted to produce a consensus, by engineering a whole situation whereby people will come to the ‘right’ decisions. Lukes points out that it cannot be assumed that the “absence of grievance equals consensus”, for him, “the most effective and insidious use of power is to prevent […] conflict from arising in the first place” (2005: 28 & 27).

Thus effects-based propaganda, even where truth is a consideration, and observable conflict is averted, is a site of what Lukes calls “latent conflict, which consists in a contradiction between the interests of those exercising power and the real interests of those they exclude” (2005: 28).

This research discussed the roles of many planners and decision-makers in the propaganda ‘War on Terror’. Lukes argues that while “decisions are choices consciously and intentionally made by individuals”, the “bias of the system can be mobilized, recreated and reinforced in ways that are neither consciously chosen nor the intended result of particular individuals’ choices” (2005: 25). Thus it is misleading to talk about ends as a justification for propaganda; the question might be asked whose ‘ends’, for any action at any one point in time. Besides ‘persuasion’ of the audience, it might also be argued that planners’ societal understandings and experience of communication, are also an ‘end’ which is (unintentionally) affected by top-down propaganda practises. The “phenomenon of collective action” Lukes argues, is “manifest, but not attributable to particular individuals’ decisions or behaviour” (2005: 26). Individuals’ goals in defence planning are unlikely to equate exactly to their government’s or institution’s declared ‘goal’, let alone the actual lived outcomes of the system as a whole (although they may embody these goals through their decision-making). This is “the phenomenon of ‘systemic’ or organizational effects, where the mobilization of bias results […] from the form of organization” (Lukes, 2005: 26).
cultures and Williams would argue that the paternalism that results creates a
gulf between the ‘common sense’ of ‘agents’ and planners and the public they
are meant to serve, something clearly demonstrated in Chapter 5 (1967).
Propaganda has institutionally been embodied in defence in this way. The
essential divide created by the relationship between the citizen and the state,
means a ‘service’ culture where it is desirable for practitioners to see beyond
the ‘weakness’ of ‘popular’ concerns to a constructed ‘real world’ in which
pragmatic military decisions about war-planning’s more immediate, operational
‘ends’ are made. By this analysis the divergence between the goals of the
institution and the misled ‘civilian’ outsider may seem unproblematic to
activities which are seen as necessary to function effectively and ‘serve’ the
public in the ‘real world’. Thus, ‘service’ organises out/discredits the views of a
wider public in favour of the institutionalised ‘reality’ of the security situation.

This dissertation discussed the construction of ‘national interests’ from
leadership goals and the negotiation of ‘needs’ perceived by decision-makers
within institutional cultural assumptions. Williams saw ‘service’ as an aspect of
the culture of public bodies which discourages critical judgement in favour of
internal cohesion and stable policy (Williams, 1958). The ‘service motive’ was
shown to have operated to secure faith in each defence system and government,
and discourage dissent from what was defined as ‘national interest’. It has
important implications for accountability. This all precludes true representation
by both:

1. Positioning political and military decision-making cultures in opposition to
   the culture of a wider public.

2. Concurrently providing their legitimacy for action through the notion of
   ‘service’ to that public in the interest of ‘stability’

The ‘War on Terror’ created a situation where ideology to some degree both
‘served’ and ‘determined’ interests. The service motive is of course one of the
means through which America’s ‘moral norms’ of patriotic idealism have served
state interests to justify action. Certainly in the Iraq case British public opinion
was hostile to war, but for their representatives in government ‘interests’ were
differently defined. The relationship of ‘service’ was built on an underlying
assumption that British ‘interests’ are best served by an increase in its relative
political stature and continued prominence in US thinking. This throw-back from an imperial past is argued in Chapters 5 & 6 to have translated into policies which sought to maintain traditional perceptions of a distinctive British military role. The intervening interests of the leadership and emphasis on ‘shared’ needs resulting from a desire to ensure cohesion, moved the definition of ‘interests’ to which bureaucratic ‘service’ motives respond away from any truly ‘national’ idea of threat or interest. Indeed such structures preclude real debate that might allow for the emergence of the kind of tentative working compromise Williams suggests is necessary for true democracy (as opposed to an assumed consensus) (1968).

