The Concept of Typology in Schiller, Nietzsche and Jung: An Historical and Comparative Study

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NOVEMBER 2007

NO. WORDS: 31,019

NO. PAGES: 90

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ABSTRACT

From the earliest times humankind has classified individuals into types in order to explain human differences and behaviour. The idea of typology was intrinsic to the thought of Schiller, Nietzsche, and Jung. Although a small amount of research has been undertaken into typology in Schiller’s and Nietzsche’s works, and there has been an explicit recognition of the importance of typology in Jung by Jungian analysts, there has been no comparative study between these three thinkers. Therefore I proposed to bridge this gap with a detailed and comparative analysis of their main link – typology.

In order to analyse fully the typological concepts present in Schiller, Nietzsche and Jung’s works, and to compare them in both their synchronic and diachronic contexts, it was necessary to examine chronologically their own differing conceptions of typology, and to study the extent to which they draw on their predecessors, before comparing them. Friedrich Schiller was instrumental in the typology of the human personality as he was the first to elucidate two fundamentally different types of cultural production – the naïve and the sentimental – and from this typological distinction he elaborated the psychological pairing of realist and idealist in Über naïve und sentimentalische Dichtung (1795-6). His typology of human nature, evolved in Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen (1795), classified three drives of the individual human: Stofftrieb; Formtrieb; and Spieltrieb. In the same work, in which he was concerned with the problem of yearning for personality, his preoccupation with opposing modes and the problems to which they give rise came to the fore. This argument later attracted the attention of Jung,
as well as being, so Jung claimed, the problem that Nietzsche had his Zarathustra identify and work through in *Also sprach Zarathustra* (1883-1885). This was the problem of opposites entailing such opposing modes as good and evil, or above and below. Furthermore, Nietzsche’s ideas on the typological pair Apollonian and Dionysian, *Die Geburt der Tragödie* (1872), were heavily indebted to Schiller. Carl Jung, having benefited from the insight of the two previously mentioned thinkers’ typological works, included chapters in recognition and criticism of their types in his main typological work, *Psychologische Typen* (1921). In this work, he made typology integral to the conceptualisation of the human individuation-process. His typology was a formulation of structural elements of the psyche, intended to help understand the wide variations in individuals. Jung’s typological works, brought together in the sixth volume of the *Gesammelte Werke*, ultimately spell out eight types: two attitudes – extravert and introvert - each containing four functions; thinking, feeling, sensation and intuition. Two further (arche) types, the animus and anima, in belonging to the shadow of the eight types, were further, complicated elements in this typology.

The explicit and significant links displayed an intimate connection between these three thinkers, whereby each of the three developed types, which may be compared on the basis that each of their typologies dealt with the synthesis of opposing types. This union of opposing types may be seen for all three as having the potential to ultimately lead to the successful negotiation of the process of achieving wholeness.
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The conception of ‘The Typological Concept in Schiller, Nietzsche and Jung: An Historical and Comparative Study’, came to the fore during my M.A. degree in German at the University of Glasgow. My interest in German literature had already been ignited, but the courses offered placed a great deal of emphasis on German philosophy and psychology, which soon developed into being my favourite aspect of the course. The classification of humankind into types has always been fascinating to me, and is one that is explicit in the works of the three renowned German-speaking thinkers, Schiller, Nietzsche and Jung. These writers were also chosen as I was familiar with their works, which I had read with zest, and I felt that not only did explicit links exist between those three, but that they had made far-reaching contributions to German thought. It was particularly interesting for me to trace the continuity of this typological distinction through the generations of German thought.

As valued Professors of mine during my M.A., having always offered much advice when needed, Professors Paul Bishop and R.H. Stephenson became my supervisors for this Masters thesis. In a field of study, where they have both contributed substantially, I would like to thank them both warmly for their guidance, encouragement, and often humorous long-distance correspondence. Additionally thank you to my family and friends whose support has been invaluable.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Jung


The edition of Jung’s works principally referred to is GW. In reference to this edition, individual works are abbreviated as follows:

A ‘Die Archetypen und das kollektive Unbewußte’ (1934/54) GW9i

FPT ‘Zur Frage der psychologischen Typen’ (1913) GW6

PST ‘Psychologische Typen’ (1925) GW6

PT Psychologische Typen (1921) GW6

PTY ‘Psychologische Typologie’ (1928) GW6

PTE ‘Psychologische Typologie’ (1936) GW6

PU ‘Über die Psychologie des Unbewussten’ (1917/26/43) GW7

Nietzsche


The edition of Nietzsche’s works principally referred to is KGW. In reference to this edition, individual works are abbreviated as follows:

Z Also sprach Zarathustra: Ein Buch für Alle und Keinen; Parts I-II (1883), Part III (1884), Part IV (1885) KGW6i

GT Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik (1872) KGW3i

Schiller


The edition of Schiller’s works principally referred to is SW. In references to this edition, individual works are abbreviated as follows:

AB Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen (1795) SW20

NS Über naïve und sentimentalische Dichtung (1795) SW20
3. REVIEW OF SECONDARY LITERATURE

‘The concept of typology in Schiller, Nietzsche and Jung: an historical and comparative study’. In order to explore this title, bibliographical research was embarked upon to review the available secondary literature available.

To begin with, the secondary literature will be analysed, which has been most valuable in coming to terms with Schiller, Nietzsche and Jung’s typologies, and helping them to be compared in their immediate and diachronic historical context. I will begin with works written about Schiller, Nietzsche and Jung individually, before examining texts comparing them. Although reference has often been made to the three writers in the one text, no text has explicitly traced the continuity between them as is the intention of this enquiry, although certain texts have examined two of the three, hence the reason for no section of triple comparison. The sequence followed will be chronological with respect to the authors and literature available.

There is a wealth of secondary literature about the philosophical dimension of Schiller’s creative writing. However, various texts seek to encompass Schiller’s life and complete works, so there is often useful mention of his philosophical ideas.

Crucial to the discussion of Schiller and the types he developed in Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen is Wilkinson and Willoughby’s translation of the work, which has an invaluable introduction. The work is entitled Friedrich Schiller: On the Aesthetic Education of Man, In a Series of Letters, English and German Facing, and was published at Clarendon Press in 1967. In their extensive introduction Schiller and his contributions are analysed aesthetically and politically. Of particular use are the extensive explanations about Schiller’s Triebe and Schillerian Schein.

R.D. Miller’s Schiller and the Ideal of Freedom: A Study of Schiller’s Philosophical Works with Chapters on Kant, published by Clarendon Press, Oxford, in 1970 uses the Schillerian theory on freedom as a focus throughout his philosophical works, held in contrast to Kant’s definition on freedom. Miller analyses each text, observing the changes in Schiller’s thought throughout.

Friedrich Schiller by John D. Simons, published by Twayne in 1981, catalogues Schiller’s importance in the USA. Simons is descriptive of the themes which emerge in
Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen, nonetheless accurately describing Schiller’s Triebe and aesthetic semblance. He also makes allusion to Über naïve und sentimentalische Dichtung, making particular reference to the types realist and idealist, which is useful and accurate.

Klaus L. Berghahn’s Schiller: Ansichten eines Idealisten, published by Athenäum in 1986, is another text about Schiller, setting him in his socio-historical context, laying more emphasis on his dramatic works but still containing a useful section on aesthetics where he focuses upon the important role the relationship between art and utopia plays in aesthetic theory. He also alludes to other philosophers throughout.

Aesthetic Reconstruction: The Seminal Writings of Lessing, Kant and Schiller, by Anthony Savile, published by Basil Blackwell in Oxford in 1987 goes further in terms of analysing Schiller’s critique of modernity in Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen than Miller, dividing the letters into three groups and makes the statement that Schiller’s purpose in developing the aesthetic mode was to create a free state, although the focus is divided between Kant and Schiller also.

Gert Ueding’s Friedrich Schiller, Beck 1990, is another text covering a range of Schiller’s works from drama to poetry, specifically referring to a number of dramas, although he includes a small but concise chapter about Schiller’s philosophy, making reference to Schiller’s diagnosis and solutions to problems in society from Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen, and Über naïve und sentimentalische Dichtung.

Lesley Sharpe’s Friedrich Schiller, published by Cambridge University Press in 1991, was written as a general modern answer to Schiller’s works in the English language. It is relatively extensive about the man and his texts, devoting a considerable part to Schiller’s philosophies on aesthetic education as well as upon the naïve and sentimental types, which she places in their historical context. It is well classified and argues and places Schiller in historical context alongside Fichte and Kant amongst others.

Schiller: Leben- Werk – Zeit, by Peter-André Alt, published by Beck in 2000, is a two-volume work in German. This is a highly detailed about Schiller’s life in historical context, his education, and complete works chronologically. The second volume makes reference to the period 1791-1799 in chapter six, where Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen, and Über naïve und sentimentalische Dichtung are
discussed under the heading – ‘Theory of the Beautiful’, which describes the composition of the aesthetic letters as well as the relationship between the naïve and sentimental.

However, Frederick Beiser’s *Schiller as Philosopher: A Re-Examination*, published by Oxford University Press in 2005 is an extremely useful text and highly relevant to my theme, which deals primarily with Schiller’s philosophical works rather than his dramas. It seeks to defend his philosophies against critics, dealing primarily with his *Kallias Briefe, Anmut und Würde*, and the *Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen*. Schiller is compared primarily to Kant and Beiser argues that Schiller has revised Kant’s moral philosophy. It is a very useful and well-written modern text, summarizing many views that have gone before, attempting to show Schiller in a new light, claiming he has been misunderstood. Beiser also offers a good summary of Schiller’s typology of modernity in his *Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen*.

Nietzsche the philosopher has attracted much attention in terms of secondary literature. His most famous fictional work *Also sprach Zarathustra* accounts for the bulk of this attention, although his philosophical ideas and influences which run through his works have recently seen an upsurge in interest. These ideas include the quest for wholeness in uniting the Apollonian and Dionysian elements, his critique of modernity including the Will to Power and God is Dead theories.

Rose Pfeffer’s *Nietzsche: Disciple of Dionysus*, although published in 1972 (by Bucknell University Press), is nonetheless useful as Pfeffer traces the line of continuity regarding the Dionysian impulse throughout Nietzsche’s works, by constantly referring to the original Nietzschean texts. The title of the book is suggested as the key to understanding Nietzschean philosophy, as she argues that all Nietzsche’s works share a common and unifying principle in the form of the Dionysian. Pfeffer was also among the first to place Nietzsche in a tradition alongside the likes of Goethe and Schiller.

In *Nietzsche*, published by Routledge & Kegan Paul in 1973, Hollingdale describes Nietzschean theories, even discussing the effects of Nietzschean thought on contemporary philosophy, and which theories have their origins in Nietzschean thought. He draws on original texts and refers to the man, writer and philosopher in Nietzsche.

Walter Kaufmann’s *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*, published by Princeton University Press 1950 acts as another useful biographically styled work about Nietzsche’s thought, chronicling his life and works, and drawing attention to the various
uses and misuses Nietzschean thought has been subjected to since his death. Although he does not necessarily agree with Nietzsche’s theories, he presents Nietzsche's Will to Power theory as one of the great accomplishments of modern philosophy, arguing that it must not be seen as ruthless self-assertion but must be linked to Nietzsche's ideas about sublimation. He also presents Nietzsche as an inspiration to and founder of many ideas of modern psychology, and what was particularly relevant was his reference to the Nietzschean typology of Apollo and Dionysus, as he traced their origin in *Die Geburt der Tragödie* through further works, noting the vital change that occurred in Nietzsche’s Dionysian type at the end of this work, as this type became the Dionysus that would be described in later works.

Arthur C. Danto’s *Nietzsche as Philosopher*, published by Columbia University Press, New York, 1980 is an all-encompassing reassessment of Nietzsche’s philosophies by examining all of his writing. He argues that Nietzsche offered a systematic philosophical theory that anticipated the question asked in modern psychology and philosophy. Danto’s arguments are clear and concise with much reference to original text and I found it valuable in coming to terms with Nietzschean theories including nihilism, morality, religion, the *Übermensch* and the Will to Power, and it even addresses the issue of the importance of opposing types to Nietzsche.

However, decidedly the most valuable text which deals with Nietzsche’s types is M. Silk and J. Stern’s *Nietzsche on Tragedy*, published by Cambridge University Press in 1981. In this work Silk and Stern make a study of Nietzsche’s *Die Geburt der Tragödie*. They provide the historical context of Greek tragedy, and trace the events in Nietzsche’s life, which prompted this work, as well as analysing the text and its aftermath. Particular focus is given to the analysis of the importance of the Apollonian and Dionysian types in this work. They trace the Apollonian and Dionysian types to the Greek deities, comparing them and proceeding to discuss Nietzsche’s many conceptions of these fundamental types in his philosophy.

R. J. Hollingdale offers an accurate introduction to Nietzsche’s thought in *Nietzsche: The Man and his Philosophy*, published by Ark in 1985. The work is another good introduction to Nietzsche’s theories, offering a straightforward synopsis of Nietzsche’s basic concepts. However it is somewhat lacking in analysis and criticism, presenting itself as more of a biography of Nietzsche’s various life phases and works.
The Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche, published by the Cambridge University Press in 1996, and edited by Bernd Magnus and Kathleen M. Higgins, is a collection of essays from Nietzschean specialists, encompassing Nietzsche the man and his works, outlining how he has been misunderstood and misrepresented, as well as investigating his philosophies and their influences on the twentieth century. Reference is frequently made to Nietzsche’s original works, and the authors analyse and criticise these works as well as secondary literature to place Nietzsche in his historical context, even comparing him with other thinkers, to reveal an unbiased picture of the philosopher. It summarises much of what the other books have said before.

Nietzsche and Depth Psychology is a collaboration of chapters tracing the psychological aspect of Nietzsche: ‘Psychology in Nietzsche’; ‘Nietzsche in Psychology’ and ‘The Psychology of Nietzsche and his Readers’. Introduced by Jacob Golomb and published by the State University of New York Press in 1999, it includes extracts from various contributors, all exploring different aspects of Nietzsche and psychology. The focus of the text is on the psychological aspects of Nietzschean thought, and his stance next to founders of psychology - Jung, Freud and Adler, even addressing the psychology of Nietzsche’s readers. Individual excerpts are more valuable to my line of questioning than others, but the work as a whole convincingly sets Nietzsche in his place among psychologists, giving credit to his many theories.

Due to the increasing popularity of psychology and Jung’s name, the Jungian school of thought has prompted many secondary texts. Also, because Jung wrote many articles and one major work dealing with the theme of typology, there is more secondary literature available for him than the other two writers, which specifically concern the theme of typology. There are many works which were not of particular value. Amongst them, there is a wealth of internet based material about Jungian types. Jung could not have foreseen the development of certain online materials, including online personality tests, claiming to be based on Jungian types, designed to uncover one’s personality types.

The uses of such materials have expanded not just from personal use, but are nowadays even often used in the business environment in such instances as the employment of staff. Employers use these type tests to establish the applicant’s strengths and weaknesses as well as ascertaining how they would fit in with other types in the office environment. Such type testing is collectively based and answered statistically, and therefore cannot be of any use in establishing one’s type as Jung intended. For that, the
analysis by a Jungian analyst is required, and even then, problems can arise by way of the
analyst’s influence. Type-testing questionnaires cannot consider the extent to which the
individual has been influenced by family or circumstance, and certainly cannot find out if
the individual is answering the questions, not from true type, but from the persona, shadow
or auxiliary functions. Nonetheless, the plethora of websites devoted to type-testing
certainly reinforces the great deal of interest that Jung’s typology has ignited, even
inspiring new personality tests such as the Enneagram and Socionics. However, with
respect to secondary literature available, the following were of particular value.

Much more specific to Jung’s typology of the personality is the compact lectures by
first-generation Jungian, Marie-Louise von Franz and third-generation Jungian, James
Hillman, entitled *Lectures on Jung’s Typology (Seminar S.*) published by Spring
Publications, U.S., in 1971. This text, which takes lecture format, documents the
personality types outlined by Jung in a faithful way, relating in detail, albeit in a rather
oversimplified way, the two attitudes – extravert and introvert – each containing four
functions, thinking, feeling sensation and intuition, to make up the eight personality types.
The lectures are in depth, detailing examples of type behaviour and how to recognise one’s
type. It is probably the most detailed yet accurate text about Jung’s personality types.

Anthony Storr’s *Jung*, published by Fontana/Collins in 1982 offers an introduction
to Jung’s most acclaimed theories, primarily describing Jungian ideas including archetypes,
psychological types, individuation and the Self, as well as brief biographical information on
the man himself and his early employment. Storr also refers to some of Jung’s influences
and offers some comparisons, especially with Freud. However, this work serves as a useful
introduction to Jungian ideas in a simplified format that is relatively accurate and
seemingly unbiased. It encompasses most of Jung’s ideas besides those concerning the
supernatural and occult. It portrays Jung’s personality types and archetypes faithfully,
without focusing on them particularly, but is succinct and does refer the reader to the
original, thus serving the purpose of giving information faithfully yet in a condensed
fashion.

Daryl Sharp’s *Personality Types: Jung’s Model of Typology*, published by Inner
City Books, December 1987 is a sincere attempt to clearly explain and give examples of
Jung’s eight typological types. It is a small work, which nonetheless goes into much
explanation about the typology, whilst staying faithful to Jung’s theory, and expounding the
various aspects and types within the typology in detail. For further practical understanding
of the types in society, it also includes an appendix entitled ‘A Dinner Party with the Types’, which is a light-hearted attempt to depict the types’ qualities and interactive relations with other types.

*Jung in Contexts: A Reader*, edited by Paul Bishop and published by Routledge in 1999, is a collection of essays by Jungian experts, which seek to place Jung’s life and works in their historical, literary and intellectual contexts. It is biographical and analytical, describing the man and theories as well as tracing the thought which influenced him, and serves as a useful introduction to Jung’s ideas and their basis.

Now that the secondary literature about each of the individual thinkers has been addressed, literature which deals which two of the three writers will now be examined. The Schiller - Nietzsche relationship is one that has been seldom explicitly recognised. Nicholas Martin’s *Nietzsche and Schiller: Untimely Aesthetics*, published by Clarendon Press in 1995, was the first modern text explicitly to link Schiller with Nietzsche, a comparison based upon aesthetics, tracing Nietzsche’s reliance on Schillerian aesthetic ideals through his earlier works. He marks such similarities between *Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen* and *Die Geburt der Tragödie* as both written because of cultural crises and with the motive of helping to solve problems in society. He also describes Nietzsche’s attitude to, and image of Schiller throughout his writing.

Paul Bishop and R. H. Stephenson’s *Friedrich Nietzsche and Weimar Classicism*, published by Camden House in 2005, does not explicitly link Nietzschean typology with Schillerian typology, but traces the relationship between Nietzsche and Weimar Classicism, the latter of which Schiller lay at the forefront. This comparison was drawn upon in their ‘Nietzsche and Weimar Aesthetics’ article published in *German Life and Letters* 52:4 from October 1999, paying particular heed to the implications of Nietzschean theories being indebted to the aesthetic theory of predecessors such as Schiller. Schillerian ideas are linked to Nietzsche’s *Die Geburt der Tragödie*, explicitly referencing the correspondence between Nietzsche’s typological distinction between the Apollonian and Dionysian with Schiller’s two typological drives, the *Formtrieb* and *Stofftrieb*. Additionally, they explicitly acknowledge that Nietzsche’s Apollonian type was heavily influenced by Schiller’s notion of *Schein*. They go on to make allusion to Weimar Classicism and Nietzsche’s *Also sprach Zarathustra*, highlighting that Schillerian aesthetic ideals lie at the heart of the work.

The idea of aesthetics lies at the core of Bishop’s, ‘Das Naive und das Sentimentalische in der Weimarer Ästhetik und in dem Persönlichkeitsbegriff der
Analytischen Psychologie’, (from *Studia Neophilologica*, 71, 1999, 62-71), which is one of the rare pieces to compare Jung and Schiller. Despite Jung’s repeated mentioning of Schillerian theory throughout his life’s works, few secondary texts have made an explicit inquiry into their comparisons, although various texts made brief reference to them. Bishop emphasises this point in this article, outlining the four authors who compare the two theorists, albeit not explicitly in their line of questioning. With particular reference to the mention of Schiller in Jung’s *Psychologische Typen*, Bishop examines Schiller’s naïve and sentimental, and tries to interpret Jung’s psychology as an aesthetic project, paying most attention to Jung’s reception of Schiller, not just in *Psychologische Typen*, but in various works.

As there is currently very little explicit comparison from secondary texts, it is of more value to analyse Jung’s own discussions of Schiller. Thus it is appropriate to address those texts available comparing Nietzsche and Jung - a comparison that has sparked an upsurge of interest recently, despite having gone long unnoticed.

There are a handful of texts which I have found most useful and accurate in their comparisons of Nietzsche and Jung. These are: Paul Bishop’s *The Dionysian Self: C. G. Jung’s Reception of Friedrich Nietzsche*, published by Walter de Gruyter in 1995; Patricia Dixon’s *Nietzsche and Jung: Sailing a Deeper Night*, published by Peter Lang in 1999; Lucy Huskinson’s *Nietzsche and Jung: The Whole Self in the Union of Opposites*, published by Taylor and Francis in 2005; and Graham Parkes’ *Nietzsche and Jung – Ambivalent Appreciation*, taken from *Nietzsche and Depth Psychology* edited by Golomb, Santaniello and Lehrer, and published by the State University of New York Press in 1999. These, together with a couple of other texts and some articles, make up the best available comparisons between Nietzsche and Jung.

Paul Bishop’s *The Dionysian Self: C. G. Jung’s Reception of Friedrich Nietzsche* was one of the first texts to deal with the comparison between Nietzsche and Jung’s theories, using the vantage point of Jung’s writing to document how Jung received Nietzsche and displaying the striking similarities between the two, which he states had been little acknowledged hitherto. It is a very detailed account following the reception of Nietzsche chronologically throughout Jung’s works. It lays the foundation for the work on Nietzsche and Jung which follow it and accurately summarizes that which preceded it. Bishop documents the various changes and opinions that Jung professes about Nietzsche throughout his works and states that it was a theory based upon Nietzschean thought which
brought about the Jung - Freud split. He cites examples to display the Nietzschean origins in Jungian work such as: Nietzsche inspired the Jungian archetypes ‘the wise old man’ and the ‘anima’; the Jungian libido bears resemblance to Nietzsche’s Will to Power. More importantly, he explicitly acknowledges the typological similarities between Nietzsche and Jung, drawing attention to the influence of Apollo and Dionysus in Jung’s own psychological types. Bishop chronicles through Jung’s initial comparisons of Nietzsche’s types with his own extraverted/introverted types to their ultimate influence on his irrational functions, sensation and intuition. Bishop even includes Schiller’s types in this tradition of thought, chronicling the extent and use of their types on Jungian thought.

In Anthony Storr’s, *Nietzsche and Jung* published by Univ. Coll. in Swansea, November 1995, he addresses the comparisons between the Übermensch and Self, taking the opinion that Jung had been strongly influenced by Nietzsche, and addresses their similar need for some kind of religious substitute, that could not be filled with science. Additionally, in the introduction to *The Essential Jung: Selected Works*, (published in London by Fontana Press in 1998) which he edited, he also compares and contrasts Jung with Nietzsche as well as Schopenhauer, and points out that Jung was influenced by Nietzsche, although separates their similarities with their varying beliefs about God, and neglects to recognise the affinity between their theories or types.

Graham Parkes’ *Nietzsche and Jung – Ambivalent Appreciation* addresses the issue of the ambivalent attitude Jung has concerning Nietzsche. Parkes mainly explains this simply in Nietzsche having been misread by Jung, which led to the often scathing remarks chronicled by Jung about Nietzsche. He does briefly mention the possibility that Jung’s fear of having too much in common with Nietzsche, and accuses Jung of listening to the gossip told at Basel University about him, rather than biographical evidence. The chapter is well-written and analysed, quoting in length from their original texts with particular emphasis being laid upon Jung’s lectures about Nietzsche’s *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*.

Patricia Dixon’s *Nietzsche and Jung: Sailing a Deeper Night*, deals with the close ties between Nietzsche and Jung, and puts significant value on the similarity between the two authors mainly resting in their quests for wholeness. Dixon also follows other similarities including: synthesis of opposites; archetypal figures; and disunity of the personality causing a sickness in Western Man – whilst nonetheless still drawing attention to the other influences upon their theories. Also, in criticism it often seems as though she
seeks to argue that their parallels go further than they actually do, not acknowledging where the similarities cease.

Christopher Hauke’s *Jung and the Postmodern: The Interpretation of Realities*, published by Routledge in 2000, argues for the continuing relevance of Jungian theories, and draws the parallels with Nietzsche. He specifically analyses three areas of similarity between Jung and Nietzsche: namely the ego; how Jung uses Nietzschean theories in his own ideas; and how the Übermensch and the individuation process share the similar thread of being a solution to problems of modernity.

With a similar line of inquiry to Dixon, Lucy Huskinson’s *Nietzsche and Jung: The Whole Self in the Union of Opposites*, also follows the similar thread between Nietzschean and Jungian thought regarding wholeness. Huskinson lays particular emphasis on the union of opposing types both Nietzsche and Jung require in order to become whole. It shows their overt links but also recognises where they differ and end. Huskinson fully analyses each argument, quoting from original works and also acting as a good summary of the most noted Nietzsche-Jung comparisons previously written. She goes one step further than previous writers by using each of Nietzsche and Jung’s models to evaluate the other. Huskinson’s main purpose in her assessment of their similarities is to reach an ultimate conclusion about the two writers’ syntheses of opposites, which she sees manifest in the Nietzschean Übermensch and Jungian Self respectively. Of particular value was her assessment of the Nietzschean Apollonian and Dionysian union, noting the importance of this synthesis to Nietzschean thought. However, Huskinson fails to grasp the creation of Nietzsche’s new Dionysus, which emerged from *Die Geburt der Tragödie*. She also fails to link the importance of the concept of Nietzschean types to Jung’s psychological types and makes no mention of the influence Schillerian ideas had on Nietzsche and Jung.

The aforementioned texts do not begin to cover the wealth of literature available concerning Schiller, Nietzsche and Jung. However, I chose only to mention both primary and secondary texts relevant to my theme, highlighting those areas which analysed or criticised the comparative relationship between these three theorists. Additionally, having looked at some of the secondary literature available, it came to light that the most recent secondary texts often accurately summarised all that had been previously said, before offering their fresh perspectives, meaning that there was little reason to evaluate older secondary literature.
2. TYPOLOGY

2.1 CONCEPT OF TYPOLOGY

In order to make an historical and comparative study into the concept of typology in Schiller, Nietzsche and Jung, it would be prudent to address and define the notion of typology. Typology refers to a systematic classification into types according to specific attributes that are commonly exclusive and collectively exhaustive. These groupings are created to indicate common characteristics within their type. Within the realm of psychological types, led by Jung, and as is also the case with Schiller and Nietzsche, the term typology specifically refers to the view, spread throughout history, that the human personality can be divided into groups based upon psychological functions, developed in the endeavour to better understand human psychology generally, born out of the knowledge that people function in different ways.

2.2 HISTORY OF TYPOLOGY

From the earliest times humankind has classified individuals into types in order to explain human differences and behaviour. The historical and continuing relevance of typology is evident in literature, mythology and philosophy. Even today, often ancient typological distinctions from various fields are still in common use.

The Greek philosopher Empedocles imposed order on natural phenomena by dividing them into the four elements of earth, water, air and fire. One of the oldest systems of typology, which still survives today is that devised by astrology, whereby human characters are classified generically into four trigons, using Empedocles’ four elements, subdivided into twelve specific signs of the zodiac. For example: the water trigon is made up of the three zodiac signs Pisces, Cancer and Scorpio; the air trigon consists of the three aerial signs Aquarius, Gemini and Libra; the earth signs Capricorn, Taurus and Virgo; whilst the fire signs of the zodiac consist of the three signs Aries, Leo and Sagittarius. This ancient view explains type differences in temperament and categorises people by their time of birth. It assumes that individuals born under each trigon and their more specific signs,
will be distinguished by their watery, aerial, earthy or fiery nature, as well as having a corresponding disposition and destiny with further similarities between those with a shared sign. Also still in common use is the Chinese zodiac, which similarly divides people into type, based upon the year of their birth. There are twelve animals of the Chinese zodiac which rotate – being born in a specific year is said to give one the characteristics of the animal, which that year represents.

Even the field of medicine made type distinctions in people. It was ancient physicians, who first tried to find some sort of system of order, so developed type differences to divide mankind into. Galen is probably the most notable, as his ancient typology’s vocabulary is still in use today. Galen’s physiological typology of Greek medicine typified individuals by bodily secretions into melancholic, phlegmatic, sanguine, and choleric types. Although these types have long since been discarded in medical terms, the types have nonetheless survived and developed their linguistic meanings.

Another ancient system of medicine, which is still in use today, is Ayurvedic medicine, which divides not only people, but also health into three types. It is roughly translated as Knowledge of Life. Although Eastern, presumably Indian in origin, it has recently been enjoying increasing popularity in the West. The three types of the Tridosha system, which are central to Ayurvedic medicine are: Vata, which is the impulse principle necessary to mobilise the function of the nervous system; Pitta, which is the energy principle that uses bile to direct digestion and therefore the metabolism into the nervous system; and finally Kapha, which refers to the bodily fluid principle related to mucus and lubrication, and is the carrier of nutrients into the arterial system. These three elements are crucial to good health. The Ayurvedic system also categorises people using these names. Each type describes a person’s physical being, personality, mental attitude, tendency to illness and favoured diet, with the Pitta type being athletic, Vata type prone to hyperactivity, and the Kapha thick-set in build.

Similar typological distinctions can be noted consistently throughout history in the fields of literature, mythology, aesthetics, philosophy and psychology. As will now be examined, in each of their typological works, Schiller, Nietzsche and Jung followed this tradition of by employing types, as a way of explaining individual differences. They also recognised that they were not the first to attempt such a division of people into types as they individually made reference to typological distinctions developed before their own time.
3. SCHILLER’S TYPOLOGY

3.1. INTRODUCTION TO SCHILLER’S TYPOLOGICAL WORKS

Friedrich Schiller (1759-1805) has a prominence in German literature which requires little introduction. However, his creative works lie at the forefront of his renown. Although revered as a philosopher, this stance is secondary to his artistic one. 1795 marked the year of his two most important philosophical texts *Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen* and *Über naïve und sentimentalische Dichtung*. Schiller himself believed the philosopher was inferior to the poet.

However, he was unable to deny his reflective and philosophical nature, which he found was a hindrance to his creative vision so he devised a typology in *Über naïve und sentimentalische Dichtung*, written 1795/6, to deal with the problem, as a means of restoring his creativity. This text is also central to Schiller’s typologies as it explores the contrasts between two different types: the naïve; and the sentimental, elaborating from this the psychological pairing of realist and idealist. As with *Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen*, Schiller’s thoughts focus on the question of the overcoming potential of art. He argues that poets have two ways of relating to nature: man either relates to nature; or nature relates to man.

*Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen* was, in part, Schiller’s reaction to the events which surrounded the French Revolution, where rationality had been replaced by barbaric behaviour. Schiller’s response is to draw up a typology of modernity, which suggests an education for humanity through art which holds balance as the key to overcome such weaknesses as overt violence. He also draws comparison between an individual’s possibility for wholeness against that possible in ancient Greece, which he holds up as a kind of ideal. Schiller’s pivotal philosophical text *Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen*, 1795, elucidates his typology of human nature and theories on the aesthetic education of man, in the form of twenty-seven letters. Here Schiller states that the aesthetic is vital to the harmony of humankind and society. He discusses the individual’s freedom and how education holds the key to this freedom by means of experiencing beauty. Aesthetic experience can help man
bring together the inner conflict between sense and intellect, nature and reason. The book was a result of his personal disenchantment with the French Revolution’s degeneration into violence, not delivering the promised humanity, combined with developing Kant’s ideas of aesthetics further. This work is used as a basis for reflecting on such philosophical concepts as morality, anthropology and history, and depicts one of Schiller’s most notable theories, namely, the classification of three drives of the human - *Stofftrieb*, *Formtrieb* and *Spieltrieb*. With the purpose of these letters resembling a guide as to how such atrocities in the French Revolution may be avoided, he describes his *Spieltrieb* as the ultimate answer, resulting from the reciprocal coordination of the two other drives, it holds the key to completeness in the individual.

3.2. TYPOLOGY IN *ÜBER DIE ÄSTHETISCHE ERZIEHUNG DES MENSCHEN*

As aforementioned, *Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen* was Schiller’s response to the terrible crisis of events in France surrounding the Revolution, which caused not just violence against the ancient régime, but also internal violence. In letters one to nine he sketches this savage barbarism in society, laying down art as the only answer. Integral to Schiller’s answer is for humanity to find a balance in opposing elements, so as to understand the nature of beauty as well as to help create a better society to live in. For Schiller Art is the only way to assist in the quest for humane balance, what he thought was needed in the unstable European political climate of the 1790s, and Art should be the way to prevent the recurrence of such misdeeds. Art was the single means, which could be free from undeveloped humanity and its society. The best examples of Art could merge substance and form, consequently being able to balance and join together one’s sense and spirit.

From letters ten to eighteen, Schiller names the forces at work in and on the individual, leading up to finding a harmony for the conflict between these forces. In the *Elfter Brief* Schiller distinguished two types in an individual’s composition, namely the *Person* and *Zustand*. 


(AB, Elfster Brief, p.341, SW20)

From this he developed two corresponding drives in the Zwölfter Brief: the sensuous drive or Stofftrieb; and a formal drive Formtrieb. The Stofftrieb is more primitive and animalistic, being concerned with sense perception, and emotions, which are aroused by desire for physical wants. It needs external stimulation from objects to be brought into being. For example, the human requires something to smell, touch, see, hear or taste. This object could be generally described as Leben. ‘Der Gegenstand des sinnlichen Triebes, in einem allgemeinen Begriff ausgedrückt, heisst Leben in weitester Bedeutung; ein Begriff, der alles materiale Sein und alle unmittelbare Gegenwart in den Sinnen bedeutet’ (Schiller, Fünfzehnter Brief, par. 2, SW20). An individual, if under the exclusive power of the Stofftrieb, would be unable to control their life; instead they would be at the mercy of changeable circumstances, driving them to act on sense experiences. The Stofftrieb was thus explained by Schiller:

Der erste dieser Triebe, den ich den sinnlichen nennen will, geht aus von dem physischen Dasein des Menschens oder von seiner sinnlichen Natur und ist beschäftigt, ihn in die Schranken der Zeit zu setzen und zur Materie zu machen: nicht ihm Materie zu geben, weil dazu schon eine freie Tätigkeit der Person gehört, welche die Materie aufnimmt und von Sich, dem Beharrlichen, unterscheidet. Materie aber heisst hier nichts als Veränderung oder Realität, die die Zeit erfüllt; mithin fordert dieser Trieb, dass Veränderung sei, dass sie Zeit einen Inhalt habe. Dieser Zustand der bloss erfüllten Zeit heisst Empfindung, und er ist es allein, durch den sich das physische Dasein verkündigt.

(AB, Zwölfter Brief, p.344, SW20)

On the other hand the Formtrieb is concerned with the subjective. Reason, justice, truth and duty all reside in the Formtrieb. ‘It preserves our identity through the changing conditions of the world around us.’ Its object is Gestalt. ‘Der Gegenstand des Formtriebes, in einem allgemeinen Begriff ausgedrückt, heisst Gestalt, sowohl in uneigentlicher als in eigentlicher Bedeutung; ein Begriff, der all formalen Beschaffenheiten der Dinge und alle Beziehungen

derselben auf die Denkkräfte unter sich fasst’ (*AB, Fünfzehnter Brief*, p.355, *SW20*).

Schiller describes it as such:

> Der zweite jener Triebe, den man den Formtrieb nennen kann, geht aus von dem absoluten Dasein des Menschen oder von seiner vernünftigen Natur und ist bestrebt, ihn in Freiheit zu setzen, Harmonie in die Verschiedenheit seines Erscheinens zu bringen und bei allem Wechsel des Zustands seine Person zu behaupten. Da nun die letztere als absolute und unteilbare Einheit mit sich selbst nie im Widerspruch sein kann, da wir in alle Ewigkeit wir sind, so kann derjenige Trieb, der auf Behauptung der Persönlichkeit dringt, nie etwas anders fordern, als was er in alle Ewigkeit fordern muss; er entscheidet also für immer wie er für jetzt entscheidet, und gebietet für jetzt was er für immer gebietet. Er umfasst mithin die ganze Folge der Zeit, das ist soviel als: er hebt die Zeit, er hebt die Veränderung auf; er will, dass das Wirkliche notwendig und ewig, und dass das Ewige und Notwendige wirklich sei; mit anderen Worten: er dringt auf Wahrheit und auf Recht.