**Williams: Individualism & ‘Service’**

Williams rejects flatly the ‘individualism’ that results from a liberal analysis of power, which is both dominant in American thinking and significant among the British leadership during this period (1967: 325-326). He saw bourgeois ‘individualism’ as responsible for the development of this hierarchical and domineering ‘service’ culture; instead he underscores how ‘community’ and public engagement (argued to be rooted in working class culture) are essential to true democracy (Williams, 1958). As detailed above, Williams saw the service motive as legitimating domineering democracy where a passive public, are alienated from decision-making, a job best left to the elite; after which a paternalistic communication process serves the policy goals defined by those in power (1958: 314). This process can be seen in many of the examples in the thesis including ‘effects-based’ approaches such as MacKay used (‘libertarian paternalism’) that attempt to create a situation whereby the target of persuasion makes the ‘right’ decision without being aware it was desired by the propagandist, who has changed behaviour, not opinion, preventing the debate from being raised (Rowland & Tatham, 2010: 2). A revealing statement by Fallon demonstrates his assumption that American solutions are best, and the domineering nature of American efforts in reconstruction of Iraq. His notion of ‘service’ is of course tied firmly to the military as CENTCOM Commander, and he equates his institutional (American) interests and assumptions with the interests of all. He states that

“Back in late 2006, early 2007, I can’t tell you the number of Iraqis who were helping us, working with us, at least with most of their hearts and minds, who would say, confronted with a difficult situation
‘well just do it this way, that’s how Saddam did it! It works, trust me, it works,’ and revert back to the same thing” (Fallon, 21st July 2009).

From Fallon’s point of view the Iraqis were ‘helping us’; helping the US Military to carry out US policy in Iraq, not rebuilding their own country. Of course the official line is that America was helping the Iraqis. Williams argues that cultural growth cannot be achieved through a dominative approach to communication or democracy, no matter how well-intentioned, since the learning process is not a passive process and the need to learn is denied through the lack of participation in the social organisation of our form of democracy (1967: 315). While a return to Saddam’s methods is clearly not desirable, Fallon is clearly confounded by the lack of comprehension by the Iraqis of the ‘superior’ American way of doing things. This gap between local ideas and American goals is used as a justification for propaganda, as a means to ensure the American way. The “huge disconnects” driven between the perceptions of planners like Fallon (21st July 2009) and the international or domestic audience, are of course underpinned by a capitalist system which is sustained by material inequalities and individualism.

As Fallon argues, “Money does not go to unstable places. Insecure places. [...] That’s a really important message. That’s a tough message to sell some illiterate bird farmer in [...] one of these countries” (21st July 2009). The solution is thus perceived as justifying this inequality through propaganda to influence opinion, and focussing the developing country’s goals on economic liberalisation.

‘Paternalistic’ propaganda does not tangibly change the real world underpinning those subjective understandings, but seeks ‘stability’ through its acceptance; it can thus only be dominative, and serve to reinforce such ‘disconnects’. In claiming propaganda as a necessity, propaganda practitioners (and theorists like Lasswell) make a claim often made by realists - a belief that they plan for the world ‘as it is’ rather than ‘as we’d like it to be’. Yet central to this is the culture of mistrust nurtured by liberalism which brings a disengagement of agents, from recipients of information, and precludes shared culture and true understanding (Williams 1967: 304).

**Williams: Gramsci, Agency and Social Structure**

As discussed in the Introduction, Williams’ later more overtly Marxist writing concerned him with the broad idea of social change, and an analysis of the relationship between the base and superstructure (1971). His main concern
during this period was the evolutionary struggle of society, and its working population’s attempts to sustain it or change it, which will be drawn on here. The present research findings demonstrate that the ‘cultural’ propaganda apparatus was evolving as its structural/functional elements changed. Williams offers one way of looking at the patterns of ‘negotiation’ and tension observed in the domestic dynamics of the propaganda apparatus, as it responded to a need to adapt its cultural assumptions and understandings to meet the changing demands of the information war. Raymond Williams, in ‘Marxism and Literature’ defines culture as comprising a set of “dynamic interrelations” between residual, dominant and emergent elements of its process (1989: 121). His analysis gives a “sense of movement” within “what is ordinarily abstracted as a system” which is useful in examining this change in propaganda culture (Williams, 1989: 121).

The counter-insurgency response needed for fighting their ‘War on Terror’ in a globalised media environment demonstrably posed a significant challenge to the Anglo-American defence infrastructures. This was being resolved in an ongoing process during the period of study. Ironically, the two countries’ failed efforts to coordinate and submit their apparatus to structural control have been shown to be one factor which drew out adaptation in actual activities. Through their informal planning some personnel moved away from the established channels, others found new ways of using established structures, while ideology and notions of service ensured resistant elements of this existing structure. Yet the rise in initiative and informality, prompted by a lack of systemic coordination

105 Once moves to war had been made it was of course the function of the propaganda apparatus to ensure efficacy of these moves, and prioritise efficiency in reaching objectives. The defence structure prioritised ensuring operational effectiveness through complimentary capabilities, and assistive functioning occurred where this was seen to advance ‘shared’ objectives or those of the leadership. American liberal rhetoric about ‘spreading democracy’ and free trade failed to sell internationally and the message was uncoordinated. Where it was perceived the outcomes of coalition policy might be unreliable, or plans/procedures were unsound, individuals’ concern for meeting objectives led them to pursue other means to operate and ensure both stability and effective operations. Prioritising their internal stability, British planning attempted to ameliorate perceived problems of coordinating information policy, to manage Islamic reaction. Bureaucratic momentum and professional ambitions drove pressure to ‘get the job done’ and prioritised pragmatism and initiative by often well-intentioned individuals with a strong belief in what they were doing. This was advanced by “goal displacement”, where functionaries’ original purposes are extended to new initiatives (Bauman, 1988: 484). The legitimacy of ‘public service’ became permissibility for informal solutions and thus could not be seen as apart from intervening interests. As formal arrangements brought the defence structures of the countries together when US structures were found to be hard to engage, British personnel often pushed on informally. Pragmatic, initiative-led responses became the normal way of navigating structural barriers and they engaged with those contacts within the US system who demonstrated a similar flexibility. In enabling prosthetic routes of informal planning and communication, Britain was shown here to have made itself extremely useful to American strategic planners, and increased its perceived value. This is particularly evident in the interviews from the example of Iraq. It is highly significant because when the problems of the insular American infrastructure also constrained the formal mechanisms of Anglo-American cooperation, this not only threatened British involvement; potentially it jeopardised both British value to America, and domestic American lines of communication. The networks that maintained these functions were supported, particularly where British resources were lacking, by the wide ideological emphasis on the cultural tradition of British ‘expertise’ in American eyes.

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and the change in propaganda environment, was necessarily accompanied by a
culture change. This period ushered in the concepts and understanding to
support these new approaches. Initiative ensured the means to continue function
were sought, but new ideas had necessarily to be incorporated into the received
knowledge. The culture of propaganda in both countries’ institutions began to
move away from the dominant preference for separation of propaganda forms to
a preponderance of emerging belief that this was outmoded (at least in so far as
this change could be married with the service ethic). As Croft points out
“America’s ‘response’ to [the 9/11] attacks was not obvious, not
natural, nor based on some objective standard of ‘common sense’.
Policy had to be built on” existing narratives, those of “America’s
government, and importantly, American society as a whole” (2006: 2).
Importantly, solutions responded to implicit definitions of material interest and
‘security’ which bounded ideas and possible ‘ends’ through institutional value
judgements. While often informal operation was perceived as necessary and
producing concrete results in ensuring continuing function, this struggle between
dominant and emergent cultures meant a development which was inconsistent
across the apparatuses.

Firstly, within the dominant propaganda cultures of both countries, propaganda
has traditionally been institutionalised into defence culture in a limited way - its
regulation through guidelines and boundaries, and separation of propaganda
powers in the state provides a basis for rational-legal authority. It supports an
ideal of Western policymaking as moderate, rational and based on ‘limited’ war;
despite a reality of extensive practice. While there might be ‘hot wars’ in
Afghanistan and Iraq; the ‘War on Terror’ became a conflict being fought
through increasingly unconventional, ideological means. Beyond addressing
terrorist acts, it has far wider implications in that it aims to prevent conflict
with the status quo from arising. The ‘unlimited’ nature of this ideological
conflict blurs the boundaries between ‘wartime’ and ‘peacetime’ operations and
renders the traditional geographical limits that democratic states such as Britain
and the US previously used to define their security problematic. Institutional
assumptions seep into the paternalistic idea that propaganda must address the
public audience ‘as they really are’ (as a potential threat to stability) not as