 (*AB, Zwölfter Brief*, p.345, *SW20*)

These two drives are inseparable outside the realms of theory; instead they are personally experienced, and simultaneous experience of this duo is the ideal with resulting powerful assimilating potential.

> Gäbe es aber Fälle, wo er diese doppelte Erfahrung zugleich machte, wo er sich zugleich seiner Freiheit bewusst würde und sein Dasein empfände, wo er sich zugleich als Materie fühlte und als Geist kennen lernte, so hätte er in diesen Fällen, und schlechterdings nur in diesen, eine vollständige Anschauung seiner Menschheit, und der Gegenstand, der diese Anschauung ihm verschaffte, würde ihm zu einem Symbol seiner ausgeführten Bestimmung, folglich (weil diese nur in der Allheit der Zeit zu erreichen ist) zu einer Darstellung des Unendlichen dienen.

 (*AB, Vierzehnter Brief*, p.353, *SW20*)

Such assimilation seems impossible as the types give the impression that they are irreconcilable, and their tendencies are in conflict. However, as the object of the *Stofftrieb* is *Leben*, and the object of the *Formtrieb* is *Gestalt*, there can be no conflict where they do not make contact. Schiller notes: ‘Wahr ist es, ihre Tendenzen widersprechen sich, aber, was wohl zu bemerken ist, nicht in denselben Objekten, und was nicht aufeinander trifft, kann nicht gegeneinander stossen’ (*AB, Dreyzehnter Brief*, p.347, *SW20*). Nonetheless an individual would be unbalanced if one drive were over-developed to the detriment of the other. The answer lies in the harmonising of the two drives, which would fuse into a higher synthesis to make the third drive - the play drive or *Spieltrieb*. 
(Sie) würden ... einen neuen Trieb in ihn aufwecken, der eben darum, weil die beiden andern in ihm zusammenwirken, einem jeden derselben, einzeln betrachtet, entgegengesetzt sein und mit Recht für einen neuen Trieb gelten würde. Der sinnliche Trieb will, dass Veränderung sei, dass die Zeit einen Inhalt habe; der Formtrieb will, dass die Zeit aufgehoben, dass keine Veränderung sei. Derjenige Trieb also, in welchem beide verbunden wirken (es sei mir einstweilen, bis ich diese Benennung gerechtfertigt haben werde, vergönnt, ihn Spieltrieb zu nennen), der Spieltrieb also würde dahin gerichtet sein, die Zeit in der Zeit aufzuheben, Werden mit absolutem Sein, Veränderung mit Identität zu vereinbaren.

(Schiller describes the potential of the Spieltrieb thus:

Der Spieltrieb also, in welchem beide vereinigt wirken, wird zugleich unsre formale und unsre materiale Beschaffenheit, zugleich unsre Vollkommenheit und unsre Glückseligkeit zufällig machen; er wird also, eben weil er beide zufällig macht, und weil mit der Notwendigkeit auch die Zufälligkeit verschwindet, die Zufälligkeit in beiden wieder aufheben, mithin Form in die Materie und Realität in die Form bringen. In demselben Masse, als er den Empfindungen und Affekten ihren dynamischen Einfluss nimmt, wird er sie mit Ideen der Vernunft in Übereinstimmung bringen, und in demselben Masse, als er den Gesetzen der Vernunft ihre moralische Nötigung benimmt, wird er sie mit dem Interesse der Sinne versöhnen.

For Schiller, play is the key to finding equilibrium in an individual. It is akin to wholeness; it is done at one’s own desire, and makes an individual free, bringing together the opposites of mind and body. ‘Spiel..ist (es), was ihn vollständig macht und seine doppelte Natur auf einmal entfaltet’ (AB, Fünfzehnter Brief, par. 7, SW20). In the Fünfzehnter Brief, Schiller’s theory about the drives reaches its ultimate fruition as he notes that play and beauty are one and the same.

Der Gegenstand des Spieltriebes, in einem allgemeinen Schema vorgestellt, wird also lebende Gestalt heissen können; ein Begriff, der allen ästhetischen Beschaffenheiten der Erscheinungen und mit einem Worte dem, was man in weitester Bedeutung Schönheit nennt, zur Bezeichnung dient.

Play is Schiller’s key for an individual to transcend mind and body, and become free. Only through harmony can an individual be complete and able to play, yet it is play that makes a human human. ‘der Mensch spielt nur, wo er in voller Bedeutung des Worts
Mensch ist, und er ist nur da ganz Mensch, wo er spielt’. (AB, Fünfzehnter Brief, par. 9, SW20) The ultimate purpose of the Spieltrieb is to merge Leben and Gestalt, which would then bring into being lebende Gestalt. Ultimately, in order to find a balance, Schiller seeks the reconciliation of Stofftrieb and Formtrieb, which brings a third drive into existence, which has the power to transcend the previous two, and make an individual whole and free.

Finally, in this typology of modernity, this meant to create an ideal way of being, with the aesthetic state being the natural object of the play drive. To transcend such brutality and barbarism requires ‘die Freude am Schein, die Neigung zum Putz und zum Spiele’ (AB, Sechzehnter Brief, par. 3, SW20). Beginning with the individual, if harmony can be found, so that play may be brought into the equation, one will first improve oneself which can lead to improving society as a whole.

3.3. THE TYPOLOGY IN ÜBER NAÏVE UND SENTIMENTALISCHE DICHTUNG

Über naïve und sentimentalische Dichtung was Schiller’s last major philosophical essay, which elucidated two modes of being, the naïv and the sentimentalisch from which he elaborated the typological distinction of the psychological pairing Realist and Idealist. Typical of the time, Schiller contributes to the discussion about the advantages of ancient Greeks, namely their ability to be at one with nature, in contrast to modern people. Schiller’s ambition was to regain such a harmony whilst simultaneously not losing modern sensibilities, another fusion of opposites in the aim to create a better person. The essay focuses around the theme as to why there are two different modes of perceiving the world or two fundamentally different human personality types.

Über naïve und sentimentalische Dichtung expounds two different types of poet: the naïv; and the sentimentalisch. This then acts as a springboard for developing the types of poets to categorise of mankind in general. The naïv is explained first. Schiller observes that children relate to the world in a different way to adults; that is to say that they are innocent, trusting and naïve. Children accept the world exactly as it appears to be; they are at one with nature. Schiller details the importance of nature from the beginning of the work.

(NS, p. 414, SW20)

For the naïve type, the relationship between the individual and the object, external world or nature is all important.

Wir schreiben einem Menschen eine naive Gesinnung zu, wenn er in seinen Urtheilen von den Dingen ihre gekünstelten und gesuchten Verhältniße übersieht und sich bloß an die einfache Natur hält. Alles was innerhalb der gesunden Natur davon geurteilt werden kann, fordern wir von ihm, und erlassen ihm schlechterdings nur das, was eine Entfernung von der Natur, es sey nun im Denken oder im Empfinden, wenigstens Bekanntschaft derselben voraussetzt.

(NS, p. 422, SW20)


(NS, p. 423, SW20)

However, as children grow into adults they follow the rules governing society, and start to live according to these rules, instead of by nature. This change into a reflective type, Schiller names sentimentalisch. The sentimentalisch type is more concerned with the subjective. The naïv type believes that the world is exactly the way that they perceive it to be; in contrast, the sentimentalisch type filters their perceptions, being unable to accept the external world for what it is, relating everything to an ideal picture they have of it in their head. Schiller particularly recognised these types in the poet.

Alle Dichter, die es wirklich sind, werden, je nachdem die Zeit beschaffen ist, in der sie blühen, oder zufällige Umstände auf ihre allgemeine Bildung und auf ihre vorübergehende Gemüthsstimmung Einfluß haben, entweder zu den naiven oder zu den sentimentalischen gehören.

(NS, p. 433, SW20)

(NS, p. 437, SW20)

Schiller described the *naïv* poet thus:

Da der naive Dichter bloß der einfachen Natur und Empfindung folgt, und sich bloß auf Nachahmung der Wirklichkeit beschränkt, so kann er zu seinem Gegenstand auch nur ein einziges Verhältniß haben, und es giebt, in dieser Rücksicht, für ihn keine Wahl der Behandlung.

(NS, p. 441, SW20)

He recognised himself as a *sentimentalisch* type, a characteristic of this type being the need to constantly reflect back upon their work:


(NS, p. 442, SW20)

This type’s writing was produced with great conscious thought and effort, as he was cut off from nature. In contrast Schiller described *naïv* poets as those who could be creative spontaneously.

Schiller names Goethe, Shakespeare and Homer as *naïv* types, as they were able to transcribe onto paper as if an inner voice were simply telling them what to write, almost in an unconscious way.

They were at one with their works, unlike the *sentimentalisch* type, who creates, detached from themselves.

Schiller then progresses to use the basis of these specific poetic types generally into two different human personality types, which he then referred to as the Realist and the Idealist. Schiller recognised that there was no pure type, either one way or the other, but that individuals had specific leanings either towards being a Realist or an Idealist. These two types represent two different modes of perceiving the world; two different value systems; two personality types. As with the *naïv* type, the Realist perceives the world from the way these objective elements present themselves. This type takes nature as it is, and therefore, the knowledge, morals, values etc of this type are based upon observation and experience of things in the world. A disadvantage is that this type may allow their life to be controlled by circumstance, knowing only what their sensations have shown them.
Und gerade so zeigt sich der Realist, sowohl in seinem Wissen als in seinem Thun. Auf alles, was bedingungsweise existirt, erstreckt sich der Kreis seines Wissens und Wirkens, aber nie bringt er es auch weiter als zu bedingten Erkenntnissen, und die Regeln, die er sich aus einzelnen Erfahrungen bildet, gelten, in ihrer ganzen Strenge genommen, auch nur Einmal; erhebt er die Regel des Augenblicks zu einem allgemeinen Gesetz, so wird er sich unausbleiblich in Irrthum stürzen. Will daher der Realist in seinem Wissen zu etwas unbedingtem gelangen, so muß er es auf dem nehmlichen Wege versuchen, auf dem die Natur ein unendliches wird, nehmlich auf dem Wege des Ganzen und in dem All der Erfahrung. Da aber die Summe der Erfahrung nie völlig abgeschlossen wird, so ist eine comparative Allgemeinheit das höchste, was der Realist in seinem Wissen erreicht. Auf die Wiederkehr ähnlicher Fälle baut er seine Einsicht, und wird daher richtig urteilen in allem, was in der Ordnung ist; in allem hingegen, was zum erstenmal sich darstellt, kehrt seine Weißheit zu ihrem Anfang zurück. Was von dem Wissen des Realisten gilt, das gilt auch von seinem (moralischen) Handeln. Sein Charakter hat Moralität, aber diese liegt, ihrem reinen Begriffe nach, in keiner einzelnen That, nur in der ganzen Summe seines Lebens.

(NS, p. 494-495, SW20)

In contrast the Idealist, the sentimentalisch type, is much more reflective and speculative, and in extreme may be prone to withdraw so much into the subjective, that they cut themselves off from nature. When not taken to extremes, the Idealist can value in people their potential, rather than what they are. This type does not accept anything to be as they perceive it: everything instead can be what its potential suggests it might be. Freedom is the ultimate goal for this type that is grounded in reason.

Ganz anders verhält es sich mit dem Idealisten, der aus sich selbst und aus der blossen Vernunft seine Erkenntnisse und Motive nimmt. Wenn die Natur in ihren einzelnen Wirkungen immer abhängig und beschränkt erscheint, so legt die Vernunft den Charakter der Selbstständigkeit und Vollendung gleich in jede einzelne Handlung. Aus sich selbst schöpft sie alles, und auf sich selbst bezieht sie alles. Was durch sie geschieht, geschieht nur um ihrentwillen; eine absolute Größe ist jeder Begriff, den sie aufstellt, und jeder Entschluß, den sie bestimmt. Und eben so zeigt sich auch der Idealist, soweit er diesen Nahmen mit Recht führt, in seinem Wissen, wie in seinem Thun. Nicht mit Erkenntnissen zufrieden, die bloß unter bestimmten Voraussetzungen gültig sind, sucht er biß zu Wahrheiten zu dringen, die nichts mehr voraussetzen und die Voraussetzung von allem andern sind. Ihn befriedigt nur die philosophische Einsicht, welche alles bedingte Wissen auf ein unbedingetes zurückführt, und an dem Nothwendigen in dem menschlichen Geist alle Erfahrung befestigt; die Dinge, denen der Realist sein Denken unterwirft, muß er Sich, seinem Denkvermögen unterwerfen. Und er verfährt hierinn mit völliger Befugniß, denn wenn die Gesetze des menschlichen Geistes nicht auch zugleich die Weltgesetze wären, wenn die Vernunft endlich selbst unter der Erfahrung stünde, so würde auch keine Erfahrung möglich seyn.

(NS, p. 495-496, SW20)
Ultimately Schiller’s two types can be thus explained: the one bases opinions on sensation; the other upon reason. Each alone does not account for what it is to be human and have human balance. The ideal is again a synthesis of the two extremes, so that they could be brought nearer their opposing type, which would allow the individual to transcend their one-sidedness, finding a balance, where they could each find stimulation in the other.

3.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS TO SCHILLER’S TYPES

Typology and the union of opposing types was a crucial theme in Schiller’s two major philosophical treatises as a means to find a new and better way of being - to find human balance. In Über naïve und sentimentalische Dichtung Schiller wanted to find an answer to the problem of restoring man’s creativity despite his reflective nature. The paradox was answered with his typology of the naïv and sentimentalisch, which elucidated two modes of cultural production, from which he elaborated the typological distinction of the psychological pairing realist and idealist. Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen dealt with the problem of yearning for wholeness and depicts his typology of human nature, which classified three drives of human: Formtrieb; Stofftrieb; and Spieltrieb.
4. NIETZSCHE AND TYPOLOGY

4.1. THE TYPOLOGICAL WORKS

Friedrich Nietzsche, (1844–1900), is more widely recognised than Schiller for his philosophical, even recently, psychological contributions. Nietzsche was just twenty-seven years old and working as a professor of classical philology at the University of Basel, when his first book, Die Geburt der Tragödie, was published in 1872. This work concerns itself with the birth and death of Greek tragedy, born from the union of two elements, Apollo and Dionysus. Influenced by Kant and more particularly, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche uses this text to perpetuate the opinion that the world can be divided into the world we live in, which is a world of appearances; and a hidden, timeless world. He particularly alludes to Schopenhauer’s principium individuationis, which was the term Schopenhauer employed in reference to the phenomenal world of appearance. Nietzsche likens these two worlds to the types Apollonian and Dionysian, originating from the names of two Greek deities. He is inspired by these terms, which, in the birth and death of Greek tragedy, are born from the marrying of these two unconscious and diametrically opposed elements, Apollo and Dionysus. This text lays out the contrast between the Apollonian and the Dionysian opposing impulses, which are representative not just of gods but of two fundamentally different types of drives. Nietzsche considered tragedy to be the highest form of art, because of its ability to integrate the opposing principles of Apollo and Dionysus, creating a union in the tragedy, for the artist and the audience.

Contrary to popular opinion of the time, in which the Greeks were portrayed as moderate, rational people who were mostly idealised to exclude flaws, Nietzsche felt it necessary to draw attention to both sides of the Greek spirit in this work, particularly emphasising the often ignored importance of the dark and underground elements of ancient Greece, manifested in the Dionysian, which had hitherto been largely ignored. It depicts Greek society, taking particular concern with the shadowy Dionysus. Thus, it surprised its readers with its criticism of Socratic society, and rhapsodies about dark, Dionysian undercurrents, as Nietzsche promoted the need for an element of Dionysian tragedy for modern society. Frequently misread, Nietzsche did not over-emphasise the irrational in
ancient Greece, instead merely sought to correct the previously one-sided, rational portrayal. Unfortunately, this work was rejected by the academic community as an unscholarly, untrue and slightly mad work, which blighted Nietzsche’s blossoming career, sparking attacks on the work and Nietzsche’s capabilities, so that his professional standing fell into disrepute. The views depicted in this work were unorthodox and unexpected by his peers in being so critical of post-Socratic Greek society. Nietzsche became ostracised by his fellow professors: they even went so far as to advise students not to attend Nietzsche’s classes. In a letter to Richard Wagner in November 1872, Nietzsche expressed his perifidy.

It was Nietzsche’s dissatisfaction with modern society, and his belief in the power of the Greek tragedy, which led him to invoke the ancient Greeks, most particularly pre-Socrates. A central theme involves the shift in Greek society pre- and post- Socrates, highlighting the change in the West to come under the influence of Socratic rationalism – a state Nietzsche strongly associates with a surplus of the sober Apollonian, at the cost of the Dionysian, taking man away from nature. Nietzsche scorns the then prevalent ideal of

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Socratic rationalism with its focus on the theoretical and blames Socrates for the change away from the Apollonian/Dionysian union. ‘In Sokrates (sieht man) den einen Wendepunkt und Wirbel der sogennanten Weltgeschichte’ (GT, Ch15 p.96, KGW3I). *Die Geburt der Tragödie* served as Nietzsche’s canvas to develop the typology of Apollo and Dionysus, types to which he ascribed his own purposes, and which he used to create the union that was Nietzsche’s answer to the problems in society. From this book emerges Nietzsche’s typology of modernity – with his critique on the theoretical ideal, based on Socrates. To Nietzsche, true Greek culture was in the age before Socrates, when Greek tragedy held a balance of the Apollonian and Dionysian elements of dialogue and music together: an age when Aeschylus held great influence through his works.

*Also sprach Zarathustra* is perhaps Nietzsche’s most famous fictional work, in which his previous typology and philosophy reach fruition in the characterisation of this fictional work. Reminiscent of the opposite types, Apollo and Dionysus, Nietzsche here develops his theory on the union of opposing types. By means of the protagonist, the prophet Zarathustra, Nietzsche elucidates the dichotomy of the discovery of opposing pairs, such as: odd and even; above and below; and good and evil. Nietzsche’s idea of man becoming whole in the union of these opposites, which had origins in the *Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen* (1873-76) became fully developed in this work, manifested in the *Übermensch*. He also draws upon the ‘God is dead’ theory which gives the *Übermensch* his chance because only without God can Zarathustra’s body-oriented teachings be realised in the shape of the *Übermensch*.