106 While the British military was already well-suited to ideological and asymmetric warfare, this is of course still
operating according to a state-centric definition of security.
we’d ‘like them to be’ (in the ideal world of reasoned debate). A redefinition of security beyond boundaries of geography, democracy, peace and war, accordingly placed pressures on states’ existing propaganda apparatus and the ‘limits’ and boundaries through which it was legitimated in the dominant culture within this apparatus. Propaganda has historically been justified in relation to realist, state-centric assumptions of relative security, which assume easy demarcation of state-audience targets. Increasingly, in a global media environment the emergent response has been for well-intentioned initiative and informal planning to favour the ever-wider employment of the fullest range of propaganda capabilities, as one of tools in the counter-insurgency kit-bag. As clear targeting is now impossible, the reliance for appearance of legitimacy on a limited, rational, ‘democratic’ basis for propaganda, becomes a site of contestation. Such changes raise contradictions which, with greater scrutiny, challenge traditional conceptual frameworks and open up sites of conflict for renegotiation by the defence structures and communities that plan and execute contemporary propaganda strategy.

Williams, in going back to Gramsci’s concept of hegemony recognised that any dominant culture must react to challenges to avoid becoming anachronistic (1971). In this period of considerable change in international social conditions and the media environment, social structures can be seen under tension. For Williams, in culture alternatives emerge from the contradictions between the architecture of social structures (in this case the propaganda apparatus and its functional environment), and the cultural apparatus through which individuals encounter and engage with it. The personnel involved as ‘agents’ and planners in the propaganda war were crucial to its reconstitution. In writings that have been hugely influential in influencing planners from Robert Gates and Barack Obama to Richard Armitage, Nye has emphasised the relative power of media compared with government information sources,

“Editors, filters, and cue givers become more in demand, and this is a source of power for those who can tell us where to focus our attention. Power does not necessarily flow to those who can produce or withhold information. Unlike asymmetrical interdependence in trade, where power goes to those who can afford to hold back or break trade ties, power in information flows goes to those who can
edit and authoritatively validate information, sorting out what is both correct and important.” (2002b).

Such analyses define the ‘threat’ of media and unfettered public debate. They underscore the sense of threat and common identity within the defence apparatus, marking out within ideological and institutional structures of government both a territory of conflict and one of containment. It is this contested cultural framework through which defines the ends and means by which propaganda is legitimated. Thorp identified a general US military fear that “if we talk about it the enemy will take advantage of it” - this Vietnam-era prejudice has proved a persistent fear among US personnel (24th August 2009). But this concern with superiority in propaganda, appears to struggle in the culture against an existing, persistent notion that unlimited use is not right. As we have seen, a long, difficult transition has thus ensued for the militaries’ conventional warfare systems to incorporate new approaches.

Changes occurred as part of an internal struggle within which ‘agents’ of propaganda are not isolated from public definitions of right and wrong, nor are they entirely free from the influence of past formulations of ‘just’ propaganda and institutionalised assumptions. Williams borrows heavily from Gramsci whose discussion of hegemony as a process highlights the role of organic intellectuals, as the “functionaries” of a structure, for both theorists such individuals hold a certain autonomy “mediated” by their relation to the rest of society (1971:12). This echoes Marx’s claim that “Men make their own history but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past” (quoted in Lukes, 2005).

This research found the information ‘War on Terror’ involved a cultural struggle; not just with the in-theatre audience, the international community or the British and American publics, but also played out within and between the dominant cultures in the two states’ administrations. Indeed the circumstances in the propaganda war were ripe for a culture change; to rework and internalise

107 James Scott has examined everyday covert and coded resistance (as ‘public’ and ‘hidden’ transcripts) to domination and it would be insightful to focus more in further research on what role such resistance plays in the mediation of relationships that produce government propaganda strategies (1990).
justifications to support the extension of the alternative (more extensive) approach, and to variously resist and incorporate it.

For Williams the ‘residual’ element of culture\textsuperscript{108} is one effectively formed in the past, yet which plays an active role in the cultural processes of the present (1989: 122). He argued this means

“certain experiences, meanings, and values, that cannot be expressed or substantially verified in terms of the dominant culture are nevertheless lived and practised on the basis of the residue - cultural as well as social - of some previous [...] institution or formation”\textsuperscript{109} (Williams, 1989: 122).

According to Williams “some version of” residual culture “will in most cases have had to be incorporated if the effective dominant culture is to make sense in these areas” (1989: 123). Williams’ states that ‘residual’ culture can include both elements that are “alternative or oppositional” to the dominant culture and others which have become incorporated within the dominant culture (1989: 122). Residual elements are also resisted; they cannot become so strong as to provide a threat to the dominant culture (Williams, 1989: 123). But it is through this that a dominant ‘tradition’ becomes evident; through its “reinterpretation, dilution, projection, discriminating inclusion and exclusion” of residual elements, and meanings and values that are sustained despite this process (Williams, 1989: 123). The notion of ‘service’, or that PSYOPS should be kept distinct from Public Affairs and not be used for targeting a domestic audience, could be argued to be examples of residual culture, since both still play crucial roles in the dominant culture of government propaganda, yet in practise are subject to renegotiation as new working practises and ideas become seen as necessary. While he asserts that dominant culture reaches further into human experience in capitalist society, Williams argues that some area of social activity or consciousness is always excluded and it is from this that ‘emergence’ of alternative cultural elements can occur (1989: 124-5). Williams calls residual and emergent elements a “necessary complication of the would-be dominant culture” (1989: 126).

\textsuperscript{108} As opposed to the ‘archaic’ - that which is “wholly recognised as an element of the past” (Williams, 1989: 122)

\textsuperscript{109} For Williams formations are “most recognisable as conscious movements and tendencies (literary, artistic, philosophical or scientific) which can usually be readily discerned after their formative productions” (1989: 119).
While the notion of ‘truth’ is underscored by both advocates of SMART Power and Strategic Communication, in both countries in reality the extent of persuasion is still a site of contest. Thorp said that for an information campaign to be strategically coordinated, there needs to be “one set of rules” and it is necessary to decide “whether the Public Affairs rules are right, the Psychological Operations rules are right or we need a new set of rules” for guiding propaganda (24th August 2009). This necessarily applies both to the cross-government information war and a joint campaign. Having dedicated his career to it, in America Thorp saw Public Affairs taking the lead in this (Thorp, 24th August 2009). But high-profile defense planners increasingly saw the ‘whiteworld’ activities as a necessary supporting programme to back up the black operations. Franklin Miller claimed that Gen Myres stance on protecting the purity of Public Affairs had been a “huge problem” because for him, “you cannot wage information operations in the black without having a supporting program in the white” [my emphasis] (3rd August 2009). The disintegration of audience boundaries and use of profit-driven contractors like PhaseOne in refining the content of the communications, must lead us to question the extent to which Thorp’s Public Affairs-dominant idealisation has remained dominant in the culture.

Within the domestic US propaganda apparatus systemic struggles can be seen played out throughout other examples in the thesis. In the evolution of the Office of Strategic Influence, for example; a propaganda department set up on the feeling that a new approach was needed but a move too early, too blatant and too rigid, which had to close due to opposition. It tried to dictate a change of thinking but refused to adapt organically with other agencies. The element of initiative, and the dissent and suppression of dissent that resulted, ultimately marked out a site where such ‘rules’ and boundaries began being renegotiated - between conservative, reassuring, notions of ‘limited’ propaganda and recognition by functionaries that this is not realistic or compatible with needs. Resignation to the latter, of course has far-reaching implications. Not least, for the propaganda apparatus to function smoothly it became necessary for the agents of propaganda to understand and justify their role according to different terms; not as justified by boundaries but more often by the ‘ends’ and ‘state of mind’ of the propagandist - for example service motive, stability, belief in
ideological goals, even self-belief and distancing where possible. Similarly we can see this struggle in the perceived ‘flexibility’ in embracing the private sector role, an easier means of reconciling the problem, alongside resistance for the rules to change in the military itself.

Between the administrations there was also an underlying struggle. While it too was needing to redefine its understandings of ‘the rules’, for Britain the barriers were more flexible to begin with. Propaganda tactics were often judged relative to America, and seen as standing within a British democratic tradition. British personnel saw a need to ‘manage’ the US approach through small informal renegotiations, avoiding conflict with its powerful ally and seeking a consistent outcome that would meet objectives in the war. The US residual culture of an almost ‘romanticised’ view if tradition and history meant it was receptive to British efforts, and this perception was encouraged by Britain. Though this too was subject to intervening challenges as the period progressed; it becomes harder to maintain through American perception of British failures such as Basra (detailed in Chapter 6) and the increasingly informal ‘behind the scenes’ ways in which British personnel provided real value to America, such as through Foreign Office/private sector solutions to American problems at CPA Baghdad and SAIC (Pennett, 15th February 2011). Of course, Britain’s approach was seen by some as an example to be followed (Thorp, 24th August 2009). Such positive perceptions helped facilitate the emergence of US Defense’s more flexible approach to propaganda, and their adaptation to asymmetric, ideological warfare. But tensions between US PSYOPS and Public Affairs personnel were an important site of conflict, indeed the ripples of these redefining boundaries appear to represent an emergent tendency within the dominant propaganda culture (favouring new concepts like ‘Strategic Communication’). This can be seen to be in conflict with the residual elements of what had preceded (the moral and structural separation of audience targeting and propaganda ‘forms’ as a justification for propaganda) (Williams, 1989: 121-122). For example, recently the Pentagon has been referring to ‘Military Information Support Operations’ - MISO, which sounds more neutral than Psychological Operations. This represents a move to weaken any association with ‘manipulation’ and allow a redefinition of this activity’s use, meanings and associated culture.