4.2. THE DEITIES APOLLO AND DIONYSUS

In order to analyse the types Nietzsche created and their place in *Die Geburt der Tragödie*, it is first necessary to describe the bases of the types Apollonian and Dionysian. These types are derived from the Greek deities, Apollo and Dionysus. In Ancient Greece each deity had a set of identifiable functions and traits. In Greek mythology Apollo was the archer-god of healing, medicine, light and truth, but in literary terms has come to symbolise harmony, order and reason. He was the son of Zeus and Leto. Dionysus was also the son of Zeus but his mother was a mortal, Semele, although Zeus had to take the embryo from Semele’s dead body, and the embryo only survived until term sewn into his father’s thigh.
Thus he is often regarded as having two births. He is the mythological god of wine, music, nature and orgiastic worship, whose mission was to mingle the music of the flute, bringing an end to care and anxiety. In writing he often symbolises the opposite to his half-brother: disorder, ecstasy and intoxication. However, these types can be seen as merely ‘carry(ing) the Greek gods’ names as symbols’,\(^3\) as Nietzsche has twisted their original roles and meanings to fit his own ends, depicting the types in starker contrast than was actually the case.

4.3. NIETZSCHE’S APOLLONIAN AND DIONYSIAN TYPES

This work laid the foundations for Nietzsche’s later theories and was his greatest contribution to the realm of typology, in which he laid out various types based on the Greek gods Apollo and Dionysus. Nietzsche’s Apollonian and Dionysian impulses are based on the Greek deities. First Apollo, the God of light and reason: ‘Apollo, als der Gott aller bildnerischen Kräfte, ist zugleich der wahrsagende Gott. Er, der seiner Wurzel nach der “Scheinende”, die Lichtgottheit ist, beherrscht auch den schönen Schein der inneren Phantasie-Welt’. \((GT, \text{Ch1, p.23, } KGW3I)\) Then Dionysus, in seeming contrast, the God of wine: ‘Mit Blumen und Kränzen ist der Wagen des Dionysus überschüttet: unter seinem Joche schreiten Panther und Tiger’ \((GT, \text{Ch1, p.25, } KGW3I)\). Nietzsche, however, whilst combining elements of these deities’ acknowledged traits, adds further aspects to the terms, which are unsupported by historical descriptions of the Greek deities, after whom the types are named.

Furthermore, for Nietzsche, the functions of the Apollonian and Dionysian types are multifarious. As Patricia Dixon points out, ‘Nietzsche employs the terms “Apollonian” and “Dionysian” to designate not merely historical and mythical deities, but two archetypal and diametrically opposed impulses of art, man and life.’\(^4\) From the beginning, in the first chapter, the types are explained as having various roles. First of all they are representative of the Greek gods, Apollo and Dionysus, or more particularly, embodiments of art or Kunstgottheiten. As such these impulses represent two different kinds of art, which were


\(^4\) Patricia Dixon, *Nietzsche and Jung: Sailing a Deeper Night* (New York: Peter Lang, 1999), p.20
developed alongside but in opposition to one another: the Apollonian could be found in sculpture, epic poetry and Doric architecture, art forms in which clarity and form take precedence; conversely Dionysus is represented in lyric poetry and in the non-visual art of music, especially the ecstatic chorus or dithyrambs seen in Aeschylean and Sophoclean tragedy.

Apollo and Dionysus’ correlation to art forms continues throughout, although the comparison is not only drawn to physical art. Apollo is also likened to the Schopenhauer term *principium individuationis*, whilst Dionysus can break down individuation to merge into nature:

Then they are also described as representing the art realms *Traum* and *Rausch* or dream and intoxication. Basically Nietzsche believed that the Apollonian drive was manifested in dreams, whilst the Dionysian presented itself through intoxication.
Thus they are articulated by Nietzsche as expressing two fundamentally different Triebe or creative impulses at work in the individual. According to Nietzsche, the Apollonian impulse presents itself in dream, but as such has only an illusory capacity; it belongs to a kind of reality, hidden beneath which there is another reality. Whilst this impulse can offer truth, it remains mere appearance. Conversely, the intoxicating Dionysian impulse brings about an ecstatic state, which causes people to lose themselves to the collective, transcending to become at one with nature. This state can be brought about with intoxicants or orgiastic festivals, by revelling in singing, dancing and sex.


Naturally, neither state is enough to create wholeness. Being one-sided either way would result in losing out on a crucial component. Apollonian form is needed to even out the extreme intoxicated Dionysian state and to prevent the individual dissolving into the collective. In this respect Nietzsche acknowledges the importance of the Apollonian, even admiring its capability to shield the individual from nature’s torrents by using illusion to create a false reality whilst still acknowledging its nature.

Nietzsche claimed this unity of Apollo and Dionysus worked alongside one another in Attic tragedy. In tragedy they need to relate to, work parallel with and be complementary to one another, and for any kind of unity to be created, they are dependent on each other: Dionysian music fully stimulates the Apollonian drama, providing a vivid picture that could not have been attained with only the actors’ dialogue and movements. The correct union of the two types is necessary to see the complete picture, to gain the full experience, which can be related not just to the tragedy but to the individual too. Whilst participating in the tragedy, the audience has an Apollonian dream vision of the energy represented by the god, Dionysus, embodied in the chorus music they hear onstage. The elements of the tragedy have created this union brought together in the dream vision.
Beide so verschiedene Triebe gehen nebeneinander her, zumeist im offnen Zwiespalt miteinander und sich gegenseitig zu immer neuen kräftigeren Geburten reizend, um in ihnen den Kampf jenes Gegensatzes zu perpetuieren, den das gemeinsame Wort „Kunst“ nur scheinbar überbrückt; bis sie endlich, durch einen metaphysischen Wunderakt des hellenischen „Willens“, miteinander gepaart erscheinen und in dieser Paarung zuletzt das ebenso dionysische als apollinische Kunstwerk der attischen Tragödie erzeugen.

(GT, Ch1, p.21-22, KGW3I)

In a similar way, the individual needs both Apollonian and Dionysian elements to find a degree of wholeness in life. To lose oneself in the Dionysian for any longer than short periods would be perilous, yet Dionysian experience is also vital to experience the bliss created by a union with nature. Likewise an Apollonian existence would be sadly lacking in experience, focusing on the more rational elements. Alone, the Dionysian destroys subjectivity, causing wild and dangerous behaviour. It needs the Apollonian to function as a kind of harness on its excesses. Similarly, the Apollonian needs to recognise the support it receives from the Dionysian, the experience of nature it would otherwise be without.

In addition to the different roles of the types, there is a further complicated element in the examination of the Dionysian type, which lies in Nietzsche’s distinction between the Dionysian Greeks and Dionysian barbarians. In this respect Nietzsche is referring to two different types.


(GT, Ch2, p.27-28, KGW3I)
Both types are based on the intoxicating energy created by Dionysus, but the behaviour of
the barbarians could only be likened to animalistic behaviour, unlike Greek Dionysian
types, ‘(wir erkennen), im Vergleiche mit jenen babylonischen Sakäen und ihrem
Rückschritte des Menschentums Tiger und Affen, in den dionysischen Orgien der Griechen
die Bedeutung von Welterlösungsfesten und Verklärungstagen’ (GT, Ch2 p.28, KGW3I).
The barbaric Dionysian still stands in contrast to the Apollonian type, but it is the Greek
Dionysian type, that had the capabilities to synthesise Dionysus with Apollo to create a
more powerful type.

As the work continues there emerges an ultimate reconciliation between the
Apollonian and the Dionysian types. The Dionysus that Nietzsche develops in later works,
such as in Götzen-Dämmerung, is actually a binary synthesis of the two drives,
representative of the former Apollonian and Dionysian types to create a new Dionysian. In
these later writings the term Dionysus is used but it refers to the union of the Apollonian
and Dionysian types as they were presented in Die Geburt der Tragödie. This new type is a
fusion of the Apollonian and the Dionysian, with all the power of both types in a new term.
The Apollonian had its place in being required to reveal the essence of Dionysus in his
appearances, whilst also acting as a protection against the madness of Dionysus, in order to
prevent the audience being completely lost in Dionysian ecstasy. The eventual recognition
is that the two types are inextricably entwined, requiring each another. In Die Geburt der
Tragödie the Apollonian and Dionysian types have been representative of Greek Gods,
Kunstgottheiten, the physiological states Traum and Rausch as well as creative human
drives. Owing to these varying distinctions the power of their union at the end of the work
is all the more powerful, with each of their individual states transforming to a higher state
in unity. As Lucy Huskinson points out: ‘The union of the Dionysian and Apollonian, as
the essence of tragic art, represents the highest meaning for the individual, as it is only
through this metaphysical union that mankind is able to affirm its existence.’ From merely
plastic art, tragedy develops. The union of the two types is crucial for aesthetic experience.

At the end of this work there is a great union so that art is the Apollonian with Dionysian
wisdom.

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5 Lucy Huskinson, Nietzsche and Jung: The Whole Self in the Union of Opposites (Hove and New York:
4.4. THE ROLE OF THE TYPES

There was an era when art was rather seen in what Nietzsche called plastic art, before tragedy was born. This was mostly sculpture but also some kinds of music, and Nietzsche associated it fully with the Apollonian.

At that time the Dionysian was found in human excess, festivals, drunkenness and music. The electric union created by the two opposing elements found in Dionysus and Apollo, when combined on stage, was responsible for the birth of tragedy. To Nietzsche, true Greek culture was in the age before Euripides and Socrates, when Greek tragedy held a balance of the Apollonian and Dionysian elements of dialogue and music together: an age when Aeschylus held strong influence. Nietzsche thought that Greek tragedy was the highest form of art as it could merge its Apollonian and Dionysian elements to create a whole, so
that the viewers were able to experience the complete human condition. The Dionysian element could be heard in the music of the chorus, whilst the Apollonian was in the dialogue. Nietzsche wrote ‘Alles, was im appolinischen Teile der griechischen Tragödie, im Dialoge, auf die Oberfläche kommt, sieht einfach, durchsichtig, schön aus’ (GT, Ch9 p. 60, KGW3I). The two elements of the tragedy work together to create a balanced picture for its viewers.


(GT, Ch4, p.36, KGW3I)

In Nietzsche’s opinion Greek tragedy died after Sophocles and Aeschylus. This is linked to a change in writing style, categorised by the coming of Euripides and Socrates. Euripides cut short the use of chorus, depicting everyday life in his drama. ‘Jenes ursprüngliche und allmächtige dionysische Element aus der Tragödie auszuscheiden und sie rein und neu auf undionysischer Kunst, Sitte und Weltbetrachtung sich uns enthüllende Tendenz des Euripides’ (GT, Ch 12, p.78, KGW3I). Nietzsche blamed Euripides for the death of the crucial mythical and musical elements of Greek tragedy:


(GT, Ch10, p.70-71, KGW3I)

However, it was Socrates, who ultimately created Greek tragedy’s downfall, perverting tragedy from its course with the unquenchable desire for knowledge, reason and
truth, as he thought that only the knowledgeable could be virtuous. Socrates established a
dialectical tendency, following his beliefs that any of society’s problems could be remedied
with rational thinking.

In jene Gründe einzudringen und die wahre Erkenntnis vom Schein und vom Irrtum zu
sondern, dünkte dem sokratischen Menschen der edelste, selbst der einzige wahrhaft
menschliche Beruf zu sein: so wie jener Mechanismus der Begriffe, Urteile und Schlüsse
von Sokrates ab als die höchste Betätigung und bewunderungswürdigste Gabe der Natur
über alle anderen Fähigkeiten geschätzt wurde. Selbst die erhabensten sittlichen Taten, die
Regungen des Mitleids, der Aufopferung, des Heroismus und jene schwer zu erringende
Meeresstille der Seele, die der apollinische Grieche Sophrosyne nannte, wurden von
Sokrates und seinen gleichgesinnten Nachfolgern bis auf die Gegenwart hin aus der
Dialektik des Wissens abgeleitet und demgemäß als lehrbar bezeichnet.

(GT, Ch15, p.96-97, KGW3I)

This resulted in Greek drama ultimately estranging itself from unconscious Dionysian
wisdom. Tragedy was replaced by a New Comedy, which celebrated the norm, depicting
the mundane and everyday life as characters began to speak.

Durch diesen Umschwung der öffentlichen Sprache hat er überhaupt die neuere Komödie
möglich gemacht. Denn von jetzt ab war es kein Geheimnis mehr, wie und mit welchen
Sentenzen die Alltäglichkeit sich auf der Bühne vertreten könne. Die bürgerliche
Mittelmäßigkeit, auf die Euripides alle seine politischen Hoffnungen aufbaute, kam jetzt zu
Wort, nachdem bis dahin in der Tragödie der Halbgott, in der Komödie der betrunkene
Satyr oder der Halbmensch den Sprachcharakter bestimmt hatten.

(GT, Ch11, p.73, KGW3I)

Thus, lacking the participation and with myth lost from the tragedy, the individual was
forced to focus on the rational, and the sense of living in harmony with the opposites and
sufferings of life was lost. Socratic rationalism brought about a division in the self, by
means of repressing the instincts and unconscious impulses, elevating the conscious and
rational, losing the necessary unity of both, which the individual requires.

Das ist die Gegenwart, als das Resultat jenes auf Vernichtung des Mythus gerichteten
Sokratismus. Und nur steht der mythenlose Mensch, ewig hungerd, unter allen
Vergangenheiten und sucht grabend und wühlend nach Wurzeln, sei es daß er auch in den
entlegenen Altertümern nach ihnen graben müsste.

(GT, Ch23, p.142, KGW3I)
From the death of tragedy caused by Socratic rationalism, Western civilisation had been led by the Apollonian impulse, foregoing Dionysian tendencies and living a one-sided existence. This way of living, Nietzsche refers to as decadence, which would lead to nihilism and is a subject Nietzsche would address in later works. However, Nietzsche believed that he noticed the Dionysian element returning to modern society. ‘Welche Hoffnungen müssen in uns aufleben, wenn uns die allersichersten Auspizien den umgekehrten Prozeß, das allmähliche Erwachen des dionysischen Geistes in unserer gegenwärtigen Welt, verbürgen!’ (GT, Ch19, p.123, KGW3I) For Nietzsche the development of art needs the duality of the two types for: ‘Die Fortentwicklung der Kunst (ist) an die Duplizität des Apollinischen und des Dionysischen gebunden...: in ähnlicher Weise, wie die Generation von der Zweiheit der Geschlechter, bei fortwährendem Kämpfe und nur periodisch eintretender Versöhnung, abhängt’ (GT, Ch1, p.21, KGW3I). In the latter half of his work, Nietzsche explores the contemporary implications of this altering in Greek thought. He argues that we are still in the Alexandrian age of culture, which is now about to collapse. Science cannot answer all the questions of the universe, but he is glad, that thanks to the works of Kant and Schopenhauer, this has now been recognised; making the time ready for a rebirth of tragedy that will remove the last remnants of Socratic culture. Nietzsche sees German music, more particularly Wagner, as the start of this change. Nietzsche calls for a rebirth of tragedy with the uniting elements of the Apollonian and Dionysian, and sees this as possible in Wagner’s operas.


(GT, Ch20, p.128, KGW3I)

4.5. ZARATHUSTRA AS A MANIFESTATION OF OPPOSING TYPES
The Apollonian and Dionysian types developed in *Die Geburt der Tragödie* are symbolic of opposing modes that are crucial to Nietzschean thought. Ultimately, with the Apollonian and Dionysian opposing elements, it became apparent that whilst Nietzsche seemed to rhapsodise about dark, Dionysian undercurrents in this text, this was emphasised in light of the Dionysian element having been removed from tragedy after the Attic tragedy. In actuality, it became clear that the union of the two types, Apollo and Dionysus, was necessary for complete experience in tragedy and for human authenticity. Nietzsche prized the ability to join, and harness the greatest tensions of opposing elements, for it was only through the full experience of these opposing modes, that a new level of understanding could be attained.

The union of these opposing types was depicted with great detail in *Die Geburt der Tragödie*, yet came to fruition in the teachings of Zarathustra in *Also sprach Zarathustra* (1883-85) for in this work the notion that the opposing elements can create a complete or individuated person comes to the fore in the Übermensch concept. In the prologue Zarathustra declares that he will teach the opposites: ‘Ich möchte verschenken und austheilen, bis die Weisen unter den Menschen wieder einmal ihrer Thorheit und die Armen wieder einmal ihres Reichthums froh geworden sind’ (*Z*, ‘Zarathustra’s Vorrede’:1, p.5, *KGW6I*). Zarathustra teaches that the human must be overcome to become something great as man has evolved to this point, and must keep evolving – it has potential to become an Übermensch:


(*Z*, ‘Zarathustra’s Vorrede’: 3, p8, *KGW6I*)

The Übermensch, which Zarathustra teaches, was anticipated in *Die Geburt der Tragödie* and prizes many of the same elements as Nietzsche’s Dionysian type, for example, similarly celebrating the power of the body.
Den Verächtern des Leibes will ich mein Wort sagen. Nicht umlernen und umlehren sollen sie mir, sondern nur ihrem eignen Leibe Lebewohl sagen - und also stumm werden.

“Leib bin ich und Seele” - so redet das Kind. Und warum sollte man nicht wie die Kinder reden?

Aber der Erwachte, der Wissende sagt: Leib bin ich ganz und gar, und Nichts ausserdem; und Seele ist nur ein Wort für ein Etwas am Leibe.

Der Leib ist eine grosse Vernunft, eine Vielheit mit Einem Sinne, ein Krieg und ein Frieden, eine Heerde und ein Hirt.

(Z, ‘Von den Verächtern des Leibes’, p.35, KGW6I)

Recognition of the importance of the realities of life is vital, as well as being at one with nature: ‘Seht, ich lehre euch den Übermenschen! Der Übermensch ist der Sinn der Erde. Euer Wille sage: der Übermensch sei der Sinn der Erde!’ (Z, ‘Zarathustra’s Vorrede’: 3, p.8, KGW6I).

Just as the Apollonian / Dionysian types relied upon each other, and had to balance one another in order for each to be at its most powerful, the Übermensch promotes both opposites to be complementary in a pair. As the Apollonian and Dionysian gave rise to a new, more powerful Dionysian type, the Übermensch has likewise fused the various opposites in himself to create a more powerful, whole individual.

Zarathustra has the complex task of uniting the opposites good and evil to people who have viewed them statically. His task is to teach the ways to become an Übermensch. ‘Ich will die Menschen den Sinn ihres Seins lehren: welcher ist der Übermensch, der Blitz aus der dunklen Wolke Mensch’ (Z, ‘Zarathustra’s Vorrede’:7, p. 17, KGW6I). In contrast to Christianity, Zarathustra recognises the importance of good and evil, not as static entities, but as complementary elements, with both parts being necessary for a complete individual. ‘Viele Länder sah Zarathustra und viele Völker: so entdeckte er vieler Völker Gutes und Böses. Keine grössere Macht fand Zarathustra auf Erden, als gut und böse’ (Z, ‘Von tausend und Einem Ziele’, p.70, KGW6I). As with the Dionysian and Apollonian
pairing, Nietzsche furthers his argument in *Also sprach Zarathustra* that humankind needs to promote both sides of opposite pairs and to find unity in them, in order to attain the overcoming power of this unity which is the path to greatness, to become an Übermensch. In contrast to Christianity, Zarathustra promotes the necessity of people recognising and having opposing tendencies in their psyches. ‘Ich sage euch: man muss noch Chaos in sich haben, um einen tanzenden Stern gebären zu können. Ich sage euch: ihr habt noch Chaos in euch’ (*Z*, ‘Zarathustra’s Vorrede’: 5, p.13, *KGW6I*).

Zarathustra embraces the concept of the Dionysian type, revelling in the satisfaction and pleasure of bodily desires and being at one with nature. Zarathustra, however, in Dionysian fashion, is fully aware of his body and the pleasures of it.


As a prophet, Zarathustra proclaims that the way forward is to become an Übermensch, who recognises and accepts the opposites in himself and the world. The Übermensch embraces the necessity of both opposites in a binary pairing. Nietzsche gave his protagonist this task of teaching the opposites, in order to redress the balance in individuals, which Christianity has destroyed. Zarathustra’s teachings stand in opposition to Christianity as Christianity views opposites in black and white terms, not as complementary elements, and promotes only the ‘good’ side of humanity. In Christianity good and evil could never be complementary or be unified. Christians are taught to repress bodily urges, prize piety and spirituality. Zarathustra preaches against Christianity, or God. ‘Ich beschwöre euch, meine Brüder, bleibt der Erde treu und glaubt denen nicht, welche euch von überirdischen Hoffnungen reden! Giftmischer sind es, ob sie es wissen oder nicht’ (*Z*, ‘Zarathustra’s Vorrede’: 3, p.9, *KGW6I*).
Zarathustra, embodying similar unifying power as Attic tragedy employed, teaches the recognition of both sides for humans to be able to gain complete experience. For Nietzsche the recognition and acceptance of opposing tensions at work is the key to further development.
5. JUNG AND TYPOLGY

5.1. TYPOLGY OF THE PERSONALITY MODEL

Jung’s model of typology is an integral part of the conceptualisation of the human individuation process – his typology can be used as a tool to assist an individual in developing psychologically in order to become complete. His typology was a formulation of structural elements of the psyche, intended to aid the understanding of various aspects of the inner being; to help understand the many variations in individuals; and to assist in the analysis of patients by determining their individual type.

Das von mir in Vorschlag gebrachte, auf praktischer Erfahrung beruhende typologische System ist ein Versuch, der bisher vorherrschenden schrankenlosen individuellen Variation in der psychologischen Auffassungsbildung eine Grundlage und einen Rahmen zu geben.

(PTY, p.600, par. 1058, GW6)

This typology was laid out in *Psychologische Typen* (1921) although it is frequently also the topic of many other writings, papers and lectures. There are particular passages and works in the complete volumes which illustrate the type theory best. The sixth volume, entitled *Psychologische Typen* brings together the main work of that name with most of the other typological papers. Volume seven, *Zwei Schriften über Analytische Psychologie*, also contains useful passages about the theme, whilst ‘Die Archetypen und das kollektive Unbewußte’, the first part of volume nine, is also relevant, in describing the archetypes and their origins in the collective unconscious.

Jung’s model consists of eight types: the two attitudes extraverted and introverted, which each contain the four functions thinking, feeling, sensation and intuition. Two further types, the anima and animus, are also crucial to this typology in belonging to the shadow of the eight types. Unlike other personality typologies, Jung’s model is concerned with one’s attitudinal relationship to the world (the directional movement of psychic energy) to distinguish one’s type.
Jung’s impetus for his study into typology lay in his incomprehension as to why Freud’s view of neurosis was so very different to Adler’s. According to Jung, Freud saw his patients in relation to the object, whereas Adler focused upon the subjective.

Bei Adler liegt die Betonung auf einem Subjekt, das sich sichert und Überlegenheit sucht über gleichgültig was für Objekte; bei Freud hingegen liegt die Betonung ganz auf Objekten, die wegen ihrer bestimmten Eigenart dem Lustbegehren des Subjektes förderlich oder hinterlich sind.

(JU, p.45-46, par. 59, GW7)

Jung regarded both views as not merely valid, but complementary, concluding that the different way of looking at things was due to personal typological differences, which gave rise to his two attitudes.

Der Anblick dieses Dilemmas hat mich vor die Frage gestellt: gibt es mindestens zwei verschiedene Menschentypen, von denen der eine sich mehr für das Objekt, der andere sich mehr für sich selber interessiert? Und ist daraus zu erklären, daß der eine nur das eine und der andere nur das andere sieht und auf diese Weise zu ganz verschiedenen Schlüssen gelangt?

(JU, p.46, par. 61, GW7)

5.2. THE ATTITUDINAL TYPES

The Freud/Adler dilemma therefore led Jung to develop two attitude types:

Bei meiner praktischen ärztlichen Arbeit mit nervösen Patienten ist mir schon lange aufgefallen, daß es neben den vielen individuellen Verschiedenheiten der menschlichen Psychologie auch typische Unterschiede gibt, und zwar fielen mir zunächst zwei Typen auf, die ich als Introversions- und Extraversionstypus bezeichnete.

(PT, p.1, par. 1, GW6)

He categorised them thus:
Erstere Einstellung (Introversion) ist, wenn normal, gekennzeichnet durch ein zögerndes, reflexives, zurückgezogenes Wesen, das sich nicht leicht gibt, vor Objekten scheut, sich immer etwas in der Defensive befindet und sich gerne versteckt hinter mißtrauischer Beobachtung. Letztere (Extraversion) ist, wenn normal, charakterisiert durch ein entgegenkommendes, anscheinend offenes und breitwilliges Wesen, das sich leicht in jede gegebene Situation findet, rasch Beziehungen anknüpft und sich oft unbekümmert und vertrauensvoll in unbekannte Situationen hinauswagt, unter Hintansetzen etwaiger möglicher Bedenken.

(PU, p.47, par. 62, GW7)

The attitudinal types, as mentioned above, are the extraverted and introverted modes, which describe an individual’s relationship to the world. Notably there are varying levels of introversion and extraversion, so that an individual can be classified as one or the other, but be that type to a lesser or greater extent. However, the more extreme the one attitude is, the more infantile and archaic the other will be unconsciously, and this unconscious attitude will try to compensate what is missing. Jung described this compensation thus: ‘Ich (fasse) den Begriff der Kompensation allgemein als funktionelle Ausgleichung, als Selbstregulierung des psychischen Apparates auf’ (PT, p.485, par. 840, GW6).

Jung believed that type differentiation could be noted at a very young age. Marie-Louise von Franz, a first-generation Jungian, comments: ‘The two attitudes…can actually be seen in a child of one or one-and-a-half, though perhaps not always very clearly.’ 6 The types are categorised by the movement of psychic energy. With introverted types the movement of energy is focused towards an individual’s inner world, where the subject is most important.


(PT, p.3, par.5, GW6)

Conversely, with extraverted types it is instead focused upon an individual’s external world and the object is more important.

Der extravertierte Standpunkt dagegen ordnet das Subjekt dem Objekt unter, wobei dem Objekt der überragende Wert zukommt. Das Subjekt hat stets sekundäre Bedeutung; der subjektive Vorgang erscheint bisweilen bloß als störendes oder überflüssiges Anhängsel objektiver Geschehnisse.

(PT, p.4, par. 5, GW6)

Extraverts are generally categorised by their actions resulting from external factors, whereas introverts, in contrast, are motivated to act as a result of the internal. ‘Der eine sieht alles unter dem Gesichtswinkel seiner Auffassung, der andere unter dem des objektiven Geschehens’ (PT, p.4, par. 5, GW6).

The extravert’s reality naturally lies in the object, or the external world as von Franz argues. ‘In the extravert the conscious libido habitually flows towards the object, but there is an unconscious secret counter-action back towards the subject’.7 This type of person is likely to respond well to, become part of and to enjoy outside events and public gatherings, indeed willingly seeking to venture away from home. Typical of extraversion is the ability to mix with and seek solace in others, to make a show of oneself without reservation, and to be concerned about one’s self-image, although nonetheless going to great pains in order to make a good impression. This makes the extraverted type comfortable in social functions or in carrying out requirements of the external world. The extraverted person would be likely to be greatly influenced ethically, morally, religiously, politically, etc., by the collective. Their personal views, thoughts, opinions, beliefs, and actions are influenced by conditions in the outside world, rather than relying on deep personal reflection. Extraverted types will be liable to alter their views depending on external standards. Whatever the majority decides will be the opinion the extravert is expected to take, which makes this type prone to opportunism. Owing to the focus on the outer world, the extravert tends not to pay the necessary attention to his physical or mental well-being, paying no heed to the inner reality until such problems arise that can no longer be ignored. Extraverts will suppress their subjective needs, until they unconsciously build so much that these unconscious needs seek to undermine the extraverted attitude, as the unconscious seeks to maintain the equilibrium psychically. Jung describes extraversion thus:

7 Marie-Louise von Franz and James Hillman, Lectures on Jung’s Typology (Seminar S.), (Putnam, CT: Spring Publications, 1971), p.3

(PTE, p.594, par. 1041, GW6)

In contrast to the extraverted type stands the introverted, whose reality naturally lies in the subject, making this type of person introspected, reflective, conservative, quiet and prone to shrink away from the outer reality. This type is more comfortable with the familiar, preferring to stay at home in the company of the select few. Introverts tend to be reclusive, distrusting the outside world and find it difficult to socialise, much preferring to retreat into their own world of solitude. Other characteristics are said to include being cautious, shy, defensive, pedantic, frugal, and aloof. They have a tendency to worry and be pessimistic. Unlike the extravert, introverts are likely to get uncomfortable in gatherings, increasingly more so, the more crowded it is. Their pleasure lies in the subjective, in their own familiar surroundings, away from the public life and gaze. In contrast to the extravert, the introvert is not swayed by popular opinion, trends or something’s popularity. It is in the subjective that this type makes their contribution to the world. Jung describes the introvert as follows:


(PTE, p. 595, par. 1046, GW6)
As with the extravert suppressing their subjective needs, the objective needs of the introvert are also repressed, making themselves known by the unconscious when they have built up too much. The extent to which the consciousness is focused on the subject will cause an unconscious compensation to arise that relates to the object.

The introvert […] feels as if an overwhelming object wants constantly to affect him, from which he has continually to retire; everything is falling upon him, he is constantly overwhelmed by impressions, but he is unaware that he is secretly borrowing psychic energy from and lending it to the object through his unconscious extraversion.8

Whether, an individual is extraverted or introverted is, however, only obvious in conjunction with one of the four functions, each of which has its own specialist area.

5.3. IRRATIONAL/ RATIONAL FUNCTIONS

The true identification of one’s attitudinal type only becomes obvious in conjunction with one of the four functions. The four functions as defined by Jung are: thinking, which focuses on cognitive thought; sensation, which refers to one’s physical sensory perception; feeling, which refers to making judgement subjectively; and intuition, which focuses upon unconscious perception.


(PT, p.5, par. 7, GW6)

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It is important to note that Jung uses a very specific meaning for the term feeling. In this psychological sense it has nothing to do with emotion, and only refers to how an individual makes subjective assessment of something or someone.

Jung chose these functions, as they were obvious types that presented themselves to him in his study, as well as being principally different to one another. ‘Ich unterscheide diese F[unktion] voneinander, weil sie sich nicht aufeinander beziehen, respektive reduzieren lassen. Das Prinzip des Denkens zum Beispiel ist vom Prinzip des Fühlen's absolut verschieden und so weiter’ (PT, p.470, par. 807, GW6). He divides these functions into two groups – rational and irrational. Thinking and feeling are described as rational functions because they are used logically, to make judgements. ‘Ich bezeichne die beiden vorausgegangenen Typen (Denken und Fühlen) als rationale oder urteilende Typen, weil sie charakterisiert sind durch das Primat vernünftig urteilender Funktionen’ (PT, p.390, par. 670, GW6). On the other hand, sensation and intuition are called irrational functions as they are based on perception, which does not rely on logic. ‘Ich bezeichne die beiden vorangegangenen Typen als irrational aus dem schon erörterten Grunde, daß sie ihr Tun und Lassen nicht auf Vernunfturteile gründen, sondern auf die absolute Stärke der Wahrnehmung’ (PT, p.403, par. 686, GW6).

Jung’s model of the four functions takes a four-fold form, which could be seen to have the functions being places at North, East, South and West positions. At the top of this diagram, for example, could be the rational function thinking, although any of the functions could be put into this position, as this place would be for each individual’s primary or main function. The position of the other functions is determined by which function is in the primary position. In this instance, directly opposite the thinking function, in the position of the inferior function, is the other rational function, feeling. The two spaces at east and west positions are for the auxiliary functions, which in this instance are the two irrational functions: intuition and sensation.

5.4. PRIMARY, AUXILIARY AND INFERIOR FUNCTIONS

The primary function holds the most important position in Jung’s model of the functions, as it is the main function of an individual, which corresponds with one of the attitudinal types to make up a person’s personality type. This function is the one of the four which is
strongest, the one that is inherently in a person. It is impossible to develop all four functions simultaneously – instead the individual will use that which comes naturally to him.

Es ist nämlich erfahrungsgemäß kaum möglich – aus Ungunst der allgemeinen Bedingungen-, daß jemand zugleich alle seine psychologischen Funktionen zur Entwicklung bringe. Schon die sozialen Anforderungen bringen es mit sich, dass der Mensch zu allernächst und allermeist jene Funktion am stärksten differenziert, zu welcher er entweder von Natur aus am besten fähig ist, oder welche ihm zu seinem sozialen Erfolg die wirksamsten Mittel leih.

(PT, p.491, par. 852, GW6)

Obviously, one can be aware of the presence of each of the four functions, but the power belongs to one function alone, as the mixture with another function would likely cause a contradiction with the primary.

Diese absolute Vormachtstellung kommt empirisch immer nur einer Funktion zu und kann nur einer Funktion zukommen, denn die ebenso selbstständige Intervention einer anderen Funktion würde notwendigerweise eine andere Orientierung ergeben, welche der ersteren, teilweise wenigstens, widersprechen würde.

(PT, p. 441, par. 736, GW6)

Therefore, any other function could only have secondary importance. It is most likely that one identifies strongest with the most developed function. However, this has the down-side of making one or more of the functions comparatively under-developed. ‘Bei der Einseitigkeit dieses Entwicklungsprozesses bleiben eine oder mehrere Funktionen notwendigerweise in der Entwicklung zurück’ (PT, p.491, par. 852, GW6).

Besides the primary function, the other functions are all comparatively inferior. However, there is always one function, which is the most inferior, and is either referred to as the inferior function or the fourth function. This function may be conscious, but simply unrecognised or repressed into the unconscious, occasionally making its presence known. The inferior function is the direct opposite of the primary function. Hence the inferior function is invariably of the same nature as the primary function. In other words, if one’s primary function were the rational functional of thinking, then one’s inferior function would be the rational function feeling, or vice versa. Or if an individual’s intuition function were dominant, then their sensation function would be the fourth function. As with the
attitudinal type, the extent to which a person has a particular primary function varies. The stronger one’s primary function is, the more likely the inferior function is to be repressed, primitive and infantile. It works like a see-saw effect, in that the higher the primary function is in the consciousness, the lower the inferior function will be: this corresponds to Jung’s notion of complementarity. For Jung, recognition of the various opposing pairs at work in the typological model is crucial to individuation. Both sides in an opposing pair are needed for a complete individual. The opposing functions work to complement one another, rising and lowering in strength as its opposite simultaneously lowers and rises.

Alongside the main inferior functions is the other inferior function, known as the auxiliary function or secondary function and this function is different in nature to the primary and fourth function. For example, if thinking were the primary function (rational type), then the auxiliary function would be intuition or sensation (irrational types) as this by nature does not stand in opposition to the primary function. Similarly, if intuition were one’s primary function, then sensation could not be its auxiliary, but only thinking or feeling. This is due to the fact that for intuition to function, the focus is on unconscious perception, which is not compatible with sensation’s outer perceptions. Thus primary and auxiliary functions can only match up when their nature is not essentially opposed.

Additionally, there are also instances of a so-called distorted type. This means that one is forced not to identify with the inherent primary type, but in order to better adapt to surroundings, the individual highly develops one of the auxiliary functions to such an extent that it becomes difficult to identify which function is actually the primary.

5.5. THE UNCONSCIOUS IN JUNG’S TYPOLOGY

The unconscious poses a problem in the identification of one’s type, as the unconscious seeks to balance the governing conscious attitude type. For extraverts, the relationship one
has with the subjective lies in the realms of the unconscious, and for introverts it is the relationship to the objective that is unconscious. Writing about the subjective for the extravert, Jung notes that ‘man verhüllt es auch vor sich selber mit Unbewußtheit’ (PTE, p.595, par. 1042, GW6). Unconscious functions can also have such an effect on an individual, than their type may appear different to what it actually is, as one’s unconscious may make more of an impact in the observation of a person. The difficulty of determining type is exacerbated as one’s type may appear to change in different circumstances or life periods. One’s habitual attitude type not only establishes one’s behaviour, but creates a leaning towards extraversion or introversion, thus determining the extent to which the unconscious must compensate. Without this unconscious compensation there would be an utter lack of psychic balance.

Thus, there is an unconscious compensation of attitude type which stands alongside the conscious attitude type. For example, in attempt to gain some kind of psychic balance, an unconscious extraverted attitude would compensate for the conscious introverted attitude and vice versa.

Introversion und Extraversion als Typen der Einstellung bedeuten ein für den ganzen seelischen Prozeß wesentlich bedingendes Vorurteil, indem sie den Reaktionshabitus feststellen und damit nicht nur die Art des Handelns, sondern auch die Art der subjektiven Erfahrung, und nicht nur das, sondern auch die Art der Kompensation durch das Unbewußte bestimmen.