110 And change in the language of propaganda.
The ‘boundaries’ and separation of Media Operations from PSYOPS had likewise been dominant in past British propaganda culture. Both were found to be elements of the dominant cultural understandings and assumptions behind propaganda in Britain. Yet chapters 5 and 6 demonstrate how unlike the US ‘coordination’, ‘initiative’ and ‘flexibility’ of different propaganda forms had been a residual element of British military culture drawn through from colonial times into contemporary ‘asymmetric warfare’. This has on some level been retained as a ‘residual’ element despite the existence of ‘boundaries’ and formal rules nominally governing propaganda audience targeting. It may thus represent a resurgence of a cultural thread during circumstances ripe for that approach. This of course was helped by the British military’s more flexible command structure and doctrine, historical adaptability of its officers, and their comparative readiness to adopt political solutions (Nagl, 2002).

Moves to bring covert action into US Defense also demonstrated a site where these formal boundaries were being frustrated, navigated and defended. In practise we can see that the CIA and Defense Department’s propaganda activities - their ‘means’ - are often not so easy to distinguish and compartmentalise in traditional ways\(^{111}\); both have paid journalists to plant articles in the media, after all. Just as propaganda projects moved departments in the case of the Office of Strategic Influence ‘women’ project (McBride, 5\(^{th}\) June 2009), they also moved countries, and into the hands of contractors, civil society and even Iraqi students (Corcoran, 8\(^{th}\) June 2006) - whatever worked. Internally within the institutions of state and between the states, cultural understandings of the ‘rules’ which communicate legitimacy and understandings of propaganda, were at the locus of the struggle with formal structures. The Information Operations Roadmap acknowledged the lack of ability to control which audience receives messages and stated that,

“the distinction between foreign and domestic audiences becomes more a question of [US Government] intent rather than information dissemination practices” (Department of Defense, 30th October 2003).

This underlines the fact that distinctions and guidelines that order ‘means’ as appropriate or proportionate, are now primarily an issue of the ‘state of mind’

\(^{111}\) ‘External’/ ’Internal’; PSYOPS/Public Affairs; Covert/Overt
of the practitioners, rather than state of actual distribution and material influence. This can be seen in the example from Chapter 3, of Ren Stelloh’s account that as long as you make a case to demonstrate the propaganda was ‘intended’ for an external audience Congress are satisfied if it leaks through (23rd June 2009). As long as the state of mind is present, then they have met their responsibility and if those ‘dissemination practices’ result in domestic audiences receiving those messages, this was essentially an act of God or global media.

As the above-mentioned ‘limited’ propaganda basis for legitimacy weakens, propaganda is being justified more by ends not means, becoming increasingly paternalistic. In these conditions effects-driven propaganda seems a logical consequence. Among an otherwise-disastrous Helmand campaign, MacKay’s influence-led approach which advocates increasingly opening the range of options for the propagandist and delegating propaganda down to the lowest level possible (MacKay and Tatham, 2009), has been held up as an example and followed subsequently in counterinsurgency campaigns (Farrell, 2010). This research found that the growing consensus in both countries that the ‘War on Terror’ required flexible responses meant the extension of capabilities often progressed in both countries into a great many hands without adequate guidance or a supportive infrastructure. Meanwhile operations continued, and practise evolved conceptually toward 2005’s ‘strategic communication’ approach (the continuing process hoped to coordinate propaganda goals with every facet of government).

New, unstated boundaries seem now to be appearing in propaganda’s dominant culture, defining the point beyond which the apparatus itself would be challenged. For example, recently, Hastings claimed that Gen. Caldwell in Afghanistan gave wide-reaching orders to Lt Col Holmes, the officer in command of his Information Operations unit - to target “NATO populations” and pushed for Generals to have PSYOPS-trained personal spokesmen (normally they have Public Affairs staff) (Hastings, 23rd February 2011). However, when Caldwell wanted Holmes to target PSYOPS at visiting US policymakers, think-tank analysts and foreign dignitaries seeking to sway decisions and funding in favour of projects

112 Mackay’s problems in Helmand exemplify this in the British example (MacKay and Tatham, 2009).
under his command, Holmes refused on grounds that PSYOPS should not target Americans (23rd February 2011). He originally received an official reprimand for his refusal to follow orders. Again this occurred through a General’s attempts to navigate structures to ensure his occupational goals were actioned. In many cases, particularly in the American system, institutional and informal means of coercion appear to have been put in service of individuals’ intent to ensure the continuation and success of their occupational goals, securing both cultural and functional changes. In at least one British example, distrust of the perceived informality of higher-level decisions led others at the lower levels to come up with their own informal, ad-hoc solutions implying a continuing system (Weale, 26th November 2010). While in Britain ‘initiative’ was a strong cultural feature already; the logic of bureaucracy and ‘goal displacement’ meant, to some extent, in America too, people responded to barriers this way. They sought what solutions they could find to meet occupational goals; solutions which emphasised informal ways of navigating the infrastructure, including coercion.

Ultimately Caldwell’s orders seem to have emerged as a step too far against the dominant culture of propaganda, one the apparatus was not willing to tolerate; the case is now being investigated by Gen. Patraeus (Hastings, 23rd February 2011). When asked, however, the Information Operations Lawyer John Scott, underscored the importance of ‘state of mind’ - he told Holmes that crossover “should be unintentional” underscoring the redefined boundary at this point (in Hastings, 23rd February 2011). This confirms a new line for acceptability, Caldwell’s orders to use PSYOPS on US Senators overtly crossed this line and challenged newly-defined aspects of authority and legitimacy. The intent to target within propaganda boundaries was not present for Holmes, raising conflict with this redefined basis for legitimacy, and prompting him to speak out. Afterwards, the Unit contracted back to the new-found limits of its function; its PSYOPS-trained staff were instructed to target a ‘PR campaign’ against both US and worldwide audiences, though not presumably the US Senate. Attempts to redefine the culture and assuage any question of legitimacy were cloaked in a change of language; Holmes describes how the Information Operations Unit was renamed an “Information Engagement Cell” in response (in Hastings, 23rd February 2011).
Accelerated efforts to deal with the demands of a modern propaganda war, led to a sometimes piecemeal, sometimes systematic cross-government diffusion of the propaganda apparatus. This trend in cross-government integration and delegation of propaganda thus disarmed the public audience and the rise in informality helped to bury emergent conflict and cultural renegotiation of the institutional understandings within the apparatus itself. Insights derived from Williams’ analysis of social change (1989) show that this forms the site of processes within which ‘agents’ were modifying how ‘legitimate’ propaganda practises are institutionally constructed, and where these practises are normalised vis-a-vis propaganda ‘needs’ and society at large.

**The Balance of Powerful Interests**

One of the key questions this thesis set out to answer was: *What power imbalances exist in the propaganda relationship?* Part of the answer to this has been unpacked above in relation to Raymond Williams writings, and relates to the creation of a divide between the audience and the elite. Yet certainly the relationship between the two powers is the other dimension of this, with crucial implications for foreign policy and the structures and cultures of defence. Here too, ‘perceived and actual outcomes’ of the relationship are important. In an American-led ‘War on Terror’ Gamble and Wright have questioned whether power differentials caused Blair to go into Iraq under duress of American influence (2004). Certainly Britain’s foreign and defence policy hung on the need to provide a function alongside America, complimenting its capabilities. Comparing with Suez, Gamble and Wright observe how America had far less means to control Britain in 2003, and countries that were far more dependent on the US than Britain dissented from support (2004). Pimlott has observed though how during the 1960’s Britain had little choice but to embrace the relationship, and its comparative strength in 2002 gave it more power (2002: 191). It seems likely Bush and Blair’s relationship, and their mutual fear and desire to spread their vision across the world combined with domestic political concerns drove British foreign policy more than any dutiful obedience of America. This is supported by Woodward’s revelation that Bush called Blair on 9th March and offered an opt-out,

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113 These trends can be seen in the extension of covert action in the US Defense Department; both countries’ use of ‘effects-based’ approaches; an explosion of contracting and the movement towards a more integrated propaganda apparatus.
"[The president] offered this extraordinary opportunity to essentially remove the UK from a combat role in Iraq and the prime minister said: ‘Absolutely not. I have made the commitment and I am with you to the end.’” (2004: 338).