(PTY, p.578-579 , par. 1008, GW6)

Similarly, there is only one function, the primary function, able to be freely manipulated by the conscious will: ‘Wir sprechen aber nur dann von Bewußtheit einer Funktion, wenn nicht nur ihre Ausübung dem Willen zur Verfügung steht, sondern auch ihr Prinzip für die Orientierung des Bewußtseins maßgebend ist’ (PT, p.441, par. 736, GW6). Hence, the inferior and auxiliary functions are either partially or entirely unconscious. ‘The inferior function is the door through which all the figures of the unconscious come into consciousness’.9 For example, there would be an unconscious compensation of feeling for someone with a primary thinking function, or intuition unconsciously balancing sensation,

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and vice versa. This also includes the attitude types, for example, extraverted thinking would be unconscious in an introverted feeling type, or introverted sensation in an extraverted intuition type. Unconscious inferior functions can also be said to belong to the more encompassing Jungian term – the shadow. The shadow can be seen to be creative as well as harmful: it harbours buried and unrealised aspects of oneself; but its opposing values seek to destabilise one’s conscious personality. For a balancing of the personality the shadow does, however, need to be recognised. Ultimately the unconscious plays a crucial role in individuation, for only its recognition, which shows and balances one’s unconscious opposites, the inferior attitude, function, and their animus or anima, can help in a person’s journey to become whole.

5.6. TYPOLOGY AND THE ANIMUS/ANIMA

Similar to the unconscious compensation, other types affect one’s personality type in an effort to balance the individual. In volume nine of his complete works, entitled Die Archetypen und das kollektive Unbewusste, Jung focuses on laying out his theory of archetypes, in the form of various papers, most noteworthy including ‘Über die Archetypen des kollektiven Unbewußten’ 1935/1954, ‘Über den Begriff des kollektiven Unbewußten’ 1936 and ‘Über den Archetypus mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des Animabegriffes’ 1936/1954. Jung named two specific contra-sexual archetypes concerned in male/female relationships: the anima – the ideal picture of a woman that a man has; and the animus – the inner ideal image a woman has of a man. The anima and animus also belong alongside one’s personality type. The anima or animus of an extravert is most likely to be introverted, and vice versa, which is unconsciously so, although probably beneficial as the two types complement one another.

Die beiden Typen sind daher für eine Symbiose wie geschaffen. Der eine besorgt die Überlegung und der andere die Initiative und das praktische Handeln. Wenn sich die beiden Typen heiraten, so können sie zusammen eine ideale Ehe zustande bringen. Solange sie mit der Anpassung und die vielfachen äußeren Nöte des Lebens vollauf beschäftigt sind, passen sie prächtig zusammen.

(PU, p.59-60, par. 80, GW7)
5.7. THE EIGHT TYPES

In total, the two attitudes of which each has four possible primary functions, either rational or irrational, come together to make up eight different personality types. One can be extraverted with either of the thinking, feeling, intuition or sensation functions as the primary, likewise with the introvert. Each type will, to some extent, be unconsciously compensated by its unconscious opposing type, shadow and animus/animus.

5.7.1. THE EXTRAVERTED TYPES

The extraverted thinking type (a rational type) is categorised primarily by its ability to organise and bring order to outside situations, arranging information in order to proceed, making this type apt for such professions as business, law, or science. As an extravert, their focus lies with the object, so any sort of personal thinking or ideas is avoided, instead concentrating upon the object. The diametrically opposed unconscious personality of this type is introverted feeling.

The extraverted feeling type (a rational type), is concerned with the evaluation and relation to outer objects.

Dieser wird also, der Definition gemäß, ein Mensch sein, der das Bestreben hat – natürlich nur, insofern er ein reiner Typus ist -, seine gesamte Lebensäußerung in die Abhängigkeit von intellektuellen Schlüssen zu bringen, die sich in letzter Linie stets am objektiv Gegebenen, entweder an objektiven Tatsachen oder allgemein gültigen Ideen orientieren. Dieser Typus verleiht nicht nur sich selber, sondern auch seiner Umgebung gegenüber der objektiven Tatsächlichkeit respektive ihrer objektiv orientierten intellektuellen Formel die ausschlaggebende Macht. An dieser Formel wird gut und böse gemessen, wird schön und häßlich bestimmt. Richtig ist alles, was dieser Formel entspricht, und zufällig, was indifferent neben ihr herläuft. Weil diese Formel dem Weltsinn entsprechend erscheint, so wird sie auch zum Weltgesetz, das immer und überall zur Verwirklichung gelangen muß, im einzelnen sowohl wie im allgemeinen.

(PT, p.376, par. 652, GW6)

The extraverted feeling type (a rational type), is concerned with the evaluation and relation to outer objects.

Dieser Art des Fühlens ist es zum großen Teil zuzuschreiben, warum so viele Leute ins Theater oder ins Konzert oder in die Kirche gehen und zwar mit richtig abgemessenen positiven Gefühlen. Ihm sind auch die Moden zu verdanken, und – was weit wertvoller ist – die positive und verbreitete Unterstützung sozialer, philanthropischer und sonstiger Kulturunternehmungen. In diesen Dingen erweist sich das extravertierte Fühlen als
schöpferischer Faktor. Ohne dieses Fühlen ist zum Beispiel eine schöne und harmonische Geselligkeit undenkbar.

(PT, p.386, par. 664, GW6)

This type is very able to be among and make friends with people, not being prone to disillusionment about them, instead being able to evaluate their positive and negative sides. This type has a seemingly sweet disposition and is empathetic. They can radiate warmth around them with their ability to make those around them feel wanted. This is because their focus is in feeling their way in the external world, making this type most likely to sacrifice themselves for others. Extraverted feeling types have introverted thinking as their unconscious polar opposite.

The extraverted sensation type (an irrational type) has a great ability to relate to objects and facts in the outside world. This type aims physically to feel the object.

Auf niedriger Stufe ist dieser Typus der Mensch der tastbaren Wirklichkeit, ohne Neigung zu Reflexionen und ohne Herrscherabsichten. Sein stetiges Motiv ist, das Objekt zu empfinden, Sensationen zu haben und womöglich zu genießen. Er ist kein unliebenswürdiger Mensch, im Gegenteil, er ist häufig von erfreulicher und lebendiger Genußfähigkeit, bisweilen ein lustiger Kumpan, bisweilen ein geschmackvoller Ästhet. Im ersten Fall hängen die großen Probleme des Lebens ab von einem mehr oder weniger guten Mittagstisch, im letzteren gehören sie zum guten Geschmack. Wenn er empfindet, so ist für ihn alles Wesentliche gesagt und erfüllt. Nichts kann mehr als konkret und wirklich sein; Vermutungen daneben oder darüber hinaus sind nur zugelassen, insofern sie die Empfindung verstärken. Sie brauchen diese keineswegs im angenehmen Sinn zu verstärken, denn dieser Typus ist nicht ein gewöhnlicher Lüstling, sondern er will nur die stärkste Empfindung, die er seiner Natur nach immer von außen empfangen muß. Was von innen kommt, erscheint ihm als krankhaft und verwerflich.

(PT, p.395-6, par. 676, GW6)

This type is likely to accurately notice all the details in their surroundings, being able to remember detailed descriptions about people, places and situations they have seen. This type would have an eye for small details and textures, and is likely to have good taste.

Er kleidet sich gut, seinen Umständen entsprechend, man ißt und trinkt gut bei ihm, man sitzt bequem oder man begreift wenigstens, daß sein verfeinerter Geschmack einige Ansprüche an seine Umgebung stellen darf. Er überzeugt sogar, dass gewisse Opfer dem Stil zuliebe sich entschieden lohnen.

(PT, p.396, par. 676, GW6)
The polar opposite and unconscious compensator of this type is introverted intuition.

The extraverted intuition type (an irrational type), applies his ability to perceive to the outer world, making this type likely to surmise future happenings in their life. This characteristic makes this type good in business, particularly in the field of journalism, politics or sales where a sixth sense for the next big thing is crucial.

They are certainly liable to be ahead of the game in many aspects of life, and can be a trend setter. On the down-side, this type, Jung claims, is prone to be vague, unpunctual, and does not pay the necessary attention to their body. They are also so focused on always finding the new, that they may abandon work on something, to chase after the new best thing.

This constant changeability often means that this type will not endure with anything long enough to reap the rewards.

The polar opposite and unconscious compensator of this type is introverted sensation.
5.7.2. THE INTROVERTED TYPES

The introverted thinking type (a rational type), unlike the extraverted type, is not focused upon the order of external object, but upon the subjective thinking of ideas.

On Jung’s account, this type is quiet, probably polite, and dislikes public life, although headstrong and unyielding with his ideas. Although held in high esteem by close friends, to those who do not know such a person closely, this type can appear standoffish and arrogant. ‘Für den Fernstehenden scheint er borstig, unhbar und hochmütig, öfters auch verbittert infolge seiner der gesellschaftungünstigen Vorurteile’ (*PT*, p.419, par. 706, *GW6*). The introverted thinker may think clearly but cannot relate his ideas well to the outside world or bring these ideas across to others, and so is often grossly misunderstood. ‘So klar ihm die innere Struktur seiner Gedanken ist, so unklar ist ihm, wo und wie sie in die wirkliche Welt hineingehören’. (*PT*, p.419, par. 706, *GW6*) This kind of person may be well-suited to philosophy. The polar opposite and unconscious compensator for this type is extraverted feeling.

The introverted feeling type (a rational type), uses feeling to relate to the world, but unlike its extraverted counterpart, does not relate to others in the external world, but internally. This type may appear very unfathomable, quiet and deep, preferring to be in the background.

Sie sind meist still, schwer zugänglich, unverständlich, öfters hinter einer kindlichen oder banalen Maske verborgen, öfters auch von melancholischem Temperament. Sie scheinen nicht und treten nicht auf. Da sie sich überwiegend von ihrem subjektiv orientierten Gefühl leiten lassen, so bleiben ihre wahren Motive meistens verborgen. Nach außen zeigen sie eine harmonische Unauffälligkeit, eine angenehme Ruhe, einen sympathischen Parallelismus, der den anderen nicht veranlassen, beeindrucken oder gar bearbeiten und verändern will.

(*PT*, p.423, par. 712, *GW6*)
To outsiders this type can be repellent with their coldness, as little friendliness exudes from them. Although a feeling type, expressions of warmth and feeling to others is negligible, leaving close friends often with the impression, that their friendship is not valued. The polar opposite and unconscious compensator of this type is extraverted thinking.

The introverted sensation type (an irrational type), like the extraverted sensation type, is also liable to drink in every detail and impression in their surroundings, although it is absorbed inwardly: ‘Während der extravertierte Empfindungstypus durch die Intensität der Objekteinwirkung determiniert ist, orientiert sich der introvertierte nach der Intensität des durch den objektiven Reiz ausgelösten subjektiven Empfindungsanteiles’ (PT, p.430, par. 721, GW6). To outsiders this type may seem slow to react, but all their processing occurs internally. The inner workings of this type, particularly the subjective perceptions such a person may have, make up their reality. ‘Tatsächlich bewegt er sich aber in einer mythologischen Welt, in der ihm Menschen, Tiere, Eisenbahnen, Häuser, Flüsse und Berge zum Teil als huldvolle Götter und zum Teil als überwollende Dämonen erscheinen’. (PT, p.432, par. 724, GW6) The polar opposite and unconscious compensator of this type is extraverted intuition.

The introverted intuition type (an irrational type) has same ability as the extraverted intuitive type to have a certain hunch about the future. Conversely, however this intuition is directed to the internal world. This characteristic makes this type like a prophet, seer or religious messenger. This type has awareness about the collective unconscious with all its archetypal communications, which often make an appearance in art or writing if the type should become an artist or writer.

Die Eigenart der introvertierten Intuition schafft auch, wenn sie das Primat erlangt, einen eigenartigen Typus, nämlich den mystischen Träumer und Seher anderseits, den Phantasten und Künstler anderseits. Der letztere Fall dürfte der Normalfall sein, denn im allgemeinen besteht bei diesem Typus die Neigung, sich auf den Wahrnehmungscharakter der Intuition zu beschränken...Die Vertiefung der Intuition bewirkt natürlich eine oft außerordentliche Entfernung des Individuums von der handgreiflichen Wirklichkeit, so dass er selbst seiner näheren Umgebung zum völligen Rätsel wird. Ist er ein Künstler, so verkündet seine Kunst außerordentliche, weltentrückte Dinge, die in allen Farben schillern, bedeutend und banal, schön und grotesk, erhaben und schrullenhaft zugleich sind. Ist er kein Künstler, so ist er häufig ein verkanntes Genie, eine verbummelte Größe, eine Art weiser Halbnarr, eine Figur für “psychologische” Romane.

(PT, p.436, par. 730, GW6)

The polar opposite and unconscious compensator of this type is extraverted sensation.
5.8. CONCLUDING REMARKS TO JUNG’S TYPOLOGY

Jung recognised himself that his typology was not the only possible one, although he claimed that he found it to be indispensable in analysis.

Aber eines muß ich bekennen, daß ich diesen Kompaß auf meinen psychologischen Entdeckungsreisen auf keinen Fall mehr missen möchte, nicht etwa bloß aus dem naheliegenden, allzumenschlichen Grunde, daß jeder in seine eigene Ideen verliebt ist, sondern wegen der objektiven Tatsache, daß damit ein Maß- und Orientierungssystem gegeben ist, das eine kritische Psychologie, die uns so lange gefehlt hat, ermöglicht.

(PTY, p.586, par. 1030, GW6)

This typology is one that is still in use by Jungian analysts today – and the attitudinal types have even made their way into general vocabulary. This typology was the first typology of the personality, although created in recognised influence of others. The extent to which he drew upon his predecessors Schiller and Nietzsche and the relationship between his typology and theirs will now be addressed.
6. THE RELATION BETWEEN SCHILLER, NIETZSCHE AND JUNG’S TYPOLOGIES

6.1. SCHILLER’S EFFECT ON NIETZSCHE

In *Die Geburt der Tragödie*, Nietzsche addresses the issue of the birth and death of Greek tragedy – the crucial element of Greek tragedy he considers to be the unifying opposing pair – the Apollonian and Dionysian pair. However a continued and underlying theme exists in the development, not just of Schopenhauer’s ideas, but also of Schillerian ideals, both directly and indirectly related to these types. Silk and Stern noted with reference to Schopenhauer’s *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung* (1819) and Schiller’s *Über naïve und sentimentalische Dichtung* (1795), that ‘both of these pairs can claim to be not only precursors, but formative influences on Nietzsche’s.’ 10 Throughout this work Nietzsche makes direct reference to Schiller, as well as indirect references when discussing ideas championed by Schiller. In total Nietzsche makes eight allusions to Schiller throughout the work, only two of which are critical. For the most part, Nietzsche alludes to Schiller to reinforce his own point. For example, he alludes to Schiller’s poem ‘An die Freude’ in order to illustrate the Dionysian, thereby classifying Schiller’s poem as Dionysian. He also quotes a letter Schiller wrote to Goethe, and in chapter seven refers to Schiller’s essay ‘Über den Gebrauch des Chors in der Tragödie’.

With reference to Schiller’s *Über naïve und sentimentalische Dichtung*, Nietzsche draws attention to the Schillerian concept of the *naiv* and *Idyll*, whilst Nietzsche shares with Schiller a belief in the harmonising power of art. The *naiv* is thus mentioned:

Hier muss nun ausgesprochen werden, dass diese von den neueren Menschen so sehnsüchtig angeschaute Harmonie, ja Einheit des Menschen mit der Natur, für die Schiller das Kunstwort “naiv” in Geltung gebracht hat, keinesfalls ein so einfacher, sich von selbst ergebender, gleichsam unvermeidlicher Zustand ist, dem wir an der Pforte jeder Cultur, als einem Paradies der Menschheit begegnen müssten.

*(GT, Ch3, p.33, KGW3I)*

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After this acknowledgement that Schiller coined the original term, Nietzsche goes on to declare that his version of the Apollonian is practically one and the same as Schiller’s concept of the *naiv*.


\[(GT, \text{Ch}3, \text{p.33, KGW3I})\]

*Idyll* is noted later in the work:

Entweder, sagt dieser (Schiller), ist die Natur und das Ideal ein Gegenstand der Trauer, wenn jene als verloren, dieses als unerreicht dargestellt wird. Oder beide sind ein Gegenstand der Freude, indem sie als wirklich vorgestellt warden. Das erste gibt die Elegie in engerer, das andere die Idylle in weitester Bedeutung.

\[(GT, \text{Ch19, p.120, KGW3I})\]

Schiller’s other typological work *Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen* bore similarities to Nietzsche’s *Die Geburt der Tragödie*. In fact, Nicholas Martin points out that in these works, the two authors’ ‘underlying motives were, however, strikingly similar’\(^{11}\). In this work, using the medium of letters, Schiller sought to restore human wholeness by harmonising the mind and body through aesthetic experience, whilst also drawing attention to the problems of the French Revolution and offering his own answer. Schiller hoped that the aesthetic education of man he proposed would prevent such violent outpourings as had been witnessed in France. Nietzsche had similar far-reaching aims for mankind in *Die Geburt der Tragödie*, drawing people’s attention to the crucial union of Apollo and Dionysus that once took place onstage, before Socratic rationalism drove the Dionysian element away. Nietzsche wanted humankind to return to this state of unity when such opposites manifested in Apollo and Dionysus like rational and

irrational, light and dark, the mind and the body were recognised. Instead, Nietzsche thought that since this early Greek time, Western civilisation had been living in a one-sided way, which Nietzsche finds detrimental to health.

With this work Nietzsche intended to change modern society, encouraging people to recognise the Dionysian element. For him Germany had had no culture, simply holding the culture of ancient Greece on a pedestal. However, Nietzsche points out small changes he has noted in German society, where he notices a re-awakening of this Dionysian element, for him particularly manifested in Wagner’s operas. Thus, both works show an awareness of a problem in modern society, to which they each offer their own solutions. Both also refer to ancient Greece as an example of better behaviour, albeit different views of ancient Greece. Nietzsche held the era of the Attic tragedy in high esteem, because of its ability to unite the Apollonian and Dionysian drives.