Some pointed to the proffered ‘opt-out’ as another sign that Britain was non-essential. Yet, in a discussion beforehand it seems Condoleezza Rice told Bush that Blair might lose his government over the deep domestic discontent with the Iraq war (Woodward, 2004: 338). Bush respected Blair who he thought had shown loyalty and commitment (Woodward, 2004: 338). As demonstrated in Chapter 6, America’s leadership did consider domestic British politics, and if necessary prioritise Britain’s needs by assisting its key ally, but each leadership’s strategic objectives were probably dominant in planning. Ultimately it could be argued that as British policy sought to provide capabilities that would compliment US defence systems and responsive solutions for American problems it was thus operating in the ‘service’ of America, but this would be reductive. It was a facilitator.

Loss of Britain would have damaged American credibility and the ‘opt-out’ would have been a way to ‘cut American losses’ were Blair to fall. It pre-empted a disaster in perception management and optimised operational (and competing domestic) objectives. According to Blair’s Iraq Inquiry testimony, in early 2002 when the decision to go to war was made, Bush apparently described his fear to him that “if we weren’t prepared to act in a really strong way, then we ran the risk of sending a disastrous signal out to the world” (30th January 2010). But Blair confirmed how this meant “Our own strategy was going to have to evolve in the light of that” commitment to America (Blair quoted in The Independent, 30th January 2010). The analysis here showed how it was considered crucial to both countries leaderships’ aims that strategies were implemented within the mechanisms of Anglo-American relations to manage conflicting interests in the information realm. A desire to minimise compromise within the coalition for dominant interests of the British leadership made the British ‘value’ perceived by American eyes extremely important to the British leadership, and an ‘assistive’ relationship was therefore seen as crucial, both in propaganda and wider planning.
It is the process whereby a series of British decisions and actions were taken in collective action, planning and responding within demands limited by their institutional cultures. The processes of British government institutions supported and enhanced systems of propaganda for America’s Iraq war; they gave a ‘crisis-management’ response, providing assistive functioning as US defence’s systemic problems worsened. In many ways, domestically, cooperation is argued as important in terms of service; that it serves mutual interests, and thus benefits the nation. This encouraged initiative and informal means of planning and implementation, helping America stay afloat and eventually develop increasingly far-reaching propaganda strategies, ‘effects-based’ approaches and ‘strategic communication’. Both prioritise distancing integration and further normalisation of propaganda. But Britain’s military is becoming less useful in kinetic terms, and the support it offers the US is increasing offered in cultural or political forms, and on a more ad-hoc (and inherently unreliable) basis. For British personnel, their actions in the ‘War on Terror’ were seen as a pragmatic necessity. With its competitive individualism, American initiative in the ‘War on Terror’ have often been witnessed as increased ‘ politicisation’; particularly where this results in influence and coercion. Yet it owes as much to the pragmatism of realist logic. Informal planning often aimed to ensure continued stability of function within each state system. For Britain’s decision-makers state interests were seen as dependent upon America’s outcomes, and their actions adapted according to the position of America’s internal struggle.

During the resolute examination of the research evidence presented here, a series of central implications arose which have been unpacked fully through this thesis. Firstly, the research established the deep significance of propaganda to the Anglo-American tie, both in terms of consistent joint activity and ‘assistive’ functioning, and in terms of sustaining institutional cultures that support this relationship. Beyond this the thesis underscored a need to move beyond crude structures, to consider actors as agents in international relations, and it rejects the examination of foreign policy in isolation from culture. This kind of analysis fails to problematise policymakers’ assumptions about foreign policy. Nor does it account for the ways in which dominance is established within the social structures that underpin the international system, through human action and culture. Within each country the domestic structures, cultures and formations of
interest also play a key role in setting the context - and limits - for policy changes. They all are brought into Anglo-American relationships and planning. It is clear that America still holds a position of great dominance in relation to Britain, yet when the qualitative relations between the two countries are considered, the extent to which this is a negotiated relationship emerges. The thesis thus demonstrates above all, that there is an urgent need for further future examination of the complex interrelationships and structures that constitute propaganda planning relationships in the international sphere. Only by considering international politics this way can we truly understand the relationship between global policy changes, publics, planners and propaganda; a relationship that is fundamentally shaping our world.
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