(GT, Ch4, p.38, KGW3I)

Conversely, Schiller refers to the superior, sophisticated and positive depiction of ancient Greece, which was a popular portrayal at that time. ‘Eine wohlthätige Gottheit reisse den Säugling bey Zeiten von seiner Mutter Brust, nähere ihn mit der Milch eines bessern Alters, und lasse ihn unter fernem griechischen Himmel zur Mündigkeit reifen’ (AB, Neunter Brief, p.333, SW20).

Nietzsche even uses Schillerian concepts in his conception of Apollo and Dionysus, taken from Schiller’s typological work Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen. Nietzsche explicitly commented that his Apollonian type was derived from Schiller in his Die Geburt der Tragödie. Nietzsche’s portrayal of Apollo particularly, is littered with Schillerian terminology. Allusions to Schiller are highly complex throughout this work, owing to the aforementioned fact that the Nietzschean types Apollo and Dionysus were presented in different ways. In the sense that Apollo and Dionysus are representative of different human Triebe, they can be viewed as corresponding to Schiller’s two basic drives, the Formtrieb and the Stofftrieb, taken from Schiller’s Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen. The Formtrieb corresponds to
Nietzsche’s Apollo, whilst the *Stofftrieb* corresponds to Dionysus. Even the *Spieltrieb* – which results from reciprocal coordination of the previous two – can be seen to represent the new Apollo/Dionysus type, which results from a union of both, when allowed to run parallel.

Additionally, in this work Nietzsche stresses the importance of *Schein*, the sense to which he refers is derived from Schiller. *Schöner Schein* lies at the heart of Schiller’s thought. In *Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen* Schiller argued the importance of Beauty in overcoming, for example, lust, which could be transformed into love. Such recognition of Beauty in a partner is indicative of high aesthetic accomplishment for Schiller:

> Eine schönere Nothwendigkeit kettet jetzt die Geschlechter zusammen, und der Herzen Antheil hilft das Bündniss bewahren, das die Begierde nur launisch und wandelbar knüpft. Aus ihren düstern Fesseln entlassen, ergreift das ruhigere Auge die Gestalt, die Seele schaut in die Seele, und aus einem eigennützigen Tausche der Lust wird ein großmütiger Wechsel der Neigung. Die Begierde erweitert und erhebt sich zur Liebe, so wie die Menschheit in ihrem Gegenstand aufgeht, und der niedrige Vortheil über den Sinn wird verschmäht, um über den Willen einen edleren Sieg zu erkämpfen. Das Bedürfniß zu gefallen unterwirft den Mächtigen des Geschmackes zartem Gericht; die Lust kann er rauben, aber die Liebe muß eine Gabe seyn.

*(AB, Sieben und zwanzigster Brief, p. 409, SW20)*

For Schiller Beauty held the psychological power to synthesise sensuousness and spirituality in humans. ‘Durch die Schönheit wird der sinnliche Mensch zur Form und zum Denken geleitet; durch die Schönheit wird der geistige Mensch zur Materie zurückgeführt, und der Sinnenwelt wiedergegeben’ (*AB, Achtzehnter Brief*, p.366, *SW20*).

Thus for Schiller, Beauty is synonymous with aesthetic achievement. ‘Dieß ist der eigentliche Punkt, auf den zuletzt die ganze Frage über die Schönheit hinausläuft, und gelingt es uns, dieses Problem befriedigend aufzulösen, so haben wir zugleich den Faden gefunden, der uns durch das ganze Labyrinth der Aesthetik führt’ (*AB, Achtzehnter Brief*, p.387, *SW20*). This idea of beauty to which Schiller refers is based on appearance or *Schein*. From the parallel working of the previously mentioned *Stoff* and *Formtriebe*, the *Spieltrieb* arose. For Schiller’s *Spieltrieb* opened the door for the aesthetic to enter.

The recurrence of Schillerian *Schein* throughout Nietzsche’s *Die Geburt der Tragödie* is evident. Particularly Nietzsche’s Apollonian type is identified with *Schöner*
Schein. ‘Apollo, als der Gott aller bildnerischen Kräfte, ist zugleich der wahrsagende Gott. Er, der seiner Wurzel nach der “Scheinende”, die Lichtgottheit ist, beherrscht auch den schönen Schein der inneren Phantasie-Welt’ (GT, Ch1, p.23, KGW3I).

Nietzsche also compares the Apollonian dream state to semblance, ‘der Traum als der Schein des Scheins’ (GT, Ch4, p.35, KGW3I). For Nietzsche the Apollonian represents the principium individuationis world of appearance, a crucial element, but only half of what is required for this artistic experience. ‘Der schöne Schein der Traumwelten, in deren Erzeugung jeder Mensch voller Künstler ist, ist die Voraussetzung aller bildenden Kunst, ja auch …einer wichtigen Hälfte der Poesie’ (GT, Ch1, p.22, KGW3I).

Additionally, as did Schiller, Nietzsche uses the symbol of the veil, but for him it is an illustration of aesthetic union of his types. He uses the image of the veil to depict the Apollonian, which veils the Dionysian undertones. ‘Dass sein apollinisches Bewusstsein nur wie ein Schleier diese dionysische Welt vor ihm verdecke’ (GT, Ch2, p.30, KGW3I)

Nietzsche also depicts Apollo as a veil with the great ability to transform into something more powerful. ‘Dies ist der apollinische Traumeszustand, in dem die Welt des Tages sich verschleiern und eine neue Welt, deutlicher, verständlicher, ergreifender als jene und doch schattengleicher, in fortwährendem Wechsel sich unserem Auge neu gebiert’ (GT, Ch8, p.60, KGW3I). In contrast the Dionysian element has the ability to destroy this Apollonian appearance to reveal the nature and unite humanity with it.

Unter dem Zauber des Dionysischen schließt sich nicht nur der Bund zwischen Mensch und Mensch wieder zusammen: auch die entfremdeten, feindlichen oder unterjochten Natur feiert wieder ihr Versöhnungsfest mit ihrem verlorenen Sohne, dem Menschen […] Jetzt, bei dem Evangelium der Weltenharmonie, fühlt sich Jeder mit seinem Nächsten nicht nur vereinigt, versöhnt, verschmolzen, sondern eins, als ob der Schleier der Maja zerrissen wäre und nur noch in Fetzen vor dem geheimnisvollen Ur-Einen herumflattere. (GT, Ch1, p.25-26, KGW3I)

As mentioned above, the typologies in these two works hold a deeper comparison seen in their education of modern culture to embrace similar human dualities. More particularly, to recognise and have them working alongside one another, as that is what Schiller and Nietzsche see as being the only way to create unity. Central to both Schiller and Nietzsche’s typologies is the harmony of their drives. Nietzsche’s Apollonian and Dionysian types were presented in Die Geburt der Tragödie as being multifaceted. Not only were they representative of the Greek Gods Apollo and Dionysus, different art forms
(Kunstgottheiten), components of tragedy, or different physiological states (Traum and Rausch), but they are also creative human drives. On that level, the Apollonian bears striking similarities to Schiller’s Formtrieb, whilst the Dionysian resembles the Stofftrieb. Neither drive has the ultimate aesthetically unifying power of Schiller’s Spieltrieb, that is, until they work together. From this reciprocal fusion of the two drives, there is a new transforming power as both elements are recognised as being vital to wholeness.

6.2. SCHILLER’S EFFECT ON JUNG

In the 1913 paper, ‘Zur Frage der Psychologischen Typen’, Jung introduces Schiller as an inspiration to his typological attitudinal study, accrediting Schiller as a founder of typological distinctions with his naïve and sentimentalisch typological pairing.

Jung continues to emphasise Schiller’s contribution in Psychologische Typen, 1921, when he devotes an entire chapter to Schillerian typology, from Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen and Über naïve und sentimentalische Dichtung. Jung also uses Psychologische Typen to make his own critique of modernity, as Schiller had done before him. He credits Schiller as being the first to make a large scale attitudinal typological study, which not only presented two modes of being, but impressively developed a third mode which held the means of their reconciliation:


(PT, p.70, par. 96, GW6)
By including such an extensive evaluation of Schiller’s work as part of his own major typological work, Jung attributes to Schiller the anticipation of modern psychological study, although he nonetheless criticises him for the terminology he used to lay down his ideas, which Jung blamed on Schiller’s own type limitations. According to Jung Schiller was an introverted-thinking type and he uses the second chapter of *Psychologische Typen* to display the psychological problems of the modern individual as seen from the point of view of an introverted-thinking type. Jung agrees with Schiller about this modern conflict people have, and quotes from Schiller’s *Sechster Brief* to illustrate the simile of the psychological wound, which becomes a recurring comparison throughout the work.


*(PT, p.73, par. 100, GW6)*

However, Jung’s was not always in agreement with Schiller’s views. In the *Elfier Brief* of *Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen* Schiller declares that:

Um also nicht bloß Welt zu seyn, muß er der Materie Form ertheilen; um nicht bloß Form zu seyn, muß er der Anlage, die er in sich trägt, Wirklichkeit geben. Er verwirklicht die Form, wenn er die Zeit erschafft und dem Beharrlichen die Veränderung, der ewigen Einheit seines Ichs die Mannichfältigkeit der Welt gegenüber stellt; er formt die Materie, wenn er die Zeit wieder aufhebt, Beharrlichkeit im Wechsel behauptet, und die Mannichfältigkeit der Welt der Einheit seines Ichs unterwürfig macht.

Hieraus fließen nun zwey entgegengesetzte Anforderungen an den Menschen, die zwey Fundamentalgesetze der sinnlichvernünftigen Natur. Das erste dringt auf absolute Realität: er soll alles zur Welt machen, was bloß Form ist, und alle seine Anlagen zur Erscheinung bringen: das zweyte dringt auf absolute Formalität: er soll alles in sich vertilgen, was bloß Welt ist, und Übereinstimmung in alle seine Veränderungen bringen; mit andern Worten: er soll alles innre veräußern und alles äussere formen.

*(AB, Elfier Brief, p.343-44, SW20)*
Jung recognises Schiller’s answer as typical of the introverted-thinking type, but fears that such action as Schiller suggests would give a free rein to the inferior and repressed aspects of the psyche:

Es müßte denn sein, daß Schiller es darauf ankommen ließe, dem Objekt Gewalt anzutun. Damit würde er aber der archaischen minderwertigen Funktion ein uneingeschränktes Existenzrecht einräumen, was bekanntlich Nietzsche dann – wenigstens theoretisch – getan hat.

*(PT, p.100, par. 142, GW6)*

As mentioned above, Schiller’s type theory in *Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen* centred around the theory that the modern individual’s problem was based around the paradox of the *Formtrieb* and *Stofftrieb*, which could be mediated by a third drive, the *Spieltrieb*. Jung acknowledges the importance of the concept of play, which is a fundamental Schillerian idea, in *Psychologische Typen* as vital to human creativity: ‘Das dynamische Prinzip der Phantasie ist das Spielerische, das auch dem Kinde eignet, und als solches ebenfalls unvereinbar mit dem Prinzip ernster Arbeit erscheint’ *(PT, p.65, par. 88, GW6)*. However, in contrast to Schiller, Jung took the opinion that the *Spieltrieb* could be responsible for allowing mayhem to rule in an individual, for once they started playing, the ultimate goal could be lost:

Es war Schiller eigentlich bewußt, was es heißen könnte, den “Spieltrieb” gewissermaßen an oberste Stelle zu setzen. Wie wir bereits sahen, bewirkt die Aufhebung der Verdrängung ein Aufeinanderprallen der Gegensätze und eine Ausgleichung, die notwendig mit einer Heruntersetzung der bisher höchsten Werte endet. Es ist eine Katastrophe der Kultur, so wie wir sie heute noch verstehen, wenn die barbarische Seite des Europäers sich zum Worte meldet; denn wer bürgt dafür, daß der Mensch dieser Art, wenn er zu spielen anfängt, sich gerade die ästhetische Stimmung und den Genuß echter Schönheit zum Ziel setzen wird?

*(PT, p.113, par. 164, GW6)*

Furthermore, Jung also felt that Schiller’s philosophy lacked the recognition of the uglier side of life, which was vital to Jung’s individuation process:

Schiller definiert als “ästhetische Beschaffenheit” einer Sache, daß sie sich “auf das Ganze unserer verschiedenen Kräfte” bezieht. Dementsprechend kann also “schön” und “ästhetisch” nicht zusammenfallen, denn unsere verschiedenen Kräfte sind auch ästhetisch verschieden, schön und häßlich, und nur ein unverbesserlicher Idealist und Optimist könnte das “Ganze” der menschlichen Natur als schlechthin “schön” erdichten.
Jung’s opinions about Schiller’s *naiv* and *sentimentalisch* types also altered from his first comparison between the 1913 paper and the 1921 work, no longer drawing direct comparisons between his extraverted and introverted types with Schiller’s, but viewing them as in this respect instead as typical mechanisms.

At this stage Jung, instead, draws a comparison with Schiller’s *naiv* and *sentimentalisch* types to his sensory and intuitive functions respectively.

Jung then goes on to credit Schiller with having developed what Jung conceives to be mechanisms, into psychological types with his Realist/Idealist pairing, which Jung considers to be as vital to Schiller’s typology as the attitudinal types are to his own.
Introvertierten und dem Extravertierten beilege…. In Übereinstimmung mit dem, was ich oben sagte, gelangt Schiller vom Mechanismus zum Typus.

*(PT, p.142, par. 204, GW6)*

In conclusion, Jung began his typological theory naming Schiller as a founder of creating psychological distinctions, and declaring himself indebted to Schiller’s *naiv* and *sentimentalisch* typological pairing. However he altered his opinions slightly in his definitive work by changing the comparison to his own sensatory and intuitive functions, and also taking the opinion that Schiller’s *Spieltrieb* would not bring about the desired result, whilst stating that Schiller’s typology did crucially fail to deal with the uglier side of existence. Nonetheless, he still makes a Schillerian critique of modernity and he recognises the obvious links they share to the problem of opposing modes. In his lectures about Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, he also links the problem of opposites, which he and Nietzsche took up, back to Schiller: ‘Schiller discovered [the] problem of the pairs of opposites: the problem that Man, on the one side, is a fairly civilized being, and on the other, quite barbarous’ (*SNZ*, II, p. 118).

6.3. **NIETZSCHE’S EFFECT ON JUNG**

‘Zur Frage der Psychologischen Typen’ marks Jung’s first comparison between his two attitude types – extraversion and introversion – with Nietzsche’s contrasting types, Apollo and Dionysus. Jung goes so far as to accredit these types typologically, referring particularly to the Dionysian and Apollonian types in one of their meanings, namely when referring to the states of *Traum* (Apollo) and *Rausch* (Dionysus) respectively. Jung gives his own definitions to the Nietzsche’s conditions of dream and ecstasy.


*(FPT, p.548, par. 946, GW6)*
Jung then proceeds to look at the Apollonian and Dionysian types. Apollo is cited using the same Schopenhauer quotation Nietzsche used in reference to the Apollonian.

Von Apollo sagt NIETZSCHE mit den Worten SCHOPENHAUERS: “Wie auf dem tobenden Meere, das, nach allen Seiten unbegrenzt, heulend Wasserberge erhebt und senkt, auf einem Kahn ein Schiffer sitzt, dem schwachen Fahrzeug vertrauend, so sitzt, mitten in einer Welt von Qualen, ruhig der einzelne Mensch, gestützt auf das principium individuationis”.

*(FPT, p.548, par. 946, GW6)*

And then quotes Nietzsche himself as an illustration of Nietzsche’s comparison of his Apollonian with Schopenhauer’s *principium individuationis*.

“Ja es wäre”, fährt NIETZSCHE fort, “zu sagen, daß in ihm das unerschütterte Vertrauen auf jenes pricipium und das ruhige Dasitzen des in ihm Befangenen seinen erhabensten Ausdruck bekommen habe und man möchte selbst Apollo als das herrliche Götterbild des principii indiviudationis bezeichnen”.

*(FPT, p.548, par. 946, GW6)*

In this paper, Jung reaches the conclusion that Nietzsche has presented the Apollonian type to be a withdrawn type, like his own introverted type which was categorised by a withdrawal of libido inwards, thereby acknowledging the great extent Nietzsche’s ideas of Apollo motivated his own attitude type. ‘Das Apollinische ist daher, wie NIETZSCHE es auffaßt, das auf sich selber Zurückgezogenein, die in Introversion’ *(FPT, p.548, par. 946, GW6).*

The concept of Nietzsche’s Dionysian is conceived by Jung, similar to his extraverted attitude, as an outpouring of libido into many objects outwith the self, ‘Umgekehrt ist das Dionysische bei NIETZSCHE das entfesselte Hinausströmen der Libido in die Dinge’ *(FPT, p.548, par. 946, GW6).* With further allusion to the Dionysian represented in *Die Geburt der Tragödie*, Jung misinterprets Nietzsche’s meaning with his interpretation. While Jung believed Nietzsche’s’ Dionysian type involved the libido being poured into things, in contrast, the passage quoted depicts the Dionysian state creating unity:

Unter dem Zauber des Dionysischen schließt sich nicht nur der Bund zwischen Mensch und Mensch wieder zusammen: Auch die entfremdete, feindliche oder unterjochte Natur feiert

(\textit{GT}, Ch.1, p.25-26, \textit{KGW3I})

Nonetheless, ‘Zur Frage der Psychologischen Typen’ was only a short paper at the beginning of Jung’s journey of creating psychological types. In his main typological work, \textit{Psychologische Typen}, Jung’s interpretation of Nietzschean opposites became more detailed, as he devotes the third chapter completely to the Apollonian and Dionysian concepts. Little change is noted in the interpretation of the Apollonian, but there is a marked difference in his understanding of the Dionysian. He now recognises that the Dionysian annihilates the individual and individuation, as the individual unites with the collective.

\textit{(Das Dionysische)} ist das Grauen über die Zerbrechung des Individuationsprinzips, und zugleich die “wonnevolle Verzückung” darüber, daß es zerbrochen ist. Das Dionysische ist daher vergleichbar dem Rausch, der das Individuelle auflöst in die kollektiven Triebe und Inhalte, eine Zersprengung des abgeschlossenen Ich durch die Welt.

\textit{(\textit{PT}, p.146, par. 210, \textit{GW6})}

In the 1913 paper, Jung had likened the Apollonian and Dionysian types to his own introverted and extraverted types respectively. By 1921, in \textit{Psychologische Typen}, Jung was no longer content with this comparison, but claimed that the Nietzschean types had necessitated him to develop a further type distinction, more specifically the aesthetic functions which Jung claimed went beyond the realms of logic and rationality. ‘Nietzsches Begriffe führen uns somit zu den Prinzipien eines dritten und vierten psychologischen Typus, die man als ästhetische Typen gegenüber den rationalen Typen (Denk- und Fühltypen) bezeichnen könnte’ \textit{(\textit{PT}, p.154, par. 223, \textit{GW6})}. These so called aesthetic types, which would later be termed the irrational functions, are: the intuitive function which Jung
associates with the Apollonian; and the sensory function which is related to the Dionysian. In his chapter about the Apollonian and the Dionysian in his *Psychologische Typen*, Jung likens the Apollonian and Dionysian types to his *Intuition* and *Empfindung* types, moving away from his earlier comparison to his introverted and extraverted attitudinal types:


(Jung, *PT*, p.153, par. 221, *GW6*)

Jung’s typological model has been heavily influenced by Nietzschean types. Jung derived his attitudinal types and the two functions intuition and sensation from Nietzsche, which, taken together with the other two functions thinking and feeling, make up Jung’s typological model.

For Jung, it is crucial to recognise that everyone is conditioned by their type. ‘Das Typenbuch brachte die Erkenntnis, daß jedes Urteil eines Menschen durch seinen Typus beschränkt und jede Betrachtungsweise eine relative ist’ (*ETG*, p.211). With the more developed typology of the personality laid out in *Psychologische Typen*, Jung even goes so far as to place Nietzsche within his typology, and concludes that Nietzsche was most likely to have been an introverted intuitive type.

Die Tatsache, daß NIETZSCHE gerade die psychologische Funktion der Intuition einerseits und die der Empfindung und des Triebes anderseits hervorhebt, dürfte kennzeichnend sein für seine eigene, persönliche Psychologie. Er ist wohl dem intuitiven Typus zuzurechnen mit Neigung nach der introvertierten Seite.

(Jung, *PT*, p.154, par. 225, *GW6*)
This was particularly determined by the works *Die Geburt der Tragödie* and *Also sprach Zarathustra* in which Jung thinks Nietzsche displayed a ‘vorwiegend intuitiv-künstlerische Art der Produktion’ (*PT*, p.154, par. 225, *GW6*).

Jung saw the ultimate reconciliation of Apollo and Dionysus as a psychological reconciliation. In *Die Geburt der Tragödie* Nietzsche described the Apollonian/Dionysian union in Greek tragedy:

Beide so verschiedene Triebe gehen nebeneinander her, zumeist im offnen Zwiespalt miteinander und sich gegenseitig zu immer neuen kräftigeren Geburten reizend, um in ihnen den Kampf jenes Gegensatzes zu perpetuieren, den das gemeinsame Wort “Kunst” nur scheinbar überbrückt; bis sie endlich, durch einen metaphysischen Wunderakt des hellenischen “Willens”, miteinander gepaart erscheinen und in dieser Paarung zuletzt das ebenso dionysische als apollinische Kunstwerk der attischen Tragödie erzeugen.

(*GT*, Ch1, p.21-22, 17-2, *KGW3I*)

Jung said that by replacing *metaphysisch* with *unbewußt* and likens it to his conception of the unconscious. For him the union of Dionysus and Apollo is symbolic of a psychological intuitive union of opposites, with Nietzsche’s quoted *Willens*, presumed to be derived from Schopenhauer’s perception of the word.

“Metaphysisch” hat für uns die psychologische Bedeutung von “unbewußt”. Wenn wir also “metaphysisch” in NIETZSCHES Formel durch “unbewußt” ersetzen, dann wäre der gesuchte Schlüssel dieses Problems ein unbewußter “Wunderakt”. Ein “Wunder” ist irrational, also ist der Akt ein unbewußtes irrationales Geschehen, eine Bildung aus sich ohne Dazutun der Vernunft und der zielbewußten Absicht; es ergibt sich, es wird, als ein WachstumspHENOMEN der schaffenden Natur und nicht aus Erklärung menschlichen Witzes, eine Geburt aus sehnsüchtiger Erwartung, aus Glauben und Hoffnung’.

(*PT*, p.151, par. 215, *GW6*)

For Jung, the Dionysian type in *Die Geburt der Tragödie* and its union with the Apollonian, represent the ability of his own conception of the unconscious as part of individuation, to repress or unleash the dark shadow or Dionysus. Nonetheless, Jung suggests that that ultimate union never took place, and was really only an illusion, and therefore that Nietzsche’s aim was not achieved.

Er [Nietzsche] vergißt aber dabei seine eigene kompensatorische Formel, nach der die Göttler des Olymp ihr Licht der Dunkelheit der griechischen Seele verdanken: danach wäre die Versöhnung Apollos mit Dionysos ein schöner Schein, ein desideratum, hervorgerufen
Nonetheless, Nietzsche and particularly Nietzsche’s *Die Geburt der Tragödie* had a profound effect on Jung’s psychological types, developing his own *Intuition* and *Empfindung* types from the Apollonian and Dionysian types in that text. In *Psychologische Typen* Jung uses Nietzsche as a tool with which to analyse and criticise Schiller’s types in *Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen*.

However, there was also a second Nietzschean work, which had a profound effect on Jung, namely Nietzsche’s *Also sprach Zarathustra* (1883-1885), which prompted Jung to give a series of seminars. Never intended as a published work, the seminars ‘Nietzsches Zarathustra’ made about Nietzsche’s most famous work, *Also sprach Zarathustra*, were given from 1934-1939. Due to the outbreak of World War II, these seminars were unfortunately never finished, and as such offer no opinion about the final parts of the work. This book was nonetheless insightful in respect of Jung’s own ideas on Nietzsche including the extent to which he feels he is indebted to Nietzsche’s philosophising as well as offering Jung’s personal opinions about Nietzsche. Never intended to be published, it reads as a dictation of the weekly seminars Jung held over five years, giving insights into how Jung spoke, acting as a transcript of his thoughts on the subject.

*Also sprach Zarathustra* was chosen, as, being a fictional work, would offer a deeper insight into Nietzsche’s psychology. Jung seeks to describe the relevance of *Also sprach Zarathustra* to contemporary psychology, and examines his own concepts of the Self and various archetypes in the text. Jung accuses Nietzsche of being typical of late nineteenth century thought. He does grant that Nietzsche carried the problems of Western Man further than Schopenhauer, although accuses him of being unable to separate himself from the archetype of ‘the wise old man’ (the protagonist and prophet Zarathustra) from his own ego. He acknowledges that the *Übermensch* may be understood in terms of his own Self, but states that Nietzsche was unable to follow this doctrine of individuation himself, and views Nietzsche as identifiable with Zarathustra. Jung viewed Nietzsche’s *Übermensch* as unsuccessful in its aims to unite opposites and proceed to greatness, instead taking the
opinion that it fails and becomes one-sided, as it lacks the element necessary to effect reconciliation of the opposites.

For those who have a symbol, the passing from one side to the other, the transmutation, is easier. In other words, those who have no symbol will find it very difficult to make the transition...Nietzsche...was without a symbol and so, naturally, to make the transition, to leave one condition and to enter another mental condition, would be exceedingly difficult, if not wholly impossible. In this case it was impossible.

(SNZ, II, p.1248-50)

It is clear than Jung rejects any notion of affinity which was created in Nietzsche’s work. It almost seems as though, through attacking Nietzsche, he wishes to distance himself from the striking similarities between their ideas on individuation. It is also mentioned by his listeners that he seemingly contradicts himself in his lecturing, but puts this down to the different ways of looking at things, either from the perspective of the self or the ego. However, in his seminars about Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, Jung did acknowledge Nietzsche’s contribution regarding opposing pairs as authoritative: ‘Nietzsche… understands that the self consists in pairs of opposites and that it is in a way a reconciliation of opposites’ (SNZ, II, p.422).

It is easy to notice the striking similarities between Jung’s Self and Nietzsche’s Übermensch, taught by the prophet Zarathustra in Also sprach Zarathustra. Both concepts result from the recognised tension of opposing types at work in the individual. As Huskinson points out: ‘Both Nietzsche and Jung seek a dynamic union that promotes competition and a ‘controlled’ tension between opposites’12. For Nietzsche and Jung in their typological works, the union of opposing types are representative of becoming complete. Regarding Nietzsche, the opposing Dionysian and Apollonian types which came to the fore in Die Geburt der Tragödie anticipated the tension of opposites in his concept of the Übermensch, which was introduced in that work through the teachings of the prophet Zarathustra. This Übermensch can be conceived as being synonymous with Nietzsche’s new Dionysian type, which emerged from a union with the Apollonian and Dionysian types first laid out in Die Geburt der Tragödie: the same creative drive and desire for the union of opposing elements in all aspects of life, including pain and suffering, seeking a union of human and nature. Like the Übermensch, the Dionysian is also

Nietzsche’s weapon against those Christian values Nietzsche rejects. In that respect they both also compare to Jung’s Self, as all concepts involve confronting the negative within oneself.

For Jung, his notion of completeness regarding his concept of the Self could only be created through the overcoming of tension between the opposing types in his typology of the personality model. The individual types which the Self comprises are: the two attitude types extraversion and introversion; each of which contains the four functions thinking, feeling, sensation and intuition; as well as the archetypes of the shadow and anima/animus. Comparable to the Apollonian and Dionysian opposing types, which make up Nietzsche’s typological model, Jung’s composition of the psyche also involves pairs of opposites. For Jung every individual possesses the two attitude types and four functions, with one of each being dominant. Nietzsche’s Apollonian and Dionysian types had to exist as complements to each other for the full tragic experience, and his Übermensch likewise insists upon neither good nor evil being completely one-sided but that they instead ought to be complementary to each another. Similarly Jung’s types must also work in harmony with one another. Even if one part is dominant, it works with its opposite, for only than can make a complete individual. As aforementioned Jung, in 1913, first compared his attitudinal types to Nietzsche’s Apollonian and Dionysian types, before going so far, in 1921, to claim that they directly led him to develop his intuitive and sensatory functions.

The Self and Übermensch alike are similarly distanced from the average person’s capacity, owing to the levels of pain both express, which must be confronted by anyone wishing to progress to either state. This is especially due to prevalent Christianity in Western society, by which individuals have been taught to reject or repress these negative elements, making it a complex emotional journey that would have to be faced in order to reach Selfhood or Übermenschlichkeit which most people could not address or would perish in the process. It is a question Zarathustra even faces as he contemplates if it would not be more advisable to teach a select group of kindred spirits instead of attempting to preach to the masses.


(Z, p.20, 29-34, KGW61)
Jung’s reception of Schiller and Nietzsche was explicit, particularly with reference to the sixth volume of the collected works. In a paper as early as 1913, ‘Zur Frage der Psychologischen Typen’, when Jung was just beginning to develop his type theory, he ascribed the basis of this type theory to Schiller and Nietzsche among others, links to whom he made that he would later elaborate on, and alter in his definitive work about personality types, *Psychologische Typen*, 1921. In the 1913 paper, Jung discusses his two attitude types – extraverted and introverted – in comparison to six other writers’ typological distinctions, including to Schiller and Nietzsche. Here he acknowledges to some extent the level he has drawn on Schiller and Nietzsche’s typological pairings. He used Schiller’s typological distinction in the pairing of *naïv* and *sentimentalisch*, and Nietzsche’s Apollonian and Dionysian types, referring to their use in Nietzsche’s *Die Geburt der Tragödie*. A marked change occurs in Jung’s understanding of both Schiller and Nietzsche’s types from how he perceived them in the 1913 typological paper to the 1921 definitive work.

In the 1921 work, in addition to allocating chapters analysing each of Schiller and Nietzsche’s typological pairings, Jung even chooses to ascribe his own psychological types to Schiller and Nietzsche to exemplify his typology as well as to analyse their works from typological perspective. He recognised Schiller as an introverted thinking type: ‘Dementsprechend müssen wir seinen Intuitivismus sehr nach der Seite des Denkens verschieben, so daß wir ihn auch vom Gesichtspunkte der Psychologie des introvertierten Denktypus aus unserem Verständnis näherbringen können’ (*PT*, p.72, par. 99, *GW6*). Nietzsche, conversely, he categorised as an introverted-intuitive type: ‘Er ist wohl dem intuitiven Typus zuzurechnen mit Neigung nach der introvertierten Seite’ (*PT*, p.155, par 225, *GW6*).

Jung recognised the great extent to which Schiller influenced Nietzsche and how much the two writers influenced his own writing, but gives more credit to Nietzsche in the typological pairing, using Nietzsche to critique Schiller. Jung places Nietzsche in a German psychological tradition alongside Schiller irrevocably linking himself with Schillerian and Nietzschean thought.

(PT, p.144, par. 206, GW6)

Jung gave greater credit to Nietzsche than Schiller for his deeper study of the type problem, by means of the Apollonian/Dionysian typological distinction.


(PT, p.145, par. 206, GW6)

A key difference for Jung between Nietzsche and Schiller arose from their fundamentally different perceptions of ancient Greece. Typical of his time, Schiller judges the Greeks in a positive light based upon the wealth of great material left behind ‘Eine wohltätige Gottheit reisse den Säugling bei Zeiten von seiner Mutter Brust, nähere ihn mit der Milch eines bessern Alters und lasse ihn unter fernem griechischen Himmel zur Mündigkeit reifen’ (*AB*, Neunter Brief, par.4, SW20). Conversely Nietzsche scratched the rosy surface and revealed the Dionysian depths. ‘Insofern berührt er sich mit Schiller – wie so ganz anders aber ist seine Auffassung des griechischen Wesens! Er sieht die dunkle Folie, auf der die golden heitere Welt des Olymp gemalt ist’ (PT, p.144, par. 206, GW6).

Jung also credited Nietzsche for his recognition of the darker side of the psyche, which manifested in the Dionysian depicted in his *Die Geburt der Tragödie*. By means of the dark Dionysian depths, which according to Jung, Schiller ignored, but which Nietzsche depicted in *Die Geburt der Tragödie* and *Also sprach Zarathustra*, Jung wrote that
Nietzsche foresaw the time of a struggle, in which a Dionysian darkness would emerge and need to be dealt with.

Als Schiller lebte, war eben die Zeit der Auseinandersetzung mit dem Unteren noch nicht gekommen. NIETZSCHE stand dieser Zeit auch innerlich viel näher, daher es ihm gewiß war, daß wir uns einer Epoche größten Kampfes nähern. Darum zerriß er auch, als der einzige wahre Schüler SCHOPENHAUERS, den Schleier der Naivität und holte in seinem Zarathustra einiges davon herauf, was zum lebendigsten Inhalt einer kommenden Zeit bestimmt war.

(PT, p.101-02, par. 144, GW6)

In contrast, according to Jung, Schiller neglected to recognise the uglier side of the psyche, which was lacking in his philosophy. Instead he alludes to Nietzsche and Also sprach Zarathustra, as the founders of this vital element:

Er [Schiller] ist hier an einer Grenze seiner selbst und seiner Zeit angelangt, die ihm zu überschreiten unmöglich war, denn überall stieß er an den unsichtbaren “häßlichsten Menschen”, dessen Entdeckung unserem Zeitalter und NIETZSCHE vorbehalten war.

(PT, p.135, par. 192, GW6)

Jung, having gained the insight of Schiller and Nietzsche’s typological works, included chapters in recognition and criticism of their types in his main typological work, Psychologische Typen (1921). In this work, he made typology integral to the conceptualization of the human individuation-process. The problem of opposing types was also central to this theory, whereby recognition and integration of opposing types is needed to progress along the path of individuation. His typology was a formulation of structural elements of the psyche, intended to help understand the wide variations in individuals. Jung’s typological works, brought together in the sixth volume of the Gesammelte Werke, ultimately spell out eight types: two attitudes – extravert and introvert - each containing four functions; thinking, feeling, sensation and intuition. Two further (arche)types, the animus and anima, in belonging to the shadow type of the eight types, were further refinements in this typology.

In this work Jung made a Schillerian critique of Western society, recognising Schiller’s role in contributing to the field of typology, yet discarding his solutions. Instead,
with some credit to foundations built by his predecessors, he offers his own detailed types and their reconciliation as the answer, which go further and elaborate on Nietzschean Apollonian and Dionysian types, from which he took great inspiration. Jung irrevocably links himself to Schiller and Nietzsche’s typologies in his own typological work by frequent allusion and even chapters dedicated to their ideas. Despite an often ambivalent attitude to Nietzsche the man as well as his works, Jung nonetheless thought Nietzsche had gone further in examining the question of uniting opposites than Schiller with his Apollonian and Dionysian types. He even used Nietzsche as a tool with which to analyse and criticise Schiller’s types.

Friedrich Schiller was instrumental in the typology of the human personality as he was the first to elucidate two fundamentally different types of cultural production – the naïve and the sentimental – and from this typological distinction he elaborated the psychological pairing of Realist and Idealist in Über naïve und sentimentalische Dichtung. His typology of human nature evolved in Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen, classified three drives of the individual human: Stofftrieb; Formtrieb; and Spieltrieb. In the same work, in which he was concerned with the problem of yearning for wholeness, his preoccupation with opposing modes and the problems to which they give rise came to the fore. The problem of opposing types was again prevalent in Über naïve und sentimentalische Dichtung. The ideal was again a synthesis of the two opposing types, naïv and sentimentalisch, so that they could be brought nearer their opposing type, which would allow the individual to transcend their one-sidedness, finding a balance, where they could each find stimulation in the other.

This problem of opposing modes later attracted the attention of Jung, as well as being, so Jung claimed, the problem that Nietzsche laid at Zarathustra’s door in Also Sprach Zarathustra in the opposing forces of good and evil, or above and below. Furthermore, Nietzsche’s ideas on the typological pair Apollonian and Dionysian, Die Geburt der Tragödie, were explicitly derived from Schiller.

This question of the reconciliation of opposing types, as for Schiller and Nietzsche, was intrinsic to Jung’s hope for human development and individuation. The Schillerian binary synthesis of the Formtrieb and Stofftrieb created the Spieltrieb or the ideal synthesis of the naïv and sentimentalisch can be viewed alongside the Nietzschean Übermensch and the Jungian individuation process as sharing a similar thread of being a solution to overcome the problems of modernity, to move to a higher state of being. These explicit and
considerable links displayed an ultimate union between these three thinkers, whereby each of the three developed types, which may be compared on the basis that each of their typologies dealt with the synthesis of opposing types. This union of opposing types, for all three, elucidated the potential to ultimately lead to the successful negotiation of the process of achieving wholeness.
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